Castro and Franco: The Backstage of Cold War Diplomacy 2019004635, 9781138343177, 9780429439308

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Castro and Franco

Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Spain’s Francisco Franco were two men with very similar backgrounds but very different political ideologies. Both received a Catholic education and had strong connections to the Galicia region of Spain. Both were familiar with guerrilla tactics and came to power through fighting civil wars. However, Franco had support from fascists, who fought a vicious campaign against communist guerrillas, whereas Cuba was strategically aligned with the USSR after the revolution. The two countries nevertheless maintained strong relations, notably keeping a formal diplomatic relationship after the 1959 Cuban revolution despite the United States’ severing of ties to Cuba. This relationship, Hosoda argues, would remain a vital back channel for communication between Cuba and the West. Using a mixture of primary and secondary sources, derived from Cuban, American and Spanish archives, Hosoda analyses the nature and wider role of diplomatic relations between Cuba and Spain during the Cold War. Addressing both the question of how this relationship was forged – whether through the personal strange “amity” of their leaders, mutual animosity toward the U.S., or the alignment of national interests – and the importance of the role that it played. Considering also the role of the Vatican, this book offers a fascinating insight into a rarely studied aspect of the Cold War, one that transcends the usual East–West binaries. Haruko Hosoda is Professor in the College of Commerce at Nihon University, Tokyo, Japan. She is also a former diplomat.

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The Catholic Church and liberal democracy Bernt T. Oftestad Women and Politics in Wartime China Crossing geopolitical borders Vivienne Xiangwei Guo The Communist International, Anti-imperialism and Racial Equality in British Dominions Oleksa Drachewych Reason, Religion, and the Australian Polity A secular state? Stephen A. Chavura, John Gascoigne and Ian Tregenza Civic Nationalisms in Global Perspective Edited by Jasper Trautsch Radical Antiapartheid Internationalism and Exile The life of Elizabeth Mafeking Holly Y. McGee Castro and Franco The Backstage of Cold War Diplomacy Haruko Hosoda Model Workers in China, 1949–1965 Constructing a new citizen James Farley For a full list of titles, please visit: www.routledge.com/history/series/MODHIST

Castro and Franco

The Backstage of Cold War Diplomacy Haruko Hosoda

First published 2019 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Haruko Hosoda The right of Haruko Hosoda to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Hosoda, Haruko, author. Title: Castro and Franco : the backstage of Cold War diplomacy / Haruko Hosoda. Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge studies in modern history ; 52 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019004635 | ISBN 9781138343177 (hardback) | ISBN 9780429439308 (e-book) Subjects: LCSH: Cuba—Foreign relations—Spain. | Spain—Foreign relations—Cuba. | Castro, Fidel, 1926–2016—Political and social views. | Franco, Francisco, 1892–1975—Political and social views. | Cold War—Diplomatic history. Classification: LCC F1776.3.S7 H67 2020 | DDC 327.7291046—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019004635 ISBN: 978-1-138-34317-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-43930-8 (ebk) Typeset in Galliard by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

Prefacevi Acknowledgmentsviii 1 Introduction

1

2 Galicia’s influence: Castro and Franco’s common roots

9

3 Consequences of the Spanish Civil War: revolutionary Cuba and Castro

24

4 Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War: independent Spanish diplomacy toward Castro’s Cuba

47

5 Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain and American prejudice

60

6 People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists

79

7 The reconciliation of generations: the post-Franco era and Castro

96

8 Conclusion: everything changes: who leaves his name in history?

109

Bibliography115 Index128

Preface

This book is a revised and translated version of my 2016 book published in Japanese, Castro and Franco. This theme, “Castro and Franco,” had long been on my mind, since I was a young diplomat dispatched to Spain. Long before that, as I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I was struck by some apparent contradictions: Why did Castro’s Cuba and Franco’s Spain maintain diplomatic relations? Why did the U.S., supposedly supportive of the Batista regime, recognize the revolutionary government before Spain did? How was Cuba able to maintain and even improve diplomatic relations with the Vatican during the Cold War while other Eastern bloc countries were not? I now think it was fortunate that I waited to publish this book until the 21st century, as this type of historical evaluation should not be written so soon after events and by a person who was not yet in her thirties. Previously I had written some articles in English about Castro and Franco. Fortunately, there were some positive repercussions from this, such as publishing an article in an Italian academic journal translated by an Italian researcher. Soon afterward a young French researcher contacted me. In 2016, the work was published in Japanese. Worldwide, contemporary relations between Spain and Cuba were beginning to attract a lot of attention. Since then, I have continued to investigate this theme, taking a broader view of the relationship and expanding upon the Cuban side, which I have added to this new English version. There is a tendency to dismiss some events and actions that don’t conform to accepted notions of the era as exceptions. However, if we decipher them meticulously, we can find that such accepted notions were not entirely accurate, and events and actions that were previously dismissed take on new relevance. There are many books about Cuba, not only in Japan but also throughout the world. However, this book intends to broaden the point of view that informs those books and allows us to see events in a new light. Franco passed away on November 20, 1975 at the age of 82. In the postFrancoist period, the transition to democracy and the shift of leadership to a younger generation was achieved relatively smoothly. Castro passed away on November 25, 2016, 41 years to the month after his Spanish counterpart. Their departures from the world stage and the change of generations that followed are of great interest at this time.

Preface vii The world is changing rapidly, and we all cannot always keep up with the changes. In Spain, secessionism in Catalonia is growing, and Europe is no longer seen as a solution to Spain’s problems. Meanwhile, the Trump administration is shaking up the world, with future consequences that cannot be predicted. I hope the change of generations in Cuba will go smoothly and not mark a break with history and tradition. I hope for a soft landing, the continuation of good traditions, with a new view toward cooperation with a changing world, especially toward a more positive relationship with the U.S. March 2019 At Sado Island, the other Isla Bonita, Haruko Hosoda

Acknowledgments

It is impossible to name here all the people who helped me during my investigation because there have been so many over the years. However, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to academics, archivists, staff, diplomats, and friends around the world and my colleagues and the staff of my university, especially Mirtha Mesa Díaz, Damila Hechavarría of the Archivo Central de MINREX and Josefina Bárbara Pérez at the Instituto de Historia de Cuba in Havana. I’m also grateful for the help of many Cuban amigos, my colleague Michael Hood of Nihon University, Toshihiko Aono of Hitotsubashi University, and the group of Cold War scholars in Japan. I would also like to thank Jonathan Brown of the University of Texas, who recommended that I publish my work, and Joan Maria Thomàs of the Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Also, I extend special thanks to Routledge and its editor, ShengBin Tan, for non-native English speaker support in Japan. It has always been one of my dreams to have my work published in English by such a prestigious publisher. Last but not least, I thank my family for understanding and moral support for me and my work.

1 Introduction

Trilateral relations: Cuba, Spain, and the U.S. This book highlights the legacy of Spanish influence in Cuba during the Cold War in order to establish a new perspective for analysis of that era, comparing the leaders of those two countries, Francisco Franco (1892–1975) and Fidel Castro (1926–2016). The analysis places at its center Spanish diplomacy, emphasizing bilateral ties and taking into account U.S. diplomacy and public opinion. Viewed through the lens of the East–West bipolar system, one might question why the Franco regime, which fought against the communists, socialists, and anarchists who comprised the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939), would maintain diplomatic relations with Castro’s Cuba. However, the broader perspective established in this book allows for a far more nuanced view of the issue.

Cold War in Latin America After the publication of numerous multi-archival studies, it became clear that the dichotomous framework of the Cold War did not adequately account for all conflicts, especially in Latin America. Westad (2017) pointed this out in the chapter entitled “The Cold War and Latin America” in his book: [T]he origins of the Cold War in Latin America are not all about the effects of US supremacy. They are also about class and ethnic conflict inside Latin American republics and about the growth of nationalism, populism, and the Left. On the whole, perhaps, the roots of the Latin American Cold War fed on high levels of inequality and social oppression. (2017, p. 339–340) In other words, when people are not satisfied with the current situation, they provoke a revolution in order to survive. In Latin America, problems were not rooted in the confrontation between communism and anticommunism but rather in locally situated social conflicts and anti-American nationalism. That is, diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Latin America cannot be measured in terms of the axis of West–East, yet we cannot understand these relations without at

2  Introduction least some reference to this framework, as very little foreign policy of the Cold War era could proceed without consideration of the conflict between the U.S. and the USSR. Most Latin American leaders seemed to speak out against “the communist threat”; however, they would only pretend to be “obeying a paradigm of international relations imposed by U.S. hegemonic control of the region and using it as a ploy to get more aid and assistance” (Harmer, 2013, p. 141). Not only these leaders but also the exiled Catholics and Miami Cubans utilized this strategy, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. Among Latin American countries, Cuba could be seen as an independent actor in the Cold War, especially if we consider its international activities in Africa. Gleijeses argued that “the Cubans played an extremely active role in shaping Cold War history and had an impact unmatched by any other country of its size” (Kirkendall, 2014, p. 10). Domínguez, a political scientist born in Cuba, also stressed that Cuba was not a “puppet” of the Soviet Union and that “it was Cuba, not the USSR, that took the most risks in the 1960s, 70s and 80s in supporting insurgencies in different Latin American countries” (2009, pp. 14–15). It is important also to note that the Soviet Union had “minimal” influence in Latin America during the Cold War; rather, the Soviet Union’s position on Cuba was that it did not want the island nation to “dictate the policies of Latin American Communists,” even if there was a “Cold War” between them (Rabe, 2016, pp. xxvi, 67–68, 84, 118). The Soviet Union “had relatively little contact with most of Latin America,” compared with the U.S., from 1917 to the 1960s, when Castro established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union (Blasier, 1983, pp. 16, 19).

Spain and Cuba in the Cold War Although Spain was a peripheral player in the Cold War, the “Hispanic tie” with Cuba deserves further scrutiny. Until now, its significance has been minimized. Kirkendall referred to the need for more analysis of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany and cited new studies of relations between Italy and the UK with Latin America. However, strangely, he did not mention Spain. Even though it is a former empire, there are few studies from the Spanish perspective. Leycester Coltman, the British ambassador to Cuba (1991–1994), described coolly the Cuban situation and some aspects of its foreign relations with the U.S.; however, he hardly mentioned Cuban relations with Spain at all (Coltman, 2003). If Cuba was one of the important actors in the Cold War, we have to reconsider how its Spanish origin might have informed its role. In this book I analyze the Spanish–Cuban relationship mainly from the Spanish point of view, while paying particular attention to the meaning of the Spanish Civil War as a precursor to World War II. At that time, Spain was not viewed as part of the “south,” but neither was it considered to be in the center of the “north.” Moreover, from the point of view of the East–West paradigm, it was not a plenary member of the West. Spain signed a unilateral agreement with the U.S. Inside the regime, however, there

Introduction 3 was a faction that supported independent diplomacy. During the Cold War,­ Castro’s Cuba and Franco’s Spain were not central actors on either side; from this position, we can view the international relationship differently. Up to now, numerous books have examined Castro’s foreign policy, and some have delved into Cuba’s relationship with Spain. Joaquín Roy, a pioneer scholar of Spain–Cuba relations, describes the bilateral history from the global viewpoint. However, he does not use the primary official sources of either Spain or Cuba (1998, 2009, among others). On the other hand, Manuel de Paz-Sánchez wrote about the bilateral relationship using the Spanish archives but only about the periods of 1957–1960 and 1960–1962 and without considering Cuban and American points of view (1997, 2001, 2006). While the approaches taken by these scholars have yielded significant contributions, a multi-archival approach to a longer timeline might provide a broader and more nuanced perspective of these international relationships and would therefore be more effective in helping us view the more subtle contours of the Spanish–Cuban relationship.

The points of view in this book This book is different from previous scholarship in that the analysis is concentrated on the 1950s through the 1980s, from before the Cuban Revolution through the Spanish transition to democracy, focusing on the “Spanish heritage” that informed the diplomacy between the two nations. I also conduct a global analysis of the international relationship, considering political, economic, ideological, and cultural aspects. Here the history of international relations is constructed based specifically on the study of diplomatic history. In addition, if we add the perspective of the U.S., in light of presidential campaigns, economic sanctions (what Cuba referred to as an economic blockade), and the role of mass media, we can attain a new perspective on international relations during the Cold War. However, if one uses only accessible English archives, one would have a biased point of view. We should consider why these documents are easy to access. In Cuba, I was able to access Cuban documents at the Central Archive at the library of the Institution of the History of Cuba. However, gaining access to Spanish documents is more difficult and requires more time. For example, the diplomatic documents of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the late 20th century could not be accessed for several years due to their relocation, and even as of late 2018, they were not easy to access, except for documents from the first half of the 20th century and some documents from the late 20th century in the General Archive of the Administration (AGA). This might be one of the reasons studies about the foreign relations between Spain and Latin America have not flourished even after democratization. I worked as a diplomat and lived in Spain for eight years in total. While in Spain, various Spanish archives were available to me for study, including the Archive of Francisco Franco, the Ministry of Commerce, the Real Academia de la Historia, the AGA, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before its closure.

4  Introduction The detailed documents from the archives provide nuance for our understanding of the negotiations among three countries. The Spanish documents are especially useful, as they relate to the humanistic character of the main actors. However, I did not want to write a book based only on primary sources, which sometimes do not relate all the facts; rather, I tried to analyze the facts from perspectives constructed from the archival records of various countries and to consider disparate decision-making processes evidenced therein. My experience as a diplomat, especially knowing the process of creating diplomatic papers (not all processes were written down), helped me understand relations between the Ministry and the embassies, and the importance of talented ambassadors. I developed an instinct for reading between the lines of the documents.

Four commonalities between two contrasting “dictators” At first glance, it is difficult to discern much in common between Franco and Castro. However, upon deeper reflection, it is possible to identify four significant commonalities between the two men that would inform their interactions: Galicia as a shared “motherland”; Catholicism as a spiritual axis; “guerrilla combat” (both were “rebels” and experienced guerrilla combat); and a shared anti-­Americanism imbedded in their sense of patriotism. “Galicia as motherland” refers to the fact that both leaders were influenced by the atmosphere of the northwestern region of Spain, where authoritarian and patriarchal traditions were dominant. Franco was born in Ferrol, a military and commercial port with dockyards. Meanwhile, Castro’s father, Ángel Castro, was from Láncara, a small village in Galicia about 150 kilometers inland from Ferrol. A sense of patriotism and sympathy for Galicia would have formed a tie between the two men. Of course, geographic proximity and related sympathies do not in themselves explain the strong connection between the two men. Another commonality is the experience of guerilla warfare. Both Castro and Franco took power after rebellions against the government. During the Spanish Civil War, Franco fought against the Second Spanish Republic, leading the rebels and Moor mercenaries. This war was to become the first battle of World War II and the Cold War, and the guerilla tactics first used in this battle would be applied during the Cuban Revolution. Curiously, Franco sympathized with Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969), who used guerilla tactics in the Vietnam War, for his patriotism. The influence of the Catholic Church is also important. Not only in Spain (it was the state religion during the Franco regime) but also in communist Cuba, the Catholic Church maintained significant influence. Castro was educated in a Jesuit high school by Spanish monks. The Catholic mindset that he acquired there would subtly inform interactions between Cuba and Spain. Moreover, Cuba maintained diplomatic relations with the Vatican during the Cold War, at a time when other Eastern European countries eschewed relations with both the Vatican and Spain. This allowed Cuba to build a positive and consequential relationship between Havana and Rome.

Introduction 5 Finally, between Castro and Franco, there was one more commonality: anti-Americanism informed by patriotism. When Franco was young, he saw in Ferrol the physical and psychological wounds suffered by officers in the Spanish-­ American War (1898). Afterward, Castro said that the Cuban Revolution would serve to restore Spanish honor following its defeat in that war (Ramonet, 2006, pp. 459–460).

The complex relationship between Cuba and Spain The relationship between Cuba and Spain could not have proceeded smoothly based solely on the sympathies shared by the two leaders. In 1960, a year after the Cuban Revolution, the furious Spanish ambassador to Cuba rushed into the TV studio where Castro had been criticizing the Franco regime and was declared “persona non grata” on the spot. In the late 1960s, the Spanish cultural attaché was condemned as a CIA spy. After the Spanish democratic transition, the Spanish ambassador to Cuba was denied his placet in 1996. Despite such tensions, Cuba and Spain never broke diplomatic relations. One of the reasons was the pending problem of the release of Spanish political prisoners. Many officials of the Second Spanish Republic had been exiled to Cuba, and this was seen to complicate relations between the two nations. Here we can see an example of conventional thinking: Viewed through the lens of the East–West bipolar system, one might expect that the exiled “left” of the defeated Spanish regime would naturally unite with the “left” of the Castro regime. We challenge this presumption. In addition, the relationship between Spain and Cuba must be viewed in light of often overlooked commercial issues at the time.1 Beginning in the 19th century, Latin American countries gradually gained independence from Spain, and many Catalonian immigrants, apart from the Galicians, went to Cuba. Although a commercial route had been well established by the 1960s, Spain was left without a sugar-producing colony. Spain signed a five-year agreement with Cuba to purchase sugar at a price fixed considerably higher than the international market rate. Ironically, the market price collapsed immediately afterward, rendering this agreement very advantageous to Cuba. The Spanish ships were paid with sugar, the monoculture crop in Cuba, during hard economic times in the mid-1960s. The transactions were similar to bartering. In short, the ties between the two were very strong despite their disparate ideologies. Unlike the U.S., Spain kept diplomatic relations with Cuba after the Revolution of 1959, despite some important disputes. In the following pages, we analyze the factors that contributed to this dynamic.

Cuba between the Americas and Spain American policy and ideology added nuance to this bilateral relationship. During the Cold War, the U.S. feared that a communist wave would spread throughout Latin America. To keep the rest of Latin America within his sphere of influence,

6  Introduction President John F. Kennedy (1917–1963) took various measures, including the “Alliance for Progress” program, which was designed to increase economic cooperation between the U.S. and other Latin American countries in order to isolate Cuba. In contrast, the Franco regime, under the banner of Hispanidad (Hispanicity), tried to keep its former Latin American colonies under control by means of cultural imperialism. This was necessary because Franco-led Spain was isolated from the international community following World War II. There was little choice but to stress ties with Latin American countries and the Middle East. In Latin America, Spain and the U.S. would confront each other again. The U.S. started to establish military bases of geopolitical importance following the signing of three separate executive agreements in 1953. This alleviated Spain’s isolation somewhat. However, the Franco regime recklessly challenged U.S. hegemony by developing an independent foreign policy. The most remarkable aspect of this foreign policy was in relation to Cuba, despite U.S. pressure to keep Cuba diplomatically isolated from other nations. The U.S. had severed diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961. Despite repeated U.S. pressure, Spain maintained diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba throughout the 1960s, even after two Spanish commercial vessels were sunk by radical Cuban exiles in Miami. At the same time, Spain tried to serve as a mediator to improve U.S.– Cuba relations, perhaps partly out of nostalgia for its last colony in Latin America. The influence of the Franco regime’s foreign policy was maintained following his death in 1975. Analysis of subsequent Spanish politicians and politics makes clear the continuing relationship between Spain and Cuba. For example, Spanish president Adolfo Suárez (1976–1981), despite his center-right ideology, showed deep understanding of the Non-Aligned Movement. He even visited Havana, which led to a shift in U.S. support for him. After joining the EC in 1986, Spain under the Socialist (PSOE) tried to serve as a bridge between the EC, Latin America, and Cuba as a means of extending the pro-Atlantic policy of the Franco regime. At the end of 2014, then-president Barack Obama (2009–2017) stated that the U.S. was going to start to normalize relations with Cuba. At that moment, he said in Spanish, “Todos somos Americanos.” He stressed the fostering of unity among the Americas (The White House, 2016). In Spanish, “America” means the American continents, while “Americano” refers to the people of those continents.2 In fact, José Martí used the term “Nuestra América” (Our America) to refer to the Spanish-speaking nations in the Western Hemisphere, contrasting them to the “rapidly industrializing United States,” which was materialist and expansionist. He had spent time in New York and Florida, so he knew “the monster” quite well. Castro would use “Nuestra America” repeatedly after the Revolution (Latell, 2005, p. 91). Sometimes people are moved not only by their regime’s cause nor simply by economic rationalism. The historian, diplomat, and politician, Salvador de Madariaga (he was also from Galicia), said, “The central orientation of the Spanish empire was (. . .) not economic or political, but spiritual” (Madariaga, 1951,

Introduction 7 p. 205). Castro did not always maintain these “spiritual” and friendly relations with all Spanish politicians during post-Franco Spain. However, after our investigation, we can conclude that there was some spiritual connection based on regional fraternity that informed the “sympathy” between the anticommunist Franco regime and the socialist Castro regime, especially on the Spanish side. The reason we seek to revise the historical view of Castro and Cuba is that we think that adding a “new” pole (i.e., Spain, a former colonial power) helps us understand the complicated international relations from a more objective and nuanced point of view. In doing so, we might rethink the simplified point of view of Cold War history. We try to determine whether the Cubans are Americanos, a part of the Madre Patria (Motherland, Spain), both, or neither through the arguments developed in this book.

The composition of this book This book presents a detailed analysis of the four commonalities between Castro and Franco outlined previously: their roots in Galicia, Christianity as a shared belief, their military and guerrilla careers, and anti-Americanism. In Chapter 2, we analyze the adolescent years of Castro and Franco as a background, tracing their anti-American roots and Galician roots as seen in their biographies and surroundings. In Chapter 3, we analyze the emotional influence of the Spanish Civil War on the Franco regime, Castro’s Cuba, and the U.S. Some of the outstanding figures related to the Spanish Civil War and revolutionary Cuba are described, including Spanish, Cuban, and American politicians, diplomats, and journalists who sometimes served to maintain prejudice and spread it throughout their societies from the 1930s to the 1950s. In Chapter 4, we analyze diplomatic relationships among Spain, Cuba, and the Vatican from the beginning of the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s until the early 1960s. Both the Vatican and Spain wanted to keep an open window on the ­socialist-communist world through Cuba in order to receive information and maintain ties for the future. When the U.S. made light of the influence of Catholicism, it inadvertently strengthened the tie between Cuba and Spain. In Chapter 5, we discuss Spanish and Cuban diplomacy, especially their resistance to unilateral U.S. policies in the 1960s. In the U.S., anticommunism was a simple motto used by the government to persuade the people to unite against it. However, the reality was more complicated than they thought: Cuba did not want to depend exclusively on the Soviet Union, while Spain did not want to depend so exclusively on the U.S. Chapter 6 is a review of the Francoist regime’s diplomacy, from its inception through its transformation, from the second half of the 1960s to the first half of the 1970s. There were struggles among the regime’s factions to expand their own influence. The winners, the technocrats of Opus Dei, were more pragmatic than their predecessors, the Catholics, and Falangists (Spanish fascists). They especially emphasized commercial relations between Spain and Cuba.

8  Introduction In Chapter 7, we analyze relations between Cuba and Spain after the death of Franco in 1975, during the Spanish democratic transition and in the 1980s, when Spain was going to change herself drastically by joining NATO and the EC, trying to take leadership again in the international arena as the mediator-bridge between Europe and the new continent. Key incidents from the later period are also presented and analyzed. Finally, we briefly discuss how Cuba and Spain managed to maintain diplomatic relations in spite of various incidents, including the persona non grata status of the Spanish ambassador and the Spanish diplomat-as-CIA agent incident, considering the political, economic, and spiritual ties between the two nations. In 2007, the Spanish Congress finally passed the Historical Memory Law, which was intended to recognize the dignity of the victims on both sides of the Spanish Civil War and the post-Francoist period. Even in the late 1990s, when I started to investigate, studies of international relations with Franco and his era had not been sufficiently developed in Spain because of the scars of the War, which had divided Spain in two. Lack of access to documents exacerbated the problem. At the time it was easier for a foreign investigator to examine documents of foundations. Another concern was more generational: Those who witnessed the Cuban Revolution firsthand tend to be overly enthusiastic and therefore view the events surrounding the Revolution subjectively. I, as a Japanese national and as a person who was born after the Cuban Revolution, might be better positioned to describe Castro and Franco neutrally and objectively. The important thing is that we can compare three different countries here: the U.S., a democratic country; Spain, which experienced a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy; and Cuba, which is expected to undergo a democratic transition. This is not to say that the democratic system itself is a perfect one, applicable to any country. Rather, it is to note the disparate paths each of these three nations took en route to democratization.

Notes 1 Until now, very few investigations have been done. Exceptions are Lambie and the ex-economic attaché, Recarte, who analyzed the bilateral economic relationship. Vid. (Lambie, 1993; Recarte, 1980). 2 I use elsewhere the term “America” in English meaning.

2 Galicia’s influence Castro and Franco’s common roots

Background about Cuba, Spain, and the U.S. Neocolonialism In this chapter, I present the historical background of the triangular relationship between Cuba, Spain, and the U.S., as well as the common roots shared by Castro and Franco in Galicia as one of the commonalities between the two men. The starting point of this relationship was the “encounter” between Cuba and Spain. In 1492, Christopher Columbus reached the Bahamas and Cuba after crossing the Atlantic Ocean. In successive voyages, Spain introduced sugar cane from the Canary Islands to Latin America and established it as the monoculture, drawing upon the labor of indigenous slaves. When slaves died and labor was scarce, Spain brought new slaves from Africa, many of them coming from Western Africa. In the first part of the 19th century, when the slave trade reached its peak in Cuba, there were more mixed race than whites, and by the late 19th century, 150,000 Chinese had been brought in as “contracted workers” (Kudo, 2002, pp. 18–21). We can see their influence in Cuban music, which also contains features brought by European immigrants, as well as Yorubans of Nigeria and West Africa. From Asia, we can hear the sound of the suona (a doublereeded horn). Catalonians had utilized African slaves for the sugar industry and other commerce and made fortunes. For example, the Güell family and the patron of the Architect of the Sagrada Familia, Antoni Gaudí, were particularly successful. The sugar export industry came to depend heavily on the American market. This led to persistent conflicts between Spain and the U.S. related to customs, and the U.S. sought opportunities to absorb Cuba into its sphere of influence. Availing itself of the Cuban War of Independence, U.S. Republican President William McKinley (1897–1901) provoked the Spanish-American War in 1898. The catalyst was the mysterious sinking of the USS Maine, an America naval ship, in Havana Harbor. Spain was defeated by the U.S., and the Treaty of Paris (1898) nominally recognized the independence of Cuba. Spain, having also lost Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, was no longer the empire it once was, and the U.S. emerged remarkably powerful.

10  Galicia’s influence Although Cuba gained independence from Spain in 1902, she was in fact put under the control of the U.S. At that moment, Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909) was in the Oval Office after the assassination of McKinley. He was famous for the construction of the Panama Canal and his Big Stick Diplomacy in the Western Hemisphere. Although Cuba had become independent, the U.S. continued its intervention by various means, including the Platt Amendment, which set conditions for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Cuba, and the long-term lease of a military base at Guantanamo Bay. This amendment was abolished in 1934; however, the base at Guantanamo remains in the hands of the U.S. It is important to remember that until the 1960s, the majority of the U.S. people considered Cuba to be “a permanent and natural dependency of Washington, almost as much a part of the United States.” Americans held similar views toward the Canal Zone in Panama. In this light, it is more understandable why both Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon believed vehemently that Cuba was oppressed by communism (Neustdt and May, 1986, pp. 148–149). This dynamic is summed up by Herbert L. Matthews, an American journalist who would later become known as “the inventor of Fidel Castro”: The cold war brought on an exaggerated – one can almost say, hysterical – American attitude towards Communism. The consistent traditional United States policy of seeking order and stability in Latin America was given a special coloration – anti-Communism. (Matthews, 1970, p. 54) Historian Brandis argued that “Latin America’s Cold War” was a fusion of long-running clashes over social, political, and economic arrangements, nationalism, decolonization, and the bipolar struggle, and so on. At the same time, he suggested that “the tragedy” of Latin America was caused by the domestic Right as opposed to the rise of the Left, rather than by the repression of the Right and U.S. complicity (2011, pp. 7–8). Meanwhile, McClintock explained the new U.S. role in the Cold War: The Cold War provided the international framework and ideological rationale for the new U.S. role. Counterinsurgency doctrine would provide a substitute for the Europeans’ imperial policies and an alternative to repetition of the United States’ own neocolonial experience in the Philippines and Latin America before World War II. (1992, p. 267) If so, the later invasion of Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs) in 1961 by the U.S. can be seen as the start of an attempt to invade Cuba during the Cold War. However, as we will see later and as Matthews suggests, the U.S. tried in vain to convince Latin Americans that communism is evil. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Latin America’s reaction was primarily nationalistic against the intervention of the Soviet Union’s power politics, not against communism as the U.S. insisted (1970, p. 323).

Galicia’s influence 11 In sum, for Cubans, the defining feature of the battle was neocolonialism rather than anticommunism, and American leaders had to consider public opinion regarding these matters as a factor in their presidential campaigns, as we will see later.

Galicia Galicia, where the fathers of both Castro and Franco were born, is located in northwestern Spain. This is a relatively rainy region. Celts lived there before the conquest of the Romans. At Santiago de Compostela, the bone of Saint Jacob was “found” in the 9th century, which made this city a holy pilgrimage destination. When Christians and Muslims fought on the Iberian Peninsula during the Reconquista, routes from France were created to facilitate military logistics. The area is now known as Camino de Santiago. According to Emmanuel Todd, French historian and demographer, relationships among people in the northern belt from Galicia to Catalonia form something like a parent–child relationship, a type of “stem-family,” in which an authoritarian relationship exists among brothers. Especially in Galicia, there are many small peasant farmers, and religious practice is very active. This is markedly different from the southern part of Spain, where large-scale agriculture predominates and religious practice is less central to daily life. (Todd, 1992, pp. 40–44, 298–312). Matthews also points out that in Latin America, there were many descendants of and immigrants from Spain, and traditionally they have personalized paternal governments (1970, p. 324). Castro’s father was one of these Galician immigrants, but other famous persons had Galician ancestors, such as Simón Bolívar (1783–1830), the revolutionary poet and journalist who was called “the liberator” of Central and South American countries, and Raúl Alfonsin (president of Argentina, 1983–1989). In addition, Galicia is separated from central Spain by mountain ranges, and communication infrastructure was poor in the past. These factors contributed to the closed nature of Galician society. What is more, one can deduce that Galicia was somewhat different from the stereotyped image of Spain, based on the conservatism and spiritualism prevalent in the region. Matthews pointed out the common points between Castro and Franco: He [Castro] thinks over and maps out an action or programme, often for a long time. Many of the apparently abrupt and emotional acts are planned in advance. Curiously, this is a well-known trait of another Gallego, who is likewise a dictator – Generalissimo Franco. Both men, so different in other respects, are enigmatic, aloof, baffling even to their closest associates. (1970, p. 31) Galicia was not a wealthy region. In the early decades of the 19th century, numerous immigrants left Spain for Latin America. This continued until around 1930, when the Great Depression rendered Latin America a less desirable

12  Galicia’s influence destination. Toward the end of the 19th century, Galician immigrants comprised about 30% of the total number of Spanish immigrants (between 200,000 and 250,000) and from 1900 to 1930, 40% (more than a million) (Nakatsuka, 2008, pp. 421–422). In Argentina, Colombia, Uruguay, and other Latin American countries, Gallego (Galician in Spanish) means immigrants from Spain; it suggests that there were numerous Galicians and their descendants in those countries. After her defeat in the Spanish-American War in 1898, Spain tried in vain to invade northern Africa. Gradually, the Spanish people became frustrated because at that time, the system of Spanish conscription was unequal. The rich could avoid it by paying money. Some of those unable to pay, like Pérez Serantes (who would become the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba as discussed later), escaped to Cuba to avoid conscription to Morocco. The birthplace of the overwhelming majority of Spanish immigrants to Cuba in the first years of the 20th century were Galicians, followed by Canarians. In 1915, 44% of Spanish immigrants were from Galicia, and 24.5% were from the Canary Islands (Vidal Rodríguez, 2005, p. 68). In 1931, Spaniards comprised 7.3% of the Cuban population. In Havana, it was 12.3%. The Galicians mainly occupied the primary and secondary industries, and they lived mainly in rural areas (Vidal Rodríguez, 2005, pp. 80, 264). They founded centers in each Latin American country, such as Centro Gallego (the actual Gran Teatro de La Habana Alicia Alonso). The Galician emigrants were hard workers, and they did not forget to donate to the community for its services (Alvero Céspedes, 2013, p. 17). In the 21st century, Castro appreciated Franco because he had maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba earlier in his regime, despite intense U.S. pressure. According to Castro, the reason he did not yield to the U.S. was that he “acted with Galician stubbornness.” Moreover, he respected Franco, who had distinguished himself in Africa and had used the Moroccans to repress the revolt in 1934, as follows: “[H]e was astute – I don’t know if it is because of the Galicians, who are accused of being cunning” (Ramonet, 2006, pp. 458–460). In addition, Castro said that Franco was supported by the rich, but “apparently, it was a less corrupt administration” (Ramonet, 2006, p. 461). In sum, Castro must have seen what he had learned from the Jesuit priests in Franco’s regime: a kind of “honest poverty.”

Castro’s affinity with Catholicism It would be difficult to make sense of Castro without first understanding his childhood and life prior to the 1959 Revolution, as well as his relationship with his father, Ángel. Fidel Castro was born in Cuba in 1926; however, his father was born in a poor peasant’s house in Láncara, a small village in the inland part of Galicia in 1875. It is now a largely depopulated village. At the beginning of the 20th century, Láncara’s population was about 5,200; in 2014, it was only 2,800 (Instituto National de Estadística, no date.). According to Castro’s sister Juanita, his and their father’s personalities were “very similar . . . very gallego” (Latell, 2005, p. 39).

Galicia’s influence 13 Ángel, after serving in the Cuban War of Independence, had returned to Cuba to reside permanently. He had no money when he started working in Cuba but went on to build a fortune. Working with American firms, such as the United Fruit Company, he became a squire, running farms in Birán, inland, near Santiago de Cuba. He was a typical hard-working Gallego. Enrique Pérez-Serantes, the archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, who later became a key person linking Fidel, the Church, and the Revolution, was friends with Ángel and visited him often. He also baptized Fidel when he was called a “Jew” because he had not received baptism until the age of eight. Castro’s mother, Lina, was employed as a maid in Ángel’s house when they first met. She was a very religious Cuban from a poor family. Ángel did not divorce his legal wife immediately, so Lina’s children, including Fidel, could not live in the main building and had to live with foster parents. Of this traumatic experience, Fidel himself said that he was “a victim of exploitation.” During his years in foster care, he was “subjugated and exploited” and developed a strong rebellious mind under the worst pressures and conditions. From these roots, according to Latell, “combating exploitation and injustice” became Castro’s central justification for Cuban domestic and foreign policies (Latell, 2005, pp. 41–48). The influence of a Jesuit education on the young Castro cannot be underestimated; it informed the basis of Fidel’s later philosophy. He was a graduate of the De La Salle Brothers School, the College de Dolores (a prestigious Jesuit academy), and the Belen Jesuit Preparatory School. Anecdotes from Castro’s formative years demonstrate the influence of his Catholic education. At Belen, Father Amando Llorente, born in Spain, was his mentor. During the Spanish Civil War, he was a combat medic. He did not talk about politics; however, he encouraged boys to do activities that would show their spirit of sacrifice, commitment, and willingness to take risks. The experiences of climbing mountains and exploration would help prepare him for later guerilla activities. Castro liked climbing because when he saw a mountain, he viewed it as a challenge and wanted to reach the summit (Castro, 2012, pp. 13–14; Ramonet, 2006, pp. 80–83). Castro admitted that “his temperament, which is partly from birth, was also forged there with the Jesuits.” They “worked without salary, lived austerely, and they were rigorous, sacrificed, and hardworking.” The founder of the Jesuits, Ignatius of Loyola, was originally a member of the military. The Spanish monks there “combined the traditions of the Jesuits – military spirit, their military organization – with the Spanish character.” That is, “the Spanish Jesuits (. . .) know how to instill a great sense of personal dignity, a sense of personal honor, (. . .) the ability to bear a sacrifice” (Ramonet, 2006, pp. 80–83).1 Later, in an interview with the Brazilian Dominican Frei Betto, Castro mentioned the same ideas: The Jesuits influenced him about the rigor of their organization, discipline, values, the formation of himself and a sense of justice, and so on. According to Castro, without selflessness and altruistic sacrifice, neither religious heroes nor political heroes could exist (Betto, 1985, pp. 155–157). For him, religion and the Revolution seem to have been deeply interconnected.

14  Galicia’s influence Father Alberto was persuaded by the thesis of Hispanidad of the Franco regime, which “attributes historical superiority to the political and cultural influence of Spain and Spanish thought.” He argued vociferously that “the independence of Latin America had been frustrated by the failure to implement social reforms because Anglo-Saxon values had displaced the Spanish cultural impact” (Szulc, 1987, pp. 140–141). In addition, the monks at Belen were “Spanish priests of rather ultra-right convictions.” According to Castro, they were pro-Francoist who had come to Cuba after the Spanish Civil War. The proper father, Llorente said that, at the epoch at Belen, Castro was more pro-Francoist than he himself was (Szulc, 1987, p. 140; Latell, 2005, p. 68). On the other hand, Castro became skeptical toward the attitudes of religious people. Later he said that before the Cuban revolution, in the rural areas where 70% of the population lived, there were no churches, which were limited to rich areas. The majority of religious people were foreigners, especially Spaniards, and religion was spread primarily through private schools in Cuba (Betto, 1985, pp. 208–209). In other words, the Catholic faith was spread most commonly not to the poor but to the elites. In Spain, the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera drew to a close in 1930, and the monarchy of Alfonso XIII was ended by a proclamation of the Second Spanish Republic in 1931. The relationship between Spain and the Vatican was thus strained because of the Republic’s radical policies of accepting the separation of government and religion and divorce and civil marriage without religious ceremony. Historically in Spain, if the Church became too powerful, there would be a backlash, and a reactive anticlerical power would emerge from both liberal governments and the masses. In fact, the Jesuits had been expelled at various times. During the Spanish Civil War, there occurred massacres of priests and sieges of churches. As a result, Catholic power was allied with the Franco side. Under the Franco regime, the youth were trained in sports in order to indoctrinate them, in a process akin to “the construction of a man who is half monk, half soldier” by the combination of Catholic and Nazis traditions (Manrique Arribas, 2011, p. 271). The regime, which converted Catholicism into National Catholicism, stressed the common language and history based on Catholicism between Latin America and Spain in order to spread its influence there.

