Caste and Class in Bihar

Citation preview

Caste and Class in Bihar Author(s): Pradhan H. Prasad Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Feb., 1979, Vol. 14, No. 7/8, Annual Number: Class and Caste in India (Feb., 1979), pp. 481+483-484 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4367368 JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at https://about.jstor.org/terms

Economic and Political Weekly is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Economic and Political Weekly

This content downloaded from 103.144.92.222 on Wed, 29 Nov 2023 08:31:08 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Caste and Class in Bihar Pradhan H Prasad The policy of reservation of jobs and promotion opportunities in government services in favour of

the middle castes in Bihar, in the teeth of stiff opposition from the uipper castes, only highlights the political reality of the present dominiant position of these castes in the state. The unprecedented violence that has accompanied the implementation of this policy might last for a while, but the process itself is irreversible.

This article attempts to relate the emergence of these 'mi'ddle castes' into a position of political power in the state to the continuing process of disintegration of semi-feudal production relations in Bihar. It

argues that the farming of caste passions ?vhich on earlier occasions had led to a diffusion of class contradictions may now turn out to be a factor which may in fact sharpen and intensify these contradictions. BIHAR is today in the midst of one of the worst phases that can be found in the life cycle of a caste-ridden society. Though there have been caste rivalries and caste tensions in Bihar since long, there was a distinct qualitative increase in their tempo following independence. And now we are in a phase which can be aptly described as one of 'caste riots'. It must also be

peasantry of almost the entire of it andl ly because of the colonial mode of pro' duction which mopped up almost all the surplus and used it partly ror peasantry also emerged as 'chronically deficit' households. Usufruct mortgage retaining its political and administraof land by middle peasantry also became tive grip over the colony b1it mainly frequent because of high pitch of land for the development ot the metropo6is.

saw to it that the class of poor-middle

But since it g'ave some crumbs to tbh zamindar. fbr their petty luxuries and lbcalised political power (subordinate, of course, to the colonial power), this significant part of their lancT to the noted that the present phase is very landlords and the village money-lendersclass never came in conflict with the different than the earlier phase. Today (who subsequently became tenantcolonial power. On the other hand bowhat is happening is mainly the outlandlords).3 cause of the high pltch of 1and rent, come of a contradiction that exists the tenant-landlodis, cultivators anid This, however, did not end here. It between the upper caste Hindus and blg peasants were restive. They were soon brought aboout a situation where the middle castes (i e, the backward the builk of the poor peasant househoIds anti-British and anti-zamindar. caste Hindus other than the Scheduled hegan to take consumption loans on a The caste baxe of these classes were castes and Scheduiled tribes). Earlier fairly regular basis from landlords, as follows. The Zamindars, the tenant the contradiction was mainly within cultivators and big peasantry - the lantdlords, cultivators and big peasants the upper caste Hindus-' main constittuents of the ruiral rich. were In mostly upper caste Hindus.4 The The social and economic roots of the nmost cases, the stipuilated rates of poor peasants were mainly from what is contradiction which has brought about interest were exhorbitantly high. Leavetoday known as Scheduled Castes and the present situation lie almost wholly aslade the loans, even full payment ofmiddle castes. The poor-middle peainterest was often beyond the means of santry and the middle peasantry were in rural Bihar, are related mainly to these 'chronically deficit' households. agriculture arid are historical in nature. dirawn mainly from middle castes. The dominant mode of production in But the creditors also did not insist Though quite a large number of them the pre-British India was feudal which on fuill payment even in the long run. were leasing-in land as sub-tenants The rural rich uLsed this debt obligahad almst completely collapsed by (mostly as share-croppers) on terms 1857. This marked the beginning of the tion to put the poor peasant class under muich harsher than those available to colonial mode of production in India. an infor-mal bondage. As no system the tenants, the contradiction between But here also all the features of the can afford to provide for less than sub-them and the tenant landlords did not feudal mode *of produiction were not sistence living to direct producers, this achieve a level to form the basis for an allowed to disintegrate. Some were system also macle such provisions. But inclependent struiggle for their emanciretained. The Permanent Settlement of the whole subs:stence payments wvere pation. Tradition had kept them socially 1793 had brouight in a new form of not made in lieit of work; only a part backward. Their relative economic situalandlordism and there emerged a long of it was given as payment for work tion was also quite precarious-only stratification of zamindars, tenant-land- and the rest as constumption loan. a shade better than that of the poor lords, tenants, and suib-tenants with This was d)ne mainly to perpetuate peasants. Moreover, even in numbers agricultural labourers beng mostly at the> svstem of indissoluble bond between they were not having any substantial the b-ottom.2 During most part of thethe direct producers and their overlords advantage over the landlords. The ratio Br#itish period control over land and - the rural rich. The informal bonbetween the middle and the poor-midtenants was mainly enforced through dage was also enforced by leasing-out dle peasants and the landlords did not land rent. On the other band, the pastiny plots of land or by giving the exceed two. However, when the tenant sivity of agricultural labourers and the poor peasants homestead land or dwellandlords, cultivators and the big peatraditional mode of payments to and ling space. Though this provided sants launched their movement in the exactions from them resulted in most enormous economic benefits to the rural la'e 1920s, their main demands were of them emerging as 'chronically derich, it could not elevate the tenant'rent reduction' and 'return of lands ficit' households in no time. The high landlords, cultivators and the big peawhich were sold as a result of rent pitch of land rent and the other share sants to the level of zamindars. Despite decrees'. As the movement touched its of zamindars robbed the tenant-landthis, the zamindars could not acquire peak during the later half of the lords, cultivators and big peasantry of much of either economic power or thirties, the demand no longer remained most of its surplus, deprived the middle political power of any significance mainconfined to the immediate problems of rent. The dynamics of the situation

