Challenges to Global Security: Geopolitics and Power in an Age of Transition 9780755622382, 9781845115272

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Notes on Contributors

Beni Prasad Agarwal is a former Ambassador of India to Somalia, Lebanon, and five West African countries. He served in Moscow as Press Secretary (1962–3), Bonn Minister in the Embassy (1978–81), and Consul in New York (1968–71). He was Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the American University in Bulgaria (1994). He is President of the Forum for Confederation in the Sub-Continent and co-founded the Association for Asian Union. Benedicte Bull is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), University of Oslo. She has written extensively about regionalization, development theory, multilateral institutions and the politics of Latin American market reforms. Her latest book (with Desmond McNeill) is Development Issues in Global Governance: Public-Private Partnerships and Market Multilateralism (2007). Joseph A. Camilleri, Professor of International Relations at La Trobe University, Melbourne, has been actively involved on issues of security, disarmament and human rights. He has given evidence to several government inquiries, and chairs the Editorial Committee of the scholarly journal Global Change, Peace and Security. He is also the President of Pax Christi Australia. His publications include: Civilization in Crisis: Human Prospects in a Changing World (1975), The End of Sovereignty? Politics in a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (1992), and States, Markets and Civil Society in Asia Pacific (2000). He recently co-edited Democratising Global Governance (2002). Joseph Y. S. Cheng joined the City University of Hong Kong in July 1992 as Professor of Political Science. Before that, he taught at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (1977–89) and the Opening Learning Institute of Hong Kong. He was a full-time member of the Central Policy Unit, Government of Hong Kong (1991–2). He received his undergraduate and postgraduate degrees at the University of Hong Kong, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand

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and the Flinders University of South Australia. He is the founding editor of the Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences and The Journal of Comparative Asian Development. His recent publications include: China’s ASEAN Policy in the 1990s: Pushing for Regional Multipolarity (1999), Political Changes Since the Establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1999), and Guangdong’s Challenges: Organizational Streamlining, Economic Restructuring and Anticorruption (2000). Michael D. Intriligator is a Professor of Economics, Political Science, and Policy Studies in the School of Public Affairs, and Co-Director of the Jacob Marschak Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Mathematics in the Behavioral Sciences, all at UCLA. He is also a Senior Fellow of the Milken Institute in Santa Monica and has been a member of the UCLA faculty (since 1963) teaching courses in economic theory, econometrics mathematical economics, international relations, and health economics. Intriligator received his undergraduate S.B. degree in Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (1959), his M.A. at Yale University (1960), where he was the recipient of the Woodrow Wilson Fellowship, and his Ph.D. in Economics at MIT (1963). He has authored over 200 journal articles and other publications in the areas of economic theory and mathematical economics, econometrics, health economics, reform of the Russian economy, and strategy and arms control – his principal research fields. Intriligator is Vice Chair and a member of the Board of Directors of Economists for Peace and Security and was President of the Peace Science Society (International) (1993). He serves on the Editorial Boards of Economic Directions, Defence and Peace Economics and Conflict Management and Peace Science. He is a Fellow of the Econometric Society, an elected member of the Council on Foreign Relations (New York) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London). He was elected as a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (1999) and as an AAAS Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (2001). B.M. Jain is a Professor and Research Scientist at the South Asia Studies Centre, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur in India. Jain is an honorary Academician and Research Professor at the International Noble Academy, Toronto, Canada. He is deeply engaged in Global Peace, Security and Conflict Studies research including international relations and in South Asia and has authored and edited numerous books, published over six dozen research articles in reputed journals in India and internationally, contributed ten articles to Encyclopedia on Modern Asia (2002), participated in more than three dozen international conferences and seminars, and lectured at universities and research

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institutes in the US, Europe and Asia. Jain was a Visiting Scholar at the University of Hong Kong (2002), Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania (2001), and Visiting Scholar at the Henry L. Stimson Centre in Washington D.C. (1998), involving Gerald Ford (Michigan) and Charles Wallace Trust Grantee (London). He is also the Editor-in-Chief of the Indian Journal of Asian Affairs. Hripsime Nalbandyan is a Ph.D. student specializing in International Political Relations at Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, University of Economics, Prague. She graduated from the Faculty of International Relations at the University of Economics in Prague, Czech Republic. She received her B.A. in International Trade, her M.A. in International Politics and Diplomacy, and her second M.A. in European Economic Integration. Her current postgraduate study focuses on the ‘Role of the International Community in Handling the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh.’ Mohammad El-Sayed Selim is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University, and the director of the Center for Asian Studies of Cairo University. He graduated in 1979 from Carleton University in Canada, and taught at the American University in Cairo, King Saud University, the United Arab Emirates University, and Kuwait University. He is a member of the advisory boards of a number of international journals and has published numerous books and articles in Arabic and English. In 2003, his latest co-edited and co-authored book on Environmental Security will be published in Europe. He is an active member in the Toda Institute GRAD research team. Hussein Solomon is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Sciences and Director of the Centre for International Political Studies at the University of Pretoria, South Africa. He is also a Visiting Fellow of the Mackinder Centre for the Study of Long-Wave Events at the London School of Economics. His latest book was co-authored with Nikki Funke and is entitled Exploring Islamic Fundamentalist Ideologies in Africa (2006). Majid Tehranian, a graduate of Dartmouth and Harvard, is currently Professor of international communication at the University of Hawai`i at Manoa, and Director of the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research. His publications include 20 books and over 100 articles. His work has been translated into ten languages. He also edits Peace & Policy as well as the

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Toda Institute Book Series. A global nomad, Tehranian has been banished to paradise where he surfs the Pacific and the Net at . His website at tells you more about him than you probably wish to know. Olga A. Vorkunova is currently Director of the Center for Development and Peace Studies FORUM. She received her Ph.D. from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences, and is Co-Director of TRANSCEND: a Peace and Development Network for Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means. She is a member of Expert Group of the Cultural Policy and Action Department of the Council of Europe, ISSC/CEWS Steering Committee, International Peace Research Association, International Studies Association, and is an editor of the journal Forum Stability Studies.

Preface Majid Tehranian

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ince 11 September 2001, the concept of security has gone through sea changes. The changes may not have yet registered in the radar of traditional nation-states. But security analysts represented in this volume are focusing on their meanings. Such changes may be summarized by a few propositions: 1. Throughout history, international relations have been governed by one or a combination of the following models of power politics: (a) unipolarity, (b) bipolarity, (c) multipolarity, (d) fragmentation, and (e) a global governance regime for enduring peace and justice. The latter is a model setting goals for the distant future. 2. The present international dis/order is making a transition from bipolarity to unipolarity, multipolarity, and possible fragmentation. 3. Terrorism as a guerrilla struggle of the marginalized against the dominant state system will probably continue for the rest of this century unless its social sources of support in marginalization are reduced. 4. In an increasingly interdependent world, state security can no longer be confined to the defense of the national borders. 5. The current global conflict seems to be what Samuel Huntington has ideologically called the ‘clash of civilizations’. However, more realistically, the clashes appear to be between those with and those without access to world resources and patterns of consumption. 6. The world is currently fragmented among five socio-technical modes of civilization, including nomadic, agrarian, commercial, industrial, and digital. Increasing direct contact among the five modes, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrates that no single power, even if a superpower, can manage the ensuing problems. 7. Institutions of global governance commensurate with the complexity of ensuing problems are currently missing. The League of Nations and the United Nations were both state-centric organizations designed to respond to the problems of a state-centric world.

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8. Although inter-state conflicts persist, a guerrilla war has been inaugurated by the marginalized groups against the forces of the states. The new revolutionary forces have gained access to the advanced technologies of transportation and telecommunication. 9. In the meantime, apart from the states, other international players have emerged on the scene with little representation in global governance. Transnational corporations (TNCs), transnational media corporations (TMCs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational ciriminal organizations (TCOs) are among them. The states mostly run the political system, the TNCs largely manage the market system, and the NGOs try to manage the civil societies. The TCOs manage an underworld of drug, currency, womenand children-trafficking. 10. To pre-empt a tragedy as large as World War I or II, the world needs to focus on the construction of a new global governance system that can (a) narrow the gaps between the five modes of civilization, (b) empower the major players to perform their own unique roles in global security, and (c) achieve unity in the diversity of the human family. Each of the above propositions calls for a separate volume. But fortunately, this volume covers every major world region in chapters written by knowledgeable experts, while the editor and a few collaborating scholars concentrate on the world as a whole. Global security affects the lives of millions of people. This volume is timely, prophetic, and accessible for scholars and students alike. Majid Tehranian Newport Coast, CA

Chapter 1: Introduction Hussein Solomon

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he Chinese curse: ‘May you live in interesting times’ clearly seems to be borne out in the twenty-first century. We are living in a time of great upheaval where change is the only constant. Three of the most important forces driving such change are globalization, regionalization and democratization. Globalization, Regionalization and Democratization: Exploring the Interface The concept of globalization has become ubiquitous in the languages of the world. In Italian there is talk of globalizzazione, in Chinese of Quan Qui Hua, in French of mondialisation, in German of Globalisierung, and in Korean of Gukje Hwa.1 Despite the worldwide use of the concept, there is no clear definition of what globalization means. Whilst Scholte2 defines globalization simply as the ‘process whereby the world is becoming a smaller place’, he does go on to note that, ‘Discourses of globalization have become a prime site of struggle between, broadly speaking, conservatives who deny such a trend, liberals who celebrate its presumed fruits, and critics who decry its alleged disempowering effects.’3 How could one concept elicit such strongly diverse perspectives? Perhaps part of the answer lay in the comment by Gillian Youngs4 that ‘the most obvious quality of discourses of globalization is their all-encompassing intention or nature, their orientation towards descriptions, explanations or theorizations of the whole, the global.’ Such totalizing discourses on the part of supporters and critics of globalization tend to ignore the nuanced complexity of processes of globalization; that globalization can be both positive and negative; empowering and disempowering; emancipatory and oppressive. Within the African context, discourses on globalization invariably focus on the negative. Giles Mohan5 for instance notes how pervasive the influence of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank is on African countries,

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pointing out that 38 out of 43 sub-Saharan African countries are undergoing structural adjustment programmes. Similarly Grugel and Hout6 argue that globalization is an uneven process and that ‘weak states’ have fewer means to hold globalization at bay. Implicit in such an argument is that globalization is essentially a negative process. However, such arguments also ignore the positive in relation to Africa: globalization has resulted in the strengthening of a global democratic ethos, seen so vividly in the international human rights regime. Thus Kwame Ninsin7 argues that globalization ‘makes African governments vulnerable to democratize because of their dependence on foreign capital’. Thus whilst dependence on foreign capital is not a good thing, it is a positive development when international actors take this dependence and use it as leverage to pressurize those authoritarian governments to democratize. The fact that globalization is undermining the power of states, bypassing sovereignty and creating precedents for external intervention in defence of human security is not a bad thing within the African context. How this has come about is briefly examined in our discussions of the historiography of the concepts of security and sovereignty below. The historical evolution of the concept ‘security’ Traditionally, security was almost exclusively understood to refer to the security of states and military security.8 In this way, security came to mean national security and was synonymous with defence. This Clausewitzian conceptualization of security is clearly evident in the following definition of security by Bellamy: ‘Security itself is relative freedom from war, coupled with a relatively high expectation that defeat will not be a consequence of any war that should occur.’9 Bellamy’s rather narrow view of security is further echoed by another parochial perception of security by Giacomo Luciani who commented that ‘[n]ational security may be defined as the ability to withstand aggression from abroad.’10 As such, the study of security in the post-1945 period was dominated by such concepts as ‘containment’, ‘deterrence’, ‘flexible response’, ‘massive retaliation’, ‘balance of power’, ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD) and an overarching concern with nuclear strategy.11 This was clearly evident during Reagan’s presidency when the world had to familiarize itself with the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), more commonly known as the ‘Star Wars’ programme. This is not to say that there were no alternative voices to be heard challenging this dominant security-centred paradigm which, it could be argued, has dominated strategic discourse from the time of Sun Tzu, almost two thousand five hundred years ago! As early as 1705, the German philosopher Leibniz

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spoke of the need for the state to provide common security (la securité commune) to its citizens, and the French philosopher Montesquieu noted that true political freedom could only occur when people are secure.12 What is interesting is that both these philosophers were concerned with the security of individuals and not primarily concerned with the security of states. In 1950, the political scientist Lasswell argued for a broader conceptualization of security: . . . all measures which are proposed in the name of national security do not necessarily contribute to the avowed end . . . Our greatest security lies in the best balance of all instruments of foreign policy, and hence in the co-ordinated handling of arms, diplomacy, information, and economics; and in the proper correlation of all measures of foreign and domestic policy.13

Lasswell’s views were reinforced by McNamara, the former United States Secretary of State, who pleaded for a less military-political focus on security in 1968. This was later echoed by Galtung’s reference to ‘four highly credible, but also totally avoidable threats to our existence on earth – war, hunger, repression and eco-disaster.’14 Despite these dissident voices, the juggernaut of military-centred security studies continued to hold sway. How does one explain this effective marginalization of voices appealing for a more holistic understanding of security? One answer could possibly be that the fear of nuclear annihilation was so overwhelming that all else paled into insignificance. This is a view certainly subscribed to by United States President Eisenhower when he declared: . . . with both sections of this divided world in possession of unbelievably destructive weapons, mankind approaches a state where mutual annihilation becomes a possibility. No other fact of today’s world equals this in importance – it colours everything we say, plan and do.15

This dominance of the traditional paradigm was not to last, however. Changes in the strategic environment in the 1970s necessitated a rethinking of conventional understandings of security. According to Carim,16 five factors laid the foundations for a ‘devaluation of the military’s currency’ in the 1970s: • the beginnings of détente between the superpowers in the early 1970s as exemplified by the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) in 1972; • the American experience in Vietnam which exposed the limits of imposing military solutions to certain types of conflict;

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• the financial costs of this campaign in conjunction with a world economic recession which fuelled a deleterious inflationary spiral; • America’s economic decline relative to Japan and the European Economic Community which were competing more successfully in international markets; and • the quadrupling of oil prices by the Organisation of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the 1970s that sent shock waves throughout global economies and exposed the West’s external dependence on strategic resources. These tectonic shifts in the global security landscape shook the very edifice of the dominant paradigm as Americans were forced to concede that threats to their national security also stemmed from a flagging economy. This new concern regarding the economic dimensions of security is perhaps best captured in the definition of security by Blair, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, who told the US Congress in 1972 that ‘[o]ur national security today depends on things like balance of payments, economic affairs, foreign assistance . . .’17 The mere acceptance of the economic dimensions of security by the establishment served to bolster those marginalized voices calling for a widening of the security agenda. Thus, the events of the 1970s effectively opened the sluice gates for further criticism of the dominant paradigm. One of the first of those to take advantage of these changing circumstances was what has been termed the ‘alternative security school’. The thrust of this approach was informed objectively by Reagan’s categorization of the Soviet Union as an ‘Evil Empire’ and by the arms race that it engendered. Proponents convincingly argued that more arms did not mean more security – more nuclear weapons did not result in a safer planet. In this, their work was inspired by the intellectual tradition of Herz who, in the early 1950s, introduced the idea of the security dilemma: ‘. . . a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intentions, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive, and the measures of others as potentially threatening.’18

Herz’s theoretical insights found practical expression in the work of the alternative security school that introduced the radical notion of ‘security interdependence’ to the strategic discourse. According to this notion, Western security was intimately related to that of the Soviet Union and vice versa; modern weaponry had created objective security interdependence. This meant that it was necessary for the West, for example, to recognize the fact that

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increases in Soviet weaponry did not necessarily improve Western security. The reverse was also true.19 This rather abstract notion was given concrete expression in concepts such as ‘arms control’ and ‘non-offensive defence’. The notion of security interdependence rapidly gained support under the banner of common security. For example, the 1982 Palme Commission provided political support for the idea of common security, arguing that ‘states can no longer obtain security at each other’s expense, but only through co-operative efforts.’20 The ideas of security interdependence of the 1980s were further developed in the 1990s by scholars like Kennedy, Breytenbach, Tehranian, Obi, Nathan, Cottey, Krasna, Van De Veer and Dabelko, and Lizee and Peou who argued that the emergence of transnational security threats such as drought, narcotrafficking and pollution necessitated transnational or collective responses.21 Thus, Kennedy notes that ‘[i]n this larger and more integrated sense, ‘national’ security becomes increasingly inseparable from ‘international’ security.’22 These notions of common or collective security, of course, built on the earlier scholarship of ‘complex interdependence’ scholars such as Keohane and Nye.23 It would be wrong to assume, however, that these debates in the security discourse were only confined to the West. Ideas of common security had already entered the discourse of the Politburo of the Soviet Union. This was motivated in large part by Gorbachev’s understanding that the Soviet economy could not sustain a new arms race and that this meant that the superpower stand-off needed to be addressed decisively. Carim24 puts it this way: In conjunction with his domestic policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring) which aimed to revive the Soviet political and economic system, Gorbachev galvanised the process of détente by proceeding with unilateral Soviet disarmament and by urging a series of arms control agreements.

Thus, the 1990s witnessed the rapid demilitarization of superpower relations. One aspect of this demilitarization was the knock-on effect it had on international relations scholars such as Barry Buzan and Ken Booth. Such soulsearching questions as ‘what is security, whose security, and security from what threats?’, were now being asked.25 In answering the question of whose security needs to be addressed, Booth argued that the problem with traditional security perspectives was that it equated security exclusively with state security.26 The problem with this perspective, as Buzan rightly argued, was that state security was often purchased at the expense of human security, specifically in the dictatorships of the third world; consider here Duvalier of Haiti, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Pol Pot in Cambodia,27 Amin in Uganda and Mobutu in Zaïre (now

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the Democratic Republic of Congo). In practice, this meant that people became the primary referent of security as opposed to the state. New security thinking therefore increasingly focused on what has been termed ‘human security’, as opposed to traditional state-centric security. According to the Bonn Declaration of 1991, human security is ‘the absence of threat to human life, lifestyle and culture through the fulfilment of basic needs’.28 This definition, in turn, has been greatly guided by feminist contributions to new security thinking. Feminists strongly argue that there is a need for ‘care’ to be incorporated into any security discourse. This seeks to place the security concerns of the ordinary man and woman on the street at the very core of any security strategy.29 One of the practical consequences of considering human security as opposed to state security, or making people the primary referent of security, is that it becomes possible to identify threats to human security at subnational, national and transnational levels.30 Thus, human security necessitated the broadening of the security agenda to include non-military threats. According to Buzan,31 the security of human collectivities is affected by threats emanating from five sectors: military, political, economic, social and environmental. These insights have resulted in a radical revision of traditional definitions of security. Today, most definitions are wider and tend to complement the definition of human security given above. For instance, Ullman’s32 definition of security provides a more adequate conceptual ‘fit’ to contemporary reality than do most traditional ones: . . . a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a brief time span to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations).

To be sure, the new security agenda did not go unchallenged by those who sought to retain security’s traditionally narrow military and state-centric approach. These critics argued that the broader the concept of security, the fuller and potentially more unmanageable the threat agenda would become.33 But Booth levels several counterarguments against this criticism. It is sensible to quote his response in some detail: First, it must be conceded that broadening the concept does greatly widen the agenda. So what? This is what the political process is all about: making choices between competing demands. Bureaucratically, the implementation of security does not have to be dealt with by the same ministry, just as ‘defence’ has a land, sea and air component and ‘foreign policy’ has diplomatic, strategic and

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commercial aspects. So, while the security agenda should be broadened, it need not become unmanageable. Second, to leave the agenda narrowly defined by military considerations will leave security advice narrowly dominated by military specialists. There will be times when this is justifiable, since there will be times when the military threat deserves special consideration and there is a particular urgency to military threats. Ever since the time of Thomas Hobbes – but in reality earlier – security has been the primary obligation of governments. To place an item on the security agenda is therefore to raise its profile. If we are serious about human rights, economic development, the lot of women and so on . . . then we must simply accept the problems of an expanded agenda and of the need to settle the question of priorities in the political process. To control the agenda up to a point is to control policy. Yes, an expanded agenda is by definition potentially more unmanageable: but one needs to ask why somebody wants certain issues such as human rights off that agenda? And why do they want to privilege [military] threats? 34

Despite these criticisms, the proponents of the new security agenda seem to have weathered the storm and have come to dominate current security discourse. This is perhaps best illustrated by the manner in which new security thinking has revolutionized the discipline of Strategic Studies. Commenting on the relationship between security and Strategic Studies, Carim notes that ‘the concept of security is central to Strategic Studies in much the same way that power is central to Politics and wealth is central to Economics; that is, they are inextricably linked, but conceptually distinct.’35 Traditionally, Strategic Studies has been dominated by a military understanding of security. Evans and Newnham36 define classical Strategic Studies as: . . . the field of inquiry that is concerned to examine the ways in which actors use their military capabilities to achieve political goals, in particular, with the way in which the threat and use of force has served these ends. It is sometimes referred to as the Clausewitzian tradition after the nineteenth century Prussian strategist who did so much to advance the symbiosis between war and state policy . . . Strategic studies has been primarily concerned with military power as the key attribute which has to be converted into usable instruments.

Strategic Studies’ lopsided emphasis on military prowess at the expense of non-military security threats has opened it to criticism from those who have argued that its substance needs to be informed by the debates around the widening of the concept of security. Chipman, the Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) argued that: Strategic Studies has been dominated by perversion and has resulted in a blinkered perspective which is unable to foresee, explain or even understand sources of threat other than those emanating from military confrontation.37

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The dominance of new security thinking is also illustrated by the fact that members of the IISS were called upon to change a key text of their Constitution at an extraordinary general meeting in 1992. They had to approve the following: The object for which the Institute is established is to promote on a non-party basis the study and discussion of an exchange of information upon any major security issues including without limitation those of a political, strategic, economic, social or ecological nature.

The original version read: The object for which the Institute is established is to promote on a non-party basis the study and discussion of and the exchange of information upon the influence of modern and nuclear weapons of warfare upon the problems of strategy, defence disarmament and international relations.38

This has resulted in a radical change in the substance or stuff of Strategic Studies to include small-arms proliferation, narco-trafficking and organized crime, mass migrations, economic insecurity, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism and regional power clientelism.39 The real difference between this and earlier approaches to Strategic Studies was the emphasis on the security of individual human beings. While aspects of Strategic Studies, for instance counter-insurgency warfare, did appreciate threats to security emanating from non-military problems, it viewed these in the light of national security considerations of the state. The above discussion on the IISS is not meant to create the impression that the substance of Strategic Studies was to be defined and decided by them. Rather, it is used as an illustrative example of how new security thinking has moved from the margins to the very core of Strategic Studies. Similarly, in 1996 the Institute for Defence Policy changed its name to the Institute for Security Studies. Accompanying this name change was a change in the Institute’s mission statement from enhancing stability on the African continent to enhancing human security in Africa. But the impact of new security thinking was not confined to theoretical discourse: it has had a tremendous influence on policymakers. In addressing a conference in Tanzania, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim dwelt on the changes in Southern Africa from the 1980s to the present as it related to the Frontline States: In security terms, the objective was to defend against colonial aggression and apartheid destabilisation. Now that circumstances have so radically changed, the first task must be to rethink security, to redefine the security needs

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and to elaborate a new defence doctrine. While in the past, the views and efforts of the Frontline States found common ground in the task of liberation, we should now find a new basis for common security moving from confrontation to co-operation in Southern Africa. This common security must be one in which all find relevance and which is holistic in scope, embracing the non-traditional areas such as social and economic domains.40

These ideas of common security and a widening security agenda have also found practical expression in the five main sub-regional organizations on the African continent: • • • • •

the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the east; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the west; the Maghreb Union (UMA) in the north; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the south; and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) representing Central Africa.41

What is interesting about each of the subregional groupings is that they began as development organizations, slowly taking on security functions. This underscores the reality of the intimate relationship between security and development. After all, in cases where there is civil unrest, it is difficult to attract foreign investor capital. This, in turn, has negative implications for development. Consider here the cases of ECOWAS troops attempting to keep the peace in Liberia, or IGAD attempting to pursue a peaceful settlement of the continuing Somali crisis. This complements the role of other sub-regional, largely development-oriented organizations in the third world that are compelled to undertake a security function. Both Latin America and Asia bear this out. In Latin America, MERCOSUR (the Southern Market) was compelled to intervene in the border war between Ecuador and Peru in February 1995. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was also forced to engage in a peacekeeping function during the Cambodian civil war. This widening of the security agenda has also impacted on the role of the armed forces in the changing global security landscape. Consider, in this regard, the various tasks the military has performed more recently. In Austria, the army is used for the construction of anti-avalanche breaks, the stabilizing of ski ropes and the development of alternative energy sources (solar and water). In Bulgaria and Cuba, soldiers are used to plant trees and to create national parks and nature reserves in their military localities. A similar situation exists in Finland where commanders of each military district are responsible

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for the environmental welfare. In South Africa, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is used to support police operations against crime and to curb the influx of illegal immigrants into the country. In France, the Navy is used to minimize pollution at sea. In Italy, the army has set up the Geographical Military Institute for the study of seismic cartography of the soil, tectonic (rock) modifications, movement of the earth’s crust and subsidence. In Jordan, the army is used to combat locust invasions.42 The underlying point of the above discussion is that the concept of security has undergone a radical transformation from one meaning state security to one meaning human security. In the process, it also confirms the process of democratization – the process whereby ordinary people are empowered. These trends also find resonance in the manner in which sovereignty has developed over the years. Reconstructing sovereignty in an era of human security and intervention Often, one hears of tyrants engaging in the internal repression of their citizens decrying any form of sanctions or intervention, arguing that this violates their state’s sovereign integrity. In this, the Saddam Husseins and Slobodan Milosevics of the world are drawing upon a particular philosophical tradition which views sovereignty as ‘. . . protection against external influence in a state’s affairs’.43 Sovereignty, as a legal and political construct, arose in Europe at a time when medieval feudal states slowly gave way to absolutist nation-states.44 Commenting on this Deng et al.45 note that sovereignty developed ‘as an instrument of feudal princes in the construction of territorial states. It was believed that instability and disorder, seen as obstacles to stable society, would only be overcome by viable governments capable of establishing firm and effective control over territory and population’. As the old social order decayed and crumbled, absolute monarchs were installed all over Europe; and each of these had their own praise singers and sycophants justifying the ‘New World Order’. In England, this saw Hobbes translating the social contract as people surrendering all their rights to the Ruler.46 In this way, the Ruler was sovereign. Jean Bodin also endorsed this view and this philosophical tradition contributed to the rise of the absolutist monarchy and the nation-state in Europe.47 This did not mean that the philosophical tradition, which was soon transformed into an established orthodoxy, did not go unchallenged. A rich and varied alternative discourse could still be heard above the cacophony of the sycophants. Other social contract theorists such as John Locke and

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Jean-Jacques Rousseau stridently argued against the notion that at the time of the social contract, the people transferred all rights to the Sovereign Ruler. From this emerged the idea of limited and popular sovereignty–that the Ruler had a clear but limited mandate from the people and that its violation by the Ruler could justify popular resistance to the Ruler.48 Of course, Locke’s and Rousseau’s ideas were not entirely unique and drew upon the earlier works of Althusius. This German Calvinist, who drew inspiration from ancient theories of popular rights, argued in 1603 for the ‘revolutionary right of active resistance to rulers who violated their contract’.49 This view was later endorsed by Suarez, who argued that ‘the Ruler always remained limited by positive law and the permanent rights of the People’.50 Similarly, the German philosopher Wolff, argued that the people were free to choose how much power to devolve upon government and how much to retain.51 By the 1780s the fierce debates between supporters of absolute monarchy and the proponents of popular sovereignty took a new twist with Kant arguing that the state, as opposed to an absolute monarch, was the agent and representative of popular sovereignty or as Rousseau put it, the ‘general will’. As in Hobbes’ sovereign, Kant’s state ‘absorbed all popular rights including the right to rebel or disobey’.52 Fuelled by the American War of Independence, the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution which heralded a new class structure in Europe and North America, Kant’s notion of a sovereign state supreme in its domestic jurisdiction and free from external influence became the norm. The sovereign nation-state also became the norm in Africa following the 1885 Berlin Conference, which carved up Africa into European colonial territories. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is increasingly clear that the myth of sovereignty meaning national governments being supreme in their territorially defined jurisdictions, is cracking. The Angolas and the Afghanistans, the Somalias and the Yugoslavias clearly illustrate the inadequacy of the concept in these troubled times. It is also clear that ‘even as the traditional concept of sovereignty erodes there is no presumptive, let alone adequate replacement for the state. The locus of responsibility for promoting citizens’ welfare and liberty, for organizing co-operation and managing conflict . . . remains with the state’.53 For academics, then, the challenge is to rethink the notion of sovereignty in an era of interdependence that has witnessed profound global change. Highlighting the enormity of this challenge, former United Nations SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: A major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty not to weaken its essence which is crucial to international security and

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co-operation, but to recognise that it may take more than one form and perform more than one function. This perception would help solve problems both within and among states.54

Supporting this shift in intellectual discourse have been developments that contributed to a radical change in the global strategic landscape, which enabled key policymakers to be receptive to these new ideas. The first of these movements is the process of democratization that has been gathering tremendous momentum from the nineteenth century. This has increasingly challenged Kant’s notion of the state as the embodiment of all popular rights. In an era where a democratic ethos prevails and where violations of human rights are quickly beamed via satellite into people’s homes, a popular consciousness has developed that state security (read sovereignty) is often purchased at the expense of human security. It has also led to the notion that in the final instance, the people are sovereign and that the state, as Kant had argued, acts as the agent of that popular sovereignty. Unlike Kant, however, it argued against the notion of a state that absorbs all popular rights, including the right to rebel. Moreover, it also emphasizes that for the power of the state to be recognized as legitimate, it must be exercised responsibly and within the mandate given to it. Sovereignty constructed in this way means that the state uses its resources to enhance the human condition of its citizens – at the very least providing for the basic needs of its people.55 Given the enormity of power the state has at its disposal vis-à-vis the individual citizen, it is equally clear that state power needs to be constrained. Here, new social contracts have evolved – the Constitution, a Bill of Rights, etc. – clearly limiting the power of the state. These, together with an elected Parliament and an independent judiciary, are supposed to make governments accountable to the people and reinforce the idea that the state is an agent of popular sovereignty. The existence of several tyrannical regimes, however, clearly illustrates the limits of such domestic accountability. In such a situation, it is becoming obvious that agents (states) who violate the trust of their people are increasingly being held accountable to the international community, effectively, to other states. But this raises another question: why should states pursuing their own national self-interest (in the classical realist genre) care about human rights violations/atrocities committed in other states? The answer to this question relates to the second movement taking place in the world today. The myth of an independent sovereign state impervious to outside influence has been recognized by states as problematic for centuries. Since this myth, however, was crucial for the construction of nation-states from disparate

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peoples, states found it useful to perpetuate the myth. States realized that just as no two people can live in total freedom without encroaching on the freedom of others and therefore need the regulatory mechanism of the state, so too states need some regulatory framework, no matter how primitive, to guide the relations between states. Thus Evan Luard56 notes that: Already during the Middle Ages, conventions had emerged about some aspects of states’ conduct: for example, the treatment of heralds, declarations of war, diplomatic practice and similar matters. The rules of chivalry established a code governing the behaviour which knights should adopt towards each other in the battlefield . . . Canon law established rules about the conduct of war and other aspects of state conduct. In particular the doctrine of ‘just war’ laid down for what purpose war was justifiable and rules about the ways which wars should be conducted.

From the nineteenth century onwards, there emerged the idea among some states that war was not a rational way to achieve their foreign policy objectives: that war was detrimental to both their political alliances and commercial ventures. Thus from the Congress of Vienna in 1815 after the Napoleonic wars to the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, states sought to create mechanisms which they hoped would prevent the occurrence of war and would regulate its conduct, should it occur. At the end of the First World War in 1918, this went a step further when states ‘accepted the discipline of compulsory conciliation of their disputes by signing the Covenant of the League of Nations’.57 At the end of the Second World War, and with the establishment of the United Nations’ Organisation in 1945, states were once more willing to surrender a part of their sovereignty for the promise of international peace offered by the new organization. Under the new United Nations system, the international behaviour of states was subjected to the political authority of a Security Council that was more powerful than the Council of the League of Nations.58 As time wore on, it became increasingly clear to states that their relations with other states was not the only thing which needed regulation. It has become obvious that how states (agents) relate to their domestic constituencies can also serve to undermine international peace and security and hence endanger the national interests of other states. How does this come about? Samuel Makinda59 notes that ‘[j]uridical sovereignty without popular sovereignty can result in human insecurity.’ Indeed, social exclusion of a particular group from economic or political power, ethnic cleansing and the like, has resulted in more than 20 million refugees and 30 million internally displaced people.60 These then become a source of regional insecurity as they

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flee into neighbouring states. In the process, the international order is itself threatened. The politics of exclusion pursued by some states that deliberately undermine the human security of their citizens also adversely affect international stability in other ways. In some cases those affected populations bearing the brunt of state repression choose to fight back. The Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) is an example of this. But this only serves to intensify the domestic conflict whilst at the same time regionalizing it, as the KLA needs neighbouring countries from which to stage assaults against the hostile government of Slobodan Milosevic. The example of the Democratic Republic of the Congo is currently the archetypal example of how a civil war threatens to involve an entire continent, as Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Chad and Sudan all have become involved in the politics of this Central African behemoth. Recognizing that insecurity anywhere is a threat to security everywhere, states have decided to band together for the cause of international security. For instance, acknowledging that an intrinsic relationship exists between agents (states) not acting responsibly towards their citizens and a failare to achieve international peace, states have in various international fora begun to regulate this domestic realm to ensure that states are in the final instance accountable to the international community for their actions. This resulted in the development of a normative code by which a state’s actions could be held up for scrutiny. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as a vast array of other human rights instruments became a part of these global norms by which state actions could be monitored.61 The flip side to this, of course, is that those states which do not adhere to these global norms open themselves up for international intervention by the global community. In this regard Kalypso Nicolaidis62 notes that state sovereignty can be effectively bypassed when ‘a state stops fulfilling the basic responsibilities and functions that go along with sovereignty’. This was a point made abundantly clear to the South African apartheid regime in 1974. In that year the international community questioned Pretoria’s right to sovereignty (read non-interference) on the basis that it exercised power illegitimately, irresponsibly and to the detriment of regional peace and security. This resulted in the South African government being ousted from the UN General Assembly and replaced by the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress on the basis that these liberation movements were perceived to be

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more representative of the majority of South African citizens. Sanctions and an arms embargo were soon to follow. Despite the development of these global norms and the case of South Africa listed above, the truth is that during much of the Cold War, dictators such as Pinochet, Mobutu and Suharto held sway – nurtured and assisted by superpowers who displayed scant regard for the precepts of popular sovereignty or human rights. With the demise of global bipolarity and the beginnings of a new international consensus regarding sovereignty as responsibility, the way has become clear for the further development of international law to ensure accountability – that states act as responsible agents of popular sovereignty. One of the earliest examples of this new consensus occurred in 1991 with UN Security Council Resolution 688. This demanded an end to Iraqi aggression against the Kurds in northern Iraq and authorized a military operation to establish safe havens on Iraqi territory. In this way international humanitarian organizations were guaranteed access to the Kurds for the purposes of providing both protection and humanitarian relief. At the time, the United States’ Ambassador to the United Nations remarked that ‘this was the first time a significant number of governments denied the states’ right to the sovereign exercise of butchery.’63 Since then the UN Security Council has authorized forcible intervention in Somalia in 1992, Haiti in 1994, as well as in Yugoslavia. The advent of forcible intervention in the affairs of a state represents a watershed in our theoretical understandings of sovereignty in the current international system. Dan Smith64 puts it this way: The most familiar social science definition of the state is that it is the entity with the monopoly of the legitimate means of force within a given territory. Humanitarian intervention – especially forcible – breaks the states’ monopoly of force and rejects its legitimacy. It thus contradicts our understanding of the most basic function of sovereign statehood.

In this way forcible intervention reinforces the notion that sovereignty equals responsibility and that states who violate the trust of their citizens will be held accountable for their actions (or inaction) to the international community. Of course, developments in international law are not simply confined to the question of forcible intervention but also to what John Dugard65 refers to as the ‘internationalisation of criminal law’. This is most clearly seen in the Pinochet case and in Tripoli’s handing over of the two Libyans to the Netherlands for trial under Scottish law for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1989. It has also resulted in the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague.66

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The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha and the 120 states that signed an agreement in Rome in July 1998 to establish an International Criminal Court also serve to consolidate the trend.67 These are momentous developments and support the view that international law . . . appears to be moving away from being premised on a system of sovereign states towards the development of a common law for a world community of individuals. In the past states were the sole legal persons; in the twentieth century this hard shell has been breached and international law now concerns itself not just with states but also with individuals.68

What is even more revealing is that in the cases listed above, the defendants have not sought to challenge the authority or jurisdiction of the courts. For instance, Jean Kambanda, who was the Rwandan Prime Minister at the time of the genocide in 1994, pleaded guilty to all charges in the indictment against him including those of genocide, complicity in genocide and crimes against humanity. Consequently he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 September 1998.69 The case of General Augusto Pinochet, former military dictator of Chile, holds special importance to our subject at hand and deserves closer scrutiny. On 16 October 1998, as the former dictator lay in a London hospital bed recuperating from back surgery he was arrested by the British police. This followed a Spanish magistrate issuing of warrants for Pinochet’s arrest and extradition in connection with 94 murders and disappearances. Following his arrest, Pinochet was found by a three-judge panel of the High Court to be immune from prosecution for any crimes he might have committed whilst he was head of state from 1973 to 1990. When the case went to the House of Lords on appeal, however, three of the five Law Lords ruled against Pinochet. Whilst the High Court restricted itself to English law which has no exceptions to state immunity, the Law Lords argued that under international law, Pinochet’s crimes against humanity do not enjoy immunity. In a landmark judgment, Lord Nicholls noted: International law has made plain that certain types of conduct, including torture and hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as it does to everyone else, the contrary case would make a mockery of international law.70

As in the case of Jean Kambanda, what is interesting about the General’s defence counsel is that it did not challenge the legality or the jurisdiction of the court. Rather the defence counsel argued that Pinochet was suffering from chronic depression which had resulted in his being mentally unfit to stand trial for extradition.71

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The twentieth century will certainly go down as one of the bloodiest centuries in the history of humanity. From the bloody plains of Armenia to the trench warfare of the First World War, the gas chambers of Auschwitz and Dachau, the killing fields of East Timor, Cambodia, Sudan; Yugoslavia and now Angola and the DRC, the twentieth century has taken man’s inhumanity to man to new heights. Altogether 160 million people lost their lives in the century as a result of war, genocide and state killings.72 With the dawning of the twenty-first century there is a millennium feeling that such grave crimes committed by the Mengistus and Pinochets are not simply crimes against the victims but an affront to our collective humanity and dignity and as such should not go unpunished. Reconstructing sovereignty as responsibility, remodelling states as agents of popular sovereignty whose purpose it is to enhance the human condition of their citizens, and who are accountable not only to their domestic constituencies but to the international community as well, might go some way to resolve the historic tensions between state and human security in favour of the latter. In the final instance, it is only in the creation of vibrant democracies that the historic tensions between state and human security can be resolved. Regionalization: new and old Having discussed the relationship between globalization and democratization whilst alluding to regionalization, it is important at this point to turn to the question of how regionalization fits into this triadic structure. Before proceeding with our discussion on regionalization, it may be useful for us to examine the concept of region first. The primary, common-sense usage of the term ‘region’ connotes physical contiguity, but as Evans and Newnham illustrate, proximity is a necessary, although not sufficient, condition for physical stipulation of region: Between state actors, contiguity as a variable in delineating regions produces mixed results. For example, there is a core area within the concept of ‘Western Europe’ which includes the founding six of the European Community. At the periphery, things become more confused. Iceland and Ireland presumably mark the Western fringes but where is the eastern fringe? Similarly, with the region of the Middle East. A core area can be identified but is Libya part of it, or of North Africa? Is Turkey part of Europe or part of the Middle East? . . . Clearly, more is needed than proximity to confidently stipulate the meaning of region.73

Obviously, other criteria are needed to define a region. One of the criteria, which Evans and Newnham74 have defined, is homogeneity at the social,

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economic and political levels. Unlike old ‘regionalism’ efforts of the 1950s and 1960s with its overwhelming stress on functional integration driven by political and economic aspirations, regionalization efforts from the 1990s stressed the multidimensional aspects of regional integration building on a common value system.75 Ultimately, as one cannot integrate apples and oranges, regional integration would need to be an integration of like-minded entities. This would also make the cohesion between national interests and regional collective interests that much easier. National entities subscribing to a common value system would also greatly facilitate the formation of common policies at the regional level. Thus, it may be argued that what is driving new regionalization efforts is a common value system. It would also stand to reason that those regional structures which are driven by a democratic value system, and where human security is paramount, are fundamentally different from those which subscribe to a less democratic ethos where state (read elite) security is paramount. This is not all. Grugel and Hout76 note that, in the developing world, regionalization is often a response to fears of globalization. Among state elites in the south, there is an assumption that in banding together they could reduce the hegemony of the West, which they see as driving globalization. That the situation is more nuanced is obvious, but this view is a myth which state elites encourage as it deflects from their own failures.

Toda and the GRAD Project In an effort to come to better understand how these forces of globalization, regionalization and democratization impact on our world and are, in turn, impacted upon by world events, the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research under the Directorship of Professor Majid Tehranian launched a three-year research project called GRAD or the Globalization, Regionalization and Democratization consortium. Researchers from all corners of the globe participated in this project under the aegis of Toda. These researchers were then organized into research clusters or themes. Each groups of researchers, however, had to examine their theme through the prism of globalization, regionalization and democratization. The chapters in this book reflect the collective efforts of one such research cluster – that of security. At the first meeting at Magdalen College, Oxford University, the project was formally launched and researchers organized themselves into research clusters. Within those clusters responsibility for specific papers was given to particular individuals. In

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2003, researchers reconvened at the Dialogue Institute at Simon Frasier University in Vancouver, Canada where first drafts of papers were presented. On the basis of comments and criticism of papers, these were revised and second drafts were presented in 2004 at the International Business School in Budapest, Hungary. Once again, presentations were made and criticism delivered. Authors once again revised the papers and updated them. These then constituted the final versions that are contained in this volume. The first part of the volume examines security from the national to the regional and on to the global. In the opening chapter, Joseph Camilleri provides an important overarching framework in order to contextualize the myriad contradictory developments at national, regional and international levels. Camilleri begins his analysis by identifying the limits of the Modern Age and how these impact on international relations generally and global security, in particular. He then situates the geopolitical landscape of the post-Cold War period, and especially the declining fortunes of the imperial project within this larger era of transition. Camilleri concludes on a positive note by referring to an alternative discourse – perspectives associated with the ‘dialogue of civilizations’ – that point to a more promising co-operative future. The second part of the volume focuses on regional security problems and begins with Michael Intriligator’s incisive chapter on the new US nuclear weapons policy – the so-called Bush Doctrine. Intriligator notes how past policies based on co-operative approaches to international security have been replaced by unilateral US policies and actions. Equally worrisome, he notes that despite this constituting a sea-change in the policy arena, very little debate has occurred around this. He concludes by arguing that it is perhaps time to consider an alternative approach – that of global security – to deal with the vexing issues of our time. Benedicte Bull’s chapter on Latin America illustrates how a fragile consensus on security issues broke down following diverse regional responses to the increasingly unilateral policies of the US in the region in the post 9/11 world. She points out that given the division between those Latin American countries that support an aggressive US security policy and those who do not, a collaborative regional security framework will be difficult to reach. The following two chapters deal with Asia. In his chapter focusing on the US and South Asia, B.M. Jain attempts to answer the question of what the main ingredients for sustainable peace are in the region. Key to this he also discusses the issue of whether the US has a ‘specific roadmap’ to encourage democratic forces in the region as well as to amelioriate tensions between nuclear rivals – India and Pakistan. In his analysis of South-East Asia, Joseph Cheng notes that countries viewed regional economic co-operation and market liberalization as

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an important means to maintain a peaceful external environment and to promote economic growth. However this confidence was shattered with the Asian financial crisis. The impact of 9/11 has also raised concerns of threats of terrorism given the fact that terrorism in the region is largely rooted in domestic ethnic and socio-economic contradictions. In the search for more security, many are turning to the promise encapsulated in democracy to provide the region with greater stability. Our focus then moves to Europe where Hripsime Nalbandyan examines the conundrum that is the European Union – an economic giant but a military dwarf. In her chapter she examines European security past, present and possible future. In assessing the future of European security, Nalbandyan gives special attention to transatlantic relations between the US and Europe. In her penetrating chapter, Olga Vorkunova notes that the multifaceted regionalization process in Europe’s peripheries is affected by the Russian Federation in all matters pertaining to the eastwards enlargement of the EU. As such, the position of Moscow may well define the limits and constraints of a Wider Europe. Next, Mohammad Selim reviews the competing security arrangements in the Middle East and analyses their experience in responding to the plethora of security challenges posed. From these lessons learned, the factors that lead to successful regional co-operation in the security realm are extrapolated. The focus then shifts to southern Africa. Hussein Solomon argues that current forms of regionalization in the Southern African Development Community is elite-driven, and that state security is purchased at the expense of the human security of ordinary citizens. In the final instance, it is a regionalization that opposes the globalizing democratic ethos. In the final chapter, Beni Prasad Agarwal examines the prospects for an Asian Union. He starts his paper by noting how centuries of war in Europe ended with the establishment of a Coal and Steel Community, which developed into the European Union. Such functional co-operation contributed to growing interdependence that minimized prospects of war. He then reflects the extent to which this may be possible in Asia. He eloquently argues that such a Union must consist of all the major powers of Asia and that these need to reflect on how such a Union might assist in the securing their individual national interests. Notes 1. J.A. Scholte, ‘Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a Critical Theory of Globalization’, in E. Kofman and G. Youngs (eds), Globalization: Theory and Practice, New York: Pinter, 1996, p. 45.

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2. Ibid., p. 43. 3. Ibid., p. 43. 4. G. Youngs, ‘Dangers of Discourse: The Case of Globalization’, in E. Kofman and G. Youngs, p. 60. 5. G. Mohan, ‘Globalization and Governance: The Paradox of Structural Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa’, in E. Kofman and G. Youngs, pp. 292–95. 6. J. Grugel and W. Hout, ‘Regions, Regionalism and the South’, in J. Grugel and W. Hout (eds), Regionalism Across the North–South Divide: State Strategies and Globalization, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 5. 7. K. Ninsin, ‘The Quest for Democracy’, Africa Insight, 30(3), December 2000, p. 11. 8. K. Booth, ‘A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations’, Southern African Perspectives: A Working Paper Series, 30, Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1994, p. 3. 9. B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the PostCold War Era, New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf (2nd ed.), 1991, p. 16. 10. Ibid., p. 16. 11. J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger, ‘Introduction: Theories, Methods, and Dilemmas in World Politics’, in J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 9. 12. E. Rothchild, ‘What is Security?’, in M. Singh (ed.), Redefining Security in Southern Africa: Workshop Proceedings, Common Security Forum, Centre for History and Economics, King’s College, University of Cambridge, 1995, p. 16. 13. J.J. Romm, Defining National Security: The Non-Military Aspect, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, p. 3. 14. M. van Aardt, ‘In Search of a More Adequate Conceptualisation of Security for Southern Africa: Do We Need a Feminist Touch?’, Politikon, 20(1), 1993, p. 55. 15. Quoted in X. Carim, ‘Strategic Perspectives for Southern Africa in the 1990s: Theoretical and Practical Considerations’, Southern African Perspectives: A Working Paper Series, 23, Bellville: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, 1993, p. 4. 16. Ibid., p. 9. 17. Romm, p. 5. 18. Buzan, p. 4. 19. N.J. Wheeler and K. Booth, ‘The Security Dilemma’, in J. Baylis and N.J. Rengger (eds), Dilemmas of World Politics: International Issues in a Changing World, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 45. 20. Ibid., p. 45. 21. P. Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, London: Fontana Press, 1993, pp. 129–30; F.A. Magno, ‘Environmental Security and the South China Sea’, Security Dialogue, 28(1), 1997, pp. 97–112; E. Ottone, ‘Overcoming Poverty and Exclusion as Causes of Insecurity in Latin America’, Security Dialogue, 28(1), 1997,

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22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30. 31.

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7–16; W. Breytenbach, ‘Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa: From the Frontline States to Collective Security’, The Arusha Papers: A Working Series on Southern African Security, 2, Cape Town: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape and Dar es Salaam: Centre for Foreign Relations, 1995, p. 3; P. Lizee and S. Peou, ‘Co-operative Security and the Emerging Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: The Challenges and Opportunities of Peace in Cambodia’, York Centre for International and Strategic Studies (YCISS) Occasional Paper, 21, Toronto, Canada: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1993, p. 1; C.Y. Obi, ‘Environmental Conflict in Africa’, African Journal of Political Science, 4(1), June 1999, pp. 40–62; L. Nathan, ‘Good Governance, Security and Disarmament’, African Journal of Political Science, 3(2), December 1998, pp. 69–79; A. Cottey, ‘Central Europe Transformed: Security and Co-operation on NATO’s New Frontiers’, Contemporary Security Policy, 20(2), August 1999, pp. 1–30; J.S. Krasna, ‘Testing the Transnational Issues for International Security’, Contemporary Security Policy, 20(1), April 1999, pp. 57–64; S.D. van De Veer and G.D. Dabelko, ‘Redefining Security Around the Baltic: Environmental Issues in a Regional Context’, Global Government: A Review of Multilateral and International Organizations, 5(2), April–June 1999, pp. 221–50; Majid Tehranian and David Chappell (eds), Dialogue of Civilizations: A New Peace Agenda for a New Millennium, I.B.Tauris and Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, London, 2002; Majid Tehranian (ed.), Bridging a Gulf: Peacebuilding in West Asia, I.B.Tauris and Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research, London, 2003. Kennedy, p. 130. R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Scott Foresman and Company, 2nd edition, 1989. Carim, p. 9. Booth Ibid., p. 5. Buzan, p. 43. A.H. Omari, ‘Regional Security: One View from the Frontline States’, The Arusha Papers: A Working Paper Series on Southern African security, 5, Cape Town: Centre for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape and Dar es Salaam: Centre for Foreign Relations, 1995, p. 4. K. Krause, ‘Critical Theory and Security Studies’, YCISS Occasional Paper, 33, Toronto: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, York University, 1996; Van Aardt, pp. 55–9; J.B. Elshtain, ‘Feminist Themes and International Relations’, in J. Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations, London: Macmillan Press, 1995; J.A. Tickner, ‘Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation’, in J. Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations, London: Macmillan Press, 1995. Booth, pp. 3–4; Solomon and Cilliers, p. 6. Buzan, p. 19.

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32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42.

43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

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Quoted in Romm, p. 4. Ibid., p. 6. Booth, p. 6. Carim, p. 7. G. Evans and J. Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics, London: HarvesterWheatsheaf, 1990, p. 379. J. Chipman, ‘The Future of Strategic Studies: Beyond even Grand Strategy’, The Roundtable, 322, 1992, p. 135. P. Vale, ‘Can International Relations Survive?’, International Affairs Bulletin, 16(3), 1992, p. 100. S. Bearman (ed.), Strategic Survey 1990–1991, London: Brasseys for IISS, 1991, pp. 18–21. S.A. Salim, ‘The Frontline State: A New Alliance for Peace and Development in Southern Africa’, Keynote address by Dr Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary General of the OAU, to the meeting of the Ministers of Defence and Security of the Frontline States, Arusha, Tanzania, 10 November 1994, pp. 4–5. J. Cilliers, ‘The Evolving Security Architecture in Southern Africa’, African Security Review, 4(5), 1995, p. 37; G. Cawthra, ‘Sub-Regional Security: The Southern African Development Community’, Security Dialogue, 28(2), 1997, pp. 207–9. M. Harbottle, ‘New Roles for the Military: Humanitarian and Environmental Security’, Conflict Studies, 285, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995, pp. 16–19. F.M. Deng, S. Kimaro, T. Lyons, D. Rotchild, and I.W. Zartman, Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996, p. vii. F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 62. Deng, et al., p. 2. Hinsley, p. 145. S. Makinda, ‘Sovereignty and Global Security’, Security Dialogue, 29(3), 1998, p. 282. Deng, et al., p. xx. Hinsley, p. 132. Ibid., p. 135. Ibid., p. 152. Ibid., p. 156. Deng, et al., p. 6. B. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Empowering the United Nations’, Foreign Affairs, 71, 1993, p. 99. Deng, et al., p. xvii. E. Luard, Basic Texts in International Relations, London: Macmillan. 1992, p. 143. Hinsley, p. 227. Ibid., p. 227.

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59. Makinda, p. 286. 60. Deng, et al., p. xiii. 61. B. de Villiers, D.J. van Vuuren and M. Wiechers, Human Rights Documents that Paved the Way, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1992. 62. Quoted in D. Smith, ‘Sovereignty in the Age of Interventions’, in A. McDermott (ed.) Sovereign Intervention, Oslo: International Peace Research Institute, p. 16. 63. Ibid., p. 15. 64. Ibid., p. 14. 65. J. Dugard, ‘Lockerbie is a Triumph of Good Sense over Tradition’, The Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 25 April 1999. 66. P. Ahavan, ‘Justice in The Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Critical Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal’, Human Rights Quarterly 20(4), 1999, pp. 737–816. 67. G. Robertson, ‘A Question of Sovereignty’, Newsweek International, 7 December 1998. 68. G. Evans and J. Newnham, The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, New York: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 151. 69. United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-third session, Agenda item 50, Report of the International Criminal Tribunal ofr the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 A/53/429 – S/1998/857, United Nations, New York, 1998, p. 3. 70. Robertson, op. cit. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Evans and Newnham, p. 281. 74. Ibid., p. 281. 75. S.K.B. Asante, ‘Regionalism and Africa’s Development: Expectations’, Reality and Challenges, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, p. 7. 76. Grugel and Hout, p. 4.

Chapter 2: The Competition for Power and Legitimacy in an Age of Transition* Joseph A. Camilleri

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here is now a good deal of evidence which suggests that we have entered over the last several decades a period of profound gestation, that is, a period of transition. Representatives of diverse intellectual traditions, usually writing in the aftermath of one or other of the great upheavals of the twentieth century, notably the two world wars and the Cold War, have repeatedly pointed to the limits of the Modern Age.1 Though starting from quite different premises and often reaching sharply contrasting conclusions, they have developed a strangely similar line of argument, which in one way or another foreshadows the end of an era. Over the last six decades on diverse labels have appeared, each attempting to capture something of the emerging epoch: atomic age, space age, electronic age, information age, global age The frequent use of the prefix ‘post’ as in postwar, post-modern, post-industrial, post-Cold War, post-Westphalian and post-colonial is itself indicative of the widespread sense that we have entered a period of transition,2 but also of the uncertainties that bedevil any serious attempt at interpretation. It is as if observers of the new landscape have a clearer sense of what is disappearing than what is replacing it. The purpose of this chapter is threefold: first, to identify, however briefly, the limits of the Modern Age and how these are impacting on international relations generally and global security in particular; secondly, to situate the evolving geopolitical landscape of the post-Cold War period and especially the declining fortunes of the imperial project within this longer era of transition; and thirdly, to point to the ensuing competition of ideas, and to a promising set of perspectives, which we associate with the ‘dialogue of civilisations’. More specifically, the aim is to explore the insights which dialogical discourse brings to the reading of the contemporary human predicament and the responses it proposes to the limits of imperial power and boundary-maintaining

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conceptions of power and authority, two distinguishing characteristics of the modern era.

Limits of the Modern Age The contention of this chapter is that a new epoch is gradually emerging, which announces the slow but irreversible breakdown of the grand narrative that sustained the modern project. By virtue of the acceleration of change, the global age signifies a different temporal construction of reality and shifting attitudes to time.3 By virtue of the centrality of technological change, it suggests the ever-widening role of technique, and society’s increasing dependence on expertise. Above all, by virtue of the transportation and communications revolutions, the ‘global age’ points to the growing interconnectedness of human actions and destinies. The movement of goods and services, capital, technology, people, information, ideas and images may now be said to be global in two distinct yet closely related senses of the word. These flows are global in their origins – they are the result of global strategies and practices that cut across geopolitical and geocultural boundaries. Equally, they are global in their consequences – they directly and indirectly influence the material and psychosocial conditions of people’s lives and increasingly connect what were once the relatively disparate environments insulated by seemingly impenetrable physical and political boundaries.4 The emphasis on the global is both necessary and instructive, yet it is our contention that the new epoch which is emerging is far too complex to be reduced to ‘globalisation’ or even to the ‘global’ age. The globalising tendencies of an earlier period continue to gather pace and momentum, but in the process, functions and modalities of economic, social and political life acquire a new and distinctive profile. What we are witnessing is the interplay of two powerful forces at work: the unifying and homogenising impact of financial, commercial, information, demographic and ecological flows on the one hand, and the divisive and polarising effect of the revitalisation of cultural, religious, linguistic and civilisational identities and allegiances on the other. This interplay of integrative and disintegrative tendencies suggests that the capacity of the modernist project to impose its logic on the global pattern of human affairs has reached its limits. These limits and the multi-faceted responses to them continue to shape the transitional period that has been gradually unfolding since the end of the Second World War. While the notion of limits and their far-reaching practical

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implications have not yet been fully or universally internalised, the two world wars, the great depression, the Holocaust and the advent of nuclear weapons – a remarkable sequence of events compressed into a mere three decades – produced shock waves whose impact is still being felt today. They helped to instil a sharper sense of the fragility of the human condition, effectively providing the first and to date most telling indication of the reality of these limits. For purposes of analytical convenience, we briefly categorise these limits under four separate headings. • Limits to empire: These are the most far-reaching limits for they go to the heart of the modernist project, which has in large measure centred on the application of science, technology and rationality to the politics of colonisation and control. By the middle of the twentieth century imperial domination was irrevocably weakened by imperial rivalry on the one hand and the revolt of the colonised on the other. It is not surprising therefore that the Second World War should have coincided with the steady rise of independence or national liberation movements, resulting in the eventual dissolution of all the European empires. It is true that the end of the war saw the establishment of two new centres of imperial power, whose geopolitical – and to a lesser extent ideological – rivalry became the pivot of international conflict. But both empires would soon be subjected to powerful centrifugal and centripetal pressures. The end of Cold War saw the disintegration of the Soviet empire, but not necessarily as some have argued, the consolidation of the American empire.5 Contrary to conventional wisdom, this chapter is at pains to show that events since 1989 have reinforced the limits of imperial power, foreshadowed three decades earlier by America’s humiliating defeat in Vietnam. • Limits to sovereignty: The concept of sovereignty was elaborated to fit the unique circumstances of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe. Designed to explain and legitimise the rise of the centralised and absolutist state, the sovereignty principle bestowed on the exercise of authority three defining characteristics: absoluteness, permanence and indivisibility. Several of these European states had already embarked on imperial expansion, or would soon do so. However, when placed in the international setting of the Late Modern period, the principle would give rise to several mutually reinforcing contradictions. In time, the sovereignty principle had to contend with the effects of the scientific and industrial revolution, especially in transportation and communications, the net effect of which was

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the increasing porosity of state boundaries. At the same time, the principle of sovereignty – itself the legal expression of an abstract spatial relationship – conferred on all states a theoretical equality which was at odds with the actual geopolitical inequalities associated with colonialism, domination, empire, intervention and war. With the collapse of the European empires (and later of the Soviet empire) the sovereignty principle was extended to a much larger number of states – UN membership increased from 51 in 1945 to 117 in 1965 and 185 in 1995. This meant that the burden of wearing the mantle of state sovereignty was extended to a great many polities that lacked the institutional infrastructure available to their counterparts in the industrialised western world. It is hardly surprising that many of these polities would soon be classed as ‘fragile’, ‘failed’, ‘collapsing’ or at best ‘quasi’ states. Regardless of the theoretical entitlements inherent in the sovereignty principle, these states – and many others too – could not in practice screen the undesired consequences of internal conflict or outside military and economic pressure. Not surprisingly, statecraft and the operation of the system of states have over the last sixty years followed a trajectory that significantly diverges from the strictures espoused by the classical theories of state sovereignty.6 • Limits to legitimacy: The mutually reinforcing impact of the limits already described could not but call into question the legitimacy of the existing order. The legitimacy deficit may be pervasive but not necessarily uniform, its complexion varying considerably with time, place and cultural setting. Expressed at the most general level, the deficit refers to the state’s growing separation from civil society. This distancing of state and citizen stems in large measure from the actual or imagined gap between the promise and performance of the state, that is, from the perceived remoteness of the state to the satisfaction of material and psychosocial needs – to put it crudely, from the perceived incapacity of the state to deliver on such key desiderata as security, economic well-being or identity. To pre-empt the dangerous possibility of internal division or disaffection, the state can turn to any number of strategies, using the very considerable levers at its disposal. An attractive option, one which has often yielded positive results, at least in the short to medium term, is the appeal to primordial ties, whether based on race, religion or nationality, or some combination of these. The state project – the particular version to be adopted will be a function of such variables as stage of economic development, socio-cultural mix and political traditions – is to establish and cement a unifying political

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culture, that is a value consensus based on an official interpretation of the community’s past history and future destiny.7 The politics of bureaucratic nationalism can be quite effective in times of war or crisis when the identification of external threats is used to uphold the unity of the state and the legitimacy of its actions. But success is neither total nor permanent. To begin with, many states represent an amalgam of several nations or ‘ethnies’ (e.g. Belgium, Canada, the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, Nigeria, India, the Sudan), and many nations or ‘ethnies’ are divided among the jurisdictions of several states (e.g. Kurds, Serbs, Macedonians, Irish). The increasing evidence of ethnic dissent is but one manifestation of the widening gap between state and civil society. Even in western parliamentary democracies, where ethnic disaffection may not be a source of acute polarisation, there is nevertheless a widely observed estrangement between formal political processes and the reality of everyday life. Electoral abstention, sudden shifts in voting behaviour, rapidly declining membership of political parties, and mounting public cynicism towards legislatures as well as political parties, leaders and messages point to a rising mood of cultural uncertainty and political detachment, to the decline of reflective political discourse and of the public sphere more generally. • Limits to Growth: These refer to the unsustainable relationship that has developed between economic practices and the natural environment. We now have a much clearer understanding of these limits than when the concept was first popularised by the Club of Rome in the early 1970s.8 Serious questions no doubt remain as to whether any number of resources (e.g. uranium, copper, bauxite, mercury) will be able to keep pace with projected rates of economic growth. The limitations of readily accessible reserves are most strikingly evident in the case of energy resources, in particular oil and natural gas, which have become the lifeline of both industrialised and newly industrialising economies. The more serious limitation, however, arises not from resource scarcity but from the disruption of the delicate equilibrium established over a long evolutionary timescale between the human species and its biological and physical environment. The introduction of pollutants into the earth’s ecosystems, whether it is through the use of pesticides or herbicides, industrial wastes or greenhouse gas emissions, represents a major and perhaps lasting hazard to life. The disturbance of the natural mechanisms helping to preserve the ecological balance has been compounded, at least until recently, by two interacting and limiting processes: the relatively unplanned or unregulated growth of technology on the one

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hand, and the uncontrolled increase of the human population. Understood in this sense, the cumulative effect of ‘economic growth’ has been to place a heavy and ultimately unsustainable burden on the earth’s ecological and institutional infrastructure. The cumulative impact of these distinct but closely related limits has produced over time a remarkable though still inchoate shift in intellectual orientation, cultural ethos and organisational practice.9 It has created the context and impetus for change in the development of laws and institutions – both regionally and globally, and more fundamentally in the way authority is understood and exercised. Not surprisingly, the process is mirrored and reinforced by the steady but uneven growth of a new transnational social consciousness.

Geopolitics after the Cold War The powerful political, economic and cultural undercurrents deriving from the limits we have just identified gained added momentum with the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that the trend associated with this new phase of the transitional era is unilinear or amenable to simple explanation. The events of 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq, the ‘war on terror’ and much that has happened in the last several years – indeed throughout the post-Cold War era (a label remarkable for what it fails to tell us about the world) – all point to a significant moment of transition. However, as we reflect on this moment, we are soon struck by the ambiguity of what we see, an almost palpable tension born of uncertainty and contradiction, for what we see is not one but several realities. Much of our initial exploration will focus on the so-called unipolar moment, that is, on imperial America, or what some have referred to as the ‘imperial tense’.10 However, the emphasis on the role of US power is simply by way of gaining a foothold on the slippery slope that is the current transitional moment, which, one should hasten to add, has still to run its full course. This is precisely what Thierry de Montbrial’s phrase ‘from Berlin to Baghdad’ helps to convey.11 What is at stake is partly a contest for power, between those intent on consolidating the supremacy of the United States and those equally determined to challenge it. But equally important, and not unconnected with it, is the contest of ideas and worldviews – different ways of interpreting the world and laying the foundations of a future world order, a theme to which we later return. As a point of departure it may be useful to revisit the assessment offered soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall of the likely course of events in the

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aftermath of the Cold War.12 The aim was to characterise the new phase of international relations by drawing attention to four possible scenarios or security models, each with its distinctive configuration of power and approach to international security: • Unipolarity: a system resting primarily on the capacity of one state (the United States) to project military power on a global scale, to maintain alliances and build coalitions as the need arose, which the imperial power would use as the basis for the articulation of a ‘new world order’. • Balance of power: a system in which alliances, to the extent that they survived, would not necessarily reflect the dictates of the imperial power, and coalitions might not fulfil their promise – such a system of competing centres of power might be better described as competitive multipolarity. • Concert of powers: a system in which the great powers would co-operate on issues of global security – a tendency which the euphoria of the immediate post-Cold War period, coupled with a healthy dose of self-interest, seemed to reinforce – such a system might be labelled co-operative multipolarity. • Universal system of security: a system in which notions of collective and common security would have pride of place, in which the UN system generally, and the Security Council in particular, would be able to function with the efficacy which had proved so elusive during the Cold War years. The UN’s greater willingness and capacity to undertake peacekeeping operations and the proposals contained in the UN Secretary-General’s report (An Agenda for Peace)13 were perhaps indicative of a universal commitment to multilateral security. Could any one of these be said to constitute the essential dynamic or inherent logic of the emerging international system? The validity, however partial or qualified, of each of these four models suggested that each captured only one slice of a complex and rapidly evolving reality. It made therefore better sense to represent the international system as a mosaic in which all four models uneasily coexisted and interacted. Unipolarity was but the most striking component of this mosaic, but one whose salience would diminish over time at the expense of multipolarity, of both the competitive and co-operative variety. This interpretation in any case dovetailed with an international political economy perspective developed over the preceding fifteen years, that is, well before the end of the Cold War, which depicted the world system in terms of three competing but interacting tendencies (hegemony, imperial rivalry and imperial collusion).14 Put simply, the world system

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was one in which the United States exercised ‘residual hegemony’ but in the context of ‘competitive interdependence’.15 In concluding this introductory note, it may be helpful to refer, at least parenthetically, to the competing perspectives of Chinese scholars and other experts – a debate that has gone largely unnoticed in western writing on the subject. Since the mid-1980s, Chinese analysts have pointed to three distinguishing features of the new transitional era (thought likely to last several decades): increasing prominence of great power rivalries, higher incidence of local wars, and redivision of spheres of influence. Two distinct interpretations have nevertheless emerged: the orthodox view which we associate with Huang Zhengji,16 and the dissenting view to which Yang Dazhou17 has been one of the main contributors. The conventional view, which underpins much of official Chinese discourse, has emphasised multipolarity as the dominant trend in international relations. This period of transition is associated with increasing competition on the world stage and the gradual decline of America’s imperial position. A new era of turbulence, to which the rise of the Third World has significantly contributed, is said to serve as a constraint on US power and to lower the probability of a major nuclear exchange. By contrast, in the eyes of the dissenting voices, the dominant trend is not towards multipolarity but towards a pluralistic world system in which the United States maintains its superpower status and its major alliances. It interacts with four other important centres of power, but it is the only ‘pole’, the only power capable of deciding key issues in any region. Over time a more sophisticated or hybrid position has emerged, which divides the transitional period into three stages: stage one (1989–91) marked by the fall of the Soviet Union; stage two (1991–2000) during which the international system has one superpower, two major military powers and three main centres of economic power; stage three (early part of the twenty-first century) which sees the formation of major centres of political power and the institutionalisation of a multipolar structure.18 The trend towards multipolarity is associated with the rise of a number of conflict zones, for example in Central Asia, new sources of tension with traditional conflicts that had been simmering during the Cold War now coming to the boil, and great power rivalries, most evident in the scramble for energy and other natural resources. Faced with such turbulence, the United States feels obliged to defend its dominant position by frequent recourse to the deployment and use of military power, an arena in which it enjoys unchallenged technological superiority, and by polarising international conflicts as a means of reinforcing its claims to leadership. These analyses, notwithstanding their limitations, capture two distinct but closely

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related features of this historical moment: geoeconomic and geopolitical fluidity, and the limits to US power.

