Canada, the Provinces, and the Global Nuclear Revival: Advocacy Coalitions in Action 9780773587939

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CANADA, THE PROVINCES, AND T H E G LO B A L N U C L E A R R E V I V A L

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Canada, the Provinces, and the Global Nuclear Revival Advocacy Coalitions in Action DUANE BRATT

McGill-Queen’s University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca

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© McGill-Queen’s University Press 2012 isbn 978-0-7735-4068-2 (cloth) isbn 978-0-7735-4069-9 (paper) Legal deposit fourth quarter 2012 Bibliothèque nationale du Québec Printed in Canada on acid-free paper that is 100% ancient forest free (100% post-consumer recycled), processed chlorine free. McGill-Queen’s University Press acknowledges the support of the Canada Council for the Arts for our publishing program. We also acknowledge the financial support of the Government of Canada through the Canada Book Fund for our publishing activities.

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication Bratt, Duane, 1967– Canada, the provinces, and the global nuclear revival : advocacy coalitions in action / Duane Bratt. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-7735-4068-2 (bound).— isbn 978-0-7735-4069-9 (pbk.) 1. Nuclear industry – Canada. 2. Nuclear industry – Political activity – Canada. 3. Nuclear industry – Government policy – Canada. 4. Nuclear energy – Government policy – Canada. I. Title. hd9698.c22b728 2012

333.792'40971

c2012-905140-3

This book was typeset by True to Type in 10.5/13 Sabon

preface

Contents

Figures and Tables

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Acknowledgments

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Acronyms xi PA R T O N E

1 Introduction 3 2 The Canadian Nuclear Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework 19 3 The Global Nuclear Revival 51 PA R T T W O

4 Ontario 111 5 New Brunswick 149 6 Saskatchewan 175 7 Alberta 215 8 International Opportunities 247 PA R T T H R E E

9 Conclusion 277 Notes 307 Bibliography 351 Index 377

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preface

Figures and Tables

FIGURES

1.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 11 1.2 Conceptual foundations, analytical framework, and structure of the book 12 1.3 Canada’s nuclear reactors and uranium mines 14 3.1 World electricity generation by source 67 3.2 Historical prices by electricity fuels 70 TA B L E S

2.1 The Canadian Nuclear Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework 25 3.1 Nuclear Reactors Worldwide 54 3.2 Planned Nuclear Power for Selected Developing Countries 61 3.3 Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Electricity Options 68 3.4 The International Nuclear Industry 72 3.5 Global Uranium Reserves and Production 91 3.6 Comparing Fatal Accidents across Energy Sources 107 4.1 Evolution of Nuclear Reactors in Ontario 117 5.1 Point Lepreau Yearly Load Capacity Factors 151 6.1 Canadian Neutron Source: Cost Sharing Arrangement 205 7.1 Comparing Nuclear Power Public Consultation Results by Instrument 239 9.1 Comparing the Nuclear Revival across the Provinces 278

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Acknowledgments

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Acknowledgments

After I had published The Politics of candu Exports in 2006, I felt that I had said everything I had to say on nuclear policy. That changed one day when I was driving with my wife and we heard a news report of a new company investigating the use of nuclear power in Alberta. Teresa turned to me and said, “How many nuclear experts are there in Alberta?” I responded by asking, “You mean outside of this car?” At that moment, I realized that a new development was emerging as several provinces explored expanding their use of nuclear power. I also realized that I was perfectly placed, intellectually and geographically, to write a second book on Canada’s nuclear policy. Unlike the first one, this time it would be the domestic story. My pursuit of this story led me to undertake research across Canada: in Saint John, Ottawa, Chalk River, Toronto, Saskatoon, Regina, Peace River, Edmonton, and Calgary. I was also able to interview people from all sides of the nuclear sector: federal and provincial government officials, nuclear industry representatives, scientists, and anti-nuclear activists. The bibliography at the end of this book lists all the people who spoke on the record with me as well as a number of officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. In addition to these formal interviews, there were even more informal conversations that helped to inform my thinking. I appreciate how willingly people were willing to speak with me, either on the record or off, about nuclear matters, both domestic and international. I would also like to thank the following people who provided helpful comments on different chapters: Keith Bradley, Milt Caplan, Miriam Carey, Barbara Connoly, Heather Conolley, Neil Craik, Christopher Farrands, Trevor Findlay, Justin Hannah, Colin Hunt, Walter

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Acknowledgments

Keyes, Armand Laferrere, Rob Linke, David Marinacci, Dan Meneley, Duane Pendergast, Greg Poelzer, Benjamin Sovacool, Cosmos Voutsinos, and Jeremy Whitlock. Thanks also go out to Morgan Brown for providing the map on page 14. The Canadian Nuclear Discussion group and the discussion group of the Alberta Chapter of the Canadian Nuclear Society were also good sources for debating ideas. I would also be remiss if I did not thank the two anonymous reviewers that McGill-Queen’s University Press arranged who provided numerous helpful comments that were especially useful in fine-tuning the theoretical framework. The staff at McGill-Queen’s University Press was also great to work with. I would like to thank, in particular, Kyla Madden who shepherded the project from beginning to end. Other key people from mqup include Ryan Van Huijstee, Ron Curtis, Katie Heffring, and Filomena Falocco. Mount Royal University supported this project with internal funding in 2008–9 and 2009–10. In addition, the sabbatical I was awarded for the fall 2009 semester was instrumental in giving me time to write this book. The Canada West Foundation provided financial support for research that led to Prairie Atoms: The Opportunities and Challenges of Nuclear Power in Alberta and Saskatchewan. Some of that research appears in this book. Canada, the Provinces, and the Global Nuclear Revival is dedicated to Teresa, Chris, Stephanie, Dorothy, and Cookie.

Acknowledgments

Acronyms

aa abb abwr acf acoa acr-1000 aec aecb aecl aeso afni ans arc auc balp bhel bjp bnfl bwr candu cause ccf ccni ccnr ccs ceaa ceo

administrative arrangement Asea Brown Boveri advanced boiling water reactor Advocacy Coalition Framework Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency Advanced candu Reactor-1000 Alberta Energy Corporation Atomic Energy Control Board Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Alberta Electric System Operator L’Agence France Nucléaire International American Nuclear Society Alberta Research Council Alberta Utilities Commission Bruce a Limited Partnership Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited Bharatiya Janata Party British Nuclear Fuels Limited Boiling Water Reactor Canada Deuterium Uranium Citizens Advocating the Use of Sustainable Energy Cooperative Commonwealth Federation Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility Carbon Capture and Storage Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency chief executive officer

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ceri cge cgnpc c-ibc cic cif cigi cirus cna cnea cner cnfa cnfnb cnnc cnnfc cnp cns cns cnsc cnwc co2 co2e cog cppnm crl ctbt cud dea dfait dif ec6 edc edf efn emr epr eps esbwr etc

Acronyms

Canadian Energy Research Institute Canadian General Electric China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation Canada-India Business Council Crown Investments Corporation of Saskatchewan Canada-India Foundation Centre for International Governance and Innovation Canada-India-United States Research Reactor Canadian Nuclear Association Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica Canadian Nuclear Energy Research Centre Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta Campaign for a Nuclear Free New Brunswick China National Nuclear Corporation China North Nuclear Fuel Corporation Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout Canadian Neutron Source Canadian Nuclear Society Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission Canadian Nuclear Workers Council carbon dioxide carbon dioxide equivalent candu Owners Group Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material Chalk River Laboratories Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty China Uranium Development Company Department of External Affairs Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Dedicated Isotope Facility Enhanced candu 6 Export Development Canada Électricité de France Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy Energy, Mines and Resources Evolutionary Power Reactor emergency power supply Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor Enrichment Technology Company

Acronyms

eu eub foak fsin gdp ge ghg gnep Gt gwe heu hwr Hz iaea ibew iccc icucec iea iipa inl inpo inra ipcc ipsp kaeri kepco khnp kWh kwu l&t leu lng luec lwr maple mdep mit mn-s mo-99

European Union (New Brunswick) Energy and Utilities Board first-of-a-kind Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations gross domestic product General Electric greenhouse gas Global Nuclear Energy Partnership giga tonne Gigawatt Electrical Highly Enriched Uranium Heavy Water Reactor hertz International Atomic Energy Agency International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce Inter-Church Uranium Committee Educational Co-operative International Energy Agency Independent Integrated Performance Assessment Idaho National Laboratory Institute of Nuclear Power Operators International Nuclear Regulatory Association Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Integrated Power System Plan Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute Korea Electric Power Corporation Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd kilowatt hour Kraftwerk Union Larsen & Toubro Low Enriched Uranium liquefied natural gas Levelized Unit Energy Cost Light Water Reactor Multipurpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment Multinational Design Evaluation Programme Massachusetts Institute of Technology Métis Nation – Saskatchewan molybdenum-99

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mou mpmo mw mwe nasa nbPower nca ndp nea neb nfa ngo ngsi nimby npcil npd npep npic npt nrc nrc nrcan nru nrx nsca nsg nwmo oci oeb oecd omers opa opal opg opr osart paec phwr pres

Acronyms

memorandum of understanding Major Projects Management Office megawatt Megawatt Electrical Nucleoeléctrica Argentina Sociedad Anónima New Brunswick Power Nuclear Cooperation Agreement New Democratic Party Nuclear Energy Agency National Energy Board Nuclear Free Alberta non-governmental organization Next Generation Safeguards Initiative not in my backyard Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited Nuclear Power Demonstration Nuclear Power Expert Panel Nuclear Power Institute of China Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty National Research Council Nuclear Regulatory Commission (United States) Natural Resources Canada Nuclear Research Universal Nuclear Research X-perimental Nuclear Safety and Control Act Nuclear Suppliers Group Nuclear Waste Management Organization Organization of candu Industries Ontario Energy Board Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System Ontario Power Authority Open Pooled Australian Light-Water Reactor Ontario Power Generation Optimised Power Reactor Operational Safety Review Teams Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor Peace River Environmental Society

Acronyms

pub pwr pwu r&d rapp rbmk rosatom sagd sarm saskPower ses SinoU snn so2 spea sun tc-99m tqnpc uae udp uk un uo2 us vver wano wna wto zeep

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New Brunswick Board of Commissioner for Public Utilities Pressurized Water Reactor Power Workers Union research and development Rajasthan Atomic Power Plant Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti Kanalniy (High Power Channel-type Reactor) State Atomic Energy Agency Steam-Assisted Gravity Drainage Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities Saskatchewan Power Saskatchewan Environmental Society China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation Societatea Nationala nuclearelectrica s.a. sulphur dioxide Society of Professional Engineers and Associates Saskatchewan Union of Nurses Technetium-99m Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company Ltd United Arab Emirates Uranium Development Partnership United Kingdom United Nations uranium oxide United States Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor World Association of Nuclear Operators World Nuclear Association World Trade Organization Zero Energy Experimental Pile

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Introduction

PA R T O N E

1

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1 Introduction

The world is in the midst of a nuclear revival owing to three factors coming together at the same time: a substantial rise in the global demand for electricity, increased attention placed on the problem of greenhouse gases (ghgs) contributing to climate change, and the need to diversify electricity supply away from fossil fuels. Nuclear reactors are being planned and constructed at record rates across the globe. China and India are poised to lead the way, but they are being joined by Europe, South America, Japan, and the United States. The International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea) estimates that seventy-five to three hundred new reactors will be built by 2030.1 Canada is also joining this revival as Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta are all considering developing and/or expanding their nuclear presence. This book places Canadian nuclear policy in the context of the global nuclear revival by measuring and explaining the nature and extent of the nuclear revival in the four Canadian provinces just mentioned. In the process, it shows how the global drivers and constraints have played themselves out in Canada. However, it also shows that the effects of these global influences have not been felt uniformly across Canada. In particular, there have been vast differences in how these four Canadian provinces have participated in the nuclear revival. In a previous book – The Politics of candu Exports – I examined Canadian foreign policy through case studies of every nuclear reactor sale, and some unsuccessful sales, that Canada made between 1945 and 2005.2 In contrast, this book examines Canadian domestic policy in the nuclear sector with case studies of the four provinces. However, it is not a study of purely domestic policy, because it also looks at the effects of the global nuclear revival as well as the international opportunities

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

for Canada. The nuclear sector is a fascinating topic because it exists at the intersection of politics (domestic and foreign), economics, and technology. This book has a number of empirical and theoretical objectives. The most important empirical objective is to measure the impact of the global nuclear revival on Canada. Has there been an expansion, both broadening and deepening, of the nuclear industry in Canada? A second empirical objective is to determine whether the Canadian nuclear industry has been able to exploit international opportunities in the areas of uranium mining, uranium upgrading, reactor sales, reactor refurbishments, and cooperation with other countries in nuclear research and development. A third is to assess the degree to which the Canadian nuclear industry has been consolidated through mergers and acquisitions, foreign direct investment, and/or the privatization of Crown corporations, and a fourth objective is to measure the degree of public acceptance across the entire nuclear fuel cycle by comparing and contrasting the mechanisms that have been used for public consultations. This introductory chapter has four parts. The first describes the basic features of the advocacy coalition framework (acf), which is the theoretical tool that will be used in this book. Part two lays out the organization of the book. Part 3 outlines this study’s contribution to the acf concept. Part 4 explains the methodology used for this study. THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith designed the acf in the late 1980s to “help explain coalition structure and behaviour, the role of scientific and technical information in policy, policy-oriented learning, and belief and policy change in contentious policy subsystems.”3 They define an advocacy coalition as a set of “actors from a variety of public and private institutions at all levels of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) and who seek to manipulate the rules, budgets and personnel of governmental institutions in order to achieve these goals over time.”4 Advocacy coalitions also “engage in a nontrivial degree of coordinated activity over time.”5 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith recognize that “in most subsystems, the number of politically significant advocacy coalitions will be quite small.”6 The advocacy coalition framework builds on work that was done

Introduction

5

on policy communities and policy networks.7 The policy community concept emerged to describe “some of the essential features of policymaking: that the distinction between public and private organizations was flexible, the pattern of linkages within a sector affected policy outcomes, and the sub-governmental level was most important for understanding the detail of policy formation and the success of policy implementation.”8 Policy communities can be defined as “includ[ing] all actors or potential actors with a direct or indirect interest in a policy area or function who share a common ‘policy focus,’ and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run.”9 Within a policy community actors that participate over the long term in the policy process establish close relationships between themselves and the relevant government departments. This set of relationships, which is a subset of a policy community, is called a policy network. Policy networks are “the properties that characterize the relationships among the particular set of actors that forms around an issue of importance to the policy community.”10 The acf shares many features with these approaches. For example, like policy communities, the acf identifies all the policy actors (governments, industry, labour, societal groups) that are involved in the policy-making processes within a particular sector. From the policy network approach, the acf also describes the relationships between statelevel actors and societal-level actors. However, the acf adds to these dimensions in a number of significant ways. First, it shows how different actors form stable coalitions that compete with other stable coalitions to promote policy goals. Second, it assumes that the cohesion of these coalitions is due to a shared belief system. Third, it explains longterm policy change within a sector as the result of external shocks (elections, socio-economic trends) and policy learning by the actors. The advocacy coalition framework took shape in the late 1980s, but the concept made its mark with the publication of an edited volume by Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith in 1993.11 The acf was originally conceptualized in the American context of pluralistic politics, but over the last two decades there have been a number of case studies, using different policy sectors, across Europe, Canada, and other countries.12 In the case of Canada, case studies have applied the acf to such diverse policy issues as education,13 climate change,14 forestry,15 and tobacco taxes16 and have led to a further refinement of the acf concept.17

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

There are five basic premises of the acf. First, it highlights the role of scientific and technical information in the policy process, and because of the fundamental role that scientific expertise plays in nuclear energy policy, the acf has started to be applied in some countries as an explanatory model.18 Second, it uses a time horizon of at least a decade to measure policy change, and it assumes that policy actors and their beliefs are stable during this period. Third, its unit of analysis is the policy subsystem based on sector and geographic scope. Fourth, it expands the traditional state-society conception of policy by including a host of additional actors, including scientists, researchers, consultants, journalists, and officials from all levels of government. Fifth, it emphasizes the role of belief systems in explaining policy development. There are two easily identifiable coalitions in the nuclear sector: a pro-nuclear coalition made up of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (aecl), the component suppliers, provincial utilities, business associations like the Canadian Nuclear Association (cna), unions of nuclear workers, and the nuclear scientific community. This coalition is opposed by an anti-nuclear coalition largely made up of environmental groups like the Sierra Club and the Pembina Institute and specific interest groups like the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (ccnr). The pro-nuclear coalition wants government to increase the size and scope of the nuclear sector, while the anti-nuclear coalition seeks to roll back and eventually phase it out. The composition of these two coalitions has been relatively stable for decades. The key actors will be described in the next chapter. Each advocacy coalition has a common belief system made up of ideas and values. These systems have a three–tiered hierarchical structure. At the base is the deep core of normative issues, consisting of fundamental principles about human nature, liberty, equality, justice, and priorities among values such as security, health, and life. This deep core is highly resistant to change. At the next level are policy core beliefs that are still difficult to change, but they can change if reality contradicts theoretical assumptions. Policy core beliefs include beliefs about the proper scale and scope of government activity; distributions of power and authority; the role of elected officials, civil servants, experts, and members of the public; orientations on substantive policy conflicts; and basic choices about policy instruments. Finally, there are secondary aspects involving instrumental decisions about adminis-

Introduction

7

trative rules, budgetary allocations, and statutory interpretation. The secondary aspects are the easiest to change.19 The belief systems of the two competing nuclear advocacy coalitions are fundamentally different. This can most easily be seen in how each coalition determines risk. Members of the pro-nuclear coalition conceive of risk as “a technically inclined, positivistic concept,” while the members of the anti-nuclear coalition use “a socially constructed, culturally embedded concept.”20 By framing risk in this competing fashion, the pro-nuclear coalition was able to maintain “that the industry has the best expertise to make technically and economically sound decisions in this area.” But the anti-nuclear coalition “argued for the democratic incorporation into policy processes of a range of actors much broader than those of industry and government.”21 Conflict between the coalitions was intensified because of “the devil shift, the tendency for actors to view their opponents as less trustworthy, more evil, and more powerful than they probably are.”22 As will be shown in the case studies, the behaviour of the pro-nuclear and antinuclear coalitions exhibit many of the outcomes of the devil shift: “polarized coordination patterns between rival coalitions, minimal communication channels between opponents, venue shopping, and long-term disagreement about major policies in the subsystem.”23 Mediating between these advocacy coalitions are policy brokers – elected officials and senior civil servants. Policy brokers seek compromise between the competing advocacy coalitions. “The distinction between ‘advocate’ and ‘broker,’ however, rests on a continuum. Many brokers will have some policy bent, while advocates may show some serious concern with system maintenance.”24 In other words, senior civil servants may be brokers, but they may also advocate specific policies. For example, many bureaucrats in Natural Resources Canada (nrcan) or in a provincial department of energy may be sympathetic to the pro-nuclear coalition, while the allegiance of bureaucrats in the departments of the environment may lie with the anti-nuclear coalition. It has been very difficult for brokers to find a compromise between the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear coalitions because of the high degree of conflict between them, owing to the complete incompatibility between pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear actors on the deep core of basic values and principles. The idea of the policy broker remains the most undeveloped aspect of the acf. Even Paul Sabatier admits this point.25 Karin Ingold and

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

Frédéric Varone point out that the “acf is lacking when it comes to explaining (1) the mere existence of policy brokers (Who are policy brokers? What are their belief systems?); (2) their behavior during the policy-making processes (Do they have a strategic interest-based behavior to increase their power or are they oriented toward the search of stability within a policy subsystem?); and (3) their influence on policy outputs in different political systems (Under which institutional rules do policy brokers have an influence?).” To address these criticisms, Ingold and Varone successfully tested a set of hypotheses through a case study of Switzerland’s climate change policy. The first hypothesis showed that policy brokers are not disinterested actors but, in fact, pursue their material self-interests and act strategically when they seek compromise between advocacy coalitions. The second hypothesis showed that policy brokers will use specific institutional rules to prevent conflict between the advocacy coalitions.26 Providing further insights into the role of policy brokers in mediating conflict between the advocacy coalitions is beyond the scope of this study: highlighting advocacy coalitions in action is the focus. The analysis of policy brokers will concentrate on two things. First, it will show how policy brokers have tried to broker consensus between the two advocacy coalitions through mechanisms such as expert panels and public consultation processes. Second, it will concentrate on the role of policy brokers as decision makers, which involves deciding on such things as whether to build or refurbish nuclear reactors, invest or divest in nuclear energy companies, and the extent to which they support nuclear research. “At any particular time, each coalition adopts a strategy or strategies involving the use of guidance instruments (changes in rules, budgets, personnel, or information) to attempt to alter the behaviour of one or more governmental institutions in order to make them more consistent with its policy objectives.”27 Examples of guidance instruments include seeking to influence legislatures to alter the budgets (e.g., increasing the parliamentary appropriation for aecl); trying to change the incumbents of various positions (e.g., removing Linda Keen as the head of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission); trying to affect public opinion through the mass media (e.g., using pro-nuclear advertisements by the cna); attempting to alter target group behaviour through demonstrations or boycotts (e.g., organizing an anti-nuclear demonstration on the steps of the Alberta legislature). These competing strategies are ultimately resolved through decisions by govern-

Introduction

9

mental authorities (executives, legislatures, regulatory bodies, judicial action, etc.). These government decisions result in both policy outputs and impacts that create a feedback loop that allows the coalitions to adjust their beliefs and/or strategies. Two sets of exogenous factors affect the policy subsystem. The first consists of relatively stable parameters that include the basic attributes of the policy area (e.g., nuclear energy), the basic distribution of natural resources, fundamental socio-cultural values and the social structure, and the basic constitutional structure. These parameters determine the environment and rules of the game in which the advocacy coalitions clash. Consequently, they rarely change over the course of a decade or even longer. However, variables in the second set – external events – are much more dynamic and are subject to change over the course of a decade. In fact, as will be argued later on, the acf hypothesizes that major change is due to changes in one or more of these factors. These external events include changes in socio-economic conditions, changes in public opinion, elections (nationally or provincially), and policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems. Mediating between the stable system parameters and the behaviour of the coalitions within the policy subsystem are “opportunity structures,” which are long-term features of a country that affect the resources and constraints of the subsystem actors. The first of these is the degree of consensus needed for major policy change. In Canada, most decisions in the nuclear sector are made by the political executive (the prime minister/premier and the cabinet). In addition, since Canada is a federal country, some decisions are made at the national level and others at the provincial level, and some require coordination between both levels of government. A second feature is the degree of openness of the political system, which can be measured in two ways: by examining the number of decision-making venues and the accessibility of each venue. Canada, with its parliamentary structure, is not usually seen as an open political system. However, most decisions concerning nuclear energy require public hearings (for the licensing of nuclear reactors, opening new uranium mines, selecting waste disposal sites, and so on). This provides a high degree of political openness.28 A major focus in policy studies is the issue of policy change. Major changes are those that occur in the policy core aspects of a governmental program (for example, in the decision to allow nuclear energy in a new jurisdiction like Saskatchewan), whereas minor changes are those that occur in secondary aspects (for example, in designing a

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

public consultation process for the introduction of nuclear energy in Alberta or Saskatchewan). In the acf, policy change can happen in two ways: through “policy-oriented learning” and through “external perturbations.”29 “Policy-oriented learning [involves] relatively enduring alternations of thought or behavioural intentions that result from experience and/or new information and that are concerned with the attainment or revision of policy objectives.”30 This type of learning can occur within (more common) or between (rarer) advocacy coalitions. However, it is much more likely that external shocks will be the cause of paradigmatic change. For example, in many countries, the disasters at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima-Daiichi were the drivers for change in nuclear policy.31 External shocks – changes in government, public opinion, disaster, and so on – may be necessary ingredients for change, but they are not sufficient. Change also requires the “skilful exploitation of those opportunities by the (previously) minority coalition within the subsystem.”32 In addition, the minority coalition’s efforts at exploiting external shocks will be countered by the majority coalition. “The majority coalition will seek to dampen the effects of such opportunities by, for example, suggesting the need for further research, confining change to small experimental projects, or diverting attention to other issues.”33 Figure 1.1, which sketches out the structure of the acf as applied to the Canadian nuclear sector, summarizes the foregoing discussion. O R G A N I Z AT I O N O F T H I S B O O K

The division of this book into three parts is visually represented in figure 1.2. This chapter (part 1, chapter 1) has described the acf and has set out the empirical and theoretical objectives of this study. Building on this discussion, chapter 2 outlines the Canadian nuclear sector on the basis of the acf. It includes a description of all the actors in the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, the policy brokers, policy beliefs, and the relationships between and within the coalitions, and it identifies the historical winning coalition. Chapter 3 explores the global nuclear revival and the political, economic, environmental, and technological implications for Canada. The three main drivers of the nuclear revival (electricity demand, climate change, and energy security) are explained, and the extent of the revival is measured through a survey of new builds, the refurbishment of existing plants, and changing public opinion towards nuclear power. The chapter then describes the

Introduction

11

Figure 1.1 The Advocacy Coalition Framework Source: Adapted from Sabatier and Weible, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 202.

international nuclear industry, focusing on the consolidation of reactor companies, electricity utilities, and uranium mining firms, showing that these structural changes have led the nuclear industry to be dominated by a handful of giants: Areva, Westinghouse-Toshiba, General Electric-Hitachi, and Rosatom. It also explores the restructuring of aecl that led to its reactor division being sold to snc-Lavalin. The final part of the chapter assesses the political implications of the revival by looking at the issues of trade protectionism, nuclear nonproliferation, and reactor safety. Part 2 compiles the empirical evidence. Chapters 4–7 provide comparative case studies of nuclear policy in the provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. These four provinces

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Conceptual Foundations & Literature Streams

Analytical Framework

and diversity & security of supply

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival Figure 1.2 Conceptual foundations, analytical frameork and structure of the book

Empirical Analysis of Four Provinces’ International Opportunities

Book Structure

Introduction

13

were selected because each of them has seen significant political activity by the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, the restarting and refurbishing of existing reactors, and serious consideration for building new nuclear reactors. Although other provinces (such as Quebec and Manitoba) have connections to the nuclear sector, their stake is much smaller, and the nuclear coalitions have not been as active. Quebec, like Ontario and New Brunswick, is a province with a pre-existing nuclear power reactor: the Gentilly-2 and many of the nuclear components suppliers are based in the Montreal area. However, because Quebec produces surplus electricity owing to its large-scale hydroelectric generation, there are no plans to add to its nuclear fleet. It decided in August 2008 to spend $1.9 billion on refurbishing Gentilly-2 extending its life until 2040.34 Two years later, Hydro-Quebec announced that it had pushed back the start of the refurbishment until 2012 owing to problems with the Point Lepreau refurbishment project and the uncertainty over the future of aecl, but the project as still going to go ahead.35 However, in the aftermath of the FukushimaDaiichi accident, Premier Jean Charest requested that Hydro-Quebec conduct a comprehensive safety review as part of a cost-benefit analysis of either shutting down Gentilly 2 or continuing with plans to refurbish it.36 Manitoba used to host aecl’s Whiteshell nuclear laboratory at Pinawa (100 km east of Winnipeg). Whiteshell conducted nuclear research in a number of areas, particularly reactor safety and waste management, but it was closed owing to budget cutbacks in 1995. Since then there have been periodic efforts to transform Whiteshell into another type of nuclear facility or even to build a power reactor in Pinawa,37 but given the province’s huge hydroelectric capacity in northern Manitoba, the provincial government has not been interested. Nova Scotia has a research reactor (at Dalhousie University), and the Northwest Territories has an abandoned uranium mine (Port Radium), but the rest of the provinces and territories have an insignificant stake in the nuclear industry (see figure 1.3 for a map of nuclear activity in Canada). The format of each case study chapter is the same, and each contains six parts. The first describes the nuclear history of the province. The second identifies the actors within the provincial acfs, and the third describes the issue(s) they face, which could be building new nuclear reactors, refurbishing old reactors, expanding the uranium mining sector, or constructing a research reactor that could also be used to produce medical isotopes. Part 4 assesses the relationships

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

Figure 1.3 Canada’s Nuclear Reactors and Uranium Mines. Copyright 2012 Canadian Nuclear Society, www.cns-snc.ca

within the provincial acf, including the relationships within each coalition and between each coalition, and their relationships with the national acf. Part 5 assesses the influence of the competing advocacy coalitions to determine the winning coalition, and part 6 identifies the changes that have occurred within the provincial acf over time. Part 2 also includes an assessment (chapter 8) of the international opportunities for the Canadian nuclear industry in the uranium sector (exploration, mining, fuel services) and in the reactor sector (new builds and refurbishments). Since Canada has just completed a

Introduction

15

nuclear cooperation agreement with India, the re-engagement with that country will be analyzed. Part 3 (chapter 9) sets out the conclusion to this study by revisiting the empirical and theoretical objectives set forth in this chapter. T H E C O N T R I B U T I O N TO T H E A C F

Since this study uses the acf as a theoretical basis for understanding and predicting the development of Canadian nuclear policy in the context of the global nuclear revival, it has been able to refine and extend our understanding of the theory in two ways. First, it uses the provincial nuclear energy case studies to test four specific acf hypotheses: 1 Significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program. 2 On major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in a dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so. 3 An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. 4 Even when the accumulation of technical information does not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important impacts on policy – at least in the short run – by altering the views of policy brokers.38 Empirically testing these hypotheses will advance the acf by confirming or refuting some of the key predictions. If a hypothesis is confirmed, this will give additional weight to the theory’s applicability to explaining and understanding public policy. If, on the other hand, a hypothesis is refuted, then a further refinement of the acf will be required. Second, this book seeks to advance the acf concept in several key ways. Aware of Les Pal’s criticism of the acf – that it “is relatively weak in describing patterns of relationships either among the coalitions themselves or among brokers” – this study documents in detail the relationships between the actors, both within and across the two

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

nuclear coalitions, in Canada as a whole and within each of the provinces studied.39 (The Canadian nuclear acf is described in chapter 2, and the provincial nuclear acfs are described in chapters 4–7.) This study also demonstrates how the national nuclear acf is separate from provincial nuclear acfs, and highlights the differences between the provincial acfs. It is true that the acf conceives of policy subsystems in intergovernmental terms. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith recognize that “the subsystem will include actors from multiple levels of government and that the subsystem will be divided into different levels of government and, at each level, into different jurisdictions.”40 However, while they envisaged only one subsystem per policy sector, this study argues that there are multiple subsystems that compete and collaborate. In fact, in a recent evaluation of the acf, its chief architects asserted that “a challenge in explaining the policy process is the interdependence among multiple policy subsystems.”41 All of the six studies that apply the acf to Canadian policy subsystems examine only one jurisdiction, either at the national level or within one province. Even in other federal systems, especially the United States, there have been very few studies of multiple jurisdictions. Therefore, I believe that this is the first study that compares different subsystems (national and provincial) in the same policy sector. Chapter 2 identifies the acf for the Canadian nuclear energy subsystem, but the subsequent chapters detailing the provincial case studies show how this national acf is modified in each province. These modifications are so significant that they have to be conceived of as separate acfs. Obviously, national actors are present in all the provinces, namely, aecl and the cnsc. These national actors may also simply replicate their relationships across different jurisdictions. In addition, many of the same types of actors are present in each province, for example, provincial utilities like nb Power, SaskPower, and Ontario Power Generation (opg). However, it is important to recognize that there are also specific differences in actors in each province: there could be new actors or the relationships between the actors may differ. Moreover, each province has different system-wide parameters. For example, the private sector plays a greater role in electricity generation in Alberta and Ontario than in New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. Similarly, the basic distribution of natural resources is different: Alberta contains oil sands, natural-gas supplies, and vast coal deposits; Saskatchewan is blessed with some of the world’s largest uranium reserves; Ontario has hydro capacity, but it has been largely

Introduction

17

maximized; and New Brunswick has few natural energy resources. As will be shown, each province has also responded differently to similar external events like climate change or the consolidation of the international nuclear industry. Detailing to great effect the existence of a national acf combined with individual provincial acfs, provides further empirical evidence of the impact of multiple levels of government, especially in federal systems. Finally this study advances the acf concept by explaining how the national acf changes when it is applied to the international environment. There has been a growing interest in the effects of the internationalization of Canadian public policy. In the mid-1990s, Doern, Pal, and Tomlin led a group of scholars examining the internationalization of Canadian public policy across a number of important sectors like social policy, banking and securities, telecommunications, the environment, agriculture, trade and industry, investment, human rights and security, and foreign policy.42 They analyzed policy changes created by internationalization, including sovereignty concerns, policy instruments, the role of international agencies, and interdepartmental relations (especially those between the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and other departments and agencies). Grace Skogstad also studied the internationalization of Canadian agriculture policy because “developments, actors, and instructions beyond our borders shape our policy agendas, the content of our public policies, and our modes of governing to an unprecedented degree.”43 She concluded that “the internationalization of agriculture” has “played a role in the adjustment of Canadian agricultural policies.”44 The acf was developed and applied to domestic policy areas. In her study of Canadian climate change policy, Karen Litfin has argued that “the twin dynamics of globalization and internationalization are driving an ever-wider range of policy questions.” Therefore, the acf needs to internationalize in order to “broaden the acf’s applicability.”45 This book takes on this challenge by showing how the Canadian nuclear energy subsystem behaves differently depending upon whether the focus is domestic or foreign policy. M E T H O D O LO G Y

Like most previous acf studies, this book uses qualitative methods in its application of the acf to the Canadian nuclear sector. The pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions were identified by examining the membership

18

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

lists of the cna, the ccnr, and other networking organizations. Their policy beliefs, stability and unity, coordination, relationships, and influence were gleaned through a thorough examination of both primary (government documents, actor studies, and websites) and secondary (books, academic journals, and news reports) sources. This was supplemented by interviews (in person and by telephone and email) with important individuals from the pro-nuclear coalition, antinuclear coalition, and policy brokers. Most of these interviews were on the record with full attribution, but in other cases, the subject asked for anonymity. When this request was made, it was always honoured. In addition, evidence was acquired through personal attendance at public and private meetings, forums, and conferences as both a participant and an observer.

2 The Canadian Nuclear Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

This chapter maps out the landscape of Canada’s nuclear sector through the lens of the acf by providing an overview of the main companies, agencies, associations, non-governmental organizations, and regulatory bodies (federal and provincial) connected with the sector, some of the history of the nuclear industry in Canada, the major arguments for and against nuclear power, and the debates over jurisdiction and responsibility for the sector. To do this it separates the actors and their policy beliefs into the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear coalitions that will be analyzed throughout this book. In addition, it identifies the nuclear policy brokers, explains the relationships within and between the coalitions, and discusses the historical winning coalitions in the Canadian nuclear acf. THE PRO -NUCLEAR ADVOCACY COALITION

The pro-nuclear coalition is composed of the nuclear industry, unions of nuclear workers, and the nuclear scientific community. The Canadian nuclear industry is dominated by federal and provincial Crown corporations. On the federal side, the primary Crown corporation is aecl, which was created in 1952 and currently employs over five thousand workers. It is the designer, engineer, distributor, patent holder, and marketer of the candu nuclear reactor and provides a range of nuclear services “from r&d support, construction management, design and engineering to specialized technology, waste management and decommissioning in support of candu reactor products.” Its headquarters and its engineering design centre are at Sheridan Park (in Mississauga, Ontario), but its major research and development labo-

20

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

ratories remain in Chalk River, Ontario. In addition, aecl maintains offices in all the countries where it has either sold a candu or hopes to sell one, including Argentina, China, South Korea, Romania, and the United States.1 In June 2011, aecl’s reactor division was sold to snc-Lavalin and became candu Energy, while aecl retained Chalk River Laboratories. The process of aecl’s restructuring is described in great detail in chapter 3. snc-Lavalin is a large engineering and construction firm headquartered in Montreal, with offices in thirty-six countries and projects in more than a hundred. It has over twenty-two employees worldwide and annual revenue around $3 billion a year and has been a partner with aecl since 1967, supplying engineering and other ancillary services, as well as providing boilers.2 To make things simple for the reader, I will use the term aecl for all events before June 2011 and candu Energy (reactor services) and Chalk River Laboratories (nru reactor and research and development) for events after June 2011. The provincial utilities – Ontario Power Generation (opg), HydroQuebec, and New Brunswick Power (nb Power) – are also important actors in the Canadian nuclear sector and dominate the provincial sectors; they own all the candus in Canada. opg, which was spawned from the breakup of Ontario Hydro, owns all of the candus operating in Ontario and also operates the Pickering and Darlington stations, which have twelve reactors altogether and are the single largest source of Ontario’s electricity. Historically, the partnership between Ontario Hydro and aecl was instrumental in the development of the candu. The continuing importance of opg in Canada’s nuclear development will be explored in chapter 4. nb Power currently owns only one reactor, but as will be seen in chapter 5, there have been a couple of proposals to build a second reactor at the Point Lepreau site. Point Lepreau, which began power production in 1983, was the first candu-6 built. For years, it was one of the most efficient reactors in the world, accounting for between 25 and 30 percent of New Brunswick’s electricity needs.3 Point Lepreau is currently undergoing a life-extension program that will extend its service till 2032. Hydro-Quebec, owing to its large reserves of hydroelectric power from James Bay and Churchill Falls, has the smallest interest in nuclear affairs of the three provincial utilities. The Gentilly-2 is Hydro-Quebec’s only reactor, and it generates less than 3 percent of Quebec’s electricity needs.

The Canadian Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

21

Chapters 4–7 show how the provincial utilities will determine the extent to which Canada participates in the global nuclear revival through their decisions to build new nuclear reactors and refurbish existing ones. If the provinces move away from nuclear power and either maintain coal and natural gas power plants or expand their use of renewables, they will kill the nuclear industry in Canada. And if they choose a reactor design other than candu, that choice will lead to a fundamental restructuring of the Canadian nuclear industry. Bruce Power, a private firm, does not own any reactors, but it operates the Bruce a & b sites (eight candus in total) in Ontario on a longterm lease from opg. In the future, Bruce Power may become an owner because it is pursuing the construction of new nuclear reactors in Saskatchewan and Alberta. Bruce Power emerged when Ontario decided to deregulate its electricity sector in 2001 and was established by British Energy (80 percent owner) and Cameco (15 percent), but British Energy has since sold its stake. Today Bruce Power is primarily owned by TransCanada Corporation and Cameco, but smaller shares are held by a trust established by the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, the Power Workers’ Union, and the Society of Energy Professionals.4 Cameco, headquartered in Saskatoon, is one of the world’s largest uranium producers with approximately 15 percent of market share. It was created in 1988 as a private company following the merger of Eldorado Nuclear Limited (a federal Crown corporation) and the Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation (a provincial Crown corporation). It owns uranium mines in Saskatchewan, Kazakhstan, and the United States and is exploring for uranium in Australia, Mongolia, and Africa. Cameco also owns a uranium refinery in Blind River, Ontario, a conversion facility in Port Hope, Ontario, and a candu fuel manufacturing plant also in Port Hope.5 mds Nordion, a major supplier of medical isotopes, radiotherapeutics, and related technologies, was originally a division of aecl, but it was privatized in 1991. Today, it is a division of mds Inc, a multinational health and life sciences company headquartered in Toronto that provides products and services for the development of drugs and the management of diseases. mds Nordion purchases the vast majority of its isotopes from aecl’s nru reactor, converts them for medical use at an Ottawa facility, and then distributes them to hospitals and clinics in Canada and around the world.6 In 1996, mds Nordion entered into an agreement with aecl to build two maple reactors to

22

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

replace the aging nru reactor as a producer of isotopes. The maple reactors were delayed and eventually cancelled, creating a crisis in the medical isotope industry. The Canadian Nuclear Association (cna), the industry’s collective voice was established in 1960 just as Canada was starting to pursue domestic nuclear power reactors. Originally it had two key roles. First, it provided a forum for networking to address technical issues – safety standards, sharing research results, basic research and development, and nuclear fission’s applications to power generation. The cna’s conferences in the 1960s and 1970s were highly technical, but this role ended when the Canadian Nuclear Society (cns) was created in 1979. Its second role was to “develop a common position on nuclear matters with the Canadian government,” a role that changed to “presenting a common position to the Canadian government” when the relevant government departments left the organization in 1999. A third role, public communication, was added to the cna’s mandate in the early 1980s.7 The cna’s initial membership was small and included the large manufacturers and the provincial power utilities. Today it has expanded to around a hundred members and includes aecl, all the major reactor component suppliers (e.g., Babcock & Wilcox and General Electric-Hitachi Nuclear), reactor operators (e.g., Bruce Power), uranium miners (e.g., Cameco and Areva), provincial power utilities (e.g., opg and Hydro Quebec), medical isotope producers (e.g., mds Nordion), universities (e.g., McMaster and Saskatchewan), scientific associations (e.g., the Canadian Nuclear Society and the American Nuclear Society), and other related nuclear organizations associations (e.g., the World Nuclear Association and the Saskatchewan Mining Association).8 In the early years, as previously mentioned, federal and provincial government departments (like the Department of External Affairs and bc Hydro) were members of the cna, but they have all subsequently left the organization. There are other business associations. The Organization of candu Industries (oci) was founded in 1979. “Its original purpose was to promote export sales for its member companies who supply services and reactor components to international and domestic market.” This has evolved into a broader objective of “promot[ing] a healthy nuclear power industry in Canada, for the benefit of oci members.” oci is made up of over 150 companies that provide reactor components or engineering services for the candu and “functions independently

The Canadian Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

23

from the design authorities and the utilities, but participates with them in the design, manufacture, construction and commissioning of nuclear power plants.” Its major activity is lobbying government officials. As the oci notes, “our provincial and federal governments are under constant pressure from anti-nuclear groups. oci holds regular discussions with government officials at various levels to promote our industry and its many benefits to Canadians.”9 The candu Owners Group (cog) was formed in 1984 by the provincial utilities that owned candus (Ontario Hydro, Hydro-Quebec, and NB Power) and aecl. These charter members were joined by all international candu owners: Nucleoeléctrica Argentina Sociedad Anónima (nasa), Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd (khnp), Societatea Nationala nuclearelectrica s.a. (snn), and the Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company Ltd (tqnpc). Canada ended nuclear cooperation with India and Pakistan in 1976 in retaliation for India’s 1974 nuclear test, but both the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (npcil) and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (paec) are members of cog. In 2001, Bruce Power, the only private sector candu operator in Canada, joined cog, whose membership is restricted to the eleven owner/operators of candus. cog “is a not-for-profit organization dedicated to providing programs for cooperation, mutual assistance and exchange of information for the successful support, development, operation, maintenance and economics of candu technologies.” Unlike the cna and the oci, cog is not an advocacy organization. Instead, it focuses on four areas: information exchange, joint projects and services, regulatory affairs, and research and development.10 In many policy subsystems, unions and industry are in different advocacy coalitions, but in the nuclear sector they are allied within the pro-nuclear coalition. The major union is the Canadian Nuclear Workers Council (cnwc), which was formed in 1993 by the major unions that represent workers in the various sectors of the Canadian nuclear industry: electric power utilities, uranium mining and processing, medical isotope production, and nuclear research. Its goal “is to ensure that Unionized Workers in the Nuclear Industries have a voice in the ongoing debate around Nuclear Power.”11 One of the most fascinating aspects of nuclear policy is the importance of technology. As Pal has noted, “the greater the scientific dimension of a policy issue, the greater the importance of scientific or specialized information and those who possess it … Scientific

24

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

expertise in this context means more than the physical sciences, it embraces the growing importance of such social science disciplines as economics, psychology, criminology, social welfare, and management.”xii Although there are many scientists, especially social scientists, in the anti-nuclear coalition, the vast majority of nuclear scientists, primarily physicists and engineers, are within the pro-nuclear coalition. The Canadian Nuclear Society is the professional association of nuclear scientists.13 It is “dedicated to the exchange of information in the field of applied nuclear science and technology. This encompasses all aspects of nuclear energy, uranium, fission and other nuclear technologies such as occupational and environmental protection, medical diagnosis and treatment, the use of radioisotopes, and food preservation.”14 Its objectives are •

•

•

•

to act as a forum for the exchange of information relating to nuclear science and technology; to foster the development and beneficial utilization of nuclear science and technology for peaceful uses; to encourage education in, and knowledge about, nuclear science and technology; and to enhance the professional and technical capabilities of those involved in nuclear science and technology in the Canadian context.15

The membership of the cns includes those who work for academic institutions, but also current or retired employees of nuclear industry companies like aecl. It has branches in New Brunswick, Quebec, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Ontario. The pro-nuclear coalition is united by its shared policy beliefs. Table 2.1 provides a summary of those beliefs. Most fundamental is the belief that nuclear energy is a safe and economical source for meeting Canada’s electricity demand: reactors have built-in safety redundancies (the “suspenders-and-belt” approach) to ensure that they shut down automatically in the case of an accident, including passive devices that do not require an operator. The pro-nuclear coalition is quick to point out that the 1986 Chernobyl accident was not at all representative of the overall safety of the nuclear sector, but it does recognize that Chernobyl, as well as Three Mile Island (1979), were twin shocks to the nuclear sector. In the aftermath of these accidents,

The Canadian Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

25

Table 2.1 The Canadian Nuclear Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework Elements of the acf

Pro-Nuclear Coalition

Anti-Nuclear Coalition

Actors

• Nuclear industry (cna, aecl, Bruce Power, etc.) • Nuclear unions (cnwc) • Nuclear scientists (cns) • Officials in the Department(s) of Energy

• Anti-nuclear groups (ccnr, cnp) • Environmental organizations (Pembina, Sierra Club) • Officials in the Department(s) of Environment

Policy Beliefs

• Nuclear energy is a safe and economical form of electricity. • Since nuclear energy does not emit greenhouse gases, it can address the problem of climate change. • Nuclear energy contributes to the Canadian economy through jobs and the gdp. • Nuclear energy has resulted in technological spinoffs. • The candu is prestigious to Canada. • Nuclear energy does not lead to weapons proliferation. • Nuclear waste issue has been exaggerated; it is being managed. • Renewable energy has significant flaws

• Nuclear reactors are unsafe (Chernobyl, Fukushima-Daiichi). • The entire fuel cycle creates radiation, which causes cancer. • Reactors produce nuclear waste that lasts for hundreds of thousands of years. • Nuclear energy is not a solution to climate change, and instead resources should be devoted to conservation and renewable energy sources. • There is a clear link between civilian nuclear energy and military nuclear bombs. • Nuclear energy is uneconomical and is highly subsidized by the government.

peer review systems were formed by nuclear operators. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (inpo) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (wano) have taken significant steps at ensuring the safe operation of reactors. In addition, nuclear energy, more so than any other energy source, is heavily regulated to prevent and mitigate accidents. The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (cnsc) indepen-

26

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

dently monitors the safety performance of all reactors and uranium mines in Canada. Canada also adheres to a series of international conventions on nuclear safety standards. Today, nuclear power’s safety record exceeds, by any measure, the other conventional energy sources of coal, oil, and natural gas. In examining the economics of nuclear energy, the pro-nuclear coalition does acknowledge that nuclear reactors have large up-front costs. However, these costs are balanced by both the large amount of electricity that one reactor can produce and the lifetime service of a reactor (fifty to sixty years). When these factors are included, nuclear power is cheaper than its major competitors: coal-, oil-, and natural gas-fired plants. For these reasons the nuclear industry urges the use of levelized unit energy cost (luec) as a guide to making decisions on the cost of different energy technologies.16 In addition, because only a small percentage of a reactor’s operating costs is attributable to the price of fuel, nuclear energy is relatively immune to the volatility of the price of fossil fuels. And since Canada has vast reserves of uranium, greater reliance on nuclear energy helps to ensure the country’s energy security. Finally, if governments start to add a price to carbon emissions, either through a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system, the economic benefits of nuclear energy will become even more apparent. The issue of climate change is discussed in great detail in chapter 3, but for now it is important to recognize that the pro-nuclear coalition sees this issue as a good opportunity to expand the number of reactors, since nuclear energy, unlike coal or natural gas plants, does not directly emit greenhouse gases. However, because there are life-cycle emissions from nuclear energy, the cna commissioned the Canadian Energy Research Institute (ceri) to compare nuclear energy to its chief electricity competitors of natural gas and coal. ceri found that the mining, fuel production, operation, and waste disposal required for nuclear plants produces just 1.8 grams of greenhouse gases (ghgs) per kilowatt-hour (g/kWh), compared to 540 g/kWh for gas-fired plants and 1,050 g/kWh for coal-fired plants. ghg emissions can therefore be significantly reduced if nuclear energy displaces these dirtier electricity sources. ceri proved that if Ontario had replaced one megawatt (mw) of coal-fired or natural-gas-fired electricity capacity with one mw of nuclear capacity, it would have avoided 1,049 kg or 538 kg of ghg emissions respectively.17 The cna has shown that since 1972, the use of candus in Canada has avoided the production of 2.4 billion tonnes of co2 and 48.9 million tonnes of sulphur dioxide (so2).18

The Canadian Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

27

The pro-nuclear coalition also emphasizes the benefits of the nuclear sector to the Canadian economy. The 150 firms that make up the Canadian nuclear industry employ over thirty thousand people. When you include the number of indirect jobs from uranium mining and nuclear plant operation the total number of jobs jumps to over seventy thousand. The Canadian nuclear sector generates over $6.6 billion in annual revenues (including $1.5 billion in exports) and pays $1.5 billion in federal and provincial taxes.19 The pro-nuclear coalition warns that if the nuclear sector were to be downgraded in Canada, these economic benefits would be lost. The country would also suffer a massive “brain-drain” of high-tech personnel skilled in the nuclear field. It is not just the number of employees in the nuclear industry that is important; it is also the type of employees. The industry uses a very high proportion of scientists and engineers, more so than many other industry, and these workers constitute a scarce resource in Canada. It also needs to be repeated that nuclear energy is produced by a high-tech sector that creates the conditions for technological spinoffs. Previous spin-offs from nuclear research and development have included medical isotopes, flight simulators, food irradiation, vibration technology, and cooling systems. Future technological advances may be in energy (thorium, hydrogen, nuclear fusion, recycling spent fuel, etc.), but others may be in unrelated areas. For over fifty years, Chalk River Laboratories, including the nru research reactor, “has made major scientific and economic contributions to the fields of aerospace, automotive, manufacturing, energy, construction, health, environmental technologies, and oil and gas.”20 The creation of an indigenous nuclear technology has also provided Canada with an important element of national prestige. Because of its participation in the Manhattan project, Canada was on the ground floor of nuclear technology, but unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, Canada directed its scientific efforts solely at civilian applications of the atom. The result was the candu reactor, which has subsequently received a number of national and international technological achievement awards. In 1987 it was named one of Canada’s top ten engineering accomplishments, and in 1984 aecl scientist Bertram Brockhouse won the Nobel Prize in Physics. As a result, the candu has benefited from a degree of national mythmaking. The prestigious image of the candu cannot be overstated. Since the early 1960s, the example of the Avro Arrow has been

28

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

brought up as a powerful warning to the government to protect the nuclear industry – to avoid giving up on another high-tech Canadian industry. Besides putting forward their own position, the pro-nuclear coalition also has to respond to criticisms levelled at it by the anti-nuclear coalition. There are three major criticisms. First, that civilian nuclear energy is directly linked to the military application of the atom. In response, the pro-nuclear coalition asserts that an elaborate system of international nuclear safeguards has been developed to ensure that civilian nuclear programs do not lead to weapons production. The system is based on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt), the International Atomic Energy Agency (iaea), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (nsg), and other international treaties and organizations. It includes technical barriers to the use of nuclear technology, especially fissile material and aims to structure international nuclear cooperation so that it directly restricts the development or military application of sensitive nuclear capabilities. John Ritch, director general of the World Nuclear Association (wna), has stated that “the global non-proliferation and safeguards system – one of the greatest achievements in diplomatic history – effectively curtails any link between civil and military programmes, and actually helps to detect and deter illicit nuclear activity.”21 The pro-nuclear coalition points out that both the North Korean and the Iranian nuclear weapons programs were discovered through the iaea’s process of inspecting nuclear facilities. The second issue is that nuclear energy is fundamentally unsafe. Anti-nuclear activists point to the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima-Daiichi. In the case of Three Mile Island in 1979, the reactor’s safety features kicked in and shut down the reactor, and its containment structure prevented the emission of large doses of radiation into the environment. Nobody died or was injured. Chernobyl, in 1986, was much more serious, since it led to the death of thirty-one people within hours, and radiation was spread across thousands of kilometres. The most authoritative study of Chernobyl, undertaken by eight un agencies and the governments of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, has indicated that four thousand additional thyroid cases will likely be attributed to the accident.22 However, the Chernobyl disaster was primarily caused by the political and social culture in the former Soviet Union, which did not emphasize safety. A sense of the uniqueness of the Chernobyl disaster is provided by the fact

The Canadian Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

29

that the facility, incredibly, lacked a fully capable containment structure and that steam explosions occurred during a test when the reactor’s safety system was turned off. On 11 March 2011 Japan was hit by a 9.0-magniture earthquake. The Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant, which is about 150 kilometres northeast of Tokyo on the edge of the Pacific Ocean, automatically shut down units 1 to 3 (units 4 to 6 were not in operation at the time of the earthquake). Although the chain reactions had been stopped, radioactive materials in the reactor cores continued to produce decay heat. When this happens there is a danger that the cores will overheat if the fuel is not cooled by circulating water using electric pumps, and unfortunately, the earthquake had knocked out the electricity in the Fukushima area. The facility therefore went to its first backup safety system: thirteen diesel-powered generators on-site. Then a massive tsunami struck one hour after the earthquake and flooded all the generators, and the plant had to revert to its secondary backup system: emergency battery power. But the batteries, in turn, expired after only eight hours. In short, the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear plant was hit by three simultaneous disasters: an earthquake, a tsunami, and a loss of all electricity. This trio led to a series of significant accidents at the FukushimaDaiichi nuclear plant. A loss of coolant at units 1 to 3 led to some melting of fuel, breaches of the containment vessel, and release of radioactive material. There were also several explosions in secondary buildings owing to the venting of hydrogen into the atmosphere. These incidents were compounded by the evaporation of water at spentfuel storage bays in units 4 to 6. Spent-fuel bundles are removed from the reactor care after going through the fission process, but since they continue to produce decay heat for several years, they are also cooled in water. A lack of water in the spent fuel pools is potentially more dangerous because, unlike the situation with the reactor core, there is no metres-wide steel and concrete containment vessel protecting the pools. For over a week Japanese authorities battled to control the nuclear crisis. They injected seawater into the reactor cores, brought in diesel generators, relied on fire trucks and helicopters to spray water, replaced damaged pumps and valves, reconnected power lines, and took other emergency actions. The nuclear crisis is now under control, although units 1 to 3 will never again be operational. An mit study of the accident concluded that “the release of radioactivity from the

30

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

plant has been large and some workers have received significant radiation doses, but health risks for them and the general population are expected to be negligible. In fact, no loss of life has occurred or is expected as a result of the accident. Direct damage and casualties inflicted on Japan by the earthquake and tsunami far exceed any damage caused by the accident at the nuclear plant.”23 Nevertheless, this was the second-worst nuclear accident in history, surpassing Three Mile Island, but not hitting the death toll and environmental destruction that at Chernobyl. In fact, as the mit study pointed out, nobody died as a result of the nuclear accident, even though over twenty thousand people perished and there was $300 billion in damage as a result of the earthquake/tsunami. Japan has placed the Fukushima-Daiichi accident at a 7 on the iaea’s International Nuclear Events Scale meaning a “major accident.” This is equal to Chernobyl’s 7 ranking and above Three Mile Island’s 5 ranking as an “accident with wider consequences.”24 As will be shown later in this chapter, the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident alarmed many environmentalists. However, one prominent environmentalist actually moved to the pro-nuclear side because of it. George Monbiot, an award-winning environmental writer from Britain, wrote in the Guardian that “as a result of the disaster at Fukushima, I am no longer nuclear-neutral. I now support the technology.” What convinced Monbiot was the fact that “a crappy old plant with inadequate safety features was hit by a monster earthquake and a vast tsunami. The electricity supply failed, knocking out the cooling system. The reactors began to explode and melt down. The disaster exposed a familiar legacy of poor design and corner-cutting. Yet, as far as we know, no one has yet received a lethal dose of radiation … Atomic energy has just been subjected to one of the harshest of possible tests, and the impact on people and the planet has been small.”25 The third issue that the pro-nuclear coalition has had to rebut is that of spent-fuel nuclear waste. They argue that the issue frequently becomes contaminated with emotion, overheated rhetoric, half-truths, and exaggeration. They believe that it is important to identify other key aspects of waste, for example that it is very small in volume compared to wastes created by many other industries or by burning coal for energy. On discharge from a candu, only about 1.1 percent of the fuel material can be viewed as waste.26 One reactor will generate about thirty tonnes of high-level waste per year. After over forty years

The Canadian Sector and the Advocacy Coalition Framework

31

of power production, Canada’s reactors have accumulated just over two million bundles of nuclear waste (which weigh about twentyfour kilograms and are the size of a fireplace log), enough to fill “six hockey rinks from the ice surface to the top of the boards.”27 The spent fuel is initially contained on-site in water-filled storage pools. Typically, after five to seven years, it is then transferred to secure onsite concrete canisters that have an effective life of many decades. Consequently, unlike the situation with coal, nuclear waste is not emitted into the atmosphere. Both the cnsc and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization (nwmo) estimate that nuclear waste can be safely stored on-site for several more decades. While the half-life of nuclear waste is very long, the substances that are the most highly radioactive die out very quickly, and those with the least amount of radioactivity have the longest half-life. Therefore, for the pro-nuclear coalition, the issue of long-term waste disposal is not a technological problem, because it is currently safely stored on-site. In addition, they point out that there is a scientific consensus on long-term geological storage. The nwmo has brought in an “adapted phased management” process for nuclear waste disposal through the “isolation and containment of used nuclear fuel in a deep repository constructed in a suitable rock formation.”28 The problem is finding an appropriate site. The nwmo is at the stage of designing a process for site selection and expects to have an operational nuclear waste facility within a decade. The pro-nuclear coalition has also identified another possible solution to the nuclear waste issue through further research and development into fuel reprocessing. After going through a reactor, spent fuel still consists of about 96 to 98 percent uranium. Reprocessing is a chemical process that recovers usable uranium from spent fuel by separating the uranium from the other by-products of fission (plutonium and other minor actinides). Beyond substantially reducing nuclear waste, reprocessing also allows for the more efficient use of uranium and can act as a hedge against a uranium shortage. A final part of the pro-nuclear coalition’s belief system is scepticism about the future role of renewable energy. They acknowledge that renewable sources such as solar and wind power should be part of Canada’s energy mix, and, in fact, their use needs to increase. But they point out that, like all energy sources, there are a number of significant flaws with renewable energy sources. Most importantly, they cannot provide the sustained high base load of electricity that

32

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nuclear energy provides. Renewables also require backup power systems (usually natural gas) when the sun is not shining or the wind is not blowing. Furthermore, because of the substantially greater efficiency of nuclear power, it has a smaller environmental footprint. Jesse Ausubel has measured the efficiency and environmental footprint of different energy sources (watts per square metre of land) and has shown that the “extraordinary energy density of nuclear fuel allows compact systems of immense scale,” that renewables like solar, wind, and biofuels cannot even come close to matching. For example, “a wind farm occupying about 770 square kilometres could produce as much energy as one 1,000 mwe nuclear plant,” while a solar plant “would require about 150 square kilometres plus land for storage and retrieval.”29 THE ANTI-NUCLEAR COALITION

It took several decades for an anti-nuclear coalition to form in Canada. Beginning with the Manhattan Project during World War II and continuing with the development of the candu nuclear reactor, the nuclear sector was controlled by government departments, Ontario Hydro, aecl other industry actors, and the nuclear scientific community.30 However, since the 1970s the anti-nuclear coalition has seen its influence within the sector grow.31 From the 1950s through to the early 1970s, Canadian anti-nuclear activists were part of a larger peace movement that was focused on banning nuclear weapons, but beginning in the early 1970s, there was a gradual shift towards opposing nuclear power. As with the previous association with the peace movement, anti-nuclear activists joined with the emerging environmental movement. The 1974 Indian nuclear test, and Canada’s involvement, was a focusing event that pushed anti-nuclear activists to examine Canada’s domestic nuclear sector. In 1975, Fred Knelman, Gordon Edwards, and others founded the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Resposibility (ccnr) to provide some organization to the growing anti-nuclear movement. In 1976, Knelman, who had a PhD in physics and taught at some of Canada’s best universities, published Nuclear Energy: The Unforgiving Technology, which became the bible for Canada’s anti-nuclear activists.32 In the late 1970s a number of federal government reports and inquiries created doubts about the nuclear sector: for example, the Hare Report (1977) on nuclear waste, the Porter Commission (1978) on electricity planning

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in Ontario, and the Bayda Commission (1977–78) on uranium mining in northern Saskatchewan. Finally the 1970s culminated with the Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania in 1979. This further galvanized the anti-nuclear coalition and gave them credibility with the public. The anti-nuclear coalition is largely comprised of public interest groups. The foremost group is the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, which was established in 1975, and acts as an umbrella organization for the entire anti-nuclear movement. The ccnr is led by Gordon Edwards a long-time anti-nuclear activist who also teaches mathematics at Vanier College in Montreal. The coalition “is dedicated to education and research on all issues related to nuclear energy, whether civilian or military – including non-nuclear alternatives – especially those pertaining to Canada.” It concerns itself with all aspects of the nuclear sector: uranium mining, the link between the peaceful and military application of the atom, government subsidies to the Canadian nuclear industry, Canadian nuclear exports, the economics of nuclear power, the negative environmental consequences of nuclear power, and the problems of disposing nuclear waste. The ccnr has been able to penetrate the public consciousness on nuclear issues through its submissions to government bodies and agencies, with press releases, and by acting as a frequent interview source for the media. This gives it a platform to participate and influence the public debate over the nuclear sector.33 Many other environmental organizations have been quite active in the past two decades in the domestic nuclear debate, for example, the Sierra Club, Greenpeace, the Pembina Institute, Energy Probe, and Friends of the Earth. Norm Rubin (president of Energy Probe), David Martin (nuclear policy consultant with the Sierra Club and founder of the Campaign for a Nuclear Phaseout), and Shawn Patrick Stensil (specialist in nuclear issues for Greenpeace) are all recognized as highprofile critics of Canada’s nuclear policies. As the case studies will show, these national environmental groups provide technical and public relations support to local grassroots organizations in each province, organizations like the Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta (cnfa) and Saskatchewan’s Inter-Church Uranium Committee Educational Co-operative (icucec). A key aspect of an advocacy coalition is that members share the same policy beliefs. This is clearly true with the anti-nuclear coalition. Table 2.1 summarizes the key aspects of their policy beliefs.

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The biggest concern is the safety of nuclear reactors. The scarring memory of the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl remain the key focusing events. The Chernobyl disaster, which was worst of all, resulted in the fallout of radioactive material across the entire European continent. Its effects are frequently cited, starting with the immediate loss of life of reactor workers and emergency responders. In addition, there have been thousands of premature deaths and risks to the long-term health of millions more from radiation exposure. Finally, wide swaths of the agricultural heartland of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia have been permanently contaminated. Almost every presentation, publication, and interview with members of the anti-nuclear coalition will contain at least one reference to Chernobyl.34 The anti-nuclear coalition was also quick to jump on the FukushimaDaiichi nuclear accident. It views the crisis as yet another argument for phasing out nuclear energy. Those who were adamantly opposed to nuclear energy before the Fukushima-Daiichi accident are even more adamantly opposed today. They also mobilized quickly after the accident. For example, tens of thousands of Germans created a human chain around some of their nuclear power plants in the first weekend of the crisis.35 The Fukushima-Daiichi accident easily fits into their narrative about how they have been warning for years that reactors are unsafe. They believe that the nuclear industry, utilities, regulators, and government have minimized the potential for accidents and that when things go wrong, they really go wrong. For them, FukushimaDaiichi has proven that nuclear technology, even when operated by an experienced industrialized country such as Japan, is simply too dangerous to be handled in the long-term. As Greenpeace’s ShawnPatrick Stensil put it, “Fukushima is this generations’ Chernobyl, and what we’ve seen since Fukushima is major industrial countries abandoning nuclear power and ramping up investment in green energy technology.”36 There are other potentially dangerous environmental concerns. One is the extent to which public health is at risk from exposure to the radiation emitted from nuclear power. Radiation is produced from all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle: mining and milling; conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication; power generation; reprocessing; transportation; and waste disposal. Canadian nuclear power plants regularly emit radioactive tritium, and, occasionally, much larg-

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er accidents lead to even more tritium being released, which can contaminate the water supply.37 The issue of long-term waste disposal remains the Achilles’ heel of the nuclear industry. A reactor produces waste of over two hundred radioactive elements, including uranium, plutonium, cesium, and strontium. The waste is intensely radioactive and requires heavy shielding to protect those who handle it against its penetrating radiation and intense heat. Moreover, the elements of nuclear waste frequently have half-lives that can range from several hundred years to tens of thousands of years. The long-term disposal of waste is a tremendous technological and managerial undertaking, and no country has yet to come up with an acceptable procedure. In the case of Canada, the nuclear industry has proposed burying all nuclear waste in titanium or copper corrosion-resistant containers fifteen hundred to three thousand feet below the surface of the granite rock of the Canadian Shield. This very controversial plan has been opposed on technological, social, ethical, economic, and environmental grounds. For instance, the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout has criticized the Canadian Shield plan arguing that waste containers could leak and contaminate underground rivers and lakes; that there could be accidents with the transportation of nuclear waste from the reactors to the disposal site in the Canadian Shield; that earthquakes on the site could lead to the release of radioactivity; that storing so much nuclear waste in one place could lead to accidental explosions; and that there has been a lack of public consultation.38 The popular discussion over nuclear waste often focuses on highlevel waste from spent fuel, but the anti-nuclear coalition points out that uranium mining also produces waste. Of particular concern are uranium tailings, the sand-like material that is leftover after uranium is milled into yellowcake. The environmental risks associated with uranium tailings are ground and surface water contamination, the release of dust containing radionuclides, and a catastrophic failure in the tailings containment site.39 Uranium tailings are disposed of near the mill. A barrier made up of a material like clay is constructed on top of the tailings pile to prevent radon from escaping into the atmosphere. The tailings pile is then covered with soil, rocks, or other materials to prevent erosion. As of 2004, there were 214 million tonnes of uranium tailings in storage sites across Canada.40

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As mentioned earlier, the pro-nuclear coalition has capitalized on growing fears about climate change. The anti-nuclear coalition is, not surprisingly, outraged at the suggestion that nuclear power could be used to combat climate change. “Nuclear power is not the solution for climate change,” said Irene Kroch of the Nuclear Awareness Project, “it is a cynical gambit on the part of the global nuclear power industry to save itself from being phased out.”41 Although nuclear critics accept that reactors do not directly emit greenhouse gases, they maintain that if all the stages of the nuclear process – uranium mining, enrichment, and transport; constructing power reactors; decommissioning, and so on – are taken into account, then nuclear power does emit greenhouse gases. Even if nuclear reactors provide some environmental benefits through the reduction of greenhouse gases, they are heavily outweighed by the environmental damage caused through the production of radiation, nuclear waste, and the possibility of a severe reactor accident. They argue that the solution to climate change lies not through the maintenance or expansion of nuclear power but through energy conservation and the greater utilization of renewable energy sources like wind and solar power.42 The anti-nuclear coalition has its roots in the Ban the Bomb movement. Today, they still picture a clear linkage between civilian nuclear energy and the military use of nuclear weapons. For example, uranium is the basic ingredient for both reactors and bombs. In addition, there are dual-use technologies (enrichment, reprocessing) that can be used for both power generation and weapons production. There are also “dual-use people”; nuclear scientists and engineers who could move back and forth between a country’s civilian and military nuclear programs. In the 1950s and 1960s, Canada, as well as the United States, assisted India’s civilian nuclear program by training thousands of Indian nuclear scientists and engineers. Unfortunately, some of these people later participated in the development of India’s nuclear weapons arsenal. The international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, is made up of the iaea, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (npt), the Nuclear Suppliers Group (nsg), and other treaties and organizations. However, the anti-nuclear coalition believes that the regime and the safeguards that it tries to institute and implement are insufficient barriers. They point out that many countries (Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran,

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South Africa, and so on) have pursued nuclear weapons by avoiding iaea safeguards and the provisions of the npt. The anti-nuclear coalition has argued that Canada has been an “accomplice” in the proliferation of nuclear weapons by exporting uranium and nuclear reactors.43 Although Canadian uranium exports were initially used to fuel the nuclear weapons programs of both Britain and the United States, the sale of research and power reactors to India, Pakistan, Argentina, and South Korea aided and abetted those countries nuclear weapons programs. The anti-nuclear coalition believes that the candu, owing to its unique heavy water design, is a proliferation-prone reactor. They point out that the candu is a very efficient producer of plutonium, one of the key ingredients of a nuclear weapon. In addition, its on-line refuelling capability allows for the diversion of spent fuel, and its fuel is natural (rather than enriched) uranium. Since enrichment technology is complicated and expensive, the use of natural uranium has been an important selling feature of the candu. Unfortunately, it also allows a potential proliferator to have a “safeguard-resistant independent fuel cycle.”44 On the economics of nuclear energy, the anti-nuclear coalition argues that no reactor in Canada has ever been built on time and on budget. They point out that the last ones built at Darlington in the 1980s and early 1990s were $10 billion over budget and five years late. Similarly, the refurbishment project at Point Lepreau has been significantly delayed, with subsequent cost overruns. For these reasons “bondrating agencies are reducing the credit rating of utilities and companies planning to build reactors.”45 The anti-nuclear coalition also points out that the Canadian nuclear industry has benefited from a high level of government subsidization. The Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout determined that over the period 1953–2000, the federal government spent over $16 billion (2000 dollars) subsidizing all nuclear projects.46 Peter Berg has noted that “Canadian taxpayers have also supported prototype and commercial reactors, heavy water plants, the high costs of regulating the industry, and the exemption of provincial utilities from federal income taxation.”47 THE NUCLEAR POLICY BROKERS

The policy brokers over the Canadian nuclear sector are the prime minister and the Cabinet and provincially the premiers and their

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Cabinets. These decision makers are not part of either of the two advocacy coalitions. Instead, they mediate and arbitrate between the coalitions and make the final decisions over building new reactors, refurbishing existing reactors, investing in nuclear research and development, and so on. However, government departments, which also play a role in decision making (deputy ministers and other senior bureaucrats), may also be part of one of the advocacy coalitions. The federal government, which has constitutional authority over the nuclear sector, legislates it through the Nuclear Energy Act, the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, the Nuclear Liability Act, and the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. Natural Resources Canada (nrCan), which is the federal department that takes the lead on nuclear matters, has responsibility for both aecl, the Crown corporation that designed the candu reactor and conducts nuclear research, and the cnsc, which regulates the nuclear sector. Another major government actor is the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (dfait), which is responsible for negotiating bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, represents Canada at multilateral institutions like the iaea, and negotiates international treaties like the npt. There are also other federal departments with some nuclear responsibilities: Health Canada shares jurisdiction with nrCan over medical isotopes, Environment Canada addresses nuclear waste and climate change, Transport Canada regulates the transportation of nuclear materials, and Industry Canada works to ensure that the nuclear industry is internationally competitive. Provincial governments are also policy brokers in the nuclear sector. The provinces reserve the right to decide whether nuclear facilities will be built in their province. For example, provincial utilities currently own all the nuclear power plants in Canada. The provinces also have regulatory powers of their own. Their departments of energy have primary jurisdiction for the nuclear sector, but provincial environment ministries also play a role. Canada has a number of regulatory agencies in a wide variety of fields whose purpose is to enforce government policy. Examples include the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunication Commission, the Canadian Labour Relations Board, and the Canadian Pension Commission. The Atomic Energy Control Board (aecb) was created in 1946 to control, promote, and regulate nuclear technology in Canada. In its early years, the aecb’s “existence revolved

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around developing and actively promoting nuclear technology; this included setting up Crown corporations such as Eldorado Nuclear and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited.”48 In 2001, the aecb was converted into the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (cnsc) largely because “antinuclear critics sometimes attacked the aecb because of the similarity of its acronym to that of aecl, which suggested that the two organizations were in collusion.”49 The purpose of the cnsc is to enforce the Nuclear Safety and Control Act (nsca) by “protect[ing] the health, safety and security of Canadians as well as the environment, and respect[ing] Canada’s international commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Like several other regulatory bodies, the cnsc has been granted quasi-judicial powers, which means that it can “judge specific cases involving the granting, denial, or removal of licenses, the approval of rates or fares and the censuring of failure to comply with terms of licenses.” The cnsc authorizes five types of licenses: a license to prepare site, a license to construct, a license to operate, a license to decommission, and a license to abandon a site. Although the process is the same, there are obviously regulatory differences between a uranium mine, a power reactor, and a research reactor. The process to award, deny, or renew a license involves public hearings and the submission of evidence by stakeholders. It is the cnsc Tribunal, a seven-person board chaired by the president, that makes the final licensing decisions.50 There are a couple of additional federal regulators. The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (nwmo), which was established in 2002 through the Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, is an arm’s-length agency that is responsible to the minister of natural resources and tables its reports to Parliament. It is funded entirely by the owners of nuclear reactors in Canada: aecl, opg, Hydro-Quebec, and nb Power. Representatives from these organizations also dominate the nwmo’s board of directors. Its mission is “to develop and implement collaboratively with Canadians a management approach for the long-term care of Canada’s used nuclear fuel that is socially acceptable, technically sound, environmentally responsible and economically feasible.”51 The Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (ceaa), in conjunction with the cnsc, conducts environmental assessments of all new nuclear projects. The Major Projects Management Office (mpmo) also works with cnsc to find ways of streamlining the regulatory process for building new nuclear reactors.52

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T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S W I T H I N A N D B E T W E E N T H E C O A L I T I O N S

The acf emphasizes the relationships of coalition members within their own coalition and across other coalitions. The policy beliefs and behaviour of actors “are embedded within informal networks and … policymaking is structured, in part, by the networks among important policy participants.” These policy participants “must seek allies, share resources, and develop complementary strategies. In addition, the devil shift exacerbates fear of losing to opponents, motivating actors to align and cooperate with allies.”53 Therefore, it is important that we identify the relationships within and between the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions. While the provincial case studies will provide greater evidence of those relationships, this section briefly sketches out the relationships of the national nuclear advocacy coalitions. First, there is an adversarial relationship between the pro- and antinuclear coalitions, a relationship that exhibits all the characteristics of the devil shift. There is not just disagreement over policy beliefs; there is also mistrust and demonization of the other side. When Steve Coupland, manager of issues and policy development with Bruce Power, was asked to provide his opinion of the anti-nuclear coalition, he distinguished between “local people with legitimate concerns” and “professional activists and agitators.” “Bruce Power will talk with [the former group] and try to address their concerns. We may not succeed, but we view these individuals and groups as legitimate.” But Coupland described the latter group as “hard core”; they “will never be convinced. How do you deal with people who want to put your entire industry out of business and characterize you as liars and criminals?”54 For example, Pat McNamara, a prominent activist who has been an important member of the anti-nuclear coalition in Port Hope, Ontario, and Grand Prairie, Alberta, has written that “the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Health Canada, Natural Resources Canada and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited are corrupt and incompetent regarding their responsibility to protect us from the nuclear industry. They are guilty of a nuclear genocide in Canada.”55 From the other side, in 1985 aecl compiled a secret dossier on the Canadian anti-nuclear movement.56 I have attended many public and private meetings involving members from both the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, and they often degenerate into questioning of motives and calling each other liars.

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On the other hand, the relationships within the pro- and antinuclear coalitions reveal that for the most part, these coalitions have been strongly united through cooperation, collaboration, and coordination. This can be seen through the creation of overarching lobby groups with multiple members, like the cna and the ccnr. These organizations issue position papers, conduct advertising campaigns, organize letter-writing campaigns, send out news releases, and provide testimony to government hearings that reflect the policy beliefs of the members of their respective advocacy coalition. For example, between January and March 2010 the Canadian Nuclear Society and the Peace River Environmental Society jointly participated in an eight-part written debate on nuclear energy through a group of community newspapers in the Peace Region of Alberta. Topics included economics, radiation, spent fuel, water, renewable energy, low-level nuclear waste, accidents, and health concerns. Each organization solicited volunteers from its membership to write on specific topics and before publication drafts were circulated within the organization for feedback. However, at times and on certain issues divisions have appeared within the coalitions, rarely in the realm of policy beliefs but more often in the secondary aspects. In the pro-nuclear coalition, there have been divisions between members of the nuclear industry over commercial interests. For instance, mds Nordion, the purchaser of medical isotopes, sued aecl for its decision to cancel its maple project that would have become the new producer for the isotopes.57 The cna, which represents all the key industry players, is faced with a very delicate balancing act, because its membership includes business competitors. This was most evident in the bidding process for Ontario’s new nuclear power plants, because aecl and Areva, both high-profile members of the cna, were competing. Consequently, the cna discusses general nuclear policy but not specific reactor types.58 In the antinuclear coalition, disunity has been much rarer owing to the lack of commercial competition between the members. However, as will be described in greater detail in the final chapter of this book, there have been high-profile defections there as well because of changes in policy beliefs. Most notably, Patrick Moore, one of the founders of Greenpeace and a former anti-nuclear activist, is now promoting nuclear energy as “our most important source of clean power” fitting in “with other technologies that will inevitably be part of our energy future.”59 James Lovelock, father of the gaia theory, has also endorsed nuclear

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power,60 and Tim Flannery, author of the Weathermakers, has supported it as a mechanism for mitigating climate change.61 Closer to home, David Schindler, the world-class water expert at the University of Alberta, has said that he would prefer living next door to a nuclear power plant to living next to a coal-fired plant.62 In response to the challenge of climate change and the contribution that nuclear energy could make, an organization called Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy (efn) was created in 1996.63 A final set of relationships takes place between the coalitions and the policy brokers. Of particular interest is the relationship between the cnsc and members of the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions. There are two major perspectives regarding a regulatory agency’s relationships. The first sees an inherent tension between industry and regulatory bodies. Evidence of the adversarial perspective was provided by what has become known as the Linda Keen affair. In December 2007 a dispute between aecl and the cnsc over the Nuclear Research Universal (nru) reactor at Chalk River, Ontario, burst into public consciousness after brewing for several years. The situation was complicated by the fact that both the cnsc and aecl report through and to the minister of natural resources, which means that the same government department both promotes (through aecl) and regulates nuclear power (through cnsc). In the aftermath of Parliament’s decision to restart the nru reactor, over the opposition of Keen and the cnsc, many key decision makers either resigned or were fired: aecl replaced its chief executive officer, chairman of the board of directors and some other senior officials; natural resources minister Gary Lunn was eventually demoted to sport minister; and cnsc president Linda Keen was fired. The nru began operations in 1957 and is the dominant supplier of medical isotopes in Canada and throughout the world. Medical isotopes are used for over four thousand medical procedures per day in Canada, and around forty-three thousand globally.64 Not only are there few global suppliers, but isotopes have very short half-lives, which means that they cannot be stockpiled. For example, Molybdenum-99 (mo-99) has a half-life of sixty-six hours and Technetium99m (tc-99m) has a half-life of only six hours. A final problem is that Canada has no back-up system for producing isotopes in the absence of the nru. Two ten-megawatt reactors – Multi-purpose Applied Physics Lattice Experiment (maple) – were designed to replace the nru reactor in the production of medical isotopes, but because of

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technical and regulatory problems the maple reactors were several years behind schedule. Eventually the entire maple project was cancelled after hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent. In August 2006, the nru’s license was renewed by the cnsc until October 2011. As part of the renewal, aecl was required to complete a number of safety upgrades to bring the reactor up to international standards. The heart of the dispute between aecl and cnsc is whether these upgrades included the connection of one or two backup pumps to a seismically qualified Emergency Power Supply (eps). During a routine maintenance shut-down in November 2007, the cnsc discovered, through a disgruntled former aecl employee who had recently joined the cnsc,65 that only one pump had been connected. It determined that aecl was in breach of its license and would not allow the nru to re-open. It needs to be emphasized that the issue was not public safety but whether aecl was operating the nru within its licensing framework. Fearing a major health crisis owing to the absence of medical isotopes both the minister of natural resources Gary Lunn and the minister of health Tony Clement searched for a solution. Ultimately, emergency legislation was tabled in the morning of 11 December 2007 and, after an all-party debate in both the House and the Senate, was passed unanimously by the Canadian Parliament on 12 December. The law overrode cnsc’s ruling and permitted aecl to restart the nru with only one pump connected for 120 days. On 16 December, the nru resumed normal operations. Talisman International, an American consulting firm with extensive experience in nuclear regulation, was commissioned by aecl and cnsc to deliver a lessons-learned report. Talisman, whose terms of reference asked it to focus on process and procedures and not individual shortcomings, identified communication problems and unclear licensing conditions. Blaming both sides, Talisman made a number of detailed short-term and long-term recommendations in the areas of communications, license renewal, probabilistic safety assessment, and the like. If these recommendations are implemented – and both aecl and the cnsc – have accepted the report in its entirety, this will substantially strengthen Canada’s regulation of its nuclear industry and improve the relationship between the two organizations.66 Since the cnsc is the principal nuclear regulator, the public relies on it to certify that nuclear facilities are safe. However, the firing of Linda Keen potentially jeopardized its credibility. It is one thing for a

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Cabinet minister to resolve a scientific dispute between two acknowledged expert groups (aecl and the cnsc) or to adjudicate between a known health risk and the remote possibility of a nuclear accident. However, it is quite another thing to then fire one of those experts for “speaking truth to power.” Independent quasi-judicial administrative tribunals, like the cnsc, must be independent of government interference. Just before her firing, Keen publicly released a set of correspondence between her and Minister Lunn in which she emphasized that “while the cnsc reports through you to Parliament, neither the cnsc nor its President are obliged to report to you on the status of particular licensing matters before the cnsc.” She also reminded Lunn that a “fundamental element of independence of quasi-judicial bodies like the cnsc is security of tenure for members,” but, in her case, “the threat of removal is entirely and exclusively based on an assessment of the steps taken – or not taken —by the cnsc in respect of the extended shutdown of the nru reactor.”67 During an appearance before the House of Commons Natural Resources Committee on 16 January 2008, Minister Lunn argued that the issue was not political independence but leadership and confidence. According to Lunn, Keen had “fail[ed] to consider fully, in a timely fashion, the serious consequences of the growing shortage of medical isotopes [which were] of greatest concern to the government.” Lunn emphasized that Keen displayed a “lack of leadership during the extended shutdown of the nru reactor at Chalk River.” Therefore, the government “reached the conclusion that the president no longer enjoys the confidence required of the president of the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission. However, she remains a fulltime member of the commission.”68 This last distinction was made because the nsca states that members of the tribunal can be removed only “for cause,” but that the president serves at the pleasure of the government. Keen would subsequently resign her position on the tribunal and contest her removal as cnsc president in a wrongfuldismissal suit. However, a federal court would then dismiss her case, ruling that the cnsc president did in fact serve “at [the] pleasure” of the government.69 The government was correct to override the cnsc and reopen the nru. The health risk caused by a lack of isotopes outweighed the potential risk of a reactor accident. Even the cnsc admitted that even with only one pump connected the nru was safer that it had ever been over its fifty years of operation.70 However, the government was

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wrong to remove Keen from her position. Keen provided her expert judgment on the safety of the nru and aecl’s compliance with the cnsc licensing requirements. There is an inherent tension between regulator and licensee; the government should establish broad policy direction but not become involved in specific regulatory decisions: it should intervene only when this tension leads to externalities that put human health or safety at risk. Additional factors support the assertion that Keen was fired because of political pressure. In particular, the cnsc under Linda Keen had terminated pre-licensing activity for aecl’s new acr-1000 reactor. If the acr-1000 had not been pre-licensed, it would have put aecl at a significant competitive disadvantage with the competing reactor companies of Areva, General Electric-Hitachi, and Westinghouse just as a Canadian and global nuclear revival was taking place. The new cnsc president Michael Binder quickly agreed to start the pre-licensing process for the acr-1000, and the government over the last three budgets has committed almost half a billion dollars to the process. This is strong evidence that the isotope crisis provided the opportunity to fire Keen and was not the cause. If so, this shows that there was political interference in cnsc. Other commentators do not see the relationship between industry and regulatory bodies in adversarial terms; on the contrary, they see collusion. In this perspective, the cnsc, instead of being a broker between the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions, is, in fact, part of the pro-nuclear coalition. It can be pointed out that Keen’s replacement, Michael Binder, has improved the relationship between aecl and the cnsc.71 In fact, in a number of instances, the cnsc has gone out of its way to publicly defend aecl from anti-nuclear critics.72 In 2010, it added a page on its website called “Mythbusters,” which is designed to “dispel some of the most common misconceptions about nuclear technology and its applications.”73 However, in the process of improving its relationship with the pro-nuclear coalition it has damaged its relationship with the anti-nuclear coalition. Cranford Pratt has written that “close relationships often develop between government regulatory agencies and the industries they are intended to regulate.”74 An independent report by the Institute on Governance commissioned by the cnsc noted that historically the commission has “put more focus on communicating with licensees than with ngos and the broader public, and this may have contributed to the perception among ngos that the cnsc has too close a relationship with

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industry.”75 For example, the report noted that senior cnsc officials often meet privately with industry to discuss licensing procedures, but that this was not consistently done with interest groups. David Martin, energy coordinator for the Sierra Club, remarked that “the only time we’ve had any direct contact with Linda Keen has been through the regulatory processes where she’s sat on the commission.” Martin believed that “when you understand that they’re conducting these meetings effectively in secret, and you combine that with the increasing regulatory leniency that [the commission] is showing to the nuclear industry, I think two and two makes four. This is an agency that has been seriously co-opted, and is in serious need of reform.”76 WINNING COALITIONS

“At any given time,” as Pal has explained, “the policy sector will be dominated by a winning coalition.”77 The winning coalition usually has a significant advantage in resources, which include formal legal authority to make policy decisions, support its policy positions by the public, information, the ability to mobilize the attentive public for political activities like demonstrations and public hearings, financial resources, and skilful leadership.78 Historically the pro-nuclear coalition has been seen as the winning coalition. Cranford Pratt, in articulating his dominant-class theory, has written that “the literature on the role of interest groups and lobbying in Canada frequently acknowledges that business interest groups have a much more intimate and influential access to policymakers than do public interest groups or other economic interest groups such as consumer associations and the trade unions.” Adding to their influence is the view that “many governmental departments and divisions within those departments have developed close links with the sectors of the Canadian economy that directly relate to their responsibilities.”79 Pratt was writing in general terms about the influence of business groups in the policy process, but others have made the case specifically about the nuclear sector. Morrison and Wonder wrote in 1978 that “those opposed to nuclear exports are likely to be the most visible in the domestic political scene. However, those who favour exports have greater economic clout and more technical expertise. The entrenched position of the pro-export interests within the government suggests that policy will tend to be dictated more by eco-

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nomic than security considerations. It is only when the nation’s vital political interests are perceived to be at stake in international activities that the prime minister’s advisors and External Affairs will dominate the policy process.”80 More recently, however, the stagnation of the nuclear sector in Canada has led some observers to reconsider: perhaps the anti-nuclear coalition is now winning. There have been no new orders of nuclear reactors in Canada since 1978, and the pro-nuclear coalition has frequently been thwarted in its efforts at expanding the nuclear sector. For example, despite the efforts of aecl and other industry members, the Saskatchewan government decided in 1992 not to build a candu3 in the province. Furthermore, government appropriations to aecl, a good barometer of influence, declined throughout the 1980s and 1990s.81 In 2007 the auditor-general, in a special review of aecl, determined that there was “a significant deficiency: the risk to aecl’s ability to achieve its mandate due to unresolved strategic challenges that, in particular, entail long-term funding requirements. These challenges are the completion and licensing of the Dedicated Isotope Facility, the development and licensability of the Advanced candu Reactor in time for the market requirement, and the replacement of aging facilities at Chalk River Laboratories.”82 It has only been in the last few years, that aecl has seen substantial increases in its government funding.83 Nevertheless, the resources of the anti-nuclear coalition are dwarfed by those of the pro-nuclear coalition. Anti-nuclear interest groups tend to have few, if any, full-time staff and minuscule budgets. Even relatively large environmental organizations are small when compared to aecl or Areva. For example, the Pembina Institute has around 50 staff members and revenue of about $4.3 million,84 but aecl has over 4,700 employees and revenue and funding of over $900 million.85 Yet, the influence of the anti-nuclear coalition is enhanced by its media access and its ability to communicate directly to the public and by the fact that it participates effectively in the public consultation processes. One illustration of its influence was the democratization of the nwmo’s consultation process. The nwmo initially wanted to rely solely on “industry representatives and technical and scientific experts.” However, it soon felt compelled to include the views and insights “of all those affected by the policy.” The nwmo realized that “without addressing certain social concerns and obtaining social acceptance of

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the nuclear waste management program, the program could be thwarted by a vociferous anti-nuclear campaign launched at the national, provincial, and local levels.”86 Politicians and bureaucrats often lack the highly technical expertise required in nuclear matters, so they have to rely on external experts within the nuclear sector: the members of the cns and other industry scientists and academics. Nuclear scientists are overwhelmingly members of the pro-nuclear coalition. Since it takes many years of education and training to acquire a complete understanding of nuclear technology, the role of scientists increases the influence of the pro-nuclear coalition. It is no wonder that politicians and bureaucrats can be intimidated by these experts on nuclear issues. Knowledge, especially very technical and specialized knowledge, is power. For example, William Farlinger, former chairman of Ontario Hydro, explained a decision to shut down reactors by referring to the nuclear scientists and engineers as a “nuclear cult” that had bamboozled Ontario Hydro’s Board of Directors.87 Nuclear scientists do not place government officials under a “trance,” but when they explain safety features and risk analysis, their arguments tend to be accepted. However, measuring the influence of nuclear scientists is more complicated than this initial assessment suggests, because, as Pal has recognized, policy-makers must “somehow balance expertise with democracy. Scientists and experts make claims and recommendations based on notions of truth, not majority wishes. The fear is that an overly rational policy process will be driven more by small cliques of experts than by the democratic desires and participation of the public. The problem is even more acute when an issue is highly contentious.”88 The nuclear policy area is obviously one of the more contentious issues that governments have to face. The influence of nuclear scientists is also mitigated by two trends. The first is their inability to communicate with the public. Because scientists are used to discussing very complex ideas, often relying on complex on mathematical equations, they often find it difficult to simplify these concepts, put them in lay terms, or even discuss the issues that are important to a general audience. Some scientists do not even consider communications to be important, believing that nuclear questions are technological, but they fail to appreciate that they are also issues of public policy. This communication failure extends to media relations. In addition, scientists can often display

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arrogance or condescension in dealing with people who either disagree with them or who are simply members of the public asking basic questions about the nuclear sector, which is why the cns and individual companies are working on the public-speaking skills of their scientists.89 Some scientists, such as Jeremy Whitlock, are excellent communicators, but they are the exceptions. For the most part nuclear scientists are outmatched by anti-nuclear activists in public hearings and debates. Commonly in public forums, the problem of agenda-setting reveals that nuclear scientists do not understand communication strategy. Instead of focusing on the positive features of nuclear power (base load electricity, lack of greenhouse gas emissions), scientists are usually forced to respond defensively to the attacks by anti-nuclear activists on nuclear power’s most vulnerable points (risk, cost, and waste). As a result, the agenda for the forum is set by the anti-nuclear organizations and not the nuclear scientific community. A second trend is the public’s growing distrust of experts in all fields. When commenting on their chosen field, where they consider themselves the authorities, experts believe “that their ‘analysis’ was rational, objective, and reasonable, while their critics were deluded, prejudiced, and even emotionally unbalanced. They were the experts, and the public merely needed to be ‘educated.’”90 However, today experts are facing a backlash against their authority across much of the Western world. Whether dealing with politicians, lawyers, doctors, teachers, religious leaders, financial advisors, or nuclear scientists, Canadians are no longer as willing to defer to authority.91 As Michael Adams, the best-selling author of Fire and Ice, has maintained, “the once shy and deferential Canadians, who used to wait to be told by their betters what to do and how to think, have become more sceptical of traditional authority.”92 With nuclear power, the issue is not so much whether the public trusts the technology, but whether they trust the people, including scientists, who support nuclear power. John Doble and Amy Richardson of the Public Agenda Foundation in the United States, pointed out in a 1996 study that 68 percent of scientists (all fields) recommended building more nuclear power plants to address the problem of global warming, but only 36 percent of non-scientists similarly agreed. The public’s opposition was not directed at the technology; rather, “they didn’t trust the energy companies, they didn’t trust the utilities, they didn’t trust the government regulators, they didn’t trust the boards that oversee

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all this stuff, they didn’t trust those groups to manage the technology safely.”93 Other scholars have shown, using extensive survey research, that expert claims are less important than whether scientific studies support an individual’s pre-existing values and beliefs. As a result, “scientists’ efforts to influence public opinion have a limited effect.”94

3 The Global Nuclear Revival

Since this book focuses on how four Canadian provinces have responded to the global nuclear revival, it is critical to examine that development before conducting the case studies of Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. This chapter provides a complete overview of all aspects of the global nuclear revival. It describes it, explains it, identifies the structural changes that have accompanied it, and it analyses its consequences. There are three ways to measure the extent of the nuclear revival: by looking at (1) the building of new reactors, (2) the life extension of existing reactors, and (3) increased public support for nuclear power. It is also necessary to explain what is driving this revival, namely, three vectors that are colliding at the same time: (1) the substantial rise in the global demand for electricity, (2) the increased attention placed on the problem of greenhouse gases contributing to climate change, and (3) the need to diversify electricity supply away from fossil fuels. While this revival has been occurring, parallel changes have altered the structure of the global nuclear industry. In particular, there has been a significant consolidation of the global nuclear industry into a handful of very large multinational firms (for example, Areva, Westinghouse-Toshiba, General Electric-Hitachi, Rosatom). The consolidation has extended to electrical power utilities, reactor operators and component suppliers, and uranium companies. These events raise important questions that will be discussed here. In particular, there are interrelated issues of international trade, nuclear non-proliferation, and nuclear safety. First, in the area of international trade, what has been the effect on the historical protectionist aspects of the global nuclear trade? Are countries reducing or elimi-

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

nating foreign ownership requirements, or “nation-first” procurement policies? Second, what have been the effects on the international nuclear non-proliferation regime? Does the npt need to be revised? Has the role of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (nsg) evolved? Have national export licensing laws responded to the inclusion of multinational nuclear power companies? Does the iaea have the human and financial resources to handle the nuclear safeguards inspections? What has been the legacy of the A.Q. Khan network on civilian nuclear trade? Third, what steps are being taken to ensure that the global nuclear revival does not compromise nuclear safety? A nuclear accident anywhere in the world could bring the revival to a crashing halt. MEASURING THE REVIVAL

The nuclear industry, over the last couple of years, has been heralding a global nuclear revival, or renaissance. Government officials, business leaders, academics, and journalists have all used the same phrases. Book titles, news articles, speeches, conferences, workshops, and roundtables have all used the ubiquitous phrases “nuclear revival” or “nuclear renaissance.” However, the proponents of a revival have met with people who have characterized their optimism as overstated. Shawn-Patrick Stensil, from Greenpeace Canada, citing a number of decisions to suspend the building of new reactors, has argued that the nuclear revival is “dead on arrival.”1 Mycle Schneider, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, has said that “hype over the future of nuclear power is rampant, but the facts tell a different story. The percentage of nuclear-generated electricity in the overall global energy mix is decreasing.”2 Harold Feiveson has identified the arguments that might mitigate against a nuclear revival: “the very high capital costs inherent in nuclear power, especially given the large size of reactors driven by economies of scale; a continuing strong aversion to nuclear power by sceptical publics concerned with safety, with unresolved questions on how to handle radioactive wastes, and with the risks of nuclear proliferation, despite some recent improvements in favourable ratings; and the rise of renewable energy and other competitors for low-carbon electric generation.”3 Finally, a comprehensive multi-year study by the Centre for International Governance and Innovation (cigi) concluded that

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a significant expansion of nuclear energy worldwide to 2030 faces constraints that, while not insurmountable, are likely to outweigh the drivers of nuclear energy. Globally, while the gross amount of nuclear-generated electricity may rise, the percentage of electricity contributed by nuclear power is likely to fall as other cheaper, more quickly deployed alternatives come online. An increase as high as a doubling of the existing reactor fleet as envisaged in some official scenarios seems especially implausible, given that it can take a decade of planning, regulatory processes, construction and testing before a reactor can produce electricity. While the numbers of nuclear reactors will probably rise from the current number, the addition of new reactors is likely to be offset by the retirement of older plants, notwithstanding upgrades and life extensions to some older facilities.4 It is obviously necessary to go beyond this competing rhetoric and objectively measure whether there is, in fact, a global nuclear revival, and if so, to what extent it is occurring. New Builds There are 435 nuclear power plants generating approximately 370 gwe of electricity in operation around the world. More than 80 percent of these reactors were built during the 1970s, and they contribute around 14 percent of the world’s electricity. After several decades of relative stagnation, it appears that the world has now entered a second growth period for nuclear reactors. Sixty-three reactors capable of generating 61 gwe are currently under construction in fourteen countries; China leads the way with twenty-six new builds. Table 3.1 identifies the number of reactors in operation, their share of electricity generation, and the number under construction. Calculating the number of reactors in operation and under construction is easy to do, but it is insufficient measurement for assessing the extent of the global nuclear revival. It is also necessary to include the number of reactors in the planning stage. Unfortunately, counting the number of planned reactors is an inexact science because there are so many different ways of measuring planning. One way is to count the number of applications for new builds received by national nuclear regulatory agencies. A second way is to measure the number of

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Table 3.1 Nuclear Reactors Worldwide (as of January 2012)

Country

In Operation

United States France Japan Russia South Korea India United Kingdom Canada China Ukraine Sweden Germany Spain Belgium Czech Republic Others

104 58 50 33 21 20 18 18 16 15 10 9 8 7 6 42

Total

435

Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation (2010, %)

19.6 74.1 29.2 17.1 32.2 2.9 15.7 15.1 1.8 48.1 38.1 28.4 20.1 51.1 33.3

Under Construction

1 1 2 10 5 6 0 0 26 2 0 0 0 0 0 10 63

Source: Figures for reactors in operation were taken from iaea, “Number of Reactors in Operation Worldwide.” Figures for nuclear share of electricity generation were taken from World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Share Figures, 2000–2010.” Accessed on 12 January 2012 at http://world-nuclear.org/info/nshare.html Figures for reactors under construction were taken from iaea, “Number of Reactors under construction Worldwide.” Accessed on 12 January 2012 at http://www.iaea.org/cgi-bin/db.page.pl/ pris.opercap.htm

requests by utilities for nuclear bids and nuclear companies conducting feasibility studies for new builds. Finally, one could reference the medium- to long-term planning for future rectors that has been done by national agencies and international organizations. The iaea regularly tries to forecast the future of nuclear power. In 2009, it calculated a low and a high range for the growth of nuclear power by 2030 using the following criteria: • •

World and regional scenarios of economic development; Correlation of economic growth and energy consumption;

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•

55

Assumptions about physical, economic, and political constraints applying to energy production and consumption; and Future prices of different energy sources.

