Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations: The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events 9783666251689, 3525251688, 9783525251683

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HYPOMNEMATA 71

HYPOMNEMATA U N T E R S U C H U N G E N Z U R ANTIKE UND ZU IHREM NACHLEBEN

Herausgegeben von Albrecht Dihle/Hartmut Erbse/Christian Habicht Hugh Lloyd-Jones/Günther Patzig/Bruno Snell

H E F T 71

V A N D E N H O E C K & R U P R E C H T IN G Ö T T I N G E N

PETER (PANΑYIOTIS) KARAVITES

Capitulations and Greek interstate Relations The Reflection of Humanistic Ideals in Political Events

V A N D E N H O E C K & R U P R E C H T IN G Ö T T I N G E N

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme

der Deutschen Bibliothek

Karavites, Peter: Capitulations and Greek interstate relations : the reflection of humanistic ideals in politik. events / Peter (Panayiotis) Karavites. Göttingen : Vandenhoeck &c Ruprecht, 1982. (Hypomnemata ; H. 71) ISBN 3-525-25168-8 NE: GT

© Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen 1982 - Printed in Germany. Ohne ausdrückliche Genehmigung des Verlages ist es nicht gestattet, das Buch oder Teile daraus auf foto- oder akustomechanischem Wege zu vervielfältigen. Herstellung: Hubert & Co., Göttingen

Νικολός, Έλενη, Θεοδώρα και Σωτηρία τοίς έμέ βύεργετήσασι

Preface In 1974 I began to collect the material dealing with the moral principles that affected Greek interstate relations. Not too long afterwards, I thought it possible to present some of the conclusions in a short paper dealing with Greek capitulation agreements to the times of Alexander the Great. Unfortunately, unforseeable circumstances delayed my research; but it has now become possible to finish this short project. The ameliorations contained in this book do not necessarily exhaust the material in the ancient authors. Only a sample of references related more or less to the discussion of the capitulations is cited here. I owe thanks to a number of friends and scholars who read the manuscript and offered their suggestions and criticisms. Many of the suggestions have been incorporated in the book, while frequent changes have been made to take into account several of the criticism. To my former colleagues David Heisser and Leighton Scott of Appalachian State University, my present colleague Joseph DeRocco of Bridgewater State College, and my friend Thomas Wren of Loyola in Chicago, all of whom offered stylistic improvements, I owe a debt. In no way are they responsible for any "infelicities" that may still remain. To a dear friend and mentor C. W. Fornara of Brown University who spared me no criticism and W. R. Connor of Princeton who initially encouraged my undertaking; to Professor H. Bengtson of the University of Munich; to A. Giovannini of the University of Geneva, Switzerland, and Peter Kußmaul of Dalhousie, Halifax, Canada, for reading the manuscript; to the editors of the "Hypomnemata", especially Professor Christian Habicht; and last but not least to Mrs. Christine Karavites for her typing of the initial drafts I express my gratitude. No one of them is responsible for the shortcomings of this book. The responsibility for them is entirely mine.

5

Table of Contents Introduction Chapter 1: Historical Background The Homeric Epics and the Aristocratic Traditions Hesiod Theognis and Pindar Early Greek History and the Aristocratic Code Terminology Chapter 2: Capitulations in the Greek World t o the End o f the Peloponnesian War Capitulations before the Persian Wars Capitulations to Athens 479 - 4 0 4 Exceptions between 5 1 0 - 4 0 4 Capitulations to Sparta 479 - 4 0 4 Other Capitulations between 4 7 9 - 4 0 4 Chapter 3: Capitulations from the End o f the Peloponnesian War t o the End o f Philip's Reign Capitulations in the Years 4 0 4 - 3 3 6 Capitulations and Greek Conventions

9 13 13 16 18 19 26

33 33 35 56 63 73

77 77 85

Chapter 4 : C o m m o n Assumptions

91

Alliance Starting a War Moral Causes of War Euergesia Fair Play Helping the Weak Sanctity of the City-State Duty Moderation

91 99 102 106 Ill 114 117 120 124

Conclusion

128

Appendix

133

Index o f Names

138

7

Abbreviations ATL = The Athenian Tribute Lists, edd., Β. D. Meritt-H. T. Wade-Gery-M. F. McGregor, 4 vols., Cambridge-Princeton, 1939-53. Beloch, G.G. = K. J. Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., 4 vols., Straßburg and Berlin, 1913-27. Bengtson = H. Bengtson-H. H. Schmitt, Die Staatsverträge des Altertums, 2 vols. Munich, 1969-75. Buck = C. D. Buck, The Greek Dialects, Chicago, 1955. Bury-Meiggs = J. B. Bury-R. Meiggs, A History of Greece, 4th ed., New York, 1975. Busolt, G.G. = G. Busolt, Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., 3 vols., Munich, 1895-1904. CAH = The Cambridge Ancient History. Davies, APF = J. K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families, Oxford, 1971. FGH = F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, 1923ff. Fornara, Documents = C. W. Fornara, Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1977. Gomme, HCT = A. Gomme, A. Andrewes-K. I. Dover, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, 5 vols., Oxford, 1945-80. Grote = George Grote, Greece, 12 vols., New York, 1900. I.G. = Inscriptiones Graecae. Meiggs, Ath. Emp. = Russel Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, Oxford, 1972. M/L = R. Meiggs-D. Lewis, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, Oxford, 1969. Meyer, GdA = Ed. Meyer, Geschichte des Altertums, Darmstadt, 5 vols., 1964. Pritchett, Gr. State = W. K. Pritchett, Greek State at War, 3 vols., Univ. of Calif. Press, 1975-1979. RE = Realencyklopädie der classischen Alterthumswissenschaft von Pauly-Wissowa. Schwyzer, DGE = E. Schwyzer, Dialectorum Graecarum exempla Epigraphica potiora, Leipzig, 1923. Syll. = Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, ed. W. Dittenberger, 3rd ed., published by Hiller von Gaertringen et al. 4 vols., 1915-24. Tod = Μ. N. Tod, A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, 2 vols., Oxford, 1946-48.

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Introduction In the second volume of his general history, Francois Laurent has argued that the Greeks did not consider themselves bound by common law or common humanitarian traditions, though they were aware of their common origin and blood, and that they acknowledged only those reciprocal obligations explicitly stipulated in treaties. Moral obligation or duty was an object of philophical speculation merely, not bounding in the realm of interstate relations. The vanquished were totally at the mercy of the victor who was guided primarily by self-interest in his treatment of his victims. 1 This was the view of Greek political morality which prevailed in the nineteenth century as expressed by A. Maury and J. Kent. It has been echoed often enough in our century by Busolt-Swoboda, V. Martin, and others. 2 But it was inevitable that so simplistic a view would be challenged. Coleman Phillipson was to take exception to it, arguing, at the beginning of this century, that such conception of Greek interstate relations was extreme and one-sided. The advocates of this view had observed cruel acts and sweepingly inferred from them that there was no general code of humane behavior to be found at any time or place in the Greek world. The fallacy of this sort of leap from conduct to ethical principles displayed by considering an analogous case, that of Greek theology. The Greeks believed that the gods eventually punished injustice, but this did not prevent them from committing injustice. Yet no one can argue that the Greek did not believe in divine retribution because of Greek disregard of divine retribution. Among the various considerations which Phillipson urges us to bring to bear in our judgment of the Greeks is the fact that the special character of the Greek city-states complicated their interstate contacts. Owing to the tightness of the Greek communities, war affected them much more directly and immediately; that is, war was more personal than it is today. The citizen of the Greek state was to an extraordinary degree animated by patriotic devotion to his particular state. Each individual was a soldier-politician who in times of conflict saw the whole fabric of life in peril and regarded every subject of the 1 F. Laurent, Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanite, La Grece, 2, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1880). All the dates belong to the pre-christian era unless otherwise designated. 1 L. F. A. Maury, Histoire de la Grece antique (Paris, 1 8 5 6 - 6 9 ) ; James Kent, Commentary on International Law (London, 1866) 11; G. Busolt-H. Swoboda, Griechische Staatskunde 2 (Munich, 1926) 1260 and η. 1; V. Martin, La vie internationale dans la Grece des cites (Geneve, 1940) 368.

9

opposing state as a personal enemy. The personalization of war was greatly responsible for the inability of the Greeks to solve their problems peacefully, and for their proclivity to violence. Nonetheless, Phillipson concludes that the Greeks had formulated certain universal assumptions which were conducive to the mitigation of war activities and which demonstrated respect for morality and justice even in the face of unjust and inhumane acts. In a word, brutal treatment and noble conduct are to be found side by in the Greek world. 3 In recent times the question of moral principles in Greek interstate relations has been reopened by several scholars. In 1958 Franz Kiechle reexamined the question and attempted to place it in better historical perspective.4 He argued that the Homeric and Archaic times cast a heavy shadow on later Greek history. Might ruled; the defeated lay prostrate at the feet of the victor. The city, life, and property were completely at the mercy of the new master who frequently did not hesitate to slay his victims, sell them, or appropriate their property. But as subsequent centuries unfolded, so did a tendency to humanize war and to practice moderation. This tendency can be discerned in the works of Greek writers as well as in the war practices themselves. However, the archaic harshness was never completely extinguished. Driven by anger or self-interest, the Greeks continued by and large to practice what they had come to condemn. So it was that while from the fifth century onwards the voices in support of moderation multiplied, the Greeks never ceased to resort to abuses of power. The evolution of this inconsistency between theory and practice is discussed in a collection of essays published in 1968, dealing with the aspects of war in ancient Greece, in which each contributor has examined a different facet of the problem at different periods of Greek history. 5 In the same year another scholar, Pierre Ducrey, dealt with the topic of war and the prisoners of war, concluding that the Trojan War exercised a strong influence on Greek war practices.6 War after Homer was not much less harsh than it was before, but Ducrey has perceived a growing effort, not always successful, to limit its inhumaneness. On the one hand, the basic principle that war provided the means 3 C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, 2 vols. (London, 1911). 4 F. Kiechle, Historic 7 (1958) 129-156. 5 J. P. Vernant, Problemes de la guerre en Grece ancienne (Paris, 1968). 4 P. Ducrey, La traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grece antique (Paris, 1968). A. Panagopoulos' book Captives and Hostages in the Peloponnesian War (Athens, 1978) came to my attention too late. The same is true about the book of A. Giovannini-G. Gottlieb, Thukydides und die Anfinge der Athenischen Arche (Heidelberg, 1980) which deals with the formation of the Athenian Alliance in 478/77.

10

to acquire another man's goods (material or human) remained unchallenged throughout Greek history. On the other hand, informal rules of thumb developed which were intended to curtail the rights of the conqueror. These rules never attained universal authority, but the Greeks conformed to them fairly often. Nonetheless, the rules and even more basic moral principles commonly yielded to military or economic pressures, as indeed they have in all ages. At times deep-seated hatreds were the underlying cause of the relentlessness with which the Greeks pursued their opponents. Even so, the Pentecontaetia, though not free from conflicts, was characterized by rarity of massacres and mass enslavements. Unfortunately, the picture changed with the coming of the Peloponnesian War. Very frequently during the war years the attitude towards rivals often approached the bounds of paroxysm, and under the persistent fear of Athenian imperialism and the total nature of war, hostilities assumed the character of a civil war. Not surprisingly, the framework of the Greek laws often proved too fragile to contain the passions provoked by these conditions. As this rapid review suggests, historical scholarship has become increasingly sensitive to the complexities of the Greek attitudes toward war, morality, and interstate relations. The purpose of the present study is to approach these topics through the narrow apercus provided by the Greek capitulation treaties down to the time of the end of Philip II's reign. There is reason to expect that a scrutiny of these treaties will shed considerable light on the larger topic of interstate relations, especially in the fifth and fourth century Greece. But they also warrant study in their own right, since they have not been explored to date. Fortunately, many of these treaties have been gathered together and published by Bengston and Schmitt, and this made the analysis of the capitulation treaties easier.7 Before the analysis of the capitulation treaties, however, a brief excursus into the history of the Archaic period will be useful for appreciating the probable influences of the Archaic period on subsequent developments in the Greek world. In what follows, our evidence will be less concerned with the historicity or the exact chronological framework of the events under discussion than with their general role in the shaping of the Greek character and historical traditions. Our focus will not be on the undeniable inconsistency between theory and practice but rather on the intrinsic value of the humanitarian traditions which were expected to govern the interstate relations of the Greeks, since humanitarian tradition was the ideal to which the Greeks aspired. Violations, albeit frequent, will emerge as aberrations from the lofty ideals the Greeks envisioned but scarcely attained.

7

H. Bengtson, Die Staatsverträge

des Altertums

2 (Munich, 1975).

11

True, some of the written material we have inherited might have been intended more as propaganda and less as history. More specifically, some of the references in the Greek orators such as Isocrates as well as Plato's Menexenus may fall under this category of propaganda if not sheer Fourth of July oratory. Yet propaganda can have its own perspicuity; even though it is designed to induce the hearer to reach conclusions with little or no rational thought, it may be profoundly suggestive. Making propaganda involves choosing a theme, simplifying it, and then repeating it frequently so as to make the best possible case for or against an idea or person. But to be successful the selection and use of these themes, be they facts of falsehoods, must be not only related to the thinking processes of those to whom it is directed, but also appeal to their traditions or sentiments. If the facts are irrelevant to the situation or the traditions of the people, socially conscious individuals will tend to be wary or ignore them, and the propagandizing attempt will fail of its own weight. Thus, many of the facts selected by Isocrates or Plato might not have been correct or historical, but they were apparently congruent with the traditional framework of the Athenians and other Greeks. It was because of this congruence that they seemed probable to the hearers, many of whom, no doubt, listened to the recital of those facts or pseudo-facts with a certain degree of pride. The same reasoning holds for the historical significance of the philosophical conclusions of Plato and Aristotle regarding the proper inter-city conduct of the Greeks. Both Plato and Aristotle developed their philosophical ideas in the context of the Greek city-state, and their conclusions concerning ameliorations of war and the canons that should govern Greek interstate relations reflect the best of the traditional ideals of Greek thought.

12

CHAPTER 1

Historical Background The Homeric Epics and the Aristocratic

Traditions

The interminable controversy that surrounds Homeric poetry has yielded unanimity on at least some points. One of these is that the material on which Homeric poetry was based originated much earlier in history and was transmitted from generation to generation with considerable accretions and changes. While it is difficult to distinguish what is earlier and what is later, it is easy to discern the outline of certain traditions which affected the conduct of Greeks in later times. Since the Trojan expedition was a collective enterprise of quasiautonomous chieftains, interpersonal relationships automatically furnish evidence of the nature of interstate relations as they existed at the time the particular account originated, which is to say sometime before 800 B.C., the approximate date of the composition of the poems. A binding sense of duty and a thirst for adventure were the principal motivations for participating in the expedition, since no force could be applied to coerce a nobleman into something he did not wish to do. Any violation of this principle of "binding voluntarism" could give rise to strife. Indeed, it was just such a violation of a rule of fair play that led to the dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles, which makes up the subject of the Iliad. The ensuing rage of Achilles was responsible for the many sufferings of the Greeks. The anger of Achilles was legitimate up to the point where it was permitted to becloud Achilles' reason and drive him to extremes of passion and spite which proved deleterious to the Greeks and to Achilles personally. The death of Patroclus had a sobering effect. Achilles' passion would now be channeled against the Trojans. The same excess of anger would lead Achilles to new violations of traditional mores until it provoked divine intervention. Achilles was less inclined to mercy after the death of Patroclus and was not amenable to pleas of mercy as he was before {II. 21.99-105). When he went so far as to defile the body of Hector, his sacrilegious act drew a warning from the gods (II. 24.53-54; 135-136). What is of special interest here is the way Homer deplores this violent abuse of Greek traditions. Immediately after his deed, hands dripping with Hector's blood, Achilles talks in friendly terms with Priam, and eventually yields to Priam's pleas for Hector's body. This change of heart may suggest on the 13

poet's part an indirect criticism of the inordinate preoccupation of the Heroic Age with war, which the poet intended by pointing out that there were ideals superior to the martial virtues. This possibility of a "peaceful" theme may also be seen in the neutrality of Zeus, who stood above the passions of the other gods and mortals and displayed a deep sympathy for both sides. He disliked Ares for his delight in strife and war and would have gladly seen both sides conclude an early peace (II. 5.890—91). These and other instances show that even in the Heroic Age there were certain humanitarian traditions that outweighed bravery. The nobleman (άγαμος) was expected to respect these traditions, the violation of which incurred moral and social opprobrium. The totality of these traditions constituted a code of ethics which guided the Homeric world and was especially serviceable in the agonistic games because war and games were the two major preoccupations of the nobility. Thus we see that at the funeral games in honor of Patroclus, Achilles set the prizes, the starting and turning points, and appointed the umpire (II. 23.333; 3 6 0 61). The rules of the competition were already known to all, who were supposed to abide by them. The most favored charioteer in the race was Eumelus. Unfortunately, Eumelus suffered an accident and came in last. Achilles commiserated and in a noble gesture suggested that Eumelus be given the second prize (II. 17.91). Antilochus demurred immediately because he had come second and considered the prize his, claiming that Eumelus could be rewarded with other prizes but that he could not get the second prize (II. 23.550-54). For Achilles to have granted what belonged to Antilochus without the latter's consent would have been a breach of the aristocratic code. Significantly, Achilles recognized the justice of Antilochus' argument (II. 23.555-62). However, this was but a temporary victory for Antilochus, since at this point Menelaus stood up and angrily denounced the sportsmanship of Antilochus. Antilochus, he said, had come second only because he had used guile, and he challenged Antilochus to swear that he had employed no trickery. Since Antilochus had indeed violated the rules of the game, he refused to swear and instead asked Menelaus to bear with his youthful impulsiveness and forgive him. Thus Antilochus preferred to surrender the vied-for prize than to forfeit the friendship of a colleague or become a pequrer in the eyes of a friend and the gods (άλιτρός, II. 23.595). Sometimes the code is violated by the άγαθοϊ, but this does not negate its validity or its purchase on them. Delinquent äyadoi did not cease to belong to the aristocratic class, but this affiliation did not absolve them of moral and social stigma. For instance, when Antinous is discourteous to Odysseus, the "beggar", Eumeus tells him that έσθλός though Antinous was he had not spoken well (Od. 17.381). 14

The Homeric heroes cared very much about public reputation, but they did not always comport themselves in accordance with the aristocratic mores. Thus when Eurymachus expressed concern about the impact of the suitors' inability to draw the bow, Penelope responded: Eurymachus, it is impossible for people to speak well of noble men who dishonor the house of a nobleman and consume his possessions. Why should you make this matter [of the bow] a reproach? (Od. 21.331—34) Earlier Penelope had rebuked Antinous, for although he had a reputation as άριστος in council and speech, his actions belied this reputation (Od. 16.41821). In fact, Antinous' conduct was all the more reprehensible since his family was under debt to Odysseus. Antinous' father had taken refuge once in Odysseus' house when the Thesprotian allies of Odysseus sought to kill him and destroy his property. How did Antinous repay his family debt? By consuming Odysseus' property, wooing Odysseus' wife, and contriving to murder Odysseus' son. Thus he had added shamelessness to ingratitude (Od. 16.418-432). 1 Similarly the suitors could make no attempt to justify their conduct. Eurymachus did not deny that what the suitors did was wrong (άτάσθαλα, Od. 22.35-41) but only tried to lay the blame on Antinous, who had already paid for his crimes with his life. Eurymachus promised to remunerate Odysseus for all that had been drunk and eaten at Odysseus' house, if Odysseus was willing to accept payment for the evil done to him. No one, Eurymachus said, could blame Odysseus for being angry. Odysseus, however, turned the proposition down. The suitors had wooed his wife while he was still alive, and this was an affront to his honor that could not go unavenged in Homeric society. Conformity with the existing social codes was of paramount importance; without it, society would run the risk of disintegrating into anarchy. No one would have known how to comport himself or what to expect from others. In this milieu, everything would have been lawful as a means of self-protection. Similar sets of traditional rules regulated conflicts in the Heroic Age. For example, combatants were supposed to respect sanctuaries and the holy persons who served them. The refusal of Agamemnon to accept the ransom of the priest and the additional insults he flung against him shocked the Achaeans and invited the punishment of god Apollo. In a similar instance, rivals might kill the living, but they were expected to show regard for the dead. 2 When Hector threatened to throw Patroclus' body 1

Μ. I. Finley, The World of Odysseus (New York, 1967) 68 and 119; A. W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 1968) 3 9 - 4 0 ; for a general overview of the role of the Aristocrats, Μ. T. W. Arnheim, Aristocracy in Greek Society (London, 1977). 2 II. 7.408-10; 22.256-59; 24.114; G. Busolt, G.G. 1.682 says that most of these νόμιμα των 'Ελλήνων originated from the amphictyonies. Almost certainly they had their root deeper in history.

15

to the dogs (II. 18.179—80), it was a vainglorious boast that could not be realized because the gods would not allow such desecration. When Achilles, driven by fury, seemed about to make his promise a reality, the gods became irate, since they disliked passion that knew no bounds. They cautioned him to refrain from such profanation, while on the other hand they sent Iris to tell Priam to pick up Hector's body. They assured Priam that Achilles would not harm him. Achilles, they said, did not lack wisdom nor was his heart so hardened with sin. Though in deep grief, he still retained his respect for suppliants. Even in the thick of war one was expected to be reasonable, avoid excess (II. 16.33), show respect for customs, shun "dirty tricks" which might be unbecoming to an άριστος (IL 7.242-43). Two other examples which Homer provides us about the mitigation of brutality in war are the custom of prescribing the weapons and methods by which war should be conducted and the gentlemanly provision that a dispute should be decided by two champions or the parties directly affected (Menelaus-Paris). Although the parties were expected to abide by the outcome, oaths to the gods were frequently taken in the presence of others. It was the violation of this convention by Paris which added moral weight to the cause of the Achaeans. Lastly, killing for its own sake was not condoned in the Homeric society, at least not unconditionally. Men not captured in the heat of the battle or in the fall of a resisting city were ransomed. Achilles seized Isus and Antiphus while they were herding their sheep and spared them (II. 11.106). At another time he surprised Lycaon while the latter was plaiting his chariot and later freed him for a ransom (II. 21.35—41). Even in the heat of the battle heroes did not remain unmoved by the entreaties of their victims. Menelaus captured Adrastus and was inclined to ransom him till he was dissuaded by his brother (77. 6.37-50). Infractions of the accepted conventions were made in fits of ire often enough but they were not condoned by society. The only exceptions to this general claim are the few attempts made to justify apparent infractions as redress for earlier violations. So we see that Peisander and Hippolochus were executed because their father Antimachus had urged the murder of Ödysseus, who had been dispatched to Troy as an envoy (II. 11.123—144). Dolon was similarly seized while on a spying mission and was killed so that he would not spy again (II. 10.378-381).

Hesiod When we leave the world of Homer and travel to the world of Hesiod, we find ourselves in a completely different environment. Man has been brought down from the lofty top of Mount Olympus to his human dimensions. He16

siod's concern is with Man, not just the aristocratic man. 1 Interestingly enough, the values of the Homeric world did not suffer transmutation; they remained the same but lost their aura of exclusiveness and assumed a universal character. This "leveling" is one of the most striking features that separates Hesiod from Homer and is particularly evident in the Works and Days. In this work, human relations become for the first time an object of study. The overriding feature in the poetry of Hesiod is the question of justice. Force is renounced as a means of solving human problems and justice is stressed as the concept capable of leading Man to happiness. Where justice reigned people and states prospered (W & D 225-231). With the poetry of Hesiod we are definitely in the era of the Greek polis as the nucleus of political units. Society knows war but dislikes it (W & D. 201-210). In the story of the hawk and the nightingale the right of the stronger prevailed. Clearly Hesiod had no political remedy against the arbitrariness of the strong, but he warned that Zeus was displeased by injunstice. Judges could still pronounce unfair judgments, but Zeus was taking note of all the crooked judges who, oblivious of the existence of the gods, exploited the people. Here, in the belief that there was such a thing as absolute justice and a supreme power which surveyed its application, Hesiod was voicing an ideal close to the heart of the Archaic Age. Beware against this [injustice] you princess and straighten out your pronouncements, you gift devourers. Hesiod advises his brother Perses (the advice applied to anyone) to be cautious: And you, Perses, put these things within your mind; listen to justice, and forget violence. For the son of Cronus has ordained this law that fish, wild beasts, and birds eat one another, for they do not understand justice. To mankind he has decreed justice which is better by far. (W & D 275-79) Hesiod's admonitions could not have been intended to be confined to intrapolis relations, but they assumed a universal character which encompassed interstate dealings. Neighbors come quickly to assistance when something goes wrong. For that reason a bad neighbor is a plague, while a good is a blessing (W & D 345—348). Take care to size up your neighbor and pay him back well with the same measure or perhaps better, if you can, so that if you would be in need he would reciprocate. (W & D 345-351) 1

The ancients were well aware of the admonitory character of Hesiod's, Theognis', and Phocylides' poetry. They considered it an excellent guide to human conduct and regretted that this poetry was not taken to heart more seriously, Isocr. To Nie. 43.

17 2 Kaxavites (Hyp. 71)

In the Cryptia (1.495) the Greeks are described as demanding the surrender of Helen and her treasure from her Trojan abductors. It was only when this reasonable request was rejected that the Achaeans advanced to attack the city and laid waste the surrounding countryside.

Theognis and Pindar At first sight Theognis seems to be closer to Homer than to Hesiod. He deplored the vulgarity of the mob and sang the ideals of the aristocratic past. He grieved for the loss of the aristocracy of his city and ascribed to this loss the injustice that predominated in Megara. On closer view, however, one can see that Theognis' concern lay not only with the fate of a particular social class but also with the ideals of law and justice it represented.1 The ruling people were evil (Theog. 1.30) not because of their social origins but because of their desertion of the traditional principles. For Theognis, virtue was identified with justice.2 The noble man was noble by virtue of his deportment, not his birth alone. This equation of nobility with character constituted the strength of the aristocratic class and its last defense in the struggle for survival. His voice on behalf of nobility echoed beyond the narrow bounds of his city and appealed to Greeks inculcated with the traditions outlined in Homer. More than Theognis, Pindar drew our attention to the Hellenic ideals of the aristocratic class at a time when the Greek world was coming out of the nebulous mythical past into the hard modernity of the fifth century, but the ideal could still win the admiration of all Greece with its agonistic exploits at Olympia, Delphi, Nemea, and the Isthmus. For Pindar, this concern with the aristocracy derived not from a narrow minded desire to preserve class privilege and prejudice, nor from a wish to support a code of ethics based on property, but from his admiration for the aristocracy's code of noble conduct and the sense of responsibility it implied for the community. This point is particularly important in the discussion of the principles of the early Greek aristocratic culture. At a time when codes of law were in their infancy, the principal standard for personal conduct was provided by a store of proverbial wisdom whose core was the traditional morality. Apart from this, effective guidance lay in the model lives of the heroes of old. Thus the code of the earlier centuries had a twofold influence. In the first place, it taught the city-state communities the 1 πολλοί το ι πλουτοϋοι κακοί, ά·γαθοί δε πένονται - άλλ' ημείς τούτοις ού διαμει ψόμεθα . . . χρήματα δ' άνθρώπων 'άλλοτε άλλως exe ι. Elegy and Iambus (Loeb. Class. Libr.) 3 1 5 318. J Theognis frg. 147 in T. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci (Teubner, 1882): ev Se δικαιοσύνη συλλήβδην πάσ' äpeτή 'on, πας τ' άνήρ Λγάβός, Klippe, δίκαιος eibv.

18

obligation to be brave, and secondly it provided the traditional values as examples for imitation. Nor was Pindar a blind admirer of the nobility. He knew that even heroes and aristocrats behaved in ways that were dishonorable. Heracles, for instance, stole the cattle of Geryon. This act, viewed from the standpoint of the accepted moral code, was considered base, no matter how heinous a monster Geryon was. Pindar added that above immortals and mortals there stood the law.3 In the same poem Pindar told how Heracles seized the horses of Diomedes and how Diomedes resisted Heracles because he thought it better to die in defense of his possessions than to save his life but be shown a coward. Elsewhere Pindar quoted a case in which divine anger was at last abated and turned into pardon. The Titans, as everybody knew, had fought against Zeus but were worsted in the struggle and thrown into Tartarus. Two of them, namely Prometheus and Atlas, had received special punishment at the opposite ends of the world. Pindar made use of another version of this myth for a special purpose. Putting a plea to Arcesilas of Cyrene on behalf of his friend Damophilus, Pindar advanced an impressive argument for clemency by identifying Demophilus with Atlas. He pointed to the necessity for clemency in human affairs, since even Zeus freed Atlas and Prometheus (Pyth. 4.289-291). The story is not a Pindaric invention. If it were, it would not have carried any weight with Arcesilas.4 The story is definitely older. It was known to Hesiod and may have had much earlier origins. It exemplifies the propensity of the Greeks toward moderation once the temporary feelings of anger have subsided. To do otherwise was seen as immoderate. Several developments in early Greek history exemplify equally well the same attitude.

Early Greek History

and the Aristocratic

Code

The collapse of the Mycenaean territorial states and the emergence of the citystates dominated by the nobility present an intriguing paradox. On the one hand, the fragmentation of the Greek world into numerous small units extremely jealous of their independence accentuated the feeling of individualism and localism. On the other hand, localism was counter-balanced by the continuous panhellenic "aristocratism" of the ruling families. As in the Homeric times relations continued to transcend the boundaries of the polis. With their 3

Νόμος ό πάντων βασιλεύς, Odes of Pindar frg. 152 (OCT); C. M. Bowra, Pindar (Oxford, 1971) 74; K. Latte, "Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischem Griechentum," in his Kleine Schriften (Munich, 1968) 247. 4 Bowra, Pindar, 82-83; F. Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus (Ithaca, 1949) 156; U. ν. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, Hesiodos, Erga (Berlin, 1928) 60.

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quarrels and their banquets, the nobles frequently gave the impression of being one panhellenic family. Their relations continued to be regulated by the Homeric code of chivalry. These relations were constantly renewed through intermarriages, visitations, and friendships which embraced the entire genos and extended to its descendants.1 Old ties were renewed and new ones cemented at the agonistic games in which the ruling aristocrats participated with vigor and pride. Now as earlier, it was below the dignity of an aristocrat to engage in menial work, and noblemen spent their time in hunting, chariot racing, entertaining, or administering their cities. Thus, it was not an accident that all the important panhellenic games had their beginnings in the period of the aristocratic rule.2 Several of the tyrants, nobles themselves, continued the tradition of cosmopolitanism by establishing alliances with other tyrants through intermarriages (Melas of Ephesus, Cleisthenes of Sicyon, the Peisistratids, Periander, Thrasybulus, etc.). The other major preoccupation of the nobility continued to be war. War was for them a sport and a necessity. It was through war that they tested and proved their competitive virtues. Naturally, war entailed a degree of a personal danger, but this could not be helped. Booty may have been an object of these early wars, but there was nothing shameful in it since it constituted a form of livelihood and a sport as well (Thuc. 1.5.1). When later peaceful conditions prevailed in Greece, looting became a disreputable enterprise conducted by pirates and thieves (Thuc. 1.12.4). This martial tradition was closely related to the agonistic spirit, and through it the nobility emerged as the ηγήτορες and μέδοντες.3 Although the aristocratic government may sometimes prove vicious and tyrannical in its internal and external relations, it was controlledas a rule-by a sense of honor and tradition of virtue.4 In the internal affairs we witness several developments within the city-state framework which constitute an advance, on earlier traditions. It was the new societal development which necessitated the mitigation of the law of vengeance. In the tradition of homicide the avenging of bloodshed was the busi1 After his Olympic victory c. 575, Cleisthenes of Sicyon announced the contest for his daughter's hand. According to Hdt. 6.127, the list of pretenders read like a modern Who's Who. There were representatives from Greece and Italy, but not all of them, of course, went there for the hand of Agariste. Many went because it was the fashionable thing to do, H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen 1 (Munich, 1967) 3 0 - 3 1 . 2 Olympics c. 776, Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian, c. 600. 3 E. Meyer, GdA 3.281. 4 The states around the Isthmus were plagued by age-old rivalries often fostered by Corinth, but they followed the aristocratic code in their conflicts. They never fought ä outrance·, farmers and their crops were spared; captives were treated as "spear-guests" (Sopiiifeuot) and rarely failed to pay their ransom. L. H. Jeffrey, Archaic Greece: The City-States c. 700500 B.C. (New York, 1976) 155.

