Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam: Between Scholarship, Politics and Identity 9783112402818, 9783879977178

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Studien des Zentrum Moderner Orient Herausgegeben von Ulrike Freitag

Zentrum Moderner Orient Geisteswissenschaftliche Zentren Berlin e.V.

Sophie Roche (ed.)

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam Between Scholarship, Politics and Identity

with Dina Wilkowsky and Jeanne Feaux de la Croix

Studien 32

S3

KLAUS SCHWARZ VERLAG • BERLIN

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.de.

Zentrum Moderner Orient Geisteswissenschaftliche Zentren Berlin e.V. Studien, edited by Ulrike Freitag Kirchweg 33 14129 Berlin Tel. 030 / 80307 228 www.zmo.de

© Klaus Schwarz Verlag Berlin All rights reserved First edition 2014 Layout/Typesetting: ZMO Cover design: Jörg Rückmann, Berlin Photo: Memorial of Central Asian intellectuals as national heroes, Dushanbe 2010 (© Sophie Roche)

Printed in Germany

ISBN 978-3-87997-71

7-8

This book was printed with financial assistance of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

Kudaiga da zhaksy adam kerek In memory of our dear colleague and friend DINA WILKOWSKY

(2 April 1960 - 19 January 2012)

Dr. Dina Wilkowsky and the Mufti Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali (© Galina Nurtasinova)

Content

Preface Irina Morozova

9

Acknowledgement

19

Summary in Russian Language

23

Introduction Sophie Roche, Jeanne Féaux de la Croix Connecting Life and Work: Central Asian Intellectuals Debating Islam

27

Chapter 1 Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali Biography Islamic Civilization and Kazakhstan

53 54 g2

Chapter 2 Vitaly V. Naumkin Biography Islam in Central Asia: Religion and Politics

81 82 gg

Chapter 3 Dina Wilkowsky Biography Islamic Education in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan Chapter 4 Ashirbek K. Muminov Biography Islamic Groups in Contemporary Kazakhstan: Current Situations and Tendencies of Development

109 110 120

145 146 154

Chapter 5 Zifa-Alua Auezova Biography Writing a History of Kazakhs at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: The Shezhyre (Genealogy) of Shakarim Qudaiberdiyev

197 197 208

Chapter 6 Muhiddin Kabiri Biography The Role of the Islamic Revival Party in the Politics of Islam in Tajikistan

227 228 236

Chapter 7 Alikhan M. Baimenov Biography State and Religion: Faith in the Context of Modernization

249 250 262

Chapter 8 Elmira Kochumkulova Biography Re-Islamization in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study of Kyrgyz Funeral Customs

269 269 280

Some Final Remarks Sophie Roche

313

Glossary of Selected Terms

371

Bibliography

377

Preface Irina Morozova

In her book, Sophie Roche endeavours to situate the professional biographies of Russian and Central Asian Orientalists who were educated and bred in the times of socialism, in combination with selected scholarly pieces by them, within the debates on societal contexts of academic interpretations of Islam and Islamic scholarship. In Central Asian studies' domain, certain groups of academicians, historians and anthropologists have attempted to do this for the last twenty-five years, paralleling the revision of classical historiography and Oriental studies' traditions in all Western schools, including the Russian/Soviet ones. Projects on Islamic education and scholarship in Central Asian republics and the Caucasus, often with a special focus on personalities active in the field, were accommodated in the fellowship programs of international research institutions and funding foundations. The biographies of the selected figures from the Soviet Oriental studies (Russ., vostokovedenie), whose lifespan extends through the late socialist, perestroika and independence periods, highlight the long-term transformations of Islamic loyalties in Central Asian intellectuals. In the Introduction, written in cooperation with Jeanne Féaux de la Croix, Roche announces her aim to represent the broad field of disputes on Islam in Soviet Central Asia to the English-speaking reader, underlining the socio-cultural patterns and their present legacies. The author realizes the distinction on the discourses on Islam and its history between the Soviet Orientalists (Russ., vostokovedy) working on the »foreign Orient« (Russ., zarubezhnyi Vostok), and those perusing research on the Soviet, »home« Orient. The whole hierarchy of the Soviet research institutes of vostokovedenie was

10

C e n t r a l A s i a n Intellectuals on I s l a m

formed since the 1920s and onwards on the basis of this principle and obviously political distinction that framed, above all, the social hierarchies in the USSR: the studies on zarubezhnyi Vostok were considered more prestigious (and thus situated in the capital), while the »home« scholars in Central Asia were linked to the studies of their localities (Russ., kraevedenie)1 and the history of their national republics. Another key obstacle on the way to proper contextualization of academic biographies, above all those connected with the legacies of the Cold War ideological biases, is the interpretation of Marx's analysis of Asian societies, which served, according to widespread perceptions, as the foundation for the whole development of the Soviet vostokovedenie. Marx never tried to situate Asian societies within the formations' scheme, for him Asia was a deviation that represented a specific »Asiatic mode of production«. The discussion between the adherents of the »Asiatic mode of production« and those justifying the formational approach in vostokovedenie was very acute in the USSR in the 1920s and the early 1930s. The final prevailing of the formational approach (primitive society - slavery - feudalism - capitalism - socialism: the so-called pyatichlenka) over the »Asiatic mode of production« concept was due to the endorsement by some influential Russian Orientalists, representatives of the »classical« Russian school, like the renowned Egyptologist and Assyriologist Vasily V. Struve. At later stages, especially after the 1960s, the rhetorical references to the normative formational approach led to a de-theoretization of vostokovedenie in the Soviet Union. To this day, the scholars, Western scholars as well, tend to avoid any serious study of Marxism; this jeopardizes their endeavours to write the history of Soviet vostokovedenie.2

1 Ingeborg Baldauf 1992. »Kraevedenie« and Uzbek national consciousness. Papers on Inner Asia. 20. 2 For the rare exceptions, see A.I. Fursov 1987. Vostochnyi feodalizm i istoriya Zapada [Oriental feudalism and the history of the West]. Narody Azii i Afriki 4: 93-109.

Preface

11

Roche levels sharp criticism on the published biographical narratives with their lack of the »reflexive turn« by accenting the respondents' suggestions to look at Islam as an intellectual capital or important political factor in order to legitimize their biographies and gain more social capital. This disillusioned observation by Roche is rarely found and has only recently being mentioned in scholarly works, 3 which are not unanimously positively received by Central Asian publics that since the Soviet times learnt to oppose the state and religion. However, the communists' relation to religion and religious activists should be ultimately distinguished from the generally pronounced communist declaration that religion is the opium of the people. Although the communists ultimately destroyed the existed religious fields wherever the situation allowed them to - by encroachment, repression, cutting off the socio-economic basis and international networks they rarely refused to let the »remnants of the old o r d e r « to assist in building the new society. Throughout the twentieth century, political preconditions and social disarray w e r e not the only factors leading to alliances between communists and representatives of religious elites and personnel at different levels (albeit in most cases temporarily); more often, the complex interplay of loyalties and personal involvement of the communists in communal life fostered these pacts. In particular, modern nationalism has connected communism and Islam. Within the shared historical space of the twentieth century, various groups and individuals in Central Asia allied with the Western/Soviet communists not solely for political gains; they also saw the ideology of communism as a way to give their activities significance and to create new social space inside their communities and beyond.

3

See Sergej Abashin 2007. Natsionalizmy

v Tsentral'noi Azii. V poiskah

identichnosti [Nationalisms in Central Asia. In search of identity], St. Petersburg: Aleteiya; Ashirbek Muminov 2011. Rodosiovnoe

drevo Mukhtara

va [The genealogical tree of Mukhtar Auezov], Almaty: Zhibek Zholy.

Auezo-

1 2

Central Asian Intellectuals on

Islam

In Soviet Central Asia, even in the latter half of the 1930s, Islamic institutions and groups never totally disappeared, despite the official anti-religious campaigns and repressions. They not only remained as elements of the former powerful religious field, they also re-emerged as social actors in many new fields in sharp competition for resources within the Soviet Union and globally. Under the Soviets, local intellectuals and ulama (Muslim scholars) learned to adopt a secular rhetoric in the public sphere after the political campaigns and repressions of the 1930s and got a better chance to consolidate and form a new stratum of state-appointed Muslims. In 1943, the Central Asian Muslims received an opportunity to institutionalize within the newly established Spiritual Directory of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (most commonly known and referred to in the Russian abbreviation as SADUM).4 After the Second World War, the interconnectivity between communists and Muslims was already so complex that no direct borderline could have been drawn between them. By the time SADUM was re-established, the survived ulama were dispersed in the rural landscape and at later periods, corresponding to the amnesties (of March 1953 in particular) and the weakening of political pressure (especially in the late Brezhnev era), the previously repressed mullahs could return to settle in their places of origin.5 The Soviet Muslims did not question the superiority of socialism as a state system, but they distinctly preferred to interpret socialism as a sort of secondary ideology that had originated from the teachings

4 SADUM was not a genuinely Soviet invention; its prototypes can be traced back to Russia's imperial history, when similar institutions w e r e established under Catherine II to reign over the Muslim population of the Russian Empire. 5 Stéphane A. Dudoignon 2013. From revival to mutation. The religious personnel of Islam in Tajikistan, from de-Stalinization to independence (195591). In B. Rubin (ed.), Islamic political and social movements. Volume IV. Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa/changing Islam, and modernity. London and N e w York: Routledge, pp. 33-34.

Preface

1 3

of the Prophet. 6 If in the 1920s Bolsheviks attempted to adjust reformist trends within Islam to the universalistic and modernistic communist ideology, since the 1960s communism, already in a stage of receding, stopped being what Emilio Gentile has called »political religion« and adjusted to Islam; this was reflected, above all, in the politics of central Soviet authorities towards Muslim republics. The biographies situated in this book reveal the change in the centre-periphery communication between Central Asian elites and Moscow since the 1970s. At the time of late socialism, not only was the korenizatsiya (Russ., rooting power in »indigenous nationalities«) of the republics' administration complete, but some Central Asian leaders already started claiming more weight and positions at the all-union level. Elite education in the top USSR institutes of high education with a specialisation in zarubezhnyi Vostok, professional training and positions in the main cities of the European part of the country, above all in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the opportunity to serve abroad, were the indicators of the continuing change in the centreperiphery relations. In fact, the biographies also help us to understand how deeply and fully Central Asian societies experienced socialism and how much various sections of the population and individuals gained from it via the adopted and manipulated institutions whose voids left enough room for unofficial - non-communist and non-secular - loyalties. The scholarly discussions on »unofficial« Islam functioning in non-registered hujras (cells) and urban literary circles (majalis), as well as the construction of mazars (holy places), and the periodically reappearing state restrictions on them can be also interpreted as the patterns and chan-

6 For a long time, this discourse had been developing on the pages of the journal »Muslims of the Soviet East«. See also Hans Bräker 1 9 8 9 . Die sowjetische Politik gegenüber dem Islam. In Andreas Kappeler, Gerhard Simon and Georg Brunner (eds.), Die Muslime in der Sowjetunion und in Jugoslawien. Identität, Politik, Widerstand, Cologne: Markus, p. 143.

1 4

C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on I s l a m

nels of centre-periphery communication. The Central Asian elites were not only responsive to the central authorities and its policies; they also discovered and exploited channels to impact and frame policies toward Islam and Muslims in the Soviet Union. Thus, before the restrictive decrees »On the measures of ideological isolation of the reactionary part of the Muslim clergy« (April 1983) or on »The strengthening of the struggle against the influence of Islam» (August 1986) were issued by the CPSU Central Committee, the direct authors of the decrees had to take into account the KGB reports from Central Asia, whose authors were charged with the task of discovering the »threats« that would help to direct and sharpen Soviet policies towards Muslim communities in correlation with the situation in the »foreign Orient«, for example the Iranian revolution of 1979 or the military campaign in Afghanistan or the urged support for »friendly« regimes in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The KGB agents in Central Asia, recruited to a great extent from the »national cadres«, gathered information on activities understood as religious,7 but it was the call for new policies in the ideological field that determined when to characterize those activities as »increasingly dangerous«. So far, the provincial administration of the republics submitted the reports on the fulfilment of the decrees in a peculiar contradictory form that could have been interpreted in two ways: either as measures successfully undertaken to slow the spread of religious activism, or as evidence that a problem still existed. The unclearness provided the republics' centres with the space to manoeuvre, to »negotiate« with Moscow and thereby to shape ideological policies.

7 See the references on the research by Kazakhstani authors in: Saltanat Orazbekova 2013. Religion and religiosity in the perceptions of various sections of the population in Kazakhstan (1980-1991). In J. Boldbaatar and I. Morozova (eds.). Proceedings of the international workshop »The legacies of Perestroika discourses in knowledge production on Central Asia. Ulaanbaatar: Ulaanbaatar University, pp. 238-266.

Preface

15

As a result of the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan, even former allies tended to associate the Soviet Union and the socialist system with a wrong ideology and another adversary to the Muslim society socio-political system. That was a crucial moment in the history of the Cold War, as many leaders of the Muslim world were able to free themselves from the former alliance with communism and expose its »evils« in the same way as the »evils of capitalism«. These discussions were well known and understood by the top Soviet Muslim administration, which nevertheless saw its future in the socialist society and within the Soviet political system. The top SADUM nomenklatura leaders' awareness of the international situation in relation to Muslim politics explains why some of them rapidly (as it appears at least on the surface) converted from supporters of secular communist state into more affirmably politically engaged Muslims at the beginning of the 1990s. The biographies collected in this book demonstrate well how the elitist »cast« of educated intellectual Muslims connected with zarubezhnyi Vostok had been forming via the Soviet foreign office and other channels, including education. These representatives of this nevertheless thin layer were eager, under certain conditions, to gain more social, cultural and political capital.8 Their unique positions became even stronger against the background of the general incompetence of the ordinary Soviet Muslims in the political history of Islam, the teaching of Islam and even the basics of Islamic doctrine and practice. The lack of information kept many believers unaware of the socio-political turn to the twentieth-first century, the deconstructions of socialism and the long-term consequences of the new rivalry in the sphere of religion. Such »chaos«, as many top SADUM leaders like Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali characterize

8 See also the analysis of the biography of Hoji Akbar Turjanzoda: Tim Epkenhans 2011. Defining normative Islam. Some remarks on contemporary Islamic thought in Tajikistan - Hoji Akbar Turjonzoda's Sharia and Society. Central Asian Survey 30(1): 81-96.

16

C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on I s l a m

this situation, in fact legitimized these leaders' entering the political arena of the newly-established Central Asian states and forming the politics of post-Soviet Islam. The 1980s (the post-1979 period with its newly constructed »Wahhabi threat« taking root) marked the new stage of politicization of Islam in the Soviet Union, which is quite visible in biographies of the leading Soviet experts on the Middle East, who came out at the forefront of many public debates and even made their way up the political Olympus (the life trajectory of Evgenii Primakov is most frequently analyzed 9 ). Debates on Islam in Soviet academia intensified in all media and even impacted the late perestroika socio-political transformations. The very end of the 1980s1990s period was unique in the free competition that existed among various groups and ideological trends. The post-1987 decade was the time of real pluralism in the conceptions of what true Muslim identity was and what constituted correct Muslim behaviour. At that historical stage the deconstruction of socialism (like during the stage of socialism's establishment and first taking root in the 1920s), the most bizarre ideas about what religion meant for an individual and society started to emerge again. Discussions about the relation of religious philosophy to the achievements of modern science reappeared, already at the next turn of the spiral, against the background of many years of atheist education and propaganda. The interview with Alikan Baimenov, educated in technical sciences, in this book shows this well. As a postponed response to Soviet anti-Islamism or anti-Turkism campaigns, these concepts, like pan-Turkism, resurfaced in political or cultural-intellectual form, to which the interviews with personalities like Zifa Auezova bear clear witness.

9 See for instance, Mikhail Roshchin 2011. Evgenii M. Primakov. Arabist and KGB middleman, director and statesman. In M. Kemper and S. Conermann (eds.), The heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies. London, N e w York: Routledge, pp. 103-111.

Preface

17

Under the slogan of the revival of traditions, many people got an opportunity to claim a degree of religious authority. The whole discussion about tradition, pre-Islamic folk beliefs and Islam from the late 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s reflected the new relocation of positions and new regrouping of people who wished to play an active role in the society at local, translocal, republican and transregional levels. The biography and text by Elmira Kochumkulova serve as a good representation of this. The scholarly debates on Islam outlined in this book are very contemporary, based on Western historiography that became available to the author and within which her formation as a scholar took place. The book calls to overcome this gap between Western and former Soviet scholars by bringing biographies of the orientalists trained in the USSR into light. The selection of the published pieces by the scholars and intellectuals whose biographies are told is critical and makes the book especially valuable for students. Together, the published texts present a sort of mosaic, which I see rather as an advantage, for it supports a multifaceted view of culture and religion in Central Asia and encourages the application of various approaches to the study of Islam. The book could be viewed not just as a representation of already completed research, but also as an outline of the studies that are called for in the future: only through the application of various sources, including not only oral, but archival as well, can the researcher continue the analysis of the biographies. Still, the necessity to study the literature and tradition that formed them remains acute. Roche's book aims to open up the field; it is a representation of the investigation of a younger generation of Western specialists in Central Asia re/studying and re/considering the history of knowledge production in and on Soviet/post-Soviet Central Asia.

Acknowledgement

This book would not have been possible without the help of many colleagues. First of all, the book grew out of the efforts of Dina Wilkowsky. Since she started to work at Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) in January 2010, she actively engaged in building a bridge or, more correctly, many bridges between the ZMO and research institutions in Central Asia. The lecture series »Islam and Society in Central Asia« was one of the results of these efforts. A large spectrum of respected scholars visited Zentrum Moderner Orient between 2010 and 2011 to give a talk. Dina Wilkowsky could not supervise the lecture series as she had wished because a disease forced her to stay at home. But she followed the lectures with great attention from afar and we planned the book together. Unfortunately she was not able to return to work as she succumbed to the disease, but her ideas and suggestions remain in this book and have shaped its organization. Left on my own with the book and the challenge it poses, I was more than thankful to find solid support in my colleagues Jeanne Féaux de la Croix and Heike Liebau. Jeanne Féaux de la Croix not only helped to organize the lectures, but also in collecting interviews, translating the material and shaping the book. Despite her many duties, she was willing to help out; she read and commented on numerous contributions. Heike Liebau supported the project from its very beginning. The numerous discussions in the working group »Actors in Translocal Spaces« headed by Heike Liebau were the source of inspiration for the book. I also thank Irina Morozova for

20

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

sharing with me her incredible experience and knowledge on orientalists in the CIS countries and providing valuable comments on the complete version. My gratitude also goes to Michael Kemper, who commented on some parts of the book and especially Adeeb Khalid, who took the time to read the whole manuscript and repeatedly provide important comments and suggestions. The book contains precious historical documents; such a work was possible only thanks the generous cooperation of the authors. All of them were deeply shaken by the loss of Dina Wilkowsky but agreed to help complete the project they all demonstrated warm solidarity in memory of Dina. I thank Prof. Marek GawQcki from Poznan University who allowed us to reprint the text that Dina had presented in 2010 and that was published first with the Poznanskie Studia Srodkowoazjatyckie. We have revised the text only with respect to language and the bibliography. The presentation of Wilkowsky's biography is the result of various talks with Heike Liebau, Zifa Auezova, Janet Tedmetova and her sisters Rosa and Galina Nurtasinova, who supported the project as well. I am convinced that her life - like that of the other authors in the book - would be worth a volume of its own, so this book only gives a small glance into the rich lives and works of these great researchers. I take full responsibility for the translations, my own texts and the way the book was designed and the material displayed. It was a conscious decision to leave the plurality of approaches, methods, text genres and ideas. Svenja Becherer accompanied this study throughout the process and in her editorial work has invested far more than I could have expected. Katharina Wuropulos was very helpful in proofreading. Central Asia today is home to various languages, including Arabic. To master the plurality of these languages, we profited from generous help by Zifa Auezova, Aksana Ismailbekova and Yasmine Berriane, as well as to the intelligent editing by Mitch Cohen, improving the English language while keeping linguistic specificities. Finally, my gratitude goes to Zentrum Moderner Orient's

Acknowledgement

2 1

directorate Ulrike Freitag, Kai Kresse and Sonja Hegasy, who supported the project. Many of those who encouraged my work on the book are specialists in other parts of the Muslim world; their interest has made the book into a site to further bridge the East and the West, the North and the South.

N o t e s on transliteration and u s a g e Transliteration is a problem in Central Asian scholarship, mainly due to the language policies of the past. In the preSoviet era, most Central Asian languages were written in the Arabic script. In the course of Sovietization, however, many of these languages began to be transcribed into the Latin and/or Cyrillic script, due to which some terms that were commonly used in several Central Asian republics acquired a distinct written form. Since the end of the Soviet Union some of the countries again opted for a change in script. Hence, within no more than one century, several changes in script have taken place. These changes have not necessarily led to standardization and fixed grammar rules. For instance, although there was already a kind of standardized Tajik language in the middle of the twentieth century, Tajik journalists, scientists and ordinary people often continued to write in their own local dialects, which resulted in multiple written variants of numerous common terms (e.g. the word »mosque« can be written as masjid, mazjid, maschid, or mazchid, and the same goes for the word »mullah« - mullo, molla, etc.). The situation is similar in the other Central Asian countries, most of which still use Russian for academic publications. In this book we did not go back to the Arabic original terms, but accepted the plurality of the scripts because they reflect the specificities of the countries and the shared historical past. Some authors have used transliteration from Arabic if their topic went back to the pre-Soviet period. We have allowed for these individual choices for transliteration.

22

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

In the glossary the reader will find some of the terms explained in their different forms. Well-known Arabic and Persian words have been simplified into their common English spellings (e.g. Qur'an, mullah). Finally, we should not forget that in Central Asia, Russian has remained an important lingua franca, especially among scholars who received their education before 1990. Even today, many young scholars opt for Russian as an academic language, while their native language may be Tajik, Kyrgyz or any other. Finally, with the choice of language a certain understanding of research is transported, and thus we have preferred to translate Russian texts into English rather than to ask the authors to write in English. Sophie Roche, August 2013

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26

C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on I s l a m

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Introduction

Connecting Life and Work: Central Asian Intellectuals Debating Islam Sophie Roche, Jeanne Féaux de la Croix

» T h e Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan asked me to go to Saudi Arabia because of a lack of specialists and work in diplomatic affairs there. Throughout my life I had studied the history and culture [of Arabs] and so I decided to go to Saudi Arabia to work at the embassy in the cultural and humanitarian sector for three years. Later the President of Kazakhstan came and told us that w e should e n g a g e with questions of religion. There was chaos in this sphere and the Spiritual Board of Muslims elected me as the representative of the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan.«

(Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali, chapter 1)

These few sentences by Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali bring together many aspects that mark the turn of the Central Asian republics from membership in the Soviet Union to independent nation states (see chapter 1). On the one hand, Derbisali identifies a lack of qualified specialists in politics and »chaos« in the way Islam was dealt with in the early years of the new nation state. On the other hand, his life and publications exemplify how researchers and high-ranking academics participate in shaping and ordering their respective countries. Like Derbisali, many researchers not only participate in the contemporary debates on national identity, but also feel a great sense of responsibility towards their society, having actively helped to pave the way to independence. This book brings together the writings and bio-

28

C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on I s l a m

graphies of eight such personalities who have shaped the debates about Islam in Central Asia. All the scholars and politicians portrayed in this book participated in the 2010-2011 interdisciplinary lecture series »Islam and Society in Central Asia« at the Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin.1 The biographies were collected between 2010 and 2012 and edited in respect to language and issues of privacy. In this manner, the book represents a collection of messages - originally formulated for a ZMO lecture audience in 2010/11- from different scientific fields and personal interests. Most of the authors were trained in Oriental Studies in the USSR (vostokovedenie) between the 1970s and 1990s. They operate in a professional spectrum ranging from religious office-holder (Derbisali), through mainstream and opposition politics (Baimenov and Kabiri), to acting as the director of an Institute at the Russian Academy of Sciences (Naumkin), university professors and academic research fellows (Wilkowsky, Muminov, Auezova and Kochumkulova). Each of these professional niches has its own genre of texts to convey their information and message. Thus, although all authors visited ZMO in their capacity as academics, the style and content of their presentation differed considerably. This book not only gives room to the different life courses of these personalities, but also to their different text genres and modes of communication. This book represents an engagement, an attempt at dialogue among researchers from different traditions, through the knowledge they produce. Such an approach follows the Zentrum Moderner Orient ethos of studying with rather than about the people of a region. Dina Wilkowsky who initiated the lecture series at ZMO used the term »cultural

1

The Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) is the only German research insti-

tute devoted to an interdisciplinary and comparative study of the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, South and Southeast Asia from a historical perspective. Current research focuses on the interaction between predominantly Muslim societies and on their relations with non-Muslim neighbours.

Introduction

29

dialogue« to deconstruct the opposition of legal religious institutions and illegal movements, but also to call for a more open-minded and self-reflexive attention to different scholarly bodies of work, methods and practices (chapter 3). The notion of dialogue does not exclude a critical stance, but it does demand, first and foremost, a sincere interest in the other and a modicum of self-reflection. Sadly, Dina Wilkowsky could not realize this book with us, as she passed away in January 2012. However, we continued the project as an exceptional opportunity to learn about our colleagues' scientific lives and the large scope of work and ideas produced by these scholars. Any researcher interested in looking beyond his or her own comfortable turf - be it a linguistic, disciplinary or institutional »home« - will be faced with the challenge of cross-disciplinary, even cross-cultural conversations, their rewards and their pitfalls. This book offers an opportunity for an English-speaking audience to engage with the profound and vigorous debates about Islam among Central Asia's intellectual elite. Although it is generally beneficial to maintain the original language of scholarly production (here mainly Russian), we decided to translate all texts and interviews, to allow an English-language readership to explore the rich world of debates on Islam in Central Asia through researchers' biographies and their contemporary texts.2 It is a translation effort not only in the strict sense of crossing language barriers, but also in the wider sense of contextualizing and making different research traditions speak to each other.1 Such a window of dialogue also allows for a greater

2

Although all five post-Soviet states have to a greater or lesser degree

promoted the language of the titular nationalities language above Russian, the former socialist elites, which still hold power in most of these republics, remain largely Russophone. In scholarship, Russian has remained the main language in many of the independent states and the lingua franca of scientific communication. 3

Of course we stand here in an honourable tradition of translating the

work of Russian-language scholars, such as Gellner's volume on Soviet

30

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

critique of the opportunities and limitations of anglophone traditions and personal trajectories in researching Islam. It allows us a wider comparative framework for reflecting on what counts as valuable research and the aims, means and structures that shape these ideals. This book is unique both in assembling scholarly texts and personal biographies and in presenting the fascinating spectrum of activities and positions that post-Soviet scholars have chosen and achieved. Thanks to the generous contributions of the participating authors, this constellation suggests a new way of learning about the conjunction of personal lives and historic sea changes, religious and scientific traditions and movements in Central Asia. The collection addresses several different axes of interest: it can be read straightforwardly as a series of essays on the role of Islam in Central Asia, while other readers may instead focus on what the authors' biographies teach us about scholarship, intellectual elites and professional and political trajectories in the post-Soviet space. Vered Amit4 has warned of an uncritical application of approaches such as functionalism and structuralism - and we can add Orientalism - to pigeonhole scholars. After all, most researchers engage with their epoch, with the questions relevant to their environment; in consequence, their writings transform as much as their own lives do. In his introduction to a biographical dictionary of scholars (2004), Amit suggests studying biographies not for the purpose of learning »who is who,« but to discover scholars as social, political and academic actors. Biographies can »ameliorate a temptation to stereotype intellectual careers by assigning categories to their lives.« (p. xviii) In this sense we invite the reader of this book to read the chapters as complemen-

Anthropology, or more recent bilingual journals such as Forum for Anthropology and Culture or Ab Imperio. Ernest Gellner (ed.) 1980. Soviet and western anthropology. New York: Columbia University Press. 4 Vered Amit (ed.) 2004. Biographical dictionary of social and cultural anthropology. London, New York: Routledge.

Introduction

3 1

tary units of biography and article, to enjoy the enthusiasm that speaks through the biographies and the scholarly text, and to engage with the authors' ideas on the contemporary world, research conditions, debates on Islam and social, political and academic involvements. Recent books such as Gallagher's Interviews with Leading Middle East Historians5 are very much in line with the » r e f l e x i v e turn« current in Anglo-American scholarship. It should be noted that the contributors to this book, with the exception of Kochiimkulova, would not explicitly pursue this mode of writing in their scholarly publications. However, understanding the academic life histories and employment trajectories of these authors will allow for a fuller understanding of the contemporary writings on Islam in Central Asia. The format of the biographic narratives varies considerably. Rather than striving for standardization, w e have preserved this variation of formats because they also express the authors' choices in conveying their experiences to an audience. Only by comprehending the various possible interpretations of experiences they provide can w e g e t away from the idea of a monolithic past with a uniform cadre of Soviet-trained scholars. This is true not only for understanding the knowledge production of scientists in postSoviet countries, but also for scientists of any institutional background, intellectual persuasion and system of knowledge production. 6 By connecting biographies to scholarly texts, w e gain new insights into the scholarly productions of knowledge. All the authors explicitly comment on the political conditions and connections of their work. Though most contributors may have been schooled in the Soviet tradition

5 Nancy E. Gallagher 1994. Approaches to the history of the Middle East: Interviews with Leading Middle East Historians. Ithaca Press: Reading. 6 Sarah Amsler 2007. The politics of knowledge in Central Asia. Science between Marx and the market. London, N e w York: Routledge. These questions have been discussed more generally at the ZMO. What counts as knowledge (expert knowledge, everyday knowledge)? How is knowledge linked to individual experience?

32

Central Asian Intellectuals on

Islam

of vostokovedenie, it is easy to see why work on Islam in Central Asia by a Russian academic employed in Moscow might look very different from work by a scholar who also heads a Tajik political party.

Oriental Studies in the Soviet Union Vostokovedenie (Oriental Studies) was a well-established subject at universities and research centres (Akademia Nauk) in Russia since the nineteenth century. Drawing on German Oriental Studies, vostokovedenie developed along with the Russian political landscape from the Tsarist Empire to the Soviet Union.7 In the USSR, several centres of Oriental Studies were established in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, including in Baku, Tashkent and Dushanbe and, after 1990, Almaty.8 In Russia, Oriental Studies were taught in St. Petersburg (Petrograd/Leningrad) and Moscow. While St. Petersburg represented the classic school of philology engaged in manuscript work and questions relating to it, the Moscow Oriental Institute specialized in contemporary

7 How the field changed under Soviet auspices in the early twentieth century has recently been investigated, see Michael Kemper 2010. Red Orientalism: Mikhail Pavlovich and Marxist Oriental Studies in Early Soviet Russia. Welt des Islam 50: 435-476. See especially p. 448; Kemper and Conermann 2011. David Schimmelpenninck von der Oye 2010. Russian Orientalism. Asia in the Russian mind from Peter the Great to the emigriation. New Haven: Yale University. 8 Kazan was another important centre for Oriental Studies since the eighteenth century. While after a pause Arabic and Persian were taught since the 1950s, this tradition was fully recovered only in 1990. For an introduction to the Kazan School and the St. Petersburg School see chapter 5, 7 and 8. In Schimmelpenninck von der Oye 2010. In Kyrgyzstan a Department of Oriental Studies was established in 1963 out of the sections for Turcology and Dungan studies at the Institute of Language and Literature at the Academy of Science. See Till Mostowlansky 2011. Kyrgyz - Muslim - Central Asian? Recent approaches to the study of Kyrgyz culture in Kyrgyzstan. In Kemper and Conermann 2011, pp. 291-305.

Introduction

33

questions and political problems, training not only scholars but also diplomats, KGB staff and policy advisors. 9 The relations between the institutions in Russia and in Central Asia were not always free of tension; for instance, language teachers in Tashkent created their own materials. Since independence access to archives and other sources has allowed scientists to explore the academic and political field, yet much work remains to be done. On the one hand, the question of Russia's relations with its European and Asian neighbours is raised; on the other hand, the crucial question of what the »Russian Orient« is and was remains a field of open discussion. One point that has recently been raised by Michael Kemper that may be important for this volume is the question of how Islam came to be integrated into the Soviet academy. As a European intellectual of the nineteenth century, Karl Marx was interested in Asia in order to explain European development. The Orient was not his primary focus of interest; nevertheless, his ideas were to become the foundation of seven decades of Russian politics in Central Asia.10 What was later heatedly debated as the Asiatic Mode of Production (AMP) was his concept that sought to situate Asia (India and China) within world historical development, (at this period, shaped by competing British and Russian imperial politics in Asia). He maintained that oriental countries were shaped by the nature of their soil, and thus irrigation systems were the main tool to gain control over people. Under these conditions, »oriental despotism« developed and these societies remained without progress for »thousands of years«. 11 The AMP was the subject of many debates and

9 Kemper 2010, p. 459 10 He e n g a g e s with these questions in »Das Kapital«, which was written in 1857-58 and re-published in 1939. See Michael Curtis 2009. Orientalism and Islam. European

thinkers

on oriental

despotism

in the Middle

East

and

India. Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University p. 224. 11 See Curtis 2009, p. 232. In his article »The British rule in India« published in the New York Daily Tribune, 25 June 1853, Karl Marx brings

34

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

varying models that we cannot elaborate here; suffice it to say that until 1931 the concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production remained a strong alternative to models that placed Asian society within feudalism (»Eastern Feudalism«). The question of where to position Islam and Muslims in Marxism-Leninism was anything but obvious. The political and social role of Islam was constantly renegotiated. 12 »The 1920s saw a wide variety of contradictory Marxist interpretations of the so-called »class character« of Islam. The idea was to establish where, on Marx's unidirectional ladder of human history, the Muslims were to be located.« (Kemper13 2011 p. 6). A Marxist's approach demanded that early sources on Islam be re-evaluated. 14 In consequence, between 1923 and 1933, some scholars declared Islam a nomadic and

his view about India to the point: »these idyllic village communities, (...) had always been the solid foundation of oriental despotism, that they restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies.« (in A.L. Macfie, ed.) 2000. Orientalism. A reader. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 16-17. 12 For a perspective on this from Muslim sources, see Adeeb Khalid 2010. The Bukharan People's Soviet Republic in the light of Muslim sources. Die Welt des Islams 50: 335-361. See especially p. 349. 13 Kemper 2011. Introduction: Integrating Soviet Oriental Studies. In Kemper and Conermann 2011, pp. 1-25. 14 Many monographs and studies have been published in the 1910s to '30s, the period in which Central Asian societies were freed from the Tsarist Empire, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, was integrated into the Soviet empire. Work in English can be found, among other sources, in Alexandre Benningsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967. Islam in the Soviet Union. London: Pall Mall; Adeeb Khalid 1998. The politics of Muslim cultural reform. Berkeley: University of California. Ibid. 2007. Islam after communism. Religion and politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California; Yaacov Ro'i 2000. Islam in the Soviet Union. From the Second World War to Gorbachev. New York: Columbia University; Stéphane A. Dudoignon 2002. Islam et nationalisme en Asie Centrale au début de la période soviétique (1924-1937). Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 95-98: 127-65.

Introduction

35

tribal ( » B e d o u i n « ) religion, while others linked Islam to agricultural societies. Yet again others identified Islam closely with capitalism because of the historical link to merchants. There w e r e even voices that claimed Islam had socialist elements; indeed, this was the view among Jadid reformers in Central Asia at the very beginning of the twentieth century. 15 The discussion in Russia - including the classification of Russian villages as »Asian« - lasted for almost twenty years before the »five-step-model« was elevated to a doctrine and pushing out publications on the A M P once and for all in the 1930s. Among others, the orientalist Vasily V. Struve, an Egyptologist and Assyrologist considerably influenced the discussion on this subject. He rejected the existence of A M P and instead classified Asian societies within the slave-holding socio-economic stage, which was the lowest development stage within the five-step-model (pyatichlenka). » I n 1938 Stalin's own simplistic formula in his Dialectical and Historical Materialism of five stages or modes of production, without reference to any Asiatic mode, became doctrinal truth for the whole communist world.« (Curtis, p. 236). Thus the »conversion of historical materialism from a critical apparatus into rigid ideology« 1 6 also affected how Muslim popu-

15 Stéphane A. Dudoignon 1996. Djadidisme, mirasisme, islamisme. Cahier du Monde Russe 37(1-2): 13-40; Khalid 1998. The politics of Muslim cultural reform-, Gero Fedtke 1998. Jadids, young Bukharans, communists and the Bukharan revolution. From an ideological debate in the early Soviet Union. In Anke v. Kügelgen, Michael Kemper and Allen J. Frank (eds.), Muslim culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18th to the early 20th centuries. (Vol. 2), Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, pp. 483-512; Hisao Komatsu 2000. Migration in Central Asia as reflected in the Jadid writings. In ibid., Chika Obiya, and John S. Schoeberlein (eds.), Migration in Central Asia. Its history and current problems. Osaka: The Japan Center for Area Studies, National Museum of Ethnology, pp. 21-34. 16 For a good history of the concept, see Marian Sawer 1977. Marxism and the question of the Asiatic mode of production. The Hague: Martinus Nijnoff, p. 99. We thank Irina Morozova for drawing our attention to this neglected aspect of Marxist history, which illuminates the discussions that took place in the 1920s and 1930s on how Asian societies could be situated

36

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

lations in Asia came to be classified when the Soviet Union was established. Also, from 1932 onwards, the interpretation of Islam was streamlined. »Islam came to be generally considered a >feudal< religion that was used by exploiters and counter-revolutionary elements and therefore had to be exterminated.« (Kemper 2011, p. 6-7) Many of the vostokovedenie specialists working in the 1920s and 30s were murdered during the Stalin purges. Only a few scholars were able to constantly adapt their research approaches and interpretations to the political shifts. Liutsian Klimovich (1907-1989) is probably one of the most successful anti-Islam propagators. »From his first pamphlets and articles against Islam in 1927 to his last book in 1988, under Stalin and Khrushchev as well as under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, Klimovich managed to publish on Islam and Muslim literatures, always adapting his interpretations to the current party line.« (Kemper 2011, p. 9) Monopolists like Klimovich were able to dominate the discourse and set the lines along which Oriental Studies would develop. 17 Despite these periods of persecution, some scholars managed to continue the St. Petersburg tradition of a less-politicized vostokovedenie oriented towards the philological study of historical sources. The 1980s mark a turn in Oriental Studies with Evgenii Primakov, the new director of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow, who went on to pursue a political career (Kemper 2011). While Primakov drew closer to political actors, he also suggested reviewing the position of Islam, especially with respect to the 1979 revolution in Iran and the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Gorbachev's politics of Glasnost

within the theory of historical materialism. A critical account of Russian orientalism including the tsarist period can be found in Kalpana Sahni 1997. Crucifying the Orient. Russian orientalism and the colonization of Caucasus and Central Asia. Chatuchak: White Orchid Press. 17 See also Michael Kemper 2009. The Soviet discourse on the origin and class character of Islam, 1923-1933. Welt des Islam 49: 1-48.

Introduction

3 7

and the process of perestroika after 1985 allowed the first steps towards a widespread revival of religious institutions (mosques, prayer groups, political groups) in Central Asia. This provided an opportunity for researchers in many fields to reflect on their relationship with religion and to redefine their personal and scientific goals. Since the end of the Soviet Union and the opening of many national archives, much has been written on Soviet Islam and Soviet Muslims from a variety of perspectives. For instance, the question of how Islam »survived« Communism has attracted many scholars. One of the main debates has circled around the categories of analysis used, such as »legal Islam« versus »underground Islam«, »official mullah« versus »unofficial clergy«, » l e g a l « or »illegal« mosque etc.18 This debate has been crucial to critically examining the categories used to research and describe Islam in Central Asia. However, identifying »Soviet« categories in contrast to »non-Soviet« ones may be less useful than to ask: what were the frames of analysis in the 1970s, inside and outside the Soviet region, and how did these change with independence? Another much-debated question is what might be specific to Soviet or post-Soviet Islam in Central Asia. How has the historical experience of the region moulded cultural practices and the relationship of politics, scholarly traditions and the general population with Islam? Many of this book's contributors originally qualified as specialists in the Arab world and moved their research focus to Central Asia only after independence. Thus, their approach and choice of subject may say something about these specificities.

18 For a classic use of these categories, see Yaacov Ro'i 2000. Islam in the Soviet Union. Alexandre Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush 1979. Muslim national communism in the Soviet Union. A revolutionary strategy for the colonial world. Chicago: University of Chicago. For a critique, see Devin DeWeese 2002. Islam and the legacy of Sovietology. A review essay on Yaacov Ro'i's Islam in the Soviet Union. Journal of Islamic Studies 13(3): 298-330.

3 8

C e n t r a l Asian Intellectuals on Islam

As this book shows, expectations that the end of the Soviet Union ought to have resulted in radically new research paradigms are not necessarily borne out, due to individuals' biographies and styles of knowledge production. In fact, the biographies in this collection reveal that the main changes were already under way in the 1980s, a dynamic period in which young scholars and students discovered history and religion as strong markers of identity. These trends have further developed in the independent republics over the last twenty years. In recent English-language works on Islam in Central Asia, we find several strong lines developing over the last decades: while historical approaches have primarily investigated how Islam came to be integrated into the socialist system,19 political scientists (like those trained in International Relations and Oriental Studies in Russia) have studied political Islam as a security issue, a »problem« that the state has to wrestle with.20 Among policy-oriented research institutes in particular, radical Islam has been a central topic in textual productions.21 In contrast, ethnographic accounts of Islam have tended to neglect political questions,

19 For instance, A. Khalid 1998. The politics of Muslim cultural reform; Stéphane A. Dudoignon 2004. Devout Societies versus impious states? Transmitting Islamic learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the twentieth century. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz; Kemper and Conermann 2011; see footnote 10 and 11. 20 Among others, Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko 1994. Islam in Central Asia. Reading: Ithaca Press; Vitaly V. Naumkin 2005. Radical Islam in Central Asia. Between the pen and the rifle. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield; Dina Wilkowsky 2009. Arabisch-Islamische Organisationen in Kasachstan. Exogener Einfluss auf die islamische Erneuerung (1991-2007). Berlin: Schiler; Mariya Y. Omelicheva 2011. Counterterrorism policies in Central Asia. New York: Routledge. 21 For instance, Martha B. Olcott 2005. Roots of radical Islam in Central Asia. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. David M. Abramson 2010. Foreign religious education and the Central Asian Islamic revival. Impact and prospects for stability. Silk Road Paper. Central Asia-Caucasus Institute. See also the International Crisis Group reports.

Introduction

39

emphasizing the everyday dimension and lived experience of Islam in order to balance the politicized discussion.22 Whether these differences are a matter of discipline, of the funding institution or a personal choice needs to be enquired in each individual case. Since many of the contributors to this book (Naumkin, Derbisali, Kabiri, Baimenov) fulfilled or still fulfil political as well as scholarly roles, it is not surprising that the question of how to assess and deal with political Islam looms large. The question whether Islam is a threat to social harmony, a traditional practice, a political tool, a moral base, a philosophy etc. is of course discussed not only among Muslims and scholars in Europe and the US or the Middle East, but also among Russian and Central Asian researchers and believers. The language (radical Islam, terrorism, etc.) developed in some of the authors' contributions to this book may be widespread, yet what is meant by these categories varies enormously. While some of the articles presented here prefer to address security issues as a global theme, many of the authors in this volume also engage more positively with the role of Islam in their society's future (chapters by Derbisali, Wilkowsky, Kabiri and Baimenov). These questions are given priority by local scholars for obvious reasons, as they are part of an elite intent on building up new nation-states and national identities. As the editors of Ab Imperio 1/2004 observed: »Post-Soviet historians are more inclined to be creators of memory (lost or mutilated during the Soviet period) than to appear as »deconstruc-

2 2 For instance, Maria E. Louw2007. Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central Asia. London, New York: Routledge; Irene Hilgers 2009. Why do Uzbeks have to be Muslims? Exploring religiosity in the Ferghana Valley. Berlin: Lit; Manja Stephan 2010. Das Bedürfnis nach Ausgewogenheit. Moralerziehung, [slam und Muslimsein in Tadschikistan zwischen Säkularisierung und religiöser Rückbesinnung. Würzburg: Ergon. For an ethnography that engages with people who are negotiating the religious tension between individuals and the state, see Johan Rasanayagam 2010. Islam in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The morality of experience. New York: Cambridge University.

40

C e n t r a l Asian Intellectuals on Islam

tors« of the myths of the past dominant in society.« (p. 24) In this sense, seemingly »internal« scholarly debates are shaped by the search for a new society and national identity through a reconstruction of the past. This book encourages a thorough engagement with the political conditions of research discourses on Islam in Central Asia and learning from the biographies of researchers who have shaped these discourses.

Understanding debates about Islam through biographies This book aims to facilitate a comparative reflection on the conditions of producing knowledge of Islam in the matrix of social movements and the spirit of an epoch, personal life trajectories and convictions, politics and its effects. The articles and biographies united here demonstrate that these dimensions and axes are certainly not always congruent or best understood as a one-to-one equation of cause, influence, expression and effect. We hope our experiment in translation and reflection enables a new perspective on research in post-Soviet Central Asia. Such a perspective engages with wider questions of intellectual history, from Kuhn's notion of »scientific revolutions« 23 through Foucault's emphasis on the relationship between knowledge and power24 to neo-Marxist approaches on the material basis of knowledge production and distribution. The thrust of this book is thus shaped by the organizers' disciplinary background, grounded in an effort to bridge and translate. In this spirit, we hope this book will serve as a tool for de-

23 Thomas S. Kuhn 1996 [1962], The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: Chicago University Press. 24 Michel Foucault 2002 [1969]. The archaeology of knowledge. London, New York: Routledge.

Introduction

4 1

familiarizing one's own scholarly practice, by de-exoticizing another scholarly practice. The solid disciplinary education of Central Asian scholars during the Soviet period has contributed considerably to the scientific discussions on Islam in Central Asia. One often unacknowledged strength of the Soviet orientalist school(s) was a very thorough grounding in languages and history, partly realized through a staff-to-student ratio that anglophone universities can only dream of. Nevertheless, the communication among scholars from different scientific traditions is often inhibited not only by a linguistic barrier, but also by the prejudiced or one-dimensional interpretation of texts. The question of truth and the right and ability to interpret Islam in Central Asia unfortunately often still seems shaped by the political oppositions of the Cold War. Hence despite many common questions, problems and ideas, relations among scholars from both traditions remain challenging. The authors Derbisali, Naumkin, Wilkowsky, Muminov and Auezova received a significant part of their education in Russia as Arabists and turned to Central Asia as a subject of research in the perestroika period. The discovery of Central Asia for Arabists has been welcomed by scholars like Ashirbek Muminov, who has edited numerous texts since the 1990s.25 The majority of the texts in this book provide less primary source material (translations of manuscripts) than interpretations of decade-long intensive research in and beyond the region. In other words, they show how the authors select and organize the material.

25 Muminov mentions that manuscripts in Arabic from Central Asia w e r e not been considered proper research material in the Soviet era. Due to the scriptural reforms during the Soviet period (to a modified Latin alphabet in 1926/27 and to Cyrillic in 1938/40 after the All-Union Turkological Congress of Baku), academics thereafter rarely considered manuscripts written in Arabic script (Persian, Chagatai, etc.).

42

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

In their diversity, the texts in this book provide a window on »internal« debates among Central Asians, as presented to a European audience. Needless to say, these scholarly debates do not take place in isolation, but draw on the experts' extensive knowledge of other parts of the world. The authors deal with issues arising from the specific post-Soviet situation and the search for a national history as well as a moral, healthy society. These concerns are what motivated many of the authors to change their focus of research in the course of their career and to become specialists on Central Asia. The book is structured chronologically by the year in which the authors defended their dissertation, a method that highlights the importance of the context of a scholar's formative years and the consequent differences in his or her opportunities and outlooks. In other words, it is the point of entry into scholarship that is the guiding principle behind the structure of the book. We thereby emphasize how biographies provide continuity, even though biographical narratives might vary according to purpose, audience and context. The articles, on the other hand, function more like snapshots of current research interests and aims, informed by a lifetime of research. They mirror the respective author's current position and responsibilities: as Supreme Mufti, politician, director of an institute, researcher, developer of national curricula etc. Acknowledging that social sciences produce more than objective products and more than abstract knowledge (after all, any researcher hopes to attach his or her name to an idea and thus to relate his or her biography to intellectual debates), we gain insights into rich scholarly lives, communities and traditions. The choice of authors was not determined by the aim to cover »Central Asia«26 or any narrowly defined subject;

26 In academic understanding today, Central Asia consists of the former Soviet republics Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, usually including Kazakhstan and Afghanistan. »Orient« is an even larger and

Introduction

43

instead it reflects two other trajectories: the scholarly network of our colleague Dina Wilkowsky and hence also her scholarly life course. The book thus not only provides biographical notes on academics and politicians, but can also trace the intellectual engagements that shaped Wilkowsky's academic life and thinking. This double level of biographic interlinkage is best experienced if the texts are read in sequence: the authors preceding Wilkowsky's contribution were her teacher (chapter 1) and her senior colleague at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, where she received her doctorate (chapter 2). The authors following her contribution represent her immediate colleagues (maybe some even friends) at different points in her life (chapter 4 to 6), while the last authors stood more in an ustod-shogird27 relation to her. While this was not a conscious choice for the organization of the lecture series (the idea was to bring to Germany a diverse scope of researchers from the former Soviet Union working on Islam) - it is a classic way of organizing academic events, namely drawing on the large pool of experiences and interactions established through one's academic

more confusing term that can stretch as far as Siberia. The academic order of geography deserves a separate study, for it is full of contradictions and imaginations of otherness. Some of these concepts have been re-appropriated by local elites in order to find their place within the Russian federation. See for instance, the book contribution by Caroline Humphrey 2002. »Eurasianismus« - Ideologie und politische Vorstellungen in der russischen Provinz. In C. Hann (ed.), Postsozialismus. Transformationsprozesse in Europa und Asien aus ethnologischer Perspektive. Frankfurt, New York: Campus, pp. 373-396. 27 The relationship expressed through the terms ustod (teacher, educated person) and shogird (follower, student) is a relation of respect in which the younger person (the shogird) stands in a hierarchical relationship with the ustod. This does not need to result from direct teaching experiences, but can also come through general mutual respect, recognition and help. Ustod-shogrid is a personal experience as much as a formal relationship and thus persists all through life, even if the shogird one day may surpass his or her teacher's reputation.

44

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

career. In this sense, we wish to re-think knowledge production as a constant interplay of individual interests, career ambitions and the social, familial and political contexts in which a person is creatively active.

A guide through the chapters While the early Soviet period has been rather intensely researched by historians, later periods such as the Brezhnev era have so far received much less attention. Many of this volume's contributors received their training in the last decades of the Soviet Union. Obviously their engagement with the Soviet educational heritage is very different from that of earlier Soviet generations. Thus the often-heard summary judgement that Oriental Studies were ideologically driven does not take account of later periods, which were less determined by ideological concerns (chapter 2). The perestroika period under Gorbachev was marked by national revivals and the enthusiastic engagement of scholars in (re-)building independent countries on the base of a rediscovered cultural-religious heritage (chapters 5, 6, 7, 8). Many of the texts in this volume clearly reflect the enthusiasm of this reawakening, which still shapes present scholarship. The texts presented here, however, should not only be classified by political period, but should rather be understood as productions at the fluid borders between science, politics, religious scholarship and popular writings that, as always, reflect contemporary debates. These fluid borders existed during not only the late Soviet period, but also mark Oriental Studies today as a prestigious subject allowing one access to lucrative positions in politics, in analytical centres attached to the government or as religious authorities. Clearly the boundaries between these different uses of scholarship are also fluid in the anglophone world, from the classic Sovietology closely tied to Cold War doctrines and aims to the contemporary burgeoning interest in Islam as the dangerous »Other«, particularly after 9/11. The book

Introduction

45

hence takes its place in the midst of hot debates in and on Central Asia's past and present - hence we have abstained from writing a »conclusion«. Instead, some final remarks invite the reader to reflect on selected points in the texts and biographies. The book is organized in chapters each of which contains a biographic note and an article of the author. Chapter 1 opens with Professor Abdsattar Haji Derbisali, who has acted as the Supreme Mufti, the head of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kazakhstan (DUMK), from 2000 to 2013. We have included an excerpt from Derbisali's first major English-language publication, »Islam - Religion of Peace and Creation«, in which he celebrates the joint flowering of religion and culture in Kazakhstan. Derbisali describes the emergence of important sites of learning and pilgrimage, such as the tomb of Khoja Yasavi in southern Kazakhstan. He details the emergence of mosques and madrasas that educated important scientists, saints and statesmen in the region. Highlighting the development of a national elite in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Derbisali further records the destruction of mosque life and its recovery since the 1970s, until the formation of formal institutions for schooling Kazakh imams in the 1990s. For Derbisali, »religion is a guarantee for the development of civilization« (chapter 1), a unifying baseline that helps to keep peace in multi-ethnic Kazakhstan.28 Derbisali's text closes with remarks on Kazakhstan's relations with Saudi Arabia, where Derbisali served as a diplomat. The second chapter introduces Professor Vitaly Naumkin, the current head of Oriental Studies at the Moscow Academy of Science. Naumkin is not only an active scholar, but has also engaged in diplomatic relations with the Middle East and in the Dartmouth Conference's effort to settle conflicts

28

Elsewhere in his book, Derbisali does address relations with the

Russian Orthodox Church, the largest non-Muslim denomination in the country.

46

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

in the former Soviet regions. Naumkin's article begins with a short overview of the history of Islam in Central Asia from the times of the Arab conquest. He then concentrates on late twentieth-century developments, particularly of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT). He argues that it was nationalism combined with hostility to Bolshevik anti-religious policies and persecution that gave rise to a resistance movement (the so-called Basmachi), which often involved Muslim clergy. Naumkin vividly describes how, despite official atheism, Islam continued to be widely observed and privately taught. A few ardent Central Asians performed the hijra and settled in diasporas that later diffused political Islam in the region. Naumkin points to the early 1960s and 1970s beginnings of disputes among different currents of »unofficial« Islam in Central Asia. He details the strategic rapprochement between Salafi and Soviet arguments in their respective attempts to suppress the veneration of saints, tombs and sumptuous life-cycle celebrations. Naumkin reveals that the Communist leadership in Tashkent even used this overlap with Salafi views to try to split the religious elite in the late 1980s. Turning to the current situation of Islam in the region, he discusses the differences in each state's policies and the religious tendencies among their populations. In discussing the impact of the international political context, Naumkin concentrates on the example of Tajikistan: while the IRPT was part of peace talks and a rather successful parliamentary party after the civil war, it has recently been officially marginalized, despite its growing popularity. The author concludes that re-Islamisation is an ongoing process, closely linked to notions of ethnicity and national identity, to political movements and external factors such as the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Chapter 3 is dedicated to Dr. Dina Wilkowsky's activities in Kazakhstan and at ZMO. Wilkowsky studied at the Faculty for Oriental Studies of the State University of Tashkent in the USSR and received her doctoral degree at the Lomonosov Moscow State University. She was then called to the newly established Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty

Introduction

47

where she taught in the Arabic Department. She joined the ZMO in 2010, actively promoting dialogue between researchers with a Soviet education and those with a Euro-American background. In a posthumous contribution, Wilkowsky deals with the main local and foreign actors fostering religious education in contemporary Kazakhstan, evaluating their efforts in relation to their suitability or potential for conflict in the current socio-political climate. Wilkowsky describes how, initially, the general population and the clerical and religiously active intellectual elite trusted foreign charitable organizations to bring »true« Islam to Kazakhstan. However, this trust and sense of solidarity with the global umma has been replaced more recently by increased fears about potentially extremist foreign influences, along with growing confidence in re-orienting towards an authentically »Kazakh« Islam. An example of this growing confidence can be found in Derbisali's article. Echoing Derbisali's view, Wilkowsky describes the main duty of the DUMK29 as providing the population with a well-educated, moderate clergy. On the other hand, she points to a growing estrangement between the official Kazakh clergy and Muslim youth. Professor Ashirbek Muminov (chapter 4) studied at the Tashkent State University, Uzbekistan and received his degree from the Leningrad University in Russia at the Department of the Near East and the Institute of Oriental Studies. He was a research fellow at the Oriental Institute in Almaty, where he has contributed considerably to a fresh approach to Oriental Studies by invigorating the study of historical manuscripts. He is currently Head of the Department of Religious Studies at the L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University Astana Muminov sets out the very different historic parameters of contemporary Islamic movements in Kazakhstan; he argues that in the early 1990s renaissance

29 DUMK: Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man Kazakhstana (Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan's Muslims). The DUMK is also sometimes translated as SAMK: Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan/Kazakhstan.

48

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

of religion, researchers tended to see Islam as having shallow roots among nomadic peoples like the Kazakhs. Muminov shows that, nevertheless, post-Soviet Kazakhstan has seen a steady increase in the number of religious institutions and groups, as well as in the growing identification of many different ethnic groups with their religious heritage. The author interprets the burgeoning interest in Islam as an exploration of identity that was suppressed in the Soviet Union and points out that many see the orientation towards Islam as a solution to social and political problems and as a source of social values in tune with traditional culture. The article then turns to an overview and classification of the Islamic groups currently operating in Kazakhstan and beyond its borders, providing a short history of each, as well as a description of their influences and activities. While some commentators regard Sufism as an expression of traditional religiosity and as a counterweight to Islamic fundamentalism, Muminov has nevertheless observed a recent deterioration in the relationship of Sufi groups to government authorities. The D U M K has grown uneasy about their independence, charismatic leaders and potential political activism. Uncertainty about the »Central Asian-ness« of these groups has resulted, for example, in Turkish groups emphasizing their » l o c a l « roots. Despite a general feeling of solidarity among Sufis in Kazakhstan and their common opposition to Salafists, Muminov has witnessed frequent rivalries within and between Sufi groups. In conclusion, he warns that the Soviet-era extermination of the clergy has resulted in a weak authority of state-controlled Islam. He sees a danger that the many groups critiquing traditional religiosity and religious forms supported by the state will increasingly turn violent. The author urges that peaceful relations in the future require going beyond violent - or what he calls »Soviet« - means of suppression, towards encouraging a broad, knowledgeable and authoritative class of specialists on Islam. In chapter 5, we introduce Dr. Zifa-Alua Auezova's research on personalities of early twentieth-century Kazakhstan. As

Introduction

49

a scholar with a solid training at the Leningrad Oriental Institute (undergraduate years and doctoral degree), she was also influenced by a sojourn at Oxford University in the 1990s. Like Muminov, Auezova has contributed considerably to developing new curricula for the Institute of Oriental Studies in Almaty. She also has a strong emotional attachment to Kazakh history through the fate of her family, which is related in her biography. In some ways, Auezova's contribution answers Baimenov's plea to investigate indigenous Islam and scholarship as a source of moral values and identity. Auezova's article investigates the early twentieth-century historian Shakarim Qudaiberdiev, a member of the Kazakh intelligentsia whose legacy is now being rediscovered. She discusses the Soviet policy of historiography, which promoted a unified history that focused on the leading role of the Russian people in striving for Communism. From the 1920s on, any allegedly nationalist or divisive accounts of history were increasingly suppressed. Auezova argues that Central Asian states are currently undergoing a period of legitimization by nationalizing their histories, similar to what new European nation-states did in the nineteenth century. Since perestroika, the writings of the early twentieth-century Alash movement activists have thus received increased attention. A sharp critic of current affairs in his poetry, Shakarim Qudaiberdiev frequented these circles, as well as being influenced by prominent Jadid reformers such as Gasprinsky. He wrote the first Kazakh-language history; this combined Kazakh-style genealogy with popularizing Russian-style historiography, ethnography and the use of Chinese sources. Shakarim and writers drawing on his work were severely persecuted as »pan-Turkists« in the 1930s, when a uniform pro-Russian interpretation of history was imposed. Chapter 6 is devoted to Dr. Muhiddin Kabiri, a graduate of Oriental Studies in Dushanbe, who continued his diplomatic education in Moscow in the 1990s. His move from scholarship to political engagement was influenced by Tajikistan's move to independence. Today, Kabiri is the chairman of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan and a lecturer at various

50

C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on Islam

universities in the country. Deepening the discussion of the IRPT initiated by Naumkin, Kabiri focuses on the role of the IRPT since its inception in the 1970s. Kabiri writes from a dual position as the current head of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan and as university teacher. Kabiri describes his own attendance at the first secret party conference of the Ail-Union Islamic Revival Party in 1990 and delineates the party's participation in the first independent Tajik government. He outlines the reasons for the outbreak of the Tajik civil war and argues that religion did not play a big role initially but was later instrumentalized to mobilize the population and unify the opposition. As party leader, he further outlines his understanding of the IRPT as a buffer against religious extremism in Tajikistan and argues for recognizing its role in further building a peaceful society. Chapter 7 introduces Dr. Alikhan Baimenov, who took an alternative path to engaging with Islam. Unlike the preceding authors, he was not formally trained in Oriental Studies, but has been involved in religious issues through his political career, establishing himself within the new discourse on Islam in Kazakhstan. His career as a »specialist on Islam«, as he claims to be, reflects even more strongly the fluidity between political arenas, academia and personal experiences. Baimenov, a politician who highlights his religious ancestry sees Islam as a moral basis for modernization and a support for values such as justice, trust and hard work. Similarly to Derbisali, he argues that the Kazakh elite should use Islam as a basis for developing a common code of ethics for Kazakhstan. He addresses the problem of the generally low level of religious education and the spread of »non-traditional« varieties of Islam, which he claims often tend to extremism. On the other hand, he also sees Tengrianism as marginal and unsuited to the needs of contemporary Kazakh society.30 Baimenov

30

Tengrianism (in Russian also tengrianstvo,

tengrianizm):

a pre-Islamic

faith with elements of nature worship and shamanism, currently experiencing a revival or re-invention among some Central Asian elites and folk practitioners.

Introduction

51

recommends an emphasis on the golden age of Islam in Central Asia in order to foster the sciences, tolerance and recognition of commonalities with other Abrahamic religions. The author argues that Islam allowed Kazakhs to preserve their cultural identity in the Soviet era and pleads for the dissemination and translation of historic Central Asian works of Islamic scholarship, which demonstrates good business practices and justice towards women. Finally, he addresses the question of what model of secularism the Kazakh state ought to pursue: the religious and scientific elite should disseminate a well-informed religion as the basis of spiritual values and law that guards against extremism. The final chapter (chapter 8) is dedicated to the youngest of the scholars, Dr. Elmira Kochumkulova, who in the 1990s was one of the first Kyrgyz students to continue postgraduate education in the United States and was much influenced by the methods and perspectives she encountered there. Coming from a background in Social Anthropology rather than Oriental Studies, Kochumkulova's article discusses Kyrgyz funeral rites and their relationship to a nomadic world-view, on the one hand, and Islam, on the other. Given the current revival of Islam and the introduction of a great variety of currents of Islamic thought, the question of what are correct or appropriate funeral rites is highly contentious. Kochumkulova describes the disputed role of the funeral yurt, the role of mourning etiquette, for example in women's and men's laments, and their relationship to Kyrgyz epic poetry. Kochumkulova describes the reforms advocated by people adhering to what she identifies as »pure« or foreign forms of Islam and resistance to these proposals by local Kyrgyz. She contrasts the views of prominent figures such as the Supreme Mufti of Kyrgyzstan with those of her relatives, who feel that customs such as slaughtering livestock show proper respect to the dead, that funeral laments are helpful in mastering their grief and that breaking with these traditions would be shameful. In conclusion, Kochumkulova argues that Kyrgyz traditions have in fact long been highly resistant to reform efforts, because they perform a

5 2

Central Asian Intellectuals on

Islam

useful social function and should be seen as an element of civil society. The final remarks by Sophie Roche pick up some points from the chapters and suggest one possible reading of the biographies. Being part of the educational elite, the authors in this collection reflect not only on their own family histories and educational career, but also allow us to follow them in their journey through the political changes of the last three decades. Since the late 1980s, many have actively shaped the educational field and the political landscape with their scholarly work and their personal investment. The authors' contributions allow broader insights into the current debates in their respective fields and countries, and into the way they situate the Soviet past in these discussions.

Chapter 1

Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali

Professor Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy of M. Auezov South Kazakh University in 1969. Between 1970 and 1975, he was an intern and postgraduate of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. In 19751976, he spent a year at the Royal University of Morocco and passed exams in Arabic language and literature. He defended his PhD thesis on »The Development Stages of Moroccan Arabic literature«. Back in Kazakhstan, he worked for a year at the M. Auezov Institute of Literature and Arts of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, followed by an associate professorship and position as Vice Dean of the Faculty of Philology in the Department of Oriental Philology at Kazakh National University, Al-Farabi. From 1986-1988, he was again back in Moscow at the Institute of Oriental Studies to accomplish his doctorate with a work on »The Evolution of Moroccan Art in the VNth to the XXth Century«. Eventually he took up the position of Prorector for Languages and International Affairs at Al-Farabi University from 1991 to 1997. Lacking competent specialists in Arabic languages and culture, the highest authorities of independent Kazakhstan invited him to work as an advisor of the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia until 2000. In the same year and again in 2005, at the third and the fourth sheikaaaa of Muslims of Kazakhstan respectively, he was elected Supreme Mufti and Chairman of the Religious Administration of Muslims

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Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

of the Republic of Kazakhstan, a post that he held until February 2013. The Central Asia Council of Muftis confirmed him several times as a spiritual leader (in 2007) and as First Deputy Chairman of the Eurasian Islamic Shura at the International Conferences (in 2000, 2002, and 2009). He was appointed the chair of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Almaty in February 2013. Prof. Derbisali is considered the founder of »Arabistics« in Kazakhstan and the first Doctor of Science, the first Professor and the first academician in this subject in Kazakhstan. He has invested a lot in education programs and in founding the new department enabled Kazakhstan to train its own specialists in Arabic literature and culture. He revived, discovered and published about numerous famous scientists who had been forgotten for many decades. His publications include many scientific works, religious publications and historical outlines. In his function as Mufti, he has nationalized religious education and opened numerous institutions teaching Islamic culture, the best-known of which is Nur Mubarak Egyptian University.

Biographical interview1 How

did you become

interested

in studying

Islam?

I studied at the Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies during the Soviet period. My professor was Dr. Sherbatov. He is the author of the Arabic language study books (that were used to teach Arabic in Moscow and beyond). He was an excellent person. After him I had another supervisor, Prof. Zavadovsky,2 who also published several books. He is a spe-

1 The interview was conducted by Jeanne Féaux de la Croix on 19 April 2012. 2 Professor Yuri Nikolaevich Zavadovsky was born in Poland in a military family; his family then moved to Paris, France, where they lived for many

Derbisali

55

cialist on Arabic in the Maghreb, and his books are mostly on the Maghrebian dialect. Was it through Zavodovsky

that you entered

science?

Yes, after I was accepted to the graduate school, he told me that he knew a good theme for me. He was a Russian with French origins. He graduated from the Sorbonne University (in Paris) and had been a French diplomat in Baghdad. He comes from an immigrant family. Later he came to the USSR and worked in Tashkent, where he organized the translation of the five AB volumes 3 into Russian. He was a very interesting person. He also consulted for the film Bek because he knew French and English. He g r e w up in Paris and knew how to draw pictures very well. I became like a son for him. Then one day he told me that he had studied in Morocco. »1 will write my teacher Jorsch Loley, a French scholar, and he will help you. When you reach Rabat, go to him. He will write you a letter of recommendation to Prof. Muhamed al-Vazari, a professor at the university. He will help you.« I arrived in Morocco and found Prof. Vazari, who later helped me enormously. Loley, however, had died one week before my arrival. Since then I started working on Moroccan literature and defended my thesis on the »literature of M o r o c c o « , particularly on folklore, under the supervision of Zavodovsky. I went to Kazakhstan and opened the Arabic Studies Department at the university. After that I wrote my habilitation (kandidatskaya dissertatsiya) and went to Tunis. This was during the Soviet period from 1985-1986.

years. He graduated from the Eastern Department of the Sorbonne University and worked as a French diplomat in Baghdad and Cairo. Then he lived and worked in Prague, was a lecturer at Charles University and the Institute of Oriental Languages in Prague. »Slovo o moem uchitele« http://writers. kz/journals/?ID = 12&NUM=36&CURENT=&ARTICLE = 1623. 3 Yuri Zavadovsky participated in the translation of several works - referred as the five ABs in Kazakhstan - into Russian: Abu Ali Ibn Sina, »The Canon of Medicine«, the »Selected Works« of Abu Rayhan al-Biruni, and the editor of »Philosophical Treatises«, Abu Nasr Al-Farabi.

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C e n t r a l Asian I n t e l l e c t u a l s on Islam

Was this already during

perestroika?

Yes, it had just started. After my return to Kazakh University, I again went to Moscow in order to finish and defend my habilitation at the Oriental Studies Department of Moscow University, in 1987-1988. Based on my habilitation, I published my book in Moscow with the publishing house Nauk - one can find it in the bibliography of the literature on Morocco, but it is in Russian. So you continued on

Morocco?

I used to have a doctoral student working on Moroccan literature. She lived in Russia with her husband. Later there was one other student who defended her thesis on Morocco under my supervision. Then we slightly changed our profile and began to study the works of scholars from Kazakhstan. So you moved to local history? We focused on scholars who were born and raised in Kazakhstan. When Kazakhstan received its independence, we started regional research. There are more than thirty experts on Al-Farabi. One of them just defended his thesis. Our vice director is an expert on Tunisian literature, and then there are many others. Later, because of a lack of specialists, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan asked me to go to Saudi Arabia and work in diplomatic affairs there. Throughout my life I had studied the history and culture and hence I decided to go to Saudi Arabia and worked at the embassy in the cultural and humanitarian sector for three years. Later the President of Kazakhstan came and told us that we should engage with questions of religion. There was chaos in this sphere and the Muslims Board elected me the representative of the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan. I spent literally twelve years in this sector. I worked here and I also remained a member of the Scientific Advisory Board, especially on the Board of Dissertation Defence, of the Academy of Science. Now this academy has officially been closed and all members have

Derbisali

57

turned to second-level education, like in the West. Before, w e had first candidate of science and then doctoral candidate, and I was a member of the scientific board. My tasks included dealing with many opponents, giving presentations and advising students. Moreover, I was the leader of the religious institution. I had two doctoral candidates who defended their doctoral dissertations and two candidates of science who defended their candidate of science habilitation. N o w I have one doctoral candidate from Syria. So much in brief. Very impressive; activities?

how do you find

time

for

all of

these

Further, I recently published my new book. We have a city called Taraz, which is one of the oldest cities and one of the Islamic cultural centres. I discovered a scholar who was born in 1271 and died in Cairo in 1332. Halatuula Tarazi was the director of the madrasa Bibasa in Cairo in Egypt. I found his works via the Internet. His works w e r e apparently found at Princeton University, USA, and I translated them into Russian. For Kazakhs, this essay was an original idea of the writings at the madrasa of the Sultan in Cairo. In fact, it is a religious book, a report on how to understand commentaries - very interesting. One can find his writings even today. At my initiative, w e lobbied to give his name to the mosque in Jambul. Another scholar is Ontor Taraza, who is also from Taraz, Kazakhstan. When he was young in 1925-1926, he went to Afghanistan with his father. Ontor Taraza would now be 82 years old. Later he moved to Egypt and became a professor at Cairo University. He died in 2003; before that, in 2002, Ontor Taraza and I had a picture taken of us at the Embassy of Kazakhstan. N o w his son has come back to Kazakhstan and w e named a mosque in his honour. The mosque was opened in presence of the President and me. I translated his works into Russian and wrote a foreword almost 40 pages long for the book, specifically discussing who he was, his life and his biography.