The image of Francisco Franco The biography of Francisco Franco is also significant. In Japan, many books have been written in Japanese or translated into Japanese about Castro and Che Guevara. While there are published books translated from English and Spanish related to the Spanish Civil War and the period of the Franco regime, very few biographies of Franco have been written in Japanese. Famous Anglo-Saxon experts have written biographies of Franco and translated them into Spanish (Preston 1994, 2002; Payne, 1987, 1992). Moreover, Spanish experts, such as Suárez Fernández (2007) and Fusi (1987, 2001), wrote biographies of Franco. However, there has been a dearth of

Galicia’s influence 15 original research on the Franco regime’s foreign policy because of the difficulty of accessing documents before the end of the 20th century, as previously noted. Compared with Castro studies, even fewer books on Franco were translated into Japanese. A book by the Spanish historian Rodao has been translated into Japanese; however, it is not a biography but rather a study of Franco’s foreign policy (Rodao, 2002). This may owe to Franco’s “monotonic” life compared with Castro’s or to exiles of the Second Republic, who promoted the cause of the Spanish Civil War (antifascism, anti-dictatorship) with the support of American labor unions and foundations (Hosoda, 2013). Franco was born in Ferrol, which had a flourishing naval port and shipbuilding industry. It is a strange but important coincidence that the founder of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, part of the Second Republic) and the General Union of Workers (UGT), Pablo Iglesias (1850–1925), and the former secretary general of the Worker’s Commissions (CCOO), Ignacio Fernández Toxo, who had worked at Bazán (national shipbuilding company), were from Ferrol as well. This city and its periphery generated leaders – “personalized paternal” leaders – compared to Castro, who was born in a rural area far from the city. Franco’s family had deep connections to naval institutions. Some people said that because of the last name (Bahamonde), common among Jews in Spain, and his appearance, his family had Jewish ancestry. His father was liberal, sympathetic to freemasonry, and a critic of the Catholic Church. On the other hand, his mother was a devout Catholic. In 1907, his father ran away with a woman to live together in Madrid, which would cause an uncomfortable situation for his family in such a small city (Preston, 2002, pp. 28–31). What is more, due to the reduction of the Navy after the loss of the Latin American colonies, the shipbuilding industry in Ferrol was declining, and the Naval Academy young Franco wanted to attend was closed. Upon completing his studies at Sacred Heart Catholic School, he departed for Toledo the same year, situated himself in the dry climate of Castile, and planned to enter the Infantry Academy (Preston, 2002, pp. 33–35). As a member of the military, Franco put emphasis on “order,” disliking his father’s and Spain’s disorder before the Spanish Civil War. Franco volunteered for the Moroccan front and distinguished himself on the field of battle. He became a captain at age 22 and was the youngest general in Europe at age 33 ( Suárez Fernández, no date). While Franco gradually distinguished himself, Spain continued to get bogged down, suffering a severe defeat to the Moroccans, led by Abd el-Krim, in 1921. Another strange coincidence is that, indirectly, Franco’s tactics influenced Castro and Che Guevara through the Spanish veteran, Alberto Bayo, who had fought in Africa, and Ho Chi Minh, among others, as discussed later (Er, 2017, pp. 137– 159). As Spain lost all its colonies in Latin America, the Northern African territory was Spain’s only remaining colony. The government and military blamed each other, and relations between the two deteriorated. As a soldier in the army, Franco gave top priority to nationalism, which puts a high value on the military. He “had an overriding sense of nationalism geared to

16  Galicia’s influence military values and saw the army as the incarnation of patriotism and the ultimate guarantor of national unity.” Franco “believed that war in Morocco would restore the prestige the army had lost in 1889 and would rekindle the ideals of Spanish patriotism.” Moreover, Franco “felt that Spanish history vindicated the army’s record of political intervention in the interests of a unified Spanish state and as the last line of defense in ‘the survival of the fatherland’ ” (emphasis added) (Fusi, 1987, p. 4). While later in the Cuban Revolution, “Patria o Muerte” (Fatherland or Death) became the slogan; under the Franco regime, “Todo por la patria” (All for the Fatherland) was a popular slogan, sometimes found written on buildings. Their slogans were not “East or West” or “communism or capitalism.” Here also we see a commonality between the two: defense of the fatherland was a key feature of the cause for which they both fought. In 1928, after his military glory in Africa, Franco became the director of the General Military Academy in Saragossa, in the northwest interior of Spain. There, he taught “a traditional concept of the army, which stressed – as ideal values for the cadets – patriotism, arduous training, rigorous discipline, chivalrous behavior, and the virtues of duty, responsibility, self-denial, valor and sacrifice”(Fusi, 1987, p. 8). Castro did not attend a military academy; however, curiously, he learned these points from the Jesuits and from the veteran, Bayo. After the exile of the Spanish King Alfonso XIII in 1931, shortly after the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic, the academy was closed. In 1934, Franco, belonging to the military of this government, suppressed a riot of workers at Asturias, a northern part of Spain, using the Spanish Legion from Morocco. In 1936, Franco revolted against the Republican government and three years later gained victory in the Spanish Civil War with the collaboration of Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. He employed the slogans of anticommunism, antiliberalism and anti-freemasonry. Many congressmen in the Second Republic, including President Manuel Azaña, were freemasons (Cruz, 1989). However, Franco Spain did not participate in World War II, despite repeated requests from the Axis powers, maintaining “neutral” status, properly speaking. From 1940 to 1943, Spain maintained nonbelligerent status, until Germany’s superior position was questioned. After the end of World War II, Spain would have to bear a difficult isolation in Europe because she had collaborated with Hitler and Mussolini. In Latin America, only the Argentine president, Juan Perón supported the Franco regime, while Mexico, which had experienced the Mexican Revolution in 1910–1920 and had maintained contacts with the Spanish Republican government, protected the exile government of Republicans inside their country. Therefore, Franco Spain needed to amplify its influence in Latin America in order to be recognized as “orthodox” in the international community.

A view from other leaders As a means of adding depth to our analysis of Franco, the views of a U.S. Army officer, Vernon A. Walters, are considered. Walters worked as an Army officer, deputy director of the CIA, and diplomat. He also served as a Spanish interpreter

Galicia’s influence 17 for U.S. presidents. His father was an immigrant from the United Kingdom, and he studied at a Jesuit school in England. In 1959, former U.S. Army general and Republican president at the time, Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953–1961), visited Spain. Although not in sync with many of Franco’s policies, Eisenhower was very impressed with his personality and “had considerable respect for Franco as individual,” free from scandal in his life. Eisenhower told Walters, who had accompanied him as an interpreter, that Franco was “nothing like the guy the press portrays.” He hardly imagined that Franco was “completely detached, non-agitated” as he had fought against his people for three years (Walters, 1970, 2001, p. 131). Knowing that Franco was from Galicia, where “the Celtic tradition and blood run strong,” Eisenhower commented that “he was a soft-spoken man of relatively few words and totally in control of himself at all times” and had an “almost Scottish dourness” (Walters, 2001, p. 134). Among the three generals, this was something they shared in common. Late in 1972, Walters visited Franco under orders from President Richard M. Nixon (1969–1974) to discuss the post-Franco era. At that time, Franco asked Walters to transmit a message: “insofar as the order and stability of Spain were concerned, these would be guaranteed by the timely measures he was taking” (Walters, 2001, p. 134). Here we want to note that in 1982, Walters, at that time ambassador to the UN under the Reagan administration, was dispatched to talk with Castro. Walters pointed out to Castro the fact that both had attended Jesuit schools (Geyer, 1993, pp. 370–372). In sum, “order and stability” are key words fundamental to understanding Franco. Ironically, these are precisely the reasons that that the U.S. wanted military bases in Spain, situated as a transit point to the Middle East. The issue dominated the Mediterranean during the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, in 1973, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Spain after his visit to the Middle East. When the Spanish prince Juan Carlos said to him, “We have stability in this country,” Kissinger, after having visited “a very disturbed part of the world,” said, “I am glad to visit a country of stability” (Department of State, 1973). Another military officer, Navy Captain Paul Ryan, explained the word “caudillo” in his book. In Latin America, the “officer class has considered itself the ultimate guardian of the nation’s soul and identity” (1977, p. 64). He argued that Castro was a caudillo, which is embodied in El Cid, a Castilian military leader in the 11th century. A caudillo is a Spanish national hero, with “its machismo and personalismo and authoritarianism in politics.” Others in this class include Simon Bolívar and Omar Torrijos of Panama (1977, pp. 64–65). Franco also used the title “caudillo” from 1936 (Moradiellos, 2016).

Franco and the Cold War After the triumph of the Spanish Civil War and during World War II when the decline of Nazis Germany was becoming evident, the Franco regime gradually

18  Galicia’s influence tried to use its Catholic faction to dilute its fascistic hue. The Catholic monarchs2 established the union of Spain in the 15th century by deporting “pagans” in the name of Catholicism. Posterior kings of the Hapsburg dynasty, who established the Golden Age of Spain, also viewed the mission to Latin America as a sacred cause. Franco also tried to unite the country, divided during the Spanish Civil War, through Catholicism. In Latin America, he tried to utilize the notion of Hispanidad to form “a single spiritual, cultural and even racial community” (Coltman, 2003, pp. 10–11), as previously noted. As Madariaga pointed out, they tried to unite the people through religion. As already discussed, the Second Republic was anticlerical, having renounced Catholicism as the state religion in 1851 and replacing it with a secular constitution. For the most part, the Church supported Franco, and the regime restored the Church’s privileges as a legal religion (National Catholicism). In 1945, the Franco regime appointed Alberto Martín Artajo as minister of foreign affairs (1945–1957). He and his successor, Fernando María Castiella (1957–1969), were members of Acción Católica de Propagandistas (ACdP). After World War II, the Franco regime – dictatorial, pro-Axis, and non­ democratic – remained isolated from the international community. The American Democratic president, successor of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman (1945– 1953) was a Baptist and a freemason whom Franco disliked. In light of such international alienation, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to exclude Spain from UN organizations and conferences in 1946. As a result, Spain could not receive assistance rendered to other countries via the Marshall Plan. At that time, Franco Spain tried to unite herself by encouraging nationalism as a means of establishing autarky in order to use her own natural resources to revive the economy, which had been damaged during the war years. In military education, they stressed “spiritual and moral values” rather than “material means” (Olivas Osuna, 2014, pp. 134–138). It was said that Franco gained victory not because of material advantages but because of moral discipline. In Latin America, Franco Spain tried to compete against the U.S., whose military strength and economic power were superior, using “spirituality” to revive its influence there (Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 1992, p. 225). In 1954, Franco told the mass media in Havana that Spain felt that Latin American countries seem to be “equal” brothers rather than children in relation to Spain. Rather, Spain and Latin American countries shared the same habits and the same ways of thinking, as if they were in the same family. They should resolve problems together when they occur, as members of the same community sharing a common destiny. It is true that the Spanish Empire had conquered and exploited Latin America and governed the Philippines, parts of the southwestern and central U.S., Mexico, Central America, and Cuba, among other places, as the Viceroyalty of New Spain, mixing Spaniards and Amerindians, not as in North America, where Europeans did not mix with blacks or Native Americans. Moreover, according to Alvero Céspedes, to those whose ancestors were from Galicia, such as José Martí, the war for independence from Spain “did not mean hatred towards Spain, but

Galicia’s influence 19 love of freedom to end slavery and respect for the right of the Cuban people when deciding their destiny” (Alvero Céspedes, 2013, p. 25). Franco used the metaphor of a banker for the U.S. relationship to Latin America: The U.S. would be a generous banker who can or should assist Latin American countries. A banker would lend money. However, Spain had a different notion, a “spirit of family” toward Latin America. Historian and diplomat, José Luis Salcedo-Bastardo also pointed out that Simón Bolívar called out to all countries of the new continent, including the people of the U.S., to be hermanos (brothers), based on the Christian and humanistic notion of brotherhood (2008, pp. 217, 221). Spain would assist them in maintaining common values of family and civilization. That is, if people are members of the family, Spain would not abandon them when a crisis occurs. In addition, Franco said to Spanish businessmen, engineers, and distinguished people who had to go to Latin America that we have to bring our solution to the people of the “brother” countries so that they would not think that the ties with Spain were merely spiritual in nature (Franco, 1954). Meanwhile, in 1953, the U.S. signed treaties with Spain, and there was also a concordat between the Franco regime and the Vatican. Franco also used the state religion, Catholicism, to try to unite a divided Spain and establish hegemony in Latin America. The intensification of the Cold War favored Spain: The U.S. needed bases in Spain for transit routes to the Middle East and for watching the Mediterranean. George Kennan, a famous diplomat who provided a framework of the containment policy toward the Soviet Union, suggested a change in U.S. policy toward Franco’s dictatorship in Spain (FRUS, 1972). The U.S. signed the Pact of Madrid, consisting of three executive agreements (a Defense Agreement, an Economic Aid Agreement, and a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement) to gain the rights to build air and naval bases in Spain. As a result, the U.S. constructed infrastructure, such as roads and rail lines. This would help Spain modernize its military forces and its economy, even as some member states opposed the inclusion of Spain in NATO because of its cooperation with the Nazis. However, some Spanish diplomats and members of the military opposed the Spanish-American agreements because they did not guarantee defense against the Maghreb countries, which were considered real threats to Spain because of their threats to the U.S. from the East. Moreover, these were “executive agreements,” not actual treaties, which would have required democratic approval in the Capitol. The U.S. government appealed to the elites of the regime, which had already expressed anticommunism but valued democracy more than the ideology of anticommunism. For the Spanish masses, the U.S. brought motion pictures about “an ideal American way of life” or the life of workers in order to gain sympathy for the U.S. and improve public opinion. For the U.S., the most important thing was keeping the rights to military bases in Spain. The masses grew interested in American music and movies; however, these were sometimes

20  Galicia’s influence considered immoral from the point of view of the Catholic Church. The message of the U.S. government – the defense of free people and open societies – seemed contradictory to the masses under the Franco regime. In addition, under the regime, censorship limited not only anti-Francoist discourse but also expression that was deemed “too modern,” as well as expressions of regionalism such as that of the Catalonians (Niño, 2012, p. 187; Delgado Gómez-Escalonilla, 2012, p. 248).

Key words Comparing the early years of each leader, we can observe some key words that help define them. Apart from Galicia and Christianity as the base of education, other important key words such as “honor” were important to Spaniards and to Spanish descendants in Cuba. Bartolomé Bennassar, French historian of modern Spanish history, argued that in the Seven-Part Code, the Castilian statutory code of the 13th century, honor (or dishonor) was defined as the motives of personal actions and their socialized value. In addition, Jorge Manrique, a poet and soldier in the 15th century, suggested that people lived three lives: “the terrestrial, shortlived life which ends in death, that of fame which lasts longer than that of glory, and the eternal life” (Bennassar, 2003, p. 253). That is, in Spain, the dishonor of the Spanish-American War would persist almost eternally. Madariaga, cited earlier, also argued about the honor of Spaniards. According to him, a characteristic system of idea-feeling-power and the norm of morality, the key to emotions and the driver of pure acts for Spaniards, was “honor,” while that of the British was fair play, and that of the French was le droit (law) (Madariaga, 1951, pp. 23–30).3 What is more, in the Mediterranean, independent of their status, the masses have a “combative and violent” notion of honor, while in the feudal period in Japan, only samurai had such a notion of honor (Ikegami, 1995; Shiba, 2010). In addition, the concept of honor is very important in the military. This was stressed in a diplomatic cable in the late 1970s, when the U.S. wanted Spain to join NATO. Spain noted that in the negotiations, the U.S. should stress “national pride, equipment, and the Mediterranean.” Meanwhile, the Spanish foreign minister at that time, José María de Areilza, insisted to Secretary of State Kissinger that frustrated military elites in the Sahara needed something to help them “forget about Africa, and think about Europe” (Hosoda, 2012, p. 166). According to Madariaga, “the strength of a superior passion can unite the Spaniards,” whose collectives are usually quite anarchic. This could only be achieved by the army, having honor as a fundamental passion, and by the Church, with its fundamental religious passion (Madariaga, 1951, pp. 164–165). In addition, Frei Betto stressed that almost all Spaniards have a notion of honor but that the Jesuits have it to a higher degree (Betto, 1985, p. 155). The Jesuits must have held the greatest potential to unite the Spaniards, having characteristics of both the military and the Church. Another key word is “patriotism.” They say Castro was a Martíst. José Martí (1853–1895) was a Cuban poet, journalist, and hero of the Cuban Wars of

Galicia’s influence 21 Independence. While some Cubans would have preferred to be annexed by the U.S., Martí persistently insisted on independence. During his stay in New York, he perceived American contradictions: the disparity of wealth, discrimination, and the oppression of workers there. The philosophy of Martí was centered on education, morality, and freedom as duties and honors of human beings (Goto, 2002, p. 49). Former Japanese Ambassador to Cuba Saburo Tanaka (1996–2000) heard that Castro himself had said that he was a José Martíst, at the same time saying that he had to live in accordance with the teachings and logic of the crucified Christ. The ambassador called Castro a moralist and José Martíst (2011, pp. 60, 72). Not only this Japanese ambassador but also an ambassador to Cuba of the Francoist regime, Juan Pablo de Lojendio, felt as much, as will be discussed. Simón Bolívar, José Martí, and Fidel Castro all have ancestors from Spain. Gabriel García Marquéz, Colombian writer and winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature, said of Castro: Spain, the land of his ancestors, is an obsession with him. His vision of Latin America in the future is the same as that of Bolívar and Martí: an integral and autonomous community capable of influencing the destiny of the world. (Castro, 2005, p. 21) Castro showed his strong respect for Martí when he said: “I had traditional ideas concerning the War of Independence and José Martí’s writings; I strongly supported Martí and his thinking” (Castro, 2005, p. 103). What is more, this seems to be something shared with the Franco regime, which stressed the spiritual motto “Hispanidad” against American materialism in its ties with Latin America. Journalist Tad Szulc interviewed Castro. He testified that Martí was always Castro’s role model (Szulc, 1987, p. 99). Martí, hero in the Cuban War of Independence, whose parents were immigrants from Spain, said that he did not hate Spain; he fought for Cuban independence and liberation but did not resent Spaniards. That is, he hated the Spanish system, not Spaniards because people are victims of the system (Betto, 1985, p. 283). According to Latell, Martí became Castro’s “mentor”: Castro collected all the works of Martí and memorized his favorite articles and speeches and “actually impersonated Marti” (2005, p. 90). Castro was so devoted to Martí that others perceived it clearly. The 100th anniversary of Martí’s birth was observed in 1953, and the embankment from Mexico in 1956 was accomplished using the tactics Martí developed. It was a devastating blow, as Batista’s troops predicted that they might embark at the same place Martí did (Goto, 1996, p. 10). Later in 1979, when Castro visited the UN, an American journalist asked whether he always wore a protective vest. Showing his chest, he denied it, stating that he wore a vest of moral protection (Sánchez, 2010). During the research for this book, in interviews and in primary documents, the word “moral” was observed frequently. For example, Castro evaluated Kennedy very highly for his moral courage to take responsibility for his failures. Considering this, it is

22  Galicia’s influence reasonable to conclude that, for Castro, an unswerving core was a kind of moral issue rather than a religion one. On the other hand, it is difficult to define Castro and Franco as fascists. After Belen, Castro began his studies at Havana University. Friends there testified that he showed an interest in the writings of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange Española de las JONS (Fascist and National Syndicalist Political Party). However, Szulc, correspondent to The New York Times and author of biographies of Castro and Pope John Paul II, argued that this did not mean that Castro had fascist tendencies, because in the Mediterranean countries, “the extremes of right and left are closer than in other parts, since both have characteristics of social populism” (1987, p. 141). Meanwhile, the Franco regime consisted of, apart from the Falangists, a Catholic faction, a military, monarchists, and later, technocrats from a faction of Opus Dei. The regime did not mobilize the masses, and not all members of the regime were Falangists. Franco himself was neither fascist nor populist. Juan J. Linz, a Spanish political scientist teaching at Yale and Columbia Universities, called this regime “authoritarian,” distinguishing it from that of Hitler or of Mussolini. However, the word “fascist” sometimes was used in Cuba and by Castro as invective against the Spanish democratic presidents (Efe, 2012). During the Spanish Civil War, Franco was antiliberalist and somewhat antiAmericanist. It is true that the Franco regime did not seem to have strong antiAmerican sentiments at first glance. This is because they had permitted American troops to be stationed there and seemed to welcome their “economic cooperation” through the agreements when Spain was isolated in Europe and was adopting autarky, which made it poorer than before the Spanish Civil War. Here comparative politics would again prove useful: Japan also experienced this contradictory position or sentiment toward the U.S. At one point or another, Japan, Spain, and Cuba (at Guantanamo) all had American troops and bases within their territory. This created an ambivalence that Americans found difficult to understand. For the U.S., Cuba, Spain, and Japan were at various times during the Cold War geopolitically important: Cuba because it is situated at the center of traffic in the Caribbean, Japan because it is on the sea route to China, North Korea, and the Soviet Union, and Spain because it was important for dominating Gibraltar, where Soviet ships passed. Gibraltar was also logistically important for American flights to the Middle East. These three countries had anti-American sentiments caused by the existence of bases within their territory. Even after the “messianic” agreements with the U.S. in 1953, anti-­Americanists strengthened and persisted in the regime, citing honor as a motivating factor for anti-American sentiments. At the same time, Castro well understood that the Americans had imposed capitalism on Cuba as if it were a “religion”, which demanded respect and gratitude to the U.S., as we will see in Chapter 3. Both Franco and Castro understood the dual, contradictory nature of American democracy. Thus, the key words that must be understood when discussing the commonalities between Castro and Franco are: Galicia, soldier, and Catholicism, as well as

Galicia’s influence 23 order, honor, morality, and patriotism. Focusing on these key terms, this book presents an analysis of events following the Spanish Civil War and the Cuban Revolution in the chapters to come.

Notes 1 The interviewer, Ramonet, is also from Galicia. 2 On the Iberian Peninsula, from the invasion of Islam in 711 until 1492 when the Catholic king and queen (Pope Alexander VI bestowed crowns on Queen Isabella I of Castile and King Ferdinand II of Aragon) deported Muslims and Jews, there were centuries of battles. 3  He studied in France, was ambassador to France, and lived in the United Kingdom while in exile, teaching at Oxford University; he tried to compare these three objectively.

3 Consequences of the Spanish Civil War Revolutionary Cuba and Castro

In this chapter, I analyze the influence of emotions on the Franco regime, Castro’s Cuba, and the U.S. that came about as a result of the Spanish Civil War. Emotional reactions to events sometimes affect the decision-making process of foreign policy officials, causing them to take actions that one might not expect in light of Cold War realities. In fact, emotions in diplomacy make clear the impossibility of the simple East–West dichotomy. In addition, I demonstrate how public opinion, propaganda, mass media, and literature, both inside and outside a country, intentionally or not, influence people’s impressions and attitudes. Concretely, I trace some apparent contradictions within and among the relevant regimes, such as the facts that anticommunist Francoist Spain supported the leftist Castro regime and that the U.S. supported the Castro regime in the beginning, while the Cuban communist did not but rather supported the Batista regime. I also examine the compatibility of Christianity and Marxism in Castro’s Cuba, which seem to be irreconcilable at first glance. We cannot overestimate the influence of the Spanish Civil War on Cuba or on the U.S. for that matter. If we consider the influence of propaganda, we can better understand these “contradictions.”

From the Spanish Civil War to the Cuban Revolution The Spanish Civil War and Cuba The Spanish Civil War was provoked in 1936 by soldiers, including Franco in Morocco, against the Second Spanish Republic. Many international brigades were sent from the U.S., including the Lincoln battalion, to fight against Franco and his rebels. American communist volunteers were sent there and had contact with the Soviet communists. As George Orwell, English novelist and journalist, described in “Homage to Catalonia,” the Second Spanish Republic was formed by various factions including communists, socialists, and anarchists. It is not difficult to see why the Republic was rife with internal conflicts. At that time in Cuba, there were not only the Falangists who supported Franco but also the Republicans. Fidel’s father, Ángel was opposed to the Republic, and in Birán, where the Castro family lived, the majority opposed the Republic, according to Castro’s recollections (Ramonet, 2006, p. 54).

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 25 The Cuban press broadcasted in great detail the progress of the war. Fidel was around ten years old at the time, two years older than Che Guevara, when he heard and remembered these broadcasts. As neighbors “fought” playing with dominos, Castro saw an analogy: the Spanish Civil War was the prelude to World War II, in which Republican ideas and so-called Western “democratic” ideas would clash (Ramonet, 2006, p. 54). In Cuba, many young people went to Spain to fight in the Spanish Civil War, both on the Franco side near the axis and on the Republican side to fight against Franco. The majority of the former was composed of Spanish immigrants and their descendants. They sent a lot of money and materials, such as tobacco, rum, shoes, and other goods in luxury cases dedicated to Franco. On the latter side, the majority were Cubans, including students and workers. For them, the amount of money and material they could send was more limited. About 1,000 people participated on the Republican side, and the Cuban communists were in charge of the recruitment of international brigades (Domingo Cuadriello,1 2009, pp. 14–15, 17; Gleijeses, 2002, p. 376; Naranjo Orovio, 1988, p. 74). In 1938, the Republicans asked for humanitarian help to aid the Batista government (Letter to Batista, 23/8/1938). On the other side, a number of Spanish priests immigrated to Cuba and told of the executions and the brutality of the Republicans at the end of the War in 1939. With the victory of the insurgent troops, groups of people who had supported the Republican side were exiled to Cuba, including intellectuals, artists, politicians, freemasons, and civilians. The brother of the famous philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, was exiled to Cuba and took part in freemason activities. However, employment in Cuba was limited. Therefore, from 1939, Cuba started to limit the number of exiles and immigrants, especially intellectuals. As a result, some Spanish intellectuals, after staying for a time in Cuba, immigrated to Mexico and then to the U.S. (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 36–37, 43, 46–47). However, it should be especially noted that many famous poets and novelists stayed in Cuba (if only briefly) and influenced Cuban art and education. What is more, the Spanish exiles worked in the press, improving its quality. Ironically, some press approved of Franco’s cause (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 33, 179). In sum, from the Spanish Civil War to World War II, not a few Spaniards came and went between Spain and Cuba and contributed to Cuba in various ways – not only culturally but also politically.

From the Spanish Civil War experience to the education of guerillas Among those who were born in Cuba and who participated in the Spanish Civil War and returned, General Alberto Bayo (1892–1967) was a particularly influential person: He taught guerrilla tactics to Castro and Che Guevara. He was born in colonial Cuba (his father was from Spain) and was a sort of poet, publishing various anthologies in the 1910s. He studied at the Infantry Academy of Toledo, where Franco had graduated (Chapter 2). After that, he

26  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War entered the Military Aviation School and fought in Morocco. Placed in the Spanish Legion, he learned the tactics of guerrilla warfare; however, he was gravely wounded. When he came back from Morocco, he established a company of acrobatic flyers in Madrid (Bayo, 1970, pp. 315–317; Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 140, 374–375). Franco and Bayo were born in the same year. Franco was promoted rapidly in the Army, and Bayo also received various state decorations for his outstanding service. Afterward, Bayo became a Freemason, joined the Republican side, and confronted Franco’s troops during the Spanish Civil War. Specifically, he fought on the Balearic Islands against the Italian and Franco troops and brought up the foreign armaments. In 1939, at the age of 47, after the war, Bayo returned to Cuba and tried to promote techniques of aviation and worked at a private school as a teacher of mathematics and language. However, in 1941, he immigrated to Mexico with his son (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 264–265, 374–375). There, he owned a furniture fabric store and worked as an instructor at the Air Force Academy. He also trained young Spanish communists as guerrillas because it seemed to him that “communists used to be more determined and courageous than others.” However, he also trained anticommunist Nicaraguan youth, who were fighting against the dictatorship of Somoza and Dominican revolutionaries (Thomas, 1982, p. 78).

Dictator Batista and the 26th of July Movement In Cuba in 1933, Fulgencio Batista overthrew the government of Gerardo Machado, and Ramón Grau San Martín became president. After that, a dictatorship, manipulated by Batista, continued until the Revolution. The U.S. needed a pro-American regime to ensure the safety of American companies doing business in Cuba. American support was contingent on protection of American interests, which Batista provided. Thus, despite the stated American desire to spread democracy, the U.S. helped Batista consolidate power and supported his dictatorship. In the 1930s, two extreme armed groups existed in Cuba. One was the Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR). The founder, Rolando Masferrer, was a communist and veteran who had fought on the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War. He participated in the American international brigade, known as the Lincoln Brigade. He was a pro-Batista congressman and after the Revolution was exiled to the U.S. He met President Kennedy, but he was so progressive that the president did not like him. He was assassinated in Miami in 1975. The other extreme group was the Insurrectional Revolutionary Union (UIR). Its founder was Emilio Tró, an anarchist and veteran who fought in the Spanish Civil War. With Cuba in disarray, Batista gradually gained power. President Federico Laredo Brú (1936–1940), a puppet of Batista, legalized the Communist Party (Popular Socialist Party; PSP) in 1938. In 1940, Batista himself took the position

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 27 of president. When fascism expanded throughout the world during World War II, he suddenly claimed that he himself was antifascist, and the Communist Party joined the broad front of Batista supporters at its creation (Castro, 2005, p. 91). Thus, from that time, the Communist Party supported Batista. After World War II, the Cold War began to take hold throughout the world. Defeated in the general election in 1944, Batista went to Florida temporarily, where he had contact with Mafia figures who owned casinos in Havana. Surprisingly, he ran for a seat in the Cuban Senate while living in Miami and won in 1948. Batista came back to Cuba in 1950 and tried to run for president. The Cuban situation was unsettled; the strongest candidate for the election of 1952 committed suicide. In 1952, Batista, supported by the Mafia, executed a coup and became president. He then voided the results of parliamentary elections from the year before. At this time, the infusion of American capital to Cuba accelerated. According to the RAND Corporation, an American think tank, in 1956, about 90% of telephone and electric services, 50% of public railways, and 40% of raw sugar production were controlled by American investors (Johnson, 1964). In 1957, Batista was gifted a gold telephone by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) (Taber, 1961, pp. 311–312; Bonsal, 1971, p. 47). Meanwhile, the majority of Cubans remained poor, and gambling, drugs, and prostitution spread rapidly.

Anti-imperialism and morality While reading State and Revolution by Vladimir Lenin, Castro’s awakening began “as an epiphany.” However, he “was not yet a dedicated Marxist” (Latell, 2005, p. 111). At that time, he was a fighter for the cause of Latin America against imperialism. According to his book, Castro already bore “leftist ideas – above all, democratic, patriotic, anti-imperialist, populist ideas.” Therefore, he was “a supporter of Puerto Rican independence, Dominican democracy and the other key Latin American causes.” However, he did not join the Communist Party or the Communist Youth at that time because he was rather “influenced by populist ideas, the ideas of the French Revolution,” especially “by the people’s struggles, tactics and especially the military aspects.” He felt solidarity with the people. For him, the Communist Party at that time was too isolated to carry out his plan for revolution (Castro, 2005, pp. 142, 144). In 1948, Castro participated in the Bogotazo mass riot in Colombia. He went there due to his “sense of honor, idealism, a moral principle,” “knowing it was suicidal and that they were making military mistakes.” He already had “some very clear, precise ideas about what should happen and should not happen in a revolution,” and he started to worry (Castro, 2005, pp. 127, 144). What he saw at Bogotá was an example of what should not happen – anarchy, riots, lynching, and so on. He learned at Bogotazo that people were not organized or educated about politics, and the revolutionary spirit suppressed the political conscience; there was no leadership. This experience would affect events in Cuba years later.

28  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War Bogotazo taught Castro the necessity of political education and leadership to avoid anarchical situations, disorder, and lynching. During the Cuban Revolution, they put up a clear slogan to generate more empathy for the cause of the people (Castro, 2005, pp. 145–146). Castro found that human suffering is caused by social inequality, where one is made to feel valueless, considered to be a nobody or a nothing, always looked down upon and humiliated. Castro felt that in Cuba, the masses were fed up with this status. In addition, he pointed out that in Cuba, before the Revolution, there was a kind of religion, “the religion of respect and gratitude to the United States.” The U.S. was widely seen as a friend who helped Cuba when it became independent form Spain and continued to help Cuba. According to Castro, the Cubans were brainwashed by this “religion” and thus did not fully understand the exploitation of Cuba by American capitalism (Betto, 1985, pp. 165–166).

Catholicism and Castro Furious with what he saw as a corrupt Batista regime, Castro formed a group (later known as the 26th of July Movement) at age 26 and attacked the Moncada Barracks in 1953. The goal was to overthrow the regime. At that time, the communists did not support them and criticized the group (Szulc, 1987, pp. 325–326). The attack by young, passionate guerillas was amateurish, and it ended with the sacrifice of half of the group in only 30 minutes. However, as we will see later, Castro benefited from some good luck. As some of Castro’s men were being marched away after being captured in Moncada, Catholic priests intervened on their behalf. Archbishop Pérez Serantes (see Chapter 2), born in Galicia and a friend of Castro’s father, insisted on sparing the captives’ lives. Archbishop of Havana, Manuel Arteaga also contacted Castro’s family. The Catholic Church is opposed to capital punishment and very sensitive about executions. Later in the 1970s, when the Franco regime under National Catholicism carried out capital punishment, the Vatican was strongly opposed. After the conquest, it was Spain that propagated Catholicism in Latin America, including Cuba, from the very beginning. The Franciscan and Dominican Orders were dominant and rather fundamentalist in nature. The Jesuits, founded in the period of Counter-Reformation, had a different approach than the others, aiming for the fusion of Catholic and local religions. In Cuba, the Jesuits took the most sympathetic stance toward the guerrillas. Before the revolution, to avoid being identified as supporters of the Batista government, they practiced religious activities with the guerillas in the mountains. After the Revolution, the Spanish ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Sánchez Bella, even claimed that Castro asked three Jesuits “to present some spiritual assistance.” Repulsed by the Batista government, they tried to “catholicize the revolution” (EERD, 22/1/1959). However, according to the ambassador dispatched from the Franco regime, it was the Franciscan order that was most radicalized “improperly” in Cuba.

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 29 Most of them were Basque separatists, who were anti-Francoist. The Basque religious people were exiled to Cuba after resisting the Franco regime, which had oppressed people in Catalonia and Basque and had practiced capital punishment and torture. On the other hand, the Catholics in Cuba were more compromising, receiving Francoist as well as anti-Francoist religious groups (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 276–277; EERD, 22/1/1959). Therefore, from the point of view of the poorest Cubans, Catholicism was quite “superficial.” Catholics ran private schools and gained status in Cuba’s upper class. It was considered a religion for the rich.

You can’t kill ideas Castro’s philosophy and ideals, which were endorsed by the Catholic Church, appealed not only to ambassadors like Lojendio and Tanaka (Chapter 2) but also to his enemies. In 1953, when Castro failed in his attack on the Moncada Barracks, Lieutenant Pedro Manuel Sarría restrained ferocious solders who wanted to shoot him. Castro and his comrades were captured but were saved by Catholic priests. Sarría had seen Castro before at Havana University (Coltman, 2003, p. 85). At that time, Sarría repeated three times, “You can’t kill ideas.” Moved by this, Castro confessed his name secretly to Sarría, who admonished him not to disclose his name to anyone because if his captors knew who we was, he would be killed. In addition, Sarría said to him, “You’re very brave, boys; you’re very brave” (Betto, 1985, pp. 184–188). Thinking that everything would be over soon, Oscar Alcalde, a colleague of Castro’s who was captured with him, identified himself as a freemason and disclosed the hidden location of other weapons (Betto, 1985, p. 163; Szulc, 1987, p. 310). Later in an interview, Sarría said that he saved Castro not out of sympathy for Castro’s cause but because he was also a human being, and Sarría, who loved his career, thought that no crime should occur under his watch (Szulc, 1987, p. 310). Sarría’s phrase, uttered with a strong sense of justice, “Ideas cannot be killed,” was seared into Castro’s mind. After that, Sarría was confined to his home by the Batista government for not killing Castro and his comrades. After the Revolution, Castro promoted him to captain and nominated him to be the leader of the security squad of the first president. Before Castro could ask him the origin of his phrase, Sarría died of cancer (Betto, 1985, p. 165). After almost half of century, its influence could still be seen in the ceremony marking the 30th anniversary of Che Guevara’s death and the exhumation of his remains in 1997. Castro said in his speech that “a fighter may die, but not his ideas” (Castro, 1997). After his capture in 1953, Castro was given over to Alberto del Río Chaviano by Sarría. Castro was fascinated by this colonel of the Batista regime. Colonel Chaviano was rather curious about him as well and wanted to hear what Castro had to say. He permitted Castro to hand a written text to the press,

30  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War and journalists were permitted to ask questions when a press conference was held. Chaviano even suggested that Castro should speak on radio (Szulc, 1987, p. 313). The colonel himself had visited Archbishop Pérez Serantes often. Pérez Serantes maintained contacts with the Batista regime and its opponents on behalf of the archbishop. This was an important method for preserving the rights of the Church. He said ironically, as if to dismiss it, “because the Galicians are like that” (Uría, 2011, p. 145). With the intercession of Pérez Serantes, Castro eluded capital punishment, but he was nevertheless imprisoned. Books were sent to Castro in prison. Having graduated from the department of law, he tried to defend himself in court, armed with a background in legal theory and thought. Finally he cited historical events in which the people rose in revolt with arms against a tyrannical system. He defended the legitimacy of the Moncada attack as the right of insurgency and ended his defense with the famous phrase “history will absolve me.” This is the quintessential Castro style: “fantasizing about heroic roles, he could play so that like his boyhood heroes – Napoleon, Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar – his name would also be emblazoned in the history books” (Latell, 2005, p. 38). In 1954, Castro sent a letter from prison in which he stated that he did not have personal ambitions, and all his motives are “moral ones – a sense of honor, dignity and duty” (Castro, 2005, pp. 176–177). The Catholic Church and his enemies might have perceived something Catholic in Castro. Of course, under his regime, there was a kind of purge, and few were satisfied with his policies. There were some who became victims in various ways, including his own family. However, at least such a “pure” mind offered a ray of hope for those who could not be saved by the Church.

Guerrilla education for Guevara and Castro In 1954, Batista planned to build a canal through the island to reduce the distance between the U.S. and the Panama Canal for the benefit of American investors. He, of course, received strong opposition from the Cuban people (Valdés Sánchez, 2009). Batista resigned as president and replaced himself with Antonio Domingo y Morales del Castillo as the candidate. He then made certain that Castillo would win the election. In fact, the rival candidate withdraw his candidacy, so the election became a vote of confidence. The following February, the U.S. Vice President Richard Nixon visited Batista, which gave him an American “credential” to guarantee the result (Uría, 2011, p. 173). Meanwhile, as the Cold War deepened, the U.S. overthrew the progressive Jacob Álbenz in Guatelama by means of a covert operation. At the same time, the Cuban people asked for pardons for political prisoners. Castro was pardoned, released, and then exiled to Mexico following the election. There Castro met Bayo. He asked Castro, who had not yet been able to gather comrades, to instruct guerillas. He also asked Castro how to raise funds and recruit comrades, thinking that it was a mere dream of a young man.