20

ness of the next of kin and the family in general. The duty of vengeance devolved automatically. The question whether a homicide was premeditated or accidental did not matter much. Patroclus as a child had killed another boy in a quarrel over a game; he had to go into exile to save his life (//. 23. 85—88). Nor was a crime committed for moral reasons always condoned as the hero Hyettus found when he killed an adulterer (Paus. 9.36.6). When a murder was committed, the grim rule of vengeance was applied in all its vigor. Vendettas might last for generations till whole families were uprooted. Agamemnon was a victim of this tradition. Aegisthus in a way avenged upon Agamemnon the crime committed upon Aegisthus' father Atreus (Aesch. Agamem. 1610—11). Achilles manifested the same passion for revenge, and at the end of the poem he apologized to Patroclus for giving up the body of Hector (II. 24.591-95). It was a lurid but often true saying of that old poet who wrote: "Fool, who, slaying the father, leaves the children" (Aristl. Rhet. 1.15). The advent of polis changed that slowly. We witness a growing respect for some rule of reason in intrasocietal affairs which necessitated alternatives to absolute and implacable customs. "A man will take a recompense," said Ajax, "even from the slayer of a son or brother, so that the killer will stay in the land, having paid a great price, which would appease the defendant's proud spirit." (II. 9.632—36). The same principle is implied in the apology of Achilles to the ghost of Patroclus and his entreaty that the ghost be satisfied with rich offerings (II. 24.594-95). That is one way whereby society may be spared unnecessary evils. Another was when the slayer, especially the involuntary slayer, cast himself upon the mercy of the avenger, in the hope that the latter would feel pity and spare his life. There is even in Homer's Shield of Achilles a scene depicting the intervention of the state in mitigation of a blood feud. The people were gathered in the market-place where a dispute had arisen about the price of a slain man. One man claimed that he had paid all in full, while the other refused to accept the proferred price. Both were eager to put an end to the matter, however, by submitting it to arbitration. The elders brandished their staffs and gave judgment each in his turn. Two talents of gold lay in the midst to be given to him who should pronounce the fairest judgment (II. 18.497—508). Clearly, it was not in the interest of the state to have its members slain in vendettas, and it did its best to mitigate this evil. A similar convention, ridiculed later by Aristotle (Pol. 1269a), was best understood as the state's method of checking private warfare. At Cyme, in Aeolis, there was a law relating to homicide whereby, when a man was accused of murder and the accuser could produce a definite number of witnesses from his own family, the person accused should be liable to the charge of the murder. This law of compurgation provided an alternative to destructive vendettas. 21

The same phenomenon appeared in the corpus of Gortyn, which preserved many archaic ideas. The law perscribed that "that side shall prevail in favor of which the greater number of witnesses would swear" {Law of Gortyn, 2. 36—41). In a closely knit society where belief in divine retribution against perjury was deeply feared peaceful adjudication was another form of avoiding bloodshed. The same changes affected the relationships of the emerging city-states. Thucydides (1.15.2) stated that there was no major war between the Trojan and the Lelantine war. The lilliputian states grouped themselves in amphictyonies, usually for the purpose of worship at some common holy place. A few regions went so far as to form themselves into greater territorial states. Attica, Boeotia, Phocis, Sparta. These units led to fellowships as a result of which the savagery of war was alleviated by agreement or usage. Though warfare between member states never ceased, the amphictyonies have to their credit the formulation of pledges aimed at protecting them from utter destruction. These agreements were a great advance on the state of affairs in early Mycenaean times when outsiders were frequently treated as enemies (Thuc. 1.5.1-3). Thus the realization of wrong-doing became deeply rooted among the Greeks and was to function in their history as Erinys that haunted the wrong-doer. The amphictyony which met at Thermopylae (later at Delphi) had to its credit an oath annually exchanged not to destroy or cut off from supplies or running water any member state (Aisch. Emb. 43). To destroy a kindred city was felt to be an atrocious act, and most neighbors were kindred. s An echo of the archaic attitude reverberated in the oath of the Greeks taken before Plataea. In it the Greeks promised to fight as long as they lived and to choose and die honorably rather than live ignominously; to adhere to the Hellenic principle which required the burial of all the dead; not to destroy Athens, Sparta, Plataea, or any other city of those who shared in the fight against Persia; not to allow these cities to be coerced by famine or thirst. The sworn party invoked the imprecations of the gods upon the violators. Sickness, destruction, sterility of animals, land, and human beingswere to be visited upon the violators by the gods. The format of this oath went back to Homeric times where the same punishment was invoked by the participants upon the violators.6 The destruction of a city was considered an evil act even in Homer's poetry. 7 s

Many scholars doubt the authenticity of this oath. Whether the oath is or is not authentic is less important at this point; the important thing is that it could be. Hdt. 1.151 implicitly condemns the early destruction of Arisba in Lesbus; A. R. Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece (New York, 1968) 34. 6 Hdt. 7.132.2; Lyc. Against Leocr. 8 0 - 8 1 ; Diod. 11.29.2-3; scorned as fictitious by Theop. 115 F 153, who considered it an invention of the Athenians. Tod 2. No. 204; A. E. Raubitschek, ΤΑΡΑ 91 (1960) 178-83; Fornara, Documents, No. 57; C. Hignett, Xerxes'Invasion of Greece (Oxford, 1963) 4 0 0 - 4 0 1 ; P. Siewert, Der Eid von Plataiai (Munich, 1972).

22

The importance of these unformulated principles became evident in the greatest panhellenic encounter after the Trojan War, the Lelantine War. We witness the arrival of reinforcements from several allied cities who fought on both sides. These allied reinforcements must have been made up from scions of the aristocratic families even when their occupation was primarily with commerce because democracies had not yet been established. The war itself did not completely banish the spirit of amity that prevailed earlier between Chalcis and Eretria. Although engaged in hostilities, the adversary cities did not succumb to the temptation to ignore their earlier bond nor did they indulge in remorseless acts but agreed in advance on the conditions under which they would pursue the war. The rivals considered it beneath their dignity to use fraudulent methods to overcome their opponents. Victory was the desired end, but the means for the attainment of that end were equally a matter of honor. Their agreement forbade the use of secret weapons or long-range missiles. Only hand-to-hand battle at close quarters was to decide the outcome. 8 A significant outgrowth of this attitude in the early Greek times was the tacit understanding that the war activities were to be limited to the combatants. The nobleman was bound by the code of conduct to protect the poor (Od. 6.206). Equally, he was supposed to show respect for the fallen foe. Herodotus stated that the Mantineans arrived late for the battle of Plataea and were greatly distressed. Hearing that the Medes were fleeing, they wanted to pursue 7 II. 9.595: κακα 'epya; 597 κακόν ήμαρ; 599 κακόν 6' ήμυνε και αϋτως. The day Troy fell was κακόν ήμαρ (II. 20.315; 21.374). Briseis witnessed the destruction of Lyrnessus: 'Ολέθριο ν ήμαρ II. 19.294; Kiechle interprets κακά epya as bad day, not bad acts and shies away from a moral judgment on the part of the poet. G. Micknat, Studien zur Kriegsgefangenschaft und zur Sklaverei in der griechischen Geschichte (Mainz, 1954) 575, on the other hand, suggests a reprobative meaning. Kiechle is supported by Ducrey, Le traitement, 314, n. 2. I am inclined towards a moral connotation. See also Π. 9.590-95; 19.290-300; Od. 8.521-31; Micknat, Studien, 527-28. 8 Polyb. 13.3.2-3. These usages must have had earlier origins. W. G. Forrest, Historia 6 (1957) 160-175 considers the agreement unhistorical. Even if this is true in connection with the Lelantine War, it does not preclude the existence of such usages among the Greeks. The reference of Strabo 10.1.12 to the enmity between Chalcis and Eretria and the continuing avoidance of gruesome acts supports the theory of these restrictive traditions. For further bibliography see Plut Mord., 153F; Proclus On Hesiod's Works and Days, 662; Plut. Moral., 760E-761A; Aristl. Pol. 1289b; Hdt. 5.99; Thuc. 1.115.3 and Scholia ad. loc.; J. Boardman, BSA, 52 (1957) 2 7 - 2 9 ; D. W. Bradeen, ΤΑΡΑ 78 (1947) 223; A. R. Burn, The Lyric Age of Greece (New York, 1960) 90; G. Bury and R. Meiggs, A History of Greece, 4th ed. (New York, 1975) 107; A. Bonnard, Das Altertum, 3 (1957) 13; J. Beloch, G.G. 1.338-39; Busolt, G.G. 1.455-57; CAH 3.622-23; Fomara, Documents 9 - 1 0 ; F. Geyer, RE, suppl. 4 (1924) 433; Gomme, HCT 1.126; F. Jacoby, CQ 35 (1941) 9 7 - 1 0 9 ; H. L. Lorimer, BSA 42 (1947) 114; 121; H. Schaefer, Staatsform und Politik (Leipzig, 1932) 64; Ε. Will, Korinthiaka (Paris, 1955) 391-392; Bengson, No. 101; D. Fehling, RRM 122 (1979) 193-210.

23

them as far as Thessaly, but the Lacedaemonians would not allow them to pursue fleeing men (Hdt. 9.77; Thuc. 5.73.4). When Lampon the Aeginetan approached Pausanias and advised him to have the head of Mardonius impaled for the Persian impalement of Leonidas, Pausanias resented the suggestion. You have missed the mark of right judgment. After flattering me, you threw me in an abyss of depravity by telling me to insult the dead. That would be an act more proper for foreigners than for Greeks, and one we deem a matter of blame even for foreigners. (Hdt. 9.78-79) There were justifiable exceptions to this rule. The first Sacred War was precipitated by the misconduct of Cirrha, which exploited its geographic location in relation to Delphi. Evidently, the Cirrhaeans made an illicit profit from tolls imposed upon visitors on their way to Delphi at a time when the numbers of visitors swelled as a result of the transmarine expansion of the Greeks. The Cirrhaeans soon incurred the enmity of their neighbors by committing outrages on women who were travelling to the temple. When things reached an intolerable state, the Amphictyones decided to put an end to this deplorable affair. After a war that lasted ten years, the Cirrhaeans were beaten; their city was destroyed; the people were sold into slavery; the land of the Cirrhaeans was consecrated to the temple. This stiff sentence was evidently justified on account of the sacrilegious character of the outrages. In addition, it is probable that the Cirrhaeans refused to yield to compromise proposals, thereby heightening the "holy" wrath that existed against them. The impact of the extreme punitive measures was alleviated by the donation of the spoils to the gods.9 In the period that stretched from the beginning of the sixth century to the times preceding the Peloponnesian War, there is only one example of a city whose defeat gave rise to a general massacre, Sybaris. We do not know the details of the enmity between Croton and Sybaris but the consternation which seized the Milesians at the news of the disaster appears to demonstrate the impact the destruction of a city made upon the Greeks.10 And naturally so, ' Athen. 13.10 p. 5 6 0 B - C (Callisthenes, FGH 124 F 1). Aesch. Against Ctesiphon 108.10; Strabo 9.3.4 (p. 418C); Harpocr. s.v. (Didymus; Xenagoras) FGH 240 F 22; Scholiast to Pindar, Summary (of the origins) of the Pythian Festival b; Parian Marble, FGH 239 F 37; Plut. Solon, 11; Bengtson, No. 104; CAH 3 . 6 0 4 - 0 6 ; T. J. Cadoux, JHS 68 (1948) 9 9 101; V. Ehrenberg, The Greek State (Oxford, 1960) 254; Bury-Meiggs, A History, 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 ; Paus. 2.9.6; 10.37.4; Polyaen. 3.6. 10 One of the causes of the war was probably the massacre by the Sybarites of the thirty ambassadors sent by the Crotonians to announce their refusal to liberate the Sybarite fugitives in their possession. The negative answer cost the lives of the envoys. Nothing prevents us from accepting the story. If true, moral factors would account for the destruction of Sybaris, Athen. 12.521D; Phylarch, FGH 81 F 85; Diod. 1 2 . 9 . 3 - 5 ; T. J. Dunbabin, The Western Greeks (Oxford, 1948) 363; J. Berard, La colonization grecque de l'ltalie Meridionale et de la Sicile dans I'antiquite, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1957) 1 4 9 - 1 5 1 ; Ducrey, Le traitement, 117.

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for by the end of the sixth century a polis was more than an administrative unit or a place where people resided. It had acquired an air of sanctity and its destruction was a sacrilegious act that was liable to provoke universal resentment. Herodotus resented the indifference the surviving Sybarites displayed at the news of Miletus' destruction (Hdt. 6.21). Their attitude becomes more reprehensible when compared to the Athenians. The Athenians were deeply grieved by the fall of Miletus and did not fail to display their grief in several ways. When the famous dramatist Phrynichus presented a play entitled The Fall of Miletus, the Athenians broke into tears. Their grief and their sense of guilt was so great that in their frustration they fined Phrynichus one thousand drachmas for reminding them of this calamity; they also forbade the reenactment of the play. This account by Herodotus is capped by a laconic epilogue which has the compactness of Thucydides but portrays fully the revulsion the Greeks felt at the news of a city's destruction: Μίλητος μέν νυν Μιληοίων ήρήμωτο (Hdt. 6.22) The story of Miletus is juxtaposed to the adventure of the Samians who left their island to escape from the Persians. They and other Ionians had been invited by the Zanclaeans to go to Sicily. When they arrived in Sicily, the Samians engaged in a series of duplicitous acts against their benefactors by colluding first with Anaxilaus of Rhegium against the Zanclaeans and then with Hippocrates, the despot of Gela. The attitude of the Samians was as invidious as that of Hippocrates about whom Herodotus said that he betrayed the people who were his allies. The saving grace for the Samians was their refusal to slay the three hundred prominent Zanclaeans Hippocrates placed in their hand. 11 This quick survey of the moral customs of early Greece has shown that the influence of these usages exercised a positive hold on later developments. We do see during this period the rise of certain humanitarian traditions which tend to serve the function performed in modem times by international agreements. These traditions developed at a time when the nobility held sway over the Greek world. Their cosmopolitan mentality and their interstate connections facilitated the universalization of their unwritten code of chivalric conduct in war. True, Homer depicted contradictory usages, but this circumstance may be due to the fact that we are unable to investigate them because of the lack of sufficient information. Where practices did not come into conflict with the

" Hdt. 6.24; H. How and H. Wells, Comment, on Herodotus, 2.73 say that the ά,πονητί shows that Hdt. was more impressed by the cleverness of the Samians than by their baseness. This is doubtful, especially since the duplicity of the Samians does not necessarily display any cleverness. Thuc. 4.4; Diod. 11.48.

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traditional sense of heroic duty, Homer seemed to advocate the application of the rule of reason, moderation, and leniency in the exercise of human affairs. This principle seems to have guided the history of Greece after the Dorian invasion. It is manifested not only in the intellectual tradition but in the historical developments of the period. The best example is perhaps the Lelantine War, where rival leaders, like eighteenth century aristocratic diplomatists in Europe, entered into gentlemen's agreements about the procedures they would regard as licit in their upcoming encounter. The second part of this book will deal with the application of the principles in the cases of the capitulation treaties. Before the discussion of the treaties themselves, however, a quick explanation of a few of the terms related to treaty-making is necessary. Finally, a word needs to be said about the purported connection between economic factors and the growing humanness in the treatment of war captives. I. A. Sisova pointed out the great masses of barbarian slaves introduced in the Greek cities of Asia Minor and especially in the island of Chios around the end of the sixth century B.C.12 The development of agriculture, according to Sisova, was responsible for the sparing of the captives' lives. However, cruel it might have been, slavery is seen as a better evil than death. Thus, farming came to be for male war prisoners what concubinage and household chores were for women.13 No doubt economic demands and utilitarian reasons must have contributed to the sparing of many slaves' lives. But the economic theory alone is not sufficient to explain the intellectual foundations of Greek humanitarianism, which well antecedes sixth century economic trends. Besides, the economic theory deals with only one aspect, though a very important one, of the humanitarian traditions. The Aristocratic code covers a wide area of interpersonal and interstate relations among the Greeks.

Terminology Άνάστασις, the act of standing up; the act of making to stand up, as well as removal from one's place. It also denotes departure, occasionally under compelling circumstances, or devastation.1 The adjective Ανάστατος is frequently 12

In H. Kuch, Kriegsgefangenschaft und Sklaverei bei Euripides (Berlin, 1974) 2 7 - 3 1 ; Theop. FGH 115 F 122; Athen. Deipn. 6.88 (265B-C); Poseid. FGH 87 F 38; Thuc. 8. 40.2; 8.45.4; Hdt. 8.105; 3.49.2-3; 3.129.3; 3.97.3-4. It should be noted that this theory deals primarily with barbarian captives rather than Greeks. 13 Hdt. 1.146.3; Paus. 7.2.6; Micknat, Studien, 608-615; G. Wickert-G. Micknat, "Dichtung als Historische Quelle," Saeculum 21 (1970) 5 7 - 7 0 ; W. K. Pritchett, Ancient Greek Military Practice 1, (Univ. of Calif. Press, 1971) 53-100. 1 Aesch. Persae 107, πόλεων τ' άναστάσβις; Agam. 589; Eurip. Troj. Worn. 364; οίκων r'

26

found in combination with the verbs miew — yiyveadai — eivai and means to depopulate a place or a city, to make people homeless.2 The practice of forceful expulsion of one's adversary, though a cruel form of punishment, was still milder than the mass killing or sale into slavery. F. Kiechle considers it a humanitarian improvement in the practices of war as compared to the Homeric practices.3 Ανοχή, to hold back, to stop, especially in the case of hostilities; hence it is found mostly in the plural and in conjunction with the verbs συντίθημι, ποιεϊν, σπένδβσθαι and indicates a truce. 4 The duration of the truce may vary from a few hours to several months. The term άνοχή is evidently employed more frequently from the fourth century on in the place of the Attic άνο(α)κωχή which also means an armistice of varied length.5 Δουλόω (δούλος) ion. attic δόλος, noun δονλοσύνη (servant, slave, servitude). The verb and noun are also combined with the preposition κατά to indicate a state of subjection by one state to another. This is mostly the meaning of the word as used by Herodotus and especially by Thucydides. The latter prefers the verb andrapodizein whenever human sale into slavery is involved.6 Ειρήνη (Peace). Andocides states that ειρήνη differs from ακονδαί in the sense that peace is contracted by equals whereas σπονδαί are imposed by the stronger upon the weaker (Andoc. On Peace 11—12). For that reason he called the peace of Antalcidas προστάγματα imposed on the Greeks. However, Xenophon, Aristotle, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Aristeides Άτρέως άνάοτασιν,

Hdt. 9.106.1 connotes some kind of destruction, whereas Thuc. 7.75. 1 the tactical departure of the Athenian army. 2 Hdt. 1.155.2; 1.177; 7.56.2; 1.106.1; 1.76.3; 1.97.3; Thuc. 6.76.2; 8.24.3; Aesch. Peri Porapresbeias 115; Isocr. Philip 20; Thuc. 6.5.3. 3 Kiechle, 135; for άνδράποδον and άνδραποδισμός see Ducrey, Le traitement, 2 3 - 2 6 ; Hdt. 3.59; 1.151; Xen. Hell. 2 . 2 . 1 2 - 1 4 ; Thuc. 6.62; Plat. Rep. 469B; H. Frisk, Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch (Heidelberg, 1960) s.v. άνδράποδον. 4 Polyaen. 2.18; άνοχάς συνίθετο, a three-month truce; Xen. Mem. 4.4.17; Bengtson, No. 220; Diod. 14.80: άνοχας 'βποί·ησατο; Bengtson, No. 222 (Tithraustes-Agesilaus) where a six-month truce is meant; Diod. 14.81.3; Paus. 3.5.5; Xen. Hell. 3.5.23; Plut. Lys. 29 use σπονδάς or ύποσπόνδους where Pausanias the Spartan king made άυοχάς to pick the body of Lysander. The truce is understood to have lasted only a brief time, sufficient for the defeated Spartans to pick up the dead. The expression takes the place of the more common term for such cases ϋποσπόνδους άναιρεισθαι or kvelXe τριακονθημίρονς άνοχάς (Epameinondas-Alexander of Pherae). 5 Hdt. 6.116; 7.100.3; 7.168.2; Thuc. 1.66; 1.40.4; 3.4.4; 4.38.1; 4.117.1; 5.25.3; 5.327; 5.26.3; 8.82.7. The scholiast to Thuc. 1.40 describes άνακωχή as ειρήνη πρόσκαιρος πόλεμον ώδίνουσα οίον ή μικρά τον πολέμου άνάβληοις, παρά το Άνω βχει τας άκοχάς των

δοράτων. 6

Hdt. 1.129.3; 6.109.3; 8.144.1; Thuc. 3.70.3; 3.63.3; 6.72.2; 5.27.2; 7.66.2; also Diod. 12.75.2; Xen. Hell. 1.3.13; Paus. 4.5.3; Plat. Rep. 351B.

27

do not seem to draw the distinction in this case and call it peace. 7 Isocrates refers to the Peace of Antalcidas as προστά'γματα, although elsewhere he speaks of the συνθήκαι* The confusion stemming from Andocides' definition is similarly evident in the case between Philip II and Cersobleptes, the king of Thrace. In this instance Cersobleptes is definitely not the equal of Philip, for Philip received Cersobleptes' son as hostage and made Cersobleptes, for all practical purposes, his vassal.9 Similarly the κοινή ειρήνη promulgated by the Delphic Amphictiony in 346 B.C. is not a peace among equals since Philip assumed the role of policeman. 10 Ειρήνη could be accompanied by φιλία and έπιμαχία or further combined with συμμαχία, a defensive or offensive alliance. 12 Ειρήνη was a form of political settlement based on the freedom and independence of the signatory cities, which may include stipulations about border arrangements. A peace agreement between Syracuse and Carthage in 339 B.C. settled the spheres of influence and enjoined the Carthaginians not to aid Greek tyrants against Sicily. 13 The noun is often found combined with several verbs to indicate the conclusion of peace: τίθεσθαι, συντίθεσθαι ιτοιείσθαι, πράττειν, εχειν, είναι.1* Although Diodorus uses εΙρήνη ν ποιεϊσθαι, he seems to prefer the είρήνην συντίθεσθαι whereas Xenophon resorts to είρήνην ποιεϊσθαι or πράττεw. Εκεχειρία (armistice-truce) etym. χείρας 'έχειν. Varro, who follows Gellio (1.25), speaks of it as peace of the fortresses of a few days duration. Actually the term serves a military as well as a religious purpose, for έκεχειρία was practiced during periods of war for the sake of the Olympic games. Theoretically, έκεχειρία was of short duration, but in reality its length could vary. The religious έκεχειρία was normally of 60 days duration (Thuc. 5.49.2; Xen. Hell. 5.2.2). The armistice between Boeotia and Athens in 421 B.C. lasted quite a long time but had to be renewed every ten days (Thuc. 5.26.2; 5.32.5), and it is also described as δεχείμεραι έπισιτονδαι (Thuc. 5.32.5). Thucydides inter7 Xen. Hell. 5 . 1 . 3 1 - 3 6 ; Aristl. Ath. Pol. 34.3; Diod. 14.110.3; Plut. Art ax. 21.2; Ages. 2 3 . 1 - 3 ; Aristeides, Panath. 172; Arrian, Anab. 2.1.4. 8 Isocr. Paneg. 115; 120; 122; 128; 137; On the Peace 16; 17; Panath. 59; 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 ; To Arch. 8 - 9 ; Lysias, 4 . 3 7 - 3 8 ; Theop. FGH 115 F 103; Bengtson, No. 242. 9 Aesch. Peri Parapresbeias, 81; Bengtson, No. 319; No. 329. 10 Dem. 12.9; Τ. Τ. Β. Ryder, Koine Eirene (Oxford Univ. Press, 1965). 12 Xen. Hell. 3.2.20; Tod 2, 145; Syll. 1 3 182; Aesch. Against Ctesiphon, 54; 6 7 - 6 8 ; Dion. Hall. Epist. ad Ammaeum, 1.11; Dem. Philip's Letter, 22; On the Peace, 25; Philoch. FGH 328 F 55; Dem. Peri Parapresbeias, 48; Bengtson, No. 217. 13 Diod. 16.82.3; Plut. Timoth. 34; Bengtson, No. 344. 14 Diod. 13.14.1; 14.3.2; 14.3.6; 14.105.4; 14.106.2; 15.9.2; Xen. Hell. 6.2.1; Diod. 15. 38.1; Philoch. FGH 328 F 151; Diod. 15.50.4; 15.76.3; 16.8.1; Xen. Hell. 2.2.20; Andoc. On the Peace 1 1 - 1 2 ; Xen. Hell. 3 . 2 . 1 9 - 2 0 ; Diod. 14.96.3; 14.98.5; Xen. Hell. 3.4.6; 6. 3.18; Thuc. 1.139.3. We also have the use of eipnvr\v γίγνεσθαι, βίρήνην συγχωμίϊν (Diod. 16.82.3).

28

changes έκεχβρία with anovhai and elsewhere with άνοκωχη. Thus the duration of the έκεχεφία in Thucydides varies according to the circumstances. 15 'Ομολογία etym. όμοΰ-λέγω meaning to agree, admit, concede something. This is its meaning in the Greek tragedians and comedians of the fifth century. 16 It also has the meaning of a formal or informal agreement between two equal parties 17 or an agreement in which one party has clearly the advantage and the other is forced into it. These types of agreements are the capitulation treaties. In the fifth and fourth centuries capitulation treaties are normally designated by the term ομολογία. 18 A different type of ομολογία could be a gentlemen's agreement (Strabo 10.1.12) where a defensive alliance is implied (Diod. 15.67. 2). The term ομολογία is usually combined with the verbs π ρ ο σ χ ω ρ ε ί (Thuc. 1.117.3), ιταρίοτασθαt (Thuc. 1.29.5), ποιεϊσθαι (Thuc. 3.28.1), γίγνεσθαι (Thuc. 4.105.2; 7.82.2; Diod. 15.59.2), ουντίθωϋαι (Diod. 15.46.4), ά^αγκάζεαθαι (Diod. 15.46.5; 15.80.6). βράτρα (βρήτρα) coming from the stem βρη (see also είρημαι, meaning speech (Frisk, s.v. ειρω). The word appears early in Greek history and is used to mean an agreement between two states. 19 It was also employed with a different connotation, that of an official decision or the decision of some one in authority. 20 In this capacity the word could be taken to mean a legal decision, a decree, or an official agreement. In the Odyssey (14.393) ρήτρα has the meaning of an oral agreement between two partners, and in this sense it appears also later. 21 The word remained in the Doric dialect as a constitutional term, connoting a legal arrangement, a law, or a decree, and with this meaning we find it in Sparta, Messene, Heracleia, and Tarent. 22

15

Thuc. 4.118.11; 4.122.2.1; 4.134.1; 5.2.1; 1.15.2 for one year. Thuc. 4.58; 4.117.3; 4. 119.3 of shorter duration. 16 Sophocles, Phil. 980; Eur. Iph. in Aul. 1142; Arist. Plut. 94; Clouds, 765; Knights, 1261; Hdt. 1.23; 1.171; 2.81; 1.142; 6.54; Plat. Timaeus, 32. For the nuances of όμολογία see Balcer, Athenian Regulations for Chalkis, Historia-Einzelschriften, Heft 33 (1978) 5 5 65. 17 Plat. Crit. 51E; 52; Isaeus, 69; Xen. Apol. 20; Hdt. 1.150.1; Thuc. 4.65.2; Diod. 15. 50.4; 15.67.1; 15.81.3; Ael. Arist. Panath. 153; Aristod. FGH 104 F 132; Thuc. 2.95.2; Diod. 12.50.3 for the treaty between Sitalces-Athens. 18 Thuc. 1.29.5; 1.117.3; 3 . 2 8 . 1 - 2 ; Diod. 12.55.7; Thuc. 4.54.3; 7.32.1; 7.82.2; Diod. 15.46.5; Thuc. 4.69.3; Xen. Hell. 2.3.6. " W. Dittenberger-K. Purgold, Inschriften von Olympia (Berlin, 1896) No. 10; 'JC βράτρα τός Άι>αί7·ο[ς] και τό[ς] Μεταπίος; Ε. Schwyzer, DGE, No. 414; Bengtson, No. 111. 20 Hesych. s.v. ρήτρα ι; Tyrtaeus fr. 3a in Diehl; Schwyzer, DGE, 687; E. Meyer, Forschungen zur Alte Geschichte 1 (Halle, 1892) 263; Liddell-Scott, s.v. retra. 21 F. Quass, Nomos und Psephisma, Zetemata 55 (Munich, 1971) 8. 22 Plut. Ages: ϊήτραν 'eypa\pev; Τ. Η. Wade-Gery, Essays in Greek History (Oxford, 1958) 62; I.G. 1 (1948) 12; Schwyzer, DGE, 62; 145; 151.

29

Σπονδή (σπένδω), a drink offering (libatio), or χοή, the wine poured out in honor o f the gods t o hallow the draught. 2 3 Hence the meaning σπονδαί (mostly in the plural) because the custom developed t o sanctify the agreements (peace agreements) by pourings o f wine in honor o f the gods and as a way o f binding also the signatories to respect the agreements. 3 4 The meaning o f the term σπονδαί as it evolved in the fifth century and after is very flexible. 2 5 It may mean a capitulation treaty, 2 6 or a brief time, enough time that is for the defeated to pick up their dead; 2 7 it may denote a preliminary stage (truce) till a final treaty could be worked o u t ; 2 8 or it may take the place o f a chronologically defined truce. 2 9 It may also mean a peace agreement o f long duration, occasionally accompanied by a defensive alliance. 30 Συμμαχία means an association in war or in arms, an alliance (συμμαχέω). A purely defensive alliance is also known as έπιμαχία. 3 1 T o avoid misunder23 Theog. 762; Aesch. Suppt. 982; Eur. Cycl. 469; Ion 1193; EL 511; Plat. Symp. 743C; Xen. Cyr. 4.1.6; 6.4.1. " Diod. 3.71; τον Δώνυσον δώόντα σπονδην οίνου πάντας ii-ορκώσαι· ... διο και . . . τους μεταγενεστέρους ... τάς ev τοις πολεμοις διαλύσεις απονδας προσαγορεύειν. " Thuc. 3.52.2 similar to ομολογία; Paus. 9.1.7; Bengtson, No. 171; 266. 26 Thuc. 4.46.2-4; 4.15.2; 4.16.1-3; 4.118.4; 4.118.6; 4.118.10-11; 4.118.14; Xen. Hell. 3.2.20; 3.4.5; Ages. 1.10-11; Corn. Nepos, Ages. 2.3-4; Diod. 14.39.6; 12.75.5; Polyaen. 2.1.8 uses ίνοχάς for this truce and specifies the time limit as three months; Polyaen. 6.20; Plut. Ages. 9.1; Bengtson, No. 219; 220. " Thuc. 1.113.3; Paus. 3.5.5 uses σπονδαί instead of ϋποσπόμδους ävelKe. 2> Thuc. 4.19.1: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δε ύμάς [Αθηναίους] προκαλούνται ές σπονδάς και διάλυοιν πολέμου. 29 Thuc. 4.118.10: αί δε σπονδαί ένιαυτόν έσονται whereas in the decree that follows Thuc. 4.118.11 the ένιαύσιοι σπονδαί are referred to as έκεχειρία of one year intended to allow sufficient time to the envoys and heralds to discuss the proposal of peace. Thuc. 4.118.14; Xen. Hell. 6.4.24-25; Diod. 12.75.5; Gomme, HCT 2.685; Bengtson, No. 185; 269. 30 Thuc. 5.14.4; 5.28.2; 5.44.1 refer to the Thirty Years' treaty between Sparta and Argos. Bengtson, No. 144; Aristod. FGH 104 F. 13.2; Bengtson, No. 152 to the Peace of Callias

in 4 4 9 / 4 8 . T h u c . 1.15.1; Diod. 12.7; Plut. Per. 24.1; T h u c . 1.44.1; 1 . 6 7 . 2 - 4 ; 1.78.4; 7.

18.2 refer to the thirty years' peace between Sparta and Athens; Bengtson, No. 156; Thuc. 4.119.3 speaks of the μΐΐξώνων σπονδών as contrated to the εκεχειρία Bengtson, No. 185; Thuc. 5.18.3; 5.40.1; Diod. 12.74.5 refer to the Fifty Years' Treaty (Nicias' Peace). Thuc. 5.19.1; 5.24.2; 5.25.1; 5.27.1; Diod. 1 2 . 7 5 . 1 ; Bengtson, N o . 189; T h u c . 5.41.1; Bengtson,

No. 192 to the Fifty Years' peace between Sparta and Argos in 420 B.C. I.G. 1 2 86; Tod 1 5 72; Plut. Ale. 15.1; Diod. 12.77.2; Bengtson, No. 193; Thuc. 5.47.8-12 refer to the hundred years' peace and defensive alliance among Athens, Argos, Mantinea, Elis on the basis of equality. Thuc. 5.39.3; 5.40.2; Plut. Nie. 10.3; Ale. 14.4 to a thirty years' alliance between Sparta and Boeotia. Thuc. 5.78; 5.79 refer to the Fifty Years' treaty between Sparta and Argos. Xen. Hell. 5.2.2. to a thirty years' treaty between Sparta and Mantinea made in 418 B.C. Diod. 15.29.7 refers to the Peace of Antalcidas as σπονδαί while Bengtson, No. 255. Diod. 15.38.3 refer to a peace treaty between Athens and Sparta. 31

Thuc. 1.44.1; 5.48.2; Dem. Philip's Letter 7; On the Crown 87; Aristl. Pol. 3.9.11; E. Bikerman, RIDA 4 (1950) 99-127.

30

standings such as that which occurred prior to the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Corinth over Corcyra, the Greeks often added clarity to their treaties by enjoining both parties not to sign peace or alliance with others withour prior consultations with each other, or without the other's agreement.32 A form of defensive alliance was also the όμοαχχμία which originated from a present and immediate danger and had a clearly defined purpose. 33 In another type of alliance where the parties were equals, the alliance did not presuppose automatic mutual aid in case of aggression against one of the parties. Military assistance in this case is to be proffered in return for specified benefits. 34 A leading city (ηγεμώi>) and its allies could sign a treaty with another city, thereby committing its satellite cities to the alliance.35 An alliance could also extend protection to the signatories against internal unconsitutional changes.36 A different form of alliance could yet take the shape of a non-aggression pact between the contracting parties.37 Finally, there were alliances which were equivalent to diktats in which one or more subordinate members swear to have the same friends and enemies as the ήγβμώυ without receiving a similar pledge in return. Although the formula "the same friends and enemies" might have been devised to be applied among equals, it is evident that in the Athenian Empire the Athenians were not bound by such an obligation. The Lacedaemonian alliance was somewhat different since the principle of autonomy was stronger and the Spartan allies did enjoy the right to disagree with the League's decisions. Several defensive-offensive alliances owed their existence to the unequal influ-

" I.G. 1 2 90; Syll. 1 3 89; Schwyzer, DGE, 84; Bengtson, No. 147; 189; Athens-Argos, 1.G. 1 2 96; SEG 10.104; Bengtson, No. 196; Laced, and allies with the Persian King, Thuc. 8.18; Athens-Βoeotia, Andoc. On the Peace, 25; Lysias, 16.13; Philoch. FGH 328 F 148; I.G. II/III 2 14; Bengtson, No. 223; Athens-Corcyra, I.G. II/III 2 97; Syll. 1 Ί 5 1 ; Tod 2, 127; Bengtson, No. 263; Athens with the Thracian, Paeonian, and Illyrian kings, I.G. II/ III2 127; Syll. 1 3 196; Tod 2.152; Bengtson, No. 309. 33 Hdt. 7.145.1; 7.132.2; 7.148; Theop. FGH 115 F 153; Thuc. 1.132.2; Plut. Them. 20.3. 34 Inarus-Athens, Diod. 11.71.4; Thuc. 1.104.1; Bengtson, No. 137; Lepreon-Elis, Thuc. 5.31.2; Bengtson, No. 164; Sparta-Egyptian king Nepherites, Diod. 14.79.4; Justin, 6.2.1; Athens-Egyptian Akoris, Arist. Plut. 178. 35 Laced, and their allies with the Persian King, Thuc. 8.18; Bengtson, No. 196; Athenians and their allies with Sparta, Thuc. 5.23.1; Bengtson, No. 189; Sybarites and allies with Serdaeoi, Bengtson, No. 120. 36 Athens and allies with Sparta, Thuc. 5.23.1; Athens-Achaea-Arcadia-Elis-Plius, I.G. II/III 2 112; Syll. 1 3 181; Tod 2.144; Bengtson, No. 290; Athens-Thessaly, I.G. II/III 2 116; Syll. 1 3 184; Tod 2.147; Bengtson, No. 193; Athens-Eretria, I.G. II/III 2 230; Bengtson, No. 340. For defensive-offensive alliances, Xen. Hell. 4.2.17; 4.3.15; Paus. 3.9.4; Plat. Theat. 142C; Bengtson, No. 225; Dionysius-IUyrians, Diod. 15.13.2; Bengtson, No. 247; Sparta-Acanthus, Apollonia-Amyntas III, Diod. 15.19.3; Xen. Hell. 5 . 2 . 1 1 - 2 2 ; Isocr. Paneg. 6.126; Hell. 5.3.26; Diod. 15.23.3; Bengtson, No. 253; Achaea-Thebes, Diod. 15.75.2; Hell. 7.1.42; Bengtson, No. 283. 37 Philip-Artaxerxes Ochus, Arrian, Anab. 2.14.2; Bengtson, No. 333.