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C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on I s l a m

May I ask you a few questions going further back into your childhood and youth? How did you happen to choose Oriental Studies? I was born and raised in remote rural areas. I am not from the city, not from Almaty. My mother raised me alone, and she died in 1977. We lived in poverty - at that time everybody lived in poverty because it was the post-war period (World War II) and there w e r e many problems. I graduated from secondary school and later from the institute. It is by chance that I was sent to Moscow, because it was said that a Department for Oriental Studies would be opened in the republic - before that, it had not been possible. Many prominent scholars of Oriental Studies had been shot and killed and it was necessary to revive the subject again. I was asked whether I would be interested in going to Moscow to work in Oriental Studies. I became very interested in this offer because my mother had been close to religion. She used to tell me stories from the 1001 Nights. I decided to go to Moscow. Two or three years ago I wrote an article that was published in the journal » P r o s t o r « . I had been asked to write an article on my supervisor, Zavolovsky. This is a very interesting article. It can be found in the Internet under the title » S o m e words about my teacher« 4 . This is a big article and I describe the history of Oriental Studies nicely there. What about your family? Our grandfathers were close to Islam. Probably not by accident - everything happens at the behest, there is no coincidence. Did you ever engage with Islam when you were young? I was very interested and I liked it. God directed me to this path. I wanted to study Arabic language and literature, and my advisors also directed me to this path.

4

»Slovo o moem uchitele«.

Derbisali

Wasn't it a time when one could study Islam only art and literature?

59

through

During the Soviet period, no one distinguished between Islamic science (theology) and Oriental Studies in Kazakhstan. Let us take a doctor, and he will affirm that no such separation between practices and ideas is possible. Similarly, it is not possible to say I am an atheist, but in my heart I am a different person. During the Soviet times, religion was not encouraged, but we could live Islam and there was no persecution. Maybe there had been persecution in the early 1920s, '30s, and '40s, but in the '60s this had eased because in 1943 Stalin opened the Spiritual Administration in Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM), and in 1993 we had the University of Islamic Studies of Kazakhstan. But there were various kinds of reasons. Kazakhstan had many famous scholars of Islam, but many of them were shot; and an interest in this started again in 1950. Why was I sent to Moscow? Because of the request of scholars, enlighteners, writers and poets, there was a revival of Islam in Kazakhstan. Our culture is related to Islam. It was time to prepare our own specialists in this field. I was not the only one sent to Moscow; there was another student of Persian Literature and another of Arabic Literature. I established the Arabic Department, which includes Turkology as well as Iranian, Hindi, Japanese and Chinese languages. I was the first instructor; now there are more than 72 professors whom I prepared and many of whom I hired. Many of my students are working as ambassadors in various Arab countries. I worked for the independence of Kazakhstan and for its future for many years. Were they intentionally

trained to become

diplomats?

At that time we did not know that one day Kazakhstan would become independent, but we felt in our hearts that this would not last forever.

60

Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

Selected

publications

Islam jauharlari men jàdigerlikteri [Treasures and monuments of Islam]. Almaty: Atamura, 2008. Islam - religiya mira i sozidaniya. Teologichesko-religiovedcheskie, istoriko-filologicheskie issledovaniya, stat'i, i razmyshleniya, doklady i interv'yu [Islam - religion of peace and creation. A work of theological and historicalphilological research, articles and reflections, reports and interviews], Almaty: Daik-Press, 2010. Islam: Religion of peace and creation. A work of theological and historical-philological research, articles and reflections, reports and interviews. London: Stacey International, 2012. Khibatulla at-Tarazi i ego dukhovnoe nasledie [Hibatulla atTarazi and his spiritual heritage], Astana: DUMK, 2012.

Muftiyat of Kazakhstan, Almaty ( © Jeanne Féaux de la Croix)

Derbisali 61 Islamic Civilization and Kazakhstan Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali

Islam in Kazakhstan 3 Kazakhstan is the most remote country in the Islamic world and thus represents a shield for the rest of the Islamic world, as it borders on Christian Russia to the northeast and on Buddhist China to the south. For many centuries the Kazakhs struggled for the preservation and integrity of their territory and religion. However, in the nineteenth century it fell under the heel of tsarist Russia. In the time of the Soviet system, in particular during the 1920s and 1930s, several million Kazakhs were lost as a result of Stalin's reign - either at his hand or due to the great famine and forced collectivization. Many mosques were destroyed and many religious figures were repressed. Nonetheless, the freedom-loving Kazakh nation managed to survive and restored its independence in 1991. When celebrating the declaration of independence of Kazakhstan we note that, due to this event, Islam in our country has gained wider opportunities for the realization of its peace-making activity. Indeed, the subsequent emergence of Kazakh nationhood is deeply connected with the proliferation of Islam in the territory of the Republic. The wide proliferation of Islam in Kazakhstan is connected with the fact that one of the main

5

The following text has been taken from the book Islam,

Peace

and Creation

Religion

of

by Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali. We thank Stacey

International Publications for allowing us to reproduce the passages from page 162 to 180 with interruptions and again from page 215. I have added titles in many cases in order to contextualize the text.

62

Central A s i a n Intellectuals on I s l a m

concepts of Islam, known as risalah, guides people in the way of prosperity and happiness. It is natural that such a humanistic attitude towards people complied with their innermost aspirations. However, the period of the Soviet system broke off the natural course of history. Nevertheless, it failed to efface from the consciousness of the Kazakhs the religious values that were traditional and very important to them. Over the course of ten years of the coming of independence of the Republic, a revival of many spiritual and religious values took place. It is gratifying to note that, for some time now, a revival of our religion has been taking place. In a relatively short period of time, hundreds of mosques have opened. Their number is now around fifteen hundred. Some fifteen million people live in multinational Kazakhstan; about 70% of them are Muslims. Among them are Kazakhs, Tatars, Uzbeks, Uigurs, Dungans and several others, getting along together in peace and concord. Religion is an important part of the spiritual culture of a nation. The reason for this is that traditions, customs and rituals have a long history and are conservative in the finest sense of the word. Therefore, they help the people preserve the historical memory and build their future optimistically on the basis of the past. Islam contributes a great deal to the promotion of inter-ethnic concord of Kazakhstan and to the growth of the region as common home for all the peoples living in it. The prosperity of the nation and the state is possible only when peace and concord reign in the country. Concern for peace and its preservation in the state is the duty of every citizen. An inter-religious and inter-confessional dialogue is of critical important in the matter of preserving peace in society. Without it, discord, vacillation and alienation of people will prevail. This is why we call upon people for peacefulness and religious tolerance; and we support those people. We are convinced that Islam must not be used for alien political aims. We strongly oppose religious fanaticism and ethnic and religious dissension.

Derbisali

6 3

During the whole period of its existence in Kazakhstan, Islam has never been a source of ethnic dissension and will never be so. Moreover, Islam always called nations to mutual understanding, concord and good-neighbourliness despite ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious differences.

The mosques and madrasas of Kazakhstan In the contemporary world, a quarter of the total number of the global population confesses to Islam. Almighty Allah has turned the hearts of about two billion of our contemporaries with his mercy and the light of unfeigned goodness, truth and higher justice. Islam originated in the territory of the present Arab Peninsula referred to as Dzhazirat al-'arab. It is here that Almighty Allah reveal the Holy Qur'an to the Prophet Muhammad Ibn 'Abdallah (Allah bless him and give him peace!) a native of the local tribe of Quraish. The Holy Qur'an was revealed to mankind as secret knowledge bearing the great and salvatory ideas of humanity, the priority spirituality over all other values and the true meaning of the existence of all flesh on earth - nurturing the seeds of good in the transient world. This religion proved to be so necessary for people, and therefore viable, that from the seventh to the eighth century it spread over Asia, Africa and a part of Europe; it brought happiness to humanity. Eventually, confident sprouts of the new religion also sprang up in Central Asia in the eighth and ninth centuries. Islam in its Sunni form found its way to the land of the Turks, gained a footing and took root there. At this very time, the first mosques and madrasas a p p e a r e d in these parts. What w e r e they like, the first man-made buildings in which the word of the Almighty w a s being accumulated and then proliferated? The mosques and the madrasas, j u s t like the people who had built them, have their own history, life and past and they are unique not only as works of art but as a tangible evidence of the formation of the spiritual and

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Central Asian Intellectuals on Islam

ethic culture of humankind. The good and evil of this world, the zest for life and the bitterness of destruction passed through the destinies of the mosques in the same way that they passed through the lives of their creators. In unison with the rest of the world, Kazakhstani »House of Allah« emerged, about which a rich if contradictory chronicle was created. This chronicle preserves the secret history of different epochs, characteristic features of different societies and dramatic destinies of the people, their cities and the settlements. For this reason, the narrative of the mosques and madrasas, and their contribution to spiritual formation of humanity, will be correct only in terms of this particular segment of history. From the triumphant entry of Islam into the territory of our country to the present day, the building of mosques has not ceased except during periods of war and invasion. This is natural as neither society nor civilization can survive without spiritual values. A mosque is the focus of goodness and morality and plays a tremendous role in the life of any nation, as it calls for friendship and the unity of people and unceasingly toils over the spiritual self-enrichment of humankind. As far as is known, the Kazakhs led a half-nomad, halfsedentary lifestyle. Therefore, the building of mosques in Kazakhstan was connected with the most characteristic years and periods of history. Based on these years, the history of our country may be traced as the expansion of Islam over a huge territory; its taking root and the deep acknowledgement of all its high postulates, prolonged for centuries. The Battle of Talas (AD 751), between the Arabs and the Chinese, played a tremendous role in the Islamification of the Kazakhs. Thanks to several written Arabic sources, it was discovered that, in AD 893, a mosque was built in the city of Taraz. Historians now believe it to be one of the earliest mosques in the Republic. Meanwhile, archaeologists who conducted excavations at Otrar and site nearby claimed to have found the remains of a domed mosque that had been mentioned in the works

Derbisali

6 5

of the historian al-Maqdisi (tenth century). The well-known archaeologist and academician K.M. Baypakov writes as follows: »Excavations in Kuiryktobe, which is identified as Keder, revealed what appear to be the remains of this mosque - the earliest construction on Kazakhstan territory. It was situated at the centre of the site, at the intersection of the main streets, and was built of square burnt brick. The overall dimensions of the mosque are 36.5 x 20.5 square metres. If w e compare the estimated date of its creation, w e can assume that this is the mosque of Kuiryktobe«. The Shakpa-ata mosque (ninth-tenth century), on the Mangyshlak Peninsula, is also one of the earliest Houses of Allah to be found on the land of our ancestors. The nature of the region, as well as the lifestyle of the local inhabitants, determined the way the mosque was constructed. In this particular case it was built on the rocks. In spite of the fact that this method of building can be traced back to the time of Beket-ata (1750-1813), with the exception of Turkestanit, is found nowhere else in Kazakhstan. In the south, the underground mosque belonged to the famous ascetic and righteous man; the confessor of all Turkic nations; the great thinker and poet Khoja Ahmad Yasavi (1093-1167). Having reached the age of the Prophet, sixty-three years, and guided by a sense of protest against further bodily life, he doomed himself voluntarily to a more than ten-year stay under the ground; alone, with no one but Allah the Almighty. Not far away, archaeologists have found a smaller underground mosque (fourteenth century) as well as a shildekhana build in the fifteenth or sixteenth century. Thus, the first Houses of Allah prompted people to start living a sedentary lifestyle from the earliest times, so it determined not only a stable existence but also, to a certain degree, a stability of thought. It is no mere chance that they asserted themselves for the first time in southern Kazakhstan, where the culture of urban building was most developed. This was the case with the Isma'il-ata mosque in the district of Turbat, as well as similar mosques in Turkestan, Sayram and Otrar, the call of which has passed across the centuries

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to reach our own day. Surviving written sources show that mosques were already being built in the early Middle Ages in the nearby territories of Otrar.6 [...]

Political struggle over mosques The mosques became the only religious and spiritual centres that helped people to survive under difficult circumstance, as they radiated goodness, mercy, generosity and superior knowledge in an atmosphere of the denial and destruction of spiritual and ethical values. These are the Konyrkuldzha mosque built in Akmola in the 1820s; the Agash mosque built in Semipalatinsk in 1834; the mosque-madrasa in Syrymbet in the Ayrtau district of north Kazakhstan also in 1834; the mosque in Orda built by Zhangir Khan in 1835; a mosque which gladdened the hearts of the inhabitants of Ayaguz was opened in 1847-1848; the Rai mosque in the Dzhezkazgan region was opened in 1850; in 1851 a mosque was built by Kunabai Khaji, the father of the well-known poet and thinker Abai, in Karkaraly; in 1852, the Dinmuhamed mosque was opened in Petropavlovsk; two mosques in the Kapalsk district of the Taldy-Kurgan region were opened in 1855 and 1867 and finally, construction of mosques in Almaty began in the 1860s. In the second half of the nineteenth century and at the turn of the twentieth century, mosques were gradually opened in other regions and districts of Kazakhstan, fighting their way through the thick mass of prohibitions. For example, in 1921, in Petropavlovsk alone, nine mosques

6 Karl M. Baypakov 1977. On the localization of the medieval cities of Southern Kazakhstan. Archaeological research in Otrar. Almaty. See also Karl M. Baypakov 1979. Nekotorye voprosy isucheniya rannie-srednevekovykh gorodov Semirech'ya i Yuzhnogo Kazakhstana [Some aspects from the study of early and medieval cities in southern Kazakhstan]. Leningrad: USA (4), pp. 7-10.

Derbisali 67 w e r e working. The Soviet government introduced sever restrictions on religious education. In northern, eastern and western parts of Kazakhstan, as well as on the slopes of Atyrau in the wooded areas, mosques w e r e built of wood. A large proportion of them w e r e committed to flames in Soviet times. In southern Kazakhstan there w e r e f e w wooden mosques; instead, brick was used, based on Middle East and Central Asia models. This was the case, for example, with the construction of the mosquemausoleum of Khoja Ahmad Yasavi in Turkestan. As for the architecture of the Kazakhstani mosques in southern Kazakhstan, they are built in the same style as the mosques of Iran and Central Asia; in the rest of the territory of the Republic, the House of Allah are made of brick, similar to the mosques of Russia, Tatarstan and Bashkiria [...]. In the 1860s, there were around twenty mosques and two madrasas for 5,000 inhabitants (according to the 1867 census). The population grew and in 1908, 41 mosques w e r e already working here. Before the revolution there w e r e about 200 mosques in the Aktyubinsk region, nearly 80 mosques in Bukei Khanate, 269 in Semirechye, 49 in the Jambyl region and in Auliye-Ata itself (present day Taraz), 15 mosques and houses of prayer for performing namaz w e r e working. All similar religious and spiritual centres may be classified as cathedrals, zabiyas and khanakas. The word jami is used to denote mosques with domes, the organization of which meets all the requirements of sharia and in compliance with latter, where the Sabbatical prayer is read each week. In zabrya-mosques, these requirements are not obligatory; here, just the five-time daily group prayers are performed. Most of the mosques in Kazakhstan are of the first type. The houses of prayer that appeared in sparsely inhabited districts are defined as zabiya. The word zabiya itself is a modification of the Arabic word zawiya. It was used to refer to the places of residence of the early hermits, ascetics and marabouts that descended from Maghrebian - in other words, western Arabs. The meaning of this word also varies. Primarily it was used to

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denote small, isolated rooms in mosques where Muslims gave themselves up to quiet reading and the study of the Qur'an. Subsequently, the righteous men and ascetics began to preach, teach and instruct in zawiyas. Therefore the people continued calling small local mosques zabiya. The meaning of khanaka is close to that one of zawiya, it is connected with the lifestyle of ascetics as well. After all, as a rule, they did not have their own houses and such premises served them as a temporary shelter as well as a place for meditative privacy and the performance of religious rituals. In the tenth century, khanakas appeared in Khorasan and Mawarannahr, and then in other regions as Islam spread throughout the world. In Central Asia and Middle Ages Kazakhstan, khanaka became ingrained in religious practice. As a rule, they appeared near the mausoleum of saint or the burial site of a scholar, priest or other distinguished person. Here, at the request of pilgrims and numerous visitors, prayers were read for the deceased and the Holy Qur'an was cited. In the heart of the fruitless struggle with Islam, atheists vented their anger upon the zabiyas and khanakas as well. Once again, mosques became the object of their fury - now part of the Soviet system. Those that survived were used as stables, storerooms and so on. Decades later, the authorities came to their senses: the preserved »constructions of the religious faith« were granted the status of historic monuments, protected by the government. Although the godless system bore within it the element of destruction, it was somewhat afraid of the people and therefore left the ancient graves, necropolises and mausoleums intact. The major parts were preserved in far greater number than the preserved mosques and madrasas - thus, our forefathers, men of wisdom, saints, priests and distinguished historical figures, even after their death, preserved the memory and culture of the nation [...]. In the Soviet period, only twenty-five mosques were functioning in Kazakhstan. The totalitarian system was suffering a crisis and while it was coming apart at the seams more and

Derbisali 69 more, the gradual return of the roots of the religion of our fathers, which had been the source of national consciousness for almost thirteen centuries, took place. It is natural that from the 1970s onwards, the Soviet system failed to halt the revival of Islam. Some thirty-eight mosques arose in the Republic in the period from 1979 to 1990; by the time of independence our country had only sixty-eight mosques. The turn of the millennium is marked by a burst of activity in the construction of Houses of Allah. Organizations, private entrepreneurs and people of modest means made contributions to the good cause; Muslim communities from every corner of the world rendered their help.

The social history of mosques and madrasas After Islam had taken root on the territory of Kazakhstan, spiritual educational institutions known as madrasas began to appear along with the mosques. It is probably not widely known that this religion is a guarantee of the development of civilization and for this reason, bears within itself the germ of the future. This actually began at the time when our forefathers adopted the Arabic script together with Islam. Arabic words, and, a little later, Persian words started to actively enter into the vocabulary of the Turkic nations. The activity of madrasas and the mudarrisses (»tutors«) working in them had much in common with Arabic and Persian religious, scientific and cultural traditions. The land of Kazakhstan was visited not only by travellers but also by different scholars and men of enlightenment. It was they who rendered active, on-the-spot help in madrasas. The representatives of the local population that were most progressive and sensitive to the spirit of the time set their sights on Shash, Bukhara, Samarqand, Merv and Termez. They also headed for places further afield - to Teheran, Isfahan, Shiraz, and even to Cairo, Baghdad, Basra and Damascus, which had been almost inaccessible in previous centuries. Our forefathers covered thousands of kilometres,

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facing incredible difficulties in order to obtain knowledge at first hand, directly from the authoritative educational centres of the countries of the Middle East. It is no mere chance that the cultural and spiritual intercourse with Khorezm, which is located to the southwest of Syrdarya, has continued since those distant times; it was our ancestors who laid the foundations for this. Our distinguished compatriots, important figures of the culture of Islam, in whose lives the achievements of humanity are reflected as in a mirror - Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Abu Ibrahim Ishak al-Farabi, Isma'il al-Dzhauhari al-Farabi, Abu-l-Qasim al-Farabi and other representatives of the city of Farab - w e r e primarily educated at the madrasa of Otrar; the Isfijabi-Sayramians at the madrasa of Sayram; the Jendians and Barshynkentians in Bashynkent; Husam ad-din alHusain as-Sygnaki in Sygnak; the Balasagunians in Balasguna and the Tarazians, Dzikilians and Sheldzians in Taraz. According to surviving records, it is particularly well known that the sultans - the Khorezm shahs (eleventh to thirteenth century) who reigned in the territory of Southern Kazakhstan - personally selected the mudarrisses, the madrasa teachers. They imposed on the mudarrisses the responsibility for the quality of the knowledge given by them. For example, w e read in one of the manuscripts that, in 1162, El Aryslan obliged Hakan Abu-l-Muzaffar Tamgash Bogra-khan Ibrahim Ibn Sulayman, in addition to the execution of other state affairs, to personally appoint the mudarrisses in the madrasas of Turkestan and to carefully supervise their activities. The teachers in the madrasas traditionally performed the duties of Imam-khatybs (Muslim priests) as well. Mustaufi Hamdallah al-Qazwini (1280-1350) also speaks of the existence of ten madrasas in the city of Balasaguna in the tenth to twelfth century. There is no doubt as to the sufficiency of highly active madrasas in Kazakhstan. However, enemy raids and internecine feuds levelled to the ground the efforts of hundreds and thousands of toiler in the name of Islam.

Derbisali 7 1 The madrasas, as well as the mosques, came alive again only in the nineteenth century, in the first half of which the first religious educational establishment appeared in the city of Bab-Ata (Baladi) not far from the centre of the Sozak district of Sholakkorgan in southern Kazakhstan. According to written sources, this madrasa was built in the 1820s and worked efficiently until very recently. The Aiganym madrasa in Syrymbet dated 1834; and known as »the madrasa of Orda« constructed in 1841 by order of Zhangi, the Khan of Orda; the Galiya madrasa, which opened in Ufa in 1872 - these were the places where many Kazakh intellectuals gained their knowledge. This knowledge probably predetermined the upsurge in spiritual, social and creative activity towards the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the twentieth century. The architectural pattern of the madrasa in Bab-Ata is repeated in similar educational establishments in Bukhara, Samarqand, Tashkent in Uzbekistan and Shayan in southern Kazakhstan. There are about thirty /lujra-classrooms in the madrasa of Bab-Ata. Up to the 1820s, those who wanted to get a sound education studied here. Mukhtar Auezov himself came here several times. In the second half of the nineteenth century the number of madrasas grew significantly. In the city of Karnak alone, located in southern Kazakhstan, there were four working madrasas. Many prominent individuals gained spiritual knowledge here; among them was Shadi Zhangirov (18551933), a descendant of Genghis Khan. Brilliant education and spiritual training was received by the graduates of two madrasas: the Mutygiya madrasa in Uralsk in the west of Kazakhstan where the talented Tatar poet Gabdallah Tokay (1886-1913) studied and the madrasa of Ahmet Riza in Semipalatinsk where the poet and enlightener Abay Kunabayev studied languages and the works of eastern classicists over the course of three years. Indeed, the madrasas in the given historical period exerted a most immediate influence on the culture and the level of the development of society as a whole.

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Many Kazakh intellectuals were graduates of the Rasuliya madrasa in Troitsk, which was opened towards the end of the nineteenth century; of the Husainiya madrasa in Orenburg, which graduated its first students in 1891, and also of the famous Bagbustan madrasa, which was opened at the same place in 1910. It is particularly important to note the Bagbustan-Khanum madrasa to which the Bashkirs, Tatars, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Uzbeks sent their daughters to be educated. In the early twentieth century, many madrasas in Kazakhstan extended their functions significantly and began to provide qualified secular education along with spiritual knowledge. This was the case with the Kalzhan akhun madrasa (1902) in Kzyl-Orda, the Mamaniya madrasa (1905) near Taldykurgan, the Koram madrasa (1910-1911) near Almaty and the Abdikadir madrasa (1912) in Taraz. The high educational level of the madrasas was related to the teachers working in them; these figures who left their mark on world science and history. Each of them was way ahead of their time during their lifetime. Investing a spiritual fund into the educational activity of such enlighteners is still yielding its results today, even after many centuries. In Islam, notions of religion and science are deeply intertwined and individual interpretations of the divine, spiritual and the revealed lose their significance, as in this religion the very essence of this world and the universe is concealed. Great thinkers such Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Ali Ibn Sina and Ulugbek were educated in the madrasa: the first went down in history as scientist and encyclopaedist, the second as a physician whose works are studied to this day and the third as an astronomer. Knowledge received with the help of Islam led the warlord Muhammad Haidar Dulati (1499-1551) to many achievements in history and poetry. Among the faithful who perpetuated the traditions of madrasas were the Otrarians 'Abbas al-Dzhauhari, Abd al-Gafur al-Kerderi (thirteenth century), Sheikh Baba Sygnaki (twelfth to thirteenth century), Abu-1Qasim al-Farabi, Muhammad al-Kerderi (thirteenth century),

Derbisali 73 Qawam ad-din al-Farabi, Husam ad-din as-Sygnaki, Sayid Merki, Shams Tarazi, Sheikh Ahmet Turkestani (fourteenth to fifteenth century), Hafiz Baqi as-Sayid Turkestani (seventeenth century) and Baqi Muhammad Turkestani (eighteenth century) [...] Madrasas still continue their tradition as high-level educational centres. Two-year courses on religious literacy have already been functioning under the jurisdiction of large regional, municipal and district mosques. Kazakhstan was one of the first countries in the civilized world to tackle the reorganization of spiritual education against the background of advanced science and technology and large intellectual potential. On these courses, experienced teachers from the most famous educational establishments in Al-Azhar and Turkey will be teaching together with local Imams. In 2001, the Egyptian University of Islamic Culture NurMubarak was opened in Almaty. No comparable educational establishment exist in either the Republic or in the CIS Countries. The Republican Islamic Institute for the Advanced Training of Imams is also worthy of mention. Here, further education is offered to those who, for whatever reason, are not able to attend full-time course at Nur-Mubarak University. Since it opened, over 3,000 clergymen have deepened their religious education here. The creation of such educational establishments in the territory of Kazakhstan is today's imperative.

The cultural heritage of Kazakhstan Our ancestors, who w e r e witnesses to the complicated history of the forming of humanity, left us a rich spiritual heritage. Our duty to them consists of not only its preservation but also its active assimilation and exploration. The culture, literature, art, traditions and mindset of the Kazakhstanis g r e w out of Islam and this religion is still a source of living waters for the present and the future.

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Tsarist Russia, in its role as a colonizer, haughtily stated that, »the outlanders do not have any ancient culture«. The Soviet system asserted that, »it was the October Revolution that opened their eyes«. The communist propaganda of almost seventy years left its mark; we, the contemporaries, have been largely estranged from the mental and ethical culture of our ancestors - the tree has lost the roots that nourished the crown. However, even a superficial review of the literature and culture of the Kazakh nation shows that they date back thousands of years. This can be seen not only in the epic works, music and art, but also in the national character, traditions, education and lifestyle. It goes back to the great culture of Islam, rather than the cheap values of the October revolution. This religion is the primary source of spiritual heritage and simultaneously, is the guarantor of life, peace and independence for us, the Kazakhstanis. It is no mere chance that our forefathers chose it around 1,000 years ago and we, as their distant descendants, preserve it in our souls and genes, for this religion is based on the last revelation of Allah. The President of Kazakhstan said: »We are Turks, and our religion is Islam.« Our spiritual heritage should also be viewed through the lens of this historical entity. The youth of today will have to explore the vast cultural history, which goes beyond the mosques and madrasas - those eternal values that constitute the basis of civilization and are sorely in need of our support, protection and cultivation. After Kazakhstan gained independence the countries of the Middle East, as well as several Asian countries, were first to acknowledge it and forge diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan. In this respect, paramount importance was given to the acknowledgement of our independence by Muslim countries, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is considered to be the cradle of Islam. The beginning of mutual relations was marked by the development of relation in political, economic, cultural and humanitarian fields.

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To some extent, this country may be considered the leader of the Islamic Arabic countries. In 1994, President Nazarbayev made an official visit to Saudi Arabia. After that, in 1996, the Embassy of Kazakhstan was opened in Riyadh. Relations became stable. Nonetheless, ten years have passed since the head of state made that visit. In spite of the repeated invitations of the Kingdom's administration, there had been no favourable pretext for another visit until finally, in early March 2004, such an occasion presented itself; the visit, which took place in the first decade of the new 1425th year of Hijra, turned out to be exceptional.

Islam and culture It is gratifying to note that the Senate of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the plenary meeting in 31 January 2002, accepted the draft law, »On the introduction of changes and additions to certain legislative acts of the Republic of Kazakhstan regarding issues of the freedom of conscience and the activity of religious associations«, presented by the Minister of Culture, Information and Public Consent, Mukhtar Kul-Muhammad. Indeed, it is very important to put the activity of religious associations into a certain legal framework with the consideration of the existing socio-political situation. All world religious bear a vast cultural and humanistic fund within themselves, which is an inherent element of the moral sanity of nations. Islam plays an important role in this process. Looking back though history, we find the evidence that Islam, having appeared in the early seventh century, expanded into the territory of Kazakhstan as well, exerting a significant influence on the development of the national culture. However, in the Soviet period it was not the custom to speak about the existence of Islamic culture and its interrelationship with other types of culture. To characterize culture, territorial or national signs were preferred on ideological

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grounds - in other words, one could speak about the culture of the Middle East or the culture of Soviet Kazakhstan. The fact that Islam embraced half of the world in the seventh and eighth centuries and that the huge unified state - the Arabic Caliphate - was created at that time, was not considered. This Caliphate was inhabited by different nations with different histories and cultures, and Islam had cemented them together. The consolidating power of Islam turned out to be stronger than all the national differences. Within the boundaries of the Caliphate, there was a fusion of Arab and other nations, as well as the fruitful interaction of their cultures. The Arabic language was spreading widely, as was Arabic script, poetry, the art of calligraphy and the principles of ornamental composition. For example, Arabic script was used in Kazakhstan until 1929 when the Latin alphabet took its place, then in 1939 Kazakhstan switched over to Cyrillic. Along with the Islamic perception of the world, Islamic values became the supranational elements of culture that created the Islamic world, and now we can speak with good reason about Islamic art. As we know, the Middle East is referred to as modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Republics of Central Asia. There was an ancient and distinctive culture in these countries before the proliferation of Islam. Various religious beliefs prevailed in them: Zoroastrism, Buddhism, Christianity of the Nestorian form and Manichaeism. The history of Kazakhstan is virtually the history of the steppe, which had its own script before Islam - in other words, the Orkhon-Yenisei inscriptions (Kul-Tegin, Tonukuk and Bilge-Kagan). The history of the steppe was considered for the first time in the works of Herodotus and Sym Tsyan. This history of the development of the nomadic culture shows that the nomads did not adopt Manichaeism, Nestorianism or Buddhism for a long time. Several oases of various cultures were created on the Eurasian subcontinent, which all existed at one time and evidently interacted with each other. Apparently, the study of archaeological cultures near the Minusinsk hollow suggests

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that >archaeological< cultures do not follow one another, but coexist and are dated from the seventeenth to fifteenth century BC. The history of the emergence of ethnicities demonstrates that objects of art are valuable because everybody can enjoy them without bias. The reason is that neither creative work nor perception are possible without sincerity and the sincere sympathy towards alien art lies in the depths of the national soul and in the ethno-psychological constitution of the people. There is also evidence that isolated development of different ethnicities is impossible, as development is only possible in the case of interaction between the cultures. For example, the history of the development of the culture of Kazakhstan is inherently connected with the development of the cultures of other present day Central Asian ethnic groups. It is known that the ancient works of art created in these Republics, such as the Amudarya treasure, the Issyk complex and the painting of Balalyk-Tepe, were performed at the highest artistic level and still have not lost their aesthetic value. This is why they have justly entered into the artistic treasury of mankind. From the second half of the seventh century, parts of Kazakhstan and Central Asia gradually began to enter the circle of the Arabic Caliphate. This led to a cultural interaction between nations of the Caliphate. In the same period, the prerequisites necessary for the development of agriculture, handicrafts, trade, science and culture were created. The first half of the eighth century saw culture and science in Kazakhstan become increasingly sophisticated under the influence of Islam. With the appearance of urban civilization in the steppe, the transition from a semi-nomadic to a sedentary culture took place. This nomadic culture gave distinguished scholars, poets, philosophers and historians to the world. Cities eventually became centres of trade and handicrafts, as well

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as centres of international life and moderators of intellectual and spiritual life. The city of Turkestan played an important role in the course of the development of the Turkic culture. This city, the 1,500th anniversary of which was widely celebrated by the UNESCO global community, is chiefly known through its monuments of great historic significance, such as the mausoleums of Khoja Ahmad Yasavi and Asian Baba. The mausoleum of Khoja Ahmad Yasavi was erected by the architect Khaji Husain, a native of Shiraz in Persia, by order of Timur. Many people justly believe this magnificent complex to be an architectural wonder of the world. The following inscription appears on the pediment of its facade: »Say: If I had that for which ye are impatient, then would the case (ere this) have been decided between me and you. Allah is best aware of the wrongdoers.« 7 Much has been done for the preservation and augmentation of spiritual culture in the course of ten years of the emergence of Kazakh nationhood and independence, led by the most earnest heed to this important issue by the Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Kazakhstan. An analysis of the development of the culture of Kazakhstan enables us to state that the active process of the revival and development of the culture penetrated by religious spirituality has been taking place in our sovereign Republic. The nations of Kazakhstan are bearers of the rich and unique heritage of Turkic culture. At the same time, we should take into account the fact that Islam imparts the spiritual knowledge, values and cultural traditions of previous generations. For example, adat, joined with the Islamic code of laws (in other words, sharia), calls upon the faithful not to violate public order, and to revere devoutly the laws of the ancestors. We can proudly say that there are personal samples of the observance of these canons in the history of Kazakhstan. Among them are the sages Tol Bi, Ayteke Bi

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The Qur'art:

Sura 6 a l - A n ' a m , v e r s e 58.

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and Kyzybek Bi; the righteous men Arystan Baba and Khoja Ahmet Yasavi; the rulers Kasim Khan, Yesim Khan and Abylai Khan and others. Increasingly close attention has recently been paid to the revival of the cultural traditions of the past, particularly the literary monuments. Among them w e hold in high regard the numerous stone stelae, on which the messages of our distant Orkhon ancestors are engraved. Professor Vilhelm Thomsen decoded the texts on the stone stelae in 1893. Due to the initiative of the leadership of the Republic, in line with UNESCO, the two-hundredth anniversary of the birthday of the great poet Mahambet Utemisov was celebrated. This is why w e believe that the decree from 26 February 2001, issued by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, to destroy all the statues and non-Islamic artefacts on its territory was a mistake that impaired the authority and prestige of Islam. We believe that Islam exerted a major influence over the cultures of nations in the countries where it proliferated. The development of culture is possible through interrelation, interaction and dialogue. It is aimed, like Islam, at nurturing high spirituality in people, and also promoting concord, peace, amity and the prosperity of nations. All cultures, whether they are Islamic or non-Islamic, are unique and equal to each other. Culture makes one human and the level of a person's culture is an indicator of his civility and spirituality. This is why we support the initiative of UNESCO, and believe that such a dialogue between the representatives of different schools of Islam will raise awareness of the fact that the preservation of cultural heritage is the sacred duty of Muslims to our contemporaries and descendants.

Chapter 2

Vitaly V. Naumkin

Prof. Dr. Vitaly Naumkin is currently director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1968, he graduated with distinction from the Institute of Asia & Africa (ISAA, then Institute of Oriental Languages) at Moscow State University in the Faculty of History & Philology. He had studied Arabic Language and History of the Arab World. He also completed a training course at Cairo University and the American University in Cairo in 19661967. From 1968 to 1970, he served in the Soviet army as an officer and taught Arabic for interpreters at the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, Ministry of Defence. Already at that time, Vitaly Naumkin was one of the best simultaneous interpreters for Arabic in Russia and was frequently summoned to work in this capacity for the country's top leadership. In the 1970s, Vitaly Naumkin launched his Yemen research project. After postgraduate studies at Moscow State University (1970-1972), he defended his PhD dissertation on the doctrine of an outstanding Islamic medieval theologian, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (eleventh-twelfth centuries). His primary interests were Yemen's ancient and modern history and current development issues. In 1981, Naumkin earned his Doctor of Science degree with a habilitation on the history of South Yemen's armed struggle for independence, led by the National Front. In 1984, he joined the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, where he became Head of the Department of the Arab Countries,

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then served throughout 1989-1994 as deputy director of the Institute and throughout 1994-2009 acted as Head of the Centre for Arab Studies. Over the years of his scientific research and academic career, Naumkin has imparted knowledge to hundreds to researchers, 50 PhDs and 5 Doctors of Science, who became scholars, professors, state and public figures, career officers and journalists in Russia and abroad, especially in the Arab world. Naumkin is a co-chair of the Russian-American Regional Conflicts Task Force of the Dartmouth Conference. He has made a significant contribution to narrowing the divide between the conflicting parties in the Middle East and postSoviet territories, particularly in the case of inter-Tajik reconciliation and the case of Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2007, the Secretary General of the United Nations appointed Prof. Naumkin Ambassador for the Alliance of Civilizations. Currently he is a Member of the Consultative Board of the Security Council of Russia; a Member of the Consultative Council of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia; and a Member of the High-Level Group for the Alliance of Civilizations (UNO).

Biographical interview1 How did you come to study Arabic? You know, for me studying Arabic was like a dream. I was brought up in the city of Yekaterinburg, which was called Svetlowsk in those days, in the Urals. So it was a typical Russian city but nevertheless I was interested in the Islamic populations, Muslim populations that were present there,

1 The interview was conducted by Sophie Roche on March 15, 2012. Harry Kreisler conducted a more complete interview with Prof. Naumkin for the Regents of the University of California on February 19, 2003, available at http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people3/Naumkin/naumkin-con5.html.

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Tatars and some people from Central Asia. Also I was reading a lot about the oriental world, about the Muslim world, the Arab world, so I was already interested in making efforts in order to penetrate into other cultures. This wish was strong when I was in high school. Then, when I learned that there was a Faculty of Oriental Languages, I found it very interesting to come back and study Arabic in order to become a specialist in the Middle East, travelling to exotic places, penetrating into other cultures. I had always liked to read travel books, usually translations into Russian. So for me, it seemed very attractive to study Arabic. Then, when I came to Moscow to the Institute - it was called the African and Oriental Institute of Languages at Moscow University - I decided it was best to study only Arabic, nothing else, because there were a lot of languages - Hindi, Japanese, Chinese. I was interested only in the Arabic language. There had been some problems about how to choose a language, so I decided to do only Arabic. This suited me well, as I was fond of the Arabic language, I liked it. They had a lot of teachers for Arabic Studies; we had one of the most important professors of the time. He was an Armenian by origin, but he came from the Middle East, he repatriated to the Soviet Union from Egypt, where he had been brought up by émigrés from the Ottoman Empire. An Armenian with native Arabic, a very good professional linguist - Grazia Kocian. Then we had several Arab professors, one of them was an Egyptian from the old leftist emigration who was living in Moscow in those days, an old communist who came to Russia in the 1920s. He was a friend of my family, of my father. He gave me a lot of material in Arabic and told me a lot about the region, information about life and culture. Then we had some very outstanding Arab poets who were also émigrés from various places like Czechoslovakia and, East Germany, of course. We had some teachers who came on the basis of contracts. One gentleman, for instance, was a writer of Iraqi origin who lived in Paris. He had come as a professor of language. So we had a very good level of training.

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So your father already had contacts with the Middle East? Not professionally, he had nothing to do with it, only on the basis of personal relationships - no, I had no special motivation, my father was a ballet director, nothing to do with this - arts, music, that is what I was closer to. I could have worked in the tradition of the family, but I did not. And then you became the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, this was in the period of change, of perestroika. Yes, first I became responsible for the Arab countries only; this was before I was at Moscow University. Then I was invited by the director of this institute - at that time this was Mister Primakov, later he became Prime Minister of Russia. This was in 1984 - and in 1984 I was young [for such a responsibility] - because usually those responsible for research at the institute were rather old. So we can say in those days the academics here were rather aged people, I was young and energetic. Oriental Studies in general was less ideological, less »ideologized«, than other humanities in Russia. The reason was that people in International Studies were dealing more with the West, they dealt with philosophy because they had to engage with Marxist theory and so on, they were more indoctrinated. In Oriental Studies, even in the Soviet days, we were not that dependent on the ideology. For instance, my doctoral thesis was on the medieval philosopher al-Ghazali, and this was very unusual. I took Ghazali - he was a mystic, he was not in line with the overwhelming line of ideology. I can tell you and I can affirm that I republished this book these days without any problems. During perestroika, of course ideological influence was the main issue, whether and to what degree it had affected the studies. When I joined the institute, I found here a total rejection of the old atheistic theories. But, as I am telling you, it was not that bad in the Soviet days either in the field of Oriental Studies, they were less »ideologized«. Of course there was some influence on the institute from the Soviet time before I came here, for

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instance we had a concentration in the study of so-called national liberation movements, like the trade unions, working class movements, and revolutions of course, all types of revolutionary movements, communist parties. But when I came, the whole system began to collapse, so there was an interesting process of reorienting the old research. But still before the collapse, I spent some time in South Yemen. I was writing - we still have a system of two dissertations in Russia - about the armed revolution in South Yemen, and it is amazing that although I wrote and published the book during the Soviet days - when one might think the system was under some ideological diktat - I tell you that I published the English edition of this book in Britain several years ago, without any problems, in Oxford! During the Soviet Union there were several institutes of Oriental Studies. How were relations between these institutes and has anything changed? Of course it changed. First - St. Petersburg was considered a branch of our institute, it was part of us. Now we separated several years ago and it is totally dedicated to research on manuscripts: medieval and ancient history and oriental manuscripts. There is no modern history, political science or economics or whatever. It is totally separated. And as far as the [oriental] institutions in Central Asia and the Caucasus are concerned, they were separate institutions within the Soviet republics; the main one was in Tashkent. Alma-Ata was a very small institution, Tashkent was more important, and Dushanbe was more or less important. Also there, they had two institutions, the institute of manuscript - which is still there - and it was part of the university. We were also supervising them; we were considered the titular or main institution. They were not a branch of our institute, they were separate, but we were supervising them, giving them some structure, consulting them, and having all these sorts of meetings about general problems. Then after the collapse of the Soviet Union they became independent and now there is a tremendous growth of this type of institutes.

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It must have been a nice time when scientists regularly across countries.

could

meet

Yes, everything w a s so easy, generously funded by the state, everything very cheap. Now, you know, even travelling within Russia is very expensive, as you can imagine. It is easier and cheaper to go to London than to go to Vladivostok. Three times more expensive at least. You are a specialist on the Islamic world with an expertise as well in the Middle East and in Central Asia. Where would you place Central Asia within this Islamic world? I think Central Asia has not yet become integrated into the Islamic world because there are secular regimes, they still have the heritage of the Soviet Union, which makes the state secular. There are different states and different population. For instance, in Kazakhstan there are still a lot of Slavs, Russians and other groups, Koreans, Germans [...] so it is more Eurasian or even close to Europe. Uzbekistan is different, you have a different past there; the Ferghana Valley is quite amazing. It is more Islamized, and more built up on a civilization based on Islamic patterns. Turkmenistan is a bit isolated, a very special case. We have strong authoritarian leaders everywhere - but still they are capable of preserving stability broadly, not very friendly to democratic values, but still their asset is that they are more or less stable. What about

Islam?

Of course it is totally different. Yemen is a very tribal country with more radical groups. We have some groups like this abroad in Afghanistan, those who moved from Uzbekistan but we do have an Islamic opposition. In general there is a process of Islamisation, especially in the three countries, the three states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Even in Kazakhstan there is a growing influence of religion, so it is regarded as an important element of the system of value, the system of self-identification, but still different from one country to another.

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Among your various political engagements you are also a co-chair of the Russian-American Regional Conflicts Task Force of the Dartmouth Conference. Could you tell us about your personal experiences in mediating in the civil war in Tajikistan and the conflict of Ngorno-Karabakh? The Dartmouth Conference was secret diplomacy between Russia and the United States.2 [...] So we were sitting together, a group of American and Russian - then Soviet experts, trying to bring our ways of thinking together, cooperating together and working on how to avoid conflicts. Then, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we decided to use this methodology of sustained dialogue to address one of the conflicts in the former Soviet Union. So we decided that we would start with Tajikistan, where we had lots of friends because of the connections between the institutes and especially among Orientalists and Arabists. So we came there when the civil war was still going on and we were trying to recruit people for this dialogue, to convince them to come and sit around the negotiation table, to sit together and come to Moscow to discuss possible ways of reconciliation. There were groups of American and Russian sponsors that were funding it. There were representatives of two conflicting sides in the civil war, different parties like Islamists, secularists, democrats, from Gorno Badakhshan the party Lali Badakhshan, then the Democratic Front, the Islamic Revival Party and the Kulyabis who were in charge of everything - with great difficulties we convinced them to come. We got the approval of the [Russian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs - because in the beginning they tried to stop us from inviting people, they did not allow us to invite people, because of the good relations between Russia and Tajikistan and their personal relationships with the Foreign Minister. Eventually they said: »Okay, you can proceed, we are not

2

One of the activities of the Dartmouth Conference was the dialogue

among different civil war parties in the civil war of the 1990s.

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going to disturb you, but listen, the issue is so sensitive right now that we cannot sit with the opposition, the Islamists.« The reason was that President Rahmon, who had just been elected, was not even referring to them as the opposition, but was calling them only »bandits«. »If you want to sit with bandits, you are free; we will not.« But we recruited people, we recruited people from the Popular Front from Kulyab, and some wise people, some professors, doctors. Nuri was sending us some people - I had a couple of meetings with him, he approved all that, for him it was easier, but it was not easy for Rahmon. Abdullo Nuri was an enemy, a bandit, to everyone. It was not easy. So we brought a group of 15 people here. From that time on, we have been working with the theory of sustained dialogue in close cooperation with my American counterpart Nelson. So step by step we developed a formula for peace. We contributed to that process - just now our contribution has been evaluated by all conflicting sides and by the United Nations. We had 35 sessions of dialogue for many years. Even after reconciliation in 1997, we continued to further develop reconciliation into a state-building process and democracy and an electoral system. We continued until early 2005. Now we have started working on Nagorno Karabagh - it is very difficult, but we are working on the issue, trying to mediate. This dialogue is based not on the idea of replacing foreign ministers or dealing with foreign affairs; rather, we try to build reconciliation between civil societies, between citizens. And encourage citizens to change their relationships and play a more significant role. This is how we influenced the official process.

Selected

publications

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Ihya 'Ulum al-Din/translation into Russian, commentary and introduction. Moscow: Nauka, 1980.

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Central Asia: State, religion, society. Reading: Ithaca, 1993. The Middle East conflict. Vols. I-II Moscow: Materik, 2003. Red wolves of Yemen. Cambridge: Oleander, 2004. Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between pen and rifle. Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. Islam and Muslims: Culture and politics. Moscow: Medina Press, 2008.

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (© Izzat Aman)

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I s l a m in C e n t r a l A s i a : R e l i g i o n a n d Politics Vitaly V. Naumkin

In the seventh century A.D., Arab Muslim troops conquered Central Asia, which they called Ma Wara' al-Nahr (What is Beyond the River), meaning the Amu Darya (the Oxus). In Ma Wara' al-Nahr, or Transoxania, which was incorporated into the Arab Caliphate, Islam began to spread. It became the official religion of the Samanid state (875-999), with the city of Bukhara as its capital, which became independent of Baghdad, the capital of the great Abbasid Caliphate. This gave an impetus to further development of Muslim science and education in the region, the spread of Arabic and also the Islamization of the nomadic population. In Ma Wara' al-Nahr, a great number of mosques and madrasas (seminaries) were built at that time, and a stratum of educated Muslim clergy and intellectuals was formed. Islam in Ma Wara' al-Nahr was spread mostly in the form of Sunnism, although a certain part of the local population became adherents of Shi'a and Isma'iliyya. In the epoch when the main madhhabs - schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) - in Sunnism were formed, some of them vied for influence in Ma Wara' al-Nahr, but gradually Hanafism displaced the other schools. Hanafism is one of the four madhhabs (Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali) in Sunni Islam, named after Imam alNu'man b. Thabit b. Zuta Abu Hanifa (700-767). This school is known by its adherence to the rationalistic methods of judgement and laid down rules in fiqh.

Naumkin 91 The Hanafis are usually distinguished from other scholars by their application of subjective opinion (ra'y). Their tradition flourished in Central Asia, where Abu Mansur alMaturidi al-Samarqandi (d. 944), one of the most prominent followers of Abu Hanifa, created his school of scholastic theology (kalam), which together with that of al-Ash'ari forms the essence of Sunni theology. The Maturidiyya became the form in which Hanafism turned into the dominant madhhab in Transoxania in the tenth century. From that time on, only the Hanafi fuqaha' and ulama (religious c l e r g y ) w e r e appointed to all the religious posts in the state (imam khatib (imam who serves in a big Friday mosque and reads a sermon), muhtasib (market inspector, assistant of imam), mudarris (lecturer) etc.). The success of Hanafism arose because it was tolerant of pre-Islamic popular customs and rites, many of which were incorporated into Islam. The head of the Hanafis in Bukhara (ra'is) even acquired hereditary power in Bukhara in the eleventh century, which his family wielded until the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century. Throughout the history of the Islamic world, the indissoluble bond between Islam, on the one hand, and politics and power, on the other, has repeatedly been confirmed. Among many Islamized popular pre-Islamic customs and rites in Central Asia was, for example, the sayyil, or sayyil-bayram - a festival of spring revelry falling in late April/early May (mostly among the Turcophone peoples of Central Asia). The celebration of the sayyil starts with a reading from the Qur'an (a common Islamizing tool) and visits to the graves of ancestors and saints, ending in mass feasts. The rural clergy adapted this festival to Islamic rituals, but theologians and the ulama see clear traces of preIslamic customs in it. Examples are tying of coloured pieces of cloth to trees and tugs (a wooden pole put over the tomb of an ancestor or a saint), the kissing of headstones, the rubbing of graveside dust over one's face and so forth. Central Asian Hanafi scholars called themselves Ahl alSunna wal-Jama'a (People of the Sunna and Concord). This designation goes back to a hadith in which Muhammad says

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that the Muslim communities will fragment into 73 sects (firqa), of which only one will remain: Ahl al-Sunna walJama'a (the Sufis likewise claimed to be called the same). These Hanafi scholars emphasized their righteousness in such a manner. In various regions of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Hanafites seriously conflicted with the Hanbalites - followers of Ahmad b. Muhammad b. Hanbal (780-855), who fully depended on the traditional sources of Islam and literal understanding of texts, admitting ra'y (subjective opinion) only as a last resort when traditional sources could not give an answer to the questions that arose. Sufism - a mystical trend in Islam, whose essence consists in admitting the idea of man's communion with Allah, gained wide acceptance in Ma Wara' al-Nahr. Sufi brotherhoods of Central Asia - Naqshbandiyya, Yasaviyya, Qadiriyya, Qubraviyya - exerted the strongest impact on the cultural and socio-political life of the region, in which a new stratum of the religious class was formed - the influential leaders and preceptors of Sufi brotherhoods: pirs, ishans, and shaykhs. The local cult of saints absorbed the strata of both local and Arab mythology, while the incorporation of local elements into Islam was probably one of the reasons why the new religion swiftly took root in the local soil. A similar judgement can be made about the Muslim » c l e r g y « that was in process of being formed after the conquest. It absorbed members of the former, pre-Islamic elite and priesthood. Parallels with the present inevitably suggest themselves: the Soviet party and state nomenklatura in our times effectively inscribed itself into the new order, having become its foundation. The activity of the Karakhanids (840-1212), who turned the tombs of their progenitors into holy places of Islam, was an example of effective transformation in the period of Islamisation in Central Asia. The holy places served as a platform for Sufism, whose roots in the entire Muslim world went back to non-Islamic influence.

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The Mongol conquest of Central Asia in the thirteenth century was a catastrophe for its civilization. Bukhara, by that time one of the greatest cultural centres of the Muslim world, was destroyed. Now its mosques and madrasas lay in ruins. It was only later, in the fourteenth century, that the role of Islam as the official religion of Central Asia began to re-emerge. By that time the Mongol conquerors had also become Muslims. But in that era it was no longer the ulama, as before the conquest, but Sufi shaykhs and ishans who played a paramount role in the religious class. Sufi symbols and rituals - »tombs of saints«, or mazars, zikr (»remembrance«, a custom of glorifying Allah with certain brief, prescribed phrases) dervishes - became the quintessence of popular Islam, joining together the diverse ethnic groups of the population. The region again turned into one of the centres of Islam under Timur (1336-1405) and the Timurids (especially under Timur's grandson Ulugh Beg - 1394-1449), when masterpieces of Muslim architecture - mosques, mausoleums and madrasas (the Shah-i Zinda ensemble, the Bibi Khanum mosque, the Gur-e Amir Mausoleum, and the Ulugh Beg Madrasa) - were built. Later Central Asia became an arena of intensified rivalry among the diverse ethnic and tribal groups, local dynasties and foreign power centres. Towards the time of the region's conquest by the Russian empire, there were several states in Central Asia, the main ones being Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva, where Islam of a Sunni variety remained an official religion. The religious class held strong positions in these states - for example, the chief judge (qazi kalon) of Bukhara, who headed the hierarchy of qadis (or qazis), was one of the most influential people in the state. Sufi shaykhs retained a strong influence on public life and affairs of state. Russia had begun to penetrate into Central Asia from the times of Peter the Great (1689-1725), but the conquest of the region took place in the nineteenth century, when a substantial part of it was annexed to the empire in the form of the Turkestan Governorship-General, Bukhara and Khi-

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va becoming its protectorates. Despite the policy of containing the influence of Islam, it remained a significant power even in Turkestan. In 1908 in Turkestan there w e r e 2,571 jum'a mosques (big mosques for Friday prayers), 8,812 neighbourhood mosques, 1,211 mazars (tombs) with 1,142 shaykhs, 6,102 maktabs (religious schools) for male students and 801 for female students, 336 madrasas and 14,375 other schools, with 103,377 students in all these schools. By the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, the religious class in Central Asia comprised very numerous groups of ministers at mosques - imams and mullas. Muftis, men of law - muhtasibs and qadis (qazis), theologians and scholars ulama, keepers of mazars, mudarrises (teachers), traditional religious authorities - Sufi shaykhs, ishans, khojas and so on. The overwhelming majority of the clergy belonged to the privileged classes of Central Asian society. In the prerevolutionary era, the population of Central Asia was traditionally divided into ok-suyak, »blue blood«, and koracha, » m o b « . In a very general sense, ok-suyak w e r e divided into sayyids and khojas, the structure of this estate being different in various regions of Central Asia. In some regions, people belonging to it claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad (just like sayyids or sharifs in most countries of the Muslim East, tracing their origin to 'Ali b. Abi Talib, who married the Prophet's daughter Fatima and had children by her). In others, they claimed descent from all the »righteous caliphs« (the first four caliphs ruling the Arab Caliphate after the Prophet's death, including Ali) or even from Arabs in general, while members of the third group viewed themselves as descendants of Genghis Khan (tura). The tura estate appeared in Central Asia after the Mongol conquest and became part and parcel of the aristocratic estate groups of the population. In the late nineteenth to early twentieth century, the dynamics of religious life in Central Asia w e r e largely shaped by the conflict between the Jadidist modernizers and the Qadimist (from Arab, qadim - old) conservatives. A number

Naumkin 95 of religious figures, particularly in the Bukharan Emirate, shared some Salafi views. Islam's involvement in politics notably increased with the downfall of tsarism as a result of the February 1917 revolution, which ushered in some progress toward the democratization of Russia's internal political life. On May 1-11, 1917, the First All-Russian Muslim Congress set up a Muslim Central Agency, a Muslim Central Council ( M i l l i Shuro) and an Executive Committee (Ikomus). The Second Congress in June 1917 also decided to set up a Muslim Military Council (Harbi Shuro) and an All-Russia Muslim Directorate (Milli Idare) and to hold a Muslim National Assembly in November 1917. The Second Congress exhibited a strong tendency towards pan-Islamism, while the Military Council started recruiting soldiers into a Muslim army. Further growth of this activity was prevented by the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, which struck a blow at the positions of Islam in Central Asia, the whole of which subsequently became part of the Soviet Union and was divided into a number of Union republics on an ethnic basis. An offensive against Islam, soon unleashed by the authorities, and the ensuing upsurge of nationalism caused a swelling in the ranks of an armed resistance movement hostile to the Sovietization of Central Asia, which took the name of basmachi ( » r o b b e r s « ) . The ishans, shaykhs and ulama were the first to declare war on atheistic power. The basmachi movement was not finally crushed until the mid19305. Facing defeat, basmachi leaders called on citizens who supported them to escape from repression by performing the hijra (religiously motivated emigration), as the Prophet Muhammad had done in his time, to dar al-Islam »lands of Islam«, or by going on a hajj. Thus, in certain Muslim countries (Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia) a substantial Central Asian diaspora was formed, whose representatives in the future, at the end of the twentieth century, would play an important role in diffusing political Islam throughout the newly independent states of Central Asia.

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In the 1930s, the state meted out the harshest repressive measures against local Islam and particularly the clergy. Many mosques were destroyed, madrasas closed, and many members of the religious class subjected to reprisals. Official Islam was placed under tight state control, an active atheism was pursued and Sufi brotherhoods were persecuted. However, popular Islam endured and went into hiding, into private life. Even many party and government functionaries, officially atheists, especially in the period after World War II when there was no mass repression, secretly observed Islamic rites, including those such as the performance of ziyarat (pilgrimage) to the tombs of saints. Apart of its official forms, Islam also existed as an informal system of spiritual education, parallel to the official one mostly by way of hujras (the Arabic for » r o o m « , an apartment where classes w e r e held), and also as theological dogmatic and legal - thought. Moreover, within this parallel discourse a polemic was carried on between champions of different views, sometimes reaching a point of bitter confrontation, while among the exponents of this unofficial Islam there w e r e - from the 1960-1970s on, at the latest - adherents of political Islam. The rise of militant Islamism in Central Asia is usually linked to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which came into existence in the second half of the 1990s, created by groups of the Ferghana Salafis who had started their activities long before the IMU's formation. In 1943, Stalin, feeling the need to use Islam, just like Orthodox Christianity, to mobilize the population to fight the fascist aggressor, decided to re-establish the Muftiate that used to exist at the time of the Russian Empire - the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM). Ishan Babakhan became Mufti of five Central Asian republics and his son, Shaykh Ziyauddin Khan, SADUM's Executive Secretary. The five SADUM representative offices in all these republics w e r e headed by qadis. A very enigmatic figure in the Central Asian Islamic thought of the twentieth century was Al-Shami al-Tarabulsi.

Naumkin 97 It is not quite clear who invited him how and for what reason to come to Tashkent in the early 1920s. Judging by scattered facts, he seems to have been invited by the Turkestani Bolsheviks themselves, who were even then launching a campaign of struggle against traditional Islam. Perhaps the local revolutionaries took to al-Tarabulsi as a partisan of Islamic puritanism, Salafism, able to become their ally in an offensive against the popular, Sufi Islam, likened by the Bolsheviks to stagnation and obscurantism. Sufism was dangerous for the Bolsheviks due to its mass following, the popularity of its preceptors, its mobilizing potential and its uncontrolled character. On the basis of his fatwas, some analysts consider Mufti Ziyauddin Babakhanov »the first fundamentalist« in Central Asia. In the fatwa on the mahr and the kalym (two forms of money paid to the family of the bride), for instance, he reproaches those Muslims who make it a custom to organize sumptuous weddings, while the size of the mahr reaches astounding proportions: »in the guise of the mahr, in essence we witness a regeneration of the pagan pre-Islamic custom of purchase and sale of brides - the kalym«. The Mufti recommended the Central Asian Muslims to henceforth avoid such pernicious customs. Similar admonitions are also to be found in the fatwa on the vanity of banquets on the occasion of the khatna (circumcision) rite. According to the Mufti, such banquets »in no way conform to the dictates of Islamic shari'a«. There is no telling whether a certain puritanism in these fatwas was a result of the Mufti's latent »fundamentalist« sympathies or a social mandate, or perhaps both. If such puritanism could be pleasing to the Salafis' hearts, one cannot fail to see that it was also useful for the authorities, to which the Mufti retained complete loyalty (the worship of the saints' tombs distracted the population from the official ideology, while the popularity of the ministers of popular Islam challenged the Party and government nomenklatura). Be this as it may, if criticism of »popular« Islam by Mufti Ziyauddin were not directly associated with the pene-

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tration of Salafi Islam into the Soviet republics of Central Asia, it nonetheless fertilized the local soil f o r the seeds of Salafism to grow on it in the post-Soviet future. Beginning from the end of the 1970s, some of the Uzbek ulama showed signs of dissatisfaction with the Hanafi doctrine, moving towards Hanbalism. These ulama had been educated by several prominent teachers of Islam who had until recently remained unknown abroad due to the almost underground character of their activities under Soviet rule. Maulawi Hindustani played a crucial role among those teachers. Starting from the end of the 1970s, after turbulent years in his biography, Muhammadjan qari focused all his efforts on private work with students at home. As testified by his adopted son Ubaydulla, he gave classes either at his home or in other places, in various parts of the city. Students came to Dushanbe from different parts of the region and visited the teacher's hujra secretly mostly during nighttimes. All his lessons w e r e individual, and no groups assembled in his house. Many of them later became founders of the first Salafi, or »Wahhabi« groups, though their teacher criticized them for that. Thanks to these lessons, the Maulawi acquired an enormous popularity in the republic. These lessons were recorded on audiocassettes, copied and disseminated. The republic's Party and state nomenklatura also displayed interest in them. The Chairman of Tajikistan's Council of Ministers of the time, Abdul Ahad Kahharov, and his daughter secretly took these classes from Hindustani. I was startled when I learned from a former Uzbek Communist ideologist whom I interviewed in the 1990s that even in the late 1980s the Communist leadership in Tashkent had ordered the Party committees in a secret circular to support Salafis in order to use them against the influential and therefore dangerous traditional Islam. The Salafis w e r e then viewed as instrumental to split the religious class. It cannot be ruled out that certain teachers (mudarrisses) lecturing in hujras maintained close, possibly even secret relations with government authorities.

Naumkin 99 The students of mudarrisses who had their clandestine hujras in Central Asia had from the 1970s established their circle of scholars (called dawra), which was characterized as mujaddidiyya, that is, «enovationism«. Some researchers believe that, by calling themselves mujaddidiyya, these radical scholars were building a bridge between themselves and the eighteenth-century Naqshbandiyya brotherhood of Ma Wara' al-Nahr ; which had used this name. The »renovators« proposed to repudiate the principles of the Maturidiyya school of Hanafism prevalent in Central Asian Islam, deeming it necessary to introduce amendments both to the system of current rituals and, in part, to dogmatics by purifying the primordial, » t r u e « Islam of later developments and borrowings from pre-Islamic cults and customs. These neo-Salafis stood against any displays of the cult of saints, including the custom of ziyarat, against the reading of certain ayats (verses) of the Qur'an and funeral prayers and prayers for the forgiveness of the deceased or for a person's health, against the dispensation of donations during the funeral (tokivor), against the mourning of the dead, against sumptuous weddings and so forth. Politicized discussions were also carried on, for instance on the question of whether the Islamic umma could exist outside of the Islamic state. Moderate Hanafi ulama believed this possible, while adepts of Mujaddidiyya believed this impossible. Thus the idea of an Islamic state had already been in the air, not being completely borrowed from foreign Salafis, but in greater degree engendered by local reality. In the early 1990s, in the peak of perestroika, the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) of the USSR, which had been established on June 9, 1990 in Astrakhan, became active in Uzbekistan. Its leaders, however, held very moderate positions and shied away from calling for the creation of an Islamic state, a platform that would have been natural for a political Islamic party. They were considered too moderate by young Salafi revivalists, who were seeking a more radical organizational framework for their aspirations.

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The Uzbekistani portion of the Ferghana Valley was where Salafis and radical Islamists managed to mobilize popular support. The religious-political group Islam Lashkarlari (Warriors of Islam) was also established during the early 1990s. This was followed by the establishment of Adolat (Justice), which was probably one of the two wings of Islam Lashkarlari. Adolat was comprised mostly of young men who organized themselves in mahalla (neighbourhood) militias. These militias started patrolling the streets and controlling prices at local markets. In effect, Adolat tried to take over the functions of the local state authorities. Having successfully challenged local law enforcement agencies, the Adolat militias declared that they had replaced them. When the m e r g e r of Adolat with radical Islam took place, the leaders of Adolat came to regard shari'a as the exclusive legal basis of their activity. They gained broad support in the densely populated cities of the Ferghana Valley owing to its high level of religiosity. Their contribution to the promotion of the idea of an Islamic state was immense. They performed all the necessary Islamic rituals and were devoted to Islamic traditions and moral values. In particular, they ordered all women not to appear on the streets unless properly veiled. These injunctions met with the particular admiration of the older generation, which believed that Central Asian youth were disrespectful of tradition and neglected the Islamic code of behaviour. This group of Muslim youth, inspired by the works of such ideologists of Islamic radicalism as Abul Ala Maududi of Pakistan and the sermons of local revivalist Islamic leaders, rallied around the concept of Musulman-abad (The Land of Islam). This paradigm was based on the following principles: (1) Central Asia belongs to the Muslim world, which is a homogeneous unified Muslim territory where Islam dominates everywhere; (2) the shari'a governs relations between individuals; (3) all the people in this space believe in Allah, and their society is ruled by the educated ulama. As one of the proponents of this concept explained, Musulman-abad meant the »unification of different independent states as

Naumkm 101 one Muslim area in which there would be many states united by Islam«. The idea of Musulman-abad displays some similarities to the concept of the Caliphate of the transnational Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami that later penetrated into Central Asia. The Uzbekistani Salafis attempted to implant in the republic their own version of Islam, based on Hanbalism and strict monotheism similar to the Wahhabi version. The »popular Islam« that incorporated many non-Islamic customs, rites and festivals became the object of their attack. One example of a pre-Islamic rite is the spinning of the bride round the fire during the wedding. The fire is made by men on behalf of the bridegroom, and the bride has to walk round it three times counter-clockwise. It may well be that in the past this rite had a sacral character and was linked to fire worship (the more so as Zoroastrianism had been widespread in this region). Although Sufism as the mainstay of traditional Islam in Central Asia was an adversary for Salafi ulama and imams, the technologists of radical Islam made use of the Sufi practice of working with the believers and placing them under the authority of shaykhs. Furthermore, the Salafis became involved in a fierce argument with the Hanafis on questions of creed, championing Hanbali positions and trying to re-educate local Muslims in their own doctrine. In this regard I can cite the former Mufti and famous Uzbek religious scholar Muhammad Sadiq Muhammad Yusuf: » I n contradiction to local customs and rituals, they began to offer prayers in a different way, loudly pronouncing Amin after reading the sura Fatiha [Qur'an, 1], raising their hands high and whispering something while standing behind the imam before and after the performance of the ritual bow (ruqu'). Local Muslims asked them about these deviations from the norms customary to them. These pseudo-teachers replied: » W e are following the Sunna of our Prophet (let Allah bless and welcome him!). These prescriptions you are asking about are mentioned in such-and-such hadiths. Unfortunately, you do not follow the Sunna of the Prophet - let Allah bless and welcome him! You are performing what was told by Abu Hanifa.«

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The Islamic radicals started to show muscle in relations with the authorities, resorting not only to acts of open disobedience, but also to the forcible seizure of premises. In December 1991, the Muslim youth took over the building of the former Communist Party (now National Democratic Party) Committee headquarters in Namangan and urged that the president listen to their fifteen demands. In particular, they demanded that the government (1) proclaim the establishment of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan; (2) use shari'a as the only legal system; (3) cease to orient themselves toward Turkey; (4) turn all schools into separate ones for boys and girls; (5) give local Muslims one of the administrative buildings in Namangan. The militants began to openly criticize Karimov, whom they characterized as an infidel, and they began to accumulate weapons in their houses in order to foment a popular rebellion. They also took steps to prepare for the creation of an Islamic state in Uzbekistan and were completely confident that they would be supported by a majority of the people and win the forthcoming conflict easily. In February 1992, Adolat, Birlik, Erk and the IRP asked Karimov to start negotiations in Namangan. It seemed to me at the time that Adolat leaders were hoping that Karimov would refuse to negotiate, which would help them mobilize supporters for a planned uprising. Tahir Yuldashev and certain other militant Salafi leaders intensified their contacts abroad at the same time. A representative of a charity organization from Saudi Arabia who visited Russia in March 1992 told me that, as he hoped, Karimov would have to declare Uzbekistan an Islamic state in the near future. Yuldashev and his comrades apparently hoped the same. But Karimov, after being directly challenged by the Islamists, severely cracked down on the Ferghana militants with the help of his loyal law enforcement agencies. All foreign »missionaries« were immediately expelled from the country, and many supporters of the Islamic and democratic opposition were arrested. The leaders of the opposition groups fled the country, and these groups were declared illegal. The leader of the IRP, Abdulla Utaev, was arrested

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in December, even though his small party had not been directly involved in violence. Only one insignificant radical Islamic political group, Tawba (Repentance), continued to operate in the republic. In 1995, however, it disappeared like its predecessors. After the expulsion of foreign emissaries, the toughening of the rules of entry of such people into the republic and other measures, outside influence on the affairs of Islam in Uzbekistan was sharply curtailed. In situations similar to the one described above, when several mosques competing for the minds of Muslims were active in one and the same mahalla, »surplus« mosques whose construction had been dictated exclusively by the desire of a foreign sponsor to implant his own understanding of Islam in the Ferghana Valley w e r e being closed. In April 1992, when the situation in Tajikistan proved most favourable for the activity of Islamists of all types (in May that year a government of national reconciliation was established in which the Islamists tried to play the dominant role), the majority of Islamic radicals and extremists from Uzbekistan fled to Tajikistan (President Karimov had by then dealt a shattering blow to their positions). During the short-lived civil war in Tajikistan, these Uzbek radicals formed the »Namangani battalion«. The battalion fought as part of the forces of the Tajik Islamic opposition. A f t e r the opposition's defeat in December 1992, the Uzbeks, together with the Tajik Islamic opposition, left for Afghanistan, where they formed their main base. The I M U fought against the governmental forces side by side with the members of the Party of Islamic Revival of Tajikistan and after the reconciliation moved into Afghanistan and the north-western regions of Pakistan. The Uzbeks until now are fighting there on the side of Taliban. Meanwhile the Central Asian branches of the transnational Party of Islamic Liberation (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami, HT) became active in Central Asia despite severe persecution.

