Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Transatlantic Perspectives on Multilevel Climate Governance 9783031339356, 9783031339363

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ENERGY, CLIMATE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Transatlantic Perspectives on Multilevel Climate Governance Arnault Barichella

Energy, Climate and the Environment

Series Editors Stephen Flood, Climate Change Advisory Council, Dublin, Ireland Fionn Rogan, Environmental Research Institute, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland Clare Noone, Department of Geography, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, Maynooth, Ireland

This is a critical time for nature-society relations as the global community faces the challenge of making food, energy, and transport systems more sustainable and resilient. Energy, climate and environmental systems are central to staying within planetary boundaries amid rapidly changing social, economic, political, and environmental conditions. This book series will focus on these topics, their interlocking impacts, interactions and uncertain outcomes. Contributions are encouraged from emerging and established scholars working within and/or across the energy, climate and environmental domains. The series provides an outlet for scholarship, debate, discussion, and dialogue between social sciences, humanities, physical and applied sciences. Its objective is to promote interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research, whilst simultaneously fostering positive social change. The series provides an opportunity for scholars to connect state of the art science with the policymaking and practitioner community, accelerating the transition to a resilient future.

Arnault Barichella

Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Transatlantic Perspectives on Multilevel Climate Governance

Arnault Barichella Sciences Po, Centre for European Studies Paris, France

ISSN 2947-8561 ISSN 2947-857X (electronic) Energy, Climate and the Environment ISBN 978-3-031-33935-6 ISBN 978-3-031-33936-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: Tim Robberts This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

I would like to dedicate this book to four people, without whom this research project would not have been possible. To my loving parents. To my wonderful Ph.D. supervisor. And to my dear uncle, who defeated Covid.

Acknowledgments

This book project derives from the research conducted for my doctoral dissertation at Sciences Po in Paris. Successful completion of the thesis would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance provided by my Ph.D. supervisor, Dr. Colin Hay. I could not have hoped for a better supervisor. Dr. Hay’s incredible devotion towards his doctoral students was manifest in his support of my work. In addition, I would like to thank all members of the Center for European Studies and Comparative Politics (CEE) at Sciences Po, including its Director Florence Faucher, as well as faculty and administrative staff. Linda Amrani, Katia Rio and Samia Saadi did a terrific job organizing the high-quality research seminars on a weekly basis. Prominent scholars from universities across the world presented relevant academic publications covering a wide range of topics, including many related to climate politics and the role of cities and sub-national actors. I was lucky to find a wonderful group of scholars, who provided me with very helpful comments and guidance at each yearly evaluation committee, enabling me to steadily progress towards completion of the thesis. This includes Dr. Nonna Mayor who chaired my committee every year, as well as Drs. Philippe Bezès, Charlotte Halpern, Matthias Thiemann, Richard Balme and Jenny Andersson. I would like to take this opportunity to warmly thank all of them, especially Nonna Mayer, for their support and advice throughout my years of doctoral studies at Sciences Po.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Moreover, this research project greatly benefitted from my year as a Visiting Fellow at Harvard University in 2018–19, where I was kindly welcomed by the Department of Government (GSAS). Faculty from all Harvard Departments, especially the Department of Government, the Kennedy School, as well as the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, positively responded to my requests for meetings and likewise provided me with very useful feedback on my work. The same applies to other universities across the US, including the University of California San Diego, Vanderbilt University, Georgetown, the Tufts Fletcher School and Columbia University, where I was also able to meet faculty. Likewise, given the key importance of interviews for this book, it is essential to thank all officials and experts who agreed to answer questions and be interviewed in the context of my research. This includes public officials at the municipal, regional and state levels in New York/ NY, Boston/MA and Paris/Île-de-France, as well as at the national level in the US and France. This project also benefitted from the input of a wide range of other experts from NGOs, think tanks, as well as the private sector. These interviews were instrumental in elaborating the main arguments and conclusions reached in all chapters of this volume. Furthermore, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my wonderful students at Sciences Po. Their great enthusiasm and excellent level of participation in my seminars on ‘Global Climate Politics’ have led to inspiring and highly stimulating discussions in class on a number of relevant issues. My students provided extensive food for thought, enabling me to think about the various topics addressed in this book in new ways, helping to refine and enhance my research. Finally, this project would not have been possible without the steadfast and unwavering support provided by my parents, who offered me invaluable guidance and advice throughout. They also provided loving care and encouragement in difficult times such as the strict COVID lockdowns in Paris, helping me steer both my thesis and this book to completion.

About This Book

This book examines and compares interactions between the different tiers of multilevel governance and their impact on the implementation of climate policies in the US and France. Both countries display notable differences in how sub-state entities are mobilized for enactment of national climate policies. This volume focuses on New York, Boston and Paris as sample cities, each of which constitutes a distinctive paradigm in terms of multilevel governance with the higher echelons; these echelons include the states of New York and Massachusetts, and the Ile-de-France region. Even though these examples of multilevel governance are located on different continents, a number of analogous patterns are apparent with respect to interactions between the different tiers. Cities and sub-state actors often act as pioneers, drivers and catalysts, leading the way with far-reaching policies in their implementation of climate initiatives. They may operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ whereby innovative climate policies can be tested on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment by the higher echelons. This book explores the key role that cities and sub-national entities play in terms of setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. The American federal system and the centralized French paradigm display both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance and the ways in which sub-state actors are integrated in the implementation process. This relates to the

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degree of policy harmonization and coordination, along with the risk of conflict for policies enacted between the different echelons. Divergences are apparent regarding the nature and extent of competence allocation to sub-national entities and the ways in which this enables or constrains policy ambition and innovation, adapted to the local context. This book argues that the inadequate articulation of multilevel climate governance may jeopardize efforts to limit the rise in global temperatures below the 2°C threshold by the end of the century.

Praise for Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?

“This compelling study on climate change governance is a must-read for academics, policy makers and the general public. The book offers original new research from a broad range of case studies at multiple echelons in both the US and France. Barichella convincingly demonstrates that multilevel governance matters. Climate policy coordination between cities, states, regions and national governments is critical if we are to keep global temperatures below the 2°C Paris Agreement threshold by the end of the century.” —Dr. Patrick Schembri, Associate Professor—Economics (Sustainable Dev|Climate Change|Energy Transition), Research Center CEARC|Institute for Sustainable Energy Paris-Saclay (Scientific Coordinator for Social Sciences & Humanities—Sustainable Development), University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines—University Paris-Saclay

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Contents

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Introducing Transatlantic Perspectives on the Role of Cities, States and Regions Within the Climate Regime 1 Introduction 2 Establishing the Research Agenda 2.1 Research Agenda, Context and Justification 2.2 Summary Structure of the Book 3 Contributions to the Academic Literature and Research Methodologies 3.1 Contributions to the Academic Literature 3.2 Methodology to Develop the Research Agenda Bibliography Historical Context of American Cooperative Federalism on Environmental Issues, with Contrasting Perspectives Between Obama and Trump 1 Introduction 2 Historical Context of Cooperative Federalism and Multilevel Environmental Governance in the US: From the Origins up to Obama’s Election 2.1 Historical Context of Environmental Politics in the US Under the Framework of Cooperative Federalism

1 1 3 3 12 13 13 16 19

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2.2

The Rise of National Gridlock on Environmental Issues Since the 1980s, with Lobbying Efforts to Block Federal Legislation and Policies 3 Contrasting Perspectives Between Obama and Trump on Cooperative Federalism and Multilevel Climate Governance 3.1 Cooperative Federalism and Multilevel Climate Governance During Obama’s Two Terms in Office (2008–2016) 3.2 Climate Policy Rollbacks Under Trump’s Presidency (2016–2020), Involving an Extreme Version of Cooperative Federalism 4 Conclusion Bibliography 3

Climate Politics Under Biden: The Clean Energy Revolution, Enhanced Cooperative Federalism and the ‘All-of-Government’ Approach 1 Introduction 2 The Clean Energy Revolution Under Biden (Since 2021), with an ‘All-of-Government’ Approach Involving an Enhanced Form of Cooperative Federalism 2.1 The 2020 US Presidential Election and Biden’s Clean Energy Revolution Platform, with an ‘All-of-Government’ Approach Relying on Enhanced Cooperative Federalism 2.2 Climate Legislation and Executive Orders Enacted Under Biden Involving an ‘All-of-Government’ Approach, with Prospects After the 2022 Mid-Term Elections 3 Assessing the US Climate Policy Framework Under Biden, Including in Terms of Multilevel Governance and the ‘All-of-Government’ Approach 3.1 Assessing Biden’s Climate Policy Framework Regarding Its Ability to Achieve Short, Medium and Long-term Climate Objectives

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61 75 77

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Assessing Biden’s ‘All-of-Government’ Approach in Terms of Multilevel Climate Governance and Enhanced Cooperative Federalism 4 Conclusion Bibliography

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Hierarchical and Stratified Centralization: The Historical Context of Multilevel Environmental Governance in France 1 Introduction 2 Hierarchical and Stratified Centralization: Historical Context of Multilevel Environmental Governance in France from Presidents Chirac to Sarkozy (1995–2012) 2.1 National Climate Policies Enacted by President Chirac (1995–2007) and Multilevel Governance Under the Centralized French System 2.2 National Climate Policies Enacted by President Sarkozy (2007–2012) and Multilevel Governance Under the Centralized French System 3 Hierarchical and Stratified Centralization: Historical Context of Multilevel Environmental Governance in France Under President Hollande (2012–2017) 3.1 National Climate Policies Enacted by President Hollande (2012–2017) and Multilevel Governance Under the Centralized French System 3.2 The Third Phase of Decentralization, with a Comparison Between French Hierarchical Centralization and Cooperative Federalism in the US 4 Conclusion Bibliography Climate Politics Under Macron: Towards More Hierarchical Centralization in Multilevel Governance? 1 Introduction 2 Modest Evolutions in Multilevel Climate Governance During President Macron’s First Term (2017–2022) 2.1 National Climate Strategies Enacted During President Macron’s First Term (2017–2022) and Interfaces with Sub-State Entities

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National Climate Legislation Enacted During President Macron’s First Term (2017–2022) and Interfaces with Sub-State Actors 3 Towards More Hierarchical Centralization? Ecological Planning and Multilevel Governance During President Macron’s Early Second Term (Since 2022) 3.1 Ecological Planning and Multilevel Climate Governance During President Macron’s Early Second Term (Since 2022) 3.2 Remaining Shortcomings with the Centralized French Climate Policy Framework, Including in Terms of Multilevel Governance 4 Conclusion Bibliography 6

Cities as Pioneers: Multilevel Climate Governance in New York 1 Introduction 2 Context About US Federalism and Historical Background of Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York 2.1 Context of Environmental Politics for States and Cities Under the US Federal System 2.2 Historical Background of Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York, with Partial Coordination Between the Two Echelons 3 The ‘Green New Deal’ and Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York 3.1 The City and State of New York Achieve Global Climate Leadership by Enacting Their Respective ‘Green New Deals’ 3.2 Effective Articulation and Remaining Shortcomings for Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York 4 Conclusion Bibliography

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Cities as Catalysts: Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts 1 Introduction 2 Historical Context of Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts, with the City Reaching a New Level of Green Ambition Under Mayors Walsh and Wu 2.1 Historical Context of Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts, with an Effective Coordination Early On 2.2 Boston Reaches the Next Level of Climate Ambition Under the Leadership of Mayors Walsh and Wu 3 Partial Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts Gradually Improves During Baker’s Two Terms in Office, with Prospects for an Effective Alignment Under New Governor Healey 3.1 Baker’s Mixed Environmental Record During His First Term, Leading to a Partial Multilevel Framework with the City of Boston 3.2 Baker Raises His Level of Climate Ambition During His Second Term, with Prospects for a Far-Reaching Green Agenda Under New Governor Healey Involving Effective Alignment with Boston 3.3 Effective Articulation and Remaining Shortcomings for Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts 4 Conclusion Bibliography Cities as Focal Points: Multilevel Climate Governance Between Paris and the Île-de-France 1 Introduction 2 Historical Background of Multilevel Climate Governance Between Paris and the Île-de-France, with a Contextual Comparison Between French Centralization and US Federalism

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Contextual Material on Cities and Regions Under the Centralized French Framework, with Points of Contrast to the US Federal System 2.2 Historical Background of Climate Politics in Paris and the Île-de-France, with Relatively Effective Multilevel Coordination Early On 2.3 Comparative Perspectives on Multilevel Climate Governance Between the French and American Cities and Regions/States in Our Sample 3 Multilevel Climate Governance from the Municipal to the Regional Level Under Hidalgo and Pécresse: Paris Leading the Way in Terms of Galvanizing the Higher Echelons 3.1 Paris Enhances Its Level of Climate Ambition Under Mayor Hidalgo, with a Comparison of the Policies Enacted by Our Three Sample Cities 3.2 Paris Leads the Way, Galvanizing the Higher Echelons to Enhance Their Climate Ambition 3.3 Effective Articulation and Remaining Shortcomings for Multilevel Climate Governance Between Paris and the Île-de-France 4 Conclusion Bibliography 9

Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Concluding Assessment on the Contrasting Examples of the US and France 1 Introduction 2 Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Key Findings in Comparing the US and France 2.1 Patterns Formed by Multilevel Climate Governance, as Exemplified by the US and French Case Studies 2.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of US Federalism Versus French Centralization in Terms of Multilevel Climate Governance, and Its Implications

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Projections on the Evolving Nature of Multilevel Governance and Its Role Within the Climate Regime, with Directions for a Future Research Agenda 3.1 Projections on the Evolving Nature of Multilevel Governance and Its Role Within the Climate Regime 3.2 Questions That Remain Open and Directions for a Future Research Agenda 4 Conclusion Bibliography

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Index

414 414 421 429 430 433

About the Author

Arnault Barichella is a post-doctoral researcher for the ‘New Energy Sustainable Mobilities’ (NESMO) Project with the Institute for Sustainable Energy at the Université Paris-Saclay. His work focuses on the role of sustainable cities and the feasibility for deploying new technologies in the transportation sector across the Ile-de-France region. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science in 2022 from Sciences Po Paris, where he is an affiliated researcher with the Center for European Studies. His thesis, under the supervision of Dr. Colin Hay, focused on the role of sub-national actors within the climate regime, providing a comparative study of the articulation of multilevel governance in the US and France. His interest in climate issues is linked to his professional experience. He has worked for UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Program, served as a Consultant at UN Environment and currently works with the energy centers at both the Jacques Delors Institute and the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri). He recently joined a research consortium funded by an EU JeanMonnet grant at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs to facilitate transatlantic sub-national climate initiatives. He was also member of the Sciences Po Paris delegation to the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP) at Glasgow in November 2021.

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He obtained his Master’s degree in European Affairs from Sciences Po Paris and received a B.A. degree in Modern History from Oxford University. He was a visiting fellow at Harvard in 2018–19, affiliated with the Department of Government.

Abbreviations

3DS Law

ACE ACES ADCEOW ADEME AIAI AMF AOC APA AREC ARRA BEGES BSER BTU CA CAA CCS CEQ CERCLA CLCPA CMA CO2 COP

Loi relative à la différenciation, la décentralisation, la déconcentration et portant diverses mesures de simplification de l’action publique locale Affordable Clean Energy Rule American Clean Energy and Security Act Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie America Is All In Association des Maires de France Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Administrative Procedure Act Agence régionale énergie-climat d’Île-de-France American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Bilan des émissions de gaz à effet de serre Best System of Emission Reduction British Thermal Unit California Clean Air Act Carbon Capture and Storage Council on Environmental Quality Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act Climate Mobilization Act Carbon Dioxide Conference of the Parties xxiii

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ABBREVIATIONS

CPP CTTs CWA DWSRF EEC EELV EO EPA EU EV RFI FEDARENE GCA GDP GHG GI and GII Laws GJA GWSA HSWA IIJA IPCC IRA LEV LR LREM LTECV MA MAPTAM MassEVIP MGP MLPs MOR-EV MPOs MW NDC NEPA NGCR NGO NOTRe NY NYC

Clean Power Plan Conservative Think Tanks Clean Water Act Drinking Water State Revolving Fund European Economic Community Europe Écologie Les Verts Executive Order Environmental Protection Agency European Union Electric Vehicle Request for Information Fédération européenne des agences et des régions pour l’énergie et l’environnement Green Communities Act Gross Domestic Product Greenhouse Gas Lois Grenelle I et II Green Jobs Act Global Warming Solutions Act Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendment Act Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Inflation Reduction Act Low Emission Vehicles Les Républicains La République En Marche Loi de transition énergétique pour la croissance verte Massachusetts Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles Massachusetts Electric Vehicle Incentive Program Métropole du Grand Paris Municipal Light Plants Massachusetts Offers Rebates for Electric Vehicles Program Metropolitan Planning Organizations Megawatt Nationally Determined Contributions National Environmental Policy Act Next Generation Roadmap for Massachusetts Climate Policy Non-Governmental Organization Loi portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République New York State New York City

ABBREVIATIONS

OneNYC PACE PACs PADD PCAEM PCAET PCET PCN PCSD PDU PLH PLU PNLCC PPA PPACA PPE PREE PRQA RCRA RES REV RGGI RPS S3RENR SARA SCOT SDGs SDRIF SDWA SIP SMCRA SNBC SNDD SRADDET SRCAE SRE SRHH TAEP TCI

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One New York: Building a Strong and Fair City Property Assessed Clean Energy program Political Action Committees Projet d’aménagement et de développement durable Plan Climat, Air, Energie Métropolitain Plan Climat-Air-Energie Territorial Plan Climat-Energie Territorial Plan Climat national President’s Council on Sustainable Development Plan de Déplacements Urbains Programme local de l’habitat Plan local d’urbanisme Programme national de lutte contre le changement climatique Plan de Protection de l’Atmosphère Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie Plans régionaux d’efficacité énergétique Plan régional pour la qualité de l’air Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Renewable Electricity Standard Reforming the Energy Vision Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Renewable Portfolio Standards Schéma régional de raccordement au réseau électrique des énergies renouvelables Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act Schéma de cohérence territoriale Sustainable Development Goals Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France Safe Drinking Water Act State Implementation Plan Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act Stratégie nationale bas carbone Stratégie nationale de développement durable Schéma régional d’aménagement, de développement durable et d’égalité des territoires Schéma Régional du Climat, de l’Air et de l’Energie d’Îlede-France Schéma Régional Eolien Schéma Régional de l’Habitat et de l’Hébergement Territoires à énergie positive Transportation and Climate Initiative

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ABBREVIATIONS

TOSCA UK UMP UN UN Environment UNFCCC US USCA WASI WCI WHO ZEV

Toxic Substances Control Act United Kingdom Union pour un Mouvement Populaire United Nations United Nations Environmental Program United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United States United States Climate Alliance We Are Still In Western Climate Initiative World Health Organization Zero-Emission Vehicle

CHAPTER 1

Introducing Transatlantic Perspectives on the Role of Cities, States and Regions Within the Climate Regime

1

Introduction

Climate change has been a controversial issue for decades, with scientific debates about its origins, causes and impacts dating to the 1960s and 1970s, if not before.1 Yet, at least since the early 2000s, and especially over the last decade, the overwhelming majority of the scientific community is in agreement concerning the anthropogenic nature of climate change, now clearly identified as the result of human economic activities.2 The release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere through exploitation of fossil fuels is responsible for gradually warming the planet, disrupting the Earth’s natural ecosystem and climatic processes. Climate change represents a systemic risk for human societies and is one of the most significant challenges facing the international community. Although the effects of climate change gradually unfold over several decades, its impact will likely result in devastating environmental catastrophes due to sea level rise, as well as an increase in the occurrence and severity 1 In this regard, it is worth mentioning the works of Rachel Carson, Garrett Hardin and the ‘Club of Rome’, which were among the first to raise awareness about the impacts of environmental degradation and uncontrolled economic growth at the time. See Carson (2000), Hardin (1968) and Meadows et al. (1972). 2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007, 2014, 2022).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_1

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of extreme weather events, such as storms, hurricanes, flooding, tornadoes, heat waves or droughts. This may threaten the world’s access to vital resources like food and water supplies, in addition to causing widespread destruction, population displacement and loss of life.3 Through ongoing United Nations (UN) climate negotiations since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and the creation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), State Parties have sought to build a nascent architecture for global, multilevel climate governance. In so doing, most countries have accepted the idea that acting alone would not suffice to address climate change, a position supported by the scientific community.4 The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was not sufficiently inclusive, while the 2009 Copenhagen Agreement provided an inadequate framework.5 By contrast, the 2015 Paris Agreement represented the first successful attempt to reach a worldwide accord on how to address climate change and marked one of the pinnacle moments of the UN climate negotiations process to date. Signed by 195 Parties in Paris on December 12, 2015, during the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21), the Paris Agreement provides a global framework for both State and non-Party stakeholders6 to implement their climate pledges over a defined period of time. The scope and ambit of the Paris Accord were unprecedented at the time, since nearly all nations in the world agreed to be bound by the rules set out in the accord. It was designed to replace the flawed Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Agreement with a new global climate regime from 2020 onwards. The most significant upgrade to the Paris Accord was the Glasgow Climate Pact, agreed on at COP26 in November 2021. This book will focus on a number of distinct issues relating to the Paris Accord, especially its practical implementation in the context of multilevel climate governance in the US and France, as explained and elaborated in the sections below.

3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Victor (2001) and Parker et al. (2012). 6 Non-Party stakeholders refer to all sub-national (cities, regions or states) and non-

state actors (businesses and private sector entities, along with civil society) that seek to be affiliated with the COP process, but cannot sign the Paris Agreement due to the State-centric nature of international law.

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Establishing the Research Agenda Research Agenda, Context and Justification

As its title indicates, this book addresses transatlantic perspectives on multilevel climate governance and asks the following question: “Can the world’s subnational actors - cities, states and regions - save our planet?”. The book’s subject matter requires clarification in order to establish the research themes and analytical ambit of this volume. The focus on cities, states and regions is warranted due to the fact that they are key contributors to the problem of climate change, as well as vital actors in finding solutions to address it.7 In the case of cities, the United Nations projects that urban population concentration will continue to gather momentum around the world over the short and long run.8 With urban areas currently encompassing more than half of the world population, studies have indicated that cities are responsible for nearly three quarters of global carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions, largely due to emissions from transportation and buildings.9 Given that such trends are predicted to accelerate over the next few decades, municipal policies focusing on these sectors can have a major impact in reducing GHG emissions and mitigating the effects of climate change. Cities are well situated to develop more efficient infrastructure with a lower carbon footprint,10 since Mayors in most cases have direct control over a number of key policy areas that are essential for climate mitigation. In addition to transport (including municipal vehicle fleets) and buildings (heating and cooling regulations), this involves fields such as zoning, waste management and recycling, as well as several key aspects of the power sector and energy supply. Nonetheless, cities cannot resolve the problem of climate change on their own. An effective articulation of multilevel governance, one which encompasses the higher echelons—federal states in the US or regions in France, is essential. Sub-national entities as a whole have a vital role to play in compensating for inadequacies at the national level, helping

7 UN Environment, Cities and climate change: https://www.unenvironment.org/exp lore-topics/resource-efficiency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Hughes et al. (2018) and Sachs (2015).

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to close the GHG emissions gap stemming from limitations in national policy. For instance, Mayors, along with executives at the sub-national level (Governors of US federal states or Regional Council Presidents in France), have the power to take immediate, direct action on climate change when compared to national governments, which often have to go through cumbersome legislative procedures. National governments may be prone to blockage and paralysis through pressure from lobbying groups, for example, which tend to be less active at the sub-national level. Additionally, cities and sub-state entities are closer to the people who will be impacted by environmental degradation, meaning that Mayors and sub-national executives can enact policies to directly address the problem at its source; this reinforces their key role in tackling climate change, contributing to closing the emissions gap. For these reasons, cities especially, but sub-national entities more generally, constitute essential focal points, catalysts and building blocks within the global climate regime. There are also a number of sectors, such as agriculture, or specific industrial and commercial activities, which are highly polluting and emit large quantities of GHG emissions. Yet, they mostly fall outside the ambit of municipal authorities, which means that cities have limited impact and control over them. Hence, the municipal level must be supported by the regional/state levels, as well as by the national government.11 A unified architecture of climate governance is needed, one that encompasses the municipal, state/regional and national echelons, where the different tiers interact and mutually support one another. Each echelon plays a different, yet complementary role in supporting the multilevel pyramid, and only through effective articulation can policies be successfully coordinated to address the problem of climate change. As will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters, climate change represents a systemic risk that may evolve into a systemic crisis, one which will negatively impact all aspects and dimensions of society. In order to successfully address such a systemic risk, a comprehensive policy approach is required, whereby every echelon of governance is fully mobilized. All echelons must be well coordinated and mutually support one another on climate policy. Without an effective articulation of multilevel governance, each echelon risks not being able to achieve its own 11 While cities are essential, they form part of a larger policy framework. Their possibilities, decision-making capabilities and motivations are intricately intertwined within broader processes involving the higher echelons of governance.

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climate objectives. What is more, if each echelon is unable to deliver on its own objectives, this also means that countries will not be able to deliver on their overall national climate targets. Consequently, the international community as a whole may fail to reach the collective objectives set out in the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature increase to below 2 °C by the end of the century. The notion of ‘multilevel governance’ has its origins in the early 1990s in relation to the process of EU integration following the Maastricht Treaty, where new theories sought to explain the framework of overlapping public authority across Community institutions, national governments and devolved bodies at the regional and local levels. According to Hooghe and Marks, “multilevel governance emerges when … several tiers of government share the task of making regulations and forming policy … usually in conjunction with relevant interest groups”.12 Likewise, Stubbs has underlined that “a multilevel governance perspective forces one to address processes of the supra-nationalization, the decentralization and the dispersal of authority as potentially coterminous”.13 The notion of ‘effective articulation’ in the context of multilevel governance is central to the analysis developed in subsequent chapters. For the purposes of this book, ‘effective’ is defined as: “producing a decided, decisive or desired effect”.14 ‘Articulation’ is defined as: “the ways in which the different parts of a structure or system are connected”.15 In terms of context, this book explores the relevant complexities involved in the articulation of multilevel climate governance in the US and France, with the aim of highlighting transatlantic perspectives and points of contrast. The decision of former American President Donald Trump to withdraw from the Paris Agreement on June 1, 2017, shocked the international community at the time, and was also highly controversial within the US. President Trump’s actions signaled an end to America’s leadership role in the UNFCCC under former President Barack Obama, removing the US from the framework of the new global climate

12 Hooghe and Marks (2001). 13 Stubbs (2005). 14 Merriam-Webster nary/effective.

Online

Dictionary:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictio

15 Macmillan Online Dictionary: https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/bri tish/articulation.

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regime.16 President Trump also sought to dismantle his predecessor’s federal climate policies, including the Clean Power Plan, while disempowering the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).17 Since the US represents the largest economy and second global GHG emitter after China, the Trump administration’s withdrawal seriously compromised the viability of the Paris Agreement and cast a shadow over the process of UN climate negotiations during a four-year period.18 As examined in Chapter 2, the American federal system allows a high degree of autonomy for sub-national actors,19 including on environmental and energy policy.20 As a result, a number of states and cities, mostly located in Democratic-voting areas on the East and West coasts, vowed to continue implementing their climate initiatives in defiance of federal abdication under Trump.21 They were joined by a vibrant civil society made up of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foundations and universities, as well as a majority of American businesses and private firms, which supported the efforts of states and cities on climate policy. A number of national climate networks were also formed or reinforced in response to Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, coalescing the efforts of non-state and sub-state entities; these networks included the US Climate Mayors association (for cities), the US Climate Alliance (for federal states), as well as ‘We Are Still In’ and ‘America’s Pledge’ (for all non-state actors). Hence, throughout Trump’s Presidency, many different actors in a number of different areas and at multiple levels of government remained committed to the Paris Agreement and continued their efforts to implement former Obama-era climate pledges. In fact, a number of sub-national and non-state actors were energized by the former US administration’s withdrawal, enhancing and accelerating the implementation of their local climate initiatives to compensate for federal inaction.

16 Jotzo et al. (2018). 17 Anderson et al. (2017) and Bomberg (2017). 18 Even though China surpassed the US as the first global GHG emitter back in 2007,

the American economy remains the largest in the world in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). See Barichella (2018). 19 Coleman and Leskiw (2018). 20 Elliott and Esty (2021). 21 Cornwall (2017) and Palacková (2017).

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Joe Biden’s election as the 46th US President in November 2020 resulted in a major paradigm shift. This reflects the deep level of polarization in American politics and society, apparent in Biden’s contrasting position on climate change. As examined in Chapter 3, Biden was under pressure from his Democratic base. Climate change rose in importance to become a top priority for progressive voters, partly as a reaction to four years of sweeping regulatory rollbacks under Trump. In fact, an undeclared but noticeable competition for the most prominent climate action plan took place between the different Democratic primary candidates during the 2020 election, helping to raise the level of ambition.22 As a result, Biden developed the most far-reaching climate policy blueprint ever proposed by an elected President. Known as the ‘Clean Energy Revolution’, these ambitious targets far surpassed Obama-era goals.23 Biden’s blueprint incorporates a pledge for the US to transition towards a 100% clean energy economy and achieve carbon neutrality no later than 2050, with the intermediary goal of reaching a carbon-free power sector by 2035.24 Within the very first few days of his Presidency, Biden initiated the process for the US to rejoin the Paris Agreement, which was finalized on February 19, 2021. Nevertheless, despite Trump’s defeat, the Republican Party as a whole has continued to obstruct climate policy during Biden’s Presidency. Democrats have faced notable challenges in their attempt to enact key aspects of the ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ agenda, forcing them to lower their level of ambition in order to reach compromises with centrist politicians in Congress. Following the 2022 mid-term elections, Democrats lost their majority in the House of Representatives, bringing Biden’s legislative climate agenda to a halt. What is more, Trump appointed three conservative Supreme Court justices in the space of only four years, in addition to many other federal judicial appointments.25 Finally, staunch Republican opposition at the sub-national level throughout a number of

22 Barichella (2019). 23 The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice: https://

joebiden.com/climate-plan/. 24 Barichella (2021). 25 Zelizer (2022).

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conservative states in the south or Midwest has also created obstacles for Biden’s federal climate agenda.26 As a result, sub-state entities have continued to play a vital role under the Biden administration, which has relied on local initiatives as a springboard to support climate policies at the national level. Climate networks created or strengthened under Trump, such as Climate Mayors or the US Climate Alliance, have reinvented themselves to act as essential relays between the federal government and states or cities across the country that are committed to climate action.27 For instance, ‘We Are Still In’ and ‘America’s Pledge’ merged to become the ‘America is All In’ coalition, seeking to unite the efforts of all non-state and sub-national actors throughout the US, in alignment with the federal climate objectives and policies of the Biden administration.28 Due to the nature of the American federal system, states enjoy broad powers under the Constitution (defined by the Tenth Amendment),29 which means that the national government is legally required to closely associate them in the implementation process. The Biden administration has sought to rely on the momentum of subnational initiatives developed under Trump in order to partly compensate for continued Republican obstruction at the federal level. For these reasons, the climate policy framework in the US constitutes a particularly relevant case study to examine the dynamics involved in the articulation of multilevel governance, with an essential role for subnational entities like states and cities. The American paradigm possesses its own distinctive characteristics, since the US is the only country in the world to have left the Paris Agreement for four years, before subsequently rejoining. This creates a rather singular situation, which explains the choice of the US as a case study with regard to the subject matter of this book. Among US sub-state actors that remained committed to climate action under Trump and since then, the cities of New York and Boston have 26 Barichella (2021). This is analyzed in detail in Chapter 3, which thoroughly examines each one of these obstacles and the ways in which each has hampered the Biden administration’s attempts to enact an ambitious climate agenda at the federal level. 27 US Climate Mayors: https://climatemayors.org. US Climate Alliance: http://www. usclimatealliance.org. 28 America Is All In: https://www.americaisallin.com. 29 On US federalism, see Coleman and Leskiw (2018), Fisher and Harriger (2019),

Robertson (2017), and LaCroix (2010).

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risen to become national pioneers, positioning themselves at the heart of American and global climate networks. As explored in Chapters 6 and 7, both cities have endeavored to lead by example with some of the most ambitious municipal climate policy agendas in the US and globally. This includes the ‘OneNYC 2050’ framework and the ‘Climate Mobilization Act’ for New York City, along with consecutive ‘Climate Action Plans’ for Boston, each of which has been regularly updated by their respective municipal councils. In fact, both cities have enacted their own ambitious versions for a local ‘Green New Deal’, working in close cooperation with the state echelon and through various national climate coalitions. New York City and Boston, together with their respective states, were very proactive in terms of continuing implementation of Obama-era climate targets under Trump. They have sought to closely align themselves with the renewed US federal climate agenda under the Biden administration. This is why the municipal climate frameworks of New York City and Boston, along with the states of New York and Massachusetts, are particularly relevant to analyze from a policy perspective and will form the two American sub-national samples in this book. Moreover, New York City is also the largest urban area in the US, making the scale of its municipal climate initiatives particularly salient to examine and compare with those of Boston, a smaller but very committed city on climate issues. Like Boston and New York City, Paris has also risen to become a global leader on environmental issues, especially since serving as the host of COP21 in 2015 when climate change acquired symbolic importance for the French capital. As analyzed in Chapter 8, Paris is the economic epicenter of the country. The French capital, in cooperation with the regional government (Île-de-France), has striven to enact a number of far-reaching municipal climate initiatives over the last few years. This involves a regularly updated ‘territorial climate plan’, whose latest version, known as the ‘Climate, Air and Energy Territorial Plan’ (Plan ClimatAir-Energie Territorial ), was unanimously adopted by the city council in March 2018. The Mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, has sought to turn her city into a global leader for municipal climate action. Due to its farreaching climate initiatives, Paris is a highly relevant case study for this book. The three cities in our sample are also interesting to analyze because they constitute large urban centers located in prosperous, developed

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countries. Each serves as the capital city within its respective jurisdiction.30 Consequently, all three cities have at their disposal ample political opportunity, as well as substantial budgets and resources, to develop advanced infrastructure and implement far-reaching climate policies. Thus, New York, Boston and Paris are salient case studies thanks to the substantive means allocated to advancing their ambitious municipal climate agendas. Because the three sample cities are world leaders on climate change policy, they constitute a model for many other cities located in the Global North. Nonetheless, even these three cities fall short of their climate targets. By examining the limitations of the climate policy frameworks enacted by these ‘best case studies’, this research project will provide evidence that global efforts to tackle climate change are inadequate. Although our three sample cities have enacted some of the most ambitious municipal climate policy frameworks in the world, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 demonstrate how they continue to fall short in terms of the level of ambition needed to reach the long-term objectives set out by the Paris Agreement. As a result, if proactive cities like New York, Boston and Paris fail to enact policies which go far enough, then the international community as a whole is most likely missing the mark and will be unable to reach the level of ambition necessary to successfully address the global climate crisis. Each of the three cities in our sample forms part of a distinct multilevel framework, with a unique configuration in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance and interaction between the different echelons. This provides for rich and diverse comparative material. The US federal system, along with the American climate policy paradigm in general, represents a striking point of contrast to the relatively centralized French political system. For instance, unlike the US cities and states in our sample, French sub-national entities, such as the city of Paris or the Île-deFrance region, have benefitted from consistent support on climate issues from both the national French government and the European Union (EU). Although President Macron has been criticized on his climate record,31 the momentum has continued throughout his Presidency, with

30 Paris as the capital of France, Boston as the capital of the state of Massachusetts and New York City as the capital of the state of New York. 31 See Réseau Action Climat France (2022).

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a number of notable policies and legislation to upgrade and enhance France’s contribution under the framework of the Paris Agreement. Despite consecutive phases of decentralization since the 1980s,32 the French political system remains relatively centralized on the whole,33 especially when compared to the American federal system. Thus, in contrast to the situation in the US whereby states enjoy a high degree of autonomy, sub-national entities in France possess limited competences, which means that the implementation process tends to proceed in a top-down manner. Climate targets and objectives are typically decided at the national level and subsequently transposed to the lower echelons in a vertical manner. Another salient difference is that climate policies tend to enjoy broad-based support across the French political spectrum; the Conservative Party and the extreme right in France do not reject the science of climate change, as do their counterparts in the US. This explains why sub-state entities in France have received consistent support from the national government over the last few decades, since changes from one government to another have not modified the consensus on climate policy in any significant way. The only difference concerns the degree of enthusiasm, with left-wing political groups tending to be more proactive on climate issues compared to conservative ones. By contrast, the US federal government has not displayed the same type of consensus on climate change, with Presidents Obama and Biden representing more of an exception to the rule (see Chapters 2 and 3). Ever since the 1980s, the Republican Party has been skeptical about environmental policy in general,34 due to the influence of powerful lobbying groups (often from the fossil fuel industry) and the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant ideological paradigm within conservative circles. Neoliberalism tends to view governmental regulation as harmful to the economy writ large. These factors explain the consistent skepticism of the Republican Party towards climate policies, including the science of climate change. For instance, President Bush Jr. refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001.35 Even under former Democratic President Bill 32 Aubelle and Kerrouche (2022) and Kada et al. (2017). 33 Chapters 4, 5 and 8 will examine how through four consecutive phases of decen-

tralization, including the current one unfolding under President Macron, the national government has progressively ascribed more competences to sub-state entities in France. 34 Turner and Isenberg (2018) and Layzer (2012). 35 Lisowski (2002).

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Clinton, the Republican-controlled Congress succeeded in blocking any significant federal climate initiative. Therefore, national climate policy in the US has been quite volatile, leaving progressive sub-state entities to take the lead in the absence of federal engagement.36 States and cities like New York/NY or Boston/ MA have enjoyed wide latitude to innovate and enact their own ambitious green initiatives. Due to the American federal system, even the climate policies under Presidents Obama and Biden have tended to provide states with broad autonomy, leaving them free to choose their preferred method of implementation, in contrast to the top-down French paradigm. Consequently, the dynamics of multilevel governance between our American and French samples clearly display interesting points of contrast, rendering them relevant to analyze and compare. 2.2

Summary Structure of the Book

The notion of ‘climate mitigation’ has been defined by the UN Environment Programme as “efforts to reduce or prevent the emission of greenhouse gases”.37 Likewise, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate mitigation as “human intervention to reduce the sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases”.38 Climate mitigation is often contrasted to the notion of ‘climate adaptation’, which has been defined by the UNFCCC as “adjustments in ecological, social, or economic systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects or impacts”.39 Taken together, mitigation and adaptation represent the two main types of policy for addressing climate change 36 Large parts of the country, mostly Republican-voting areas in the South or Midwest

for example, remain uncommitted to climate action, which continues to sharply divide the US along partisan lines. See Barichella (2018, 2021). On the degree of polarization in US climate politics under Obama, see also Brewer (2012). 37 “Mitigation can mean using new technologies and renewable energies, making older equipment more energy efficient, or changing management practices or consumer behavior”. UN Environment, Mitigation: https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/cli mate-change/what-we-do/mitigation. 38 IPCC (2014). 39 “It refers to changes in processes, practices, and structures to moderate potential

damages … associated with climate change”. UNFCCC, What do adaptation to climate change and climate resilience mean?: https://unfccc.int/topics/adaptation-and-resilience/ the-big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-change-and-climate-resilience-mean.

