Canadian Defence Industry in the New Global Environment 9780773565210

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The Canadian Defence Industry in the New Global Environment

The defence industry in Canada is facing serious challenges. Declining defence expenditures, protectionism in Canada's principal markets, political resistance, and escalating costs of weapons technology all threaten it. The Canadian Defence Industry in the New Global Environment is a thorough examination and assessment of the problems and prospects of the industry given the recent dramatic changes that have transformed the international security environment. Alistair Edgar and David Haglund examine changes in the international demand for defence prodticts in the post-Cold War era, review the reorganization and ratjonali/ation of the supply side of the international defence market through various government policy initiatives and corporate strategies, and discuss the ways in which the Canadian government and defence producers have attempted to cope with this new and uncertain international environment. They also explore the international and domestic contexts - military, economic, and political — within which defence industries operate. Edgar and Haglund's analysis draws on extensive interviews with political and industry leaders, military personnel, and government officials from Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Spain, and Germany. This timely study of the domestic, American, and other NATO defence markets will interest scholars and students of Canadian defence policy, Canadian foreign policy, and Canadian external relations, and public servants, politicians, and personnel in the industry. ALISTAIR D. EDGAR is assistant professor of political science, Wilfrid Laurier University. DAVID G. H A G L U N D is director of the Centre for International Relations and head of the Department of Political Studies, Queen's University.

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The Canadian Defence Industry in the New Global Environment ALISTAIR D. EDGAR

and DAVID G. HAGLUND

McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Buffalo

© McGill-Queen's University Press 1995 ISBN 0-7735-1272-1 (cloth) ISBN 0-7735-i273-x (paper) Legal deposit second quarter 1995 Bibliotheque nationale du Quebec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper This book has been published with the help of a grant from the Social Science Federation of Canada, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. McGill-Queen's University Press is grateful to the Canada Council for support of its publishing program.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data Edgar, Alistair D., 1962The Canadian defence industry in the new global environment Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7735-1272-1 (bound) ISBN 0-7735-1273-x (pbk.) i. Defence industries - Canada, i. Haglund, David G. ii. Title. HD 9743- c:2 2 K 33 !995 3^-47^33'097l ^95-900177-8 Typeset in New Baskerville 10/12 by Caractera production graphique, Quebec City

Contents

Tables vii Acronyms ix Preface xiii PART ONE

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

1 The International Security Structure and the Demand for Defence 3 2 The Evolution of Transatlantic Defence Economic Relations 19 3 Corporate Strategies and Responses in a Changing International Defence Market 42 PART TWO

THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT

4 The Defence Industrial Base: Domestic Policy Context and Industry Review 61 5 Defence Production: Changing Markets and Economic Viability 81 6 Defence Industrial Darwinism? Industry and the Dynamics of Adjustment 104 7 The Dilemmas of Policy in the 19908 117 PART THREE CONCLUSION

8 What Kind of Defence Industry for Canada? 139 Appendix 147 Notes 159 Bibliography 199 Index 225

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Tables

1.1 CFE Treaty Limits on NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization Equipment: Estimated Holdings and Required Reductions, February 1991 7 3.1 Average Annual Volume of Defence Equipment Sold Per Firm, United States and Europe, mid-igSos 48 3.2 Number of Program Types in Production, 1992 and 1997 54 4.1 Canada's Defence Industrial Base: Major Federal Government Actors and Policy Instruments 71 4.2 Defence Industry Sector Profiles, 1988-90 78 5.1 u.s. National Defence Expenditures, by Outlay and Procurement Year, 1985-95 95 6. i Leading Aerospace and Other Defence Companies in Canada, 1989-94 107 A.I Value of Arms Trade Within NATO, by Country, 1984-88 147 A.2 Total NATO Arms Trade, 1978-88 148 A.3 High-Tech and Arms Trade of NATO Countries, 1987 149 A.4 Top Twenty-Five Defence Firms in the World, 1989-90 150 A.5 Contributions Made to Defence Industry Firms by ISTC and External Affairs, 19887 89-199%! 151

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Acronyms

ACE ACV A DATS ASW CAPS GDI CFE cis GNAD CPF CSCE DARPA DDI DDSA DEAIT DFAIT DOS DIB DIPP DND DoD DPSA DSP

Allied Command Europe armoured combat vehicle air defence/anti-tank system anti-submarine warfare Conventional Armaments Planning System Conventional Defence Improvements Initiative Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Commonwealth of Independent States Conference of National Armaments Directors Canadian Patrol Frigate Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency developing defence industrial (countries) Defence Development Sharing Arrangements Department of External Affairs and International Trade (now DFAIT) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Department of Government Services defence industrial base Defence Industry Productivity Program Department of National Defence (Canada) Department of Defense (u.s.) Defence Production Sharing Arrangements Defence Services Program

x Acronyms

EAITC

External Affairs and International Trade Canada EC European Community (now European Union, or EU) Ecga EC 1992 program ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EDEM European Defence Equipment Market EEC European Economic Community EFA European Fighter Aircraft EIG economic interest group ESDI European security and defence identity ESPRIT European Strategic Program for Research in Information Technology EU European Union EUCLID European Cooperative Long-term Initiative in Defence EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community EUREKA European Research Coordination Agency FF French francs FSX Fighter Support Experimental FT A Canada-u.s. Free Trade Agreement FY fiscal year GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade GDP IEPG

IJDP INF IRB IRI ISTC LAV LLAD LRPA LSVW MET MCP NADIBO NAFTA NATO

gross domestic product Independent European Program Group

(now WEAG) international joint development project Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces agreement industrial and regional benefit Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale Industry, Science and Technology Canada (now Industry Canada and Science Canada) light armoured vehicle low-level air defence long-range patrol aircraft light support vehicle, wheeled main battle tank major crown project North American Defence Industrial Base Organization North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization

xi

NSA OTA PAD PAPS POM R&D RDP SEA SIPRI TRUMP U.K. UTTH WEAG WEU

Acronyms

new shipborne aircraft Office of Technology Assessment (u.s.) Preliminary Analysis Document Phased Armaments Programming System personnel, operations, and maintenance research and development research, development, and production (agreement) Single European Act Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Tribal-class update and modernization program United Nations utility tactical transport helicopter West European Armaments Group Western European Union

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Preface

The furor triggered by the federal budget of February 1994 demonstrated once again that defence spending can stir passions in Canada. This has to do, in part, with the lingering suspicion held by many Canadians that there is something inherently dubious about military expenditures in a country that, in their eyes, has no interests that could effectively and ethically be safeguarded by the use of force. It also has to do with a long-standing tendency, in certain regions and certain segments of society, to regard defence spending as one more form of transfer payment to which they are entitled - and which can only be withdrawn at some pain, as shown by the recent controversy over the decision to close the College militaire royal de Saint-Jean. And finally it has to do with the sheer size of the defence budget: although the Department of National Defence is by no means the money pit that its harshest critics imagine it to be, in 1993—94 it st iU ranks as a relatively well-funded arm of the federal government, with $12 billion of authorized expenditure, or slightly more than 7 percent of total federal disbursements for the year. But while defence expenditures may represent only a small percentage of overall federal spending and an even less conspicuous (less than 2 percent) share of gross domestic product, they do account for a significant share (36 percent) of "discretionary" federal spending in 1993-94 - that is, of spending that is tied neither to debt servicing nor to transfer payments to individuals. Yet despite, or perhaps because of, all the attention focused on defence spending in Canada, there has been surprisingly little public discussion of that sector of the economy known as the "defence industrial base" - the subject of this book. Apart from a few vested interests - on the one hand, defence producers and preparedness advocates; on the other, disarmament groups - few seem to know

xiv

Preface

much about how and from whom Canada procures its military hardware in an environment marked by declining defence budgets, ever more diffuse threats, and increasingly fierce competition for what little defence business remains. Our purpose here is to shed some light on these issues in the context of what is likely to be a period of great uncertainty for the Canadian defence industry. One of the most striking characteristics of the defence industrial base in Canada since at least the early igGos has been its dependence on exports. Not only does this dependence affect the general economic well-being of much of the industry (shipbuilding and repair being exceptions), but it is essential to its basic economic viability. Export dependence has been long recognized as a necessity in order to foster a reasonably broad-based and advanced defence manufacturing capability. Moreover, for some years government defence procurement policies have been used in the pursuit of non-defence objectives, such as regional development and technology transfer.1 A necessary consequence of this level of export dependence is that the medium- to long-term prospects of much of the Canadian defence industrial base are strongly influenced - and even determined, at times - by the impact of changes in the international demand and supply for defence equipment and not just by decisions made by the federal government or in corporate head offices elsewhere in the country. Canadian government officials and industry executives must therefore consider carefully legislative initiatives and other policy issues that are discussed in Washington, at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, and at the European Union, as well as corporate strategies that are crafted by global (but mainly Western) producers of defence equipment. Even those foreign-owned companies initially established in Canada purely to service Department of National Defence (DND) contracts are today buffeted by the changing climate of the international defence market, whether as a result of corporate restructuring strategies pursued by their parent organizations, of changes in ownership, or of the almost inevitable need to seek new business once a contract has been completed. This exposure to external influences is a determining factor in our analysis in Part One, where we examine the major events and trends in areas of the international defence market that have a direct or indirect impact on the economic viability of Canadian defence companies. In chapter i, we seek to illustrate the impact of the international political-security context on the demand for defence, and hence for the material wherewithal to pursue defence policies. Three broad groupings of issues are examined. First, we explore those factors

xv

Preface

associated with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the declining (or nonexistent) threat of large-scale conventional military conflict in much of Europe, and the ability of the Soviet Union's successor states to abide by existing arms-control or -reduction agreements. The second set of demand-side factors, also related to the end of the Cold War, includes the reformulation of strategy and structure in NATO, and efforts to rationalize and coordinate national armaments-procurement planning through the Conventional Armaments Planning System (CAPS). Finally, we turn our attention briefly to new (or reemerging) security concerns that may require greater attention in the post-Cold War era, ranging from regional or "out-of-area" conflicts or crises to calls for concerted action regarding the international trade in narcotics or international environmental problems. In chapters 2 and 3, we review the evolution of transatlantic defence economic relations and other intergovernmental political or economic activities affecting the demand for, or supply of, defence-related products, as well as trends or pressures operating within the international defence market itself, especially the various corporate strategies emerging as businesses navigate their path through a period of great uncertainty. These chapters provide background analysis for the consideration, in Part Two, of potential corporate and governmental responses in Canada to the phenomenon that we label "defence industrial Darwinism." Throughout, our principal concern will be to demonstrate the constraints and opportunities facing the Canadian defence industrial base in conditions of increasing interdependence and declining defence budgets. Naturally, we do not have ready answers to the questions facing policy makers as they seek to determine how — or even whether Canada's defence industry can remain viable in this era of what we term "Darwinian struggle." We believe, nevertheless, that our study can be of use to those wishing to learn more about the international and domestic challenges confronting Canada's defence industry. Inasmuch as it does so, it will be so largely as a result of the cooperation that we received from numerous individuals in the course of our research and of the financial assistance that we secured from some institutions. Among the latter, we are happy to acknowledge the Centre for Studies in Defence Resources Management, of the National Defence College of Canada, which provided the major source of funding for this project. We wish to cite, in this regard, Pat McDonnell and Serge Caron for the sympathy and understanding they demonstrated over the course of the research and writing. As well, the Military and Strategic Studies Program of the Department of National Defence, through its ongoing contributions to the Queen's Centre for

xvi

Preface

International Relations, played its usual invaluable role in enabling the Centre's researchers to turn an idea into a finished product. We are also grateful to the Aid to Scholarly Publications Programme of the Social Science Federation of Canada for providing a grant towards the publication of this work, and to Wilfrid Laurier University for having awarded us a Book Preparation grant. We are also pleased to acknowledge the following persons who kindly shared with us some of their time and expertise in Washington, Brussels, London, Ottawa, and a few other locales over the past several years: Gerald Abbott, Panayotis Andreakos, John Barrett, Justin Battle, Jim Bishop, Mario Bonomo, Erik Briihn, Glenn Brown, Robert Brown, Thomas A. Callaghan, Jr., Don Chambers, Elizabeth Cherrett, Bill Claggett, David Collins, Gordon Coombe, David Cooper, Vic Coroy, John Day, Nicolas de Chezelles, Michael D. Delia, TerrenceJ. Dooner, John E. Dubreuil, Ken Epps, Gabby Ferenczy, D. J. Field, Keith Gardner, Tim Garrard, Bill Gerard, Francis Gevers, Cynthia Gonsalves, Robert Hawkins, Cal Hegge, William Hinks, Theresa Hitchens, David Hobbs, Sharon Hobson, Caroline Holmes-Higgins, James Holt, Fred Jardine, Richard Jones, Robert Kemerer, G.H. Kimbell, Lucien Klein, Robert Lancashire, Marcel Leroy, David Lightburn, E. Mark Linton, Brian Lowe, Geoff Magnus, Paul Manson, Alan Martel, Dave McAnich, Martin McCusker, Simon Mclnnis, Bob McKendry, Thomas M. Meagher, Alastair Merrill, William S. Meyer, CJ. Mialkowski, Michael Moodie, Thomas Niles, Louis Parai, Bill Pettipas, Erik Poole, James Pugh, Max Reid, William Reid, Borden Ronald, Michael Riihle, Diego Ruiz Palmer, Rainer W. Rupp, Robert Sandor, Raymond Schaus, Derek Schofield, Tony Scott, Friedhart Sellschopp, Graham Sharp, Arcangelo Simi, General N. Skarland, Michael Slack, Herman Stakler, Donald Stein, Simon Street, William B. Taylor, Jr., Beth Thomas, Rick Thomas, Peter Trau, David Vadas, Anton van de Grampel, Luc van der Laan, Cent van Vliet, Jean Velon, Dirk de Vos, Philip Wall, Stein Weber, Scott Whiley, Nicholas Williams, Marvin Winklemann, Simon White, and Bill Yost. Finally, to Mary Kerr, Kay Ladouceur, and Marilyn Banting goes our appreciation for so efficiently and good-naturedly typing this manuscript and steering it through a series of ever more refined technical stages. Michel Forand acted as editorial consultant and made a number of helpful suggestions. Alistair D. Edgar and David G. Haglund

PART

ON E

The International Context

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CHAPTER

ONE

The International Security Structure and the Demand for Defence

The signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 8 December 1987 by Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in Washington marked a watershed in East-West relations. For the first time, the two superpowers agreed to the elimination, under the terms of the treaty, of an entire category of weapons from their respective nuclear arsenals. The INF agreement, ratified in Moscow in May 1988, gave a clear and highly visible signal of a more positive and cooperative u.s.-Soviet relationship. 1 The following year, the pace of change in the external relations of the Soviet Union gathered speed in a manner that few could have expected. Not only did Soviet troops finally withdraw from Afghanistan after a decade-long political and military debacle, but the physical division of Germany - and of Europe - ended dramatically with the opening of the Berlin Wall. Despite the much-publicized, albeit unwarranted, fears of some commentators, especially in Britain and France, and the potentially more difficult obstacle of Soviet resistance, the reunification of Germany became a reality on 3 October 1990. East Germany left the Soviet orbit, thus following in the footsteps of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.2 Inside the Soviet Union, the pace of subsequent change was even more dramatic. The Supreme Soviet reacted to the failed coup of 192 i August 1991 by banning indefinitely all Communist Party activities in the government or the military. Despite his rescue from the hands of the coup leaders, President Gorbachev's influence dwindled rapidly, while that of Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Federation, grew, especially after he concluded an agreement with the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus that established the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis). Their declaration effectively undermined President Gorbachev's proposed new union treaty, and he

4 The International Context

resigned on 25 December 1991, four days after eleven of the newly independent republics had declared themselves to be members of a revised version of the cis. : SECURITY IN