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Now let us pass on to the current religious situation in Central Asia. To begin with, the following principle observations are needed to characterize it generally. First, despite the civilizational affinity of Central Asian societies and the similarity of authoritarian secular systems that dominate them (except perhaps in Kyrgyzstan), the religious situation should still be approached on a case-bycase basis. This is related to distinctions both in the degree of the population's religious devotion (for example, between the less religious Kazakhstan and the more religious Uzbekistan), the forms in which Islam manifests itself and the policies of governments. It is customary to speak of a community of processes under way in the Ferghana Valley, which is partitioned between three states - Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. Still, there is a tendency towards further divergence of their development trajectories. Second, Islam manifests several basic forms that interact with each other. There is the grassroots, first and foremost Sufi Islam with its ramified patronage networks, rituals, beliefs and practices (for instance, the cult of saints), shaykhs and a well-developed oral tradition. There is the official Islam with its state-controlled organizational framework, religious class, mosques, educational institutions and literature. There is political Islam with its political parties and organizations of varying orientation having their own goals and programs. Among these organizations one may specify both moderate, legally operating ones (for example, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan, or IRPT) and extremist, illegal ones, including those that the states of the region and some global powers classify as terrorist (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Akramiya). In the ranks of the latter are illegally operating cells of foreign or international organizations, like the Party of Islamic Liberation (Hizb alTahrir al-Islami) with its conception of an Islamic caliphate and Tabligh-i Jamaat, to name just two. Third, despite tough opposition by the ruling regimes to Islamic currents imported from abroad and alien to the local Hanafi tradition, the contention between Hanafi and Salafi

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ideas still persists in local Islam. T h e r e is no need to r e p e a t here the well-known truth on the antagonism b e t w e e n tolerant Hanafi Sunnism and Salafism, which calls upon believers to root out all the » n o v e l t i e s « (bid'a), of which there w e r e none in the early Islamic community. This said, the number of concealed adherents of the latter is to all appearances rather significant. Fourth, external factors greatly a f f e c t the situation. We are r e f e r r i n g primarily to the war being w a g e d in Afghanistan and - in a b r o a d e r sense - the international and regional anti-terrorist campaign (in recent American terminology » t h e global w a r on t e r r o r « ) , not to speak of the occupation of Palestine by Israel. All this is used, on the one hand, by the radicals as a means for a mobilizing indoctrination in the struggle against the ruling secular regimes and, on the other, by governments in the struggle against the opposition. A paradoxical situation arises when local governments provide all-out assistance to coalition forces w a g i n g military operations against religious extremists in Afghanistan, creating additional political risks for themselves, but are slammed by governments of the coalition p o w e r s f o r cracking down against the Islamists (having said this, let us leave aside the question of w h o in fact is the target of the crackdown). By w a y of example, let us examine one of the Central Asian states, Tajikistan. As a result of arduous negotiations after a bloody civil w a r b e t w e e n the g o v e r n m e n t of Emomali Rakhmon and the Islamic-cum-democratic opposition, a national reconciliation was achieved there and Tajikistan became the only country of the region where an Islamic party - the IRPT - came to share in power. It gained 3 0 % of the seats in the executive g o v e r n m e n t bodies and an admission to take part in elections. T h e party does not call into question the secular character of the state, nor does it raise the demand to introduce shari'a norms in the country. However, in recent years IRPT representatives have gradually found themselves washed out of the executive bodies, while at the parliamentary elections they invariably received a percentage of votes that enabled them to secure two parliamentary seats out of 63. At

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the same time, the party's influence was clearly growing and, moreover, passed the limits of districts traditionally forming the mainstay of Islamic forces (the Garm-Karategin group), which came as a serious challenge for the ruling National Democratic Party. This being so, it is revealing that the IRPT was a consistent ally of the country's leadership in combating illegal Islamic political organizations, especially HT. For its part, in recent years the leadership of Tajikistan has begun to emphasize its consideration for Islam. A confirmation of this, among other things, was the decision on the construction in Dushanbe of a giant cathedral mosque (one of the largest in the Islamic world) and a lavish celebration in the nation's capital of a jubilee of Imam Abu Hanifa. In 2010-2011, the country's leadership took measures that the initiators conceived to strengthen the secular character of the state, being aimed against extremist forces that had become active in the republic. These were, to name but a few, a ban on prayer in official institutions during work hours, the recall of students from religious educational establishments abroad, attestation of imam khatibs (26 persons failed to pass it), and other measures. As stated by President of the Sogdian Region K. Rasulzoda, »we are applying efforts to systematize the activity of the mosques, religious education and study at religious schools abroad. Today the greater part of those who studied abroad illegally have returned.« The IRPT viewed the ban on the performance of prayer without raptures, but, as a party forming part of the government coalition, backed it in parliament and carried out corresponding work with the other members. The party has continued to carry on information work against extremists, as exemplified by HT, who show no signs of abating their activity. The Tajikistani authorities do have grounds for concern. Among the most daring actions of the militants in recent times was an attack upon a Defence Ministry column in the east of the country on 19 September 2010, which killed 28 servicemen. This prompted the government to launch a Special Forces operation in the Rasht district and generally to step up security operations against terrorists. Simultane-

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ously, many experts pointed out that, to counter extremism successfully, one has to resolve socioeconomic problems, expand access to education and provide jobs for young people who, as in the countries of the Middle East, make up the majority of the country's population, eliminate corruption and reform the judiciary, while the powers that be must forbear to »impose total control over society«. Incidentally, the IRPT proposed to relieve the Agency on State Financial Control and Fight against Corruption from subordination to the executive government bodies and reassign it to report to parliament or the judicial bodies. But in recent months the IRPT leaders have begun to complain of being pressured by »certain circles«. On 7 February 2012, strangers beat up in the street the chief editor of the party newspaper Najot Kh. Saifullozoda, who had earlier made critical remarks concerning the situation in the country and the world. An IRPT statement issued after the beating noted that such values as humanism, pluralism and freedom of conscience and the press in Tajikistan have now been sharply curtailed and that instead authoritarianism, corruption and violations of religious and political rights of citizens are in evidence. This and many other cases illustrated an exacerbation of tensions between the ruling regime and the moderate Islamic party forming a coalition with it. A certain section of the camp of secular forces has started to accuse the party of secretly collaborating with extremists and of presumably having already lost the right to be considered moderate. What is more, appeals have begun to be launched to ban IRPT activity. A few occurrences have served as a formal pretext for this. After the attack upon the armed column mentioned above, RT television showed a brother of one of the ringleaders {amirs) of the band of attackers, Alovuddin Davlatov (Ali Bedaki) Khusniddin, who disclosed that his brother had asked him to purchase substances to make explosives. Khusniddin was an IRPT activist, a member of the Rasht district majlis (council). Shortly before, he had been arrested on charges of belonging to the banned Salafi faction. The band was smashed as part of a Special Forces operation.

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According to one of the operatives of Tajikistan's Interior Ministry, the nation's security agencies intend to safeguard the secular state from »the radical minority within the IR.PT«, while all the members of the party are allegedly »religious fundamentalists who are set to transform Tajikistan into an Islamic state«. The exacerbation of political struggle between the authoritarian regime and the legal religious party in Tajikistan (which at this stage cannot not even be characterized as a purely oppositional one, given its position within the regime) causes serious anxiety. However, I think that the authorities are unlikely to heed the voices demanding that the IRPT be outlawed. Indeed, this would mean a final collapse of the democratic experiment, which sets the post-conflict Tajikistan favourably apart from many other regimes. I can conclude by saying that the process of Islamic revival or, of re-Islamization in Central Asia has not been completed yet. This process, as we can see, has been effected by several factors, some of which are still shaping this openended process. The first of these factors is a strong relationship between religion and ethnicity. In the beginning of 1990s Islam already turned into an important source of emerging national identity of the new-born Central Asian states. The second factor was and still is the relation, even stronger than before, between religion and politics that will persist for many years to come. The history of the region shows that Islam has been always used as a powerful catalyst of political movements in the region. The third factor is the impact of external actors and developments. Above all, events in Afghanistan that may unfold in a manner we cannot predict, including the possibility of a new Taliban rule.

Chapter 3

Dina Wilkowsky

Dr. Dina Wilkowsky studied at the Faculty for Oriental Studies of the State University of Tashkent in the USSR (former Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic) and received her degree there in 1982. Immediately thereafter, she worked as a scientific assistant for Arab languages at the Faculty for Philology at the university in Almaty. In 1984, she became a doctoral candidate at the Moscow State University named after Lomonosov and received her degree with a work on »The traditions and innovations in the contemporary culture of Egypt: Philosophical problems« in 1989. She was then called to the newly established Kazakh State University named after AlFarabi in Almaty as one of its first scientific staff from a new generation of young Kazakh orientalists. Despite the economic difficulties that accompanied the perestroika period, she organized a study journey for students from Kazakhstan to the Maulay Ismail University of Meknes in Morocco in the early 1990s. During her work at the Academy of Science in Kazakhstan (1992-1996), she organized her first research stay in Germany through the DAAD in 1994. With the West's growing interest in the former Soviet region, Dina Wilkowsky turned her scientific focus to Kazakhstan without losing sight of her two other regions (Egypt and Morocco). In 1996, she went back to university now as the Chair of the Section for Oriental Languages of the newly established Faculty for International Relations at Al-Farabi University. She worked on teaching material to train future diplomats and conducted research on »Kazakhstan in inter-

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national relations«. In 2001 she left Kazakhstan for Germany, where she continued to work on scientific projects that focussed on Kazakhstan and the cultural debates. Financed by the Volkswagen Foundation, Dina Wilkowsky worked on a project on Arab-Islamic organizations in Kazakhstan that was based at Humboldt University at Berlin. Later, from 2010 onwards, she continued with the project on discussion clubs in Kazakhstan between politics, science and Islam at ZMO Berlin. She fell ill dramatically in 2011 and succumbed to her disease on 19 January 2012.

Biographical interview1 Travel in search of knowledge Heike Liebau: I got to know Dina in September 1978 in Tashkent. We both studied at the Faculty for Oriental Studies at the State University. We shared a room in a student hostel together and I witnessed Dina's enthusiasm not only for the subject she was studying (Arabic Language and Literature), but also for helping her co-students, who would transform our room into a study room during exam period. Janet Seitmetova: We met with Dina at the university; it must have been in 1992. I was studying in Moscow at the Department of Oriental Studies. When I came there, Dina had already finished and was not at the Institute in Moscow anymore. When I started at the Institute in Almaty, she

1 This biography was written on the basis of oral and written accounts by Dina Wilkowsky's relatives and colleagues. These accounts document that ideas and discourses are made by interaction among people. This way we find Dina's biography in the interaction of some of the people she met during her life. The biographical contributions come from Heike Liebau (ZMO), from Zifa-Alua Auezova on 15 June 2012 and from an interview Sophie Roche conducted with Dina's sisters Rosa and Galina Nurtasinova and her former colleague at the University of Almaty Janet Seitmetova on 24 July 2012.

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was away with the students in Morocco. Then, a Moroccan delegation from Meknes came to visit us. They established friendly relations between Almaty and Meknes and started to exchange students. Students had left for a study trip and Dina was the first one who went with the students. They went for a whole academic year - seven months. They left in November, and came back in the spring. She offered useful addresses to everyone who wanted to go. [...] Dina talked a lot about Morocco, specifically that Morocco was a beautiful country and that the people were very good. She told about a woman who was going to give all her household stuff to our Kazakh students. The woman thought that our girls were very poor, and therefore she gave them all kinds of unnecessary things. Dina laughed about this. The students also travelled around the country, accompanied by Dina. We had never gone abroad, especially to Arab countries. The following year, I went with the students. There were seven of them and we walked in the footsteps of Dina, working with people who had communicated with Dina, and all of them showed high esteem for Dina. They kept asking about »Duktur Dina« [...] Of course we had little knowledge about Islamic traditions then, but there was no pressure from teachers at all. There was a campus and as anyone can judge from the photos, they all went without a scarf; it was all quite free. They had intensive lessons about literature and language. There was a subject called Islamic culture, but this was a more general approach. After all, it was the town Meknes, near Fez, a famous town that was much more Islamized. We went there and met Kazakhs who had already been Islamized (islamizirovan). Dina probably did not see them, or she would have told me. How did they get

there?

Galina Nurtasinova: They probably studied theology. JS: They probably came as students, received an education and stayed there. We were interested in all of this, because our journey there fell in the Ramadan period. We didn't

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know, because in the Soviet Union this did not exist. During this period, the lessons were shorter. They used siren signals to announce when you could eat, and we ate. Very interesting! So you, too, followed

Ramadan?

JS: Well, no, we just stuck to the rules. We were asked whether we were Muslims or not and we said »yes«. Rosa Nurtasinova: Visually, yes, but internally - no. JS: We were not fed separately. RN: The education of the teachers there was on a high level. They were fluent, as Dina said, in English, French and Arabic. JS: In general, there was no pressure on religious behaviour. GN: We should also not forget that the Arabs are very wise people. They were beginning to open up their country, and those who wish, will come to religion. The Soviet Union and Morocco maintained friendly relations. For them, it was important that Kazakhstan would open towards the Arab world and the Arabic language, as all the rest will come through language. JS: I still think if we had studied in Fez - which has the oldest university in the Arab world - we would have undoubtedly felt pressure; Meknes is a very secular (religiously independent) small town. There, it was very nice, we ate in the same restaurant as Dina had; they had yogurt and chicken, which was very tasty. There were students who had fallen in love with Moroccans, one even got married and moved there. Knowing Arabic Why did Dina study

Arabic?

JS: A quota, that is why she came to study Arabic and not Turkish. GN: I worked at the Institute of Philosophy and Economics at the Faculty of Economics. We considered and reconsidered Arabic [which was offered to Dina], we thought and decided: why not? But we never thought it would be Tashkent.

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Moscow, Leningrad, okay, but then they offered her Tashkent - this was never intended. RN: But eventually she was satisfied that she was in Tashkent and in this faculty. JS: Always these quotas: In Moscow, too, we studied at the theatre and with the Kazakh team. We all lived together [without discrimination]; we had to return to our own country once we accomplished our studies. RN: She was in a program that prepared national cadres. [...] JS: When I studied Arabic, for some reason everyone thought that I knew the Qur ran. Dina had gone to Tashkent. For me Arabic was an additional subject, while for Dina it was her main subject. When we finished our education, I went to Moscow. Four or five women came from Petersburg and Moscow with a strong knowledge of Arabic and Islam. We had only studied literature, nothing more. How come? JS: It was the transformation period, the time of Derbisali. He had studied Arabic and came. Then Dina came and taught Arabic as well. This way we had two faculties offering Arabic. We had the Arabic Department at the State University of Kazakhstan and the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Science.2 GN: The situation was the same for all. All teachers had to write teaching manuals. Dina wrote them too. RN: When did Dina go to the Oriental Institute? JS: It must have been in 1993; when I came back, she was no longer there.

2

Prof. Derbisali (chapter 1) had founded the Department for A r a b Studies

at the State University of Kazakhstan, which w a s renamed Kazakh National University, Al-Farabi in the 1990s. Around the same time, Arabic

was

introduced as one of many languages within the Faculty of International Relations. This department was headed by Dina Wilkowsky.

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RN: She combined hours. She worked at the Institute of Oriental Studies and at the same time she had hours at the department [the Faculty for International Relations]. JS: We organized the Faculty of International Relations, where Dina and I were invited. Dina was invited by the Dean to become the leading Chair. I then worked at the Egyptian Embassy, and Dina was asked to give lessons. They also had Japanese and Chinese at the Faculty. She chaired the department until her departure to Germany. Zifa Auezova: The first time we met was at Al-Farabi State University, I guess, in 1993-94. I came to inquire about job opportunities as an Arabist at the university and took a parttime job teaching the history of Arab literature. Dina was already teaching at the Department of Oriental Studies, and I was happy to be introduced to her, particularly because I knew that she had received her Kandidat Nauk (PhD) degree in Russia, in Moscow, and I had just defended my dissertation in St. Petersburg. There was certainly much understanding between us about adapting (»re-entry«) to the academic atmosphere of Kazakhstan. The organization of teaching and research was different, with a more family-like atmosphere, in which students addressed female teachers as »apay« (»aunt«) and male teachers as »aghay« (»uncle«), and students aimed rather at repeating and memorizing what the teachers were saying than at analysing and criticizing. Our specialization in Arabic was often »internalized«: in the eyes of many Kazakhs and many students, the most natural explanation of our interest in Arabic was that we wanted to understand what is said in the Qur'an. And we were probably supposed to be proud of this knowledge. Having studied Arabic Language and Culture in Russia, we had perhaps a more distant attitude toward the subject of our study, more distant from our Kazakh culture, because the Arabic we had studied was contextualized primarily by the Middle East, while its importance for Central Asia was usually referred to in historical perspective only. Of course, it was nice to teach our relatives and friends some of the Qur ranic suras: in the 1990s, atheism was no longer state ideology and in-

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terest in Islam was growing in society. In practice, from my own experience, for most of my relatives and friends it was pleasant to learn by heart several »key« suras and understand their meanings; then these skills could be projected to newly published books about Islam. The dynamic and sporadic growth of the infrastructure of mosques and Islamic education did not have that much to do with our training in Russia (Arabic literature, plots and styles, etc.). Arabists and Islamologists in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, as well as probably in the Caucasus, Tatarstan and other parts of the former Soviet Union with »historically Muslim population«, were confronted with an interesting (epistemological) challenge: the shift from studying Islam as an attribute of a foreign culture to observing it as a newly regained attribute of home culture. Dina addressed this very important process in her study of Islamic education in Kazakhstan. It is a very important and useful publication shedding light on the postSoviet search for Islamic identity in Kazakhstan. A Soviet past How did the relation between the institutes and Moscow change after 1991?

in Central

Asia

JS: Derbisali defended his thesis in Moscow. GN: Moscow has always been with us as a reference. Whenever possible, someone always came from Moscow. JS: The young people were all sent to study in Moscow, to take courses etc. Everyone was in Moscow. GN: Then the opportunity emerged to have direct contact with the countries in question [not via Moscow], JS: In 1992 the Egyptian Embassy opened its doors. GN: There even came invitations from the Arab countries. In 1999 Dina and Janet followed an invitation to Cairo. There were such agreements. We learned on Egypt's money. JS: We only learned the language. Because when I studied, we had only one newspaper, an Arabic newspaper printed in Moscow. We learned »Moscow Arabic«.

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GN: The entire foreign policy was in Moscow, even the economic system, we were all tied to Moscow. Everything went only through Moscow. JS: We had a Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but everything went through Moscow. GN: It would have been better if we knew Arabic, it would have been easier to understand the literature, like Tajiks and Uzbeks. JS: Like the imams trained in Kazan, in Tashkent and in Tajikistan. But in Kazakhstan things had only started. There, in Tashkent and Tajikistan, secret services and translators were trained. All the men who studied with Dina somehow later ended up in Afghanistan. GN: Dina was sent to Tashkent exclusively for the academic program. In the 1980s there was the conflict with

Afghanistan.

GN: Yes, it was a constant theme at the time. JS: There were a lot of Soviet advisors. GN: All humanitarian help (gumanitarnye pomoshch) went through the Central Asian countries. SR: And Dina was also talking about the Afghan war? GN and RN: Yes, of course GN: They took many students from Tashkent and also students from Tajikistan. Of course it was very scary, many were silent, it was not allowed to talk about this. Many people who had sons were afraid that their children might be sent to Afghanistan. JS: There were some who went voluntarily. Guys from Kazakhstan also went, for instance they were recruited. Not Uzbeks; the government was afraid that they would sympathize with Afghanistan [Today] there are even groups in Kazakhstan who are fighting for their rights as Afghan veterans. GN: We can say that we, too, had the Vietnam syndrome. There were many disabled, both physical and moral. They are called Afghantsy. This is a whole subject, especially for the Russians. And yet, the oligarchs hire the Afghantsy, because they know how to master emergency situations.

Wilkowsky In 1986 the student uprising

117

happened.

JS: This was in Almaty, on 16-18 December 1986; in Moscow they felt the echoes. The reason was that they appointed a Russian as First Secretary of the Kazakh Republic. 3 And this was accompanied by protests or an uprising of students that had its echoes in Moscow. The students congratulated me that w e w e r e great (molodtsy). GN: And students from the Baltic areas congratulated Dina that the Kazakhs w e r e great. JS: Yes, the reason is that a person unknown in Kazakhstan was supposed to take this post (First Secretary). Then troops were even sent to disperse the crowd. This was caused by the young students who participated in this meeting. One student was even sentenced to death. Mukhtar Shakanov, a very famous poet spoke and wrote much about this rebellion. All those who participated w e r e then exposed to repression, persecution and exclusion from institutes. What went on in Moscow, petition there?

didn't they have some kind of a

JS: The Institute for Oriental Studies was quiet. In 1989, after the Baltic States had separated, there was an action, but mostly it was quiet. When the Soviet

Union ended, did you talk about it?

GN: Every day w e talked about it, every day w e had some evil surprises. RN: But this is overcome now. There was a series of events, a genealogy of events, privatization had to be implemented. We never knew how things would go further (Nikogda ne snali

3 In response to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's dismissal of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, Dinmukhamed Konayev, an ethnic Kazakh, students protested against the new First Secretary, Gennady Kolbin, who came from some other part of the USSR. (See chapter 7 for more details.)

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shto budet dal'she). Monetary changes, the question of flats, there were many issues and constantly choices to be made. JS: There was also confusion. GN: People didn't know what to do, they felt lost. After 1980 there was hope, and then in the 1990s all the aforementioned things happened. Dina's German c h a p t e r What about Dina's German

chapter?

GN: The first time Dina came to Germany, she was still with our mother. We went with my mother to Hamburg with a Trabi, an East German car model. Then in 1994, she came via DAAD. RN: After Moscow, she headed the department. She had a good informal relationship with the students. A huge number of her former students throughout Kazakhstan constantly helped her. When I went back recently I organized a memorial evening and heard a lot of good memories about her. JS: Dina always supported people; everybody knew that and loved her [...] When she threw a farewell party in 1999, it was very moving. Many students accompanied her as if she was their mother, as a master. She was a terrific organizer. HL: In Europe, scientific interest in the geo-strategic region of Central Asia increased. Dina conducted research about Islamic education in Kazakhstan, a theme that she later developed in a project. Generally her focus of interest shifted in the early 1990s away from the Arab world to Central Asia, more specifically Kazakhstan. Her main interest, however, always remained languages. She worked on a project on national languages and the social transformation in Kazakhstan and the Arab countries. She also intensified her research on the relationship between political and economic developments, on the one hand, and socio-religious and cultural change, on the other hand. Her participation in the summer university in Budapest in 2000 on religious questions in Central and Eastern Europe was an important event that marked her scientific path. In 2001 she married

Wilkowsky 119 in Germany and left her position as Chair of the Section for Oriental Languages at Al-Farabi University Almaty without knowing what to expect in Germany. She had trained several generations of people who now worked in various important diplomatic and economic positions, yet, she decided for the risk, for a new beginning [...] She never gave up writing proposals and eventually received a grant from the Volkswagen Foundation in 2004 whose result was a monograph on Arab-Islamic organizations in Kazakhstan. In January 2010, she started a project at Zentrum Moderner Orient on discussion clubs as forums for political scientific and religious dialogue. ZA: She always looked much, much younger than one would expect from a person with her professional achievements and status. It is hard to imagine that she has passed away [...] In the spring, Dina's colleagues and former students in Almaty organized a conference in her honour, and a special grant for students named after Dina was founded at the Department of Oriental Studies.

Selected

publications

Islam i obshchestvo: podkhodu arabskoy politicheskoy mysli [Islam and Society: The Approach of Arab political throught]. In Kul'turnye i istoricheskie prozessy v stranach vostoka. Materialy mezhdunarodnoy konferentsii [Cultural and historical processes in the countries of the East. Proceedings of the International Conference], Almaty: KazGU, 1999, pp. 211-220. Islam in Kasachstan: aktuelle Entwicklungstendenzen. Orient 2006(2): 218-235. Arabisch-islamische Organisationen in Kasachstan. Exogener Einfluss auf die islamische Erneuerung (1991-2007). Berlin: Hans Schiler, 2009.

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Islamic Education in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan Dina Wilkowsky

Introduction 4 In recent years, the question of post-Soviet modernization in Central Asia has attracted wide academic interest. In this context, the role of Islam has been discussed repeatedly. Scholars pay special attention to Islamic revival in the more »Islamized« countries of Central Asia, such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and where post-Soviet changes have provoked religious-ethnic and political conflicts. Little research has been done on the transformational processes taking place in the religious sphere of present-day Kazakhstan.5 Islamic revival is common to all of Central Asia, with a different specific character in each country, depending on local ethno-confessional traditions and the specifics of socio-political development. This is also true of Kazakhstan, although the influence of Islam on social and political life in contemporary Kazakhstan is weaker than in other countries of Central Asia. Yet, considering that Kazakhstan is at the

4 This text first appeared as Islamic education in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. Poznan; Pznanskie Studia Srodkowoazjatyckie, 2010. The editor Marek Gawecki has kindly allowed us to use the text by Dina Wilkowsky in this book. 5 For example, A. Nysanbaev (ed.) 2004. Religiya v politike i kul'ture sovremennogo Kazakhstana [Religion in politics and culture of contemporary Kazakhstan]. Astana: Elorda; Z.G. Zhalilov 2006. Islam i obshchestvo v sovremennom Kazakhstane [Islam and society in contemporary Kazakhstan]. Almaty: Daik-Press. See the contribution in this book by Ashirbek Muminov, Sheikh Haji Derbisali and Alikhan Baimenov on Islam in Kazakhstan.

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»periphery« of the Muslim world, the role of religion has increased over the past years. Re-Islamisation in Kazakhstan, as in the other Central Asian countries, began in the 1990s with the new legitimization of Islam, intensive construction of mosques, growth of religious and ethno-cultural consciousness and restoration of broken relations with the Islamic world. Along with the establishment of the Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan's Muslims (Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man Kazakhstana DUMK), which is based in Almaty, activities of foreign Islamic organizations and foundations that contributed to the revival of religious values were greatly appreciated during this period. These factors shaped more or less the formation of a »new local Islam«, which brought Islam in Kazakhstan to the next, more difficult stage of development. This new stage of Islam is marked by an intensified spread of Islamic knowledge, an increased receptivity by the population, especially youth, of religion and a growth in the number of Islamic religious associations. 6 The study of the dynamics of re-Islamisation in post-Soviet Kazakhstan requires a multidisciplinary approach. Based on field research in Kazakhstan, more particularly in two cities, Almaty and Shymkent (South Kazakhstan), 7 this study takes into account political and social aspects and attempts to identify factors and actors that are affecting or have already influenced these dynamics. It argues that a close examination of the activities of foreign and local Is-

6 According to data for 2006, there are 1,853 Islamic associations and 1,727 mosques; by comparison, there are also 267 Orthodox Christian associations owning 241 churches. Programma sovershenstvovaniya kazakhstanskoy modeli mezhetnicheskogo i mezhkonfessionamogo sogfasiya na 2006-2008 gody. Postanovlenie Pravitel'stva. Respubliki Kazakhstan ot 28 June 2006, Astana. 7 Field research was carried out in 2005, 2006 and 2007 within the project funded by Volkswagen Foundation and in 2009 with support from Prof. Hon. Wilfried Stein, a German businessman and member of the Board of the German-Kazakh Society, Berlin.

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lamic organizations within the Islamic education system in Kazakhstan will contribute to the understanding not only of the role of actors in this process, but also of the transformations taking place in local Islam today. Because of Kazakhstan's geopolitical position and the socio-economic changes in the country Islam in Kazakhstan will be the focus of attention and exposed to various forces. Therefore, theoretical questions concerning the religious problematic will receive more attention and become more acute in the coming years.

Arab-Islamic organizations in the context of Kazakhstan The official atheism, which limited the legal transfer of Islamic knowledge in the Soviet Union, resulted in a stagnation of the historical development of clergy and an isolation of Muslims from the Islamic world. Though at times there were 63 mosques in Soviet Kazakhstan, no official institutes of religious education existed. As is known, all official institutions for Islamic education were in Uzbekistan. Therefore, in the early nineties, after the establishment of the independent Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan's Muslims (1990), the local clergy faced great responsibility and problems concerning the restoration of the broken process of training highly educated theologians. Lacking a proper system of religious education and an institute that would prepare qualified ulama made it necessary to have young people educated at foreign Islamic centres, on the one hand, and to consider their experiences for the development of a local educational network, on the other hand. Kazakhstan's establishment of diplomatic contacts with the Islamic world in the 1990s provided the necessary conditions for the realization of this task. In return, this allowed Arab-Islamic organizations from the Persian Gulf to start their activities in the country. The Arab-Islamic world developed a strategy based on the desire to raise the

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»consciousness for Islam« of local Muslims in the »new Islamic states« of Central Asia. They put the emphasis on enhancing Muslims' religious cultural level and envisioned a prompt emancipation from the atheistic ideology that would lead the country back to »the bosom of the Islamic umma« (Rajab 1996).8 To accelerate these transformation processes, Arabic theologians offered: - To intensify contacts to Muslims in order to »dissipate feelings of estrangement from the Islamic world and thereby to strengthen the spirit of Muslim dignity« ( A l - ' a l a m alislami 1994);9 - To provide assistance to organizations that engage in religious activities within their own communities so that they »can realize themselves as apart of the Islamic umma and understand the depth of Islamic brotherhood« C A l - ' a l a m al-islami 1994); - To train a new generation of preachers from among local Muslims who would then be able to continue religious activities within their local societies. For this, it is necessary to strengthen the status of the mosques, which had been transformed into multipurpose social-religious centres; - To give grants to young people for a religious and secular education to »show young Muslims the advantage of Islamic education« (Yamani 1994);10

8 M. Rajab 1996. Al-dawr al-'arabi fi al-jumhüriyyät al-islämiyya assüfyätiyya [The role of the Arab state in the Soviet Islamic republic], Al'älam al-islämi, 12-18 August. 9 Matlüb Khutat wä'iyya wa barämij 'ilmiyya li-tawäsul al-'älam al-islämi ma'a al-'ä'idln ilä 'izz al-isläm [The request for specific measures and scientific programs to link the Islamic world with the people who have found their way back to Islam], Al-'älam al-islämi, 21 March 1994. 10 M. A. Yamäni 1994. Thälüth al-khutur yuhaddid al-muslimln fi äsiyä al-wustä [The triple dangers that threaten the Muslims in Central Asia]. Al-'älam al-islämi, 3-9 January.

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- To encourage the target states to invest in Islamic institutions such as mosques, madrasas and waqfs. To finance the construction of Arab-Muslim universities in republics and the opening of Arabic and Islamic Studies departments in Central Asia's secular universities; - To provide financial aid to scientific organizations to specific republics and to support the exchange of researchers and teachers (al-Dasuql 1994). 11 The Arab-Islamic organization devoted special attention to strengthening the Arabic language to support the upbringing of a new generation of Muslims with spiritual perfection. This would mean that it was most suitable to start with Islamic da'wa (spreading the religious message) within local schools, because »children and youth are the most fertile ground to establish the best future for these Muslim societies« (Al-'âlam al-islâmï 1994). Concrete measures of cooperation between Kazakhstan and the Arab world started just after the independence of Kazakhstan in 1991. Along with international economic cooperation, humanitarian assistance was also given, first of all for religious enlightenment projects and education. But this sphere of interaction turned out to be very problematic, because in addition to state organizations, especially from the Arab Gulf countries, various welfare foundations and missionaries also became involved; their inrush at this initial stage was uncontrolled. Believers perceived these missionaries and representatives of Islamic charitable organizations as better transmitters of »true« Islamic values and knowledge than local imams and mullahs who had a low educational level. Consequently, the missionaries profited from these conditions and

11 S. Al-Dasüqi 1994. Takthlf al-juhüd li-izäla al-äthär al-shuyü'iyya min hayät al-muslimin fl äsiyä al-wustä [Intensifying the efforts to remove communist remnants from the life of the Muslims in Central Asia]. Al-'alam

al-islami, 21 March.

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introduced themselves in Kazakhstan in the early 1990s. This is especially visible in Shymkent, the spiritual centre of South Kazakhstan, which is traditionally regarded as the »most Islamized« region of the country. For instance, representatives of the International Charitable Association Taiba (from the USA) tried to regulate the work in mosques and to introduce wages for imams. However, their activities soon created tensions within the Islamic community, as »their ideas and purposes were unclear to many local Muslims«. 1 2 Other organizations, such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and Social Reforms Society (SRS, Kuwait), concentrated on youth, in particular pupils of secondary schools, by offering Arabic language courses and teachers - the teachers being graduates of the Arabic departments of local universities. They also organized summer crash courses in Arabic for youth from Kazakhstan and the other republics of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. Simultaneously, teachers from Syria and Jordan started their activities in the Islamic Institute under the DUMK, and secular higher and secondary schools received Arabic literature, which mainly came from Saudi Arabia. At the same time, charity work also promoted the establishment of local Muslim centres and private educational networks. In this way, one of the local religious activists founded the Youth Association Yqylas in Shymkent city, receiving assistance from a Qatar Charity Society. Later, as a result of such activities, Yqylas established a boarding school in Shymkent that hosted more than 50 young men from low-income families. This association gained enormous popularity among youth in South Kazakhstan and was registered with the Akimat (City Administration) of Shymkent, which supports the project.

12 The author's interviews with one of the Muslim activists and founders of Kazakh-Arab University in Shymkent, May 2005. In the early nineties, he passed a two-year course at the University of al-Azhar with the support of the al-Babtin Foundation, Kuwait.

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In 1992, the International Kazakh-Arab University was founded in Shymkent on the basis of a madrasa with the support of SRS and Taiba (Kobeeva 2002, p. 5).13 In 1994-95, the University of Shymkent opened the departments of Arabic Language and Religious Studies, which employed specialists from Egypt, Yemen, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Since 2000, the list of sponsors of the university has included another foundation - Ibrahim Ben Abdul Aziz al-Ibrahim (a RussianSaudi Arabian foundation). For almost ten years, the university received considerable foreign financial help that covered not only the salaries of the teachers, but also the tuition fees for many students, their accommodation and scholarships. In 2005, following the visit of a commission from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the university had to reform its departments, resulting in a reduction of teaching offerings for Oriental Languages and Religious Studies, and the school was renamed Otrar University. In 1999, SRS financed the foundation of the KazakhKuwaiti University in Shymkent. In 1998, a Social Reforms Society (SRS) Branch had already been officially registered with the Department of Justice of South Kazakhstan, which gave this Branch the opportunity to act legally in the region. Later, the University was renamed South Kazakhstan Humanitarian Academy, claiming to function as »an independent institution of secular higher educational« (Zhaqsylykova 2005).14 Nevertheless, graduates of madrasas were privileged for admission to the Religious Studies department - for instance at the Kazakh-Arab University. Moreover, unlike other higher schools of the region, these institutions offered an absolutely free education, which was the

13 O. Kobeeva (ed.) 2002. Hallqaralyq Qazaq Arab universiteti rukhaniyat ordasi [The international Kazakh-Arab University as a centre of spiritual values], Almaty: Qazaq Publisher, pp. 4-16. 14 M. Zhaqsylykova 2005. Pod prikrytiem very [Under the cover of Islam]. Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 19 March.

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most »attractive feature« of the Academy. Representatives of the SRS managed the Academy staff; local teachers basically taught the Kazakh language, the history of Kazakhstan and other secular disciplines. Gradually Arabic became obligatory for all subjects (not only Religious Studies) and the textbooks that were used were based on religious material. In early 2005, the Academy was closed down because law enforcement authorities found »facts of indoctrination of students« (Zhaqsylykova 2005). For the same reason, work at the Pedagogical College Taiba in Almaty was stopped. The college had worked since its opening in 1990 with the support of the International Charitable Association Taiba. The curriculum of the college primarily aimed to teach teachers of Arabic in primary and secondary schools. With a tuition fee of US$ 100-200 per year, the three-year education provided courses that focused on teaching Arabic and the Qur'an, along with disciplines stipulated by the Republic of Kazakhstan's educational standard. The opening of the Kazakh-Arab Spiritual (Muslim) University in Almaty in 2003 may be considered another attempt to coordinate the efforts of internal and external actors to found an important private Islamic educational centre. Initiators of this project were several Kazakh businessmen and intellectuals whose activities were supported by foreign Islamic organizations.15 The university comprised a Muslim kindergarten, a school, general educational courses and charitable centres for orphans and invalids. Along with secular specializations, the students were also offered some mainly religious subjects, such as 'aqida (Islamic Theology), fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence), History of Islam, the Qur'an, Arabic etc. under the guidance of experts from Arab countries and Turkey. The underlying aims were that graduates would remain active and would spread acquired religious knowledge in various social establishments, inclu-

15 See /man, 3, 2003. The author's interviews with representatives of the teaching staff of the University in Almaty, April 2006.

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ding mosques, madrasas, universities etc. The purpose was »to revive Islam, transmitting Islamic knowledge within the society, the observance of traditions and customs of Muslims and also satisfaction of spiritual needs of citizens«. 16 Despite of the university's wide spectrum and educational offerings, it existed for only three years. The main reason for closing it down, according to teachers working in the university, was the extremely low level of teaching, the absence of proper technical and material resources and, generally, failing to provide the promised conditions for studies. By and large, the intention of foreign Islamic organizations to create an administrative network of »secular« education on the territory of Kazakhstan can be characterized as unsuccessful. At the same time, they did have »spiritual influence« on youth, especially from peripheral and lowincome families, for whom such establishments granted special privileges (free or preferential education). Although such educational centres were unable to compete with secular educational institutions, they created favourable conditions for youth, who got more fundamental and deep Islamic knowledge. These centres offered these young people new possibilities for self-affirmation within society. The activities of the charity organizations UAE Red Crescent and Committee of Asia, both affiliated with the International Islamic Charitable Organization (Kuwait), were the most successful and fruitful. These organizations concentrated their efforts on building numerous new mosques in various regions of Kazakhstan (including more than 50 middle-sized and small mosques in South Kazakhstan), on establishing and financing Qur'an study centres and on maintaining children's homes and organizing care for orphans and children from poor families. Today, the mosques

16 See G. Abdikerova 2004. Osobennosti vliyaniya politicheskikh i pravovykh faktorov na sotsializatsiyu lichnosti v Respublike Kazakhstane [The impact of legal and political factors on the socialization of the individual in

Kazakhstan]. Sayasat, 2: 31.

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erected with their assistance are centres not only for Islamic education but also for the social consolidation of Muslims: along with Arabic and Qur'an courses, they offer computer classes and sewing workshops. 17 Organizations such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and al-Waqf al-Islami (with headquarter in Holland), whose main goal are to spread Islam through da'wa among youth, focus on, among other things, teaching Arabic in leading universities of the country, as well as on publishing religious literature and providing grants to students. According to the agreement with the secular universities of Almaty, they promote an exchange of teachers, conduct joint seminars, provide necessary literature etc. Preparing the Second Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions held in Astana in 2006, these charitable organizations donated literature on Islamic history and Arabic courseware to the theological library located in the Peace and Consent Palace of Astana. Kazakhstan's state and Muslim clergy regarded this activity as a contribution to the country's effort to »establish an inter-confessional dialogue that uses the spiritual and moral potential of the world's traditional religions«. 18 Nevertheless, the ambiguous nature of this contribution is revealed in the inconsistent attitude of local Islamic clergy towards the activities of the Arab-Islamic organizations in the country. Official Islam reasonably follows the direction of state policy, and therefore intensifies cooperation primarily with the Muslim World League and the Organization of Islamic Conference. Thus, some Islamic activists consider the presence of foreign Islamic organizations in Kazakhstan expedient and necessary. They take the point of view that »Islamic solidarity« principles cement Kazakhstan's belon-

17 The largest of such mosques (for 2,000 persons), located in the Orbit district of Almaty, was constructed at the expense of UAE Red Crescent. After computer class, the most popular courses are those in Arabic, which, to date, are attended by more than 300 persons of various ages. 18 Available from http://www.akorda.kz [accessed 31 August 2006].

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ging to the international umma. Other groups of Muslims, by contrast, have a different opinion and are concerned that the spread of movements alien to local Islam could lead to a schism within the Muslim community. Special attention is paid here to the fact that, along with the development of the traditional Hanafi School of Sunni Islam, a number of semi-legal Salafi communities have emerged. 19 Against the backdrop of these developments, the clergy reasonably underlines that it is important to promote an internal religious education that is based on local traditions and to resist the strict canons of »imported« Islam. It should be admitted that the charitable projects of Arab-Islamic organizations by and large led to an intensification of religious life, especially during the first years of Islamic revival in the 1990s and that, to a certain extent, they tried to occupy the niche in religious education. At the same time, this external influence on domestic Islamic communities in Kazakhstan has disparate effects that can lead to contradictions and problems. However, what has been learned in this process is that internal socio-politics should set the conditions and prerequisites for international Islamic organizations.

Official Islamic educational institutions The development of an Islamic education system in the context of Kazakhstan is a long-term process that requires first of all a high degree of professionalism from the local clergy and the national religious elite. However, since this factor is lacking, the question arises whether the local religiouseducational system will ever be able to establish such a standard, and how quickly, so as to create a system that can realistically compete with the well-established foreign centres.

1 9 See the contribution by Ashirbek Muminov in this book for more details on the various orientations of the Salafi groups.

Wilkowsky 131 Following the geopolitical developments in the neighbouring countries Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and the emergence of radical tendencies, the Kazakh state began to pay special attention to the development of a domestic religious education system. At a meeting with imams in Almaty in April 2005, the President of Kazakhstan, N. Nazarbaev, emphasized the role of well-educated imams, who must comply with the state strategy, which is stability and inter-religious dialogue in the country.20 Considering the inconsistent activities of numerous religious sects, imams should pay greater attention to skilful, highly professional educational work, especially among young people, Nazarbaev writes, and they should explain the true values of Islam and humanism.21 In other words, the efficiency of »the enlightenment process« should not only be visible in the activities of state-supported clergy, but should first of all increase the social status of imams. The problem is that the Muslim clergy still lacks a sound religious education enabling it to participate in open discussions and is unable to face the population's strong yearning for religion. Currently, the situation in the Islamic educational sphere is rather difficult: semi-literate »experts« in Islam dominate the clergy in the countryside, often far from any cultural and religious centres. One of the leading imams of South Kazakhstan told me confidentially that he was concerned about the extremely low level of the imams who try to »teach« rural Muslims. According to him, out of 500 imams who live in rural areas only 40-50 have a religious education.22

2 0 Egemen Qazaqstan, 20 April 2005. 2 1 Kazakhstanskaya pravda, 20 April 2005. 2 2 The author's interview with the Imam of South Kazakhstan, Akhmedzhan Kerimbetov, May 2005, Shymkent. According to him, the problem is that Muslims prefer an imam from their native village (aul). Before an imam can go to study, he has to be approved by the Board of Local Elders (aksakals) from his aul, who sometimes reject the candidate and suggest an alternative.

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In the early nineties, the DUMK established Islamic institutes (with two-year courses). However, this was not enough to improve the level of education. To meet this end, in 2001 the joint Kazakh-Egyptian Nur-Mubarak University of Islamic Culture (in short: Nur-Mubarak University) was established with the support of the Egyptian government. The University was the result of an agreement made between the government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Republic of Kazakhstan, but was to be a non-governmental educational institution. Egypt allocated about US$ 15 million for its construction, thereby demonstrating the Egyptian state's desire to render assistance to Kazakhstan for the training of religious personnel and, in return, for Kazakhstan's promotion of historical and cultural relations between two countries. The main founder of the university on the Egyptian side was the Waqf Ministry of ARE and on the Kazakh side the DUMK. Clergy and statesmen from both parties were appointed to the managerial board of guardians »to guarantee general control of the university and coordination of its activity« (Ittifaq 2006, p. 205).23 The Faculty of Islamic Studies was entrusted with educating a Muslim clergy and theologians for Kazakhstan. The curriculum consisted mainly of religious subjects and Arabic along with some other obligatory secular subjects (the history of Kazakhstan, Kazakh language and literature, etc.). University teaching staff comes mainly from the University of al-Azhar (Egyptians and Kazakh graduates) and Cairo University.24 During the first four semesters, courses are conducted in Kazakh, and the following two years, in Arabic.

23 Ittifaq baina hukuma jumhuriyya misr wa hukuma jurahuriyya qazaqstan bi-sha'n al-jami'a al-misriyya li ath-thaqafa al-islamiyya [Agreement between the government of the Republic of Egypt and the government of the Republic of Kazakhstan concerning the Egyptian University for Islamic Culture]. In M. Hijazi and S. Kerim (eds.) 2006. Islamtanu zane arab filologiyasl maseleleri. Almaty: Qazaq Universiteti, pp. 204-210. 24 The university offers education in three specialities: Islamic Studies, Arabic Philology and Translation. At present, ten teachers from Egypt work

Wilkowsky 133 A four-year education at the university costs approximately US$ 600 per year, but the tuition fees for students at the Faculty of Islamic Studies are sometimes covered by Kazakh businessmen. The library's Islamic literature department has a collection of Arabic books (basically developed at the University of al-Azhar) and of Turkish books, and from time to time is replenished by religious books meanwhile published in Kazakhstan. The students commonly use computer programs that teach the Qur'an and electronic Arabic textbooks. By 2008, more than 200 students had graduated from the faculty, and 50% of these graduates were sent to lead regional mosques. The DUMK sends the graduated imams to work in mosques in rural Kazakhstan where personnel are needed. To encourage the students, the university offers successful graduates a year at the University of al-Azhar to practice their skills or to continue their education with a master or postgraduate course at the theological faculty of any university in Egypt. The objectives of the university are to train future imams and to continuously improve their skills and broaden their knowledge, because part of their work is to explain Islamic values and conduct da'wa. Therefore, subjects such as psychology and rhetoric are part of the education. According to the university's prorector, imams should not only be able to answer any unexpected question at any time, but also to settle and solve possible tensions arising in their community.25 However, since Islamic Studies and the qualification of imams are not included in Kazakhstan's state educational standard, the diplomas received from this education do

at the University. Since 2001, its Rector has been Prof. Mahmud Fahmi Hijazi, the former Director of the Arabic Centre at Cairo University. The prorector appointed by the Kazakhstan side is Shamshidin Kerim, professor for Kazakh Language. The Egyptian partner bears the expenses (including the salary) of teachers from Egypt, and Kazakhstan bears those of local teachers. Interviews with university employees, May 2007, April 2009, see also ¡man, 3, 2003: 10-11. 25

The author's interview with the prorector of the university, April 2009.

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not correspond to accepted university standards. But this is compensated by the possibility that faculty graduates can enter master courses at secular institutions of higher learning. In March 2006, during an official delegation from Egypt's visit to Almaty, the parties discussed further expansion of the university. Thus, the Egyptian government is going to allot more than US$ 6 million for the construction of a second building (Derbisali 2007, p. 17).26 Another institution that engages in teaching is the Institute of Imams Advanced Training, which works under the DUMK with financial support from the Islamic Development Bank. This institute offers assistance to imams, mainly those coming from the countryside, to enhance their professional qualification. According to Sheikh MuhammadHussain Alsabekov, the Rector of the Institute of Imams Advanced Training, over the last five years more than 600 imams have been trained in four-month courses. The curriculum was developed on the basis of the Islamic institutes in Moscow, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Islamabad, Pakistan. The focus is placed on the study of the Arabic language and religious subjects. The curriculum also includes the study of the Kazakh language and the history of Kazakhstan in order to create a common body of ideas and to broaden the imams' worldview while in communication with the population.27 In addition, imams also offer and welcome secular education. The DUMK's aim in issuing certificates to imams and in organising conferences and seminars28 in cooperation with

26 Absattar Qazi Derbisali (ed.) 2007. Qazaqstan musilmandari dini basqarmasinin toragas i, bas mufti 2006 zili atqargan bast] is-saralar seiiresi [Key speech and publication of the Head Mufti, Chairman of the governing Board of Muslims of Kazakhstan in 2006], Almaty. 27 The author's interviews with the Mufti of Kazakhstan and the rector of the Institute, Almaty, 2006-2008. The Institute is financed basically by private Kazakh and Turkish companies. The teaching staff consists of theologians from Egypt, Turkey and DUMK employees. 28 For example, one of the last huge actions held by the DUMK was the International Conference »Mazhhab of great imam Abu Hanifa and the cur-

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various universities and organizations is to increase the authority of the Muslim clergy. To encourage imams, they are given the opportunity to continue their study at foreign Islamic universities (priority is given to the University of alAzhar). Many of these activities that are directed at the official clergy bear the signature of the Mufti Absattar Qazhi Derbisali, who used to be a university professor and scholar before he accepted the position of Mufti in 2001. His secular educational background and his former career,29 however, are also the main reasons for severe criticism from Islamic opposition circles. In contrast, the clergy and intelligentsia have noted that his professional experiences have equipped him for the Mufti missions and to develop constructive relations with the state and other traditional religions. According to Derbisali, »The mission as Supreme Mufti is multipurpose. This mission demands not only a profound knowledge of Islam, but also great managerial, diplomatic, scientific, psychological and even economic skills.« 30 He also underlines that the task of the Spiritual Directorate is to raise the local clergy to the »level of world civilization«. »To meet a spirit of the time«, imams should not lapse into

rent issues of Islam«, Almaty, 2 April 2009, in which Islamic authorities and historians from Central Asia and Russia took part. 29 Besides diplomatic work in the Embassy of Kazakhstan in Saudi Arabia (1997-2000), Derbisali focused his research interests on of the sources of Central Asian medieval culture, stored in libraries in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and India. The result of his research was the disclosure of the names of more than fifty thinkers who w e r e natives of the Kazakh steppe in the tenth to the eighteenth centuries and who made great contribution to the development of Arab sciences and culture. See Abdsatar Derbisali 2008. Islam jauharlari men jadigerlikteri [Treasures and monuments of Islam]. Almaty: Atamura. 30 The author's interviews with the Mufti in 2007 and 2009, Almaty. See Shapaghat Niir, 20 N o v e m b e r 2000; Rysbai 2005. In Almaty alone there are already more than 20 secular schools that teach Arabic. Also to be taken into account are private colleges and universities where Arabic is studied as an additional foreign language. D. Rysbai 2005. Aqlqat din - Islam [Islam as the true religion]. Zhalyn Publisher 1: 12-13.

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a cocoon of self-isolation; on the contrary, they should actively participate in discussions and take into account the opinions of other people. Compared with the 1990s, the dynamics of the DUMK's current activities have reached a large market through its educational-theological publications of books, annual reportschronicles on its work and periodic editions of newspapers like Islam iane orkeniet, and magazines such as Iman and Shapaghat Niir. The Association of Kazakhstan's Haji was founded in 2003 (with more than eight thousand members today), and it renders great assistance to the DUMK in organizing various activities. The primary goal of the association is to promote religious enlightenment among the intelligentsia and youth through the organization of seminars and conferences in different regions of Kazakhstan. For the last two years, the association has specialized in introducing and distributing halal products at the local level. Part of this activity was the establishment of a State-Technical Committee for Halal Standardization, which studies manufacturing experience in Russia, Malaysia and other countries. Along with the development of higher education, the DUMK also focused on developing its system of legal madrasas in the country. In the middle of the 1990s, about 20 madrasas started to work in Kazakhstan (mainly in Almaty, Atyrau, Taraz and Shymkent). They worked independently and were founded in a chaotic way, with no systematic national plan. At the same time, courses in mosques, private lessons on the Qur'an and more generally Islam enjoyed wide popularity. They shared the same difficulties associated with financial maintenance and teaching staff. The lack of teachers was often mitigated by international Islamic organizations that sent teachers with low professional qualifications. Their semi-legal activities raised concerns among law enforcement bodies. At the beginning of 2000, many of them were closed down because of inappropriate requirements for education and because the religious institutions propagated an extremist ideology not corresponding to local Islamic practices. But many assume that this measure primarily aimed to

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strengthen the state's coordinating and supervising role of »official« Islam among Kazakh Muslims. As a result of the DUMK's activities over the last three years, six legally operating mad rasas were opened. They are located in the main cities of the country (Astana, Aktobe, Pavlodar, Shymkent, Shymalgan and Uralsk), all of them officially managed by the DUMK. Each mad rasa has 40-60 students, the majority of them young people from rural areas and low-income groups. They attend a training program for two years and eight months. The seventh madrasa is under construction, but it is planned as the central one due to its location right at the DUMK in Almaty. The curriculum for these madrasas is developed by the DUMK and it is more or less equivalent to but more detailed than the program of the aforementioned Institute of Imams Advanced Training. The graduates have the opportunity to continue education at the Nur-Mubarak University. On the whole, madrasas represent the most widespread form of religious education. Being the main and official way of training a Muslim clergyman, these educational institutions cater to different strata of people. They all require that students have completed their compulsory secular secondary education. The madrasas are supported by mosques, individual persons and private companies. Attempts made by »official« Islamic institutions to establish methods and forms of religious education contribute to further developments and improving the system. Imams have started to actively participate in discussions about Islamic education, which, as many of them suggest, should be resolved with direct participation of the government. In order to revive the Islamic culture of the region, in their opinion, it is necessary to introduce Arabic as early as in primary secular schools, because language plays an important role in mastering Islamic subjects. 31 The national intelligentsia

31 Also to be taken into account are private colleges and universities where Arabic is studied as an additional foreign language.

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suggests introducing as soon as possible to the State Educational Standard of the Republic of Kazakhstan subjects such as theology (as a special subject: Islamic and Orthodox theology), a subject offered only as optional course for now and not systematically.32 Recognizing the significance of international experiences in training a clergy the DUMK, however, considers the University of al-Azhar in Cairo the most comprehensible source of Islamic knowledge acquisition, as its curriculum tolerates different doctrines of Islam. Despite of all these measures, it is still difficult to say that the concept of Islamic education is already well developed and has a clear outline. This would presuppose that Kazakh graduates of foreign Islamic universities could make a substantial contribution to this process. However, we can observe a kind of estrangement between official Islam and young Muslims, probably either because they have been influenced by Islamic movements untypical of Kazakhstan or because of true competition. At the same time, some argue that there is disunity among the new generation of Muslims because they have learned different theological-legal doctrines of Islam in different places of education and countries (Turkey, Egypt or Saudi Arabia). Nevertheless, in the absence of a well-established Islamic theological school in Kazakhstan, graduates of foreign Islamic universities are respected as a spiritual force qualitatively distinct from the »postperestroika« generation of imams. Arab-Islamic organizations are therefore interested in cooperating with graduates and actively hire them in their work. So to strengthen the state's control over foreign missionary organizations, it is necessity to look for adequate forms of cooperation with local actors. The authority of these graduates of foreign Islamic centres is also shown by their appointment to positions of imams in mosques that have been financed by representatives of the business and state elite. For many of them, continuing

32

See Nash Mir (Almaty), 29 June 2007.

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their education in magistracies at secular universities in Kazakhstan has been a way to follow their primary goal, which is to revive Islamic moral values in society. Thus they established educational centres and publishing houses and give private lessons in the Arabic language and about the Islamic canon. One of the remarkable examples of their activities is the opening of religious publishing houses such as al-Barakat, Kokjiek and Kawsar in 2005 and 2006 in Almaty. Their employees, mainly graduates of foreign Islamic universities, are engaged in translating works by Arab and Turkish theologians and in publishing standard works in Kazakh and Russian. These publishing efforts have to be coordinated with the DUMK. The work of each of these publishing houses differs slightly: while the first two specialized in publishing material for beginners and secular readers, Kawsar publishing house has a literature selection directed towards more advanced readers who wish to deepen their knowledge of religion. It is worth mentioning here that more and more Kazakh sponsors are financing the activities of these centres.

Informal religious education Public Islamic associations make a special contribution to promoting Islamic knowledge in Kazakhstan. Having the status of official legal organizations, they operate independently of the DUMK but recognizing its leading and coordinating role. These associations have chosen traditional ways to spread knowledge through educational institutions and have created an alternative to official Islam. Among them w e find the Otes Madrasa in Shymkent, which was very popular among Muslims in the early '90s. This madrasa provides an example of an independent educational association that relies on regional teaching staff. In 2005, it was renamed al-Karim Islamic University and received an official licence from the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan. The main founder of the university,

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who is also its president, is the local small-scale businessman Oserbai Qazhi Tanataruly. Upon his initiative, the small madrasa for 7-10 students was opened at the beginning of perestroika. 33 Thanks to a number of loans, he established a small agrarian enterprise, which allowed him to enlarge the madrasa to almost 200 students, who study free of charge. The income of the enterprise is used to pay the salary of the teachers of Arabic, who come from Uzbekistan. On the grounds of the university is a small mosque, which was partially financed by his relative, Ismail Ybrai Qazhi, for whom the mosque was named. According to data from 2006, students are instructed in three subjects: shari'a (Islamic law) (4 years); history of Islam and Arabic language (4.5 years); Islamic culture and history of Kazakhstan (4 years). For those who do not study free of charge, education at the university costs about US$ 100 per year. Along with standard religious subjects, great attention is paid to the study of the Islamic heritage of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. The main objective of the university is to produce highly educated religious personnel who will promote Islam in Kazakhstan without any external - especially foreign - financial support. The graduates should be able to work as imams in mosques and in various educational and public establishments; today many of them comprise the basic teaching staff of the university. According to Oserbai Qazhi, the students are brought up »in the spirit of Kazakh Islam«, and therefore they are able to spread » t r u e « religious values, rather than extremist ideas. Muslim Women can be considered another important internal actor of re-Islamisation. In the early nineties, the first female associations (among them the League of Muslim Women of Kazakhstan) started religious education for women within the framework of religious schools from Turkey, Pakistan and Malaysia. However, according to the per-

33

The author's interviews with Oserbai Tanataruly, May 2006, Shymkent.

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sonnel of these associations, the educational level at these schools did not always meet the expectations of Kazakh women. So in recent years courses began to be developed for local women. For the past ten years, the key role in female religious education was held by the madrasa financed by the Bereket Public Fund, which was organized in Almaty by Madina Churina.34 Churina received her higher education during the Soviet era, then studied the canons of Islam at various missionary centres in Kazakhstan and eventually went to the Islamic University of Islamabad. Today, she heads four teachers in her madrasa, including graduates of this madrasa and of the Arabic Department of the faculties of Oriental Studies in secular universities. Every year, more than 30 women from different regions of Kazakhstan attend the one-year-education free of charge. Most of these women are educated and in their 30s or older. They accomplish their education with exams with assistance from the DUMK, and all students g e t corresponding certificates. Moreover, the madrasa provides annual summer religious courses, which are attended by 100 women and girls from all over Kazakhstan. The madrasa receives essential financial support from local businessmen and thus to a certain degree testifies to the increase in religious charitable activities in Kazakhstan. It comes as no surprise that in November 2008 the madrasa moved out of its small, two-apartment location in Almaty to a new, spacious, three-storey country house. A Kazakh private civil engineering company built this house especially for this purpose. According to Madina Churina, the madrasa is able to accommodate more than 60 Muslim women. Moreover, it became a local Islamic centre for the inhabitants of a suburb of Almaty, who now have an opportunity to attend evening courses in Islam and the Qur'an. The most effective and popular institution among modern Muslim women, however, remains the system of small

34

Interviews with Madina Churina in 2006, 2007 and 2009, Almaty.

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educational associations or jama'at in which the Qur'an, Arabic, shari'a etc. are studied. Influenced by such associations are a new generation of Muslim women who differ from other women of the post-Soviet generation in that they adhere strictly to religious norms. Along with charity activities for orphanages traditionally conducted by such associations, some of them also provide religious education for women and teenagers. They see their mission in the revival of Muslim family traditions, in spreading the spiritual and moral principles of Islam and in the execution the holy duty of mother - namely, to familiarize children with Islam. Emphasising the social significance of Islam, they argue that although the religious dress of Muslim women - like the hijab - sometimes causes a negative reaction during studies in secular schools, in employment, or even in household life, in marriage it plays a positive role and evokes special trust and respect in modern men. Nevertheless, a drop in the activity of these female religious organizations can be observed. The reason for this, Muslim women complain, is insufficient financial support from both local and foreign Islamic funds, as well as a lack of coordinated unity among the local Islamic religious organizations.

Conclusion The discussion of Islamic education in post-Soviet Kazakhstan makes it possible to define some tendencies that testify to several aspects of the development of Islam at the local level. While in the early nineties foreign charitable organizations played an important role in the process of Islamic revival, for the last five years the main actors have been local Islamic associations. The attempts by the DUMK to establish methods and structures of religious education are likely to further develop and improve. But it is still not enough to bring internal (and possibly external) religious authorities to develop joint approaches and concepts of Islamic education in Kazakhstan. Along with the Spiritual Direc-

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torate of Kazakhstan's Muslims, graduates of foreign and local Islamic Centres are starting to play a substantial role in creating a network of Islamic education. This activity is evidence of the strong role of the new generation of betterqualified theologians that emerged out of the deep socialpolitical and spiritual changes in society. In spite of this, foreign Islamic Centres are gradually losing their dominant position as the desirability of adhering to local Islam with its regional peculiarities to prevent the spread of alien Islamic ideology is increasingly stressed. In this context, the role of external Islamic actors for Kazakhstan is not only their contribution to religious enlightenment, but also to a substantial degree their ability to adapt their strategy to local socio-political transformations and mentality. The emergence and the growing activities of Kazakh Islamic organizations is a striking illustration of the consolidation of internal actors who have proven capable of independently influencing the dynamics of Islam in the country. However, their quantitative growth is not an indicator of their quality. Most of them are poorly organized and have no stable material or other resources. Nevertheless, the importance of local Islamic associations that pursue a joint goal - the revival and spread of lost Islamic knowledge and traditions - will increase. Occupying a certain niche in the religious spectrum of the country, they enjoy more trust among the population than foreign organizations do. However, the influence of local and trans-local authorities on the discourses and practices of these organizations and on their concepts of development of Islam in Kazakhstan remains to be studied.

Chapter 4

Ashirbek K. Muminov

Prof. Ashirbek Muminov grew up in Tashkent, visiting an Arabic school there and continuing university in Arabic Language and Literature at Tashkent State University, Uzbekistan. He completed his studies in 1982 and worked as a researcher at the Department of Oriental Manuscripts of the Institute of Oriental Studies in the Academy of Science, Uzbekistan. In 1987 he was sent to join the graduate program at Leningrad University in Russia at the Department of the Near East and the Institute of Oriental Studies, where he received his doctoral degree in 1991. He was then invited to Turkestan State University in Kazakhstan as Associate Professor in the Department of Oriental Languages and Literature from 1991 to 1993. During this period, Ashirbek Muminov participated in the development of new teaching material and curriculum. For the following twelve years he worked as Associate Professor at the Department of Islamic Studies of Tashkent State University and joined the Institute of Oriental Studies in Almaty, Kazakhstan as Deputy Director in 2005. He cooperated with international institutes such as Institut Français d'Études sur l'Asie Centrale in Uzbekistan that helped to publish some of his rich material. From the mid-1980s on, he worked on manuscripts in the Turkic, Arabic and Persian languages of Central Asia and has published on the nineteenth, twentieth and twentyfirst centuries. He has eased access to scholars and historical periods with his numerous articles in Russian, French, English, German, Japanese, Arabic and other Central Asian

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languages. Until recently he worked at the R. B. Suleimenov Institute of Oriental Studies and for the Scientific Committee of the Ministry of Education and Science of Kazakhstan in Almaty. Today Prof. Muminov holds the position of Head of the Department of Religious Studies at the L.N. Gumilev Eurasian National University Astana.

Biographical interview1 How did you come to choose your research theme? Who were the professors who influenced you, and what was your relationship to them throughout your academic career? Let me begin with my childhood. Life is an interesting thing with lucky chances. During the Soviet time, I lived in Tashkent. In the neighbourhoods where I lived, children went to a special school where, from the second grade on, they were taught the Arabic language. Another lucky chance was my admission to university. I was admitted to the Arabic Department of the Faculty of Eastern Studies at Tashkent State University. Later it became the State Institute of Oriental Studies (Institut Vostokovedeniya). Between 1982 and 1987 I could not decide on a research topic. Since I had no specific theme in mind, I worked with the manuscripts and read and studied them gradually. Another lucky chance occurred for me in 1987. In accordance with the Soviet five-year plan, a Leningrad Arabist Anas B. Khalidov (1929-2001) visited our institute - in this year they were allocating one place at the graduate school (aspirantura) in Leningrad. After talking to him, my previous supervisor Asam U. Urunbayev (1929-2009) invited me personally for a talk and introduced me as a young specialist to Khalidov, who got to know me and examined

1

This interview w a s conducted by Jeanne Féaux de la Croix on 4 July

2012.

Mummov 147 me. For instance, he showed me manuscripts and asked me to read them. We also had a long conversation in which he asked me a lot. After that, Khalidov went home. Later I was sent to Leningrad to submit my documents and take exams. N o one at the Institute wanted to go to Leningrad because it had tough requirements. It was obligatory to read manuscripts for the exam, which was a difficult subject - and also one had to pass history exams. But I agreed happily and passed all the exams. Thus I was accepted to aspirantura and then I met my supervisor Stanislav M. Prozorov. Prozorov also examined my Arabic Language skills. Previously I had worked twice as a translator for Arabic, and additionally, I had experience in reading manuscripts. This is why they accepted me for aspirantura. There was another lucky chance: it was the time of General Secretary Gorbachev, who began perestroika and [the study o f ] Islamic subjects ceased to be banned and I was the first one to suggest an Islamic subject. Following the advice of Prozorov, I looked for unstudied manuscripts in Tashkent and stumbled over the essay by Mahmud ibn Sulayman alKafawi from the sixteenth century, where there was a collection of biographies of Hanafi faqihs (jurists). I was given permission to work with these manuscripts. My supervisor directed my fate, my approach, and I am very grateful to him. Then, over three years, w e worked together a lot. He taught me the techniques of how to read manuscripts, to extract facts, to analyze them, and he transmitted to me all his skills and talents. He is still alive and now works in Petersburg. During my graduate school (aspirantura) years I also learned French, visited foundations, and talked to the » K h a l i f s « of Oriental Studies. First, I worked in the Krachkovsky study room where there was a lot of literature and many specialists. There w e r e also annual conferences of Arabists. For us it was an honour and a great challenge to speak in front of such an audience. We were nervous and excited. Then I presented in the study room of Krachkovsky first small articles and then

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more important articles, which were widely discussed in the scientific world. Within three years, I wrote my dissertation. When they discussed my dissertation - they had given it to all members of the sector Middle East - for example, Oleg F. Akimushkin made almost 100 comments. Then Mikhail B. Piotrovskiy, the current Director of the Hermitage, Pyotr A. Gryazneevich (1929-1997) and then the young Efim A. Rezvin, the famous Qur'an researcher, Aleksandr D. Knysh, Konstantin Boyko and Dmitriy Ermakov.2 In general, I am very glad that I had a chance to work with such important people. It was very useful for me to study in a building with such historical significance and to communicate with those who had read my papers, libraryresearch abstracts and reviews. When I completed my scientific work, I had experienced the taste of the scientific work and understood the responsibility one must have to work on such a task. This school and its traditions have a great impact on the life of a researcher. This is how the years on the dissertation passed, and then I returned to Tashkent. Already at the State Institute of the Oriental Studies, I had worked and realized that it was necessary to change the direction of the work. In Turkestan (Kazakhstan) they opened an international university, where they specialized with a Faculty of Islamic Studies and where they trained specialists in Islamic Studies. I decided to go there, 300 km from Tashkent. The university was still in its infancy. There were neither universities nor institutes; they only had one medical school. There was a lot of work. There came Sinologists, Turkologists, Arabists and we founded the Faculty of Islamic Studies. There was a Faculty of Islamic Theology too. There, for the first time, I gave lectures and prepared the curriculum for three years. While in Turkestan, I became very interested in the subject of khoja. Since there were a lot of gene-

2 See for instance, Manuschpta Orientalia, vol. 9, September 2003. Available at http://manuscripta-orientalia.kunstkamera.ru/archive/2003_03_09/.

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alogies, this gave me an opportunity to conduct fieldwork. I met with the specialists in Islamic Studies (Zikiriya Z. Zhandarbekov, Mukhtar Qozhayev, Seytomar Sattarov) and thus, finally, I found a research theme that I called »Islam in the steppes or Islam of nomadic p e o p l e « . Since that time, almost 20 years have passed, but I cannot stop publishing books - w e published on the genealogies of religious families and the genealogies of khoja. We published the first volume and now the second volume is coming. This is the work of twenty years. Last year I was approached by the Mukhtar Auezov Fund and I agreed and w e have almost finished working on the life of Mukhtar Auezov. He belonged to the Kazakh writers of the khoja lineage. After this project, I became interested in the topic of genealogies, their holy places and places of worship in Central Asia. At that point, it became very interesting f o r me to work with the specialists from Western Europe. I returned to Tashkent in 1993, and in 1994 I worked on the establishment and opening of the French Research Institute for Central Asian Studies - IFEAC (Institut Français d'Études sur l'Asie Centrale). This was already the next stage in my scientific career. IFEAC plays a crucial role in establishing Islamic Studies in Central Asian countries. I can say this openly now because I have been an associate member of the project in Tashkent since 1995.3 They organized trips to European countries, and they provided support in order to work with European funds. This gave us a chance to come into contact with European scholars. At that time they had only started their many projects. We made expeditions to the holy places in Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, to the Ferghana Valley, to southern Uzbekistan and discovered many places that no one knew. This was very fruitful; w e met with other scholars and learned

3

See Maria Szuppe, Francis Richard and Ashirbek Muminov 1999. Patri-

moine manuscrit et vie intellectuelle de l'Asie Centrale islamique. Cahiers d'Asie Centrale

7.