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at the global, national and local levels; both are necessary and mutually reinforcing.40 Despite the fact that adaptation to climate change often starts at the local level, with municipal infrastructure serving an essential function in terms of adaptation, this book will focus on climate mitigation in order to narrow the scope of analysis. Each chapter examines a different, yet complementary facet regarding the articulation of multilevel governance in terms of climate mitigation. Chapters 2–5 focus on the upper level of the multilevel pyramid, from the sub-state to the national echelon, illustrating how national governments in the US and France interact with sub-national entities like cities, states and regions. These chapters explore the ways in which substate entities are mobilized and integrated in the implementation process of national climate/environmental policies, and their role in terms of achieving nationally defined objectives. While Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the US, Chapters 4 and 5 concentrate on France. An historical perspective is provided for each country, before moving on to the current situation under President Biden (Chapter 3) and Macron (Chapter 5). Chapters 6, 7 and 8 explore the lower levels of the multilevel pyramid from the municipal to the state/regional echelon. Chapter 6 focuses specifically on multilevel climate governance between the city and the state of New York, while Chapter 7 concentrates on Boston and Massachusetts. Finally, Chapter 8 does the same in the context of the city of Paris and the Île-deFrance region. This volume concludes with a recapitulation of the core arguments in Chapter 9, along with projections on the evolving nature of multilevel governance, its role within the climate regime and suggestions for a future research agenda. Chapter 9 also presents a number of key findings established in this volume with respect to the nature of multilevel governance and climate policy.

3 Contributions to the Academic Literature and Research Methodologies 3.1

Contributions to the Academic Literature

The research agenda outlined above constitutes a distinctive contribution to the literature on climate change politics, since it explores a number of areas and topics that have not been compared by other authors, or at 40 See Lackner et al. (2022).

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least not in sufficient detail. The following section will provide a summary of the main contributions to the academic literature stemming from this book. The municipal climate policy agendas of the three sample cities (along with their respective states/regions) have not been analyzed, compared and contrasted before by any other book or article in the literature. This volume explores a number of different patterns apparent in the articulation of multilevel climate governance and uncovers new elements concerning the vital role of cities as essential pioneers within the global climate regime, in terms of their interactions with the higher echelons. While authors such as Johnson et al.,41 Hughes et al.,42 Van der Heijden,43 Barber44 or Fitzgerald,45 have examined the role of cities within the climate regime more generally, they have not provided a detailed analysis of municipal policy agendas involving particular case studies. When they do so, as in the case of Jones,46 they do not rely on the same sample cities, nor do they focus on the articulation of multilevel governance and the nature of interactions between the different tiers. Although the subject matter of this book is likely to be influenced by the case study selection, different cities across the world are confronted with similar challenges in their attempts to enact climate initiatives at the local level and to coordinate their policies with the higher echelons. This means that the conclusions reached in this book possess a broader relevance beyond the choice of sample cities; a detailed analysis of specific case studies also provides the advantage of a certain analytical richness. The multilevel climate governance frameworks of the US and France have also not been compared and contrasted before by any other study in the literature. Hence, this volume provides fresh insights about the dynamic mechanisms involved in the articulation of multilevel governance in these countries from the municipal to the national echelon. This includes an assessment of its vital importance within the climate regime, and the nature of interactions between the different tiers. Several 41 Johnson et al. (2017). 42 Hughes et al. (2018). 43 Van der Heijden et al. (2019). 44 Barber (2017). 45 Fitzgerald (2020). 46 Jones (2018).

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authors, such as Wurzel et al.47 or Bruyninckx et al.,48 have analyzed the role of multilevel governance in a general sense, or within specific sectors like transportation (Bache et al.49 ), without engaging in a detailed comparative analysis of particular case studies. Others, such as Harrison and Mikler50 or Dupont and Oberthür,51 examine multilevel governance in the US or Europe separately, without developing a comparative analysis. These studies do not explicitly focus on multilevel governance, even though this still forms part of their analysis. A comparative study between the American and French multilevel governance frameworks is essential to developing many of the key insights presented in this book. While authors such as Weibust and Meadowcroft52 attempt something similar, they have concentrated on North America and Europe on the whole, without examining in detail the relevant distinctions between the US federal system and the centralized French paradigm. In addition, Weibust and Meadowcroft do not emphasize the crucial role of cities in the articulation of multilevel governance, examining environmental issues in general (including water management), instead of climate change and clean energy more specifically. This applies to other transatlantic comparative analyses like that edited by Achilles and Elzey,53 which does not focus on issues relating to multilevel governance. For these reasons, such authors have reached different conclusions regarding the mechanisms involved in the effective articulation of multilevel governance, the nature of interactions between the different tiers and its role within the climate regime. Finally, this book also engages in a comparative analysis of recent climate policies and clean energy initiatives enacted by US President Joe Biden and French President Emmanuel Macron. This represents another notable contribution, since very few academic studies have been published which provide an in-depth analysis of the latest climate/clean energy initiatives comparing the US (1st global economy) with France (7th global economy). While subsequent chapters examine these policies in 47 Wurzel et al. (2020). 48 Bruyninckx et al. (2012). 49 Bache et al. (2015). 50 Harrison and Mikler (2014). 51 Dupont and Oberthür (2015). 52 Weibust and Meadowcroft (2015). 53 Achilles and Elzey (2013).

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the context of interaction with sub-national entities, a discussion of the overall trajectory of climate initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic is also provided. 3.2

Methodology to Develop the Research Agenda

This book relies on two main qualitative methodologies: comparative text analysis of the laws, regulations, decrees and policy blueprints for the countries, cities and states/regions in our sample, as well as thematic interviewing involving a large and broad data corpus from fifty-seven different policymakers and/or experts. This tandem constitutes a methodological framework to support the original research material developed throughout the book. Comparative text analysis has made it possible to identify any gaps between official commitments and implementation in practice, as well as how climate pledges are executed over time. This book examines policies, legislation or strategic blueprints enacted by the US and France, as well as the cities of New York, Boston and Paris within their respective multilevel governance frameworks in the states of New York and Massachusetts, and the Île-de-France region. At all echelons, the latest and primary climate initiatives have been selected for comparative analysis, so as to highlight divergences in approach between our sample cities and countries. Still, in order to examine the evolution of policies over time, legislation and documents going back several years, in some cases even several decades, have also been selected and analyzed. This book does not include analysis of texts produced by other types of non-state actors, such as private sector companies, businesses and banks, or NGOs, universities, think tanks and foundations. These non-state actors are only occasionally referred to in subsequent chapters. In the interest of narrowing the analytical ambit, the focus of this volume is on public national and sub-national entities, within the context of multilevel interactions between the different tiers of governance. Comparative text analysis demonstrates the development of three distinctive models of multilevel climate governance, based on each of the cities in our sample. These models highlight variations in how New York, Boston and Paris have interacted across all echelons of the multilevel pyramid. More specifically, the frameworks will show how the states of New York, Massachusetts and the Île-de-France region have provided varying levels of support to their capital cities. In addition, the book

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explores notable differences between the US federal system and the centralized French paradigm, whereby sub-state entities possess varying levels of autonomy and competences to enact local climate policies. Overall, these three distinctive models illustrate different approaches to multilevel climate governance, with fluctuating levels of cooperation and different types of interactions between the echelons. From a temporal perspective, it should be noted that these frameworks do not extend beyond early 2023. The policies that are examined in this analysis are in alignment with the timeline under which this book was completed. Although centering on the US and France, these models are potentially applicable to other multilevel contexts in countries around the world. While the US was the only nation to exit the Paris Agreement for four years before subsequently rejoining, the administrations headed by Scott Morrison, Jair Bolsonaro and Narendra Modi were less than enthusiastic about climate policies, and in some cases even overtly hostile (such as Bolsonaro in Brazil). Nonetheless, these leaders chose not to withdraw from the Paris Accord. Australia, Brazil and India have federal systems with their own particularities, which provide sub-national entities with a broad level of autonomy. As in the US, this allows federal states or regions to enact their own ambitious climate initiatives at the local level in the absence of national leadership. Moreover, while the French political system is also unique, a number of other nations around the world operate under a comparable centralized framework of government—countries such as Denmark, Portugal and Poland, or Vietnam and Indonesia, for example. In such cases, multilevel climate governance tends to operate in a similar top-down, vertical manner, with sub-national entities enjoying only limited autonomy and competences. Interview input for this book has consisted of sixty-two meetings with fifty-seven different authorities, officials and experts54 in order to gauge intent and progress with the implementation of climate policies. It should be noted that most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication. The diversity in the profiles of the various interviewees allowed for the collection of a broad and rigorous qualitative data set, supporting the analysis developed throughout this volume. These interviews were organized on a multilevel basis with relevant authorities 54 Several respondents were interviewed multiple times, which explains this discrepancy in numbers.

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at the national, regional/state levels, as well as at the municipal echelon. The data provides valuable insights regarding differences in climate policy approaches for the three cities in our sample and how this impacts the articulation and coordination of multilevel governance, including in terms of interactions with the national echelon and the achievement of global climate objectives. More specifically, the author interviewed public officials working on environmental issues in the cities of New York, Boston and Paris, the states of New York and Massachusetts, as well as the Île-de-France region. These respondents provided invaluable information on the dynamics of multilevel governance and the implementation of climate policies for our sample cities and states/regions. The author also met with the directors or former directors of some of the most influential American environmental NGOs, as well as representatives from the private sector working on carbon markets in large corporations. This broadened the interview sample to other non-state actors, and the ways in which they have sought to collaborate with cities and states/regions in the enactment of climate initiatives. Finally, the author interviewed current or former high-ranking public officials at the US State Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as at the French National Assembly and the Ministries for Foreign Affairs and the Environment. These individuals contributed indispensable insights on the implementation process of national climate initiatives in the US and France. As a result, while a dose of analytical impartiality is necessary, the material gathered from these expert interviews should be considered as accurate information, supporting the arguments developed throughout this volume. In order to counteract professional biases, the author organized more than sixty interviews with an array of respondents from different political Parties, institutions and affiliations. Such a diverse selection provided a wide variety of opinions. A further counterbalance to the potential risk of interview biases is the broad range of academic literature to support the analysis and research developed in the different chapters. The academic impartiality provided by peer-reviewed books or journal articles should correct any latent biases stemming from interview material. Therefore, the relevant academic literature has been mobilized as an essential complement to interview material and comparative text analysis, forming a key methodological support for this book.

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Palacková, E. (2017). ‘The Race for Climate Leadership in the Era of Trump and Multilevel Governance’. European View, 16(3), 251–260. https://doi. org/10.1007/s12290-017-0451-9 Parker, C. F., Karlsson, C., Hjerpe, M., & Linnér, B.-O. (2012). ‘Fragmented Climate Change Leadership: Making Sense of the Ambiguous Outcome of COP-15’. Environmental Politics, 21(2), 268–286. https://doi.org/10. 1080/09644016.2012.651903 Réseau Action Climat France. (2022). Bilan du quinquennat d’Emmanuel Macron et de sa majorité présidentielle sur le climat et la transition énergétique. Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Sachs, J. D. (2015). The Age of Sustainable Development. Columbia University Press. Stubbs, P. (2005). ‘Stretching Concepts Too Far? Multi-Level Governance, Policy Transfer and the Politics of Scale in South East Europe’. Southeast European Politics, 6(2), 66–87. Turner, J. M., & Isenberg, A. C. (2018). The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Harvard University Press. Van der Heijden, J., Bulkeley, H., & Certomà, C. (2019). Urban Climate Politics: Agency and Empowerment. Cambridge University Press. Victor, D. (2001). The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming. Princeton University Press. Weibust, I., & Meadowcroft, J. (2015). Multilevel Environmental Governance: Managing Water and Climate Change in Europe and North America. Edward Elgar Publishing. Wurzel, R., Liefferink, D., & Torney, D. (2020). Pioneers, Leaders and Followers in Multilevel and Polycentric Climate Governance. Routledge. Zelizer, J. E. (2022). The Presidency of Donald J. Trump: A First Historical Assessment. Princeton University Press.

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Websites America Is All In. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://www.americaisallin. com Macmillan Online Dictionary. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://www. macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/interaction Mayors National Climate Action Agenda—Climate Mayors. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://climatemayors.org Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effective The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ UN Environment, Mitigation. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://www. unenvironment.org/explore-topics/climate-change/what-we-do/mitigation UN Environment, Cities and climate change. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/resource-effici ency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change UNFCCC, What Do Adaptation to Climate Change and Climate Resilience Mean? Retrieved January 15, 2023, from https://unfccc.int/topics/adapta tion-and-resilience/the-big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-changeand-climate-resilience-mean US Climate Alliance. Retrieved January 15, 2023, from http://www.usclimate alliance.org

CHAPTER 2

Historical Context of American Cooperative Federalism on Environmental Issues, with Contrasting Perspectives Between Obama and Trump

1

Introduction

This chapter provides an analysis of the historical context of multilevel governance in the US, with specific attention to how the national echelon has interacted with sub-state entities on environmental issues from the 1950s up through Trump’s Presidency. This national or second echelon of the multilevel pyramid is significant due to the strategic importance that federal policies continue to have for the effective articulation of multilevel environmental governance. This chapter aims to assess the different ways in which the national level has either supported or hindered the implementation of environmental/climate initiatives for the American states and cities in our sample (New York/NY and Boston/MA). The first section will examine the historical context of cooperative federalism and multilevel environmental governance in the US from the origins up to Obama’s election. The second section will focus on contrasting perspectives between Obama and Trump on cooperative federalism and multilevel climate governance. The US constitutes a particularly relevant paradigm in terms of the articulation of multilevel environmental governance for a number of reasons. The American federal system provides states with extensive © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_2

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competences and a high degree of autonomy,1 under what is often referred to as a system of ‘cooperative federalism’. This means that Congress and the federal government may establish a national minimum standard (or floor) via environmental legislation and policy.2 In the case of climate change initiatives, this has enabled progressive states to go beyond the minimum standard by enacting their own innovative policies at the sub-national level which are particularly well adapted to the local context. At the same time, the US federal system is such that the national government cannot directly attribute competences to cities. Constitutionally, municipalities fall under the purview of state authority, which may ascribe the degree of autonomy deemed appropriate, based on local circumstances.3 As will be examined in the following sections, most national environmental statutes were passed during America’s so-called ‘environmental decade’ in the 1960s and 1970s.4 This historical period was remarkable from a contemporary standpoint, as it saw the enactment of far-reaching environmental initiatives by Presidents from both Parties, supported by large bipartisan majorities in Congress. Much changed, however, with the advent of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies within the Republican Party, culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan as President. From the 1980s onwards, the Republican Party gradually sought to block environmental and climate legislation, perceived as harmful to economic development; this led to gridlock at the federal level on these issues. Moreover, the rise of neoliberalism provided an ideal framework for lobbying groups to enhance their influence over the US political system, exacerbating gridlock. Hence, the degree of federal support and interaction with sub-national actors has tended to be rather limited in this policy area, and the ambitions of Democratic Presidents such as Clinton or Obama were constrained. While President Obama’s election in 2008 led to hopes about a potential change in paradigm and he did succeed in enacting

1 On the legal mechanisms of the US federal system, see Fisher and Harriger (2019). 2 On US environmental law and politics, see: Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Rowell and

van Zeben (2021), Elliott and Esty (2021). 3 See Chapters 6 and 7 for more details. 4 Kraft (2000) and Hays (2000).

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several notable climate initiatives,5 Republicans were able to thwart his more far-reaching proposals. The situation significantly worsened under Trump’s Presidency who engaged in extensive climate policy rollbacks, leading to a vacuum at the federal level. This has had the effect of increasing the margin of maneuver for states to implement their own ambitious climate policies at the local/regional level. However, the latter has been limited mostly to Democratic-voting areas on the East and West coasts due to the degree of polarization on these issues.6 As a result, the multilevel framework on environmental policy between the national and sub-national echelons in the US has been partly inadequate. This chapter will analyze those historical developments which have contributed to the inconsistencies of US climate policy over time. Original research for this chapter is based on a broad range of interviews conducted with American public officials working at the federal and state levels on environmental issues, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks and NGOs. The interviewees provided invaluable insights on the historical development of environmental and climate politics in the US over the last few decades, the nature of multilevel governance and federal-state level interactions on these issues.7

2 Historical Context of Cooperative Federalism and Multilevel Environmental Governance in the US: From the Origins up to Obama’s Election 2.1

Historical Context of Environmental Politics in the US Under the Framework of Cooperative Federalism

The history of environmentalism in the US may be traced to common law doctrines in the nineteenth century; the first federal environmental statute was the Rivers Harbors Act of 1899. The nature conservation movement, associated with President Theodore Roosevelt in the early twentieth century, led to the creation of the national park service under President

5 On climate initiatives enacted under Obama, see Bailey (2019). 6 Regarding polarization on climate issues under Obama, see Brewer (2012). 7 Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this

publication (see Chapter 1).

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Wilson in 1916. Yet, it was not until after World War II that the modern environmental movement began to emerge and gather momentum in the US, linked in part to the influence of intellectual figures such as Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner and Garrett Hardin, who succeeded in rallying popular concern over the impacts of environmental degradation.8 Several events during the 1950s and 1960s shocked public opinion by demonstrating the magnitude of anthropogenic environmental degradation, including the 1954 hydrogen bomb test on the Marshall Islands near Japan, and the major oil spill from an offshore well in California’s Santa Barbara Channel in 1969. As public opinion started to evolve in the US, voters put more pressure on politicians to act.9 The first major environmental law passed after World War II was the 1955 Air Pollution Control Act, which mostly involved funding for air pollution research and did not set out federal regulations, since control and prevention were delegated to state and local agencies. Up until that point, most pollution control issues had been delegated to state-level authorities,10 with reliance on state police powers. Nevertheless, Congress begun to realize that states often lacked sufficient incentives to manage interstate pollution spillovers and the resulting consequences, a factor which required federal oversight and management. Even in cases where states did enact programs, these were often inconsistent or conflicted with one another, meaning that more harmonization was needed at the national level. Therefore, under public pressure from the growing environmental movement, President Johnson (1963–1969) signed the Clean Air Act (CAA) in 1963, the first law establishing air pollution regulations at the national level.11 This became one of the most extensive federal environmental statutes in the US,12 as well as one of the most comprehensive air quality laws in the world. The Act was followed by a first amendment in 1965 focusing on motor vehicles (‘Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act’), along with a second amendment in 1967 (‘Air Quality Control Act’), which increased the powers of the federal government over air pollution regulations covering all states. Thus, while 8 See Carson (2000), Commoner (1971), and Hardin (1968). 9 See history of US environmental politics: Hays (2000, 2008) and Kraft (2000). 10 Ibid. 11 88th US Congress (1963–1965), Clean Air Act, Public Law 88–206. 12 Brinkley (2022).

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only six states had air pollution control programs in 1960, all 50 states had developed them by 1970. What is remarkable about early environmental policy and legislation in the US is that it enjoyed strong bipartisan support, with major federal statutes being approved by large majorities in Congress from both Parties. Hence, after passage of the Clean Air Act and its initial amendments by Democrats under Johnson, some of the most significant US environmental laws and policies were enacted under Republican President Nixon (1969–1974),13 during what historians refer to as America’s ‘environmental decade’. In an effort to win over support from moderate and centrist voters, Nixon succeeded in broadening the ambit of the Republican Party to integrate environmental policy,14 thereby displacing the Democratic Party from its former position of dominance on this issue. Hence, in 1970, Nixon signed the ‘National Environmental Policy Act’15 (NEPA) establishing the President’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which became a permanent division of the President’s Executive Office charged with coordinating federal environmental initiatives.16 During the same year, Nixon also proposed an executive reorganization that consolidated federal environmental responsibilities under a single new agency, the ‘Environmental Protection Agency’ (EPA), an initiative approved by Congress with a large bipartisan majority. Although intended as a technical assistance agency to set goals and standards, new statutes passed by Congress subsequently gave the agency more wide-ranging regulatory authority. Nixon signed a major new amendment to the Clean Air Act in 1970 (‘Clean Air Act Extension’), which greatly expanded the EPA’s federal enforcement mandate by requiring states to comply with strict regulations from both stationary (industrial) and mobile (vehicle) sources of pollution. Another notable environmental law passed under Nixon was the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972,17 which became the primary national 13 Coodley and Sarasohn (2021). 14 Turner and Isenberg (2018) and Flippen (2000). 15 91st US Congress (1969–1971), National Environmental Policy Act , Public Law

91–190. 16 NEPA also established procedural requirements whereby all federal agencies must prepare ‘environmental assessments’, along with ‘environmental impact assessments’, in order to determine the effects of federal regulations on the environment. 17 92nd US Congress (1971–1973), Clean Water Act, Public Law 92–500.

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framework governing water pollution; this act is mainly administered by the EPA, in close collaboration with states. Although Nixon’s successor, President Ford (1974–1977), was chiefly concerned with economic recovery following the first petrol shock in 1973, he was still under strong bipartisan pressure from Congress to continue the momentum on environmental legislation. Thus, he enacted the ‘Safe Drinking Water Act’ (SDWA) in 1974,18 which became the principal law ensuring safe drinking water for the public. Likewise, Ford signed the ‘Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’ (RCRA) in 197619 to govern the disposal of solid hazardous waste, as well as the ‘Toxic Substances Control Act’ (TOSCA) the same year to regulate various types of chemicals.20 Once more, these federal statues were administered by the EPA, which was required to set national standards and oversee their implementation by states. It was under President Jimmy Carter (1977–1981) that America’s ‘environmental decade’ reached its high point, as he sought to return the Democratic Party to a leadership position on ecological issues. Carter promulgated several major environmental laws, including substantial updates to the CAA and CWA, both in 1977, which enhanced the EPA’s regulatory authority over states on a variety of issues. He also signed the ‘Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act’ (SMCRA) in 1977, which became the primary national law regulating the environmental impacts of coal mining.21 In addition, Carter pushed through the ‘Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act’ (CERCLA) in 1980, which established a ‘superfund program’ administered by the EPA to investigate and clean-up sites contaminated with toxic substances.22 Carter also sought to make the US less dependent on imported oil by creating a new Department of Energy in 1977, merging several federal programs into a single entity, which would play a key role for national US climate policies in the future. Again, all of these environmental laws

18 93rd US Congress (1973–1975), Safe Drinking Water Act , Public Law 93–523. 19 94th US Congress (1975–1977), Resource Conservation and Recovery Act , Public

Law 94–580. 20 94th US Congress (1975–1977), Toxic Substances Control Act , Public Law 94–469. 21 95th US Congress (1977–1979), Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act ,

Public Law 95–87. 22 96th US Congress (1979–1981), Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act , Public Law 96–510.

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were approved by large bipartisan majorities in Congress23 and continue to apply to this day. The nature of the interaction between the national and state levels has been at the heart of US environmental law and policy-making over the last few decades.24 Under the US federal system, the powers of the national government are delineated as ‘express’ or ‘enumerated’ powers, which are set out in the US Constitution.25 Obviously, the Constitution was written in the late eighteenth century, long before the rise of modern ecological concerns,26 and makes no mention of the environment.27 Instead, Congress and the national government have had to rely on other enumerated powers in the Constitution to enact the major statutes which were passed during America’s ‘environmental decade’. For the most part, this has involved the ‘interstate commerce clause’,28 stipulating the power of Congress to regulate inter-state activities that impact commerce. This has been interpreted quite broadly by the federal court system so as to enable national regulations over nearly any environmental pollution issue that pertains to interstate commerce. For instance, pollution sources, such as automobiles or ships, or products that are manufactured in sectors such as agriculture, as well as the pollutants themselves, have often been seen to represent ‘products’ or ‘byproducts’ which circulate through interstate commerce. This clause has been especially relied on to legally justify federal air pollution programs under the CAA, but also water pollution with the CWA or SDWA, solid waste with the RCRA, as well as toxic substances through TOSCA or CERCLA. In addition, Congress and the federal government have relied on other enumerated powers in a selective manner to enact federal statutes and environmental policies over the last few decades. Powers such as

23 See Hays (2000, 2008) and Kraft (2000). 24 On US environmental politics, see Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Konisky (2020), and

Kraft (2021). 25 Mostly in Article I, Section 8. See also the literature on US federalism: Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and LaCroix (2010). 26 Attempts by activists to infer a constitutional right to a clean environment from various unrelated provisions have generally been dismissed by the federal court system. 27 On US environmental law, see Elliott and Esty (2021), Rowell and van Zeben (2021), and Glicksman et al. (2019). 28 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3.

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the ‘property clause’29 permit Congress to regulate its own lands and contiguous lands in order to protect the environment. Likewise, the federal ‘taxing power’30 allows for emission fees to regulate pollution; the ‘admiralty power’31 has helped control shipping pollution; and the power to approve interstate compacts32 has helped put pressure on compacting states to apply federal environmental standards. Finally, the ‘treaty power’33 emphasizes that treaties form part of the “supreme law of the land”. This has been especially significant with regard to the UNFCCC, the last international climate treaty approved by the Senate in 1992. Beyond these enumerated powers, however, the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution (which forms part of the 1791 Bill of Rights) underlines that: “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people” (known as ‘reserved powers’).34 Even though the Constitution does not explicitly say so, it implies the existence of ‘concurrent powers’ that are shared between the federal government and the states, as long as the latter have not been ‘denied’ to them (known as ‘denied powers’).35 Therefore, under the American federal system, the national government shares sovereignty with its constituent units36 and the two interact with one another based on a relation of parity. This means that states have constitutionally enshrined powers, which the national government does not have the right to abrogate without their express consent, through a process of constitutional amendment.37 The existence of both ‘concurrent’ and ‘reserved’ powers for states has obliged the federal government to closely associate them in the implementation process of national environmental statutes. This has given rise 29 Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2. 30 Article I, Section 8. 31 Article III. 32 Article I, Section 10, Clause 3. 33 Article II, Section 2. 34 Constitution of the United States of America (1791). Tenth Amendment . 35 Article I, Sections 9 and 10. 36 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and LaCroix (2010). 37 Ibid.

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to the notion of ‘cooperative federalism’, which refers to the idea that states are tasked with enforcing federal laws at the local level, all the while retaining the power to enact their own more stringent and ambitious laws.38 In most cases, this involves a minimum standard or ‘floor’ being enacted at the national level, which then provides states with wide latitude to go beyond it, if they wish to do so. Such a system of cooperative federalism has come to characterize the implementation of federal environmental laws and policies in the US. The rationale is that local conditions can vary substantially from one state to another, and that the federal government does not have the resources or capacity to tailor environmental rules for each state. Thus, delegating implementation of federal environmental laws and policies to state authorities,39 which are better acquainted with local circumstances, was a logical choice and has become the standard mode of operation. At the same time, however, the Supremacy Clause in the US Constitution asserts that federal statutes take precedence over state law in the event of a conflict40 ; this means that environmental rules and legislation at the state level cannot be contrary to and must be compatible with those at the national level. Thus, the system of cooperative federalism is based on a delicate balancing act involving, on the one hand, the primacy of national law and, on the other, the rights and autonomy of states enshrined in US constitutional law. These elements represent some of the main strengths of the American federal system. Because the multiple competences given to states, as defined under US constitutional law, provide them with extensive powers,41 this has a significant impact on the articulation of multilevel governance and interaction between the different echelons. The high

38 The American federal system has undergone many transformations over the course of US history. Thus, a number of different appellations, such as ‘dual federalism’ or ‘new federalism’ more recently, have been relied on to describe different historical periods. In the environmental field, the notion of ‘cooperative federalism’ is generally considered to be the most appropriate denomination. 39 On US environmental politics, see Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Kraft (2021), and Rosenbaum (2019). 40 Article VI Clause 2, which asserts that the Constitution and federal laws deriving from it, represent the “Supreme Law of the Land”. 41 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017).

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level of decentralization and autonomy granted to states allows environmental policies to be well adapted to the local context and tailored to changing local conditions. States that are politically motivated to do so may enact innovative and far-reaching environmental policies (discussed below), enhancing performance over time as they surpass minimum national environmental standards. In addition, such a constitutional allocation of powers contributes to rendering multilevel governance more dynamic, fluid and flexible. A recurring issue concerning all federal environmental statutes over the last few decades has been the precise degree of flexibility for states in the implementation process.42 This matter lies at the heart of the articulation of multilevel environmental governance in the US, as it involves establishing the nature and characteristics of the interaction between the different echelons. Interestingly, a variety of approaches have been adopted, depending on the subject matter or set of circumstances, both at the national and state levels. In general, federal statutes passed by Congress, or executive orders signed by the President tend to delegate authority to the EPA or other departments to enact regulations for their enforcement; these administrations, in turn, often delegate a number of responsibilities in the implementation process to states.43 For instance, under the RCRA, the EPA must issue federal regulations applying to hazardous waste; yet, states retain the possibility to develop more ambitious laws and policies in this area. The EPA must review the latter to determine whether or not they are consistent with RCRA federal rules. If they are compatible, then state-level policies are granted the same enforcement power as EPA regulations at the national level. In some cases, states are provided with even greater autonomy in the implementation process. For instance, under the SMCRA, states have the option of circumventing federal rules on coal mining altogether by enacting their own policies and statutes. These may serve as a substitute, as long as they do not directly go against federal provisions in the SMRCA.

42 On US environmental politics, see Konisky (2020), Kraft (2021), and Rosenbaum (2019). 43 The exact interplay can be more subtle, as in some cases federal laws may appear to provide states with flexibility, while the EPA’s implementing regulations might subsequently attempt to constrain it, or vice versa.

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In general, many federal statutes operate under what has been described as a system of ‘partial preemption’.44 This has come to characterize the functioning of cooperative federalism for US environmental policy, including multilevel interactions between the different tiers of governance. Thus, under the CAA or CWA for example, the EPA may choose to delegate responsibility for implementation to states that are willing to endorse it, as long as they achieve certain federal objectives and minimum requirements.45 The EPA has the right to retract this ‘primacy grant’ if states are judged not to be meeting federal standards. This is especially apparent with the CAA, whereby states can choose to develop a ‘State Implementation Plan’ (SIP), outlining how they intend to achieve so-called ‘national ambient air quality standards’ within their borders for different types of air pollutants. If approved by the EPA, states receive federal funding to support local implementation of the CAA; in fact, the ‘power of the purse’ is an important tool at the EPA’s disposal to exercise pressure over states, and plays a key role in terms of interactions between the two echelons. However, states may choose not to develop a SIP and leave the EPA to assume responsibility for implementation within that state; likewise, if a SIP does not meet minimum federal air quality standards as defined by the CAA, it can be rejected by the EPA, which will then take-over enforcement in that state.46 As will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, both of the US states in our sample, New York and Massachusetts, have enacted laws requiring the development of a SIP to comply with the CAA for a number of different air pollutants, which subsequently delegate enforcement responsibility to relevant state agencies. In the case of New York, this involves the ‘State Department of Environmental Conservation’ (DEC), while in Massachusetts, the ‘State Department of Environmental Protection’ is in charge. This has allowed Massachusetts and New York to receive federal funding to support local enforcement of national ambient

44 Woods (2006). 45 On US environmental politics, see Kraft (2021), Konisky (2020), and Rosenbaum

(2019). 46 A notable example was the state of California, which failed to meet new national requirements after the 1970 CAA amendment. This led the EPA to launch a lawsuit against the state, which was followed by a federally enforced implementation plan.

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air quality standards.47 Both states have consistently enacted a number of SIPs over the years which often surpassed national minimum standards under the CAA. As will be examined in more detail below, this has been very important in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance, since the CAA has served as the primary legal framework for enacting national climate regulations. Overall, the various characteristics involved in the enactment of federal environmental statutes emphasize instances of effective interaction between the national and state echelons. This underscores several advantages of the US federal system when it comes to the articulation of multilevel governance, and the nature of interactions between the different tiers. The various techniques used by the EPA to regulate the degree of flexibility granted to states in the implementation process of federal environmental statutes fall into two broad categories.48 ‘Performance standards’ specify certain required federal objectives, while ‘design standards’ determine the means of achieving such objectives. The latter can take on multiple forms, with the most common being ‘minimum requirements’ (performance and design standards can be more ambitious than federal rules), along with ‘conditional flexibility’ (states can rely on alternative performance and design standards if certain federal objectives are attained). ‘Process requirements’ (whereby states may set out their own performance standards insofar as they rely on federally prescribed processes), as well as ‘choosing amongst options’ (which allows states to choose from a menu of federally-established design standards), can also be relied on.49 In addition, the EPA may assist states in the implementation process through various other means, including scientific research, engineering schemes or expert analyses. Furthermore, the level of state autonomy for enacting national environmental laws has generated debate about the advantages and disadvantages of these various approaches. For instance, providing more autonomy in the implementation process may enable states to offer solutions that are better tailored to changing local conditions, while also making it possible to promote more innovative approaches. Autonomy may also contribute 47 For many air pollutants, the latest SIPs in the states of Massachusetts and New York were upgraded in 2018 and 2019, with an interruption since then due to the COVID-19 crisis, before slow resumption since 2021. 48 Bass et al. (1996). 49 Ibid.

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to enhancing environmental performance over time. On the other hand, too much autonomy and disparate standards among states can hamper national or even international trade, and trigger enhanced costs for states and capacity issues at the local level. Above all, too much autonomy may generate federal monitoring and enforcement due to the multiplication of disparate standards across states.50 The latter can also lead to problems of accountability, since states might rely on greater flexibility to avoid or delay compliance. These various frameworks and issues play an important role in defining multilevel interactions between the different tiers of governance for enacting environmental policies in the US. So far, this section has highlighted multilevel interactions between the federal and state levels; yet, it should be noted that local governments can also be involved in the implementation process. As will be examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, the US Constitution does not mention cities and local governments, which fall under the purview of states according to the Tenth Amendment.51 Thus, it is up to the state constitution or state statutes to define precisely the degree of competence allocation for local governments. The US possesses a so-called ‘dual system’ of local government, “which maintains a formal separation of central and local government. Although the center is sovereign, local authorities are not seen as part of a single State structure”.52 Nevertheless, this does not mean that the federal government lacks influence over cities and local governments. The US Congress can enact general statutes, including on environmental matters, which may contain some provisions applying to all entities across the country, including states, cities, firms or even individuals in certain cases. In fact, a number of the federal environmental statutes examined above retain such characteristics, even though most of the provisions contained in national environmental laws usually apply specifically to states, due to the nature of the US federal system. One way for the EPA to involve local governments in the implementation process has been through the provision of funding mechanisms. Thus, major national statutes such as the SDWA allocate grants to states, which are charged with disbursing funding to provide low interest loans

50 Ibid. 51 See Fisher and Harriger (2019). 52 Hague and Harrop (2007, p. 243).

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for cities and local communities. In the case of the SDWA, local governments ultimately ensure that the funding is used to safely administer the drinking water system.53 It is clear, however, that cities and local governments have a rather limited role to play in terms of implementing national environmental statutes. The principal multilevel interactions clearly take place between the federal and state echelons. Yet, this does not prevent the state and municipal levels from closely interacting with one another when it comes to enacting state-level policies and legislation. This configuration highlights an important pattern in the articulation of multilevel governance more generally: cities and local governments are not always actively mobilized in the implementation process of national environmental policies. Instead, each echelon tends to interact mainly with the one immediately above or below it; hence, the federal government prioritizes interaction with states, while cities or local governments also collaborate mostly with state-level authorities. While this is hardly surprising due to legal and practical considerations, it still puts the intermediary echelon (i.e., states) in a privileged position. This is particularly apparent in the case of the US, since states enjoy such broad powers and autonomy under American constitutional law.54 2.2

The Rise of National Gridlock on Environmental Issues Since the 1980s, with Lobbying Efforts to Block Federal Legislation and Policies

In retrospect, America’s ‘environmental decade’—which saw the emergence of a bipartisan framework of cooperative federalism incorporating (mostly) an effective balance between the national and sub-national echelons in the implementation of environmental policy—was an historical anomaly. Since the 1980s, very few new national environmental laws have been enacted. Those which were approved by Congress mostly represented upgrades to existing statutes. Likewise, no federal legislation has been adopted in the US specifically addressing climate change,55 which 53 This system was established by the ‘Drinking Water State Revolving Fund’ (DWSRF), passed under the 1996 Congressional amendment to the Safe Drinking Water Act, with ‘capitalization grants’ funding provided to states. 54 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017). 55 Klyza and Sousa (2013) and Bailey (2015).

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began to emerge as a major policy concern in other countries and on the international agenda starting in the early 1990s. One of the main reasons for the rise of environmental gridlock at the national level is a change in the ideological paradigm within the Republican Party from the late 1970s onwards.56 The Presidency of Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) is often considered to have marked a watershed moment in American history,57 as it led to the ascent of neoliberalism as a dominant framework within US conservative circles. Neoliberalism generally considers governmental regulations writ large, including on environmental matters, to constitute an impediment to economic growth and job creation.58 Pioneered by a new generation of neoliberal economists led by Milton Friedman, this resulted in the end of the so-called ‘Keynesian consensus’ which had dominated the Western world since the Great Depression, inspired by the theories of John Maynard Keynes.59 ‘Keynesianism’ is based on support for a ‘mixed economy’, where government has an essential role to play in terms of regulating markets and wealth redistribution (all the while remaining within a capitalist system).60 US Keynesianism provided an ideal framework to sustain the flurry of laws and regulations passed during America’s ‘environmental decade’. By contrast, neoliberalism is marked by the belief that free markets represent the most efficient way of allocating resources, and that governmental regulation should be kept to a minimum.

56 See Perlstein (2021). 57 See Diggins (2007) and Byrne (2018). 58 This formed part of a broader international movement within the Western world at

the time, as it coincided with the electoral victories of Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Helmut Kohl in West Germany. Both leaders embraced similar neoliberal agendas, which contributed to changing the structure of the global economy and led to the rise of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. See Robison (2006). 59 See Keynes (2017 edition) and Keynes and Skidelsky (2015 edition). 60 Keynesianism was born out of the failure of the free market economy, which had led

to the Wall Street Crash in 1929, the most severe economic depression in history. The latter had highlighted the need for more governmental regulation over financial markets and the economy. Yet, by the 1970s, the post-war economic boom had come to an end with two petrol shocks in 1973 and 1979, which triggered a ‘stagflation crisis’ (inflation and stagnating growth). With memories of the Great Depression fading away, this led neoliberal economists such as Friedman to challenge the Keynesian consensus by arguing that governmental regulation was, at least in part, responsible for the stagflation crisis of the 1970s. See Friedman (1993) and Friedman et al. (2017).