AND STABILITY

POST-SOVIET EUR OPE

These rapid and mostly unanticipated changes in the domestic- and foreign-policy circumstances of the former Soviet Union raise a number of questions regarding security and political stability that have profound, though still indeterminate, implications for those demandside factors operating on the international defence market. How could such a redistribution of power between the major actors in the international system - the United States and the Soviet Union (or, more broadly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and the Warsaw Treaty Organization) - have been accomplished without conflict? Although that issue has been debated mainly among academic observers, it is worth touching upon here since it also addresses the concerns of those who caution that the transformation of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War are not irreversible. At the very least, these analysts argue, there is wisdom in waiting to see the true nature of whatever new political entity emerges in the East before proceeding too far in the West with disarmament and conversion schemes.4 The management of peaceful change in the international system, which rests on the relative status and strength of Great Powers, has long been a central concern in international relations theory. The principal reason for this concern is clear: what Robert Gilpin calls "systemic change," or change in the distribution of power between the Great Powers, has historically been associated with large-scale "hegemonic" war."' Thus one might have expected the decline and disintegration of the Soviet Union to be accompanied by military conflict in Europe, where the opposing blocs' military forces remained in close proximity. Or one might at least have anticipated a potentially dangerous crackdown by the Kremlin authorities as their former East European satellites, especially East Germany, began to replace the defunct Brezhnev Doctrine with what some have referred to as the "Sinatra Doctrine," each state deciding to "do it my way."'1 Despite such fears, however, the most important characteristic of the disintegration of the Soviet Union has been its essentially peaceful nature: not only at the international level, but also (if only for a short time) at the domestic level, the Soviet empire collapsed without triggering a cataclysmic system-wide war.7 As a result, commentators who

5 International Security and Defence in earlier times were engaged in prolonged disputes over the origins and basis of the Cold War have now turned their attention to debating the causes of its sudden ending and assessing the frequency of ethnic conflict and its meaning for European security in the post-Cold War era.8 Although the experts disagree on many aspects of the post-Soviet era, there does seem to be consensus on one point that is critical to the defence industries in Canada and other Western countries: while future "significant lurches in political developments" such as the August 1991 coup attempt remain a possibility, it is highly unlikely that a reconstituted Soviet Union or even just a reinvigorated Russia could again, at least over the short to medium term, present the West with a conventional military threat comparable to that of the Cold War period.9 As the notion of "threat" encompasses both the capability and the intention to carry out a threat, it is also important to note that the latter element largely disappeared with the collapse of the ideological basis of the former Soviet Union. 1 " The control and disposition of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union will undoubtedly remain a matter for close attention in the West. This concern is warranted for a variety of reasons, including the safeguarding of nuclear facilities against accidents or terrorism, the safe dismantling or transfer of existing warheads (possibly to become part of the fuel cycle for civilian nuclear reactors in the United States and other Western countries, as well as in Russia itself), and the threat of transfer of weapons or related technologies to other states." As with the conventional military threat, however, no one doubts that profound changes have also taken place in the "intentions" component of the full-threat calculus. While their existence does constitute a risk, Russian nuclear weapons do not appear to pose any immediate threat to Western security in the coming years. 12 The events that have taken place since August 1991 in the former Soviet Union should not obscure another demand-side factor already in place — namely, the implementation of conventional arms-control or -reduction agreements that had been reached previously. In particular, NATO officials have continued to seek assurances from the members of the cis regarding their adherence to the terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. The goal of that treaty is "to strengthen stability and security in Europe through the establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional armed forces ... at lower levels.'"'1 These "lower levels" concern seven carefully defined categories of "Treaty Limited Items," including aircraft, helicopters, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles, heavy armoured

6 The International Context combat vehicles, and artillery. The successful completion of the treaty in 1990 was especially noteworthy as it followed fifteen years of frustration and failure at the previous Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks in Vienna. In contrast to the earlier negotiations, the CFE meetings began in 1989 against a background of unilateral Soviet force reductions (which were later subsumed within the CFE limits) and, most importantly, with Soviet negotiators expressing their willingness to accept intrusive verification techniques, asymmetrical force reductions, and the adoption of the concept of "defensive sufficiency" into their military doctrine.' 4 Although the CFE negotiations were to provide for a balance of forces "at lower levels," the equipment ceilings eventually agreed to would have had only a comparatively limited impact on NATO equipment levels as they stood in late 1990. As Table 1.1 indicates, by far the greatest reductions would have been borne by the Soviet forces, which had traditionally been numerically superior to NATO forces. Under the terms of the treaty, any required reductions were to be completed forty months after the treaty had entered into force, with special procedures to be established both for the equipment reductions and for the ratification process. The latter involved the depositing of instruments of ratification by all CFE signatories, with the date of the last deposit also establishing the date (ten days later) at which the treaty would come into force. When this complex process was completed, reductions would then take place, in three stages, over the forty-month period.'5 Following this agreement, and prior to the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, a number of potential difficulties regarding Soviet compliance with NATO interpretations of the treaty had already been addressed and overcome.'1' In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, additional concerns were raised regarding the treaty's future. The ratification process was further delayed, as it required approval by all of the eight republics within the CFE Treaty's geographical scope - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. At the time of writing, representatives from these republics, with the exception of the last-named, had met with NATO officials and agreed to ratify the treaty without renegotiation. An issue that poses a potentially more serious obstacle to the full implementation of the accord is whether the republics can agree on a division of the military assets of the former Soviet Union that is compatible with the geographical limits and other terms written into the treaty. Some of the republics harbour the ambition to develop their own armed forces, and this raises questions about what equipment they should or could retain from the conventional arsenal of the

7 International Security and Defence Table 1.1 CFE' Treaty Limits on NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization Equipment: Estimated Holdings and Required Reductions, February 1991"

ci'E Limits Tanks Armoured combat vehicles Artillery Aircraft Helicopters

20,000 30,000 20,000 6,800 2,000

\'A TO

German Democratic Republic*

Canada

Warsaw Treaty*

2,274 5,817 2,140 392 51

77 277 38 45 12

31,713 41,832 24,754 8,368 1 ,662

24,325 34,230 20,443 5,708 1,719

Source. Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security, Guide to Canadian Defence Policies. 1 CFE = Conventional Forces in Europe [Treaty]. 2 Based on final data exchange by the parties to the Treaty. i

57

Corporate Strategies and Responses

C ON C L U S I ON

In seeking to determine whether and to what extent the activities of defence industries could replace government initiatives in support of a more open Alliance defence market, we have examined corporate restructuring strategies within both the European and U.S. defence markets. This analysis has revealed a central theme - namely, that both are political markets to a significant degree, driven by a logic that does not necessarily match that of industry and that tends to set strong limits or "boundary conditions" on the ability of market imperatives to determine the structure of the market and of defence trade relationships within it. Does this focus on the two geographically separate markets skirt the possibility that a wider transatlantic defence market may be emerging? Is our emphasis on the distinctiveness of the Alliance's defence markets misleading? We think not. To begin with, it is apparent that industry-initiated m&a activities of a transatlantic nature have been very limited, in either direction: not only is the Atlantic not a two-way street, it hardly rates as even a one-way path. Between 1986 and 1988, of a total of 42 acquisitions made by American companies, 37 were in the domestic market, three in the United Kingdom, and one in France (the other was in Canada). American companies have shown very little interest in pursuing formal transatlantic industrial linkages, which is especially surprising given the advent of v.cgz and the commonplace business reasoning that "being there" is a critical element in successful market penetration. British companies were, it is true, more active, making 20 acquisitions in the United States, along with 24 in the United Kingdom and one each in Canada, the Netherlands, and Germany. The other leading European defence industrial country, France, saw its companies make only five acquisitions, four in the United States and one at home. Thus, of 90 acquisitions accomplished by companies of these three NATO members, (52 were made within their own market and 28 on a transatlantic axis, with only four of the latter involving acquisitions of European businesses by u.s. companies."'"' If governments hope to hand over the initiative to industry in establishing patterns of transatlantic cooperation, the record of formal mergers and acquisitions offers little concrete demonstration of such an inclination or capability, with the single exception of U.K. manufacturers. Moreover, as our review of European corporate activities indicated, there are evident factors limiting the extent to which industrial restructuring strategies in KC countries can proceed before they run up against national political interests and "boundary conditions." Much the same is true of the appreciation by European governments

58 The International (Context

of the merits of transatlantic defence trade and defence economic relations. While the Bush administration was ostensibly committed to the notion that industry and the market must decide the future of the defence industrial base and defence trade, with government merely playing a "permissive" rather than a leadership role, this position had less appeal in the eyes of Congress. The perspective of many in that latter body may be glimpsed in the following passage from the previously cited Office of Technology Assessment report: The dilemma for policy makers is that the interests of the u.s. defense companies may not coincide with the future national interests of the United States ... international collaboration can increase u.s. dependence on potentially unreliable foreign sources to unacceptable levels, erode the middle tiers of the u.s. defense industrial base, take business away from u.s. companies and jobs from u.s. workers, and transfer valuable technology to competitors that may later be used to penetrate civilian markets in the United States. Perhaps most important, industry-to-industry collaboration reduces government control over the distribution of advanced defense technology."'1'

The controversy over the u.s.-Japan FSX program, though perhaps an extreme example given the otherwise volatile nature of that bilateral relationship, may be a harbinger of future such disputes if the concerns expressed in the report eventually become policy initiatives. Our examination of the progress and prospects for corporate-led defence market restructuring convinces us of the wisdom of Callaghan's observation, cited at the end of chapter 2, that substantive transatlantic defence economic cooperation required political leadership and sustained political will. Since the collapse of the governmentnegotiated Nunn Amendment projects, several government officials in the United States and Europe (most notably in Britain) have expressed the wish that defence companies be allowed to lead the way in seeking out and establishing future collaborative ventures on an efficient and profitable basis. In practice, however, although companies may have greater leeway, their activities remain subject to numerous political limitations. The nature of the defence market is such that the establishment of more open trade and improved defence economic relations depends finally on the actions of governments that are the "only buyers in the arms market in the Alliance, who control export sales and who are in most nations the only ones able to finance the development of products.""1'

PART

TWO

The Domestic Context

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CHAPTER

FOUR

The Defence Industrial Base: Domestic Policy Context and Industry Review Directly or indirectly, changes in the international economic and security environment, governmental policy initiatives related to defence economic relations, and corporate responses to both of the above have a powerful and unavoidable impact on the export-oriented Canadian defence industry. But government policies pertaining to that industry are no less affected by external variables. Over the past four years since the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis and the rapid conclusion of the war that followed, the impact of these factors has been highlighted by a series of parliamentary debates over Canadian export policy regarding defence products, following the approval of General Motors' sale to Saudi Arabia of i ,117 light armoured vehicles (LAVS) produced in London, Ontario. More recently, a proposed sale of frigates by Saint John Shipbuilding to Saudi Arabia has whetted parliamentary concern over sales of weapons platforms to non-Allied recipients, especially those situated in troubled regions such as the Middle East.1 Whatever other issues it raised, the fact that the proposed LAV sale led to hearings on the criminal code and on the Export and Import Permit Act suggests another policy context that may set "boundary conditions" for the Canadian defence industry - namely, the political and economic realities of the domestic defence market. To be sure, the export policy review has not exactly dominated public discussion in Canada, not even among those few people who take a serious interest in procurement issues. Two other matters - the dispute over the perceived favouritism shown to Quebec by former Defence Minister Marcel Masse in the awarding of several major new defence contracts and the controversy surrounding the support given by his successor Kim Campbell to a prior decision to purchase fifty EH-IOI helicopters (at a total program cost of more than $5 billion) - have

62 The Domestic Context

received far more publicity.2 Whatever the merit of the criticisms levelled at the two ministers, the fact that attacks such as these are made so regularly clearly indicates that one must not lose sight of the domestic context when examining the recent politics of Canadian defence acquisition.3 Accordingly, this chapter begins with a review of the domestic policy environment within which the Canadian defence industry has evolved. We also explore the salient contours of the contemporary policy context, paying special attention to the roles and interests of the major actors, including those in key federal government departments. We then summarize the dominant characteristics of the Canadian defence industrial base before concluding the chapter with a brief analysis of the sectoral structure and composition of the industry. THE DOMESTIC POLICY ENVIRONMENT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The history of the Canadian defence industrial base (DIB) since World War ii has been characterized by two main trends. The first is closer cooperation with, and integration into, the U.S. defence industry and market; the second is the shift away from the domestic production of major platforms towards a concentration on subsystems and components.4 The origins of the first trend can be traced back to the Ogdensburg Declaration, signed on 18 August 1940, in which Prime Minister Mackenzie King and President Franklin Roosevelt agreed to coordinate defence production, and from which would emerge the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. This declaration was significant for two reasons: for Canada, it was a recognition that this country was part of North America, with vital interests linked to continental defence and cooperation with Washington; for the United States, it marked an awareness of Canada's importance as an element in continental military and industrial preparedness.5 King and Roosevelt met again on 20 April 1941, eight months after their Ogdensburg encounter, at the president's private residence in New York's Hudson River Valley. The result of this second meeting — the Hyde Park Declaration - signalled their intention to "develop a coordinated program of requirements, production, and procurement."'1 This second statement of purpose was a major step on the road to a North American defence market and fostered the expectation that the border between the two countries would, in effect, be eliminated almost completely with respect to all defence-related concerns,

63 The Defence Industrial Base

whether purely military or defence economic. Defence production from that time would increasingly be contemplated in continental rather than national terms, though it has to be said that this perspective has been more evident in Canada than in the United States.7 Since the early 19405, some fifty bilateral defence production agreements have been signed by Ottawa and Washington, conforming to the spirit of the Ogdensburg and Hyde Park Declarations. In particular, an exchange of notes on 26 October 1950 reaffirmed the principle of joint defence production and resource sharing set out in the latter declaration, through the issuance of a new Statement of Principles of Economic Cooperation, which was subsequently incorporated into the u.s. armed-services procurement regulations. Bilateral defence economic transactions increased rapidly during the 19508 as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War and of subsequent mobilization efforts, with u.s. military procurement from Canada reaching $300 million in FY1952. Canadian purchases from the United States between April 1951 and December 1952 totalled approximately $850 million.8 Once the Korean conflict ended, however, these levels fell rapidly and both governments tended to favour their domestic industries in a shrinking market. However, to the amount of defence equipment being traded should be added the sums transferred under the u.s. Defense Production Act, both to obtain "strategic minerals" for the National Defense Stockpile and to expand Canadian productive capacity in some of these minerals (especially nickel). 9 The 19508 also witnessed the rapid expansion of the Canadian defence industry under the leadership of C.D. Howe's new Department of Defence Production, established in 1951. By 1957, for example, the industry was producing a variety of piston and jet engines (including, among the latter, the Orenda and Iroquois); it had also developed a strong electronics sector and was selling small numbers of aircraft to the United States and shipping much larger numbers to the European allies.10 This swelling in Canadian defence production capabilities was taking place even though, once the post-Korean War demobilization began, neither Ottawa nor Washington was particularly anxious to expand continental defence economic cooperation; indeed, it could be argued that the stagnation in bilateral procurement was the cause of this outward thrust. By 1958, however, the Canadian defence industry was facing a crisis and Canada became the first NATO member to experience structural disarmament, although no one identified the problem in those words at the time. Despite undeniable technical successes and achievements, Canada's defence industry suffered the effects of the collision between the spiralling costs of advanced-technology weapons platforms and a

64 The Domestic Context

limited domestic market. The crisis hit home with the cancellation of the CF-1O5 Avro Arrow aircraft; in abandoning that program, Canada was effectively also abandoning future domestic development prospects for entire major weapons systems. In this new context, Ottawa and Washington agreed in 1959 to the Defence Production Sharing Program (also known as "Arrangement," thus its acronym, DPSA), the essence of which, from the Canadian perspective, was the "removal of obstacles that prevented Canadian firms from bidding for u.s. defence contracts on an equal basis with their u.s. competitors, and the consolidation of these gains by embodying them not only in u.s. procurement regulations, but in the behaviour of procurement agencies and of u.s. and Canadian firms."11 When the DPSA was reviewed four years later, a new provision was added to the original objectives, stating that, henceforth, each side should seek to maintain "a rough long-term balance in reciprocal defence procurement at increasing levels." (During the late 19805, this goal was to come under critical reexamination in the face of persistently large American surpluses - an issue to which we shall return in chapter 5-) 12 Also in 1963, both sides signed a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperative R&D projects, especially with respect to joint funding and permission for Canadian firms to bid on American defence R&D contracts funded solely by the u.s. government. The resulting Defence Development Sharing Arrangement (DDSA) was intended to complement the DPSA by helping Canadian industry to take part in the early stages of new systems development aimed at meeting future Pentagon requirements.13 As a result of the Arrow decision and the subsequent signing of the DPSA and DDSA, the defence industry in Canada "increasingly evolved into a subsystem/component supplier to both the DoD and American prime contractors. Other export opportunities for specialized Canadian products evolved in large part from this relationship with the United States.'"4 Whatever arguments might be made about the sovereignty implications of this dependence on access to the u.s. defence market - or, for that matter, on whether there existed any realistic alternative to dependence if maintaining defence industrial capabilities was deemed to be necessary - the new relationship clearly did make the domestic industry vulnerable to shifts in the trade and economic policy climate of the United States. And as neither set of sharing arrangements held treaty status, they were and remain open to alterations, restrictions, or simple evasions on the part both of Congress and of successive administrations - a flaw that was exposed about a decade after they had been signed.