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from one another. Moreover, since 2002 we have started our cooperation with the Japanese researchers (Prof. Shinmen, University Chuo, Prof. Sawada, Dr. Yayoi Kawahara, Tokyo University). They have another (scientific) school. They have a rigorous approach to research. During the last 15 years, every year we went on expedition. Afterwards we processed the materials. Personally, I visited more than 500 holy sites. All the material was used in the book on Mukhtar Auezov. I have introduced the scientific revolution. There have been several conferences in which the results of these studies have been presented. We also issued well-documented reports based on the findings about these sacred sites. Cooperation with Western researchers as well as with the Japanese ones has helped us financially: we have been able to publish documents that otherwise would have remained on the shelves and covered with dust. It was with their financial support that enabled us to publish those documents and make them accessible to other researchers. What kind of motivation did you have when you were a student? Was this your own choice or the choice of your supervisors, who supported you? There is something interesting, namely that a young person always wants to show his or her worth, in his or her way, and for this gets into many difficulties, for instance he studies badly at school and falls into a bad circle at university and it becomes difficult to get out of it. But in the circle there are good people that can support one in one's search for an alternative. For a long time, I was not able to find my own way. For example, when I graduated from university, I first wanted to engage with Islamic philosophy. Then, I was offered historical themes, but these were just stages. It seems that I spent almost half a year thinking about unnecessary topics, as I understood later. Nevertheless, these unnecessary topics were still useful. I was given a book on the history of medicine from the thirteenth century (Ibn Abi Usaybi'a). It was helpful that I engaged with this theme,

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sorted and organized documents and learned the medieval language. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I entered the field of Islamic Studies and discovered many Arabic manuscripts that they [the Soviets] had earlier wanted to destroy, and I worked with these manuscripts. I helped many colleagues of mine to defend their theses, and now they are all still working together with me. One day we will publish a book on these manuscripts and their descriptions. However, I should admit that I have not yet fully met the expectations of Professor Urunbaev, who taught me that we should not only work with the manuscripts, but also apply theories and find alternative approaches to study and understand the material. Now Kazakhstan has great motivation. There are many manuscripts, but there is no centralized system to store those manuscripts. Kazakh Islam is poorly studied, because documents are dispersed in many parts of the country and there is no expert in this field. Another reason is that they [the Soviets] had educated a big team of atheists, who claim that Islamic culture came rather late to Kazakhstan and who maintain that paganisms and shamanists were more typical of the country, which contradicts history. Right now we are involved in a big project in the Manghistau district of Kazakhstan. This place has many ethnographic monuments with Arabic inscriptions. I have already published one book on them, and a second book is in preparation, and we are going to publish a third book. So far, epigraphic monuments, especially Arabic writings, have not been studied in the territory of Kazakhstan, not to mention the handwritten manuscripts. Training specialists in these fields and receiving additional funds requires a lot of effort. But it is hard to get financial support, because many scientific positions are filled with people of the elder generation or people with old ways of thinking, and any attempt to start new scientific approaches requires a lot of time.

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What is your most interesting scientific question right now? Considering this theme, I would be interested in looking at the origins and developments of Kazakh Muslim communities. So far, no one has been able to provide answers to this question. There are only fragments of data. I have started work with the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries, when Kazakh representatives developed serious works on Muslim theories, on law. And recently I have discovered manuscripts on the biographies of Kazakh theologians of the nineteenth-twentieth centuries. These were collected and written down by the Qaz'i of Kazakhstan (1952-1972), Saduaqas Ghilmani (1890-1972). I found the manuscripts in the house of his daughter; and now Dr. Allen J. Frank (an American researcher) and I are preparing them for publication. With this, we will know about the lives of 55 Kazakh theologians who lived in the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. It remains to link the thirteenth to the twentieth century - these are the kinds of problems I am interested in. I am interested in the fate of theologians and I am interested in scholars of theoretical Islam. In Kazakhstan, there are a lot of problems, everyone wants to work on this subject, but there is no time. My task is to create a tool for research and to lay the foundation for future generations. Without a historical perspective, it is impossible to understand current situations. We are supported in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan needs to create a national history, and a lot of money is allocated to this, but there should be a more focussed way of allocating the money.

Selected

publications

Chami-damulla et son rôle dans la constitution d'un »Islam soviétiques«. In Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse (eds.), Islam et politique en ex-URSS (Russie d'Europe et Asie centrale). Paris: l'Harmattan, 2005, pp. 241-261.

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Mazar documents from Xinjiang and Ferghana (facsimile). Edited by Ashirbek Muminov, Nadirbek Abdulahadov and Kawahara Yayoi. Studia Culturae Islamicae, 88. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2007. Disputes on Muslim authority in Central Asia (20th Century): Critical editions and source studies. Edited by Bakhtiyar M. Babajanov, Ashirbek K. Muminov and Anke von Kügelgen. Almaty: Daik-Press, 2007. Rodoslovnoe drevo Mukhtara Auezova [The genealogical tree of Mukhtar Auezov], Almaty: Zhibek Zholy, 2011. Muslim law in Central Asia. In Wallace Johnson and Irina F. Popova (eds.), Central Asian Law: An historical overview. A Festschrift for the ninetieth birthday of Herbert Franke. Edited by. Topeka, Kansas: The University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS., 2004, pp. 55-63.

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Islamic Groups in Contemporary Kazakhstan: Current Situations and Tendencies of Development Ashirbek K. Muminov

Introduction Geographically, Kazakhstan has a unique position in Eurasia, located at the crossroads between East and West. The confessional and ethnic diversity of the country is striking to many researchers: more than 120 ethnic groups live in the country and more than 40 religious confessions and denominations are found within its territory. Compared with the Soviet period, since the early 1990s, there has been a constant growth in the number of houses of worship in the Republic of Kazakhstan. There are now more than 3,200 houses of worship belonging to all religious denominations. For comparative purposes, let me give some numbers: since the independence of Kazakhstan, the number of mosques has significantly increased from 59 in 1989 to more than 2,000 mosques officially registered in 2011.4 Since independence, the religious identification of the population and the status of religion have increased considerably. A recent survey revealed that over 70% of respondents said that they are united by a common language

4 Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali 2012. Islam. Religion of peace and creation. A work of theological and historical-philological research, articles and reflections, reports and interviews. London: Stacey International; Vladimir A. Ivanov and Yakov F. Trofimov 2010. Religii v Kazakhstane [Religion in Kazakhstan]. Spravochnik [Reference work]. Almaty: Arkaim; Zaur G. Zhalilov 2004. Religioznaya situatsiya v Kazakhstane i nekotorye problemy politiko-pravogogo regulirovaniya [The religious situation in Kazakhstan and some problems of political-legal regulations]. Shygys 1: 236-246.

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with their people, over 60% of respondents highlighted customs and rituals that unite people, and over 40 % of respondents considered religion and spiritual culture (dukhovnaya kul'tura) the uniting factors. A growing self-consciousness in language, cultural and religious terms have become apparent among all ethnic groups. Despite the declaration of a rigid separation between religious institutions and the state and a wide range of conditions for the development of secularism, the new intelligentsia among the Muslim peoples consider themselves as belonging to Muslim culture. One can also observe a strengthening tendency in the majority of the population to consider Islam a mode of life. In renewing religious identifications (it is called revival or rebirth: »vozrozhdenie«), Muslims appeal to three main layers of their own and new traditions: -

Orientation and strict adherence to the traditions of the local Muslim community (continuation of the traditions of the Central Asian region's Muslim societies); - Belonging to a community of particular Muslim peoples of the Near or Middle East (orientation more towards these countries, rather than Central Asian tradition) 5 - Recourse to the primary sources of the faith (Qur'an and hadith), shari'a and the practices of the period of the Prophet Muhammad's life and his companions (Salafism, fundamentalism). It is important to highlight that in the early stage of the revival of religious life, some researchers w e r e inclined to think that Islam in Kazakhstan had shallow roots and that the spread of Islam here was a recent phenomenon. Many claimed that the nomadic Kazakhs and Kirgiz were not susceptible to Islamization and political Islam (Islamism). 6

5

Katipa T. Kusainova 2010. Deyatel'nost'

ganizatsiy

v Tsentral'noy

musul'manskikh

dvizheniy

i or-

Azii (1991-2008) [The activities of Muslim move-

ments and organizations in Central Asia (1991-2008)]. PhD dissertation in history, Almaty. 6

Martha B. Olcott 1995 [1987], The Kazakhs. Stanford: Hoover Institution.

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In the reinforcement of these various Islamic schools of thought in the processes of religious identifications, several factors play a crucial role: 7 - The publication and dissemination of ideological literature (published translations of the Qur'an and hadith and the publication of books devoted to the various versions of the origin and development of Islamic culture, society and religion). These books are widely published and distributed legally through the action of lobbyists of various schools or are self-published (illegally); - The active operation of numerous confessional educational institutions (universities, institutes, madrasas) and various kinds of short courses in mosques, foreign cultural centres or private homes (teaching the Arabic language, the basics of Islam, Qur'an recitation etc.); - The training and return to the homeland of a large group of young men/women who graduated from Islamic schools or universities and spent many years abroad through the initiatives of the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims (DUMK) 8 or on private initiative etc. The population's interest in the religion of Islam is constant, substantial and widespread phenomenon and is associated with the study of translation of the Qur'an, collections of hadiths on various subjects and the works of famous theologians with propagandistic aims. These include Ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, Abu'l Ala' Mawdudi, Fethullah Giilen, al-Albani, Muhammad Ilyas Kandihlavi

7 Ashirbek Muminov 2010. Self-identification and re-Islamisation processes in contemporary Central Asia. In Halit Eren, Meruert Abuseitova, Ashirbek Muminov, Ayna Askeroglu (eds.). Proceedings of the International Conference »Islamic Civilization in Central Asia«. Astana, 4-7 September 2007. Istanbul: OIC Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture, R. B. Suleimenov Institute of Oriental Studies, Ministry of Education and Science, Republic of Kazakhstan, pp. 231-237. 8 Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man Kazakhstana (DUMK, Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims).

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(Kandhlawi) and many others. According to the survey by Prof. Zaur G. Dzhalilov, almost 73% of those who participated expressed an interest in Arabic Islam and more than 15% read translations of the Qur'an (versions of the Azeri Shi'i Islam, Isma'ili, Arabo-Fundamentalist, Salafi, Sufi or other interpretations). 9 Traditional religion has, however, not lost its functional link to national traditions and customs and has not lost the quality of an integral and necessary element of the whole system of spiritual culture. For the majority of the Muslim population of Kazakhstan, Islam stands for spiritual and moral values. The reason for the increase in religious schools of thought, including Islamic groups in Kazakhstan, can be traced to the obtaining of national sovereignty. As a result, religious freedom and freedom of conscience (of worship) were granted to the citizens. The government of Kazakhstan has pursued a democratic course valid for all aspects of society and many religious movements have taken advantage of this situation. 10 The most important initiatives in this course have included the international congresses of the representatives of the World and Traditional Religions (2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012); the International Conference on Peace and Reconciliation (2006); the international forum Common World: Progress Through Diversity (2008); the program of The Muslim World and the West; and many others. These have been held in the framework of international and regional initiatives, such as the Conference on Interaction and Cooperation in Asia (CICA). The U N supported Kazakhstan's initiative to declare 2010 the »Year of Rapprochement of Cultures«. In 2010, Kazakhstan headed the Organization for Security and

9 Zaur G. Zhalilov 2006. Islam i obshchestvo v sovremennom Kazakhstane [Islam and society in contemporary Kazakhstan]. Almaty: Daik-Press. 10 Naghima Zh. Baytenova 2009. V Kazakhstane sushchestvuet tikhiy ekstremizm [In Kazakhstan exists quite extremism], Delovaya nedelya. 20 November 2009.

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Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); in 2011-2012, Kazakhstan chaired the Council of Foreign Ministers of the »Organization of Islamic Cooperation« (OIC). Now it is time to revive forgotten links and connections with the Muslim world. In 1995, Kazakhstan became a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and started expanding its cooperation with the OIC countries in a number of directions. There are four main a r e a s of economic cooperation: trade, transport, tourism and finance. Moreover, there are also programs that focus on the employment of young people, sport and cultural exchanges, trade cooperation, migration and fighting against extremism and terrorism. Many countries of the OIC develop their economic policies along with religion, Islamic ideas and also the principles of shari'a. The Islamization of economic life has become an official policy of many countries. Kazakhstan has economic cooperation and trade relations with the 42 members of the OIC. The emergence of Islamic banks in Kazakhstan was expected to increase the attractiveness for investments from Muslim regions. Kazakh citizens travelling to Muslim countries comprised almost 58.8% of all Kazakh foreign travel in 2009. In comparison, the number traveling to Muslim countries in 2000 was no higher than 31.3%. This is indeed a very impressive growth. Today there are also a large number of pilgrims to Mecca (about 4,000 Kazakh Muslims go on pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj) per year and even more do the umra). The increase in the number of pilgrims for hajj - which is one of the five pillars of Muslims - is one indicator of this freedom of religion in Kazakhstan. In 1991, for the first time since Kazakhstan's independence, 20 people went for pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca. In 1993, President Nursultan Nazarbayev spoke in Almaty's Central Mosque to already 300 Kazakhs who were going to Mecca. Among them were representatives of different nationalities and ages, as well as prominent public figures, intellectuals, artists and

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ordinary people. 11 Since then, the number of pilgrims who want to go to the holy city of Mecca from Kazakhstan has rapidly increased. Following this tendency, the chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims (DUMK), Sheikh Absattar Qazhï Derbisali, asked the representatives of the Ministry of Hajj of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to increase the pilgrim quota for Kazakhstani citizens twice. In 2006, there were thus about a thousand pilgrims registered to g o to Mecca from Kazakhstan. Since July 2009, information campaigns have been conducted in Kazakhstan to explain how to perform the modern hajj. All mosques have started offering training courses instructing pilgrims in the proper performance of rituals. According to the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims, four thousand pilgrims from Kazakhstan in 2010 went for hajj. Since 2007, the main tasks related to the organization of the hajj are carried out by the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims ( D U M K ) and the Committee on Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Culture (now the Agency for Religious Affairs) of the Republic of Kazakhstan, together with the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The gathering of pilgrims, their accommodation and administration of documents, sending pilgrims off and their provision with the necessary facilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and last but not least the organization of religious rituals are delegated to travel agencies. The Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims and the Agency for Religious Affairs control and supervise the work of these travel agencies. The Spiritual Administration actively encourages its regional administrations to call

11 Sheikh Absattar khaji Derbisali 2010. Islam - religiya mira i sozidaniya. Teologichesko-religiovedcheskie, istoriko-filologicheskie issledovaniya, stat'i, i razmyshleniya, doklady i interv'yu [Islam - religion of peace and creation. A work of theological and historical-philological research, articles and reflections, reports and interviews], Almaty: Daik-Press, pp. 206-229.

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people to hajj and promote the hajj pilgrimage. They do so by a d d r e s s i n g questions on the hajj in their sermons and organizing sessions on learning about its rituals. In recent years, a special hajj mission had to accompany the pilgrims to Saudi Arabia in order to maintain order, guide the meetings of pilgrims and a r r a n g e for their activities. The hajj mission group consists of 30 people: one representative from t h e Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims, one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from the Agency for Religious Affairs, one r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from the Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, one Kazakhstan! representative from the World Islamic League, five Kazakh doctors, four journalists and several responsible employees of Kazakhstani travel companies. As the a g r e e m e n t of the hajj requires, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of pilgrims from Kazakhstan to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and back is carried out only by air. Some of the pilgrims a r e delivered to the airport of Jeddah, and some to the airport of Medina. The Association of hajis from Kazakhstan was established in Kazakhstan in 2003 and today unites more than seven thousand people. Its main goal is to educate intellectuals and young people about the principles and values of Islam by organizing various kinds of scientific conferences in different p a r t s of Kazakhstan. Over the p a s t two years, t h e activities of the association have become closely linked to the introduction of a halal m a r k e t in Kazakhstan. Within the framework of this association, a State Technical Committee has b e e n established t h a t develops s t a n d a r d s for halal production, and for this, actively studies the experiences of Russia, Malaysia and other countries. Further, Professor MaratQazh'i Sarsenbayev, chairman of t h e association, introduced theology courses (with specializations in Islamic and Christian Orthodox theology) to t h e general education (both in school and university) of the Republic of Kazakhstan. 1 2

12

Nash Mir (Almaty), 29 J u n e 2 0 0 7 .

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In 1996, about 80 Kazakhstani students studied at the famous Islamic university Al-Azhar in Egypt, 100 students in Turkey and 20 students in Pakistan. Between 2001 and 2007, 145 students received their religious educations at the Egyptian University of Islamic culture Nur Mubarak in Almaty, Kazakhstan. In general, almost 700 citizens of Kazakhstan received their religious educations at theological institutions abroad in this period. Specifically, almost 200 Kazakhstani students attended universities and educational centres in Egypt, more than 100 students studied in Saudi Arabia, over 100 in Syria, over 140 students in Pakistan, 30 in Iran, 80 in Turkey, 20 in Libya, 5 in Russia and 2 in Kyrgyzstan. More than 470 of these students study privately, avoiding official channels. Why is the process of Islamic revival in different regions of Kazakhstan supported with such great enthusiasm? We do not think that such a phenomenon can be explained simply as a tendency towards religious fanaticism or by the level of economic and social development, whether low or high. Rather, many catalysts have set in motion mechanisms leading some parts of the population to wish to become part of a world Muslim society. From a cultural studies (kul'turologiya) point of view, the revival of Islamic values in Kazakhstan is a process of selfidentification, a consequence of the search for spirituality after many years of domination by atheism. The revival of Islamic traditions and values is one aspect of the revival of the cultural heritage. Many intellectuals see the revival and development of religion as a solution to many social problems in Kazakhstan. According to these intellectuals, the development of a national culture is only possible if it is based on national cultural values. Foreign spiritual concepts cannot replace the traditional religion of Kazakh society. From the psychological point of view, this development creates the prerequisites for national identification and thus for attachment to one's culture. These voices propose the revival of Islamic values through the reconstruction of history and culture; identity and traditions lead to the restoration of the traditional way of life.

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The religious space of contemporary Kazakhstan is diverse. There are radical groups,13 but so far they have not been able to establish a firm foothold in Kazakhstani society. The majority of Muslim communities stand under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Administration (DUMK). Inheriting from Soviet practices, the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims is the representative body of Islam in Kazakhstan. All mosques, religious educational institutions, schools and religious publications have to be registered with this judiciary. However, there are many groups on the periphery of the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims.14

Islamist groups Al-Takfir

wa'l-Hijra

The penetration of the ideology of one particular group - alTakfir wa'l-Hijra (or al-Takfir for short) - into Kazakhstan began in the mid-1990s. Currently, this group is represented in Kazakhstan in two ways: first by the Bagauddin (Baha' alDin) and, second, by the Ayyubist: the latter is particularly active in Kazakhstan.

13 Vitaly V. Naumkin 2005. Radical Islam in Central Asia; Emmanuel Karagiannis 2007. The rise of political Islam in Kazakhstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 13: 297-322; Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2007. Le jihad comme idéologie de 1' »Autre« et de »l'Exilé« à travers l'étude de documents du Mouvement islamique d'Ouzbékistan. (Translated by H. Fati). Cahier d'Asie Centrale 15-16: 140-159; Adeeb Khalid 2007. Islam after Communism. Religion and politics in Central Asia. Berkeley et al.: University of California Press; Mariya Y. Omelicheva 2011. Islam in Kazakhstan. A survey of contemporary trends and sources of securitization. Central Asian Survey 30(2): 243-256. 14 Asylbek K. Izbairov 2009. Netraditsionnye islamskie napravleniya v nezavisimykh gosudarstvakh Tsentral'noy Azii [The non-traditional Islam movements in the independent Central Asian states], PhD dissertation in General History, Almaty.

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In the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), this group first entered Daghestan and subsequently spread throughout the Caucasus region. This movement has split into two wings, especially after 1995-1996. First, w e find a large number of Bagauddin Mohammed ( » B a g a u d d i n « ) supporters. Second, a relatively small group of followers of Omar Anguty Angutaevich, who are commonly known as »Ayyubov Jama'at« or »Ayyubist«. His supporters started in the city of Astrakhan. The main idea of al-Takfir in Kazakhstan is to conduct an armed jihad against the government. They believe that the Kazakh government does not conform to the »Islamic model«, and they also condemn the ethnic and cultural traditions and customs of the people of Kazakhstan. The leaders of al-Takfir (they call themselves Salafis) consider everyone (governors and ordinary citizens) infidels ( k a f i r ) , who commit small and big sins without repentance and do not follow the laws of Allah. Infidels are those who do not recognize their teachings and do not join their ranks. We also know that the followers of al-Takfir do not go to the mosque and their preaching has completely broken with the general religious environment. The group's actions are coordinated by the centre, and the network comprises individual groups in different countries that do not have contact with one another. Ayyubists advocate the return to an idealized fundamentalist past to replace the existing order. T h e i d e o l o g y of a l i e n a t i o n in the l i f e of C e n t r a l Asia since i n d e p e n d e n c e p e r i o d In Uzbekistan in the years of perestroika (1985-1991), Abduvali Qari Mirzaev was one of the first young scholars to criticize »local Islam«. He has become a well-known leader of the so-called Wahhabis in the Ferghana Valley. In one of his presentations in the spring of 1990, he gave his famous speech (khutba). His supporters recorded this speech on audio and videotape, and now they call his speech »Ghuraba«. The word »ghuraba« (the plural of the Arabic »Ghar i b « ) means »strangers, foreigners«, » p o o r « or » e x i l e s « .

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His speech began by commenting on the Prophet's hadith on »Islam began from the exile (ghurbat) and the return from exile«. 'Abduvali Qari interpreted this hadith, applying it to the Soviet and post-Soviet situation. In his opinion, »outcasts« (or »the exiled« - »Ghuraba«) are the rare Muslims in society who »strictly adhere to the requirements of the Qur'an and Sunna in all spheres of society«, whereas the rest of the Muslims »were far from following the requirements of Allah and His Messengers«. This taped speech of 'Abduvali-qari became popular among some Muslims, especially among his young followers, who found it necessary to fight for a »pure Islam«. The followers of the movement began to call themselves »renewers« (Mujaddidiyya), while other Muslims began to call them »Wahhabis«. The Mujaddidiyya consider many of the rituals and customs of local Muslims impermissible innovations (bid'a). This has led to disagreements with other Muslims, who prefer to stick to the traditional forms of local Islam. Despite its initial popularity, the ideology of Ghuraba was doomed to remain the ideology of a minority, which is one of the reasons for its subsequent radicalization. Later Ghuraba became the ideological orientation of many radical Muslims. The d o c t r i n e on e m i g r a t i o n (hijra) Ideologists of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (in particular Tahir Yuldashev) interpreted the speech of 'Abduvali Qari in their own ways, using his interpretation for their own movement. They developed the idea of Ghuraba to legitimize other religious teachings, such as hijra, i.e. the need to emigrate from »the country of strangers«, in particular from Uzbekistan, a territory they considered »Dar al-harb« (»the house of war«, a country in which Muslims face war). In the interpretations of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the person who has performed hijra automatically becomes a Mujahiddin (jihadist), or »a soldier of Allah«.

Muminov 165 Salafis in Kazakhstan The first Salafi groups in Kazakhstan formed in the 1990s: - as a result of the activities of the members of the international association of the Muslim Brotherhood and through their affiliated groups (Kuwait Community of Social Reforms, Committee of Muslims of Asia, Independent Institute for learning Arabic language and Eastern culture, al-Haramayn Islamic Foundation etc.); - through the training and education of Kazakhstani youth at the Islamic universities in the Middle East (including pilgrims who performed the hajj and 'umra); - through illegal religious educational institutions operating in the country (hujra; Kazakhstani-Arab University Ruhaniyyat, Kazakhstani-Kuwait University, KazakhstaniArab College Tayba etc.); - through enormous financial investments from the rich countries of the Muslim world etc. As a result of these uncontrolled activities, at the moment there are more than 100 sustainable communities of Salafis actively functioning in all regions of the country. They are divided into three main groups. 1. Madkhalits - f o l l o w e r s of the Saudi Shaykh R a b i ' alMadkhali are mainly concentrated in the cities of Astana, Almaty, Shymkent and Pavlodar. They believe that the Muslim community should obey their imams and official authorities. The strategic goal is to integrate with the official clerg y The leaders of this Salafi movement are the former imam of the mosque Ush Qongir, Toirjon Ibragimov and a resident of the town near Almaty, Qaskelen Rinat Zaynullin. This jama'at criticizes the activities of scientists and theologians of the past as well as of the contemporary period. It has criticized even the medieval traditionalist Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani for non-shari'a views on theology (kalam). It has also criticized contemporary scholars such as Hasan al-Banna', Sayyid Qutb, al-Qaradawi, Muhammad 'Ammar, Huvaydi Fahmi, 'Ali al-Tantawi etc.

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2. Sururits (Medina Jama'at) are mainly concentrated in the southern regions of Kazakhstan (south Kazakhstan, Zhamb'il and Almaty regions). There are almost 24 small Sururit Jama'ats. These groups are the ones that first attempted to create an alternative to the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan's Muslims and to local traditional religious communities. They are organized in a pyramid structure, which they see as basis for the religious communities. This pyramid is headed by the elected leaders (.amir) or advisors ( s h u r a ) , holding their own monetary funds and opening underground educational centres ( h u j r a ) . The leaders are a citizen of Somalia, Muhammad 'Abd al-Samad, as well as the Kazakh citizens Didar Ospanov and Darin Mubarov. 3. There are also so-called moderate Salafis. The strict adherence to the principle of monotheism ( t a w h i d ) is an important provision for this Salafi group. Any violation of the principle of tawhid is evaluated as a manifestation of shirk (polytheism) or related to bid'a (innovation). They strongly condemn the various Sufi groups, because tawassul (an appeal to Allah through someone else) can lead to »the worship of man«. The scholars of this Salafi ideology are Shaykh 'Abdallah ibn Baz, Shaykh Muhammad ibn al-'Uthaymin, Shaykh Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, as well as theologians of other nearby countries such as the Syrian muhaddith (al-Albani, Abd al-Qadir al-Arnaut, Ahmad Shakir) and their students and followers. The main f a c t o r s l e a d i n g to the s p r e a d of S a l a f i s m The revival of economic ties with the Muslim world It is important to highlight that Kazakhstan has been interacting with the Islamic world for many centuries. Islam arrived in Kazakhstan more than 1200 years ago. Now it is time for the renewal of such forgotten ties. Becoming a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1995, Kazakhstan is intensifying its cooperation with the countries of the Islamic world in a number of directions.

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In 2003-2005 the Islamic Bank of Development financed several projects, such as the S'izghanov Institute for $ 55 million, the reconstruction of the main roads GulshatQaraghandi and Oskarovka-Vishnevka and small and midsized businesses. 15 Many countries of the OIC build their economic policies taking into account religious, Islamic ideas and principles of shari'a. The Islamization of the economy has become the official policy of Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, yet the main centres of such Islamized economies remain in the Middle East. In these countries, the idea of a special Islamic development is implemented within the framework of a market economy. This new trend is called »Islamic economics«. The principles and rules of shari'a are applied to clothes, food, leisure, health etc. As a result, a big halal industry has developed, which fully meets the requirements (aya) of the Qur'an. In many countries, food production, clothing production, the creation of special fashion, the design and construction of tourist centres, recreation etc. have to meet the requirements of the halal industry. Kazakhstan maintains trade-economic ties with the 42 member countries of the OIC. There are four main areas of economic cooperation: trade, transportation, tourism and finances. The turnover of commodities between these countries for the period under research has increased 9.5 times - from $ 1.1 billion in 2000 to $ 10.5 billion in 2008. This region accounts for 9.6% of total Kazakh foreign trade, while 27% is with the EU and 53% with Russia. The major trade partners of Kazakhstan are Turkey (2,875.1 million), Iran (2,098.4 million) and Uzbekistan (1,788.2 million).16

15 Dina Wilkowsky 2009. 16 Export and Import of Kazakhstan for 2007, 2008, 2009. Astana: Agentstvo Respubliki Kazakhstan po statistike, 2007-2009.

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Religious educational and other journeys of Kazakhstanis to the Muslim world17 Visits by Kazakhstani citizens to Islamic regions account for 58.8% of total departures abroad in 2009. This is up from 31.3% in 2000, so the growth in travel to these regions is very impressive. The number of pilgrims to Mecca, in particular, is quite large (see above). Local fundamentalism and illegal networks of education on Islam (hujra) After the destruction of the traditional centres of Islam in Central Asia (Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva, Kokand) during the early Soviet period, Tashkent, the capital of Turkestan, emerged as the most prominent Islamic centre of the Soviet type. At the beginning of 1919, a theologian following a traditionalist Shafi'i school of thought, Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahid ibn 'Ali al-'Asali alTarablusi al-Shami al-Dimashqi (who died in 1932 in the Khorezm oasis) appeared in Tashkent, where he became known locally under the venerable nickname »Shami-damulla«.18 He was rescued from a Beijing jail by the Soviets, where he had been imprisoned as a result of his theological activities in the cities of Eastern Turkestan, especially in Kashghar and Chuguchak (1906-1919). Shami-damulla was originally from the Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire and studied in Cairo at Al-Azhar University. He advocated the supremacy of the Qur'an and the »authentic« ( s a h i h ) hadiths (the Prophet's Sunna), rather than the local traditions of the Central Asian School of theology. He did not accept Hanafi tradition or the teachings of Sufi brotherhoods, and he opposed the cult of holy places (a phenomenon he called »but-

17 See www.shakirt.kz. 18 Ashirbek K. Muminov 2005. Chami-damulla et son rôle dans la constitution d'un »Islam soviétique«. In M. Laruelle and S. Peyrouse (eds.), Islam et politique en ex-URSS (Russie d'Europe et Asie centrale). Paris: l'Harmattan, pp. 241-261; Qurban-'Ali Khalidi 2005. An Islamic biographical dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe 1770-1912. Ed. by A. J. Frank and M. A. Usmanov (Leiden, Boston: Brill), p. 70; Mulla Musa ibn 'Isa Khwaja Sayrami 1986. Tarikh-i hamidi. Beijing: Millatlar nashriyati, pp. 669-702.

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parastlik« - » t h e worship of idols, paganism«), as well as local religious customs and ceremonies. Shami-damulla was not accepted in theological circles in Ferghana (he travelled to Andijan and Kokand) or Samarkand (where he visited the nearby tomb of Imam al-Bukhari). At that time, local theologians followed strong Hanafi and Sufi traditions. Tashkent was only an unimportant Islamic centre compared to celebrated centres such as Bukhara, Samarkand, Khiva and Kokand. However, in Tashkent Shami-damulla's excellent knowledge of the Arabic language, his ability to make (istinbat) new decisions ( f a t w a ) from the two main sources of Islam (Qur'an, Sunna), highlighting issues of the modern period, and his strong position in condemning »non-Islamic customs« (bid'a, khurafat) impressed many scholars of his time. His diverse religious activities (justification of »Islamic socialism«, the fight against the local clergy, innovative approaches, reforming medieval Islam by issuing new fatwas) continued in Tashkent until 1932. The most important aspect here is his classes to educate the local ulama. Shamidamulla could attract local madrasa graduates, who had thus already studied Islam for 10 to 15 years. He had two groups of graduates. His first group of students in 19191923 included Jamal Khwaja-Ishan, 'Abd al-Qadir Muradov and Mulla Yunus Hakimjanov. The second group studied with him in 1925-1931 and included Ziyautdin Babakhanov, Shaikram Shaislamov and Ibrahim Qari Ishaqov (also known as Shaykhim qary) and Mulla 'Abdussamad. His third cohort of students did not complete their studies because Shamidamulla was exiled to Turtkul (Qaraqalpaqstan) in 1932. His teachings included courses in Arabic philology, interpretations of the Qur'an and hadith. Shami-damulla reintroduced the authorized (rivaya) collections of hadith »alJami' al-Sahih« of Imam al-Bukhari and that of Imam Muslim al-Nishaburi. He allowed those who completed his teaching course (khat-i ijazat) to continue teaching these works. As a result of his activities in Tashkent, a group called »Ahl alHadith« emerged, which has about 3000-4000 people today.

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The members of this group follow the Qur'an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad and consider themselves above the madhhab schools. They believe that dividing Islam into madhhabs is wrong, and consequently they are very critical of the teachings and practices of local Islam. This group was particularly influential and active during the official activities of Ziyautdin Babakhanov (1908-1982), when Babakhanov was a vice chairman of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan from 1943 to 1957 and Mufti from 1957 to 1982. Babakhanov and his circle had a significant influence on the formation of a new Islamic institution of the Soviet type. The members of the group Ahl al-Hadith can be seen as fundamentalists; their critical attitudes towards local forms of Islam were supported and skilfully used by the Soviet government for party propaganda and even influenced Soviet approach to ethnography in the region. 19 After World War II, the only legal institutions that were permitted to train Muslims (imams of mosques and the regional religious leaders - qadis) in all four spiritual directorates of the Soviet Union were the two Central Asian madrasas in Tashkent and Bukhara. The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan allowed only 30 or 60 students (muta'allim) to study. The Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SADUM) had been created by the Council of People's Commissars on the October 10, 1945. These two schools were the restored madrasa of Mir-'Arab in Bukhara (well-known since 1540 and restored in 1945) and the madrasa of Baraq-khan (in use between 1956-1961) in Tashkent. Later, based on the Baraq-khan madrasa, the

19 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2001. O fetvakh SADUM protiv »neislamskikh obychayev« [About the fatwas of the SADUM against non-Islamic customs]. In Alexei Malashenko and Martha B. Olcott (eds.), Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzglyad iznutri [Islam in post-Soviet space: A view from within], Moscow, pp. 170-184.

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Tashkent Islamic Institute ('Ali Ma'had) named »Imam alBukhari« was established in 1971; it functions to this day.20 The family members of Mufti Babakhanov - Ishan Babakhan 'Abdulmajidkhanov (1943-1957), Ziyautdin Babakhanov (1957-1982) and Shamsiddinkhan Babakhanov (1982-1989) - greatly influenced the formation and functioning of these new religious institutions. 21 Babakhanov, for instance expressed strong interest in hadith scholars and Shafi'i tradition: he organized and celebrated anniversaries devoted to the Central Asian scholar al-Imam al-Bukhari (d. 870) and published his works. Moreover, he also collected the scientific works and materials of the Tashkent scholar Kulayb ibn al-Haytham al-Shashi and a Shafi'i theologian, Abu Bakr alQaffal al-Shashi (d. 976). His son and successor S. Babakhanov later continued these activities, publishing translations of the »al-Adab al-Mufrad« by Imam al-Bukhari. Besides the educational institutions of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, illegal forms of receiving an Islamic education were available. This form of education has become known in scholarship as hujra (»cell«, »training room«). 22 The lead in the hujra is taken by a teachermentor - mudarris. Many mudarris were operating under-

20 M. Kemper, R. Motika and S. Reichmuth (eds.) 2010. Islamic education in the Soviet Union and its successor states. London and New York: Routledge. 21 About this family, see Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2003. Babakhanovy. In S. M. Prozorov (ed.), Islam na territorii byvshey Rossiyskoy imperii [Islam within the territory of the former Russian empire]. Entsiklopedicheskiy slovar 4. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura; Shamsuddinkhan Babakhanov 1999. Muftiy Ziyovuddinkhon ibn Eshon Bobokhon. Zhizn' i deyatel'nost' [The Mufti Ziyovuddinkhon Ibn Eshon Bobokhon. His life and professional work], Tashkent. 22 This network is the continuation of traditional forms of religious education ( m a k t a b , madrasas, qari-khana). This institution started under Tsarist rule, ignored local institutions and is rooted in private religious schools. During the Soviet period, hujras survived only in the former Turkestan provinces, mainly in the Ferghana valley. It adapted to the Russian form of government and control.

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ground in the Soviet era. It is only now that work has begun on collecting and classifying information on their activities: One important hujra leader was Muhammadjan Rustamov from the Hanafi madhhab, known as Damulla Hindustani or Hajji-damulla (1892-1989). 23 After receiving his elementary education near Kokand, he continued his studies and teachings in Bukhara, Balkh and India, from where he went on hajj. In his activities as a theologian and a mudarris, Damulla Hindustani maintained a conservative line and advocated the preservation of old Hanafi traditions. He criticized the modernist ideas of Muhammad 'Abduh and Rashid Rida, as well as the fundamentalist position of the »Central Asian Wahhabis« (in Uzbekistan these included Rahmatullah 'Allama, 'Abduvali Qari Mirzaev and Hakim-jan Qari Vosiyev). He had many students in Tajikistan, the Ferghana Valley and Tashkent. Among his more than 200 students, w e find contemporary religious authorities like Hikmatullah Qarategini, Sayyid 'Abdullah Nuri, the groups around Turajan-zada in Dushanbe, Ishaq-jan Qari, Ibrahim-jan Qari in Kokand and Asadullah Qari in Marghilan. Schools for girls and boys in private houses or in mosques were traditionally widespread in every neighbourhood (mahalla) of cities and villages (qishlaq). This network remains poorly studied. Many of these networks provided and still provide highly trained reciters of the Qur'an (qari). To judge from competition results, representatives of the Namangan school had the highest quality of reciters. The Namangan school is followed by two schools from Shahrisabz and Andijan. In Central Asia, during Soviet times the term »Wahhabi« came to be used to denote political activists who, under the

23 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov and Muzaffar Kamilov 2001. Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892-1989) and the beginning of the »Great Schism« among the Muslims of Uzbekistan. In S. A. Dudoignon and H. Komatsu (eds.), Islam in politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early eighteenth to late twentieth centuries). London et al.: Kegan Paul, pp. 195-219.

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umbrella of Islam, opposed the official authorities.24 According to unconfirmed reports, in the early 1990s there were up to 100 people in such Islamic groups operating in Namangan. Drastic actions by the authorities in the fight against illegal religious opposition, however, led to their expansion, radicalization and even inclusion of foreign fighters who had experiences in subversive warfare. Religious instruction was conducted in these underground groups (jama'at) under the guidance of a teacher. Since 1995 these so-called Wahhabis have integrated with Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami. To summarize, the fundamentalist approach was used in the religious school of the Soviet type (SADUM). At the organizational and methodological level, however, these ideas have not become the dominant approach because of the low skills of their proponents. In subsequent years, this imperfect and unfinished system was unable to compete with the other groups in the struggle for social influence: on the one hand, the illegal network of education (hujra) in which a conservative teaching was maintained and, on the other hand, foreign missionary organizations. In the years of independence, the lack of a strong group of local theologians prevented profound reforms of local Islam long due and the improvement of legal religious educational institutions. The failure of local intellectuals to confront the spiritual challenges of the radical Islamic movements and oppositional religious groups in the struggle for the minds of believers led to a situation in which the problem seems soluble only by old and proved methods - by force. 25

24 B.M. Babadjanov, A. K. Muminov, and A.von Kügelgen (eds.) 2007. Disputes on Muslim authority in Central Asia (20th Century): Critical editions and source studies. Almaty: Daik-Press. 25 Ashirbek K. Muminov 2007. Fundamentalist challenges to local Islamic traditions in Soviet and Post-Soviet Central Asia. In U. Tomohiko (ed.), Empire, Islam, and politics in Central Eurasia. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University (Slavic Eurasian Studies 14), pp. 249-262.

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The

Qur'anites

The Qur'anites became popular in Kazakhstan thanks to the activities of the organization Izgi Amal, headed by Turarbek Qusainov and Talghat Usenqulov. The doctrine of the Qur'anites follows the fundamentalist thesis that Islam is based solely on the holy Qur'an and denies the validity of both the Sunna of the Prophet and other principles of Islam. Their teaching has the following features: - They deny parts of the authentic hadiths, especially those in the collections of al-Bukhari, Muslim al-Nishaburi etc., which, in their opinion, are not logical. They question the reliability of hadiths and claim that the Prophet forbade further writings. - Allah did not leave anything out in the Qur'an; therefore there is no need to adhere to the Sunna. - Simple people can understand the Qur'an and the shari'a better than the founders of madhhabs (Islamic schools of thought) - Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik, al-Shafi'i, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and many others. As is widely known, there is no institutionalized «Church« in Islam. Regulation of the religious sphere has therefore relied on individuals, such as religious leaders (ulama and fuqaha'), whose authority was socially recognized solely on the basis of their actual knowledge in the field of religious sciences. The founder of the teachings of Qur'anites, Ahmad Mansur, was against the institution of the ulama and madrasa (religious schools) and was suspended from teaching at the University of al-Azhar in May 1985. The reason for this was afatwa (legal advice) from the theologians of the university, in which Ahmad Mansur was accused of deviation from the basic principles of Islam and from compliance with the Sunna of the Prophet ( k u f r ) . Ahmad Mansur was subsequently arrested in 1987-1988 by the Egyptian authorities, who tried to keep the peace and preserve unity in Egyptian society and fought against the destabilization of the country.

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In the late 1980s, the teachings of the Qur'anites became widespread among some intellectual groups in Turkey who were searching for new ways of development and who actively campaign to explain the true message of Mansur. Ahmad Mansur himself settled in Northern Virginia, and he advocates his teachings along with his sons through the International Qur'anic Center and a website in Arabic and English: www.ahl-alquran.com. The Qur'anite phenomenon has to be studied in comparison with other religious movements in Central Asia that have appeared since the period of independence. The Islamic revival of the late 1980s and early 1990s took place within the ideological vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was followed by a call to revive suppressed (former) cultural and religious traditions of peoples in Central Asia. However, along with other, positive aspects, this process led to the emergence of massive social and political problems, which were often the source of conflicts. Many problems emerged particularly over the religious revival in Central Asia.26 This religious revival has affected all sectors of society, including young intellectuals from marginal sectors, whether their education is in the humanities or in technical professions. Their spiritual quest and maturation fell in the perestroika and postperestroika period, a period often described as an »ideological ferment«. It was in this environment (especially among marginal groups) that the »return to the religion of the forefathers« acquired its special features. This environment has also brought forth groups such as Akramiyya, the Ma'rifatchilar in the Marghilan district of Ferghana and the so-called Mahdit group in Syrdarya and Urgut. The impetus for the formation and development of religious-ideological ideas among the traditionally educated

26 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2004. Debates over Islam in contemporary Uzbekistan: A v i e w from within. In Stéphane A. Dudoignon. Devout societies versus impious states?, pp. 39-60.

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Islam

younger generation of intellectuals in Uzbekistan came from Uzbek and Russian translations of the Quran, which were published in the magazine Sharq Yulduzi in 1989-1991. The »new attitude« (i.e. not atheist) towards sacred texts almost immediately turned religion into a kind of ideological reference point for many people after the Communist ideas had collapsed. However, a huge distance between the profound, elite knowledge of religious specialists and the emotional desire of people to make religion their new ideological orientation has led to the emergence of a number of small religious communities - peculiar socio-religious mutations of the post-perestroika era. One of these is the Akramiyya group, established by Akram Yuldashev, born in 1963 in Andijan. This group is also known as Iymonchilar or Chalifatchilar. The Andijan cell started approximately in 1995. From the beginning, Yuldashev paid great attention to economic activities. The group has been successful in cross-border trade, creating small and medium-sized enterprises. Akramiyya is active in Andijan and some surrounding areas such as Kokand, Tashkent, Urgut and Qashqadarya. In southern Kyrgyzstan it is located mostly in Osh and Jalalabad. The Akramiyya group also established in the Samarkand region and in some cities of the Russian Federation (Ivanovo, Novosibirsk). Some of the dogmatic and ritualistic features of Akramiyya According to Yuldashev, Muslims are currently in the period of »ignorance« (in the so-called pre-Meccan period, Jahiliyya). Consequently, Muslims must realize that they live in »a different time« in relations to rituals as well as to their other activities. As a result, he initially considered it acceptable to read prayers only twice a day (as in the early Muslim community), instead of praying five times a day. He also suggested not complying with the regulations that were introduced after the death of the Prophet, etc. Two factors have made the emerging group Akramiyya a rapidly growing, promising and mobile group. The first factor is social: there has been a tendency to integrate into

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micro-communities such as kinship, clan, local (territorial) allegiances, trade and, more recently, religious and ideological allegiances in Uzbek society, especially in the marginalized parts of society. Uncertainties about official ideological orientations,27 amorphous identity, heterogeneity and also the weakness of general Islamic education - have all stimulated the exploration of micro-ideologies in small communities. The second factor is linked to this tendency: namely, microideologies are an attempt to overcome collective economic problems. These two factors have contributed to the Akramiyya's success and its attraction for more and more new members. If there had been other conditions (such as a charismatic leader with a broader approach and the legal opportunity), Akramiyya could have become a major religious-political force not only in Uzbekistan, but also in the region. It had the potential to become an ideological movement of religiously oriented, middle-class businessmen. It is still hard to say whether the ideological orientation of Akramiyya was well established. The religious component accommodated young people who got a secular (mainly technical) education and who began to perceive religion in a more modernist way, that is, without the restrictions that strict ritual practices and instructions bring. Yuldashev initiated various moral and ritual » b r e a k s « (permitting drinking and smoking, limiting prayers to two a day, etc.). According to Yuldashev, society was still in the »period of ignorance« (jahiliyya); all of these deviations would be gradually overcome with the Islamisation of society. It was the lack of strict religious purist regulations that was attractive for the first members of Akramiyya, many of them influenced by the secular education of the Soviet era. Consequently, the emergence of groups like Akramiyya can be considered peripheral attempts to initiate a local and

27

The official ideology of Uzbekistan is a mixture of nationalism, old tra-

ditions, religious heritage and secularism (which is also a mixture of nomad and Soviet traditions) following the Western model of political structure.

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religiously motivated political and religious reformation, beginning among the young theologians of the Soviet era.28 Let us return to the religious reformers of Central Asia, more especially to those who tried to propose their own visions of reforms and the improvement of Islam and Muslims. The desire of these groups to return to the »religion of the forefathers« awoke in them ambitions to be the »experts of religious truth«. But this clearly demonstrated their lack of systematic and traditional religious education. Meanwhile, the proper religious education conducted for many years had lost its elite status. Instead, access to sacred texts and a mass of theological works in translation dramatically increased and generated conditions in which new leaders and experts appeared to religiously minded intellectuals. Studying religious texts in the language they understand, religiously minded intellectuals are no longer dependent on the interpretations of more or less literate theologians. These circumstances have stimulated the emergence of small and large religious communities and have led to intolerance among them as well as towards other theologians educated in the classic Hanafi school. It is evident that believers in Central Asia are in the process of a long transformation and evolution. But this transformation should be guided by state authorities, in a spirit of tolerance towards non-standard manifestations of religious self-expression.

28 Bakhtiyar M. Babajanov, Ashirbek K. Muminov and Martha B. Olcott 2004. Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892-1989) i religioznaya sreda ego epokhi (Predvaritel'nye razmyshleniya o formirovanii »Sovetskogo Islama« v Sredney Azii) [Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892-1989) and the religious milieu of his epoch (Early thoughts on the formation of »Soviet Islam«)]. Vostok (Moscow) 5: 19-33. Recently some groups merged that are hard to classify as reformation movements but claim to come out of the circle of provincial intellectuals. For example, we studied the activities of the group of U. Tulekbayev, a Russian-speaking Kazakh from the city of Gulistan (Syrdarya oblast'). He has turned to the Russian-speaking population, claims to be the Messiah and calls Christians and Jews to join Islam.

Muminov

The Tablighi

179

Jama'at

The travelling missionaries of Tablighi J a m a ' a t started coming to Kazakhstan from the Arab East, India, Pakistan and Kyrgyzstan from 1998 onwards in small groups usually consisting of 5-10 people. However, later channels of penetration also issued from Western Europe. Currently, the followers of the organization are mainly concentrated in Almaty, Aqtobe, Atirau, Aqmola, Zhambi'l, East Kazakhstan, Qaraghand'i, Manghistau and the oblasts of Southern Kazakhstan. There are also a n u m b e r of female jama'ats who are p a r t of Tablighi J a m a ' a t in the city of Almaty and in the Zhambi'l region. The centre of the movement was in the village Bayserke in the Almaty region. However, the movement is currently in crisis, and the centre has been moved to Almaty itself. One of the leaders of this movement is Saken, an educated ethnic Kazakh and g r a d u a t e of the Faculty of Philosophy of Kazakh National University. The Tablighi Jama'at defines its objective of da'wa (literally »to call«, an invitation to act) according to these principles. The Tablighi Jama'at requires each group member to travel for a certain time to call people to Islam: 3 or 7 or up to 40 days. They call the population to turn to an Islamic way of life and wish to attract new members to the movement. Actually, the preaching of Islam is carried out in small groups of adherents with appropriate training before their missionary activities (groups of about ten people in Asian countries and three to five in other parts of the world). They preach where Muslims live and go »from door to door«. This practice is called »kharuj« (»the way«). Religiously active men use the event of Jum'a-prayer for individual sermons, in which after praying with the congregation, the activists give talks on religious subjects. There is no definite opinion on a Deoband political position and whether their madrasas are politicized or not. During the colonial period, Dar al'Ulum supported the struggle for independence from the British government. After the creation of Pakistan, these

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ulama criticized the secular character of its government, defending the traditional rights of the Muslim majority. Tablighi Jama'at is a movement whose members have not been involved in violent actions or in terror against India, but they are actively involved in propaganda. Tablighi Jama'at developed widely in the 1950s in Pakistan; currently its membership stands at more than 100 million worldwide. Today it is a full-fledged organization with headquarters in Rayvind, Pakistan and offices in several dozen countries around the world. Tablighi Jama'at is active in several other countries of Central Asia. However, since the mid-1990s it has restricted its activities on Uzbek territory. 29 The regional centres of Tablighi Jama'at are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan. There is a theological institution of 'Abdallah ibn Mas'ud in Bishkek offering six-year courses. 30 After graduation, students are sent to the various regions of Kazakhstan for 40 days of da'wa (missionary activities). National conventions are held annually with delegates from different regions, where they define and agree on further tactics of missionary activity. Prospective preachers are sent for a four-month course at the theological institutions of Tablighi Jama'at in India (the madrasa Nizamuddin in N e w Delhi), Pakistan (the Markaz training centres exist in the madrasas Arabiyya in Rayvind, Bilal Masjid in Bunier and Jami'a Ashrafiyya in Lahore) or Kyrgyzstan. 31 Despite

29 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2009. »Tabligh« - rairovaya organizatsiya, tsel' kotoroy - islamizatsiya mira, [»Tablighi« - a world organization, whose aim is to Islamize the world] http://www.ferghana.ru/article.php?id=6066 [last accessed in August 2011]. 30 Bayram Baici 2010. The Jama'at al Tabligh in Central Asia. A mediator in the recreation of Islamic relations with the Indian subcontinent. In M., J.-F. Huchet and S. Peyrouse (eds.), China and India in Central Asia, a new »great game«? New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 235-248. 31 Bayram Baici 2012. The rise of the Jama'at al Tabligh in Kyrgyzstan: The revival of Islamic ties between the Indian subcontinent and Central Asia? Central Asian Survey 31(1): 61-76.

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the apolitical character of Tablighi Jama'at, the presence of a united and independent missionary organization from the governing body of the Muslim Administration and their coordination at a national level has created an alternative to the official clergy.

Sufism in Kazakhstan Contemporary

Sufi

groups

By the time the Soviet Union collapsed, many researchers believed that Sufism in Kazakhstan had not survived. The majority of contemporary researchers in Kazakhstan believe that Islam does not have a long history and deep roots here. However, Dr. Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov was able to reveal a Sufi brotherhood of Naqshbandiyya-MujaddidiyyaHusayniyya existing in the village of Qus/Qusshi-Ata, Turkestan district of Southern Kazakhstan. He demonstrated the continuity of this brotherhood in the biography of 'Abd al-Wahid, Shaykh Mamadshukurov (1885-1967), which discussed the main stages of his life, his main followers and the ritual life of the group established by this Shaykh.32 Dr. A. Abdirasilqiz'i has conducted research on the life of this Shaykh as well, and he has discovered new sources on the history of his life, mainly in archival materials.33 In particular, she clarified the date of the death of the Shaykh as April 1, 1967. S. Ospanov submitted another report based on the archives of the Commissioner for Religious Affairs. In this report he states that the »guide of the mausoleum of Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi brought the pilgrims to the house of

32 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 1998. Le renouveau des communautés soufies en Ouzbékistan. Cahiers d'Asie centrale, 5-6: 285-311. 33 Kentau Regional State Archives, Fund 92, Opis' la, Delo 93, p. 7 (Pokhozyaystvennye knigi kolkhoza imeni Dzhambula, from 1954); Fund 97, Opis' 1, Delo 47, p. 4 (from 1955).

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'Abd al-Wahid, where the Shaykh took their promise of allegiance to him (bay'at) and turned them into his murids«. 34 This is important information about the traditional practices of ziyarat and the changes over time. Our research has revealed that there are currently four Sufi movements active in Kazakhstan: the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiya-Husayniya, the Chechen Sufi groups of Qadiriyya, the Jahriyya and the Turkish Sufi groups.

The

Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiya-Husayniya

The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiya-Husayniya's spiritual centre is in the village of Qush/Qusshi'-Ata, located about 15 km southeast of Turkestan. The followers assemble twice a year in the houses of 'Abd al-Wahid-Ishan Mamatshukurov's sons (especially during Mawlid and at the beginning of Ramadan). The total number of followers is about 1,500 people. Regional groups in various parts of Kazakhstan are run by caliphs. For example, the caliph of the Almaty region is Dayrabay Rysbay the well-known imam of a mosque in the neighbourhood Orbit in the city of Almaty; the caliph of Southern Kazakhstan and Zhambi'l districts is Qurban-'Ali Akhmetov. In the area around Turkestan, the leader of all the groups, Nasr al-Din Ishan - the son of Abd al-Wahid Shaykh - is active. The Sufi religious association Islam Shapaghati" is officially registered in Taraz. Apart from Kazakhstan, there are several groups of Husayniyya operating in various countries of Central Asia (mainly in Uzbekistan).35 The group of 'Abd al-Wahid Shaykh continues preaching the surviving traditions of the local movement, Mujaddidiyya-Husayniyya, which is considered one of the branches

34 State Archives of the South Kazakhstan Oblast', Fund 1353, Opis' 2, Delo 17, p. 3; Delo 28, p. 4; Delo 35; p. 5; Delo 38, p. 5. 35 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2006. Husayniya. In S.M. Prozorov (ed.), Islam

na territorii byvshey Rossiyskoy imperii, pp. 431-432.

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of Naqshbandiyya. The name of the famous Bukhara Shaykh Khalifa Husayn (d. 1249/1833-34) is in the title of this movement, which arose in the first half of the nineteenth century. T h e line of succession of 'Abd al-Wahid Shaykh is as follows: Ahmad Sirhindi Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thani, (d. 1624) -» Sayyid Muhammad -> Shaykh 'Abdallah -» Mawlana Miyan 'Abid-Shaykh -> Muhammad Musa Khan Dahbidi (d. 1789) - Khalifa Siddiq (d. 1795) - Khalifa Husayn (d. 1833-34) -> Khalifa 'Abd al-Sattar ibn Khalifa Husayn -> Khalifa Muhammad-Salih -» Khalifa Muhammad-Amin -» Khalifa 'Abd al-Wahid Turkistani (d. 1967). Under the rule of the dynasty of Manghi'ts (1757-1920) and the Amir 'Abd al-Ahad (1885-1910), Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahid received Irshad (meaning: he was granted the right to lead his own disciples) f r o m Bukhara with Shaykh Khalifa Mujaddidiyya Muhammad Amin and returned to his village in Ura-Tube. T h e name 'Abd al-Wahid Shaykh, however, is not mentioned in the sources that have b e e n found so far. T h e authors of biographical collections of that time ( f o r example, Majdhub N a m a n g a n i ) occasionally mention the name of his teacher Muhammad Amin and his special loyalty to the authorities. A c c o r d i n g to these sources, Muhammad Amin c o n f o r m e d and e s c h e w e d politics; however, other members of his group seem to have actively involved in political intrigues or took sides with the opposition of Turkic tribes such as K e n e g e s (Shahrisabz). Following the example of his teacher, 'Abd al-Wahid Shaykh avoided any involvement with politics. Even in the difficult times under Bolshevization, he tried to k e e p his students and his numerous relatives out of politics. 'Abd alWahid Shaykh managed to escape repression and quickly adapted to the new political conditions. This is how the leader of the m o v e m e n t Husayniyya survived under the atheistic policy of the Soviet regime. A c c o r d i n g to the stories of his descendants, Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahid accepted a limited number of students and o f f e r e d v e r y short-term training on the subject of dhikr rules; this instruction was based on the concentration ( t a w a j j u h ) on

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specific »points« or »corpuscles« (lata'if) of the thorax. This kind of ritual was a local form of the dhikr of the Mujaddidiyya, which formed the basis of modern ritual practice of the Husayniyya group. Before his death in 1967, Ishan Baba (grandfather Ishan) appointed Qari 'Abdallah his successor (khalifa). Abdallah had lived with his teacher for about 33 years. The latter, according to the stories of his descendants, attracted the attention of the authorities. He was arrested several times, but was released each time after two or three months of imprisonment after having pledged that he would not recruit any more students into his group. He died in 1976. Despite the ban by the authorities, Qari 'Abdallah managed to teach a few students, who today have numerous murids in the urban and provincial centres of the Ferghana Valley and in other cities of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and even in Russia. However, during his lifetime, due to the fear of Soviet authorities, he did not write his students traditional Irshad-namas (permission to lead a group). He would give only oral permission to his students that they could recruit more students. However, he strongly warned his followers about the threat of arrest and recommended that they to have not more than 2-3 murids at one time. Among his followers, Ibrahim Hazrat Mamatqulov (Kokand, 19762009) was the most honoured and authoritative successor. 36 Activities of Sufi groups have an individual and a collective character. A distinctive feature of the Naqshbandiyya group Husayniyya is a silent dhikr - »dhikr-i khafi«. After making the initiation (bay'at, qui berish), the murshid begins to give the murids individual tasks (vazifa). These tasks concern additional prayers (nawafil) and the rules of performance of dhikr. The collective rituals of Husayniyya can be divided as follows:

36 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2006. Ibrahim khazrat. In S. M. Prozorov 2006, pp. 155-156.

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185

Mawlid during that day, the followers gather in the house of Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahid in Qush Ata. Under the leadership of Ishan, the Mawlid al-Nabi is practiced. Khatm-i Qur'an this is practiced at the house of Ishan 'Abd al-Wahid in the first days of Ramadan. Majlis the gathering where murids have an opportunity to meet the Ishan and get answers to all their questions.

The followers of Husayniyya have only a vague and incomplete memory of the history of their brotherhood and all the secrets of the mystical path. The most important aspect is the charismatic figure of the Shaykh. After the death of Hazrat Ibrahim Mamatqulov, his place was claimed by Shaykh Qurban-'Ali, who was working in the south of Kazakhstan.

The Chechen Sufi groups of Qadiriyya The second movement that has survived the Soviet era are the Chechen Sufi groups of Qadiriyya. Stalin relocated the Chechens to Kazakhstan in 1944. In 1957, the majority of Chechens returned to their homeland. According to statistics, citizens of Chechen origin numbered 31,431 persons or 0.2% of the population. 37 In 1995, the war for the independence of the Republic of Chechnya (Ichkeriya) from the Russian Federation began. The war was accompanied by a great loss of human life and the destruction of towns and villages, and it led to the collapse of the economy, which triggered large-scale migration and refugees from Chechnya to other CIS states, particularly to Kazakhstan. The choice of Kazakhstan as a refuge was quite understandable, as Chechens could join their relatives

37

Z h a r a s A. E r m e k b a y e v 2009. Chechentsy

toriya

i sud'by

i ingushi

v Kazakhstane.

Is-

[ C h e c h e n a n d I n g u s h t i a n s in K a z a k h s t a n . H i s t o r y a n d their

f a t e ] . A l m a t y : D a i k - P r e s s , p. 186.

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here. 38 Because of the closeness of the Chechen community and the language barriers, Sufism among the Chechens in Kazakhstan is an understudied topic. We are not aware of any significant Chechen shaykhs currently or previously operating in Kazakhstan. In the system of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kazakhstan, the Chechen authority Shaykh al-Islam Muhammad Husayn Alsabekov has worked as the vice mufti since 2000. Qadiri dhikr among Chechen groups have also a form of dhikr-i jahr. It is widely performed in Ural'sk, Astana, Almaty and other cities.

The Jahriyya Jahriyya are the followers of 'Ismatulla Maqsum 'Abd alGhaffar Maqsum ulï, who arrived from Mazar-i Sharif in Afghanistan and took Kazakh citizenship. This group was widespread in Kazakhstan in the mid1990s. It has gone through two steps in its formation. At the beginning, the movement was established in the village of Qarasu in the Almaty region. However, in the late 1990s the group was banned because their madrasas and mosques were not registered at the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan Muslims, and 'Ismatulla-Maqsum was deported from Kazakhstan. Since 2000, this Sufi group has reestablished itself in the district of Mamïr, Almaty and numbers about a thousand followers under Khalifa Narïmbay Razbekulï. The group has repeatedly tried to avoid official registration. As a result, they w e r e not permitted to open a charitable fund called Shakarim. Instead, the Republican Public

38

According to Prof. Zharas A. Ermekbayev, it is hard to determine the

exact number of Chechens because family members can live and easily move from one republic to another. Interview with Prof. Zharas A. Ermekbayev, Almaty, Kazakhstan, August, 2012.

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Association Senim, Bilim, Omir was organized, which has 17 branches and 16 offices. The main groups are located in the cities of Astana, Almaty, Ural'sk and Turkestan and number about 1 500 people in total. Under the patronage of this organization, the vocal group Yasavi has performed using the Hikmet of Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi and other Sufi narratives and the weekly republican newspaper Ush Qiyan was published. 'Ismatulla Maqsum, the leader of Jahriyya, never mentioned any succession in his lineage. He said t h a t his ancestors moved from the Soviet Union to Afghanistan during the collectivization of the Q'izil-Orda region (his lineage belongs to the Small Horde). The basic doctrine of 'Ismatulla Maqsum was linked to his coming to Kazakhstan with a special mission to revive Islam. He had dreamed ayan and worked to help Kazakhstan becoming the centre of Islamic education. The proponents of this movement widely use the activity of Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi and the cultural heritage of Shakarim and Abay. In 2005 the Muslim Board passed a fatwa that rejects the doctrine of 'Ismatulla Maqsum, because it is not in line with shari'a, but the activities of this association have not been legally banned. A distinctive feature of 'Ismatulla Maqsum is that the dhikr is practiced aloud - dhikr-ijahr,39 Rituals are usually carried

39 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2003. Zikr-i jakhr i sama': sakralizatsiya profannogo ili profanatsia sakral'nogo? [Zikr-i jahr and sama': Sacralizing the profane or profaning the sacral?] In S. N. Abashin and V. O. Bobrovnikov (eds.), Podvizhniki Islama. Kul't svyatikh i suflsm v sredney Azii i na Kavkaze [Mobile Islam. The cult of the sacred and of Sufism in Central Asia and the Caucasus]. Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, pp. 237-250; Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2004. O vidakh zikra jakhr sredi bratstv Tsentral'noy Azii [The (different) forms of zikr jahr in the brotherhoods of Central Asia]. In Jstoriko-kul'turnyy vzaimosvyazi Irana i Dashti Kipchaka v XI11-XVI11 veka [Historical and cultural interaction between Iran and the Kipchak Stepps], Materialy mezhdunarodnogo kruglogo stola. Almaty: Daik-Press, pp. 133-157.

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out on Thursday or Friday night to Saturday in the khanaqah (this place is also called as dhikr khana, jahr khana). Dhikr begins with the sermon of 'Ismatulla Maqsum, where doomsday (akhiret) is described, a Day of Judgement, or various instructive stories from the life of the Prophet, his followers, or the famous Sufi shaykhs. Members justify their acts by saying that the only way of salvation is the way shown by the awliya Hazrat Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi, the fourth awliya and the successor of the traditions of the awliya Qutb. Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi is represented as a man who was able to reach the pinnacle of perfection, more specifically the six steps of tariqa. The followers of 'Ismatulla Maqsum use only 3-4 types of dhikr. They consist of movements of the head from right to left, with the utterance of the word »Hu-Hu, H a y y « . In this process, breathing techniques play a crucial role and ultimately lead the murid into a trance. The culmination of loud dhikr is the trance and reaching an ecstatic state of mind, hal.

Turkish Sufi

groups

Some contemporary Turkish Sufi groups have branches in Kazakhstan, but it is too early to speak of their consolidation. However, they are very active. Their main bases are the 28 Kazakh lyceums and the joint Kazakh-Turkish universities - the Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in Turkestan, the University of Foreign Languages and Business Career and the University of Siileyman Demirel in Almaty. 40 Among the acting Turkish figures, w e can distinguish the following directions:

40 Bayram Baici 2003. Missionnaires de l'Islam en Asie centrale. Les écoles turques de Fethullah Guelen. Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose; Bayram Baici 2003. Fethullah Guelen's missionary schools in Central Asia and their role in the spreading of Turkism and Islam. Religion, State and Society 31: 151-177.

Muminov 189 - The Siileymancilar group was established by Siileyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959). Its numerous influential religious organizations have a pan-Turkic orientation. A unique characteristic of this doctrine is that there is no requirement for strict adherence to the canons of shari'a, which makes it compatible with a secular way of life; - Osman Nuri Topba§ Cemaati spreads works y the Turkish author Osman Nuri Topba§; - Ihlascilar concentrates its activity around the agency Ihlas and its leader Osman Karabiyik; - there are a few groups of Nurcular in Kazakhstan: 1) okucular gruplari; 2) yazici gruplar, which propagates »Risale-i Nur«; - Gulen grubu; - Mahmudcilar. The output of the Turkish Sufi movements can be seen in a variety of books, the journal Zolotoy Rodnik and the Kazakh language journal Rakhmet Samal'i. Turkish groups have gained considerable influence among the Kazakh people since independence. Now enlightening work is carried out, authoritative books are produced and magazines are published.41 Many students from Kazakhstan study in Turkey. Kazakh pupils and students attend Turkish schools in Kazakhstan. Religious education is not part of the curricula of these schools, but is studied in the dormitories. The educational program for students includes the basics of Islam, ritual practice and discussion on various subjects. Gradually, these schools and dormitories are given over to Kazakh students who have graduated from the school.

4 1 Allen J. Frank 2007. Popular Islamic literature in Kazakhstan. An annotated bibliography. Hyattsville: Dunwoody Press; Wendell Schwab 2011. Establishing an Islamic niche in Kazakhstan: Musylman Publishing House and its Publications. Central Asian Survey 30(2): 227-242. In 2004, the journal Rakhmet Samal'i began publishing in the publishing house Khikmet baspasi in the city of Almaty, micro district 4 Mam'ir.

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No one has yet researched the performance of dhikr and the inner life of the Turkish groups in Kazakhstan.

Relations with authorities (traditional

and new groups)

The relationship of Sufi groups with the state is shaped by two factors: first, the post-Soviet legacy of official institutions and their functioning and, second, the lack of clerical organization within Islam. The relationships between the leaders of Sufi groups and the Muslim Board have not yet stabilized. The emergence of a charismatic leader, a new Sufi Ishan enjoying spiritual influence and authority among believers, has so far always alerted the executive directors of the Spiritual Administration of Kazakhstan Muslims. For example, in 2005 according to a Muslim Board fatwa, the doctrine of 'Ismatulla Maqsum was rejected as inappropriate to shari'a. Some observers consider Sufism a counterweight to Islamic fundamentalism in Kazakhstan. We may compare this with the experience of Uzbekistan: at the dawn of independence, Sufism in Uzbekistan was perceived as a spiritual heritage, the foundation for national revival, as well as a doctrine able to resist political Islam and such groups as Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami and the Wahhabiyya.42 However, after the celebration of the 600th anniversary of Khwaja Ahrar in 2004, the official attitude toward Sufism began to change. An important role in this change of attitude was the increasing politicization of the activities of Sufi leaders, such as Khwaja Ahrar, Makhdum-i A'zam, Mawlana Lutfallah Chusti and others, and also the contemporary politicization of the Sufi organizations.43 There was also abundant re-

42 Maria E. Louw 2007. Everyday Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia 43 Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2001. Andizhanskoe vosstanie 1898 goda: 'dervishskiy gazavat' ili natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie? [Andijan uprising in 1898: a Dervish ghazavat or a national liberation movement?]

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ference to the political activities of Naqshbandiyya leaders, the descendants of Makhdum-i A'zam in East Turkestan, in regard to their resistance to the Ch'ing and their participation in the uprisings of Ya'qub bek in 1864-1877. In the absence of clear policy directions on Sufism, debates about »traditional« and »non-traditional« Islam may play an important role. This refers to the presence of various Sufi movements in the history of Kazakhstan. If we take 1991 as a starting point, Turkish groups and 'Ismatulla Maqsum have no chance to survive because they are classified as non-traditional Islam. Therefore, 'Ismatulla Maqsum has made efforts to link their work to the Yasaviyya. The Turks meanwhile are emphasizing »the emergence of the Anatolian Turks from historic Turkistan«. Another aspect is the ethnic-confessional orientation of a group. The Muslim Board and the authorities regard the Chechen groups cautious suspicion. Furthermore, concerning the Husayniyya, in a report the Commissioner for Religious Affairs of the South Kazakhstan region has called the Kazakhstani citizen Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahid an Uzbek and Tajik. Since then, the Husayniyya group has been considered an »Uzbek influence«. Uzbekistan meanwhile was wary about discovering a spiritual centre of the Husayniyya in Kazakhstan.

Uzbekistan tarikhi [The history of Uzbekistan] 2: 2 5 - 3 0 ; ibid. Uzbekistan tarikhi 4: 6 1 - 6 7 ; Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2 0 0 5 . K voprosu o vospriyatii statusa sufiyskogo shaykha (na primere Khoja Akhrara) [The questions of the perception of the Sufi shaykhs' status (for example Khoja Akhrara)]. In V. Naumkin (ed.), Arabia vitalis. Arabskiy vostok, islam, drevnyaya Araviya. Sbomik statey, posvyashchyonnyy [Arabia vitalis, the Arabic east, Islam, and ancient Arabia. A collection of articles]. Moscow, pp. 1 7 7 - 1 9 0 .