US Dominance and the Ambiguities of Emerging Plurality There is no denying that the emerging post-Cold War international landscape made for a good deal of ambiguity and not a little confusion, all of which may have served to mask the extent of US decline. Several features readily come to mind: the abrupt disintegration of the Soviet empire, the survival of US alliances, indeed the apparent consolidation of security relationships in Asia Pacific and the enlargement of NATO, the revival of the US economy during the 1990s, Europe’s inability to develop a strategy conflict management, let alone conflict resolution, for following the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, China’s preoccupation with economic modernisation, the technological sophistication of US military capabilities displayed in the first Gulf War and in Kosovo. The net effect was to feed the seemingly reasonable but nonetheless misleading notion of the United States as a hyperpower. The technological, military and economic resources at the disposal of the American state were not in question, but the capacity to use these resources in ways capable of producing intended consequences and preventing unintended ones was very much open to question. Compounding the ambiguity were a number of developments in US policy, some intentional, others accidental, that appeared to enhance effectiveness of the Bush Sr. and Clinton presidencies. The relative success of Desert Storm, the Dayton Agreements and subsequent measures taken to enforce them, Clinton’s prosecution of the Kosovo war, the Framework agreement with North Korea, all these pointed to limited objectives pursued with sufficient support – from allies, friends and the wider international community – and sufficient success to mask numerous failures elsewhere. Humiliation in Somalia was followed by disengagement in Rwanda; severe frictions and instabilities continued to afflict the international trading and financial systems notwithstanding the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the weathering of several financial crises; lack of clarity as to NATO’s future purpose reflected deep-seated internal differences; stemming the tide of horizontal nuclear proliferation remained a high but elusive priority for both administrations. US actions and pronouncements radiated power, yet this was abstracted power, one might say a kind of ‘virtual’ power that was not, perhaps could not

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be, clearly or systematically reflected in the concrete. To put it crudely, the power of the American state was more fragile than appeared to the naked eye. Ironically, this fragility would not come into full view until an American president succumbed to the unilateralist temptation, that is, until he and his closest circle of advisers became convinced that the United States was at the peak of its power and could wield undisputed authority in international decision-making. Not that unilateral intervention was an entirely Bush innovation. The Reagan presidency practised its own brand of cautious and limited unilateralism, and Clinton’s Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, was not reticent to describe the United States as ‘the indispensable nation’. The flaws of the unilateral option would be forcefully exposed when 9/11 struck its devastating blow on the twin symbols of US power. The symbolic significance of the terrorist attacks was widely acknowledged but little understood. They dramatised the ominous but not entirely new reality that the United States had no monopoly on unilateralism. George Bush Jr., possibly the most unilateralist American President since the Second World War, was met by the arch unilateralist of our time, Osama bin Laden. In the immediate aftermath, US policy-makers, intelligence organisations and think-tanks were spurred to action driven by scenarios which, though apocalyptic in the minds of many, were not entirely bereft of credibility. Vociferous opposition to US interests was rapidly gaining ground in many parts of Latin America; Russia was, however slowly, regaining something of its former economic and military poise; China was on the rise; unprecedented militancy had exploded in much of the Islamic world; the chronic US trade deficit had reached staggering proportions; and much of Western Europe (governments, intellectual elites and public opinion) was more sceptical of and resistant to US leadership than at any time since the Pershing and Cruise missile crisis of late 1970s, some might say since the creation of the Atlantic alliance. In this deeper sense, 9/11 and what was to follow offered the most revealing glimpse yet of the enormity of the US predicament. We would also see more clearly than ever before key features of the emerging international landscape, in which cultural and psychosocial currents would prove just as important as economic and geopolitical fault lines.

A Word on Terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’ In responding to the terrorist attacks on US interests and launching a ‘war on terror’, the Bush administration laid bare the weakness of its position, namely

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the inability to articulate to its own (let alone any else’s) satisfaction answers to three closely inter-related questions. Whose war was this to be? Waged against whom? And with what specific objectives? The obvious answer to the first question was the ‘coalition of the willing’. But even those who seemed willing at first soon became much less willing (witness the steady exodus of coalition partners in the Iraq war). And even those who remained made it clear that they would remain as far away from the main theatre of conflict as they could manage. The willing proved to be less than willing. Indeed, it soon emerged that many of those who initially paraded their support for the US-led war on terror had agendas of their own (at times hidden, often not hidden at all). In return for their willingness, they would each exact a heavy price, whether in the form of economic assistance, military aid, trade concessions, or diplomatic favours. In the case of Russia and China, Washington felt obliged to turn a blind eye to gross human rights violations in Chechnya and Xinjiang respectively. The difficulties besetting the hegemon, or to be more accurate quasi-hegemon, should not be underestimated. The American state, it should be remembered, has had to carry its own public – a task, which despite the result of the 2004 presidential election, is by no means assured of success. In the face of the immense and still escalating human, financial and diplomatic costs, support for the Iraq war has sharply diminished. Securing and maintaining the support of governments (in Europe, the Arab world, Pakistan, Japan and elsewhere) has proven just as taxing and often unrewarding. The argument bears stressing: the means at the disposal of the imperial power are awesome, but so are the obstacles in its path. The Bush presidency has had to contend not only with reluctant or half-hearted allies, but with duplicitous friends, rogue states and an assortment of national and transnational movements, organisations and networks that refuse to be intimidated. To this was now added the frightening possibility (real or imaginary) of terrorist groups combining with rogue states, suicide bombers with weapons of mass destruction. The policy of regime change, ostensibly in the interests of democratic transformation, is by no means guaranteed to bring to power regimes more sympathetically disposed to US interests. Ambiguity and uncertainty, now integral to the use of force in international relations, have translated into imperial vulnerability. Indeed, ambiguity is at the heart of terrorism itself. What exactly does this phenomenon represent? Who or what are terrorists? What are their objectives and future plans? As for weapons of mass destruction, the questions are many but the answers stubbornly elusive. Who has them? Who might have them? Who could have them? Who wants to have them? In this potentially paralysing circumstance, Donald

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Rumsfeld’s comment at a Department of Defense briefing assumes a significance that few have fully appreciated: . . . there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.19

Rumsfeld did know something: uncertainty. He knew that he, his department and the administration as a whole were in the throes of uncertainty. Preemptive action and the use of force were driven above all by fear of the unknown, the desire to control uncertainty, a desperate attempt to reaffirm the absoluteness of imperial authority. But the very attempt to do this, and do it unilaterally, could not but accentuate the legitimacy deficit, which is rapidly emerging as the Achilles heel of US power.

The Changing Grammar of International Relations The 9/11 incident and contemporary terrorism more generally – the Islamic dimension of the phenomenon gave the image added sharpness – mirrored and reinforced the unexpectedly and strangely turbulent seas in which US power now had to navigate. The United States had to contend with what Bertrand Badie has called the ‘changing grammar of conflict’.20 Conflict was now waged by different means, or with the same means but at the service of different ends, or in the pursuit of different strategies. What after all is the meaning of Somalia, Bosnia, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, not to mention 9/11, Bali and Madrid? Here we see the violence of the weak exposing the weakness of the violence of the strong. In the case of the American state, its strength, as we have already seen, has been subjected to many constraints. Perhaps the most debilitating has been the inner contradiction which, though embryonically present in the latter part of the bipolar era, has become steadily more acute with the passage of time. This is the contradiction between the ‘new world order’ triumphantly proclaimed by Bush Sr. in 1990 and the unwillingness or inability of the United States to establish the norms, rules and institutions implicit in the promised order. In most conflicts, Washington has not been able to perform the kind of regulatory or co-ordinating role that nurtures legitimacy. Over the last fifteen years, and most conspicuously in the last four, it has played the part of claimant rather than judge.

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The weight of sentiment in much of Europe, East Asia and the Third World generally is that the United States has sought to maximise narrowly conceived self-interest, whether it be at the United Nations, in NATO or the WTO, around issues of international trade, nuclear proliferation, climate change or international criminal justice. To many, especially in the Arab and Muslim worlds, it appeared to lose any semblance of neutrality or even-handedness. In the words of Badie, it is as if its role has shifted from would-be ‘regulator’ to unconcealed ‘gladiator’.21 There is, of course, more to the constraints on US power than internal contradictions. Imperial conduct is not purely the product of internal motivations. External pressures inevitably influence and at times even shape policy outcomes. In this transitional moment, the spatial and temporal dimensions of international life are undergoing profound and rapid change. Traditionally the state has based much of its power and authority on the control of physical distance. However, with the transportation and communications revolutions and the ensuing exponential growth of transnational processes, relationships and organisations, the national state has seen the virtual monopoly it once exercised over space slowly but steadily dissipate. The far-reaching reorganisation of political space has had several consequences. First, agency is increasingly exercised by old entities in new ways and by new entities in ways both old and new. The telling blows inflicted on the United States by Al Qaeda and their supporters through their use of the airwaves (courtesy not just of Aljazeera, but also of western media outlets) are a case in point. Transnational flows, in line with unstable social dynamics and the variable geometry of communication, commerce, industry and migration, cut across territories, evade borders and restructure space. Territory still offers the state important modes of control, but in relation to fewer goods and often with diminishing returns. Secondly, territory has been severely destabilised by the reinvention of tradition. Partly in response to the crisis of institutions and the illusion of their regulatory efficacy, identity fever can take hold wherever states no longer make sense. The return to ‘nature’, to community, to the sacred, or simply to ethnie shatters the functioning of the territorial state as traditionally conceived. Present-day terrorism may be understood as a product of this dual movement of transnationalism and communitarianism. A third element of change merits attention. With the end of bipolarity and the melting of the Soviet glacier came the disorganisation of space in the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, now the Caucasus, and with it increasing contestation over borders, uprooted populations and new conflicts.

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We may legitimately speak of spatial chaos which the imperial power is scarcely able to comprehend, let alone resolve. Far from establishing a new normative consensus on the meaning and functioning of territory, globalisation spawns at best ambiguous and at worst contradictory conceptions of space. Nowhere is this ambiguity more conspicuous than in the Muslim world. Here passionate micro-communities vie for a place in the sun with fiefdoms, struggling states, regional formations and religious movements. Is this not the meaning of post-invasion Afghanistan and Iraq, where the imperial power is struggling to regulate territory by administering a concoction of military coercion and rhetorical democracy? The evolution of the international system would seem to have reached a critical threshold that underscores the reasonably obvious yet often overlooked characteristic of societal organisation, namely the cultural and historical relativity of all spatial constructions on which such organisation is predicated. The present threshold is once again pointing to new ways of imagining and organising space, new forms of political geography. What after all is the meaning of the extraordinary rearticulation of German and Russian space that we have witnessed over a period spanning two world wars and the Cold War? This trend and its multiple ramifications have yet to run their full course. We need only bring to mind the fall of the Berlin Wall and its aftermath, and the accelerating reorganisation of European space. Indeed, we may be entering a period of even greater spatial reconstruction, if the growth of the new regionalism in its diverse manifestations and the hesitant steps towards global governance are any guide. If it is the case that the emerging world system is one where both the grammar of conflict and the organisation of space are undergoing change, it follows that the function and modus operandi of all states will be affected, albeit some more than others. But, contrary to conventional wisdom, the impact may be especially pronounced in the case of the world’s most powerful state. For, notwithstanding the potent levers it can use to shield itself from unwelcome intrusions into its domain, the vastness of the territorial space over which it is obliged to exercise a degree of imperial control makes it especially vulnerable to changes in the logic of conflict and articulation of space. It is precisely this vulnerability that terrorist violence aimed at US interests has sought to exploit. The great irony is that terrorism has turned the globalisation of insecurity and the deregulation of the market of violence into weapons which it has used with devastating impact against the arch apostles of globalisation and market deregulation. What is true of space is equally true of time. At first sight the compression of time scales – in other words speed – not least in the storage, retrieval and

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dissemination of information, should work clearly in favour of the high-tech hyperpower. Paul Virilio, the pre-eminent student of speed, has made much of America’s capacity to wage ‘virtual’ or mediatised war. In the first Gulf War, he was struck by America’s capacity to transform local war into worldwide war, though the artifice of television and the controlled release of information. The result, he argued, was that ‘real time prevailed over real space’.22 The hyperstate, equipped with cyber-optic vision, was capable of global telesurveillance. The ‘virtual bubble’ of the single world market was now followed by the ‘visual bubble’ of electronic optics, with images and information able to travel at the speed of light. The US Air Force Chief of Staff in fact claimed that in first third of the twenty-first century the Pentagon would be able to find, track and target in almost real time any significant object on the surface of the earth. Even Virilio, this unusually perceptive French analyst, could not but be struck by this emerging revolution in military affairs. Was not Kosovo but the first full-fledged example of info-war in which US technology could rightly expect to reign supreme? Was it not this capacity that had allowed the United States to evade the United Nations, and might in time enable it to evade NATO itself? Confronted like the rest of the world by the ‘shock and awe’ quality of the US invasion of Iraq, Virilio managed nevertheless to put events in perspective. He described the Pentagon’s use of its awesome technical power as an ‘act of panic’. To return to our earlier theme, the United States had to contend with two weighty unknowns. On the eve of the invasion Saddam Hussein almost certainly did not possess weapons of mass destruction, but could the United States be sure that he lacked the intention and capacity to acquire them in the future? Pre-emptive war was waged as a response to this first unknown. But no sooner had war been launched, then a second unknown came to the fore: how much resistance would Washington encounter, what form might it take, and most importantly, how long would it last? For Virilio, the hyperpower had been rendered powerless by strategic innovation or, to use his expression, by the ‘metropolitics of terror’.23 What is it that in Virilio’s perspective has somehow overtaken America’s technological supremacy, its seemingly exclusive monopoly over speed and precision? The answer, as one might expect, is to be found in the psychology of the new situation. Virilio’s exposition is illuminating and merits careful reading: With terrorism we have entered the era of war without end, in both senses of the word. Henceforth, a state of emergency is able to spread without the constraint of time or space . . . We must now be in a permanent state of alert for an accident

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that is always possible, always announced, always reported. We have entered a situation which is without historical precedent. It is a situation of hysteria. Hence, the use of the word panic. The ministry of Fear is gradually replacing the ministry of War and the ministry of Defence.24 (author’s translation)

The unknowns or ambiguities inherent in the dynamic of nuclear proliferation and terrorism have, it seems, combined to haunt the psyche of the world’s only superpower. To complete this all too brief explication of the psychological underpinnings of the American predicament, we turn to Baudrillard who turns the spotlight on the American nation, as distinct from the American state.25 What were, he asks, the most visible elements of the response to 9/11? Star-spangled banners, commemorative messages, prayer services and the cult of victims and of post-modern heroes – fire-fighters and the police. Struck by an unimagined and unimaginable evil, the American nation presents itself as the victim that wants to be left ‘alone with God’. The evil, Baudrillard tells us, which had hitherto existed merely in the American unconscious, has suddenly materialised by courtesy of ‘Islamic’ terrorism. Baudrillard wants to take us one step further, where perhaps many would prefer not to go. He wants to argue that what is unimaginable in the American consciousness is not just ‘Evil’ but also the ‘Other’. It is this refusal, or inability, to conceive of the other, be it friend or enemy, in its radical otherness, in its irreconcilable foreignness, that ultimately transforms the objective hyperpower into subjective victim. Though we need not regard Baudrillard as having uttered the last word on the subject, his analysis of the American psyche and in particular his emphasis on the concepts of victimhood and ‘otherness’ provide a useful backdrop to the road we have travelled from Berlin to Baghdad, and lead neatly to a discussion of larger intellectual and cultural currents. Discursive Competition Events since the fall of the Berlin Wall are indicative of the attempts we have made to reorganise human affairs in the context of intensifying economic globalisation and the end of the Cold War system. Critical to this journey has been the task – to which many, not least US policy-makers, have devoted much energy – of identifying the principles which might sustain a new international order. Put simply, the question has been: What might be the international discourse that can legitimate the exercise of power and authority in the new dispensation?26

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For those who interpreted the end of the Cold War as the triumph of the United States and of capitalism more generally, the moment for a ‘new world order’ had arrived. We are all reasonably familiar with Fukuyama’s rendition of this theme.27 After the defeat of Communism, world history was said to have reached the end of its dialectical process. Economic and political liberalism was now the only game in town. It seemed to offer the only rational, indeed available model of economic and political organisation. Globalisation, understood as the globalisation of liberalism, was hastening the interconnection of human destinies, and in this sense pointed to the ‘final’ consolidation of human history. The victory of liberalism had exorcised, or at least substantially mitigated the two most troublesome features of international society, anarchy and war. We had come to the ‘end of history’ as the world had known it. Beguiling though it was, the theme was unsustainable. Though in different ways and to different degrees both the Bush Sr. and Clinton administrations dabbled with this theme, in so far as it lent weight to US primacy in world affairs, it did not seem to serve the necessary legitimising function. Too many remained unconvinced; too many conflicts and divisions persisted; and no one seemed able and willing to deliver the promised new order. The discourse centring on the triumph of the free market and democracy would soon be complemented if not overtaken by notions of rogueness, military pre-emption, and the pursuit of narrowly defined self-interest. By the early 1990s an alternative discursive map would emerge. Huntington’s ‘Clash of civilizations’28 became the best known exposition of this worldview, although the term itself was probably first coined by Bernard Lewis.29 Conflict, threats and insecurity were seen again as abiding features of the international system, but with culture and religion as key categories defining geopolitical fault lines. In official discourse, even in the case of the present Bush administration, the prospect of a civilisational clash was not explicitly articulated. Nonetheless many pronouncements emanating from Washington, including presidential speeches and policy statements did proclaim a new political and ideological, not to say cultural, struggle pitting freedom and democracy against terrorism and Islamic fanaticism. US policymakers had found a new way of depicting the struggle between good and evil and of bifurcating the world, in part as a way of preserving and legitimising imperial authority.30 As we have seen, this second discursive strategy has been no more successful than the first. Tied to unilateralist inclinations, it has disturbed friends and allies, whose perceptions and priorities were already at variance with those of the United States. It has sharpened and probably strengthened Arab

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and Muslim militancy, provided terrorism with a new lease of life, and in all likelihood given added impetus to the dynamic of nuclear proliferation. Not surprisingly, even before the events of 11 September 2001 – some would say in fearful anticipation of them – several voices could be heard beginning to articulate a third discourse, sharply divergent in tone and inspiration from the two previously outlined. I am referring to the ‘dialogue of civilisations’. Though it has a longer history than many realise, the discourse as developed over the last ten years is still at an embryonic stage. Here I simply single out three voices – each of different origin, inspiration and language, but all three remarkably similar in their diagnostic and prescriptive implications.

The Dialogical Frame of Reference We begin with a voice which perhaps better than any other symbolises the fall of the Berlin Wall, Vaclav Havel. An intellectual and playwright who in the 1960s came to epitomise the strong regenerative tendencies prevailing in Czech culture and Czech society in the 1960s, he eventually led the velvet revolution against Soviet-style authoritarianism, and in December 1989 was elected President of Czechoslovakia and later on of the Czech Republic. His intellectual contribution to civilisational dialogue is best encapsulated in the powerful metaphor of the ‘room’, evocatively suggested by the sharing of a prison cell, which is artistically developed in several of his plays. Our contemporary civilisation is compared to the common room in which we are doomed to live together, though each of us remains a different being: Parallel to the process of global unification in today’s civilization, there is an opposite development unfolding simultaneously: nations and whole regions are re-awakening and asserting anew, often quite aggressively, their own ways of life, their unique identity, their traditions, their history, their deities, their habits, their cultures.31

For Havel the only possible answer to the contemporary human predicament is a new ethos of co-existence or, to put it a little differently, a new normative structure of international society, which would transcend the Eurocentric Westphalian system. Such a structure, he made it clear, could not ‘rest on the set of imperatives, principles and rules produced by the Euro-American world’.32 Different cultures and civilisations would need to play a part in identifying common ground. As if to emphasise the point, Havel, though faithful to the Atlantic partnership and grateful to the American role in the emancipation

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of his country from communist rule, nonetheless insisted that ‘the artificial world order of past decades ha(d) collapsed’, and that the central political task now was the creation of a new model of co-existence among the various cultures, peoples, races and religious spheres within a single interconnected civilisation. That he should have chosen to develop this theme in a landmark speech delivered on American Independence Day in the Independence Hall of Philadelphia where he was to be received with pomp and ceremony as one of the heroes of the post-Cold War period, is indicative of the importance he attached to the symbolic link between his message, the occasion and his audience. I now turn to a figure no less significant and just as controversial in his country and internationally, who perhaps more than any other has been instrumental in placing the dialogue of civilisations on the intellectual and political map. Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the fifth president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, is a religious scholar steeped in the study of philosophy. He headed the Hamburg Islamic Centre in 1979, is fluent in English, German and Arabic in addition to Persian, and has written several books and articles, little of which has been published in the English-speaking world. He successfully proposed the idea of the dialogue of civilisations to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 1997, and then gained the unanimous acceptance of the idea at the 1998 UN General Assembly, which went on to declare 2001 as the Year of Dialogue among Civilisations and to adopt the Global Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilizations. Numerous international governmental and non-governmental organisations have since adopted the principle and organised forums, colloquia and conferences, although declarations of principle have yet to be matched by sustained practice. Significant as the organisational impetus he has given to the concept might be, his more notable contribution lies in the intellectual domain, and especially in his characterisation of the dialogical process. Dialogue, which for him is the common search for truth, is not meant to obscure or evade the differences that separate its participants, which is why for him the act is one in which listening is at least as important as speaking. Dialogue, then, is the encounter across cultural, religious, philosophical, ethical, civilisational boundaries, in which each participant listens to the other, becomes open, even vulnerable to the other. In this sense, dialogue engages the participant in a journey of self-discovery: It is only through immersion in another existential dimension that we could attain mediated and acquired knowledge of ourselves in addition to the immediate and direct knowledge of ourselves that we commonly possess. Through

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seeing others we attain a hitherto impossible knowledge of ourselves. Dialogue among cultures and civilizations, rests upon rational and ethically normative commitment of parties to the dialogue . . . [It] is a bi-lateral or even multi-lateral process in which the end result is not manifest from the beginning.33

What, then, are dialogue’s normative foundations? The recurring themes in Khatami’s numerous speeches on the subject suggest the following key elements: (a) the dignity of human being – made possible only through will to empathy and compassion – as the measure of world order; (b) the refusal of politics without morality; (c) the notion that ideas and values, embedded in cultures and civilisations, are an important determinant of political behaviour; (d) the sense that intellectuals, poets, artists, scientists and mystics, precisely because they have the capacity and authority to articulate the large questions of human existence, have a unique role in civilisation dialogue. Many questions remain unanswered: Who participates in this dialogue? What are the modalities of dialogue? Are states participants or mere spectators? There is nevertheless atleast one particular idea, central to Khatami’s conception of dialogue, which merits attention. In his celebrated 1999 speech at the University of Florence, he offered the following juxtaposition of East and West: Orient, which even in an etymological sense signifies the process of imparting direction and order to things, can beckon Europe and America to equilibrium, serenity and reflection in the context of an historical dialogue . . . If deeply understood in their Eastern connotations, equilibrium and serenity lie beyond both the Dionysian and Apollonian extremes of western culture. The age of reason is an Apollonian age while romanticism is the opposite pull on the swing of the same pendulum.34

Khatami’s exposition takes us back to the question of what is to be the discursive framework that guides the post-Cold War era. For Khatami dialogue among civilisations is designed specifically to address the fault line that separates Orient and Occident, a fault line that has a long history, of which the present difficulties between Islam and the West are but the most recent, perhaps geopolitically most troublesome manifestation As the third influential voice I have chosen Tu Weiming, perhaps the foremost Confucian thinker of our time. Born in February 1940 in Kunming, China, he grew up and was educated in Taiwan and is now Professor of Chinese History and Philosophy and of Confucian Studies at Harvard University. He holds honorary professorships from Zhejing and Renming Universities and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, and advisory

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positions in Singapore and Malaysia, with the UN and the World Economic Forum at Davos. A five-volume collection of his works as published in China in 2001.35 A recurring theme of Tu Weiming’s intellectual contribution is the modern transformation of Confucian humanism. Confucian values, he argues, remain highly relevant to modernity and are evident in contemporary social practices, at least as principles of societal organisation. These include: (a) the role of the state in the management of the market; (b) social civility as the key to civilised mode of conduct (law is useful but not enough); (c) the family as the foundation stone of social civility; (d) civil society as the indispensable nexus between family and state; (e) education as the key to civil society; (f) self-cultivation understood as both goal and process. Confucian societies retain many of these values even as they embrace the fierce competitiveness of the West. The reason is not hard to fathom: modernisation and modernity are shaped by cultural forms rooted in tradition: Traditions in Modernity are not merely historical sedimentation passively deposited in modern consciousness. Nor are they simply inhibiting features to be undermined by the unilinear trajectory of development – on the contrary they are both constraining and enabling forces capable of shaping the particular contour of modernity in any given society.36

For Tu Weiming, these traditions constitute the critical elements of sustainable dialogue. What can Confucianism bring to such a dialogue? Here is where Tu Weiming is at his most illuminating. He draws attention to what he calls the ‘ecological turn’ of neo-Confucian thought, and in particular to the contribution of three modern Confucian thinkers, Qian Mu (1895–1990), Tang Junyi (1909–78) and Feng Youlan (1895–1990) based in Hong Kong, Taiwan and China respectively.37 In their critique of the enlightenment and the discourse of modernity, they take us, he contends, beyond aggressive anthropocentrism and instrumental rationality, and pave the way for an inclusive cosmological and humanist vision that transcends the either/or mode of thinking in favour of a nondualistic understanding of the continuity of heaven, earth and humanity. The theme is a highly instructive one, for it offers another path to East–West dialogue. Placed in this context, it is not hard to see why Tu Weiming sees the long-term stability of the Sino-American relationship as likely to depend on

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China widening the frame of reference offered by its indigenous traditions. For him, it is these traditions that hold the key to its own spiritual self-definition. The United States which has hitherto functioned principally as a teaching civilisation may have to acquire more of the qualities of a learning culture. Put simply but not inaccurately, Tu Weiming suggests that we may be entering a ‘second axial period’ in which all the major religious and ethical traditions that arose during the ‘first axial period’ are undergoing their own distinctive transformations in response to the multiple challenges of modernity. It is possible that such reassessment will make possible, through a process of mutual learning an ‘anthropocosmic’ worldview where the human is embedded in the cosmic order. This period of transition is the ‘dialogical moment’, the beginning of a new history that is simultaneously global and plural. Such a moment, Tu Weiming tells us, can flourish when ‘the politics of domination is being replaced by the politics of communication, networking, negotiation, interaction, interfacing and collaboration’.38 This brief excursion into civilisation dialogue was not meant to cover what is now a large and rapidly expanding field of philosophical and cultural inquiry. Rather it was meant to suggest that, despite the vastly different cultural and ideological backgrounds from which they spring, influential voices have emerged calling for a distinctive approach to world order, sharply at variance with the one that appears to have informed the vision and practice of empire. This discourse lends itself to the following propositions: (a) Dialogue, that is encounter with the other, is the path to self-discovery and is therefore a profoundly transformative process; (b) Dialogue can proceed only with the renewal of tradition against the backdrop of modernity; (c) The dialogue of civilisations proposes first and foremost the dialogical encounter between East and West; (d) Such encounter will involve a new synthesis constituted of both differences and commonalities; (e) The dialogue of civilisations offers the most promising cultural underpinning for the rapidly evolving multilateral edifice, and for new conceptions of governance, not least regionally and globally. What emerges from this review of civilisation dialogue is that several discourses are presently competing in the international arena for the attention of theorists and practitioners alike. The end of the Cold War, 9/11 and its aftermath, not least the responses of the imperial power and in particular the war in

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Iraq, have added weight and urgency to this discursive competition. What is at stake is not simply or even primarily the future configuration of global geopolitics, but the norms that will guide the organisation of a still globalising yet fragmenting world. The evidence of the last fifteen years suggests that neither western triumphalism nor the clash of civilisations is likely to provide an acceptable let alone effective basis of world order. The journey from Berlin to Baghdad appears to have opened up a third possibility of a world that is simultaneously singular and plural. In this unfolding transitional moment, the journey between occident and orient has some way to go.

Notes * This chapter is based in part on the keynote address delivered to the HUGGII International Conference Alliance of Civilizations for Global Peace: Human Security, Regional Conflict, and Global Governance, Vancouver, Canada, 25–27 June 2006, an earlier version of which was given at the Philippines-Australia Studies Network Inaugural Week Lectures (see Joseph A. Camilleri et al., Australian Perspectives on Southeast Asia, the United States and the World, Manila: Ateneo de Manila University, 2005, pp. 13–38). 1. The reference here is not simply or even primarily to the body of thought generally referred to as ‘postmodernism’ that has exerted such a profound influence on philosophy, art, critical theory, literature, architecture, interpretation of history and culture in the late twentieth century. An earlier trend is evident in the works of Spengler (Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, authorised translation with notes by Charles Francis Atkinson, London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1926–28), and José Ortega y Gasett, The Modern Theme, translated from the Spanish by James Cleugh, New York: Harper, 1961. 2. Worthy of mention in this context is the contribution of Daniel Bell to the notion of post-industrialism, in particular The End of Ideology (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1976) and The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (London: Heinemann Educational, 1974); and that of Edward Said to post-colonial theory (Culture and Imperialism London: Chatto & Windus, 1993). 3. See Martin Albrow, The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. 4. See Joseph A. Camilleri, ‘State, Civil Society and Economy’, in Joseph A. Camilleri, Anthony P. Jarvis, Albert J. Paolini (eds), The State in Transition: Reimagining Political Space, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1995, pp. 209–28. 5. See Eliot A. Cohen, ‘History and the Hyperpower’, Foreign Affairs, 83n(4), July/August 2004.

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6. See Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty: Politics in a Shrinking and Fragmenting World, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 1992. 7. A.D. Smith refers to this project as ‘bureaucratic nationalism’. See A.D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. 8. The Limits to Growth, a report for the Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind by Donnella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randers, William W. Behrens, London: Earth Island, 1972. 9. There is now a rich literature covering most aspects of this evolving landscape. Particularly useful in this regard are: Aseem Prakash and Jeffrey Hart (eds), Globalization and Governance (London: Routledge, 1999); Kenneth Pomerantz and Stephen Topic, The World that Created: Society, Culture and the World Economy, 1400 to the Present (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); Pierre Jacquet et Frédérique Sachwald, ‘Mondialisation: la vraie rupture du XX siècle’, Politique étrangère 3–4/2000: 597–612; John Urry, Global Complexity (Cambridge: Polity Press 2003). 10. Andrew J. Bacevich (ed.), The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003. 11. Thierry de Montbrial, Quinze ans qui bouleversèrent le monde: De Berlin à Bagdad, Paris: Dunod, 2003. 12. Joseph A. Camilleri, ‘Alliances and Emerging Post-Cold War Security System’, in Richard Leaver and James L. Richardson (eds), Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, pp. 81–94. 13. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: 1995 (2nd edn with new supplement and related documents), New York: United Nations, 1995. 14. Joseph A. Camilleri, ‘The Advanced Capitalist State and the Contemporary World Crisis’, Science and Society, 45 (2), Summer, 1981, pp. 130–58. 15. The idea is further developed in Joseph A. Camilleri, States, Markets and Civil Society in Asia Pacific, The Political Economy of Asia Pacific Vol. I, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar, 2000, pp. 148–52. As the title of the book indicates, a political economy perspective requires an integrated approach that focuses on the interconnectedness of state, market and civil society. This is highly relevant to any discussion of empire, for here, and especially in the context of the American empire, we are dealing with the American state certainly, but also and of necessity with the American economy, hence the role of US capital, and with American civil society. In what follows, I emphasise the functioning of the state, but by situating it explicitly or implicitly in the context of this triangular relationship. 16. See Huang Zhengji, ‘Volatile World Situation’, International Strategic Studies (published by the China Institute of International Strategic Studies), 24(2), June 1992, pp. 1–5. 17. Yang Dazhou’s position is outlined in Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, January 2000 (sighted at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/ pills2/part01.htm on 28 June 2004).

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18. See Chen Qimao, ‘The Transitional Era: Roots of Turbulence and Features of International Affairs’, Shanghai Institute for International Studies Journal 1(2), 1994, pp. 15–32; also Chen, Qimao, ‘New Approaches in China’s Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era,’ Asian Survey, 33(3), March 1993, pp. 237–51. 19. United States Department of Defense, News Transcript, 12 February 2002 (sighted at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t02122002_t212sdv2.html on 25 June 2004. 20. See Bertrand Badie, Marie-Claude Smouts (dir.), L’International sans territoire, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1996 (Cultures & Conflits). 21. Bertrand Badie, ‘La puissance américaine condamnée à la modestie’, interview with Jean-Luc Allouche et Jean-Dominique Merchet, Liberation, 15–16 septembre 2001 (sighted at http://xtream.online.fr/china/references/www.liberation.com_quotidien_semaine_20010915samzc.html on 20 May 2004). 22. Paul Virilio, ‘Télésurveillance globale’, Le Monde Diplomatique, August 1999, p. 4. 23. Paul Virilio, ‘L’état d’urgence permanent’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 2051, 26 February 2004 (sighted at http://www.nouvelobs.com/articles/p2051/a233909.html, 20 June 2004). 24. Paul Virilio, ‘Télésurveillance globale’, p. 5. 25. Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism and Other Essays, translated by Chris Turner, London: Verso, 2003. 26. I am deeply indebted here to Fabio Petito’s characterisation of the competing intellectual currents of the post-Cold War period, although it is probably more useful and accurate to think in terms of currents or discourses than theories. See Fabio Petito, ‘The Dialogue of Civilisations as International Political theory: Khatami and Havel, paper presented at the workshop on ‘Political Science and Dialogue of Civilizations’, International Centre for Dialogue Among Civilizations, Tehran, 15–21 May 2003. 27. Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, London: H. Hamilton, 1992. 28. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), Summer 1993, pp. 22–8. This much discussed article was subsequently developed into a full length study The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. 29. Bernard Lewis, ‘Roots of Muslin Rage’, The Atlantic Monthly, September 1990 (sighted at http://www.travelbrochuregraphics.com/extra/roots_of_muslim_ rage.htm on 20 June 2004. 30. See Joseph Camilleri, ‘Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism and the Globalization of Insecurity’, Arena Journal, no. 19, 2002, pp. 7–19. 31. Vaclav Havel, speech delivered at the Latin American Parliament, São Paolo, 19 September 1996 (sighted at http://old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/ index_uk.html on 22 May 2004). 32. Vaclav Havel, ‘The Need for Transcendence in the Postmodern World’, speech

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33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

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delivered in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 4 July 1994 (sighted at http://www.worldtrans.org/whole/havelspeech.htmlon 15 April 2004). Address by H.E. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the Dialogue Among Civilizations Conference at the United Nations, 5 September 2005 (sighted at http://www.un.int/iran/dialogue/2000/articles/ 1.html on 12 May 2004). Speech at the European University Institute, Florence, 10 March 1999 (sighted at http://www.dialoguecentre.org/PDF/Florence%20Speech.pdf on 15 June 2004) Some of Tu Weiming’s more important works in English include: Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1985; The Way, Learning and Politics in Classical Confucian Humanism, Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1985; Confucianism in a Historical Perspective, Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1989; Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Exploring Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons (editor), Harvard University Press, 1996. Tu Weiming, lecture delivered at Colorado College, 5 February 1999, sighted at http://www.coloradocollege.edu/academics/anniversary/participants/Tu.htm on 23 April 2004. Tu Weiming, ‘The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the World’ (sighted at http://www.tc.columbia.edu/centers/coce/ pdf_files/s8.pdf on 23 April 2004). See Tu Weiming’s presentation to the seminar organised by the Danish Foreign Ministry, Copenhagen, June 1001 (proceedings edited by Jacques Baudot, Building A World Community: Globalisation and the Common Good, Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in association with University of Washington Press, Seattle, 2001).

Chapter 3: US Nuclear Policies* Michael D. Intriligator

Introduction and Purpose

T

here have been remarkable recent changes in US nuclear weapons policy under the current administration of President George W. Bush that were announced in 2002 in three official documents but are neither widely known nor adequately discussed and critiqued. They constitute a new doctrine, the Bush doctrine, ending the security system and nuclear weapons policies of the Cold War period. They thus represent a discontinuous sea change in the international security system that calls for discussion, debate, and analysis, which have not occurred. The earlier bipolar world has been replaced by a proposed unipolar world with the US under President Bush seeing itself as the dominant power or sole superpower. The mutual deterrence system that was part of the Cold War has been replaced by US unilateral actions against possible rivals, including ‘regime change’. Cooperative approaches to national and international security and alliance systems that had existed in the earlier epoch have been replaced by unilateral US policies and actions. Arms control has been replaced by unilateral US arms initiatives. The purposes of this chapter are to present these new concepts related to US nuclear weapons doctrine; to evaluate them; and to consider an alternative approach, that of global security. The new concepts as well as alternatives, such as global security, call for a wide-ranging debate both nationally and internationally. Unfortunately, this has not happened, possibly due to the concern over the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that were, ironically, examples of these new policies put into action. Both the new policies and their underlying goals should be subjects of intense scrutiny.

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Background to the New Bush Policy The background to these new nuclear weapons doctrines includes the end of the Cold War in 1989; the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991; the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) established in 1997 ‘to promote American global leadership’; the advent of the new Bush Administration in January 2001, which included many of the PNAC individuals in major leadership positions; the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon; and the ensuing declaration by the Bush administration of a ‘War on Terrorism’. Following on the adoption of these new policies were the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Changes in Policy Announced in Three Major Policy Documents in 2002 The changes in US nuclear weapons policy were announced in three official documents that were released by the administration in 2002. The first of these documents is the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that was delivered to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense in January 2002. It is a classified document that is mandated by Congress and produced periodically, the last one having been that of the Clinton administration in 1994. The Los Angeles Times leaked the latest version in March 2002. According to the NPR, ‘A combination of offensive and defensive, and nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities is essential to meet the deterrence requirements of the 21st century.’ It is a wide-ranging analysis of the requirements for deterrence in the twenty-first century. It states that it does not provide operational guidance on nuclear targeting or planning. Rather, it states that the Department of Defense continues to plan for a broad range of contingencies and unforeseen threats to the US and its allies in order to deter such attacks in the first place. It does, however, refer to the ‘possible use of nuclear weapons in an Arab–Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from North Korea on the South’. It also refers to the possible use of nuclear weapons against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack, in retaliation for attacks by nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ‘in the event of surprising military developments’. Thus, it calls for contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons in various contingencies, including against non-nuclear weapons states and in response to conventional weapons. It also states that the administration is fashioning a more diverse set of options for deterring the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which emerged as the last of these three policy documents in December 2002.

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Overall, according to the NPR, nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. The NPR states that these ‘nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important strategic and political objectives’. This document calls for the integration of nuclear weapons into conventional strike options, thus diminishing the firewall separating nuclear and conventional weapons and the development of new nuclear weapons to provide a wider range of options to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. It also calls for a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons via missile defense and non-nuclear strike forces, including precision conventional forces, but, at the same time an indefinite retention of nuclear weapons under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) – the Moscow Treaty. The second of these documents is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) that was issued by the Office of the National Security Advisor to the President in September 2002. It is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House website. According to the NSS, there are plans to ensure that no nation could rival US military strength. The emphasis is on defeating rogue states and global terrorists, noting that deterrence will not work against such enemies. It proclaims the doctrine of US preemption, where it states that the US ‘cannot let our enemies strike first’ and gives arguments for preemption. (Some have noted, correctly, that this is not a doctrine of preemption but rather one of preventive war.) For example, it notes that, ‘For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack.’ It further states that ‘The US has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.’ It should be noted, however, that the US did not preempt in most of the recent wars it has fought, including the two World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, while its attempt at preemption in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was a total failure. Far from there being historical precedents, this new policy represents a fundamental shift from a US policy of reaction to a new policy of initiation. It is too early to say that this policy of preemption in the Iraq War was a success or failure, but the costs in terms of both casualties and dollar spending have been immense and much larger than expected. Indeed, this war is being seen more and more as a quagmire and likened to the Vietnam War. The NSS notes that ‘To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary act preemptively.’ Such a policy of

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preemption is, however, a violation of the UN system that was set up in large part to prevent precisely such preemption, as in Hitler’s invasion of Poland or Japan’s invasion of China. The UN Charter forbids a member state from taking military action against another member state unless it has itself been attacked or it has the authorization of the Security Council. The US acted preemptively in the current Iraq War, which represented the first application of the NSS policy, but, at the same time, also represented a violation of the UN Charter. In terms of international law, the US was as much an outlaw in its attack on Iraq as Saddam Hussein was in his attack on Kuwait. President Bush’s West Point Commencement Speech of June 2002 articulates many of the points in the NPR and the NSS. In fact, this speech set the stage for the NSS, which quotes at length from it. The third of these documents is the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSWMD) that was issued by the White House in December 2002. As in the case of NSS, NSWMD is an unclassified and open public document that is available on the White House website. It notes that WMD, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of states hostile to the US or terrorists represents one of the greatest security challenges facing the US. It states that an effective strategy for countering WMD, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the US. It states that, as in the war on terrorism, the strategy for homeland security, and the new concept of deterrence, this new approach to WMD represents a fundamental change from the past. It affirms that the highest priority is accorded to protection of the US and its allies from the threat of WMD. The three pillars it announces are counterproliferation to combat WMD use, strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation, and consequence management to respond to WMD use. It discusses such policies as interdiction of WMD, new methods of deterrence with threats of overwhelming force, and defense mitigation, including the destruction of an adversary’s WMD before their use, on a first-strike attack as in the preemptive policy enunciated in NSS, as well as traditional nonproliferation approaches. It does not exclude the use of nuclear weapons to destroy facilities that could produce nuclear weapons. The policies set out in NSWMD were further elaborated by President George W. Bush in his February 11, 2004 speech at the National Defense University, in which he developed a seven-point agenda, including international cooperation against proliferation, requiring all states to criminalize proliferation, an expansion of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the required renunciation of reprocessing and enrichment for

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non-nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT, a required additional protocol for states to import equipment for civilian nuclear reactors, the formation of a special committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board to focus on safeguards and verification, and a requirement that states under investigation for violations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) not be allowed to serve on the IAEA Board of Governors. Targets for Nuclear Weapons According to the NPR the US reserves the right to use nuclear weapons, thereby possibly breaking the taboo against their use that has existed since their first and only use – by the US against Japan in August 1945. According to this statement of US policy they are treated like any other weapon, with no sharp distinction from non-nuclear weapons, unlike traditional doctrine that sees them as weapons of last resort. Nuclear targeting discussions have been a part of US military strategy for some time, but the leak of the NPR provides for the first time an official ‘hit list’ of targets for nuclear weapons. The NPR lists seven nations as possible targets for US nuclear weapons. First are the two ‘old’ enemies of Russia and China. Second are the three countries listed as members of the ‘Axis of Evil’ in President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union speech, namely Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. Third are two countries that are listed by the US as terrorist states: Syria and Libya. Of these seven nations that could be targets of US nuclear weapons, three are non-nuclear weapons states that are parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT, namely Iran, Syria, and Libya (‘regime change’ has occurred in Iraq as a result of the US invasion, while North Korea has withdrawn from the NPT). The US along with other nuclear weapons states that are parties to the NPT, however, gave so-called ‘negative security assurances’ to non-nuclear weapons state parties to the NPT in 1978, pledging that it would not use nuclear weapons against such non-nuclear states unless they were allied with nuclear powers. The most recent such pledge was given on April 5, 1995 during the Clinton administration by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who stated: The United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a

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State toward which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon States in association or alliance with a nuclearweapon State.

This pledge was reiterated by the US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher on February 11, 2002 but undermined by his saying that if WMD were used against the US the Administration would not rule out any specific type of military response. Thus, targeting any of these three nations with nuclear weapons would be a violation of these US negative assurances that provided an inducement for these states to join the NPT and that were reiterated at the time of the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. The NPR also calls for lesser reliance on the massive stockpiles of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to attack, with greater reliance on precision-guided weapons to deter attacks. It states that because of improvements in precisionguided weaponry, as demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan, the US military can now rely more on powerful, highly accurate conventional bombs and missiles. A New Triad According to the NPR there is a new triad. The old triad consisted of three different basing modes for nuclear weapons: long-range bombers, land-based missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. By contrast, the NPR refers to a new triad with three component parts of the US strategic system. First are offensive strike weapons, both nuclear and nonnuclear, including all three components of the old triad. Second are defenses, both active and passive, including the new national missile defense system that is currently under construction. Third is a revitalized defense infrastructure that could ‘design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements and maintain readiness to resume underground testing [at the Nevada Test Site] if required’. The Bush administration has obtained agreement from Congress to lift its ban on the design of new nuclear warheads, and there are plans to develop two such weapons. One is a low-yield weapon, a ‘mini-nuke’, that could potentially be used as a weapon in regional conflicts, thus possibly changing the role of nuclear weapons from that of deterring war to that of an instrument of war. The other is the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, a ‘bunker buster’, that can destroy underground facilities, including missile silos in Russia, China, and

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elsewhere. The administration has already started to construct a missile defense system at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and the Secretary of Defense has asked his Science Board to look into the possibility that the new system might use nuclear-tipped interceptors. Such interceptors would be much more effective in destroying incoming missiles than the more conventional hit-to-kill interceptors that are being tested now, and they could even neutralize a Russian second-strike deterrent. Thus, the NPR is a strategy for indefinite reliance on nuclear weapons with plans to improve the capabilities of the existing arsenal and to revitalize the infrastructure for improving US nuclear forces in the future. It promotes a nuclear strategy of maximum flexibility as opposed to measures for irreversible nuclear disarmament as agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference in the form of ‘13 Practical Steps’ related to Article VI of the NPT Treaty that calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons. The US and the other nuclear weapons states that are parties to the treaty agreed to these steps. They included ‘an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals’; an early ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies, including irreversible and verifiable reductions of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. According to NSWMD and the other 2002 documents, however, the US has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons but rather sees them as playing an even more important role in its security strategy and as part of a continuum of weapons, with no clear breaks or taboos against their use.

Preemption and Its Dangers The NSS places major emphasis on preemption (more properly, as already noted, a preventive war) and calls for preemption rather than deterrence as the fundamental basis of national security. The Iraq War is the initial case of such preemption, with the US retaining its right to preempt in defending its vital interests. (The Afghanistan War is more properly interpreted as a retaliatory strike for the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US) Such a policy of preemption requires massive defense spending, and the US now spends more than $400 billion annually on defense, more than most of the rest of the world combined. In addition to its costs, there are significant dangers associated with preemption. First, it creates antagonism toward the US and the possibility of further terrorist attacks. Second, it sends a message to the rest of the world, that they should not attempt to fight the US with

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conventional weapons, leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Third, this policy sets a precedent for other nations to also engage in similar preemption, including China in Taiwan and India in Pakistan. Fourth, there are dangers stemming from US hubris after its quick defeat of Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq, with the next step possibly being an invasion of the other nations on President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ list: Iran and North Korea, or possibly others on the NPR nuclear hit list, such as Syria or Libya, or yet others, such as Sudan or Cuba. These nations will see such a possibility as looming and try to protect themselves, possibly by building their own nuclear weapons, as has already happened in North Korea. According to the New York Times editorial of March 12, 2002: If another country were planning to develop a new nuclear weapon and contemplating pre-emptive strikes against a list of non-nuclear powers, Washington would rightly label that nation a dangerous rogue state. Yet, such is the course recommended to President Bush by a new Pentagon planning paper . . . Nuclear weapons are not just another part of the military arsenal. They are different, and lowering the threshold for their use is reckless folly.

A New Non-Proliferation Agenda The new non-proliferation agenda included ‘old approaches’ such as controls on materials and technology and ‘new approaches’ such as reserving the right to destroy facilities used to make WMD. A precedent for the latter was the Israeli destruction of the Osirak reactor near Baghdad in 1981 before it could be used to make nuclear weapons. Many nations criticized Israel for this action that was in violation of international law, including the UN Charter, given that the Security Council did not authorize it. Similar criticisms could be directed at the US if it were to engage in such acts. Furthermore, if the US claims a right to such acts then other nations could also make such a claim, creating very dangerous situations. For example, India might claim the right to destroy Pakistani nuclear facilities using the same logic or China could claim a right to destroy the nuclear infrastructure of Taiwan or Japan. Such policies and actions would make the world a much more dangerous place. One could also argue that the ‘old’ problem of proliferation was that of nations acquiring nuclear weapons, while the ‘new’ problem is one of terrorist groups acquiring such weapons. More should be done on a cooperative international basis to deny such weapons to terrorist organizations or subnational groups in general. This should be done under the auspices of the UN as a truly

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international cooperative effort. As to the old problem, involving such nations as Iran and North Korea, a case could be made that their acquiring such weapons could, in fact, be stabilizing rather than destabilizing if the effect is to deter the US from using its weapons against these nations seeking further ‘regime change.’ The world has noted that the US invaded and occupied two non-nuclear nations, Afghanistan and Iraq, but that it did not invade North Korea or Iran, nations that were on President Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’ in his January 2002 State of the Union address, possibly since the former already has nuclear weapons while the latter could possibly acquire them in the near future. Indeed, the US 2002 documents on nuclear policy create powerful incentives for states to proliferate to deter a US preemptive strike.

An Alternative Approach: Global Security There is an alternative to the policies that are enunciated in the NPR, the NSS, and the NSWMD, namely global security. The concept refers to security for the planet as a whole to replace the concept of national security, which is outmoded. National security, which is defined up to certain well-defined borders, makes little sense given the globalization that has occurred. The goal of global security would be that of protecting the planet as a whole from threats to its vital interests. This approach recognizes the value of global cooperation, in particular, the value of cooperative efforts among the current great powers of the US, the EU, Japan, Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, South Africa, and others. The concept of global security recognizes the need to create a new global system comparable to the creation of a new world system after World War II, one that would encompass not only security but also economics, politics, and other issue areas. This new global system would treat problems of security, both military and non-military, through strengthening existing international institutions or creating new global institutions. These new institutions could be built, in part, on the UN system and its components. They would involve supranational decision-making and authority, with enforcement capabilities, transparency, and accountability and with global perspectives and responses. Participation in the global decision-making process would be through close international cooperation. There would be a prohibition against preemption by any one nation, no matter how powerful, in favor of collective action. Such a system of global security should be preferred to the current system of the US as a hegemonic global power.

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Among the specific steps that might be taken in an agenda to foster such a system of global security are reducing world stockpiles of nuclear weapons and other WMD, especially the enormous stockpile of chemical weapons in Russia; a ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; taking nuclear weapons off hair-trigger alert and generally dealerting WMD; a reaffirmation of the moratorium against nuclear testing; international cooperation to prevent nuclear proliferation; implementation of the 13 steps program under the NPT with specific timetables for each of these steps, including an abandonment of all plans to develop new nuclear weapons; a sharing of Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology with all nuclear weapons states to reduce the chance of accidental nuclear war; a US renunciation of its policy of preemption and its reaffirmation of the UN Charter; and cooperative efforts against terrorism, especially the acquisition of WMD by terrorist groups. Notes * A Presentation to the GRAD Conference on ‘Regional Cooperation and Global Security’ International Business School, Budapest, 30 June–4 July 2004.

Bibliography Allison, Graham (2004) Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, New York: Times Books. Arkin, William M. (2002) ‘Secret Plan Outlines the Unthinkable,’ Los Angeles Times, March 10. Cushman, John H., Jr. (2002) ‘Rattling New Sabers,’ The New York Times, March 10. Gaddis, John Lewis (2003) ‘A Grand Strategy of Transformation,’ Foreign Policy 133: 50–7. Gordon, Michael R. (2002) ‘US Nuclear Plan Sees New Weapons and New Targets,’ The New York Times, March 10. —— (2002) ‘Nuclear Arms for Deterrence or Fighting?’ The New York Times, March 11. Gould, Robert M. and Patrice Sutton (2002) ‘Global Security: Beyond Gated Communities and Bunker Vision,’ Social Justice 29(3): 1. Guoliang, Gu (2003) ‘Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption,’ The Washington Quarterly 26(2): 135. Heisbourg, François (2003) ‘A Work in Progress: The Bush Doctrine and Its Consequences,’ The Washington Quarterly 26(2): 75. Hoffman, Stanley (2003) ‘The High and the Mighty: Bush’s National Security Strategy and the New American Hubris,’ The American Prospect 13(24): 28.

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Intriligator, Michael D. (1994) ‘Global Security After the End of the Cold War,’ Presidential Address, Peace Science Society (International), Conflict Management and Peace Science 13(2): 1–11. Levi, Michael A. (2003) ‘The Case Against New Nuclear Weapons: New Tactical Bombs Would Have Little Military Value and Would Undercut US Nonproliferation Efforts,’ Issues in Science and Technology (March). McGwire, Michael (2002) ‘Shifting the Paradigm (Western Ideology of the Cold War),’ International Affairs 78(1): 1. O’Hanlon, Michael E. (2002) ‘The New National Security Strategy and Preemption,’ Brookings Institution. US Department of Defense (2002) Nuclear Posture Review, The Pentagon ( January). Excerpts available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/ dod/npr.htm US Office of the National Security Advisor (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House (September). http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html US Office of the President (2002) National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, The White House (December). http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf

Chapter 4: Regional Security in Latin America Benedicte Bull

Introduction

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egionalism in Latin America has traditionally revolved around two competing visions: the Latin American-led regionalism originating in Simón Bolívar’s Pan-American visions, and US visions of a cooperating Latin America originating in the Monroe Doctrine (Hurrel 1995; Kirby 2003). Currently regional integration initiatives abound; both those that represent a continuation of the visions of Bolívar, and those that emerge from US aspirations of hemispheric leadership. The main focus of current integration processes – including Mercosur and the negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – has been economic issues, primarily trade and investments. However, the wave of new regionalism also encompasses security issues. In the 1990s, a fragile consensus about specific values upon which security cooperation should be founded was established. However, this consensus broke down with the increasingly unilateral policies of the US after 2000, and the interpretation of Latin American security issues within the frames of the War on Terror. This has led to a division between those Latin American countries that support an aggressive US security policy, and those countries that are more skeptical towards it. This division adds to the already diverse security calculations among the Latin American countries, and makes it unlikely that a more committing security framework than the one already in place will emerge in the near future. This chapter analyzes security co-operation in Latin America with a special emphasis on the role played by the US The chapter is structured chronologically; it starts by discussing the Cold War period, moves on to the human security interlude of the 1990s, and ends with the period of the Bush administration. The main argument that I make is that security issues in Latin America are complex and essentially contested. What are considered solutions

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to security problems by some are considered threats by others. However, the US presence in the region has contributed to the tendency to subsume complex threats within simplified concepts of the enemy in accordance with US geo-strategic interests and shifting policies. With the exception of Cuba, the enemy in Latin America has never been identified as a specific country; rather the threat has been of a changing transnational nature. In the Cold War era it was communism, in the 1990s it was drug-trafficking, and in the post-2001 period it has been terrorism. This simplification of the security agenda has contributed to the continued irrelevance of the institutions of the hemispheric security system, and to the lack of successful cooperation efforts regarding many of the most pressing security issues.

Regional Security and Contested Security Concepts Recently, some significant literature has added to our understanding of the regional security dynamics of Latin America and its relationship to the global order. The starting point of these contributions is that we are currently not facing a single global order, but rather a variety of new regional orders. However, different authors utilize different concepts of security, and have different views with regards to the extent to which regional orders are viewed as independent of global orders. This chapter applies a constructivist concept of security, based on Buzan et al.’s (1998) definition. The intention of its formulation was a desire to move beyond both the traditional notion of security focusing on military threats against states, but also avoid the pitfalls of a wider notion of security including non-military threats against a variety of referent objects. The critique of both concepts is now well-known.1 Among main shortcomings of the traditional concept is that it fails to account for the fact that the most pressing threats against the lives of the populations is the very state, whereas the wider concept runs the risk of diluting the concept of security. To make up for this, Buzan et al. argue that to qualify as a security threat it has to be ‘staged as an existential threat to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind’ (1998: 5). Whereas this concept is also vulnerable to critique for essentially being able to encompass just about any threat to human existence (dependent on the existence of successful securitizing actors), it allows us to study the crucial phase in which a security threat is constructed. However, this can never be the only purpose of security analysis (and the authors certainly are not ready to

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limit their analysis to that). Thus, at the core of a security analysis must also be an understanding of what is the real threats against the lives of citizens. This is the double concept underlying the approach to regional security by Hentz and Bøås (2003) who in spite of warning against the pitfalls of a widening agenda attempts to include a wide range of threats, regionalizing and securitizing actors and referent objects in their analysis. What is sacrificed of theoretical parsimony is attempted made up for by empirical relevance. The underlying security concept of this analysis will mainly be a constructivist concept, but with the qualification that the issues that are securitized are not necessarily the only existing threats to people’s survival. The second issue is what is a regional order and how does it relate to the global order? Lake and Morgan (1997) argue that regional orders are open systems and thus linked to global orders. Nevertheless, their desire to understand regional orders is founded on a desire ‘to identify when and how great powers, like the United States, can best contribute to regional stability in the years ahead’ (Lake and Morgan 1997: 6). This implies that regional orders may exist prior to and can be analyzed independent of the activities of great powers, in spite of their assertion that regional and global orders are interlinked. This, I will argue in the following, is not unproblematic. A second major contribution to the field of regional security (Buzan and Wæver 2003) argue explicitly that regional security complexes (defined as ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another’, ibid.: 44) are mutually exclusive, and that they should be analyzed as a ‘closed’ subsystem. An outside power may also penetrate the region and pose significant threats to it. Moreover, in extreme cases outside powers may have what they call ‘overlay’, defined as a situation in which great power interests transcend mere penetration, and come to dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 61). Nevertheless, this does in their view not take away from the fact that the close interlinkage of securitization processes within a region distinguishes it from outside forces. The argument above is important, and perhaps also necessary for the project of Buzan and Wæver to re-focus security studies on territoriality, without limiting the analysis to one specific state. However, the possibility of analyzing regional dynamics separate from the global superpower is based on an emphasis on material forces and an equal de-emphasis on ideational power. I will argue that the United States have played a significant role in the securitization of specific issues in the Latin American region and the desecuritization of

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others. Its role goes beyond being an external threat or penetrating the region, also in cases that do not fit the description of ‘overlay’ (which primarily relates to classical imperialism), by influencing the very ideas of what is to be considered a security issue. Buzan and Wæver argue for example that ‘South America is close to creating a security community based on securitizing primarily an external economic threat, and from this deriving the necessity of regional pacification’ (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 57). I will argue that this misses the point that the very process of securitization is deeply influenced by the United States, in matters not related directly to it being a threat or a guarantor against other threats. The key role of the US in the definition of regional security issues, or regional securitization, also calls into question the neat dividing line between the North American and the South American regional security complexes that Buzan and Wæver operates with. In other words, they do not adopt the term ‘Latin America’, but argue that securitization processes in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean are interlinked with the securitization of the United States, whereas the Southern Cone and the Andean region make up a separate security complex. It is true that the securitization processes of northern, central and southern Latin America differ significantly, and also that they differ from the processes in the Caribbean. However, it is also true that the very process through which the United States securitizes threats emerging from its southern neighbors the American continent, contributes to the construction of them as one single region – or alternatively several sub-regions (Central America, the Caribbean, the Andean region, the Southern Cone) – not two. The fact that the United States tries to construct Latin America as one region in security terms does of course not mean that any analyst should do the same. However, as I will discuss below page 74, the US policy and regionalizing strategies do impact on the region in a way that further interlinks the process of securitization. In sum, this analysis owes a lot to the ones cited above. However, it differs by including the United States as an important regionalizing actor that attempts actively to impact on the processes of securitization in Latin America. Although their own security calculations are more dependent on those of the northern part of Latin America than the southern part, their regionalizing strategies crucially impact on both. This chapter also differs from the approaches discussed above by looking directly at the possibility for regional security cooperation and how that is linked to the question of securitization and the strategies of regionalizing actors.

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Security in the Cold War Latin America A review of different concepts of security that have dominated the political agendas in Latin America over the last fifty years reveals that security has always been a contested concept. The Cold War era was dominated by the so called ‘traditional agenda’ and intra-state security issues, either discussed as having their roots in the deep-rooted inequality of the social structures, or in global communism. Security concepts in the Cold War era In Latin American security debates it is common to refer to a series of interstate conflicts, many of which have their roots back to colonial times, as the ‘traditional agenda’. In the Southern Cone, Brazil and Argentina have long competed for the hegemony of the Southern Atlantic Ocean, and there have been frequent border confrontations between Chile and Argentina (with a climax in 1978). Chile has a further border dispute with Bolivia. At the Pacific coast, Peru and Ecuador experienced a series of confrontations throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, Peru never attempted to hide that it prepared for a conflict with Chile in the 1980s, whereas Venezuela and Colombia have competed for control over the Golfo de Maracaibo. Further north, tensions between Honduras and El Salvador resulted in the so-called ‘soccer war’ in 1969. Both countries compete with Nicaragua for the control over resources in the Golfo de Fonseca. Colombia and Nicaragua have conflicts over the maritime delimitation of certain Caribbean islands, Nicaragua and Costa Rica have confrontations over Rio San Juan, and Guatemala still disputes the sovereignty of Belize (Tapia 2003). The ‘traditional agenda’ is not entirely a Cold War phenomenon, nor is it of purely historical interest, as many of these inter-state disputes still linger.2 In total, there are sixteen unresolved inter-state disagreements in Latin America and during the 1990s, military forces were utilized between Latin American states seventeen times, although only at one occasion did it result in a war-like situation (the conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995) (Rojas Aravena 2004). There are also ‘new’ tensions between Latin American states that may threaten to escalate into conflicts. These include the current relationship between Venezuela and Colombia, resulting partly from the spill-over from the Colombia conflict into Venezuela (as will be discussed below page 83) and partly from the differences between Colombian right-wing president Alvaro Uríbe and the left-wing populist president of Venezuela, Hugo Chávez.

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Nevertheless, it is generally acknowledged that inter-state conflicts in Latin America increasingly are dealt with in diplomatic forums, and that there currently is no major threat of a fully fledged inter-state war in Latin America. However, this does not mean that all the security problems from the past are solved. Indeed, the ‘traditional agenda’ has never constituted the most serious threat to people’s lives in Latin America. It is civil wars rather than inter-state wars that have constituted the most serious threat to people’s lives in Latin America. For example, the soccer war between El Salvador and Honduras lasted for 100 hours and killed approximately 2,000. In contrast, during the course of the twelve-year civil war in El Salvador, an estimated 75,000 people were killed. The same mismatch can be reported in Guatemala, where the 36-year long civil war left some 150,000 dead. This contrasts with the Guatemala–Belize border issue that never has resulted in outright military confrontation, in spite of repeated threats. Although the states of South America did not match the Central American ones in terms of killing of their citizens, also here internal conflicts demanded more lives than inter-state conflicts. The war between Ecuador and Peru in 1995 caused a few hundred victims and lasted for two days, whereas the internal confrontation between Sendero Luminoso and the government lasted for twelve years and caused an estimated 12,000 victims (Tapia 2003). Similarly, the numbers of casualties of the Falkland war between Argentina and Great Britain are dwarfed by the number of deaths in the ‘dirty war’ of the Argentine state. Historians and other scholars with in-depth knowledge of Latin America point to a complex set of issues that contributed to the outbreak of civil wars in Central America and the rise of authoritarian and violent regimes further South. The non-inclusive nature of the national states, the domination of small oligarchies, the skewed distribution of land and feudal organization of labor in the countryside, the vulnerability of the elites leading to the necessity of violent ‘protection racket states’ (Stanley 1996) are all elements in the explanation of the insurgencies in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, and the rise of authoritarian regimes in South America. However, as is well known, that was not the explanation offered by the United States. The US connected the different insurgent movement invariably to the global communist threat. That not only resulted in the well-known support for anti-communist governments and counter-insurgencies, but also gave the impetus to hemispheric security ‘cooperation’.

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Security cooperation in the Cold War era The US concern with the communist threat led to the creation of a series of multilateral organizations. On the one hand, it spurred interest in the creation of organizations for economic development as a means to curb the spread of communism in the region. This was the main backdrop of the Alliance for Progress initiated by the Kennedy administration in 1960. The communist threat and Latin American resentment against the US was also the main reason why the US changed its attitude towards the Latin American proposal for a regional development bank. Vice-president Richard Nixon’s tour in Latin America early 1958 was a wake-up call regarding the risks that development in the region posed to the US, and consequently, the US endorsed the plans for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), which was created the year after (Dell 1972). On the other hand, US concern with communism overshadowed the agendas of already existing organizations for security cooperation. The InterAmerican Defense Board (IADB) was established in 1942 originally to deal with the fascist threat by coordinating an inter-American defense and political response to it. However, its main tasks were soon to be support of anti-communist work. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) (the Rio Treaty), signed in 1947, was designed to provide the region with a flexible collective security arrangement. It was initiated by the United States, and Latin American countries always viewed it with a great deal of skepticism. Over the course of the post-war period, their skepticism was strengthened by a series of developments. IATRA was converted dramatically into an anticommunist alliance in the 1960s, making the US priorities of the Cold War the main purpose of the alliance. Furthermore, it repeatedly served US rather than Latin American interest when they were in conflict. One example was its stance in the Falkland conflict. Due to US pressure IATRA supported the United Kingdom to the dismay of many regional governments (Tapia 2003). The fact that IATRA was absent from the multilateral efforts to resolve the ‘traditional conflicts’ (see below page 79) further diminished its relevance. Finally, the Charter of the Organization of the American States (OAS), established in 1948, is itself a statement of collective security and defense cooperation through its chapters V and VI. The American Treaty for Peaceful Resolutions was signed simultaneously with the creation of the OAS, and since then a series of other agreements have been added to it.

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However, OAS has also been subdued due to controversies between the Latin American countries and the United States for most of its existence. Whereas the Latin American countries have viewed it as a shield against US intervention, the US has perceived it as a vehicle for its foreign policy interests (Gosselin and Thérien 1999). The OAS’s debut was the support of the USbacked ouster of social reformist president Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. This left an impression of the organization as little more than a tool in the hands of the United States, an image it was stuck with until the ‘interlude of human and democratic security’ in the 1990s gave it increased powers to play a role in resolution of conflicts (see page 74). Nevertheless, even in the Cold War era, Latin American countries managed to create ‘pockets’ of autonomy for Latin American initiatives. A series of adhoc coalitions created to resolve specific issues have been among the most efficient initiatives in the region. These were sub-regional initiatives that were not initiated by the United States, nor did they involve the inter-American organizations to any significant extent. In fact, the presence of the United Nations in the groups that contributed to the resolution of conflicts in the region has been more significant than the presence of the inter-American organizations. There are four major examples of regional multilateral conflict resolution. These are, first, the Grupo Contadora (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) established in 1983 with the main purpose of solving the political conflicts in Central America, second, Grupo del Rio that emerged out of the Grupo Contadora and (consisting of all the countries in Central and South America, Mexico, the Dominican Republic and one representative of the anglophone Caribbean), that has met annually since 1987 to discuss security issues in the region. In addition to these two groups, there were formed two groups of Friends of Latin American and non-regional countries, to resolve the conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala respectively. In addition to these, some more limited treaties between the Latin American countries have also had great success. That includes the Treaty of Tlateloco (1967), which has contributed to making Latin America and the Caribbean the first zone free of nuclear weapons in the world (Figoli 2003). In conclusion, during the Cold War era, the successful examples of security cooperation between Latin American states were those that were initiated by Latin American countries themselves, with minor US involvement, and with clearly defined tasks. General hemispheric organizations, on the other hand, tended to erode into US-led anti-communist clubs and generally contribute more to the insecurity of people than to the resolution of the region’s problems. This situation changed by the end of the Cold War.