The iaea also compared its own data with that compiled by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (oecd), the World Bank, previous iaea studies, and other international organizations. Its low projection sees no new reactors – aside from those already under construction or firmly planned – coming on-stream, and it sees old reactors being retired on schedule. Under this scenario, nuclear power plants would generate 511 gwe of electricity. The high projection estimates additional reasonably planned and proposed reactors being built, combined with some life extension of older reactors. Under this scenario, nuclear power plants would generate 807 gwe, which would require between 75 (low) and 300 (high) new reactors being built by 2030. The iaea predicts that the overall share of electricity production from nuclear plants would be between 12.6 and 15.9 percent, not far from the current 14 percent.5 Other organizations besides the iaea have tried to project the future of nuclear power. The oecd’s Nuclear Energy Agency (nea) estimates that by 2050, nuclear power would generate between 580 and 1,400 gwe of electricity. Nuclear power’s share of electricity production would range between 9 and 22 percent. For this goal to be reached, between twenty-three and fifty-four new reactors would have to be built every year between 2030 and 2050.6 The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook also put forward a range of scenarios. Its reference scenario, assuming unchanged current policies, projects a slightly increased generating capacity of 415 gwe by 2030. Its alternative scenario, which assumes that the world adopts additional measures to prevent ghg emissions, projects an increase to 519 gwe.7 The question now is, where will these new reactors be built? The market for nuclear reactors, as Steven Miller and Scott Sagan suggest, can be distinguished between “a potential growth in the production of nuclear energy in states that currently have nuclear power facilities and the potential spread of nuclear power plants and related facilities to states that are new entrants to the “nuclear energy club.”8 The market for nuclear reactors can therefore be divided into four categories in descending order of the number of new builds: (1) China and India, (2) Western industrialized countries, (3) developing countries with pre-existing nuclear power, and (4) new entrants.

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China and India are leading the nuclear revival. Based on both construction and planning, over 40 percent of all new builds will occur in just these two countries. The medium projection for China is 50 gwe of new nuclear power by 2030, and the high range is 90 gwe.9 For India, the low estimate is 31 gwe of new nuclear power by 2025, and the high estimate is 43 gwe.10 Neither China nor India are planning on changing their pro-nuclear strategies in the aftermath of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. Although China temporarily suspended new approvals for its own nuclear power plants and conducted a nationwide safety review, it has not abandoned its long-term goal of increasing nuclear energy in the country.11 In India, Prime Minister Singh announced a strengthening of its Atomic Energy Regulatory Board to ensure the safe operation of India’s nuclear reactors. However, he rejected the idea that India should abandon nuclear energy, saying that “nuclear energy has the potential of playing an increasingly important role in giving our country energy independence from traditional and polluting sources of energy.”12 The Western industrialized world can be further divided into three parts: Europe, North America, and East Asia. In general, there will be new nuclear builds, beyond those already under construction, throughout Europe. The extent to which nuclear planning turns into nuclear reality depends on each individual country. Before the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, there were countries that were heavily dependent on nuclear power and planned to stay that way (France and Slovakia). There were also countries that had either reversed or significantly delayed previous decisions to phase out nuclear power (Germany, Sweden, Italy, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands). Finally, there were European Union (eu) countries that remained fiercely opposed to nuclear power (Austria, Denmark). A special issue on nuclear prospects by the International Journal of Global Energy Issues projects that Western and Central Europe will see a low increase of 15 gwe generated by nuclear power by 2025 and a high of 135 gwe.13 In Eastern Europe, a medium projection is for 24 gwe of new nuclear power,14 and in Russia, a medium projection is for 60 gwe of new nuclear power by 2030.15 The Fukushima-Daiichi accident has had a dramatic effect on Europe’s nuclear planning. This was most evident in the case of Germany. Starting in the 1950s, West Germany had developed a sophisticated nuclear infrastructure originally relying on designs from Westinghouse and General Electric. In 1967, Siemens and aeg created

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Kraftwerk Union (kwu) to develop a German-made reactor. kwu quickly became one of the world’s largest nuclear companies and concluded exports to the Netherlands, Iran, Brazil, and Argentina in the 1970s. East Germany was also actively building Soviet-designed nuclear reactors from the 1950s to the 1980s. By the time of unification in 1990, six power reactors were operating in East Germany, but after unification, the East German reactors were shut down because of safety concerns. Germany has a very strong environmental movement that, especially since Chernobyl, has sought to end the use of nuclear energy in that country. In 2000, the Social Democratic Party chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, under great pressure from his junior coalition partner (the Green Party) decided to begin an organized and multiyear nuclear phase-out program. However, in 2010 the Christian Democratic Party chancellor Angela Merkel reversed that decision. (Merkel had wanted to do so earlier but was bound from 2005 to 2009 in a “grand coalition” with the Social Democrats.) Merkel feared that the nuclear phase-out, while popular among the German public, would mean that Germany would not be able to reduce its use of coal and natural gas. Her government had concluded that wind and solar power could not meet Germany’s electricity demand.16 Under a new law, the life of Germany’s reactors was extended, and plans to build more started to take shape. Days after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident happened, Merkel immediately ordered the temporary shut-down of seven reactors built before 1980.17 She went even further in May 2011 by promising to shut down all Germany’s nuclear power plants by 2022.18 Germany’s seventeen nuclear power plants (11 pwrs and 6 bwrs) currently produce over 21 gwe, representing over 26 percent of Germany’s electricity generation. Merkel believes that this loss of electricity can be matched by dramatically increasing government and private sector investment in renewable energy technology. However, there are questions about whether this plan is achievable. Swedish environment minister Andres Carlgren called it “unrealistic,” and argued that Germany will have to rely on increased coal generation or imports of nuclear energy from France and natural gas from Russia.19 Either that, or a future German government will have to backslide from Merkel’s commitment. Other European countries have followed Germany’s lead. Switzerland, despite a referendum in February 2011 that supported replacing its five-reactor-strong nuclear fleet, also decided to phase out nuclear

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energy by 2034 (when its existing reactors end their lifetime service).20 Italy, after a June 2011 referendum, rejected a plan to reverse its 1987 decision to phase out nuclear energy by building Areva-designed reactors. The defeat of the referendum resulted from a combination of public fears after Fukushima-Daiichi and growing disenchantment with the scandal-ridden prime minister Silvio Berlusconi (who lost three other referendums on the same day). Regardless, as Berlusconi remarked after the vote, Italy “shall have to say goodbye to nuclear.”21 In contrast, other European countries remain steadfast in their support for nuclear energy. In a major address, British energy minister Charles Hendry asserted that “we must go forward with new nuclear and we would be a darker and less prosperous nation without it. After more than a decade since we built the last plant, there should be no doubt that uk wants to be a serious nuclear nation once again.” Hendry added, “and that’s why we don’t want to see one nuclear power plant built, but we want to see a fleet.”22 Lithuania is building a new 1,300 mw reactor that will also export electricity to Estonia, Latvia, and Poland.23 And former French president Nicolas Sarkozy had committed an additional €1 billion to future nuclear programs, including research on fourth-generation reactors. Sarkozy was critical of his European partners bringing in nuclear moratoriums, since in his view “there is no alternative to nuclear today.”24 North America has not seen a new build approved in over thirty years, but there has been plenty of nuclear chatter by governments and industry in recent years. In the United States, the Bush administration brought in a number of incentive programs for building new nuclear power plants, which included a more streamlined regulatory process, reduced regulatory fees, increased nuclear research and development through the Department of Energy, loan guarantees, delay insurance, production tax credits, and limited liability. The Obama administration has continued this support. In President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union speech he set a goal for 80 percent of the United States’ electricity to come from clean energy sources, including nuclear, by 2035. “Some folks want wind and solar. Others want nuclear, clean coal and natural gas. To meet this goal, we will need them all.”25 The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (nrc) has already received twenty-six applications for new builds.26 Nevertheless, industry insiders predict only four to eight new reactors coming online by 2015.27 The Fukushima-Daiichi accident is not likely to dent American government support for the maintenance and expansion of nuclear

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energy. Energy Secretary Steven Chu stated that “whenever there is an accident, it’s very natural to have concern. We’ll take this opportunity to look again at all our nuclear sites. We get 20 percent of our electricity from nuclear power, and you just don’t turn that off overnight. We think nuclear power should be part of the mix.”28 The Canadian case will be explored in depth in chapters 4 to 7, but an initial comment is necessary. Although Canada’s nuclear industry is confident that new builds will go ahead and that they are necessary to respond to Ontario’s decision to close its coal-fired plants, to replace its aging generating infrastructure, and to reduce carbon-based sources, there are those who think otherwise. For example, John Cadman’s case study of the Canadian nuclear industry, part of cigi’s Nuclear Energy Futures Project, is doubtful that any new builds will occur. His initial assessment is that “cross-cutting federal and provincial priorities will inevitably constrain any sustained Canadian nuclear energy revival.”29 The East Asian region focuses on Japan and South Korea, where, unlike in Europe and North America, nuclear power plants were being built throughout the 1990s. Japan currently has 48 gwe of nuclear power connected to the grid. The low projection for 2030 is that Japan will have 55 gwe, and the high projection is 77 gwe. South Korea’s current nuclear fleet generates 18 gwe of electricity. The low projection for 2030 is 25 gwe and the high projection 50 gwe.30 In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, Japan had shut down some of its reactors for safety tests amid growing public opposition. There was to be a full review of its energy plan and its high dependence on nuclear energy. In July 2011, the Japanese government went further when Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced his intention to initiate a phase-out program to gradually rid the country of nuclear energy. “Given the enormity of the risks associated with nuclear power generation, I have realized that nuclear power technology is not something that can be managed by conventional safety measures alone.”31 In August 2011, the Japanese Parliament replaced Kan as prime minister with Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who also promised to gradually phase out nuclear energy. He said that building “new reactors is unrealistic, and we will decommission reactors at the end of their life spans. But it is also impossible to immediately reduce our dependence to zero.”32 However, there are sceptics, which include some other Japanese cabinet ministers and nuclear industry leaders, about whether Japan,

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which has very few national sources of coal, oil, and natural gas, can wean itself completely from nuclear energy. For example, chief cabinet secretary Yukio Edano downplayed Kan’s initial statement, which he said was his “private view” and not government policy. Edano indicated that Japan should have a national debate about the future of nuclear energy.33 Even Noda acknowledged that Japan needed to restart reactors that had been shut down in the aftermath of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident.34 Only nine of the countries that currently have operating nuclear power plants are developing countries. China and India, as previously mentioned, are undertaking massive expansions of their nuclear fleet, which leaves Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan. Table 3.2 provides projections by the World Nuclear Association (wna) for future nuclear expansion in these countries. Fifty countries have expressed a new interest in nuclear power to the iaea. Many are simply too small to be considered serious candidates for nuclear power.35 If you subtract the countries whose gdp is less than $50 billion and those with an electrical grid that is smaller than 10 gw, then you are left with sixteen potential new markets: Algeria, Belarus, Chile, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela (table 3.2).36 Some of these countries (Egypt, the Philippines, and Turkey) have abandoned nuclear programs in the past, but the others are considering nuclear power for the first time.37 Doing planning projections for nuclear power is always difficult because a number of factors could constrain the revival. The biggest is the issue of cost.38 Nuclear power plants have massive upfront capital costs; substantially more than most other electricity sources. Although these costs are later balanced by lower operational costs, owing to the low percentage of fuel costs, initial construction cost can be a heavy disincentive. Getting financing for a nuclear project can be difficult: the international credit-rating firm Standard and Poor’s has stated that “no utility will commit to a project as large and risky as a new nuclear plant without assurance of cost recovery.”39 The economic situation is compounded by past experience, especially in North America, of scheduling delays and cost overruns into the billions. As the nuclear industry is introducing new, first-of-their-kind Gen III+ reactors, there are concerns that these delays could be replicated. For

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Table 3.2 Planned Nuclear Power for Selected Developing Countries (in gwe) Country

2008

2030 Low

2030 High

Algeria Argentina Belarus Brazil Chile Egypt Greece Indonesia Iran Kazakhstan Kenya Malaysia Mexico Pakistan Philippines Poland Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) South Africa Thailand Turkey

0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0

0 4 2 10 0 3 0 2 3 0 0 0 2 10 1 4

5 11 5 30 5 10 2 6 10 2 2 10 20 20 10 10

0 2 0 0

12 8 2 5

50 25 10 15

Venezuela

0

0

3

Source: World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Century Outlook Data” (2009). Accessed on 17 November 2009 at http://www.world-nuclear.org/outlook/nuclear_century _outlook.html.

example, the Olkiluoto-3 plant in Finland is now more than three years late, and costs have spiralled by more than $2 billion. As will be shown below, public opinion has been slowly swinging in favour of nuclear power. Yet there still remains a public concern over reactor safety, spurred on by a core anti-nuclear activist community and the lingering memories of the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima-Daiichi accidents. The issues of long-term nuclear waste disposal and the linkage between civilian nuclear energy and nuclear weapons are also constraining factors on the public’s acceptance of the global nuclear revival. It is true, however, that the safety

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of reactors has been steadily improving following the twin shocks of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. Today, nuclear power’s safety record exceeds, by any measure, the other conventional energy sources of coal, oil, or natural gas. Nevertheless, a major accident that killed hundreds or thousands (which was not the case with FukushimaDaiichi) anywhere in the world could bring the nuclear revival to a screeching halt. As for long-term nuclear waste disposal, the issue is not a technological solution, because there is a scientific consensus on geological storage. The issue, rather, is site selection. The siting of a long-term nuclear waste depository, as the us experience with Yucca Mountain has shown, is very sensitive politically. Until there are actual long-term storage facilities in place around the world, the waste issue will continue to be a constraint on the nuclear revival. A major multinational survey of attitudes about nuclear power showed that the number one reason “for being against the increase/development of nuclear generating capacity” was the “efficiency of solutions of nuclear waste disposal.”40 Greater demand for electricity and concern over ghg emissions is driving the nuclear revival. However, there are other electricity options. Nuclear energy has to compete with the drive for more renewable energy sources like wind, solar, geothermal. Although nuclear power and renewables can be seen as complementary technologies in producing electricity – nuclear can produce backup power for renewables – they do compete for financial resources and government attention. Nuclear also has to compete with new carbon capture and storage (ccs) technology that might mitigate some of the damaging ghg emissions from coal, natural gas, and oil. In addition, new conservation initiatives, like “smart” electricity grids and more energy-efficient products, may also help to dampen electricity demand. The intimate connection with nuclear weapons remains the original sin of the nuclear power sector. Despite elaborate safeguards by the iaea, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is tied into civilian programs in two respects: through people and technology. An expansion of the civilian side creates a cadre of technically sophisticated scientists and engineers who, with some extra effort, have the potential for migrating to the military side. There are also two types of civilian technologies that could support a weapons program: uranium enrichment and uranium reprocessing. Light water reactors (lwrs) are fuelled by low enriched uranium (4–6 percent), but nuclear weapons require highly enriched uranium (93 percent). If a country decides for

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energy security reasons to avoid importing fuel and instead develops its own enrichment capacity, it simultaneously acquires the capacity to produce both low and highly enriched uranium. It is still a big technological step to go from low to highly enriched uranium, but it is easier to do once you have acquired the basic enrichment facility. A second proliferation-prone technology is fuel reprocessing, which is used to convert nuclear waste into useable nuclear fuel. There are economic and environmental incentives for reprocessing (as well as economic and environmental criticisms), but unfortunately the separation process that is involved also creates plutonium, one of the ingredients for a nuclear weapon. For developing countries, which are expected to be a major part of the revival, there are additional constraints. The twin issues of low gdp and small grid sizes have already been mentioned. In addition, unlike the practice with massive hydroelectric projects, the World Bank and other international lending organizations will not underwrite nuclear power plants.41 Nuclear power is also not part of the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism, which allows developed countries to get credits by helping developing countries reduce their ghg emissions. Another constraint for developing countries is establishing an effective nuclear governance regime, ie., an atomic energy commission and/or nuclear regulatory authority. Moreover, as Findlay has warned, the ability to manage the entire scope of a nuclear power program is “not built overnight.”42 Finally, proliferation concerns are heightened in the case of the developing world. As Jose Goldemberg argues, “there is a fundamental contradiction between efforts to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons and enthusiasm for the spread, for commercial reasons, of nuclear reactors to many developing countries. Recent efforts by North Korea, Iraq, and Iran evidence this contradiction.”43 Life Extension Besides building new reactors, the global nuclear revival includes the life extension of existing reactors. The life-extension process includes technical upgrades of the reactor that will also lead to greater safety and performance. In the United States, reactors are licensed for forty years, but as of January 2012, seventy-one reactors have been given twenty-year extensions by the nrc. Another fifteen have applied, and seventeen expect to apply within the next couple of years.44 France and Sweden are also considering bringing in policies for life exten-

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sion.45 Utilities like extending the life of their reactors because “much of the initial capital investment has been paid or written off,” making these reactors “highly profitable.”46 In the case of heavy water reactors (hwr), life extension is referred to as “refurbishment.” candu reactors can operate for fifty years, but only if a complex and expensive refurbishment occurs at mid-life. “The primary reason for this,” as Jeremy Whitlock, an aecl scientist, points out, “is the limited life of these components under the harsh conditions of reactor operation. Zirconium alloy pressure tubes, in particular, are bombarded intensely by neutrons under immense heat and pressure. Although the zirconium alloy is a robust material, chosen for its survivability under these very conditions, it does experience life-shortening metallurgical changes (e.g., pressure tubes grow several inches during their time in the reactor, and at the same time become more brittle). The monitoring of this situation is an on-going process throughout the reactor’s life, and at any time a given pressure tube can be removed for inspection and replacement.”47 Therefore a middle-aged candu requires a systematic retubing – the removal and replacement of pressure tubes, calandria tubes, and feeder tubes. At the same time, other plant upgrades are done. As of January 2012, there are nine refurbishment projects at various degrees of completion: in Ontario (4), India (2), Argentina (1), New Brunswick (1), and Quebec (1). In July 2011, after over two years of work, Wolsong-1 in South Korea was successfully refurbished. It was the first time that a candu-6 had been dismantled, retubed, and restarted.48 The life extension process for a pressurized heavy water reactor (phwr) is more expensive and complex than for a light water reactor (lwr). According to Armand Laferrere, former president of Areva Canada, “the advantage of our technology over heavy-water technology is there is no refurbishment. I’m not saying that there will never be any short-term unexpected outage. But definitely there is no midlife refurbishment that takes so much time off and reduces the availability of the plant over its lifetime.”49 While Laferrere is correct that the refurbishment process is different for lwrs and hwrs, this is not meant to imply that the operational cost of the reactors is the same. While hwrs require mid-life refurbishment, this is balanced out by its online refuelling capability. For this reason the nuclear industry uses the Levelized Energy Unit Cost (leuc) as a guide to making decisions on the cost of different energy technologies, including competing reactor designs. It should be added that the acr-1000 and Enhanced

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candu-6 are designed to make their mid-life refurbishment an easier and cheaper procedure. INCREASED PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR POWER

An additional measurement of the extent of the nuclear revival is the increasing public support for nuclear power. Public opposition to nuclear power, especially in Europe and North America, after Three Mile Island and Chernobyl was a major reason for the decline in nuclear power. If there is to be a revival, there needs to be a shift in public attitudes. A major twenty-country multinational poll by Accenture in November 2008 showed that support for nuclear power has been increasing around the world.50 Seventy-four percent of respondents “think that nuclear power will play an important role in meeting future electricity needs in [their] country.” India (93 percent) and China (89 percent) lead the way, but even the lowest surveyed country, Greece, saw a majority in favour of nuclear power. European countries ranged from a high in Slovakia (88 percent) to a low in Greece (51 percent). In North America, both the United States (80 percent) and Canada (62 percent) showed clear majorities in favour of nuclear power. The Fukushima-Daiichi accident, not surprisingly, has produced a dramatic downturn in global public opinion about nuclear energy. Ipsos-Mori conducted a twenty-four-nation survey in late May 2011 and found 62 percent opposition to nuclear energy.51 Only three countries supported nuclear energy: India (61 percent), Poland (57 percent), and the United States (52 percent). Twenty-six percent of respondents said that their opinion towards nuclear energy was influenced by the accident at Fukushima-Daiichi. Interestingly, 41 percent of Japanese still support nuclear energy, even though 52 percent were influenced by Fukushima-Daiichi. Since these poll results were produced with the memory of Fukushima-Daiichi fresh in people’s minds, the question is whether, as we move further away from the events in Japan, there will be a return to the levels of public support that existed before March 2011. DRIVING THE REVIVAL

There are three principal drivers for the global nuclear revival: increased demand for electricity, the goal of mitigating climate change, and the pursuit of energy security. The role of each of these

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drivers varies country by country. In some cases, energy security is the primary driver, and in other cases it is climate change. Increased Demand for Electricity The International Energy Agency (iea) predicted a 76 percent increase in electricity demand between 2007 and 2030, which would require 4,800 gwe of new capacity. Much of this growth will come from developing countries, and China and India will account for almost half the increase.52 The heightened demand will come from three interrelated sources. First, there is an expectation of increased population growth. The United Nations has predicted that the world’s population will grow from 6.1 billion to 8.2 billion between 2000 and 2030.53 Second, and commensurate with population growth, the World Bank forecasts a 4.2 percent average annual growth rate until 2015. In the period 2015–2030, the growth rate will slow to 3.3 percent.54 Developing countries, especially China and India, will have the highest rates of economic growth, while the oecd countries, as more mature economies, will have slower rates. Third, there will be an increased demand for a higher standard of living for many people in developing countries. This is especially true for the 1.6 billion people currently lacking access to electricity. Finally, electricity has been consistently increasing its share of energy consumption throughout the world because of urbanization, information technology, electricity-driven urban transportation systems including electric cars, and automated manufacturing. Climate Change The issue of climate change caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (co2) into the atmosphere is helping to drive the global nuclear revival. Most electricity is generated using fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) that emit ghgs. Figure 3.1 shows electricity generation by source. The iea predicts that energy-related co2 emissions will rise from 28.8 Gt in 2007 to 34.5 Gt in 2020 and 40.2 Gt in 2030. The environmental consequences of this sustained rate of emissions will be dire. The iea, not a fear-mongering environmental lobby group but an intergovernmental energy organization, has warned that “the rising global consumption of fossil fuels is still set to drive up greenhouse gas emissions and world temperatures, resulting in potentially catastrophic and irreversible climate change.”55

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Figure 3.1 World electricity generation by source. Source: International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics 2008, 24.

The world’s people have realized that electricity generation must move away from fossil fuels. According to the Accenture multinational poll on nuclear power mentioned in the previous section, 88 percent believed that it was important that their country “reduce its reliance on fossil-fuelled power generation (i.e., coal, oil or gas generated power).” In addition, only 39 percent believed that “renewable alone can fill in the gap, in order to reduce [their] country’s reliance on fossil-fuelled power generation.”56 Since it does not emit greenhouse gases, a move toward greater utilization of nuclear power is better for the environment. It is true that there are small emissions from the entire fuel cycle (uranium mining and processing, construction of facilities, operations, waste management, etc). However, using a life cycle comparison shows the benefits of nuclear power in avoiding ghg emissions. Nuclear power’s ghg emissions are comparable to renewable sources like wind, hydro, and solar and immensely better than the conventional fossil fuels of coal, natural gas, and oil (see table 3.3). As bad as the global situation is with ghg emissions, it would have been worse if nuclear power had not existed, because, throughout their history, nuclear reactors have avoided about 13 Gt of carbon emissions.57 Now that the global fleet of reactors has expanded, yearly emissions of about 650 million tonnes of co2 are avoided. This is comparable to the amount of carbon displaced by the use of hydro. Given the increased demand for electricity, avoiding future ghg emis-

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Table 3.3 Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Intensity by Electricity Options (tonnes of co2equivalent/gwh) Electricity Technology

Greenhouse Gas Intensity

Hydro Wind Nuclear Solar Natural Gas Oil

1–34 8–30 1.5–20 0.74–1.3 360–575 700–800

Coal

800–1000

Source: Compiled from data in Alberta Research Council and Idaho National Laboratory, The Nuclear Energy Option in Alberta (1 October 2008), 87. Accessed 5 April 2009 at http://www.arc.ab.ca/documents/arcinl-report-secure.pdf.

sions can occur only if two strategies are enacted. The first is to replace existing high-carbon generation (coal, oil, and natural gas) with new low-carbon generation (hydro, nuclear, and renewable). This would have a tremendous impact because, as figure 3.1 showed, 68 percent of electricity is generated from fossil fuels. A second strategy involves relying on low-carbon emitters instead of high-carbon emitters for new electricity generation. This is also important because of the expected increased demand for electricity. Both the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (ipcc) and the iea see nuclear power as a significant contributor to ghg mitigation. The ipcc compared fuel switching across many different options (nuclear, hydro, wind, bioenergy, geothermal, solar photovoltaic, concentrating solar power, and coal and gas with carbon capture and storage). It found that “nuclear power represents the largest mitigation potential at the lowest average cost of any electricity generation.” Meanwhile, the iea forecasts that nuclear energy would account for about 15 percent of co2 savings by 2050.58 The economics of nuclear power, especially the high upfront costs, has hindered the expansion of the nuclear industry. However, placing a price on carbon, either through a carbon tax or through a cap-andtrade scheme, makes nuclear power cost-competitive. At what carbon price nuclear becomes economically competitive is a source of much debate. According to mit’s 2003 study, nuclear generation begins to become competitive with coal when carbon dioxide is priced at

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us$100/tonne.59 In contrast, Robert Socolow and Alexander Glaser, two engineering professors at Princeton, believe that “an emissions price of $20 per ton of co2 gives nuclear power a 2c/kwh boost relative to power from coal and a 1c/kwh boost relative to natural gas.”60 This is not just an academic debate but one with real policy implications because the price of carbon varies around the world. Carbon prices in Europe, which has a cap-and-trade system, have been hovering around €12 a tonne.61 Meanwhile, many jurisdictions, in preparation for a new international climate change treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol are beginning to establish their own carbon prices. For example, us president Barrack Obama is trying to introduce legislation to establish a cap-and-trade system in the United States. California is also considering a cap-and trade-program that could be regionally extended to other western us states and Canadian provinces through the Western Climate Initiative.62 Both Australia and New Zealand have also passed carbon-trading programs, and Japan is considering its own scheme. In Canada, two provinces have already established different types of carbon pricing: British Columbia has a carbon tax of $10/tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (co2e), and Alberta requires large emitters who exceed their carbon-intensity targets to pay $15/tonne of co2e to a technology fund. Energy Security Fossil fuels will continue to be a primary source of electricity for decades to come. However, price volatility and concerns over the security of supply are leading countries to shift towards nuclear power. In the past, the lack of domestic fossil fuels was the key driver that led countries like France and Japan to focus their electricity generation on nuclear power. Converting to nuclear meant that they did not have to rely on imports of coal, oil, or natural gas. It was the 1973 oil shocks that highlighted French dependence on imported Middle Eastern oil, and from that moment forward, France shifted its electricity generation from oil to nuclear. Today, France has the world’s highest percentage of electricity produced by nuclear power (over 76 percent) and has become the number one electricity exporter.63 In the case of Japan, it cannot “exchange energy with neighbouring countries through power transmission lines or pipelines” because it is an island. Japan also lacks many natural resources, meaning that it depends “on foreign countries for about 80 percent of its energy resources.” For this

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Figure 3.2 Historical prices for electricity fuels (us$). Source: Oil prices were obtained from http://www.iea.org/stats/surveys/mps.pdf Coal prices were obtained from http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec7_19.pdf Uranium prices were obtained from http://www.firsturanium.com Natural gas prices were obtained from http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9190us3m.htm.

reason Japan has believed that “nuclear power generation contributes to improved energy sufficiency and to the stability of the energy supply.”64 Without the approximately 28 percent of its electricity produced by nuclear power, Japan’s dependence on foreign energy sources would be even more heightened. The first aspect of energy security is the price of fossil fuels. Although the recession of 2008–10 led to a temporary decline in oil and natural gas prices, the trajectory has been mostly upward (see figure 3.2). The high prices provide “a strong motivation for countries with high shares of imported fuels for their electricity generation to look for substitutes.”65 A related concern is price volatility. As the iaea has stated, “all elements of the energy supply infrastructure are long lived. Similarly, energy intensive industries base their investment decisions on cautious expectations about future energy and electricity prices. A reasonable degree of stability and predictability of resource prices is crucial for such decisions.”66 All fuel prices fluctuate. However, in the case of nuclear power, fluctuation has been mitigated because the cost of fuel as a percentage of production costs is only 10 percent for nuclear power plants, compared with 93 percent for natural gas plants and 77 percent for coal plants.67

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The second aspect is security of supply. The iaea has noted that “political conflicts in key supply regions exacerbate the price pressure and raise severe concerns over the security of supply.”68 For example, in 2006 and again in 2008 Russia shut off natural gas shipments to Ukraine because of disputes over natural gas supplies, pricing, and debts. The aftermath of Ukraine’s orange revolution in 2004–5 and its impact on relations with Russia was also a factor. In the process, other eu states were also affected because about 25 percent of all natural gas consumed in the eu comes from Russia and 80 percent of it was transported through pipelines in Ukraine. This situation obviously concerned many European countries and gave them an incentive to pursue nuclear power. In 2009, Italy reversed two decades of anti-nuclear policy by declaring its intention to return to nuclear power. In explaining this decision, Claudio Scajola, Italy’s Minister for Economic Development, referenced the Russian-Ukraine natural gas dispute by pointing out that it “made the Italian understand the importance of energy security [and that] we must go back to nuclear power if we want to become less dependent on others’ moods.”69 Bulgaria and Slovakia also made similar comments.70 Energy security has often been identified in public surveys as a reason to pursue nuclear power. The Accenture poll showed that the most important reason for supporting the development/increase in nuclear power was its role in helping countries “be less reliant on countries providing oil and gas.” At 85 percent support, energy security was seen as more important than the fact that nuclear power was a low-carbon emitter (78 percent).71 THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY

The global nuclear industry is made up of the world’s largest industrial companies. In most, but not all, cases the nuclear division is just a smaller unit of a larger company that also produces conventional power generation, appliances, and consumer electronics. In recent years, the nuclear industry, like all other industries, has undergone a significant process of mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures. Table 3.4 compares the major reactor design companies. There has been both vertical and horizontal integration. While vertical integration involves combining elements of the fuel cycle such as uranium mining and reactor design, as in the case of Areva, horizontal integration involves combining two or more companies in the same part of the

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Table 3.4 The International Nuclear Industry Westinghouse-Toshiba

General Electric-Hitachi

Rosatom

aecl

Headquarters

France

United States

United States/Japan

Russia

Canada

Ownership Structure

87% French government 13% private sector

67% Toshiba 20% Shaw Group 10% Kazatomprom

Hitachi owns 40% of ge, and ge owns 20% of Hitachi

100% Russian government

Was 100% Canadian government, now 100% snc-Lavalin

Reactors, Services, and Fuel Revenue

Can$5,117 million

Can$4,475 million

Can$3,196 million

Can$2,494 million

Can$558 million

Reactor Type

Pressurized Light Water epr-1000

Pressurized Light Water-ap-1000

Boiling Water abwr

Pressurized Light Water vver-1200

Pressurized Heavy Water candu

Reactors Operating

71

119

70

68

30

Reactors under Construction

6

5

4

16

0

Countries that have reactor design

7

10

7

12

7

Source: Statistics for reactors operating and under construction came from World Nuclear Association country profiles. Accessed on 25 November 2009 at http://www.world-nuclear.org. Reactors, services, and fuel revenue data was obtained from Natural Resources Canada, Review of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (May 2009), 16.

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Areva

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fuel cycle, as in the case of the merger of two reactor design companies creating ge-Hitachi. Keith Bradley, a senior aecl official, puts the consolidation into perspective: “When Mexico was considering nuclear power in the early 1980s, aecl was competing against 7 other vendors. All were strictly North American or European. Today, there is only one European vendor and two American-Japanese ones.”72 The consolidation of the nuclear industry has occurred among reactor design companies, power utilities, reactor operators and component suppliers, and uranium mining and conversion. To properly understand the competition that in the international nuclear reactor trade, one must distinguish between the many different reactor designs and variations of designs based on fuel, vessel type, moderator, coolant, power output, and so forth. For our purposes here, the classification of reactor types has been simplified to a handful of the most popular models for electricity generation and has excluded research reactors, historical designs, and future prototypes. The most common reactor, produced by both Areva and Westinghouse, is the pressurized light water reactor (pwr). In a pwr, “the fuel is contained in a large, water-filled pressure vessel, and the water is kept at a sufficiently high pressure so that it does not boil. Instead, hot water from the reactor, the primary coolant, flows into steam generators, or boilers, in which the heat from the primary coolant is transferred to the boiler feedwater, which is at a lower pressure, allowing it to boil and turn into steam. The primary coolant leaving the boilers is considerably cooler than when it entered the boilers, and it is pumped back into the reactor vessel.” Boiling water reactors (bwrs), which were created by General Electric, are similar to pwrs, but “the water surrounding the fuel assemblies is allowed to turn into steam, being at a lower pressure than in a pwr. The steam generated in the reactor vessel is piped directly to the turbine. Unlike pwrs, there are no separate steam generators or boilers.” Pressurized heavy water reactors (phwrs) are the candu reactors designed by aecl. The key different between a pwr and phwr is the use of heavy water as a coolant and moderator. Light, or ordinary, water has a molecular composition of H20, but heavy water is D20. Heavy water has two atoms of heavy hydrogen or deuterium. This means that “heavy water weighs approximately 10% more than light water.”73 Most countries around the world are exclusively either light water or heavy water reactor markets. This creates a technological barrier for entry for companies marketing different reactor designs. Light water

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reactors (either pwrs or bwrs), which are present in the United States, France, Japan, and Russia, dominate the market with over 90 percent share. Argentina, Canada, and Romania are heavy water countries. Only a handful of countries, such as China, India, and South Korea, have adopted both kinds of reactors. R E A C TO R D E S I G N C O M PA N I E S

Areva is a fully integrated nuclear company across the entire fuel cycle. Its reactor design is focused on its new Gen III+ Evolutionary Power Reactor (epr). In the front end, it has uranium mining and exploration operations, fuel conversion, and enrichment capacity. In the back end, it has reprocessing technology and nuclear waste treatment. Areva is headquartered in Paris and has most of its nuclear facilities are in France. Nevertheless, it is a global company with over seventy five thousand employees in over forty countries. Areva was formed by a 2001 merger between two large European nuclear companies: the French company Framatome (66 percent) and the German company Siemens (34 percent). Cogema, a French firm specializing in mining, uranium enrichment, and nuclear waste treatment, was also included in the Areva formation. Framatome was established in 1958 by a partnership of several existing French firms to license Westinghouse nuclear technology. Siemens was founded in a small workshop in Berlin in 1847 to produce telegraphs. It is now a world leader in electronics and electrical engineering. Its Kraftwerk Union subsidiary was a major nuclear design company building reactors in Germany, Brazil, and other countries in the 1970s. This partnership lasted only less than a decade. In February 2009, Siemens backed out claiming that its “role as a minority shareholder considerably limit[ed]” its “entrepreneurial manoeuvrability.”74 The creation of Areva was a groundbreaking move in the consolidation of the international nuclear industry, but further acquisitions would soon transpire. In 2002, Areva acquired Duke Engineering & Services, a large us nuclear engineering firm. In 2003, Areva reached a partnership with urenco, a British-based firm that gave Areva access to gas centrifugation, the most efficient form of uranium enrichment technology. Three years later, in 2006, Areva purchased 50 percent of urenco’s Enrichment Technology Company (etc). etc develops, designs, and manufactures uranium enrichment equipment. Also in 2006, Areva acquired Sfarsteel, one of the world’s

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largest producers of very large forgings (required in the construction of nuclear reactors), and it formed a strategic partnership with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to develop and market a mid-sized reactor. Beyond these major moves, Areva also acquired, or formed partnerships, with other nuclear companies across the fuel cycle.75 Today, Areva’s majority shareholder is the French government, with minority private sector ownership. Westinghouse nuclear was created by one of the world’s largest industrial conglomerates. The Westinghouse Electric Company was established by George Westinghouse in 1886, making its start in railroad technology. It subsequently branched out into the area of electricity when it invented the alternating-current transmission system and was soon manufacturing household appliances and consumer electronics. Given that Westinghouse has been a technology leader, it is not surprising that it was active in the formation of the nuclear age. During World War II, us scientists created the first atomic pile using Westinghouse-produced uranium. When the war was over, Westinghouse built the Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory in Pennsylvania to begin research on producing power from the atom, and in 1957 the first civilian nuclear power plant began operating. Westinghouse also helped to design the USS Nautilus, the first nuclear-powered submarine. For decades, Westinghouse was the world leader in nuclear reactor design, and its nuclear technology is responsible for almost half the world’s nuclear power plants. Today, it “offers a wide range of nuclear plant products and services to utilities throughout the world, including fuel, service and maintenance, instrumentation and control and advanced nuclear plant designs.”76 The ap1000, a Gen III+ pressurized light water reactor, which is being marketed and constructed around the world, is Westinghouse’s flagship nuclear reactor. Westinghouse Nuclear remains privately owned and headquartered on the outskirts of Pittsburgh, but the division has been bought and sold by firms around the globe. In 1999, British Nuclear Fuels Limited (bnfl) bought it, and in 2000, bnfl also bought Asea Brown Boveri (abb) a Swedish-Swiss conglomerate and rolled it into Westinghouse. Then in 2006 Toshiba acquired Westinghouse from bnfl for us$5.4 billion. (Toshiba had been producing boiling water reactors for the Japanese market.) In acquiring Westinghouse, Toshiba made the strategic decision to adopt the pwr. The Westinghouse-Toshiba nuclear company combines two prominent international nuclear companies in the world’s two most advanced economies: the United States and Japan.

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General Electric, one of the world’s largest companies, is another us-based industrial giant. Thomas Edison, one of the world’s greatest inventors, founded ge in 1878. It has “products and services ranging from aircraft engines, power generation, water processing and security technology to medical imaging, business and consumer financing, media content and industrial products.”77 Like other large industrial firms, ge soon moved into the nuclear sector. It designed the boiling water reactor in the 1950s and built more than ninety of them in the United States and around the world. ge has developed new Gen III+ reactors: the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (abwr) and the Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (esbwr). Both the abwr and the esbwr are capable of producing 1,500 mw of electricity. ge also provides reactor services for the bwr and abwr, including “outage services, inspections technology, reactor modifications, speciality projects, and parts solutions.”78 Other product lines include nuclear fuel and performance services. In 2007, building on previous partnerships, General Electric and Hitachi merged their nuclear power divisions. Hitachi, headquartered in Tokyo, is also an industrial conglomerate, with holdings in information and telecommunications, electronic devices, power and industrial systems, digital media and consumer products, high-functional materials, logistics, and financial services. The merger was based on a cross-ownership scheme that saw Hitachi take a 40 percent stake in ge’s nuclear division, and ge assumed 20 percent of Hitachi’s. ge-Hitachi is now one of the world’s most comprehensive nuclear power plant and services operations, and it will be a keen competitor for new reactor projects around the world. ge-Hitachi, along with Toshiba, also operates Global Nuclear Fuels, a fuel supply joint venture. In Russia the State Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom), a 100 percent state-owned holding company, was created in 2007 to unite the Russian civilian nuclear industry. Under the Rosatom brand the following companies cover the entire nuclear fuel cycle: armz Uranium Holding Co. (uranium mining), tvel (a nuclear fuel supplier) and tenex (uranium enrichment), AtomEnergoProm (reactor designer), Atomenergomash (nuclear facilities constructor), Concern Enrgoatom (the largest nuclear electricity generation company in Russia), AtomStroyExport (international nuclear power plant construction and project manager), and Energoatom (nuclear power plant operator). The Ros-

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atom umbrella also includes Russia’s nuclear weapons enterprises, but those will not be analyzed in this book. Russia has a very long history with nuclear power, and its nuclear industry has built reactors throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Russia’s first nuclear power plant, and the first in the world to produce electricity, was the 5 mwe Obninsk reactor in 1954. Russia’s first two commercial-scale nuclear power plants started up in 1963–64, then in 1971–73 the first of today’s production models was commissioned. By the mid-1980s Russia had twenty-five power reactors in operation, but the nuclear industry was beset by problems, which could mostly be traced to the rmbk reactor, a graphite-moderated boiling water reactor. The rmbk reactor was the only one that combined a graphite moderator and water coolant. This type of reactor design was unstable because “allowing light water to turn into steam within the fuel channels makes the rbmk inherently more difficult to control, as light water is a good neutron absorber, and steam is a much poorer neutron absorber. As reactor power increases, there is more and more steam, and less and less water in the fuel channels, making more neutrons available to cause fissions, an inherently somewhat unstable design requiring very good control.”79 The Chernobyl reactor was a rmbk reactor, and its severe 1986 accident and subsequent radiation fallout was accentuated by the lack of a containment facility, another critical design flaw at the heart of the rmbk. No new rmbks are being built, and many of the existing reactors, especially outside of Russia, have been shut down. Today, Rosatom’s primary nuclear technology is the Vodo-Vodyanoi Energetichesky Reactor (vver), which is a type of pwr. vvers were first built in the 1960s, and the current version is the advanced vver-1000, which has adapted Western instrumentation and control systems in a traditional Russian design. The vver-1000 is being built in China and India, as well as in Russia. Rosatom is a textbook case of vertical integration, but it has started the process of horizontal integration. In March 2008, AtomEnergoProm signed an agreement with Toshiba regarding future cooperation on all aspects of the nuclear cycle.80 Then in March 2009, Siemens, which was still in the process of divorcing itself of its marriage with Areva, signed a memorandum of understanding to create a joint venture with Rosatom to further develop and construct the vver. (There had been cooperation between Siemens and Rosatom in Solvakia and

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Bulgaria since 1990.) A major complication for the Siemens-Rosatom partnership is a clause in its contract with Areva that bars the German company from working in nuclear power for eight years after the end of the joint venture.81 aecl is the smallest of the reactor design companies. It has many disadvantages compared to Areva, Westinghouse-Toshiba, geHitachi, and Rosatom. First, it is not an integrated company, either vertically across the nuclear fuel cycle or horizontally with other nuclear firms. aecl is a reactor design company with some engineering services, but it lacks assets in both the upstream and downstream parts of the fuel cycle. As a Crown corporation, aecl is prevented from participating in formal alliances. MZConsulting Inc has written that the most significant change in the nuclear landscape is “the emergence through consolidation of three major lightwater reactor players with products at a more advanced stage than aecl’s acr-1000, creating great challenges for the future of aecl and Candu.”82 Second, aecl is not part of a larger multinational industrial company, with global supply networks, that also provides conventional energy products and services. Third, as mentioned above, its candu technology is competing against light water reactors that have cornered most of the global market. These are not new disadvantages. In a review of the nuclear industry in the early 1980s, the Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources catalogued many of the same difficulties for aecl.83 Almost thirty years later, the situation has only gotten worse. As a result of the problems just described, and in the context of the global nuclear revival, Ottawa is planning to restructure aecl. In November 2007, Natural Resources Canada launched a review, aided by a commissioned study by National Bank Financial, to determine the future of aecl. nrcan emphasized three public policy objectives in its review: 1 Canada requires safe, reliable and economic options to address its energy and environmental needs. 2 The costs of the Government’s support of the industry need to be controlled and the return on its investment in the industry maximized. 3 The final outcome and structure of aecl should position Canada’s nuclear industry to seize domestic and global opportunities.84

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nrcan was seeking an option for aecl that would “help Canada maximize opportunities in the global marketplace, manage more effectively the federal investment in aecl and reduce the Government’s exposure to financial risk.”85 The review, which was released in May 2009, concludes that “aecl’s current mandate and structure hampers its success and development and does not maximize benefits for Canada. The two halves of the Corporation, the candu Reactor Division, and the Research and Technology Division, have distinct mandates and resource and management needs.” This means that “the execution of key projects under pressure, exposes[s] the Government as shareholder to undue financial risk, and potentially limit[s] Canada’s participation in the global supply chain.” Moreover, the candu Reactor Division “is too small to establish a strong presence in the high growth markets that are a key to its success.” Meanwhile, the Research and Technology Division may meet “essential public policy requirements,” but “can be managed in a more focused manner and still provide for innovative approaches.” The review thought that there would be private sector interest in aecl’s commercial business. It “highlighted aecl’s strong industry credentials, its valued intellectual property and highly trained labour force. aecl employs some of the best and brightest engineers and scientists in the nuclear business.” The review believed that private sector investment in aecl would expand “opportunities for Canada’s nuclear industry.” It even “found private sector interest in participating in the management of Chalk River Laboratories, through alternative approaches such as government-owned/company-operated arrangements.”86 Based on these findings, the review recommended that aecl be restructured. Ottawa concurred: Natural Resources Minister Lisa Raitt maintained that “the overall objective of this restructuring is to strengthen the capacity of Canada’s nuclear industry to compete for and deliver domestic and international nuclear projects.”87 The next step was a process to determine how to restructure. Complicating the restructuring process is that aecl has four different aspects. First, it develops and markets new reactor designs like the acr-1000 and the enhanced candu 6 (ec6). Second, it refurbishes and services the existing candu fleet; these two commercial businesses are the responsibility of the candu Reactor Division. Third, it uses the nru and other facilities to conduct nuclear research and development and produce medical isotopes. Fourth, it is responsible for managing

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nuclear waste, decommissioning, and legacy liabilities. These tasks are the responsibility of the Research and Technology Division based at Chalk River Laboratories. These are also public policy activities that are performed on a non-commercial basis. To assist nrcan, N.M. Rothschild and Sons were hired to develop a restructuring plan and provide external financial advice.88 David Leith, formerly of cibc World Markets, was also hired as a consultant.89 On 17 December 2009, nrcan called for proposals for aecl’s candu Reactor Division. The proposals would be assessed on the following objectives: “ensuring that Canadians have nuclear as a safe, reliable, and economic clean energy option; controlling costs to the Government while maximizing the return on the taxpayers’ investment; and positioning the nuclear industry in Canada to seize domestic and global opportunities.” Minister Raitt also emphasized that the nuclear industry “employs 30,000 highly skilled Canadians, and our Government is committed to making sure these jobs are retained and more are created.”90 nrcan, as part of its 2009 restructuring review, commissioned a series of public opinion polls by Ipsos Reid and conducted focus groups to determine what safeguards the government should put into place if aecl were to be partially privatized. It identified the need for transparency (“the public should be able to know what aecl does and how it does it”) and accountability (“there should be clear areas of responsibility and accountability”). Participants emphasized that, even with a partially privatized aecl, “the government of Canada must remain the controlling force.”91 A host of economic, technological, environmental, and political arguments needs to be weighed before any decision on restructuring aecl is made. The stakes are huge and the dollars are in the tens of billions. A number of potential benefits might follow a restructuring of aecl through a complete or partial privatization. Mike Burns, the former chairman of aecl, has argued that the company “needs more private sector content in the company to make it work.”92 One reason for privatization is the fact that, as table 3.4 showed, aecl requires a massive capital infusion because for years it has been starved of cash, which has eroded some of its technological capacity. In contrast to other so-called Generation III+ reactors, the acr-1000 is still in the prototype stage, while Areva’s epr is under construction in Finland and Westinghouse’s AP1000 has been certified by the us Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Compounding the cash problem is that aecl,

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because of its status as a Crown corporation, cannot “access capital markets” or “mak[e] equity investments.”93 Consequently, unlike its competitors, aecl cannot borrow money or form strategic partnerships. nrcan’s review of aecl highlighted the fact that “successful participation in the commercial reactor business depends on partnering with corporations that have global scale to leverage aecl’s technology, skills, experience and capabilities.”94 This is exactly the sort of integration pursued by Westinghouse-Toshiba, ge-Hitachi, and Areva with Mitsubishi. aecl, as a 100 percent Crown corporation, is currently prevented from entering into these types of partnerships with other firms. In addition, aecl would benefit from private sector management practices, especially in the area of project planning and management. Interviews with nuclear industry officials all identified project planning and management and a “Crown corporation culture” as the major internal weaknesses of aecl that could be solved through privatization. One senior aecl official asserted that “there are incredible restrictions on being a Crown corporation.” Another maintained that “privatization needs to happen. Crowns are inefficient. They are not business-oriented. It starts with government appointing the board and filters all the way down. What are the metrics? It isn’t economics, it isn’t profits, it’s political calculation. Even absent direct political interference, there is still a lack of focus, a lack of direction.”95 There are Canadian nationalists who fear losing a high-tech champion. However, it needs to be recognized that the process of globalization has meant that the international nuclear market is no longer the national zero-sum game that it once was. After all WestinghouseToshiba and ge-Hitachi are American-Japanese firms and Areva was a European consortium. In addition, any major project requires partnerships with local engineering, construction, and supplier firms. This consolidation of the nuclear industry has meant that concerns of economic nationalism may not be as prevalent. For instance, until very recently, Canada has benefited greatly from a consolidated auto sector even though there is no “Canadian” auto company. That being said, there were risks to pursuing aecl’s privatization. In particular, a sale to non-Canadian owners like Areva (which is majority-owned by the French government) would have been problematic. The nationality of ownership still matters when it comes to the nuclear industry. To mention an obvious example, there are clear

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issues of national security associated with nuclear technology. Ipsos Reid concluded that in the focus groups “participants tended to say government should be most responsible for nuclear activities, particularly those dealing with the safety of nuclear technology, overseeing waste management and setting regulations.” This was because government is orientated “towards public benefits, not profits,” and it would be “an appropriate check against the inherent risks of nuclear power.” In addition, “nuclear energy is simply too important an element of public infrastructure and too expensive with too long-term a pay-off to expect the private sector to adequately support it, ensure its safety or consider the national security implications of its proliferation.” However, participants did see some role for the private sector in research and development, and “researching commercial applications and producing medical isotopes.” Thus, 72 percent of those surveyed want aecl to remain a crown corporation. Only a “minority of respondents believe that a private aecl would result in more jobs for Canadians (36%), would help Canada’s economy (34%), or would be able to better sell nuclear technology around the world (33%).”96 Second, there were concerns that a privatization of aecl would be the end of the candu. Would companies such as Areva and ge, which have their own reactor designs, continue to support the candu? This concern is especially valid the uniqueness of heavy water reactor technology is factored in. According to John Cadman, author of a report on the future of nuclear power in Canada, “all of these firms have invested heavily in their own designs, most of which are now ‘ahead’ of the latest candu technology. There might be some spinoff or marginal innovation value, but I really can’t see any of them fundamentally altering their design to adopt the candu.”97 The Society of Professional Engineers and Associates (spea), which represents more than nine hundred aecl engineers and scientists, also fears the loss of the candu technology if a non-Canadian company were to purchase it. spea vice-president Michael Ivanco has asserted that “historically, whenever you sell a technology to a foreign country, you lose it.”98 These concerns of economic nationalism were supported by public opinion data. The participants in Ipsos Reid’s focus groups feared that a privatized aecl, even a partially privatized aecl in some cases, “would inevitably become an aecl owned and controlled abroad.” Eighty-four percent of responders believed that “the nuclear technol-

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ogy used in Canada should be retained in companies owned and controlled by Canadians,” and 73 percent believed that “new nuclear plants should be based on Canadian-developed technology.”99 These results are consistent with the results of Accenture’s Multinational Nuclear Power Pulse Survey, which found that 75 percent of Canadians are “not comfortable with the presence of non-Canadian nuclear plant manufacturers and plant operators in Canada.” That study also found that “contribution to the local economy and the use of Canadian technology are rated most important by respondents for the selection of a design and of a building vendor for a new nuclear site.”100 Regardless of ownership, nuclear industry people maintain that government support is critical. According to Neil Alexander, president of oci, “the nuclear industry is very big. It’s very strategic, and it’s very long term. And typically, you find some government backstopping that activity.”101 Duncan Hawthorne has warned that even if aecl’s reactor division was 100 percent privatized, the government would still need to be involved. “There is no exit for a federal government from a nuclear industry. Once you’re in the nuclear industry, you’re in it. And the only question is whether or not you want to be fully committed and visibly supporting it and actively promoting it as a liability and risk.” Hawthorne complains that Canada has not “shown that leadership for a long number of years.” In contrast, “you cannot go to any country pursuing new nuclear and not find that there’s been a visit from the President or Prime Minister of those countries that have vendors. Wherever Areva goes, Sarkozy’s been before them – everywhere. Because that political support is clear, visible, and obvious to all.”102 Third, critics question how much aecl is worth. Some insiders suggest that aecl’s commercial side might be worth only $300 million – less than its recent yearly parliamentary appropriations – because of the economic downturn and the view that the candu is only a niche player in the international nuclear sector. As one former aecl employee stated, “the buyer will require a big broom. Basically, this is a company with no firm prospects for future reactor sales, a steady but small revenue stream from technology services, contingent liabilities that amount to four or five times its annual funding, and a bloated payroll.”103 Kory Teneycke, who was Harper’s communications director, stated that “the government has put $20 billion into aecl over its history and it’s been one of the largest sinkholes of government money

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probably in the history of the government of Canada.” He added that there has been “well-founded, sharp criticism of the history of aecl … I don’t think we’re going out on a limb to say it has been a fairly dysfunctional place.”104 Fourth, would Ottawa be willing to properly invest in pure research at Chalk River, knowing that any commercial application will only benefit the private sector? What about Areva’s commitment to Canadian research? While Areva would use Canadian construction workers and reactor operators, where would it conduct its most important nuclear research: in Canada or in France? It is not the overall number of jobs that would be gained or lost through privatization; it is the type of jobs. Maintaining and expanding high value-added scientific jobs is always important, but doubly so in a country like Canada, which has very few high-tech champions. Potential applicants were bound by a confidentiality agreement, but some information did leak out. There was some initial interest from international nuclear firms. Both General Electric and Westinghouse had expressed some interest early in the process, but neither of them ever began formal negotiations with Ottawa. Areva officials looked at aecl’s books in 2009, but they saw some financial aspects of aecl that they did not like, so they decided not to participate in the process.105 This left only Canadian bidders: Bruce Power and sncLavalin. snc-Lavalin was interested in all three aspects of aecl’s commercial business: (1) the engineering services for existing candu reactors in Canada and the rest of the world, (2) the refurbishment of existing reactors, and (3) the possibility of selling new reactors. However, sncLavalin was not interested in aecl’s new prototype reactor, the acr1000. aecl spent a decade and around one billion dollars designing the acr-1000. By 2011, its design was 85 percent complete, but final design modifications needed to wait until an actual sale was concluded and the purchasing utility’s requirements were fully know. However, snc-Lavalin was unwilling to invest any more time and money in the reactor’s completion, because first-of-a-kind builds are especially risky, and snc-Lavalin wanted to avoid delays and cost overruns. In addition, the other large international nuclear firms were already building their new Gen III+ reactors, and the acr-1000 would be coming onto the market quite late. Instead, snc-Lavalin was interested in developing and marketing the ec6, a new and improved version of the candu-6 that had already been built in Canada and China.106 snc-

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Lavalin also believed that the ec6 is better-suited for utilities that only need 700 mw of electricity as opposed to the larger Gen III+ reactors, which produce 1,200 mw of electricity. snc-Lavalin was interested in aecl for several reasons. First, sncLavalin had decades-long nuclear experience, especially with the candu, and wanted to stay involved in the industry. Second, the company saw a global opportunity for the nuclear industry resulting from concerns about climate change. Pierre Duhaime, president of sncLavalin, said that “there is a need for a shift towards cleaner energy. The world needs it; we can’t just continue what we are doing right now … Nuclear has a role to play in a greener planet. We need to reduce our carbon footprint and nuclear is part of it.”107 Even after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, snc-Lavalin remained optimistic about the international growth of nuclear power. Durhaime said that “to build a reactor takes eight years. So [the market] may slow down for one year, or so, but the truth is, we need clean power, and there are not too many alternatives … Either you decide to maintain your coal-fired plant, or you swing over to nuclear … We have been building safe nuclear reactor for many years.”108 Third, snc-Lavalin was convinced that its global reach would help it secure future international contracts. As Neil Linsdell, an analyst with Versant Partners, put it, “one of the things that snc brings to the table apart from the logistics and the know-how on these projects, is their global Rolodex.”109 sncLavalin planned on marketing the candu to Jordan, Romania, Argentina, Turkey, and China, as well as Ontario.110 In January 2011, Bruce Power decided to pull out of the competition, but owing to the confidentiality clause, its reasons for ending its bid were not publicly announced. However, people within Bruce Power have said that the decision came from Trans-Canada Corp – Bruce Power’s majority owner – because of concerns over the financial risks of acquiring aecl.111 Press reports suggested that Bruce Power was Ottawa’s preferred buyer “because it had indicated a commitment to keep on more [aecl] employees than had snc-Lavalin.”112 At one time in the process, snc-Lavalin looked to have acquired a partner in its bid when it was joined by the Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System (omers), which manages a $44 billion pension fund. Ironically omers is also a minority shareholder in Bruce Power. However, following the nuclear accident at FukushimaDaiichi, omers decided to back out of any deal for aecl. There were several reasons for its decision.113 First, omers felt that snc-Lavalin did

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not have a long-term vision of the nuclear business; it feared that sncLavalin was interested only in the maintenance and refurbishment contracts but had no plans to develop new reactor technologies. Second, omers entered the competition for aecl believing that Ottawa would continue to provide financial support for nuclear research and development and potential cost overruns. However, it soon discovered that the federal government was unwilling to make those sorts of promises to the new owners of aecl’s reactor division. Third, omers was concerned that the international nuclear industry was going to suffer in the aftermath of the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. To expedite the restructuring of aecl, Ottawa brought in legislation – attached to the 2010 budget – that gave the minister of natural resources the sole authority for the restructuring of aecl, bypassing Parliament. In addition, the minister would be able to determine what aspects of any restructuring – in particular the privatization in part or whole of the nuclear reactor division of aecl – could be publicly disclosed to the Canadian people. This sort of secrecy was unprecedented. Previous Crown corporations – Petro-Canada, Air Canada, Eldorado Nuclear – were all privatized without granting exceptional powers to the relevant minister. More importantly, there was a lack of transparency. This led to concerns that important questions about the restructuring would go unanswered. Would Canadians be allowed to see the entire contract? What was the selling price? What conditions were attached to the transaction with regards to jobs and investment in research and development? Did the federal government promise to provide loan guarantees or allocate funds to the new entity in order to acquire new build contracts either in the provinces or in other parts of the world? What legacy costs were kept off the books and assumed by the government? On 29 June 2011, Joe Oliver, the natural resources minister, announced that aecl’s reactor division had been sold to snc-Lavalin for $15 million. There were many clauses in the agreement. First, aecl would retain all liabilities and obligations for the five on-going lifeextension projects (Point Lepreau, Bruce a1 & a2, Gentilly 2, and Wolsong I in South Korea). snc-Lavalin would continue to work on these projects, but as a sub-contractor. The new company, candu Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of snc-Lavalin would take full responsibility for all new projects, such as the proposed new reactor to be built in Ontario. Second, the government would retain ownership of all candu intellectual property, meaning that it would receive royalties

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on any future candu sale. Estimates are that these royalties, combined with the sale of the government’s inventory of heavy water, could reach as much as $285 million. Third, a five-year agreement was reached between candu Energy and Chalk River Laboratories (the other half of aecl) to provide services, on a commercial basis, in such areas as shielded facilities, reactor chemistry, and systems engineering. Finally, the federal government agreed to cover 70 percent in a costsharing arrangement with candu Energy to complete the development of the ec6, up to a maximum of $75 million.114 Oliver emphasized that the sale was “a critical step to strengthen Canada’s nuclear industry while reducing taxpayers’ exposure to nuclear commercial risks.”115 Unlike other privatization efforts, this one was not designed to bring a lot of cash into the federal government’s coffers; instead, the principal goal was to get aecl off the books. Since 2006, the federal government had provided $2.5 billion in parliamentary appropriations to aecl, including $1.2 billion to the reactor division.116 Critics, on the other hand, called it a firesale. Prominent syndicated columnist Greg Weston asserted that Ottawa was “effectively paying snc-Lavalin to take over” aecl.117 Meanwhile, spea warned that candu Energy would shed eight hundred out of two thousand engineers and scientists currently working for aecl’s reactor division.118 The Ontario government was also not happy with the sale of aecl’s reactor division because, as Oliver maintained, the agreement with snc-Lavalin contained no obligation for the federal government to help Ontario with its purchase of two nuclear power plants.119 Both Premier Dalton McGuinty and Finance Minister Dwight Duncan argued that Ottawa, despite divesting itself of the company, would still have to provide financial support for the province’s new reactor project. Duncan complained that the federal government was willing to provide a $4.2 billion loan guarantee for Newfoundland’s Lower Churchill Falls hydro project but seemed unwilling to help Ontario with its electricity needs.120 What has been driving this large degree of consolidation? First, there has been an increase in the size of reactors. Instead of single 250 or even 600 mw plants, there are facilities with two to four units with a size of 1,200 mw for each reactor. The increase in electricity output has had a corresponding increase in price. New reactor projects require billions of dollars, which in turn requires financial-risk sharing through either very large companies or consortiums. Second, reactor vendors are now moving into project management. In the past, the

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vendors provided the reactor design and some procurement and engineering services. The general contractors were the owners of the nuclear power plant – the electricity utilities. Now the vendors are taking more control – and the subsequent risks – of the entire project. Responsibility for both the nuclear and the non-nuclear components are now being assumed by the reactor vendors. Third, the size and scope of research and development of new reactor designs has led to partnerships. All the major players have taken steps to align their products with the Generation III+ paradigm. Generation IV reactors will result in even more partnerships. The Generation IV International Forum, established in 2001 to lead research into the next generation of nuclear reactors, includes thirteen participating countries. Fourth, there has been a significant increase in the degree of analysis now required to present the licensing case and safety case to regulators. The pre-licensing process, an essential feature of the reactor bid process, is much more comprehensive than in the past. New tools are needed that did not previously exist. In addition, there have been huge demands to improve safety (and there have been safety improvements) by a high degree of magnitude. Finally, market access has been driving partnerships. Consolidation allows greater coverage of protected markets. For example, acquiring a Japanese partner allows a firm to penetrate the Japanese market.121 Utilities Beyond the consolidation of the nuclear industry’s reactor designers, there has also been a consolidation of the owners and operators of nuclear power plants. One of the most active players in the mergers and acquisitions game has been Électricité de France (edf). edf is France’s state-owned power utility, which represents half the country’s duopoly in the generation and distribution of electricity. Eightyfive percent of edf is owned by the French government, and the remaining 15 percent is held by private interests. edf, by acquiring utilities throughout Europe and especially in Germany, Italy, and Britain, has become the continent’s dominant utility.122 It owns 45 percent of enbw, Germany’s third-largest utility. edf took joint control with aem Milan of Edison, Italy’s second-largest utility, in 2005. In the fall of 2008, edf purchased British Energy, which owned eight nuclear power plants in Britain, for £12.5 billion. British Energy combined with edf’s own subsidiary now generated 27 percent of British

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electricity. As a result of these acquisitions, edf has an electricity capacity of 127.1 gwe, with over 70 percent from fifty-eight nuclear power plants. It now produces over 22 percent of the eu’s electricity. edf’s efforts have not been confined to Europe; it has also started to acquire firms, primarily nuclear utilities, throughout the rest of the world. The most significant investment occurred in late 2008 when edf bought a 49.99 percent share of Constellation Energy’s nuclear holdings. Constellation, the largest private sector electricity supplier in the United States, owned 3,869 mw of nuclear capacity from plants in Calvert Cliffs, Maryland, Nine Mile Point, and R.E. Ginna in New York.123 Other key international partnerships include a joint venture with China Guangong Nuclear Power Holding Company (cgnpc), which is 30 percent owned by edf, to build new reactors in China. Previously, edf owned all France’s nuclear reactors. However, GdFSuez has entered the market and now constitutes the other half of France’s electricity duopoly. GdF-Suez, which was formed through a 2008 merger of Gaz de France and Suez, the world’s second largest utility, was primarily a natural gas and renewable-electricity firm. The French government owns over 35 percent of GdF-Suez. The Suez wing owned Electrabel sa, Belgium’s biggest power company and the owner of all seven of its nuclear power plants. The newly formed company has taken a number of initiatives in the nuclear sector: it acquired an epr simulator from Areva that it is locating in Belgium, it has a 25 percent stake in the new reactor build at Penly, France (edf has the majority share), and it had submitted a tender, albeit ultimately unsuccessful, in partnership with Areva, edf, and Total, to the United Arab Emirates to build an epr.124 The consolidation of nuclear power plant owners is not restricted to French-based companies. Owners of single nuclear plants in the United States “have concluded that they should either shut down their plant or sell out to multiplant owners with the resource and the economies of scale necessary to implement the program of excellence required to achieve world class operational performance.”125 After over a decade of mergers and acquisitions, the top ten utilities now control more than 70 percent of nuclear power generation in the United Sates.126 Exelon Corp, headquartered in Chicago, is the largest nuclear power producer in the United States with 20 percent of market share. It has seventeen operating reactors in ten facilities across Illinois, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, and it has made two additional efforts

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at getting bigger – with pseg in New Jersey and nrg Energy in Texas – but these takeovers were rejected by state governments. Interestingly, while Exelon was rebuffed in its overture towards nrg Energy, Toshiba was successful in acquiring a 12 percent stake in its Texan nuclear plant. Entergy, headquartered in Louisiana, is the second largest nuclear generator and has doubled its capacity in the last decade through ownership of reactors in Arkansas, Mississippi, New York, Michigan, Massachusetts, Louisiana, and Vermont. In January 2011, Progress Energy merged with Duke Energy; the combined company becomes America’s largest utility, and the third-largest nuclear owner after Exelon and Entergy, with an enterprise value of $65 billion. Its financial heft results in lower borrowing costs and a greater ability to handle risk, thus allowing it to build three new nuclear power plants in North Carolina and Florida. FirstEnergy, a marriage of Ohio and New Jersey companies, owns reactors in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Progress Energy, created by a 2000 merger between Carolina Power & Light and Florida Progress Corporation, owns five reactors in North Carolina, South Carolina, and Florida. Reactor Operators and Supplier Companies There were forty-five nuclear operators in 1995, but by 2009, this number had dropped to only twenty-five.127 As Keith Bradley has noted, “smaller and less successful operators have left the industry. Nobody just operates one reactor anymore.”128 For example, the Nuclear Management Company, a joint venture of four us utilities, has taken over the operation of eight nuclear units at six sites. The number of specialized nuclear component suppliers has also shrunk. However, this was not necessarily because of mergers and acquisitions but rather because of the decline in nuclear construction since the 1980s, which saw suppliers leave the nuclear field. Not just any manufacturing company can supply many of these products, since they require highly specialized knowledge and equipment. As the iaea has noted, “reactor pressure vessels, pump cases and other components must be manufactured to the highest standards to ensure safety.”129 According to Sharon Squassoni, “apart from Russia, there are five large nuclear engineering companies; six companies fabricating steam generators and reactor vessels; a few ultra-heavy forging firms (Japan Steel Works, Sfarsteel-Creusot Forge and now Doosan) and

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Table 3.5 Global Uranium Reserves and Production (tons of uranium)

Australia Kazakhstan Russia South Africa Canada Others

Known Reserves

World Share (%)

Production

World Share (%)

1,243,000 817,000 546,000 435,000 423,000 2,005,000

23 15 10 8 8 36

5,900 17,803 3,562 583 9,783 16,032

10.9 33.1 6.6 1.0 18.2 29.8

Source: World Nuclear Association, “World Uranium Mining” (December 2011). Accessed on 13 January 2012 at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf23.html

only three steam generation tubing firms (Valinox Nucleaire, Sumitomo and Sandvik).”130 The shortage of supplier capacity could be a constraint on the nuclear revival. It has been estimated that “a single order for a third generation nuclear plant represents 20–40 percent of a component manufacturer’s capacity.”131 However, others, like the iaea, are less pessimistic, because “many other companies established such capacities in preparation for meeting the rising expectations for nuclear power.” For example, Mitsubishi has doubled its industrial capacity for large forgings, and Chinese (Shanghai Electric Group and Dongfang Boiler Group) and Indian (Larsen and Toubro) companies are preparing to enter the market.132 The Uranium Industry In assessments of the degree of consolidation that has occurred in the uranium industry, there is a necessary division between uranium exploration and mining and uranium processing. Uranium, like other natural resources, does not exist equally throughout the world. Table 3.5 calculates the extent of uranium reserves and production around the world. Canada, Australia, and Kazakhstan are responsible for 60 percent of global uranium production. The major uranium mining companies operate in all three of these countries. The top four firms produce approximately 60 percent of all uranium: Cameco (16 percent), Areva (16 percent), KazAtomProm (15 percent), and Rio Tinto (12 percent).133

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After the uranium is mined and milled into yellowcake (a concentrated dry powder), three steps are required to process it into nuclear fuel. First, the raw uranium must be refined and converted. This transforms natural uranium (U3O8) into uranium oxide (UO2) and then into a gas (UF6). At each of these steps, there has been a consolidation of the uranium industry,134 and four companies (Rosatom, Areva, Converdyn, and Cameco) account for about 88 percent of the uranium conversion market. Since conversion capacity is being increased in only two principal ways – a new facility being built by Areva and an expansion of the Converdyn facility – the market dominance of these four firms will increase.135 Second, the uranium needs to be enriched by raising the percentage of the fissile isotope U-235 from 0.72 percent to 3 to 4 percent. (This step is not needed for reactor designs like the candu that use natural uranium.) There are four major enrichment corporations that account for 95 percent of the market (Tenex, Eurodif, Urenco, and the us Enrichment Corporation). Third, there must be the fabrication into fuel pellets that are put in tubes and bundles. There are sixteen fuel fabrication suppliers with operations in eighteen countries, but four of them (Areva, Westinghouse, Global Nuclear Fuel,136 and tvel) have 84 percent of the market share. Earlier in this chapter it was shown how Areva and Rosatom are vertically integrated companies. Other reactor designers are similarly trying to acquire uranium mining and processing companies. For example, KazAtomProm, a nuclear fuel supplier in Kazakhastan, owns 10 percent of Westinghouse (in partnership with Toshiba). This allows Toshiba to expand overseas, with KazAtomProm providing a potential fuel supply source for reactor purchasers. Cameco (70 percent) and Mitsubishi (30 percent) are partners in Kintyre, a new and substantial mining project in Australia. Cameco, through its ownership stake in Bruce Power, was, at one time, interested in purchasing part of aecl. There is also evidence of growing partnerships between uranium companies. Cameco and Areva have partnerships in mines in Australia and Africa. Since 2006, KazAtomProm has had an agreement in principle with Cameco to build a conversion facility in Kazakhstan. Areva, because of a joint venture, is building a new centrifuge facility (centrifuges are critical pieces of equipment for the enrichment process) using Urenco technology. ge-Hitachi and Cameco are jointly working on a new enrichment process using laser separation.137

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C O N S E Q U E N C E S O F T H E G LO B A L N U C L E A R R E V I V A L

The preceding sections of this chapter have fleshed out the key aspects of the global nuclear revival. However, the discussion has been mostly descriptive; it is now time to turn to analyzing the politics. The domestic politics of the global nuclear revival is addressed in chapters 4–7, but there are three international political aspects that need to be examined here: trade, security, and nuclear safety. International Trade Historically, trade protectionism has been a problem in the sale of nuclear reactors. In this respect, the reactor business was not much different from other products of economic activity, especially large industrial products like automobiles and planes. Since the 1970s, largely through the work of the World Trade Organization and various regional trade agreements, there have been significant efforts at liberalizing trade. Liberalization has also occurred in several parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, but it has not been extended to nuclear reactors. There are still some barriers to the trade of uranium and nuclear components, but this is on the export side, not the import side. Export controls have been placed on nuclear materials because of security concerns, not for trade protectionism. Since its creation in the aftermath of the 1974 Indian nuclear test, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has tried to standardize nuclear export controls among its members. This issue will be dealt with in more detail in the following section on non-proliferation. The degree of openness of reactor markets is not the same around the world. In the past, countries with domestic nuclear industries were closed off to foreign competition. The only open markets were in countries without a domestic industry, largely in the developing world. Today, not much has changed. France (Areva), Russia (Rosatom), and Japan (Toshiba, Hitachi, Mitsubishi) possess some of the largest markets for nuclear power; they are also the most protected because of the existence of national champions. Even the us market, which advertises itself as being the most open, shows signs of protectionism. All the 104 reactors in its current fleet were designed by either Westinghouse or ge. Today, the only expected change in the market composition will likely be the arrival of Areva. However, as will be shown below, Areva has had to make significant us invest-

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ments in order to penetrate the market. This leaves the developing world, especially China and India, as the most open markets for reactor sales.138 Even South Korea, which in the past bought technology from Westinghouse, Framatome (now Areva), and aecl, is now a closed market. This is because Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co Ltd (khnp) has created its own reactor design, the Optimised Power Reactor (opr-1000), which is now being built in South Korea and the United Arab Emirates and is being marketed in Indonesia and Vietnam. What is new is that protectionism in the trade of nuclear reactors has become “more sophisticated.”139 Two methods in particular stand out. First is the use of regulatory standards. In theory regulators are technology-neutral, but in reality national regulators tend to possess expertise in the local reactor design, which makes it difficult for different reactor designs to gain regulatory approval without a lot of additional time and money being spent and thus represents a significant barrier to entry. For example, aecl initially tried to get its candu design approved by the nrc in the us. However, it soon backed off when it realized that that there was a high cost to achieving “regulatory parity” with the phwrs.140 The cnsc has also admitted that it has been tougher to approve pwrs than the phwrs that it was more familiar with.141 The second method is the growth of partnerships, even including some cross-ownership, between reactor companies and electricity utilities. The result is that when the utility decides to build a new reactor, it will choose its designated reactor vendor and not conduct an open bid process. The situation in France is a good illustration of the “new” trade protectionism in nuclear reactors. There is a “Team France” approach that combines Areva, Total (an oil and gas firm), edf, and GdF-Suez. The French government has a significant ownership stake in all four. Beyond the joint partnerships in specific nuclear projects, there are also cross-ownerships between the companies, with Total owning 1 percent of Areva and Areva owning 1 percent of GdF-Suez. France is obviously an inaccessible market for any competing nuclear firm, but Team France is trying to extend its protected market to the rest of the eu. According to nuclear insiders edf and GdF-Suez, “by buying up utilities,” the French have “cornered the European market.”142 When edf and GdF-Suez look to expand electricity capacity, they will focus on nuclear power, and there will not be an open bid process; they are likely to select Areva’s epr. Beyond the partnerships with edf and

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GdF-Suez, Areva has other major advantages in Europe. It is a local company with intimate knowledge of the market and access to politicians, and it is in the euro currency zone. Team France is seeking to enhance these inherent advantages by attempting to standardize nuclear regulations in the eu, but based on epr technology. This factor will make it difficult for competing nuclear firms to access the entire eu market.143 Team France talks as if the United States is an open market for nuclear reactors, but its actions show that it perceives the United States to be as closed as France. This is why it has pursued the same strategy in the United States as in Europe: using edf and GdF-Suez to buy up electricity utilities to build eprs without a competitive bid process. For example, edf’s purchase of almost half of Constellation Energy paved the way for building four new nuclear reactors in the United States, starting with a new nuclear unit at Calvert Cliffs, Maryland. These units will obviously be eprs.144 Areva even changed the name of its new reactor from a European Power Reactor to an Evolutionary Power Reactor in order to make it more appealing to an American audience. The high percentage of state-owned reactor companies, such as Rosatom, Areva, aecl, and khnp, is a simple but powerful symbol of the state of trade protectionism in the nuclear reactor’s arena. The question is why does protectionism in the nuclear reactor trade still linger? First, despite some recent efforts at deregulation (largely in North America and Britain), electricity is still regarded in most jurisdictions as a natural monopoly. This means that it is often treated as a public good that is not solely in the domain of market forces. Second, electricity generation is often viewed by states as an instrument of economic and industrial development. Third, nuclear power involves very high economies of scale, with large amounts of both upfront costs and electricity production. Fourth, there are important aspects of public policy – namely national security, safety, and the environment – strongly associated with nuclear power. For example, Ipsos Reid, in a survey of Canadians, reported that “nuclear energy is simply too important an element of public infrastructure and too expensive with too long term a pay-off to expect the private sector to adequately support it, ensure its safety or consider the national security implications of its proliferation.”145 Fifth, public opinion supports economic nationalism when it comes to the nuclear sector. For example, 84 percent of Canadians said that it was “important that the