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Internal conflicts between

and within Sufi

groups

Another leader (ishan) of the Naqshbandiyya-MujaddidiyyaHusayniyya was Hazrat Ibrahim Mamatqulov (1937-2009). He studied with Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahid (d. 1967) and Qari 'Abdallah (d. 1976) in 1950-1970. He became the 32nd successor (pzr) in the silsila. Until 1984 he lived in Tashkent, and then he moved to his native village Aqqurghan in the Buvayda district of Ferghana region. According to him, he had more than 20 000 followers (murid - follower, mukhlis - devoted person). After the death of Hazrat Ibrahim, there was a rift in the Husayniyya group. In Kazakhstan this is a conflict between Nasr al-Din and Qurban-'Ali Akhmetov. Both Shaykhs claim to be ishan (here: leader). The followers of Qurban'Ali Akhmetov have changed their traditional Sufi clothes (shoes mahsi with galoshes, white chapan, white salla) for jeans and sneakers. Qurban-'Ali has many followers in various cities of Kazakhstan (Qi'zil-Orda, Taraz, Astana), and he has four wives. Nasr al-Din's followers are in the Turkestan region and Almaty, while the shaykh himself lives modestly in his own native village. It is expected that they will eventually install the son of the deceased Hazrat Ibrahim as ishan leader. Another split in the group occurred in Uzbekistan. The Uzbek section of Husayniyya has no ishan leaders, but khalifas in various cities. The main rival of Hazrat Ibrahim was a Naqshbandi Shaykh, Dust-Muhammad Tursunov (born in 1935 in Shurchi, in Surkhandarya). This Shaykh had been appointed by the local shaykhs; in particular, 'Abdusalom Ghiylani gave his permission and support. He is strong in fiqh. Ishan Dust-Muhammad strongly criticizes other Naqshbandiyya shaykhs, particularly Hazrat Ibrahim. There are also several other Naqshbandi shaykhs in Uzbekistan (e.g. Zuhr al-Din Eshonov) who criticize Hazrat Ibrahim. The Naqshbandiyya-Jahriyya takes an intermediate position between the various groups of Husayniyya. The group Naqshbandiyya-Jahriyya was led by 'Adil Khan Qari Salomov

Muminov 193 (1928-2009) from Andijan. 'Adil Khan Qari obtained a) the right to be irshad (to take disciples) through the line of Khalifa 'Abdallah Qari, a student of Shaykh 'Abd al-Wahid and b) the right to conduct dhikri Jahr from Muhammad Sharif Hisari in Tajikistan. After the death of 'Adil Khan Qari, 'Abd al-Baqi 'Abdurahmanov became ishan for the groups in Nanamngan. In Andijan there were three shaykhs: 'Abd al-Quddus, 'Izzatalla Qari and Sayib-jan Qari. The group has about 500 people and is increasingly performing dhikr and jahr, rituals that are different from what is practiced in Husayniyya and in 'Ismatulla Maqsum's groups. 44 The group's connection with the ritual Qadiriyya has not yet been ascertained.

The confrontation

with the Salafis

The representatives of the Salafis (fundamentalists) in Kazakhstan can be viewed as uncompromising opponents of Sufi groups. The fundamentalists strongly condemn Sufi teachings and practices, such the honouring of shaykhs, visiting sacred sites etc. The fundamentalists consider these practices polytheism (shirk) and innovation (bid'a) to Islam. Salafis call themselves representatives of »traditional Islam« or »orthodox Islam«. Consequently Sufism is presented as a distortion of » p u r e « Islam. Along with the local Salafists, many foreign foundations and organizations active in the territory of Kazakhstan, including ISTIL, Tayba, and the Asian Muslim Committee, also distance themselves from Sufism. 45 Kazakhstani Salafi leaders such as Abdujabbarov, Toirjon Ibrahimov, Rinat Zeynullin, Mubarov etc. have negative attitude towards Sufism and Sufi leaders.

44 Haydarkhon Yo'ldoshkho'jayev 2010. Tariqatchilikning zamonaviy ko'rinishlari [Current images of the tariqat practice]. Tashkent: Tashkent Islam University. 45

Dina Wilkowsky 2009.

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Folk beliefs »Popular Islam« refers to several practices that were preserved by the local community and remained popular. Most important is the performance of Ziyarat to the graves of authoritative leaders of Islam, including earlier Sufi leaders. During the Soviet period, pilgrimages usually took place informally.46 However, a new organization, Ata Zhol'i (Aq Zhol, the Horde) emerged in February 1997. Its founder was Qid'irali Taribayev, who declared that he had had a prophetic dream in which he was told that his mission was to lead the Kazakhs to their own faith. This meant that the faithful Muslim should visit the tombs of saints (of which there are more than 100), where they would communicate with the spirits of the saints (arvah) and receive the latters' blessings (bata). Pilgrimage routes were then developed in Almaty, Zhamb'il, South Kazakhstan and the Qi'z'il-Orda region. Moreover, the biographies of saints and instructions on ritual practices have been published, travel companies enrolled and agents placed at sacred sites. Thousands of people from all regions of Kazakhstan, including the border areas with Russia, began to pass along these routes. The ritual usually takes place in the Kazakh language. During our expedition in 2008 to Qostanay, in the northern Aqmola region, we documented several stories narrated by local experts on the history of that region. They told us that in the imperial period there was a category of the faithful »piradar« (biradar, brothers). They obtained this title on the pilgrimage to the mausoleum of Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in southern Kazakhstan. During the pilgrimage, they said that they had met some Sufi shaykhs, took bay'at from them

46 Maria E. Subtelny 1989. The cult of holy places: Religious practices among Soviet Muslims. Middle East Journal 43(4): 593-604; Pavel Jessa 2006. Aq Jol Soul Healers: Religious pluralism and a contemporary Muslim movement in Kazakhstan. Central Asian Survey 25(3): 359-371.

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and became Sufis. However, it was not possible to find more information about this phenomenon in written form. Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi has an important place in modern Kazakhstan as a spiritual leader: he is considered the builder of traditional Islam, Kazakh spirituality and the spirit of the nation. State authorities have stated that the basis of national ideology should be, first, the works of Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi, second, Abay and, third, the oral traditions of Kazakhs.

Preliminary results The destruction of the local clergy during the Soviet period and the belittling of theoretical training in Islamic education at the Soviet institutions (who made use of Hanbali, Wahhabi and other material to counter local practices) led to a situation in which the state and official clergy could keep the leadership in the religious sphere in their own hands, especially in the current era of Islamic revival. The new Islamic groups have a critical attitude towards the traditions of Kazakh Muslim society and have ambiguous attitudes and relationships with national culture and statehood, which might lead to conflict in the future. The critical training and practices in many of the new Islamic groups might unwittingly foster more militaristic qualities of Islam such as jihad, holy war, the rejection of infidels, war against unbelievers, martyrdom and suicide to accelerate the process of reaching heaven etc. Often journalists and people not specialized in Islam use the terms »Salafists«, »Wahhabis« and »fundamentalists« indiscriminately for all theologians without exception, thus also including a large group of traditionalist believers. We must distinguish between the traditionalists, who take the positions of the Hanafi madhhab, and the Wahhabis, who are close to the Hanbali school of thought. There is also a negative evaluation among official and semi-clerical circles of the new religious groups. Such judge-

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mental discussion and reasoning about their teachings and practices it is not possible, otherwise the history of Islam is discredited. Experience has shown that the use of a coercive method in the struggle with Islamic groups (so-called »Soviet practices«) can lead to the latter's radicalization. The education of a broad group of local scholars (»Islamic hierarchy«) and competent experts on Islam may contribute to the peaceful development of Islam in Central Asia.

Chapter 5

Zifa-Alua Auezova

Dr. Zifa-Alua Auezova is a Visiting Scholar at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Amsterdam and was President of the European Society for Central Asian Studies (ESCAS). Her research interest focuses on Culture and Intellectual History of Central Asia. She received her MA and PhD at the Department of Oriental Studies of the St. Petersburg State University. She was Deputy Director of the Soros Foundation - Kazakhstan (1998-1999) and Executive Director of the Educational Centre »Bilim - Central Asia« (2004-2007). She has held several series of lectures on Central Asian Intellectual History in U.S. universities at the invitation of the Silk Road Foundation.

Biographical interview 1 Could you tell us about your life references in regard to how, why and where you came to work on or study Islam and history? Maybe the first step in turning to the subject was when I entered the Department of Oriental Studies. When I graduated from secondary school, I entered the Department of Oriental Studies of St. Petersburg University, which in the

1

This interview was conducted by Sophie Roche on 19 M a y 2011.

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Soviet Union was considered to be - at that time at least - the most important centre [...] well, the most qualitative centre for so-called classical studies of the Orient in general. The reason of my choice was - actually it was not my own choice, it was the advice that I received from my family, particularly from my father. The thing is that in our family I was supposed to be the third person, the third generation, who turns to Oriental Studies, to Russian Oriental Studies actually, well, because my father, he graduated from Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, it was a part of Moscow State University. It was the Department of Chinese philology and his father, Mukhtar Auezov, who was a writer, graduated from St. Petersburg University from the Department of History and Philology. Actually the main reason for all of us was to get more knowledge and, well, to get access to understanding the sources that would help us to understand our history better. It was obvious and I just received this knowledge from my parents that not all topics were discussed within the frameworks of Soviet ideology, and I could also see that through the biographies. My father was seen as a dissident in the 1960s-1970s, because he was found to be too nationalistic. He organized an Association of Kazakh Students Studying in Moscow. They went during the summer vacations to remote villages of Kazakhstan to tell the people there about their culture and also situating Kazakh culture within the broader context of Central Asian culture, Turkic culture. And the KGB regarded this as a signal to potential growth of pan-Turkic or nationalistic feelings and sentiments. Some students were expelled [from university]; my father was restricted just for some time in what he could articulate, and also in the 1970s some articles he wrote and some collections of articles he was editing were just destroyed or eliminated - similarly as in the biography of my grandfather, who was a very productive writer; actually he reflected upon various themes of Kazakh history, the Kazakh past. There were several periods: in 1932 he was arrested as a nationalist, also. And he had to accept an official refusal of

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some of his novels dedicated to certain sensitive issues that were unwanted from the point of view of Russian ideology. So he was arrested, and after he signed this official refusal he could continue to work. And then in 1953 again there was a whole trial, ideological trial organized against him in Kazakhstan and again he was accused of nationalism. This time it was because he wrote several volumes about the history of Kazakh epics. In these epics, of course, Kazakhs, like any other nationality, were proud of their heroes, but the problem was that the heroes of the Kazakhs had struggled against outstanding heroes of the Russian people. Especially the personality of Yedegi Bakr became a problem for Tatar scholarship and for Kazakh scholarship as well. This was a person who just tried to write about Kazakh epics in a more or less objective way. His writings were not found objective enough, so he had to flee. He fled to Moscow in 1953 and spent some time teaching at Moscow State University. So in general in our family there was a feeling that this is a very important and interesting area, that it needed to be worked on, regardless of the official attempts to restrict the way people think about Kazakh culture. It still contained a huge number of issues that had to be studied, and maybe this was one of the reasons that made Oriental Studies so interesting for me. But I studied as an Arabist, and studying as an Arabist I was interested in Arabic literature. Actually I did not think about turning to the Central Asian region for long time. My PhD dissertation was about the history of the Maqamat genre and its rhymed short stories and rhymed prose with much humour. I liked humour and I liked just the beauty of this style. This Maqamat was compiled during the Abbasid period. The Maqamat that I studied was written between the twelfth and the fifteenth century. It was purely literary study, but it gave me a good feeling about working with sources, with manuscripts, with old texts; and thanks to the Maqamat I saw that it's not boring, it can be very interesting, it can be very pleasant.

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After graduation I worked in Kazakhstan and I had to combine my work as a teacher in the Department of Oriental Studies at Kazakh State University, with management work in the Unites States Agency for International Development. This teaching and research work I tried to keep for many years along with my part time business. My next academic project was dedicated to Mahmud al-Kashgari. He wrote the Divan Lughat At-Turk which is the oldest lexicographic treatise and also encyclopaedic work about the culture and languages of the earliest Turkic tribes. It was compiled, it was written in eleventh century. I found it very interesting to study this source and also to carry out its complete translation into Russian. During the period of the Soviet Union, some of the purely lexicographic material was taken out of the dictionary and included in the old Turkic dictionaries. The book itself, as a full composition, as a divan, was not translated into Russian. Maybe for some ideological reasons, again, so as not to support potential pan-Turkism or pan-Islamism among a huge number of Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in Russia and in the Soviet Union. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union there were no more official restrictions, and in Kazakhstan the Soros Foundation articulated the need for such translations; and when an interpreter was needed, I decided to stop all other practical things and I applied for this project and dedicated 5 years to this work, which I enjoyed very much. After having spent so much time in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, I became interested in the way discourse on the past history of Central Asia was formed. Maybe I came again to this issue from my practice working as a lecturer in Kazakhstan and in other Central Asian universities. I saw that in Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia students knew much more about German philosophy than about their own intellectual history. They would know all the details about Marxism and about Hegel, about Kant. Very interesting things, but they could not connect these products, these high-quality products of human intellect

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with what had ever been written and produced in their own region, and that was something that I found a pity. This led me to the idea to try to put together a course on the intellectual history of Central Asia. I started with very simple, maybe superficial things, but I tried to look at it from the point of view of the local discourse and tried to differentiate between different mainstream themes, that is, the way they had been popularized in various periods throughout the Central Asian region. Having done so, I found out that the Soviet period itself had not been articulated very clearly yet, and I decided to carry out new research about the discourse on the past during the Soviet Union period in Kazakhstan. That is what I'm working on now. Did the breakup

of the Soviet

Union affect your

work?

Of course, it is a huge difference. Just physically not being in the Soviet Union, it was already a big difference because when this happened, when the collapse of the Soviet Union was officially declared, I was already in Great Britain, I received this opportunity thanks to George Soros, to the Foundation that was opened in Moscow that time. It was called the Cultural Initiative. I was among this small group of postgraduates from Russia who received scholarships to Oxford University to do just one year of studies there. It was in 1991 and I left in September. In December I heard that this thing happened. It was not unexpected, of course, because we had already seen the events of August of 1991. There was Glasnost, but it was not unexpected. Maybe more important for me was the possibility to spend a whole year in Oxford and read all these books that had been written in Arabic Studies, on Central Asia; and maybe [it was more important for me to] really evaluate my ideas about scholarship on the Middle East and Arabic Studies and also see much more the whole ocean that existed beyond to the Soviet scholarship, the Soviet humanities. Maybe this was the impetus for me. When I came back to St. Petersburg I had to defend my dissertation, using this huge amount of material, which

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was a huge contribution, of course, to my research. But I think that the impetus that I received in Oxford during this year was very important for me - from the point of view of changing my world-view, maybe in general. And also from the point of view of intellectual optimism, because I saw a huge network of people who were and who could be interested in history and in the development of our region without any ideological agenda, and that was so different from what I used to see before. And also the way of teaching. When I came back to Kazakhstan, to Kazakh State University, I suggested changing the way [of teaching]. The History of Arabic Literature, for example, was taught and I was asked to prepare some new courses and I knew how to do that thanks to what I had seen in Oxford. Of course, in St. Petersburg the teaching also had a very high level, but in Oxford it was not only the level of teaching but also the way of managing universities and the courses. It was new for me that students would received their programs for the trimester and for the whole year and the students could be more critical - and choose, and go from one building to another to listen to various lectures and to go to different departments. That was something that was not familiar to us in the Soviet Union at that time, and I also found the methods of teaching very interesting. I also liked teaching very much. So I tried to use these practical experiences in the university and I was surprised to see that there were actually no serious restrictions imposed by local universities [...] The number, the possibilities for our students to go abroad grew from year to year. I was very active in this opening and in educational advising. I worked as an educational advisor and Soros Foundation hired me to become the Director of its Educational Advising Centre. I got information from Western universities and advised everyone who needed this information and provided information about scholarship programs abroad. And then later, also our Kazakhstan Minister of Education came up with its governmental programs that enabled young people to go abroad. I was maybe just at the beginning of this huge change.

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You mentioned that Oriental Studies in Moscow and St. Petersburg were very different from Oriental Studies in the West. So what were the differences for you and where is Kazakhstan going? The biggest differences existed within the Soviet Union between Moscow and St. Petersburg. St. Petersburg promoted the study of classical sources and maybe literary styles or maybe dead languages or texts or languages that are not used anymore. To be very impractical but profoundly knowledgeable, you would go to St. Petersburg. But in order to become a diplomat or just be able to work in the contemporary world and to have more practical skills, you would go to Moscow. When I went to Oxford I saw the combination of both there, but for me it was interesting to see that the courses I was interested in, on classical literature, classical philosophy and languages in general - I was very satisfied to see that the level of St. Petersburg was comparable to what I saw in Oxford. The huge difference for me was the library and the access to sources and to cross-disciplinary or interdisciplinary possibilities. So you were not only restricted to Arab philologists, as I was in St. Petersburg. If I was interested, I could go to the Department of English Literature. I was interested in Geoffrey Chaucer's Canterbury Tales because I recognized some patterns that could be compared to my Maqamat. You could go to the Department of Philosophy, you could go to the Department of Sociology; and it was something that I had been unattainable in the Soviet higher education system. And also the openness of the whole network - if you need information you can get it until you are tired. Which was absolutely not the case in Russia and absolutely not the case in Kazakhstan. As for Kazakhstan, during the Soviet period there was no Department of Oriental Studies in Kazakhstan. People who wanted to study Oriental history or languages would go to Tashkent as the closest place that had such studies. Or otherwise to Moscow or St. Petersburg or to the Caucasus. Of course, it was very important that this department was

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opened. It was thanks to our current Mufti of Kazakhstan. Abdsattar Haji Derbisali, I call him by his secular name because he was my boss in Kazakhstan, at the university. I taught at the Department of Arabic Philology at that time and I know it was thanks to his efforts that the first chair of Arabic Philology was established and then it was expanded to a whole department, the Faculty of Oriental Studies and later, once Arabic Studies were established, there came Sinology and Iranian philology. [...] Abdsattar Haji Derbisali was first the head of the Chair of Arabic Philology and then once the Department was organized, he was Dean of the Department of Oriental Studies at Kazakh State University. And then he was promoted to the position of the Deputy Rector of Kazakh State University, the university responsible for International Affairs. And as a next step people were saying - there were different rumours - that he would become an ambassador of Kazakhstan because it was the period of independence. Qualified people who could speak both Kazakh and Arabic were needed. And there were some speculations that he would become an ambassador. And then suddenly we heard that he had become Mufti, which made me personally happy, because in comparison with the Mufti who had been there before, he was educated and he knew about Islam not only from his individual point of view. He knew about it on a more global scale, and I found this very important. It's like the Jaddids in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they distinguished between islam khususi, the individual, personal or maybe family or clan level and islam umumi, the more general. This, it seems to me, is an important difference and approach, and I found that Derbisali was prepared for this umumi approach very well, which was very important for Kazakhstan in its first years of independence and still is very important [...]

Auezova

So it was common politics...

to move from

a scientific

post

205

into

... not only in Kazakhstan, but also for many post-Soviet states. It is a widespread practice, because good specialists are not easily found, especially in this first phase of transition. It was very difficult to see how they [societies] would develop because it depends very much on human capital [...] When the government is stable enough as an employer, people from other sectors - from non-governmental and also from academic circles - will always be interested in having a stable job. And that is what is happening now in Kazakhstan. I know this well; many people [from science] became involved in the Ministry of International Affairs. My colleagues, many of my fellow students who studied in St. Petersburg at the Oriental Department, I would say that a huge part of them is now working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Our current, our new Minister of Foreign Affairs was my course mate, Ishan Kazykhanov. He was also an Arabist and he studied History of Arabic Countries, and this year he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. Also I know that our former Ambassador to Germany studied one course behind mine also at the Department of Oriental Studies in St. Petersburg. So it is a little bit different from Germany. Why was Oriental Studies so highly valued during the Soviet era? It was one of the most difficult departments to enter. It was rather difficult to enter. The year I was entering, people were saying that it was something like five and a half applicants to one slot. There was lots of competition. I would say that there was something that a layperson would believe, there was an idea that some of the knowledge was not easily accessible, that it was some secret knowledge not open to everyone. Because in order to be able to read the Bible - and not solely the translations- to read it for example in Hebrew, but also to read the Aramaic or just old texts, you had to spend some time and first you had to enter

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this Department. I know that for Central Asians it was very important. When I went there I expected that I would be able to understand and to read the Qur'an, not only the Qur'an but also to understand the whole Islamic tradition more or less in an academic way. It was not just like learning some suras by heart and being able to recite, but also to understand the huge political issues and the Qur'an's history and the way it was received and the way it was taught throughout the centuries. So it was kind of »closed knowledge« that could be revealed to those who were in this community itself and the Department itself was not very big. Some people were interested also in careers as interpreters and in the possibilities of going abroad and working in Arab countries or in China, India or in other Eastern countries. But those who were interested in such perspectives went for the most part to Moscow (but also to St. Petersburg, as well). At the department itself, its atmosphere and history, and also we knew that many, many orientalists were repressed under Stalin. But those who survived, who stayed there to teach, had vast knowledge, not only of their own area but also of the whole history. This knowledge was preserved and transformed and maybe in this way survived through all the times. So it was a special atmosphere of attractiveness and there was an aura of mystery and the possibility to break through this veil. Getting this knowledge was very attractive for young people. Did you learn Arabic through the Qur'an or were there Arabic books? We had five-year courses as at any of the Soviet institutions. We studied various texts. We started with calligraphy, so we had to learn how to write in a proper way and then of course phonetics and grammar. Then we had a huge range of courses. It was historical Arabic, and we read for example Hisham and stories about the Prophet Mohammed. And we read classical literature; we read Jewish stories and Nasreddin

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Khoja stories, folklore. Then it became more and more complicated, geographical texts, linguistic texts, philosophical texts and technical texts, of course, in case we wanted to work as interpreters. One day a week was dedicated fully to military training, and during this military training we had also to learn military terminology and translate military texts: Russian-Arabic and Arabic-Russian. So that was the time of the Soviet Union. I graduated in 1987. We graduated already with the rank of a lieutenant. Then several years later I received documents that I was a senior lieutenant. That was the official requirement of our Department. It was imposed on everyone because the students were privileged to learn such a huge number of languages. So they had to pay indeed.

Selected

publications

Diwan Lughat at-Turk [translated from Arabic into Russian], Translation with introduction by Z.-A. Auezova. Almaty: Daik Press, 2005. Conceiving a people's history: the 1920-1936 discourse on the Kazakh past. In M. Kemper and S. Conermann eds., The Heritage of Soviet Oriental Studies. London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 241-261. Post-Soviet revisions of the early 20th century, discourse on Turkic identity. In: Shyghys Orkeniettery zhane Turky Alemynyng Madeni Murasy [The legacy of the Turkic world in the context of eastern civilizations], Materials of the International Conference, held on October 23-24, 2012. Almaty: Kazakh University 2012, pp. 77-81.

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Writing a History of Kazakhs at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century: The Shezhyre (Genealogy) of Shakarim Qudaiberdiyev Zifa-Alua Auezova

Introduction: What makes Shezhyre special? In the course of the twentieth-century, the historiography of the Kazakh people was re-conceptualized and rewritten several times, to conform to changing requirements of state ideologies: first, that of the Russian Empire (till 1917), then that of the Soviet Union (1917-1991), and finally that of the independent Republic of Kazakhstan (after 1991). Revisions of the greatest scope and frequency took place in Soviet Kazakhstan: their necessity consisted primarily in historians' constant failure to implement the political task of reconciling the past of the Kazakhs with the past of Russia in historical narratives, in order to create a firm impression of long-existing friendship and common aspirations between the two peoples. In this article, we will consider the treatise by Shakarim Qudaiberdiyev »The Shezhyre (Kazakh for »genealogy«) of Turks, Kyrghyz-Kazakhs and their Khans«, published in Orenburg in 1911, one of few pre-Soviet cases of conceptualizing a history of Kazakhs, a Turkic-speaking Muslim people, by a local scholar, an insider. This treatise was written under the strong influence of nineteenth-century Russian publications on the Kazakh Steppe and Central Asia, albeit in the context of articulated shared values of Turkic-speaking peoples and Muslims in general. Acquaintance with this treatise might be valuable for a better understanding of the later debates and conflicts in the field of Kazakh historiography, because this work provides a picture of the

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historical self-identification of Kazakhs as a people (tribal, semi-nomad, Turkic-speaking, Muslim, governing as descendants of Genghis Khan, colonized, etc.) on the eve of radical changes, brought about by the creation of the Soviet state. This treatise has had a remarkable destiny. In the 1910s20s, it was published and popularized along with Shakarim's poetry. In the Soviet period, in spite of its broad acceptance among the Kazakhs, the publication and study of Shakarim's intellectual legacy was forbidden. However, from the early days of perestroika, it became one of the most popular reference books on Kazakh and Kyrgyz history and genealogies. 2 The latter have developed into a new popular genre of individual inquiry in the post-Soviet societies. We will consider some historical and cultural backgrounds of the Shezhyre and try to find explanations for the sudden growth of its popularity in the post-Soviet discourse on the identity of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.

The work and life of Shakarim Some data from the biography

of Shakarim

(1858-1931)

Considering the available biographic data 3 on Shakarim, one would inevitably correlate it with the biography of Abai Qunanbayev (1845-1905), the most famous Kazakh poet and philosopher of the nineteenth-century, whose legacy was preserved and popularized in the Soviet period even beyond the borders of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

2

The 1991 edition of this book was published by Qazaqstan and Sana

in the Kazakh language in Almaty in an edition of 50,000 copies, while the Russian translation by Bakhyt Kairbekov w a s published by Zhazushy in 1990 in an edition of 100,000 copies. 3

The first detailed book about Shakarim's life is that by Shamshiyabanu

Satpayeva 1991. Shakarim

Kudaiberdiyev.

Alma-Ata: Rauan Publishers.

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Islam

Shakarim was the son of Abai's elder brother Qudaiberdy and a grandson of Qunanbai Oskembay-uly (1804-1886), the head of the Tobyqty clan of the Middle Zhuz, located in the Chingiz district (volost') of Semipalatinsk province (uezd). In his Shezhyre, Shakarim mentioned that he considered his grandfather Qunanbai the most important member of his family: in the logic of Shezhyre, he identified himself in the first instance as a grandson of Qunanbai and even replaced his treatise's traditional autobiographical paragraph with a paragraph about his grandfather.4 Qunanbai, an influential governor as well as a haji who built a mosque in Qarqaraly (1849) and made a pilgrimage to Mecca (1874-75), provided his grandson with education in the Muslim tradition, including the study of Arabic and Persian, as well as Russian. Having seen the growing influence of the Russian government in the Kazakh lands, Qunanbai founded a school in Eski-Tam borough, where the traditional curricula of Muslim education were combined with the study of Russian. This was implemented with the help of a Tatar teacher. The strong influence of his uncle poet Abai became apparent in Shakarim's experiments in poetry and music starting from his adolescence. 5 Shakarim describes his uncle as »a

4 As a compiler of a genealogy, Shakarim refers to the tradition of mentioning his own origins, as for example the author of »The Genealogy of Turks« Abu-l-Ghazi Bahadir Khan did: Shezhyre Turyk-ty zhazghan Abu-lGhazi Khannan byzge qalghan byr miras, shezhyre zhazghanda ozymyzdy maqtap az soz zhazbaq edy. Byraq menyng ozymdy maqtarlyq laiyq ysym zhoq bolghan song, uly atamyz Qunanbai-khazhy marqum zhaiynan az soz zhazamyn [According to the custom left to us by the author of the »Genealogy of Turks«, Abu-l-Ghazi Khan, a compiler of a genealogy would write a couple of words praising himself. However, having no deeds that would be worth praising, I would prefer to write a couple words about our deceased glorious grandfather Qunanbai-khaji], Shakarim Qudaiberdyuly 1991. Turik, Qyrghyz-Qazaq ham Khandar Shezhyresi. Almaty, p. 44. 5 According to his biographers, Shakarim could play not only the Kazakh dombra, but also »Western« music instruments, such as the violin, accordion and street-organ, having learned them from Russian musicians in Semey.

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gifted connoisseur of Islamic and Russian sciences, a person of outstanding intelligence and talent«. Praising Abai's legacy, Shakarim regrets: »It's a pity that Mirza Ibrahim (Abai's full name) lived only among Kazakhs, so that scholars knew little about him. If it had been otherwise, the world would have recognized him as a great philosopher and thinker. He lived in the middle of an ignorant people and died in a bitter solitude [...]«. 6 Poetry proved to become Shakarim's greatest passion for the rest of his life and the core of his intellectual legacy. His poems dedicated to historical events, reflections on morals and manners observed in everyday life, poetic accounts of the plots of popular Kazakh legends and translations of Persian poetry w e r e published in the Kazakh journals Abai, Aiqap and Sholpan and in the newspaper Qazaq between 1913 and 1924. In 1936 his translation of two stories by Pushkin from the Russian were published in the Adebiet Maidany journal. After 1936 till the end of 1980s, there was a long period of public neglect of Shakarim's work on the grounds that it was »ideologically harmful«, »nationalistic« and » f e u d a l « . At the age of twenty Shakarim became a vo/ost' governor, inheriting the administrative business of his family for the next twenty years (from 1878 to 1898). This period coincided with the most active phase in the Russian colonization of the lands populated by Kazakh tribes. As a governor, Shakarim was involved in judging numerous lawsuits and disputes, which resulted in his bitter disappointment with the politics of the Russian government towards his people, but not in Russian scholarship. At the age of approximately forty, he left his administrative career for scholarly studies and in 1903 joined the Semipalatinsk subdivision of the Russian Geographic Society, studying works written by Russian scholars and travellers.

6

Shakarim Qudaiberdyuly 1991, p. 46.

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From then till the end of his life, Shakarim dedicated himself to poetry and history, avoiding active involvement in government and politics. His poetry shows that he saw and could not accept, but rather criticized, the massive devastation, hunger and destruction brought about by the foundation of the Soviet state on the lands owned by his ancestors. In 1931, his dead body was found with bullet wounds in the Semey region, where he had lived for the last ten years of his life as a respected old man, haji and a descendant of neglected local rulers.7

Reflections on the early twentieth-century Turkic unity

discourse on

The very title of Shakarim's treatise shows that in his view the origins of Kazakhs had to be correlated with the past of other Turkic (Turyk) peoples. Many intellectuals representing Turkic-language cultures in that period shared this approach to history: one of the closest prototypes for Shakarim's Genealogy can be recognized in the Mufassal Tarikh Qaum Turki (A Comprehensive History of Turkic Peoples) compiled by an acknowledged Muslim scholar of Tatar origin, Hasan-Ghata Gabashi (1863-1936). 8 Aiming at the study of the role of Turkic peoples in the world history, Gabashi compiled an encyclopaedic treatise including ethno-genetic chapters tracing the history of modern Turkic-speaking peoples and their neighbours from Adam and the emergence of human races, as well as chapters describing the lifestyles and customs of modern peoples. His ac-

7 Who could have shot Shakarim has been discussed in Kazakh media since the late 1980s, starting with the publication » W h o shot Shakarim, and why?« in the June 9, 1989 issue of the newspaper Qazaq Adebiyeti. 8 Published in 1909 in Ufa. Its translation into Russian by A. Tukhvatulin was published in Kazan in 2009: Hasan-Gata Gabashi, Vseobschaya Istoriya Tyurkskih Narodov.

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count included chapters dedicated to »Kirgiz-Kazakh Turks«, »Ottoman Turks«, »Uzbek Turks«, Tatars and others. Noteworthy is Gabashi's statement about the predisposition of Turkic peoples to Islam: he argues that the majority of Turkic tribes embraced Islam voluntarily, after having compared it with other religions. Examples of such choices are given from the past of the Bulgars, the Turks of Turkestan, some of the Khazars, some of the Uighurs and some of the descendants of Genghis Khan9. Interesting is Gabashi's argumentation that Genghis Khan himself found most of the main principles of Islam (except for the importance of hajj) correct: he refers to the dialogue between Genghis Khan and Ashraf, Qazi of Bukhara, according to which Genghis Khan accepted the statements concerning the unity and eternity of God, the divine mission of God's prophets and the necessity of five prayers every day, fasting during Ramadan and giving alms. Gabashi emphasizes the tolerance of Turkic peoples toward other religions, seeing it as evidence of the high level of their culture.10 Gabashi's views on Turkic unity going back to ancient times were in tune with the general discourse on »pan-Turkism«, developed and spread within the Russian Empire and beyond it by Ismail Gasprinskiy (Gaspirali) (1851-1914), a Tatar intellectual and political activist. In 1883, Gasprinskiy founded the newspaper Tarjuman, which observed the life of Muslims in the Russian Empire and neighbouring states and had a broad range of distribution, including the Crimea, the Ural region, Siberia, Khiva, Bukhara, parts of the Ottoman empire, Egypt, China, Persia and some European countries. The newspaper was published in Turkish using a vocabulary that was understandable for a broad Turkicspeaking audience: »Eastern and Western, as well as Northern, Turks could read and understand Tarjuman, which was

9 See Hasan Gata Gabashi 2009. Vseobshchaya istoriya Tyurkskikh narodov [The general history of Turkic populations]. Kazan, p. 220. 10 Op. cit., p. 221.

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thus living proof that all Turks could unite around the same language.« 11 Because of the newspaper's focus on the debates on the future of Muslim peoples, its materials were translated and published also in Arabic. In his Shezhyre, Shakarim wrote that he considered himself a follower of Ismail Gaspirali, since he had learned much from his newspaper Tarjuman.12 A comparison of Shakarim's approach to the history of Kazakhs as one of the Turkic peoples with analogues from neighbouring Turkic societies of the same period shows many common features, particularly many common approaches to the idea of »Turkicness« as a point of departure. It is most likely that, in his intellectual search, Shakarim had a chance to familiarize himself with the most well-known source called upon in the discourse on common Turkic roots, Shejere-i Turki (Genealogy of Turks), written by Abu-1 Ghazi Bahadir Khan in the seventeenth century and published in Kazan in 1852 and 1854 (in a Russian translation by Sablukov), later also in St. Petersburg (1871). This treatise became known in Turkey thanks to the translation into Turkish by Ahmet Vefik Pasha (1823-1891). Another historical treatise introducing materials from ancient written sources on the history of Turks referred to in »pan-Turkic« disputes was Tarih-i 'Alam (History of the World), compiled by Suleyman Husnu Pasha (1838-1892). Having studied available literature on local history published in Russia, Shakarim decided to get a better acquaintance with Islamic cities and towns, perhaps in order to learn more about ideas on Islamic modernization, which were reaching Kazakh society. In 1905-06 Shakarim

11 Ziya Gokalp 1968. The principles ofTurkism. Leiden: Brill, p. 5. 12 »Onyng [Abaidan] songghy ustazym Tarzhyman gazetynyng iyesy Ismaghul Gasprinskiy [...] sol kysynyng gazetyn oqyp kop paidalandym.« [My teacher after [Abai] was the founder of the Tarjuman newspaper Ismaghul Gasprinskiy [...] having read his newspaper I learned many useful things]. Shakarim Qudaiberdyuly 1991, p. 46.

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travelled to Mecca, Istanbul and cities in Egypt and spent much time in libraries and bookstores. In this period, the intensification of political struggle against the tsar's rule in Russia, on one hand, and social movements aimed at the cultural and political consolidation of Turkic-speaking Muslim peoples against colonization, on the other, defined local intellectuals' discourse about the cultural identities of their peoples. In Shakarim's Shezhyre, one can clearly recognize the features of both trends.

Recognition of common Turkic origins: milestones of Turkic history highlighted by Shakarim Shakarim's Genealogy refers to popular Muslim discourse in discussing the roots of Kazakhs as a part of the earth's Turkic population going back to Adam and Eve and emphasizing the role of Japheth as a common ancestor »of all Turks, Iranians, Greeks, Chinese and Europeans«. 13 With numerous references to the »Genealogy of Turks« of Abu1-Ghazi Bahadur Khan, Shakarim projects the origins of the Kazakhs to the general canvas of stories related to descendants of Tatar and Mongol, two sons of Alanchi Khan, who in his turn was a descendant of Turk, son of Japheth. Shakarim continuously emphasizes Abu-l-Ghazi's general concept of the equal importance of Turkic and Mongol backgrounds in understanding the past of Central Asians. In addition to the sources based on Islamic historiography, Shakarim mentions the importance of Chinese sources on the origins of Turkic tribes, referring for the most part to Radloff,14

13 S. Qudaiberdyuly 1991, p. 7. 14 Vasily Vasilievich Radlov or Friedrich Wilhelm Radloff (1837-1918) was a German-born Russian scholar who is considered to be the founder of Turkology, the author of a profound ethnographic study of peoples living in Siberia and Central Asia »From Siberia« (1884) and a comparative dictionary of Turkic languages.

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Kazem-Bek15 and Aristov.16 Summarizing numerous references in Chinese sources concerning the origins of Turkic tribes, which had been mentioned by Kazem-Bek and Radloff, Shakarim emphasizes: »Our people originates from descendants of Seth, also called So or Shis. It's clear that we descend from the people that was called tukil in Chinese, or tiirik in our language. Having increased, this tribe So or Seth divided into four branches and moved. One branch settled in the northern Altai on the Qu River and was called quman in Russian. The second branch settled between the Apu and Qan17 Rivers and was called Qyrghyz. The third stayed at the Shu [Chu] River in Altai and was called Chu-ksi in Chinese and Chuiskiy in Russian. The forth branch called tukii in Chinese and tiirik in our language settled in rocky mountains on the upper reaches of the Shu [Chu] River.« 18 Numerous fragments of Shakarim's text dedicated to pre-nineteenth-century history show that he was willing to popularize the views of Russian researchers among Kazakh readers. Bakhyt Kairbekov, the translator of Shakarim's »Genealogy« from Kazakh into Russian,19 even amended his translation with quotations from Aristov,20 which Shakarim

15 Mirza Kazem-Bek or Alexander Kazem-Bek (1802-1870) is considered a founder of institutional Oriental Studies in Russia. He was the first Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Languages of St. Petersburg University. His »Research on Uighurs«, 1841, as well as »Seven Planets: the history of the Crimean khans«, 1832, and other works were obviously familiar to Shakarim. In his text, Shakarim refers to Kazem-Bek as »Najib Qasym-bek«, or »Noble Qasym-Bek«. 16 Nikolai Aleksandrovich Aristov (1847-ca. 1903) was an officer of the Russian government in Semirechye, Turkestan and Steppe regions, and the author of several studies of societies of Central Asia, including »Ethnic structure of Turkic tribes and nations and information on their numbers« (1896). 17 Abakan and Yenissey. 18 Shakarim Qudaiberdyuly 1991, p. 9. 19 Shakarim Kudaiberdy-Uly 1990. Rodoslovnaya tyurkov, kirgizov, kazakhov i khanskikh dinastiy [Descent of Turks, Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and the dynasties of khans] Translated by B. Kairbekova. Alma-Ata: Zhazushy. 20 N. A. Aristov. 1896. Zametki ob etnicheskom sostave tyurkskikh piemen i narodnosty i svedeniya ob ikh chislennosti [Notes on the ethnic composi-

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found particularly important to refer to in his work. These fragments concerned the tribal and clan structure of ancient Turkic society and the conditions that, in the course of time, led to either the strengthening or the weakening of clan unions and the formation of new entities and unions. Referring to Aristov, Shakarim points out that the biggest Kazakh clans had possessed their own tamgas (brands) from ancient times, and he provides the images of some of these brands. Shakarim emphasizes the continuity in the preservation of clan tamgas under Genghis Khan and supports Aristov's statement that Genghis Khan assigned each clan its own war cry, a bird, a tree and a tamga. Shakarim includes a summary of data about ancient (pre-)Turkic history from Chinese chronicles - probably for the first time in the Kazakh language for a wider Kazakhreading audience. This summary is written primarily with references to Kazem-Bek and Radloff. It mentions some evidence of the existence of Tii-ku (»which is Turk«, as Shakarim explains) tribes as early as 2197 BC, or 2819 before Hijra. Several pages of Shakarim's summary are dedicated to the history of the Huns, with a focus on their role as the ancestors of the Turkic peoples and the vast geography of their conquests and settlement. Shakarim notes: »Turkfic] tribes were not one people [khalyq] like, for example, Arabs and Persians. Various tribes united forming tribal unions, attacked neighbouring states and either conquered them, or - in the case of defeat - surrendered to the winner, became a part of his army and moved with it to conquer new territories. They moved from one clan, or tribe, to another, changing their titles.« 21 With references to The Secret History of Mongols, the author names numerous tribes that populated the terri-

tion of Turkic tribes and information on their numbers]. In Zhivaya vol. Ill and IV. St. Petersburg. 2 1 Shakarim Qudaiberdyuly 1991, p. 15.

Starina,

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tories of modern Mongolia before the conquests of Genghis Khan. Shakarim mentions the powerful khan of the Huns, Mode, who lived in the 3rd century BC, and the expansion of the Hun territories under his leadership, then provides brief information about the neighbouring tribes, such as the Uisun, Yuezhi, Yenissei Kirgiz (adding that they were also the ancestors of the Kazakhs). Discussing the period between Mode and Genghis Khan he mentions Kidans, or QaraKhitai, Toghuz-Oghuz (as a subgroup of the Uighur), the Turkic tribes of the Merkit, Uryankhai and Tuba, then the Kyrgyz who lived to the west of Uryankhai, the Karluks who lived to the south-west of the Kyrgyz on the Black Irtysh and others. The formation of the Eastern and Western khanates of Turks at the end of the 6th century AD is represented as the result of a significant expansion of territories controlled by Turkic tribes. The author names the tribes that became the most influential in the course of time: the Uighurs, who conquered Tu-kii Turks around 750 AD in alliance with the Tele and Karluks; the Yenissei Kyrgyz, who conquered the state of the Uighurs a century later; the Kidan, or Kara-Khitai, who conquered Chinese tribes, founded their own dynasty and whose Emperor Ambagan in 924 AD reached the former capital of the Uighurs on the Orkhon River in his military campaigns. However, according to Shakarim, the Tatars were the most powerful in this period, so that even Qara-Khitai did not manage to conquer them. Genghis Khan's triumph is interpreted as a phenomenon that, thanks to the initial support of the Turkic Kerei tribe, led to the unification of the Mongols, victories over the Tatars, Merkits and Naimans and finally the conquest of all of Mongolia. Shakarim stresses that, prior to Genghis Khan's conquests, Mongolia, with the exception of its north-eastern part, had been populated predominantly by Turkic tribes, and that the Bayegin or Arghyn tribe (to which the author himself belongs) had played a strong role among them.

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Shakarim emphasizes the importance of understanding the relation of the Kazakhs to other Turkic tribes and points out such Kazakh customs as presenting cattle to a bride's family (qalym in Kazakh and aghirlik in Turkish), paying f o r seeing a bride for the first time (korimdik in Kazakh and yuz gormek in Turkish), giving presents as signs of friendship or congratulation with new acquisitions (qol ustamaq in Kazakh and el opmek in Turkish) and the Kazakhs' preservation of ancient tribal tamghas till the twentieth century.

On the origins of the Kazakhs In the chapter dedicated to the origins of the Kazakhs, the author mentions that the Kazakhs can be seen as belonging to the »Uighur branch of Turks«, which included the tribes of the Kazakhs' ancestors: the Qyrghyz, Qangly, Qypshaq, Arghynot, Naiman, Kerei, Dulat, Uisyn and others. According to Shakarim, Genghis Khan »conquered all the Tatars [whom he sees as a subgroup of Turks] and Mongols and divided the conquered people between his four sons«. The Kazakhs are considered the people of the ulus of Ozbek Khan (13121342), a descendant of Genghis Khan's elder son Zhoshy (Juchi). Shakarim emphasizes that Ozbek Khan became a Muslim and spread Islam in his ulus, and he quotes a Kazakh saying: »Our belief is left to us by Ozbek.« 2 2 According to Shakarim, his people was called qazaq (Kazakh) in the middle of the fifteenth century, when Sultan Zhanibek (the son of Barak Khan) and his brother Kerei moved with their people from the lands of Abulkhair Khan to the domain of Toghluq Khan on the Chu River. This migration was spurred by a conflict between Zhanibek and Abulkhair Khan: according to Shakarim, the core of this conflict consisted in Abulkhair's protection of the great batyr Qoblandy from the Qypshaq tribe, who had killed a popular j u d g e

22

Op. cit., p. 21.

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from the Arghyn tribe, Aqzhol-Bi. Zhanibek is said to have been indignant about Abulkhair Khan's tolerance to Qoblandy and decided to leave him together with his people. A c c o r d i n g to Shakarim, the title qazaq was applied to people w h o f o l l o w e d Sultan Zhanibek in his migration; as f o r its tribal composition, » b e f o r e the Kazakhs gained their title leaving with Zhanibek, our p e o p l e had been composed of numerous tribes, such as Arghyn, Naiman, Kerei, Qangly, Qypshaq, Uisyn, Dulat [...] When Kazakhs dissociated from the rest, these tribes gave rise to new peoples, which are known today as Noghai, Bashkir [bashqurt], Ozbek.« 2 3 Shakarim associates the division of the Kazakhs into three parts (zhuz), which have been preserved in the collective self-identity of Kazakhs till today, with the rule of Ahmet Khan, called Alashy, who introduced the division of Kazakh troops into three wings (Great, Middle and Little), to fight against the Kalmyks in the sixteenth century. Mentioning Kazakh khans of the seventeenth-nineteenth centuries, Shakarim discusses the laws and rules they introduced: » T h e Main Path« of Qasym Khan (sixteenth century), who was remembered for having united numerous Kazakh tribes and introducing common legislation; »The Ancient Path« of Yesim Khan (seventeenth century); and the Laws of Tauke Khan (seventeenth century), also known as »Seven Statements« (Zhety Zharghy). The author emphasizes the importance of continuity in these law codes, saying that every later ruler was following the path of his predecessor. Shakarim tells the reader about the Great Disaster of 1723, when Kazakh tribes had to leave their lands having been defeated by the Kalmyks. To illustrate the hardships of this exodus, the author quotes the lyrics of the folk song Yelim-ai (O, my people!), composed in that period and describing the kosh (massive movement) of devastated hungry and exhausted people. This forced migration of the Kazakh zhuzes closer to the borders of Russia and the threat of new

23

Op. cit., p. 23.

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attacks by the Kalmyks are seen as the main reasons why the Kazakh Khans decided to join Russia in 1731. Shakarim dedicated several pages of his work to the stories about Abylai Khan, who had been proclaimed Khan of all Kazakhs in 1735 and was known as a brave fighter against the Kalmyks Qungars) and a wise diplomat who managed to navigate between Russian and Chinese emperors. Kazakhs refer to the events of the nineteenth century as a gradual loss of freedom: Shakarim mentions the abolition of Kazakh khans' authority from 1822, the administrative reform based on the »Statute on Siberian Kyrgyzes« of 1822, which led to the formation of okrugs (regions), volosts (districts) and auls (villages) and increasing control by the Russian government. » T h e temporary provisions on governance in the steppe regions of Orenburg and West-Siberian general-governorships« of 1867, according to Shakarim, led to » t h e complete loss of freedom and submission to Russian laws.« 2 4

Deducing

family history from historical

narratives

Having discussed the common history of the Kazakhs, Shakarim proceeds to the three big unions of the Kazakh tribes, which are called zhuz and known as the Great, Middle and Little, their origins and the geography of their migrations, and he dedicates a paragraph to each of the b i g g e r tribes belonging to or united with the Middle Zhuz: the Qangly, Qypshaq, Qongyrat, Qara Qyrghyz, Kerei, Naiman, Uaq, Tolengit, Taraqty and Arghyn. Writing about the Kazakh tribes, Shakarim combines information from his own observations and from narratives known within the tribes with the data found in historical accounts. Thus, in the paragraph about the Kerei tribe, he refers to Rashid ad-Din, Abu-l-Ghazi Bahadir Khan and Kazem-Bek, as well as Berezin

24

Op. cit., p. 33.

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and Aristov. The origins of the Naiman tribe are summarized with reference to Abu-l-Ghazi Bahadir Khan, Spasskiy, Aristov and Mayevskiy. The Qongyrats are presented with references to Rashid ad-Din, Abu-l-Ghazi, Radloff and Levshin. Sometimes Shakarim contests conclusions of his predecessors, providing alternative information on some genealogical branches, argumentations and names. Discussing the Middle Zhuz, Shakarim dedicates a paragraph to the Qara-Qyrghyz, explaining the need for this information by including some Qyrghyz clans in the Middle Zhuz. Shakarim mentions Abu-l-Ghazi's accounts of Qyrghyz and names some of their clans (from the right side of the AlaTau Bughy, Sarbaghysh, Solty, Sheryk, Baghysh and Sayaq, called descendants of Saghai), emphasizing that two Qyrghyz clans - the Munkish and the Ishkilik - entered the Qypchaq, Arghyn and Naiman tribes. Having discussed the tribes of the Middle Zhuz, Shakarim proceeds down to the next structural level, from tribe to clans: a special chapter is dedicated to clans constituting the Arghyn tribe of the Middle Zhuz. This chapter describes a number of branches and chains of ancestors starting from Qodan, a descendant of Arghyn-Agha, and his sons DairQozha, known as Aqzhol, Qara-Qozha and Suiyndyk. The long list of names of male descendants leads the reader to the bottom of the Shakarim's genealogical pyramid, to his own great-grandfather Oskenbai-Bi and grandfather Qunanbai. This chapter is based most likely on orally preserved information transmitted from generation to generation and does not contain references to written sources. With this combination of a clan history with broader narratives on clan, tribal and national histories, Shakarim demonstrated the possibility of deducing a general macronarrative thoroughly compiled and legitimized by famous scholars, to the level of a clan and even family history, which can appeal to everyone. This made the Shezhyre of Shakarim different from historical treatises about peoples and rulers, on the one hand, and, on the other, particularly attractive for a Kazakh audience with its well-preserved clan identity.

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period

With the arrival of the Soviet governance with its new expectations placed on historians based purely on European and Russian academic tradition, Shakarim's Genealogy and historical compositions of Jadids from other parts of the growing Soviet state were regarded as counterproductive, archaic and nationalistic. However, in 1926 it was still reasonable to refer to Shakarim; » T h e Materials on the History of the Kirgiz-Kazakh People« by Muhammedzhan Tynyshpaev (1879-1937), published in 1926, has a few references to his Genealogy. Arguing that the history of Kazakh society, like any other tribal society, had to be studied as a system of numerous tribal histories, Tynyshpaev built up his essay as a collection of chronologically organized genealogies of separate clans. His main argument for such an approach was that »without the preliminary study of the genealogy of each separate clan of the Kirgiz people - without understanding whom they fought with and when - it is impossible to imagine a general picture of the historical events of the Kirgiz people.« 2 5 As early as 1935, in the new textbook on Kazakh history edited by S. Asfendiyarov and P. Kunte, Muhamedzhan Tynyshpaev was accused of propagating local nationalism and attempting to prove »by means of various historical, linguistic and geographical pseudo-scientific exercises that all peoples of Asia and Eastern Europe originate from the Kazakhs«. 26 Authors classified Tynyshpaev's approach as a type of »pan-Turkism«, close to »pan-Tatarism« and »panUzbekism«, which in the authors' view promoted inter-

25 Muhamedzhan Tynyshpaev 2002. Istoriya history of Kazakh people], Almaty, p. 63

kazakhskogo

naroda

[The

26 S. D. Asfendiyarova and P. A. Kunte (eds.) 1997. Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochrtikakh i materialakh [Kazakhstan's past in the sources and documents]. Almaty: Qazaqstan, vol. 1, p. 5.

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ethnic antagonisms and helped the bourgeoisie to use the study of history in its class interests. Probably because the authors saw Turkey as an enemy of the Soviet state and a strategic ally of Germany, they connected this discussion to Hitler's statements on the historical mission of Germany and the Aryan race and the related tendencies in the writings of German historians of that period. However, Tynyshpaev was not permitted to respond to this grotesque interpretation of his clan history and his critics' related exercises in eloquence: in 1932, the OGPU arrested him and exiled him to Siberia (Voronezh), where he was executed in 1937. All post-1934 historiography was already developing in the framework of »Soviet internationalism«, aiming at a common narrative about the past for all ethnic groups: as Lowell Tillett put it, »in the tortured rewriting of the history of the non-Russian peoples, the case of Kazakhstan had no rival«. 27

Conclusion In the course of the last two decades, which Kazakhstan and fourteen other newly independent states have experienced as post-Soviet, historical curricula have been revised from the perspectives of the new ideologies of national states. Much attention has been paid to the restoration of the intellectual legacies of public leaders of the second decade of the twentieth century - Alikhan Bokeikhanov, Ahmet Baitursynov, Mirzhaqyp Dulatov and other contemporaries of Shakarim, activists of the Alash Party who undertook resolute efforts for the creation of a Kazakh autonomy within Russia. These authors addressed the history of their people to a considerable extent within the context of the Russian

27 Lowell Tillett 1969. The great friendship: Soviet historians on the nonRussian nationalities. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, p. 110.

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colonization of the territories populated by Muslims. Their texts (particularly those written in Russian or translated into Russian) represented an obvious departure from local traditions of narrating the history, as they were primarily aimed at persuasiveness in the context of political struggle in Russia and operated with categories learned and borrowed from the modern Russian discourse. However, the appeal to certain common Turkic and Muslim values was distinctly articulated in their publications. Shakarim's legacy has also been revived and publicized broadly in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. A film about his life was made in 1992, based on the script written by Bakhytzhan Kanapyanov; the state university in Semei was named after Shakarim; and in 2008 Shakarim's 150th anniversary was celebrated with a number of conferences and cultural events where his songs and poems were performed. For the most part, Shakarim is seen as an author of extended volumes of eloquent poems.28 However, apart from big events, at a popular level it is rather Shezhyre than poetry that reminds today's Kazakhs and Kyrgyz of Shakarim: the growing interest in genealogies often starts with reading his Shezhyre and finding references to a clan or tribe in question. Another recent trend in the contemporary historiography of Kazakhstan is the use of orally preserved genealogies as valid sources for reconstructing history, as demonstrated in Shakarim's Shezhyre.

28 In 1988, the poetic legacy of Shakarim was collected and published by Mukhtar Maghauin; in 1989, by Muhammedrahim Zharmuhammed-Uly; in 2006, the International Abai Club published a volume of his poetry, Zhol tabalyq aqylmen, including some fragments from his Shezhyre; in 2008, a two-volume edition of Shakarim's works was published by Senym, Bylym, Omyr society in Almaty.

Chapter 6

Muhiddin Kabiri

Dr. Muhiddin Kabiri studied Arabic Language and Cultures at the Institute of Oriental Studies in Dushanbe (1987-1991). After a research period in Yemen (Saana University, 19911993), he joined the Moscow Diplomatic Academy in 1993 to study at the Faculty of International Law, where he graduated in 1996. The opposition then called him to join the Commission for National Reconciliation in Tajikistan during the transition period (1997-2000), in which it negotiated the peace agreement following the civil war (1992-1997). Kabiri joined the Islamic Revival Party and was elected its Chairman in 2006 and again in 2011. He is engaged in religious dialogue groups all over the Muslim world and in Europe and lectures at various universities in and outside Tajikistan. From 2006 on he initiated a dialogue in Tajikistan in which intellectuals, religious authorities, poets and politicians participate. This dialogue has been one of the most important institutions to keep a conversation going on fundamental questions of nation, culture, identity and religious politics among Tajikistan's leading social and political forces.

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Biographical interview1 Could you please tell us about your life and educational career and the role Islam holds in it? Bismi 'llahi al-rahmani al-rahimi I was born in a family from a mountain village - we were a religious household, not by the meaning that we were famous mullahs, but the traditions of Islam and education in Islam were very strict in our home and everything was according the rules. This is how I was born and raised. And one can say that I gained maturity (grew up) like any other Soviet citizen of similar age. However, the name of Islam and books on Islam existed at home. I learned from my father and my eldest brother. [...] We had books, books of old Arabic, many Old Persian books that my father and mother had hidden. They had sewed them into a piece of cloth because they were old; they packed them because the upper page had been taken, so that they should not get lost, some of the middle pages were missing; they had been pulled out. They read the books with special care as they had remained from earlier times. But to be honest, I also studied well in school and with my father I studied religious books. Then I matriculated in the economic college in Vahdat. However, to learn about Islam, I continued to visit religious people illegally. I had many good friends - so I studied with the disciples of Mahmadsharif Himmatzoda. [...] After my military service, which I served in Gujiston, I already became part of the study group of Himmatzoda himself in the city of Vahdat. I was very found of Islamic groups. In 1987 I entered the State University. I studied at the State University, Eastern (Oriental) Languages and Arabic Language. There in the university, I learned the Arabic lan-

1 This interview was conducted by Sophie Roche on 5 August 2011 with a follow-up interview on 26 November 2012.

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guage in the Arab faculty and also I organized the first underground group of the Islamic Youth of the University. We w e r e eight to ten people. Of course this was secret. Later w e had elections; I remember, in the road Giprasem there was the home of one fellow student, and there w e went and conducted an election to decide who should be the leader of the group. And they voted for me - two of us had been campaigned. So I became the first leader of the Islamic Youth Group in 1987. After one year I got to know Ustod Nuri 2 , privately. Of course I knew the leader of the Nahzat and I knew his disciples (shogirds) - w e had occasional contact and participated in their private meetings. It is through such connection that the Nahzat emerged. We had close links to those groups who w e r e around the Nahzat from its early period on. [...] When I returned from military service, after college I worked on the kolkhoz of a village of Faizobod. Then something happened in my life: It was at the time of making hey, the month of May or June, when I handed in my documents [to the university] - w e w e r e cutting grass and at noon w e w e r e having lunch, I told the brigadier (foreman) that the loan he had paid was too little, that he underpaid me. He said, «This is as much as you w o r k e d . « I told him that I studied economics and technical studies, »1 know the price of my work, you gave too little.« Then he said that I was wrong, if I had studied so much, if I was intelligent enough, » a f t e r finishing your technical studies you would not have become a kolkhozchi (kolkhoz worker), you would have done another work. You came out of lack of intelligence and now you work on the kolkhoz.« My parents had said come

2 Said Abdullah Nuri organized the Organization of F r e e Youth (Sozmoni Javononi Ozod) in the late 1970s, which in 1991 became the core group of the Islamic Revival Party (often referred to as the Nahzat). Nuri or Ustod Nuri (Teacher Nuri) was a key figure in the peace process following the civil war of the 1990s and was one of the most respected religious authorities in Tajikistan until his death in 2006.

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and work with us on the kolkhoz, don't go anywhere. We finished lunch and, furious about his words, I went home, I felt nomus (my honour was impinged upon). I came and told (my parents) that I would go to Dushanbe. Why, they asked? I took my documents, my passport and said, »1 go because it is the time to hand in the documents for university. I go and study, they harassed me that I was not clever.« It was rather difficult to enter Oriental Studies at that time; how did you manage? Then I came and asked what university course was the most difficult to enter; they said Oriental Studies; there one needs people, needs a network and money. I went and handed my documents in for Oriental Studies. Everybody was laughing at me saying, »He has gone crazy.« They would accept 25 people, and some five hundred people had submitted their documents. They had passed exams. They spoke many foreign languages, and I had not studied any foreign language. So I said that I would take exams in Persian - Persian was considered one of the foreign languages. They asked where I studied, and I told with my father. They administered exams and then allowed me to submit my documents. I passed all the exams and was accepted as the twenty-fifth person, the very last. Then at university - you know our system of five levels - throughout the five years I studied at university, I had a grade of four only once, everything else was with five. 3 At that time one could not buy (grades); at that time it was very difficult. Then I finished my studies. I went to the University of Yemen, I studied there and later I studied at Moscow University, where I completed my doctoral grade. Dushanbe and Sanaa were brother cities, every year five students from here would go there and five from there would come here. During the Soviet period, they would announce a competition and send the best students to Yemen.

3 The grades in the Russian system increase from one to five, which is the highest grade.

Kabiri 2 3 1 I submitted my documents for the competition, and I won! So I went to Moscow and from there I bought the tickets; my tickets were from the Soviet Union. I was in Yemen when the Soviet Union ended. I was a tiny little bit sad about the collapse of the Soviet Union, but to 80% I agreed that our country should become independent. Tajikistan being independent, we Muslims would not be in a communist atheist country anymore. One person who was living with us in Sanaa, had studied in Bishkek and Kiev and was a writer in Aman, he cried a lot in this night, this Yemeni cried a lot. He would ask why I didn't cry that the Soviet Union is over; I told him, »Okay, the Soviet Union ended, but our Tajikistan exists. I will not cry; I am a citizen of Tajikistan.« He was angry with me, he would bring Russian vodka and say I am a citizen of the Soviet Union; he was a Yemeni who cried a lot. For me it was something ordinary, it was nothing special. When I came, the Soviet Union had already ceased to exist, and in Tajikistan war was going on. [...] I had been in the fifth (last) course and I took my diploma. When I came to Moscow they said that war had started and that the Popular Front had entered (Dushanbe), so I stayed in Moscow. [...] I entered the Academy and studied there. Having gone to Moscow, I was in touch with Nuri, with the [Tajik] opposition. Later I became the representative of the Youth of Nahzat in Moscow. I was engaging in science and in politics at the same time. So politics

was always

with

you.

All my life, politics have been with me. Also, when I was in Yemen, I immediately got into contact with Yemeni parties. I did not stand still; I went (to meet activists and) engaged - now if I see the opposition in Yemen I know them one hundred percent. The Islamic Party of Yemen, I knew them - thus politics were with me all the time. There [in Moscow] they had a faculty of international law - I don't know; I liked diplomacy. Then I left Moscow, I finished in '96 and went to Kazakhstan for one year. In Kazakhstan I did some busi-

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ness in order to earn money. Then Ustod Nuri - I was doing the work for the Nahzat in Kazakhstan - when the national commission started, Ustod Nuri went to Dushanbe, called me. It was Ustod Himmatzoda who told me, »Ustod Nuri is asking for you.« I came and became his right hand - he said I need a person who knows English, knows Arabic, knows Russian, knows Turkic and studied diplomacy. To finish the account, in 2000 I became a member of the Nahzat. From 1997 to 2000 I was helping Nuri and was then elected vice chairman. In 2003, I became Deputy Chairman of the IRP. In 2006 - may God forgive him - our Ustod passed away. Then the members elected me. You initiated the Dialogue Centre. Could you tell me more about this? It was founded in 2002 or 2003 at my initiative and worked until 2009, when it had to be closed down. But we are going to reopen it soon. We would discuss various themes; one of the first was who would be considered »intellectual« in the context of Tajikistan. Some argued that only those who held diplomas and degrees were intellectual, which would deny that religious authorities were intellectuals. For instance, should we regard Ibnu Sina and Sadriddin Aini as not having been intellectuals because they had no diplomas? We discussed such questions. We eventually agreed that intellectuals could be dini (religious) or duniyvi (worldly). One of the conditions for the Dialogue Centre we had agreed upon was that no one would speak in the name of his institutions, of his organization or academy.4 Everybody would speak for himself. For instance, if professors attended workers of the hukumat (state), which would not allow them

4 Among the participants we find Iskandar Kurbonov, who was the right hand of the president; Komil Bekzoda, a philosopher working at the academy of science; Mahmad Shakuri, another philosopher and a descendant of an intellectual family from Bukhara; the brothers Turajonzoda, Ibrohim Usmon, Shamsiddin Dustov and many others.

Kabin 2 3 3 (to speak in the name of the government) - so they spoke in their capacities as private persons. We had the rule that everybody was equal and that we would not separate by age or education. The mullahs and the atheists were equal (barobar). It was not meant to serve one side, but everybody. It was great. Then some started to worry, »If only I hadn't said that.« So we agreed that nobody was allowed to publish about the discussions (bahs) in the newspaper or quote, for instance, what Turajonzoda or this or that student had said in the Dialogue Centre. People would not have felt free if they knew that their words would be published. This is why we were all speaking freely. [...] There were many women who participated. What were some of the themes you

discussed?

For Tajiks the first question was whether we are Muslims or Tajiks. This does not make much sense, as during the Soviet period people were both Tajiks and Muslims. We hardly had any Tajiks who were not Muslims - they would perform janoza secretly. Maybe after the Soviet Union some Tajiks started to become Christians, Buddhists, or so. This was just to create hostility. We discussed certain themes for six months. Every month we would meet and continue the discussion over months. There were domullo (religious authorities), olim (scholars) of the university, students etc. This was one of the first Tajik initiatives. We said we won't accept any money from abroad. I financed the place where we met; this was within my business, my company. It had a room and first we met there. It was a bit far from Dushanbe, but people would come, people found the place. And we had good discussions (bahs). A friend would, for instance, organize lunch - we would cook there, we could not afford a restaurant. There everything was Tajik, the theme, the people and the language; we even tried to have the food be Tajik. People believed that such a thing was necessary. We had meetings (majlis) for about three years. The main language was Tajik, but of course several people preferred to speak in Russian. They were free; everybody would speak

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as they liked. The right hand of the president was there. He would have interesting subjects. He would say, »1 am an atheist. If you take power what will be the conditions for me?« He would say this from the depths of his heart. [...] After seventy years of Soviet rule repressing religious people (dindorho), if now the religious people come and take power he expected them to continue this rule in revenge. »The state today does many bad things, but at least they let me be an atheist,« he would say. [...] We would always assure him that nothing would happen to people like him, but he was never calmed. However, the questions he would ask were very good. [...] One of the participants who would talk a lot one day came to me asking for a signature attesting that he was not a member of our party, because the state had hassled him, asking why he partook in the dialogue. [...] He is a philosopher from the academy. One day when I was just getting into a car he asked me why the dialogue discussions had stopped; »There is no better place to exchange thoughts and where we can speak about all themes.« He had wanted to establish a similar group at the academy, but it didn't work out. [...] I think that my place remained vacant. I had thought I would do this for one or two years and then others would continue, but nobody did. [...] Some accused me of preparing an intellectual team for myself, but my main aim was to bring secular and religious-minded people closer to each other. For instance, that young people who follow religious or secular ideas would also engage in discussions with each other. But they did not manage to keep the centre going.

Selected

publications

Die Partei der Islamischen Wiedergeburt Tadschikistans und Hisb-ut-Tachrir: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede. In A. Kreikemeyer and A. C. Seifert (eds.), Zur Vereinbarkeit von politischem Islam und Sicherheit im OSZE-Raum. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002, pp. 210-221.

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The Tajik experience of a multiparty system - exception or norm? In B.N. Schlyter (ed.), Prospects for democracy in Central Asia. Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, 2005, pp. 21-24.

Academy of Science, Institute for Language, Literature, Oriental Studies and Document Heritage by name ofRudaki, Dushanbe (© Umayra Rashidova)

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The Role of the Islamic Revival Party in the Politics of Islam in Tajikistan Muhiddin Kabiri

This contribution will not have a scientific character and I also hope it will not sound like a sermon. Instead I will respond to the request to talk about the religious life of Tajikistan, more specifically the role and place of the Islamic Revival Party (IRP). I will start with a short introduction about the party's history and then move on to current debates and the role of the IRP in these debates. Over the last decade, the question »how should the relation between state and religion be organized« has generated many debates and led to arbitrary decisions and practices. The role of the IRP in these debates is crucial and reflects a tension between religious motivated citizens, political actors and various forces in the region. The Islamic Revival Party was created out of a cell of the youth cultural organization in 1973, right at the peak of the Soviet Union and the Communist party's achievements and development. The state could not allow any oppositional organization or any groups with a different ideology or worldview. Therefore the small group of Tajik youth consisted of no more than five persons under the leadership of Ustod Sayid Abdullah Nuri, who was then only 26 years old. He organized the first cell structure, which later became the structural base for the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRP). 5 As the main organizers and founders of the group

5 M. Kabiri and H. Saifullohzoda (eds. and organizers) 2007. Mujaddidi Asr. Bakhshida ba 60-umin solgardi zodriizi ustod Saiid Abdullohi Nuri. Dushanbe.

Kabiri 237 wrote, their goal was to preserve a religious identity and spread new methodology and literature on Islamic education. The organizers of this circle did not expect much popular support and even less that their movement would turn into a well-organized political party. Similarly, the Soviet authorities did not pay much attention to this movement. Several researchers have pointed out various internal factors that helped the movement to develop rapidly, but one of the main factors came from the outside: the beginning of the war in Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution of Iran, both in 1979.6 The Soviet government was no longer able to ignore the growing importance of the organization. By the mid-1980s, it was no longer a small circle consisting of a few young men, but a well-organized structure with numerous cells in many parts of the country. Consequently, the state arrested the founder of the movement, Ustod Nuri, on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda; but soon he was released from prison under the pressure of his supporters, who staged a demonstration near the regional office of the public prosecutor. In fact, this was the first demonstration in the history of Soviet Tajikistan. The authorities managed to arrest him only on their second attempt. When Ustod Nuri wanted to leave the district (oblast) where he lived; the court found him guilty and sentenced him to three years in prison. When he returned from prison, he continued his work. The politics of glasnost by Gorbachev offered a release from many restrictions and promoted national and religious identity among the population. In 1989, Muslims gathered at the

6 U w e Halbach 1996. Der Islam in der GUS. Die regionale und einzelstaatliche Ebene. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien 27; Saodat Olimova 2000. Islam and the Tajik conflict. In R. S a g d e e v and S. Eisenhower (eds.), Islam and Central Asia. Washington: Center for Political and Strategie Studies, pp. 59-71; Tim Epkenhans 2010. Muslim without learning, c l e r g y without faith. Institutions of Islamic learning in the Republic of Tajikistan. In M. Kemper, R. Motika and S. Reichmuth 2010, pp. 313-348.

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Organizing Committee in Moscow to found a Soviet Muslim political party for the first time, and Tajiks participated in this meeting. In the early 1990s, they conducted the first congress of the people's party Vozrojdenie (Revival) in the city of Astrakhan. I had a chance to participate in this historical event as a second-year student of Tajik University although we, young people, had not been invited. The Tajik delegates had been selected in strict privacy, and young members were not on the list of delegates. Hence, we learned about the congress only after the delegation was already on its way. But we were very eager to attend and thus I decided to go to Astrakhan on my own. I asked Ustod Muhammadsharif Himmatzoda, who was the spiritual leader of the group around Ustod Nuri, for permission to attend the congress. He blessed my trip and I flew to join the delegation in Astrakhan, which arrived later by train. Despite the administrative obstacles set up by the local authorities of Russia, the congress was held on 9 June 1990 in Astrakhan. The delegates organized in groups and attempted to register the party in Moscow and within the respective Union Republics. Although Moscow registered the All Union Party in June 1990, the Tajik branch was unable to obtain registration in Dushanbe on its first attempt. Because of the negative attitudes of state authorities, the Republican Congress of the Party was held not in the capital but in a suburban village of Chortut on 6 October 1990. The state authorities did not recognize the congress, but later in 1991 the party was recognized officially and it was possible to hold the next congress in the main hall of Dushanbe, the capital. Upon the end of the Soviet Union, the party actively took part in the governmental project »national solidarity«. The national solidarity project aimed to heal the country from the shock following the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the national solidarity project did not last due to various factors such as civil war, which unfortunately lasted more than five years and took the lives of ten thousand people. It is my contention that the Islamic factor

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did not play a major role in fuelling the war. Rather, localism, a power struggle among clans and the clash of ideas (old communist elite and new democratic religious claims) were responsible for the escalation of violence. 7 The political struggle increasingly made it necessary to pinpoint positions in terms of ideologies to mobilize people. On the one side, slogans such as »the restoration of the USSR« appeared most successful; on the other side, religious slogans were most appealing to youth.8 These two mutually exclusive ideologies and slogans led to a direct confrontation among the parties. Religion proved strong in uniting several opposition parties under a common United Tajik Opposition. Already by early 1993, over a hundred thousand Tajik citizens emigrated to Afghanistan, including supporters of the Islamic Revival Party, the Democratic Party and the movement Rostohez, which were the main oppositional forces.9 Later, the oppositional force turned into the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), under the leadership of Ustod Sayed Abdullah Nuri, who was the leader of the Islamic Party. Analysts argue that the reconciliation was made possible thanks to his leadership of the United Tajik Opposition. On 27 June 1997, after five years of civil war, the President of Tajikistan and the UTO leaders signed the Treaty of Peace and National Reconciliation in Moscow. This day remains in na-

7 Stéphane A. Dudoignon (ed.) 1994. Le Tadjikistan existe-t-il? Destins politiques d'une »nation imparfaite«. Cahier d'Études sur la Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien 18. 8 Valentin I. Bushkov 1995. Politische Entwicklung im nachsowjetischen Mittelasien: der Machtkampf in Tadschikistan 1989-1994. Berichte des Bundesinstituts für orientwissenschaßiche und internationale Studien, 4, Cologne; Valentin I. Bushkov and Dmitri V. Mikul'skiy. 1996. Anatomiya grazhdanskoy voyny v Tadzhikistane (ethno-sotsial'nye Protsessy i politicheskaya bor'ba 1992-1995) [Anatomy of the civil war in Tajikistan (ethnosocial processes and the politicai struggle 1992-1995)]. Institut ethnologii i antropologa RAN; Institute Prakticheskogo Vostokovedeniya. Moscow. 9 Guisssou Jahangiri 1994. Anatomie d'une crise. Le poids des tensions entre régions au Tadjikistan. Cahier d'Études surla Méditerranée Orientale et le Monde Turco-Iranien 18: 37-72.