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Security in the Latin America of the 1990s It has often been argued that the Cold War ended in Latin America before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. However, one may also say that it ended later. What marked the end of the Cold War was the fall of right-wing dictators in the Southern Cone starting in the mid-1980s, and the end of the civil wars in Central America (Nicaragua 1990, El Salvador 1992 and Guatemala 1996). Both processes were, of course, partly related to the diminishing US support for authoritarian regimes and for right-wing insurgents (Contras in Nicaragua). In the early to mid-1990s, there was a renewed interest in a broader security concept than the traditional one. However, over the course of the 1990s it was again overshadowed by the US interpretation of the ‘new threats’ focusing primarily on drugs and increasingly centered on Colombia. Thus, again the US contributed to narrowing the security agenda in the region, but this time revolving around different US concerns than during the Cold War. The 1990s was characterized by the end of the three bloody civil wars in Central America and the return to democracy in the countries of the Southern Cone. Therefore, the 1990s was often deemed the decade of the ‘double transition’; from authoritarianism to democracy and from state-led development towards market-oriented policies. Thus, a purported consensus emerged regarding the desired political system and economic policies. This led to a periodic opening for a broad security agenda in Latin America in line with trends in the rest of the world. This new agenda was reflected both in the renewal of the OAS as an expression of hemispheric regionalism, and in the revival of Latin American regional security cooperation. The first step in this direction was the adoption by the OAS of the Protocol of Cartagena in 1985. In this charter amendment, the OAS’s commitment toward the promotion and strengthening of representative democracy was articulated more explicitly than ever before, and the need to uphold the sacrosanct principle of nonintervention was reaffirmed. It also established the link between democracy and human rights. In 1990, a new Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) was created within the OAS, and in the wake of its establishment, the OAS General Assembly adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System reaffirming their ‘inescapable commitment to’ the defense and promotion of democracy and human rights in the Western Hemisphere (Gosselin and Thérien 1999). The development of the 1990s did not only involve adoption of declarations, but also testified to the growth of the OAS’s capacity to defend democracy

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collectively. In the early to mid-1990s, OAS contributed to restoring democracy on four occasions: the September 1991 military coup in Haiti, the autogolpes (self-coups – attempt to set aside the national legislature) in Peru (1992) and Guatemala (1993), and the Paraguayan political crisis of 1996. Here, OAS proved itself to be an efficient multilateral mechanism in defense of democracy (Cameron 1998). The new ‘democratic’ interventions also signified a new willingness by the United States to support missions restoring democracy. When President Bill Clinton sent 20,000 American troops to Haiti to restore JeanBertrand Aristide to the presidency, it seemed to herald a new day in the postCold War when American invasions were not automatically synonymous with supporting some Latin American caudillo (Hallinan 2004). In 1994, the first in a series of hemispheric summits (including the leaders of all the countries in the Western Hemisphere except Fidel Castro) took place in Miami. This was an important event in many ways. Here President Bill Clinton re-launched the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)3 to tie together the hemisphere from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego in one single free trade area. Clinton further prodded the defense ministers to join the regional integration process by committing themselves to the peaceful resolution of border disputes, multilateral cooperation in peacekeeping missions, and the maintenance of constitutional governance (Barry 2003). The human security agenda was also influential at the sub-regional level in the early to mid-1990s. This was perhaps most evident in Central America where a process towards a broader definition of security and regional threats was initiated within the framework of the Central American Integration System (SICA). In 1995, the Framework Agreement for Democratic Security in Central America (Tratado Marco de Seguridad Democrática en Centroamérica (TMSDCA)) was adopted. It elaborated the concept of Democratic Security to involve a wider range of threats to human beings, and although it failed to include civil society participation in its preparation, it raised expectation that security policy-making was to become more democratic in the future (Jácome 2003). However, already at the summit at which the TMSDCA was adopted, it was clear that the ability of the Central American states to jointly pursue such a broad agenda was limited, and that the US security demands were still powerful in the region. This was reflected in the final declaration which perceived no other joint action than a joint framework to fight car-theft (implying primarily the theft of cars in the US for sale in Central America) (Bull 1999). A new aspect of the security agenda in the 1990s was that it involved also the organizations set up to deal with economic development in Latin America. In

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the mid-1990s statistics revealed disturbing facts about crime rates in Latin America. Only South Africa had higher homicide rates than El Salvador and Colombia. In El Salvador, 6,000 people were killed annually between 1994 and 1996, signifying that El Salvador had a murder rate 20 times higher than the global average in 1996, and surpassed even Colombia (Call 2000). The revelation that more people were killed by violence in El Salvador in 1996 than the average during the civil war put traditional security concepts into perspective. As a consequence, US police cooperation was increased through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), and organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) got involved in public security issues. Yet, the new agenda of the 1990s was not as free of tension as it was often portrayed. The US proved itself to be deeply committed both to democracy and human rights, and to policies that could put those values in jeopardy. Towards the end of the 1990s, it became increasingly clear that the consensus on the new security issues was not as deep as purported. First, it was based on a strong belief in the virtues of market-oriented policies and democracy without recognizing that the general support for the former was much stronger than the latter. Towards the end of the decade, it became increasingly evident that the market-oriented policies failed to reduce poverty levels, and worsened the difference between rich and poor, which already was the worst in the world. Moreover, as noted by one commentator: . . . even in these best of times, there were deep contradictions in Washington’s argument for a policy of increased integration and hemispheric cooperation shaped largely by US corporate interests. [. . .] Official rhetoric about the confluence of economic liberalization and the transition to democratic peace was undercut by the self-serving mercantile policy of improving US exports to the region through the free flow of arms, attack helicopters, and fighter planes (Barry 2003: 4)

Second, the US came to increasingly identify the ‘new security agenda’ with drugs, migration, and to some extent money-laundering and contraband activities. Thus, as a result, economic strategies were increasingly designed to halt these undesired flows to the United States. The Miami summit in 1994 adopted the so-called ‘Williamsburg agenda’, in which it was argued that the end of the bipolar confrontation should be followed by a redefinition of security concepts, orienting them towards aspects such as the defense and promotion of democracy and human rights, but also the struggle against drug-trafficking, joint action against terrorism and participation in peace missions.

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In the shadow of the evolving priorities of the US, the new institutions established to develop a joint policy against new and diverse threats faced increasing problems. The Commission for Hemispheric Security, established in 1992, was given the mandate to ‘identify the forms to revitalize and strengthen the institutions of the inter-American system related to various aspects of hemispheric security’, in order to make them relevant for the challenges of the new millennium at the Presidential Summit in Santiago, Chile in 1998 (Delgado 2003: 153). However, during the special meeting of the Commission for Hemispheric Security to confront the ‘New Focuses of Hemispheric Security’ it became evident that the organization was not an effective forum for establishing concrete politics and decide upon actions (Covacevich 2003). A centerpiece of the US strategy and a main cause of concern was Colombia. In the 1990s, the Colombian conflict evolved from being a domestic problem to a major regional security issue. Atrocities committed by governmental militaries, paramilitaries and guerilla forces resulted in massive internal displacement and refugee flows into Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador. Moreover, despite having its historical roots in the concentration of resources in the hands of Colombia’s powerful political and economic elite, the drug trade was increasingly fuelling the warring parties, involving surrounding countries as transit areas, in money-laundering etc. Although the US had provided significant military support to Colombia since the 1960s, justified by the fight against communism, from the early 1990s support was given in the name of fighting drugs. Although legal attempts were made in the US Congress to distinguish between anti-drug and anti-guerilla operations, the dividing lines were increasingly blurred. From the 1980s the term narco-guerillas was increasingly used to denote the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) (Miller 2001). As a result of the focus on drugs, the Clinton administration increased significantly its aid to Colombia. In July 2000, Clinton signed a US$1.3 billion emergency counter-drug package, earmarking roughly $860 million in aid for Colombia. This special package, together with already appropriate funds, meant that the Clinton administration authorized an extraordinary US$1.2 billion in counter-narcotics aid to Colombia during 2000 and 2001. Roughly 80 percent of this was designated for military equipment and training (Miller 2001). Also at the sub-regional level, the broad human security agenda was replaced by US concerns on drug-trafficking. In Central America, various regional institutions were established in the aftermath of the adoption of the TMSDCA. However, they reflect to a larger extent military concerns in the

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region than the broad human security agenda that was attempted adopted in 1995. As such, it is symptomatic for the development over the course of the 1990s, when ‘new threats’ increasingly were associated with US concerns about the consequences of drug-trafficking. With the onset of the Bush administration in 2000, the priorities changed again.

The Security Agenda of the Bush Era The entering of the Bush administration in the US in 2000 was initially met with high expectations among Latin American governments. During his first months in the White House, president Bush repeatedly promised that he would work to make this the ‘Century of the Americas’. He developed a close relationship with newly elected Mexican president Vicente Fox, and he achieved significant support among the many Latino migrants in the US To the pleasure of many state leaders in Latin America, Bush promised to put the negotiations for the FTAA back on track after they had stalled due to Clinton’s failure to achieve a Fast Track Authority from Congress. Moreover, Bush’s personality matched well with the Latin American leadership style: ‘Many Latin Americans accepted the political persona that the novice Bush created for himself – a rancher who conducts the affairs of the nation with a smile and a handshake, a fellow uncomfortable with the pretentious rhetoric of foreign policy elites but drawn to commonsense solutions that served US national interests’ (Barry 2003: 2). However, Bush soon disappointed many of the Latin Americans that had supported him. His policy towards the region combined the two elements that many Latin leaders feared most: right-wing conservative ideology and a lack of attention to Latin American affairs. The two elements were reflected by his appointment – and lack of such – of people responsible for hemispheric affairs. Over the strong objections of the Latin American diplomatic community and despite bipartisan dissent, Bush appointed Otto Reich, a person famous for his rabid anti-Castroism and public support for the Nicaraguan Contras as the Assistant State Secretary for the Western Hemisphere, the State Department’s chief regional officer. However, the Senate failed to endorse the appointment and therefore Reich continued in a interim position until 2003, when he was replaced by Roger Noriega, a former chief aid to Senator Jesse Helms, and favorite of the militant Cuban American lobby for his activism in support of the Contras and against Castro. Among the other appointments questioned by Latin Americans was the decision to appoint John Negroponte

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as the US ambassador to the UN Negroponte was the ambassador to Honduras during the Cold War and oversaw from his position there the operation of Contras in Nicaragua. Bush also demonstrated the low priority Latin American affairs had by sending low ranking officials to events of great importance to Latin America. The most famous example of that came later, in 2002, when he sent trade negotiator Robert Zoellick instead of secretary of state Colin Powell to the inauguration of Brazilian president Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva. Moreover, it was soon evident that ‘whereas the Clinton administration ensured freedom through the diffusion of free trade and democratic ideas, the Bush administration made it conditional on the promotion of free trade and other topics on a security agenda’ (Fuentes Saavedra 2003: 2). This was, for example, evident in the Puebla-Panama Plan, launched by Mexican president Vicente Fox in 2000, but strongly backed by the US administration. The plan intends to integrate the economies of the eight impoverished South Eastern Mexican states (including Chiapas) with the Central American countries, through a series of infrastructure projects. The plan currently encompasses many different policies and a series of political agendas. However, its core idea has been to exploit the possibilities opened through free trade agreements, particularly through establishing assembly industries in the region, simultaneously curbing migration towards the north and improve the control of the problematic border areas that serve as transit regions for various kinds of illicit trade (Bull 2004). 9/11 and its aftermath There is little agreement about the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 in Latin America. Some analysts argue that it ‘changed everything’ whereas others argue that the security situation in Latin America did not really change at all. What certainly did change were US priorities in the region. The immediate impact of 9/11 on hemispheric security politics was the revival of OAS and IATRA and an odd diplomatic defeat of Mexico. On 7 September 2001, Mexican President Vicente Fox announced that Mexico would withdraw from IATRA due to its irrelevance and inefficiency. Although Fox thereby voiced the feelings of many Latin American state leaders, the announcement came as a surprise. However, within a few hours of the terrorist attacks of 11 September, Brazil proposed to convoke IATRA in order to discuss Latin American responses and show the countries’ support for the US.

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Shortly after, the OAS issued an immediate condemnation of the attack and on terrorism in general, and on 21 September the OAS issued a statement saying that the member countries considered the attack to be directed against all members of OAS. Following these resolutions, the OAS assigned the InterAmerican Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) (that had been established in 1996) to design a specific program to enhance multilateral actions against terrorism in the hemisphere. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, the Latin American countries united behind Washington (Youngers 2003). However, the unity would not last long. The development of US security policies in general and towards the region in particular caused great concern among the Latin American countries, and also a split between the different countries. One may distinguish between the effects of four different aspects of US policy post-9/11; the strategy of preventive war, including the war in Iraq, the increasing disrespect for democracy and human rights in its war against terror, the tendency to interpret various security issues within the framework of the war against terror, and finally the increasing tendency to put Latin America policy on the back-burner. The impact of the strategy of preventive war and the Iraq invasion The hemispheric consensus that many countries were eager to emphasize following the events of 11 September, broke down during the build-up to the Iraq war. In the division that followed the interlinkages between free trade and security became most evident. Dependence on trade or aid from the United States turned to be an almost perfect predictor of attitude towards the Iraq war. The Central American countries (with the exception of Costa Rica) that were eager to finalize the negotiations for the Central American Free Trade Area (CAFTA) all supported the US war in Iraq. Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador together sent 1,300 troops to Iraq, costing the impoverished countries US$30 million. Also the Dominican Republic, which is equally dependent on the US economically, backed the Iraq action. Colombia also proved a staunch ally of the US as the main recipient of US aid in the region. The exception was Chile that, in spite of being in the process of signing a free trade agreement with the United States, did not support the US policy.4 However, the willingness to cooperate with the US must also be understood against the background of the historical experiences with US intervention among the small and vulnerable states in Central American and the Caribbean. US direct interventions have been a returning feature of US policy in the region, and got renewed actuality after the launch of Bush’s security strategy.

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Among the rest of the countries, there was widespread resentment against US policy in Iraq. For Mexico and Chile with non-permanent seats in the Security Council their positions against the Iraqi war had severe consequences for bilateral talks on migration and trade issues. With regards to Chile it kept congressional endorsement of the Chile–US Free Trade Agreement in limbo for several months, whereas Bush cut off the process to negotiate a bilateral solution to the problem of illegal migration with Mexico. This split between different Latin American countries had both negative and positive consequences for Latin American unity. Whereas it moved Central America even further into the orbit of US influence, and reaffirmed Colombia’s close relationship with the US, it also strengthened the unity among the remaining Latin American countries, where anti-US sentiments experienced a boost. Disrespect for human rights and democracy The second main aspect of the policy that has affected Latin America was its increasing disrespect for human rights and democracy. Thus, one may argue that the consensus about the virtues of free market and democracy received two setbacks; whereas both civil society and governments of the region challenged market oriented policies, the US de facto challenged democracy and human rights in the name of the war on terror. There are several examples of that. The US has lately been unusually blunt in its opposition against some electoral candidates and support for others. It has intervened directly in electoral campaigns in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Brazil and El Salvador in order to prevent left-wing candidates from taking position. However, the main ‘enemies’ of the region that Bush has publicly announced to be part of the axis of evil are Fidel Castro and Venezuelan president, Hugo Chávez. In Venezuela, the US propped up the opposition against Chávez through the National Endowment for Democracy, the Center for Strategic Studies and right-wing think tanks. When the US finally embraced the government that was installed after Chávez had been forcefully ousted from office on April 12, 2002, it provoked severe criticism from across the region. However, the US did (albeit reluctantly) endorse the results of the August 2004 referendum on Chávez’s future, in which a solid majority of the population rejected the proposal to oust him from office before the end of his term. The US handling of the crisis in Haiti in 2004, during which democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide claimed he had been kidnapped by US forces and forced out of the country, did not provoke the same reactions.

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Indeed the United States managed to put together a multilateral force, including troops from Canada, France, Chile and later Argentina to maintain stability in Haiti after the US-sponsored change of government. Thus, the US was not alone in its setting aside the principle of sovereignty and respect for a democratically elected leader. Nevertheless, the increasing interference with democratic processes in the region over the last years, ‘sends the very clear message that Washington supports electoral democracy – as long as its candidate wins’ (Youngers 2003: 3). There is also a very real fear that the policies of the US in the region will strengthen the military’s domination of security policy, and discontinue the unfinished process of establishing civilian control over the military forces (Diamint 2004). Without a stronger commitment to democratic, civilian governance in security matters, the ability to implement the various treaties of regional cooperation is also weakened, as these are not sufficiently embedded in the domestic polities but ‘managed by a small group of officers’ (Diamint 2004: 56). The reframing of security The focus on terrorist organizations in US foreign policy in Latin America precedes the terrorist attacks of 2002. The tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay has long been considered a ‘hotbed of Arab radicalism’. This area allegedly hosts a training camp for groups associated with Hizbollah that were made responsible for the attack on the Asociación de Mutuales Israelitas Argentinas (AMIA) in Buenos Aires in 1992 (Urzúa Lira 2003). The term narco-terrorist was also used about the Colombian guerilla forces long before 11 September. Furthermore, as a result of the perceived terrorist threat from Latin America, a special commission was set up under the framework of OAS, the CICTE, early as 1996. Moreover, the day before the terrorist attacks in New York, the US government announced that the paramilitary groups in Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) as well as the guerillas (ELN and FARC) had been put on the list of international terrorist organizations.5 However, the new security framework changed the rhetoric of the US that increasingly framed old conflicts in terms of terrorism. Thus, ‘old enemies’ were again subsumed under the rhetoric of a new security agenda. This was most evident with regards to Colombia, a state in which the boundaries between guerilla movements and terrorist movement were viewed as increasingly blurred (Gaitán Pavía 2003). This is a move that has been supported by hard-line

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Colombian president Alvaro Uribe. Immediately after the 11 September attacks, he offered his public support for President Bush, and repeatedly emphasized to the international community that Colombia, too had a terrorist problem.6 At the same time, the US drug policy in Colombia has contributed to the regionalization of the problem. The eradication of coca cultivation in Colombia conducted under the US-supported Plan Colombia resulted in the reduction of approximately 50,000 hectares of coca plants in 1999–2002. However, the reduction in Colombia was equivalent to the increase in Bolivia and Peru. Moreover, the surrounding countries experience an increasing militarization attempting to create a ‘cordon’ around Colombia (Gaitán Pavía 2003). Thus, the arms and ammunition trade, money-laundering, smuggling of goods and the trade in illegal chemicals not only refuel the conflict in Colombia, but significantly challenge the sovereignty of the neighboring countries Colombia a matter which in particular has increased concerns that the conflict will spill over into Venezuela. Thus, initially viewed as a ‘problem country’ by the US administration, it increasingly came to be considered as a ‘serious threat’ and as a regional destabilizing factor with the potential of compromising peace and security for the hemisphere. As a result, the Bush administration has increasingly taken a regional approach to the conflict. One example of that is the Regional Andean Initiative, which has channeled US$800 billion in counter-narcotics support to the region. The regionalization of the Andean conflict is increasingly understood in Washington in the intersection between drugs and terror. This has resulted in a continuous increase in military aid, showing only a short setback immediately following the events of 11 September 2001. Currently the total military aid to the region is approximately US$900 million annually, of which the aid to Colombia accounts for two-thirds (Rojas Aravena 2004). The US Colombia policy has also lead to a further split between Laitn American and the US Although almost all the countries in the region (except Cuba and Venezuela) share the idea of attempting to find multilateral solutions to the Colombian crisis because of its external impact, the US and the Colombian government favor military solutions whereas the rest of the governments prefer political and diplomatic solutions (Manaut 2003). In sum, it contributes to making the prospect of hemispheric security cooperation bleaker. The issues that are ignored A final consequence of the new security framework is that it accentuates an old dilemma for Latin American policy-makers: namely that while their economic

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and political dependence on the US makes them dependent on attention from the big brother in the north, this simultaneously implies that they are subject to the changing policy priorities and geopolitical strategies of the US. The War on Terror has not only framed security debates, it has also moved pressing issues facing Latin America far down on the list of priorities in the US. One issue that has received less attention than before is migration. Mexico and the US were at the point of signing an agreement resolving the issue of the flows of illegal immigrants to the US immediately before September 2001, but after that the issue was put on the back-burner. In February 2004 an agreement was finally signed, but this was focused on strengthening the border controls and repatriating detained migrants, and not on improving the lives of the thousands of migrants that already had crossed the border.7 More fundamentally, the issues that mostly concern Latin Americans, including poverty, inequality, unemployment and daily violence, are kept off the agenda. According to one analyst: . . . keeping in mind the travails of neo-liberalism, the persistence of poverty and inequality, the heavy weight of joblessness, the shadow of daily violence, and the diverse grievances and preoccupations of civil society, would lead us to think that a truly democratic discussion about what issues should be ‘securitized’ in Latin America and the Caribbean would produce a very different agenda from the current one, with ‘traditional’ security issues receding quickly into the past. (Stark 2003: 71)

Moreover, because of the daily insecurity experienced by Latin Americans, polls show that support for democracy is decreasing in many countries, being as low as 35 percent in Guatemala (Latinobarómetro 2004) and although there is still no majority for the return to authoritarianism, the calls for a strong hand (‘mano dura’) may not be very far away. With the increasing US support for authoritarian actions, this leads to fears of a return to the past in Latin America. Thus, it should be remembered that among many Latin Americans, the term ‘security’ itself is still is connected to the ‘national security state’ and primarily invokes an image of a threat. Although somewhat eroded by now, the aversion towards the use of the term itself that derives from the unhappy experiences of the authoritarian regimes is not entirely forgotten (Stark 2003). Conclusion: The Future of Sub-regional Co-operation Although the tendency to subsume hemispheric security issues under simplistic agendas such as the current war against narco-terrorists represent is clear, it

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does not obstruct every regional initiative. Although it has been argued that the current successes of regional economic integration are not matched when it comes to security (Grabendorff 2003: 3), as in the past, there are examples of more efficient sub-regional projects. In the Southern Cone, the creation of Mercosur in 1990 (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, with Chile and Bolivia as associated members) promised not only to provide an alternative to the US led, free market-oriented North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) but also to spur a deeper political integration, including security integration. In 2000 Mercosur established a ‘peacezone’ and established a so-called ‘democratic clause’ that implies a regional commitment to peace and democracy in the region.8 It is in the Mercosur area that the highest degree of confidence has evolved over the last years, and that includes at least Chile in addition to the ‘core’ Mercosur countries. Today, the Argentine marines train in Brazilian aircraft carriers and Argentine warships are repaired in Chilean shipyards. Chilean and Argentine defense authorities meet regularly in the Permanent Security Committee Chile-Argentina (COMPERSEG). Thus, in spite of the fact that Brazil’s hegemonic pretensions are increasingly evident, with its aircraft carriers, active defense industry and participation in the global arms trade, the Southern Cone increasingly resembles a security community. Central America, on the other hand, has increasingly aligned its policies to those of the United States. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has been an important goal of the Central American countries for the last years. The group of countries has also signed agreements with the US for joint patrols for control of terrorists, illegal migration towards the US and drug-trafficking in the maritime corridors. The US has signed institutional agreements with El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Honduras for training and institutional strengthening with the pursuit of combating terrorism. There has also been talk about the creation of a regional army coordinated by the United States (Castro 2003). In conclusion, security cooperation in the Western Hemisphere is, and has always been, deeply affected by US policy priorities and strategic considerations. They have for most of the history contributed to a narrowing of the security agenda and subsumed complex issues within often rather uni-dimensional agendas. Although there have been clear exceptions to this rule, it has deeply affected the ability of hemispheric security organizations to address the issues of most concern to Latin American peoples and governments. Nevertheless, several sub-regional initiatives have proved to be efficient mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution. Today, there are several examples of this.

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A new aspect of inter-American relations today is the increasing division of the hemisphere into a US sphere of influence, and a Brazilian one. There is a tendency for Central America to line up with the US both when it comes to political issues and economic policies, whereas the countries of the Southern Cone (led by Argentina and Brazil) challenge both the neo-liberal hegemony and US trading strategies in the region, and the US security policies. However, the outcome of this challenge remains to be seen. Thus, it may be that we see the contours of a divided Latin America and that the Americas are about to be divided into two regional security complexes. If so, the hemispheric security institutions that were established in the period after the Second World War will be more obsolete than ever. However, so far the role of the US is still too prevalent in affecting processes of securitization also in South America for the two parts of the Americas to be analyzed completely separately.

Notes 1. See for example Krause and Williams (1996) and Haftendoorn (1991) and Hentz (2003) for a critique of the traditional concept. For a critique of the widened security concept, see Gray (1994) and Walt (1991). 2. That includes the conflicts between Guatemala and Belize, El Salvador–Honduras–Nicaragua, Nicaragua and Colombia, Venezuela and Guyana, Trinidad and Venezuela, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Venezuela, and Bolivia and Chile. 3. It was originally proposed by George Bush, Sr. in 1990. 4. Other Latin American countries saw this as an inconsistency in the Chilean relations to the United States. However, Juan Gabriel Valdés; who was Chile’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations at the time, argues that Chiles support for free trade agreements and rejection of the US failure to recognize the authority of the United Nations and international law, rests on the same foreign policy goal, namely the creation of a world with stable and recognized rules in which collective action, subject to majority consensus, takes precedence over unilateral action. This desire, he argues is based both on the needs of a small country, and on the Chilean’s traditional support for strong institutions (Valdés 2004). 5. http://www.cnnenespanol.com, 10 September 2001. 6. E.g., http://www.bbcmundo.com, ‘No queremos mas terrorismo’, 8 April 2002. 7. EE.UU./México: devolverán migrantes, http://www.bbcmunco.com, 21 February 2004.

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8. This has happened through the Declaration of Mercosur as a Zone of Peace as well as the Political Declaration of MERCOSUR of 24 July 1998, and the Common Declaration of Buenos Aires of 30 July 2000.

References Barry, Tom (2003) ‘Our Backyard Pax Americana’, Americas Program Discussion Paper, Silver City: New Mexico: Inter-hemispheric Resources Center, February 17. Bull, Benedicte (1999) ‘“New Regionalism” in Central America’, Third World Quarterly, 20(5): 957–70. Bull, Benedicte (2004) ‘Between Bush and Bolívar: Change and Continuity in the Remaking of Mesoamerica’, in Morten Bøås, Marianne Marchand and Tim Shaw (eds), New Regionalisms at the New Millennium, London: Palgrave. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver (2003) Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Call, Charles (2000) Sustainable Development in Central America: The Challenges of Violence, Injustice and Insecurity, CA 2020: Working Paper #8, Hamburg: Institut Für IberoAmerika Kunde. Cameron, Maxwell A. (1998) ‘Latin American Autogolpes: Dangerous Undertows in the Third Wave of Democratization’, Third World Quarterly, 19(2): 219–39. Castro, Gustavo (2003) ‘Petromilitarización del continente y de la América en medio’, Paper presented to the Conferencia Internacional: Paz, crisis regional, y política exterior de Estados Unidos, FLACSO-CHILE, Santiago, 28–29 de agosto 2003. Covacevich, Gerardo (2003) ‘Mecanismos de la seguridad subregional y las nuevas amenazas’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 138–48. Delgado, Pedro Villagra (2003) ‘Conferencia de Ministros de Defensa de las Américas:Tópicos sobre defensa y seguridad en el hemisferio’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena y Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 149–62. Dell, Sidney (1972) The Inter-American Development Bank. A Study in Development Financing, New York: Praeger Publishing. Diamint, Rut (2004) ‘Security challenges in Latin America’, Bulletin of Latin American Research, 23(1): 43–62. Figoli, Herbert (2003) ‘Mecanismos y estructuras institucionales para enfrentar las nuevas amenazas’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 127–38.

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Fuentes Saavedra, Claudio (2003) ‘Tres Dilemas en el Sistema Internacional. Terrorismo, Soberanía Nacional y Unipolarismo’, Paper presented to the Conferencia Internacional: Paz, crisis regional, y política exterior de Estados Unidos, FLACSO-CHILE, Santiago, 28–29 de agosto 2003. Gaitán Pavía, Pilar (2003) ‘La Reconstrucción del Estado y el papel de la Sociedad civil frente al Conflicto interno en Colombia’, Paper presented to the Conferencia Internacional: Paz, crisis regional, y política exterior de Estados Unidos, FLACSOCHILE, Santiago, 28–29 de agosto 2003. Gosselin, Guy and Jean-Philippe Thérien (1999) ‘The Organization of American States and Hemispheric regionalism’, in Gordon Mace, Louis Bélanger and contributors, The Americas in Transition: The Contours of Regionalism, Boulder and London: Lynne Rinenner Publishers, pp. 175–92. Grabendorff, Wolf (ed.) (2003) La seguridad regional en las Américas: enfoques críticos y conceptos alternativos, Bogota: Fescol/Cerec. Gray, Colin S. (1994) Villains, Victims and Sheriffs: Strategic Studies and Security for an InterWar Period, Hull: University of Hull Press. Green, Rosario (2003) ‘Un nuevo regionalismo latinoamericano para un orden multilateral alterado’, Paper presented to the Conferencia Internacional: Paz, crisis regional, y política exterior de Estados Unidos, FLACSO-CHILE, Santiago, 28–29 de agosto 2003. Haftendoorn, Helga (1991) ‘The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Disciplinebuilding in Internacional Security, International Studies Quarterly, 35(1): 3–17. Hallinan, Conn (2004) Haiti: Dangerous Muddle, Foreign Policy in Focus, Silver City, NM: Interhemispheric Resource Center. Hentz, James (2003) ‘Introduction: New regionalism and the “theory of security studies”’, in New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 3–16. Hentz, James J. and Morten Bøås (2003) New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State, Aldershot: Ashgate. Hurrel, Andrew (1995) ‘Regionalism in the Americas’, in A. Hurrel and H. Fawcett (eds), Regionalism in World Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 250–82. Jácome, Francine (2003) ‘El tratado marco de seguridad democrática en Centroamérica’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 297–315. Kirby, Peadar (2003) Introduction to Latin America: Twenty-First Century Challenges, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications. Klepa, Hal (2003) ‘Rarely Relevant Institutions for Terribly Relevant Challenges: Some Reflections on the Inter-American Security “System” and Today’s List of Risks and Threats’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 173–204

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Krause, Keith and Michael C. Williams (1996) ‘Broadening the agenda of security studies: Politics and Methods’, Mershon International Studies Review, 40, supplement 2: 229–54. Lake, David A. and Patrick M. Morgan (1997) Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Latinobarómetro (2004) Informe – Resumen Latinobarómetro 2004: Una década de mediciones, Santiago de Chile: Corporación de Latinobarómetro. Manaut, Raúl Benitez (2003) ‘Seguridad hemisférica versus seguridad nacional: determinantes nacionales, regionales y globales’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 379–86. Miller, Andrew (2001) ‘Colombia in Crisis’, Foreign Policy in Focus, 6(20), May. Rojas Aravena, Francisco (2004) ‘Principales tendencias que afectan la seguridad internacional: La necesidad de construir nuevos mapas cognitivos’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena y Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 81–6. Stanley, William 1996 The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Exttortion, and Civil War in El Salvador, Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Stark, Jeffrey (2003) ‘Environmental Security in Latin America and the Caribbean: Development, Conflict, and Democracy’, in James Heinz and Morten Bøås, New and Critical Security and Regionalism: Beyond the Nation State, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 55–73. Tapia, Gabriel Gaspar (2003) ‘Desafíos y dilemas de seguridad en América Latina en la post Guerra Fría’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena and Paz V. Milet (eds) Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 87–109. Urzúa Lira, Gustavo (2003) ‘Las amenazas asimétricas como nuevas formas de conflicto en el contexto sudamericano’, in Francisco Rojas Aravena y Paz V. Milet (eds)Seguridad y Defensa en las Américas: La búsqueda de nuevos consensos, Santiago, Chile: Flacso, pp. 213–24. Valdés, Juan Gabriel (2004) ‘Chile’s Role in the World: Independence and the Rule of Law’, Revista: Harvard Review of Latin America, Spring 2004: 3. Walt, Stephen M. (1991) ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, 35(2): 211–39. Youngers, Coletta (2003) The US and Latin America After 9–11 and Iraq, Silver City, NM and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, June 2003.

Chapter 5: Regional Security in South Asia B.M. Jain

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t the dawn of a new millennium, the processes of globalization and democratization are becoming inevitably intertwined. Both economists and political scientists agree that they are interdependent. Jagdish Bhagwati, a well-known economist, writes that globalization promotes democracy directly and indirectly. His argument hinges on the interpretation that modern information technology loosens the control of the ‘traditionally hegemonic groups’, making the dependent class ‘more-independent actors, with democratic aspirations, in the political arena’.1 Robbie Robertson considers democratization as a ‘by-product of globalization’.2 If seen in these perspectives, the globalization of ideas and information, springing from a revolution in science and communication technology, makes transition to democracy in military and authoritarian regimes possible. Without democracy, globalization will have little meaning to teeming millions who aspire to living a free, dignified and virtuous life. Democrats across the world are faced with an onerous task of promoting political pluralism and civil societies in order to help build up a free and democratic world. Nearly four dozen countries are still far away from becoming democratic. There is a widely shared belief that the cases of radical militancy, intolerance and violation of human rights are on rise in those societies where democratic institutions are either not allowed to grow or are sought to be further weakened by the narrow national ruling elites. Democratization of societies is one of the hallmarks of the globalization phenomenon. New waves of globalization on the one hand and an increasing trend towards regionalization on the other have become irreversible. Though the ongoing processes of globalization and regionalization, primarily in the economic sense, may appear paradoxical, in reality they are complementary processes in a quest for establishing an integrated and equitable international political and economic order based on the notions of democracy, freedom, equality and rule of law.

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The 9/11 tragedy made it imperative to promote political liberalism and to democratize traditional societies with a view to defeating the dark forces of terrorism and religious radicalism, in order to help secure a peaceful and democratic world order.3 Towards this goal, the United States and its strategic partners are committed to stamping out terrorism with political, diplomatic, economic, military and strategic resources at their command. Undoubtedly, war on terrorism has become a ‘core security interest’ in US foreign policy. Deputy Defense Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, acknowledged that terrorism was ‘the single greatest threat’ to peace and security in the world. President George W. Bush made a fervent appeal to the world community to participate in the US-led global campaign against terrorism to make the world safe and secure for all. Response to his appeal was quick and overwhelming. He spelled out that a new global security order, based on liberal constitutional democracy and rule of law, would be a priority of the US foreign policy agenda. One may draw some plausible inferences that the conception of a new global security order departs from a traditionalist approach to security through the processes of arms control and disarmament or by concluding treaties and protocols on non-proliferation of weapons, although their importance cannot be belittled. Nevertheless, the focus has shifted from conventional threat perceptions to emerging neo-threats, for instance, in the form of international terrorism whose striking capability with a greater ‘awe and surprise’ is unmatchable even with an overwhelming military superiority of the mightiest power.4 In brief, a major challenge facing the proponents of globalization and democratisation is how a ‘move’ or ‘consolidation’ of democratisation throughout the globe is possible. According to some political analysts,5 this is made possible by ‘remaking the societies’ along democratic norms and values. Against this background, this chapter deals with those key issues and ‘disturbing trends’ in US–South Asia equations which impede the promotion of liberal democratic values and civil societies in the region. A host of questions in this regard are raised here. What are key components of peace and security in South Asia? What are the American dilemmas while dealing with a democratic India on one hand and a virtually military regime in Pakistan on the other? Does the United States have a ‘specific roadmap’ to encourage the forces of democracy and discourage pro-weapon lobbyists in South Asia? To find out answers to these questions, this chapter will examine US concerns, interest and approaches to creating a democratic, stable and peaceful South Asia. Finally, this chapter will evaluate the American commitment to democracy, rule of law and non-proliferation goals in the region. This chapter argues that in order to help create a new security order in the

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subcontinent, India needs to encourage ‘political and economic engagement’ between India and Pakistan, to help end cross-border terrorism permanently, and to help end the geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan. In order to understand the complexity of the current US–South Asia engagement, it will be useful to provide a brief historical and contemporary backdrop to their relationship. South Asia has remained a turbulent region since the days of Cold War politics. With the partition of British India in August 1947, the deep-seated rivalry between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir dispute resulted in three wars between them. Apart from the Kashmir problem, systemic crises produced a string of unpalatable developments in the Indian subcontinent, which not only threatened the future of democracy but also sought to further undermine the fragile nature of peace and stability in the region. Such instances abound: the clamping of emergency in India by Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1975; the overthrow of democracy and a return of army rule in Pakistan after a military coup by President Zia-ul Huq in mid-1970s; Pakistan-sponsored crossborder terrorism in the State of Jammu and Kashmir since 1989 by using religion as an instrument of its foreign policy. In a chain of such developments, the Indian subcontinent turned abruptly into a ‘most dangerous spot’ in the world following nuclear weapon tests carried out by India and pakistan in May 1998. Subsequently, unprovoked aggression was launched by Pakistani armed forces in the Kargil sector of Indian Territory in May 1999 at the behest of the then General Pervez Musharraf. Synchronizing with the Kargil conflict, a democratically elected government was overthrown by General Musharraf in a military coup in October 1999. These instances validate the volatile character of the South Asian region.6 In geopolitical and geo-strategic terms, South Asia underwent a major transformation after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The superpower rivalry in South Asia came to an end; ideological shibboleths lost their relevance while nation-states interacted with one another. If seen in this perspective, India drew closer to the United States, politically and strategically. Interestingly, the ‘lonely superpower’ status of the United States imparted a new meaning and dimension to its relations with South Asian states, and with India and Pakistan in particular. Devoid of any ideological rigidities, India went ahead with cultivating the ‘renewed ties’ with the United States, and establishing diplomatic ties with Israel from whom India had sought to maintain a benign distance during the Cold War era. At the same time, a sea change was witnessed in the US’s South Asia diplomacy both in content and style. White House officials began crafting a set of new policies

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in order to promote democratic institutions apart from encouraging political reconciliation between the hostile nations in South Asia. As regards India, the US ‘relationship with Russia is a case of consolidation or guarding against a slip-up. With the US, it is a reversal of the old negative trends, of strengthening of the ‘new beginning’.’7 A new era of friendship in US–India, US–Pakistan relations in the postSoviet period received a sudden setback in May 1998 when India and Pakistan each exploded nuclear devices underground. This had obviously created ‘heightened concerns’ in the world community in general, and in the United States in particular, that the arms race between New Delhi and Islamabad might further accelerate. Also, there was a widely shared belief that both the countries might enter into nuclear exchange, probably over the prolonged impasse on Kashmir. The United States not only denounced their weapon tests but it also imposed economic and military sanctions against them. It also asked both India and Pakistan to sign the NPT and CTBT without preconditions and pleaded with them to exercise maximum nuclear restraint. Since India and Pakistan had declared themselves as de facto nuclear weapon states, they refused to roll back their nuclear programme. In effect, American sanctions proved ineffectual. Its non-proliferation efforts were further impeded following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush Administration not only removed sanctions against them but also went ahead with forging a solid strategic relationship with Islamabad and New Delhi. In realistic terms, the United States was forced to embrace the military regime in Islamabad whose geo-strategic value overruled the American concern for a return of democracy and civilian rule in Pakistan. Because of its geographical location, Pakistan became indispensable to US strategic goals and interests in Afghanistan, South Asia and the Middle East.8 Shift in the US Policy A major shift in the US’s South Asia policy had occurred during the Clinton Administration II, which desirer a constructive and creative role in the region. It embarked on a balanced policy towards India and Pakistan as manifested from its nonpartisan stance on the Kargil conflict. The diplomatic support that India got from the Clinton Administration in the Kargil war was extremely unexpected. It was out of character with the pat American record in Indo-Pak disputes in which Washington was either neutral or seen as being tilted towards Islamabad. The Clinton Administration had

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insisted that the Pakistani aggression across the Line of Control was unacceptable and Islamabad must unconditionally and unambiguously restore the status quo ante.9

It was ‘firm action’ by President Clinton that forced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to comply with enforcing the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Kargil sector. This was much to Sharif’s awe and anguish: Pakistan did not expect that America would put its entire weight on the Indian side. For the Clinton Administration, the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Kargil was a categorical necessity in the larger interest of security and stability in the region. A new phase in the US relationship with South Asian states began with President Clinton’s visit to New Delhi and Islamabad in March 2000. He spoke about four principles – the ‘4Rs’ they were called – the need for mutual restraint, respect for the LoC, rejection of violence and resumption of dialogue.10 During this visit, President Clinton signed a Vision Paper with the Indian Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee. Both the leaders agreed to set up a Joint CounterTerrorism Committee in order to work out modalities to curb terrorism. Political analysts in India described Clinton’s visit as a ‘historic one’ in the direction of reversing negative images and trends of the Cold War era. Both the leaders expressed a common desire to begin strategic dialogue on a number of issues such as nuclear proliferation, the armament’s race, drug-trafficking and narcoterrorism. The Clinton Administration realized that there was no rationale in putting India ‘at the back end’ of American foreign policy in the twenty-first century. On his second leg to Islamabad, President Clinton met with General Musharraf. He conveyed his message to Musharraf frankly that all outstanding disputes with India be resolved through political and diplomatic channels. Clinton gave unambiguous hints to General Musharraf that Pakistan might have to pay a heavy price if it ever entertained the idea of coming into a direct conflict with India. Pakistani military rulers described Clinton’s approach as pro-India, while New Delhi described this as a departure from the US’s ‘evenhanded policy’ towards the subcontinent. The Clinton Administration attempted to move away from ‘zero-sum’ to a ‘positive-sum’ game in South Asia by treating India and Pakistan separately.11 US Engagement Policy The Bush Administration carried forward the Clinton legacy of a ‘new strategic paradigm’ for South Asia. Acknowledging India as a ‘major global player’,

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the Bush Administration made it amply clear that the United States needed to consult India on critically important regional and global issues ‘in the same fashion that it seeks the views of other major players such as Japan, South Korea, China, Brazil, Australia and the major European powers’.12 Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina B. Rocca in her speech before the Indian American Friendship Council in Washington on 17 July 2001, remarked: ‘The Bush Administration is committed to strengthening and intensifying relations with India. The past few years have seen the beginning of a transformation in our ties with the world’s largest democracy. Now is the time to complete that transformation.’13 A former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, also stated that in the changing geopolitical scenario, the Bush Administration did not perceive India as an ‘irritating recalcitrant.’14 To complete that transformation, the Bush Administration has acknowledged India’s ‘role and responsibility’ in securing stable and peaceful conditions in South Asia and beyond this region. The Administration has demonstrated its seriousness about expanding, strengthening and upgrading the ongoing strategic dialogue with India on numerous issues that include terrorism, nuclear proliferation, armament race, drug-trafficking, and narco-terrorism. Leadership in both the countries have expressed their firm commitment to a common goal of establishing a peaceful and stable world order by way of encouraging democratization of societies, defending Human Rights and ensuring the rule of law among authoritarian, military and orthodox regimes. Both the countries have a shared perception on the urgency of stopping the growing insurgent activities in the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal. As one may recall, US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Alan Eastham, had visited India and Nepal in April 2001 to assess the gravity of the ongoing political turmoil in Nepal. Both India and the United States expressed their profoundly anxiety over the Maoist-led endemic insurgencies. Not the least, both countries are concerned about ‘fractious democratic politics’ in Kathmandu. The Bush Administration reiterated its firm commitment to the restoration of democracy in Nepal and also underlined the urgency of the US military assistance to Kathmandu which was waging a fierce struggle against the Maoist-led violence and bloodshed. Nevertheless, what worries India is an overly forceful American involvement in the internal developments of Nepal. In the past, America had never exhibited so much keen interest in the political affairs of Kathmandu. To India, the pro-active role of the United States has wide-ranging implications for the region. Firstly, New Delhi fears that once America solidifies its strategic presence in Nepal, it might undermine Indian role and influence not only in Nepal

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but also in South Asia. In Indian perception, a direct involvement of the ‘only superpower’ in Nepalese affairs is likely to encourage anti-Indian elements in Nepal, which is strategically indispensable for India’s defence and security. Second, it might accentuate the strategic contest between the US and China since Beijing feels its national interests directly threatened in Tibet, as being geographically proximate to Nepal. There is no secret that Washington and Beijing have political differences on the Tibetan issue. Besides, there is a possibility of US intelligence operations along Nepalese borders. Though the Bush Administration has brushed aside such fears, built-in misgivings remain ingrained in the psyche of India and China about the possibilities of American military involvement in Nepal.

Paradigm Shift: Indo-US Shared Concerns With a ‘paradigm shift’ in the US policy in South Asia, strategic relations between New Delhi and Washington appear to be on the upswing. Bureaucratic and intellectual constituencies in India have a broad consensus that New Delhi should not miss the opportunity to transform its strategic dialogue with Washington into a more durable and purposeful partnership. A host of correlates dictate this thinking. First, the shared threat of terrorism has made New Delhi and Washington conscious of an imperative need to work together to help preserve freedom, democracy and civil rights globally, regionally and nationally. Second, there is a convergence of strategic concerns and interest of New Delhi and Washington on the question of Asian security and stability. If one recalls, President George W. Bush reiterated on several occasions that China was a potential ‘strategic competitor’ of the United States in the AsiaPacific region. So far as India is concerned, in spite of its friendly ties with Beijing at present, China remains its major strategic challenger in South Asia. In realistic terms, convergence of strategic perceptions and interests between India and America, reinforced by New Delhi’s endorsement of President Bush’s Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) programme, has given a further impetus to the deepening of Indo–US ties. Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Joseph Biden, was reported to have written to President George Bush: ‘I applaud the President on his pro-active initiatives with regard to bettering relations in the subcontinent, particularly with India.’15 This apart, India and the United States signed a non-extradition pact on 26 December 2002. Under the agreement, both the countries would refuse to hand over nationals of each country to any international tribunal. It may be mentioned

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here that America has already signed this kind of agreement with more than two dozen countries of which the majority are either close strategic partners of the United States or are small countries. The United States looks upon India’s concurrence as being of great significance since India is the largest functioning democracy in the world, apart from enjoying a prominent place in the nonaligned movement(NAM). The mainstream opposition in India, while making a frontal attack on the government, discounted any rationale behind signing the non-extradition agreement except to appease and flatter America.16 Be that as it may, there appears a greater degree of positive change among US policy-makers who have realized India’s importance in global and regional affairs.17 There is a wide consensus among White House officials that India’s deepening ties with the United States are in the country’s national interest. India too did not lag behind in its euphoric expression. Prime Minister Vajpayee even went to the extent of describing India and the United States as ‘natural allies’. Moreover, the institutionalization of the regional security dialogue as well as a steadily increasing defence cooperation between New Delhi and Washington are being seen as positive trends in their bilateral relationship. Political analysts in India are of the view that a close strategic cooperation between the two largest democracies might be helpful in fostering democratic institutions elsewhere. That is why, as they argue, military rulers in Pakistan do not take kindly to the deepening ties between Washington and New Delhi. If viewed in larger political, economic, military, defence and security contexts, the strategic relationship between New Delhi and Washington is based on mutual expectations and interests in pursuit of fulfilling their respective policy goals. For instance, America expects India to cooperate in strengthening the non-proliferation regime by putting a ban on the transfer of its nuclear technology to volatile regions like the Middle East where some countries are suspected to be clandestinely involved in nuclear weapon-building programmes. Besides, Washington expects New Delhi to resolve outstanding disputes with Pakistan with whom America has a solid strategic partnership in its global war against terrorism. And also, the United States desires India to open its markets for American entrepreneurs in the service and investment sectors. On the other, New Delhi’s desire to build ‘deeper relations’ with Washington is inherently impelled by its expectation that America extend its full support in ending infiltration into Kashmir permanently, and also facilitate transfer of dual-use technologies and high-tech defence-related hardware to India. In spite of common democratic principles and shared security and strategic concerns, the emerging strategic partnership between India and the United States may face tough challenges from the lingering mutual skepticism and

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narrow perceptions of some sections of the policy-making community in both countries. On the question of arms control, for instance, the bureaucratic lobby in the United States looks upon India as a ‘part of the problem’ rather than a solution in controlling weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, several defence-related deals like delivery of advanced US technology to India have been delayed. On the Indian side, it is the perception of ruling leaders and bureaucratic elites that America has not done enough to help end the crossborder terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with American promises given in the aftermath of terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. Also, there is a widely held perception among Indians that America abandons its friends and allies once its objectives are fulfilled. In this scenario of conflicting images and perceptions, a fundamental question that needs to be addressed by public policy makers on both sides is to how to develop mutual trust.

Cross-Border Terrorism India has been a victim of the Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism since 1989, accusing Islamabad of employing terrorism as an instrument of its state policy. General Musharraf has been reiterating that he was committed to fighting terrorism by citing his initiatives in nabbing ‘home-grown’ militants even in the face of a strident opposition internally. The Bush Administration’s high officials have praised Musharraf’s efforts in stopping or reducing cross-border terrorism to a large extent. However, India complains that Musharraf’s crusade against terrorism is more in tune with the US-led campaign against the Al Qaeda-Taliban combine rather than in consonance with his intention to provide a genuine relief to India. Be that as it may, the selective agenda of the United States and Pakistan on counter-terrorism, focussed primarily on Al Qaeda and Taliban militants, has not cut any ice with India. That is why New Delhi has told the Bush Administration time and again to assign priority to helping to end the cross-border infiltration.18 Despite Indian apprehensions, the Bush Administration promised that it would treat India’s case as a priority once its war against terrorism in Afghanistan was over. In the meantime, America had declared Lashkar-eToiba and Jais-e-Mohmmad as terrorist organizations after the terrorist attack on the State Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir in October 2001. This did not produce any impact. The Indian Parliament was attacked in December 2001, which forced the Indian government to use coercive diplomacy against

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Pakistan. India asked Islamabad to hand over the twenty terrorists who were alleged to have masterminded the attack on the Parliament. Though General Musharraf virtually refused to oblige India on this count, he denounced the wanton acts of terrorism in his speech of 12 January 2002. White House officials urged India to exercise maximum restraint. But Indian hopes were dashed when it found that there was no changed reality on the ground. Prime Minister Vajpayee made a rhetorical appeal for ‘aar par ki larai’ (the decisive war), primarily aimed at mollifying the restive Indian masses who had accused the government’s weak and indecisive policy. With no other option, the Vajpayee government authorized the deployment of massive Indian troops on the international border and line of control. ‘Nearly one million Indian and Pakistani troops subsequently mobilized along the shared international border and the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir, reaching a peak in May–June 2002. US officials shuttled back and forth from the subcontinent to avert war while US soldiers, with Pakistani assistance, searched for Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists on the nearby Afghan-Pakistani border.’19 As mentioned earlier, visits of Secretary of State, Colin Powell and Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage to New Delhi and Islamabad in May–June 2002 helped produce a conducive environment in the subcontinent. Both India and Pakistan withdrew their military troops from borders. If one recalls, General Musharraf had given an ‘absolute assurance’ to Armitage about Pakistan’s intention to end infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir. Subsequently, India had announced a lifting of the ban on over-flights by Pakistani civilian planes. Nevertheless, no substantial progress has been registered on the subject of cross-border terrorism. It may be that jihadi groups are not fully under to control of Musharraf. The US’s high-profile diplomacy to make India and Pakistan agree on the reengagement process is priority of the Bush Administration. The visit of United States Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage to South Asia in May 2003 may be seen in this context. His visit was seen as a follow-up action to Prime Minister Vajpayee’s offering the hand of friendship to Pakistan. Armitage first went to Islamabad and met with top Pakistani officials including President Musharraf, who told him that Pakistan was no longer involved in any kind of proxy war in the State is of Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf, moreover, gave him hyperbolic assurances, in his usual style, that if there were any training camps in the PoK, he would get them dismantled in ‘one day’. Armitage conveyed Musharraf’s impression to Indian leaders. During his meeting with Prime Minister Vajpayee on 10 May 2003, Armitage eulogized Vajpayee’s statesman-like act. He, however, expressed

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‘cautious optimism’ that a ‘step-by-step’ approach to the peace process would ‘eventually resolve all issues’.20 He agreed with Vajpayee that cross-border terrorism was a ‘terrible thing’ and it must be stopped without further loss of time. Not surprisingly, Indian leaders expressed their deep-seated anguish over Pakistan’s failure to translate its promises into a reality. Strategic analysts are, however, quite hopeful that although America may not pressure Pakistan beyond a certain point, its diplomatic engagement with both India and Pakistan may be helpful in defusing tension in the region. Also, India realizes the American dilemma in the given circumstances when it can not do without Islamabad’s logistic support to the US-led anti-terror campaign against the Al Qaeda and Taliban. It is a well-known fact that Pakistan handed over more than 500 militants to the United States. The latter could not have captured the Al Qaeda strategist Kahild Shaikh Mohammed without the direct support of Pakistan.21 India’s main accusation against the United States is that it has been treating the issue of terrorism differently when it comes to South Asia. India cites the case of the US-brokered road map for Palestinians and Israelis under which the Palestinian Authority was asked to end all forms of terrorist operations against Israelis in return for a permanent peace in the region. What about a specific road map for South Asia? It is not yet in sight. New Delhi has impressed upon Washington time and again that American security is inextricably linked to what challenges India has been facing from the Pakistan-based jihadi groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jais-e-Muhammad. India has repeatedly warned the US not to expect jihadi groups to listen to General Musharraf’s appeals urging them to stop their terrorist activities. Perhaps, sensible aides and advisors of President Bush will need to ponder how the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure operating against India is directly linked to security and material assets of American citizens.22 Other policy-related problems to be addressed by New Delhi and Washington are the question of defining both long-and short-term strategic goals precisely as well as identifying their respective strategic priorities. Neither country has yet worked out a composite, compatible and well-coordinated policy approach on how to move forward in defeating the common enemy of terrorism and encouraging the forces of democracy. Perhaps, the core problem emanates from divergence in the national security perceptions of India and the United States. Without mutual understanding and ‘clarity of purpose’, it will not be an easy task to translate the conceptual level of the Indo-US strategic partnership into a reality.

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Non-Proliferation South Asia, once on the backside of the ‘US diplomatic globe’, emerged as a focal centre of US pro-active diplomacy following the May 1998 nuclear weapon tests carried out by India and Pakistan. These countries fought three major wars – 1947–48, 1965, 1971, and the Kargil conflict in 1999, producing deeply entrenched mutual suspicion. The fear of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, though exaggerated by American officials, is becoming a cause of serious concern to the United States. In American perception, they might use nuclear weapons out of desperation given their historic enmity.23 This is a far-fetched conclusion. Nevertheless, what is important for the United States and South Asian states is to address ‘inadequate security safeguards’, for instance, in Pakistan which has nuclear weapons and where nuclear authority is in the hands of non-civilian ruling elites. At this critical juncture, India and Pakistan need to improve and strengthen their nuclear command and control systems. In India’s case, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), in its meeting held in January 2003, disclosed the procedures for nuclear command and control. A two-layered structure in the government, termed the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), will be responsible for management of nuclear weapons as well as for an ultimate decision to use them. The Prime Minister, a civilian head of the NCA’s Political Committee, is solely authorized to press the nuclear button. At the same time, India would retain its option of nuclear retaliation if its security was threatened by a hostile power or a configuration of powers by using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against India. In the case of Pakistan, the nuclear decision rests with military authorities. The ground reality is that the political leadership, headed by Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Khan Jamali in a fragile democracy, does not dare lay its hands on military elites. This fear of course lingers on in the psyche of the US decisionmakers who claim to have played a ‘behind-the-scene role’ in averting the nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan following the Kargil conflict. It is in this context that the Bush Administration has been making strenuous efforts to persuade both India and Pakistan to undertake concrete measures to ensure nuclear strategic stability in the region. More significantly, the Administration is of the view that the old concepts of arms control have outlived their utility. The American priority is now how to prevent weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. Towards this end, President Bush announced a seven-point action plan in February 2004, which is aimed at restructuring the global nuclear order, and

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which that places a ban on the sale of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technologies. This action plan includes the strict enforcement of international law by other states in order to combat proliferation networks in Pakistan.24 India has welcomed Bush’s action plan. At the same time, the Bush Administration is reluctant to penalize India and Pakistan for not abiding by the NPT. There are palpable reasons behind it. First, the United States is preoccupied with its global campaign against terrorism in which Pakistan’s strategic role is indisputable. Second, Pakistan is vitally important for the United States in dealing with the situation arising out of the reported regrouping of Taliban and Al Qaeda elements in Afghanistan. Third, the punitive action might further worsen Pakistan’s ailing economy and also jeopardize the functionality of its newly established democracy. For these reasons, America has written off mounting debts owed by Pakistan and has announced huge military and economic assistance as a price for Islamabad’s blanket support for the US war against terrorism.25 The Bush Administration is seized with a dilemma in light of the recent disclosure about the Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan’s overt hand in selling sensitive nuclear technology to countries like North Korea, Iran and Libya. This revelation raised eyebrows not only in the world community but more particularly in the United States, whose nuclear concerns about the ‘rogue states’ are already too well known. Despite that, the United States and Pakistan have glossed over this episode, fearing long range fallout in their ongoing strategic partnership. Indeed, the Bush Administration designated Pakistan as its non-NATO military ally (NNMA) in March 2004 during Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to Pakistan This sent the wrong signals to the world community. India also opposed it on the ground that it might derail the ongoing bilateral dialogue as well as negatively impact the peace initiative undertaken by both New Delhi and Islamabad. The Bush Administration did not take serious note of India’s protest while offering the same label to India provided it was prepared to accept it. But India turned down this offer, saying that this would run counter to India’s non-aligned policy. At home, the Bush Administration is facing a tough time. Congressman Ackerman brought forth a HR 4021 Bill to amend the Foreign Assistance Act 1961 that only democratic governments with their ‘adherence’ to the US non-proliferation objectives may be designated as NNMA. American citizens are also not convinced by the Administration’s argument that A.Q. Khan’s actions remain outside the official domain. They are demanding that the Administration should take appropriate steps to investigate the long-term

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security consequences of Khan’s reported sale to the so-called ‘rogue states’. Alfred Stepan and Aqil Shah in their article titled ‘Pakistan’s Real Bulwark’, carried in the Washington Post, May 5, 2005, have raised doubts about the ability of the United States to support democratization in ‘strategically located nuclear states’ such as Pakistan. They have argued that Pakistan’s designation as a ‘major non-NATO ally’ is rooted in the belief that ‘Pakistan’s military is the best bulwark against the growth of Islamic extremism in a nuclear state’.26 On the contrary, the Pakistani military put the two former premiers – Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif – virtually in exile despite the fact that they had won about 70 percent of the vote (and seats) in the general elections of 1993 and 1997. They further say that far from being a ‘bulwark’, the military is actually a facilitator of Islamic extremism. Worse, after helping to marginalize the traditional moderate parties, the military is in danger of becoming beholden to the extremist parties, which in fact cast [the] deciding vote to constitutionalize many of Musharraf’s self-granted powers.27

Stepan and Shah think that the ‘right person’ for the United States and Pakistan is a prime minister put in office by free elections and allowed by the military to finish his or her full term.28 President General Musharraf’s efforts at strengthening his grip over ‘fledgling democracy’ is a matter of serious concern to the United States. The US Administration called for Hasmi’s appeal process to be more open than his closed trial (he was jailed for a term of twenty-three years by a Pakistani district court in April 2004 for his hand in inciting the army mutiny).29 The military’s increasing role in the nation’s strategic policy-making is also reflected in General Musharraf’s decision to set up a thirteen-member NSC, headed by him. According to Teresita Schaffer, a former US Ambassador writing in a report released in April 2004 by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the military’s ‘central role in politics in Pakistan is at the heart of the country’s troubled prospects.’30 Schaffer has sent a clear message to the American Government that its democratic liberal values call upon it to help promote democratic forces in Pakistan rather than to support openly the military regime. In realpolitik terms, the ‘US vision’ is confined to destroying the Taliban and Al Qaeda network with the help of Pakistan. The Kashmir Issue The Bush Administration has been supportive of the normalization process in Indo-Pakistan relations on the Kashmir issue. It has been appealing to both the

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countries that instead of wasting their resources and ‘political energies’ on ‘hard issues’, they need to reach agreements on ‘small issues’ in order to pave the way for resolving the most contentious issues like Kashmir. Speaking to the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) on January 7, 2003 in Hyderabad, Richard Hass, Director of the US State Department’s Policy Planning Staff spelled out the, American stance on Kashmir. He said: I cannot predict what a solution to the Kashmir problem might look like or when it will come. But there are a few things about which I am certain. First, the status of the Line of Control will not be changed unilaterally. Second, the LOC will also not be changed by violence. To the contrary, in the absence of a jointly agreed Indo-Pakistani alternative, everyone should act to ensure the continued sanctity of the Line of Control.31

Hass also welcomed the steps taken by the chief minister Mohammad Mufti in Jammu and Kashmir towards reducing tension and bringing normalcy in the Valley through the ‘healing touch policy’. Apart from this, the Bush Administration has called upon India to respond positively to President Musharraf’s slow but encouraging initiatives towards a ‘reformed Pakistan’. The Administration emphasized that India should reinforce the new civilian government in Pakistan and support its ‘positive developments’. In response to this, India has reiterated its stance that before discussing the Kashmir issue, Pakistan must dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in its own territory. America has also been persuading Pakistan to take more concrete steps to end terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. However, how far Pakistan acts upon American pleadings remains to be seen. Some political analysts think that there are ‘greater chances’ of success for American mediation since ruling leaders of India and Pakistan have demonstrated a total lack of political will to settle the Kashmir issue once for all. They also argue that the situation has gone beyond their control. Past history shows that efforts towards mediation have proved futile, mainly because of India’s principled stand not to accept any third-party mediation or intervention. In this complex scenario, American encouragement is warranted so that New Delhi and Islamabad might reach some amicable accord without being prejudiced to the interests of Kashmiri people. The current ‘healing touch’ policy of the Jammu and Kashmir government is a laudable effort in this direction The Bush Administration has made it unambiguously clear that its foreign policy goal in the Indian subcontinent was to help foster a peaceful dialogue between New Delhi and Islamabad in the larger interest of development and stability in the region. President George W. Bush also conveyed to General

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Musharraf that Pakistan should return to ‘true democracy’.32 According to a senior US official, President Bush is reported to have told President Musharraf that ‘adherence to democracy was key’. The senior official said: He [Bush] hit it hard at the top of the meeting [with Musharraf in his meeting with him in September 2002]. I think he made it clear that his vision is that Pakistan will not succeed unless it goes down, the road of democracy, and that if it doesn’t succeed, that would be bad for the entire world. He [Bush] kept on stressing, ‘we want to see you succeed, we have big stakes in this. If you [Musharraf] don’t adhere to democracy, we’ll all have trouble’.33

The Bush administration also expressed its consternation about Musharraf’s recent amendments to the constitution that, in the administration’s perception, was tantamount to subverting the democratic process in Pakistan. Impliedly, America wants Pakistan to work towards restoring democratic institutions in the country. But the American dilemma is how to strike a balance between its commitment to promoting democracy and keeping intact its relations with Pakistan, a ‘stalwart’ ally in its global war against terrorism. Given Pakistan’s strategic value to the United States, President Musharraf intends to exploit the situation in his country’s favour with a view to bringing India to the bargaining table. That is why Musharraf has been urging America to mediate over the Kashmir dispute. The Bush Administration does not seem to be enthusiastic to mediate because it understands India’s sensitivity over a third party’s mediation. However, the Bush Administration is seized with the gravity and magnitude of the Kashmir problem that has rocked India–Pakistan relations over the past five decades. What the Administration desires is that both New Delhi and Islamabad resolve all bilateral issues, including Kashmir, diplomatically and peacefully so that the United States can maintain its friendly ties with them. This apart, US officials have been denying that they have any ‘secret plan’ for resolving the Kashmir dispute. The evidence suggests that it was at the behest of the Bush Administration that President Musharraf was forced to recast his Kashmir policy, by not dragging in old UN Resolutions to settle the Kashmir dispute. Nevertheless, President Musharraf did not miss the opportunity of lashing out at India at the UN General Assembly Session in September 2002, while raking up the rising violence against Muslims in the Indian state of Gujarat. He called upon the international community to oppose Hindu extremism ‘with the same determination it displayed in combating terrorism, religious bigotry, ethnic cleansing and fascist tendencies elsewhere’.34 The Bush Administration in its policy statement said that America did not see its South Asia policy through the ‘prism’ of its relationship with either India

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or Pakistan. The State Department’s Director of Policy Planning Staff, Richard Hass, underlined that the US’s chief concern was to address the ‘threat of conflict’ between India and Pakistan on whom rests the chief burden of creating a favourable environment for a conflict-free region. He said: ‘America – as much as India – is eager to see a thriving, peaceful and democratic India take its place in the world. But it is simply a fact of life that India will not realize its immense potential on the global stage until its relationship with Pakistan is normalized.’35 President Bush expressed happiness that India and Pakistan were making ‘good progress’, and they were ‘talking with each other in a positive way’ rather than making war-mongering speeches as was the case a few years ago.36

Post-Iraq War Scenario President George W. Bush, while announcing the victory of the US-led coalition forces in Iraq, sent out an unambiguous message to ruling leaders of volatile regions such as the Middle East, North-East and South Asia that if they failed to resolve their outstanding bilateral and regional disputes on their own, then America might have to take-action. Prime Minister Vajpayee picked up the thread of his veiled warning. In his speech to the Parliament, including his party functionaries, Vajpayee underlined that India and Pakistan should draw an appropriate lesson from the experience of Iraq. At the same time, Vajpayee disapproved of the United States’ war on Iraq and refused to send Indian troops to Iraq.37 In realistic terms, the process of re-engagement between India and Pakistan has to be read between the lines. Although leaders from both the countries have denied any outside pressure to resume the fragile peace process, the circumstantial evidence suggests that both New Delhi and Islamabad were under constant American pressure to resume political dialogue. Just prior to Richard Armitage’s visit to South Asia in May 2003, Pakistani ISI Chief and Vajpayee’s national security adviser, Brajesh Mishra, were in Washington to discuss the latest situation in the region with top US officials. White House officials advised them to resolve their bilateral disputes without provoking any outside interference. Moreover, the Bush Administration called upon India and Pakistan to address their bilateral problems in tune with the temper and spirit of the transformed character of the international system. In fact, the ongoing re-engagement between India and Pakistan can be ascribed to ‘behind-the-scenes’ US diplomatic initiatives. In the light of recent

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peace initiatives undertaken by Prime Minster A.B. Vajpayee, both New Delhi and Islamabad have now realized that they should not miss any opportunity to resolve their outstanding disputes including Kashmir through confidencebuilding measures. This is manifest from the decision of India and Pakistan to restore an ambassadorial-level relationship, and resume air, rail and bus links. The recent tract-II diplomacy undertaken by the Pakistani team of Members of Parliament is a welcome gesture towards improving relations between India and Pakistan. During their visit to India, they not only met top Indian leaders but also people from various communities with diverse sociocultural backgrounds to assess their mood. This created a lot of good will among people of both the countries. These positive steps have revived some ray of optimism among people that the region might usher in the era of peace and prosperity since they have been the worst sufferers in a perpetual enmity between India and Pakistan. But at the same time, leadership in both the countries need is either to restrain or to win over their respective anti-peace constituencies – radical religious organizations – that are intent on disrupting such moves. The Bush Administration has expressed its happiness over these developments. The National Security Adviser, Ms Condoleeza Rice said in Washington on 28 May 2003 that America was encouraged by recent developments in Indo-Pakistan relations. She stressed that ‘there was more to be done’ since the United States had remained ‘very engaged’ in the region.38 She further added: ‘The issue is how to broaden and deepen our relationship with Pakistan with which we have important counterterrorism issues, important issues concerning Afghanistan, important issues of democratisation in Pakistan.’39 One might draw the inference from Ms Rice’s remarks that the Bush Administration seemed to be serious about addressing the issues of democratization and counter-terrorism in the Indian subcontinent. The gargantuan challenge before the United States is how to uproot the network and infrastructure of terrorism in South Asia in cooperation with India and Pakistan. What is important to bear in mind is that the jihadi outfits in the region have overt and covert links with Al Qaeda and Taliban, ultimately impacting on the security of Americans, their military and economic assets as well as on their cultural and democratic values. If South Asia remains a citadel of terrorist activities, it may not only transform the region into one where there is perpetual fear and insecurity among the peoples but may also severely threaten the existing fragile global security order. Without exaggeration, the strategy of a sustained US diplomacy of reactivating the peace process in South Asia is essential, albeit with a caveat. There is a shared perception among the

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informed and enlightened public in India and Pakistan that America speaks a double talk and at times it acts as a partisan. That is why they are demanding that America tread on a path of transparency with the intention of helping diffuse tension between New Delhi and Islamabad.