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nuclear technology used in Canada be retained in companies owned and controlled by Canadians.”146 Nuclear Non-proliferation Sharon Squassoni has noted that “a defining feature of nuclear energy, in contrast to other electricity sources, is the risk that fissile material, equipment, facilities, and expertise can be misused to develop nuclear weapons. No other type of electricity-generating plant requires international inspections to detect diversion of material.”147 Therefore, the question is whether the global nuclear revival will increase the proliferation of nuclear weapons? For some, the issue has already been decided. Jose Goldemberg has determined that the “nuclear renaissance is already undermining the npt.”148 On the other hand, John Ritch, director general of the wna has responded that “the global non-proliferation and safeguards system – one of the greatest achievements in diplomatic history – effectively curtails any link between civil and military programmes, and actually helps to detect and deter illicit nuclear activity … Most fundamentally, whatever proliferation risk we face would be unaffected even by a 20-fold increase in the global use of safeguarded nuclear reactors to produce clean energy.”149 Nevertheless, it is clear, as Miller and Sagan put it, that “the expansion of nuclear power, the future of nuclear weapons disarmament, and the future of the npt and related parts of the nuclear control regime are so intertwined.”150 Several arguments link nuclear proliferation with the global nuclear revival. Despite elaborate safeguards by the iaea, the proliferation of nuclear weapons is tied into civilian programs in two respects: people and technology. An expansion of the civilian side creates a cadre of technically sophisticated scientists and engineers who, with some extra effort, have the potential of migrating to the military side. On the technology side, there are concerns that the revival will increase the amount of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (heu), the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons. The cause of this increase is a reliance on spent fuel reprocessing and enrichment technology. After going through a reactor, spent fuel – also called nuclear waste – still retains about 96 percent uranium. Reprocessing is a chemical process to recover usable uranium from spent fuel by separating the uranium from the other by-products of the fission process (plutonium and other minor actinides). Unfortu-

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nately, the process also separates the plutonium from the rest of the waste. The benefits of reprocessing are that it provides a hedge against a uranium shortage, more efficient use of uranium, and the reduction of nuclear waste. The fear is that reprocessing increases the availability of plutonium. However, there is a major difference between weaponsgrade plutonium and reactor-grade plutonium. Weapons-grade plutonium, which is specifically designed for use in nuclear bombs, is 93 percent Pu-239. Reactor-grade plutonium, found in a reactor’s spent fuel, is 60–70 percent Pu-239 and contains other plutonium isotopes that reduce its attractiveness as a weapons material and are almost impossible to separate. Reactor-grade plutonium can be used as the fissile material for a nuclear weapon, but it requires “sufficient ingenuity, expertise, expense, personal health risk, and luck.”151 Countries that have reprocessing technology include France, India, Japan, and Russia. China has a pilot program, but the United Kingdom is on the verge of abandoning reprocessing. The United States has not reprocessed since President Carter issued a 1978 moratorium precisely because of proliferation risks. Enrichment involves increasing the amount of U-235 (0.72 percent) that naturally occurs in uranium: light water reactors use slightly enriched uranium (U-235 that is enriched to around 3–5 percent), research reactors require more highly enriched uranium (U-235 that is enriched to more than 20 percent), and nuclear weapons require very highly enriched uranium (U-235 that is enriched to over 90 percent). Uranium is enriched either by gaseous diffusion or centrifuge technology. Both these processes work on the principle of separating the lighter U-235 from the heavier U-238 when in the form of uranium hexafluoride gas. Uranium enrichment is a very complex process, and acquiring the sufficient expertise is not an easy proposition. The problem is ensuring that countries have access to nuclear fuel – enriched uranium – but are prevented from developing an enrichment capability. Obtaining an enrichment facility would allow a country, albeit with some technical difficulty, to go from low enriched uranium, used for power production, to highly enriched uranium, used for weapons production. Countries that currently have some form of enrichment technology include Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To help prevent proliferation, the g-8 established a 2006 moratorium on countries with enrichment technologies. There have been initiatives by both the iaea

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and the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (gnep)152 to establish multilateral control of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing technology. At the moment, these efforts have been unsuccessful because they would contradict the principle of Article IV of the npt, which allows all parties to the treaty “the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” As a result, the biggest deterrent for states seeking an enrichment capability is the technological sophistication and associated costs required. It is simply cheaper and easier to purchase nuclear fuel from an existing enrichment facility. A related concern is that sensitive dual-use items, like reprocessing and enrichment technology, will proliferate through black market networks based on those assembled by A.Q. Khan. Given the impact that A.Q. Khan has had on nuclear proliferation, it is important for his story to be briefly told. It begins in 1971 when Pakistan was humiliated by the Indian army, leading to the loss of East Pakistan and the creation of the new state of Bangladesh. Three years later, in 1974, the Indians would shock the world by testing a nuclear bomb. These twin events would unleash a young Pakistani scientist in Europe on the path towards nuclear espionage. A.Q. Khan, motivated by a complex cocktail of nationalism, religious fervour, and greed would steal nuclear blueprints and equipment from employers in Belgium, Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. His goal was to produce a nuclear bomb for Pakistan. Kahn would then move back to Pakistan and create, with the support of Pakistani politicians and senior military officers, Khan’s Research Laboratories. As his nuclear expertise increased, Khan went from importer to exporter and built up an elaborate global network that would sell centrifuge machines (the essential tool for enriching uranium), technical designs, and nuclear weapons designs to Iran, Libya, North Korea, and other countries. American and British intelligence had been tracking the Khan network for years, but it took the catastrophic 9/11 terrorist attacks to lead them to initiate a concerted effort to unravel it. A major break came in 2003 when Libyan leader Muammar Qadaffi agreed to end his nuclear weapons program. In 2004, after extreme pressure was applied by American president George W. Bush and British prime minister Tony Blair, Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf placed Khan under house arrest. Arrests of Khan’s associates around the world followed, and nuclear facilities in Pakistan, South Africa, and Malaysia

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were closed. Important information about Iran’s nuclear program also came out when the Khan network was shut down. In the last several years of his operation, Khan took full advantage of the technological revolution by relying on digital means to disseminate his designs. Thus, while the Khan network has been largely rolled up, the digital copies may still be floating around the world. The iaea has been tasked with finding all the copies of Khan’s nuclear designs. According to the iaea’s Olli Heinone “we are talking to people who made copies and … trying to get from them a list of who got it.”153 Obviously, in a world of internet transfers this is an impossible job. Future nuclear weapons networks will be even tougher to corral because of the “combination of the availability of dual-use machines, the globalization of production capacity, and the availability of computerized designs.”154 The non-proliferation system that the iaea and nsg put in place was designed to prevent the spread of dual-use nuclear technology from Western states to developing world countries. Since that time, however, a wider array of countries has developed nuclear technology; it has therefore become much harder to stop these countries from exporting their nuclear know-how to others. Aspiring weapons states can simply buy, share, and sell technology amongst themselves, rather than starting programs from scratch, importing materials, or stealing plans from the West, as Khan and Pakistan were forced to do. Even the exposure of the Khan network is unlikely to stop the growth of these activities. Secondary proliferation is a major worry, particularly when states like North Korea, Syria, and Iran are involved. It has the capacity to shatter the existing non-proliferation system.155 Critics also worry that nuclear facilities, which would naturally increase as part of the global nuclear revival, are prime targets for terrorist attacks. Graham Allison, a prominent international relations expert at Harvard, has written about the different ways that nuclear terrorism could occur. The ones that are relevant to nuclear power plants – as opposed to the security of nuclear weapons – include planes hitting containment domes or storage sites for spent fuel rods; starting fires at a nuclear power plant to disperse radiation; using conventional explosives wrapped around with radioactive material to produce a “dirty bomb”; and stealing spent fuel waste that could be separated to make a nuclear weapon.156 The terrorist fears that Allison documents in great detail are indeed frightening, especially the fears regarding the theft of nuclear weap-

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ons; however, in the case of nuclear power facilities, he has greatly exaggerated the threat. If spent fuel from a reactor was stolen, it would also require elaborate separation technology to convert it to the plutonium that is needed for a nuclear bomb. A further deterrent to theft is the fact that a terrorist group would have to steal many spent fuel bundles to acquire enough reactor-grade plutonium to convert into a bomb and it would have to deal somehow with the deadly irradiation field surrounding the bundles. As Jeremy Whitlock has pointed out, “this would require 100 spent fuel bundles, weighing two tonnes without shielding. Not only would the theft be extremely difficult, but since it would also be easily and quickly detected, it would be followed by the necessary evasion of a top-priority manhunt employing most likely the full resources of the country’s security infrastructure.”157 John Mueller, in his comprehensive rebuttal to Allison, similarly concludes that “it is not clear that any terrorist groups really want the weapons or are remotely capable of obtaining them should the desire to do so take hold of them. If they try, there are a host of practical and organizational difficulties that make their likelihood of success vanishingly small.”158 Fears about terrorist attacks also ignore the fact that there are stringent safeguards enforced by the iaea on nuclear facilities. Even before 9/11, “nuclear plants represent[ed] hardened targets and already had strong security forces in place.” The containment structure, part of the defence-in-depth strategy for reactor safety, is simultaneously also a very effective defence against sabotage or terrorism. In the 1980s, Ontario Hydro determined that even in the extremely unlikely event that a 747 jumbo jet was able to successfully hit a candu plant, there would be no significant damage, because of the facility’s very thick reinforced concrete and steel roofs and walls. The pool water that immerses the spent fuel rods would act as an additional security barrier from falling debris. Finally, all reactors are designed to automatically shut down in the event of a physical attack.159 After 9/11, the iaea and domestic nuclear regulatory agencies increased their already tough guidelines for the security of nuclear facilities. In March 2002, the iaea’s Board of Governors, in cooperation with its member states, approved an action plan designed to prevent nuclear terrorism that emphasized the physical protection of nuclear materials.160 As part of this plan, the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (cppnm) was amended in 2005, although it has yet to come into force. An additional treaty, the Inter-

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national Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism came into force in 2007. In April 2010, the United States hosted a gathering of forty-seven world leaders to discuss ways of securing nuclear sites from terrorists. The leaders agreed to the goals of coming to a common understanding of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and taking effective measures to secure all “loose nukes” within four years and to prevent nuclear smuggling. A detailed work plan was established and progress was reviewed at a follow-up conference in South Korea in 2012. The work plan included increased funding for the iaea and support for the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Several countries, such as Ukraine, Russia, and the United States, agreed to dispose of large quantities of highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium.161 National regulatory bodies have followed suit by strengthening their own regulations. For example, the cnsc amended its Nuclear Security Regulations to include the following provisions: better threat and risk assessment; a permanent on-site armed response force at major nuclear facilities; enhanced security screening of employees and contractors; enhanced access control to nuclear facilities, including reactors, uranium refineries, and fuel fabricators; development of basic threat analysis for nuclear facilities; uninterrupted power supplies for alarm systems; and contingency planning involving drills and exercises. The cnsc also monitors its licensees to ensure that they are compliant with these new enhanced security regulations.162 In short, if the possibility of major radioactivity or weapons proliferation because of a terrorist act against a nuclear power facility was remote before 9/11, the steps taken by the world’s nuclear community in the last few years have made it even more remote. What about the new entrants to the global nuclear revival? It has been suggested that there are particular vulnerabilities for many of the aspiring nuclear power states, since there is a clear link between stable democracy and nuclear non-proliferation. Many developing countries, which make up the vast majority of the aspiring nuclear power states list, lack “domestic ‘good governance’ characteristics that will encourage proper nuclear operations and management.” These characteristics include low degrees of corruption, high degrees of political stability, high government effectiveness scores, and strong regulatory competence.163 There is also a concern about their willing-

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ness and ability to accept iaea safeguards, which are the principal mechanism by which the legally binding obligations contained in the npt are monitored. Unfortunately, as Miller and Sagan point out, “each known or strongly suspected case of a government starting a secret nuclear weapons program was undertaken by a non-democratic government.”164 Consider the record of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Before the democratization processes in Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and South Africa, these countries also pursued a nuclear weapons program. On the list of aspiring nuclear power states are many non-democratic countries: Algeria, Belarus, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. Ultimately these concerns all have the same solution: maintaining and strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In particular, the iaea safeguards system needs to be enhanced in order to respond to the global nuclear revival. International safeguards place technical barriers and political disincentives on states and groups that seek nuclear weapons.165 As the situations in Iran and North Korea have shown, the iaea cannot enforce nuclear non-proliferation, but it has been more than capable of sounding the alarm. There are some proposals for strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. First, more states should ratify the iaea’s Additional Protocol, which enhances safeguards by allowing the iaea to conduct surprise inspections of nuclear facilities, inspect both declared and undeclared facilities, rely on iaea member states’ intelligence information, take environmental samples, and take other measures designed to reveal illicit nuclear activities.166 The following are existing and aspiring nuclear power countries where, as of October 2011, the iaea’s Additional Protocol is not yet in force: Algeria, Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam, and Venezuela.167 The nsg should add support for the further ratification of the Additional Protocol by making it a condition for any nuclear transfers. Second, it should be made easier for the iaea to better utilize its scarce resources by allowing it to prioritize its inspections. Why should the iaea divert resources from suspect states like North Korea and Iran so that it can monitor Canada and Sweden? The challenge is to balance the issues of sovereignty and non-discrimination with the realization that some states are more likely to try to violate their non-proliferation commitments. The iaea took a step forward when it adopted the concept of Inte-

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grated Safeguards in 2002. That concept gives the iaea more flexibility to optimize safeguards implementation on a state-by-state basis for those states that have both a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and its Additional Protocol in force. For example, Canada is now under Integrated Safeguards, “which means that the iaea has concluded that we have not diverted anywhere in our infrastructure (a conclusion they have to renew annually) and therefore the inspection frequency can be relaxed – making use of less frequent, unannounced inspections, and lengthening the time between verification requirements.”168 In this way, Integrated Safeguards provides for the implementation of iaea inspections to be consistent across countries, and there is a rigorous process for qualifying and implementing Integrated Safeguards. By January 2010 there were close to fifty states were under Integrated Safeguards, and several of them were non-nuclearweapons states with large civilian nuclear programs, states such as Canada, Germany, and Japan.169 The Integrated Safeguards system has cleared up some resources for the iaea to inspect other, more problematic, countries. A 2007 study of Integrated Safeguards found the program has increased the iaea’s efficiency and effectiveness. In particular, the program has been beneficial in three ways: •

•

•

It is helping to reduce the overall verification burden on the iaea Secretariat and its member states; It is increasing the national verification capacity of participating countries; and It is strengthening the Agency’s ability to carry out its verification mission.170

Third, the iaea must receive substantially more financial and human resources in order to handle the global nuclear revival. The iaea, as the report of the International Commission on Nuclear NonProliferation and Disarmament concluded, “has insufficient resources, in terms of both money and qualified manpower, for the specifically non-proliferation tasks it must be able to do.”171 This shortfall was primarily due to a combination of a budget that experienced zero real growth since the early 1980s and increased responsibilities. The Zedillo Commission on the Role of the iaea asserted that “a substantial increase in iaea resources for safeguards is urgently required. iaea member states should provide the funds needed to ensure that the effectiveness of safeguards is not compromised by lack of

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resources.”172 According to Jeremy Whitlock, aecl’s international safeguards representative, “the iaea will be seriously challenged if its resources stay effectively flat. It has found ways to “work smarter” with safeguards, but with the predicted increase in not only the numbers of reactors, but the types, its safeguards regime will need to become much more efficient. Fortunately there has been an increase in states helping the iaea in this regard. Canada has consistently contributed to improvements in efficiency (and effectiveness) over the years. The US Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (ngsi) is a major recent entry to this effort.”173 Fourth, the nsg needs to increase its membership to include India, which has become important in the international nuclear sector, and its exports will only increase with the global nuclear revival. Therefore it only makes sense that India should adhere to the export controls established by the nsg. India has been strongly opposed to the nsg, seeing it as a cartel designed to keep nuclear materials out of Indian hands. This impression was not unreasonable given that the nsg was created explicitly after India’s 1974 nuclear weapons test; however, Indian and nsg attitudes have recently changed because in September 2008, the nsg passed a waiver allowing its members to transfer nuclear materials to India, even though it had not signed the npt. The decision to grant the waiver should make it easier for India to join the nsg. Nuclear Safety It is essential that any spread of civilian nuclear technology accompanying the global nuclear revival is safe and secure. The safety record of nuclear power worldwide has been very high, but there are concerns, related primarily to the accidents at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima-Daiichi, that continue to haunt the industry. However, as was described in chapter 2, nobody died as a result of the nuclear accidents at Three Mile Island and Fukushima-Daiichi. Chernobyl was much more tragic, but even there the death toll was less than at major hydroelectric accidents or coal mine disasters.174 It must also be stated that these three nuclear accidents occurred within a three decades and that in contrast, coal mine disasters and pipeline explosions are still occurring at a rate of more than one per year. Experts in the United States, using Probabilistic Risk Assessment, have estimated that reactor core damage is likely to occur less than once in ten thousand reactor-years.175

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Nuclear reactor safety is the responsibility of designers, operators, and regulators. Designers need to include extensive safety features in their reactors. There are built in safety redundancies – known as the suspenders-and-belt approach – to ensure that the reactor is automatically shut down in the case of an accident. This approach includes passive devices that do not require an operator to shut down a reactor in case of danger. In addition, a major feature of all reactors is the containment dome, which is designed to prevent the release of radiation. The New Generation III+ reactors that are being built as part of the revival have even more enhanced safety features. Operators need to be vigilant in ensuring that the reactor operates as intended and that there are no accidents. To assist nuclear operators in the dedication to safety, a peer review system led by two industry associations has been established. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (inpo) was formed by us nuclear operators in 1979 after the Three Mile Island accident. inpo has improved American nuclear safety by setting performance standards, conducting safety inspections, and sharing best practices. The World Association of Nuclear Operators (wano) was formed in 1989 by international nuclear operators after the Chernobyl accident. wano provides peer reviews of reactor safety, conducts technical-support missions, compiles safety indications, and offers professional development activities such as workshops, seminars, and training courses. These peer groups will be essential resources for aspiring nuclear power states. Regulators independently monitor the safety performance of operators. In fact, nuclear power, more so than any other energy source, is heavily regulated to prevent and mitigate accidents. There are international efforts, led by the iaea, to ensure reactor safety. For example, the 1996 Convention on Nuclear Safety established international safety standards which were maintained through a peer review system. Since 1982, the iaea has also offered a peer review service called the Operational Safety Review Teams (osart). Regulators also have formed their own associations. The International Nuclear Regulatory Association (inra) was formed in 1997 by Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. inra’s purpose is to influence and enhance nuclear safety, from the regulatory perspective, among its members. The Nuclear Energy Agency (nea), part of the oecd, is another association with some regulatory responsibilities. The nea has twentyeight members, among which are many of the leading nuclear power

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countries in the world. The nea’s Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (mdep) is a multinational initiative taken by national safety authorities to develop innovative approaches to leveraging the resources and knowledge of the national regulatory authorities who will be tasked with the review of new reactor power plant designs; its aim is to harmonize safety goals. The mdep program incorporates a broad range of activities, such as enhanced multilateral co-operation within existing regulatory frameworks; multinational convergence of codes, standards and safety goals; and the implementation of mdep products to facilitate licensing of new reactors, including those being developed by the Generation IV International Forum.176 Both the inra and the nea operate the same way for regulators as wano does for operators. There has also been greater coordination between national regulators. According to a cnsc official, “this is relatively new. While the regulatory network has always existed, the scale and volume of the interactions has substantially increased. This has occurred in response to the nuclear renaissance.”177 The result of efforts by designers, operators, and regulators, is that, as the Zedillo Commission recognized, “a wide range of safety indicators make clear that nuclear safety in many countries has improved significantly since the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents.”178 Similarly, Trevor Findlay, after a comprehensive review of the safety literature using three different methodologies (historical experience, probabilistic risk assessment, and deterministic safety analysis) was “reassure[ed]” by the safety record of nuclear reactors.179 In comparing the number of deaths, nuclear power has a safety record that is better than any other major energy source (see table 3.6). wano has been tracking reactor safety for almost two decades. In 1990, there were 5.2 accidents per 200,000 hours worked, but this had declined to 0.92 by 2008. There has also been a noticeable decline in radiation exposure across all types of nuclear reactors.180 The iaea has stated that “the international nuclear safety regime over the years has produced many insights on how to minimize safety risks. But we should not rest on our laurels. It is essential that existing safety standards, operational practices and regulatory oversight be adapted – and in some cases strengthened – to ensure enhanced levels of safety in the future.”181 Another way of illustrating the increased safety of nuclear reactors, both their design and their operation, is by highlighting the dramatic improvement in the capacity factor of the world’s reactors. According to wano, the capacity (or capability) factor “is the percentage of

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Table 3.6 Comparing Fatal Accidents across Energy Sources (1969–2000) Energy Source

Accidents

Direct Fatalities

Coal Oil Natural Gas Liquefied Petroleum Gas Hydro Nuclear Reactor

1,221 397 125 105 11 1

25,107 20,283 1,978 3,921 29,938 31

Source: Australia, “Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy,” 2006, 77.

maximum energy generation that a plant is capable of supplying to the electrical grid, limited only by factors within control of plant management. A high unit capability factor indicates effective plant programmes and practices to minimise unplanned energy losses and to optimize planned outages.”182 Although the capacity factor measures the efficiency of a reactor, it is also a good proxy for measuring safety, because the more efficient a reactor is the safer it is. In 1990, the global capacity factor was 77.2 percent, but by 2008 this had climbed to 86.3 percent.183 The biggest improvement has been in the United States. In the 1970s and early 1980s, measures were under 60 percent, but today they have surpassed the 90 percent mark. This improvement has resulted from a number of factors that are directly related to the global nuclear revival. First, the consolidation of reactor operators has been a factor because, simply put, the current roster of operators are better. The us nuclear industry has gradually “overhaul[ed] (and standardiz[ed]) reactor control systems for existing plants, with the aim of simplifying operator training and reducing operator error. This approach, together with extensive preventive maintenance programs, has led the us nuclear industry over the past two decades to outstanding performance in both human safety and reactor availability (presently averaging well over 90 percent).184 Second, inpo and wano have played a role through the uniform application of best practices.185 The global nuclear revival has been in place for the last couple of years through both new reactor construction and life extension projects. Yet, contrary to those who predicted a decline in safety, the statistics for industrial accidents, radiation exposure, and capacity factor continue to improve.

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Richard Meserve identifies two potential dangers associated with the global nuclear revival. First, new entrants “have limited experience with nuclear energy, and nearly all lack the extensive national infrastructure common in most countries currently with npps.” 186 For this reason France created an international nuclear cooperation agency – L’Agence France Nucléaire International (afni) – to “help foreign countries prepare the institutional, human and technical environment necessary for installation of a civilian nuclear program under conditions of safety, security and nonproliferation.”187 Second, many existing reactors are having their life extended to sixty or eighty years; however, “the continuing operation of older plants requires careful attention over time to surveillance, preventive maintenance, and component replacement.”188 In both cases, the peer support network provided by wano, the iaea, inpo, the nea, and the inra will be crucial. CONCLUSION

The purpose of this chapter was to give a good overview of the global nuclear revival before turning to the domestic case studies. It did so by describing the revival, focusing on new builds, the life extension of existing reactors, and the growing public support for nuclear power. It also explained the drivers behind the revival: increased demand for electricity, climate change, and energy security. Then it identified the structural changes – consolidation of the nuclear industry across the entire nuclear fuel cycle – that have accompanied the revival. Finally, it assessed the trade, security, and safety consequences of the revival. Clearly the global nuclear revival is real, and its effects are being felt across the world. Its effects on Canada are coming up next.

Introduction

PA R T T W O

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4 Ontario

N U C L E A R H I S TO R Y

Canada’s nuclear sector began in World War II through its participation in the Manhattan Project. C.J. Mackenzie, who was president of the National Research Council during the war, affirmed in 1961 that Canada’s participation in the project with the United States and Great Britain allowed it to get in “on the ground floor of a great technological process for the first time in Canadian history.”1 The Manhattan Project was a weapons program designed to construct atomic bombs to be used against the enemy states of Germany and Japan. Canada’s major research contributions were a laboratory established at the Université de Montréal in August 1942 and two heavy water research reactors built at Chalk River, Ontario (about 200 kilometres northwest of Ottawa). The Montreal lab, which included both Canadian and British scientists, conducted research into the measurements and theoretical analyses of the nuclear properties of heavy water, uranium, and graphite. There were frequent scientific exchanges with the American laboratory teams assembled in New York, Chicago, and California. The research reactor, the Zero Energy Experimental Pile (zeep) became operational in 1945. zeep, the first operational nuclear reactor built outside the United States, was intended to produce plutonium for the atomic bombs. A full-scale heavy water research reactor, the Nuclear Research X-perimental (nrx), became operational in 1947. At the time, it was widely considered to be the most powerful research reactor in the world, and it would continue to serve the needs of nuclear scientists and engineers for the next four decades.

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Canada’s development of nuclear technology was the result of wartime imperatives. The Manhattan Project must be viewed in the context of the larger war effort against the Axis powers. However, just as other wartime inventions had civilian applications, for example, radar and synthetic rubber, so too was nuclear technology not restricted to military uses. Hiroshima and Nagasaki may have demonstrated the military applications of the atom, but there was also widespread agreement, especially in Canada, that there could be tremendous civilian uses, primarily as an almost inexhaustible energy source. According to C.D. Howe, Canada’s powerful “minister of everything,” “the real significance does not lie in the fact that this new bomb has accomplished an almost incredible feat of destruction, important as that fact may be; its significance is that this bomb is a sign which all can appreciate that the basic problems of the release of energy by atomic fission have been solved, and that the unbelievably large amounts of energy which scientists have long believed to be associated with matter can now be made available for practical use.”2 World War II finally ended in 1945, but there was no question that Canada would continue the drive to exploit the atom. Its political leaders, most notably C.D. Howe, were determined not to lose the unique technological advantage that it had acquired during the war. So, attention quickly turned to electricity production. Canada decided to pursue a nuclear power reactor based on a heavy-water, naturaluranium design, for several key reasons. First, Canada possessed a rich reservoir of uranium deposits in the Northwest Territories (at Great Bear Lake, later known as Port Radium) and in Ontario (Port Hope and Elliot Lake). Second, the use of natural uranium would avoid the costly construction of a uranium enrichment facility. Third, Canada, through the Manhattan Project, had already developed a cadre of nuclear scientists and engineers with a significant body of technical knowledge related to heavy water reactors. Finally, and not unimportantly, there was a strong desire to develop an independent nuclear system from the Americans and the British. In 1947, following the completion of the zeep and nrx projects, the scientists at Chalk River proposed that Canada design and build an even more powerful research reactor: the Nuclear Research Universal (nru). The decision to spend over $26 million (a significant sum at the time) on another research reactor was to ensure that Canada maintained an operational reactor. What would happen if the nrx were to suffer an accident (as it did in 1947 and, more seriously, in

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1952)? Moreover, nobody knew at the time what the lifespan of a research reactor was. Was it ten years, or only five? If Canada was left for a long period without a working reactor, the team of scientists and engineers, which had painstakingly been put together, would be left idle. In this situation, there was a good chance that this critical mass of nuclear knowledge would be broken up, and Canada’s independent nuclear research program would be disbanded. A second reactor was necessary if Canada was to remain at the forefront of atomic energy development. After much negotiation within the government, approval for the nru was finally given in January 1951. It would suffer start-up and construction delays, foreshadowing future problems with the candu design, before it finally went critical in 1957. Despite some controversial shut-downs in 2007 and 2009, the nru is still operational today. Although similar to the nrx in size and basic operating design, it had a number of important new features: “it would have a closed cooling system, operate at a higher temperature, and, most importantly, have an on-power refueling mechanism, which meant that fuel rods could be replaced without interrupting operation of the reactor.”3 The decision to build the nru was a momentous one in Canada’s nuclear history because it was the first major development that was not part of its wartime commitment. By setting aside the necessary funds to build the nru, Ottawa provided a visible sign that Canada would develop and support an indigenous nuclear technology. In fact, the nru was the first purely Canadian-designed reactor; the nrx had entailed a joint Canadian-British collaboration. Robert Bothwell, who was commissioned to write a history of aecl, has argued that the nru “kept Canada in the nuclear game, a fully paid-up participant in the small international club of atomic powers. It allowed independence and reciprocity with the Americans and the British; if Canada were not in the ‘big leagues’ that some dreamed of, then surely it occupied a very solid middle position without the expense and complications that a weapons program entailed.”4 By the early 1950s, it was evident that the next stage in Canada’s nuclear development was designing a reactor for generating electricity. Although Canada’s initial foray into nuclear matters was based in Montreal, the scene soon shifted to Ontario. Ontario would become the focal point of Canada’s nuclear sector owing to a strong partnership between the federal government and the province. Ontario would become the lead nuclear province for a number of reasons. As

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a result of war production in World War II, Ontario went through a period of rapid industrialization. In those days, electricity development was the sole domain of government and industry. Electricity sources were determined by resource availability, economic cost, and job production. Electricity generation was about finding a source with the lowest consumer rates. The provinces, which had constitutional jurisdiction over energy, used provincial power utilities as their primary industrial development strategy. Attracting industry – for example, aluminum smelters in Quebec and automobiles and steel in Ontario – required low electricity rates. Ontario’s problem was that by the late 1940s it had run out of domestic sources of electricity to fuel its industrial base. It also had the problem of being an electricalsystem island of 25 Hz in a North American continent that was working at 60 Hz. This meant Ontario had to go through frequency harmonization in the late 1940s and early 1950s when it decided to convert the entire province to 60 Hz. This huge program was done at great cost. Ontario had relied on its hydroelectric power for its electricity needs, but by the late 1940s there was no new easily accessible large-scale hydroelectric capacity, so it built coal-generating stations. However, Ontario had no coal and had to import it from the United States or from distant parts of Canada (the Atlantic and Prairie regions). This meant that coal was expensive, and there was not always a reliable supply. In contrast to expensive rail transport across Canada, us coal was shipped relatively inexpensively across the Great Lakes. Unfortunately, the Great Lakes would freeze during the winter. In addition, Ontario was vulnerable to escalating coal prices and helpless in the face of frequent coal miner strikes in the United States. As Canada’s largest industrial province, and in dire need for electricity, the province of Ontario decided, in conjunction with the federal government, to pursue nuclear power.5 Canadian-Ontarian nuclear cooperation led to a partnership between aecl, Ontario Hydro, and Canadian General Electric (cge) to develop a made-in-Canada power reactor. The aecl-Ontario Hydro partnership, as Robert Bothwell has pointed out, was “central to the development of Canada’s nuclear industry.”6 Since aecl was a Crown corporation created in 1952 with the mandate to develop the peaceful uses of nuclear power, it took over responsibility for the Chalk River laboratories. According to Howe, aecl was established to “relieve the National Research Council of responsibilities that have become more industrial than research and … concentrate the man-

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agement in one agency charged solely with responsibility for expediting development in this expanding field.”7 aecl had recognized that a power reactor was crucial if “Canada is to hold her position in this new field.”8 The federal Cabinet approved the building of a demonstration power reactor in 1955. Seven years later, Canada’s first power reactor, and the prototype for the candu, the 20-megawatt Nuclear Power Demonstration (npd) plant, went into commercial operation. The npd was built near Chalk River and operated for twenty-five years before being decommissioned in 1987. The npd was a crucial stage in the development of the candu. As Fawcett has noted, “all the elements defining the distinctive candu reactor type – natural-uranium fuel, heavy-water moderator and coolant, horizontal zircaloy pressure tubes, and a bidirectional fuelling method – were first brought together in npd.”9 This project was shortly followed by a larger prototype, the 200megawatt Douglas Point station on Lake Huron (site of the current Bruce nuclear power station), which went into service in 1968. Douglas Point was also a cooperative effort between aecl and Ontario Hydro. aecl was responsible for the reactor design and construction of the plant’s nuclear section. Ontario Hydro was in charge of the construction of the conventional parts of the plant and would operate the plant. Private sector firms, most of them Canadian, would supply the components for the reactor in a competitive bid process. The Douglas Point station was the first reactor to be called a candu, and it, along with the success of the npd, showed that the heavywater model was a viable technology in large-scale power reactors. Although Douglas Point operated for twenty years, it was not problem-free. As Bothwell noted, “it was frequently ‘down,’ more than half the time between 1968 and 1971. Its pumps and valves were difficult to get at. Repairs were difficult, time-consuming, and costly. Because vital components were in congested and inaccessible locations, usually because of attempts to minimize the ‘hold up’ of heavy water in systems, repairs had to be done by remote control or by large teams, each member of which could stay only a short time in the ‘active’ part of the reactor.”10 As the candu prototype, lessons were learned from it, and future reactors would be improved. The benefits of the Douglas Point learning curve would be enjoyed with the Pickering reactors. The future candu design was now set, and Ontario would soon tie itself into nuclear technology as the major source of its electricity.

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With two prototypes under their belt, it was time to move to a much bigger stage. A four-unit power station built at Pickering, a Toronto suburb on the shores of Lake Ontario, with each reactor generating 500 mw, was announced in 1964. Once again, there was an explicit partnership between Ottawa and Ontario with the federal government’s share at 54 percent and the Ontario government’s share at 46 percent. In contrast to Douglas Point, which was owned by aecl, Ontario Hydro would own the Pickering reactor and all subsequent reactors built in the province. All four units of Pickering a would come on stream between 1971 and 1973. Pickering a was a technical and financial success, and in the words of Bothwell, it was “one of the best and most reliable” reactor systems “in the world” and “one of the cheapest.”11 McConnell convincingly demonstrates, using a Levelized Unit Energy Cost, that by 1989 “the cost of electricity generated in Ontario Hydro nuclear generating stations was amongst the lowest in the world.” Further comparisons with electricity generated by hydro or fossil fuels in other Canadian provinces and the United States found that costs in Ontario were largely cheaper.12 Pickering a would soon be followed up in the 1970s and 1980s with more multi-unit nuclear stations (Pickering b, Bruce, and Darlington). (See table 4.1 for the evolution of nuclear reactors in Ontario.) In the mid-1970s, public attention towards nuclear energy started to increase, so in 1975 the Ontario government launched the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning (known as the Porter Commission, after its Chairman Dr Arthur Porter, an engineering professor at the University of Toronto). This exhaustive study was to look at long-range electricity planning for the 1983–93 period and was explicitly mandated to consider energy, environmental, and socio-economic factors. The nuclear sector was well represented in its public hearings across the province and both industry and anti-nuclear groups provided detailed submissions. The interim report, titled A Race against Time, was published in 1978 and suggested that Ontario cut back on building nuclear reactors.13 However, the Porter Commission’s final report in 1980 reversed its previous position and cautiously supported “nuclear generated electricity as a major means of meeting Ontario’s energy needs.”14 Darlington, the last set of reactors built, has become infamous for construction delays and multi-billion-dollar cost overruns. A plant with four candu-6 reactors on the shore of Lake Ontario about seventy kilometres east of Toronto, Darlington was approved in 1977 and

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Table 4.1 Evolution of Nuclear Reactors in Ontario Reactor

Type

On-line

Current Status

zeep nrx nru npd Douglas Point Pickering a-1 Pickering a-2 Pickering a-3 Pickering a-4 Bruce a-1 Bruce a-2 Bruce a-3 Bruce a-4 Pickering b-1 Pickering b-2 Pickering b-3 Pickering b-4 Bruce b-1 Bruce b-2 Bruce b-3 Bruce b-4 Darlington 1 Darlington 2 Darlington 3 Darlington 4

Research Research Research candu Prototype candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu candu

1945 1947 1957 1962 1968 1971 1971 1972 1973 1977 1977 1978 1979 1983 1984 1985 1986 1985 1984 1986 1987 1992 1990 1993 1993

Decommissioned (1973) Decommissioning (1992) Operational Shut down (1987) Shut down (1984) Operational Long-term shut down (1997) Long-term shut down (1997) Operational Refurbishment Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational Operational

construction began in 1981. The reactors were supposed to come online in 1985–88, but were delayed until 1990–93. More disturbing is the fact that the eventual cost was $14.5 billion, almost twice the initial estimate of $7.4 billion. Ontario consumers were required to pay for Darlington cost overruns through higher electricity prices. Between 1990 and 1993, bulk power rates for Ontario consumers went up about 28 percent,15 and Darlington became the poster child for anti-nuclear critics condemning the economics of nuclear power. In a typical statement, Lawrence Solomon, executive director of Energy Probe, asserted that “Darlington became one of the last plants to be completed in North America, coming in 10 years late, six times over-

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budget and bankrupting Ontario Hydro.”16 However, there were a number of extenuating circumstances. First, the Ontario government kept starting and stopping the project, creating obvious delays that translated into massive cost overruns. Darlington suffered eleven major delays that amounted to about five years of net lost time per unit. Most were the result of the poor economic conditions in Ontario during the severe recession of the early 1980s. Other delays resulted from “the labour actions, staff shortages, and two unforeseen technical issues requiring the replacement of generator rotors and pump impellers.”17 Second, the early 1980s saw interest rates as high as 18 to 20 percent. With rates at that level, all types of projects would see their budgets inflated, not just nuclear reactors. Unanticipated additional interest charges caused about 70 percent of Darlington’s cost increase and 40 percent of its total cost. Third, the Darlington reactors needed design modifications because of changing regulatory requirements over the course of the project. As Whitlock has noted, “the experience of Darlington underscores the importance of schedule (both optimization of, and adherence to) in the construction of large generating plants, and, in particular, the ramifications of imposing schedule delays based upon government policy or load forecasts once a major capital project is under construction.”18 Ontario’s nuclear problems had been largely focused on financial issues, but in 1997 its nuclear program suffered a major technical setback. On 12 August 1997 Ontario Hydro announced that it had temporarily shut down seven of its twenty reactors.19 The aecb had previously identified a number of significant problems with the performance of the nuclear reactors in Ontario and in 1996, decided to renew the license for the Pickering plant for only six months, as opposed to the normal two years. This convinced Ontario Hydro to hire some American consultants to perform an “independent integrated performance assessment” (iipa) of its nuclear operations. The iipa report, issued in early August 1997, recommended a recovery plan that involved shutting down a number of reactors. Ontario Hydro complied with the recommendation because the iipa report was a scathing indictment of the safety culture that existed in Ontario’s nuclear plants.20 It stated that Ontario Hydro’s safety standards were only “minimally acceptable.” “Minimally acceptable” is a ranking substantially below industry standards and was the lowest grade that could be given to a reactor before revoking a utility’s

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nuclear license. It put the cause of Ontario Hydro’s problems squarely on “a lack of authoritative and accountable managerial leadership.” For example, the nuclear plants were portrayed as being operated by poorly trained workers with a blatant disregard for safety. Numerous instances were documented of unqualified radiation safety technicians, unauthorized ad hoc modifications to the candu design, unsafe storage of dangerous chemicals, and alcohol and drugs in the workplace.21 The iipa report took pains not to criticize the technology of the candu. In fact, it stated that Ontario Hydro had done an excellent job in the “design and construction phase,” but that it had failed in the second stage of “operating and maintaining” its nuclear reactors.22 David Jackson and John de la Mothe confirm that “the present consensus is that organizational, attitudinal, and political factors rather than the candu technology itself were the root causes of the problem.” In particular, there were significant issues at Ontario Hydro, such as “frequent, politically driven changes in the chairmanship, several ineptly managed downsizing programs, and confrontational labour relations” that helped to shape “negative and unproductive attitudes among employees.”23 The anti-nuclear attitude of the ndp provincial government that governed from 1990 to 1995 was also a contributing factor to the deterioration of the province’s nuclear fleet.24 Regardless of what caused the problems with Ontario’s nuclear reactors, the anti-nuclear organizations took full advantage of the situation. David Martin of the Durham Nuclear Awareness organization insisted that Ontario Hydro faced a “fundamental technology problem. Ontario Hydro is shutting down its oldest reactors because they have too many defects – and I predict that they will never be restarted.”25 The anti-nuclear movement, which had previously been disdained for its lack of scientific knowledge, was now given immense credibility since it had been proven correct over the problems at Ontario’s nuclear sites. Criticism of Ontario’s nuclear industry also came from government. Ralph Goodale, then natural resources minister, warned the Canadian Nuclear Association that the industry had “lost credibility” with the Canadian public and “without public support, nuclear power has only a limited future.”26 Meanwhile, a Senate committee on nuclear safety reported that the nuclear shutdown has “reawakened public concern about the safety of nuclear reactors.”27

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T H E O N TA R I O N U C L E A R A D V O C A C Y C O A L I T I O N F R A M E W O R K

The Ontario nuclear advocacy coalition framework is fundamentally different from the other provincial advocacy coalition frameworks because, for the most part, the actors that make up the national nuclear sector are identical and perform the same roles in both the national and the Ontario nuclear sectors. This is often the case in many sectors because Ontario has 40 percemt of the country’s population and is the most prosperous province. There is no doubt that the heart of the nuclear industry is in Ontario. The Diefenbaker, Pearson, and Trudeau governments all tried to regionally diversify the nuclear industry with initiatives like building a heavy water plant in Glace Bay, Nova Scotia, and with the Whiteshell research laboratory in Pinawa, Manitoba. However, the nuclear industry soon consolidated back to Ontario as both the heavy water plant and Whiteshell were closed. Today, Ontario hosts aecl’s business offices (Sheridan Park) and research facilities (Chalk River), most of the headquarters of the country’s nuclear suppliers, all of the major nuclear associations (cna, oci, cns), all of the uranium upgrading facilities, and all but two power reactors are in Ontario. In addition, in interviews nuclear stakeholders based in Ontario often unknowingly described the Ontario nuclear sector as the Canadian nuclear sector. It is true that the uranium industry is based in Saskatchewan, but the reactor and mining wings have often been disconnected. This goes back to the decision in the early 1950s not to merge aecl with Eldorado Nuclear (the Crown corporation in charge of uranium mining). According to Bothwell, “it made no sense to combine a mining and engineering company with a scientific establishment. What they had in common was far less than what separated their interests and priorities … aecl’s scientific staff [also took a dim view] of a bunch of rough mining engineers, [that it saw as] far down the intellectual scale.”28 Therefore, in this section on identifying the Ontario nuclear advocacy coalition framework, several actors will be not be described in detail – cnsc, cna, cog, oci, aecl, and Bruce Power – because this information was provided in chapter 2. Pro-Nuclear Coalition In the late 1990s, Ontario restructured its electricity market to increase competition.29 Today, Ontario has a competitive market for electricity generation that combines provincial Crown corporations

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with private sector entities. As part of this restructuring initiative, in 1999 Ontario Hydro was split into five separate companies: Ontario Power Generation (opg), which generates the electricity; Hydro One, which distributes the electricity; the Independent Electrical System Operator, which balances the supply and demand for electricity and directs its flow across the province’s transmission lines; the Electrical Safety Authority, which is responsible for public electrical safety; and the Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, which manages the debt of the former Ontario Hydro. The Progressive Conservative government of Mike Harris had intended to use the restructuring as the first step in privatizing opg and Hydro One, but this did not happen owing to a 2002 price freeze on electricity (opg), as well as a court challenge (Hydro One). Today, the government of Ontario continues to be the sole owner of each of Ontario Hydro’s successor corporations, and they report back to the government through the Ministry of Energy. However, both opg and Hydro One are expected to operate as if they were private companies, as opposed to provincial Crown corporations. The most important of Ontario Hydro’s successor corporations for the nuclear sector is opg. opg generates over 21,000 mws from its sixtyfive hydroelectric plants, four coal plants, three gas-fired plants, and five nuclear plants. It operates the Pickering a & b and Darlington plants, but Bruce Power has a long-term contract to operate the eight reactors at the Bruce a & b plants. Nuclear may represent only onethird of Ontario’s electricity grid, but it generates over 50 percent of the province’s electricity.30 In addition, Ontario is a large exporter of electricity, and much of it is generated by nuclear.31 It was noted above that the two most important industrial leaders (aecl and Bruce Power) are headquartered in Ontario, but this also extends to many of the other key nuclear companies: Areva Canada, ge Hitachi Nuclear Energy Canada, Babcock & Wilcox, snc-Lavalin, Sulzer Pumps, Kinectrics, Aecon Industrial-Nuclear, and rcm Technologies. Of the cna members, 79 out of 120 are headquartered in Ontario, compared with only 14 from other provinces. In fact, there were more firms from the United States (26) than from non-Ontario Canadian provinces.32 These businesses all have an economic incentive to see Ontario maintain and expand its reliance on nuclear power. The Power Workers Union (pwu) is the key union in Ontario’s nuclear industry. The pwu represents over fifteen thousand workers in Ontario’s electricity industry, and it operates nuclear power plants for

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opg, Bruce Power, and aecl. The pwu is a member of the Canadian Nuclear Association and strongly supports the expansion of the nuclear industry in Ontario. In fact, it is a minority owner of Bruce Power. The other major union is the Society of Professional Engineers and Associates. The spea represents the nine hundred engineers and scientists who work for aecl, and it also supports the expansion of Ontario’s nuclear industry.33 The Canadian Nuclear Society is centred in Ontario. The best way of showing this is that its branch system is made up of four provincial branches (New Brunswick, Quebec, Saskatchewan, and Alberta) and nine spread out across Ontario (Bruce, Chalk River, Hamilton, Ottawa, Pickering, Sheridan Park, Toronto, University of Ontario Institute of Technology). While the cns has periodically hosted its annual conference in Montreal, Saint John, or Calgary, most of the time the conference is in either Ottawa or Toronto. The top academic programs in nuclear science are also based in Ontario at McMaster and the University of Ontario’s Institute of Technology (uoit). The Anti-Nuclear Coalition In contrast with other provinces, Ontario has only a few local grassroots environmental organizations. There used to be such groups – Durham Nuclear Awareness, for example – and they played a prominent role in opposing the Pickering and Darlington reactors. However, the Durham group has since become defunct, and its key organizers have moved on to larger organizations. For example, David Martin, who founded Durham Nuclear Awareness with his partner Irene Kroch, is now the Sierra Club’s nuclear specialist. In general the antinuclear coalition is led by national groups that focus on the Ontario market (Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, Pembina, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, etc.). For example, Shawn Patrick-Stensil, a prominent anti-nuclear activist, is based at Greenpeace’s headquarters in Toronto and spends his time critiquing nuclear power in Ontario. Policy Brokers The Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure is the major policy broker in the nuclear sector in Ontario. There are two independent agencies that report through the Ministry of Energy. The Ontario Energy

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Board (oeb) is a quasi-judicial tribunal that licenses all electricity generators and approves rates, and the Ontario Power Authority (opa) is responsible for planning and procuring sources for Ontario’s electricity generation. The other major department with some jurisdiction over nuclear power is the Ministry of the Environment. THE NUCLEAR ISSUES

Ontario’s Energy Strategy In a major speech in September 2005, Premier Dalton McGuinty laid out his government’s energy strategy at the annual meeting of the Ontario Energy Association in Niagara Falls. He emphasized that within fifteen years the province needed to add twenty-five thousand megawatts of “safe, clean, affordable and reliable” electricity.34 A year later the Ontario Power Authority fleshed out the premier’s speech when it released its Integrated Power System Plan (ipsp).35 The ipsp was issued in response to Ontario’s Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force, which in January 2004 called for an “action plan for attracting new generation, promoting conservation and enhancing the reliability of the transmission grid.”36 Despite a year of public consultation, the report was never approved by either the Ontario Energy Board or the Ministry of Energy. However, the ipsp does represent the broad parameters of the Ontario government’s electricity strategy. The ipsp is a twenty-year, $60 billion plan for a comprehensive overhaul of Ontario’s electricity system. Ontario ratepayers would see an increase in their electricity bills of between 15 and 20 percent. The ipsp has two objectives: (1) to address a potentially large shortage in the province’s electricity generation, and (2) to pursue a strategy that would lead to a 60 percent drop in carbon dioxide emissions. As mentioned, one of the major objectives of the ipsp is to phase out the electricity system’s largest polluters – the coal-fired plants. During the 2003 provincial election campaign, Liberal leader Dalton McGuinty promised to phase out all the province’s coal-fired electricity generation by 2007. The 1,140 mw Lakeview Generating Station was shut down in April 2005, but plans to close the remaining four coal-fired plants have been repeatedly pushed ahead to the current deadline of 2014. To replace the electricity produced by coal plants, the ipsp offers a four-pronged plan. First, reduce electricity demand through conserva-

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tion. The Ontario government wants to conserve 6,300 mw of electricity by 2025; interim goals include conserving 1,350 mw by 2007, another 1,350 mw by 2010, and a further 3,600 mw by 2025. Four types of energy conservation are identified: “efficiency, demand reduction/conservation behaviour, self-generation and fuel switching.” Specific initiatives included more regulations under the Energy Efficiency Act and other measures like the Home Energy Retrofit program, installing residential smart meters, updates to the Ontario building code, and the Community Conservation Initiatives. The government has budgeted $10.2 billion for energy conservation measures.37 Second, expand the contribution to electricity generation from renewable sources like hydroelectric, wind, solar, and biomass. The goal is to hit 10,402 mw from renewable sources by 2010, to a total of 15,700 mw by 2025, which would represent a doubling of existing renewable supply at a budgeted cost of $15.4 billion. The emphasis would be on adding 3,024 mw of hydroelectric capacity (for a total of 10,771 mw) and 3,751 mw of wind (for a total of 4,685 mw).38 According to the Ontario government, the province has already started up over 1,200 mws of renewable electricity since 2003 at a cost of $2.8 billion. The most recent announcement, in January 2010, was of a $7 billion deal with a consortium led by Samsung and the Korea Electric Power Corporation (kepco) to generate 2,000 mws of wind and another 500 mws of solar electricity.39 Third, increase the percentage of electricity generated from gasfired plants from 22 to 28 percent, which would address the electricity gap caused by shutting down the coal plants. New gas-fired facilities are planned for the Northern York Region, Kitchener-Waterloo, and the greater Toronto area by 2014. Gas plants would focus on supplying peak power to Ontario’s electricity grid. The cost of expanding gas-fired generation is set at $3.6 billion. The fourth prong of the plan, and the focus of this chapter, is to expand Ontario’s existing nuclear generation capacity, bringing it up to 14,000 mw. In 2004, the opg Review Committee argued that “Ontario must begin planning new to supplement and ultimately replace its aging nuclear assets with new and better generations of nuclear technology.”40 The ipsp came to the same conclusion and recommended investing $26.5 billion to refurbish older reactors and build two new ones at existing sites by 2018. Two scenarios for nuclear power relate to either refurbishing Pickering b over 2013–16 or not doing so. If Pickering b is refurbished, then 1,400 mw of new nuclear

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capacity is needed, but if Pickering b is not refurbished then 3,400 mw of new nuclear capacity is needed.41 The ipsp identified five specific challenges for developing nuclear power in Ontario. The first is working with opg to determine the details – timelines and cost – for coordinating the refurbishment of Ontario’s existing reactors. The approval and licensing processes for new nuclear builds pose the second challenge, and the financial aspects of nuclear power pose the third. The ipsp noted that “how financial and technological risk is shared among proponents and other parties may affect the terms under which power is procured and the price risks borne by Ontario electricity consumers.” The fourth challenge is the fact that the ipsp will be technology-neutral about the type and the supplier of reactor, and the fifth is the disposal of nuclear waste “because the plan is obliged to consider the environmental sustainability of all alternatives.”42 The ipsp’s support of expanded nuclear capacity confirmed previous government reports and reviews. In March 2004, the opg Review led by former federal finance minister John Manley “concluded that Ontario must begin planning now to supplement and ultimately replace its ageing nuclear assets with new and better generations of nuclear technology.”43 In December 2005, the opa reported that Ontario needed to invest $83 billion over the next twenty years to upgrade its electricity generation. Within that amount, $35 billion should be spent on repairing and replacing Ontario’s nuclear fleet. According to the opa, technological enhancements to nuclear power plants make them “simpler to operate, cheaper to run, and better performing.” Making this investment in nuclear power would ensure that 50 percent of the province’s electricity continues to be generated by nuclear with 43 percent coming from renewable sources (hydro, wind, and solar), and the remaining 7 percent generated by natural gas. Coal would be completely phased out.44 Ontario’s anti-nuclear coalition was aghast at the province’s proposal to build more nuclear reactors as part of the ipsp. The Sierra Club referred to it as “insanity” and Greenpeace called it “a leap backward at a time when alternative sources should be sought.” Jack Gibbons, executive director of the Ontario Clean Air Alliance, added that expanding Ontario’s nuclear capacity was a “1950s-style solution to meet our electricity needs in the 21st century.”45 A number of environmental organizations (Greenpeace, the Toronto Environmental Alliance, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, etc.) wanted

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a comprehensive public-consultation process on what they considered the ipsp’s pro-nuclear agenda. Although the Ontario Energy Board did conduct public hearings, they were narrowly focused on the rate effects of the ipsp and not on environmental issues (there would be separate environmental assessments on each facility) or a policy review. While there was opposition from some interest groups, there was a political consensus on moving forward on the nuclear file. The ndp was opposed to nuclear power, but both the governing Liberals and the opposition Progressive Conservatives supported it. In fact, John Tory, then leader of the PCs, wanted to fast-track new builds by reducing the approval process: “I think there’s a way we can have absolute and complete consultation and review of these projects and get it done faster if the will is there.”46 This explains why during the 2007 provincial election, nuclear power was not an issue and why the anti-nuclear groups were having trouble attracting attention. Another provincial election was held on 6 October 2011 (re-electing the Liberals, albeit with a minority government), and once again, nuclear energy was absent as a campaign issue because both the McGuinty government and the new Progressive Conservative leader Tim Hudak supported expanding Ontario’s nuclear fleet. Only ndp leader Andrea Horwath was in favour of phasing out nuclear energy in Ontario.47 In November 2010 the Ontario Ministries of Energy and Infrastructure released their report entitled Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan. It outlined its plans to invest over $87 billion over the next twenty years in the province’s electricity sector: $33 billion for nuclear, $14 billion for wind, $12 billion in conservation efforts, $9 billion in transmission, $9 billion in solar, $4.6 billion in hydro, $4 billion in biomass, and $1.8 billion in natural gas. It reiterated the government’s commitment that nuclear would continue to generate 50 percent of the province’s electricity which would require a capacity of 12,000 mw of nuclear energy through the refurbishment of existing reactors, as well as building new ones. As the report stated, “over the first 10 to 15 years of this Plan, 10,000 mw of existing nuclear capacity will be refurbished … The remainder of the nuclear capacity that Ontario will need for its projected demand (about 2,000 mw) will be made up of new nuclear at Darlington.”48 There are challenges to Ontario’s nuclear agenda. First is the issue of cost. Greenpeace argued that the $33 billion price tag for nuclear

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was unrealistic, since the refurbishments of two Bruce a units, which were not yet complete, had already cost $4.8 billion.49 They claimed that completing eight more refurbishments and two new builds could not be done for less than $28 billion. Tom Mitchell, president and ceo of opg, realized that Ontario’s nuclear history had included massive cost overruns but claimed that opg had learned from its previous mistakes. He said that “opg will build a mock-up of the Darlington reactor, so workers can practise and perfect what they’ll have to do when they enter the reactor for real. opg is doing a detailed assessment of the Darlington station, so the scope of the work and condition of the plant will be well understood … The company is also planning for the inevitable challenges of dealing with the unexpected and managing risks.”50 A second challenge is whether Ontario can successfully coordinate so many nuclear projects. On the refurbishment side, Duncan Hawthorne acknowledged that returning ten reactors to service will require Bruce Power, opg, and the opa to produce “a credible plan to carry out these refurbishments”51 because we do not have “the capacity to work on two sites at the same time, so we’re going to have to phase that. We’ll also have to think about skill set. I need a 10-year agreement with all the building trade unions so I can move people from site to site in a seamless way.”52 A third challenge, which will be discussed in more detail later on in this chapter, is choosing a vendor and reactor type for the new nuclear build. Refurbishment: Pickering a All four of the Pickering a reactors were temporarily shut down in 1997. In August 1999, opg approved restarting all four units at a cost of $1.1 billion: “$457 for Unit 4 and systems common to all four units, $213 million for Unit 1, $219 million for Unit 2, and $211 million for Unit 3.”53 The restart work was not as extensive as a full refurbishment would have been; that is, there was no retubing, because all the Pickering a reactors had their pressure tubes (but not the calandria tube) in the 1980s and very early 1990s. Still, the restart project was “a major design and construction project, with modifications required to virtually all systems in the plant.”54 In September 2003, Pickering a4 was brought back online and will remain operational until 2018. However, the project’s cost was triple the original budget ($1.25 billion) and was completed two years behind schedule.

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In the aftermath of Pickering a4’s restart, the Mike Harris government commissioned a study by Jake Epp, the former federal natural resources minister, to determine the causes of Pickering a4 cost overruns.55 The Epp review was not asked to decide whether to go forward with the restart of the other three units. Instead, it was asked to provide recommendations on “improving the management of the project to restore the Pickering a Generating Station to full operation, including measures to ensure the cost-effective and timely completion of the project.” The review placed the blame squarely on opg’s “seriously flawed” management skills. “opg failed to recognize the full scope and complexity of the project and was too slow to put in place the appropriate project management and accountability mechanisms.” Delays were also caused by the decision of the aecb to conduct a more rigorous regulatory process, including a more comprehensive environmental assessment, than opg originally had anticipated. In addition to the scheduling delays, opg’s cost estimates were “consistently unreliable.” Following the release of the Epp review, three senior management officials resigned and a new board of directors was appointed by the government.56 By the time the Epp review was released, on 30 November 2003, there was a new provincial government. The newly elected Liberal government of Dalton McGuinty decided to commission a second study. This study, chaired by former federal minister John Manley, would determine, as part of a larger review of opg’s role in the electricity sector, whether to finish the Pickering a restart project. Manley’s committee also included Epp and Peter Godsoe, a former ceo of Scotiabank. In March 2004, the opg Review Committee released its report, recommending that Pickering a1 be restarted with an additional investment of $500 million. This was a cheaper option than keeping the reactor shut down and building new natural-gas generation capacity. If a1 was successfully restarted without complications, then a2 and a3 could follow suit.57 The Ontario government accepted the recommendation of the opg Review Committee and in July 2004 announced that it would restart Pickering a1. Epp, who was subsequently named chairman of opg, maintained that “there are many differences in our approach to the Unit 1 project this time around. The project is ready to go and our third-party auditors will continue to monitor the progress of the restart. opg is satisfied that every precaution has been taken to ensure that the refurbishment stays on track.”58 Pickering a1 achieved criticality in August 2005, was restored

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to service in November 2005, and is expected to continue generating electricity until 2022. The restart of a1, unlike that of a4, was completed on time and on budget. opg announced on 12 August 2005 that it would retire Pickering a2 and a3 rather than attempt to restart them. Restarting was “technically feasible,” but President and ceo Jim Hankinson stressed that “we don’t see a sound business case for returning Units 2 and 3 to service.” Instead, opg would focus on maximizing the electricity output of the restarted Pickering a4 and a1 units, refurbish Pickering b, and build new reactors at Darlington.59 Refurbishment: Bruce a Bruce Power released a study in 2004 recommending the refurbishment of all the Bruce a units.60 Bruce a2’s operation had been suspended in 1995 because of a maintenance accident in which lead contaminated the steam generators, causing significant corrosion. Bruce a1, a3, and a4 had all been part of the larger reactor suspension decision in 1997. After $750 million was spent on it, Bruce a4 returned to service in October 2003, joined by Bruce a3 in January 2004. The plan was to complete the refurbishment project in two stages: Bruce a1 and a2, followed by Bruce a3 and a4. In October 2005, the Ontario government agreed to the refurbishment plan.61 Bruce Power would cover the $4.25 billion cost of the refurbishment: $2.75 billion for a1 and a2, $1.15 billion for a3 and a4, and $350 million to replace a4’s steam generators. In return, Bruce Power would sell electricity back to the province at 6.3 cents/kWh (with a Consumer Price Index clause). In exchange for receiving a guaranteed price, Bruce Power would take on most of the risk if the refurbishment project led to scheduling delays or cost overruns. Bruce Power would cover 75 percent of any cost overruns associated with refurbishing Bruce a1 and a2, and for units a3 and a4, any cost overruns would be evenly split between Bruce Power and the Ontario government. Having Bruce Power take on the financial risk of the project was a major objective of the government. Energy Minister Donna Cansfield emphasized that “this agreement transfers much of the risk associated with the project to the private sector and away from hard working Ontarians, while ensuring fair prices and the capacity to meet Ontario’s future energy needs.”62 For its part, Bruce Power called the refurbishment project a “destiny issue.” According to its president,

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Duncan Hawthorne, “the success of this project spawns other projects and the failure of this probably means that we wouldn’t want to do it again.”63 Cameco, one of the major partners in Bruce Power (31.6 percent), decided that while it supported the refurbishment project, it felt that it did not meet its investment criteria. Therefore, Cameco received a $200 million payout for its interest in Bruce a. The other partners set up a separate group – the Bruce a Limited Partnership (balp) – to sublease Bruce a from Bruce Power and to pay for the project.64 Jim McCarter, Ontario’s auditor-general, undertook a special assessment of the province’s deal with Bruce Power. McCarter reported that the negotiated purchase price for electricity was too high. As a result of Queen’s Park failing to negotiate a better deal, Ontario consumers would pay 44 percent higher than the going market rate for electricity from the refurbished reactors.65 Energy Minister Dwight Duncan defended the deal because Bruce Power was taking on the financial risk. “This was a good deal when we signed it, and it’s a good deal today. We will get a clean supply of affordable electricity for the next 30 years.”66 Duncan would be proven correct when the refurbishment project saw its costs escalate. Refurbishing Bruce a1 and a2 would be a substantial undertaking involving replacing the pressure tubes, calandria, and steam generator; upgrading the electrical system; refurbishing the main condenser and feed water heater; enhancing the shut down system; and doing other maintenance. This work would extend the life of the reactors until 2043. Bruce Power is the project manager for the refurbishment and is joined by several major contractors: amec ncl is providing management support services, aecl is responsible for the retubing, Babcock & Wilcox is supplying the steam generators, snc-Lavalin Nuclear is installing the steam generators, Siemens is supplying the turbine-generators, and E.S. Fox is supplying and installing the feeder pipe sections, fittings, and hubs. The refurbishment of Bruce a1 and a2 has seen significant delays and cost overruns. The project was initially supposed to be completed by late 2009 or early 2010 at a cost of $2.75 billion. However, the 2010 deadline was missed. Hal Kvisle, the president of TransCanada (the majority owner of balp), commented in November 2009 that “[t]he Units 1 and 2 project is approximately 75 percent complete, with the bulk of the highly technical, high-risk work now complet-

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ed.”67 In November 2009, the federal government gave aecl $200 million to complete its part of the refurbishment projects at Bruce and Point Lepreau. According to a Treasury Board document, the money “will be used to address a cash shortfall caused by unexpected challenges on Candu reactor refurbishment contracts. These projects are first-of-a-kind, making them inherently complex.”68 As a result of these delays, the cost has risen to $3.4 billion,69 but some outside business analysts believe that it could exceed $4 billion.70 The refuelling of Bruce a2 was completed in July 2011 and, after gaining permission from the cnsc, it was reconnected to the grid in March 2012. Bruce a1 is expected to come back online in summer 2012. As a result of these refurbishments, Bruce a1 and a2 will continue operating until 2037. When Bruce a1 and a2 come back online the refurbishment of Bruce a3 and a4 will begin. It is estimated that this project will start in 2021, and it will extend their life until 2037. Initial estimates are that it will cost $1.15 billion for Bruce a3 and $1.50 billion for Bruce a4 (because the steam generators have to be replaced). However, these estimates could be increased based on the experience with Bruce a1 and a2. Future Refurbishment Projects Further refurbishment projects are expected. opg has assessed the feasibility of refurbishing Pickering b and Darlington a. The cnsc, after an initial environmental assessment, determined in early 2009 that Pickering B’s refurbishment would not cause significant adverse environmental affects. opg also completed an Integrated Safety Report in September 2009. The Pickering b reactors are licensed to mid2013, but some preliminary work for the refurbishment has already been conducted.71 In February 2010, opg announced that Pickering b would get a $200 million tune-up (not a refurbishment) to keep the reactors running for approximately another ten years. At that time, the long-term decommissioning process would begin. Darlington a would go through a complete refurbishment extending its life to 2050. The Darlington refurbishment is planned to begin in 2016.72 In July 2009, Bruce Power announced that its focus was on refurbishing its Bruce b units, as opposed to building new plants at Bruce or Nanticoke.73 When the government selected the Darlington site for new nuclear capacity, it affirmed the importance of

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privately-run Bruce Power and the need for it to contribute 6,300 mwe of nuclear capacity, maintaining this level of capacity beyond the present planned operating lifetime of Bruce b. A decision on refurbishing Bruce b (3,260 mw) is pending but highly probable now that the alternative proposal to build four new reactors (Bruce c) has been shelved. Work on refurbishing the four Bruce b units would occur only after the completed refurbishment of all the Bruce a units. It is expected that the refurbishment projects would begin in 2018–20. New Builds: Darlington b In September 2006, opg applied for a licence to prepare its Darlington site for construction of up to four new nuclear power units. Darlington b would begin with two new units and eventually progress to a four-unit station. The Darlington site was chosen because its transmission capacity is more accessible than the Bruce site on Lake Huron. An application was sent to the cnsc that could have led to a Licence to Prepare Site being issued by the end of 2010. In March 2008, the government commenced a two-phase request for proposals that would lead to additional nuclear capacity of between 2,000 mwe and 3,500 mwe at the Darlington site. Phase One asked vendors to submit a preliminary proposal that included •

•

• • •

Preliminary demonstration of the respondent’s capability to execute a plan to provide the support necessary for a successful construction licence review; Demonstration of a plan to deliver a construction licence application on schedule and in compliance with Canadian regulatory requirements; Respondent’s willingness and capacity to deliver the project; Financial strength of the respondent; and Legal position of the respondent.

Phase Two’s evaluation criteria would include • • •

Financial and commercial terms; Respondent team members; Schedule commitments;

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Estimated operating and decommissioning costs; and Level of domestic economic value-added.

Energy Minister Gerry Phillips stated that “building replacement nuclear facilities will bring economic benefit to Ontario. It will help Ontario meet its future energy needs, keep prices stable, cut our carbon footprint and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”74 In June 2008, the Ontario government accepted opg’s proposal to operate two new nuclear units, providing over 2,000 mw of electricity, at its Darlington site. opg started preparing the site through a site evaluation, environmental studies, and community consultations. It hoped to have the new reactors operational by 2018. Meanwhile, the Ontario government begin a process for the selection of the appropriate reactor technology. Three submissions were received by the February 2009 deadline: aecl’s acr-1000 (1,085 mw), Westinghouse’s AP1000 (1,117 mw), and Areva’s epr (1,600 mw). ge-Hitachi was also invited by the Ontario government to submit its esbwr reactor for consideration, but ge-Hitachi declined since it was part of Team candu. Infrastructure Ontario, the government agency in charge of selecting the reactor design, explicitly forbade vendors from promoting the merits of their technology in relation to the bidding process. The Ontario government established criteria for bid selection. Eighty percent of the evaluation is based on capital costs, operating costs, technology design readiness, and schedule risk-management plans. Twenty percent depends on the proponent’s relative contribution to Ontario’s gdp from this project, future projects by the winner anywhere, and additional investments promised specifically for Ontario.75 Infrastructure Ontario led a technical evaluation committee that also included opg and Bruce Power to examine the bids. The financial aspects would be evaluated by the Ministries of Energy and Finance. The most important political feature of the reactor selection process was the invitation to all vendors to submit competitive bids. As explained in chapter 3, the trade in nuclear reactors has historically seen companies protected in their national market. In the case of Ontario, all previous nuclear reactors had been built due to an exclusive arrangement between Ontario Hydro and aecl. This would be the first time that aecl would have to compete with other vendors in

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its home market. A 2004 panel headed by former federal deputy prime minister John Manley recommended that “Ontario should not be biased towards choosing Canadian-developed technology, but should seek the best available technology worldwide.”76 The Ontario government accepted this argument. Dwight Duncan, Ontario’s minister of energy, said in 2006 that “it is our preference to use Canadian companies and technology, but our first responsibility is to the people of Ontario.”77 Duncan identified that the key considerations were cost, technology, and the potential for furthering Ontario’s economic development, not the nationality of the vendor.78 Ottawa recognized that electricity generation was in provincial jurisdiction and that Ontario was free to choose whatever nuclear technology it desired. Nevertheless, it was not happy with the decision. Gary Lunn, the federal natural resources minister, said, “I’m quite prepared to say on the record that we are not technology neutral. We are very favourable to the Candu technology … We must build the Candu technology at home. It’s imperative for the Canadian nuclear industry. If we can’t compete at home, I would suggest it wouldn’t look very good for our technology elsewhere around the world.”79 Hugh MacDiarmid, president of aecl, was also fully cognizant of the necessity of winning the Ontario bid. “This is the heartland of our fleet. For any firm with that kind of a market position, if we were not to be selected to be the provider of the next generation reactor, it would be a great disappointment. But if that were to happen, we would pick ourselves up and dust ourselves off and sell some reactors in other jurisdictions.”80 Team candu, the consortium of aecl, Babcock & Wilcox, ge Hitachi, and snc-Lavalin Nuclear that was created to market and build the candu, believed that the open bid process actually discriminated against the home side. If it was an international contract, aecl could get Export Development Canada (edc) financing support, which it did for reactor sales in China, Romania, Argentina, and other countries. But because it was a domestic bid, edc financing was not an option. In contrast, both Areva and Westinghouse would be able to access export financing from the us and French governments. This situation led aecl and snc-Lavalin Nuclear to formally ask for federal financing of their Ontario bid. In a 4 July 2008 letter to nrCan minister Gary Lunn, snc-Lavalin Nuclear president Patrick Lamarre asked that the government ensure that “the Canadian nuclear industry is not disadvantaged on its home ground” in a competitive bid that is

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critical to aecl’s future prospects. “In order to ensure that aecl and Team Candu are competing on a level playing field with our competitors, you will understand that it is imperative that equivalent financing support for the Canadian bid be confirmed.”81 While the Ontario government did create an open-bid process, there were also some indications that Ontario viewed the new build project as aecl’s to lose. In April 2009, Premier Dalton McGuinty warned that “if you’re bidding from outside Canada you better have a proposal in place that’s going to guarantee employment for our people. We’ve certainly said that in terms of the weight we attach to different parts of the bid, one of the parts we’ll be weighing is how many people are you going to employ? We are the centre of the nuclear industry right here in Ontario. What assurance can you provide us that we’ll keep our industry alive in terms of our workforce?”82 Since the Canadian nuclear industry is already situated in Ontario, providing tens of thousands of direct and indirect jobs, this was an easy case for aecl to make. For either Westinghouse or Areva – outside of actually purchasing aecl – it was a much tougher argument, although Areva did suggest that “by signing on with them, the province’s considerable nuclear industry base could enjoy a much larger share in the worldwide revival than they might ever be in a position to reach through aecl.”83 The Ontario government gave mixed signals throughout the bid process. On the one hand, the process was indeed technologically neutral. In addition, a gag rule was imposed on the vendors preventing them from appealing to the public for support. This prevented aecl from waving the flag to generate patriotism among the public and force the government’s hand. On the other hand, McGuinty and his changing energy ministers continually emphasized the role of economic development as a criterion in the selection process, a criterion that obviously benefited aecl. This suggests that there may have been other reasons for choosing the open bid process besides acquiring the best technology at the lowest price. The first reason was that Ontario used the presence of competitors to drive aecl’s price lower. This, in and of itself was not unusual, since the use of sealed bids is a standard business practice. However, in the case of the nuclear sector, there was an additional external audience. Ontario used the open bid process to force the federal government (which because of its ownership of aecl had a vested interest in them winning the contract) to commit more dollars to the new nuclear-

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build project. This delicate dance between the two levels of government is discussed in more detail below in the section of this chapter dealing with relationships within Ontario’s nuclear advocacy coalition framework. A second and related point was the fear over cost overruns and scheduling delays. Ontario remains deeply scarred by the experience of the Darlington a project. No matter what the reasons were for the delays and cost overruns, the simple fact was that Darlington was billions of dollars over budget. Armand Laferrere, then head of Areva Canada, even fuelled this fear when he acknowledged that “you often see – actually, always – cost overruns when a design is built for the first time. And then the supply chain comes together, you get used to the processes of the new technology. And when you enter into series mode, you get to a situation where the industry can build on time and on budget.”84 Laferrere’s comments were firmly rebuked by the Ontario government. Lorne Burger, communications advisor on the nuclear procurement project for Infrastructure Ontario, warned that “if the company building Ontario’s new nuclear reactors goes over budget, the costs will be shared between that company and opg.”85 By using the combination of an open bid process and the requirement that vendors take on all risk management for scheduling delays and cost overruns, the Ontario government was hoping to avoid a repeat of Darlington. Third, Ontario wanted to hedge its bets concerning the candu technology. Unlike Westinghouse and Areva, aecl’s generation III+ reactor – the acr-1000 – had not been fully approved by any of the world’s regulatory bodies, nor had it ever been constructed. What if aecl was no longer capable of designing world-class nuclear reactors? Some outside observers wondered whether aecl, even if it won the bid, would be able to actually build the reactors.86 By using the open-bid process – even if it secretly favoured aecl – the Ontario government was giving itself options in case aecl was technologically not up to the job. The Ontario government announced in June 2009 that the newbuild project was being suspended. It noted that the only acceptable bid was from aecl. Both Areva’s and Westinghouse’s bids were non-compliant because they would not solely accept price escalation risk. However, Ontario would not accept aecl’s bid because it was far too expensive. Energy Minister George Smitherman emphasized that aecl had to bring its price down “substantially, certainly

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a measure of many billions. We’ll know the right price when we see it and we ain’t seen it yet.”87 An additional concern of Ontario surrounded the future of aecl, because the federal government had announced plans to restructure the company involving the full or partial privatization of its commercial unit. Smitherman touched on both points when he asserted that “the government of Canada needs to do the work that they’re doing now to clarify the future ownership of aecl, and when they have clarified that, to sharpen their pencils substantially so that the people of the province of Ontario can renew their nuclear fleet with two new units from that company.”88 In an exclusive article, the Toronto Star provided a fairly comprehensive analysis of the financial aspects of the competing bids.89 Since its numbers have not been authoritatively countered by the Ontario government and since the companies cannot disclose their bids, it remains the only publicly available analysis of the financial aspects of the bids. The Star estimated that aecl submitted a bid of $26 billion, or $10,800 per kilowatt of power capacity. Areva’s bid was $23.6 billion ($7,375 per kilowatt). There was indeed an element of “sticker shock” because the $26 billion was the entire nuclear budget of the ipsp for refurbishment and new build, not just for two new reactors. The opa had planned for only $2,900 per kilowatt and the Ontario Energy Board said anything higher than $3,600 would be uneconomical compared to natural gas electricity generation. Although it would not disclose different numbers, Infrastructure Ontario called the Star report “inaccurate” because it did “not reflect the evaluation and/or analysis of the bids performed by Infrastructure Ontario.”90 Levelized Unit Electricity Cost is the mechanism for comparing the cost of the nuclear bids, as well as other electricity sources, which was used by Infrastructure Ontario. “This measure is more sophisticated than just considering the capital cost of a facility as it projects the facility’s lifetime electricity output, costs during the construction period, cost of fuel, ongoing operating expenses, as well as decommissioning, disposal and financing costs. As a result, any evaluated price would be an estimate of the project over its lifespan.”91 This is why nuclear industry officials maintain that the $26 billion is an aggregate number that includes two reactors (including a contingency fund for cost overruns), turbines, transmission and distribution infrastructure, plant infrastructure, nuclear fuel for sixty years, and decommissioning. They

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also point out that the key number is not $26 billion or even $10,800 per kilowatt of power capacity but the fact that the delivered cost of electricity from the plants would be in the range of five cents per kilowatt hour.92 Why was aecl’s price so high? First, it was the only vendor that accounted solely for the risk of price escalation. This is why aecl was the only compliant bid. Second, the Harper government told aecl that its bid must provide a commercial rate of return and that its price must recover all costs, rather than spreading them out over future sales. A briefing paper prepared by nrCan maintained that “while Ontario is likely to ask aecl to lower its price, the government would need to ensure the project is commercial to preserve aecl’s value as it is restructured and to avoid [federal taxpayers] subsidizing Ontario taxpayers.”93 Did the suspension announcement mean that the Ontario’s new nuclear build project was completely dead or only sick? aecl, at least publicly, believed that it was just another step in the selection process. Hugh MacDiarmid said that “We are very pleased that our bid proposal was determined to be the best among the group of world-class vendors who participated in the process. We look forward to the “next phase” in which the company and the province can negotiate a contract.”94 The Ontario government seemed to agree. McGuinty put the ball in the federal government’s court when he said that “Ottawa will determine whether the province moves forward with nuclear power.”95 On 24 February 2011, in a keynote address to the Canadian Nuclear Association, opg president and ceo Tom Mitchell announced that Ontario would be holding public hearings on building two new nuclear reactors at the Darlington site. This will be the final phase of the environmental review because an Environmental Impact Statement and an updated License to Prepare the site at Darlington had already been submitted in fall 2009. Mitchell said that “new nuclear is on the verge of becoming a reality in Ontario. We’re not there yet. We don’t have liftoff. But we’re definitely moving to the launch pad.” He also told delegates that opg was likely to choose the ec6, not the acr1000, or some form of light water reactor. According to Mitchell, “we see the merit in building enhanced candus at the Darlington site.”96 The new build project is expected to generate a maximum of 4,800 mws of electricity using four reactors, with an initial need of close to 2,000 mws provided by two reactors.

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As part of the environmental assessment of the new build project, public hearings were held over seventeen days in March and April. Interestingly, the first day of hearings was only days after the FukushimaDaiichi accident. Many environmental groups wanted them delayed until studies were completed assessing the impact of the Japanese disaster and the potential for something similar to occur in Ontario.97 In response, the Joint Review Panel determined that “it would be premature and inappropriate to bring the proceeding to a standstill and adjourn the review process.” Instead, the panel determined that if, after a presentation “or during the course of the hearing, that new information is required for the discharge of its mandate, then the Panel will provide appropriate direction for the filing and consideration of the information. This could, as appropriate, include further opportunities for written submissions or for further hearing days.”98 Greenpeace even tried to disrupt the proceedings by chaining themselves to the table, but after the police made some arrests, the hearings continued unabated. There were 278 contributions to the hearings process, which included members of the pro-nuclear coalition (opg, Power Workers Union, oci, etc.), members of the anti-nuclear coalition (Greenpeace, Lake Ontario Waterkeeper, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, etc.), and policy brokers (federal, provincial, and municipal governments).99 In August 2011 the federal joint review panel (made up of the cnsc and the ceaa) approved the project. “The Panel conclude[d] that the Project is not likely to cause significant adverse environmental effects, provided the mitigation measures proposed and commitments made by opg during the review, and the Panel’s recommendations are implemented.”100 The next decision is choosing a vendor and reactor design. Although Mitchell signalled that opg was most interested in an ec6, the fact was that the government of Ontario had made “no decision … on the choice of a reactor technology.”101 In addition, the ec6 has yet to complete the cnsc’s pre-licensing design review. It did complete Phase 1 (the pre-project design review) on 1 April 1 2010 and is expected to complete Phase 2 (identification of fundamental barriers) in early 2012. The third, and final, phase involves a follow-up on certain aspects of Phase 2 findings by “seeking more information from the cnsc about a Phase 2 topic; and/or asking the cnsc to review activities taken by the vendor towards the reactor’s design readiness, following the completion of Phase 2.”102 In contrast, the acr-1000 had

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successfully completed all three phases, Westinghouse’s ap-1000 has successfully completed Phase 1, and Areva’s epr was put on hold by the company in the midst of the Phase 1 process.103 These four reactor designs were used by the joint review panel, which applied a multiple-technology approach in conducting its environmental assessment.104 In assessing these four reactor designs, it needs to be mentioned that both the ap-1000 and epr are under construction, but that is not the case for either the acr-1000 or ec6. It is true that many candu-6s have been built around the world, but the ec6 is an evolutionary design that would represent a first-of-a-kind build in Ontario. Finally, with the exception of the ec6, the other three designs require slightly enriched uranium. The use of slightly enriched uranium would mean that opg would have to import reactor fuel (most likely from the United States) and would have different storage and processing requirements for the spent fuel than is the case with the other Darlington reactors. New Build: Bruce Power In August 2006, Bruce Power applied for a licence to prepare the Bruce site for construction of up to four new reactors. The cnsc accepted the company’s project description for 4,000 mw in January 2007. In order to expedite environmental assessment, the cnsc recommended that the project go straight to a public review panel rather than negotiating an eight-month process to determine if such a panel was necessary. Bruce Power submitted an environmental impact statement in September 2008, showing that up to four new reactors at Bruce c would have no significant environmental effect. The new units were envisaged as coming on line beginning in 2015. Six different reactor types were under consideration. However, in July 2009 the company announced that it would withdraw its site license application and suspend its Environmental Assessment for Bruce c and focus on refurbishment of Bruce a and b. It explained that since there was a declining demand for electricity in Ontario, maintaining existing capacity through refurbishment, as opposed to expanding capacity by building new reactors, was the best option.105 The ipsp’s objective was to close all of Ontario’s coal-fired capacity by 2014. Generating 3,964 mws of electricity, Nanticoke is the largest coal-fired plant in North America, and contributes almost one-eighth

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of Ontario’s electricity capacity. Facing its imminent closing, the communities surrounding the Nanticoke plant (250 km northwest of Toronto) in early 2008 strongly urged the provincial government to consider the area for a new nuclear power plant. A key advantage of the Nanticoke site is that it has an established transmission infrastructure. At the end of October 2008, Bruce Power announced that it would conduct an environmental assessment for two new nuclear units in the Haldimand-Norfolk region. Although both the Haldimand and the Norfolk councils support the idea of the environmental assessment, as do 80 percent of residents, according to an IpsosReid poll, the plan was met with a cool reception from the provincial government on the grounds that its policy for expanded nuclear power did not include new sites. George Smitherman, Ontario’s minister of energy and infrastructure, said of Bruce Power’s plans, “I want to make very clear that this is an unsolicited action on the part of a private interest. We didn’t solicit it, we don’t endorse it, tacitly or otherwise. It’s designed to influence government policy.”106 In July 2009, Bruce Power withdrew its site license application for Nanticoke. T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S W I T H I N O N TA R I O ’ S NUCLEAR ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

The biggest relationship within the Ontario’s nuclear sector has been between the two levels of government. The history of nuclear power in Canada, until recently, was of a partnership between the federal government and the province of Ontario. This cooperation has shifted to competition. The Ottawa-Ontario battle started early with Ottawa promoting aecl and Ontario deciding on an open bid process. Ottawa also committed additional money to fund development of the acr-1000. In the 2009 budget, $135 million was allocated for the acr-1000.107 In addition, Ottawa’s removal of Linda Keen as president of the cnsc was, as chapter 2 explained, due in part to kickstarting the pre-approval process for the acr-1000. The acr-1000 has since been granted full pre-project approval by the cnsc, in January 2011. The decision to initially suspend the new nuclear build project intensified the game of chicken between Ontario and Ottawa. Both of them wanted the project built – and built by aecl – but the financial arrangements were the sticking point. Ontario, as every govern-

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ment announcement and every appointed expert panel has maintained, is facing a looming electricity shortage. The ipsp and the subsequent November 2010 announcement initiated an aggressive plan for both conservation efforts and adding substantial amounts of renewable electricity to the grid, but unless they want to renege on their promises to phase out coal generation, then nuclear power is required. For its part, Ottawa also wants to see candus built at Darlington. There has recently been a drop in electricity demand in Ontario, caused by the recession, the resulting damage done to Ontario’s manufacturing sector, and new gas plants and wind facilities coming on-stream. In addition, there has been a reduced demand in Ontario’s electricity export market. The economies of Michigan, western New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio are all similar to Ontario and they are all suffering similar problems. Consequently, in the battle between Ottawa and Ontario, Queen’s Park has the temporary advantage. With four years of declining electricity demand, Ontario can afford to wait out the federal government.108 As Queen’s Park recognized, “the decrease in demand together with the new supply added in recent years, means that Ontario is well-positioned to examine a number of options for negotiating new nuclear production at the right time and a cost-effective price.”109 In contrast, the sale of aecl to snc-Lavalin may force Ottawa’s hand. As Michael Ivanco, vice-president of the spea, argued, “any potential investor would be crazy to ante up any amount of money before knowing what’s happening in Ontario.”110 Therefore, if the nuclear situation is going to get resolved it will likely require movement from the federal government. Ottawa and Queen’s Park will eventually come to an arrangement, especially since the new build project has been restarted. As McGuinty acknowledged when the new build was first suspended, “there is going to be a continuing dialogue with the feds.”111 This federalprovincial dialogue will not be easy; the jurisdictional and cost issues are exacerbated by partisanship issues with a Liberal government in Ontario and a Conservative government in Ottawa. However, the fate of tens of thousands of jobs in the Canadian nuclear industry demands that a deal be reached. Moreover, the recession has already taken a big bite out of Ontario’s manufacturing base, especially in the auto sector, and neither government can afford a similar bite on the nuclear sector.

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The traditional divide in the Ontario nuclear sector has been between the pro-nuclear coalition (industry, unions, scientists, etc.) and the anti-nuclear coalition (the Sierra Club and other public interest groups). However, there have been signs of discontent within the pro-nuclear coalition. There was initially a battle over the type of reactor design. Members of the pro-nuclear coalition were defecting away from the Gen III+ acr-1000 to endorse the less costly and risky ec6. The Power Workers Union had initially supported the acr-1000, but later publicly diverged from its alliance with aecl and argued that the company should focus on the ec6. It even ran newspaper ads asking Ontario to build “proven, emission-free Candu 6 reactors.” According to Don Mackinnon, union president, “we need to get building something now, and if the government doesn’t feel comfortable moving to next-generation technology at this moment, then let’s build something we know.”112 Some opg officials also appeared to join the movement away from the acr-1000 and towards the ec6.113 In contrast, other members of the pro-nuclear coalition, most notably aecl, kept insisting on the acr-1000. aecl and its allies argued that if Ontario did not build the acr-1000, then nobody would. This would have meant that Canada would have been abandoning the new advanced nuclear technology despite investing hundreds of millions of dollars in design work. With the sale of aecl’s reactor division to snc-Lavalin and the determination of its new owners to shelve the acr-1000 and to focus on the ec6, this debate over technology is now over. However, it does illustrate that cleavages can and do exist within the pronuclear coalition. The open-bid process also caused a major rift within the Canadian nuclear industry. According to Colin Hunt, director of research and publications for the Canadian Nuclear Association, “candu is not the Canadian nuclear sector. If another reactor design was chosen, Canada would not exit the nuclear industry.”114 Yet there was a definite rallying around aecl by the other industry and union members of the Ontario’s pro-nuclear coalition. Especially active in support of aecl was the Organization of candu Industries. When ge-Hitachi initially decided to bid on the Ontario new nuclear build project, pressure was placed on it by the other members of Team candu, leading ge-Hitachi to pull its proposal.115 Westinghouse and Areva were also seen as interlopers by a Canadian industry with close ties to aecl. This did not stop Areva from campaigning hard for the contract, albeit within the constraints of the Ontario government’s gag order.

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Areva president Armand Laferrere was a constant presence in the Canadian media and at nuclear conferences across the country. Areva even replaced aecl as the signature sponsor of the 2009 cna conference, which caused great embarrassment, since it forced aecl’s owner (nrCan minister Lisa Riatt) to give her keynote address under a large Areva banner. Areva has been emphasizing its global reach while simultaneously maintaining that it is a Canadian company.116 For example, as a result of the legacy of Cogema and other uranium mining companies, Areva has been in Canada for forty years, and it currently employs over eleven hundred Canadians. However, critics have pointed out that the optics of Laferrere’s background – a member of the French elite who had studied at Ecole Normale Supérieure ulm Lettres, had been a senior French civil servant, and was a close confidant of French president Sarkozy – damaged Areva’s efforts to portray itself as a Canadian company. The cna tried to stay above the fray. As the major industry association, it had to perform a very delicate balancing act because its membership includes business competitors. This was most evident in the bidding process for Ontario’s new nuclear power plants, because aecl and Areva, both high-profile members of the cna, were competing. This is why the cna discusses general nuclear policy and does not get into specific reactor types.117 The long, drawn-out privatization process for aecl also contributed to the fragmentation of the pro-nuclear coalition. Both the key nuclear unions – the pwu and the spea – opposed the privatization of aecl, believing that it would lead to job losses and possibly foreign ownership. Meanwhile, the oci supported the privatization, claiming that it would strengthen aecl. “A stronger aecl, positioned to compete internationally, will have a powerful impact on Canada’s economy and the thousands of workers who make up Canada’s nuclear supply chain.”118 aecl’s management team was also supportive of the impending restructuring of the company.119 T H E W I N N I N G C O A L I T I O N I N T H E O N TA R I O N U C L E A R S E C TO R

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the pro-nuclear coalition was very influential in Ontario. During those years, nuclear policy was a closed shop decided on by aecl, Ontario Hydro, and government bureaucrats.