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tional history as an event that prevented the disintegration and splitting of the country. One question remains however: would there have been peace if the leaders had not been Rakhmonov and Nuri? I believe that, yes, peace was possible also without these two leaders, but maybe not so fast and effective. At the Afghan conference in London, I put forward the argument that the difference between Tajikistan and Afghanistan was their leaders' authority. In Afghanistan there is no authority that would take full responsibility and lead people to peace and harmony. Yet, the personal role of the leaders is crucial in such situations. Probably an important part of the success of the peace agreement lies in individual leaders and their willingness to find a solution. Both of the leaders in the Tajik conflict not only recognized the peace agreement, but, even more important, they were able to induce their supporters to accept it. Today, we can look back to over ten years of peaceful coexistence and discuss existing problems and also positive achievements. Of course, we could have achieved a stronger peace, but the desire to end the war as soon as possible was strong among all alike. Therefore, some aspects were never finalized and several points remained unspecified in the peace agreement. These incomplete aspects and unspecified points are why certain requirements of the General Peace Agreement have never been implemented and remain the object of discussions in political and academic circles; but things have not moved beyond discussions. Thus, the members of the Islamic Party have proven that they can not only protect and defend their rights and interests, but also that they can participate in the peace process and in the nation-building project. I believe that this is the merit of a moderate Islam in Tajikistan, which was not only part of the peace process, but is also crucial in the postconflict construction of the national state.10

10 On post-conflict Tajikistan, see Suchandana Chatterjee 2002. Politics and society in Tajikistan. In the aftermath of the civil war. Gurgaon: Hope

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In the following I would like to briefly engage with discussions of »political Islam«. In particular, I will look at ideas of »political Islam« as analysts apply the term to active individuals, groups or political parties who base their ideology or value system on Islam. I do not agree with the separation of Islam into »political« and »apolitical«, and similarly I do not think that it makes sense to speak of »economic Islam« or »social Islam«. It is true that Islam covers all aspects of society and human life and it has a specific conceptual approach to questions and doctrinal requirements in regard to all areas of life. But the well-known principle »render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, to God what is God's« has not become part of the conception of how Islam and the state or Islam and politics relate. This does not mean that Christianity, Judaism or other religions are not engaged in political, economic or social life. In fact, there are thousands of political parties and groups around the world that directly or indirectly find orientation in religious principles and values, and most of them do not belong to the Muslim world. However, today the term »political« is usually applied to Islam, and Muslims appear the only ones to »politicize« religion. By the way, this is also true for other terms such as »terrorism«, »extremism«, »fundamentalism« etc. that are given an »Islamic face«. Most people today associate these terms with Muslims or Islamists. One could however classify differently, for instance depending on a person's social, ethnic, religious, national etc. affiliation or personal motivation. Let me give an example from yesterday's news that moved around the world. In Afghanistan, a suicide bomber blew himself up and killed a few soldiers. Without exception, the media called this an act of »terrorism« committed by Islamic radicals. At the same time, in Tehran, the car of an

India Publisher. J o h n H e a t h e r s h a w 2009. Post-conflict Tajikistan. The politics of peacebuilding and the emergence of legitimate order. L o n d o n : Routledge.

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atomic physicist was blown up and he and his family were killed. Here the same media referred to the perpetrator of this act as »a motorcyclist«. It was not even referred to as a crime. There are countless examples that promote the feeling that »terror« refers only to those acts committed by Muslims or so-called Islamists. Consequently, violent acts committed against Muslims or Islamic forces are categorized differently. Let me come back to Tajikistan. It has repeatedly been stated that the Central Asian states are in a nation-building process that is not yet completed. Every country has taken its own path; however, they have all placed the accent on »national peculiarities«. But no one can explain what these peculiarities of the nations really are, and why the people in the region who have been living side by side for centuries and used to be part of the same region, suddenly live in countries that fundamentally differ. Further, despite their claim to be building democracy on the base of national peculiarities, these countries have taken an authoritative path. While Kazak and Uzbek authoritarian regimes have been firmly established, the situation of Tajikistan is different. The peace process prepared the ground for a freer and more plural society than some of the neighbouring countries. It should however be emphasized that only the ground has been established, nothing more. Hence, our ability to use that moment (the peace agreement) as a real opportunity to develop this potential has been limited. I think Tajikistan has missed many moments and opportunities to build a more open and well-developed society. The internal and external conditions after the peace process could have been more conducive to better achievements than what we have now. People were tired of the war and were longing for peace and stability and craved labour and constructive endeavour. International actors (the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the US, Russia, Iran, Germany) encourage peace and democratic developments. In the first years, these international actors supported Tajikistan a lot. Post-conflict development in Tajikistan has been an example for many

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countries and the pride of many international organizations and states that participated in the peace process. I believe that we are relying too much on this success and have neglected to strengthen and develop the foundations into a democratic society. What was the role of the IRP in the post-conflict development of Tajikistan? Probably the most important merit of the IRP is that the party remained loyal to its promise of peace despite the difficulties and provocations from the side of the state and that it has not changed its course towards peace and stability of the society. The party has proven its stance as a relevant power in the political arena and has supported a constructive and meaningful dialogue that has helped solve various issues, even difficult and controversial ones. Taking into account the population's increasing religious identification, the IRP became a kind of mediator and stabilizer of political tension, for instance for the religious voters during the elections in 2010. Increasingly, the population of Central Asia is turning to Islam for self-identification, a process that is accompanied by an increase in radical forces among the population. Within Central Asia, Tajik people are often pointed out for their religiosity and conservative behaviour. At the same time, this protects them from the influence of extremists or radical ideas, and many see precisely here the main role of a legal party that incorporates religious value. It was necessary for the IRP to rethink its previous activities and future program to realize its new role after signing the peace agreement. Behind us lie an era of semi-legal activities and the struggle for the survival of the party. Today the IRP faces the test of time and we will see whether it will be able to bear the heavy burden. IRP is the only legal religious party in Central Asia; therefore, it must balance between the realities of the region and its difficult mission. The party's main goal is to peacefully coexist with all views and forces, both domestically and abroad. The party accepted the special program to build a trusting relation to all and to create a good atmosphere within the party. The program

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has four directions: creating trusting relations a) within the party, b) with the society, c) with elites and d) with the international community. It was necessary to struggle and break down all the negative stereotypes that emerged in recent years around Islam and the Islamic party. The problems demanded a lot of energy and resources. But in the end we record rather good results, especially concerning relations within the party, with the society and with the international community. The result with the national political elite was less successful, but to understand this, we need some more contextual details. After the death of Ustod Nuri in 2006 there were many rumours that the party might split into two groups. Analysts discussed that the party consisted of two internal, competing groups: the conservative wing and the modernists. As long as Ustod Nuri, a charismatic leader, had been the head of the party, he could guarantee stability and unity within the party, they said, but his death would inevitably split the members. The reason for this assumption was that problems and issues were discussed openly within the party, allowing for different views and positions. There are several examples in the political life of the country over the last ten years in which we have witnessed the split or the end of a party after the retirement of the founder or leader (Socialist Party, Democratic Party). In the case of the IRP, the majority considered internal dialogue the weakest point of the party; however, it turned out to be its strongest side. Thanks to the internal dialogue, many questions concerning the life of the party could be solved and sharp corners were polished. This strengthened the party's identity, because everyone knew that different views would be considered and discussed. New leadership was necessary to strengthen the party and increase mutual trust among members with various views and approaches. Today the party not only disproved this rumour and got rid of a possible split, but also dispelled the myth of an internal ideological faction. Different opinions, views and ideas

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are natural and an important contribution to the solution of problems. The election of February 2010 has been a touchstone of the trusting relation between the party and Tajik society. For the first time, representatives of national minorities gave their voice to the party. Although these were not many, it was a positive indicator for us. Especially the Russianspeaking part of the population not only voted, but also offered help. After all, the position of the party was the result of the post-war consequences. The party officially received about 8% of the votes11 during the election and entered parliament as the second-largest party after the ruling People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan. However, international observers have criticized that the elections were not transparent and democratic. Therefore, the percentages do not reflect the actual support of any party. The IRP had taken several steps to get closer to the various sectors of society, especially with the intelligentsia. In this way, youth leaders, women and the intelligentsia were attracted and joined IRP. In the early 1990s, only two to three people among the leaders of the party had a university education; today most of the members of the presidium of the party (which consists of 59 persons) come from among the intelligentsia; they are well-educated people, and several hold degrees of higher education ( k a n d i d a t nauk). The average age of the members of the presidium is below 45 years. However, despite the fact that women constitute more than half of the party members (more than 40 thousand members), they are not yet equally represented in the party's leadership. But we are working on this, and the new political council of the party already includes women. Nevertheless, the party has still to work a lot to defuse stereotypes about Islam and the party, not only in Tajikistan.

11

Unofficial sources report that about 40% of the votes went to the IRP

(comment by Sophie Roche).

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The relationships between the IRP party and the international community have been constructive. International organizations maintain mutual and friendly relations. The representatives of the party meet periodically with the diplomatic corps, participate in various international events, both within the country and abroad, and actively engage in discussion with international scientific and political experts. Also with the Tajik elite, including governmental representatives, trusting relations have been established, there are mutual understanding and good intentions, and cooperation on major issues such as nation-state-building projects has taken place. According to the National Reconciliation Commission, parties enjoyed equal representation, but had no direct bilateral meetings - the reason being that they had established trust and understanding throughout the peace process. It is important that each side feels and sees the limits of its activities; this is crucial not only for the relationship between them, but also for the society. The leaders of the parties have gone through the reconciliation process and know the difficulties and subtleties accompanying such a process. We are confident that the situation is under control now. The primary guarantor of the stable relationships is the presence of Emomali Rahmon, the president of the country and one of those who signed the peace agreement. The current leadership of the IRP not only works in agreement with the Commission of National Reconciliation, but also continues the political path paved by Ustod Nuri who signed the peace agreement in the name of the party. We are confident that the wish for a common peace will prevail in all the decisions taken by both government and opposition in the future. But the time factor is crucial; sometimes we do not have enough time to rethink and understand the essence of what happens. The people, their attitudes and their approaches, as well as the reality in which we live, are changing. Besides the president and a few other people in the government and in the IRP, most people today have not participated in the peace process. The new generation that did not see and participate in that process

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raises new questions: Can we say confidently that the spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation will be preserved in a couple of years? In principal, I would say yes, also for the future. I hope that it will be like that. But we should not be too confident, because the Tajiks were already victims of such confidence once before. Therefore it is better to take preventive measures to eradicate possible causes and factors that promote conflicts. We need concrete steps to build sustainable trust in the society. The IRP has taken steps in this direction; however, we have to admit that work has not been going well these last years. As shown above, the IRP works well in three of its cooperations, but feels less secure about its relation with the governmental elites. A trusting relationship with the state authority shall, however, help the party in its self-critical work. Usually we rely on prompt and adequate reaction in relation to different layers of the Tajik society and at the international level. Our readiness to cooperate and engage in dialogue with the ruling party and other opposition parties qualifies us as a political party of a democratic county in which views and opinions can be openly debated. While some of our views coincide with the politics of the government, in other matters our opinion contradicts it. But not only in Tajikistan do state authorities perceive criticism as inappropriate. Tajikistan is not the worst country in this matter; I don't say this on the basis of my conventional patriotism, but as a reality with which we deal every day in the region. Sometimes, the opposition is really being the opposition, and sometimes it plays a mere role on stage. If we happen to criticize the government, then we do only softly and on minor issues. Any confrontation on a political issue or demand for reform is an affront and beyond the possibility of the political context. If the opposition demands that its place in society be acknowledged, it risks being termed a »dangerous force« or an »extremist party«. Hence, oppositional work is only limited in Tajik democracy. One of the problems the current government has failed to solve is the relation between religion and the state. Instead

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of regulating meaningfully, any event depends on personal attitudes and patronage networks, rather than on professional decision-taking processes. Thus the measures taken against religious activities in 2010 and 2011 are the subjective actions of individual state authorities. For instance, the ban on praying at one's workplace, the ban on wearing hijab for female students, the ban on attending mosque prayers for citizens under age 18 and the ban on women visiting mosques for prayer have alienated the state from the people and failed to find constructive solutions. Under these conditions, the IRP is increasing its efforts towards dialogue and cooperation with all sectors of society in the region and abroad. Even if results are not promptly reached, we will continue on this path; however, it is not yet clear whether we will find dialogue partners beyond Tajikistan. Will we have to resign ourselves to the role and (tight) framework within which oppositions in Central Asia can express themselves? Will it be possible to balance the different roles of the IRP as the only religious party in the region, the strongest opposition party in the country and the representative of moderate Islam and still resist the increasing pressure from certain circles?

Chapter 7

Alikhan M. Baimenov

Dr. Alikhan Baimenov is an expert and consultant at the Institute of National Research in Kazakhstan. Having accomplished the Moscow Motor-Road Institute in 1988, he became Deputy Dean of the Mining-Mechanical faculty in the Zhezkazgan branch of the Karaganda Polytechnic Institute of Motor Transport (1981-1992). Since 1989, he has actively engaged in politics with the first movement »Ulytau«, of which he was the leader. He then held the offices of Deputy Minister of Labour (1995-1996), the Deputy Head of the Administration Office of the President of the Republic Kazakhstan (1996-1997), the Head of the Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (1997-1998) and other important positions. From 2002 on, Alikhan Baimenov engaged in the democratic party »Ak Zhol«, through which he made an effort to reform politics through social engagement. His primary interests are the socio-political transformation of Kazakhstan and the role of Islamic morality in Kazakh society. His political engagements since 1986 have been based on an idea of a national identity and Kazakh culture.

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Autobiography I was born in 1959 in a large family in the town of Karsakpai. I was the eighth of nine children. Karsakpai is located in the Ulytau region, which is about 70 kilometres to the west of the city of Zhezkazgan. My village is well known in Kazakhstan because it has the largest copper industry. The whole Zhezkazgan industrial complex was a part of the corporation »Kazakhmys« that started its activities from the factory of Karsakpai. English concessionaires constructed the factory. Karsakpai was a working settlement; most people were employed in the copper-smelting factory. At the same time, Karsakpai was the centre of Sovkhoz (Sel'skiy Soviet/Village Council), and, as a result, the unique environment was reshaped. On the one hand, the local population mainly consisted of peasants living from agricultural work, who preserved folk traditions and Kazakh culture as well as oral traditions. On the other hand, the working community of the copper-smelting factory was multinational. It was an environment where open discussions were possible and straightforward, while the multicultural environment allowed a child to understand that people had different cultures and different ethnic origins. Despite the social problems of that period and the criminality in Karsakpai, I studied there until the fifth grade. Then in 1971 my parents moved to Zhezkazgan, where we had a lot of opportunities, various groups, sports sections etc. They had a very good park, considering the small population of the city, with a small stadium where every weekend the local population organized and participated in the various sport competitions. I think this was the main advantage of that new location. The outstanding scientist and geologist Kanysh Satpayev, who worked in Karsakpai, had a great impact on Karsakpai's schoolchildren. He was also the first President of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan. He conducted a significant part of his initial research work in Karsakpai. His

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apartment was just across the street from the school. Later it was turned into a museum. The schoolchildren were frequent visitors to that museum. In the late 1960s, Akhmetov, who, as they said, was sent from Leningrad where he had taught at the university, became the director of this museum. He involved us in research; we would search for quartzite, which was quite common in our region. In the Kazakh language it is called »sutas«. He used to tell us that the most beautiful quartzite that we find in the hills would be placed in the showcase. Certainly for me personally the image of Satpayev became one of the driving motivations to engage in science and follow my desire to learn more about the world in future. The scientist Baikonurov, who earlier on had studied at our school, also influenced us positively. He was a model to us and we knew that if we studied very hard, we could make similar high achievements even if we had lived in remote places. Moreover, in my childhood I also used to hear a lot about the scientist Sharmanov, who was the Minister of Health for twelve years. Our parents and his parents lived in the same neighbourhood, and my father and his father were good friends. I am glad to be a good friend of Sharmanov; we are thirty years apart in age, but this does not affect our friendship. My mother used to point to Sharmanov's childhood as an example, as he was a young man who studied well at school and was good in sports and music. I would also like to mention other famous people from the region, such as Zaure Omarova, who was the Minister of Social Welfare and the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The exemplary life of these people together with the unique environment that I mentioned above beneficially influenced young people in Karsakpai. However, the most important examples for me were, of course, my parents. My father was named Muhammedya and my mother Khadisha. My father was a highly educated man of his time. Besides the Kazakh language, he also knew Russian, Arabic, Persian and Chagatai - a Turkic language

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of the Middle Ages. We have preserved the remnants of their family library in our house. The reason I use »remnants« is that since 1929 the Arabic script, which had been used for a thousand years, was replaced by the Latin and later in 1940 by the Cyrillic alphabet. This went along with a cultural genocide committed by the Soviet power. There was a persecution of Arabic-speakers, of religious experts and of all those who held texts written in Arabic script. It was only after the independence of Kazakhstan in 1991 that w e learned that there had been more than three hundred uprisings against Soviet rule between the years 1920 and 1930. The clergy led most of these uprisings. Undoubtedly, the clergy, as the enlightened elite of Kazakh society, had already sensed before anybody else the coming threat of cultural homogenization that was part of the cultural policy of the Soviet power. When war against books in Arabic script and the clergy began, our family, according to my father's telling, buried four chests of books in the steppes, keeping only the most necessary ones; these w e r e 20-30 books, among them the Qur'an, the story of the Prophet, the hadith, »Divani Hikmat«, Hodja Ahmet Yassawi, » T h e Shahname« of Ferdowsi, all of them in original language published in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries and even earlier. Actually, last year the head of the archive of Zhezkazgan gave me copies of my father's documents from 1939 and it appears clearly that he concealed his language skills from the Soviet authorities. Throughout the 16 or 17 years of his studies, until 1925, he wrote down his biography of the time when he worked f o r the local rich man (bai). He studied in his native place, a village near Karsakpai, where the Bileuty and Bulanty Rivers flow. This is a place known in history. For example, in 1724-1725, for the first time the Kazakh forces united and successfully defeated the Jungars. And 140 kilometres to the north lie the sacred mountains of Ulytau, a place of importance to all Kazakhs. Ulytau was the birthplace of my mother. After finishing his studies in his native village, my father continued to study in the small

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settlement of Karnak, which today is the madrasa of Aktas in what is now the Kyzylorda region, South Kazakhstan. My father died in December 1984. Before his death, I was accepted for an internship in Moscow in February 1984. In the summer of that year I brought newspapers from Egypt, Afghanistan and other countries published in the Arabic and Farsi languages and asked my father to translate them. My father smiled at me, saying that I was checking him. He translated those texts and then I showed them to aspirantura students from Arabic countries, Afghanistan and other countries and they confirmed that he knew Arabic and Farsi languages very well. In fact the quality of education in the madrasa must have been very high; they w e r e taught well languages, history, geography and astronomy and even the foundations of mathematics, because even without reading those 20-30 books and without practicing for fifty years since the persecution of 1929-1930, he had preserved his language skills. My father was twice subjected to repressions. The first time was in 1931; his children did not know about this. Only last year, through the Internet, in the materials of the Russian chronicles I found documents about him showing that in 1931 he was subjected to repression under article 58-10 of the Criminal Code of the USSR. I requested the material from the archives. He was an educated person and had been elected to the village council. The charge brought against him was that during the dispossession he had struggled that the peasants should not give all of their bread away. The ideologists of the Communist Party considered this act rendering assistance to kulaks. The second time my father was subjected to repression was in 1949-1950, when he was a Chairman of Ulytau District Consumers Union and during a meeting criticized the leadership of the district. They immediately fabricated a case against him. They did so by using a local person who wrote slander against my father. What is amazing is that after 30 years this man, whose children had gone to school with us, when he felt his last days w e r e coming, sent a letter to my father through his children in which he apolo-

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gized for his action and asked my father to read the last prayer, once he dies. My father agreed to read the prayer for him and told him that he forgave him long ago and that it was the duty of every Muslim to forgive the mistakes of other Muslims. Another similar case I remember occurred when my father began organizing the building of a mosque in Zhezkazgan in the late 1970s. The construction of this mosque took him three and half years. At that time it was a very complicated procedure to register and open a mosque. First of all, one had to register a community with at least one hundred members. The demand had to pass the City Council, the Commissioner for Religious Affairs, the Executive Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, and after this it was necessary to get permission from the Mufti, whose seat was in Tashkent. Eventually all documents w e r e sent to Moscow, from where the authorities in Moscow gave the decisive permission. Thirty years later, the head of the ideological department of the regional committee admitted that they intentionally worked against my father. The regional committee installed an Executive Committee; then they gave the instruction to delay the process, so they did not consider the issue for 29 days and only on the 30th day did they consider the issue and find that some full stops, some commas and grammatical mistakes had to be corrected. He told me that my father was never indignant, he would simply take away the documents and bring the corrected version the next day, but they would do the same again and stretch the time for another half year. They did so because the opening of a mosque was viewed unfavourably. When it seemed impossible to restrain the opening of the mosque, the KGB ordered other mullahs to act against my father and the opening of the mosque. Only then did I understand the hidden agenda of the state. When the mosque had almost been registered, there were two incidents. The first was when my father sent somebody to g e t the stamp from Tashkent; it was withheld for a long time. The second incident was that one of the local mullahs tried to frighten my father with a knife and attacked him. Accord-

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ing to the eyewitnesses, my father remained upright and kept praying without moving and the mullah stopped. This person, too, wrote a letter to my father before his death, apologizing for his actions and asking my father to pray for him. This was an example and lesson for us. My father was a public figure and a spiritual leader. Apart from the organization of the mosque, he did not have any official status; but thanks to his knowledge, he was treated with respect. Our father lived an ascetic way of life. On the one hand, our financial situation did not allow him to behave differently, as he had nine children (six sons and three daughters). Disregarding the difficulties, his main priority was to gain knowledge, to study and to engage in science. I remember that when I graduated from the polytechnical institute in Zhezkazgan, I was sent to the agro-technical factory as a mechanical engineer. My salary there was set at 145 roubles, plus a bonus every quarter, which in all amounted to 170 to 180 roubles. Within two weeks I was invited to a post as the assistant of the teacher with a salary of 120 roubles. In this way, I lost half my salary, which was a significant loss to the family. But my father was delighted when he heard about my position and told me that to be a teacher means to do a great work and enjoy great happiness. On the other hand, my father was a very disciplined and organized person. He would come from meetings or some other events and ask for 20 minutes rest before continuing his work once he woke up. He would definitely wake up after 20 minutes and he again fully engaged in his tasks. He was brought up in a traditional way. Ten of us lived in a 44-m2 apartment of. We had a small corridor where my father used to turn on lights and read his books until late in the night. He studied in that corridor in order not to bother my mother and his children when they were sleeping. I remember that the kitchen was always free and had chairs. But my father used to read on a stool in the corridor. Maybe the kitchen, for men of his generation, was a solely female place or maybe it was not allowed to bring the sacred books to the kitchen.

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My teaching courses would start close to lunchtime, around 11 or 12 o'clock. However, my father always told me to leave for work at 9:00 in the morning, saying that during working hours a man should be at work. I had to go either to the library or play tennis with my colleagues. He was a real fighter. The Zhezkazgan city council party, knowing of his culture and education, used to send future teachers of philosophy and history of the CPSU to our house so that they would discuss with my father. I remember my father debating always with dignity, without raising his voice and explaining his point of view very thoroughly. They would go home satisfied with the conversation. Later when I worked at the institute, they gratefully told me about their experience with my father and the conversations they had conducted with him. Eventually the mosque was opened, in 1982. The building was bought with the money collected and turned into the mosque. In the late 1980s and 1990 a new mosque was built on the base of that mosque. I therefore think that my father had a very difficult life; however, at the end of his life he received satisfaction from the fact that he could open the mosque in the regional centre despite the difficulties of the Soviet period. This remained a unique event in the Soviet period of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some of the people who made his life very difficult realized their mistakes and apologized for their actions, which also brought him some relief. In general, he was a determined man. When he was subjected to repression for the second time and dismissed from his position, my mother with their four children waited for him in Karsakpai, while he was still struggling to seek truth. He was unemployed and invented for himself a new challenge: before he used to write with his right hand, but in his fiftieth year, he began to learn how to write with his left hand. The rest of his life he wrote with his left hand. Now I think he would constantly set himself new challenges in order to go on and not give up.

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My mother supported him throughout his life. She was the keeper of the local traditions. Her father had been an orator in Ulytau region - Tursun Tynymbaiuly. He was also subjected to repressions because he was religiously educated and well respected among his own people. He had been a person with progressive views. Unfortunately, I did not have a chance to meet my grandfather and grandmother. When I was born, my father was 57 years old and my mother was 39 years old. In principle, the fact that our family was a traditional family means we can say that the relationship between my parents and us children was at the same time like parents and children and like grandparents and grandchildren. Concerning the politics, we witnessed our father's experience with the state and knew parts of his life. He did not like to tell us much about his own life and that of his parents. His principle was: when good things happened they should not be talk about widely; rather the duty of the Muslims is before God. But we received some scraps of information, so in school we saw some of the absurdities, such as the events in Czechoslovakia or the Chilean event. We tried to get students involved in a political campaign at school. As a response to these events, internal protest grew. I tried to avoid the Komsomol (Young Communist League) and Party activities. As a good student at school, I was automatically included as a member of the Komsomol committee. And at the institute I was forcibly included in the Bureau of the Komsomol. Already during my student years, we began to discuss the policy of the Soviet power together with students from the faculty of social sciences. I used to discuss especially with Shamil Balabekov, my classmate who now lives in Moscow. We used to discuss the principle of the right of nations to self-determination and national cultures and about position of culture. Today I am grateful to those teachers who did not denounce the content of these discussions to the relevant authorities (remember that it was the mid-1970s),

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otherwise w e would have had difficulties with the state authorities. While earning a doctorate in Moscow at the graduate school (aspirantura), I lived for four years in the university dormitory where there were representatives from different regions of the USSR, including the Baltic States, Ukraine and the Caucasus republics. We had lively discussions, sometimes until late in the night. In December 1986, there was a revolt of Kazakh youth. And we collected signatures for a petition to the Central Committee and even considered going out to the streets of Moscow. Some Kazakhs, students or employees of the KGB, visited us in the dormitories in Moscow and warned us that everybody knew about our plans and if we went out to the street we would be caught and expelled from the university. Therefore, w e decided to only submit a petition at a public meeting on 18 or 19 December during the poetry evening of Mukhtar Shakhanov in the House of Writers on Gerzen Street. And a young man named Yerbol, a native of the Aktobe region, handed over the petition on behalf of us all. Of course, the December revolt played a crucial role in our lives. After that, many of our fellow students from various republics changed their attitudes towards us and started to respect us Kazakhs for our courage. We got sketchy details of the revolt from home. Whenever I called my mother - by that time my father was no longer among us - she worried about possible repressions and strongly discouraged; she told me not to talk too much because she was afraid that the next wave of repressions would come. While flying from Moscow to Zhezkazgan in 1988 or 1989, I read for the first time about the newly opened nuclear tests site of Semipalatinsk. I was very angry and, in emotional turmoil, I wrote poems that Yerken Zhabaginov later put to music. The song is called »Semipalatinsk-Saryozek Baikonur«. This generated a new sense of protest. Once I arrived in Moscow, a f e w graduates of the Moscow universities decided to organize a social movement. I became the coordinator of the social organization » U l y t a u « and later

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its chairman. We started pressuring the military, first, to remove rocket fragments; second, to warn local people about the upcoming launch and ask them to avoid falling fragments; third, not to place radar stations in proximity to human settlements; and fourth, not to destroy cultural monuments. In an attempt to register this social organization »Ulytau« we faced the first conflict with local authorities. It is important to mention that we were still in the Soviet period. The city council did not want to register this organization for a long time. To be on the safe side and avoid responsibilities, they invited the First Secretary of the City Committee to the meeting. During this meeting we addressed the issue of registering the organization »Ulytau«, and he started accusing me of nationalism because the organization was named »Ulytau«. I told them that Ulytau was not only a sacred site in the history of Kazakhstan but also a unique ecological system. A month later I threatened to sue the case, and then we were permitted to register the organization. »Ulytau« became the circle for many active citizens of the Zhezkazgan region. Informal associations also joined us. Simultaneously, »Ulytau« started to be the base for an antinuclear movement called »Nevada-Semipalatinsk« within the regional branch of Zhezkazgan. I became the chairman of the regional branch. We actively participated in the anti-nuclear movement. When, in 1989, the first democratic elections of the Soviet Union were held, with the consensus of the movement I ran for Deputy of the Provincial Council and won the regional elections. My engagement in the Regional Council gradually involved me in problems of regional dimensions. So I was elected Chairman of the Commission's Regional Council for Environmental Issues. As a result, I contributed to solving some of the problems that had been raised by the movement »Ulytau« and »Nevada-Semipalatinsk«. I continued this work after Kazakhstan's declaration of independence. At that moment, I was working primarily at the Zhezkazgan Polytechnic Institute, where I was the Assistant to the Dean.

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During this period, changes were taking place in the administration, such as that the regional executive committees were replaced by regional administrations. The Head of Regional Administration of Zhezkazgan, Yurchenko, invited me to become his Deputy for Health, Education, Culture, Youth Policy, Physical Culture and Sports. I worked in this position from 1992 to 1994. Of course, this was a new volume of work and new challenges. We had to work very hard as the country entered the transition phase and we faced many difficulties in financing the social and cultural sphere. By 1994, I had participated in many republican events where I met many young civil servants of the central governmental agencies, my new colleagues. When elections were held for the Supreme Council in March 1994, it seemed to me natural to take part in the elections. However, the head of the regional administration did not support my intentions. The election was hard, as was the winter of 1993-1994. It was cold and many homes in Zhezkazgan, where I stood for election, had no electricity or heating system, and people were cooking outdoors. All of this led to additional difficulties. But I was aware of the problems of ordinary people and I did not lose contact with them. My being from the region, my previous activities with »Ulytau« and other initiatives that I carried out as the Deputy of the Regional Administration helped me to win the elections. We worked for one year on the Supreme Council of the thirteenth convocation. I was the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which helped me to expand my horizons and take on new responsibility. Conversation with deputies, like-minded persons and friends and discussion of various questions helped me to prepare for the next stage. This was in 1995, when I was appointed Deputy Minister of Labour and simultaneously the President appointed me Vice President of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. Perhaps my technical education and scientific engagement, along with my personal interests in history and culture, my work within the educational sphere and my work in the social sphere in Zhezkazgan, influenced my work with

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social problems. I think that a technical education shapes a person specifically. In brief, this is the path I took to become a politician.

Selected

publication

Gosudarstvennaya sluzhba: mezhdunarodnyy opyt: Kazakhstanskaya model [Public service. International experience. Kazakhstani model], Astana: Foliant, 2000.

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State and Religion: Faith in the Context of Modernization Alikhan Baimenov

The search for the optimal model of interaction between state and religion for Central Asia in general, and for Kazakhstan in particular, is one of the key challenges of the coming decades. What do I mean by this? Firstly, in Kazakhstan we find that the renaissance of statehood coincides with the renaissance of religion. Secondly, we can observe that spiritual and cultural identities are the key features of social development. Thirdly, until independence, our country, like all post-Soviet republics, experienced a degradation of values (i.e. the lack of unified moral and cultural values, because of the suppression by the Soviet power). The formation of new values (especially concerning public morality) was based on religion, which, as the experience of mankind shows, is the most powerful institution. The blurred values are by and large the result of the historical events of the twentieth century. By this I mean, for example, the conversion of the Kazakh alphabet in 1929 from Arabic script, which had been used for thousands of years, to Latin characters and after 11 years to the Cyrillic alphabet. Consequently, 90 % of the Kazakhs now cannot read such great writers as Abay (1845-1904) and Makhambet (1804-1846), Shakarim (1858-1931) and Magzhan (18931938), the remarkable period of Alashorda (government of the nineteenth century) in which political and educational activities are discussed in the early twentieth century, not

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to mention Al-Farabi and Yassawi.1 Along with these changes came a complete destruction of political, cultural and economic elites, as well as the clergy. On top of this, in the 1930s, people went through a terrible famine, which took the lives of nearly 40% of the population and caused enormous damage to moral values. In other words, our people had almost no strength left to preserve and transmit cultural habits and traditions to future generations. Independence in 1991, globalization and new social and political conditions compel us to search intensely for the answer to the question »Who Are We?« and to ponder our cultural and civilizational identity. At international forums, historians have noted an increase in interest in cultural identity in all regions. 2 Some experts have emphasized that sacred texts are one of the basic features of the modern boundaries of civilizations, which almost everywhere coincide with the boundaries of one of the world's religions (Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism have also created religious canons that are more similar to religion than to philosophy).3 In this context, the question has arisen of how compatible Islam and modernization are, which I see as the main challenge of the coming decades. Obviously, modernization is impossible without a solid social capital. In turn, social capital is based on values such as justice, fairness, trust,

1 Nysanbayev traces the prominent thinkers of Islamic philosophy, culture and spirituality in Central Asia through Al-Farabi, Abu Ali Ibn Sina, Hodja Akhmed Yassawi, Abay Kunanbaiuly (nineteenth century) and Shakarim Kudayberdiev. This genealogy of enlightened people has entered the canon of national heroes in Kazakhstan. Nysanbayev sees them as the source of the rebirth of the Kazakh national culture and spirituality of the twentyfirst century. Abdumalik Nysanbayev 2004. Kazakhstan: Cultural inheritance and social transformation. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. 2 See also Chapter 1, 5 and 8 in this volume. 3 See for instance, Samuel Huntington 2004. Who are we? The challenges to America's national identity. New York: Simon & Schuster.

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work and knowledge. Observing the growing interest in religion as an objective and natural process, the elite of Kazakhstan should use religion in the interest of modernization and furthermore should regard both Islam and modernity as universal values. Of course, whether the increase of belief in religious values will work in the interest of modernization will depend on the ruling elite, on the clergy, on scientists, philosophers and intellectuals and on whether they succeed in developing common approaches to these new values and the restoration of lost values. If they succeed, they should develop a universal model framework that includes code of ethics for modern Kazakhstan - a code that combines the best of our traditions - is competitive and is based on Islamic ethics. Elites should be attentive that, along with the revival of the traditional Islam, that is, the Hanafi madhhab - which has proven its vitality and respect for national cultures over the millennia - there have emerged religious circles that implant non-traditional currents of Islam (Wahhabism, Salafism etc.) on Kazakh ground. We have to remember that we entered independence with a very small educated religious elite, because the Soviet authorities had destroyed the whole system of spiritual education. As a result, young people studied and are studying in countries with different religious practices and often have teachers from different madhhabs (not Hanafi but Shafi'i, Maliki or Hanbali). In addition, young people who seek to increase their knowledge about faith are confronted with the low qualifications of many of the clergy. Consequently they turn to koranists, Salafis and Wahhabis who have appeared. Some people do not understand the essence of Sufism, and so they attempt to view it as a separate school of thought of Islam. Over the centuries, Islam has been shaping the cultural space where it developed and has affected the culture of different nations. Simultaneously, religious practices have been infused by local traditions and local spiritual practices. Consequently, some pre-Islamic traditions of the Arabs and Persians (such as the covering of the face) were transferred

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through people with Islamic culture and today are seen as part of the shari'a. It is also not surprising that some pay attention to Tengrianism, a shamanic belief in the steppes. These believers do not understand the difference between religion in the modern sense and pre-religious beliefs. 4 All these issues require discussions and reflections, not only by the clergy but also by philosophers, scientists, artists and political elites. SAMK should play a catalytic role in roundtables, workshops and conferences so to raise awareness. It is however important that the Muftiate does not repel followers of non-traditional streams of Islam, but should patiently, as befits spiritual leaders, explain the true doctrine. Concerning the pre-Islamic period, we should follow a constructive thesis because Tengrianism, as a monotheistic belief, played a positive role in preparing our ancestors to adopt Islam. It is remarkable that over the past thousand years, none of our thinkers and leaders on the national level thought outside of Islam. Thus ceremonial representatives of Tengrianism such as the Bakhshy (shaman) had a marginal and isolated role in society. It is enough to recall the following lines of Abai Kunanbaiuly (1845-1904): »[...] molasynday baksynyng zhalgyz qaldym tap shynym« 5 (Truly, I am left alone, as the tomb of the shaman) which means that shamans were not even allowed to be buried in community cemeteries. The last census showed that more than 70% of the residents of Kazakhstan considered themselves Muslims. The task of modernizing society in Kazakhstan on the basis of Islamic values can be met if people learn more about the

4 In the Ancient Turkic world, Tengrianism incorporated the cult of the Sky God Tengri and elements of shamanism, animism, totemism and ancestor worship. 5 Abai Kunanbaiuly (in Russian: Kunanbaev) was a Kazakh poet, philosopher and activist and is seen as the founder of Kazakh written literature. The quote is taken from the play »Segiz ayaq«, 1889 (private copy).

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progressive role of Islam in the history of mankind. It is also important to emphasize the common values of the world religions, including Islam, Christianity and Judaism. Concretely, our clergy could mention more often that Islam recognizes the prophets Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa) and Jesus (Isa), for instance, and that the Bible is recognized as divine revelation. Further, I believe that it would be useful to remind people of the periods when the Islamic world was a centre of scientific developments, especially mathematics, astronomy, geography and medicine. While they called Al-Farabi the »second-greatest teacher«, they thought of Aristotle as the first-greatest. This period also laid the groundwork for the European Renaissance. The revival of religion should not lead us to oppose other cultural groups and civilizations. In this regard, it is important that our umma (religious community) learn from the clergy about earlier Islamic states and their ideas of tolerance towards people of different ethnic belonging, nation and cultures. I believe that it is Islam's rank as a world religion helped Kazakhs to survive the tsarist and Soviet period and to preserve their cultural and spiritual identity. For comparison, if we look at the southern ethnic groups, they strictly adhered to Islam and maintained religious practices throughout the Soviet period, while the northern ethnic groups, whose spiritual practice remained at the level of pre-religious beliefs, almost lost their cultural identity. And does anyone know that most of the revolts that took place in Kazakhstan in the twentieth century, when members of the Alashorda were massacred and the leaders exiled, were headed by the Muslim clergy? They were well aware of the consequences that the expansion of atheism (in the Soviet period, when religion was forbidden and atheism took over) would bring. These people were highly educated, as I can judge by looking at the education of my father, who studied in religious schools between about 1910 and probably 1923. Until the end of his life in 1984, although he had no opportunity to practice his language skills, he retained a solid command of Arabic,

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Persian and Chagatai, as well as a good knowledge of astronomy, mathematics and oriental literature. This testifies to the quality of teaching in those schools ( m a d r a s a s ) . Recently I was given a four-volume commentary on Islamic law titled » H i d o « (comments on Muslim law), published in Moscow in Russian, which was written in the twelfth century by a native of Central Asia, Burhanuddin Marginani. I was amazed to learn that, as early as the seventh to eighth centuries, the substantive rights of women had carefully been spelled out; the same applied to the relationship between shareholders and managers and between lenders and borrowers. Unfortunately, most of our fellow citizens are not aware of this heritage. We need translations of such works into the Kazakh language. I believe that the revival of religion creates demand for better interpretations of the meaning of the Qur'an. Cooperation in this matter among the clergy, scientists, philosophers and writers would help many Kazakh philosophical terms and concepts to return into state language. The Constitution proclaims that Kazakhstan is a secular state. The interpretation of this concept is also the subj e c t of serious debate. We see that in developed countries various models of interaction between religion and the state are being implemented. Secularization does not imply a complete separation from spiritual and civilizational roots. Religious ethics are largely reflected in the norms of modern law. Fear of God served as a basis for and as the precursor of legal consciousness in most of the population. The schools teach the basics of religion. Intellectuals and artists are well aware of the stories of the sacred texts. In some developed countries, religion is included in the constitution. A Norwegian friend, for instance, told me that from the elementary school on, Norwegian children learn that the road to paradise goes through faith, labour and justice. I believe that such an education - along with other factors - is the basis for the socio-economic prosperity of Norway. Our clergy, in collaboration with scientists, philosophers and artists, needs to publish brochures such

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as »Islam and science«, »Islam and knowledge«, »Islam and work« and »Islam and justice«. This will keep destructive forces from using the religious revival for their nefarious pseudo-religious objectives. Spiritual leaders should engage in the cultivation of good values in society, and people educated with such values will be able to build an equitable, socially-oriented state in which there are strong economic, legal and moral barriers to the spread of extremism and fundamentalism. Now a new quality of our society is being formed, a new generation of Kazakhstanis has grown up, for which strong spiritual roots are natural and necessary. Cooperation between the state and religion should ensure the use of the law-governed process for the prosperity of Kazakhstan.

Chapter 8

Elmira Köchümkulova

Dr. Elmira Köchümkulova is a senior research fellow at the Mountain Societies Research Centre (MSRC) at the University of Central Asia in Bishkek, Kyrgysstan. She received her BA and MA from the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization, and her PhD from the Interdisciplinary Program in Near and Middle Eastern Studies at the Universtity of Washington in Seattle in 2007. Her research interest is the nomadic cultures and oral traditions of Turkic Central Asia with a focus on the funeral rituals.

Autobiography Family background and childhood I am the first of five children, and I was raised in a Kyrgyz family with a long nomadic tradition. My ancestors on both sides led a semi-nomadic life up until the 1990s. During World War II, like many other Kyrgyz who led a nomadic life, my paternal great grandfather, Kochiimkul1 (1906-1986)

1

His name »Kochiimkul« derives from the Turkic v e r b and noun » k o c h - «

meaning »to move or movement from one place to another.« His mother had given birth to him on the road as they w e r e moving to another pasture on horse and camel backs, and his father had given him this n a m e to reflect story of his birth. Also, it is important to note, that Russians use the

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fled with his three young boys, to the oasis regions of modern day Uzbekistan in the Ferghana Valley to avoid mobilization to the front line. In the 1970's, Kochiimkul took with him three of his grown up grandsons and moved back to his home village in KIzi'1-Jar. His three sons with their families remained working as herders of collective farms (kolkhoz) in Uzbekistan until the mid 1990s. The Kyrgyz herders ( c h a b a n ) in Uzbekistan lived peacefully with their Uzbek neighbors with each community participating in each other's feasts and gatherings. However, they consciously kept their Kyrgyz identity separate from the sedentary Uzbek farmers and merchants. They spoke Kyrgyz at home with each other and their children. They did not intermarry with Uzbeks and kept close contacts with their kinsmen in Kyrgyzstan and carried out all their customs and feasts in a Kyrgyz way. In summers, like all other families of Kyrgyz herders of Andijan and Namangan provinces of Uzbekistan, my grandparents and two great uncles took the collective farm's livestock, namely sheep, horses, and cows, to their traditional summer pastures on the Chatkal and Ferghana mountain ranges in Kyrgyzstan. I am most grateful to my paternal grandparents, especially to my grandmother, Kumu (1931-2011) who gave me the most memorable and happiest childhood by raising me in the jayloo, summer pasture. When I turned one, my mother, who was only nineteen when she gave birth to me, wanted to get an education to be an elementary school teacher at a local school in Ki'zi'1-Jar where my father also taught the history subject. My mother wanted to give me to her own mother, who lived in an another mountain village, but my great-

term »kochevnik« for »nomad« and »kochevoi« for »nomadic.« The end word »kul« is the Kyrgyz translation of Arabic » a b d , « »slave«, i.e, »slave of God.« Traditionally, the nomadic Kyrgyz never had names with »kul« as it was and still is a very derogatory word used towards those men who did not know their ancestral and tribal roots. The nomadic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and Mongols had strong feelings about their kinship and tribal identity and relations.

Kochumkulova 271 grandfather Kochiimkul was very much against that idea as that would estrange me (bolok ostii) from my paternal kinsmen of Ogotur clan. So, he called his daughter-in-law, i.e., my grandmother Kumu and said very assertively: »1 have no daughter to give to the Aginays! (i.e., my mother's lineage). She will be estranged from us if she grows up there. Your two daughters will be three if you raise Elmira. If she dies [among us], w e won't blame you (o/so doosu jok)«.2 Thus, for the next five years, my childhood with my grandparents was intimately tied to semi-nomadic life and culture, which I enjoyed tremendously. We lived in yurts, and moved from pasture to pasture five or six times during the six months of summer. Our daily activities included milking mares to make koumiss, fermented mare's milk; milking cows to make yogurt, cheese and butter; making felt; tending sheep; collecting dung and wood for fuel; and for children, playing traditional games and picking flowers. Children very much enjoyed my grandmother's interesting stories which she had adapted from Kyrgyz epics. In the evenings, when the smaller children would fight with each other and thus make noise inside the yurt, she would tell scary stories about witches (jelmoguz) and wild man (adam japayi) to quite them and put to sleep. My grandfather would play his komuz, a three-stringed instrument, quietly when my grandmother told stories. We also enjoyed feasts and gatherings involving traditional horse games such as bayge or horse races; ulak, a game played by a group of horsemen who fight over a goat's carcass filled with coarse w e t salt; er engish or wrestling on horseback; kiz kuumay, a young man on horse back chasing a girl, who is also on horse back; and kurosh, wrestling on the ground. Even af-

2 When I joined them, my grandmother's youngest child Nurali was only a four years old boy. Therefore, until today, I call my grandmother » a p a « , mom and my own mother » a p c h i « , sister. When I turned six, however, my parents took me back as it was time for me to g o to an elementary school in Kyrgyzstan.

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ter I returned to my parents when I w a s six, until I turned fourteen, I joined my grandparents in the jayloo during my summer vacations. These childhood experiences became the foundation of my personal identity and values. Growing up in southern Kyrgyzstan, which is part of the Ferghana Valley, I experienced both Uzbek sedentary and Kyrgyz nomadic cultures. Every year, after five to six summer months in the mountains, we returned to the Uzbek collective farm, where we lived side by side with Uzbek farmers and merchants. Uzbek and Kyrgyz languages are closely related, and I learned to speak Uzbek fluently, briefly attended an Uzbek school, and developed a taste for Uzbek music and dance. My mountain Kyrgyz relatives would jokingly call me sarttin kizi, which means daughter of a Sart or merchant and townsman. The Uzbek kolkhoz village was pleasant with narrow streets and mud houses with courtyards, surrounded by high mud walls. In the autumn, upon returning to the kolkhoz, w e would kill a sheep and invite our Uzbek neighbors for a meal. They in turn would bring us fruits and freshly baked bread and hot somsas, pastries filled with meat and onions and baked in a clay tandoor oven. My schooling from the first through the eleventh grades was in Kyrgyz, in Kizil-Jar sovkhoz, state farm, one of the most agriculturally developed regions in the Aks'i region of southern Kyrgyzstan, specializing in cotton and tobacco. During harvest time, school children like me had to work in the fields. I especially hated the tobacco field, because it smelled bad and w a s labor-intensive and time-consuming. Everything - picking, stringing, drying, and sorting the dry leaves - w a s done by hand. During the tobacco harvest, I would long for the cool mountain pastures.

Kochumkulova 273 Spirit of komuz music I grew up listening to Kyrgyz music on the komuz. My grandfather Kochkorbay always took his komuz with him to the jayloo, and he used to play in the evenings in the yurt. He loved to listen to the radio to the aytish, a traditional singing contest between two poets who challenge each other in improvising poems while keeping alliteration and rhyme. As a little girl, I loved to sing. I became interested in playing the komuz when I was in the tenth grade. Like many young school children of my generation, I became inspired by dynamic cultural and national revivals in post-Soviet independent Kyrgyzstan. There was a big interest in playing traditional music, especially komuz music which was often played on TV and radio. Inspired by dastans and traditional songs played on komuz, I asked my parents to find me a komuz and taught myself to play it within a month. It was my passion for komuz music that helped me to earn recognition in my hometown and at my university in Bishkek, and that finally brought me to the United States. In the Soviet Union, Kyrgyz traditional music and instruments were considered backward and primitive, and children in the cities learned mostly European classical innstruments such as the piano and violin. When I began singing traditional songs on the komuz, I felt the spiritual power of Kyrgyz oral tradition which fosters well-spoken words and rhythmic poetry. Touched by the spirit, people, especially the elderly would often cry while listening to old poems of Kyrgyz aki'ns, oral poets who composed wisdom poetry on all aspects of human life and nature. The well-known Kazakh scholar, Mi'rzatay Joldasbekov had once said, »A Kazakh who does not cry when hearing [traditional] Kazakh music/song is not a true Kazakh.« This touched my heart deeply, because it is indeed so. Traditional music, especially those played on komuz or dombra remains an essential component of Kyrgyz and Kazakh cultural identity.

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Student l i f e in Bishkek In 1992, I graduated from high school with honors and that summer, my father took me to the capital Bishkek, to apply to university. I got accepted into the Kyrgyz philology department, which later became Turkology, at Bishkek University of Humanities and lived in the student dormitory for two years with Kyrgyz girls from various rural regions of Kyrgyzstan. The first two years of our study coincided with the postSoviet economic crisis which hit all the newly independent republics. All of a sudden, grocery store shelves were empty. Monthly student stipends were not given out on time. During the winter of 1993, Kyrgyzstan faced its worst economic crisis. The government asked parents, local state farms and village administrations in the countryside to bring humanitarian aid to their students studying in the cities. Each rayon, or regional administration, brought truck loads of food and distributed it to students in Bishkek. Many students also received special food packages from their families, and like our nomadic ancestors, we crumbled pieces of chabat'i or thin and crunchy bread, into bowls, added three or four balls of dried curt (kurut), and poured boiling water over them. In this way, w e survived the economic hardships of the post-Soviet collapse of the early 1990s. In the winter of 1994, the Rector of the Bishkek Humanities University of the Humanities announced that there was an opportunity for a student to go to the United States to study. One day, Sulayman Kay'ipov, chair of our department told me that the university rector Kadi'raly Konkobaev wanted to talk to me. When I entered the rector's office, the rector asked me »Would you like to go to America?« He described an exchange agreement between our university and the University of Washington in Seattle. Professor Ilse Cirtautas, a Turkologist, had initiated the program during a recent visit to Bishkek, and she wanted a student with good grades, who spoke Kyrgyz, and who could represent Kyrgyz culture. My rector asked me to write a short biographic es-

Kochumkulova 275 say and send it to Professor Cirtautas. Soon after, I heard that I had been accepted into the University of Washington. After the spring semester, I returned home. My parents gave a farewell offering for me by killing a sheep, and invited all our relatives and neighbors. Everyone was very happy and proud of me, but at the same time, they were worried that I was going far away, where I did not know anyone. My American chapter I and another Kazakh girl named Aynur from Almaty, who came under the same exchange program, arrived in Seattle in the evening. We were met at the airport and as we approached the city's downtown with its lit-up skyscrapers driving in a big American car; none of it seemed real and I felt as if I was in an American movie. I still remember my first impression of the University of Washington. I immediately fell in love with Seattle and the beautiful nature of the Northwest and people who were very polite and always ready to help. The city's cool air and very green nature reminded me of the summer pastures in Kyrgyzstan. The architecture of the University buildings mirrored medieval times in Europe. I met American students enrolled in the Central Asian Language and Culture Summer Program who were interested in learning about me and my culture. However, most people in Seattle did not know anything about Kyrgyzstan or Central Asia. I gave many formal and informal presentations about Kyrgyzstan, and musical performances of Kyrgyz traditional music. I was proud to be the first Kyrgyz to introduce the American audience in Seattle to recitations of the Kyrgyz epic »Manas«. Unlike Aynur, who spoke some English, I knew almost none when I arrived in Seattle. I enrolled in English as a Second Language (ESL) classes on campus, and in other required undergraduate courses. It was a challenge to adapt to a different educational system and academic learning style. I found writing analytic papers difficult because I had not been taught to think critically or to analyze literary and

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scholarly works in the Soviet school system. Professor Cirtautas, my ESL and other professors and friends helped us with our papers. Seven more Kazakh students, funded by the Kazakh national education program came to the University of Washington. They stayed in the university dormitories and we usually socialized together. I was the only Kyrgyz student in the beginning, but later was joined by a Kyrgyz girl from Bishkek came to study under another program. After the first year, there was an opportunity for those who qualified to stay on for a second year. I was homesick, but I knew that this was a great opportunity and opted to stay. During the summer, I assisted Professor Cirtautas, teaching Kyrgyz in the Central Asian Language and Culture Summer Program. I then returned home to Kyrgyzstan for about a month and a half. Everyone asked me why I had become so skinny and pale. I said that I was homesick a lot and that there was not much sunshine in Seattle. Between 1994 and 1998, I visited Kyrgyzstan three times in late summer and spent all my time with my family in Kizll Jar. Each home visit turned into a big feast involving cutting a sheep or goat and inviting relatives and neighbors. Each time I arrived home, after I greeted everyone and before I entered the house, my mother performed a traditional ritual to purify me after returning home safely from my long trip. She circled a bowl of water over my head and asked me spit into the water. Then she dumped the water under a bush or tree and put the empty bowl with upside down. In 1996, I received my Bachelors of Art and in 1998, I received my Masters from the Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilization at University of Washington. My parents, professors, and friends encouraged me to apply to the doctoral program, and I did. I realized that I needed to learn more to do academic research and I decided to focus my research on the oral tradition and nomadic culture of Central Asia. In 2007, upon receiving my doctoral degree in the Interdisciplinary PhD Program in Near and Middle Eastern Studies from the same university, I re-

Kochumkulova 277 turned to Kyrgyzstan, and since then, I have b e e n w o r k i n g as a R e s e a r c h Fellow at the n e w l y established U n i v e r s i t y of Central Asia. Becoming a scholar Living and studying f o r more than ten years in the United States had a tremendous impact on my personal and academic growth. I was only nineteen years old when I w e n t to study there and the American higher education and culture w e r e a v e r y challenging experience f o r a young girl like me f r o m rural Kyrgyzstan. I had to adapt to an educational system, lifestyle, views, and values that w e r e completely d i f f e r e n t f r o m those in Kyrgyzstan. Although, I o f t e n felt homesick, I knew the value of higher education and was determined to achieve my academic goals. I learned m o r e about my Central Asian/Kyrgyz history and culture by being outside of my country. I enjoyed teaching American students and public in general about Central Asian peoples and cultures, especially Kyrgyz traditional music. One of the frequent questions that Americans asked me was about my religion. Like many other Kyrgyz, until the postSoviet Islamic revival, my religious identity was never questioned. I do not c o m e f r o m a religious family background, but our Muslim faith was an accepted fact of life. N o n e of my f o r e f a t h e r s was a mullah or imam or practiced orthodox Islam. M y g r e a t grandfather Kochiimkul, w h o died at the a g e of 80, began praying his Muslim namaz at the a g e of 60, w h e n his first grandchild was born. While not a fanatic about his Muslim faith, he was a role model, demonstrating g o o d behavior, wisdom, and deeds. H e was a wise r e s p e c t e d aksakal w h o knew a lot about Kyrgyz nomadic life and customs as w e l l as the g e n e a l o g y of his own Ogotur and other related Kyrgyz clans within the Saruu tribe. H e had no religious schooling when he was young, could not read nor w r i t e in Arabic, but m e m o r i z e d those Arabic prayer w o r d s which he used during namaz prayers. H e would n e v e r preach us about God or Allah or tell us to carry out the five pillars of Islam. H e used to utter the Kyrgyz expression b e f o r e he

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slept: Jattim tinch, jazdigim kench; tilim Quran, tilegenim iyman (I wish myself a good-night sleep, may my pillow be full of wisdom; my tongue speaks Quran, and my wish is to be faithful.) After this poetic phrase in Kyrgyz, he would say the shahada in Arabic to make the confession of faith »La ilaha il Allah, Muhammad-ur-Rasool-Allah,« (None has the right to be worshipped but Allah, and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah). My g r a n d f a t h e r Kochkorbay followed his father's example and began praying at an older age. My grandmother, who practiced some traditional healing rituals, also began praying at an older age a f t e r 60 or when she began to think of the after-life. My maternal grandparents, who led a semi-nomadic life raising the livestock of a Kyrgyz collective farm, did not pray at all until they died. My own parents also intend to pray at an older age. My father Mamatkerim, who is a history t e a c h e r at a local secondary school, has been educated in the Soviet system; however, he was not a communist and did not preach communist ideology and atheism to his students. Like many Kyrgyz of his generation, he considers himself Muslim, but is critical of those who advocate the purist form of Islam which condemns Kyrgyz traditional beliefs, cultural practices and values. He is quite knowledgeable about Islam and its history as he reads a lot of Russian, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz history and literary works. I like to engage him in intellectual discussions about Islam and Kyrgyz religious identity. He has his personal views and opinions about world religions and their origin, development, and spread among various peoples of the world. As a learned man, he questions and wonders about the origin and end of the world/creation and tries to approach the subject in philosophical way. He likes to recite Omar Khayam's rubaiyat in Uzbek translation which says: Biz kelib ketguchi tu'garak jahon, Na boshi malim-u, na okhiri ayon. Gar su'rsalar, hech kim aytib berolmas, Biz qaydan keldig-u, keturmiz qayon.

Kochùmkulova 279 This round earth into w h i c h w e come and f r o m w h i c h w e depart. N o one k n o w s h o w it came into existence and h o w it will end, If s o m e o n e asks, no one can answer, W h e r e w e c a m e f r o m and w h e r e w e will g o [ a f t e r w e die]. 3

Like many other Kyrgyz men and women of their time and age, my ancestors and grandparents did not see a contradiction between their ethnic Kyrgyz and religious Muslim identities and customs. And I'm very happy for having grown up among such people who w e r e content with who they w e r e and tolerant of other religions, ethnic groups, and cultures. In my personal life and academic research, I foster this kind of attitude and approach to the study of cultural and religious issues in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia in general.

Selected

publications

Kyrgyz nomadic customs and the impact of re-Islamization after independence. PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 2007. Music of Central Asia: An introduction (with Theodore Levin). Bishkek: UCA Cultural Heritage Book Series, 2013. Islam, nomadic heritage and Kyrgyz identity. Bishkek: UCA Cultural Heritage Book Series, 2013.

3 The standard nineteenth century English translation by Edward Fitzgerald is as follows: »Into this Universe, and Why not knowing. Nor Whence, like Water willy-nilly flowing; And out of it, as Wind along the Waste, I know not Whither, willy-nilly blowing.« (The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayam by Edward Fitzgerald. Hypertext meanings and commentaries from the Encyclopedia of the Self by Mark Zimmerman. URL: www.selfknowledge.com).

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Re-Islamization in Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan: A Case Study of Kyrgyz Funeral Customs Elmira Kochiimkulova

Introduction Kyrgyz death rites are closely linked with the Kyrgyz nomadic way of life, worldview, kinship system and oral tradition. With the adoption of Islam, the nomadic Kyrgyz incorporated many Muslim beliefs and practices. Among the traditional Kyrgyz life-cycle rituals, death rites present an interesting case for understanding the Kyrgyz identity, kinship relations and local forms and contextualization of Islam in Kyrgyz society A contemporary Kyrgyz funeral encompasses the essential Muslim burial rites such as the washing of the deceased's body and wrapping it in a white shroud (kepin), the recitation of janaza by an imam or mullah, digging the grave with two compartments and placing the body in it with its head facing the direction of qibla, (direction of Mecca) and dedication of Quranic recitations to the spirit of the deceased. These adopted Muslim funeral practices, however, did not replace the existing set of pre-Islamic or native death rites that are integral to Kyrgyz cultural identity. Islamic revival in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, in which more than 80% of the population identify themselves as Muslim, brought about major changes in the religious life and identity of some segments of Kyrgyz society. This paper's discussion of Kyrgyz funeral customs is based on my extensive ethnographic research conducted in the Aks'i region of southern Kyrgyzstan between the years of 2002 and 2011. In 20022003, I had conducted my doctoral dissertation fieldwork on Islamic revival and its impact on Kyrgyz funeral customs in my hometown of Ki'zil-Jar, which has about twenty thousand

Köchümkulova

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inhabitants, most of whom practice farming and animal husbandry. Influenced by new Islamic ideas coming mainly from abroad, many Kyrgyz began to critically view and assess their religious and cultural identity. Along with many other traditional practices, many essential aspects of Kyrgyz death rites have been condemned as bid'a, religious innovations or pagan, by local followers of »fundamentalist« or purist Islamic groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT). 4

A Kyrgyz funeral Death is a sensitive subject to study as it involves strong human emotions and feelings of suffering, separation and sorrow. I became interested in Kyrgyz funeral customs through personal experiences of funerals and memorial feasts for members of my extended family. In the spring of 2002, while I was studying at the University of Washington in Seattle, my 49-year-old paternal uncle passed away from a heart attack, and I found out about it three months later when I came home to conduct my field research in Kyrgyzstan. Then, after a year, my 76-year-old paternal grandfather, who had suffered from asthma for many years, passed away. I attended his funeral (kara ash) and fortieth-day memorial service ( k ï r k ï ) and my uncle's one-year memorial service (jïïdïk). In the autumn of 2003, my husband's family offered the final memorial feast (ash) for their father who had died in 1991, and I did a video documentation of this major and important event. In the winter of 2005, after I returned to the US for my studies, my cousin Kojomkul, with whom I had grown up together, died at the age of 34, leaving his w i f e and five small children behind. My parents decided not to inform me about it, as

4

H T is a religious group banned in Kyrgyzstan that aims to establish an

Islamic state

(kalifat)

in Central Asia by peaceful means. Its local members

advocate »fundamentalist« or »purist« form of Islam and oppose all »unIslamic« elements in Kyrgyz cultural practices.

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I was too far away to come to the funeral. I learned about his death two years later when I came back to Kyrgyzstan in 2007. Then, in the last four years, my great-aunt Baktikan (63 years old), the mother of Kojomkul, my paternal great-uncle Anarbay (78 years old), my maternal uncle Oziibek (58 years old) and my paternal grandmother Kumu (80 years old), who raised me from age one till six, passed away from various illnesses. Like my other close kinsmen, I attended their funerals and subsequent memorial feasts and, in accordance with a Kyrgyz tradition, sang koshok, funeral lamentations. At my grandmother's funeral, I was at the centre of people's attention as the main koshokchu, lamenter. When she was alive, my grandmother had told me to sing a good koshok at her funeral by telling people what kind of a woman she had been in this life. At these events, I observed all the essential rituals of Kyrgyz death customs, including Muslim rituals, which were practiced side by side with the Kyrgyz ones. If these would have been the funerals or memorial feasts of people not related to me, I would not have been able to observe the rituals as closely as I did at my kinsmen's funerals. My »double status« as an insider-researcher and a family member of the deceased people gave me the advantage of using a real »participant-observation« method. I observed how people behaved and interacted with each other inside and outside the funeral yurt and experienced all the emotional aspects. I sat inside the funeral yurt with my female relatives and performed traditional rituals such as crying out loud and singing a lament (koshok), seeing off the body to the burial ground, visiting the grave at dawn the day after the body is buried (bashina ch'iguu) and giving gifts of clothes to the family of the deceased (kiyit kiygiziiii). With the permission of elders, I videotaped key funeral practices without making my relatives feel too uncomfortable. Most of my relatives knew about my interest in Kyrgyz life-cycle rituals and they rushed me to capture certain rituals in action on my video and still cameras. In 2003, at my paternal uncle's one-year memorial feast, my distant aunt, Anash ene, who is a good lamenter (koshokchu), hap-

Kochumkulova 283 pily agreed to let me videotape her singing. I must note that I did not videotape all of these on the days that my relatives died. Recording was done several weeks after the burial, at the fortieth-day and one-year anniversary memorial feasts, as they repeat the same rituals performed before the burial. I had many interesting informal discussions and conversations with my relatives about the significance of Kyrgyz death rites and the attitudes of local » p u r i s t « Muslim clergy towards these customs. One of my paternal uncles, who had joined the HT, is against the local form of Islam and tried to prevent his kinsmen from carrying out Kyrgyz customs (salt), which contradict Muslim death rites and practices, as it is mandatory for an imam or mullah to recite the janaza prayer for the deceased's body before the burial. Nowadays, it became a common practice in Kyrgyzstan, especially in the Aks'i region, for an imam or mullah to lecture the people attending the funeral on the right way of burying the dead and mourning the death of a close one and also of being a good Muslim in general. This lecture takes about 20-30 minutes while the deceased's body is being washed inside the yurt. Imams call people to drop their un-Islamic or » o l d « death rites and customs (eski irim-jirimdar, kaada-salttar), as they bring suffering to the soul (jan) of the deceased as it travels into the other world (tigi/narki diiyno), and tell them to recite Quran only and do nothing else. Below are the essential aspects of a Kyrgyz funeral that are said to contradict Muslim death and burial traditions: -

Erecting a yurt for the funeral and keeping the body unburied for more than 24 hours; - Sacrificing a larger domesticated animal ( s o g u m ) , usually a horse (jilki) or cow (uy), and serving food to people; according to Islam, no food should be served in the first three days in the house of the deceased. - Women's singing of lamentations (koshok koshuu) and men's crying out loud (okuriiii); - Displaying sets of new clothes (olumtiik kiyit) inside the yurt and distributing them to persons who wash the deceased's body;

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Distributing pieces of cloth (jirtish) to people attending the funeral; The giving of livestock or monetary contributions (koshumcha) by kinsmen and in-laws to the deceased's family; Hosting groups of special guests in the neighbouring houses by killing sheep (soyush beriiu); Offering periodic memorial feasts (beyshembilik, jetilik, k'irk'i, jildik, and ash); Placing memorial monuments on the graves.

First, I would like to examine the significance of some of these practices and then discuss the on-going disputes around them between followers of »purist« Islam and ordinary people who continue practicing death rites in the Kyrgyz way, which incorporates both Kyrgyz and Muslim rituals.

Kïrgïz boz ilydô tuulup, boz ilydô ôlôt5 - a Kyrgyz saying Although the Kyrgyz gave up their nomadic way of life about a century ago and thus no longer live in yurts (boz iiy), the yurt remains one of the key markers of Kyrgyz cultural identity and is used for special occasions.6 These include family feasts, weddings, anniversaries, national celebrations and,

5 » A Kyrgyz was born in the yurt and will die in the yurt.« Unfortunately, » y u r t « is not the right term to call the traditional dwelling of nomadic Turks. Russians and westerners have been using it incorrectly. In all Turkic languages, including Kyrgyz, the word » y u r t « means the place or ground w h e r e the » y u r t « is pitched. The Mongols call their traditional dwelling » g e r « , whereas the Kyrgyz call it » b o z iiy«, a » g r e y house«, referring to the colour of the felt covering. In a w i d e r sense, yurt means » p e o p l e , relatives, and homeland«. For example, Kyrgyz say »ata-jurt« f o r their fatherland and paternal relatives, » t a g a j u r t « for maternal relatives, and »kayin j u r t « for in-laws and their relatives. 6 Svetlana Jacquesson 2008. The sore zones of identity: past and present debates on funerals in Kyrgyzstan. Inner Asia 10(2): 281-303.

Kochumkulova 285 most importantly, funerals. In the countryside, many Kyrgyz families own a yurt made of metal, which they place in their courtyard. The pitching of the yurt is mandatory for funerals, as all important rituals and customs of a funeral take place inside and outside the yurt. It houses the dead for a day or two before the burial. In the Aks'i region, if the deceased is male, he will be placed on the men's side, i.e. the left side from the entrance, behind a curtain. If the deceased is female, she will be placed on the women's side, the right side from the entrance. In the Aks'i region, if the deceased is an elderly woman, they place her on the tor, the seat of honour in the rear of the yurt opposite the entrance. Close female relatives sit inside next to the deceased's body and sing traditional lament songs (koshok), and male relatives sit on a bench outside the yurt on the side where the body lies. The yurt erected for a funeral does not differ much from a regular yurt in terms of its decorations and size. In some parts of Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the north, people cover the front exterior of the yurt with a colourful rug onto which they hang a portrait of the deceased. This practice is a recent development influenced by Soviet/Russian culture. In the past, when a man died, it was customary to place a spear on the yurt of the deceased's family with a black, red or white piece of fabric tied on its tip. If the deceased was a young man, a red cloth was tied; if he was a middle-aged, a black cloth; and if he was an old man, the spear had a white piece of fabric. Kyrgyz use the yurt for funerals because it is practical and spacious for receiving hundreds of people who come to express their condolences to the deceased's family. Men greet men sitting outside the yurt and women go directly into the yurt to express their condolences to women. Moreover, by placing the deceased's body inside the yurt, family members spend time - one to two days - with the body of their loved one and express their feelings by singing laments. When he was alive, my great uncle Anarbay explained why the Kyrgyz need to erect a separate yurt to house the deceased's body:

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We, the Kyrgyz, did not have any other house than the yurt in the past. We hold it close to our heart. It is very practical. People feel comfortable in it. We keep the body in it for at least one or two days. Uzbeks do not have a yurt and they also do not keep the body overnight. They stay away from the body and cry, whereas we cry sitting next to the body. It is a sign of respect to sit close to the deceased. We want the deceased to leave being grateful to us.

In many regions of Kyrgyzstan, especially in the Aks'i region, the yurt, usually made from metal, stands in the courtyard until the fortieth-day memorial feast is offered. Immediate family members of the deceased remain longer to receive people who come to express their condolences to the family and dedicate Quranic recitations in honour of the deceased's spirit. Those who borrow the yurt from other families usually return it after the burial or after the first Thursday memorial feast. Then the yurt is pitched again for the one-year memorial feast.