US Response to India’s Peace Initiative The Bush Administration welcomed Prime Minister Vajpayee’s peace initiative announced in April 2003 to defuse tension in the region by opening a ‘new beginning’ with Pakistan. Vajpayee said that this would be his last ‘peace attempt’ to improve relations with Pakistan. Islamabad responded to his initiative positively. According to US former Assistant Secretary of State Karl F. Inderfurth, these ‘positive changes in rhetoric’ in Indo-Pakistan relations might provide the United States an opportunity to play the role of facilitator in a serious dialogue between the two countries – a role that is possible today because of the improved relations of the US with India starting under President Clinton and continuing under President Bush and the transformation of relations with Pakistan as a result of 9/11 and Gen. Musharraf’s decision to become a key ally in the war on terrorism.40

In October 2003, the Cabinet Committee on Security under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Vajpayee announced a new twelve-point proposal that included a ferry service between Mumbai and Karachi; the restoration of road and rail links between Sindh and Rajasthan; a proposal to start a bus service between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The Indian Government’s argument is that if these proposals were implemented in letter and spirit, it might help mitigate the deeply entrenched mistrust between the two countries. This step was termed as a ‘bold initiative’ on India’s part.41 Moreover, Prime Minister Vajpayee attended the SAARC Summit in Islamabad in January 2004, which created a positive momentum in Indo-Pakistan relations. President General Musharraf also toned down his anti-India rhetoric despite the mounting pressure from his home constituencies, especially from the jihadi organizations. There was a consensus among heads of state and government at the SAARC summit that the imperative of peace and development required not only a ‘permanent end’ of terrorism but was also essential for a lasting amity and friendship among SAARC members to ensure regional security and stability.42

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Conclusion A real security order in South Asia will depend largely on fostering the democratic governance and strengthening secular forces in order to facilitate economic integration among South Asian states globally and regionally. This requires the United States’ long-term constructive engagement with the countries of South Asia, especially with Pakistan where fragile democracy finds it difficult to survive. It remains to be seen how serious is America about its concerns and commitment in encouraging the forces of democracy, political pluralism in the region, and also in playing the role of a benign facilitator to bring about political reconciliation between India and Pakistan. This might render the balancing task of US diplomacy more difficult in view of its blanket dependence on Pakistan’s logistical and strategic support to its global war against terrorism. Be that as it may, a nuclear restraint regime in the Indian subcontinent is likely to remain on the priority of the US foreign policy agenda. Notes 1. Bhagwati, In Defence of Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. 2. Robertson, The Three Waves of Globalization, London: Zed Books, 2003. 3. A plethora of studies have been conducted to show the linkage between the ‘structural violence’ unleashed by terrorists and the support provided by authoritarian regimes. See Mathew Levitt, Targeting Terror: US Policy Toward Middle Eastern State Sponsors and Terrorist Organizations, Post-September 11, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002; Sudhir Kakar, The Colours of Violence, New Delhi, 1995. 4. See J.N. Dixit, ‘Emerging Perspective’, Seminar (517), September 2002, pp. 24–31. 5. Schwenninger, Sherle R., ‘Revamping American Grand Strategy’, World Policy Journal, fall 2003: 25. 6. See Shiva Hari Dahal, Haris Gazdar et al., Internal Conflicts and Regional Security in South Asia: Approaches, Perspectives and Policies, Geneva: UIDIR, 2003. 7. K.K. Katyal, ‘Dealing with Washington and Moscow’, The Hindu, December 16, 2002, p. 10. 8. See B.M. Jain, ‘India–Pakistan Relations’, in David Levinson and Karen Christensen, Encyclopedia of Modern Asia, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2002, pp. 20–33. 9. Raja Mohan, ‘The Problem’, Seminar (517), September 2002: 14. 10. Karl F. Inderfurth, ‘Vajpayee’s Last Push for Peace’, The Hindu, May 5, 2003, p. 10; Stephen P. Cohen, ‘A New Beginning in South Asia’, Policy Brief No. 55, Brookings Institution, January 2000. 11. For a perceptive analysis of other related parts see Gautam Adhikari, Current History, April 2004: 158–64.

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12. NEA 105, June 25, 2001, The Text, American Information Centre, New Delhi. 13. Source: Transcript of the Speech of Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs, Christina B. Rocca, on July 17, 2001, American Information Centre, New Delhi. 14. To substantiate this, see State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher’s Briefing on July 17, 2002. NEA 307 07/17/2002 Excerpts: US Presses for Permanent End to Kashmir Infiltrations, The American Information Resource Centre, New Delhi, pp. 1–3. 15. The Hindu, September 12, 2001. 16. See V.S. Mani, ‘ Indo-US Non-Extradition Pact’, January 9, 2003, The Hindu, p. 10 Strategic analysts in India disapproved of the government’s decision on the ground that India had always been a vocal champion of punishing perpetrators involved in crimes against humanity. Whereas the Indian government justified its decision on the ground that it was the government’s prime duty to protect the country’s soldiers from the consequences of possible misuse of the arbitrary jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. It is worth mentioning that India is one of the major contributors to peacekeeping forces. But the underlying reality is that India did not like to displease America with whom its defence, security and strategic relations are deepening. 17. See K.P. Nayar, ‘Beyond the Bonhomie–Bush has been quicker than Clinton to change his diplomacy’, The Telegraph (Calcutta), January 22, 2004. 18. See J.K. Baral and J.N. Mahanty, ‘The US War against Terrorism: Implications for South Asia’, Strategic Analysis, Oct./Dec. 2002: 518ff. 19. Satu P. Limaye, ‘Mediating Kashmir: A Bridge Too Far’, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2002–3, 26(1): 157. 20. The Hindu, May 14, 2003, p. 1. 21. Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Way to Buck History’, The Indian Express, March 28, 2003, p. 7. 22. For observations on related aspects, see Colin L. Powell, ‘A Strategy of Partnership’, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004: 22–34. 23. See Deepa Ollapally, ‘Pathways to Security’, Seminar 517, September 2002: 31–5. 24. See C. Raja Mohan, ‘Looking beyond the NPT,’ The Hindu, February 18, 2004, p. 12. 25. Bharat Karnad, ‘Peril of a Tight Embrace: India, US, Kashmir and NonProliferation Issues’, Strategic Analysis, 26(3), July–September 2002: 329–40. 26. The Washington Post, May 5, 2005, p. A29. For an in-depth analysis see Sumit Ganguly, ‘Pakistan, the Other Rogue Nation’, Current History, April 2004: 147–50. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid., http//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2332–2004May4.html. 29. For details see Amhed Rashid, ‘Military Tightens Its Grip’, Far Eastern Economic Review, May 6, 2004: 20.

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30. Quoted from ibid., p. 21. 31. NEA203 01/07/2003 Text: Bush Administration Determined to Strengthen Ties With India, distributed by the Office of International Information Programme, US Department of State. Website: http://usinfo.state.gov, p. 9. 32. See Sridhar Krishnaswami, ‘A Musharraf offensive’, Frontline, October 11, 2002, p. 53. 33. Quoted, Ibid., p. 54. 34. Quoted from Sridhar Krishnaswami, ‘A Musharraf offensive’, Frontline, October 11, 2002, p. 52. 35. NEA203 01/07/2003 Text: Bush Administration Determined to Strengthen Ties With India, distributed by the Office of International Information Programme, US Department of State. Website: http://usinfo.state.gov, pp. 7–8. 36. See Sridhar Krishnaswami, ‘Bush Sees Progress in India–Pakistan Relations’, The Hindu, April 23, 2004, p. 11. 37. ‘Bush’s enthusiasm for India remains undiminished by India’s opposition to the war in Iraq and its subsequent refusal to contribute troops to stabilize post-war Iraq.’ K.P. Nayar, The Telegraph (Calcutta), January 22, 2004. 38. The Hindu, May 30, 2003, p. 1. 39. Ibid. 40. Karl F. Inderfurth, ‘Vajpayee’s last push for peace’, The Hindu, May 6, 2003, p. 10. 41. See the Editorial, ‘A Bold Initiative’, The Hindu, October 24, 2003, p. 10. 42. K.K. Katyal, ‘Continuity and Change’, The Hindu, June 2, 2004, p. 10.

Chapter 6: Regional Security in Southeast Asia* Joseph Y.S. Cheng

Introduction

T

he end of the Cold War has probably generated some rethinking regarding the concept of security. Approaches such as co-operative security, mutual security and human security have attracted more attention in government, academic and non-governmental organization (NGO) circles.1 Non-traditional security issues too have become significant in the agendas of governments, NGOs, research institutes and international organizations.2 Until recent years, security has largely been perceived in East and Southeast Asia in military and geopolitical terms, involving concepts such as deterrence, balance of power, collective security, etc. But comprehensive security gradually becomes one of the most widely used security concepts in the Asia-Pacific region. The gist of this concept is simply that security must be examined in a holistic way to include both military and non-military threats to a state’s overall well-being.3 According to Muthiah Alagappa, the term was initially used in Japan when Ohira Masayoshi was prime minister in the late 1970s, but it also found strong support among Southeast Asian states, particularly Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.4 This perception of comprehensive security was also shared by the Chinese leadership in the post-Cultural Revolution era. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaoping and his supporters realized that China needs a peaceful international environment to concentrate on economic modernization, and it has to try its best to secure such an environment in the foreseeable future. Striving for a peaceful international environment certainly involves establishing friendly relations with neighbouring countries and avoiding conflicts with them. This has probably been China’s most important foreign policy objective since 1983, and it has been achieving results. This policy means that advancing China’s national interests by force or the threat of force will be costly.5

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Later Chinese leaders perceived the early 1990s as a transitional period between bipolarity and multipolarity, and they considered that such a transition would last for a considerable length of time. They were convinced that a fundamental factor for the termination of bipolarity was the backwardness of the Soviet economy and its scientific and technological developments. The multipolar world is still in its early stages, and the emergence of a new balance of power would ultimately depend on the competition in ‘comprehensive national power’, the main components of which are economic and technological powers. China would need to concentrate on the intermediate- and longterm competition in building ‘comprehensive national power’, otherwise it will fall behind in this competition. It appeared that the Asia-Pacific region has shared the consensus of maintaining a peaceful international environment and concentrating on economic development since the early 1980s. They had been handsomely rewarded until the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98. During this period, its impressive economic growth generated much self-confidence and pride symbolized by the claim that the twenty-first century would be the Asia-Pacific century. At the same time, domestic political and social stability had been maintained because of economic growth. Regional governments claimed their legitimacy on the basis of performance too. As economic growth revived in the beginning of this century, this trend has been maintained. Rapid economic growth in many cases caused environmental degradation, but relative prosperity and stability had allowed the regional governments limited attention and resources for the concern of sustainable development. Since the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, however, the need to promote sustainable development has been widely appreciated in the region.6 The definition of ‘human security’ in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme, which includes issues such as uncontrolled population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, migration pressures, environmental degradation, drug-trafficking and international terrorism, has won considerable approval in the region too.7

Broadening the Concept of Security: The Impact of Globalization and the Asian Financial Crisis As the East and Southeast Asian leaders’ top priority is economic growth, international economic security has become their important agenda item. Meanwhile, globalization has made the management of international financial

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risks a much harder task. The Asian financial crisis and the subsequent difficulties in the Asia-Pacific region have amply demonstrated its vulnerabilities. The lukewarm support from the US, the flawed and harsh rescue packages offered by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the inaction on the part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) all made East and Southeast Asian leaders appreciate the significance of regional co-operation to the exclusion of the Western powers. Chinese foreign policy researchers in recent years have been engaged in discussions of interdependence in international relations as well as the relationship among interdependence, international organizations and state sovereignty. While Southeast Asian countries do not share China’s major-power ambitions, they are very concerned with the issues of state sovereignty and international organizations. Malaysia’s rejection of the IMF demands and its imposition of capital controls was an important case in point. Before the Asian financial crisis, the approach to international organizations among regional countries was largely one of ‘system-maintaining and systemexploiting’;8 now they are looking for new forms of international organizations to cover their vulnerabilities and prevent erosion of their sovereignty. Bilateral and multilateral free trade areas have been spreading; even countries with strong reservations initially such as Malaysia and Thailand have now jumped on the bandwagon. Globalization, however, does not provide an adequate analytical framework to understand East and Southeast Asia’s economic crisis. Kanishka Jayasuriya argues that the answer lies in the domestic dynamics of the states concerned. Before the Asian financial crisis, countries in Southeast Asia adopted a set of foreign economic and security policies based on the existence of a pattern of domestic coalitions. Such coalitions allowed the protection of politically linked cartels and business groups, while simultaneously promoting the pursuit of liberal economic policies; and the latter had managed to secure the praise of Western governments and economic institutions. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, some of these domestic coalitions were badly shaken, resulting in some states dominated by reform-oriented coalitions, while in others nationalist coalitions still remain well entrenched.9 The various types of domestic political alliances mean that different economic strategies are being pursued. They naturally have different conceptions of regional security, political development and social security. At the individual level, the crisis forced people in the region to reassess their future and in fact the meaning of life. The first question to address is perhaps democracy. Authoritarian leaders in Asia who brush off democracy and political freedom do not represent the wishes of their people. Admittedly when

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Asians attempt to make a list of their values, they usually emphasize the family, education, hard work, thrift, harmony, etc. Often democracy and political freedom tend to be downplayed. Yet even an illiterate peasant in a remote Chinese village treasures his right to articulate his grievances, and he yearns for the power to remove corrupt local officials. The educated middle class in Asia appreciate the importance of democracy and the rule of law. Their fundamental concern is not the acceptance or rejection of democracy, but the process and the associated risks in attaining it. Economic growth in East and Southeast Asia had generated a complacency regarding the status quo and fear of major changes. They had been exploited by authoritarian leaders who wanted to delay the democratization process. But when the middle class in the region is decisively mobilized to fight for democracy, it usually wins, and often without much violence and bloodshed, as has been demonstrated in South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The economic crisis in many countries in East and Southeast Asia in 1997–98 brought much pain to the people. The social consequences included a steep increase in poverty and unemployment, the removal of tens of thousands of children from schools because their families could no longer pay for their education, and the closure of hospitals and other basic services. Though there were complaints against overseas speculators and suspicions against Western countries generated by various conspiracy theories, there is no denying that people in these countries understood that ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ were the basic causes of their economic problems. As a result, there were subsequent changes of governments in Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia. Joseph Estrada won the presidency in the Philippines by presenting himself as the champion of the poor and underprivileged. The new governments in these countries were all implementing a broad range of economic, regulatory and legal reforms. Moreover, it did not appear that nationalism had been rising in any significant manner. In Thailand and South Korea, where competitive, multi-party systems existed and the media were relatively free, changes of governments were achieved through the ballot boxes, and they had not exacerbated tensions in the communities. In contrast, President Suharto of Indonesia was brought down by mass demonstrations which were accompanied by racial riots and abuses of human rights. In the former two countries, stability has been maintained. In Indonesia, however, substantial unrest lasted for some years even after the fall of Suharto. It becomes increasingly clear to people in the region that economic security, political democracy and the rule of law are inter-related. Without the latter two,

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corruption, collusion and nepotism will flourish, and they in turn will threaten economic security and development. Even from a utilitarian point of view, political democracy is essential to guaranteeing economic security. More important still, people in the region are not satisfied with the mere existence of a democratic political system. No one can deny that democracy exists in Japan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, yet the democratic political systems have not been effective in curbing corruption and collusions or in enforcing transparency. A more participatory political culture has to be developed to ensure transparency, accountability and proper checks and balances. In short, the underdeveloped civil society and its various channels of political participation have a lot of catching up to do. The ultimate test lies in whether people secure a sense of satisfaction through participation. Instead of focussing on voting behaviour, one has to take note of other forms of participation such as involvement in signature campaigns, donations to political parties, taking part in public demonstrations and marches, attending meetings concerned with public affairs, writing to newspapers or calling in to radio and television talk-shows. The media in Indonesia have become much more lively since the fall of Suharto. The push for transparency and the development of effective regulatory and commercial law systems are basically political decisions, since autonomous institutions limit the exercise of arbitrary political power and thus help to eliminate corruption, collusion and nepotism. Respect for the rule of law will provide a firm foundation for political reforms and genuine democracy. The second broad question pertains to the quality of life. While people in Japan, Singapore and Hong Kong have higher per capita GDP than that of Australians and Canadians, it is obvious that the latter two enjoy considerably higher living standards, especially in terms of housing and leisure time. Economic growth in the region in the past three decades or so has produced a vibrant middle class. Some of them temporarily lost their jobs and social status in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, but undoubtedly they retained their middle-class aspirations. As the regional economies pass their take-off stage, as the second and third generation middle-class families place a greater emphasis on economic security than rapid accumulation of wealth, and as work pressure and the aging population generate a greater concern for health, exercise and leisure, people in the region have to adjust their lifestyles and work patterns. At the same time, the impact of gradual changes in the family system will become conspicuous. The divorce rate has been climbing (it is close to 2.5 per cent in China where infidelity is not uncommon), nuclear families have become the norm, the aged expect less care from the younger generation, though

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parents continue to be willing to make sacrifices for their children’s education. These changes will affect people’s pursuit of the meaning of life too. Globalization has been achieved through the free flow of goods, capital and information, and will be reinforced in the region by converging lifestyles and consumption patterns. Distinctions between East and West will become increasingly blurred. In the search of solutions to maintain long-term, sustainable improvements in productivity and competitiveness, some governments in the region have now turned to educational reforms. The Asian financial crisis and the following economic difficulties also forced the intelligentsia of the region to re-examine the ‘Asian Way’. Many of them have studied abroad, mainly in Western countries. They believed they had gone through the pupilage stage and were ready to assert themselves. They had been particularly encouraged by the spectacular economic development in the region and the relative economic decline of the West. They considered that the next century would be the Asia-Pacific century. Today they have become more sober and have a more realistic assessment of the progress in the region. It is fortunate that their self-confidence has not been eroded much nor their resentment against Western paternalism significantly exacerbated. Catching up with the West is a more strenuous endeavour, and neglecting political development is unwise in the long term. Regional economic co-operation has become all the more important in view of the negative aspects of global capitalism. Directions for an institutional framework strengthening economic co-operation among East and Southeast Asian countries are still fluid, but they will have an important impact on the role of the US and, to a lesser extent, that of the European Union in the region. The region certainly needs effective representatives in negotiations with Western countries and in various international organizations. China, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), on the basis of close bilateral and regional consultations, can perform that role together. After all, they have no intention of isolating each other in regional affairs, and they do not have the ambition of assuming a predominant leadership role in the region. Non-zero-sum games can and should be the norm in the articulation of regional interests. The conception of peace should be more than just an absence of war and violence. It is related to North–South issues and the elimination of social injustice arising from the gap between the rich and poor. Economic interdependence is perhaps the strongest incentive to avoid conflict. Joint efforts in crisis management open up new opportunities for co-operation too. These considerations were highlighted by the events of 11 September 2001.

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Broadening the Concept of Security: The Impact of 9/11 The reactions of the East and Southeast Asian countries to the terrorist attacks in September 2001 and the US response were significant and diverse. While condemning international terrorism, China attempted to facilitate the United Nations (UN) to assume a leading role in the global anti-terrorism efforts. Predominantly Muslim countries like Indonesia and Malaysia found themselves in very difficult positions when domestic political needs clashed with diplomatic demands. For the first time since the Second World War, Japan sent its Self-Defence Forces overseas in support of the military campaign in Afghanistan. Later, in the case of Iraq, it did so even in the absence of UN endorsement. Furthermore, anti-terrorism measures were initiated through a series of regional co-operation frameworks. Countries in the region witnessed the vulnerabilities of the US security system and the potential damage of terrorism. In the eyes of Chinese leaders, the terrorist attacks clearly demonstrated the irrelevance of advanced weapon systems such as the National Missile Defence (NMD) programme; they were certainly disappointed that the rising nationalism in the US in the aftermath of 9/11 in fact facilitated the Bush administration to secure Congressional approval for funding in support of the research and development related to the programme. In order to justify the funding request, several reports on China’s military threat to the US were released. A report of the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, indicated that Chinese inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) aimed at the US would expand fourfold, to about seventy-five to one hundred in fifteen years.10 The Bush administration has been according top priority to the combat of global terrorism since the incident, and Asian countries feel its pressure to take a clear-cut stand on the campaign. Such a priority has a significant impact on the relations of the US with countries in the region. The war with Afghanistan persuaded the Bush administration to accept the nuclear-power status of India and Pakistan, and withdraw the sanctions imposed after their nuclear tests in 1998. This has a subtle impact on all potential nuclear states, and it certainly has not escaped the notice of Pyongyang. Subsequent to 9/11 US foreign policy has become considerably more interventionist, as reflected by the Bush administration’s new doctrine of pre-emptive strike. This doctrine is supposed to apply to rogue states which are engaged in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well as to Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups in other

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countries. But there is a concern that its application may gradually widen. The US military presence in Asia has expanded. US forces now operate from bases in Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These deployments are likely to continue in the long term, both for militarily strategic reasons and to allow the tapping of the significant oil and gas reserves in the region. Beijing and Moscow are naturally concerned with the spread of US influence in Central Asia. The US now maintains a military presence in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, making use of the military facilities there in support of the military campaign in Afghanistan. Taking into consideration of the much-improved US–Indian relations and their bilateral military exchanges, the ‘containment’ of China may have become more comprehensive from Beijing’s point of view. At least the US presence in Central Asia has rendered the Shanghai Co-operation Organization less effective. The latter has been the vehicle initiated by Chinese leaders to promote mutual trust and confidencebuilding measures among China, Russia and the four Central Asian republics (Turkmenistan is not a member), and to enhance their common interests in avoiding interferences in their respective efforts to combat terrorism, separatism and religious fundamentalism. China is interested in tapping the energy resources in western Siberia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan too. Oil and gas pipelines from these countries to China’s coastal provinces will be able to achieve the economy of scale if China can be assured of an expanding and stable supply, extend the pipeline network to South Korea and Japan so that the latter two will help share the cost of construction, and link this pipeline network with the existing plans of transporting oil and gas from China’s western provinces to the coastal ones. The expanding US influence in Central Asia is expected to generate keen SinoAmerican competition for its energy resources. Since the US can now depend on its allies in Kabul, major American oil companies will be interested in exploiting the oil and gas fields in Central Asia and bringing the oil and gas to sea by pipelines through Afghanistan, Pakistan or India. This competition for energy resources will in turn be exacerbated by the Sino-American jockeying for influences in the region. Meanwhile, the recent war in Iraq has highlighted China’s dependence on oil imports from the Middle East, and the urgency to establish a strategic oil reserve.11 In 2003–6, China’s economy grew at over 10 per cent per annum. In 2003, China surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest oil consumer, and since 2000 China has been the source of almost 40 per cent of the world’s oil-demand growth. The New China News Agency estimates that by 2020, China will import more than 500 million tons of oil per annum, an almost four-fold increase over 2005.12

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The US is developing closer military ties with India. In the Straits of Malacca, Indian naval ships provide escort for the US naval and commercial vessels carrying valuable cargo such as ammunition and fuel. This trend precedes the 11 September 2001 incident, but probably will be maintained in view of the perceived common strategic interests.13 In Southeast Asia, the Bush administration has been stepping up security re-engagement with the region including the expanded military co-operation with the Philippines and the conclusion of the ASEAN–US Joint Declaration for Co-operation to Combat International Terrorism in July 2002. The main purpose of the latter is to allow the governments of the ASEAN states which have domestic political constraints to act more firmly against their own terrorist and extremist groups in the name of a regional agreement; and, if necessary, ask for US assistance. Indonesia, for example, has been promised help by the Bush administration to improve its anti-terrorist capabilities.14 The situations, however, vary among the founding members of ASEAN. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad used the fight against terrorism to enhance the position of his Barisan Nasional coalition by associating the fundamentalist Muslim opposition with support for terrorism. Mahathir Mohamad emphasized his record of political stability and economic growth, a moderate and progressive Islam, as well as multi-racial co-existence without threatening Malay political predominance. Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, on the other hand, minimized confrontation with the radical Muslims, fearing an electoral backlash in the world’s largest Muslim democracy. Her Vice-President, Hamzah Haz, emerged as a potential challenger. At least before the Bali bombing in October 2002, Haz was very critical of the war on terrorism, and poured scorn on attempts to investigate those suspected of links to Al Qaeda in Indonesia. He even publicly courted such extremist elements as Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah. The Bali bomb blast led to an anti-terrorist law being issued, giving the police more power to detain terrorist suspects. But this law and its replacement, Law No. 15/2003 on the Elimination of Terrorism, did not stop the subsequent attack on the JW Marriot in Jakarta in October 2003, and the car bomb attack outside the Australian embassy in the capital in September 2004.15 In Thailand, the global war to combat terrorism was not high on the government’s agenda initially. When the Iraq war started in March 2003, Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra quickly declared Thailand’s neutrality because he did not want to upset the six million Thai Muslims in southern Thailand. But in May 2003, he reversed his position and pledged full support for the US war effort in Iraq. Finally, the arrests of Jemaah Islamiyah suspects

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in June 2003 turned a recalcitrant nation into a pro-active one in the International coalition to fight terrorism.16 The Philippines, with direct US military and financial assistance, cracked down on the extreme terrorists in the south, the Abu Sayyaf, while negotiating power-sharing arrangements with two larger Muslim political movements, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The Abu Sayyaf group was reported to have links with the Al Qaeda terrorist network, and is on the US list of terrorist organizations. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has taken advantage of the Bush administration-led global war on terrorism. US troops heading for war in Afghanistan were allowed to be stationed at their former Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base in the Philippines. In return, Manila received US$100 million in development aid and another US$55 million for the country’s anti-terrorism campaign. US soldiers not only took part in joint training exercises with their Filipino counterparts, but also helped to pursue members of the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern Philippines. There is a growing unease in the Philippines that the continuing involvement of American troops in fighting local terrorist groups will endanger the prospects of the fragile peace talks between the government and the MNLF/MILF. Meanwhile, the New People’s Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines remains a serious security threat.17 While ASEAN states and China see no alternative but to join the US-led international coalition against terrorism, US policies in the Middle East and the Bush administration’s military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to exacerbate domestic tensions in Southeast Asian countries with sizeable Muslim populations. They have become an important source of anti-American feeling which extremists exploit. These extremists do not constitute a serious threat such as that posed by the Communist insurgents in the Cold War era. They do not have the support to bring down the government in any Southeast Asian country, but they can generate a vicious cycle of instability and economic decline which will erode the legitimacy of the regime concerned. ASEAN states have already been suffering from a decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), much of which has been diverted to China. At the beginning of the 1990s, Southeast Asia received 61 per cent of all FDI going to developing countries in Asia, while China got 18 per cent. After a decade, the proportions had been reversed: China secured 61 per cent of the FDI inflows, while ASEAN states only claimed 17 per cent.18 ASEAN’s failure to create a favourable business environment and its political instability have much handicapped its ability to compete with China in the long run. The Bali bombing in October 2002 threatened to make the already difficult economic

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circumstances worse by driving away tourists from the region and affecting investor confidence further. Inappropriate state responses, such as undue militarization of the anti-terrorism fight, excessive use of force against civilians, and general political and administrative ineptitude can greatly assist the terrorist cause.19 In sum, the anti-terrorism war in Southeast Asia is more than an intelligence, police and propaganda war, it is a war to be won through economic development and improvement of governance in plural societies. As economic growth is perceived to be most effective in attacking the root cause of terrorism, worries tend to concentrate on Indonesia and the Philippines. Poverty in these two countries makes unemployed, restless young people vulnerable to religious extremism. In 2002, the major investment banks were not optimistic about Southeast Asia’s short-term prospects.20 Japan’s economic stagnation and competition from China posed serious challenges, but the delay of structural reforms in the Southeast Asian economies meant that domestic demand remained in the doldrums, and there was over-dependence on exports. In 2003, SARS generated further economic difficulties. But the economy in East and Southeast Asia improved in the following years, with 2006 an exceptionally good year. Asia’s growth averaged 7.7 per cent, an international best.21 At the society level, commentators on Muslim Asia often indicate that this region has traditionally been more tolerant and moderate than the Muslim Middle East because of historical reasons. Further, the development of modern communications, education and urbanization in twentieth century Asia also served to erode the traditional patterns of authority in the Muslim community. Religious developments during the late 1970s and 1980s, however, challenged the nationalists’ domination and established new frameworks for an ideological contest that still goes on in Muslim Asia today. According to Robert W. Hefner, this resurgence of Islam in Asia was not so much political but a demonstration of public piety in the form of an increase in mosque construction, religious education, pilgrimages to Mecca and Islamic publishing. This resurgence brought Islamic ideas and organizations into public prominence; therefore if and when political rivalries intensified, some among the protagonists would be tempted to use Muslim symbols for their mobilization work.22 The events of 9/11 highlight that a new and more militant form of transnational Islam has succeeded in building a loose network in parts of Asia, including Southeast Asia. Radical Muslims no doubt represent only a small segment of the Muslim population in the region, but they are likely to remain a destabilizing force in Asian Muslim politics and communal politics in the

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foreseeable future. At the end of the Cold War era, ethno-religious issues and conflicts which had earlier been suppressed by the bipolar deterrence reemerged, and their significance was enhanced by the globalization processes in the political and cultural spheres. In countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and India, a moderate Islam co-exists with modern pluralism and tolerance; but this is feasible only through the association of Islamic ideals on one hand, and justice and equality in the economy and modern constitutional structures on the other. If the economic and political orders break down, this moderate Islam will find it difficult to contain the challenge of radical Islam, often in violent forms.

The New Security Agenda at the International Level ASEAN was generally criticized for being unable to effectively respond to the Asian financial crisis. Further, it appeared helpless regarding the Indonesian forest fires in 1997 and 1998 which blanketed the region with haze pollution. Finally, the association and its members were unable to take a firm and united stand in dealing with the humanitarian and security crisis in East Timor that emerged after the vote for independence from Indonesia. In view of the above, it was not surprising that the advocates for institutionalism in Southeast Asia had been somewhat demoralized. As a result, a demand for ‘intrusive regionalism’ emerged. It called for a review of the doctrine of non-interference, a sacred cow of ASEAN regionalism. Supporters of ‘intrusive regionalism’ argued that had ASEAN not been so committed to non-interference, ‘friendly criticism’ of Thailand by its neighbours might have resulted in more timely Thai action to attend to its domestic troubles before they became a regional contagion. The Thai foreign minister, Surin Pitsuwan, admitted: ‘It is time that ASEAN’s cherished principle of non-intervention is modified to allow it to play a constructive role in preventing or resolving domestic issues with regional implications.’23 To make ASEAN more effective, Surin urged that ‘when a matter of domestic concern poses a threat to regional stability, a dose of peer pressure or friendly advice at the right time can be helpful’.24 But Surin’s initiative received support only from the Philippines. At the ASEAN foreign ministers’ annual meeting in Manila in July 1998, it was decided that the regional organization should stick to the old principle of non-interference. The enlargement of ASEAN to include Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar also aroused concerns that ASEAN would be divided into two tiers by economics

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and politics. This was more disturbing because ASEAN’s expansion took place in times of great economic difficulties in the region. There was some recognition that development assistance among the ASEAN countries should be given greater emphasis, though transfer of funds and financing of major infrastructural projects have never been on the ASEAN agenda. There was also a view that treating a few ASEAN members primarily as donors and others as aid recipients may be divisive for ASEAN. The more developed member states believe that their responsibility mainly lies in promoting trade expansion and foreign investment within the entire region so that the less developed member states will benefit. There is ample scope, however, for intra-ASEAN assistance in training and human resources development among the new members; and it is expected that countries like Singapore will offer scholarships and help to develop and support educational institutions and training institutes in the less developed member states.25 ASEAN has set for itself the long-term goal of eventually becoming a community. Alongside the ASEAN Informal Summit in Singapore at the end of 2000, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies organized the first ASEAN People’s Assembly with more than three hundred activists from community and NGOs in Batam, Indonesia to share their perspectives with the official ASEAN processes. The officially appointed ASEAN Eminent Persons Group articulated a vision of a ‘people’s ASEAN’ too. These are obviously steps in the right direction in response to the challenge of reinventing ASEAN. But the progress has been very modest. In view of the diversity within the enlarged ASEAN, Jusuf Wanandi advocates the principle of the ‘coalition of the willing’, i.e. allowing some members to develop a programme and to proceed without the others at the beginning.26 In this connection, Singapore has already concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with New Zealand, Japan and the US, and is in the final stage of negotiating an FTA with Australia. It has been approaching Canada, Mexico and the European Union for similar trade deals, as well as negotiating a Comprehensive Economic Co-operation Agreement with India. In response to the economic difficulties in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, Singapore planned to revive the economy by expanding economic exchanges with countries with which Singapore has strong ties. Singapore was especially interested in the exchanges of highly-trained specialists and the promotion of investment flows. Singapore was reluctant to wait for the other ASEAN members because of the huge gap in development between Singapore and the least developed ASEAN states; further, exports of agricultural products which are often a very troublesome issue in trade agreements, are not a Singaporean concern.

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The bilateral approach of Singapore caused friction with other ASEAN members. Though Singapore has been assuring them that its FTAs are ‘World Trade Organization (WTO)-plus’ in nature and would be trade-creating for the region, concerns have been raised about possible discriminatory effects for other member countries. There was resentment too that Singapore’s approach would undermine the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)’s efforts to enhance trade and investment liberalization within the region. AFTA already reached full implementation in 2002 for all except the four new members, i.e. Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.27 Singapore’s FTAs has a demonstration effect too. In July 2001, Thailand began to explore the possibility of an FTA with Australia. It has approached Japan, and even considered entering into FTAs with countries such as Mexico, India, New Zealand, Russia, and the Czech Republic.28 Singapore’s move towards bilateralism has prompted ASEAN as a group to engage in bilateral economic partnerships, or explore FTA possibilities with its important trading partners. It was in this context in the ‘ASEAN plus 3’ summit in November 2000 that former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung suggested an East Asian free trade zone consisting of all countries in the ‘ASEAN plus 3’ group. At the same time, former Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the establishment of a free trade area between China and the ASEAN states, which ultimately led to the conclusion of a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-operation in the eighth ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh in November 2002, establishing a free trade area between China and the six original ASEAN states in 2010, and between China and the entire ASEAN by 2015.29 As an indication of goodwill, China has agreed to reduce the tariffs on a number of ASEAN agricultural products entering China before the reciprocal reductions come into effect. Negotiations over the details of this ‘early harvest’ provision were conducted during 2003. The president of the Asian Development Bank has argued that China will likely overtake Japan as Asia’s largest importer by 2005.30 Japan too made use of the same summit occasion to issue an ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Although the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro denied it, most observers perceived the joint declaration as an act of competition with China for Southeast Asia, and they also doubted whether it would be implemented faithfully. They too linked this competition with Koizumi’s efforts to cultivate North Korea.31 On the same day of the ASEAN–Japan joint declaration, India agreed to establish a free trade area with ASEAN during its first summit with the regional organization. India became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1995, but it

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had not been involved in the regional economic integration efforts before. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen believed that trade and investment ties with India would especially help the newer and poorer members of ASEAN, as he was concerned with the emergence of a two-tier ASEAN.32 South Korea was certainly a bit slow, though it was discussing a similar free trade pact with ASEAN during the summit process, and it acknowledged that imports of marine and agricultural products from Southeast Asia posed a problem. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, prompted by the disappointment with the West and APEC as well as the pressure to enhance the role of ASEAN, it was natural that ASEAN leaders turned to Northeast Asia; at the same time, Northeast Asian countries were seeking ways to exploit the evolution of the AFTA. By then, about half of East and Southeast Asian countries’ foreign trade was intra-regional and roughly two-thirds of their foreign investment also came from within the region. The implementation of the Chiang Mai Initiative probably represents the most important achievement of the ‘ASEAN plus 3’ approach. Under this initiative, central banks of the ten ASEAN states plus Japan, China and South Korea have woven a web of foreign exchange swap agreements that would make foreign exchange reserves available at short notice to any member country facing a balance-of-payment crisis. The objective was to enable the central banks to secure the financial support to buy time during the kind of speculative onslaught that led to the devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997, which triggered the regional crisis. The Asian governments concerned basically completed the major currency swap deals in time for the annual conference of the Asian Development Bank in 2003.33 Although the sums involved were still small in relation to the size of the foreign exchange market, the Chiang Mai Initiative was perceived by the officials concerned as a crucial step towards regional economic co-operation to strengthen mutual economic security. There were some speculations that the currency safety net foreshadowed the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund or even a single Asian currency;34 but such forecast was certainly over-optimistic. Initially, the above swap network excluded Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. According to the rules, countries could draw down only 10 per cent of the swap line without agreeing to conditions set by the IMF. Some ASEAN central bankers believed that this requirement was too harsh, but there was also a view that one could not afford to throw good money after bad without tough IMF guidelines. In recent years, Chinese leaders have become aware that the emphasis of the ‘China threat’ has gradually shifted from the military to the economic aspects.

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In the Cold War era before the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, anti-Communist Southeast Asian countries perceived China’s ‘export of revolutions’ as a major security threat. In the recent decades, when Chinese leaders have been engaging in economic reforms and opening to the outside world, many ASEAN members are still worried about China’s policy of gradual expansion in the South China Sea. This policy has been variously described as ‘creeping assertiveness’, ‘creeping sovereignty’ and by the Philippine Defence Secretary as ‘talk and take’.35 Creeping assertiveness has been interpreted as a gradual policy of establishing a greater physical presence in the South China Sea without recourse to military confrontation. In the ASEAN summit in 2002 mentioned above, China and ASEAN concluded the Declaration of Good Conduct in the South China Seas. Though non-binding, it obliges the ASEAN members and China to avoid any activity which would damage or complicate relations between them, i.e. it serves as a code for avoiding armed clashes over their conflicting claims on the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands. Since the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN countries increasingly feel threatened by China’s strengthening competitiveness in manufacturing industries as an ‘international workshop’ and its attraction of FDI at the expense of its Southeast Asian neighbours. Further, ASEAN states appear to continue to lose their export market shares in the US, Asia and elsewhere to China. Finally, ASEAN will have to compete with China for the more profitable slots on the value-added chain. It might have been assumed that as China became increasingly sophisticated in production, ASEAN would stay ahead and profit from supplying the capital goods needed for China’s growth. But this model of development is no longer viable; China is large enough and sophisticated enough to fill every link on the production chain itself. In response, Chinese leaders continue to emphasize the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence,36 while calling for closer economic co-operation among Asian countries. China is expected to invest substantially in Asia too. The latter’s worry of the deterioration in Sino-American relations and the potential danger of the ‘containment’ of China by Western countries has been an important motivation for their promotion of East Asian regionalism through the ‘ASEAN plus China’ and the ‘ASEAN plus 3’ routes. On the part of ASEAN states, they hope that this regionalism may enable them to deal with Western countries from a position of strength on issues such as protectionism, in contrast to their impotence during the Asian financial crisis. They share Beijing’s resentment against Washington’s arrogance and unilateralism, as well as its promotion of a more multipolar world. They are disappointed with APEC’s failure to serve as an engine to push the WTO to launch a new

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round of global trade negotiations; they have become more cautious about globalization too.37 China, however, has to appreciate the limitations of the ‘ASEAN plus 3’ framework and the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area. The ASEAN states share a strong consensus that they must not replace ASEAN, nor should they be seen as excluding other countries in the Asia-Pacific, particularly the US The latter’s presence has been seen as an important foundation stone and guarantor of regional security. Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia, as well as Thailand and the Philippines in Southeast Asia, have defence alliances with the US It has been and continues to be a major investor too. Despite the considerable resentment against US hegemony and unilateralism, very few in Southeast Asia anticipate or desire the departure of the US.38 The 9/11 incident turned the attention of the leaderships in China and Southeast Asia from economic security to terrorism. There was a common recognition of the importance of collaboration to fight transnational terrorism. ASEAN states realized that their capabilities were limited, and offers of assistance from the Bush administration were generally welcome. ASEAN governments, however, also took care to avoid being seen as pandering to US demands, since many Muslims in the region perceived the US war on terrorism as really an attack on Islam. In the early 1990s, the strategic focus of many ASEAN states had shifted from domestic political stability to external defence, and the emphasis on force structure had correspondingly shifted from the army to the navy and air force. In this connection, these states had to purchase modern military equipment to enhance their naval and air force capabilities. Their efforts were facilitated by the keen competition between cheap Russian supplies and Western arms manufacturers. Economic development among the ASEAN states also prompted them to strengthen national defence to safeguard their maritime resources. China’s Southeast Asian experts were quick to point out that the ASEAN members which had spent more on military modernization before the Asian financial crisis were those less concerned with the China threat; Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand spent relatively more simply because they were more prosperous and had the financial resources to do so.39 China and the ASEAN states were closely monitoring each other’s military modernization programmes. They did not see such programmes as immediate threats, but they were concerned with the potential danger of getting into the vicious cycle of an arms race. In the post-Cold War era, the ASEAN states had to strengthen their defence capabilities in response to the reduction in security commitments to the region on the part of the US and Russia. To varying

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degrees, there was also a concern with the rising influence of regional powers, including China, Japan and India. China, therefore, recognized that the ASEAN states were worried about the uncertainty of their security in the future, as well as the emergence of potential threats. The military modernization plans of the ASEAN states, which reached a peak before the Asian financial crisis, had to be shelved in view of the subsequent financial difficulties. By the time of the 11 September 2001 incident, these ASEAN states had just started to reorder the naval vessels and military aircraft in their plans of the 1990s. The military modernization programmes were designed to enhance their capabilities to monitor and control the sea and air spaces around their territories to deal with the problems of fishery poaching, piracy, illegal immigration, etc. Now an important objective is of course to combat terrorism. The armed forces of the ASEAN states had established very few co-operation links, an important reason being that territorial disputes existed between the Philippines and Malaysia (over Sabah in the earlier decades), between Malaysia and Indonesia (over the islands of Sipadan and Ligitan), between the Philippines and Indonesia (over the delimitation of the territorial seas between Mindanao and Sulawesi), and among Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand (over the delimitation of the territorial seas in the Gulf of Siam). The events of 9/11 prompted the ASEAN states to work together. Statements condemning terrorism as well as pledging intelligence-sharing and collaboration among law enforcement agencies were soon released by ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). According to Sheldon Simon, the most effective anti-terrorist co-operation has been bilateral, especially between Singapore and Malaysia. A counter-terrorism agreement among Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand has also been concluded to monitor their porous borders, especially regarding the issue of illegal immigration. But in view of their limited surveillance and interdiction capabilities, the Bush administration still finds the efficacy of all these joint efforts problematic.40 In sum, ASEAN countries has responded differently to the Bush administration’s war on terrorism, ranging from the enthusiastic endorsement from the Philippines, to the quieter backing from Singapore, rather tentative support from Thailand, and endorsement from Indonesia and Malaysia tempered with warnings that the US should not target Islam generally. At the Brunei summit in November 2001, ASEAN delegates emphasized that ‘at the international level, the UN should play a major role in this regard (in countering terrorism)’.41 Obviously ASEAN was not about to offer a carte blanche endorsement for unilateral American actions against terror, though the Bush administration has

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been enjoying a greater success in promoting security multilateralism in its various annual military exercises in Southeast Asia. An encouraging sign of this multilateral collaboration in counter-terrorism was perhaps a gathering in Singapore in early June 2002 involving the defence ministers from the ASEAN states, the US, China, Japan, India and Russia, along with legislators, academic experts and European defence officials. It is interesting that an official from Taiwan’s National Security Council also attended. At an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in June 2003, the joint communiqué issued acknowledged intensified co-operation among ASEAN member states in the fight against terrorism and confirmed their resolve to strengthen co-operation in this area. It also welcomed the establishment of the Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counter-terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in the following July. On the question of transnational crimes, member countries agreed to step up co-operation and strengthen the capability of law enforcement authorities. The events of 9/11 obviously provided a good opportunity to improve Sino-American relations after the spy plane incident in April 2001 and the substantial arms sales to Taiwan by the US in the same month. The Bush administration had to enlist China’s support to combat global terrorism so as to present a truly international united front, and Chinese leaders responded readily because the maintenance of a peaceful international environment for China’s modernization requires a cordial Sino-American relationship. President George W. Bush attended the informal APEC summit in Shanghai in October 2001, and then returned to Beijing in the following February for a working visit. Both governments reached a consensus on the establishment of co-operative mechanisms to combat terrorism on an intermediate- and longterm basis, and this contributed much to the atmosphere. However, there remains substantial discrepancy in the definition of terrorism. The Chinese authorities consider that the Bush administration has double standards. For example, they believe that Sino-American co-operation against terrorism should cover terrorists of all shades including Xinjiang separatists; and in August 2002, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage announced that the US had added the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to its list of terrorist groups. Some European allies of the US questioned the motivations behind this unexpected move of the Bush administration, and there was suspicion that it was a trade-off for China’s support in the UN Security Council for the US campaign against Iraq.42 The Chinese leadership, however, is concerned with China’s major-power status and its good relations with the Islamic world. Hence a delicate balance

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has to be maintained among the combat of global terrorism and various separatist forces, the opposition to hegemonism and power politics, and the avoidance of damaging China’s traditional good relations with the Islamic world. Hence when the Western world led by the US launched retaliatory campaigns against Afghanistan, Iraq and other countries, Chinese leaders believed that they had to remain cool, maintain close ties, engage in consultation with most countries of the world, and insist on authorization by the UN Security Council for major military action. Chinese leaders also consider close co-ordination and consultation among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council essential, as China has a veto in the Council; they certainly see the UN as a significant instrument to curb US unilateralism too. The official think tanks in China have been engaged in a discussion of the concept of terrorism since 9/11. While there is not yet a conclusion, there is a general consensus that Western definitions and studies of terrorism tend to focus solely or mainly on the phenomena of violence, especially individual retaliatory actions in developed countries; and they seldom attempt to explore the deep roots of terrorism, neglecting the antagonisms generated by the deepseated implications of cultures, religions and international institutions.43 Some of these think tanks have also appealed for a thorough survey of the hidden security problems in the country, learning from the lessons of 9/11; and that the Chinese authorities have to hurry in the establishment of crisismanagement mechanisms so that China will be better prepared for terrorist attacks in the future. In the early 1990s, Chinese leaders already believed that the end of the Cold War would enhance instability and facilitate the re-emergence of various territorial disputes, ethnic contradictions and religious conflicts. Some of these troubles would have an adverse impact on China too, such as the demonstration effect of the rise of ethnic-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism in the newly independent Central Asian republics on the national minorities in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet. The rising strategic importance of Central Asia naturally exacerbates the Chinese leadership’s worries. They now consider that the foreign policy of the Bush administration will be a crucial factor sharpening such territorial disputes, ethnic contradictions and religious conflicts. The Middle East situation is a classic example; the legacy of the Kosovo crisis is another. Many Chinese scholars argue that if a traditional ethnic or religious conflict takes place in an area involving no major power’s strategic interests, such as in Central Africa, the conflict will probably be contained and the danger of escalation will be reduced. Once major powers (especially the US) perceive that their interests are at stake, the conflict will be magnified, and likely

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become a persistent source of international tension, as in the case of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Significant confrontations are always related to major powers’ interests and strategies. The Bush administration’s orientations concerning its China policy continue to cause considerable worry in the Chinese foreign policy establishment. Former President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Libya and Iran in April 2002 was clearly meant to be a message to the US that Beijing would oppose any attempt by the Bush administration to sanction and attack sovereign states labelled as an ‘axis of evil’ (Iran, Iraq and North Korea) as well as other states accused of sponsoring terrorism by the US.44 Both Iran and Libya have been acquiring military technology from China, and in February 2002, President George W. Bush in his visit to China failed to obtain a guarantee from his host not to export weapons technology to nations hostile to the US. But China’s position on the US-led campaign against Iraq was relatively mild, in comparison with that of Russia, France and Germany. Apparently the Chinese leadership has been following Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy line of ‘avoiding the limelight and keeping a low profile’. Maintaining a peaceful international environment to focus on domestic economic development is of paramount importance, and the economic relationship with the US with its annual trade surplus of over US$100 billion for China remains a significant consideration. The Chinese leadership is even willing to pay the price of being criticized domestically for its being weak in the handling of China’s relations with the US and Japan.

The New Security Agenda at the Regime Level At the end of the Cultural Revolution and after the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, modernization has certainly become the most important goal of the Chinese leadership. The top priority assigned to this objective reflects the understanding on its part that the goal of revolution is to improve the people’s livelihood, and that the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime will depend on its ability to raise the living standard of the Chinese people. In terms of foreign policy, Chinese leaders will strive for a peaceful international environment to modernize China; and diplomacy has to serve China’s economic interests.45 The Asian financial crisis did not cause too much difficulty for China: in fact it served to demonstrate its economic strength. China’s financial support for ASEAN in the latter’s economic crisis enhanced mutual trust between them. China’s relative economic health also won considerable admiration in ASEAN.

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As the largest borrower from the World Bank, China received no further funds from the International Development Association, the soft-loan arm of the World Bank, after mid-1999.46 In August 1997, China offered US$1 billion to help Thailand to overcome its financial crisis. Similarly, it provided assistance to Indonesia. In December 1997, at the summit between ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea in Kuala Lumpur, former President Jiang Zemin pledged US$4–6 billion for the IMF programme to support Southeast Asia, and to take part in other assistance programmes.47 Chinese leaders also promised not to devalue the renminbi so as to avoid another round of competitive devaluations among Asian currencies. Chinese leaders considered this an important contribution to stabilizing the financial markets in Asia and a sacrifice on China’s part, a view shared within ASEAN circles.48 The US government was also concerned with China holding US government bonds. In July 1997, Beijing owned US$12 billion of US government bonds, second only to Japan. If it decided to sell US$10 billion of these bonds, it would raise interest rates in the US by 1 per cent, and make a significant impact on international financial markets.49 In contrast to China’s efforts, Japan was criticized for not doing enough to help rescue Southeast Asia from the regional economic crisis.50 The Chinese leadership was concerned with the vulnerabilities of the countries hardest hit in the Asian financial crisis. It became more cautious in making the renminbi a hard currency. But its determination to integrate China with the world economy had not been much affected. The decision to apply for and take up WTO membership and the related concessions made to the US in 1999 reflected the Chinese leadership’s appreciation that China must open its doors and accept the challenge of globalization. Isolation from the global system would deny China the opportunity to catch up with the world’s most advanced countries. Hence, China had no choice but to engage in global competition under rules that it had no part in formulating. Yet at the same time, Chinese leaders understand that China has been a major beneficiary of the existing international economic order, and it should seek to influence its gradual evolution rather than oppose it. It is far from clear whether China will benefit on balance from its admission to the WTO. Given their inherent fear of losing control, Chinese leaders deserve praise for their courage to take up the challenge of globalization. In twenty years’ time, a good proportion of China’s elite professionals are likely to be employed by foreign companies or joint ventures, and their pensions as well as their medical insurance schemes will be invested in foreign financial institutions. It will be difficult to demonstrate the superiority of socialism under such circumstances.

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In recent years, the new Chinese leaders’ policy agenda has been dominated by the challenges of globalization. This is likely going to remain so in the foreseeable future. In view of China’s joining the WTO, the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has to be further accelerated; and the reforms have now reached the state monopolies. Unemployment is expected to rise further, while the gap between the rich and poor, and that between the coastal provinces and the interior, will continue to expand. Maintaining political and social stability will become increasingly challenging, and the new Chinese leadership has to secure adequate funding for a social security system. It has to show its determination to combat corruption too. In contrast to their predecessors, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have been trying to present themselves as modest, uncorrupt and caring leaders, focusing their attention on the welfare of the underprivileged such as the peasants and the urban poor. Since the Chinese Communist regime will continue to rely on promoting economic growth and raising people’s living standards to maintain its legitimacy, it will be under pressure to maintain a respectable annual economic growth rate at about 7 per cent and above. This pressure will be exacerbated by the new leaders’ eagerness to perform. Despite China’s expanding foreign trade and inflow of foreign investment, the Asian financial crisis alerted the Chinese leadership that a big country like China must avoid over-dependence on external demand in maintaining a healthy economic growth rate. Since 1997, the Chinese authorities have been financing major infrastructural projects by budget deficits to maintain the desired growth rate and create jobs. In 2002, a deficit of 300 billion yuan was expected.51 The Chinese authorities sold a record US$106 billion in bonds in 2002 to pay for the roads, bridges and other projects which had been supporting the impressive growth of the Chinese economy. Bond sales to domestic investors rose 16 per cent, from 758.8 billion yuan in 2001 to 877.4 billion yuan in 2002. The infrastructural projects supported an economic growth rate of 7.9 per cent in the first three quarters of 2002. It is widely considered that the Chinese government needs growth of more than 7 per cent to absorb eight million new urban job-seekers every year.52 With debt levels only a fraction of those in Japan and the US, China can afford to borrow more. In the autumn of 2003, the Chinese authorities, however, were worried that parts of the economy were growing too fast, especially bank credits to real estate and cyclical industries like steel, cement and aluminium. Some economists argued that it was not a matter of overheating, but over-investing. This concern reflected that economic growth in China would have to depend more on expansion of consumer demand which in turn would depend on a rise in

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income for the entire population, rather than on extensive investment in infrastructural projects. Further, a contraction in China’s economy would have a considerable impact on the world economy, especially the suppliers of raw materials, demonstrating the weight of China’s economy.53 A careful reading of former Premier Zhu Rongji’s final government work report in March 2003 indicates that China no longer considers that it has to oppose any particular country or any particular force in the world.54 The Chinese leadership feels no significant threat from the external environment in terms of traditional security, and it therefore accords top priority to the maintenance of domestic political and social stability which, it believes, can be best achieved by economic growth. Chinese leaders probably realize that the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China cannot be maintained if the Party continues to represent solely the proletariat. In light of the introduction of the market economy and the increasing economic polarization that has occurred in the course of modernization, claims that the Party represents the ‘fundamental interests of the broadest mass of the people’ is undeniably a wise redefinition of the Party’s role. Jiang Zemin has recognized that in the economic reform era, changes have occurred in the composition of China’s social strata. New elements such as entrepreneurs and technicians in private enterprises, managers and technicians in foreign-owned enterprises and individual household entrepreneurs have emerged; and they have contributed much to the development of productivity in the Chinese economy. To broaden the base of support for the Party, Jiang suggested in 2001 that as long as these elements were willing ‘to struggle consciously to realize the Party line and platform and conform to the demands of Party members’, then they should be absorbed into the Party.55 Regarding 9/11, it has already been explained earlier that the Chinese leadership considered it important to make good use of the opportunity to improve Sino-American relations. The incident highlighted the threat of terrorism to national integrity in China; and the Chinese authorities have been concerned with the militant Muslim separatists in Xinjiang.56 China suffered terrorists attacks both in Xinjiang and in Beijing; some militant members of the ETIM in Xinjiang apparently were trained and supported by the radical Islamists in Afghanistan, including Al Qaeda.57 One report claims that Osama bin Laden’s organization trained 1,000 Uighur terrorists from China.58 The Chinese leadership predictably made use of 9/11 to increase pressure on all separatists in Xinjiang, but it appreciates that pressure alone will not solve the problem. Ultimately the threat of separatism will be minimized by economic development in the border areas. In the late 1990s, the

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Chinese authorities began to launch a grand strategy to develop the western region in China. It is expected that improving the living standards there will reduce the contradictions with the involved national minorities. Admittedly, the massive inflow of funding for major infrastructural projects and other forms of assistance have raised the economic growth rates of many western provinces to exceed the national average since 1999. The relative prosperity undeniably has strengthened the social and political stability in the region. The considerable immigration of Han people into the western region helps too, though this may not be favourable to the preservation of the cultures of the national minorities. The development of China’s western region, at least at the policy level, demonstrates significant concern for environmental protection. Policy programmes have been formulated and funding provided to restore cultivated land to forests, protect natural forests and prevent further desertification. Former Premier Zhu Rongji in his final government work report promised that the programme of restoring grazing areas to grasslands would continue, and relevant legal work would be intensified. The Asian financial crisis threatened the economic prosperity and political stability of Southeast Asia in many important ways. As the legitimacy of the non-democratic regimes had largely been dependent upon their economic performance, a sharp economic setback naturally called their legitimacy into question and changes of government took place in a number of countries. In general, ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’ were perceived to be the basic causes of the economic problems, and political solutions were demanded. But the solutions were probably more complicated than a general push for democratization, particularly when the processes were evolutionary and not revolutionary. As argued by J. Ruggie and Kanishka Jayasuriya, an important characteristic of the Southeast Asian political economy before the Asian financial crisis was the co-existence of two distinct economic segments: a globally oriented segment based on exports and mainly supported by FDI, and a domestic segment which largely operated as cartels. The former tradable sector was predominantly controlled by foreign investors, while the latter non-tradable sector was largely in the hands of business groups well connected with the political establishments. The economic growth generated by the tradable sector was compensated through a set of bargains and arrangements between the capital in the tradable sector and that in the non-tradable sector.59 For example, in Malaysia, the profits of the export-oriented segment supported the expanding economic and political power of the non-tradable sector. This expansion was well

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demonstrated by the rapid growth of infrastructural projects, which were funded by the export-oriented segment. More significant still, the large capital inflows attracted by the spectacular growth of exports went to the politically connected non-tradable sector. In fact, most of the debts which caused the Asian financial crisis had been incurred by the politically connected domestic cartels. Whether the dominant domestic political coalition wanted to initiate reforms or resist them in response to the Asian financial crisis depended on the extent of its dominance in the domestic political economy and the severity of the external shocks. Hence the strategies to restore economic growth and therefore political and social stability were related to the survival of the dominant domestic political coalitions, which in turn had to redefine their perceptions of external security and thereby the relations with the external major powers, as well as their perceptions of domestic security and thereby the very composition of the dominant domestic political coalitions. The Asian financial crisis and its aftermath highlighted the fact that the prosperity brought by economic growth had not always been equitably distributed across social sectors and classes, as well as across regions within the Southeast Asian countries. These social inequities now cause social tensions and conflicts, and can contribute to the decline of the political legitimacy of the governments concerned. In 2000, the ASEAN countries had Gini coefficients ranging from 0.485 for Malaysia to 0.304 for Laos.60 This obviously is a potential source of social conflict triggered by economic difficulties and political repression. Since Southeast Asian societies are multi-ethnic ones, these social inequalities that often coincide with ethnic and religious lines can lead to domestic instability and violent social conflicts. The problem in Mindanao in the southern Philippines is rooted in social inequalities which have lasted for a very long time. The inequalities at the same time also have religious overtones and have fuelled Moro secessionism since the 1970s. Socio-economic disparities in Indonesia tended to be associated with the fact that many major business groups in the country belonged to its ethnic Chinese citizens. Hence, class lines also tended to follow ethnic, and often religious, lines. The riots just before Suharto’s fall included the destruction of places of worship – churches, temples and mosques. To a considerable extent, the rise of modern nationhood in Southeast Asia was accompanied by racial riots and other forms of ethnic contradictions. The recent decades of rapid economic development had certainly improved the inter-ethnic relations in Southeast Asia. Both democratic and non-democratic

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governments in the region were strengthened by prosperity, and their desire for stability meant that they had little tolerance for political activism attempting to exploit racial or ethnic contradictions as rallying points for support. Almost every Southeast Asian government dealt strongly with what they labelled as ethnic chauvinism or communalism. In some countries, military means were employed as much as ideological and legislative recourses. However, the degree of reconciliation that the pluralistic societies in Southeast Asia had succeeded in securing between their ethnic identities and the national identities varied.61 The Asian financial crisis, unfortunately, caused a severe setback to these processes of reconciliation in the region. The ethnic troubles which had emerged in Indonesia since the outbreak of the crisis worried many people in Southeast Asia, besides having a demonstration effect in some localities. Barry Buzan observes that strong states, i.e. strong in terms of unity, integration and good governance, build their national identities based on national or societywide consensus, while the reverse is true of weak states typically suffer from lack of identity and consensus, reflecting a failure in nation-building.62 This observation may well apply to the study of nationalism and national identity visà-vis ethnic diversity in Southeast Asia. Some weak states in the region have built strong military establishments which are recognized as major players in security and stability. While the economic difficulties have exacerbated the problems of interethnic relations in Southeast Asian countries, the governments have less financial resources to help those adversely affected. The problems have been further complicated by the 9/11 incident. On the positive side, most of the regional governments have been alerted to the potential of communal conflicts and have abandoned their complacency. With the increasing freedoms of the mass media and the healthy development of NGOs in countries like Indonesia, better strategies may be developed to meet the challenges in the longer term. The events of 9/11 were similar to the Asian financial crisis in the sense that they again highlighted the previously ignored contradictions in many Southeast Asian societies. In December 2001 and January 2002, authorities in Singapore and Malaysian arrested dozens of Islamists who were accused of organizing clandestine cells in the two countries. These cells included Indonesians, Malaysians and Singaporeans and were linked to individuals in the Philippines. Apparently they tried to target US and other Western embassies as well as US forces in Singapore.63 But it was the Bali bombing in October 2002 which fully exposed the threats to regional tourism and trade

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posed by what appeared to be networks of local Islamic militants perceived by Western intelligence to be in league with Al Qaeda. In the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in 1979–88, a considerable number of Muslims from Indonesia and Malaysia joined the mujahidin in their campaign against the Soviet occupation forces. While in Afghanistan, they were exposed to radical Islam and trained in guerrilla warfare. Upon their return, they formed organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) in Singapore and Malaysia as well as their counterparts in Indonesia. The fundamental problem is that there are sizable pockets of dissatisfied, anti-American youth in some Southeast Asian countries and therefore there will be a radical Islamic movement posing a threat to Western and especially US interests.64 The authorities of the ASEAN states do not see Al Qaeda cells all over their countries, but they acknowledge that there are longstanding problems of extremism in the region, with specifically local roots; and it is the connections of locals with international groups that is the real worry.65 Many experts on Southeast Asia are not optimistic, and some consider that the threat of terrorism in the region since the Bali bombing has been ‘bad or worse’. A common observation is that for an angry Muslim in the region, ‘the only lesson to take away from Iraq is that no state can confront the US headon. The only way to make the Americans taste the injustice they feel is through terrorism.’66 Dr Clive Williams of the Australian National University looks ahead and issues the following warning: ‘Demographically in the Muslimmajority countries, they genuinely regard bin Laden and Al Qaeda as something to be respected. These could well be a demographic problem in five or ten years as youth gets to the point of acting on its own.’67 It is recognized that more anti-terror declarations would not solve the problem of terrorism, while clamping down on free expression and carrying out precautionary arrests may exacerbate the problem by further radicalizing the Muslim community. Indonesia is obviously the centre of the problem, as corrupt or frightened governments may not be willing to adopt the appropriate strategies of strengthening the rule of law, ending corruption in the police and armed forces, getting the military out of politics, promoting multi-faith dialogues and allowing dissent to be freely expressed through ballot boxes. The combatting of terrorism is of course related to the general campaign to end local and transnational crimes as well as stemming the trades in guns, drugs and human beings. The challenge is that some governments in the region are still subject to undue influence from the military, as in Indonesia, or fear peaceful dissent, as in Malaysia and Singapore. More equitable and sustainable

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development processes for the global poor are the key in the combatting of terrorism, and some even argue that the solution lies in an economic rescue programme along the lines of the Marshall Plan in Europe after World War II.68 In sum, there is an increasing awareness of the need to tackle terrorism at its roots which demands not only economic prosperity and more financial resources at the disposal of the governments, but more equitable distribution of wealth and better governance. Democratization and the rule of law therefore cannot be avoided in the pursuit of security broadly defined.

Conclusion Retreat from its over-expansion in Asia by the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 1980s foreshadowed its breakup and the end of the Cold War. Withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and the subsequent Paris Peace Conference in the early 1990s not only removed a serious security threat to the ASEAN states, but they also represented diplomatic victories for the regional organization. Basically from the 1990s onwards, China and the ASEAN states perceive no menacing external threat and they all want to maintain a peaceful international environment to promote economic growth. External threat plays a diminishing role in the foreign policies of China and the ASEAN states. There is no need to identify an enemy or a security threat for ideological reasons, for forging alliances, or for attracting foreign aid. Some version of modernization diplomacy is pursued so that economic interests are accorded priority. Such foreign policy orientations have enhanced the security of the countries concerned, and their impressive economic growth has also improved their international status and influence. It is in this context that they have gradually adopted comprehensive security and similar concepts. Non-zero-sum games emerge as the norm in international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. For China and the non-democracies in Southeast Asia, performance remains the most important source of legitimacy for the authoritarian regimes. Economic growth therefore contributes to their strength and political and social stability, as well as minimizing the domestic contradictions. Nationbuilding through political mobilization has given way to modernization. At the individual level, aspirations and security are also realized in the context of satisfactory economic development. At the international level, regional economic co-operation associated with market liberalization is perceived as an important means to maintain a peaceful external environment and to promote economic

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growth. The concept of security is thus both broadened and extended to link up the international, regime and individual levels. Export-oriented development strategies enhance economic interdependence, and the economic risks associated with globalization become more difficult to manage, as demonstrated in the Asian financial crisis. The crisis exposed the contradictions between the developed countries of the West and the developing economies in the Asia-Pacific region, and also challenged the dominant domestic political coalitions in Southeast Asia based on such development strategies. China, a relatively sheltered economy during the Asian financial crisis, was less affected; but the challenges of globalization soon dominate its policy agenda once it decided to join the WTO. New alignments have to be established within the Asia-Pacific region to ensure effective interest articulation within the WTO framework, and the shaking of the foundation of the regional regimes produced varied responses ranging from defensive adjustment to offensive adjustment and fundamental economic restructuring.69 Values and aspirations on the part of individuals have to be redefined too in view of the severe economic setback. Thus perceptions of security have to be adjusted at the international, regime and individual level. The threat of terrorism was first highlighted by 9/11 and then the bombing in Bali. But the threat was rooted in domestic ethnic and socio-economic contradictions and exacerbated by economic difficulties in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. The 9/11 incident caused the Bush administration to broaden its presence and engagement/intervention in key parts of Asia, triggering a wide spectrum of responses from the US’s formal allies, quasi-allied democracies, Muslim-dominant states and countries which the Bush administration has regarded with suspicion. But the threat of terrorism has in turn alerted the regional governments to the issues of radical Islam, the widening gap between the rich and poor and inter-ethnic relations, as well as to a whole range of non-traditional security issues. In search of the more broadly defined security at the international, regime and individual level, democratization and the equitable sharing of the fruits of economic growth have become increasingly conspicuous themes. Notes * This is a considerably expanded version of an article by the same title published in Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 15, No. 46, February 2006, pp. 89–111. 1. ‘Human Security’, in David Capie and Paul Evans, The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002, p. 139.