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There was very little public engagement or opposition. This situation ended in the late 1970s and 1980s with the rise of the anti-nuclear movement and the financial disaster of the Darlington nuclear power plant. The anti-nuclear coalition gradually gained influence in both public opinion and within government. Its influence peaked in 1997, when the Ontario government shut down a third of its nuclear fleet. However, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the pendulum has swung back. Today, the pro-nuclear coalition in Ontario has regained influence, and the anti-nuclear coalition has seen its influence wane. Anti-nuclear groups like Energy Probe, Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, and the Ontario Clean Air Alliance are well organized and have access to the media and government officials. They have tried many different strategies for preventing the nuclear revival from occurring in Ontario, including appearances at public hearings, independent studies, submissions to expert panels, conference participation, public demonstrations, petitions, and media interventions. But in the end the arguments they have used to try to discredit nuclear power have not convinced the Ontario government. There may indeed be critics of nuclear power in Ontario’s Ministries of Energy, Environment, and Finance, as well as at opg and even among some of McGuinty’s political advisors,120 but Premier McGuinty and the rest of his government have come to the conclusion that while they will never fall in love with nuclear power, they do recognize that it is the best solution to a complex problem. According to McGuinty, “there is nothing that is neat and tidy by way of a solution to our energy challenges. Natural gas is too expensive, wind power is unreliable, coal plants pollute the air and Ontario’s hydroelectric potential has largely been maxed out.” This leaves nuclear power expansion “on the table” for province.”121 Besides making the hard calculations of the strengths and weaknesses of competing electricity options, the Ontario government’s endorsement of nuclear power was buttressed by rising public support. In April 2002, 57 percent of Ontarians supported nuclear power, but by August 2009 that figure had grown to 62 percent.122 Even in the aftermath of the June 2009 decision to suspend the new nuclear build project, public support for nuclear power rose. Twenty-seven percent of Ontarians felt that the province “should get on with it and build new nuclear power plants to ensure we have an adequate and

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reliable source of power for the future.” Another 24 percent agreed that the province should build new plants “sooner rather than later.” Only 13 percent opposed new nuclear power plants.123 The Canadian Nuclear Association had a direct effect on this rise in public support. Between 2003 and 2007, it launched a major advertising campaign in print, radio, and television to reassure Ontarians about the role of nuclear power in their province. This successful public relations campaign showed the influence of the nuclear industry in Ontario. Even after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, the Ontario public’s support for nuclear energy remains the highest in Canada. A June 2011 poll showed that 53 percent of Ontarians supported nuclear energy and that 50 percent supported the building of new nuclear power plants.124 It is true that the new nuclear build project was initially suspended, but it was not cancelled. Moreover, two years later, Ontario is back supporting a new nuclear build. Even its June 2009 suspension decision was caused by a fight with the federal government over price and the future of aec, not by an innate opposition towards nuclear power. For example, multiple restart and refurbishment projects have occurred in the last several years, and other nuclear projects are expected in the future. Even though there have been technical and financial glitches with some of these nuclear projects, the governing Liberal party remains committed to nuclear power. Even if the Liberals were replaced in a future election, the Progressive Conservative party would be just as supportive of nuclear power. Only in the unlikely event of an ndp victory during a future provincial election would the nuclear agenda be jeopardized. THE CHANGES WITHIN THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

There have been three major changes within Ontario’s advocacy coalition framework. The first was the revival of Ontario’s nuclear sector after years of stagnation. During the 1980s and 1990s, there were no new orders for nuclear reactors, and, in fact, this period saw the shutting down of a third of Ontario’s nuclear fleet. In recent years, four reactors have been restarted, and there are efforts to extend the life of many of them through elaborate refurbishment programs. In addition, the government undertook a comprehensive process for adding

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new nuclear capacity. It is now clear to most observers (including critics) that Ontario will build new nuclear reactors. The second change was the fragmentation of the pro-nuclear coalition in the Ontario nuclear policy community, which was caused by the competitive-bid split process for the new reactor build project and the restructuring of aecl. Industry was split between aecl and Areva, with companies and industry associations either choosing one side over the other or trying to uneasily to remain neutral between the two. The unions also broke with aecl management and oci over both the initial reactor design for the new build proposal and the privatization plans for the company. Finally, the emergence of Bruce Power as a critical and distinct actor has been an important change in the Ontario nuclear sector. Bruce Power was created in 2001 to operate the Bruce nuclear power plant under a long-term lease. It was the first private sector nuclear operator in Canada. When it received the license to operate the Bruce facility, the situation was quite grim. All four Bruce a units were laid up, and the Bruce b units were underperforming. In less than a decade, two of the Bruce a units have been restarted, and the company is in the midst of an ambitious multi-billion dollar project to refurbish all four reactors. The performance levels of the Bruce b reactors have been gradually rising under the operation of Bruce Power,125 and there are now plans to refurbish the Bruce b reactors, extending their life to the middle of the century. Bruce Power has also illustrated an entrepreneurial culture as it has attempted an expansion strategy. Within Ontario, Bruce Power investigated adding new units at the existing Bruce facility, as well as converting the Nanticoke coal-fired plant to a nuclear power plant. It also considered expanding outside Ontario by conducting feasibility studies in both Alberta and Saskatchewan. Ultimately, Bruce Power cancelled its Ontario expansion, and its initiatives in the prairie provinces have yet to be finalized, but the fact that it was willing to try was considered refreshing in an often conservative culture in the Canadian nuclear industry. Perhaps the long-term impact of Bruce Power’s successful entry into the nuclear industry will be its demonstration effect. It showed that a private sector nuclear company can make money and improve efficiency without compromising safety.126 Both Ottawa and Queen’s Park have learned from Bruce Power’s example. Queen’s Park has

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encouraged opg to operate as if it was a private sector company and Ottawa has privatized aecl. Governments are realizing that given the extent of regulation that already exists in the nuclear sector, that it is okay to allow private capital to dominate the industry.

5 New Brunswick

N U C L E A R H I S TO R Y

New Brunswick was the third province (after Ontario and Quebec) to acquire nuclear power. There had been some initial discussion in the 1950s, but the decision to build the province’s first nuclear reactor at Point Lepreau, thirty-five kilometres southwest of Saint John, was not made until the early 1970s. Construction of a candu-6, the first of its kind, began in 1975 and the reactor went on-line in 1983. It cost $1.44 billion. The 1980s have been described as the “nuclear age” in New Brunswick, since the Point Lepreau reactor provided 30 percent of New Brunswick’s electricity and contributed a third of its production to export sales to the New England region of the United States.1 The Point Lepreau project was originally designed for two reactors, but it was scaled back to one. Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s there were periodic discussions about adding a second reactor at Point Lepreau.2 In the 1982 provincial election campaign, Progressive Conservative premier Richard Hatfield promised to add a second reactor, but even though he won the election, he abandoned the proposal. The proposal for a second reactor at Point Lepreau would return again in 2007. This is discussed in more detail later on in this chapter. Point Lepreau, through much of its history, was one of the world’s most efficient reactors. It was ranked in the top ten of the world’s most efficient reactors in twelve years of its operation.3 Point Lepreau has had a lifetime capacity factor (measured as the percentage of time that the reactor operates at its design level) of 79.22 percent. Table 5.1 shows the yearly capacity factor percentages of the Point Lepreau reactor.

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival THE NEW BRUNSWICK NUCLEAR ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

The Pro-Nuclear Coalition The New Brunswick pro-nuclear coalition is comprised of the provincial utility, the nuclear industry, unions of nuclear workers, and the nuclear science community. New Brunswick Power (NB Power) is the provincial Crown corporation that has a monopoly over electricity in New Brunswick. It produces electricity from fifteen hydro, coal, oil, and nuclear facilities. The Point Lepreau reactor is its most important facility because it generates between 25 and 30 percent of New Brunswick’s electricity. As a result of changes in 1996 to the province’s Electric Power Act, nb Power is required to operate on a commercial basis and make decisions based on sound business practices. After a 2004 restructuring, Nuclearco was established as nb Power’s operating company for Point Lepreau and for the nuclear sector in the province. nb Power owns and operates Point Lepreau, but if a second reactor were to be built, it would be under a merchant model. nb Power would purchase electricity from a second reactor, but it would not own it. The New Brunswick nuclear industry is led by aecl, which designed and built Point Lepreau and had maintained a permanent office in New Brunswick since the 1970s. It was also in New Brunswick that the Team candu consortium first appeared. Members included aecl and the four most important private sector component supplier companies: Babcock & Wilcox (steam generators), General Electric Canada (fuel services), Hitachi Canada (turbine generator, condensing feed heating plant, large motors), and snc-Lavalin Nuclear (engineering and construction). Team candu was formed “to provide a business model whereby each of the partners takes on a share of project risk to deliver new candu power plants on a turnkey basis.”4 The proposed second reactor at Point Lepreau was their immediate target, and then they would apply the concept to other markets. Besides Team candu, there are some locally based New Brunswick nuclear companies, like Sunny Corner Enterprises Inc (construction and steel fabrication), Precision Nuclear (manufacturing of vacuum chambers and end fittings for reactors), and Lorneville Mechanical Contractors (mechanical services). The nuclear labour unions are active participants in the New

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Table 5.1 Point Lepreau Yearly Load Capacity Factors (1984–2005, %) 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

89.66 97.47 93.9 91.82 95.7 94.68 95.89 97.75 89.59 95.64 94.02 28.97 82.25 62.12 68 73.4 71.12 80.02 67.61 85.2 77.09 78.61 78.42 74.1

Lifetime Average

79.22

Source: iaea, Power Reactor Information System, “Point Lepreau.” Accessed on 16 December 2009 at http://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/.

Brunswick pro-nuclear coalition. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (ibew), a member of the Canadian Nuclear Workers Council, provides many of the workers at the Point Lepreau reactor. Except for a famous 1979 incident when Saint John workers supported the “No candu for Argentina” movement by refusing to load a shipment of heavy water destined for Argentina, New Brunswick unions have strongly supported the nuclear industry. For example, during the 2002 public hearings by the New Brunswick Board of Commissioner for Public Utilities (pub) over the refurbishment of

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Point Lepreau, the ibew was granted intervener status and supported the project. A number of scientific actors are members of the New Brunswick pro-nuclear coalition: the New Brunswick Branch of the Canadian Nuclear Society, the Canadian Nuclear Energy Research Centre (cner), and the international Centre of Excellence for the retubing of candu-6 reactors. cner is a non-profit research and corrosion monitoring company located at the University of New Brunswick. The international Centre of Excellence, located in Saint John, was established by aecl as part of the Point Lepreau refurbishment project. It “serves as a recruiting and training facility for the more than 800 additional staff that are working on the refurbishment project.” Engineers and nuclear technicians from Quebec, South Korea, and Argentina are at the Centre of Excellence to “receive comprehensive training on refurbishment methods and on the high-tech tooling required for these complex projects.” After the refurbishment project is finished, the Centre of Excellence is expected to continue with “further training and retraining opportunities in nuclear energy.”5 The Anti-Nuclear Coalition The major local anti-nuclear organization is the Campaign for a Nuclear Free New Brunswick (cnfnb), which cnfnb “is supported by a group of concerned citizens opposed to nuclear activity in the province of New Brunswick including uranium exploration and mining, and nuclear power generation.” Membership in the cnfnb includes local chapters of national organizations (like the Sierra Club), peace groups (the Fredericton Peace Coalition), local environmental groups (Petitcodiac Riverkeeper), and social-justice groups (Mobilization). The cnfnb believes that nuclear power is dirty, dangerous, relies on a non-renewable resource (uranium), is unaffordable, and is unethical because of its link to nuclear weapons and depleted uranium. As a consequence of these objections, the cnfnb has three goals: •

• •

A permanent ban on uranium exploration and mining in New Brunswick; Abandonment of plans for nuclear power expansion; and Immediate phase out of existing nuclear programs including the abandonment of plans to refurbish the Point Lepreau reactor.6

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POLICY BROKERS

The government of New Brunswick is the nuclear policy broker for the province, and the lead actor is the Department of Energy. New Brunswick Energy has attempted to rebrand the province as “a world-class energy hub.” According to New Brunswick Energy, “an energy hub is a central marketplace where energy related companies, people, research, generation, distribution and related activities and projects are located.” New Brunswick has “a diverse mix of energy generation; an oil refinery and its related petroleum by-products; nuclear electricity generation; hydro-electricity; bio-mass and combustion.” In addition, because of these resources and New Brunswick’s small population, its “generation capacities provide more than enough energy for [its] own consumption allowing [it] to market the excess.” Also contributing to the “energy hub” metaphor is New Brunswick’s central location to markets in Quebec, parts of the eastern United States, and the rest of Atlantic Canada.7 To capitalize on the “energy hub” brand, there have been over $20 billion worth of major energy projects being built in New Brunswick. These include the Point Lepreau refurbishment, a liquefied natural gas (lng) terminal at Saint John, a natural gas pipeline to service the lng terminal, a proposed second oil refinery (the Eider Rock project),8 and the Kent Hills wind farm. A final energy hub project is the proposal to build a second reactor at the Point Lepreau site. The other government department that is a nuclear policy broker is New Brunswick Environment (air quality, climate change, environmental impact assessments, and water issues). The New Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board (eub) – formerly the New Brunswick Board of Commissioner for Public Utilities – “is an independent crown agency established by the Legislature to regulate the electricity, natural gas, motor carrier industries and set maximum gasoline prices for the province.”9 In the case of nuclear power, the eub “has the responsibility to regulate certain aspects of the electricity market in the province. This authority includes licensing participants in the electricity market,” including the Point Lepreau reactor.10 In the eub’s decision making – for example, concerning the refurbishment of Point Lepreau – it conducts public hearings that include the pre-filing of evidence, opportunities for interveners to make information requests, witnesses, and final submissions.11

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The Decision to Refurbish Point Lepreau By the late 1990s Point Lepreau was starting to show its age. In November 1999, the aecb put Point Lepreau under a special watch because its quality assurance program needed to be strengthened. According to Ken Pereira of the aecb’s performance evaluation division, “the program at Point Lepreau [was] no longer appropriate for conditions of the plant, the age of the plant and the experience of the plant.”12 More worrisome was that in 1997 and 1998, Point Lepreau “suffered two major shutdowns and has had a dozen serious reportable nuclear incidents.”13 After years of being the pride of the candu fleet because of its high capacity factor, Point Lepreau started to see its ratings drop. In 1996, Point Lepreau’s lifetime capacity factor was a very high 88.4 percent, but by 1999 it had dropped to 73.58 percent.14 For these reasons the New Brunswick government started to consider refurbishing the Point Lepreau reactor. As explained in chapter 3, refurbishment is a very complex and expensive process designed to extend the life of a nuclear reactor. It involves re-tubing and other plant upgrades. The decision to refurbish was a difficult one, since it had to consider economic feasibility, energy security, and environmental issues. There are a number of advantages of refurbishment. First, it extends the life of a reactor by twenty-five to thirty years. Without refurbishment, Point Lepreau would have had to be permanently shut down in 2010, but with refurbishment, it would be able to operate beyond 2030. Second, refurbishment is not only designed to extend the life of the reactor but, since it would conduct a comprehensive upgrade of its systems, its safety and performance would be enhanced. Third, despite the high cost of refurbishment – about $1.4 billion – it is still about 50 percent cheaper to refurbish than to build a new reactor. Fourth, refurbishment defers both the cost and environmental cleanup involved in decommissioning a reactor. Fifth, you don’t lose the labour force. Even though the reactor would be off-line, the Point Lepreau workforce would still be working during the refurbishment process. For example, operators would still be needed to monitor radiation. Sixth, the refurbishment process, especially a first-of-a-kind project, would increase New Brunswick’s nuclear expertise. Finally, deciding to close Point Lepreau, instead of refurbishing it, would lead to a

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shift away from nuclear power to fossil fuel sources (coal or natural gas), which would increase ghg emissions.15 In contrast, there are a number of economic, technological, and environmental arguments against refurbishment. First, it might be more cost-effective to replace nuclear power with a natural gas plant. Determining the economic viability of refurbishment requires comparing the costs of the project, capital (debt and equity), replacement electricity (while the reactor is off-line), escalation, contingency, and the long-term operations versus the costs of acquiring additional electricity by building and operating a natural gas plant. A key part of this decision making is the anticipated capacity factor of the refurbished; the higher the capacity factor, the better the case for refurbishment; the lower the capacity factor, the better the case against refurbishment. Second, there is the risk of attempting a first-of-a-kind project. Could there be some unforeseen technical problems that would lead to significant delays and cost overruns? Third, there could be regulatory risks if the cnsc adds additional requirements during the refurbishment project. Fourth, for those opposed to nuclear power on environmental and/or health grounds, the refurbishment debate constitutes a good moment to shut down the reactor.16 To assess these arguments, nb Power conducted a number of internal and external reviews over several years to determine whether to proceed with the refurbishment of Point Lepreau. The first review took place in 1998, and after assessing the technical and economic aspects of refurbishment, it determined that Point Lepreau should be refurbished in the 2006–8 period. In 2001, nb Power reached a $40 million agreement with aecl to provide a technical assessment of a potential refurbishment. The assessment would consist of “preliminary engineering for fuel channel replacement and a compressive plant condition appraisal.”17 In 2002, the New Brunswick Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities (pub) considered a proposal from nb Power that Point Lepreau should be refurbished. The estimated cost was approximately $1.14 billion and would cover the project, financing, and replacement electricity charges. The pub conducted public hearings on the refurbishment question and concluded, based on a review of the “capacity factor and the cost of capital”18 that “there [was] no significant economic advantage to the proposed refurbishment project.” Therefore it recommended “to the Board of Directors of nb Power that it not proceed with the refurbishment of Point Lepreau.” However, the pub noted that there might be non-economic fac-

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tors outside the purview of the pub that only the government could evaluate.19 Following the release of the pub report, a number of events led the New Brunswick government to revisit the refurbishment project. First, projections showed that electricity demand in New Brunswick would continue to grow. If Point Lepreau were permanently shut down, which would occur in the absence of refurbishment, alternative electricity sources would have to be found. Second, the refurbishment of Pickering Unit 4 in Ontario saw cost overruns and scheduling delays. The Pickering refurbishment was not an identical project to that of Point Lepreau, but it was comparable. Third, there were concerns about the possible impact on the electricity generation mix in New Brunswick and the desire to minimize costs and risk to taxpayers and ratepayers, depending on whether or not to refurbish.20 Therefore, the New Brunswick government decided to commission a review by Dr Robin Jeffrey, an international nuclear expert. The Jeffrey review, released in April 2004, determined that the Point Lepreau project would be “much less complex” than the one at Pickering because Point Lepreau was a “more modern plant with a simpler design,” meant that Point Lepreau required only “32 design changes ... compared with 810 at Pickering.” There were also substantial differences in the extent of environmental assessments and risk mitigation strategies between Point Lepreau and Pickering. This led Jeffrey to conclude that “there are sound reasons to believe that the Point Lepreau refurbishment project can be done without the massive over-runs experienced at Pickering” (3–4). The Point Lepreau refurbishment project was a partnership between nb Power and aecl. nb Power was the owner of the plant, but aecl was the reactor designer and acknowledged candu expert. Three contracts that had been signed for refurbishment, retubing, and plant performance. A fourth contract was also being proposed, one for candu operations support services. Jeffrey felt that these contracts left nb Power too exposed to scheduling delays and cost overruns. He also believed that aecl’s bonus structure was based on a threshold (80 percent) that was too low for Point Lepreau’s future performance and made four recommendations: 1 The basis of the aecl retubing and refurbishment contracts should be renegotiated in respect of pricing and commercial terms.

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2 These contracts should be put onto a “fixed price” basis so that aecl takes the escalation risk. 3 Either the terms of the aecl plant performance contract should be revised so that there is an equitable proportioning of risk and reward or the contract should be terminated. 4 The negotiations on the candu operational support services contract should be terminated. (7) Unlike the pub analysis, Jeffrey went beyond the financial cost of refurbishment to consider other aspects. First, failing to refurbish Point Lepreau would require “the replacement of nuclear by fossil based generation [which] would have a significant adverse impact on New Brunswick’s effort to meet its commitments to greenhouse gas reduction; i.e., replacement by coal would contribute around 4 million tonnes of co2 and similarly replacement by natural gas would add 2 million tonnes of co2.” Second, Jeffrey considered the employment opportunities both for existing Point Lepreau employees and New Brunswick companies that would receive sub-contracts to work on the refurbishment. Third, he pointed out that “Point Lepreau is the centre of a high technology industry and this has a favourable impact on local schools, universities and community colleges.” Fourth was the fact that nuclear power contributes to energy security. Canadian uranium fuel “provides a diverse and secure fuel source. Market price fluctuations have little effect on nuclear plant economics unlike fossil fuel prices that have a major impact on fossil generation costs.” Moreover, if nuclear was to be replaced by fossil fuel (coal or natural gas) “there would be a significant reduction in fuel diversity within the province.” Jeffrey recommended that “the New Brunswick government should review the non-economic benefits of the refurbishment project and determine what weighting should be attached to these” (15–17). Jeffrey’s report urged the New Brunswick government to consider the following options on the proposed refurbishment project. First, nb Power could renegotiate its aecl contracts to do the refurbishment work. Second, it could abandon Point Lepreau and start to research fossil fuel options to replace nuclear power. And third, it could consider the involvement of potential equity partners (19). nb Power responded by announcing its intention to renegotiate its contracts with aecl.21 Later on, nb Power hired Citigroup to assist in analyzing possible private sector partners in the Point Lepreau reactor and also

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approached Bruce Power to submit a proposal on participating in the refurbishment.22 In July 2005, the New Brunswick government announced that it was going ahead with the refurbishment in a partnership with aecl. The project would begin on 28 March 2008 and was intended to cost $1.4 billion and be completed by September 2009. aecl was given responsibility “for two aspects of the overall project: retubing in which 380 fuel channels and associated feeder tubes will be removed and replaced, and construction of a facility on site to store the removed active material; and refurbishment, where aging components and outdated technology will be removed and upgraded.” Meanwhile, nb Power, would be “responsible for other aspects of the project, including: normal shut down of plant for outage, removal of fuel, heavy water, normal maintenance during outage, providing new fuel, reloading heavy water and providing station staff to restart the plant.”23 Premier Bernard Lord, a Progressive Conservative, stated that “proceeding in partnership with aecl allows us to meet all our project objectives, including balancing our risk and the cost, ensuring security and diversity of supply, maximizing environmental benefits, and maintaining 700 highly skilled jobs.” Lord went on to say that the refurbishment project was “the most prudent, balanced, and realistic approach to take. It is prudent because it allows us to secure a reliable, cost-efficient energy supply for commercial and non-commercial users. It is balanced because it takes a balanced approach to risk and cost, and it balances environmental concerns with economic development. It is realistic because it allows us to continue to pursue our objective to ensure diversity and security of our energy supply.”24 The decision to refurbish Point Lepreau received bipartisan support as Liberal leader Shawn Graham also supported the decision. When Graham became premier in 2006 he would take over responsibility for overseeing the project. The Experience of Refurbishing Point Lepreau As a first-of-a-kind project, the refurbishment project required new technology. After all, replacing components when the reactor core is still radioactive is not an easy process. Joe Howieson, Team candu project leader, described it as “repairing your tv from across the street.”25 In order to do the job, “more than 50 highly automated tooling systems for fuel channel and calandria tube replacement have

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been designed and developed by the team at aecl. Many of these tools are first-of-a-kind, while others are based on tools used for new reactor construction and previous refurbishments of different candu models.”26 Since new technologies had to be invented for the project, it is not surprising that there have been significant technical difficulties resulting in scheduling delays and cost overruns. The project was divided into stages. The first stage, performed by nb Power, was shutting down the plant, defueling the reactor core, removing all the fuel bundles, and draining the pressurized heat transport system of its heavy water. This went smoothly: it took three months and came in slightly ahead of schedule. But problems were encountered in the second stage, which began in March 2008. This stage, which consisted of the retubing, was aecl’s responsibility. Retubing involved removing the pressure tubes and channel and then reassembling everything. It was expected to be completed by September 2009, but delays have been pushing it back significantly. The retubing was finally finished in April 2012. Two key technical problems contributed to these delays. First, aecl had difficulties with an automated tool designed to dismantle the reactor’s pressure tubes, which are the most radioactive components that have to be removed from the reactor. Second, a technique used to polish the end shields before installing the new calandria tubes failed, which forced aecl to remove all 380 tubes after they had already been installed and redo the work from scratch. Clearly, aecl should have tested some of the tubes before installing all of them; failing to do so has pushed everything else back. Stage three, which is to be led by nb Power, is the commissioning and return to service of the reactor, which has been delayed to the fall of 2012. aecl was also let down by one of its local suppliers. Precision Nuclear, a manufacturing facility based in Mactaquac, was held up by the Graham government as the shining example of how a refurbishment project would help develop the New Brunswick economy. Precision Nuclear signed a $10 million contract with aecl to supply end fittings for the Point Lepreau refurbishment. Both the provincial and federal governments contributed significant financial support. The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency provided Precision Nuclear with a $500,000 loan and a $50,000 grant, and the Graham government provided it with a $227,500 forgivable loan for job creation and an additional $950,000 in loan guarantees.27 The company later

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signed a contract for work on the Wolsong refurbishment project in South Korea. Unfortunately the story did not end well: because of financial problems Precision Nuclear was unable to deliver the product, and aecl had to cancel its orders for Wolsong and go to another supplier. aecl, which had been funding Precision Nuclear since September 2008, was able to delay bankruptcy long enough to get the required parts for Point Lepreau, but the project was pushed back because the original delivery date was May 2008.28 Precision Nuclear eventually went into receivership in February 2009. These scheduling delays involved major costs. The contract between nb Power and aecl anticipated the possibility of cost overruns and assigned responsibility and financial penalties. Construction cost overruns, which have run into the hundreds of millions of dollars, are solely the responsibility of aecl; replacement-electricity costs are nb Power’s responsibility. These costs amount to about $1 million a day, but even though some partial financial penalties are assigned to aecl, nb Power must still pay a hefty $22 million a month, which will result in about $1 billion in extra costs, more than double the original estimate of $400 million. As the delays mounted and the costs increased, it was inevitable that there would be finger pointing. When former premier Lord announced the refurbishment project in 2005, he also set the scene for the province’s future line of argument. Lord claimed that the federal government had a responsibility to support New Brunswick’s nuclear industry. “We were shocked by the decision of the federal government not to invest in New Brunswick by investing in the refurbishment of Point Lepreau,” he said. Later in his speech, in words that would be prophetic, Lord said “I would like to remind the federal government that aecl is their corporation, and we will hold the federal government accountable for aecl’s performance as we move forward with this project.”29 Following Lord’s path, Premier Graham wrote to Prime Minister Stephen Harper in January and September 2009 demanding that the federal government fully compensate, beyond the original contract’s contingency provisions, nb Power for the delays.30 Harper responded that the refurbishment delays were also costing the federal government “a lot of money.” The contract between nb Power and aecl “imposes significant obligations on the federal government and we will be respecting those contractual obligations.”31 Besides arguing over money, the two governments were also playing the blame game. Premier Graham, referring to the Ontario reac-

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tor bid process and medical isotopes, suggested that “aecl seems to be scattered in a number of different areas. There are a number of issues that seem to be taking away from their top priority, which should be the refurbishment of the first Candu 6 reactor.”32 Energy Minister Jack Keir added his opinion that aecl’s “poor management” of the project was the cause of the delays.33 Keir’s opinion was shared by the Moncton Times & Transcript, which claimed in a scathing editorial that aecl “was once a world-class company producing world class nuclear generators; state-of-the-art reactors with excellent production records and said to be the safest of all reactor designs. It has, however, been sliding downhill for many years now. Today, aecl is an embarrassment. It is also clearly a fat bureaucracy that is not only inept, but doesn’t appear to understand how bad it looks to everyone else. The Point Lepreau refit is only reinforcing that negative image.”34 In contrast, Lisa Raitt, the federal natural resources minister, said that the problems at Point Lepreau were the exclusive responsibility of aecl and nb Power, who were both “autonomous agencies.”35 She also maintained that the “business case is still there” for the refurbishment. In addition, the experience will help with future nuclear projects because “they’re developing new tools and learning from whatever delays are happening.” For Raitt, the blame needed to be placed on timelines that “were too ambitious” for a first-of-a-kind project.36 Similarly, Ross Galbraith, head of the ibew in New Brunswick, argued that it was not project management, but the “incredibly complex robotic equipment” that was being designed and used.37 The impact of the significant delays goes beyond financial cost. They have also damaged, fairly or unfairly, aecl’s reputation for managing nuclear projects on time and on budget. Before the project had even really got started, the deputy minister of New Brunswick Energy had warned that “aecl’s credibility was on the line.”38 Premier Graham reiterated this warning to Prime Minister Harper when he wrote that an unsuccessful outcome to deliver this world’s first refurbishment project for both aecl and the Province will cause substantial harm to the Canadian nuclear industry, particularly at a time when governments are charged with serious greenhouse gas emission targets in the electricity sector, and this by 2020. A poor result will also adversely affect aecl’s business both within Canada and abroad. The eyes of the world’s nuclear community are

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focused on this refurbishment project and I cannot over emphasize the strategic importance of this file to our Province, its residents and the Canadian nuclear industry’s competitiveness.39 Keir was sympathetic about the steep learning curve that aecl was facing in completing its first ever candu-6 refurbishment at Point Lepreau. He understood that future refurbishment projects would go more smoothly because of the new tools developed and lessons learned. Nevertheless, he remarked that “the ratepayers of New Brunswick are paying for aecl to learn how to do this better in Korea, Romania, and Argentina.” Keir believed that Ottawa, not just New Brunswick, should be paying for this type of learning.40 Since aecl was also losing hundreds of millions because of the delays at Point Lepreau, Ottawa gave aecl a cash infusion of $300 million in its 2010 budget to support, in part, the problems it faced at Point Lepreau.41 This money was over and above emergency instalments of $100 million provided in March 2009 and $200 million in November 2009. According to a Treasury Board document, the money “will be used to address a cash shortfall caused by unexpected challenges on Candu reactor refurbishment contracts.”42 A Second Reactor at Point Lepreau? The proposal to build a second reactor at Point Lepreau, like the refurbishment project, was part of New Brunswick’s “a world-class energy hub” strategy. On 1 August 2007, the New Brunswick government announced that it had accepted a proposal by aecl and its Team candu partners (Babcock & Wilcox, General Electric Canada, Hitachi Canada, and snc-Lavalin Nuclear) to fund and conduct a feasibility study for the construction of the acr-1000 at Point Lepreau.43 The study, at a cost of $2.5 million, assessed the business case for a second reactor. It looked at the market demand for electricity from a second reactor (in New Brunswick and for exports to New England and New York), at electricity transmission options to the United States, project delivery, the operation model, the project’s timeline, and the possible environmental and socio-economic impacts. The second reactor would be based on a merchant model built and owned by Team candu. Patrick Lamarre, president of snc-Lavalin Nuclear, said that “if the study is favourable, the funding for the project will be organized by Team candu and by private investors and not

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by New Brunswick taxpayers.” This statement was echoed by Energy Minister Jack Keir, who maintained that “at this point in time there is absolutely no risk – no risk – to the ratepayers and taxpayers of New Brunswick.”44 nb Power’s role would be limited to purchasing electricity from the second reactor for New Brunswick. However, it was possible that its role could be expanded to operating the plant (as it does at Point Lepreau) or even to investing as a partner. Team candu presented its feasibility study, which found that there was a market for a second nuclear reactor at Point Lepreau, to the New Brunswick government in February 2008.45 New Brunswick hired MZConsulting to provide it with a second feasibility study that would be independent of the nuclear industry.46 MZConsulting “studied the market for electricity, both domestically and for export; looked at potential business structures and assessed the risks associated with various options; prepared a high level business case to determine if this can be an economically viable project; and finally, considered the economic benefits to the province” (2). The consulting firm determined that the market in Atlantic Canada and New England was large enough for nuclear-based electricity exports from New Brunswick, concluding that the “project [could] be viable under a set of suitable conditions” (2). The first condition was that Team candu, not the government of New Brunswick, would be responsible for raising the money to build the reactor. Second, the project would have to be based on a merchant model in which the owner of the reactor (Team candu) would sell electricity to multiple customers (including, but not limited to, nb Power) on long-term contracts. Third, Team candu had to be responsible for all the risk (scheduling delays, cost overruns, etc.) that a first-of-a-kind new build (acr-1000) represented. There were a number of drivers for the second reactor proposal. The first, as mentioned by Premier Graham, was to use nuclear power to “further cement New Brunswick’s growing position as an energy hub on the Eastern seaboard.”47 The key to this strategy was New Brunswick’s central geographic location between the rest of Atlantic Canada, the Atlantic Ocean, Quebec, and the northeastern United States. Electricity exports from New Brunswick would address the anticipated electricity shortfall in New England, which aecl predicted to be between 4,300 and 6,400 megawatts by 2018.48 us utilities in New England, despite the thirst for electricity, would not be building new coal- or gas-fired plants to avoid the ghg emissions that accom-

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pany those sources. In addition, because of the nimby syndrome, they were also reluctant to build new nuclear reactors in the region. According to Howard Hayden, emeritus professor of physics at the University of Connecticut and editor and publisher of the Energy Advocate, as soon as a nuclear reactor is proposed, “legions of demonstrators always descend on the company.”49 This pattern provided an opportunity for nuclear-generated electricity exports from New Brunswick. Jobs and spin-off opportunities for New Brunswick were a second driver. Premier Graham emphasized that “significant private sector investment into electricity generation in New Brunswick” would create “up to 4,000 jobs during construction and 500 permanent, highpaying jobs to operate the facility.”50 In its feasibility study MZConsulting recommended that when considering the employment benefits to New Brunswick the “emphasis should be on knowledgebased infrastructure more than on fabrication,”51 which is why Energy Minister Keir maintained that “a primary focus of the initiative is to develop New Brunswick supply chain capacity and capability in the nuclear sector, with a particular focus on knowledge and fabrication applications, including expertise in the refurbishment of nuclear reactors.”52 The Centre of Excellence for Retubing of candu reactors was an inducement for going with aecl for the refurbishment project, and Keir hoped to replicate that type of spin-off with the second reactor project. aecl has promised that it would establish a similar centre for excellence for acr-1000 reactors to reward New Brunswick for being the first jurisdiction to build the new model. New Brunswick officials hoped that an additional reactor at Point Lepreau (with a possibility for even more), combined with two centres of excellence for nuclear research and development, would spur on the private sector firms in Team candu to similarly move some of their operations to Saint John, creating a nuclear cluster. In fact, one of the reasons that Team candu was chosen without a bid process for the project, instead of competitors like Areva, was its willingness to conduct research and development in the province instead of just building a reactor.53 It is true that Areva was also approached to make a greater investment in New Brunswick in exchange for a reactor contract. Premier Graham even travelled to Paris to meet with Areva officials about the proposal. However, Areva was taken aback by this request because the New Brunswick market was simply too small to justify that type of

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additional investment. As Armand Laferrere, former president of Areva Canada asserted, “are these guys serious? New Brunswick only has one reactor!”54 Even though two separate feasibility studies that favoured the construction of a second reactor had been completed, announcement of the initiation of the project was being delayed by several factors. First, the global economic recession had resulted in a lower demand for electricity and had also created a credit crunch. According to Energy Minister Keir, “one [hurdle] is still the credit issue, on how quickly this recession is going to be over, and some of these investors can get access to credible capital opportunities.”55 Already one of the major projects for the New Brunswick energy hub strategy – the $8 billion second oil refinery in Saint John built by Irving Oil and BP – had been cancelled because of the recession. aecl officials have said that the New Brunswick government has said yes to a second reactor, but Team candu has had difficulty in convincing private sector investors56 Second, uncertainty surrounded the future of aecl as the federal government considered various privatization options (discussed in more detail in chapter 3). According to Keir, “these investors have sat down with aecl and talked to them about using their technology. And certainly that’s causing me some concern, in terms of what the federal government’s going to do with aecl and whether they’re going to sell it or keep it and give it the required funds.”57 The aecl question was also used to explain the suspension of the nuclear new builds in Ontario (discussed in chapter 4). Finally, the problems with the Point Lepreau refurbishment were contributing to the delay. In September 2009, Energy Minister Keir warned that the delays and cost overruns jeopardized the new build. “Any noise created like that obviously causes everybody to pause and ponder.”58 While the Team candu proposal for a second reactor in New Brunswick was dying a slow death, Areva had returned with another offer. In July 2010, New Brunswick and Areva signed a letter of intent to explore building a lwr to deliver electricity for New Brunswick, the other Maritime provinces, and the New England states.59 The letter of intent established a framework for cooperation, including “technical feasibility studies, early site studies, and development of project financing options.” Areva would be solely responsible for designing, constructing, and financing a reactor with the goal of having it operational by 2020. The project would be part

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of a larger “clean energy park” that would include wind, solar, biomass, and natural gas generation. Graham praised the deal as being about “jobs” and “spin-off benefits.” Moreover, “the project would involve no financial risk whatsoever to New Brunswickers. Our government has made it clear that a second reactor would have to be funded completely by private investors.”60 For his part, Jack Keir went out of his way to blast aecl. “The way this is playing out isn’t good for aecl. Certainly, in the international market when you are looking for stability and reliability. And with the issues they had at Chalk River and with the Maples and at Point Lepreau, it is a tough sell for aecl.”61 The Aborted Sale of nb Power to Hydro-Québec At a 29 October 2009 joint press conference in Fredericton, Premier Graham was joined on stage by Quebec Premier Jean Charest to make a shocking announcement: nb Power was being sold to HydroQuébec in a $10 billion transaction.62 In addition to receiving nb Power’s generating stations, transmission lines, and other assets, Hydro-Québec also gained greater geographic access to the lucrative us market. Hydro-Québec would immediately shut down nb Power’s generating stations at Dalhousie (oil), Courtenay Bay (oil), and Grand Lakes (coal) and replace them with hydroelectricity power from Quebec. The facilities at Belledune (coal) and Coleson Cove (oil) would be retained by nb Power, but Hydro-Québec could, with a year’s notice, decide not to purchase electricity from them. In addition, if, after the expensive and time-consuming refurbishment, Point Lepreau was unusable, then its ownership would revert back to New Brunswick.63 The decision to sell nb Power was made for four major reasons. The first was to lower electricity rates for the people in New Brunswick. Quebec, because of its vast hydroelectric capacity, had the lowest power rates in the country. At the time of the announcement, Montreal residents paid about 6.9 cents a kilowatt hour, but Moncton residents paid 11.63 cents.64 Under the agreement, New Brunswick residential rates would be frozen for five years. Industrial rates would also be lowered under a formula that would discourage Quebec companies from moving to New Brunswick but would still give businesses cheaper electricity. The New Brunswick government believed that lower electricity prices for industry, such as pulp and paper mills and

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manufacturing, would lead to economic expansion. Second, it would save the cost of replacement electricity while Point Lepreau was being refurbished because Hydro-Québec would be responsible for all replacement fuel costs after 31 March 2010. This would save New Brunswick $275 million.65 Third, it would pay off nb Power’s $4.8 billion debt. Fourth, it would bring in about $5 billion in cash that could be used for other projects. The proposed takeover of nb Power was supported in Quebec, but it was very controversial in New Brunswick. A Leger Marketing poll in November 2009 showed 60 percent opposed the sale and only 22 percent supported it.66 Critics believed that the deal was designed for the Irving family businesses, which is the largest corporate interest in the province, and would hurt ordinary people. They also believed that it was handing over a major lever for economic development to Quebec. Finally, there were concerns about a Quebec hegemon further dominating the much smaller province of New Brunswick, and there were even rumours circulating that all anglophone employees of nb Power would lose their jobs. This may explain why opposition was stronger among English-speaking New Brunswickers (64 percent) than among French-speaking New Brunswickers (52 percent).67 New Brunswick’s opposition leaders were also fierce critics of the deal. Progressive Conservative leader David Alward claimed that “this may be the biggest deal ever for the province and (it) involves us potentially losing control over our energy supply and our energy future.”68 There was even some criticism from within the Liberal caucus as one cabinet minister resigned over the issue. Other Atlantic premiers also attacked the deal. Both Newfoundland premier Danny Williams and Nova Scotia premier Darrell Dexter charged that Quebec would get a lock on transmission access to the United States. Dexter was worried that “anything that concentrates the power utilities in the hands of a single entity like (Hydro-Québec) has potential ramifications for the energy corridor (to New England).” Meanwhile, Williams warned that “if it looks like that is not good for the people of Atlantic Canada, the people of Newfoundland and Labrador, the people of the country, then we’d certainly consider going before the Competition Bureau with an anticompetitive claim.”69 After a couple of months of political pressure, Premier Graham renegotiated the transaction. Under the revised agreement, nb Power

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would sell Point Lepreau and its hydroelectric plants to HydroQuébec for $3.4 billion, but nb Power would retain ownership of its power transmission system. New Brunswick would enter into a longterm power-purchase agreement with Hydro-Québec that would allow for a rate freeze for residential customers and a smaller rollback for industrial users. However, Hydro-Québec would assume a smaller portion of nb Power’s debt.70 If Graham felt that downsizing the transaction would ameliorate its critics, he was wrong. If anything the criticism of the New Brunswick government increased. Therefore, it was not a surprise when, ultimately, the sale of nb Power to Hydro-Québec collapsed. Graham placed the blame on Hydro-Québec’s concern over unanticipated risks and costs of the Mactaquac dam and, to a lesser extent, the Point Lepreau reactor. In the case of the Mactaquac dam, there were doubts about whether it could continue to operate for another ten years (replacing it would cost $2 billion), as well as civil liability issues surrounding flooding and ice damage.71 For Point Lepreau, it was the refurbishment delays and the potential costs of decommissioning the reactor. Graham claimed that “one of the key issues in Hydro-Quebec moving away from [the] deal is they could not get a firm commitment on when the Point Lepreau generating station would be operational.”72 New Brunswick’s anti-nuclear coalition also blamed Point Lepreau for being the rationale for the sale (eliminating nb Power’s debt, which they claimed was caused by Point Lepreau’s construction and refurbishment) as well as being Quebec’s reason for ending the sale (the risk cost overruns for Point Lepreau’s refit).73 However, it was also clear that political opposition in New Brunswick – there were thousands protesting in front of the legislature in Fredericton days before the deal collapsed— was a major reason.74 Graham and the Liberal party suffered a bigger political defeat when they lost the 27 September 2010 provincial election to David Alward and the Progressive Conservatives. Alward won a landslide majority government, winning with 42 out of 55 seats. The aborted sale of nb Power was the major issue in the campaign: 38 percent of voters said their opposition to the sale dictated their vote.75 Graham held on to his seat, but Keir was defeated. Soon after taking office, Alward announced his intention to allow the previous government’s agreement with Areva to expire, saying that his priority was “to get Point Lepreau up and running.”76 This does not mean that the idea

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of a second reactor is completely dead. New Brunswick’s Department of Energy maintains that “Areva is still pursuing the project with the full support of the Province of New Brunswick. We have an advantageous location, both in terms of a licensed site and the geographic proximity of New Brunswick next to a number of potential export markets, and a willing host community. The project proponents will ultimately decide whether the project proceeds based on a number of factors, with economics and market conditions being first among them.”77 After the Fukushima-Daiichi accident, Alward expressed confidence that the Point Lepreau project, while taking way too long, was being done with “full transparency and in a very safe way.” T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S W I T H I N N E W B R U N S W I C K ’ S NUCLEAR ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

The most interesting relationship within the New Brunswick nuclear advocacy coalition framework is between the pro-nuclear coalition (Team candu and nb Power) and the policy brokers within the New Brunswick government (the premier, the Cabinet, the Department of Energy). The maintenance (refurbishment of Point Lepreau) and expansion (proposal for a second reactor) of nuclear power has involved an intimate partnership between government bureaucrats and the nuclear industry. aecl, New Brunswick Energy, and nb Power all supported the decision to proceed with the refurbishment of Point Lepreau. When it was initially blocked by the pub, they convinced the New Brunswick government to get a second opinion by appointing international nuclear expert Robin Jeffrey to conduct a separate review of the project.78 This intervention, combined with a more favourable review by Jeffrey, convinced the Lord government to proceed with the refurbishment. The problems with the project had the potential to seriously disrupt the relationship, especially since it was to extend further to a potential new build. Energy Minister Keir, who was in the spotlight over the nuclear file and the refurbishment delays, was walking a tightrope. He was visibly angry with aecl’s performance, which was one of the drivers for signing a letter of intent with Areva for building a second reactor. At the same time, he also had additional incentives to go after aecl: trying to obtain federal compensation for the delays and using aecl as a whipping boy to deflect blame away from

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nb Power and his own department. At the same time, he needed to be diplomatic because he needed aecl to get the job done.79 Following a late September 2009 meeting with aecl president Hugh MacDiarmid, aecl admitted its fault and established a new timeline. As Keir maintained “it is not about blame at this point, it is about getting the job done.”80 Keir’s views of aecl were probably best reflected when he said that it was a “wonderful idea” that nrCan was planning to privatize aecl’s candu Reactor Division. Keir added that aecl was a “Crown Corporation that wasn’t being funded properly.”81 The shift in government after the September 2010 election has not fundamentally changed the government’s nuclear policy. Premier Alward did let the letter of intent with Areva expire, but the government’s treatment of aecl has been the same. It has worked closely with aecl on completing the Point Lepreau refurbishment, while simultaneously demanding that Ottawa provide compensation for New Brunswick’s replacement electricity costs resulting from the threeyear delay. For example, after the sale of aecl’s reactor division to snc-Lavalin was announced, New Brunswick energy minister Craig Leonard said, “the obligation doesn’t go away if there is a transaction between aecl and snc. We feel the federal government is responsible, that there is an obligation there for compensation for New Brunswickers. The contracts follow the company and so snc will have to live up to the contract the exact same way the federal government was living up to it when it comes to the Point Lepreau refurbishment.”82 It is important to recognize that this close relationship between government and industry actors did not extend outside Team candu. For example, although Areva was viewed as an outsider in New Brunswick, it tried to convince the government to consider it for the new build. Areva’s goal was to use New Brunswick to break into the Canadian market for nuclear reactors, and it based its case on convincing New Brunswick to move away from the candu’s heavy water technology and adopt, like most of the rest of the world, light-water technology. “Getting [New Brunswick] involved in light-water technology,” according to Areva Canada president Armand Laferrere, “which is currently more than 90 per cent of worldwide demand, I think would bring them useful new skills especially if they want them to work outside of New Brunswick and on the export market. If the Canadian industry, which is an excellent industry, wants to have more opportunities to go abroad and to sell its skills abroad then it could get a foothold in the technology that is selling abroad.”83

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Although the New Brunswick government engaged in some preliminary talks with Areva, ultimately it decided to allow Team candu the first opportunity to pursue an additional reactor unopposed. Why did the government decide to stick with aecl? First, New Brunswick had a three-decades-long partnership with aecl. New Brunswick had been the site of the first candu-6 and of the first refurbishment of a candu-6, and it would have been willing to be the site of the first acr1000.84 The work that nb Power and aecl were doing on the refurbishment project further solidified that partnership. Second, Areva would not commit to the same sort of spin-off sweeteners as aecl did, ie., the centres of excellence. Ultimately, aecl valued the New Brunswick market more than Areva. Third, the federal government provided evidence of a stronger commitment to aecl when its 2008 budget allocated $120 million in additional funds for the acr-1000. Finally, the Team candu approach gave aecl additional credibility that it would not have had on its own. According to Claire Lepage, deputy minister for New Brunswick Energy, “Team candu has provided fiscal discipline to aecl. It would have been unlikely that we would have worked with aecl alone.”85 It is true that eventually the Team candu approach was abandoned and a new letter of intent was signed with Areva. But that needs to be viewed in the context of the political battle between aecl, Ottawa, and the New Brunswick government over the Point Lepreau refurbishment. This can also be seen by how quickly the newly elected Alward government distanced itself from the Areva agreement. Team candu, New Brunswick Energy, and nb Power were joined by other members of the pro-nuclear coalition, labour and scientific actors, in promoting nuclear projects. For example, nb Power partnered with the cner in three key areas: “attracting workers to the nuclear industry and filling employment needs, preparing new nuclear energy workers while enhancing the skills of current employees and the advancement of nuclear energy research.”86 The ibew also supported both the refurbishment project and the proposal for a second reactor. THE WINNING COALITION I N T H E N E W B R U N S W I C K N U C L E A R S E C TO R

The pro-nuclear coalition has been the winning coalition in the New Brunswick nuclear sector. The most influential actor has been nb Power, the provincial crown Corporation with responsibility for

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the energy sector. On all energy issues, including nuclear power, the New Brunswick government takes its advice from nb Power. nb Power made the decision to refurbish Point Lepreau, and it was nb Power that pushed the government to promote a second reactor for electricity exports as part of the government’s energy hub strategy. nb Power was aided and abetted by aecl and Team candu: aecl provided nb Power and the New Brunswick government with a business case and technical support for going ahead with the refurbishment project, and Team candu convinced the government to allow it to pursue a second nuclear reactor without a competitive bid process. How influential were nb Power, aecl, and Team candu? Influence can be measured by assessing the extent to which they achieved their objectives. Using that criterion, nb Power and Team candu were able to significantly influence the New Brunswick government. There were two projects that they wanted: the refurbishment of Point Lepreau and a second reactor. Although the refurbishment has had scheduling delays, the real measurement of their influence was the 2005 decision to go ahead with the project. The first objective was achieved, but the second one was not. However, the failure to build a second reactor was not because of an inability to influence the New Brunswick government. New Brunswick supported a second reactor, albeit using a merchant model that did not require investment by the government. Evidence of its support was the fact that both Premier Graham and Energy Minister Keir publicly campaigned for much of 2007–9 in favour of a second reactor. No, the second reactor proposal failed because of a lack of support from the private sector financial community due to the global economic recession, the uncertainty around the future of aecl, and the problems with the Point Lepreau refurbishment. In addition, and also partially related to the global economic recession, Team candu was unable to obtain long-term contracts with us utilities for the export of electricity. THE CHANGES WITHIN THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

The actors, the relationship of the actors, and the influence of the actors within the New Brunswick nuclear sector have remained largely the same since its inception back in the 1970s. nb Power, aecl, and

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the bureaucrats in the Department of Energy continue to dominate the nuclear sector. The rest of the pro-nuclear actors, the other members of Team candu, the ibew, and the local nuclear suppliers, are still the same. There was an anti-nuclear coalition in the 1970s that was centred on Pollution Probe and the Maritime Energy Coalition. Today the Campaign for a Nuclear Free New Brunswick is the leader in opposition to nuclear power. But despite the name change, their influence is as minimal as it was in the 1970s. While there is anger in New Brunswick over the delays and especially over cost overruns with the Point Lepreau refurbishment, this anger has not extended to an anti-nuclear sentiment. Two new actors might have emerged on the scene, but the decision to stay with aecl for the refurbishment meant that Bruce Power would remain outside of New Brunswick. Similarly, the decision to work with Team candu on the proposal for a second reactor meant that Areva would also remain outside of New Brunswick. Areva did eventually sign a letter of intent, but that has subsequently expired. One major actor from the 1970s who is absent this time around is the federal government. It did help to finance the first Point Lepreau reactor in a cost-sharing arrangement with the New Brunswick government, but there was no direct federal government financial support either for the refurbishment project or the proposed second reactor. There have been changes to the nuclear sector in the arguments surrounding the two significant nuclear projects. In the debate over building the original Point Lepreau, the pro-nuclear arguments focused on designing a mega-project that would increase employment in the province. Energy security was also an important factor, because New Brunswick possessed few natural resources and was forced to rely on expensive oil imports. Nuclear power would give the province an independent energy source. The increased electricity generated by Point Lepreau was also seen as a way of promoting economic development in the province. When we examine the decisions to refurbish Point Lepreau and pursue the building of a second reactor, we find that some of the arguments, like those about employment opportunities, are the same as those in the 1970s. However, there are also some new arguments. First, there is an increased emphasis on electricity exports to the United States as a driver for building a nuclear reactor. Point Lepreau-1 often exported a third of its 635 mw capacity to the United States, but the

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plan for Point Lepreau-2 was to export almost all 1,200 mw of its electricity generation. Second, the sweeteners that the New Brunswick government wanted to accompany the nuclear projects were technological research and development spinoffs through centres of excellence, rather than just construction and operational jobs.

6 Saskatchewan

N U C L E A R H I S TO R Y

Even though it does not possess a nuclear power reactor, Saskatchewan still has some of the longest experience with nuclear technology of any province because of its history of uranium mining. Canada’s first uranium mines were at Port Radium in the Northwest Territories (1930s) and, at Elliot Lake, Ontario (1950s), which had the world’s largest deposits at the time. Saskatchewan first became involved in uranium mining in the late 1940s. The discovery of the Athabasca Basin, located in northern Saskatchewan, has been the site for all the major uranium discoveries in the last forty years. Uranium City, along the Saskatchewan-Northwest Territory border, was established in 1952, and it would be joined by additional mines and mills, including Beaverlodge (1953–82), Rabbit Lake (1975–present), Cluff Lake (1980–2003), Key Lake (1983–2001), McClean Lake (1999–present), McArthur River (2000–present), and Cigar Lake (2005–present). Cigar Lake “is the richest uranium deposit in the world, with an average ore grade of 18%.”1 Northern Saskatchewan is a perennially poor region with a large native population (over 87 percent are native people). The uranium industry emerged as one of the few industries to operate in the region. In fact, it has become the economic driver of Northern Saskatchewan. Initially, the mining workforce was almost exclusively non-native, but today the uranium industry has become the single largest native employer (over 80 percent of all mine workers are native). Moreover, a large native business capacity in mining and support sectors has been developed over the last twenty-five years.2

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Since uranium was the key ingredient for nuclear weapons, there was a high degree of secrecy with regard to uranium mining in the World War II and Cold War periods. However, by the 1970s, light started to shine on the industry in a number of public hearings and inquiries.3 The Berger Inquiry (1974–78) into the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline in the Northwest Territories was not directly related to uranium mining, but because it extended its environmental scope to include socio-economic, community, and native interests, it would be precedent-setting for future public hearings. The Bayda Commission (Cluff Lake Board of Inquiry, 1977–78), a comprehensive examination of uranium mining, held public hearings across the province, especially in the north. It extended the scope of mine assessments to include a number of new aspects: biological effects; environmental considerations; worker health and safety; federal and provincial regulation; social, economic, community and northern benefits; disposal of nuclear waste; nuclear proliferation and terrorism; and moral and ethical issues. Ultimately, the Bayda Commission approved continued uranium development, but subject to increased government regulation. It also sought to clarify the federal and provincial jurisdictions over the environment. The Key Lake Board of Inquiry (1979–81) continued the pattern of comprehensive public hearings in both large and small northern communities. It approved the Key Lake Project with the addition of stronger socio-economic performance targets in the form of quotas and reclamation requirements. It also defined the provincial regulatory framework. There were additional inquiries in the 1990s: the Rabbit Lake Panel (1993–94) and the Joint Federal Provincial Panel on Uranium Mining Development in Northern Saskatchewan (1991–97). As a result of the public scrutiny of these hearings/inquiries, more government regulation was established. In addition, the Saskatchewan public became more aware of the advantages/ disadvantages of the uranium industry and a knowledgeable cohort of local experts emerged. In 1979, the ndp government of Alan Blakeney convinced Eldorado Nuclear (the predecessor to Cameco) to build a refinery at Warman, a small town near Saskatoon, to process uranium. This was the first significant effort by the province to add value to uranium through one of the upgrading procedures. There was plenty of local opposition to the refinery because of fears of the effects of radiation on human health and agricultural land, as well as the connection between uranium refining and nuclear weapons (especially since

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Warman had a large Mennonite population that was overtly pacifist). In 1980, the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office decided not to support the construction of the facility, although not on environmental or human health grounds (it authoritatively dismissed these fears) but on considerations of social impact.4 As a result the project relocated to Blind River, Ontario (always the first choice for the company). Many Saskatchewanians have subsequently viewed this decision as a missed opportunity. The Saskatoon and District Chamber of Commerce has calculated the missed economic benefits: employment opportunities (80–160 workers a year), increased gross provincial product (between $38 and $78 million), an increased tax base ($14 million in municipal taxes and $21 million in provincial taxes), and spin-off economic benefits.5 In contrast to the public fears that were perceived in Saskatchewan, the Blind River refinery has been operating for over twenty-five years with strong community support. Since it has operated safely – there has not been a lost-time accident since 1990 -- it can be argued that “the safety and environmental findings over more than a decade of experience at the Blind River facility proves that the environmental and safety objections were unfounded to the extent that the project proceeded in another part of Canada.”6 The facility is now the world’s largest uranium refinery, and Cameco is considering expanding it. A decade later, the Progressive Conservative government under Premier Grant Devine became involved in another attempt at moving up the nuclear fuel cycle, beyond uranium mining, in this case through electricity generation. In 1991, aecl proposed building a 300 mw power reactor, the candu-3, in Saskatchewan. Both aecl and the federal government conducted a concerted lobbying effort to gain support for the candu-3. In 1992, the newly elected ndp government of Premier Roy Romanow determined that the project was not economically feasible and that there was sufficient electricity generation in the province, so it was dropped. Saskatchewan’s nuclear history goes beyond the fuel cycle. The Cobalt cancer treatment, using medical isotopes, was developed by Dr Harold Johns at the University of Saskatchewan’s Royal University Hospital Cancer Wing in 1951. There were other medical discoveries made by Sylvia Fedoruk, who would later become the lieutenant governor of Saskatchewan. The slowpoke research reactor has also safely operated at the University of Saskatchewan for over forty years.

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The Pro-Nuclear Coalition The Saskatchewan pro-nuclear coalition is comprised of the nuclear industry, unions of nuclear workers, aboriginal groups, the nuclear scientific community, and parts of the medical community. The nuclear industry in Saskatchewan is dominated by two large uranium mining companies. Cameco, Canada’s largest uranium mining firm, was described in chapter 2 as part of the national pro-nuclear coalition. It is also a charter member of the Saskatchewan pro-nuclear coalition. However, its provincial role is much more influential than its national role: as one of Saskatchewan’s largest companies and one of the few multinational corporations headquartered in the province, Cameco is a major economic player. The other major uranium mining company is Areva Canada, (formerly called Cogema), a subsidiary of the French nuclear giant Areva. Areva Canada is headquartered in Pickering, Ontario, but has offices in several provinces employing over nine hundred workers and with revenues of $438 million.7 Its Saskatchewan operations include the uranium mine at McClean Lake, and it is also involved in joint ventures with Cameco at McArthur River, Cigar Lake, and Key Lake.8 Areva is also interested in expanding its presence in the province beyond uranium mining to include building a nuclear reactor. If Saskatchewan decides to go with nuclear power, Areva hopes that it would be the choice for its reactor design. In June 2008, Armand Laferrere, former president of Areva Canada, stated that “it’s very early days, but as things progress, at one point they will decide who to buy the nuclear plant from, and we’re one of the global leaders in that field.”9 There is a strong and vibrant labour movement in Saskatchewan. Several unions are key actors in the provincial pro-nuclear coalition. For example, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (ibew), whose members operate many of the nuclear power plants across Canada and the United States, is the union representing employees at SaskPower’s coal-fired power plants. The ibew signed an agreement with Bruce Power offering to help develop a nuclear power option for Saskatchewan.10 In return, Bruce Power agreed that if a nuclear power plant was built in Saskatchewan, it would be operated and maintained by ibew members.

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Unlike the situation in other provinces, Aboriginal peoples are prominent members of the Saskatchewan pro-nuclear coalition, because many uranium mines are located inside and around native reserves. In addition, Aboriginal employment in northern Saskatchewan relies heavily on the mining sector and spin-off businesses. Beyond these geographic and economic factors, there is also the Duty to Consult, which recognizes that there are Aboriginal rights that predate the arrival of the Europeans and the existence of unique treaties between First Nations and Canada. Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 affirms these rights and treaties. The Duty to Consult requires the federal and/or provincial government to consult “before any legislation, policy, program or other activity that could adversely affect Treaty or Aboriginal rights is developed or put in place.”11 The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations (fsin) and the Métis Nation–Saskatchewan (mn-s) are the major aboriginal organizations. The fsin is developing the First Nations Strategy on Consultation, Accommodation and Resource Revenue Sharing that will provide the foundation for developing any and all consultation protocols, including any protocols on uranium development and nuclear waste. However, both the fsin and mn-s maintain that any consultation must be with First Nations and Métis communities, not their umbrella organizations.12 The Saskatchewan Branch of the Canadian Nuclear Society (cns), which was established in 1991, is one of the smallest branches, despite the large uranium industry in the province and the increased nuclear activity. This is because the industry and academic scientists involved in uranium mining have joined other organizations like the Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum. Compounding the difficulties of the Saskatchewan Branch is a lack of support from the cns head office. As Walter Keyes, the Saskatchewan Branch President puts it, “the national branch only takes up time – asking for reports but never, never phoning to ask how things are going, making suggestions for activities or things like that. It is the classic head office– branch office relationship. Again this is not a criticism; it’s just the way it is.”13 The activities of the Saskatchewan branch include briefing Saskatchewan government departments, participating in consultation processes, and public education about nuclear science. The University of Saskatchewan is another scientific member of the pro-nuclear coalition. Individual faculty members have long played a role in the nuclear sector, but the university’s role is on the verge of

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greatly expanding as a result of the creation of the Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation (ccni). The ccni was a critical component of the Canadian Neutron Source proposal to produce medical isotopes and conduct nuclear and neutron beam research. In fact, the proposal was co-written by the Saskatchewan government and the University of Saskatchewan. The ccni “represents a broad base of engagement in the various disciplines and includes a diversity of viewpoints that touch on the many aspects of the nuclear industry, from mining to nuclear science, medicine, environmental stewardship, public policy and community development.”14 This institute, especially if a new research reactor is built on campus,15 would become a lure for topranked nuclear scientists from across Canada and the world. Saskatchewan’s proposal to produce medical isotopes has expanded the pro-nuclear coalition in the province by bringing in medical actors. The Saskatchewan Cancer Agency, the Saskatchewan Health Research Foundation, the Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, the Saskatchewan Medical Association, and the College of Dental Surgeons of Saskatchewan all endorsed the Canadian Neutron Source project.16 The Anti-Nuclear Coalition Since Saskatchewan has had a long nuclear history, it is not surprising that there are a number of similarly long-standing anti-nuclear groups in the province. The Coalition for a Clean Green Saskatchewan, which is comprised of several anti-nuclear groups, is opposed to a nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan because 1 Nuclear power obstructs an effective climate change strategy. 2 The nuclear fuel chain endangers environmental health. 3 The nuclear industry is involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 4 Full costing of nuclear power rules it out as an economically viable energy. option.17 A key spokesman for Clean Green Saskatchewan is Jim Harding, a retired professor of environmental and justice studies at the University of Regina who has been an anti-nuclear activist since the late 1950s. Over the decades, Harding has organized many grassroots anti-nuclear

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organizations in Saskatchewan and was a key participant in many of the province’s nuclear debates. Harding has written several books and produced documentaries opposing the nuclear sector. As a consequence, he is a much sought after speaker not only in Saskatchewan but across Canada and the rest of the world. A second major anti-nuclear organization is the Saskatchewan Environmental Society (ses), which was formed in 1970 and focuses on issues that include “energy production and conservation, sustainable agriculture, mining, forests, nuclear power and urban planning.”18 The ses is opposed to uranium mining and nuclear power because it feels that it is not economical, produces radioactive emissions and waste, and is strongly associated with nuclear weapons. It believes there are “better, safer and cheaper options for meeting our energy needs and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”19 Two prominent members of the ses are Ann Coxworth and Peter Prebble. Coxworth was offered, but refused, a position on the province’s Uranium Development Partnership, and Prebble is a former ndp cabinet minister. Additional members of Saskatchewan’s anti-nuclear coalition include the Inter-Church Uranium Committee Educational Co-operative (icucec) and the Saskatchewan Union of Nurses (sun). The icucec was formed in 1976 to combat the proposed Warman Uranium Refinery, and since then, it has mobilized against every potential nuclear project in Saskatchewan.20 Its role is to “educate people about the nuclear industry in Saskatchewan and halt all nuclear development in the province, including the mining of uranium.”21 sun, in conjunction with the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, commissioned a study that alleged that higher rates of cancer were associated with nuclear power plants.22 Nuclear Policy Brokers The government of Saskatchewan is the nuclear policy broker for the province. Within the Saskatchewan government a wide number of departments, agencies, and provincial Crown corporations have responsibility over different aspects of the nuclear sector. The Saskatchewan Department of Energy and Resources takes the lead role, since it administers the province’s uranium mines, which includes granting permits, setting royalty rates, and establishing regulations for uranium mining and exploration.23 Further evidence of the dominant role of Saskatchewan Energy was provided when, following

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a spring 2009 Cabinet shuffle, Minister Bill Boyd was named the “nuclear super-minister” after he was given additional jurisdiction over SaskPower, the Uranium Development Partnership, Innovation Saskatchewan, and the Saskatchewan Research Council.24 Beyond Saskatchewan Energy there are other departments. Enterprise Saskatchewan is a new and unique department that was created to increase economic development. It seeks to establish “broad partnerships involving all levels of government, industry, labour, Aboriginal people, post-secondary institutions and other stakeholders dedicated to the goal of sustained economic growth.”25 Many of the nuclear initiatives that the government has pursued – the Uranium Development Partnership and the Canadian Neutron Source – were based on this model. The Department of Environment is responsible for environmental assessments and climate change. If a permanent nuclear waste site was to be located in the province, Saskatchewan Environment would also be involved. Since over 85 percent of the population of northern Saskatchewan, where the uranium mines are situated, is native Canadian, the Department of First Nations and Métis Relations is involved to ensure that native Canadians are consulted over uranium mining activities.26 And the Ministries of Health and Advanced Education, Employment, and Labour were involved in the government’s proposal to build a research reactor for medical isotope production and nuclear research. Provincial government departments are not the only governmental actors in the Saskatchewan nuclear policy community; rural and municipal governments are too. The Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (sarm) represents 296 rural municipalities across the province. Its first priority is promoting economic development in rural Saskatchewan, but it often drifts from being a policy broker to being a member of the pro-nuclear coalition. For example, it was one of the members of the udp and has long believed that nuclear power is “clean, reliable, and safe.”27 SaskPower, the provincial Crown corporation that is the principal supplier of electricity in Saskatchewan, reports to the Crown Investments Corporation of Saskatchewan (cic), and the cic minister is the link between SaskPower and the Cabinet and legislature. SaskPower operates seven hydroelectric facilities, four natural gas plants, three coal plants, and two wind facilities that provide 3,172 megawatts of electricity.28 Since 1972, SaskPower has conducted numerous studies on the feasibility of nuclear power in Saskatchewan. If nuclear power

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was introduced in Saskatchewan, there would be a number of possible business models, several of which involve an ownership stake by SaskPower.29 However, at a minimum, any reactor development would rely SaskPower as the purchaser of electricity. Within SaskPower there are individuals who would be considered part of either the pro-nuclear or anti-nuclear coalition. However, as an institution that has an effective veto over the introduction of nuclear energy in the province, SaskPower is best considered a nuclear policy broker. In the event that nuclear energy became part of Saskatchewan’s energy mix, SaskPower would then move from being a policy broker to a member of the pro-nuclear coalition. THE NUCLEAR ISSUES

The Uranium Development Partnership Report In November 2008 the Saskatchewan government appointed an expert panel, the Uranium Development Partnership (udp), to examine the nuclear sector and to make recommendations to the government on value-added opportunities in the uranium industry, in particular on conversion, enrichment, reactor fuel manufacturing, and the use of nuclear reactors. It was mandated to “include details of the investment, legislative and regulatory conditions required for nuclear development as well as timelines for putting enabling measures in place.”30 The udp was chaired by Richard Florizone, the vice-president finance at the University of Saskatchewan and a nuclear physicist. Other members were taken from the top reaches of the Canadian nuclear industry: Duncan Hawthorne, president and ceo of Bruce Power; Jerry Grandey, president and ceo of Cameco; and Armand Laferrere, president and ceo of Areva Canada. Some additional panellists were also well acquainted with nuclear power: Edward Mathie, a nuclear physicist at the University of Regina; Patrick Moore, chair and chief scientist of Greenspirit Strategies and co-founder of Greenpeace. The remaining panellists were Ray Ahenakew, business development advisor at the Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technology; Keith Brown, representing the Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce; Neil Collins, representing the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers at SaskPower; Allan Earle, president of the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association; Jim Hallick, vice-president of the

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Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities; and Alex Pourbaix, president – energy for TransCanada Corp. Given that the udp was to indicate a partnership between the Saskatchewan government and the nuclear industry, a notable omission from it was any representation from aecl. aecl wanted to be on the udp, but the Saskatchewan government decided it wanted only industry members with direct ties to Saskatchewan. Since aecl had closed its office in Saskatoon in 1993 following the candu-3 episode, it was ineligible. According to Ron Oberth, a senior aecl official, aecl was “disappointed” with the decision, but it still cooperated with the udp.31 The composition of the udp, particularly the involvement of Grandey, Hawthorne, and Laferrere, was a target of opposition by environmental groups. Ann Coxworth of the Saskatchewan Environmental Society, who turned down an invitation to join the panel because she said it would be biased, stated that “I think it’s got a clearly pro-nuclear development mandate and their question is not whether to proceed with development, but how.” Coxworth is certainly correct that the mandate of the udp was to identify how the province could develop value-added opportunities in the uranium sector. Enterprise and Innovation Minister Lyle Stewart confirmed that “we recognize that we need to add value to our raw resource, so whether that be refining, whether it be upgrading, whether it be a nuclear fuel production facility, whether it be generating nuclear power, whether it be all of these things, that’s what we have to determine.” Crown Corporation Minister Ken Cheveldayoff echoed this sentiment when he said that “we see the potential here as enormous and we want to make sure we’re not falling behind, we want to make sure we’re leading the way given the resources that we have.”32 Since the mandate of the udp was not to address the pros and cons of the uranium and nuclear industry but to maximize its potential within Saskatchewan, it only made sense that industry leaders would play a significant role in the composition of the udp. The thrust of the udp report, which was released on 31 March 2009,33 was stated right in the preface: “we believe great potential exists for the Province of Saskatchewan in the uranium and nuclear industries. We have identified where we believe these opportunities lie and what it would take to successfully realize them. We have also identified efforts that the Partnership believes should not be pursued in the foreseeable future” (i). In evaluating the opportunities for Saskatchewan

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across the entire nuclear fuel cycle the udp followed a four-part approach: 1 Identified specific commercial opportunities at each step of the chain. 2 Evaluated the business case for each opportunity. 3 Estimated the potential benefits accruing to Saskatchewan from each opportunity. 4 Created a strategy for pursuing the opportunities over time and developed clear recommendations to inform discussions and decision making. (3) The udp presents forty findings and provides twenty specific recommendations across five sections. Here is a brief synopsis of the key recommendations: •

•

•

•

•

Exploration and Mining: measures to assist the uranium mining industry in Saskatchewan, i.e., royalty framework, infrastructure, foreign ownership guidelines, etc. Upgrading: Saskatchewan should not pursue either a conversion or a fuel fabrication facility; in the long-term it should start to work on establishing the political and technology requirements for uranium enrichment. Power Generation: build a nuclear reactor for electricity generation both for Saskatchewan’s own needs and for export to Alberta. Used Fuel Management: Saskatchewan should not pursue fuel reprocessing; Saskatchewan should consider hosting a long-term nuclear waste repository. Research, Development, and Training: Create a centre for excellence for nuclear research and training; expand educational programs in the areas of mining and exploration, nuclear engineering, physics, and related social sciences; build a research reactor; and pursue medical isotope production. (4–9)

There were also technical appendices on the health and safety considerations of nuclear power, managing the risks of nuclear proliferation, an introduction to medical isotopes, and small reactors (95–111).34 The udp considered that “the high-priority opportunities for Saskatchewan appear to be exploration, mining, nuclear power generation,

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and hosting a used fuel repository” (90). It also proposed a time sequence for implementing its recommendations. In the immediate term (2009–14), the focus should be on uranium exploration and mining and building a centre of excellence for nuclear research and development. In the medium term (2015–25), Saskatchewan should see a power reactor coming on-line, “potentially constructing Canada’s first enrichment facility,” and taking “the initial steps to develop a deep geological repository in the Province.” Finally, in the long term (2025+) “Saskatchewan would have established core investments across the value chain that would create a range of new options and opportunities,” for example, the possibility of initiating activity in conversion, fuel fabrication, and reprocessing technology (93). In evaluating the udp report several themes emerge. First, despite Premier Wall’s repeated public calls for Saskatchewan to diversify away from its mining base and start adding value to uranium, the udp report focuses on how “to maintain [Saskatchewan’s] position as a leader in uranium mining” (27–41) and discourages the creation of uranium conversion or fuel fabrication facilities (43–53). This is significant because it shows that the udp panel was independent of the government: it ignored the signals from the premier’s office and made its own conclusions based on market capacity. The panel included the heads of the key private sector firms who would have been responsible for building the conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. Obviously, Cameco and Areva realized that because of the new facilities it was building in France, Kazakhstan, and the United States, expansion into Saskatchewan was not warranted. According to Armand Laferrere, president of Areva at the time, the focus of the udp was on the “economics of an open-ended fuel cycle,” not on the “environmental aspects of reducing the overall amount of spent fuel.”35 The only nod by the udp to value-added uranium was to support, in the long-term, a public-private partnership on emerging laser enrichment technology (a pet project of Cameco). It is also interesting that the Saskatchewan government quickly distanced itself from the udp’s recommendation to pursue a permanent nuclear waste repository. Pre-empting the public consultation process, the government noted that it had already determined that there was a lack of public support for locating a nuclear waste repository in the province.36 Clearly the government feared that the nuclear waste boogeyman, if not confronted directly and quickly, would undermine the entire udp report and become a lightning rod for the

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forthcoming public consultation sessions. They feared this possibility because local anti-nuclear activists for decades had asserted that there were plans to turn Saskatchewan into the world’s “nuclear waste dump.”37 Armand Laferrere was surprised at how quickly the Wall government distanced itself from the nuclear waste facility recommendation. He felt that the technology was sound and that it was only the politics of site selection that was problematic. He believed that negotiations with native bands in northern Saskatchewan would have eventually led to their agreeing to host a nuclear waste facility.38 The udp report was criticized when it was released. Jim Harding has summarized many of these criticisms: a government-commissioned panel should focus on renewable energy, the udp’s assumptions were flawed, all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle require public subsidies, and the report fails to resolve the nuclear waste issue. A surprising target of opposition was the udp recommendation for a centre for nuclear excellence, which, in Harding’s view, would facilitate the “collusion” between the nuclear industry and the academic community. According to Harding, “the nuclear industry has always counted on government funding for its r&d, and on sympathetic or oblivious scientists for doing it.”39 The Drivers for Nuclear Energy There are a number of drivers for considering the building of a nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan. First, Saskatchewan needs to develop additional electricity capacity. Bruce Power has estimated that owing to increased economic growth, between 812 mw and 2,230 mw of new electricity would be required by 2020.40 These estimates were echoed by SaskPower, which reported that the demand for power across the province increased by an average of 2.1 percent each year from 2002 to 2007. They further project an increase by an average of 2.9 percent per year during the next decade (2010–19). Looking to 2030, SaskPower states that it needs to rebuild, replace, or acquire an additional 3,300 megawatts of power – a total that exceeds the current aggregate generating capacity of 3,172 megawatts.41 In 2008, Bruce Power conducted a feasibility study, Saskatchewan 2020, to determine whether there was a business case for introducing nuclear power into Saskatchewan. Bruce Power’s investigation had the full support of the provincial government. Ken Cheveldayoff, Saskatchewan minister of Crown corporations, joined Duncan Haw-

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thorne, president and ceo of Bruce Power, at a press conference announcing the launch of Saskatchewan 2020. Cheveldayoff stated that “our government is establishing a climate so companies like Bruce Power can come to our province and compete to provide the next generation of clean electricity.”42 Saskatchewan 2020 examined the following: •

•

•

•

The electricity supply requirements in Saskatchewan and Alberta over the long-term. How best to integrate nuclear energy, which produces no greenhouse gases when it generates electricity, with hydrogen, wind, solar and clean coal technologies to give Saskatchewan a diverse and secure supply of clean energy for 2020 and beyond. The economic impacts, public attitudes and level of support for adding nuclear energy to the province’s current electricity supply mix. Potential locations that would be suitable to host a new nuclear generating station.43

Saskatchewan 2020 concluded that a 1,000 megawatt reactor should be built in Saskatchewan. It also identified a region – spanning from Lloydminster to Prince Albert – that could be a potential host for the nuclear reactor. A second electricity driver is the possibility of exports to Alberta owing to that province’s increasing demand for electricity. Saskatchewan 2020 explicitly identified “the growth in demand in northeastern Alberta, which is fueling the province’s growth,” as “a significant opportunity for Saskatchewan.”44 The udp had also emphasized that “significant potential exists for exports – for example, Alberta could need between 4,000 and 5,000 mw of new power generation by 2020.”45 This explains the possible site selection of Lloydminster, which sits on the Alberta-Saskatchewan border not far from the major oil sands region. A third driver is the issue of climate change. When Hawthorne launched Saskatchewan 2020, he emphasized that “the reality of climate change is upon us and the government clearly understands the need to consider all options if we are to tackle one of society’s most pressing issues. I believe nuclear energy, when properly integrated with technologies such as hydrogen, would be a worthy addition to Saskatchewan’s energy mix and look forward to exploring the poten-

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tial further.”46 Saskatchewan’s electricity comes from several different sources: 43 percent coal, 31 percent natural gas, 21 percent hydro, 4 percent wind, and 1 percent other.47 A close look at this data reveals that over 70 percent of Saskatchewan’s electricity comes from ghgemitting coal and natural gas plants. SaskPower acknowledges that “with new environmental regulations imminent, reliance on conventional coal-fired generation is unlikely to be feasible.”48 Therefore, new non-ghg-emitting sources of electricity like nuclear power need to be considered. Saskatchewan, as a major fossil fuel producer, is also one of Canada’s largest producers of ghgs. Despite a population hovering around only one million, it trails only Alberta, Ontario, and Quebec in total ghg emissions. The situation looks even worse when the rate of emission growth is considered. Between 2001 and 2006, Saskatchewan has led all provinces in its “emission growth rate at 8% ... a rate twice that of Alberta (3%) and over four times that of Canada (1.5%).”49 According to Bruce Power, a 1,000 mw reactor would reduce Saskatchewan’s ghg emissions by an annual total of 1.7 mega tonnes.50 A fourth electricity driver is an effort to increase value-added from Saskatchewan’s uranium resources. In a 2009 speech to the Canadian Nuclear Association, Premier Brad Wall emphasized that “the next ounce of yellowcake that we add any value to at all will be the first.” He then discussed conversion, refinement, recycling, small-reactor technology, and enrichment. He also took pains to emphasize repeatedly the medical applications of nuclear technology.51 Wall also promised to create a “business environment, the research climate … prepared to partner with real resources and provide the right environment so that we may thoroughly explore the chance for our province to be a leader in value-added opportunities related to this great resource.”52 Wall’s nuclear agenda is being driven by the idea of using the global nuclear revival to expand and transform the Saskatchewan economy. In particular, Wall envisages that Saskatchewan can substantially increase its uranium exports to meet the growing demand for nuclear fuel. Canada, largely as a result of uranium mines in northern Saskatchewan, is the world’s largest uranium producer, supplying 30 percent of the global demand. In proven reserves, Canada is third behind Australia and Kazakhstan. Moreover, in Australia “the governments of New South Wales and Victoria prohibit nuclear exploration and mining, while Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia,

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and the Northern Territory still have a ‘no new mines’ policy.”53 As with other commodities, there are great fluctuations in the value of Canada’s annual uranium exports based on both demand and price. For example, in1997–2002 uranium exports were in the $700–$900 million range, but in 2005–7 they had climbed to $4–$5 billion.54 The Fukushima-Daiichi accident in March 2011 has had an adverse effect on uranium prices. The spot price for uranium in early 2011 was $70 per pound, but by June 2011 it had dropped to $54. However, securities analysts believe that it will rise again because of increased demand in China and India.55 Wall wants to move Saskatchewan beyond the level of primary resource extraction (oil, gas, potash, coal, uranium) towards more technologically advanced economic production (in the areas of reactor design/building/maintenance, uranium processing, nuclear fuel production, etc.). There are two major uranium mining companies, Cameco (Canadian-owned) and Areva (the majority stake is held by the French government), and the more advanced uranium facilities of both companies are outside Saskatchewan. Cameco refines, processes, and converts its uranium at facilities in Ontario (Blind River and Port Hope) and the United Kingdom; Areva does all its refining, processing, conversion, and fabrication at its facilities in France and the United States. Given its large pockets of uranium, Saskatchewan could benefit greatly from uranium upgrading like conversion, processing, and enrichment; instead of relying solely on uranium mining, it could be involved in more value-added uranium processing. This has been a long-standing goal of successive provincial governments going back to the 1970s, and it was also the objective behind the creation of the udp. The Saskatchewan government clearly wants a uranium enrichment facility built in the province. In fact, Cameco has already been investing in advanced us enrichment technology.56 A number of economic arguments favour acquiring an enrichment facility. The vast majority of nuclear reactors require slightly enriched uranium for fuel, but there are very few enrichment facilities in the world. Saskatchewan wants to be in a position to take advantage of the growing export opportunities for enriched uranium because of new reactor construction around the world. There are, however, a number of barriers to Saskatchewan’s entry into the enrichment field. Canadian uranium is currently enriched in the United States and France, and those countries would not want to see additional competition. A second

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major political obstacle is the g8’s decision to establish a moratorium on countries with enrichment technologies because of fears of nuclear weapons proliferation (see Iran and North Korea). Both the iaea and the gnep would like to have multilateral control of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment technology, and Canada needs to decide whether it wants an independent enrichment capacity or whether it accepts the goal of multilateral control of enrichment. If it decides to pursue enrichment, the prime minister could make a compelling case to the g8 by arguing that Canada is the world’s largest exporter of uranium, a major player in reactor technology, and a non-nuclear weapons state. In short, Canada is a responsible nuclear country, it is not Iran, and it should not be treated like Iran. If Canada was granted an exemption to the moratorium, it would remove the major political obstacle to Saskatchewan’s pursuit of an enrichment facility. Australia is very similar to Saskatchewan in that it is the other major uranium producer and also lacks processing and enrichment facilities, as well as power reactors. A 2006 Australian nuclear review task force noted that there are advantages to pursuing conversion, enrichment, and fabrication technology but was ultimately dissuaded by the challenges. “The commercial viability and international competitiveness of a new plant will depend on factors such as capital investment cost, operating costs, the ability to access technology on competitive terms, the state of the international market, access to the required skill base and regulatory environment and, in the case of enrichment, nuclear non-proliferation issues.”57 It concluded that Australia should focus on its core business of uranium mining but that it should start to build power reactors because “nuclear power is the least-cost low-emission technology that can provide baseload power.”58 In 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd dampened expectations that Australia would generate nuclear power by saying that “we believe that we have a full range of energy options available to Australia beyond nuclear with which, and through which, we can respond to the climate change challenge and we are confident we can do it.”59 If Australia has decided to pass on the opportunity to move up the nuclear fuel cycle, why should a similar jurisdiction like Saskatchewan do the opposite? It should because while Saskatchewan, like Australia, currently lacks the advanced nuclear technology and regulatory framework necessary to expand the industry, the rest of Canada

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does not lack it. There are already conversion and fabrication facilities in Ontario and power reactors in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick. Moreover, the cnsc is a robust regulatory body with a skilled workforce and detailed operating policies and procedures. Australia, like Canada, is a federal state, but unlike Canada, the federal government does not have exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear materials, which has created a set of overlapping regulations throughout Australia. In addition, Australia would have to make some significant legislative changes if it was going to move beyond simply mining uranium. In short, Saskatchewan is better placed than Australia because of the absence of a number of technological, political, and legal barriers to its plans to advance along the nuclear fuel cycle. Wall also recognizes that high-tech sectors create the conditions for technological spin-offs. Thus, investment in nuclear power allows for the possibility of participation in new high-tech industries. Previous spin-offs from nuclear research and development include medical isotopes, flight simulators, food irradiation, vibration technology, and cooling systems. Future technological advances may be in energy (nuclear fusion, hydrogen, recycling used fuel, etc.) and medicine (new types of procedures), but others may be in totally unrelated areas. However, if Saskatchewan does not have a presence in the nuclear industry, it will be left outside watching the United States, Russia, China, France, India, and Ontario develop new technologies in new economic sectors. Wall has said that “we’re going to continue to make the case that this ought to be the place for a nuclear research centre of excellence.”60 A final driver is the level of political support for nuclear energy in Saskatchewan, which has led Saskatchewan to become the most nuclearfriendly government in Canada. Soon after coming to power, Premier Brad Wall of the Saskatchewan Party stated that “we would like to lead. It’s time for the country to have a national vision on nuclear energy – and we want to aggressively pursue that.”61 Creating the udp was a clear illustration of his support for nuclear energy. The activism of the Saskatchewan Party is consistent with over sixty years of all-party political support for nuclear power in the province. In the 1940s and 1950s, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (ccf) initiated the uranium mining sector. The Liberal government in the 1960s established the Rabbit Lake mine. In the 1970s-1980s, the ndp government created a provincial Crown corporation (Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation) to mine uranium,

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approved two new uranium mines, and supported the Warman Refinery.62 The Progressive Conservative government of Grant Devine pursued the candu-3 to provide electricity for the province. From 1991 to 2007 the ndp opened up five new uranium mines and began the initiative of seeking out value-added uranium production. In a 2004 speech at the World Nuclear Association annual symposium, former ndp premier Lorne Calvert said that “as the demand for uranium fuel rises there would be an increased need for uranium refining and we would welcome further private investment in the province.”63 The Saskatchewan Party is uniformly pro-nuclear, but there has often been internal disagreement within the ndp. Unlike other ndp parties across Canada, the Saskatchewan version contains both pronuclear supporters who recognize the economic significance of the uranium mining industry and northern economic development and anti-nuclear critics who are concerned with its environmental, safety, and military aspects. These two factions have often had an uneasy relationship. As John Gormley has commented, “since the 1970s the Saskatchewan ndp has housed a strong contingent of the radical environmental left, the peace movement and the anti-capitalism crowd who are opposed even to uranium mining … This group challenged the ndp in the 1970s when the Allan Blakeney government expanded uranium mining … In 1980, ndp stalwarts were instrumental in leading an excoriating and fear-mongering campaign that killed a uranium refinery proposal north of Saskatoon.”64 In November 1992, the ndp narrowly adopted, after heated debate, a motion supporting uranium mining. This was a reversal of the anti-nuclear stance that the ndp had taken while in opposition, a reversal illustrated the cleavages within the party on nuclear issues. Premier Romanow was compelled to stare down his anti-nuclear faction by emphasizing the need for party unity and was able to push the motion through at the party’s policy convention.65 The ndp’s current policy is to oppose building nuclear power plants in the province,66 but its leader, Dwain Lingenfelter, had previously proclaimed nuclear power a “clean, safe and affordable energy to power oilsands development.”67 Would an ndp victory in a future election result in the province’s nuclear development coming to a halt? Not necessarily. If the ndp replaced the Saskatchewan party, it is just as likely that the ndp would follow the same path, because the ndp tacks towards its internal anti-nuclear faction while in opposition, but when it is in government it listens to its pro-nuclear wing.