65

The Defence Industrial Base

As part of a comprehensive review of the United States' international economic relationships, Treasury and Commerce Department officials sought in 1971 to eliminate a number of bilateral Canadau.s. trade irritants. Among those irritants, they cited a Canadian surplus in defence trade (largely a result of Department of Defense procurements during the Vietnam War), as well as the lo-percent preference given by Ottawa to Canadian companies seeking the award of new domestic defence contracts. Although the trade talks were broken off in 1972, the intrusion of the Treasury and Commerce Departments into the domain of bilateral defence economic relations, and the linkage of such issues to broader u.s. economic policy concerns, marked a significant departure from American practice of the previous few years. With the u.s. Department of Defense no longer the sole manager on its side of the relationship, the sharing program became more "vulnerable to modification, or even termination, through bargaining trade-offs for what Canada perceived to be highly questionable criteria.'"5 It is perhaps difficult to justify the accusation implied in the term "highly questionable criteria," given Ottawa's own constant focus upon the economic aspects of the DPSA and DDSA (particularly the former), but in retrospect this episode can nonetheless be seen as a harbinger of the change in the nature of the bilateral defence economic relationship that occurred by the late 19808 and early 19908. The defence trade balance during the past decade has shifted heavily in favour of u.s. industry; even so, the general economic malaise in the United States during the past few years has fostered a sense that the country's trading partners are "taking advantage" of it, and this has led to renewed pressures — from the Congress rather than the administration, this time - being directed at the defence-sharing arrangements. Concomitant with this rise in resentment in the United States has been a call by the Canadian defence industry for the bilateral defence trade relationship to be placed on the same treaty basis as trade in the nonmilitary sector. This shows clearly that defence company representatives recognize the critical importance of access to the u.s. defence market and are keenly aware of their present vulnerability to political interventions by Congress in response to pressure from domestic interest groups in the United States.'*' While the Canadian industry's sense of vulnerability was triggered by the Nixon administration's interventions in the early 19708, the defence policy review initiated at about the same time by the government of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau promised to have a more severe and immediate impact on the structure and composition

66 The Domestic Context of the domestic defence industry. The details of the defence policy review need not occupy us here; suffice it to note that for Canadian defence producers, the failure to carry through on procurement plans mooted by the Pearson government, coupled with a virtual moratorium on new procurement projects, was to result in "a major erosion of Canada's military capabilities and ... a concomitant erosion of Canada's defence industrial base.'"7 Until the Defence Structure Review was initiated in December 1974, the domestic aerospace and defence industry relied on such civilian and export sales as it could find to maintain at least some of its rapidly deteriorating capabilities.18 The second phase of the review, which was completed in November 1975, established a revised funding formula for the Department of National Defence (DND) whereby the budget would be indexed to inflation and capital equipment procurement funds would increase by an additional 12 percent a year until such time as they accounted for 20 percent of total defence spending. The funding increases resulting from the review proved invaluable for the rebuilding or expansion of what had since 1959 become the major elements of the Canadian defence manufacturing base - aircraft components, defence electronics (especially systems integration), ships, small arms, and light armoured and other vehicles. Of course, those increases in funding were from a base that had been lowered substantially as a result of earlier spending reductions imposed by the first of Trudeau's defence reviews in the late ig6os. Reports published at the close of the Trudeau era suggested that the government had only approved slightly more than half of the procurement funding estimated to be required to cover the necessary replacement of obsolete equipment until the end of the century.' 9 The period from the late 19605 to mid-1970s was further noteworthy because two "givens," or parameters, of future procurement policy became established: tight budget constraints accompanied by vacillating government direction; and the requirement that offset provisions be attached to all major equipment purchases from foreign sources (including the United States). The deferment, scaling-back, or outright cancellation of projects previously proposed under Prime Minister Lester Pearson, the period of spending freeze, and then the reversal of policy in the Defence Structure Review resulted in a pattern in Canadian defence procurement decisions that came to resemble nothing so much as, in the words of one commentator, "ad hoc obsolescence management."'50 It was this unpredictable, short-term, and fundamentally reactive procurement environment that the 1987 Defence White Paper, Challenge and Commitment, was supposed to correct, with its emphasis on long-term planning, greater and more

67

The Defence Industrial Base

dependable funding for "essential" procurement projects, and better industrial-preparedness planning. The 1987 White Paper, or more precisely its subsequent gutting in the April 1989 budget, merely continued (albeit in dramatic form) the trend established in the early 19708.*' The familiar cycle of procurement proposals, policy reversals, and new proposals at furtherreduced levels was on display again in the span of only a few months between late 1991 and early 1992, beginning with the unveiling of what was supposed to have been the country's "new" defence policy in September 1991. This new policy lasted until February 1992, when as part of its budgetary revisions the government announced an additional force structure reduction of i ,000 troops and the reversal of its decision to retain a stationed task force of 1,100 troops in Europe after 1995. In a similar display of pinchbeck consistency, Defence Minister Marcel Masse announced on 7 April 1992 a $1.8 billion procurement plan for 100 new helicopters and 229 light armoured vehicles, to be acquired respectively from Bell Helicopter Textron (Mirabel, Quebec) and GM Diesel Division (London, Ontario); but he also cancelled the planned procurement of a $2.8 billion batch of multirole combat vehicles, which had been announced the previous September.22 The vacillation and unpredictability of the Mulroney government in the matter of defence policy, and the undeniable influence that broader financial or other economic policy considerations had on defence policy, were not a departure from the trend established during the late 19605 but rather its most recent iteration. 25 Whatever the validity of the criticisms directed at former Defence Minister Masse (principally that he unduly "favoured" Quebec firms), the debates over the Bell Helicopter Textron contract also highlight the second given of the defence procurement policy process in Canada - namely, the requirement for various forms of offsets and "regional industrial benefits." The effective abandonment in 1959 of domestic production of major non-naval weapons systems or platforms to meet the needs of the Canadian Forces, which implied that a proportionate amount of D N D procurement dollars would be spent with foreign suppliers, "provided the catalyst for a 'new' comprehensive defence-purchasing strategy."'"''1 Beginning with the competition to provide the new long-range patrol aircraft and later with the new fighter aircraft program, the "issue of industrial benefits to Canada from weapons procurements emerged, and was to remain, as a primary political and economic consideration in defence decision-making."2"' The use of offsets or industrial-benefits provisions was viewed as a valuable means of maintaining some domestic defence industrial

68 The Domestic Context capabilities and reducing the potential political fallout resulting from the expenditure of large sums of DND money outside Canada. As two students of the issue have put it, offsets and industrial benefits were attractive in that they enabled the "central purchasing agency to place major contracts with offshore suppliers and simultaneously guarantee substantial orders for domestic firms.""'1 Beginning in 1986, there was a shift in emphasis away from quantitative measures of benefits and offsets towards such qualitative and long-term gains as the inflow of technological knowledge. Such gains were considered to be much more valuable than the earlier "build-to-print orientation of recent military procurement," which had been criticized in the 1983 Report of the Advisory Committee on Aerospace Development as precluding "any real state-of-the-art improvement in Canadian engineering or design."27 The implementation of the industrial-benefits policy in the 19705 served to reinforce the preexisting trend towards integration of Canadian defence companies into the u.s. defence market as specialized subcontractors. Because of the need to fulfil the new offset requirements, u.s. prime contractors intensified their relationships with Canadian suppliers and in some cases established subsidiaries in Canada. These two trends - integration and specialization - were strength ened with the creation in 1987 of the North American Defence Industrial Base Organization ( N A D I B O ) , although under the current rapidly changing environment that organization has become comatose, at least temporarily.28 By the early 19908, these facets of the Canadian defence industry were combining with two dominant characteristics of the domestic policy environment pertaining to defence procurement issues - uncertainty resulting from budgetary constraints and from the lack of longterm leadership and direction on the part of the government; and the use of procurement budgets, such as they are, in the pursuit of domestic economic and political policy objectives - in a manner reminiscent of the concerns raised in the early 19705 about access to the u.s. market. A defence industry heavily dependent upon, and integrated into, the North American defence market today faces u.s. industries that are increasingly bent upon maintaining their own production capabilities and employment levels. The use of industrialbenefit requirements, especially by Canada but also by some other NATO allies, is being criticized in the United States as a pernicious form of "double-dipping," and Congress has been pressing for the review of existing bilateral defence industrial and trade memoranda of understanding, purportedly to take u.s. economic interests more fully into account. At the same time, the Canadian defence industry

69 The Defence Industrial Base

must seek to plan as best it can in the face of myriad uncertainties over the future of DND procurement budgets and of government policy turnabouts and pressures for further defence budget reductions to generate a "peace dividend" from the ending of the Cold War. The domestic policy context becomes more important, yet also more difficult to fathom. THE

CONTEMPORARY

DOMESTIC

CONTEXT

In a 1988 article written for the defence journal Forum, W.L. Claggett, sales manager of Defence Product Sales at General Motors of Canada's Diesel Division, discussed the "government-industry duet" that characterized the normal operating environment for defence industries based in Canada. Claggett identified some fifteen offices in five government departments and agencies with which his division was in routine contact in its pursuit of defence contracts at home and abroad.29 A major concern raised in the article, and expressed at numerous defence industry conferences, was that "it is often difficult to determine who is supposed to occupy the leadership role," especially on the issue of international defence sales.3" In truth, "duet" is a misleading term, because it understates the chaos that reigns in the defence-industrial concert hall in Canada. To begin with, in discussions of the domestic policy context and the policy-making process pertaining to the defence industrial base, many analyses tend to leave out perhaps the most important bureaucratic actor, since it is one without a direct and immediate presence. We refer to the Department of Finance, which plays a powerful role in establishing the conditions within which the other, more directly involved, departments must operate. As two DND officials have noted, "the government has set the broader fiscal context for defence policy — and, indeed all government operations - through its commitment to reduce Canada's accumulated national debt ... This fiscal context has specific implications for the Department of National Defence [since] the defence budget is seen as a discretionary item." 5 ' In the 1989 federal budget, planned defence expenditures were to be reduced by $2.74 billion over five years; the 1990 budget subtracted a further $658 million from future DND coffers. The defence policy announced in September 1991, as modified in the February 199 federal budget, included additional reductions of $258 million for 1992-93 and $272 million for 1993-94, [projected] defence spending has been cut by close to $6 billion."3' The Chretien government's first budget, unveiled in late February

70 The Domestic Context 1994, did something novel: it actually reduced defence spending instead of simply paring back "projected defence budgets." Although the oft-cited figure of $7 billion in defence cuts between 1994 and 1999 involved some elimination of projected increases, there was no blinking the fact this time: actual defence spending in current-year dollars would be reduced. From a figure of $11.3 billion in 1993-94, defence spending is to decline to $10.8 billion in 1994-95 and $10.5 billion in 1995-96. By the latter date, it is estimated that defence spending as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) will have shrunk to 1.5 percent.33 Within this general context of budgetary constraints, defence companies must still seek a livelihood; in doing so, they find themselves dealing with the multitude of departments and agencies customarily referred to in most studies of the domestic policy environment for defence industry issues. Table 4.1 summarizes the relevant federal government actors, including those specific directorates or offices within departments with particularly significant defence industryrelated roles; the mandates or areas of responsibility of the departments and directorates or offices; and the main policy instruments at their disposal.34 The table represents the wide variety of actors, mandates, and instruments with which defence industries in Canada must attempt to deal.35 It also indicates the number of sources of assistance - in planning, marketing, and finance - to which these industries ma turn. From the industry's perspective, the bureaucracy is far from being entirely constraining, not to say menacing; there is also a beneficial side of the story, as shown in Table A-5, where the notes offer insights into the potential advantages associated with multiple and overlapping bureaucratic mandates. However beneficial some aspects of this bureaucratic web of jurisdictions may be, the competing and often contradictory demands on industry continue to draw criticism - and not only from the defence companies. One issue, in particular, can be guaranteed to raise eyebrows: the requirement for industrial and regional benefits. These are of special interest in the United States, where much scrutiny has been brought to bear on whether industrial and regional benefits requirements (IRBS) violate the spirit of the DPSA and DDSA. They have also featured largely in the domestic policy debate. IRBS have proven to be a useful policy tool with which successive governments in Canada have sought to direct defence expenditure towards the achievement of regional economic objectives.3t) Their value has inhered primarily in the fact that defence spending represents such a large proportion more than a third - of the federal government's discretionary funds

7i

The Defence Industrial Base

Table 4. i Canada's Defence Industrial Base: Major Federal Government Actors and Policy Instruments Department/agencty and selected

Defence industial base-related mandates/

key directorates

activities and policy instruments

Department of National Defence - Maritime/Land/Air Doctrine and Operations - Associate Deputy Minister (Materiel) - Director General, International and Industry Programs (includes D I M R ) - Chief, Research and Development

User department: - establishing current and future supplv requirements - R&n and life-cycle support - international cooperative programs (i jni's); industrial preparedness planning and analysis in n n m - in-house R&n for Canadian Forces, using CRAD budget (Defence Industrial Research Program)

External Affairs and International Trade Canada (KAITC, now OKA IT) - International Marketing Bureau, Aerospace and Defence Program Division

Primary responsibility for defence trade activities and promoting international trade: - prepare profiles of short-and mediumterm export market opportunities for key sectors (defence and civilian aerospace and marine products - provide' potential foreign customers with information on Canadian industrial capabilities; and assist Canadian companies' export efforts - increase access to i'.s. R D P defence and commercial markets via DDSA and DI-SA; and manage Ri)i' defence arrangements with European nations, including Task Force on Kurope 1992 recommendations - enhance/maintain Defence Program Strategy of "Going Global" - export controls and permit programs

Supply and Services Canada/Canadian Commercial Corporation (ssc/ccc, nov nos/ccc)

ssc/ix.s is the department responsible for handling all D N D contracts in Canada; c.cc facilitates foreign (especially I T .S.) purchases of military items on a government-togovernment basis. - collect information on defence procurement and mil capabilities (e.g., Defence Industrial Base Review 1987, Federal Procurement Database) - Canadian Content Policy; Open Bidding Policy; and Procurement Review Board (non-defence items)

72

The Domestic Context

Table 4.1 (cont'd) Defmrtmmt/agmcy and selected km directorates

Defence industrial base-related mandates/ activities and policy instruments

Industry, Science and Technology Canada (ISTC, now ic and sc)

Mandated to plan and implement industrial support programs in Canada relating to regional industrial development, trade and commerce, including defence industries. - Defence Industry Productivity Program (DIPP): oversight oi'nipp funds - Program for Export Market Development (PKMD) coordination - Industrial and Regional Benefits Policy as part of Canadian Annual Procurement Strategy (CAPS) - preparation of industry profiles and statistical analyses; and emergency planning coordination

Export Development Corporation (KIH:)

Government financing, guarantees and insurance for international sales - restricted to Canadian content only of defence products

Sourer. Compiled from Claggett, "Government-industry duet"; C.tiuddnin Defence Industry (iii/de, it)t)* Chief, Research and Development, the Defence Industrial Research Program, Department o National Defence; Y/nn Way to the C,tn>ernment Market: Arcexs In the Federal Procurement Dnlnhasr, Sandor, "Notes for a Speech"; and R. Thomas, "Canadian Annual Procurement Strategy."

and that, unlike other forms of discretionary expenditure, it is bound by neither legal agreement nor statutory obligation/" Equally significant, GATT restrictions and Canada-u.s. Free Trade Agreement conditions that limit the discriminatory use of procurement so as to favour domestic industry do not apply to matters related to national security and defence expenditure.:^8 Despite these advantages, both the use of defence spending to pursue non-defence objectives and the more particular impact of IRB requirements on the Canadian defence industrial base have come under critical scrutiny at home for several reasons. First, although the IRB policy established in 1986 by Industry, Science and Technology Canada (ISTC, now Industry Canada and Science Canada) considers the foremost priorities in procurement to be operational requirements, competition, and accessibility, followed by lesser objectives such as industrial and regional development, IRBS can nonetheless determine who will win and who will lose the competition for contracts. As one analyst has summed it up so well, "a satisfactory IRB proposal cannot make an otherwise unsatisfactory bid acceptable.