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2. ‘Introduction’, in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (eds), NonTraditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Select Publishing for Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2001, p. 1. 3. ‘Comprehensive Security’, in David Capie and Paul Evans, p. 64. 4. Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries’, Research Paper and Policy Studies No. 26, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, no date given. 5. See the author’s ‘China’s ASEAN Policy in the 1990s: Pushing for Regional Multipolarity’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 2, August 1999, pp. 176–83. 6. Raymond L. Bryant and Michael J.G. Parnwell (eds), Environmental Change in Southeast Asia: People, Politics and Sustainable Development, London: Routledge, 1996, pp. 10–11. 7. Human Development Report 1994, Oxford: Oxford University Press/UN Development Programme, 1994. 8. See Samuel S. Kim, ‘China’s International Organizational Behaviour’, in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, p. 431. 9. Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Southeast Asia’s Embedded Mercantilism in Crisis: International Strategies and Domestic Coalitions’, in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (eds), pp. 26–53. 10. Ming Pao (a Hong Kong Chinese newspaper), March 13, 2002. 11. The Middle East accounted for 46.4 per cent of China’s total oil imports of 69.4 million tonnes in 2002. Chinese oil companies have been very active in acquiring foreign oil assets in the past few years. See South China Morning Post (a Hong Kong English newspaper), March 12, 2003. The Chinese authorities also plan to spend US$1.57 billion to accumulate a strategic oil reserve of about 50 million barrels, amounting to thirty days of imports, before 2005; see Tian Hang, ‘Zhongguo Nengyuan Zhanlue Mianlin Tiaozhan (China’s Energy Strategy Facing Challenges)’, The Mirror (a Hong Kong Chinese monthly), No. 309, April 2003, p. 48. 12. Leland R. Miller, ‘In Search of China’s Energy Authority’, Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), Vol. 169, No. 1, January/February 2006, p. 39. 13. See John W. Garver, ‘The China–India–US Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era’, NBR Analysis (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research), Vol. 13, No. 5, October 2002, pp. 5–56. 14. Daljit Singh, ‘The Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia’, in Russell Heng Hiang Khng and Denis Hew (eds), Regional Outlook, Southeast Asia 2003–2004, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, pp. 4–6. 15. See Financial Times (London edition), September 10, 2004. 16. See Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Thailand – International Terrorism and the Muslim South’, in Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2004, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004, pp. 267–8.

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17. See Sheldon W. Simon, ‘Southeast Asia’, in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (eds), Strategic Asia 2002–03, Asian Aftershocks, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2002, pp. 309–48. 18. Brad Glosserman and Vivian Brailey Fritschi, ‘ASEAN Needs to Unite, or Fade in China’s Shadow’, South China Morning Post, November 11, 2002. 19. Daljit Singh, p. 6. 20. Credit Suisse, First Boston, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch all cut back their operations in Southeast Asia. See Wayne Arnold, ‘In Southeast Asia, a Wary Optimism’, New York Times, April 4, 2002. 21. See Lowell Dittmer, ‘Asia in 2006‘, Asian Survey, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, January/ February 2007, p. 1. 22. Robert W. Hefner, ‘Islam and Asian Security’, in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (eds), pp. 351–92. 23. Amitav Acharya, ‘Realism, Institutionalism and the Asian Economic Crisis’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 21, No. 1, April 1999, pp. 18–19. 24. Bangkok Post, June 13, 1998. 25. Simon S.C. Tay and Jesus P. Estanislao, ‘The Relevance of ASEAN Crisis and Change’, in Simon S.C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro (eds), Reinventing ASEAN, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, pp. 14–16. 26. Jusuf Wanandi, ‘ASEAN’s Past and the Challenges Ahead: Aspects of Politics and Security’, in Simon S.C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro (eds), p. 34. 27. Rahul Sen, ‘Singapore’s Free Trade Agreements: Implications for ASEAN and Future Challenges’, in Russell Heng Hiang Khng and Denis Hew (eds), pp. 75–77. 28. ‘Australia-Thailand FTA Joint Scoping Study’, at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/ negotiations/thai_fta/index.html; and ‘Thailand Seeks Free Trade Deal with Australia, Others’, at http://www.woolmark.com/index.shtml, March 23, 2001. 29. South China Morning Post, November 5, 2002. 30. Meng Yan, ‘Country Seeks Trade Partners’, China Daily (Beijing), May 21, 2002. 31. Ming Pao, November 6, 2002. 32. South China Morning Post, November 6, 2002. 33. Ibid., November 28, 2002. 34. Daljit Singh, ‘Southeast Asia in 2000: Many Roads, No Destination?’, in Daljit Singh and Anthony Smith (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2001, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001, p. 10; and Sunday Morning Post, May 13, 2001. 35. ‘Erap Orders Blockade of Mischief Reef ’, Philippine Daily Inquirer (a Manila English newspaper), November 11, 1998. 36. The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence were jointly initiated by China, India and Burma in 1953–54; initially they were to apply to relations among countries

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37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42.

43.

44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

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with different social systems. They are: respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit, mutual non-aggression and peaceful co-existence. Daljit Singh, ‘Southeast Asia in 2000: Many Roads, No Destination?’, pp. 10–13. Simon S.C. Tay, ‘ASEAN and East Asia: A New Regionalism?’, in Simon S.C. Tay, Jesus P. Estanislao and Hadi Soesastro (eds), pp. 206–25. See Wang Xiaomin, ‘Luelun Lengzhan hou Dongnanya Diqu Nicaijun de Yuanyin (Brief Analysis of the Reasons for Arms Expansion in Southeast Asia in the Post Cold-War Era)’, Dongnanya Xuekan (Southeast Asia Journal (Guangzhou), No. 26, December 1999, pp. 10–15. Sheldon W. Simon, p. 310. This was cited by Mohammed Jawhar Hassan, ‘Terrorism: Southeast Asia’s Response’, PacNet Newsletter (Honolulu: Pacific Forum/CSIS), No. 1, January 4, 2002. On August 28, 2002, officials at the US Embassy in Beijing further announced that they had evidence that the ETIM was plotting a terrorist bombing of the US Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. On September 11, 2002, the UN announced that, at the request of both the US and China, it was placing the ETIM on a UN list of terrorist organizations, requiring that all UN members freeze the group’s financial assets and ban its members from entry. See Kerry Dumbaugh, ‘China–US Relations’, Issue Brief for Congress (Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress), January 31, 2003, p. 3. Li Dongyan, ‘Kongbu Zhuyi Wenti – Guojishehui Mianlin de Zhongda Nanti (The Issue of Terrorism – A Serious Problem Facing the International Community)’, in Li Shenming and Wang Yizhou (eds), Guoji Xingshi Huangpishu (Yellow Book of World Situation), Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2002, pp. 126–47. South China Morning Post, April 20, 2002. See the author’s ‘The Evolution of China’s Foreign Policy in the Post-Mao Era: From Anti-hegemony to Modernization Diplomacy’, in his edited work, China: Modernization in the 1980s, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1989, pp. 161–201. South China Morning Post, September 20, 1997. Ming Pao, December 15 and 16, 1997. Ibid., April 18, 1998. Ibid., January 16, 1998. South China Morning Post, January 19, 1998. Ibid., November 19, 2002. Sunday Morning Post, December 15, 2002. Ben Dolven, ‘Investment Bubble’, Far Eastern Economic Review, Vol. 166, No. 37, September 18, 2003, p. 50. In the key paragraph on Chinese foreign policy in former Premier Zhu Rongji’s final government work report delivered in March 2003, targets of opposition were only

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55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

60.

61.

62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

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mentioned once in the second last sentence: ‘We remain opposed to all forms of hegemonism and power politics and stand against terrorism in all manifestations.’ For the full text of the report, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2003–03/ 19/content_787885.htm. The author’s view expressed here was also the consensus of a group of Chinese foreign policy experts from Beijing and Shanghai whom the author met at the 16th Annual Conference of the Association of Chinese Political Studies held at the Hilton Hotel, Knoxville, Tennessee, US on April 4–6, 2003. See Jiang Zemin’s speech on the eightieth anniversary of the establishment of the Communist Party of China, Renmin Ribao (Beijing), July 2, 2001. See Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China’, in Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, p. 56. Phillip P. Pan and John Pomfret, ‘Bin Laden’s Chinese Connection’, Washington Post, November 10, 2001; and ‘Chinese FM Tang Eyes Afghan War, Terrorism, Ties with US, Japan, Vatican, Italy’, La Stampa (Turin), FBIS 11/24/01 (EUP 200011/26000152). ‘Unveiling the Terrorist Nature of ‘East Tujue’ Elements’, People’s Daily (Beijing), November 16, 2001. See J. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, in Stephen Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 195–232; and Kanishka Jayasuriya, pp. 33–6. Table 2.8, Distribution of Income or Consumption, World Development Indicators 2000, World Bank Group, http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi2000. No data were available for Brunei, Myanmar and Singapore. See Ooi Giok Ling, ‘Governance in Plural Societies and Security-Management of Inter-ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia’, in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (eds), pp. 288–317. Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1983. Sheldon Simon, p. 311. Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Addressing Transnational Security Threats in the AsiaPacific Region’, paper presented at the 2002 Pacific Symposium, National Defence University, Washington, DC, February 20–21, 2002, pp. 6 and 8. Vaudine England, ‘Time for Consensus on Tackling Threat of Terror’, Sunday Morning Post, November 3, 2002, p. 9. Peter Kammerer, ‘Terrorism Faces Day of Judgment’, ibid., May 11, 2003, p. 9. Ibid. This was the view of Dr Chandra Muzaffar, president of the International Movement for a Just World in Kuala Lumpur; see Peter Kammerer, ‘Economic Aid Could Iron out Extremism’, ibid., November 3, 2002, p. 9. In Malaysia, a politically dominant status quo coalition relied on the institution of highly protectionist and regulatory measures, and is a good example of defensive

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adjustment. In Singapore, attempts were made to modify existing policies to make the economy more competitive without significant changes in the structure and ownership of the domestic economy; it may be considered an example of offensive adjustment. In Thailand, a dominant reform coalition facing severe economic pressure opted for a programme of fundamental economic restructuring. These concepts are developed by Kanishka Jayasuriya, pp. 44–5.

Chapter 7: Regional Security in the European Union Hripsime Nalbandyan

World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peace relations.1

Introduction

I

n the development of international relations, principal changes in a political balance usually causes countries to reappraise their conceptions of security. During the period of the Cold War the definition of security was, ‘Security in its objective meaning expresses an absence of threats to main values and in its subjective meaning expresses the absence of fears that those values will be attacked.’2 Each part of the bipolar world saw threats to its values and tried to safeguard those values. NATO and the Warsaw Pact were created to play that role. After the Cold War, with one of the actors of the bipolar world leaving the international arena and with globalisation and the interconnection in international relations becoming a reality, the concept of security has been reassessed. Security has now come to be described as an effort to secure against dangers and as the ability of states and organisations to keep their independent identity and functional integrity against forces of change, which they perceive as unfriendly. In the fight against terrorism, security concepts started to play a different role. Europe has been attached to the architecture of international institutional security since the time of the Cold War. NATO has been looking for a purpose after the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the West European Union and the EU have shown a relative inadequacy in conflicts since 1990s. Recently, some of the Warsaw Pact countries became

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part of NATO and some became part of the EU. The EU achieved a very strong position from an economic point of view; however, it is still weak from a military and security point of view. A short history on the development of European security arrangements after World War II will aid an analysis of the current situation in Europe, transatlantic relations and the possible future of security arrangements in unifying Europe.

The Brussels Pact and NATO As a result of World War II, the influence of Western European countries on the development of international relations on the European continent was weakened. Dependence on the USA was growing. European states, in a last effort to make their own decisions without the direct presence of the USA, signed the Allied Agreement (between France and Great Britain) on 4 March 1947, as well as the Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural Co-operation and Common Selfprotection on 17 March 1948, which was signed in Brussels by five Western European countries. The Agreement formed the alliance known as the Brussels Pact or the Western Union.3 On 22 January 1948, British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin made his historical speech in which he called for the creation of the Western Union, in order to face the Soviet threat. The Western Union would include European countries, the Commonwealth and territories in Africa and South Asia. For France, participation in the Brussels Pact was a continuation of its European security policy, which was created by the Allied Agreement in Dunkirk on 7 March 1947.4 One of France’s goals was co-operation with the Western European countries, in order to strengthen its role in international affairs, to have a greater influence on the co-ordination of Western European policy towards Germany and to dominate the position of the USA in Western Europe. Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg had had a positive experience with co-operation already when, in 1944, they signed the Agreement on Benelux; so for them, the Brussels Pact was the continuation of the process of co-operation. The Brussels Pact was an important step in the effort to organise a common Western European defence against the threat of Soviet expansion to the West. Common security policy was covered in ten articles of the Pact. Signatories were obliged to provide military and other help in the event of an armed offence against any member of the Pact. The Pact was open for participation by other democratic countries. Any problem had to be solved by peaceful means and all members had recourse to the International Court in The Hague in order to settle problems.

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Activities in economic, social, cultural and especially military questions started a multilateral process of integration and a gradual convergence of Western European states. However, the military influence of the USA was growing. The US Senate adopted a resolution on 11 June 1948 that enabled the USA to enter regional security organisations. On 24 June 1948 the ‘Berlin crisis’ started; the Soviet army began to blockade roads leading to the Western sectors of Berlin. A complex agreement on the principles of defensive pacts in the North Atlantic area, proposed by the Advisory Council of the Brussels Pact in October 1948, was the first step in negotiations towards the North Atlantic Agreement, signed between members of the Brussels Pact, the USA and Canada in December 1948, in Washington. The mission of the new Agreement was summarised in the words of its Secretary General, Lord Ismay: ‘To hold America in Europe, Russia out of Europe and Germany on the ground.’5 After the formation of NATO the Brussels Pact stayed alive. However, its armed forces came under the common command of NATO. The Western European Pact could have been an important and powerful organisation against the Soviet Union and the whole Eastern block. However, after the establishment of NATO the significance of this organisation rapidly decreased. After the end of the Cold War, NATO’s significance began to be questioned. The question of whether NATO’s actions should be limited to the North Atlantic area, even when a crisis outside the North Atlantic area threatened its security, also became a frequent topic of discussion. It is clear that some members of NATO have serious doubts when it comes to operations that are outside the North Atlantic area. However, after the attacks on 11 September, the USA began to advocate a worldwide operational role for NATO and for military forces to come ‘whenever they are needed and wherever interests of the USA are threatened’. France and Germany voiced their doubts about NATO Response Forces being able to deploy anywhere in the world. During the Prague summit NATO decided to enlarge, at the same time stressing that the Alliance is entering a new era of relevance and shall be a major player in the war on terrorism, as well as fighting against other global threats. New European members of NATO – CEE states – currently go through military reforms. The State Secretary of the Slovak Ministry of Defence expresses this view: The reform of the armed forces is mainly connected with the new reality and new security challenges in the world. We must abandon the Cold War model and adopt the armed forces of a modern European democracy, which has nothing to do with NATO membership, although the success of transformation increases our qualification for NATO.6

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During the Cold War, NATO helped to maintain peace in Europe through its policy of deterrence; however, almost from the very beginning it also experienced disagreements among its members. The future of NATO is one of the issues that greatly affect EU–USA political relations. Some of the former Warsaw Pact countries have already become full members of NATO. Other European states – who are not ready to join NATO as yet or who are unable, for reasons of constitutional neutrality, to join NATO – have concluded partnership agreements with NATO which permit co-operation on peacekeeping and other activities.

The Common Foreign and Security Policy in Europe The first important political proposals on common defence and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy were presented at the beginning of the 1950s. In 1950 it was the so-called Pleven Plan which led to the project of the European Defence Community. This project was expected to create a European army with 43 divisions, 14 of them from France, 12 from Italy, 12 from Germany and 5 from Belgium, Netherlands and Luxemburg.7 A parallel political structure was planned. However, this was rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954. In the next decade two Fouchet plans were presented. These plans aimed at strengthening interstate co-operation and were not accepted by other member states. Thus the main objective of the Fouchet plans – the creation of a political union – was not reached. A major step forward was the incorporation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the Treaty on the EU. The Common Foreign and Security Policy forms one of the three pillars of the EU. Europe tried to build its own military capability in order to reduce its dependence on the USA in the international arena. In 1998, Tony Blair and Jaques Chirac obtained the EU’s consent to enlarge the European force to 60,000 soldiers, to attend the missions out of Europe for a period of one year.8 Unfortunately, not all similar efforts to build a capable and independent European force brought the expected positive result – limited budgets remain an obstacle to European military projects. The beginning of the twenty-first century seemed to bring to the fore important decisions on security and the military of the EU. Two working groups on the Future of the EU (External Relations and Defence) convened in September 2002. Some points of consensus were presented in the

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Final Reports of both groups in December 2002, although there were also differences of opinion among member states. The role of the European external representative was proposed to strengthen the voice of the EU outside Europe. Another important issue was the problem of international terrorism and the reactions of the EU as a body. Some of the problems encountered included the fact that some EU member states are also members of NATO while others are not, and the question of the military budgets of member states. Unfortunately, member states could not agree on solutions to these questions. The European Common Foreign and Security Policy can be understood differently. Javier Solana remarked, Europe’s new determination to introduce the Common Foreign and Security Policy has aroused mixed feelings in the United States. Some Americans doubt that it will ever happen; others believe that common policies will be adopted, but fear they will conflict with the USA interests.9

To allay these fears, European politicians very often give assurances that the Common Foreign and Security Policy is not intended to replace NATO as the most important security guarantee in Europe. The Common Foreign and Security Policy should not be seen as a project aimed against the USA and its interests, but as a step towards Europe playing the role of an equal partner. The EU does not want to take over the work of NATO. Table 7.1 Four armies with the greatest expected ‘military investments’ the Common European Forces Army

Number of people in military forces

Defence budget

France

1999–2000 474,009 (including 80,249 civilians)

2000 USD 35.8 bil./30 bil.*

2003 437,069 (including 80,945 civilians)

2003 USD 41 bil./ 31.07 bil.

2001 340,000 December 2002 290,600

2002 USD 27 bil. 2003 USD 25 bil., 1.45 per cent of GDP

Germany**

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Great Britain

Italy

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2001 215,000

2002 USD 33 bil., 2.7 per cent of GDP

2003 208,000

2003 USD 35.5 bil.

2000 265,000 + 43,000 civilians

2000 USD 13.2 bil., 1.45 per cent of GDP

2002 211,926 + 41,405 civilians

2003 USD 20.5 bil. (from that USD 14.02 bil. for military expenses), 1.07 per cent of GDP

Source: Josef Fucik, ‘Evropska unie jde do zbrane’ in ‘Mezinarodni politika’10/2003 (taken from the World Defense Almanac 1999–2000 and 2002–2003). * total defence/military expenses. ** German budget remains the same until 2006 (even is it decreases its contingent for NATO).

Role of the OSCE European nations have never liked the bipolar separation of their continent. Questions of security and co-operation were part of the programme of European policy at the end of the 1960s, when French President De Gaulle began to turn his attention to the so-called ‘détente’. He refused the separation of Europe and started to promote a change of ideas, from ‘détente’ (release) to ‘entente’ (agreement) and then to ‘co-operation’.10 At the beginning of June 1973, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was held in Helsinki with thirty-three participants from Europe, the USA and Canada. In two years it achieved huge successes. The conference accepted the so-called ‘Concluding Act’ on 1 August 1975. This Act had ten principles. Participants accepted the post-war status quo in Europe and set out concrete tasks for mutual co-operation on economic, cultural and humanitarian questions. After the meeting at the CSCE in November 1986 in Vienna, the principle of co-operation was involved in the ‘first pillar’, which dealt with political and security questions as well as in the ‘second pillar’, which dealt with the economic aspects of co-operation. The members still had confrontations about the ‘third pillar’, which represented cultural and humanitarian questions.

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During the 1990s, questions of security changed rapidly. The new situation in Europe put new tasks in front of the CSCE. In this changed reality it was also necessary to look at the military and security questions differently. Problems, especially national ones, came to the fore in Europe. The Conference, not being in a position to solve new problems, embarked on a new era of its development. Questions of human rights arose as a priority; the ‘third pillar’ started to have a greater influence on the next set of negotiations. Conflicts in some countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union required thinking about questions of security without using a large military force, for example police operations for peacekeeping and peacemaking. During the meeting of the CSCE in Budapest, ten documents were presented by the EU, Canada, Hungary, Germany with the Netherlands, Poland, Austria with Hungary, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine and the USA. The final text was a compromise of all the proposed documents. Three declarations were accepted and ten decisions were made. The main political declaration, which was called ‘Towards a genuine partnership in a new era’, laid out the main tasks of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The fourth decision of the ten mentioned was the most important from a security point of view; it includes the ‘Codex of behaviour in political-military aspects of security’ as well as characterising a complex approach to common security and the states’ obligations to fight terrorism and to keep armed forces for defence. It also confirms the right of the individual and common self-defence and defines principles of democratic and civil control of the armed forces.11 The consensus is that a principal defect of the OSCE is the time it takes to make a decision. The fact that the OSCE does not have its own armed forces can be also taken as a defect. During the last decade the OSCE has had some positive results in its missions in different local conflicts. However, most of the conflicts are not definitely settled yet. In each of them different reasons can be found for the limited success; however, in most cases an almost open ‘fight’ can seen among OSCE members, who each have their own interests in given areas of conflicts, which makes the settlement harder and slower. Examples of these kinds of conflict are Nagorno Karabakh (the OSCE Minsk Group, where we can see internal conflicts between Russia and Western countries) or Georgia (where conflicts of interest exist between Europe, Russia and the USA in the Caucasus). The OSCE can become a suitable common base of European security, defining and developing a pan-European security architecture and a common European security space. Its leading role in conflict prevention and settlement could be a part of the security architecture in Europe. The goal of the OSCE is

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to prevent conflicts, to protect the peace and to solve conflicts by peaceful means. The problem is that although members have accepted these postulates, in a lot of cases international relations behave differently and the ‘right of might’ often wins. In the OSCE the voice of one member out of fifty-five is enough to reject any proposal. This procedure impedes the OSCE from being a reliable guarantee of military security. Some authors suggest that the OSCE would be a good alternative if it could be changed and developed.

CEE Countries after the Cold War At the end of the 1980s, a number of CEE countries (Central Eastern European – those that were part of the former Soviet Union) in transition started to return to Europe. Those countries are very heterogeneous, so their levels and speed of transition were different. The change over from highly militarised totalitarian and repressed societies into a ‘different world’ and a different way of thinking became a reality for the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Huge changes in the security strategy and orientation of those countries have become evident. Many had had foreign occupation forces on their territories for a long time, so foreign policy or security questions were impossible to gauge. This situation changed in the early 1990s, when the Warsaw Pact became part of their history. Terms like the European House or United States of Europe began to be popular and talk about a collapse of both blocks emerged everywhere. However, the reality was rather different. International relations were far more complicated than had been imagined and the escalation of tensions in the Near East and a war on the European continent were unexpected. Countries had to face a number of internal problems. At the same time, they had to pay particular attention to events in the international arena in Europe and look for ways of participation in those events that were in harmony with their national interests. When drawing up security policies it used to be necessary to know who the enemy was and against whom the security should be oriented. After the Paris Declaration the situation changed. A clear definition of the enemy was made very difficult after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In the mid-1990s, many CEE countries’ politicians advocated NATO membership for their countries. Poland, especially, pressed for a unification of the whole Visegrad group in order to field a joint candidate for NATO membership. Since 1989 NATO has been engaged in adapting its infrastructure to the new threats and opportunities of the European and global security area. The possibility of joining NATO suited the resource constraints of the CEE countries, as well as

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their goal of integration into Western institutions. The beginning of the 1990s brought events that proved to be of importance to NATO – the war in the Persian Gulf, the putsch in the USSR, the war in Yugoslavia; the importance of gaining European security on the basis of co-operation between existing military structures became clear. Many CEE countries began to express their interest in becoming members of NATO in a short space of time. At the beginning of 1990, Czech President Vaclav Havel told President Bush that NATO should change as soon as possible into a European alliance, including the change of its name, which would prove that the bipolar separation of Europe and the Cold War are finished.12 NATO hesitated, as can be seen by the following words of its representatives on 8 May 1991: ‘The Alliance is not sure how big a help it can give to the former bedfellows of Moscow in their effort to achieve a political and military stability.’13 However, NATO began developing an ‘intensive dialogue and co-operation with all countries of the CEE as a promising contribution in order to build a mutual trust’. In November 1991, at the summit in Rome, the new strategic conception of NATO was approved. It had the following three main principles: a willingness for political dialogue with other countries; co-operation in all security questions with CEE countries; and protection and security for all member states of NATO together with the stability of a new arrangement in Europe. In the socalled Rome declaration, NATO had also accepted the obligation of building a new architecture for European security. The meeting of the ministers of defence of NATO states started the Partnership for Peace project (PFP) in October 1993, which was accepted by the NATO summit in January 1994. It included states of the CEE, post-Soviet states (including the Asian component) as well as European ‘neutrals’ like Sweden, Austria, Finland and Switzerland. The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary joined NATO in March 1999. There was no great expectation that substantive military capabilities would be contributed from the very beginning. With the defence reforms proceeding, the interoperability and capability gaps would gradually close with time.

US Hegemony and Security in Europe At the end of the twentieth century Europe began a new era in international relations, which has its influence on global security and stability. In the second half of the 1990s, when the bipolar world order ended, changes occurred in the Common Foreign and Security Policy of Europe. Two options were and are

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possible: either to live in a hegemonic world with the USA as the only superpower, or to live in a world with more than one power. If we live in a multipolar world, then the next question is which country or group of countries could be playing a role as a world power in the twenty-first century? The possibility is that it could be China, India, Russia or a unified Europe. So far, reality reveals an American predominance. Transatlantic problems had already begun in the beginning of 1990s, when the USA and the EU had words over the conflict in Bosnia. Europeans did not like the ‘arrogance’ of the USA when it refused to intervene on the basis that this was a ‘European conflict’ and that America had a lot of other strategic duties. Americans, on the other hand, started to talk about the weakness of Europe and its ingratitude. In this conflict, disagreements and a crisis could already be seen between NATO and the United Nations and the Western Allies and Russia, as well as between the USA, Great Britain and France. ‘When France and Germany at least tried to create something like an independent European military force, Bush’s administration did not like it.’14 From time to time the United Nations did take independent action, like the creation of ‘security zones’ in May 1993; however, in February 1994 they had to ask NATO for its help. We can see that at the beginning of the 1990s, the unipolar system worked almost without any disturbance. On the one hand, the USA tried to become what Samuel Huntington calls ‘a lonely superpower’ and looked at questions of power mainly from a military point of view. On the other hand, Europe has the problem not only of a lower military capability, but also of internal difficulties. ‘The Balkan conflict has shown the military weakness of Europe and its political disagreements.’15 Differences between the EU and the USA were also strong in 1997, when Europeans disagreed about sanctions on Iraq and then, with the exception of Britain, they opposed the bombarding of Iraq in 1998 without approval from the Security Council. In Kosovo, the EU presented NATO’s campaign from the European perspective, with reference to human rights, democracy and freedom. However, the British perspective differed from that of Germany and France. While British leaders may have been thinking about national and European perspectives, in public they referred more to the international community than to the EU. Tony Blair, for example, talked about the ‘world obligation’ to stop ethnic cleansing. His arguments applied to the ‘values of civilisation’ and ‘rules of humanity’. On the other hand, German Foreign Minister Fischer held that the war in Kosovo would not set a precedent for NATO to act in future conflicts, but would be ‘a very large exception’. The French and the Russians held similar positions on the mandate, their concerns being that the Security Council

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would lose influence and whether NATO would have the right to intervene in future conflicts. French officials expressed the need for an alternative to the unipolar world, arguing that the evolution towards a multipolar world would demand a respect for international law. This crisis questioned the credibility of the EU as an actor in international affairs. Javier Solana later defined the Kosovo crisis as ‘a wake-up call, which had revealed the shortcomings of European military capabilities, and had resulted in the decision to create a joint EU force’.16 The EU member states applied the justification of humanitarian ethics. However, depending on their logic and appropriateness, they then justify their security policy in different ways. The globalisation of the security agenda is mirrored in the security policy of states, but from a variety of angles. The attacks on 11 September 2001 were directed against the USA; however, they have had a major influence on the world and, mainly, on the development and future of transatlantic relations. For many years economic questions had been given priority. Suddenly, the problem of security rose to the forefront of international policy in both the USA and the EU. Opinions on the future arrangements differ greatly. On the one hand the USA the ponders the question of multilateralism or hegemony, while on the other hand Europeans discuss whether an improved military capacity would lead to stronger transatlantic relations, or whether it has to play a role balancing that of a growing USA role. The negative opinions on the future development of NATO and the EU do have their influence on the ability of the West to act. When discussing the future of transatlantic relations and the role of the USA, Robert Kagan’s words should be kept in mind: that the policy of any international actor is first of all defined by its power. Kagan talks about the powerful USA and weak Europe, and also points out that American policy is a function of its power and that European policy is a function of its weakness. This opinion meets with great criticism from the Europeans. A country that is militarily strong is not necessarily a powerful country. On the other hand, in order to achieve a position of power a country has to have appropriate military forces. In fact, the USA’s defence budget is much bigger than the budget of all NATO countries put together. This number also represents a higher percentage of the GDP than in European countries (in 2001: in the USA 3.1 per cent of GDP, in France 2.5 per cent of GDP, in Germany 1.5 per cent of GDP, in GB 2.5 per cent of GDP).17 Another factor is the superior political position of the USA as being one country in comparison with the EU, which is very heterogeneous economically, culturally and linguistically. The difference in status of these two international actors begs the question of whether Europe can be a powerful political actor if it does not increase its defence budget and expenses in the

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future. On the other hand we should also take into account the fact that, in comparison with the USA, Europe’s common security and defence policy has been implemented for a shorter time. Europe today represents a very strong economic unit; however, it still has to work on having a stronger and more effective security and defence policy in order to be seen as a single actor. Zbigniew Brzezinski thinks that the changing world situation demands that the USA be a leader in a new global system (‘The Choice: Domination or Leadership’). However, he also says that Bush has responded in the wrong way. On one hand Brzezinski offers a co-operative effort with America’s allies, on the other hand he also supposes that all the others will allow the USA to lead. The Impact of the 9/11 Attacks and the Invasion of Iraq on Security in Europe and on Transatlantic Relations Transatlantic relations went through a significant transformation during the last decade. In the new global situation, the USA achieved the position of the player with a dominant military force and a strong economy. Transatlantic relations underwent a number of serious disagreements and problems. The USA’s bubble of sang-froid, which has been connected with the collapse of communism a decade ago, was burst by the attacks on 11 September 2001. The USA met with a new reality: one in which the world’s threats became more complex and threatened the USA. These threats called for common answers by the transatlantic partners. The EU looked upon the threat as an obligation towards the protection of common transatlantic values. The fight against international terrorism, defined as one of five common goals of the USA and the EU as early as in June 2001, became one of their first priorities. Britain lent the greatest support to the attacks in Afghanistan in October 2001. The creation of a powerful global anti-terrorist coalition became one of the main goals in the political arena. The creation of the so-called Plan of Actions, accepted at an extraordinary meeting of the European Council in Brussels ten days after the 11 September attacks, was a result of the EU and the USA’s common effort in their fight against terrorism. The EU has been involved in a range of intensive multilateral activities. European soldiers took part in the military action in Afghanistan: Britain, France, Germany, Czech Republic18 and Italy had all sent troops. Among others, the EU is a major provider of immediate humanitarian assistance. The Union must be in a position to take more resolute and effective action in the interests of sustainable development and to deal with certain new risks,

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associated in most cases with the persistent and growing economic and social imbalances in the world. It must therefore stick up for a strategy of sustainable development, based on a multilateral and multipolar organisation of the world economy, to offset any hegemonic or unilateral approach. (Commission 2002)19

This statement proves that the EU is constructing an identity as an international actor. The EU should develop strategies to combat international terrorism that are different from the USA’s ‘war on terrorism’. It should try to become a more effective external actor. The capability and the role of the EU should be increased in order to counter-balance the USA’s power. The EU should have a shared commitment to its common values and principles and its ability to identify priorities, to formulate common policies and to utilise policy instruments. ‘Military solutions to the problems’ in Afghanistan, which had been chosen by the USA and supported by Britain, involved the European states in discussion; however, the question of the invasion of Iraq brought them to a serious crisis. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 raised the question of whether the EU could, or should, ever be a military actor and whether it could speak with ‘one voice’. For a long time such considerations were unspoken. The military capabilities of the EU are limited. However, this was not the reason for the internal EU crisis over Iraq. The difficulty of finding a political consensus was the main problem. Even had Europe had a fully operational common military force, the member states would probably not have reached a consensus. A common view, a strategic concept for external actions and the will to act together is needed for the EU to be successful in its future decision-making. The failure of Anglo-American diplomacy over Iraq fractured both the EU and NATO. By the beginning of 2003, important previously unspoken questions about the role of the EU and the character of USA hegemony were raised. The position taken against the invasion of Iraq by the French, German and Belgian governments led to a crisis of the transatlantic alliance and proved, once more, the reality of the USA’s military dominance. While the USA talked about the extent of European weakness, some EU member states tried to find a counterbalance by speaking about the EU as a more effective independent military actor in international relations. One example is a meeting of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in Brussels in April 2003, held to accelerate the EU’s military development through the co-operation of a group of willing member states. British and

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American reactions to that meeting were very sceptical. The British had to choose between their interests in developing a European defence policy and their Atlanticism. The conflicts between Britain and France seriously influenced the European Security and Defence Policy project. The NATO crisis, connected to Iraq, shows that the old discussion on the role of NATO is not closed yet. The difference between the strategy of the EU member states and the strategy of the USA is that Europeans prefer to attempt peaceful methods of crisis management before using force. The question remains; when is the use of force permitted? The 11 September attacks and the invasion of Iraq highlighted the major differences between the views of the Bush administration and the EU on questions of security and how to achieve it. The USA has also observed that there is no certainty that the Alliance will support all their actions and policies. The expectation that, in the context of the war against terrorism, member states of NATO would approve the worldwide role of NATO was incorrect. Did the attacks on 11 September and the invasion of Iraq have any meaning for Europe beyond the crisis in NATO? The attacks did not bring about a big change in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy; it highlighted the uses of the European Security and Defence Policy within the territory of the EU and included the ‘fight against terrorism’ in its main tasks. According to the opinion of some European experts, the invasion of Iraq created the urgent need to further enhance the military capability of the EU. Should the EU succeed in building an integrated military force, this could have consequences for the EU’s relations within NATO. It would constitute the European pillar of NATO at the level of military capacity. The European pillar would then not be obliged to take part in USA operations should the EU have political objections against such operations. In accordance with that, NATO would remain the guarantee for the security of its members. Each of the two pillars would build their own integrated military capacity. In the current reality, where the EU and the USA do not always necessarily share the same views and conclusions, this could be a good opportunity for dialogue.20

Conclusion We need a strong, pragmatic engagement by the international community wherever else our common interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference by working together – either within the Euro-Atlantic area, or outside it.21

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The situation in the world has rapidly changed after the Cold War. Newly independent countries began to ‘turn back’ to Europe and to define their foreign policies. Europe is rapidly being unified and the CEE countries are beginning to play an important role in the official united European structures. We can find an enthusiasm for European ideas there. CEE militaries went through major changes after the collapse of their old structures. They have reoriented their national security strategies and military doctrines. Some of them have also become part of NATO. Economics, business and industry in Eastern Europe were ‘militarised’ during the Cold War. The bipolar confrontation came to an end in the reality of European regionalisation. The fact is that the military dimension has now lost its strategic significance in the policies of those countries. The armed forces have acquired a new role in the common security agenda. Now they have to secure peace in a regionalising Europe and participate in common policies towards peace in a global context – we can see the change in the role of armed forces, from that of preventing a bipolar war to that of being an operative instrument of a common European security, together with other countries on a regional and global level. ‘Co-operation between nations, while essential, cannot alone meet our problem. What must be sought is a fusion of the interests of the European people and not merely another effort to maintain the equilibrium of these interests.’22 The most important issue today is that Europe has to define its position in the world and the common position of its countries, including its Western, Eastern and Central parts, in order to play as one global power. Unification made and shall continue to make Europe stronger and secure, not only economically but also politically. The transatlantic link through NATO has proven its worth; however, new thinking and eventually a new security structure will be required to protect the values and goals of a unified Europe. In comparison to the USA, the EU is very heterogeneous. The national identities and the national policies of the old and new EU member states still play an important role within the EU’s foreign policy. Nationalism has also dominated in conflict resolution in the Balkans and in the Caucasus (Abkhazia, Adzaria, Nagorno Karabakh, Chechnya). Although the EU has taken on the superficial attributes of a fully fledged transnational state, with a national anthem, a flag and a national day, the notion of a European identity has not yet taken root. Any long-term European security strategy should include Russian security interests within a democratic framework, try to increase their co-operation with organisations like the OSCE or the PFP and try to settle local conflicts within the same European structure, thereby reducing the length of the

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process of settlement and peace. Some CEE countries became members of NATO; however, the question of other CEE countries and the question of Russia are proving very difficult and remain open. The new vision should replace confrontational habits. The problem of the current inbalance in transatlantic relations lies in the complicated institutional model of Europe, with two institutions dealing with security and defence questions – the EU and NATO. First, the EU has to overcome its internal difficulties and improve its identity and common values. Only then can it answer the other important questions of whether it can act as a unified player having one unified foreign policy and whether it should increase its military budget in the future. The document ‘Security Interests of the Czech Republic’ states: The security guarantees of NATO play a very important role. On the other hand, the formation of the Common European Security and Defence Policy is a natural part of the process of European integration. It should not be forgotten that it is important that this process is in a harmony with the development of a European Security and Defence identity within NATO and it shall lead to a strengthening of transatlantic ties.23

The current international security environment needs a transatlantic dialogue in order to overcome threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. No international actor can overcome these issues alone. In the new reality, we cannot look only at the so-called ‘hard power’ and see problems only from a military point of view. ‘Military power does not always mean nonvulnerability. Success in war also does not have to mean successful achievements in peacebuilding. This has been proven in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.’24 We should rather be thinking about co-operation in solving global problems and fighting against global threats, like terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Notes 1. P. Fontaine: A new idea of Europe, The Schuman declaration – 1950–2000, Annexes: Declaration of 9 May 1950, p. 36, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, European Communities, 2000. 2. ‘Mezinarodni vztahy ocima mladych badatelu’, sbornik z konference, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, Czech Association for the UN, Association of International Studies in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 281.

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3. Alexandr Ort, Dejiny svetove politiky II, Univeristy of Economics in Prague, 1993, p. 22. 4. Ceska republika a evropske bezpecnostni struktury, kolektiv autoru, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, 1996, p. 19. 5. Enciklopedie moderni historie, Nakladatelstvi Libri, Prague 1995, p. 306. 6. Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Paper prepared for the CEEISA/ISA International Convention, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 26–28 June 2003, ‘Becoming Credible and Contributing NATO Members: Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, p. 8. 7. Ceska republika a evropske bezpecnostni struktury, kolektiv autoru, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, 1996, p. 26. 8. Robert Kagan, Labyrint sily a raj slabosti, nakladatelstvi Lidove noviny, 2003, p. 72. 9. European Integration – Impacts of Globalization, Young Scholars International Conference, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies at the University of Economics in Prague, 29–31 May 2000, p. 112. 10. Ceska republika a evropske bezpecnostni struktury, kolektiv autoru, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, 1996, p. 66. 11. Ceska republika a evropske bezpecnostni struktury, kolektiv autoru, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, 1996, p. 88–89. 12. Ceska republika a evropske bezpecnostni struktury, kolektiv autoru, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, 1996, p. 104–105. 13. Mezinarodni vztahy ocima mladych badatelu – sbornik z konference, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, Czech Association for the UN, Association of International Studies in Central and Eastern Europe, p. 300. 14. Robert Kagan, Labyrint sily a raj slabosti. Amerika, Evropa a novy rad sveta, Lidove noviny, 2003, p. 62. 15. Robert Kagan, Labyrint sily a raj slabosti. Amerika, Evropa a novy rad sveta, Lidove noviny, 2003, p. 39. 16. Charlotte Wagnsson, Swedish National Defence College, ‘Polarity and Morality in Russia’s and the EU’s Discourse on Security’, paper for CEEISA/ISA International Convention in Budapest, Hungary on 26–28 June 2003. 17. Tomas Karasek, ‘Future of Transatlantic Security Relations: Four Scenarios’, in International Relations 2/2004, Institute of International Relations in Prague. 18. The new Czech minister of defence supposes that the Czech Republic will be more engaged in the operations of NATO in Afghanistan in 2005, it shall send ninety soldiers to the ISAF mission. 19. Charlotte Bretherton, John Vogler, Paper prepared for the CEEISA/ISA International Convention, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 26–28 June 2003, ‘The EU as an International Actor Post – 9/11: Changed Environment, Changing Role?’. 20. Dr Sven Biscop, International Studies Association – Central and East European International Studies Association, Central European University, Budapest, 26–28

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23.

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June, 2003, ‘Global Tensions and Their Challenges to Governance of the International Community’, p. 9. Speech by Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 19 March 2004. Words of Jean Monnet, ‘European Integration – Impacts of Globalization’, Young Scholars International Conference, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies at the University of Economics in Prague, 29–31 May 2000, p. 116. Alexandr Ort, Vlastimil Krines, Zdenek Vesely, Zahranicni politika Ceske republiky, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, Prague 2002, p. 160. Preface written by Alexandr Vondra to Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order, Robert Kagan, Lidove noviny, 2003, ISBN 80–7106–655–9, p. 14.

Bibliography Biscop, Dr. Sven (2003) ‘Global Tensions and Their Challenges to Governance of the International Community’, International Studies Association – Central and East European International Studies Association, Central European University, Budapest, 26–28 June. Bretherton, Charlotte, and John Vogler (2003) Paper prepared for the CEEISA/ISA International Convention, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 26–28 June, ‘The EU as an International Actor Post-9/11: Changed Environment, Changing Role?’ Ceska republika a evropske bezpecnostni struktury (1996) Kolektiv autoru, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations. Dienstbier, Jiri (1999) Od sneni k realite. Vzpominky z let 1989–1992, Prague: NLN. Enciklopedie moderni historie (Encyclopedia of Modern History) (1995) Prague: Nakladatelstvi Libri. ‘Enlargement of the European Union. Globalism – Regionalism and Europe’ (2002) Paper Series from the Fifth Annual Young Scholars International Conference, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, Prague. ‘European Integration – Impacts of Globalization’ (2000) Young Scholars International Conference, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies at the University of Economics in Prague, 29–31 May. Fucik, Josef (2003) ‘Evropska unie jde do zbrani’, in Mezinarodni politika (International Politics) 10. Hinds, L.B. and Windt, T.O., Jr. (1991) The Cold War As Rhetoric, New York: Praeger. Ireland, T.P. (1981) Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of North Atlantic Treaty Organization, London: Aldwych Press. Kagan, Robert (2003) Labyrint sily a raj slabosti. Amerika, Evropa a novy rad sveta (Of

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Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order), Prague: Nakladatelstvi Lidove noviny. Karasek, Tomas (2004) ‘Future of Transatlantic Security Relations: Four Scenarios’, in Mezinarodni vztahy (International Relations) 2, Institute of International Relations in Prague. Khol, Radek (2003) ‘Bezpecnostni a obranna politika EU. Ambice a realita na pocatku roku 2003’, in Mezinarodni politika (International Politics) 3. Mencl, Vojtech a kol (1990) Krizovatky 20. stoleti, Prague: Nase vojsko. ‘Mezinarodni vztahy ocima mladych badatelu’ (1997) sbornik z konference, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, Jan Masaryk Centre of International Studies, Czech Association for the UN, Association of International Studies in Central and Eastern Europe. Moiseev, N.N. (2003) Razmislenija o sovremennoj politologii, Moskva: Izdatelstvo MNEPU. Ort, Alexandr (1993) Dejiny svetove politiky, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations. Ort, Alexandr (1995) Evropa od rozdeleni k jednote, University of Economics in Prague. Ort, Alexandr, Vlastimil Krines and Zdenek Vesely (2002) Zahranicni politika Ceske republiky, University of Economics in Prague, Faculty of International Relations, Prague. Robinson, Jeffrey (1997) The End of the American Century: Hidden Agendas of the Cold War, London: Simon & Schuster. Schmidt, Helmut (2003) Sebezachova Evropy. Perspektivy 21. stoleti (Die Selbstbehauptung Europas), Paseka, Praha – Litomysl . Solana, J. (2000) ‘The Development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Role of the High Representative’, Institute of European Affairs, Dublin, 30 March 2000, press release. Soucasna Evropa a Ceska republika (2001) Centre of International Studies at the University of Economics in Prague, ISSN – 1211 – 4073, 1. ‘Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defense’, ‘Non-military Crisis Management of the EU’, (1999) Press release No. 13619/1999, BrUSAsels. Ulrich, Marybeth Peterson (2003) ‘Becoming Credible and Contributing NATO Members: Achieving Radical Military Reform in the Czech Republic and Slovakia’, Paper prepared for the CEEISA/ISA International Convention, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 26–28 June. Wagnsson, Charlotte, Swedish National Defence College (2003) ‘Polarity and Morality in Russia’s and the EU’s Discourse on Security’, Paper for CEEISA/ISA International Convention in Budapest, Hungary on 26–28 June.

Chapter 8: Regional Security in Russia and the Near Abroad Olga A. Vorkunova

Introduction

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normous changes have occurred in recent years, including globalisation, as part of the political interrelationship of national communities. With the collapse of the bipolar international system, new regional arrangements have become a prominent feature of world politics. Besides the economic factor, new regional centres involve political, social and cultural aspects. As a reaction to globalisation, regionalisation has spread in many areas of the world in order to fight against social and cultural homogenisation deriving from globalisation.1 Regional integration and globalisation are two complementary processes. Regional integration policies promote trade exchanges, free markets and open economies. The emergence of a global governance is accompanied by local integration experiences, not just at the economic level to create stronger economic blocks, but also to find common solutions to new security threats, risks and challenges.2 The post-Cold War world is characterised by complexity, fragmentation and uncertainty. It requires common strategies. In this context, multilateral institutions are created to help states to manage common problems. Strong interdependence due to geographical proximity and geopolitical constraints impose a common approach to deal with sources of instability such as national and religious extremism, arms- and drug-trafficking and migration flows. New regional arrangements, conceived as a co-operative initiative, cope with non-military challenges such as the increasing development gap, political and societal instability and the insecurity environment. New regional arrangements within the EU are more effective than the nation-state and potentially offer more legitimacy and collective identity than globalisation. Regionalisation may thus also be understood as a rational strategy

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for governments in order to compensate for their loss of authority and power under European integration and globalisation.3 Horizontal regional and sub-regional segmentations within the EU are ripe for formulating a constructive platform of regional co-operation to strengthen stability, despite the lack of a common approach towards understanding security. The close geographical proximity to potential conflicts makes regional and sub-regional organisations more likely to learn of threats before they have reached crisis proportions and more likely to respond before they have affected the interests of the organisation’s member states. Regional organisations may be able to respond to a problem situation more quickly than the UN and global organisations. They can bring the pressure of neighbouring states to bear on the parties to a conflict. The preventive methods are often based on traditional regional customs and practices, which are often more acceptable to the parties in dispute than methods and norms imposed by external forces. However, regional organisations often find themselves constrained by their member states’ determination to maintain their individual sovereign national prerogatives. Regional organisations may not be impartial in a given conflict, because they often reflect in their own politics the very disputes and clashes of interests that the organisations are supposed to settle. Regional security should make more deliberate and co-ordinated use of the respective political, moral and material advantages of the several types of third parties already involved in conflict regions around the world. In this chapter we consider two regional processes, the Euro-Mediterranean and the Northern Dimension. Multi-layered regionalisation processes in Europe’s peripheries are affected by the Russian Federation in all matters pertaining to Eastern enlargement. The focus on the Russian factor within the framework of the prospective European comprehensive dimensions would define the limits and constraints of a Wider Europe if its border areas are organised along a sharp division between insiders and outsiders.

The Mediterranean–Black Sea–Caspian Sea Region from the Russian Perspective The wide concept of the Mediterranean includes the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the Persian/Arab Gulf Region, recognising the ecological, cultural and economic similarities.4 The recent Russian tradition stressed that the Mediterranean/

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Black Sea/Caspian Sea Region (MBC) was a single geopolitical and geostrategic space with deep historical roots.5 Debate about regional security and stability has intensified over the past few years as a result of the growing realisation that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. With the changes in the world geopolitical scene after 11 September 2001 and the Iraq war, and the new European security strategy deployed, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea Region was of primary importance. The Wider Europe doctrine recognised that the Wider Europe of states with EU accession prospects would border upon the Black Sea and the Caucasus.6 The geopolitical space from Gibraltar to the Caspian Sea area is the region of the origin and disappearance, clashes and co-operation, and unification and dissolution of many civilisations. As a crossroads of civilisations, peoples and regions, it appears to elude comprehensive definition. The security agenda around this complex region is evolving together with the changes on the European scene at large. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the increasing weakness of Russia affect the European security policy situation as a whole. Several factors are often equally important in determining the position of states on various issues. Geographical proximity to problem areas can lead states to argue for attention to be given to their particular fears of approaching dangers. The Middle East is one example of a region containing a host of problems, the solutions to which are likely to be costly, and which serves to underline the competition between regional and outside powers: Russia and the USA. Significant decisions have been taken and solutions are emerging in key processes, constituting a multi-institutional security order for Europe and affecting the situation in the MBC region. Furthermore, the MBC region is currently facing a multitude of problems and challenges. Socio-economic disparities, migration, refugees, conflicts, arms proliferation – these are perhaps the most commonly cited. The nature of the issues which characterise the regional security environment is by no means exclusive to the region. The specific geopolitical and socio-cultural context, however, gives the MBC a particularly complex security identity. Within this level of diversity and challenges, there is a clear interrelation among the countries and regions within the MBC region, which derives mainly from their growing interdependence. This interrelation suggests the need for a co-operative approach to security, one that privileges dialogue and co-operation.

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As the prevailing problems of the region are mainly of a socio-economic nature, it is only logical that the EU plays a most prominent role in promoting co-operative relations across the MBC security complex. It is logical, then, that the evolution of the MBC region as a stable and prosperous territory requires the involvement of other actors. In this context Russian involvement in the region is of great importance. Russia is also struggling to develop a distinct European and NATO policy, based on the Founding Act with NATO and the Partnership with the EU, and to get more involved in conflict and crisis management. Today, Russia looks to the MBC as a region where it has its own specific interests, dealing with threats and challenges to national security derived from the Southern border line, which includes the vulnerable Caucasus and Central Asia states. With the inclusion of Russia in the Euro-Mediterranean process, with its still largely untapped potential for co-operation in security matters and its experience of different models, with diverse levels and speeds, of integration with CIS countries, as well as its dynamic co-operation in security issues, the Black Sea Economic Co-operation organisation could reinforce and complement other international efforts to establish and enhance co-operation with Mediterranean countries. These include the EU’s Barcelona Process, the Middle East Peace Process and efforts by institutions such as the OSCE. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept, approved in 2000, had been formulated as a programme of action. It had, for the first time, clearly formulated an understanding of Russian national interests: the need to create the most favourable conditions for the onward development of the Russian economy and society. Foreign policy work turned to the solution of the problem. The Concept puts Russian foreign policy on a firm grounding of historical continuity in the globalisation era. Russia’s new Security Concept, approved in January 2000, reflects the Russian commitment to a comprehensive vision of security, which recognises the importance of political, economic and social factors in addition to the indispensable defence dimension. This broad approach to security forms the basis on which Russia will accomplish its fundamental security tasks and develop effective co-operation with other international organisations. These are: • • • • • •

ensuring reliable security; strengthening the foundations of constitutional order; the consolidation of civil society; assistance to Russian entrepreneurship; the protection of the interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad; the support of domestic science and culture.

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The subsequent development of contemporary Russian foreign policy is based upon the following principles: 1. The central role of the UN in world affairs and the importance of the principles of the UN Charter and the universally recognised rules of international law. 2. The promotion of strategic stability and the search for collective answers to present-day threats and challenges. 3. The region’s countries should assume clearly defined international obligations on a mutual recognition of sovereignty and territorial integrity. 4. Balance of interests and mutually advantageous co-operation. 5. Not one state, however strong and influential, is in a position to command world polities single-handedly. 6. The only organisation empowered to authorise the use of force in international relations is the UN Security Council. Russia looks to its foreign policy for precise definitions of national priorities on the basis of pragmatism and economic effectiveness. A key element in the region-based order is the ability of the participating states to take common and concerted action in managing conflicts and supporting compliance within the common norms and principles. The goal of a common security space, based on co-operation among states and institutions, aims at a common identity and a workable culture of problemsolving. Integration and region-building, as well as conflict prevention and peaceful conflict resolution, contribute to the construction of a common security space. Security and stability in the MBC area is a combined outcome of regional and wider European co-operation, unification and integration. A concept for bilateral and concerted assistance to the MBC states is needed in developing the basic internal and external security functions of an independent state, such as effective administration, law enforcement and border controls as well as national defence. Another direction is to create a joint regional capability for participation in international peacekeeping and crisis management and in developing a multilateral defence-related infrastructure, as well as establishing an institution for military education. Russia is ready for constructive co-operation with the European Union in solving the problems of the MBC security complex. A closer relationship with the Union will be an essential element in overcoming residual divisions and in the unification of the Black Sea region as a common security space. Cooperation arrangements will consolidate security and stability and promote the

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domestic changes and reforms required for the sustainable transformation of the region. Growing partnership co-operation between the nations of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea basins; between the Black Sea Economic Co-operation and the EU has a considerable potential.7 The Black Sea region is bound to remain a grey area in terms of its relationship to the EU. The three candidates for EU membership are unlikely to accede to the Union before the end of the decade. In addition, several countries in the Black Sea region regard EU accession as a long-term foreign policy objective. This strategic uncertainty with regard to the EU, in many cases, has its counterpart in uncertainty concerning relations with Russia. The numerous ‘frozen conflicts’ and the intensity of conflicting bilateral relations are rather high in the Black Sea region.8 The security problems facing the MBC region today are multifaceted. Many of these problems are not of a military nature. Some belong to the level of states, involving issues which can be contained within one state or solved on a state level. Other issues extend across borders. Environmental issues are common in this respect, often involving several states and frequently needing the framework of an organisation for their solution. Today’s problems are also likely to interact with each other, thereby escalating the process of hostilities and making their resolution unlikely without recourse to the comprehensive solutions available only through international organisations. One example of this complexity is the above-mentioned situation in the Middle East, a complex conflict region that is seen as highly vulnerable to escalating instability and therefore a threat to European security. The MBC region contains problems of a demographic, social, environmental and economic nature, which the EU seeks to address through the regional organisation arrangement, involving a range of measures intended to result, inter alia, in the completion of a free trade agreement. The complexity of the problems themselves explains the complicated nature of the problem-solving process. The problems of today are often of a civilian nature. They are therefore thought to be most easily solved on the civilian level, before an escalation to military measures takes place. This does not mean that military forces are not used at all: they are well suited to a number of tasks, such as rescue operations and other humanitarian actions for which a military organisation is necessary. Problems arise when such tasks are performed alongside military tasks, such as the bombardment of Serbia in former Yugoslavia. The two tasks are hard to reconcile militarily, since troops engaged in humanitarian tasks may easily be taken hostage after such bombardments. It

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might also be difficult to make a clear distinction in a confused war situation between, on the one hand, giving humanitarian assistance to the civil population and, on the other, deterring the combatants. In addition to the co-ordination of civilian and military tasks, there are other factors that may complicate problem-solving. These may occur on the organisational level, where conflicts related to security belong to the second, intergovernmental, pillar. The economic and other means available for solving the problem are, however, often found in the first pillar, which is largely supranational. In addition, even when seeking to create stability in the long run and thus acting within the civilian sphere only, there is a complexity in the means used. This is related to the two sectors of society – the governmental and the private sectors. It is widely recognised that without trade contacts and investment by private companies, the chances of creating stable societies in which people can rely on a future with a reasonable standard of living is minimal. Stability thus depends on a well-functioning private sector, whose mechanisms governments should ideally leave well alone. At the same time, governments must be involved in the creation of possibilities for private companies to establish themselves in formerly non-market economies. The factors that create diversity in the MBC region are counterbalanced by a number of factors that unite states at the same time as they serve to improve co-operation within organisations. The primary unifying factor is the similarity of societal systems that now exist in the region. The second factor is the need for states to co-operate in order to solve problems. The third factor is that states share the understanding that organisations have to work with some efficiency. The states bordering the MBC region present examples of most of the forms of associations that exist in NATO and the EU. In addition, there is an important division between states that are applying for membership of NATO and the EU, and Russia, a state that does not accept the consequences of the process of the enlargement of NATO, in particular when this concerns the former Soviet Union states. The new types of cross-border problems are represented here too. Above all, problems related to minorities and environmental issues are potentially dangerous and need to be dealt with. Regarding the difficult issue of Russia’s non-acceptance of FSU NATO membership, the discrepancies between the views of Russia and other countries are still wide. The position and policy adopted by Russia is of equal importance to the MBC region, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russian

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involvement in the region through economic ties in Russia’s ‘near abroad’ policy, the presence of armed forces, the acquisition of Russian citizenship and passports by a large part of the population of the non-recognised Abkhazia and the role of a provider of peacekeeping operations all have a great influence upon Russian functional capacities and spheres of action. The complexity of organisational structures with several forms of association and with overlapping memberships and tasks has given the MBC countries the scope and freedom to participate in initiatives proposed by various organisations. This has permitted all of them to participate in the Partnership for Peace activities and the activities of the newly formed Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, when appropriate. The challenge is to create a zone of increased security and economic integration in the MBC area that overarches the organisational affiliations that separate the various countries. In this endeavour economic co-operation is likely to be the dominant form of co-operation, as the necessary basis for stable societies and as the area in which interests converge. Generally, the size of Russia also tends to accentuate the dominance of cooperation among states rather than organisational co-operation and integration. Russia’s importance is such that bilateral co-operation with the United States as well as the larger European states, especially Germany and France, is likely to continue as a vital pattern in its policy. In a situation of new security threats in Europe, there is need of efficiency through institutional change. The second trend is that of flexibility or flexible integration. The enlarged EU faces some fundamental problems: above all, the problem of effective governance and flexibility. With unanimity as the dominant principle of decisionmaking in security, the enlarged body of the EU may be less effective. Flexibility in the economic field is likely to become a reality with the introduction of the third stage of the EMU. As some members of the EU become part of the EMU and others are left, or prefer to stay, outside, the differences between them may become substantial. The logic of governance favours a joint solution of common problems. It transforms, as an approach, the meaning of security by moving away from conceptions of narrow self-interest and zero-sum calculations regarding gains and losses. The stronger the impact of the logic of governance grows, the smaller will be the danger of a relapse into exclusionary politics and a return of binary divisions into friends and enemies. The presence of competitive and nervous energies that exist in the region can be directed and channelled away from exclusionary and confrontational politics. This is done by introducing separate regional measures and processes,

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but above all, by integrating the Mediterranean – including the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea basin – into the positive tendencies that have been underway in Europe at large and by implementing a variety of changes in order to overcome the region’s past. The core issues consist of dynamism, integration, free flows and a pooling of the strengths of the region in order to bolster its position in a Europe-wide competition for influence and centrality. Security, to the extent that it enters the discourse, also turns into a unifying theme as there is a joint interest in downgrading and settling problems in order to be eligible for European politics. Even outside powers have an interest in ensuring that they are not automatically brought into the picture as soon as local tensions flare. Security in its ‘soft’ form generates a fairly co-operative political scenery. Security turns to the promotion of community and joint endeavours to counteract the negative trends. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of the 1990s and the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 were the result of a long and crisis-ridden relationship between Europe, the Middle East and the Maghreb, including Turkey, Iran and the Gulf States. Initiatives over time have revealed great hopes for rapprochement and co-operation between the two regions. Europe’s focus on the region has changed and varied over time in its degree of intensity and explicit interests. The Barcelona Declaration, signed by twenty-seven states and the European Commission, is a document mirroring the CSCE/OSCE structure of political co-operation and is, at the same time, a reflection of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with regard to world regions in terms of structure and procedure. The Union seeks to promote dialogue and co-operation in the fields of politics and security, in the financial and economic area and in matters concerning civil society and culture. Euro-Mediterranean co-operation has been channelled into an institutional process and structured through several levels of interaction. The Barcelona Process has set up political institutions consisting of individuals from twenty seven countries acting at both governmental and non-governmental levels. Political leaders, senior officials, civil society representatives and experts from the twenty seven partner countries regularly meet within the EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP) institutions, participate in the process and revitalise it. Different perspectives and points of view are compounded within common institutions aimed at facilitating co-operative behaviour. Action is structured by a shared system of rules that are still in the making. The EMP deals with three areas of co-operation that are closely intertwined: the political, economic and financial areas; the social, cultural and human areas;

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and political stability and human development. The current format of the EMP derives from the EU experience. The engine behind the process is the shared interest of managing resources, the necessity of facing sources of insecurity in order to create a regional security regime, the improvement of economic conditions and the fostering of a better understanding among peoples. The Barcelona Declaration has indicated several policy domains, some of which have progressed towards policy formulation while others are still at the declaratory stage. The structural component of the institutionalisation has preceded the normative and cognitive aspect of the EMP institutions. Political and security co-operation within the framework of the EMP is based upon the typology of initiatives ranging from meetings at ministerial, junior diplomat or senior official level, to networks of practitioners or researchers. One of the most innovative aspects of the Barcelona Declaration concerns the definition of security itself. The security doctrine that had emerged in the post-Cold War world has been redefined as the result of the challenges and threats stemming not just from hard security but, prominently, from political and economic challenges and soft security, and is reflected in the EMP, where the conventional definition of security is replaced by a comprehensive concept. A broad definition of security is then adopted when promoting initiatives to prevent illegal migration, terrorism, organised crime, drug-trafficking or arms proliferation. These soft security issues are widely recognised as transregional and must be tackled within a regional security regime based upon cooperation. As the political and security partnership also embraces a wide range of actions dealing with hot issues such as terrorism, some problems among the partner countries can arise, even at the very beginning of co-operation. To avoid a complete stalemate, a pragmatic approach has been adopted and action is taken on a step-by-step basis whenever there is a common perception of a specific threat. The difficulties encountered by the partners in adopting the EuroMed Charter for Peace and Stability, which would provide an institutional mechanism for dialogue and crisis prevention, proves that in this case, a ‘lowest common denominator’ approach is de facto adopted, with issues tackled only when there is a common will and general interest in security issues. One of the main achievements of the Barcelona Process is its very existence and the fact that, despite the existing political tensions among the partners, all members meet regularly in a multilateral forum. Multiple areas of co-operation allow for different levels of involvement for each partner in the EMP projects according to political interest. It is evident

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that the EMP brings together twenty-seven partners that not only have different levels of socio-economic development, but also different socio-political systems, which are differently ranged in the democratic development scale. Russia’s interests in the MBC region are based on the age-old trade, political, cultural and humanitarian relations with the region. These traditional ties have been enriched with new forms, including growing tourism. Russia’s national interests in the Mediterranean also stem from the new geopolitical situation that is a result of the end of the Cold War period. The erosion of bipolarity, followed by the withdrawal of the Mediterranean Squadron of the former USSR and the dissolution of the Soviet and Yugoslav empires, has drastically changed the security environment and the balance of power in the Black Sea/Caspian Sea basins. New actors like the Ukraine, Georgia, Croatia, Bosnia and others entered the Black Sea/Balkan scene after the break-up of the former USSR and Yugoslavia. Thus, the emergence of the Ukraine as an independent regional player has drastically changed the balance of power in the Black Sea region, which is characterised by the relationship within the triangle of Russia–Ukraine–Turkey. The emergence of Azerbaijan, with its richest oil fields on the Caspian Sea and its special relationship with Turkey, has bridged the Caspian and the Balkan areas. Thus, the interlacing and conflicting interests of the traditional and new actors have significantly reinforced regional interdependence. Russia’s major concerns and goals became to maintain its political stability, to contain conflicts across the post-Soviet space and to extend, if possible, to the areas adjacent to it. Russia has strong national interests all over the Black Sea/Caspian Sea regions. Co-operation between Russia and Turkey is essential for stability in the Black Sea area. It should also be recognised that Russia and Turkey may be partners, but they are not allies because their post-Cold War regional strategies are guided by opposing goals. Turkey is interested in undercutting Russia’s position in the Black Sea/Balkan region and in expanding its own influence into the Muslim republics and communities in Central Asia, the South Caucasus region, the Northern Caucasus area and Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. Turkey’s growing importance to Russia confronted the Russian leadership with the necessity to work out a neighbourhood policy vis-à-vis Turkey that would differ both from the primitive anti-Turkish stance and from the unrealistic wish to be friends with all nations of the MBC region. The emergence of a new factor – the problem of the transportation of oil – within the security context in the MBC has strongly changed the geopolitical sense. The transportation of Caspian and Central Asian oil has not only an

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economic but also a political importance. The choice of a large oil route (on Turkish territory to Jaikhan or on Russian territory up to Novorossiysk and further by tankers) is closely connected not only with economic profits but also with questions of the political attachment of the Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Turkic republics to Turkey. For Turkey it is a matter of the integration of the Turkic world under its aegis. Although uninterrupted navigation is of great importance for the transportation of Caspian and Central Asian oil from Novorossiysk, a decision on the problem of Caspian and Central Asian oil export is connected to the construction of a reliably functioning pipeline network and, moreover, with an output not at a Black Sea terminal, but at a Mediterranean one. Such a decision is dictated by political rather than by economic reasons. The problem of Caspian and Central Asian oil transportation is also complicated by the fact that all arterial roads pass through regions of ethno-political conflicts – Karabakh, South Ossetian, Chechen, Abkhazian and Kurdish regions. Although the origin of there conflicts is not connected to the transportation of petroleum, this problem has strongly complicated the decision as to routes and has become an obstacle in the way of a peaceful solution of these conflicts.

The Emergence of Regionalism in the EU and the Northern Dimension Project The enlargement and partnership policies of the European Union generate political and economic changes in the wider Europe. Regionalism is affected by the expansion and security policies of the EU and NATO, and by integration efforts in the former Soviet Union territories. Regionalism will be linked with co-operative processes and implemented by regionalisation and regionbuilding. Regionalisation is affected by subjective factors such as common identity, culture and history and by such objective factors as geography, economics and geopolitics. Region-building is political activity driven from above (governments) and from below (sub-state actors). It is based on regionalisation and establishes new institutions and organisations. Common institutions could strengthen common identity. In terms of regionalism, four main levels can be distinguished. The first level is a geographical and ecological unit; the second level is a social system; the third level is a framework of organised co-operation; and the fourth level is a regional civil society.