31

ence of the partners, the weak partner being of course compelled to follow the senior partner to war. 38 There was another type of defensive alliance which had a religious character. Its purpose was the protection of the members as well as the sanctuary around which the alliance coalesced.39 Other alliances prescribed a religious institution as the judge of future violations and specified the fine violators should pay, instead of the invocation of divine imprecations. The life-length of many of these alliances was often explicity stated. In several cases the duration of the alliance was not mentioned because it was implicitly understood to be forever.40 Συνθήκη/αι was a compact either between parties or between states.41 The word is often found in the plural and indicates the articles of agreement and collectively the agreement itself. Unlike other terms which may have a more limited connotation, the word συνθήκη-συνθήκαι covered a wide spectrum of agreements, and it could easily be applied to a wide variety of purposes replacing terms like ομολογία, ειρήνη,

συμμαχία,

οπονδαί,

σύμβασις,

etc.

A few other terms used to mean an agreement or treaty were: σνμβασις, (ουμβαίνω-agxee);42 συμβολή or συμβολαί, used especially in legal agreements;43 σύμβολα, used especially for arbitration and trade treaties (although not exclusively);44 συμβάσιa, used in the sense of an agreement, but not very often. 45 Διαλλαγή also means a change from enmity to reconciliation, hence reconciliation and truce. 46 38

Tod 2, 158; Diod. 15.67.4; Ste. Croix, Origins, appendix v; Schwah, RE, 4.1 (1931) 1107-09; s.v. συμμαχία. 39 Aesch. Peri Parapresb. 115; Against Ctesiphon 109-110. 40 Schwyzer, DGE 413; Eretria-Hestiaea, I.G. 1 2 9.188; Bengtson, No. 110; 205; Delphic Amphictyony, Aesch. Peri Parapresb. 15; Against Ctesiphon 109-110. There are treaties which were made for ever: tiei&iov χρόνου, Sybaris-Serdaeoi, M/L 110; Bengtson, No. 120; ek α'ίδιον χρόνον, I.G. 1*51; M/L 63; 64; ek & el χρόνον, I.G. II/III 2 15; iαι τήν Χερσόνησον Άττικήν έπολιορκέοντο, ές ο και ούτοι παρέστησαν, οϋτω δή τήν Αήμνον εσχον Άθηνωοί τε και Μιλτιάδης. (Hdt. 6.140) Miltiades is, supposedly, fulfilling an oracle given to the Lemnians earlier. When therefore the city of Myrina, in Lemnos, would not comply with Miltiades de1

Arist. Lys. 274 and the Scholion; Thuc. 1.126.12; Isocr. Concerning the Team of Horses 25ff; Dion. Hal. 5.1; Meyer, GdA 3 . 7 4 0 - 4 1 ; CAH 4, 140; How and Wells, Comm. on Hdt. 2 . 3 9 - 4 1 ; Hdt. 5.72.

33 3 Karavites (Hyp. 71)

mands, Miltiades besieged the city, and it agreed to surrender. The Lemnians were expelled from the island, and the Athenians took possession of it. 2 Capitulation of Megara Μeyapeas re τους έν Σικελίη, ώς πόλωρκεόμενοι ές όμολσγίην προαεχώρησαν, τούς μεν αύτών παχέας, άειραμένους τε πόλβμον αύτφ και προσδοκώντας άπολέεσθαι δια τούτο, άγαγώΐ' ές τάς Συρηκούοας πολιήτας έττοίησε • τον δέ δήμον τών Μεγαρέων ούκ έόντα μεταίτιον τοϋ πολέμου τούτου ούδέ προσδεκόμενον κακόν ούδέν πείσεσθαι, άγαγών και τούτους ές τάς Συρηκούσας άπέδοτο έπ' έζαγοτγη έκ Σικελίης. (Hdt. 7.156) Gelon of Syracuse laid siege to Megara sometime before 480 B.C. The Megarians surrendered to him on terms which are not specified. The wealthy Megarians expected to be punished for their opposition to Gelon, but Gelon made them citizens of Syracuse. Contrariwise, the fate of the demos, who had no part in the war against Gelon, was pitiable. Gelon sold them into slavery outside of Sicily. The reason behind this decision was his belief that the demos were a thankless meddley, hard to live with. How and Wells remark, however, that deportations were not infrequent in Sicily.3 At any rate, if Gelon's decision had been based on the traditional mores, those responsible for the trouble between Megara and Gelon could have been punished, while the others would not. Because the political ideas of Gelon were not related to justice, the guilty went unpunished while the innocent were deported. Capitulation of Thebes αύτίκα re έπεκηρυκεύοντο προς Παυσανίην oi Θηβαίοι θέλοντες έκδώόναι τούς άνδρας. Ώ ς δέ ώμολ&γησαν έπί τούτοισι, Άττα-γίνος μεν έκδώρήσκει έκ τοϋ άστεος, παϊδας δέ αυτού άπαχθέντας Παυσανίης άπέλυσε της αίτΐης, φας τού μηδισμού παϊδας ούδέν είναι μεταιτίους. τούς δέ άλλους άνδρας τούς έξέδοοαν oi Θηβαίοι, οι μεν έδόκεον άντιλογίης τε κυρήσειν και δη χρήμασι έπεποίθεσαν διωΟέεσθαι • δ δέ ώς παρέλαβε, αύτά ταύτα ύπονοέων την οτρατιην την τών συμμάχων άπασαν άπηκε και έκείνους äyayuv ές Κόρινθον διέφθειρε. (Hdt. 9.87-88) A few days after Plataea, the Greeks under Pausanias laid siege to Thebes, desiring to punish the guilty for the Theban medism, the most prominent among them being Timagenidas and Attaginus. The Thebans withstood the siege for nineteen days, after which they agreed to deliver the main culprits. Upon this, Pausanias agreed to put an end to the siege but Attaginus did not stay to be delivered. Pausanias siezed Attaginus' sons but eventually let them go, not considering them guilty of their father's crimes. The rest of the men delivered by the Thebans were carried to Corinth (where they probably stood trial for 2 3

Meyer, GdA 4.1.278; Forschungen 1.16; Beloch, G.G. 1.351. How and Wells, Comm. on Hdt. 2.195.

34

treason) and were put to death. The interesting feature here is that the Greeks refused to fulfill their earlier decision to destroy the cities that had medized.4 There are six capitulation treaties down to the Persian Wars, two of which were concluded with the Persians (See Appendix 1 and 2). In the four remaining treaties punishment is inflicted upon the surrendered parties. In the treaty between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, the Lacedaemonian invaders were allowed to depart from Athens unmolested. The Athenians who had supported Cleomenes were considered traitors, and the penalty for treason was frequently death (Thuc. 1.138.6\Hell. 1.7.20-22; Dem. 18.38; 2079). The punishment for treason often took the form of apotympanismos, and something similar might have occurred here.s Miltiades' alleged reason for the expulsion of the Lemnians was triggered by an earlier decision of the Delphic Oracle, commanding the Lemnians to submit to whatever penalty the Athenians decided to impose upon them. Finally, the paradoxical decision of Gelon had little to do with the facts concerning justice and more with Gelon's personal political philosophy. But the treaty which perhaps best exemplifies the Hellenic spirit in its finest hour of triumph was the capitulation of Thebes. Despite the earlier agreement among the Greeks who fought the Persians to punish medism, the Greeks limited the punishment to the few Thebans most responsible for medizing, though Herodotus (9.87) alludes that it was by common consent that the decision to medize was taken.

Capitulations

to Athens

479—404

Soon after the organization of the Delian League, the aggressive and volatile Athenians faced several problems which could have led to the dissolution or restructuring of the league. The major question posed was whether any member had the right to drop out since the allies were voluntary partners. It seems that their desire to secede increased as the Persian danger and Athenian tactfulness decreased (Thuc. 1.97; 1.99). The underlying antagonism burst out into an open defiance of the Athenian leadership and led to the general transformation of the alliance into an empire. Many of these encounters were settled by capitulation treaties. The first of these was that between Athens

4

Hdt. 7.132; 145; 172; Lyc. Against Leocr. 81; Diod. 11.33.4; Cie. Rep. 3.15; Isocr. Plat. 30; Meyer, GdA 4.1.391; Plut. Moral. 864F. 5 Hdt. 7.33; 9.20; Aesch. Prom. Bound, 5 8 - 5 9 ; Arist. Thesm. 9 3 0 - 9 4 6 ; 1001; 1110; Knights, 1 0 3 7 - 4 9 ; Dem. 8.61; 9.61; 19.137; Aesch. 2.181; Lysias, 13.56; 65.68; MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators (New York, 1963) 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 .

35

and Carystus, πρός δε Καρνστίονς αύτοϊς άλλων Εύβοέων πόλεμος έ-γένετο, και χρόνφ ξυνέβησαν καθ' όμολσγίαν. (Thuc. 1.98.3) The length of the siege and the exact terms of the capitulation treaty are not mentioned. Of the several cities in Euboea, Carystus had remained outside of the League for reasons unknown, but its proximity to the Attic coast must have been important. Obviously, this was undesirable to Athens.1 The Athenians must have tried to persuade the Carystians to join the alliance and when persuasion failed, the Athenians decided to use force. The important thing, however, is that the Carystians most probably escaped punishment since none is mentioned. It is interesting that the fate of the Carystians is juxtaposed to that of the Eionites and the Scyrians. We learn that the inhabitants of both these places were sold into slavery. Plutarch tells us that the Dolopians of Scyrus were lazy adventurers, and that they deserved their fate. Plutarch's views were doubtless colored by Greek and Roman practice. Robbers and brigands (latrunculi and praedones) did not enjoy the rights accorded to public enemies and were beyond tha pale of law.2 Thus we notice a determinative in the treatment of enemies by the ancients. The Eonites were not only barbarians but also pirates, and although the Carystians themselves were not Greeks but Dryopians, yet they were treated with moderation as Greek traditions demanded. Capitulation of Naxos Ναξώις δε άποστάσι μετά ταύτα έπολέμησau και πολιορκία παρεοτήοαντο. •πρώτη τε αϋτη πόλις ξυμμαχις παρά το καθεστηκός έδουλώθη, έπειτα δε και τών άλλων ώς εκάστη ξυνέβη. (Thuc. 1.98.4) Naxos was the first allied city to withdraw from the alliance. Athens promptly treated this action as a casus belli and blockaded the island. After a brief blockade, the Naxians were forced to capitulate. The exact terms imposed upon Naxos are not known, but Thucydides stated that it was the first ally to have lost its autonomy, contrary to the original terms of the alliance; the turn of the others would follow. The word έδουλώθηοαν here does not have the connotation of ήνδραποδίσθησαν. Besides her loss of autonomy, Naxos had to pay 61/2 talents of tribute, a "rather modest sum." 3 Clearly, the amount paid was not as significant as the loss of autonomy, and Thucydides (1.97.1) stressed this unprecedented measure by his characteristic brevity. He emphasized that the Naxians έδουλώθηοαν παρά το καθεστηκός, 1 Meyer, GdA 4.1; 307; 364; 374; 464; Μ. L. W. Laistner, A History of the Greek World from 479 to 323 B.C. (London, 1962) 10; Meiggs, Ath. Emp. 123, 566; Schol. Thuc. 1.98. 2 Cie. De. O f f . 3 . 2 9 . 1 0 7 - 8 ; Pritchett, Gr. State, 67; H. Bengtson, The Greeks and Persians (London, 1968) 7 1 - 7 2 ; A. Giovannini and E. Grzybek, Mus. Helveticum 35 (1978) 3 3 - 4 7 . 3 Gomme, HCT 1.282.

36

while the scholiast considered the action as παρά τό νόμιμον και πρέπον* The traditional state of the Greeks was autonomy, and the Delian League was formed by autonomous states for the preservation of their autonomy. The emphasis on the παρανομία connoted the violation of a traditional principle. This unfortunate precedent was deleterious to Greek practices, especially since it finally drew the approval of the Peloponnesian League. Despite promises for assistance to Thasos and Samos, soon after Naxos, no assistance was given. Later, the Corinthians reminded the Athenians that they had voted against aid to Samos on the theory that each alliance should discipline its own members without outside interference. 5 The allies obviously accepted the Corinthian theory, since there was nothing done to support Samos. The Corinthians admitted that his was not the traditional practice, and in a way they wished they had not advocated it. A few years later, they were to reverse their position because the Athenians had interfered in Corcyra. Capitulation of Thasos Θάσιοι δε τρίτω ετει πολιορκούμενοι ώμολόγησαν Ά&ηναίοις τεϊχός τε καϋελόντες και ναύς παραδόντες, χρήματά τε οσα εδει άποδοϋναι αντίκα ταξάμενοι και το λοιπόν φέρειρ, τήν τε ήπειρον και το μέταλλον άφέντες. (Thuc. 1.101.3) έκ δέ τούτου Θασίονς μεν άποστάντας Αθηναίων καταναυμαχήαας τρεις και τριάκοντα ναύς ελαβε και τήν πάλιν έξεπολιόρκησε και τά χρυσεία τα πέραν Άύηναίοις προσεκτήσατο και χώραν, ής έπήρχον Θάσιοι, παρέλαβεν. (Plut. Cim. 14.2) έπί δέ τούτων άποστάντες Θάσιοι άπό Άάηναίων, μετάλλων αμφισβητούντες, εκπολιορκη&έντες υπό των Ά&ηναίων ήνα-γκάσϋησαν πάλιν im' έκείνους τάττεσ&αι. (Diod. 11.10.1) After almost three years of siege, the Thasians buckled under Athenian unrelenting pressure and capitulated. According to our sources, the Thasians had to raze their wall, abandon their possession on the mainland, deliver a number

4

A. Giovannini and G. Gottlieb, Thukydides und die Anßnge der Athenischen Arche (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akad. 1980 n. 7) p. 30 n. 92; Scholia to Thuc. 1.98.4 if we accept the scholiast's νόμιμον as harmonizing with the Giovanni-Gottlieb interpretation, we are still left with the translation of -πρέπον. Should we accept the Athenian action as legally or morally improper? I follow this second view, though certitude is not always guaranteed in these matters. s David Greene, Greek Political Theory (Chicago, 1965) 55 says that Thucydides had no moral censure for the violation of the old-fashioned autonomy of the states. This is not correct. Meiggs, Ath. Emp. 7 0 - 7 1 .

37

of their ships, and pay money to tribute in the future. Thucydides did not specify the number of ships to be delivered. Plutarch, on the other hand, implies that Cimon captured thirty-three Thasian ships before he began the siege. It is possible that Plutarch used a ϋστβρον-πρότερον expression, and that the captured ships were the same referred to by Thucydides as part of the settlement. In either case, the number of ships did not represent the totality of the Thasian ships since Thucydides used ναϋς and not τάς ναϋς or άπάσας τάς ναϋς. Probally, all the warships were given up, while the Thasians were allowed to retain several of their merchantmen. The χρημάτων τε οαα εδει άποδοϋναι presents also a slight difficulty because it does not clarify if εδει stands for back payment, tribute, indemnity for the expenses of siege, or both. 6 In the case of Samos, Thucydides was more specific. He mentioned χρήματα τά άναλωθέντα

ταζάμενοι (Thuc. 1.117.3).

Capitulation of Aegina ώ μ α λ ό γ η σ α ν ...

τείχη

re πβρνελόντβς

και ναΰς παραδόντβς

φόρον

τε

ταξάμενοι ές τον έπειτα χρόνον. (Thuc. 1.108.4) [. . 4 . .τ]οϊς

Alyi[ver-

cuiopyiai δε τε[ι ν reμ. ν υ φυλακε[ν — ν τά χσυνκείμε[να —-

ι eiaiv αύτοίς, μ[ βλάβει τέι Άdeu[aiov ον μη πεμαίν υ υ e[vν έάν δε αίτιοι γ[— ατεύεσ&αι έπί τ

κες όσες αύτ. ι

ένΐ]

στρ](I.G. I 2 18)

The above inscription is too badly mangled for us to make any sense from it, and Lewis doubts that it belongs to this time. Thucydides told us that the Aeginetans were forced to raze their walls, deliver their ships, and pay tribute in the future. How many ships were delivered is not known. It is unlikely that

* Polyaen. 8.67; Meiggs, Ath. Emp. 83-85; Bengtson, No. 135; Busolt, G.G. 3M, 2 0 3 204'; Meyer, GdA 3.535; Beloch, G.G. 2 3 1.149; F. Hiller von Gaertringen, RE 5A (1932) col. 1315; Gomme, HCT 1.299-300; I.G. 1 J 108; H. W. Pieket, Epigraphica 1 (Leiden, 1964) No. 2; J. Pouilloux, Recherches sur l'histoire et les cultes de Thasos 1 (Paris, 1964) 6 1 - 7 4 ; Μ. I. Finley, Trade and Politics in the Ancient World (Paris, 1965) 2 8 - 3 2 . Unlike Samos which stayed faithful to Athens, Thasos, along with other allies, revolted after the Sicilian expedition (Xen. Hell 1.4.9).

38

all the ships were delivered, however, because again the abscene of an article makes it certain that not all the ships were surrendered. Since Aegina was a commercial island and lived off its trade, it is probable that, as in the case of Thasos, all military ships and several transport ships were given up. 7 According to Diod. 11.70.2-4, Aegina revolted from Athens about the time of the Thasian revolt. The Athenians ravaged the land and besieged the city, but apparently did not take it. A little later (Diodorus 11.78.3—4 gives the year as 459 but his dates are not always reliable and this one is not) the Athenians resolved to subdue the Aeginetans completely. They defeated them and compelled them to pay tribute. The Aeginetans had to contribute money, while up to now they had contributed only ships to the alliance. According to Thucydides, the war began with a sea battle in which the Athenians captured seventy ships. A siege followed, which ended with Aegina's capitulation (Thuc. 1.105.2—4).8 This seems a more natural sequel and is probably the correct account. Two features are to be noticed. First, the decision of the Peloponnesians to help the Aeginetans by an invasion of the Megarid recalls their intention to help the Thasians by invading Attica (Thuc. 1.101.1—2). It was a normal Peloponnesian reaction to the revolt of the allies. Secondly, the terms eventually imposed by Athens on Aegina were almost exactly the same as those imposed on Thasos (Thuc. 1.101.3). Capitulation of Euboea και Αθηναίοι πάλιν ές Εϋβοναν διαβάντες Περικλέους στρατηγούντος κατεστρέφαντο πάοαν, και την μεν αλλην όμολσγία κατεστήσαντο, Έστιαιάς δε έξοικίσαντες αύτοι την γήν 'έσχον. (Thuc. 1.114.3) αύθις ούν έπί τούς άφεστώτας τραπόμενος και Stoßen; εις Εϋβοιαι> πεντήκοντα νανσί και πεντακισχιλίοις σπλίταις κατεστρέφατο τάς πόλεις, και Χαλκιδέων μεν τούς ίπποβότας λεητομένους πλούτψ και δόξη διαφέροντας έξέβαλεν, Έστιεϊς δε πάντας άναστήσας έκ της χώρας 'Αθηναίους κατφκισε, μόνοις τούτοις άπαραιτήτως χρησάμενος 'ότι ναϋν Άττικην αιχμάλ ω τ ο ι λαβόντες άπέκτειναν τούς άνδρας. (Plut. Per. 23.4) Αθηναίοι κρατήσαντες Χαλκώέων κατεκληρούχησαν αύτών την yf/v είς δισχιλίους κλήρους, την Ίππόβοτον καλουμένην χώραν, τεμένη δε άνηκαν τη Αθηνά έν τ Ληλάι>τω όνομαξομένω τ άπω, την δέ λοιπήν έμίσθωσαν

1 I.G. Ι 2 18; J. Ε. Hondius, Novae Inscriptiones A tticae (1925) No. 1; Paus. 2.29.5; 2.38. 5; Gl Klaffenbach, Gnomon 1 (1926) 706; D. Μ. Lewis, BSA 49 (1954) 2 1 - 2 5 ; ATL 3. 38-39; Bengtson, No. 141; A. S. Nease, Phoenix 3 (1949) 103-104. ' Obviously, the captured seventy Aeginetan ships were almost all Aegina could have had. They must have become part of the final settlement.

39

κατά τάς στήλας τάς προς τη βαοιλείω στοφ έστηκυίας, αίπερ ούν τά των μισθώσεων υπομνήματα εϊχον. τούς δέ αιχμαλώτους Ζδησαν, και ούδέ ένταύθα έ'σβεσαν τον κατά Χαλκιδέων θυμόν. (Ael. V.H. 6.1) κατά δέ την Ελλάδα Αθηναίοι την Εϋβοιαν άνακτησάμενοι και τούς Έστιαιεϊς έκ της πόλεως έκβαλόντες ιδίαν άποικίαν εις αύτήν έξέπεμψαν Περικλέους οτρατηη/οϋτος, χίλιους δε οίκήτορας έκπέμφαντες τήν τε πόλο* και τήν χώραν κατεκληρούχησαν. (Diod. 12.22.2) In 446 the Athenians crossed over into Euboea to put down an outbreak of revolts on the island. The operation was successful and the treaties concluded with the Euboean cities were to regulate the future relations between them and Athens. Only the Hestiaeans suffered expulsion because they had murdered the crew of an Athenian ship. Aelian also adds that the Athenians took the land of the Chalcidians and divided it into two thousand lots and rented out the rest. The reliability of Aelian, however, is very doubtful. 9 Capitulation of Samos 444/439 και ναυμαχίαν μέν τννα βραχεϊαν έποιήοαντο οι Σάμωι, άδύνατοι δέ οντες άντίσχειν έζεπολωρκή&ησαν ένάτ οπλα παρέδωκαν έπιτρέποντες τώ δήμω τών Ά&ηναίων βουλεύσασ&αι περί αύτών • έάν δέ τίνες αύτών φεύγοντες αλώσι, (απασύ λελύσθαι τάς σπονδάς. Κερκυραίοι δείσαντες, μή φιλανϋρώπως βουλεύσηται περί αύτών ö 'Μηναίων δήμος, κρύφα έπεμψαν προς ένίους άποδράναι συμβουλεύοντες και πλοϊον αύτοϊς παριστάντες, "ίνα πεισΰέντων φυγείν αί σπονδαί λυθείεν. 'Αθηναίοι δέ ώς παρασπονδήσαντας αύτούς έξέδωκαν τοις Κερκυραίοις · οί δέ παραλαβόντες απαντας άπέκτειναν. (Ροlyaen. 6.20) Polyaenus' version agrees with Thucydides.17 The Corcyraean oligarchs and the foreign soldiers were delivered to the goodwill of the Athenians with the understanding that they would not attempt an escape while the Athenian decision was pending. If any of the prisoners violated the agreement, it would become null and void for all. It was this which proved the prisoners' undoing. Polyaenus does not name the foreign soldiers. Thucydides (4.47.2) states that the scheme for killing the prisoners was put into practice with the connivance of the Athenian generals who were reluctant to have the prisoners conveyed to Athens by others, lest the others would get the credit. Extravagant as this statement may sound, 17

H. Müller-Stiiibing, JKPh 133 (1886) 616; Bern. Müller, Korkyreische Studien (Leipzig, 1890) 83; Busolt, G.G. 3.2.111-112; CAH, 5.221-222; Bengtson, No. 177.

44

Thucydides was justified in being critical of the generals. Eurymedon was one of the Athenian generals who in 427 had brought reinforcements to the Corcyraean democrats. Unlike Nicostratus, who in 427 prevented bloodshed on the island, Eurymedon did not make the least effort to stop it (Thuc. 3.81). Thucydides implies that Eurymedon could have helped had he wanted because his force was five times larger than that of Nicostratus. Capitulation of Cythera και μάχης γενομένης όλίγον μέν χρόνον υπέστησαν οί Κυΰήριοι, έπειτα τραπόμενοι κατέφυγον ές την άνω πάλιν, και ύστερον Συνέβησαν προς Νικίαν και τους ξυνάρχοντας Άϋηναίοις έπιτρέφαι περί οφών αυτών πλην ϋανάτου. ήσαν δέ τίνες και γενόμενοι τφ Νικία λόγοι πρότερον πρός τινας τών Κυ&ηρίων, δι ο και ΰάσσον και έπιτηδειότερον τό τε παραυτίκα και τό έπειτα της ομολογίας έπράχ&η αύτοίς • άνέστησαν γαρ (αν) οί 'Αθηναίοι Κυΰηρίους, Λακεδαιμονίους τε οντες και έπί τη λακωνική της νήσου οϋτως έπικειμένης. (Thuc. 4.54.2—3) ήγον δέ TIPας και έκ τών Κ υ&ήρων άνδρας ολίγους, οϋς έδόκει ασφαλείας ές τάς νήσους, και τους άλλους Κυύηρίους οίκοϋντας την εαυτών φόρον τέσσαρα τάλαντα φέρειν. (Thuc. 4.57.4) The Cytherians abandoned themselves to the mercy of the Athenians on the condition that they would not be put to death. The Athenians did not impose any penalty except removing a few of the Cytherians for security purposes and imposing on the island a tribute of four talents. Thus they converted them to the status of their allies.18 Nicias is primarily responsible for the arrangement, as he was in the case of Mende (Thuc. 4.130.6). It is to be noted that the Cytherians set certain terms for their capitulation, evidently because after Mytilene and Platea, they could not rely any more on the good will of their opponents. Capitulation of Nisaea και oi έν τη Νισαύ} δείσαντες, σίτου τε άπορίφ (έφ ήμέραν yap έκ της άνω πόλεως έχρώντο) και τούς Πελοποννησίους ού νομίζοντες ταχύ έπιβοη&ησειν, τούς τε Μεγαρέας πολεμίους ηγούμενοι, ξυνέβησαν τοις

" Bengtson, No. 178; Busolt, G.G. 3.2.1127; CAH 5, 238. For the Aeginetans, Thuc. 4. 56.2; 57.4. In the summer of 431, the Athenians expelled the Aeginetans from Aegina together with their wives and children because they considered them partially responsible

for the war. Arist. Rhet. 3.10.

45

Ά&ηναίοις ρητού μέν 'έκαστον άργυρίου άπολυ&ήναι σπλα παραδόντας, τοις δέ Αακεδαιμονίοις, τώ τε αρχοντι και εί τις άλλος ένήν, χρήσϋαι Αθηναίους ö τι &ν βούλωνται. έπί τούτοις όμολσγήσαντες έξήλΰον. και οί 'Αθηναίοι τά μακρά τείχη άπορρήξαντες άπό της των Μ φορέων πόλεως και την Νίσαιαν παραλαβόντες τάλλα παρεσκευάζοντο. (Thuc. 4.69.3-4) οί δε ΪΙελοποννήσιοι φοβούμενοι μη κατά κράτος άλόντες άναψεύώσι, παρέδοσαν την Ν ίσαιαν τοις Άύηναίοις και}' όμολοηίαν. (Diod. 12.66.4) The two versions we have differ in one cardinal respect. Thucydides states that the Nisaeans delivered their city, while Diodorus says that the Lacedaemonians in the city delivered it. The Nisaeans agreed to pay a specified amount of ransom for each man; to deliver their arms; and to leave the Lacedaemonians and the other Greeks to the discretion of the Athenians.19 Since it was the Nisaeans who agreed on the stipulations for the capitulation and not the Peloponnesians, Thucydides' version is the more reliable. Capitulation of Orchomenus c. 418 oi δέ Όρχομένιοι δείσαντες τήν τε τοϋ τείχους άσθένειαν και τοϋ στρατού το πλήθος, και ώς ούδείς αύτοϊς έβοήθει, μη προαπόλωνται, ξυνέβησαν ώστε ξύμμαχοΐ τε είναι και ομήρους σφών τε αυτών δούναι Μαντινεύσι και ους κατέθεντο Λακεδαιμόνιοι παραδούναι. (Thuc. 5.61.5) The Orchomenians were afraid that they might be captured before aid came to them and capitulated. The terms imposed upon them by the Athenians and their allies were that they should join the alliance; that they should give hostages to the Mantineans; and that they should deliver the Arcadians whom the Lacedaemonians had deposited with them. Capitulation of Melians και κατά κράτος ήδη πολιορκούμενοι, -γενόμενης και προδοσίας τινός άφ' έαυτών, ξυνεχώρησαν τοις Άθηναίοις ώστε έκείνους περί αύτών βουλεύσαι. οί δέ άπέκτειναν Μηλιών όσους ήβώντας ekaßov, παίδας δέ και -γυναίκας ήνδραπόδισαν. τό δέ χωρίον αύτοί άποκτεΐναι. (Paus. 1.29.12) The terms of the capitulation are clearly spelled out. The Athenians were to give up their arms and their money in return for their lives. They were not to be treated harshly or be chained, nor be deprived of the necessary foodstuffs. From Pausanias and other sources we learn that Demosthenes, in a chivalrous gesture, exempted himself from the agreement, leaving it to his captors to decide his fate. 4 The same thing was done by Nicias.5 There are only four capitulation treaties known outside of those between Athens—Sparta in the period between the Persian Wars and the end of the Peloponnesian War. This small number may be due to inadequate documentation on the history of the rest of Greece. At any rate, two of these four belong to the pre-war period, the first being concerned with the capitulation of the inhabitants of Oeniadae to the Messenians of Naupactus. The date of the treaty if unknown. Pausanias, who mentiones this event, placed it soon after the settlement of the Messenians in Naupactus. The most probable date would be the years 4 5 5 - 5 3 B.C., during Pericles' expedition in the West. The city of Oeniadae was hostile to Athens. The Messenians must have attacked Oeniadae to help bring it under the Athenian control and thus repay their debt to the Athenians for their help after their departure from Messene. The 4

Philistus, FGH 556 F 53; Plut. Nie. 2 7 - 2 8 ; Diod. 13.19.5; Busolt, G.G. 3.2.1394; Bengtson, No. 199; CAH 5.310; Heza, Wiss. Z.U. Rostock, 2 1 3 - 1 4 ; Meyer, GdA 4 . 2 . 2 5 4 56. 5 Thuc. 7.85.1; 7 . 8 6 . 2 - 4 ; Plut. Nie. 28.3.

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people of Oeniadae gave in to the Messenians. The evidence thus indicates that the people were spared, though they did have to abandon their city. The testimony regarding the second treaty appears somewhat confused, but between Thucydides and Diodorus the testimony of Thucydides is to be preferred as more reliable. The non-Epidamnian immigrants, mostly Ambraciots and Leucadians, were delivered to the Corcyraeans, who sold them into slavery, an act not common till the advent of the Peloponnesian War. This unusual act was compounded by the death of the non-Corinthian prisoners taken in Leucime. The Corinthians probably would have been slaughtered had it not been for their value as counters for bargaining. Unlike the modern inhabitants of the island, who are praised by the other Greeks for their "European fitnesse" and their civility, the ancient Corcyraeans seem to have been disrespectful of Greek traditions. To a certain degree they were typical of the primitive conditions which prevailed in some parts of western Greece, still unaffected by the high level of civilization achieved by the rest of the Greeks. Thucydides depicted a few of these western tribes as practicing and selling the booty thereof. The inhabitants of these areas considered it an honor to be successful in this business (Thuc. 1.5.2-3). The Corcyraeans were guilty of violations and Thucydides, who evidently did not like them, spared no opportunity to describe their censurable deeds. He explained for instance, how Themistocles fled from Argos to Corcyra because he had been recognized as their benefactor, a title bestowed upon him either because he had taken the part of the Corcyraeans in a dispute with Corinth (Plut. Them. 24) or because he had excused their absence in the Persian Wars (Hdt. 7.115). In fleeing to Corcyra, Themistocles relied upon this right of asylum which entailed some moral obligation for the beneficiary. The Corcyraeans, however, asked him to leave their country, alleging that they were afraid of the Lacedaemonians and the Athenians (Thuc. 1.136.1). When prior to the Peloponnesian War Epidamnus, the daughter-city of Corcyra, asked Corcyra for help, Corcyra denied it, although the Epidamnian envoys sat at the temple of Hera as suppliants (Thuc. 1.24.7). Corcyra also failed to honor Corinth, her mother-city, with the customary privileges; instead, she treated Corinth with contempt. 6 After the battle of Sybota, the Corinthians sent a delegation to complain to the Athenians that they were committing an injustice by breaking the Thirty Years' Truce and starting a war. The envoys added that if it were the intention of the Athenians to persist in their wrong ways then the Athenians should get them (the envoys) and treat them as enemies. The 6 Colonies sent annually θεωρούς to the mother-cities' festival and conceded priority at the sacrifices to the representatives of the mother city. The Corcyraeans dispensed with these traditional customs (Thuc. 1.25.3-4).