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The Saskatchewan government appointed Dan Perrins, the respected former head of the Saskatchewan Public Service, to lead a public consultation process to gather input on the udp report.68 The consultation period, held between 6 April 2009 and 31 July 2009, included the following devices: a major stakeholder conference in Saskatoon, hearings in Saskatoon and Regina, thirteen community meetings across the province, an opportunity for individual stakeholder organizations to provide oral and/or written submissions, and a special opportunity for presentations from First Nations and Métis groups.69 A special website was also created that would contain “the full report, presentation materials, online input opportunities, and ultimately, the results of the public input.”70 Over twenty-six hundred people attended the public meetings and almost thirteen hundred responded by letter or email.71 On 15 September 2009, the Saskatchewan government released The Future of Uranium, Dan Perrins’ udp public consultation report.72 Perrins was given a very strict mandate: he was restricted to simply summarizing “public input and feedback from stakeholders and citizens gathered through the public consultations process.” He was not to act as “a spokesperson for the udp or the government of Saskatchewan.” Nor was he to “advocate for or against the key findings and recommendations contained in the udp report.” Finally, Perrins would “not make recommendations for further action with regard to uranium industry development except to recommend further public consultations and/or the provision of further information to the public.”73 The Future of Uranium revealed significant opposition to nuclear energy in Saskatchewan. The document identified eight main themes that emerged out of the responses to the public consultation process: • • • • • •

•

85 percent were opposed to nuclear power generation; there were concerns about health, safety, and the environment; 86 percent were opposed to nuclear waste storage; there were concerns about the costs of uranium development; there was 98 percent support for renewable energy sources; there were concerns about the udp report (its composition, mandate, quality of information, information on alternative energy sources); there were different degrees of opposition to uranium mining and exploration;74 and

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there was a need for more and better information about nuclear power and all energy sources.

Beyond these eight major themes, Perrins identified another eight. Three were related to uranium: 70 percent were opposed to uranium upgrading (conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication), 42 percent were opposed to uranium research, training, and development, but a majority favoured the production of medical isotopes,75 and 88 percent were opposed to the udp strategy for Saskatchewan. Perrins also noted that 98 percent of responders viewed the public consultation process as inadequate, and 88 percent believed that it would have no impact on the government. Finally, four themes related to establishing Saskatchewan’s future energy policy: public concerns about the involvement and public participation of First Nations and Métis Peoples and the duty to consult; 95 percent of responders felt that the government should focus on reducing energy consumption; there was a discussion of whether Saskatchewan should have an independent energy production system or whether it should work with other jurisdictions in North America; and there was a discussion over who should deliver energy for the province (SaskPower or some other combination). From these themes, Perrins made nine recommendations regarding future public consultations and further information on energy. First, the government of Saskatchewan should “develop a consolidated report on all power generation options and make this report available to the public.” It should “document the health, safety, environmental, and economic considerations” for each energy option. Second, SaskPower should “publicly release any existing analyses it has already undertaken regarding provincial power needs, the current state of its infrastructure, and future options for response.” Third, the government of Saskatchewan should “commission a study to review the current research on the health impacts of nuclear power and … this study, and a publicly consumable summary version, [should] be publicly released.” Fourth, the government of Saskatchewan should “initiate a public information campaign regarding the production and use of medical isotopes and make this report available to the public.” A particular focus of this medical isotope report is the proposed Canadian Neutron Source. “What will it produce, what technology will it use, what will it cost, and how is it similar [to] or different from proposals submitted by other jurisdictions?” Recommendations five, six,

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and seven called for separate consultation processes for First Nations and Métis peoples and the Athabasca Basin (home of the uranium mining activity), centred on the Crown’s Duty to Consult. The final two recommendations address the frequent demand for more information. The eighth argues that forums should be “organized on an ongoing basis to facilitate dialogue, debate, publication and information dissemination through the media.” In particular, the Universities of Saskatchewan and Regina should host large-scale conferences to discuss “nuclear generation, environmental health and community health” and “explore other options for future power generation.” The ninth recommends that the Government of Saskatchewan should “use mechanisms such as surveys, focus groups and polling on an ongoing basis to assess the knowledge, understanding, information needs and views of the public” (137–42). The Wall government initially accepted Perrins’ report with caution. Energy Minister Bill Boyd suggested that “when I look at this report, it’s neither a green light nor a red light for the future uranium development. It’s more like a yellow light – take any next steps with caution … my foot is off the accelerator.”76 However, nuclear critics used The Future of Uranium to say, “the people have spoken.” For example, the Saskatchewan Environmental Society argued that the report showed that the government should stop pursuing nuclear power and turn its attention to renewable energy sources, greater energy efficiency, and conservation.77 Sandra Morin, the ndp’s environment critic, stated that the Perrins report is “a good barometer of the passion that’s out there … Given this report, it’s clear that the government is moving contrary to what people are saying.”78 According to Murray Mandryk, a columnist with the Regina Leader-Post, the report “screamed at the government to slam on [the] brakes” of nuclear development in the province.79 The Saskatchewan Government Decision On 17 December 2009, the Saskatchewan government outlined its strategic direction for uranium development in the province: •

•

Continuing to facilitate the uranium exploration and mining that has taken place in Saskatchewan for over 50 years. Encouraging investment in nuclear research, development and

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training opportunities, specifically in the areas of mining, neutron science, isotopes, small-scale reactor design and enrichment. Reserving decisions on supporting Saskatchewan communities interested in hosting nuclear waste management facilities to when such proposals are advanced in a regulatory process; and Directing SaskPower to continue including nuclear power in the range of energy options available for additional baseload generation capacity in the medium and long term after 2020.

At the same time, the government released its official response to the udp report and the public consultation process. Energy and Resources Minister Bill Boyd said that “through the udp’s extensive research and Dan Perrins’ follow-up consultations, we have received the most comprehensive overview of the uranium industry in our province’s history. We reaffirm our belief in, and our need for, a strong future for the industry that goes beyond exploration and extraction.”80 The government endorsed all but two of the udp’s recommendations: a nuclear power plant by 2020 and the “maintenance of the current physical claim staking system, given the investment already made in developing an electronic claim staking system.”81 There were three notable features of the government’s announcement. First was the decision not to pursue a nuclear power plant at the time. This was probably the most important recommendation of the udp report and a project that Bruce Power had proposed in November 2008, and the Wall government had previously given indications that it was going to support it. Nevertheless, Boyd now stated that the government had “carefully evaluated” Bruce Power’s “initial plans,” but “uncertainty around long-term costs to consumers remain[ed] a lingering concern. Further, the large scale of the proposed nuclear power investment that may arise requires a regional approach involving, ideally, all three prairie provinces for successful implementation.”82 Boyd did not rule out a future nuclear plant proposal, suggesting that “when you look at beyond 2020, we still think it should be in the basket of options that SaskPower has to take a look at.”83 Bruce Power viewed the December 2009 announcement “as not being very far off our take on what potential there is in Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan obviously continues to consider nuclear energy as part of its mix. Nothing has been ruled out. We don’t see it really changing that much as we’ve always looked at 2020 and beyond.”84 How-

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ever, it needs to be emphasized that Bruce Power has yet to make a decision to act on its 2008 feasibility study, because it feels that it needs to conduct negotiations with the Saskatchewan government and SaskPower. Dwight Millet, Bruce Power executive vice-president, has maintained that a nuclear reactor requires a “government-backed entity to partner with Bruce Power.”85 This partnership, at a minimum, requires a contract with SaskPower to purchase electricity from a Bruce Power reactor: Bruce Power “needs to have a contract in hand with a buyer (SaskPower) before they can get financing” to build the reactor.86 The partnership could also include SaskPower investing in the reactor project as a minority shareholder. SaskPower does have some understanding of nuclear energy, because it has been conducting numerous feasibility studies since 1972. One thing that it does note is that “the SaskPower system, as it currently exists, is not designed to cope with a large nuclear plant.”87 Second, the government reversed its earlier stance, and endorsed the udp’s recommendation to support any Saskatchewan community that might consider hosting a long-term nuclear waste repository. However, “[i]t still reserve[d] decisions and its options around a geological repository for nuclear waste and communities that might want to host such a facility, while acknowledging the Nuclear Waste Management Organization’s consultation and siting process in this regard.”88 Third, the government ignored the results of the udp public consultation process that it had put together. For instance, the Perrins report showed that 88 percent of participants were opposed to the overall udp strategy, yet the government’s uranium strategy was “massively pro-uranium industry and pro-development.”89 Regarding nuclear power generation, the Perrins’ report showed that 85 percent of responders were opposed to nuclear power generation and that there were particularly strong concerns about health, safety, and environment. However, the government simply delayed its decision on nuclear power generation – it did not close the door – solely because of cost considerations. Clearly there was a gap between the Wall government’s nuclear vision and the public’s concern over nuclear energy. The question was, why would a democratically elected government ignore the will of the people? The answer appeared to be that the Wall government viewed The Future of Uranium as a flawed document resulting from a flawed process. As a result, The Future of Uranium did not lead to clarifying the public’s views about the nuclear sector but may have ended

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up significantly muddying the debate. For example, the media reported that 85 percent of Saskatchewanians opposed nuclear power generation, but it was actually 85 percent of responders who attended public meetings or submitted letters to the udp public consultation process who opposed nuclear power generation. There is a big difference. As Perrins noted in his report, “the responses summarized here are not necessarily representative of the Saskatchewan population and cannot be linked back to the population with any statistical reliability” (emphasis added).90 In fact, the government recognized that “recent independent polling has shown support for the nuclear industry.”91 There were further problems with The Future of Uranium’s methodology. In many ways, the methodology of the study, which coded qualitative responses to generate quantitative statistics, was consistent with established social science practices. Unfortunately Perrins decided to count all responses equally, which was problematic in two respects. There was an unknown number of multiple responses from the same individual “speaking a number of times at a public meeting, submitting a series of written pieces, or through a combination of those scenarios” (35). More worrisome was the fact that responses from large organizations (e.g., the Saskatoon Chamber of Commerce, Cameco, etc.) counted the same as responses from small organizations (e.g., the Fellowship for Reconciliation and Peace, the Singers of the Sacred Web, etc.) or even from an individual. Another flaw, and again one consistent with Perrins’ mandate, was that he made no attempt to evaluate the quality or factual accuracy of the responses. Several simple examples should suffice. Sixty percent of responders stated that they wanted medical isotopes, but without nuclear fission. This is like saying that I want to drive a car, but do not want to use gasoline. Electric cars may be possible, but with current technology they are expensive and inefficient, with a very small market share. Similarly, it is possible to produce some medical isotopes without the fission process, but with current technology it is very expensive and inefficient. Seventy percent of responders criticized the composition of the udp because it was loaded with senior industry representatives even though it was designed to be a governmentindustry partnership. Sixty-five percent of responders criticized the udp for not writing more about alternative energy sources, even though its mandate was to focus on the economic potential of uranium development. When these sorts of responses are taken at face value, is it any wonder that The Future of Uranium avoided a compre-

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hensive evaluation of the arguments (both pro and con) surrounding the health, safety, environmental, security, and economic issues of the nuclear sector.92 The reaction to the government’s announcement was mixed. Bruce Power viewed “this announcement as not being very far off our take on what potential there is in Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan obviously continues to consider nuclear energy as part of its mix. Nothing has been ruled out. We don’t see it really changing that much as we’ve always looked at 2020 and beyond.”93 Ironically, some environmentalists also appeared pleased with the same decision. Ann Coxworth, of the ses, said that “nuclear power has been the elephant in the room in all of our thinking about energy planning for the next decade and while the elephant hasn’t been killed, it’s securely locked up in its cage.” However, other environmentalists wanted “the door completely shut on it.” Some nuclear supporters were also upset with the government. The Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce was disappointed that the government based its decision on cost, “but when you start to take into account the carbon costs, you take into account escalating infrastructure costs for any type of new power supply, they should have done full due diligence. They’ve written it off for reasons that are unknown to us.”94 The December 2009 decision was followed up by a number of pronuclear announcements by the Wall government. For example, in August 2010, Energy Minister Boyd told a group of uranium conference delegates in Saskatoon that small reactors, producing less than 500 mws of electricity, make a lot of sense for Saskatchewan.95 In November 2010, the Wall government announced that it supported federal legislation that would open up foreign investment in the uranium sector.96 Finally, in January 2011 Premier Wall announced a three-pronged nuclear agenda: nuclear medicine, nuclear research and development, and small reactors for electricity.97 Wall maintained that while the province had no immediate plans to build a small reactor for electricity generation, it continued to investigate the idea. Saskatchewan could be “replacing coal plants down the road, smaller coal plants with smaller nuclear facilities.” Wall further stated that “this isn’t the end of the nuclear centre story, either. You’ll see us moving with private partners on the small reactor side.”98 The March 2011 accident at the Japanese Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant led many governments around the world to reconsider their use of nuclear energy. In the case of Saskatchewan, the

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government has affirmed that it will continue to pursue uranium mining, nuclear medicine, material science, and research on smallreactor technology. Innovation Minister Rob Norris, who is also responsible for SaskPower, said that “we need to make sure that we’re contributing to this dialogue, to the discussion and actually to the science about making the technology safer.” He also argued that Saskatchewan, as one of the world’s largest uranium producers, has “an ethical obligation” to move forward with its uranium mining. The government also reiterated its pledge to develop a public-private partnership to determine whether a small reactor would fit into the province’s existing electricity grid.99 The Canadian Neutron Source The use of medical isotopes is crucial to modern medicine. The most common are molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) and its daughter, Technetium99m (tc-99m), but there are “300 stable isotopes of the 81 stable elements and more than 800 radioactive isotopes” that are used to diagnose and treat many forms of heart disease and cancer.100 For example, isotopes are used for 30,000 nuclear imaging diagnoses and 300 brachytherapy treatments every week in Canada. Demand is growing, and more medical procedures are being invented that rely on different medical isotopes. Without medical isotopes, doctors would have to use more invasive diagnostic tools to identify tumours and heart problems. Medical experts believe that “without sufficient access to isotopes and nuclear medicine tests, one can expect an increase in advanced cardiovascular [disease] and cancers during the current decade.”101 During the nru shutdowns, which reduced the amount of isotopes to historic low levels, the nuclear medicine community had to minimize the effects “by working double shifts, reorganizing the examinations around the timing of the delivery of the technetium available, using different protocols and isotopes, spending an enormous time over the telephone contacting patients and referring physicians to reschedule studies and not providing on-call services.”102 These types of mitigation efforts are not sustainable in the long run and, in fact, they may have led to some long-term damage to the health of Canadians. Jean-Luc Urbain, president of the Canadian Association of Nuclear Medicine, noted that “we [saw] a decrease of 26 per cent of our diagnostic studies” when the nru was out of service. “We are very concerned that there will be, over the next few years, an

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increase in advanced cardiovascular disease and cancer because the diagnosis was not made.”103 Therefore a stable supply of isotopes is critical; unfortunately, Canada’s production of medical isotopes is in crisis. In May 2009, the nru reactor was shut down again, this time for significant repairs because of a heavy water leak. It did not go back online until August 2010. The nru, which became operational in 1957, is scheduled to be permanently shut down in 2016. The maple reactor project, designed to replace the aging nru reactor, was officially cancelled by the federal government after technical problems delayed the project by a decade, which meant that no medical isotopes were being produced in Canada. In addition, because the nru supplied between 30 and 40 percent of the world’s isotopes, there was now a global shortage. There were multiple causes of the medical isotope crisis. They include • •

•

•

•

•

No coherent plan for replacement of aging reactors worldwide; The complexity of a supply chain requiring just-in-time delivery of a highly perishable product; The economics of isotope supply and the lack of any clear link among cost, price, and incentives for new entrants to help meet demand; The story of the maple reactors, licensing difficulties and the influence on others’ decisions; The lack of an alternative strategy or technological options to meet demand on the required scale; and The policy and legislative developments as they relate to the supply of heu targets for production of technetium-99m.104

Just as there were multiple causes of the crisis, the solution would require multiple responses. In June 2009, the federal government responded to this crisis by sending out a “call for expressions of interest to supply isotopes in the medium and long term.” To assess these proposals an Expert Review Panel was created, made up of Peter Goodhand, chair and president and ceo of the Canadian Cancer Society; Richard Drouin, former chairman of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation; Dr Thom Mason, laboratory director at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory; and Dr Eric Turcotte, clinical head of the Molecular Imaging Center of Sherbrooke. The panel would apply the following criteria

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to evaluate the isotope proposals: “technical feasibility, business implementation, timeliness of solution, regulatory considerations, and benefits to Canadians.” A deadline of 31 July 2009 was set for proposals, and a decision would be made by 30 November 2009.105 The federal government received twenty-two proposals for medical isotope production. The most comprehensive – and expensive – proposal came from a joint bid prepared by the government of Saskatchewan and the University of Saskatchewan. Their proposal was to establish the Canadian Neutron Source, a new 20mw, low-enriched uranium research reactor that would serve two primary purposes: 1 Delivery of medical isotopes – specifically, with a preliminary goal of 2,000 six day curies of Mo-99 per week to serve the Canadian and export market; and 2 Delivery of neutron beams for neutron science – to serve the needs of Canadian science in both industry and the public sector. (9) The first purpose is straightforward; it is a direct response to nrCan’s request for expressions of interest in the production of medical isotopes. In addition, isotope research extends beyond the medical sector and includes potential applications in environmental science and management, industrial and material sciences, geosciences, and nuclear waste treatment (14). The second purpose is a response to the fears of physicists, other scientists, and industry researchers that the shutting down of nru would also end their research into neutron scattering.106 Neutron-scattering research has led to applications in a number of important sectors of the economy: aerospace, automobiles, manufacturing, energy, environment, health, and communications. Only a handful of research reactors around the world combine medical isotope production and neutron research. The most recent, and the one that the Canadian Neutron Source is modeled on, is the Open Pooled Australian Light-Water Reactor (opal), which went on-line in 2007 (9–12). A third and related objective of the Canadian Neutron Source is the centerpiece of a proposed national academic centre for nuclear research and development; the University of Saskatchewan’s Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation (appendix b, 109–12). The Canadian Neutron Source proposal involves a cost-sharing arrangement between the federal government, the government of Saskatchewan, and industry (see table 6.1). The governments of Canada and Saskatchewan would divide the costs to develop and construct

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the Canadian Neutron Source. Operating costs would be partially offset by isotope sales to industry and the cost-recovery use of neutron beamlines, but would still require government subsidies. The Canadian Neutron Source proposal contained letters of support from the Saskatchewan nuclear community (Cameco and cnsSaskatchewan Branch) and many members of the medical (Saskatchewan Cancer Agency, Saskatchewan Health Research Foundation, Saskatchewan Registered Nurses’ Association, College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan Medical Association, etc.) and scientific communities (Canadian Light Source, Canadian Institute for Neutron Scattering, etc.) (appendix a, 78–108). Despite this level of support from high-profile stakeholder groups, the Canadian Neutron Source proposal was vulnerable to criticism because it was released at the end of the udp public consultation process. David Orchard, a prominent political activist who had spoken at an earlier udp hearing, asked, “what’s the purpose of having public hearings when the Premier himself is declaring his plans before the hearings are complete.”107 Jim Penna, of the anti-nuclear Coalition for a Clean Green Saskatchewan, suggested that the Canadian Neutron Source was part of a larger effort by the nuclear industry, pro-nuclear scientists, and the Wall government “to normalize nuclear development” in order to eventually pave the way for a power-generating reactor.108 Sandra Morin, the ndp’s environment critic, said, “this is something that literally falls on the heels of the consultation process and yet there was no real information given to the consultation process through the Uranium Development Partnership as to proceeding with something like a project of this nature.”109 For his part, Wall argued that the proposal had to be released before the completion of the udp public consultation process because of the deadline established by nrcan. He promised that Saskatchewan would withdraw the Canadian Neutron Source proposal “if it doesn’t reflect the will of Saskatchewan people.”110 Despite the criticism of the timing of the release of the Canadian Neutron Source proposal, there actually was some preliminary discussion about medical isotopes and nuclear research, because one of the udp’s recommendations was to “partner with the Federal Government to pursue the construction of a research reactor in the Province as a complement to synergies with existing research infrastructure and capabilities and to better position the Province to participate in multiple areas of study. [And to] pursue medical isotope

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Table 6.1 Canadian Neutron Source: Cost-Sharing Arrangement (in $millions) Funding source

Development capital

Construction capital

Operating capital

Canada Saskatchewan Industry

25–37.5 (50%) 25–37.5 (50%)

337.5–506.25 (75%) 112.5–168.75 (25%)

27–42 (60%) 11–18 (25%) 7–11 (15%)

Total

50–75

450–675

45–70

Source: Government of Saskatchewan and the University of Saskatchewan, The Canadian Neutron Source, 64.

production as part of the reactor’s mandate.”111 During the udp consultation process, most people supported the production of medical isotopes, but “nearly three-quarters supported medical isotopes created without fission.”112 However, this opinion ignores the scientific reality that it is not technically feasible in the near term, and possibly in the medium and long term, to create medical isotopes without using nuclear fission. Mo-99 and Tc-99m are the most widely used isotopes, with applications in cardiology, skeleton, brain, thyroid, lungs, liver, spleen, kidney, gall bladder, bone marrow, salivary glands, etc. In both cases, they can be produced only with a nuclear reactor. A cyclotron and high-energy photon can, in theory, create isotopes, but the yield is very small, cannot be sustained for a period of time, requires more r&d, and is much more expensive than nuclear fission.113 A cyclotron has an additional problem because it produces Tc-99m directly (it cannot produce Mo-99). Combined with Tc99m’s very short six-hour half-life, this means that “cyclotron technology cannot serve the needs of more remote hospitals in Canada because the significant transportation distance/time would be impractical given the amount of decay that would occur.”114 One might ask, if it was in fact easy to produce medical isotopes, why would over 90 percent of the world’s production be done by five reactors that are all over forty years old?115 On 30 November 2009 nrcan’s Expert Review Panel on Medical Isotope Production delivered its report to Minister Raitt.116 The panel did not assess the merits of each proposal, but classified them based on six technological options: new multi-purpose research

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reactor, a Dedicated Isotope Facility (dif) like the maples, existing reactor, linear accelerator (photo-fusion option, linear accelerator) Mo-100 transmutation option, cyclotron (direct Tc-99m option) (28–71). Each technological option was then compared based on the terms of reference given to the panel in its mandate from nrcan. The panel’s number one recommendation was that “the government expeditiously engage in the replacement of the nru reactor as we believe a multipurpose research reactor represents the best primary option to create a sustainable source of Mo-99, recognizing that the reactor’s other missions would also play a role in justifying the costs” (xi). Although the panel did not explicitly single out the Canadian Neutron Source, its recommendation was exactly along the lines of what Saskatchewan had proposed. The panel also recommended the “use of medical cyclotrons to produce Tc-99m” combined with “a multi-purpose research reactor, to ensure security of supply and 100% of Canadian demand of Tc-99m” (67). This would assuage those who, like many responders during the public consultation process, desire a non-fission approach to medical isotopes. While the expert panel identified the multi-purpose research reactor as the best option, it is also the most expensive one. The panel estimated that it would cost $500 to $1,200 million to build and $45 to $70 million to operate, compared with $250 to $500 million for an accelerator (Photo-fusion); $50 to $250 million for a dif, existing reactor, and accelerator (Mo-100 transmutation); and less than $50 million for a cyclotron (30). The Canadian Nuclear Society, through the publication of a fortypage booklet, also endorsed the building of a new multi-purpose research reactor. A multi-purpose research reactor is required to perform three fundamental tasks: neutron beam applications, radioisotope production, and reactor-fuel and material testing. While the public’s (and the government’s) attention seemed to be exclusively on finding a solution to the medical isotopes crisis, “the impact of losing a significant neutron source [would have been] equally detrimental to the other two industrial and scientific missions.” Alternatives to fission-based isotope production could be investigated, but neutron beam and nuclear research and development are impossible without a research reactor. Beyond nuclear, the nru had scientific breakthroughs in such diverse fields as aerospace, oil and gas, mining, health care, energy, military, and agriculture. A new research reactor would continue this pattern. Other countries, such as Australia,

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Belgium, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have recently built new neutron sources. The cns argued that “maintaining a domestic capability in these three missions will benefit Canadian science and industry, and Canadians in general, by ensuring competitiveness, supporting the unique requirements of Canadian nuclear power technology, enhancing the scope and responsiveness of Canadian r&d, developing the people that drive innovation, encouraging commercialization of spin-off technology and sustaining a world-leading industrial and medical radioisotope capability.”117 On 31 March 2010 the federal government responded to its expert panel report by making several key decisions. First, the nru would be re-licensed in 2011 to operate until 2016, at which time the reactor would be decommissioned. This would allow it to continue producing medical isotopes. Second, the maples would not be restarted. Third, it rejected the panel’s recommendation to build a new multi-purpose research reactor, because of the high cost, long lead times to construct, and the waste issues and proliferation concerns associated with highly enriched uranium. The government did acknowledge that “a research reactor serves many missions. The need for a new reactor for these other purposes would need to be based on a thorough assessment of the missions, including neutron scattering and r&d for the nuclear industry, and consideration of the appropriate sharing of costs among the many users and beneficiaries of such a facility.” However, it argued that this “assessment is outside the scope of this response.” Fourth, it would look for new ways to produce Tc-99m that did not involve nuclear fission. To that end, Ottawa would invest $35 million in cylcotrons and linear accelerators over a two-year period for isotope research, development, and demonstration.118 According to Natural Resources Minister Christian Paradis, “we are investing in Canadian innovation to diversify our sources of medical isotopes and reduce the production of radioactive waste. This initiative will build upon existing expertise and help Canada remain a world leader in the area of medical isotope technology.”119 However, Ottawa’s decision did not please many in the nuclear sector, especially the experts in nuclear medicine. Christopher O’Brien, president of the Ontario Association of Nuclear Medicine, warned that “the government by moving to an experimental, untested situation, is taking a very big risk for Canadian patients.”120

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Several groups across Canada submitted bids to produce isotopes, and in January 2011, Ottawa choose four projects: Advanced Cyclotron Systems Inc. (Universities of Sherbrooke and Alberta), triumf (University of British Columbia), Canadian Light Source (University of Saskatchewan), and the Prairie Production Enterprise (Winnipeg).121 This provides Canada with multiple sources of isotopes, using diverse technologies, which are spread out across the country. The Saskatchewan government, as Energy Minister Bill Boyd said, was “disappointed” with Ottawa’s decision to reject its Canadian Neutron Source proposal.122 However, the Saskatchewan government remained unfazed in its pledge to expand nuclear medicine and nuclear research and development in the province. In January 2011, Ottawa announced that the Saskatoon-based Canadian Light Source had been awarded a $17 million contract to use its cyclotron to produce medical isotopes. An additional $6 million from the province and Royal University Hospital Foundation would be used for a pet-ct scanner, which is a medical imaging device using isotopes that helps doctors to precisely locate tumors and to determine whether treatments are working. This would be the first pet-ct scanner in the province. In March 2011, Premier Wall announced that the government was committing $30 million over seven years to a new Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation (ccni) at the University of Saskatchewan.123 This was one of the key recommendations of the udp. The ccni would focus on four areas: nuclear medicine, nuclear science, nuclear engineering, and materials science. However, research would also extend into environmental studies, public policy, and northern development. The ccni, according to Karen Chad, vice-president research at the University of Saskatchewan, would build “on the university’s history as a leader in nuclear medicine and accelerator technology, these investments will enable the U of S to become a centre of excellence in nuclear research, training and innovation, as well as in probing the environmental and social context of nuclear development.”124 T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S W I T H I N T H E S A S K ATC H E W A N NUCLEAR ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

The relationship between the national and provincial policy brokers has been fairly smooth in the nuclear sector. For example, an admin-

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istrative agreement was reached between the cnsc and the Saskatchewan Departments of Environment and Labour over joint federalprovincial regulation of the uranium mining industry.125 cnsc officials have also met with Saskatchewan government officials to explain how the regulatory requirements for power reactors and research reactors that produce medical isotopes are different from the existing protocols around uranium mines.126 One significant area of disagreement occurred when the federal government rejected the province’s proposed Canadian Neutron Source. There were also clear linkages between the Saskatchewan government and the pro-nuclear coalition. Obviously, the formation of the udp was clear evidence of a close relationship between the provincial government and the nuclear industry. For the Canadian Neutron Source, a partnership was reached with the University of Saskatchewan. The ties with the University of Saskatchewan were strengthened when the province committed money to the new Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation. The Saskatchewan government also appears to be bringing a new actor into the nuclear policy community: in March 2009 it signed a memorandum of understanding (mou) with the Idaho National Laboratory (inl), which is the top nuclear research laboratory in the United States. The mou allows the province and the inl to collaborate on research projects that include uranium, nuclear power, heavy oil, oil shale, oil sands, and carbon capture and storage.127 The inl was consulted on the proposal for the Canadian Neutron Source. The udp report and consultation process provides a good illustration of the relationship between the pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear coalitions. As its title indicates, the initial udp report was designed to be a partnership between the government and the nuclear industry. This can also be seen in the composition of the udp, which was dominated by the heads of the big nuclear firms (Areva, Cameco, Bruce Power) and left out any members of anti-nuclear organizations. According to one member, the udp panel members had their “own agenda” and competitive differences, but for the most part “put them aside in the interests of defining the project for Saskatchewan.”128 If industry, under a mandate from a friendly provincial government, controlled the initial udp process, the situation was reversed when it came to the public consultation process. Anti-nuclear activists packed the public hearings and made the majority of submissions.129 Dan Perrins, in his report on the public consultations, declared that 85 per-

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cent of participants opposed nuclear power. This result contradicted numerous public opinion surveys that showed a slight majority of Saskatchewanians in favour of nuclear power. THE WINNING COALITION I N T H E S A S K ATC H E W A N N U C L E A R S E C TO R

It is clear that the pro-nuclear coalition is the winning coalition in Saskatchewan, not just because of the ordinary arguments about jobs and economic growth but because the Saskatchewan Party – and especially Premier Wall – is not neutral; the party and Wall are strong supporters of the nuclear sector. In fact, with his overtures for building uranium upgrading facilities in the province rejected by Cameco and Areva in the udp report, Wall may be even more pro-nuclear than Saskatchewan’s nuclear industry! However, this influence must be balanced against the role of the public. Elected politicians are very susceptible to public opinion, especially on hot-button topics like the nuclear sector. A premier in his first term, even if he is popular, must be cognizant of public opinion. What do ordinary Saskatchewanians have to say about the future of their province’s nuclear sector? Before the udp public consultations, it could be said that there was general public support for the nuclear sector in Saskatchewan. Particularly high support existed for uranium mining, which in May 2007 reached over 80 percent.130 However, as the issue moves further and further away from uranium mining, the level of support, while still positive, decreases. In three separate polls conducted by Sigma Analytics for the Regina Leader-Post (November 2006, May 2008, and April 2009) support for a uranium refinery has ranged between 57.2 and 75.1 percent, while support for the construction of a nuclear power plant is lower still: support has ranged between 47.8 and 53.5 percent, and opposition has ranged between 30.5 and 33.5 percent.131 When we analyze this polling data, a number of conclusions can be made. First, opinion tends to be polarized between those who strongly support and those who strongly oppose a nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan. Second, respondents on the whole feel uninformed: over 40 percent of them fall on the poorly informed side of the equation. Those who believe that they are well informed are more likely to support a nuclear reactor, but those who see themselves as poorly informed are more likely to oppose a reactor being built in the province. Third, the biggest reason for opposing a nuclear reactor is a

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concern with safety and waste disposal. Fourth, support for nuclear power is strongly correlated with income as well as gender. If you are male with an income over $90,000, you are more likely to be supportive than if you are female with an income under $30,000.132 The udp public consultations, while not a representative sample of public opinion, revealed a cross-section of groups that are strongly opposed to most (for some, all) aspects of the nuclear sector. The range of opposition groups (environmental, labour unions, peace, religious groups, etc.); the geographic range of the opposition (all parts of the province – no nimby syndrome here); and the range of arguments (economic, health, environmental, peace arguments, etc.) against nuclear expansion was wide indeed. Everybody in Saskatchewan, organizations and individuals alike, could have participated in the udp public consultation process. The fact that it was the antinuclear forces who mobilized is something that the government cannot ignore. A highly motivated minority can often overwhelm a soft majority. The udp public consultation process, as a Bruce Power official admitted, allowed the “anti-nuclear movement to mobilize and unify. It gave all of the opposition groups an opportunity and platform. They could say what they wanted without any consequences. Opinions, even misguided ones, even completely wrong ones, were equally counted as facts. The Perrins report, as an official government document, has given the anti-nuclear groups legitimacy.”133 The Saskatchewan government’s decision on the udp and the public consultation process helped to determine the winning coalition. Supporting the udp – with the notable exception of the nuclear power plant – and essentially ignoring the public consultations shows the dominance of the nuclear industry in Saskatchewan. Even regarding the nuclear power plant, the Wall government simply slowed down its nuclear ambitions by waiting for a post-2020 proposal. This does not mean that the Wall government is disregarding the wishes of the public, but it is recognizing that the public-consultation process was highjacked by special-interest anti-nuclear groups who did not represent the majority view of Saskatchewanians. The nuclear debate is a major public policy issue, and it may have an impact on the next provincial election (estimated to be November 2011). If Wall has misjudged the public’s position (as opposed to the anti-nuclear coalition) on nuclear power, the Saskatchewan Party will be punished by the electorate.

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In many respects, the Saskatchewan nuclear advocacy coalition framework in 2008–11 bears a strong resemblance to the framework of previous years and decades. The issue of expanding the nuclear sector in the province beyond uranium mining to include upgrading, electricity generation, waste disposal, and so on remains the same. Many of the actors within the pro-nuclear coalition (Cameco, Areva, the ibew, the Chamber of Commerce, northern communities, Aboriginal groups) that favoured the expansion of the nuclear sector in the past continue to favour it, and many of the actors within the anti-nuclear coalition who opposed the expansion (or even the existence) of the nuclear sector in the past continue to oppose it. The arguments that each side uses to support its position have largely remained the same. Those who support a larger nuclear sector in Saskatchewan continue to highlight economic growth, exports, and employment. Those who oppose a larger nuclear sector in Saskatchewan continue to highlight health, economic, environmental, and security risks. In the udp report and the resulting public consultation process there were strong echoes of the previous debates over the Warman uranium refinery and the candu-3. This sense of déjà vu does not, however, mean that nothing has changed within the Saskatchewan nuclear sector. First, the issue of climate change has added a new dimension to an old debate. The pronuclear coalition was energized because it suddenly had a new and powerful argument and anti-nuclear activists were put on the defensive. Supporters would point to the lack of ghg emissions pumped out by nuclear reactors, while opponents would respond with arguments about nuclear power’s life cycle emissions and that conservation, efficiency, and investments in renewable energy was a better strategy. Previously, nuclear power had been vulnerable on the environmental issue. Today, the environment is a source of nuclear debate, and some prominent environmentalists (Patrick Moore, James Lovelock, and David Schindler, for example) have even endorsed nuclear power. Supporters emphasize the clean-air aspects of nuclear power and compare the ghg emissions produced by other energy sources (coal, natural gas, and so on). Critics stress the dangers posed by radiation, nuclear safety, and the storage of nuclear waste. The udp consultations revealed how supporters and opponents both used climate change arguments.134

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Second, the stronger economic situation in Saskatchewan has helped to change the parameters of the economic arguments. In previous debates, Saskatchewan was dealing from a position of weakness as a lightly populated province with an underachieving economy that depended on a few resource products. Nuclear development was seen by its supporters as a way out of this rural, agrarian economy. Today, the situation has changed as the Saskatchewan economy has taken off, largely because of persistently high commodity prices (potash, uranium, oil, and natural gas). Both the ndp and the Saskatchewan Party governments have been running budgetary surpluses for several years; the province is slowly paying down what was once a very high provincial debt. As of March 2011, Saskatchewan’s debt was $4.6 billion, which was only 8 percent of its gdp. This low debt-gdp ratio resulted in Standard and Poor upgrading the province’s debt rating to triple-A in May 2011.135 Saskatchewan was even able, in the midst of a nasty global economic recession, to post a balanced budget in 2009–10, the only Canadian province to do so.136 Its gdp has been steadily growing at a rate above the national average. Projections for 2011 and 2012 show the highest gdp growth rate in all of Canada at between 3.3 and 3.9 percent.137 After decades of being a “have not” province that received funds from Canada’s equalization program, in 2005 Saskatchewan finally became a “have” province and started to make contributions to the equalization fund. This increased economic activity is also reflected in its population growth. Saskatchewan’s population, after flat lining for decades, has started to slowly increase. Since 2007, Saskatchewan has had the second highest rate of population growth (behind Alberta) of any province: its population is now of over one million, and there is now net interprovincial migration to Saskatchewan, reversing the old joke that Saskatchewan’s best export is its people.138 As a result of this changing economic situation in the province, the pro-nuclear coalition now argues about the need to sustain this momentum and further capitalize on this upsurge in economic growth. Third, the medical isotope issue has had a major, and new, impact on the Saskatchewan nuclear sector. As mentioned, the udp report contained a section on medical isotopes, and the Saskatchewan government submitted a comprehensive proposal (the Canadian Neutron Source) to nrCan to produce medical isotopes in the province. Previously there had been no discussion of the issue of medical isotopes in Saskatchewan; few people even understood what they were

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and how they were used. The medical isotope issue also spawned a new, and influential, actor: the University of Saskatchewan. The medical community has also been split over the isotope issue: as some groups have endorsed it (the Saskatchewan Medical Association, the College of Physicians and Surgeons), while others remain staunchly anti-nuclear (the Saskatchewan Union of Nurses).

7 Alberta

N U C L E A R H I S TO R Y

Unlike the provinces in the previous chapters Alberta is largely bereft of a nuclear history. The University of Alberta does host a small slowpoke research reactor, built by aecl in 1978, for teaching and research. There were also some crazy schemes in the 1950s and 1960s to detonate a nuclear bomb in the oil sands,1 but that was about it. Consequently, Alberta has represented virgin territory for the global nuclear revival. T H E A L B E R TA N U C L E A R A D V O C A C Y COALITION FRAMEWORK

Since Alberta was a brand new market, it would have been simple for the Canadian nuclear advocacy coalition framework to replicate itself in the province. Yet a unique provincial nuclear sector has emerged instead. It includes some of the same actors as the national acf (Bruce Power, aecl, cna, and cns) and some of the same actor types as other provincial acfs (government departments of energy and environment). But it also includes some unique actors like Energy Alberta Corporation (eac), Alberta Electric System Operator (aeso), and the Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta (cnfa), among others. The Pro-Nuclear Coalition Alberta’s pro-nuclear coalition begins with the creation of Energy Alberta Corporation. The story of eac is a classic case of Alberta entre-

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preneurship. It was created in 2005 by two prominent Alberta-based entrepreneurs: Hank Swartout and Wayne Henuset. Swartout, one of the big players in Calgary’s oilpatch, was ceo of Precision Drilling. Henuset, the face of eac, had made his money in the pipeline business and through his chain of Willow Park Wines and Spirits liquor stores. In a famous story that he often told, Henuset became a nuclear advocate while withstanding a hurricane during a Florida vacation. Henuset realized that climate change was real and that there was a need for electricity generation that did not contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. This sparked his interest in nuclear power. eac was a small firm employing only a handful of full and parttime personnel with its offices above Henuset’s flagship Willow Park liquor store. This was hardly the setup for constructing and operating a multi-billion dollar nuclear facility. However, eac was actually only a “shell” company that was intended to be the face of nuclear power in Alberta. Behind the scenes was aecl. While eac remained independent and aecl did not put any money into the company, there was a very close relationship. aecl provided the technical expertise and conducted numerous studies of nuclear applications for Alberta. It also paid for its scientists to participate in speaking tours organized by eac. Both firms realized that it was important that a private Albertabased company with strong ties to the oil patch take the lead, as opposed to a federal Crown corporation based in Ottawa.2 In August 2006 an exclusive contract that formalized the relationship was reached between eac-aecl; the contract specified that the acr-1000 would be the sole reactor used by eac. eac’s business plan was not to build Alberta’s first nuclear power plant but to create the right conditions for nuclear power in Alberta and then at the right opportunity to sell off to a major player. eac’s job was to raise awareness of nuclear power in Alberta. It did so by commissioning two public opinion polls, conducting media interviews (especially in the small communities that were viewed as possible sites, like Grimshaw, Whitecourt, and Peace River), and holding public information sessions in different parts of the province.3 eac even took politicians, business people, Aboriginal leaders, and activists on tours of nuclear reactors in New Brunswick and Ontario. The visit to Bruce Power’s facility near Kincardine, Ontario, along the shores of Lake Huron (250 km northwest of Toronto) was very successful in demystifying nuclear power. Visitors were surprised by a number of things:

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how small the plant was – a very small environmental footprint; the fact that there was wildlife right up to the fence of the plant and that cottages surrounded the plant; the number of people working in the plant – showcasing not only the plant’s safety culture, but also the economic impact (jobs); local politicians emphasizing to the visitors the economic benefits of a nuclear power plant in their community; and how property values went up after the nuclear plant opened.4

Beyond public relations, eac did the necessary ground work: preparing a preliminary budget, identifying workforce requirements, establishing timelines, and so on. A site selection process was undertaken. On 27 August 2007, eac submitted a “license to prepare site” with the cnsc for a twin acr-1000 megawatt reactor on the shore of Lac Cardinal just outside Peace River. With these important introductory tasks completed, it was time to either move on to the next phase or get out. In March 2008, eac sold out to Bruce Power, the largest private nuclear operator in Canada. Duncan Hawthorne, president of Bruce Power, commented on the critical role that eac had played in Alberta.5 “Energy Alberta deserves great credit for progressing the dialogue around nuclear energy to the point where we feel it’s worthy of further exploration. In the Peace Country region, where an application has already been made to site a nuclear plant, we have a community that wants to learn about our technology. This is a valuable first step, but more information needs to be shared. Our partners are serious investors and we are a proven operator, but any decisions we make will rely heavily upon a willing host community.”6 With the purchase of eac, Bruce Power joined the Alberta nuclear policy community. Bruce Power benefited from eac’s public campaign promoting nuclear power and obtained its assets. However, it also discarded two of eac’s major achievements. First, it determined that Lac Cardinal was too shallow and that only the Peace River was a suitable water source for a nuclear reactors because it was deep and wide and had a good flow. Maintaining the Lac Cardinal site but utilizing the Peace River would have required building a thirty-five kilometre pipeline, which would have led to all sorts of economic, technical, and environmental complications. In addition, the local population was concerned that the Grimshaw Gravels Aquifer would be adversely affected by a nuclear power plant on the Lac Cardinal

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site. Therefore, after a detailed technical review using forty-one evaluation criteria, Bruce Power changed the site from a location on the banks of Lac Cardinal to Whitemud, which is much closer to the Peace River.7 Second, it ended the exclusivity contract with aecl and opened up the bid process to include four competing firms: aecl, Areva, ge-Hitachi, and Westinghouse. The decision to change site locations showed the strengths and weaknesses of eac. eac was a very good nuclear promoter and put the issue on the agenda in Alberta, but its knowledge of nuclear technology and Canada’s nuclear regulatory framework was weak. According to nuclear experts, Lac Cardinal should never have been chosen as the location for a nuclear reactor, for the reasons cited above. In addition, Wayne Henuset, in a couple of public appearances in 2007 (before a Parliamentary committee and the cna’s annual conference), had suggested, embarrassingly, that regulation of a nuclear reactor should be the same, and take just as long, as with any other power facility. In particular, Henuset felt that the environmental assessment process needed to include fewer stakeholders and less negotiation and to take less time.8 While there should be efforts at streamlining the regulatory process, Henuset’s comments showed a complete lack of understanding of the critically important role – both from a safety perspective and for public confidence – that regulation of the nuclear industry plays. As one nuclear insider put it, “Bruce Power had to act quickly in its purchase of Energy Alberta Corp, or else the Alberta nuclear market would have been ruined because of their amateurishness.”9 This account was also confirmed by an unlikely source – the Peace River Environmental Society (pres). Brenda Brochu, pres president, has commented that “eac was out of their depth … They did not really seem to understand the water requirement for a nuclear reactor. eac’s performance damaged the credibility of the entire nuclear industry. So did its tactics. When Bruce Power came in things changed. Bruce is very polished and professional. They know what they are doing. Because of Bruce’s involvement, this worried people even more because they realized that a nuclear power plant was now a real possibility.”10 aecl was the first nuclear vendor to take an interest in Alberta when they signed the exclusivity contract with eac. However, because of the importance of distinguishing provincial nuclear advocacy coalitions from their national cousins, aecl could not just replicate its

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strategies from other jurisdictions and apply them to Alberta. In order to support the extraction of oil from the Alberta oil sands, aecl had to expand its technological focus beyond simple electricity generation, so it “carried out feasibility studies with several major oil sands producers on how a candu reactor could supply their large energy requirements.” It looked at “both surface mining projects and in situ extraction projects.” It recognized the problems of transporting pressure steam across distances of more than fifteen kilometres, but its scientists were working on other options.11 When eac was acquired by Bruce Power, the bid process opened up to other vendors, and aecl’s activities were matched by Areva, among others. Both aecl and Areva worked on public education strategies in the province. aecl president Hugh MacDiarmid and Armand Laferrere, Areva Canada president at the time, were active in the province: meeting with political leaders (provincial and municipal), granting media interviews, and delivering presentations to the public. While specific nuclear firms recognized the uniqueness of the Alberta market, industry associations did not. The cna and the oci treated Alberta as just another Canadian province, which shows that some actors treat the national nuclear sector in the same way that they treat the different provincial nuclear sectors. The Alberta Branch of the Canadian Nuclear Society, another member of the pro-nuclear coalition, was established in April 2007 following a year of discussion with the cns Council. The Alberta Branch, which includes both Albertans and those with an interest in Alberta, is one of the smallest. However, it makes up for its size with its activity. Its mandate, like that of the other branches, is public education on nuclear issues. Members have participated in teacher’s conventions and science conferences, given presentations to local governments, written letters to the editor, attended energy conferences, conducted media interviews, and participated in public debates with anti-nuclear activists.12 As a new and small organization, the cns Alberta branch relied on support from the cns national office, which has provided financial support for the branch, especially funds for expenses of members and for participation in local events. The form of support with the highest profile was the decision to host the cns’s annual conference in Calgary in 2009. The parallel Western Focus Seminar was designed by the Alberta Branch, but supported by the national office, to set up a seminar of special interest to Albertans and Westerners.

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The Anti-Nuclear Coalition As speculation about the possibility of nuclear power in Alberta increased, anti-nuclear groups started to spring up. The earliest responder and the most active regional group is the Peace River Environmental Society.13 This is not surprising because if a nuclear power plant is built in Alberta, it will likely be in the Peace region. Originally formed in 1989, the pres has had a history of activism against the forestry, oil and gas, and large agribusiness, but it knew little about nuclear until eac came to town. When eac, and now Bruce Power, proposed building a nuclear plant in their area, pres shifted its focus to the nuclear sector. It was a galvanizing event because it increased its membership and funds, and it provided a clear direction.14 For the most part, the members of pres had little previous knowledge about nuclear issues, and it has been a steep learning curve for them to get up to speed. There are exceptions, like Pat McNamara, who was a prominent anti-nuclear activist in Port Hope, Ontario, and who even wrote a small booklet (Port Hope – Canada’s Nuclear Wasteland) describing the adverse health effects of uranium processing in that community. McNamara later moved to Grand Prairie, Alberta, and joined up with the anti-nuclear forces in the region. However, for the most part the local opposition is not made up of long-time activists against nuclear power. Concern about nuclear power was not isolated in the Peace River region. Citizens Advocating the Use of Sustainable Energy (cause), based in Calgary, was formed in January 2007. Its goal “is to inform the public about the safety, environmental, health, and economic risks of nuclear power. [It] support[s] energy conservation, and renewable energies, such as wind, solar and geothermal, as safer, less expensive and more environmentally friendly energy alternatives.”15 While most members of cause were inexperienced in nuclear activism, its founder was not. Elena Schacherl became involved in the anti-nuclear movement in the 1990s while living in Saskatoon. As relatively new and inexperienced interest groups, pres and cause established links with other national and international antinuclear groups and activists.16 For example, there is frequent information sharing with similar groups in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Quebec. pres and cause have also helped to sponsor a series of visits to Alberta by Gordon Edwards (president of the ccnr), Jim Harding (long-time anti-nuclear activist from Saskatchewan and author of

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Canada’s Deadly Secret), and Helen Caldicott (internationally known Australian medical doctor and author of Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer). These linkages were crucial to pres and cause because many of its founding members were experienced in public advocacy but lacked technical experience in the nuclear sector. Further illustrating the cooperation of pres and cause with larger national organizations is the fact that while they were unable to solely finance the trips by Edwards, Calidcott, and Harding, they were able to rely on sponsorship from larger, non nuclear-specific groups, like Mountain Equipment Co-Op, the David Suzuki Foundation, and the Gordon Foundation. A number of local groups, including cause and pres, decided that they needed to coordinate their anti-nuclear efforts in Alberta, because individually each group was quite small and needed to maximize its numbers. In addition, there was a sense that each group was opposed to nuclear power in the province, not just in their local neighbourhood. If the the nuclear power plant was moved from Peace River to some other part of Alberta (Whitecourt, Fort McMurray, Lloydminster, etc.), the cause would not be abandoned but instead they would be ready.17 Therefore, in January 2008 the Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta was formed. The cnfa is “comprised of several regional groups and individuals who have joined forces to speak out and raise awareness among Albertans about the risks and costs of nuclear power.”18 To join the cnfa the organization needed to have a local volunteer base, not just a paid office staff. This has meant that some of the large environmental organizations (the Sierra Club, the Pembina Institute, Greenpeace), although supportive, are not members of cnfa.19 The cnfa has a number of concerns about nuclear power: that it is an inappropriate solution to climate change, that it is dangerous to human health, that it generates radioactive waste, that it does not create as many jobs as renewable energy, and that it is expensive to taxpayers.20 Local branches of the Sierra Club and the Pembina Institute have also become engaged in the Alberta anti-nuclear movement. The Sierra Club’s Prairie Chapter produced the “Community Nuclear Action Guide,” which was designed to keep Alberta nuclear free. This guide was a combination of national materials (the history of nuclear energy in Canada, a debunking of nuclear myths, a nuclear fact sheet, and directions on taking action in the community) with local content (a description of the proposal for building nuclear reactors in Alberta

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and a sample letter to Premier Stelmach).21 The Pembina Institute is a national environmental organization, but it takes a special interest in Alberta because that is where it is headquartered. In April 2009, the Pembina Institute released Greening the Grid, which identified green electricity options for Alberta that included a critique of the proposal to introduce nuclear power in the province.22 Policy Brokers The provincial government bureaucracy is just starting to come to grips with nuclear power. Unlike the situation in other provinces, there are few bureaucrats in Alberta with nuclear expertise or experience. If nuclear power were to be established in the province and while the nuclear process was proceeding, the Department of Energy would be the lead department. Alberta’s electricity, unlike that of most other provinces, is produced by privately owned companies (dominated by TransAlta and Atco) or municipally owned companies (epcor for Edmonton and enmax for Calgary). The government “does not select the fuel or location of plants, and the decision to apply to build any generation facility is made by private sector companies.”23 The role of Alberta Energy is to “develop, support and monitor the framework for bringing new generation on-line, competitive electricity markets, and efficient delivery systems.”24 If nuclear power came on-stream, it would be regulated by the Alberta Utilities Commission (auc), which regulates the province’s electricity transmission system. The other major department with an interest in nuclear power is Alberta Environment, whose mission is to “assure the effective stewardship of Alberta’s environmental systems to sustain a high quality of life.”25 This involves oversight over factors like water usage, air quality, and land use. Alberta has had a private electricity market since the mid-1990s. The Alberta Electric Systems Operator, which is “responsible for the safe, reliable and economic planning and operation” of Alberta’s electricity transmission system,” was created in 2003 as a non-profit organization. aeso plays an important role in ensuring access to the grid, facilitating the exchange of electricity within Alberta, and developing relationships with neighbouring jurisdictions.26 aeso has started to include nuclear generation in its forecasting scenarios.27 The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission plays the same role in the provincial nuclear sectors as it does in the national nuclear sector

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because the federal government has constitutional jurisdiction over the regulation of the nuclear sector, although in the environmental assessment process, there is coordination between federal agencies (cnsc and the ceaa) and provincial departments (Alberta Environment). THE NUCLEAR ISSUES

Setting the Stage for Nuclear Power eac and Bruce Power decided to investigate nuclear power for a number of reasons. First, they believed that nuclear power could be used to help meet Alberta’s growing electricity demand. Alberta’s Department of Energy noted that “power consumption has been growing at an annual pace exceeding 3%.”28 It explained that “in the next 20 years, based on past demand patterns, we will need another 11,500 megawatts of new generation. Many of our existing generators are nearing the end of their useful life. There will be more than 2,000 megawatts of generation retired from service over the next 20 years.”29 aeso also projects that Alberta will need another 6,650 megawatts of electricity by 2024. While this is not as high as the projection of Alberta Energy, it is still a 75 percent increase. This surge in electricity demand is the result of three factors: an increase in population, the increased use of electricity in the production of other energy fields (most notably oil and gas), and the expected shut-down of coal plants that contribute to greenhouse gas emissions. In its long-range planning aeso modelled several different scenarios, and many of them included nuclear power in their projected electricity generation.30 In the oil sands alone, aeso projects an increased demand of 3,200 mw of electricity by 2016.31 As a result, Alberta, in contrast to much of Canada,32 is a net importer of electricity: with the exception of 2001, it has been a net importer of electricity every year since 2000. In 2010, Alberta exported 459,381 mwh and imported almost four times as much at 2,204,839 mwh.33 One of the objectives of the nuclear power proposal is not only to end electricity imports but, through sales to the United States, to turn Alberta into a net electricity exporter. Alberta does require a substantial increase in electricity, but this increase cannot be currently absorbed by the electrical grid. Don Lowry, the president of epcor Utilities, has warned that because of a shortage of new transmission lines, “it will only be a matter of time

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before there is a catastrophic failure” in the Alberta electricity transmission system.34 The grid is aging, congested, and inefficient; it has not seen any significant new lines since the 1980s. It is true that the issues with the grid are independent of the energy source; whether the supply comes from nuclear, coal, or natural gas, Alberta’s transmission system, as aeso has recommended, needs to be upgraded. And building a 4,000 megawatt facility in an isolated north-central locale like Peace River, as Bruce Power is proposing, would only increase the transmission requirements and expense because of the distance. The government of Alberta has started to take significant steps to upgrade and expand its electricity grid. On 27 November 2009 the Electric Statutes Amendment Act, 2009 received Royal Assent, approving five of aeso’s electricity projects at a cost of about $3.4 billion: • •

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Southern system reinforcement to connect new wind farms. Two new high-voltage direct current transmission lines between Edmonton and Calgary to carry more power to Alberta consumers in central and southern Alberta. One new double circuit alternating current transmission line between Edmonton and the Heartland area (near Fort Saskatchewan) to carry power to industrial consumers like Alberta upgrading facilities. Two new alternating current transmission lines between Edmonton and Fort McMurray. A substation in Calgary to provide more reliable service to customers in south Calgary.35

It needs to be recognized that building new transmission lines has been very controversial in Alberta. Grassroots groups, largely in rural Alberta, have emerged to protest the plan. The opposition Wildrose Party has ridden this discontent over electricity transmission, among other issues, to potentially challenge the Progressive Conservative dynasty in the next provincial election. Even within the pc party there has been disagreement. During the 2011 pc leadership race, many of the candidates tried to distance themselves from the Stelmach government’s policy. This even included ministers such as Ted Morton (who is now the energy minister), who had introduced some of the land-use legislation.36 Alison Redford, who won the leadership race, had also questioned whether some of the transmission lines, for exam-

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ple the two new lines from Edmonton to Calgary, needed to be built. After becoming premier, Redford ordered a review by the Alberta Utilities Commission of the Western Alberta Transmission line between Calgary and Edmonton and of the Eastern Alberta Transmission Line from northeast of Edmonton to Brooks. Opposition was triggered by many aspects of the new transmission system. First, many were outraged by the estimated $14 billion cost. They also noted that in 2005 the Klein government had changed the law requiring producers and consumers to share equally in the cost of transmission so that it required consumers to pay 100 percent. Second, there were questions about whether it was needed, since peak electricity demand, the most electricity used at any one time, had dropped in 2010 from 10,236 mw to 10,196 mw.37 The Industrial Power Consumers Association of Alberta, whose members use 35 percent of the province’s electricity, warned that aeso’s plan would “limit new oil and gas project viability and force other industries to relocate to jurisdictions where electricity is much more cost-competitive. If Bill 50 passes without modifications, large-scale Alberta industry will look to self-generate electricity, leaving residential and commercial consumers to pay for a considerably larger portion of this new and largely unnecessary transmission infrastructure.”38 Third, it was alleged that the real purpose of the transmission system was to facilitate electricity exports to the United States, in particular to California. WikiLeaks documents revealed that as far back as 2003, the us ambassador to Canada at the time, Paul Cellucci, wrote to Washington that “Smith [Alberta’s energy minister Murray Smith] and others also want to make sure that the (United States Government) is aware that over time there will be tremendous electricity cogeneration available as a result of the huge thermal needs of the oil sands refining process. This could over time make significant new electricity exports available to the United States, but at least for now there is limited capacity to move this west and then south through British Columbia and on to our Pacific Northwest.”39 Fourth, environmentalists were upset that the new transmission system would be used to support large windfarms whose turbines would damage the rural landscape in Southern Alberta.40 Finally, the antinuclear coalition was convinced that the new system was designed to support the building of a nuclear reactor in northwestern Alberta. David Gray, former head of the Utilities Consumer Advocate office, claimed that capacity for a nuclear plant in Peace River was “built into

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Bill 50. The large amount of transmission that they plan to build will facilitate generation projects that haven’t been built yet, and that’s one of them.”41 A second reason for considering nuclear power was the role that it can play in mitigating the problem of climate change. Alberta is the heartland of Canada’s oil and natural gas sector, and as a result, it is also Canada’s largest producer of greenhouse gases. Despite having only 12 percent of Canada’s population, Alberta produces 31 percent of its ghg emissions,42 over 233 million tonnes of ghgs per year.43 Currently, 45 percent of Alberta’s electricity is generated by coal and 38 percent by natural gas.44 Alberta could significantly reduce its ghg emissions by replacing coal and natural gas plants with nuclear power plants. Making matters worse for Alberta is the fact that its conventional oil supplies are dwindling, which means that the province needs to rely more on the oil sands, which generate more ghg emissions. The oil sands represent a great resource for Alberta, since they have proven reserves of 178.8 billion barrels of oil, a total that is exceeded only by Saudi Arabia’s reserves. However, it is also a very difficult resource to extract. The bitumen (petroleum that exists in a semisolid or solid form) is trapped in sand. The two primary means of extraction are both expensive and labour intensive. The first is surface mining (using the famous three-story-high trucks), followed by procedures to wash out the sand and silt. The second way is in situ production using steam-assisted gravity drainage (sagd). The sagd process pumps natural-gas-generated steam deep into the surface, freeing the oil from the sand and sending it up to the surface. Further upgrading of the bitumen, using hydrogen, is also required. Whichever method is used, the result is that oil sands production generates over twice the amount of ghg emissions as conventional oil. Since 2001, Alberta has been increasing its ghg emissions by over one million tonnes per year,45 the largest increase in ghg emissions in Canada. This problem will get even worse because only about 3 percent of the oil sands has been converted since 1970. As oil sands production inevitably increases, Alberta’s ghg emissions will grow even larger. At the current rate of production, without new technology, it is estimated that the oil sands will emit 156 million tonnes of ghgs by 2015.46 Today and for the foreseeable future, the basis of Alberta’s economy is oil and gas. The major challenge facing the oil and gas economy is

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climate change. If the environmental problem of ghg emissions is not effectively dealt with, it could result in long-term damage to both Alberta’s economy and its quality of life. Already, there are increasing warnings from President Obama, the United States Congress, California, and even some private firms about restricting imports of Canada’s “dirty” oil. Nuclear power could help to mitigate a number of environmental problems: expanding electricity to meet Alberta’s growing demand in a cleaner fashion, reducing ghg emissions by displacing dirtier electricity sources, and reducing ghg emissions in oil sands production. In short, the long-term international competitiveness of Alberta is jeopardized by climate change, and nuclear power offers some ways to reduce the threats posed by it. A final comment on the link between climate change and nuclear power is needed. As governments around the world start to add a price to carbon emissions, the cost advantage of nuclear power over coal and gas plants begins to emerge. An influential study from mit has demonstrated that “nuclear does become more competitive by comparison if the social costs of carbon emissions are internalized.”47 This removes a major argument from the anti-nuclear forces, who have traditionally maintained that nuclear power is too expensive. The fact that private firms, like Bruce Power, are the ones promoting the expansion of nuclear reactors shows that there are economic advantages when the price of carbon is included. A third reason for considering nuclear power is the role it can play in lessening Alberta’s dependence on natural gas. Natural gas is valuable because it is a cheap, efficient, and relatively clean energy source. In addition, natural gas is a versatile resource that generates electricity and heats homes and businesses and that is a key ingredient in many petrochemicals. Finally, natural gas exports have contributed greatly to the economic prosperity of Alberta. Natural gas royalties in Alberta amounted to $42.6 billion between 2000–1 and 2006–7.48 Even with the recent drop in natural gas prices, the Alberta government still collected $1.4 billion in 2010–11.49 Unfortunately, Alberta is starting to run out of conventional natural gas. While there has been lots of discussion about peak oil, a more immediate concern, especially for Alberta, is the long-term supply of natural gas. David Hughes, of the Geological Survey of Canada, has argued that Canada’s natural gas production peaked in 2001. Hughes, working with estimates out of the National Energy Board (neb), determined that at current production rates, Canada had only 9.4 years of

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proven reserves, 4.9 additional years of resources, and the possibility of 46.9 more years of undiscovered resources. Already gas production in Alberta is declining, and the rate of decline would be even worse were it not for the increased use of unconventional sources like coalbed methane and upgraded bitumen gas.50 Nuclear power can help conserve the supply of natural gas in two major ways. First, it can replace natural gas as a source of electricity generation. As mentioned, 38 percent of Alberta’s electricity is currently generated by natural gas. Adding several thousand megawatts worth of electricity to the grid from nuclear power would reduce the demand on gas-fired plants. Second, nuclear power could be used in the oil sands. In fact, the initial proposal for nuclear power was to place a reactor in Fort McMurray to extract and upgrade the bitumen in the oil sands. After all, it takes about 1,200 cubic feet of natural gas (a cleaner fuel) to produce a barrel of bitumen (a dirtier fuel). One oil executive referred to this as “burning a Picasso for heat.”51 The neb also predicts that “natural gas requirements for the oil sands industry are projected to increase substantially from 0.7 billion cubic feet per day in 2005 to 2.1 billion cubic feet per day in 2015.”52 A 2007 mit study determined that replacing natural gas with nuclear energy in the oil sands would reduce co2 emissions by 3.1 million metric tons per year for a plant producing 100,000 barrels of bitumen daily.53 Unfortunately, some technical problems are involved in using nuclear power in the oil sands. The biggest impediment is that because the reactor’s high-pressure steam can travel only 15 kilometres, many small reactors (of less than 300 mw) would need to be built. However, because of economies of scale (high initial construction costs support building larger reactors) and licensing challenges, deploying many small reactors in the oil sands is not feasible at this time. This is why eac/Bruce Power changed their proposal to using nuclear power purely for electricity generation. This does not mean that nuclear power has no role in the oil sands, since the complex upgrading and refining of bitumen also requires electricity. Moreover, new technologies are being developed that would separate bitumen using massive amounts of electricity instead of using natural gas.54 Finally, there are proposals for multi-use reactors that combine steam production for the oil sands with electricity generation (both dedicated supplies to oil sands facilities and wholesale sales to the Alberta electricity grid).55 The neb has argued that “Co-generation of steam

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and electricity holds tremendous synergies for oil sands operations by lowering energy costs and improving electricity reliability.”56 The more that nuclear power can be used as an alternative to natural gas (for electricity production and oil sands extraction), the longer natural gas supplies can last. Since natural gas is a key component in the international economic competitiveness of Alberta, it makes sense to take steps to ensure the long-term supply of this valuable, but non-renewable, resource. Environmental writer Andrew Nikiforuk has recognized that “the rapid depletion of natural gas in the tar sands is driving Canada’s so-called nuclear renaissance.”57 The Nuclear Power Expert Panel and the Public Consultation Process The Alberta government was behind the rest of the provincial nuclear policy sector in considering the ramifications of nuclear power within the province. eac and, later, Bruce Power were involved in building public support for a nuclear power plant, making arrangements for reactor vendors, and selecting a site. Grassroots anti-nuclear organizations, like pres and cause, were starting to mobilize, and the media was covering the emerging story. What was lacking was government involvement. There were some initial musings from politicians and some preliminary discussions within the Departments of Energy and Environment, but that was about it. Eventually the Alberta government decided that it had to get more involved in the growing nuclear debate. In April 2008 it appointed the Nuclear Power Expert Panel (npep), chaired by former federal Conservative cabinet minister Harvey Andre, to prepare a comprehensive report on nuclear power in Alberta. According to Andre, the provincial government had been forced to act because it realized that there was simply too much government responsibility in the area of nuclear power for it to be absent from it. First, the federal government had constitutional authority for all nuclear facilities. Second, both the provincial and the federal governments had responsibility over the environment. Third, the province had primary responsibility for social issues emerging out of major industrial projects. And fourth, the public frequently demanded that all levels of government should become involved in major energy projects, especially nuclear projects.58

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The npep would examine environmental, health, and safety issues; waste management; nuclear energy compared with other electricity generation technologies; current and future nuclear power generation being used in Canada and around the world; Alberta’s future electricity needs; and social issues/concerns related to nuclear energy.59 The report would not make any recommendations; instead the panel’s mandate was to “prepare a balanced and objective Report for the government of Alberta on factual issues pertinent to the use of nuclear power to supply electricity in Alberta.”60 Unlike other panels appointed by the Stelmach government, most notably the Oil & Gas Royalty Review, no public hearings would be held during the drafting of the report. Instead, the panel’s findings would be used as the basis for a public consultation process that would gather input from Albertans. As Andre noted, “the report was written for government, but the ultimate audience was the public.” This is why the report was kept short and relatively free of scientific jargon.61 The report was drafted in secrecy. The panel decided that it would not meet any interest groups: organizations representing nuclear technologies, organizations interested in nuclear power development, or organizations opposed to any form of nuclear energy.62 Instead, the panel relied on its member’s personal expertise and a specially commissioned technical study by the Alberta Research Council (arc) and the Idaho National Laboratory (inl).63 In fact the arc/inl study was substantially more detailed than the npep report. At three times the length and written by nuclear experts, it was able to more fully describe the following topics: • •

•

• • • • • • • •

Electricity supply and demand in Alberta; Comparisons between the different technologies of fossil-fuel based, nuclear, and renewable electricity sources; The integration of nuclear power plants into Alberta’s electricity grid; A nuclear reactor’s operation, maintenance, and decommissioning; Nuclear fuel handling and disposal; Nuclear safety and security; Water usage and sourcing; Environmental and social impacts; Regulatory processes; Comparisons of different nuclear reactor types; and The Chernobyl accident.

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It is apparent from a reading ofboth studies that the arc/inl report formed the technical basis for the npep report. What the npep did was to evaluate the arc/inl’s data, condense its information, add in its own economic analysis, and put it in more lay person’s language. Although the arc/inl study was acknowledged by the npep report and was listed in its bibliography, its importance seemed to be downplayed. For instance, the arc/inl study cannot be found on the Alberta Energy website as part of the npep documents, nor was it mentioned in the subsequent consultation process by the Alberta government. Instead, it was necessary to go to the arc website to locate the report. The arc/inl study would not be widely read, but it should have been more transparently available in view of the obvious influence that it had on the npep report. The npep report was widely touted in Alberta’s long-term energy strategy paper. The Alberta energy strategy paper stated that “nuclear energy, dependent on mined uranium, is one alternative to fossil fuels. Uranium is still plentiful globally, however issues include waste management and environmental, health, safety, and social concerns. Nuclear has experienced resurgence as the world attempts to reduce its co2 emissions. Some synergistic applications involving bitumen processing may be available. Alberta is currently examining the merits and challenges of nuclear power.”64 Even before its release, the npep report generated controversy over the panel’s membership. Anti-nuclear activists targeted John Luxat, because of his past life with the nuclear industry. At the time of appointment to the panel, Luxat was teaching nuclear engineering at McMaster University, but before that he had worked for decades in the Canadian nuclear industry (principally with Ontario Hydro, but with other firms as well). Critics charged that he would be biased in favour of the nuclear industry in general and the candu reactor system in particular. cause argued that “the very composition of the panel made it inevitable that we would be presented a very one-sided and biased view of the nuclear issue. The nuclear panel report can in no way claim to be objective.”65 It also asserted that somebody from the antinuclear community (Helen Caldicott, Gordon Edwards, a member from the Pembina Institute) should have been added to the npep to provide balance. This charge became amplified when Luxat was later appointed to aecl’s board of directors. Nevertheless, the npep required some advanced technical knowledge of nuclear power, and Luxat provided it. None of the other panellists had a nuclear back-

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ground: Andre was a former federal politician who was working in the oil and gas sector,66 and Joe Doucett and Harrie Vredenburg were business professors specializing in energy policy at the Universities of Alberta and Calgary. After several months of delay, the npep report was released by the government on 26 March 2009.67 Although it did not contain any recommendations, it did present some important conclusions that would frame the debate over the development of nuclear power in Alberta. The key conclusions are 1 Alberta’s economy and population will continue to grow, and significant additional electrical power will be needed to maintain and improve the standard of living of Albertans. Options include more fossil-fuel-burning power plants (with or without carbon capture), more renewable sources and greater energy efficiency, as well as nuclear power. 2 Each technology has trade-offs associated with it. Such trade-offs include the availability of technology, environmental impacts, costs and operating implications for the Alberta system. 3 The decision to build a plant – whether powered by thermal combustion, or wind or nuclear – is a private-sector decision taken by a company based on its assessment of the project’s economic viability. But, as with any large industrial construction project, all such plants must obtain approval from relevant government and regulatory authorities regarding their impacts or consequences. 4 Nuclear power has been in use for generating electricity for more than 50 years, and more than 400 units are in operation worldwide. New designs, based on learning from previous incidents and from long-term safe operation, are safer, more efficient and easier to control and operate. 5 Nuclear power does not release carbon dioxide. This is a significant difference (in environmental terms) between it and traditional technologies using coal and natural gas. 6 The offsetting concerns relate primarily to nuclear waste disposal. While the spent fuel removed from a reactor is radioactive, more than 99% of this material is made up of the heavy metals uranium and plutonium, which can be recycled to be reused as nuclear fuel. The remaining waste fission products decay comparatively quickly. Thus a program of separating the spent fuel and recycling heavy metals will dramatically reduce the amount of waste to be

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dealt with and the time period during which this material would be radioactive at levels above the natural background radiation. (Capturing carbon from fossil fuel plants also creates storage issues). 7 In Canada, the Federal Government has the authority and responsibility for approving and regulating all nuclear facilities and nuclear related activities. Normal provincial approvals required for any major project would also be required, based on the Provinces’ constitutional responsibilities for land resources. 8 Any nuclear generating project would be a major construction project and have social impacts in areas such as schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, Aboriginal communities, local economies, housing and so on. Significant though these issues might be, they are regularly dealt with by the Government of Alberta and its agencies and affected municipalities. ( 4–5) A thorough examination of the tone and emphasis of the npep report reveals strong support for the development of nuclear power in Alberta. It makes it clear that the demand for electricity will rise in Alberta: it estimates annual increases of 3.3 percent until 2024 (14). Therefore, the question is, what electricity sources will be used to meet the demand: coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, solar, or nuclear? On this point, the npep repeatedly emphasizes that the absence of greenhouse gases in the generation of nuclear power “is a significant difference (in environmental terms) between it and technologies using traditional coal and natural gas” (52). When the discussion turns to renewable energy, the npep points out that “while there is considerable interest in other non-conventional power generation means such as geothermal, bio-fuel, solar, etc., it is unlikely that these technologies will be able to satisfy all of Alberta’s growing electricity needs” (10). In addition, “compared with hydroelectric and wind power, nuclear has a smaller physical footprint on the landscape” (52). Nuclear waste is a prominent issue among both anti-nuclear activists and the public in general. How can highly toxic elements, some of which have a half-life in the range of hundreds of thousands of years, be effectively handled? The npep’s response is twofold. It begins by emphasizing the role that fuel recycling (also called reprocessing) can play in significantly reducing the amount of waste, and it highlights the fact that “more than 99%” of spent fuel “is made up of the

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heavy metals uranium and plutonium, which can be recycled into nuclear fuel. The remaining waste fission products decay comparatively quickly” (53). All of this is true and, in fact, critical to mitigating substantially the long-term issue of nuclear waste. The problem is that fuel recycling is not yet cost-effective. However, there is a rampedup research and development effort in this area that should start to bring results. The second part of the npep’s response describes in detail the nwmo’s Phased Adaptive Management approach to spent fuel. This is a threepronged approach: •

•

•

Phase One, lasting 30 years, is on-site dry storage (done at all existing facilities); Phase Two, lasting another 30 years, sees the spent fuel moved to a centralized facility (these exist in Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick); and Phase Three, after 60 years, sees the used fuel moved to a permanent storage facility in a deep geological repository. (34)

The npep acknowledges that “opinions on nuclear safety tend to be highly polarized between supporters and opponents, making it more difficult to develop an objective, balanced view of the risks and impacts” (35). Nevertheless, the report follows that statement up with a detailed chapter identifying all the comprehensive safety features of a nuclear reactor (35–43). In the process, it minimizes the risks of radiation exposure (by comparing nuclear-created radiation and natural radiation), reactor safety (by listing the triple redundancies of control, cool, and contain features), and the lessons learned from accidents like Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (by citing the role played by the iaea, wano, and the cnsc in ensuring reactor safety). The npep is correct to note that nuclear reactors have been functioning for six decades with few fatalities, Chernobyl being the obvious exception, and even then, it notes that the “consequences” have often been “overstated” (42). When these facts are presented, it becomes apparent that around the world, nuclear power has a substantially better safety record than any other energy source, and better than other sectors like construction or agriculture. One of the tasks that the npep was mandated with was to address social issues, because anti-nuclear critics often highlight them as reasons to prevent or eliminate nuclear power. However, the npep report

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maintains “that there are no separate social issues which fall within provincial jurisdiction that are uniquely associated with nuclear power generation plants. Any project of the magnitude under consideration will have social impacts in areas such as schools, hospitals, transportation infrastructure, aboriginal communities, the local economy, housing and so on” (53). Some unique challenges identified in the npep report would have to be resolved before a nuclear power plant could be built in Alberta. For example, the large size of a nuclear power plant (a 800–1,000 mw reactor is over twice the size of the largest coal unit at 450 mws) “could require increased operating reserves or, alternatively, additional transmission interconnections with neighbouring jurisdictions” (44). Another challenge is satisfying the requirement for nuclear specialists such as engineers and physicists. The report notes (moving very closely to making a recommendation) that “it might be desirable to develop the nuclear-specific skill sets within Alberta, both for future employment within Alberta as the sector grows and as a technicalservice export to a growing international sector. This would require training programs to help develop the necessary expertise, which could be sponsored by government or facility owners” (46). Critics who were hoping for a denouncement of nuclear power have argued that the npep was biased. For example, Gordon Edwards was blunt when he said that “they are really presenting a very onesided, very limited picture which doesn’t give the average member of the public, or the average politicians, any real insight into the nature of the hazards that are peculiar to nuclear.”68 Meanwhile, Brian Mason, leader of Alberta’s ndp complained that the panel “cannot claim to be unbiased when it clearly tries to abdicate responsibility for the decision to have or not have nuclear power. bc and Manitoba have anti-nuke policies and we should too.”69 For its part, cause has argued that the npep was riddled with errors and omissions. Here is just a sampling. The report •

•

•

does not discuss the design and construction problems of generation III+ reactors; does not discuss the risks and consequences of a nuclear accident; ignores the Nuclear Liability Act that makes insurance available to nuclear operators at a fraction of the costs of a catastrophic accident;

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does not address the health risks of nuclear power; and ignores the real financial costs of nuclear power (hefty government subsidies, massive cost overruns, costly unscheduled reactors repairs, etc).70

cause also responded to the npep with its own report: Nuclear Power in Alberta: An Alternative Perspective.71 This alternative view, which was written before the release of the npep report, was heavily influenced by the Pembina Institute’s Greening the Grid report.72 It reiterates most of Greening the Grid’s recommendations: Alberta should appoint a panel on renewable energies; Alberta should collaborate with the federal government on a study on the health effects of nuclear power; and Alberta should establish a centre of excellence to support growth and expertise in renewable energies. The rest of cause’s short rejoinder repeats most of the typical arguments against nuclear power: it is unsafe, unreliable, expensive, has cost overruns, damages the environment, consumes too much water, and produces massive amounts of highly radioactive waste. In a public response to the npep’s critics, Harvey Andre asserted that “facts are by definition one-sided” and that contrary to the allegations of cause and others, the npep report does include risk assessments.73 In a sense, these critics are correct; the report does come out in favour of nuclear power. The npep authoritatively dispelled some of the myths around nuclear power and put it on a level playing field with other electricity sources. This is the very definition of neutrality. The npep has properly framed the debate not as “nuclear yes or no?” but as “what electricity sources does Alberta need to build to address its growing needs?” Nuclear power is very contentious. Therefore, it is crucial that the people are heard. The npep report served as the basis for a “multifaceted consultation process” that was designed to gather the views of Albertans on nuclear power. Innovative Research Group, an independent research firm, was commissioned by the government to collect the data and provide a summary to the government.74 The process, which took place between April 27 and June 1, included •

A workbook and survey that was developed, and made available to all Albertans. It covered the themes of the npep report. These were completed either through an interactive online mechanism or in paper form.

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Twenty discussion groups held in ten communities across Alberta. Six stakeholder discussion meetings held in Edmonton with individuals from groups that came forward asking to participate and those identified as having an interest in the issue. Included were local government politicians, Aboriginal people, businesses, and environmental groups.75

Many members of the pro-nuclear coalition did not participate in the public consultation process. For example, Bruce Power, despite being the principal advocate for nuclear power in Alberta, deliberately avoided the process. Similarly, the cns Alberta branch was not asked to participate in any of the stakeholder meetings. In contrast, the antinuclear coalition, despite being very critical of the process, participated in the stakeholder sessions in Edmonton. cause was upset that the online workbook and feedback form starts with the executive summary of the npep report. This led them to allege that “a biased nuclear panel report with one-sided, pro-nuclear information will play a key role” in the public discussions. They believed that a counter-document focusing on alternative energy needed to be commissioned by the government to balance the debate. Instead of “selective meetings with stakeholders and some focus groups,” they recommended that “public hearings be held throughout the province.”76 However, public hearings were not chosen, because they often get highjacked by interest groups. The only people who tend to participate in public hearings, with the exception of hearings at potential reactor sites (which will be included in the consultation process) are the rabid anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear activists. It was to avoid this problem that focus groups, where the participants were not told what the topic would be in advance, were used to provide input from Albertans who were undecided about nuclear power. Allowing any interested person to fill out the workbook (in combination with the stakeholder consultations and focus groups) was a legitimate compromise. The Alberta Government Decision On 14 December 2009, the Alberta government announced its conditional support for nuclear power in the province. “Alberta,” Energy Minister Mel Knight explained, “will maintain its existing policy where power generation options are proposed by the private sector in the province and considered on a case-by-case basis. We will work

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with the federal government regarding any nuclear power application to ensure provincial rules and environmental standards are respected. Further, we will not invest public dollars in any nuclear power proposals.”77 The government based its decision in part on the public consultation process that was conducted on the entry of nuclear power into the province. According to Knight, “Albertans have told us that we shouldn’t be closed to new generation technologies that could provide clean, low-emission power. At the same time Albertans have identified concerns with nuclear power that potential future applicants will need to fully address.”78 The public consultation report, compiled by Innovative Research Group Inc., was released at the same time as the government’s announcement.79 As mentioned earlier, the public consultation process included a telephone survey (1,024 people), twenty randomly selected discussion groups (193 individuals), stakeholder discussion groups (First Nations and Métis, community, business, environmental groups, and all the province’s anti-nuclear groups), and an online and mail-in questionnaire (3,615 responses).80 As table 7.1 shows, the different consultation tools led to different results. Most noticeably, it shows that randomly selected Albertans (in telephone surveys and discussion groups) were more supportive of nuclear power than self-selected Albertans. A probable explanation for the division between randomly selected and self-selected Albertans is that the efforts by the antinuclear coalition to mobilize people to fill out the survey were done in a way that opposed nuclear power. For example, cause sent out emails labelled a “call for action” through affiliated organizations with instructions on how to fill out the survey. They wrote that “the information preceding the survey is full of false and missing information. I am attaching again cause’s response to the Nuclear Panel Report, our alternative report and media release. Here is a summary of some of the errors in the government document preceding the survey (this new government document is similar, but not identical, to the Nuclear Panel Report.)”81 A second feature of the public consultation report was that the discussion groups showed that when more information was provided, the level of opposition to nuclear power dropped. This was consistent with the telephone survey and workbook submission, which showed a strong correlation between how informed people were about nuclear power and electricity and their support for nuclear power.82

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Table 7.1 Comparing Nuclear Power Public Consultation Results by Instrument (percentages) Telephone Survey Discussion Group Submission of Workbooks (Randomly-Selected) (Randomly Selected) (Self-Selected)

Province should encourage proposals Considered on a case-by-case basis Province should oppose proposals Don’t Know

19

22

28

45

57

16

27 8

13 8

55 1

Source: Innovative Research Group Inc., Alberta Nuclear Consultation.