73

The Defence Industrial Base

The converse, however, is also true. An otherwise satisfactory bid can lose because of an unsatisfactory IRB proposal."39 Mindful of this, companies bidding for defence contracts have had to juggle the competing demands of the user department (DND) and the department judging the IRB proposals ( I S T C / I C ) , with the former insisting on efficiency in resource allocation (that is, on achieving the lowest cost of producing a given level of defence capability) and the latter emphasizing regional equity.40 A second criticism of the IRB process has been that by frequently involving the establishment of new production facilities in Canada, it has served to stimulate overcapacity, thereby exacerbating the defence industry's dependence on exports. Companies involved in high-technology production, it has been remarked, "require very rich diets," and it is far from certain that they can find sufficient new work once their original contracts have been completed. 4 ' While the industrial benefits policy of the past twenty years has served to facilitate the establishment in Canada of some companies and production capabilities not hitherto present, the focus on investment in new companies becomes counterproductive for the economic health of the industry when it creates excess capacity. By dint of increasing overcapacity, this policy may weaken or undermine established companies' prospects. Accordingly, officials at ISTC, as well as industry representatives, have been suggesting that the IRB requirements associated with future defence contracts should place greater emphasis on supporting existing production facilities in Canada, not on creating new competitors. 42 That it confronts defence contractors with confusing departmental overlapping and creates excess capacity have not been the only charges levelled against IRB policy; according to industry executives testifying before the Senate Special Committee on National Defence in 1984, the policy in force at that time provided merely "low tech scraps of weapons systems developed abroad in return for the political illusion of jobs" and was clearly intended chiefly to make defence budgets more palatable to cabinet and to public opinion. 43 The use of defence spending to achieve economic policy goals has itself been criticized because "other public expenditures may be just as effective, if not more so, in influencing regional patterns of employment and incomes," despite the ostensible advantages of defence expenditures alluded to earlier.44 The IRB policy revisions announced by the federal government in May 1986 were intended to allay those criticisms. The new policy concentrated on such qualitative benefits as technology transfer and R&D to be performed in Canada; investment and product development; and licensing agreements. The aim was "to create long-term,

74 The Domestic Context sustainable economic activity in Canada that results in goods and services which are internationally competitive."45 In addition, in order to streamline the process and reduce the administrative load on smaller Canadian companies, ISTC indicated that in the future it would not seek IRBS on contracts valued at less than $100 million; instead, IRB requirements would be applied only to major crown projects.]b The procurement of the Martin Marietta-Oerlikon Buhrle air defence/and-tank system (ADATS) to meet Canadian Forces requirements for a low-level air defence capability, because of the industrial benefits arrangements associated with the project, has been touted as an example of how the new IRB policy should work. The Oerlikon contract involved "certain world product mandates with export possibilities, technology transfer and investment in the defence industrial base, combined with a regional development programme which satisfies DND'S needs."47 Since 1986, when the choice of the new system was made - or, more to the point, since 1989 when the above comments were written - the changing international security environment and the decision to withdraw all Canadian troops from Europe and close the two Canadian Forces bases in Germany have left the question of export potential in serious doubt while effectively eliminating the original DND rationale for the entire project. In fairness, this may be less an observation on the logic of either the IRB requirements or the procurement selection process than on how quickly the external security context has been transformed and how ad hoc defence policymaking by the federal government can sometimes contradict its own recent and costly procurement choices. Nevertheless, the low-level air defence project did not address the concern expressed about creating new companies or projects in Canada that would depend on exports to survive. In the end, this may prove to have been a major flaw, given changing market conditions, though it was initially considered an excellent opportunity.48 The Oerlikon contract did offer work for a number of existing hightechnology industries in Canada, including Litton Systems Canada, CAE Electronics, Devtek Corporation, Dowty Canada, Lavalin Incorporated, and Spar Aerospace. However, if the long-term value of the project to these companies depends on success in obtaining extensive export sales, as seems to be the case, then the final judgment on the procurement program is likely to be less positive than the one made in 1989. Aside from this particular controversial example, a number of possible changes in the management of industrial policies - not just those pertaining to the defence sector but others of a more general nature

75

The Defence Industrial Base

regarding all government procurement - suggest that the difficulties created by the complex departmental web of regulations and responsibilities have been recognized and that complaints from industry groups such as the Forum for Industrial Participation (formerly the Canadian Industrial Benefits Association) have been heard in relevant government offices. Formal evaluation of the long-term economic benefits - industrial and regional - actually attained from the new I R B policy has not yet been undertaken, partly because of the short lapse of time since the new policy's inception. Nevertheless, a review of that policy has been set into motion to identify means of improving its implementation. Moreover, the Canadian content policy announced by Supply and Services Canada (currently Public Works and Government Services Canada), effective from i April 1992, was intended to simplify all government procurement procedures by replacing with a single set of guidelines the eleven policies previously existing affecting "Canadian content." 49 Although still in their early stages, it is apparent that neither the IRB review nor the new Canadian content policy has resolved the problem of competing government objectives and mandates - a problem cited both by industry groups and by federally appointed study teams such as the Defence Industrial Preparedness Task Force.'° However, the measures adopted should at least reduce the burden of paperwork and additional time facing companies seeking to fulfil IRB demands or to determine whether their products meet Canadiancontent levels. At the same time, there is concern that the revised federal regulations on content policy might expose Canadian manufacturers to competition from international companies, some of which receive considerable support from national governments. Be that as it may, it seems safe to predict that, insofar as the domestic policy context is concerned, current priorities will remain largely unchanged, with defence trade and procurement continuing to play second fiddle to domestic political and economic realities.

CANADA'S DEFENCE INDUSTRIAL BASE: A SECTORAL ANALYSIS Despite some rather exaggerated claims and occasional trivializations to the contrary, the first and most general remark to make regarding defence production in Canada is that there does not now exist, and has never existed, a "military-industrial complex" comparable to what is found in the United States, the larger European countries, or for that matter, even in neutral Sweden.5' Anv claims that Canada has a

76 The Domestic Context military lobby of some 500,000 to three million members with the military, economic, political, and bureaucratic clout to distort the country's defence policy would seem to be betrayed by the relatively quick and comprehensive demise of the 1987 White Paper, as well as by subsequent (and repeated) program deferments and cancellations, the frequent zigzags in government procurement plans, and the demonstrated power of other departments (such as Finance and ISTC/IC) to press their competing claims on limited public funds. 53 The complicated reality of the domestic policy context is far removed from caricatured versions of a military-industrial complex, even though defence lobby groups certainly do exist (as they do for any other industry), and even though former high-ranking military officers are found in the executive ranks of the corporate sector, where their understanding of DND requirements and knowledge of remaining personnel can offer some advantages to their new employers. The second point worthy of note, partly derivative of the first, is that the macroeconomic impact of Canadian defence industries is limited, whether measured as a percentage of gross national product, of trade, or of the total domestic workforce.53 Admittedly, within particular industry sectors and geographic regions, its importance can be much greater, a point we highlight below. Third, and again at this very general level, the defence industry is incapable of fulfilling the equipment needs of the Canadian Forces, even after (or despite) the reductions and revisions announced in September 1991, February 1992, and February 1994. Indeed, it has been neither structured nor tasked to fulfil those needs since the late 19508. One particular characteristic of the Canadian defence industrial base is that it is composed primarily of small and medium-size enterprises, with sales of under $100 million per year. Foreign ownership of defence industries is also comparatively high - at more than 60 percent - in relation to the situation in other countries, and it is especially prevalent among the largest firms. This reflects, for the most part, the decision in the late 19505 to abandon domestic development of major systems, but it also is a consequence, as we have argued, of subsequent IRB policies requiring foreign companies competing for DND contracts to establish production facilities in this country. Finally, the Canadian defence industry is characterized by an extremely heavy dependence on exports in order to remain economically viable, with the largest percentage being sent to the United States. Within the defence industry, the major areas of strength are in aerospace, electronics, and communications, where there exists some capability for total systems-design integration. This capability, however,

77 The Defence Industrial Base

requires considerable technical and financial support, and this can be obtained or developed most easily by the subsidiaries of larger foreign companies, such as Paramax Electronics (prior to the EH-IOI cancellation) and Oerlikon Aerospace.54 Significantly, although there has been growth in western Canada and although the shipbuilding industry in the Atlantic provinces is almost entirely defence-dependent, defence production has been geographically concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, particularly in the "golden triangle" of Toronto-OttawaMontreal.5"' A number of other basic strengths and weaknesses of the Canadian defence industrial base - opposite sides of the same coin, to a large extent - are commonly cited. Take the case of the integration of Canadian and American defence production via DPSA and DDSA and, at an administrative planning level, via NADIBO; this can and does offer Canadian companies favoured access to elements of the much larger u.s. market. Geographic proximity can itself be an advantage, in part as the Pentagon seeks to maintain a reliable variety of "planned producers" of essential defence-related goods. But integration also causes a number of immediate and potential difficulties, not the least of which is the uncertain status of the bilateral defence economic sharing regime. As we indicated earlier, without formal treaty status for the sharing arrangements, the access of Canadian-based industries to the American market will remain subject to gradual erosion through the application of nontariff and other barriers. It will also be hostage to any rise of protectionist sentiment in Congress, either as a result of rapidly declining domestic U.S. defence budgets or because of perceptions of protectionist policies or intentions elsewhere (ECQS and the IEPG'S initiatives, for example). Additionally, the reinvigoration of defence industry capabilities in Canada in the latter part of the 19708, and the use of industrial benefits requirements to expand these capabilities, have resulted in a defence industry with internationally recognized expertise in a variety of fields including flight simulators, gas turbines, major aircraft components, inertial navigation systems, microwave land systems, and other technologies geared towards specialized needs in aerospace and naval

subsystems or components.56 These specialized capabilities have in

turn given Canadian companies competitive advantages in individual niche markets and facilitated their export-sales orientation. However, this comes with a price tag - one that becomes less affordable during periods of lean international markets. As long as these technological skills have remained predominantly Canadian, the niche markets have been reasonably secure. Increasingly, however, as foreign companies or governments respond to a much reduced market and to the growing

78 The Domestic Context Table 4.2 Defence Industry Sector Profiles, 1988-90' Number

Sector

Aerospace Defence electronics2 Shipbuilding & ship repair Instrumentation

of establish- Employments me.nt

Total sales

Exports

($ millions)

($ millions)

200 150

63,650 26,330

5,990.0 1,723.0

47

12,250

1,568.4

475

25,871

1,952.0

4,175 1,381

36.4 791

Exports to United Exports/ Defencetotal sales dependent States

(%)

(%)

(%)

70 80

30 100

70 80

2.3

90

11

40.5

n.a.

69

Source. Industry, Science and Technology Canada, Industry Profile series (Ottawa, 1990—91). i Figures refer to is re: 1990—91 sector profiles reporting results for 1988 (aerospace), 1989 (defence electronics, shipbuilding) and 1990 (instrumentation), a Trade and employment statistics for the defence electronics sector are also included within the totals for the aerospace sector.

high-technology composition of defence products, competition in these niches can be expected to become much fiercer. As well, governments may be more inclined to favour domestic producers. Dependence on niche markets, whether in the United States or overseas, also requires that Canadian industries retain a skilled workforce, capable of adapting quickly to changing industrial processes and techniques. The recent recession may mask, but it does not eliminate, the chronic structural reality of the Canadian defence industry in this instance: the industry has traditionally faced shortages, or at least uncertain availability, of skilled production workers, experienced technologists, and engineers. In addition, the adoption by defence companies - especially second- and third-tier firms - of computer-aided design and manufacturing capabilities, total-quality-management techniques, just-in-time inventory controls, and concurrent engineering has been lagging and may result in their being increasingly vulnerable to competition from such new suppliers as South Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia.57 The core of the domestic defence manufacturing base remains the aerospace and defence electronics sectors, which in many cases are closely integrated: the aerospace industry statistics for trade and employment presented in Table 4.2, for example, include those for

79 The Defence Industrial Base

defence electronics and space technology companies. The table illustrates the basic composition of the defence industry, based on the most recent estimates available at the time from ISTC; lacking from the sectors listed is that of land systems, for which ISTC (or its successor, Industry Canada) as yet does not produce a sector profile. Obviously, care must be taken lest one read too much into these summary statistics. As mentioned above, the trade and employment figures for the defence electronics industry cannot be added to those for aerospace, shipbuilding, and instrumentation, since they are included as well within the aerospace statistics (as the avionics subsector). This caveat aside, one interesting finding, confirmed by discussions with officials of what was then ISTC, is that of the total sales for the Canadian aerospace industry in 1988 (almost $6 billion), only 30 percent were obtained from defence contracts. Among this latter set, 70 percent of sales dollars were derived from exports and 30 percent from domestic Canadian defence procurement. As a rough rule-ofthumb, therefore, the aerospace industry in Canada looked to domestic defence contracts in 1988 for $539.1 million, or 9 percent, of total sales - a share that had remained unchanged since at least 1985. Although as a proportion of defence sales the domestic market is still significant (at roughly 30 percent), the aerospace industry as a whole is certainly cushioned from the immediate impact of declining domestic defence spending. This does not, however, take into account the importance of domestic sales either to individual manufacturers or as a demonstration of a product's acceptance by DND; that latter point could, in turn, become a significant factor for other potential buyers. The preponderance of foreign ownership is evident in both the aerospace and defence electronics sectors, especially among the larger firms. Despite the purchase of de Havilland (previously owned by Boeing Aircraft Canada, a subsidiary of the U.S. defence contracto by Bombardier — a move with undoubtedly major implications for the domestic aerospace industry since it established a single, integrated manufacturer (a "national champion" perhaps?) - six of the top ten aerospace firms in Canada are foreign-owned. Among the ranks of the ten leading defence electronics companies, seven are subsidiaries of foreign parents. In both cases, the majority of foreign owners are located in the United States.58 The shipbuilding and ship repair industry, relatively small in comparison with the aerospace sector, is largely Canadian-owned and almost entirely dependent on domestic government contracts. The two largest shipyards in eastern Canada - MIL in Quebec and Saint

80 The Domestic Context John Shipbuilding in New Brunswick - possess approximately half the industry's capacity. It is worth noting that the two major naval programs - the Canadian patrol frigate and the Tribal-class update and modernization program - have both involved foreign subsidiaries (Paramax Electronics, owned by Unisys Corporation; and Litton Systems Canada) as suppliers of naval subsystems and for systems integration.59 The last sector that we wish to highlight briefly here is one not included in Table 4.2 — land systems. The pivotal companies in this precinct of the industry are Bombardier, General Motors' Diesel Division, and UTDC, although Oerlikon Aerospace and the Western Star Truck Company have gained some public prominence of late as a result of the criticisms directed at the low-level air defence procurement and the award of the light support vehicle wheeled (LSVW) truck contract, respectively. The GM plant, a subsidiary of General Motors of the United States, has also come under intense scrutiny, given that its sale of LAVS to Saudi Arabia was the occasion for parliamentary hearings on Canadian exports of defence-related products. Our sectoral review here has necessarily been abbreviated, intended merely to set the stage for our next chapter, in which we focus on the economic viability of the Canadian defence industry in the light of current market conditions in Canada and the United States, as well as overseas. Those conditions, a product of both governmental and private-sector decisions, increasingly take on a Darwinian aspect, and the remaining chapters are devoted to an assessment of the ability of the Canadian defence industry to engage in this struggle of the fittest.