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Corcyraeans recommended that the envoys be killed, but the Athenians turned the suggestion down (Thuc. 1.53.3). It is not surprising that Thucydides chose the Corcyraean stasis to illustrate the deep moral degeneration that Greece was undergoing as a result of the war psychology (Thuc. 3.69—98). The Corcyraeans afforded simply the best and the most extreme example. Upon the failure of the abortive Theban coup in Plataea in the spring of 431 B.C., the Thebans found themselves surrounded and in a desperate plight and decided to surrender. Unfortunately, the Plataeans were driven by an ancient hatred against their opponents and put them to the sword. Their deed was morally and practically indefensible. They could have spared the prisoners for the purpose of future exchange, or as negotiating counters. They did not. At the capitulation of Plataea in 427 B.C., this act would plague them. When the Plataeans asked the Lacedaemonians for mercy they were thwarted by the Thebans, who reminded the Plataeans of their treatment of the Theban prisoners. The Plataeans endeavored to gloss over this event by emphasizing the unjust and unprovoked attack of the Thebans upon Plataea in time of peace and during a holiday (Thuc. 3.65.1). Unlike the Thebans, Demosthenes set certain terms far his capitulation in Sicily. The Syracusans adhered to the letter of their agreement but not the spirit. Angered by the Athenian audacity in attacking Sicily, they deposited the prisoners in the stonequarries, where they were treated harshly. The prisoners were exposed to the burning sun during the day and the chill of the night. They were given a scanty diet of one pint of food and half a pint of water. The scantiness is best realized by a comparison with the ration the Lacedaemonians had received in Sphacteria; namely, two quarts of barley meal per man and a pint of wine (Thuc. 5.16.1). Nicias and Demosthenes were killed, though, according to Thucydides (Thuc. 7.86.2—4), Gylippus would have preferred to have them spared for his triumphal return to Sparta. In addition, he wished to save Nicias because the latter had been kind to the Spartan prisoners of Sphacteria. But the Syracusans objected. Many of them feared that Nicias might reveal the names of prominent Syracusan informants (Thuc. 7.86.4).

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CHAPTER 3

Capitulations from the End of the Peloponnesian War to the End of Philip's Reign Capitulations

in the Years

404—336

Capitulation of Cythera in 393 Έπεί δε oi έχοντες την πάλιν τών Κυθηρίων φοβηθέντες μή κατά κράτος αλοϊεν έξέλιπον τά τείχη, έκείνους μεν ύποσπόνδους άφηκεν εις την Λακωνικήν, αυτός δ' έπισκευάσας το τών Κυθηρίων τείχος φρουρούς τε και Νικόφημον Άθηναίον αρμοατήν έν τοίς Κυθήροις κατέλιπε. (Xen. Hell. 4.8.8) εύθύ δε ταύτης έξ έφόδου κυριεύσαντες τούς μεν Κυθηρίους ΰποσπόνδους έξεπεμψαν είς την Λακωι>ικήν, αύτοί δε καταλνπόντες της πόλεως την ίκανην φρουράν επλεον έπί Κορίνθου. (Diod. 14.84.5) Following the battle of Cnidus (394), Pharnabazus and Conon carried the war to the Peloponnese. In 393 Pharnabazus sailed to Phoenicus in Cythera. Those who held the city became alarmed lest they be overcome by an assault and decided to capitulate. Pharnabazus allowed them to depart to Laconia. He then repaired the wall and left a garrison under the Athenian Nicophemus. The free departure of the Cytherians might have been prompted by Pharnabazus' desire to end the siege quickly or to show the other Greeks his mildness. It is difficult to see how Pharnabazus and Conon, who came as the liberators of the Greeks, could afford to antagonize them by a cruel outrage. 1 Capitulation of Heraeum (at Piraeum) in 390 oi δ' έν re.; Ήραίω καταπεφενγότες έζησαν, έπιτρέφοντες Ά-γησιλάω -γνώναι Ö τι βούλοιτο περί σφών. ό δ' eyvoj, οσοι μεν τών σφαγέων ήσαν, τταραδούναι αυτούς τοϊς φυ^άαι, τά δ' άλλα πάντα ... (Xen. Hell. 4.5.5) Agesilaus besieged Heraeum in 390. As soon as the people perceived that the heights were occupied by the Peloponnesians, they gave no further thought to their defense but fled to the Heraeum with their wives, children, slaves,

* Isocr. Paneg. 119; Meyer, GdA 5.236.

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and cattle. The Lacadaemonians closed in upon them, and the besieged decided to capitulate, leaving it to Agesilaus to determine their fate. Agesilaus delivered to the exiles those who had a part in the massacre and allowed the rest to be sold.2 Capitulation of Mantinea in 385 έπεί δέ ήττώντο τοϋ ύδατος, δείσαντες μη πεσόντος ττη τοϋ κύκλιοι τείχους δοριάλωτοι yivowTO, ώμολ&γουν περιαψήσειν. oi δέ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ούκ εφασαν οπείσεσθαι, ει μη και διοικιοϊντο κατά κώμας. οι δ' αύ νομίσαντες άνάγκην είναι, συνέφασαν και ταύτα ποιήσει». οίομένων δέ άποθανεϊσθαι των άρΎολιζόντων και των τοϋ δήμον προστατών, διεπράξατο ό πατήρ παρά τοϋ Ά-γησιπόλιδος άσφαλειαν αύτοίς -γενέσθαι άπαλλαττομένοις έκ της πόλεως, έξήκοντα ούσι. και άμφοτέρωθεν μέν της οδού άρξάμενοι άπό των πυλών έχοντες τά δόρατα oi Λακεδαιμόνιοι εστασαν, θεώμενοι τοΰς έξιόντας. και μισοϋντες αυτούς ομως άπείχοντο αυτών pq.ov τ) oi βέλτιστοι τών Μαντινέων. (Xen. Hell. 5.2.5-6) διό και τών οικιών πιπτουσών καταπλα'γέντες ο'ι Μαιπίνεις ήνα-γκάσθήσαν την πόλιν παραδούναι τοίς Λακεδαιμονίοις. oi δέ παραλαβόντες άλλο μέν ούθέν κακόν εΐργάσαντο τούς Μαντινεϊς, προσέταξαν δέ εις τάς άρχαίας κώμας μετοικισθήναι. διόπερ ήνα·γκάσθησαν την μέν ιδίαν πατρίδα κατασκάπτειν, εις δέ τάς κώμας μετοίκησα ι. (Diod. 15.12.2) The Lacedaemonians laid siege to Mantinea after the expiration of the Thirty Years' Treaty with Mantinea because the Mantineans had maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Sparta and frequently aided the enemies of Sparta in violation of the agreement.3 The two versions agree, though Xenophon's description is much more detailed. Polybius is critical of the Spartans for breaking up the Mantinean city, but Polybius is probably biased at this point (4.27.6). The Mantineans were to break up their union and dwell in separate villages as before. A collateral agreement between Agesipolis and his exiled father Pausanias protected the pro-Argive Mantineans from their co-patriots' wrath. This is recorded as a striking example of Spartan nobility and self-discipline. Capitulation of the Phliasians in 379 έκ τούτου δη πέμφαντες προς τον ΆΎησίλαον έδέοντο σπείσασθαι πρεσβείαν εις Λακεδαίμονα ίούσι • δεδσχθαι yap σφίσιρ εφασαν έπιτρέπειν τοϊς τέλεσι τών Λακεδαιμονίων χρήσασθαι τη πόλει ο τι βούλοιρτο. (Xen. Hell. 5.3.23) 2 3

The reference to the massacre is not clear, Xen. Hell. 5.4.2. Ephorus, FGH 70 F 79; Isocr. On the Peace, 100; Paus. 8.8.7; Meyer, GdA 5 . 2 8 9 - 2 9 0 .

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Αγησίλαος δη οΰτως εηνω, πεντήκοντα, μέν άνδρας των κατεληλυθότων, πεντήκοντα δέ τών οίκοθεν πρώτον μέν άνακρϊναι δντινά τε ζην έν τη πάλει και οντινα άποθανεϊν δίκαιον είη · έπειτα δέ νόμους θεϊναι, καθ'· ους πολιτεύσοιντο- έως δ' αν ταύτα διαπράξωνται, φυλακήν και μισθόν τοις φρουροϊς εξ μηνών κατέλιπε. (Xen. Hell. 5.3.25) Faced with starvation, the Phliasians capitulated. Agesilaus was authorized to treat with them. He empowered fifty men from the restored exiles and fifty from the men at home to determine who should be put to death and to draw up a new constitution for their city. Until matters were settled, he left behind a garrison with six months pay for it. 4 Capitulation of Olynthus in 379 Και ό Πολυβιάδης δέ δη παντάπασι κακώς έχοντας λιμώ τούς Όλυνθίους δια τό μήτ έκ της γης λαμβάνειν μήτε κατά θάλατταν εϊσάγεσθαι σίτον αύτοίς, ήνάγκαοε πέμφαι εις Αακεδαίμονα περί ειρήνης • οΐ δ' έλθόντες πρέσβεις αυτοκράτορες συνθήκας_ έποιήσαντο τον αύτόν μέν έχθρόν και φιΚον Αακεδαιμονίοις νομίξειν, άκολουθείν δέ οποί αν ή^ώνται και σύμμαχοι είναι, και όμόσαντες ταύταις έμμενεϊν οϋτως άπήλθον οίκαδε. (Xen. Hell. 5.3.26) The Olynthians treated for peace. The Lacedaemonians agreed to lift the siege on the condition that the Olynthians would accept an offensive-defensive alliance with Sparta.5 Capitulation of the Cadmea in 379 ώς δβ έγνωσαν οί έν τη άκροπόλει όλίγοι οντες, τήν τε προθυμίαν τών προσιόντων απάντων έώρων, και τών κηρυγμάτων μεγάλων -γενομένων τοις πρώτοις άναβάσιν, έκ τούτων φοβηθέντες είναι οτι άπίοιεν äv, εί σφίσιν άσφάλειαν μετά τών οπλών άπιούσι δώοίεν. οι δέ ασμενοί τε εδοσαν α ητουν, και σπεισάμενοι και 'όρκους όμόσαντες έπί τούτοις έξέπεμπον. (Xen. Hell. 5.4.71) διόπερ ούτοι μέν ύπόσπονδοι καθ' όμολογίαν άφεθέντες εις τήν Χ\ελσπόννησον απηλλάγησαν . . . (Diod. 15.27.2) The Peloponnesians who were in occupation of the Cadmea were assailed by Theban patriots and decided to sue for terms. Diodorus states that the Lacedaemonians wanted to fight to the end (μέχρι θανάτου), but the rest, who were 4

Plut. Ages. 24.2; Diod. 15.19.3; Isocr. Paneg. 126; Meyer, GdA 5.291. Diod. 15.23.3; Bengtson, No. 253; Meyer, GdA 5.299-300; F. Geyer, Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps 1 (Munich and Berlin, 1930) 120-121; Mabel Gude, A History of Olynthus (Baltimore, 1933) 29; F. Hampl, Hermes 70 (1935) 179; Martin, La vie intern. 388. 5

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more numerous, declared themselves ready to surrender the Cadmea, and thus the Lacedaemonians yielded. The only term set was safe conduct. The Thebans agreed.6 Capitulation of Plataea in 373 παραγενόμενοι δέ πλησίον της τών ΧΥΚαταιέων πόλεως, άπροσδοκήτου της έπιϋέσεως γενομένης, οί πλείστοι μέν των Πλαταιεωΐ1 έπί της χώρας καταληφϋέντες ύπό των ιππέων συι>ηρπάγησαν, οι δέ λοιποί καταψυγόντες εις την πόλιρ, και συμμάχων οντες έρημοι, συνηνα-γκάσδησαν ομολογίας σννϋέσ&αι τοίς πολεμίοις εύαρέστους. εδει γαρ αύτούς τά· έπιπλα λαβόντας άπελϋείν έκ της πόλεως και μηκέτι της Βοιωτίας έπ άποκομισθήσονται πάντες εις την Ελλάδα μεθ' ών'άν έξενέγκωσι, παρέδωκαν τό φρουρών. (Diod. 16.49.2) The agreement is made between Greeks. When the Persian Bagoas and his soldiers deprived the Greeks of their possessions in violation of the agreement, Lacrates turned against Bagoas (Diod. 16.49.4-6). Lacrates was the commander 10 Athen. Deipn. 560B; G. L. Cawkwell, REG 73 (1960) 416-438; H. W. Parke, Greek Mercenary Soldiers (Oxford, 1933) 135 n. 4; F. Schober, RE 20 (1941) 489; F. R. Wust, Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland (Munich, 1938) 12-17; Bengtson, No. 330. During the Sacred War, the Boeotians executed several enemy mercenaries on the ground that they had lent their services to the Phocian "temple-robbers" (ιερόσυλων, Diod. 16. 31.1). The opposite side meted out the same punishment to their prisoners, and the Boeotians put an end to executions for religious reasons. Later on (346/45) the Eleans executed their mercenary prisoners (they were mercenaries that had earlier served in the Sacred War) because of the outrage they had committed against the oracle of Delphi (Diod. 16.63.5); Pierre Ducrey, in J. P. Vernant, Problems de la guerre 234. For a similar case Diod. 16.35.6.

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of the Boeotian contingents on the Persian side. Bagoas complained to the Persian King about Lacrates' conduct, but the Persian King upheld Lacrates. 11 The Peloponnesian War released forces which changed the political and moral fabric of the Greek world and profoundly altered the character of the city states. Greek individualism became intensified, and several extraordinary personalities sought now to identify themselves with the state or tried to dominate it. The confines of the city-states became too restrictive for some, and ambitious and adventurous men sought adventure and fortune by hiring out their services to Greek city states or foreign potentates as mercenary soldiers. Very often, the generals of the city-states ceased to be the elected officials who managed civic and military duties as before; they became more and more specialized in a given field, including the field of the military affairs. Thus, the fourth century became the transition between the era of the city-state and the advent of the large territorial states of the diadochoi. It was also a time when return to peace and autonomy became the desideratum of the decaying city-state world, but remained a dream on account of the constant petty fighting. Yet, in spite of these dynamic changes and the afflictions that war imposed upon the Greeks, many traditions continued to be maintained. One of them was the tradition of capitulation practices. Of the eleven (possibly twelve) capitulation treaties in the period between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the end of Philip's reign eight (perhaps nine) present the moderate character of the Pentecontaetia. 12 In Mantinea the Lacedaemonians accepted the capitulation of the Mantineans, although it was possible for them to take the city and dispose of the people in any way they desired. Instead, they allowed the people to remain in their territory on one condition, to which the Mantineans agreed in advance, that they break up their federation. In addition, through the intercession of the exiled King Pausanias, King Agesipolis agreed to offer safety to the pro-Argive and the democratic leaders of the Mantineans who would otherwise have been massacred by their political opponents. In the same fashion, Agesilaus agreed to the capitulation of the Phliasians. He was disposed to deal with them severely since he felt personally insulted by their conduct but did not. He allowed the Phliasians themselves to mete out judgment to the guilty and to organize the policy under which they wished to be governed. In the same spirit, the Lacedaemonians received the capitulation " Bengtson, No. 334; U. Kahrstetd, RE 12 (1924) 529; F. K. Kienitz, Die Politische Ge-

schichte Aegyptens vom 7. bis zum 4. Jh. v.d.Ztw. (1953) 106. 12 The action of the Cebrenians in 399 B.C. may be taken as a capitulation: oi S' ävaneräσαΐτες ίδέξαιno, καταστήσας 6e [Δερκυλλίδας] και Ενταύθα, φρουρούς βύθύς fiel eirt την Σκήψιν και την Γβργιβα. Xen. Hell. 3.1.19. Dercyllidas besieged the city of the Cebrenians in the Troad, an ally of the Persians. The people opened their gates and admitted him into the city, Diod. 14.38.3; Isocr. Paneg. 144; Meyer, GdA 5 . 1 8 7 - 8 8 .

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of the Olynthians, with the provision that the latter must sign a defensive and offensive alliance with the Lacedaemonians. An exception to this leniency is the treaty with Heraeum. The circumstances behind this case are not certain, but we see that there was a massacre committed by the people of Heraeum, and this may help explain the uncharacteristic attitude of Agesilaus. In the three instances wherein the Thebans granted terms to their beleaguered opponents the terms were in accordance with past practices, although the Thebans were not always noted for their leniency. In two of the cases they were led by the noble Pelopidas, who was probably instrumental in drawing up the agreements. In the first instance, the foreign garrison on the Cadmea asked for safe conduct to depart from Thebes, and the Theban liberators gladly granted them their request. It is possible, of course, that the alternative, a fight to the finish, was something the Thebans preferred to avoid at that time, but they must have weighed tha possibility when they undertook the enterprise. Nevertheless, our sources do not encourage us to believe that the primary motives of the Thebans were military and practical. In the second of the capitulations, Alexander of Pherae was utterly defeated and sued for peace. He was compelled to surrender his conquests but otherwise he was left to rule his own territory of Pherae, and like the Olynthians he had to accept a defensive alliance with the Boeotians. The nature of the third capitulation was very different from the other two. The Plataeans, caught by surprise, were forced to abandon their city (Pausanias 9.1. 7 - 8 ) within the day. Although the stipulations cited by Diodorus (15.46.5) allowed them greater latitude, it is possible that Pausanias' version is the more accurate of the two. The hatred that existed between the two cities impelled the Thebans to be less generous to the Plataeans than they had been to others. The proximity of Plataea to Thebes may have added strategic considerations to this inveterate hatred, (although the strategic reasons may be less obvious or pervading). Philip of Macedon was notorious for his pragmatic political methods and his expert use of the carrot and the stick approach in foreign affairs. His political methods are borne out by the two capitulation treaties he conceded. The Macedonian Methone capitulated after a stubborn and protracted siege in which Philip lost an eye. The people were compelled to abandon their city with only the clothes on their back. Then, Philip proceeded to level the city and distribute the territory to Macedonians. Unfortunately, we are not told whether the persistence of Methone had much to do with its harsh treatment. In all probability, however, military and political considerations were behind this harsh treatment. Obviously, Philip aimed at unifying Macedonia, and the expulsion of the Methonaeans together with the stimultaneous settlement of Macedonians in the land of Methone was part of his plan. 84

The second capitulation could be an example of Philip's carrot approach. Phalaecus and his mercenaries were allowed, after a stubborn fight, to depart whither they wished. Without Phalaecus' soldiers, the Phocians realized that they could not withstand Philip and gave in. The fate of the Phocians was left by Philip to be determined by the Amphictyonic Council, since their offense against the Delphic temple involved sacrilege. Unfortunately, the Thebans were the ones who carried out the sentence. Once the more „barbarous" proposals had been rejected, the Phocians were dispersed into villages of fifty houses each, with at least two hundred yards interval between them. On top of that, they were compelled to repay the money they had taken from the temple and could not bear arms or own horses until complete restitution had been made. The fugitives of this sacrilegious people were to be liable to seizure in any country. The Phocians lost their votes in the Amphictyonic Council which votes were now assigned to Philip. Because the Phocians had been guilty of sacrilege by robbing the temple, the Phocians could have been treated much more harshly. Cirrha, in an earlier and more pious age, was annihilated. The Phocians escaped with a light sentence, and despite Demosthenes' grim picture of the desolation visited upon Phocis, their ability to begin payments of the temple within three years and the uninterrupted character of these payments show that their lot might not have been as desperate as Demosthenes painted it. 13 The last in this series of agreements was contracted on foreign soil but between the Greeks. It bears all the features of a gentlemen's agreement. When the Persian commander committed a violation against it, the Greek party to the agreement chastized him. The chastizement was sustained by the Persian King who realized that a bargain was a bargain, and if he hoped to retain the good faith of his Greek mercenary troops, he had to uphold the agreement.

Capitulations

and Greek

Conventions

So far the discussion of the capitulation treaties had postulated the existence of an unformulated tradition that discouraged the maltreatment or slaying of defeated enemies, although there have been occasions when maltreatment and death have been visited upon a defeated population. It would be interesting to examine the treaties more closely in order to establish what conventions have been associated with them and to what degree the leniency exercised by the victor was due to strategic and politico-economic considerations or to respect for traditional mores. 13

CAH 6, 241.

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Mercy The existence of the tacit rule requiring leniency for the vanquished is made obvious by the frequent decision of the vanquished to deliver themselves into the hands of their opponent before their city was captured by storm. Thus we see that the men of Oeniadae, fearing that they would be destroyed while their wives and children would be sold into slavery (if the city fell in the hands of the enemy), capitulated (Paus. 4.25.2). Equally, the Orchomenians did not trust the strength of their ally, and being apprehensive of the great number of their enemy's army, capitulated before the city was captured (Thuc. 5.61.5). The Cytherians were possessed by similar fears when they decided to deliver their city to Pharnabazus.1 Similarly, the Thebans in Plataea surrendered with no request for a guarantee because they hoped that by surrendering they would be spared (Thuc. 2.4.7). The Spartans, also, on the island of Sphacteria asked no conventional guarantee. Obviously, they deemed it improbable that the enemy would put them to the sword on the field, for otherwise they would have fought to the end (Thuc. 4. 38.2). Though the Melians had been warned in advance of their fate if they decided not to take the advice of the Athenians to surrender, nevertheless, they must have hoped for mercy when they surrendered before the capture of the city. It goes without saying that the Mytilenaean demos capitulated to the Athenians hoping that they would be spared, and that if anyone was to be punished it would be someone from the oligarchic party. Otherwise, they would not have moved to deliver themselves to the mercy of the enemy. The measures taken by Paches in defense of the Mytilenaean oligarchs who sought the protection of tha altars tend to buttress the view that if Paches had his way, like other generals in the past, he would not have put so many, if any at all, of the Mytilenaeans to death. The notion is supported by the statement, ό δέ Πάχης γι>οϋς την μετάνοιαν των 'Αθηναίων έχάρη (Diod. 12.55.10). Aelian, long after the Mytilenaean incident, mistakenly believed that the Atheninas had executed Cleon's decree and felt sorry, for it exposed the Athenians to malicious but justified criticism (Aelian V.H. 2.9). The astonishment of the Mytilenaeans must have been immense when they heard the unprecedented decree. But the Mytilenaeans were not the only ones to be shocked by the decision. The Athenians were not inured to such actions and before the day went by they changed their mind, bothered by the contradiction to Greek and Athenians practices. (Schol. Thuc. 3.38.4). When the Athenians violated the autonomy of the first ally, Thucydides marked the event with a criticism of Athenian policies and so did his scholiast (Thuc. 1.98.1). ' The Cytherians in the city were afraid of the worst (Xen. Hell. 4.8.8).

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In their speech the Plataeans warned the Lacedaemonians that they did not surrender themselves to the Thebans but to the Spartans. They would have chosen to die, they added, rather than deliver themselves to the hated Thebans, when death would have been a foregone conclusion. The statement brings to mind the warning of Diodotus that the use of terror to discipline the allies was not only contrary to the ingrained traditions of the Greeks (Thuc. 3.47.3) but also contrary to the strategic interests of Athens. Thus, moderation was morally preferable as well as expedient because no enemy would henceforth yield, unless he hoped that he might be treated leniently (Thuc. 3.46.1). The Plataeans also reminded the Lacedaemonians of the importance of public opinion, which did not condone acts of extremism (Thuc. 3.57.1; 3.58.2). Again (Thuc. 3.57. 2) they cautioned the Spartans that their death δεινόν δόξει, where δόξβι represented the future reaction of the Greek world to the news of the Plataean destruction. It becomes clear that avoidance of extremism in the Pentecontaetia was not an accident but had roots in earlier Greek history. Outbursts of vindictiveness were due to prior history of animosity among certain people. They were not a frequent occurrence until the coming of the Peloponnesian War. What has been said so far demonstrates the existence of moderation as a traditional convention connected with capitulations. It could be said, however, that while moral considerations in the exercise of foreign affairs were important, they were not important enough to guide the conduct of foreign relations, and that the nature of the penalty was dictated by political and strategic circumstances. Only when conventional morality coincided with strategic requirements was it allowed to prevail. Precedence was given to strategic exigencies, but the coincidence of strategy and conventional morality produced the pseudo-impression that conventional morality played an inordinate role. There are, indeed, problems with our sources since they do not always distinguish between military, economic, and moral considerations in the application of foreign policy. Thucydides does not allow himself to make moral commentaries on the events he describes. Polybius, however, is much more detailed. He tells us that the Greeks did not subscribe to the eye for an eye philosophy, though they all too frequently practiced it impelled by the emotions of the moment. Ideally, however, destruction should serve the overall politico-military purposes. It was justified only when the adversaries were to be rendered weaker or if one's resources were to be strengthened (Polyb. 5.11.5). The question apropos our discussion is to what degree moderation was a principle or to what extent it was simply an expedient that served the military objectives of the combatants. Since our sources do not spell out the problem expressly and Polybius is a much later source, it would be necessary to use a few test cases from the aforesaid treaties to ascertain whether moderation was ingrained in tradition. 87

In the capitulation of Carystus, we hear of no punitive measures, although Carystus was near Attica, and a settlement of Athenian cleruchs could have been justified for strategic reasons. Naxos suffered the loss of its autonomy, but no cleruchs are reported there until later. Even the deprivation of Naxos' autonomy was not part of a well-thought-out plan in Athenian dealings with the allies. It occurred erratically as occasion offered, though Athens would doubtless take advantage of "treasonable" designs and secessions to deprive states of their autonomy. 2 In their 4 4 7 - 4 6 campaign in Euboea, the Athenians negotiated a treaty with Chalcis and Eretria but refused to treat with Hestiaea except on terms of unconditional surrender. This was due to the killing of the Athenian crew and not to any particular military reason. Similar reasons operated in the treatment of Aegina. In 457 and 431 the Aeginetans were not killed but when they were later seized in Thyrea they were put to the sword. No discernable purpose was served by their death. On the contrary, their survival would have strengthened Athenian bargaining power at some point in the future. Thucydides, to his credit, does not fail to allude to the futility of this act. The proximity of Samos to Persia and the protracted siege engendered much anxiety in Athens. Yet no άνδραποδωμός or death is recorded. The Samian territories on Asia Minor and the island of Amorgus were taken away from Samos, but these measures could be interpreted as politically and military necessary since they weakened Samos. The imposition of an indemnity was equally intended to strengthen the drained Athenian treasury. Otherwise, the mild settlement in Samos is interesting in view of the fact that the Samian rebellion was the second in the interval of a short time. Perhaps Athens' patience paid its dividens at the end since Samos remained faithful t o its alliance to the very end. The same is true in regard to Potidaea, the stiffer sanctions notwithstanding. The war and the absence of Pericles were reasons conducive to the stiff penalties. Yet if the expulsion of the population could be justified from the economic standpoint, the military benefits of the settlement were doubtful. The displaced Potidaeans were bound to remain inveterate enemies of the Athenians, more so now than before since they had lost everything and stood to lose nothing else. 3 Many could go to Corinth or to Perdiccas and from there continue to fight the Athenians. True, the Athenian demos disagreed with the terms their generals had granted, but there is no evidence to suggest that the disagreement was due to strategic motivations. It was probably related to the prevailing feelings of anger and the importunateness of Cleon. The fate of Mytilene presents similar problems. The delivery of the ships and the razing of the walls are strategically comprehensible. The death of all males 2 3

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Gomme, HCT 1.283. Thuc. 2.70.4; Kiechle, Historia 133 n. 2; 138.

and the sale of women and children would have been a calculated act of terror designed to serve as future deterrent. Yet the progressively stringent penalties since the time of Carystus and Naxos had not deterred the allies from conspiring to revolt, nor is it certain that death would have succeeded where milder measures had failed. Regardless of the purported value of terror, however, the revised decision of the ecclesia had no military motives. It stemmed from the concern of the Athenians over the cruelty of their act. Moreover, it is doubtful that the death of the people supposedly responsible for the insurrection accomplished any practical results, except satisfying the thirst for revenge, which was natural in the circumstances. If, on the other hand, the cleruchies in Mytilene could be considered justified from the economic and military standpoint, their military value lost its importance when the cleruchs decided to become absentee landlords. Finally, the death of Salaethus makes no sense. It accomplished nothing. On the contrary, had Salaethus been preserved, he might have been able to save the Athenians and Plataeans. The argument of Diodotus and his emphasis upon expediency may refute the notion of traditional humanitarian motives. But Diodotus was not consistently in favor of expediency. His theory that killing the Mytilenaeans may be repulsive because it was an injustice to kill one's own benefactor compromises the expediency argument and supports the suspicion that economic reasons might not have been the overriding concern, but that this strategy was intended to avert the Athenians from the "monstrous" act. Needless to say, the return of the Athenian generals to the moderate principles in the cases of Cythera, Nisaea, and Corcyra as well as the cold-blooded murder in Melos and Scione do not indicate a clearcut policy whereby leniency and murder become militarily explainable. The same pattern emerges in the case of the Lacedaemonians. From the little evidence that we have, we can safely infer that the Lacedaemonians could have achieved total victory in Ithome. Naturally, the capitulation speeded the end of the conflict, and this might have been the reason for the free departure of the helots. But was it? Our sources intimate that the reasons were moral. Furthermore, the Lacedaemonians were fully cognizant that if they let the rebels go, the rebels would become pawns in the hands of Sparta's enemies. Yet, they let them go. The decision of the oracle is of equal interest. What were the motives of Delphi in the formulation of such an unambiguous response to the Spartan question? We cannot know what was in the mind of the cunning priests at Delphi, but we cannot exclude the possibility that the decision was formulated with the δίκαια τών 'Ελλήνων in mind and the feelings of the Greek public toward the helots. The outcome of the Plataean siege is a classic example of revengefulness. The proximity of Plataea to Thebes may explain the expulsion of the population, but the execution of the Plataeans and more so of the Athenians was senseless. It 89

ran counter to the political and military interests of Sparta, for the prisoners could have been kept for a later exchange. Conversely, from the standpoint of momentary considerations the mildness of the Spartans after the defeat of the Athenians did not benefit the Spartans much. The Spartans had a legitimate excuse in 405, along with the encouragement of their allies and former Athenian allies, to execute or sell the Athenians into slavery. From the standpoint of the Greek traditions, however, the act would have been morally censurable, and the Spartans realized it when they rejected the importunings of their allies. When Alcidas in 427 murdered the captives he had seized on the high seas, the exiles at Anaea reminded him that that was not the way for an alleged liberator to comport himself. What Alcidas was doing, in other words, was contrary to Greek logic, and the expectations of the Greeks. An analysis of the fifth and fourth century capitulation treaties does not indicate that moderation was consciously employed as an instrument of national policy, unless again we equate interstate affairs with the traditional assumption of leniency. The obvious instances in which moderation was used deliberately as a political instrument were Acanthus and Amphipolis. It is not known what the policy of Brasidas would have been had the people rejected his blandishments, but this does not minimize the importance of conventional morality, nor does it make it subordinate to practicality. Admittedly, it is difficult on the occasion of Brasidas to determine to what extent conventional morality affected practicality, but the sensational successes of Brasidas and the propensity of the Greeks to his moderate approach speak strongly in favor of the convention. The Athenian defeat in Syracuse is a case in point. The merciless treatment of the allied and Athenian captives was the product of understandable hate. On the other hand, the Syracusans had a splendid opportunity to enrich themselves from the human loot they had collected had they wished to capitalize from it. Humanitarianism could have been blended with economic interest but was not. Nor is it certain that the Syracusans believed that the Athenians would return, if kindly treated and released for ransom. Stated briefly, no uniform pattern emerges from the sketchy analysis so far. There does not seem to have existed a calculated policy of moderation as an instrument of interstate diplomacy. On a practical level, there was no clear-cut policy of sanctions toward the defeated enemy. A great deal depended upon the idiosyncrasies of the military commanders or the momentary whims of the people. Yet in the pre-war era and even during the war the majority of the military leaders were fairly gentle toward the vanquished. This policy had no other discernible origins than past practices. When extreme punishment was inflicted, it yielded no visible dividends. On the contrary, as a policy it was usually unwise and detrimental to the interests of the states that applied it.

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CHAPTER 4

Common Assumptions Alliance One of the reasons for the disputes between Athens and her allies was the nature of the alliance. The argument over the character of the alliance is implicit. The Athenians obviously believed the alliance to be permanent; the allies did not. The attitude of the Greek to alliances was not dissimilar to ours, except perhaps, that they occasionally tended to use formulas that lent themselves to misunderstandings. One type of alliance in the Greek world was the "eternal" alliance. Early Greek documents contain references to the perpetuity of alliances.1 Since these alliances speak of friendship, there is no doubt that they sprang from the nature of personal relations that characterized the aristocratic world where personal and family friendships were contracted forever. The notion of perpetuity was continued in the post-archaic world, but the complex web of intra-city and inter-city interests conflicted with this archaic concept. Pharnabazus, for instance, complained to Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 4.1.32.34) that the Lacedaemonians devastated his territory, although he had helped them against Athens and never wavered from his alliance with them as Tissaphernes had (Hell. 3.1.6-9; 3.2.14-20; 3.4.1-24). He wanted to know if this conduct was just and was willing to listen to what the Lacedaemonians considered just. The Spartans were embarrassed, and Agesilaus tried to justify this apparent ingratitude by pointing out the conflict between friendship and national interest. In the case of war, he argued, national interest superseded friendship. The answer was evidently inadequate, for otherwise the Spartans would not have hung their heads in shame. Not much later (in 386) Agesilaus was asked to lead the campaign against Mantinea. He asked to be excused on the grounds that the city of Mantinea had rendered his father many services. (Xen. Hell. 5.2.2-6). 1 Heraea-Elis mention one hundred years which is considered equivalent to perpetuity, M/L, No. 17; Buck, No. 62; Syll. 1'9; Bengtson, No. 110; Phillipson, Intern. Law 5 4 - 5 5 ; L. I. Highby, The Erythrae Decree, Klio-Beiheft 36 (1936) 6 3 - 6 4 ; V. Ehrenbeig, JHS 57 (1937) 151. The treaty between Sybaris-Serdaeoi speaks of heiBiov (for ever) χρόνου, M/L, No. 10; Bengtson, No. 120. In 418 the Argives accepted the συμβατηρίους λόγους of the Lacedaemonians and renounced their one-hundred years alliance with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, even though there was no provision for that in the treaty.