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 31 Bayo had overheard a group of Social Democrats and Republican leaders talking about their memories in a cafeteria as they sadly celebrated the anniversary of the Republic. Many said that they wanted to overthrow Franco, Batista, and Juan Perón, president of Argentina, among others. However, these words disappeared in the air like cigarette smoke (Geyer, 1993, pp. 142–143). He did not expect them to take action. Castro, however, was different. He raised funds and collected comrades, which moved Bayo. In the beginning, Bayo intended to conduct guerrilla education for three hours per day in his spare time between his family and business duties. However Castro persuaded Bayo to instruct him and Che Guevara all day long (Szulc, 1987, pp. 367–368). Che Guevara was one of the many people inspired by the Spanish Civil War. His uncle, Cayetano Córdova Iturburu, was a correspondent of the newspaper, Crítica de Buenos Aires. In addition, he was a member of the Argentine Communist Party. The place where he lived in Argentina, Alta Gracia, was home to a number of leftist sympathizers, or the Republican side, of the Spanish Civil War, as in Cuba. Che lived with the wife and children of this uncle until he was about ten years old. He received letters and information about pro Republicans from this uncle and the Spaniards (Alvarez, 2013, p. 40). Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was also moved by the Spanish Civil War. He had been with the communists (the Popular Socialist Party) since before the Revolution in 1959 and served in both the Batista and Castro regimes. He was the vice prime minister of foreign relations (1972–1976) and had significant influence on the decision-making process of Cuban foreign policy, especially in the 1970s. He was also a son of a Galician: His father was from Ribadeo in Galicia and was a “well to do merchant” in Cienfuegos. He received his primary education at a Jesuit school. He said that what he had learned there was decisive in his development. When young, affairs such as the Spanish Civil War gave his generation a “sense of internationalism,” and he felt in retrospect that “the defense of the Spanish Republic is for us what defense of Vietnam for the youth of the world is forty-five years later” (Rodríguez, 2013, pp. XVI, XXXVII). Bayo was strict in his training of “amateur” guerillas, one day taking away all the toothpaste, soap, and shaving cream, and another day saying that “very few of you will survive in Cuba, you are going to win, but from you there will remain few” (Geyer, 1993, p. 142). Castro admired Bayo, who was familiar with the world wars and historical conflicts (Thomas, 1982, p. 78). As an amateur guerilla, Castro thought that he could learn guerrilla war by reading Hemmingway’s novel, For Whom the Bell Tolls (Ramonet, 2006, p. 193; Szulc, 1987, p. 270). But he learned much more from Bayo, as Guevara later wrote in Guerrilla Warfare. The most excellent student of Bayo was Guevara. Bayo said to Castro that “the guerrilla is invincible when he can rely on the support of the local peasantry” (Szulc, 1987, p. 367). This phrase from the old veteran might resound with amateur guerillas. And as I argue later, guerilla tactics were not understood by the U.S.

32  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War

The Right-wing Spanish ambassador who praised Castro Diplomacy between Cuba and Spain After World War II, as noted earlier, the Franco regime was isolated internationally. In 1946, the U.N. condemned the Franco regime and recommended that all members of the U.N. recall immediately their ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary from Madrid. Mexico did not recognize the Franco regime and hosted the Republican government in exile there. Mexico did not have diplomatic relations with Spain until 1977, two years after the death of Franco, when general elections were held in Spain. As noted, in Cuba, many Republican exiles had been defeated by Francoist troops. Cuba and Franco Spain had a complicated international relationship. After the Spanish Civil War, the Franco regime dispatched a chargé d’affaires to Cuba, but many Falangist organizations in Latin America, including Cuba, were obliged to dissolve. Meanwhile, exiled Spanish communists and the PSP (the Communist Party in Cuba at that moment) kept close contacts (Naranjo, 1988, pp. 114, 187). Finally in 1952, under the Batista regime, Cuba and Spain exchanged ambassadors. The reason it took so long was the problem of recognition of the Spanish government, a result of the Spanish Civil War. Cuba was in a complicated situation. During the war, Republican Ambassador Félix Gordón Ordás administrated Cuba from Mexico. He was a former minister of the government, and later he became president of the Republican government in exile in Mexico (1951– 1960). He had attended conferences and made speeches in Havana in 1949 and 1952 and had a deep friendship with Cuban intellectuals (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, p. 544). His presence would become a barrier to the recognition of the Spanish government. Franco Spain sent Juan Pablo de Lojendio, who had a long history in South America. He was from Basque country, the same as Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Society of Jesus, and Francisco Javier, an ancestor of Che Guevara. After the arrival of Lojendio, the economic and cultural ties between the countries started to strengthen. In Cuban cinema, radio, and TV programs, Spanish works were presented, and Spanish artists became familiar to the people. Ambassador Lojendio took deep root in Cuban society (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 101, 109).

Embankment to Cuba by Castro and Guevara Instructed by Bayo, Castro, Guevara, and their comrades landed in Cuba in 1956 aboard a yacht named Granma. After being found by Batista’s regular army, only 16 survivors were able to gather at Sierra Maestra. However, this turned out to be where they started the revolutionary struggle. Castro applied psychological warfare, installing loudspeakers that emitted the national anthem, patriotic songs, and revolutionary exhortations to the Batista soldiers in order to undermine their morale (Szulc, 1987, p. 507). The American

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 33 ambassador at the time, Arthur Gardner (1953–1957), mentioned later the reasons why Batista’s troops could not deploy where the guerrillas were: The troops were not familiar with guerilla combat. In March 1958, the U.S. stopped shipping arms to Batista, thinking that his regime would no longer serve to stabilize Cuba. And once the export of armaments stopped, Batista’s troops lost the spirit and morale to fight. Ambassador Earl T. Smith (1957–1959), successor of Ambassador Gardner, testified in 1960: After the Matthews articles which followed an exclusive interview by the Times editorial writer in Castro’s mountain hideout and which likened him to Abraham Lincoln, he was able to get followers and funds in Cuba and in the United States. From that time on arms, money, and soldiers of fortune abounded. Much of the American press began to picture Castro as a political Robin Hood. Also because Batista was the dictator who unlawfully seized power, American people assumed Castro must, on the other hand, represent liberty and democracy. (Senate, 1960) DePalma also insisted that sympathetic articles about Castro had led Washington to suspend arm sales to Batista (2006, p. 146). The American ambassador to Cuba credited Matthews’s articles for Castro’s victory. At the very least, the Department felt sympathy toward Castro. Spanish Ambassador Sánchez Bella, watching Castro’s discourse and activities, reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possibly having in his mind the destructive activities of the National Confederation of Labor (CNT) or of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) before the Spanish Civil War, that Castro’s activities seemed to reflect not a classic communist movement but rather an appeal for revolution for its own sake, an anarchistic destruction of norms and institutions without regard for their successors: exposed with such panache and decision, with such courage, such value and personal detachment, that they marvel with admiration and conquer many people, especially young idealists of deficient formation. (EERD, 25/2/1958) Ambassador Sánchez Bella had good information, and his report to the ministry was accurate, perhaps because of his career as the director of the Institute of Hispanic Culture, where he came to understand Spanish publicity in Latin America. After serving in the Dominican Republic, he was appointed ambassador to Colombia and Italy and, in 1969, minister of information and tourism (–1973). American diplomats had neither the ability to get this type of information nor the instinct to comprehend communist thinking and action on the level that Sánchez Bella could.

34  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War

Castro’s rebels supported by the Franco regime Finally, Batista fled Cuba on the 1st of January 1959, and the rebels took power. Venezuela was the first to recognize the revolutionary government on the 4th of January. Surprisingly, the U.S. also recognized it on the 7th, before Castro had even arrived in Havana. According to American Ambassador Earl T. Smith, the Department of State urged recognition “as soon as possible” (Smith, 1962, p. 193). In contrast, the Spanish government was more tepid in its response, maintaining a stance informed by the Estrada Doctrine, which called for nonintervention in internal affairs. The Spanish government would not rush to recognize the rebel government ahead of the normal processes of establishment. The real reason Spain did not recognize the rebel government immediately, as Venezuela or the U.S. did, is that the Spanish Republican government in exile in Mexico was supported by the Batista regime and would be until the spring of 1960, when President Gordón Ordás planned to resign (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, pp. 312–313). On the 17th of January 1959, Gordón Ordás entered Cuba and had a meeting with the new president, Manuel Urrutia, and Castro. However, the Franco regime had recognized the rebel government on January 15, two days earlier. Gordón Ordás demanded that they break with the Franco regime and recognize the government in exile (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, pp. 318–320). There is another point of view, however. Before the Revolution, the Franco regime had supported the rebels as the group was being formed. It is true that some Republicans like Bayo were on Castro’s side, but there was a bigger stream of supporters. In fact, the Cuban consul in Madrid noted “the excellent treatment of Franco’s government by the exiles of the 26th of July Movement during the Batista repression” (Uría, 2011, pp. 269–270). Ambassador Lojendio of the Franco regime was, at first, favorable toward Castro. When the Spanish government was indecisive, he observed other countries’ attitudes and sent a long telegram saying that Spain should recognize the rebel government (Paz-Sánchez, 1997, p. 145). Lojendio’s telegrams were as long as Castro’s speeches. They may in fact be seen as speeches, full of adjectives and complex points that are uncommon in most telegrams or reports. Before Spanish recognition, on January 9th, Lojendio sent 17 pages of dispatch to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In them, he pointed out that the Batista regime was brutal, its army had low morale, and its administration was corrupt. At the same time, opposition to the Batista regime was “growing in vigor, audacity and high combative morale of the revolutionary movement.” As ambassador from a country imbued with National Catholicism, he could not abide Batista, who made Cuba corrupt with drugs, prostitution, and crime through his collaboration with the Mafia (EEH, 9/1/1959). Conversely, he said that Castro “speaks with almost a Spanish accent, undoubtedly has the speaking qualities of a politician,” although he admitted his voice was not mature. However, he praised Castro for his energy and goodness. Even if he appeared at times confused, he maintained a certain attractive idealism that garnered a certain sympathy (EEH,

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 35 9/1/1959). Apparently Lojendio was fascinated by Castro and felt more sympathy toward him than Batista. Lojendio continued to praise Castro’s speeches in a telegram on July 16, stating that Castro spoke “with a pleasant voice, a cultured expression, a persuasive tone of conversation with the auditors” and an “intelligent and audacious approach to the topics that he addresses” although he sometimes used improper expressions (EEH, 16/1/1959). It is true that Castro’s speeches were quite interesting even to the Americans. According to Brian Latell, who worked at the CIA and National Intelligence Council for more than 30 years, Castro pronounced the “r” in “Revolusión” and “revolusionario” with a long and strong trill, making it “a hypnotically mesmerizing performance device” (Latell, 2005, p. 64).

Republicans afterward Bayo entered Havana on the 17th of January, the same day as Gordón Ordás, so that his entry would not attract the attention of the Cuban mass media (PazSánchez, 1997, p. 151). In the 1960s, Bayo established a school for instruction of guerillas who would fight against Latin American dictators. He published My Contribution to the Cuban Revolution and made pamphlets. In these documents he wrote about the use of weapons and explosives, the manufacture and placement of bombs, and methods of sabotage. He served as an instructor for Cuban and foreign guerrillas on the American continent throughout the 1960’s. He wrote a booklet entitled, “One Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla,” which was “widely distributed among subversive and guerrilla groups in Latin America” (Bayo, 1970, p. 318; Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, p. 267). At the same time, he tried to spread the appreciation of chess, and in 1966, the 17th Chess Olympiad was held in Havana (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, p. 292). Guevara was also good at chess (Emocionante partida entre el Che y Bayo, no date.). In July of the year of the Revolution, Bayo tried to form a Spanish version of the “26th of July Movement.” He did not form a party but rather an anti-­ Francoist movement, the Union of Spanish Fighters. However, by the end of year, it was divided internally. When he failed to overthrow the Franco regime, he joined the Spanish Communist Party (Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 114– 115). In 1965, the Franco regime gained new information that 2,000 workers (half of them Spaniards), instructed by Bayo’s son, had gone to Cuba from Mexico (EEH, 11/11/1965). Another veteran of the Spanish Civil War was Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, born in 1909 in Madrid. He attended the same Academy in Toledo as Franco. He was a communist and freemason who fought against Franco as a high-ranking officer in the Battle of Teruel. He had a reputation as one of the toughest and most decisive battle leaders of the Republican government. After the Spanish Civil War, he was exiled to the Soviet Union. Dispatched to Cuba in 1960, he defended Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion as an adviser to Castro and later participated in the battles against rebels supported by the CIA in Escambray (1959–1965). He

36  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War also participated in the Vietnam War, defeated French troops there, and became friends with Ho Chi Minh (Paz-Sánchez, 2011, pp. 189–203; Domingo Cuadriello, 2009, pp. 267–268, 393). In addition, it is important to mention Eloy Gutierréz Menoyo, born in 1934 in Spain. He was at the center of the Revolution with the Castro brothers and Che Guevara. His family was pro-PSOE and pro-Republican. As a result, they had difficulty in life after the Spanish Civil War. After World War II, he was exiled to Cuba, where he studied at night at Belen, where Castro had studied. His brother Carlos died when they attacked Moncada. Moved by this, Eloy wanted to participate in the Revolution. However, he was exiled to the U.S. in 1961 and tried to overthrow the Castro regime, helping to organize Alpha 66, a paramilitary group based in Miami. In the end, he was captured and sent to prison. As noted in Chapter 7, his release would become a pending bilateral problem (Ramos, 2007, p. 263; Vicent, 2012).

Something in common Why Spain maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba Franco Spain finally recognized Castro Cuba on the 15th of January, more than a week after the U.S. As mentioned earlier, the Franco regime applied the Estrada Doctrine. However, knowing that there were Spanish exiles in the revolutionary government such as Bayo, who instructed Castro and Guevera on guerrilla warfare, officials in the Franco regime had reason to hesitate before recognizing the rebel government. At that time, Mexico broke off relations with the Franco regime and supported the Spanish Republican government in exile. For that reason, the Franco regime wanted to prevent the Cuban government from following Mexico’s lead in supporting the Republican government. Rather, the Franco regime had to recognize the rebel government actively to attract Cuba to its side. Before the exiles could interrupt diplomatic relations between the Franco regime and Cuba, the former recognized the latter (Uría, 2011, pp. 269–270). Franco, around 1960, said to Cuban Ambassador José Miró Cardona (the first prime minister, later exiled to the U.S., and eventually the provisional president of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion), “Tell Fidel to give hell to the Americans!” In addition, Franco said to a Spanish journalist who knew Castro as well that he was “very intelligent” and a “great strategist.” What is more, he stated that “everything he (Castro) did was that of a good military man” and affirmed the necessity of change in Cuba (Geyer, 1993, pp. 342–343). In response, Castro stated that “Franco was right because Franco knew the war and the guerrilla perfectly” and noted that Franco had refused to give the location of the guerrillas to the Batista government even though he was well aware of their location (Geyer, 1993, pp. 342–343). The guerrilla tactics that Castro learned from Bayo were excellent tactics for Franco as well. From this, we can deduce that if the two had met, they would have understood each other as excellent solders.

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 37 The Franco regime, like the Castro regime, established effective control over their territory and gained recognition from the international community. The Franco regime also signed an agreement with the U.S. that softened the attitude toward Spain in relation to the Cold War. Spain would regain its place in the international community by joining the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank at the end of the 1950s. These steps were needed in order to isolate the Republican government in exile. Here we must again consider why Franco Spain maintained diplomatic relations with Castro Cuba, despite American pressures not to do so. We have to remember that Franco Spain was isolated in the world, a situation that the U.S. helped maintain. Various documents and studies stressed the emotional, social, and political reasons for maintaining diplomatic relations arising from the facts that Cuba was the last colony of Spain and that many Spanish emigrants lived there. Therefore, there were problems related to compensation for immobility and the protection of Spaniards abroad. Apart from that, we can point out an economic reason, the necessity of having a trade partner. Spain did not have a market-colony or ex-colony that could serve as a supplier of cheap primary commodities, nor did it have a market for the export of Spanish industrial goods (Hosoda, 2010). We must also consider the moral reasons. In February 1965, Franco said that Spain had to continue diplomatic relations with Cuba to protect Spanish emigrants as a moral obligation (Franco Salgado-Araujo, 1976, pp. 434, 438), even if it meant making an “enemy” of the U.S. This key word “moral” is used numerous times in Spanish telegrams. It is perhaps the most essential term to understanding the ties between Castro and Franco.

Christianity and Marxism On the 8th of January 1959, when Castro reached Havana, he gave a victory speech in which he discussed topics such as, “Weapons for what? To fight against whom?” The speech was like a conversation with the masses, reminiscent of the call and response of rumba or son cubano music. White pigeons were released, and one of them perched on his shoulder, as if it had been staged. Chargé d’Affaires Eduard Groizard of the Spanish Embassy, pointed out Castro’s “tendency to histrionics and theatricality” (EEH, 15/7/1960). Thus in Cuba, some considered him to be a Christ-like figure. He himself identified with Christ, stating in a speech before Easter that Christ was crucified for saying and defending the truth against the hypocrisy of that time and that, in front of Christ, there was no difference between races, and rich and poor people are treated equally (Szulc, 1987, pp. 532–533). It is true that among the revolutionaries, there were obvious communists such as Castro’s brothers Raúl and Che Guevara. However, for them communism and Christianity were compatible. The Revolution was supported not only by Catholics but also by adherents of various other ideologies (Goto, 1996, p. 57).

38  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War At the time of the Revolution, Castro did not use communism as an ideology to appeal to people, but he considered himself to be “a great admirer of our (Cuban) history and of José Martí” before becoming a Marxist. He also said, “[T]here are no contradictions between the aims of religion and those of socialism,” going so far as to say that “Christ was a great revolutionary.” The biblical story of Christ multiplying fish and loaves of bread for the people would have been appealing to the communists; similarly, they wanted to multiply schools, teachers, hospitals, doctors, factories, cultivated fields, jobs, industrial and agricultural productivity, and research centers and scientific projects (Betto, 1985, pp. 34–35, 142). In short, for Castro, differences of religion did not matter, but he expected to share his aims with his comrades: “patriotism, revolutionary spirit, seriousness, integrity, willingness to struggle, and acceptance of the goals and risks of the struggle” (Betto, 1985, p. 154).

The U.S. supports Castro in the beginning Attitude of the American mass media Now we shift to a discussion of the reasons why relations among Spain, Cuba, and the U.S. cannot be explained simply in reference to the Cold War framework. A view from the U.S. may explain why it hastened to change its policy toward Batista. It can be said that one of the reasons the Cuban Revolution succeeded was the nonintervention policy of the U.S. when Castro tried to take power. At that time, the American media and liberal power elites were greatly favorable to the Revolution. First, we will present how the American mass media treated Cuba. Herbert Matthews’s articles about Castro had a great influence in the U.S. In fact, he was considered later to be “the man who invented Fidel” (DePalma, 2006). He was a journalist for The New York Times and supported Benito Mussolini when he invaded Ethiopia. However, afterward in the Spanish Civil War, he sympathized with the Republic government, which promoted antifascism and anti-dictatorship as its causes. In Spain, he stayed in the same hotel as the writer Ernest Hemmingway and became friends with him. However, the Republican side lost to the Francoist side. In short, he was always on the side of the losers. Maintaining his frustration, Matthews believed in the causes of the Civil War – democracy, freedom of expression, and passion to overthrow dictators (DePalma, 2006, pp. 56, 63, 145). At first, Matthews praised Batista because he believed that Batista had brought economic growth to Cuba. However, beginning with the coup of 1952, he became more critical (DePalma, 2006, pp. 20, 176). In 1957, Matthews conducted an interview with Castro, approaching him in the mountains where Castro and the fighters plotted guerrilla act ivities. During his visit there, Castro pretended that the area he had under control was wider than it really was, and Matthews believed him. In reality, Castro had only about 20 partisans at the time (Szulc, 1987, p. 463).

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 39 Matthews found in them and their revolutionary movement a cause, fighting for liberation against fascism, much the same as he had felt about the Republican government. But this time he was on the winners’ side. He believed that this revolution would have a “more lasting impact” than the Mexican Revolution “or any other since the French Revolution” (DePalma, 2006, pp. 145, 153). His article was published with Castro’s signature and photo. Batista’s side published a critical article in the New York Herald Tribune, a rival of The New York Times at that time, calling Matthews’s article fiction (DePalma, 2006, pp. 99–102). The Times then fought back, publishing photos of Matthews interviewing Castro (Szulc, 1987, pp. 461–468). These articles had a significant impact on the U.S. After Matthews, other journalists such as Robert Taber of CBS visited Castro in the mountains. To interview the guerrilla leader, heavy equipment was brought to the mountain. Castro’s side knew only the names of the journalists but did not know their political leanings. The resulting documentaries portrayed Castro as hero or legendary person, a modern-day Robin Hood. Here we have to remember the influence of the Spanish Civil War. The novels written by volunteers during the Spanish Civil War established a rather romantic view of the Republicans who had fought against fascism. Not only Hemmingway and George Orwell, but also Spanish exiles in the U.S. produced influential works. These exiles were mainly associated with the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (POUM). The POUM was antagonistic toward the communists, though they fought on the same side in the Popular Front against Franco’s troops. After the defeat of the Popular Front, the U.S., found it “useful” to intensify its anticommunist propaganda against the exiles of the POUM as a function of the Cold War (Glondys, 2013). The U.S. government shifted from an “antifascist” stance toward pro Franco Spain and then had to appease antifascist American public opinion. Therefore, the U.S. government had to assume an appeasement policy, allowing Spanish exiles and some leftist Americans to cooperate in their democratic cause against the Franco regime. Some formed the Spanish Refugee Aid, published anti-Francoist articles via the AFL-CIO, or worked with American scholars of Spanish History in order to create an alternate narrative history of the Spanish Civil War (Hosoda, 2012, pp. 51–53; Hosoda, 2013, Rodríguez Jiménez and Hosoda, 2013). As Gronbeck-Tedesco said of the Spanish Civil War: [In] the cause that allied Old Left artists and intellectuals across the Atlantic, Spain represented the last-ditch effort to thwart fascism in what would become a horrific dress rehearsal for another world war. (2015, p. 152) The cause “resonated within the wider diasporic dialogue between African Americans and Afro-Cubans,” such as Cuban poet, Nicolás Guillén (GronbeckTedesco, 2015, p. 157). Certain American liberals became the so-called New Left, which “includes students, but a much more ideologically and geographically

40  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War diverse bunch of youth” (Gosse, 1993, p. 257). These developments suggest that American public opinion was easily controlled through “romantic” images.

American political appointees Next, we will analyze Cuba from the point of view of American diplomacy, comparing it with the Spanish view. Analyzing American diplomatic missions to Spain, we find that even at the mid-level of embassies, where the diplomatic bureaucracies typically execute instructions from the Department of State, the relations with the contracting state vary depending on the leadership at the top. In the U.S., it is not uncommon for major contributors to election campaigns to be rewarded with high-level political appointments, particularly to diplomatic posts, subject to Senate approval. Generally, ambassadors who attain their positions through this sort of patronage cannot speak the language of the contracting state and tend to report information from press articles or from the party in power. In 1974, President Nixon tried to appoint his friend and election supporter, Peter Flanigan, but the Senate would not confirm him. In the 1970s, such ambassadors were appointed to Portugal, Greece, and Spain, but lacking diplomatic training and savvy, they could not detect the expansion of communist power under the dictatorial regimes in those countries (Hosoda, 2012, pp. 78–80). Before the Cuban Revolution, Ambassador Gardner was such a political appointee. He said to Hugh Thomas, British historian, that to kill Fidel Castro, the U.S. was ready to send the CIA or FBI to the mountains. This was an improper remark for an ambassador to make. It might have been seen as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. Matthews suggested to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Ambassador Gardner was too close to Batista in the post-Batista era. As the position of ambassador was critical to U.S.–Cuban relations, Dulles asked Gardner for his resignation. Whether or not this was the catalyst, Gardner was dismissed (DePalma, 2006, p. 114). As a potential successor to Ambassador Gardner, Charles Bohlen was at first seen as one of “The Wise Men” of the American diplomatic corps (Smith, 1962, p. 119; Simeón, 2002, p. 217). He was a career foreign officer and worked in Tokyo before the U.S. entry into World War II and in Moscow as ambassador during the Cold War. However, he was appointed ambassador to the Philippines, which was considered a higher priority than Cuba at the time. If he, as an experienced diplomat, had been appointed to Cuba, history might have been different. Instead, President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed, Earl T. Smith (1957– January 19, 1959), a businessman, friend, and contributor to Eisenhower’s electoral campaign. Later he became the mayor of Palm Beach, Florida (1971–1977), where there had been direct flights to Cuba before the Revolution. With this appointment, the U.S. wanted to show its intention to construct a new relationship with Cuba. However, the image of a “corrupt Batista and the U.S. who supports him” was widely recognized. Unfortunately, as a political appointee like

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 41 his predecessor, Ambassador Smith was not particularly skilled at diplomacy, and he could not speak Spanish. This complicated U.S. efforts to construct a better relationship with Cuba. Ambassador Smith met Matthews on the recommendation of William Wieland, director of the office of the Caribbean and Mexico at the Department of State. Smith confirmed that the opinions of the Department and of Matthews were the same – anti-Batista and pro-Castro. Some articles said that Wieland was a “pro-communist” or even an ex-Cuban Communist Party member (Chardy, 2014; McManus, 2016). As will be discussed, the Department of State at that time held an opinion not quite in sync with the White House; it was rather antiBatista and pro-Castro. Until 1952, Matthews viewed Batista as previously noted, but then he became more critical of Batista, feeling that Cuba was going down the same path as Spain: “a heroic struggle of freedom versus fascism” (DePalma, 2006, p. 153). Ambassador Smith also came to believe that the Batista government would be overthrown as a consequence of its corruption, disintegration, and direct and indirect American aid, and not necessarily as a result of Castro’s forces alone, which were insufficient for the task (Senate, 1960). At the same time, Spanish Ambassador Lojendio was critical of Ambassador Smith. The Ambassador and his wife paid attention only to American interests and held a meaningless charity party at the most luxurious hotel in New York, the Waldorf Astoria, “for the sake of Cubans” (EEH, 16/1/1959).

A liberal Department of State As noted earlier, the attitude of the U.S. toward Cuba before the Revolution was not unified. Informed by the Cold War, the White House tolerated strong dictators as “necessary evils.” The military also argued that it was necessary to construct bases in “fascist” Franco Spain. In addition to Franco, the U.S. needed a puppet dictator like Batista in order to protect American interests in Cuba. However, in the Department of State before the Revolution, an anti-Batista and pro-Castro mood dominated. According to officers at that time, it seemed that the Department agreed with Castro’s anti-Batista cause and cooperated with him. Ambassador Smith testified that to be exact, executives in the Ministry did not show interest in the Cuban situation until late 1958, and nonexecutives were anti-Batista. The position of the ambassador was not widely held, and the gap between him and the Department was growing wider. On the other hand, at the American Embassy in Havana, some officers supported the expulsion of Batista or were pro-Castro (Ramos, 2007, pp. 237–238; Senate, 1960). They did not think highly of the revolutionary career of Castro as internationalist or anti-imperialist. Rather, the CIA and the government (especially the Department of State) held a strong belief that Castro wanted to have good relations with the U.S. (Latell, 2005, p. 99). The political situation in Cuba in 1958 was unstable because of antigovernment guerrilla activities. Batista, wanted to curry the support of the U.S., so he

42  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War held an election in November. It was little more than a gesture toward democracy rather than a serious exercise of democratic practice. Ambassador Smith tried to persuade the Batista regime that the U.S. could not support it. On the 17th of December, he again tried to persuade Batista that the U.S. could not support him because he “had lost effective control of the situation” (Smith, 1962, pp. 169–171). What is more, the U.S. changed its attitude quickly and refused to allow Batista to exile to Florida. At last, Batista, with a large sum of money, exiled first to the Dominican Republic and then to Portugal. He died in the southern Spanish resort city of Marbella in 1973. It is true that at that moment, the U.S. was somewhat leftist in its point of view and had supported the cause of the Spanish Civil War, and the Department of State was seen as relatively liberal. Radical intellectuals sympathized and aspired toward developing countries such as Cuba. Troubled by McCarthyism during the Cold War, the intellectuals wanted to find an “exit” outside of the U.S. For example, the AFL-CIO and Spanish Refugee Aid supported “noncommunist” Spanish exiles, as previously cited. The American sociologist, Charles Wright Mills, felt sympathy for the Cuban Revolution, but he knew that the Cuban revolutionary government was not communist. Meanwhile he argued that: In the U.S. newspapers, all of it is simply lumped together as “communism,” and communism is treated as an unchanging and homogeneous piece of evil. (Wright Mills, 1960, pp. 180–187) Kennan curiously pointed out the defects of American “simplistic single-­ mindedness,” the tendency to “lose ourselves in fascination with a single issue,” and “the difficulty we seem to have in recognizing contradictory values in a given situation and then finding our way thoughtfully among them” (Kennan, 1977, p. 61). The Spaniards also recognized this American “simplistic single-mindedness.” From Spain’s point of view, the Department of State, even in the early 1970s, seemed to maintain a “partial and outdated [view of] Spanish reality.” Its view of Spanish economic and social development might have been informed by the novels of Hemingway (Ortí Bordás, 2005, pp. 195–198).

Liberals and the Spanish Civil War The U.S. recognition of the new regime on the 7th of January 1959 was informed by wishful thinking as to what the new regime might be, as previously mentioned. Even Spain viewed Cuba with a leery eye and recognized the regime later than the U.S. On the 3rd of January, Ambassador Smith and Matthews passed each other on the steps of the Cuban Presidential Palace. This was communicated immediately to the Department by Matthews, who reported strangely that the ambassador

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 43 was asked if he had gone there to support a military junta “to keep Fidel Castro from assuming power.” This assured the ambassador that the contacts between Matthews and the Department were very intense (Smith, 1962, p. 194). The U.S. decided to dispatch a new ambassador to Cuba. Smith’s successor was Philip Bonsal, whose father was a correspondent in Cuba when the Spanish-­American War broke out (Szulc, 1987, p. 545). Ambassador Bonsal (February 1959–October 1960) was a liberal career diplomat, unlike Smith or Gardner. He had been appointed to Cuba before (1938–1939, as the third secretary). In addition, he was a chargé d’affaires to Spain (March 1946–June 1947), and after that he was ambassador to Colombia and Bolivia. Apart from these diplomatic posts, he worked at the Division of Latin America in the Department. He also worked for ITT in Cuba, which was very close to Batista as previously cited. In short, he could speak Spanish fluently and had extensive experience and skills as a diplomat. Though he was considered to be a “liberal” ambassador in the U.S., he was not appreciated as such in Spain under the Franco regime. As we mentioned before, the Franco regime took an antiliberal stance just after the Spanish Civil War. The ambassador to the Dominic Republic, Sánchez Bella, criticized Franco bitterly: he was “our old enemy” who tried to democratize Spain (EERD, 19/1/1959). The Franco regime considered Bonsal to be dangerous because he was “suspected of participating in anti-Francoist activities and having contacts with the opposition” (Eiroa San Francisco, 2009, p. 238). Here shadows of the Spanish Civil War can be seen in relations among Spain, the U.S., and Cuba.

Castro received sympathy in the U.S. After the overthrow of the Batista regime, some pro-Batista partisans were executed by Raúl Castro and Guevara (Latell, 2005, p. 153). This was strongly criticized in Washington. At the same time, Fidel Castro was conducting Operation Truth. Speaking in front of 380 Latin American journalists, he appealed to the rebels to treat the captured and wounded enemy fighters justly, then ordered that they be tended to by the few doctors on hand or turned over to the Red Cross. He also criticized enemies who were carrying out an anti-revolution campaign, appealing to “the motherland of our America, the great motherland” (Suárez Pérez and Román, 2017). The revolutionary troops needed a new enemy. Just after the Revolution, in April 1959, Castro visited New York. At that moment, the American media welcomed him, and the American public received him with sympathy. Neither the CIA nor Bonsal thought that Castro was a communist. According to journalist Tad Szulc, the great majority of new Latin American leaders traveled to Washington as soon as possible to seek its support and economic aid, but Castro was different. By not asking for money, he let them know what Latin American nationalism was, underscoring the absolute independence of the Revolution from the U.S., although he was accompanied by the principal economic and financial experts in his cabinet (1987, p. 552). Spanish Ambassador Lojendio was among those who believed that Castro was not a communist. To Lojendio, “Communism is usually more cautious and

44  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War intelligent.” However, he admitted the existence of “a strong Communist infiltration that exploits the dominant demagogy for its ends” (Embajador de España en La Habana, 21/3/1959). On his visit to the U.S., Castro was accompanied by Walters (cited in Chapter 2), who served as interpreter during meetings with U.S. officials (Walters, 2001, p. 149). President Eisenhower, however, was absent, “on vacation playing golf.” He intentionally avoided Castro. Instead, Castro met Vice President Nixon and talked for more than two hours. However, nothing important was agreed upon (Ramos, 2007, p. 252). Nixon, convinced that Castro was a communist, wrote a report to Eisenhower in which he insisted that the Cuban Revolution had to be liquidated (Castro, 1984). As Castro answered negatively to questions about relations with the communists and the possible confiscation of American assets, even a U.S. congressman said, “I am your new friend.” José María de Areilza, Spanish ambassador to the U.S., reported to the Spanish Ministry that Castro’s friendly attitude made a very good impression in the U.S. Similarly, Ambassador Lojendio reported the same about Castro’s visit. In Cuba, everyone from conservatives to the extreme leftist press praised Castro’s performance during the visit (EEH, 25/4/1959; EEW, 21/4/1959). Later in an interview with Szulc, Castro admitted that since Moncada, he had socialist ideas and considered himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. However, at the time of the Moncada attack and the Revolution, he did not believe that the development of a socialist revolution in Cuba was an immediate issue. From Castro’s viewpoint, the U.S. immediately labeled him a communist when he talked about agrarian reform and tried to crush the Revolution (Castro, 1984). It was in a televised speech in December of 1962 that Castro confessed that he was Marxist-Leninist. He tried to fuse communism with the utopian vision of society of Rousseau in order to overcome the discomfort many people felt toward Stalinist socialism. He also said that what he had learned from MarxismLeninism was decisive, going so far as to say that “my contribution to the Cuban Revolution consists of having synthesized Martí’s ideas and those of MarxismLeninism and of having applied them consistently in our struggle” (Betto, 1985, p. 146). In his mind, Christianity, José Martíism, and Marxism-Leninism were compatible: They shared the ideals of living in honest poverty and fighting for the oppressed masses. The Cuban Revolution was also called the moral revolution, as it stressed public morality and insisted on the strict morality of its leaders. Medical and educational cooperation with other nations, such as the dispatch of doctors to fight Ebola in the 21st century in developing counties, was rooted in the ideas of Martí and Rousseau (Goto, 1996, p. 25). However, it is also possible to see such humanitarian gestures as a form of public diplomacy to enhance Cuba’s image in the world. According to Matthews, “Communism was not a cause of the Cuban Revolution; it was a result.” That is, Cuban communism was instilled not by the Cuban communists or by the Soviet Union but by the pressure of various problems,

Consequences of the Spanish Civil War 45 events of the moment, and Castro himself (1970, pp. 162–163). He also pointed out that “one of the striking features of Latin American history is the absence of ideologies,” and he argued that, for this reason, “Cuba’s Marxism-Leninism has no appeal in its doctrinal form.” In short, these facts suggest that the Cuban Revolution became “Fidel Castro’s revolution” (1970, pp. 13, 306–307). Matthews said that the Communist Party of Cuba, founded in 1965 (not PSP, which was dissolved in 1961), is Fidel Castro’s party, not Marxism-Leninism but “Fidelismo.” Castro insisted on having a communist party, but it served a utilitarian function, not an ideological one (1970, pp. 321–322, 326). Another journalist, Georgie Anne Geyer, and Leycester Coltman, British ambassador to Cuba, also mentioned this in their books published in 1991 and 2003 respectively (DePalma, 2006, p. 265). In hindsight, it appears that the American nonintervention policy served as indirect and unintended assistance to Castro, just as American “neutrality” during the Spanish Civil War facilitated Franco’s victory. It is clear that after the defeat of Batista, the U.S. government and public opinion gradually pushed Castro toward communism.

Freedom of expression In late August 1960, in hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Ambassadors Gardner and Smith testified about Cuba. The former said that when he was ambassador, the Department was significantly affected by the Matthews’s articles. He repeated to the Department his belief that Batista was a friend of the U.S. but felt that his opinion was ignored. Meanwhile, Smith believed that the Department, Washington, congressmen, public opinion, and mass media played a role in Castro’s ascension to power. Under pressure from those forces, Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere Roy Rubottom (who worked in Bogotá during the Bogotazo riots and later in Madrid) and Director Wieland enacted pro-Castro policies (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, pp. 269–270). After leaving Cuba, Ambassador Smith wrote in a book published in 1962 that he blamed the failure of Cuban policy on the “leftist inclination of department officials who dealt with Cuban politics day by day.” The Department interpreted Castro and Castro’s Cuba as they wanted to see it. As a result, the president and the Department did not notice what was really happening in Cuba until it was too late. Cuba had become communist. Moreover, Smith said that although he warned that “the antecedents of Castro” were communists and that the Movement was infiltrated by communists, the Department took a neutral policy, which ultimately favored Castro (El Consulado de España en Miami, 19/11/1962). In the U.S., although there was freedom of expression, some information was overstated. Castro, through the interview with Matthews, utilized the power of journalism to maximum effect. Ironically, the ability of Spanish ambassadors to gather information under the Franco regime, where freedom of expression was not permitted, was superior to that of American ambassadors in Cuba, where the

46  Consequences of the Spanish Civil War information was muddled. Apart from the use of the same language, ambassadors under the Franco regime had no confidence in journalism. This made it possible for them to gain more accurate information from other channels. The success of diplomacy did not depend on whether it originated from a dictator or from a democratic leader. Sometimes problems are caused by the use of amateur political appointees and the manipulation of the mass media. Some exiled Spaniards in the U.S. after the Spanish Civil War also had a certain amount of influence on public opinion there, promoting the cause of democracy against the fascism of Franco Spain, through media and academia. The Spanish Civil War and the existence of exiled Spaniards lent sentimentality to the special Cuban–Spanish relationship, and the U.S.–Cuba–Spanish relationship was more nuanced than previously imagined. As Westad concluded, “Washington saw the defeat of the Latin American Left as a defeat for Moscow” (2017, p. 362). Here lies the tragic irony: The U.S. brought the Cold War, the conflict with communist ideology, to Cuba where in reality it had not previously existed.