CHAPTER

FIVE

Defence Production: Changing Markets and Economic Viability

If it is deemed advisable that a technologically advanced defence production capability be retained in Canada, beyond the confines of some form of limited, state-owned arsenal, then it follows that the defence industry must also be commercially viable. For this, three essential conditions must be met. First, Canadian-based manufacturers must maintain, and perhaps even expand, their access to the larger u.s. defence market. Second, in order to cushion their business against fluctuations or adverse trends in that market, other international purchasers must be cultivated. Finally, to provide business incentives within the domestic defence industrial base and increase imports from the United States - with a view to stimulating further export flows southward under the "rough balance" provision of the DPSA the Canadian government must increase its own defence capital expenditures. 1 In this and the following chapters, we set out to meld our earlier discussions of demand- and supply-side factors into an assessment of the marketing environment within which the Canadian defence industry must operate. Taking the question of the continuing viability of this country's defence industrial base as our framework for analysis, we will examine the recent evolution of the domestic defence industry, focusing, inter alia, on corporate and governmental initiatives and policies. Our inquiry will begin by considering the third of the market conditions introduced above - namely, domestic Canadian defence expenditures and changes in DND equipment requirements. Budgetary analysis will serve as our jumping-off point at this stage, for as one defence analyst has correctly observed, "much of what passes for defence policy formulation in Canada these days revolves around questions of the budget; how much the Forces have to spend, and, more importantly, what they intend to spend it on."" This budgetary

8s The Domestic Context

perspective will provide a handy means of determining both the priority given by the federal cabinet to national defence relative to other federal government programs, and within DND itself, to different branches of the armed services. This perspective will also provide insights into Ottawa's decisions about force posture - and about associated equipment requirements - by highlighting changes in the allocation of funds between personnel, operations, and maintenance, on the one hand, and capital, on the other. CANADA'S DEFENCE BUDGET The two major issues of interest in the context of the defence budget are the trends in the relative priority given to defence and the impact on equipment procurement of the funds specifically appropriated for the capital component of expenditures. We are hardly the first writers to draw attention to this dual aspect of DND'S contemporary funding crisis. "3 It could be argued that talk of a crisis in defence funding is misplaced, perhaps even alarmist. After all, the absolute level of defence expenditures, whether measured in budget-year or constantdollar terms, has risen steadily since the early to mid-1970s, following the Defence Structure Review. Between 1980 and 1990, for example, the defence budget grew from roughly $5 billion to slightly over $11 billion; it reached nearly $12 billion in FY 1992—93 before declining to $11.3 billion in FYiggg—94. 4 However, it would be erroneous to infer from these figures that DND has been able systematically to advance its departmental interests at the expense of competing departments or that defence budgets have grown at a "disproportionately" high rate in Canada.5 Relative to both gross domestic product and total federal outlays, post-1945 defence spending in Canada peaked during the Korean War, reaching nearly 7.5 percent of GDP in 1952. In subsequent years, it actually fell sharply until the 19708, recording a low of 1.6 percent in 1979, when it began to stabilize. By 1990, despite the apparent commitment of the Conservative government towards defence, the defence/GDP ratio was only slightly higher than its postwar low, at not quite 1.8 percent. Thus, over the past two decades, defence spending has remained below 2 percent of GDP, and the 1979 mark is likely to be eclipsed by the end of this decade, when that figure may decline to 1.5 percent as a result of GDP growth and further defence cuts.h As a share of total federal government expenditures, defence spending declined from a peak of 43.4 percent in 1952 to a low of 7.8 percent in 1982, rising to 8.1 percent in FYi99i~92. As with the GDP measure,

83

Defence Production

this latter indicator suggests that a steady state has been reached (at around 8 percent of federal outlays) since 1975; however, that proportion is expected to slide to 7 percent during the remainder of the iggos.7 The downward relative trend of defence expenditures over the past twenty years reflects both Ottawa's greater emphasis on social programs, which rose from 26.5 to 36.1 percent of federal spending between FY 1989-90 and FY 1991-92, and the large debt charges arising from these and other programs (including defence). Public debt servicing accounted for 25 percent of total federal government spending in FY 1993-94 - more than three times the amount expended on national defence.8 Defence will no doubt have to absorb its share of budget cuts in response to the government's ongoing fiscal difficulties (as well as to a changing and, at least temporarily, less menacing strategic environment), but it would be idle to believe that further defence budget reductions can do much to solve the deficit problem in the absence of more radical macroeconomic policy measures. If the critics of defence spending in Canada tend to overstate their case, might not the same argument be made respecting those who see not too much but too little public spending on defence? At the aggregate level, recent figures do not suggest an imminent crisis. As Dan Middlemiss notes, although defence does consume a much smaller share of GDP than it did in the 19508, as well as a reduced share of total federal outlays, "this is now a smaller percentage of a greatly expanded economy," and the general levels appear to have been quite stable. A more significant indicator, however, both for DND'S operational capabilities and for the prospects of its suppliers of defence-related products, is the ratio of the budget allocated to personnel, operations, and maintenance as opposed to capital expenditures - that is, expenditures on major equipment, buildings and facilities, and research and development. While there is no a priori "correct" ratio, D N D statements and defence analysts have customarily claimed that in order to maintain a capable and modern fighting force, regularly supplied with updated equipment, the department must allocate between 25 and 35 percent of its budget to capital programs. The 25-percent figure was initially accepted in the 1964 Defence White Paper; in the statement of Canadian defence policy made in April 1992, Defence Minister Marcel Masse noted that his department would seek to raise the capital share from just below 22 percent to 26 percent over the next five years, "while a target figure of 30 percent will be maintained." 9 The 1992 defence policy statement added that in order to achieve this higher relative level of capital spending, the share allocated to personnel must

84 The Domestic Context be reduced, with R&D expenditures remaining at their previous level of 5 percent. If past experience is any guide, there is not much likelihood that these targets will be attained. Indeed, one might be excused for viewing Masse's April 1992 statement as yet another incarnation of "dejd vu all over again" (in Yogi Berra's famous words). Since 1959, the 25-percent goal has been met in only one five-year period, 198488; since then, the proportion of capital spending has actually fallen, to nearly 21 percent in 1991-92. The "target figure of 30 percent" may make for good reading, but it has so far proven to be a will-o'the-wisp, not once having been reached since the 19508. Nor is the February 1994 budget, with its frontal assault on DND infrastructure costs, likely to contribute significantly to the attainment of that target; at best, a capital share of between 23 and 25 percent of defence spending can be anticipated.10 This failure to match rhetorical commitment with actual outlays is hardly unique to this country, and thus the shortfall in capital budgets does not amount to a crisis when Canada is compared with the rest of NATO. But in light of the long-term impact of the 1972 allocations to capital of only 7.8 percent, that failure has nonetheless created a serious cumulative shortfall in expenditures on equipment that, when measured in terms of the nominal target of 30 percent, amounts to some $19 billion since 1965. It is in this sense that one can claim that DND today faces an urgent need to replace obsolete or obsolescent equipment and that its operations have been impaired by a "chronic funding problem of crisis proportions." 11 THE "CRISIS" AND

THE

DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Although equipment obsolescence may seriously undermine DND'S ability to fulfil even its normal post-Cold War operational tasks - to say nothing of the equipment needs associated with the expanded commitment to peacekeeping and "peacemaking" mooted by the Liberal government - it would be reckless to think that this will generate substantial new domestic contract opportunities for Canadian defence companies. The April 1992 policy statement, for example, while arguing that the military must have "the tools to do the job," also recognized that higher priority needed to be accorded to other national economic and social policy objectives. Accordingly, the statement enjoined DND to "search rigorously for the minimum necessary in each category of expenditure"; the limited resources available for the capital budget under these circumstances "will be used frugally on the

85 Defence Production

highest priority items." This might be taken to imply that equipment that has become entirely obsolete and genuinely unsafe will be replaced, even though the example of the "low level air defence" (LLAD) contract suggests the opposite. 12 The "new" policy of DND for capital acquisitions during the second half of the 19905, as set out in the Conservative government's defence policy statement, emphasized multi-purpose roles for the Canadian Forces. This implies a constriction of the range of equipment types and also suggests that procurement of systems whose performance has already been demonstrated in the field may be desirable. That, in turn, would probably translate into fewer new contracts - though some individual contracts might be somewhat larger - and into an even greater emphasis on off-the-shelf procurement. The policy statement also indicated that equipment upgrades would be evaluated critically against their cost and that "unique Canadian solutions that require expensive and risky research, development or modification of existing equipment" would be avoided. In summary, "shortening the procurement cycle" would appear to be the continuing approach of the Liberal government.' 3 It is difficult to determine exactly how all this will affect those Canadian companies which specialize in unique technologies for DND requirements, but in general terms it seems likely that the policy will reduce their incentive to engage in new R&D activities. The interviews that we conducted suggest that there will be greater emphasis, by both companies and federal government departments, on further developing existing products rather than creating new ones.' 4 Although DND'S professed intention to seek to allocate a larger proportion of the Defence Services Program (DSP) to capital expenditures may make excellent sense from a military-operational point of view, there are good reasons to expect that economic and political factors will impede the department's ability to do so, all the while continuing to erode the purchasing power of existing capital funds. Such macroeconomic variables as fluctuations in the exchange rate and the rate of inflation can reduce the real value of the defence procurement budget. Inflation is a significant concern, as the Treasury Board no longer compensates DND for its full impact; the shift from the DND Economic Model to the GDP deflator in economic analysis means, in the words of one observer, that the "real [i.e., adjusted for true defence-related inflation] growth in defence spending has been overstated by about 1.7 percent annually," on average, since FV198586.'5 Variations in the exchange rate are also significant, since DND procures much of its equipment from outside Canada because of the specialized nature of the domestic defence industrial base.

86 The Domestic Context Such fluctuations affect the capital portion of the defence budget more than any other element, for two main reasons. First, most of DND'S acquisitions of major new equipment (except ships) since 1959 have been from the United States, but the Canadian dollar has almost always traded below par with the u.s. dollar during this period - by more than 20 percent in recent years. Second, the long-standing tendency for the costs of advanced-technology defence products to increase at a rate surpassing that of "normal" inflation - that is, the trend towards structural disarmament, to which we referred in chapter 3 - did not simply end when the Cold War did. Whether or not DND succeeds in meeting its stipulated goal of spending 26 percent of the DSP on capital by 1995-96 - and we think it will not - these pressures will continue to erode the purchasing power of the defence procurement dollar. Apart from these more or less purely economic factors, domestic political and policy issues have intruded in such a way as to constrain DND'S freedom to decide the fate of its own budget. In order to reduce spending on other portions of the DSP, the department been trying to reduce the excessive domestic infrastructure it had retained from a time when the Canadian Forces were much larger. Eliminating redundant or underutilized facilities - which means, essentially, the closure of a large number of bases across Canada - would in turn allow DND to reduce the relatively large number of civilians in its employ who perform support and administrative functions for this oversized infrastructure.1'1 Despite occasional reports to the contrary, both DND and the community of defence analysts in Canada recognize that as many as half of the twenty-eight bases operating in early 1994 are redundant. The appointment by Marcel Masse, in mid-1992, of an advisory group to analyze the issue of base closures amounted, in effect, to little more than a means of laying the groundwork for yet another debate on the subject and, more to the point, shelving the politically contentious matter until the 1993 federal election had taken place.'7 One should not single out the governments of Brian Mulroney or Kim Campbell for criticism, however. Previous governments and political parties were equally adept at skirting the issue of infrastructure rationalization as the armed forces were being steadily downsized. In that respect, the federal budget unveiled on 22 February 1994 really did constitute something new - and not entirely unwelcome to the Canadian Forces' military leadership. What Finance Minister Paul Martin announced that day was nothing less than an attack on DND "overhead," ordering that twenty-one departmental facilities (including four bases) be closed and that an additional seven facilities be

87

Defence Production

reduced. These measures, coupled with further reductions and restructuring at National Defence Headquarters, will pare some 16,500 positions - slightly more than half of them civilian - from DND rosters by 1998.'* But even if the issue of pork-barrel politics, as represented by excess infrastructure, is now resolved - and we are not convinced that it is DND'S capital expenditures will continue to be affected by political considerations, and in particular by the expectation that all major crown projects (and, indirectly, smaller contracts as well) should provide industrial and regional benefits (IRBS). To our knowledge, no systematic analysis has been done of the financial premiums paid by DND in order to meet the new IRB objectives; but as one observer puts it, "this requirement still adds costs, complications and delays to DND'S equipment procurement programmes," and it is often the cause of acrimonious debates and intensive lobbying by political and business interests alike, as well as jockeying between federal departments "who seek to exploit it as an economic policy instrument."' 9 What does all this mean with respect to the capital spending targets announced in the April 1992 defence policy statement? The "bad news" for the Canadian defence industrial base is that the 26-percent target is unlikely to be attained, while the go-percent level is clearly a fanciful figure, unrelated to the real world. However, the "good news" is that the attack on overhead makes it unlikely that there will be a repeat of the nightmare of the early 19708, when capital acquisition nearly disappeared as a legitimate defence budgetary aspiration. But even if the government remains firm in its determination to weather the resistance mounted by a variety of groups affected by the February 1994 defence cuts, the actual purchasing power of capital appropriations will continue to be eroded by factors largely beyond DND'S control. And the government's fiscal restraint policy will continue to force the department to squeeze its capital expenditures - in absolute if not in relative terms — in order to meet the demands, realistic or not, for further reductions in the defence budget. THE

POLITICS

OF

CONTRACTING

While the effectiveness of DND'S efforts to bolster the capital portion of the DSP remains the key to the long-term prospects of the domestic defence market, this topic receives relatively limited public consideration. Far more attention, by comparison, is lavished on individual contract competitions and awards, not least because of the political controversies that major contracts regularly stir tip between winners

88

The Domestic Context

and losers, and between supporters and critics. By way of illustration, we consider a small sample of these contracts, including both ongoing and proposed future projects. When Defence Minister Masse announced on 7 April 1992 that General Motors' Diesel Division had been awarded a contract for 229 light-armoured vehicles (LAVS) to replace DND'S 25-year-old Lynx vehicles, senior department staff and other defence analysts applauded the decision. They saw it as an earnest of Ottawa's commitment to reequip its military with modern systems - in this instance, systems that had been combat-proven by u.s. forces in the Persian Gulf War."0 At the same time, they were aware that the $800 million LAV contract award followed the cancellation of existing plans for a much larger, $2.8-billion program for new multi-role combat vehicles. To be sure, the LAV contract provided General Motors with valuable additional work to supplement its Saudi Arabian order (and a possible Australian one) for the same vehicle, but the government's decision to abandon the earlier acquisition program illustrated the unpredictability and vulnerability of capital procurement plans to other policy considerations. The decision to withdraw all Canadian Forces personnel from Europe, announced in February 1992, effectively negated any possibility that the obsolescent Leopard Ci main battle tank would be replaced. WTiile a domestic tank production capability would not have been considered in any event, the substantially scaled-down LAV contract and the $2OO-million "light support vehicle wheeled" (LSVW) contract (awarded to the Western Star Truck Company of Kelowna, British Columbia) constituted the only two major domestic manufacturing projects to be undertaken for the land systems sector of the defence industry/' In the aerospace sector, DND'S capital-equipment acquisitions plans during the first half of the i 9908 initially revolved around two key projects, with a very distant third possibility. The two contracts (one still under way and the other cancelled by the new Liberal government) were both within the rotary-wing subsector - the "utility tactical transport helicopter" (or UTTH), and the controversial and short-lived "new shipborne aircraft" ( N S A ) . At the same time that the LAV award was being announced, Defence Minister Masse also gave notice of a contract for 100 new Model 412 helicopters from Quebec-based Bell Helicopter Textron Canada, worth approximately $1 billion. The primarily commercial design of the Bell helicopter could be modified for military purposes, and the aircraft was intended to replace Canada's aging fleet of 116 011-136 Kiowas, CH-135 Twin Hueys, and C H - i i 8

89

Defence Production

Iroquois in a variety of roles, including troop and supplies transport, inland search and rescue, and emergency medical evacuation.22 For this Canadian subsidiary of a large American manufacturer, the UTTH contract involved the creation of some fifty to 100 additional jobs, depending on the required rate of production after the start of delivery in 1994 and on the company's ability to remain an active participant in the Canadian helicopter market. The vast majority of Bell Helicopter's sales are made abroad, with 260 Model 4128 already in service in the United States, Japan, Germany, Norway, and Egypt.2'' The announcement of the contract, however, was immediately greeted with a number of widely reported accusations that Masse had deliberately directed the work to the Mirabel-based firm without adequate opportunity for competitive tendering from a rival manufacturer, Eurocopters Ltd. of Fort Erie, Ontario (previously MBB Helicopter Canada). The criticism of some of Masse's public statements, especially those regarding the disparity between Quebec's share of the defence procurement pie and its percentage of the national population (with the former being smaller), may well have been justified. But even if it was not, there arose a perception within federal departments that the minister was determined to make Quebec "Canada's arsenal," and this, it has been argued, did considerable damage to government officials' morale. 24 Criticism of the contract procedure itself, or of the choice of the Model 412, appears by contrast to be neither accurate nor reasonable. One industry publication, The Wednesday Report, noted that the selection criteria were known well in advance, that Eurocopter personnel were less critical of the final decision than media and political or other commentators, and that the selection process compared very favourably, in cost terms, with "the unending cost of the NSA acquisition process." 2 ' The decision to increase the number of helicopters in the UTTH contract from the original figure of forty to 100 raised further speculation, especially given Masse's remarks on increasing Quebec's share of defence expenditures. Again, however, this choice was consistent with DND'S policy of rationalizing its equipment inventory as it modernizes its forces: as indicated earlier, the greater number of Model 412s will be used to replace at least three types of helicopters now in service. This, it is argued, will enable DND to make long-term savings in operating and maintenance costs, as well as simplifying future training requirements. The logic of force modernization and rationalization may also be glimpsed in the case of the NSA program through which older Sea