Mourning

etiquette

A traditional Kyrgyz funeral requires its participants to observe a certain etiquette during the entire funeral procession and mourning period. Close relatives of the deceased and people who come to the funeral all know their individual roles and physical place inside or outside the funeral yurt. They follow a particular etiquette of greeting the family members and use traditional expressions to console them. Men and women follow certain codes of behaviour and dress. Men usually wear a traditional hat, a kalpak, which is also worn in everyday life, and in southern Kyrgyzstan, they also tie a sash (belboo) around their waist, which is an influence from Uzbek culture. Social interaction is restricted for the mourning family members. This restriction corresponds to the second stage

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of van Gennep's »rites of passage«, the »liminal« period7 during which mourners »live in a marginal state midway between the world of the living and the world of the dead«.8 In southern Kyrgyzstan, the widow, daughters and sisters wear blue or green dresses and large scarves. As in many cultures, the colour black is chosen for widows as mourning clothes. In some traditional societies, widows lead extremely restricted lives: they are required to wear black for the rest of their lives or until they remarry. They do not go to the city to shop, nor do they attend social events such as village festivals and weddings.9 In the past, until the 1920s, Kyrgyz women, especially young widows, practiced an old mourning custom of letting their hair loose and scratching their cheeks with their fingernails.10 This aggressive act is observed in other cultures, including among the Greeks: »violent tearing of the hair, face and clothes were not acts of uncontrolled grief, but part of the ritual indispensable to lamentation throughout antiquity«.11 In the Kyrgyz epic Kojojash, the hunter's widow Zulayka also follows this old practice when her husband dies tragically by falling from a high cliff: Karan'i kiygen Zulayka,

Zulayka who is dressed in black.

Kaygirip lylayt un tarti'p.

Wept in sorrow and mourned.

Besh ti'rmak saldi tamgaluu,

With her five fingernails,

Zulaykan'in ongiino.

Zulayka scratched off her face.

Betine tamga salbasa,

If she hadn't scarred her face,

7 Arnold van Gennep 1960. The rites of passage. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, p. 11. 8 Loring M. Danforth 1982. The death rituals of rural Greece. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 54. 9 Danforth 1982, p. 54. 1 0 F. A. Phielstrup 2002. Iz obryadovoy zhizni kirgizov nachala XX veka [On the customary life of the Kyrgyz in the twentieth century]. Moscow: Nauka. 1 1 Margaret Alexiou 1974. The ritual lament in Greek tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 6.

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C e n t r a l A s i a n Intellectuals on Islam

Kaygïrgan jok dep kalk aytchu,

People would've said that she wasn't grieving hard

Duynödön ketken erine. 12

The loss of her husband...

Among the Kyrgyz, the last memorial feast, ash, offered around the one-year anniversary of the death, involves a special ceremony called ak kiydi, i.e. »wearing of a white (dress)« which allows women to change their mourning clothes for white or the brighter colours of everyday life. It is usually the close relatives and in-laws who bring the new clothes to male and female family members of the deceased. After the ak kiydi ceremony, people express their good wishes to the widow and her children expressing the hope that they will experience no more bad and sad days (jamandik), but see only happy days and events (jaksh'ilik) in their lives. This ceremony of ak kiydi corresponds very well to Van Gennep's third step of »rites of passage« i.e. »rites of incorporation« into normal life and society.

Men's ritual of crying out loud

(okuriiu)

There are two different forms of mourning etiquette for men and women among the Kyrgyz. Men sit outside the yurt according to their age and closeness of kinship relations to the deceased. They do not usually sing laments like women, but, standing facing the wall of the yurt13 where the body lies inside, cry out loud (ôkùrùu) words such as Boorumoy! Boorum-oy! (Oh, my liver! Oh, my liver!) or Esil kayran, boorum-oyl (Oh, my dear liver!), as the liver is believed to

12 Kojojash 1996. Bishkek: Sham, p. 185 13 In some parts of Kyrgyzstan, for example in the Issik-Kul region, men cry in a half-bending position, holding a stick to lean on or holding their two knees with their two hands. While, in regions like Aks'i, men cry facing the wall of the yurt, in regions like Issik-Kul, men cry facing the visitors who come to express their condolences. This difference is also characteristic of women sitting inside the yurt.

Kochumkulova 289 be the seat of a person's vital life force. 14 Parents usually say, Tiregimden/jdldgilmdon ayrildim! (I became separated from my support!). For a father, Jolborsumdan/arstanimdan ayrildim! (I became separated from my tiger/lion!) This old ritual of crying out loud is also mentioned in Kyrgyz oral epics, including the epic » M a n a s « , which the Kyrgyz widely view as the most treasured expression of their national heritage.15 Kyrgyz oral epics are the great source for learning about old Kyrgyz beliefs and practices. Singers of the epic Manas, called manaschis, were the living books and oral historians, as they orally preserved and transmitted the rich traditional and historical knowledge from one generation to the next. In the major episode of Manas, called » T h e Memorial Feast of Kokotoy Khan«, the Khan Manas arrives together with thousands of men at the memorial feast (ash) of the Kokotoy Khan. The epic singer describes the hero Manas' arrival with his men in the following way: Kaling ki'rglz urugu

With his crowd from the Kyrgyz tribe

Keldi Manas churkurap.

Manas arrived crying out loud.

Seksen ming adam kungiirop

Eighty thousand men came crying

Jer kochiirup diingurop.

Their voice breaking the ground,

Chang obogo burkurap,

The dust whirling in the sky

14 In Turkic culture, expressions of inner feeling are most often associated with the human's internal organs. Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Uzbeks have many expressions using the word boor (Kyrgyz), baw'ir (Kazakh), jigar (Uzbek). The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz consider themselves as being boordosh el, meaning people who share the same liver, i.e. related or brothers. Since both the feelings of sadness and happiness are physically related with the liver, they express them in the following ways: Boorum oorudu or boorum ach'idi (My liver ached or burned); boorum ezildi (My liver became soft/spoiled), usually from too much crying; or boorum katip kald'i (My liver became hard) from too much laughter; tash boor (stone livered, i.e. stonehearted, hard-hearted); boor ber/berbe (to have/not to have warm/close feelings towards someone). In other cultures, these and other similar feelings maybe associated with the heart. 15 Sagimbay Orozbakov 1990. Manas. Kyrgyz elinin baat'ird'ik eposu [Manas. The heroic epic of the Kyrgyz people]. Vol. 3, Moscow.

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Centra! Asian Intellectuals on Islam

Chapkïlashïp churkurap

Riding his horse and crying

Manas kelip kalïptïr,

Manas arrived suddenly.

Baari jurt aygay salïptïr.

All the people made a great hue and cry.

Kazakh kïrgïz kalkïna

Thus, the tradition of crying out loud

Ökürüktün adatï

Among the Kazakh and Kyrgyz people

Ötköndördön kalïptïr.

Remained from those who came before us.

W o m e n ' s koshok ritual lament Tirüüniin

körkü

sïy bolot,

Ölüktün

körkü

ïy

bolot.

(Respect honours the living, Lamentation honours the dead) - a Kyrgyz saying The ritual of singing a lament ( k o s h o k koshuu) is an old and essential aspect of Kyrgyz death rites. Kyrgyz scholars believe that koshok is one of the oldest genres in Central Asian oral literature, and that many Kyrgyz heroic epic songs, like M a n a s , g r e w out of koshoks.16 Like epic songs, which usually narrate the life story of the main hero and glorify his deeds, koshoks sung f o r well-known historical personalities such as rulers (khans), tribal leaders (biys), and heroes (baatirs) eventually turned into epic songs. 17 Kyrgyz oral poets and especially w o m e n played an important role in developing, refining and preserving this g e n r e of folk ritual music. W h e n w e l l - k n o w n people died, aqins and professional lamenters ( k o s h o k c h u s ) w e r e invited to sing a koshok. A traditional koshok has a specific structure consisting of opening lines, core and closing lines, and g o o d lamenters follow that structure w h e n they sing. Lamenters quite masterfully incorporated n e w Muslim beliefs and practices into their existing Kyrgyz system of beliefs and practices. In the Aks'i region, for example, the traditional

16 Koshoktor [Ritual laments]. 1998. Bishkek: Sham, p. 5. 17 Many scholars agree that the text of the 8th-century Kiiltegin inscription, written in Old Turkic, is composed in the style of a koshok; in it, Kiiltegin uses words and expressions otherwise used in traditional lamentations.

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opening lines of a koshok begin and end with Kyrgyz poetic phrases, as well as Islamic references to God ( A l l a h or Kuday) and the Qur'an lamenting that death makes people sad and admitting that no one escapes death in this world and even great men like the Prophet Muhammad, the hero Manas, khans and other well-known poets died. Ketilgen Kuran t'ish'i eken Keyitken Kuday ishi eken Buzulgan Kuran tish'i eken Mungaytkan Kuday ishi eken. Bi'smilda sözdün adal'i, Ölböy bir adam kalabi. Ölgönü menen kurusun, Öksütöt eken adamd'i.

The Quran's cover has been torn. It is God's will to make one lament. The Quran's cover has been destroyed, It is God's will to make one sad. Bismillah18 is the purest of all words , There is no man who doesn't die. But death is very hard to accept, For it makes one very sad.

There are also formulaic opening lines with references to nature, such as the moon, sun, cloud, hills and mountains, birds, gold and silver, which are the main themes and metaphors in Kyrgyz oral poetry:19 Aydin bir betin torgogon, Ayaktay bulut turbaybl, Adilet jandi kor kiflgan, Azaptuu ölüm turbaybl

It is a big chunk of cloud That covers the face of the Moon. It is the cruel death That takes innocent lives.

Kir-kirdin bashin kün chalat,

The sun begins to shine on hilltops [early in the morning]. But I, the miserable one, begin my day, singing a lament sadly.

Kubargan beebak ün salat

18

»In the name of Allah, the Almighty!« Like all Muslims, Kyrgyz use

this expression before beginning to do something, especially before eating. 19

These sample texts of koshoks

were transcribed from my female rela-

tives. I memorized some of the lines while my aunts w e r e singing and wrote them down later.

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Central Asian Intellectuals on

Too-toonun bashïn kün chalat,

Islam

The sun begins to shine on mountain, tops (eariy in the morning),

Tomsorgon beebak ün salat.

But, I, the lonely one, begin my day singing a lament sadly.

Core lines After the opening lines, the daughter-lamenter proceeds to the main part, lamenting the loss of her father and describing his personality and life in the mountains. If the father owned much livestock, spent summers in high mountain pastures (Jayloos) living in a yurt and milking mares to make fermented mare's milk (koumiss), the lamenter describes these main activities and the man's virtues, such as horsemanship skills and generosity and kindness to the poor and needy. A man's wealth is measured by the quantity of livestock and the quality of a riding horse and yurt. The choice of metaphors, symbols and terms of endearment depends on the lamenter's relationship to the deceased. Daughters usually express their love and respect for their father by saying »my dearest father« ( k a g i l a y ' i n atakem), or »my soul-like father« (jan atom), »my bazaar« ( b a z a r i m ) meaning that he was rich and prosperous, or »my garden« (charbagim).

Traditional koshoks sung by daughters for their mothers usually mention the mother's skill in such domains as felt making, embroidery and hospitality, as well as her beauty, respect for her husband's family and close relationship with her daughter. Altindan chachpak suy tashtap,

Wearing a golden

chachpak20

gracefully, Argimak mingen koch bashtap.

She led the koch riding on an argimak,21

20 21

Chachpak: women's hair decoration made of silver. Argimak: a pure breed of horse.

Kôchumkulova 293 Kùmushtôn chachpak suy tashtap, Kûluk bir mingen kôch bashtap.

Wearing a silver chachpak gracefully. She led the koch riding on a kiiliik.22

Kmldan uchuk saptagan, Kijïmdan tôshôk kaptagan kïjïm.23

She used a red thread for a needle, And made sleeping mats from silk.

Kïzdarîm eptiiù bolsun dep,

So that her daughters would beskilled, She trained them like a hawk.

Kïrgïyek kushtay taptagan. Closing lines A f t e r singing about the g o o d qualities of the d e c e a s e d , the l a m e n t e r a c k n o w l e d g e s the inevitable f a c t that no one can b r i n g the dead back to life. The f o l l o w i n g expressions h a v e b e c o m e traditional closing lines of koshoks w i t h w h i c h wom e n t r i e d to console and find p e a c e in t h e m s e l v e s . T h e lam e n t e r w i s h e s the d e c e a s e d a cool and shady final resting place under a poplar tree, which will p r o t e c t him or her f r o m the sun. A h e r d of mares g r a z i n g on a g r e e n pasture by the bank of a r i v e r or lake is a c o m m o n m e t a p h o r f o r a scene in H e a v e n . Saralaluu san jïlkï Say boyuna juushasïn. Sanaasïjakshï atakem, Salkïn bir jerde uktasïn.

May a herd of palomino mares Graze on the edge of a river. May my dear, kind-hearted father Sleep in a cool place.

W i t h the incorporation of Islamic beliefs, mainly in the e i g h t e e n t h and nineteenth centuries, the f o l l o w i n g expres-

22 Kiiliik: a racehorse. 23

Kijirrt: a thick and valuable silk fabric that comes in various bright

colours. Kyrgyz use it for making sleeping mats, blankets and clothes such as vests and coats.

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sions have been added and used as traditional closing lines. The lamenter expresses the Muslim belief that faith in God and reciting the Qur'an for the deceased's spirit is the most righteous response to the death of a loved one: Beyishtin törü besh eshik,

May the five doors leading to

Besh manjang tiybey achjflsïn.

Open before your five fingers touch

Heaven them. Beyishtegi kMl gül,

May red flowers shower on your forehead

Beshenenge chachïlsïn.

As you enter Heaven.

ïylagan menen aylajok, emi

Too much crying won't help

Kurandan bashka payda jok.

Now, there is nothing to do but recite from the Quran.

Azaytayïn keyishü,

Let me tune down lamenting now.

Aylanayïn jan atam (apa, eje,

Oh, my dear father! (mother, brother,

ake, etc.)

sister, etc.),

Aralap jürgün beyishti

May you now stroll in Heaven.

While it is mainly ordinary Kyrgyz women who preserve the tradition of singing koshoks, it is male aqins - oral poets who compose spontaneous rhythmic poetry - and sometimes also female singers who perform a koshok when grieving the loss of a well-known public figure, poet or writer at public gatherings or on television and radio. The highlight of the public funeral of the renowned Kyrgyz writer Chingiz Aitmatov (1928-2008) was the performance of two koshoks composed and sung by two Kyrgyz aqins, Zamirbek Usonbayev (b. 1952) and Elmirbek Imanaliev (b. 1978). They composed their koshoks in traditional poetic form and musical style but, unlike female lamenters, accompanied themselves on the komuz, as is traditional for male aqins. The two koshoks w e r e played over and over during the official farewell ceremony and also aired on Kyrgyz national television and radio for several days. The tradition of singing a koshok was raised to a national level during the April events of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan, which

Kôchumkulova 295 took the lives of over eighty young men. Again, the highlight of their funeral ceremony was the singing of koshoks by Kyrgyz oral poets. The official funeral ceremony displayed religious syncretism and harmony in which not only were old Kyrgyz and Muslim death rites equally performed and valued, but which also incorporated elements of modern or European funerals, such as giving speeches by government officials, placing the Kyrgyz national flag on the coffins and placing flowers and the pictures of the deceased men on each of their graves. Today, few women can improvise new koshoks or adapt traditional versions to new social and individual contexts. The diminishing number of professional lamenters is reflected in the waning social significance of koshok singing, especially in urban areas. In villages, it is considered shameful for grown-up Kyrgyz women not to sing a koshok at the funeral of their close family members - parents, husband, children and siblings. One needs a good voice, poetic and musical skills and an agile memory to sing a koshok. Most women do not know koshok texts by heart, and when a death occurs in their family, they often feel lost and do not know what to say about their loved one. So they write down the texts from older women and try to sing them using a traditional melody.24 Muslim clergy discourage women from singing koshoks on the grounds that it violates shari'a law. It is difficult to predict the future of this old and important ritual, believed to be the source of Kyrgyz oral epic songs. But where there is death, there will always be grief and lament, and the ritual of singing koshoks may well remain a broadly used and effective palliative that brings consolation and solace.

24 As is broadly true for orally transmitted song repertoires, there is no single authoritative version of the song - and for that matter, of the text. Thus women freely draw lines from a general reserve of traditional koshok s and fill in the particulars of names, kinship relations and other circumstances drawn from the life of the deceased.

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Kelindi kelgende kör, kempirdi ölgöndö kör (See the bride when she arrives and the old woman when she dies) - a Kyrgyz saying This saying embodies t w o v e r y important Kyrgyz traditions associated with a w e d d i n g and funeral. T h e first part about seeing the n e w bride w h e n she arrives r e f e r s to the bridal d o w r y (sep) given by her parents when she g e t s married. As in many cultures, Kyrgyz p r e p a r e a sep f o r their daughters. A traditional Kyrgyz sep consists of several sets (sïyras) of handmade f e l t rug (kiyiz), appliqué rug made f r o m multi-coloured f e l t ( s h ï r d a q s ) , sleep-on mats (töshöks), blankets (Juurkans), pillows (jazdïqs), all kinds of kitchen items and sets of n e w clothes f o r the b r i d e and g r o o m . T h e entire sep is d i s p l a y e d at b r i d e ' s n e w yurt or r o o m in a house f o r public view. T h e bride distributes small gifts (such as soaps, combs, cosmetics, pins, handkerchiefs etc.) to young girls and w o m e n w h o come to see her and her dowry. T h e second part of the saying, » s e e the old woman when she d i e s « refers to the tradition of preparing sets of new clothes ölümtük (ölüm, death) for one's own funeral. These clothes, which are p r e p a r e d b e f o r e the person's death, will be distributed to close kinsmen, in-laws and friends w h o wash the body and w r a p it in a shroud. In Islam, » t h e closest relatives of the deceased have the primary right to bathe the d e c e a s e d « . 2 5 The sets of clothes are hung inside the yurt in a w a y similar to how the sets of clothes are hung f o r the bride. T h e number and quality of clothes r e f l e c t the social status of the deceased. Traditionally, people hang nine sets (toguz sïyra); each set consists of a scarf or men's hat, diff e r e n t types of coats, shirts and pairs of soft leather boots (maasï), but if the d e c e a s e d has a high social status and many in-laws (kuda-söök), the number of sets g o e s up to

25 Muhamad Abdul Hai 'Arifi 2001. The Islamic way in death. (Translated by Ahkame-e-Mayyit). Karachi: Idaratul-Qur'an, p. 40.

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fifteen. Women start preparing these items as they g e t older, usually after 65 and 70, and keep them in a special chest (sandiq). They are also responsible for the olilmtiik of their old husband. 26 In summer of 2009, while showing her olumtiik to us, my husband's 85-year-old grandmother quoted the saying shown above. Then she picked a large white scarf from one of the large bundles and put it on my head. She blessed me, wishing me a long and happy life with my husband, and said at the end half jokingly: » W h e n I die, cry well and sing a koshokl« The logic behind giving gifts of clothes to those people (5-7 people) who wash the deceased's body is to show one's appreciation.

Funeral

feasting

Food plays an important role in Kyrgyz funerals and other life-cycle celebrations. While some people find the idea of eating food at a sad event quite awkward, most Kyrgyz cannot imagine a funeral without an animal sacrifice. Quoting Mikhail Bakhtin, who stated, »Sadness and food are incompatible [...] The banquet always celebrates a victory and this is part of its very nature,« the American scholar Jacqueline S. Thursby writes, » T h e funerary banquet celebrates a life, often well lived, and the victory is in overcoming and accepting change that death brings; honouring a loved one at death becomes victorious because it renews the living.« 2 7 Kyrgyz consider the death of an old person, usually after 80, a toy, feast, and organize traditional games and competitions played on horseback, awarding prizes to winners.

26 In addition to these sets of clothes, hundreds of small pieces of new cloth called jïrtïsh are distributed to people, mostly to women, who attend the funeral. Nowadays, people give handkerchiefs to men and scarves, hand towels or potholders (tutkuch) to women. 27 Jacqueline S. Thursby 2006. Funeral festivals in America. Rituals for the living. Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, p. 3.

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The legacy of nomadic culture, in which animals, especially horses, occupied a special place, remains strong in contemporary Kyrgyz society. Domestic animals such as horses, sheep and goats are still traditionally slaughtered for special occasions and life-cycle celebrations. The purpose of the animal sacrifice for the funeral is twofold: to honour the spirit of the deceased 28 (arbagina bagishtap soyu) and to serve food to people who in turn dedicate Quranic recitations to the deceased's spirit and express condolences to the mourning family. It is also believed that the meal served at a funeral »provides sustenance and a place for shared memories, reunion, and joy«.29 For major life-cycle celebrations it is customary to slaughter a horse, but those who cannot afford can slaughter a young cow or calf, which is much cheaper. 30 Most people prefer eating horse meat (J'ilkinin eti) and sausage (chuchuk) because they do not get to eat them every day and horse fat does not congeal. And most importantly, one can feed up to thousand people with the meat and sausages of a horse, which are usually served with rice pilaf. The number of people attending the funeral or the memorial feast and the amount of food and meat to be served is contingent upon the social status of the deceased.

2 8 There is an old belief that deceased man will ride the horse in the other world. 2 9 Thursby 2006, p. 9. 3 0 Today, a fat horse costs over 1000.00 US dollars, while a young cow costs around 600.00 and a calf 400.00 US Dollars. See also Svetlana Jacquesson 2007. Le cheval dans le rituel funéraire kïrgïz: variations sur le thème du sacrifice. Journal asiatique 295(2): 383-414.

Kochumkulova 299 The role of the kinship (tuugandik

institutu)

Some people, especially the Muslim clergy, condemn Kyrgyz life-cycle celebrations as a waste of money and a main cause of poverty in Kyrgyz families. However, the legacy of the historical socio-political organization of the nomadic Kyrgyz, which was based on the tribal and kinship system, remains strong in modern Kyrgyz society. In villages, people continue to foster the idea of mutual aid and rely on kinship support and values when holding major life-cycle celebrations or as people say at » g o o d and bad times« (jakshilik jana jamandik). People reinforce kinship ties by attending major family celebrations, exchanging gifts of clothes and adding contributions in livestock or money (koshumcha). Traditional kinship is being revived in rural areas among kinsmen (tuugan-uruk) of the same uruk or clan when a death occurs in a family. In many regions of Kyrgyzstan, all married male members within one uruk are obliged to contribute a certain fixed amount of money to the deceased's family. The deceased's family can use the money towards buying the animal to be slaughtered for the funeral or for other expenses. The amount of the contribution varies from one region to another depending on what the clan members agree upon. For example, among my kinsmen of the Ogotur clan (about 200 households in the town), each married man contributes 100 som, i.e. about $2.00 (USD), whereas in some villages in the Kochkor region, only close kinsmen contribute 1000 som, i.e. $20 (USD). When all the contributions in livestock and money received from kinsmen and people who are not related by blood (such as in-laws, friends and neighbours) are counted, they cover most of the funeral expenses. Almost every Kyrgyz family keeps a special » n o t e b o o k « ( d e p t e r ) in which it records the type of animal or amount of money brought by close kinsmen and people in general. This is done so that the same type of animal or an equal amount of money will be returned to that family when they have a funeral or other traditional feasts. Close kinsmen and in-laws of the deceased usually bring livestock

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such as a sheep or lamb. Neighbours, friends and distant relatives mostly bring money. A trustworthy relative, usually a man, will be assigned to record the names of all guests and the amount of their contribution. Then, in accordance with that list, the host gives a soyush, one sheep to be killed and served in honour of those guests, who will be assigned to the neighbouring houses. Each house will get one sheep for twelve people, including the host (husband and wife), because the sheep has twelve jiliks, parts that are served in accordance with the age and gender of guests.

Ash, the final memorial

feast

Ash, as the final major memorial feast o f f e r e d in honour of the deceased person, brings closure both to the deceased's spirit and to the mourning family that is left behind. Ideally, ash should be offered within a year of person's death, but people can o f f e r it whenever their economic situation allows them. Slaughtering a horse (for a man) or cow (for a woman) is mandatory for the ash to feed the large number of people. Kyrgyz believe that the spirit of the deceased will not rest in peace until his children or relatives o f f e r his ash. It is said that the deceased waits for forty years for his relatives to o f f e r his or her ash. There are still cases in which old people who have no children to carry out this task o f f e r their own ash while they are still alive. In the Aks'f region of southern Kyrgyzstan, the family and relatives of the deceased bring closure to the deceased's spirit and their mourning by carrying out two essential rituals at the end of ash. Male relatives turn the ochok where the meat is cooked upside down, 31 bury the ash (ochok ko-

31 In the past, the nomadic Kyrgyz did not carry large and heavy metal ochoks; instead, they dug a hole in the ground to hold the cauldron to cook the horse meat. The hollow fireplace where the meat was cooked was refilled with soil and levelled to the ground.

Kochumkulova 301 muu) and, while standing around the fireplace, cry out loud, upon which they dedicate a recitation f r o m Quran to the spirit of the deceased. Women also do their last crying by singing a koshok upon which, through the ceremony of ak kiydi, they e x c h a n g e their mourning clothes for brighter colours. S w e e t s such as candies and cookies are placed on the hem of w o m e n ' s new colourful dresses, and they g o around the room o f f e r i n g these to other women. As other w o m e n take sweets f r o m the hem of these women, they bless them, wishing them a long life and happy events and celebrations (m'indan kiyin jalang jakshil'ik toylor bolsun, ech jamandik korbogiilo). The old mourning clothes of w o m e n are burned. T h e s e final rituals of the ash correspond to Van Gennep's third step of rites of passage, i.e. » t h e rites of incorporation«, in which both the spirit of the deceased and the living family members f e e l content and continue living a normal life.

Religious disputes around Kyrgyz death rites With the revival of Islam in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the number of practicing Muslims, mostly young men and women, began to increase. Influenced by radical Islamic ideas and practices f r o m other Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, these p e o p l e began following the strict Muslim dress c o d e and advocating a pure form of Islam. T h e y have been g e n e r a t i n g heated discussions and disputes around »un-Islamic« Kyrgyz beliefs and customs (salt) and telling people to g e t rid of these pagan practices. Oziibek Aj'i Chotonov is one of the active advocates of a » t r u e « Islam and v e r y critical of Kyrgyz cultural practices. H e severely condemns old Kyrgyz customs, including funeral rites: No matter how wonderful our customs are, since we accepted being Muslim, we must first find out whether our customs conform to our religion or not. Otherwise, any customary act that

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does not conform to the religion makes that person an infidel. Religion is the law that came from God, and no one has the right to violate it... Our standing with one foot in Islam and the other in idolatry does not bring us any dignity. 32

Young imams and mullahs try to use funerals to preach Islam. Last year, at my maternal uncle's funeral, while his body was being washed inside the yurt, a local mullah in his 30s, who was invited to perform the Muslim janaza ritual, stood outside of the yurt and, for about half an hour, lectured to men and women attending the funeral in a quite authoritative tone, pointing out to all un-Islamic rituals and practices of a funeral. He called on people to observe the five pillars of Islam and also vividly described God's tortures of Hell and pleasures of Heaven. People listened to his words quietly, but some men and women who stood near me seemed to dislike the imam's behaviour and the tone of his voice; meanwhile, one of the older women said quietly, »ushul moldolorduku ottii da« (we are sick and tired of these mullah's [preaching]). In 2003, a day before my paternal grandfather's fortiethday memorial service and my uncle's one-year memorial feast (jildik), I had made a brief video interview of my close family members, my great uncle, grandmother, my mother and the uncle who had become a radical Muslim. I asked my greatuncle Anarbay about these memorial feasts and how the preparations for these memorial feasts were going. He spoke in favour of these customs, as they have been practiced for many centuries by our ancestors (ata-babalar), and said that they are w e r e going to slaughter a yearling that day, make a lot of fried bread (boorsok), and g e t ready to host special guests in the neighbouring houses tomorrow. My other younger uncle, who sat next to Anarbay, was quite upset about these preparations and said:

32 Oziibek Aj'i Chotonov 2002. Iymart sabagi [Lesson of faith], Bishkek: Technology Press Center, p. 229.

Kochumkulova 303 Yes, all of these customs have been practiced by our ancestors. However, they are all bidda, religious innovations. God willing, when w e establish an Islamic state, w e will ban all of them, including the slaughtering of an animal. Shari'a does not allow killing any animal and cooking for three days in the house of the deceased. One has to make an ekhsan only by reciting Qu'ran in the memory of the deceased. We are trying to explain (shari'a) and the religion of Islam to people, and finally establish an Islamic state here. Well-off people can carry out these customs, but it is a burden for the poor. One must show respect for the deceased when he or she is alive. What is offered after the person dies has no value. When my older brother died, I tried to prevent the relatives from carrying out these customs, but none of them listened to me. They said that people would laugh at them if they did not follow them. But don't people think of the testimony that they must give before Allah when they go to the other world? Allah will interrogate the deceased and ask, »Did you receive Quran from above? Did the Prophet Muhammad come to you? Did a mullah tell you about these things?« What will you say to Him? Singing a lament song is the utmost sin! It is like killing the person a second time. The deceased will be tortured in the grave: »Were you a mighty mountain or a great hero?!« Yes, one has to cry, but very quietly from inside without singing laments or crying out loud.

Kumu, 72 years old (at the time of the interview), my paternal grandmother: They are saying that singing a lament song is not right. I say whatever the people say about these customs. People will just laugh at me if I just sit there quietly without crying and singing a lament song. I do whatever people do. If no one cried, perhaps, I would not cry either. Suusar, 47 years old (at the time of the interview), my mother:

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We cannot just throw away these old customs overnight. Only time will show. When Islam establishes itself fully here and forbids slaughtering animals and singing lament songs, our children will regulate these funeral customs. According to Oziibek aj'i Chotonov, » c r y i n g out loud next to the deceased, screaming or kicking the ground, or singing laments for the d e c e a s e d are archaic, darkness and sinful.« 3 3 H e further states, » I t is shameful and ridiculous f o r a person of the twentyfirst century to carry out customs and rituals that w e r e practiced 2000-3000 years ago. T h e r e f o r e , shari'a presents us the right and easy cultural path.« 3 4 Like many Kyrgyz elders, my grandmother does not accept these accusations: Their prohibition of crying and singing lament songs is not acceptable. How can you not cry when your close relative dies?! One must honour his or her spirit and praise his or her good deeds by singing lament songs. Even when a person who is disliked by others dies, his mother, wife and daughters must sing lament songs with praising words. Abdi'shukiir Narmatov, President of the Institute of Islam in Bishkek, w h o r e c e i v e d his education in Egypt, shared his v i e w on this tradition: Of course, if one loses one's loved one, not only a person, even an animal will cry. It is impossible not to cry. When the Prophet's sixteen-year-old son died, he hugged his son with tears running from his eyes. And someone asked him: »Oh, Prophet, we thought you would not cry?« The Prophet said: »Yes, I also cry. I cry for my child, I shed my tears for him. However, I do not say a word against God.« Today, when women sing lament songs, they say words against God and religion: »Oh, God! To

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whom did you leave your children?! Oh, God! Why did you take him so young! You took his life away, etc.!« One should not say such words. Women's voice should be soft and gentle; their loud voices should not disturb the men outside. One should weep silently from inside. Many Kyrgyz women and men noted that when one loses a loved one it is impossible to refrain from weeping and crying out loud, especially for women. Singing a koshok is an effective spiritual and psychological tool for comforting and easing one's pain. Many Kyrgyz women say that singing a koshok helps them control their emotions, suppress negative feelings of anger and bitterness and conserve energy. A Kyrgyz woman shared her personal feelings when she sang a koshok after her parents died: Crying without saying anything is very hard. After crying hard for some time, you begin to lose your voice and also feel tired. You know that you cannot bring them back, and koshoks confirm this fact and let you admit God's will. You cry every time new visitors or relatives come to offer condolences. Singing a koshok helped me to console myself and express what I was feeling inside without crying hard. I tried to sing those lines that suited my father's life and my feelings. Also, when I sang a koshok, I felt as if my deceased father and mother (who lay in front of me behind the curtain inside the yurt) heard what I was saying about them in my koshok.

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Disputes about slaughtering the funeral

a larger domestic animal for

Purist Muslims condemn the tradition of sacrificing a horse for the funeral as an act dishonouring the deceased and the family in mourning. In 2003, when I interviewed mufti, Head of the Muslim Spiritual Board of the Kyrgyz Republic, Murataal'i Aj'i Jumanov,35 he said the following in regard to this custom: Shari'a is not against the slaughtering of a mare if it is killed in honour of the deceased. However, it is against wasting. It is wrong to cook any meal at the house where the death has occurred for the first three days. It is the neighbours' job to do it at their house. After three days, however, they can slaughter whatever they want. One has to slaughter an animal with a genuine wish that a person does not suffer economically. For example, let's say that someone's father died. The elders will ask him what he has. Many people will come to the funeral. They will tell him that he must find a cow or mare, ten kilograms of rice will not be enough, you should get hundred kilos, they say. If you do not have a cow, you should borrow from someone. Yes, there are relatives, who usually help him. However, in most cases poor families suffer by trying to be like the wealthy. On average, they take six or seven years to pay off their debt. Shari'a says to do the thing that you can afford.

Thus, according to Jumanov, it is permitted to kill a horse in honour of the deceased, but killing any animal and offering its meat to people should be done after three days. He is right that some families cannot afford to fulfil some of the main requirements of their tradition and that some well-off

35 He died mysteriously at the age of 37, not long after the April revolution of 2010 in Kyrgyzstan. He served as the Muftiy of the Kyrgyz Republic for more than 8 years.

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or wealthy families use the occasion to show off. However, my uncle Anarbay said: How can I not kill any animal when my parents are dying?! Why did they raise and educate me? When a person dies it is allowed to slaughter an animal (maZ) for nomadic Kyrgyz. We slaughter the animal in honour of the deceased. If you just bury him without any rituals, he will go away just like that. For example, our father raised three of us, including his many grandchildren. Since he worked hard to raise us, we must return that service. We tried our best to help and respect him when he was alive, but we must also send him to the other world with the same dignity and respect. It is not good to bury him immediately right after his death as if you are happy to get rid of him.

Preserving one's own and one family's honour ( n a m i s ) is very important in cultures in which traditional values are strongly preserved. In Central Asia, some families sacrifice all they have to celebrate life-cycle events, especially weddings and funerals. Offering such big feasts is not based on one individual's or one family's decision, but rather on the collective decision of kinsmen. Even though some people are critical of slaughtering a larger domestic animal for the funeral and the final memorial feast, they admit that they are unable to break with the old tradition. When I asked my parents' neighbour, who was critical of the tradition of killing an animal, whether he would kill any animal for his parent(s)' funeral and memorial feast, he replied: As a Kyrgyz, I will, because many relatives and in-laws will come. For example, if they come from Talas and Chatkal, they would not sit hungry for two days. Secondly, it is an honour thing. If my father or mother dies, if I bury them without killing any animal, after leaving my courtyard, people will curse me, saying that I was not able to offer one mare or cow for my late father's spirit and give him a proper burial.

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Disputes about burying the body too

quickly

There are also disputes about how fast the deceased's body should be buried. According to Muslims burial practices, the deceased's body must be buried as soon as possible, usually within 24 hours. The neighbouring Uzbeks follow this rule strictly, but Kyrgyz keep the body at least one night (in some regions, people keep it for two or three days until close family members arrive) and bury the next day around noontime. Many Kyrgyz oppose the idea of burying the body without waiting for the close family members to arrive. My grandmother said, » I t will be equal to the burial of a dog's carcass! When I die, I want to be buried like a human being, not like a d o g ! « My uncle Anarbay, who lived in Uzbekistan for more than forty years, also expressed strong sentiments about it: I learned that keeping the body for one or two days does not do any harm. Uzbeks say that it is a bad sign for the dead body to stay overnight i.e. the outcome will be bad, and they bury their dead even by a lantern; they do not let it stay overnight. As for us, we keep it up to three days. We think that after living this long in this house, can't the person fit in it for three or four days?! If there are close relatives coming from far away, we wait for them, because it is important to see one's parent, brother or sister, wife or husband before burial for the last time. Even if he or she is dead, they will have the chance to see his or her face. If you just bury him without any rituals, he will be buried too quickly. Our father raised us and his grandchildren. We did our best to help and respect him while he was alive, but we must also send him to the other world with the same dignity and respect.

Since the break up of the Soviet Union, due to the lack of jobs in Kyrgyzstan, thousands of young Kyrgyz migrant workers, both men and women, have been living and working in various cities in Russia and Kazakhstan. When their loved one, such as a parent or sibling, dies, it takes about

Kochumkulova 309 three days to travel by train. Knowing that the deceased's body will be buried after one or two days, most people loan money from their friends and buy a ticket for an airplane to Bishkek. From there they travel directly to their village by car, desperate to make it before the burial. There are many sad cases when people cannot make it or make it just before the body is wrapped fully and ready to be taken to the burial. Many people feel angry and agonized about not being able to see their father or mother one last time after travelling that far and scold their relatives for not waiting for them.

Conclusion Muslim death rites have become an integral part of a Kyrgyz funeral. Until recently, many ordinary Kyrgyz did not and could not distinguish clearly between what is purely Muslim and what is non-Muslim in their beliefs and practices. In adopting Islam and its death rites, the nomadic Kyrgyz were quite inclusive and tolerant towards new beliefs and practices if they did not contradict their traditional belief system. As in many cultures, Kyrgyz cultural traditions have been quite resilient in adapting to new and outside influences and changes. As the Kyrgyz saying goes, »Every fifty years, people are new« (eliiii jilda el jangi); cultural renewal is a natural process in human development. However, that renewal should bring social cohesion rather than disharmony. However, the post-Soviet disputes around Kyrgyz vs. Islamic customs are causing religious disharmony and social tensions in some families and communities. As the above koshok texts demonstrate, Kyrgyz women quite masterfully and naturally incorporated new Islamic religious terms, expressions and concepts into their traditional lament poetry. Thus, the koshoks present a unique religious syncretism and harmony between Islam and Kyrgyz traditional belief system.

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Rather than a focus on comfort for those left behind, Islam puts an exclusive focus on the deceased's soul to make sure that it peacefully and easily transitions from this world to the other. As Danforth notes, funeral rites are » t h e system of death related practices which overcomes the threat of social paralysis. Death rites are concrete procedures for the maintenance of reality in the face of death. Through the performance of these rituals, those who have confronted death are able to resume their reality-sustaining conversation«. 3 6 Muslim clergy say that the deceased is in no need of people's rituals, except Qur'anic recitations. I argue, however, that a Kyrgyz funeral is not about the deceased alone, but also about the status of the living, those who are left behind. In the past, the singing of koshoks as well as men's ritual of okiiruu was the mandatory and essential aspects of a Kyrgyz funeral, or as one Kyrgyz manasch'i said, »Koshok was our Quran.« The recitations from the Quran (Kuran okuu) at funerals are traditionally the task of men and mullah. So, the Kyrgyz women need their own sacred ritual like the koshok to deal with the sad situation they are in. I believe that the purpose of reciting the Quran and singing a koshok is the same, i.e. to show respect to and please the spirit of the deceased. The two rituals supplement each other and help to heal or ease the pain of the mourners. The difference is that the Qur'an is recited in Arabic, which the Kyrgyz do not understand, but they still feel the spiritual power of the melodic prayer, whereas, the koshok is sung in their native poetic language, and thus, has an immediate and strong spiritual and emotional effect. The touching poetic words and expressions accompanied with a sad melody and sounds that are like crying between verse lines make the lamenters and listeners cry and help them to let their sad emotions and feelings out. In addition, a koshok provides a communication platform for women mourners,

36

Danforth 1982, p. 31.

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who, through this ritualized song, express their feelings to other relatives who come to the funeral. The tradition of preparing your own dlumtiik kiyit ahead of time and distributing them to the selected group of people who wash your body also demonstrates the respectful relationship between the deceased and the people left behind. Old people usually leave a testament (kereez) about whom they prefer to have perform the washing of their bodies. The Kyrgyz strongly believe in the existence of the deceased's spirit (arbak) and its power to cause harm to the family and relatives if it is mistreated or not remembered. One of the powerful curses that the Kyrgyz use is »Eh, arbak urgur/ursun!« (May you be cursed by the [deceased's] spirit!) The final memorial feast, ash, is still mandatory, as it brings closure to the mourning period and the deceased's spirit. Or as the common Kyrgyz saying states, »One cannot/should not die after the death of a loved one« (olgondiin art'inan olmoy jok), i.e. life goes on. Most Kyrgyz are aware that a quick burial was a necessity in the hot Arabian deserts where Islam was born and, therefore, are against burying the dead too quickly in the cooler climatic conditions of Kyrgyzstan. The quick burial of the deceased would eliminate many of the essential Kyrgyz death rites discussed above. When we talk about religious tolerance and diversity, we should not promote these ideas among solely between different religions - Muslims, Jews and Christians - but within religious groups as well, including the full range of Muslim nations, peoples and communities. After all, there was never one homogenous Muslim culture or civilization, but many Muslim cultures, and Central Asia is one of them. As for the Kyrgyz, people's religious identity is inseparable from their ethnic and cultural identity, as it is mostly their so-called un-Islamic customs and values that make them good Kyrgyz and Muslims. Finally, Kyrgyz life-cycle celebrations involve a large number of people, great quantities of food, various traditional games played on horseback and wrestling. Such events

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serve as the main platforms for social interaction and public entertainment. This is still the case in most rural areas of Kyrgyzstan where, unlike in cities, there are fewer or no opportunities for villagers to socialize and enjoy modern forms of entertainment, such as public music festivities, theatres, dance, sport competitions etc. Traditional Kyrgyz feasts and customs help to bring people and communities together by reinforcing individual, family and kinship ties and relationships. They have been tested and refined over many centuries and maintain elements of self- or local governance and civil society.37 Time, socio-economic and political conditions, the government's religious and cultural policies and sound research will help to determine the course and nature of religious and cultural developments in Kyrgyzstan. Today, one segment of modern Kyrgyz society strictly follows Muslim death rites, but the majority of people continue practicing mixed - Kyrgyz, Islamic and Russian/European - cultural elements in their funeral customs. This hybrid nature of Kyrgyz cultural identity created the following sarcasm which the Kyrgyz say about themselves: »We are born as a Kyrgyz, we live as a Russian, but die as a Muslim« (Kirgiz bolup tuulabiz, oruscha jashaybiz, musulmancha olobiiz).

37 Kyrgyz Muslim clergy, together with some Kyrgyz parliament members, have been trying to adopt a special law to limit people's expenses for life-cycle celebrations, especially for funerals and weddings. So far, this idea has not found support among the majority of people.

Some Final Remarks1 Sophie Roche

From a cultural studies (kul'turologiya) point of view, the revival of Islamic values in Kazakhstan is a process of self-identification, a consequence of the search for spirituality after many years of the domination of atheism. The revival process of Islamic traditions and values is one aspect of the revival of the cultural heritage. Many intellectuals see the revival and development of religion as a solution to many social problems in Kazakhstan. According to these intellectuals, the development of a national culture is only possible if it is based on national cultural values. Foreign spiritual concepts cannot replace the traditional religion of Kazakh society. From the psychological point of view, this development creates the prerequisites for national identification, and thus the attachment to one's culture. They propose the revival of Islamic values through the reconstruction of history and culture; identity and traditions leads to the restoration of the traditional way of life. (Ashirbek Muminov, chapter 4)

1 This conclusion is the result of numerous discussions with Dina Wilkowsky about her views on research in the Soviet Union and the West. Biographies are one of the lines of discussion at Zentrum M o d e r n e r Orient (especially within the working group » A c t o r s in translocal s p a c e , « led by Heike Liebau). An earlier version of this manuscript was presented at the workshop »Ruptures and Linkages: Biography and History in the South,« organized by Zentrum Moderner Orient and the German Historical Institute London, 16-18 February 2012.

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The hybrid nature of Kyrgyz cultural identity created the following saying: »We are born as a Kyrgyz, we live as a Russian, but die as a Muslim« ( K i r g ' i z bolup musulmancha

tuulabiz,

oruscha

jashaybiz,

olobiiz). (Elmira Kochumkulova, chapter 8)

Introduction: Text as genre Today no one questions that Central Asians are primarily Muslims: this identity appears to be unquestioned and dominant. Yet this has not always been the case. There have been decades in which religious identities were questioned, denied, downplayed and persecuted. Thus, we may wonder whether the emphasis on religious identities today results from (western) researcher's interests, from people's lives and practices, from political conditions, or from a combination of these. There is no reason to assume that Central Asian people are Muslims before they are Tajiks, Kazakhs, former Soviet citizens, men, women, Uzbek speakers, farmers, poets, teachers, religious scholars, etc. Thus, the reason why Islam has become central to some and not to others demands a careful investigation. The role of the intellectuals in re-contextualizing Central Asia internationally since the end of the Soviet Union poses the question of how and why Islam became such an important vector in scientific and political analysis. This book has approached the question through different text genres (scientific, political, autobiographies and biographic interviews). Through these genres we receive a nuanced insight into the ways that Islam is currently being discussed among the intellectual elite of Central Asia (and Russia). This elite received its university education during the Soviet period and has been active in the transformation of their respective country since the end of the Soviet period. As such, their texts and biographies are important for a historical understanding of Central Asia. The different text genres link discourses to authoritative biographies and provide primary material about how Islam

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is discussed within the contemporary educational elite. Discourses are neither independent of the social world nor are they only politically dictated, but are the result of individual efforts to engage with contemporary problems, questions and opportunities. The contributors invite us to think about Islam in Central Asia as an intellectual history, as a scientific subject, as cultural capital, as habitus, and as a political problem, and thus as being multi-dimensional. Hence, while politics remain an important category, this frame of analysis limits our understanding of the relevance of scholarship for shaping contemporary society. All biographic notes engage with Islam at one point or another. However, the authors' religious identities or relation to religion are never one-dimensional, but are situated in family history, in professional training, in political context, and vis-à-vis the interviewer. At times Islam appears to be one of the most precious resources that one can possess for shaping the new society. However, this resource is not exclusive and instead offers itself to various interpretations and implementations. At other times Islam appears as a foreign, dangerous power challenging national integrity. This book contains a variety of text genres, some of which are familiar to a social science audience, others perhaps less so. Why have these contributors, despite a common education and assumingly a common ideological school, chosen such a large variety of genres to convey their respective messages? Genre studies suggest that culture and situations influence linguistic choices. Within academic circles, self-censorship is applied to keep what is perceived as a »norm« of academic work. While globalization has pushed English academic writing as norm, this is by no means an »objective« genre. In fact, Russian-speaking scholars similarly apply a norm that grew during the Soviet period. Genres are fuzzy categories and it would be inappropriate to pinpoint any of the texts as »typical.« Instead, I invite the reader to engage with the different genres and enjoy the multiple possibilities of transporting ideas and information, and to reflect upon the narrative means used to con-

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vey a message. We do, however, need to keep in mind the audience for which the texts were produced - an academic audience, interested laymen, and generally an audience not very informed about Central Asia. It is the latter that motivated researchers in the west to produce countless »introductory works« to Central Asia, a demand that has also been met by Central Asian, highly specialized scholars. Carolyn Miller and Amy J. Devitt have argued that »genres operate socially.«2 Thus, it is not only the educational career that predefines textual production, but education (whether in habitus, university education or a political training) may allow for a more creative capacity to adapt genre to situations. Over time people learn situations within which they produce meaning. (Rhetoric) texts are produced in a social world that is neither fully private nor only defined by material circumstances - rather, they are products of our socialisation. Devitt suggests three contexts for understanding genre: situation, culture, and genre set. »Thus context of situation, context of culture, and context of genres all influence the actions of writers and readers, speakers and listeners, and they do it partly through genre. Each kind of context has both a material and constructed reality, for what makes them »context« is the extent to which people give them significance [...] All three contexts interact, and at the nexus of that interaction lies genre.« (p. 29) Some of the texts in this book have a clear political message. The text by Baimenov goes even further by claiming academic participation not through education but through

2 Carolyn R. Miller 1984. Genre as social action. Quarterly Journal of Speech 70(2): 151-167; Amy J. Devitt 2004. Writing genres. Illinois: Southern Illinois University. Of course genre studies are a brought field which for reasons of space I cannot elaborate here. I only suggest taking genre as a way to reflect upon academic writing in post-Soviet space and in the Euro-American tradition. A good overview of Genre Studies can be found in: Daniel Chandler 1997 »An Introduction to Genre Theory« http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/ Documents/intgenre/intgenre.html [last accessed 26 March 2013].

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descent and political status.3 The role of Islam in these texts is sometimes a » p r o b l e m « in a classic orientalist way, but also a resource and promise, both a cultural capital and habitus. This may be one of the specificities of intellectual discourse in post-Soviet Central Asia, namely the plurality that Islam adopts in texts whether these are interviews, academic texts, sermons, or political talks. An interesting opposition seems to exist between biographies and the texts in this book: The biographies seem to have been shaped by external guidance, individual chance and capacity and family background; they develop smoothly and radical moments are relativized within the life narrative. The biographic narratives in this book (whether short interviews or autobiographies), in contrast to the academic texts, seem less radical. Careers are shaped by possibilities, individual capacities, chances and hazards, political contexts, and many other factors, yet, as a rule they are linear narrations emphasising success. In this, they fundamentally differ from religious life narratives that bear the moment of conversion. One can observe a tendency to omit discontinuities in career narratives in order to construct a linear apposition of information and experiences. 4 Generally, the interviews have been conducted to understand the educational strategies of the authors and their relation to Oriental Studies and Islam. While most do provide information of this nature, the majority provide little reflection about these strategies, their education, and the private and political context.

3 Baimenov's participation in the book may be contested, yet he is an example of how non-specialists managed to enter debates by claiming political status and popular knowledge. He is not an exception but has at least one famous predecessor: Liutsian Klimovich. See Michael Kemper 2009. The Soviet discourse on the origin and class character of Islam, 1923-1933. Welt des Islam 49: 1-48. 4 This does not apply to all academic disciplines and professions, compared for instance to economic studies that emphasize radical breaks and risk as biographic virtue.

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Things appear differently in the texts that clearly judge the Soviet period - which is seen as having interrupted the flow of history in Central Asia, or Muslim activists - who appear as either liberating or dangerous to the region. Why are the texts more radical than the career narratives? (See for instance, Baimenov's descriptions of the Soviet period as »cultural genocide« p. 252). Academic and political texts are a product of time, a direct response to either acquired knowledge (manuscripts etc.) and/or experiences. The texts, as a production of specific situations, message and times, are more radical in their formulation, either in how they accept certain structures (e.g., classificatory systems) and representations of the region (e.g., legal-illegal or united civilization of Islam) or in their political message. This calls for a reflection of how we, as readers, expect academic texts to be narrated, and why the contributors have chosen a specific form to convey their message, since genre lies between the textual and the contextual, Miller and Devitt emphasize. With this in mind, we will now turn to the content of texts. An interesting genre example has been provided by Derbisali (chapter 1). While his text is highly academic in content, the form of the text has been »sanctified« through various formulations. Obviously this text was not intended for a German academic audience, but rather for a Kazakh or, more generally, a »Muslim« public with a religious consciousness. Derbisali's efforts to use his knowledge gained through historical-archaeological research in Kazakhstan to contextualize Kazakhstan within the »Islamic world« and »Islamic culture« - both terms that he uses is a new text genre that transgresses the border between secular science and theology. This is a very specific text genre made possible because of the fluidity between his position as academic, politician, and religious authority, as well as an attempt to place Kazakhstan within a new world order in which Islam is considered one of the main providers of »civilization.« »Truth« and »facts« are merged in a challenging text that goes far beyond the many pamphlets

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that one finds all over Central Asia.5 His text is probably one of the most complex examples in a newly emerged hagiographie tradition in which descendants of local saints inscribe their territory into a religious landscape.5 The following analysis is divided into three larger sections as a result of the book's structure: First, the biographic narratives, second, the texts and, third, some theoretical reflections. I will start by addressing some of the themes that have been suggested by the authors in the biographic narratives, and move on to a more general discussion about Islam in Central Asia based on the texts and biographies in the second and third sections. The final remarks are meant to invite the reader to engage with the contributions in a comparative manner, yet they are nothing more than suggestions and by no means represent the final word on the subject.

5 For information about the little pamphlets sold in front of the mosques, see Adeeb Khalid 2007, p. 136. For a translation of texts s e e Allen J. Frank 2007. 6 Stéphane Dudoignon presented a study about the appearance of the Khujand-noma, a religious history and guide to the main Islamic sanctuaries of Khujand, where he argues that the book serves to vitalize neighbourhood memories, sanctify human community on the local level, and re-centre Khujand on the spiritual map, employing genealogies and local religious history. Dudoignon s e e s the resulting localized understanding of religious identity in the continuity of the Soviet discourse on kraevedenie, which identified local history as an amalgamation of local events, while larger geographical connections are either ignored or re-centred on their locally significant aspects. Such local and regional religious histories, he argues, were common in the 1990s all over Tajikistan, documenting a general interest for local religious literature in the 1990s as part of what he calls local political »autonomization«. From Stéphane A. Dudoignon 2004. Local lore, the transmission of learning, and communal identity in late 20th-century Tajikistan: The Khujand-nàma of 'Ârifjàn Yahyàzàd Khujandï. In idem (ed), Devout societies versus impious states? Berlin, pp. 213-242.

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I. (Auto)biographic presentations of experts on Islam The editors of Ab Imperio, in the thematic journal on »Narrating the Multiple Self: New Biographies for the Empire« (1/2009), suggest using empire as a »context-setting category« with a special space for biographical reconstruction. This makes it possible to recognize the diversity of imperial space; the editors claim that utilising biographies helps to explore a more diverse picture of the imperial condition. Biographies »are about how imperial heterogeneity and the multifaceted nature of individual experience in empire created conditions for a conscious construction of one's identity. In this sense, empire becomes a milieu that stimulates the formation of a modern subjectivity characterized by self-reflection and social constructivism. No doubt, empire equally limits this constructivism.« (p.20) This approach may be helpful for reflecting on the autobiographies of those contributors who were educated during the Soviet period and thus experienced both the end of that period and a new epoch. This new epoch should, however, not be understood as a radical rupture at all levels and to all people. The perception of what the end of the Soviet period meant to individuals, groups or nation-states is far from homogenous and has also changed over the last two decades. To recognize the researchers' individual paths is also to acknowledge the »multifaceted nature of individual experience« within the Soviet setting. Thus, the claim of Dina Wilkowsky that »Sovietization was not simply a »topdown« process, but that it provided considerable scope for local initiatives,« 7 has been shared by other authors, notably V. Naumkin. Individual careers may be shaped by personal family motivation, individual talent, and (unexpected) political events. The personalities that turned to politics and became respected authorities in the newly independent

7 Dina Wilkowsky 2001. Unpublished paper. Presented at Z M O on 19 May 2011.

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countries did not begin by replacing their »Soviet« identity with their respective »national« identity. Instead, they engaged in critical (self-)reflection and socio-political discussions long before. To be able to move between different political settings, individual experiences, and knowledge production, I believe that it is useful to consider the Soviet Union as a context-setting category. It is not very helpful to think of the USSR as a monolithic block and its people as subjects of state doctrines. Instead, if we trace individual biographies we not only identify various political periods, but also how far the state milieu was able to stimulate subjectivity. The role of the family in providing alternative narratives, supporting political ideology or, most often, simply ignoring much political engagement has not been fully explored. In fact, we find various orientalists who received their linguistic foundation from their relatives, and who after independence made use of this genealogical cultural capital in their political engagement. In the following I suggest engaging with the biographies of the authors in their plurality as witnesses of history. I am very thankful that these authors have provided younger generations with a glimpse of Central Asia through their individual and personal accounts. In this way they have contributed to a more nuanced and intimate view of life in a different period.

Genealogy

as a cultural

capital

History is not a process that only takes place outside the self: history is made in families, in politics, in everyday experiences. Some of the authors' biographies exemplify to what degree the state's milieu shaped family history and how family life influenced and shaped social and political participation. The family, which is one of the central institution in which culture is produced, became a resource for many of the authors from Central Asia. Elmira Kochumkulova, for instance, speaks of culture as a personal experience in childhood. Her text and autobiography is a fascinat-

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ing journey into her family history. The university director chose to send her to study as one of the first students in the United States in 1994 not only because she was a good student, but most importantly because she was considered best among the students to represent Kyrgyz culture abroad (at the time she was already an artist playing the komuz and singing traditional songs). She had a cultural mission when she left for further study, and thus she told people in Seattle about Kyrgyzstan, a world that had been closed to the west. Kochumkulova's cultural capital was her authentic nomadic childhood paired with a solid modern education through which she was able to translate her experiences into scientific work. 8 Similarly, Zifa Auezova describes her career as a mission: The thing is that in our family I was supposed to be the third person, the third generation, who turned to the Oriental Studies to Russian Oriental Studies actually, well because my father he graduated from Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies. (See the full context of the quote chapter 5, p. 198)

Zifa Auezova was advised to take up Oriental Studies by her family. She certainly profited from being a member of one of the leading intellectual families of Kazakhstan, but also felt the responsibility of her family history. Her biography and the text she provides engage with a genealogy of intellectual history. She uses this method to engage with a controversial past and a search for her own and her country's past. As a descendant of Mukhtar Auezov, she is often confronted with a central figure of Kazakh intellectu-

8

E d u c a t i o n w a s o n e of the m o s t p r e s t i g i o u s social capital that a n indivi-

d u a l c o u l d attain. I n d e e d , the c o n t e n t of e d u c a t i o n w a s not t h o u g h t of as i d e o l o g i c a l indoctrination, b u t m o r e or less n e u t r a l k n o w l e d g e a c q u i s i t i o n . H e n c e , r e l i g i o u s authorities w o u l d s u p p o r t e d u c a t i o n as a w a y of a c c u m u lating k n o w l e d g e as a m a t t e r of p r e s t i g e a n d social capital, not b e c a u s e they w a n t e d their c h i l d r e n to b e d e d i c a t e d M a r x i s t s .

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al history and the political judgement of the Soviet Union. What trauma could the life of a relative bequeath to its descendants? And how do people deal with such a past today? The biography of Mukhtar Auezov has been published and made available to the public by Muminov, yet, he is only one of many important authorities who formulated alternative narratives to the Soviet doctrine. Zifa-Alua Auezova mentions Shakarim as another such authority particularly the contradiction in his life: on the one hand, Russia offered a new sphere of intellectual engagement and sources of education, on the other hand, they increasingly dominated the people who thought they had found new ground. Eventually any local intellectual history was brought into line with the dominant Soviet narrative, to the degree that students knew more about Hegel, Goethe and Russian history than they did about Kazakh history and philosophers. Muhiddin Kabiri and Alikhan Baimenov both received their first religious education at home and emphasize that their religious education was a form of cultural capital; their families both had religious books and members who were religious authorities. Baimenov puts great emphasis on his father, who was a local religious authority and hero who perpetuated his cultural and religious values during Soviet repression. Baimenov's autobiographic description of his father provides us with a glimpse of the many difficulties that people experienced if they wanted to legally open a mosque in the 1970s and 1980s. Although Alikhan Baimenov's political party (Ak Zhol) had no religious agenda, he used his cultural capital to create trust with ordinary people. In his biographic interview, Muhiddin Kabiri tells how his cultural capital - he learned Arabic and Persian before his father and elder brother - helped him to enter one of the most challenging faculties at the State University of Dushanbe: Oriental Studies. At the same time, he does not present his biography as exceptional, but rather modestly, as a result of his individual ambitions. »One can say that I gained maturity like any other citizen in my age during the Soviet Union.

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However, we did talk about Islam and read Islamic books at home.« (For the full context of this quote consult chapter 6, p. 228). His good command of Arabic and Persian helped him to soon become one of the best students. Several of the contributors received linguistic training (in Arabic and/or Persian) in their childhood through relatives and were able to use this cultural capital to enter university and engage in a scientific or political career. Hence, Soviet sciences profited from the knowledge that continued to be cultivated within families and passed inter-generationally. What is known as the politics of korenizatsiya (indigenization) is more than only the integration of local people into politics and sciences. The examples show that Soviet science directly profited from education within families, while simultaneously officially rejecting religious education. This was possible because the families would value education over politics. In other words, the family would encourage education even if they disagreed with politics. With perestroika, cultural capital received political weight and became a political resource. The move of several of the authors (e.g., Derbisali, Kabiri, Baimenov) into politics is described as a continuation of social engagement. A solid education paired with cultural capital makes the authors especially suitable to help shape a new society, it seems. Some of the authors display a remarkable, detailed knowledge of their family history (e.g., Auezova, Baimenov, Kochiimkulova) which they use to situate themselves within the contemporary nation. Many of the authors grew up in educated families and local elite families who were eager to pass family memories onto their children. It is known among anthropologists that religious and elite families tend to cultivate family memories much more than farmers or workers. Scientists are even more able to engage with their own biography to present a rather reflective version of their life. Some of the family histories are more than individual accounts, however, as they appear representative for the suffering of a people vis-a-vis a system. Hence, it is less in-

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dividual rehabilitation that matters than the reconstruction of a collective identity and historical continuity to reconcile with the past. In the accounts by Baimenov and Auezova, the family history is also the history of »the Kazakh« to a certain degree, and Kabiri describes himself as being exemplary of a collective history. Here, the end of the Soviet Union is experienced as a way to negotiate past power structures, and thus redresses an unequal hierarchy (the Russian centre and the Central Asian periphery). The revival of a historical memory helps to recentre history onto the new independent nations. This is not an abstract imagination or arbitrary construction (at least in most cases), but a personal experience in which the family, with its dissident members, becomes rehabilitated and assumes its place in the independent nation state.

Disruption

and

continuity

The idea that the Soviet period was filled with suffering, restriction, deprivation and lack of societal engagement has shaped the idea that its collapse must have been a break in people's biography, a marker in families, and brought with it a general experience of liberalization. Twenty years later the picture is much more differentiated. The economic collapse led to difficulties in all the newly independent countries and affected large parts of the population. While some groups managed the economic transitions more or less successfully, many others experienced a re-evaluation of their profession, sometimes with a painful loss of financial resources. Researchers and teachers were among the social groups that experienced the hardest cuts to their financial security. If we speak about possible change and disruption in Central Asia we have to go back at least to the 1980s. Gorbachev's perestroika unleashed an enthusiastic engagement with Islam on all levels. While in Central Asian villages this turned into a mushrooming of mosques, in universities,

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scholars discovered new material and chose new topics. Young people, especially students, founded movements to discuss national ideas and religious identities, such as for instance the Kazak students in 1986 (chapter 7, p. 258), and the Tajik youth groups in 1990 (chapter 6, p. 229). Political breaks are fast, punctual, and irreversible, yet it takes more than half a generation for these changes to be fully mentally processed, as Aleida Assmann9 reminds us. The end of the Soviet Union, however, was not unexpected and sudden to everybody; many of the authors in this book were among the intellectual elite that participated in its deconstruction, thereby paving the way for new concepts of nation. These authors' autobiographies reveal little the abrupt end of the Soviet Union and speak more of a process of change. For some this process of change started with political activities in the 1980s, while for others it was the physical experience of travelling outside the Soviet Union to Britain, Germany, or the US that marked a turn in their biography. Each of the authors in this volume shaped the end of the Soviet period differently. There is no general pattern of how they lived as researchers. Vitaly Naumkin, for example, was a co-chair of the Russian-American Regional Conflicts Task Force of the Dartmouth conference since 1984. In this position he participated in a dialogue with the USA that began in 1960 and that paved the geopolitical path to a peaceful transition. The Dartmouth conference continued to exist after the end of the cold war, but it turned to conflicts that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union,

9 Assmann writes: »Politische Akte [...] sind schnell, punktuell und irreversibel vollzogen, während mentale Einstellungen und soziales Verhalten in ihrem Wandel schwerfälliger sind und vielleicht länger anhalten als eine halbe Generation.» (Aleida Assmann 1999. Zeit und Tradition. Kulturelle Strategien der Dauer. Köln, p.13.) [Political acts [...] are fast, ad hoc [focus around specific dates] and irreversible, whereas mental attitudes and social behaviour change only slowly and may last for more than half a generation].

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such as the Tajik civil war of the 1990s and more recently the Ngorno-Karabach conflict in the Caucasus. For Baimenov, changes began with his involvement in student activities, and a growing consciousness of an ethnic identity and national history. The Kazakh student revolt in 1986 marked the beginning of his political career, which drew from his father's popularity and resistance to Soviet politics. Although Baimenov has not become a religious figure, he profits from his family's cultural capital. Kabiri has been similarly active. Soon after he began pursuing Oriental Studies, he found an underground students' circle where they read religious literature and discussed political issues. In 1987 he was elected leader of the Young Muslims Group and met Said Abdullo Nuri, who was leading a Youth Group established in the 1970s (which later became the Islamic Rebirth Party Tajikistan). How did the authors experience the official declaration of the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991? Most authors indicate that the end was not unexpected, but that its official declaration has remained in their memory, whether positive or not. Muhiddin Kabiri, for instance, was in Yemen when the Soviet Union ended. He and a Yemenit friend watched the Soviet Union's official end on television, and while his friend experienced it as an emotional disruption, Kabiri explains »for me it was something normal, it was nothing special.« He rejects the idea that the end of the Soviet Union left a deep mark on his biography. Similarly, Baimenov describes the end as a necessary step that politically active youth had themselves prepared. Zifa Auezova's view is more controversial; she believes that the end of the Soviet Union had an effect on her feelings of belonging. Of course, it is a huge difference. Just physically being not in the Soviet Union, it was already a big difference because when this happened, when the official declaration or announcement of the collapse of the Soviet Union took place, I was already in Great Britain; [...] Maybe more important for me was the possibility to

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Islam

spend a whole year in Oxford [...] Maybe this was the impetus for me. (For the full context see chapter 5, p. 201) Similarly, Dina Wilkowsky and Elmira Kochiimkulova emphasized their travel beyond the border of the (hereafter »former«) Soviet Union as a central event in their biography. Dina Wilkowsky's biography is a case in point. She radically broke with her career in Kazakhstan in the 2000s despite her success; she was the chair of Oriental Languages in the newly established Faculty for International Relations, which would train diplomats. Still, she left Kazakhstan to start anew in Germany. Why did she break so radically? From her family members we have learned that to her, the Soviet world had already broken apart in the 1980s. Was she looking for something new, something different that would provide meaning to her scientific research? Many researchers in »the west« were rather critical towards scholarly works from the former Soviet Union. The different methodological approaches needed a translation, Dietrich Reetz explained, since both sides had difficulty understanding the other's approaches. 10 Both worlds, the east and the west, met in the restructuring of Berlin's universities, a process that was painful to many colleagues from the former GDR. Dina Wilkowksy experienced this negotiation first hand.11 She wondered about 10 Dietrich Reetz is a senior researcher working at ZMO who has documented academic discussions at universities in the former GDR. See for instance, Dietrich Reetz 1991. Die Entwicklung und Stand der Asienwissenschaften in der DDR. Asien. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur 38: 75-87. 11 Perhaps the most important difference was in methodology, not in content. In numerous conversations, Dina Wilkowsky told me that the system in Germany was difficult to understand, people were classified by »quantity« (number of articles and books) and by »fashion« themes - somehow science had lost its reason for being, namely to engage with wider questions, at various levels (politics, scholarly debates, common articles, etc.). Further, Wilkowsky often wondered about the »narrowness« of the research questions in the west that were little suitable to explain society's development.

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the way the end of the Soviet Union was celebrated in the west, while for her it was merely a political change that however did not devalue the past. How should researchers of the generation of change deal with this tension? How could a bridge be built between both scientific worlds? While the travels described above have marked the respective authors' biographies, it is not mobility as such that was new. Soviet researchers (especially those in Russia) enjoyed great mobility and a vibrant scientific life far beyond the Soviet borders (to Arab countries, for instance). Today it is cheaper to fly to London than within Russia (See for instance, the biography of Dina Wilkowsky, chapter 3), to say nothing of Central Asia, Naumkin explains. As a result, scholars may know subjects and researchers from any U.S. university, but have no idea about the university activities in neighbouring cities. The network that was cultivated during the USSR and that stretched far beyond the Soviet Union has collapsed to a large extent and forced many young researchers to turn to where the money comes from. To conclude, rather than looking for disruptions in the biographies, we suggest looking at processes and self-representations. The density of descriptions in the authors' autobiographies may hint at the processes that have prepared the punctual and irreversible political event and led to its full implementation at all levels during the following years. Shifts in biographies that led a person to reorient may have come through travel across borders, through engaging with new scholarly traditions, or through re-discovering one's family, national, ethnic, or religious history. These personal experiences contribute to the political dynamics that appear less sudden to the intellectual elite but nevertheless leave irreversible marks on biographies.

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II. Islam - classifications, institutions, discourses and authorities The order of things Several of the authors in this book have organized religious movements and groups in a meticulous manner. The underlying order of these texts is shaped by a politically motivated view about religion, namely that there are official historically rooted forms that can be controlled by state institutions as opposed to unofficial, imported, foreign, and even dangerous forms of religious activities (whether political, ritual, or cultural) that can be detected, named and classified. The historians Herren, Riiesch and Sibille12 have argued that regimes tend to create orders and categories in the analysis of history. Such an »order of things« creates hierarchies of relevant topics that support the development of a national agenda. Thus, the effort to order the various religious movements, texts and authorities is not only a legacy of the Soviet period, but a general way nations think about history. The categories themselves have their origin in Soviet Oriental Studies and Soviet politics of religion. Below I explain these categories more thoroughly. One of the strongest concepts that has been inherited from the Soviet period's approach to religion is the notion of official and unofficial Islam, legal and illegal mosques, legal and underground mullahs, etc. These notions suggest that Islam during the Soviet period 13 had two opposing faces: on the one hand was an official structure, a top-down organization through which the state and local authorities

12 Madeleine Herren, Martin Riiesch and Christiane Sibille 2012. Transcultural history. Theories, methods, sources. Heidelberg et al.: Springer. 13 In the introduction we provided some relevant literature about the way Islam came to be situated within the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the role that Oriental Studies played in this process.