4 Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War Independent Spanish diplomacy toward Castro’s Cuba

In this chapter we concentrate on the diplomatic relationships among Spain, Cuba, and the Vatican from the 1950s, around the time of the Cuban Revolution, until the early 1960s, with particular focus on the role of Catholicism in the prerevolutionary period. Analysis reveals that the Vatican or the Catholic Church sometimes worked as a mediator for Cuba. The earliest immigrants to the United States were Protestants from England, fleeing religious persecution. Later, Catholics from Ireland and Italy came to the U.S. In this chapter, we show some points of view about anti-Catholicism and some American prejudices toward Latin America. For example, McPherson argued that in the U.S. there was negative sentiment toward Spain, Catholicism, and monarchy. In addition, American prejudicial stereotypes toward Latin American countries allowed them to justify their policies of “unequal interdependence: military intervention and occupation, covert operations, support for dictators, economic domination, diplomatic arm twisting, anticommunist pressure, and cultural infiltration” (2006, p. 3). Clearly, these prejudices had profound effects. Kennan, one of so-called The Wise Men (Chapter 2), also blamed Catholic “heritage.” He “alleged that Latin Americans were condemned to perpetual backwardness because of their Catholicism, their racial heritage, and their enervating lives in tropical climes.” What is more, he, according to Rabe, thought that “Dictatorship might be the only answer for preventing communism and protecting U.S. vital interests” (2016, pp. 23–25). That is, Kennan felt hopeless for Latin America, and, in the U.S., a kind of prejudice persisted toward Catholics and Latin Americans. Catholics initially supported the Cuban Revolution as a fight for social justice against tyranny (i.e., Batista) and were optimistic for “an expansion of Catholic influence within the context of a movement for social reform.” That is, they “did not mean accepting communism” but condemned communists’ “atheism and materialism that negates spiritual values and morals” (Poyo, 2007, pp. 10, 40, 58–59). In addition, we have to remember that, at first, Castro and his regime were not communist.

48  Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War

The Church and the revolution Pérez Serantes as mediator First, we view the Church as a key actor in events of the period. As we mentioned before, there was an unmistakable “tie” between Castro and the Catholic Church, while at the same time Franco proclaimed National Catholicism for Spain. Around the time of the Cuban Revolution, the presence of Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba Pérez Serantes (1948–1968) could not be ignored. He was a friend of Castro’s father and had “saved” Fidel from capture by the Batista regime. Spanish historian, Ignacio Uría wrote a book entitled Iglesia y Revolución en Cuba, using archival documents located in Cuban churches. He argued that Archbishop Pérez Serantes, having more moral authority than any Cuban archbishop, “wanted to see in Castro a new Franco, victorious militarily who could establish a Christian organization of the state.” However, he was a “democrat” and did not want Castro to “be a dictator” like Franco. For the archbishop, to resolve pending Cuban problems, it was necessary to have universal suffrage and to change the government, as the 26th of July Movement had sought (Uría, 2011, p. 263). Pérez Serantes, as mentioned, was one of the immigrants who had escaped to Cuba from Galicia to evade the draft in 1901. With his relatives’ support, he attended the Belen School, where Castro would later study (Uría, 2011, p. 29). After that, he went to Rome to study. His activities related to workers were done based on the Encyclical of Leo XIII in 1891, Rerum Novarum, about the Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor (Uría, 2011, p. 44). After this, the popes would periodically warn of the harmful effects of excessive capitalism. Before the Cuban Revolution, Pérez Serantes maintained contacts with antiBatista activists in many cities where many Catholics sympathized. When he visited guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra, he was surprised at their discipline, modern weaponry, and religious “morals” (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, p. 86) because at that moment, the lack of morality in the corrupt Batista regime was notorious. Pérez Serantes could play the role of intermediator between the Batista government and the rebels. The nuncio to Cuba, Luigi Centoz (the “doyen” in the diplomatic corps in Havana and, upon returning to Rome in 1962, the vice camerlengo, an important post in the Vatican) had asked American Ambassador Earl T. Smith (1957–1959) to supply a Navy helicopter to transport Pérez Serantes to the mountains. However, the U.S. denied this request, citing its nonintervention policy (Smith, 1962, p. 126). Spanish Ambassador Juan Pablo de Lojendio (1952–1960) had thought highly of the archbishop before the Cuban Revolution. According to a telegram he wrote to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, de Lojendio had attained great prestige and popularity in Cuba and sometimes had intervened effectively to resolve recent outbreaks of violence (Smith, 1962, p. 192). Meanwhile, in the late 1950s, some Spanish religious officials entered the rebel zone under orders

Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War 49 from Pérez Serantes, which caused the ambassador some difficulty (Smith, 1962, p. 221). The existence of these Spaniards in the rebel zone could be interpreted by the Batista regime as Spanish intervention in domestic policy, which could have provoked a diplomatic crisis. For the rebels, this situation was favorable because it created the image that the Church was on their side. We should remember that the Franco regime too had gradually tried to dilute its fascist reputation by aligning itself more closely with the Church and thereby changing its image, appointing Catholic faction ministers, and signing a concordat with the Vatican.

The Vatican as mediator Much like the thawing of relations between American President Obama and Raúl Castro of Cuba in 2014, relations between the Vatican and Cuba during the Revolution underwent a similar thaw. In a conversation with Frei Betto, a liberation theologian who criticized the capitalist system, especially as it developed in Latin America and exacerbated poverty and social injustice, Castro testified that from the beginning of the Revolution, the relationship between the Vatican and Cuba was very good. At that time, when various problems with the Church occurred, the papal nuncio always offered support (Betto, 1985, p. 319). For example, in the beginning of March 1958, when the political situation was deteriorating just before the Revolution, the Nuncio Centoz insisted to American Ambassador Smith that actually it was impossible to celebrate universal suffrage. Centoz “reiterated his proposal to form a united government composed of the different parties, including the 26th of July Movement” (Uría, 2011, p. 213). This offer was diplomatically so interesting that later the Spanish General Council of Miami sent to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs a book, The Fourth Floor: An Account of the Castro Communist Revolution, written by Smith. It seemed to be an interesting narrative explaining the involvement of the Vatican and the opinions of the Department of State, which were facilitated by Herbert Matthews, the journalist (El Consulado de España en Miami, 19/11/1962). In December of 1958, just before the Revolution, Ambassador Smith also suggested that the U.S. government consider using Centoz as a mediator to help peacefully resolve the Civil War in Cuba. That is, he recommended the “establishment of a provisional government before the 24th of February 1959” when Batista’s term would expire: “the convocation of elections was within six months, and the presence of international observers under the protection of the Organization of American States (OAS) would be there to supervise those elections.” In this way, Batista was prevented from competing for a new term, and Castro could not assume power. If this were to occur, the U.S. would not have to be involved deeply in Cuban domestic policy (Uría, 2011, p. 244). However, this plan would not be realized. According to Ambassador Smith, the papal nuncio tried to be a “bridge” between Batista and Castro and asked for American support, repeatedly searching for peaceful solutions. The ambassador himself personally thought that the U.S. and the OAS should support

50  Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War this initiative. However, the Department of State did not want to support the Church’s plan because it doubted the effectiveness of the Church hierarchy in such an undertaking. The position of the Department was a “non-intervention” policy (Smith, 1962, pp. 69, 174–175, 229–230). Meanwhile, although Franco Spain officially had a nonintervention policy, it was able to leverage its national Catholicism in order to gain better terms with the Vatican than the U.S. could. On the 21st of March, Spanish Ambassador Lojendio received a call from Nuncio Centoz. According to the nuncio, Archbishop Pérez Serantes persuaded Mrs. Batista that, for Cuba and President Batista and his family, a prompt resignation was the only way to control the situation. Hearing this, the nuncio said to Lojendio that the diplomatic corps in Havana should have a meeting to discuss the situation, describing the proposed meeting not as having an “official character but [as a] purely friendly” arrangement (EEH, 23/3/1958). Lojendio, as a part of the diplomatic corps, opposed intervention by the diplomatic corps. First, he persuaded Nuncio Centoz and presented him to the Cuban foreign minister, with whom Lojendio had a friendly relationship (EEH, 23/3/1958). After the 1st of January 1959, when the Revolutionary Army entered Havana, the “doyen” nuncio in the center, foreign ambassadors from various countries, including Brazil, the U.S., Chile, Spain, and later Argentina, gathered. Together they formed a commission to discuss the future development of the situation, especially diplomatic inviolability and the right of protection for exiles (EEH, 10/1/1959).

Ambassador Lojendio as “preacher” of democracy to Castro Black legend It is time to analyze the policies of Cuba from the point of view of Spain. The Franco regime, isolated after World War II, attempted to fortify its presence in the international community and fight against the U.S. by appealing to the Hispanidad of Latin American countries, stressing the common cultural points of history and language. Cuba was the central focus among these countries, led in 1945 by the Instituto de Cultura Hispánica in Madrid, where Sánchez Bella also presided as a director (1946–1956). The Franco regime was a centrist government, based on ideas from the period of the Catholic king and queen, as mentioned in Chapter 2. Accordingly, the use of Catalonian on official documents was prohibited. That was because the Catalonian groups in Latin America were anti-Francoist, while the Galicians were not always so. In Latin America, the “Catholic and Castilian” works of significant artists, such as Manuel de Falla’s ballet The Three-Cornered Hat and Isaac Albéniz’s Iberia, were especially popular in Cuba, and Spanish choruses and dances attracted large audiences (Eli, 1999, pp. 132–134; Millan Astray, 1954). Jaime Caldevilla, “a fierce anti-Communist, a man of the regime, very ideologicalized,” worked at the Spanish embassy in Cuba. He was a delegate of the

Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War 51 Office of Diplomatic Information and later Councilor of Information and Press (Alija, 2015). He was a journalist (accused as a CIA spy in 1966, as will be discussed) in charge of information and public relations for nearly 20 years (Merry del Val, 18/12/1969; Spanish Counselor in Havana declared Persona Non Grata, 28/5/1966) before Ambassador Lojendio started to work in Havana in 1952. Caldevilla worried that, in the first half of the 1950s, little news of Franco Spain was featured in the Cuban mass media, and a negative image of Spain was beginning to spread. In Cuba, there were international leftists, exiles from the Spanish Republic, freemasons, and communists, including Protestants – all of whom were enemies of the regime. Moreover, the so-called Black Legend persisted. The Black Legend comprised the discourse of exaggeration and the fabrication of “Spain’s cruelty and intolerance.” This originally started to spread in the 16th century, during the Spanish Inquisition and the brutality after the conquest of Latin America. In the centuries since, it has been used as part of a negative campaign by the enemies of Spain. According to Caldevilla, especially in Latin America, the accusation of Spanish brutality has persisted. The Franco regime insisted on challenging these misperceptions so that they would not take root. To this end, he thought that Spain should advertise widely to create a positive image of the Franco regime, especially in the Caribbean, with Cuba at its center. Ambassador Lojendio praised Franco’s achievements, which made it possible for him to gain influence in the Cuban mass media. At the very least, it is fair to say that the relationship between Cuba and Spain before the Revolution was not terrible, and there were no specific diplomatic problems (Alija, 2015). During the Batista regime, Ambassador Lojendio believed that Cuba lived apart from other Hispanic countries, except Spain: “[T]herefore, the best and most effective way to serve here the cause of Hispanidad is to maintain the presence and prestige of Spain in this environment.” He added that Spain should spread and share their values, using culture as a key word, develop interchange programs, and establish a center for exchanging information. All this was to be done in order to give Spain a strong leadership position in Latin America. As Lojendio’s brother was in the Office of Diplomatic Information, the Spanish Embassy tried to spend so much money on public relations that Castiella, Spanish minister of foreign affairs, had to order him to reduce it because of its negative effects on the budget (Merry del Val, 18/12/1969; NSA, 28/5/1966). According to Alija, Lojendio did not appear on the list of Embassy staff directing the protocol service of the Cuban Ministry. However, considering the importance of his work, Lojendio asked for an official post for his brother as soon as he came to Cuba (2015).

Doubt regarding communization Ambassador Lojendio, who at first had praised Fidel Castro as described in Chapter 3, gradually began to have doubts and suspicions about the Castro regime after the Revolution of January 1959.

52  Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War The relationship between Castro and the Catholic Church seems contradictory if we only look on the surface. From that perspective, a good relationship would not be expected. However, curiously the Spaniards believed that the relations between Castro and the Church would not become problematic. For example, Spanish Ambassador to the Dominican Republic Sánchez Bella (later the ambassador to Colombia, 1959–1962, and to Italy, 1962–1967) foresaw that the position of the Church and Pérez Serantes would not be problematic because the Catholic students and workers oppressed under the Batista regime contributed to the Revolution (EERD, 22/1/1959). Moreover, according to Sánchez Bella, although Castro was disoriented, he did not lack religious instruction, and he would not confront the Church. According to the teachers at Belen, Castro “was a bright, violent, crazy student, with obvious qualities of a leader.” Further, Sánchez Bella anticipated that in the Cuban ecclesiastical hierarchy, Archbishop Pérez Serantes would have greater influence on Castro (EERD, 19/1/1959). Cuban bishops also had high expectations of the man who had served with Castro in the assault on the Moncada Barracks. However, this optimistic expectation did not developed as they hoped. Ambassador Lojendio had a very different opinion. It is true that the 26th of July Movement was a miscellaneous group comprised of Christians, communists, and others. However, the ambassador started to doubt the regime’s commitment to the Church when Fidel’s younger brother, Raúl, joined in a civil marriage with Vilma Espín on the 26th of January 1959 without a religious ceremony (EEH, 31/1/1959). His point of view was understandable, supported by his experience watching the communists seize power after the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic, with the subsequent abolition of state religion and the acceptance of secular marriage. Apart from this civil marriage, at the end of March, Lojendio was afraid that Cuba was going to become a communist state. He concluded that there might be communism at its roots because of the physical elimination of armed adversaries and the middle class, as well as the destruction of the great sources of creation of wealth, which were “essential for the implementation of communism” (EEH, 28/3/1959). On the other hand, Lojendio felt that Castro’s speech was “full of idealistic expressions and interesting interpretations of various aspects of Cuban history and problems.” He was afraid that “some personal imbalance, excess of vehemence, lack of maturity, intolerance for advice and for critics” would cause Castro to take “the easy and dangerous path of his current demagogy,” benefitting only communism (EEH, 28/3/1959). Even though U.S. President Eisenhower was soon to leave office, he visited Franco in Spain in December 1959. Castro started to suspect that they were conspiring together (Uría, 2011, p. 360). It is certain that the Franco regime used photos of the two men to advertise inside and outside of Spain to insinuate U.S. backing. However, in reality the two countries did not conspire against Cuba, as will be described.

Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War 53

Ambassador Lojendio preaches democracy On the evening of January 20th 1960, Ambassador Lojendio was watching Castro’s speech on TV. Castro was criticizing the U.S. Embassy and the Spanish Embassy support of the anti-Castro movement. What is more, he said that Spanish monks in the churches were sheltering and hiding antigovernment forces and that the Spanish Embassy was conspiring with them. It is true that Councilor Caldevilla held a meeting with religious officials in the Spanish Embassy on January 7. There was no intention of conspiracy, according to Spanish historian Paz-Sánchez. The one-hour meeting was followed by a joint declaration, which was delivered to the representative of Spain, “in solidarity with the Franco regime and with the principles of the ‘Crusade’ ” (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, p. 20). However, if Caldevilla was seen as a CIA spy, and Paz-Sánchez described this part using the telegrams written by Caldevilla, such a truth would not have been exposed. Therefore, the possibility of a conspiracy could not be dismissed. Lojendio was angry, feeling that he was not really in charge. He rushed into the TV station where the Castro’s speech was being broadcast live. Castro’s speeches usually continued for hours. When Lojendio broke into the studio, the moderator said that in order to speak, the permission of the prime minister (Castro) was necessary. Lojendio answered with anger: “This is a democracy and the moderator is the leader.” However, Castro cynically said, “Is the ambassador of the greatest dictatorship in Europe talking about democracy?” The video image was cut at that moment, although the sound continued to be broadcast. The ambassador shouted “Liar!”, and booing and scornful jeering could be heard. Some minutes later when the video image was back, the ambassador had been removed from the studio (Ayllón, 2016). Castro asked him to depart Cuba within 24 hours, declaring him persona non grata and recalling the Cuban ambassador to Spain. At that moment, ex-U.S. Ambassador Smith, who had already left Cuba, commented on this incident: “[A]lthough undiplomatic, it was the natural reaction of a proud Spaniard defending the honor of his country against the malicious beratings of the former bandit now become statesman” (El Consulado de España en Miami, 19/11/1962). On the other hand, U.S. Ambassador Bonsal (1959–1960), who had been appointed to Cuba by then, saw this broadcast live. The next day he visited Lojendio, who was, according to him, “an old friend and valued colleague.” The mass media photographed him and wrote that the instigator must have been the American ambassador (Bonsal, 1971, p. 119). After this incident, some expressions were heard in Cuba like “fascist priest” directed at Spanish priests such as Pérez Serantes (Uría, 2011, p. 523). However, as described in Chapter 2, in fact, only a part of the Franco regime was fascist. Diplomatic relations remained intact. In fact, they continued as if nothing had happened, though the post of ambassador was left vacant. Raúl Castro ordered Alberto Bayo, the teacher of guerrilla tactics and commander in Africa mentioned in Chapter 2, to abstain from anti-Spanish propaganda on TV and radio. Moreover, the Cuban government restrained the activities of exiles in Cuba, especially

54  Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War those from Mexico, from criticizing the Franco regime in Cuban mass media. This was done so that the government could concentrate on the problem of Lojendio (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, p. 37). As a result, the Spanish airline carrier Iberia could arrive and depart without incident. In Cuba, there were no remarkable incidents reported by the Spanish Embassy to the Ministry (EEH, 5/2/1960). Spain did not appoint a new ambassador to Cuba until 1975, around the time Franco was dying. Before this incident, Franco told the minister of foreign affairs, “Castiella, you are the minister, do whatever you think proper, but with Cuba, anything but break” (Uría, 2011, p. 362). The proper Castiella declared to the Spanish embassy in Cuba that the Spanish policy toward other countries was one of “nonintervention” in their internal affairs, “especially toward a friend such as Cuba” (MAE, 27/1/1960). Under Franco’s orders, the diplomatic relationship was kept intact. What kind of “sanction” did Lojendio receive? In February 1961, the year after the incident, Franco said: An accredited ambassador to a head of state should never react with attitudes of extreme violence, without previously counting on the government he represents. (Franco Salgado-Araujo, 1976, p. 312) According to Paz-Sánchez, Franco did not want to understand or forgive Lojendio’s behavior. However, neither did he want to level accusations against a man who had defended the honor of Spain and the Church to the Revolutionary government (Paz-Sánchez, 2006, pp. 63–64). He was subsequently appointed ambassador to Switzerland, Italy, and the Vatican. This was not exactly a demotion. However, later Lojendio’s preoccupation with “the communization of Cuba” and Castro’s preoccupation with “the spy in the Spanish embassy” would become points of contention.

Cuba, the Vatican, and Spanish diplomacy in the Cold War Cuba vs. the Church With Lojendio sidelined, the Cuban revolutionary government gradually grew distant from the Catholic Church and proceeded with communization by means of agrarian reforms and confiscation of American capital. After Cuba confiscated American properties, on the 3rd of January 1961, the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba. The U.S. could have maintained “de facto relations,” sending “a person of lower rank and prestige” such as a chargé d’affaires, as Spain did after the incident with Lojendio, rather than break “full diplomatic representation at the ambassadorial level”, as Kennan stated in the 1970s (Kennan, 1977, pp. 62–63). That is, in spite of a lack of any formal diplomatic recognition at all, Spain maintained a diplomatic channel in order to negotiate later.

Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War 55 On the 15th of April, an anti-revolutionary group, led by exiled Cubans and aided by the CIA, bombed Cuba. The next day, Castro proclaimed “a Socialist Revolution.” On the 17th, anti-revolutionary forces invaded Playa Girón (the Bay of Pigs Invasion). The fact that the Castro regime repelled this attack united Cuba after the Revolution, and Cuba started to advance toward socialism. At that moment, among the anti-Castro forces, there were a few battlefield missionary priests. About 250 priests and religious leaders were arrested after the Bay of Pigs incident (Uría, 2011, p. 473). Between 1961 and 1963, about 14,000 Cuban children were taken to the U.S., with the involvement of Catholic priests in Cuba and Miami, in what was called Operation Peter Pan. A rumor was spread that the Cuban government would send children to Siberia, taking them away from their parents. However, in reality, many of the children had to live miserably in shelters in the U.S., without proper homes to live in (National Archives, 2005). With the accumulation of these actions, the Cuban government gradually came to distrust the Church. In May 1961, the Castro regime decided to convert Belen, where Fidel and Raúl had studied, into a barracks (Uría, 2011, p. 480). They also nationalized all private schools and provided free education to all. Archbishop Pérez Serantes demanded the rights of religious education, using the Church’s channel to the Castro regime in vain (Paz-Sánchez, 2006, p. 160). Castro saw that the children of high society, rich and anti-revolutionary, went to private Catholic schools, which had become centers for anti-revolutionary activities (Betto, 1985, p. 216). In September, during the festival of Our Lady of Charity (patroness of Cuba, Our Lady of El Cobre, which was said to have been founded by Indios and black children), anti-revolutionaries and the government confronted each other. Several days afterward, about 130 priests and religious leaders were expelled (Uría, 2011, pp. 487–490). However, Castro did not mean to exclude all Catholic people and their religious practice but rather potential antirevolutionaries. He was not fundamentally antireligion. This tension between the Church and the revolutionary government did not mean tension with Catholic belief itself but rather with its institutions (Betto, 1985, pp. 214–215). This discourse seemed to be based on sophistry but appeared parallel to a theory of José Martí, who hated the Spanish system, not Spaniards (Betto, 1985, pp. 341–345). In condemning Castro, his own sister Juanita, who was exiled to the U.S., claimed that the Castro regime confiscated properties, closed religious schools, and expelled various religious leaders. However, Castro did not eradicate the religious groups because it would have had a negative effect on the regime from the point of view of external propaganda (Juanita Castro, 1/7/1964).

Why Spain maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba Spain, having Catholicism as its national religion, could play the role of mediator in the diplomatic arena, or it could ask the Vatican to play the role of mediator. One of the reasons why Spain and Cuba maintained their relations was that the

56  Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War U.S. government and the Vatican desired it. In the summer of 1960, when relations between Cuba and Spain were particularly strained, the Spanish Embassy insisted that it was the only contact point for Spaniards and religious people and a place for hope. Therefore, the closure of the Embassy would not be possible. Caldevilla argued that Spain could prevent U.S. intervention because Spain could argue to Latin America that Spain would protect them. Subsequently, they would appreciate the Spanish crusade and Franco (Paz-Sánchez, 2001, p. 105). Caldevilla must have believed that Spain was in a struggle for power with the U.S. over Latin America. In December, the U.S. press reported the kidnapping of Pérez Serantes. The Spanish press also reported it, but the Cuban authorities denied it and blamed it on an invention of Falangist priests (MAE, 7/12/1960). In the year following the Lojendio incident, Spain again felt a rupture of diplomatic relations. However, the chargé d’affairs in the Spanish Embassy in Havana said that it was important to consider the prestige and dignity of the countries and defend material and moral interests. Here again, honor and morality were used as the reason to sustain diplomatic relations. He affirmed, especially relating to Cuba, the “strong affinities and close ties that unite us” (EEH, 6/5/1961). Spain insisted on reasons other than politics and economics for maintaining relations with Cuba. Of course, there were indeed political and economic imperatives. Statistically, the Spanish trade balance with Cuba was a surplus ($10 million. However, the payment from Cuba was often delayed, and Spain did not want Cuba to evade payment entirely. This turned out to be an impediment to diplomatic relations, and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to solve this problem rapidly and diminish the scale of the imbalance in order to allow greater freedom of movement of Spanish policy toward Cuba (MAE, 1961). Moreover, the Spanish Ministry repeated the principle of nonintervention regarding Cuban domestic policy, without the Spain–Cuban bilateral relationship affecting the American–Cuban one (MAE, 3/5/1961). The Ministry thought that Castro’s government was provoking the Spanish government and itself offered to make a break by criticizing the Catholic Church: “[T]hey are Falangist priests.” At that moment, in Cuba there were about 2,000 Spanish religious figures. The Spanish Embassy was afraid that if they let all of them leave the island, the Spanish presence there would be diminished (El Consulado General de España en Cuba, 5/5/1961). Councilor Caldevilla appealed to the Ministry about the crisis in Cuba, claiming that an exodus of Spanish priests would make the religious situation in Cuba critical and would affect Spain and the regime politically. Because this would have ripple effects in Latin America, he insisted, “with maximum urgency save the honor of Spain and the dignity and glory of our Regime” (EEH, 27/5/1961). It seems that the “spiritual” tie between Spain and Cuba should be given more prominence relative to politics and economics, at least for the Spanish side in the early 1960s.

Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War 57

The Vatican’s circumstances The U.S., which had already broken off diplomatic relations with Cuba, wanted the Spanish Embassy to remain as a source of information, and the Vatican feared the vulnerability of the Catholics in the country (Roy, 1998, p. 62). In 1962, when again the relations between the Church and the Castro regime were in crisis, according to the Spanish Embassy, Cuba was the only country in the Eastern bloc with which the Vatican maintained full diplomatic relations. It was important also for the Vatican to see that Spanish–Cuban relations were maintained (EEH, 22/2/1962). Also in 1962, President (and communist) Osvald Dorticós (1959–1976) asked for the exchange of Spanish priests detained in Cuba and Cuban intellectuals detained in Spain through the Vatican (La Embajada de España cerca de la Santa Sede, 13/4/1962). At the same time, Castro well used the nuncio for propaganda. For example, when the bilateral relationship seemed to be in crisis in 1962, photos of Nuncio Centoz, President Dorticós, and Castro were used repeatedly in the mass media. One time, a photo of the nuncio visiting Castro was printed on the front page, with a congratulatory message: The nuncio had visited because Castro sent a New Year’s message to Pope John XXIII. The Spanish Embassy analyzed this coolly, claiming that Castro took advantage when Centoz was only politely performing an official protocol (EEH, 22/2/1962). On the 23rd of July 1962, Cesare Zacchi (1962–1975) was appointed successor of Centoz, who was almost 80 years old. Zacchi was relatively young, in his late forties; however, he had experience working in socialist Yugoslavia. According to Uría’s analysis, it was a Vatican strategy to send a young nuncio to have conversations with Castro. Promptly, Nuncio Zacchi gained permission for Cuban bishops to attend the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council (1962–1965). For Zacchi, the Cuban policy toward Catholics, which was without persecution, was much more tolerant than that of Yugoslavia (Uría, 2011, pp. 509, 548, 550, 552). The CIA also observed that Zacchi “worked hard to improve relations with the Castro regime and apparently has developed an excellent personal relationship with Castro himself” (EEH, 22/2/1962). The Castro regime evaluated Zacchi very highly because he was very effective in resolving conflicts between the Church and the Revolution (Betto, 1985, pp. 224–225; Uría, 2011, p. 555). In 1963, Castro praised the Pope and the nuncio (EEH, 26/4/1963). In 1966, he declined to make critical comments when he had the chance in order to avoid conflict with the Church pertaining to some controversial incidents (EEH, 6/5/1966). Castro even said that Zacchi was one of the friendliest diplomats ever appointed to Cuba (CIA, 8/9/1969). When Zacchi passed away in Rome in 1991, Castro sent flowers to his tomb and to the Cuban Embassy in the Vatican. The Cuban Embassy continues to send flowers every year, on the anniversary of his passing (Caputo, 2014). However, the Church was not exactly monolithic in its policies toward Cuba. Some Church leaders, such as Pérez Serantes, were not in favor of conversations between the nuncio and Castro (Uría, 2011, p. 551). The Spanish Embassy also

58  Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War reported to Spain in a Mexican magazine in 1966 that Zacchi was reported to be “pro-Communist” because he had said that “between the Catholic Church and the Cuban government there is a co-activity in all work.” He also asserted that “Fidel is an extraordinary man” and described the relationship between the Church and the government as cordial (EEH, 8/10/1966; Garrigues, 4 /8/1966).

The battle against atheism In 1970s Latin America, liberation theology, influenced by Marxist thinking, which attempted to resolve social concerns through political means, was spreading and partly coalescing with the antigovernment movement against communism. The Vatican could not accept the communist denial of private property and found Catholicism and communism to be incompatible. However, Cuba was the only communist country with which the Vatican maintained a diplomatic tie. There was rapid secularization in the 20th century. When the Spanish Second Republic abolished the national religion and pursued radical secularism, the bilateral relationship with the Church deteriorated. The Vatican was active in the Cold War, which it saw as a fight against the spread of atheism (Matsumoto, 2013, pp. 158–160). In addition, as described in Chapters 2 and 3, the Franco regime disliked both communism and Freemasonry, positions it shared with the Catholic Church (Núñez, 2017, pp. 184–191). In April 1974, Archbishop Casaroli, secretary of the Vatican’s Council of Public Affairs, visited Cuba for ten days and had a 90-minute meeting with Castro. In a meeting with Raúl Roa, the minister of foreign affairs (1959–1976), they discussed U.S.–Cuban relations. At that moment, the nuncio to Cuba was still Zacchi. Casaroli was an experienced negotiator with communist countries such as East Germany, and the Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe in 1975 was his proposal (Embassy in Rome, 10/4/1974). On the other hand, in July, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had an audience with the Pope, and one of their themes was “Latin America and Cuba” (The Embassy in Rome, 29/6/1974). Kissinger made light of Latin America, while Nixon held a prejudice that “one-third of Latin American Catholics were now ‘Marxists’ ” (Rabe, 2016, pp. 123–124). Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba Pérez Serantes could not keep up good relations with Castro after the Revolution, and he was opposed to Castro, especially regarding freedom of education, right of assembly, and freedom of expression. His critical attitude toward the regime was inherited by his successor, Archbishop Pedro Meurice, who conduced Pope John Paul II’s visit to Cuba in 1998 (Uría, 2011, pp. 20–21). At that time, the pope asked for the pardon of political prisoners who were being held for criticizing Cuba on human rights grounds. He also visited Our Lady of Charity of El Cobre, near Santiago de Cuba.1 The Berlin Wall fell during the reign of Pope John Paul II, who was from Poland, and the normalization of U.S.–Cuban diplomatic relations was established during the time of Pope Francis, who is a Jesuit from Argentina. Pope

Catholicism as a lifeline during the Cold War 59 Francis is not antagonistic toward liberation theology (Badilla, 2014). The approach between former president Obama and Raúl Castro, who had been a communist before Fidel, was aided by the Vatican’s backroom intermediation. Raúl himself showed gratitude to the Vatican, especially to the pope. In sum, some Spaniards, such as Pérez Serantes, Ambassador Lojendio, and the nuncios, could be called on to some extent to serve as mediators, or as a “lifeline” for Cuba, which was isolated just after the Revolution. Cuba used the Catholic “sense” and linkage that American diplomats could not develop. In this way, Spain and the Vatican could comprehend more accurately the situation in Cuba through priests, who could move more freely among the people. Sometimes they had more contacts with the opposition than American diplomats, who typically had contacts only with the pro-Batista regime and its supporters in Cuba. The Catholic linkage for Cuba was critically important during and after the Revolution and even now. For Spain, it was even more crucial if we consider the lack of intimate political and spiritual linkage in relation to the East–West dichotomy during the Cold War period.

Note 1 Later, in 2012, during the 400-year anniversary of its discovery, Pope Benedict XVI visited.

5 Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain and American prejudice

So far, we have analyzed the bilateral relationships among Cuba, Spain, and the U.S. in light of the Castro-Franco commonalities: Galicia, guerilla warfare, and Catholicism. In this chapter, we look back to the periods before and after the Cuban Revolution, analyzing Spanish foreign policy around the 1960s related to Cuba and comparing it with Cuban independent foreign policy, which is similar in some ways to the Spanish one. They both shared anti-Americanism, latent at times, and Cuban internationalism (putting attention on Cuba’s ties with Africa, African Americans, and Cuban exiles in Miami). At the same time, the American prejudice toward Catholicism was common, as discussed in Chapter 4. Another common point between Cuba and Spain was their nondemocratic political systems. Comparing Franco’s Spain and Castro’s Cuba, we can observe that the president of a democratic country such as the U.S. might struggle to form a foreign policy in light of campaign pressures.

John F. Kennedy from a multidirectional point of view The presidential campaign and Cuba During the John F. Kennedy administration (1961–1963), many important affairs related to Cuba occurred. Kennedy thought that “the spread of communism in Latin America would endanger national security, hamper the nation’s ability to act elsewhere in the world, and imperil the Democratic party and his presidency.” Moreover, “the Kennedy brothers were obsessed with Castro and designed their Latin American policies in response to the Cuban revolutionary” (Rabe, 1999, pp. 541, 545). In 1957, Kennedy, then still a senator, visited Havana. The wife of American Ambassador Smith in Cuba had been a friend of the senator for many years. It is important to remember that at that time, Castro was an active guerrilla in the Sierra Maestra, fighting against the Batista regime. It was around this time that Matthews interviewed Castro, as discussed earlier. Kennedy’s policy toward Cuba was affected heavily by the presidential campaign of 1960. Kennedy, as the candidate of the Democratic Party, initially said

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 61 that he was going to improve the American policy toward Cuba put in place by the Republican Party during the Eisenhower administration. On the other hand, then vice president and Republican candidate, Richard Nixon, took a more aggressive stance toward Cuba: “[T]he administration had taken appropriate steps and would continue, if reelected, to pursue a policy that would help the Cuban people eventually to get rid of Castro” (Bonsal, 1971, pp. 170–171). In fact, as the presidential election campaign drew to a close, the theme of Cuba was not a prominent issue for debate. However, gradually Kennedy was going to change the favorable image of Castro linked with “the Latin American revolutionary tradition of Simón Bolívar,” as his speechwriter Sorensen testified (1965, p. 205). In addition, after the Cuban Revolution in January of 1959 and the nationalization of American companies in August of 1960, the issue of Cuba grew more serious and contentious. Kennedy even said that he would not preside over the communization of Cuba, just as Nixon had said (Bonsal, 1971, pp. 170–171). The Eisenhower Republican administration initiated a trade embargo against Cuba on October 19, 1960, less than one month before the presidential election. Thus Kennedy became a president after the official severing of diplomatic ties with Cuba on January 3, 1961, and he had no choice but to pursue a more hardline policy toward Cuba than that of the previous Republican administration, which had already taken significant economic measures (Bonsal, 1971, p. 176).1 President Kennedy worried that a communist Latin America might come under the influence of the Cuban Revolution and proposed “the Alliance for Progress” in March of 1961. The U.S. plan was to isolate communist Cuba by supporting the members of the OAS. Ironically, the sum the U.S. would send to Latin America was identical to the $30 million that Castro had asked for in economic cooperation with U.S. at the summit of the Organization of American States Social and Economic Council in Argentina (Szulc, 1987, p. 247). However, this aid was not intended to serve the people, and Latin American growth remained weak. After that, on April 17, 1961, the Cuban exiles supported by the CIA invaded at the Bay of Pigs. This invasion resulted in failure. In January of 1962, the OAS decided to exclude Cuba. In 2009, the Assembly of the OAS decided that the resolution to exclude Cuba was invalid; however, Cuba has not yet returned to the OAS.

Reality was like a spy novel Just before becoming president, Kennedy asked Ian Fleming, former English intelligence officer and famous novelist of the James Bond series, the following question: If he were James Bond, how would he assassinate Castro? Fleming jokingly offered three scenarios, but the CIA took them seriously; however, none of these plots would succeed (William, 2005; Botello and Angulo, 2005, pp. 68–72). Many attempts were made on Castro’s life. The American Mafia tried to assassinate Castro and overthrow his regime because they had taken huge losses when

62  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain their casinos in Cuba, which had been constructed during the Batista regime, were forced to close in October of 1960 (Ramonet, 2006, p. 232). Once, bacteria or chemical materials were found on Castro’s clothes. On another occasion, A woman was sent to put poison in Castro’s drink, but she fell in love with him and flushed the poison down the toilet (Lorenz, 2015). On yet another occasion, during an X-ray inspection, they tried to douse Castro with radiation in order to cause cancer. Other attempts involved a poisoned cigar, a voltage-wired microphone, among others. After these incidents, the Castro regime got more and more sensitive, even “obsessive” about security (Ramonet, 2006, p. 232; Botello and Angulo, 2005, pp. 68–72). From the CIA to the Mafia, the U.S. took various terroristic measures to prevent communism from taking root in Cuba and to assassinate Castro; however, all of these efforts failed. These measures were taken during the Kennedy administration. It is true that Kennedy did not have “sympathy” for Castro. However, it seems that he himself did not instigate these assassination plans. According to Szulc, Kennedy was pressured by some of his staff to assassinate Castro, although he might personally have been opposed to it on moral grounds. The very day of Kennedy’s assassination, Castro had contact with a French journalist, who had brought messages from the president (Castro, 1984). Castro, for his part, criticized Kennedy publicly; privately however, he hoped that Kennedy would become president. As will be discussed, sometimes Castro acted publicly against the Franco regime or criticized it as “fascist.” But, in reality, he negotiated with them and even showed sympathy toward the Spanish negotiators. Here we have to read between the lines: Castro knew well how to utilize the mass media to steer public opinion. His public statements against Kennedy might not have reflected his true feelings. In fact, Castro, in the interview with Szulc, said that we were lucky because at that moment, it was Kennedy, not Nixon who was president: Kennedy had “an ethic.” To Castro, Kennedy seemed to have understood “the roots of the problems that generated social nonconformity” in Latin American society, and he and Castro could hold productive discussions (Castro, 1984). Castro’s opinion makes sense because Nixon (before being the president and during) had a prejudice against Latin America in general, as discussed earlier. His prejudice extended to “all Latin countries” including Spain. He said that all Latin countries, such as Italy, France, Spain, and Latin America, “couldn’t handle democracy” and “strong leadership is essential” (FRUS, 2009). Curiously, one of the leading actors during the Cold War, Kennan himself, recognized that democratic institutions were not always best for non-Western Europe and the U.S. and recognized the merits of some authoritarian regimes, such as Salazar’s in Portugal, Mao Zedong’s in China, and even Castro’s in Cuba to some extent (Kennan, 1977, pp. 42–43). In addition, Nixon had stronger ties with dictators than did any of his predecessors (Rabe, 2016, pp. 124–125). This interview was done in 1984, but we see his loaded words. After all, he had witnessed by then various American administrations, including Nixon’s, as well as his resignation in 1974.