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In the personal bonds there were certain informal assumptions the violations of any of which by either party dissolved that special relationship. By the same token, state alliances relied on certain tacit presuppositions to cement their agreements. Once again, however, the complexities of life in the fifth century made the maintenance of these relations difficult, and states found reasons, real or imaginary (both were real to them) to renounce the alliances, if they considered them violated by the other party. Athens used the "treasonable" activities of her allies to reduce them to subjection. The same charges were hurled against the Lacedaemonians and others by purported friends and allies. The Delian League was supposed to be permanent, or at least of indefinite duration. The ceremony of sinking the ingots in the sea proves that the League was intended to be permanent. This implied that the members did not have the right to withdraw at their pleasure.2 Similarly, Thuc. 8.18 refers to an alliance that had no time limit and was therefore eternal. In the fourth century permanent alliances were very frequent. Athens signed several permanent alliances (the formula was aei χρόνον or άπαντα χρόνον) with Thebes,3 Locris,4 Chios,5 Byzantium,6 Dionysius I, 7 Ceos,8 (though the äei χρόνον is missing from the text), Arcadia, Achaea, Phlius,9 Thessaly.10 The decree of Aristotles that reorganized the Second Athenian Alliance ( 3 7 8 - 7 7 ) implied that the alliance was eternal.11 The constant warfare of the fourth century and 2 Aristl. Ath. Pol. 23.5; Plut. Amt. 25; Hdt. 9.106.4; 1.165.3; Callim. frg. 388.9 (ed. Pfeiffer). Tod 2.14-15 claimed that there is no evidence of a military alliance specifically designed to last forever before the fourth cent., but M/L No. 10 points out that the alliance was meant to be eternal; see also M/L No. 63 and 64; Tod 1 2 No. 57/58; Aesch. Eumen. 291; 670; 763-64. The Athenian allies were not to blame for the difficulties which raged over the alliance; nor is Thucydides ascribing the total responsibility to them. Some of the complexities are denoted by Plut. Arist. 25.1. Plut. notes the casting of the ingots into the sea, but he adds that when the circumstances compelled Athens to a more strenuous policy (whatever that might be) Aristeides bade the Athenians to pressure the allies and lay the blame on him. This policy of expediency contravened Aristeides' reputation for justice, and Theophrastus stressed the double standard between Aristeides' private and public life. The passage (if correct) alludes that Athens should bear the brunt for the complaints of the allies. 3 Bengtson, No. 223; I.G. II/III 2 14; Tod 2, No. 101; E. Schweigert, Hesperia 8 (1939) 1 -

10. 4

Tod 2. No. 102; I.G. II/III 2 15. Bengtson, No. 248; Tod 2. No. 118; I.G. II/III 3 34; Syll. 1 3 173. 6 Bengtson, No. 256; I.G. II/III 2 41; Syll. 1 3 146; Tod 2. No. 121. 7 Bengtson, No. 280; I.G. II/III 3 105. 8 Bengtson, No. 289; Tod 2, No. 142; I.G. II/III 3 111; Syll. 1 3 173. 9 Bengtson, No. 290; Tod 2, No. 144. 10 Bengtson, No. 293; I.G. II/III 2 116; Syll. I 3 184; Tod 2.147. 11 Bengtson, No. 357; Tod 2, No. 123; I.G. II/III 2 43; Syll. I 3 147. 5

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the city-state degeneracy that set in since the Peloponnesian War made it easier to dissolve alliances, notwithstanding their eternal character, without much ado. Almost all of the "eternal" alliances signed by Athens between the establishment of the Second Alliance and the Social War were broken. Treaties confirmed by the taking of oaths had an aura of sanctity about them and the Greeks did not wish to give the impression that they violated them. The Lacedaemonians hesitated to start the war with Athens though they were in agreement with their allies that the Thirty Years' Treaty had been broken by the activities of Athens (Thuc. 1.118.3). Concerned that they might give the impression that they had violated the treaty, the Lacedaemonians sought divine reinforcement. Delphi approved of their decision to go to war and promised help. But not even the divine approbation soothed Spartan moral scruples that they might be breaking their pledges. When later they were asked by the Syracusans for help (Thuc. 7.18.2—3), they were responsive to the pleas because they clearly regarded the Athenians as the first to break the treaty of Nicias. In the Archidamian phase of the war they felt that the transgression (παρανόμημά) was more on their side because the Thebans had attacked Plataea at time of trace (Thuc. 2.2.1), and that they themselves had refused to submit their differences to arbitration as the treaty prescribed (Thuc. 7.18.2). Consequently, they interpreted their misfortunes in the war, such as Pylos and any other that had befallen them, as right punishment for their treaty infraction. It was this feeling of guilt that made them overlook the Athenian violations of Nicias' treaty, regarding Epidamnus (Thuc. 6.105.1) Prasiae, and other places in the Peloponnese. When the Plataeans turned down Archidamus' proposals for the delivery of Plataea (Thuc. 2.74.3), Archidamus found it necessary to denounce the Plataeans and to invoke the gods and heroes as witnesses that he neither started the wrong against Plataea nor was now acting unjustly, if he took any measures for the reduction of Plataea. Actually this action of Archidamus was intended to justify the reduction of Plataea in the eyes of the gods and men in view of the pledges that Pausanias had given to Plataea in front of all the Greeks in 479 (Thuc. 2.71.2; Plut. Arist. 21.1-2). Since the Thebans were the first to have started the wrong-doing, Archidamus was trying to shift the responsibility now to the Plataeans (Thuc. 2.4.7). The Plataeans conveniently reminded the Lacedaemonians that it was they who had recommended to them earlier that they seek assistance from Athens (Thuc. 3.55.3). For the Plataeans now to have defected would have been treasonable (και προδοϋναι αύτούς ούκέτι ην καλόν). The Thebans did not contest that what the Plataeans said was correct (Thuc. 3.63.3). In the same vein, the Plataeans acknowledge that they could not have left their Spartan alliance because the 93

Spartans would have felt betrayed and would have punished them, and with good reason (Isocr. Plat. 12—14).12 The Plataeans had asked the Athenians, prior to their rejection of Archidamus' proposals, whether they should accept the proposals. Their attitude stemmed from the Greek notion that to abandon an ally without mutual consent or sufficient provocation was treasonable. The Athenians urged them not to break off their alliance (Thuc. 2.73.3). Thereupon, the Plataeans conferred among themselves and decided not to "betray" the Athenians (Thuc. 2.74.1), but to abide by the alliance. Similarly, the Corinthians before the war acknowledged the same principle. They did not consider it morally acceptable to leave the Peloponnesian alliance without reason (oiire γαρ όσια αν ποιοίμεν μεταβαλλόμενοι, Thuc. 1.71.6). In 428 the Mytilenaeans skipped the Athenian alliance and asked the Lacedaemonians for help. The Lacedaemonians suggested that they explain their grievances at Olympia before the assembled Greeks. Naturally, the suggestion had propagandists aims. The Spartans wanted to expose the Athenian oppression and certainly to justify their claim as the liberators of Greece. The Mytilenaeans, however, conformed with the suggestion because they wished to explain the reasons for their defections. They admitted that to abandon one's ally was a treacherous act, and said that they had come forward to explain their compelling reasons, so that they would not be considered by the other Greeks (δόξομεν) as deserters (Thuc. 3.9.1—2). Their justifications for leaving the alliance were (1) that the mutual confidence that ought to have existed between the allies had ceased to be there; (2) that the requirement of equality among the allies had vanished; and (3) that the original purpose about liberating the Greeks from Persia had been replaced by the subjection of the Greeks (Thuc. 3.10.2-6; 3.11.1-2; 3.13.1; 3.13.7; 2.8.2). Finally, Cleon attacked the Mytilenaeans for the same reason: the abandonment of an ally in an hour of need, despite the fact that the Mytilenaeans had not been subjected like the other allies (Thuc. 3.39.1-2). The allies (especially the leaders) were obligated to proffer assistance to one another. Failure to do so was grounds for an ally to desert the alliance (Thuc. 2.7.4-6). In such a case, the guilty party would be the ally that had failed to discharge his obligation and not the party that, left unsupported, joined others. Philip II considered it incumbent upon himself to help his allies when they needed his assistance; otherwise, he would have been regarded utterly contemptible (Dem. Philip's Letter 11). 12 Epameinondas charged the Arcadians foi abandoning the Theban alliance and making a separate treaty with the Mantineans (Xen. Hell. 7.4.40). For similar cases see Hell. 7.4.69; 7.4.10; 7.3.8\Anab. 1.9.7-10; 2.7.

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A leader had the obligation to respect the other allies and not to apply force against them. Isocrates urged the Athenians to make peace in order to finish the Social War, and to allow those allies who wanted to drop out to do so. He was confident, however, that if the Athenians followed the principle of voluntarism, the Greeks would welcome the Athenians as leaders and would not abandon them in the hour of peril (reference to allies who seceeded from the Delian League, Isocr. On the Peace 21; 30—31; Panath. 67.69; Paneg. 73; Thuc. 1.95-96; 3.10.2-6; 3.11.1-2; 3.13.7; 2.8.2). 13 The Athenians were not the only ones who had violated this principle; the Spartans had done the same. Inclined more to force after the Peloponnesian War, they did not hesitate to push their allies around. They even attacked the King who had furnished them with money to prosecute the war (Andoc. On the Peace 29); the Chians who supported them with their fleet; and the Thebans who were their staunchest allies against Athens (Thuc. 4.93; Xen. Hell. 5.25; Isocr. Panath. 104; Paneg. 1 4 5 - 4 9 ; Philip 90; Diod. 13.65). A moral duty of an ally was not to accept third parties whose intention was to hurt a member of the alliance. The Corinthians cautioned the Athenians that it would not be right to accept the Corcyraeans into their alliance. The treaty allowed each side to enroll neutrals in their alliance, but the provision was not intended for those who applied with the intention of injuring others, but for those who wanted to join for their own protection. He who accepted the new ally should not do so for the purpose of bringing war instead of peace. Otherwise, this would be a violation of the spirit, if not the letter of the alliance (Thuc. 1.40.2—3). On the same pretext, the Corinthians refused to accept a treaty with Athens (Thuc. 5.30.3) because they could not give up their allies in Thrace to whom they had been bound by pledges in the name of the gods. After the conclusion of the peace of Nicias, the Corinthians were angry at the Lacedaemonians for failing to consult the Corinthians about the treaty. Thereupon, the Corinthians left the Spartan alliance and allied with the Argives (Thuc. 5.27.2). In Pylos, Brasidas spoke to the allies of Sparta and reminded them of Sparta's benefactions in return for which they should help Sparta (Thuc. 4.11. 4). Dercyllidas asked the people of Abydus to show their loyalty to Sparta at a critical time because crisis was the test that proved an ally's steadfastness (Xen. Hell. 4.8.4). Similarly, Xenophon praised the steadfastness of the Phliasians 13

The Greeks blamed the Athenians because the latter had subjected other Greeks to slavery and maltreated those who had distinguished themselves in the Persian Wars, namely the Aeginetans and Potidaeans (Aristl. Rhet. 1396a). Polyb. 2.61.9-10 told the story of the Megalopolitans (c. 222 B.C.) who preferred to lose their land, their temples, their homes, than the trust of their Achaean allies. See also Polyb. 2.5.2-7; Plut. Phil. 5; Paus. 8.27.1516; Plut. Cleom. 251.

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{Hell. 7.2.1-2), who, harassed by the Argives and Corinthians and suffering from lack of food supplies, rejected the proposal for an alliance with them. Xenophon was impressed by their faithfulness, which he found all the more commendable at a time when the Lacedaemonians had lost their power subsequent to Leuctra. The treaty contracted by the Lacedaemonians and Persians in the later part of the Peloponnesian War had incorporated the provision that neither of the partners should make a peace without the other's consent, something which would have been a desertion of an ally, unjustifiable by Greek conventions (Thuc. 8. 18.2—3; 8.37.4). Thucydides scorned the Peloponnesians for betraying their allies, when the Peloponnesians, pretending that they were gathering vegetables and firewood, stole away and abandoned their allies to the wrath of the Athenians (Thuc. 3.109.2). Isocrates criticized the conduct of the Persian officers who were trained to be faithless to their friends (Paneg. 152-154), while Xenophon cites the example of Jason who, having asked Polydamas to ally his city to Jason (Hell. 6.1.13), received the answer that he was an ally of the Lacedaemonians and that to secede from the alliance and cross over to the enemy of the Lacedaemonians without any reason would be unlawful. Instead of getting angry, Jason was pleased with this display of honesty and devotion and decided to compromise with Polydamas. Furthermore, allies who had been forced into an alliance should not be held responsible for it. The Plataeans maintained that the Thebans should not harbor a grudge against them for their alliance with Sparta because they had been forcibly enrolled into the alliance. If the Plataeans had left the alliance during peace, the Lacedaemonians would have felt betrayed and would have punished the Plataeans (Isocr. Plat. 12-14). The period preceding the Persian Wars has been described as an age of cosmopolitanism. The Greeks traveled throughout the Mediterranean world and had contacts freely with non-Greeks. Many had visited Lydia and had contracted long-lasting friendships. The Lydians reciprocated with their philhellenism, particularly in the time of Croesus. Homer treated the Trojans as if they were just another group of Greeks. Herodotus saw nothing unusual in the close association of foreign and Greek institutions and did not blush to record his conclusion that many of the Greek concepts had Near-Eastern antecedents, since lands like Egypt had an earlier civilization (Hdt. 2. and 3). In this setting, family friendships often superseded "state" interests. Thus, we observe Diomedes suggesting to Hippolochus that they avoid one another in battle owing to the friendship that bound their houses (II. 6.226). With the progressive consolidation of the Greek city-states and the coming of the Persian Wars the attitude of the Greeks began to change. Those who sided with the Persians, for example, during wars were looked upon as traitors to 96

the Greek cause. The Plataeans in 427 did not fail to point out that the Thebans fought on on the side of the Persians whereas the Plataeans had defended the Greeks. The Thebans did not deny it. They simply ascribed the responsibility for that to the oligarchic group that ruled the city at the time of the Persian Wars (Thuc. 3.62.4; Plut. Arist. 18.6). 14 Obviously, the Theban explanation was not universally accepted since Polybius and others continued to be critical of their desertion to the Persian side (Polyb. 4.31.4-8; Arrian. Anab. 1.9.6-7). Allies of Athens might still align themselves with Persia to evade the claws of Athenian imperialism (Samos, Thuc. 1.115.4-5; 116.3); nevertheless, the Persians were viewed as enemies, and cooperation with them, unless under duress, was reprehensible. The Peloponnesian War is interesting in the sense that it brought out the paradox of major Greek powers allying themselves with their former enemies. In 432 Archidamus alluded to the possibility of a Persian alliance and justified it on the basis of Athens' injustices. Yet, earlier, during the Athenian campaign in Egypt, Persian diplomacy sought to bribe the Peloponnesians into action against Athens, but Sparta turned the offer down. 15 Beyond the military considerations that might have impelled Sparta not to accept the offer, it would have seemed improper for Sparta to ally herself with Persia, while Athens was still fighting the Persians, the Spartan-Athenian differences notwithstanding. In the Peloponnesian War, however, the advice of Archidamus was heeded. In the latter phase of the war, the Peloponnesians were subsidized by the Persians. This policy eventually drew the fire of many Greeks, especially the Athenians, who considered it unpatriotic and hypocritical for the "liberators" of Greece to play this double role. The most vocal spokesman against this policy was Isocrates. He missed no opportunity to remind the Athenians, and through them the rest of the Greeks, that the Athenians had rejected the Persian proposals in 480 and with them the signal honors the Persian King had offered them (Hdt. 7.185). Isocrates asserted that it would have been excusable for a small state to seek security by every means, but that the Athenians thought it unbecoming for those who claimed the leadership of Greece to avoid the perils of war. It would have been preferable to die nobly rather than live in disgrace (Isocr. Paneg. 9 4 - 9 5 ) . 14

The Thebans played a double game with their stand during the Persian Wars. Rising to the hegemony of Greece in the fourth century, they solicited Persian help on the argument that they were the only Greeks who had fought with the King at Plataea; that they had never undertaken a campaign against him; and that they had declined to participate in Agesilaus' campaign against the King (Xen. Hell. 7.1.34; 3.5.5; 3 . 4 . 3 - 4 ) . Plut. Arist. 18.6 takes the same line with the Thebans (Thuc. 3.62.4) to excuse the Theban medism in the Persian Wars. 15 Thuc. 1 . 1 0 9 . 1 - 2 ; Diod. 11.74.6 on the other side alludes that the bribes were accepted but no invasion of Attica followed, Hdt. 3.160.2; CAH 5.78; Gomme, HCT 1, 321. Diod. 1 1 . 3 . 1 - 2 denounced those Greeks who sided with Persia in 480 B.C.

97 7 Karavites (Hyp. 71)

The attitude of the Athenians is contrasted to the action of the Spartans in order to expose Sparta's hypocrisy. Isocrates accused the Spartans of entering the Peloponnesian War with the avowed intention of freeing the Greeks (Thuc. 4.85) from the Athenian yoke, but at the end they delivered so many of them into bondage. They induced the Ionians to revolt from Athens, and they betrayed them to the barbarians (Isocr. Paneg. 126—28; Xen. Hell. 5.1.31), the same barbarians the Athenians had chased out of Europe (Isocr. Paneg. 117123; 128; Areop. 80, Panath. 59-61; Dem. Peri Parapr. 273; Lyc. Against Leocr. 73; Dem. Fun Orat. 54—57). Isocrates spoke of an ingrained Athenian hostility against the Persians, so much so that the Athenians studied zealously the stories of the Trojan War to learn through them their enemy's misfortunes. In this sense, the treaty of Antalcidas was anathema to many Greeks because it delivered many Greeks to the Persians. Isocrates called it a diktat not a treaty among equals {Paneg. 176). The insidiousness of the treaty was that it produced confusion among the Greeks. Some of them were misled into believing that they had acquired their freedom and autonomy throught the goodwill of the King, while others remained bitter against those Greeks who had delivered them into slavery. Consequently, Isocrates invited the Greeks to rise against the treaty and annul this shameful document (Isocr. Paneg. 157; 175-76; 177-78; 181-82; 183-84; To Philip. \26\Panath. 59-61; 102-3; 106; Dem. Against Aristocr. 140). The Spartans were not the only culprits in this respect. Archidamus, the young Spartan king, pointed out that the great states of Greece were not ashamed to fawn upon the wealth of the King. Indeed, Argos and Thebes joined forces with the Persian King in the conquest of Egypt {Paneg. 161), and the Athenians and Spartans sent ambassadors independently to the King, hoping that by winning his favor they would be regarded as paramount among the Greeks (Isocr. Panath. 159).16 Although Isocrates denounced war, he nevertheless believed that war was justifiable against the barbarians who were by nature the foes of the Greeks (Panath. 163). In spite of their alliance with the King, the Lacedaemonians were sensitive to the moral implications of their action and the criticism of the other Greeks. In the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartan Lichas reviewed the two previous agreements with the Persians (Thuc. 8.18.2; 8.37.2—4) and no16 Plat. Menex. 245A naturally glosses over this type of overture to Persia. Victories over the barbarians called for hymns, but victories over the Hellenes called for dirges, said Gorgias in his Epitaphios, quoted in Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 493. Isocr. may reflect Gorgias here. In Paneg. 158; Plat. Menex. 243B and 245C it is stated that sheer jealousy of Athens drove the Greeks to such a pitch of blindness as to solicit the aid of their deadliest foe (reference to Sparta's treaty with Tissaphernes in 412, Thuc. 8.18.2; 8. 3 7 . 2 - 4 ; 8.43.3).

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ticed that they were badly formulated. Their vagueness could allow the King to claim a much wider area than Ionia, including Thrace, Macedonia and Thessaly as far as Boeotia. Thus, these treaties instead of bringing freedom to the Greeks would have placed them under the Persian yoke with the blessing of Sparta. Accordingly, he urged that a better treaty be written (Thuc. 8.43.3—4). This spirit was perhaps best represented by Agesilaus in his Asia Minor campaign, and by Callicratidas. The latter deplored the toadying of the Greeks to the barbarians for the sake of money and promised to do his best to eliminate this humiliation once he returned home (Xen. Hell. 1.6.7). Finally, the young Archidamus ridiculed the claims of the Thebans to liberate the Messenians from Sparta at a time when they did not mind delivering the Asia Minor Greeks to the barbarians by the treaty of Pelopidas (Xen. Hell. 7.1.36.; Isocr. Arch. 26—27).

Starting

a War

It is an axiom that war was a frequent occurrence among the Greeks. Yet, starting a war was considered a serious matter that carried a moral opprobrium. War presupposed certain conventions, one of which was an obligation to declare war instead of making a surprise attack. In 435—34 the Corinthians decided to support the plea of the Epidamnians against the Corcyraeans. As soon as they and their allies had manned the ships destined for Epidamnus, they sent a herald in advance to declare war against the Corcyraeans. While the Corinthians were at sea, the Corcyraeans sent their own herald who met the Corinthian squadron at the sanctuary of Apollo at Anactorium (the meeting place is not perhaps accidental). He warned the Corinthians that their further advance would mean war, and that the responsibility for it would weigh on the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.39,1). This was mainly political maneuvering for the purpose of legal and moral justification in the eyes of the Greek world. Clearly, it was an attempt to show the world that the other side had fired the first shot and should be held accountable for starting the war. The same type of maneuvering took place between the Corinthians and Athenians in Corcyra in order to ascribe to the other party the blame for what would follow. The Corinthians sent a herald to the Athenians who announced: You commit an injustice, Athenians, by starting a war and breaking the treaty. If you intend to hinder us from sailing against Corcyra or anywhere else we may wish . . . first take us who are here and treat us as enemies. 99

The envoys carried no flag of truce because if they had done so they would have acknowledged that the peace between Athens and Corinth had already been broken. 1 The Athenians refused to fall into the trap, nor did they admit that they were responsible for starting the war: We do not begin the war, Peloponnesians, nor do we violate the treaty. We have come to aid the Corcyraeans who are our allies. If you then wish to sail anywhere else, we do not hinder you. Similarly, at the Spartan conference in 432, King Archidamus urgued the Lacedaemonians to exercise caution. This was important because Sparta was unprepared for the war, and, if she was forced to treat for peace, she might not be able to conclude an honorable peace. Consequently, her haste might create the image that she rather than Athens started the quarrel (αρξαι μάλλον της διαφοράς, Thuc. 1.81.5). Archidamus returned to the subject again and advised the Spartans to send envoys to Athens to discuss the differences, especially since Athens maintained to be ready to submit to arbitration (Thuc. 1.78.4). It would have not been lawful, Archidamus continued, to proceed against one who offered arbitration as though against a wrong-doer. (Thuc. 1.85.1-2). At the conclusion of the conference the Lacedaemonians were convinced that the Athenians were in the wrong. Yet, in spite of it, they hesitated to start the hostilities; instead, they sent to Delphi to inquire about the advisability of war. Although the Delphic answer was unambiguous, the Lacedaemonians still procrastinated. They summoned their allies again and posed the same question. The support of their allies notwithstanding, the Lacedaemonians shied away from immediate hostilities. They dilly-dallied in order to equip themselves with moral reasons and convey the impression that the Athenians had started the war. They dispatched ambassadors to ask the Athenians to drive the Cylonian curse out of Athens (Thuc. 1.126.1—2). The shaft was aimed at Pericles whose family was involved in this affair. 2 Pericles, of course, saw through the Spartan stratagem and counter-attacked with a similar piece of propaganda, the curse of the Brazen House (Thuc. 1.128.2; Paus. 2.17.2). The answer did not satisfy the Spartans, who decided now to march into Attica. But even at this moment, Archidamus dispatched Melesippus, the son of Dia1 Dem. On the Trierarchic Crown 13. Gomme, HCT 1, 190 and Hdt. 5.8 mention the case of the Aeginetans who started a war without sending a herald to announce it (πόλβμον Ακήρυκτου); Isocr. Evag. 28 praises Evagoras for not having ever been the aggressor. 2 Thuc. 1 . 1 2 6 . 1 0 - 1 2 ; Hdt. 5.71; Plut. Solon 12. Obviously this is a propaganda gimmick by the Spartans, E. Meyer, GdA 2 . 2 . 2 - 2 2 . It seams that the issues had become important pieces of propaganda because we see the story repeated earlier in a dispute between Sparta and Athens, Hdt. 5.70.

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critus, on a peace errand to Athens. It was a last-minute gesture intended to show that the Lacedaemonians exhausted all the avenues of peace before they launched their attack upon Athens. Only when the Athenians refused to accept Melesippus did Archidamus engage in an act of war by laying waste to the Athenian countryside. The same tactics are followed by Agesipolis in 385 towards Mantinea. Upon arrival Agesipolis asked the Mantineans to comply with the Spartan request. When they refused, he began to lay waste the countryside. In spite of it, the Mantineans persisted; whereupon he laid siege to the town (Xen. Hell. 5.2.3-6). Thucydides tells us that after the conclusion of the Peace of Nicias the Lacedaemonians chose to disregard the injustices they had suffered at the hands of the Athenians so that they would not have to start the war again. They finally yielded to the Corinthian and Syracusan entreaties for assistance when they were completely reassured that the Athenians had precipitated the war. Their long hesitation was due to the compunction they felt for having started the Peloponnesian War when they should have resorted to arbitration (Thuc. 7.18. 2). This time, however, they were satisfied that blame for the unlawful conduct (τό παρανόμημα) resided with the Athenians. Similarly, when Sphodrias attempted to capture Piraeus without a declaration of war or sufficient moral cause, the Athenians complained vehemently to the Lacedaemonian ambassadors who happened to be in Athens. The ambassadors assured them that they knew nothing about the plot and would see to it that Sphodrias was properly punished. The ephors brought charges against Sphodrias, but he refused to obey the summons, fearing death. Certain influential people, however, intervened and Sphodrias was acquitted. The case involved a double crime: unjustified attack and failure to appear before the court. Xenophon explicitly states that the decision of the court was considered unfair (εδοξεν ... (ώικώτατα ev Λακεδαίμονι ή δίκη κριθήναι, Xen. Hell. 5.4.23—24). In the Mytilenaean debate (in 427), Cleon had advocated harsh punishment for the Mytilenaeans because he considered them guilty on several counts, one of which was that they had started the wrong-doing. 3 Similarly, the Plataeans accused the Thebans of having started the hostilities in time of peace as well as during a holiday (a double crime, Thuc. 2.5.5; 3.56.2). 4 The Thebans did not 3

Thuc. 3.40.5: 'άλλως re καΐ προϋπάρξαντας άδικίας. The commencement of hostilities during a holiday posed a special problem. In 388 the Lacedaemonians campaigned against Argos. The Argives immediately shifted their calendar to claim a holy truce. The calendars of the Greek cities varied so much that shifting the dates of a religious festival to meet an emergency was not difficult or unusual (see Xen. Thuc. 5.5.4.3). Agesipolis was placed in a quandary. He betook himself to Olympia where he asked the god if his action constituted an impiety. The god answered that there was no impiety involved. Not satisfied with one answer, Agesipolis went to Delphi. Apollo agreed with his father (Xen. Hell. 4 . 7 . 2 - 4 ) . 4

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deny that starting a wai was a crime; they had simply tried to reyerse the charges by arguing that the Plataeans had invited them to come, implying that the guilt for the commencement of hostilities was to be ascribed to them. s Besides, the Plataeans had the obligation to try to persuade the Thebans that their action was wrong and ask them to leave before they engaged in hostilities. They did not, thereby resorting unjustifiably to violence.

Moral Causes of War Before the outbreak of a war, we often witness a flurry of diplomatic activities. Since war entailed destruction of unpredictable dimensions, the Greeks considered it essential to have the right on their side. This was done by a judicious selection of the casus belli and above all by some show of respect for the traditional rites in the declaration of war. The reasons for going to war could be quite legitimate; if not, arguments could be contrived to demonstrate the legitimacy of one's cause. No Greek wanted to give the appearance of being the aggressor. In the Platonic dialogue that bears his name, Alcibiades states that for any one determined to go to war the best thing to do was to invoke the defense of the gods and the interests of one's allies.Thus a large field of possibilities was opened for someone wishing to camouflage an act of aggression under honorable motives.1 Although causes might have frequently been contrived, the Greek states almost always believed in the justice of their wars, even for the wrong reasons. Belief in justice and the injustice of aggression for its own sake are best exemplified by Isocrates (Areop. 4). Isocrates considered the passion to dominate a disease which resulted sooner or later in disaster. For Isocrates, power begot folly and folly insolence. The result of insolence was ruin. This law operated more definitely in the history of states than in individuals, for an individual might offend and die before paying the penalty, but states lived on forever and could not escape the consequences of their folly (On the Peace 120; Plat. Rep. 545 B). In the case of Athens imperialism was at the root of her destruction. The fruits of Athenian imperialism were wars that led to her loss of power (On the Peace 29). Self-control and the disposition to live and let live, to cherish freedom for one's self and others was the saving virtue of states no less than of men in their 5

Thuc. 3.65.2: ol yap ayomec. παρανομοϋσι μάλλον των ϊπομένων. Υ. Garlan, War in the Ancient World (New York, 1975). Dem. For the Megalopolitans 24 tried to justify the shifting of the Athenians alliances as nothing more than a fight against injustice, and a desire to help the victims of injustice. Accordingly, the changes were due to the shifting of the circumstances, though the principle remained the same. He would have agreed with Xenophon that the root of all evil is the unwillingness to act justly under all circumstances (Hell. 3.2.23). 1

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relations to each other (On the Peace 119-121). The Athenians and Spartans of old, before they were overtaken by their lust for empire, practiced this virtue, and while they did they were the benefactors of Greece. They treated the Hellenes with respect and not with insolence, deeming it their right to take command in the field but not to tyrannize them. They desired to be addressed rather as leaders than as masters, to be greeted as saviors rather than to be reviled as destroyers. Consequently, they won the Hellenic cities to themselves by doing kindness instead of subverting them by force. They prided themselves less in the exercise of power than in living with self-control thinking it proper to feel toward the weaker as they expected the stronger to feel toward themselves. (Paneg. 8 0 - 8 1 ) This is an idealized picture that may not have measured too closely to the actual state of things, but it portrayed an ideal that the Greeks desired. But although the Greeks found more excuses to wage war with each other than live in peace, nevertheless they felt always compelled to justify their aggression. In their second speech at Sparta, the Corinthians attempted to persuade the slow-moving Spartans that they should go to war free of a sense of moral guilt because they would be defending two violated principles; ( 1 ) the infraction of the treaties (the Thirty Years' Treaty, Thuc. 1.123.2), and (2) the subjugation of the Greeks by the Athenians (Thuc. 1.124.3).2 On the occasion of the Corinthian-Corcyraean dispute, the Corinthians dismissed the proposals of the Corcyraeans and declared war against them (434) on the ground of justice and on account of the failure of the Corcyraeans to honor Corinth as their mother city (Thuc. 1.29.1; 1.25.3). In 431, the Lacedaemonians decided to go to war against Athens after an exhaustive discussion in which all sides were heard (Thuc. 1.79.2), and the Lacedaemonians were convinced that the Athenians had been guilty of injustice. Sthenelaidas, who cast the decisive vote in favor of war, asserted that the Athenians never denied in their long speeches that they were wronging the Spartan allies (Thuc. 1.86.1). Moreover, the Spartans had divine assurances that their going to war was morally correct. But to buttress their moral basis further, they contrived the odd story of the Cylonian curse, which they now employed as one of their complaints against Athens (Thuc. 1.126.1-2; Plut. Solon 12; Hdt. 5.11). In the same vein, Brasidas in Acanthus minimized the interests of Sparta and maximized the idealistic purpose of his campaign: the liberation of the Greeks 2

In 403 the Corinthians and Boeotians refused to follow the Spartans when the latter plot-

ted to depose the restored Athenian Democracy. The reason the Corinthians and Boeotians refused to do so was that they would not be true to their agreement with Athens, since the Athenians had done nothing wrong (Xen. Hell. 2.4.30; Cyr. 7.5.77).

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from the Athenian yoke. If, therefore, the Acanthians resisted him, they would be resisting the liberation of Greece, and that would be a monstrous act (Thuc. 4.85.1). He proceeded to invoke the gods and local heroes as witnesses in order to absolve himself from the consequences of their resistance. At the height of their hegemony, the Thebans proposed peace to the Lacedaemonians on condition that they let the Messenians go free. Young Archidamus objected strenuously to this term and attempted to unveil the immorality and hypocrisy of the Theban proposal. He contended that the settlement of the proposed Messenian colonists was contrary to the Peace of Antalcidas and to recent Theban practices. The Thebans had conveniently forgotten that only yesterday they had razed Thespiae and Plataea (c. 372); yet, after the laspe of four hundred years, the Thebans remembered the Messenians. In both cases they acted contrary to their oaths and convenants (Isocr. Paneg. 115). Were they to restore those who were truly Messenians, the Thebans would still be acting unjustly, but, at least, they would have had a better pretext to wrong the Lacedaemonians. In reality, the Thebans proposed to settle helots on the Spartan frontier, an act that would have added insult to injury. Thus, the Lacedaemonians would be deprived of their land unjustly (παρά τό δίκαιου), and they would have their former slaves as masters of the land. The occupation of Messene by the Spartans was justified, according to Archidamus, because it was a fair punishment for Messenian wickedness. The crime that deserved this punishment was the killing of Chresphontes, who was the founder of the Messenians and a descendant of Heracles. The sons of Chresphontes escaped to Sparta and entreated the Spartans to revenge their father's death in return for the land (Isocr. Arch. 22-27). 3 Consequently, Archidamus urged his people to take up arms and fight better than their foes because they had justice on their side (Arch. 38). Like the Lacedaemonians, the Athenians blamed the other side for the troubles of Athens (Plat. Menex. 242A-B). Thus Pericles asserted that the Athenians would defend themselves against violators of the Thirty Years' Treaty, but that they would not start a war (Thuc. 1.144.2). The statement implied that the Lacedaemonians and not the Athenians were at fault. But in the case of Melos one of the points illustrated by the dialogue was the Athenian disregard of all the traditional attempts at justification, and their exhortation to the Melians to do likewise. The Melians disobeyed this advice and focused their argument on the injustice of the Athenian position (παρά τό δίκαιον; των δικαίων ημάς έκβφάσαντες, Thuc. 5.90; 98.1). Similarly, in Syracuse, Nicias indirectly admitted the possibility of injustice behind the Sicilian expedition, and sought to 3 According to another account, it was Aegyptus, the son of Chresphontes, who avenged the death of his father (Apollon. 2.8.5).