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As a result, Reagan and his Republican successors were skeptical of the level of governmental regulation which characterized the environmental decade,61 and largely supported a deregulatory agenda. For instance, in addition to slashing the EPA’s budget and using structures such as the ‘Task Force on Regulatory Relief’ or the ‘Council on Competitiveness’, Presidents Reagan and Bush Sr. (1989–1993) sought to halt the momentum of environmental regulation by enacting rules that were more favorable to industry. A hallmark of neoliberalism has been the strong influence acquired by industrial and business lobbying groups within the US political system,62 and their close association in the enactment of federal policies and rules which accommodate their private interests. As a reaction against the surge of green legislation during the 1960s and 1970s, perceived by industry as negatively impacting competitiveness and lowering profits, special interest groups were able to rely on a variety of different methods discussed below to block the enactment of new federal environmental statutes in Congress, or far-reaching regulations by the EPA. This had a significant impact on the articulation of multilevel governance and interaction between the different echelons, since the neoliberal policy vacuum on the environment provided states with wide autonomy to enact their own laws and policies in this area. Hence, from the 1980s to the present, those statutes which were approved by Congress mostly involved updates to existing environmental law. For instance, partly due to pressure from Democrats, Reagan signed the ‘Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendment Act’ (HSWA) in 1984. This expanded the scope of the RCRA passed under President Ford. Likewise, Reagan also approved the ‘Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act’ (SARA) in 1986, which updated and renewed CERLA launched under President Carter by adding new minimum cleanup standards. More importantly, Bush Sr. signed a major upgrade to the CAA in 1990, which included new programs to reduce acid rain by limiting emissions from coal plants, as well as further standards to reduce emissions from over two-hundred airborne toxic chemicals. Grassroots mobilization from environmental movements, skillfully steered by Democrats, pushed Congress to ratify these important amendments despite opposition from lobbying groups. Industrial and corporate special interests were

61 See Layzer (2012) and Turner and Isenberg (2018). 62 See Drutman (2015) and Quirk (2016).

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still able to block the enactment of any major new environmental legislation, especially in the field of climate change, which had begun to emerge as an important area of concern in countries such as France during the 1990s (see Chapter 4). Determined lobbying was especially apparent under President Bill Clinton (1993–2001) who, despite good intentions and ambitious proposals, was unable to fulfill his agenda on climate change.63 For example, while Clinton did create the President’s Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD) in 1993, many aspects of his Climate Change Action Plan, including a ‘British Thermal Tax’ proposal,64 hit a brick wall following the 1994 mid-term elections. Industrial and business lobbying groups spent record sums that year supporting Republican candidates who staunchly opposed environmental regulations. Democrats lost both Houses of Congress, a state of affairs which lasted for the rest of Clinton’s two-term Presidency.65 Democrats at the national level were forced to readjust their policies towards the center and move closer to the neoliberal agenda promoted by conservatives, abandoning or moderating much of their green agenda.66 This increased the policy void on climate and environmental issues, further enhancing the margin of maneuver for sub-national actors in terms of multilevel governance. Yet, by relying on his executive powers, Clinton was able to bypass Congress and enact certain climate policies during his second term, including a Clean Air Partnership Fund and a Climate Change Technology Initiative.67 This would set a precedent for Obama’s Presidency

63 See Klyza and Sousa (2013). 64 Clinton’s proposed Climate Change Action Plan was announced in October 1993

and aimed to reduce US GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 through 44 different policy initiatives. For instance, the proposal of a British Thermal Tax sought to introduce a levy on producers of oil, gasoline and other fossil fuels based on their fuel content, in accordance with the British Thermal Unit (BTU). 65 See Maney (2016). 66 This led Bill Clinton to famously declare during his 1996 State of the Union address

that “the era of big government is over”. 67 The Clean Air Partnership Fund aimed to support state, local and private efforts to reduce both GHG emissions and ground-level air pollutants through grants to state governments. Likewise, the Climate Change Technology Initiative involved a package of tax incentives and investments in research and development to spur increased energy efficiency and broader use of renewable energy sources. See President Clinton’s

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discussed below.68 Due to lobbying pressure, however, Clinton’s policies were not as ambitious as initially planned for.69 What is more, executive orders tend to lack durability, since they can be repealed by subsequent administrations. In this regard, the Presidency of George W. Bush (2001–2009) marked the shift to an extreme version of neoliberalism, which was outright hostile towards any form of environmental regulation. During Bush’s two-term Presidency, the influence of industrial and corporate special interest groups reached unprecedented levels. This led to near-complete gridlock on climate change initiatives at the national level. The Bush administration rejected signature of the Kyoto Protocol and pursued a strongly pro-fossil fuel domestic policy agenda,70 almost immediately breaking campaign promises to regulate emissions from coal power plants. An ‘Energy Task Force’, headed by Vice-President Cheney and filled with top executives from the fossil fuel industry, became one of the main forces behind the administration’s climate skeptic and pro-fossil fuel agenda. This approach has been described as a ‘war on science’,71 involving deliberate attempts to cast doubt on the science of climate change. Subsequent investigations revealed that the Bush administration, in close collaboration with interest groups, worked to block scientific reports on climate change, while implementing disinformation campaigns to deliberately mislead the public about the effects of global warming.72 At a time when European countries like France were enacting ambitious national climate policies (see Chapter 4), Congressional gridlock and a federal policy void in the US generated an ‘open policy field’ on

Climate Change Initiatives, White House Archives: https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives. gov/WH/SOTU99/climate.html. 68 Shafie (2020). 69 See Klyza and Sousa (2013). 70 See Lisowski (2002). 71 Mooney (2007) and Shulman (2007). 72 This included attempts to convince the public that the science of climate change

is not proven and that there is no consensus, that it is the result of natural cycles, or that ‘technological breakthroughs’ such as hydrogen cars would eventually resolve the problem. Attempts were made to pressure scientists to eliminate the words ‘climate change’ or ‘global warming’ from official documents, and major reports such as the ‘National Assessment on the Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change’, were buried by the White House.

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climate issues. This had a substantial impact on the articulation of multilevel governance, with the unintended effect of boosting the margin of maneuver for sub-national entities. National gridlock provided wide latitude for a number of states—such as Massachusetts and New York in our sample—to innovate by enacting leading climate legislation, relying on the broad powers granted to them under US constitutional law. It should be noted that President Bush Jr.’s attempts to undermine climate policies at the international and national echelons were also mirrored at the sub-national level. Throughout his two-term Presidency, Bush Jr. and his administration actively worked to undermine efforts by states to implement their own climate policies. For instance, the Transportation Secretary at the time, Mary Peters, personally directed efforts to galvanize Republican Governors and members of Congress to block California’s pioneering rules in 2004 seeking to limit GHG emissions from light and heavy vehicles. As will be examined in more detail below, this negatively impacted the articulation of multilevel governance for the two states in our sample. Indeed, both New York and Massachusetts had chosen since 1993 and 1995, respectively, to follow California’s stricter vehicle emission standards (Criteria Pollutant Regulation and ZEV Program), which was rendered more problematic by federal interference and led to lawsuits against the Bush Jr. administration in response to its obstruction of sub-national climate initiatives. Therefore, the framework of cooperative federalism which had characterized America’s ‘environmental decade’ evolved under President Bush Jr. towards what may be described as ‘conflictual federalism’, with the national echelon actively seeking to undermine sub-state actors on climate issues. All of this set a precedent, which would return in an aggravated form during Trump’s Presidency as discussed in Sect. 3. The Republican Party’s embrace of neoliberalism since the 1980s is a major factor in explaining the rise of national gridlock on environmental and climate legislation over the last few decades.73 The resulting federal policy void was caused and accompanied by a significant rise in the influence exercised by industrial and corporate lobbying groups not only over the Republican Party, but also over the US political system as a whole.74 The founding fathers had envisioned a ‘pluralist’ framework whereby all

73 See Layzer (2012) and Turner and Isenberg (2018). 74 See Hertel-Fernandez (2021) and Whitehouse (2019).

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interest groups in society would be equally represented, allowing citizens to express their views at different times other than elections. Yet, such an idealized model gradually became disconnected from reality, giving rise to other concepts such as ‘plural elitism’ whereby special interests possessing greater resources are able to dominate the political system.75 Over time, lobbying groups have been able to translate their greater resources into political influence.76 This has been facilitated by the fact that environmental policy-making in the US has always been relatively fragmented, with authority being dispersed across multiple committees and agencies. The latter has made it harder to build consensus in support of specific objectives, while also providing many potential entry points for lobbying groups to gain influence over the environmental policy-making process. Today, more than twenty different Congressional committees, along with multiple sub-committees, share policy responsibilities that pertain to environmental issues. Lobbying groups seek to influence which legislative proposals enter the agenda, how they are formulated and the ways in which committee hearings are conducted; these groups also pressure members of Congress to vote for or against specific laws and determine which amendments they introduce. One of the main reasons why special interests are able to exercise so much influence over legislators is linked to financial contributions during political campaigns. Lobbies often rely on so-called ‘Political Action Committees’ (PACs), which distribute money directly to candidates.77 This allows special interests to ‘frame’ the policy agenda by obtaining influence over which issues are debated during electoral cycles. Lobbying groups also seek to exert pressure on politicians indirectly through extensive advertising campaigns which attempt to shape public opinion and how voters think or behave. These campaigns may cast doubt on the science of climate change through dubious industry-funded studies, for example. In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that special interests have often relied on conservative think tanks (CTTs) to enhance their legitimacy. For instance, the veracity of global warming has often

75 See McFarland (1987) for a detailed analysis of different interest groups and theories of power in US politics. 76 Brown (2016). 77 Charnock (2020).

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been presented as an open and balanced debate,78 even though there has been broad agreement within the scientific community on this issue since at least the mid-2000s. Interest groups have relied on CTT’s close links with mass media platforms and various policy forums to frame the policy debate, with the intent of orienting public opinion towards more skeptical views about climate change.79 When policy issues are more controversial, lobbying groups tend to focus on other processes where the media are less present, including executive agencies and the court system. For instance, special interest groups might seek to exert pressure by blocking or delaying the implementation of environmental regulations promoted by the EPA, or by modifying certain clauses so as to make them less stringent. While the EPA is the main federal agency in charge of enforcing federal environmental laws, its responsibility on these matters is not unequivocal,80 since other departments also play an important role. These include the US Departments of the Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Transportation, Energy and Justice, as well as the State Department (for foreign affairs). In fact, most federal departments enact regulations which touch upon environmental issues to a certain extent. As with Congress, this provides another example of how authority for national environmental issues in the US is fragmented, providing opportunities for lobbying groups to exercise influence over the policy-making process. While it is true that laws such as the ‘Administrative Procedure Act’ (APA)81 have sought to limit the influence of lobbying groups over executive agencies,82 lobbyists continue to hold significant sway.83 Finally, when all other strategies have failed, special interests may rely on the court

78 Mooney (2007) and Shulman (2007). 79 Examples of the most prominent CTTs include the Heritage Foundation, the Amer-

ican Enterprise Institute, the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, and the Ethics and Public Policy Center, among others. 80 On US environmental politics, see Kraft (2021), Rosenbaum (2019), and Konisky (2020). 81 79th US Congress (1945–1947), Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law 79–404. 82 For example, the APA requires federal agencies to consult and obtain public input

in the process of developing regulations, which allows a certain level of oversight from civil society. Overall, the APA has established the main procedural framework under which federal agencies put regulations in place. 83 See Whitehouse (2019) and Charnock (2020).

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system to directly or indirectly sue the federal government, as well as executive agencies, so as to block or hamper the enactment of environmental policies and regulations.84 Overall, these different frameworks illustrate the various ways in which industrial and business lobbying groups have successfully gridlocked legislative and policy-making processes at the national level in the US over the last few decades, contributing to the federal policy void on environmental and climate change issues. Therefore, the articulation of multilevel governance on climate policy has followed a distinctive pattern in the US, involving national abdication and the assertion of states and sub-national entities as dominant and innovative actors in this area, including the states of New York and Massachusetts in our sample. Although lobbying groups are present in local policy-making processes, they tend to invest fewer resources and are much less active at the sub-national level. It would be highly problematic for special interests to be involved in every state and large city across the US, leading them to focus on the federal government in Washington, D. C., instead. Because politicians at the sub-national echelon tend to be closer to voters, they are more likely to act according to public opinion within their constituencies. These constituencies are polarized, however, with climate change skepticism widespread in the more rural, heartland states and sub-national green initiatives far more popular on the East and West coasts. By the time of Barack Obama’s election in 2008, just over one quarter of US states had enacted some degree of policy and state-level legislation to address climate change and develop clean energies. An early climate initiative enacted by a number of states at the time was the launching of so-called ‘renewable portfolio standards’ (RPS). This involved policies which aimed to enhance the share of renewable energy sources for power generation by requiring or encouraging suppliers to offer customers a minimum share of electricity from renewables. As will be discussed below, Massachusetts adopted its RPS in 2002 and updated it in 2008 under the ‘Green Communities Act’, while the state of New York enacted its RPS in 2004, before updating it in 2010 and 2015 under the ‘Reforming the Energy Vision’ agenda. Likewise, two major regional carbon market 84 A prominent example, which will be examined in more detail below, is the Supreme Court’s staying of Obama’s Clean Power Plan in 2016, following a lawsuit launched by 24 Republican states, under pressure from industrial and corporate lobbying groups (which also filed separate lawsuits against the EPA).

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initiatives were launched or were in the preparation phase at the time of Obama’s election in 2008. The Western Climate Initiative (WCI) was pioneered by the state of California in 2007, along with the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI). RGGI’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed in 2005—with Massachusetts and New York playing leadership roles in the process—before its launch in January 2009. The fact that states like those in our sample developed such farreaching initiatives at the sub-national level had a demonstration effect, galvanizing Barack Obama into raising his level of climate ambition during the 2008 campaign. Democrats released a platform known as ‘New Energy for America’, which contained the most comprehensive climate policy agenda ever introduced during a Presidential campaign.85 The platform borrowed many ideas from sub-national initiatives, including a proposal to launch a federal-level RPS (known as the ‘Renewable Electricity Standard’—RES), along with a national emissions trading scheme to incorporate and build upon regional initiatives such as RGGI or the WCI. Hence, this supports the idea that sub-national actors may serve as catalysts within the climate regime, pulling the higher echelons of governance upwards over time. While the latter part of this book focuses on the role of cities, it is clearly states in this case that helped to set the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. This corroborates the notion that local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, stimulating further action from the bottom-up, which represents a key aspect of the potential contributions from sub-national actors within the climate regime.86

85 See Obama and Biden (2008). 86 Hale (2018).

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3

3.1

Contrasting Perspectives Between Obama and Trump on Cooperative Federalism and Multilevel Climate Governance Cooperative Federalism and Multilevel Climate Governance During Obama’s Two Terms in Office (2008–2016)

Barack Obama became the first President in American history who attempted to enact far-reaching policies to address climate change at the national level. During the 2008 campaign, he promised a new chapter in how American would address what he described as one of the greatest challenges facing the US and the world, pledging to end the federal inaction which had characterized the last few decades.87 His ‘New Energy for America’ platform represented the most ambitious climate policy agenda ever brought forward by a Presidential candidate. Like President Clinton, however, he was confronted by staunch opposition from lobbying groups and Republicans after losing his Congressional majority in 2010; this clearly hampered his ability to fully enact an ambitious green agenda. Consequently, the federal gridlock on climate change did not disappear during Obama’s Presidency. Hence, sub-national actors, including those in our sample, continued to enjoy wide latitude to enact their own ambitious initiatives at the local level. To a certain extent, Obama’s first mandate represented a ‘lost opportunity’ on climate issues, since the President failed to push through climate legislation during his first two years in office when Democrats had a majority in Congress. Despite ambitious campaign promises, climate change was lost to other priorities, such as reforming the national healthcare system (‘Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’—PPACA) and the financial system (‘Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act’). Obama did make an attempt to enact a national capand-trade system in order to lower US GHG emissions 80% by 2050.88 The ‘American Clean Energy and Security Act’ (ACES), introduced by Senators Waxman and Markey, was approved by the House in 2009.89 The law was intended to establish a national carbon market system, which 87 See Zelizer (2018) and Rich (2019). 88 See Bailey (2019). 89 111th US Congress (2009–2010), American Clean Energy and Security Act , H.R.2454.

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would have shared a number of similarities with the EU’s Emissions Trading System. Nevertheless, the ACES bill was never brought to the Senate for a debate or vote. A number of moderate Republicans and centrist Democrats in the Senate switched their support to block the initiative, while progressives did not make a sufficient effort to push it through. President Obama never proposed an alternative to replace it. Legislators had already been through difficult, partisan debates over the PPACA and the Dodd-Frank Act; most of them were not predisposed for another major political battle. Lobbying pressure from industrial and corporate groups, operating through the mechanisms examined in the previous section, also played a key role in stalling the initiative.90 Obama feared that pushing through ACES or any alternative would jeopardize Democrats’ chances in the 2010 mid-term elections, along with his own reelection chances in 2012.91 In fact, special interest groups from the fossil fuel industry spent record sums in elections throughout Obama’s Presidency in order to prevent the adoption of ambitious federal climate legislation. Democrats subsequently lost their majority in the House in 2010, and in the Senate in 2014. In retrospect, failure to follow through with the ACES bill constitutes a lost decade for climate legislation, since Democrats would not regain a majority in both Houses until 2020 under President Biden. Moreover, progressives have not been able to recover to this day a so-called ‘super majority’, which they enjoyed during Obama’s first two years in office.92 Democrats’ inability to enact a national climate change law at the time has had significant implications in terms of multilevel governance and for climate politics in the US, more generally. Not only has it forced Presidents Obama and then Biden to rely mostly on executive action,93 but it has also perpetuated the federal gridlock and policy void on climate issues

90 See literature about the influence of special interest groups on the US political system: Drutman (2015), Charnock (2020), Quirk (2016), and Brown (2016). 91 Regarding the degree of polarization on climate issues within US public opinion and

the resulting party politics during Obama’s first term, see Brewer (2012). 92 As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3, this refers to a situation when a Party holds the sixty votes in the Senate required to circumvent a ‘filibuster’ from the opposition; the ‘filibuster’ is an obstruction technique relying on a Senator’s right to speak and hold the floor potentially indefinitely, thus blocking the adoption of legislation. 93 See Shafie (2020).

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in a number of key areas such as cap-and-trade, where national legislation is still lacking. With the failure of the ACES bill in 2009, prospects for enacting a federal emissions trading system collapsed, providing opportunities for sub-national actors to implement their own carbon pricing initiatives on a local and regional scale. This constitutes another compelling example of how national gridlock on climate issues in the US has directly affected the articulation of multilevel governance and interaction between the different echelons. Relying on the broad powers granted to them under the US Constitution,94 states have been able to develop a number of prominent carbon market systems at the sub-national level, filling a policy void triggered by federal gridlock. For example, California’s cap-andtrade system, known as the ‘Western Climate Initiative’ (WCI), initially succeeded in connecting with many other American states and Canadian provinces; unfortunately, it has faced a number of challenges, with most participants exiting the project in 2011.95 Although perhaps less well known, the ‘Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative’ (RGGI) in the northeast, which represented the first mandatory cap-and-trade program in the US to limit CO2 from the power sector, has been quite successful on a number of counts. In fact, the two states in our sample, Massachusetts and New York, have played a pioneering role in launching and developing RGGI over the last few years. Negotiations for RGGI begun in 2005, when seven northeastern states signed a Memorandum of Understanding. Massachusetts and New York were instrumental in pushing through the initiative in its early days, with the first pre-compliance auction taking place in September 2008. RGGI was fully launched in January 2009. RGGI developed rapidly, and currently comprises twelve states in the north-east, representing around one sixth of the US population and one-fifth of national GDP.96 By

94 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017). 95 In spite of this, the WCI continues to operate on a smaller scale and has yielded positive results for the remaining participants (California, the state of Washington, Nova Scotia and Quebec) in terms of reducing GHG emissions. See Western Climate Initiative, https://wci-inc.org. 96 This includes Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont and Virginia. See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, https://www.rggi.org.

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the end of 2020, it had helped states lower annual power sector emissions by nearly 45% below 2005 levels, and members set the objective of cutting emissions by an additional 30% up to 2030. RGGI was set up in 3-year compliance periods,97 with revenues stemming from auctions; the first 32 auctions generated $2.5 billion. Overall, RGGI had generated close to $5 billion by the end of the fourth phase in 2020, signaling success in decoupling GHG emissions from economic development, all the while maintaining low electricity prices.98 Not only did the states of Massachusetts and New York play a leadership role in launching and developing RGGI, but they have also been among its primary beneficiaries given the importance of the power sector in their respective economies. More than two-thirds of RGGI proceeds have been used to develop energy efficiency, GHG abatement and renewable energies; for example, since 2016, member states have been investing around $2 billion annually in energy efficiency programs.99 RGGI has supported Massachusetts and New York in the enactment of ambitious state-level climate initiatives over the last few years, especially in terms of compensating for drastic regulatory rollbacks at the national level under President Trump.100 Moreover, the launching of RGGI in 2009 coincided with the year the ACES bill failed to win approval in the Senate. Had Obama and Democrats succeeded in launching a national emissions trading system that year, this would have considerably restricted the margin of maneuver for regional initiatives like RGGI. RGGI would have been obliged to integrate a national cap-and-trade program and comply with federally designed standards. Instead, the states of Massachusetts and New York developed their own extensive carbon pricing rules and norms at the sub-national level. This underlines once more how federal gridlock and the resulting policy void on climate issues at the national level have provided sub-state actors with significant autonomy to enact their own initiatives on a local and regional scale. 97 Ibid. The first period covered 2009–2011, the second period was from 2012–2014, the third one from 2015–17, the fourth period from 2018–20 and the fifth one spans 2021–2023. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 As will be examined in more detail in subsequent chapters, this corroborates the idea that initiatives at the sub-state level have become essential in terms of closing the global emissions gap, due to the inadequacy of national climate policies.

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Moreover, the development of RGGI substantiates several patterns relating to the articulation of multilevel governance. First, sub-state actors can act as pioneers, leading the way with ambitious policies in the enactment of their local or regional climate initiatives, as national governments struggle to catch up. Second, sub-national policy innovation can have a demonstration effect, galvanizing further action from the bottom-up; these ‘laboratories of democracy’ experiment with innovative climate policies at the local level, which can subsequently be applied by the higher echelons. In this regard, the failed ACES bill would have built upon sub-national carbon market initiatives like RGGI or the WCI, incorporating them into a national emissions trading system. Relying upon RPS programs enacted by a number of states, the ACES bill would have introduced a federal RPS or ‘Renewable Electricity Standard’, aiming for up to 3% of US electricity generation to come from renewables other than hydropower by 2013. While the ACES bill was never adopted, this still buttresses the notion that sub-national actors may serve as essential building blocks within the climate regime, setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. This also supports the idea that local policy experiments can trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up, representing a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state entities within the climate regime.101 Despite the ACES setback, President Obama was still able to enact several noteworthy climate initiatives during his first mandate.102 For instance, in exchange for bailing out the auto industry in 2009, Obama reached a compromise deal with auto companies to enhance fuel economy standards for vehicles, which they had been resisting for 25 years. Likewise, as part of the stimulus package to boost the economy in response to the 2008 financial crisis (‘American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’ of 2009—ARRA),103 Obama succeeded in inserting a record $90 billion to support clean energy and renewables; this constituted at the time an unprecedented sum from the federal government to support climate initiatives. The 2009 stimulus package included a multilevel component, which sought to associate sub-national entities in the spending plan. Thus,

101 Hale (2018). 102 See Bailey (2019). 103 111th US Congress (2009–2010), American Recovery and Reinvestment Act , Public Law 111–5.

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out of the $90 billion, nearly half was allocated to support state and local energy investments, and around 10$ billion was used to enhance smart grid development, including for cities and urban areas.104 Once his reelection was secured, however, a remarkable turnaround occurred during Obama’s second mandate, as he embarked on the most ambitious climate policy agenda of any President in US history, at least until Biden’s election. Obama had been constrained during his first mandate,105 but as he began to look towards his legacy, he embraced the importance of tackling climate change.106 This demonstrates that multilevel governance is not static but evolves over time, in this case due to changes in policy platforms within the same administration from one mandate to another. The pace of acceleration for Obama’s climate agenda during his second term was remarkable. Since Democrats had lost their majority in the House after the 2010 mid-term elections and their majority in the Senate in 2014, Obama had to rely on his executive powers and regulation to implement his ambitious climate agenda.107 President Clinton had set a precedent for this during the 1990s, but Obama’s policies during his second term were far more comprehensive. Nonetheless, even though executive orders and regulations make it possible to bypass Congress, they tend to lack durability, since they can just as speedily be rescinded by the next President (which is precisely what happened under Trump).108 Obama had to rely on provisions from the Clean Air Act (CAA) for the regulation of air pollution in order to enact many of his climate policies.109 Twelve states and several cities had played a key role by launching a lawsuit against the EPA under the Bush Jr. administration to demand that it regulate GHGs as air pollutants, which it had refused to do up until 104 US Department of Energy—Office Electricity, 2009 American Recovery and

Reinvestment Act: https://www.energy.gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act. 105 See Bailey (2019) and Rich (2019). 106 As explained above, Democrats chose to prioritize pushing through legislation on

other polarizing issues such as health care during Obama’s first term, instead of focusing on climate change. 107 Shafie (2020). 108 Executive orders also raise issues in terms of democratic accountability, since they

essentially aim to circumvent both Houses of Congress. 109 On US environmental politics, see Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Kraft (2021), and Konisky (2020).

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then. In Massachusetts v. EPA,110 the Supreme Court ruled in 2007 that CO2 and other GHGs fall within the purview of the capacious definition of an ‘air pollutant’ as set out in the CAA.111 The Court ordered the EPA to issue regulations to mitigate its effects. As a follow-up, the EPA issued an ‘Endangerment Finding’ in December 2009, which highlighted how current trends and projected levels of emissions for six different GHGs threatened both human health and welfare, thus justifying their regulation under the ambit of the CAA.112 This constituted an important development, whereby the ‘conflictual federalism’ characteristic of the Bush Jr. years led to a landmark ruling.113 This ruling enabled the Obama administration to innovate with federal policies, applying the cooperative federalism paradigm of America’s environmental decade to the domain of climate change. The CAA had been signed into law during the 1960s with the last major update in 1990, and was therefore not designed to regulate GHGs and mitigate the impacts of climate change.114 By relying on provisions from the CAA, the EPA was granted authority to regulate GHGs as ‘air pollutants’ in relation to their impact on public health and welfare, not to address the effects of climate change itself. This limitation has led to awkward bureaucratic redundancies, generating enhanced costs for subnational actors. At the same time, however, while inferior to what could be achieved through legislation specifically designed to address climate change, the CAA also constitutes a robust alternative over the short to medium run for enacting federal policies to regulate GHG emissions. In spite of its limitations, the CAA has provided a relatively effective legal framework when utilized in a sensible manner. Thus, the EPA accelerated and enhanced the process begun in 2009 by setting out comprehensive light, medium and heavy-duty vehicle fuel emission and efficiency standards, upgraded energy efficiency rules for home appliances and building

110 US Supreme Court. Massachusetts v. EPA. No. 05-1120, 2nd of April 2007. 111 See Lazarus (2020). 112 US EPA (2009, December). 113 While multiple legal challenges were subsequently launched to contest the ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have consistently upheld the central clauses of the initial ruling back in 2007. 114 See US EPA, Clean Air Act Text—What Is the Clean Air Act? https://www.epa. gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-text.

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codes, along with impressive regulations to contain methane leaks, which required companies to reign-in pipeline leakages.115 Obama’s 2013 ‘Climate Action Plan’ was his most ambitious. It outlined a number of wide-ranging policies to reduce GHG emissions by developing renewable energies such as wind, solar and hydropower, cutting methane leaks from gas infrastructure, as well as enhancing the protection of forests.116 Likewise, Obama used executive orders to place a moratorium on coal leasing from federal lands in 2016; during the last few months of his Presidency, he also announced an historic ban on offshore oil and gas drilling along large parts of the Atlantic and Arctic coasts. Such an approach has been described as a ‘thousand small hammers’117 or a ‘stealth strategy’118 to develop a bold climate policy agenda through executive action without support from Congress. In retrospect, while this undoubtedly made implementation more complex and challenging, it also had the advantage of making it more difficult for Republicans to roll back under Trump, due to the multiplication of dozens of different initiatives. For these reasons, Obama’s climate policy agenda succeeded in developing a new form of cooperative federalism. Up until then, such a framework had not focused directly on climate change, covering instead a broad range of other environmental issues. Since Obama became the first President to enact far-reaching climate policies at the national level, it is unsurprising that he was also the first to apply a framework of cooperative federalism specifically to address climate change. The broad powers granted to states under US constitutional law,119 along with the fact that Obama lacked a majority in Congress and had to rely on executive orders, meant that the President had no other choice than to provide wide latitude to sub-national actors and closely associate them in achieving federal

115 More specifically, the rules aimed to reduce US methane emissions by 40–45% over 2012 levels up to 2025. 116 The Climate Action Plan also outlined provisions to ‘lead international efforts to address global climate change’, as well as ‘prepare the United States for the impacts of climate change’ (adaptation falls outside the ambit of this book). 117 Quotation from Dr. David Victor (University of California San Diego). See Lavelle (2016). 118 Bailey (2019). 119 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018),

and Robertson (2017).

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climate objectives. A rigid top-down and vertical approach would simply not have been feasible.120 The federal climate policies enacted during Obama’s second term provided states with a high degree of autonomy by involving them in the implementation process. For instance, Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan directed the EPA to work in collaboration with states and sub-national actors to develop carbon pollution standards across a range of different sectors.121 The most notable example of such a renewed paradigm of cooperative federalism on climate change is probably the ‘Clean Power Plan’ (CPP), which became Obama’s signature green initiative during his second term. Despite adopting a ‘stealth strategy’ involving a ‘thousand small hammers’, Obama was still required to develop one overarching policy framework in order to achieve his proposed Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.122 This was the rationale behind preparation for the CPP, which set out the ambitious objective of reducing US GHG emissions in the range of 26–28% for 2025, along with a medium-term target involving a 32% cut by 2030 (from 2005 levels).123 Announced by Obama in August 2015, the final version of the CPP contained the first-ever federal limitations on CO2 emissions from power plants,124 which constituted the largest source of American GHG emissions at the time.125 The CPP mandated the EPA to develop binding national carbon pollution standards for power plants

120 A rigid, top-down approach to climate policy would have been problematic to enact anyway under the US federal system. 121 Executive Office of the President (2013, June). The President’s Climate Action Plan. The White House. 122 See Bailey (2015, 2019). 123 The short- and medium-term targets set out by the CPP for 2025 and 2030 also

aimed to establish a pathway for the US to achieve a longer-term commitment of reducing GHG emissions 80% by 2050 (again from 2005 levels). This built upon a previous pledge made by the Obama administration in preparation for the 2009 Copenhagen conference of reducing US GHG emissions 17% by 2020 (relying on a 2005 baseline once more). 124 US EPA (2015, October 23). Clean Power Plan Final Rule, Federal Register Vol. 80 No. 205. 125 The power sector has since then been surpassed by the transportation sector, which today represents the largest source of American GHG emissions, with an upward trajectory (27% for transportation and 25% for the power sector in 2020). See US EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gasemissions.

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(coal and gas-fired plants specifically), which were referred to as ‘carbon dioxide emission performance rates’, and constituted a national minimum ‘floor’. In the words of President Obama, the CPP was “the single most important step that America has ever made in the fight against global warming”,126 and remained so up until Biden’s election. Interestingly, the CPP established broad emission reduction targets and percentages for each individual state, as well as the District of Columbia, based on differing local circumstances, including variations in energy mixes.127 States were given a high degree of autonomy in the implementation process, especially in terms of flexibility for how to meet national carbon standards at the local level.128 Each individual state was provided with the opportunity to develop its own specific plan to reduce emissions for coal and gas plants within its borders in the most cost-effective manner, with the possibility of going beyond national minimum standards. This allowed state-level plans to be specifically tailored to varying local circumstances, providing multiple options for sub-national actors to achieve their required emission cuts, subject to approval by the EPA.129 In this regard, the CPP relied on the fact that US states possess responsibilities for GHG emissions controls, which are linked to their traditional functions concerning the regulation of electricity. Overall, states were given the option of choosing between four different types of carbon pollution limits, which still needed to be based on the national ‘carbon emissions performance rates’. States could directly apply federal standards to their own power plants; states could also adopt a ‘weighted average’ of different rates, giving rise to a ‘blended rate’; they could follow a ‘mass-based’ budget as set out by the EPA for existing power plants (articulated through total CO2 emissions each year); and finally, states had the option of enacting a mass-based budget for both existing and new power plants.130 Relying on section 111 of the CAA covering ‘best system of emission reduction’ (BSER), the EPA interpreted 126 Speech by President Obama unveiling the CPP on August 3, 2015. 127 See US EPA (2015). Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, Cutting Carbon

Pollution from Power Plants. 128 Ibid. 129 In fact, the EPA provided extensive guidelines to assist states in developing approv-

able plans under the CPP, including ‘model rule’ provisions that states could simply copy and paste into their own plans. 130 Bianco and Carbonell (2015).

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the latter clause very expansively so as to include both on and offsite reduction measures that would contribute towards decreasing overall emissions from the power sector under the framework of the CPP. This encouraged states to combine carbon pollution limits on power plants with a broad range of different types of measures, including the development of renewables or energy efficiency, carbon trading, nuclear power, as well as carbon capture and storage.131 It was also possible for states to collaborate in enacting their plans through regional compacts (such as RGGI), which provided additional latitude. Furthermore, states were allowed flexibility in the timing for the enactment of their plans; even though a deadline for submission to the EPA was set for September 2016, extensions were possible for up to two years. And while the compliance period was to begin in 2022, emissions were to be gradually phased out up to 2030.132 In addition, the CPP established a ‘Clean Energy Incentive Program’, which aimed to reward states for early investments in clean energy, including renewables and energy efficiency. This provided an adaptable and non-punitive mechanism for the EPA to incentivize states to raise their level of ambition.133 What is more, the CPP did not oblige states to adopt their own plans to reduce power plant emissions. If a state chose not to develop one, or if that plan was found not to conform with national minimum standards, then the EPA would assume responsibility for developing a plan and enforcing it directly within that state.134 In this regard, the CPP bears many apparent similarities to the mechanisms involved in implementation of the Clean Air Act.135 This is unsurprising since Democrats were unable to push through national climate legislation during Obama’s first two years in office, hence all

131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. This involved a ‘glide path’ model, whereby emission reductions were to

gradually increase and become more ambitious over time, starting off at a lower level to end on a higher rate. 133 The Clean Energy Incentive Program specifically prioritized low-income commu-

nities for early clean energy investments. See The White House (2015, August 3). Fact Sheet: President Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution Standards for Power Plants. 134 Ibid. See also US EPA (2015). Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants. 135 See US EPA, Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution, https://www.epa. gov/clean-air-act-overview.

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climate regulations at the federal level had to be based on the capacious definition of an ‘air pollutant’ set out by the CAA, following the landmark ruling by the Supreme Court in 2007 (Massachusetts v. EPA).136 The paradigm of cooperative federalism, manifest in the legal foundation provided for enactment of the CAA, was extended under Obama to the field of climate change. Like the Clean Air Act, the Clean Power Plan sought to establish national standards which constituted a minimum floor across the US—these were referred to as ‘National Ambient Air Quality Standards’ for the CAA and ‘Carbon Dioxide Emission Performance Rates’ for the CPP, respectively. Yet, relying on the broad powers granted to them under the US federal system, states were provided with latitude to go beyond this minimum floor by enacting their own, more ambitious plans at the sub-national level. It was expected that state plans would have the advantage of being better adapted to the local context and tailored to changing conditions. Thus, state plans developed under the framework of the CPP were very similar to the State Implementation Plans (SIPs) required for enacting federal air pollution standards under the CAA. In both cases, the EPA can take-over enforcement if a state does not meet national minimum standards, or if it declines responsibility to produce a local plan. Overall, these various aspects of the CAA and CPP illustrate effective articulation of certain elements of multilevel climate governance between the national and state echelons in the American federal system. The CAA and CPP also demonstrate that climate policy becomes more general and holistic higher up on the multilevel pyramid, where national governments set broad and overarching policy objectives. As will be examined in greater detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this stands as a point of contrast to cities, which target specific sectors through detailed policy blueprints adapted to the municipal echelon. Thus, the CAA or CPP established very general policy frameworks, providing sub-national actors with a high level of autonomy in the implementation process, in contrast to the targeted municipal climate policy agendas for cities like Boston and New York. This underscores another pattern, whereby each echelon appears to have a distinctive function within the multilevel

136 Lazarus (2020).

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pyramid, supporting and complementing one another if the right policies are enacted.137 One notable difference between the CAA and the CPP has to do with local or municipal involvement. In this regard, urban areas have long had a role to play in the implementation process of the CAA. For instance, ‘Metropolitan Planning Organizations’ (MPOs) were created by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1962, becoming policy-making entities focusing on transportation and composed of representatives from that sector, along with municipal government officials.138 MPOs help to channel federal funding to the local and city level for transportation projects/programs, including those relating to air pollution control. Thus, the ‘New York Metropolitan Transportation Council’, created in 1982, is the MPO comprising New York City, Long Island and the lower Hudson Valley139 ; likewise, the ‘Boston Region Metropolitan Planning Organization’ was launched in 1974, encompassing 97 cities and towns in total.140 By contrast, the CPP did not contain any particular provisions to involve cities and local governments in the enactment phase, and each state was left free to determine how it wished to proceed. Although many power plants are still located in cities, a factor that should have pointed to their indirect involvement, this is not comparable with the MPO framework and its role for air pollution control under the CAA. However, even the CAA constitutes a rather limited paradigm for associating cities and local governments in the implementation process, since MPOs were founded by the Federal Highway Act in 1962, one year before the CAA (whose initial version was passed in 1963). Thus, their original purpose was distinct, and it was only subsequently that MPOs were mobilized in relation to air pollution control, on a somewhat adhoc basis. Therefore, cities and local governments continue to have a rather limited role to play in terms of enacting national environmental statutes in the US.141 The principal multilevel interactions clearly take place between the federal and state echelons, as exemplified by the CAA 137 This substantiates the notion that the different levels of governance are interdependent and may be mutually reinforcing. 138 87th US Congress (1961–1963), Federal-Aid Highway Act, Public Law 87–866. 139 New York Metropolitan Transportation Council: https://www.nymtc.org. 140 Boston Region Metropolitan Planning Organization: https://www.ctps.org. 141 As previously examined, the United States possesses a so-called ‘dual system’ of local government, “which maintains a formal separation of central and local government.

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and the CPP. This does not prevent the state and municipal levels from closely interacting with one another when it comes to state-level policies and legislation. Such a configuration highlights a further pattern regarding the articulation of multilevel governance in the case of the US, whereby cities and local governments may not be actively mobilized in the implementation process of national environmental policies. Instead, the federal government prioritizes interaction with states, while cities or local governments collaborate mostly with state-level authorities. While this is not surprising due to legal and practical considerations, it still puts the intermediary echelon in a privileged position (i.e., states). The latter is particularly apparent in the case of the US, since states enjoy such broad powers and autonomy under American constitutional law. Because climate change represents a systemic risk that may evolve into a systemic crisis, it will negatively impact all aspects and dimensions of society. In order to successfully address such a systemic risk, a comprehensive policy approach is required, whereby every echelon of governance needs to be fully mobilized. Without effective articulation of multilevel governance, countries may not be able to deliver on their overall climate targets, and the international community risks failing to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. Consequently, the fact that cities and local governments have a rather limited role to play in terms of implementing national environmental statutes like the CAA or the CPP represents a potential weakness in the US multilevel governance paradigm.142 As will be discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, cities have great potential and can offer vital contributions within the global climate regime. Finally, regardless of how successful the Clean Power Plan was in designing a new version of cooperative federalism specifically applied to the field of climate change, in practice the plan was never fully enacted, a notable point of contrast with the CAA. Only ten days after it was set out by the EPA, twenty-seven, primarily Republican states launched multiple lawsuits in order to halt its implementation, arguing that the federal Although the center is sovereign, local authorities are not seen as part of a single State structure” (Hague and Harrop 2007). 142 In this regard, Chapters 6–8 highlight the importance of associating cities within broader processes involving higher echelons for the effective articulation of multilevel governance, whereby urban centers represent a critical part of larger policy frameworks.