fouind the poor-middle peasantrv and agricultu-ral labourers losing quite a

481

This content downloaded from 103.144.92.222 on Wed, 29 Nov 2023 08:31:08 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEnLY Annual Number February 1979 tenanby but grew into a bid for zamindani abolition. But at no time did the problems of

suib-tenancy and of poor peasantry find a prominant place in their charter of demands. The hegemony of the movement remained in the hands of upper caste Hindus, specially the Bhumihar

Brahmins. The anti-British approach of the tenant-landlords, cultivators and big peasants made them also the active supporters of independence movement in rural Bihar. Therefore, with independ-

ence came the zamindari abolition. But with the zamindari abolition in early fifties, this contradiction also vanished.

Political power in Bihar, thus at that stage, passed into the hands of the land-

lords,5 cultivators and big peasants the upper caste Hindus. Inflationary pressure arising out of Second World War and thereafter in the forties and

the fifties considerably reduced the

burden of land revenue, and the landlords, the cultivators and the big peasants found themselves loaded with surplus produce. The approach to developmental planning in the post-independ-

ence era also led to public investment in infrastructure meant for agricultural

development. But these did not prove powerful enough to bring about rapid development in agriculture. The landlords, the cultivators and the

big peasants did not allow the system of informal bondage to disintegrate. With the help of this practice and the newly acquired surplus, they also be-

came politically very powerful. They claimed the bulk of the benefits that

began to flow in the area either in the name of developmental activities or the rural poor. They began to operate as

sole arbiters even in the context of

distribution of relief and other essentials like sugar and kerosene. For all practical purposes they became the law in their areas.

The rural rich have thus developed a vested interest in the continuation of mass poverty where the vast bulk of poor peasantry remains in perpetual 'deficit'.

The gains arising out of this backword 'semi-feudal'6 agrarian structure

have made the rural rich not enthusiastic about rapid development which, if allowed, is likely to improve the economic condition of poor peasants who

can thereby free themselves from the 'informal bondage'. Therefore, the dominant classes, the rural rich, have not been enthusiastic about dynamicising agriculture in a big way by taking the advantage of the new technology.

That is why the bulk of resources for development activities are either wasted

away or are used up on conspicuous consumption. It also explains the low utilisation of infrastructure meant for agricultural development and the almost negligible net investment in agriculture by the rural rich. It also partly explains the absence of dynamism at the state goveirnmen)t level for undertaking a vigorous drive for rapid development of agriculture on the right lines.

On the other hand the middle and the poor-middle peasantry did not suffer from the aforesaid inhibitions in the context of development. The inflation had given them some relief. They began to use their newly acquired surplus (though it was very meagre compared to what was available tothe rural rich) for ihe development of their agriculture. Later on they took to new technology as it came by. They had begun to redeem the;ir lands which were under usufruct mortgage. This process started in the late forties. The zamindari abolition also found quite a significant number of them being elevated to a position of tenants from that of sub-tenants. Numbers also became important in the context of new political superstructure borrowed from the advanced capitalist countries. On the other hand caste groups within the upper caste Hindus vied with each other for political power and in the process the caste factor became crucial. In order to win over the down-trodden to the side of the ruling faction, concessions in ter-ns of seats in educational institutions and jobs in government sector were offered to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Some of the groups began to promote leaders from the Scheduled Castes and m.ddle castes under their patronage in a bid to win over these castes to their side.7 This undoubtedly defused the class contradiction between the rural rich and the middle and poor-middle peasantry for the time being. But iD. also raised the hopes and aspirations of the Scheduled Castes and the middle castes. zamindari abolition had already demonstrated that the traditional superiority of the upper caste Hindus was not invincible.