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encourage his demoralized troops with the thought that from then on the gods would pity and assist them. 4 Addressing himself to the question of justice in the Social War, Isocrates argued that no lasting peace could be achieved which was contrary to justice (On the Peace 6) and cited past history to illustrate his point. It was his belief that as long as Athens kept herself on the path of justice and did not crave the property of other cities, she was admired by the Greeks (Panath. 6 7 - 6 9 ; Paneg. 12; On the Peace 3 0 - 3 1 ; Thuc. 1.95; 96), but as soon as she identified covetousness with state interest, she was placed in utmost peril. Isocrates, therefore, inveighed against those who had reached such a point of extreme folly as to hold the view that injustice was reprehensible but profitable and advantageous in one's daily life, and that justice might be commendable but disadvantageous, capable of benefiting others than those who practiced it (On the Peace, 3 0 - 3 1 ; To Nie. 59; Plat. Rep. 392B). Around 373 the Thebans alleged that the Plataeans had committed injustice when they refused to join the Theban Confederation and the Thebans proceeded to assail Plataea in order to right the wrong. The Plataeans appealed to the Athenians, denouncing the moral pretentions of Thebes and posing the question whether such grounds as the Thebans alleged were justifying the penalty (war and expulsion of the Plataeans) so contrary to justice, or whether it seemed proper for the city of Plataea to be forced into dependence on Thebes (Isocr. Plat. 8). In 431 the Thebans justified their first attack on Plataea on the ground that they had been invited by the Plataeans (Thuc. 3.66.2). Their sequel to the first attack was due to the immoral execution of the Theban prisoners (Thuc. 3.65.1; 66.2). In the 370's the Thebans unleashed a succession of counterattacks upon Sparta owing to Sparta's "unjustifiable" seizure of the Cadmea (Xen. Hell. 5.2.29-31; 5.4.11; 3 . 9 - 1 1 ; 5; 46). They carried their offensive to the Peloponnese where they liberated Messene, alleging that in so doing they accomplished the restoration of an evil (Isocr. Arch. 26—27; Paus. 4.4.3; Dinarch. Against Dem. 73). Even the "barbarian" Philip of Macedon never failed to couch his aggressive plans in moralistic language. Just before the battle of Chaeronea (Dem. Peri Stephanou 157), Philip pretended that the Amphissians had occupied and were tilling the territory of Apollo, which it was forbidden to till. This reason was a needed excuse in order to invade their territory on behalf of the Amphictyonic Council, of which he was now a member. In the probably spurious letter (Peri Stephanou 157) Philip accused the Amphissians as παραβαίνοντας τι τών έν 4

Thuc. 7.79.3-4. The alleged reason for going to Sicily was, of course, the protection of Leontinoi. Patriotic tradition picked up the story as a legitimate and true cause of the Sicilian expedition (Plat. Menex. 242E).

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άνθρώποις εύσεβών. Not only did he use a moral reason but a religious one on top of it. In view of past history, Isocrates had agonized on the subject of war and peace and concluded that among the Greeks only defensive wars were justified. 5 In his address to Nicocles (Nie. 24) he admonished the young man to be always prepared for war but to avoid all aggression (he thus presaged the Roman si vis pacem para bellum but in a much more humane way). He denounced the Triballians and Lacedaemonians (On the Peace 50) for their constant aggrandizement without sufficient reason and exhorted the Greeks not to imitate their example but to apply justice and wisdom and all the other virtues in relation to one another. He also praised his pupil Timotheus (Antid. 127-28; Xen. Hell. 5.4.54) because he never inflicted irreparable injury on anyone. War with the barbarians was another matter. 6 For that Isocrates did not need a reason other than that the Persians were the natural enemies of the Greeks, and that they had attacked Greece before and had always intrigued against her. He therefore advised the Greeks to unite and fight the Persians because a war against the barbarians was better than peace with them. Nay, it was a sacred mission, not simply a military expedition (Isocr. Panath. 163; Paneg. 181-182; 183-184).

Euergesia One of the most significant principles in interstate relations was the principle of eüepyeaia. It was a general term, which, for lack of better translation, we can render by "benefaction". Its function in the inter-personal society of the Homeric world was a very important and continued to be so in the world of the Greek city-states. Isocrates lists some of the benefits Athens bestowed upon mankind since the ancient times and believed that for these benefits she deserved the leadership of Greece. It was Athens, for instance, which bestowed the blessings of agriculture (Paneg. 28.29). The token of this truth (he did not consider it a simple myth) was that most of the cities sent to Athens part of their first produce 5 According to Xenophon (Hell. 3.2.22), when Agis went to sacrifice to Zeus in Olympia, the Eleans would not allow him to pray for victory in war, alleging that there was an ancient principle that forbade the Greeks to consult the oracle about against Greeks, και τό άρχαϊον νόμιμου, ... μη χρηστηριαζβοθαι τους "Ελληνας €φ 'Ελλήνων πολέμψ. 6 The idea of a total war (war to final extinction) against non-Greeks becomes more popular in the fourth century. Plat. Menex. 2 4 2 C - D points out that war against Greeks was justified only up to the point of victory and that it did not justify the destruction of the entire city. On the other hand, total war against the barbarians was right. See Hdt. 9.78. also Diod. 12.79.6.

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and that those who had neglected to do so had been admonished by the Pythia (Paneg. 31). Athens provided the leaders who established colonies at a time when the Hellenes suffered from internal strife because of the lack of daily necessities {Paneg. 3 5 - 3 7 ) . Then, by setting her own house in order, she provided an example for others living without laws (some oppressed by tyrannies and others perishing owing to anarchy) to deliver themselves from these evils (Paneg. 39). Honor was also due to Athens because of her manifold struggles in defense of herself as much as for the freedom of the other Greeks. Athens had offered herself at all times as a refuge to the oppressed. For this reason, Athens had often been accused of cultivating the friendship of weaker people (Isocr. Paneg. 51—53; Andoc. On the Peace 28; Plat. Menex. 244E; Dem. Against Leptines 3). The most celebrated refuges were the sons of Heracles. Persecuted by their uncle Eurystheus after the death of their father, they escaped to Athens. Athens, of course, was mindful of the might of Eurystheus; yet, she decided to support the persecuted at her own risk. The refuge of the sons of Heracles became a subject for the great tragedians and the Attic orators, who often used it as a propaganda vehicle to glorify Athens or to castigate the ingrate Peloponnesians (Aesch. Seven Against Thebes·, Soph. Antigone·, Euripides Phoen. Women·, Suppliants; Hdt. 9.27; Isocr. Paneg. 5 4 - 5 6 ; 57; 61; To Philip 3 3 - 3 4 ; Panath. 1 6 8 169; 170; 194; Lysias, Fun Oration 7 - 9 ; Plat. Menex. 239B; Dem. Fun. Oration 8; Peri Stephanou 186; Xen. Mem. 3.5.10; Aristl. Rhet. 1396a). Since the Lacedaemonians claimed descent from Heracles, Isocrates stressed their ingratitude displayed by their invasion of Attica (Paneg. 5 7 - 6 1 ) . 1 The services of Athens in defense of Greek freedom during the Persian Wars were distinctly weightier than those of Sparta (Isocr. Paneg. 5 9 - 6 1 ; 100-132). As a result, during the period of the Athenian hegemony the barbarians were prevented from marching beyond the Halys River (Paneg. 144) or sailing this side of the Phaselis (Paneg. 118; Areop. 80). On the contrary, under the supremacy of Sparta, they gained the freedom to march and sail wherever they pleased, and they also became masters over several Greek states. The Lacedaemonians were not the only ingrates. The Athenians had similar complaints against the Thebans. With a touch of exaggeration, Isocrates states that they were the only allies of the Lacedaemonians (not true) who demanded that the Athenians be reduced to slavery and their territory be left to pasturage 1

In a similar scene Eur. Hecuba, 2 3 9 - 5 0 , Odysseus is criticized for ingratitude. As a suppliant, he was granted mercy by Hecuba but did not reciprocate when Hecuba and her daughter Polyxene fell into Greek hands. Diod. 12.45.1 said that in 430 the Lacedaemonians destroyed Attica with the exception of tetrapolis where their forefahters had found shelter. By sparing tetrapolis the Lacedaemonians had a sense that they paid back an old debt.

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like the plain of Cirrha. Fortunately, the Lacedaemonians vetoed the suggestion, and the authors of so many services to the Greeks were spared (Isocr. Plat. 31— 32). In the Corinthian War, the Thebans asked Athens' assistance against the Lacedaemonians. Athens granted them help, but as soon as the danger was over the Thebans abandoned Athens and entered into an alliance with the Lacedaemonians (Isocr. Plat. 27-28). The people of Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium remained loyal, but the Thebans did not even have the decency to remain neutral. They joined Sparta in an alliance against Athens, the savior of their city. Fortune, however, forced Thebes to seek Athens' alliance, but again they turned against their benefactors when the peril was gone (Isocr. Plat. 29).2 Naturally, Athens was not the only state that had claims of gratitude from others. The Corinthians and Plataeans had benefited Athens several times and later demanded equal treatment in return. After the fall of the Peisistratids, the Spartans were upset with the new regime in Athens and invited their allies to confer with them about the possibility of overthrowing Cleisthenes and reinstating Hippias. The effort failed because the Corinthians opposed it as unjust and murderous (ίώικώτβρον and μιαιφονώτερον, Hdt. 5.92). During Athens' early troubles with Aegina (probably in the 490's) the Corinthians loaned the Athenians twenty ships to carry on the war since Athens had not yet built her armada (Hdt. 1.89; Thuc. 1.41.1-2). Lastly, in the Samian war (Thuc. 1.115), the Peloponnesians wanted to accept Samos' plea for help, but the effort was foiled because the Corinthians vetoed the proposal (Thuc. 1.40.5). In the Corcyraean-Corinthian conflict, the Corinthians reminded the Athenians of their past benefactions and demanded that the Athenians do not ally themselves with Corcyra. Since the Corinthians had earlier recommended the policy of non-intervention in one another's sphere of influence, they now expected the same consideration from Athens, although, unlike Samos, Corcyra was not an ally of Corinth (Thuc. 1.43.1; 1.43.2). The Plataeans had always been the allies of Athens. They maintained the alliance with Athens at a great peril to their national existence in view of the fact that their alliance with Athens intensified their differences with Thebes. Consequently, the Plataeans fought on the side of Athens during the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War. Even though they were asked by Archidamus to save themselves by delivering their city to him, they refused because the Athenians asked them to do so (Thuc. 2.73). When the Plataeans were again pressured by the Thebans (c. 373), they appealed to Athens for help, which, they felt, was due to them owing to their past services to the city of Athens (Isocr. Plat. 57). 2 Isocr. may refer to the year 395 when the Thebans asked the Athenians for help, alleging at the same time that they had refused to aid the Lacedaemonians earlier against Piraeus (Xen. Hell. 2.4.11 and 14; 3.5.8). The Athenians agreed to send help, although Piraeus was un walled.

108

In the same vein, Demosthenes (Peri Parapr. 66) reminded the Athenians that they ought to assist the Phocians who had been their benefactors, For in the year 404, after the Athenian defeat at Aegospotamoi, the Phocians openly cast their vote against those who recommended the enslavement and destruction of Athens. He castigated his political opponent for delivering the Phocians to their enemies, though it was incumbent upon Athens to help them in return for their past favors. The conduct of the Athenians, according to Demosthenes, was an ignominy. States that had no prior record of mutual favor found it embarrassing to ask for favors. In their speech at Athens (434), the Corcyraeans were aware of the difficulties under which they labored in requesting aid from Athens. They, therefore, opened their speech by admitting that they had no claim upon Athens, either on account of past services or an alliance. (Thuc. 1.32.1): It is right, Athenians, that those who like us come to ask your assistance without any previous claims on account of important services rendered or an existing alliance . . . If they had benefited Athens, they would have claims to aid. Now they tried to convince the Athenians that (1) it would be to their interest to help the Corcyraeans, and (2) that the Athenians would lay up for themselves a debt of gratitude among the Corcyraeans, who are in need of their aid (Thuc. 1.3.2.2; 1.33.1). The Corcyraeans might have hit a sensitive nerve at this point because the Athenians always bragged about their good deeds to the Greeks. They acquired friends, they maintained, not by receiving favors from others but by conferring them upon others. The reason for this policy was their belief that he who conferred favors was a surer friend than the recipient. The giver was motivated by spontaneous good feelings toward the beneficiary, whereas the beneficiary saw the favor as a debt to be repaid (Thuc. 2.40.4). The same idea was expressed by Diodotus in the Mytilenaean debate (Thuc. 3.47.5), when he stated that killing the Mytilenaeans would have been an act of ingratitude contrary to the Greek unwritten laws which presupposed respect for one's benefactors (Thuc. 3.47.3). In 427 the Plataeans delivered themselves to the Spartans. At the trial they were asked to enumerate their services to the Lacedaemonians in the Peloponnesian War. There were none, of course; so, the Plataeans chose to belabor their past favors to the Spartans and the Greeks in general. They reminded them of the Plataean contributions in the Persian Wars (Thuc. 3.54.1-4; 3.56.4-5; 3 . 5 8 . 1 5; 3.59.1-4; Isocr. Paneg. 9 2 - 9 3 ) , and their help during the earthquake in 464 (Thuc. 3.54.5). They also pointed out that the Spartans had suggested that the Plataeans ask for help from the Athenians, and the Plataeans did so. It would not, therefore, seem nice for the Plataeans to have abandoned the Athenians now 109

that the latter were in great danger (Thuc. 3.55.3). Furthermore, they drew the attention of the Spartans to the Greek convention that killing one's benefactors was a serious moral crime (Thuc. 3.59.1). They warned that the violation of this unformulated law would scandalize the conscience of all the Greeks (Sewov δε δόξα, Thuc. 3.57.1). Finally, the Plataeans demanded from the Lacedaemonians that they change their mind, if they had already decided to execute them (Thuc. 3.58.1). The Thebans felt compelled to answer the Plataeans. They did not dispute the principle of ευεργεσία; they only affirmed that the Greek debt to the Plataeans was incurred in a just matter but that the Plataeans did not subsequently prove worthy of the debt. They had forfeited it with their bad conduct (Thuc. 3.63.3). like the Plataeans, the Aeginetans had helped Sparta during the earthquake, but, unlike them, they continued to remain loyal to Sparta. Their loyalty cost them their country. Being displaced by Athens for military purposes in 431 (Thuc. 2.27.2; 4.56.2), the Aeginetans received from Sparta the territory of Thyrea in payment for their past services and loyalty. 3 Similarly, the Lacedaemonians expected others to repay their benefactions to them particularly when the Lacedaemonians needed help. Brasidas in Pylos (Thuc. 4.11.4) urged the Spartan allies to contribute ships in return for the great benefits they had received from the Lacedaemonians, and Dercyllidas (Xen. Hell. 4.8.4) pointed out to the people of Abydus (in 394) their opportunity to show themselves benefactors of the Lacedaemonians. The time was especially propitious since Sparta needed their support badly, and bad times showed who one's true friends were. The Greeks placed great value on steadfast friendship. With a tinge of admiration Xenophon narrates the attitude of the Corinthians in 366/65. They were fighting on the side of the Lacedaemonians against the Thebans when they found themselves in an unenviable position and were forced to sue for peace. The Thebans agreed to grant peace, but the Corinthians requested that they be allowed to consult the Lacedaemonians since they did not wish to give the impression that they had abandoned an ally. The Thebans agreed again. Although the Corinthians were not able to convince the Lacedaemonians to accept a common peace, they were given the freedom to proceed independently. The Thebans offered them alliance and peace, but the Corinthians refused to accept an alliance with Thebes, for this would have pitted them against the Lacedaemonians whom they considered their benefactors. This act drew the admiration of the Thebans, who granted the Corinthians what they asked (Xen. Hell. 7.4.6-9; Isocr. Arch. 91). 3

Since Thyrea was on the border between Argolis and Laconia, the Spartans evidently tried to kill two birds with one stone.

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Unwillingness to repay one's benefactor was a serious offense that provoked public censure.4 In a comparison between the conduct of Athens and Sparta, Isocrates found the Spartans wanting in this respect. Whereas the Athenians destroyed small and insignificant islets and cities (obviously for rhetorical purposes virtue is judged by size in this instance) the Lacedaemonians laid waste the greatest and most glorious cities in the Peloponnese. These cities deserved the greatest reward instead of punishment from the Greeks because of their part in the Trojan expedition {Panath. 70-72; 91). s The Lacedaemonians also proved ungrateful to their benefactors during the Peloponnesian War. They turned against the Great King who had enabled them to win the war (Andoc. On the Peace 97-98; Panath. 145-149; To Philip, 90; Xen. Anab.), against the Chians who had offered them their navy (Isocr. On the Peace 97-98; Diod. 13.65.3—4), and their staunchest ally, the Thebans (Xen. Hell. 5.25-30). The reference to the Persian King is interesting. It demonstrates that the Greeks did not draw a sharp distinction between Greeks and Persians in the applicability of their values.6 We notice that after the Peloponnesian War, Cyrus sent ambassadors to Sparta to ask that the Spartans show themselves as good friends to him as he was to them. The ephors agreed that the request was fair and instructed Samius, their admiral, to lend his services to Cyrus (Xen. Hell. 3.1.1). To Pharnabazus, who complained about the ingratitude of the Lacedaemonians, Agesilaus gave the answer that the state interest dictated the supercession of personal friendship. Evidently, the answer was not satisfactory even to the Spartans who were filled with shame before Pharanbazus and fell silent (Xen. Hell. 4.1.32-34).

Fair Play The Greeks deplored the use of treachery to gain an advantage over an opponent. Consequently, persons and states that respected themselves were not supposed to stoop to such methods. Speaking about the increasing treachery of Philip V and his underhanded methods against the other Greeks, Polybius 4

Obviously, Isocr. alludes to Messene, Pylos, Argos, and pre-Dorian Laconia. For Messene, see also Arch. 26; Philip, 51. 5 Isocr. deliberately leaves out instances of Spaitan repayment of benefaction. For instance, Thuc. 7.89.1 says that Gylippus wanted to spare Nicias in Syracuse because Nicias had been in favor of releasing the Spartan prisoners captured at Sphacteria (5.6.1). Thuc. 1.136.1 criticized the Corcyraeans for not extending their protection to Themistocles, though he had been their benefactor; see also L. Piccirili, Annali 3 (1973) 317-55. ' άχάριστοι (Xen. Mem. 2.2.2) are characterized those who did not show gratitude for benefits received no matter who the benefactor might have been, friend or enemy. Ingratitude was an injustice and the greater the ingratitude the greater the injustice. For similar reference, Xen. Mem. 2.6.5; 2.7.9; 3.5.10; 4.4.24.

Ill

(13.3.2-3) commented on the degree to which Greek morals had deteriorated. He felt that the ancients would not have stooped so low as to get the better of their enemy by fraud, regarding their success unworthy unless they crushed their adversaries in open battle. This attitude is a survival from the aristocratic times when victory was important, but fair methods in battle were the means for attainment of victory. The ancients, Polybius continues, preceded war with a declaration, and they proceeded to give notice of the impending battle as well as of the spot on which they would array themselves for combat. He commended the Romans who still maintained some of the ancient principles regarding war: they continued to make declarations of war; they seldom resorted to ambuscades; and they fought hand-to-hand. In reality, while the principle of fair play was highly valued in antiquity, the Greeks were not always above deceitful tricks. Thus, we frequently find Greek writers criticizing unfair practices. Perhaps, the most celebrated of these was the Wooden Horse. The verdict of the Greeks on that was ambivalent, probably because it had become a legendary act illustrative in some way of the other side of the Greek character. On the other hand, the trick of Odysseus that enabled him to escape the carnivorous Polyphemus (Od. 9.346—402) was not reprehensible, because the cyclop had disregarded all the rules regulating Xenia. When, during the Trojan War, Hector agreed to fight a duel writh Ajax, he promised a clean fight openly and squarely, without resort to insidious tricks (II. 7. 242—43). This might have been important for an additional reason. A little earlier Menelaus and Paris had fought a duel that was intended to end the squabble between Greeks and Trojans. But at the point when Menelaus was about to kill Paris, Paris was kidnapped by Aphrodite unbeknownst to the Greeks. The flight of Paris was considered a breach of faith, and the Greeks were strengthened in their conviction that justice lay on their side, injustice on the other (II. 3.340ff)· Unfair play seemed to violate the informal code that guided Greek inter-personal and interstate relations and was also supposed to draw the wrath of the gods because it often entailed the breach of oaths. Herodotus mentions the case of Cleomenes of Sparta who at some date before the Persian Wars attacked Argos but was not able to corner the Argive army which followed his movements closely. To attain his goal, he finally resorted to deception. Unfortunately, the deception was followed by bad faith as well. After his victory, Cleomenes invited the Argives, who had fled to the holy grove of Hera, to come out, promising to ransom them out for two minae (Hdt. 6.79). When several came forward, he had them slain, thereby committing a double crime (violation of promise to suppliants). Those who refused to come out he burned by setting fire to the grove.1 1 Plut. Moral. 223 B.C. gives a different story: Cleomenes agreed to a seven-day truce but attacked the argives on the third night. Alexander the Isian regretted Philip V's unfair and sinister methods which contrasted sharply to Philip's predecessors, Polyb. 18.3.4; E. Heza,

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The Argives believed that the later madness and unhappy end of Cleomenes (Hdt. 6.84) were due to divine punishment for this treachery. Xenophon draws a distinction between stratagems (fair play) and unfair methods in the career of Agesilaus. Campaigning in Asia Minor after the Peloponnesian War, Agesilaus had succeeded on one occasion to fool Tissaphernes. Agesilaus had spread rumors that he intended to march into Carta and had Tissaphernes make preparations to encounter Agesilaus there; instead, Agesilaus invaded Phrygia. Tissaphernes, on the other hand, swore to a temporary truce with Agesilaus, but then he violated the truce and his oaths in order to gain advantage over his enemies. Agesilaus was not fooled but chose to abide by the agreement in order to expose the unreliability of Tissaphernes (Xen. Hell. 3.4.11; Ages. 1.10-14; 1.17). This duplicity of Tissaphernes was small compared to that he perpetrated against the captains of the Ten Thousand. Unable to beat the Greeks in his territory, Tissaphernes lured their leaders to a meeting in the hope that he could defeat the Greeks if they were left leaderless. Consequently, he appealed to the gods and to principles men held sacred to banish the suspicions of Clearchus. He promised not to indulge in perfidious tactics and shameful practices (Xen. Anab. 2. 20—21). Yet, despite these oaths and assurances, as soon as the captains went to the meeting place, he seized and executed them (Xen. Anab. 2.29-30; Isocr. Paneg. 147; To Philip, 91). Thucydides may not have had faith in divine retribution but he despised duplicitous methods. He cites a few examples of improper tactics without extensive commentary. In 427, while Paches was at Colophon (Thuc. 3.34.3-4), he called to a conference Hippias, the commander of the Greek mercenaries in the service of the Persians, on pledges of safe conduct. When Hippias arrived, Paches placed him under guard and made a sudden attack upon the fortress where Hippias' troops were stationed. He captured it and put to death all the Arcadian and barbarian soldiers. Afterwards, he took Hippias to the fortress, as he had promised, and killed him. Obviously, Paches used a sophistic trick to lure Hippias, and Thucydides attached no comments to the incident because no comments were necessary.2 Eos 62 (1974) 2 2 7 - 2 4 4 ; H. R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus (Cleveland, 1966) 243. 2 A good example of the sophistic argument used by Paches is in Soph. Philoctetes. Neoptolemos used deceit to take away Philoctetes' bow. At the end he repented for his deceitful methods and returned the bow, despite Odysseus' efforts to dissuade Neoptolemus. Neopt: I practiced craft and treachery with success, 1228 To my shame, unjustly, I obtained it. 1234 It was a sin, 1248 A shameful sin, which I shall try to retrieve 1249 D. Greene and R. Lattimore (eds), The Complete Greek Tragedies (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1957) 11; J. de Romilly JHS 93 (1973) 1 6 0 - 1 6 2 .

113 8 Karavites (Hyp. 71)

About a similar incident, Thucydides is more explicit. When the capture of Spartan soldiers on the island of Sphacteria was imminent, Sparta asked for a truce to negotiate peace proposals. The agreement stipulated that the Lacedaemonian ships in Pylos were to be delivered to the Athenians for the duration of the truce, while the Athenians agreed not to attack the fortifications either by land or sea. The Athenians were also to permit the Lacedaemonians to send food supplies to the men on the island under the supervision of the Athenians. The agreement specified that if either party violated it, it would become void. The negotiations failed, but the Athenians used a flimsy excuse not to return the ships to the Lacedaemonians. Thucydides clearly states that the excuse was trivial (ούκ άξιόλογα, Thuc. 4.23.1). This conduct was disgraceful for a city like Athens which had claims to a noble past, for she sought to gain advantage by deceit. Open force, as Thucydides was going to say in another occasion, brings victory by the assertion of power; deceit through the intrigue of a perfidious mind (Thuc. 4.86.6).

Helping

the

Weak

The Greek city-states were politically sovereign, but their sovereignty was circumscribed by the traditional mores that affected their mutual contacts. The obligation not to help trouble-makers and to protect the weak from the predatory disposition of the greater powers was implicit in their world. In the Corcyraean-Corinthian debate at Athens (in 434) the Corcyraeans solicited the Athenian help on the ground that the Corinthians were committing an inhustice. They maintained that they had proposed to arbitrate the case of Epidamnus, but the Corinthians opted for a military solution (Thuc. 1.34.1—2). On the other hand, the Corinthians answered that the Corcyraeans were not upright people. To be upright was to display arete, a concept that meant, among other things, to observe without compulsion the claims of justice in interstate relations. The Corcyraeans had failed to display this virtue when they attacked their neighbors (Thuc. 1.37.5). Thus, it would not be right for the Athenians to accept them in their alliance. It was true that the treaty allowed either party (Peloponnesians-Athenians) to enroll neutrals, but the provision was intended for those who wanted to join for the sake of their own protection and not with the purpose of injuring others (Thuc. 1.40.2—3). If therefore, the Athenians accepted the Corcyraeans, they would be assisting the evil-doers and would thereby be establishing a precedent in the Greek world that might eventually work against the Athenians. They further stressed that their reminders were Ικανά κατά τούς 'Ελλήνων νόμους. Supposedly, the Mytilenaeans deserted the Athenian Alliance for the same reasons. They justified their stand on the principle that they did not wish to 114

give the appearance of wrong-doing by collaborating with those guilty (Athens) for the subjugation of the Greeks (Thuc. 3.10.2-6). Free allies do not take part in campaigns, they said, unless those against whom they march committed some impropriety. Similarly, collaboration to subjugate other Greeks constituted the main stake of the Theban argument against the Plataeans (Thuc. 3.63.3—4). If it was true that not to repay favors with the like was dishonorable, to collaborate with the perpetrators of evil was equally shameful (Thuc. 3.64.3). This argument was widely used in the Greek world. Brasidas used it, for instance, to persuade the Acanthians that refusal to comply with his proposals might well incur a just punishment because (1) the Lacedaemonians and their allies could be injured by the money the Acanthians would continue to pay to the Athenians; and (2) the Acanthians would not prevent the Athenians from depriving the Greeks of their freedom (Thuc. 4.87.1-3). The Athenians would employ similar arguments in the fourth century to revile Philip. After the Peace of Philocrates, Philip allegedly acted in the interests of the Thebans. Why so? asked Demosthenes. His explanation was that Philip had found out that there was nothing that would tempt Athens to sacrifice to him any of the other Greek states on account of Athens' respect for justice. With the Thebans it was a different story. The Thebans were willing to give Philip a free hand in return for benefits to be bestowed upon them by him (Dem. Second Phil. 7 - 8 ) . The positive side of the above principle was the obligation to go to the aid of the weak and the victimized. The best example of a collective effort in defense of the injured was the Trojan War. The Greeks supposedly submitted themselves to the vicissitudes of the ten-year ordeal for the sake of Menelaus and Helen who had fallen victim to an injustice (Hyp. Fun. Orat. 36). All the Greeks claimed to adhere to the ideal of helping the weak and the down-trodden, but the most prominent defender of this principle was the city of Athens, chiefly because the information about Athens is richer. Thus, we see that it had become a topos in the funeral speeches that Athens had always fought in defense of the weak (Plat. Menex. 244D; Dem. Fun. Orat. 10—11). Isocrates boasted that Athens had always been a place of refuge for the persecuted. Her habitual bane was that in opting to protect the weak from the strong, she sacrificed her own interests. The penchant for backing the weak did not originate from a lack of appreciation of her interests but from her commitment to certain ideals (Andoc. On the Peace 28; Plat. Menex. 244E; Dem. Against Leptines 3; Isocr. Paneg. 5 2 - 5 3 ; 81). The prominent Athenian politicians of the past purportedly considered it their duty to behave toward the weaker as they expected the stronger to feel toward them (an early version of the golden principle). Theseus gladly defended the renowned fugitives of the early times, Adrastus and the sons of Heracles. 115

Adrastus, after his defeat in Thebes, was unable to recover the bodies of his dead for burial and appealed to Athens for help. The Athenians immediately sent ambassadors to Thebes to suggest that the Thebans think the matter over more carefully. When the Thebans refused to comply, the Athenians marched against Thebes and forced the Thebans to give up the bodies since refusal to do so constituted a transgression of the Greek common law.1 The second case was that of the Heraclids. Expelled from the Peloponnese and hunted by their uncle Eurystheus, they escaped to Athens. Athens extended them protection at the expense of her own security (Eurip. Heracles- Heraclidae: Suppliants; Isocr. Paneg. 54-56; 37-61; To Philip 33-34; Panath. 170; 194\Plat. 54-55; Lysias, Fun. Orat. 7 - 9 ; Plat. Menex. 239E; Dem. Fun. Orat. 8; Peri Stephanou 186). After the Persian Wars, Athens was supposed to have fought at Tanagra in defense of the Boeotians (Plat. Menex. 242A; Thuc. 1.108), and in Sicily for the freedom of the Leontini (Plat. Menex. 242E). This is how epideictic rhetoric presented the Athenian involvements of the fifth century. The defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War did not dampen her spirit in defense of justice and the protection of the weak. She never ceased to denounce in words the effort of Sparta to deprive the Greeks of their autonomy (Isocr. On the Peace 67—69) or to call upon all the important Greek cities to join an alliance (in 395, Athens—Corinth-Thebes-Argos) to protect the Greeks from the predatory appetite of Sparta (Diod. 14.82). She also sent embassies to the Persian King (only that headed by Conon in 395 is known) to convince him that it was neither fair nor expedient for one state to dominate the Greeks. When later the Thebans coveted the territory of several Boeotian cities, Athens again supported the imperiled cities because she considered it unfair to allow ancient Greek cities to be uprooted (Dem. For the Megapolitans 25). 2 It was not unusual for cities in trouble to appeal for assistance to others on the grounds of justice for the weak. In 434 the Corcyraeans emphasized that they were victims of an unjust attack (Thuc. 1.33.1) and so did the Plataeans in 373/2. They appealed to Athens, they claimed, because they knew that it was the custom of the Athenians to go willingly to the aid of victims of injustice. Since the Plataeans had been faithful allies in the past, it behooved the Athenians now to show solitude for Plataea more than for others (Isocr. Plat. 1—2). Justice 1

ώς f) πόλκ αύτοϊς ούκ επιτρέψει παραβαίνουσι τον νόμον τον κοινό ν απάντων των 'Ελλήνων (Isocr. Panath. 170). For an analysis of the problem discussed here from a different standpoint see H. Strasburger, "Thukydides und die politische Selbstdarstellung der Athener," in Thukydides, Wege der Forschung (Darmstadt, 1968) 4 9 8 - 5 3 0 . 2 Demosthenes spoke of an amendment to the Peace of Philocrates in 346 in accordance with which the peace covered not only the signatories (Athens and her allies and Philip and his allies) but neutrals who were exposed to ruin by the stronger states (Dem. On the Halonnesus, 3 - 3 1 ) .

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was supposed to be on the side of the Plataeans, and if the Athenians proved willing to go to the aid of those who were wronged, many others would follow their example (Isocr. Plat. 42-43). At any rate, only recently the Athenians had undertaken a war (378—374) to secure freedom and autonomy for others; so, they could not act otherwise in the Plataean occasion (Isocr. Plat. 17). Later on in their speech, they reiterated the same ideas: You Athenians should help us because it would not be reasonable that every individual who is the victim of injustice receive pity at your hands, yet when an entire city is so lawlessly destroyed, it should be unable to win the slightest pity from you, who in former times incurred neither shame nor dishonor when you displayed pity for the suppliants. (Isocr. Plat. 52-53) Needless to point out that the Athenians were not always on the side of justice. In the Melian dialogue, the Melians told the Athenians that they intended to fight in spite of the odds against them because they firmly believed that as far as fortune was concerned, it would be on the Melian side since they were fair people pitted against unjust (Thuc. 5.104). They also hoped, they said, that the Lacedaemonians would not abandon people like them who were unjustly treated, because the Lacedaemonians were liable to incur the distrust of all the Greeks favorably disposed toward Sparta (Thuc. 5.106). This notion regarding the Lacedaemonians was in congruence with the image the Lacedaemonians cultivated for themselves. In 432 the Corinthians had urged the Lacedaemonians to declare war against Athens without fear of a treaty violation (they meant the Thirty Years' Treaty) because they would be helping the wronged (Thuc. 1.123-2). Sthenelaidas concurred with those advocating war since Sparta, with the aid of the gods, would be attacking the wrong-doer (Thuc. 1.86.3).3

Sanctity

of the

City-State

In its abstract form the city-state was more than a geographic or administrative unit. Nor was it identified only with the people who lived in it at a given time. The concept of the city-state incorporated all that belonged to the past, present, 3 The Spartans arbitrated a case in which the Eleans claimed Epeum, the town between Heraea and Macistus. The Eleans maintained that they had bought the territory for thirty talents from the people to whom it belonged. The Lacedaemonians, however, decided that the purchase was made under duress which was tantamount to seizure and compelled the Eleans to restore the independence of the town (Xen. Hell. 3 . 2 . 3 0 - 3 1 ) . In Diod. 5 . 7 1 . 4 - 5 Zeus punished the giants because, according to this version, they used their superior strength to exploit their neighbors.