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communicated, thereby allowing a selected amount of Muslims to study Islam in legally recognized institutions (the SADUM 14 ). On the other hand, religious activities carried out by ordinary people, by religious families, etc. would be classified as illegal, clandestine, unofficial, etc. While these classifications were a useful tool for politics, these notions have been criticized for ignoring the many shades in which »unofficial activities« were tolerated and accepted by the political leadership. 15 So-called official mullahs were active in » i l l e g a l « activities reproducing a network of religious scholars independent of these classifications. 16 Yet although these categories may not reflect the reality, they w e r e established based on a concept of the modern secular state. Such a state would rationally regulate (topdown) religious practices, many identified as »remnants of the past« (perezhitki). A modern state, according to this view, is one that regulates religious practice based on rational considerations. In other words, a modern state also controls legal categories of religious activities even if in practice, these categories are arbitrary. 17 Against the background of these assumptions w e can understand why the categories of official-unofficial, legal-illegal are still applied not only by researchers but first of all

14 Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man Credney Asii i Kazakhstana (Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan) usually referred to as the SADUM. 15 Devin DeWeese 2011. Survival strategies. Reflection on the notion of religious »survivals« in Soviet ethnographic studies of Muslim religious life in Central Asia. In F. Mühlfried and S. Sokolovskiy (eds.), Exploring the edge of empire. Zürich, Berlin: Lit, pp. 35-58; Paolo Sartori 2010. Towards a history of the Muslims' Soviet Union. A view from Central Asia. Die Welt des Islams 50: 315-334. 16 Stephane A. Dudoignon. 2011. From revival to mutation: the religious personnel of Islam in Tajikistan, from de-Stalinization to independence (1955-91). Central Asian Survey 30(1): 53-80. 17 For an example of this perspective, see the interview of Serguie Glebov with Clifford Geertz »Interview with Clifford Geertz: Islam, modernity, nationalism« Ab Imperio 2004/3.

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by the current regimes in place. This not only gives security staff an arbitrary tool to arrest people (as the border between these categories are never clearly defined), 18 but also allows the state to constantly redefine content and cooperate with religious authorities.19 Hence, these categories provide a language for official communication on Islam and Muslims in the region. We may call these »translation terms« that operate between the researcher's intimate experience, the researcher community, and the politician's interest.20 Thus, many of the authors continue to use these categories.

18 The number of people who were arrested either because they held a leaflet about an »illegal« group or because a detention had to be legally justified was large, and often discussed in independent media such as Radio Free Europe's local branches, the BBC, Eurasianet, Ferghana.ru, and many local media outlets. 19 For instance, the Tajik regime cooperated with the Salafi in 2008, only to classify them as an »illegal« movement shortly thereafter. 20 If researchers use this category they may do so for analytical purposes but this does not mean that they are unaware of the many links. An example here is the book by Dina Wilkowsky 2009. The book is the only work that provides real insight into the complex economic and social relations between Arab organizations in Kazakhstan. While the main text follows classic ways of representing knowledge in Soviet categories of analysis, the footnotes provide rich material and detailed descriptions that make the book a unique text. See also P. Sartori's observation: »Muslimness might also be concealed behind strategies of accommodation, mimicry and resilience: it is sometimes possible to learn more about the cultural background of a scholar at the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the profound knowledge of Islam they received from their family) from the notes they left in the margins of the manuscripts they read than in direct conversation.« See also the footnote to the previous quote: »The people I have in mind are the Muslim intellectuals who survived Stalinist-era arrests and deportation to Siberia, were rehabilitated in the 1960s and found jobs at the Institute of Oriental Studies.« (Paolo Sartori 2010, p. 323).

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The SADUM in and after

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perestroika

Let us now take a look at what the authors understand to be »official Islam«. First of all this refers to legal institutions such as the SADUM (Spiritual Board of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan). 21 While some considered this body to be a close partner of Soviet government, other voices emphasized the internal discussion among religious authorities in Central Asia. Interestingly, though the SADUM is the official institution of Muslims in Central Asia, it is also the source of the narrative about »radical Islam« in Central Asia. 22 This master narrative of a »radical Islam« starts with Sa'id ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahid ibn 'Ali al-'Asali al-Tarablusi al-Shami al-Dimashqi, also known as Shamidomulla, who initiated the Ahl al-Hadith, a group propagating a return to the original sources of Islam, the Qur'an and the hadiths in the 1920s. 2 3 Members of this group, Ishan

2 1 The SADUM was installed in 1943, and its role was to train a small number of religious authorities and respond to political demands (for instance, to find legal proof in sharia law for political rules, or adapt religious feasts to Soviet labour demands, Paolo Sartori 2010). These »official« clergy were opposed to the »unofficial« clergy that acted outside this state structure. From the 1970s onwards some young mullahs (who were referred to as Wahhabis) were blamed for politicizing Islam and challenging the non-political official clergy (see for instance, Vitaly V. Naumkin 2005. This way the opposition between a non-political state Islam (structured through state controlled authorities) against an oppositional political Islam (various religious movements subsumed under Wahhabis) became a discourse that have shaped much of the political and scientific discourse since independence. However, the SADUM is not a new invention - a similar institution, the Orenburg Muslim Spiritual Assembly, was initiated by Catherine II in 1788. 22 Sebastien Peyrouse 2007. The rise of political Islam in Soviet Central Asia. In H. Fradkin, H. Haqqani and E. Brown (eds.). Current trends in Islamists ideology. Washington, D.C.: Hudson Institute, pp. 40-45; Ludmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko 1994; Alexei Malashenko 2006. Islam, the way we see it. Russia in Global Affairs 4, 12 October 2006. http://eng. globalaffairs.ru/print/number/n_7325 [last accessed November 2012]. 23 Chapters 2 and 4 provide some insights about this narrative and Shamidomulla, who is not a native but came via China, »importing« his Salafi or

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C e n t r a l A s i a n I n t e l l e c t u a l s on I s l a m

Babakhan and his son Ziyauddin Babakhan came to lead the SADUM until perestroika. 24 During the Soviet time the SADUM was located in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and maintained two officially recognized institutions f o r learning Islam: In Bukhara (Madrasa MirArab) and the Tashkent Islamic Institute » I m a m Bukhari«. Many people went through this educational system but it produced no coherent political group. Instead, during perestroika Muslim authorities w e r e among the first to call for national politics, while the Soviet apparatchiki w e r e skeptical about this Muslim-national combination. As Muhiddin Kabiri mentioned in the biographic interview, the Islamic Rebirth Party Tajikistan, along with the political party Rastokhez w e r e leading the discourse of nationalizing Tajikistan. Only later did the government appropriate the ethno-national narrative as its own. 25 Consequently, with independence the relation between religious authorities and the ruling elite had to be re-negotiated. The leaders, Irina Morozova has argued, needed to strengthen their position

Wahhabi views. Usually the Ahi Al-Hadith group is opposed to Hanafi madhab for being more tolerant towards traditions. Although this distinction has been criticized, the master narrative that situates radical Islam as an import to Central Asia has been well established. Bakhtiyar M. Babadjanov 2001. O fetvakh SADUM protiv »neislamskikh obychayev« [About the fatwas of the SADUM against non-Islamic customs]. In A.Malashenko and M.B. Olcott (eds.), Islam na postsovetskom prostranstve: vzglyad iznutri [Islam in post-Soviet space: A view from within]. Moscow, pp. 170-184; Ashirbek K. Muminov 2005. Chami-damulla et son róle dans la constitution d'un »Islam soviétiques«. In M. Lamelle and S. Peyrouse (eds.), Islam et politique en ex-URSS (Russie d'Europe et Asie centrale). Paris: l'Harmattan, pp. 241-261. 24 See V. Naumkin, chapter 2: »On the basis of his fatwas, some analysts consider Mufti Ziyauddin Babakhanov >the first fundamentalist in Central Asia.«. For more examples see p. 86. 25 Over the last two decades we have seen different efforts by the authorities to make culture a political tool. In this way the new regimes have tried to shape the »new citizen« as a cultural subordinate (for Tajikistan see Sophie Roche and Sophie Hohmann 2011. Wedding rituals and the struggle over national identities. Central Asian Survey 30(1): 113-128.

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within their respective republics and establish legitimacy by re-defining their relation to religious groups.26 With perestroika, publicly performed religious activities developed very dynamically. In June 1990 the Party of Islamic Rebirth of the Soviet Union was founded in Astrakhan. This party claimed to be a religious as well as a political organization uniting Muslims who were willing to actively disseminate Islam.27 The party was denied registration in most Central Asian republics and eventually registered in a Moscow district. They did not last as a Soviet Union-wide organization, and instead broke into national sections. Suspecting that the all-Union organization followed pan-Turkic ambitions, the Tajik section soon split and became an important political force and cultural motor within Tajikistan in the years to come. The IRP Tajikistan was calling for a return to the ethnic identity to which Islam was inherent. By doing so, they opposed the state's claim of subordinating Islam to state administration, thus denying religion an active role in shaping the country's political future. It is in fact frightening how persistent the classifications of religious movements have been throughout the last 20 years. Despite the IRP's efforts to integrate into a democratic government, they have never ceased to be confronted with suspicion and continue to be accused of a hidden »radical Islamizing agenda.« Things were different in the other republics: In Kazakhstan the struggle over the official integration of Islam was solved by the first party secretary Nursultan Nazarbayev, who established a Muftiat, which is an institution similar to the SADUM, the DUMK or SAMK.28 This institution was

26 Irina Morozova 2011. Islam and politics of late socialism in Central Asia. Leidschrift 26(2): 77-94. 27 Bakhtiyor Babadjanov 2004. Islam et activisme politique. L e cas Ouzbek. Annales. Histoire, Science Sociales 5-6, EHESS; Polanskaya and Malashenko 1994. Islam in Central Asia. 28

See Glossary of selected terms for explanations.

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to oversee religious education, the building of institutions (mosques and madrasas) and maintain good relations with the ruling party, most significantly with the then-president Nazarbayev. A view from one of the most recent leading Mufti, Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali, is provided in chapter 1. Uzbekistan inherited the Central Asian SADUM, whose power had considerably declined by the end of the 1990s. Following Martha Brill Olcott's report from 2007,29 MuhammadSodiq Muhammad-Yusuf, who was Mufti (1989-1993) when Uzbekistan gained its independence, worked as a translator for the Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and used his influence to promote his particular idea of Islam. This idea of a united Islam was later reinforced during his exile in Arab countries for seven years. 30 Muhammad-Sodiq follows the goal of many contemporary movements, namely that of a unification and cultural adaptation of Muslims world wide (Olcott p. 26). In Uzbekistan in 2000, he placed supporters in the government and - perhaps significant for this book - » T h e groups of believers who support neoIslamists in Uzbekistan include the young generation of graduates of Higher Islamic Institution in Tashkent and the Tashkent State Institute of Oriental Studies« (p. 27).31 While on the one hand, he condemns local groups whether these are Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami or Akramiyya, he also continues to maintain his independence from state authority and actively promotes his view. The Spiritual Administration of Uzbekistan did not accommodate all rival groups (Sufi groups and other groups)

29

Martha B. Olcott 2007. A face of Islam.

Muhammad-Sodiq

Muhammad-

Yusuf. C a r n e g i e E n d o w m e n t f o r International Peace. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/cp_82_olcott2_final.pdf [accessed N o v e m b e r 2012]. 30

H e h e a d e d the S A D U M f r o m 1989 to 1993.

31

W h i l e one m a y c r i t i c i z e the t e r m i n o l o g y Olcott uses, e.g., »neo-Isla-

m i s t s « , her account f e e d s w e l l into a w i d e r l o g i c of A r a b i s t s ( O r i e n t a l i s t s ) b e i n g specialists in Islam and t r a n s g r e s s i n g the t h r e e s e c t o r s of politics, a c a d e m y and r e l i g i o u s authority.

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that emerged during perestroika and independence. 3 2 Yet the religious discourse and rivalries within Uzbekistan happened without much public expression, and hence elude the author's capacity to comment on them. 33 In Kyrgyzstan the SAMK was established in 1993 and had similar responsibilities as the Kazakh pendant, namely to oversee religious activities and institutions whether they w e r e mosques, madrasas or Islamic organizations. The Mufti heading the SAMK was elected by a circle of 30 ulamas. At the same time, the State Agency for Religious Affairs (SARA) that operates within governmental structures sets the line for a general politics of religion. 34 This double institution also exists in Tajikistan and can be considered a tool that keeps close control over the ulamas whether they act as Muftiat (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) or as Shuroi Olii Ulamoi Tojikiston (The High Council of Ulama), 35 subordinated to the State Committee for Religious Affairs.

32 Abdujabar Abduvakhitov 1995. Independent Uzbekistan. A Muslim community in development. In M. Bourdeaux (ed.), The politics of religion in Russia and the new states of Eurasia. Amonk, N e w York: Sharpe, pp. 293-303. 33 Yet authors such as Bakhtiyor Babadjanov (see bibliography at the end of the book) and Adeeb Khalid have published on various dimensions. For instance, Adeeb Khalid has emphasized that Islam in public discourse is integrated into the concept of national cultural heritage (Adeeb Khalid 2007. Islam after communism. Religion and politics in Central Asia. Berkeley: University of California, especially chapter 4). But also for post-Soviet Uzbekistan, the importance of integrating Islam into an Uzbek cultural identity as »Musulmonchilik« has been emphasized by the anthropologist Irene Hilgers 2009. Why do Uzbeks have to be Muslims? Exploring religiosity in the Ferghana Valley. Berlin: Lit. For a similar development in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus see Dittmar Schorkowitz, 2010. Geschichte, Identität und Gewalt im Kontext postsozialistischer Nationsbildung. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 135: 99-160. 34 Ravshan Eratov heads the da'wa department within the SAMK; he has been actively supporting Tablighi Jama'at followers, whom he sees as Hanafi practitioners. I thank Mukaram Toktogulova for sharing her knowledge on the Tablighi Jama'at with me. 35 This Shuroi Ulamo (Ulamo council) still exists and works within the Kumitai Umuri Dini Tojikiston (State Committee for Religious Affairs, short:

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C e n t r a l Asian Intellectuals on Islam

This admittedly superficial survey of the various developments since perestroika requires further systematic and comparative research. For now it shall suffice to say that perestroika forced political leaders to redefine their relation with Islam to create legitimacy among their population. Most of the republics opted for a controlled integration of Islamic institutions based on the model of the Soviet SADUM, and at the same time, the establishment of a committee or state agency meant to supervise these institutions' activities. The position of Islam within national culture - a debate that became publicly discussed during perestroika - has not been solved, leaving Muslims to constantly readapt to sudden political changes. Whereas in Tajikistan this has been done in regular Dialogue Meetings that included the political and educational elite (see below), in Kazakhstan debates take place in discussion circles. 36 Uzbekistan has tightened its control over religious activities with little room for debate. And Kyrgyzstan is developing into a centre in Central Asia where (political) religious movements and parties find the necessary political framework to develop concepts and ideas that bring religion, culture and politics together within and beyond a national context. 37

Kumitai Dini) which is directly subordinated to the Hukumat (government). This group's members are mostly (unknown) religious figures from the south, Kulob and around Dushanbe (there is no Gharmi in the Shuroi Ulamo). No popular figure is represented in the Shuroi Ulamo. 36 These discussion circles have been researched by Dina Wilkowsky, who observed a vivid discussion among various intellectuals from politics, academics or religious corners. (Personal conversation with Wilkowsky at ZMO in 2011). 37 Julie McBrien claims that »Kyrgyzstan [...] remains one of the most religiously tolerant Central Asian countries, if not the most tolerant.« (p. 48). Julie McBrien 2006. Extreme Conversations: Secularism, religious pluralism, and the rhetoric of Islamic extremism in Southern Kyrgyzstan. In C. Hann (ed.), The postsocialist religious question. Faith and power in Central Asia and East-Central Europe. Miinster: Lit, pp.47-72. For a recent initiative, see V Kirgisii obsudili islamskoe probuzhdenie Zentraln'noy Asii [In Kyrgyzstan they discuss the Islamic revival in Central Asia], 13 June 2012,

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The different debates on Islam in contemporary Asia

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Central

The text by Prof. V. Naumkin (chapter 2) begins with a historical outline that frames the categories of analysis (religious development in Central Asia). Drawing from his deep knowledge of Islamic history, Central Asia is contextualized within this larger frame. Contemporary questions, however, are situated in political discussions that are regional. Naumkin develops his argument along historical continuities. The problem of Islam in Central Asia peaks in events such as the civil war in Tajikistan (1990s) and in Andijan (2005). He sees the problem of Islam in Central Asia as a question of secularism and political development, and makes use of his extensive experience with political actors all over the former Soviet Union and beyond during the turbulent years of independence. Naumkin has mediated between politicians and conflict actors in the Tajik civil war and more recently in the Caucasus, and thus sees research not as an isolated »academic bubble«, but as an applied science that needs to sustain conversation with the present without however losing its historical perspective. His position as Director of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Science in Moscow makes him an actor between research and politics, and an authority that shapes the religious-political debates in the region. Much of the discourse on Islam in Russia today is shaped by the ongoing Caucasian conflicts. Central Asians in Russia are first of all an economic factor, as several millions of mi-

http://www. I s l a m n e w s . r u / n e w s - 1 3 1 3 1 1 . h t m l [ l a s t a c c e s s e d June 2 0 1 2 ] . T h e m e e t i n g b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r a n e t w o r k of political, scientific a n d

religious

p e r s o n n e l w h o w i s h to a c c o r d I s l a m its p l a c e within the social a n d political s p h e r e . A s f a r as I know, they d o not r e p r e s e n t any special m o v e m e n t ( H i z b al-Tahrir al-Islami, Tablighi, W a h h a b etc.), b u t s e e t h e m s e l v e s a s the v o i c e of y o u t h w h o w a n t s f r e e d o m in r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s a n d politics that t o l e r a t e r e l i g i o u s plurality; generally, the a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t that I s l a m b e l o n g s to the c u l t u r e a n d intellectual history of the r e g i o n .

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grants from the region come to Russia every year in search of work. Indeed, migration is currently the most urgent topic for the majority of Central Asians, yet this problem is nowhere discussed in the texts of this volume. Another set of texts in the book refers to Kazakhstan, one of the five Central Asian republics where economic developments long appeared to be more important than religious revival - at least to the west. However, as Dina Wilkowsky has shown in her recent book,38 Kazakhstan's integration into world economics went hand-in-hand with Islamic movements that established various networks and groups, often along economic relations. Wilkowsky provides a short overview of these groups and their activities. The enormous variation of groups and individuals that she describes documents the path to a vivid religious public sphere that developed along with the economic boom in Kazakhstan. While she uses classifications of »legal« and »illegal«, and thus reproduces Soviet political categories, she develops a wider approach that she terms »cultural dialogue.« Wilkowsky's more recent research focused on discussion clubs and the role they have played in shaping communication culture in Kazakhstan. This cultural dialogue necessarily involves politicians, many of whom are from the intellectual elite: Political stability in Kazakhstan, more than anything else, means stability of relations within the political elite. Intra-elite conflict in Kazakhstan has become more visible and open. It is caused by the clash between different p o w e r groups representing the different generations: on the one side, representatives of the first generation of the post-Soviet elite w h o constituted the highest echelons of the Soviet nomenclatura, including the president. On the other, there is the new elite which consists of a hybrid generation which has incorporated both Soviet and democratic values. Its representatives have been actively involved in business and have gained work experience in the civil service sector.

38

Dina Wilkowsky 2009.

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The founders of the discussion clubs belong to this elite group and their life histories could serve as an illustration of »hybridity of soviet and post-Soviet layers of identity,« that might demonstrate the complexities of reordering a society, experiencing new influences on individual and collective understanding of political processes.39 Within this »post-Soviet reordering of society« the categories of legal and illegal dissolve into a dialogue and competition among the intellectual elites who wish to actively shape the future society. Thus, Wilkowsky writes »The central concept, circulating within these groups, is determined basically by the intention to support the people to overcome the post-Soviet chaos and crisis, by adopting a » n e w « social order, promoting freedom of self-expression, and religious and political plurality that open up new arenas for activities.« Since its independence, Kazakhstan has provided the necessary framework for experimental engagement with religious groups. Thus, this form of dialogue (whether successful or not) represents the Kazakh situation and reflects the inner debates to which the politician A. Baimenov (chapter 7) also contributes. His claim that the Soviet period was a »cultural genocide« more directly addresses past categories and cultural politics. This political slogan captures much of the popular demand for an »authentic Kazakh identity« and to some degree also reflects the intellectual elite's effort to look into archives, family histories and poetry for cultural capital that was ignored during the Soviet period.40 Especially Kazakhs feel that they have lost their cultural heritage during the Soviet period. The traumatic experience of many Kazakhs in the 1920s and 1930s finds political expres-

39

Dina W i l k o w s k y 2011. Unpublished paper, Z M O .

40

In her unpublished p a p e r Dina W i l k o w s k y speaks of an » i n c r e a s i n g

ethnic i n t o l e r a n c e in the s o c i e t y « w h i c h r e f l e c t s the tension a m o n g intellectuals about the identities and the r o l e of an authentic ethnic identity ( l a n g u a g e , education, ethnicity, etc.).

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sion through young politicians like Baimenov. Against the background of his biography and text we can understand that current debates on Islam in Kazakhstan draw from a »post-colonial relationship« that needs to re-evaluate the Soviet power divide. In his text on culture and Islam, Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali orients the debate towards historical discussion. Based on his profound research in the religious and history of the region, Derbisali presents a precise historical account of religious material culture. He uses this material to claim peace and tolerance for Kazakh culture, and especially for Islam. Unlike other religious authorities who emphasize theology, Haji Derbisali transcends his historical knowledge into a religious call. Nominating Haji Derbisali as Director of the Faculty of Oriental Studies and later to the position of Mufti and Chairman of the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Kazakhstan acknowledges the importance that the new state accords to researchers and intellectuals, not only in Kazakhstan. Thus, while on the one hand researchers observe the increasing interest of ordinary people to redefine their lives in religious terms and turn to all kinds of religious movements, on the other hand, politicians in Kazakhstan consider their scholars as the suitable actors who would help redefine the state's religious identity.41 Ashirbek Muminov (chapter 4) takes us through a complex account of various movements, networks and groupings in the region that he organizes according to their teleological development. Muminov's text is less nationally oriented in its content, which to some degree reflects his scholarly career (he grew up in Uzbekistan, studied in Leningrad and works today in Kazakhstan). His text is not only

41 Not only politicians considered researchers from Oriental Studies as being religious authorities. Ordinary people during the Soviet period thought similarly: »When I studied Arabic, all for some reason thought that I knew the Qur'an« the Arabist Janet Seitmetova from the University of Almaty explains (chapter 3).

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a good overview of multiple religious activities and claims, but also proof of the rich academic research conducted since perestroika.42 As he explains, (partially) open access to archives initiated a »scientific revolution« which not only provides new answers but generates even more questions. One of the central questions most radically articulated by Baimenov is »Who are we?« This search for authenticity for a past, a history, and a future is an internal debate with many possible answers. Another approach to this question is provided by Zifa Auezova (chapter 5), who follows another trend of contemporary academic work in Oriental Studies and history. In her texts, she analyzes Shakarmi's writings as an entry point to history. With a study on the early twentieth century she provides a more nuanced view of the Russian-Kazakh relationship than that of »cultural genocide.« Shakarim's works and poetry were prohibited during the Soviet period because the heroes of the Kazakhs were the enemies of the Russians. Auezova's writings are thus not only a scholarly contribution, but beyond this a discovery of Kazakh culture and national identity. After completing her education in Oriental Studies in the Arabic department, Auezova turned into a specialist of historiography, with a focus on Kazakhstan. In this function she has taught courses and developed curricula at various universities in Central Asia, Russia and beyond. The autobiography of Auezova further provides us with a sensitive discussion of history within the family: she gives us insight into various periods and how political constraint influenced internal debates. Her re-evaluation of the past not only contributes to research generally, but also specifically to the debate about Kazakh identity.

42 See for instance, the collection of Cahiers d'Asie central and the online journal Manuscripta Orientali. International Journal for Oriental Manuscript Research, http://manuscripta-orientalia.kunstkamera.ru/archive/2009_01_15/ [last accessed June 2012].

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With the contribution by Muhiddin Kabiri (chapter 6) we move to the very periphery of the former Soviet Union, Tajikistan. In Tajikistan the debate about a national identity has been accompanied by strong demands for »the truth.« The question of truth is not only politically but also culturally motivated (What is true Islamic culture?). Thus it comes as no surprise that journalism today is one of the most popular and most prestigious choices for university-level education.43 The call for truth shaped the political tension of the early 1990s that eventually turned into civil war. Two debates have developed since independence: on the one hand, creating of historical continuity of »Tajikness« and on the other hand, the search for true religious life (as an alternative to the still-dominant Soviet secular narrative). The search for Tajikness is led by the most prominent political party and has progressed through centuries of cultural history of the region.44 The year 2003 »was declared the year of Zarathustra and Zoroastrian culture«45, in 2006 Tajikistan celebrated the »year of Aryan civilization«, and the year 2009 was dedicated to Emomi Azam (founder of the Hanafi madhhab), which included a conference to honour him; in 2010 Tajikistan hosted the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This journey through history in search of an »authentic« Tajik identity clashes with the demand by the Islamic Rebirth Party Tajikistan for a democratic and hence pluralistic society.

43 Political activists have opened their own journal and are invited to lecture. Again the boundaries between different professions are blurred in a more general process of nation building. 44 In other republics such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan some movements turn to Tengrianism or Zoroastrian culture as an alternative source of national or ethnic identity. 45 The year 2003 was declared the 3000th anniversary of Zoroastrian culture by UNESCO, based on the initiative of Tajikistan. Tim Epkenhans 2012. Zwischen Mythos und Minenfeld. Historiographie in Tadschikistan. Osteuropa 62: 137-150.

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Nowhere in the other Central Asian republics did a religious party succeed in integrating into the new nation state; this only happened to the IRP in Tajikistan. Thus, while other countries engage in a »cultural dialogue« with various intellectuals, in Tajikistan this dialogue is dominated by political oppositions. This gives the debate a sharp character, which is addressed in Kabiri's text. The call for truth is less about a definition of what Tajik identity is, and more about how to live morally and authentically, independent of what one believes in. Such a call for moral behaviour is of course not only true for Tajikistan but more generally for religious actors all over Central Asia. In the beginning of 2000, Muhiddin Kabiri initiated a Dialogue Centre which would allow anyone to partake in intellectual exchange. For several years the Dialogue Centre had brought together intellectuals from the Academy of Science, the University, religious authorities (e.g., Turajonzoda) and official institutions, as well as members of the Shuroi Ulamo and the IRP. The questions that were discussed (bahs kardan) were fundamental, for example, who was an intellectual in the Tajik context, or what was a person in Tajikistan first: A Tajik, a Muslim, or both together? These discussions were highly political and deeply cultural. One of the ongoing debates is whether Islam is part of Tajikness and Tajik culture, or needs to be considered an external element.46 Whereas Kabiri himself questioned the usefulness of this identity division, he considered it important to provide space to allow for such unsanctioned dis-

46 Zifa-Alua Auezova mentions the way she and Dina Wilkowsky had to redefine their work as orientalists when they worked at Kazakh Universities. People saw their motivation to learn Arabic as a religious one, while she suggests »Having studied Arabic language and culture in Russia, we had perhaps a more distant attitude to the subject of our study, more distant from our Kazakh culture, because Arabic which we studied was contextualized primarily by the Middle-Eastern region, while its importance for Central Asian region was usually referred to in historical perspective only.« (chapter 3)

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cussions. While religiously-oriented participants identified Islam as an integral part of Tajikness, another group argued that Islam was an external element that exists independent of Tajik culture. This oppositional approach is represented in the political landscape and thus differs from Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, where ethnic identities (e.g., Uzbekchilik, Hilgers 2009) are considered inherently Muslim.47 Unfortunately, the Dialogue Centre ceased operations before it could satisfy the need for intellectual exchange. The last chapter was written by Elmira Kochiimkulova. With her we move to Kyrgyzstan and a more recent approach to religious studies. Kochiimkulova is a trained ethnographer. Being the youngest among the contributors, she is also the only one with a higher education degree from the United States. Religious history was not in the realm of Soviet ethnographia, and there was no reason to assume that Islam would be the primary identification for all people alike. Thus it came as a surprise to her that in the United States the primary interest of her colleagues was her religious identity: One of the frequent questions that Americans asked me was about my religion. Like many other Kyrgyz, until the post-Soviet Islamic revival, my religious identity was never questioned. I do not come from a religious family background, but our Muslim faith was an accepted fact of life. (For the full context see chapter 8, p. 277.)

Her text reflects this tension between the external pressure to identify religious elements in cultural practices and an internal wish to keep the Kyrgyz culture as an authentic way of life.

47 For a good discussion on how people negotiate Uzbekness in religious terms see Johan Rasanayagam 2010.

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In Kyrgyzstan the cultural debates were very much led within families. To a certain degree, Kyrgyzstan itself allowed for experimentation in religious life, which has led various groups and movements to extend their activities, for example the Tablighi Jama'at or Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami.48 The detailed descriptions provided by Kochiimkulova give insight into these debates that take place in ritual practices as well as in everyday life. Her clear position confirms that researchers feel responsible within the new society, that their works represent an active participation in the intellectual debates about Kyrgyz culture, and that this is a moral question as much as a material one. Many Kyrgyz intellectuals reject Islam in its »purified« form (such as what the Tablighi or the Salafi or other groups call for) and seek alternative spiritual paths such as Tegrianism.49 Whereas Islam has become a strong identity for many young Kyrgyz, the majority remains sceptical towards a general translation of traditions into a religious language. The text, as much as her autobiographic text, suggests continuity through cultural practices (which are grounded in religious values), not through theological debates and religious biographies. With this she provides a specific debate for Kyrgyz intellectuals, who wish to find a cultural path that naturally includes Islam as a cultural practice rather than a political force. With the sentence »We are born as a Kyrgyz, we live as a Russian, but die as a Muslim,« she not only imagines a Kyrgyz way of life, but raises the question of generations, a matter that Dina Wilkowsky also worked on in her research. Different generations discuss Islam in different ways, hence for the time being the cultural dialogue continues to be shaped by generational views that put the elderly in opposition to young reformers. While this is not a black and white

48

Till Mostowlansky 2011. I n M . Kemper and S. Conermann, pp. 291-305.

49 This movement also exists in Kazakhstan and similarly mainly appeals to a small elite who can afford (time, sources, financial means) to e n g a g e in alternative philosophical directions.

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picture anywhere, the biographies in this book demonstrate that the authors, as the generation of change, are aware of the large field in which debates take place. To some degree, several of the authors hold a special position (in their role as the generation of change) because they lived through perestroika as reformers while also profiting from a Soviet education. Contemporary discourses on Islam, as we learn from texts and biographies, are linked to family and ethnic experiences, to collective memories, and to nation building processes. Hence, much of the discussions go far beyond purely political concerns and narrow religious claims. In the past two decades, numerous works have been written by some of the authors in this book; they not only contributed to a better understanding of the past, but also to the construction of the present. In Kazakhstan just as much as in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan, the intellectual elite is actively integrated in cultural debates. While the content naturally differs, many elements are similar, for example to what degree religion is inherent in ethnic culture or the question about legal and illegal religious practices and institutions. Whereas some of the authors place their religious identities at the forefront, others show that this is by no means the only or the dominant identity. In fact, the call for normalizing religious identities is a strong claim in the political texts of Baimenov and Kabiri, just as much as in the texts of Kochumkulova, Naumkin and Wilkowsky. Much of the debate on Islam in Central Asia revolves around truth and the authority to represent history. The debate over whether ethnic cultures are inherently Islamic or whether Islam is a separate element is led most radically in Tajikistan, but exists in all the concerned republics. The blueprint for Islam as a social practice was formed during the time of the Prophet for the Salafi-oriented people, and in pre-Soviet Central Asia for many others. Eventually some religious scholars turn to Arab countries in search of an »authen-

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tic Islamic culture.« 50 Discussion about authentic cultural sources varies in each republic, and yet the same religious movements have invested in all the republics, to various degrees. In the introduction we asked what the specificities of Islam in Central Asia may be. Paolo Sartori (2010) has suggested that »Muslim culture in the Soviet Union is therefore understood as a complex web of social interactions, cultural capital and private emotional investment.« (2010 p. 334) This is one suggestion, while in this book many other suggestions have been proposed. What we can say more generally is that culture (with and without Islam) shapes the current debates about national identity within the independent republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.51 While we do not know the outcome of these debates, we can observe regional differences and the many nuances and levels that mark these debates.

50 For an account of such an »authentic Islamic culture,« see Sophie Roche (2014). Domesticating youth. The dynamics of youth bulge in Tajikistan. N e w York, Oxford: Berghahn Books. 51 Nationality politics have been the focus of extensive research, not least due to the concept's success in the independent states. For a good theoretical discussion see Juan R.I. Cole and Deniz Kandiyoti 2002. Nationalism and the colonial legacy in the Middle East and Central Asia. Introduction. Journal of Middle East Studies 34: 189-203; Olivier Roy 2000. The new Central Asia. The creation of nations. London: I.B. Tauris; and many others. Ethno-national identities had been actively developed from the very beginning of Bolshevik politics and they w e r e also the basis of territorial division in Central Asia in the 1920s. For a discussion on the subject see f o r instance, Paul Bergne 2007. The birth of Tajikistan. National identity and the origins of the republic. London: Tauris; S e r g e j Abashin 2007. Die Sartenproblematik in der russischen Geschichtsschreibung des 19. und des ersten Viertels des 20. Jahrhunderts. A N O R 18, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz.

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III. Representing Central Asia Who speaks for Islam today? Concerning the place of religion in the newly independent states, most post-Soviet Central Asian countries have maintained a secular model rather similar to the USSR.52 The emphasis on ethnic identity as the core of a nation has successfully dominated the new political discourse. Internal political debates on national identity and the role of Islam are therefore led by historians just as much as by orientalists, politicians, journalists and anthropologists (if such exist).53 The activation of a national history as an ethnic, political and religious development is reflected in many of the texts in this book. Researchers feel indebted to and responsible for their independent nation and its people, for whom they write; thus, their participation often blurs the lines between (political) activism and research.54 Researchers' participation in the nation building process is not restricted to textual productions. Instead, numerous examples exist where orientalists were recruited into the ministries or other political positions. Zifa Auezova remembers that »many people became involved in the Ministry of International Affairs. My colleagues, many fellow students who studied in St. Petersburg at the Oriental Department, I would say that a huge part of them is now working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.« (For the full context see p. 205.)

52 An example is Sheikh Derbisali who, in his role as Mufti of Kazakhstan, sees the secular and the religious as »absolutely organically combined in my life« (2012, p. 311) Sheikh Abdsattar Haji Derbisali 2012. Islam, Religion of peace and creation. A work of theological and historical-philological research, articles and reflections, reports and interviews. London: Stacey International. 53 Historical research, Adeeb Khalid (p. 96) has mentioned, was an exclusive domain of the national republics. Adeeb Khalid 2007. 54 Compare with Sarah Amsler 2007. The politics of knowledge in Central Asia. Science between Marx and the market. London, New York: Routledge.

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Thus, the position of scholars appears fluid and the border between a politician and a scholar or a religious authority is not always clearly defined. The biography of the Supreme Mufti and Chairman of the Spiritual Board of the Muslims of Kazakhstan (Haji Derbisali) and former Director of the Faculty of Oriental Studies is a case in point and certainly not an exception in the post-Soviet world. 55 Similarly, Muhiddin Kabiri is seen as occupying the right position because of his solid education in Oriental Studies and diplomacy, and because he received religious training from the religious authorities of his time. Many of the authors in this volume received their education during the 1980s. This period, particularly following Gorbachev's politics of perestroika, went along with a vivid revival of Islam at all levels. Similarly, in scientific circles the question of state control was renegotiated. Thus, the 1980s and 1990s were a dynamic period in which intellectuals envisioned a new society. The account by V. Naumkin gives us an idea about these internal debates: »During perestroika,of course ideological influence was the main is-

55 Similarly, for Uzbekistan Michel Bourdeaux writes »The principle of policy formation with the help of advisors from the ranks of religious people and professional Orientalists is widely implemented on all levels of power.« (p. 303) For instance, Shamsuddinkhan Babakhanov, the son and grandson of the Babakhanov dynasty heading the SADUM throughout the Soviet period, was the Uzbek ambassador to Egypt and Saudi Arabia. He received his education in the SADUM institutions in Bukhara and Samarkand and graduated from the University of al-Azhar in Cairo in 1966. He then worked at the Muslim Organization of the USSR Council for Foreign Relations from 1966 to 1974, and led the Tashkent Islamic Institute between 1974 and 1982; he was the leading chairman of the SADUM until 1990. Such a practice seems to continue until today. According to Abdullo Mirzoev, who pursued Oriental Studies in Dushanbe in early 2000, most of his peers from the southern region of Kulob entered the Foreign Ministry after completing their studies. Also for Azerbaijan similar developments have been documented by Altay Goyushov, Naomi Caffee and Robert Denis 2011. The transformation of Azerbaijani Orientalists into Islamic thinkers after 1991. In M.Kemper and S.Conermann, pp. 306-319.

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Islam

sue, whether and to what degree it had affected the studies. When I joined the institute, I found here a total rejection of the old atheistic theories.« (For the full context see p. 84.) What Naumkin suggests is a serious engagement with the past in internal debates and thus liberation from previous doctrines. These debates took place already in the 1980s long before the end of the Soviet Union. As a young scholar, Naumkin was among those who with an excellent education engaged in research without feeling restraint by an ideology: But, as I am telling you, it was not that bad in the Soviet days either in the field of Oriental Studies, they were less »ideologized«. Of course there was some influence on the institute from the Soviet time before I came here, for instance we had a concentration in the study of socalled national liberation movements, like the trade unions, working class movements, and revolutions of course, all types of revolutionary movements, communist parties. (For the full context see p. 84-85.)

The perestroika years were experienced as dynamic years of change, as a period of heated debates within academic circles, liberation from Russian/Soviet dominance, and an awakening of national and religious consciousness without necessarily a total rejection of the state as a provider of social security and jobs. The biographies and the texts represent this period as an enthusiastic and even emotional period, a period in which researchers redefined their task as builders of society. While there is no contribution that mentions gender issues and discussion about gender is absent from the texts, there is an underlying gendered narrative about Islam in Central Asia that has been continued throughout the Soviet period. Nadje S. AL-Ali (2001) observes that men's biographies often come to stand for »the culture« of a social group. Similarly, almost without exception the biographies, genealogies and authorities in the texts of this book are all about men.

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Even in the biographies we learn that mainly male descendants have shaped individual thoughts and action. This is most explicitly the case for Baimenov, who, lacking any religious or academic education in this orientalist subjects, uses orally transmitted knowledge about his father to establish himself as a religious-political authority. The trend to think about Central Asia through its tribes or genealogies has produced interesting historical accounts, yet the question of gender has quite continuously been ignored.56 Female religious authorities have been »discovered« by western scholars only two decades ago who gained access to postSoviet Central Asia and generated a large body of literature.57 In fact, they have identified women as the carriers of culture and religious rituals throughout the Soviet period (cf. Tett58), while men (as public actors) were more restricted from exerting religious duties.

56 During the interesting conference on » H i s t o r y making in Central and Inner A s i a « which had a strong focus on the role of genealogies, the question of history and g e n d e r was not mentioned in any of the papers. Conference at Zentrum für Interdisziplinäre Regionalstudien, Martin-Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg, from February 22-23, 2013. 57 Feride Acar and Ayçe Günes-Ayata (eds.) 2001. G ender and identity Women in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Turkey. Leiden: construction. Brill; Habiba Fati 2004. Femmes d'autorité dans l'Asie centrale contemporaine. Quête des ancêtres et recompositions identitaires dans l'islam postsoviétique. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose; Colette Harris 2004. Control and subversion. Gender relations in Tajikistan. London: Pluto; Sigrid Kleinmichel 2001. Halpa in Chorezm and Atin Ayi in Ferghana. Zur Geschichte des Lesens in Usbekistan. A N O R Berlin: Das Arabische Buch; Anette Krämer 2002. Geistliche Autorität und islamische Gesellschaft im Wandel. Studien über Frauenälteste (otin und xalfa) im unabhängigen Usbekistan. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz; Gregory J. Masseil 1974. The surrogate proletariat. Moslem women and revolutionary strategies in Soviet Central Asia: 1919-1929. Princeton: Princeton University; and many others. 58 Guilian Tett 1995. Guardians of the faith? Gender and religion in an (ex) Soviet Tajik village. In Camillia F. El-Solh and Judy M a b r o (eds.), Muslim Women's Choices. Religious belief and social reality. Providence: Berg, pp.128-51.

3 5 4

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Islam

This book has three female contributors. Having been trained in the same institutions as the male contributors, they receive the same military grades.59 Yet while academically they hold the same diplomas as their male colleagues, these female scholars represented in the book were not equally able to transform their status in their respective country with independence. Whether this is linked to dynamics of gender during periods of political insecurity, with concepts of Islam put forward by certain groups, or to the continuation of Soviet tradition remains unanswered for the time being. Obviously this is not the place to analyze of gender politics during and after the Soviet period, yet more investigation about the role of female intellectuals in shaping views about Islam are urgently be needed. The question of who speaks for Islam in Central Asia today is anything but obvious. Some academics have turned into activists for Islam and/or for the nation, using their scholarly knowledge and cultural capital as a profitable resource. Hence, religious authorities today come from academia, from politics and from theology. At the same time, ordinary people and especially the youth has engaged in religious (self)education of all sorts and gained considerable self-consciousness outside religious institutions such as mosques, madrassas and Islamic universities. Many of them no longer accept any tutelage from religious authorities, but wish Islam to be an integral part of everybody's life and thinking. This book has not engaged with this broad spectrum of religious debate within society, which has been covered by other studies.60

59 Military education was part of Oriental Studies. Among others things, the students learned military vocabulary in Arabic and received a military title at the end of their studies. This tradition continues in Tajikistan, where students are required to attend military courses and thus are freed from compulsory military service. 60 See for instance, Irene Hilgers 2009; Maria E. Louw 2007; Julie McBrien 2006. Extreme conversations: Secularism, religious pluralism, and the rhetoric of Islamic extremism in Southern Kyrgyzstan. In C. Hann (ed.), The

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When adopting a geopolitical view of Central Asia, Islam is most often viewed as a security issue, which overshadows the more nuanced and pluralistic discussions (also within politics) that link Islam to cultural debates, global studies, gender issues and history. Both views are not exclusive, but are interlinked and constantly negotiated. Whether in the early twentieth century or during perestroika, Islam developed within a specific socio-political context that was carried, discussed and positioned by individual actors. As such it was compatible with communism, whose superiority as a system was by and large unquestioned until perestroika.61

Arabists

as specialists

of Islam

The authors contained in this book share a network that centres around Dina Wilkowsky. As such, they represent a selection of scholars and politicians who again shaped one of the contributor's career. These various levels of interconnectedness of the people through biographic inter-linkages are the underlying narrative of the book. This is why Kazakhstan is overrepresented in this volume; still, Wilkowsky's network stretches all over Central Asia and Russia, and is a nice example of Soviet scholarly activity. All but two of the contributors began their career with Arab studies and a focus on Arabic countries outside the Soviet Union. The cities of Tashkent, Dushanbe, Almaty, Leningrad/St. Petersburg and Moscow shaped their careers, mobility and their studies. These researchers turned to Central Asia during perestroika and especially since independence. Oriental Studies had a mystical aura, Zifa Auezova describes - it was a secret knowledge available only to a small elite.

postsocialist religious question. Faith and power in Central Asia and EastCentral Europe. Münster, Berlin: Lit, pp. 47-72. 61 Being Muslim was not opposed to being Soviet, Adeeb Khalid has shown. Adeeb Khalid 2007, p. 98.

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Many Central Asians w e r e interested in Oriental Studies as a solid intellectual education. It was a way to understand the Qur'an or the Bible in its original language, meaning and context - not only » a f e w Suras learned by heart« or »translations of the Bible« (For the full quote see chapter 5, p. 205-206). Orientalists who studied on Islam dealt with North Africa and the Arab peninsula and, most importantly, written manuscripts in the Arabic language. According to the interviews, Islam was not debated in Leningrad or Moscow, yet religiously relevant texts w e r e part of the curriculum. Besides » M o s c o w Arabic« (as Janet Seitmetova characterizes the available sources; see chapter 3, p. 115) texts about the life of the Prophet Muhammad w e r e read. At the same time, the scholars w e r e politically integrated. 62 Alexander Morrison has called this, in the context of Tsarist Russia, »applied orientalism« in the Russian context - that is, the points at which the study of Oriental languages, religions, and societies and the exercise of imperial power intersected.« (p. 62 3 )63 However, the Orient that these Arabists studied was quite distant and had nothing to do with Central Asia. While Arabists w e r e thus e n g a g e d in studying Islam in its » o r i g i n a l « language and w e r e integrated into a political contextualization, ethnographers w e r e the ones to trace these different »cultural traditions« and remnants of the past in Central Asia. Indeed, ethnographers dealt with the cultural dimension of Central Asia, separating the different cultural elements and reordering them along an axis of human development (pyatichlenka 6 i ). The Arabists in this

62 For instance, when the war erupted in Afghanistan, Persian language students were recruited as translators and for secret missions. 63 Alexander Morrison 2009. »Applied Orientalism« in British India and Tsarist Turkestan. Comparative Studies in Society and History 51(3): 619-647. 64 A good example of how the pyatichlenka theory was applied concretely see Tyntchykbek Tchoroev 2002. Historiography of Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 34: 351-374.

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book seem less concerned with this classification of culture and more engaged in interpretations of (revolutionary and fundamentalist) movements. This subject remained a strong point of Vostokovedinie, Naumkin explains in the interview. Thus it comes as no surprise that several of the authors chose to structure their text along religious groups. While Arabists hence became specialists of Arabic texts (and were potentially able to read religious texts in the original), Islam in Central Asia was not a main topic for historians or anthropologists. The leading journal Sovjetskoe Vostokovedinie shows that in no way did religious themes dominate the discussion. On the contrary, interpretations of economic systems, languages, political and social organizations, etc. appear far more often than discussion about religion. An exception is Afghanistan, which seems to be analyzed through its religious identity, which confirms the assumption that Islam was not considered »natural« to Turkic Central Asia (Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) but rather to its outer border countries of Afghanistan, Turkey and Iran.65 Thus, Central Asia does not appear as the Muslim orient, which is rather projected onto the Middle East and the Afghan south. Following the historical narrative developed in the nineteenth century by Russian Orientalists, the Turkic people of the Central Asian steps were presented as being Islamized rather late and superficially (text by Naumkin, see also comments in Muminov's biography), whereas shamanism was their » r e a l « spiritual heritage. 66 Tribal systems

65 This continues to be the case in academic writings. The borders of the USSR have become the border of SNG, argues the following publication: B. B. Y. Velokrenitskiy and A. Z. Egorin 2001. MusuI'manskie strany u granits SNG (Afganistan, Pakistan, Iran i Turtsiya - sovremennoe sostoyanie, istoriya i perspektivy). Russiyskaya Akademiya Nauk Institut Bostokovedeniya. Moskow: Ivran-Kraft+. 66 This narrative seems to have resulted from Soviet historiography and has also been reproduced in the book by Martha B.Olcott 1987. The Kazakhs. Stanford: Hoover Institution. It is interesting that this tribal argument is

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w e r e the m a i n a p p r o a c h to K a z a k h s o c i e t y b e f o r e a n

eth-

n i c n a r r a t i v e r e p l a c e d it. 6 7 B o t h A u e z o v a a n d D e r b i s a l i e x plicitly e n g a g e d w i t h t h e s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in t h e i r

texts.

D e r b i s a l i ' s t e x t » r e d r e s s e s « t h e c e n t r a l r o l e o f I s l a m in K a z a k h c u l t u r e . 6 8 It is n o t e n o u g h to m e a s u r e K a z a k h r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e s b y j u d g i n g t h e i r l e v e l of M u s l i m n e s s . I n s t e a d , D e r bisali r e v e a l s a vivid intellectual life of scholars to t h e A r a b p e n i n s u l a , M e c c a a n d M e d i n a , a n d

travelling

emphasizes

the b u i l d i n g of m o s q u e s to p r o v e K a z a k h s ' i n t e g r a t i o n into the M u s l i m world.69 Derbisali picks u p essentializing ments

and transforms

t h e m into a n

t e x t w h e r e i n I s l a m is n o t o n l y t h e p r o v i d e r o f (which

h e l i n k s to u r b a n

argu-

academic-theological civilization

s e d e n t a r y life a n d the

building

used by Naumkin to differentiate Islam in Central Asia from Islam in the Middle East (interview in chapter 2). Bruce Privratisky even provides the origin of this narrative » T h e evaluation of the Kazakhs as marginal and syncretizing Muslims derives from Chokan Valikhanov.» (p. 11). Valikhanov was the first Kazakh to make Kazakh known world wide especially through his students who studied Kazakh religion and were preoccupied with shamanism to describe the Kazakh spiritual world. Bruce G. Privratsky 2001. Muslim Turkistan. Kazakh religion and collective memory. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. 67 The reason was that the Central Asian Turkic population had to be integrated into the pyatichlenka model of Marx' historical materialism (primitive society (tribal confederations), slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism). This meant that the Turkic population did not have to pass the capitalist development but moved right from a tribal society to an ethnic and socialist society. A nice summary of how this master narrative was exported via guests to the west can be read in Georg Benz 1967. Bei Kasachen und Usbeken. In H. Mochalski and E. Kogar (eds.), Sowjet-Sibirien und Zentralasien heute. Frankfurt a. M.: Stimme Verlag, pp. 80-96. 68 For a review of how Central Asian religious authorities w e r e misrepresented by Soviet academics see the article by Devin DeWeese on Khoja Ahmad Yasavi, one of the Central Asian religious figures rehabilitated in the book by Derbisali. Devin DeWeese 2011. Ahmad Yasavi and the Divan-i hikmat in Soviet scholarship. In M. Kemper and S. Conermann, pp. 262-290. 69 Alexandre Papas, Thomas Welsford and Thierry Zarcone (eds.) 2012. Central Asian pilgrims. Hajj routes and pious visits between Central Asia and the Hijaz. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz.

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of mosques and material cultures), but also the motor for scientific and cultural development. Almost paradoxically Naumkin mentions that a crucial difference between Yemen and Central Asia is the absence of tribes in the latter societies, and thus unexpectedly challenges the classic narrative that predefines Central Asia: Of course it is totally different. Yemen is a very tribal country with more radical groups. We have some groups like this abroad in Afghanistan, those who moved from Uzbekistan - but we do have an Islamic opposition. In general there is a process of Islamisation, especially in the three countries, the three states: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. (For the full context see p. 86.)

The alienation of Islam from Central Asia by some of the scholars suggests that Islam was in competition with Russia and later the Soviet Union. Both are seen as competing over the citizens of the region. Where Islam is dealt with, it is done through notions of opposition, whether through individual actors such as Shami-Domulla in the 1920s, the Basmachi, or the Jadid movement. Islam seems to have a similar awakening power as communism and competes for setting societal order. This view of Islam as an awakening power, developed by Irina Morozova, becames even more prevalent with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 70 This is also a central point for the authors to turn to their own home country and history with the skills they acquired as Arabists. Derbisali's text about mosques in Central Asia is a case in point; he develops a counter-narrative to the nomadic past as a lower form of human development (pyatichlenka) by showing that mosques are proofs of early sedentary life (as far back as 893 in Taraz). He thus continues to employ the tools (archaeology, manuscripts) of interpretation and classifications used in Soviet Oriental Studies but repositions Kazakhstan and Central Asia within this narrative.

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His primary aim is to link Kazakhstan back to the Muslim world, and he has good reason to do so, considering the travel of former religious authorities to the Middle East and the Arab lands. In her study about women in Uzbekistan, Marianne Kamp71 has mentioned that full veiling was not a common or widespread practice in pre-Soviet Central Asia, but rather an urban response to Russian imperial expansion into the region in the nineteenth century. Martha Brill Olcott even speaks of conversion that was encouraged by Catharine the Great, who »became convinced that the nomads of the steppe could best be civilized by Muslim rather than Christian missionaries.« (1987, p.102) The early twentieth century experienced a boom in religious institutions. Similarly, both Naumkin and Derbisali observe a boom of mosque building with the establishment of the Russian Tsarist administration in Kazakhstan. »In the 1860s, there were around twenty mosques and two madrasas for 5000 inhabitants (according to the 1867 census). The population grew and in 1908, 41 mosques were already working here. Before the revolution there were about 200 mosques in the Aktyubinsk region, nearly 80 mosques in Bukei Khanate, 269 in Semirechye, 49 in the Jambyl region and in Auliye-Ata itself (today's Taraz),« (Derbisali, for the context see p. 67, cf. also chapter 2). While this may not be a useful argument for discrediting Muslims in the pre-Tsarist period as » b a d « or »not real« Muslims, it tells a lot about the cultural contact between Russia and the Muslim south. Thus, the violent confrontations in which Central Asian Muslims (and I include Kazakhs) w e r e involved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries generated cultural responses, and Islam came to be a resource to various actors. Such an approach goes beyond any need to form a hierarchy for Islam or extract it from more or

71 Marianne Kamp 2006. The New Woman in Uzbekistan. Islam, Modernity, and Unveiling under Communism. Seattle, London: University of Washington.

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less tribal, shaman, etc. culture nor does it demand to be monopolized by an oppositional discourse as found in Sovietology. To conclude, Arabists were able to re-discover Central Asia through its Arabic written manuscripts and Islamic history, and in this function they have considerably shaped the prevailing cultural and political dynamics since independence.

Unpredictable

Central Asia

Earlier we discussed classifications used to order scientific material. The classifications applied in some of the texts suggest that these categories serve a political need to control unpredictable religious dynamics. 72 Here, the state is presented as the main institution able to provide the necessary order and scientists seem to engage in this narrative - again the argument by Herren, Riiesch and Sibille helps to clarify that this is not specific to Central Asia but is a general marker of historiography. While the authors in this book would rather not reestablish Soviet control, several of them suggest that state law and legal control of religious education and activities may be the only solution to avoid the »ideological ferment« (compare to Muminov's description p. 175) that causes harm in Islamic movements. In these texts Central Asia became the unpredictable orient that must be regulated with the help of external power. »Central Asia« seems unable to deal with its religious plurality itself, and it needs professional classification and political control. This again feeds into a global narrative about the Muslim world that produces a sense of insecurity and unpredictability.

72 For a critical discussion about such approaches and alternatives see Michael Kemper 2008. How to take the Muslim peripheries seriously. In the writing of imperial history? Ab Imperio 4: 472-482.

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Another example is the civil war in Tajikistan that was stopped with the help of international engagement, among others by the Dartmouth Conference. Naumkin mentioned that Russia did not believe that Tajikistan would ever be able to bring order itself and sit at one table with Muslim activists. Many of the texts in this volume reproduce this picture of an unpredictable Central Asia rather unreflected in one way or another. On the other hand, some authors identify Islam as an alternative to Russia and Western imperial politics, and consider it capable of installing order and uniting society. While Islam is considered as a possible »ideology« to fill the »vacuum« that the collapse of the Soviet Union has caused, the view that local mullahs lack a proper education is almost unanimous; this view is shared by the population itself. This again supports the idea of a backward Central Asia that needs to catch up with the rest of the Muslim world - like a region that never reached an autonomous identity or maturity, whether a Soviet identity or a Muslim identity. During perestroika we find the paradox that the atheist communist state closely worked with local religious institutions and authorities. This interest-based alliance has been reformulated since independence. Without exception, Islam is seen by all authors as the uniting factor in the region - an argument picked up by western researchers as well - yet the question about authority has nowhere been fully solved. Even the very term »tradition« causes confusion between local traditional practices (i.e. Sufi traditions, rituals) and the Islamic tradition of the four madhabs. This confusion of terms and categories has contributed to the malleability of the sector by political actors, religious authorities and scholars. Unfortunately we lack research about one more vector, namely how Arab countries contextualize Central Asia. On the one hand. Central Asia is the frontier for reconquering occupied Muslim territory (i.e., jihad in Central Asia and Caucasus), on the other hand, Central Asians enjoy a mys-

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tical reputation as »Bukharians«, that is, descendants of Imom al-Bukhari.73 It is still unclear whether cultural contact to the north, the south, the east and the west, established through economic, diplomatic and educational relations, will allow Central Asia to find its own position and a way out of the »unpredictability« narrative.

Instead of a conclusion: Central Asia's integration into western scholarship This book has opened a window onto the plurality of discourses about Islam in Central Asia. I have insisted on leaving most texts in the genre that they have been presented. I believe that such an approach is justified, as western academic formats seem restrictive to me for properly exploiting the theme. Science74 (Wissenschaft) stops being science (Wissenschaft) if its self-imposed categories (including standards, forms) become too restrictive to explore a theme. In this sense, the book transgresses many academic formats and categories, as well as text genres, regarding the choice of people and the themes debated. Some may criticize such an approach as not conforming to academic standards. But I hope that others will enjoy the plurality of this book and take the opportunity to rethink their ideas about Central Asia and Islam as being a purely academic, political or social problem, and try to understand the meaning that the past and present have to these authors and how we, the readership, understand these messages. Instead of a conclusion I shall finish these final remarks with a short description of how Central Asia has been inte-

73

I thank my c o l l e a g u e C h a n f i A h m e d f o r s h a r i n g his e x p e r i e n c e . M o s t

A r a b s , he explains, k n o w little a b o u t the d i f f e r e n t nations in C e n t r a l A s i a a n d c o n s i d e r citizens f r o m the r e g i o n as » B u k h a r i a n s « ;

B u k h a r a has a

mystical c o n n o t a t i o n to a g l o r i o u s past. 74

In G e r m a n » s c i e n c e « ( W i s s e n s c h a f t ) i n c l u d e s the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s a n d

humanities, a n d thus is b r o a d e r in m e a n i n g than the E n g l i s h term.

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grated into contemporary western scholarship. As this book studies Central Asia through Islam, such a critical remark appears necessary to me; however, this should by no means devalues the work done so far. Since perestroika, Central Asia has reconnected to the rest of the world. This also applies to the integration of the region into Oriental Studies, Islamic Studies, Social Anthropology, Political Studies and many other sciences. As many of the texts in this book show, the west's main interest in the region remains political and religious. This specific approach to Central Asia is not only motivated by real political events - at least not until 9/11 and the military invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S. It is my contention that the interest in the region coincided with a scientific curiosity about the orient, which had been inaccessible for many decades and that is surrounded by imaginations about »the Silk Road«. Even today we find general overviews and publications that start by claiming that Central Asia is an unknown area despite the literature that has been produced and become accessible in various languages. It is difficult not to see the mystical imaginarles that consciously or unconsciously guide such views. So how can we understand the western construction of Central Asia today? And how does this book contribute to this field? To start with, let me go back to the Orientalism debate that has produced many valuable books with a specific focus on orientalist representations since Edward Said's Orientalism critic.75 While I cannot provide a full account of the debate here, a few points must be mentioned to un-

75 The debate among Central Asia scholars has remained focussed on the question to what degree Russia's orientalists share similar features with European ones. Hence the question has been less about how the European and American scholars represents Central Asia, but rather how Russian scholars represents or integrate in their orient. For a concise summary of the different debates contrasted to the British orientalists, see Morrison 2009, »Applied orientalism«.

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derstand how Central Asia is portrayed in contemporary western writings. Dietrich Jung76 has argued that essentialist images of Islam are the result of modernism and the emerging of a global public sphere. Between the second half of the nineteenth century and World War II, Islam emerged, along with a critical engagement with Christianity, within Europe. Hence, the first scholars of Islam were students who had undergone theological studies (and as a result broke with their church) and specialists of Semitic languages. In his book »Orientalists, Islamists and the Global Public Sphere« Jung traces the emergence of Islamic Studies as a university subject. Here he emphasizes the role that scholars play in creating an essential image of Islam. For instance, the paradigm of Islam as a political religion with a violent potential is a product of the late nineteenth century, notably put forward by scholars like Julius Wellhausen and others.77 Jung links textual productions about Islam to the biographies of individual scholars, and thus develops the genealogy of the image of Islam. Similarly, this present book presents scholarly texts with the biographies of leading intellectuals, most of them Arabists. Yet obviously it is not only a historical picture that emerges from these texts and biographies, but a contemporary debate that is sometimes

76 Dietrich Jung 2011. Orientalists, Islamists and the global public sphere. A genealogy of the modern essentialist image of Islam. Sheffield, Oakville: Equinox. 77 Julius Wellhausen who, like his contemporaries was a specialist of Semitic languages, wrote for the Encyclopaedia Britannica about the life of the Prophet as a political leader. His argument was, that the Prophet Muhammad turned into a political leader with the move from Mecca to Medina. Since this time he came to utilize Islam as a way to create a commonwealth which turned profitable for the Arab tribes. (Jung, p. 135 ff, Chapter 5). For another perspective on Wellhausen consider Edouard Conte 2011. Julius Wellhausen und die »Kinder Adams«. Die Aktualität der Orientalisten. In B. Schnepel, G. Brands and H. Schönig (eds.), Orient - Orientalistik - Orientalismus. Geschiche und Aktualität einer Debatte. Bielefeld: Transcript, pp. 43-70.

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contradictory but based on a shared experience - life in the Soviet Union. In Jung's book Central Asia is completely absent and the image of Islam is built upon the German, (French) and British experience in the Middle East (especially the Ottoman Empire, Syria and Egypt) and India. This is not a coincidence but rather the result of the politics of this time and the sources available to scholars. Central Asia does not exist in these debates on Islam, yet travel books and botanic expeditions have produced exotic knowledge about the »Central Asian tribes« since the nineteenth century.78 This Central Asia is mostly the territory of today's Afghanistan, while the image of the Emirate of Bukhara remains mystified. 79 With the establishment of the Soviet Union the area is even more left to the imagination. These imaginarles are grounded in the oriental image that Jung describes in his book. Hence, Islam - political by nature - offers itself to political resistance against Russia's/Soviet's dominance. Most obviously, Benningsen 80 and Wimbush have put for-

78 This Central Asia is first of all Afghanistan and the British interest zone. Much of the early material on the region has been supplied by former high ranking military official of the British Army. See for instance, Mayor H. G. Raverty 1881. Notes on Afghanistan and part of Beluchistan. London: George Edward Eyre and William Spottiswoodo; Henry W. Bellew 1891. An inquiry into the ethnography of Afghanistan. London: The Oriental University Institute; John Biddulph 1971. Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh. Graz: Akademischer Druck und Verlagsanstalt. He claims to be one of the first to visit Chitral in the Pamir describing »Mohamedanism« and »tribal life«. 79 »The Silk road« notion has maintained a mystical notion since Marco Polo's (-1254-1324) description of his travel. 80 Alexandre Benningsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay 1967. Islam in the Soviet Union. (Translated from French by E. Geoffrey and H. Evans) London et al.: Pall Mall; Alexandre Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush 1979. Alexandre Benningsen and S. Enders Wimbush 1985. Mystics and commissars, Sufism in the Soviet Union. London: Hurst; ibidem 1986. Muslims of the Soviet empire. Bloomington: Indiana University; Alexandre Benningsen and Maria Broxup 1983. The Islamic threat to the Soviet state. London: Taylor & Francis. For an earlier version of this narrative of Muslim

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ward this view of a Sufi Islam that resists efforts of Sovietization in Central Asia. Similarly, Michael Rywkin81 wrote »The struggle between the Basmachi and the Russian troops was not between Communists and anti-Communists, as in Russia, but between Russians and Moslems.« (1963 p. 57) A continuation of this view has recently been provided by Pinar Akcali,82 who sees the co-operations of Central Asian movements since perestroika as the wish to unite in Islam. Hence, he argues that for the Islamic Rebirth Party in Tajikistan and the Afghan mujahiddin »the common bond of Islam was the most important and decisive identity that transcended other identities existing in the region, such as nationalism and ethnicity« (p. 267). While this may have been true for some actors, the Islamic Rebirth Party in Tajikistan very consciously abstained from becoming a panIslamic actor in the region, opting for national engagement - they were the first calling to replace the official language Russian with Tajik. Thus, analyzes that identify Islam as an underlying strategy rather than a mode of communication and moral code help fix the region into an »orient« predefined by Islam. At the same time, imagining an Islamic civilization, an Islamic culture or unity under Islam serves as a resource to some contributors to reconnect their society to the Arab world and positively evaluate their past struggles under historical materialism and the pyatichlenka. Thus, reintegrating Central Asia into »the orient« through Islam is a process that seems to be developing mutually between some intellectuals from Central Asia and western academics.

resistance to Russia and the Soviets s e e L.T. General Sir George Macmunn 1929. Afghanistan from Darius to Amanuilah. London: G. Bell & Sons LTD. 81 Michael Rywkin 1963. Russia in Central Asia. New York: Collier books. 82 Pinar Akcali 1998. Islam as a »common bond« in Central Asia: Islamic Renaissance Party and the Afghan mujahidin. Central Asian Survey 17(2): 267-284.

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This western genealogy of studying Central Asia through its religious potential culminated in the Afghan war in the 1980s, where the west supported radical political Muslim groups - the Taliban - ready to face the Soviet army. Dietrich Reetz, who worked at the embassy of the German Democratic Republic in Pakistan during this period, remembers his western counterparts being very confident that the Islamic identity was strong enough to break the Soviet Union.83 Obviously this confidence proved right, and the Taliban were the beginning of the end of Soviet superiority in the southern tier. The primary focus on Central Asia through Islam has continued and it is in this domain that most studies have been produced. Whether as a dangerous or cultural identity, Islam remains one of the main subjects through which Central Asia is discussed in Europe and the U.S. This is not only true for academics but even more for politicians. For instance, political and academic institutions, as well as international bodies have organized numerous »dialogues« in or on behalf of Germany during the last two decades.84

83 In a private conversation (5.6.2012), Dietrich Reetz (ZMO) recalled a meeting during his time at the embassy of the German Democratic Republic in Pakistan. His British counterpart had said self-confidentially that the west would not need to do much but to leave the mujaheddin fight against the Soviet troops. Reetz has documented the development of Asian studies in the German Democratic Republic. His publication contextualizes Asian studies in the DDR within a debate about how to integrate DDR academics into the West German academy after reunification. See Dietrich Reetz 1991. Die Entwicklung und Stand der Asienwissenschaften in der DDR. Asien. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur 38: 75-87. 84 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (political foundation following the Social Democratic Party's (SPD) principles) is actively engaged in dialogue between the state and Islam for instance »Dialog zwischen Staat und Religion: die Samarkander-Konferenz« September 2006. For a critical view of the OSCE and the dialogues they have conducted with the Central Asian states, see Tim Epkenhans 2006. Das Dilemma der OSZE in Zentralasien. OSZE-Jahrbuch 2006, pp. 233-245. I myself organized such a SecularReligious Dialogue for International Alert, Tajikistan in October 2011. Another Dialogue by the German Ministry for International Affairs and

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The goal of these dialogues is to explain the German model of secularism as a way to engage with Islam. While not always explicitly mentioned, all participants discuss Islam as »the problem« that needs to be solved. Hence, these dialogues are meant to find a solution to Islam, and the European models are seen as suitable for being imitated. So far, these meetings have had minimal impact. In fact, while we were »dialoguing« in October 2011 in Berlin with a delegation from Tajikistan, the Tajik regime closed another important mosque in Tajikistan and arrested further religious authorities! Today, scholars as well as international organizations and political institutions attempt to »improve« the conditions in Central Asia and suggest solutions for dealing with »radical Islam.« Thus, the west holds the remedies to gain control over this »danger«, the main manifestation of which was the event of 9/11. While such views have been criticized repeatedly, 85 it appears difficult to escape the underlying structures that shape contemporary research topics, funding networks, and politics. Many recent studies have reinforced the image of Central Asia as first, a tribal/clan area with more or less » r e a l « Muslims, and second, a problem because of its unsolved religious question. Hence, we can speak of an »orientalization« of the region by western scholars. Keeping this criticism in mind, we can understand the centrality of Islam for the intellectual elite in Central Asia conversing with western hegemonies. Competition over the region is articulated in religious terminology, whereas the models manifest in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, as well as Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami and other movements compete with secular suggestions from Germany, Turkey, the US, Britain, etc. It goes without saying that the intellectual elite in Cen-

CORE took place in April 2013. Both included visits at Z M O and political foundations. 85

See for instance, Mariya Y. Omelicheva 2011.

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tral Asia today are directly involved and confronted with western models of Islam and the nation state, and hence their ideas and views have to be seen in relation to the abovementioned western approaches. The scholars articulate these competiting visions in different ways, suggesting alternative models and discussions. The text genres are only one way to convey the large plurality of engagements with Islam in Central Asia. This book has suggested engaging closely with scholars and their works on Islam in Central Asia. Capturing differences and commonalities of discourses and life courses, the book invites scholars to rethink research through different text genres. It is still common to treat Central Asia as a homogenous block, especially in political analyzes without respecting local debates. However, we urgently need to recognized a wide variety of developments and to pay attention to local scholarship and scholars and their contribution to science, not only as producers of information but as participants in (global) theoretical debates and local nation making. Scholarship is more than the sequential accumulation of texts, it is a personal investment into intellectual history and into national and cultural debates. Studying these scholars' texts and professional biographies provides a unique opportunity to rethink the present by integrating the past as an existing reference point (not an imagined and abolished idea). I shall finish these final remarks by expressing my deep gratitude to the contributors, who have allowed us to create this book and thus preserve a view of history from which young future researchers can learn. All of the contributors are respected researchers and/or political figures whose life stories are in themselves worth telling. Hence, we hope that engaging with the chapters will contribute to what Dina Wilkowsky had worked for: a dialogue of (scientific) cultures in a climate of mutual respect.

Glossary of Selected Terms

The following glossary provides a selection of terms that have been used in the contributions. Due to the language plurality and the different versions of one term found in the various Central Asian languages we have decided to give only those versions that were used in the texts. Arab. Arabic com. compare Kaz. Kazakh Kyrg. Kyrgyz syn. synonym Pers. Persian Russ. Russian Tajik Taj. Turk. Turkic (dialects of Central Asia) Uz. Uzbek aksakal (Turk.): elderly man, in some places also community leader aspirantura (Russ.): further grade of qualification in the Russian academic system. After successful exams one holds the status of Candidate of Science (kandidat nauk) bahs (Arab): Talk around a specific thing or theme, discussions basmachi (Russ.): robbers, opposition movement in the early twentieth century bid'a (Arab): impermissible innovations

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da'wa (Arab): to call to Islam, spread the religious message dar al-Islam (Arab): lands of Islam - as opposed to land of war dar al-harb dawra (Arab), Syn.: doira (Taj.): room, chamber, in Central Asia usually to r e f e r to a circle of scholars. Com. hujra (Arab) dhikr (Arab): prayer performance among Sufis DUMK (Russ.): Dukhovnoe Upravlenie Musul'man Kazakhstana Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan's Muslims «- SAMK: Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Kyrgyzstan/ Kazakhstan fatwa (Arab): legal reasoning, legal advice fiqh (Arab): Islamic jurisprudence firqa (Arab): sect hajj (Arab): pilgrimage