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agency was overstepping its legal authority and encroaching upon state rights. Eighteen other mostly Democratic states, including Massachusetts and New York in our sample, launched counter-legal actions in support of the CPP. The US Supreme Court responded by ordering the EPA to immediately halt enforcement of the CPP in February 2016, pending finalization of a judgment in the lower Court of Appeals, an unprecedented decision in US judicial history.143 Trump’s election in November 2016 sealed the fate of the CPP, meaning it was never enacted. Despite President Obama’s best intentions, federal gridlock on climate issues continued to a certain extent throughout his eight years as President.144 Nonetheless, the Clean Power Plan was still adopted on a voluntary basis by the American cities and states in our sample. Although Obama initiated a ‘thousand small hammers’ to tackle climate change, he was not able to put in place one overarching policy framework, since the CPP was never implemented. The Obama administration did succeed in launching several notable federal standards for specific sectors, such as upgraded energy efficiency rules for home appliances and building codes, as well as regulations to contain methane leaks. Throughout Obama’s Presidency however, progressive states and cities continued to enjoy wide latitude and autonomy on climate policy. States such as Massachusetts and New York continued to innovate by enacting their own ambitious local climate initiatives. This is especially significant since, as will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, the American states and cities in our sample began to formulate some of their most notable climate initiatives during Obama’s Presidency in preparation for the 2015 Paris COP. Hence, local green policies developed by New York/NY and Boston/MA were in many ways shaped by the absence of a binding national framework on climate policy, which provided them with the opportunity to develop their own innovative plans at the sub-national level. The Obama administration made efforts to associate sub-state and non-state actors, including those in our sample, in

143 US Supreme Court. Order in Pending Case: West Virginia et al. v. EPA et al. Order 577 U.S., 9 February 2016. See also Hurley and Volcovici (2016). 144 This provides an interesting example of how ‘conflictual federalism’ has now become the norm, due to the level of polarization that climate change has acquired in American politics. Regardless of which Party is in office, the other one systematically launches lawsuits to oppose either the enactment or the dismantlement of federal climate policies and initiatives.

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the formulation of the American NDC to the Paris Agreement, which was supposed to be achieved through enactment of the Clean Power Plan. Consultations organized by the EPA took place in the years and months before elaboration of the CPP, whereby cities, states, businesses and civil society were able to provide inputs on how to fashion America’s NDC in preparation for the Paris climate conference in 2015.145 The objective was to shield the administration from domestic criticism and neutralize Republican opposition by demonstrating that climate action enjoyed broad-based support across American society. Nevertheless, the US has lacked an appropriate framework to institutionalize the involvement of sub-state and non-state actors within the process of national climate policy formulation, due to persistent Republican opposition,146 along with pressure from lobbying groups. Consultative processes were inadequate for cities and states such as Boston/MA or New York/NY, which were not provided with an official role in the formulation of the CPP. In fact, they were only associated via an ad-hoc process, which lacked any binding or structured component, including in terms of how comments were submitted to the EPA during the public comment period. This highlights the ways in which the potential monitoring role for sub-state entities as ‘watchdogs’ on national climate policies or NDCs, remains underdeveloped in the US; this weakens the level of accountability and transparency with respect to the NDC. Instead, the CPP was still adopted on a voluntary basis and provided a framework for a number of sub-national entities to continue with the implementation of their local climate initiatives during Trump’s Presidency and up until Biden’s election (see below). 3.2

Climate Policy Rollbacks Under Trump’s Presidency (2016–2020), Involving an Extreme Version of Cooperative Federalism

Donald Trump’s election as US President in November 2016, along with Republican majorities in both Houses of Congress that year, signaled a

145 This included up to four million comments submitted to the EPA during the ‘public comment period’. 146 See Layzer (2012) and Turner and Isenberg (2018).

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dramatic end to the Obama era, highlighting a substantial degree of polarization in American politics.147 This repeats the pattern, identified above, whereby multilevel governance is not static but evolves over time, often due to changes in administration, in this case a major swing in policies at the national echelon. The Trump administration embraced an extreme version of neoliberalism involving a drastic deregulatory agenda, unfettered fossil fuel development and a staunch rejection of climate policies that stood accused of harming the US economy.148 Throughout his Presidency, Trump never recognized the science of climate change, describing it at various times as a ‘hoax’, and took the momentous decision to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement in June 2017.149 The influence of powerful corporate and industrial lobbying groups,150 such as the fossil fuel industry, reached unprecedented levels under Trump’s Presidency. His administration slashed the EPA’s budget and drastically reduced its workforce. Consequently, the Trump administration followed former President Bush Jr.’s example, making concerted efforts to suppress climate change and related science. For instance, individuals who openly contested climate change, often with strong ties to the industries they would be regulating, were appointed to leadership positions, including Scott Pruitt and his successor Andrew Wheeler at the head of the EPA, along with members of the agency’s Board of Scientific Counselors. Public communications from the EPA on climate change were halted, scientific information and data on the subject was removed from official documents and websites, and government reports on the subject were systematically buried.151 As explained above, the Democrats’ inability to push through a climate law in Congress during Obama’s first two years in office meant that

147 Zelizer (2022). 148 See Anderson et al. (2017) and Bomberg (2017). 149 See Jotzo et al. (2018). See also Blau (2018). 150 On the influence of special interest groups over the US political system, see: Drutman (2015), Charnock (2020), Quirk (2016), and Brown (2016). 151 For instance, the Trump administration edited a major report by the Defense Department to water down its conclusions on climate change, and ordered the EPA to suppress the scientific evidence it relies on to develop regulations.

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all climate policies were enacted via regulations and executive orders— mostly during his second term.152 Because executive orders lack durability and can be rescinded relatively easily, Trump was able to undo many of Obama’s ‘thousand small hammers’ to address climate change.153 Trump quickly signed a flurry of executive orders to repeal or drastically loosen a number of Obama’s landmark climate achievements,154 including the 2013 Climate Action Plan; light, medium and heavy-duty vehicle fuel emission standards; upgraded energy efficiency rules for home appliances and building codes; as well as regulations to contain methane leaks.155 He ordered all departments to work towards eliminating any rule that could potentially restrict US fossil fuel and energy production, discarding the ‘social cost of carbon’ established by the previous administration.156 Likewise, he repealed Obama’s ban on offshore oil and gas drilling along large parts of the Atlantic and Arctic coasts, along with his predecessor’s moratorium on coal leasing from federal lands. Partly due to the importance of coal mining communities within the core Republican electoral base in key swing states, the Trump administration attempted to enact a ‘coal renaissance’. This meant weakening or getting rid of many regulations on coal production enacted under Obama or previous US presidents, including the ‘New Source Review’, stream protection and coal ash rules, for example. Nevertheless, the paradox is that Trump had to rely extensively on executive action to repeal Obama’s executive orders.157 Trump’s maverick and populist presidential style, combined with his background as an outsider to the Washington political establishment, created difficulties with Republicans in Congress, as demonstrated by his conspicuous failure

152 Partly due to pressure from special interest groups and the prioritizing of other issues like health care. See Shafie (2020). 153 Obama’s strategy of a ‘thousand small hammers’ was at least partly successful, since the multiplication of so many different initiatives meant that Trump was unable to completely roll all of them back. 154 See Kraft (2021), Smith and Jacques (2022), and Vig et al. (2021). 155 Trump also ordered the EPA to stop gathering gas and oil company data, which is

relied upon to contain methane leaks from infrastructure. 156 The ‘social cost of carbon’ had been established under Obama as a regulatory tool, putting a price on the future damage which society will have to pay for every ton of CO2 that is generated. 157 See Thompson et al. (2020).

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to repeal Obama’s Health Care law. Likewise, Republicans failed to win a ‘super majority’ in the Senate during the 2016 elections, rendering them vulnerable to filibusters from Democrats to block legislation. Polarization on climate change reached heightened levels,158 incited by Trump’s policies and provocative rhetoric. Once Republicans lost their majority in the House following the 2018 mid-term elections, the Congressional gridlock of previous administrations was perpetuated. This constrained the margin of maneuver available to the Trump administration to fully rescind Obama’s climate legacy, and was compounded by the fact that the EPA was still under a legal obligation to regulate GHG emissions under the provisions of the Clean Air Act following the 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court (Massachusetts v. EPA).159 Hence, Republicans could not simply repeal all climate policies enacted by the Obama administration, but were legally obliged to develop alternatives in a number of cases. For these reasons, while Trump had no other choice than to rely on the framework of cooperative federalism developed over the last few decades, the latter was transformed into an extreme version. This was especially apparent in the way in which the Trump administration sought to undo the CPP, Obama’s signature climate initiative. Because Republicans could not unilaterally repudiate the CPP and were legally required to develop an alternative, in conformity with the Clean Air Act, Trump signed an executive order in March 2017 directing the EPA to review and replace the CPP; one year later, the federal budget completely defunded it. In March 2019, EPA Administrator Wheeler introduced plans to change the methods used by the EPA to calculate health risks from air pollution and to enable the reporting of fewer deaths each year. This essentially constituted the CPP’s repeal. The new ‘Affordable Clean Energy Rule’ (ACE) was finalized in July 2019160 and came to epitomize the Trump administration’s extreme version of cooperative federalism. Under the ACE rule, states were only required to implement modest upgrades in power plant efficiency (known as ‘heat rate improvements’), so as to draw more energy from the same quantity of fuel in order to

158 See Turner and Isenberg (2018) and Bomberg (2017). 159 See Lazarus (2020). 160 US EPA (2019, July 8). Affordable Clean Energy Rule—Final Version, US Federal

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decrease the carbon intensity per unit of generated energy.161 According to the EPA’s own analysis, this would have only reduced emissions from the power sector by 11 million tons up to 2030, which represents a trivial 0.7 to 1.5% overall, in stark contrast to the objective of cutting emissions by 32% under Obama’s initial CPP.162 This significant disparity was linked to contrasting interpretations of Section 111 of the Clean Air Act on “best system emissions reduction” (BSER). As previously discussed, the CPP adopted a broad interpretation of Section 111 to include both onand off-site emission reduction measures, encouraging states to combine power plant emissions limits with a wide range of other measures, such as the development of renewable energies, carbon trading or carbon capture and storage. By contrast, the ACE rule showcased a much narrower interpretation of EPA authority under Section 111 by limiting BSER to the restricted set of on-site energy efficiency measures for individual power plants.163 While the EPA was still required to regulate GHGs under the CAA, neither the law nor the Supreme Court laid out explicitly how rigorous the agency had to be in fulfilling that mandate. Consequently, the ACE rule would have led many power plants in the US to emit more GHGs up to 2030 and beyond, compared to a scenario where no policy had been enacted. Clearly, the ACE rule represented an extreme version of cooperative federalism, whereby states were given very wide latitude to do mostly as they pleased, independent of the federal government. Consequently, the federal void on climate change policy was largely exacerbated during Trump’s Presidency. This situation provided states such as New York and Massachusetts a free hand to continue innovating through ambitious climate policy agendas at the sub-national level, relying on the broad powers granted to them under US constitutional law.164 As will be examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, a number of progressive sub-state

161 US EPA (2019). Fact Sheet—The Affordable Clean Energy Rule (ACE). 162 The EPA noted that US GHG emissions were still likely to fall by 35% up to 2030,

but this would not be the result of the ACE rule and would rather be linked to the accelerating deployment of renewable energies due to the fall in costs for such technologies, along with the continuation of the ‘shale gas’ revolution begun under Obama. See US EPA (2018). 163 US EPA (2019). Affordable Clean Energy Rule. 164 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018),

and Robertson (2017).

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entities, mostly located on the East and West coasts, chose to voluntarily continue adhering to the objectives which had been set out by Obama’s Clean Power Plan, despite Trump’s repeal and replacement with the ACE rule. The coastal states of New York, California and Washington played a leadership role in launching the US Climate Alliance in 2017.165 The Alliance pledged to fully uphold within state borders the Obama-era commitments under the Paris Agreement, as set out in the CPP, of reducing GHG emissions by 26 to 28% for 2025, as well as by 32% up to 2030. This was confirmed with the launching of two other national climate coalitions (‘We Are Still In’—WASI, and ‘America’s Pledge’), which brought together the efforts of all non-state and sub-state actors in the US that remained committed to upholding the targets of the CPP.166 The cities of Boston and New York played proactive roles within national city networks such as Climate Mayors, which also pledged to uphold Obama-era commitments at the municipal level.167 While the state of Massachusetts never in fact joined WASI and did not play a leadership role in launching the US Climate Alliance, the fact that former Governor Baker still chose to participate in the Alliance was tantamount to pledging to uphold the CPP’s targets within his state. This highlights the ways in which coalitions of sub-national actors may reinforce or create new proclimate groups and communities across the country. Therefore, all climate policies and laws enacted by New York/NY and Boston/MA at the subnational and local level from 2017 up until Biden’s election, constituted innovative attempts to develop climate initiatives that aligned with the CPP; the objective was to remain engaged in fulfilling the official Obamaera US climate pledge under the Paris framework. This represented more of a symbolic commitment, however, since the climate policies and laws put in place by the US cities and states in our sample under Trump far surpassed the level of ambition of Obama’s CPP. For instance, the respective Green New Deals set out by the city and state of New York in 2019 both pledged to reduce GHG emissions by 40% up to 2030, as well as achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century.

165 United States Climate Alliance, http://www.usclimatealliance.org. 166 We Are Still In: https://www.wearestillin.com. America’s Pledge: https://www.ame

ricaspledgeonclimate.com. 167 US Climate Mayors: https://climatemayors.org.

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Boston established an even more ambitious target of cutting emissions 50% by 2030 and also initially pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050,168 with the possibility of being upgraded to a decade earlier by Mayor Michelle Wu (elected in 2021) under her far-reaching municipal ‘Green New Deal’.169 While the state of Massachusetts dragged behind the city of Boston in its level of climate ambition during Baker’s first term, the Governor still enacted several noteworthy policies at the time, partly galvanized by the municipal echelon. Once again, this affirms that substate actors may act as catalysts, leading the way through the enactment of far-reaching climate initiatives on a local level, with national governments striving to catch up. Chapters 6 and 7 will provide detailed examples of how sub-national entities even engaged in competition among themselves in order to be seen as actively promoting environmental reform, as a point of contrast with President Trump. Due to the level of polarization in American politics, bold climate initiatives at the sub-state level were mostly limited to the East and West coasts. Progressive states, like New York and Massachusetts on the East Coast, and California on the West Coast (the largest US state and 5th economy in the world), constitute vibrant hubs at the heart of the American economy. Coalitions like ‘We Are Still In’ and its successor ‘America Is All In’ bring together a diverse range of non-state actors, which represent over half of the US’s GDP. This clearly emphasizes the ways in which sub-national actors can play an essential role in terms of closing the GHG emissions gap stemming from inadequate federal policies and, in the case of the Trump administration, extensive regulatory rollbacks. This represents a key aspect of the contributions from non-state actors within the global climate regime.170 While the extreme version of cooperative federalism laid out in the ACE rule granted states extensive latitude to develop their own local climate initiatives, it also allowed other, less progressive states to do very little, and in some cases nothing at all, to address climate change.

168 In that sense, the US cities and states in our sample anticipated some of the renewed climate pledges that would be made at the national level by the Biden administration a few years later (see Chapter 3). 169 Office of Boston City Councilor Michelle Wu (2020), Planning for a Boston Green New Deal & Just Recovery. 170 Hale (2018).

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Although polarization on climate issues was not a recent phenomenon,171 it reached a high point under Trump, triggered by the provocative rhetoric of the former President. As examined above, not only did the Trump administration deny climate change, but it actively sought to cast doubt and discredit the science of global warming in a variety of different ways, extensively relayed by conservative media. Thus, many conservative or Republican leaning states were in fact encouraged to lower their level of climate ambition under Trump, at the same time that progressive states were galvanized into doing precisely the opposite. The polarizing nature of Trump’s Presidency also had negative consequences in terms of overall progress with reducing US GHG emissions from 2016 to 2020. In the end, less than half of all US states (twenty-four states and two territories in total) ended up joining the US Climate Alliance.172 As a result, many sub-national actors relied on Trump’s regulatory rollbacks and the wide latitude provided by the ACE rule to stall any genuine climate action. A number of fairly conservative rural states, mostly in the Midwest or the ‘rust belt’, took the opportunity to renege on previous climate policies and commitments. While these states had certainly not been very proactive due to gridlock at the national level and conservative politics at the local level, they had still been forced to comply with certain federal climate rules under Obama, including standards for vehicle fuel emissions, upgraded energy efficiency for home appliances and building codes, as well as methane leaks. Such a situation became problematic in that conservative-leaning states represent between a third to half of the country in terms of GDP and GHG emissions (depending on how measurements are taken).173 For example, while Texas is the second largest economy in the US after California, it produces close to double the rate of GHG emissions, making Texas by far the most polluting state in the Union. For these reasons, the repeal of the CPP under Trump and its replacement by the mostly symbolic ACE rule, combined with extensive regulatory rollbacks, permitted between a third to half the country to fall behind in terms of climate policy. This exacerbated differences with more progressive states, such as Massachusetts and New York in our sample, which redoubled

171 This was already true during the Obama era. See Brewer (2012). 172 See US Climate Alliance, http://www.usclimatealliance.org. 173 Ibid.

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efforts by developing far-reaching climate initiatives at the sub-national level, efforts that are discussed in detail in Chapters 6 and 7. Consequently, such a state of affairs led to the emergence of two related problems, often denominated as ‘free-riding’ and ‘carbon leakage’. ‘Free-riding’ refers to a situation whereby conservative laggard states may choose not to enact adequate climate policies, while still enjoying some of the overall benefits stemming from the high level of green ambition demonstrated by other more progressive states. ‘Carbon leakage’, a related problem, is linked to the fact that firms may respond to strict climate regulations in a given state by relocating carbon-intensive activities to other states with less stringent regulations. This tends to engender net economic costs and losses for states with a higher level of green ambition, which may discourage the enactment of more rigorous climate policies over time. The end result of such stark sub-national variations has meant that the US lost precious time in meeting national objectives, which the Obama administration set out in the CPP as part of America’s initial pledge under the Paris Agreement.174 The fact that between a third to half of all states were able to rely on the policies of the Trump administration to lower their level of climate ambition, leading to ‘free-riding’ and ‘carbon leakage’, clearly had a negative impact on the pace of US national GHG emission reductions. The timing was also especially problematic, since it coincided with the period when governments were supposed to make preparations for launching their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) post-2020. This situation also rendered it more difficult for the Biden administration to develop a renewed and credible American NDC in preparation for the COP26, as discussed in Chapter 3. This clearly highlights the vital importance of the national echelon in terms of the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance and interaction between the different echelons. While states play an essential role, the federal echelon continues to possess key strategic importance when it comes to setting overarching and binding climate objectives, which sub-national actors are then required to follow and implement. This was precisely the aim of the CPP set out under Obama, which established binding national minimum standards that all US states had to meet in order to prevent the emergence of pronounced discrepancies, such 174 On America’s initial pledge under the Paris Agreement, see Konisky (2020), Kraft (2021), and Smith and Jacques (2022).

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as those which eventually emerged under Trump’s much weaker ACE rule.175 Trump’s extreme version of cooperative federalism negatively impacted progressive sub-national actors in a variety of ways. It is undeniable that the lack of federal support under Trump had a detrimental effect on states such as New York and Massachusetts. Indeed, progressive states and cities might have been able to go even further with their local climate plans had they received support from the federal government under Trump. For example, Obama’s CPP had included a ‘Clean Energy Incentive Program’ to financially reward states for early investments in clean energy, including renewables and energy efficiency; such rewards provided a flexible mechanism for the EPA to incentivize states into raising their level of ambition. Thus, if sub-national actors in the US receive inadequate support from the federal government to enact their climate agendas,176 this can impact their ability to develop far-reaching local climate initiatives or enact them sooner, in spite of the broad powers granted to states under US constitutional law.177 This represents a striking point of contrast to the situation in France where, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the national government has provided sub-state entities with consistent support over time in the implementation of their local climate policies. Once more, this highlights the key role that the national echelon continues to play in the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance, and the essential support it can provide to local actors. This reinforces the pattern whereby each echelon plays a distinctive role within the multilevel governance pyramid, and the different levels can in fact mutually support one another if the right policies are enacted. Overall, these various elements point to several weaknesses of the American federal system in the articulation of multilevel governance 175 As previously explained, while all states had to meet federal minimum standards under the CPP, they were still given the option of adopting their own more ambitious sub-national plans that surpassed the national floor during the implementation phase, as exemplified by New York and Massachusetts in our sample (see Chapters 6 and 7). See also US EPA (2015). 176 As examined in this chapter, although President Bill Clinton had lofty climate ambitions, he lost both Houses of Congress in the 1994 mid-term elections, which constrained him for the rest of his Presidency. Likewise, while it is true that Obama did enact a number of different climate policies through executive action during his second term, none had the ambit of the CPP in terms of supporting sub-national actors. 177 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019) and Coleman and Leskiw (2018).

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and interaction between the different echelons. The degree of policy harmonization and coordination between the federal and state echelons is inadequate on the whole. This has led to the emergence of a lower national minimum standard, with many climate laggards across the US, mostly in Republican-voting areas, which rely on greater flexibility to avoid or delay compliance. As previously explained, these states may represent between a third to half the country, depending on how measurements are taken. This increases the risk of conflict between the different echelons due to the multiplication of disparate standards across states, which may result in federal monitoring and enforcement challenges. Such a situation can also trigger related issues such as ‘free riding’ or ‘carbon leakage’ from one state to another. While Trump’s Presidency and the ACE rule undoubtedly constituted an extreme case, several of these problems were already apparent with Obama’s Clean Power Plan and are linked to the very nature of cooperative federalism as defined under US constitutional law. As discussed above, most of Obama’s climate initiatives had provided states with a high degree of autonomy in the implementation process. This resulted in a situation where even a strong central thrust at the federal level was diluted in practice at the sub-national level during the enactment phase. The articulation of multilevel climate governance in the US was further exacerbated by the fact that the Trump administration endeavored to actively undermine sub-national climate initiatives in general. Although reminiscent of the situation under President Bush Jr., Trump’s assault on California’s vehicle emission standards, for example, was unprecedented in its scale and ambit. In September 2019, the White House unilaterally rescinded California’s right to develop its own efficiency standards for vehicle emissions, while simultaneously banning other states from continuing to rely on these standards or from establishing similar rules.178 California was granted a special waiver by the EPA during the 1970s to develop its own standards in this area, which were allowed to be more stringent than national norms.179 In 1977, other states were authorized 178 See US EPA & Department of Transportation (2019, September). Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program Rule (SAFE-1), Federal Register Vol. 84 No. 188. 179 This was partly due to the dangerous levels of toxic smog in the city of Los Angeles at the time, even though California would still have to justify its waiver, which had to be approved by the EPA with each new set of rules.

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to adopt California’s stricter standards or follow federal rules, but were not permitted to establish their own. Over the last few decades, the golden state’s vehicle emission rules gradually turned into a benchmark for car-makers nationwide.180 The state of New York adopted California’s ‘Criteria Pollutant Regulation’ for ‘Low Emission Vehicles’ (LEV) in 1993, along with its ‘Zero-Emission Vehicle’ (ZEV) standards under Section 177 of the Clean Air Act the same year; likewise, Massachusetts adopted these same regulations two years later in 1995. The two states in our sample were among the first to follow California’s lead on LEV and ZEV emission standards, highlighting their early commitment to ambitious climate action. Yet, it wasn’t until 2005 that California finally adopted far-reaching GHG standards for motor vehicles; by 2009, both New York and Massachusetts had approved these new rules in turn. Obama was able to rely on California’s pioneering vehicle GHG standards for motor vehicles as a model and ordered the EPA to enact similar norms at the federal level. This provides a clear example of how sub-national actors may serve as ‘laboratories of democracy’, where new policies can be tested, before subsequently being adopted by the higher echelons of governance. In addition to Massachusetts and New York in our sample, ten other states (thirteen in total—including California itself), as well as the District of Columbia, had adopted the golden state’s stricter vehicle emission standards by 2019, comprising close to a third of the overall US car market. With transportation surpassing the power sector in 2016 as the largest source of American GHG emissions, California’s waiver has come to play an instrumental role in terms of reducing federal emissions. In addition to serving as a model for the Obama administration in a bottom-up manner, the latter represents an example of how sub-national actors may also operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ on a horizontal scale. It highlights the ways in which new policies may be tested by one entity—in this case, vehicle emission standards from California—before being adopted by others states. For these reasons, Trump’s decision to unilaterally rescind California’s right to develop its own efficiency standards for motor vehicles in September 2019 negatively impacted not only US GHG emission levels, 180 As a result, certain emission control techniques which started out in California, such as catalytic converters and oxide nitrogen regulations, have since become widespread across the US.

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but also the articulation of multilevel governance. This represented an acute version of the ‘conflictual federalism’ which had already emerged under President Bush Jr. Trump’s decision clearly constituted a direct assault from the federal echelon on ambitious climate initiatives developed at the sub-national level. It also undermined the nascent US market for zero-emission vehicles at a critical time. This was especially problematic since other states, like New York or Massachusetts, were prohibited from developing their own similar standards to replace those from California. Given the growing prominence of the transportation sector in terms of overall GHG emissions, this hindered the ability of the American states and cities in our sample to continue developing their climate initiatives at the sub-national level. Several progressive states chose to instigate legal actions to contest the policies of the Trump administration, which came in addition to the lawsuits launched to oppose the CPP’s repeal. Trump’s assault on sub-national climate initiatives contradicted, somewhat ironically, official Republican discourse about the importance of states’ rights.181 States’ rights provided a justification for developing an extreme version of cooperative federalism, whereby states were mostly left to do as they please under the ACE rule. Interestingly, Trump’s unilateral repeal of California’s waiver for vehicle emission standards was widely interpreted by Democrats at the time as constituting a violation of states’ rights. The legal actions launched by progressive states bore fruit since on the last full day of Trump’s Presidency in January 2021, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals chose to reject the ACE rule, stating that it conflicted with key provisions of the Clean Air Act.182 While the federal court did not order the re-instatement of the CPP, it did provide a clean slate for the incoming Biden administration to come-up with its own new National Climate Plan,183 which will be examined in more detail in Chapter 3. Despite all the actions undertaken by the Trump administration to weaken US climate efforts, GHG emissions in fact continued to decline during Trump’s Presidency. This was not a result of the ACE rule, but rather the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing economic recession which led to a reduction in GHG emissions during Trump’s 181 On Republican discourse about states’ rights in relation to environmental matters, see Turner and Isenberg (2018). 182 US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, American Lung Association v. EPA, No. 19–1140, 19 January 2021. 183 See Morehouse (2021).

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last year in office.184 More importantly, although US GHG emissions continued to decline overall under Trump, this happened at a much slower pace than had been the case under Obama. Emissions would have most likely declined at a faster rate had the Trump administration not rolled back so many of Obama’s ‘thousand small hammers’ on climate change. Since around half the country took the opportunity of Trump’s aggressive regulatory rollbacks to stall on any genuine climate action, this had a negative impact on the pace of national emission reductions from 2016 to 2020, and beyond. At the same time, the shale gas revolution begun during Obama’s Presidency accelerated under Trump. In order to stimulate the economy, Obama had relied on technological innovations to encourage the development of new types of fossil fuels such as shale gas, overseeing an historic ‘shale revolution’ which turned the US into the first world producer of natural gas, surpassing even Russia.185 Despite other environmental issues, shale gas is far less polluting in terms of GHG emissions and is much cheaper than coal. This explains why it has gradually come to replace coal as a source of power generation across the US. Despite Trump’s best efforts, his administration’s attempts to enact a ‘coal renaissance’ were ultimately unsuccessful.186 A final important factor in GHG reductions has been the dramatic fall in costs for most renewable energies, due to technological breakthroughs involving solar, wind power and battery storage. As a competitive and cheaper source of energy, renewables have become one of the fastestgrowing sectors in the US, including in terms of job creation, far outpacing coal.187 Renewables surpassed coal as a source of power generation in the US for the first time in 2019, on Trump’s watch,188 providing a foundation the Biden administration could rely on to enact its ambitious federal climate agenda, discussed in Chapter 3. Thus, in addition to sub-national actor initiatives, market forces developed under Obama also 184 See Larsen et al. (2020). 185 See Lavelle (2016). 186 Barichella (2021). 187 Hence, due to market-based forces, even conservative states like Texas have been undergoing a partial green transition over the last few years in terms of the development of renewable energy sources, despite political opposition from the Republican Governor Greg Abbott. 188 Barichella (2019).

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played an essential role in counteracting Trump’s regulatory rollbacks and climate skeptic agenda.

4

Conclusion

This chapter has examined multilevel environmental governance and the nature of interactions from the sub-national (states and cities) to the national level, relying on an historical approach spanning the decades up through the contrasting Presidencies of Obama and Trump. The second echelon of the multilevel pyramid is significant due to the highly strategic position that federal policies have had for the effective articulation of multilevel environmental governance over the last couple of decades. This chapter assessed the different ways in which the national echelon has either supported or hindered the implementation of local and regional environmental/climate initiatives for the US states and cities in our sample (New York/NY and Boston/MA) from an historical perspective. It has highlighted various factors that explain why the US constitutes a particularly relevant paradigm in terms of the articulation of multilevel governance, justifying its choice as a sample country. The American federal system provides states with extensive competences and a high degree of autonomy,189 under a framework of ‘cooperative federalism’. As a result, Congress and the federal government may establish a national minimum standard (or floor) for environmental legislation and policies.190 This has allowed progressive states to go beyond the minimum standard by enacting their own initiatives at the sub-national echelon, which are often well adapted to the local context. Yet, under the Tenth Amendment, the US federal system is such that the national government cannot directly attribute competences to local governments such as cities. These fall under state authority, which may ascribe to them a degree of autonomy considered appropriate, depending on local circumstances. This chapter also underscored the fact that most of America’s national environmental statutes were passed during the so-called ‘environmental decade’ spanning the 1960s and 1970s.191 This historical

189 On the legal mechanisms of the US federal system, see Fisher and Harriger (2019). 190 On US environmental law and politics, see Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Rowell and

van Zeben (2021), Elliott and Esty (2021). 191 Kraft (2000) and Hays (2000).

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period witnessed the enactment of far-reaching environmental policies and legislation by Presidents from both Parties, supported by large bipartisan majorities in Congress. Such a situation changed with the advent of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies, culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980. From that point onwards, the Republican Party endeavored to block environmental and climate legislation, accused of harming economic development. This led to persistent federal gridlock; neoliberalism also provided an ideal paradigm for lobbying groups to increase their sway over the American political system, thereby reinforcing gridlock. For these reasons, federal support to sub-national actors on environmental matters has been somewhat unpredictable. Although the election of Barack Obama as President in 2008 ushered in new hopes of improvement with a number of notable achievements,192 he was unable to enact several of his more ambitious climate policy proposals. Trump’s Presidency then led to extensive climate policy rollbacks, along with the development of an extreme version of cooperative federalism, leaving states to do mostly as they please. This created a vacuum at the federal level, with the unintended consequence of increasing the margin of maneuver for progressive states to enact their own climate initiatives at the local level.193 Consequently, the historical development of environmental politics in the US highlights a partially inadequate framework for multilevel environmental/climate governance. At the same time, this chapter analyzed a number of notable patterns regarding the articulation of multilevel governance in the US, involving the interaction of sub-national entities with the federal echelon. For instance, US sub-state actors may act as pioneers and catalysts, leading the way with far-reaching climate policies in the implementation of local climate initiatives. The national government often strives to catch up and may be galvanized by states, such as New York and Massachusetts, into raising its level of ambition over time. Likewise, sub-state actors may also operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ whereby new, innovative climate policies can be tested on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment

192 On climate initiatives enacted under Obama, see Bailey (2019). 193 Regarding polarization on climate issues under Obama, see Brewer (2012).

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at the national echelon. This reinforces the idea that cities, and subnational actors more generally, can help to set the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. Moreover, this chapter emphasized that each echelon has a distinctive role to play within the multilevel pyramid; these echelons can mutually support and complement one another, if the right policies are enacted. Therefore, while sub-state actors like those in our sample play a vital role within the climate regime, the national echelon remains essential from a strategic point of view when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Furthermore, cities and local governments are often not actively mobilized in the implementation process of national environmental policies. Instead, the federal government prioritizes interaction with states, while cities or local governments collaborate mostly with state-level authorities. This places the intermediary echelon (i.e., states) in a privileged position.194 Finally, the national echelon of the multilevel pyramid is not static, but evolves over time. This is due either to changes in elected administrations at the federal level, which have been especially radical in the US due to the polarization of American politics on issues like climate change, or to changes in policy platforms within the same administration over time.

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Certain Highways in Accordance with title 23 of the United States Code, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 87–866, enacted in 1962. 88th US Congress. (1963–1965). ‘Clean Air Act’—An Act to Improve, Strengthen, and Accelerate Programs for the Prevention and Abatement of Air Pollution. Public Law 88–206, enacted in 1963 with major amendments in 1965, 1967, 1970, 1977 and 1990. 91st US Congress. (1969–1971). ‘National Environmental Policy Act’—An Act to Establish a National Policy for the Environment; to Authorize Studies, Surveys, and Research Relating to Ecological Systems, Natural Resources, and the Quality of the Human Environment; and to Establish a Board of Environmental Quality Advisers. Public Law 91–190, enacted in 1970 with major amendments in 1975 and 1982. 92nd US Congress. (1971–1973). ‘Clean Water Act’—An Act to Amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Public Law 92–500, enacted in 1972 with major amendments in 1977 and 1987. 93rd US Congress. (1973–1975). ‘Safe Drinking Water Act’—An Act to Amend the Public Health Service Act to Assure that the Public Is Provided with Safe Drinking Water, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 93–523, enacted in 1974 with major amendments in 1986 and 1996. 94th US Congress. (1975–1977). ‘Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’— An Act to Provide Technical and Financial Assistance for the Development of Management Plans and Facilities for the Recovery of Energy and Other Resources from Discarded Materials and for the Safe Disposal of Discarded Materials, and to Regulate the Management of Hazardous Waste. Public Law 94–580, enacted in 1976 with major amendments in 1980, 1984 and 1996. 94th US Congress. (1975–1977). ‘Toxic Substances Control Act’—An Act to Regulate Commerce and Protect Human Health and the Environment by Requiring Testing and Necessary Use Restrictions on Certain Chemical Substances, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 94–469, enacted in 1976 with major amendments in 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992 and 2016. 95th US Congress. (1977–1979). ‘Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act’—An Act to Provide for the Cooperation Between the Secretary of the Interior and the States with Respect to the Regulation of Surface Coal Mining Operations, and the Acquisition and Reclamation of Abandoned Mines, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 95–87, enacted in 1977. 96th US Congress. (1979–1981). ‘Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act’—An Act to Provide for Liability, Compensation, Cleanup, and Emergency Response for Hazardous Substances Released into the Environment and the Cleanup of Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites. Public Law 96–510, enacted in 1980 with a major amendment in 1986. 111th US Congress. (2009–2010). ‘American Clean Energy and Security Act’— A Bill to Create Clean Energy Jobs, Achieve Energy Independence, Reduce

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Global Warming Pollution and Transition to a Clean Energy Economy, H.R.2454. Passed the House of Representatives in June 2009. 111th US Congress. (2009–2010). ‘American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’—An Act Making Supplemental Appropriations for Job Preservation and Creation, Infrastructure Investment, Energy Efficiency and Science, Assistance to the Unemployed, State, and Local Fiscal Stabilization, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, and for Other Purposes. Public Law 111–5, enacted in February 2009. US Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, American Lung Association and American Public Health Association v. Environmental Protection Agency, No. 19–1140, 19 January 2021. US EPA. (2009, December). Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act. US EPA. (2015, October 23). Clean Power Plan Final Rule—Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units. Federal Register Vol. 80 No. 205. US EPA. (2015—Archive Document). Fact Sheet: Overview of the Clean Power Plan, Cutting Carbon Pollution from Power Plants. US EPA. (2018), Fact Sheet: Proposed ACE Rule—CO 2 Emissions Trends. US EPA. (2019, July 8). Affordable Clean Energy Rule—Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions From Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations. US Federal Vol. 84 No. 130. US EPA. (2019). Fact Sheet—The Affordable Clean Energy Rule (ACE). US EPA, & Department of Transportation. (2019, September). Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient Vehicles Rule Part One: One National Program Rule (SAFE-1). Federal Register Vol. 84 No. 188. US Supreme Court. Massachusetts, et al., Petitioners v. Environmental Protection Agency, et al. No. 05–1120, decided on 2 April 2007. US Supreme Court. Order in Pending Case: West Virginia et al. v. EPA et al. Order List 577 U.S., 9 February 2016.

Websites America’s Pledge. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.americaspled geonclimate.com Boston Region Metropolitan Planning Organization. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://www.ctps.org New York Metropolitan Transportation Council. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://www.nymtc.org

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President Clinton’s Climate Change Initiatives, White House Archives. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://clintonwhitehouse2.archives.gov/WH/SOT U99/climate.html Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https:// www.rggi.org US Department of Energy—Office Electricity, 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://www.energy. gov/oe/information-center/recovery-act US EPA, Clean Air Act Text—What Is the Clean Air Act? Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-text US EPA, Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview US EPA, Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions We Are Still In. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.wearestillin.com Western Climate Initiative. Retrieved January 19, 2023, from https://wciinc.org

CHAPTER 3

Climate Politics Under Biden: The Clean Energy Revolution, Enhanced Cooperative Federalism and the ‘All-of-Government’ Approach

1

Introduction

The third chapter further develops the material examined in the previous chapter by analyzing multilevel governance from the national to the subnational (states and cities) level on climate issues under President Biden. US policies at the federal level represent the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid and are significant due to the highly strategic importance of national policies for the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. This chapter provides evidence to assess the different ways in which the federal echelon has either supported or hindered the implementation of local climate initiatives for the American states and cities in our sample (New York/NY and Boston/MA). It concentrates on events that have unfolded under Joe Biden’s Presidency, including the 2020 Presidential election and the 2022 mid-term elections. Hence, Sect. 2 focuses on Biden’s Clean Energy Revolution platform with an ‘all-of-government’ approach involving an enhanced form of cooperative federalism. After that, Sect. 3 assesses the adequacy of the US climate policy framework enacted under Biden, including in terms of multilevel governance and the ‘all-of-government’ approach.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_3

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As explained in Chapter 2, the US constitutes a particularly relevant paradigm for the articulation of multilevel climate governance. Its federal system provides states with a high degree of autonomy, under a system of ‘cooperative federalism’. This has been especially apparent under Biden’s Presidency, since Democrats have relied on sub-national green initiatives as a springboard to enact their ambitious federal climate agenda. The Biden administration has sought to develop an ‘all-of-government’ approach involving an enhanced form of ‘cooperative federalism’ to closely associate states in the implementation process. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Democrats continue to face significant obstacles to implement their proposed ambitious federal climate policy agenda.1 Due to pressure exercised by powerful lobbying groups, along with the influence of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies, the Republican Party has continued its obstruction of environmental and climate legislation at the federal level (and in certain states). This includes staunch Republican opposition in Congress, which has worsened following the 2022 mid-term elections and the new conservative majority in the House of Representatives. Republican hindrance has also been apparent in a number of conservative states across the country; conservative opposition in the federal court system has likewise been robust, due to Trump-era nominations. Hence, climate policies enacted under Biden are currently inadequate to meet the objectives set out in the renewed US NDC, and the articulation of multilevel governance with sub-state entities remains inadequate on a number of counts. For these reasons, the partially inadequate framework on climate policy between the federal and sub-national echelons under President Biden provides for engaging material to explore nuances in the articulation of multilevel governance.2

1 Barichella (2021). 2 As in the previous chapter, this chapter is informed by an extensive range of interviews

with US public officials currently working at the federal and state levels on climate policy and clean energy, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks, NGOs and the private sector. They provided relevant insights about Biden’s attempts to re-enact an ambitious federal climate policy agenda, and the ways in which sub-national entities have been closely associated in the implementation process. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1).