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Regions as identity systems play an important role in a globalising world with high mobility, including migration. Multiculturalism is a major social phenomenon. There are several successive projects of region-building in Northern Europe. Newly independent Baltic States are scenes for institutionalised cooperation within the framework of the Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Cooperation (BSSSC). Other regional and sub-regional organisations that would also strengthen their common identity are being established, such as the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council. The Barents Regional Council extends local participation in region-building and transnational co-operation in the High North of Europe from the Nordic region to North-western Russia. Norden has received a chance to strengthen its position through the reestablishment of special relations with the Baltic States. From the Baltic States’ perspective, the Northern Dimension initiative has thus far, functioned more as a dialogue than a co-operation in traditional terms, as it was expected to do. The dialogue has facilitated the shaping of new discourses, but the new networks are as yet underdeveloped. Baltic dialogue is complicated because, while the nations share the same space, there is a big economic gap as well as a visible social and civilisation gap. However, the Northern Dimension initiative still has a chance to succeed as a functional and operational co-operation and it has ambitions to build some homogeneity in socio-cultural terms in the Nordic/Baltic area. Highly monofunctional projects run the risk of reproducing old economic myths and political attitudes, now in the framework of market relations. However, one of the aims of the Northern Dimension is the development of a partnership which has its roots in creative subjectivity. The Northern Dimension has encountered a number of obstacles as compared to the initial high aspirations. It is still a region under construction in functional terms. Northern Europe stands out as an area of stability compared to other regions of Europe. The Southern Dimension, which the Barcelona Process initiated in 1995, was used as a model for the Northern Dimension. The Northern Dimension initiative was intended to facilitate security and stability in Europe. From the beginning, the idea of an EU policy for the Northern Dimension has covered the political, economic and social sectors, with the exception of traditional military security issues. The Northern Dimension introduces the partner-oriented approach. It is not only about the right of ‘outsiders’ to participate in the shaping of the Union’s policies; it is also about the Union’s ability to manage change. Northern and Southern Dimensions may soon be completed by an Eastern

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Dimension. The Northern Dimension has to be flexible; the European Union is constantly changing and it should become better equipped at dealing with change, in itself and outside. Promoting stability should not mean promoting immobility. The Northern Dimension initiative could be transformed into one element of the relationship between the EU and Russia. In this sense the Northern Dimension could serve as a means of providing substance and focus to the developing strategic partnership, both geographically and in terms of sectoral priorities. The most significant improvements in the Northern Dimension’s practice are visible in the context of the evolving EU–Russian strategic partnership and changes in Russian policy towards the Baltic States. The Northern Dimension provides direction to EU–Russian co-operation and could provide an example for relations with countries that are unlikely to become EU members, such as the EU’s partners in the Barcelona Process. Russia is the only true ‘outsider’ in the North and in the short run the Northern Dimension revolves almost entirely around the bilateral EU–Russian relationship. From the Baltic States’ perspective, the Northern Dimension initiative has been limited, as the Baltic States have never been a focus of the Northern Dimension and perceive themselves as marginalised. They have not realised the potential of the Northern Dimension initiative. The main foundation of EU–Russian relations is the existence of common European values, which has been acknowledged by both parties. For example, according to the European Union’s Common Strategy on Russia, the relationship is to be built on the ‘foundations of shared values enriched in the common heritage of European civilisation’. Similar references to shared values can be found in the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement as well as the official communiqués of EU–Russia summits. These common values are mainly Western liberal values, such as democracy, a respect for human rights and individual liberties, and a market economy. However, the notion of common values as the basis of EU–Russian relations is misleading, because both actors are engaged in a process of radical internal change. In 1992 it became clear to the European Community and its member states that Russia was too big, troubled and nuclear to be fully integrated into the European project as a member state. The European Union sees a strategic partnership with Russia as a vehicle to be used to facilitate the transformation of Russia. Thus, the central objectives for co-operation are a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Russia, governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy. Therefore, when viewed from Brussels, the strategic partnership is about the centrality of common values and supporting

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the transition and, consequently, increasing the similarities between the European Union and Russia. In Moscow the emphasis is, however, entirely different. The Medium-Term Strategy for Development of Relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union (2000–10), does not make a single reference to common values. Russia is seeking to counterbalance the US influence in Europe. Enlargement has recently become the underlying project in the acceleration of the process of European integration: to a greater extent, in fact, than the single currency. The disparity in the GDP per capita between these candidates and the EU ranges between 30 and 50 per cent. These differentials indicate the need to enforce strict transitional adjustment and convergence criteria. This eastward enlargement encompasses a larger number of diverse states. The cultural, religious, political, economic and social kinship between the EU and Eastern Europe is closer than is the case in the Southern Mediterranean setting. Another difference is the presence of the Russian Federation in all matters pertaining to Eastern enlargement. Since Poland and the Baltic States have joined the European Union, there is inevitably a much greater focus than previously on co-operation with Russia – not only because five EU members have a common border with Russia, but also on account of the sizeable Russian-speaking minority that now live inside the EU. Most direct cross-border co-operation with Russia will take place within the Baltic Sea region. It will reflect the regional interests and structures of Northwestern Russia. As a regional link between the states of Western and Northwestern Europe and Russia, the Council of the Baltic Sea States has a role of crucial importance for the future. Consequently, the Northern landscape appears even more complex, bearing in mind NATO’s intention to handle hard security matters in the sub-region and the fact that the EU has reached the borders of the Russian Federation through its recent enlargement to include the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary as well as the planned inclusion of the Baltic States. The definition of ‘Europe’ suffers from Europe’s strong diversity and from the contradictions of national myths and the legacies of historical crises, not to mention that the actual ‘identification’ of Europe is subject to discussion. Most border lines in the East and South-east seem prone to be redrawn according to different present and future contexts. Regions new to the traditional understanding of Europe’s identity, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, are subject to discussion. This is also one of the main differences between the Euro-Mediterranean process and other European dimensions, including the

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Northern Dimension. None of the Southern Mediterranean basin states belongs geographically to Europe and will probably never be included unless the EU acquires a trans-European dimension. While the Northern Dimension and the Eastern Dimension are peripheries of continuity, the North–South global divide is a determinant trait in the Euro-Mediterranean setting. Moreover, these new peripheral border-spaces that condition both European members and non-member states act not only in an ‘outside-in’ direction but also ‘inside-out’, forming various concentric layers. The Nordic countries are not only influenced by the ‘core EU’; the intensity is more visible in how the Russian Federation is influenced. The same holds true for the Euro-Mediterranean member states, though here the ‘outside-in’ connection is definitely stronger than the ‘inside-out’. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership has enhanced common policy towards the diverse Mediterranean regions. However, the Euro-Mediterranean process was a blueprint for the Northern Dimension as a common EU policy. This same EU common policy could be applied to the relationship of the Nordic countries with the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe. The very term ‘Northern Dimension’ was launched in 1997 by Finland’s Prime Minister, Paavo Lipponen, in a speech delivered in Rovaniemi. Initially, the Northern Dimension as an EU policy had as its ‘ultimate goal’ the promotion of ‘peace and stability, with prosperity and security shared by all nations’ in the region. The Northern Dimension was placed on the EU’s agenda at the Luxembourg European Council meeting in December 1997, following the spirit of the Barcelona Process. It became part of the political agenda at the Vienna European Council of December 1998, ‘not only as a framework for external relations but also for cross-border policy matters’. The Foreign Ministers Conference held in Helsinki in November 1999 became the first high-level conference on the Northern Dimension. At this meeting, three main objectives were outlined: the promotion of stability through economic integration, addressing trans-border challenges of European significance and outlining perspectives for regional co-operation. At the European Council meeting in Feira (June 2000), following Finland’s EU Presidency proposal to the Helsinki European Council (December 1999), the Northern Dimension was provided with an Action Plan for 2000–3 in order to ‘provide added value through reinforced co-ordination and complementarity in the EU and member-states’ programmes and enhanced collaboration between the countries of Northern Europe’. A full report on Northern Dimension policies was presented at the Gothenburg European Council meeting in June 2001.

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The first substantial question to be raised was how to map the Northern Dimension. It seemed to consist of more than the traditional Nordic community did, with its network of institutionalised working organisations epitomised by the Nordic Council. Had it been aimed solely at the Nordic community countries, the term Nordic Dimension would have been more accurate and would have endowed the EU with added Nordic values, such as a welfare society, equality, openness and strict environmental regulations. However, the term ‘Northern’ is more overarching because, without the European connotation, it refers to a cartographic image of the North. As such it may include the US and Canada, both of which have northern dimensions. Nevertheless, if we assume it to be a strictly North European dimension, with all its purposeful collateral connections with the North American hemisphere, it naturally revolves around the Nordic countries, the Baltic region and especially the Russian Federation. The question arises, however, of whether Belarus fits in. The Northern Dimension is apparently geographically open-ended and, presumably, according to the Finnish original connotation, it was meant to be open-ended and to create a new political and security architecture in Northern Europe: a ‘New Northern Europe’ consisting of 70 million inhabitants. The geographic limits were thereafter fixed to a region stretching from Iceland in the west to North-western Russia, and from the Polar Sea in the North to the southern coast of the Baltic Sea. This ambitious and ambiguously expressed dimension was anchored in Finland’s present non-alignment policy and her long-standing record of historical relations with Scandinavia as well as with Russia, the Soviet Union and the present Russian Federation. Sweden also displays a similar status in Northern Europe, though with an added value, according to a 1999 statement by Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lind, who said, ‘Through development co-operation, about SEK 800 million are channelled every year to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition there is the so-called Baltic Billion Fund and also Sweden’s participation in EU co-operation with Eastern Europe and Nordic co-operation with this region.’ Sub-regional co-operation is increasingly becoming an important security factor in Northern Europe. Sub-regionalism offers opportunities for a developing Russian democracy and civil society, serving as a catalyst for successful reforms and international integration. Sub-regional co-operation facilitates the rise of a mechanism of interdependence in Northern Europe and promotes mutual trust and understanding among nations. In this sense, sub-regionalism helps to solve local security problems and to prevent the rise of new threats and challenges. Russia and the EU agree in principle that the Union’s enlargement should not entail the creation of new dividing lines in Europe and that the freedom of

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movement of people and goods in the regions should be ensured. They support various collaborative projects, including economy, trade, energy security, social systems, health care, environment and the improvement of the border and transport infrastructure in the regions.

Conclusions Different projects of region-building offer unique opportunities to strengthen the political, economic and cultural ties across the regional areas. Regional solutions are more suitable to the promotion of stability; and military stability is linked to the broader strategic context. In all sectors of security policy, national and regional efforts can complement and reinforce wider European policies. The comprehensive approach adopted in Barcelona is based upon the assumption that political stability and economic prosperity are interdependent and require social and cultural development according to a mutually reinforcing logic. However, given the improbability of achieving political stability in the area and the delay in economic development taking off, a restructuring of the Barcelona Process is required, paying serious attention to halting the degeneration of interrelations, such as an increasing intolerance. Political, economic and cultural contradictions could threaten the process and necessary measures have to be adopted. To raise the visibility of the process, initiatives are essential to deal not only with the elites, such as politicians, civil servants, NGO representatives or academics, but with a broader public as well. Regional projects in Northern Europe are shaped by several parallel processes. Co-operation can be facilitated primarily by strengthening the regional institutions: the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Barents EuroArctic Council. The benefits of integration are channelled by the Northern strategy and the partnership policy of the European Union and Russia. The Nordic countries can have a significant role in promoting joint stability and transitions in the Baltic States and Russia. The most important Russian priority in Northern Europe is security, which can be achieved by the establishment of the all-region security system with the participation of Russia. Another objective is to achieve complex and sustainable economic development and the integration of North-western Russia into European markets. In the short run the issue of Kaliningrad is among the most sensitive problems of European politics and Russia is looking for co-operation with Nordic countries and the Baltic States to enhance a mutually beneficial

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status for the ‘Russian island’ in the European area. With the remarkable growth of influence of St Petersburg in Russian political and economic life, a new priority is the transformation of St Petersburg into a global city. Evaluation of the Southern and Northern Dimensions indicates that they have brought ‘added values’ to the policies of the European Union. The evolution of the Northern Dimension initiative into a primary method of strengthening EU–Russian bilateral relations means that such a model would be unlikely to solve the numerous problems in the different sub-regional areas. On the other hand, the original and ambitious model, aimed at providing a counterweight to the pattern of concentric circles and the problems this causes for those in the outer circles, appears to be appropriate for the vulnerable Caucasus and the Black Sea region. The evaluation of new regional arrangements has demonstrated that a regional approach could play an important role in the relationship between the EU and its neighbourhood, as well as in other areas including the Northern and Southern Dimensions.

Notes 1. Rosenau, J. (1997) ‘The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization’, Current History, 96(613): 360–4. 2. Attina, F. (1996) ‘Regional Co-operation in Global Perspective. The case of the “Mediterranean” regions’ University of Catania, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics, JMWP 04.96. 3. Hirst, P. and Thompson, G., (1995) ‘Globalization and the Future of the Nation State’, Economy and Society, 24(3), August, p. 433. 4. Brauch, H.G., Marquina, A., Liotta, P.H., Pogers, P.E., and Selim, M. El-Sayed (eds) (2003) Security and Environment in the Mediterranean. Co–ceptualising Security and Environmental Conflicts, Berlin: Springer, p. 36. 5. Kovalskij, N. (1999) ‘Geopolitical Aspects of Regional Security’, in Zhurkin V.V., et al. (eds) Europe and Russia: Problems of the South. The Mediterranean – Black Sea Region – Caspian Area, Moscow: Interdialect +, p. 21. 6. Coppieters, B., Huysseune, M., and Emerson, M., Tocci, N., and Vahl, M. (eds) (2003) ‘European Institutional Models as Instruments of Conflict Resolution in the Divided States of the European Periphery’, CEPS Working Documents, N 195/July, p. 15. 7. Parshin, L. (1998) ‘Russia: to Turn the Mediterranean into a Zone of Stability and Co-operation’, in Europe, the Mediterranean, Russia: Perception of Strategies, Moscow, Institute of Europe, pp. 42–6.

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8. Vahl, M. (2002) ‘The Northern Dimension as a Model for Relations Between the European Union and its ‘Near Abroad’, in International Perspectives on the Future of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region and the Northern Dimension (Part 1), Lulea, January, pp. 1–12.

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Edwards, G. and Philippart, E. (1997) ‘The EuroMediterranean Partnership: Fragmentation and Reconstruction’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 2: 465–89. Eriksson, J. (1994) ‘Euro-Arctic Insecurity’, in Common Security and Northern Europe After the Cold War – the Baltic Sea Region and the Barents Region, Stockholm: The Olof Palme Center. Fawcett, L. and Hurell, A. (eds) (1995) Regionalism in World Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Heininen, L., Jalonen O.-P. and Kakanen J. (1995) Expanding the Northern Dimension, Tampere Peace Research Institute, Research Report (61). Hettne, B. (1993) ‘Neo-Mercantilism: The Pursuit of Regionality’, Co-operation and Conflict, 28(3): 211–32. Joenniemi, P. and Stalvant, C.-E. (eds) (1995) Baltic Sea Politics. Achievements and Challenges, Stockholm: The Nordic Council. Joenniemi, P. (1994) ‘Norden – en europeisk megaregion?’ in Karlsson, S. (ed.) Norden ar dod. Lange leve Norden! Stockholm: Nordiska Radet. Joffe, G. (1999) ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative: Problems and Prospects’, in Joffe, G. (ed.) Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, London: Frank Cass, pp. 247–66. Katzenstein, P. (1996) ‘Regionalism in Comparative Perspective’, Co-operation and Conflict, 31(2): 123–59. Keohane, R. (1993) ‘Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge After the Cold War’, in Baldwin, D. (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 269–300. McGrew, A. (1997) The Transformation of Democracy?, Cambridge: Polity Press. Mottola, K. (1996) ‘Security in Northern Europe – Combining and Reinforcing National, Regional and Wider European Policies’, in Visions of European Security – Focal Point Sweden and Northern Europe, Stockholm: The Olof Palme International Center, pp. 88–103. Rosenau, J. (1997) ‘The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization’, Current History, 96(613): 360–4. Spencer, C. (1998) ‘Rethinking or Reorienting Europe’s Mediterranean Security Focus?’, in Park, W. and Rees, W. (eds) Rethinking Security in Post-Cold War Europe, London: Longman, pp. 135–54. Stavridis, S. and Hutchence, J. (2000) ‘The Foreign Policy of a Civilian Power: The Case of the European Union in the Mediterranean’, in Panebianco, S. (ed.) Visions of Mediterranean Co-operation. Towards a Mediterranean Identity?, London: Frank Cass. Strange, S. (1997) ‘The Erosion of the State’, Current History, 96(613): 365–9. Tanner, F. (1996) ‘An Emerging Security Agenda for the Mediterranean’, Mediterranean Politics, 1(3): 279–94. Tovias, A. (1999) ‘Regionalisation and the Mediterranean’, in Joffe, G. (ed.) Perspectives on Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, London: Frank Cass, pp. 75–88.

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Vesa, Unto (ed.) (2000) Democratic Security Building: Cases from the Baltic and Black Sea Regions, Tampere: Tampere Peace Research Institute. Occasional Papers, N 83. Zhurkin, V. and Kovalsky N. (eds) (1998) Europe, the Mediterranean, Russia: Perception of Strategies, Moscow: Institute of Europe. Zhurkin, V. and Kovalsky, N. (eds) (2000) European Union – Russia: Balkan Situation, Moscow: Interdialect. Zhurkin, V. (ed. in chief), Arbatova, N., Borko, Y., Kovalsky, N., Kosolapov, N., Shenaev, V., Shmelev, N., Voitolovsky, H., Yazkova, A. (eds) (1999) Europe and Russia: Problems of the South. The Mediterranean – Black Sea Region – Caspian Area, Moscow: Interdialect +.

Chapter 9: Regional Security in the Middle East Mohammad El-Sayed Selim

Introduction

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his chapter attempts to assess the viability of the regional security arrangements in the Middle East from the broader perspective of the interplay between the mega-trends of globalisation, regionalisation and democratisation. These trends will be examined in general and in the context of the Middle East in particular, in order to understand the extent to which they have influenced and were influenced by the security arrangements in that region. By reviewing the competing security arrangements in the Middle East and analysing their experience in dealing with the security challenges, we will infer the common factors that lead to successful regional co-operation. The choice of the Middle East is justified by the fact that this region is one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world. In fact, the region was described as being characterised by the dominance of the Hobbesian state of nature. Various security arrangements were devised and met with varying degrees of success. By drawing upon the experience of the Middle East, one could reach certain policy recommendations concerning the factors that lead to the success or failure of security arrangements. The Middle East is understood here as the wider area that includes the East Mediterranean, West Asia and North Africa. The chapter will be divided into ten parts. It will begin by conceptualising the interplay between the mega-trends at the global level, both during and after the Cold War, with a view of delineating its impact on the conceptualisation of security. In the second part, such interplay will be examined with reference to the case of the various security arrangements that were put forward during and after the Cold War in the Middle East. The four parts that follow will deal with the three main security arrangements that were proposed in the Middle East and the major regional dialogue operating in the region, i.e., the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. These arrangements and dialogue will then be

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compared, with a view to drawing certain policy stances on the factors that lead to the success of security arrangements. The eighth part will deal with the future of the security arrangements in the Middle East after 11 September 2001 and the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq in April 2003. The ninth part will review the recent developments in the area of security arrangements of the region, namely the trend of the internationalisation of such security arrangements, whereby the region will be put under the scrutiny of the great powers. Finally, the paper will attempt to draw conclusions concerning the conditions conducive to successful regional co-operation, especially in the field of security, and to identify policy recommendations for future practice.

Major Shifts in the Interplay between the Mega-Trends and their Implications for Security The East/West Cold War dominated international politics for almost a half century. Although it did not result in a military global confrontation, it generated numerous regional, inter-state and civil wars and resulted in the dumping of tremendous resources on global and regional arms races. Under Cold War conditions a new pattern of global relations emerged, which came to be characterised as interdependence. This new phenomenon was facilitated mainly by the revolutions of technology and mass communications. It entailed a tremendous increase in world trade and a higher level of sensitivity by actors to developments within each other, and a more or less equal vulnerability to the same external variables. However, the state remained the main unit of analysis and the emphasis was on inward-oriented development strategies. Further, during the Cold War regional projects for co-operation were subordinated to global bipolar competitions. Most of the regional governmental enterprises were reflections of the Cold War struggle. One may recall that the West European regional project, formalised in 1957, was mainly an attempt to strengthen Western Europe against perceived Soviet threats and to reverse the marginalisation of Europe’s role in international politics. The criteria of geographical contiguity and legal institutionalism were considered the cornerstones of the concept of regionalism. Most regional problems were extensions of the bipolar struggles and were largely approached from this perspective. The issue of the type of political regime (democratic vs. authoritarian) was hardly an international issue during the Cold War. Despite the ideological struggle between the two models of political and economic development advocated by the East and the West, the superpowers rarely considered the

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type of political regime in Third World countries an issue in their global struggle to win friends or alienate enemies. Granted that the Soviet Union established socialist/authoritarian systems in East Europe and the other countries it dominated, and the USA managed to establish liberal democracies in the countries it occupied, namely Japan and Germany, they rarely approached developing countries from that angle. The struggle was mainly focused on winning friends regardless of the political regime. Both superpowers supported authoritarian regimes provided that these were loyal to them. One need only examine the cases of the American-sponsored military coup against the democratically elected President of Chile, Salvador Allende in 1973, the American/South Vietnamese link until 1974 or the American/South Korean relationship until 1993 and the Soviet relationship with regimes of different political ideologies such as Nasser’s Egypt and Nehru’s India, to conclude that democracy was hardly an issue during these days. As the Cold War approached its end, a qualitative shift emerged in the global pattern of interdependence, paving the way for globalisation. Globalisation meant the integration of the world economy into a single main pattern, the transcendence of the state into a new pattern of supra-territoriality and the standardisation of the global criteria for economic, cultural and political cooperation. The end of the Cold War and the bipolar struggle and the emergence of globalisation endered the subordination of regional issues to global ones less inevitable. It became possible to address regional issues on their own terms and to approach regional institution-building from a more flexible perspective. The end of the Cold War also raised a different set of issues in regional cooperation, the most important being the issue of trade liberalisation, which became the cornerstone of the neo-regional co-operation project. Other structural forces contributed to the rise of the regionalist perspective. Among these forces one may refer to the shift towards outward-oriented strategies of development in the developing world. Cognisant of the success of the outward-oriented strategies of East Asian nations during the Cold War, developing countries began to shift away from their protectionist strategies towards gaining more access for their own exports in Western markets. This led to a greater willingness to negotiate regional deals with the main trading partners. The growing importance of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade also increased the attractiveness of regional agreements between states, where greater cultural and interest affinities can facilitate agreements on NTBs. These dramatic changes resulted in the rise of a new pattern of regionalism. There has been a dramatic increase in intra-regional trade and investment,

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especially in North America, the European Union and East Asia. The new emphasis on regionalism entailed four main concepts that, taken together, form the essence of a new paradigm of regionalism. First, geographical proximity is no longer the main determinant of regional co-operation. It is now possible for geographically disparate countries to belong to the same regional grouping on the basis of shared interests. Second, regional institutions are mainly oriented towards socio-economic issues rather than politico-strategic ones. As a corollary, ideology is no longer considered an essential bond for forming the new regional groupings. Third, an emphasis is placed on loose institutionalism rather than legal-organisational approaches. In other words, the emphasis is on integration without institutionalisation. The criterion of building regional groupings around a charter and permanent secretariat is no longer considered viable for regional co-operation. Instead, there is a new emphasis on the formation of a functional system, which consists of broad guidelines of action and simple institutions with no permanent elaborate bureaucratic structures. Fourth, there is neo-regional co-operation centred on the theme of trade liberalisation and integration into the main rules, as laid down by the Uruguay Round in 1994 and the World Trade Organization later on. The objective is no longer to achieve self-reliance or collective self-reliance, as was the case during the Cold War, but rather to unleash the market forces domestically and regionally. The establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (APEC) reflected this neo-regionalist paradigm. This institution consists of set geographically non-contiguous countries, ideologically different, but committed to the objective of trade liberalisation. One needs only to recall that the three Chinese economies (China, Taiwan and Hong Kong) are all members of the APEC to comprehend its neo-regionalist dimensions. The establishment of other groupings, such as the Indian Ocean Rim Community (IORC) in 1997, points in the same direction (Selim 1999). Finally, new forms of regional interaction were introduced, such as regional dialogues. Processes of regional dialogues are based on an informal exchange of views, the creation of intra-regional policy networks and unilateral measures (Dieter 1998). The ASEAN Regional Forum and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue are prime examples of this form of neo-regionalism. The end of the Cold War also highlighted the type of political regime as a global issue. This was mainly facilitated by the collapse of the authoritarian regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, which led to the rise of the notion of the End of History. The anti-authoritarian revolutions and changes in the former communist bloc triggered waves of democratisation across the world. Neo-liberal theorists argued that democratisation was essential to

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maintain global peace, as democracies do not fight each other. However, progress on the road to democratisation was much slower than progress toward regionalisation.1 These radical developments influenced the conceptualisation of security. During the Cold War, a realist concept of security prevailed whereby the concept was state-centric and dominated by issues related to military force and diplomacy. Various regional collective security institutions were established all of which virtually focused on strategies of deterrence, containment and armament. States dominated the discourse on national, regional and international security: three levels which were almost separate. The advent of the age of globalisation led to a new discourse on security characterised by the ‘de statecentric’ approach to the concept of security, in addition to presenting a new human-centric perspective. Security arrangements have come to be based upon broader concepts of economic, political, and cultural interactions rather than on purely militaristic ones, and on notions of dealing with ‘new’ security threats (environmental decay, spread of new epidemics, etc. . . .) in parallel with the traditional ones (Brandao 1998; Reed and Tehranian 1999).

The Interplay between the Mega-Trends in the Middle East during and after the Cold War The Middle East is an exemplary arena for the interplay between the forces of globalisation, regionalisation and democratisation. Since the advent of the imperialist age in the Middle East in the nineteenth century, the region has been well connected with the global system and highly influenced by its transformations. The global Middle Eastern connection was characterised by the dependence of the Middle East on the global system. This pattern of dependence continued after the ‘political independence’ of Middle Eastern states. During the Cold War, the patterns of development and trade were characterised by their emphasis on Westernism. Further, two main regional projects emerged in the Middle East: Arab and Middle Eastern. Each project implied a different set of assumptions, concepts and security arrangements. Both competed for dominance in the Middle East during the Cold War and, at the end of that period, revived that competition. The Middle Eastern project, mainly advocated by Western powers, viewed the Middle East as a geographical area, rich in oil resources, containing a mosaic of nations and threatened by external hostile powers, mainly the Soviet Union. The region, it was argued, should be linked with the West through a security regime and a set of economic arrangements,

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which would stabilise the region and preserve Western interests. The United States first enunciated the project in 1950, when it suggested the establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). President Eisenhower re-introduced the idea in 1953, when he proposed the establishment of an alliance between the northern tier countries of the Middle East (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq) to contain the Soviet Union (Mustafa 1987; Al-Kilany 2000). In response to this proposal, Iraq and Turkey signed a security pact in February 1955, according to which the two countries pledged to defend each other in the case of foreign aggression. Britain joined the pact, which became known as the Baghdad Pact, in April 1955. The Pact was met with vehement opposition from the advocates of the Arab regional project. Such criticism was quite instrumental in preventing Jordan from joining it. After the 1958 Iraqi revolution, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and the headquarters of the Pact was moved to Ankara. The Pact came to be known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). The last time the idea was introduced during the Cold War was when President Reagan introduced the concept of ‘Strategic Consensus’ among Middle Eastern countries in 1982, under the auspices of the USA. This was done in the wake of the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, the Iranian revolution, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the collapse of the CENTO, all of which occurred in 1979. Strategic consensus meant that Middle Eastern countries would establish an overall understanding that the Soviet Union was the major threat to the region and would resolve their conflicts in a way that would ultimately lead to a strategic relationship with the USA. If countries of the region failed to resolve their disputes, they would solicit American help. Advocates of the Arab regional project, mainly Arab nationalists, contended that the Middle Eastern project was a Western invention. They argued that the region to which they belonged was characterised by the dominance of one Arab nation that had common features, interests and security concerns and priorities. The Arab people enjoy the unity of language, culture and geography, which entitles them to form their own security and economic arrangements. The main threat to the security of the region was perceived to be Israel. Arab regional arrangements should be established in order to minimise that threat. These arrangements should be placed within an Arab security framework. The main embodiment of that project was the establishment of the League of Arab States in 1945 and the signing of the Arab Common Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty in 1950. The two projects competed for dominance in the Middle East during the 1950s and 1960s. The 1967 Arab defeat dealt a serious blow to the Arab

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regional project, as the weakness of the forces of Arab nationalism and radicalism was exposed. The Arab regional project was weakened even further with the death of Nasser, the main champion of this project, in 1970; the advent of a new leadership in Egypt that emphasised Egyptianism; and the subsequent developments such as the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty in 1979 (which detached Egypt from the Arab security arrangements against Israel), the Iraq–Iran War (1980–8), and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. That invasion resulted in a major rupture in the Arab regional project, which is still imprinted on it. The Middle Eastern and Arab projects failed to develop any significant security arrangements for the region. The Baghdad Pact was weakened after the 1958 Iraqi revolution and its successor the CENTO, and was dissolved in 1979. On two occasions the Arab regional project was able to initiate some security arrangements. These were during the Iraqi–Kuwaiti crisis in 1961 and in respect of the Arab plans to prevent Israel from diverting the water of the Jordan River in 1964–7. After the independence of Kuwait in 1961, Qasim, the then President of Iraq, claimed that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and declared his intention to annex it. Britain sent troops to Kuwait to safeguard against a possible Iraqi invasion. The League of Arab States formed a joint Arab emergency force that landed in Kuwait and replaced the British forces. The plan succeeded in protecting the newly independent Gulf State. Once again, in 1964, Egypt called for the convening of an Arab summit in Cairo to draw plans to prevent Israel from diverting the Jordan River to its territory. The summit established an Arab joint military command headed by an Egyptian General to draft plans to protect Arab projects in the Jordan Valley. The Command did not succeed in protecting these projects during the 1967 War and was later disbanded. During that era various bilateral security arrangements between Arab states were formed, such as the Egyptian–Syrian–Saudi security arrangements in 1955, the Egyptian–Syrian mutual defence pact in 1966, the Egyptian– Libyan–Sudanese security arrangements in 1971 and, finally, the Egyptian– Syrian security arrangements which enabled them to launch the war against Israel in 1973. Perhaps, with the exception of the last arrangement, most Arab security arrangements were not effective. They reflected the short-term interests of Arab states and lacked a long-term vision for security in the Arab regional system. Further, sub-regional security arrangements were developed on the periphery of the Middle East between Arab partners to make up for the limited performance of the Arab regional project. The most important of these was the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) in 1981 and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1984. The GCC consisted of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman,

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Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, while the AMU included Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Whereas the GCC entailed a specific, but limited, security structure in the form of the Al-Jazeera Shield Force, the AMU was essentially an economic arrangement. The Middle Eastern dependence on the global system and the rivalry between the two regional projects over dominance in the region helped to marginalise the issue of democracy in the Middle East. In this respect, the Middle East was no exception from the global pattern. Further, the region was ridden with many conflicts, which rendered the issue of democracy a low priority one. The most important of these was the Arab–Israeli conflict, the inter-Arab Cold Wars between Arab revolutionaries and conservatives, the regional struggle between the Arab and Middle Eastern projects and, most importantly, the global Cold War struggle that dominated the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War, the struggle between the Middle Eastern and Arab projects was revived. This was a result of the major blow to the Arab regional project suffered as a result of the Second Gulf crisis of 1990–1. NonArab Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Israel and Turkey) emerged as net winners after this crisis, at the expense of the Arabs. The struggle was soon joined by a third regional project, a Euro-Mediterranean project supported by the European Union (EU). Each of the three projects had certain assumptions and proposals concerning future security arrangements in the Middle East. In the following sections these projects will be reviewed and compared. The comparison of these projects will be based on the following criteria: 1. The security conceptualisation of each project and its relationship with the other dimensions of regional co-operation; 2. The strategies advocated to achieve security; 3. The level of consensus of each project on the main conceptualisations of security; 4. The relationship of each regional security arrangement with the United Nations and major powers; and 5. The institutional capacity of the project in the area of collective security and peaceful resolution of disputes among member states.

Security Arrangements within the Middle Eastern Project The Middle Eastern project was revived in the wake of the Madrid Arab–Israeli peace conference in October 1991. The Madrid conference followed two main

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tracks: a bilateral track and a multi-lateral one. The bilateral track focused on negotiations to reach a political settlement of the territorial issues on a bilateral basis between Israel and each of the neighbouring countries whose territories are occupied. The second dealt with future economic and security arrangements. In this respect five working groups were formed, namely: Arms Control and Regional Security, Regional Economic Co-operation, Refugees, Water and Environment. Many non-Middle Eastern countries took part in the multilateral tracks. In fact, the working groups were chaired by big powers and their meetings were held in different places in and outside the Middle East, in order to emphasise the ‘internationalisation’ of the multi-lateral track. The Syrians and the Lebanese boycotted this track, arguing that they could not discuss regional co-operation projects in which Israel would be a partner unless a political settlement had been reached within the bilateral track. However, Egypt participated in the five working groups arguing that the multi-lateral negotiators should work in parallel with the bilateral ones. The main security issues were discussed in the working group on arms control and regional security. Two major approaches emerged in this group concerning the future security agreements: Egyptian and Israeli. The main issues were related to the relationship between the arms control regime and the political settlement, the mechanisms of arms control and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the Middle East. The Egyptians argued that establishing an arms control regime should precede, or at least be parallel with, the political settlement between the Arabs and the Israelis. Such a regime could not be postponed until the completion of the peace process. Israel contended that no genuine arms control could be reached until the parameters of the political situation and the elements of the political agreements on the territorial issues had been reached. Israel also argued that an arms control regime should begin by introducing certain confidence-building measures, such as the conduct of joint military exercises and joint border patrols, the ban on the exportation of weapons to the Middle East and, finally, the elimination of chemical and biological weapons from the region. Israel advocated establishing a regional arms control regime rather than subscribing to the global ones. The Egyptians contended that these proposals would establish a Middle East dominated by Israel. A ban on the export of arms to the Middle East should be combined by restrictions on the local manufacturing of arms, because Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that manufactures most of its arms. Further, all categories of weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated from the Middle East, including the nuclear weapons possessed by Israel. Such removal must be immediate and simultaneous. Israel asserted it

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would not remove its nuclear arsenal until peace treaties were signed with Arab countries and Iran. The Egyptians also contended that the calculation of the military balance should take into consideration the capabilities of other powers in the region, such as Iran and Turkey and, as such, should not be calculated between Israel and all Arab countries only. It is important to note here that Iran and Turkey had not participated in these debates as Iran was not invited and Turkey considered itself outside the arms control regime of the Middle East (Selim 2000d). This has resulted in no significant progress in the question of establishing a regional security arrangement. Issues related to economic security were discussed in the other four working groups. Once again, there was a disagreement over issues related to refugees, environment, water and regional economic co-operation. For example, while the Arabs wanted to implement United Nations resolutions on the issue of the Palestinian refugees, the Israelis rejected their return and linked that issue to the question of the ‘Jewish refugees’ from Arab countries. In addition, Israel wanted to establish a pan-regional regime of water distribution according to which it would share Arab rivers. The Egyptians contended that the resources of the Nile were not a matter of negotiation as the Nile River was controlled by agreements with the African riparian states. The Arabs and the Israelis also differed on the linkages between regional economic co-operation and the settlement of political issues, with the Israelis advocating the precedence of the former, the Egyptians arguing that the two types of issues were inter-linked. The Syrians, who did not participate, adopted the position that regional economic co-operation was not likely to proceed in the absence of the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. One of the most important manifestations of the Middle Eastern projects was the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) series of conferences held to formulate a pan-Middle Eastern regime for economic co-operation. The conferences were held in Casablanca (1994), Amman (1995), Cairo (1996) and Doha (1997). These conferences were convened after the signing of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, which provided for a framework to establish a Palestinian Authority in the Palestinian occupied territories and to establish a Palestinian state by 1998. In addition, Simon Peres, the then Foreign Minister of Israel, published a book in 1993 entitled The New Middle East, in which he envisioned a new regional co-operation system. Washington seized the opportunity to persuade the Swiss-based Davos Forum to call for a regional economic co-operation conference for the Middle and North Africa. The Casablanca conference represented the second official launching of the

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concept of a Middle Eastern regional system. The conference issued the Casablanca Declaration, which reiterated that building the foundation of an economic group for the Middle East and North Africa required the flow of goods, capital and labour in the region including the establishment of a development bank. It also established a steering committee and an executive secretariat and decided to hold the conference annually. The last of these conferences was held in Doha, as most Arabs refused to proceed on this track after the election of the hard-line Netanyahu government in Israel in 1996. The new Israeli government was against the Declaration of Principles. It ordered the acceleration of the building of Israeli colonies in the occupied territories and, most importantly, it gave the Middle Eastern project no priority in its agenda. It viewed that project as a legacy of the ‘soft-line’ previous Rabin-Peres Government. This represented the end of the Middle East security arrangements at the level of the multi-lateral working groups and the MENA conferences. However, the idea of a Middle Eastern framework for security is still being debated as one of the potential arrangements for the future of the Middle East, especially after the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003 as will be outlined later.

Security Arrangements within the Euro-Mediterranean Project Of all the regional projects in the Middle East, the Euro-Mediterranean (EMP) is the most elaborate and multi-dimensional. The EU introduced the concept of the EMP in 1994 to safeguard its interests in the Mediterranean in view of the security threats emanating from that region. The most important of these were the violent trends in North Africa, the influx of immigrants from North Africa to Europe and the continuation of the Arab–Israeli deadlock. In addition, the project was motivated by the marginalisation of the EU’s role in MENA conferences. According to this concept, the member states of the EU and twelve selected Mediterranean countries would enter into a series of ‘association agreements’ between the EU and each Mediterranean country in order to create a free trade area by the year 2010, as well as security-political and social-cultural frameworks for co-operation. In 1994, the EU announced a Proposal directed to ‘support the establishing of a zone of stability and security and creating conditions for lasting and sustainable rapid economic development in the Mediterranean countries’. The Proposal reiterated two main dimensions of the partnership, namely:

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1. Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Zone of Stability and Security through political dialogue between the EU and the Mediterranean countries based on the principles of democracy, good governance, the rule of law and the efforts of the EU to persuade Mediterranean countries to renounce nonconventional military options. A code of conduct among Mediterranean countries for the resolution of disputes was also suggested; and 2. Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area in which all manufactured products would be traded freely. In October 1995, the EU issued another statement, which brought the EMP proposal into operation. The new policy statement outlined three main aspects of the EMP: a political and security aspect, an economic and financial aspect and a social and human aspect. Upon the initiative of the EU, the first ministerial meeting of the twenty-seven Euro-Mediterranean partners was held in Barcelona, which led to the labelling of the entire process as the Barcelona Process. The conference witnessed heated debates between the EU and the Mediterranean countries on the elements of the EMP. The final declaration (the Barcelona Declaration) reflected, to a large extent, the European viewpoint of the nature of security in the Mediterranean and the free trade area. The EMP activities consist of bilateral and multi-lateral tracks. The former are governed by Euro-Mediterranean Association agreements signed between the EU and each participating Mediterranean country. It is important to notice that although Turkey, Cyprus and Malta are member states in the EMP they have not entered into negotiations to sign association agreements with the EU as their ambitions go beyond the EMP. They are in the EMP to camouflage the fact that their objective is to build an Arab–Israeli economic and security framework sponsored by the EU. In fact, Greek Cypriots and Malta joined the EU in 2004. Turkey also hopes to follow. This will leave the EMP with only certain Arab states and Israel, which will turn the entire process into a Middle Eastern one, with EU participation. Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority all signed separate association agreements with the EU. Only Syria has not signed yet. At the level of the multi-lateral tracks, the EU and its Mediterranean partners have developed a series of institutions that hold annual conferences to monitor and develop the EMP. The most important of these are: 1. The Euro-Mediterranean conference that takes place at the level of foreign ministers and the meetings of sectoral ministers, government experts and representatives of civil society; and

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2. The Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process. The Committee meets on a quarterly basis at a senior official level and is chaired by the EU presidency. It consists of the EU Troika, Mediterranean partners and the European Commission representatives (member states not in the EU Troika also participate). The Committee acts as an overall steering body for the regional process with the right to initiate activities to be financed by the EU programmes. The EMP was not able to develop a viable security arrangement in the Mediterranean. This was mainly due to the contending approaches of the Europeans and the Israelis on one hand and the Arabs on the other hand concerning the architecture of security in the Mediterranean, which mainly refers to the Middle East or, to be specific, to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The main issues of contention are: 1. Strategies to be pursued to achieve security; and 2. The role of the EU in building security architecture in the Mediterranean. Whereas the views of the EU are well articulated in its documents, such as the draft Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability and the Common EU Strategy in the Mediterranean adopted by the European Council in 2000, Arab viewpoints are not well-articulated in specific documents and can only be identified through the different statements of Arab policy makers. The EU advocated a confidence-building strategy as the main security strategy in the Mediterranean. It argued that this strategy had succeeded in maintaining peace in Europe since the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and it could serve the same purpose in the Mediterranean. These measures are introduced under the label of ‘partnership-building measures’, whose major modality is the promotion of regular consultations and exchanges of information with its Mediterranean partners. The Arabs argue that these measures are not a substitute to political settlement and they will not necessarily lead to security as long as major conflicts have not been resolved. They have worked in Europe because European territorial issues were resolved before they were introduced and because East and West had reached arms control agreements that had achieved equilibrium in Europe. These conditions are lacking in the Mediterranean and have to be introduced before one can talk meaningfully about partnership-building measures. The strategy of the democratisation of Mediterranean countries is another strategy pursued by the EU to achieve security in the Mediterranean. This includes the promotion of democratic institutions, the rule of law, support for judicial reform, institution-building

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and freedom of expression, the strengthening of independent media and good governance. The assumption here is that democratisation will lead to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Once again, Arab countries contend that democratisation is not a substitute to conflict resolution. Democratisation is a societal long-term process that ought to be introduced within the framework of the cultural norms of different Mediterranean countries. Conflict resolution and the restoration of occupied territories cannot wait until democratisation is complete. This is a recipe for providing Israel with ample time to colonise the entire occupied territories. Further, the EU conceptualises its role in security arrangements in the region as one of ‘conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation’. It leaves the task of conflict resolution to the regional parties and the USA. The Arabs contend that conflict prevention is not a sufficient security strategy. Unless conflicts are resolved, they cannot be prevented from escalating in the future. Countries that are in conflict are not likely to agree on preventing further conflicts in the future (Selim 2000a, 2000b). One the main areas in which there is a wide agreement on the security arrangement in the Mediterranean is the notion of establishing a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of mass destruction weapons, nuclear, chemical and biological and their delivery systems. This implies the signature and ratification by Mediterranean actors of all non-proliferation instruments such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The agreement cannot be extended beyond this general policy statement, as the actors differ on the timing of the elimination of such weapons and the linkages between their elimination. The Europeans and the Israelis would prefer a focus on the biological and chemical weapons, leaving the elimination of nuclear weapons until the completion of the Middle East peace process. The Arabs argue that all weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated simultaneously and immediately. It is because of these disagreements that the EMP has not been able to introduce a generally accepted security paradigm, or to develop security structures other than the bilateral and multi-lateral dialogue institutions. This explains the inability of the Euro-Mediterranean partners to agree on the projected Charter for Peace and Stability, which was drafted by the EU. Arab countries raised serious reservations about adopting a security charter under the conditions of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories. The EU resorted to a new strategy to persuade its Arab partners in the Middle East to accept its security paradigm. It sent signals to these countries that it

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would revive the 5 + 5 formula for co-operation, thereby marginalising the concept of the EMP. The 5 + 5 Formula was launched in 1989 as a form of economic and security co-operation between five North African Arab countries (Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya) and five south European Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta). The formula was suspended in 1992 after Libya was charged with involvement in the downing of the Pan Am plane over Lockerbie. By signalling its willingness to revive this formula, which does not include a reference to the Arab–Israeli conflict, the EU hoped that other Arab countries would get in line and accept its version of the security component of the EMP. The EU made good on its signal. After ending the Lockerbie Question between Libya and the USA, France persuaded the member states of the 5 + 5 Formula to hold their first summit in Tunis. The summit was held on 5–6 December 2003. The final declaration of the summit reflected a tendency to focus on sub-regional Euro-Maghreb co-operation rather than a wider Euro-Mediterranean one (Selim 2004). In February 2004, Germany presented a Middle East proposal titled ‘The Wider Middle East Initiative’. It later became a Franco-German proposal. The proposal was presented after the USA announced its ‘Greater Middle East Partnership’ initiative and more or less carried the same title. It will be analysed in a later section when we refer to the American proposal. Security Arrangements within the Arab Regional Project The Arab Common Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty of 1950 set the foundations of an Arab collective security regime. It also established executive institutions such as the Arab Defence Council and the Military Consultative Committee. In 1964, a General Unified Command for Arab Armies was established according to a resolution of the Arab summit held in Cairo in January 1964. These security mechanisms failed to establish an effective Arab collective security regime. This was because of inter-Arab rivalries over ideological orientations and regional leadership. The General Unified Arab Command was also not effective in dealing with the threat resulting from the Israeli attack in June 1967 and was later dissolved. The concept of Arab national security was dealt a major blow as a result of two major events: 1. The signing of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. The treaty effectively eliminated Egypt from any Arab regional security arrangement against Israel. Article 10 of the treaty gave Egypt’s security commitments to Israel priority over its security commitments to Arab countries; and

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2. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. It shook the basics of this concept, which evolved around the notion that Israel was the main threat to the security of the Arab system. For the first time, some Arab countries found themselves in the same box with Israel in opposing the Iraqi invasion and working to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The crisis also shattered the Arab consensus that was emerging since 1987 on the re-invigoration of the Arab regional system. After the end of the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of 1990–1, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, Egypt and Syria signed the Damascus Declaration, on 6 March 1991. According to the Declaration the signatories considered the presence of Egyptian and Syrian troops on the territories of some of the GCC countries as the beginnings of an Arab peace force entrusted with the task of securing the GCC and a model to be pursued to re-invigorate the Arab common defence system. The Declaration also broadened the concept of security to include economic dimensions, as it referred to the pledge of the participants to pursue economic policies that would achieve ‘balanced development’ as a step toward establishing an Arab economic bloc. The Damascus Declaration was amended on 19 July 1991 to reflect the GCC states’ misgivings about the Arab collective security concept. The amendment changed the collective security concept laid down in March into an ad hoc and bilateral mechanism between each GCC State, Egypt and Syria, and gave each GCC state the right to request or reject such mechanisms. Further, the economic component of the Declaration was amended to delete the reference to balanced development and restrict that component to coordination between the parties concerned. The Damascus Declaration itself was soon consigned to history. A debate initiated in 1993, in the League of Arab States, to reformulate the concept of Arab regional security witnessed disagreements on the conceptualisation of Arab regional security between the Arab states in the Mashreq and the GCC states. Whereas the GCC countries expressed reservations over the concept an Arab regional security system, the Arab Mashreq countries presented measures to revitalise that system (Galal 1997). The 1993 debate did not result in any specific conclusions concerning the revitalisation of the Arab security arrangement, as the differences were quite deep. The Maghreb countries were almost oblivious to this debate, paying more attention to their security commitments within the EMP or the 5 + 5 Formula. Today, one can identify a high level of convergence of security conceptualisations among the countries of the Arab Mashreq (Egypt, Syria, Jordan,

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Lebanon and the Palestinian Authority). These conceptualisations are heavily dominated by geo-political concerns and are characterised by an emphasis on the resolution of the territorial and existential issues in the Middle East before addressing the question of building security arrangements that would incorporate non-Arab powers (Selim 2003). There is also an emphasis on revitalising the League of Arab States as a forum for inter-Arab security debates. Further, Egyptian, Saudi and Yemeni proposals have been submitted with a view to rebuilding the Arab collective security system. The Egyptian proposal, submitted in July 2003, reiterated that the League should establish an Arab Security Council, an Arab court of justice and an Arab parliament.2 The Arab summit, held in Tunis in May 2004, adopted two documents. The first was on developing, modernising and reforming the Arab world. It enumerated a series of measures, to be taken by each Arab country individually, to introduce democratic changes. The second document was related to the reform of the structures and processes of the League of Arab States. For the first time, the Arabs were linking the regional institutional reform with domestic reform. However, no operational steps were taken to translate the two documents into reality. These documents were mainly adopted in response to the ‘Greater Middle East Project’, submitted by the USA, to which we will refer in a later section.

The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO held in Athens in June 1993, and at the January 1994 Summit held in Brussels, NATO leaders expressed their conviction that security in Europe was highly influenced by the Mediterranean. NATO leaders thought that the Israeli– Palestinian Declaration of Principles had paved the way for measures to be taken by NATO to contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in the Mediterranean.3 In December 1994, NATO leaders expressed their readiness to establish contacts on a case-by-case basis between the alliance and Mediterranean non-member states with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability, and to achieve better mutual understanding. On 8 February 1995, NAC decided to initiate a direct dialogue with these states. The Dialogue was initiated with five Mediterranean states outside NATO. These were Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel and Mauritania. The Dialogue was held in Brussels between the General-Secretariat of NATO and the embassies of these countries. In December 1995, Jordan was incorporated in the Dialogue

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and Algeria participated in February 2000. The Dialogue was held in a bilateral and undeclared framework. Throughout the Dialogue sessions, specific proposals were discussed and it was agreed to hold the Dialogue twice a year on the basis of a specific agenda. The agenda included issues such as exchange of information and visits of army officers, and the provision by NATO of technical assistance in the area of the civil management of emergency cases. In a seminar held in Rome in 1996, Balazino, the Deputy Secretary-General of NATO, asserted that NATO would like to turn this Dialogue into a public and collective one and that the objective of the Alliance was to ‘build a series of political relations which could provide each state with a sense of security’. Balazino argued that NATO would not take part in the processes of Mediterranean conflict resolution or arms control in the region, nor would it provide economic assistance. These issues would be left to the EU. The Alliance would focus on issues related to the exchange of information and fighting terrorism and organised crime The participation of six Arab governments in the Dialogue gave a strong indication that these governments perceived it in a positive framework. These governments viewed the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue as a mechanism to secure the continued interest of the West in their security concerns. Although the Jordanian and Egyptian governments subscribe to this view, their perceptions of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue have other dimensions. The Jordanians view the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue as a mechanism to boost their security in an environment ridden with multiple sources of threat. The Egyptians approach the Dialogue within the context of its impact on their regional role and relationship with the Arab–Israeli peace process and interArab relations. The Egyptian government contends that any NATO Mediterranean security co-operation involving the Arabs and the Israelis must be preceded by a comprehensive Arab–Israeli settlement. They are critical of NATO’s neglect of the pertinent territorial and economic concerns of southern Mediterranean countries, its emphasis on soft security issues and the exclusion of other Arab Mediterranean actors such as Libya and Syria.4 The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue was widely criticised by the majority of Arab intellectuals. In Egypt, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue was criticised as: 1. Lacking a clear concept of Mediterranean security; and 2. Being selective by including only some countries, thereby excluding other actors such as Syria, Lebanon and Libya (Saif 1998). An Egyptian analyst argued that the main objective of NATO was to ‘reach a specific agreement

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with some Arab countries which would secure the access of the Combined Joint Task Force to the military infrastructure of these countries . . . and to monitor the flow of missile technology to southern Mediterranean states which could threaten northern Mediterranean countries, and to monitor also the possession of some of the southern Mediterranean countries of WMD’ (Gad 1998). However, some Arab analysts contended that NATO’s Mediterranean policy did not represent a threat to Arab security and it provided certain opportunities for future co-operation between Arab countries and the European Union. Ahmad Nafeh, a leading former columnist, argued that there were new forms of complementarities between NATO’s new agenda and Arab interests. For example, NATO’s new agenda focuses on combating terrorism and organised crime. These issues were of concern to NATO and Arab countries alike. According to Nafeh, this required a new Arab approach toward NATO. Such an approach would focus on ‘maximizing the areas of complementarity and minimizing the negative aspects of this policy, if they existed’. General Mohammed Shiyyab of Jordan, among others, argued that NATO could play a positive role in stabilising North–South relations across the Mediterranean, bring expertise and credibility to bear in confidence-building between the Arabs and the Israelis and provide a link to a wider transatlantic security system spanning old regional boundaries, thereby making an Israeli–Syrian peace more attractive (Shiyyab 1996). In Israel, the perception of NATO’s role was different from the mainstream Arab perceptions. Israeli strategic thinkers were more supportive of NATO’s new role in the Mediterranean. Ambassador Hanan Bar On of the Weizman Institute contended that the transatlantic component of Mediterranean security must and should not be ignored. Mediterranean security cannot be realised without a NATO role. He went on to argue that Turkey, being a NATO member and at the same time a member in the Mediterranean co-operation, could serve as a link between both worlds.5 This was also the view articulated by the Israeli government. Israel views its inclusion in the NATO’s Mediterranean Initiative with Arab countries as a symbol of its regional acceptance. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is more of a forum for the exchange of information than an arrangement for security in the Mediterranean. Most of the activities are related to holding seminars on issues related to security and conducting limited military manoeuvres.6 However, no security structures were established or envisioned. During the NATO summit in November 2000, various measures for co-operation in security matters were adopted on a

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range of issues. These issues include military education; training and doctrine to address basic interoperability requirements with a view to making Mediterranean countries better prepared to participate in military exercises and related training activities; military medicine; defence reform and defence economics, including best practice in the economic and civilian management of defence forces; terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; border security, especially in connection with terrorism; the smuggling of small arms and light weapons and other illegal activities; civil emergency planning, including disaster management; science and environment, including activities in the field of desertification, drought, management of water and other natural resources; and environmental pollution (Bin 2002). Because of the misgivings of the Mediterranean partners about NATO and their perception of the Dialogue as a means to monitor their military activities, and because of the 11 September 2001 events, most of these measures remained as mere proposals until the completion of the invasion of Iraq in March–April 2003. NATO moved to establish a new role for itself in the Middle East and the Arabian Gulf region. This follows the role it had been performing in Afghanistan after the American occupation of that country. At present, NATO is considering playing a role in the Arabian Gulf. In fact, NATO has held two seminars in May 2004 in Doha and Rome to define that role. The new NATO projected role was debated in the summit of the G-8 held in the USA in June 2004. Further, the June 2004 NATO summit also decided that member states, individually, could help in training Iraqi security forces.

Comparative Analysis of Middle Eastern Security Arrangements Security arrangements in the Middle East may be compared along four main dimensions: their underlying philosophical assumptions, their linkages with the mega-trends identified in this paper, their institutional capacity and ability to contribute to peace in the region, and their relationships with the UN and the major powers. In terms of the first dimension, the Arab project assumes that the main security problems of the region emanate from the Arab–Israeli conflict and the unbalanced intervention of the great powers in that conflict. The main sources of regional instability are viewed as mainly external to the Arab system. Other projects have different assumptions. They are based on the premise that Middle Eastern troubles are the result of a lack of democracy and development in the Arab world. Such an environment encourages extremism and

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‘terrorism’. The main sources of instability are viewed as inherent in the Arab system itself. Security will only be achieved if major domestic changes were introduced in Arab countries. As a result, the point of providing regional security is to introduce domestic reforms into Arab countries and the Arab regional system. The Arab–Israeli conflict is not viewed as the main source of instability and insecurity in the region. As far as the second dimension is concerned, the EMP is the closest to the incorporation of the mega-trends in a single framework. It is the only project that includes an emphasis on the adjustment of the Mediterranean countries to the prerequisites of globalisation, although it sometimes creates tougher rules than those mandated by globalisation such as the rules of origin, as stated in the EU’s association agreements with Arab states. The project emphasised trade liberalisation, but only in the area of manufactured goods. Agricultural products would not be liberalised in the EMP as the EU sought to protect its farmers, but the project remains somehow oblivious to the protection of nascent industries in Arab countries. The EMP has also created a neo-regional framework that secures the interests of the European countries in the Mediterranean and vice versa. However, Arab countries have criticised the EMP on the grounds of the failure to coordinate with the League of Arab States and to include other Arab Mediterranean countries, such as Libya, and Mauritania. The EMP also included states that are not legitimate members, such as Malta, Cyprus and Turkey. Although these countries are Mediterranean powers, they are not interested in the EMP and have not entered into any negotiations with the EU to sign association agreements, as their aspirations transcend the EMP. Finally, the EMP is the only project that emphasises the notion of democratisation as one of the main elements of the project. Nevertheless, the EU perceives the question of democratisation from a European perspective. It views democratisation as meaning compliance with the European norms and values. This is clearly stated in the Common European Strategy in the Mediterranean adopted by the EU in June 2000. In addition to the emphasis on the respect for human rights and the rule of law, the document refers to the change of family laws and abolition of the death penalty according to the European values. The notion of regionalism is the main thrust of the Arab regional project. This project hardly refers to the issue of coping with globalisation or democratisation. Perhaps the only exceptions were was the Declaration of the Rights of Citizens in Arab Countries, issued in 1971 and the Arab Charter for Human Rights, issued in 1994 by the League of Arab States. The Charter reflected the awareness of the sponsors of the Arab regional project that the issue of

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democracy could no longer be ignored. However, the Charter remained a theoretical document lacking any mechanism for implementation or monitoring. Likewise, the Middle Eastern project was essentially an attempt at regional restructuring with an emphasis on the economic and security dimensions. The main thrust of the project was directed towards economic regional Cooperation and the building of ‘soft’ security arrangements. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue almost lacks any significant connections with the three mega-trends. The substance of their Dialogue did not touch to any significant degree upon the issues of globalisation or democratisation. Neither was the Dialogue an attempt to create a new regional framework. Many analysts view the Dialogue as an attempt by NATO to monitor the region, rather than to change it. As far as the second dimension is concerned, the EMP and the League of Arab States have developed a set of regularised institutional arrangements through which the actors interact in the process of goal-attainment. The institutions of the League are older than those of the EMP. The institutions of the EMP are mainly subsidised and supervised by the European powers, which provide them with tremendous leverage over the policy-making process. In fact, one may argue that the entire EMP is a European initiative in which the Mediterranean actors are in the position of the recipient of policies and guidelines. Conversely, the institutions of the League are characterised by a higher level of balance in cost distribution and the ability of the member states to make initiatives. Granted that the Arab Gulf states, Egypt and Syria are more influential in the League than other states, but they do not enjoy the position which the EU enjoys in the EMP. As mentioned earlier, the institutions of the Middle Eastern project are non-functional and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is restricted to a set of ad hoc meetings. The four regional projects failed to establish credible collective security systems in the Middle East, or to provide solutions for the main conflicts that have been plaguing the region since the end the Second World War. The EU perceives the EMP as a mechanism for conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution. The League of Arab States was somehow more successful in the process of inter-Arab conflict resolution (Al-Atrash 1999; Selim 1983). Such success is far below what was expected when the League was established in 1945. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is just a framework for consultation. Because the EMP is backed by the economic power of the EU, it was able to develop a set of economic co-operation arrangements through which funds flow from North to South with a view to upgrading Mediterranean economies

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in order to establish a free trade area by the year 2010. However, the EMP has failed to attract a large volume of foreign direct investment to the Mediterranean partner countries or to increase the level of commerce between them and their European counterparts (Gillespie 2002). The League of Arab States initiated a similar project in 1998. Almost five years after the initiation of the Arab free trade area proposal, little was achieved in this respect. This is because of the competitiveness of Arab economies. They mostly export raw materials and import manufactured goods. Regarding the relationships between the Middle Eastern security arrangements and the UN and other external powers, the Arab regional system is the only project that explicitly recognises the UN’s role. In fact, the League of Arab States is considered to be a regional organisation under the UN Charter. The Arab regional project is not linked to any of the big powers, although Britain played a role in facilitating the establishment of LAS during the Second World War. We have seen earlier that Western powers have attempted to replace LAS with a Middle Eastern arrangement. The Middle Eastern and EuroMediterranean projects and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue were sponsored by the USA, the EU and NATO respectively. In fact, the survival of these projects largely depends on these powers. There is no clear link between these projects and the UN. One may argue that the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue is an attempt to play a security role in the Mediterranean which the UN ought to be playing.

The Future of the Middle Eastern Security Arrangements The main conclusion to be drawn from our review of the Middle Eastern security arrangements is that the region lacks a pan-regional security institution and that the present security arrangements do not provide a credible degree of security to the regional actors. The institutions of LAS are almost non-functional. They have played a limited role in the resolution of some disputes among member states, but did not provide a genuine security guarantee against external threats. Likewise, the institutions of the EMP and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue are mainly frameworks for debating security issues. The fact that the projected Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean, proposed by the EU, has not been endorsed reveals the level of disagreement within the EMP on the conceptualisation of security. Most Arab countries in the Middle East are still sceptical about the ‘real’ objectives of NATO’s approaches to them. The Middle Eastern arrangements were frozen

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in 1997. There had been some suggestions of revival in the wake of the occupation of Iraq in 2003. We will refer to these suggestions later. The 11 September 2001 events in the USA dramatically changed the strategic environment in the Middle East and the foundations of the present security arrangements. The USA claimed that the attacks emanated from the Middle East because of the ‘authoritarian character’ of its Arab regimes. It claimed that the war against terrorism required social changes in the Middle East in the direction of full integration with globalisation and forming new regional arrangements. In September 2002, the USA issued the National Security Strategy Paper (NSSP), which reiterated a new security doctrine for the USA. The NSSP envisaged the use of American resources to shape the political structures within states to promote democracy and fight terrorism; the use of economic measures to liberalise international trade and to cut off the financial supplies to terrorists; and most importantly, that the USA use the doctrine of military pre-emption to foil threats to American security (Mazari 2003). The Middle East was the arena of the implementation of the new American strategy, as the ‘terrorist’ threats to the US were viewed as emanating from that region. The prelude to this process was the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 2001. In March–April 2003, the Americans and the British invaded and occupied Iraq under the pretext of the possession of illegal of weapons of mass destruction. This is considered a prelude to the reshaping of domestic and regional arrangements in the Middle East. Further, the 11 September events strengthened the American–Israeli link more than ever before. In fact, what emerged from 11 September is an American–Israeli strategic consensus on the perception of security threats and the way to deal with them in the Middle East. The main threats are viewed as emanating from terrorism, including the Palestinian movements of resistance to Israeli occupation. Both countries declared it was now legitimate to crush ‘the terrorists’ by all means. The Bush Administration moved from a position of neglect in the Arab–Israeli conflict to a position of full endorsement for the Sharonian strategy of the physical elimination of the resistance movements. For the USA and Israel there is no difference between Al-Qaeda (the alleged sponsor of the 11 September attacks) and the Hamas or Islamic Jihad movements in Palestine. In fact, Colin Powell, the then US Secretary of State, justified the American invasion of Iraq on the grounds that it would enhance Israeli security by removing an adversary of Israel. In parallel with these developments, the Middle East has been witnessing vigorous attempts to revive the Middle Eastern project under American persuasion. There are five main indicators to corroborate our argument. Firstly,

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on 17 March 2003, and before boarding the Presidential plane to the Azores islands to consult with his partners on the date of invading Iraq, President Bush announced the long-waited ‘Road Map’, a document which envisaged a phased solution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Road Map was drafted in mid 2002, but was only declared in the context of the final preparations for the invasion of Iraq as a means to win the support of Arab public opinion to the then-projected invasion. It referred to the revival of multi-lateral engagements on issues including regional water resources, environment, economic development, refugees and arms control during the second phase of the Map ( June 2003– December 2003). This meant a revival of the multi-lateral negotiations which began after the Madrid Peace conference in 1991. These negotiations were designed to build Middle Eastern co-operation regimes. Secondly, On 9 May 2003, President Bush suggested establishing a free trade area between Middle Eastern countries and the USA within ten years, provided that these countries had introduced economic and political reforms. The most important of these reforms was adhering to the World Trade Organization, protecting intellectual property rights, establishing democratic regimes and fighting terrorism. The Bush proposal was not clear whether the projected free trade area would be an American–Middle Eastern area through which the USA would sign bilateral treaties with the regional actors, or a pan-Middle Eastern area that would create a Middle Eastern free trade area as well. However, it seemed that the Bush proposal was an attempt to link the region with the three mega-trends in one process: establishing democratic regimes, promoting regional co-operation and integration with the process of globalisation.7 Thirdly, in October 2003, Colin Powell, the American Secretary of State, delivered a speech at the Arab-American Economic Forum held in Detroit. Powell outlined the elements of a new American vision in the Middle East based on three main elements: 1. The first is what Colin Powell called the Millennium Challenge Account, according to which the USA would only provide assistance to countries of the Middle East that apply the rule of law. He added that the USA had earmarked US$10 billion to be increased by US$5 billion every two years (Powell 2003). 2. The second element of the American strategy is free trade. He argued, ‘free trade has helped people to defeat poverty and learn the habit of freedom’. The USA would help Middle Eastern countries to introduce economic reforms and enter the WTO. It would also sign bilateral trade agreements with these countries.

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3. The third element of the new American Middle Eastern strategy is the ‘Middle East Partnership Initiative’ (MEPI), according to which the USA will support those who work to expand their economic capabilities, increase public participation and reform education. Powell added, ‘We are the ones who can bring about the desired change in the Arab world, because we are Americans who believe in change, believe in the future, and we could help our Arab friends.’ On November 2003, President Bush formalised the MEPI in his speech at the National Endowment for democracy. The MEPI entailed four ‘pillars’. In the economic pillar, the focus was on region-wide economic and employment growth driven by the private sector. In the political pillar, MEPI championed an expanded public space, participation and the rule of law. In the education pillar, a great deal of emphasis was placed on enabling people to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in today’s economy. Finally, there is a pillar on gender equality, which refers to granting women full and equal opportunities.8 The MEPI was later expanded into the ‘Greater Middle East Partnership’ to which we will refer. Fourthly, the USA had persuaded the Davos Forum, the sponsor of the MENA conference in 1994, to hold an extraordinary meeting to draft a plan for Middle Eastern co-operation. The meeting was held in Jordan on 21–22 June 2003. Various projects were submitted, the most important of which was the Jordanian–Israeli project to connect the Red Sea with the Dead Sea through a canal. In the conference, Colin Powell announced that the Bush Administration had asked the Congress to allocate US$500 million to support Middle Eastern projects. The Egyptians participated in the conference, asserting once again, ‘any regional co-operation in the Middle East should be linked with the move towards a settlement and peace’.9 Fifth, In February 2004, the USA announced a new project entitled, ‘The Greater Middle East Partnership’ (GME). The concept of a Greater Middle East was a new one. It referred to countries of the Arab world plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Israel. The new American-sponsored project focused on introducing reforms in the ‘Greater’ Middle East in three main areas: promoting democracy and good governance, building a knowledge society and expanding economic opportunities. The first area referred to reforms in the fields of: holding free elections, parliamentary training, having an independent media, anti-corruption efforts and civil society. The area of a knowledge society focused on basic education initiatives especially in the field of literacy, educational reform and digital and business education initiatives. Finally, the area of expanding economic opportunities emphasised the

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centrality of finance for growth initiatives, partnership for financial excellence and trade initiatives. The GME suggested creating new institutions to implement these suggestions, such as ‘the Greater Middle East Finance Corporation’, and ‘the Greater Middle East Development Bank’. The GME Project envisioned a major role for the G-8 Group to assist in implementing the suggested reforms and creating these institutions.10 These developments indicate that the USA is striving to revive the Middle Eastern project at the expense of the competing ones. The ability of the US to implement these grand designs will depend on a number of factors, namely: 1. The extent to which the US is able to solidify its power in Iraq. Increasingly the US is confronted with massive resistance. This resistance undermines the US ability to implement its grand Middle Eastern design. 2. To what extend will the US be able to provide a mutually acceptable solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict. As mentioned earlier, the American position on the resolution of the conflict does not differ in any meaningful way from the Israeli one. In fact, the 24 June 2002 speech of President Bush on the Arab–Israeli conflict was so pro-Israel that some Israelis felt that the Sharon government could have written it themselves (Rafique 2002). In April 2004, in a joint press conference with the Prime Minister of Israel, President Bush brought about a major change in American policy towards the conflict by declaring that the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are ‘facts’ that cannot be changed, and the right of the return for Palestinian refugees is no longer valid. This had limited the US ability to present a balanced solution to the conflict. In fact, the Road Map, presented by President Bush and endorsed by the Quartet, is now a dead project. The failure to provide a solution to the conflict will impair any security arrangement in the future. One must recall that the collapse of the Middle East peace process in the Camp David Conference held in July 2000 had resulted in the stagnation of the EMP (Gillespie 2002). 3. The ability of the sponsors of the competing regional projects to revive their regional commitments. The Secretary-General of LAS, Egypt and Saudi Arabia presented initiatives to reinvigorate LAS in the wake of the invasion of Iraq. Among the main proposals one may refer to the establishment of a pan-Arab parliament, a mechanism for inter-Arab conflict resolution, the introduction of sanctions against countries which breach LAS Charter and restructuring the Arab Economic and Social Council, the institution that supervises Arab technical institutions. Some of these

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proposals were endorsed by the Arab summit held in Tunis in May 2004. However, their implementation is highly questionable. As far as the EMP is concerned, the 5 + 5 Formula has been already revived. Germany and France have presented the ‘Wider Middle East Initiative’. This Initiative is quite similar to the American GME Initiative in its emphasis on domestic reforms. However, whereas the American project marginalises the Arab–Israeli conflict, the European one advocates a parallel interest in domestic reforms and the relations of the Arab–Israeli conflict. In addition, whereas the American proposal focuses on political and economic reforms, the European one contends that the modernisation of Middle Eastern countries should be given priority. However, the substance and the timing of the European Wider Middle East Project indicates that the Europeans are thinking along the lines of the American vision of the future of the Middle East, rather than the Mediterranean.