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and future. It represented a tangible and material element as well as an intangible and supernatural entity. Thus, there was something of the metaphysical in the idea of the polis which today is foreign to us except when we refer to the "eternal" city of Rome, the city of Jerusalem, or when modern Greeks refer to the polis, by whibh they always mean, of course, Constantinople. This aura of sanctity surrounded the notion of the city-state like the halo of a saint and held the ancient Greeks in awe. It impeded them from the destruction of a city or afflicted their consience when they accomplished it. It may not be coincidental that the destruction of Troy gave rise to such an outpouring of poetic literature in archaic times. It might not have been only the feat of destroying a famous city that fired the imagination of the Greeks but also the act of violating a city's sanctity as well that attracted attention to the subject. The destruction of an entire city's population was tantamount to the destruction of the city itself, although a city-state, as it was explained above, consisted of more than the living in it. The oxymoronic character of the city-state can be better grasped if it is borne in mind that the living were the bearers of the city's traditions and the guarantors of its future. So, we notice that Thucydides equated the city with the people ; 1 yet the people away from the land of a given city were not considered as the same city. The Athenians in 480 faced for a minute the alternatives either to fight the Persians alone in defense of their city or give up their city and stick to their ships. Most of them were, however, distressed at this prospect. Consequently, they wanted neither victory nor safety, if safety meant that they had to abandon to the enemy the shrines of their gods and the sepulchers of their dead (Plut. Them. 9.4). This attitude toward the city-state illuminates some of the statements of the ancient authors. The pangs of conscience generated by Cleon's decree regarding Mytilene are most certainly intertwined with the Greek traditional ideas about a city's sanctity. Thucydides himself stated that the second ship sailed, not surprisingly, faster than the first. The first ship tarried because the decision to destroy all the Mytilenaeans was unique (άΧΚόκοτον, Thuc. 3.49.4). The uniqueness lay in the unprecedented character of the decree which drew no distinction between guilty and not guilty (Thuc. 3.36.4). This is the reason, it seems, that Thucydides, the artist as well as the historian, decided to introduce Cleon at this point in history rather than earlier, although Cleon had been politically active for a number of years already. Although there is no absolute certainty, there is little doubt (at least in this writer's mind) that Cleon was responsible for abetting the dissatisfaction of the Athenian ecclesia with the milder form of punishment the Athenian generals 1 Thuc. 7.77.7. For similar statements Alcaeus frg. 22; Soph. Oed. Tyr. 56; Aesch. Persae, 349; Eur. frg. 525; Plut. Lye. 19; Dem. Peri Stephanou, 299; Dio Cass. 54.5.3; Cie. ad Att.

8.11. 118

imposed on the capitulated Potidaeans. 2 Without this ominous precedent, Paches would have made his own settlement in Mytilene on the basis, of course, of past practices. It also admits little doubt that the senseless death of Salaethus by the Athenians was due to the intervention of Cleon (Thuc. 3.36.1). No other individual or political faction was liable to have advocated his execution. One may object that it would be odd if Thucydides had failed to condemn Cleon for yet another brutality. This objection has some merits, but we should not forget that Thucydides the artist aimed at the most timely effect of his narrative, and this effect he achieved by the shrewd juxtaposition of Cleon's name with the unprecedented decree which constituted the ultimate crime. Naturally, Thucydides does not omit to mention Cleon when he writes of the decree that caused the destruction of Scione, but his hasty narrative of the event corresponds to Thucydides habit not to comment twice on similar incidents (Thuc. 4.122.6; 5.32.1), and the possible dullness of a people's feelings to cruelties of this kind by now. In the same manner, the stand of Archidamus in Plataea is to be understood in terms of the Greek attitude toward the city-state concept. It really does not matter if Archidamus was sincere or not. What matters is that he appeared diffident to the Plataeans and felt the need to justify his impending action in the eyes of men and gods. The need for justification was doubly necessary as the (endemic) sanctity of the city had been recently reconsecrated by the oaths that all the Greeks who had fought in Plataea were supposed to have taken for the future protection of Plataea. Archidamus invoked at first traditional arguments to draw the attention of the Plataeans to their purported wrongdoing (Thuc. 2.72.1). Finally, he felt the compulsion to ask the Plataeans to deliver their city and their houses, to point out the boundaries of their land, the number of trees, and whatever else could be enumerated. He promised safe conduct to the Plataeans, who would be free to go whither they wished, and topped it by the Spartan promise to hold the Plataean land and everything in it in trust, working the land and paying satisfactory rent for it, till the war was over. He abstained from ravaging the land for as many days as the Plataeans needed to consult the Athenians and to reach a decision. When the Plataeans turned his proposal down, Archidamus invoked the gods as witnesses that he had exhausted all means of reasonableness and measures of justice and that the responsibility for the would-be adverse consequences lay with the Plataeans (Thuc. 2. 73). Notwithstanding all these imprecations and precautions, the Lacedaemonians did not escape criticism for the slaughter of the Plataeans and the destruction of their city (Isocr. Plat. 62). 3 3 Thuc. 2.70.4; Arist. Knights 438 seems to allude to Cleon, Busolt, G.G. 3.2.962 η. 1; Kagan, Arch. War 98; Pritchett, Gr. State, 1.68; 2.47. 3 In 396 the Lacedaemonians stormed Caryae in the Pelop. and put all the captives to the sword. Xenophon (Hell. 7.1.28) gave no other explanation for this act except that earlier (7.26; 5.25) the Gr. State, 3.68.2.47.

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Another illustrative instance of Thucydidean concern with the sanctity of the Greek city-state was the famous Mycalessus incident. The incident had no historical or military interest, but the senseless and indiscriminate killing that occurred in this little town touched Thucydides deeply enough to make him incorporate the story in his highly condensed history (Thuc. 7.29.4). The destruction of cities and the massacre of the population during the Peloponnesian War were acts for which their perpetrators were criticized by the other Greeks and which evidently never ceased to bother Greek conscience. Upon their defeat, the Athenians remembered (obviously they had never gotten over it) what they had done to the Melians, Hestiaeans, Scionaeans, Toronaeans, Aeginetans, and others. If we believe Xenophon, their pangs of conscience were due to the totally unnecessary annihilation of those cities (Hell. 2.2.3; 2.2.10). 4 Fortunately, the Lacedaemonians were not stirred into a frenzy in their hour of triumph, and they resolved that exterminating a city's population, especially when that city happened to be Athens, would not be to their honor (Xen. Hell. 2.2.19-20). The Thebans, who had demanded the destruction of Athens, were hard pressed afterwards to explain their stand, and, as in the case of the Persian Wars, they attributed the shameful proposal to a single culprit, not the people (Xen. Hell. 3.5.8). 5 The deeply rooted reverence the ancient Greeks had toward the polis is also manifested by the fact that among the first measures of reconstruction, immediately at the end of the Peloponnesian War, was the return to their cities of all the people displaced by the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 2.2.9).

Duty In the Plataean speeches (Thuc. 3.53—64) the Plataeans charged the Thebans with having allied themselves with the Persians, while the Plataeans had fought with the other Greeks against the Persians. The Thebans were very sensitive to the charge and sought to shift responsibility to the small group of oligarchs that ruled the city at that time. The Thebans were not the only ones who sided 4

The destruction of the above cities was a source of criticism for Athens in the Pelop. War as well as the subsequent years, Isocr. Panath. 6 1 - 6 4 ; Paneg. 100; 110; Antid. 1 2 4 - 1 2 5 ; 127-128. 5 The destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Great is described by Airian as πάθος τούτο ... ßeyedei ... και όξύτητι τον epyov, ... ού μΐών τι τους'άλλους"Ελληνας ή και αυτούς τούς μετασχόιτας του έργου έξέπληξβ (Anab. 1.9.1). Those who disliked the Thebans considered it divine retribution for Thebes' past misdemeanors among which were her purported betrayal of the Greeks in the Persian Wars, her seizure of Plataea (431 B.C.) during peace, her sale of the Plataeans and the massacre of the men (427 B.C.), the devastation of the Plataean countryside, and her suggestion that Athens be destroyed (at the end of the Pelop.

War), Anab. 1.9.6-7; A. B. Bosworth, A Hist. Comment, on Arrian's of Alexander 1, ad. loc. 120

with the Persians. The Macedonians, Thessalians, and many islanders were faced with the choice between submission and resistance against overwhelming odds and chose the course of safety. Nevertheless, the duty to fight in defense of one's city was a very early idea. Homer advised that the best omen was to fight for one's country (II. 12.243). Accordingly, it became a common place among Greeks to boast about the defense of their cities even against tremendous odds, and the most vocal among them were the Athenians. Repeatedly, they pointed out how they had the chance to escape danger in the Persian Wars if they only desired to ally themselves with the Persians, but that they rejected the Persian proposals outright (Isocr. Paneg. 9 4 - 9 5 ; Hdt. 7.185). They understood it to be natural for weak states to seek safety in yielding, but that it was impossible for states like Athens to avoid the perils of war for the sake of safety. The Greeks considered it preferable for honorable men to die nobly rather than to live in disgrace, and likewise it was better for the leading cities to be destroyed than to be in bondage (Isocr. Paneg. 95). To the other Greeks, who were afraid that the Athenians might be tempted by the Persian offers of gold and the overlordship of Greece, the Athenians answered that there was not enough gold on this earth to induce the Athenians to give up their freedom, and that they were determined to wage war until the sun changed his course; consequently, the person who dared to suggest capitulation was stoned to death (Dem. Peri Stephanou 205; Hdt. 9.5; Cie. De O f f . 3.11.48). Though great and evil powers may eventually overpower the weak and honorable, nonetheless one had to risk his life for the defense of his country. The best example of that was the case of Leonidas. He and three hundred Spartans attracted the admiration of all in spite of their defeat (Isocr. Panath. 185—86). The Athenians took pride in the fact that they had followed the same policy after the Persian Wars. In his Funeral Oration, Pericles praised the dead who thought it better to defend their country rather than yield and save their lives, and thus they escaped from shameful dishonor and passed away at that brief moment ordained by fate (Thuc. 2.42.4). Pericles reminded the living that the power of Athens had been acquired by men of courage who knew their duty and were moved by a high sense of honor (Thuc. 2.43.1). They gave their lives for the common good and won for themselves an everlasting glory (Thuc. 2. 43.2). 1 Demosthenes in Pylos urged his soldiers not to think of the present

1 Pericles was fully aware of the blessings of peace. He considered those who chose to fight, when they enjoyed good fortune, foolish, unless they were forced to yield to others' dictations. In that case it was their duty not to shrink from any danger in defense of their independence. Admittedly, the Greeks were more eager to fight for their city than for Greece, but they did not cease to criticize those like the Thebans who had medized in 480 or the Lacedaemonians who sold out the Ionian Greeks to the Persians. For a similar thought see Hyp. Fun Orat. 24.

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dangers but to proceed against the enemy without delay (Thuc. 4.10.1). By the same token, the Chians were criticized as shameful people, for though they were the wealthiest of the Hellenes, they expected others to risk their lives and their money in defense of Chian liberty (Thuc. 8.45.4). The obligation to defend one's country was so compelling that we find people regarding those who failed to keep it as worse than the unjust aggressors. Thucydides, who blamed the Athenians for depriving their allies of their autonomy (Thuc. 1.98.4), did not omit to stress the responsibility of the allies themselves in this matter (Thuc. 1.99.3). Hermocrates the Syracusan did not criticize those who wished to dominate others (for that was a natural human drive) as much as those who were ready to submit to the domination of others (Thuc. 4.61.5). Pagondas expressed the same thought when he exhorted his fellow citizens to be ready to fight for their own freedom and to show to the invaders that they could not hope to get what they desired with impunity (Thuc. 4.92.7). It was for this reason that the Melians refused to accept the logic of the Athenians, albeit they realized full well that the Athenians possessed the superiority. They did not feel, after seven hundred years of independent life, that they could abandon their land and their liberty for the sake of personal safety (Thuc. 5. 112.2). Besides, the Athenians had felt the same way in the Persian Wars (Plut. Them. 9.4) and were to exhort friends to conduct themselves in a similar manner (Isocr. To Demon. 43; To Nie. 36; Paneg. 77). 2 The Athenians were advised to regard it as a distinct honor that Philip had built a coalition against Athens. This act was a compliment to Athens demonstrating that only Athens was unwilling to abandon the common rights of the Greeks (Dem. Sec. Phillipie. 7-11). The person, however, who devoted a whole speech on the subject of duty to past traditions was the young Spartan King Archidamus. After Leuctra, Sparta lost her old power and was struggling to maintain the territory of Messene. Epaminondas proposed peace, provided that Sparta would be willing to relinquish Messene. Many Lacedaemonians had been ready to accept the Theban compromise, and this impelled Archidamus to make the purported speech in defense of Sparta's possessions. Again and again Archidamus returned to the duty of the Spartans to defend Messene. He would personally choose to die, he said, rather than live many times his allotted time at the price of voting to yield to the Theban demands (Isocr. Arch. 8). It would be disgraceful for a descendant of Heracles and the son of a ruling king if he did not try to protect the possessions of his forefathers {Paneg. 62). The other Spartans, too, would be equally aroused to the prosecution of the war if they could see in their imagin-

2 This refutes the argument of Ste. Croix that small states should take their chances and submit to the strong (Origins, 1 9 - 2 2 ) .

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ation their parents standing besides them urging them not to disgrace the name of Sparta or the battles they had fought earlier (Arch. 110). Then Isocrates borrowed a Periclean idea and put it in the mouth of Archidamus, though the idea was probably common long before Pericles articulated it so elegantly. Remember, said Archidamus, that it is noble to exchange a mortal body for immortal glory and to purchase with a life which one would retain for only a few years a glorious reputation which shall abide for all ages (Arch. 109; Dem. Fun. Orat. 27; Hyp. Fun. Orat. 24). Those who advised compliance with the Theban demands were striving to persuade the Spartans to throw away in a brief moment the glory which their forefathers bequeathed to them in the course of seven centuries. This would be humiliating for the Lacedaemonians (Arch. 12), and to stress his point further, Archidamus mentioned the examples of Dionysius and Amyntas. Dionysius was besieged by the Carthaginians and, faced with a disaffected citizenry, was on the point of sailing away. At that moment one of his companions was bold enough to remind him that "royalty is a glorious shroud". Ashamed of himself and plucking up courage, Dionysius began to fight again and won (Arch. 44—45; Diod. 14.6). Similarly, Amyntas was worsted in a fight against his barbarian neighbors and robbed of all Macedonia. He intended at first to slip away in order to save his life, but when he heard someone praising what had been said to Dionysius he changed his mind. He seized a small post, sent for freinforcements, recovered the whole of Macedonia within three months, and died of old age (Arch. 46; Diod. 14.3; 14.8.5; 14.92.3; Ael. V.H. 4.8). 3 At another point Archidamus interwove duty with justice and expediency. He viewed the withdrawal from Messene as constituting an injustice to the Spartans. Archidamus stated that the commission of this injustice would lead the Spartans to utter failure inasmuch as men were forever prone to negotiate with those willing to defend themselves but apt to demand more and more from those ready to yield to pressure. On the contrary, men ready to fight normally obtain more satisfactory peace than those who are too docile (Arch. 38—39; Thuc. 1.140.4—5; Livy. 5.48). Archidamus gave the example of the Athenians versus Eurytheus and the Persian (Arch. 42;Paneg. 7 1 - 7 8 ) . The Athenians alone, outside of the Peloponnese (it is not true, of course), decided to fight, though their odds were overwhelming, because they did not consider it honorable to accept the terms proposed to them (Hdt. 7.133) and chose to see their city ravaged rather than become enslaved to the Persians (Arch. 43). 4 3 Amyntas was the father of Philip and reigned from 3 9 4 - 3 7 6 . For similar ideas on duty see Isocr. Arch. 5 1 - 5 2 ; 59; 7 3 - 7 4 ; 86; 91; 95; 99; 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 . 4 The sense of honor is as old as Greek history. Achilles discounted the possibility of his death. When his mother warned him that he would be killed, he responded that he was afraid of dishonor or an ignoble life more than death (II. 18.97ff; Plat. Apol. 28C-D). Polyb. 4 . 3 1 . 4 - 8 explained that war was a terrible thing but not so terrible as to submit to everything in order to avoid it (F. W. Walbank, HCP 1 . 4 7 8 - 4 7 9 ; Thuc. 1.80.1; Eurip. Troads

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Moderation While in practice the defeated was at the mercy of the victor, in theory the powers of the victor over the vanquished were not unlimited. The Greeks believed that brave men should be full of fire, undaunted, and courageous in battle, but that in the hour of victory they should be moderate, placable and humane (Polyb. 18.37). The quality of moderation was evident early in Greek history. Ajax, according to a story, had incurred the hatred of Atreidae by his insidious designs against them and the Greek army. Ajax was evidently aware of the gravity of his crime and his consequent liability to be refused funeral ceremonies. His only prayer to Zeus was that his body might not be thrown to be prey of dogs and birds (Soph. Ajax 829-830). When Ajax finally passed away, Greek humaness and moderation prevailed; Odysseus induced Agamemnon to grant Ajax' body burial (Soph. Ajax 1332—1336). The lesson of the story is that unformulated usages should be respected, and that hatred should not be carried to extremes. Thus, moderation became a virtue that drew the commendation of people wherever it was applied. Just before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians wished to be commended for their demonstrable moderation. For though overpowered by human weakness they ended up ruling their allies, nevertheless, they never forgot the imperatives of justice (Thuc. 1.76.3), nor did they forget that others in their place would not have shown equal respect for moderation (Thuc. 1.76.4). Consequently, their complaint was that the Greeks did not dutifully appreciate Athenian reasonableness (Thuc. 1.76.4). Throughout the war, the Athenians were going to return repeatedly to their vaunted moderation. They candidly admitted that they were motivated by fear (δεος), honor (τιμή), and self-interest (ώφελίά) in setting up their empire, but they commended themselves because even at that point they did not forget justice and equity. (Thuc. 1.75.2; 1.76.2; 1.76.3-4). Elsewhere we notice that the Athenians expressed similar sentiment. This effort may simply be due to an over-idealization of the concept of moderation and as such may not correspond to the real feelings that prevailed at the time alluded to. But even if this is true, the effort expresses an ideal toward which the Greeks strove, though they might not have always attained it. When the Athenians captured the Lacedaemonians in Sphacteria in 425, it was in their 4 0 0 - 4 0 2 ; Diod. 30.18.2); for we do not praise the Thebans, Polyb. said, who forsook the Greeks in 480 B.C. (see also Polyb. 9.39.5) nor do we praise Pindar for approving their attitude (Bergk, 109; Stobaeus, A nth. 4.16.6; Pind. Isth. 5 . 4 8 - 5 3 ; 8.5.118; CAH 4.509.11). Peace with justice and honor is the fairest and most profitable of possessions but not at the price of baseness and disgrace. See also Polyb. 4.74.3; 18.14.8; 1 8 . 1 1 . 4 - 6 ; Thuc. 1.124. 2; R. von Scala, Die Studien des Polybios 1 (Stuttgart, 1890) 306.

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discretion to destroy them; yet they spared them, although the Lacedaemonians were supposed to have started the war, and had ravaged the Athenian countryside. The Athenians acted so because they believed it right to wage war only up to the point of victory, and that they should not wreck the whole of Greek community for the sake of private grudge (Plat. Menex. 242C-D). It was for this reason the decree of Cleon was shocking because it deliberately flouted moderation and mercy for the sake of fulfilling a grudge. It was designed to exterminate the entire city, instead of the few responsible for the revolt (Thuc. 3.40.2). Thucydides the Athenian did not prevail over Thucydides the historian and was prompt in citing the cases where the Lacedaemonians should be commended. He recorded how the Lacedaemonians fought their battles stubbornly, standing their ground until they routed their foes, but that when they had routed them, their pursuit of the foe was restrained (Thuc. 5.73.4). During the battle in Sphacteria, the Lacedaemonians arrived in Athens in search of peace negotiations, and they presented specific proposals as basis for reconciliation. At the heart of that statement lay the principle of moderation. Permanent peace, they said, was likely to be secured not when one party sought revenge nor when it tried to impose unequal terms, but when it vanquished its opponent by generosity, offering terms of reconciliation which were moderate beyond expectation. For the adversary, finding himself now under obligation to repay the generosity in kind instead of seeking vengeance, would be moved by a sense of honor and would be more inclined to abide by his agreements (Thuc. 4.19.2—4). One of the reasons for Thucydides' admiration of Brasidas was the latter's ability to combine diplomatic skill with moderation. That was the secret of his successful Thracian campaign. Consequently, Brasidas' fairness and conciliatory approach became responsible for the defection of many Athenian allies (Thuc. 4.81.2). Thucydides again stressed Brasidas' μετριότητα and πραότητα as the key to his success: Brasidas showed himself in other things moderate, and in his speeches he made it clear everywhere that he was sent to liberate Greece. And the subject cities of the Athenians realizing . . . what assurances he offered and his mildness were tempted to revolt. (Thuc. 4.108.2-3) Although Brasidas captured Torone by assault, he spared the Athenian partisans in the city and promised them equal treatment in the future; they were to be held responsible only for the acts committed thereafter (Thuc. 4.114.3). Thus, Brasidas' mildness was remembered long after he died and prompted several Athenian allies to desire to withdraw the alliance and join the Lacedaemonians (Thuc. 4.81.2). The best example, perhaps, of Lacedaemonian moderation was their treatment of Athens after the Athenian defeat at Aegospotamoi. Spurred by their recalcitrant allies to destroy Athens, the Lacedaemonians resisted these extreme de125

mands and chose to impose a characteristically mild settlement. In this respect, they fulfilled the philosophy they had expounded in the negotiations following the Sphacterian fiasco (Thuc. 4.19.2-4). What Brasidas was to Thucydides, Agesilaus was to Xenophon. Like Thucydides, Xenophon commended Agesilaus for his refusal to assault the city of Corinth, despite the rosy reports of the Corinthian exiles. Agesilaus' ideals restrained him from resorting to destruction and enslavement of the Hellenic cities. The purpose of the war should be, Agesilaus said, to render the culprits prudent, otherwise there would not be enough Greeks to fight the barbarians (Xen. Ages. 7.6). As we shall see, this idea was not unique with Agesilaus or Xenophon. It was a widely disseminated concept shared by many Greeks in the fourth century. The formulation of moderation as an article of faith became evident in the fourth century. This century, which witnessed the pathetic spectacle of petty and senseless city-state warfare, produced, on the other hand, an admirable reaffirmation of the virtue of moderation in the conduct of interstate relations. In this respect, the articulation of the concept of moderation was not an abstraction of the fourth century political thinkers, but the elaboration of a traditional principle with roots as deep as the Greek nation. For Isocrates, among the qualities that individuals and cities should possess in pursuit of their happiness was the quality of moderation (On the Peace 31—35). Consonant with this philosophy, Isocrates strove to incline Philip to a policy of kindness and moderation toward the Hellenes because he believed that cruelty was grievous both to those who exercised it and those upon whom it was exercised (Isocr. To Philip 116). Thus, he congratulated Philip for his treatment of the Thessalians and urged him to show himself equally prudent to the Athenians, who were equal to Philip in strength and influence. It would be much better for Philip to capture the goodwill of cities than their walls. The one engendered ill-will, the other won permanent friendship (Isocr. To Philip, 1.20-21). 1 Similarly, Isocrates took pride in his disciple Timotheus, who gave practical application to the ideas of his teacher. Although Timotheus had led several expeditions on behalf of Athens, he never allowed his soldiers to plunder or ravage the homes of people. On the contrary, he took precautions to prevent the unnecessary destruction of people and physical property. When enemy cities were captured by him, they were treated with moderation and justice (πρφως και νομίμως). This behavior stemmed from Timotheus' belief that moderation was the best ally against the enemy (Isocr. Antid. 124-125). In an age when war among the Greek states became a common practice and mercenary troops often made 1 All admired Philip for his magnanimity toward Athens. Although the Athenians had injured him by word an deed, when he overcame them he refused to take advantage of his victory to injure them. On the contrary, he buried the Athenian dead with due rites and sent the prisoners back without ransom, Polyb. 2 2 . 1 6 . 1 - 3 ; 2 3 . 1 5 . 1 - 3 .

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pillaging a profession, the example of Timotheus was refreshing. Isocrates attributed the survival of the Athenian empire for over seventy years to Athenian moderation. Athens, he claimed, held sway over Greece for seventy years whereas the Spartans retained the leadership of Greece for hardly ten years. With a strong dose of historical exaggeration, Isocrates ascribed the "loyalty" of the allies to Athens' moderate policy towards them (Isocr. Panath. 56). 2 The concept of moderation is one of the focal points of the Socratic-Platonic philosophy. 3 Plato was concerned with the consequences of the destruction of Greek cities and the expulsion of the population and advocated that the practice be avoided (Rep. 469B-C; Laws 693A; similar Xen. Ages. 7.6; Hell. 1.6.14; Aesch. 2.115). As a further step in this direction, he maintained that the Greeks should not even dedicate weapons to the temples, if they have been taken from other Greeks, since he considered the practice a pollution rather than an offering (Rep. 4 6 9 E - 4 7 0 A ; also 427B-C; Aesch. Seven Against Thebes 2 7 5 - 2 9 9 ; Agam. 5 7 7 - 5 7 9 ; Cie. de Invent. 2.70). He also denounced the general Greek practice of devastating the land of Greek opponents because the opponents' land did not cease to be Greek. He would only allow the destruction of the harvest for obvious military reasons. Plato conceived of all the Greeks as friends by nature and of wars among them as a moral illness.4 Therefore, the attitude of those Greeks who found themselves in the unenviable position of enemies should be such that reconciliation would be effected easily and perennial enmity should be prevented (Rep. 4 7 0 D - E ) . Plato agreed with Xenophon (Ages. 7.6) that the victor's duty was to make the guilty thereafter cautious (αωφρονιαται οντβς). This could be accomplished if the victor did not ravage the conquered territory, burn the habitations, or declare all the population guilty but only those who were most responsible for the factional conflict. s So, conflict should be carried to the point where the guilty were compelled to compensate the innocent for the damage inflicted and no further (Rep. 47IB). 2

Isocr. views the Spartan supremacy as lasting from 405 to 371, Philip, 47. But later on in Philip, as here, he speaks of Conon's victory at Cnidus in 394 as the terminal point of Spartan supremacy. The Athenians held sway for 65 years (Paneg. 106, Isocr. speaks of 70 years). Lysias, Fun. Orat. 55 and Demosthenes reckoned the period more accurately at 73 years. 3 Plato, however, shared the natural feelings of Isocrates, Demosthenes, Xenophon, and others on the question of Greeks vs. barbarians, Plat. Rep. 4 7 0 A - E (Isocr. Paneg. 157; 184; Panath. 163); Menex. 231; Laws 692C and 693A. According to Diodorus (15.57.1), after Leuctra the Thebans wanted to punish Orchomenus but Epameinondas dissuaded them, o n τα διά τής άνδρβίας κατερ-γασθέντα r f j φίλανθρωπίη. Sei διαφυλάττίΐν τούς της Ελλήνων ή-γβμονίας öpeyoßtvovs, . . . At the end, Orchomenus did not escape disaster (Diod. 15.79.6). See also Diod. 14.105.2. 4 The Corinthians even expressed the sentiment that one could shame his opponent by responding with moderation to the opponent's outrages, Thuc. 1.38.5. ' Plato speaks of factional conflict rather than war because he conceived the disputes among Greek factions as staseis and the conflicts between Greeks and Barbarians as wars (Rep. 470A-E).

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Conclusion At first sight the attitudes of the ancients on interstate relations may seem confusing. There is ample evidence to support the view that the Greeks believed the spoils belonged absolutely and unconditionally to the victor. Kiechle has built a case for this notion and has cited several sources in support of this view, although his short paper could not possibly have done full justice to the subject. Not all the evidence was taken into consideration, while at times the testimony seems out of context (Kiechle, 129-132). The isolated reference to Xen. Cyr. 7 . 5 . 7 2 73, for instance, gives an elliptical picture of Xenophon's real view and cannot be considered apart from Xenophon's ideas expressed in Hell. 2.1.18-20; 2.2. 1 9 - 2 0 ; 4.3.20; 5.2.3-6; 5.3.7; 5.3.22-25; 5.4.64; 6.4.23; 7.2.16; Anab. 5.7.19; 6 . 2 . 5 - 7 ; Ages. 1.21-22; 2.13; 7.5; 7.6; 11.1. The story of the Armenian King is very interesting and though the persons may not be Greeks the argument is. The Armenian King had made a treaty with Astyages, promising to be Astyages' vassal, but revolted when Cyrus came to power. When he noticed, however, that the game was lost, he delivered himself to Cyrus' mercy. In the trial that supposedly followed he was boxed into a corner by Cyrus' dialectics and admitted that he deserved to die. Thereupon, Tigranes, his son, entered the trial to plead his father's case. Tigranes argued exactly as Diodotus had in the Mytilenaean debate. He accepted the principle that punishment should be meted out when it benefited the person inflicting it. In that particular case, however, Cyrus would be injuring himself if he were to punish the Armenian King, for the King had acted moved by αφροσύνη against a stronger man and was worsted. The defeat served as a medicine that cured the King's rashness and converted him into a prudent man. His experience played the role σωφρονιστού. Thereafter, Tigranes argued, the Armenian King was bound to love Cyrus because, although Tigranes deserved to die, Cyrus was generous enough to spare him from such a fate (Xen. Cyr. 3.1.9). In another story, Xenophon described how the magnanimity of Cyrus coincided with the demands of the public interest (Cyr. 4.4.7—8; 7.2.11). Even in the case cited by Kiechle, the emphasis is more on equity than the law of plunder (Cyr. 7.5.72-73). Similar difficulties surround Aristotle's statement in Politics quoted by Kiechle: eon yip τις και κατά νόμον δούλος και δουλεύων • ό yap νόμος ομολογία τις έστιν έν f j τα κατά πόλεμον κρατούμενα των κρατούντων είναι φασιν. (Aristl. Pol. 1255a)

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This quotation does not provide a complete picture if allowed to stand isolated. Actually, Aristotle's references dealt with his discussion of the best constitution and the position of the slaves in it. In discussing slavery as a useful institution, Aristotle drew a distinction between people who were fit by nature to serve others and those who were suited to supervise and lead them. Aristotle, along with others, recognized that many slaves were in the condition of slavery not by virtue of their nature but because of a misfortune in life. A man became a slave because he was captured in war and by convention he belonged to the captor. But this convention was not universally espoused by the Greeks and was highly disputed. It was considered a violation of the nature of law because the master was only superior in power. The question is further illuminated by Aristotle's exposition of the complexities of justice. Aristotle (and the Greeks in general) realized that an inflexible application of injustice may, ironically, lead to the opposite result. Thus, the Greeks propounded the concept of equity which transcended the strictly legal realm of justice and was superior to justice, though itself justice. Equity and justice were generally the same and both were good, though the superior quality of equity (τό έπιβικβς) made equity better. Because legal codes could not cover satisfactorily all facets of human life, equity was conceived as an extention of what legal justice could not anticipate. In some respects, equity was injustice since the equitable man was expected to act in a way which entailed refusal to insist unduly upon his rights, a readiness that is, to accept less than his share, although he may be entitled to it by law (Aristl. Nie. Eth. 1137a 35-b24). This conception of equity was frequently co-extensive with the natural law {φύο€ΐ δίκαιον), whose origins lay in the very beginnings of the Greek community (Aristl. Rhet. 1373b; 1134b—1135a; 1287b). This transcendental quality guiding human relations was equally applicable in the realm of interstate relations where it made it unworthy for a statesman or a state to want to govern neighboring people. It was not worthy because it was not right. Consequently, those who equated despotic rule with statemanship were contradicting themselves, since they wished to practice upon others something that they considered unjust and detrimental if practiced upon themselves. By the same token, states that imposed their will on others contravened that principle of justice and equity to which they aspired in their internal affairs (Aristl. Pol. 1324b). The same thing was true about people who upheld the enslavement of prisoners of war or the possession of an empire. This was evil because it forced upon others something they themselves despised. Thus, military pursuits were good in a qualified way as a means to the ultimate end and not as the ultimate end. For the end of a society should be the happiness of its members, while the exercise of force produced adverse effects (Aristl. Pol. 1324b; 1333b; 1255a; Nie. Eth. 1134b-1135a; Rhet. 1373b). Kiechle relied on several Homeric passages and on Micknat's thesis to support further his view about the ambivalent attitude of the Greeks in interstate con129 9

Karavites ( H y p . 7 1 )

tacts. The truth of the matter is that the ambivalence of the Homeric descriptions was due to the multiplicity of chronological elements his poetry embodied. Hesiod, who lived not too distantly chronologically, represents the ethos of Homer's time better, for his poetry deals with contemporaneous problems. But even the Trojan War reflects partly the Greek notions of justice. The Greeks asked the Trojans to deliver Helen to them, and they did not start hostilities until the Trojans refused the just and honorable request. Their refusal demonstrated that Trojan guilt was universal and not individual (only Paris'). Later in the story the Greeks agreed to a duel between the two protagonists, but it was the Trojans (Paris) again who violated the oaths and the agreements. Lastly, the destruction of Troy may have been too severe a punishment, and several of the Achaean leaders are later punished for their shameful role in the destruction of the city. The fall of Troy impressed the Greek mind so deeply that the outpouring of literature relating to Troy may have been a way of compensating for the city's fate. Homer makes Zeus address Ares as the most hateful of all the gods that dwelt on Mount Olympus (II. 5.890). Ares is the destroyer of cities (πτόλίπορθος, II. 5.333; Hesiod Theog. 936), but Athena is the protectress of cities (έρνσίπτολις). And although she is also the goddess of war, she symbolizes war tempered by prudence (II. 1.206; 5.840; 10.244; 21.406). Ultimately, she becomes a goddess of peace, είρηνοφόρος. Furthermore, the Amphictyonies centering at Delphi and Thermopylae were very close to the times of Homer and Hesiod. Its members' primary interest was the sanctity of the city-state and the protection of that city-state. Thus, along with Athena, Apollo became the protector of the cities, at least those which were allied under his wings. Between this time and the Peloponnesian War only three cities were reported destroyed. Of them Sybaris was the victim of a grudge and was mourned by the other Greek cities, especially Miletus. Miletus was destroyed by a foreign invader and was mourned by the Greeks, particularly the Athenians. Cirrha's leveling was attributed to "metaphysical" sins and had the approval of the god. Acts of this form were not common in the early Greek period and the Pentecontaetia until the advent of the Peloponnesian War. Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Demosthenes, and the other writers of the fourth century manifest the rule of reason and moderation in the popular morality they contain in their works. But the best example is again Isocrates who constantly resorted to historical paradigms to buttress his arguments. Equity in foreign policy is one of those traditional principles that attracts him strongly, and he returns to it repeatedly. His young Archidamus insisted that the Lacedaemonians possessed Messene because the sons of Heracles gave it to them; Apollo directed them to do so; and they fought and conquered it. The last reason evidently was not sufficient, and the other two were projected to back it and justify it (Arch. 2 2 - 2 3 ) . Speaking on the occasion of the illegal seizure of Plataea and Thespiae by the Thebans, Isocrates pointed out that those who advocated injustice as advantageous in 130

foreign relations were foolish, and that those who held in subjection other cities failed to reckon with the disastrous consequences of their policy (On the Peace 17). The most prominent example of that policy was Athens (Isocr. On the Peace 3 0 - 3 1 ; Panath. 6 7 - 6 9 ; Paneg. 72; Thuc. 1.95-96). States were like individuals. Those which practiced sobriety should be emulated (Plat. Rep. 545B; Isocr. On the Peace 119-120); those which did not, were censured. In this connection, Isocrates criticized the Spartans for their duplicity. They knew that in theory land belongs to those who had duly and lawfully acquired it; on the other hand, they also knew that those who were superior in power profited in war. Aware of this antinomy, they neglected agriculture and converted themselves into life-long soldiers in order to take advantage of others' weaknesses (Panath. 46). Yet nothing was lawful and honorable which was not acquired lawfully (Panath. 185—86). Obviously, unjust wars did not constitute a lawful means of appropriating others' property. Only at one point Isocrates contradicts himself, in his effort to excuse Athens' reprehensible conduct. The Athenians of the fifth century, he says, imposed democracies on their allies, though aware of their ill effects. The reason for it was that they considered it better to do injustice to others than suffer it themselves. Had they avoided the application of this policy to escape reproach, the alternative would have been subjection to the Lacedaemonians (Panath. 1 Π Ι 8). This cynical view accords ill with Isocrates' plea for justice as a rule of conduct among city-states in his On the Peace 28—30, where he almost expounds the Platonic ideal that is better to suffer than to do evil (Plat. Gorgias 469C). In the above passage Isocrates inclined to the harsh view of Cleon (Thuc. 3.37. 2) and the sophists, as well as the view of Demosthenes that if all other states made justice the basis of their foreign policy, it would have been shameful for Athens not to observe the rule. But in a world where all others are seeking power to do injustice, for Athens alone to be governed by that ideal would be "not justice but cowardice" (Dem. For the Rhodians 28—29).1 Societies, like individuals, undergo moral crises and spiritual revolutions. In their long and turbulent history, the Greeks experienced many crises that sorely strained their moral traditions. These moral traditions were frequently violated, ignored, or employed to justify the practice of cruelties. But even in these dire cases the Greeks never forgot that they were acting contrary to their long-established principles. These principles had their origins in the misty times of Mycenaean history; they first appear as binding values in the Homeric poems, ruling 1

Demosthenes disavows this view, Third Phil. 16; For the Megalop. 15; 2 4 - 2 5 ; On Halon. 29 - 3 1 ; 3 6 - 3 8 ; Peri Step. 186; Peri Parapr. 66; Against Aristcr. 140. As for Isocrates, this locus is so contrary to what he had been advocating in all his writings, that the possibility of textual corruption cannot be excluded.