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The Clean Energy Revolution Under Biden (Since 2021), with an ‘All-of-Government’ Approach Involving an Enhanced Form of Cooperative Federalism The 2020 US Presidential Election and Biden’s Clean Energy Revolution Platform, with an ‘All-of-Government’ Approach Relying on Enhanced Cooperative Federalism

Joe Biden’s election as the 46th US President in November 2020 marked another radical swing of the political pendulum,3 underlining the divisions within American society.4 As explained in Chapter 2, the multilevel governance pyramid is not static but evolves over time due to changes in administration, involving in this case another major switch at the national echelon. Joe Biden began his campaign in May 2019 by presenting himself as a centrist candidate, proposing a ‘middle ground’ platform to address climate change. Yet, Biden faced a grassroots backlash from the more progressive wing of the Democratic Party from vocal figures, such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC). Thus, he was pushed into changing his position by setting out a much more ambitious plan known as the ‘Clean Energy Revolution’.5 What is remarkable about the 2020 US Presidential election, and the Democratic Primary in particular, is that climate change became a dominant issue for the first time in American electoral history. Up until then, Democratic candidates had tended to eschew the topic, fearing this would compromise their chances of (re)election when confronted with Republican discourses about job losses and stifled growth due to government regulation. For these reasons, Obama presented his climate plans as way to stimulate the economy during the 2008 and 2012 campaigns. While Hillary Clinton’s political platform included many green proposals, climate change was barely

3 Zelizer (2022). 4 The level of polarization in American politics has triggered radical changes from one

administration to the other over the last few years. It is becoming increasingly difficult for US Presidents to leave legacies. Each administration is only able to establish ‘marks’, which can then be reversed, in part or in full, by their successors. This is especially the case for divisive issues like climate change. 5 Barichella (2019).

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referred to during the 2016 Presidential debates against Trump; in fact, only Bernie Sanders emphasized the issue during the primaries that year. By contrast, the Democratic primary of the 2020 election saw candidates competing for the boldest climate action plan, with detailed policy blueprints.6 A number of candidates, including Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren and Tom Steyer, openly placed the issue of climate change as one of their main priorities. Candidate Jay Inslee decided to conduct his entire political campaign under the banner of far-reaching climate action, formulating the most extensive green proposals in American political history. Most candidates, including Biden, signed an official pledge not to accept campaign donations from the fossil fuel industry, agreeing to join a number of different environmental fundraising platforms. This generated pressure on all candidates to enhance their level of climate ambition. Immediately rejoining the Paris Agreement became the strict minimum, and while most candidates agreed on grand objectives such as transitioning towards 100% clean power and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 at the latest, they also endeavored to set themselves apart through a number of original policy proposals.7 This situation was linked to changes in US public opinion over the last few years, as climate change grew in importance for registered voters from both Parties. A number of factors, including the multiplication of climate change-related extreme weather events across the US with devastating consequences and the increasingly irrefutable scientific consensus on global warming as confirmed by the latest IPCC reports, influenced this trend.8 Such factors, combined with outrage at the policy rollbacks of the Trump administration, made climate change a top priority for Democratic voters. A poll conducted in 2019 underlined that environmental protection was now second and climate change third in terms of prioritization for liberal Democrats, just after health care (out of 29 main issues for registered voters), while it was in fifth and eighth position, respectively, for centrist Democrats, a notable increase compared to previous years.9 Similar patterns were also apparent among young and moderate conservatives. Other major polling revealed that up to 68% of moderate registered

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 See IPCC (2014) and (2022). 9 Leiserowitz et al. (2018).

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Republican voters agreed that climate change is a reality, 55% believed that the latter is mostly due to man-made economic development, and 58% said they are increasingly concerned about it; again, this constituted a substantial evolution compared to previously staunch climate change denialism.10 All of these factors explain why Joe Biden chose to backtrack on his initial ‘middle ground’ climate proposals in order to focus on a visionary ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ agenda. Not only was this a response to grassroots pressure from the core progressive Democratic-voting base, but it also helped win over undecided centrist voters and moderate/ young Republicans, who were disappointed by Trump’s poor environmental record.11 Such a strategy proved to be successful and at least partly contributed to Biden’s election in 2020. The ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ represents the most ambitious climate blueprint ever brought forward by a US President, clearly surpassing the policies enacted or even attempted under the Obama administration.12 The central element of Biden’s Climate Plan is for the US to become a 100% clean energy economy and achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest; this is accompanied by an impressive intermediary objective of making the electricity sector carbon-free by 2035. In addition, Biden pledged an unprecedented $2 trillion of investments in order to accelerate the deployment of renewable energies, increase energy efficiency by upgrading aging infrastructure and enhance spending on research for innovative climate technologies.13 Biden’s initial nominations also included experienced figures with solid environmental track records to key positions within his administration, highlighting his aim to implement a bold domestic climate change agenda.14 In addition to grassroots pressure from the Democratic base, another factor that contributed to raising Biden’s level of climate ambition was the 10 Ibid. (2018). 11 Barichella (2019). 12 Ibid. (2021). 13 The ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ plan also contains ambitious proposals in other fields,

such as climate adaptation and environmental justice, which fall outside the ambit of this book. See The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/. 14 This had included, for example, Jennifer Granholm as Energy Secretary, Michael Regan as EPA Administrator, along with Gina McCarthy as National Climate Adviser.

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example set by sub-national climate initiatives enacted during Trump’s Presidency. As exemplified by the extensive city and state-level green policies discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, certain sub-national entities redoubled their efforts under Trump. In order to compensate for US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and extensive regulatory rollbacks, a number of American sub-state actors developed some of the most ambitious set of local climate policies in the world. This set the example and put pressure on Democrats to enhance their climate proposals during the 2020 campaign. As a result, Biden’s ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ platform borrows a number of elements from climate initiatives developed at the sub-national level, or is at least influenced by them. For instance, the original carbon neutrality pledges for 2050 made by California and New York were especially significant in terms of galvanizing Democrats into making a similar pledge at the federal level. As will be examined in Chapter 6 on New York, the state’s ‘Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’ (CLCPA) contained a pledge to transition the state’s power sector towards 100% carbon-free electricity by 2040 (five years ahead of California).15 Biden’s ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ makes a similar commitment at the national level for 2035, five years ahead of New York, and ten years ahead of California.16 In addition, New York’s CLCPA also set out the ambitious intermediary objective of reducing statewide GHG emissions by 40% up to 2030. Along with other similar pledges for 2030 by progressive states like California, the Biden administration was clearly pushed into enhancing the initial 2030 US objective which had been established under Obama. On the occasion of the (virtual) ‘Leaders’ Summit on Climate’ hosted by the US on 22 April 2021, Biden announced a far-reaching new pledge, which constitutes the renewed American NDC under the Paris Agreement: to reduce emissions by 50 to 52% up to 2030 (from 2005 levels).17 This largely surpasses the 15 At the time of writing, fifteen states and territories have taken similar legislative or executive action to achieve 100% clean electricity before 2050, and the list keeps expanding every year. 16 This will probably encourage states across the US to raise their level of ambition regarding clean electricity over the next few years, which shows how the national echelon may galvanize action from the lower levels of governance, as well. This will nonetheless depend on the durability of the Biden administration’s target, and whether or not Democrats succeed in winning Presidential elections in 2024 and beyond. Indeed, a Republican administration may simply rescind this objective, as Trump did with Obama-era climate pledges. 17 The White House (2021). President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S.

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level of ambition of Obama’s previous NDC, which had sought to reduce GHG emissions by 32% up to 2030 (also from 2005 levels).18 The Biden administration could have decided to freeride on the high level of ambition of certain sub-national actors, allowing climate initiatives from non-state actors to over-achieve the government’s NDCs.19 Yet, instead of simply freeriding, once elected President Biden chose a strategy that relies on certain far-reaching sub-state initiatives developed under Trump as a springboard to enact his own ambitious climate agenda at the federal level. Within the first few days of his Presidency, Biden signed a comprehensive executive order which set out an ‘allof-government’ strategy, whereby every federal agency and department must take climate impacts into account when making decisions; the latter was supplemented by the establishment of a White House Office of Domestic Climate Policy, along with three specialized working groups.20 The ‘all-of-government’ approach is significant, as it has a direct impact on the articulation of multilevel governance and interaction between the different echelons. This approach also refers to all levels of government, meaning that the Biden administration has pledged to build on subnational climate initiatives, closely associating state and local governments in the implementation process of federal climate policies. This is clearly a sensible policy since, as examined in Chapter 2, between a third to half of US states, mostly in conservative voting areas, had relied on Trump’s regulatory rollbacks to stall on any genuine climate action over the last few years. Given this state of affairs, freeriding would evidently not have been enough.

Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/sta tements-releases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gas-pol lution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-securing-u-s-leader ship-on-clean-energy-technologies/. 18 Yet, this enhanced 2030 target remains insufficient in terms of what the US, as the world’s largest economy and 2nd global GHG emitter, should be contributing to achieve the long-term objective of the Paris Agreement to keep global temperatures below 2 °C by the end of the century. 19 See Hale (2018). 20 This includes the ‘National Climate Task Force’, the ‘Interagency Working Group on

Coal and Power Plant Communities and Economic Revitalization’, along with the ‘White House Environmental Justice Interagency Council’. See Executive Order 14008 (2021, January 27). Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.

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Despite Obama’s efforts to affiliate sub-national actors in the enactment of his climate policy agenda, he did not make an equivalent pledge. Thus, the Biden administration appears to have developed a more effective and accommodating version of the cooperative federalism paradigm. Nonetheless, the Biden administration has continued to face significant obstacles in its attempts to enact an ambitious ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ agenda at the federal level. As with Obama, Democrats have not been able to implement a rigid, top-down approach to climate policy (which would have been problematic under the US federal system). Instead, continuing with a pattern that was apparent under Obama’s Clean Power Plan, Democrats have had to develop an enhanced version of cooperative federalism, providing wide latitude to sub-national actors and closely associating states in the process of achieving federal climate goals. Even though the obstacles encountered by the Biden administration are similar to those which hindered Obama, certain impediments have emerged in an exacerbated form. For instance, Democrats had enjoyed a super majority in the Senate (sixty seats or more) from 2008 until the 2010 mid-term elections, allowing them to circumvent a filibuster from Republicans in passing their historic healthcare reform.21 Yet, for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, they chose not to push for ambitious climate legislation at that time, abandoning the ACES bill, which would have established a national legislative framework to address climate change. The situation in the Senate under Biden underlines once again to what extent this was a missed opportunity. Throughout Biden’s Presidency, the upper House has remained very divided. Although Democrats unexpectedly won the two Georgia runoff elections in January 2021, each Party controlled fifty seats during Biden’s first two years in office; this made Democrats dependent on VicePresident Kamala Harris to break a tie. While Democrats did much better than expected in the November 2022 mid-term elections by keeping their short majority and even winning an additional seat in Pennsylvania, they are still far from a sixty-seat super majority. As a result, Democrats have been vulnerable to filibusters from Republicans since the very first day Biden assumed office, blocking any far-reaching legislation.22 Although some liberals in Congress have suggested getting rid of the filibuster,

21 Zelizer (2018). 22 Barichella (2021).

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independents and centrist Democrats are opposed. Several of them, such as Joe Manchin (Democrat—West Virginia), Kyrsten Sinema (Independent—Arizona) or Martin Heinrich (Democrat—New Mexico), expressed their lack of enthusiasm for a number of the more ambitious elements in Biden’s ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ program.23 The latter highlights growing divisions between moderates and progressives within the Democratic Party. These divisions have become especially apparent in the House of Representatives through vocal figures such as Alexandria OcasioCortez (Democrat—New York). This made it more difficult to reach consensus over ambitious climate legislation during Biden’s first two years in office, despite the fact that Democrats held majorities in both houses of Congress at the time. Yet, due to changes in public opinion impacting young and moderate conservative voters,24 several centrist Republican Senators, such as Susan Collins (Maine) or John Barrasso (Wyoming), are open to reaching compromises over green legislation, supporting what they refer to as ‘innovation over regulation’ to address climate change.25 This involves promoting nuclear power, revamping infrastructure, focusing on national energy production, along with funding on research for new innovative climate technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS). As will be examined in more detail below, several of these ideas reemerged during the 2022 mid-term election cycle, including in the ‘Commitment to America’ that House Republicans presented as a policy blueprint during the campaign, and which has been endorsed by the new House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (Republican, California). Nevertheless, it should be noted that these moderate Republicans represent more of an exception to the rule, since the GOP as a whole remains quite skeptical towards climate action.26 The climate policy proposals some Republicans now claim to endorse are no substitute for

23 Senator Joe Manchin is in a peculiar situation, since he comes from West Virginia, a traditionally coal reliant state, which has made him very reluctant to support Democrats in Congress over ambitious climate legislation. The same also applies to Senator Martin Heinrich who represents the state of New Mexico, which is still very reliant on fossil fuels. 24 Leiserowitz et al. (2018 and 2019). 25 Barrasso (2018). 26 See Turner and Isenberg (2018).

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those supported by Democrats, which has led to accusations of ‘greenwashing’.27 While this is partly due to the lingering impact of Trump’s Presidency and the influence of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies, the sway exercised by special interest groups remains a chronic issue.28 Likewise, while young and moderate conservatives now take climate change more seriously, a core section of the Republican voter base continues to strongly reject climate science, partly due to the pervasive influence of conservative media. As a result, despite Biden’s experience in finding compromises with Republicans after thirty-six years in the Senate and eight years as VicePresident, it has proven very challenging for Democrats to reach bipartisan support in Congress to enact ambitious climate legislation. This indicates that the federal gridlock begun in the 1980s, which accelerated through the 1990s and 2000s and was exacerbated under Obama and Trump, has to a certain degree been perpetuated during Biden’s Presidency. 2.2

Climate Legislation and Executive Orders Enacted Under Biden Involving an ‘All-of-Government’ Approach, with Prospects After the 2022 Mid-Term Elections

Because Democrats have not been able to bypass a filibuster from Republicans, their only recourse has been ‘budgetary legislation’, which may proceed through a process known as ‘Reconciliation’ whereby only a simple majority is required in the Senate (as opposed to a ‘super majority’).29 Budgetary laws tend to be narrower in scope when compared to other more conventional types of legislation, such as the Clean Air Act. Nonetheless, budgetary legislative proposals under Biden were substantially watered down from their initial versions in order to reach compromises in Congress with moderate Republicans or Independents, and especially with centrist Democrats. Thus, a renewed and enhanced paradigm of cooperative federalism has clearly emerged under Biden, relying on the ‘all-of-government’ approach previously examined, closely

27 Barichella (2019). 28 On special interest group influence in the US political system, see Drutman (2015),

Quirk (2016), Brown (2016) and Charnock (2020). 29 On US Congressional procedures, see Oleszek et al. (2019) and Adler et al. (2021).

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associating sub-national entities and providing them with wide latitude in the implementation process. This accommodating approach is very different from the extreme version of cooperative federalism developed under Trump. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Trump administration provided states with an excessively wide margin for maneuver to do mostly as they please, leading to the emergence of very weak national minimum climate standards, exacerbating disparities between states throughout the country. In contrast, while the Biden administration has provided states with wide latitude, it has endeavored to closely associate them, relying on sub-national initiatives as a launch pad to enact a federal climate agenda that remains ambitious on the whole, in spite of the compromises reached.30 These elements are apparent with the first major legislative act passed under Biden that has a bearing on climate change, known as the ‘Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act’—IIJA. In late 2021, after months of difficult negotiations involving hard compromises, both Houses of Congress finally reached agreement on a massive infrastructure spending bill.31 This spending package allocates around one trillion dollars, with $550 billion in direct new federal expenditure over the next eight years to upgrade highways, roads or bridges, and to modernize city transit systems and passenger rail networks. The bill also introduced funding for a nationwide network of electric vehicle charging points and included a total of $73 billion for ‘clean energy’ projects, such as modernizing power grids, electrifying public transport, more electric car chargers or cleaning up soil and groundwater in mines and gas fields, among other elements.32 In addition, the IIJA contained $66 billion for new train and railway infrastructure, which plays a non-negligible role in terms of reducing GHG emissions for a country like the US, traditionally very reliant on auto and

30 In this regard, see Fisher and Harriger (2019) and Coleman and Leskiw (2018). 31 117th US Congress (2021–2022). Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. Public

Law 117–58. 32 The White House (2021). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal: https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bip artisan-infrastructure-deal/.

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airplane travel.33 While the package represented the largest federal investment in infrastructure for decades, the Biden administration had difficulty passing it through both Houses of Congress. Democrats needed to rely on support from moderate conservatives due to opposition not only from many Republicans, but also from several more progressive members of the party who criticized the bill’s limited ambit.34 Similar patterns are apparent in the second major legislative act passed under Biden that aims to address climate change, known as the ‘Inflation Reduction Act’ (IRA).35 This compromise bill resulted from eighteen months of highly difficult negotiations. It was passed in its final form by Congress in August 2022 and signed into law by Biden the same month. The IRA constitutes another massive spending package of approximately $738 billion which includes provisions targeting a wide range of different sectors that are key to the Democratic agenda including health care, tax policy, in addition to climate/clean energy issues. The IRA represents the largest federal investment to tackle climate change in US history, since it involves a total of around $369 billion for climate-related projects over the next decade and beyond, far surpassing the ambit of the previous IIJA, or the Obama-era ARRA. The bill encompasses a broad array of measures from clean energy manufacturing, electric vehicle tax credits to investments for environmental justice communities. Instead of legal limitations backed by sanctions, the IRA mostly relies on economic incentives such as tax incentives for companies investing in renewable energies, as well as rebates for individuals purchasing electric cars or energy-efficient home equipment.36 Some of the main provisions in the bill include extending tax credits for electric vehicles with $7,500 in credits for the purchase of a new electric car and $4,000 for a used car, 10-year consumer tax credits 33 Ibid. Train infrastructure is generally considered far less polluting, emitting only around half the amount of CO2 compared to airplanes. The IIJA will be financed in several ways, including unspent emergency relief funds for the COVID-19 pandemic. 34 This includes members of the so-called ‘Congressional Progressive Caucus’, who criticized the bill’s lack of ambition and had asked for the simultaneous voting of the ‘Build Back Better Act’. 35 117th Congress (2021–2022). Inflation Reduction Act. Public Law 117–169. 36 Ibid. There is one exception to this, since the IRA also includes a provision to

develop a methane program that would collect fees on fossil fuel producers which emit methane over a certain threshold. However, this clause in the law has been left quite vague, including in terms of the level of fees to be collected, which raises doubts about the prospects for rigorous enforcement.

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to lower the cost of heat pumps, water heaters, electric heating, rooftop solar, as well as ventilation and air conditioning. The IRA also involves spending $60 billion to advance domestic clean energy manufacturing, as well as $30 billion for a production tax credit targeting solar, wind and battery storage. Finally, the bill aims to develop a so-called ‘clean energy accelerator’, which would collect and distribute public or private funding to enhance existing green projects and develop new ones. Due to the very nature of multilevel governance and competence allocation in the US, a large portion of the IRA’s $369 billion allocated for climate action, along with the IIJA’s $73 billion dedicated to clean energy projects and $66 billion for new railway infrastructure, will be directly channeled towards states and cities.37 As will be examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, US sub-national entities, including states and cities,38 possess direct control over a number of targeted policy domains which are essential in terms of climate mitigation. In the case of cities, these include fields such as zoning, building codes (heating and cooling regulations), transportation (such as municipal vehicle fleets), infrastructure planning, waste management and recycling, as well as several key aspects of the power sector and energy. Due to broad powers granted under the US federal system,39 states possess extensive competences in a wide range of different areas, some similar to municipal competences, but also in other sectors not covered by cities such as agriculture, along with many industrial and commercial sectors. Likewise, American states have responsibilities for GHG emissions controls which are linked to their traditional functions concerning the regulation of electricity. What is more, even when funding does not directly target sub-national entities but is provided to federal agencies instead (like the EPA), the paradigm of cooperative federalism, which characterizes environmental policy-making in the US, is such that states are in most cases closely associated in the

37 For example, the IRA includes a provision to create a $30 billion ‘climate bank’, which will deliver low-interest loans directly to cities and local governments for various climate-related projects (along with domestic manufacturers of electric vehicles and renewable energy infrastructure). 38 On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020). 39 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), Robertson (2017), and Karch and Rose (2019).

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implementation process. For these reasons, either directly or indirectly, a significant amount of the ‘green funding’ from the IRA and IIJA will in all likelihood be spent to support sub-national entities, including New York/NY and Boston/MA in our sample.40 The vertical, multilevel interrelationship operates in both directions since, as previously indicated, Biden has relied on local and regional initiatives developed over the last few years as a springboard to enact several key aspects of his proposed federal climate agenda. For instance, the IRA and the IIJA explicitly seek to build upon state-based programs such as RGGI for federal ‘clean energy’ projects that aim to modernize power grids. As indicated above, RGGI represents the first mandatory cap-andtrade program in the US to limit CO2 from the power sector, which will enable participating states to receive notable funding from IRA and the IIJA to cut emissions from power plants. Likewise, these two bills also seek to rely upon local initiatives such as the ‘Electric Vehicle Request for Information’ (EV RFI) to develop a nationwide network of electric vehicle charging points and electrify public transport. Feedback obtained via the EV RFI enabled the launching of an ‘EV Purchasing Collaborative’ in September 2018, with over 250 cities, counties and other sub-state actors in the US having now joined the initiative, pledging to purchase more than 4000 EVs.41 Members of the ‘EV Purchasing Collaborative’ will receive renewed federal funding from IRA and the IIJA to reduce emissions in the transportation sector—accounting for around third of total CO2 emissions in the US.42 Nevertheless, despite these noteworthy accomplishments, IRA and the IIJA also highlight the extent to which Congressional Democrats face significant obstacles to enact their climate change legislative agenda, even when they have majorities in both Houses. During Biden’s first two years in office, they were forced to rely on budgetary legislation in order to circumvent a filibuster from Republicans in the Senate; these two bills

40 It is still too soon to establish a precise figure in this regard, as much will depend on disbursement priorities that will gradually unfold over the next few years. 41 Climate Mayors, EV Purchasing Collaborative: https://climatemayors.org/ev-purcha sing-collaborative/. 42 As will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, New York and Massachusetts in our sample have also enacted a number of notable initiatives at the state level in the fields of transportation and the power sector, which will likewise enable them to receive additional funding from the IRA and IIJA in these areas.

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only passed through Congress with great difficulty after several failed attempts and many months of difficult and complex negotiations, with close votes in each case. What is more, in their final versions, both laws were substantially watered down and only represent mere shadows compared to the initial proposals discussed below. While the IIJA was able to garner some bipartisan support in the Senate, the November 2021 vote in the House of Representatives was tight with 228 in favor and 206 against.43 The vote was even closer in the case of the IRA, with every single Republican voting against it both in the House of Representatives (220–207 vote), as well as in the Senate in August 2022. This resulted in a highly partisan division of 50 votes on each side, making it necessary for the Vice-President Kamala Harris to cast the deciding vote in the Senate.44 Moreover, gridlock in Congress only worsened following the results of the 2022 mid-term elections. While it is correct that the ‘red wave’ predicted in the polls failed to materialize, Republicans still succeeded in winning a short five-seat majority in the House of Representatives.45 Although Republicans displayed deep internal divisions in the House due to an internal revolt from the right-wing Republican ‘Freedom Caucus’, Kevin McCarthy finally secured a majority to be elected House speaker on his fifteenth attempt, giving his Party control over the lower chamber. McCarthy was forced to make significant concessions to the more conservative branch of the Republican Party, especially members of the ‘Freedom Caucus’, in order to secure his election. The caucus remains staunchly opposed to climate action and continues to deny the science of climate change. Consequently, this puts into perspective the climate and environmental policy proposals made by some moderate House Republicans during the 2022 mid-term election cycle, which appeared in their legislative blueprint

43 US Congress (117th), Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act: https://www.con gress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/3684. 44 US Congress (117th), Inflation Reduction Act of 2022: https://www.congress.gov/ bill/117th-congress/house-bill/5376. 45 More specifically, Republicans now hold 222 seats against 212 for Democrats. While this may seem like a very short majority, Democrats held the exact same five-seat majority during Biden’s first two years in office. This highlights the growing polarization of US politics, and how both Parties are finding it increasingly difficult to win large majorities in Congress, with only marginal changes at each election cycle.

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‘Commitment to America’.46 Changing opinion patterns among young and moderate conservative voters has led to support for innovation over regulation, an emphasis on national energy production, boosting nuclear power, along with investments in technologies to make fossil fuels more ‘clean’ such as carbon capture and storage, or the planting of trees. Yet, closer analysis reveals that such proposals are no substitute for the climate policies promoted by Democrats, since the GOP continues to advocate for extensive deregulation, along with an expansion and acceleration of domestic fossil fuel production and exports. Republicans’ conception of environmentalism remains vague and unarticulated, and the Party continues to suffer from deep internal divisions on this issue. In fact, a clear majority is still hesitant to openly commit to climate action, while more conservative members (such as the ‘Freedom Caucus’) continue to strongly reject it. This is due to the lingering influence of neoliberal ideology which rejects governmental regulation writ large, and the sway of lobbying groups from the fossil fuel industry. In this regard, while negotiations for the House Speakership were kept secret, it is quite possible that the ‘Freedom Caucus’ was able to extract from McCarthy a concession to stall any genuine climate action. For instance, Republicans immediately dismantled the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis in January 2023 at the very start of the 118th Legislature; this Committee had been established in early 2019 by Democrats following their mid-term election victory in the House under President Trump. Clearly, this is not a positive omen for ambitious climate action. As of this writing, it is arguable that the newfound Republican conception of environmentalism mostly amounts to greenwashing. The situation in the Senate after the 2022 mid-term elections does not offer better prospects. Once again, Democrats did much better than expected, since Republicans failed to win a majority. In fact, Democrats succeeded in enlarging their Senate majority by one seat after a victory in the state of Pennsylvania, while also keeping their seats in key states like Georgia. However, Democrats are still far-off from a sixty-seat super majority needed to circumvent a filibuster from the opposition. Moreover, these results were subsequently diminished by the defection of Senator Kirsten Sinema from Arizona, who announced she would register as an

46 See The Republican Commitment to America, https://www.speaker.gov/commit ment/.

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Independent in the upcoming Legislature.47 Sinema had been one of two centrist Democrats together with Joe Manchin who contributed to significantly watering down Biden’s two main pieces of climate legislation (the IIJA and IRA) during his first two years in office. Sinema’s registering as an Independent, while not as damaging as it might have first appeared, means that she is now less likely to bow to pressure from Democrats on issues like climate action. In addition, while Joe Manchin has indicated that he does not intend to register as an Independent for the time being, he refused to rule out that possibility in the near future. Therefore, combined with the loss of the Democratic majority in the House, it appears unlikely that any significant climate legislation will be able to pass through Congress for the rest of Biden’s mandate. For these reasons, like Obama, Biden has often had to rely on executive action to enact many aspects of his climate policy agenda in an effort to bypass legislative gridlock in Congress. It should be noted that quite a lot can be achieved in this way. Executive orders have enabled Democrats to re-establish many environmental and climate regulations implemented by Obama and his predecessors, which the Trump administration had rescinded. On the very first day of his Presidency, Biden signed an Executive Order (EO)48 which, among other things, asserted the administration’s intention to follow scientific methods to protect public health and the environment. Likewise, the EO instructs a review of all policies and actions enacted by federal agencies under Trump, so as to ensure compliance with the new administration’s environmental objectives. This was followed by a flurry of other EOs within the first weeks and months of Biden’s Presidency, which went beyond simply reinstating Obama-era policies and testify to a high level of climate ambition. For instance, in addition to establishing an ‘all-of-government’ approach, the EO signed on January 27, 2021, also contained far-reaching provisions impacting a variety of different sectors.49 These included the development of low-carbon energy (with an emphasis on the power sector), a 47 In fact, Democrats hold only 49 Senate seats in the current Legislature, since there

are two additional Senators that are also registered as Independents: Bernie Sanders (Vermont) and Angus King (Maine), who caucus with Democrats on most issues. 48 Executive Order 13990 (2021, January 20). Protecting Public Health and the Environment and Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis. 49 Executive Order 14008 (2021, January 27). Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad.

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federal procurement system for clean electricity and zero-emission vehicles, the goal of doubling offshore wind production by 2030, the issuing of a federal oil and gas moratorium on public lands and offshore waters, the ending of fossil fuel subsidies, along with the creation of a Civilian Climate Corps. A number of these provisions aim to closely involve states and local actors in the implementation process, pointing to the enhanced cooperative federalism and ‘all-of-government’ approach adopted by the Biden administration. This applies especially with regard to the deployment of clean electricity and zero-emission vehicles, whereby state and local governments are able to benefit from the newly established federal procurement system. The latter was supplemented by another EO in August 2021 to green the US car and truck fleet, mandating relevant federal agencies (Transportation and the EPA) to establish more stringent multi-pollutant emission standards.50 In fact, these EOs have sought to develop linkages with a number of state-based regional initiatives such as RGGI, highlighting once again the close association of sub-national entities. Throughout 2022, President Biden continued with his ‘all-ofgovernment’ approach to tackle climate change and environmental degradation via executive action. For instance, in April 2022, he signed an executive order to upgrade national forestry policies with a focus on federal lands, in order to address deforestation and reduce wildfire risks.51 This EO explicitly emphasizes the need to consult with a broad range of sub-national authorities so as to support the enactment of collaborative initiatives between the federal and local echelons. Likewise, in May 2022, the Biden administration approved a ‘Permitting Action Plan’ which aims to ensure the achievement of the IIJA’s main objectives, including the tackling climate change and nature conservation.52 The Plan seeks to enhance transparency and efficiency for environmental review and permitting processes, with an emphasis on the need for early and extensive public input from states, territories and local communities. Pursuant to 50 Executive Order 14037 (2021, August 5). Strengthening American Leadership in

Clean Cars and Trucks. 51 Executive Order 14072 (2022, April 22). Strengthening the Nation’s Forests, Communities, and Local Economies. 52 The White House (2022, May). Permitting Action Plan to Rebuild America’s Infrastructure, Accelerate the Clean Energy Transition, Revitalize Communities, and Create Jobs.

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the provisions set out in the IIJA, another notable example is the Biden administration’s decision to launch a $3.5 billion program to capture and store CO2 directly from the air (May 2022).53 The program aims to support four large-scale regional direct air capture hubs, each of which will oversee a network CO2 removal projects involving close collaboration with sub-national actors, including states and local governments, which are eligible to receive direct funding from the program.

3 Assessing the US Climate Policy Framework Under Biden, Including in Terms of Multilevel Governance and the ‘All-of-Government’ Approach It should be noted that the Biden administration’s approach of relying on sub-national initiatives as launch pad for an ambitious federal climate agenda, based on an enhanced version of cooperative federalism involving the ‘all-of-government’ approach, continues to suffer from a number of shortcomings. Weaknesses stemming from federal climate policies enacted under President Biden can generally be divided into two broad categories. First, there are shortcomings in terms of the actual climate policies themselves, their level of ambition and their ability to achieve medium and long-term climate objectives. Second, there are also inadequacies related to the articulation of multilevel climate governance, and how effectively the national government is able to mobilize and integrate sub-state entities in the implementation process. 3.1

Assessing Biden’s Climate Policy Framework Regarding Its Ability to Achieve Short, Medium and Long-term Climate Objectives

To begin with, while Biden’s strategy of relying on executive action has enabled Democrats to bypass gridlock in Congress, there is always a risk that executive orders may be repealed by a future Republican administration, since climate change remains a polarizing issue in American politics.54 In addition, a more immediate concern was that Trump appointed

53 US Department of Energy (2022, May). 54 In this regard, the speed at which Trump had been able to rescind many Obama-era

climate-related executive orders is revealing (see Chapter 2). See also Shafie (2020) and Smith and Jacques (2022).

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many conservative federal justices during his four-year mandate, in addition to confirming three Supreme Court judges.55 Hence, there is the possibility that Biden’s executive orders on climate change could be nullified if they are judged as too far-reaching with respect to the Constitutional allocation of powers. As discussed in Chapter 2, Obama’s Clean Power Plan was stayed by the Supreme Court in 2016, at a time when the Court did not possess such a clear-cut conservative majority.56 This is evidently not a good omen and may lead to executive-judicial gridlock on climate change in certain instances. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in June 2022 that the EPA does not possess legal authority to regulate GHG emissions across entire states or in relation to whole sectors of the US economy.57 This significantly constrains the agency’s powers, precisely at a time when Biden is seeking to rely on the EPA to enact large portions of his climate agenda via executive action. Although the Supreme Court did not entirely bar the EPA from implementing sweeping emission reduction rules, it asserted that Congress would need to explicitly allow for this beforehand. Hence, the ruling has restricted the President’s ability to bypass the legislative branch through far-reaching executive orders. This is problematic. Not only is there a new Republican majority in the House of Representatives since January 2023, but it was challenging for Biden to pass climate legislation even when Democrats had majorities in both Houses. Additionally, the legal doctrine embraced by the Court under this ruling, known as the ‘major questions doctrine’, also limits the possibility of relying on general provisions from the Clean Air Act to tackle climate change.58

55 Zelizer (2022). 56 Barichella (2021). 57 US Supreme Court. West Virginia v. EPA. No. 20-1530, 30 June 2022. 58 For several decades, the Supreme Court had usually upheld that judges should defer

to national governmental agencies like the EPA when interpreting the ambit of federal law. This ruling by the Supreme Court clearly points to the eroding of such a practice, asserting instead an opposing legal doctrine known as the ‘major questions doctrine’. The latter emphasizes that the discretion of federal agencies is limited on important issues that encompass potentially wide-ranging regulatory measures, unless Congress has explicitly authorized this through statutory law. This risks significantly limiting the ability of Presidents to rely on broad provisions from the Clean Air Act to address climate change, since the CAA does not explicitly provide a mandate for doing so (see Chapter 2).

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This will make it difficult for Biden and future Presidents to enact ambitious climate policies, thus potentially jeopardizing prospects of the US achieving its climate goals over the medium to long run. When it comes to shortcomings in terms of the actual policies themselves, the climate initiatives enacted by the Biden administration might not go far enough in terms of what the US, as the world’s largest economy and 2nd global GHG emitter, should be contributing to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Accord. For instance, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act only contains $73 billion for clean energy projects, including for modernizing power grids, electrifying public transport, as well as additional electric car chargers.59 While the bill also sets out $66 billion for new railway infrastructure, the IIJA only peripherally addresses climate change, since its focus is clearly on upgrading infrastructure in other sectors. This is true even when compared to the stimulus package enacted under Obama in response to the 2008 financial crisis (ARRA bill of 2009). The ARRA had inserted a record $90 billion to directly support clean energy and renewables, slightly more than the $73 billion under the IIJA, and without taking into account price inflation over the last decade. While the initial version of the infrastructure bill proposed by the Biden administration in March 2021 had set out $2.3 trillion in federal spending, Democrats were forced to water down their proposals to reach a compromise at around $1 trillion in order to win over centrist members of Congress.60 Likewise, the original version of the Inflation Reduction Act, known as the ‘Build Back Better’ plan, had involved up to $3.5 trillion in federal spending, with Democrats hoping it would become Biden’s overarching climate framework and the largest federal investment since Roosevelt’s New Deal. A slimmed down version of the bill at $1.75 trillion had even been passed by the House of Representatives in October 2021, before stalling in the Senate. Persistent opposition from centrist Democratic Senators like Manchin and Sinema killed any prospects of enacting the initial ‘Build Back Better’ plan. This pushed Democrats to lower their level of ambition even further with a compromise IRA bill at around $738 billion (with $369 billion for climate-related projects). A mere shadow of 59 The White House (2021). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal: https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bip artisan-infrastructure-deal/. 60 See Politi and Fedor (2021).

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the initial proposal, this cutback was acceptable to Manchin and Sinema, whose votes were necessary due to unanimous Republican opposition.61 In fact, the combined funding of the IIJA and IRA allocated to address climate change is significantly lower than the $1.7 trillion which had been promised during Biden’s campaign in 2020.62 The full amount initially proposed before Congressional negotiations would have been needed to achieve the ambitious objectives set out in the renewed American NDC of reducing national GHG emissions by 50 to 52% up to 2030 (from 2005 levels). A number of studies have corroborated the fact that while the IIJA and especially the IRA are predicted to make notable contributions in terms of reducing emissions over the coming decade and beyond, they fall short of what is needed to reach the 2030 targets set by the Biden administration.63 For instance, even studies conducted by Democratic Congressmen have indicated that the IRA is only expected to help reduce GHG emissions by around 40% by the end of the decade.64 This has been confirmed in a number of other studies, including from the Rhodium Group, an independent research provider, which estimated that the bill would contribute to cutting emissions between 32 and 42% by 2030, in comparison with 24–35% without it.65 Likewise, the nonpartisan Energy Innovation group predicted that the IRA would lead to a decrease in GHG emissions between 37 and 41%,66 against 24% if the bill had not been enacted.67 As discussed above, federal budgetary laws lack the ambit and scope of more ‘conventional’ or non-budgetary types of legislation, such as the 61 Wright and Sands (2022). 62 The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice: https://

joebiden.com/climate-plan/. 63 Spending from the IRA is also meant to be disbursed over the course of a decade, which reduces its impact and makes it comparatively small in relation to US GDP growth over that period. 64 US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022). 65 Larsen et al. (2022). 66 Mahajan et al. (2022). 67 These studies have emphasized that for such GHG emission reductions to take place

by the end of the decade, the IRA would need to be fully enacted according to the strict timetable set out in the law. Republicans have already threatened to stall or delay the IRA’s enactment if/when they win back control over the Senate and/or the White House, and have already started to do so with their new majority in the House of Representatives following the 2022 mid-term elections.

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Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA contains provisions that are much more far-reaching and directly mobilize sub-national actors in the implementation process (see Chapter 2). Consequently, the CAA became one of the most extensive federal environmental statutes in the US,68 as well as one of the most comprehensive air quality laws in the world. While providing states with a wide degree of autonomy, the CAA still requires them to meet strict minimum criteria for ‘national ambient air quality standards’ within their borders for different types of air pollutants. If approved by the EPA, states receive federal funding to support local implementation of the CAA.69 States may choose not to develop a State Implementation Plan (SIP) and leave the EPA to assume responsibility for implementation within that state; likewise, if a SIP does not meet minimum federal air quality standards defined by the CAA, it can be rejected by the EPA, which will take-over enforcement within that state.70 This clearly goes much further than the narrower scope and ambit involved in budgetary legislation or spending packages like the IIJA or IRA, which are mostly limited to providing economic incentives for reducing GHG emissions, as opposed to legally binding limitations on pollution backed by sanctions.71 The filibuster process also means that once ‘conventional’ pieces of legislation are able to pass through the Senate, they tend to be long-lasting. For instance, while the CAA was enacted under President Johnson back in 1963, it continues to apply to this day and has benefitted from a number of amendments over the last few decades. Furthermore, one of the main reasons the IRA is predicted to be insufficient for reaching the GHG emissions reduction goals set out by the Biden administration for 2030 is that it locks the development of renewable energies to the concomitant growth of fossil fuel production. This 68 See literature on US environmental politics: Konisky (2020), Rinfret and Pautz (2019), and Rosenbaum (2019). 69 US EPA, Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution: https://www.epa.gov/ clean-air-act-overview. 70 Ibid. A notable example of this was the state of California, which failed to meet new national requirements after the 1970 CAA amendment. This led the EPA to launch a lawsuit against the state, which was followed by a federally enforced implementation plan. 71 This is linked to Senator Joe Manchin’s steadfast opposition to include legally binding limitations on pollution backed by sanctions in the final version of the bill, since the economy of the state of West Virginia (which he represents) continues to rely extensively on fossil fuel industries.