The reaction to the government’s announcement was predictable. Bruce Power saw the decision as a green light. Duncan Hawthorne, Bruce Power’s ceo, stated that “it’s encouraging to see the door remain open for us to demonstrate we can bring value to the province and help Alberta meet its future energy needs without contributing to greenhouse gas emissions.”83 The anti-nuclear coalition, despite predicting the government’s decision in advance, was outraged. Adele Boucher Rymhs, president of the cnfa, argued that “the government didn’t listen.”84 Similarly, Elena Schacherl, the founder of cause, complained that the government “ignored the 55 per cent opposition to nuclear from the 3,600 Albertans who filled out the consultation workbook.” For Schacherl, “the consultation results were the culmination of a process that right from the start suggested that the government had already made up its mind about nuclear. They set out to convince rather than consult Albertans.”85 In contrast, the large environmental groups argued that “not providing public dollars to subsidize the nuclear industry hits the final nail in the nuclear energy coffin for the province.”86 Alberta’s decision to allow nuclear power on a case-by-case basis gives approval to Bruce Power to move forward with its project. If the province had said no, then Bruce Power obviously would have abandoned it. However, the conditional “yes” from the government met only one of Bruce Power’s conditions. The others included a willing host community, a successful environmental assessment, and a prof-

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itable business case. While it was waiting for a government decision, Bruce Power was doing some preliminary work. It secured the land for the Whitemud site. It is also conducting a public education and consultation campaign with the local community. Finally, it has started some of the pre-environmental assessment work (water flow and temperature, soil studies, etc).87 The Fukushima-Daiichi accident generated several reactions in Alberta. The ndp used the event to request that the government “reassure Albertans that nuclear energy is one hazard that this province will steer clear of now and in the future.” In response, Energy Minister Ron Liepert re-affirmed that Alberta has an “open, competitive generation market and that at such time that an application is filed, it should be considered along with any other particular proposals.”88 Some business commentators in Alberta also believed that the nuclear accident would benefit the province’s natural gas industry, since utilities around the world would decide to opt for gas-fired plants over proposed new nuclear facilities.89 This is an interesting perspective, given that low natural gas prices have been a constraint on nuclear energy, and therefore that it could be assumed that higher natural gas prices would have the opposite effect. Polls in Alberta after the Fukushima-Daiichi accident showed that the province had the second highest level of public support for nuclear energy in Canada at 46 percent.90 Despite the government approval, Bruce Power eventually decided to withdraw from its reactor proposal in Peace River.91 Although no public explanation was provided, Bruce Power’s decision-making calculus was probably based on low natural gas prices. As explained earlier in this chapter, high natural gas prices were a driver for the interest in nuclear energy in Alberta in 2007–9. However, the recent drop in natural gas prices, largely resulting from the discovery of shale gas in large parts of the United States, has greatly diminished that interest. Natural gas prices had been relatively high since 2003 and peaked at $9.84/gj in July 2008, at which point they had started a steady decline. By October 2011 they were at $3.17/gj. In fact, natural gas had not been above $6/gj since December 2008.92 As all economic studies have indicated, nuclear power plants need to be compared with other electricity sources.93 Gas-fired plants, because of their peaking ability, relatively lower rate of ghg emissions (at least in comparison to coal), and superior construction timelines, are the major competitor to nuclear. However, gas-fired plants are much more sensitive to fluctuations in fuel prices than nuclear power plants, because 70–80 percent

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of the cost of electricity produced by natural gas is due to fuel, while in the case of nuclear energy, it is only 15–20 percent. Thus, low natural gas prices provide an economic incentive to build gas-fired plants, as opposed to nuclear power plants. While the price of natural gas is important for nuclear energy in general, it is particularly important in a market like that of Alberta, which has lots of easily accessible natural gas. In fact, the drop of natural gas prices has greatly increased the life expectancy of natural gas reserves in Alberta, because natural gas is being kept in the ground. Exports have also plummeted because it is cheaper for American consumers to use local sources of natural gas, rather than piping in Alberta gas.94 Simply put, no nuclear power plant will be built in the province until natural gas prices rise. T H E R E L AT I O N S H I P S W I T H I N A L B E R TA’ S NUCLEAR ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

Alberta government departments have often met with the other actors in the provincial nuclear sector, although members of the pronuclear coalition have dominated. Since the Departments of Energy and Environment and other departments were largely uninformed about nuclear power, the meetings were largely about information sharing. Bruce Power has had an open dialogue with bureaucrats from Energy and Environment. The talks, which have not discussed any potential role for the provincial government, have focused on defining the proposed nuclear project, explaining nuclear technology, and showing how nuclear could fit into Alberta’s energy system.95 Academic specialists in nuclear science and nuclear policy have also been invited to speak to members of the Energy and Environment departments. Alberta government officials also met with the cnsc for an information session to get a better idea of what the cnsc is and what it does.96 The relationship within the nuclear industry changed when Bruce Power bought out the eac. aecl and the eac had a very close partnership, exemplified by the exclusivity contract. However, Bruce Power went to an open-bid process because, in the words of a senior executive who was very knowledgeable about the contract, it was a “onesided bad deal.” The eac had to work with aecl, but aecl could work with another company. Getting out of this contract was an essential condition for Bruce Power’s takeover of the eac.97 Bruce Power sub-

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sequently informed aecl that it was modifying the agreement to include two new conditions. First, aecl had to be exclusive to Bruce Power; they could not go to anyone else. Second, Bruce Power had the right to conduct an open bid among all nuclear vendors. aecl “was not happy” with the changes, but they accepted them.98 The relationship between the scientific community (represented by the Alberta branch of the cns) and the nuclear industry, two key members of the pro-nuclear coalition, is one of similar goals but organizational distance. Initially there was a close relationship between the eac and the Alberta branch of the cns. Many of the eac principals joined the cns and cns members helped with public education efforts in northern Alberta, but when the eac was transferred to Bruce Power, the “relationship petered out.” With aecl, the cns Alberta branch maintains some tight relationships, owing to overlapping memberships, but this is at an individual-to-individual level, not between the two organizations. With respect to the industry spokesgroup (the cna) cooperation exists (for example, with the 2009 cns Conference in Calgary), but the mandates of the two groups are different. The cns has utilized some of the cna’s research when their goals have met (e.g., with industry expansion for the cna and public education about nuclear power for the cns). When the cna commissioned the Canadian Energy Research Institute (ceri) to write a critique of the Pembina Institute’s Greening the Grid report, the cns helped to publicize it. The cns has the expertise to conduct this type of research, but it does not have the resources. The cna does have the funds to commission this type of work, but the cns would have to rely on volunteers.99 As for members of the Alberta anti-nuclear coalition, they do not believe that there is any separation between the cns and the nuclear industry. They point out that cns members often work for the nuclear industry. Academics, too, have often worked for the industry in the past. And even if they have no industry ties, it is still the case that teaching nuclear physics requires an expansion of the nuclear industry.100 As predicted by the advocacy coalition framework, there is an adversarial relationship in which Alberta’s pro-nuclear coalition (of the nuclear industry and the cns Alberta branch) is on one side and Alberta’s anti-nuclear coalition is on the other. There have been public debates and competing op-eds and letter-writing campaigns. While the nuclear industry is motivated by profits, the cns members and anti-

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nuclear activists are intellectually and emotionally committed to their cause. The “devil shift” also exists in spades, with accusations of lying and misrepresentations during joint media and public appearances.101 T H E W I N N I N G C O A L I T I O N I N T H E A L B E R TA N U C L E A R S E C TO R

There is a consensus among all actors within the Alberta nuclear sector that the pro-nuclear coalition is winning and that the most influential actors are in the nuclear industry, although this does not mean that industry actors control the decision-making process. Therefore, a larger question is, how influential have they been? One way to measure their influence is through agenda-setting. When the eac and, later, Bruce Power began investigating the possibility of introducing nuclear power to Alberta, they forced other actors to respond: aecl formed a partnership with the eac, the cns established an Alberta branch, local anti-nuclear organizations formed, and Alberta Energy began to educate itself. Eventually, the government of Alberta created the npep and began a public consultation process in reaction to industry actors pursuing nuclear power in the province. A second way to measure their influence is through the level of political support for their position. There has been an evolution, commiserate with growing public support, in the thinking of leading Alberta politicians towards nuclear power. This can be shown by tracing some of the statements and actions of former Premier Ralph Klein. In 2005, Klein declared that nuclear was the “least acceptable” option for the oil sands,102 but by April 2006 he was saying that “we have to consider nuclear power.”103 Finally, in February 2008 he coauthored a think tank study on continental energy that supported nuclear power.104 The Stelmach government was much more cautious when asked about nuclear power in the province. During his campaign for the Progressive Conservative leadership in 2006, Stelmach did not advocate nuclear power (as did Jim Dinning, the perceived frontrunner) but instead promised to study whether it was a right fit for the province. After Stelmach assumed the premiership, there were some initial tentative comments, both in favour and in opposition, from some of Stelmach’s cabinet ministers. For example, Treasury Board President Lloyd Snelgrove said that nuclear power was “a natural fit” for the oil sands, but Environment Minister Rob Renner responded that he was sceptical and was concerned about the disposal of nuclear waste.105

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However, once the npep was established, a cone of silence went up around the government, and no public comments were made, except for the government to say that it was consulting Albertans. Even when the government announced its conditional support for nuclear power in December 2009, there were no comments aside from those of Premier Stelmach and Energy Minister Knight. Because the Progressive Conservatives have been in power since 1971, Alberta has been described as a “one party dominant” province. Nevertheless, there is some value in examining the position on nuclear power of the opposition Liberals and the ndp. The Alberta ndp, like the ndp nationally, is strongly opposed to nuclear power.106 Meanwhile, the Liberals, like the Stelmach government, have been cautious as they investigate the issue independently and await the results of the public consultation process. The Liberal Party had refrained from making any official statement until the government released its nuclear decision.107 When the government did make its decision, the ndp were strongly opposed, and the Liberals were ambiguous.108 In the last few years, the Wildrose Party, a new conservative party led by its charismatic leader Danielle Smith, has made great political inroads in the province. It acquired four mlas since the fall of 2009 and ran second in public opinion polls behind the pcs for much of the pre-election period. In the April 2012 provincial election, Wildrose led in the public opinion polls for much of the campaign, and ultimately formed the official opposition with 17 seats. Smith is not opposed to nuclear energy on safety or environmental grounds, but she is nevertheless sceptical about nuclear plants being built. After speaking with Bruce Power officials in the summer of 2011, Smith claimed that a nuclear power plant needs a thirty-year government subsidy of 9–11 cents per kilowatt hour to be cost competitive. “I just think that if your proposal requires a subsidy from the government, then you’re probably in the wrong business. We are not the kind of party that would support direct subsidies for individual firms, if they can’t put forward a business plan that actually makes sense in this market environment then it’s not going to happen,”109 A third way to measure influence is through public support. In November 2005, the eac commissioned Longwoods International to poll on the use of nuclear power in the oil sands: 40 percent of Albertans supported, 36 percent of Albertans were neutral, and 23 percent of Albertans opposed.110 In January 2007, the Calgary Herald con-

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ducted its own poll, which found that 45 percent of Albertans supported nuclear power, 42 percent were opposed, and 12 percent were unsure. There was stronger opposition in northern Alberta, home of the oilsands and the likely location of a nuclear power plant, with 53 percent opposed and only 36 percent support. The strongest support was found in Calgary, home of the oil sands decision makers, with 47 percent support and only 41 percent opposed.111 The July 2009 survey done in conjunction with the public consultation process revealed a similar breakdown; as table 7.1 illustrates, Albertans favourite response was to consider nuclear power plant proposals on a case-bycase basis. While all these polls show support for developing nuclear power in Alberta, the support is soft for several reasons: it has not been measured over time, it has shown great volatility, the degree of nuclear knowledge is weak, and no specific proposal is being polled. A final way to measure influence is through elections. The municipal elections in the Peace River region in the fall of 2007 saw several pro-nuclear councillors defeated and several anti-nuclear councillors elected. In addition, the March 2008 provincial election, the November 2008 federal election, and the May 2011 federal election included candidates in the Peace River ridings that ran on explicitly antinuclear campaigns. However, outside the Peace region, nuclear power has not been an election issue at any level of government. THE CHANGES WITHIN THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

Unlike what has happened in other provinces, there has been no change in the Alberta nuclear acf, because the nuclear sector is in its infancy. Instead, the Alberta nuclear acf is in the process of being developed. Actors are being formed, relationships are being established, and each actor is vying for influence with the government. The most notable aspect of the creation of the Alberta nuclear sector is its relationship with the national nuclear sector. This was not a case of the Canadian nuclear sector simply replicating itself in Alberta; rather, a series of mutually beneficial partnerships developed within the different components of the nuclear sector. The trend was for local Alberta groups to seek out technical knowledge from members of the Canadian nuclear sector. aecl knew that it needed to find a local partner on the ground if it was going to penetrate the Alberta market. In addition, it had to do technical studies to see if it could

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modify its existing reactor designs to the specific requirements of the oil sands. Bruce Power, which is a reactor operator only in Ontario, is seeking to expand its role by becoming an owner/operator in Alberta, because Alberta, unlike other provinces, has a privatized electricity system. There is no provincial Crown corporation with a monopoly over the electricity grid. The Alberta Branch of the cns relied heavily on financial, administrative, and technical support from the national office. Local anti-nuclear groups could mobilize grassroots opposition, but they relied on national organizations, other provincial organizations, and international groups to provide technical advice. Finally, Alberta government officials in the Departments of Energy and Environment sought out information from their federal cousins.

8 International Opportunities

The previous four chapters analyzed Canada’s domestic opportunities for taking part in the global nuclear revival. This chapter analyzes Canada’s international participation in the global nuclear revival. The provincial case studies did a little bit of that by addressing electricity exports to the United States as an incentive for building new nuclear reactors. However, this chapter substantially increases the analysis of foreign policy relating to nuclear power in two ways. First, it examines the international opportunities for the Canadian nuclear industry, especially aecl and Cameco. Second, it analyzes the renewal of CanadaIndia nuclear cooperation. This represents such a fundamental shift in Canadian foreign policy that it deserves a separate section. I N T E R N AT I O N A L U R A N I U M O P P O R T U N I T I E S

The global nuclear revival will lead to an increased demand for uranium. According to the World Nuclear Association (wna), the world’s reactors required over 68,000 tonnes of uranium for 2011.1 However, the demand for uranium is commensurate with the increased demand for nuclear power: “each gwe of increased capacity will require about 195 tu/yr of extra mine production routinely, and three times this for the first fuel load.” Therefore, the wna projects a 33 percent increase in uranium demand over 2010–20.2 This demand also offers opportunities along the uranium cycle. Over the next ten years, to pick just one example, world demand for uranium conversion “is expected to increase by 32% to about 87 million kilograms of uranium in 2017.”3 The increased demand for uranium provides a tremendous opportunity for Canadian companies, principally Cameco and Areva Resources

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Canada Inc., to expand their uranium business through exports. Areva Canada focuses on Canada only, leaving the world to its Areva parent company in France, but Cameco has been making investments around the globe. These export and investment opportunities are in both uranium exploration and mining and in its upgrading processes producing reactor fuel. Already, Canada exports about 85 percent of its uranium production. In 2010, this was 8,111 tonnes of uranium.4 In the area of uranium conversion, Cameco already has a 35 percent nameplate share of the Western world’s market.5 China will be the world’s most important uranium customer. That country has known uranium reserves of 70,000 tonnes, and over the last decade its uranium production has been slowly increasing.6 In 1998, it produced 500 tonnes, but by 2010 it had produced 827 tonnes.7 Nevertheless, this is far short of its requirements, since in 2011 alone it required 4,402 tonnes for its reactor fleet.8 Beyond the long-term contracts that it has arranged, China also accounts for about one-quarter of all spot uranium sales: 8 million of the 33 million pounds of uranium.9 Moreover, as China undergoes a massive expansion of reactors – it has over fifty reactors either under construction or firmly planned – its uranium requirements will increase fivefold. This demand will skyrocket even more if China moves ahead with its ninety proposed new reactor builds. To address this challenge and with the goal of nuclear fuel-cycle independence, China has been taking steps to acquire uranium resources internationally. The China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation (SinoU) was created by the China National Nuclear Corporation (cnnc) in 2006 to “carry through the national strategy of ‘going out’ to enhance the exploitation of foreign uranium resources.”10 SinoU is already setting up a mine in Niger and is investigating opportunities in Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Jordan, and Algeria. China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (cgnpc), cnnc’s domestic competitor, also has its own international uranium company. China Uranium Development Co (cud) has already acquired 70 percent of Energy Metals Limited, an Australian firm, and is engaged in Africa and Central Asia. China’s effort to conduct exploration and mining in other countries is one strategy, but it will still have to rely on imports from foreign countries and companies. Following the completion of a ChineseAustralian nuclear co-operation agreement in 2006, Australia agreed to provide up to 2,500 tonnes of yellowcake. The first shipments of Australian uranium by bhp Billiton started to flow to China in late

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2008. Australian resource minister Martin Ferguson made clear his country’s objective: “with more than one-quarter of the world’s uranium resources, Australia is well-placed to benefit economically from uranium mining and uranium exports. We also have an obligation to be part of the solution to the environmental consequences of rapid economic growth on our doorstep in China and the Asia Pacific.” Ferguson added that “expansion of the uranium industry could generate up to a$17 billion in gdp for Australia to 2030 and avert up to 15 billion tonnes in carbon emissions through the use of uranium in the global power sector.”11 cgnpc also concluded a $3.5 billion deal with Areva in November 2010 that would provide it with 20,000 tonnes of uranium over a ten-year period.12 China has also increased its uranium imports from Canada. In November 2010, cgnpc reached a longterm agreement, extending to 2025, to purchase 29 million pounds of uranium concentrate from Cameco. Cameco is also hoping to expand this relationship with China beyond uranium exports and include possible partnerships in exploration and fuel processing.13 A second major uranium opportunity is in Kazakhstan. In the last several years, there has been plenty of foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan by Russian, Japanese, French, and Chinese companies across the entire nuclear fuel cycle.14 As a result, Kazakhstan is set to leapfrog over Canada and Australia and become the world’s number one uranium producer. Canada has recently started to make its own moves in Kazakhstan. In September 2009, it completed negotiations with Kazakhstan for a bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. While in Kazakhstan, International Trade Minister Stockwell Day stated that the “agreement will open up the civil nuclear market to Canadian companies, who have a full array of products and services to offer Kazakhstan’s growing market for nuclear energy. Given its expertise in nuclear energy, Canada will continue to play a growing role in this energy-rich country, especially in oil and gas and uranium extraction.”15 The bilateral agreement has opened the door for Cameco to start making further investments in the country. Cameco has been in Kazakhstan since 1993, where it has been involved in a joint venture with Kazatomprom in developing the Inkai uranium mine. This mine, where Cameco has a 60 percent stake, has proven reserves that are three times greater than all of Cameco’s Canadian holdings. Inkai’s probable reserves dwarf Canada’s: 86,000 tonnes compared to only 1,056 tonnes.16 Cameco has committed us$300 million to develop the mine for production. In May 2007, Cameco signed an agreement with

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Kazatomprom to build a uranium conversion facility that saw Cameco supply the technology and take a 49 percent ownership stake. The project is expected to be complete by 2016. Commenting on the Canada-Kazakhstan nuclear cooperation agreement, Jerry Grandey, Cameco’s president said that “once implemented, this agreement will allow us to expand our role and presence in the country and develop partnerships that will allow Cameco and Kazatomprom to work together on opportunities to convert uranium.”17 Cameco is putting most of its international efforts into China, Kazakhstan, and India (discussed later in this chapter). However, it has customers all around the world for its uranium and fuel services. It exports uranium through long-term contracts to the United States (its largest customer), South Korea, and Japan, and it also places uranium on the international spot market. In addition, it has expanded its foreign direct investment beyond the United States, the United Kingdom, and Kazakhstan to uranium exploration and mining in Australia, Niger, and Mongolia. I N T E R N AT I O N A L R E A C TO R O P P O R T U N I T I E S

Where are the international opportunities for candu Energy to sell or refurbish its candus? As a senior aecl official maintained, the company has to “stay focused. We are a small vendor and can’t be everywhere. We need to identify strategic markets. Places that are likely to want a candu: existing markets, those that desire natural uranium, those that want a smaller reactor, etc.”18 Therefore the market can be divided into two classes of countries: those who are existing candu customers and aspiring nuclear power countries. Existing Customers Any company thinking about expanding its business looks first to countries where it has existing customers. In the case of nuclear reactors, these countries have already made a commitment to the heavy-water technology. Canada has sold nuclear power reactors to six countries, including Pakistan. However, there are no opportunities in Pakistan because Canada severed nuclear cooperation with it in 1976 and there is no possibility in the foreseeable future of a renewal of cooperation. India, where Canada similarly terminated nuclear cooperation in 1974 but where a new nuclear cooperation agreement has been negotiated,

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will be dealt with in a separate section. That leaves four existing candu customers: Argentina, China, South Korea, and Romania. Argentina is a heavy water nuclear power country with two operational reactors: Atucha-1, built by Kraftwerk Union (kwu) of Germany, and Embalse, built by aecl. A third reactor, the Atucha-2, saw construction halted in 1994 with about 80 percent of it completed. In the last several years, aecl has sought to renew its nuclear cooperation with Argentina. In May 2006, aecl signed an agreement with Nucleoeléctrica Argentina s.a. (nasa) to refurbish the Embalse reactor, conduct a feasibility study for another 700 mwe candu-6, and assist nasa in finishing construction of the Atucha-2 reactor.19 This last item was ironic because in 1979, aecl lost out on the bid to build Atucha-2 to kwu. The decision to award the Atucha-2 contract to kwu was very controversial because aecl had a lower bid, but Argentina was concerned about the reliability of Canada as a nuclear supplier,20 This was due to Canada’s unilateral renegotiation of Embalse’s nuclear safeguards agreement in 1975, the fact that West Germany’s nuclear safeguards were not as stringent as Canada’s, and a major United Nations speech by Canadian external affairs minister Flora MacDonald that singled out the atrocious human rights record of the Argentine military government. Now, almost thirty years later, aecl was being asked to consider providing technical advice for the completion of the kwudesigned heavy water reactor. Ultimately, the Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica (cnea) elected to finish Atucha-2 on its own, and the reactor is expected to start producing electricity in 2012. While the Atucha-2 project failed to materialize, two other projects (life extension for Embalse and a new build) are progressing. On 21 September 2009, aecl signed a three-year agreement, extending its previous agreements with nasa and cnea, to work on a number of nuclear co-operation programs. The agreement emphasized the Embalse’s life extension and a feasibility study to build a new candu reactor (most likely the ec6). aecl had previously been awarded a $400 million contract to complete significant pre-project work on the Embalse refurbishment. This has now been done, and Buenos Aires has also passed the necessary enabling legislation. Negotiations over the final price and financing arrangements for the refurbishment project were delayed because of the long process of restructuring aecl. When the sale to snc-Lavalin was finally completed in June 2011, it paved the way for finalizing the life extension project. On 25 August 2011 candu Energy and nasa signed a $440 million contract to begin work on the

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retubing and refurbishment of the Embalse reactor. This will allow the reactor to operate for another twenty-five to thirty years. candu Energy will provide the key technologies and tools to complete the retubing, as well as the engineering and supply for plant upgrades. nasa, as the operator of the station, will be the overall project manager for the refurbishment and will carry out all reactor component procurement and oversee the on-site work. As Patrick Lamarre, executive vice-president of snc-Lavalin, pointed out, “this contract is a good example of the opportunities that lie ahead for Candu, and a testament to Canada’s long association with Argentina in the field of nuclear energy.”21 Now that the life extension contract is signed, negotiations on the new build can proceed. The Argentine government, based on a November 2009 announcement, may still build a new candu. It had projected us$2 billion and wanted construction to begin after 2010.22 In addition to these two specific projects, the aecl-nasa-cnea agreement also included a number of initiatives “aimed at the advancement of pressurized heavy water reactor technology and supporting facilities, including new developments related to materials and fabrication of fuel channels components and candu fuel cycle design.”23 However, the delays over the restructuring of aecl may have damaged the opportunities in Argentina, because aecl was prohibited by Ottawa from signing any major new contracts until its status was finalized.24 While the newly formed candu Energy remains optimistic that sales to Argentina can still be made, it is clear that cnea has also been looking at other nuclear vendors. For example, in 2010 Argentina signed feasibility agreements with both the Russians and South Koreans. China, on the surface, would be an ideal candu customer. As explained in chapter 3, China is leading the global nuclear revival. China wants 60 gwe of nuclear generation by 2020 and a further increase to 120–160 gwe by 2030. There are already 19 reactors under construction and another 34 that are firmly planned. Beyond that, China is proposing an additional 110 reactors.25 Just as importantly, China purchased two candu-6 reactors in 1996 that reactors were built on time and under budget. Since they came into service, they have performed at a very high efficiency rate: Qinshan 3–1 has a cumulative load factor of 88.58 percent and Qinshan 3–2’s is 89.56 percent.26 In September 2005, aecl signed a technology development agreement with cnnc to possibly supply more candu-6 reactors. Estimates are that additional candu-6 reactors could be replicated for 25 percent less than the first two.27

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However, China wants pwr standardization in its nuclear fleet. As a result, while it may be very interested in buying Canadian uranium, it is cool towards buying additional candus. “They have made a decision for light-water technology,” Gary Lunn, then natural resources minister, acknowledged after visiting China in November 2006, “but that doesn’t mean that decision is there in perpetuity. Things could change. We’ll continue our dialogue with China on this.”28 Examining the current situation shows the significant market penetration of aecl’s competitors. Areva is already building two eprs at the Taishan site in Guangdong province. Areva is also involved in two joint ventures with Chinese nuclear companies. The first, with cgnpc, involves constructing fifteen cpr-1000 reactors; the second, with cnnc, involves constructing two cnp-1000 reactors. Both the cpr-1000 and the cnp-1000 are derived from Areva technology. Westinghouse is already building three of its AP1000s and has another ten that are firmly planned. Rosatom is about to start construction on two vver-1000s in fall 2012.29 A further constraint on possible candu exports has been the poor bilateral relations with China under the Harper government. In order to secure the initial sale of two candus at Qinshan, Ottawa used a full diplomatic press: a Team Canada trade mission in 1994 and additional visits by Prime Minister Chrétien and Natural Resources Minister Ann McClellan.30 aecl officials emphasized “the fact that there was good political support” in achieving the sale.31 In contrast, the Harper government after coming to power in 2006 “stopped using the term ‘strategic partnership’ to describe bilateral relations and removed China from the priority list of Canadian foreign policy.”32 This was a deliberate shift away from what had been a consistent message of engagement by successive Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments. After almost four years in power, Prime Minister Harper finally visited China in December 2009. This visit, combined with previous visits by senior cabinet ministers in 2009, appeared to signal a shift back to Canada’s traditional policy towards China. The question is whether it is too little too late for the Canadian nuclear industry to participate in China’s expansion of its nuclear energy program. Good political relations will not guarantee a reactor sale, but poor political relations will almost certainly prevent one. While the sale of candus may be unlikely, other forms of nuclear cooperation are possible. In 2007, aecl signed a three-way memorandum of understanding with cnnc and nasa to co-operate in the “design, manufacture, construction and operation of Candu nuclear

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plants in Argentina, Canada, and China.” However, this mou was really about working with the Chinese in Argentina. cnnc president Kang Rixin emphasized that “cnnc is interested in exploring cooperative efforts regarding various aspects of future candu projects, such as the new build in Argentina.”33 At the moment, aecl is proceeding with negotiations on a new build with Argentina without cnnc, but it may come on board later. A second area of cooperation involves research into alternative fuel cycles. On 14 July 2009, aecfl signed a memorandum of understanding with China’s Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company (tqnpc), the China North Nuclear Fuel Corporation (cnnfc), and the Nuclear Power Institute of China (npic) to cooperate in assessing the use of thorium fuel in candus. Thorium is an alternative to uranium for nuclear fission, but it is more abundant and more widely distributed across the world. While China lacks uranium reserves, it does have thorium. aecl vice-president of product development Jerry Hopwood stated that “candu nuclear technology has the potential to make a major contribution to reducing China’s dependence on imported nuclear fuel resources by utilizing abundant domestic thorium resources. This signing marks the initiation of an important step to demonstrate the use of thorium fuel in commercial candu reactors.”34 One of the technical advantages of the candu is that it can use a variety of fuels: among other sources, natural uranium, light water nuclear waste, nuclear weapons fissile material, and thorium. The benefits of the candu’s flexible fuel cycle are such that it may even re-open the door in China for additional reactor sales. An expert panel appointed by cnnc and comprised of representatives from China’s top nuclear academic, government, industry, and research organizations, has determined that the candu “is the ideal nuclear reactor design to further China’s nuclear power program using thorium as an alternative nuclear fuel source.” In December 2009, it unanimously recommended that China consider building two enhanced candu-6 reactors at the Qinshan site to take advantage of its “capabilities in utilizing alternative fuels.” The candu, according to aecl president Hugh MacDiarmid, will allow China “to utilize its abundant domestic thorium supply to power its nuclear new-build growth plan.”35 Canada sold Romania five reactors in the 1970s, but the communist Ceausescu regime soon suffered from numerous political and financial problems that resulted in significant delays to the project. It was only in the 1990s after the fall of the communists that negotiations on

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completing the Cernavoda reactors began. Both the Mulroney and the Chrétien governments ended up committing hundreds of millions of dollars to restart the construction of the first two units at Cernavoda. Following the re-engagement of the Canadians, Cernavoda-1 came on-stream in 1996 and Cernavoda-2 in 2007.36 Getting contracts to complete construction of the remaining three units is a major goal for aecl. In 2003, Romania’s state nuclear company, Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica s.a. (snn), commissioned a feasibility study from aecl and its consortium partners (Ansaldo and khnp) to complete units 3 & 4 at Cernavoda. snn has since formed an international investment group to help with the estimated us$6 billion cost. SC EnergoNuclear s.a. (EnergoNuclear), a consortium of six European companies led by snn, was formed in March 2009 to build and operate Cernavoda-3 & 4.37 A second consortium, this time for constructing the reactors, is also being formed. It too is largely European, although snc-Lavalin has submitted a bid. In February 2010, aecl signed an $11 million contract to assess the technical and commercial viability of building Cernavoda-3 & 4. aecl’s feasibility study would include the “design, authorization and assessment of the existing infrastructure and safety conditions.”38 If the project goes forward, aecl would assume the engineering and procurement role, as well as manage the project. International Trade Minister Day had been lobbying on aecl’s behalf with the Romanian government. The Cernavoda project was the major topic of Day’s May 2009 trip to Romania,39 and he has also suggested that the Canadian government, through Export Development Canada, would be able to provide the Romanians with financing (as it did for Cernavoda-1 & 2).40 edc financing would be contingent on the extent of Canadian content, which is being preliminarily estimated at 30–40 percent.41 South Korea is Canada’s largest nuclear customer, with four candus that were built in the 1970s and 1990s. However, there is no possibility of additional candu sales, because the Koreans have developed their own nuclear industry. In fact, South Korea is now an exporter. In December 2009, the Koreans made their first international sale, a research reactor worth us$183 million, to Jordan.42 This was followed up later that month with an even bigger export, a $20 billion sale of four apr-1400 power reactors to the United Arab Emirates.43 South Korea is also marketing to other Asian countries, such as Indonesia and Vietnam. However, this does not mean the end of Canada-Korean nuclear cooperation. Opportunities remain for aecl

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to acquire some reactor servicing contracts and for Canadian-based nuclear-component suppliers to conclude some sales: for example, aecl led the Wolsong-1 retubing as part of a larger refurbishment project with khnp. However, there will be no further candu sales. One interesting tidbit is that South Korea has been operating two maple-based research reactors called hanaro. Unlike the maples in Canada, which were shut down without ever becoming operational, the Koreans have been running them without any problems. New Opportunities What opportunities exist for candu energy among countries that are either just entering the nuclear game or that have never purchased a candu before? While there has been lots of chatter about possible locations, for the most part, aecl either pulled out of the competition (United Kingdom) or was defeated in its bid by a rival firm (Lithuania). This has left only a couple of options. The most feasible is in Jordan, which would be the first Middle Eastern country to produce power from a nuclear reactor. Energy security is a clear driver for Jordan because, unlike many of its neighbours, it lacks oil resources. A second benefit of a nuclear reactor for Jordan is water desalination. In a region that is scarce of freshwater resources, the ability to convert saltwater in a cost-effective fashion would be a godsend. The iaea has estimated that “using 20% of the electrical capacity of a 600 mw nuclear reactor operating in cogeneration mode can purify 500,000 m3 of water per day.”44 During a 2007 visit to Canada, King Abdullah II noted that “we’ve had some very serious and ongoing discussions with the Canadians” about candu exports.45 Jordan has already narrowed the competition down to three types of reactors: aecl’s Enhanced candu6, AtomStroyExport’s aes-92 model of its vver-1000, and the Atmea-1 pressurized water reactor design through a joint venture of Areva and Mitsubishi.46According to a nuclear industry insider, aecl’s strength is the ability to provide a mid-size 600–700 mw reactor using natural uranium. Areva’s strength is the ability to provide the entire nuclear package: uranium, reactor, training, transmission system upgrades, attractive financing arrangements, and so on.47 The South Koreans, who have never made a foreign power reactor sale, elbowed their way into the mix when a consortium led by the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute (kaeri) and the Daewoo engineering group concluded the sale of a research reactor to Jordan.48

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T H E C A N A D A - I N D I A N U C L E A R C O O P E R AT I O N A G R E E M E N T

Canada has had a long and tragic nuclear relationship with India.49 During the 1950s and 1960s, India was Canada’s number one nuclear customer, receiving a research reactor (cirus), two early versions of the candu (raps-1 & 2), and uranium. In addition, there were frequent scientific exchanges between Canadian and Indian nuclear scientists. As the years progressed, tensions emerged in the relationship because Canada was becoming more interested in nuclear safeguards as a means of preventing nuclear proliferation. In contrast, India was a frequent critic of the international safeguards system and also refused to sign the npt because it saw it is as a means for Western countries to control nuclear technology. Nevertheless, these tensions were manageable until India stunned the world with a nuclear explosion in 1974. More significant for Canada was the fact that the plutonium used in the bomb came from the cirus research reactor, which lacked any significant safeguards. In response, Canada immediately suspended and later officially terminated all nuclear cooperation with India. In addition, Canada, the United States, and the other nuclear supplier states (through the newly formed Nuclear Suppliers Group) began a process that would isolate India completely from the international nuclear trade by making npt membership status a requirement for all nuclear exports. In the mid-1990s, owing to concerns over the nuclear safety of the Canadian-built raps reactors, Ottawa began to consider restarting nuclear cooperation in some fashion. However, that idea vanished when India, and later Pakistan, tested additional nuclear weapons in 1998. On 18 July 2005, United States president George W. Bush and Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh announced a potential nuclear cooperation agreement between their two countries that would end India’s nuclear isolation and allow it to import nuclear technology, equipment, and fuel from the United States.50 Eventually, through arrangements at the iaea and the nsg, this agreement would be extended to other countries. Since India has few domestic sources of uranium, it has suffered from a uranium fuel shortage that has hindered its production of electricity from its fleet of reactors, a problem that was compounded by international nuclear sanctions that prevented the export of uranium to India.51 The agreement with the United States would also allow India to reprocess us-origin and other foreign-sourced nuclear fuel at a new national plant under iaea safeguards. In return, India had to

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disclose and designate all of its nuclear facilities as either military or civilian; create a firewall between the military and nuclear wings to prevent the transfer of nuclear material, expertise, and technology from one to the other; place all of its power reactors under iaea safeguards; close down the cirus research reactor by 2010; and commit to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, although it was not required to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (ctbt).

India’s eight military nuclear facilities would remain outside iaea inspections. In a sense, India would be treated almost, but not quite, like a nuclear weapons state under the npt. In July 2007, the us-India Civil Nuclear Co-operation Initiative was finalized. India’s parliament approved it in July 2008, and the us Congress did so in September 2008. A host of nuclear, political, and economic objectives drove the Bush administration to launch its Indian nuclear initiative. Nicholas Burns, us under–secretary for political affairs, who helped negotiate the agreement, outlined the objectives: “deepen the bilateral partnership, address India’s energy needs, and advance international nonproliferation norms and practices.”52 From a nuclear perspective, the agreement would bring most of India’s nuclear program under international nuclear safeguards. In addition, India agreed to both a moratorium on further nuclear weapons testing and an eventual ban (by 2014) on the production of fissile materials. All of this, according to the Americans, would be a boost to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The iaea also welcomed the initiative: its director general Mohamed El Baradei described it as “an important step towards satisfying India’s growing need for energy, including nuclear technology and fuel, as an engine for development.” At the same time “it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime. It would also be a step towards the universalization of the international safeguards regime” and “timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.”53 Politically, the agreement improves American relations with India. Under-Secretary Burns remarked that “India is a rising global power.” He told a Congressional committee that “it is in our national interest

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to develop a strong, forward looking relationship with the world’s largest democracy as the political and economic focus of the global system shifts inevitably eastward to Asia.”54 There was also speculation that another important political consideration was a balance-of-power strategy of courting India against China. George Perkovich argued that the US-India deal was based on the strategic premise that “dissuad[ing] or prevent[ing] China from competing harmfully with it, the United States must mobilize states on China’s periphery to balance Chinese power … India is a rising power with great intrinsic merits, including its attachment to democracy, and is a natural partner with the United States in the global system. The United States should cultivate a partnership with India and enhance India’s international power. A more powerful and collegial India will balance China’s power in Asia.”55 There were also economic arguments that favoured US-India nuclear cooperation. An obvious attraction is that the deal opens the door to increased nuclear trade and investment in the billions. us nuclear companies have been salivating about entering the Indian market. However, there are wider economic benefits that go beyond the nuclear sector. Under-Secretary Burns noted that “one of the driving forces in the us-India relationship has been its expanding economic component.”56 Bilateral trade has been steadily increasing from us$11.1 billion in 1998 to us$31.8 billion by 2006.57 Further trade is expected, since India has become the sixth largest economy in the world. The value of enhanced US-India relations is a bipartisan belief. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reminded a us-India Business Council audience that “the first stage of Indo-US relations was ushered in when President Bill Clinton opened a new chapter of engagement with India. Then President George [W.] Bush took it to the second level with the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement. The Obama administration is determined to take it to the third stage, which would allow the countries to move beyond concerns about the status of India’s nuclear program to a framework of economic and technical cooperation.”58 For a number of reasons India, too, desired nuclear co-operation with the United States, and ultimately other countries. Principally, it allows India to generate emission-free electricity, a key requirement for economic growth and the alleviation of poverty. Because of nuclear sanctions, only 3 percent of India’s energy comes from nuclear power, and the country is forced to rely on imported oil and coal, both highemission energy sources. Ending sanctions is a necessary step for India

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to meet its goal of producing 20 percent of its electricity through nuclear power by 2020. Prime Minister Singh told the Indian Parliament on 29 July 2005, that “nuclear power has to play an increasing role in our electricity generation plans.”59 In addition, it brings India into the global nuclear family by placing all its civilian nuclear facilities under international safeguards. This should have a positive impact on many of India’s bilateral relationships. It is also a way to strengthen both the iaea and the nsg. The announcement of the us-India nuclear cooperation initiative set off a spate of criticism that the nuclear non-proliferation regime would be gravely weakened. By making an exception for India, the agreement implies that all a non-nuclear-weapons state has to do to be considered a nuclear weapons state is develop the bomb and wait. This sends a dangerous signal to other non-npt states like Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea, as well as potential proliferators like Iran. It also undercuts many countries, which may have had nuclear weapons aspirations, including South Korea, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, but instead accepted the npt. Indian-American nuclear cooperation might even lead to greater nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan, which would be even more destabilizing for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The agreement also facilitates the expansion of India’s nuclear weapons program, because “every pound of uranium that India is allowed to import for its power reactors frees up a pound of uranium for its bomb program.” This could increase India’s nuclear weapons production “from 7 bombs to 40 or 50.”60 Critics have suggested that India should either have been required to meet certain conditions to receive its nsg waiver or that these conditions should be added so that it could maintain its waiver. First, it should sign the ctbt, which has already been signed by 178 states and all 45 nsg members. This would provide a written commitment that India would not test another nuclear bomb. Second, India should agree to an immediate halt, instead of waiting until 2014, of all production of fissile material for weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). There should also be a ban on enrichment technology transfers. Third, the iaea should establish verifiable limits on Indian stockpiling of uranium.61 The United States and India justified their deal on the grounds that “as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states [emphasis added].”62 Unlike Pakistan and North Korea, India has not export-

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ed its nuclear technology to unstable states. When the major nuclear suppliers blackballed India in the 1970s, as Seema Gahlaut has noted, they were “lucky that India did not express its defiance of denials by selling technology to states of concern. The decision for restraint was based on a political commitment and national policy that such items are meant only to demonstrate Indian capabilities and to augment national defence.”63 In addition, India has never broken a non-proliferation treaty.64 In contrast to many countries who violated the npt, such as Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea, India simply refused to sign it. For India, the npt was a discriminatory document that legally entrenched the major powers’ ability to maintain nuclear weapons but prevented everybody else from doing the same. India has always been a consistent critic of what former Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh labelled “nuclear apartheid.”65 There were also of plenty of critics of the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (bjp), the centreright nationalist opposition party, which had conducted India’s 1998 nuclear weapons tests, believed that the agreement damaged India’s nuclear sovereignty. Yashwant Sinha, a major bjp figure, claimed that the deal would make India “subservient to the us.”66 In particular, it would prevent future nuclear weapons testing. The far left Communists were also concerned about sovereignty and saw the agreement as giving too much control to the Americans over Indian foreign and nuclear policy. Communist leader Prakash Karat stated that the nuclear agreement would “adversely affect our independent foreign policy and our strategic autonomy.”67 Since the Communists were junior partners in the ruling Congress Party’s coalition government (the United Progressive Alliance), not only might the agreement not have been ratified, the government could also have fallen over it. Ultimately, the Communists bolted the coalition, and only when the Congress Party wooed some small parties and independents did it have enough votes to pass it. In the end, it narrowly passed the Indian Parliament in July 2008 with a vote of 275 to 256. The us-India agreement required approval at two international bodies. First, the iaea had to design and approve a special inspection plan for India’s civilian nuclear facilities. Second, the nsg had to agree to grant a special waiver that would allow India to begin importing nuclear technology and uranium. Both these requirements were met. India and the iaea negotiated a new comprehensive safeguards agreement that included the Additional Protocol.68 In fact, iaea director-

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general Mohamed El Baradei was a strong supporter of the agreement. He said that the “India Safeguards Agreement could have, if properly implemented, a lot of positive implications, development implications, security implications, non-proliferation implications, and arms control implications.”69 The agreement was approved by the iaea board in July 2008 and signed by India in February 2009. Implementation would start in 2009 and be completed by 2014. India has since placed fourteen of its twenty-two nuclear facilities under iaea safeguards: eight power reactors, a uranium oxide plant, two fuel fabrication plants, two enrichment facilities, and a nuclear fuel complex. During an August 2008 meeting of the nsg, the group failed to approve India’s waiver. Therefore, a special second meeting had to be scheduled for the following month, which provided an opportunity for more lobbying by the Americans and the Indians. In particular, India responded with a public message on its nuclear policy aimed at uneasy nsg members.70 On 5 September 2008, India’s external affairs minister, Shri Pranab Mukherjee, wrote that “India has a long-standing and steadfast commitment to universal, non-discriminatory and total elimination of nuclear weapons.” India’s “civil nuclear initiative will strengthen the international non-proliferation regime,” and it “will be good for India and for the world.” The result will be a “profound positive impact on global energy security and international efforts to combat climate change.” Mukherjee reminded nsg members that India had recently submitted a number of initiatives on nuclear disarmament to the un General Assembly. In addition, India “remain[ed] committed to a voluntary, unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.” Finally Mukherjee maintained that “India has an impeccable non-proliferation record. We have in place an effective and comprehensive system of national export controls, which has been constantly updated to meet the highest international standards ... India has taken the necessary steps to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and through harmonization and committing to adhere to” nsg guidelines. “India will not be the source of proliferation of sensitive technologies, including enrichment and reprocessing transfers.” This statement was critical in assuaging the doubts of some of the nsg member states. In September 2008, the nsg passed the special waiver for India, bypassing its requirement that all non-nuclear weapons states must agree to npt full-scope safeguards (applying to all nuclear facilities) in order to import nuclear materials. Since both the iaea and the nsg operate on consensus, Canada had

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to make a conscious decision to return India to the international nuclear club. This would mark a major reversal not only of over thirty years of Canadian nuclear policy but also in Canadian-Indian bilateral relations. The decision was not easy, but in the end Canada agreed to support the United States at the iaea and the nsg. The foreign affairs minister at the time, David Emerson, explained that “there’s no doubt that we do this having reflected long and hard and recognizing the deep concerns and frustrations that Canada has gone through over the nuclear history with India. But you can’t keep somebody in the penalty box forever.”71 Agreeing to the iaea inspection plan and the nsg waiver represented a fundamental shift in Canadian foreign policy. Negotiating a separate Canada-India nuclear cooperation agreement would codify this shift. This was a logical conclusion, because if Canada was going to make a significant exception to its nuclear non-proliferation policy, it was not going to allow the United States and other countries to reap the economic benefits. With over a billion people, India is a very attractive market for Canada, and there are predictions that it will surpass China as the world’s most populated country within a decade. Since 1991, when the Indian government initiated a number of economic reforms, its economy has been one of the fastest-growing in the world, with both its gdp and its per capita income rising. India’s economy has been growing at a rate of 7 to 9 percent annually for almost twenty years. In 2009, despite a global recession, India’s economy still rose by over 6 percent. Its high-tech, manufacturing, and services sectors are all leading its growth. India also shares many traits with Canada: English is the language of business, and in the words of Prime Minister Harper, both countries are “democratic federal states that have forged cohesive societies out of ethically, spiritually and linguistically diverse populations.”72 Negotiating the bilateral cooperation agreement was not easy. The fact that Canada was following the United States, the iaea, the nsg, and other countries in negotiating with the Indians helped. So did the commitment to shut down cirus, which was the source of the fuel for the 1974 Indian nuclear tests. But there remained significant problems that delayed the completion of the Canada-India nuclear cooperation agreement. Although Canada has a model bilateral safeguards agreement, it could not be used because it was based on npt ratification, a condition that India obviously lacked. Therefore, an entirely special agreement had to be designed. Since dfait lacked the technical expertise, it was assisted by officials in nrcan and from aecl. The

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agreement, according to a dfait source, was “over and above what the international community may be content with. [The bureaucrats are saying] what if the International Atomic Energy Agency and their guidelines, what if all that fails, for whatever reason? We want to have our own system.”73 Other technical sticking points included expanding the military-civilian firewall to include Indian nuclear scientists moving back and forth, prior consent for any fuel reprocessing, tracking of nuclear materials, and the return of nuclear materials if the agreement is violated.74 Also complicating the negotiations was an internal rift between dfait’s “trade” and “security” people. The trade side believed that the non-proliferation branch wanted to add excessive restrictions to the agreement that would hinder Canadian companies in the competition to conduct business with the Indians.75 According to the Canadian nuclear industry, the trade people had been very supportive, especially Minister Day who had been to India several times taking members of the Canadian nuclear industry with him, but there were sceptics in dfait who remembered the betrayal by India in 1974 and 1998.76 This internal debate within dfait, as well as the additional technical requirements, contributed to delays in drafting the agreement. Embarrassingly, Canada missed an important public relations opportunity to have Harper and Singh sign the agreement during Harper’s visit to India in mid-November 2009. In late November 2009, after Harper’s visit to India, Ottawa and New Delhi announced the conclusion of the bilateral nuclear co-operation agreement. Ironically, Harper and Singh were together again at a Commonwealth Summit in Trinidad and Tobago when the announcement was made. Harper told a press conference that the agreement would “allow Canadian firms to export and import controlled nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India.”77 It was formally signed by Harper and Singh in Toronto during the g20 summit on 27 June 2010,78 and it was subsequently ratified by Canada through an order-in-council on 7 February 2011. The agreement comes into force when the Indian Parliament ratifies it. However, according to dfait’s non-proliferation and disarmament division, it would not be implemented (“i.e., the granting of licenses for nuclear exports from Canada to India” would not take place), until “a so-called ‘Administrative Arrangement’ (aa) had been successfully concluded between the cnsc and India’s Department of Atomic Energy. Negotiations to establish such an aa are scheduled to commence shortly.”79 The nuclear cooperation agreement includes several unique clauses

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that distinguish it from the rest of Canada’s nuclear cooperation agreements. Article 6 allows both reprocessing and enrichment, but under certain conditions. Reprocessing of uranium for civilian nuclear reactors is allowed as long as it takes place in iaea safeguarded facilities. Fuel enrichment is allowed to a maximum of 20 percent of U-235, which would prevent it for being used for nuclear weapons. Article 8 puts the iaea in charge of the tracking of nuclear materials. Article 14 determines that if the agreement is violated, resulting in its termination, there is no return of nuclear materials to their country of origin. Instead, iaea safeguards provisions would continue to apply.80 Despite some concerns within Canada, there were no clauses preventing the free movement of scientists from civilian to military facilities. However, a senior official with dfait’s non-proliferation and disarmament division disputed that this was ever a “consideration during negotiations of the nca with India, nor do provisions to this effect exist in any of the other 27 bilateral ncas that Canada has concluded with nuclear partner countries to date.” He pointed out that “it stands to reason that any sovereign country would consider ‘foreign’ attempts to regulate the career paths of its nationals, including nuclear scientists, as preposterous.” However, “in terms of the nca, Canada will only ever cooperate (including the hosting of scientists) with nuclear facilities that India has officially designated as for civilian use and that are subject to iaea safeguards.”81 Numerous benefits to Canada follow from completing a nuclear cooperation agreement with India. First, there is an opportunity to expand uranium and nuclear fuel exports. India has very modest uranium reserves: estimates are that it has only 54,000 tonnes, combined with an additional 23,500 tonnes in situ.82 Its production of uranium in 2008 was only 271 tonnes, but its 2009 demand was for 961 tonnes of uranium.83 This significant gap explains why, before receiving its nsg waiver, India frequently suffered from nuclear fuel shortages. “In mid2008 Indian nuclear power plants were running at about half of capacity due to a chronic shortage of fuel.”84 Moreover, India will rely heavily on uranium imports to cover the anticipated massive expansion of its nuclear fleet. In anticipation of the successful completion of the agreement, Cameco opened a sales office in Hyderabad, India, in September 2009. Cameco India’s president, Chaitanyamoy Ganguly, a former senior iaea official, says that it expects to export two thousand tonnes of uranium to India annually.85 Jerry Grandey, president of Cameco, has stated that “we would look at the entire spectrum of co-operating with

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the Indians on exploration, uranium supply and then vertically integrate into the (fuel) conversion and fabrication side of it as well … I would say that we anticipate India becoming significant among the Cameco customer universe.”86 India’s phwrs will be a prime destination for Cameco’s UF6 (through the conversion process), because it is the world’s only commercial producer for reactors using natural uranium. India has been quick to strike uranium and nuclear fuel agreements with a number of Canada’s competitors. First off the mark was Russia’s tvel, which has a us$700 million contract to supply uranium pellets for India’s nuclear reactors. tvel was already fabricating fuel for the Russian-designed vver-1000 reactors that are nearing completion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant.87 Next up was Areva, which agreed to supply 300 tonnes per year of uranium, which represented 30 percent of India’s current requirements.88 In addition, companies from Kazakhstan, Brazil, and South Africa have been in negotiations with Indian authorities. However, since India’s requirements are so high and since Canada remains the largest producer of uranium, there is no doubt that Canada will make plenty of sales. Canada’s opportunities are also enhanced by the fact that one of its major competitors, Australia, still has a ban on uranium exports to India, even though Australia agreed within the nsg to India’s waiver. The previous Liberal government of John Howard had agreed in August 2007 to sell India uranium as long as the nsg passed the waiver and the uranium was used exclusively for power generation, but in January 2008 this agreement was reversed by the newly elected Labour government of Kevin Rudd. Rudd stated that the ban would remain in place until the unlikely event that India signed the npt. However, there was some speculation that his government would reverse itself again and allow uranium exports to India. The International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, an expert panel created by the Australian and Japanese governments, recommended that since India, Pakistan, and Israel will never sign the npt, an equivalent mechanism was needed that would allow them “access to nuclear materials and technology for civilian purposes on the same basis as an npt member,” provided they showed a strong commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation.89 Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister and co-chair of the commission, stated that “it’s self-evidently rather quixotic for Australia to be maintaining a ban on the sale of uranium until India joins the npt when manifestly it is not going to join the npt and manifestly this is not

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going to stop it acquiring uranium from other sources.”90 Nevertheless, the Rudd government decided to reject the commission’s recommendation and maintained its ban on uranium exports to India until it ratified the npt. Australian trade minister Simon Crean stated that “the signal to India ... is that this is the way in which they can be recipients of our supply and it’s for India to respond to that.”91 It now appears that Australia will soon be changing its uranium export policy once again. The ruling Labour party voted narrowly at its annual policy convention in December 2011 to allow uranium exports to India. Prime Minister Julia Gillard told her party delegates that Australia “should take a decision in the national interest, a decision about strengthening our strategic partnership with India in this Asian century.” Gillard also promised that any agreement to sell uranium to India would include strict safeguards to ensure that it was used in India’s civilian nuclear program and would not be used for nuclear weapons.92 Michael Angwin, head of the Australian Uranium Association, thinks that Australia could eventually sell about twentyfive hundred tonnes of uranium annually to India. However, Canada still has an early edge, because it will take a few years for Australia to negotiate a treaty with India, pass it in the Australian Parliament, and make other necessary legal arrangements. As Angwin acknowledged, “India already has access to uranium from countries who are competitors of ours, such as Kazakhstan. Australia will have to work hard to ensure we can compete with countries that already have uranium trading relationships with India.”93 Second, there is the possibility of reactor exports to India (an enhanced candu-6 or acr-1000). “The market opportunity is enormous,” said Hugh MacDiarmid, aecl’s president, “somewhere between 40 and 60 nuclear reactors will be constructed [in India] in the next 30 to 40 years.”94 In June 2009, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (npcil), India’s government-owned company responsible for designing, constructing, and operating nuclear power plants, stated that it was aiming to have 63 gwe of new nuclear capacity by 2032.95 Estimates are that the Indian nuclear market could be worth as much as us$150 billion over the next couple of decades.96 It is important for Canada that the Indian nuclear program is already based on heavywater technology. Besides the two candus built in the 1970s, there are thirteen indigenous candu-clones. India also operates two ge-designed bwrs and two new Russian reactors, but its nuclear industry (research, supplies, fuel, etc.) is hwr based. Following the nsg waiver decision,

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there was a rush by many nuclear suppliers to sign deals with India. Westinghouse, Atomstroyexport (Rosatom’s subsidiary), and geHitachi have already signed a number of mous with Indian nuclear companies over joint ventures in constructing new nuclear power plants. Areva also signed a deal with Bharat Forge Limited to build a manufacturing facility for heavy forgings in India. Sweden, Britain, and Kazakhstan have all visited India, eager to do nuclear business. Even before the announcement of the Canada-India nuclear cooperation agreement, aecl had signed a mou in January 2009 with Larsen & Toubro (l&t) to co-operate on the acr-1000. l&t “has been playing a lead role in equipment manufacture, construction and project management” for India’s phwrs.97 There are already six reactors under construction in India and plans for dozens more. However, it will be difficult for aecl to make a new reactor sale because of the intense competition. In addition to npcil, which is currently constructing four reactors and has plans for more, other foreign reactor companies have now entered the Indian market. npcil has already shortlisted Rosatom (which is already building two reactors), Westinghouse, ge-Hitachi, and Areva. “The plan is to devote one site each to clusters of reactors from each vendor.”98 All four companies have already inked contracts for reactors that are firmly planned. aecl’s competitors have all been able to establish themselves more quickly in the Indian market because of their larger size and global market presence, combined with the delays in negotiating a Canada-India nuclear co-operation agreement. In addition, now that India has acquired the critically important nsg waiver, it will be able to import enriched uranium, which will allow it to pursue pwr technology. aecl does have the edge with respect to hwr technology, but this is balanced by npcil’s native abilities in this area. Indian high commissioner Shashishekhar Gavai ruled out new candus in India, saying that “we have our own technology. I don’t know if we are really looking at buying another reactor from Canada.”99 While the opportunities for new builds in India may be slight, there are opportunities for aecl and other Canadian companies to participate in refurbishment and other servicing projects for India’s candubased reactors. India operates fifteen reactors based on candu technology, and they will all have either to be shut down or go through a refurbishment. Given the desire to expand nuclear power in India, it is likely that most of these reactors will be refurbished. Already there are two Indian reactors undergoing a life extension process. The cna

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sees that the nuclear cooperation agreement allows for future partnerships: “India is one of the countries with the most ambitious plans for constructing new nuclear reactors. Dozens of reactors are contemplated, and these are at various stages of planning and construction. Indian officials and business people have visited Canada in a search for partnerships. India has used Canadian and Canadianderived reactor technologies in the past, and India’s electricity sector is familiar with the quality of this technology.”100 There are clear opportunities in India for Canadian nuclear firms, but several factors could limit Canadian nuclear business activity in India. First, India passed a new nuclear liability law in August 2010. It holds foreign suppliers responsible for accidents at nuclear power plants for up to a hundred years after the plant’s construction. The law applies to companies that supply equipment to the contractors building the reactors, even if these companies do not have a physical presence in India. The law defines nuclear damage very broadly and has a ten-year time frame for property damage and twenty years for personal injury. It caps damages at the rupee equivalent of 300 million Special Drawing Rights. Canadian nuclear companies may therefore decide to avoid India in order to protect themselves from liability. Second, patents for inventions relating to atomic energy are controlled by the Indian government. There are no independent intellectual-property rights in the nuclear sector in India. Third, there is very little transparency with the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (aerb) concerning licensing conditions. Fourth, Indian law prevents foreign direct investment in nuclear power generation; npcil has a monopoly that includes the design, engineering, construction, and manufacturing of components, and project management of nuclear power plants. Fifth, Indian contract law is problematic, because Canada does not have a reciprocal arrangement with India regarding the enforcement of foreign legal judgments. Finally, foreign companies are taxed at a higher rate than Indian companies.101 Another benefit to Canada from completing a nuclear co-operation agreement with India is that there would be opportunities for increased research and development co-operation and information sharing, primarily on hwr technology. This is a more likely scenario than new reactor sales. Canadian and Indian scientists are already dealing with similar technical issues: pressure tubes, refurbishment, physics codes, etc. Since the severing of nuclear co-operation in 1974, both Canada and India have pursued nuclear r&d on hwr technolo-

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gy independently of each other. In the process, India has developed expertise in some areas, such as advanced fuel cycles, while Canada has developed expertise in other areas, such as larger reactors. Now there is an opportunity to bring the two research teams back together again to compare notes. This was recognized by Hugh MacDiarmid when he said that “India and Canada have each separately taken heavy water power reactors technologies to an advanced level. We will certainly find synergies that could allow us to achieve more by working cooperatively.”102 One natural area of co-operation is research into advanced fuel cycles such as thorium. Because of its poor uranium resources, “the long-term goal of India’s nuclear program has been to develop an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle.”103 India has already started some thorium experiments with one of its hwrs. aecl, as MacDiarmid explained, is also “embarking on an evolutionary development path for thorium fuels and thorium capable heavy water reactors, starting with a modestly adapted version of our planned Enhanced candu 6 reactor. Our near term goal is to place the first thorium capable Enhanced candu 6 reactor into commercial service before 2020.”104 A fourth benefit of cooperating with India is that Canada and India could work together to market hwrs to third countries. Canada by itself has had difficulties selling hwrs, but with the size of the Indian market, there is now a critical mass. Indian high commissioner to Canada Shashishefkhar Gavai has said that “we do think there is a good possibility for us to co-operate in third countries ... We have developed our own technology over the years. We could bring your expertise and our expertise together, and go into third countries where they require reactors … There could be countries in Africa or elsewhere. This is something which needs to be explored. There is a feeling on both sides that this is very feasible, and it can be a mutually beneficial way of co-operating in the nuclear sphere.”105 aecl also recognizes this potential. In a 2009 visit to India Hugh MacDiarmid said that aecl welcomed India’s “entry into the global market of the advanced heavy water reactor … We have been somewhat lonely proponents of heavy water reactors in the international market place for several decades and we welcome your company.”106 npc and another state-owned nuclear company, Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited (bhel), signed an mou in April 2008 about setting up a joint venture company to export hwrs.107 aecl could join them in some capacity. Neil

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Alexander, president of the oci, added that “supply chains in both countries have been developing in order to supply the goods and services needed to build, operate and maintain phwr reactors.”108 These companies could obviously benefit from the expansion of phwrs around the world. A fifth benefit is that agreement would go a long way in healing the bilateral relationship, which would lead to increased trade and investment, immigration, tourism, and so forth.109 India’s 1974 nuclear weapons test and Canada’s nuclear sanctions response created a major breach in the relationship, and until the nuclear file was resolved, that breach would remain and infect every aspect of the relationship, which is why the Indo-Canadian community treated the “nuclear deal as a means to improving the larger Canada-India relationship.”110 This was also confirmed by government officials. As David Emerson, the former foreign affairs minister, accurately put it, “the way we’re looking at it is that our relationship has been underperforming if not in the doldrums completely for a couple of decades now, if not more.”111 Yuan Pao Woo, president of the Asia-Pacific Foundation, agreed, saying that “civil nuclear co-operation is just a symbol of Canadians and Indians paying more attention to each other, and finding opportunities in the nuclear industry, but well beyond that.”112i When Harper announced the completion of the agreement, he highlighted the fact that “increased collaboration with India’s civilian nuclear energy market will allow Canadian companies to benefit from greater access to one of the world’s largest and fastest expanding economies.”113 During Harper’s visit to India in November 2009, he also discussed two major trade and investment initiatives with Prime Minister Singh. A Joint Study Group was set up to explore the possibility of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that “eliminates tariffs on most goods, opens up opportunities in services, establishes rules in investment and reduces non-tariff barriers.” The second initiative was a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. In 2008, Canada-India trade was only $4.6 billion, but these initiatives are designed to increase bilateral trade to $15 billion in the next five years.114 A politically partisan incentive was an additional driver for the Harper government to pursue the Indian nuclear co-operation agreement. The Conservatives were wooing the large Indo-Canadian population of over a million people, especially in the seat-rich areas of

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greater Vancouver and Toronto.115 India, as Ryan Touhey has noted, “is now the largest source of immigrants to Canada.”116 The ethnic vote had traditionally been the domain of the Liberal Party, but the Conservatives had made it a priority to penetrate the Chinese and Indian communities. Jason Kenney, currently the immigration minister, was the party’s point man for this initiative.117 The success of the Conservatives in the 2011 federal election – achieving a majority government – was largely accomplished by winning those targeted ridings. Achieving a nuclear co-operation agreement with India had been a goal of successive Canadian governments,118 but the Conservatives, by actually concluding it, hoped to gain the political rewards. Anita Singh, in a 2010 phd dissertation, has also argued that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora was an influential variable that led to Canada’s nuclear cooperation agreement with India. Singh pointed out that the Indo-Canadian Diaspora was more significant than its size might indicate, because of its entrenchment in key sectors of the economy and important segments of the professional class. In addition, there was frequent interaction, including participation in trips to India, between government officials and interest groups such as the Canada-India Business Council (c-ibc), the Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce (iccc), and the Canada-India Foundation (cif). Finally, there was issue congruence, with a high saliency on re-establishing nuclear cooperation between the federal government and the IndoCanadian Diaspora. For example, the cif hosted a bilateral energy conference in April 2009 that included representatives from the Canadian and Indian governments, nuclear experts, and business executives to consider the benefits of a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The c-ibc also participated in business discussions surrounding bilateral nuclear trade and encouraged its members (which included aecl and Cameco) to sign nuclear contracts with Indian firms.119 Canada’s nuclear cooperation agreement with India has its critics. For example, a 2008 survey by the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada noted that only 34 percent of Canadians agreed with the statement, “Canada should accept India as a responsible nuclear power.”120 “If we sell uranium to India,” Ernie Regher, of Project Ploughshares, has warned, “the danger is not that it will be used for building weapons. But it will ease the pressure on India’s domestic resources so it can use its own [uranium] for its military program.”121 This concern is not without foundation. For example, K. Subrahmanyam, the former head of New Delhi’s official National Security Advisory Board, has written

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that “given India’s uranium ore crunch, it is to India’s advantage to categorize as many power reactors as possible as civilian ones to be refuelled by imported uranium and conserve our native uranium fuel for weapon-grade plutonium production.”122 The government has responded to this criticism. In the lead up to the nsg vote, David Emerson, then foreign affairs minister, remarked that “India’s come a long way in terms of democracy and the rule of law, and the whole nuclear constellation of issues has evolved to the point where we just can’t continue with our position that has been absolute and negative to allowing India back into the nuclear club, as it were.”123 A dfait spokesperson added that “India has made substantial nonproliferation and disarmament commitments to achieve the trust of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which were reiterated in a political statement on Sept 5 [2008].”124 While in India, Prime Minister Harper reminded reporters that “we have great faith in our Indian friends and partners. We are not living in the 1970s. We are living in 2009.”125 CONCLUSION

This chapter has shown that even if there are no new reactor builds in Canada, there are Canadian companies that will benefit from the global nuclear revival. Many nuclear companies, for example, Areva Canada and many Canadian nuclear suppliers, are either poised to exploit the global nuclear revival or are already doing so,. However, the story is really about two firms: Cameco and aecl/candu Energy. Cameco is already the global leader in uranium mining and a significant player in the upgrading process. The global nuclear revival simply expands Cameco’s business. The opening up of India, in particular, will bring in hundreds of millions (possibly billions) a year in uranium and nuclear fuel sales. Cameco is already exporting its mining production techniques, which it developed in northern Saskatchewan, to Kazakhstan, Australia, and other countries. It also is making investments, for example its partnership with ge-Hitachi in developing enrichment capacity through laser-based technology, in the nuclear fuel business. candu Energy, even after its privatization, is still a small niche player in a reactor business that is dominated by four giants (Areva, Westinghouse, ge-Hitachi, and Rosatom). candu Energy, like its aecl predecessor, will continue to be a niche player fighting for 5 to 10 percent of market share for its independent and unique reactor

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design. candu Energy’s decision to focus on a mid-size reactor design (ec6) and abandon the large acr-1000 design also highlights the niche approach. Focusing on a niche business with a relatively small market share is not a bad strategy, because as a result of the global nuclear revival this market share will be in a greatly expanded business. There is a huge economic upside to possessing a 5 percent market share of a sector that climbs from four hundred reactors to five hundred. In addition, candu Energy’s refurbishment and reactor services business will expand. India, in particular, with its fleet of candu clones, provides a new opportunity for candu Energy in the services field. A contract for refurbishing Embalse in Argentina has been signed, and service work in South Korea will also likely occur. Nuclear r&d will also be enhanced through aecl cooperation with both India and China. Research in the thorium fuel cycle, in particular, is promising and could lead to some practical benefits. Turning to future reactor sales, the situation is much more problematic. As explained in chapter 3, variables such as interest rates, the price of fossil fuels, an international strategy on climate change, a sustained economic downturn, or another potential major reactor accident will all affect the future contours of the global nuclear revival. Nevertheless, the most optimistic future for candu Energy is that by 2020 it will conclude eight new reactor sales outside Canada. This number would include two candus each in India, China, and Romania, and singles in Argentina and Jordan. This result would be impressive, given that candu Energy has not made a foreign sale since 1996, and it would maintain aecl’s previous global market share of 5–10 percent. However, a more likely scenario is that there would be three new sales (two to Romania and one to Argentina), with the additional possibility of some joint partnership with India on a reactor or two. Even under this scenario, candu Energy would remain a niche player, but its niche would be getting smaller. The story of Cameco and candu Energy is actually the old story of Canada as a “hewer of wood and drawer of water.” Canada will continue to be a world leader in uranium mining, both at home and in foreign lands. In addition, it will make a noticeable contribution in the technology required in uranium upgrading. However, as for the really high technology part – the reactor business – Canada has candu Energy fighting for a small market share with a relatively unique product against substantially larger multinational corporations that have very deep pockets and global reach.

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9 Conclusion

This final chapter provides a comprehensive comparison of the Canadian response to the global nuclear revival by measuring the activity in Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. By measuring the global nuclear revival using multiple indicators, it shows that the record is mixed. Then a multi-layered explanation is provided for why the response to the global nuclear revival was different in each province. Following the empirical aspects, this conclusion revisits the theoretical questions surrounding the advocacy coalition framework that were outlined in the introductory chapter. MEASURING THE NUCLEAR REVIVAL IN CANADA

As the case studies of Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta have shown, the global nuclear revival has included Canada. Table 9.1 summarizes the level of activity in the Canadian nuclear sector in the first decade of the twenty-first century, measuring activity in four ways. Two of the measurements identify material manifestations through restarts, refurbishments, and new reactor build projects. The other two identify virtual manifestations in the form of major studies by government, industry, and anti-nuclear groups, and the degree of public support through public consultations and public opinion polls. The first measurement is based on the preparation stage, which includes major studies by the members of the provincial nuclear communities. All provincial governments have conducted studies of the nuclear sector. Some, like those in Ontario and New Brunswick, have focused narrowly on the feasibility of refurbishing existing reactors or

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Table 9.1 Comparing the Nuclear Revival across the Provinces New Brunswick

Saskatchewan

Alberta

Major studies, government

ipsp, Pickering a: opg review

Pt Lepreau refurb: new reactor feasibility

udp

npep

Major studies, industry

Bruce Power (refurb of Bruce a): opg (refurb of Pickering b)

Team candu, new reactor feasibility

Bruce Power new reactor feasibility

None

Major Studies, anti-nuclear groups

Several

Few

Several

Several

Refurbishments

Pickering a1 & a4 (restart), Bruce a3 & a4 (restart), Bruce a1 & a2 (refurb)

Pt Lepreau

n/a

n/a

New Builds

Two reactors at Darling- Two cancelled proposals ton (initially suspended, for another reactor at restarted) Point Lepreau

One power reactor (delayed); one multiuse research reactor (proposed)

Two reactors (proposal cancelled)

Public support: consultations

Localized

Localized

Comprehensive

Limited

Public support: polls pre-Fukushima

60–65% support

45–55% support

50–55% support

50–55% support

Public support: polls post-Fukushima

50–55% support

45–50% support

45–50% support

45–50% support

Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

Ontario

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building new ones. Others, like those in Saskatchewan and Alberta, have done comprehensive analyses across the entire nuclear fuel cycle. The different approaches of the four provincial governments can be explained based on the basis of the previous existence of nuclear energy in a province. Since both Ontario and New Brunswick already use nuclear energy, the question was whether to maintain or expand nuclear energy. For Saskatchewan and Alberta, the question was whether to introduce nuclear energy. Governments were not the only actors studying nuclear energy; the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions were as well. Nuclear companies conducted feasibility studies for refurbishment and new build projects in Ontario, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan. Meanwhile, counterstudies opposing nuclear energy were prepared by groups in Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. Beyond the provincial activity, national studies supporting nuclear energy were prepared by the cna, the cns, and the oci, and parallel ones opposing nuclear energy were prepared by the Pembina Institute, the Sierra Club, and Greenpeace. The second measurement identifies the restarting and refurbishment of existing nuclear reactors. Pickering a1 & a4 and Bruce a3 & a4 have been restarted. Bruce a1 & a2 and Point Lepreau are currently going through a full refurbishment to extend their life. In addition, opg plans on refurbishing its four Darlington reactors, and Bruce Power plans on refurbishing the rest of its reactors (Bruce a3 & a4, as well as the four Bruce b units). The third measurement looks at the building of new nuclear power plants. While the first two measurements provide evidence of a nuclear revival in Canada, the third one does not. Considering only new reactors, some keen observers were led to declare that the “putative Canadian nuclear energy revival” has come to an “abrupt halt,”1 because the Point Lepreau 2 proposal in New Brunswick is dead, Saskatchewan has delayed consideration of building the province’s first reactor until after 2020, and a formal application for a reactor or reactors in Alberta has yet to be sent to the cnsc. The only possibility for a new reactor build in Canada is in Ontario. After initially suspending its procurement decision in 2009, the Ontario government has restarted the project. Public hearings were held in the spring of 2011 and the Joint Review Panel has given the environmental approval. However, there are still some significant steps left to take. A reactor design must be chosen (it will most likely be the ec6), and the financial arrangements must be concluded. This means that a con-

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tract with candu Energy must be negotiated and the financial role of the federal government must be determined. These will not be easy steps, and they are going to require tough negotiations between industry and two levels of government. The fourth measurement is the level of public support for nuclear energy. The development/expansion of nuclear power requires public support, and public attitudes have been tracked since the 1970s.2 Examining the data yields several conclusions. First, support for nuclear power across Canada has been slowly, but steadily, growing since the early part of the decade, although there has been a bit of a reversal since the Fukushima-Daiichi accident. Second, the level of knowledge of nuclear energy by the public is quite low; opinions about nuclear energy tend to be more emotional than rational. Third, places that already have nuclear power are more supportive than places where it is being proposed, as is evident in perceptions of nuclear safety. For example, support for nuclear power is highest in Saint John (with the Point Lepreau reactor nearby), Saskatchewan (with its uranium mines), and Durham county, Ontario (with its ten Pickering and Darlington reactors). The nimby syndrome means that it is easier to add another reactor to an existing plant than to build a new plant. Public opinion polls, even those asking similar questions over time, give only a snapshot. However, a systematic public consultation process, which two of the provinces have conducted, gives more information about the level of support. In Alberta, public consultation showed cautious support, on a case-by-case basis, for nuclear energy in the province. This result was consistent with most polls. However, in Saskatchewan, the process revealed strong opposition to the introduction of nuclear power in the province, contradicting most polls. The public consultation processes in Alberta and Saskatchewan will be analyzed in more detail later in this chapter. There are a number of similarities across the four provinces. First, all the actors in the nuclear policy communities have been seriously investigating maintaining, expanding, or introducing nuclear power in their respective provinces. Second, in provinces with existing nuclear fleets, the reactors are being restarted and/or refurbished to maintain electricity generation from nuclear power – no phasing out is occurring. Third, despite significant preparation in all four provinces (especially in Ontario), construction has not started on any new nuclear reactor project.

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The announced delays in new builds, whether temporary or permanent, have resulted almost exclusively from the issue of cost. While critics have brought forward a number of arguments relating to radiation, nuclear safety, water usage, etc., it appears that governments across the country have, on balance, accepted the that nuclear energy has more strengths than weaknesses with the exception of the issue of cost. In New Brunswick, the Point Lepreau 2 project was based on a merchant model,3 whereby the private sector (in this case Team candu and Areva) would be solely responsible for financing (including assuming the risk of any cost overruns), building, and owning the nuclear power plant. It would then have to find customers in Canada and the United States for its electricity. However, the project has been stalled owing to a lack of financing credit and the inability to obtain a long-term purchasing agreement with nb Power. This scenario was repeated in the other three provinces. The government of Ontario initially suspended the bid process for two new reactors at the Darlington site because of a price that was “billions” too high. When they restarted the new build project, the preferred reactor design shifted from the larger and more expensive acr-1000 to the smaller and less expensive ec6. The Saskatchewan government also referenced the cost of nuclear power when it decided to wait until after 2020 to consider a nuclear power project. Finally, in Alberta, Bruce Power crunched the numbers to see if there is a business case for building nuclear reactors in the province and realized that because of the drop in natural gas prices the business case was not there. Problems related to access to capital resulting from the global economic recession have been a primary cause of the cost problem. It was for this reason that in February 2010 United States president Barack Obama provided a us$8.3 billion federal loan guarantee to help Southern Co. build two nuclear reactors in Georgia.4 However, there are additional factors beyond access to capital. The global recession, in Ontario especially, has led to a drop in electricity demand. There are real questions in Ontario about whether the province’s vital manufacturing sector, in particular automobiles manufacturing, will rebound or whether this drop in electricity demand will be permanent. Finally, there are fears within government about the potential of cost overruns with nuclear power, as in the case of Darlington. The experience with the restarts (Pickering a1 & a4 and Bruce a3 & a4) and refurbishments (Point Lepreau and Bruce a1 & a2), which have been marred by significant delays and cost overruns

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that, combined, have totalled several billion dollars has heightened those fears. There were also differences across the four provinces. First, Saskatchewan and Alberta used comprehensive consultation processes to gauge public support for nuclear power. Consultations occurred in different parts of the provinces, and the topic was broad, especially in Saskatchewan. In contrast, New Brunswick and Ontario used only localized and limited consultations.5 nb Power limited its public engagement to the Point Lepreau refurbishment project and limited its geographic scope to the greater Saint John area. In Ontario, where public hearings into the new build project at Darlington were held by the Joint Review Panel, anyone could make a submission, and the hearings were webcast, but the panellists stayed in Clarington, Ontario, near the Darlington reactor site. Second, while three of the provinces focused exclusively on electricity generation, Saskatchewan examined many different aspects of the nuclear sector. In particular, the udp panel was commissioned by the government to consider opportunities in uranium mining, uranium upgrading, nuclear research and development, and nuclear waste disposal. As a result, the Saskatchewan government has pursued a nuclear agenda that goes beyond electricity generation and includes the creation of the Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation. EXPLAINING THE NUCLEAR REVIVAL IN CANADA

The similarities and differences in how each province has responded to the global nuclear revival can be explained in a number of different ways. The first is the history of the nuclear sector in each province, the second is the nature of the electricity market (public, private, or mixed), and the third is the type of public consultation process that was used by the provincial governments. Provincial Nuclear History The existence of a previous nuclear history is a key variable that separates the provinces: Ontario has been the heart of the nuclear sector since the beginning, New Brunswick has had a presence in the nuclear sector since the early 1970s, Saskatchewan traces its uranium industry back to the late 1940s, and Alberta has very little nuclear history at all. These differences manifested themselves in many ways.

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First, Ontario and New Brunswick had to consider maintaining their existing nuclear fleets through restarting and refurbishment and expanding their fleet through building new reactors, but Saskatchewan and Alberta only had to consider new builds. The subsequent technological problems and cost overruns with the restarts and refurbishments were contributing factors in the decisions not to delay pursuing new build projects in both Ontario and New Brunswick. Second, nuclear history has had a distinct impact on public support. In general, Ontario and New Brunswick – especially Bruce County and Durham Region in Ontario and Saint John, New Brunswick – have been the strongest supporters of nuclear power in the country, for a number of reasons. Thousands of jobs would be directly at risk if nuclear power was phased out in those provinces, which creates a pro-nuclear lobby that influences the government’s decisions on maintaining and even expanding the nuclear sector. In addition, people are familiar with the technology. For example, hundreds of thousands of Ontarians drive by the Pickering reactor on Highway 401 every day and rarely question its safety. This weakens a major constraint against the development of nuclear power. Third, because there were no existing nuclear power plants in the province, the provincial governments in Saskatchewan and Alberta commissioned comprehensive expert panels to investigate nuclear power. In addition, both provinces conducted public consultations on the introduction of nuclear power. However, because Saskatchewan had debated nuclear power in the past, there was a coordinated anti-nuclear movement there that was able to mobilize opposition during the public hearings. In Alberta, the anti-nuclear groups were newer and weaker and have not been able, except in Peace River, to even put the issue of nuclear power on the province’s political radar screen. The Electricity Market Electricity generation and distribution is in provincial jurisdiction, and how each electricity market operates is a key explanatory variable for comparing a province’s response to the global nuclear revival. In the first period of nuclear expansion in the 1970s, the electricity market, both globally and nationally, was heavily regulated, and publicly owned utilities were the standard. Now, many developed countries, including Canada, have deregulated or partially deregulated their

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

electricity system, which means that the provincially owned public utilities can no longer manipulate electricity prices as part of an overall economic development strategy. Private sector firms (and their shareholders) must now base investment decisions on the projected rate of return based on a levelized energy cost analysis. This is the same process regardless of whether the source is nuclear, coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, wind, or solar. Alberta has a completely privatized electricity generation system, although some degree of governmental regulation remains through the Alberta Utilities Commission.6 Alberta has no provincial Crown corporation with a monopoly over the electricity grid. In that same vein, Alberta’s Department of Energy can recommend to the government whether to allow nuclear power (which they did in December 2009), but they do not have to consider whether they would have a financial stake in the business. It is up to a private electricity generator to find customers to sell their electricity to. A company, such as TransAlta or Enmax, could put all its electricity on the grid, it could sell it directly to one customer, or it could decide on some combination of the two strategies. For Bruce Power, which seeks to move beyond being a reactor operator (as they are in Ontario) to being an owner/operator (as they once intended to in Alberta), there are advantages and disadvantages in the privatized Alberta market. On the one hand, the Alberta political and economic culture respects the fact that Bruce Power is a private sector firm willing to undertake the risk of building a nuclear power plant for the opportunity of great financial reward if the project succeeds. On the other hand, it would have been easier for Bruce Power to negotiate with only one customer, such as an Alberta utility that monopolized the electricity grid.7 Since the restructuring of Ontario Hydro, Ontario has partially deregulated its system and now has what could be described as a quasi-private electricity market. opg and the other successor companies remain solely owned by the government of Ontario, but opg is expected to operate on sound business principles as if it were privately owned. This is one of the reasons why opg initially conducted a competitive bid process for its new build project: it owed it to its shareholders (the people of Ontario) to get the best technology at the lowest price. This is also why the reactor vendors were required to be solely responsible for any price escalations. After the procurement process, the only compliant bid came from aecl, but it was rejected

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285

because, notwithstanding the economic development aspects of its proposal, it was deemed to be too expensive. Now that the new build has been restarted, it appears that Ontario will be working exclusively with candu Energy to acquire two ec6s. Ontario’s partially deregulated electricity market also explains why Bruce Power was able, on its own, to consider investing in new reactor projects. The situation in Saskatchewan and New Brunswick is different because both provinces have retained pure public ownership of electricity. While private sector companies (Team candu, Areva, or Bruce Power) would be involved, all decisions regarding electricity would ultimately flow through the provincial Crown corporations of SaskPower and nb Power. When SaskPower told the government that it wanted to wait until 2020 to consider nuclear power, that is exactly what the government did.8 Both Saskatchewan and New Brunswick also continue to adhere to the old model of using electricity generation for regional development. Nuclear power was seen by both governments as a key component of their province’s industrial strategy. Premier Graham’s vision was to turn New Brunswick into an “energy hub” with multiple energy projects (lng terminals, an expanded transmission system, oil refinerys, etc.) based on the province’s central geographic location. The refurbishment of Point Lepreau and the pursuit of a second reactor were integral parts of this “energy hub” strategy. Premier Wall created the udp to pursue his plan of leveraging Saskatchewan’s substantial uranium mining resources to move up the value-added and hightechnology chain to uranium upgrading, medical isotopes, nuclear research and development, and nuclear power. Part of the regional development strategy was also designed to acquire federal funds for nuclear projects. Point Lepreau was first built in the 1970s with a significant contribution from the federal government. Therefore, the New Brunswick government was surprised when it was rebuffed by the Paul Martin government in its request for about $800 million to support the refurbishment of Point Lepreau. More recently, the New Brunswick government has asked Ottawa to cover the cost overruns associated with the refurbishment. In the case of Saskatchewan, its proposal for a new multi-use research reactor is based on a cost-sharing arrangement that would have the federal government contributing up to 75 percent of the construction costs and 60 percent of the operating costs.

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Public Consultations A major difference between the provinces was the use of public consultations. Public consultation is an inherent part of governmental decision making on major public policy issues, which would obviously include something as expensive and politically controversial as nuclear power. Yet in New Brunswick and Ontario, where nuclear plants have been generating electricity for decades, the governments, despite demands from local anti-nuclear groups, have decided against an elaborate public consultation process and have relied instead on local engagement of a limited scope. In contrast, in Saskatchewan and Alberta, where nuclear energy would be a new phenomenon, both provincial governments decided on a process to consult the public. As Richard Florizone, chair of the udp, has asserted, several elements are critical to a successful nuclear strategy: it must be technically sound and feasible, economically attractive, environmentally appropriate, and socially accepted. An effective public consultation process supports this strategy by “inform[ing] debate and dialogue on the nuclear development; surfac[ing] and explor[ing] the strong and varied perspectives that exist; and provid[ing] input into longterm policy decisions.”9 It is interesting that Saskatchewan and Alberta used different tools in their public consultation processes concerning nuclear power, which allows a policy analyst to make some observations about the strengths and weaknesses of different designs. Designing the appropriate mechanisms is critical, since an inappropriate mechanism can lead to accusations that the decision is already a fait accompli, or it can allow a vocal minority to block a project that would greatly benefit the province. However, a proper design is only half the battle. When the results are in, governments need to weigh quantitative and qualitative data and randomly selected versus self-selected responses. They need to assess the strength of economic and environmental arguments and balance scientific facts with democratic impulses. The ultimate judgment of the government’s decision and the role of the public consultation process occurs when the electorate either rewards or punishes the government at the ballot box. The biggest difference in the processes in the two provinces was that Saskatchewan used public hearings, but not Alberta. The major benefit of public hearings is that they support the concept of deliberative democracy, which takes “the ideal of the informed and unco-

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erced dialogue of all those who could be bound or affected by policy (or their accountable representatives) as an appropriately high standard of justice and legitimacy.” It is critical that the dialogues – such as public hearings – allow “all those potentially affected by the outcomes to freely draw from their experiences and expertise, mutually exchange their perspectives, and ultimately exercise their decisional agency.”10 As was shown in chapter 7, critics of Alberta’s decision not to hold public hearings emphasized that the omission constituted a democratic deficit. An additional benefit of public hearings is that, while not a statistically representative sample of public opinion, they did, in the case of Saskatchewan, reveal a cross-section of groups that were strongly opposed to most (for some, all) aspects of the nuclear sector. The range of opposition groups (environmental groups, labour unions, peace groups, religious groups, etc.), the geographic range of the opposition (all parts of the province, no nimby syndrome here), and the range of arguments (economic, health, environmental, peace, etc.) against nuclear expansion was wide indeed. Everybody in Saskatchewan, organizations and individuals alike, could have participated in the udp public consultation process. The fact that it was the anti-nuclear forces who mobilized is something that the government cannot ignore. A highly motivated minority can often overwhelm a soft majority by its intensity. There is a danger that public hearings can often be hijacked by special-interest groups. Commenting on previous public hearings, Colin Hunt of the Canadian Nuclear Association, noted that “it didn’t matter where you were in Canada, it was exactly the same faces testifying as at the previous one ... the usual horde of anti-nuclear groups. That’s who participated in these hearings ... The public didn’t speak. All the Panel heard from was a handful of special interest groups repeating their message time after time after time. So, my question becomes then, is it legitimate to translate a handful of public interest groups to say, or so-called interest groups, to say they constitute the public interest?”11This scenario played out again in Saskatchewan, as anti-nuclear activists packed the public hearings and made the majority of submissions.12 The udp public consultation process, as a Bruce Power official admitted, allowed the “anti-nuclear movement to mobilize and unify. It gave all the opposition groups an opportunity and platform. They could say what they wanted without any consequences. Opinions, even misguided ones, even completely wrong ones, were

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Canada and the Global Nuclear Revival

equally counted as facts. The Perrins Report, as an official government document, has given the anti-nuclear groups legitimacy.”13 The only people who tend to participate in public hearings about nuclear issues, with the exception of hearings at potential reactor sites (which are included in the environmental assessment process) are the rabid anti-nuclear and pro-nuclear activists. As we saw in an earlier chapter, it was to avoid this problem that focus groups, where the participants are not told what the topic is in advance, were used to provide input from Albertans who were undecided about nuclear power. Allowing any interested person to fill out the workbook (in combination with the stakeholder consultations and focus groups) was a legitimate compromise. Moreover, stakeholders from the Peace Region were invited to a special consultation meeting. But it was a closed meeting, by invitation only, and no media were allowed. This meant that there could be a real discussion of the pros and cons of nuclear power, as opposed to individuals playing to the camera. It is important to note that many of the most vocal and organized critics of nuclear power in Alberta participated in these stakeholder sessions. A second aspect of the public consultation process is that it needs to include multiple tools, because each one has strengths and weaknesses. Telephone surveys may provide a statistically representative sample, but they do not have time to go into detail, and there is no opportunity for dialogue. Workbook submissions, either online or hard-copy, allow for greater detail including an opportunity to provide comments instead of just a sliding scale of responses. Workbooks also allow participants to reflect on their answers. However, since they are time-consuming, only the most motivated will take the time to fill them out, with the result that you get the most intense responders, but not a statistically representative sample. Public hearings allow individuals and groups to prepare (as do the workbooks), but with the additional benefits of a dialogue with other individuals and groups. In addition, if the media covers the event, a hearing allows nonattendees to be educated about the subject. The public hearings in Saskatchewan generated substantial media coverage; in contrast, the nuclear issue in Alberta was under the radar. The downside of public hearings is that they can be hijacked by special interest groups and the silent majority can be ignored. Focus groups also allow for dialogue, but because they are randomly selected they are more representative than public hearings. However, focus groups do not allow participants the time for preparation and reflection in advance of the meetings. In

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addition, there is the possibility that a facilitator could lead the participants in a pre-designated direction. Multiple tools also need to be used, because there is a strong correlation between the particular consultation tool and the result. In both Saskatchewan and Alberta, there was a wide divergence between the results from randomly selected participants (telephone surveys, public opinion polls, focus groups) and self-selected participants (public hearings attendees, online workbook submissions). In his report, Dan Perrins declared that 85 percent of participants opposed nuclear power, but this result contradicted numerous public opinion surveys that showed a slight majority of Saskatchewanians in favour of nuclear power.14 In Alberta, as table 7.1 shows, there was a similar gap. What impact did the public consultation process have on government decision-making? Before the process began, the Saskatchewan government could have been described as very pro-nuclear. Soon after coming to power, Premier Brad Wall stated that “we would like to lead. It’s time for the country to have a national vision on nuclear energy – and we want to aggressively pursue that.”15 The governing Saskatchewan Party publicly desired everything from uranium upgrading, to a power reactor, to increased research and development, to medical isotopes. This was reflected in the mandate that they gave the udp, which was not to assess in a neutral fashion the technical aspects of nuclear power (as was done in Alberta) but to consider how to maximize the potential of the nuclear sector in Saskatchewan. Moreover, if the Saskatchewan Party was replaced it is likely that the ndp would follow a similar path, because the ndp tacks towards its internal anti-nuclear faction while in opposition, but when it is in government it listens to its pro-nuclear wing. In contrast, the Alberta government could be described as agnostic on nuclear issues. There is no pro-nuclear political party in Alberta. The Progressive Conservatives, who have governed since 1971 in what has been described as a “one party dominant” political system, have been very cautious when asked about nuclear power in the province. During his campaign for the Progressive Conservative leadership in 2006, Ed Stelmach did not advocate nuclear power (as did Jim Dinning, the perceived frontrunner), but instead promised to study whether it was a right fit for the province. After he assumed the premiership, there were some initial tentative comments, both in favour and in opposition, from some of Stelmach’s cabinet ministers.16 But once the npep was established, a cone of silence went up around the

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government and no public comments were made, except for it to say that it was consulting Albertans. Even after the government announced its conditional support for nuclear power in December 2009, there were no comments aside from those from Premier Stelmach and Energy Minister Knight. Ultimately, the purpose of the public consultation process is to help elected officials to come to a decision. Governments must weigh the advice of nuclear scientists, business people, and other experts with the concerns of ordinary citizens. In addition, governments must weigh the various tools that are used in the public consultation process. The Saskatchewan government, on the surface, appeared to throw out most of the results that process, but its decision to delay moving forward with a nuclear reactor was obviously informed by the strong, if not statistically accurate, opposition exhibited in the public hearings and submissions. This does not mean that the Wall government is disregarding the wishes of the public but that it recognizes that the public consultation process was controlled by highly organized special-interest anti-nuclear groups who did not represent the majority view of Saskatchewanians. The Alberta government’s decision further reflected its agnostic stance regarding nuclear power. It did not oppose it; instead, it asserted that building a nuclear power plant, as with all other forms of electricity production, was a private sector decision. It did not support nuclear power; instead it explicitly stated that it would not put any public money into a nuclear project. This balancing act continued with its assessment of the results of the public consultation process. It opted to emphasize the quantitative results of the telephone survey over the online workbook. The Alberta government also balanced the qualitative discussions in the stakeholder sessions with those of the focus groups. Regarding public hearings, the government noted that if a nuclear project went forward it would require a further threeyear environmental assessment that would include public hearings. T H E C A N A D I A N N U C L E A R S E C TO R AND THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK

This book uses the provincial nuclear energy case studies to test four specific acf hypotheses. Empirically testing these hypotheses advances the acf by either confirming or refuting some of its key predictions. If a hypothesis is confirmed, it will give additional weight to the the-

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ory’s applicability to explaining and understanding public policy. If, on the other hand, a hypothesis is refuted, then a further refinement of the acf is required. Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 1 states that significant perturbations external to the subsystem (e.g., changes in socioeconomic conditions, public opinion, system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems) are a necessary, but not a sufficient, cause of change in the policy core attributes of a governmental program. Hypothesis 1 was confirmed by the case study on the Canadian nuclear sector. There have been two major external shocks to the nuclear sector, but in each case they have accentuated the pre-existing conditions in each province. The first systemic change to hit Canada’s nuclear acfs was with the deregulation of electricity in Alberta and Ontario. As was discussed earlier, deregulation created a brand new environment that actors had to operate in. The old rules about electricity generation and industrial development were replaced with new rules that emphasized rates of return through levelized unit energy costs (luecs). Deregulation also introduced a new type of actor. Actors naturally change over time, but the arrival of Bruce Power represented a fundamental change. There have always been private sector firms in the Canada’s nuclear acfs, for example, component suppliers, engineering firms, and consultants. However, Bruce Power, as a private sector operator of nuclear power plants with an interest in owning a nuclear power plant was something new, since nuclear power plants had previously been owned and operated by provincial utilities. Now there was a large nuclear firm that was interested solely in the profit motive. The formation of candu Energy after aecl’s reactor division was sold to snc-Lavalin continues the trend of the deregulation of Canada’s electricity system. However, as with climate change, the rise of private sector actors in Canada’s nuclear sector simply accentuated the importance of the cost considerations that had previously existed. The other external shock was the March 2011 Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident. Although it is still too early to determine its full effects, the early results reveal a couple of things. First, the accident will be used as evidence by both nuclear coalitions to support their respective policy beliefs. The anti-nuclear coalition will use it to high-

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light pre-existing concerns over reactor safety, radiation exposure, and nuclear waste disposal, and these attacks will be rebutted by the pronuclear coalition, which will stress the relative absence of death and injury resulting from the nuclear accident, especially in contrast to the earthquake and tsunami. Second, it does not appear to have altered the nuclear agenda of any of the policy brokers in Canada. Ottawa still went ahead and sold off aecl’s reactor division to sncLavalin, Ontario went ahead with the public hearings that were required for its new nuclear build project, and Point Lepreau is still being refurbished. Both the Alberta and the Saskatchewan government reiterated their previous nuclear stance, although with a lot more enthusiasm in Saskatchewan. Only in Quebec was there an apparent policy reversal resulting from Fukushima-Daiichi when the Charest government delayed the refurbishment of Gentilly-2 pending more analysis. However, even in Quebec, this simply reflected a stronger anti-nuclear sentiment that had existed in the province before Fukushima-Daiichi. For example, in 2008 only 22 percent of Quebecers supported nuclear energy in their province.17 This support plummeted even lower to only 17 percent in polls taken in June 2011.18 Quebec has, by far, the lowest support for nuclear energy in the country. Third, there will be effects on nuclear policy in Canada, but it will be in the area of secondary aspects, not in the policy core. Examples will include an increase in the threshold for nuclear liability, additional safety requirements for reactors, etc. It will not lead to a nuclear phase-out. Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 states that on major controversies within a policy subsystem when policy core beliefs are in a dispute, the lineup of allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or so. Hypothesis 2 has been confirmed by the case studies in this book. The debate over the existential nature of nuclear energy has been fiercely fought by the same pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear coalitions for decades. The evidence is constantly being revised and updated by the competing coalitions, but their core policy beliefs, as laid out in table 2.1, have been relatively stable for decades. The only real new argument concerns climate change. Many of the arguments about nuclear power – cost, safety, radiation, electricity demand – have been largely

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constant over decades, but the introduction of the climate change argument forced all actors to respond. The pro-nuclear coalition grabbed hold of climate change arguments to push for the expansion of nuclear power. Meanwhile, the anti-nuclear coalition attempted to counteract this argument by bringing in life cycle emissions and other climate change alternatives, for example, conservation and renewable energy. Numerous studies, speeches, and public relations campaigns were dedicated to examining the role of nuclear power in combating climate change and to swaying public opinion and persuading governments in both directions. Arguments about climate change did not change the structure of the competing coalitions in any jurisdiction, but they did change the plane of debate. For example, a qualitative analysis of the public consultations in Saskatchewan revealed how “both sides of the debate were jockeying to claim their side was the ‘greenest.’ The industry-dominated supporters of the udp expressed concern that climate change is destabilizing global civilization, and a whopping 76% spoke about the need for nuclear power to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (ghgs). This figure was much greater than the 43% of opponents who stated that renewables, not nuclear, are the way to lower ghgs. From these numbers it is clear that the environmentalist nuclear opponents did not have a monopoly claim to ‘green-ness.’” 19 This battle over the relationship between climate change and nuclear energy between the pro and anti-nuclear coalitions shows that new ideas, like external shocks, also require skilful exploitation by the competing coalitions. As chapter 3 explained, climate change has been an important driver of the global nuclear revival, which was also the case in each of the four provinces in the case studies. An examination of the virtual measurements of the nuclear revival in those four provinces shows that the pro-nuclear coalition was better able to exploit the climate change idea. In Ontario, particularly, the pro-nuclear coalition was able to exit a period of nuclear stagnation and shut-downs and move to a period of restarts and refurbishments and even to a new build project. However, concerns over climate change, even when magnified by the pro-nuclear coalition, were insufficient in helping them to achieve the full extent of their agenda. The coalitions in New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta have been stymied in their efforts to build new nuclear power plants. Other factors, most notably the cost of constructing a nuclear power plant, were also present in the process of decision making by the policy brokers.