The Internationalization of the Middle Eastern Security Arrangements The question of security arrangements in the Middle East has been internationalised more than ever before. The American Greater Middle East Project was quickly matched by a European supporting proposal. It was also endorsed by the G-8 summit held in the USA in June 2004. It seems that the region is now returning to the post-First World War mandate system, whereby the security structure is determined under the mandate system by major powers. The borders of the region are also being expanded beyond its traditional definition and the major security issues are being viewed as mainly domestic rather than external. NATO is also moving to play a security role in the region. Perhaps, the most important manifestation of the internationalisation of security arrangements in the Middle East is the documents issued by the G-8 summit held in the USA in June 2004. The summit issued three major documents which correspond more or less with the American GME project. It established a mechanism of communication between the G-8 countries and ‘Greater’ Middle Eastern countries to ensure that the latter are fulfilling the tasks outlined in the American project and to hold them accountable for the lack of implementation. Further, the NATO summit held in Istanbul on 28–30 June 2004 shifted its strategy towards inviting its Mediterranean Dialogue partners to consider a security role for NATO in the Mediterranean, with an emphasis on combating ‘terrorism’. This represents a

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drastic shift from past policies which restricted NATO’s role to the exchange of information. However, the Middle East is not likely to experience the formation of a genuine security regime in the near future, given the return of the region to the age of military occupation and the asymmetry between the American militaristic approach to the achievement of its objectives in the region and its proposals to integrate the region into the process of globalisation. The region is experiencing two contradictory processes: integration into globalisation and the quest for national liberation from occupation. The contradiction between these processes is likely to engulf the region in chaos. In fact, the region is already in a state of chaos because of the deteriorating situations in Palestine and Iraq. According to Fendi, an Arab-American analyst close to the neo-conservative group of Washington, ‘this chaos is likely to last for the next four years’ (Fendi 2003). There is a great deal of resentment in the region towards the Greater or Wider Middle East projects. These projects are being viewed as attempts to dominate Arab countries and dilute the Arab–Islamic identity of its people, as was clearly stated by Ahmad Maher, the Foreign Minister of Egypt, and major Arab analysts.

Policy Implications of the Experience of Middle Eastern Security Arrangements The Middle Eastern experience in the area of regional security arrangements provides ample lessons for the identification of conditions conducive to the effectiveness of these arrangements. The most important conclusion to be drawn from this experience is that security arrangements must address themselves to regional security concerns of all regional actors, rather than the concerns of some, or the concerns of external powers. Projects sponsored by these powers usually address a security agenda detached from the local and regional one, which tends to lead to resentment on the part of local actors. This has been the experience of the Middle Eastern project. As was outlined earlier, this project was initiated in the early 1950s by Western powers to mobilise the region behind them in the Cold War rivalry with the communist bloc. It was argued that the USSR was the main security threat to the region. Most Arab actors believed that the main threat came from the region itself. This led to a major confrontation, causing the region to become an arena for the Cold War rather than a domain for a regional security regime. The success of regional security arrangements also depends on the resolution of the main conflicts in the region, especially those related to territory and

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identity issues. Countries in conflict are not likely to enter into meaningful security arrangements. This is the main reason for the failure of the security arrangements of the EMP in the region. The EMP was based on the European concepts of conflict prevention rather than conflict resolution and the introduction of confidence-building measures as a mechanism of conflict resolution. The European powers found that they were unable to get a regional endorsement for the projected Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean which is based on this approach. This was because the draft Charter ignored the present conflicts and focused on a futuristic agenda, and because they failed to realise that, as in the European experience of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, confidence-building measures can only be effective within the framework of the overall process of territorial conflict resolution. The third main condition for the success of regional security arrangements is to establish them on the basis of strategic equilibrium. This concept entails two main dimensions: 1. The arrangements will achieve a balance between the actors whereby no actor feels threatened by the overwhelming power of other actors; and 2. The actors will obtain more or less equal benefits from these arrangements. The EMP and Middle Eastern projects were based on an undeclared assumption of retaining and reinforcing Israel’s strategic superiority in the region. This was clear in the emphasis of both projects on the elimination of weapons of mass destruction from the region, excluding the nuclear weapons possessed by Israel. This meant that Israel would emerge as the only power in the region that possessed weapons of mass destruction in the nuclear category. Further, one of the reasons for the failure of the Arab regional project was the perception of some actors (the Gulf Co-operation Council states) that they were not likely to draw equal benefits from that project and that other states were using the project to draw upon what were rightly this of GCC state resources. Finally, in building security arrangements one must take into consideration the local cultural variables. The Western-sponsored projects failed because they tended to project the Franco-German, or American–Japanese postSecond World War co-operation as a model for Middle Eastern security architecture. In fact, in his 5 April 2003 speech, President Bush referred to the peace achieved between the USA on one hand and Japan, Germany and Russia on the other hand as a model for Middle Eastern peace. If one reviews the three models referred to by the American President, one cannot help but conclude that

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the three powers share one common dominator, ie, they were held as defeated powers in the Second World War or the Cold War. One can hardly expect the success of a similar model in the Middle East where the culture is diametrically different to that of the three defeated powers referred to by George Bush. It is hardly possible to convince the Arabs that then should acknowledge defeat and make peace from that point onwards. After all, one must remember that Sadat would have not been able to make peace with Israel without the partial victory he achieved in October 1973.

Notes 1. Scholte conceptualised the relationship between globalisation and democratisation in a different way. He argued that whereas globalisation has encouraged innovations in democratic practice, it has rendered old formulas of state-centric democracy inadequate and has undermined conventional liberal democracy. Globalisation has introduced trans-border actors and flows, which cannot be put under the popular control of those affected (Scholte 2000). 2. The text of the Egyptian proposal was published at Al-Ahram (Cairo), 28 July 2003. 3. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue was not the only security-oriented initiative suggested by Western powers. The West European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also suggested similar dialogues with Mediterranean countries. These dialogues did not last for long, and were discontinued as it became clear they were repetitions of the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and EU’s project 4. Despite these criticisms, Egypt and Algeria participated in the multi-lateral military manoeuvres led by NATO within the framework of the NATO Mediterranean Project in September 3003 (Al-Ahram, 4 September 2003). 5. Statement in Thomas Scheben, ed., Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East, Cairo: Conrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1998, p. 82. 6. Alberto Bin, a NATO official, argued, ‘Information is the key component of the initiative facilitating mutual understanding between the Alliance and Dialogue countries’ (Bin 1999). 7. There has been some disagreement among Arab analysts on the objectives of the projected American-Middle Eastern free trade area. Some of them viewed it as an attempt to control Arab markets and enable Israel to dominate the region (Lari 2003). They argued that the Bush proposal links any regional co-operation to the integration of Israel into that process. They recalled that the USA–Jordan free trade area of 2001 required Jordanian exports to the American market to have an Israeli component in order to qualify for a free trade status in the American market and argued that the same rule will apply to the projected free trade area with

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other Middle Eastern countries. Others contended that the Bush proposal is a genuine attempt to introduce reforms into the region through the reward of trade liberalization (Abdel-Jawad 2003). 8. http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/ 9. Akhbar El-Yom (Cairo), 21 June 2003. 10. http://english.daralhayat.com/Spec/02-Article-20040213-ac40bdaf-c0a8-0led-00

References Abdel-Jawad, Jamal (2003) ‘Restricting Violence and Liberalizing Trade’, Al-Ahram, 17 May. Abdel-Malek, Anwar (2003) ‘The “New” in the Middle East’, Al-Ahram, 27 May. Abdel-Salam, Mohammad (2003) Regional Security Arrangements after September 11, 2001, Cairo: Center for Political and Strategic Studies of Al-Ahram, Strategic Papers series, June. Al-Atrash, Ahmed (1999) ‘Inter-Arab Management of Regional Conflicts: The League of Arab States and the Algeria-Morocco Case, 1963–1995’, Doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Kent at Canterbury. Al-Essawy, Ibrahim (2003) ‘Free Trade or Middle Easternism by the Swords?’ Al-Ahram (Cairo), 15 June. Al-Kilany, Hytham (2000) ‘Middle Eastern Defense Projects’, Encyclopedia of the Twentieth Century Events, Part II, Cairo: Dar Al-Mustakbal Al-Arabi, pp. 239–76. Al-Rasheedy, Ahmed (1997) ‘Arab–Arab Conflict Resolution Mechanism: Current States and Potential Development’, Cairo: The Arab Center for Strategic Studies, Monthly Monographs series, 2(11), September. Bin, Alberto (2000) ‘NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue: A Post Prague Perspective,’ Mediterranean Politics, 7(2), Summer: 115–19. Bin, Alberto (1999) ‘NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue,’ paper presented at the Halki International Seminar, Halki, Greece, 12–16 September. Brandao, Ana Paula (1998) ‘The Redefinition of Security: An Assessment’, paper presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting of the International Studies Association, Vienna, 16–19 September. Dieter, Heribert (1998) ‘Regionalism in the Age of Globalization: A Comparative Study of Regional Integration Projects in the Asia-Pacific, Southern Africa and Central Asia,’ paper presented at the Third Pan-European International Relations Conference and Joint Meeting of the International Studies Association, Vienna, 16–19 September. Fendi, Mamoun (2003) ‘Four Years of Turmoil’, Al-Ahram, 23 August. Gad, Emad (1998) The Impact of the International System on International Alliances, The Case of NATO, Doctoral dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Economics and Political Science of Cairo University.

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Galal, Mohammad (1997) The Arab National Security, Cairo: Dar El-Ma’aref. In Arabic. Gause, F. Gregory (1998) ‘Continuity and Change in the Middle East Regional System, 1945–1988’, paper submitted at the Middle East Studies Association Convention, Los Angeles, CA, 2–5 November. Gillespie, Richard (2002) ‘The Valencia Conference: Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process?’ Mediterranean Politics, 7(2), Summer: 105–14. Haluani, Makram (1994) ‘Deregulation of Regional Security Structures: Prospects for War and Peace in the New Middle East,’ paper presented at the 90th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1–4 September, New York. Lari, Reda (2003) ‘The Middle Eastern Free Trade Market’, Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), 15 May. Mazari, Shireen (2003) ‘The New US Security Doctrine: Implications for the South Asian Region,’ Strategic Studies (Islamabad), 23(1), Spring: 8–31. Mekheimar, Osama (2002) Common Challenges to the Levant: Co-operative Security in the Middle East after Peace, Rome: NATO Defense College, Monograph series No. 11. Mustafa, Ahmad (1987) ‘The Eastern Mediterranean Pact Project’, Arab Journal of the Human Sciences (Kuwait University), 7, Winter: 94–111. Neal, Zakaria (2004) ‘In the Summit of the Industrialized Countries, an Attempt to De-construct the League of Arab States’, Al-Ahram, 19 June. Ne’ma, Mounir (2004) ‘A New Sykes-Picot Project,’ Al-Ahram, 6 June. Noshab, Farzana (2002) ‘Global economic implications of 9/11 attacks’, Strategic Studies (Islamabad), 22(3), Autumn: 207–27. Powell, Colin (2003) ‘Secretary of State Colin Powell at US-Arab Economic Forum’, US State Department, 29 September. Rafique, Najam (2002) ‘9/11, A Year After: Appraising US Regional Strategies’, Strategic Studies (Islamabad), 22(3) Autumn: 18–51. Reed, Laura and Majid Tehranian (1999) ‘Evolving security regimes’, in Majid Tehranian (ed.) World Apart: Human Security and Global Governance, London and New York: I.B. Tauris, pp. 23–53. Rifa’at, Essam (2003) ‘Should Egypt Join the Quadruple Axis of the Dead Sea?’ Al-Ahram, 27 June. Rifa’at, Essam (2003) ‘Reviving the Middle East on the Shores of the Dead Sea’, AlAhram Al-Iktisadi (Cairo), 30 June. Saif, Mustafa (1998) ‘The Mediterranean Policy of Western Security Institutions: An Egyptian Perspective’, in Sonia Hegazy (ed.) Egyptian and German Perspectives on Security in the Mediterranean, Cairo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Scheben, Thomas (ed.) (1998) Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East, Cairo: Conrad Adenauer Stiftung. Scholte, Jan Aart (2000) Globalization: A Critical Introduction, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

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Selim, Mohammad (1983) ‘The Role of the League of Arab States in the Resolution of Inter-Arab Disputes’, in The League of Arab States: Reality and Ambition, Beirut: Center for Arab Unity Studies, pp. 167–84. Selim, Mohammad (1999) Egyptian Approaches to Neo-Regionalism and their Asian Implications, New Delhi: Research and Information Systems for Non-Aligned and other Developing Countries, RIS Occasional Papers No. 55. Selim, Mohammad (2000a) Arab Perceptions of the Euro-Mediterranean Projects, Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, Strategic Papers series No. 47. Selim, Mohammad (2000b) Some Conceptual Issues in the Projected Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic studies, Strategic Papers series No. 87. Selim, Mohammad (2000c) ‘Southern Mediterranean Perceptions of Security Cooperation and the Role of NATO’, in H.G. Brauch, A. Marquina, and A. Biad (eds) Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century, London: Macmillan, pp. 129–146. Selim, Mohammad (2000d) ‘Towards a New WMD Agenda in the EuroMediterranean Partnership, An Arab Perspective’, Mediterranean Politics (London), 5(1), Spring: 133–57. Selim, Mohammad (2003) ‘Conceptualizing Security by Arab Mashreq Countries’, in H.G. Brauch, A. Marquina, P. Liotta, P. Rogers and M. Selim (eds) Security and Environment in the Mediterranean: Conceptualizing Security and Environmental Conflict, Berlin: Springer. Selim, Mohammad (2004) ‘The Implications of the Revival of the 5+5 Euro-Maghreb Formula’, Al-Ahram, 6 January. Shiyyab, Mohammad (1998) ‘A Jordanian Viewpoint’, in Thomas Scheben (ed.) Security Structures in the Eastern Mediterranean Region and the Near East, Cairo: Conrad Adenauer Stiftung. Sid-Ahmed, Mohammad (2003) ‘Chaos in the Middle Eastern System’, Al-Ahram, 28 August. Simai, Mihaly (1994) The Future of Global Governance: Managing Risk and Change in the International System, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. Vandewalle, Dirk (1994–95) ‘The Middle East Peace Process and Regional Economic Integration’, Survival, 36(4), winter: 21–34. Yoshinbu Yamamoto (1998) ‘Globalization and the State: A Japanese Perspective’, Japan Review of International Affairs, 12(3), Fall: 198–212.

Chapter 10: Africa’s Shaky Security Architecture: Perspectives from SADC and the AU Hussein Solomon

Introduction

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hat globalization, regionalization and democratization are driving social change is self-evident. What this chapter seeks to do is to discuss the combined impact of these three phenomena on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as responses to it on the part of SADC’s political leadership and the impact thereof on Africa’s emerging regional security architecture. It will be pointed out that the current regionalization existing amongst SADC countries is elite-driven, where state security is purchased at the expense of human security. In the final instance it is a regionalization that opposes the globalizing democratic ethos. Such an assertion might seem surprising if one considers the rhetoric surrounding both SADC and that of its dominant member – the Republic of South Africa. It could be pointed out, for instance, that new security thinking – both human and common – has found its way into Southern African security discourse. For example, at a meeting of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in Gaborone in January 1996, the respective ministers stated that one of the main objectives of the Organ is ‘to promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security.’1 A holistic approach to security has also guided the policies of the South African government. In an address to the UN, former South African President Mandela said: It is . . . true that hundreds of millions of politically disempowered masses are caught in the deathly trap of poverty, unable to live life in its fullness. Out of this are born social conflicts which produce insecurity and instability, civil and other wars that claim many lives and millions of desperate refugees . . . Out of this cauldron are also born tyrants, dictators and demagogues . . .2

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In the same vein, South African Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aziz Pahad criticized narrow military-centred perceptions of security and argued that the following issues also need to be included: • The promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance. • Sustainable economic development enabling us to achieve political, economic and social well-being for all the people of Southern Africa. This must be based on ‘people-centred’ societies. • Based on our regional strength we must seek to achieve constructive and mutual beneficial all-round interaction between SADC and the rest of Africa. • We must seriously and urgently deal with issues such as the protection of the environment, the prohibition of arms proliferation, arms control and smuggling, drug trafficking, refugees and displaced soldiers, mass migration, drought and other natural disasters. • Ethnic conflicts. • Territorial claims.3 New security thinking has also emerged in the South African Department of Defence’s White Paper on Defence that explicitly states: In the new South Africa national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern with the security of people.4

However, despite the promise elicited by the words above, concrete actions lag well behind the rhetoric. As such, SADC suffers from a lack of credibility – arising from the gap between promise and performance. In order for us to understand why, we need to understand the development of SADC in a historical context.

From Destabilization to Regionalization From the 1970s onwards, the primary source of insecurity confronting the Southern African region was the apartheid South African state. In attempting to maintain white minority rule, the apartheid regime brutally crushed internal dissent. Among a litany of massacres, Sharpeville in 1960 and Soweto in 1976 stand out as stark testimony to this brutality. Talk of democracy was treasonous – after all democracy threatened the very foundations of the racist regime. With the coming to power of the hawkish Prime Minister (later President) P.W.

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Botha, the malignant reach of the apartheid state extended well beyond its borders. Convinced that internal dissent was intimately related to the external support provided by neighbouring states to the liberation movements of the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), Pretoria turned its wrath on these states. Independence for Namibia became a far-off dream as the South African Defence Force (SADF) entrenched itself further in this country. Namibia was then used as a springboard for attacks into Angola. Bombing raids by the South African Air Force was conducted against several of the region’s capitals – including Lusaka, Gaborone and Maputo. In addition, other more subtle responses were also adopted. Economic blockades against neighbouring states were employed. More destructively, the apartheid regime supported various surrogate forces in neighbouring states – UNITA in Angola, the Mashala Gang in Zambia, Super-ZAPU in Zimbabwe, the Lesotho Liberation Army in Lesotho and RENAMO in Mozambique. By the late 1980s the cost of apartheid destabilization in the region was estimated to be between two and three million people dead and US$65 billion worth of damage to the economies of neighbouring states.5 The doctrine underlying this policy of regional destabilization was ‘total onslaught’. According to this doctrine, Pretoria was a pro-Western democracy, which embraced capitalism and was therefore a target of subversion by the Soviet Union who were using black nationalists inside South Africa and the region in order to expand communism in South Africa. Despite the fact that the doctrine did not make empirical sense, Pretoria succeeded for some time in convincing certain sectors of Western opinion that black nationalism could be equated with communism and that she was the West’s only bulwark against this threat in the region. Certainly, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was happy with such a penetrating analysis and they, together with the SADF, greatly assisted UNITA in its murderous campaign against the Luanda government in Angola.6 Of course, the military assistance given by the Soviet Union to both the liberation movements and neighbouring states were seen as confirmation of this doctrine of total onslaught.7 By the mid-1980s history finally caught up with the apartheid regime. Great tectonic changes were affecting the political landscape. With the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to the premiership of the Soviet Union and the policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring), South African policy-makers were placed in a quandary, since the total onslaught was rendered superfluous.8 No more could draconian apartheid legislation be justified with reference to a hostile Soviet Union contemplating imperialist designs on South Africa. No longer could South Africa justify its military incursions into neighbouring states as the country for free

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enterprise and democracy against the pro-Soviet, pro-Communist southern African states. Apartheid destabilization was seen for what it was: a desperate attempt by a minority to maintain a brutal racial hegemony over the majority. Whilst some came to terms with this revelation later, others had seen the light much earlier. The 1950s witnessed the emergence of a global antiapartheid movement reflecting an international popular consensus on respect for human rights and democratization. These sought to pressurize their respective governments into placing economic sanctions on the apartheid regime. Initially marginalized, their concerns of human security slowly came to replace the dominant realpolitik concerns of national interests when dealing with Pretoria. To compound matters, Pretoria itself provided the ammunition to these human rights campaigners, with each new massacre committed inside its borders being televised internationally to a horrified international audience. Furthermore, South Africa’s international pariah status tended to be further entrenched in the eyes of the international community by the atrocities committed by its surrogate forces. The massacres of innocent civilians committed by RENAMO at Homoine, Manjacaze, Taninga and Molwana tended to be very costly diplomatically to South Africa. In April 1988 an emergency aid donors’ conference was held in Maputo and Roy Stacey, US Assistant Deputy Secretary of State accused the RENAMO of ‘one of the most brutal holocausts against ordinary human beings since World War Two’.9 South Africa, by virtue of its support of the bandit movement, was implicated by RENAMO and this reinforced calls in the West, and particularly in the US, that South Africa be declared a ‘terrorist state’.10 In the final instance, the global anti-apartheid campaigners got their way and sanctions were imposed on the apartheid regime. This was in spite of the vociferous protestations of South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha who argued that sanctions were a violation of South Africa’s sovereignty. This argument the international community was not prepared to buy, and it came out in defence of the popular sovereignty of South Africa’s citizens as opposed to the juridical sovereignty of the apartheid state. Despite the fact that sanctions were imposed from the 1960s onwards, the impact of sanctions was only felt much later when the international community agreed to act in concert against the pariah.11 Thus although the UN passed its first punitive resolution against South Africa in April 196112 and the UN Security Council passed a mandatory arms embargo in 1977,13 it was only when the United States got into the act by means of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1985 that the screws against Pretoria were well and truly tightened.14 Thus the participation of the US colossus in the South African context proved decisive in getting the

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incumbent regime to re-evaluate their options and to peacefully accept the principle of majority rule. Changing international circumstances also served to exacerbate the impact of international economic sanctions. The oil crisis of 1970s occurred at the very time when South Africa had begun a large-scale programme of oil stockpiling. Oil imports which in 1973 had cost R190 million were by 1975 costing R1,100 million.15 However, Pretoria sought to bypass international sanctions through sanctions-busting and the overt and covert support of certain states. For instance, Israel and France assisted Pretoria in the development of its defence capabilities.16 Notwithstanding these attempts, sanctions did start to bite and their cumulative impact forced the apartheid regime to reconsider both domestic and regional policies. Moreover, given that the rationale for sanctions was to modify the behaviour of the South African state, the intensity of sanctions imposed was closely related to the actions of the regime. Thus, the sanctions campaign intensified as internal repression on the part of the apartheid state intensified against the democratic opposition inside the country. Hence in the shadow of the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 the first sanctions were imposed against the apartheid regime. Following the 1976 uprisings and the killing of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko in 1977, more sanctions were to follow. Pretoria’s brutal repression of the 1984–6 uprisings during its State of Emergency drew further sanctions. The success of the international sanctions campaign against Pretoria lay in the vulnerability of its economy. In the 1980s, South Africa was estimated to have an open economy of between 50 and 60 percent with more than half of the country’s Gross National Product (GNP) dependent upon trade with the West. Being such an open economy, South Africa was and is very vulnerable to trade boycotts, sanctions or disinvestments.17 Hence we can conclude that the fact that 90 percent of South Africa’s merchandise exports were subjected to sanctions of one kind or another, and that one hundred states applied restrictions on trade with the Republic, did not do wonders for its economy.18 Neither was the country’s rising inflation rate and stagnating growth rate helped by the R18 billion in private capital disinvestments from South Africa between 1986 and 1988.19 Sanctions and disinvestments were perceived by senior government officials to be hurting the economy, and they were a powerful motivational force for the apartheid state to adopt reform at home and a less bellicose foreign policy towards its neighbours. Foreign Minister Pik Botha publicly declared several times that the only way out of South Africa’s international isolation was through domestic reform. These sentiments also informed President De Klerk’s own thinking:

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We realise that credible constitutional reform has a very important role to play in creating a climate which will be conducive to private investment, to the normalisation of South Africa’s international economic relations, and to the development of a strong economy.20

The unbanning of the ANC, the release of Nelson Mandela and the beginning of formal negotiations between the ANC and the National Party government was to begin within months of President De Klerk making this statement. The way was thus paved for majority rule and the first democratic elections on 27 April 1994. The success of international sanctions against apartheid South Africa could be seen as a success for the globalizing democratic ethos mentioned earlier in the chapter. It was also a success for a globalization ‘from below’ as it reflected the popularly led (as opposed to state-led) global anti-apartheid movement. If the forces of globalization had a positive impact on the region in ending apartheid, then apartheid destabilization contributed to a peculiar form of regionalization developing in southern Africa – a form of regionalization which continues to be the bane of the unhappy citizens of this – the southern most tip of Africa. In response to apartheid destabilization neighbouring states banded together. In 1979 the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference was launched. Its primary aim was to reduce neighbouring states, economic dependence on the apartheid regime. This was in response to South Africa using its economic might in order to force compliance amongst neighbouring states to its diktat. Another structure that was created was the Frontline States (FLS). The purpose of this latter structure was to serve as a loose military/security alliance among neighbouring states against the predatory raids of the apartheid military machine.21 What both these structures had in common was that they existed not to share sovereignty in some collective endeavour: rather they existed in defence of national sovereignty. More to the point, given the African context, these collective arrangements existed to defend state elites. These state elites whilst paying lip service to the antiapartheid cause were also not averse to collaborating with Pretoria when it suited them. Thus Malawi’s President Hastings Banda forged diplomatic ties with the international pariah in order to extract economic largesse. Similarly, Swaziland’s King Sobhuza II was quite willing to enter into a security pact with the apartheid regime in exchange for territorial compensation.22 Similarly despite the obligatory rhetoric on economic independence, cross-border trade between the apartheid regime and neighbouring states continued apace.23 The existence of the apartheid regime, however, served other useful purposes from the perspective of these states. Poor delivery on the part of national

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governments to provide housing, health or employment to its citizens could always be blamed on apartheid destabilization that wrecked infrastructure – although this was not equally true in all neighbouring states. The lack of democracy inside these states could be accounted for by the war they were engaged in with the apartheid state. More importantly, the support rendered by the apartheid military to opposition forces in neighbouring states tainted these, while at the same time lending legitimacy to incumbent regimes that were deemed to be ‘progressive’. In the process their own severe flaws were overlooked. In a nutshell then apartheid destabilization resulted in a particular form of regionalization: one which privileged state security over human security, one which stressed solidarity above all else; and one which viewed external intervention as fundamentally hostile to it own interests. This form of regionalization was fundamentally anti-democratic as it viewed state elites to be legitimate on the basis of their historical struggle for independence and their anti-apartheid credentials (no matter how chequered the latter was). It was this legacy which continued to haunt the region even after the dissolution of the SADCC and its replacement by the Southern African Development Community in 1992. This legacy was also to haunt the new SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security that replaced the FLS as the premier vehicle for security co-operation in the region.24

The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security On 28 June 1996, the SADC decided to establish the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) in accordance with Article 4 of the SADC Treaty.25 However the OPDS never became operational and a variety of problems plagued it. First, there was the issue of the permanency of the Chair of the OPDS. Despite the fact that Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe was appointed the first Chair on a rotational basis which was to change annually, he still managed to secure himself as Chair for an additional four years – until 2001 when SADC Heads of State forced him to give up the position.26 Second, there was the problem that the OPDS functioned independently of the SADC which allowed President Mugabe to use his chairpersonship of the OPDS to justify his country’s and that of his allies – Angola and Namibia’s – intervention into the DRC as a SADC force. The third set of problems confronting the OPDS revolved around a weak organizational structure incapacitated by a shortage of financial resources, poor political direction and a dearth of skilled professionals. By March 2001, a critical SADC review of all operations and structures was finalised.27 The new SADC structure is reflected in Appendix 1.

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Structures of the new SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC) At the SADC Heads of State Summit in Blantyre, Malawi many of the recommendations of the March 2001 SADC review were incorporated into the new organizational structure of the now re-named SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (OPDSC). This is shown in Appendix 2. The most important development here was that the OPDSC lost its erstwhile independence and formally became an integral part of SADC.28 This is reiterated in Article 3(1) of the Protocol29 on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, which states that the OPDSC is an institution of SADC and shall report to the Summit. This is a positive development for two reasons. First, it reinforces notions of a holistic, expanded and integrated security. In this way it also emphasizes the point that questions relating to peace and development cannot be separated. Secondly, on a more practical level, it prevents abuse by one state of the Organ for national or even personal reasons, as we saw in the decision to intervene in the DRC. The OPDSC now consists of the following structures: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

the Chairperson of the Organ; the Troika; a Ministerial Committee; an Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC); an Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC); and such structures as may be established by any of the ministerial committees.

(a) The Chairperson of the Organ In the spirit of accountability, the Summit elects the Chairperson of the Organ. The term of office is restricted to one year only. This stands in sharp contrast to the five years that President Mugabe stayed on as Chair and also must be seen as a positive development. The rotating chairpersonship is also positive since it promotes common ownership of SADC. The Protocol also stipulates that whilst the Chairperson is responsible for the overall policy direction and the achievement of the objectives of the Organ, this can only be done in consultation with the Troika of the Organ.30 Once more this is a positive development since it promotes collective decision-making and prevents abuse. Another important stipulation that serves to limit abuse is that the Chairperson of the Organ cannot simultaneously be the Chairperson of the SADC. (b) The Troika The Troika consists of the Chairperson of the Organ, as well as the Incoming Chairperson of the Organ who, in the spirit of accountability, is also elected by

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the SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government. The Incoming Chairperson also serves as the Deputy Chairperson of the Organ. The final member of the Troika is the Outgoing Chairperson.31 (c) Ministerial Committee This committee comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs, defence, public security and state security from each of the Member States and is responsible for the co-ordination of the work of the Organ and its structures. The Ministerial Committee is a positive development since it results in greater co-ordination and integration inside and between state actors. In the process it reinforces the vision of a more holistic understanding of peace embedded in the concept of human security. The committee is chaired by a Minister from the same country as the Chairperson of the Organ32 and in this way continuity within the structures of the Organ is reinforced. (d) The Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) The ISPDC comprises the ministers responsible for foreign affairs from each of the State Parties and is mandated to perform such functions as may be necessary to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to politics and diplomacy. To maintain continuity, the ISPDC is chaired by a Minister from the same country as that of the Chairperson of the SADC Organ and reports to the Ministerial Committee.33 The ISPDC is also mandated to establish any substructures as it deems necessary to perform its functions. (e) Inter-State Defence and Security Community (ISDSC) The ISDSC consists of those ministers from State Parties responsible for defence, public security and state security and performs the functions necessary to achieve the objectives of the Organ relating to defence and security. As with the ISPDC, the ISDSC is chaired by a Minister from the same country as the Chairperson of the Organ and reports to the Ministerial Committee. Under the ISDSC there exist the defence, state security and public security sub-committees. As with the ISPDC, the ISDSC is also mandated to establish other structures necessary in order to perform its functions. Shortcomings and recommendations • The first problem confronting SADC, and consequently the SADC Organ, is a clear shortage of funds. Indeed, SADC is reliant on the international donor community for 80 percent of its operational costs.34 This dearth of

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funds not only undermines the operations of the organization but also prevents the SADC Organ from attracting highly skilled professionals. As such the question of Membership Contributions would need to be revisited. Second, given the integrated nature of security, it is undesirable and costly for duplication to continue. Hence there does not seem to be a need for both an ISDSC and an ISPDC when all these Ministers are already brought together in the Ministerial Committee. After all, when faced with the issue of preventive diplomacy for instance, it cuts across both ISDSC and ISPDC and needs to be discussed at the level of the Ministerial Committee. Likewise issues of terrorism, ethnic conflict and so forth need the attention of both committees and therefore the Ministerial Committee is the ideal vehicle to deal with these issues comprehensively. It is furthermore recommended that the various sub-committees of the ISDSC become part of the Ministerial Committee. Third, Article 9 of the Protocol35 stipulates that the SADC Secretariat shall provide secretariat services to the Organ. This is a departure from previous practice where the Chairperson of the SADC Organ provided the secretariat services. Whilst this move needs to be welcomed since it builds institutional capacity and also firmly locates the Organ within broader SADC structures, there are practical problems. The existing SADC secretariat is already overstretched and is currently undergoing rationalization to reduce costs for the organization. In addition, the needs of the Organ are such that a specialized secretariat is necessarily trained in security matters to provide adequate support to the Organ. As such what is needed is financial resources to expand the current secretariat to recruit specialists in security issues. In the absence of funds and as an interim measure, Member States could look at the possibility of seconding some of their own staff to serve as the secretariat to the Organ. Fourth, we have Article 8(c) of the Protocol,36 which stipulates that decisions of the Ministerial Committee shall be taken by consensus. This is problematic. Consider the following scenario: a SADC Member State engages in gross human rights violations and hangs on to power by means of fraudulent elections. Should other Member States on the Ministerial Committee believe that intervention is needed in this country, then this country simply votes against such a decision. In this way, one recalcitrant member holds the SADC Organ hostage. In this way decision by consensus is effectively the right to veto the majority decision. As such it is recommended that the SADC Organ follow the example set by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in its latter years that decisions be reached by consensus minus one. Fifth, there is the question of sovereignty. In an increasingly interdependent world where sovereignty is daily challenged, the Organ has chosen to interpret

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sovereignty in an absolute sense. Consider here the following statement to be found in the Protocol: ‘Recognising and re-affirming the principles of strict respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, good neighbourliness, interdependence, non-aggression and noninterference in internal affairs of other State’.37 This absolutist notion of sovereignty is extremely problematic if regional integration is to be successful in Southern Africa. According to Haas38 international integration involves ‘the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and larger centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing states’. In this way, one of the most fundamental principles of the SADC Organ, that of sovereignty, will undermine its primary objective – that of regional integration at the levels of peace and security in Southern Africa. Whilst this is not good for the region’s citizens this absolutist notion of sovereignty works in the favour of state elites and confirms the anti-democratization nature of the regionalization currently in existence in southern Africa. Sixth, the modalities of co-operation still need to be worked out between the SADC Organ and the conflict prevention mechanism of the African Union (AU) – who is responsible for what? How can the SADC Organ reinforce the objectives of the AU and vice-versa? These are crucial questions that need to be speedily resolved. The reason for this urgency stems from the existence of conflict systems such as that existing in the Great Lakes Region, which involves SADC and non- SADC Member States. Seventh, and in similar fashion, the relationship between the SADC Organ and the peace and security cluster of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as well as the NEPAD Peer Review Mechanism still needs to be worked out. Eighth, the modalities of the relationship between the SADC Organ and the United Nations under Chapter 8 of the Charter of the United Nations also needs to be worked out. This is especially important when it comes to the prior authorization of the UN Security Council before SADC forces can intervene into any state. It should be noted here that neither the intervention of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe into the DR Congo nor the intervention of Botswana and South Africa into Lesotho in 1998 was mandated by a UN Security Council Resolution. Such UN Security Council Resolutions are also important if one needs to look to the UN to bear the costs of such peace support operations. Ninth, the internal modalities of a viable SADC peacekeeping force still has to be worked out by Member States and here the issues of common

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command and control, a common logistics framework, uniformed training, compatible armaments, common military doctrine and common defence budgeting all need to be factored in.

Further Insights From June 1996 with the Gaborone Communiqué establishing the SADC Organ to the SADC Summit in Malawi in 2001, there has been progress on some fronts. But, as also indicated, there are also problems and these have unfortunately clouded out what progress has been made. The recommendations listed above would help with some of the more visible problems but some of the problems are so deeply ingrained, it would require far deeper and more penetrating questions to be asked about the nature and substance of SADC itself. The first of these relates to whether it is possible for SADC to become a strong entity when its component member states are weak. This is an important question since it points to what each brings to the organization. To provide one such example, consider what the region’s strongest power – South Africa – brings to SADC peacekeeping. At a recent briefing at the Saldhana military base, members of South Africa’s Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Defence heard that: • More than half of the country’s 76,000 soldiers are medically unfit; • Many of the riflemen and servicemen are regarded as too old for deployment and active service; • Lack of funds means the army can deploy only one operational brigade of 3,000 and it is ‘impossible’ to deploy 19 regular army companies and 23 reserve platoons; • Training has virtually come to a halt. Army reservists, for instance, have not been deployed on training exercises since 1996; • Equipment is in a deplorable state with only 20 out of 168 Olifant tanks and 16 out of 242 Rooikat armoured cars being deployed due to budget constraints; • The SANDF is seriously top-heavy, with a ratio of one general for every 293 men, compared with a general for every 2,000 men in the United States Army.39 Under these circumstances of weakness of states (components), how strong can SADC be? A second question which was posed by Schoeman40 is whether the OPDSC ‘will be used by heads of state and governments to protect each other, or

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whether, in the spirit of the SADC Treaty it will be used to protect the people of the region’. Simply put, is security about citizens or the political elites? Time and time again, the SADC leadership has answered this question in favour of the latter. Consider here the case of Malawi in 2002 where political violence was on the rise as former President Bakili Muluzi attempted to change the constitution to allow him to serve an unconstitutional third term in office. Militants from the ruling United Democratic Front – the ‘Young Democrats’ – have been held responsible for much of the current violence as those opposed to a constitutional amendment are beaten up. Among the high-profile cases was an attack on Brown Mpinganjira, the leader of the opposition pressure group NDA. He was ambushed at a police roadblock just outside the capital Lilongwe in August 2002. Even more ominous, the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) had also been implicated in these attacks on the opposition.41 Despite these developments, Bakili Muluzi continued to serve as Chair of SADC and the SADC Summit continued to issue statements such as this one: ‘On the political situation, Summit expressed satisfaction that the region generally continues to enjoy political stability and the consolidation of democracy, respect for the rule of law, respect for human rights, peace and stability’.42 In May 2006 following allegations of an assassination attempt on the life of current Malawian President Mutharika by his Vice-President Cassim Chilumpha and the subsequent arrest of the latter, SADC has responded with silence.43 A similar silence occurred last year when the Zimbabwean government launched Operation Murambatsvina (‘Drive out Filth’) to ostensibly purge informal settlements. Critics noted that it was meant to destroy the constituency of the rival political party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). It has resulted in 700,000 people left homeless and without a livelihood.44 But SADC goes beyond simply ignoring human rights abuses – they even congratulate the abusers, for instance their congratulations to President Robert Mugabe on a successful election in Zimbabwe – an election that according to most was neither free nor fair.45 Beyond ignoring human rights abuses and congratulating the abuser, SADC also seeks to shield the abuser from any external action as a result of his actions. In the light of the ongoing human rights atrocities committed in Zimbabwe, SADC saw fit to attack those in the international community such as the European Union who imposed sanctions on the Harare regime. Consider here the following statement from SADC’s ISDSC: ‘The Committee expressed concern on the continued foreign interference in the internal affairs of some Member States, especially in Zimbabwe which has embarked on an agrarian reform programme aimed at

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addressing the problem of poverty.’46 Statements such as these do SADC irreparable harm as does the hiatus between rhetoric and reality. Small wonder then that SADC suffers from a credibility crisis arising from the gap between promise and performance. This leads us to the question what common values are shared by SADC states. It should be noted that in our earlier discussion on regionalism, it was noted that common values are one of the determining criteria of the new regionalism. According to Jones47 value-sharing is one of the pre-conditions for a viable political community to come into existence. This is an issue which was also raised by a recent report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions48 which argued for the ‘promotion of common political values, systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are democratic, legitimate and effective . . .’. This issue of shared values is often one of those intangibles which exercise a decisive influence on what approach parties adopt. Two examples will bear this out. With the exception of Swaziland and the DRC, most SADC states are now formal democracies in the sense that they have governments chosen in multiparty elections. However, Isaksen and Tjonneland49 note that the reality is that not more than half the regional states can be said to have their democratic credentials intact. South Africa together with Botswana, Mozambique, Mauritius and Seychelles50 could be said to be the most democratic of the SADC states. Zimbabwe together with Angola, Namibia and the DRC may be viewed as the least democratic. Since 1998, SADC has been split into two regional blocs – roughly along the lines of democratic states versus non-democratic states. In 1998 Zimbabwe together with Angola and Namibia deployed military forces to assist the regime of President Laurent Kabila in the DRC. These four states subsequently adopted a collective security agreement. On the other hand, South Africa together with Botswana and Mozambique pushed for the resolution of the DRC conflict by political and diplomatic means.51 The contest between these two regional blocs also surfaced on the issue of a proposed Mutual Defence Pact in the run-up to the Blantyre Summit in August, 2001. Here, ‘Angola and Zimbabwe wanted a defence pact obliging SADC countries to also assist member countries in internal conflicts while the South Africa-dominated group wanted to limit the defence pact to external threats.’52 The underlying point here is that differing value systems result in differing approaches to the same issue. It is for this reason that there is a tremendous need for the development of shared or common values. This, in turn, raises the question of who drives this process of value-sharing. According to the epigenesis theory of political community put forth by Amitai Etzioni53 it is the most

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powerful nation in such a regional grouping that ‘guides’ such a process. Within SADC, such a nation is South Africa. However, witness the failure of South African ‘quiet diplomacy’ in Zimbabwe as well as the weakness of the South African state itself (alluded to above) and one might be forgiven for discounting any ‘leadership’ emanating from Pretoria on this crucial issue. In the final instance, SADC remains all image and little substance. SADC continues to function at the rhetorical level and continues to be a club to protect the excesses of its political elite as opposed to being concerned with the true emancipation of its citizens. State security is privileged over human security. The regionalization currently practised by the SADC states is not only anti-democratic but also anti the global democratic impulse.

Exploring the Interface between SADC and the African Union Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, violence and the collapse of governments and ultimately the state have come to represent the greatest challenge to peace, security and stability. The African Union (AU) has initiated vital steps towards the creation of a Peace and Security Council (PSC) that will serve as the decision-making institution and the sole authority for deploying, managing and terminating AU-led peace operations. Furthermore the AU has proposed the development of a common defence policy that would enable Africa to avoid over-reliance on the international community to solve its problems.54 The Peace and Security Council of the African Union The impetus for the creation of a Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the African Union was realized with the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in July 2002. The rationale for its establishment came through mutual concern expressed by Heads of State and Government and Member States of the African Union about the ‘continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between states’.55 Further rationale for its establishment was found in a firm awareness that the development of strong democratic institutions, the observance of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the implementation of postconflict recovery programmes are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability, as well as for the prevention of conflicts. A

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strong determination and commitment by the African Union to play a central role in bringing peace, security and stability to the continent and to establish an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace support operations and intervention as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction became an overriding objective expressed fervently by the member states gathered in South Africa in July of 2002. African leaders meeting at the African Union summit in Maputo in July 2003 offered wide support for a Peace and Security Council and considered the process of establishing the Council as a top priority at the summit. South African President and former Chairman of the African Union Thabo Mbeki urged member countries to give special priority to the establishment of an African standby force to allow the continent to solve its own conflicts. Such a force is to be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.56 The African Standby Force: does Africa have the capacity? By the end of this decade Africa should have a five-‘brigade’ UN-style force ready to police the continent’s trouble spots. In terms of a plan drafted by a panel of experts, the force will consist of five regionally based brigades in addition to a sixth, continental formation based at AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The document adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) at a meeting in May 2003 contains detailed proposals on the establishment of the force, to be known as the African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is to be established in two phases. The first, ended on June 30, 2005, was to see the AU develop and maintain the full-time capacity to manage Scenario 1 (AU/Regional military advice to a political mission) and Scenario 2 missions (AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission) and a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 3 missions (Stand alone AU/Regional observer mission) and eventually develop the capacity to use a standby reinforcement system to manage Scenario 4 missions (AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventative deployment missions.57 During phase 2, the period up to June 30, 2010, the AU must develop the capacity to manage up to Scenario 5 missions (AU Regional Peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional missions). The deployment targets envisioned by the ASF also appear highly ambitious: full deployment within 30 days of the adoption of a resolution for traditional peacekeeping operations, complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days and recommendations for the

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establishment of a robust military force able to deploy in 14 days to respond rapidly to situations of genocide. The right to intervene must also be paralleled with the capacity to do so. Robust intervention requires strong command and control, logistics and equipment. Currently most African countries lack the capacities to support even the most modest of missions. This has become abundantly clear during the AU’s mission in Darfur. Months after making the decision to deploy, the Rwandan and Nigerian troops could not be sent to Darfur since there was no strategic airlift capability to transport them. The US military eventually transported them to the area. Once deployed in Darfur, it became painfully obvious that that the AU force lacked basic communication equipment and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had to step in to assist them on this issue. It is the ASF, which is supposed to operate at brigade level through subregional structures like SADC and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), that constitutes the real interface between the AU regional body and the various sub-regional structures. However, as pointed out above, such sub-regional structures like SADC are weak and this weakness then translates into the weakness of the AU. The AU PSC has no troops to deploy on its own. It is entirely dependent on the various structures like SADC to maintain peace and security in its respective region. Herein lies the weakness of the entire African security architecture. Moreover, questions remain as to where the AU PSC’s mandate ends and where that of the sub-regional organization begins. From an operational perspective the lack of clearly demarcated authorities is bound to undermine effective command and control of such a force. However there are further parallels between the AU PSC and the SADC OPDSC that serve to reinforce these weaknesses.

More Parallels between the AU and SADC? In July 2006 the South African Sunday Times58 carried an interesting story on the gathering of African heads of state and their ministers in the Gambia for the African Union (AU) summit, and their failure to adopt a charter on democracy and good governance that would seek to limit coups and power-grabs. Select heads of state, who themselves came to power through coups d’etat, were willing to outlaw coups in the future; however, what they could not accept was any clause that obstructed their desire to alter the constitution to extend their expired mandate in power. In this context it is not hard to understand how such a summit accomplished so little.

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However, given the AU’s history of adopting policies and subsequently not realizing them, what is the difference between the organization adopting a charter on democracy and good governance, or not doing so? Article 3.1 of the AU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption refers to respect for democratic principles and institutions, popular participation, the rule of law and good governance. Yet, to cite just one example in what seems to be a pattern in African politics, Chadian President Idriss Deby has now held power for sixteen years and came to power undemocratically. Moreover, he has packed his government and armed forces with people from his minority clan. We are sure this provision was also violated on 17 April 2006, when thirty journalists and human rights monitors were held – some severely assaulted – by police officers after a press conference in Bujumbura, Burundi. Yet where was the voice of the AU? Article 3.2 of this AU Convention refers to respect for human and peoples’ rights. Where was any kind of defence of this article, let alone any condemnation or action, against President Mugabe’s Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, which cost some 700,000 Zimbabweans their homes and livelihoods? Article 3.5 condemns and rejects acts of corruption. Yet, of the forty worst countries in Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index, nearly half were African countries. Similarly, the discrepancy between adopting policy and carrying it out can be seen in the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Article 4b refers to the need to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts. The conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region worsens daily. After some three years, and despite being the AU’s biggest mission at 7,000 troops, the organization has rendered itself impotent to halt atrocities or establish any kind of peace and security. Even more, its mission there is scheduled to be handed over to the United Nations (UN) at the end of the year. In the same vein, Article 4p refers to the condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments. Yet the AU watched with bated breath and stood in silence as François Bozize seized control of the Central African Republic through a coup in 2003. So what accounts for the lack of action from the AU on all these fronts? Some would like to point out that this is merely an issue of a lack of resources – a capacity problem. I beg to differ. Even if we were to witness a far more robust response from the AU in dealing with Darfur, it would not be effective in responding to the human security needs of Sudan’s long-suffering citizens. Note here that before the genocide in Darfur there was the conflict between the north and south of Sudan, which, between 1983 and 2002, resulted in the

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loss of a million lives. Moreover, whilst the world’s attention fixed on Darfur shortly thereafter, Beja in the east exploded. The fundamental source of insecurity in Darfur does not lie in the AU’s lack of resources, but in the Bashir regime in Khartoum. Until the AU comes to terms with this fundamental fact, and deals decisively with the likes of Bashir and Mugabe, the African continent is destined to lurch from one crisis to another. In most African states, the source of misery for citizens is precisely the African political elites who so proudly ‘represent’ their countries at these AU Summits. The AU, after all, is a state-based organization. As such, these state-based elites do not want to see a robust AU since such a development would directly threaten them. What is needed, therefore, is for the AU to follow the example of the European Union (EU) and ostracize those political elites who seek to take Africa back to the era of Bokassa, Amin and Mobutu. One should recall here how Franco’s fascist Spain was not allowed into the EU. More recently, European leaders threatened to expel France from the EU should Jean-Marie le Pen win the French presidency. What is clear from these European examples is that it is a principle underlying the EU that mere physical contiguity does not make state a part of it: a state needs to subscribe to certain values and will be held accountable if they are in any way violated. Similarly, some geographical quirk of fate should not make a state a member of the AU. It would need to subscribe to the espoused values of the AU Charter. If there is a discrepancy between those values and its actions in their country, they should be excluded from the AU. The international community should be lobbied to do the same and isolate that country both politically and economically. In this way as well, the absence of a state from AU deliberations would not hold the body hostage to its most recalcitrant members. For far too long Africa’s leaders have been getting away with murder. The time for decisive action is upon us.

Appendix 1: The New SADC Structure (2001)

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Appendix 2: Organogram of the SADC OPDSC SUMMIT (Heads of State and Government)

Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation

Council of Ministers Ministerial Committees Standing Committee of Officials

Integrated Committee of Ministers

Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee

Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

Sub-Committees

Sub-Committees

SADC Secretariat

National Committees Sub-Committees

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Notes 1. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, Meeting of the SADC Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence and SADC Affairs, Gaborone, Botswana, 18 January 1996, p. 4. 2. Quoted in A. Pahad, ‘Regional security and the role of the military’, in M. Singh (ed.), Redefining Security in Southern Africa: Workshop Proceedings, Common Security Forum, Centre for History and Economics, King’s College, University of Cambridge, 1995, p. 20. 3. Ibid., p. 20. 4. Department of Defence, Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, Pretoria: Department of Defence, 1996, Chapter 2, paragraph 1, p. 5. 5. D. Cammack, ‘South Africa’s War of Destabilization’, in G. Moss and I. Obery (eds), South African Review 5, Ravan Press (Pty) Ltd, 1989; R. Davies, ‘South African Regional Policy Before and After Cuito Cuanavale’, in Moss and Obery, 1989. 6. R.J. Jaster, The Defence of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under Pressure, Macmillan, London, 1988; G. Moss, ‘The Frontline: Regional Policy in Southern Africa,’ in Moss and Obery, 1989. 7. Jaster, p. 96. 8. P. Nel, A Soviet Embassy in Pretoria? Tafelberg Publishers Ltd, Cape Town, 1990; S. Friedman and M. Narsso, A New Mood in Moscow: Soviet Attitudes to South Africa, South African Institute of Race Relations, Cape Town, 1989. 9. The Weekly Mail, 5 May 1988, p. 4. 10. Jaster, p. 157; K.W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988, p. 127. 11. J. Hofmeyr, The Impact of Sanctions on South African White Political Attitudes, Investor Responsibility Research Centre, Washington, DC, 1990, p. 1. 12. Africa Research Centre, The Sanctions Weapon, Buchu Book, Cape Town, 1980, p. 11. 13. C. Alden, Apartheid’s Last Stand: The Rise and Fall of the South African Security State, Macmillan Press, London, 1996, p. 117. 14. Hofmeyr, p. 1. 15. D.J. Goldsworthy, ‘South Africa,’ in M. Ayoob (ed.), Conflict and Intervention in the Third World, Croom Helm, London, 1980, p. 211. 16. Ibid., p. 208. 17. V. Razis, The American Connection: The Influence of US Business on South Africa, Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd., London, 1986, p. 12. 18. D. Geldenhuys, ‘Ten Crises in South Africa’s International Relations,’ International Affairs Bulletin, Vol. 13(3), 1989, p. 93. 19. P.L. Moorcroft, Africa Nemesis: World Revolution in South Africa 1945–2010, Brasseys

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Ltd., London, 1990, p. 25. 20. Address by Mr F.W. de Klerk, State President, to the Financial Mail Conference on Investment in 1990, Johannesburg, 6 October 1989, p. 3. 21. H. Solomon and J. Cilliers, ‘Southern Africa and the Quest for Collective Security,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 28(2), June 1997, pp. 198–200. 22. T.R.H. Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History, Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 473–81. 23. Ibid., p. 478. 24. G. Cawthra, ‘Sub-Regional Security: The Southern African Development Community,’ Security Dialogue, 28(2), June 1997, p. 208. 25. SADC. Communiqué establishing the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, 28 June 1996, Gaborone, Botswana, SADC. 26. ‘SADC to wrest security organ from Mugabe’, The Zimbabwe Independent, 10 August 2001. 27. SADC. Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions, March 2001, Gaborone, Botswana. SADC. 28. See SADC’s Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Gaborone, Botswana, 2001, SADC. 29. Ibid., p. 6. 30. Iibid., p. 7. 31. Ibid., p. 6. 32. Ibid., p. 8. 33. Ibid., p. 9. 34. SADC. Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions, March 2001. Gaborone, Botswana. SADC, p. 31. 35. Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. Gaborone, Botswana. SADC, p. 11. 36. Ibid., p. 11. 37. Ibid., p. 2. 38. Ernst B. Haas. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957. Stanford University Press. Stanford, California, 1958, p. 16. 39. Reader’s Digest, November 2002, pp. 109–10. 40. Schoeman, p. 20. 41. Malawi: Fear over Rising Political Violence, IRIN Report, www.irinnews.org, 23 August 2002, pp. 1–2. 42. Final Communique of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community. Blantyre, Malawi. 12–14 August 2001, p. 4. 43. ‘Arrest of journalists bad news for government critics’, www.irinnews.org, 10 May 2006. 44. ‘Zimbabwe: A year after Operation Murambatsvina,’ www.irinnews.org., 14 May 2006. 45. Press Release: ‘Second Meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the SADC Organ

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47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

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on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation’, 20–23 August 2002, Maputo, Mozambique, p. 3. Final Communiqué: 23rd Session of the Interstate Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation, Luanda, Angola, 7–9 August 2002, p. 2. Walter S. Jones. The Logic of International Relations. 6th. edition. Scott, Foresman and Company. Boston, USA, 1988, pp. 635–8. Report on the Review of Operations of SADC Institutions. March 2001. SADC. Gaborone, p. 8. Jan Isaksen and Elling N. Tjonneland, Assessing the Restructuring of SADC: Positions, Policies and Progress. Crh. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, 2001, p. 43. Seychelles formally ended its membership of SADC and has since been replaced by Madagascar. Isaksen and Tjonneland, p. 43. Isaksen and Tjonneland, p. 43. Amitai Etzioni, ‘The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level,’ in James N. Rosenau (ed.) International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory, The Free Press, New York, 1969, p. 348. Vanessa Kent and Mark Malan, ‘The African Standby Force: Progress and Prospects’, African Security Review, 12(3), 2003, pp. 72–81. African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 10 July 2002, http://www.african-union.org. Ibid., p. 18. E.A. Thorne, ‘The African Standby Force Takes Shape: An Observation of Needs and Necessary Action’, African Armed Forces, 31 July 2003. ‘Scant attention for charter at AU Summit’, Sunday Times, 2 July 2006, p. 15.

Chapter 11: Prospects for an Asian Union Beni Prasad Agarwal

The European Example

W

e all know how the institutions of the European Union have changed the scene in Europe. After the devastation of the two world wars, and hundreds of years of struggle for the mastery of Europe, what began as a Coal and Steel Community has culminated in an European Union, with even a common currency and mixed military regiments. All this has happened in a span of just 50 years. The continent which was the most dangerous region of the world for 200 years, if we go back only to the Napoleonic invasions, has become the most stable part of the world, ready to play a stabilizing role in the rest of the world. Asia the New Continent of Instability The mantle of instability and potential danger for the rest of the world has been taken over by another continent, Asia. Whether it is the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in West Asia, or the India–Pakistan confrontation in south Asia, or the Korean conundrum in the East, or more importantly, the Sino-Indian equation, involving one-third of the world’s population, it is Asia which is calling for the attention of policy-makers and thinkers and those concerned about peace and stability in the world. The Afghanistan crisis was just the beginning. The Iraq war was a further confirmation. There is already talk of other wars in Asia. Hints have been dropped from time to time about Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia and North Korea. Taiwan and Tibet continue to simmer, and so does the Sino-Indian border problem. Major Powers of Asia Should Come Together It is not necessary for Asians to go the whole hog of experiencing a few devastating wars, which in the nuclear age could mean total destruction, before they

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embark on a path of creating an Asian Union on the pattern of the European Union. Does history teach us anything at all or is repetition inevitable? The answer to this may vary according to whether one believes that history is a circle or a line and whether one believes in the adage, ‘History repeats itself’ or in the opposite one which says: ‘History never repeats itself’. Evolution and progress imply the latter. Europe remained in a mess while the big powers of Europe continued to play games against each other, creating alliances aimed at each other. The scene only changed when the big powers, initially Germany, France and Italy, came together to co-operate instead of confronting each other. Benelux was thrown in for good measure. The six soon became 9, then 12, then 15, and 10 more have joined very recently. Some others are still waiting anxiously to join. UK tried to keep out at various stages but had no choice but to join in and is now even contemplating joining the common currency. There is a clear-cut lesson in this for Asians. Only when the big powers of Asia, namely China, India, Japan, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, come together will the scene change. Smaller sub-regional alliances can make only a limited impact or no impact at all, as illustrated by ASEAN and SAARC respectively. The same can be said of the Gulf Cooperation Council. ASEAN is experimenting with various other combinations like ASEAN + 1 or ASEAN + 2 or ASEAN + 3, but the real combination has yet to come. ARF (Asian Regional Forum) is a move in the right direction. SAARC can never take off unless the India – China equation changes and when that happens it will take off in no time. Apart from ASEAN, SAARC, Gulf Cooperation Council etc. there are some other laudable initiatives. The President of Kazakhstan launched one initiative under the name ‘Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA)’ and the Prime Minister of Thailand launched another under the name of ‘Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).’ There is also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All these have to culminate in a dialogue for an Asian body. Questions have been raised why China has not settled its border problem with India, when it has done so with most other neighbors including Russia. The MacMohan Line that is the issue in the border problem between India and China has been accepted by China in regard to Myanmar, but not yet in regard to India. Is this a border problem causing a political problem, or a political problem causing a border problem? Where are the two most populous nations of the world heading in their relations? India points at the nuclear asymmetry between the armed forces of China and India, Beijing’s close defense ties with Pakistan and the threat from its

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missiles to major Indian cities. Commenting on the annual report of the Indian Ministry of Defense for 2004, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhang Qiyue had said, ‘If both sides adhere to the five principles of peaceful co-existence, increase trust, strengthen cooperation, then Sino-Indian relations can continuously develop.’1 The then Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandez made a successful visit to China in late April 2003. Prime Minister Vajpayee and Chinese President Hu Jintao met in St Petersburg on May 31, 2003, on the sidelines of the celebrations marking the 300th anniversary of the historic city. Hu Jintao is also reported to have said that is India and China can come together, the twenty-first century will belong to Asia. Prime Minister of India, A.B. Vajpayee had a successful visit to China in June 2003. He signed nine agreements with China. Some skeptics may raise the bogey of the danger to the industries of one from those of the other. Similar bogeys were raised when imports became freer under WTO regulations. Freer trade has to take place anyway, with or without an Asian Union. What Asian Union may provide is a mechanism for creating safeguards as happened in Europe when the less developed countries of South Europe joined or when the countries of the former Soviet block became assimilated gradually. As UN Development Reports bring out year after year, the gap between the rich and the poor is growing wider and wider. This can only be reduced or bridged if the poor come together. The Multiplier Effect Positive There are numerous examples in Europe of the rush to join the organization after the big powers came together to form it. As mentioned above, there is still a waiting list of candidates. However, to illustrate the point it may be worth quoting what the then Austrian Ambassador in New Delhi, Dr Herbert Traxl, had to say on this in February 2001. He said, Austria, as an independent nation, had chosen to keep out of the European Economic Community for decades and was content with being a member of the European Free Trade Area. It joined the community in 1995 when it learnt to perceive the EC as a process of building peace between nations that had been hostile to each other for a long time, especially France and Germany, and establishing a zone of peace and stability.

Dr Traxl was speaking at a Chamber of Commerce in South India and went on to say that another reason for Austria’s accession to the EC was the fact that it found itself affected by decisions taken by the community on several issues

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such as trade and transportation. Austria then decided it would be better to be ‘part of the decision making process itself and find friends and allies in the grouping’. He emphasized the advantages from the evolution of collective policies on issues such as environment, illegal immigration and international crime, which includes terrorism.2 It follows from the above that if the big powers of Asia come together, others will follow, in their own interest, as happened in Europe.

Dialogue of Civilizations at Asian Level Islam has become a major issue in world affairs in the wake of what happened on 11 September 2001. The phrase ‘clash of civilizations’ had become a topic of public discourse dramatically with Samuel Huntington’s article of that title in the Summer 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, published by the New York-based Council for Foreign Relations. Subsequently Professor Huntington expanded his article into a book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, published in 1996. Huntington’s work immediately caught the imagination of intellectuals all over the world. It was widely read and debated and there were both supporters and critics. However the events of 11 September 2001 brought his thesis into sharp focus. Huntington defines a civilization as a culture writ large, involving values, norms, institutions and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance. According to him religion is the defining characteristic of civilization. Huntington devotes considerable attention to the collision between Islam and the West. He argues that the absolute nature of Islam that merges religion and politics, the absence of the concept of non-violence in that faith and the fact that it lacks one or more core states that could effectively mediate conflicts have all combined to make Islam a source of global instability. The twentieth-century conflict between liberal democracy and Marxist-Leninism is only a fleeting and superficial phenomenon compared to the continuing and deeply conflictual relation between Islam and Christianity. Though at times peaceful co-existence has prevailed, more often the relation has been one of intense rivalry and of varying degrees of hot war. Bernard Lewis observes: ‘For almost a thousand years from the first Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siege of Vienna, Europe was under constant threat from Islam.’3 The ‘Clash of Civilizations’, if one prefers to call it that, has to first be resolved in Asia itself. It is an axiom of science that an experiment is first

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carried out at a smaller scale; the results, if positive, are then transferred to a larger arena. It is necessary to bring Saudi Arabia and Iran into a dialogue for an Asian Union as they represent the sources of Sunni and Shia Islam respectively. The presence of Turkey, with its comparatively more modern Islamic institutions and secular outlook, will be of immense help. Imagine a table around which Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, India, Japan, Indonesia, Turkey and Russia meet for dialogue, where the civilizations representing the major religious are seated together. The result will be a ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’ instead of a ‘Clash of Civilizations’. In fact the very talk of an Asian Union will lead to a dialogue between and among civilizations, so to say. There are extremist elements everywhere, but equally there are moderate silent majorities. This is why Iran has been changing. The silent majority in Saudi Arabia should be enabled to get into the mainstream. Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, Taoism and Shintoism are all Asian religious. There is a certain unity in the diversity in them as there is a common Asian cultural ethos. Once the equilibrium born of that unity in diversity is implemented at the Asian level, it will be easy enough to do so at the world scale. If it cannot be done at the continental level, it definitely cannot be done at intercontinental level. Therefore the sooner we begin talking about an Asian Union, the better it is for the whole world.

Tackling Terrorism by an Asian Union The problem of terrorism also has to be tackled at sub-regional, regional as well as global level. Once a dialogue begins in Asia for an Asian Union, and countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Israel, Pakistan and Afghanistan are a part of the dialogue, along with other major powers of Asia like China, India, Japan, Indonesia and to some extent Turkey and Russia, which are both European and Asian, discussion on curbing terrorism will be easier and fruitful. Existence of a mechanism for dealing with terrorism at the Asian continental level will facilitate smoother operation of anti-terrorist measures and will supplement and reinforce other efforts at sub-regional and global level. In the long run, this is the only way to remove the root causes, which have given rise to terrorism. Lessons of the Indian experience in tackling terrorism at local level In support of the idea that terrorism can and should be tackled at various levels, national, sub-regional, regional and global, it may be worth examining how the

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Indian approach of keeping the issues localized and finding political solutions has worked in the past and may work in the future. India started experiencing terrorism and violence, sponsored mainly from across the borders, from the very inception of the country after independence in 1947. First it was in Jammu and Kashmir and later in the northeast. However, it was the localized political approach, combined with the principle of unity in diversity, which led to the situation that Laldenga, who was leading as insurgency in Mizoram State, gave up violence and became Chief Minister of the State. Similarly, the DMK Party in Tamil Nadu State, which was involved in insurgency in the late 1960s, came to head the state government subsequently. The Nagaland story is similar, and so are the cases of Manipur in the 1960s and 1970s and Punjab in the 1980s. The October 2002 elections in Jammu and Kashmir have given the state a representative government, which is trying to give stability to the state in the face of Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism. The terrorists killed in Jammu and Kashmir by Indian security forces include people from Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen, China and Pakistan but the indigenous involvement in terrorism, which was at its peak in the early 1990s, came down drastically by the late 1990s. The empirical evidence collected about the suicidal attacks from 1990 to 2001 in India shows that only in one incident was a local involved, the rest were all mercenaries.4 Thus to tackle terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir one would have to have a multiple approach: political solution at home and liaison with security agencies in countries of origin of the mercenaries, in this case Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen, China and Pakistan. The existence of an Asian Secretariat with a department handling terrorism would go a long way in tracking down the sources and plugging them. This approach can be repeated in other hot spots in Asia, including Palestine, Afganistan and Iraq.

Lesson of the Iraq War: Need for an Asian Organization Before the US-led invasion of Iraq, several justifications were put forward: a pre-emptive strike at a tyrant with a record for unprovoked aggression, redrawing the political map of the Islamic world, control of oil and so on. Regardless of the right and wrong, it would be prudent to bear in mind that starting a war is easier than working through its consequences. The creeping escalation of the war in Vietnam is an example from America’s own history. Beginning with a desire to help the French, the US got slowly sucked into what one of its own generals termed a ‘quagmire’. Iraq is beginning to look like a ‘quagmire’ for the

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US and Britain. US is desperately trying to bring in troops from other countries, particularly from Asia. There was a big debate in India on whether to respond to the US call for sending troops to Iraq, before India decided not to send troops (July 14, 2003), at the invitation of US and UK, who are seen as invaders. India, however, expressed willingness to help under a UN mandate. Similar debates took place in other countries, including Pakistan. Eventually some sort of an Asian solution will be needed in this part of Asia. Would it not be better to have an Asian organization to facilitate this? During the NATO action in Bosnia, it was being said that Europeans should be asked to handle European problems, instead of another continent getting involved. The same could be applied here. Democracy Promoted by an Asian Union Value of democracy Democracy is not an easy road to follow . . . Successful maintenance of democracy demands the utmost in use of the best available methods to procure social knowledge that is reasonably commensurate with our physical knowledge, and the invention and use of forms of social engineering reasonably commensurate with our technological abilities in physical affairs.5

Does democracy really exist? Take the US example and the neo-con agenda. Those opposed to violence may be in the majority but when you come down to brass tacks they have little significance. What prevails is the neo-con policy. As Richard Falk said at the second TODA conference on ‘Globalization, Regionalization and Democratization’ in Vancouver, Canada, in June 2003, we may be living in ‘pseudo-democracies’. Political illiteracy of the public enables governments to do what they do. He went on to say that 50 percent of Americans believed that WMDs were found in Iraq. Forty percent even believed that Saddam Hussein had used them in the 2003 war and many believed 9/11 was caused by Iraq. So true democracy is an illusion. But does that make it irrelevant? The answer is no. The struggle has to continue and, as John Dewey suggested, more than half a century ago, and many others have done, democracy and education go hand in hand. Democracy in Asia One of the fundamental bases of the European Union is democracy and the question may be raised that lack of democracy in major parts of Asia makes an Asian Union unrealistic. However, the progress of the global community in

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democracy requires that Asia keep pace in this sphere. There are several countries in Asia where different versions of democracy prevail. The largest democracy in the world, in terms of population, namely India, is in Asia. In fact many scholars agree that the single greatest achievement of India, since gaining independence in 1947, is the preservation of democracy. It is perhaps true that democracy has preserved India. The reason why a multi-racial, multi-religious, multi-lingual country of more than a billion people is holding together, while smaller entities like Yugoslavia have broken up, is the existence of democracy in India. Pakistan, which was founded on the basis of Islam, by partitioning India, lost half of the country in 1971–2 because democracy was not allowed to prevail; if the verdict of the elections of 1971 had been respected in the then Pakistan, even with two geographically distant wings, the country may have survived and there would be no Bangladesh. Improved prospects of democracy with an Asian Union There are many factors promoting democracy in Asia, in different parts, and one of the avowed purposes of the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was also to promote democracy. But even a loose ‘Asian Union’ is bound to prove infectious, carrying democracy from the democratic to the others in a peaceful interaction. In centuries gone by, China sent scholars to India to learn the authentic Buddhist Sutras. The Chinese economy has changed fundamentally; it is no longer a communist economy. Can a capitalist economy and a totalitarian political system co-exist? Change is inevitable. An Asian Union could direct that change in the right direction. India, in turn, could imbibe some of the Confucian values which have benefited China, Singapore and others. Islam not hampering democracy Equally important is the case of West Asia. Are Islam and Democracy incompatible? There are some who believe so. But true Islam and democracy are not incompatible. The largest Muslim country in the world is Indonesia. It has a democratic framework. The second largest is India, as it has more Muslims than any other country except Indonesia, including Pakistan and Bangladesh. The Muslims of India have become an integral part of the democratic framework. Bangladesh is doing reasonably well. Turkey is a good example. The problem in Pakistan is the vested interest of the military, deriving sustenance from US support at various times. The brief periods when democracy prevailed in Pakistan, under civilian control, were also the periods when relations between India and Pakistan showed signs of improvement.