remained mostly on paper, the cautions among the landlords, the cultivators and the big peasantry sold their surplus land, not within their own class but mainly to middle peasants the

up and coming agricultural class because of their better paying capacity. T'he process was of course slow, but in course of time control over at least 10

per cent of the land passed into the hands of middle peasantry, if we take into account also the redumption of usufruct mortage since the late forties

and the acquisition of tenancy rights

by middle and poor-middle peasantry in the wake of zamindari abolition. Thus, the middle and poor-middle peasantry emerged as most efficient class in the context of agricultural development in 'semi-feudal' Bihar. With their newly acquired economic power,8 they made a successful bid for the capture

of political power. The demon of casteism which was created by the elites of the semi-feudal set-up (the upper caste Hindus) to keep themselves in political power has now turned against their creators. It is now being used by the middle and poor-middle peasantry to rally the middle castes from the poor peasantry class also to their sidie. They now outnumber the upper caste Hindus by a ratio of more thau 1:2. By now for every one acre land in the hands of upper caste Hindus the landlords, the cultivators and the big peasantry), the middle and poor peasantry own about two-thirds of an acre.

In operational terrns the share of the latter is even more. The level of

adoption of new technology in the case of the latter (even with the meagre resources that they command) is higher than that of the former. Therefore, the per acre output in case of the latter is on an average about 20 per cent higher

than that of the former. The latter's intensity of cropping is also much more than that of the former. The recent reservations in appoint-

ments and promotions in government in favour of the middle castes in the

teeth of stiff opposition from the upper caste Hindus is proof of the political

supermacy of the middle castes. N3

doubt this has led to unprecedented The petty bourgeois reformist pressure violence on caste lines, but it is not and the contradiction within the upper going to reverse the process. The violcaste Hindus (the landlords, the cultience will last for some time, and then vators and the big peasantry) and also it will find the middle castes in control between the upper caste Hindus and the of the political power in the state. Of middle castes (the middle and the poor-

middle peasantry) arising on account of hunger for land led to various land reform legislations, particularly the legislation related to ceiling on landholdings. Though these enactments

course, there will be some attempts on

the part of grouips dominated by upper caste Hindus to capture power. Some,

of them may even adopt "semi-facist"

strategies. Some mnay try to woe the 483

This content downloaded from 103.144.92.222 on Wed, 29 Nov 2023 08:31:08 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

Annual Number February 1919 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WER1nY Classes Commission (Government of Scheduled Castes and other minorities India), Volume II, pp 16-22; 142-3 to their side. The 'semi-facist' strategy and z12-3. may have some chances of success but 2 '1lhe classes has been differentiated the latter (wooing of scheduled castes as follows. All those households and other minorities) has probably none who supply physical labour in agriculture are peasant households. because there is no love lost between 'ihose peasant households where the elites of the semi-feudal set-up and membters of the households work poor peasantry. No doubt there is an on other people's lands in lieu of antagonistic contradiction between the some payment either cash or kind middle peasantry and the poor peasanor ot uebt servicing are termed as try (and the chances are that the conpoor peasant households or agricultural labourer householcds. We tradiction may sharpen with the increasuse tthe terms 'agricultural labourer' ed economic power of the middle peaand 'poor peasant' as synonymous. santry as illustrated by the increasing 'ilhose peasant households who