90 The Domestic Context King and Boeing-Vertol Labrador helicopters were to be replaced by the EH-IOI, tendered by E.H. Industries (EHI) of Montreal. In this illfated and highly controversial instance, most of the public debates in Ottawa focused not so much on the particular choice of helicopter or the geographic location of the manufacturer of the aircraft as on the financial and political affordability of the project in the context of the post-Cold War era and the continuing domestic fiscal constraint. Although EHI'S original $5-billion proposal (for fifty-seven units) was reduced to fifty helicopters at a total acquisition cost of $4 billion, and subsequently to forty-three helicopters, the entire project came under considerable criticism and was eventually cancelled. Even those who supported the need for a new helicopter to replace aging Sea Kings and Labradors suggested various alternatives, such as the purchasing of fewer EH-IOIS with more limited advanced-technology features or consideration of alternative products such as the Sikorsky Seahawk, a Eurocopter model, or a new Sea King.*'' We shall return, in the next chapter, to a discussion of the debate that surrounded the EH-IOI program prior to its cancellation and of the impact of that decision. Apart from these high-profile and generally well-known capital acquisition plans, the April 1992 defence policy document contained a small shopping list of potential new major equipment programs for both the aerospace and shipbuilding industries. The study of a fixedwing aircraft, presumably intended to replace the CF-i8, suggested in the policy review, has led to little or no debate. This may be linked to its relatively distant time horizon, beyond the current fifteen-year planning cycled7 Somewhat more immediately relevant are two proposed naval programs — one for six new conventional submarines, and a second for a fleet of six corvettes - which are beginning to attract greater attention from critics and advocates alike. With its two principal navy contracts - the much troubled Canadian patrol frigate (CPF) and the Tribal-class "update and modernization project" (TRUMP) - theoretically scheduled for completion by 1996, the domestic shipbuilding and ship repair industry, more than any other subsector of the defence industry, faces an uncertain future. As indicated earlier, this industry remains especially dependent for new business on domestic government contracts, and in particular on those from DND. The proposed new programs, as they are currently defined, call for six new submarines to replace the older Oberon-class vessels, along with the corvettes; however, no firm timetable has been suggested for the latter program, although DND did initially state that the submarine project would not begin until 1994. The start date, of course, presupposed that the conventional submarine proposal will

91

Defence Production

not meet the same fate as that of its nuclear-powered predecessor, announced in the 1987 Defence White Paper.28 Without work on these new major naval programs being undertaken prior to the completion of the CPF and TRUMP contracts, the Canadian Maritime Industries Association has warned that Canada stands to lose a large portion of its existing shipbuilding and ship repair industry. The association has proposed that the submarine and corvette programs be started soon and that the procurement methodology be changed so as to replace the boom-and-bust pattern of intermittent large contracts by a more constant production of warships at a lesser rate.29 Some critics of the proposed new programs, who suggest instead the procurement of additional frigates to take advantage of the current CPF production, thereby improving scale economies as well as support costs, might accept this latter suggestion of carefully regulated production rates to maintain industry workloads. Others, however, have expressed the view that domestic shipbuilding should be phased out entirely and replaced by off-the-shelf procurement of naval vessels from abroad (most likely from the United States), which they argue would be more cost-effective. These analysts suggest that Canadian-based companies could then focus on such tasks as installing new systems into the vessels to meet Canadian naval requirements. In this way, they argue, an industry that perhaps remains artificially supported by government contracts could take a route similar to that already travelled by the more internationally competitive aerospace industry, abandoning platform development and production in favour of concentration on specialized, high-technology markets. 3° THE CANADIAN PROCUREMENT HORIZON

DARKENS

If, as suggested by P.H. Wall, one of the chief conditions for maintaining the economic viability of Canadian defence production is an expansion of government procurement, then the business prospects for the domestic defence industrial base generally are shrinking along with the real purchasing power of the capital portion of DND'S budget. Given the forty-year record of failure of capital budgets to approach stated government spending targets - and even without taking into account the preferences and objectives of the current government there is little reason for DND or the defence industry to expect capital spending to meet the 1992 target figures. Rather, the speed with which the K H - I O I contract was cancelled suggests that market conditions for

g2

The Domestic Context

Canadian defence contractors will only continue to become more difficult in the future. It will become increasingly difficult to support individual major crown projects, however necessary they may be in order to counter the "rust-out" and obsolescence of current equipment, in the face of fiscal constraint, emphasis on deficit reduction and other social programs, and a popular press much enamoured of the phrase "peace dividend." As explained above, the capital portion of the Canadian defence budget is especially vulnerable to the erosion of its purchasing power for macroeconomic and technological reasons (exchange rates and "defence inflation") largely beyond the control of DND, as well as to the more obvious domestic political pressures linked to non-defence industrial and regional economic benefits requirements. Whatever their domestic political value, even in justifying defence programs, these requirements result in a premium being paid by DND on many of its most important equipment procurement contracts, thus further eroding already scarce capital funds. To all of these pressures, DND has responded in two main ways that may directly affect the domestic defence market. First, it has sought to improve the capital portion of the DSP. Second, it has begun to rationalize its equipment inventory as it replaces older equipment. If successful, this policy should allow for greater economies in operating, maintenance and training costs, as well as in unit prices (assuming, in the latter case, that production is not stretched out over inordinately longer periods of time). In addition, off-the-shelf procurement of proven platforms has become even more widespread. The impact both of these pressures affecting the DND capital budget and of the department's new procurement approach on defence manufacturers' business plans and strategies will be assessed in the next chapter. Here, a few broader points about the evolving nature of the Canadian defence market are in order. First, although their export orientation helps to cushion, to some extent, the aerospace and avionics sector, as well as the defence electronics industry, the "constant inconstancy" that characterizes government defence procurement seriously undermines the ability and willingness of industry to make the essential long-range plans or to risk the investment commitments that would maintain its international competitiveness. Second, because the shipbuilding and ship repair industry is almost entirely dependent on domestic demand, uncertainty over future government procurement plans portends a monumental structural crisis during the next halfdozen years that can only further complicate the industry's search for business strategies other than those dictated by short-term survival

93 Defence Production needs. Finally, it is worth noting that, to the extent that DND is able to reduce regular force levels to less than 67,000 in order to pursue its spending targets for capital, an ironic longer-term result will be that less equipment of many types will be required for the lower troop levels.'5' Apart from this uncertain and shifting domestic political context, the recent examples cited above - the light armoured vehicle and the Bell Model 412 and EH-IOI helicopters - suggest a trend towards fewer new contract opportunities and fewer units being ordered in these contracts. The LAV order was scaled down considerably from earlier DND proposals, and the contract for 100 new Bell 4128, though larger than the first estimate of some forty or fifty, nonetheless is intended to replace 116 existing machines. The long, drawn-out debate and review of options for the EH-IOI program also suggests another result of financial constraints and alternate government political priorities that industry can no longer assume that major procurement contracts, even when they are signed, will not in the future be cancelled as either governments or priorities change. At one time, defence critics would argue, perhaps justifiably, that, once begun, programs took on a life of their own and could not be cancelled. That is no longer the case: for industry executives, especially, long-range uncertainty is the only constant in the Canadian defence market. Two purposes are said to be served by strong or improved domestic demand for defence — the provision of business incentives to domestic producers; and the increase in Canada-u.s. defence trade, since higher levels of imports of American platforms or major systems are presumed to be compensated for by more exports to the United States under the "rough balance" provision of the production-sharing arrangements. While we have dealt with the former issue, the latter appears to us a dubious contention, not simply because of the longterm imbalance in bilateral defence trade in favour of the United States or of the pressures on new capital procurement programs in Canada, but also, and perhaps mainly, because of changes in the crucial u.s. defence market. U.S. AND

DEFENCE

PROCUREMENT

MARKET ACCESS

1 9 9 0 S: THE

IN THE

BUDCETARY

PERSPECTIVE

When considering the North American bilateral defence-trade relationship in the light of those numerous changing market conditions

94 The Domestic Context outlined in earlier chapters, it is useful to take two different, though related, approaches to the question of the likely prospects for Canadian companies seeking to win contracts from the u.s. Department of Defense (DoD). The first is budgetary; under this rubric, we seek to ascertain trends in u.s. defence spending, especially for procurement, and to ask how these might affect industry subsectors as well as types of procurement programs. The second approach is politico-economic; here, we speculate on the manner in which the pressures of defence austerity might influence the views of both the administration and Congress on matters of defence industrial base and defence trade, most particularly in the bilateral context. Will the access of Canadian companies to the vital u.s. defence market be altered? If so, what will be the consequences? In chapter i, we made passing reference to the Pentagon's Six-Year Defense Plan for 1992-97 in the context of our selective review of some countries' post-Cold War defence budgets. In chapter 3, we set out in greater detail the moderately critical response to DoD budget plans and the new procurement strategy that was issued by Wisconsin Representative Les Aspin, the influential chairman of the House Armed Services Committee who later became Secretary of Defense, and we highlighted Aspin's own suggested alternative procurement strategy, intended to mitigate the adverse effects of budget cutting on the u.s. defence industry. We now revisit the budgetary element more thoroughly before moving on to discuss the political repercussions of defence austerity. Needless to say, some of these repercussions have already begun to be felt in the Canada-u.s. defence trade relationship. Table 5.1 sets out u.s. defence budgets since 1985 in terms of both actual outlays and procurement budget functions, and it compares the totals in both current dollars and constant 1991 dollars. The proposed spending figures from FY1992 onward, it should be noted, were calculated prior to the election of the Democratic administration. The new president's spending plan, however, included relatively limited cuts beyond those already planned by the Bush administration, totalling us$6o billion over five years; thus, the overall trends are broadly similar. The figures reveal that defence spending peaked under the Reagan administration and has been declining since the end of the 19805, especially when measured in constant dollars. They provide a graphic illustration of the declining purchasing power of defence dollars: the FYiggi outlay in current dollars, for example, was over $40 billion higher than in FYig85, but in constant dollars the 1985 total represented an additional $12 billion in purchasing power. Between FY 1986 and F Y i g g i , virtually identical outlay totals in current dollars hid a

95

Defence Production

Table 5.1 U.S. National Defence Expenditures, by Outlay and Procurement Year, 1985-95 Outlay

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Procurement

Current $

1991$

Current $

1991$

(Billions)

(Billions)

(Billions)

(Billions)

252.7 295.2 282.0 290.4 303.6 299.3 298.9 295.2 292.0 286.7 288.6

310.8 354.5 329.2 328.3 329.5 314.9 298.9 -

70.4 74.3 80.7 77.2 81.6 81.0 79.1 74.3 68.8 67.2 68.6

86.6 89.2 94.2 87.3 88.6 85.2 79.1

Source: u.s. Government, Kudget, l-'Y 1992, 30—6, '$8—44. i When the table was prepared, the 1992 figures had been enacted, while the 1993—95 figures had been proposed.

constant-dollar decline of over $55 billion. Likewise, while the currentdollar procurement budget rose from $70.4 billion in KYI985 to $79.1 billion in 1991, this nonetheless represented a decline in constant dollars (and purchasing power) of almost $7 billion. Not taken into account by these figures is the additional impact of "defence inflation," which results from the constant pressure for technological improvements in equipment performance - another way of expressing the trend towards structural disarmament. Other measures of this declining priority for defence in Washington's budget process can be cited. One is the shrinking share of defence spending in relation both to other federal government expenditures and to GNP. From 1983 to 1989, defence accounted for more than 26 percent of total federal outlays, peaking at about 28 percent in FYigSG and FYigSy. By 1992, however, that share had sunk to just above 20 percent. As a percentage of GNP, national defence spending from FYigSg to FYig88 was constantly above 6 percent, peaking at 6.5 percent in FYig86; by early 1992, that share had dropped below 5 percent; today, it is closer to 4.5 percent. Government forecasts, based on trends prior to the change in administrations at the White House, anticipated that defence would account for 19 percent of all federal outlays and 3.8 percent of GNP by FYigg6. i 2 These forecasts, however, are likely to err on the high side, given the domestic priorities of the Clinton administration, even though the president has signalled

96 The Domestic Context that he intends to insure that the United States will remain committed to developing high-technology weaponry.33 Declining DoD procurement budgets have already begun to affect market opportunities for individual Canadian companies, some of which participated in a number of those multinational programs initially funded under the Nunn Amendment. Two of those programs - the "autonomous precision-guided munition" project and the NATO frigate replacement project - were cancelled following withdrawal or uncertain financial support by the United States. The decision by the u.s. Navy to cut its purchases of sonobuoys from 425,000 a year to 100,000, so as to reduce spending on this equipment from $190 to $60 million a year, was expected to prove detrimental to the export sales of Hermes Electronics of Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, which supplies the Navy with the SSQ-53D sonobuoy. The decision will also likely force two large American manufacturers, Magnavox Electronic Systems and Sparton, to pursue new orders outside their traditional domestic market, perhaps including the relatively small but stable Canadian one/ 54 The cancellation or collapse of new international joint development projects, the reduction of existing procurement programs and export opportunities, and potential competition from u.s. suppliers in the Canadian market and abroad are the most problematical and direct consequences of cuts in Washington's defence budget, at least from the perspective of Canadian defence manufacturers. On a more positive note, tighter R&D budgets in the United States may encourage American companies and DoD officers to seek greater cooperation with their Canadian counterparts in order to make use of Ottawa's financial support, however modest in comparative terms, of industry through the Defence Industry Productivity Program (DIPP). This outcome remains largely speculative, however, as it depends on maintaining DIPP funding levels in the face of domestic financial constraints and some public criticism, to say nothing of the (remote) possibility that the DIPP might become an issue in GATT discussions on subsidies. It is the longer-term political consequences of declining defence budgets that will prove of greatest importance in determining the conditions of market access for Canadian companies pursuing exports to the United States. In particular, as budget cuts and program cancellations cause large-scale layoffs in the American defence industry, Congress has come under increasing pressure to control the downsizing of the industry and to assist those local economies and individual companies most severely affected by the process.•''" This intervention has usually taken two forms - financial and other types of support for domestic industry and workers; and a critical review of the terms of

97 Defence Production current defence economic arrangements with the United States' military allies and trading partners. Pressure has mounted for Congress to "do something" to cushion the full force of post-Cold War defence budget reductions on industry and related workers, as well as on DoD personnel; the Bush administration's avowed laissez-faire stance towards issues of economic adjustment and industrial policy only exacerbated these pressures. A 1992 report by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a Congressional advisory and analysis group, estimated that defence spending would decline from $287.5 billion to $235.7 billion between 1991 and 1995, while defence industry employment would fall from 2,900,000 to about 2,300,000 and some 500,000 DoD military and civilian jobs would be pared. Should budget cuts be deeper than DoD was estimating, total defence-related employment would, according to the OTA, fall from 5,990,000 in 1991 to some 4,600,000 by 1995 and approximately 3,600,000 by the end of the century - an overall loss of nearly 2,400,000 defence jobs in a single decade.3'1 In one U.S. defence sector alone, aerospace, nearly a third of all jobs were lost between 1990 and 1994-"7 Bearing in mind the interests of their constituencies, the Democratic members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate introduced adjustment assistance packages. The House proposals, passed on 4 June 1992 as part of the $27o-billion defence authorization bill for 1993, specified $1 billion as the first installment of a multiyear aid program, with measures to provide new job training, assistance to state and local governments for the creation of alternative job opportunities, and early retirement benefits for laid-off workers. Industry could receive up to $150 million to fund consortia for the development of dual-use technologies, with a further $50 million for direct DoD investment in firms that could or would not otherwise invest in "critical technologies." Finally, as a demonstration of its special interest in small business, Congress directed that an additional $125 million - still part of the $i-billion total package — be made available to these companies through the provision of information services and advice on defence technologies.:1's The House package was considerably larger than the Bush administration's proposed measures, even if slightly smaller than the Senate package announced on 21 May 1992. Support for both was strong in the previous Congress, particularly with reference to the administration's proposals, which were regarded as inadequate for those "unprecedented times." With the Democrats having lost control of the Congress, however, it would be surprising if new Congressional initiatives were to bear greater fruit in coming years, unless defence spending increases/'1"