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represents one of the most controversial clauses of the law, and certainly the aspect which has drawn most criticism from environmental activists and the more progressive wing of the Democratic Party; it appears to have mostly been a concession to Senator Joe Manchin.72 The IRA reverses Biden’s previous suspension of new lease sales for drilling on federal lands, which was one of the key elements in the executive order signed on the first week of his Presidency. Instead, the IRA goes so far as to prohibit any new leasing of federal lands for the development of renewable energies, without the government previously leasing a certain minimum threshold of acres in public lands and waters for the drilling of oil and gas.73 The result will be the release of considerable quantities of new GHGs over the next decade, holding the growth in renewable energies hostage to that of fossil fuels, at least when it comes to federal lands and waters. Although the exact figure is contested, the more pessimistic assessments point to as much as 110 million tons of additional emissions annually by 2030 due to new leasing.74 The IRA’s supporters, including Democrats in Congress, have emphasized that while the bill may lead to a certain increase in new GHG emissions, the other provisions in the law would more than offset this, with net emission reductions predicted to be between 10 to 50 times higher than any potential increase, or 35 tons of GHG emissions cut for every ton of new fossil fuel pollution.75 As of this writing, it is too soon to ascertain what the exact impact of the law will be in terms of balancing between increases and cuts of GHG emissions by 2030, and much will probably depend on the manner and speed at which the different clauses of the IRA are enacted over the next few years. In this regard, concerns have been raised about how rapidly the law will be able to deliver emission reductions.76 For instance, the clauses on solar and wind power could 72 Brown and Phillis (2022). 73 More specifically, the law prevents the leasing of federal lands for the development

of renewable energies unless at least 2 million acres of public lands and 60 million acres in federal waters have been leased for the drilling of oil and gas the year before. 74 US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022). See also US Department of Energy (2022, August). 75 Prest (2022). Still, other studies have lower projections pointing to smaller figures at around 55 million tons of additional new GHG emissions annually by 2030, for example. See Mahajan et al. (2022). 76 Brown and Phillis (2022).

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be delayed by supply chain issues linked to the advanced technologies required in their construction. Likewise, carbon and capture and storage techniques are still in their early stages; they are not yet ready to be deployed on a large commercial scale since they remain too expensive, difficult to install and are often not effective enough. Moreover, Biden’s approval of the ‘Willow’ project in March 2023 may not be a positive omen. This project represents the most significant oil drilling initiative on federal lands in Alaska over the last few decades and could result in the production of around 180,000 new oil barrels each day. The US Bureau of Land Management has estimated that the Willow project could generate up to 278 million metric tons of GHGs over the course of 30 years, the equivalent of adding as many as two million new cars on US roads each year.77 In response to extensive criticism from environmental groups, the Biden administration has counterbalanced this decision by authorizing only three drill sites for the project, as opposed to the five sites initially planned for, while imposing other new limits on fossil fuel leasing off the Alaskan coast and Arctic Ocean. Nevertheless, this does not compensate for the GHG emissions and environmental degradation that will result from the Willow project, which risks locking-in US fossil fuel drilling in the Arctic for at least another three decades by galvanizing further oil and gas extraction in the region. Partly for these reasons, Democrats themselves have acknowledged that the IIJA and IRA will be insufficient on their own to achieve the goal of reducing national emissions between 50 to 52% by 2030 (from 2005 levels).78 What is more, with the new Republican majority in the House, prospects for the Biden administration of enacting any further spending packages appear highly doubtful. Fiscally conservative Republicans have strongly criticized what they perceive as excessive federal spending in the IIJA and IRA, and have threatened to block any new initiative of this nature. In addition, the exponential increase of the US national debt over the last couple of years, combined with the rise in inflation stemming from the global energy crisis due to the Ukraine War, would render it very challenging for Democrats to pass through Congress any significant new spending bills.

77 US Bureau of Land Management (2023). 78 US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022).

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This means that, due to both Congressional and judicial gridlock, ambitious initiatives at the sub-national level are still needed for the US to reach its climate objectives. Given the far-reaching nature of climate policies enacted by American sub-state entities over the last few years (see Chapters 6 and 7), their potential in terms of compensating for inadequacies at the national level remains significant. Ambitious green initiatives remain mostly limited to states and local governments on the East and West coasts, since nearly half the country remains uncommitted to climate action. This will continue to negatively impact the pace of US national GHG emission reductions in the coming years.79 Nevertheless, progressive states like New York and Massachusetts will play an important role in terms of closing the GHG emissions gap stemming from inadequate policies at the federal level, due to the persistent difficulties faced by the Biden administration in enacting its climate agenda. The latter represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-national entities within the climate regime.80 3.2

Assessing Biden’s ‘All-of-Government’ Approach in Terms of Multilevel Climate Governance and Enhanced Cooperative Federalism

Second, a number of notable shortcomings can also be identified in relation to the articulation of multilevel climate governance, and how effectively the federal government is able to mobilize and integrate substate actors in the implementation process. Despite previously examined instances of effective mobilization, there remain a number of areas where the US federal government and states are still not well synchronized on climate policy, including New York/NY and Boston/MA in our sample. Such a situation suggests that even in developed countries like the US, there is plenty of room for improvement in terms of the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Consequently, implementation of climate initiatives for sub-national entities may in some cases leads to problematic interactions between the federal echelon and local actors. On a more general level, optimal multilevel governance involves the capacity of the

79 US Climate Alliance: http://www.usclimatealliance.org. 80 In this regard, see Hale (2018).

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different tiers to mutually support one another when enacting policies, even under difficult circumstances. For instance, there have been issues relating to temporal discord, which have to do with divergent choices regarding baseline years against which to measure the impact of climate policies. As examined above, the Biden administration adopted 2005 as a baseline year for the renewed American NDC, set out during the Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021. Yet, Chapters 6 and 7 will highlight that while Boston and New York, our sample cities, have also chosen 2005 as a baseline, both Massachusetts and the state of New York have mostly adopted the year 1990 instead. In fact, this is not an isolated case, since there is a great variety of choices for baseline years across the US, both at the state and municipal levels. According to the latest IPCC reports, different choices for baseline years are often linked to the notion that they may offer certain types of advantages, depending on the echelon of governance.81 Shorter baseline years can be useful for measuring the achievement of climate goals in targeted sectors like buildings, transportation or waste management, which characterizes the approach of cities like Boston and New York. By contrast, longer baseline years can support more holistic approaches to tackling climate change, as adopted by the states of Massachusetts and New York, as well as countries like France or the European Union (see Chapters 4 and 5). The fact that the US federal government has consistently adopted the year 2005 as a baseline against which to measure the enactment of the American NDC is notable, given the latter’s holistic ambit. This applies both to the initial NDC submitted by the Obama administration in 2015 under the framework of the Clean Power Plan, as well as the renewed NDC presented by President Biden in April 2021 at the Leaders’ Summit on Climate. This emphasizes how short baselines can support holistic policies at the national level in some cases,82 and that there are no clearly established rules on this issue. For American states which have adopted the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050 like the Biden administration at the federal level, the end result in terms of reaching carbon neutrality by mid-century will in all likelihood end-up being relatively

81 IPCC (2014) and (2022). 82 This may apply especially to the US, which has displayed an inconsistent level of

commitment towards climate action over the last few years.

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similar, since they share the same long-term goal. At the same time, however, the federal government tends to interact mostly with the state echelon during the implementation process and for the achievement of national environmental objectives.83 This is why discrepancies of baseline years between the federal government and the state level can still potentially cause problems over time. A lack of alignment in terms of baseline years may generate challenges linked to policy coordination and harmonization, which can render it more difficult to compare climate goals and the achievement of results over the medium to long run. Such a situation risks gradually exacerbating discrepancies between the national and state levels, thus compromising the effective articulation of multilevel governance. What is more, this may be exacerbated due to the broad powers and autonomy granted to states under the US federal system. Given the far-reaching nature of sub-national climate initiatives developed over the last few years—exemplified by the US cities and states in our sample—along with the growing role played by non-state actor networks, there has clearly been a risk of duplication with the new federal climate policies enacted under Biden.84 One area where this has been especially apparent is the power sector. For example, the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA) enacted by the state of New York in 2019, along with the ‘Next Generation Climate Roadmap’ (NGCR) and the ‘Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind’ (ADCEOW) passed by Massachusetts in 2021 and 2022, respectively, contain ambitious provisions to enhance their share of clean electricity over the short, medium and long run. This includes measures to update both states’ renewable portfolio standards, along with specific rules for power plants, which complement the fact that Massachusetts and New York form part of RGGI, the first mandatory cap-and-trade program in the US to limit emissions from the power sector. As previously explained, several of the executive orders signed by Biden aim to establish upgraded federal standards concerning the development of renewables and low-carbon/clean

83 On federal-state interactions in US environmental law and politics, see Rowell and van Zeben (2021), Kraft (2021), and Vig et al. (2021). 84 Although a certain degree of overlap and duplication is inevitable, especially for a complex policy area like climate change that touches upon multiple different sectors, these examples still highlight clear weaknesses in the US multilevel governance framework and whether the national government is able to mobilize sub-state entities effectively in the implementation process.

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energy, with an emphasis on the power sector.85 What is more, the IIJA and IRA also seek to build upon state-based programs, such as RGGI for federal ‘clean energy’ projects to modernize the electrical grid. National networks, such as the US Climate Alliance, or the ‘America is All In’ coalition, are endeavoring to ensure that state-based initiatives support the Biden administration’s federal climate agenda. Yet, the risk of redundancy between the different echelons is apparent, especially since Biden’s plan for a ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ sets the far-reaching goal of achieving a 100% carbon-free power sector by 2035.86 It is still too soon for evaluating precisely to what extent redundancies between the different echelons will prove problematic, since they can hinder the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. This may be especially challenging in terms of interaction between the federal and sub-state levels, due to the highly strategic position the national echelon continues to occupy for the articulation of environmental policies in the US. Nevertheless, the risk of duplication between the climate policies of the Biden administration and initiatives enacted by sub-state entities is arguably mitigated by the constitutional nature of the American political system. As will be examined in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7, multilevel governance is relatively dynamic and flexible under the framework of US federalism, because competence allocation tends to be clearly defined on the whole.87 Such a legal framework can help to reduce overlap between the different echelons, thereby enhancing the articulation of multilevel climate governance.88 In fact, duplication may not be as serious an issue as it appears. In cases of overlap, climate initiatives from sub-national entities like states or cities may in fact help governments enact their NDCs at a faster pace and more thoroughly. In these instances, overlaps can actually enable governments to over-achieve their NDCs, since they have the

85 This includes Executive Order 14008: ‘Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad’ (see above). 86 The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice: https:// joebiden.com/climate-plan/. 87 As examined in Chapter 2, all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government are reserved to states according to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution. The Tenth Amendment makes it clear that local governments and cities are legally under the authority of states, not the federal government. 88 As will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5, this forms a notable point of contrast to the ‘hierarchical’ and ‘stratified’ nature of the centralized French political system.

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effect of accelerating and reinforcing the implementation process.89 This represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state actors within the global climate regime.90 Because the US federal system provides states with broad powers and a high degree of autonomy, this could lead to a weaker level of policy harmonization and coordination (at least when compared to the centralized French paradigm, examined in Chapters 4 and 5). Thus, depending upon the political alignment between state and federal government, while the American constitutional system possesses elements which contribute towards mitigating the risk of duplication, it also may increase the possibility of conflicting norms between the different echelons, which can lead to monitoring and enforcement issues due to the multiplication of disparate standards across states. While duplication involves the enactment of overlapping rules between different echelons, conflicting norms leads to the opposite problem. One sector where this has been especially apparent is transportation. As will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, the states of New York and Massachusetts have set out detailed and far-reaching standards in this area, bolstered by the participation of cities like Boston and NYC in local initiatives such as the ‘EV Purchasing Collaborative’. Launched in September 2018, over 250 cities, counties and other sub-state entities across the US have pledged to purchase more than 4000 EVs.91 The IIJA and IRA seek to rely upon local initiatives like the EV Purchasing Collaborative to develop a nationwide network of electric vehicle charging points and to electrify public transport. Likewise, several of Biden’s executive orders focus on the field of transportation, via the establishment of a federal procurement system for clean electricity and zero-emission vehicles, enabling state and local governments to participate.92 The risk of conflicting norms is even more noticeable when it comes to vehicle emission standards. As explained in Chapter 2, California was 89 In some cases, it is possible to identify a process whereby national governments ‘subcontract’ the implementation of policies to sub-state entities for achieving the objectives set out within NDCs. 90 See Hale (2018). 91 Climate Mayors, EV Purchasing Collaborative: https://climatemayors.org/ev-purcha

sing-collaborative/. 92 Executive Order 14008, Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad (see above).

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granted a special waiver by the EPA during the 1970s to develop its own rules in this area, which were allowed to be more stringent than national standards; other states were authorized to adopt CA’s stricter norms or follow federal rules, but were not permitted to establish their own. President Obama enacted the first national vehicle fuel efficiency standards for light, medium and heavy-duty vehicles, relying on California’s pioneering GHG rules for motor vehicles as a model. The Biden administration has followed a similar approach, as exemplified by the executive order signed in August 2021.93 This EO aims to green the US car and truck fleet, mandating relevant federal agencies (Transportation and the EPA) to establish multi-pollutant emission standards at the national level. At the same time, President Biden also reinstated in March 2022 California’s right to establish its own rigorous clean car standards, which the former Trump administration had rescinded in 2019. The federal rules enacted by Obama and Biden are much less stringent compared to the far-reaching GHG standards for motor vehicles developed by California. This is partly linked to domestic political constraints faced by both Presidents, which forced them to reach compromises and lower their level of ambition. The end result, however, is that even though California’s standards have served as a model, federal norms in this area have ended up being quite different due to the very fact that they are less ambitious. In addition to Massachusetts and New York in our sample, eleven other states since 2022 (fourteen in total—including California itself), as well as the District of Columbia, have already adopted the golden state’s stricter vehicle emission standards. At least three more states are also scheduled to adopt them over the next few years, representing in total more than a third of the overall US car market.94 Hence, in spite of efforts to the contrary, the risk of conflicting norms for vehicle emission standards between the federal and state level is apparent. This may lead to monitoring and enforcement issues due to the multiplication of disparate rules across the country, hampering the articulation of

93 Executive Order 14037, Strengthening American Leadership in Clean Cars and Trucks (see above). 94 See California Air Resources Board (2022).

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multilevel climate governance.95 This is especially significant since transportation surpassed the power sector in 2016 to become the largest source of American GHG emissions. Moreover, states and cities rarely run large budgetary or fiscal deficits in the US, unlike the national government.96 While there is nothing in the federal Constitution preventing sub-national actors from doing so, most states, including New York and Massachusetts in our sample, have enacted strict rules through statute or in their state constitution that require state and local governments to balance their budgets.97 Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing inflation crisis, the finances of many sub-national entities have been seriously impacted; a number of states and cities are still cash-strapped, due to the lingering impact of pandemic-induced budgetary cuts. This means that they no longer have the same resources to enact new and far-reaching climate policies, precisely at a time when Biden is seeking to mobilize and closely associate them in the implementation of ambitious federal climate objectives. Biden’s economic stimulus packages, including the IIJA and especially the IRA, will help to partly compensate for this since a notable portion of the funding will be allocated towards supporting sub-national initiatives, as discussed above. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the IIJA and IRA can fully compensate for local budgetary restrictions linked to the pandemic. What is more, Biden’s federal spending programs may have exacerbated inflation, already linked to the energy crisis triggered by the war in Ukraine; this could negate some of the potential benefits stemming from the economic stimulus provided by the IIJA and IRA. Like Obama, Biden has tried to associate sub-state and non-state actors with preparations for the renewed American NDC. Consultations were organized by the EPA in the months following the Democratic victory in the 2020 election; cities, states, businesses and civil society provided 95 Overall, while duplication and the risk of conflicting norms are clearly problematic, they are arguably still less of an issue when compared to inaction or aggressive regulatory rollbacks, as had been the case under the Trump administration (see Chapter 2). 96 See National Conference of State Legislatures (2010). An exception to this would be, for example, the city of Detroit, which declared bankruptcy in December 2015. 97 Vermont is the only state that has not set out a legal requirement for a balanced budget, while the states of Wyoming, North Dakota and Alaska also have some flexibility on this issue. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State Constitutional and Statutory Requirements for Balanced Budgets, https://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscalpolicy/state-constitutional-and-statutory-requirements-fo.aspx.

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inputs on how to fashion America’s upgraded NDC (including via platforms such as ‘America is All In’98 ), in preparation for the virtual Leaders’ Summit on Climate in April 2021.99 As in 2015, the aim was to highlight that climate action enjoys broad support across the country.100 Subnational and non-state actors organized their own parallel event known as the ‘US Climate Action Week’ under sponsorship from the White House. They convened side-events and made announcements which complemented the official Summit that took place the same week. The ‘Climate Group’, a transnational non-state actor network, served as the official convener of the US Climate Action Week, which endeavored to pressure national governments to raise the collective level of ambition.101 The event was successful, encouraging the Climate Group to organize a broader ‘US Climate Action Summit’ the following year in April 2022, inviting a wide range of participants from municipalities, state-level authorities, the business sector and civil society. This summit aimed to increase coordination between climate initiatives from non-state actors with the policies of the Biden administration to transition, for example, towards a clean energy economy via the deployment of national zeroemission vehicle infrastructure.102 Once more, these elements reinforce a previously examined pattern: sub-national entities play a key role in terms of setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. This also supports the notion that local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, triggering upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up. Nevertheless, in spite of Biden’s efforts, an institutionalized framework to integrate sub-state entities within national climate policy formulation is still lacking, while consultative processes remain inadequate on the whole (as had been the case with Obama, see Chapter 2). US climate policy has not been able to build a solid foundation due to persistent Republican 98 See America Is All In, https://www.americaisallin.com. 99 Ibid. See also US Department of State. Leaders Summit on Climate, https://www.

state.gov/leaders-summit-on-climate/. 100 Ibid. 101 ‘The Climate Group’ serves as the lead organization or Secretariat for the Under2

Coalition, one of the largest transnational climate networks for sub-national actors. Most of the US cities and states in our sample are members of the Under2 Coalition. 102 The Climate Group, US Climate Action Summit 2022: https://www.theclimategr oup.org/us-climate-action-summit.

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opposition over the last few decades, especially after four years of drastic regulatory rollbacks under Trump.103 Another related factor has been the continued pressure exercised by influential lobbying groups from the fossil fuel industry,104 which has hampered the enactment of a consistent framework in this area. As a result, there is still no formal institutionalized system to permanently associate sub-state and non-state actors, such as Boston/MA and New York/NY in our sample, in the development and formulation of national climate policies. While initiatives such as the ‘US Climate Action Week’ or ‘US Climate Action Summit’ (which were branded as parallel summits for non-state actors) are laudable, they are organized on an ad-hoc basis, and no structure currently exists to legally enshrine contributions from cities or states for example, within the official American NDC. Likewise, there is no formal role or process for sub-state entities to monitor the implementation of the American NDC over time, including in terms of assessing progress and remaining shortcomings.105 Although non-state actor networks such as the ‘America Is All In’ (AIAI) coalition have tried to play a role in this regard, they have yet to be granted an official function in terms of monitoring NDC enactment. Like the ‘US Climate Action Week’ or ‘US Climate Action Summit’, AIAI’s contributions for monitoring have mostly been organized on an ad-hoc basis. Hence, this underscores the ways in which the potential ‘monitoring’ role for sub-state entities to act as ‘watchdogs’ of national climate policies remains underdeveloped; the latter arguably weakens the level of accountability and transparency deriving from the official US NDC. Finally, a related shortcoming is that sub-national actors are still not sufficiently well integrated within the actual federal policies themselves. As previously examined, due to Republican obstruction in Congress, Democrats have had to rely on budgetary legislation, which is mostly 103 On the instability of US environmental policy, see Shafie (2020), and Smith and Jacques (2022). 104 On special interest group influence in the US political system, see Drutman (2015), Quirk (2016), Brown (2016) and Charnock (2020). 105 This is not unique to the US and is in fact a problem impacting most countries

around the world, including nations like France that have sought to provide consistent support to sub-national actors on climate issues over the last few decades (see Chapters 4 and 5). Yet, there are a few countries, especially Scandinavian nations in northern Europe, where frameworks and consultative processes to integrate sub-state entities within national climate policy formulation are more robust by comparison.

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limited to providing economic incentives. Likewise, the executive orders that have been signed so far by President Biden, while noteworthy on a number of counts, arguably lack the ambit and scope of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), whose final version had been presented by Obama in 2015. As examined above, the CPP was Obama’s signature climate initiative during his second term, articulating an overarching policy framework to achieve the initial US NDC under the Paris Agreement. It had set out the first-ever federal limitations on CO2 emissions from power plants, which constituted the largest source of American GHG emissions at the time.106 The CPP also mandated the EPA to develop binding national carbon pollution standards for power plants (coal and gas-fired plants specifically), which were referred to as ‘carbon dioxide emission performance rates’, and constituted a national minimum ‘floor’. Although states were given wide latitude in the implementation process, the CPP still established emission reduction targets and percentages for each individual state, based on differing local circumstances, including variations in energy mixes for example.107 Clearly, this goes much further than anything which has been attempted so far by the Biden administration, whether it be through budgetary legislation or executive orders. It is true that at the time of writing, Biden is only in his third year in office and Obama enacted the CPP during his sixth year. Nonetheless, this means that the US currently lacks on overarching policy framework to regulate multilevel interactions on climate policy between the federal government and subnational entities.108 The end result is that disparities in terms of the level of climate ambition across the country between progressive states like Massachusetts and New York in our sample and so-called ‘laggard states’ 106 As previously explained, the power sector has since then been surpassed by transportation, which today represents the largest source of US GHG emissions. 107 As analyzed in Chapter 2, while the CPP did not oblige states to adopt their own plan to reduce power plant emissions, if a state chose not to develop one, or if that plan was found not to conform with national minimum standards, then the EPA would assume responsibility for developing a plan and enforcing it directly within that state. See US EPA (2015). 108 President Trump had endeavored to dismantle the EPA and other federal agencies with environmental responsibilities, including from a budgetary perspective, while staffing them with climate change deniers. It has taken the Biden administration some time to renew staff and repair such extensive damage, which has further slowed down the enactment of ambitious climate policies.

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(mostly Republican-voting areas in the South or Midwest) have remained under Biden. Although ‘laggard states’ still need to comply with renewed federal regulations enacted under Biden across a range of different sectors, the lack of an overarching climate policy framework means that such disparities, which were exacerbated by Trump, have been perpetuated to a certain extent under his successor. What is more, the fact that the CPP was struck down by the Supreme Court in 2016 before its implementation, when the Court did not possess as strong a conservative majority as it does today, does not bode well for Biden’s prospects of enacting anything similar. As previously examined, the legal doctrine known as the ‘major questions doctrine’, which the Court embraced through the West Virginia v. EPA ruling in June 2022, significantly narrows the possibility of relying on broad sections of the Clean Air Act to tackle climate change.109 As a result, it has become much more difficult from a legal perspective for Biden or future Presidents to bypass Congress in enacting far-reaching climate policy through executive orders. This situation may perpetuate inaction from many Republican states, thus exacerbating disparities with more progressive parts of the country on the east and west coasts. Indeed, a number of conservative-leaning states continue to rely on coal as an important energy source, which means they have made very few efforts to lower their emissions over the last few decades. For instance, the 19 conservative states involved in launching the above lawsuit against the EPA are responsible for around 44% of US GHG emissions, having only reduced their own emissions by an average of 7% since the year 2000.110 Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision clearly has an impact on the effective articulation of multilevel governance, since it will make it much more difficult for Biden or future administrations to enact rules requiring conservative states to take action and lower their emissions. This will negatively impact the trajectory of national GHG emission reductions and may jeopardize the country’s ability to achieve the ambitious climate targets set out by the 109 The Supreme Court issued a ruling in June 2022 which stated that the EPA does not possess legal authority to regulate GHG emissions across entire states or in relation to whole sectors of the US economy, asserting that Congress would need to explicitly allow for this beforehand through statutory law. US Supreme Court. West Virginia v. EPA. No. 20-1530, 30 June 2022. 110 See Stallard (2022).

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Biden administration over the medium to long run, including the goal of reducing emissions between 50 and 52% by 2030 (from 2005 levels). This is especially worrying since, as explained above, current national policies and budgetary laws such as the IIJA and IRA are predicted to only reduce US GHG emissions by around 40% up to 2030.111 For these reasons, sub-national entities continue to have a vital role to play in terms of closing the remaining emissions gap. The issues examined above reveal that even in developed countries such as the US, the articulation of multilevel climate governance has not always been effective, and there is clearly room for improvement. In order to successfully address the systemic risk posed by climate change, an effective articulation of multilevel governance is essential, whereby each echelon must be well coordinated and mutually support the others on climate policy. If even developed countries are unable to foster an effective articulation of multilevel governance, this does not bode well for the rest of the international community, and for the long-term objectives of the Paris Accord.

4

Conclusion

This chapter has examined multilevel climate governance and the nature of interactions from the sub-national (states and cities) to the national level, focusing on the Presidency of Joe Biden. This constitutes the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid which, for reasons developed throughout the previous sections, remains significant due to the highly strategic position that federal policies continue to have for the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. This chapter has sought to assess the different ways in which the federal echelon under Biden has either supported or hindered the implementation of local and regional climate initiatives for the US states and cities in our sample (New York/ NY and Boston/MA). It has provided a number of different reasons as to why the US constitutes a relevant framework regarding the articulation of multilevel climate governance, which justifies its selection as a sample country. The US federal system gives states wide competences, referred to as a framework

111 See Larsen et al. (2022) and Mahajan et al. (2022).

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of ‘cooperative federalism’, whereby Congress and the federal government often enact a national minimum floor. This makes it possible for states to implement their own far-reaching local green initiatives and go beyond federal standards. Such a situation has been evident under Biden’s Presidency, whereby Democrats have sought to mobilize sub-state initiatives as a springboard to launch an ambitious national climate policy agenda known as the ‘Clean Energy Revolution’. Biden has endeavored to enact an ‘all-of-government’ approach which relies on an enhanced version of ‘cooperative federalism’, aiming to closely affiliate states. Nevertheless, powerful lobbying groups and the lingering sway of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies have led the Republican Party to continue obstructing climate initiatives under Biden. Indeed, Democrats have been confronted with notable impediments when trying to enact their ambitious climate agenda, involving Republican opposition in Congress, together with hampering from the federal judicial system.112 For these reasons, it appears that climate initiatives from the Biden administration so far will not be enough to achieve the targets contained in America’s new NDC. Moreover, the arguments developed throughout this chapter have also highlighted a number of inadequacies and shortcomings in the articulation of multilevel climate governance from the sub-national to the federal level in the US. This includes temporal discord in terms of baseline years, the risk of overlap and duplication, conflicting norms between the different echelons, along with the lack of an institutionalized framework to integrate sub-state actors within national climate policy formulation and enactment. Yet, if even developed countries like the US can in some cases fall short of providing effective synchronization on climate policy, then this means that the international community as a whole is probably also failing to provide an adequate framework of multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Accord. Indeed, as previously examined, climate change represents a systemic risk that may evolve into a systemic crisis, which is likely to negatively impact all aspects and dimensions of society. In order to successfully address such a systemic risk, an effective articulation of multilevel governance is essential, whereby each echelon must be well coordinated and mutually support the others in the implementation of climate policies.

112 Barichella (2021).

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Finally, this chapter has also highlighted a number of patterns involved in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, which corroborate those that were already identified in Chapter 2. This includes how subnational entities (federal states and local governments in the case of the US) may act as pioneers, drivers and catalysts, leading the way with farreaching climate initiatives. The national echelon is often striving to catch up and may be galvanized by sub-state actors into raising the level of ambition over time. Sub-national entities can also operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ whereby innovative climate policies may be tested on a local/regional scale, before subsequently being enacted by the national echelon. This corroborates the notion of sub-state actors playing a key role in terms of establishing the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. Moreover, this chapter has further substantiated what was also underlined in the previous chapter, in terms of how the US federal system displays both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. In terms of advantages, extensive decentralization for states allows climate initiatives to be well adapted to the local context and tailored to changing local conditions. States enjoy a high level of autonomy and multiple competences, which enables them to innovate and enact far-reaching climate policies. This enhances performance over time, making it easier for states to go beyond federal minimum environmental standards. Likewise, multilevel governance tends to be more dynamic and flexible, since competence allocation for sub-national entities is clearly delineated. States have precise powers defined under US constitutional law, with local authorities (cities, counties, etc.) falling outside the ambit of the federal government. This helps to reduce overlaps and duplications between the different echelons, enhancing the effectiveness of multilevel governance. In terms of disadvantages, however, the US federal system tends to result in a relatively weak level of policy harmonization and coordination, since federal environmental laws/policies often set only loose minimum national standards, providing states with extensive autonomy. Thus, even a strong central thrust can end-up being diluted in practice at the subnational level during the enactment phase. This is exacerbated by the fact that due to gridlock in Congress, no substantial federal climate legislation has been passed over the last few decades (only budgetary laws). On account of relatively loose national environmental standards, a number of laggards among sub-state entities have emerged across the US, mostly

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in Republican-voting areas (between a third to half of all states), which often rely on greater flexibility to avoid or delay compliance. This tends to lower the overall level of national climate ambition. Such a paradigm also increases the risk of conflict regarding differentiated policies enacted between the different echelons, which can lead to federal monitoring and enforcement issues. The latter may also trigger related problems such as ‘free riding’ or ‘carbon leakage’ from one state to another. These insights represent an original contribution of this book to the academic literature. Certain authors referenced in the last two chapters (such as Banks, Kettl, Coleman and Leskiw or Robertson113 ) have analyzed issues in related fields. This book offers a comprehensive classification regarding the adequacy of the American political framework specifically in the context of multilevel climate governance and the nature of interactions between the different echelons. This includes an innovative emphasis on the fact that US federalism displays both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance. As explained in Chapter 1, the American federal system stands as a point of contrast to the relatively centralized French political framework, which has a significant bearing in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance. The latter will be the focus of the next two chapters (Chapters 4 and 5).

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113 Banks (2018), Kettl (2020), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017).

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Brown, H. (2016). Pay-to-Play Politics: How Money Defines the American Democracy. Praeger Publishers. Brown, M., & Phillis, M. (2022, August 19). ‘Climate Bill’s Unlikely Beneficiary: US Oil and Gas Industry’. Associated Press News. Charnock, E. J. (2020). The Rise of Political Action Committees: Interest Group Electioneering and the Transformation of American Politics. Oxford University Press. Coleman, A. N., & Leskiw, C. S. (2018). Debating Federalism: From the Founding to Today. Lexington Books. Drutman, L. (2015). The Business of America Is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate. Oxford University Press. Fisher, L., & Harriger, K. (2019—12th edition). American Constitutional Law, Volume 1: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism. Carolina Academic Press. Hale, T. (2018, November). ‘The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes’. Chatham House—Research Paper. Hamin Infield, E. M., Abunnasr, Y., & Ryan, R. L. (2018). Planning for Climate Change: A Reader in Green Infrastructure and Sustainable Design for Resilient Cities. Routledge. Hickman, R., & Banister, D. (2014). Transport, Climate Change and the City. Routledge. Karch, A., & Rose, S. (2019). Responsive States: Federalism and American Public Policy. Cambridge University Press. Kettl, D. F. (2020). The Divided States of America: Why Federalism Doesn’t Work. Princeton University Press. Konisky, D. M. (2020). Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. Kraft, E. M. (2021, 8th edition). Environmental Policy and Politics. Routledge. Larsen, J., King, B., Kolus, H., Dasari, N., Hiltbrand, G., & Herndon, W. (2022, August 12). ‘A Turning Point for US Climate Progress: Assessing the Climate and Clean Energy Provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act’. Rhodium Group. Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., Rosenthal, S., Cutler, M., & Kotcher, J. (2018, May 8). Politics & Global Warming, March 2018. Yale Program on Climate Change Communication and George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication. Mahajan, M., Ashmoore, O., Rissman, J., Orvis, R., & Gopal, A. (2022, August). ‘Modeling the Inflation Reduction Act Using the Energy Policy Simulator’. Energy Innovation: Policy and Technology. Oleszek, W. J., Oleszek, M. J., Rybicki, E., & Heniff, B. Jr. (2019, 11th edition). Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process. CQ Press.

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Pincetl, S., Gustafson, H., Federico, F., Fournier, E. D., Cudd, R., & Porse, E. (2020). Energy Use in Cities: A Roadmap for Urban Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan. Politi, J., & Fedor, L. (2021, June 24). ‘Biden Agrees Slimmed-down $1tn Infrastructure Deal With Senators’. Financial Times. Prest, B. (2022, August 15). ‘Inflation Reduction Act Can Achieve Emissions Reductions Even with Oil and Gas Provisions’. Resources for the Future. Quirk, P. J. (2016). Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton University Press. Rinfret, S. R., & Pautz, M. C. (2019). US Environmental Policy in Action. Palgrave Macmillan. Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Rosenbaum, W. A. (2019—11th edition). Environmental Politics and Policy. CQ Press. Rowell, A., & van Zeben, J. (2021). A Guide to U.S. Environmental Law. University of California Press. Shafie, D. M. (2020). The Administrative Presidency and the Environment: Policy Leadership and Retrenchment from Clinton to Trump. Routledge. Smith, Z. A., & Jacques, P. (2022—8th edition). The Environmental Policy Paradox. Routledge. Stallard, E. (2022, June 30). Supreme Court Limits Biden’s Power to Cut Emissions. BBC World News. Turner, J. M., & Isenberg, A. C. (2018). The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Harvard University Press. Vig, N. J., Kraft, M. E., & Rabe, B. G. (2021—11th edition). Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century. CQ Press. Wheeler, S. M., & Rosan, C. D. (2021). Reimagining Sustainable Cities: Strategies for Designing Greener, Healthier, More Equitable Communities. University of California Press. Wright, G., & Sands, L. (2022, August 9). ‘US Senate Passes Sweeping Climate, Tax and Healthcare Package’. BBC World News. Zelizer, J. E. (2018). The Presidency of Barack Obama: A First Historical Assessment. Princeton University Press. Zelizer, J. E. (2022). The Presidency of Donald J. Trump: A First Historical Assessment. Princeton University Press.

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Websites America Is All In. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.americaisallin. com Climate Mayors. EV Purchasing Collaborative. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://climatemayors.org/ev-purchasing-collaborative/ National Conference of State Legislatures. State Constitutional and Statutory Requirements for Balanced Budgets. Retrieved January 25, 2023, from https:/ /www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/state-constitutional-and-statutory-req uirements-fo.aspx The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ The Climate Group, US Climate Action Summit 2022. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.theclimategroup.org/us-climate-action-summit The Republican Commitment to America. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.speaker.gov/commitment/ The White House (2021, April 22). President Biden Sets 2030 Greenhouse Gas Pollution Reduction Target Aimed at Creating Good-Paying Union Jobs and Securing U.S. Leadership on Clean Energy Technologies. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/04/22/fact-sheet-president-biden-sets-2030-greenhouse-gaspollution-reduction-target-aimed-at-creating-good-paying-union-jobs-and-sec uring-u-s-leadership-on-clean-energy-technologies/ The White House. (2021, November 6). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisaninfrastructure-deal/ United States Climate Alliance. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from http://www. usclimatealliance.org US Congress (117th). Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/ 3684 US Congress (117th). Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/ 5376 US Department of State. Leaders Summit on Climate. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.state.gov/leaders-summit-on-climate/ US EPA. Overview of the Clean Air Act and Air Pollution. Retrieved January 23, 2023, from https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview

CHAPTER 4

Hierarchical and Stratified Centralization: The Historical Context of Multilevel Environmental Governance in France

1

Introduction

This chapter will focus on multilevel environmental governance from the sub-national (cities and regions) to the national level in France. As the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid, this is significant due to the highly strategic importance of national policies for the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance, examined in detail below. Similarly to Chapter 2 in the context of the US, this chapter will also adopt an historical approach in order to assess the different ways in which the national French government has tried to support the enactment of local climate initiatives for the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region. The first Sect. (2) will present the historical context of multilevel climate governance in France and how the national echelon interacts with sub-state entities from President Chirac to President Sarkozy (1995– 2012). The second Sect. (3) will examine these issues involving multilevel climate governance under the Presidency of François Hollande (2012– 2017). Comparative analyses between the French and American multilevel frameworks are developed and elaborated throughout this chapter. France and the US both constitute particularly relevant frameworks in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance, since they differ from one another in thought-provoking ways. Chapters 2 and 3

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_4

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examined the constitutional paradigm of the US federal system,1 which provides states with broad powers and a high degree of autonomy in the implementation of environmental statues and national objectives. By contrast, France has historically possessed a relatively centralized political system,2 relying on a tight framework of multilevel governance between the national and sub-state echelons. Despite ongoing decentralization since the 1980s which has ascribed more competences to sub-national entities, French regions possess far fewer competences than American states, which means they are less able to innovate or enact their own farreaching climate policies. Nonetheless, unlike in the US, there is broad consensus across the French political spectrum on environmental issues, even though there remains a difference in terms of prioritizing climate action between the left and the right. Thus, since the 1990s, consecutive French Presidents from different Parties including Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande have sought to enact climate policies which directly associate ‘territorial communities’ in the achievement of nationally defined objectives. Because French regions tend to be much more closely aligned with objectives defined at the national level, this often leads to a higher and stricter national minimum standard compared to the US, along with a more harmonized and coordinated system of interaction between the different echelons. Likewise, the centralized political system in France enables the national government to directly interact with local entities, such as cities,3 on environmental matters, which is not constitutionally possible in the American federal system. French authorities have also consistently supported a national climate policy agenda, in contrast to the US. In addition, France is rendered a more complex and relevant case study due to interactions with the European Union,4 since there

1 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018) and Robertson (2017). 2 See Aubelle and Kada (2019) and Aubelle and Kerrouche (2021). 3 See Collectif (2021). 4 This chapter and the next one will duly acknowledge where appropriate the multilevel

dimension stemming from France’s position as a core EU member state, including the transposition of EU climate initiatives at the national level. However, this does not represent a focus area in Chapters 4 and 5, which concentrate instead on the French multilevel framework, and how the national government has interacted with sub-state entities like Paris and the Île-de-France inside the country. The multilevel paradigm of the European

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is a legal requirement for EU climate initiatives (directives and regulations) to be transposed at the national level. Hence, the national echelon in France has provided sub-state entities like regions and cities with far more support over the last few decades on climate issues, which provides for rich comparative material with respect to the US.5

2

Hierarchical and Stratified Centralization: Historical Context of Multilevel Environmental Governance in France from Presidents Chirac to Sarkozy (1995–2012) 2.1 National Climate Policies Enacted by President Chirac (1995–2007) and Multilevel Governance Under the Centralized French System

France began to enact environmental policies at approximately the same time as the US during the 1960s and 1970s. This formed part of a global movement within the Western bloc during the Cold War, pioneered by the US and galvanized by the first UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972. Already, France was relatively well synchronized with the European Economic Community (EEC—the precursor to the EU), which embarked on an ambitious and comprehensive environmental policy agenda at that time,6 rivaling the US in its level of ambition. Yet, it was not until the year 2000 that the French government developed its first major national policy program specifically targeting climate change, forming part of France’s official pledge under the international framework of the Kyoto Protocol. Known as the

Union is a large and complex subject, which would necessitate an entire book in itself, and thus mostly falls outside the ambit of this research project. 5 Original research for this chapter is informed by an extensive range of interviews with French public officials working at the national, regional and municipal levels on environmental issues, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks and NGOs. The interviewees provided relevant insights about the historical development of environmental and climate politics in France over the last couple of decades, and the nature of multilevel governance and national/sub-state interactions on these issues. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1). 6 On the historical origins of European environmental and energy policy, see Hoerber (2012).