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 63 In addition, Castro agreed with some of Kennedy’s ideas, such as the Peace Corps (Szulc, 1987, p. 616). He said “in the American people there has been an idealistic, altruistic feeling”; however, the difference with Cuba is that “American society is not educated in that spirit and our youth is educated in that spirit” (Castro, 1984). Moreover, he was impressed with Kennedy’s attitude when he recognized his error during the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. For Castro, Kennedy seemed to have “the moral courage to take responsibility for what had been done” (Castro, 1984). In fact, Kennedy viewed this as lesson, and it improved his decision-making process in the future. He did not repeat the same mistakes during the Missile Crisis in 1962. In July of that year, Matthews told Kennedy that “Castro is pure Spanish and very vengeful.” Kennedy answered that his error had taught him an important lesson (DePalma, 2006, p. 187). Actually, this “decision making of a leader” was analyzed and cited in various books on leadership. Kennedy demanded that the people make some kind of contribution to the nation. This created a commonality with Castro. In Kennedy’s presidential inaugural address, he demanded that the citizens “pay any price, bear any burden” and stated “ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country.” In this famous speech, Kennedy reminded the people that they were the heirs of the American Revolution. Castro, perhaps because of his Jose Martíism, said that he did not feel hostility toward the American people. On the contrary, he, in defense of himself for the Moncada attack, invoked, among other ideas, those of the Declaration of Independence of 1776. At the time of the interview (1984), Cuba suffered under unfair American policies. In response, Castro invoked this foundational American text in the name of liberty (Castro, 1984). At first glance, there would seem to be no common ground between the two men. But Kennedy’s ancestors were from Ireland, and he was the first Catholic president of the U.S. It is not so strange that Castro was moved by some of Kennedy’s phrases and beliefs. As we will see in the Chapter 7, Castro also felt a kind of sympathy toward President Jimmy Carter (1924–present), who was religious (a Baptist) and a “man of ethics” from Castro’s point of view. However, the leaders’ idealism was not enough to resolve problems in the bilateral relationship, especially in the U.S., where a “democratic” president does not have omnipotent power to do as he pleases.

Kennedy from the point of view of the Franco regime Meanwhile, the Franco regime invited then-President Eisenhower to Spain in 1959, seeking the firm backing of the U.S. both inside and outside Spain. The Franco regime worried that a new “liberal” Democratic administration would take power in the next presidential election. Therefore, Antonio Garrigues, who had personal contact with Kennedy and was considered relatively liberal in the Franco regime, was appointed ambassador to the U.S. (1962–1964) to help build a smoother bilateral relationship.

64  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain Garrigues had acted together with Joseph Kennedy, John’s older brother, during the Spanish Civil War. At that time, the Spanish cities were in conflict, and both men were interrogated, but they were saved by Joseph’s American passport (Garrigues, 1978, pp. 84–88). According to Garrigues, the Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella did not know this fact. Rather, the minister considered him useful because of his strong ties with the U.S. His wife was an American whose father worked for the multinational ITT (the third connection between ITT and diplomacy noted in this book), so even after the Spanish Civil War, he could open a law office and gain American companies as customers in Spain (Garrigues, 1978, p. 86). In 1962, when the Spanish royals, Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofía, visited the U.S. for their honeymoon, the Franco regime did not show interest in this trip. But thanks to Ambassador Garrigues’s efforts, the royal couple not only met President Kennedy and the first lady but were also invited to their villa (Hosoda, 2012, p. 85).2 This might have been the beginning of a back channel between the White House and the Spanish royal family. Still more, after the assassination of Kennedy, Ambassador Garrigues remained such a close friend of Kennedy’s widow (he himself had lost his wife in 1944) that the U.S. ambassador to Spain had to deny rumors about them (Peñafiel, 2001). In 1964, Garrigues was appointed ambassador to the Vatican (Telegraph, 2004). After the death of Franco, Garrigues was appointed minister of justice and served under Franco’s successor, Juan Carlos I. In his book looking back on relations between the U.S., Cuba, and Spain, Garrigues said that “the regimes and the hazards of politics happen, history goes on, and politics must be done not only for each day, but also for past, present and future history” (Garrigues, 1978, p. 103). The discretion of ambassadors seems to be very limited. However, the actors of diplomacy are also human. When Spain had to negotiate harder with the U.S. for the renewal of the agreements, and in a moment when relations with Cuba could influence relations between the U.S. and Cuba, it was fortunate for the Franco regime to have an ambassador to the U.S. like Garrigues, who had something in common with Kennedy. Even Castro respected his long-term point of view.

The U.S. embargo on Cuba, and Spain Trade partners The U.S. broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1961, the year former President Obama was born. In 2017, Cuba and the U.S., under the Obama administration, resumed diplomatic relations. However, the trade embargo on nearly all imports remains in effect as of March 2019. Under the Trump administration, bilateral relations became strained again. Cuba’s diplomatic relations with Spain went in a far different direction. Since the Cuban Revolution in 1959, Spain has maintained diplomatic relations in spite of ups and downs, and it continues strong trade ties in spite of repeated pressure

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 65 from the U.S. So far, we have pointed out some of the reasons why Spain and Cuba had strong diplomatic ties. However, it is also necessary to view the economic ties, as we will see in the following chapters. Originally it was Spain that made Cuba its colony after Christopher Columbus’s first voyage in 1492. From the 15th to the 19th centuries, it was administered by the Viceroyalty of New Spain. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Franco regime stated that the U.S. was exploiting Cuba, utilizing the economic and social structures of the colonial era to distort its “natural evolution.” That is, American ambassadors during the Batista regime worked to exploit conditions in Cuba for the profit of American companies, with sugar as the monoculture. Cuba was dependent economically on the U.S., from the point of view of Spain (MAE, 10/8/1960). Spain, getting out of the autarchic system in the 1950s, tried to join the world market as a newcomer but had difficulty finding a market to export its industrial products. On the other hand, Cuban industry, which had depended heavily on exports to the U.S., had lost many customers after the Revolution in 1959. Therefore, Cuba needed to strengthen its commercial relationship with Spain and other countries. The Cuban Ministry of Commerce sought alternative markets to the U.S., firstly in socialist countries, then in Spain, and thirdly in France. Cuba was particularly keen to improve trade with Spain as a means of procuring replacement parts for its American machinery (MAE, 12/12/1960). In October of 1959, Cuba agreed to replace an agreement with Spain from the Batista era with the Trade and Payments Modus Vivendi. This would be followed in 1963 by another agreement, this one expanding the sugar trade. The needs of both countries were met. However, most of Cuba’s trade with the U.S. was replaced by the Soviet Union. In 1960, the Cuban–Soviet bloc accounted for only 2% of trade; it increased to 80% by the end of 1961 (LaFeber, 2006, p. 213).

Independent Spanish foreign policy Just after the death of Franco in 1975, during the period of democratic transition, the diplomatic accomplishments of the Franco regime were not well understood. However, one aspect of this diplomacy is evaluated here: Spanish “independent” diplomacy. In Spain, Fernando María Castiella succeeded Martín Artajo (1945–1957) as the minister of foreign affairs. A member of the Acción Católica de Propagandistas (ACdP), he had also studied international law. He stayed in the position until 1969, a tenure of about 12 years. He argued for the neutrality of the Mediterranean and the return of Gibraltar, which had been ceded to the U.K. by the Utrecht Treaty in 1713. He insisted on independent Spanish diplomacy and was obsessed with the Gibraltar issue. Castiella negotiated aggressively with the U.S. For Spain, tired from the autarchic economy and isolation after World War II, the Cold War was a kind of “divine aid.” The U.S., emphasizing the geopolitical importance of Spain, signed agreements with Spain in 1953, as discussed earlier. However, ten years later

66  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain in 1963, the negotiations for the renewal of these agreements hit a snag. Castiella believed that Spain had gained significant national power by then, so he approached the negotiations with a bullish attitude toward the U.S., referring to the possible neutrality of the Mediterranean. During the Cold War period, the U.S., which wanted to maintain the right of use of Spanish bases was, in a sense, in a weaker position. Then Spanish ambassador to the U.S., Garrigues studied other security treaties, such as the one between the U.S. and Japan, and thought that they should renew the agreements of 1953 using these as models (Hosoda, 2012, p. 34). However, the U.S. would not concede the point. Moreover, the U.S. viewed the possible neutrality of the Mediterranean during the Cold War as an outrage. In December of 1960, the U.S. demanded that noncommunist countries form an economic blockade against Cuba. The U.S. expected that Spain, with “its moral influence upon the Spanish colony and the Cuban people in general,” would exert its influence. It expected constant action against Cuba by other Ibero-American governments as well (MAE, 7/12/1960). This was viewed as an exercise of soft power. Finally on February 3, 1962, the Kennedy administration declared an embargo on all trade with Cuba “in light of the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet Communism with which the Government of Cuba is publicly aligned” (Kennedy, 1962). The bullish Castiella did not obey the U.S., which demanded a rupture of diplomatic relations between Spain and Cuba. On the contrary, Spain renewed its commercial agreement with Cuba in 1962 and promised to import 60,000 tons of sugar and 2,000 tons of tobacco. This was because in the 1960s, as a result of economic growth, Spain was transitioning from an agricultural society into an industrial society, and it could not produce enough sugar through domestic production alone. Therefore, they needed an agreement with Cuba in order to secure a reliable and cheaper source of sugar (Lambie, 1993, p. 243; Hosoda, 2010, p. 92; MAE, 26/2/1962). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs defended the special position of Spain and told Garrigues that this was so “only because the trade between Spain and Cuba does not coincide exactly with the objectives of the US policy in the short term” (Sedó Gómez, 8/11/1963). In the diplomacy of Castiella, the independent and unique stance of Spain, unyielding to U.S. pressure toward Cuba, was emphasized repeatedly. This can be seen in the telegrams and other documents of the Spanish Foreign Ministry. For example, the historical tie between Spain and Latin America was noted: Spain always maintained “the spiritual ties that have arisen from its civilizing work and permanent historical ties, regardless of any temporary political contingency” (MAE, 13/7/1963). With its independent diplomacy, Spain was thinking about its long-term relationship with Cuba.

The problem of Iberia airlines After the Missile Crisis of October 1962, Secretary of State, Dean Rusk (1961– 1969) again pressured Ambassador Garrigues to break diplomatic relations with

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 67 Cuba (Garrigues, 1978, p. 103). Moreover, the U.S. demanded that Spain stop flights between Madrid and Havana by the national carrier Iberia “for the solidarity of the West.” At that moment, Czechoslovakia permitted Iberia to pass through its airspace on flights from Switzerland and Madrid bound for Cuba. The U.S. intended to limit the circulation of people and material between Cuba and the East via these flights. Aeroflot, the Soviet airline, did not start its service between Moscow and Havana until June of 1963. Of course, for Castro, it was important to maintain sea and air routes with Spain. The regular flights between Cuba and Spain were important for both the West and the East. At that time, Iberia maintained between two and four direct flights to Cuba from Spain per month. However, in response to the U.S. demand, it temporarily suspended them after the Missile Crisis. The final authority for this decision was not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but Franco himself. He fully realized that Spain had to maintain its diplomatic ties with Cuba. However, Spain also had to maintain a good relationship with the U.S. In addition, the ocean line Compañía Trasatlántica Española stopped its service in 1962 in response to pressure from anti-Castro paramilitary groups in Miami (Moralès, 2014, p. 89). Notwithstanding, counselor Caldevilla in the Spanish Embassy in Havana appealed to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asserting that both sea and air routes should be reopened as soon as possible because they were beginning to have problems exchanging diplomatic pouches. He further asserted that if communication with Madrid were curtailed, they (the Spanish delegation) had to consider withdrawing from Havana (Caldevilla, 3/12/1962). The Ministry asserted this point to the U.S. in order to reopen the Iberia flights. In February of 1963, it was decided at a cabinet meeting of the Franco regime to reopen the Iberia flights (Moralès, 2014, p. 84). Iberia planned to resume weekly flights between Madrid and Havana in May of 1964 (Department of State, 8/5/1964). There was sufficient demand to justify the flights. In fact, passenger traffic had increased so much that Iberia had to cut back its cargo service (Spain to Cut Back Air Cargo to Cuba, 1964).3 In March of that year, Jorge Taberna Latasa, the Spanish chargés d’affaires in Havana (1961–1964), returned to Madrid and offered his view of the Cuban political situation to an American diplomat, the first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid – once at the home of Ángel Sagaz, director of the North America diplomatic policy department (later he would become ambassador to Egypt and the U.S.) and a second time at the home of this American diplomat. He sent this “very interesting” information to the Department of State (MAE, 26/3/1963). The fact that these meetings took place in private places suggests that Spain might have given the U.S. interesting information about Cuba.

Fight against the commercial embargo In spite of American pressure, economic relations between Spain and Cuba strengthened. In 1963, Spain predicted that sugar production would decrease,

68  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain driving up the price of sugar on the international market. Therefore, while Spain worried about higher prices, Cuba could fix the price higher and signed an advantageous agreement with Spain. At the same time, Spain was incrementally increasing the exportation of industrial products, so the amount of trade of both countries increased sharply. Exports from Spain to Cuba increased from $1.4 million (in 1962) to $9.2 million, while imports increased from $8.6 million to $21.7 million. The trade imbalance with Spain was curtailed by Spanish fees for services, including freight, travel (Iberia Airlines), expenses of diplomatic representation, and expenses of the fishing fleet (Recarte, 1980, p. 185). It is unusual for a head of state to talk about substantial things with a diplomat at the level of chargés d’affaires. However, on November 19, Taberna talked with Castro from 11:00 p.m. to 3:00 a.m. For the ex-guerrilla, it would be easy, but for a Spanish diplomat it might have been difficult. In reality, Taberna was highly regarded by the Cuban authority, noting that he “had managed to create a current of sympathy with the high personalities of the regime and, especially with Castro himself” (Embajador de España en Paris, 24/6/1965). At that moment, Castro expressed his desire for ships from Spain for the transportation and fishery industries. What is more, Castro referred to his family origin in Spain and highly estimated the value of the Spanish race. In addition, he praised Spain for always maintaining its independent diplomacy (Taberna, 9/11/1963). It can be said that Castro knew well what Castiella wanted from his diplomacy. Additionally, he and Castro had something in common – their obsessive cause against the U.S.

The balanced diplomacy between the U.S. and Cuba Spain, wanting to maintain good relationships with both the U.S. and Cuba, skillfully persisted somehow in maintaining a fragile balance. The U.S. demanded that third countries respect the embargo against Cuba, under the pretext of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of December 1963, after the assassination of President Kennedy on November 22. The Franco regime was frustrated by this unilateral measure, which it saw as irrational. First, though Western countries maintained trade with the socialist countries, with which Spain did not have diplomatic relations, Spain did not export to Cuba “strategic materials” but was criticized for her import of sugar. Second, Spain could not expect compensation even if she were to stop trade with Cuba. And last, if Spain retreated from Cuba, the U.S. would sweep in on the Cuban market in the post-Castro period and make it difficult for Spain to reenter the market there (Hosoda, 2010, p. 96). That same year, Cuba started to negotiate for the import of fishing and commercial ships with a Spanish shipping company. Castro told the company that Cuba wanted to buy three large ships in 1964, ten in 1965, and 15 in 1966, apart from other smaller ships. However, the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain weighed the political situation of that

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 69 moment and felt that an agreement for 28 large ships plus small ships at once would be “imprudent.” Instead, it suggested an order of two or three ships, in a deal to be negotiated between the private sector and the Cuban authority, not through an agreement between the two governments (MAE, 2/12/1963). At the same time, Spain was involved in the West through the U.S.–Spanish agreements, so she naturally had to be subordinated to the U.S. In 1965, Minister Castiella asserted to Secretary of State Dean Rusk that Spain was seriously making efforts to reduce trade and contact with Cuba, adding that it was Cuba that wanted to increase trade and that Spain did not want to break totally with Cuba considering its common cultural heritage and many human ties (Department of State, 7/10/1965). In other words, the Franco regime showed to the U.S. its “subordinated attitude” but did not totally yield on Cuba policy. The Spanish government said that whether the Department of State liked it or not, Spain would maintain its relationship with Latin American countries regardless of their type of government. Moreover, if the U.S. wanted to maintain the right to use Spanish bases and also wanted Spain to break relations with Cuba, Spain thought that it deserved “compensation” (Sagáz, 24/12/1963). Despite U.S. pressure, Spain acted to maintain long and thin commercial ties with Cuba, in both principle and practice. In comparison, the Japanese government, led by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida (1946–1947, 1948–1954) had been focusing diplomacy on economic issues and did not intervene in the private sector’s trade of sugar. As previously noted, Cuba, rolling out socialist policies in the 1960s, had a very realistic trade policy and pursued expansion of trade with capitalist countries such as Spain and Japan (Tanaka, 2012). After a half century, it seems clear that the U.S. took an economic loss by refraining from trade with Cuba. Related to Cuba, it was the Americans who persisted with the economic blockade, despite its own long-term interests. In Franco’s Spain and Castro’s Cuba, democratic presidential campaigns did not exist, so leaders were free from the results-oriented pressure of legislators, lobbyists, and voters, which made it possible for them to take the long view of matters.

The internationalism of Cuba and Africa African culture as Cuban folklore? Now we return to the view from Cuba. Cuban “independent” diplomacy proposed internationalism against the imperialism of the U.S. Cuba placed particular importance on its relationship with African countries, and this would be reflected in its policy toward the U.S. The U.S., for its part, in 1967, considered Cuban foreign policy to be “almost entirely a Castro Foreign policy, developed and fostered by Castro himself” because of “a complex structure of offices, committees and agencies” and because they believed that “Castro is still keenly interested in creating a ‘third force’ in international politics.” The U.S. also believed that by participating in various

70  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain international organizations, Cuba was trying to obtain “certain technical assistance to the Cuban economy” (CIA, 9/10/1967). As we saw in the Introduction, Africa was Castro’s stage for activities that showed him to be “independent” from the Soviet Union. As discussed in Chapter 2, Cuba historically has had strong ties with Africa. Various religions of African origin, especially the Santería, brought to Cuba by the Yoruba from Western Africa, were interwoven with Cuban Catholicism and had significant influence on Cuban music, religion, literature, and society. Before the Revolution, they said that most of the Cuban people were Catholic, but, as we have seen, Catholicism was extended primarily to the upper class. Among the Afro-Cuban poor, syncretism of the Santería prevailed. Nevertheless, racism persisted, and Castro wanted to construct an egalitarian society. After the Revolution, the music and dance rituals of the Santería were performed with greater frequency by the national companies. These were used to establish and promote Cuban folklore culture as a bulwark against American culture and as a form of soft power in African countries (Ramos, 2007, pp. 266–268). We have to remember that around the time of the Cuban Revolution, the African continent was prominent. In 1960, which was called the Year of Africa, 17 African countries became independent. Nationalism spread throughout Africa as the decolonization movement spread worldwide. For example, Spain had a colony in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as control of part of Morocco, which became independent from France in 1956. It also held Equatorial Guinea, which did not become independent until 1968. In addition, in 1961, the first conference of the Non-Aligned Movement was held in Yugoslavia, and Cuba participated.

To a hotel in Harlem In addition to his efforts with Africans, Castro also sought solidarity with African Americans. In the U.S., the Civil Rights Movement was flourishing in the 1950s and 1960s. In September of 1960, Castro was going to visit New York to speak at the General Assembly of the UN. The Cuban Ambassador to the UN had chosen a first-class hotel, the Waldorf Astoria, for their stay. It was the same hotel where Ambassador Smith and his wife had held a “charity” party in 1958, as noted in Chapter 3. However, a young Cuban diplomat named Raúl Roa4 had a different opinion. Before the Revolution, Robert Taber, an American journalist for CBS who interviewed the guerrillas in the Sierra Maestra (Chapter 3), formed the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in 1960. Taber was more radical than Matthews of The New York Times and was too involved in the Revolution personally to continue working for CBS. The Committee was supported by Left-wing intellectuals such as French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Here, African American intellectuals and artists felt that “Cubans are the enemy of our enemy” and sympathized with the incidents in Cuba as being part of a liberation war (Yui, 2012, p. 38). Taber had contact with

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 71 Malcolm X, an African American Muslim and human rights activist. Malcolm X suggested that Castro should stay at the Theresa Hotel in Harlem in New York City. This hotel was called the “Waldorf of Harlem” in the 1940s. Roa thought this would build solidarity between African Americans and the Hispanic world. In the end, the Shelburne in Midtown, near the Consulate General, was selected (Mealy, 1993). It was the second day of their stay at the Shelburne when problems occurred. In front of the hotel, radical Cuban exiles gathered, and they intimidated the hotel staff by throwing rocks. The manager of the hotel told Roa that they would need $20,000 as a security fee. Hearing this, Castro said, “That’s a problem for the New York police” and called the manager a gangster, adding that “we are not going to pay a single cent.” Roa, serving as interpreter between the manager and Castro, as there were few Cubans who could speak English in the delegation, was told by the hotel that if they could not pay, they would be evicted from the hotel. The Cuban side was capable of paying this amount, as they paid more for other expenses later. However, there was another problem: The Cubans kept live chickens in the hotel in order to eat fresh meat. In the Caribbean, cockfighting is popular, and for Cubans, the chickens are very familiar. Castro’s delegation, expelled from the Shelburne, planned to go to an army and navy store to purchase tents to encamp in front of the U.N. Of course, Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld wanted to avoid such a scene, while the best hotels offered suites and entire floors free of charge. Roa suggested to his father, the minister of foreign affairs, that they stay at the Theresa Hotel in Harlem, whose owner was African American. Castro showed interest in this idea and agreed to stay there upon hearing that this was the recommendation of Malcolm X through Taber (Mealy, 1993, pp. 32–37).

The interview with Malcolm X in Harlem Castro became the first international leader to come to Harlem. Of course, he mentioned this incident in his speech at the UN. It is certain that developing countries pay a very high price to send a delegation to the UN, as Castro mentioned. He communicated this very dramatically. In addition, his “debut” speech at the General Assembly was selected as the second craziest things ever said during a U.N. speech by Foreign Policy (this article was written in 2009, and the first one was the speech of Indian U.N. envoy, lasted more than eight hours in 1957). It took four and a half hours. In it, he criticized the imperialism of the U.S. and the presidential campaigns of Nixon and Kennedy. The third craziest was Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s speech, and the fourth was made by American Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. From this we can deduce that the General Assembly was in an uproar at the time (Keating, 2009). Foreign Policy cited the words of Castro: “Were Kennedy not a millionaire, illiterate, and ignorant, then he would obviously understand that you cannot revolt against the peasants.” He wanted to say that Kennedy did not

72  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain understand “guerrillas.” In reality, successive American presidents would struggle to understand guerrillas during the Vietnam War. At the same time, Franco understood that a guerrilla war was painful, and, as will be discussed, he suggested to President Lyndon B. Johnson (1908–1973) that the U.S. should withdraw from Vietnam. Ironically, the U.S. would later support regional guerrillas in Central America. At the Theresa Hotel, Castro granted interviews to African journalists and Malcolm X. The meeting with Malcolm X lasted only 15 minutes, and they did not settle any important matters. However, when Castro was in the U.S., enthusiasm for the civil rights movement was high, and African countries were struggling for independence. The fact that an international leader such as Castro met with an African American leader in Harlem was very symbolic and important. In the interview, Castro argued that he works for racial equality but would not interfere in domestic policy (Mealy, 1993, p. 43). In this interview, only two journalists and one cameraman were permitted. One of them saw Castro throwing feathers off the terrace. The people below cheered. They were especially interested in Juan Almeida, the black hero in the Revolution “as if everyone knew his name and knew about his role and exploits in the revolution” (Mealy, 1993, pp. 18, 19, 47). He had traveled with Castro’s brothers and was exiled to Mexico. He also landed on the Granma and become the vice president of the Cuban Council of State. He was a musician during the guerrilla period and composed more than 300 songs. Almeida was famous among the people and apparently well known in the U.S. Castro said that he wanted to stay longer in Harlem because he thought that blacks would be more sympathetic toward the Revolution (Szulc, 1987, p. 598). During this stay, Castro met several dignitaries, including Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, the second United Arab Republic (UAR) President Abdel Nasser, the first Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah, and first Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru – all at the Theresa Hotel. Khrushchev said that “going to a black hotel in a black district could show a double demonstration: contrary to the discriminatory policy of the United States of America against blacks, and also against Cuba” (Szulc, 1987, p. 599). Every action of a big-name politician has some intent behind it. The presence of Castro in Harlem was more significant than many understood at the time.

Malcolm X and his heritage Roa pointed out that the narrow vision of Malcolm X was broadened after this meeting. That is, Malcolm X understood that it was not only African Americans who were poor and oppressed but also the Indians, Chicanos, and Hispanics too (Mealy, 1993, p. 56). It is true that, for Malcolm X, this meeting with Castro was the first step to becoming an international theorist. He regarded Cuba very highly as that country confronted a giant and praised it as a model that African Americans could use in their fight against racism. He admired Castro and Che Guevara. The three of them shared ideas of anti-imperialism and armed resistance

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 73 against the U.S. (Jenkins, 2008). Also, both Malcolm X and Castro utilized call and response in their speeches in order create a sense of solidarity between the audience and the speaker (Ara, 2009, p. 130). Malcolm X was assassinated in 1965. Just before that, he had planned to visit Cuba. Although he never visited Cuba, Malcolm X became a popular and well known African American leader in Cuba. Thirty years after that historic meeting, in May 1990, the Malcolm X Speaks in the 90s Symposium was held in Cuba. Castro mentioned the meeting and recalled Malcolm X. At the end of the symposium, a declaration was issued, calling for people to “deepen our solidarity with the Cuban Revolution” (Mealy, 1993, pp. 81–84). The thought and speech of Malcolm X influenced rap music too. In 1993, the Malcolm X Grassroots Movement was formed to defend the human rights of African Americans. Black August was formed as a part of this project in order to “educate rappers and hip-hop audiences on the plight of Black political prisoners,” and some rappers and activists went to Cuba (Chang, 2005, p. 449). These international solidarity actions had their origin in the 1960s.

The Cold War, internationalism, and race in Cuba Castro stated that we are Latin “African” when he dispatched troops to the crisis in Angola in the 1970s (Kudo, 2002, p. 21). In reality, many Cubans rushed there, viewing it as a crisis related to their roots. Castro, in the middle of the Cold War, searched for independent diplomacy, distancing Cuba from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as we have seen. He repeated publicly and privately that “he is not, and resents being considered a Soviet puppet” (CIA, 1/4/1964). Other scholars had the same opinion, including Domínguez (2009, pp. 14–15) and Gleijeses (2010, p. 345). In Latin America, according to Kudo, they distinguish race mainly based on skin color, but such classifications are not so fixed. In Cuba, the lines between whites, mixed race, and blacks are blurred and unsettled, and, depending on the situation, they refer to different “races” (Kudo, 2006, p. 225). Cuba fought in Africa not because of the East–West conflict but because of North–South conflicts and imperialism. According to Gleijeses, who had investigated Cuban policy toward Africa, for Castro this battle against imperialism was “more than against the United States: it is the war against despair and oppression in the Third World” (Gleijeses, 2010, p. 348). According to some experts, even the export of revolution was a kind of “religious calling” or “mission” (Brown, 2017, p. 195). We have to remember that, on the Isla de Pinos (Isla de la Juventud) in the 1970s, there were boarding schools for Cubans and young African refugees. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, they were closed. Sarría, who saved Castro’s life in 1953 as mentioned in Chapter 3, was AfricanCuban. After the revolution, he was promoted to captain. Meanwhile, Almeida, mentioned earlier, was another famous black in Cuba. However, after the Revolution, there were not so many African-Cubans with university appointments in the higher levels of the military or on the Central Committee of the Cuban

74  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain Communist Party. Then in the 1980s, the number of African-Cubans who departed Cuba increased (Moore, 1997, p. 225). It is difficult to say that in Cuba, African-Cubans were treated with total equality. Notwithstanding, it is true that Cubans have sympathy for Africans outside of Cuba. Considering the sympathy of African Americans toward Cuba, there was a chance that bilateral relations would improve between the U.S. and Cuba under President Obama and Raúl Castro. On December 15, 2013, during the funeral of the first African president Nelson Mandela, they met for the first time and had a “friendly” conversation.

Cuban society in Miami Cubans in Miami Finally, we analyze Cuba and Spain from Miami, where the powerful anti-Castro society of Cuban exiles was growing. It was during the 15th century when Spaniards reached Cuba. In the 16th century, a Spanish conquistador reached Florida and started the conquest of North America. After that, Florida belonged to Spain, then England, and again Spain. In 1819, the U.S. purchased it. Miami, the city on the southern part of the Florida peninsula, was the epicenter of the anti-Batista movement when the dictator reigned. In 1958, almost 10,000 Cubans lived in Miami, and one-third of them had fled from the Batista regime. During 1959, almost 35,000 anti-Castro Cubans left the island. The Cuban exiles had to search for their identity in the U.S., a culturally diverse country, using “religious and other traditions as an enduring bridge to the homeland” (Poyo, 2007, pp. 271, 286–287), because they were ready to return at any moment. For that, Catholicism played a significant role. For Cuban exiles and for Operation Peter Pan (Chapter 4), it was the Roman Catholic Church, not the federal government, that offered assistance to these people (Levine, 2001, pp. 41–42). Most Cuban Catholics in Miami insisted that “Castro-communism” meant that Castro was an atheist and as such an enemy of Catholicism. This view became so pervasive that when the Vatican tried to take “a more reflective and tolerant approach,” it found it difficult to sway people’s minds even when most other Latin American military dictators were far more brutal, even in the 1970s (Poyo, 2007, pp. 122, 273). The geographic distance between Miami and Cuba is about 150 to 160 kilometers; it is natural that the existence of a communist regime, with missiles stationed there by the Soviet Union, was seen as a grave threat by the U.S. The majority of Cubans who were exiled to Miami just after the Revolution were relatively wealthy, educated, and professional people, including entrepreneurs, intellectuals, and others who had previously held high positions in Cuba. Gloria Estefan, the famous singer, was exiled when she was very young. People like her not only introduced Cuban culture and their way of life but also had

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 75 significant financial power to pressure U.S. administrations to overthrow the Castro regime. The U.S. government invested billions of dollars into this community “to transform it into a showcase of success vis-à-vis the economically strangled Cubans” (Yúdice, 2003, pp. 196–197). Thus Miami, unlike Cuba itself, became “a center of commerce and of recording and distributing music but not of artistic effervescence” (Moore, 2006, pp. 254–255). Belying the brightness of sunny Miami were various dark battles within the society of the Cuban exiles. The community was divided into various factions, such as Batista groups, Castro groups, and so on. The Cuban exile Pérez Firmat described it in his work, El año que viene, estamos en Cuba (1997), based on his experience in the exile community, with humor but also with criticism. Castro’s sister Juanita had a particularly painful life there. She was not sympathetic with her brother Fidel, and she collaborated with the CIA, along with the Brazilian ambassador and his wife. She was exiled in 1964 and made accusations against the Castro regime from Mexico. But she could not be accepted easily in Miami because she was a relative of Castro (Castro Ruz, 2014). In a sense, she was a victim, utilized by the CIA and affected by her brother who was going to stick to his cause.

The incident of Spanish Counselor Caldevilla, suspected CIA spy Now we look at how Spain coped with these movements in Miami. In March 1961, just before the Bay of Pigs incident when the CIA attempted to overthrow the Castro regime using Cuban exiles, the counselor of the Spanish Embassy in Havana, Jaime Caldevilla, recommended to the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Spain establish a Consulate General in Miami as soon as possible in order to keep up with the changing world situation (EEH, 11/3/1961). According to the Spanish Consulate, established in May 1962, about 120,000 Cubans lived in Miami, and this number increased by 7,000 every month. However, at that moment, they believed that the Cubans in Miami were already losing their decisive political importance, and all political decisions about Cuba were being decided in Washington (El Consulado General de España en Miami, 12/5/1962). We have to remember that this was in the middle of the Cold War, only five months before the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Consulate reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Madrid the information that could not be gathered in Cuba – information that served to modify the biased vision of Spain toward Cuba. Caldevilla is known to have met Franco in 1962, 1965, and 1966, on return trips from Cuba. Though he had worked for 20 years in total, first as press attaché and lastly as counselor in Cuba, in the summer of 1966 he was expelled from Cuba because he was suspected of communicating secretly with the CIA (Merry del Val, 18/12/1969). According to the Cuban government, he “intolerably abused the diplomatic immunity and privileges” with his secretary and his wife, distributing correspondence with instructions, received by diplomatic pouch, for

76  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain counterrevolutionary purposes. He was also accused of illegally removing foreign currency and jewels from Cuba (Spanish Counselor in Havana declared persona non grata, 28/5/1966). The Ministry in Madrid had been informed about him via the Cuban ambassador to Paris, who praised the works of Taberna, Spanish chargés d’affaires in Havana, but pointed out the anti-Taberna campaign by Caldevilla at the Spanish Embassy in Havana (Embajador de España en Paris, 24/6/1965; MAE, 31/5/1966; Ministerio de Interior, 2/7/1964). In addition, Caldevilla helped Castro’s sister, Juanita, flee to Mexico. In his letter to Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella, Caldevilla wrote, “Castro is nervous and his sister Juanita (to whom Rosa and I are trying to [tratamos]) help has gone to Mexico today” (Caldevilla, 21/9/1962). It is true that the tension between the two countries was increasing, but the Cuban government intended to consider this incident as a blip and that it should not influence the overall bilateral relationship (MAE, 8/2/1967). After that, Caldevilla worked as the director of the magazine Iglesia-Mundo (Church-World) in Spain. He died in 1976. It is clear that he had strong ties to the Catholic Church. It is also possible that he had strong ties to the Cuban American Catholics, exiled from Cuba and living in Miami. Although it was a dramatic incident, the bilateral diplomatic relationship was maintained as if nothing had happened after the ambassador and the counselor were expelled from Cuba.

Attack on Spanish ships Related to Miami, there were other incidents “against” Spain. As discussed earlier, Iberia was the only European airline that offered services between Havana and Europe. Therefore, not a few Cuban exiles went to the U.S. via Madrid. After the trade blockade began in 1962, Spain continued its trade with Cuba. At that moment, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained to Cuban exiles in Miami why they continued trading with Cuba. First, Spain needed a stable supply of sugar, and second, both the Spanish government and public opinion were very skeptical about the effect of the blockade imposed by the U.S. (Hosoda, 2010, p. 97). Nevertheless, the radical anti-Castro faction in Miami attacked Spanish ships. In 1964, Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR), supported by the U.S., attacked the merchant ship Sierra de Aránzasu as it moved toward Cuba, about 130 kilometers from Guantanamo. The ship was carrying not armaments but groceries and daily necessities. The MRR, which “emerged initially from a coalition of Catholics” (Poyo, 2007, p. 59), confused this Spanish ship with the Cuban Sierra Maestra, a cargo vessel of the Cuban merchant marines. The White House denied that it had supported this attack (Brown, 2013, pp. 115–120, 2017, pp. 165, 188). The next year, another Spanish ship, the Satrústegui, was sabotaged by an antiCastro group in Miami, supported by the CIA, while anchored in Puerto Rico, which is a territory of the U.S. (Etcheverry Vázquez, 2014).

Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain 77 The Spanish government protested to the U.S. through diplomatic channels and asked for an explanation of these attacks, which caused Spanish casualties. The Department of State replied that the FBI was conducting an investigation, but in any case Spain should break with Cuba (Palacios Bañuelos, 2013, p. 55). The problems caused by Cuban exiles in Miami pressured Spain to revise its bilateral relationship with Cuba.

Cuban music and the transformation of Miami In the 1960s in the U.S., there were many social changes and movements, such as multiculturalism, a counterculture related to political identity, rock and roll as the music of resistance, drugs, the sexual revolution, and so on. However, after the end of the Vietnam War in the 1970s, American culture reverted to conservatism, the political power of the counterculture weakened, and the establishment reclaimed the musical industry. As the counterculture receded, disco music, especially African and Hispanic, became popular in the U.S. By the 1980s, dance and drag clubs had become popular escapes from the more conservative culture of the era. Miami became the center of activity for famous Spanish singers such as Rafael, Julio Iglesias and his son Enrique, and other Latin artists. As Rabe argued, by the end of the 1960s, the U.S. could not eliminate the Castro brothers but could contain the Cuban Revolution and prevent its spread to other Latin American countries and internationally. Since the death of Che Guevara in 1967, revolutionary movements were no longer a threat to Latin America, and Soviet influence in the Western Hemisphere remained minimal (2016, pp. 83–85, 118). From a social point of view, the Cuban exiles’ quality of life changed gradually; not only political refugees but also economic refugees were increasing. This created more complicated relations among Cuba, the U.S. and Spain. Further, Castro’s Cuba was rapidly finding solutions to poverty, racism, illiteracy, and other social ills. Although the goals of Liberation Theology (Chapter 4) were not totally achieved in Latin America by the end of 1960s, progress was evident, and the ideology began to spread. At the same time in the U.S., other Latinos such as Mexicans and Puerto Ricans were responding positively to its social projects. However, Cuban Catholics in exile, obsessed with “social justice,” were insistently “blurring the line between Catholic and communist ideals” (Poyo, 2007, pp. 147, 152–153, 215–216). In 1977, Kennan pointed out that Cuban exiles, as well as other lobbies, had succeeded “in selling themselves repeatedly to the American intelligence community” by claiming “a common anticommunism” during the Cold War. However these groups “in other respects, . . . have very little in common.” The interests of Cuban exiles and American national interests “never coincide entirely” (Kennan, 1977, p. 61). In sum, the exiles in Miami and Caldevilla appealed to “Castro-communism” sentiments, which were seen as anti-Catholic. This allowed them to leverage

78  Anti-Americanism in Cuba and Spain successive U.S. administrations’ support during the Cold War, while Castro was more practical and flexible enough to negotiate. The three actors, the U.S., the Catholic Church, and Castro’s Cuba, changed the balance of power: the Catholics, united behind Castro at the beginning against the Batista regime, now supported the U.S. in its anti-Castro efforts.

Notes 1 The effect of U.S.–Cuban relations on the presidential campaign became apparent in 2000, when votes in Miami were crucial to the Republicans in the election, but the origin was here. In addition, the Obama administration’s approach to Cuba from 2014 can also be seen as an attempt by the Democrats to demonstrate successful diplomacy before the Presidential campaign of 2016. 2 At that moment, the prince had not been nominated to be Franco’s successor; however, the Department of State recommended that the White House meet him, suggesting they saw the possibility of his becoming king. During the Johnson administration, the prince did not meet the president but was invited to tea by the first lady. 3 For details about the Iberia problem, see (Moralès, 2014). 4 His father, also named Raúl Roa, was the minister of foreign affairs 1959–1976.