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Not only have the arguments that frame the debate over nuclear energy been stable, even the climate change debate has been relatively stable since the late 1990s, and so has the list of participants. When you look at the submissions to the Joint Review Panel, which conducted public hearings into Ontario’s new nuclear build in 2011, and compare them to the submissions to the Porter Commission in the 1970s, you see the same groups on each side making similar arguments. In Saskatchewan, the public consultations over the udp revealed the same divisions (and many of the same people) between the pro- and anti-nuclear coalitions that had occurred decades ago in the debates over the Warman Refinery and the candu-3. Even in Alberta, where the nuclear debate emerged only less than a decade ago, the types of actors who emerged and the coalitions that they joined could easily have been predicted based on previous experiences elsewhere in Canada. When the eac initially began to investigate bringing nuclear power to Alberta, a new provincial nuclear acf sprang up spontaneously. Within a couple of years, the parameters of an Alberta nuclear acf could be easily identified, and it resembled, at least in its structure, the other provincial nuclear acfs, with a pronuclear coalition made up of industry and scientific actors, an antinuclear coalition made up of environmental groups, and policy brokers from within the provincial government. This also tells us that an acf will not emerge under hypothetical circumstances (notice the lack of provincial nuclear acfs in British Columbia, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland), but only when there is a need, that is, when there is a serious business group preparing a license for the cnsc. In addition, a new provincial acf will rely, at least initially, on its ties with the national and other provincial acfs. The Alberta case, then, shows the predictive power of the acf concerning coalition formation. The only possible exceptions to hypothesis 2 have been the highprofile defections of some environmentalists from the anti-nuclear coalition to the pro-nuclear coalition owing to the issue of climate change. While individuals have switched sides, organizations have not. The best example is Greenpeace. Patrick Moore, one of the founders of Greenpeace, went from criticizing nuclear energy in the 1970s and early 1980s to promoting nuclear energy in the 2000s. However, Greenpeace remains firmly part of the anti-nuclear coalition. Shawn Patrick Stensil has become one of the most prominent anti-nuclear spokesmen, and he organized both Greenpeace’s submission to the Darling-

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ton new build environmental-assessment process and its effort to disrupt the hearings. Moreover, Moore’s defection illustrates the devil shift described in the introductory chapter: Moore is now demonized by the anti-nuclear coalitions across Canada. For example, Rex Weyler, a director of the original Greenpeace Foundation in the 1970s, criticizes Moore’s pro-nuclear position. But he goes further by insulting him as a “corporate public-relations consultant” and then declares that “Moore has served as a consultant far longer than he ever worked for Greenpeace, and he’s never worked as a scientist.”20 Hypothesis 3 Hypothesis 3 states that an actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of his (its) belief system before acknowledging weaknesses in the policy core. Hypothesis 3 was confirmed by the empirical evidence in Canada’s nuclear sector. All pro-nuclear coalition actors continue to support the general benefits of nuclear energy that make up the policy core, but recent events related to secondary aspects have divided aecl from other pro-nuclear actors. In New Brunswick, the delays and costs overruns with the Point Lepreau refurbishment project set aecl and nb Power against one another, and this dispute escalated to a higher level when the owners of the companies – the New Brunswick government and the federal government – became involved. Similarly, the delays and cost overruns with the Pickering A restarts and the Bruce A refurbishments have created tensions between opg, Bruce Power, and aecl. The competitive bid process in Ontario also led to a dispute between Areva and aecl. Other nuclear companies, especially those within the oci, were forced to choose sides. The suspension of the new build project in Ontario led the Power Workers Union to support the ec6, while aecl was still promoting its new acr-1000. Finally, the privatization of aecl’s reactor division to snc-Lavalin has been supported by much of the nuclear industry (including aecl senior management) but opposed by the unions. Hypothesis 4 Hypothesis 4 states that even when the accumulation of technical information does not change the views of the opposing coalition, it can have important impacts on policy – at least in the short run – by altering the views of policy brokers.

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Hypothesis 4 has also been confirmed by the case studies in this book. Neither the pro-nuclear coalition nor the anti-nuclear coalition has been able to change the views of their opponents. However, the pro-nuclear coalition has been able to change the views of the policy brokers. While this occurred in all four provinces it was most evident in two very different provinces: Ontario and Alberta. In Ontario, the anti-nuclear coalition had the upper hand for much of the 1990s: Bob Rae’s ndp government (1990–95) was largely sympathetic to the policy beliefs of the anti-nuclear coalition. In addition, the delays and cost overruns with the Darlington reactors in the late 1980s and early 1990s provided strong evidence of the problems with nuclear power. Finally, the Harris government had to temporarily shut down seven reactors in 1997 owing to poor performance. Since then, the pronuclear coalition has gradually gained the upper hand. It convinced the Harris government to begin the process of restarting several of the reactors that had been shut down. Then it convinced the McGuinty government to begin a long-term plan to refurbish most of Ontario’s existing reactors and to build new ones. The pro-nuclear coalition was able to accomplish this by improving the performance of its nuclear fleet (especially after the arrival of Bruce Power and the attitudinal change within opg), by maintaining a strong safety record, and by marshalling evidence about climate change. The pro-nuclear coalition also worked hard at changing public attitudes towards nuclear energy. The Alberta situation was harder for the pro-nuclear coalition than the situations in New Brunswick or Saskatchewan. In New Brunswick there was an existing nuclear reactor, and Saskatchewan had an existing uranium industry as well as a premier who was quite supportive of the nuclear sector. The Alberta pro-nuclear coalition was brand new, and it had to deal with a similarly inexperienced set of policy brokers who were initially skeptical of nuclear energy and who resided in a province that was rich in fossil fuel. Nevertheless, the pronuclear coalition was able to convince the government to assemble an expert panel to produce a scientific study of nuclear power in Alberta. This was followed up by a public consultation process designed to gauge public support for nuclear energy in Alberta. In the end, a cautious government agreed that introducing nuclear power was a private sector decision subject to existing federal and provincial regulations. The pro-nuclear coalition achieved this by compiling and distributing technical material about the positive features of nuclear

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energy, for example by commissioning studies that came out of ceri, which is based in Calgary. Alberta’s pro-nuclear coalition targeted not only the provincial government but the larger energy sector, the media, and the public (especially in Peace River). It also benefited from being challenged by a similarly inexperienced anti-nuclear coalition that lacked the financial and technical resources that it had. This study has now confirmed each of the four testable hypotheses, which is a strong show of support for the utility of the acf in policy analysis. Not only does it provide a good, yet elegantly parsimonious, way of organizing the nuclear sector by dividing all key actors into the categories of pro-nuclear coalition, anti-nuclear coalition, and policy brokers, but it also has significant predictive powers that explain the policy process. All of the above helps to improve our understanding of the policy process. In this book I wanted to do more than just apply and test the acf on Canada’s nuclear sector. I also sought to advance the acf concept in two key ways. First, as the introductory chapter argued, as useful as the acf is, there has been a gap in its utility for federal states like Canada, because theorists do not distinguish between national and provincial acfs. This study has demonstrated how the national nuclear acf is separate from provincial nuclear acfs, and it highlights the differences between the provincial acfs. This is the first study that has compared different subsystems (national and provincial) in the same policy subsystem. It has also demonstrated that these multiple subsystems compete and collaborate. Moreover, it has shown that each province has also responded differently to similar external events, such as declining natural gas prices, climate change, and the consolidation of the international nuclear industry. The detailed case studies contained in this book have shown that the national nuclear acf is modified in each province. The major reason for federal-provincial cooperation and competition in the nuclear sector is that it is mandated in the Canadian constitution, which grants jurisdiction over natural resources, energy, and electricity generation to the provinces but assigns jurisdiction over nuclear power, especially regulatory powers to ensure the safety and security of nuclear reactors, to the federal government. This is why both levels of government have Crown corporations in the nuclear sector. At the federal level there is aecl, and at the provincial there are nb Power, opg, and SaskPower. The interplay between these national and provin-

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cial actors was an essential feature of each provincial case study. For example, the new build project in Ontario was initiated by the provincial government, but the environmental assessment was conducted by two federal agencies (cnsc and the ceaa). The refurbishment of Point Lepreau involved a close partnership between aecl and nb Power. The nuclear agenda-setting in Alberta was coordinated by a local firm (eac) and a national nuclear firm (aecl). Finally, many of the provinces wanted federal dollars for their nuclear projects: Ontario (new build), New Brunswick (refurbishment), and Saskatchewan (research reactor). The fragmentation of the nuclear sector replicates the larger fragmentation in electricity generation. For example, Canada generates electricity in different ways depending on the province: hydroelectricity in Quebec, Newfoundland, and Manitoba; nuclear energy in Ontario and New Brunswick; and coal and natural gas in Alberta and Saskatchewan. In addition, Canada does not have an east-west electricity grid but a series of north-south grids. Because of the problems of fragmentation, business leaders have been asking the federal government to initiate and coordinate a Canadian energy strategy.21 The national nuclear acf and the provincial nuclear acfs interact in many different ways. At one extreme is Ontario, where it is very difficult even for the participating actors themselves to distinguish between the national and the provincial acfs. At the other extreme is Alberta, where it was easy to delineate the two acfs. The Alberta nuclear acf is notable for the existence of a series of mutually beneficial partnerships within the different components of the nuclear sector. Since there was a general lack of nuclear knowledge across the province, a partnership emerged between a local actor who knew the economic/political landscape and an affiliated national actor who provided technical support. This situation existed in the pro- and antinuclear coalitions and even among the policy brokers. At the policy broker level, the Alberta Departments of Energy and Environment spoke with their colleagues in the federal government and the cnsc. In the case of industry, the eac was the public face, but aecl was in the background. Even when Bruce Power took over it made sure to establish a small office in Peace River headed by Albert Cooper, a former mp and prominent businessman in the area. Bruce Power also has local ties through one of its owners – TransCanada Corp – which is a major oil and gas firm headquartered in Calgary. Local anti-nuclear groups could mobilize grassroots opposition, but they relied on

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national actors, other provincial organizations, and international groups to provide technical advice. The Alberta Branch of the cns relied heavily on financial, administrative, and technical support from the national office in Toronto. This relationship existed because the political culture in Alberta demanded that local actors lead the process – there was no way that an Ontario-based Crown corporation like aecl could gain traction in Alberta – but the technical realities of nuclear power required assistance from the larger national actors. It is also important to note that there has been significant coordination between the national and provincial nuclear acfs but that there has been little coordination between provincial nuclear acfs. As Cadman has noted, “one need only consider the apparent lack of consultation and coordination between neighbouring Alberta and Saskatchewan in their respective nuclear planning … Likewise, Ontario and New Brunswick appear to have engaged in little, if any, coordination in their respective nuclear ambitions.”22 This study has shown that the acf concept needs to be expanded to include a distinction between national and provincial acfs. However, since it is also clear that there needs to be more research in this area, here is a brief agenda for further research. First, policy analysts should examine other federal jurisdictions: Is the relationship between national and provincial nuclear acfs the same in Germany, Australia, or the United States? Second, work should be done in multiple sectors: Is the relationship between the Canadian nuclear acf and provincial acfs the same in other sectors? What about agriculture, health care, education, or financial services? The acf is a very useful analytical tool, but adherence to this research agenda would definitely strengthen it. In addition to the differences between the national and provincial nuclear acfs, as the detailed case studies showed, there are also stark differences between the four provincial nuclear acfs. Each provincial nuclear acf can be compared based on their composition and their influence over government decision-makers. There are obviously national actors, like the cnsc and the Canadian Nuclear Association, that simply replicate their relationships and influence across different provincial jurisdictions. In addition, there are the same types of actors are present in each province, ie., government departments, provincial utilities (SaskPower, nb Power, opg), component suppliers, chambers of commerce, local environmental groups, and so on. What is most interesting is the existence or promi-

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nence of actors in some provinces, but their absence in others. Labour unions are important actors in the pro-nuclear coalitions in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, but largely absent in Alberta. First Nations organizations exist in every province, and any siting decision involves the Duty to Consult, yet their presence is most apparent in the Saskatchewan pro-nuclear coalition, which reflects the role of native employment in the uranium mining sector and the location of uranium mines on native land. However, a more powerful explanation is the more active role that native groups play generally in Saskatchewan politics. A role that is greatly heightened when compared to the other provinces analyzed in this study. In other provinces, native groups are contained within the anti-nuclear coalition. For example, the Union of Ontario Indians opposed shipping used steam generators, which contained some low-level radioactivity, along the Great lakes. In addition, the Williams Treaties First Nations were interveners in the environmental assessment for the new nuclear build at Darlington and offered a number of criticisms of the project.23 However, unlike in the case of Saskatchewan, the influence of native groups has been small. Similarly, rural municipality groups, as opposed to just individual mayors and county officials, are traditionally stronger in Saskatchewan, which is reflected by their involvement in the Saskatchewan pro-nuclear coalition. In each province, there are local antinuclear groups, but their presence is relatively smaller in New Brunswick than the other provinces. This could result from the combination of a small population base and a traditionally weak economy with high unemployment whereby economic development trumps many other social considerations. The influence of the competing nuclear coalitions has been different depending upon the jurisdiction. In all cases, the pro-nuclear coalition has had greater access to the policy brokers. But access is not the same as influence. If influence is determined by whether a coalition has achieved its primary policy goals, then the pro-nuclear coalitions in Ontario and New Brunswick and the anti-nuclear coalitions in Saskatchewan and Alberta have been most successful. In Ontario almost all existing reactors have had their life extended through restarts and refurbishments. In addition, Ontario now seems committed to building two new nuclear reactors. In New Brunswick, the only reactor is having its life extended, and partnerships with Team candu and Areva for a new reactor have been pursued by the provincial gov-

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ernment. Meanwhile, there are no immediate plans for introducing nuclear power in either Saskatchewan or Alberta. If, on the other hand, you judge success based on which set of policy beliefs policy brokers tend to accept, then the situation changes. Saskatchewan premier Wall is the most pro-nuclear politician in the country. While he has yet to approve construction of a nuclear power plant in Saskatchewan, he has committed millions of provincial dollars to the rest of his nuclear agenda, including a new Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation at the University of Saskatchewan. Moreover, the province is still investigating the possible use of smaller reactors. In Alberta the provincial government had an opportunity to stop the discussion surrounding nuclear energy, but their 2009 announcement opened the door. Low natural gas prices, not the hostility of the provincial government, are preventing Bruce Power from going forward in Peace River. In short, the policy brokers in Alberta and Saskatchewan have accepted the policy beliefs put forward by the pro-nuclear coalitions in their provinces. The second way that this study advances the acf concept is by explaining how the national acf changes when it is applied to the international environment. The acf was developed and applied to domestic policy areas. As the introductory chapter pointed out, some acf scholars, such as Karen Liftin, have been critical of the literature for failing to incorporate both national and international levels into policy analysis. This book takes on this challenge by showing how the Canadian nuclear energy subsystem behaves differently depending upon whether the focus is domestic or foreign policy. It has shown that the Canadian nuclear acf operates both domestically and internationally, but it does so in different ways. The most obvious difference is that the Canadian nuclear acf shares the domestic space with the provincial acfs, but it operates in the international sphere by itself. Canada speaks with one voice abroad, but that is simply impossible at home. There are multiple nuclear acfs in Canada, but only the national one operates internationally. A second difference is that the federal government has taken a number of initiatives to promote the Canadian nuclear industry abroad. As chapter 8 explained, the global nuclear revival has created a window of opportunity for the Canadian nuclear industry in the areas of uranium mining, uranium upgrading, and reactor sales and refurbishments. Ottawa has successfully negotiated a nuclear cooperation

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agreement with India to promote exports in uranium and reactor components, as well as further research and development opportunities for Canadian and Indian nuclear scientists. During Harper’s trip to China in the fall of 2009, one of the goals was to promote nuclear collaboration, especially in the area of uranium exports, but also including the possibility of additional candu sales. Former trade minister Stockwell Day also made a series of foreign visits (including to Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Romania) promoting the Canadian nuclear industry. Accompanying Harper and Day on their foreign trips were senior executives of aecl, Cameco, and other Canadian nuclear companies. It is true that the federal government also supports aecl and the candu domestically, but it is hamstrung by the fact that the provinces have ultimate control over electricity generation. In contrast, the federal government has more room to manoeuvre internationally. It is for this reason that the pro-nuclear coalition has been especially critical of the Harper government for not doing enough to promote the candu internationally – especially in contrast to other world leaders such as President Nicholas Sarkozy of France and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of Russia. Canada’s pro-nuclear coalition knows that Ottawa is less constrained internationally than domestically and therefore has had higher expectations of political support. A third difference is the relative absence of Canada’s anti-nuclear coalition from the international environment. While Canadian government officials and industry representatives have been active in the international environment, the same cannot be said for the anti-nuclear groups – this is a reversal of previous practice. The antinuclear coalition used to devote a good percentage of their time to Canada’s international nuclear activity. A particular focus was linking the exports of civilian nuclear materials and technology to weapons proliferation. For example, the Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout and the Sierra Club published several studies criticizing candu exports,24 while others focused on uranium exports.25 Today, because the nuclear revival has extended to Canada, the anti-nuclear coalition is focusing its scarce resources on preventing the expansion of nuclear power in Canada and has largely ignored the international aspects. A fourth way that the Canadian acf participates internationally is through international organizations. In intergovernmental organizations, such as the iaea and nsg, membership is restricted to dfait officials. However, there are also industry organizations, such as wano, in which there are multiple members from the Canadian nuclear indus-

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try. In this sense, there is an international nuclear sector made up of states, international organizations, companies, scientists, and global non-governmental organizations. This international sector includes membership from the actors who populate Canada’s pro-nuclear coalition, as well as from Canada’s nuclear policy brokers. Preceding pages examined how the Canadian nuclear acf has looked outwards towards the rest of the world. However, the global nuclear revival has also exercised pressures inward on the Canadian nuclear acf, as can be seen in the original decision to use a competitive bid process in Ontario for the new reactor build project. If Canada wants access to the reactor markets in other countries, then it needs to offer reciprocal access in its own market. A second way that the international environment has put pressure on Canada’s domestic nuclear policy is through Ottawa’s decision to restructure aecl. The formation of candu Energy, a solely owned entity of snc-Lavalin, was in large part a response to the consolidation of the international nuclear industry that was described in chapter 3. A third source of international pressure results from the Harper government’s intention to open up Canada’s uranium sector to foreign direct investment. In 2008, Industry Canada commissioned a blue-ribbon panel, chaired by Red Wilson, former ceo of Bell Canada, to make recommendations on increasing Canada’s competitiveness. In June 2008, the final report, entitled Compete to Win, was released, making recommendations on the airline, uranium, and telecommunications sectors.26 It concluded that “Canada must step up its game and become more competitive, both here at home and abroad.” Focusing on the uranium mining sector (there were no restrictions on uranium exploration), Compete to Win recommended that Canada should liberalize its restrictions on foreign ownership if it was to be able to secure “commensurate market access benefits allowing for Canadian participation in the development of uranium resources outside Canada or access to uranium processing technologies used for the production of nuclear fuel for nuclear power plants.” In addition, it recommended that the threshold for a foreign investment review, including uranium mining, should rise from $5 million to $1 billion. The Conservatives campaigned during the fall 2008 federal election on many of the recommendations contained in the Compete to Win report, including lifting the foreign ownership restrictions on uranium mining. However, the global financial crisis soon swamped the government, and these promises were forgotten for a

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while, but they were revisited in the March 2010 Speech from the Throne, which asserted that “while safeguarding Canada’s national security, our Government will ensure that unnecessary regulation does not inhibit the growth of Canada’s uranium mining industry by unduly restricting foreign investment. It will also expand investment promotion in key markets.”27 According to Sam Tranum, a journalist with Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, India has delayed ratification of its Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with Canada partly because of Ottawa’s delay in changing legislation that would allow Indian companies to own majority shares of Canadian uranium mines.28 CONCLUSION

The first decade of the twenty-first century has seen the beginning of a global nuclear revival. Has it extended to Canada? The answer is yes. A public debate has been raging in Canada over the nuclear sector, and governments have responded in Alberta and Saskatchewan with commissioned studies and public consultations. nrcan has similarly produced reports on the restructuring of aecl and the production of medical isotopes. Ottawa has also sold off, after a lengthy process, aecl’s reactor division to snc-Lavalin. This high degree of political activity has been matched by nuclear construction. There have been refurbishments of existing reactors in New Brunswick and Ontario and there are plans for more. This is a significant development: billions of dollars have been spent and new technologies that have been developed. In the area of new builds, the record is a lot more mixed. After a temporary suspension, it appears that Ontario is on the verge of building two new reactors, albeit on a much smaller scale than originally conceived. Moreover, while an environmental assessment – an important step – has been completed, the phases of procuring a reactor design and constructing the plant still need to be completed. In New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta no new nuclear builds are on the near horizon. Thus, in the realm of new reactor projects, Canada is not nearly as active as the leaders of the global nuclear revival, China, India, Russia, and South Korea. Internationally, the record is also mixed. A significant nuclear cooperation agreement was signed with India. However, once again, despite plenty of talk, there have been no new builds. Instead, there have been two refurbishment projects (in South Korea and Argentina), increases in uranium mining

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and fuel services, and talks of technology collaboration with the Chinese and Indians. In the years that come, we may look back on this period of activity in Canada, especially from 2005 to 2011, as the critical preparation stage that was necessary before the country fully embarked on a revival of nuclear power. It was during this period that the political, economic, and technological case for nuclear power was made, that is, that the arguments of the pro-nuclear coalitions persuaded the policy brokers and the wider public to maintain and expand nuclear power across Canada. By 2030, we could very well be observing new nuclear power plants operating in Ontario, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. An alternative scenario would be to look back and see that Canada chose not to participate in the global nuclear revival, to see that despite the energetic activity of the pro-nuclear coalition, governments across the country decided that while they would maintain the existing fleet of reactors (largely because of the sunk costs), they would pass on expanding nuclear power. Providing an empirical measurement and explanation of Canada’s participation in the global nuclear revival was the primary purpose of this study, but it was not the only one. It also tested and expanded on the advocacy coalition framework. Four of the acf’s specific hypotheses were tested and all of them were confirmed: this demonstrates the utility of the acf. In addition, by expanding its reach to include the nature of federal systems, as well as their international dimensions, this study has enhanced the acf. Therefore, regardless of which of the two scenarios just described prevails, analysts would benefit from using the advocacy coalition framework, as amended in this book, to explain Canada’s nuclear policy.

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1 Notes

CHAPTER ONE

1 International Atomic Energy Agency, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power. 2 Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports. 3 University of Colorado Denver, School of Public Affairs, “Advocacy Coalition Framework.” 4 Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, “The Study of Public Policy Processes,” 5. 5 Sabatier, “Policy Change over a Decade or More,” 5. 6 Ibid., 26. 7 For a brief look at the literature on policy communities and networks, with a focus on the Canadian context, see Coleman and Skogstad, Policy Communities and Public Policy in Canada; Atkinson and Coleman, “Policy Networks, Policy Communities and the Problems of Governance”; Montpetit and Coleman, “Policy Communities and Policy Divergence in Canada”; Skogstad, “Policy Networks and Policy Communities”; and Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture. 8 Dowding, “Model or Metaphor?” 138. 9 Coleman and Skogstad, “Policy Communities and Policy Networks, 25. 10 Ibid., 26. 11 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning. 12 Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, “Themes and Variations.” 13 Mawhinney, “An Advocacy Coalition Approach to Change in Canadian Education”; Bischoff, “Extension of Authority to Confer Bachelor of Education Degrees in Alberta.” 14 Litfin, “Advocacy Coalitions along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier.” 15 Lertzman, Rayner, and Wilson, “Learning and Change in the British Columbia Forest Policy Sector”; Wellstead, Davidson, and R.C. Stedman, “Assessing

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19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Notes to pages 5–17

Approaches to Climate-Change-Related Policy Formulation in British Columbia’s Forest Sector.” Breton, Richard, et al.“Fighting a Tobacco-Tax Rollback.” Sabatier and Weible, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework.” Nohrstedt, “Do Advocacy Coalitions Matter?” Nohrstedt, “Crisis and Policy Reformcraft”; and Shu-Hsiang Hsu, “Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Change on Nuclear Power Utilization in Taiwan.” Sabatier and Weible, “Innovations and Clarifications,” 194–6. Mehta, Risky Business, 1. Johnson, Deliberative Democracy for the Future, 27. Sabatier and Weible, “Innovations and Clarifications,” 194. Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, “Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 132–3. Sabatier, “Policy Change over a Decade or More,” 27. Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, “Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 132. Ingold and Varone, “Treating Policy Brokers Seriously.” Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, “Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 182. Sabatier and Weible, “Innovations and Clarifications,” 199–201. Ibid., 192. Sabatier, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 104. Nohrstedt, “Crisis and Change in Swedish Nuclear Energy Policy,” 309–33. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, “The Advocacy Coalition Framework” 222. Ibid. World Nuclear News, “Gentilly 2’s Refurbishment for Longer Life,” (20 August 2008). “Gentilly 2 Refurbishment Postponed,” Canadian Nuclear Society Bulletin 31/3 (September 2010), 35. Lynn Moore, “Hydro-Québec to Study Nuke Plant Shutdown,” Montreal Gazette, 23 March 2011. See Simpson, “Pinawa, Twelve Years Later”; and Simpson and Skinner, “Should Manitoba Join the Nuclear Club?” Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, “Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 134. Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis, 256. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, “Assessment, Revisions, and Implications,” 217. Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen, “Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework,” 134. Doern, Pal, and Tomlin, Border Crossings.

Notes to pages 17–26

309

43 Skogstad, Internationalization and Canadian Agriculture, 3. 44 Ibid, 251. 45 Litfin, “Advocacy Coalitions along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier,” 239. CHAPTER TWO

1 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (2009). Accessed on 20 July 2009 from http://www.aecl.ca. 2 http://www.snclavalin.com. 3 New Brunswick Power, “Point Lepreau Generating Station” (November 2006). 4 http://www.brucepower.com. 5 http://www.cameco.com. 6 http://www.mds.nordion.com. 7 Telephone interview with Colin Hunt, director, research and publications, Canadian Nuclear Association (5 May 2009). For more historical information on the cna see Weller, “The First 30 Years of the cna”; and Hunt, “The First Half Century of the can.” 8 Canadian Nuclear Association, “Members” (2007). Accessed on 14 July 2009 from http://www.cna.ca/english/members.asp. 9 Organization of candu Industries, “Our Membership” (2008). Accessed on 20 July 2009 from http://www.oci-aic.org. 10 http://www.candu.org. 11 Canadian Nuclear Workers Council, “About the cnwc” (2009). Accessed on 23 December 2009 at http://www.cnwc-cctn.ca/about/. 12 Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis, 260. 13 Other scientific associations specialize in more specific parts of the nuclear sector. For example, the Canadian Nuclear Medicine Association is a multidisciplinary professional organization with a common interest in the scientific use of radionuclides. See http://www.csnm-scmn.ca. 14 Canadian Nuclear Society, “About the Society.” Accessed on 10 July 2009 from http://www.cns-snc.ca/society.html. 15 Canadian Nuclear Society, “Objectives of the cns.” Accessed on 10 July 2009 from http://www.cns-snc.ca/object.html. 16 Canadian Energy Research Institute, Relative Costs of Canadian Electricity Generation Technologies. 17 Canadian Energy Research Institute, Comparative Life-Cycle Assessment (lca) of Base Load Electricity Generation in Ontario. 18 Canadian Nuclear Association, Celebrating 50 Years: Seizing Opportunities for Growth (2010), 11.

310

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30

31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

42 43

Notes to pages 27–37

Canadian Energy Research Institute, The Canadian Nuclear Industry. cna, Celebrating 50 Years, 32. Ritch, “Crucial Role for Government and Industry.” International Atomic Energy Agency, “Chernobyl’s Legacy.” Buongiorna, Ballinger, et al., Technical Lessons Learned from the FukushimaDaichii Accident, 3. For more information on the Fukushima-Daaichi accident see iaea, “Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Update Log.” Last accessed on 2 August 2011. George Monbiot, “Going Critical: How the Fukushima Disaster Taught Me to Stop Worrying and Embrace Nuclear Power,” Guardian, 22 March 2011. Tammemagi and Jackson, Half-Lives, 142. Nuclear Waste Management Organization, “Implementing Adaptive Phased Management: 2008–2012” (2008), 5. Accessed on 14 August 2008 at http:www.nwmo.ca. nwmo, “Implementing Adaptive Phased Management.” Ausubel, “Renewable and Nuclear Heresies.” The literature on the early years of the Canadian nuclear sector is dominated by a handful of books: Eggleston, Canada’s Nuclear Story; Bothwell, Eldorado; and Bothwell, Nucleus. For a brief introduction to the origins of the anti-nuclear movement in Canada see Mehta, Risky Business, 38–41. Knelman, Nuclear Energy. Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility at http://www.ccnr.org. This document was accessed on 23 July 2009. For just one example, albeit from a high-profile anti-nuclear activist, see Helen Caldicott, Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer, 74–80. James Kanter and Judy Dempsey, “Germany Shuts 7 Plants as Europe Plans Safety Tests,” New York Times, 15 March 2011. Quoted in Jon Hembry, “Atomic Fallout: Global Chill but Nuclear Not Dead,” cbc News, 31 May 2011. Mike Buckthought, Tritium on Tap. Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, High-Level Nuclear Waste. Pembina Institute, “Uranium Mining.” Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Office, Inventory of Radioactive Waste in Canada. Campaign for Nuclear Phaseout, “Canada’s Federal Government Is Wrong.” See also Sierra Club, “The Canadian Nuclear Lesson”; and Caldicott, Nuclear Power Is Not the Answer. Bell and Weis, Greening the Grid; and Torrie and Parfett, Phasing Out Nuclear Power. McKay, Atomic Accomplice; see also Harding, Canada’s Deadly Secret.

Notes to pages 37–44

311

44 Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, 74. 45 Pat McNamara, “The Economics of Nuclear Power,” Grimshaw Mile Zero News, 20 January 2010. 46 Martin, Financial Meltdown. 47 Berg, Nuclear Power Production,10. 48 Jackson and de la Mothe, “Nuclear Regulation in Transition,” 100. For a good history of the origins and development of the aecb see Sims, A History of the Atomic Energy Control. 49 Jackson and de la Mothe, “Nuclear Regulation in Transition,” 104. 50 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 8 January 2009. Accessed on 21 July 2009 from http://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca. 51 Nuclear Waste Management Organization, “Vision, Mission, and Values,” July 2009. Accessed on 23 July 2009 from http://www.nwmo.ca/vision. 52 http://www.mpmo-bggp.gc.ca. For a detailed look at the role of major project regulation see Conference Board of Canada, Making Canada More Competitive. 53 Sabatier and Weible, “Innovations and Clarifications,” 196. 54 Interview with Steve Coupland, manager of issues and policy development with Bruce Power, Calgary, 20 October 2009. 55 McNamara, “Nuclear Genocide in Canada.” 22 March 2009. 56 ccnr, “What Does the Nuclear Industry Think of ccnr?” Accessed on 24 July 2009 from http://www.ccnr.org/ccnr_by_aecl.htm. 57 Partridge and McCarthy, “aecl Lawsuit ‘Just One More Liability’ to Sale,” Globe and Mail, 10 July 2008, b3. 58 Telephone interview with Colin Hunt, director, research and publications, Canadian Nuclear Association, 5 May 2009. 59 Moore, Confessions of a Greenpeace Dropout, 202. 60 James Lovelock, “Nuclear Power Is the Only Green Solution,” The Independent, 24 May 2004. 61 Tim Flannery, “Let’s Talk about Nuclear Power and Other Energy Sources,” The Age (Melbourne), 30 May 2006. 62 “Some Environmentalists Embracing Nuclear Power,” Edmonton Journal, 20 May 2007. 63 As of November 2009, there were almost 10,000 members of efn in sixty countries. http://www.ecolo.org/base/baseen.htm. 64 Morrison and Meneley, “Balancing the Risks,” 4. 65 Jessica Leeder, “aecl: Canada’s Nuclear Fallout,” Globe and Mail, 23 February 2008. 66 Talisman International, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited National Research Universal Reactor Safety Systems Upgrade. 67 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Correspondence between President and

312

68

69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

Notes to pages 44–50

Chief Executive Officer cnsc Linda Keen and Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn (8 January 2008). Canada House of Commons, Natural Resources Committee, “ Nuclear Safety Issues, Including Safety Issues at the Chalk River Nuclear Reactor,” 16 January 2008. Quoted in Steven Chase, “Ottawa’s Ouster of Nuclear Watchdog Lawful, Court Rules,” Globe and Mail, 11 April 2009, a8. Canada, House of Commons, “Debate on Isotope Issue.” Confidential interviews with both cnsc and aecl officials. The cnsc has begun to respond, through its website and through letters to the editor, to news stories and studies that it feels contain mistaken information about nuclear technology. See http://www.cnsc-ccsn.gc.ca/eng/ mediacentre/whatsnew/. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, “Mythbusters.” Pratt, “Canada: An Eroding and Limited Internationalism,” 55. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Regulatory Independence, 21. Quoted in Sue Bailey and Jim Bronskill, “Nuclear Watchdog Too Close to Industry, Report Suggests,” Globe and Mail, 9 October 2007, a8. Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis, 255–6. Sabatier and Weible, “Innovations and Clarifications,” 201–3. Pratt, “An Eroding and Limited Internationalism,” 54–5 Morrison and Wonder, Canada’s Nuclear Export Policy, 8. Doern, Dorman, and Morrison, “Transforming aecl,” 85–9. Office of the Auditor-General of Canada, Special Examination Report,18. Bruce Cheadle, “Nuclear Support Triples under Conservative Government,” Canadian Press, 10 March 2009. Pembina Institute, Annual Report 2007. Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Annual Financial Report 2008. Johnson, Deliberative Democracy for the Future, 31–3. Quoted in “A Nuclear Cult Ran Reactors: Chairman Reacts to Scathing Report,” Toronto Star, 14 August 1997, a1. Pal, Beyond Policy Analysis, 261. Alexander, “On Picking Your Message,” 11–12. Rampton and Stauber, Trust Us, 2. See Nevitte, The Decline of Deference; and Peter C. Newman, The Canadian Revolution 1985–1995. Adams, Fire and Ice, 52. Quoted in Rampton and Stauber, Trust Us, 311. Carlisle, Feezell, et al., “The Public’s Trust in Scientific Claims.”

Notes to pages 52–8

313

CHAPTER THREE

1 Quoted in Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Struggle Facing the Atomic Age,” National Post, 1 August 2009. 2 Schneider, “2008 World Nuclear Industry Status Report.” 3 Feiveson, “A Skeptic’s View of Nuclear Energy,” 60–1. 4 Findlay, The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030, 9. 5 iaea, Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates. 6 Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Nuclear Energy Outlook 2008. 7 International Energy Agency, iea Energy Technology Essentials. 8 Miller and Sagan, “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” 9. See 10, fig. 1. 9 Li, “The Prospects for Nuclear Energy in the East Asian Region.” 10 Grover, “Prospects for Nuclear Energy in South Asia.” Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh is even more optimistic, pledging that “if we manage our program well, our three-stage strategy could yield potentially 470,000 mwe of power by the year 2050.” World Nuclear News, “Think Big, India,” 29 September 2009. 11 Olivia Chung, “China to Maintain Nuclear Power Goal,” Asia Times, 30 March 2011. 12 Quoted in “Independent Nuclear Watchdog for India?” United Press International, 30 March 2011. 13 Van der Zwaan, “Prospects for Nuclear Energy in Europe.” 14 O. Purtov, “Prospects for Nuclear Energy.” 15 A.N. Chebeskov and V.S. Kagramanyan, “Prospects for Nuclear Power Development.” 16 For a short history of Germany nuclear power see Mez and Doern, “Nuclear Energy in Germany and Canada.” 17 Kanter and Dempsey, “Germany Shuts 7 Plants as Europe Plans Safety Tests,” New York Times, 15 March 2011. 18 “Last Decade of German Nuclear Power,” World Nuclear News, 31 May 2011. 19 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy and Richard Blackwell, “Getting Nervous about Nuclear,” Globe and Mail, 31 May 2011. 20 “Swiss Cabinet Goes for Nuclear Phase Out,” World Nuclear News, 25 May 2011. 21 Quoted in Eric Reguly, “Referendum Kills Italy’s Nuclear Plans,” Globe and Mail, 14 June 2011.

314

Notes to pages 58–63

22 Quoted in “Britain to Return as ‘Serious Nuclear Nation,’” World Nuclear News, 5 July 2011. 23 “Hitachi-ge Wins Lithuanian Nuclear Tender,” World Nuclear News, 14 July 2011. 24 “Sarkozy Supports Nuclear with €1 Billion Pledge,” World Nuclear News, 28 June 2011. 25 United States, White House, “Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address.” 26 United States, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “Combined License Applications for New Reactors.” 27 Sharon Squassoni, “The us Nuclear Industry.” 28 Quoted in John Avlon, “Interview: Steven Chu,” Newsweek, 3 April 2011. 29 Cadman, “The Canadian Nuclear Industry” 30 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Century Outlook Data.” Also see K. Nagano, “Prospects for Nuclear Energy.” 31 Quoted in Danielle Demetriou, “Japan’s pm Says It’s Time to Abandon Nuclear Power,” Calgary Herald, 14 July 2011. 32 Quoted in Hiroko Tabuchi, “Japan Leader to Keep Nuclear Phase-Out,” New York Times, 2 September 2011. 33 Quoted in “N-phaseout Merely Kan’s ‘Private View’: Ministers Blast pm for Lack of Notice,” The Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 July 2011. 34 “New Japan pm Noda in Nuclear Restart Call,” bbc News, 13 September 2011. 35 There has been sustained research by a number of companies (including Toshiba, Mitsubishi, General Atomics, Babcock & Wilcox) who are working on small power reactors of less than 50 mw for remote communities. Small reactors are beyond the scope of this book. For more information see World Nuclear Association, “Small Nuclear Power Reactors.” 36 Goldemberg, “Nuclear Energy in Developing Countries,” 72. 37 For a comprehensive analysis of the progress towards nuclear power by new entrants see the Centre for International Governance Innovation, Survey of Emerging Nuclear Energy States. 38 For a review of the economic issues around nuclear power see David McLellan, “The Economics of Nuclear Power: Current Debates and Issues for Future Consideration,” Nuclear Energy Futures Paper No.1 (February 2008). 39 Quoted in Feiveson, “A Skeptic’s View of Nuclear Energy,” 64. 40 Accenture, Multinational Nuclear Power Pulse Survey 2009 (April 2009), 22. 41 Harold A. Feiveson, “A Skeptic’s View of Nuclear Energy,” 62. 42 See Findlay, The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030, 20. 43 Goldemberg, “Nuclear Energy in Developing Countries,” 75.

Notes to pages 63–73

44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

62

63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73

315

Nuclear Energy Institute, License Renewal. (2012). Joskow and Parsons, “The Economic Future of Nuclear Power,” 49. Findlay, The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030, 25. Whitlock, “How Is Core Refurbishment Part of candu Life Management.” “Korean candu Restarts after Refurbishment.” World Nuclear News, 29 July 2011. Quoted in Daniel McHardie, “Pickering Woes Shouldn’t Weaken aecl Bid, Says Expert,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 27 July 2007, b1. Accenture, Multinational Nuclear Power Pulse Survey 2009. Ipsos-Mori, “Strong Global Opposition towards Nuclear Power.” International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009 Fact Sheet. United Nations, World Population to 2030. World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2007. iea, World Energy Outlook 2009 Fact Sheet (2009). Accenture, Multinational Nuclear Power Pulse Survey 2009, 8–11. International Atomic Energy Agency, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 8–9. Quoted ibid., 10–13. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Nuclear Power, 7–8. Socolow and Glaser, “Balancing Risks, 33. bbc News, “Copenhagen Deal Causes eu Carbon Price Fall,” 21 December 2009. Accessed on 16 March 2010 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8425293.stm. Western Climate Initiative, “wci Complementary Policies White Paper Release and Stakeholder Call,” (2009). Accessed on 30 November 2009 at http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org. International Energy Agency, Key World Energy Statistics 2008, 17, 27. Japan Nuclear Power, “Japan’s Nuclear Program” (2002). Accessed on 30 November 2009 at http://www.japannuclear.com/nuclearpower/program/. Quoted in iaea, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 14. Quoted ibid. Rowe, “Nuclear Power in a Carbon-Constrained World,” 86. Quoted in iaea, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 14. Quoted in Anna Momigliano, “Russian Gas Cutoff Energizes Nuclear Comeback,” Christian Science Monitor, 16 January 2009. World Nuclear News, “Gas Fires Up Nuclear in Europe,” 7 January 2009. Accenture, Multinational Nuclear Power Pulse Survey 2009, 21. Telephone interview with Keith Bradley, senior advisor, business development, aecl, 29 October 2009. Steed, Nuclear Power in Canada and Beyond, 5–7.

316

Notes to pages 74–82

74 Quoted in James Kantor, “Siemens Pulls out of Nuclear Venture with Areva,” New York Times, 6 February 2009. 75 For a summary of these transactions see Areva, 2008 Reference Document, 44–8. 76 Westinghouse, Westinghouse Company Profile (2008), 1. Accessed on 26 November 2009 at http://www.westinghousenuclear.com/docs/ WestinghouseProfile.pdf. 77 General Electric, “Fact Sheet” (2009). Accessed on 27 November 2009 at http://www.ge.com/company/factsheets/corporate.html. 78 General Electric Energy, “Reactor Services” (2009). Accessed on 27 November 2009 at http://www.ge-energy.com/prod_serv/products/nuclear_energy/ en/reactor_serv.htm. 79 Steed, Nuclear Power in Canada and Beyond, 7. 80 World Nuclear News, “Toshiba, AtomEnergoProm Sign Framework Agreement,” 20 March 2008. 81 World Nuclear News, “Siemens Teams Up with Russia’s Rosatom,” 4 March 2009. 82 Quoted in Rob Linke, “Nuclear Crown Corporation’s Future Uncertain,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 23 April 2008. 83 Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, Nuclear Industry Review. 84 Natural Resources Canada, Review of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 13. 85 Ibid., 13. 86 Ibid., 4–5. 87 Quoted in editorial “aecl Sale Needs Careful Handling,” Toronto Star, 29 May 2009. 88 Natural Resources Canada, Rothschild, candu Inc. Investment Summary. December 2009. 89 Natural Resources Canada, “Statement by the Honourable Lisa Raitt, P.C., M.P., Minister of Natural Resources, aecl Review.” 90 Natural Resources Canada, “Government of Canada Invites Investor Proposals for aecl candu Reactor Division,” News Release 2009/123, 17 December 2009. 91 Ipsos Reid, Public Opinion Research on Nuclear Energy. 92 Quoted in Peter Zimonjic, “Ottawa Blasted on Nuclear Business,” London Free Press, 2 February 2008. 93 nrCan, Review of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 12. 94 Ibid., 5. 95 Confidential interviews with senior aecl officials. 96 Ipsos Reid, Public Opinion Research on Nuclear Energy, 4.

Notes to pages 82–7

317

97 Quoted in Andrew Mayeda, “aecl Sale Could Be ‘Death Knell’ for candu Reactors,” Canwest News Services, 14 October 2009. 98 Quoted in Mayeda, “aecl Engineers Urge Ottawa to Protect candu Technology.” 99 Ipsos Reid, Public Opinion Research on Nuclear Energy, 5. 100 Accenture, Multinational Nuclear Power Pulse Survey 2009. 101 Quoted in Andrew Mayeda, “Feds Expected to Unload Entire Stake in Candu,” National Post, 3 May 2010. 102 Hawthorne, “Notes for an Address to the Empire Club.” 103 Quoted in David Akin, “Taxpayers Won’t Recoup $8B Hit: MPs,” Edmonton Journal, 22 October 2009, A5. 104 Quoted in Bruce Cheadle, “aecl a $30B ‘Sinkhole,’ Harper Spokesman Says,” Toronto Star, 12 June 2009. 105 Confidential interview. 106 For a description of the technical changes to the candu-6 that turns it into the ec6 see Hopwood, Soulard, and Hastings, “Enhanced candu 6 (ec6).” 107 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, “Duhaime Takes snc on New Path with aecl Bid,” Globe and Mail, 20 September 2010. 108 Quoted in Gordon Pitts, “Regimes Change but the Work Stays the Same for snc Chief,” Globe and Mail, 24 April 2011. 109 Quoted in Ross Marowits, “snc-Lavalin Could Adopt New Nuclear Strategy with aecl Acquisition,” Canadian Press, 21 September 2010. 110 snc-Lavalin, “Agreement Signed to Acquire aecl’s Commercial Reactor Division by candu Energy,” News, 29 June 2011. 111 Confidential interview. 112 Quoted on cbc News, “aecl Bidder Backs Out,” 14 January 2011. 113 Shawn McCarthy, “omers Walks Away from Talks to Buy aecl,” Globe and Mail, 20 April 2011. 114 Natural Resources Canada, “The Transaction Agreements,” News Release 2011/57(a), 29 June 2011. 115 Natural Resources Canada, “Government of Canada and snc-Lavalin Group Reach Agreement on aecl candu Reactor Division,” News Release 2011/57, 29 June 2011. 116 Natural Resources Canada, “Government Funding for aecl Commercial Activities,” News Release 2011/57(b), 29 June 2011. 117 Greg Weston, “Ottawa Basically Paying snc to Take aecl,” cbc News, 29 June 2011. 118 John Spears and Rob Ferguson, “800 Ontario Jobs at Risk in aecl sale,” Toronto Star, 30 June 2011.

318

Notes to pages 87–95

119 Shawn McCarthy and Richard Blackwell, “No Candu: Unloved Reactor Maker Fetches Just $15 Million,” Globe and Mail, 30 June 2011. 120 Shawn McCarthy and Karen Howlett, “aecl Sale Pits Ontario against Ottawa,” Globe and Mail, 29 June 2011. 121 This discussion was based on several interviews with nuclear industry insiders. 122 edf, “International Presence.” 2006. 123 edf, “Constellation Energy and edf Group Enter Definitive Investment Agreement.” 124 World Nuclear News, “GdF Suez Prepares for Nuclear Operation,” 19 August 2009. 125 Quoted in Jeffrey, Point Lepreau Refurbishment Review, 15. 126 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in the USA.” 127 Ibid. 128 Telephone interview with Keith Bradley, senior advisor, business development, aecl, 29 October 2009. 129 iaea, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 26. 130 Squassoni, “The US Nuclear Industry,” 16–17. 131 Quoted ibid., 16. 132 iaea, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 26. 133 World Nuclear Association, “World Uranium Mining.” 134 Market share percentages were obtained from Squassoni, Nuclear Energy, 8n13. 135 Saskatchewan, Uranium Development Partnership, Capturing the Full Potential of the Uranium Value Chain. 136 Global Nuclear Fuel is a partnership between ge, Hitachi, and Toshiba. 137 Saskatchewan, udp, Capturing the Full Potential of the Uranium Value Chain, 48. 138 Even this degree of openness may be temporary. As Keith Bradley, senior advisor, business development, aecl, has pointed out, “China is carefully targeting the import of technologies with an explicit intent to become self-sufficient in a very short time frame and India talks of importing lwrs as an interim step to develop nuclear capacity rapidly.” Email correspondence with author, 15 March 2010. 139 Confidential interview with nuclear industry insider. 140 Confidential interview with aecl official. 141 Confidential interview with cnsc official. 142 Confidential interview with cnsc official. 143 Confidential interviews. 144 edf, “Constellation Energy and edf Group Enter Definitive Investment Agreement,” Press Release, 17 December 2008.

Notes to pages 95–103

145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152

153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160

161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169

170 171

319

Ipsos Reid, Public Opinion Research on Nuclear Energy, 23 February 2009, 4. Ibid., 19. Squassoni, Nuclear Energy, 39–40. Goldemberg, “Nuclear Energy in Developing Countries,” 79. Ritch, “Crucial Role for Government and Industry.” Miller and Sagan, “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” 9. Whitlock, “Security and Non-Proliferation.” The gnep, which has subsequently seen its funding cut by the United States, was also viewed suspiciously by many countries because it was designed to “ensure that existing suppliers would remain in control, with spent fuel being returned to suppliers for reprocessing.” Email correspondence with Trevor Findlay, 24 February 2010. Quoted in Corera, Shopping for Bombs, 242. Ibid., 243. Ibid., 245. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism. Jeremy Whitlock, “Security and Non-Proliferation.” Mueller, Atomic Obsession, xiii. Rossin, Nuclear Facilities and Terrorism. International Atomic Energy Agency, “iaea Action Plan to Combat Nuclear Terrorism,” Press Release, 19 March 2002. Accessed on 4 June 2008 at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2002/prn0204.shtml United States, Department of State, “Nuclear Security Summit.” See Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Enhanced Security in the Nuclear Industry. Miller and Sagan, “Nuclear Power without Nuclear Proliferation?” 9–10. Ibid., 11. For a more complete analysis of the political and technical role of nuclear safeguards see Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports, 41–61. iaea, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s). iaea, “Strengthened Safeguards System.” Email correspondence with Jeremy Whitlock, manager non-proliferation and safeguards, aecl, 8 December 2009. International Atomic Energy Agency, Safeguards Statement for 2008. The eu reached an agreement with the iaea in January 2010 making all their members eligible for integrated safeguards. iaea, “Agreement Reached on Integrated Safeguards in European Union.” Boureston and Feldman, “Integrated Nuclear Safeguards,” 19. International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, 35.

320

Notes to pages 104–15

172 iaea, Independent Commission [Zedillo Commission], Reinforcing the Global Nuclear Order for Peace and Prosperity, vii. 173 Interview with Jeremy Whitlock, manager non-proliferation and safeguards, aecl, 18 November 2009. 174 Seventy-five people were killed in 2009 when the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydro dam in Russia broke a turbine, and in 1958 the Springfield, Nova Scotia, coal mine disaster killed seventy-four miners. 175 mit, The Future of Nuclear Power, 48. 176 Confidential interview with cnsc official. 177 Confidential interview with cnsc official. 178 iaea, The Role of the iaea to 2020 and Beyond, 3. 179 Findlay, The Future of Nuclear Energy to 2030, 14. 180 World Association of Nuclear Operators, 2008 Performance Indicators. (2009). 181 iaea, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 32. 182 wano, 2008 Performance Indicators. 183 Ibid. 184 Lester and Rosner, “The Growth of Nuclear Power, 26. 185 Telephone interview with Keith Bradley, senior advisor, business development, aecl, 29 October 2009. 186 Meserve, “The Global Nuclear Safety Regime,” 104–5. 187 Findlay, Nuclear Energy Futures Part 1, 35. 188 Meserve, “The Global Nuclear Safety Regime,” 104–5. CHAPTER FOUR

1 2 3 4 5

Quoted in Bothwell, Nucleus, 22. Quoted in Buckley, Canada’s Early Nuclear Policy, 34. Fawcett, Nuclear Pursuits, 61. Bothwell, Nucleus, 171. This information was derived from telephone interviews with Colin Hunt, director, research and publications, Canadian Nuclear Association (5 May 2009 and 12 March 2010) and from McConnell, “Why Ontario Generates So Much Electricity from Nuclear Energy.” 6 Bothwell, Nucleus, xiv. Quebec was not happy about aecl’s alliance with Ontario Hydro, because it saw federal government intrusion into the provincial jurisdiction of electricity. When the deal went ahead, Hydro-Quebec’s representative on the aecl board resigned and was not replaced until 1963. Bothwell, Nucleus, 198. 7 Quoted in Finch, Exporting Danger, 27. 8 Quoted in Bothwell, Nucleus, 204.

Notes to pages 115–21

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

321

Fawcett, Nuclear Pursuits, 102. Bothwell, Nucleus, 295–6. Ibid., 440. McConnell, “Why Ontario Generates So Much Electricity from Nuclear Energy,” 68–71. Ontario, Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, A Race against Time. Ontario, Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning, The Report of the Royal Commission on Electric Power Planning (1980). Dewees, “The Future of Nuclear Power in a Restructured Electricity Market,” 153. Lawrence Solomon, “The Two Blows That Killed the Industry,” National Post, 1 August 2009. Jeremy Whitlock, “Why Was the Cost of Ontario’s Darlington Plant So High?” Ibid. See also Organization of candu Industries, “Debunking Darlington.” Accessed on 8 January 2010 at http://www.canducanada.ca/eng/darlington.html. The seven reactors were Bruce a1, a3, a4, and Pickering a1, a2, a3, and a4. Ontario Hydro, “Report to Management iipa/ssfi Evaluation Findings and Recommendations,” News Release, 13 August 1997. Paul Waldie and Chad Skelton, “Documents Itemize How Nuclear Plants Earned Low Rating,” Globe and Mail (15 August 1997), A4. Ontario Hydro, “iipa/ssfi Evaluation Findings and Recommendations.” Jackson and de la Mothe, “Nuclear Regulation in Transition,” 106–7. Mez and Doern, “Nuclear Energy in Germany and Canada,” 134. Quoted in Mark Nichols, “candu Flawed,” Maclean’s, 25 August 1997. Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Speech 98, 2 (8 February 1998). Standing Senate Committee on Energy, the Environment, and Natural Resources, Canada’s Nuclear Reactors (February 2000), 2. Bothwell, Nucleus, 146. For a good discussion of the restructuring of Ontario’s electricity system see Dewees, “Electricity Restructuring in the Provinces,” 71–98. Ontario Power Generation, “About opg” (2009). Accessed on 8 January 2009 at http://www.opg.com/about/. Ontario has traditionally exported large amounts of electricity. However, when a third of Ontario’s nuclear fleet was out of service between 1997 and 2003, the province was forced to import electricity. Today, Ontario now exports about 9 percent of the electricity it generates. National Energy Board, “Electricity Exports and Imports.”

322

Notes to pages 121–8

32 Canadian Nuclear Association, Nuclear Canada Yearbook 2009 33 Society of Professional Engineers and Associates, “spea’s History.” Accessed on 15 December 2009 at http://www.spea.ca/spea/speahistory. 34 Government of Ontario, “Remarks by Dalton McGuinty.” 35 Ontario Power Authority, Ontario’s Integrated Power System Plan. 36 Ontario, Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force, Tough Choices. 37 Ontario Power Authority, The Integrated Power System Plan for the Period 2008–2027. 38 Ibid. 39 Ontario Government, “Korean Companies Anchor Ontario’s Green Economy,” News Release, 21 January 2010. 40 Ontario Power Generation Review Committee, Transforming Ontario’s Power Generation Company, March 2004, 19–20. 41 opa, The Integrated Power System Plan for the Period 2008–2027. 42 opa, Ontario’s Integrated Power System Plan, 17. 43 opg Review Committee, Transforming Ontario’s Power Generation Company, 19–20. 44 Richard Brennan and John Spears, “Put $35B in Nuclear Power, Report Says,” Toronto Star, 10 December 2005. 45 Quoted in Robert Benzie, “Ontario to Build Reactors,” Toronto Star, 12 June 2006. 46 Quoted in Rob Ferguson, “Tory Vows to Fast-Track Nuke Plants,” Toronto Star, 23 September 2007. 47 Robert Benzie, “ndp Vows to Wean Ontario off Nuclear,” Toronto Star, 3 August 2011. 48 Ontario, Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan, (2010), 23–4. 49 John Spears, “Ontario Energy Plan Raises Tough Issues,” Toronto Star, 23 November 2010. 50 Quoted in John Spears, “Nuclear Industry in Ontario and Durham Region Faces ‘Critical Decade’ Says opg Chief Tom Mitchell,” Toronto Star, 12 December 2010. 51 Quoted in Spears, “Ontario Energy Plan Raises Tough Issues.” 52 Quoted in Spears, “Nuclear Industry in Ontario and Durham Region faces ‘Critical Decade.’” 53 Pickering Review Panel, Report of the Pickering “a” Review Panel, 3. 54 Ibid., 5. 55 Ibid., 2. 56 opg chairman William Farlinger, chief executive officer Ron Osborne, and chief operating officer Graham Brown all resigned. 57 opg Review Committee, Transforming Ontario’s Power Generation Company, 71.

Notes to pages 128–34

323

58 Ontario Ministry of Energy, “Ontario Government Restarts Pickering Unit to Increase Electricity Supply,” News Release, 7 July 2004. 59 Ontario Power Generation, “Ontario Power Generation not proceeding with the refurbishment of Pickering a Units 2 and 3,” News Release, 12 August 2005. 60 Bruce Power, Bruce a Refurbishment for Life Extension and Continued Project. 61 Ontario Ministry of Energy, “Government and Bruce Power Reach Agreement to Restart Nuclear Units,” News Release, 17 October 2005. 62 Ontario Ministry of Energy, “Government and Bruce Power Reach Agreement to Restart Nuclear Units,” News Release, 17 October 2005. 63 Quoted in Sandro Contenta, “High Stakes at Bruce Power,” Toronto Star, 8 December 2007. 64 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Canada.” (January 2010). 65 Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, The Bruce Power Refurbishment Agreement. 66 Quoted in Karen Howlett, “Auditor Blasts Costly Ontario Nuclear Deal,” Globe and Mail, 6 April 2007. 67 Quoted in Lauren Krugel, “TransCanada Expects Delay on Bruce Nuclear Power Plant Refurbishment,” Canadian Press, 4 November 2009. 68 Quoted in Rob Linke, “Another $200m for aecl,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 6 November 2009. 69 Ontario Power Authority, “Second Amending Agreement to the Bruce Power Refurbishment Implementation Agreement.” 70 Quoted in Krugel, “TransCanada Expects Delay.” 71 Ontario Power Generation, “Pickering b Refurbishment Study.” (2009). 72 Ontario Power Generation, “opg Moves to Planning Phase of Darlington Refurbishment,” Press Release, 16 February 2010. 73 Bruce Power, “Bruce Power to Focus on Additional Refurbishments at Bruce A and B,” News Release, 23 July 2009. 74 Ontario Ministry of Energy, “Ontario Takes Next Step to Ensure Clean, Affordable and Reliable Energy Supply for Generations to Come,” News Release, 7 March 2008. 75 Bryne Purchase, “Privatization Is a Moot Point – Ontario Holds aecl’s Fate,” Globe and Mail, 4 March 2009, A17. 76 opg Review Committee, Transforming Ontario’s Power Generation Company, 21. 77 Quoted in Paul Webster, “Will candu Do?” The Walrus, September 2006, 36. 78 Quoted in Murray Campbell, “Pressure Rising in Ontario’s Nuclear-Reactor Debate,” Globe and Mail, 6 January 2007. 79 Quoted in Karen Howlett and Murray Campbell, “Ottawa Favours Candu Reactors,” Globe and Mail, 26 December 2006.

324

Notes to pages 134–41

80 Quoted in Karen Howlett and Shawn McCarthy, “Ontario Puts Condition on Doing Business with aecl,” Globe and Mail, 29 February 2008. 81 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, “aecl, snc Ask for Billions for Nuke Plan,” Globe and Mail, 7 August 2008. 82 Quoted in Jonathan Jenkins, “Create, Preserve Canadian Jobs: Premier,” Kingston Whig-Standard, 8 April 2009. 83 Cadman, “The Canadian Nuclear Industry,” 8. 84 Quoted in Kate Jaimet, “French Firm Defends Reactor Cost Overruns,” Ottawa Citizen, 31 March 2009. 85 Quoted ibid. 86 Confidential interviews. 87 Quoted in Rob Ferguson, “Ontario Shelves Costly Nukes,” Toronto Star, 30 June 2009. 88 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy and Karen Howlett, “aecl’s Future in Doubt as Ontario Suspends Nuclear Power Plans,” Globe and Mail, 30 June 2009. 89 Tyler Hamilton, “$26b Cost Killed Nuclear Bid,” Toronto Star, 14 July 2009. 90 Quoted in Tyler Hamilton, “Province Still Mum on Cost of New Nuclear Plant,” Toronto Star, 17 July 2009. 91 Quoted ibid. 92 Confidential interviews. 93 Quoted in McCarthy and Howlett, “aecl’s Future in Doubt.” 94 Quoted ibid. 95 Quoted in Andy Frame, “Risky Political Strategies Could Turn Out the Lights,” Toronto Star, 15 July 2009. 96 Ontario Power Generation, Tom Mitchell, “Countdown to Ontario Power Generation’s New Build.” 97 Renata D’Aliesio, “Ontario Asks Ottawa to Consider Japan in Nuclear Plant Expansions,” Globe and Mail, 19 March 2011. 98 Joint Review Panel, Environmental Assessment Report, 163–4. 99 Joint Review Panel, Darlington New Nuclear Power Plant Project, 23–35, 159–61. 100 Ibid., i 101 Ibid, 11. 102 cnsc, How is a Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Review Conducted? 103 cnsc, Status of Pre-Licensing Vendor Design Reviews (22 August 2011). 104 Joint Review Panel, Darlington New Nuclear Power Plant Project, 11–12. 105 Bruce Power, “Bruce Power to Focus on Additional Refurbishments at Bruce a and b,” News Release, 23 July 2009. 106 Quoted in Tyler Hamilton, “Smitherman Rejects Nanticoke Nuclear Plant Plan,” Toronto Star, 31 October 2008. 107 Bruce Cheadle, “Taxpayers Backstop aecl Reactor Design as Key Ontario Bid Looms,” Canadian Press, 4 February 2009.

Notes to pages 142–9

325

108 Tyler Hamilton, “Slump Leaves Power to Spare,” Toronto Star, 26 May 2009. 109 Ontario, Ontario’s Long-Term Energy Plan. 110 Quoted in Tyler Hamilton, “Ottawa Seeks Bidders for Candu Business,” Toronto Star, 18 December 2009. 111 Quoted in Sheldon Alberts, “Feds Can Save Nuclear Project: McGuinty,” Canwest News Service (30 June 2009). 112 Quoted in Tyler Hamilton, “Union Backs Older ‘Emission-Free’ Candu 6,” Toronto Star, 8 October 2009. 113 Quoted ibid. 114 Telephone interview with Colin Hunt, director, research and publications, Canadian Nuclear Association, 5 May 2009. 115 Confidential interview with aecl official. 116 Interview with Armand Laferrere, former president of Areva Canada, Calgary, 3 April 2009. 117 Telephone interview with Colin Hunt, director, research and publications, Canadian Nuclear Association, 5 May 2009. 118 Organization of candu Industries, “Organization of candu Industries Applauds Progress with aecl Restructuring.” 119 Confidential interviews with senior aecl officials. 120 Confidential interviews. 121 Quoted in “Nuclear Power May Be Best Energy Option: McGuinty,” ctv News, 19 April 2006. 122 Support was highest in September 2008 and January 2009 at 67 percent, and lowest in February 2005 at 48 percent. Ipsos-Reid, “Annual Summer Tracking Report, September 2009,” 20. 123 Ibid., 36. 124 Innovative Research Group, “Canadian Nuclear Attitude Survey: Key Findings,” June 2011. 125 iaea, Power Reactor Information System, “Bruce-5,” “Bruce-6,” “Bruce-7,” and “Bruce-8.” 126 Bruce Power recently celebrated 15 million hours worked without an acute lost-time injury. See Bruce Power, “Bruce Power Celebrates Safety Record with $15,000 Donation to Children in Need,” News Release, 28 August 2009. CHAPTER FIVE

1 nb Power, The First Seventy Years: 1920–1990. 2 For a technical history of different proposals for a second unit at Point Lepreau see Craik, “History of Lepreau 2 since 1974.” 3 nb Power, Point Lepreau Generating Station.

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Notes to pages 149–56

4 candu, “Who Makes It?” Accessed on 28 October 2009 at http://www.candu canada.ca/eng/team.html. 5 Jack Keir, “Speaking Notes for Canadian Nuclear Association ,” Ottawa, 26 February 2009, 9–10. 6 The Campaign for a Nuclear Free New Brunswick, “About,” (2009). Accessed on 24 October 2009 at http://nuclearfreenb.org/about/. 7 New Brunswick, Energy, “The Energy Hub.” Accessed on 26 October 2009 at http://www.gnb.ca/0085/Hubdef-e.asp. 8 Owing to the drop in oil prices and the global economic recession, the Eider Rock project was abandoned by Irving Oil in August 2009. 9 New Brunswick, Energy and Utilities Board, “Home.” Accessed on 26 October 2009 at http://www.nbeub.ca/index.php/en/. 10 New Brunswick, Energy and Utilities Board, “Electricity.” Accessed on 26 October 2009 at http://www.nbeub.ca/index.php/en/electricity. 11 New Brunswick, Energy and Utilities Board, “Board Policies.” Accessed on 26 October 2009 at http://www.nbeub.ca/index.php/en/board-policies. 12 Quoted in “Lepreau Officials Take Hot Seat over Nuclear Power Plant,” Moncton Times & Transcript, 2 November 1999, a1. 13 Morrison Campbell, “Lepreau Nuclear Plant Is Lagging,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 4 November 1999, a1. 14 For its lifetime rating as of 1996, see iaea, Reactors Connected to the Grid (31 December 1996). For its 1999 rating, see “Nuclear Electricity Generation for December 1999,” Nucleonics Week, 10 February 2000. 15 These pro-refurbishment arguments were derived, in part, from information from nb Power, Powering the Future; J.R. Humphries, P.D. Thompson, et al., “Benefit-Cost Analysis in the Point Lepreau Refurbishment Planning Process”; Jeffrey, Point Lepreau Refurbishment Review, 2; and interview with Joe Howieson, Team candu project leader, aecl, Calgary, 2 June 2009. 16 These anti-refurbishment arguments were derived, in part, from information from New Brunswick, Board of Commissioner of Public Utilities, Decision in the Matter of an Application; and the Campaign for a Nuclear Free New Brunswick, “About” (2009). 17 nb Power, “nb Power & aecl Reach Agreement on Point Lepreau Refurbishment Assessment,” Press Release, 16 January 2001. 18 The proposal to the pub estimated that a refurbished reactor would operate with an 89 percent capacity factor. This is much higher than Point Lepreau’s 83 percent from 1983 to 2002. 19 New Brunswick, pub, Decision to Refurbish Its Generating Facility at Point Lepreau, 24 September 2002. 20 Jeffrey, Point Lepreau Refurbishment Review, 2.

Notes to pages 157–62

327

21 nb Power, “Statement from the President and ceo of nb Power, David Hay – Report on Point Lepreau,” Press Release, 10 April 2004. 22 nb Power, “Lepreau Analysis Process Ongoing,” Press Release, 24 November 2004. 23 aecl, “aecl Mobilizing Immediately on Lepreau Refurbishment,” News Release, 29 July 2009. 24 New Brunswick, Department of Energy, “Province to Proceed with Refurbishment of Point Lepreau,” News Release nb945, 29 July 2005. 25 Interview with Joe Howieson, Team candu project leader, aecl, Calgary, 2 June 2009. 26 Keir, “Speaking Notes for Canadian Nuclear Association,” 12. 27 New Brunswick, Office of the Premier, “Province Provides Support for Precision Nuclear Inc.,” News Release, 18 November 2006. Precision Metal Works Ltd., “Precision Nuclear Lands Multi-million Dollar Contract,” News Release, 18 November 2006. 28 Dave MacLean, “On Borrowed Time,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 17 January 2009. 29 New Brunswick, Department of Energy, “Province to Proceed with Refurbishment of Point Lepreau,” 29 July 2005. 30 New Brunswick, Office of the Premier, “Letter to the Right Honourable Stephen Harper,” 21 January 2009; and New Brunswick, Office of the Premier, “Letter to the Right Honourable Stephen Harper,” 15 September 2009. Accessed on 28 October 2009 at http://www.cbc.ca/news/pdf/letters-topm.pdf. 31 Quoted in Chris Morris, “Lepreau Costing Feds As Well – Harper,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 29 September 2009. 32 Quoted in Quentin Casey, “Dropping the Ball,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 15 September 2009. 33 Quoted ibid. 34 Editorial, “aecl Competence Must Be Addressed,” Moncton Times & Transcript, 29 September 2009. 35 Quoted in Casey, “Dropping the Ball.” 36 Quoted in Rob Linke, “Case Remains Strong,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 18 September 2009. 37 Quoted in Rob Linke, “Union Says Ottawa Should Cut a Deal on Lepreau Costs,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 7 October 2009. 38 Interview with Claire Lepage, deputy minister, Department of Energy, New Brunswick, Saint John, 2 June 2008. 39 New Brunswick, Office of the Premier, “Letter to the Right Honourable Stephen Harper,” 21 January 2009.

328

Notes to pages 162–5

40 Quoted in Jennifer Pritchett, “Keir Hears of More Lepreau Delays,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 29 March 2010. 41 Chris Morris, “aecl Gets $300m to Help Lepreau Refurbishment,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 5 March 2010. 42 Quoted in Rob Linke, “Another $200m for aecl,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 6 November 2009. 43 New Brunswick, Energy, “Team candu, nb to Conduct Feasibility Study for Second Nuclear Power Plant at Point Lepreau,” News Release, 1 August 2007. 44 Quoted in Daniel McHardie, “Energy Proceeding with Nuclear Reactor Feasibility Study Gives New Brunswick a Huge Head Start on Competing Provinces,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 2 August 2007, a1. 45 New Brunswick, Energy, “Government Receives Feasibility Study for Second Nuclear Reactor,” News Release (4 February 2008). Accessed on 29 October 2009 at http://www.gnb.ca/cnb/news/ene/2008e0134en.htm. 46 MZConsulting Inc., Viability Study for New Nuclear Facilities in New Brunswick. 47 New Brunswick, Energy, “Team candu nb to Conduct Feasibility Study for Second Nuclear Power Plant at Point Lepreau,” News Release, 1 August 2007. 48 Daniel McHardie, “Let the Power Pitch Begin,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 2 August 2007, a1. 49 Quoted in Daniel McHardie, “Development American Expert Says Timing Right to Exploit Nuclear Exports,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 27 July 2007, a1. 50 New Brunswick, Energy, “Team candu nb to Conduct Feasibility. 51 MZConsulting Inc., Viability Study for New Nuclear Facilities in New Brunswick, 3. 52 Keir, “Speaking Notes for Canadian Nuclear Association,” 23. 53 Interviews with Claire Lepage, deputy minister, Department of Energy, New Brunswick Government, and Stephen Waycott, director of electricity, Department of Energy, New Brunswick Government, 2 June 2008. 54 Interview with Armand Laferrere, president of Areva Canada, Calgary, 3 April 2009. 55 Quoted in “Second n.b. Reactor Threatened by aecl, Weak Economy,” cbc News, 27 July 2009. Accessed on 2 November 2009 at http://www.cbc.ca/ canada/new-brunswick/story/2009/07/27/nb-lepreau-aecl-reactor-350.html. 56 Confidential interview with aecl official. 57 Quoted in “Second n.b. Reactor Threatened.” 58 Quoted in Mary Moszynski, “Premier Wants Update on Lepreau Delay,” Moncton Times & Transcript, 18 September 2009.

Notes to pages 165–70

329

59 Avera, Letter of Intent between Her Majesty the Queen in right of the Province of New Brunswick as represented by the Minister of Energy and New Brunswick Power Nuclear Cooperation and Areva Inc. (8 July 2010). 60 Quoted in Nick Moore, “Lepreau 2 Nuclear Talks Get Serious,” Moncton Times & Transcript, 9 July 2010. 61 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, “New Brunswick Frustrates Ottawa’s Plan to Sell aecl,” Globe and Mail, 9 July 2010. 62 New Brunswick and Quebec, Memorandum of Understanding (29 October 2009). Accessed on 29 October 2009 at http://www.lowerratesnb.ca/ downloads/mou_en.pdf. 63 Stephen Llewellyn, “Keir says Hydro-Quebec to Inherit Lepreau Woes,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 5 November 2009. 64 Greg Weston, “Potential Power Deal Could Be ‘Win-Win’ for Provinces,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 27 October 2009. 65 Llewellyn, “Keir Says Hydro-Quebec to Inherit Lepreau Woes.” 66 Leger Marketing, “Réaction des Néo-Brunswickois. 67 Ibid. 68 Quoted in Chris Morris, “Pressure Mounting,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 27 October 2009. 69 Quoted ibid. 70 Shawn McCarthy, “n.b. Strikes New Hydro Deal to Prevent Quebec Stranglehold,” Globe and Mail, 19 January 2011. 71 Brett Bundale and Paul Gessell, “How It All Fell Apart,” Saint John TelegraphJournal, 25 March 2010. 72 Chris Morris, “Refit Uncertainty Played Role: Premier,” Saint John TelegraphJournal, 25 March 2010. 73 Janice Harvey, “Where Did All That Power Debt Come From?” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 31 March 2010. 74 “Thousands Protest nb Power Deal,” Moncton Times & Transcript, 22 March 2010. 75 Oliver Moore, “Attempted Sale of Utility Hurting Liberal Campaign, n.b. Voter Poll Suggests,” Globe and Mail, 21 September 2010. 76 Quoted in Rebecca Penty, “Alward to Shelve Areva Deal,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 29 September 2010. 77 Email correspondence with Stephen Waycott, director, electricity and nuclear energy, Department of Energy, New Brunswick, 31 August 2011. 70 Confidential interview with nb Power official. 70 For evidence of this internal tension see Rob Linke, “Refurb Meltdown.” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 26 September 2009, a1 80 “aecl Says n.b. Reactor Delay Now 16 Months,” cbc News, 26 September

330

81

82 83

84

85 86

Notes to pages 170–8

2009. Accessed on 3 November 2009 at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/newbrunswick/story/2009/09/26/nb-point-lepreau-aecl-delay-keir-928.html. Quoted in Bill Curry, Karen Howlett, and Anna Mehler Paperny, “Canada Puts Its Nuclear Pride on the Block,” Globe and Mail, 18 December 2009, a11. Quoted in Adam Huras, “aecl Sale Puts Lepreau Funding in Doubt,” Fredericton Daily Gleaner, 29 June 2011. Quoted in Daniel McHardie, “Making the Case for Nuclear French Reactor Firm Presses New Brunswick to Invest in Its Technology,” Saint John Telegraph-Journal, 5 July 2007. Interviews with Claire Lepage, deputy minister, Department of Energy, New Brunswick Government and Stephen Waycott, director of electricity, Department of Energy, New Brunswick Government, 2 June 2008. Interview with Claire Lepage, deputy minister, Department of Energy, New Brunswick Government, 2 June 2008. nb Power, “nb Power Partners with the Centre for Nuclear Energy Research,” Press Release, 5 February 2008. CHAPTER SIX

1 Canadian Nuclear Association, “Uranium Mining in Northern Saskatchewan” (2008), http://www.cna.ca. It should also be noted that the Cigar Lake mine flooded in October 2006 and again in August 2008, and it is not expected to start up production again until 2013. 2 Parsons and Barsi, “Uranium Mining in Northern Saskatchewan.” 3 Ibid. For a more critical look see Jim Harding, who argues that “the historical chronology of uranium mining in Saskatchewan reveals how public inquiries have served the interests of Crown and private uranium corporations. Harding, Canada’s Deadly Secret, 57. 4 Federal Environmental Assessment Review Agency, Eldorado Uranium Refinery. 5 Saskatoon and District Chamber of Commerce, The Cost of Saying “No” to Opportunity: Lessons from the Rejection of the Warman Uranium Refinery (May 2004). 6 Saskatoon and District Chamber of Commerce, The Cost of Saying “No” to Opportunity, 16. 7 Areva Canada, “Welcome to Areva Canada.” Accessed on 16 October 2009 at http://www.arevacanada.ca. 8 Areva Resources, “Operations.” Accessed on 16 October 2009 at http://www.arevaresources.com/operations/index.html.

Notes to pages 178–82

331

9 Quoted in Angela Hall, “Areva Expresses Interest in Saskatchewan Nuclear Potential,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 20 June 2008. 10 See the letter of agreement between Neil Collins, business manager and financial secretary for ibew Saskatchewan Local 2067 and Duncan Hawthorne, Bruce Power president. This letter can be accessed at http://www.cbc.ca/news/pdf/sk-ibew.pdf. 11 Government of Saskatchewan, Guidelines for Consultation with First Nations and Métis People. 12 See Dan Perrins, Future of Uranium, appendix d (151–61) and appendix e (162–3). 13 Email correspondence with Walter Keyes, president, Saskatchewan Branch, Canadian Nuclear Society, 24 September 2009. 14 Government of Saskatchewan and the University of Saskatchewan, The Canadian Neutron Source, appendix b,109–12. 15 A Slowpoke II research reactor is already operated by the Saskatchewan Research Council on the University of Saskatchewan campus. 16 Perrins, Future of Uranium, appendix a, 78–108. 17 The Coalition for a Green Clean Saskatchewan, “About us.” Accessed on 27 September 2009 from http://sites.google.com/site/cleangreensaskca/Home/ about-us-1. 18 Saskatchewan Environmental Society, “About Us.” Accessed on 16 October 2009 at http://www.environmentalsociety.ca/about/index.html. 19 Saskatchewan Environmental Society, Position on Nuclear Energy. 20 Inter-Church Uranium Committee Education Co-operative, “icucec: A History” (2008). Accessed on 16 October 2009 at http://www.icucec.org/icucechistory . 21 Inter-Church Uranium Committee Education Co-operative, “About Us,” (2008). Accessed on 16 October 2009 at http://www.icucec.org/category/ 1/1?page=1. 22 Mark Lemstra, Exposure to Radiation and Health Outcomes. The Canadian Nuclear Association released a rebuttal, written by Richard Osborne, of Lemstra’s report. This can be accessed at http://www.cna.ca/english/pdf/ Studies/July16-09-Dr-Osborne.pdf. 23 Government of Saskatchewan, Energy and Resources, “Our Mineral Resources,” (2009). Accessed on 1 October 2009 at http://www.er.gov.sk.ca. 24 James Wood, “Nuclear Files Consolidated under Boyd,” Saskatoon StarPhoenix, 30 May 2009. 25 Government of Saskatchewan, Enterprise Saskatchewan, “Agency Information,” (2009). Accessed on 1 October 2009 at http://www.enterprise saskatchewan.ca/AgencyInfo.

332

Notes to pages 182–9

26 Government of Saskatchewan, First Nations and Métis Relations, “Ministry Overview” (2009). Accessed on 1 October 2009 at http://www.fnmr.gov.sk.ca. 27 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, “Draft Speaking Notes for the Nuclear presentation,” Submission to the Uranium Development Partnership public consultation, Regina, 22 June 2009. This document can be obtained at http://www.saskuranium.ca 28 SaskPower, “Corporate Profile.” (2009). 29 SaskPower, Nuclear Power, 11–12. 30 “Saskatchewan Considers Its Nuclear Options,” World Nuclear News, 21 October 2008. 31 Interview with Ron Oberth, Team candu project leader, aecl, Calgary, 2 June 2009. 32 Cassandra Kyle, “Environment Group Questions Uranium Panel Objectivity,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 21 October 2008, a7. 33 udp, Capturing the Full Potential of the Uranium Value Chain in Saskatchewan. 34 Small reactors, which are designed for remote towns and industrial sites, generate between 10 and 300 mw of electricity. 35 Telephone interview with Armand Laferrere, former president, Areva Canada, 7 April 2009. 36 Angela Hall and Joanne Paulson, “Long-Awaited Uranium Report Released,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 4 April 2009. 37 Harding, Canada’s Deadly Secret, 157. 38 Telephone interview with Armand Laferrere, former president, Areva Canada, 7 April 2009. 39 Harding, “The Sask-Party Government’s Uranium Development Partnership (udp) Report.” 40 Bruce Power, Saskatchewan 2020. 41 SaskPower, Powering Saskatchewan’s Future. 42 Quoted in “Bruce Power Considers Feasibility of Nuclear in Saskatchewan,” World Nuclear News, 18 June 2008. 43 Bruce Power, Saskatchewan 2020, 4. 44 Ibid., 6. 45 Saskatchewan, udp, Capturing the Full Potential, 55. 46 Quoted in “Bruce Power Considers Feasibility of Nuclear in Saskatchewan.” 47 SaskPower, Powering a Sustainable Energy Future. 48 SaskPower, “Power Supply Gap.” 49 Email correspondence with Zewei Yu, senior policy analyst, Climate Change Unit, Ministry of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 11 October 2008. 50 Bruce Power, Saskatchewan 2020, 17.

Notes to pages 189–94

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51 Premier Brad Wall, Address to the Canadian Nuclear Association, Ottawa, 26 February 2009. 52 Karen Howlett, “With Two Proposed Reactors, Saskatchewan Joins Ontario in Nuclear Renaissance,” Globe and Mail,18 June 2008. 53 Australia, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy, 28. 54 Statistics Canada, “Snapshot on Uranium: Revival as a Viable Resource.” The Daily, 14 August 2007. Accessed on 22 July 2008 at http://www.statcan.ca/ Daily/English/070814/d070814a.htm. 55 Brenda Bouw, “For Cameco’s New ceo, Patience Is a Priority,” Globe and Mail, 23 June 2011. 56 Jason Warick, “Cameco Invests in ‘Next Generation of Enrichment Processing,’ ” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 21 June 2008. 57 Australia, Uranium Mining, Processing and Nuclear Energy, 4. 58 Ibid., 5. 59 Radio Australia, “Nuclear Not Answer to Australia’s Energy Needs: Rudd,” 27 June 2008. Accessed on 17 July 2008 from http://www.radioaustralia.net .au/news/stories/200806/s2287798.htm. 60 “Wall, Harper Talk Nuclear,” Regina Leader-Post, 21 June 2008. 61 Quoted in Howlett, “With Two Proposed Reactors.” 62 Jim Harding, and other Saskatchewan anti-nuclear critics, have often derided the ndp (under the previous governments of Tommy Douglas, Allan Blakeney, and Roy Romanow) as the “Nuclear Development Party.” 63 Quoted in Harding, Canada’s Deadly Secret, 225. 64 John Gormley, “ndp’s Nuclear Meltdown,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 3 April 2009. 65 For a detailed, albeit critical, look at the 1992 ndp motion see Harding, Canada’s Deadly Secret, 180–90. 66 Jason Warick, “Sask. Not Ready for Nuclear: ndp,” Saskatchewan News Network, 15 September 2009. 67 Editorial, “Anti-nukes Dragging ndp Back to Past,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 2 April 2009. 68 For a full description of the consultation process see Perrins, Future of Uranium, 23–4. 69 Government of Saskatchewan, “Public Consultation to Follow Release of Uranium Development Partnership Report,” News Release, 3 April 2009. Accessed on 6 April 2009 at http://www.gov.sk.ca. 70 http://www.saskuranium.ca. 71 Perrins, Future of Uranium, 19. 72 Ibid. 73 Saskatchewan, “Public Consultation to Follow.”

334

Notes to pages 194–200

74 Nineteen percent were opposed to all uranium mining and exploration, 41 percent were opposed to further expansion of mining and exploration, and 10 percent were opposed to expansion of mining and exploration with financial incentives (i.e., reduced royalty rates). Perrins, Future of Uranium, 83–7. 75 Sixty percent supported medical isotope production without nuclear fission, 30 percent supported medical isotope production generally, and 10 percent were opposed to medical isotope production generally. Perrins, Future of Uranium, 103. 76 Quoted in Hall, “Heated Opposition to Nuclear Option.” 77 Quoted in Angela Hall, “Heated Opposition to Nuclear Option,” Regina Leader-Post, 16 September 2009. 78 Quoted in Patrick White, “Public Cautious about Nuclear Power,” Globe and Mail, 16 September 2009, a10. 79 Murray Mandryk, “Boyd Must Heed Loud Message,” Regina Leader-Post, 16 September 2009. 80 Government of Saskatchewan, “Government Announces Strategic Direction on Uranium Development,” News Release, 17 December 2009. 81 Government of Saskatchewan, The Government’s Strategic Direction on Uranium Development, 3. 82 Saskatchewan, “Government Announces Strategic Direction on Uranium Development.” 83 Quoted in Angela Hall, “Saskatchewan Government Says No to Nuclear Power,” Regina Leader-Post, 18 December 2009. 84 Quoted ibid. 85 Quoted in Jeremy Warren, “Sask. Nuclear Reactor Depends on Gov’t Partner: Bruce Power,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 26 June 2009. 86 Interview with Steve Coupland, senior advisor – regulatory affairs, Bruce Power, Calgary, 20 October 2009. 87 SaskPower, Powering Saskatchewan’s Future, 14. 88 Saskatchewan, The Government’s Strategic Direction on Uranium Development, 3. 89 Murray Mandryk, “Nuking Nuclear Idea Good Call,” Regina Leader-Post, 18 December 2009. 90 Perrins, The Future of Uranium, 36. 91 Saskatchewan, The Government’s Strategic Direction on Uranium Development, 17. 92 Perrins, The Future of Uranium. 93 Quoted in Hall, “Saskatchewan Government Says No to Nuclear Power.” 94 Quoted ibid.