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‘National Program to Address Climate Change’ (Programme national de lutte contre le changement climatique—PNLCC), the program aimed to return France’s GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2010.7 Although France was governed at the time by President Jacques Chirac from the Conservative Party,8 the Prime Minister was Lionel Jospin from the Socialist Party, since Chirac lost his parliamentary majority in the 1997 elections, forcing him to form a government with the ‘plural left’ opposition under the ‘co-habitation’ system.9 The ‘plural left’ alliance in the National Assembly brought together various left-wing political groups, including the Green Party. This contributed to raising the national government’s level of ambition on environmental matters, especially since a Green Party member (Dominique Voynet) was selected to serve as Environment Minister.10 Yet, a major assessment (bilan) of the PNLCC in 2002 revealed that progress in meeting emission reduction objectives was not sufficient, pointing to the need to raise the level of performance. This led the French government to enact a new, upgraded National Climate Plan (Plan Climat national—PCN) in 2004, which adopted a holistic approach covering all major sectors of the economy. The aim was to reduce CO2 emissions by 54 million tons up to 2010 and cut national GHG emissions at least fourfold by 2050. This is representative of a previously examined pattern whereby the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more general and holistic policy approaches tend to become, with national governments setting out broad and overarching objectives, in

7 The Program included 100 different measures which specifically sought to reduce France’s CO2 emissions by 16 million tons up to 2010, so as to ensure that emissions did not exceed 144 million tons by that date, based on a growth trajectory of 2.2% from 2000 to 2010. See République française, Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement (2000). 8 At the time, the French Conservative Party was known as the Rassemblement pour la République—RPR (‘Rallying for the Republic’). 9 ‘Co-habitation’ in French politics refers to a situation whereby the President is forced to form a cabinet led by a Prime Minister from the opposition, usually after losing his parliamentary majority. This is precisely what happened after Chirac dissolved the National Assembly in April 1997, leading to a surprise victory of the ‘plural left’ coalition, led at the time by Lionel Jospin from the Socialist Party. See Berstein and Milza (2009). 10 On the history of the green party in France, see Boivin (2015), Villalba (2021) and Jacob (2016).

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contrast to cities which target specific sectors well adapted for the municipal scale. Indeed, the main provisions of France’s 2004 National Climate Plan (covering a time period up until 2012) were divided into eight major categories11 : 1. National information on climate change. 2. Sustainable transportation. 3. Buildings and eco-housing. 4. Industry, energy and waste. 5. Sustainable agriculture and forests. 6. Sustainable air conditioning. 7. Territorial climate plans and an exemplary State. 8. Research, international cooperation and perspectives beyond 2010. It is the seventh category that is particularly relevant with regard to multilevel interactions between the different echelons. For the first time, the French national government explicitly invited sub-national entities (known as collectivités territoriales or ‘territorial communities’ under French law) to develop their own climate plans, in order to help implement national climate objectives on a local scale. As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 8, the French Constitution defines three levels of sub-national governance or territorial communities (from the top-down): regions, départements and communes —the latter includes municipalities.12 All three echelons were encouraged to adopt their own ‘territorial climate plans’ (plans climat territoriaux). Moreover, the National Climate Plan specifically called upon the ‘Agency for the Environment and Energy Control’ (Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie—ADEME, created in 199113 ) and other relevant organizations to elaborate toolkits, so as to assist territorial communities in the elaboration of their local climate plans. The national government also officially committed to becoming more involved as a relay to support local climate 11 République française, Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement Durable (2004). 12 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux

and Janicot (2021), Verpeaux (2020), and Faure (2021). 13 The ADEME is placed directly under the authority of several national ministries, which cover fields such as the environment or research and innovation. The ADEME’s mission is to coordinate and implement national policies in these areas, in collaboration with territorial communities.

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initiatives, with the PCN pledging to emphasize contributions from subnational actors during yearly ‘national climate gatherings’ (rendez-vous climat nationaux), starting in 2005. These gatherings brought together relevant stakeholders from all levels of governance, as well as private sector and civil society actors, in order to take stock of progress in implementing the PCN. The National Climate Plan also emphasized that the elaboration of ‘territorial climate plans’ should seek whenever possible to build upon policies relating to sustainable development. The French government set out a National Strategy for Sustainable Development (Stratégie nationale de développement durable—SNDD) in 2003,14 following several international UN and EU summits.15 The SNDD sought to integrate the notion of sustainable development into all elements of governmental action and also encouraged sub-national actors to develop their own sustainable development strategies at the local level. These were known as local ‘Agenda 21’ programs, following from the Agenda 21 of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit. In this regard, Paris developed its own local Agenda 21 program in 2004, which provided a basis for the subsequent elaboration of the city’s first ‘territorial climate plan’, finalized in 2007 (discussed in Chapter 8).16 Thus, Paris constitutes an example of a territorial community which was encouraged to follow the guidelines and recommendations set out in the National Climate Plan. It is apparent that through the PCN and SNDD, the French government endeavored to involve sub-state entities early-on in the implementation of national climate objectives. Yet, in both cases, territorial communities were at this stage only ‘encouraged’, but not legally required to adopt territorial climate plans or local Agenda 21 programs. As a result, beyond Paris and several other large urban 14 République française – Comité interministériel pour le développement durable (2003). 15 This includes the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg (South Africa), as well as the 2001 European Council Summit in the city of Göteborg, which led to the development of the European Strategy for Sustainable Development. The French SNDD has since then been regularly updated every couple of years, with the latest version released in February 2020 and spanning a time period up to 2030. Its title has been modified and it is now referred to as the ‘French Roadmap for the 2030 Agenda’. See République française – Ministère de la transition écologique et solidaire (2019). 16 Ville de Paris (2007). For an explanation about the ‘Agenda 21’ at the local level in France, see Lorach and de Quatrebarbes (2003).

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centers, many French municipalities chose not to develop these types of local climate and environmental programs at the time. Chirac’s government also initiated important constitutional reforms during roughly the same time period, so as to reinforce the allocation of competences towards territorial communities. France has historically been a centralized nation, a tradition that was perpetuated and enshrined in the 1958 Constitution establishing the 5th Republic as a unitary State.17 Consequently, and up until recently, very few powers had been attributed to sub-national entities. Under the unitary French political system, the Constitution places all territorial communities at the same level below the State, which means that neither communes, départements nor regions have authority to exercise tutelle or ‘tutelage’ over other territorial communities; likewise, each echelon only possesses those powers that are expressly attributed to them under French law.18 This is because, in a unitary State like France, only national authorities can delegate specific and limited competences to local actors, but not transfer sovereignty itself, in contrast to the US federal system.19 The French multilevel governance paradigm represents a form of ‘hierarchical’ and ‘stratified’ centralization, as opposed to the American system of ‘cooperative federalism’ (see Chapters 2 and 3). The hierarchical element is apparent since, unlike in the US where sovereignty is shared between the federal government and its constituent units (states), sovereignty in France is held solely by national authorities, which sit at the apex of the multilevel pyramid above the other echelons; only limited transfers of competences to territorial communities are possible, but not sovereignty itself. Likewise, the ‘stratified’ element of the French system

17 See Berstein and Milza (2009). 18 See Collectif (2021). As will be examined in Chapter 8, there is one exception to this

rule, since communes—which mostly refers to the municipal echelon—continue to benefit from a ‘general competence clause’ (clause générale de competence), which allows them to enact regulations that go beyond the strict wording of competence allocation under the law, in the name of ‘local public interest’. While the first phase of decentralization in 1982 had also provided regions and départements with such a ‘general competence clause’, the third phase in 2015 only kept it for communes (see Sect. 3). 19 In this case, sovereignty refers to the power of delegating competences. In a federal system like the US, states possess sovereign powers that are enshrined in the Constitution, which the central government cannot infringe upon without their express consent (hence the notion of ‘shared sovereignty’). On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019) and LaCroix (2010).

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can be discerned in the many different layers of sub-national governance (regions, départements , as well as communes and inter-communalities), all of which are positioned at the same level beneath the State, since no territorial community may exercise ‘tutelage’ over another. Hence, the different layers have a tendency to pile up and become superimposed, a situation which is sometimes colloquially referred to as the millefeuille administratif or ‘administrative layer cake’. While the academic literature, including Kada et al., Verpeaux et al., Vital-Durand or Aubelle and Kerrouche,20 has implied its existence, this book is the first to advance the notion of hierarchical and stratified centralization in the context of an extensive study of the French multilevel governance framework. This represents a distinctive contribution in terms of the comparative analysis between France and the US. It was not until the 1980s and the election of President Mitterrand that France begun a gradual process of decentralization, which has unfolded through several phases and continues up to this day, progressively transferring more competences to the sub-national level.21 The first phase occurred between 1982 and 1984 under Mitterrand, while the second one took place from 2003 to 2004 under Chirac. Hence, communes, départements and regions have each been granted a different set of core competences in a certain number of specific areas, including many that are relevant for environmental policy such as transportation, the energy supply or waste management. The second phase of decentralization under Chirac enhanced the financial autonomy of territorial communities, led to new transfers of competences in specific areas such as transport (especially at the regional echelon), the inclusion of decentralization and regionalism within the Constitution,22 along with the reinforcement of local

20 Kada et al. (2017), Verpeaux et al. (2021), Vital-Durand (2017), and Aubelle and Kerrouche (2021). 21 See Aubelle and Kada (2019). 22 This included the introduction of the ‘principle of free administration for territorial

communities’ (principe de libre administration des collectivités territoriales ), enshrined in the constitutional revision of March 2003. The latter is referred to as the ‘Constitutional law relating to the decentralized organization of the Republic’. See XIIe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2002–2007). Loi constitutionnelle n°2003-276 du 28 mars 2003 relative à l’organisation décentralisée de la République.

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democratic mechanisms (such as new rights for petitioning and referendums).23 The second phase of decentralization clearly had an impact on the articulation of multilevel climate governance, especially through the enhancement of financial autonomy, as well as the transfer of additional competences to territorial communities in key sectors. Subsequently, the National Climate Plan was updated in 2006, partly in order to transpose new requirements from EU legislation. Another factor was linked to conclusions drawn from the first ‘national climate gathering’ in 2005, which underscored that while progress was being made, more action was needed to ensure that France would meet its objectives under the Kyoto Protocol. The 2006 update reinforced existing measures and introduced new ones, focusing especially on the transportation and building sectors, with additional net annual gains of 6 to 9 megatons of CO2 emissions from 2008 to 2012, and relying on an upgraded objective of cutting national GHG emissions 10% by 2010 (from 1990 levels).24 The latter was in line with official national targets under the Kyoto Protocol to stabilize emissions between 2008 and 2012 at their 1990 levels, with the aim of enabling France to play an exemplary role in the implementation phase of the treaty. As explained in Chapter 2, this formed a notable point of contrast to the US, which at the time was led by Republican President Bush Jr. Not only did the latter reject US signature of the Kyoto Protocol,25 but his administration sought to actively undermine it on the international stage, all the while promoting unfettered fossil fuel development at the domestic level, as well as casting doubt on the science of climate change.26 This is all the more notable since France in that period was no longer operating under a ‘co-habitation’ system, as Prime Minister Jospin failed to qualify for the second round of the Presidential Election in 2002, enabling Chirac to be reelected and the Conservative Party to obtain a comfortable majority in the National Assembly.27 President Chirac chose moderate conservatives, such as Jean-Pierre Raffarin or Dominique de Villepin, as Prime Ministers; both politicians led cabinets also made up 23 See Collectif (2021) and Baguenard (2006). 24 République française, Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement Durable (2006). 25 See Lisowski (2002). 26 See Shulman (2007) and Mooney (2007). 27 Berstein and Milza (2009). See also Bernard (2008).

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of moderate conservatives who did not deny climate science or oppose the enacting of climate policies. In fact, a fundamental point of contrast between France and the US is that French conservatives are generally more measured, including on environmental matters.28 French conservative politicians and voters have tended to support climate action, as long as it avoids overly constraining regulatory measures with a negative impact on economic development. Thus, the French Conservative Party was and remains quite different from its American counterpart, as the US Republican Party29 has tended to veer towards more extreme positions involving rigid climate change denialism since the 1990s. 2.2 National Climate Policies Enacted by President Sarkozy (2007–2012) and Multilevel Governance Under the Centralized French System French President Nicolas Sarkozy continued with these patterns, as a member of the Conservative Party (rebranded as the ‘Union for a Popular Movement’—Union pour un Mouvement Populaire or UMP).30 While elected in 2007 on a relatively conservative platform, Sarkozy still attempted to maintain a more centrist position on the environment and climate change by signing an ‘ecological pact’. One of his electoral promises was to organize a Grenelle de l’Environnement,31 a series of political meetings with representatives from across French society, to come up collectively with environmental proposals for the short, medium and long term. The Grenelle took place from September to December 2007 under the aegis of Jean-Louis Borloo, a centrist conservative and Environmental Minister at the time. A total of 268 propositions covering a broad range of topics emerged from the Grenelle,32 where 28 Regarding polarization of climate issues in the US, see Brewer (2012). On American public opinion and the environment, see also Konisky (2020). For a contrast with the situation in France, see Cautrès et al. (2021). 29 On Republican attitudes towards environmental and climate issues, see Turner and Isenberg (2018) and Layzer (2012). 30 The UMP replaced the former RPR (‘Rally for the Republic’ or Rassemblement pour la République—RPR, which had been founded by Jacques Chirac in 1976. The UMP was subsequently renamed Les Républicains or ‘The Republicans’ in 2015. 31 See Berstein and Milza (2009) and Bernard (2008). 32 Berstein and Milza (2009).

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sub-national actors occupied a prominent role. In fact, territorial communities (including a notable presence of the city of Paris) constituted one of the five ‘colleges’ representing the main actors involved in the environmental transition, which engaged in various workshops throughout the Grenelle.33 In October 2008, the French National Assembly approved the Grenelle I Law (GI) with near unanimity, highlighting once again a broadbased consensus on climate issues across the French political spectrum. The legislation formalized various commitments which came out of the Grenelle; as a ‘programming’ law, it set out general national objectives over the next few years.34 Article 51 explicitly asserted that territorial communities are “essential actors regarding the environment and sustainable development”, and have “complementary roles, both from a strategic and operational perspective”.35 Overall, the GI Law was divided into a number of different ‘Titles’, including: Title 1: Addressing Climate Change (which comprised sub-titles on Buildings, Transport and Energy). Title 2: Biodiversity and Natural Habitats. Title 3: Preventing Environmental Risks linked to Health. Title 4: An Exemplary National Government. Once again, this is representative of a previously examined pattern, whereby the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel governance pyramid, the more general policy approaches tend to become. Hence, national governments usually set out broad and overarching objectives, in contrast to cities which target specific sectors that are well adapted to the municipal level (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). However, it was the second law deriving from the Grenelle de l’Environnement, known as Grenelle II (GII),36 which legally enshrined and defined the main institutional provisions regarding interactions between the national government and territorial communities for environmental

33 The other ‘colleges’ represented the national government, NGOs, the business sector and employees. 34 XIIIE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2007–12). LOI n° 2009967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre du Grenelle de l’environnement. 35 Ibid., Article 51. 36 XIIIE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2007–12). LOI n° 2010-788

du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement.

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and climate policy. Enacted in July 2010,37 the GII Law was different from its predecessor since it was not a general programming law; instead, it set out detailed, technical policy provisions across different sectors.38 One aim was to enact the main provisions deriving from the Grenelle de l’Environnement by declining them at the sub-national level via the integration of territorial communities in the implementation process. Another main objective was to nationally transpose the EU’s ‘2020 Climate and Energy Package’ adopted in 2007 and enacted in 2008,39 and decline these new targets at the sub-national level. The EU’s Climate and Energy Package was designed to reduce GHG emissions by 20% (from a 1990 baseline), as well as enhance renewables and energy efficiency up to 20%, by the year 2020.40 As previously explained, national climate policy frameworks (such as the 2004 Climate Plan and its 2006 update) had until then merely ‘encouraged’ or ‘incited’ sub-national entities to develop their own ‘territorial climate plans’. The Grenelle II Law marked a significant change in that it rendered it legally mandatory for any territorial community of more than 50,000 inhabitants to put in place an enhanced local climate plan, which was rebranded as the ‘territorial climate and energy plan’ (Plan climat énergie territorial —PCET).41 This constituted an upgraded version from the previous ‘territorial climate plan’, hence the addition of the word ‘energy’ in the title; the PCET had to be renewed every five 37 Unlike its predecessor, the GII Law was not approved by unanimous consent in the French Parliament, since the opposition (mostly from the left) abstained or voted against it, denouncing a lack of ambition and accusing it of betraying the proposals which had emerged from the Grenelle de l’Environnement. 38 While the GII Law mostly maintained the different policy categories or ‘Titles’ of its predecessor (GI), it went further by setting out many technical policy provisions across relevant sectors such as buildings, transport or energy. 39 See European Commission, 2020 Climate & Energy Package, announced in 2007 and enacted in 2009: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2020climate-energy-package_en. 40 The French GII law transposed such EU objectives into similar national targets and also adopted a slightly more ambitious goal for renewable energies (23% by 2020). This included sub-targets such as 27% for the electricity sector, 33% in heating/cooling, along with 10.5% in the transport sector, with a special emphasis on the development of wind and solar power, as well as biomass. The latter were set out in France’s National Renewable Energy Action Plan. See République française – Ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer (2009). 41 For a detailed analysis of the PCET, see Rizzoli (2015).

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years. In fact, the GII Law went further by establishing certain deadlines for the realization of PCETs, depending on the echelon and number of inhabitants. Likewise, it set out detailed provisions for the main elements which territorial communities had to integrate when developing their local PCETs, and also specific methods for evaluation over time. This included42 : 1. The development of effective strategic and operational climate objectives over the short, medium and long run.43 2. A policy action program deriving from these objectives, which must be aligned with national and EU targets: GHG emissions must be reduced by 20%, and renewable energies and energy efficiency must be enhanced by 20% up to 2020 (3×20 goals—1990 baseline). The level of GHG emissions up to 2050 must be divided by four (also from a 1990 baseline). 3. A framework to follow up and evaluate progress over time for the achievement of these various objectives, through the development of specific assessment metrics, indicators or observation techniques covering environmental, economic, social and sanitary criteria. Moreover, the GII Law explicitly indicated the method to be followed in the elaboration and preparation of the PCET,44 which had to respect certain procedural rules, including a public consultation process. An evaluation of GHG emissions for each territorial community within its borders (Bilan des émissions de gaz à effet de serre—BEGES) before the end of 2012 (to be renewed every three years) had to precede the PCET. This was rendered mandatory for any territorial community of more than 50,000 inhabitants, providing a basis for the subsequent elaboration of the PCET. Such an evaluation had to include emissions in relation to both the respective competence allocation and the patrimony of each territorial community; this was to be developed according to a methodology established under the legislation and made freely available to sub-national

42 LOI n° 2010–788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement. 43 The GII Law stipulated how PCETs may become the ‘climate component’ of a local Agenda 21 for those territorial communities which had previously developed one. 44 Rizzoli (2015).

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entities. The GII Law also mandated the ADEME agency to offer relevant guidelines and support to territorial communities, in both the elaboration of their BEGES and their PCET. The GII Law also integrated provisions impacting policy frameworks in other sectors at the municipal level which have a bearing on climate policy.45 Thus, it set out new environmental and energy requirements in the elaboration of ‘Local Urbanism Plans’ (Plan local d’urbanisme— PLU), ‘Local Habitat Programs’ (Programme local d’habitat—PLH) or ‘Frameworks for Territorial Coherence’ (Schéma de cohérence territorial— SCOT), which aimed to complement the more specialized climate-related provisions of the PCET. Therefore, it is clear that the Grenelle II Law developed an extensive and sophisticated framework for direct and legally binding interactions between the national government and sub-state entities across the country. This is linked to the hierarchical and stratified nature of the centralized French political system and represents a striking point of contrast to the US federal paradigm. As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 8, these nationally defined legal requirements prompted both the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region to develop a new inventory of GHG emissions within their borders (BEGES), which preceded the elaboration of their local PCETs.46 For the city of Paris, this constituted an updated version of its initial ‘territorial climate plan’ developed on a voluntary basis in 2007, before its subsequent upgrade in 2012 according to the dispositions of the GII Law.47 Regarding the Île-deFrance, its first Climate Plan was developed in 2011 as a PCET, based on these nationally defined rules (Plan régional pour le climat d’Île-deFrance).48 It is notable that policy frameworks in other related sectors, such as the ‘Local Urbanism Plan’ (PLU) or ‘Local Habitat Program’ (PLH), were also developed or upgraded by the city of Paris according to the legal dispositions of the GII Law. For example, Paris’ PLH was first 45 On French territorial communities and the environment, see Pissaloux (2017) and Zuindeau (2018). 46 As will be examined in Chapter 8, the city of Paris had conducted an initial, voluntary bilan carbone in 2006, while the Île-de-France had done the same in 2007. Yet, both of them subsequently updated their GHG emissions inventories, based on the requirements of the GII Law. 47 Ville de Paris (2007, 2012). 48 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2011).

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adopted in 2011 and subsequently updated in 2015 (for a final adoption in December 2016).49 For these reasons, France appears to represent a counter-example to the pattern whereby sub-national actors may act as catalysts, leading the way with far-reaching local climate initiatives, while national governments strive to catch up. In the case of the US, for example, the federal government has displayed an inconsistent level of commitment to climate action due to persistent Republican opposition (see Chapters 2 and 3). Yet, even in the case of France, this pattern is subtly at work, albeit in a more diffused manner when compared to the US. For instance, the fact that Paris, the capital city at the heart of France’s centralized political system and economic infrastructure, voluntarily chose to adopt an ambitious municipal Climate Plan early-on has played a role in terms of galvanizing the national government to raise its level of ambition. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, Paris was one of the first French cities to adopt a territorial climate plan in 2007. This partly contributed to showcasing the importance of climate action to the French political elite based in Paris, helping to mainstream support for environmental policies. Likewise, the French capital’s innovative green policies at the municipal echelon helped to demonstrate the vital contributions of climate action at the sub-national level. At least to a certain extent, this prompted the national government to render it obligatory for territorial communities across France over a certain population threshold to develop a PCET, as outlined in the GII Law. This corroborates the notion that local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact in galvanizing further action from the bottom-up, which represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-national entities within the climate regime.50 The French paradigm substantiates the enhanced role and participation of sub-state actors in the process of policy formulation, along with the importance of democratic processes at the local level in the articulation of multilevel governance.51 Moreover, the Grenelle II Law also enshrined the importance of regions, which were consolidated as the privileged echelon for the transposition of national climate objectives at the sub-state level. It was and

49 Ville de Paris (2016). 50 See Hale (2018). 51 Bache and Flinders (2004).

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remains far more feasible for the national government to interact directly with the regional echelon in the implementation of national targets, including for climate and environmental matters, since there were 27 regions at the time, as opposed to over 35,000 communes. Therefore, the GII Law established detailed provisions for each region to develop a ‘Framework for Climate, Air and Energy (Schéma Régional du Climat, de l’Air et de l’Energie—SRCAE), with the aim of transposing national and EU climate objectives at the regional level. Regions would then interact with the lower echelons (départements and communes), so as to further decline these objectives. Unlike the PCET, the GII Law emphasized the different ways in which the national government must be directly involved in the elaboration of the SRCAE, through extensive consultations with regional authorities. This was to be accomplished mainly via the official representative of the national government within each region known as the ‘Prefect’ (or Préfet —see Sect. 3), along with the relevant administrative branches of several national ministries.52 These branches were tasked to closely collaborate with Regional Councils across France, as well as with the ADEME, based on the following elaboration procedure, as set out in the GII Law53 : • The Regional Prefect and the President of the Regional Council must jointly elaborate the design of the SRCAE by a certain deadline. • The elaboration of the SRCAE must be preceded by the realization of an inventory of regional GHG emissions (Bilan), together with an ‘energy assessment’ comprising an evaluation of the potential for enhancing renewable energies and energy efficiency.

52 This includes the Regional and Interdepartmental Direction for the Environment and Energy (Direction Régionale et Interdépartementale de l’Environnement et de l’Energie— DRIEE), which formed part of the national Ministry for the Environment. It should be noted that the DRIEE merged with another department in 2021 to become the Regional and Interdepartmental Direction for the Environment, Territorial Layout and Transport (Direction Régionale et Interdépartementale de l’Environnement, de l’Aménagement et des Transports ). 53 LOI n° 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement.

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• The SRCAE must be open to public consultation for a period of at least one month before submission to the Regional Council for approbation, prior to its final ratification by the Prefect. Such a configuration substantiates another previously examined pattern, whereby national governments favor interaction with the closest echelon beneath them (regions in the case of France), as the privileged interlocutor for the implementation of nationally defined climate policies; thus, each echelon tends to interact mainly with the one immediately above or below it. The French government prioritizes interaction with regions, while cities and local governments also collaborate more with regional authorities. Such a state of affairs places the intermediary echelon (i.e., regions) in a privileged position. As examined in Chapters 2 and 3, this is apparent under the cooperative federalism paradigm involved in American environmental policies, since states enjoy such broad powers and autonomy according to US constitutional law.54 Although regions in France enjoy far fewer competences, they have still come to play a similar role in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, mostly due to practical considerations discussed above. In addition, the GII Law also established detailed provisions in terms of the actual content of the SRCAE, along with the subsequent framework to follow-up and evaluate progress over time (in this regard, there are similarities with the PCET). The GII Law outlined the main elements to be integrated in each regional framework, which include55 : • A declination at the regional echelon of the climate and energy objectives adopted by national and EU authorities for 2020 and 2050. This included both the 3 × 20 goals for 2020,56 as well as the target of dividing by four the level of GHG emissions up to 2050 (from a 1990 baseline). • A ‘policy toolbox’ to help territorial communities at the lower echelons (such as départements and communes) to define and implement

54 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018). 55 LOI n° 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour

l’environnement. 56 As previously explained, this refers to the objective of cutting GHG emissions by 20%, as well as enhancing renewables and energy efficiency also by 20%, up to 2020.

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their own PCETs, so as to transpose the SRCAE’s objectives at the local level. • The establishment of local targets across different areas within the region for the development of renewables and energy efficiency. This includes the elaboration of a ‘Regional Framework for Wind Power’ (Schéma Régional Eolien—SRE), an annexed component to the SRCAE which identifies a list of communes most susceptible to harboring wind power projects. Finally, the GII Law established an evaluation and follow-up framework whereby the SRCAE must develop specific tools to assess progress over time, including through various environmental, economic, social and sanitary indicators, along with different metrics or observation techniques.57 The national legislation indicated that after five years, the SRCAE must be jointly evaluated by both the Regional Prefect and the President of the Regional Council, in order to assess progress in achieving the objectives defined. As will be examined in Chapter 8, these legal requirements led the Île-de-France to subsequently develop its own version of the SRCAE, which was approved by the Regional Council in November 2012, before final ratification by the Regional Prefect in December 2012.58 This established 17 objectives and 58 strategic orientations for the region in terms of reducing GHG emissions, as well as enhancing renewables and energy efficiency.59 The Île-de-France also enacted its own ‘Regional Framework for Wind Power’ (Schéma Régional Eolien—SRE), which was annexed to the SRCAE as required by the legislation, and approved in September 2012 by the Regional Prefect and Council.60

57 LOI n° 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement. 58 Likewise, the GII Law established that if a region had already elaborated a PCET, the latter would also be annexed to the SRCAE. This applied to the Île-de-France since, as previously explained, it had developed its own PCET in 2011, which subsequently became the ‘climate’ component of the SRCAE enacted in 2012. 59 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2012). 60 As will be discussed in Chapter 8, while the Île-de-France’s SRE was initially approved

in 2012, it was subsequently struck down by the French court system in 2014 due to the inadequate following of procedural requirements.

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Another notable aspect of the GII Law is that it established modalities for the elaboration of other, more specialized regional policy frameworks across a number of targeted sub-sectors, with the aim of complementing the more general dispositions of the SRCAE. Thus, in addition to the SRE on the development of wind power, the ‘Regional Plan for Air Quality’ (Plan régional pour la qualité de l’air—PRQA) focuses on improving air quality (from both an environmental and health standpoint) and was also annexed to the SRCAE as prescribed under the GII Law.61 Likewise, the ‘Regional Framework for Linking Renewable Energies to the Power Grid’ (Schéma régional de raccordement au reseau électrique des énergies renouvelables—S3RENR) aims to facilitate and accelerate the linking of renewable energy production with the main power grid, so as to compensate for its intermittence and merge local production sites in order to lessen regional disparities. Like the PCET and SRCAE discussed above, the Grenelle II Law contains detailed provisions not only in terms of the elaboration process, but also regarding the actual content of these two specialized policy frameworks (PRQA and S3RENR), along with subsequent modalities to follow up and evaluate progress over time. These nationally defined legal requirements led the Île-de-France to develop its own PRQA approved by the Regional Council in June 2016, along with the S3RENR passed in February 2015.62 Overall, these various components which derive from the Grenelle II Law illustrate the ways in which the national government has sought to closely associate sub-state actors in the implementation process under the relatively centralized French political system. While general climate objectives are defined at the EU or national echelons, French legislation sets out detailed provisions which establish precise modalities in terms of how sub-state entities should be mobilized, so as to transpose these objectives at the local level. Hence, national legislation such as the GII Law establishes binding procedural requirements concerning the elaboration process of local climate plans and frameworks, the main elements which must be integrated, as well as provisions for the subsequent evaluation and follow-up to assess progress over time.

61 Although the PRQA had existed before the enactment of the GII Law, the latter established detailed upgraded modalities for its elaboration and implementation, including its subsequent annexation to become the ‘air’ component of the SRCAE. 62 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2015) and (2016).

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This is a direct result of the hierarchical and stratified nature of the centralized French political system, highlighting some of its main assets when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance. The French system engenders a relatively high level of policy harmonization and a tight coordination between the different echelons, due to the obligation for most sub-state actors to produce climate plans and frameworks following specific procedures, and whose main elements are defined by national legislation. As a result, this generates a higher minimum standard across the country, which reduces the possibility of ‘climate laggards’, along with associated risks such as ‘carbon leakage’ and ‘freeriding’ discussed in Chapter 3. Finally, such a framework also enhances the articulation of multilevel governance by reducing the risk of conflict on policies enacted between the different echelons. As examined above, this forms a notable point of contrast to the American federal system, whose paradigm of cooperative federalism for the enactment of national environmental policies tends to suffer from inadequacies of this nature (see detailed comparative analysis in Sect. 3). For these reasons, the French paradigm reinforces another previously examined pattern, whereby each echelon tends to have a distinctive role within the multilevel governance pyramid. These roles can mutually support and complement one another, if the right policies are enacted. Hence, while sub-state actors play a vital role within the global climate regime that is likely to increase in the future, the French multilevel paradigm provides a clear example of why the national echelon remains essential from a strategic perspective.

3

Hierarchical and Stratified Centralization: Historical Context of Multilevel Environmental Governance in France Under President Hollande (2012–2017) 3.1 National Climate Policies Enacted by President Hollande (2012–2017) and Multilevel Governance Under the Centralized French System

The French Conservative Party under Presidents Chirac and Sarkozy did not deny climate change and even attached a certain importance to the issue. While not constituting a priority, both conservative Presidents still enacted several notable policies and legislation in this area during their

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respective mandates, closely involving sub-national actors in the implementation process. This forms a point of contrast to the US, where the Republican Party has endeavored to block climate change initiatives,63 due to the pressure exercised by powerful lobbying groups,64 and the influence of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. While the French Conservative Party has also been subjected to similar pressures and influences, salient cultural differences are partly responsible for such different outcomes in terms of climate policy on both sides of the Atlantic. On the whole, the French Conservative Party has remained less prone to the influence of neoliberalism in comparison with its American counterpart. French conservative voters are generally not skeptical of climate science in the same way as the core Republican base in the US, and have thus put pressure on their elected representatives to act, as long as environmental policies do not hinder economic imperatives.65 Both Chirac and Sarkozy, along with Valérie Pécresse at the regional level in the Île-de-France (see Chapter 8), have put forward a ‘realist’ conception of ecology. In alignment with traditional conservative ideas, this approach seeks to reward green initiatives and entrepreneurship while avoiding the so-called ‘punitive ecology’ that French conservatives have attributed to the left, which they accuse of enacting taxes and overly stringent regulations that hamper economic development. Nevertheless, there remains a clear difference in terms of the level of prioritization for environmental issues between the right and the left in France. The national French Socialist Party and the Green Party (EELV66 ) have consistently attached more importance to environmental matters. These parties and the French left in general consider climate change to be a top priority. Consequently, the victory of the left during the French Presidential election in 2012 had a noticeable impact on the trajectory of national climate policies, as it contributed to raising the level 63 See Turner and Isenberg (2018) and Layzer (2012). 64 On special interest group influence in the US political system, see Drutman (2015),

Charnock (2020), Quirk (2016) and Brown (2016). 65 Regarding polarization on climate issues in the US, see Brewer (2012). On American public opinion and the environment, see also Konisky (2020). For a contrast with the situation in France, see Cautrès et al. (2021). 66 In 2010, the Green Party (previously Les Verts or ‘The Greens’) rebranded itself and changed its statutes so as to enlarge membership, becoming known as ‘Europe Ecology The Greens’ (Europe Écologie Les Verts —EELV).

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of green ambition on a number of different issues. The Socialist Party and EELV negotiated an alliance agreement in anticipation of the 2012 electoral cycle, the first such accord since 1997 under Prime Minister Jospin, as both political groups had failed to renew their alliance in 2002 and again in 2007.67 François Hollande from the Socialist Party was elected President and, following the agreement negotiated in preparation for the 2012 legislative elections, formed a coalition with EELV in the National Assembly, giving the left a strong Parliamentary majority. This configuration made it possible to enact some of the most ambitious climate legislation in French history. The renewed Alliance negotiated between EELV and the Socialist Party included the prioritization of climate and environmental issues to a higher degree than in 1997.68 This matches a previously examined pattern, whereby the national echelon within the multilevel governance pyramid is not static but evolves over time—positively in this case. Like in the US, this may be due to changes in elected administrations, even though the transition from the right to the left is not as drastic when compared to American politics, since climate change enjoys relatively strong consensus in France. It should be noted that evolutions in the international context at the time also played an important role in pressuring the French government to raise its level of commitment. Following the disappointing outcome of the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, Parties to the UNFCCC sought to renew efforts for a robust alternative to the Kyoto Protocol.69 Towards that end, the ‘Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’ was agreed upon at COP17 in 2011 (Durban, South Africa); this provided a dynamic framework allowing negotiators to build a momentum over the next few COPs (Doha, Warsaw and Lima), with the aim of reaching a new comprehensive global climate accord in Paris at the COP21, scheduled for 2015. As the host of what was widely anticipated to be one of the most significant COPs since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the French government was under pressure to set the example with renewed climate legislation. 67 On the history of the green political movement in France, see Boivin (2015), Villalba

(2021) and Jacob (2016). 68 Still, this alliance between the Socialists and the Green Party had its highs and lows throughout Hollande’s five-year Presidency (2012–2017). Indeed, EELV left the national government in 2014 due to policy disagreements, while some of its members chose to return in 2016 following internal divisions within the Party. 69 See Gupta (2014) and Hoffmann (2011).

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Former Presidential candidate and political heavyweight Ségolène Royal was nominated as Environment Minister in 2014, charged with overseeing preparations for the upcoming COP21 (in collaboration with Laurent Fabius, the Foreign Minister) and for historic new climate legislation, finalized in 2015. The ‘Law Relating to the Energy Transition for Green Growth’ (Loi relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte—LTECV70 ) was approved by Parliament in July and validated by the Constitutional Council in August 2015, only four months before the COP21 in December of that year. This represented at the time the most far-reaching French climate law ever passed, along with one of the most ambitious pieces of green legislation in the EU, with the aim of turning France into a climate pioneer. Like the Grenelle II Law, the LTECV was elaborated following an extensive public consultation process begun in 2012, known as the ‘national citizens debate on the energy transition’ (débat national et citoyen sur la transition énergétique). Territorial communities played a prominent role in terms of defining priorities during the citizens’ debate.71 The LTECV also aimed to transpose the EU’s latest climate legislation at the national level. The ‘2030 Climate and Energy Framework’ built upon the previous 2020 package discussed above. Approved by the EU Council in October 2014, the Framework established several new key targets to be achieved by the year 2030, including a 40% cut in GHG emissions (from a 1990 baseline), achieving 32% for the share of renewable energies, and a 32.5% improvement in energy efficiency.72 The EU’s Roadmap for a Low Carbon Economy, published in March 2011, had set out the long-term goal of cutting EU-wide GHG emissions 80% by mid-century.73

70 XIVE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2012–17). LOI n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte. 71 This national debate lasted for eight months and ended in 2013 with a series of

policy recommendations, which were handed over to the government and formed the basis for the elaboration of the LTECV law. 72 See European Commission, 2030 Climate & Energy Framework, adopted in October 2014: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/climate-strategies-targets/2030-climate-ene rgy-framework_en. 73 European Commission (2011).

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The LTECV adopted the following overarching climate targets for France over the short, medium and long run74 : • Reduce national GHG emissions by 40% up to 2030 and 75% by 2050 (from a 1990 baseline, mostly in alignment with EU objectives). • Reduce final energy consumption by 20% up to 2030, and by 50% up to 2050 (from a 2012 baseline), with a related goal of cutting energy consumption from fossil fuels by 30% up to 2030 (also from a 2012 baseline). • Confirm the goal to enhance the share of renewable energies 23% by 2020, with the establishment of a new target of 32% by 2030 (in alignment with EU objectives), along with a 40% target specifically for electricity production. • Reduce the share of nuclear power in energy consumption from 75 to 50% by 2025. • Focus on addressing energy poverty, along with the goal of cutting waste generation by 50% up to 2025. The LTECV corroborates a previously examined pattern, whereby the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more general policy approaches tend to become. National governments usually set broad objectives, in contrast to cities which tend to target specific sectors that are well adapted to the municipal level (see Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Likewise, many of these objectives are relatively well aligned with those of the city of Paris, as set out in its latest 2018 municipal Climate Plan or PCAET.75 Albeit for the difference in baseline years, this applies especially in terms of GHG emissions reductions, enhancing energy efficiency and developing renewable energies. Yet, the capital city still continues to display a slightly higher level of ambition across these different areas (a more detailed analysis is provided in Chapter 8).

74 République française – Ministère de la Transition écologique, Loi de transition énergétique pour la croissance verte: https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/loi-transition-energetique-cro issance-verte. 75 The same also applies to the Parisian Metropolis with its 2018 PCAET and the Île-de-France in its 2018 Energy and Climate Strategy (see Chapter 8).