6 People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists

In this chapter, I analyze Franco Spain’s development of foreign policy toward Cuba from its inception through its transformation, from the second half of the 1960s to the first half of the 1970s. During the Cold War, the geopolitical importance of Spain to the U.S. was steadily increasing. In addition, Spain’s economy was recovering, and it gained access to the international market. In doing so, Spain gained power that allowed it to become a tough negotiator against the U.S. In this chapter, I show how trade and the détente of the Cold War influenced the Spanish–Cuban–American relationship, considering also the role played by two other Galicians who had indispensable nongovernmental ties with Cuba.

Passion for the motherland Franco’s cause Franco had shown a certain kind of esteem toward Castro. This can be explained by his sympathy for former colonies and by their shared sense of Hispanidad. Moreover, their shared Galician background might have played a role. As we have seen so far, Castro’s power derived from the guerilla movement, which advanced the causes of democracy, patriotism, and anti-imperialism on behalf of his people. However, strangely, Franco also had sympathy for Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese leader, who did not share commonalities such as colonial ties, Hispanidad, and so on, as Castro and Franco shared. So how can we explain the fact that Franco felt sympathy for Ho? While Castro was involved with guerrilla activities before he came to power, Franco fought the patriotic guerillas in Morocco in order to defend “one Spain.” Franco was not a so-called intellectual, and he did not aim to become a historic personality, as Castro did. He did, however, consider Charles V and Philip II, kings of the Habsburg Monarchy, as his rivals. However, according to a diplomatic source, the contemporaries Franco obsessed about most were Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro, all of whom had “an impressive mastery of guerrilla warfare” and who had defeated regular armies using guerrilla tactics (Roy, 2009, p. 27). To begin with, the word “guerrilla” is the diminutive form of the Spanish word “guerra,” which means “war.” It was first used at the beginning of the

80  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 19th century when Spaniards fought against the invasion of Napoleon. They were fighting for their motherland against an enemy. In this sense, we can see the commonalities among Ho Chi Minh, Castro, and Franco. Franco regarded the nationalist who fought for their motherland such as Mao and Ho very highly. He was also interested in the independent diplomacy that Charles De Gaulle had searched for.1 In short, Franco’s cause was informed by defense of Hispanidad, or the motherland.

Ho and Franco Franco judged the situation of Vietnam coolly and objectively from a distance. When Franco received a letter from U.S. President Johnson asking him to reconsider his position and offer assistance for the war in Vietnam, Franco was unmoved, confident that the U.S. would not defeat the guerillas. As Franco himself had fought in North Africa, he argued that it would be very difficult to defeat subversion in the jungle with conventional weapons, as in the case of Batista’s army, which could not fight against Castro’s guerillas in the Sierra Maestra. Franco added in his response to Johnson that: Although subversion in Vietnam may at first glance seem to be a military problem, it really is, in my opinion, a profound political problem; one included in the destiny of new nations. It is not very easy for the West to understand their innermost and deeply rooted problems. Their struggle for independence has stimulated nationalist sentiments. Because the people bet their destiny, he felt that the only effective way of confronting Western imperialism was through communism. He even said that “we have to help these nations to find their political way just as we have found our own” (FRUS, 2001). Franco told Johnson that, although he had not met with Ho, he praised him: [I]n view of his record and his efforts to expel the Japanese, first, the Chinese next, and the French later, we must give him credit for being a patriot who cannot be indifferent to the annihilation of his country. And apart from his well-known reputation as being a tough adversary, he could, without doubt, be the man of the hour needed by Vietnam. (FRUS, 2001) At last, however, Franco did respond to the American request, dispatching more than 50 Spanish doctors and combat medics, recruited secretly, from 1966 to 1971. These individuals were stationed 45 kilometers south of Saigon. They played a very active humanitarian role, and during the first six months treated more than 23,000 wounded, 70% of whom were Vietcong. For their efforts, Spain heaped decorations upon them (Españoles en Vietnam. La mission secreta de Franco, no date).

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 81 In reality, successive American administrations did not understand what guerrilla warfare is. Franco might have insisted on this point to Johnson, who could not end the war in Vietnam and was getting bogged down there.

Something Galician: Minister Manuel Fraga with bathing suits Now, to make clear what is Galician or Galician-esque to Castro and Franco, I analyze two Galicians who were fighting for the cause and who worked under the Franco regime. These two men had a significant effect on Cuba. Salvador de Madariaga, mentioned in Chapter 1, was a historian and diplomat. Born in Galicia, he lived for a long time in foreign countries while local politics in Spain were controlled by the local dictator or cacique. According to him, “local government, through the most energetic and capable man, will probably always be the basis of Spanish political life”, and they, as if actors in a drama, were driven not by principles, as the French were, but by their personalities (Madariaga, 1951, pp. 195–201). We can understand this opinion if we analyze some examples of Galician leaders, including Franco. As mentioned in Chapter 5, in 1964 and 1965, Spanish ships were attacked by Cuban exiles in Miami. Minister of Information and Tourism Manuel Fraga (1962–1969) criticized the U.S., pointing out that the CIA was involved behind the scenes. He also chided the American Ambassador to Spain, Angier B. Duke (Conversation with the Chief of State, Generalisimo Francisco Franco in Madrid at 12:00 noon, 1/3/1965). As Fraga’s father had immigrated to Cuba and Fraga himself lived in Cuba when he was young, he might have felt it necessary to argue for the importance of the Spanish–Cuban relationship to the U.S. On January 17, 1966, a B-52 bomber of the U.S. Airforce carrying four hydrogen bombs collided with a U.S. KC-135 tanker near Palomares, situated on the Mediterranean coast, near Almería in Spain. Three of these bombs were found immediately, but it took more than three months to find the last one. Although the Franco regime censored much information, this incident was broadcasted widely. In March, Fraga, then minister of information and tourism, jumped into the cold Mediterranean with American Ambassador Duke in order to demonstrate to the people that the sea was safe, free from radioactive contamination. From the water, they waved to the press. Photographs taken of this event impressed many people, not only at that moment but also later. Fraga, the former diplomat, was also Galician and a fighter for the cause.

A Galician entrepreneur: Barreiros with Franco and Castro Now, we analyze a Galician who was not a politician but rather a businessperson with dealings in Cuba. The most famous Galician in the business world at the time was Eduardo Barreiros, from Ourense, located inland from Galicia. The Franco regime founded the National Institute of Industry (INI), a state-owned holding company after their triumph in the Spanish Civil War. After the failure of the autarky, the Franco regime tried to promote industrialization. In the early

82  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 1950s, Barreiros expanded his business (Barreiros Diesel) in Madrid, promoted diesel fuel, and produced tracks. His company was private and expanded to the U.S. and Cuba. While there was some friction with the INI, Barreiros had a good relationship with Franco. It is curious that his company was recognized abroad before becoming famous in Spain. Once he won a bid for the Portuguese army, he was asked by Franco why he had not produced on a large scale in Spain. Barreiros answered that the Ministry of Industry had frustrated his efforts. After that, he was supported by the Franco regime, and he frequently visited the Palace of Pardo, where Franco lived. Asked by the press whether Franco respected him because both were Galician, Barreiros denied it. He explained that the reason Franco respected him was that Barreiros had contributed to Spain by creating national wealth and employment (Gómez-Santos, 2006, p. 253). It was Barreiros who was the “motor,” both in name and reality. Under the Franco regime, Barreiros Diesel was extended to Cuba too. The relations between Cuba and Barreiros Diesel went well, more or less, until 1965, and the company exported a number of trucks and engines. In Cuba, there was a technical service section. In 1963, Barreiros Diesel concluded an agreement with Chrysler, and in 1969, this American company held the majority of stock in Barreiros Diesel, so it was converted to an American capital company. Therefore, this company had to obey the American policy of blockade against Cuba and could not export replacement parts. However, Barreiros did not follow the embargo and in fact gave parts to Cuban messengers at a cheap price. In addition, he offered postponement of payment (Gómez-Santos, 2006, p. 224).

Barreiros goes to Cuba Retired from Chrysler, Barreiros stepped away from the automobile industry for ten years. However, in the late 1970s, he competed in the bid process for Nissan, the Japanese company, and won. Apparently he still wanted to work in the automobile industry. He immigrated to Cuba and became a counselor to Castro, trying to modernize the old Soviet-type factories (Fundación Eduardo Barreiros, no date). At that time Carlos Rafael Rodríguez was vice president of the Council of State. His father was from Galicia (Chapter 3), and he supported the words of Che Guevara: “[A] country is not fully independent without its own auto industry” (Thomas, 2007, pp. 507–509). Curiously, he was a communist long before the Revolution. In the cited interview with the press, Barreiros admitted that he had a good relationship with Castro, and he was respected by Franco too for having resolved traffic problems in Cuba. Barreiros was not a communist, but that was not a contentious point. As Archbishop Pérez Serantes said maybe Barreiros acted as he did “because the Galicians are like that” (Chapter 3). Some criticized Barreiros

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 83 for having left Franco to go to Cuba and shake hands with Castro, which “left everything among Galicians” (Gómez-Santos, 2006, p. 229). Also when Barreiros was asked for similarities and differences between Franco and Castro, he answered that their merits are similar: Franco is “honest, human and patriotic,” and Fidel is also “honest, intelligent, human and of course, one hundred percent patriotic.” He added that Franco was not as authoritarian as Castro (Gómez-Santos, 2006, p. 253). Barreiros “ceded to Cuba the rights to use the technology and configuration of its engine” and contributed to automation in Cuba (Gómez-Santos, 2006, p. 230). Because he worked under Castro, he was abused and threatened by the Cuban exiles in Miami. Barreiros came from a capitalist country. Cuba was socialist. The reason he could have a good relation with Castro was not only because both had Galician origins but also because Barreiros found a way to take an active part in Cuba’s development. This was his strong point. Franco, Ho Chi Minh, Castro, Fraga, and Barreiros were people who were passionate about something and who could attract similar people beyond ideology. It is difficult to justify something invisible, but the important thing is doing something for their motherland in the middle of the Cold War. That is what led to mutual respect among these individuals with different backgrounds.

The power struggle between ministries Using sugar to buy Spanish ships When we consider the decision-making process, analysis of the top leaders’ character is not sufficient. Additionally, it requires analysis of other actors. In Spain, although Franco himself had the last word in the foreign policy decision-making process, such as the suspension of Iberian flights in 1962 as we have seen, domestic policy was a different matter. The ministries under the centralized government came to compete among themselves for supervisory authority. In addition, it is necessary to consider the influence of public opinion or who makes a public opinion when it comes to the decision-making process for foreign policy. In 1964, the Spanish Embassy in Cuba viewed Castro’s Cuba as if it were the capital of a black African country with communists, not unlike Madrid during the Spanish Civil War, although Cuba was neither as poor nor as dirty as Madrid at that time and seemed to have more freedom (EEH, 27/11/1964). Considering North–South relations, strictly speaking, Spain could not be considered to be a part of the North, although Spain statistically experienced almost 7% annual economic growth in the 1960s and early 1970s, as Japan did. The starting point was lower than average before the Spanish Civil War. In addition, the Embassy reported that Cuba is composed of Caribbean islands, and the regulations of the communists were not as strict as those of the Soviet Union (EEH, 27/11/1964). Here we have to be aware that a stereotypical bipolar classification of North–South or East–West is not always applicable.

84  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists Traditionally, trade between Spain and Cuba was favorable for Spain, and including the balance of payments, it became more favorable when Cuba exported cigars and sugar (Bosch, José M., 14/5/1952). So in the 1960s, did Spain gain more interest in trade with Cuba? The answer is no. In 1964, the international price of sugar was down; however, the purchase price had already been fixed between the two countries. That is, Spain could not gain cheaper sugar; on the contrary, it had to purchase expensive sugar (more than 2.5 times the international price) from Cuba from 1964 to 1966. The excess profits from selling sugar at such a high price had a great economic impact on Cuba: “[T]he surcharge of sugar is equivalent to giving Cuba three large boats annually.” The amount of Spanish imports from Cuba more than tripled in one year, from $9.2 million in 1963 to $31.4 million in 1964 (Morley, 1987, p. 373; Hosoda, 2010, p. 94). Under these circumstances, in 1965, the Ministry of Agriculture in the Franco regime wanted to revise the price of sugar each day. Therefore, they opposed the Ministry of Commerce, which wanted to have a long-term agreement. Commerce wanted to have the assurance of receipt of charges of ships, which had been agreed for export and also wanted continuously to export to Cuba cheaper Spanish goods, such as cider, Christmas nougat confection, grapes, and trucks, which could not be exported to other markets. Food and shipbuilding companies intended to expand their share in Cuba, where the U.S. could not enter, so they appealed to the Spanish government and received credits to finance sales to Cuba. In addition, Cuba maintained a clearing system with Spain. Spain was the only country with a market economy to use this system with Cuba (Recarte, 1980, p. 161; Hosoda, 2010, p. 94).

Emphasis on the spiritual over the economic By 1966, the amount of trade of both countries peaked. In the sum of Spanish exports, the share to Latin America was 17%. Of that, 6%, or one-third, of its total exports to Latin America was to Cuba, which was the highest. Cuba was pragmatic: for Cuba, “the meaning and importance of relations with Spain goes beyond the maintenance and growth of commercial relations.” Also Cubans knew that Spain maintained bilateral trade, resisting pressure from the U.S., and that the Cuban market was important to Spain, as it was its best market in Latin America (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, 7/1968). As previously described, in 1966 Spain traded for Cuban sugar at more than double the price on the international market. And Spain had an agreement of long-term credit of transaction because she believed in the Cuban government. That is, if Cuba were to collapse, Spain would suffer a great loss of trade. Spain stated that although there were various problems in the economic relationship, the “spiritual balance” was superior in the case of Cuba. Spanish religious charities helped the Cuban people, and it became their hope (El Consulado General de España en Cuba, 15/4/1966). Echoing Madariaga, one Spanish diplomat in the U.S. wrote, “France has no spiritual or economic message capable of supplanting South and Central America” (Alabart, 1/12/1964).

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 85 Meanwhile, Cuba intended to buy ships without using the official channel of the Spanish Ministry. In 1969, the elder brother of Franco, Nicolás Franco, was invited to Havana by the Cuban government. He made a private visit and had a three-hour conversation with Castro. Cuba requested the import of vehicles and ships, in total about $3 million worth, and the expansion of trade beyond the agreement. In addition, Castro mentioned a private matter, that his aunt lived in Galicia (Nicolás Franco, Jr., 1969; MAE, 22/3/1969). Castro was grateful to Spain and praised her because she continued trading with Cuba during the hardest period under the American embargo. He added that this meeting was the first open conversation and that he hoped “the identity of race and culture, and that proof of trust, would make deeper political understanding, overcoming ideologies.” At that moment, both countries were starting to negotiate bilateral agreements. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that this invitation would be an important step toward the desire of Cuba to explore its commercial possibilities (Nicolás Franco, Jr., 1969; MAE, 22/3/1969). Although Castro paid lip service to Spaniards (especially, here, to Franco’s brother), from the Cuban point of view, commercial ties were more important not only for the Hispanidad but also because “of mutual benefit of trade.” And the Cubans believed that Spanish independent policy toward Cuba would give Spaniards “prestige” as a middle power in Europe as well as in Latin America (Miguel Alfonso, 18/6/1964).

Public opinion in the U.S. and Spain As noted earlier, during the Cold War the position of the U.S. was weak before the renewal of agreements because it needed to maintain the rights to use Spanish bases. In addition, in 1964, in accordance with the U.S.–Spanish agreement, the naval station Rota in Spain would become a roadstead for American atomic submarines. For these reasons, the U.S. could not offend Spain and could not strongly critique Spain’s independent diplomacy and policies, even if they were somewhat against American interests. At the same time, the U.S. had to consider public opinion in support of a dictator, Franco. President Johnson himself “wanted to give aid of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.” The U.S. had to consider the influence of public opinion and the effects on third countries if she were to grant Spain a waiver of Section 620 (Prohibitions Against Furnishing Assistance) (a) (3) of the Foreign Assistance Act. The U.S. also had to consider “the great importance” of American bases in Spain (Memorandum for the Record, 20/2/1964; Johnson, 19/2/1964; Hosoda, 2010, pp. 96–97). For Spain’s part, it was impossible to obey the U.S. unwaveringly. Spain had to make a gesture of support to the U.S. when they were negotiating the renewal of agreements, while the U.S. demanded a reduction of the service of Iberia Airlines to Cuba, as discussed in Chapter 5. As Castiella, Spanish minister of foreign affairs, said to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Spain “had made serious efforts to

86  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists decrease their contacts with Cuba,” although she “does not want to lose all contact with Cuba, particularly in the cultural field” (Memorandum of Conversation, 7/10/1965). The U.S. constructed bases and facilities such as Torrejón, Zaragoza, Morón Air Bases, and Rota naval station, among others, in Spain after the agreements of 1953. And it is true that after that, more infrastructure was constructed. The Spanish people certainly benefitted from that. However, the Spanish people did not know that Rota naval station was going to be the anchor site for an atomic submarine. As we saw before, after the incident at Palomares, the press appealed for the safety of the Mediterranean. Accidents involving the H bomb could not be hidden even by a dictatorial regime. Ironically, Fraga, minister of information and tourism, instituted the Press Law, which eased a part of censorship, just after that incident. It is difficult to say that public opinion, so important in democratic countries, would have much influence in the Franco regime without the freedom of expression. However, it is interesting to point out that, although the Franco regime could not allow truly free public opinion, anti-Americanism in Spain was sort of the official public opinion. The regime utilized this to gain leverage during the negotiation of agreements. The Franco regime insisted that Spain could not accept the demands of the U.S. because of anti-American public opinion, which was opposed to the danger created by the American bases and demanded the closure of the Torrejón Air Base near the capital, Madrid (Embassy in Madrid, 3/7/1975).

Consular problems and economic relations As we have seen, Spain insisted at various times to Cuba that both have historical, rational, familial, and cultural ties, and because of these Spain felt sympathy toward Cuba. Spain would always defend her “dignity, independence and honesty.” On the other hand, Spain demanded that Cuba increase the number of departures of Spaniards, solve the compensation problem, and release 28 Spaniards under restraint (Oyarzun, 1/8/1965). That is, the bilateral consular problems could not be ignored. Around 1964, about 500,000 Spaniards lived in Cuba. Before the Revolution, it was said that 45,000 were registered in the Centro Gallego (EEH, 27/11/1964). Although the Franco regime was authoritarian, it would not abandon them there, especially when many of them were Galicians. As previously cited, there was a confrontation between the Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture regarding Spanish policy toward Cuba. The Ministry of Commerce desired a long-term agreement, while the Ministry of Agriculture preferred a shorter-term policy. In addition, there was a conflict between the Commerce and the Foreign Affairs Ministries. Foreign Affairs wanted to give priority to policies to protect the 500,000 Spaniards living in Cuba, such as release of those in custody, compensation for expropriated properties, and the withdrawal of limits of departure from Cuba, while Commerce

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 87 did not want these negotiations to be linked with trade policies, which would cause a restraint of trade. This confrontation existed inside the Spanish Embassy in Cuba; the charge d’affaires from Foreign Affairs and the attachés from Commerce tended to deviate from instructions of the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Oyarzun, 21/3/1966; Caldevilla, 28/3/1966; Hosoda, 2010, p. 95), which caused problems. In June of 1964, 17 Spaniards detained by the Cuban authorities were released. However, later more Spaniards were detained. Therefore, Román Oyarzun, charge d’affaires of Cuba (1964–1969), insisted that Spain should change tactics: “[U]ntil now only it asked for a gesture of clemency from the Cuban authorities but now it should begin to exert pressure” (Oyarzun, 26/3/1965). Then he tried to use the trade negotiations to pressure Cuba to release the Spaniards. However, the negotiations of 1965 had already concluded. Therefore, in March 1965, he suggested to Castiella, minister of foreign affairs, that the purchase of Cuban frozen meat in convertible currency payments be covered outside of the commercial agreements, tying these negotiations to the of release of the Spaniards. Possibly as a result of this, in October 1965, Cuba agreed to protect the Spaniards in Cuba and released nine of 29 in custody the previous month. However, the following February, the number again increased to 35 (Oyarzun, 26/3/1965). To address this situation, Oyarzun, trying not to threaten Cuba, told the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs that if the Spaniards were released, it would be possible to improve trade relations, which were under negotiation at that time (in 1966) (MAE, 6/8/1965; Oyarzun, 14/2/1966). Thus, he tried to negotiate linking political and economic problems. It is true that he was a tough negotiator. When the problem of Caldevilla occurred (Chapter 5), he exchanged opinions with the Cuban director of protocol. Through the document, we can see the tension between the two. Oyarzun said: The trade relations with my country is convenient economically for you, and Cuba ought to thank us for the effort we make despite the pressure exerted by the Americans. (Melendez Díaz, 16/6/1966) He understood better than the Spanish Ministry that economic matters were more important than spiritual matters or the East–West conflict to Cuba at that moment. In 1969, Oyarzun, looking back on his stay in Cuba in 1964, handed a report to the Ministry. It stated that the products of the Castro regime were education and medical care. The medical facilities were constructed in rural areas, although he did not deny the decrease of level of education and of doctors. In addition, he said that Castro had succeeded as a revolutionary but not as a statesman. Castro was too antagonistic to the U.S., sometimes at the expense of the interests of his own people (Oyarzun, 31/3/1969). This was a very cool analysis, different from those of Ambassador Lojendio. He changed the general feeling toward Castro from great admiration to criticism.

88  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists In sum, between 1963 and 1969, despite the U.S.- imposed economic blockade on Cuba, which it expected other countries to observe as well, and other constraints, Spain maintained and even increased trade with Cuba.

Spain as a mediator with the U.S. Despite trade friction, Spain intended to be a diplomatic mediator for the U.S. In May 1964, Cuba tapped José María de Areilza, Spanish ambassador to France (former ambassador to the U.S. 1954–1960; under the democratic transition, minister of foreign affairs) in order to improve the U.S.–Cuban relationship. Fundamentally, the U.S. agreed with this, with reservations, depending on the presidential campaign in November (Suárez Fernández, 1987, pp. 248–251; Embassy in Madrid, 21/5/1964, 25/5/1964; DoS, 2/6/1964; Embajador en Paris, 24/5/1964). Relations with the U.S. were always contingent on the presidential campaigns. Finally, the Democrat Johnson won the election, but Spain did not become a mediator. The American Embassy of Madrid believed that this idea of Spain as “intermediary” would be that of Castiella, and he sought to confirm this belief through analysis of The New York Times (Embassy in Madrid, 21/5/1964). If reports were accurate, the Franco regime well knew how to utilize public opinion or mass media in a democratic country. In 1967, Bolivian soldiers, supported by the CIA, captured Che Guevara and executed him. Rabe argued that his death symbolized “the collapse of revolutionary movements throughout Latin America” (2016, pp. 82–83). This might have been a great shock to Castro and for the U.S., as the pretext of fighting against communism or revolutionary movements in Latin America was being weakened. In the same year, a report of a meeting between Adolfo Martín Gamero, head of the Office of Diplomatic Information, and Castro was handed to the U.S. Although the U.S. did not want a special emissary from Spain, the telegram from the American ambassador in Spain reached the Spanish Ministry after the meeting, and Martín Gamero stated to Castro that Spain was an intermediary between the U.S. and Cuba. He said that the U.S. considered two points nonnegotiable: 1

Cuban intervention and support of subversion and guerilla activities in other Latin American nations had to stop; 2 Soviet military presence in Cuba had to end (SoS, 21/12/1967; EEW, 21/12/1967). However, this mediation did not bear fruit; neither the U.S. nor Cuba took steps to resolve these issues.2

The exit of the people fighting for the cause from the political scene Spanish foreign policy toward the U.S. has developed since the 1950s. Because of the competition for hegemony between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the U.S. instituted a strict embargo against Cuba after the Missile

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 89 Crisis and demanded other countries go along with it. At first, Spain was worried that if it did not follow along, the U.S. would discontinue its participation in the U.S.–Spanish agreement, just as international isolation of Spain was drawing to a close. In 1967, the Spanish Ministry pointed out the following five points as reasons Spain maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba: bilateral relations with Latin America beyond political ideology (convenience of nonintervention), existing Spanish communities, advantages of maintaining relations with a country in the Soviet orbit, gestures of Spanish independent policy and bilateral trade relations for sugar (imports), and naval construction (exports) (Hosoda, 2010, p. 97; MAE, 8/2/1967). Investigation of the documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Castiella (1957–1969) found that Spain used to stress its “independent” diplomacy with the U.S. from the viewpoint of the bipolar system of the Cold War. After economic development, as the amount of trade with Cuba continued to increase, Spain came to understand that the U.S. put great importance on its geostrategic position. Spain tried to continue trade with Cuba without strict adherence to U.S. policy (Hosoda, 2010, pp. 97–98). On the other hand, Spain insisted on the neutrality of the Mediterranean and strongly negotiated the renewal of the U.S.–Spanish agreement. Spain also maintained a hard line regarding the problem of Gibraltar against the United Kingdom. On these matters, Castiella confronted Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco (vice president 1967–1973 and president 1973).3 In 1967, Cuba expressed its support of the Spanish stance on Gibraltar at the U.N. Cuba offered to gather support from other countries friendly to Cuba (EEH, 6/12/1967). Finally General Assembly Resolution 2353 (XXII) declared that the colonial situation on Gibraltar interferes with Spanish territorial integrity. In addition, in 1968 when Spain presented its candidate for a seat on the Security Council of the U.N., Cuba completely understood the Spanish situation and was in favor of her candidate. The Ministry of Foreign Relations of Cuba analyzed the Spanish foreign policy toward Vietnam and Arab-Israel conflicts. As previously mentioned, Spain did not “support” the U.S., though it sent a group of nurses and maintained a pro-Arab stance. Of course, Cuba mentioned the Franco regime as an “obstacle” to the Spanish candidate; however, due to the “background” and the renewal of the Modus Vivendi, it voted in favor (Dirección de Política II, 9/9/1968). Finally, Spain obtained the seat during 1969–1970. Cuba knew that Spain, or more specifically Castiella, was obsessed with Gibraltar. Cuba understood well how to negotiate with the Spanish Ministry under Castiella. Diplomatic success is achieved not in relation to a single issue but to various issues (including those in the multilateral arena) at the same time. Meanwhile, the U.S. blamed Castiella for the rough negotiations. So through the American Ambassador to Spain, it pressed the military, especially Carrero Blanco, to get Castiella out of the negotiations. Concretely speaking, in 1966, the U.S., through John Fitzpatrick of the Gulf Oil Company in Spain, insisted that the only obstacle to the negotiations was

90  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists Castiella, who was against the authority of Carrero Blanco. Fitzpatrick represented the preoccupation of the Department of State. Carrero Blanco suggested getting rid of Castiella and replacing him. Fitzpatrick was thus able to use the influence of Carrero Blanco (Hosoda, 2012, p. 43). In 1969, after the Matesa financial scandal, Castiella, the minister of foreign affairs, who was tough on the U.S., and Fraga, the minister of information and tourism, who was relatively pro-Cuban and an anti-American liberal, were replaced. Instead of these people who had fought for the “cause” in the Franco regime, it was the people of Opus Dei, an institution of the Catholic Church, who were going to be put in place. They were pragmatists by principle. Carrero Blanco was quite near the Opus Dei. After the reshuffling of the cabinet, particularly the change of the minister of foreign affairs, Spanish diplomacy, especially her policy toward Cuba, was going to change.

The economy as the cause at the end of the Franco regime in the 1970s Promotion of economic relations The new Minister of Foreign Affairs Gregorio López-Bravo was a member of Opus Dei. After receiving his doctorate in Spain, he studied management in the U.S. and was at one time the minister of industry. As the minister of industry, his reputation in the U.S. was not so bad. The U.S. was relieved upon his nomination as foreign minister because when he was the minister of industry, he was not primarily oriented toward the Spanish national companies. At that time, the U.S. was wondering whether his successor would be generous to foreign companies, as López-Bravo had been (Memorandum of Conversation, 19/2/1968). As foreign minister, López-Bravo advanced reform of the structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He reformed the organization of departments and eliminated regional general directors, creating a General Director of Foreign Policy. He also established the Department of International Economic Relations and the International Technical Cooperative. Moreover, following West German Prime Minister Willy Brandt, he started a Spanish version of the Ostpolitik and increased trade with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At this moment, Franco Spain, which could not join NATO because of its opposition to some Western countries, intended to concentrate on trade as postwar Japan had done. In Latin America, the minister settled on the centrist Estrada Doctrine, which meant that Spain would not intervene in their domestic affairs and would promote trade and economic cooperation. Unlike his predecessor, Castiella, who visited only Costa Rica in Latin America, López-Bravo stressed economic relations and visited various Latin American countries such as Brazil, where he met with Under Secretary of Commerce Nemesio Fernández Cuesta (1969–1973), who would be appointed minister of commerce in 1974. However, López-Bravo did not visit Cuba or Mexico, as Spain did not have diplomatic relations with them (Hosoda, 2010, p. 99).

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 91 In 1972, Javier Oyarzun, brother of Román, the chargé d’affaires of the Spanish Embassy at Havana (1964–1969) cited earlier, was appointed to Cuba. The fact that his prior post was the Director General of Consular Affairs meant that he was familiar with the problems of the Spanish emigrants living in Cuba, which was a pending issue for the Ministry. While López-Bravo himself did not visit Cuba, Javier Oyarzun formed a good relationship with the communist executives and with Castro. He often mentioned his ancestors and aunts living in Galicia, and his house in Cuba had a very Spanish atmosphere (at that time, he had not yet visited Spain). He also said that sometime he would like to eat Galician food at the Spanish Embassy. Oyarzun had the impression that Castro himself did not bear any antagonism toward Spain and added that he preferred to “negotiate with Castro than with other Cuban high ranking officers who were obliged to show their antagonism against the capitalist world to acquire merit in the eyes of the Communist Party” (Oyarzun, 13/11/1972; 5/12/1972). In short, Castro was pragmatic and knew well how to reach a person’s heart. At that moment in 1973, neither the government nor the Spanish companies were effective in terms of economic cooperation. In the meantime, Cuba had restored diplomatic relations with Salvador Allende’s Chile in 1970 and had joined COMECON. Cuba was seeking multilateral diplomacy. In 1974, Cuba and Spain discussed concrete plans, such as dispatching specialists, signing economic and financial cooperation agreements, and trying to enhance economic cooperation. Thus, the confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commerce was going to converge (El Convenio que acabamos de firmar con Cuba tiene el propósito de intensificar los intercambios al máximo, 17/12/1974; Hosoda, 2010, p. 99). Fernandez Cuesta, Minister of Commerce from 1974, stressed to the American ambassador to Spain the importance of trade with Cuba and demanded the removal of the American embargo against Cuba from various sectors in Spain. By the end of 1974, the minister of commerce finally visited Cuba. It was the first official visit of a Spanish minister since its loss in the Spanish-American War in 1898. The ensuing bilateral trade agreement, the biggest in Spanish history, was seen as a gift. This agreement, offering $900 million in export credits to Cuba to finance imports such as ships from Spain, made Spain Cuba’s third largest trade partner after the Soviet Union and Japan. The Spanish press praised Spanish independent diplomacy, which did not yield to U.S. pressure to join the embargo against Cuba (Embassy in Madrid, 20/12/1974; Hosoda, 2010, p. 100). Few Spanish goods were on the international market after World War II because domestic production capacity was largely destroyed during the Spanish Civil War. Moreover, there was a lack of competitiveness because of the protectionist policies of the government. However, Spain could gain access to the Cuban market through the “clearing” system. By the 1970s, Spanish production and techniques had thoroughly infiltrated the Cuban market. Therefore, Cuba wanted to continue importing from Spain. On the other hand, the Spanish Commerce Ministry thought that if Spain could display Spanish goods in Cuba, which was going to expand trade

92  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists throughout Latin America, Spain could show its goods to other countries. At that time, Commercial Attaché Alberto Recarte was dispatched (1974–1978). However, the Commerce Ministry, in January of 1975, wanted to have a broader office with more staff outside of the Embassy in Havana (Hidalgo de Quintana, 30/1/1975; Hosoda, 2010, p. 100).

Trade friction with the U.S. Spain protested the embargo against Cuba, using the renewal of the U.S.–Spanish agreement in 1974 as a shield. However, Kissinger answered that a change of policy was impossible, considering the U.S. midterm election in November. In addition, the U.S. would not accept American companies trading with Cuba via its subsidiary companies in third countries. However, this meant an extraterritorial application of American law, and friendly nations such as Canada and Mexico, where these companies were situated, were also protesting. Meanwhile, American public opinion was also critical. Then in the mid-1970s, U.S. public opinion toward the Cold War began to shift after the Vietnam War. Americans were starting to question the validity of the domino theory of communist expansionism and distrusted their government. People came to believe that “China and the Soviet Union presumably wanted to maximize their power within the existing international system rather than overthrow the international order.” What is more, they gradually came to notice covert actions by the U.S. in Latin America (Rabe, 2016, pp. 151–152). Guevara’s death triggered “the collapse of revolutionary movements.” The notion of the “threat of communism” as a premise for the Cold War was beginning to change. The Department of State admitted in February of 1975 that it was time to review its policies regarding the application of the blockade to third countries. Western countries such as Spain and France extended commercial credits to Cuba. If the blockade were limited to only the U.S., its effectiveness was questionable (Department of State, 15/8/1974; Department of State, 25/2/1975; White House, 19/8/1975; Hosoda, 2010, p. 101). In 1975, when the U.S.–Spanish agreement needed to be renewed, the Spanish government appealed to American Ambassador Wells Stabler. Spain wanted permission for trade between a Spanish company (Barreiros) and Cuba. However, the U.S. government tried to limit it. Receiving a claim from the Spanish government, Stabler feared that the matter would be leaked to the press, which would enhance anti-American sentiment in Spain. The Franco regime would then utilize this to its advantage in the delicate base negotiations. Therefore, the ambassador proposed giving the Spanish side “some hope that this question may be resolved within a relatively short period of time” (Embassy in Madrid, 10/7/1975, 23/7/1975; Hosoda, 2010, p. 102). However, as discussed earlier, if the Department allowed an exception, then more problems would occur with other countries. Finally, in July, the OAS adopted a resolution to terminate mandatory sanctions on trade, travel, and diplomatic contact with Cuba. In August, U.S. President

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 93 Ford agreed to modify the U.S. trade embargo, eliminating the ban on thirdparty subsidiaries (Morley, 1987, p. 277; Embassy in Madrid, 10/7/1975; White House, 19/8/1975). In sum, in the 1970s, the U.S. did not want to worsen relations with Spain because of the Cuban problems. Therefore, the U.S. grew more amenable toward Spanish independent policy. In addition, U.S. negotiations with Cuba had made progress under the initiative of Kissinger (Kami, 2018, p. 72).

From the Cuban point of view Here we add the Cuban point of view of the Spanish situation. In 1968, the Cuban side saw Spain pragmatically. At that moment in the “normalization” of the bilateral relationship, Cuba did not discount the disturbance created by the zigzag of its foreign policy, nor did it underestimate the confused internal situation caused by the power struggle of the post-Franco era. The Cubans were more “pragmatic.” They stated clearly that the most important aspect of the relationship was “trade policy” (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, 18/1/1968). We have to remember that, meanwhile, the Spaniards sometimes stressed the spiritual ties with Cubans in telegrams, which are official documents. However, the Cubans thought differently. Of course, the Cuban side understood that their relations with Spain were determined by the fact that Cuba was the only socialist country that maintained diplomatic relations with Spain. Cuba recognized that Spain was gradually increasing exports to socialist countries, which was, according to Cuba, “the only way of escape” in Spanish trade policy. The Cuban authority ordered the Embassy to conduct an analysis of U.S. capital and Spanish penetration in Latin America related to the U.S. It also sought to understand plans for Spanish imports and exports and the potential market for Cuban exports such as fruit, coffee, precious wooden chessboards, and so on. In addition, they wanted to know Spanish publicity for goods! What is more, they tried to gain Spanish economic assistance to enter the extractive industry by obtaining machinery on credit, as well as technical assistance from highly qualified persons and scientific-technical information (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Cuba, 18/1/1968). To obtain the final objective – an agreement or convention with Spain – Cuba was amplifying its sphere of influence in the Spanish “establishment” (i.e., the political-economic structure) to gain a better diplomatic position. Although the character of the Spanish regime had long been determined, Cuba seemed to gain special consideration after the Revolution. That is, whatever regime they had, Cuba had to keep diplomatic relations with Spain. And now it seemed to Cuba that Spain was suffering from a transformation in the economic-political order, so its leadership was trying to figure out how to accommodate it (Carlos Neira, director de Política II, 28/7/1969). In addition, Cuba believed that the political situation of Spain was positive for Cuba. Prince Juan Carlos, who studied in Spain, was nominated as the successor to Franco in 1969. This would become a positive development for Cuba, in terms of not only its commercial objectives but also its cultural and scientific-technical

94  People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists ones (Carlos Neira, director de Política II, 28/7/1969). This is further proof that for Cuba, until then, commercial objectives were the main aspect of Spanish–Cuban relations. The same thing can be seen in a later Cuban document during the postFrancoist era, under the administration of Suárez (1976–1981), in which Cuba viewed in retrospect its policy toward Spain: From the new Spanish democratizing stage process, relations have gone beyond the commercial frameworks and diplomatic formality to experience a development towards previously unseen aspects such as politics, education, sports and in particular cultural ones. (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, 22/8/1978) It seems that it was Spain that developed more emotional, naïve, and personalized ideas of foreign policy among its diplomats.

Is profit better than fame? As we saw, in the 1970s, Javier Oyarzun, chargé d’affaires of the Spanish Embassy in Havana, met Castro. He was so welcomed that we cannot imagine that he was antagonistic to Spain. Perhaps Castro denounced the dictator Franco, considering Franco’s image in the minds of the masses of Cuba. But in reality, economically Cuba had no choice but to continue trading with Spain, and she had to be friendly. Madrid, after all, was not among the “neo-colonialist European capitals” (EEH, 3/5/1971). Already in 1970, the exchange of ambassadors was mentioned in the process of negotiating for compensation of properties (MAE, 16/4/1970). In 1975, Spain sent a mission to Cuba to discuss the most contentious pending issues, the release of Spanish political prisoners, the departure of Spaniards from Cuba, and their compensation. These issues were resolved, and in September, the two nations exchanged ambassadors (Embassy in Madrid, 19/6/1975). Kami argued that the Cuban exiles to the U.S. were one of the tools of diplomacy for Cuba with the U.S. (2018), but between Spain and Cuba, the prisoners were an important tool. The confrontation between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce was resolved too. The Foreign Ministry started to use the commercial agreement as a tool to resolve political problems, and former Minister of Industry López-Bravo, a technocrat, became the minister of foreign affairs in 1969. Meanwhile, the Franco regime had, since the late 1960s, strengthened its commercial relations with Cuba, giving a favorable impression toward the Castro regime. This led to an improved and stabilized relationship (Hosoda, 2010, p. 102). In the meantime, the late Franco regime was coping with problems arising from other countries, such as Morocco, regarding the Western Sahara. The contentious issues that plagued Cuba–Spain relations could not have been resolved only by reference to the spiritual ties between the two countries, despite Franco’s view of Latin America. However, being pragmatists and centered on

People fighting for a cause vs. pragmatists 95 economic profit, both could keep their “honor,” so Spain and Cuba could form a win-win relationship. Neither Spain nor Cuba mentioned clearly, however, that a common understanding of “anti-Americanism” existed between the two. In other words, both had a “common” enemy, a materialist country that formed a backdrop for their own trade policies and for their sense of moral justification. The actual relationship between U.S. and Cuba contains lessons here: maintain honor while establishing a profitable bilateral relationship.