98 The Domestic Context THE POLITICAL

ENVIRONMENT

The budgetary perspective is a valuable approach for identifying relevant trends in u.s. defence expenditures, as well as some of the more direct implications for individual procurement programs or market sectors in which Canadian companies have a stake. In order to grasp the full meaning of the contemporary challenge to the bilateral defence-trade relationship, we must turn to an analysis of the political and economic consequences of the downsizing of the American defence industry during the late 19808 and early 19908. Above all, a clear understanding of Congressional involvement in American defence economic relations is critical. How might the changing attitudes in Washington affect the relatively successful Canada-u.s. defence trade agreements? And how will they affect Canadian access to the lucrative u.s. defence market? Criticisms of the bilateral defence-trade agreement or of the balance of defence trade have recurred throughout the thirty-five-year history of the DDSA/DPSA. 4 0 Each country has at times had reasons for desiring revisions to the terms of the production-sharing arrangements, in particular. And both countries have faced domestic demands for change, although until recently most of the criticism directed against the sharing arrangements tended to come from Canadian groups irritated by the continuing imbalance in defence trade in favour of the United States.4' Despite this, both types of arrangements continued to operate comparatively successfully, probably in large part because they were pursued at a non-political, bureaucratic level. The NADIBO, established in 1987, added another layer to the bilateral cooperation on D IB-related matters and, at the same time, sought to promote greater awareness in both countries - but especially on the part of DoD procurement officers and politicians - of the national security benefits of including Canadian companies as "domestic" American suppliers.42 Despite these achievements, however, the unprecedented adjustment problems faced by the defence industry and the entire economy in the United States have placed the bilateral relationship in a crucial transition period. In response largely to Congressional directives that it take domestic economic interests more fully into account in the future, the Pentagon initiated a reevaluation of existing bilateral memoranda of understanding pertaining to defence research, development, and production (RDp). 4 3 While the contents of the reevaluations remained confidential at the time of writing, their tone, intent, and broad parameters can be established with a reasonable degree of

99 Defence Production confidence from comments made by government officials on either side of the border during our research. Given the greater emphasis on domestic economic benefits or implications that marks the RDP review process, the central u.s. concern about defence trade with Canada is the latter's inevitable demand for extensive offset provisions associated with any major procurement contracts. This is viewed by critics in the United States as a form of "double-dipping" in a supposedly security-oriented arrangement that already provides Canadian companies with favoured access to the American defence market. In response to this point and to other questions regarding the appropriate role of the Canadian Commercial Corporation in aiding these companies' sales drives, officials in Ottawa have long pointed to a variety of protectionist legislation and practices that inhibit or restrict access to DoD contract competitions.44 The initial American report on the bilateral development and production-sharing arrangements that circulated between government departments in Washington and Ottawa and generated part of the current pressure on the relationship, has been described by Canadian officials as a mediocre study that never grasped the realities of Canadau.s. defence trade. At best, the Gibson Report was seen as an early data-gathering exercise to be used as a starting point for fuller debate and negotiation. Opinion on the significance of the RDP review process itself was and remains mixed, with some Canadian officials suggesting that it was simply part of internal Pentagon and Washington politics and would fade away without any major impact.'1"' At least one observer has noted, however, that the present circumstance may be different. A DND internal discussion paper of 1991 recommended the negotiation of a new defence economic arrangement: "Based on years of successful cooperation, [this] should be negotiated in the near future, and in fact will be, whether we want to or not. Based on early indications from the u.s. side, it will be a challenge for Canada to maintain even an equivalent of the status quo."4 The broad-ranging Defence Economic Review and the conditions of confidentiality under which it took place - quite unlike those normally attending such policy discussions - are indications of the seriousness with which the possibility of a long-term negative impact was viewed. Contributing to the reluctance of Canadian government officials to disclose the substance of their review process in any detail, of course, may be the fact that any policy recommendations would likely entail changes in IRB requirements, in the terms of the DPSA, or in other measures affecting industry and local economies — all subjects with highly sensitive political implications.

ioo The Domestic Context Canadian industry executives often insist that it is not potential future protectionism that concerns them so much as the existing array of restrictive legislative measures and informal practices surrounding the u.s. defence market. Small Business Set-Aside legislation, "black" (i.e., classified) programs, and the "no foreign" designation - which can hinder the participation of Canadian companies even though Canada was considered as part of the American DIB in proposed amendments to the Defense Production Act - are the obstacles most frequently cited in this regard. Notwithstanding these apprehensions, one must bear in mind that even with all of the above restrictions attending the u.s. procurement process, Canadian suppliers do have access to a market of roughly us$2O billion. At the same time, however, Canadian government officials in Ottawa and Washington repeatedly argue that of this market, Canadian industries obtain, on average, much less than 5 percent, either through DoD direct acquisition or through subcontracts made with American prime contractors.17 In the opinion of these Canadian officials, one of the chief obstacles to increased defence sales by Canadian companies to the United States - which currently stand at 9 percent of all foreign contracting in that market, in absolute terms roughly equivalent to the share of defence contracts awarded to the state of Nebraska - is their inability to operate well in the highly political American defence procurement marketplace. This is partly a function of the relatively small scale of most Canadian firms, which even in less uncertain economic times leaves little financial leeway for employing sales representatives and market analysts on a permanent basis in Washington. However, it also results from an unwillingness to take certain risks, especially those necessary to obtain essential marketing expertise. As valuable as it may be, the aid provided by government agencies such as the Canadian Commercial Corporation and by trade commissioners cannot substitute for more aggressive marketing by the manufacturers themselves.48 It should be clear that there is no single factor determining the overall success, or lack thereof, of Canadian defence industries in the American market. Budget cuts may have a direct or indirect impact, either by constricting DoD's demand for specific products or by heightening Congressional anxieties about the vitality and viability of the American defence industry. On the other hand, many of the programs now facing cancellation, reduction, or deferment in the United States do not involve Canadian firms since they primarily concern major platforms - with one notable exception, heavy armour.49 Congressional protectionism, though lamented by Canadian industry executives, is not the entire story, and Canadian officials are

ioi

Defence Production

correct in noting that those still-considerable u.s. defence market opportunities are inadequately pursued by the majority of Canadian manufacturers. As long as the review of defence economic agreements continues in both countries, concrete details on existing bilateral defence trade arrangements will be difficult to obtain. One can, nevertheless, speculate. It is our hunch that a consequence of the review process could well be cooperative pacts that are more specific regarding what is to be purchased, and how it is to be "traded."'0 We shall return to this hunch in the next chapter. THE O V E R S E A S AND

CANADIAN

MARKET DEFENCE

PRODUCTION

The u.s. defence market will undoubtedly remain the most attractive target for Canadian defence exporters. Still, the overseas defence market is a third critical element affecting the future economic viability of the Canadian defence industrial base. In order to continue to operate at anything like its current level, the Canadian defence industry will, at times, require marginal revenues through sales outside North America. This essentially means Europe, though there are some notable, and often well-publicized, exceptions."'1 The DFSA and DDSA are not Canada's only bilateral defence-production compacts; since the early ig6os Ottawa has entered into bilateral RDP agreements with nine European countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). Agreements with Spain, Australia, and possibly also South Korea, may be added to these existing RDPS in the future. The original aim of the RDP agreements was to identify "defence projects of sufficient bilateral interest to warrant the contribution of funds by both nations to develop and produce products to meet the requirements of each or both armed forces and agreed third markets. "•'* Differences of opinion exist as to the success of the RDP agreements for Canada, and industry has often been critical of their orientation. The RDP "success story" most commonly cited is that of the CL-28g, an unmanned reconnaissance drone jointly developed by Canada, Germany, and France, which shared equally in its $2-billion development costs.5S The RDP agreements and process did indeed contribute to this program, but as one observer has noted, "in all likelihood, it would have occurred in the absence of RDPS with Germany and France." Other than the CL-s8g, very few joint projects have been attributed directly to the RDP agreements.' 4

K>2

The Domestic Context

Mixed opinions similarly exist regarding the utility or appropriateness of Foreign Affairs' continuing mandate over the RDP process, with critics arguing that "the original objectives have been eroded and have evolved into mainly commercial and trade related objectives." A more positive assessment, by contrast, is that "the evolution of all RDPS towards more commercial and trade related objectives reflects changes in the defence industry and the need for increased government support to achieve sales."55 Notwithstanding its lacklustre record, the existence of the RDP program could, in theory, offer industry opportunities for meeting the future defence requirements of various European governments.511 That, at least, is the theory. Experience suggests, however, that access to European defence procurement contracts for Canadian industry hardly depends upon the existence of the RDP agreements. Their importance in this regard is marginal at best. The mere existence of specific bilateral accords means very little in comparison to the broader transatlantic defence economic and defence trade dynamics that are developing as the United States and Europe adjust to their new international and internal political-security and economic environments. Thus it must be acknowledged that the prospects for greater defence economic cooperation and increasing defence trade seem very limited, in the transatlantic dimension especially. Declining defence budgets, fewer procurement dollars, industry restructuring, and large layoffs continue to make the major NATO states very reluctant to spend any significant portion of their defence revenues outside their domestic markets. The NATO defence trade initiative, discussed in chapter 2, made only very slow progress in the face of this reluctance, despite the otherwise clear logic favouring increased cooperation to achieve the purported economic and military benefits of equipment standardization.57 Potential markets outside either the United States or Canada's NATO or RDP partners, however valuable, are controlled and restricted by export regulations; the debates associated with the General Motors sale of the LAV to Saudi Arabia, whatever their final implications for Canadian export legislation, will make both industry and government even more hesitant to try to find new markets in the Middle East and elsewhere in the Third World. The indirect export of Canadian defence products as components of u.s. equipment sold in those markets may also be affected as American firms seek to maintain their own workloads."'8 Since 1985, the external environment - conditioned by political, security, and economic considerations - of Canada's defence industry

103 Defence Production

has undergone a period of rapid and, at times, bewildering change. The demand for defence, and hence for defence production, has declined in its chief export markets. The defence industry is globalizing and becoming more fiercely competitive, while its political salience has become more acute as the domestic economic costs of post-Cold War industrial restructuring trigger electoral alarm bells in a number of countries. In this environment, how might Canadian manufacturers and government officials respond? That is the question we attempt to answer in chapters 6 and 7.

CHAPTER

S IX

Defence Industrial Darwinism? Industry and the Dynamics of Adjustment The period from the late ig8os to the mid-iggos will prove to be a decisive one for the economic viability of Canadian defence production. Momentous changes in the international security structure have had significant consequences for the demand for defence, lessening the public's willingness to pay for investments in national security, at least of the traditional military variety. At the same time, juxtaposed with trends in the international economy, changes in supply-side factors in the international defence market have transformed defence economic policy and industrial base issues into politically contentious subjects both between and within the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Alliance's defence trade initiatives have repeatedly come to an impasse as a result of politically inspired obstacles, with the resolution of one difficulty merely leading to the emergence of another. The pressure to preserve an industrial capacity deemed to be critical for national security is especially strong in the United States, where it is estimated that the Department of Defense's supplier base shrank from some 120,000 companies in 1982 to 40,000 by 1987, and to many fewer today. In Canada too this Darwdnian trend has been evident: at the end of the i g8os, the number of Canadian companies supplying goods and services to the Department of National Defence dropped by between 25 and 35 percent as enterprises either went bankrupt or chose to move out of the defence business.' Mergers, takeovers, and acquisitions have also played a part in changing the makeup of the domestic defence industry.2 This chapter focuses on these and other changes that have occurred in the Canadian supply side in response to both demandand supply-side pressures originating in the United States and overseas.3 After examining the adjustment efforts undertaken by a number

105 Defence Industrial Darwinism?

of companies in the aerospace and electronics sectors, held jointly to be the pillar of whatever Canadian defence industrial base emerges from the current shakedown, we evaluate how Ottawa has managed defence-related issues and policies, including IRBS, DIPP grants, and other subsidies in support of defence exports. We highlight those structural changes which are developing in the defence industry in response to two sets of variables - corporate reorganization strategies and government policy initiatives - so as to project where the "government/industry duet" is likely to take Canadian defence industries during the coming years of Darwinian struggle. CORPORATE RESTRU CT U R ING ON T H E L E A D I N G E D G E : THE GA S E O E THE AERO S PA CE SECTOR

As the preceding chapters have suggested, the evolution of the defence industry in Canada has by no means reached a terminal point; if anything, the pace of change can be expected to accelerate. Perhaps as a result of this, the collecting of reliable data on corporate adjustment strategies in the post-Cold War defence market can be a daunting task. Manufacturers naturally are reluctant to divulge too many financial, technical, or other details, while even government departments charged with oversight of industry or trade matters cannot always obtain suitable data from all segments of the defence industry. l In the case of the aerospace and electronics sectors, however, the relatively modest size of the industry and the predominance of a few major firms tend to counterbalance such drawbacks. In the aerospace industry, the ten leading firms account for approximately half of the total annual industry output, and the top twenty firms for more than 80 percent. The defence electronics industry is marked by an even greater degree of concentration, with the ten leaders in 1989 producing some 75 percent of that sector's nearly $2.4-billion revenue. Accordingly, our analysis here will focus on these groups of manufacturers, all of which are included under the general rubric of aerospace, although we will also have a word or two to say about companies in the shipbuilding and ship repair, land systems, and instrumentation sectors. By restricting the scope of our industry study, we hope to identify major trends and developments within each sector primarily by highlighting the actions or preferences (or both) of a few principal corporations. Such an approach can only provide general insights into current restructuring strategies; obviously, each company will have a

io6 The Domestic Context specific mix of product lines and other characteristics that will necessarily influence its behaviour. Nonetheless, we believe that the strategic choices of the leading firms often have implications for others within their sector, as well as for the lower-tier suppliers with whom they have subcontracting arrangements. Over the past few years, defence industries in the United States and Europe have been undergoing a period of far-reaching realignment. As we argued earlier, this process predated the ending of the Cold War, at least to some extent, since it came as a result of existing defence market pressures and other political changes (especially £092). Nevertheless, the radical transformation of the international security environment did add a much stronger impetus for defence budget cuts, in the process swelling public demands for a peace dividend. The Canadian defence industry, including the aerospace sector, has not been immune to those pressures. The stability that marked the ranks of the leading aerospace companies in Canada throughout the 19808 gave way in the early 19905 to a restructuring drive that may have only begun to gather momentum with the sale by Boeing of Canada's de Havilland division to the Bombardier group, which already included Canadair. Table 6.1 illustrates the stability of the aerospace industry during most of the igSos: of the twenty leading companies listed in 1989, only three were not in that group prior to 1985. Among the top six (Pratt & Whitney, Canadair-Bombardier, Boeing, Litton Systems, McDonnell Douglas, and CAE Electronics), there had been few changes in rank ordering. The 1991 ISTC survey assessing corporate rankings did, as can be glimpsed from its forecast for 1994 company standings, anticipate greater fluidity in the aerospace sector during the early 19905. The moderate decrease in employment levels at Pratt & Whitney Canada appears to be conforming to the expectations of ISTC analysts: the 2 April 1992 announcement of an additional 400 jobs to be cut, mainly at the firm's Longueuil (Quebec) headquarters, brought total employment at its major facilities to 7,885, down from some 8,500 in 199091.5 Despite declining international export orders for Pratt & Whitney's highly successful lines of aircraft engines, this subsidiary of United Technologies in the United States will retain the second-largest engineering department among Canada's privately owned aerospace companies and will continue to dominate all other firms as the primary recipient of federal DIPP funding/' A far more fundamental change in the organizational structure of the Canadian aerospace sector, however, was neither reflected nor anticipated in the ISTC report. After Boeing's initial attempt to sell its de Havilland aircraft division to the Franco-Italian consortium of

icy

Defence Industrial Darwinism?

Table 6. i Leading Aerospace and Other Defence Companies in Canada, 1989-94' Year 1985 Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc. Canadair/Bombardier Inc. Boeing of Canada Ltd.2 Litton Systems Canada Ltd. McDonnell Douglas Canada Ltd. O A K Electronics Ltd. Canadian Marconi Company Spar Aerospace Ltd.

1

1

2

2

2

2

1

3

3

3

3

5

4

4

9

4

5

5

4

7 11

7 13

6 7

6 10

6

6

8

7

-

8

9

12

9

10

10

11

10

14

11

18

8

11

12

-

-

19

13

8

18

9

14

13

Computing Devices Company Carrett Canada*

13

12

15

17

12

15

16

14

Menasco Aerospace Ltd. 1 Devtek Corporation

16

16

17

15

-

18

18

20

Bendix Avelex Inc !

14

17

19

16

Walbar of Canada Inc. 1 15

-

20

-

General Electric Canada Inc. Rolls-Royce Industries Canada Bristol Aerospace Ltd. Raytheon Canada Ltd. Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Standard Aero Ltd.

1

Country of Location of 1988 1989 1994 ownership major plant United States Canada United States United States United States Canada United Kingdom Canada United States United Kingdom United Kingdom United States United States United Kingdom United States United States United States Canada United States United States

Longueuil, Que. Dorval, Que. Downsview,2 Arnprior, Ont.; Winnipeg, Man. Downsview, Ont. Mississauga, Out. Montreal, Que. Kanata & Cornwall, Ont. Montreal, Que. Mississauga, Ont. & St. Anne, Que. Rexdale, Ont. Montreal, Que. Winnipeg, Man. Waterloo, Ont. Mirabel, Que. Winnipeg, Man. Nepean, Ont. Rexdale, Ont. Oakdale, Ont. Kitchener & Scarborough, Ont.; Dartmouth, N.S. Montreal, Que. Mississauga, Ont.