number of atrocities on Scheduled Castes), but there is also an antagonistic

conduct their agricultural activities mainly with the help of the members of their households and where contradiction between the landlords, no member of the households cultivators and big peasantry on one works on other people's lands in side and the poor peasantry on the lieu of any paynment or debt servicother arising out of semi-feudal bondage. inig are poor-miilddle peasant households. I'he big andt the middle But this contradiction will probably peasant households are those who take a low profile as the semi-feudal purchase labour power; but in the set-up disintegrates. However it will be case of big peasant households the replaced by another contradiction betfemale members of the households do not go to work in the field. Beween new upper caste Hindus kulaks cause ot this fact the status of a and the poor peasantry. However, what big peasant household is traditionis certain is that this will lead to the ally deemed to be higher than that disintegration of semi-feudal production of a middle peasant household in relation. The landlords, the cultivators rural Bihar. No member of the household of a big and middle and the big peasantry will now forsake peasant works on other people's their earlier approach to agricultural lands in lieu of any payment or development and will take steps to debt servicing or even as exchange dynamicise their cultivation in a big labour. Cultivators are those who way. The fanning of caste passions only supply supervisory labour to which at one time led to a diffusion of their cultivation. All those houseclass contradictions, and thwarted agri- holds other than poor peasant households leasing-out land are cultural growth, now turns out to be a termed as landlords, Zamindars factor which may sharpen the contradic- were such landlords who paid land tion and cause the disintegration of revenue to government. The tenants paid land rent to the 'semi-feudal' production relations in

zamindars. Those of the tenants who leased out land are termed as

tenant-landlords.

3 The term 'landlord' includes both zamindar and tenant-landlord prior to abolition of zamindari and tenant-landlord subsequent to it. 4 The big peasant households were not of much significance. Even as late as in the forties of this century their percentage in the total rural households did not exceed one. 5 The ex-zamindars mostly became tenant-landlords - hereinafter termed as 'landlords'. 6 Fior evidence suggesting widespread existence of semi-feudal production relations, see P'radhan 11

IPrasad; 'Production Relations:

Achilles Heel of Indian Planning. EPW, May 12, 1973; 'Reactionary Role of Usurer's Capital in Ruxal India', EPW Special Number, August 1974; 'Poverty and Bon-

dage', EJW, Special Number,

August 1976; and 'A Strategy For Rapid Development of Bihar Eco-

nomy', Journal of Social anid Econonic Studies, Volume II, 1977. 7 For example, the proportion of nonupper caste among Hindus in the Executive Committee of Bihar Pra-

desh Congress remained less than 8 per cent before 1947, but it suddenly shot up to 29 per cent in 1948 and 32 per cent in 1954. See Ramashray Roy, 'Caste and Political Recruitment in Bihar', in Rajni Kothari, (ed), "Caste in Indian Politics", Table 4, pp 242-3. 8 This has been rising since the mid-fifties. It will be seen that there was a significant increase in the educational standard of nonupper castes among Hindus as a consequence by the late fifties.

See l:emashray Roy, op cit, Table

3, p 233.

Bihar.

World Milk Production

Notes 1 Bihar is the second most populous State in India accounting tor 10.3 per cent of the country's popula-

WORLD milk production in 1979 will

rise faster than demand, aggravating problems in the troubled dairy sector,

tion. The dynamics of rural Biharaccording to a report released by the (particularly North and South Food and Agriculture Organization of

Bihar plains) has so far been almost the United Nations (FAO). wholly dominated by Hindu popuLast year, excessive milk suppl:es in lation which is 83.5 per cent of the major dairying countries necessitated total. Therefore, the exclusion of the rest 16.5 per cent (including costly surplus disPosal measulres, the tribals and its stratification kept prices in world dairy product does not vitiate the analysis. trade at low levels and discouraged

Brahman, Rajput, Bhumihar and needed expanlsion of milk production Kayastha are the important upper by developing countries. castes among Hindus accounting During 1979, excess supplies will infor about one-sixth of the total crease, FAO predicts. Milk production population. There are two other caste Hindus - Agarwal and will rise faster than in 1978, when it Khatri-but they account for only rose about 1 per cent to 457 million 0.1 per cent of the population. tons, but will not equal the per cent We shall term the backward rise, of 1977. caste Hindus other than the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Milk production will be encouraged as middle castes. The list of these by abundant feed supplies from the backward class Hindus, Scheduled bumper 1978 harvests and by higher Castes and Scheduled Tribes is government price supports in the given in the Report of the Backward ARA

This content downloaded from 103.144.92.222 on Wed, 29 Nov 2023 08:31:08 +00:00 All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

USSR, Eastern Europe and Oceania. According to FAO, milk production will level off this year only in North America.

Demand for milk is strong in Eastern Europe and the USSR and in some developing counitries, notably oil exporting countries following the recent rise in oil prices. However, sluggish demand is likely in the maior markets of North America, Europe and Oceania. FAO sees little hope for higher prices in international dairy trade this year. Export markets are oversupplied, and despite some rise during the past year, trade prices of skimmed milk powder remain depressed, at about one-third of the domestic market levels of northern hemisphere dairying countries. With saturated domestic and exports markets, dairy product stocks will tend to rise again, notably in the EEC and Oceania.