Notes 1 After his resignation in 1969, De Gaulle visited Franco in June of 1970, several months before his death. Both men would feel that their style had something in common (Franco, 3/5/1969). 2 In fact, Spain was not the first mediator with the U.S. Ambassador Sagaz (1966– 1972, mentioned in Chapter 5), of UAR mediated between these countries. He was permitted to help 1,500 Jews escape from Cairo. The Franco regime appealed to anti-Jewish forces but strangely, in order to appeal to the Jewish community in the U.S., protected them during this dangerous time. As a result, the U.S. often showed its gratitude in high-level presidential meetings (Rein, 1996, p. 308; Rein, 2006; EEW, 14/11/1967). The U.S. created an Interest Section in the Spanish Embassy in Cairo. Later Sagaz became ambassador to the U.S. (1972–1974). However, he returned to Spain due to ill health and passed away (Europa Press, 2014). 3 In Spain, they use the term “presidente” as head of government, equivalent to “prime minister” in English.

7 The reconciliation of generations The post-Franco era and Castro

In the following chapter, I view Spanish–Cuban relations after the end of the Franco regime, from 1975 when he died. I place particular emphasis on the Spanish point of view. Spanish diplomacy had entered a new stage, and Spanish–Cuban relations deepened and changed toward the end of the Cold War. The bipolar system could not explain these fluctuations.

The right wingers in the nonalignment movement Cuba mourns the death of Franco Near the end of September of 1975, when the Franco regime was going to execute a number of Basque terrorists, foreign countries and the Vatican asked the regime to grant them amnesty. However, the regime ignored their pleas. After the executions, the world protested, and European governments recalled their ambassadors. Meanwhile, American Ambassador Wells Stabler happened to be in the U.S., and Cuba did not recall its ambassador, who had been the first to be sent to Madrid since the incident with Lojendio in 1960. In fact, he had just arrived that very month. On November 20th 1975, Franco died, and the dictatorial regime finally came to an end (the Portuguese dictatorial regime had come to the end one year earlier). Two days later, Prince Juan Carlos ascended to the throne. Spain was going to take a step toward democratization and restored the monarchy, as Franco had designated the prince as his successor in 1969. Castro decreed three days of mourning for Franco’s death. This mourning provoked some friction. It is certain that Castro sent an official decree with the signature of Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós to the Spanish Embassy in Havana to Ambassador Enrique Suárez de Puga, who had just arrived in Cuba in September. The Spanish ambassador communicated with Francisco Rubiales, the Spanish correspondent for Agencia EFE in Cuba. He sent an urgent telegram to Spain. However, Rubiales received a telephone call from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba, threatening him with expulsion from Cuba because of his “lie” about the mourning in Cuba for Franco. In reality, the “official decree” sent to the Embassy was a “personal communication” to the ambassador, and it should not have been made public, considering relations between Spain and the

The reconciliation of generations 97 international community. In addition, the ambassador visited Spanish institutions in Havana to see that flags were flown at half-mast. After he left, however, the flags were flown normally (Barbadillo, no date).

The new relationship between democratic Spain and Cuba The transition from the Franco regime (1939–1975) to democratization was not done in fits and starts as the Revolution was. Franco was aging, but so too were his old enemies from the Spanish Civil War. Different generations, from those who fought the war to those who were ignorant of it, tried to reconcile. And while Franco was still alive, powers inside the regime started to think of the postFranco regime and to prepare for a peaceful transition. Firstly, Franco stressed the stability of Spain, designating Prince Juan Carlos as his successor (Hosoda, 2018). The new king did not dismiss but rather retained President Carlos Arias Navarro, who was the last president of the Franco regime and the first of the democratic period. However, some relatively liberal persons were designated as ministers: Fraga (Chapter 6), from Galicia, became the vice president and minister of the interior, and former ambassador to the U.S. and the Vatican, Garrigues (Chapter 5), became the minister of justice. The new king, tutored under the Franco regime, was to be “Francoist” and was expected to maintain the regime. However, he functioned as an unofficial back channel in diplomacy until 1978, when the Constitution was promulgated. He continued his behind-the-scenes diplomacy even afterward and owed his success to amazing relations with the U.S. (from the Ford administration to the AFL-CIO) and even with the communists, with whom he maintained clandestine communication (Hosoda, 2012). Although the king did not dismiss the Francoist President Arias Navarro, he did try to pressure him to hasten the democratization process. Then in July of 1976, Adolfo Suárez became president. He had worked as the minister-secretary general of the National Movement and the director-general of the Spanish Radio and Television Corporation (RTVE). The Francoist faction considered him to be a safe person who would not take strict measures against the Francoist faction. However, once he became president, Suárez formed a center-right party, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), shifting from the right to the center politically. Neither Fraga nor Garrigues wanted to join his cabinet. During the Franco regime, Fraga was considered a liberal. However, he then formed the Popular Alliance (AP) with the Francoist faction. This was considered to be the more conservative party. Fraga had not changed much, but the circumstances had shifted. Here we see an example of how the dichotomies of East–West and Left–Right ideology do not account for political reality.

Reconciliation with Cuba Once he became president, Adolfo Suárez searched for diplomatic success in the “classic” Spanish-friendly zones of Latin America and the Middle East, as the Franco regime had done. He could not speak English well and was an “amateur”

98  The reconciliation of generations at diplomacy. However, coming from the “rightists,” he finally came to have sympathy for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), having close friendships with Castro and Yasser Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). At that moment, the heads of state in Europe had not yet visited Cuba. However, Suárez visited Cuba and Venezuela in September of 1978. He stayed only two days in Cuba, but he was largely welcomed there. At the José Martí Airport at Havana, Castro received him under the gangway ladder. As they walked side by side, Castro joked to the chief of protocol, “[D]o I walk on the left side or the right?” (Sebastian, 1978). After democratization, the bilateral relationship was going to facilitate not only commercial policy but also cultural and scientific policies. This visit made possible the return of many Spaniards left in Cuba. At that time, Castro, in front of the press, praised Franco because he did not bend to the pressure of imperial America, maintained the services of Iberia, struck a deal for the sugar trade, and strengthened diplomatic ties with the stubbornness of the Galicians (Bayo, 2006). Castro and Suárez seemed to maintain a good relationship. In August of 1981, when Suárez’s presidency came to an end, he visited Cuba via Panama. During his brief stop, he met with Castro and talked for over an hour about international politics. As he departed, Castro again saw him off under the gangway ladder (Efe, 1981). Suárez was good at appealing to Castro when he worked at the RTVE. Just before the general election in 1977, despite the opposition of the American Embassy in Madrid, Spain negotiated directly with Washington and planned for Suárez to visit the U.S. At that time, a photo of Suárez with President Carter was taken. Both men were smiling, and Suárez was called the “Latin Kennedy” in the U.S. In reality, when he visited Carter and it was discovered that he could not speak English, the luncheon was canceled, though Carter did not have any official lunch scheduled (Hosoda, 2012, pp. 176–177). Although the contents of the conversation were not substantial, Suárez used this visit in Spain to appeal for support (at least, the image of support) from the U.S. and won the first election since the Spanish Civil War. This is reminiscent of the way Franco had used a photo with President Eisenhower taken during an official visit in 1959 as propaganda. Suárez attracted the American press to his side so that they might broadcast a better image of him than reality, much as Castro had done in the Sierra Maestra.

Spain becomes a nonaligned country? Suárez sent for the first time an observer to the sixth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana in 1979. Castro, at that moment, secretary general of this organization (1979– 1983), lauded Spain’s participation, and stated that in Europe, there was now a friendly nation that was not imperialist. However, this fact was enough to make the U.S. suspicious about Suárez and deepened the gap between President Suárez and Spanish Foreign Minister

The reconciliation of generations 99 Marcelino Oreja. He was opposed to Spanish participation in NAM. Because Spain had had a hard time during World War II when Spain chose to be a nonbelligerent nation, he concluded that neutrality did not guarantee Spanish independence. Instead he started to think about the possibility of Spanish participation in NATO (Oreja, 2011, pp. 332–333). This would have placed Spain in the framework of Western defense. Further, Suárez had a friendly relationship with Yasser Arafat. He visited Spain in 1978, and a photo of their embrace was distributed widely. Afterward the PLO established an office in Spain. Spain would not have diplomatic relations with Israel until 1986. Beforehand, Suárez did not follow the advice of the U.S. and legalized the Spanish Communist Party before the general election in 1977. During the Cold War period, the U.S. feared that a “neutral and non-aligned” Spain could have worked to neutralize the strait of Gibraltar. The U.S. could not permit such a state of affairs under any circumstances. Spain is situated on the Mediterranean, which is very important in terms of geopolitics. We should remember that Castiella, former minister of foreign affairs, appealed for the neutrality of the Mediterranean in the 1960s, and he was dismissed as a result of U.S. pressure. President Suárez as well might be classified as a “dangerous person” by the U.S. On the other hand, Suárez was more preoccupied with Spanish domestic policy than with foreign policy because Spain was undergoing the democratization process. Curiously, Castro himself showed a certain respect for Carter. Castro considered Carter to be a man of ethics and thought he could understand the problems at hand. Castro valued him as “the best president whom he had known” (Ramonet, 2006, pp. 369–371, 373; Levine, 2001, p. 112). In fact, in 1977, the Carter administration established an Interest Section within the Swiss Embassy in Cuba. It must be noted, however, that it was during the Carter administration (1980) that the Mariel Boatlift occurred, in which 125,000 Cuban emigrants departed for the U.S. In the meantime, relations between Cuba and Spain were advancing to the next level. A democratic country has to hold elections periodically. Now Spain was a democratic country. This meant that Spanish foreign policy toward other countries had the potential to become a campaign issue – a means of distinguishing one political party from others or even of attacking opposing parties. In a democracy, public opinion about the parties’ foreign policy positions can make or break them when the people go to the polls. It is true that during the Franco regime and the period of the transition, under the new Constitution and a democratically elected parliament, Spain did not criticize Cuba regarding the problems of human rights (or the authoritarian Spain did not have the “right” to criticize Castro’s Cuba). This was also one of the reasons continuous bilateral relations could continue. Moreover, Spain did not join NATO until 1982 and the European Community until 1986. This meant that Spain had free rein over her foreign policy, free from rules, opinions, and pressures of other member states.

100  The reconciliation of generations

The end of the Cold War: what could Spain do as a middle power? Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, and Castro It is true that the Cuban Communist Party made foreign policy based on its principles.1 If Spanish “rightist” leaders Franco and Suárez got along well with Castro, what kind of relations did Castro form with Spanish leftist leaders? As we have seen, the Castro regime maintained diplomatic relations with the Franco regime, which prohibited the activities of political parties. What kind of relationship did Castro develop with Spanish communists? Here we will analyze two examples: the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) and Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). Under the Franco regime, all other parties were illegal, with the exception of the National Movement. The communists conducted their activities in Spain underground, unlike the PSOE or the Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (POUM), which criticized the Franco regime from abroad where they had exiled. Although the regime restricted the trade union movements, after joining the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1956 and signing the Collective Agreements Act in 1958, it recognized the right to negotiate work conditions between labor and management. Moreover, beginning in 1962, strikes were permitted. The illegal PCE formed Workers’ Commissions, and in the syndical elections, it achieved a grand and unexpected triumph, enhancing its strength in Spain. The secretary general of the PCE was Santiago Carrillo (1960–1982). When he came to Cuba in 1960, he was received by Ciutat de Miguel (Chapter 3) and some former military personnel of the Spanish Republican Army. He had a meeting with Castro just one day before Castro went to the UN, when he met Malcolm X, as described in Chapter 5. They started talking at midnight, just two hours before Castro’s departure to New York. According to Carrillo, Castro was full of energy, and Carrillo wondered when he had time to sleep; it seemed to him that Castro never got tired. After that, the two met several more times (Carrillo, 2009). From December 1963 to the following January, some Spanish Communist Party executives, such as Dolores Ibárruri, La Pasionaria, a mythic heroine of the Spanish Civil War, and Carrillo began gathering in Havana (Caldevilla, 22/3/1969). Carrillo felt admiration and friendship because Castro was “a liberator that returned to the Cuban people its independence and freedom, put an end to racial discrimination, and restored Cuban national dignity.” Moreover, the sacrifice (of the Revolution) served as an example for subsequent leaders of the Latin American left. Also, in Carrillo’s opinion, because Castro was the son of Galician immigrants, he felt very close to Spain and the anti-Franco cause. It is true that Castro maintained diplomatic relations with Franco. However, from the point of view of Carrillo, Castro helped this cause when he could, such as on the occasion

The reconciliation of generations 101 of the speech at the General Assembly of the UN in 1960 in which he criticized imperialism (Carrillo, 2009). In February of 1968, Carrillo visited Cuba again. Castro was angry at the Soviet Union because they had “breached many of the trade commitments with Cuba.” Carrillo intended to be a good officer to help smooth relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba. However, after that, Carrillo was surprised when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in April. Castro criticized the Soviet Union but justified its intervention (Carrillo, 1994, pp. 531–533). According to Carrillo, in general, once communist leaders resign from official posts, they seldom continue personal relations. However, after Carrillo’s resignation as secretary general of the PCE, he maintained cordial relations with Cuban communists. He once visited Castro even though he was without any official post, just before the visit of democratic Spanish President Suárez. Carrillo believed that he contributed, though modestly, to the success of Suárez’s visit (1994, pp. 533–534). In the 21st century, Carrillo said that at the time of the inauguration of President Obama in 2009, the Americans “have to start to put an end to the economic and political war against Cuba” (Carrillo, 2009). We can conclude that Castro’s discourses and activities were praised both by the rightist and by the leftist. Carrillo himself was a legend. After the Prague Spring, he kept a distance from the Soviet Union. With Italian and French communists, he followed the Eurocommunism line, which defended the multiparty system and parliamentary democracy. When he entered Spain illegally, he disguised himself by wearing a wig made by the procommunist exiled barber of Pablo Picasso. The wig became famous after democratization, and it is displayed in the archive. In 1981, during a coup at the Congress when occupants fired shots and ordered everyone to lie down, only Carrillo, President Suárez, and Vice President Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado refused and remained seated. In sum, Castro had an ability to identify leaders with strong will. While maintaining diplomatic relations with the Franco regime, he also kept in contact with his comrades.

President González and Castro The next example of a Spanish leftist leader is Felipe González. In the general elections in Spain in October of 1982, the PSOE won and took power, and young González became president at the age of 40. It was in February of 1984 when Castro went to Spain for the first time. When he set foot in Spain, he was only a five-hour transit from Moscow, where the funeral of Soviet Secretary General Yuri Andropov was taking place. This was also his first “visit” to a Western European capital. The Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs was informed of the visit only two days beforehand, but by their potentiality, the Spanish protocol section arranged the visit perfectly. At that time, Castro had a conversation with King Juan Carlos and invited him to Cuba (Bayon, 1984). Finally the king visited Cuba in 1999, when the 9th Ibero-American Summit was held.

102  The reconciliation of generations Castro arrived in Spain at the airport of Madrid with Daniel Ortega, a Nicaraguan politician who had once lived in exile in Cuba and later became the president of Nicaragua. President González received them under the gangway ladder and invited them for lunch. The Pacification of Latin America was one of the topics of conversation. González had contributed positively to the resolution of conflicts in Central America, where the U.S. was also involved. Apart from this, Castro seemed to be interested in new technology and the revitalization of industry in Spain. There was at the time a problem about a Spanish exile in Cuban custody, Eloy Gutiérrez Menoyo (see Chapter 3). He was exiled to Cuba when he was very small and joined the Cuban Revolution but later was exiled to the U.S. From there, he intended to overthrow the Castro regime but was captured. When Castro came to Spain in 1984, Gutiérrez Menoyo’s family and some Cuban exiles rushed to the airport to protest. González tried to get Gutiérrez Menoyo released, finally succeeding in 1986. He lived in the U.S. after that but came back to Cuba in 2003 at almost 70 years of age. He spent his later years there to “reform the regime from inside.” He was called Galician Menoyo, even though he was not from Galicia. In Latin America, Spanish immigrants sometimes are called Gallego. In November 1986, González made an official visit to Cuba. Spain, cooperating with Cuba, intended to contribute to the pacification of Latin America, trying to assert a more powerful political voice and increase its influence amid the ending of the Cold War.

Friction in relations and the collapse of the Soviet Union Strangely, González got on well with U.S. Republican President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989). In domestic policy, Spain gradually turned to neo-liberal economic policies and lost the support of the General Union of Workers (UGT). From Castro’s point of view, it seemed that González, who had fought against the Franco regime, was becoming more conservative; he was not a socialist anymore, and he sent advisors who would help bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union ( Barbadillo, n. d.). After that, Castro visited Spain in 1992 to assist the 2nd Ibero-American Summit at Madrid, attend the inauguration of the Olympic Games at Barcelona, and go to a ceremony at the Exposition of Seville. At first Castro said that he would not visit Spain. However, without Cuban presence, the Summit would have collapsed, and it would have been seen as a failure of Spanish diplomacy. It might have been a kind of performance by Castro. Finally in July, he made the trip and helped Spain save face (Roy, 1998, pp. 96, 108). What is more, at that time, Cuba was struggling, having lost much of the countries’ necessary supplies due to the drastic changes taking place in the Soviet Union, Cuba won 14 gold medals, taking the 5th most of any country (Castro, 2008) and one more than the host country, Spain. Very symbolically, Nelson Mandela attended the Opening Ceremony of the Olympics. He would become president of South Africa the following year.

The reconciliation of generations 103

Fraga and Cuba As we noted previously, Manuel Fraga was a former minister in the Franco regime, but he became a “reformist” and formed the “conservative” AP Party with some former Francoists. In 1985, he presented a book that Gutiérrez Menoyo had written while in prison, drawing the attention of the Spaniards to the indifference caused by leftist ideology (Galbis, 1985). Gutiérrez Menoyo was not Galician, but Fraga, with his (and his father’s) experience of emigrating to Cuba, always took care of Galicians around the world. After he became president of Galicia in 1990, he visited Galician communities in Europe and Latin America (Elorriaga Fernández, 2014, p. 230). His father was a poor farmer, but after their emigration to Cuba he made a fortune. Fraga himself was born in Spain but went to Cuba when he was only four years old in 1926 and spent two years there (Elorriaga Fernández, 2014, p. 18; Penella, 2009, p. 22). As a result, when he came back to Spain, he spoke Spanish with a Cuban accent (Penella, 2009, p. 26). When he visited Cuba in 1991, he was welcomed as if he had come as a state guest, and an average of eight events were planned per day during his visit (Orgambides, 1991). As mentioned, Castro visited Spain in 1992. He was invited by Fraga, and they visited Láncara, where his father was born. He was emotional about this experience (Roy, 1998, p. 56). The birthplace of his father was a small and modest, one-story house of stone built long ago. He showed photos of his poor ancestors’ house to his guests (Orgambides, 1992; Szulc, 1987, p. 113). In a speech, Castro compared himself with Don Quixote, whom he liked, and added: I find myself in Galicia, body and soul, my Spanish blood has endowed me with a bold, adventurous and reckless spirit. (Alvelo Céspedes, 2013, p. 90) Castro conceived of himself as having roots in both Galicia and Castile, where the action of Don Quixote takes place. We should remember that Franco was Galician and studied at the Academy in the Castilian city, Toledo. In the middle of a speech of welcome to the Cuban leader, Fraga burst into sobs, remembering his Galician emigration and, particularly, that of his father to Cuba (Orgambides, 1992). During a visit to Cuba in 1998, Fraga had lunch where he had once lived and visited his relatives’ graves. However, he did not go to the “routine” tourist attractions of Cuba, such as the cabaret Tropicana. Instead, he brought 13 tons of food from Galicia and invited 3,000 Galicians to dinner, serving them tapas such as octopus and pies à la Galicia (Vicent, 1998). During this visit, Fraga said: Cuba is something familiar to Galicia, which is why we have been defending and reiterating as many times as necessary that relations between Spain and Cuba should be conceived of as family relations. A family understands its members and forgives their mistakes, while recognizing their own. (Alvelo Céspedes, 2013, p. 108)

104  The reconciliation of generations Both Fraga and Franco considered Latin America to be family. They wished to maintain common values of “family,” and because of these family-like ties, Spain would never abandon Latin America. Castro and Fraga were attracted to each other. Later, in 1994, Castro turned up late at a reception at the Chinese Embassy because he had spent the day fishing with Fraga. Leycester Coltman, the English Ambassador to Cuba, stated that “if Fraga represented the right wing in Europe, Castro thought he would support the right.” Castro added that “he would have got on well with Mrs. Thatcher,” the British prime minister, and felt sorry to have not had a chance to meet her. Castro was neither a simple anticapitalist nor an anti-imperialist. Nor was he a politician who only insists upon opposition in order to be distinguished from others or merely for political performance as a raison d’être. As Coltman concluded, “[I]n the modern world the concepts of left and right were no longer relevant” (Coltman, 2003, p. 219). Spanish diplomacy under a democratic system allowed for the inclusion of multiple actors in addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including the governments of Galicia and Catalonia, which were very active.2

Miami and the propaganda of the Cold War Among the various actors, we have to mention the existence of the anti-Castro Cuban exiles in Miami. Some tried to be a conduit between Cuba and Miami, such as the Cuban exile Bernardo Benes, who worked for the release of 3,600 political prisoners in Cuba and for visits between exiled families and Cubans during the Carter and Reagan administrations. In general, Miami at the time was a segregated city and very complicated (Levine, 2001). In 1980, as we have mentioned, about 125,000 Cubans were exiled (or emigrated) to the U.S. in what was called the Mariel Boatlift. It was supported by the Cuban Americans. In 1981, the Cuban exile and Christian democratic activist (Poyo, 2007, p. 175) Jorge Mas Canosa formed the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF). In 1985, with the Reagan administration’s support, Radio Martí, which broadcast anti-Castro discourse, and CANF became the center of the anti-Castro movement. The Reagan administration started to develop a strong anti-Castro policy in order to gain votes in Florida, where the Hispanic population was growing (Schmidt, 1984). Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush, admitted that the issue of Cuba was a domestic one, not a foreign policy issue, for the U.S. (LeoGrande and Kornbluh, 2014, p. 405). The Miami Cubans were getting greater political power because of domestic policy in Washington. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, new budget priorities in the U.S. nearly meant the end of broadcasting to foreign countries. Radio Martí was the exception. However, Radio Martí, especially TV Martí’s broadcasts, were disrupted by the Castro regime. The U.S. government tried to cut the budget various times but was thwarted by Miami Cubans. Even though nobody could

The reconciliation of generations 105 watch the broadcasts, the U.S. spent hundreds of millions of dollars (Council of Hispanic Affairs, 2006). The Miami Cuban community had become so important that it served as a pivotal voting block for the presidential election in 2000; from the 1990s, the importance of the Latino electorate continued to grow. However, this community was not monolithic. In Miami proper, after the Reagan administration became more influential, the Clinton Democrats regained power, and as a result of the Elián González affair in 1999, George W. Bush got the support of Cuban Americans. Migration was becoming a more and more important factor in bilateral relations and was utilized as a means of “foreign” policy for Cubans. According to Japanese scholar, Hideaki Kami, the Cold War “profoundly shaped Cuban exiles’ worldview and their political attitudes” (2012, p. 201). That is, they, including the Catholic section, utilized this confrontation to leverage the U.S. government to advance their cause against Castro’s Cuba. During the Cold War, the U.S. had three conditions for normalization of the relationship with Cuba: “to reduce if not eliminate its military relationship with the Soviet Union, stop supporting revolution in Latin America, and withdraw its military forces from Africa.” In the 1990s, when the Cold War ended, the U.S. demanded that Cuba change its social and political system, “accepting a free-­ market economy and multiparty liberal democracy,” while Cuba saw U.S. demands as coming from a superior relationship (LeoGrande and Kornbluh, 2014, pp. 405, 417). Their aims were so different that they could not narrow the differences even after the end of the Cold War significantly altered the geopolitical landscape. In 2009, in the U.S. about 59% of Cuban Americans were foreign born, and only 53% came to the U.S. before 1990 (Dockterman, 2011, pp. 1–4). Actually, in Miami, the change of generations of Cuban Americans was dramatic. The younger generation, having been influenced by Spanish media for their identity through radio and Internet (which was not always linked to Cuban Americans), got broader information and did not develop a hard-line stance against Castro as had previous generations (Lohmeier, 2014, pp. 67, 133, 143).

To the new generation The era of the PP In Spain, the PSOE, which had stayed in power for 14 years, had been exposed ­ opular for its corruption and lost the general election in 1996. The conservative P Party (PP, successor of AP, founded by Fraga) formed a strong tie with CANF. According to Castro, the leader of this party, José María Aznar, was a close friend of Mas Canosa and visited Central America via his personal jet. Aznar ran for president in the electoral campaign of 2000 and won (Ramonet, 2006, pp. 456–457). The new President Aznar did not get along well with Cuba from the outset of his administration. In November of 1996, the 6th Ibero-American Summit was the first occasion for Aznar and Castro to meet. At that time, Aznar exchanged

106  The reconciliation of generations neckties with Castro as a gesture, but Aznar was firmly against the Castro regime, if not Cuba. Just after that, the PP appointed a new ambassador to Cuba, Josep Coderch, who was close to former President Suárez and served as president of the Diplomatic School at that time. He said that the Embassy doors are wide open, even to dissidents. This provoked a dispute, and the Cuban side did not give him agrément. At that point, relations between the PP and Cuba started to deteriorate. Unlike the PSOE, which was oriented toward Europe, the PP empathized with Atlanticism to some extent in order to stress the difference of their “new” foreign policy. On the other hand, Aznar wanted Spain to be a great power in Europe and approached President George W. Bush, backing the war in Iraq by dispatching Spanish troops, even when the majority of Spanish people opposed this decision. Thus, Spain became a member of the so-called New Europe, as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeldt stated in 2003. However, Spain had to pay a high price when it experienced terrorism in 2004.

New bilateral relations forged by new generations In March of 2004, only three days before the general election in Spain, train bombings occurred in Madrid. Al-Qaeda later claimed responsibility. The PP tried to conceal the truth, blaming instead the ETA (Euscadi Ta Askatasuna). As a result, PSOE won the election and returned to power. New Prime Minister José Rodríguez Zapatero again stressed the role of Spain in Europe, promoting a policy of cooperation with France and Germany. He also tried to be a bridge between Europe and Latin America. He immediately withdrew Spanish troops from Iraq, which strained the U.S.–Spanish relationship. As for Cuba, unlike former President González of the PSOE, Zapatero did not have a special personal attachment to Castro, and he tried to move closer to the EU framework. From within this framework, Spain could no longer ignore positions of the EU and go it alone if it wanted. This is the democratic feature of the EU. It is a fundamental value for the EU, a value that Francoist Spain lacked, effectively keeping Spain from joining the EU. In addition, the theme of human rights became more problematic when it came to foreign policy. Spain, moving on from Franco’s dictatorial regime, had been conducting diplomacy since the transition with the protection of human rights and of democracy as core principles. However, Zapatero was criticized for these policies because of their inconsistency. For example, Zapatero Spain maintained normal relations with Cuba, Morocco, China, and Equatorial Guinea without criticizing their human rights records. This caused other member states to distrust Spain (Torreblanca, 2012, p. 456). On this point, Carrillo had been critical since the 1990s, when the Spanish government applied a double standard by criticizing Cuba but not Morocco (Carrillo, 1994, p. 534). Zapatero’s administration stressed that in the process of democratization in Cuba, Spain could be a mediator and play an active role. However, Spain was not

The reconciliation of generations 107 the only European country that wanted to initiate policies toward Latin America and Cuba. Spain gained little traction, as its discourse and activities were confusing, inconsistent, and ambiguous (Palomares, 2012, p. 499). The Spanish middle class in the 21st century distinguishes between Cuba and the Castro brothers. They have sympathy toward Cuba and Cubans but hold a different sentiment toward the Castro brothers. Asked which country they felt the most sympathy for in Latin America, Cuba was the third (7%) after Argentina (20%) and Mexico (8%). When asked whether they felt sympathy toward Cuba, 63% said yes, while for Cubans 50%. Also, 86% said that a democratic system should be established in Cuba. In 2010, three-fourths thought that the international community should apply more pressure to resolve the problem of human rights in Cuba (Noya, 2013, pp. 277, 281). In the general election of 2011, the PP came back to power, and Galician Mariano Rajoy (2011–2018) became president. Fidel Castro, having ceded his official position to his brother Raúl, criticized Rajoy as a “fascist” and an “admirer of Franco” (El Confidencial, 2012). Here, Franco was used as a negative adjective. Not all Galicians could be accepted by Castro unconditionally.

The change of generations and the diversification of actors In the 21st century, the gap between Spain and Latin America is getting bigger. Toward Latin America in general, Spaniards have sympathy. However, they do not see Latin American countries as particularly trustworthy (Noya, 2013, pp. 277, 281). A survey conducted toward the end of 2011 found that 60% of Spaniards thought their diplomatic priority was Europe and next the U.S. at 16%. A similar survey conducted in 2000 also placed Europe at 60%, with Latin America second (11%) and the U.S. third (6%) (Noya, 2013, p. 244). In Spain, the younger generation does not have firsthand experience of the hard times when Spain was poor and saw an outflow of emigrants. Perhaps most importantly, the younger generation has no firsthand experience related to the Spanish Civil War or even the Cuban Revolution. In Spain, the actors of diplomacy, who belonged to a privileged class, have diversified, and a broader swath of society can now influence it as information is more readily available to people regardless of economic class. After democratization, as we saw in Fraga’s diplomacy, regional governments such as those in Basque, Galicia, and Andalusia maintain direct contact with Cuba. According to the analysis of a think tank focusing on Spain, the key institutions for economic and political change in Cuba are the armed forces, the communists, and the Church; Spain has maintained a close relationship with the communists and the Church but not with the armed forces (Domínguez and Gratius, 2006). Meanwhile, the diversification of actors also means that it is difficult to have a coherent or coordinated diplomacy as the Franco regime did. Facing a general election, the opposition may try to stress the difference of its foreign policy from the prior government. At the same time, an economic crisis can harm Spanish diplomacy by reducing the budget for cooperation.

108  The reconciliation of generations Castro, while active, watched a dictator, six presidents3 during dictatorial Spain and under democracy, and the bipolar party system of the leftist PSOE and rightist PP. Principally, Castro valued leaders who made sense and fought for a “cause.” Conversely, Castro relentlessly criticized leaders without a cause or who had lost their fight for a cause. In Spain, from the death of Franco until the end of the 20th century, leaders demonstrated strong leadership. However, in the 21st century, a new generation is developing a new diplomacy, and the relationship between Cuba and Spain is not limited to a bilateral framework; it is now multilateral. As a result, relations between Cuba and Spain are transforming once again.

Notes 1 For example, even in 2016, Raúl Castro, then the first secretary of the party, insisted that “the Cuban foreign policy will remain faithful to its principles” even as U.S.– Cuban relations were about to change (La política exterior cubana se mantendrá fiel a sus principios, 2016). 2 I had a chance to sit next to him during a business lunch when he was the president of Galicia. He was very much a gentleman, free from formal protocol. I myself felt that this type of person could understand others beyond their ideology. 3 Suárez (UCD), Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo (UCD, 1981–1982), González (PSOE), Aznar (PP), Zapatero (PSOE) and the Galician Rajoy (PP, 2011–2018).

8 Conclusion Everything changes: who leaves his name in history?

A sense of duty to humanity As we have seen, for Castro, having some sort of “cause” in common with his counterparts was important as he tried to form rapport with them. On December 17, 1996, the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Peru was occupied by the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA). At that time, the Peruvian president was Alberto Fujimori, who was of Japanese descent.1 This occupation lasted for four months. However, on Fujimori’s orders, the Peruvian Armed Forces rushed in and saved almost all of the hostages, while killing all of the terrorists. Until the final day, various negotiations, both official and unofficial, were ongoing. Particularly significant were the efforts of Cipriani, archbishop of Ayacucho in the southern part of Peru and a member of Opus Dei, and Anthony Vincent, the Canadian ambassador to Peru, who would later be appointed ambassador to Spain. Castro stated that he was ready to receive exiles from MRTA. Spain also worked clandestinely to solve the problem. The members of MRTA did not harm the hostages as Peruvian forces moved in. According to Tanaka, Japanese ambassador to Cuba at that time, one member pointed a gun but hesitated and was shot. This may show that he (and others) did not forget Castro’s offer to receive them in Cuba (Tanaka, 2005, p. 34). Japanese Prime Minister Rutaro Hashimoto, a holder of fifth grade (dan) in kendo, did not forget Castro’s efforts. When he visited Cuba in October of 2001, they talked for eight hours (Nishibayashi, 2013, p. 121). How many Japanese or other world statesmen could talk with Castro for eight hours? Persons who share a cause can understand each other. If Franco, who was rather quiet, had had the chance to argue with Castro, would he have talked with him for such a long time? Or might he have been merely a listener, as he was in his seven-hour conversation with Hitler in Hendaye, France, near the Spanish border in 1940. At that time, Hitler intended to persuade Franco to join his cause by presenting some positive outcomes of taking part in World War II, but Hitler did not want to yield to Franco’s extreme claims on Gibralter, French Morroco, and elsewhere. At the very least, Castro was sure that both he and Franco would understand each other perfectly, because

110  Conclusion a communist could understand a fascist but not a liberal, according to an anecdote recalled by Nicolás Franco in 1969 (Chapter 6) (Mulet del Valle, Roberto, primer secretario, 22/4/1974).

The mistake of the simple dichotomy When we consider the world during the Cold War, we tend to divide it by the East–West dichotomy without considering other possible alignments. But this narrow view fails to account for some important details. In the same way, we cannot simply divide Spain into two factions, pro-Francoist or pro-Republican, during the Spanish Civil War and after. In Cuba, all sorts of people gathered: anti-Francoist and pro-Francoist, among many others. As a result, Cuba became something like “a little Spain” to some extent, in terms of the relationship between Miami and Cuba. This sort of diversification was not permitted in Francoist Spain. So once Spain democratized, the significance and position of Cuba underwent a transformation in the eyes of Spaniards. Using various archives in various countries, I found that official propagandistic remarks made by Castro in Cuba and unofficial ones are slightly different. We cannot determine what was in his mind if we analyze only his official remarks. If the Cuban Communist Party had decision-making authority during the Cold War, Cuba would have been aligned differently. That is, it might very well have followed the simple East–West scheme and ideology. However, as we have seen, the Cuban Communist Party (PSP) leaders, including Carlos Rafael Rodríguez (Chapters 3 and 6) were at first on Batista’s side. As for its policy toward Spain, Castro would have the last word on all matters. As Javier Oyarzun stated (Chapter 6), Castro could be more pragmatic and flexible than other “high ranking Cuban officers who were obliged to show antagonism against the Capitalist world to acquire merit in the eyes of the Communist Party.” Applying a political theory does not always lead to success. Economic diplomacy could be served as a trump on an ace, but giving priority only to economics might not work smoothly. Diplomacy focused on a cause could gain sympathy, even though it might require sacrifice. However, without a view of the spiritual connection, we cannot understand the Spanish position regarding Cuba, the U.S., and international relations. Leaders must save face (i.e., honor). This is important for diplomatic relations also. If one wants to maintain a good relationship for the long term, one should not try to crush one’s opponents, which can lead to bad blood and doom future relations. Both Franco and Castro avoided one-off victories and worked on comprehensive negotiations, consisting of various themes to resolve a single issue, such as the release of political prisoners. They sometimes hid their real intention from the public depending on the needs of the moment in order to save face. To this end, they used domestic propaganda and public diplomacy depending on the occasion and the negotiators. Analyzing the relationships among the U.S., Spain, and Cuba made us think about democracy and public opinion. For many people, life in the present is most

Conclusion 111 important. It is true that democracy allows different opinions, but for it to work, we have to foster statesmen with a cause for the long term and support them. Only criticizing or opposing them will not accomplish anything.