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The solution to problems in West Asia also lies in democracy. As Fouad Ajami said in his article entitled ‘Iraq and the Arabs’ Futures’, in Foreign Affairs magazine for Jan.–Feb. 2003, ‘thus far the United State has been simultaneously an agent of political reaction and a promoter of social revolution in the Arab-Muslim world . . . Its power has invariably been on the side of political reaction and stagnant status quo.’ The middle classes and professionals in these countries have been thwarted by the US relationships of convenience with the autocracies in saddle. This has hampered the growth of democracy, not Islam. Even 9/11 is a by-product of these same US policies. The targeting of America came out of the terrible political culture of Arab lands. If the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the physician Ayman al-Zawahiri, could not avenge himself against the military regime of Hosni Mubarak for the torture he endured at the hand of his country’s security services, why not target Mubarak’s US patrons? A similar motivation propelled the Saudi members of Al Qaeda. ‘These men could not sack the house of Saud . . . the war against America was the next best thing.’6 As Peter Bergen points out in his book on Osama Bin Laden, Bin Laden’s anger was not at America’s decadent culture, but at the support America gave to the regime in Riyadh. After nearly six decades in Saudi Arabia and three in Egypt, what America has earned is the wrath and estrangement of the frustrated middle class. There is an unfathomable anti-Americanism in Egypt, even among those professionals who have done well through the American connection. America is also in for a bitter harvest in Iraq, judging by the number of casualties, even since the official end to the hostilities. The sooner America and UK get out of Iraq, after handing over charge to an Asian force, perhaps under UN auspices, since there is no Asian Union as yet, the better for them. In fact a factor that enabled Saddam Hussein to emerge as some kind of a ‘pan-Arab Bismack’ was US backing of conservative Arab regimes and the bias in favor of Israel. The US role in the creation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is well documented. As also mentioned above, in Pakistan, US support to the military regimes, over a long period, has thwarted democracy, not Islam. Thus an Asian Union could even help America in promoting its avowed goal of spreading democracy in the world.

Conflict Resolution within an Asian Union There are several cold and semi-hot was within sub-regions of Asia, as between India and Pakistan, between Israel and Palestine, between Japan and Korea and between the two Koreas. These will subside once the dialogue for an Asian

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Union begins. The fact that both UK and Ireland are members of the European Union has had a positive effect on the Northern Ireland conflict. Similarly, the fact that Greece is in the European Union and Turkey is aspiring to become a member of also has had a positive effect on the Cyprus problem, which could otherwise have taken a worse shape. Further, we can only imagine various other conflicts which could have arisen in Western Europe during the last six decades since the end of the Second World War, if there were no EEC/EU. Kashmir Let us take a brief look at how the prospect of an Asian Union may help in resolving some of the conflicts in Asia. We could begin with the Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan. Kashmir is a symptom, not the disease affecting Indo-Pak relations. For more than half a century, efforts have been made to tackle Kashmir in the wrong way. Ask any doctor and he/she will say straightway that what needs treatment is the disease and not the symptoms. The disease to be treated is the partition of India on a community basis. Pakistan says Kashmir is the core issue for it and India has repeatedly made the point that it is a symbol of India’s secularism. It is a core issue for Pakistan because the very survival of a country founded on the basis of Islam depends on asserting its right to a Muslim majority area bordering it. But Kashmir acceded to India legally as did 500 other former princely states at the time of independence. If Kashmir’s accession is questioned then the whole post-independence legal framework is put in jeopardy. But there is another crucial factor for India. There are nearly 140 million Muslims spread all over India and their future is linked with what happens to Kashmir. Thus Kashmir becomes a core issue for Indian secularism. As already mentioned above, there are more Muslims in India than in Pakistan or Bangladesh. Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad was born in Mecca to Arab parents. He came to India and became totally Indian. He identified himself completely with the political aspirations of the Indian nationalists. He was deadly opposed to the partition. Delivering the presidential address at the Ramgarh session of the Indian National Congress before independence, he proudly proclaimed: I am a Muslim and am profoundly conscious of the fact that I have inherited Islam’s glorious traditions . . . I am not prepared to lose even a small part of that legacy . . . I am equally proud of the fact that I am an Indian, an essential part of that indivisible unity of Indian nationhood.

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He was sensitive to the fact that partition would bring about incalculable harm to the minorities in both countries. With prophetic vision, the Maulana told the Cabinet Mission in 1946 I have examined its likely effect upon the fortunes of Muslims in India . . . I have come to the conclusion that it is harmful not only for India as a whole, but also for Muslims in particular. And in fact it creates more problems that it solves. Two states confronting one another offer no solution to the problems of another’s minorities but only lead to retribution and reprisals by introducing a system of mutual hostages.7

We cannot and need not undo the partition, but it needs treatment. A positive approach would suggest some kind of a Common Market, South Asian Union or a Confederation in the subcontinent. Just as Alsace Lorraine and the Ruhr area, which was the bone of contention between France and Germany, became the starting point of the European Coal and Steel Community, which eventually led to the European Union, Kashmir, presently a bone of contention between India and Pakistan, could become the cement to join the two. In 1962, when the well-known economist John Kenneth Galbraith was the US Ambassador in Delhi, and John F. Kennedy was in the White House in Washington, there was a good deal of diplomatic activity in the wake of the Sino-Indian border war. The Americans were anxious to help, especially to prevent any enlargement of the conflict in the Himalayas through the entry of Pakistan into it. On December 6, 1962, Galbraith wrote to Kennedy, In my view, incidentally, Kashmir is not soluble in territorial terms. But by holding up the example of the way in which France and Germany have moved to soften their antagonism by the Common Market and common instruments of administration, including such territorial disputes as that over the Saar, there is a chance of getting the Indo-Pakistan dialogue into constructive channels.8 According to the diary of Galbraith quoted in his ‘Ambassador’s Journal,’ published in 1969, Nehru also agreed with Galbraith that the only solution to the Kashmir problem was some sort of a Common Market in the sub-continent, on the European track.

The sub-region of South Asia has many complementarities. Historical, geographical, economic, cultural and linguistic factors all point to the need for coming together, which would solve not only the problem between India and Pakistan, but also those relating to Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. As already mentioned above in another context, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not made much headway so far, but will take off amazingly once there is a positive Asian level dialogue and the equations

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change among the major powers of Asia, especially those between India and China and between India and the major Muslim countries of West Asia. This can happen through a dialogue for an Asian Union. Palestine The Israeli–Palestinian problem has also lasted more than half a century. Various efforts, over the years, have failed and the bloodshed continues. So does the suffering of millions. There are some similarities between the partition of Palestine and the Indian subcontinent. Just as Pakistan was created on the basis of Islam, Israel was created on the basis of Judaism. Both partitions led to large-scale movement of populations and many massacres. Just as India was left with a sizeable Muslim population, Israel was left with a sizeable Muslim Arab population, which has been growing and is like a time-bomb for the state based on Judaism. Here too the partition cannot be undone, but needs treatment. Any viable road map would have to be integrative rather than divisive. The problem of the occupied territories, of the Arab population in Israel, which cannot forever remain as second-class citizenry, of the Palestinian refugees abroad, the case of Jerusalem, the Israeli settlements in occupied areas, all need to be addressed in a comprehensive, forward-looking plan, in consonance with the democratic spirit of the twenty-first century. This is only possible within the framework of a macro approach. Just as dialogue for an Asian Union is bound to have a positive impact on South Asia, it will have a healthy and salutary effect on the most difficult and long-standing issue in West Asia, namely the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, which, at other levels, is an Arab–Israeli and a Jewish–Muslim problem. Ironically, 9/11 may have paved the way for a solution because some of the Arab countries and Iran, which earlier swore by a policy of total annihilation of the state of Israel, are now inclined to adopt a more moderate approach, if the legitimate interests and rights of the Palestinian people are protected. Korea and others In East Asia too, there are legacies of discord. Apart from the partition of Korea, which is threatening to blow up into a nuclear menace, there is a past history of rancor between Korea and Japan, China and Japan, Russia and Japan, and Russia and China. These can all submerge in a dialogue for an Asian Union, as happened with various historical rivalries, discords and

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negative memories among the countries of Europe in the context of the European Union. As Stephen Cohen, a renowned American scholar, said in New Delhi at a seminar at the India International Centre on January 18, 2005, countries with long-standing conflicts need a face-saving device in order to extricate themselves from positions, held over long periods and a body like an Asian Union may provide the formula, as did the European Union.

Action at Micro and Macro Levels Not Antithetical Co-operation at the Asian continental level is not antithetical to organizations at sub-regional level, nor to co-operation at the global level. Regional and subregional cooperation can reinforce each other and the two together can be intermediary to global cooperation. They are like building blocks at different levels. The whole body has no healthy existence without healthy parts and parts are healthy only when the whole body is healthy. While in relation to subregions like Asean, SAARC, SCO, etc., dialogue at the Asian level is at the macro level, in relation to the global dialogue, it is at the micro level.

Globalization vs. Balance of Power – the Latter Still Relevant We live in times when the word ‘globalization’ is a part of everyday vocabulary. To be a part of everyday vocabulary is not the same thing as common-sense. However, the discovery of today is the accepted fact of tomorrow and the common-sense of the day after. The revolution in communications and travel could not but result in a global society. Moreover, world economy is inextricably interlinked and operates on all continents simultaneously. The ideal form for today’s world would be a ‘World Federation’ or ‘Global Union’, but that is still for the future. Today we have to restore a certain balance, which maintained world peace for long stretches of time in different periods of history, and may help tomorrow. It is true that balance of power systems have existed only at certain times in history, and that for the greater part of history, empire has been the typical mode for the world system. As Henry Kissinger points out in his book Diplomacy, ‘Empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they aspire to be the international system. Empires have no need for a balance of power. That is how the United State has conducted its foreign

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policy in the Americas, and China through most of its history in Asia’. But in the twenty-first century the very thought of an empire running the world is highly repugnant. We are in an era which was preceded by a long history of colonialism, imperialism, exploitation and then by a worldwide anti-colonial and anti-imperialist phase. There is no going back to the ‘era of empires’. The events of 9/11 and the continued killing of soldiers in Iraq, after May, 2003, when the operation was officially declared over, are chilling reminders that the era of empires is gone. So if the imperial system is a thing of the past and a democratic Global Union is still far off, perhaps for a few decades, if not a century or two, the only alternative is to bring about some form of the balance of power system. At the same time, a bi-polar world of the type that existed during the Cold War cannot be imagined today. Thus the only feasible model is of a multi-polar world. Two poles are already visible, namely America and Europe. Africa is formally a Union but its capacity to play the role of another pole is obviously too limited at present. It has also been shown above why Asia has to be taken as a whole, and not in parts, because that would be dangerous not only for Asia but for the whole world. China, Russia, India or Japan can play the role of a viable third pole only if all of them or some of them join hands along with other Asian countries, as happened in Europe. So a tri-polar world is more viable for the near future than either a bi-polar or a multi-polar one. The split in Europe during the Iraq crisis and the existence of the Atlantic Alliance show that the role of Europe in this world order is not exactly that of a pole to balance America. That balance has to come from somewhere else. It could be from Asia or a combination of Asia, Africa and parts of Europe. A third force is usually a positive element even in the domestic politics of nations having the two-party system, as e.g. in Germany, UK and France and in the emerging order in India. This holds a lesson even for the international system. But this tri-polar system will not have the rigidity of the Cold-War bi-polar system. What we are looking forward to is not another cold war. It will have scope for evolution, combinations and permutations to suit particular needs, situations and crises. Paul Kennedy’s study The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers analyzed economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 1988. The chief message of his study was that: the international system is subject to constant changes, not only those caused by the day-to-day actions of statesman and the ebb and flow of political and military events, but also those caused by the deeper transformations in the foundations of world power, which in time make their way through to the surface.

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Surprisingly, he spoke of the ‘pentarchy’ of the United States, the USSR, China, Japan and the EEC as the likely pattern for some time to come, just on the eve of the collapse of the communist empire and the USSR. This fallacy occurred because he was making an assertion in contradiction to his own sound discovery after the study of 500 years of history, regarding the crucial relevance of global productive balances, technological innovation and military spending, in the rise and fall of the great powers. It may be worth repeating here Bismarck’s famous remark about protagonists of an international system, that they travel on ‘the stream of Time’, which they can ‘neither create not direct’, but upon which they can ‘steer with more or less skill and experience’.9 The lesson to be learnt is that the balance of power in world affairs has to be reinvented in different epochs.

UN Not Yet Ready to Provide a New World Order Is the UN the answer in seeking the new world order, instead of a new balance through a tri-polar/multi-polar world? The reality has been thrown sharply into our faces during the recent Iraq crisis. However, we had to say, ‘The UN is dead, long live the UN’, because UN has several other roles to play. If there were no UN, we would have to invent one. The development of The specialized agencies of the UN and certain peace-keeping operations are commendable; but in key political issues, UN has had a very limited role. Useful role of specialized agencies There would be total chaos in the rapidly globalizing world if the various specialized agencies of the UN did not regulate various activities. Air travel on the world-scale would be in a total mess, with planes colliding every now and then if the ‘Civil Aviation Organization’ were not there to regulate air travel. Communications would be in total disarray if the ‘International Telecommunications Organization’ did not exist. World health would be in serious jeopardy, as the recent SARS crisis showed, and various other epidemics have shown over the years, if there were no WHO. International trade world be in a state of perpetual trade war if there were no WTO or its predecessors. The list is endless. Then there are institutions like UNESCO, UNICEF, ECOSOC and the various Economics Commissions for different parts of the world.

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Some useful peace-keeping operations UN has also played a role from time to time in peace-keeping in different parts of the world. Every year on May 29, an ‘International Day of United Nations Peace-keepers’ is observed, in pursuance of resolution 57/129 of the UN General Assembly, adopted at the 57th Session, on December, 11, 2002. On that day, 55 years ago, the first UN peacekeeping operation, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East was established. More than half a century later, that operation is still going on. In 1949, UNMOGIP (UN Military Observation Group for India and Pakistan) was created, after India took the issue of Pakistani aggression in Kashmir to the UN That group still exists in a skeleton form. With the outbreak of the Cold War, the UN Charter’s concept of collective security collapsed in the face of political realities. As Starcevic put it, the enforcement action in Korea, a hybrid between the ‘coalition of the willing’ of the time and the Security Council’s application of Chapter VII of the Charter brought in its wake the ‘Uniting for peace’ resolution, which formed the basis for the first real peacekeeping operation in 1956.10

On the whole, collective security did not work during the Cold War, though one among thirteen PKOs (Peace-Keeping Operations) established between 1948 and 1978, the one in Congo, came close to enforcement action and, in all likelihood, ‘cost the life of the activist Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold’. The decade of 1978–88 passed with no new PKO devised. Since the end of the Cold War, the system of collective security has worked on some occasions and failed on others. Cambodia is an example of the former, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and now Iraq of the latter. In critical issues UN is like a sweeper in a circus At crucial moments, in the face of key issues, the UN has had to make way for an alternative international system and its role was confined to taking care of the humanitarian problems left behind by the actions of the powers that be. Mushirul Hassan put it strikingly in his April 2003 article entitled, ‘The New Colours of Imperialism’: The US has cleared its arrears to that body, so declared Colin Powell at a recent press conference, and it was time for its functionaries to press on with their humanitarian work and not meddle in American affairs. His arrogant and patronizing tone must have added to Kofi Annan’s sleepless nights.11

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The humanitarian role of the UNO is of course important. In a circus, after an act by a group of elephants or other animals, a sweeper has to appear and clean up the mess left behind. In critical issues, the UN has a similar role. It has to take care of all the humanitarian issues, the refugees, the prisoners and so on, left behind by the actions of major power. The circus goes on. Can a reformed UN help? There is much talk of a reformed UNO as the solution to the problem of world governance. It is rightly said that a system devised 58 years ago, on the basis of the outcome of the Second World War, does not reflect the reality of the present-day world. This is very true. The Security Council is an outdated body. There is a good case for its expansion. Names of countries like Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, etc. have been mentioned for inclusion as Permanent Members. But there is no real move by any Permanent Member, nor will they give up their own Veto Power or add new members with Veto Power. That brings us back to square one. UN is an inter-governmental organization and in the final analysis governments conduct their policies on the basis of national interest. Revision of the UN charter will only be possible when the power equations change in the world, not vice versa. It will be easier to revise the UN charter, if there is an Asian Union in Asia as there is an European Union in Europe, and not vice versa. It is a question of idealism vs. realism. Global Beneficiaries of an Asian Union US interests After this survey one may ask, what is in it for me? Why should the USA the only superpower, go out of its way to create another center of power? We have seen above that the era of imperialism is gone for ever. In the complex world of today, it is impossible for any one state, however powerful, to dominate it. As Jonathan Schell says, the larger question, facing not only the United States but any country that might be eager to establish an empire is whether the connection between military and political power – snapped by the world revolt of the 20th century – can be restored. Does power still flow from the barrel of a gun or a B-52 bomber? Can the world in the twenty-first century be ruled from 35,000 feet? Can cruise missiles build nations? Modern people have the will to resist and the means to do so. Force can confer a temporary advantage, but politics is destiny.12

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It would be in the interest of the United States to encourage and help in the formation of an Asian Union. Only a shortsighted view will find fault with the suggestion or harbor suspicions or apprehensions of creating a rival center of power. The US helped in the creation of what is today the European Union. It must have known then that there would be times when differences of opinion may arise between the US and the new entity, but the balance was in favor of a positive approach, which has proved to be sound. Because of the size of the Asian continent, the diversity of races, religions, cultures and languages, and various historical elements, an Asian body, call it an ‘Asian Union’ for the sake of identification, on the pattern already known and existing, will be a loose organization. It cannot have, in the foreseeable future, the cohesion of a strong international persona with the potential to assume an aggressive international role. It may function as a clearing house for solving Asian problems of all kinds – political, economic, defense- and terrorismrelated, of transport and communication, of health and epidemics, of culture and religion and so on, at the Asian level, without jeopardizing the peace, tranquility and interests of the people of other continents. It is said that US wanted to transform Europe into a loose body by supporting its expansion through inclusion of more and more countries, specially in the east, earlier part of the Soviet system. The solution sought in Europe already exists in Asia. It can only be a loose body. Further, if the US helps in the creation of an Asian Union in Asia, the charge of ‘unilateralism’ and imperialistic ambitions, which is heard more and more, will go away There will be less or no risk of getting stuck in quagmires far away from home. There will be an additional mechanism for tackling Asian conflicts and terrorism emanating from Asia. Then there is the economic angle. Eric Hobsbawm argues that with the exception of its military superiority in high-tech weaponry, the US is relying on diminishing, or potentially diminishing, assets. Its economy, though large, forms a diminishing share of the global economy. It is vulnerable in the short term as well as in the long term. At some stage it will be obvious that it is much more important to concentrate on the economy than to carry on with foreign military adventures, especially with unemployment at a high level. European interests For the European Union too, it may be useful in the long run to have a sister in an Asian Union. Both ‘old Europe’ and ‘new Europe’ have an interest in a smooth and peaceful management of world affairs. Playing Asian countries

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against one another is a thing of the past and exploiting rivalries among or between any of them can be dangerous or counter-productive, as can be seen from the history of the Indo-Pak conflict, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the saga of Sino-Japanese or Korean relations and so on. Russia, Turkey and Egypt as links with other continents Russia is in a very special position, being both in Europe and Asia, and so is Turkey. Egypt is in a similar position between Asia and Africa. In the final analysis, all boundaries are artificial and the designation of the Urals as the dividing line between European Russia and Asian Russia is the same. But for historical and practical reasons, we have to accept these divisions, without losing sight of the essential unity. New Russia can play the role of a crucial link between the two subcontinents of Eurasia. History shows vividly the role of Russia in the fate of Europe, whether in the era of Napoleon or Hitler, or in the half-century after the Second World War. Lessons of the past can be ignored only at the peril of all sides both for the present and the future. That the geo-political role of Russia in Asia is of a crucial nature is obvious. It has played a balancing role between India and China, the two most populous nations of the world, and will continue to play an important role in central, southern and eastern Asia. Turkey may be a candidate for the European Union, but the larger part of its territory is in Asia and the geographical, historical, economic and cultural links, especially with central and western Asia, overshadow its European ambitions. It can also be a positive link between Europe and Asia, which it literally is. Importance for Africa and Australasia Africa and Asia have been arm-in-arm in the struggle against Imperialism, colonialism and Racialism. During the Cold War, their cooperation flourished under the banner on the ‘non-alignment movement’. Some say that movement has lost its relevance after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Others, however, believe that the basic ideals and principles of that movement have become more relevant after loss of the balance of power existing then. In the political sphere, that movement enabled small, weak and poor countries to safeguard their dignity, independence and the freedom to pursue their own independent foreign policies. The need for such a safeguard still exists, and may have become greater in the face of the threat of ‘unilateralism’ of the single superpower. In the economic sphere, that movement rallied countries of the so called ‘Third World’ in a struggle for a just international

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economic order, against the growing disparity between the rich and the poor, the north and the south. Those problems still exist and are becoming acuter by the day. Ultimately, peace and tranquility in the world also depend on a just and equitable economic order. No one is so benevolent that they will make a gift of such an economic order to anybody. Only concerted action by the have-nots will lead to the amelioration of their situation. Then there is the forgotten issue of disarmament, without which there can be no fair allocation of the resources of the planet. So in the struggle in all these issues, concerted cooperation between the African Union and a future Asian Union can play a significant role. Australasia has a role similar to that of Russia, Turkey and Egypt, as a link between continents, as Australia and New Zealand are ethnically more European but geographically close to Asia.

Asian Relations Conference of 1947 and its 40th Anniversary The first Asian Relations Conference was held in New Delhi in March 1947, even before India achieved independence. Bidding farewell to the delegates, Mrs Sarojini Naidu of India had said: we have set the great wheel of destiny in motion again and the hands of time will not stop the revolution of the wheel. In years to come . . . the work we have done today will remain, will survive and will be the beacon star to all those who seek freedom, fellowship, equality . . .13

The expectations arising from that conference were not to be immediately realized. The newly independent countries of Asia had to go through difficult periods of conflict and tension. The Cold War following the end of the Second World War led to various alliances and entanglements, which kept Asian counties far apart and even raised high barriers among them. Fortunately that cold war is over. It may be appropriate to mention that in October 1987, an Asian Relations Commemorative Conference was held in New Delhi to observe the 40th anniversary of the first Asian Relations Conference of 1947, to consider once again the question of Asian countries working in tandem for common causes. Curiously, this commemorative conference was held just on the eve of the end of the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union which had interrupted the coming together of the Asian countries. At that time no one believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall was imminent. Intellectuals, scholars, artists and public figures from all over Asia attended the Commemorative Conference. The

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initiative for this Conference had also come from India. A National Steering Committee had been formed and the then Vice-President of India, Shri R. Venkatraman, was its first Chairman. When he became President, his successor Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma took over the Chairmanship. Speaking at the inaugural ceremony, the then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi said: at the Asian Relations Conference [of 1947] Nehru brushed aside apprehensions that the gathering of Asians was directed against any other continent or people. In the most famous passage of his speech, he had pointed out: ‘For far too long we of Asia have been petitioners in Western courts and chancelleries. That story must belong to the past’, and had added: ‘We have no desire against anybody, ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress all over the world’.

Rajiv Gandhi further said, ‘it is the same message, which we send again to all the continents of the world as we gather together at the Commemorative Conference.’ He added: The Asian drama continues, a drama of swift change, drama of self-discovery and of self-assertion. The Asian dilemma also continues, the dilemma of modernization, without sacrificing what is valuable in our tradition, the essential Asian challenge lies in reconciling change with continuity.14

The then Vice President of India, Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma, said at the opening ceremony on 2 October, which also marked the anniversary of the birth of Mahatma Gandhi: ‘As Asia comes into its own, and regains the due position, not just the problems of Asia, but also those of the world, will find Asian solutions.’ Another Asian Relations Conference? It is time to pick up the threads of 1947 and 1987 now and weave a new tapestry, which will also take in various other threads started in the meantime by the wheel of time. These are the various initiatives at regional or sub-regional cooperation in Asia, mentioned above on pages 253 and 261. ASEAN, SAARC, ARF, GCC, CICA, ACD and SCO and all other similar efforts have to culminate in dialogue for an Asian body. The year 2007 will mark the 60th anniversary of the first Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi. It would be appropriate to use this occasion for launching an ‘Asian Union’, ‘Asian Economic Community’, or ‘Organization of Asian Unity’. India took the initiative in 1947 and 1987, and could do the same in 2007, for reasons both of history and geography. If one looks at the world map, India is

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right in the center of Asia. Historically, from times immemorial, India has interacted in a positive manner with the rest of Asia, before and from the time of the great Buddha, through the Middle Ages in the era of Islamic domination, to the anti-colonial struggle of the modern times. India should fulfill her destiny. However, this is not just India’s destiny, but that of Asia as a whole. Therefore, any other country is equally qualified and entitled to take the new initiative before, in or after 2007. Smaller countries of Asia will have a major stake in the future Asian Union, as the smaller countries of Europe have in Europe. The headquarters of EU are not in Berlin, Paris or London, but in Brussels. Others institutions of the EU are scattered all over Europe. Many Asian cities will be in line for those roles. To mention a few, Manila, Bankok, Singapore, Kathmandu, Dubai, Bahrain are all potential seats of institutions of the future Asian Union. Even a united Jerusalem will have a major role to the immense benefit of both Israelis and Arabs.

Notes 1. ‘Don’t see us as a Threat: Beijing Tells New Delhi,’ Hindustan Times, 6 June 2003. 2. ‘European Community, a Process of Building Peace,’ The Hindu, 21 February 2001. 3. Quoted by Huntington. 4. ‘Tackling Terror’, T. Sreedhar, The Hindu, 31 January 2003. 5. Democratic Faith and Education, John Dewey, 1944. 6. Fouad Ajami, ‘Iraq and the Arabs’ Future,’ Foreign Affairs, January–February. 7. Asian Annual 2002, Mahabir Singh, editor, Shipra Publications, Delhi. 8. Ambassador’s Journal, Galbraith, 1969. 9. Bismarck and the Development of Germany, Pflanze. 10. Speech of the Director of the UN Information Centre in New Delhi, 29 May 2003, at the observance of the International Day of United Nations’ Peacekeepers. 11. ‘The New Colours of Imperialism’, Mushirul Hasan, The Hindu, 19 April 2003. 12. ‘The World Order After Iraq’, Prem Bhatia Memorial Lecture by Hon. Lakshman Kadirgamar, Former Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka, New Delhi, 11 August 2003. 13. Asian Relations, edited by Eric Gonsalves and published by India International Centre, New Delhi, 1991. 14. Ibid.

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Bibliography Ajami, Fouad (2003) ‘Iraq and the Arabs’, Foreign Affairs, January–February. ‘Asia Pacific Anti-Terror Politics’ (2002) The Hindu, 11 November. ‘Asian Social Forum’ Conference Proceedings (2003) Hyderabad, India, January. Balakrishnan, Pulapre (2001) ‘A Tale of Two Asias’, The Hindu, 14 February. Bergen, Peter (2001) Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden, New York: Free Press. Clark, Tom L. (2003) ‘Pax Americana – Towards a Permanent War’, Times of India, 10 February. Dewey, John (1946) Problems of Men, New York: Philosophical Library. ‘European Community, a Process of Building Peace’ (2001) The Hindu, 21 February. Galbraith, J.K. (1969) Ambassador’s Journal, New York: Houghton Mifflin. Gittings, John (1968) The Sino-Soviet Dispute, London: Oxford University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster. Joshi, Manoj (2003) ‘Shattered World Order’, Times of India, 14 February. Kennedy, P. (1988) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Random House. Kissinger, Henry (1994) Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster. Mohan, C. Raja (2003) ‘India, China and Asian Security’, The Hindu, 27 January. Shinawatra, Thaksin (2002) ‘Asia Co-operation Dialogue – The New Asian Realism’, address by Proceedings, Prime Minister of Thailand at the East Asia Economic Summit, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 6 October. Taylor, A.J.P. (1954) The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, New York: Oxford University Press. Yelev, Yelio (former President of Bulgaria) (1996) Facism, New York: Columbia University Press. Zagoria, Donald S. (1962) The Sino-Soviet Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 12: On the Road to Global Security? Hussein Solomon

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n November 1989, the Berlin Wall crumbled, heralding the demise of Sovietstyle communism in Eastern Europe. Scholars like Francis Fukuyama and John Lewis Gaddis1 were quick to announce the start of a new golden era which saw the end of brutality, the global triumph of Western liberal democracy and economic prosperity. In the same vein, President George Bush boldly announced his vision of a New World Order. Soon after Bush made this announcement in 1992, Los Angeles erupted into racial riots and Bush lost the presidency. Far from heralding a new global era of peace and prosperity, the end of the Cold War has ushered in a world racked by conflict. Released from the straitjacket of bipolarity, international politics is on a turbulent trajectory. That these conflicts have intensified under the presidency of George W. Bush is only too evident. There are in my view, five important clusters of insecurity in the post-Cold War world. These are listed below, but not in any specific order of priority. These five clusters have an important binding point in that they present grave threats to national and regional security, and ultimately to global security. Drugs Worldwide, the value of illegal trading in drugs may be as high as US$500 billion per annum. The United States is the largest consumer, with thirty million users spending an estimated US$28 billion per annum on cocaine, US$68 billion on marijuana and between US$10 billion and US$12 billion on heroin.2 But this is not only a problem of developed countries. Many developing countries have also experienced this scourge. In South Africa, it is now thought that 100 of the estimated 273 crime syndicates operating in the country are involved in narco-trafficking.3 The domestic toll of drug addiction is alarming. It includes loss of productivity, soaring health costs, a sharp rise in drug-related crimes and the accelerated

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spread of HIV/AIDS via contaminated needles. But drug use is not simply a social phenomenon; it has wider political and security implications. For instance, in Latin America there is an intimate relationship between the narcotraficantes (drug-traffickers) and leftist revolutionary groups such as Colombia’s M-19 and Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).4 Neither are these isolated examples: in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East, in the Balkans, the Southern Republics of the former Soviet Union, Burma (Myanmar) and Sri Lanka, drugs have been the main source of funds for more than one armed movement.

Environment The waning of Cold War military tensions has coincided with the growing visibility of problems that threaten the security of many states and require international solutions – the hole in the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, deforestation, and scarcity of water, energy and other resources. Increased environmental hazards have underlined the importance of two forms of interaction between states in the world: co-operative and conflictive. In 1985 scientists discovered a hole in the planet’s ozone layer over Antarctica. This layer protects life on earth by acting as a shield to the sun’s harmful ultra-violet rays. Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are regarded as the primary cause of ozone depletion. Subsequent research has revealed that similar holes in the ozone layer are developing over much of the industrialized North. The ozone layer is said to be disappearing at a rate of 4 to 5 percent over US latitudes, which would result in an additional 200,000 deaths from skin cancer over the next fifty years in that country alone.5 This has serious implications for the health-care systems and the economies of countries that are similarly affected. The related greenhouse effect is also a real threat. It is no coincidence that the seven hottest years this century have all occurred since 1984.6 Because of global warming the earth’s surface is expected to rise between 2° C and 2.5° C in the course of this century. Global warming would result in a significant melting of the Antarctic ice sheet thereby raising sea-levels. A one-foot rise in the sea level (which is in the middle of the expected range) would pose a serious threat for low-lying regions such as Bangladesh, the Nile Delta, China, Japan and the Netherlands. A third of the globe’s population live within forty miles of the sea, where the soil is the most fertile and the land the lowest. As sea-levels rise the world will witness millions of environmental migrants.7 The loss of valuable arable land would adversely affect the capacity of the world to feed itself: mass famine could become more widespread.

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Intimately related to the greenhouse effect is deforestation, a problem described by Jessica Tuchmann Matthews as ‘the most serious form of renewable resource decline’.8 Each year an area the size of Austria is deforested, resulting in intensified global warming. Through deforestation, plants, the only organisms that can remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, are destroyed. Moreover, when trees are chopped down, burnt or allowed to decay, they release carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, further contributing to global warming.

Population The world’s population grew from 5.3 billion in 1990 to 6.2 billion in the year 2000, and is expected to reach 8.5 billion in the year 2025.9 This growth rate of nearly one billion per decade presents grave environmental, economic, sociocultural and political consequences. For instance, resource problems in countries such as Mexico and Egypt are directly linked to population growth. A 1982 draft report on the political conflict in El Salvador noted that ‘the fundamental causes of the present conflict are as much environmental as political stemming from problems of resource distribution in an overcrowded land. El Salvador has a population density that exceeds India’s.’10 Within the African context, it has been noted that high population density in the midst of scarce resources was one of the factors contributing to the Rwandan genocide of 1994.11 The twist in the tale lies in the fact that population growth levels are fundamentally uneven. Little of the projected population growth will take place in the north. The developed industrialized states’ share of the world population is decreasing dramatically. In 1950 it was 22 percent, 15 percent in 1985, and is projected to be a minuscule 5 percent by the year 2085.12 The future imbalance between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ will increase, thereby exacerbating the North–South divide. Most, therefore, of the projected population growth will take place in the countries of the south. For instance, Ethiopia’s population is expected to increase from 47 million in 1990 to 112 million by 2025; Nigeria’s from 113 million to 301 million; Bangladesh from 116 million to 235 million; and India’s from 853 million to 1,446 million.13 Environmental degradation, economic decline, social fragmentation and political instability will be the norm in the Third World as these states seek to provide the basic needs of its citizens within the context of a weaker financial base.

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Global Economic Challenges The existence of the North–South divide, and in some cases, its expansion, is clear. It is highlighted by the fact that the richest 20 percent of the world control 80 percent of the world’s resources.14 This is also demonstrated by the fact that the richest 20 percent of the world are now 150 times richer than the poorest 20 percent. It is also underlined by the fact that 1.3 billion human beings in developing countries live in conditions of absolute scarcity. Saddest of all, it can be seen in the fact that 34,000 children die every day in the developing world because of malnutrition and disease. The need to address the North–South divide stems not only from humanitarian reasons, but also from the threat to prosperity that poverty poses everywhere. The North–South divide, however, is just one of the global economic challenges we have to confront in the twenty-first century. Economic scarcity in the form of shrinking global markets and increasing production costs is intensifying economic rivalries. Technology races and various forms of commercial warfare have replaced the arms race of the Cold War days. According to Japanese politician Isihara Shintaro, the twenty-first century will be an era of economic warfare.15 Should this prediction materialize, international security will be severely jeopardized. Huge economic power blocs have already developed in the Pacific Rim and North America as a counterweight to the European Union (EU). Similar economic formations have also developed in Africa and the Central and South America. The existence of these large economic formations need not necessarily mean economic rivalries; indeed, they could complement each other. However, in conditions of scarcity such rivalries could develop and historically have become ‘hot’.

Fusion and Fission Two of the most contradictory elements in the contemporary period are fusion and fission – the peaceful coming together and the violent disintegration of communities. Regarding fusion, a nascent global culture seems to be taking shape. Denim jeans and Coca-Cola are universal. If Toshiba and Toyota are in New York, then McDonald’s and Microsoft will be found in Tokyo. If stewed lamb is being cooked in a New Delhi delicatessen, then you can bet that a posh London restaurant is serving a hot Indian curry. If Michael Jackson and Madonna are burning the airwaves in Montevideo, Maputo or Kuala Lampur, then West

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African and Indian music represented by the likes of Manu Dibango and Baba Shegal are sure to be found playing in a Parisian or Manchester discotheque. But this trend towards a nascent global culture is even deeper than this: human rights and gender issues are criss-crossing geographical, political and cultural divides. Part of the reason is that communications and technological innovations have compressed space and time, making international travel cheaper and allowing CNN broadcasts to reach people in ninety different countries. Fission is seemingly contradicting this trend: scarce resources, varying population growth levels within a heterogeneous society and the resultant growth of virulent ethnic nationalisms are all combining to tear communities and their states apart. This has been evident during the Rwandan genocide between Hutus and Tutsis as well as in the former Yugoslavia between Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims. Fission is also fuelled by the rise of religious fundamentalism. Religion, which can bring meaning to one’s life and preaches peace, love and generosity, has morphed into something ugly and violent. In Japan, we have seen members of the cult of Aum Shinrikyo (the Supreme Truth) release sarin gas in Tokyo’s subways. In India’s Gujarat State, we saw Hindu fundamentalists kill hundreds of their fellow Muslim citizens. In northern Uganda, there is Joseph Kony and his Christian fundamentalist Lord’s Resistance Army aiming to overthrow the secular government of Yoweri Museveni and to replace it with a government observant of the biblical Ten Commandments. In the process, the commandment ‘Thou Shall Not Kill’ has been violated thousands of times. From the United States, we see people motivated by strong Christian principles bombing abortion clinics or federal buildings as in the case of Timothy McVeigh – the infamous Oklahoma bomber. The world has also witnessed Jewish fundamentalism in the form of Yigal Amir’s assassination of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin after he signed the Oslo Peace Accords. The rise of a violent Islamic fundamentalism was vividly illustrated by the tragic events of 9/11 in New York and Washington and by the atrocities committed by Muslim fundamentalists on the streets of London on 7 July 2005. Al-Qaeda terrorism has in turn unleashed the phenomenon of ‘war on terror’. One of the greatest fears amongst intelligence officials whether in London or Berlin or Jakarta in the battle against terrorism is the possibility that non-state actors acquire access to nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. One may well ask at this moment what the significance of the preceding exposé on the five clusters of insecurity is to our subject at hand. In the 1940s, David Mitrany constructed a functional theory of international relations. This proposed that, given the common problems confronting humanity everywhere, it would result in greater co-operative relations between states. This theme has

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been picked up and expanded by globalists in the 1980s and 1990s – even to the extent of proposing a world federal government for the Planet Earth.16 At the heart of such theories is the notion that the gravity of global problems necessitates global solutions, resulting in a greater degree of co-operation among the countries of the world. For instance, one country cannot solve the problems of the widening hole in the earth’s ozone layer: it will have to be a planet-wide combined effort. This volume began with an exposition of human security, which has as its basis a collective view of security and an expanded view of security – one that embraces both traditional military threats and non-military threats. The devastation insited by Hurricane Katrina on New Orleans underlined the importance of these non-military threats to security. In his passionate appeal for an Asian Union Beni Prasad Agarwal clearly adopts this approach – noting how common problems can be resolved more effectively at the regional level. However there is a cautionary note sounded by Michael Intriligator’s chapter on US nuclear policies under President George W. Bush. Co-operative and multilateral approaches to security have been sidelined by a Republican administration bent on pursuing the goal of US global dominance through unilateral action in the nuclear arena. However the enunciation of the Bush Doctrine has not made the US a safer place. This is a point illustrated by Joseph Cheng when he notes that 9/11 demonstrated the irrelevance of advanced weapon systems such as the National Missile Defense System. Despite this, a perusal of the local press would demonstrate that the unilateral impulse in US foreign and security policy has intensified following 9/11. The US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq without UN Security Council approval is a case in point. However, this too holds negative consequences for Washington. Over 140,000 troops are currently bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq, leaning the US with little room to manoeuvre as Tehran and Pyongyang go down the nuclear road. Moreover, according to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) own estimations Iraq has become a breeding ground on which to train foreign terrorists. But we need to be clear that the actions of the US are not unique. Other countries, too, are adopting unilateral positions and increasingly bellicose ones. Note how China was prepared to protect the genocidal regime in Khartoum despite the thousands of lives being lost in Darfur on account of its need for the cheap energy resources it derives from the Sudan. Or for that matter examine Beijing’s increasingly aggressive stance towards Taiwan. The question that needs to be posed is how does one bridge the divide between national security interests and collective security needs? At a conceptual level, Joseph Camilleri’s chapter points to the insight which dialogical discourse brings to the reading of the contemporary human predicament. More prosaically, the way out of the crisis

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historically has been where the state engages in compromise at two levels. Internally, it seeks to compromise with its constituency – its citizenry. Implicit in this process is democratization. This is a point eloquently set forth by Joseph Cheng when he states, ‘even an illiterate peasant in a remote Chinese village treasures his right to articulate his grievances and he yearns for the power to remove corrupt local officials’. However in a globalizing world where insecurity anywhere threatens security everywhere, compromise needs to be effected at the international level too. Ultimately, the US would need to understand that it cannot fight terrorism effectively when its antagonizes its allies, when it ignores the authority of the United Nations, and when it pours scorn on world opinion. On the issue of regionalization, one theme has strongly emerged – that of common values. Without common values, regional integration (whether political, economic or security) will flounder. In his chapter on the Middle East Mohammed El-Sayed Selim bemoans the plethora of different regional organizations. However, this may merely be a symptom of the competing value systems in the region. Consider here the vast discrepancies in the political system of say Iran and Saudi Arabia or Syria and Jordan. Similarly Benedicte Bull’s chapter on Latin America notes how regionalism is adversely impacted upon by the existence of two competing visions – that of a Latin America-led regionalism originating in Simón Bolívar’s Pan-American visions, and US visions of a co-operating Latin American originating in the Monroe Doctrine. These differing value systems may also cause problems at the international level even when all member states within a region share common values. Olga Vorkunova makes clear how the dearth of common values – whether on issues of democracy or security – between Brussels and Moscow is preventing a genuine partnership from emerging between the European Union and the Russian Federation. Meanwhile Hripsime Nalbandyan also discusses how the differing value systems as between the EU and the Bush Administration are resulting in soul-searching questions amongst Europeans on the nature of their partnership with the US. The nexus between the global and the regional on the issue of democracy – as one such value – is explored by both Jain and Solomon in their respective chapters. Jain argues that globalization promotes democracy directly and indirectly. One such example Jain gives to support his position is where modern information technology loosens the control of the traditionally hegemonic groups. Solomon concurs with Jain’s position on the democratizing power of globalization but notes how in the Southern African region, the regional organization – the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – actively resisted demands from the global community that Zimbabwe democratize. One could

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draw a similar conclusion from the way the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) protects the military junta in Myanmar from international criticism. Where a disjuncture occurs between the different levels of security – state, regional and international – global security is imperilled. Ultimately global security emerges when these three different levels of security reinforce each other in their respective quests to enhance human security. That we are not there yet in the beginning of the twenty-first century is all too obvious. Notes 1. J.L. Gaddis (1992). The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsideration, Provocations, New York: Oxford University Press. 2. J.J. Romm (1993). Defining National Security: The Nonmilitary Aspects, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, p. 9. 3. S. Baynham (1995). ‘Narco-trafficking in Africa: Security, Social and Economic Implications’, African Security Review, Vol. 4, No. 6, pp. 33–4. 4. Romm, p. 10. 5. ‘Ozone Destruction Worsens’, Science, 12 April 1991, p. 204; ‘The Vanishing Ozone’, Time, 17 February 1992, pp. 60–8. 6. Romm, p. 16. 7. G. Porter (1990). ‘Post Cold War Global Security’, Fletcher Forum, Summer 1990, p. 336; J. Jacobson (1990). ‘Holding Back the Sea’, The Futurist, September– October 1990, p. 23. 8. J.T. Matthews (1989). ‘Redefining Security’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, Spring 1989, p. 164. 9. H. Solomon (1995). ‘The Challenges of Global Change to International Relations,’ Politeia, Vol. 14, No. 1, p. 43. 10. Quoted in Romm, p. 26. 11. H. Solomon and J. Cilliers (1996). ‘Sources of Southern African Insecurity and the Quest for Regional Integration’, in H. Solomon and J. Cilliers (eds) People, Poverty and Peace: Human Security in Southern Africa, IDP Monograph Series, 4, June 1996. 12. Solomon, p. 44. 13. Ibid. 14. Nineteenth Congress of the Socialist International (1995), Freedom and Solidarity in a Changing World, Socialist International. London. 15. Romm, pp. 66–7. 16. H. Solomon (1996). ‘Towards the 21st Century: A New Global Security Agenda?’, Occasional Paper No. 6, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria.

Index

5 + 5 Formula 202, 203 Abu Sayyaf group 121 Ackerman, US Congressman 102 Afghanistan War 55, 61, 118, 211, 246 Afghanistan–Soviet war (1979–88) 139, 193 African National Congress (ANC) 14, 224 African Standby Force (ASF) 237 African Union 232–, 236–40 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 239 Agarwal, Beni Prasad 276 Agenda for Peace, An 33 Agreement on Benelux 148 Agreement on Economic, Social and Cultural Co-operation and Common Selfprotection 148 Ajami, Fouad 254 Al Qaeda 39, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 107, 118, 120, 135, 139, 211, 254, 275 Alagappa, Muthiah 112 Albright Madeleine 36 Aljazeera 39 Al-Jazeera Shield Force 195 Allende, Salvador 190 Alliance for Progress 72 Allied Agreement (France/GB) 148 alternative security school 4 Althusius 11 al-Zawahiri, Ayman 254 American Treaty for Peaceful Resolutions 72 American War of Independence 11 Amin, Idi 5, 240 Amir, Yigal 275 Annan, Kofi 261 apartheid 8, 14, 224–8 Arab Charter for Human Rights 208 Arab Common Defence and Economic Co-operation Treaty (1950) 193, 202

Arab Defence Council 202 Arab Economic and Social Council 214 Arab–Israeli conflict 207–8, 214 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 194–5, 203 Arab regional project 202–4 Arbenz, Jacobo 73 Arctic Council 178 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand 75, 81 Armitage, Richard 99, 106, 130 arms control 5 ASEAN 9, 117, 123–30, 247 foreign direct investment (FDI) 121 impact of September 11th 2001 128–9 projects 278 ASEAN–China Free Trade Area 128 ASEAN Eminent Persons Group 124 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) 125, 126 ASEAN–Japan Joint Declaration on Comprehensive Economic Partnership 125 ASEAN plus 3 approach 125, 126, 127, 128 ASEAN plus China 127 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 129, 191 ASEAN–US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism 120 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (APEC) 114, 126, 127, 191 Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) 247 Asian Development Bank 125, 126 Asian financial crisis impact on China 132–3, 134–5 impact on Southeast Asia 113–17, 136–8 Asian Relations Commemorative Conference 265 Asian Relations Conference (1947) 265–6 Asian Union 246–67 Africa, Australasia and 264–5 conflict resolution within 254–8

280

INDEX

Asian Union (cont.): democracy and 252–4 European interests 263–4 Iraq war and 251–2 Russia, Turkey and Egypt and 264 terrorism and 250–1 US interests 262–3 Asociación de Mutuales Israelitas Argentinas (AMIA) 82 Association of South East Asian Nations see ASEAN Atlantic Alliance 259 Aurn Shinrikyo 275 Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) 82 autogolpes (self-coups) in Peru (1992); Guatemala (1993) 75 Azad, Maulana Abdul Kalam 255–6 Badie, Bertrand 38, 39 Baghdad Pact (1955) 193, 194 balance of power 2, 33 Balazino, Sergio Silvio 205 Bali bombing 120, 121, 138, 139, 141 Baltic Billion Fund 182 Baltic Sea States Sub-regional Co-operation (BSSSC) 178 Banda, Hastings 227 Barcelona Declaration (1995) 174, 175, 199 Barcelona Process (EU) 169, 175, 178, 179, 183 Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) 178, 183 al-Bashir, Omar 240 Baudrillard, Jean 42 Bay of Pigs invasion 57 Bellamy, Ian 2 Bergen, Peter 254 Berlin Conference (1885) 11 Berlin Wall, fall of 32, 40, 42, 44, 74, 265, 271 Bevin, Ernest 148 Bhagwati, Jagdish 90 Bhutto, Nebazir 103 Biden, Joseph 96 Biko, Steve 226 bin Laden, Osama 36, 135, 139, 254 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 201 Bismarck, Otto von 260 Black Sea Economic Co-operation Organisation 169 Blackwill, Robert 95 Blair (US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs) 4 Blair, Tony 150, 156

Bøås, Morten 68 Bodin, Jean 10 Bokassa, Jean-Bédel 5, 240 Bolívar, Simón 66, 277 Bonn Declaration (1991) 6 Booth, Ken 5, 6 Bosnia conflict 156 Botha, Pik W. 223–4, 225, 226 Boucher, Richard 60 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 11 Bozize, François 239 Breytenbach 5 Brussels Pact 148 Brzezinski, Zbigniew 158 Bush, George Sr 35, 38, 271 administration 43 Bush, George W. 91, 104–5, 130, 132, 271, 276 Bush, George W.administration 36–7, 66, 78 engagement policy in South Asia 94–6 on Indian cross-border terrorism 98, 99, 100 on Kashmir 103–6 on Middle East 212, 214, 218 non-proliferation agenda 62–3 on non-proliferation in South Asia 101, 102 nuclear weapons policy (2002) 56–9 preemption 61–2, 118 re-engagement with India and Pakistan, postIraq War 106–8 response of ASEAN countries to 129–30 response to India's peace initiative 108 targets for nuclear weapons 59–60 triad of US strategic system 60–1 Buzan, Barry 5, 6, 67, 68–9, 138 Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) (India) 101 Camp David Conference 214 Carim, X. 3, 5, 7 Casablanca Declaration 198 Castro, Fidel 75, 78, 81 Center for Strategic Studies 81 Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 80, 85 Central American Integration System (SICA) 75 Central Asia, US influence in 119 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 224 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 194, 195 Charter for Peace and Stability in the Mediterranean 210, 217

INDEX

Chávez, Hugo 70, 81 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 201 Chiang Mai Initiative 126 Chile–US Free Trade Agreement 81 Chilumpha, Cassim 234 China creeping assertiveness 127 economic strength 132–3, 134–5 environmental protection 136 Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence 127 impact of Asian financial crisis 132–3 impact of September 11th 2001 131–2, 135–6 military threat to US 118 oil and gas 119 relations with Bush administration 130–2 state reforms 134 Chipman, J. 7 Chirac, Jacques 150 Christopher, Warren 59 clash of civilizations 43, 49, 249–50 Clinton, Bill 35, 75, 108 administration 43, 56, 59, 77, 93–4 Club of Rome 31 Cohen, Stephen 258 Cold War 15, 27, 29, 55 global conditions under 189–92 Latin America under 70–3 collective security 5 Colombian conflict 77 US policy on 82–3 Commission for Hemispheric Security 77 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 150–2, 156, 174 common security 5, 8 Common Security and Defence Policy 160 COMPERSEG 85 competitive interdependence 34 competitive multipolarity 33 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 61, 64, 93, 201 concert of powers 33 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA) 247 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) 152–3 Confucianism 47 Congress of Vienna 13 containment 2 Contras 74, 78, 79 co-operative multipolarity 33 Cottey, Andrew 5

281

Council of Baltic Sea States 183 Cultural Revolution 132 Dabelko, Dr Geoffrey D. 5 Damascus Declaration 203 Darfur, Sudan, conflict in 239–40 Davos Forum 197, 213 Dayton Agreements 35 Dazhou, Yang 34 De Klerk, F.W. 226, 227 Deby, Idriss 239 Declaration of Good Conduct in the South China Seas 127 Declaration of the Rights of Citizens in Arab Countries 208 deforestation 273 democracy in Asia 252–3 Islam 253–4 value of 252 Democratic Security 75 democratization 1–2, 90 Deng, F.M. 10 Deng Xiaoping 112, 132 Desert Storm 35 deterrence 2 Dewey, John 252 dialogical frame of reference 44–9 dialogue of civilizations 27, 44–9, 250 drugs 271–2 see also narco-terrorism Dugard, John 15 Duvalier, Jean-Claude 5 Earth Summit 113 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 130 Eastham, Alan 95 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 9 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 9, 238 economic growth, limits 31–2 ECOSOC 260 Ecuador/Peru war (1995) 71 Eisenhower, Dwight 3, 193 Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) 77, 82 El Salvador civil war in 71, 74 homicide rates 76 soccer war 70, 71 empire, limits to 29

282

INDEX

environment 272–3 Estrada, Joseph 115 Etzioni, Amitai 235 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council 173 Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability 175, 200, 201 Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona Process 200 Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area 199 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 174–5 Euro-Mediterranean Project (EMP) 198–202, 208, 209, 210, 217 Euro-Mediterranean Zone of Peace and Stability 199 European Community 248–9 European Security and Defence Policy 160 European Union 240 Common Strategy on Russia 179 democracy 253 economy 157–8 impact of September 11th attacks 157, 158–60 regionalisation in 166–7 regionalism in 177–83 sub-regionalism 182–3 US hegemony and 155–8 Evans, G. 7, 17–18 Falk, Richard 252 Falkland conflict 71, 72 feminism 6 Feng Youlan 47 Fernandez, George 248 Fischer, German Foreign Minister 156 flexible response 2 foreign direct investment 121 Fouchet plans 150 Fox, Vicente 78, 79 Framework Agreement for Democratic Security in Central America (TMSDCA) 75 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 124 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 66, 75, 78 French Revolution 11 Friends of Latin American 73 Frontline States (FLS) 227 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) 77, 82 Fukuyama, Francis 43, 271 Gaborone Communiqué 233

Gaddis, John Lewis 271 Galbraith, John Kenneth 256 Galtung, Johan 3 Gandhi, Mrs Indira 92 Gandhi, Mahatma 266 Gandhi, Rajiv 266 Gang of Four 132 Gaulle, Charles de 152 General Unified Command for Arab Armies 202 geopolitics after the Cold War 32–5 Georgian conflict 153 glasnost 5, 224 global age 28 Global Agenda for Dialogue Among Civilisations 45 global culture 274–5 global economic challenges 274 global warming 272 globalization 1–2, 28, 43, 90, 190, 258–9 impact in Southeast Asia 113–17 Gorbachev, Mikhail 5, 224 GRAD (Globalization, regionalization and democratization consortium) 18 great depression 29 Greater Middle East Partnership (GME) 213–14, 215 greenhouse effect 272 Grugel, J. 2, 18 Grupo Contadora 73 Grupo del Rio 73 Guatemalan civil war 71, 74 Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) 194–5, 203, 217, 247 Gulf War first 35, 41 second (1990–91) 195 Hague conferences (1899 and 1907) 13 Haiti crisis (2004) 81 Haiti military coup (September 1991) 75 Hamas 211 Hammarskjold, Dag 261 Hasmi, Javed 103 Hass, Richard 104, 106 Hassan, Mushirul 261 Havel, Vaclav 44–5, 155 Haz, Hamzah 120 healing touch policy 104 Hefner, Robert W. 122 hegemony 33

INDEX

Helms, Jesse 78 Helsinki Final Act (1975) 200, 217 Hentz, James J. 68 Herz, John 4 Hitler, Adolf 58 Hizbollah 82 Hobbes.Thomas 7, 10, 11 Hobsbawm, Eric 263 Holocaust 29 Honduras–El Salvador war (soccer war) 70, 71 Hout, W. 2, 18 Hu Jintao 134, 248 Huang Zhengji 34 human security 6, 113 Hun Sen 126 Huntington, Samuel 43, 156, 249 Huq, Zia-ul 92 Hurricane Katrina 276 Hussein, Saddam 10, 41, 58, 62, 252, 254 imperial collusion 33 imperial rivalry 33 imperial tense 32 Inderfurth, Karl F. 108 India and Pakistan cross-border terrorism 98–100 on Kashmir 103–6 non-proliferation 101–3 post-Iraq War 106–8 US ties with 120 Indian Ocean Rim Community (IORC) 191 Indo-US shared concerns 96–8 Industrial Revolution 11 Institute for Defence Policy 8 Institute for Security Studies 8 Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) 80, 82 Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) 72 Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 72, 76 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (IATRA) (Rio Treaty) 72, 79 Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 9 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 59 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 14 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 14 International Criminal Court 16

283

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) 76 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 15 for Rwanda 16 International Development Association 133 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 7–8 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 1, 114 Iraq US invasion (2003) 55, 57, 58, 61, 81, 159, 198, 211, 246, 251–2, 276 aggression against Kurds 15 invasion of Kuwait (1990) 58, 194, 203 Iraq–Iran war (1980–88) 194 Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis (1961) 194 Islam fundamentalism 275 resurgence in Asia 122–3 Ismay, Lord 149 Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles 204 Israeli-Palestinian problem 257 Jais-e-Mohmmad 98, 100 Jamali, Mir Zafrullah Khan 101 Jayasuriya, Kanishka 114, 136 Jemaah Islamiyah 120, 139 Jiang Zemin 132, 135 Junichiro, Koizumi 125 JW Marriot, Jaharta attack (2003) 120 Kabila, Laurent 235 Kagan, Robert 157 Kambanda, Jean 16 Kant, Immanuel 11, 12 Kargil conflict 92, 93, 94, 101 Kashmir Asian Union and 255–7 dispute 92, 103–6 Kennedy, John, administration 72 Kennedy, Paul 5, 259–60 Keohane, R.O. 5 Khan, A.Q. 102, 103 Khatami, Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad 45–6 Kim Daw Jung 125 Kissinger, Henry 258 Kony, Joesph 275 Korea 257–8 Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA) 14

284

INDEX

Kosovo war 35, 41, 156, 157 Krasna, J. S. 5 Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) 139 Kuwait Iraq crisis (1961) 194 Iraq invasion of (1990) 58, 194, 203 Lake, David A. 68 Lashkar-e-Toiba 98, 100 Laskar Johad 120 Lasswell, Harold D. 3 Latin America crime rates 76 human rights 81–2 impact of Iraq invasion 80–1 impact of September 11th 79–80 migration 84 security in 1990s 74–8 security in Cold War 70–3 League of Arab States 194, 195, 203, 204, 208, 209, 210 League of Nations Covenant 13 Council 13 legitimacy, limits to 30–1 Leibniz, Gottfried 2–3 Lesotho Liberation Army 224 Lewis, Bernard 43, 249 Lind, Anna 182 Lipponen, Paavo 181 Lizee, Pierre P. 5 Locke, John 10, 11 Lockerbie disaster 15, 202 Lord's Resistance Army 275 Luard, Evan 13 Luciani, Giacomo 2 M-19 272 Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria 121 MacMohan Line 247 Maghreb Union (UMA) 9 Maher, Ahmad 216 Makinda, Samuel 13 Mandela, Nelson 222, 227 Marshall Plan 140 Masayoshi, Ohira 112 Mashala Gang 224 massive retaliation 2 Matthews, Jessica Tuchmann 273 Mbeki, Thabo 237 McNamara, Robert Strange 3

McVeigh, Timothy 275 Mediterranean-Black Sea-Caspian Sea (MBC) region 167–77 Mengistu, Haile 17 Mercosur 9, 66, 85 Middle East, mega-trends during/after Cold War 192–5 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) conferences 197–8 Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO) 193 Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) 213 Middle East Peace Process 169 Middle Eastern project 195–8 Middle Eastern security arrangements comparative analysis 207–10 future of 210–15 internationalization 215–16 policy implications 216–18 Millennium Challenge Account 212 Milosevic, Slobodan 10, 14 mini-nuke 60 Mishra, Brajesh 106 Mitrany, David 275 Mobutu , Joseph 5, 15, 240 Mohamad, Mahathir 120 Mohammed, Kahild Shaikh 100 Mohan, Giles 1 Monroe Doctrine 66, 277 Montbrial, Thierry de 32 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, Baron de 3 Morgan, Patrick M. 68 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 121 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 121 Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) 234 Mpinganjira, Brown 234 Mubarak, Hosni 254 Mufti, Mohammad 104 Mugabe, Robert 228, 229, 234, 239, 240 multipolarity 34 Muluzi, Bakili 234 Museveni, Yoweri 275 Musharraf, General Pervez 92, 94, 98, 99, 100, 103, 105, 108 Mutharika, Bingu wa 234 mutually assured destruction (MAD) 2 Nagorno Karabakh conflict 153 Naidu, Mrs Sarojini 265 narco-terrorism 82, 84–5 narco-trafficking 5, 8, 77–8, 271–2

INDEX

Nasser, Gamal 190, 194 Nathan, Laurie 5 National Endowment for Democracy 81 National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) 234 National Missile Defence (NMD) programme 118, 276 National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) 57, 61, 63 National Security Strategy Paper (NSSP) 211 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSWMD) 58, 61, 63 NATO 35, 39, 147, 148–50, 154–6, 159–62, 215–16, 238, 252 NATO–Mediterranean Dialogue 191, 204–7, 209, 210 Negroponte, John 78–9 Nehru, Jawaharwal 190, 256, 266 Nepal, political turmoil in 95–6 Netanyahu, Benjamin 198 New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD) 232 Newnham, J. 7, 17–18 Nicaraguan civil war 74 Nicholls, Lord 16 Nicolaidis, Kalypso 14 Ninsin, Kwame 2 Nixon, Richard 72 non-aligned movement (NAM) 97 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 112, 138 non-offensive defence 5 Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty of (NPT) 59 non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 190 Noriega, Roger 78 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 85 Northern Dimension Initiative 178, 179 North–South divide 273, 274 Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) 101 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 59–60, 61, 64, 93, 201 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) 56, 57, 59, 60–1, 63 Nunn-Lugar Cooperative threat reduction program 58 Nye, J.S. 5 Obi 5 oil crisis 4, 119, 226 transportation in MBC 176–7

285

On, Hanan Bar 206 Operation Murambatsvina 234, 239 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 153–4, 161, 169 Organization of African Unity (OAU) 8, 231 Organization of Oil Exploring Countries (OPEC) 4 Organization of the American States (OAS) 72–3, 74–5, 79, 80, 82 Oslo Peace Accords 275 overlay 68, 69 ozone layer, holes in 272, 276 Pahad, Aziz 223 Pakistan see India and Pakistan Palestine, Asian Union and 257 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 197 Palme Commission 5 Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 14, 224 Paraguayan political crisis (1996) 75 Partnership for Peace project (PFP) 155, 161, 173 Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union 236–7 Peace-Keeping Operations (PKOs) 261 Pen, Jean-Marie le 240 Peou, Sorpong 5 Peres, Simon 197 perestroika 5, 224 Permissive Action Link (PAL) technology 64 Philippines, terrorism and 121 Pinochet, General Augusto 15. 16, 17 Pisuwan, Surin 123 Plan Colombia 83 Plan of Actions 158 Pleven Plan 150 Pol Pot 5 population, world 273 Powell, Colin 79, 99, 102, 211, 212, 213, 261 preemption, US policy of 57–8, 61–2, 118 Project for a New American Century (PNAC) 56 Protocol of Cartagena (1985) 74 Puebla-Panama Plan 79 Qasim 194 Qian Mu 47 Rabin, Yitzhak 275 Reagan, Ronald 2, 4, 193 Regional Andrean Initiative 83

286

INDEX

regional dialogues 191 regional security 67–9 regionalization 1–2, 17–18, 277 Reich, Otto 78 religious fundamentalism 275 RENAMO 224, 225 residual hegemony 34 Rice, Condoleeza 107 Road Map 212 Robertson, Robbie 90 Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator 60 Rocca, Christina B. 95 Rome Declaration 155 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 11 Ruggie, J. 136 Rumsfeld, Donald 37–8 Russia, MBC region and 167–77 Russian Foreign Policy Concept 169 Russian Security Concept 169 al-Sadat, Anwar 218 SADC 9, 222–40, 277 SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 228–33 chairperson 229 Inter-State Defence and Security Community (ISDSC) 230, 231, 234 Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) 230, 231 Ministerial Committee 230 Troika 229–30 Salim, Salim Ahmed 8 Schaffer, Teresita 103 Schell, Jonathan 262 Security Council 62 security dilemma 4 security interdependence 4–5 security, definition 6 security, evolution of concept 2–10 Sendero Luminoso 71, 272 September 11 atrocity 32, 36, 38, 56, 91, 157, 249 impact on ASEAN 128–9 impact on China 131–2, 135–6 impact on European Union 157, 158–60 impact in Latin America 79 impact on Middle East 211 impact on Southeast Asia 118–23, 138–9, 141 Shah, Aqil 103 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 119, 247

Sharif, Nawaz 94, 103 Sharma, Dr Shankar Dayal 266 Sharon, Ariel 214 Sharpeville Massacre (1960) 226 Shinawatra, Thaksin 120 Shintaro, Isihara 274 Shiyyab, Mohammed 206 Silva, Luis Ignácio Lula da 79 Simon, Sheldon 129 Smith, Dan 15 Sobhuza, II, King 227 soccer war (El Salvador and Honduras) 70, 71 Solana, Javier 151, 157 South African Defence Force (SADF) 224, 238 South African National Defence Force (SANF) 10 South Asia, US policy in 93–4, 96–8 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 247, 256 Southeast Asia impact of Asian financial crisis 113–17, 136–8 impact of globalization 113–17 impact of September 11 attacks 118–23, 138–9, 141 intrusive regionalism in 123 Southeast Asian Regional Centre for Counterterrorism 130 Southern African Development Community see SADC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) 227, 228 Southern Dimension 178 Sovereign Ruler 11 sovereignty 10–17 limits to 29–30 Stacey, Roy 225 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 134 Stepan, Alfred 103 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) 3 Strategic Consensus 193 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (Star Wars programme) 2 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) (Moscow Treaty 2002) 57 Strategic Studies 7–8 Strategy for Development of Relations 180 Suarez, Francisco 11 Suharto, President 15, 115, 116 Sukarnoputri, Megawati 120 Sun Tzu 2

INDEX

Super-ZAPU 224 Taliban 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 107 Tang Junyi 47 Tehranian, Majid 5, 18 Thailand, war on terror and 120–1 Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programme 96 Tlateloco, Treaty of 73 TMSDCA 77 Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research 18 traditional agenda 70, 71 traditional conflicts 72 Traxl, Dr Herbert 248 Tu Weiming 46–8 Turkey, cooperation with Russia 176 Ullman, Richard H. 6 UN 39, 73, 156 development programme 113 establishment 13 new world order and 260–2 UN Charter 58, 62 UN Security Council 33, 262 resolutions 15, 232 UN Truce Supervision organization (UNTSO) 261 UNESCO 260 UNICEF 260 unipolarity 32, 33 Unit for the Promotion of democracy (UPD) OAS 74 UNITA 224 United Nations see entries under UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 14 universal system of security 33

287

UNMOGIP (UN Military Observation Group for India and Pakistan) 261 Uribe, Alvaro 70, 83 Uruguay Round 191 Vajpayee, A.B. 94, 97, 99, 100, 106, 107, 108, 248 Van De Veer, S. D. 5 Venkatraman, Shri R. 266 Vietnam War 3, 29, 57, 251 Virilio, Paul 41 Waever, Ole 68–9 Wanandi, Jusuf 124 war on terror 21, 36–8, 56, 66, 84, 98, 102, 159, 275 Warsaw Pact 147, 154 Wen Jiabao 134 Western Union 148 Wider Middle East Initiative 215 Williams, Clive 139 Williamsburg agenda 76 Wolff, Christian 11 Wolfowitz, Paul 91 World Bank 1, 133 World Health Organization (WHO) 260 World Trade Organization (WTO) 35, 39, 127, 133, 134, 141, 191, 212, 248 World War I 13 World War II 13, 28, 29 Youngs, Gillian 1 Zemin, Jiang 133 Zhang Qiyue 248 Zhu Rongji 125, 135, 136 Zoellick, Robert 79