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the interpersonal, and by extrapolation, the interstate relations of the Homeric kings. With the disappearance of the Mycenaean feudal states, the Homeric society was transmuted to the city-state world, dominated by the άριστοι, but the Homeric values continued to be the guiding rules of these early city-states. Later on in Greek history, city-life was democratized and the bonds of kinship ceased to be the main prop of the city's political life. Yet the same set of values appears to have governed the interstate relationships of the Greeks. The practice of these values manifested the possession of a degree of σωφροσύνη, that virtue which constitutes the main theme of Plato's Charmides. This σωφροσύνη was the spirit behind the great Delphic saying, "Nothing in excess." Arrogance, insolent selfassertion, selfish ambition, were qualities most detested by the Greeks while σωφροσύνη was the exact opposite. It meant accepting the bounds which excellence lays down for human being, restraining impulses to all excess, obeying the inner laws of harmony and proportion. It was to the attainment of this inner law of harmony and proportion that the Greeks aimed, even when they occasionally strayed from this lofty objective.

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Appendix The following appendix contains seven capitulation treaties. Two, belonging to the pre-Persian Wars period, are placed in the appendix because one of the contracting parties, the dominant, was Persian. The other four treaties are from the times of Alexander the Great. Another is from the period of the Peloponnesian War, but the parties involved are Greeks, a Thracian King, and the Macedonian Philip, brother of the reigning Macedonian King Perdiccas. 1. Capitulation of Samos "Επεώή ών άπίκοντο ές την Σάμον οί ΐΐέρσαι κατάγοντες Συλοσώντα, οϋτε τις σφι χείρας άνταείρεται, ύπόσπονδοί τε εφασαν είναι έτοιμοι οί τού Matανδρών στασιώται και αύτός ο Μαιάνδρως έκχωρήσαι έκ της νήσου, καταθέσαντος δ' έπί τούτοιαι Ότάνεω και σπεισαμένου, τών Περσών οί πλείστου άξιοι θρόνους Οέμενοι κατεναντίον της άκροπόλιος κατέατο. (Hdt. 3.144) Darius decided to oust Maeandrius, the successor of Polycrates, and to install Sylosen, Polycrates' brother. Realizing the weakness of his position, Maeandrius offered to leave Samos under a flag of truce. Otanes, the Persian commander, accepted Maeandrius' proposal. 1

2. Capitulation of Carystos to the Persians in 490 ώς δε περιπλέοντες τάς νήσους προσέσχον και ές Κάρυστον, οΰ yap δή σφι οί Καρύστιοι οϋτε ομήρους έδίδοσαν οϋτε εφασαν έπί πόλιας άστυ γείτονας στρατεύεσθαι, λέγοντες Έρέτριάν τε και Αθήνας, ένθαϋτα τούτους έπολώρκεόν τε και την γήν σφεων 'εκειρον, ές ο και οί Κ αρύστιοι παρέστησαν ές τών Περσέων την γνώμην. (Hdt. 6.99) On their way to Athens Datis and Artaphernes put in at several islands of the Aegean Sea and picked up soldiers and hostages. When they came to Carystos, the Carystians refused to give hostages or join the Persians against Athens and Euboea. Thereupon, the Persians besieged Carystos and laid waste to the land, till the Carystians gave in. No punishment is recorded here, though the Carystians must have angered the Persians with their initial refusal to submit. 2 1 2

Hdt. 3.139; Meyer, GdA 3.736. CAH 4.235; How and Wells, Com. on Hdt. 2.105.

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3. Capitulation of Agalasseis (Indians) to Alexander the Great c. 326-25 Ύών δ' έγχωρίων [ Α γ α λ α σ σ ε ω ν ] τών υπολειπομένων εις τρκτχιλίους συμφιτγόντας εις την άκρόπολιν και με&' ίκετηριών δεηΰέντας άπέλυσεν [Αλέξανδρος], (Diod. 17.96.5) In 326 Alexander engaged the Agalasseis (Indians) and defeated them. He captured several of them and sold them into slavery while others barricaded themselves and fought stoutly, causing the death of a number of Macedonians. This made Alexander angry. He set fire to the city and burned up most of the inhabitants with it (Curtius 9.4.6—7). The survivors, to the number of three thousand, fled to the citadel, whence they appealed for mercy. Alexander pardoned them.1 4. Capitulation of Aspendos to Alexander the Great in 333 Έκ Πέργης δέ ώ ς προήει [ό Αλέξανδρος], έντυ^χάνουσιν αύτώ κατά την όδόν πρέσβεις Ασπενδίων αυτοκράτορες, την μεν πόλιν ένδίδόντες, φρουράν δέ μη εισάγει» δεόμενοι. και περί μεν της φρουράς πράξαντες άπήλϋον, οσα ήξίουν • πεντήκοντα δέ τάλαντα κελεύει τη στρατιά δούναι αύτοϊς ές μισϋόν και τούς ίππους, ους δασμόν βασιλεί 'έτρεφον. ο'ι δέ \χπέρ τε τού άργυρίου και τούς ίππους παραδώσειν ξυνϋέμενοι άπήλϋον ... 01 δέ Άσπένδιοι ... πέμποντες πρέσβεις έδέοντο εφ οίσπερ τό πρότερον ξυμβήναι. και 'Αλέξανδρος ... έπι τοίς αύτοϊς μέν ούδέ ώς ξυνέβη προς αύτούς • ομήρους δέ δούναι σφών τούς δυνατωτάτους έκέλευσεν και τούς ίππους, ους πρόσϋεν ώμολόγησαν, και εκατόν τάλαντα άντί των πεντήκοντα, και πείϋεσϋαι τφ σατράπη τφ (ύπ') Αλεξάνδρου ταχϋέντι και φόρους άποφέρειν οσα ετη Μακεδόσι, και ύπέρ τής χώρας διακριϋήναι, ήν τών προσχώρων ούσαν βίφ ρατέχειν έν αίτίφ ήσαν. (Arrian A nab. 1.26.2—3) Aspendos (in Pamphylia) submitted without resistance to Alexander in 333. Alexander, responding to the city's plea for freedom, allowed her to be free. In return, Aspendos promised to pay 50 talents for the reimbursement of Alexander's troops and to provide Alexander with horses as the city had been doing for the King. Shortly after this agreement Aspendos reneged, and Alexander made preparations for a siege. In the light of this, Aspendos treated for terms again. This time Alexander demanded hostages, raised the money to 100 talents, added an annual tribute along with the delivery of horses, and placed the city under the provincial administration. In addition, the city of Aspendos had to submit to arbitration all the territory she had formerly annexed.2

1

See also Justin 12.9.2.

2

Bengtson, N o . 405.

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5. Capitulation of Gortynia, Atalanta, and others in 429 ö δέ στρατός των Θρακών έκ τής Δοβήρου έσέβαλε μέν ές τήν Φιλίππου πρότερον ούσαν άρχήν, και εΐΚεν Ε'ώομενην μεν κατά κράτος, Γορτυνίαν δέ και την Άταλάντην και άλλα αττα χωρία όμόλσγύ} δια τήν Άμύντου ψιλίαν προσχωρούντα, τοϋ Φιλίππου υίέος, παρόντος. (Thuc. 2.100.3) The Thracian army invaded the territory of Philip and took by storm Idomene. Gortynia, Atalanta, and several other places capitulated out of friendship for Amyntas, son of Philip, who had accompanied the invading forces. The king of Macedonia was Perdiccas, but Philip, the brother of Perdiccas was in alliance with Athens (see also Thuc. 1.57.3) against Perdiccas. When Sitalcis invaded Macedonia in 429, Philip was dead, but the son of Philip was with Sitalcis. (Thuc. 95.2-3). Obviously, no punishment was exacted on Gortynia, Atalante and the rest. 6. Capitulation of Cyrene to Thibron Κυρίευσα ς δέ [ό Θίβρω ν] τον λιμένος και πολιορκήσας και καταπληξάμενος τους Κυρηναίους ήνάγκασεν ομολογίας ποιήσασΰαι ώστε αυτούς δούναι άργνρίου τάλαντα πεντακόσια, των δέ αρμάτων τά ήμίση πρός τάς στρατείας συνεκπέμπειν. (Diod. 18.19.4) Thibron forced Cyrene to capitulation in 322. Cyrene had to pay 500 silver talents and agreed to deliver half of her chariot force for Thibron's campaign in Libya. Thibron treated as spoils of war the property of the traders that had been captured in the part of Cyrene and gave it to his soldiers as plunder. He was criticized for this by Diodorus, who saw in the subsequent troubles of Thibron a fit retribution. 1 7. Antipater and the Greeks τού δ' Αντιπάτρου διακούσαντος τών λόγων και δόντος άπόκρισιν ώς άλλως ού μή συλλύσηται τον πρός Αθηναίους πόλεμον, έάν μή τά καθ' έαυτούς έπιτρέφωσιν αύτφ (και yap έκείνους σνγκλείσαντας εις Ααμίαν τον Άντίπατρον τάς αύτάς άποκρίοεις πεποιήσθαι πρεσβεύσαντος αύτού περί της ειρήνης) ό δήμος ουκ ών αξιόμαχος ήναγκάσθη τήν έπιτροπήν και τήν έξουσίαν πάσαν Άντιπάτρω δούναι περί τής πόλεως, ό δέ φιλανθρώπως αύτοϊς προσενεχθείς συνεχώρησεν εχειν τήν τε πόλιν και τάς κτήσεις και ταλλα πάντα · τήν δέ πολιτείαν μετέστησεν έκ τής δημοκρατίας και προσέταξεν άπό τιμήσεως είναι το πολίτευμα και τούς μεν κεκτημένους πλείω δραχμών δισχιλίων κυρίους είναι τοϋ πολιτεύματος και τής χειροτονίας, τούς δέ κατωτέρω τής τιμήσεως απαντας ώς ταραχώδεις οντάς και πολεμικούς άπήλασε 1

Bengtson, No. 414; FGH 1 5 6 . 9 . 1 6 - 1 9 ; Justin 13.6.18.

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της πολιτείας και τοις βουλομενοις χώραν εδωκεν εις κατοίκησιν έν τή Θράκη, ούτοι μεν ούν οντες πλείους των μυρίων και δισχίλίων μετεστάθησαν έκ της πατρίδος, οί δε την ώριομένην τίμηοιν 'έχοντες περί έννακισχιλίους απεδείχθησαν κύριοι της τε πόλεως και χώρας και κατά τούς Σόλωνος νόμους έπολιτεύοντο· πάντες δέ τάς ουσίας είάθησαν έχειν αναφαίρετους, φρούραρχον δέ Μένυλλον και φρουράν ήνα·γκάσθησαν δέξασθαι την ούκ έπιτρέφουσαν οΰδενί νεωτερίζειν. περί δέ της Σάμου την άναφοράν έπί τούς βασιλείς έποιήσαντο. Αθηναίοι μέν ούν παρ' ελπίδα φιλανθρωπευθέντες ετυχον της ειρήνης και τό λοιπόν άταράχως πολιτευόμενοι και την χώραν άδεώς καρπούμενοι ταχύ ταίς οϋσίαις προσανέδραμον. (Diod. 18.18.3—6) Demades proposed the dispatch of envoys to Antipater οϋτω δέ τον ψηφίσματος έπικυρωθέντος άπεστάλη [Φωκίων] προς Άντίπατρον έν τη Κάδμε iq. στρατοπεδεύοντα και παρασκευαζόμενον εύθύς εις την Άττικήν βαδίξειν. και τούτο πρώτον ητει, τό μένοντα κατά χώραν ποιήσασθαι τάς διαλύσεις. (Plut. Phoc. 263) ό Αντίπατρος, "Αοτέον," είπε, "Φωκίωνι ταύτην την χάριν." περί δέ των άλλων έκέλευεν αύτοίς έπιτρέπειν τούς 'Αθηναίους, ώοπερ έν Λαμίςι Αεωσθένης έκείνον. (Plut. Phoc. 26.4) Ώ ς ούν έπανήλθεν ό Φωκίων εις τό άστυ και τοις Άθηναίοις ταύτα έδοξεν ύπ' άνά-γκης, αύθις εις Θήβας έβάδιξε μετά τών άλλων πρέσβεων, Ξένο κράτην τόν φιλόσοφον τών Αθηναίων προσελομένων. (Plut. Phoc. 27.1) τών δέ περί τόν Φωκίωνα διαλεχθέντων άπεκρίνατο φιλίαν εσεσθαι τοις Άθηναίοις και συμμαχίαν έκδούσι μέν τούς περί Λημοσθενην και 'Ύπερείδην, πολιτευομένοις δέ την πάτρων από τιμήματος πολιτείαν, δεξαμένοις δέ φρουράν εις την Μουνυχίαν, 'έτι δέ χρήματα τού πολέμου και ξημίαν προσεκτίσασιν. Ο'ι μέν ούν άλλοι πρέσβεις ή·γάπησαν ώς φιλανθρώπους τάς διαλύσεις. (Plut. Phoc. 27.3-4). Οϋτω μέν έδέξαντο φρουράν Μακεδόνων 'Αθηναίοι και Μένυλλον ηγεμόνα. (Plut. Phoc. 28.1) ... Άϋηναιοι μέν έξέπεμψαν πρεβευτήν προς Αντίπατρου Αημάδην, δοκοϋντα καλώς πολιτεύεσϋαι τά προς τούς Μακεδόνας, άξιούντες τόν Άντίπατρον, καϋάπερ ην έξ άρχής ώμόλoyηκώς, i^ayayeiv την φρουράν έκ της Μουνυχίας. (Diod. 18.48.1) The Greek coalition built against Antipater in the summer of 323 was defeated. Upon its defeat the coalition was dissolved and Athens surrendered to Antipater without terms (Diod. 18.18.3; Plut. Phoc. 26.4). Athens was obligated to deliver the rivals of Antipater in the city, pay an indemnity, accept the Macedonian occupation of Munychia, and change its constitution. Citizenship was now to be limited to those possessing at least 2000 drachmas. The fulfillment of these 136

terms constituted the basis for an alliance between Antipater and Athens. This treaty, according to Plut. Phoc. 27.5, renewed the previous treaty of friendship and alliance between Athens and Macedonia.1 It also contained arrangements about the protection of the oligarchic constitution and the period for the occupation of Munychia (Diod. 18.48.1). The question of the Athenians occupation of the island of Samos was to be determind by Perdiccas. Oropos and several islands were taken away from Athens (Diod. 18.56.6). 2 1

See also Corn. Nepos, Phoc. 2 . 2 - 3 ; Justin, 13.6.9; Paus. 1.25.5; 7 . 1 0 . 4 - 5 . Bengtson, No. 415; A. Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit, 3 2 (1887) 3 8 7 - 3 9 0 ; W. S. Ferguson, Hellenistic Athens (1911) 1 9 - 2 2 ; H. Bengtson, Strategie l 1 (1937) 51; Chr. Habicht, Athen. Mitt. 72 (1957) 1 5 4 - 1 6 0 . 2

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Index of Names Abydus, 95, 110 Acanthus/Acanthian(s), 64, 70, 71, 90, 103, 115 Acarnanian(s), 73 Achaean(s), 15, 16, 18, 81, 130 Achilles, 13, 14, 15, 21, 49 Acropolis, 33, 56 Admetus, 54 Adrastus, 16, 115 Aeantides, 53 Aegina/Aeginetan(s), 24, 38, 39, 47, 88, 108, 110, 120 Aegistus, 21 Aegospotamoi, 109, 125 Aelian, 40, 86 Aeolis, 21 Agamemnon, 13, 15, 21, 124 Agariste, 54 Agesilaus, 77, 79, 83, 91, 99, 111, 113, 126 Agesipolis, 78, 83, 101 Aipeia, 53 Ajax, 21, 112, 124 Alcibiades, 102 Alcidas, 70, 90 Alcmeonid(s), 53, 56 Alexander, 81, 84 Ambraciot(s), 75 Amorgus, 88 Amphictyones/Amphictyonic/Amphictyony, 22, 24, 28, 58, 85, 105, 130 Amphipolis, 65, 71, 90 Amphissians, 105 Amyntas, 123 Anacharsis, 53 Anactorium, 99 Anaea, 70, 90 Anaxagoras, 56 Anaxilaus, 25 Andocides, 27 Antalcidas, 27, 67, 98, 103 Antigone, 49 Antilochus, 14 Antimachus, 16

138

Antinous, 14, 15 Antiphus, 16 Aphrodite, 113 Apollo 15, 67, 99, 105, 130 Arcadia/an(s), 46, 54, 92, 113 Archaic, 10, 11, 17 Arcesilas, 19 Archidamus/Archidamian, 55, 56, 66, 67, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 103, 104, 109, 119, 122, 123, 130 Ares, 14, 130 Argos/Argive, 53, 54, 68, 75, 78, 83, 95, 96, 113, 116 Aristeides, 27, 54, 55 Aristotle, 92, 128, 129, 130 Armenian (king), 128, 129 Artayctes, 58 Asia Minor, 26, 88, 98, 113 Aspasia 59 Astyages, 128 Athena, 130 Athens/Athenian(s), 24, 25, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 131 Atlas, 19 Atreidae, 124 Atreus, 21 Attaginus, 34 Attic/a, 22, 27, 57, 88, 100, 107 Bagoas, 82, 83 Boeotia/n(s), 22, 28, 57, 81, 83, 84, 99, 116 Brasidas, 61, 65, 71, 72, 90, 95, 103, 110, 115, 125, 126 Brazen House, 110 Byzantine/Byzantium, 41, 47, 50, 57, 58, 92, 108

Cadmea, 79, 80, 84, 105 Callicratidas, 99 Caria, 113 Carthage/Carthaginian(s), 28, 123 Ceos, 54, 92 Carystus, Carystian(s), 36, 47, 58, 88, 89 Cersobleptes, 28 Chaeronea, 105 Chalcis/Chalcidian(s), 24 , 40, 61, 85 Cheilos, 54 Chersonese, 55 Chilon, 53 Chios/Chian(s), 26, 55, 92, 95, 108, 111, 122 Chresphontes, 67, 104 Cimon, 38, 55, 57, 58 Cirrha/Cirrhaean(s), 24, 85, 108, 130 Citium, 55 Clazomenian(s), 56 Clearchus, 113 Cleisthenes, 20, 33, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 108 Cleomenes, 33, 35, 54, 56, 112 Oeon, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 86, 88, 94, 101, 118, 119, 125, 131 Cnidus, 77 Colophon, 113 Conon, 77, 116 Constantinople, 118 Corcyra/ean(s), 31, 37, 44, 45, 50, 51, 52, 54, 62, 65, 75, 76, 89, 99, 100, 103, 108, 109, 114 Corinth/ian(s), 31, 34, 37, 48, 54, 72, 73, 75, 76, 89, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 103, 108, 110, 114, 116, 117, 126 Croesus, 53, 55, 96 Crete/Cretan(s), 53, 82 Cronus, 18 Croton, 24 Cryptia, 18 Cydonia, 82 Cylonian, 53, 100, 103 Cyme, 21 Cyprus/Cypriot, 53 Cyrus, 67, 111, 128 Cythera/Cytherian(s) 45, 52, 65, 77, 86, 89 Damon, 56 Damophilus, 19 Delian League, 35, 37, 92, 95

Delphi/Delphic/Delphian(s), 18, 24, 35, 53, 55, 57, 66, 67, 89, 93, 100, 130, 131 Demosthenes, 74, 76, 85, 109, 115, 121, 130, 131 Dercyllidas, 95, 110 Diacritus, 100, 101 Diodorus, 27, 28, 39, 40, 41, 42, 46, 48, 65, 73, 75, 79, 80, 81, 84 Diodotus, 87, 89, 109, 128 Diomedes, 19, 96 Dionysius, 92, 123 Dolon, 16 Dolonchi, 64 Dolopian(s), 36, 57, 58 Dorian(s), 26, 64 Doric, 29 Doris, 79 Dryopian(s), 36 Duris, 48, 49, 50 Egypt, 53, 82, 96, 97, 98 Eion/ites, 36, 57 Elean, 112 Eleatic, 56 Epaminondas, 122 Ephesus, 20 Ephialtes, 59 Ephorus, 4 8 Epicles, 54 Epidamnus/Epidamnian(s), 65, 73, 75, 93, 99, 114 Epimenides, 53 Eretria, 24, 53, 88 Erinys, 22, 51 Euboea/n(s), 36, 40, 47, 57, 58, 88 Eumelus, 14 Eumeus, 15 Eurymachus, 15 Eurymedon, 52 Eurystheus, 107, 116, 123 Eurytanian(s), 51 Gela, 25 Gellio, 28 Gelon, 34, 35 Geryon, 19 Gortyn, 22 Gylippus, 76 Halys (River), 107 Hector, 112

139

Helen, 18, 115 Heliopolis, 53 Hellenes/Hellenic, 18, 24, 61, 67, 68, 70, 103, 107, 122, 126 Hera, 75, 112 Heracleia, 29 Heracles, 19, 67, 104, 107, 115, 123, 130 Heraeum, 77, 84 Hermionian, 54 Hermocrates, 122 Herodotus, 24, 25, 27, 33, 35, 54, 56, 57, 96 Heroic, 14, 15 Hesiod, 1, 16, 18, 19, 130, 131 Hestiaea/n(s), 40, 58, 88, 120 Hiero, 54 Hippias, 53, 56, 108, 113 Hippocrates, 25 Hippodamus, 56 Hippolochus, 16, 96 Homer/ic, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 96, 121, 131, 132 Hyccara, 61, 63 Iliad, 13 Ionia/n(s), 25, 54, 98, 99 Iris, 16 Isocrates, 12, 28, 95, 96, 97, 98, 102, 105, 106, 107, 111, 115, 123, 126, 127, 130, 131 Isagoras, 33, 56 Isthmus, 18 Isus, 16 Ithome, 89 Jason, 96 Jerusalem, 118 Lacedaemonian(s), 24, 31, 33, 35, 43, 46, 52, 53, 55, 56, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 87, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 131 Laconia, 77 Lacrates, 82, 83 Lampsacus/Lampsacine(s), 53, 55 Lampon, 24 Lelantine (War), 22, 24, 26 Lemnian(s), 33, 35

140

Leonidas, 24 Leontinoi, 116 Lesbian(s), 55 Leucadian(s), 75 Leucime, 73, 75 Leuctra, 96, 122 Lichas, 98 Locris, 92 Lycaon, 16 Ly courgus, 55 Lydia/Lydian(s), 96 Lygdamis, 53 Lysander, 70 Macedon/Macedonia/n(s), 81, 84, 99, 105, 121, 123 Magna Graecia, 54 Magnesian(s), 81 Mantinea/n(s), 24, 46, 78, 83, 101 Medes, 24 Megacles, 54 Megara, 18, 34 Megarid, 39 Melas, 20 Melesias, 55 Melesippus, 101 Melos/Melian(s), 46, 47, 50, 51, 61, 62, 63, 86, 89, 104, 117, 120 Mende, 45 Menelaus, 14, 16, 112, 115 Menexenus, 12 Messene/Messenian(s), 29, 43, 52, 63, 66, 67, 68, 73, 74, 75, 99, 104, 105, 122, 123, 131 Methone/Methonaean(s), 81, 84 Miletus/Milesian(s), 24, 25, 56, 130 Miltiades, 33, 34, 35 Molossian(s), 54 Mycalessus, 120 Mycenaean(s), 19, 22, 56, 131, 132 Mylae, 4 3 Mytilene/Mytilenaean(s), 43, 45, 50, 51, 52, 59, 60, 61, 62, 70, 86, 88, 89, 94, 101, 108, 109, 114, 118, 119, 128 Naupactus, 73, 74 Naxos, Naxian(s), 33, 37, 47, 53, 88, 89 Nemea, 18 Nicias, 45, 52, 61, 63, 74, 76, 93, 95, 101, 104 Nicocles, 106

Phlius, 92 Phocis, 22, 64, 81, 82, 85 Phoenicus, 77 Phrygia, 113 Phrynichus, 25 Odysseus/Odyssey, 14, 15, 29, 124 Phthiotian(s), 81 Oeniadae, 73, 74, 75, 86 Pindar, 18, 19 Olorus, 55 Piraeum, 77 Olympia/Olympic, 18, 28, 94 Piraeus, 66, 101 Olympus, 16, 130 Plataea/n(s), 24, 34, 45, 47, 55, 64, 68, 01ynthus/01ynthian(s), 61, 80, 84 69, 70, 72, 74, 76, 80, 84, 86, 87, 89, Orchomenus/Orchomenian(s), 46, 50, 52, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 104, 105, 108, 109, 86 110, 117, 119, 120 Plato/nic, 12, 102, 127, 130, 131, 132 Paches, 43, 50, 86, 113, 119 Plutarch, 27, 36, 38, 39, 41, 48, 50, 54, 56, Pagondas, 122 57, 58, 66, 81 Panathenaicus, 67 Polyaenus, 44, 45 Paris, 15, 112, 130 Polybius, 78, 88, 97, 112 Patroclus, 14, 15, 21 Polydamas, 96 Pausanias, 24, 34, 74, 78, 80, 83, 84, 93 Polyphemus, 112 Peisander, 16 Potidaea/n(s), 41, 50, 52, 66, 88, 119 Peisistratus/id(s), 20, 53, 108 Prasiae, 93 Pelopidas, 84, 99 Priam, 14, 15, 49 Peloponnese, 63, 68, 77, 93, 105, 111, Promethus, 19 116 Protagoras, 56 Peloponnesian (War-League), 11, 24, 37, 39, Protesilaus, 58 47, 49, 58, 62, 68, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, Psenopis, 53 83, 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, Pylos, 93, 95, 110, 114, 121 107, 108, 109, 111, 113, 114, 116, 120, Pythia, 66, 107 123, 124, 130 Penelope, 15 Rhegium, 25 Pentecontaetia, 11, 47, 48, 50, 51, 66, 83, Roman, 106, 112 87, 130 Sacred War, 24, 82 Perdiccas, 88 Sais, 53 Periander, 20, 53 Salaethus, 70, 89 Pericles/Periclean, 39, 48, 52, 55, 56, 59, Salamis, 54 60, 61, 71, 72, 74, 89, 100, 104, 121; Samius, 111 Funeral Oration, 123 Samos, Samian(s), 25, 37, 38, 40, 41, 47, Perses, 18 48, 49, 50, 55, 66, 69, 70, 71, 88, 97, Persia/n(s), 24, 33, 35, 49, 54, 57, 62, 67, 108 74, 75, 82, 83, 85, 88, 94, 96, 97, 98, Scione/Scionaean(s), 61, 62, 89, 119, 120 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, Scyrus/Scyrian(s), 36, 57 116, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123 Phalaecus, 82, 85 Scythian, 53 Phamabazus, 77, 86, 91, 111 Sestus, 57, 58 Phaselis, 107 Sicily/Sicilian(s), 25, 28, 52, 74, 76, 104, Pherae, 80, 81, 84 116 Sicyon/Sicyonian(s), 20, 54, 56 Philip, 11, 28, 81, 83, 84, 85, 94, 105, Sigeion, 53 111, 115, 122, 126 Philocrates, 115 Simonides, 54 Philocyprus, 53 Social War, 93, 95, 105

Nicomedes, 64 Nicophemus, 77 Nicostratus, 45, 52 Nisaea/n(s), 45, 46, 50, 52, 65, 89

141

Socratic, 127 Soli, 53 Solon, 53, 54 Sonchis, 53 Sparta/n(s), 22, 29, 31, 33, 43, 54, 55, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 116, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 127, 131 Sphacteria, 43, 52, 76, 114, 124, 126 Sphodrias, 101 Sthenelaidas, 103, 117 Strymon, 53 Susa, 53 Sybaris/Sybarites, 24, 25, 130 Sybota, 75 Syracuse/Syracusan(s), 28, 34, 76, 90, 93, 101, 104, 122 Tanagra, 116 Tarent, 29 Tartarus, 19 Thasos/Thasian(s), 37, 38, 39, 41, Thebes/Theban(s), 34, 35, 53, 67, 70, 72, 74, 76, 79, 80, 84, 85, 89, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98. 102, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 115, 116, 120, 122, 123, 130 Themistocles, 54, 55, 75 Theognis, 18 Thermopylae, 22, 130

142

47 68, 69, 86, 87, 99, 101, 111,

Thespiae, 104, 130 Thespro tian, 15 Thessaly/Thessalian(s), 24, 53, 92, 99, 121, 126 Theseus, 58, 115 Thrace, 28, 53, 55, 57, 95, 99, 125 Thrasybulus, 20 Thyrea, 88, 110 Thucydides/Thucydidean, 22, 25, 27, 28, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 57, 62, 63, 65, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 87, 88, 96, 101, 113, 114, 118, 119, 120, 122, 125, 126 Tigranes, 128 Timagenides, 34 Timesitheus, 57 Timotheus, 104, 127 Tissaphernes, 91, 113 Titans, 19 Torone/Toronaean(s), 61, 120, 125 Triballian(s), 106 Trojan (War), 11, 13, 14, 18, 22, 23, 68, 96, 98, 111, 112, 115, 130 Troy, 16, 118, 130 Varro, 28 Xenohpon, 27, 66, 78, 95, 96, 101, 110, 113, 120, 126, 127, 128, 130 Zanclaean(s), 25 Zeno, 56 Zeus, 14, 17, 19, 124, 130

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