Notes to pages 200–5

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95 Cassandra Kyle, “Nuclear Future Possible,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 17 August 2010. 96 Brenda Bouw and Shawn McCarthy, “Focus Shifts from Potash to Uranium,” Globe and Mail, 17 November 2010. 97 James Wood, “Sask. Party Ready to Fire Up Its Nuclear Agenda,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 19 January 2011. 98 Quoted in Jeremy Warren, “Nuclear Hub for u of s,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 3 March 2011. 99 Jennifer Graham, “Saskatchewan Moves Ahead with Agenda despite Crisis,” Globe and Mail, 15 March 2011. 100 Government of Saskatchewan and the University of Saskatchewan, The Canadian Neutron Source, 14. 101 Urbain, Mazzuca, et al., “Impact of the Chalk River Reactor Shutdown,” 77. 102 Ibid., 73. 103 Quoted in Gloria Galloway, “Isotope Reactor Back in Business, but Shortage’s Impact May Last for Years,” Globe and Mail, 18 August 2010. 104 Nathwani and Wallace, “Towards a Robust National Strategy,” 130. 105 Natural Resources Canada, “Government of Canada Announces Expert Review Panel Members and Call for Expressions of Interest to Supply Isotopes in the Medium and Long Term,” News Release 2009/62, 19 June 2009. 106 Thad Harroun, “Why the Reactor Shutdown Is Really Bad News for Neutron Research,” Globe and Mail, 15 July 2009, a15. 107 Quoted in Patrick White, “Premier Accused of Subverting Nuclear Hearings,” Globe and Mail, 23 June 2009, a8. 108 Quoted in James Wood, “Sask. Makes Pitch for Isotope Reactor,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 5 August 2009. 109 Quoted in James Wood, “Isotope Reactor Could Cost $500m: Wall,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 10 July 2009. 110 Quoted in White, “Premier Accused of Subverting Nuclear Hearings.” 111 Uranium Development Partnership, Capturing the Full Potential, 87. 112 Perrins, Future of Uranium, 104. 113 Thank you to Anthony Waker, Dan Meneley, and Eleodor Nichita, all from the Faculty of Energy Systems and Nuclear Science at the University of Ontario Institute of Technology for their expertise on this matter. 114 Natural Resources Canada, Report of the Expert Review Panel on Medical Isotope Production, 32. 115 The nru in Canada (operational in 1957), the hfr in the Netherlands (operational in 1961), the br2 in Belgium (operational in 1961), osiris in France (operational in 1966), and safari-1 in South Africa (operational in 1965).

336

Notes to pages 205–13

116 nrcan, Report of the Expert Review Panel on Medical Isotope Production. 117 Canadian Nuclear Society, Planning a New Multi-purpose Research Reactor for Canada. 118 Canada, Government of Canada Response to the Report of the Expert Panel on Medical Isotope Production. 119 Natural Resources Canada, “Government Responds to Expert Review Panel on Medical Isotope Production, Invests in New Technology Solutions.” 120 Quoted in James Wood, “Isotope Reactor Decision Disappoints Province,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 1 April 2010. 121 Natural Resources Canada, “Government of Canada Investing in Isotope Innovation,” News Release, 24 January 2011. 122 Quoted in Wood, “Isotope Reactor Decision Disappoints Province.” 123 Government of Saskatchewan, “Wall Launches New Centre for Research in Nuclear Medicine and Materials Science at U of S,” News Release, 2 March 2011. 124 Quoted in Neil Petrich, “Energizing Nuclear Research in Saskatchewan,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 28 May 2011. 125 cnsc, cnsc-Saskatchewan Administrative Agreement for the Regulation of Health, Safety and the Environment. 126 Confidential interview with cnsc official. 127 Saskatchewan, “Saskatchewan Signs Co-operation Agreement with Major U.S. Research Lab,” Press Release (17 March 2009). 128 Telephone interview with Armand Laferrere, former president, Areva Canada, 7 April 2009. 129 Jeremy Warren, “Uranium Forums ‘sidetracked,’” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 15 June 2009. 130 Areva, “Supporting the Shift.” 131 Regina Leader-Post and Sigma Analytics, “Uranium Development and Nuclear Power Generation.” 132 Ibid. 133 Interview with Steve Coupland, senior advisor – regulatory affairs, Bruce Power, Calgary, 20 October 2009. 134 See Brett Dolter and Katherine Arbuthnott, “‘Any Risk is Unacceptable.’” 135 Tim Kiladze, “Resource-Rich Saskatchewan Gets Bumped Up,” Globe and Mail, 25 May 2011. 136 National Bank Financial Group, Saskatchewan Budget 2009. 137 “Sask. Growth Forecast to Lead Country,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 2 June 2011. 138 Saskatchewan, Bureau of Statistics, Saskatchewan Quarterly Population Report.

Notes to pages 215–20

337

CHAPTER SEVEN

1 For more information on this fantastic story see William Marsden, Stupid to the Last Drop, 2–41. 2 Interview with Guy Huntingford, director of media and public relations, Energy Alberta Corp, Calgary, 21 August 2009. 3 For a community’s views of eac’s outreach efforts see Trevor Thain (Whitecourt Mayor), “Nuclear Power in the Snowmobile Capital of Alberta.” Presentation to the 30th annual Canadian Nuclear Society conference, Calgary, 3 June 2009. 4 Interview with Guy Huntingford, director of media and public relations, Energy Alberta Corp., Calgary, 21 August 2009. 5 Wayne Henuset would remain as a consultant for Bruce Power and would receive a very large bonus when/if the cnsc awarded Bruce a “license to construct” in Alberta. 6 Bruce Power, “Bruce Power Signs Letter of Intent with Alberta Energy Corporation,” Press Release, 29 November 2007. 7 Bruce Power, “Bruce Power Alberta Narrows Focus to Whitemud Site,” Press Release, 23 March 2009. 8 Murray Elston, then president of the Canadian Nuclear Association, who was testifying with Henuset before the House of Commons Natural Resources Committee, felt compelled to clarify some of Henuset’s remarks. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Natural Resources, “Committee Evidence,” 16 May 2007. 9 Confidential interview. 10 Interview with Brenda Brochu, president of the Peace River Environmental Society, telephone, 14 September 2009, and http://www.peaceriverenviron mentalsociety.org. 11 aecl, “Canada’s Nuclear Opportunity.” 12 Telephone interview with Duane Pendergast, chair, Alberta Branch, Canadian Nuclear Society, 30 August 2009. 13 Citizens against Nuclear Development, made up largely of farmers surrounding the Lac Cardinal site, was a second group that emerged in the region. They have cooperated with pres. 14 Interview with Brenda Brochu, president of the Peace River Environmental Society, telephone, 14 September 2009, and http://www.peaceriverenvironmentalsociety.org. 15 Citizens Advocating the Use of Sustainable Energy, “Who We Are.” 16 Email correspondence with Elena Schacherl, chair of cause, 2 September

338

17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40

Notes to pages 220–5

2009, and interview with Brenda Brochu, president of the Peace River Environmental Society, telephone, 14 September 2009. Interview with Brenda Brochu, president of the Peace River Environmental Society, telephone, 14 September 2009. Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta, “About the Coalition.” (2009). Interview with Brenda Brochu, president of the Peace River Environmental Society, telephone, 14 September 2009. Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta, “About the Coalition.” Sierra Club, Prairie Chapter, Keep Alberta Nuclear Free. Bell and Weis, Greening the Grid. Alberta, “Province Releases Results of Nuclear Consultation,” News Release, 14 December 2009. Alberta Energy, “Electricity.” Alberta Environment, “Vision and Mission.” 2009. Alberta Electric System Operator, “About aeso.” Alberta Electric System Operator, aeso Long-Term Transmission Plan. 2009. Alberta, Launching Alberta’s Energy Future, 11. Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, “Outgrowing our Electricity System.” Alberta Electric System Operator, aeso Stakeholder Consultation. Alberta Electric System Operator, Northeast Alberta Load Forecast. Canada’s electricity exports amount to more than twice that of its imports. Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba are particularly large electricity exporters. National Energy Board, “Electricity Exports and Imports,” 15 December 2009. Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, “Electricity Statistics.” Quoted in “Alberta Producer Warns Province on Cusp of ‘Catastrophic’ Power Failure,” cbc News, 13 June 2008. Accessed 13 June 2008 at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/calgary/story/2008/06/13/cgy-alberta-power.html. Government ofAlberta, Department of Energy, “Outgrowing Our Electricity System.” Ted Morton, “We Don’t Need Two New North-South Power Lines,” Calgary Herald, 1 June 2011. Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, “Electricity Statistics.” Industrial Power Consumers Association of Alberta, Bill 50: Implications and Concerns. Quoted in Jason Fekete, “Leaks Raise Questions over Power Projects,” Calgary Herald, 17 May 2011. See, for example, Sid Marty, “Spin, Baby, Spin,” Alberta Views (July/August 2011): 36–40.

Notes to pages 226–35

339

41 Quoted in Hanneke Brooymans, “Pro-nuclear Stance Linked to Bill 50,” Edmonton Journal, 16 December 2009. 42 Simpson, Jaccard, and Rivers, Hot Air, 24. 43 Email correspondence with Zewei Yu, senior policy analyst, Climate Change Unit, Ministry of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 11 October 2008. 44 Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, “Electricity Statistics.” 45 Email correspondence with Zewei Yu, senior policy analyst, Climate Change Unit, Ministry of Environment, Government of Saskatchewan, 11 October 2008. 46 Simpson, Jaccard, and Rivers, Hot Air, 84. 47 mit, The Future of Nuclear Power, 7. 48 Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, “Natural Gas,” 2008. 49 Alberta Department of Energy, “Natural Gas,” 2011. 50 Hughes, “The Energy Sustainability Dilemma.” See also Asgarpour, “Energy for Oil Sands Production.” 51 Quoted in Andrew Nikiforuk, Tar Sands,15. 52 National Energy Board, Canada’s Oil Sands. 53 Bersak and Kadak, Integration of Nuclear Energy with Oil Sands Projects. 54 aecl, “Canada’s Nuclear Opportunity.” 55 See Oberth, Kuran, et al. “candu Nuclear Plant.” 56 neb, Canada’s Oil Sands. 57 Nikiforuk, Tar Sands, 4. 58 Andre, “Alberta Expert Panel on Nuclear Energy.” 59 Government of Alberta, “Expert Panel to Develop Comprehensive Research Paper on Nuclear Power,” News Release, 23 April 2008. Accessed 29 April 2008 at http://www.energy.alberta.ca. 60 Government of Alberta, Nuclear Power Expert Panel Order. 61 Andre, “Alberta Expert Panel on Nuclear Energy.” 62 Ibid. 63 Alberta Research Council and Idaho National Laboratory, The Nuclear Energy Option in Alberta. 64 Alberta, Launching Alberta’s Energy Future, 10. 65 cause, Nuclear Power in Alberta. 66 Before entering politics, Harvey Andre was a professor of chemical engineering at the University of Calgary, which meant that he had a scientific background, albeit not in the nuclear area. 67 Government of Alberta, Nuclear Power Expert Panel. 68 Quoted in Hanneke Brooymans, “Nuclear Energy Safe Alternative, Says Expert Panel,” Calgary Herald, 27 March 2009, a11.

340

Notes to pages 235–40

69 Quoted in Kerry Diotte, “Nuke Power Input Urged,” Edmonton Sun, 27 March 2009. 70 cause, Response to the Alberta Nuclear Panel Report. 71 cause, Nuclear Power in Alberta. 72 Bell and Weis, Greening the Grid. 73 Andre, “Alberta Expert Panel on Nuclear Energy.” 74 Government of Alberta, “Alberta Government Releases Nuclear Power Expert Panel Report: Process to Gather Views from Albertans Begins Next Month,” News Release, 26 March 2009, and Government of Alberta, Alberta Nuclear Consultation (April 2009). Accessed 28 April 2009 at http://www. energy.alberta.ca. 75 Government of Alberta, “Alberta Energy: Nuclear Power,” (9 July 2009). Accessed on 30 July 2009 at http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Electricity/1577.asp. 76 cause, Response to the Alberta Nuclear Panel Report. 77 Alberta, “Province Releases Results of Nuclear Consultation,” News Release, 14 December 2009. 78 Ibid. 79 Innovative Research Group Inc., Alberta Nuclear Consultation. 80 Ibid. 81 Confidential email received by the author. 82 The telephone survey showed 40 percent of those who could explain nuclear details to others were supportive of nuclear power, compared to 10 percent who were “not familiar” with nuclear power at all. In addition, 31 percent of those who follow electricity news “very closely” were supportive of nuclear power, compared to 15 percent of those who follow electricity “not closely at all.” 83 Quoted in Jason Fekete, “Alberta Would Welcome Private Nuclear Power,” Calgary Herald, 15 December 2009, a4. 84 Quoted ibid. 85 Elena Schacherl, “Alberta Might Go Nuclear despite Citizens’ Concerns,” Calgary Herald, 18 December 2009, a17. 86 Quoted in Fekete, “Alberta Would Welcome Private Nuclear Power,” a4. 87 Interview with Albert Cooper, lead, Alberta Affairs, Bruce Power, Calgary, 9 September 2009. 88 Alberta, Legislature, Hansard, 15 March 2011. 89 Deborah Yedlin, “Nuclear Troubles Benefit Gas Industry,” Calgary Herald, 16 March 2011. 90 Innovative Research Group, “Canadian Nuclear Attitude Survey” (June 2011).

Notes to pages 240–5

341

91 Nicki Thomas and Elise Stolte, “Bruce Power Withdraws Nuclear Plant Proposal,” Edmonton Journal, 13 December 2011. 92 Government of Alberta, Department of Energy, “Alberta Gas Reference Price History.” 93 See, for example, Caplan, Nuclear Power. 94 F. Michael Cleland, Seismic Shifts. 95 Interview with Albert Cooper, lead, Alberta Affairs, Bruce Power, Calgary, 9 September 2009. 96 Confidential interview with cnsc official. 97 Confidential interview. 98 Interview with Ron Oberth, Team candu project leader, aecl, Calgary, 2 June 2009. 99 Telephone interview with Duane Pendergast, chair, Alberta Branch, Canadian Nuclear Society, 30 August 2009. 100 Telephone interview with Brenda Brochu, president, Peace River Environmental Society, 14 September 2009. 101 I personally experienced this during a highly publicized debate with Helen Caldicott in Peace River in October 2009. During the intermission, I was accosted by members of the audience, clearly part of the anti-nuclear coalition, who were demanding how much the nuclear industry was paying me for my appearance. I carefully explained that I was an academic, not an employee of the nuclear industry, and that all I had received was having my expenses covered by the cns. I was doing the talk on my own time. It did not occur to me until much later that it was Caldicott who was the one on the paid speaking tour across Canada. 102 Quoted in Claudia Cattaneo, “Nuclear ‘Least Acceptable’ Oilsands Power Source: Klein,” National Post, 23 September 2005, fp5. 103 Dave Ebner, “Nuclear Pitch for Oil Sands,” Globe and Mail, 17 August 2006. 104 Klein and Tobin et al., A Vision for a Continental Energy Strategy. 105 Quoted in Jason Fekete and Tony Seskus, “Nuclear Option Divides Alberta,” Calgary Herald, 11 February 2007. 106 Diotte, “Nuke Power Input Urged.” 107 Interview with David Swann, Alberta Liberal leader, 28 September 2009. 108 Quoted in Jason Fekete, “Alberta Would Welcome Private Nuclear Power,” Calgary Herald, 15 December 2009. 109 Quoted in Jacquie Maynard, “Wildrose Alliance Leader Danielle Smith Tours Peace,” Peace River Record-Gazette, 26 July 2011. 110 Wayne Henuset, “Nuclear’s New Frontiers.” 111 Fekete and Seskus, “Nuclear Option Divides Alberta.”

342

Notes to pages 247–52 CHAPTER EIGHT

1 World Nuclear Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements.” 2 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium Markets” (September 2008). Accessed on 16 December 2009 at http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf22.html. 3 Cameco, “Cameco’s Markets,” Fact Sheet (July 2008). 4 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium in Canada.” 5 Cameco, 2008 Annual Financial Review, 63. 6 World Nuclear Association, “India, China, and npt.” 7 World Nuclear Association, “World Uranium Mining.” 8 wna, “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements.” 9 Andy Hoffman, “Cameco Seeks Deal in China,” Globe and Mail, 13 August 2009, B4. 10 China National Nuclear Corporation, “China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation.” 11 Quoted in World Nuclear News, “Australia Starts Shipping Uranium to China,” 21 November 2008. 12 World Nuclear News, “Areva into Chinese Fuel Supply,” 5 November 2010. 13 Brenda Bouw, “Cameco Taps Chinese Market with Long-Term Uranium Deal,” Globe and Mail, 25 November 2010. 14 World Nuclear Association, “Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan.” 15 Quoted in dfait, “Minister Day Announces Conclusion of Negotiations with Kazakhstan on Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” News Release 2009/272, 24 September 2009. 16 Cameco, 2008 Annual Financial Review, 55. 17 Quoted in dfait, “Conclusion of Negotiations with Kazakhstan.” 18 Confidential interview with aecl official. 19 World Nuclear News, “aecl Works on Argentine Candu Contract,” 30 July 2007. 20 For more information on the Atucha-2 case see Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports, 155–64. 21 aecl, “Another International Project for candu,” News Release, 25 August 2011. 22 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Argentina.” 23 aecl, “aecl Extends Agreement with Argentina for Expanded candu Nuclear Co-operation,” News Release, 21 September 2009. 24 “aecl Suppliers Worried about Future,” cbc News, 17 January 2011. 25 World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in China.” 26 iaea, Power Reactor Information System, “Qinshan 3–1” and “Qinshan 3–2.”

Notes to pages 252–6

343

27 wna, “Nuclear Power in China.” 28 Quoted in Geoffrey York, “China Sets Sights on Canadian Uranium Supply,” Globe and Mail, 16 November 2006, b12. 29 wna, “Nuclear Power in China.” 30 For a discussion of the Qinshan sale and the accompanying diplomatic initiatives, see Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports, 183–94. 31 Quoted in Frolic, “Re-engaging China,” 32. 32 Jiang, “Seeking a Strategic Vision for Canada-China Relations,” 892. 33 aecl, “aecl Signs Memorandum of Understanding with China and Argentina for Future Cooperation on candu Projects,” News Release, 4 September 2007. 34 aecl, “aecl Signs Agreement with China to Assess Use of Thorium Fuel in candu Reactors,” News Release, 14 July 2009. 35 Quoted in aecl, “Expert Panel Recommends candu as Best Choice for China’s Alternative Nuclear Fuel Program,” News Release, 18 December 2009. 36 For a history of Canada-Romanian nuclear relations see Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports, 151–5, 179–82, and 213–18. 37 SC EnergoNuclear s.a. (EnergoNuclear) is majority owned by snn (51 percent) and also includes Czech utility cez, France’s gdf-Suez, Italy’s Enel, Germany’s rwe Power, Spain’s Iberdrola, and steel giant ArcelorMittal. 38 aecl, “sc EnergoNuclear s.a. and Atomic Energy of Canada Limited Sign Contract,” News Release, 8 February 2010. 39 dfait, “International Trade: Minister Day Opens Doors for Canadian Business in Europe” (2009). Accessed on 12 December 2009 at http://www. international.gc.ca/commerce/visit-visite/europe-2009.aspx . 40 dfait, “Address by the Honourable Stockwell Day, Minister of International Trade and Minister for the Asia-Pacific Gateway, at Business Creating Business Trade Show,” Speeches 2009/33 (20 May 2009). 41 Confidential interview with aecl official. 42 Professional Reactor Operator Society, “Korea to Build Nuclear Research Reactor in Jordan,” 4 December 2009. Accessed on 12 December 2009 at http://www.nucpros.com/index.php?q=node/7519. 43 “uae Picks Korea as Nuclear Partner,” World Nuclear News, 29 December 2009. 44 iaea, Climate Change and Nuclear Power 2008, 16. 45 Quoted in Mark MacKinnon, “Abdullah Eyes Canadian Nuclear Reactor Deal,” Globe and Mail, 12 July 2007, a10. 46 World Nuclear News, “All Systems Go for Jordan’s First Nuclear Reactor,” 27 July 2010.

344

Notes to pages 256–61

47 Confidential interview with nuclear industry insider. 48 World Nuclear News, “Korean Consortium for Jordan’s First Reactor,” 7 December 2009. 49 For details on the history of the Canadian-Indian nuclear relationship see Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports, 87–101, 106–10, 117–28, 137–43, and 198–202. 50 United States, The White House, “Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh” (18 July 2005). 51 For example, soon after the us-India deal was announced, an anonymous Indian nuclear official told the British Broadcasting Corporation that “the truth is we were desperate. We have nuclear fuel to last only till the end of 2006. If this agreement had not come through we might have as well closed down our nuclear reactors and by extension our nuclear programme.” Quoted in M.V. Ramana, “The Indian Nuclear Industry: Status and Prospects,” 8n9. 52 United States, House of Representatives, International Relations Committee, R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, “Remarks as Prepared for the House International Relations Committee,” 8 September 2005. 53 Quoted in World Nuclear Association, “India, China & npt.” 54 Burns, “Remarks as Prepared for the House International Relations Committee.” 55 George Perkovich, “Faulty Promises,” 1–2. 56 Burns, “Remarks as Prepared for the House International Relations Committee.” 57 Cited in Hosur, “The Indo-us Civilian Nuclear Agreement,” 440. 58 Quoted in Raman, “The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal – One Year Later.” 59 Quoted in Ramana, “Feeding the Nuclear Fire,” 23. 60 Edward J. Markey and Ellen O. Tauscher, “Don’t Loosen Nuclear Rules for India,” New York Times,20 August 2008. 61 See Markey and Tauscher, “Don’t Loosen Nuclear Rules for India”; and Regehr, “An Exception to the Rule?” 13–17. 62 us, The White House, “Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.” 63 Gahlaut, “A Critical Look at the Opposition to the us-India Agreement,” 20. 64 Contrary to popular belief, India never legally violated any bi-lateral agreement with Canada when it detonated its “peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974. For a discussion of the legal aspects see Bratt, The Politics of candu Exports, 122–6.

Notes to pages 261–6

65 66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

80

81 82 83

84 85 86

345

Jaswant Singh, “Against Nuclear Apartheid.” Quoted in Hosur, “The Indo-us Civilian Nuclear Agreement,” 444. Quoted in Singh, “The India-Canada Civilian Nuclear Deal,” 242. iaea, “Agreement between the Government of India and the International Atomic Energy Agency.” iaea, “iaea Chief Addresses India Safeguards Agreement.” India, Ministry of External Affairs, “Statement by External Affairs Minister of India Shri Pranab Mukherjee on the Civil Nuclear Initiative,” Press Release (5 September 2009). Accessed on 16 December 2009 at http://meaindia.nic.in/pressbriefing/2008/09/05pb01.htm. Quoted in Campbell Clark, “Canada Changes Nuclear Policy to Accommodate India,” Globe and Mail, 2 August 2008, a7. Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, “pm Speaks about the Friendship between Canada and India,” 18 November 2009. Quoted in Campbell Clark, “India Is Booming, Trade with Canada Isn’t,” Globe and Mail, 22 August 2009, a4. Confidential interview with aecl official. Campbell Clark, “India is Booming.” Confidential interviews with Canadian nuclear industry officials. Quoted in World Nuclear News, “Canada and India Secure Nuclear Deal,” 1 December 2009. Prime Minister of Canada, “Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,” 27 June 2010. Accessed on 21 July 2011 at http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=3500. Email correspondence with Jan van Jaarsveld, senior policy officer, NonProliferation and Disarmament Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 21 July 2011. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of India for CoOperation in Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, 27 June 2010. Email Correspondence with Jan van Jaarsveld. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in India.” Production figures for 2008 came from World Nuclear Association, “World Uranium Mining” (November 2009). Demand figures for 2009 came from World Nuclear Association, “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements,” 1 December 2009. wna, “Nuclear Power in India.” Graeme Smith, “Canada-India Nuclear Pact Heightens Tensions,” Globe and Mail, 25 June 2010. Quoted in Reuters, “Cameco Upbeat on India Deal,” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 2 October 2009.

346

Notes to pages 266–71

87 World Nuclear News, “Russia Signs Fuel Supply Contract with India,” 11 February 2009. 88 World Nuclear News, “Areva Named for Indian Uranium Supply,” 16 December 2008. 89 International Commission, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, 100. 90 Quoted in Daniel Flitton, “Uranium Exports to India on Cards,” The Age, 16 December 2009. 91 Quoted in Rod Mcquirk, “Trade Minister Says Australia Can Proceed with Pact to Sell Uranium to Russia but Not India,” Associated Press, 19 March 2010. 92 “Australia’s Labor Party Backs Uranium Sales to India,” BBC News, 3 December 2011. 93 World Nuclear News, “Australia to Allow Uranium Exports to India,” 5 December 2011. 94 Quoted in “South Asian Tiger Has Economic Claws,” cbc News, 16 November 2009. 95 wna, “Nuclear Power in India.” 96 Confidential interviews with nuclear officials. 97 aecl, “l & t Signs mou with aecl for acr-1000 Reactors,” News Release, 21 January 2009. 98 Ramana, “The Indian Nuclear Industry,” 20. 99 Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, “India Courting Canada for Joint Ventures to Sell Nuclear Reactors,” Canadian Press, 18 July 2011. 100 Quoted in Blanchfield, “India Courting Canada.” 101 Upendra Joshi, “Investment in India’s Nuclear Future.” 102 aecl, “Heavy Water Reactors and Energy Sustainability.” Notes for an address by Hugh MacDiarmid (25 September 2009). 103 wna, “Nuclear Power in India.” 104 aecl, “Heavy Water Reactors and Energy Sustainability.” 105 Quoted in Mike Blanchfield, “India Courting Canada for Joint Ventures to Sell Nuclear Reactors,” Canadian Press, 18 July 2011. 106 aecl, “Heavy Water Reactors and Energy Sustainability.” 107 Ramana, “The Indian Nuclear Industry, 20. 108 Alexander, “Indo-Canadian Nuclear Opportunities,” 15. 109 Ryan Touhey, a specialist in the Canadian-Indian relationship, argues that the civilian nuclear co-operation agreement is only one, albeit a crucial, strategy to enhance the bilateral relationship. See Touhey, “A New Direction for the Canada-India Relationship.” 110 Anita Singh, “Stephen Harper’s India Policy,” 202. 111 Quoted in Campbell Clark, “Canada Changes Nuclear Policy to Accommodate India,” Globe and Mail, 2 August 2008, a7.

Notes to pages 271–82

347

112 Clark, “India is Booming.” 113 Quoted in World Nuclear News, “Canada and India Secure Nuclear Deal,” 1 December 2009. 114 Canada, Office of the Prime Minister, “Joint Statement by India-Canada on the Occasion of the Visit to India of Mr. Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada,” 17 November 2009. 115 For a discussion of the political impact of the Indo-Canadian population see Henry Yu, “Global Migrants,” 1024–5. 116 Touhey, “From Periphery to Priority,” 924. 117 John Ibbitson and Steven Chase, “Minister of the Crown, or Party Operative?” Globe and Mail, 5 March 2011. 118 On 26 September 2005, the Liberal government of Paul Martin issued a joint statement with India indicating a desire to negotiate a civilian nuclear co-operation agreement. This followed the precedent set by the United States earlier in the year and matched other countries, like France, Britain, and Russia, that also announced their intention to pursue civilian nuclear trade with India. 119 Singh, Stephen Harper’s India Policy. 120 Cited in Ryan Touhey, “Time to Get Over India’s Nuclear Bomb,” Toronto Star, 1 August 2008. 121 Quoted in Olivia Ward, “Canada Eager for Renewed Nuclear Trade with India,” Toronto Star, 17 November 2009. 122 Quoted in Raman, “The u.s.-India Nuclear Deal.” 123 Clark, “Canada Changes Nuclear Policy to Accommodate India.” 124 Quoted in Shawn McCarthy, “Nuclear Deal Would Allow aecl to Renew Indian Business Ties,” Globe and Mail, 14 November 2008, a15. 125 Quoted in Rick Westhead, “We Are India’s Nuclear ‘Friend,’ Harper Says,” Toronto Star, 18 November 2009. CHAPTER NINE

1 Cadman, “The Canadian Nuclear Industry,” 3. 2 For cross-provincial time sequence data, see Ipsos-Reid, “Annual Summer Tracking Report.” 3 For an analysis of the merchant model see Cadman, “The Canadian Nuclear Industry,” 12. 4 Darlene Superville, “Obama to Announce Loan Guarantee for Nuclear Plant,” Associated Press, 15 February 2010. 5 Duguay and Hoornweg, “Earning the Social License for Nuclear Operations.”

348

Notes to pages 284–95

6 For an evaluation of electricity privatization in Alberta see the “Short Circuit” series in the Calgary Herald, 7–11 January 2012. 7 Confidential interview with Alberta electricity industry representative. 8 Confidential interview with Saskatchewan government official. 9 Richard Florizone, “Capturing the Full Potential of the Uranium Value Chain.” 10 Johnson, Deliberative Democracy for the Future, 79. 11 Quoted ibid., 45. 12 Jeremy Warren, “Uranium Forums ‘Sidetracked,’” Saskatoon Star-Phoenix, 15 June 2009. 13 Interview with Steve Coupland, senior advisor – regulatory affairs, Bruce Power, Calgary, 20 October 2009. 14 In three separate polls conducted by Sigma Analytics for the Regina LeaderPost (November 2006, May 2008, and April 2009) support for a uranium refinery has ranged between 57.2 and 75 percent. Support for the construction of a nuclear power plant is lower still: it has ranged between 47.8 and 53.5 percent, while opposition has ranged between 30.5 and 33.5 percent. Regina Leader-Post and Sigma Analytics, “Uranium Development and Nuclear Power Generation,” Survey Report (April 2009). Accessed on 18 April 2009 at http://www.leaderpost.com/pdf/UraniumNuclearTracking ReportApril09.pdf. An October 2009 online poll by Insightrix Research found that almost 62 percent of respondents expressed support for the development of a nuclear reactor in Saskatchewan. In addition, 75 percent of respondents “felt the feedback at public hearings this summer represented a very vocal minority of nuclear opponents.” Jeremy Warren, “Opposition to Reactor Grows,” Regina Leader-Post, 21 October 2009. 15 Karen Howlett, “With Two Proposed Reactors, Saskatchewan Joins Ontario in Nuclear Renaissance,” Globe and Mail, 18 June 2008. 16 For example, Treasury Board President Lloyd Snelgrove said that nuclear power was “a natural fit” for the oil sands, but Environment Minister Rob Renner responded that he was sceptical and was concerned about the disposal of nuclear waste. Quoted in Jason Fekete and Tony Seskus, “Nuclear Option Divides Alberta,” Calgary Herald, 11 February 2007. 17 Wright and Hrobsky, “Presentation to the Canadian Nuclear Association.” 18 Innovative Research Group, “Canadian Nuclear Attitude Survey: Key Findings,” June 2011. 19 Dolter and Arbuthnott, “The Uranium Development Partnership Consultations.” 20 Rex Weyler, “Don’t Let the Greenpeace Pedigree Fool You,” 31 March 2011. Accessed on 3 September at

Notes to pages 295–304

21 22 23

24

25 26 27 28

349

http://www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/recent/Dont-let-the-Greenpeace-pedigree-fool-you/ Kimber and Gibbins, Finding Common Ground. Cadman, “The Canadian Nuclear Industry,” 15. Joint Review Panel, Darlington New Nuclear Power Plant Project, written submission from the Williams Treaties First Nations (21 March 2011). Accessed on 3 September 2011 at http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/48106/ 48106E.pdf. Martin, Exporting Disaster; Martin, The candu Syndrome; Martin, Nuclear Threat in the Eastern Mediterranean; and Sierra Club, Comments by NonGovernment Organizations. Finch, Exporting Danger; and McKay, Atomic Accomplice. Industry Canada, Competition Review Panel, Compete to Win (June 2008). Canada, Speech from the Throne (3 March 2010), 7–8. Email correspondence with Sam Tranum, 1 September 2011.

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1 Bibliography

INTERVIEWS

Roger Alexander, Calgary, 3 April 2009 Jean-Francois Beland, telephone, 29 September 2010 Keith Bradley, telephone, 29 October 2009; email, 15 March 2010 Brenda Brochu, telephone, 14 September 2009 Jason Cameron, telephone, 23 September 2009; email, 23 September 2009 Milt Caplan, email, 29 August 2011 Albert Cooper, Calgary, 10 September 2009 Steve Coupland, Calgary, 20 October 2009 Romney Duffey, Calgary, 2 June 2009 Trevor Findlay, email, 24 February 2010 Richard Florizone, Calgary, 2 June 2009 Justin Hannah, telephone, 27 October 2009; telephone, 16 December 2009 Joe Howieson, Calgary, 2 June 2009 Colin Hunt, telephone, 5 May 2009, 12 March 2010 Guy Huntingford, Calgary, 21 August 2009 Terry Jamieson, email, 23 October 2008 Walter Keyes, email, 24 September 2009 Hal Kivsle, Calgary, 14 May 2008 Armand Laferrere, telephone, 17 November 2008; Calgary, 3 April 2009; telephone, 7 April 2009; email, 11 January 2010 Claire Lepage, Saint John, 2 June 2008 David Marinacci, telephone, 29 October 2009; email, 22 December 2009 Ron Oberth, Calgary, 2 June 2009; Toronto, 26 February 2010 Duane Pendergast, email, 30 August 2009; telephone 31 August 2009 Norm Rubin, email, 26 November 2010; 29 November 2010

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1 Index

Abdullah II, King, 256 Aboriginals, 216, 233, 235, 237, 300; in Saskatchewan, 175–6, 178–9, 182, 187, 212, 300 Accenture, 65, 67, 71, 83 Adams, Michael, 49 advanced boiling water reactor, 72, 76 Advanced Cyclotron Systems Inc., 208 Advocacy Coalition Framework, 4–10, 13–17, 19, 25, 40, 217, 245, 290–1, 294, 297–305; in Alberta, 215–23; in Alberta, changes, 245–6; in Alberta, relationships, 241–3; Alberta’s winning coalitions, 243–5; in Canada, 19–50; within Canada, relationships 40–6; Canada’s winning coalitions, 10, 19, 46–50; differences between acfs in Canada, 16, 297–301; and external shocks, 5, 10, 291–3; and the international environment, 301–4; in New Brunswick, 150–3; New Brunswick, changes in the acf,

172–4; New Brunswick, relationships, 169–71; New Brunswick’s winning coalitions, 171–2; in Ontario, 120–3; Ontario, changes in the acf, 146–8; Ontario, relationships, 141–4; Ontario’s winning coalitions, 144–6; in Saskatchewan, 178–83; Saskatchewan, changes in the acf, 212–14; Saskatchewan, relationships, 208–10; Saskatchewan’s winning coalitions, 210–11; policy belief systems, 6–8, 10, 18–19, 24–37, 40–1, 291–6, 301; policy brokers, 7–8, 10, 15, 18–19, 37–9, 42, 122–3, 139, 153, 169, 181–3, 208, 222–3, 292–4, 295–8, 300–1, 303, 305; testing the acf with the Canadian nuclear sector, 290–7 Aecon Industrial-Nuclear, 121 aeg, 56 aem Milan of Edison, 88 Africa, 21, 92, 248, 270 Ahenakew, Ray, 183 Air Canada, 86

378

Index

Alberta, 3, 24, 40–1, 51, 69, 122, 147, 185, 188–9, 213, 277–94, 296–301, 304–5; and advocacy coalition framework, 215–23; and changes within acf, 245–6; and relationships within acf, 241–3; nuclear history, 215; and nuclear issues, 223–41; and winning coalition, 243–5 Alberta Electric System Operator, 215, 222–5 Alberta Energy, 222–3, 231, 243, 284 Alberta Environment, 222–3 Alberta Research Council, 68, 230 Alberta Utilities Commission, 222, 225, 284 Alexander, Neil, 83, 271 Algeria, 60–1, 102, 248 Allison, Graham, 99–100 Alward, David, 167–71 amec ncl, 130 American Nuclear Society, 22 Andre, Harvey, 229–30, 232, 236, 339n66 Angwin, Michael, 267 Ansaldo, 255 anti-nuclear coalition, ix, 6, 61, 71; in Alberta, 219–22, 227, 229, 231, 233–4, 237–9, 242–3, 245–6, 297–8, n341; in Canada, 6–8, 10, 13, 17, 19, 23–5, 28, 32–7, 40–2, 45–9, 277–9, 283, 286–7, 291–7, 300, 302, n310; in New Brunswick, 152, 168, 173; in Ontario, 116–17, 119, 122, 125–6, 139, 143, 145, 296; in Saskatchewan, 180–1, 183, 187, 193, 204, 209, 211–12, 214, 287–9, 294

ap1000 reactor, 75, 80, 133, 253 apr-1400 reactor, 255 Areva, 11, 22, 41,45, 47, 51, 58, 71–5, 77–8, 80–4, 89, 91–3, 178, 186, 190, 209–10, 212, 218–19, 248–9, 253, 256, 266, 268, 273, 281, 285, 295, 300; and New Brunswick, 164–6, 168–71, 173; and Ontario, 133–7, 140, 143–4, 147; and Team France, 94–5 Areva Canada, 64, 121, 136, 165, 170, 178, 183, 219, 247–8, 273 Argentina, 57, 60–1, 74, 97, 102, 260; and nuclear relations with Canada, 20, 37, 64, 85, 134, 151–2, 162, 251–4, 274, 304 Arkansas, 90 armz Uranium Holding Co., 76 Asea Brown Boveri, 75 Asia, 255, 259, 267 Asia Pacific, 249 Asia-Pacific Foundation, 271–2 Atco, 222 Athabasca Basin, 175, 196 Atlantic Canada, 153, 163, 167 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, 159 Atomenergomash, 76 AtomEnergoProm, 76 Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, 6, 8, 13, 16, 19–20, 22–5, 27, 32, 38–45, 47, 64, 72–3, 78, 94–5, 104, 113–16, 120–2, 130, 144, 150, 247, 250–6, 263, 267–8, 270, 272–4, 295, 297, 302, 320n; in Alberta, 215–16, 218–19, 231, 241–3, 245, 298–9; and candu Reactor Division, 11, 20, 79–80, 83, 86–7, 170, 291–2, 295, 304; and Chalk River

Index

Laboratories, 20, 27, 47, 79–80, 87, 114; and new build in New Brunswick, 163–5, 171–2; and new build in Ontario, 41, 133–8, 141, 143–4, 147, 284, 295; and refurbishment of Point Lepreau, 131, 152, 155–62, 166, 169–73, 295, 298; and refurbishments in Ontario, 131, 295; and Research and Technology Division, 79–80; and restructuring of, 11, 13, 20, 78–87, 92, 142–4, 147–8, 170, 252, 273, 291–2, 295, 303–4; in Saskatchewan, 47, 177, 184 Atomic Energy Control Board, 38–9, 118, 128, 154 AtomStroyExport, 76, 256, 268 Atucha-1, 251 Atucha-2, 251 Australia, 21, 69, 92, 107, 189, 203, 206, 221, 249–50, 274, 299; uranium exports, 91, 189–92; uranium exports to India, 266–7; uranium exports to China, 248–9 Australian Uranium Association, 267 Austria, 56 Ausubel, Jesse, 32 Avro Arrow, 27 Babcock & Wilcox, 22, 121, 130, 134, 150, 162, 314n35 Bangladesh, 98 Bayda Commission, 33, 176 bc Hydro, 22 Beaverlodge, 175 Belarus, 28, 34, 60–1, 102 Belgium, 54, 56, 89, 98, 207, 335n115

379

Bell Canada, 303 Berg, Peter, 37 Berger Inquiry, 176 Berlusconi, Silvio, 58 Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory, 75 Bharat Forge Limited, 268 Bharat Heavy Electrical Limited, 270 Bharatiya Janata Party, 261 bhp Billiton, 248 Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, 271 Binder, Michael, 45 biofuels, 32 Blair, Tony, 98 Blakeney, Alan, 176, 193, 333 Blind River, 21, 177, 190 Boiling Water Reactors, 57, 73–4, 267 Bothwell, Robert, 113–16, 120 Boyd, Bill, 182, 196–7, 200, 208 bp, 165 Bradley, Keith, ix, 73, 90, 318n138 Brazil, 57, 60–1, 74, 97, 102, 260, 266 British Columbia, 69, 225, 294 British Energy, 21, 88 British Nuclear Fuels Limited, 75 Brochu, Brenda, 218 Brockhouse, Bertram, 27 Brown, Graham, 322n Brown, Keith, 183 Brown, Morgan, x Bruce Power, 21–3, 25, 40, 120–2, 147, 284–5, 291, 296; in Alberta, 21, 147, 215–20, 223–4, 227–9, 237, 239–44, 246, 281, 284, 298, 301; attempted purchase of aecl, 84–5, 92; and Bruce a reactors, 21, 116–17, 121, 127, 147, 321n19;

380

Index

and Bruce a refurbishment, 86, 127, 129–31, 140, 147, 278–9, 281, 295; and Bruce b reactors, 21, 116–17, 121, 147; and Bruce b refurbishment, 131–2, 140, 147, 279; in New Brunswick, 158, 173; and new build in Ontario, 132–3, 140–1, 147; in Saskatchewan, 21, 147, 178, 183, 187–9, 197–8, 200, 209, 211, 278, 287, n331 Buenos Aires, 251 Bulgaria, 71, 78 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 52 Burger, Lorne, 136 Burns, Mike, 80 Burns, Nicholas, 258–9 Bush, George W., 58, 98, 257–9 Cadman, John, 59, 82, 299 Caldicott, Helen, 221, 231, 341n101 Calgary Herald, 244 Calgary, ix, 122, 216, 219–20, 222, 224–5, 232, 242, 245, 297–8 California, 69, 111, 225, 227 Calvert Cliffs, 89, 95 Calvert, Lorne, 193 Cameco, 21–2, 91–2, 130, 176–8, 183, 186, 190, 199, 204, 209–10, 212, 247–50, 265–6, 272–4, 302 Campaign for a Nuclear Free New Brunswick, 152, 173 Campaign for a Nuclear Phaseout, 33 Canada, ix, 3–5, 9–10, 13–14, 16, 54, 59, 65, 69, 72, 74, 78–87, 90–1, 96, 102–5, 108, 111–15, 135, 137, 141, 143–4, 146–7, 161, 175, 177–81, 186, 189–93, 201–3, 205, 207, 208, 213, 217–18, 220–1, 223, 225–7,

229–30, 233, 240, 247, 249–50, 256, 277–83, 287, 291–2, 294–5, 297–8, 300, 302–5; and advocacy coalition framework, 19–39, 40–6; nuclear cooperation with China, 20, 84–5, 134, 248–54, 274, 302, 318n138; nuclear cooperation with India, 15, 23, 36–7, 64, 247, 250, 257–74, 302, 304–5, 344n64, 346n109, 347n118; nuclear cooperation with Romania, 85, 134, 162, 251, 254–5, 274, 302; nuclear co-operation with South Korea, 20, 64, 86, 152, 160, 250–2, 255–6, 274; nuclear relations with Argentina, 20, 37, 64, 85, 134, 151–2, 162, 251–4, 274, 304; and winning coalitions, 46–50 Canada-India Business Council, 272 Canada-India Foundation, 272 Canadian Association of Nuclear Medicine, 201 Canadian Cancer Society, 202 Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation, 180, 203, 208–9, 282, 301 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 181 Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility, 6, 33 Canadian Energy Research Institute, 26, 242 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 39 Canadian Environmental Law Association, 122, 125, 139 Canadian General Electric, 114, 150, 162

Index

Canadian Institute for Neutron Scattering, 204 Canadian Institute of Mining, Metallurgy and Petroleum, 179 Canadian Labour Relations Board, 37 Canadian Light Source, 204, 208 Canadian Neutron Source, 180, 182, 195, 201–9, 213 Canadian Nuclear Association, 6, 22, 119, 122, 138, 143, 146, 189, 287, 299 Canadian Nuclear Energy Research Centre, 152, 171 Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, 8, 16, 25, 31, 38–9, 42–6, 94, 101, 106, 120, 131–2, 139–41, 155, 192, 209, 217, 223, 234, 241, 264, 279, 294, 298–9, 312n72, 337n5 Canadian Nuclear Society, 14, 22, 24, 206; Alberta Branch, x, 41, 219; New Brunswick Branch, 152; Ontario branches, 122; Saskatchewan Branch, 179 Canadian Nuclear Workers Council, 23, 25, 151 Canadian Pension Commission, 37 Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission, 37 candu, 19–23, 25–7, 30, 32, 37, 38, 64, 72–3, 78–9, 82–7, 92, 94, 100, 113, 115, 117, 119, 131, 134, 136, 142–3, 150–1, 154, 156–7, 159, 162, 164, 170, 219, 231, 250–7, 267–8, 274, 302; acr-1000, 45, 64, 78–80, 84, 133, 136, 138–41, 143, 162–4, 171, 216–17, 267–8, 274, 281, 295; candu-3, 47, 177, 184,

381

193, 212, 294; candu-6, 20, 64–5, 84, 116, 140, 143, 149, 152, 161–2, 171, 251–2, 267; Enhanced candu-6, 64–5, 79, 84–5, 87, 138–40, 143, 251, 254, 256, 267, 270, 274, 279, 281, 285, 295, 317n106 candu Energy, 20, 86–7, 250–2, 256, 273–4, 280, 285, 291, 303 candu Owners Group, 23, 120 Cansfield, Donna, 129 cap and trade, 26, 69 Caplan, Milt, ix carbon capture and storage, 62, 68, 209, 232–3 carbon tax, 26, 68–9 Carey, Miriam, ix Carlgren, Andres, 57 Carolina Power & Light, 90 Carter, Jimmy, 97 Cellucci, Paul, 225 Central Asia, 248 Central Europe, 56 Centre for International Governance and Innovation, 52, 59 Cernavoda reactors, 255 Chad, Karen, 208 Chalk River, ix, 20, 42, 44, 84, 111–12, 115, 120, 122, 166 Charest, Jean, 13, 166, 292 Chernobyl, 10, 24–5, 28, 30, 34, 57, 61–2, 65, 77, 104–6, 230, 234 Cheveldayoff, Ken, 184, 187–8 Chicago, 89, 111 Chile, 60–1 China, 65–6, 74, 97, 192, 259–60, 263; nuclear cooperation with Canada, 20, 84–5, 134, 248–54,

382

Index

274, 302; and nuclear revival 3, 53–6, 60, 77, 89, 94, 190, 304 China Guangong Nuclear Power Holding Company, 89, 248–9, 253 China National Nuclear Corporation, 248, 252–4 China North Nuclear Fuel Corporation, 254 China Nuclear International Uranium Corporation, 248 China Uranium Development Co., 248 Chrétien, Jean, 253, 255 Christian Democratic Party (Germany), 57 Chu, Steve, 59 Churchill Falls, 20, 87 cibc Capital Markets, 80 Cigar Lake, 175, 178, 330n1 cirus, 257–8, 263 Citigroup, 157 Citizens Advocating the Use of Sustainable Energy, 220–1, 229, 231, 235–9 Clement, Tony, 43 climate change, 3, 5, 8, 10, 17, 25–6, 36, 38, 42, 51, 65–9, 85, 108, 262, 274, 291–4, 296–7; in Alberta, 216, 221, 226–7; in New Brunswick, 153; in Ontario, 293; in Saskatchewan, 180, 182, 188–9, 191, 212 Clinton, Bill, 259 Clinton, Hilary, 259 Cluff Lake, 175; Board of Inquiry, 176 coal, 21, 26, 30–1, 42, 57–60, 62, 66–70, 85, 104, 107, 259, 284,

320n174; in Alberta, 16, 223–4, 226–7, 232–3, 235, 240, 298; in New Brunswick, 150, 155, 157, 163, 166; in Ontario, 114, 121, 123–4, 126, 140, 142, 145, 147; in Saskatchewan, 178, 182, 188–90, 200, 212, 298 Coalition for a Clean Green Saskatchewan, 180, 204 Coalition for a Nuclear Free Alberta, 33, 215, 221, 239 Cogema, 74, 144, 178 Cold War, 176 College of Dental Surgeons of Saskatchewan, 180 College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, 180, 204 Collins, Neil, 183, 331n10 Comisión Nacional de Energía Atómica, 251–2 Commonwealth, 264 Communist Party (India), 261 Compete to Win, 303 Competition Bureau, 167 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, 271 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 258, 260 Concern Enrgoatom, 76 Congress Party (India), 261 Connoly, Barbara, ix Conolley, Heather, ix Conservative Party of Canada, 142, 271–2, 303 Constellation Energy, 89, 95 consumer price index, 129 Convention on Nuclear Safety, 105 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 100–1

Index

Converdyn, 92 Cooper, Albert, 298 Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, 192 Coupland, Steve, 40 Coxworth, Ann, 181, 184, 200 Craik, Neil, ix Crean, Simon, 267 Crown Investments Corporation of Saskatchewan, 182 Daewoo, 256 Dalhousie University, 13 Darlington, 20, 37, 116–18, 121–2, 145, 279–82, 296; new build, 126, 129, 131–40, 142, 281, 300; refurbishment, 127, 131 David Suzuki Foundation, 221 Day, Stockwell, 249, 255, 264, 302 De la Mothe, John, 119 Dedicated Isotope Facility, 47, 206 Denmark, 56 Department of Atomic Energy (India), 264 Department of Energy, Mines, and Resources, 78 Department of External Affairs, 22 Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 17, 263–5, 273, 302 devil shift, 7, 40, 243, 295 Devine, Grant, 177, 193 Dexter, Darrell, 167 Diefenbaker, John, 120 Dinning, Jim, 243, 289 Doble, John, 49 Doern, Bruce, 17 Dongfang Boiler Group, 91 Doosan, 90

383

Doucett, Joe, 232 Douglas Point, 115–17 Douglas, Tommy, 333n62 Drouin, Richard, 202 Duhaime, Pierre, 85 Duke Energy, 90 Duke Engineering & Services, 74 Duncan, Dwight, 87, 130, 134 Durham Nuclear Awareness, 119, 122 Duty to Consult, 179, 195–6, 300 E.S. Fox, 130 Earle, Allan, 183 East Asia, 56, 59 East Germany, 57 East Pakistan, 98 Eastern Europe, 56, 77 Ecole Normale Supérieure ulm Lettres, 144 Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor, 76, 133 Edano, Yukio, 60 Edison, Thomas, 76 Edmonton, ix, 222, 224–5, 237 Edwards, Gordon, 32, 33, 220, 231, 235 Egypt, 60–1, 102 Eider Rock, 153, 326n8 El Baradei, Mohamed, 258, 262 Eldorado Nuclear, 21, 39, 86, 120, 176 Electrabel sa, 89 Electrical Safety Authority, 121 Électricité de France, 88–9, 95 electricity demand, 3, 10, 24, 57, 62, 65–8, 108, 165, 292; in Alberta, 223–6, 233; in New Brunswick, 156, 162–5; in Ontario, 121,

384

Index

123–7, 142, 291; in Saskatchewan 187–8 electricity market in Canada, 282–5; in Alberta, 222; in Ontario, 120–1 Elliot Lake, 112, 175 Embalse, 251, 254, 274 Emerson, David, 263, 271, 273 enbw, 88 Energoatom, 76 Energy Alberta Corporation, 215–20, 223, 228–9, 241–5, 294, 298 Energy Metals Limited, 248 Energy Probe, 33, 117, 145 energy security, 3, 10, 26, 63, 65–6, 69–71, 108, 154, 157, 173, 256, 262 enmax, 222, 284 Entergy, 90 Environment Canada, 37 Environmentalists for Nuclear Energy, 42 epcor, 222–3 Epp, Jake, 128 Estonia, 58 Eurodif, 92 Europe, 3, 5, 34, 56–9, 65, 69, 71, 73–4, 81, 88–9, 94–5, 98, 179, 255 European Union, 56, 71, 89, 94–5, 255, 319n169 Evans, Gareth, 266 Evolutionary Power Reactor, 72, 74, 80, 89, 94–5, 133, 140, 253 Exelon Corp, 89–90 Export Development Canada, 134, 255 Farlinger, William, 48, n322

Farrands, Christopher ix Fawcett, Ruth, 115 Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, 177 Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations, 179 Fedoruk, Sylvia, 177 Feiveson, Harold, 52 Fellowship for Reconciliation and Peace, 199 Ferguson, Martin, 249 Findlay, Trevor, ix, 63, 106 Finland, 61, 80 Fire and Ice, 49 First Nations Strategy on Consultation, Accommodation and Resource Revenue Sharing, 179 FirstEnergy, 90 Flannery, Tim, 42 Florida, 90, 216 Florida Progress Corporation, 90 Florizone, Richard, 183, 286 Fort McMurray, 221, 224, 228 Framatome, 74, 94 France, 54, 56–7, 63, 69, 72, 74, 84, 88–9, 93, 97, 105, 108, 186, 190, 192, 248, 302, 335n115, 347n118; Team France approach 94–5 Fredericton, 166, 168 Fredericton Peace Coalition, 152 Friends of the Earth, 33 Fukushima-Daiichi, 10, 13, 25, 28–31, 34, 56–62, 65, 85–6, 104, 139, 146, 169, 190, 200, 240, 280, 291–2 Future of Uranium, The, 194–6, 198–9 g20, 264 g-8, 97, 191

Index

Gahlaut, Seema, 261 Galbraith, Ross, 161 Ganguly, Chaitanyamoy, 265 Gavai, Shashishekhar, 268, 270 GdF-Suez, 89, 94–5 Gen III+ reactors, 60, 74–6, 84–5, 88, 143 Gen IV reactors, 88, 106 General Electric, 56, 73, 76, 84 General Electric-Hitachi, 11, 22, 45, 51, 72–3, 76, 78, 81, 92, 133, 143, 218, 268, 273 General Electric Hitachi Nuclear Energy Canada, 121 Gentilly-2, 13, 20; refurbishment of, 13, 86, 292 Geological Survey of Canada, 227 geothermal, 62, 68, 220, 233 Germany, 34, 54, 56–7, 74, 88, 97–8, 103, 105, 111, 207, 251, 299, 313n16 Gibbons, Jack, 125 Gillard, Julia, 267 Ginna, R.E., 89 Glace Bay, 120 Glaser, Alexander, 69 Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, 98, 191, 319n152 Global Nuclear Fuels, 76 global nuclear revival, 3; consequences of 93–108; explaining it 65–71; explaining the revival in Canada, 282–90; and international trade, 93–6; measuring it, 52–65; measuring it in Canada, 277–82; and nuclear proliferation 96–104; and nuclear safety 104–8; structural changes, 71–92 Godsoe, Peter, 128

385

Goldemberg, Jose 63, 96 Goodale, Ralph, 119 Goodhand, Peter, 202 Gordon Foundation, 221 Gormley, John, 193 Graham, Shawn, 158–61, 163–4, 166–8, 172, 285 Grand Prairie, 40, 220 Grandey, Jerry, 183–4, 250, 265 Gray, David, 225 Great Bear Lake, 112 Greece, 60–1, 65 Green Party (Germany), 57 greenhouse gases, 3, 25–6, 36, 49, 51, 55, 62–3, 66–9, 212; in Alberta, 216, 223, 226–7, 233, 239–40; in New Brunswick, 155, 157, 161, 163; in Ontario, 133; in Saskatchewan, 181, 188–9, 212, 293 Greening the Grid, 222, 236, 242 Greenpeace, 33–4, 41, 52, 122, 125–6, 139, 145, 183, 221, 279, 294–5 Greenspirit Strategies, 183 Grimshaw, 216–17 Hallick, Jim, 183 Hamilton, 122 Hankinson, Jim, 129 Hannah, Justin, ix Harding, Jim, 180–1, 187, 220–1 Hare Report, 32 Harper, Stephen, 83, 138, 160–1, 253, 263–4, 271, 273, 302–3 Harris, Mike, 121, 128, 296 Harvard, 99 Hawthorne, Duncan, 83, 127, 130, 183–4, 188, 217, 239, 331n10

386

Index

Hayden, Howard, 164 Health Canada, 38, 40 Heavy Water Reactors, 64, 73, 94, 112, 266–71 Heinone, Olli, 99 Hendry, Charles, 58 Henuset, Wayne, 216, 218, 337n5 Hiroshima, 112 Hitachi, 72, 76, 93, 318n136 Hitachi Canada, 121, 150, 162 Hopwood, Jerry, 254 Horwath, Andrea, 126 House of Commons, 43; Natural Resources Committee, 44, 337n8 Howard, John, 266 Howe, C.D., 112, 114 Howieson, Joe, 158 Hudak, Tim, 126 Hughes, David, 227 Hunt, Colin, ix, 143, 287 hydroelectricity, 13, 16, 20, 63, 67–8, 87, 104, 107, 114, 124–6, 145, 150, 153, 166, 168, 182, 189, 233, 284, 298, 320n174 Hydro One, 121 Hydro-Quebec, 13, 20, 23, 39, 320n6; aborted purchase of nb Power, 166–9 Idaho National Laboratory, 68, 209, 230–1 Illinois, 89 Independent Electrical System Operator, 121 India, 3, 74, 97–8, 102; nuclear cooperation with Canada, 15, 23, 36–7, 64, 247, 250, 257–74, 302, 304–5, 344n49, 346n109, 347n118; nuclear cooperation

with the United States, 257–63, 344n51; and nuclear revival, 54–6, 60, 65–6, 77, 91, 94, 104, 190, 192, 304, 313n10, 318n138; 1974 Nuclear Test, 23, 32, 93, 98, 104, 250, 257, 263–4, 271, 344n64; 1998 Nuclear Test, 257, 261, 264 Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, 56, 269 Indo-Canada Chamber of Commerce, 272 Indonesia, 60–1, 94, 102, 255 Industrial Power Consumers Association of Alberta, 225 Industry Canada, 38, 303 Ingold, Karen, 7–8 Inkai, 249 Innovation Saskatchewan, 182 Innovative Research Group, 236, 238–9 Institute of Nuclear Power Operators, 25, 105, 107–8 Institute on Governance, 45 Integrated Power System Plan, 123–6, 137, 140, 142, 278. Inter-Church Uranium Committee Educational Co-operative, 33, 181 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 68 International Atomic Energy Agency, 3; Additional Protocol 102–3; forecasting future of nuclear power 54–5; Integrated Safeguards 102–3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 151–2, 161, 171, 173, 178, 183, 212, 331n10 International Centre of Excellence for Retubing, 152

Index

International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, 103, 266 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 101 International Journal of Global Energy Issues, 56 International Nuclear Regulatory Association, 105 Ipsos Reid, 80, 82, 95, 141 Ipsos-Mori, 65 Iran, 28, 36, 57, 60–1, 63, 97–9, 102, 191, 260–1 Iraq, 63, 102, 261 Irving family, 167 Irving Oil, 165, 326n8 Israel, 36, 260, 266 Italy, 56, 58, 71, 88 Ivanco, Michael, 82, 142 Jackson, David, 119 James Bay, 20 Japan, 3, 29–30, 34, 54, 59–60, 65, 69–70, 72–5, 81, 88, 93, 97, 103, 105, 111, 139, 200, 207, 249–50, 266 Japan Steel Works, 90 Jeffrey, Robin, 156–7, 169 Jenkins-Smith, Hank, 4–5, 16 Johns, Harold, 177 Joint Federal Provincial Panel on Uranium Mining Development in Northern Saskatchewan, 176 Joint Review Panel, 139–40, 279, 282, 294 Jordan, 248, 255; nuclear cooperation with Canada, 85, 256, 274

387

Kahn, A.Q., 52, 98–9 Kan, Naoto, 59–60 Karat, Prakash, 261 Kazakhstan, 21, 60–1, 90–2, 102, 186, 189, 248–50, 266–8, 273, 302 KazAtomProm, 71, 90–2, 249–50 Keen, Linda, 8, 42–6, 141 Keir, Jack, 161–6, 168–70, 172 Kenney, Jason, 272 Kent Hills, 153 Kenya, 60–1, 102 Key Lake, 175–6, 178; Board of Inquiry, 176 Keyes, Walter, ix, 179 Kincardine, 216 Kinectrics, 121 Kintyre, 92 Klein, Ralph, 225, 243 Knelman, Fred, 32 Knight, Mel, 237–8, 244, 290 Korea Electric Power Corporation, 124 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. Ltd., 23, 94–5, 255–6 Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, 256 Kraftwerk Union, 57, 74, 251 Kroch, Irene, 36, 122 Kudankulam, 266 Kvisle, Hal, 130 Kyoto Protocol, 63, 69 L’Agence France Nucléaire International, 108 Lac Cardinal, 217–18, 337n13 Laferrere, Armand, x, 64, 136, 144, 165, 170, 178, 183, 186, 187, 219 Lake Ontario Waterkeeper, 139 Lakeview Generating Station, 123

388

Index

Lamarre, Patrick, 134, 162, 252 Larsen and Toubro, 91, 268 Leger Marketing, 167 Leith, David, 80 Leonard, Craig, 170 Lepage, Claire, 171 levelized unit electricity cost, 26, 64, 116, 136–7, 284, 291 Liberal Party: of Alberta, 242: of Canada, 253, 272, 347n118; of New Brunswick, 158, 167–8; of Ontario, 123, 126, 128, 142, 146; of Saskatchewan, 192 Libya, 98, 261 Liepert, Ron, 240 Light Water Reactors, 62, 64, 73, 75, 77–8, 97, 138, 165, 170, 253–4, 318n138 Lingenfelter, Dwain, 193 Linke, Rob, x Linsdell, Neil, 85 Litfin, Karen, 17 Lithuania, 58, 256 Lloydminster, 188, 221 Longwoods International, 244 Lord, Bernard, 158, 160, 169 Lorneville Mechanical Contractors, 150 Louisiana, 90 Lovelock, James, 41, 212 Lowry, Don, 223 Lunn, Gary, 42, 43, 134, 253 Luxat, John, 231 MacDiarmid, Hugh, 134, 138, 170, 219, 254, 267, 270 MacDonald, Flora, 251 Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, 176 Mackenzie, C.J., 111

Mackinnon, Don, 143 Mactaquac, 159 Mactaquac dam, 168 Major Projects Management Office, 39 Malaysia, 60–1, 98, 102 Mandryk, Murray, 196 Manhattan Project, 27, 32, 111–12 Manitoba, 13, 120, 234–5, 298, 338n32 Manley, John, 125, 128, 134 maple Reactors, 21–2, 41–3, 166, 202, 206–7, 256 Marinacci, David, x Maritime Energy Coalition, 173 Martin, David, 33, 46, 119, 122 Martin, Paul, 285, 347n118 Mason, Brian, 235 Mason, Thom, 202 Massachusetts, 90 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 29–30, 68, 227–8 Mathie, Edward, 183 McArthur River, 175, 178 McCarter, Jim, 130 McClellan, Ann, 253 McConnell, Lorne, 116 McGuinty, Dalton, 87, 123, 126, 128, 135, 138, 142, 145, 296 McLean Lake, 175, 178 McMaster, 22, 122, 231 McNamara, Pat, 40, 220 mds Nordion, 21–2, 41 medical isotopes, 13, 21–2, 24, 27, 38, 41–4, 79, 82, 161, 177, 180, 185, 192, 195, 197, 199, 201–9, 213, 285, 289, 304; Molybdenum99, 42, 201, 203, 205–6; nrcan Expert Review Panel on Medical

Index

Isotope Production, 202–5; Technetium-99m, 42, 201, 205–7 Meneley, Dan, x merchant model, 150, 162–3, 172, 281, 347n3 Merkel, Angela, 57 Meserve, Richard, 108 Métis Nation–Saskatchewan, 179 Mexico, 60–1, 73 Michigan, 90, 142 Miller, Steven, 55, 96, 102 Millet, Dwight, 198 Mississauga, 19 Mississippi, 90 Mitchell, Tom, 127, 138–9 Mitsubishi, 81, 91–3, 256, 314n35 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, 75 mobilization, 152 Molecular Imaging Center of Sherbrooke, 202 Monbiot, George, 30 Moncton Times & Transcript, 161 Mongolia, 21, 248, 250 Montreal, 13, 20, 33, 111, 113, 122, 166 Moore, Patrick, 41, 183, 212, 294–5 Morin, Sandra, 196, 204 Morrison, Robert, 46 Morton, Ted, 224 Mountain Equipment Co-Op, 221 Mueller, John, 100 Mukherjee, Shri Pranab, 262 Mulroney, Brian, 255 Multinational Design Evaluation Programme, 106 Musharraf, Pervez, 98 MZConsulting Inc., 78, 163–4 N.M. Rothschild and Sons, 80

389

Nagasaki, 112 Nanticoke, 131, 140–1, 147 National Bank Financial, 78 National Energy Board, 227–8 National Research Council, 111, 114 National Security Advisory Board, 272 natural gas, 21, 26, 32, 57–8, 60, 62, 66–71, 89, 94, 107, 121, 124–6, 128, 137, 145, 153, 155, 157, 163, 166, 182, 189–90, 206, 212–13, 249, 284, 297; in Alberta, 16, 220, 223–30, 232–3, 240–1, 281, 297–8, 301 Natural Resources Canada, 7, 38–40, 42–3, 119, 128, 134, 161, 253; Expert Review Panel on Medical Isotope Production, 202–5; restructuring of aecl, 78–87 nb Power, 16, 20, 23, 39, 150, 169, 171–2, 285, 297, 299; and aborted sale to Hydro-Quebec, 166–9; and new build project, 20, 163, 172, 281; and refurbishment project, 155–61, 169–72, 282, 295, 298 Netherlands, 56–7, 97–8 New Brunswick, 3, 11, 13, 16–17, 20, 24, 51, 64, 122, 192, 216, 234, 277–9, 281–3, 285–6, 293, 295–6, 298–300, 304–5; and Advocacy Coalition Framework 150–3, 172–4; and energy hub, 153, 162–3, 165, 172, 285; New Brunswick Energy, 153, 161, 169, 171; New Brunswick Environment, 153; nuclear history, 149;

390

Index

and nuclear issues, 154–69; and relationships within the acf, 169–71; and the winning coalition, 171–2 New Brunswick Board of Commissioners for Public Utilities, 151, 153, 155–7, 169 New Brunswick Energy and Utilities Board, 153 New Delhi, 264, 272 New Democratic Party: of Alberta, 235, 240, 244; of Ontario, 119, 126, 146, 296, 333n62; of Saskatchewan, 176–7, 181, 192–3, 196, 204, 213, 289 New England, 149, 162–3, 165, 167 New Jersey, 89–90 New York, 89–90, 111, 142, 162 New Zealand, 69 Newfoundland and Labrador, 87, 167, 294, 298 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, 104 Niagara Falls, 123 Niger, 248, 250 Nikiforuk, Andrew, 229 Nine Mile Point, 89 Nobel Prize, 27 Noda, Yoshihiko, 59–60 Norris, Rob, 201 North America, 56, 58–60, 65, 73, 95, 114, 117, 140, 195 North American Electric Reliability Corporation, 202 North Carolina, 90 North Korea, 28, 36, 63, 98–9, 102, 191, 260–1 Northwest Territories, 13, 112, 175–6

Nova Scotia, 13, 120, 167, 294, 320n174 nrg Energy, 90 nru Reactor, 20–2, 27, 42–5, 79, 112–13, 117, 201–3, 206–7 Nuclear Awareness Project, 36 Nuclear Energy Act, 38, Nuclear Energy: The Unforgiving Technology, 32 Nuclear Fuel Waste Act, 38–9 Nuclear Intelligence Weekly, 304 Nuclear Liability Act, 38, 235 Nuclear Management Company, 90 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 28, 36–8, 52, 96, 98, 102, 104, 257–8, 260–3, 266–7 Nuclear Power Corporation of India, 23, 267–9 Nuclear Power Demonstration reactor, 115, 117 Nuclear Power Expert Panel, 229–37, 243–4, 278, 289 Nuclear Power Institute of China, 254 nuclear proliferation, 11, 25, 28, 33, 36–7, 51–2, 62–3, 82, 93, 95–104, 108, 176, 180–1, 191, 207, 257–8, 260–6, 273, 302 Nuclear Research Universal reactor, 20–2, 27, 42–5, 79, 112–13, 117, 201–3, 206–7 Nuclear Research X-perimental reactor, 111–13, 117 nuclear safety, 11, 13, 26, 51–2, 61, 93, 100, 104–8, 119, 212, 230, 234, 257–8, 280–1, 292 Nuclear Safety and Control Act, 38–9 Nuclear Suppliers Group, 28, 36,

Index

52, 93, 99, 102, 104, 257, 273, 302; waiver for India, 104, 257, 261–3, 265–8, 273 nuclear terrorism, 99–101, 258 nuclear waste, 25, 30–3, 35–6, 38, 41, 48, 61–3, 74, 80, 96–7, 125, 176, 179, 187, 194, 203, 212, 232–4, 243, 254, 282, 292, 348n16; possibility of a permanent nuclear waste site in Saskatchewan, 182, 185–7, 197–8 Nuclear Waste Management Organization, 31, 39, 47, 234 Nucleoeléctrica Argentina Sociedad Anónima, 23, 251–3 O’Brien, Christopher, 207 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 202 Obama, Barack, 58, 69, 227, 259, 281 Oberth, Ron, 184 Obninsk reactor, 77 Ohio, 90, 142 oil, 26–7, 60–2, 66–71, 94, 107, 150, 153, 165–6, 173, 190, 206, 209, 213, 216, 219–20, 223, 225–30, 232, 249, 256, 259, 285, 298 Oil & Gas Royalty Review, 230 oil sands, 16, 188, 209, 215, 219, 223, 225–9, 243–6, 348n16 Oliver, Joe, 86–7 Olkiluoto-3, 61 Ontario, 3, 11, 13, 16, 19–21, 24, 26, 32–3, 40–1, 48, 51, 59, 64, 85, 87, 149, 156, 160, 165, 175, 177–8, 189–90, 192, 216, 220, 234, 246, 277–85, 291–6, 298–300, 303–5, 321n29; and Advocacy Coalition

391

Framework 120–3, 141–4, 146–8; Community Conservation Initiatives, 124; Electricity Conservation and Supply Task Force, 123; Energy Efficiency Act, 124; Home Energy Retrofit program, 124; Infrastructure Ontario, 133, 136–7; Ministry of Energy, 121–3, 145; Ministry of Environment, 123, 145; Ministry of Finance, 133, 145; nuclear history 111–19; nuclear issues, 123–41; and winning coalition, 144–6 Ontario Association of Nuclear Medicine, 207 Ontario Clean Air Alliance, 125, 145 Ontario Electricity Financial Corporation, 121 Ontario Energy Association, 123 Ontario Energy Board, 122–3, 126, 137 Ontario Hydro, 20, 23, 32, 48, 100, 114–16, 118–19, 121, 133, 144, 231, 284, 320n6 Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, 21, 85–6 Ontario Power Authority, 123 Ontario Power Generation, 16, 20–2, 39, 121–2, 125, 127, 131, 145, 148, 284, 296–7, 299; and new build project, 129, 132–140, 143, 284; and opg Review Committee, 124–5, 128, 278; and refurbishment projects, 127–9, 131, 278–9, 295 opal, 203 Operational Safety Review Teams, 105

392

Index

opr-1000, 94 Orchard, David, 204 Organization of candu Industries, 22–3, 83, 120, 139, 143–4, 147, 271, 279, 295 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 55, 66, 105; Nuclear Energy Agency, 55, 105 Osborne, Ron, 322n56 Ottawa, ix, 21, 78–9, 84–7, 111, 113, 116, 122, 134, 138, 141–2, 147–8, 162, 170–1, 207–8, 216, 252–3, 257, 264, 285, 292, 301–4 Pakistan, 23, 36–7, 60–1, 97–9, 102, 250, 257, 260, 266 Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, 23 Pal, Les, 15, 17, 23, 46, 48 Paradis, Christian, 207 Paris, 74, 164 Peace River, ix, 216–18, 220–1, 224–5, 240, 245, 283, 297–8, 301, 341n101 Peace River Environmental Society, 41, 218, 220 Pearson, Lester, 120 Pembina Institute, 6, 25, 33, 47, 122, 221–2, 231, 236, 242, 279 Pendergast, Duane, x Penly, 89 Penna, Jim, 204 Pennsylvania, 33, 75, 89–90, 142 Pereira, Ken, 154 Perkovich, George, 259 Perrins, Dan, 194–9, 209, 211, 288–9 Petitcodiac Riverkeeper, 152 Petro-Canada, 86

Philippines, 60–1, 102 Phillips, Gerry, 133 Pickering, 116, 122, 178 Pickering reactors, 20, 115–18, 121–2, 279, 283; and Pickering a refurbishment, 127–9, 154, 156, 278–9, 281, 295; and Pickering b refurbishment, 124–5, 129, 131, 278 Pinawa, 13, 120 Pittsburgh, 75 plutonium, 31, 35, 37, 63, 96–7, 100–1, 111, 232, 234, 257, 260, 273 Poelzer, Greg, x Point Lepreau, 13, 20, 149–70, 172–4, 278–81, 285; and a proposed second rector, 20, 153, 162–6, 168–9, 173–4, 278–9, 281, 285; and refurbishment, 13, 20, 37, 86, 131, 152–62, 165–70, 172–3, 269, 278–9, 281–2, 285, 292, 295, 298, 326nn15,16 Poland, 58, 60–1, 65 policy brokers, 7–8, 15, 295; in Alberta, 222–3, 294, 296, 298, 301; in Canada, 10, 18–19, 37–9, 42, 292–3, 296–7, 300–1, 303, 305; in New Brunswick, 153, 169; in Ontario, 122–3, 139; in Saskatchewan, 181–3, 208, 301 policy community, 5, 147, 182, 209, 217, 307n7 policy network, 5, 307n7 Pollution Probe, 173 Politics of candu Exports, The ix, 3 Port Hope, 21, 40, 112, 190, 220 Port Hope: Canada’s Nuclear Wasteland, 220

Index

Port Radium, 13, 112, 175 Porter Commission, 32, 116, 294 Pourbaix, Alex, 184 Power Workers’ Union, 21, 121–2, 144 Prairie Atoms, x Prairie Production Enterprise, 208 Pratt, Cranford, 45, 46 Prebble, Peter, 181 Precision Drilling, 216 Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors, 64, 73, 94, 266, 268, 271 Pressurized Water Reactors, 57, 73–7, 94, 253, 268 Prince Albert, 188 Prince Edward Island, 294 Princeton, 69 Progress Energy, 90 Progressive Conservative Party: Alberta, 224, 243–4, 289; Canada, 253; New Brunswick, 149, 158, 167–8; Ontario, 121, 126, 146; Saskatchewan, 177, 193 Project Ploughshares, 272 Pro-nuclear Coalition: in Alberta, 215–19, 237, 242–3, 245, 289, 296–7, 300; in Canada, 6–8, 18–32, 36, 41, 45–8, 187, 283, 288, 292–7, 300, 302–3, 305; in New Brunswick, 150–2, 169, 171, 173, 296, 300; in Ontario, 120–2, 126, 139, 143–5, 147, 293, 296, 300; in Saskatchewan, 178–80, 182–4, 193, 204, 209–10, 212–13, 289, 296, 300–1 pseg, 90 Public Agenda Foundation, 49 public consultation, 4, 8, 35, 47, 123, 126; in Alberta, 229–30,

393

236–9, 243–5; comparing the provinces, 9–10, 277, 280, 282–3, 286–90, 293–4, 296, 304; in Saskatchewan, 186–7, 194–9, 204, 206, 209–12 Putin, Vladimir, 302 Qinshan reactors, 252–4 Quebec, 13, 20, 24, 64, 114, 122, 149, 152–3, 163, 166–8, 189, 292, 298 Queen’s Park, 130, 142, 147 Rabbit Lake, 175–6, 192 Rae, Bob, 296 Raitt, Lisa, 79–80, 161, 205 Raps reactors, 257 rcm Technologies, 121 Redford, Alison, 224–5 Regher, Ernie, 272 Regina, ix, 194 Regina Leader-Post, 196, 210, 348n14 Renner, Rob, 243, 348n16 Richardson, Amy 49 Rio Tinto, 91 Ritch, John, 28, 96 Rixin, Kang, 255 rmbk reactor, 77 Romania, 20, 74; nuclear cooperation with Canada, 85, 134, 162, 251, 254–5, 274, 302, 343n36 Romanow, Roy, 177, 193, 333n62 Rosatom, 11, 51, 72, 76–8, 92–3, 95, 253, 268, 273; vver-1000 reactors, 77, 253, 256, 266 Royal University Hospital Foundation, 208 Rubin, Norm, 33 Rudd, Kevin, 191, 266–7 Russia, 28, 34, 54, 56–7, 71–2, 74,

394

Index

76–7, 90–1, 93, 97, 101, 192, 249, 252, 266–7, 302, 304, 320n174, 347n118 Rymhs, Adele Boucher, 239 Sabatier, Paul, 4–5, 7, 11, 16 Sagan, Scott, 55, 96, 102 Saint John, ix, 122, 149, 151–3, 164–5, 280, 282–3 Samsung, 124 Sandvik, 91 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 58, 83, 144, 302 Saskatchewan, 3, 9–11, 16, 21, 24, 33, 47, 51, 120, 122, 147, 220, 273, 277–83, 285–94, 296, 298–301, 304–5, 330n3, 348n14; and Advocacy Coalition Framework, 178–83, 208–10, 212–14; Department of the Environment, 182; Department of First Nations and Métis Relations, 182; Enterprise Saskatchewan, 182; Ministry of Advanced Education, Employment, and Labour, 182; Ministry of Health, 182; Northern Saskatchewan, 33, 175–6, 179, 182, 187, 189, 193, 208, 212, 273; nuclear history, 175–7; and nuclear issues, 183–208; Saskatchewan Energy, 181–3; and winning coalition, 210–11 Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities, 182, 184 Saskatchewan Cancer Agency, 180, 204 Saskatchewan Chamber of Commerce, 183, 200, 212, 299 Saskatchewan Environmental Society, 181, 184, 196

Saskatchewan Health Research Foundation, 180, 204 Saskatchewan Indian Institute of Technology, 183 Saskatchewan Medical Association, 180, 204, 214 Saskatchewan Mining Association, 22 Saskatchewan Mining Development Corporation, 21, 192 Saskatchewan Party, 192–3, 210–11, 213, 289 Saskatchewan Public Service, 194 Saskatchewan Registered Nurses Association, 180, 204 Saskatchewan Research Council, 182, 331n15 Saskatchewan Union of Nurses, 181, 214 Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association, 183 Saskatoon, ix, 21, 176, 184, 193–4, 200, 208, 220 Saskatoon and District Chamber of Commerce, 177, 199 SaskPower, 16, 178, 182–3, 187, 189, 195, 197–8, 201, 285, 297, 299 Saudi Arabia, 60–1, 102, 226 sc EnergoNuclear s.a., 255, 343n37 Scajola, Claudio, 71 Schacherl, Elena, 220, 239 Schindler, David, 42, 212 Schneider, Mycle, 52 Schröder, Gerhard, 57 Senate, 43, 119 Sfarsteel, 74, 90 Shanghai Electric Group, 91 Sheridan Park, 19, 120, 122 Siemens, 56, 74, 77–8, 130

Index

Sierra Club, 6, 25, 33, 46, 122, 125, 143, 145, 152, 221, 279, 302 Sigma Analytics, 210, 348n14 Singers of the Sacred Web, 199 Singh, Anita, 172 Singh, Jaswant, 161 Singh, Manmohan, 56, 257, 260, 264, 271, 313n10 Sinha, Yashwant, 261 Skogstad, Grace, 17 Slovakia, 56, 65, 71 Slowpoke reactor, 177, 215, 331n15 Smith, Danielle, 244 Smith, Murray, 225 Smitherman, George, 136–7, 141 snc-Lavalin, 121, 130, 134, 150, 162, 252, 255; purchase of aecl, 11, 20, 72, 84–7, 142–3, 170, 251, 291–2, 295, 303–4 Snelgrove, Lloyd, 243 Social Democratic Party (Germany), 57 Societatea Nationala Nuclearelectrica S.A., 23, 255, 343n37 Society of Energy Professionals, 21 Socolow, Robert, 69 solar power, 31–2, 36, 57–8, 62, 67–8, 124–6, 166, 188, 220, 233, 284 Solomon, Lawrence, 117 South Africa, 37, 60–1, 91, 98, 102, 260, 266, 335n115 South America, 3 South Carolina, 90 South Korea, 37, 54, 59, 74, 101–2, 256, 260, 304; nuclear cooperation with Canada, 20, 64, 86, 152, 160, 250–2, 255–6, 274; nuclear

395

cooperation with United Arab Emirates, 94, 255 Southern Co., 281 Sovacool, Benjamin, x Soviet Union, 28, 57, 77 Spain, 54, 56, 105, 343n37 Special Drawing Rights, 269 Squassoni, Sharon, 90, 96 Standard and Poor, 60, 213 Stelmach, Ed, 222, 224, 230, 243–4, 289–90 Stensil, Shawn Patrick, 33–4, 52, 122, 294 Stewart, Lyle, 184 Subrahmanyam, K., 272 Sulzer Pumps, 121 Sumitomo, 91 Sunny Corner Enterprises Inc., 150 Swartout, Hank, 216 Sweden, 54, 56, 63, 102, 105, 268 Switzerland, 8, 57 Syria, 99 Taiwan, 60 Talisman International, 43 Team candu, 133–5, 143, 150, 158, 162–5, 169–74, 278, 281, 285, 300 tenex, 76, 92 Teneycke, Kory, 83 Texas, 90 Thailand, 60–1, 102 Third Qinshan Nuclear Power Company Ltd, 23, 254 thorium, 27, 254, 270, 274 Three Mile Island, 10, 24, 28, 30, 33–4, 61–2, 65, 104–6, 234 Tokyo, 29, 76 Tomlin, Brian, 17

396

Index

Toronto, ix, 21, 116, 122, 124, 141, 216, 264, 272, 299 Toronto Environmental Alliance, 125 Toronto Star, 137 Tory, John, 126 Toshiba, 75–7, 90, 92–3, 314n35 Total, 89, 94 Touhey, Ryan, 272, 346n trade protectionism, 11 TransAlta, 222, 284 TransCanada Corp, 21, 85, 130, 184, 298 Transport Canada, 38 Tranum, Sam, 304 Treasury Board in Canada, 131, 162; in Alberta, 243, 348n14 Trinidad & Tobago, 264 triumf, 208 Trudeau, Pierre, 120 Turcotte, Eric, 202 Turkey, 60–1, 85 tvel, 76, 92, 266 Ukraine, 28, 34, 54, 71, 101, 302 Union of Ontario Indians, 300 United Arab Emirates, 60–1, 89, 94, 102, 255 United Kingdom, 27, 54, 97, 105, 190, 207, 250, 256 United Nations, 28, 65–6, 251, 262 United Progressive Alliance, 261 United States, 16, 20–1, 27, 36–7, 49, 54, 69, 72, 74–6, 89, 95, 97, 101, 104–5, 107, 111, 114, 116, 121, 140, 178, 186, 190, 192, 207, 209, 225, 227, 240, 250, 257, 299, 319n152, 347n18; electricity imports from Canada, 149, 153,

162–3, 167, 173, 223, 225, 247, 281; nuclear cooperation with the United States, 257–63; nuclear revival in, 3, 58–9, 63, 65, 281 Université de Montréal, 111 University of Alberta, 42, 208, 215, 232 University of British Columbia, 208 University of Calgary, 232 University of Connecticut, 164 University of New Brunswick, 152 University of Ontario Institute of Technology, 122 University of Regina, 180, 183, 196 University of Saskatchewan, 177, 179, 183, 196, 208; and Canadian Centre for Nuclear Innovation, 180, 203, 208–9, 282, 301; and Canadian Neutron Source, 203, 205, 209, 214 University of Sherbrooke, 208 University of Toronto, 116 uranium, 4, 9, 11, 13–14, 16, 21–4, 26–7, 31, 33, 35–6, 39, 51, 67, 70, 75–6, 101, 107, 111–12, 115, 120, 152, 157, 175–82, 184–6, 189, 191–201, 203, 207, 209–10, 212, 213, 220, 231–2, 234, 254, 256–7, 260–2, 266, 270, 273–4, 280, 282, 285, 289, 296, 300–4, 330n3, 334n74; and enrichment, 34, 36–7, 62–3, 74, 76, 92, 96–8, 101, 112, 140, 183, 185–6, 189–91, 195, 197, 207, 260, 262, 265, 268, 273; and increased demand of, 70, 93, 189–91, 247–50, 253, 265, 267–8; and proliferation, 11, 25, 28, 33, 36–7, 51–2, 62–3, 82, 93, 95–104,

Index

108, 176, 180–1, 191, 207, 257–8, 260–6, 273, 302; and reprocessing, 31, 34, 36, 62–3, 74, 96–8,185–6, 233, 262, 264–5, 319n152; and uranium industry, 51, 71, 73–4, 91–2, 144, 175–9 Uranium City, 175 Uranium Development Partnership, 181–8, 190, 192, 197–200, 204, 208–13, 278, 282, 285–6, 289, 293; and public consultation, 194–6, 204–5, 209–12, 287, 294 Urbain, Jean-Luc, 201 urenco, 74, 92 us Enrichment Corporation, 92 us-India Business Council, 259 us-India Civil Co-operation Initiative, 258 uss Nautilus, 75 Utilities Consumer Advocate Office, 225 Valinox Nucleaire, 91 Vanier College, 33 Varone, Frédéric, 8 Venezuela, 60–1, 102 Vermont, 90 Versant Partners, 85 Vietnam, 94, 102, 255 Voutsinos, Cosmos, x Vredenburg, Harrie, 232 Wall, Brad, 186–7, 189–90, 192, 196–200, 204, 208, 210–11, 285, 289–90, 301 Warman Refinery, 176–7, 181, 193, 212, 294 Weathermakers, The, 42

397

West Germany, 56, 251 Western Climate Initiative, 69 Western Europe, 56 Westinghouse, 45, 56, 73–5, 80, 84, 92–4, 133–6, 140, 143, 218, 253, 268, 273 Westinghouse, George, 75 Westinghouse-Toshiba, 11, 51, 72, 75, 78, 81 Weston, Greg, 87 Weyler, Rex, 295 Whitecourt, 216, 221 Whitemud, 218, 240 Whiteshell, 13, 120 Whitlock, Jeremy, x, 49, 64, 100, 104, 118 WikiLeaks, 225 Wildrose Party, 224, 244 Williams, Danny, 167 Williams Treaties First Nations, 300 Willow Park Wines and Spirits, 216 Wilson, Red, 303 wind power, 31–2, 36, 57–8, 62, 67–8, 124–6, 142, 145, 153, 166, 182, 188–9, 220, 224–5, 232–3, 284, 301 winning coalitions, 14, 46; in Alberta, 243–5; in Canada, 10, 19, 46–50; in New Brunswick, 171–2; in Ontario 144–6; in Saskatchewan, 210–11 Winnipeg, 13, 208 Wolsong reactors, 64, 86, 160, 256 Wonder, Edward, 46 Woo, Yuan Pao, 271 World Association of Nuclear Operators, 25, 105–8, 234, 302 World Bank, 55, 63, 66

398

World Nuclear Association, 22, 28, 60, 96, 247 World Trade Organization, 93 World War II, 32, 75, 111–12, 114, 176

Index

Yucca Mountain, 62 Zedillo Commission, 103, 106 Zero Energy Experimental Pile reactor, 111–12, 117