Why the two countries maintained diplomatic relations Now we return to the question of why Cuba and Spain maintained diplomatic relations despite various ups and downs. Three big factors can be pointed out: the independent diplomacy of both countries, the spiritual ties between them, and a pragmatic commercial policy. Neither Spain nor Cuba was at the center of the bipolar system of the Cold War. Spain did not have diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union, and the U.S. had troops stationed in Spain. Perhaps Spain can be said to have leaned toward the West while Cuba, receiving support from the Soviet Union, leaned toward the East. However, we should remember that both countries stressed “independent diplomacy” against U.S. pressure. To unify a diverse country, strict discipline and a common outside enemy was needed. Both countries, recognizing the complexity of the times, looked for a third way. In addition to the traffic of people related to the Spanish Civil War, it was the Catholic Church that strengthened bilateral ties. As we described earlier, despite having different regimes and ideologies, Spanish diplomats under Franco had a keen sense toward their former colony that their American counterparts could not possibly develop. It is strange for the Communist Party and the Catholic Church to coexist, but successive popes had been pained by excessive capitalism. When diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba were reestablished in 2015, Canada and the Vatican again played active roles, just as they had during the Japanese embassy hostage crisis in Peru years earlier. Ironically, under the Franco regime and National Catholicism, the Church gradually came to criticize the regime and, as it drew to an end, supported a smooth democratic transition. Neither in the Peru incident nor in this case did Spain play a remarkable role. However, we cannot overlook its role in establishing a trusting relationship between Cuba and the Catholic Church. The “common historical tie” between Spain and Cuba does not consist of a political system or of purely economic interests but of a spiritual tie, at least from the Spanish point of view. Castro said that the Cuban Revolution would serve to restore Spanish honor following its defeat in the Spanish-American War. Between Cuba and Spain, despite the difference of ideologies during the Cold War, some spiritual ties tracing back to Galicia might have kept the two nations close. What is more, another reason the diplomatic relationship could be maintained was the existence of pragmatic commercial policy. Insisting on the spiritual bilateral tie, Cuba and Spain kept their trade relationship because both were in a peripheral position or removed from the international economic system dominated by the U.S. During the U.S. blockade, both increased the amount of trade to the other. Concretely, Spain was moved not so much by Cold War ideology as by the notion of Hispanidad, infused with Catholicism, and a sense of honor in resisting the U.S. Cuba was moved rather by economic necessity. Cuba took

112  Conclusion advantage of the Spanish approach, through the sugar agreements for example, while Spain was more naïve.

What dictators can do, what democratic leaders cannot Both Spain and Cuba had strong and autocratic leadership, supported by a militaristic moralism, which made it possible to view diplomacy and the fatherland over the long term. Despite a lack of natural resources, under strong charismatic leaders the people can endure to some extent. In Spain, there were statesmen with causes and strong political leadership that endured until the end of the 20th century. In contrast, Batista was a military leader but succumbed to temptation. Leaders without causes try to make the accounts appear balanced by referencing macroeconomic figures, and corrupt politicians cannot gain the esteem of their own people or of those abroad. We do not blindly praise Franco and Castro, of course. They were rightly criticized for human rights abuses. However, we can say that they stressed morality. Cuba, pointing out the positive “historic tie” between the two countries while pretending not to notice human rights abuses, enforced economic relations and continued to be a good partner. We can say that Castro was both an idealist and a pragmatist. As Matthews said regarding Latin American history, “the absence of ideologies” can be seen in this instance (Matthews, 1970, p. 306). What is more, at that moment, it was crucial to utilize foreign media to mobilize international and domestic public opinion. The Spanish Civil War was a preliminary skirmish leading up to World War II and the Cold War. The winners and losers of the Spanish Civil War mixed in Cuba, and this fact complicated the bilateral relationship. In the U.S., intellectuals who had supported the cause of the Cold War through McCarthyism found, for an instant, their cause in the Cuban Revolution. As a result, a biased view of Cuba emerged from the mass media, and this colored the Department of State’s view. In short, the American mass media, from the Spanish Civil War to the Cold War stressed an unromanticized dictator Franco and an idealized Castro (around the Revolution period) while greatly influencing American public opinion. The Spanish ambassadors could analyze coolly the Cuban situation because of their experience with internal conflicts in the Spanish Civil War. The problem of public opinion also can be seen during the negotiation of the Panama Canal during the Carter administration. Carter and the Panamanian military leader, Omar Torrijos, also shared a common “enemy” in public opinion. They fought together against what might be deemed a poorly informed and easily manipulated public, as well as a casual American prejudice toward Latin America. As opposed to the American democratic system, Franco and Castro, while denying the freedom of the press in their countries, tried to improve their image through the American mass media. Now in the 21st century, not only propaganda or public diplomacy but also unintentional broadcasts and individual discourses can influence foreign policy. We should not forget that a simple, harmles or naïve leader or system might not always be able to overcome political crisis.

Conclusion 113

Whose name will be remembered by history? Che Guevara said on October 20, 1962, on the occasion of a ceremony marking the second anniversary of the Association of Young Rebels: [T]he youth also must create. Youth that does not create is really an anomaly. The UJC (Union of Young Communist) has been a bit lacking in that creative spirit. (Deutschmann, 1997, p. 139) And in 1965, in a letter to Carlos Quijano, a Uruguayan journalist, Guevara wrote: The basic clay of our work is the youth. We place our hope in it and prepare it to take the banner from our hands. (Deutschmann, 1997, p. 213) Guevara clearly pinned his hopes on the young. He participated in the Cuban Revolution in his early thirties, became the president of the National Bank and Minister of Industry, and held many other positions. He died at only 39 years of age. He was more a revolutionary than a statesman. He did not cling to power and thought about cultivating the next generation. Revolutionaries cannot remain in place; revolutionaries and bureaucrats are different. The Cuban Revolution was a gleam of hope for Spanish exiles who aimed to defeat the Franco regime, and the Franco regime was isolated in Europe. In Japan, the generation of Baby Boomers was also devoted to the Revolution. However, in Spain, Japan, Cuba, and the U.S., it is now time to pass the baton to the next generation. In the U.S., some American politicians tried to normalize the relationship with Cuba. However, this was difficult when Castro was still in power, as he advanced the cause of anti-Americanism so that Cuba could have an outside enemy that would unite people in Cuba. A change of generations has since taken place then. Fidel ceded power to his brother Raúl before he passed away. Then in April 2018, Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel, born in 1960 (after the Revolution) succeeded him as president of the Council of State and the Council of Ministers. Some of the older generation remain in place, where they can give advice to the younger leaders. Now, normalization would not damage the Cuban sense of honor. To the younger generation, normalization does not mean that Cuba has yielded to the U.S. Former President Obama could act more freely than others. Obama used the good offices of then Spanish President Zapatero, especially toward Cuba and Venezuela and also cooperation with the Catholic Church (LeoGrande and Kornbluh, 2014, pp. 381–382). On April 11, 2015, at the Summit of Americas in Panama, a historic dialogue between Obama and Raúl was held. The New York Times published an article entitled “Obama and Raúl Castro Meet, Making

114  Conclusion History.” However, the ascendency of American President Donald Trump in 2017 has made matters difficult, as he is taking a hard-line policy toward Cuba. The winners write history and tell a story of old survivors. More than 60 years have passed since Fidel Castro said, “[H]istory will absorb me.” But we still wonder who will be remembered by history. Strangely, in the 21st century in democratic Spain, a revisionist view of history is gaining traction. The Alcazar of Toledo, used as a defense point by Franco’s forces during the Spanish Civil War, became in 2010 the Army Museum of Toledo. It displays a “neutral” chronology, while previously it had been reconstructed and its parts used as a museum about the blockade and the attack by the Republicans against Franco’s forces. In the past it had a more “pro-Francoist” nuance.2 As we mentioned in the beginning, in 2007, the Historical Memory Law were passed by the Spanish Congress. Further, in 2018, under the new Pedro Sánchez administration, the Congress approved, with the abstention of the conservatives, the removal of Franco’s remains from their mausoleum (Valle de los Caídos), which would be converted to a national monument. This caused some heated discussion among Spaniards. Who gets their name engraved in the “eternal life” of history? Is it Jorge Manrique (Chapter 2), the Castilian poet and soldier of the 15th century? What about Shoin Yoshida, the Japanese intellectual samurai whose disciples became political activists during the Meiji Restoration in the 19th century? He said, “I have no choice but to await the judgment of my way of life as a human being only after entering the coffin” (Ryukonroku). Even after entering the coffin, history can be revised; the evaluation can change depending on the period. Where Do We Come From? What Are We? Where Are We Going? is a painting by Paul Gauguin, the French painter. Both Castro and Franco, coming (or having ancestors) from Galicia, showed who they were to the people of their time and left their names to history, in both good and bad ways depending on the period or the people who interpret it. The evaluation of their “achievement” depends on us and on later generations. This is history.

Notes 1 I was dispatched there for a month after the incident by the Japanese Embassy in Spain. 2 I visited the site in 1993, but now it has changed totally, and there is little information about that time on its website.

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Index

17th Chess Olympiad 35 26th of July Movement 28, 48, 52 Abd el-Krim 15 Acción Católica de Propagandistas (ACdP) 18 Aeroflot (soviet airline) 67 AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) 42 Africa: Cuban folklore and 69 – 70; Cuban policy toward 73; decolonization movement 70; Ghana 72; internationalism of Cuba and 69 – 74; nationalism in 70; Nigeria 9; South Africa 102; sub-Saharan 70 African Americans: Castro seeking solidarity with 70; Malcolm X Grassroots Movement 73 African-Cubans 73 – 74 African culture, as Cuban folklore 69 – 70 Albéniz, Isaac 50 Álbenz, Jacob 30 Alcalde, Oscar 29 Alcazar of Toledo 114 Alexander the Great 30 Alfonsin, Raúl 11 Alfonso XIII, King of Spain 14, 16 Allende, Salvador 91 Alliance for Progress program 6, 61 Almeida, Juan 72, 73 Alpha 66 36 Al-Qaeda 106 American capitalism see capitalism American democracy, dual, contradictory nature of 22 American Mafia 61 – 62 American media see journalism/media Andalusia 107

Andropov, Yuri 101 anti-Americanism 1 – 2, 5, 22, 86, 92, 113 anti-Batista movement 74 – 75 anti-Castro movement 53, 76, 104 see also Cuban exiles anti-communism 10 anti Francoists 35 anti-freemasonry 16 anti-imperialism 27 – 28, 72 – 73, 79 anti-liberalism 16, 22, 43 Arab-Israeli conflict 17, 89 Arafat, Yasser 99 Areilza, José María de 20, 44 Argentina 12, 31, 50, 61, 107 Arias Navarro, Carlos 97 Arteaga, Manuel 28 Asturias 16 atheism 58 – 59 Atlanticism 106 autarky 18, 22, 81 – 82 authoritarianism 4, 8, 11, 17, 22, 62, 86 Azaña, Manuel 16 Aznar, José María 105 – 106 Baptists 18, 63 Barcelona, Spain 102 Barreiros, Eduardo 81 – 83 Barreiros Diesel 82 Basque 96, 107 Basque separatists 29 Batista, Fulgencio: 26th of July Movement and 26 – 27; currying U.S. support 41 – 42; exiled to Florida 42; fleeing Cuba 34; Nixon visit with 30; Pérez Serantes as intermediator for 48; as president 26 – 27; succumbed to temptation 112 Bayo, Alberto 15; biography of 25 – 26; entering Havana 35; establishing

Index  129 guerilla school 35; Fidel Castro meeting 30 – 31; Raúl Castro and 53 Bay of Pigs invasion 10, 35 – 36, 55, 61, 75 Bazán (national shipbuilding company) 15 Belen monks 14 Benedict XVI (pope) 59n1 Benes, Bernardo 104 Bennassar, Bartolomé 20 Betto, Frei 13, 20, 49 Big Stick Diplomacy 10 Birán 13, 24 Black August 73 Black Legend 50 – 51 Bogotazo mass riot 27 Bohlen, Charles 40 Bolívar, Simón 11, 19, 21 Bonaparte, Napoleon 30, 79 – 80 Bond, James (fictitious character) 61 Bonsal, Philip 43, 53 Brandt, Willy 90 Brazil 50, 90 Bush, George H.W. 104 Bush, George W. 105, 106 Caesar, Julius 30 Caldevilla, Jaime 50 – 51, 53, 56, 67, 75 – 78, 87 Camino de Santiago 11 Canada 92, 111 Canal Zone 10 Canary Islands 12 capitalism: exploiting Cuba 28, 65; harmful effects of 48 Caribbean 22, 51, 71, 83 Carlos, Juan see Juan Carlos, Prince/King of Spain Carrero Blanco, Luis 89 – 90 Carrillo, Santiago 100 – 101 Carter, Jimmy 63, 98, 99, 112 Casaroli, Agostino 58 Castiella, Fernando María: Carrero Blanco and 89 – 90; as member of Acción Católica de Propagandistas 18; on neutrality of the Mediterranean 99; Rusk and 69, 85 – 86; succeeding Martín Artajo 65 Castile 15, 103 Castro, Ángel (father of FC) 4, 12 – 13, 24 Castro, Fidel: as amateur guerilla 30; appeal for revolution 33; assassination attempts on 61 – 62; Aznar and 105 – 106; battle against imperialism

73; Bayo and 30 – 31; birth of 12; at Bogotazo mass riot 27; Carillo and 100; Carter and 99; Catholic Church and 51 – 52; Catholicism and 28 – 29; as caudillo 17; ceding power to Raúl 107, 113; Ciutat de Miguel as advisor to 35; commonalities with counterparts 109; commonalities with Franco 4 – 5, 11; communism and 43 – 44; conducting Operation Truth 43; criticizing Soviet Union 101; criticizing the U.S. Embassy 53; Don Quixote comparison 103; education of 4; eluding capital punishment 29 – 30; exiled to Mexico 30; fascist tendencies of 22; forming 26th of July Movement 28; in foster care 13; Fraga and 103 – 104; on Franco’s death 96 – 97; Franco’s support for 36; Hashimoto and 109; at Havana University 22; Jesuit influence on 13 – 14; on Kennedy 62 – 63; leftist ideas of 27; Lojendio on 34 – 35, 43 – 44; Malcolm X and 72; Marquéz on 21; Martí as mentor to 21; as Martíst 20 – 21; as Marxist-Leninist 44; meeting Suárez 98; at Olympic Games 102; as pragmatic and flexible 110; proclaiming a Socialist Revolution 55; receiving sympathy in U.S. 43 – 45; searching for independent diplomacy 73; solidarity with African Americans 70; speaking voice of 35; steering public opinion by mass media 62; support for Franco 36; sympathizing with Ho Chi Minh 4; Taberna Latasa and 68; United Nations debut speech 71 – 72; using psychological warfare 32 – 33; utilizing power of journalism 45; vest of moral protection 21; visiting Láncara 103; visiting New York 43; visiting Spain 101 – 102; see also Castro regime, Cuban Revolution Castro, Juanita (sister of FC) 12, 75, 76 Castro, Lina (mother of FC) 13 Castro, Raúl (brother of FC): Bayo and 53; ceded power from Fidel 107, 113; executing pro-Batista partisans 43; marriage of 52; Obama and 49, 59, 74, 113 – 114 Castro regime: grew distant from Catholic Church 54 – 55; providing free education to all 55

130 Index Catalonia/Catalonians 5, 9, 11, 20, 29, 50 Catholic Church: Castro and 51 – 52; Cuban revolutionary government and 54 – 55; influence of 4; Operation Peter Pan 55, 74; opposing capital punishment 28 Catholicism: Castro and 28 – 29; Castro’s affinity with 12 – 14; communism as incompatible with 58; Cuban exiles and 74; Franco uniting Spain through 18, 19; as superficial 29 Catholics: supporting Castro Revolution 47; U.S. prejudice toward 47 caudillo, definition of 17 CBS 39, 70 Centoz, Luigi (nuncio) 49 – 50, 57 Central America 18, 72, 84, 102, 105 Centro Gallego 12, 86 Céspedes, Alvero 18 – 19 Charles V, of Habsburg Monarchy 79 Chaviano, Alberto del Río 29 – 30 Che Guevara see Guevara, Ernesto Che Chile 50, 91 China 22, 62, 92, 106 Christ, Jesus 21, 37 – 38 Christianity 7, 24, 37 – 38, 44 see also Catholicism Chrysler 82 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.): anti-Castro movement supported by 76; Bay of Pigs invasion 75 – 76; Bolivian soldiers supported by 88; on Castro 40 – 41, 43; Cuban exiles supported by 55, 61, 81; Juanita Castro collaborating with 75; Zacchi and 57 Cipriani, Juan Luis 109 Ciutat de Miguel, Francisco 35 – 36, 100 Clinton, Bill 105 Coderch, Josep 106 Cold War: favoring Spain 19; Franco and 17 – 20; Latin American origins in 1 – 2; U.S. role in 10 College de Delores 13 Colombia 12, 27, 33, 43, 52 Coltman, Leycester 2, 45, 104 Columbus, Christopher 9, 65 COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) 91 commercial policies 98, 111 communism: Catholicism as incompatible with 58; Christianity compatible with 37; Lojendio’s view

of Castro and 43 – 44; not cause of Cuban Revolution 44 – 45 Communist Party of Cuba 45, 100, 110 communization 51 – 52, 54, 61 Compañia Trasatlántica Española 67 Conference of Security and Co-operation in Europe 58 Córdova Iturburu, Cayetano 31 Costa Rica 90 counterculture 77 Cuba: American political appointees to 40 – 41; anti-American sentiments 22; Barreiros Diesel and 82; commercial issues with Spain 5; diplomatic relations with Chile 91; diplomatic relations with Spain 55 – 56, 89, 111 – 112; exchanging ambassadors with Spain 94; exodus of Spanish priests 56; importing commercial ships 68 – 69; independence from Spain 10; as independent actor in Cold War 2; infusion of American capital to 27; internationalism of Africa and 69 – 74; Kennedy’s hardline policy toward 61; multilateral diplomacy 91; relationship with democratic Spain 97; Second Spanish Republic officials exiled to 5; Spain as mediator with U.S. and 88; as Spain’s colony 65; Spain’s diplomatic relations with 55 – 56; Spain’s Hispanic tie with 2; Spanish immigrants to 11 – 12; spiritual tie with Spain 56; trade partners 64 – 65; trade policy with Spain 93 – 94; U.S. trade embargo against 61 Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) 104 Cuban Communist Party see Communist Party of Cuba Cuban exiles 74 – 75, 77, 83, 104 Cuban Missile Crisis 10, 75 Cuban music 77 Cuban Revolution: American mass media attitude to 38 – 40; Catholics supporting 47; communism not a cause of 44 – 45; defense of fatherland slogan 16; diplomatic corps intervention 50; as moral revolution 44; Pérez Serantes as mediator 48 – 49; regime’s commitment to Catholic Church 52; Spanish exiles and 113; Vatican as mediator 49 – 50 Cuban War of Independence 9

Index  131 cultural imperialism see imperialism Czechoslovakia 2, 67, 101 defense of fatherland, as slogan 16 De Gaulle, Charles 80, 95n1 De La Salle Brothers School 13 democratic Spain: González as president 101 – 102; joins New Europe 106; as nonaligned country 98 – 99; reconciliation with Cuba 97 – 98; relationship with Cuba 97; see also Franco regime, Franco Spain, Spain, Suárez, Adolfo Department of State see U.S. Department of State Díaz-Canel, Miguel Mario 113 Domingo y Morales del Castillo, Andre´s Antonio 30 Dominican Republic 27, 33, 42, 52 Don Quixote 103 Dorticós, Osvald 57, 96 Duke, Angier B. 81 Dulles, John Foster 40 East-West dichotomy 1 – 3, 5, 24, 59, 73, 83, 87, 97, 110 economic diplomacy 110 economic ties between Spain and Cuba 64 – 65, 84, 90 – 92 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 17, 40, 44, 52, 61 El Cid 17 Equatorial Guinea 70, 106 Espín, Vilma 52 Estefan, Gloria 74 Estrada Doctrine 34, 36, 90 ETA (Euscadi Ta Askatasuna) 106 Eurocommunism 101 Europe: Conference of Security and Co-operation 58; Franco as youngest general in 15; Franco regime isolated from 113; immigrants 9; imperial policies 10; Spain as middle power in 85; Spain’s isolation in 16, 22; Zapatero bridging gap between Latin America and 106 European Union (EU) 106 fair play 20 Fair Play for Cuba Committee 70 Falange Española de las JONS (Fascist and National Syndicalist Political Party) 22 Falangists 7, 22, 24

Falla, Manuel de 50 fascism 22 Ferdinand II, King of Spain 23n2 Fernández Cuesta, Nemesio 90, 91 Fernández Toxo, Ignacio 15 Ferrol, Spain 4, 15 Fitzpatrick, John 89 – 90 Flanigan, Peter 40 Fleming, Ian 61 Florida 6, 27, 40, 42, 74, 104 Ford, Gerald 92 – 93 Foreign Assistance Act (U.S.) 68 Foreign Policy 71 – 72 For Whom the Bell Tolls (Hemingway) 31 Fraga, Manuel 81, 86, 97, 103 – 104, 105 France 92 Francis (pope) 58 – 59 Franciscan order 28 Franco, Francisco: biography of 14 – 16; birth of 4, 15; Castro’s support for 36; Cold War and 17 – 20; commonalities with Castro 4 – 5, 11; death of 96; Eisenhower and 52; Eisenhower on 17; esteem toward Castro 79; as General Military Academy director 16; Johnson and 72, 80; on Lojendio media incident 54; Lojendio praising achievements of 51; as military member 15 – 16; National Catholicism for Spain 48; nationalism focus of 15 – 16; naval institutions connection 15; Nixon on 17; Sánchez Bella criticizing 43; supporting for Castro 36; sympathizing with Ho Chi Minh 79 – 80; understanding guerilla warfare 72; uniting Spain through Catholicism 18; on U.S. relationship with Latin American countries 19; see also Franco regime, Franco Spain Franco, Nicolás (brother of FF) 85 Franco regime: on Bonsal 43; censorship under 20; as centrist government 50; on Cuban policy 84, 86; diluting fascist reputation 49; inviting Eisenhower to Spain 63; isolated from international community 18; Mexico breaking relations with 36; Mexico not recognizing 32; National Institute of Industry and 81; promoting industrialization 81 – 82; restricted trade union movements 100; signing agreement with U.S. 37; subordinated attitude to U.S. 69;

132 Index supporting Castro’s rebels 34; on U.S. exploitation of Cuba 65 Franco Spain: competing against U.S. in Latin America 18; leveraging national Catholicism 50; maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba 37; nonintervention policy of 50, 56; recognizing Castro Cuba 36; see also Franco regime, Spain freemasonry 15, 58 French Revolution 27, 39 Fujimori, Alberto 109

Hashimoto, Rutaro 109 Havana 4, 6, 9, 12, 18, 22, 27 – 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41, 48, 50, 51, 56, 60, 67, 75, 76, 85, 91, 92, 94, 96 – 98, 100 Hemingway, Ernest 31, 38 Hispanidad (motto) 14, 21, 51, 79 Historical Memory Law 8, 114 Hitler, Adolf 16, 22, 109 Ho Chi Minh 4, 15, 36, 79 – 80 honor 20, 22, 56, 110 human rights/human rights violations 106 – 107, 112

Galicia, Spain 4, 11 – 12, 81 – 83 Galician emigrants 11 – 12 Gallego 102 see also Galicia, Spain García Marquéz, Gabriel 21 Gardner, Arthur 33, 40, 45 Garrigues, Antonio 63 – 64, 66, 97 Gaudí, Antoni 9 Gauguin, Paul 114 General Archive of the Administration (AGA) 3 General Military Academy 16 General Union of Workers (UGT) 102 Germany 2, 16, 17 – 18, 58, 106 Geyer, Georgie Anne 45 Ghana 72 Gibraltar 89 Gleijeses, P. 73 Golden Age of Spain 18 González, Elián 105 González, Felipe 101 – 102 Gordón Ordás, Félix 32, 34 Great Depression 11 – 12 Greece 40 Groizard, Eduard 37 Gronbeck-Tedesco, J.A. 39 Guam 9 Guantanamo, U.S. military base at 10 Güell family 9 guerilla combat 4 guerilla education 30 – 31 guerilla warfare 72, 79 – 80 Guevara, Ernesto Che 31, 43, 77, 88, 92, 113 Guillén, Nicolás 39 Gulf Oil 89 Gutiérrez Mellado, Manuel 101 Gutiérrez Menoyo, Eloy 36, 102 – 103

Ibárruri, Dolores 100 Iberia airlines 66 – 67, 76, 83 Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) 33 Ibero-American Summit 101, 102, 105 – 106 “Ideas cannot be killed” 29 – 30 Iglesia-Mundo (magazine) 76 Iglesias, Pablo 15 Ignatius of Loyola 13, 32 imperialism 6, 69, 71, 73, 80, 100 – 101 see also anti-imperialism India 72 Infantry Academy 15, 25 – 26 Instituto de Cultura Hispánica, Madrid 50 Insurrectional Revolutionary Union (UIR) 26 Internal Security Laws 45 International Labour Organization (ILO) 100 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 37 International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) 27, 43, 64 Iraq 106 Ireland 47, 63 Isabella I, Queen of Spain 23n2 Isla de Pinos (Isla de la Juventud) 73 Israel 17, 89, 99 Italy 2, 33, 47, 52, 54, 62

Hammarskjöld, Dag 71 Hapsburg dynasty 18 Harlem, New York 70 – 72

Jacob, Saint 11 James Bond series 61 Japan 14, 20 – 22, 66, 69, 83, 90 – 91, 113 Javier, Francisco 32 Jesuits 13 – 14, 28 John XXIII (pope) 57 John Paul II (pope) 22, 58 Johnson, Lyndon B. 72, 80, 85 JONS (Falange Española de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista) 22 journalism/media 45 – 46, 62, 98 see also New York Herald Tribune

Index  133 (newspaper), New York Times, The (newspaper) Juan Carlos, Prince/King of Spain 17, 64, 93 – 94, 96 – 97, 101 Kami, Hideaki 94 Kennan, George 19, 42, 47, 54, 62, 77 Kennedy, John F. 6, 60 – 64, 66 – 67 Kennedy, Joseph 64 Khrushchev, Nikita 72 Kissinger, Henry 17, 20, 58, 92 Kudo, Takako 73 Láncara, Spain 4, 12, 103 Laredo Brú, Federico 26 Latell, Brian 13, 21, 35 Latin America: American prejudices toward 47; Catalonian groups in 50; Cold War in 10; Galician immigrants 11 – 12; gap between Spain and 107; origins of Cold War in 1 – 2; Soviet Union influence in 2 Latin American leaders, speaking out against communist threat 2 Lenin, Vladimir 27 Leo XIII (pope) 48 Liberation Theology 58 – 59, 77 Lincoln, Abraham 33 Lincoln Brigade 26 Linz, Juan J. 22 Llorente, Amando 13 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr. 71 Lojendio, Juan Pablo de 21; biography of 32; on Castro 34 – 35, 43 – 44; critical of Ambassador Smith 41; doubt regarding communization in Cuba 51 – 52; media incident 53 – 54; opposing diplomatic corps intervention 50; on Pérez Serantes 48; praising Franco’s achievements 51; as preacher of democracy to Castro 50 – 54; preaching democracy 53 – 54 López-Bravo, Gregorio 90, 94 Machado, Gerardo 26 Madariaga, Salvador de 6 – 7, 20, 81, 84 Madrid 15, 19, 26, 32, 34, 35, 45, 50, 67, 75, 76, 81, 82, 83, 86, 88, 91 – 94, 96, 98, 102, 106 Maghreb countries 19 Malcolm X 70 – 73 Malcolm X Grassroots Movement 73 Mandela, Nelson 74, 102

Manrique, Jorge 20 Mao Zedong 62, 79, 80 Mariel Boatlift 104 Marshall Plan 18 Martí, José 6, 20 – 21, 38 Martin Artajo, Alberto 18, 65 Martín Gamero, Adolfo 88 Marxism, Christianity and 37 – 38 Marxism-Leninism 44 – 45 Mas Canosa, Jorge 104 Masferrer, Rolando 26 Matthews, Herbert L. 10, 11, 38 – 39, 41, 44 – 45, 112 McCarthyism 42, 112 McKinley, William 9 media see journalism/media Mediterranean see neutrality of the Mediterranean Meiji Restoration 114 Meurice, Pedro 58 Mexican Revolution 16, 39 Mexico: Almeida exiled in 72; Bayo immigrating to 26; Castro exiled to 30; Franco regime and 32, 36; Juanita Castro exiled in 75 – 76; Mexican Revolution 16; Spanish Empire conquering 18; Spanish intellectuals immigrating to 25; Spanish Republican government exiled in 32, 34 – 35; Spanish sympathy for 107 Miami, Florida, anti-Castro faction in 76 – 77, 104 see also Cuban exiles Miami Cuban community 104 – 105 Middle East 6, 17, 19, 22, 97 Mills, Charles Wright 42 Miró Cardona, José 36 Missile Crisis 10, 63, 66 – 67, 75 Modus Vivendi 65, 89 Moncada Barracks 28 moralism 18, 20 – 22, 27 – 28, 37, 44, 56, 66, 112 Morocco: Bayo fighting in 26; Franco fighting in 16, 79; Pérez Serantes and 12; Spain’s control in 70; Spanish Civil War and 24; Zapatero administration’s relations with 106 Morón Air Base 86 Moscow 40 Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria (MRR) 76 multiculturalism 77 Muslims 11, 23n2 Mussolini, Benito 38 – 39

134 Index Nasser, Abdel 72 National Catholicism 14, 18, 28, 34, 48, 50, 111 National Catholicism, Spain 48, 50 National Confederation of Labor (CNT) 33 National Institute of Industry (NII, Spain) 81 – 82 National Intelligence Council 35 National Movement 97, 100 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 8, 19 – 20, 90, 99 Naval Academy 15 Nazis 14, 17, 19 Nehru, Jawaharlal 72 neocolonialism 9 – 11 neutrality of the Mediterranean 65 – 66, 89, 99 New Europe 106 New Left 39 – 40 New York 6, 21 – 22, 41, 43, 70 – 71, 100 New York Herald Tribune (newspaper) 39 New York Times, The (newspaper) 22, 38, 39, 70, 88, 113 – 114 Nicaragua 102 Nigeria 9 Nissan 82 Nixon, Richard M. 17, 30, 40, 44, 61 – 62 Nkrumah, Kwame 72 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 98 – 99 non-intervention 50 North Korea 22 North-South relations 73, 83 Obama, Barack 6, 49, 59, 64, 74, 113 – 114 Office of Diplomatic Information 50 – 51, 88 Olympic Games 102 “One Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla” (Bayo) 35 Operation Peter Pan 55, 74 Operation Truth 43 Opus Dei see technocrats of Opus Dei Oreja, Marcelino 98 – 99 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) 37 Organization of American States (OAS) 49 – 50, 61, 92 – 93 Ortega, Daniel 102 Ortega y Gasset, José 25

Orwell, George 24 Ostpolitik 90 Our Lady of Charity 55, 58 Oyarzun, Javier 94, 110 Oyarzun, Román 87, 91 Pact of Madrid 19 Palomares 81, 86 Panama 10, 98, 113 – 114 Panama Canal 10, 30, 112 patriotism 20 – 21 Paz-Sánchez, Manuel de 3, 53, 54 Peace Corps 63 Pérez Firmat, Gustavo 75 Pérez Serantes, Enrique: baptizing Fidel 13; on Barrieros 82; demanding rights of religious education 55; escaping to Cuba 12; kidnapping of 56; as mediator during Cuban Revolution 48 – 49, 50; opposed to Castro 58; Sarría and 30; on sparing captured rebels’ lives 28 Perón, Juan 16 personalismo 17 persona non grata 5, 8, 51, 53, 76 Peru 109, 111 Philip II, of Habsburg Monarchy 79 Philippines 9, 10, 18, 40 Picasso, Pablo 101 Platt Amendment 10 Playa Girón (Bay of Pigs) 10, 58 see also Bay of Pigs invasion PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) 99 Poland 2 Popular Alliance (AP) 97, 103, 105 Popular Party (PP) 105 – 106, 107 Popular Socialist Party (PSP, Cuba) 26 – 27, 32 Portugal 40, 42, 62 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio 22 Primo de Rivera, Miguel 14 public diplomacy 44, 110, 112 public opinion, U.S.: after Vietnam War 92; Carter administration 112; influence of 85; Panama Canal 112; of U.S. and Spain 85 – 86 Puerto Rico 9, 76 Quijano, Carlos 113 Rabe, S.G. 77 Radio Martí 104 – 105 Rajoy, Mariano 107

Index  135 RAND Corporation 27 Reagan administration 104 Recarte, Alberto 92 Reconquista 11 Republican government, Spanish see Spanish Republican government Rerum Novarum (encyclical) 48 Roa, Raúl 58, 70 – 71, 72 Roa, Raúl (father) 78n4 Robin Hood 33, 39 Rodríguez, Carlos Rafael 82, 110 Rome 4, 48, 57 see also Vatican Roosevelt, Franklin 18 Roosevelt, Theodore 10 Rota naval station 86 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 44 Roy, Joaquín 3 Rubiales, Francisco 96 Rubottom, Roy 45 Rumsfeldt, Donald 106 Rusk, Dean 66 – 67, 69, 85 – 86 Ryan, Paul 17 Sacred Heart Catholic School 15 Sagaz, Ángel 68, 95n2 Sahara 20, 70, 94 Salcedo-Bastardo, José Luis 19 Sánchez Bella, Alfredo 28, 33, 43, 50, 52 Sánchez, Pedro 114 San Martín, Ramón Grau 26 Santería 70 Santiago de Compostela 11 Saragossa 16 Sarría, Pedro Manuel 29, 73 Sartre, Jean-Paul 70 Satrústegui (ship) 76 Scowcroft, Brent 104 Second Spanish Republic 5, 18, 24, 58 Seville 102 Shelburne Hotel 71 Sierra de Aránzasu (ship) 76 Sierra Maestra 32, 48, 60, 70, 80, 98 Sierra Maestra (ship) 76 slave trade 9 Smith, Earl T. 33, 40 – 42, 45, 48 – 49, 53 Socialist Revolutionary Movement (MSR) 26 social justice 77 social populism 22 Sofia, Princess of Spain 64 South Africa 102 Soviet Union: collapse of 102; influence in Latin America 2

Spain: anti-American sentiments 22, 86, 92; autarchic economy after World War II 65 – 66; balancing diplomacy between U.S. and Cuba 68 – 69; commercial issues with Cuba 5; on Cuban policy 84, 86; diplomatic relations with Cuba 55 – 56, 89, 111 – 112; exchanging ambassadors with Cuba 94; extending commercial credits to Cuba 92; on Gibraltar 89; Golden Age of Spain 18; Hispanic tie with Cuba 2; Historical Memory Law 8; increasing trade with Cuba 87; independent diplomacy policy 89; invading northern Africa 12; Latin American war for independence from 18 – 19; as mediator for U.S.Cuba relations 6; as mediator with U.S. and Cuba 88; National Catholicism for 48; on neutrality of the Mediterranean 89; Pact of Madrid 19; protesting embargo against Cuba 92; regaining place in international community 37; signs treaties with U.S. 19; spiritual tie with Cuba 56; terrorism in 106; trade friction with U.S. 92 – 93; trade partners 64 – 65; unilateral agreement with U.S. 2 – 3; U.S. base negotiations 86, 92; view of U.S. Department of State 42; World War II participation 16; see also democratic Spain, Franco regime, Franco Spain Spanish-American War of 1898 9, 12 Spanish Civil War: American neutrality during 45; Che Guevara inspired by 31; Cuba and 24 – 25, 112; influence on novelists 39; liberals and 42 – 43; as prelude to World War II 25 Spanish Communist Party (PCE) 99, 100 Spanish Radio and Television Corporation (RTVE) 97 Spanish Refugee Aid 39, 42 Spanish Republican government 16, 24 – 26, 31 – 32, 34 – 39, 100, 114 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) 100, 105, 106 spiritual ties between Spain and Cuba 6 – 8, 19, 56, 66, 84 – 85, 93 – 94, 110 – 111 see also Hispanidad (motto) Stabler, Wells 92, 96 Stalinist socialism 44 Suárez, Adolfo: Arafat and 99; Carter and 98; as a “dangerous man” 99;

136 Index legalizing Spanish Communist Party 99; as president 97 – 98 Suárez de Puga, Enrique 96 Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act 45 sugar cane 9, 84 Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement 98 Summit of Americas 113 Szulc, Tad 21, 22, 43, 62 Taber, Robert 39, 70 – 71 Taberna Latasa, Jorge 67 – 68, 76 Tanaka, Saburo 21, 109 technocrats of Opus Dei 7, 22 Thatcher, Margaret 104 Theresa Hotel, Harlem, New York 71, 72 Thomas, Hugh 40 Todd, Emmanuel 11 Tokyo, Japan 40 Toledo 15, 25, 35, 103 Torrejón Air Base 86 Torrijos, Omar 112 Toxo, Ignacio Fernández 15 Trade and Payments Modus Vivendi 65, 89 trade partners 64 – 65 Treaty of Paris 9 Tró, Emilio 26 Truman, Harry 18 Trump, Donald 114 Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) 109 TV Martí 104 Union of Spanish Fighters 35 Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) 97 United Arab Republic (UAR) 72, 95n2 United Kingdom 17, 23n3, 89 United Nations: General Assembly 70, 71, 89, 100 – 101; Secretary General 71; Security Council 18, 89 United States: American Mafia 61 – 62; appeasement policy 39; base negotiations with Spain 86, 92; Bay of Pigs invasion 10; broke diplomatic relations with Cuba 64; Civil Rights Movement 70; Cuban foreign policy 69 – 70; dual, contradictory nature of democracy 22; embargo against Cuba

64 – 69, 88 – 89; exploiting Cuba 28, 65; failure of Cuban policy 45; fear of communism 5 – 6; Foreign Assistance Act 68; geopolitical importance of military bases 6, 19; guerilla warfare and 79 – 80; immigrants to 47; negative sentiment toward Spain 47; nonintervention policy of 45, 50; normalizing relations with Cuba 6, 105, 113; overthrew Jacob Álbenz 30; Pact of Madrid 19; policy and ideology of 5 – 6; political appointees to Cuba 40 – 41; prejudice toward Catholics 47; recognizing Castro Cuba 42 – 43; Rota naval station 86; severing diplomatic relationship with Cuba 6; signs treaties with Spain 19; simplistic single-mindedness of 42; Spain as mediator with Cuba and 88; Spain’s unilateral agreement with 2 – 3; Spain’s view of Department of State 42; stopped shipping arms to Batista 33; on Suárez as a dangerous man 99; supporting Batista 26; supporting Castro Revolution 38; terroristic measures to prevent communism 62; Torrejón Air Base 86; using Spanish Embassy as source of information 57; White House 41, 64, 76, 78n2; see also CIA (Central Intelligence Agency, U.S.), U.S. Department of State universal suffrage 49 Uría, Igacio 48 Urrutia, Manuel 34 Uruguay 12 U.S. Department of State: diplomatic bureaucracies instructions from 40; investigating attack on Spanish ships 77; as liberal toward Cuba 41 – 42; mass media influence on 112; recommending president meet with Prince Juan Carlos 78n2; reviewing blockade policies 92; Sagaz and 67; Spain’s view of 42, 69; urged recognition 34; Vatican and 49 – 50 Utrecht Treaty 65 Valle de los Caídos 114 Vatican: diplomatic relations with Cuba 4, 7; as mediator 49 – 50, 59, 111; opposing capital punishment 28; supporting Spanish-Cuban relations 57; view Catholicism and communism as incompatible 58

Index  137 Venezuela 34, 98, 113 Vietnam 31, 72, 80, 89 Vietnam War 4, 35 – 36, 72, 77, 92 Vincent, Anthony 109 Waldorf Astoria 41, 70 Walters, Vernon A. 16 – 17, 44 Westad, Odd Arne 46 Western Germany 90 Western Sahara 94 White House, U.S. 41, 64, 76, 78n2 Wieland, William 41 Workers’ Commissions 100 Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification (POUM) 39, 100 World Bank 37

World War II: Cold War beginning after 27; fascism and 27; first battle of 4; Franco regime isolated after 6, 16, 18, 32, 50; Franco Spain as nonparticipant in 16; Hitler and Franco during 109; Spanish Civil War as prelude to 2, 25, 112; Spanish goods after 91; U.S. entry into 40 Yoruba 9, 70 Yoshida, Shigeru 69 Yoshida, Shoin 114 Yugoslavia 57, 70 Zacchi, Cesare 57 – 58 Zapatero, José Rodríguez 106 Zaragoza 86