Source: Compiled from Industry, Science and Technology Canada, sector profile series, various years. i Ranked by sales in 19X9; the ranking for 1994 is projected only. a Prior to the sale of the de Havilland division to Bombardier. '.j Garrett and Bendix Avelex are operating divisions of Allied-Signal Aerospace Canada, a r.s.-ovvned subsidiary of Allied-Signal Corp. 4 Menasco and Walbar are divisions of Coltcc Industries Inc. (formally Colt Industries) of the United States.

io8 The Domestic Context Aerospatiale and Alenia was nullified by the European Commission, which deemed that such a sale would create a near-monopoly in the European commuter aircraft market, the company found buyers for its Downsview, Ontario subsidiary in Bombardier and the provincial government of Ontario. Having purchased de Havilland originally from the Canadian federal government in 1986 for a cash payment of $90 million, Boeing invested almost $400 million in plant and other improvements, and received from Ottawa $161 million as compensation for existing deficiencies at the Downsview facility. Despite the improvements, Boeing was unable to make de Havilland a profitable enterprise, with industry analysts citing its labour structure and high operating costs as the chief problems. Given that the American parent company was seeking to reduce its debt load as part of its own broader restructuring plans, it came as no surprise that it should divest itself of de Havilland, selling it in January 1992 for a fyo-million payment accompanied by the transfer of $190 million in liabilities to the new Canadian owners.7 For Bombardier, already owner of Canadair of Montreal (as well as Short Brothers of Belfast, Northern Ireland), the acquisition of de Havilland offered a number of potentially valuable "considerations" in both the defence and commercial aerospace markets. In the commercial market, Canadair's Regional Jet and the de Havilland Dash-8 series aircraft were considered complementary, while the Lear jet was produced by Learjet, Bombardier's u.s. subsidiary. Therefore, even before engaging in any additional efforts to diversify its business further, the new company would be able to offer a wide range of products and could spread its management overhead costs over an expanded business base in order to make its entire aircraft group more cost-effective. Finally, cheaper procurement of parts and the ability to subcontract work out within the group were additional benefits that could serve to reduce costs and improve competitiveness. The defence side of Bombardier's expanding aerospace activities now includes the six versions of the Dash-8 currently in service with the Canadian Forces; Canadair's prime contractorship for technical and systems engineering support on the CF-i8 from its Mirabel facility; the Canadair CF-227 Sentinel and CL-28g unmanned aerial vehicles, the latter produced in conjunction with Dornier GmbH of Germany and SAT of France; and, though not military products but still something aimed at government procurement markets, the CL215 and newer ci.-s 15T amphibian water bombers.8 It is worth noting that part of the financing attending the purchase of de Havilland was a $i7o-million federal government loan in the form of DIPP funds for restructuring, as well as the promise of assistance in seeking

i og

Defence Industrial Darwinism?

foreign aircraft sales by the Export Development Corporation.9 This funding was arranged despite an earlier statement by Science Minister Bill Winegard that the federal government would not become financially involved with the company, following the European Community's objection to the sale attempted by Boeing with Aerospatiale and Alenia. 10 In the event, neither the federal nor the provincial government was willing to risk the consequences of Boeing's being unable to secure a purchaser for de Havilland. The company had already announced that it would lay off 1,300 of its 3,700 employees in 1992, and its possible complete closure would have been an exceptionally damaging blow both to the local economy and to the Canadian aerospace industry. A 1990 study prepared by the Aerospace Industry Association of Canada estimated that almost half of de Havilland's Dash-8 sales were made in Canada, creating over 350 million dollars' worth of orders for its 2,000 smaller suppliers." As a result of the de Havilland-Bombardier arrangement, possibly large labour force reductions were avoided (at least temporarily), although future employment levels depend upon the new management's success in obtaining greater orders for their aircraft. On a negative note, orders for the Dash-8 dwindled from 104 in 1989 to only thirty-two by 1991 because of the recession and of potential buyers' uncertainty regarding de Havilland's prospects. Closely related to the improvement of export sales and international competitiveness, and of equal significance for Bombardier and for the Canadian aerospace industry in general, is the integrating effect of the acquisition of de Havilland on company and industry alike. As one analyst has explained, [the] purchase gives Canada a fully integrated aircraft company for the first time, one that can compete in the global marketplace ... It means Canadian suppliers will deal with one major aircraft manufacturer, which could, over time, ease marketing and production problems emanating from juggling the demands of two separate companies. 1 "

While stressing that the critical element in achieving export success is the ability to bring to the defence market the best product at the best price, Robert Brown, president of Bombardier's Canadair group, had pointed out a few months before the deal that compared with their American and European counterparts, Canadian defence producers were still too fragmented to generate the critical mass necessary to produce competitive advanced-technology systems.l;i The new company, which brings together Canada's two major airframe manufacturers along with extensive engine and avionics capabilities, may thus be

no

The Domestic Context

seen as a step that goes some distance towards creating in Canada a rationalized and vertically integrated aerospace sector and a "national champion" manufacturer in a manner clearly parallel to that in the European defence industry, described previously. DEVELOPMENTS HELICOPTER

IN

THE

INDUSTRY

If the conglomeration of Bombardier/Canadair/de Havilland was seen to be a positive element in the corporate restructuring among the leading defence and aerospace companies, it should be recalled that there is another side to the coin. Following its divestiture of de Havilland, Boeing Canada Technology retained two operating divisions, in Winnipeg and Arnprior. The Winnipeg facility designs, manufactures, and supplies aerial and surface target systems for domestic and export markets, while the Arnprior plant is primarily concerned with servicing the needs of the Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, a task that accounts for 75 percent of its total business.' 4 However, prospects for the remaining 25 percent - which is focused on the repair, overhaul, and modification of the Canadian Forces' fleet of Boeing helicopters - appear to be limited and to depend on decisions yet to be made regarding a successor to the ill-fated EH-IOI procurement contract. The basis of the Arnprior division's defence business since at least the end of the 19708 has been the modification and modernization, and after 1986 the repair and overhaul, of the CH-I 13/1ISA Labrador search-and-rescue helicopter and the CH-147 Chinook (now retired). The decision to phase out both models and to replace them in the search-and-rescue role by the EH-IOI would therefore have meant the loss of an important component of Boeing's Canadian defence market after the sale of de Havilland, as well as the loss of the basis of the Arnprior division's current defence business. However, the controversy surrounding the purported need for, and cost of, the EH-IOI program raised the possibility of a reprieve, especially if the Conservatives were to lose the 1993 federal election. Boeing's vice-president, George Capern, proposed as one alternative that his company modernize the Canadian Forces' thirteen existing Labrador helicopters for approximately $10 million each, as well as recall and modernize a number of the Chinooks.1"' The July 1992 announcement by the Defence minister that the EH-IOI program would proceed as planned, however, appeared at the time to mean an end to Boeing's involvement in the Canadian military helicopter market. As the last Labrador was retired and replaced by the EH-IOI, the Arnprior division either would have

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Defence Industrial Darwinism?

to obtain subcontracting work on that or other programs, or else move out of the defence sector altogether. Of course, the fate of the EH-IOI acquisition program subsequently postponed this rather dismal scenario - dismal at least from the perspective of those at Boeing who sought to retain defence contract business. But eventually the obsolescent helicopter airframes will have to be replaced, and Boeing could again face a difficult future as part of Canada's defence aerospace industry; it could even become another casualty of the post-Cold War contraction.1'1 This is not to suggest, of course, that such a fate would necessarily do significant harm to other parts of Boeing's aerospace activities in this country. As noted earlier, with most of the Arnprior division's business being directed towards servicing its commercial aircraft operations, trends in civil aviation will do more to affect overall employment and other corporate matters. The fact that Boeing's parent organization chose to divest itself of the ostensibly unprofitable de Havilland facility while Bombardier decided to acquire it as part of its own restructuring plans, amply illustrates the point made by an executive of Bombardier - namely, that restructuring is a management tool that can be used not only for retrenchment but also for expansion.' 7 It may be, as well, that the latitude enjoyed by suppliers in making such choices depends to a large extent on their degree of dependence upon government defence contracts. Neither Boeing nor Bombardier looks to defence for the bulk of its revenues and neither of their major aerospace subsidiaries are defence-dependent; while Canadair's level of dependence approached 100 percent in the mid-19705, that figure had declined to only 10 percent by the early iggos.' 8 For companies such as Bombardier, Pratt & Whitney, Boeing Arnprior, or McDonnell Douglas Canada - all of them major elements of the Canadian aerospace industry - the civilian market remains critical, though the defence sector has provided a valuable source of additional revenue historically. Among even the leading companies, however, there are others that look to the Canadian and international defence markets for a significant part of their revenues, ranging from virtually 100 percent in the case of Paramax Electronics to 60 percent for Litton Systems Canada and 40 percent for CAE Electronics. To understand more completely the range of pressures affecting Canadian defence industries, and their possible responses, therefore, one must review the types of strategies that have been adopted by these suppliers and the various problems that they currently see themselves as facing. The EH-IOI contract was to have been a critical element in sustaining the long-term economic viability of Paramax Electronics, a Montrealbased company employing approximately 1,100 people.'9 In a relation-

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The Domestic Context

ship somewhat akin to that between Boeing Canada and the de Havilland division, Paramax Electronics until late 1991 was the Canadian subsidiary of a u.s. firm, Unisys Corporation, though it operated through a lower level of the parent organization, Unisys Defense Systems.20 Also like Boeing's de Havilland division, Paramax Electronics' parent company during 1991 pursued a restructuring strategy that involved divesting itself of its defence sector. On this occasion, however, the divestiture did not involve the sale of the Canadian company; instead, in October 1991 Unisys Corp. announced that it was creating a new, u.s.-based company, Paramax, consisting of both Unisys Defense Systems and Paramax Electronics. Thus the restructuring of the American parent corporation did not lead to any restructuring and rationalization of the Canadian defence industrial base, as occurred in the Boeing-de Havilland case. To some extent, Paramax may be considered an atypical Canadian defence manufacturer, and hence not a representative example: it was established when its parent company was awarded the systems-integration contract for the Canadian patrol frigate (CPF), and has been a single-contract supplier since then. Obviously, it also became virtually entirely dependent on the domestic defence market for its revenues, which amounted to approximately $300 million a year.21 For these very reasons, it can serve as an exemplar of the problems facing domestic defence industries in a changing and uncertain business environment. Finally, as one of Canada's leading software-engineering and systems-integration firms - even without the corporate backing it once enjoyed from Unisys Corp. - Paramax is a useful case study in its own right. With work on the CPF program drawing to a close, Paramax in the early 19908 faced a growing need to win new defence contracts in order to sustain itself. Thus it strongly supported the Canadian Forces' proposed acquisition of the K H - I O I helicopter as the new ship-borne and search-and-rescue aircraft, since Paramax would be E.H. Industries' prime contractor in Canada. If the selection favoured the K H - I O I , Paramax stood to gain something else it sought - potential new export sales through future international orders for the helicopter.22 The announcement that cabinet had approved the procurement of the Anglo-Italian helicopter, when it Finally came in late July 1992, thus provided Paramax executives with welcome news as the company's estimated $1.8-billion share of the program over the next thirteen years offered a measure of stability while the company sought to broaden its business base both within and beyond the defence sector. Even if the K H - I O I program had been continued, however, Paramax would still have been left in the precarious position of being a single-

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contract company in a market particularly prone, at times, to changes of direction based as much on political bargaining and electoral politics as on any military operational needs or prior strategic analysis. Recognizing this problem, a senior Paramax executive (who was also a former Canadian chief of the defence staff) noted at a small industry investment seminar held in 1990 that "there is a need to diversify, to get away from this one contract syndrome. The big question is where, and how do we do it?"23 T H E L U R E OF D I V E R S I F I C A T I O N

As we saw earlier, the notion of diversification can take two basic forms - either wiihin the defence sector but across a range of products and applications, or out of defence and into commercial markets. While Unisys Defense Systems became involved in civilian markets through such offerings as air-traffic-control, weather-radar, postal-sorting, and data-fusion systems, Paramax in Canada still had not advanced further by the early 19908 than planning a modest expansion into similar commercial areas involving the integration of large electronic systems. Expansion by defence manufacturers into non-defence products and markets, as Paramax executives themselves were quick to point out, is difficult for a number of reasons. Primarily, success in such ventures often entails winning contracts in competition against existing and well-established, civilian-oriented companies with more experience and understanding of the methods best suited to this very different type of market, and with management and other personnel also familiar with commercial requirements. To an increasing extent, competition will also become fiercer as more defence firms in Canada, the United States, and Europe look towards commercial sales as an alternative to the dwindling defence market; defence electronics companies such as Paramax especially may experience this, as many begin to examine non-defence government procurement opportunities. The difficulties of diversifying out of the defence sector are especially great in the case of Paramax by virtue of its heavy reliance on military contracts - a reliance that other defence industry executives interested in pursuing new commercial markets have also noted in their own cases."4 As in the case of Boeing, predominantly commercial companies may thus be tempted simply to divest themselves, where possible, of their defence industry holdings or to spin off defence subsidiaries into independent units, as did both Unisys Corp. and Honeywell in the United States.""' Another option, however - one actively pursued by Paramax - is to seek to broaden the range of products targeted at the defence sector both for traditional securitv

114 The Domestic Context

requirements and for the new roles that have been mooted for the armed forces. Among the traditional types of defence contracts that were being sought by Paramax executives in Canada, two longer-term prospects of varying potential were identified. The more likely, given Paramax's status in the original program, was seen to be the mid-life update and modernization of the CPF, which would take place in the next decade. Rather less certain, the possible acquisition of new, conventionally powered submarines would also create opportunities for systems integration and training contracts. However, after the public criticism of the nuclear-powered submarine program proposal in the 1987 White Paper — and with the example of the EH-IOI cancellation in mind — it is difficult to imagine that any Canadian government would be prepared to contemplate pressing ahead with the conventional submarine program. Less traditional security-related roles for which DND and the Coast Guard could be used, and which would therefore generate some specific new requirements, include drug interdiction as Canada becomes a major route for drug traffickers seeking to move their goods into the United States; the protection and monitoring of Canadian fisheries and other resources; interception of illegal immigrants off either coastline; and countering environmental threats such as major oil spills (again emphasizing coastal roles). Finally, in a mixture of traditional and newer concerns, a growing demand for humanitarian-relief or peacekeeping forces of all types, such as ground forces in the former Yugoslavia or technical experts searching for Iraqi nuclear weapons information, and perhaps for new and large-scale U.N. peacekeeping forces, could generate specialized equipment requirements.ah Whether more or less traditional in their nature, and whether short-, medium- or longer-term in their time horizons, there is a clear and common thread running throughout all of these possible defence market opportunities (also identified by Paramax executives, among others) - specifically, their emphasis on advanced technologies, especially the use of automatic data-processing techniques. Specialization in niche-market technologies and the absence since the late 19508 of major platform manufacturers may cushion the Canadian defence industry from the dramatic restructuring seen as necessary in the United States and already well under way in Europe, but Canadian aerospace and electronics industry executives and analysts alike recognize that a degree of restructuring and rationalization is inevitable. In this regard, "high technology and low cost are going to be the discriminators that eventually will decide which companies do well in this very demanding and very challenging environment, and which

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Defence Industrial Darwinism?

do not."2" As well as the rationalization process under way in the aerospace sector, new industry consortia and strategic alliances, such as the two groups that competed for the Canadian Forces' supplysystem upgrade contract, are thus likely to increase in frequency and may take on a more permanent though informal character, again as has occurred among European defence manufacturers. 28 For defence-dependent aerospace firms in Canada, diversification either within or outside the defence sector has gained in importance as the demand for defence has declined internationally. One should not exaggerate the decline of the domestic defence market, which is still estimated at some $20 to $25 billion throughout the 19908, but as we have already established, that market faces a variety of challenges ranging from macroeconomic variables to the rising cost of technology, all of which serve to strain the real purchasing power of whatever defence funding is made available.*9 Declining defence budgets in the United States and in Europe tend to make export opportunities more difficult to find and to increase competition for each contract. Support for increased Canadian defence exports is, in any case, precarious at best; certainly industry requests for non-NATO defence exports will be a highly contentious policy issue over the remainder of the decade.:i