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The LTECV instituted several major upgrades to the Grenelle II Law in terms of how the national government would interact with and mobilize territorial communities in the implementation of these overarching climate targets.76 The most notable upgrade is the transition of the PCET towards a new framework defined as the ‘Territorial Climate, Air and Energy Plan’ (Plan Climat-Air-Énergie Territorial—PCAET), which introduced several important new elements for the local climate plans elaborated by sub-national entities77 : • As indicated by the addition of the word ‘air’ in its title, the PCAET required that local climate plans integrate an ‘air quality’ component, including six different GHGs which must be taken into account both in the elaboration of the bilan (BEGES—see above) and in the plan itself. • The development of a PCAET is no longer obligatory for all territorial communities. It is now a legal obligation specifically for ‘public intercommunal cooperation entities’ (établissement public de coopération intercommunal, which refers mostly to different types of groups of communes) with more than 50,000 inhabitants in 2016, and from 2018 onwards for those with more than 20,000 inhabitants. • While the PCET had to be updated every five years, the PCAET set this requirement at every six years. Likewise, the application of the PCAET now covers not only the direct patrimony of the echelon concerned, but its territory as a whole. • Many sections of the previous PCET were upgraded and enhanced, including reduction of GHG emissions or renewables and energy efficiency enhancement, so as to transpose new national and EU climate objectives at the sub-state level. • Several other new elements included the obligation to estimate the potential for the sequestration of CO2 , the potential for energy recovery and storage, the mandatory display of energy infrastructure, along with a clear identification of the areas targeted by the territorial strategy. 76 Some of the specific modalities for the elaboration and implementation of PCAETs, as set out in the LTECV, were completed through executive decrees subsequently enacted by the national government. 77 LOI n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte.

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• A number of upgrades concerned the elaboration phase, whereby the PCAET must now go through a more intricate process involving several layers of formal approval, plus the mandatory development of a ‘strategic environmental evaluation’. The LTECV also established several important upgrades regarding the preparation of GHG emission inventories or BEGES for territorial communities,78 which had already been rendered legally binding under certain conditions by the previous GII Law. While the temporality (every three years) and minimum population requirement (over 50,000 inhabitants) were left unchanged, the LTECV introduced financial sanctions for sub-state actors which failed to produce a BEGES, or did not correctly follow procedural rules for its elaboration. In this regard, the legislation changed modalities concerning the transmission of each BEGES, to be uploaded via an online platform managed by the ADEME. The LTECV also set out additional tools for the ADEME to assist territorial communities in both the development of their BEGES and the realization of their PCAET. This included, for example, detailed online documentation providing advice on the various aspects of the new procedures, along with a ‘national PCAET observatory’, as well as labeling tools such as Cit’ergie or Climat Pratic.79 Relying on these new legal procedures and requirements defined in the LTECV, the city of Paris developed an upgraded GHG emissions inventory or BEGES, which paved the way for the elaboration of its third and latest Climate Plan (constituting the city’s PCAET), finalized in March 2018.80 For reasons examined in detail in Chapter 8, Paris’ latest Climate Plan or PCAET clearly represents the most far-reaching version, going beyond simply upgrading its predecessors. It sets out ambitious objectives corresponding to three distinct temporalities (2020, 2030 and 2050), with the ultimate goal of achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century. Consequently, Paris’ latest Climate Plan has played a key role in terms of enabling the city to implement its local climate initiatives. This applies

78 On the territorialization of climate and energy policies in France, see Strapoli et al. (2015), Fortin et al. (2016) and Janicot (2021). 79 Cit’ergie, for instance, is a labelling tool which aims to reward territorial communities in terms of the quality of their climate and energy policies, over a four-year process. 80 Ville de Paris (2018).

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not only to the city of Paris, but also to most other cities and metropolises across France, whereby the elaboration of a PCAET constitutes the main framework for the enactment of local climate policies. Based on the legal rules of the LTECV, the Parisian Metropolis (Métropole du Grand Paris—MGP) developed its own version of the PCAET in 2018, referred to as the ‘Metropolitan Climate, Air and Energy Plan’ (Plan Climat, Air, Energie Métropolitain—PCAEM), which displays a similar level of ambition in terms of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.81 Moreover, the LTECV, like the GII Law discussed above, established new provisions impacting policy frameworks in other sectors at the municipal level which have a bearing on climate policy. For instance, it set out upgraded environmental and energy requirements in the elaboration of ‘Local Urbanism Plans’ (Plan Local d’Urbanisme—PLU) or ‘Frameworks for Territorial Coherence’ (Schéma de Cohérence Territoriale—SCOT) to supplement the climate policy dispositions of the PCAET. This comprises the introduction of a ‘Project for Urban Planning and Sustainable Development’ (Projet d’Aménagement et de Développement Durable—PADD), defining general orientations for energy grids involving electricity or gas which must be integrated within the PLU or SCOT. Likewise, the PADD identifies urban sectors where the realization of construction work and renovation needs to meet certain minimal renewable energy requirements. As will be examined in Chapter 8, these new legal rules led the city of Paris to launch an upgrade of its PLU, the first since 2006 (even though many adjustments had been made over the years). The aim was to place climate change at the center of an enhanced ‘Bioclimatic Local Urbanism Plan’ (Plan Local d’Urbanisme Bioclimatique), which is to be finalized by the end of 2023 and enter into force the following year. The same also applies to the Parisian Metropolis concerning the elaboration of its SCOT, which is scheduled for final approbation before the end of 2023. Such a configuration represents a striking point of contrast to the American federal system. Both the Grenelle II Law and subsequent updates enacted by the LTECV established detailed, legally binding obligations for communes—which constitute the municipal echelon—as well as ‘public intercommunal cooperation entities’ (referring mostly to groups of communes) to develop specific types of climate plans or frameworks under certain deadlines. By contrast, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the

81 Métropole du Grand Paris (2018).

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Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution prevents the national American government from passing legislation or policies which directly target the municipal echelon in the same manner as in France, since this is clearly stated as falling under the purview of state-level authorities. Thus, the US President or Congress cannot enact federal laws obliging municipalities across the country to produce specific types of climate plans or frameworks (whose main elements, elaboration procedure and follow-up processes are legally enshrined) in the same manner as the PCET and the upgraded PCAET in France. The US Congress may still enact federal legislation, or the President can sign executive orders on environmental matters which have a general ambit and apply to all entities, including states, cities or even individuals in some cases (see Chapters 6 and 7). This nonetheless represents an indirect form of interaction with local governments when compared to the centralized French political system, whereby national legislation like the GII Law or LTECV establish detailed modalities for directly integrating municipalities in the implementation process and achievement of nationally defined climate objectives.82 For these reasons, France possesses a so-called ‘fused system’ of local government, whereby “municipalities form part of a uniform system of administration applying across the country, with a centrally appointed prefect supervising local councils”.83 This differs from the ‘dual system’ in the US, which “maintains a formal separation of central and local government; although the center is sovereign, local authorities are not seen as part of a single State structure”.84 Moreover, the LTECV might be interpreted as showcasing France as a counter-example to the pattern whereby cities and sub-state actors more generally often act as catalysts, leading the way with far-reaching climate policies. Although this clearly applies to the US due to the constitutional nature of the US federal system, along with the fact that the national government has demonstrated an inconsistent level of support for climate action due to persistent Republican obstruction, the opposite seems to be the case in France. National French authorities have evidently displayed a much steadier level of commitment to climate action over time, while 82 This highlights the importance of associating cities within broader processes involving higher echelons for the effective articulation of multilevel governance, whereby urban centers represent a critical part of a larger policy framework. 83 Hague and Harrop (2007, p. 243). 84 Ibid.

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engaging in direct forms of interaction with territorial communities under a centralized political framework. Nevertheless, as with the GII Law examined above, sub-state actors in France acted as pioneers in a more subtle and diffused manner, when compared to the US. For instance, although the city of Paris was under a legal obligation to follow the new upgraded guidelines established by the LTECV when elaborating its PCAET in 2018, the level of ambition it had demonstrated with its two previous municipal climate plans certainly had an impact on the national echelon. Not only was Paris one of the first cities to develop a Climate Plan in 2007, but many of the municipal policies it has enacted in targeted sectors such as buildings, transportation or waste management were highly innovative and far-reaching. Thus, in addition to the fact that policies within these sectors are relatively well aligned between the municipal and national echelons, Paris’ first two climate plans appear to have influenced, at least to a certain extent, the elaboration of national policies in analogous areas within the LTECV. The latter not only set out overarching climate objectives on a general plane as discussed above, but also contained a total of 212 articles, many of which outlined detailed policies across similar targeted areas. For instance, the LTECV introduced ambitious provisions for the renovation of existing buildings, enhancing the energy efficiency of new buildings via upgraded national norms, the development of clean modes of transportation including through greater use of electric vehicles, reducing waste by promoting a circular economy, as well as improving the sorting of waste at the source. These elements within the LTECV were formulated in a more general manner, so as to render them better adapted to the national echelon. Yet, they seem to borrow from, or were at least influenced by, policies in similar sectors coming from Paris’ first two municipal climate plans, in particular the second plan elaborated in 2012 (known as the PCET).85 As the capital city at the heart of the French economy and political system, Paris was able to successfully showcase its climate initiatives. And the capital city remains more ambitious in its policies across targeted areas such as buildings, transportation or waste management. Thus, albeit in a more subtle and diffused manner, the paradigm in France underscores the role of cities and sub-state entities as catalysts for far-reaching climate policies. This supports the notion that local climate policy innovation can

85 Ville de Paris (2012).

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have a demonstration effect, galvanizing further action from the bottomup. Cities and sub-state actors may serve as ‘laboratories of democracy’ through the testing of climate policies on a local scale, which can subsequently be enacted at the national echelon. Thus, local policy innovation may trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up, which represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state entities within the climate regime.86 By relying on the hierarchical and stratified nature of the centralized French political system, the LTECV directly mobilized local actors when enacting policies in targeted sectors like buildings or transportation. For instance, the legislation specifically determined how new public buildings within territorial communities would be exemplary from an energy efficiency standpoint, with the possibility of imposing higher standards than those prescribed nationally.87 Likewise, when it comes to promoting clean modes of transportation, the LTECV launched a program to directly finance around one hundred initiatives at the local level through various calls for projects (appel à projet transports collectifs et mobilité durable), involving a range of transport methods from electric buses to cycling. The law also required that a certain percentage of public vehicle fleets in territorial communities, including those used for public transport, be electric or low-carbon from 2025 onwards, and encouraged Mayors to allow electric vehicles to circulate on bus lanes and to park for free. In parallel, the French government launched another call for projects in 2014 referred to as ‘positive energy territories’ (territoires à énergie positive—TAEP). The aim was to reward territorial communities that are exemplary from a climate and environmental standpoint, by funding local projects which support the implementation and achievement of LTECV objectives at the sub-national level. Several rounds of funding based on a ‘fund for the energy transition’ were organized, with territorial communities eligible to receive anywhere between e500,000 and e2 million, depending on the quality of their local project(s). As many as 528 territorialities across France expressed a desire to become involved in this call for projects, with 212 initial ‘laureates’ awarded the designation as

86 See Hale (2018). 87 Mayors may approve waivers if they come across what they consider to be overly

stringent urban planning rules.

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‘positive energy territories’, including the city of Paris.88 This represents another example of how the centralized French political system can enable the direct involvement and integration of sub-state entities for achieving nationally defined climate objectives. This constitutes a stark point of contrast to the decentralized US federal system, highlighting some of the advantages associated with the French multilevel governance framework. Furthermore, the LTECV also established notable provisions targeting regions.89 While the centralized French multilevel paradigm allows for more extensive interactions with municipalities when compared to the US, the LTECV consolidated the role of regions as the privileged echelon for transposing national climate and energy objectives at the sub-state level. As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 8, each echelon of the territorial communities is ascribed certain core competences in specific fields under French law90 ; in areas where such competences overlap, there has been a growing reliance on the role of the ‘leader in line’ (chef de file), which provides a coordinating role to one echelon over the others. Thus, the LTECV legally enshrined the position of regions as ‘leaders’ (chef de file) for energy efficiency, reinforcing their coordinating role in this area through the establishment of ‘regional plans for energy efficiency’ (plans régionaux d’efficacité énergétique—PREE). The objective was to supplement the SRCAE with a specialized framework focusing on energy efficiency, in particular with regard to the renovation of buildings and housing. The modalities for its elaboration and implementation were set out in the LTECV.91 This is significant because the SRCAE and PREE have played a key role in enabling regions across France to implement their local climate initiatives over the last decade, with the Île-de-France developing its SRCAE in late 2012 (discussed in Chapter 8).

88 The number of ‘laureates’ subsequently expanded to over 400 by the end of 2016; still, it should be noted that the city of Paris formed part of the initial laureates. See République française – Ministère de la Transition écologique, Territoires à énergie positive pour la croissance verte: https://www.ecologie.gouv.fr/territoires-energie-positive-cro issance-verte. 89 In this regard, see Strapoli et al. (2015) and Fortin et al. (2016). 90 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux

and Janicot (2021) and Faure (2021). 91 The PREE must be approved by the Regional Council, before submission to the Regional Prefect.

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In fact, the SRCAE and its PREE supplement focusing on energy efficiency constitute only one of a number of different policy frameworks whereby the French government directly interacts with the regional echelon for the transposition of nationally defined objectives. While the SRCAE concentrates specifically on climate change/energy and derives from the Grenelle II and LTECV Laws, there are a number of other frameworks that cover different yet related policy areas which also have a bearing on environmental matters, and whose modalities are defined by other legislation. One example is the ‘Plan for the Protection of the Atmosphere’ (Plan de Protection de l’Atmosphère—PPA) which addresses a broader range of air pollutants, or the ‘Plan for Urban Mobility’ (Plan de Déplacements Urbains—PDU) that defines urban mobility rules for people and goods across a given region.92 As will be discussed in Chapter 8, the Île-de-France’s latest PPA was approved in January 2018, while its PDU was enacted in June 2014 with an ‘environmental assessment’ on GHG emissions.93 Other salient examples include the ‘Regional Framework for Habitat and Housing’ (Schéma Régional de l’Habitat et de l’Hébergement— SRHH), establishing coordinating elements for regional housing and habitat policy, as well as the ‘Directing Framework for the Île-de-France Region’ (Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France—SDRIF), which constitutes the overarching regional planning framework and focuses on territorial management.94 The Île-de-France set out its SRHH in

92 The modalities for the elaboration of the PPA and PDU were established by the 1996 ‘Law on Air and the National Use of Energy’ (Loi sur l’air et l’utilisation rationnelle de l’énergie—LAURE). The elaboration process of the PDU was subsequently completed by the ‘Law Relating to Solidarity and Urban Renewal’ passed in 2000 (Loi relative à la solidarité et au renouvellement urbain—SRU). 93 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2014) and (2018). 94 The modalities for the elaboration of the SRHH were established by the “Law

modernizing territorial public action and affirming metropolises” (Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles —MAPTAM), passed in 2014 as part of the third phase of decentralization (see below). Although existing under different formats since 1965, the SDRIF emerged in its modern form in 1995, and its precise modalities were established by the SRU Law in 2000. This established that the Île-de-France, as the French economic epicenter and seat of the capital city, would be the only metropolitan region to maintain an overarching planning framework like the SDRIF—providing it with a special legal status, similarly to the city of Paris (see Chapter 8).

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December 2017, which has a bearing on climate policy since buildings represent major GHG emission sources; the SDRIF was approved in December 2013, establishing regional medium-term GHG emission reduction goals up to 2030.95 These various policy frameworks went through complex elaboration processes, where regional authorities closely collaborated with the national government and its local representatives, especially the ‘Prefect’ (Préfet ). This thicket of climate policy frameworks is representative of the ways in which the centralized French political system enables direct interaction with the regional echelon, mostly by relying on the ‘Prefect’ as an intermediary. This constitutes the modern version of an old tradition within the centralized French bureaucracy that goes back centuries,96 whereby the authority of the national government must be embodied at the sub-state level by an official representative. The role of the Prefect is enshrined in the French Constitution, which asserts that “within the territorial communities of the Republic, the representative of the State, representing each member of the Government, is charged with overseeing the national interests, administrative control and compliance with the law”.97 The French government has relied on the Prefect as a primary intermediary for transposing national policies and objectives at the substate level, including for climate and environmental matters. Therefore, the Prefect of the Île-de-France was directly associated and played a key role in the elaboration, implementation and follow-up processes for all regional policy frameworks previously examined.98 Moreover, Prefects only exist at the level of regions and départements , but not at the communal echelon.99 This means that cities or 95 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2013) and (2017). 96 See Aubelle and Kada (2019). 97 Article 72 of the Constitution of 1958, the founding document of the 5th French Republic. While the authority of Prefects has gradually diminished over time through consecutive phases of decentralization, they continue to enjoy broad powers across a range of policy areas, which are defined under the law. 98 In this regard, protection of the environment is officially listed as one of the Prefects’ main tasks or ‘missions’, along with ensuring safety and public order, local democratic freedoms, as well as the transposition at the sub-state level of national policies enacted by the Council of Ministers. 99 Under French law, the regional Prefect is ranked hierarchically above all other Prefects. Although there are no Prefects at the level of communes (only in regions and départements ), Mayors still possess a ‘dual function’, where they act not only on behalf of

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metropolises such as Paris and the MGP have been able to elaborate their PCAET somewhat independently from the national government; at the same time, however, they have extensively interacted with regional authorities in the process. As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 8, one of the characteristics of the French multilevel governance paradigm is the legal obligation of compatibility between the various echelons100 when developing and implementing plans or strategies across multiple policy sectors, which usually applies from the bottom-up. This means that Paris’ PCAET must be compatible with the orientations defined in the Île-deFrance’s SRCAE (not the other way around), an obligation which can be enforced through the French court system.101 Such a configuration substantiates the pattern whereby national governments favor interaction with the closest echelon beneath them (regions in the case of France), as the privileged interlocutor for the implementation of nationally defined climate policies. Because cities and local governments also collaborate more with regional authorities as their closest echelon, this places regions in a privileged position. A similar pattern is apparent under the cooperative federalism paradigm in American environmental policies, since states enjoy such broad powers and autonomy under US constitutional law. Although regions in France enjoy far fewer competences, they have still come to play a similar role in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, for the reasons examined above.

the municipal council as elected officials, but also represent the State at the level of the commune. Hence, within the confines of their local territory, they enjoy certain administrative powers which resemble those of the Prefect, and fall under the latter’s authority when these powers are exercised. 100 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux and Janicot (2021) and Faure (2021). 101 Modalities for this legal obligation of compatibility between the different echelons, when it comes to the elaboration of the SRCAE and PCAET, were established by the GII Law and LTECV.

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The Third Phase of Decentralization, with a Comparison Between French Hierarchical Centralization and Cooperative Federalism in the US

François Hollande’s Presidency was also marked by the enactment of a third phase of decentralization.102 This impacted the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance in terms of the local/regional policy frameworks examined above. Hollande’s first major decentralization initiative was the ‘Law modernizing territorial public action and affirming metropolises’ (Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles —MAPTAM), passed in 2014.103 The MAPTAM bill legally enshrined the status of ‘metropolises’ (which bring together groups of communes and cities) by ascribing to them specific competences, including in relation to the energy transition; the act also provided the Greater Paris Metropolis with a special status.104 Likewise, the MAPTAM Law clarified the allocation of competences for different levels of territorial communities through greater reliance on the ‘leader in line’ (chef de file), assigning the leader a coordination role over the other echelons. Thus, regions were made ‘leaders’ for the sustainable planning and development of territories, while communes were granted a leadership role for air quality and sustainable mobility. Because the MAPTAM Law also introduced modalities for the elaboration of ‘Regional Frameworks for Habitat and Housing’ (Schéma Régional de l’Habitat et de l’Hébergement—SRHH), it established coordinating elements for regional housing and habitat policy. The Île-de-France set out its SRHH in December 2017, which has a bearing on climate policy since buildings represent major GHG emission sources.105

102 On French territorial communities and decentralization, see Verpeaux et al. (2021), Vital-Durand (2017), Aubelle and Kerrouche (2021), and Kada et al. (2017). 103 XIVE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2012–2017). LOI n° 2014-

58 du 27 janvier 2014 de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles. 104 The metropolises of Lyon and Marseille were also granted a similar special status. See the work of Kada and Fazi (2022) on French territorial communities with a special status. 105 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2017).

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The second major decentralization initiative was the ‘Law concerning a new territorial organization of the Republic’ (Loi portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République—NOTRe), passed in 2015.106 The NOTRe Law transferred additional competences to regions in fields such as transport and waste management, and also led to a major redrawing of the map of France, decreasing the number of metropolitan regions (as opposed to overseas territories) from twenty-two to thirteen.107 The NOTRe Law upgraded the SRCAE by merging it within a new enhanced regional policy framework referred to as the Schéma régional d’aménagement, de développement durable et d’égalité des territoires — SRADDET (‘Regional framework for planning, sustainable development and territorial equality’).108 However, the NOTRe Law established that, unlike other French metropolitan regions, the Île-de-France would continue relying on the SRCAE as the main policy framework for climate and energy. This was because many of the new dispositions for the upgraded SRADDET had already been covered by another planning document, specific to the capital region, known as the ‘Directing Framework for the Île-de-France Region’ (SDRIF—see above).109 This document, adopted in 2013, consolidated the special legal status of the Île-de-France by

106 XIVE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2012–2017). LOI n° 2015-

991 du 7 août 2015 portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République. 107 The redrawing of the regional map of France was done through a separate bill, which complemented the dispositions of the NOTRe Law. 108 With the exception of the Île-de-France, Corsica and overseas territories, all regions within metropolitan France are under a legal obligation to develop a SRADDET, which will become a key framework for the enactment of local climate initiatives in the near future. The latter merges together not only the SRCAE, but several other important regional policy frameworks covering a number of related fields. Like the LTECV with regard to the SRCAE (see above), the NOTRe law also set out precise legal modalities regarding the elaboration process for the SRADDET, the main elements which had to be included, along with a detailed follow-up procedure over time. 109 See Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2013).

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adding juridical details.110 Likewise, NOTRe introduced specific requirements for the elaboration of PCAETs for communes and municipalities which form part of the metropolis, including the city of Paris. The NOTRe Law also revoked the ‘general competence clause’ (clause générale de competence) for regions and départements , while maintaining it only for communes. As previously explained, this allowed communes to enact regulations that go beyond the strict wording of competence allocation under the law, in the name of ‘local public interest’. President Hollande’s legislation to associate sub-state entities with the achievement of national climate objectives was significant for other reasons, as well. The Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) set out by the French government under Hollande in preparation for the COP21 conference in 2015 could only be enacted post-2020 under the rules of the Paris Agreement. Therefore, the association of territorial communities early-on in the implementation process enabled the latter to play an essential role in terms of climate action before 2020, in preparation for the official launching of the French NDC. This highlights some of the main assets of the hierarchical and stratified nature of the centralized French political system in the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Sub-state entities are directly mobilized in the achievement of national objectives. The obligation for territorial communities to produce certain types of climate plans and frameworks under specific procedures engenders a relatively strong level of policy harmonization, along with a tight coordination between the different echelons. As seen above, the GII Law and LTECV established precise legal requirements for the elaboration process of the SRCAE and PCET/ PCAET, as well as the main elements to be integrated, along with detailed obligations for the implementation and follow-up phase in terms of assessment over time. The GII Law and LTECV also set out modalities for a legal requirement of compatibility between the different levels, which impacts regions and communes when developing their SRCAE and

110 As will be examined in Chapter 8, the city of Paris also benefits from a special legal status (referred to simply as Ville de Paris ), since it combines the functions of a commune and département . Therefore, it is apparent that both the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region enjoy a special legal status, which distinguishes them from other territorial communities across France. This is unsurprising, given the centralized nature of the French economy and political system, which is focused on the capital city and its surroundings. On territorial communities with special status, see Kada and Fazi (2022).

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PCET/PCAET. Such a paradigm has generated a higher minimum standard across the country, preventing the emergence of ‘climate laggards’ and diminishing the risk of conflict regarding policies enacted between the different echelons. As examined in Chapters 2 and 3, this forms a notable point of contrast to the American system which relies on cooperative federalism. The latter is often characterized by a weaker level of policy harmonization and coordination, since there is no obligation for sub-national entities to enact specific types of climate plans or policy frameworks in the same manner as in France. This has resulted in a lower national minimum standard in the US, with many climate laggards among sub-state actors, mostly in Republican-voting areas. These represent between a third to half the country, including large states like Texas (the second largest economy after California and first GHG emitter), which have tended to rely on greater flexibility to avoid or delay compliance.111 Such a situation increases the risk of conflict regarding policies enacted between the different echelons and can lead to federal monitoring and enforcement issues due to the multiplication of disparate standards across states. This may also trigger related issues such as ‘free riding’ or ‘carbon leakage’ from one state to another. It is true that under the provisions of the Clean Air Act (CAA), for example, states have had the possibility to develop ‘State Implementation Plans’ (SIP)112 outlining how they intend to achieve so-called ‘national ambient air quality standards’ within their borders for different types of air pollutants. If approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), states receive federal funding to support local implementation of the CAA; however, states may choose not to develop a SIP and leave the EPA to assume responsibility for implementation within that state. Likewise, if a SIP does not meet minimum federal air quality standards as defined by the CAA, it can be rejected by the EPA, which will then take over enforcement in that state. While this bears some similarity to

111 For instance, as explained in Chapter 3, the 19 conservative states involved in launching a lawsuit against the EPA under Biden are responsible for around 44% of US GHG emissions, having only reduced their own emissions by an average of 7% since the year 2000. 112 In this regard, see literature on US environmental politics: Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Konisky (2020) and Kraft (2021).

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the paradigm involved in the elaboration of the SRCAE or SRADDET for French regions, significant differences remain. Under the relatively centralized French political system, regions are directly mobilized and integrated in the achievement of national climate objectives due to the obligation for them to produce certain types of policy plans or frameworks, following specific procedures. This forms a notable point of contrast to the US paradigm, since states are provided with a wide margin for maneuver and a high degree of autonomy in the development and implementation of their SIPs. The CAA establishes relatively loose minimum federal requirements concerning national ambient air quality standards. The French government, however, relies on a regional ‘Prefect’, who embodies the authority of the State within territorial communities as the primary intermediary for transposing national policies and objectives at the local level. This would be unconstitutional from an American perspective, violating states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment to the US Constitution, whereby the federal government shares sovereignty with its constituent units.113 They both enjoy a relation of parity, in contrast to the hierarchical nature of the unitary French framework.114 The top-down French political system also presents a number of disadvantages, however, in terms of the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. For instance, its rigid and stratified nature can in some cases reduce sub-national actors’ margin for maneuver, impeding their ability to enact policies that are well adapted to the local context. Despite consecutive phases of decentralization, sub-national entities in France continue to possess relatively limited competences on the whole. The latter can hinder the capacity of French territorial communities to innovate and enact far-reaching policies at the local level. This applies especially with regard to regions, since as previously explained, cities as communes continue to benefit from a ‘general competence clause’ after the third phase of decentralization. 113 Regarding the sharing of sovereignty between states and the national government, see literature on US federalism: Fisher and Harriger (2019), and Coleman and Leskiw (2018). 114 In this case, sovereignty refers to the power of delegating competences. In a federal system like the US, states possess sovereign powers that are enshrined in the Constitution, which the central government cannot infringe upon without their express consent (hence the notion of ‘shared sovereignty’), in contrast to France. This explains why reliance on the equivalent of the French ‘Prefect’ would be unconstitutional under American law.

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By contrast, as highlighted in Chapters 2 and 3, since the US federal system provides states with a high level of autonomy and decentralization, climate initiatives may be well adapted to the local context and tailored to changing local conditions. States enjoy broad powers and multiple competences as defined under US constitutional law,115 enabling them to innovate and enact far-reaching climate policies. The latter can help to enhance performance over time, making it easier for states to go beyond national environmental rules if they choose to do so (which is harder to achieve in the case of French regions). As will be examined in Chapters 6 and 7, this has been particularly apparent for progressive US states like New York and Massachusetts, which have relied on such a paradigm to enact some of the most ambitious climate policies in the world, far surpassing the ambit and scope of the SRCAE in the Île-de-France, for example. This includes the ‘Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’—branded as New York’s ‘Green New Deal’ and passed in 2019, along with the ‘Act Creating a Next Generation Roadmap for Massachusetts Climate Policy’, approved in 2021. Overall, this comparative analysis between France and the US arguably reinforces another previously examined pattern, whereby each echelon tends to have a distinctive role to play within the multilevel pyramid. These echelons can mutually support and complement one another if the right policies are enacted, even though this tends to unfold in different ways on both sides of the Atlantic, resulting in diverging strengths and weaknesses for the French and US multilevel paradigms. Hence, while sub-state actors play a vital role within the climate regime which is likely to increase in the future, the national echelon remains essential from a strategic point of view. The latter may manifest itself according to different frameworks, due to variations in the nature of national political/ constitutional systems.

4

Conclusion

Chapter 4 has analyzed the historical background of multilevel governance in France, in particular the interactions between the national level and sub-state entities on environmental and climate issues. This constitutes the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid which, as

115 See Fisher and Harriger (2019).

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demonstrated throughout this chapter and the two previous ones (Chapters 2 and 3), remains essential due to the highly strategic importance that national policies continue to have for the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Chapter 4 has also examined the ways in which the national French government has either supported or hindered the implementation of sub-state climate initiatives for Paris and the Île-de-France under Presidents Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande. This chapter has sought to develop a comparative analysis between the French and US multilevel paradigms, highlighting the ways in which they differ from one another in thought-provoking ways. Thus, while the US federal system provides states with a large degree of autonomy,116 France has historically displayed a relatively centralized political framework,117 even after several phases of decentralization since the 1980s. In contrast to the US where climate change remains a polarizing issue, there has traditionally been a wide consensus on this matter across the French political spectrum, despite some differences in terms of prioritization between the right and the left. As a result, the succession of French Presidents from distinct political parties has not altered national attempts to directly associate sub-state entities in the implementation process and in the achievement of national climate goals. This is different from the US, where the level of federal engagement with sub-state entities on climate issues has depended on which Party has control over the White House and/or Congress. Moreover, and unlike the US federal system, the centralized French paradigm makes it possible for the national government to directly associate local municipal authorities in the achievement of climate goals.118 In spite of these points of contrast, however, a detailed examination of the multilevel climate governance paradigms in France and the US has also revealed a number of similar patterns. First, sub-state actors may act as drivers and catalysts, leading the way with ambitious and far-reaching policies in the implementation of their local climate initiatives. National governments often strive to catch up and may be galvanized by cities or states/regions into raising their level of ambition over time. In addition,

116 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017). 117 See Aubelle and Kada (2019) and Aubelle and Kerrouche (2021). 118 See Collectif (2021).

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sub-state entities may operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ to test innovative climate policies on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment by national governments. In that sense, local actors play a key role in terms of setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. Another identifiable pattern in both the US and France is that the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more general and holistic policy approaches become. National governments often set broad and overarching policy objectives, in contrast to cities which target specific sectors well adapted to the municipal scale. Likewise, each echelon appears to have a distinctive role to play within the multilevel pyramid; the latter can mutually support and complement one another, if the right policies are enacted. Hence, while sub-state entities play a vital role within the climate regime, the national echelon remains essential from a strategic point of view when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Furthermore, national governments in both the US and France favor interaction with the closest echelon beneath them, as a privileged interlocutor for the transposition of policies at the sub-state level. Thus, as each echelon interacts mainly with the one immediately above or below it, this places the intermediary echelon (i.e., French regions and US federal states) in a privileged position. Moreover, the different echelons of the multilevel pyramid are not static but evolve over time, either due to changes in elected administrations, or due to changes in policy platforms within the same administration. These explorations represent a novel contribution to the academic literature. Several authors referenced in the last few chapters such as Hale, Hughes et al., Bache et al. and Wurzel et al.,119 have examined policies in similar areas. This book proposes a structured analysis covering a broad range of patterns involved in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, as exemplified by French and American case studies in our sample. The latter involves an emphasis on the essential role played by local actors in terms of establishing these patterns and the ways in which cities, regions or states can set the policy agenda within a multilevel framework vis-à-vis the national echelon.

119 Hale (2018), Hughes et al. (2018), Bache et al. (2015) and Wurzel et al. (2020).

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Fortin, M.-J., Fournis, Y., & L’Italien, F. (2016). La transition énergétique en chantier: Les configurations institutionnelles et territoriales de l’énergie. Presses de l’Université Laval. Gupta, J. (2014). The History of Global Climate Governance. Cambridge University Press. Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2007). Comparative Government and Politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Hale, T. (2018, November). ‘The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes’. Chatham House—Research Paper. Hoerber, T. (2012). The Origins of Energy and Environmental Policy in Europe: The Beginnings of a European Environmental Conscience. Routledge. Hoffmann, M. J. (2011). Climate Governance at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response After Kyoto. Oxford University Press. Hughes, S., Chu, E. K., & Mason, S. G. (2018). Climate Change in Cities: Innovations in Multi-Level Governance. Springer. Jacob, J. (2016). Histoire de l’écologie politique: Comment la gauche a redécouvert la nature. Éditions Albin Michel. Janicot, L. (2021). Les collectivités territoriales et la protection de l’environnement. Berger Levrault. Kada, N., & Fazi, A. (2022). Les collectivités territoriales à statut particulier en France. Peter Lang. Kada, N., Pasquier, R., Courtecuisse, C., & Aubelle, V. (2017). Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de la Décentralisation. Berger Levrault. Kraft, E. M. (2021, 8th edition). Environmental Policy and Politics. Routledge. Konisky, D. M. (2020). Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. LaCroix, A. L. (2010). Ideological Origins of American Federalism. Harvard University Press. Layzer, J. A. (2012). Open for Business: Conservatives’ Opposition to Environmental Regulation. The MIT Press. Lisowski, M. (2002). ‘Playing the Two-level Game: US President Bush’s Decision to Repudiate the Kyoto Protocol’. Environmental Politics, 11(4), 101–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/714000641 Lorach, J.-M., & de Quatrebarbes, E. (2003). Guide du territoire durable: L’Agenda 21 territorial pour les collectivités locales et leurs partenaires. Pearson France. Mooney, C. (2007). The Republican War on Science. Basic Books. Pissaloux, J.-L., & Collectif. (2017). Dictionnaire Collectivités territoriales et développement durable. Éditions Lavoisier. Quirk, P. J. (2016). Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton University Press.

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Rinfret, S. R., & Pautz, M. C. (2019). US Environmental Policy in Action. Palgrave Macmillan. Rizzoli, F. (2015). La territorialisation de la politique énergie-climat en France: Le Plan Climat-Energie Territorial. Éditions universitaires européennes. Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Shulman, S. (2007). Undermining Science: Suppression and Distortion in the Bush Administration. University of California Press. Strapoli, C., Eiller, A.-C., Poupeau, F.-M., & Marcou, G. (2015). Gouvernance et innovations dans le système énergétique: De Nouveaux Défis Pour Les Collectivités Territoriales. Éditions L’Harmattan. Turner, J. M., & Isenberg, A. C. (2018). The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Harvard University Press. Verpeaux, M. (2020—6th edition). Les collectivités territoriales. Dalloz. Verpeaux, M., & Janicot, L. (2021—2nd edition). Droit des collectivités territoriales. Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. Verpeaux, M., Rimbaut, C., & Waserman, F. (2021—12th edition). Les collectivités territoriales et la décentralisation. La documentation française. Villalba, B. (2021). L’écologie politique en France. Éditions La Découverte. Vital-Durand, E. (2017—10th edition). Les collectivités territoriales en France. Hachette Éducation. Wurzel, R., Liefferink, D., & Torney, D. (2020). Pioneers, Leaders and Followers in Multilevel and Polycentric Climate Governance. Routledge. Zuindeau, B. (2018—2nd edition). Développement durable et territoire. Presses universitaires du Septentrion.

Public Policy Documents and Laws Collectif (2021—25th edition). Code général des collectivités territoriales. Dalloz. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (June 2011). Plan régional pour le climat d’Îlede-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (November 2012). Schéma Régional du Climat, de l’Air et de l’Energie d’Île-de-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (December 2013). Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (June 2014). Plan de Déplacements Urbains. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (February 2015). Schéma régional de raccordement au réseau électrique des énergies renouvelables. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (June 2016). Changeons d’Air en Île-de-France: Plan Régional pour la Qualité de l’Air 2016–21. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (December 2017). Schéma Régional de l’Habitat et de l’Hébergement.

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Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (January 2018). Plan de Protection de l’Atmosphère. Constitution of 1958 establishing the 5th French Republic. Article 72. European Commission (2011). A Roadmap for Moving to a Competitive Low Carbon Economy in 2050—Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Xe Législature de la Cinquième République française (1993–97). LOI n° 96-1236 du 30 décembre 1996 sur l’air et l’utilisation rationnelle de l’énergie. XIe Législature de la Cinquième République française (1997–2002). LOI n° 2000-1208 du 13 décembre 2000 relative à la solidarité et au renouvellement urbains. XIIe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2002–7). Loi constitutionnelle n°2003-276 du 28 mars 2003 relative à l’organisation décentralisée de la République. XIIIe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2007–12). LOI n° 2009967 du 3 août 2009 de programmation relative à la mise en œuvre du Grenelle de l’environnement. XIIIe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2007–12). LOI n° 2010788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement. XIVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2012–17). LOI n° 201458 du 27 janvier 2014 de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles. XIVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2012–17). LOI n° 2015991 du 7 août 2015 portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République. XIVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2012–17). LOI n° 2015992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte. Métropole du Grand Paris (November 2018). Plan Climat, Air, Energie Métropolitain. République française, Ministère de l’Aménagement du Territoire et de l’Environnement – Mission Interministérielle de l’Effet de Serre (2000). Programme national de lutte contre le changement climatique. République française – Comité interministériel pour le développement durable (2003). Stratégie nationale de développement durable. République française, Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement Durable – Mission Interministérielle de l’Effet de Serre (2004). Plan Climat 2004: Face au changement climatique, Agissons ensemble. République française, Ministère de l’Ecologie et du Développement Durable – Mission Interministérielle de l’Effet de Serre (2006). Actualisation 2006 du plan climat 2004–2012: Face au changement climatique, agissons ensemble.

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République française – Ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer (2009). Plan d’action national en faveur des énergies renouvelables, période 2009–2020. République française – Ministère de la transition écologique et solidaire (2019). Feuille de route de la France pour l’Agenda 2030. Ville de Paris (2007). Plan climat territorial. Ville de Paris (2012). Plan climat énergie territorial. Ville de Paris (December 2016). Programme local de l’habitat 2011–2016 modifié. Ville de Paris (March 2018). Plan Climat de Paris: Vers une ville neutre en carbone, 100% énergies renouvelables, résiliente, juste et inclusive.

Websites European Commission. 2020 Climate & Energy Package. Retrieved January 26, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/climate-strategies-tar gets/2020-climate-energy-package_en European Commission. 2030 Climate & Energy Framework. Retrieved January 26, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/climate-strategies-tar gets/2030-climate-energy-framework_en République française – Ministère de la Transition écologique. Loi de transition énergétique pour la croissance verte. Retrieved January 26, 2023, from https:/ /www.ecologie.gouv.fr/loi-transition-energetique-croissance-verte République française – Ministère de la Transition écologique. Territoires à énergie positive pour la croissance verte. Retrieved January 26, 2023, from https:// www.ecologie.gouv.fr/territoires-energie-positive-croissance-verte

CHAPTER 5

Climate Politics Under Macron: Towards More Hierarchical Centralization in Multilevel Governance?

1

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the French paradigm for multilevel environmental governance involving interactions between the national and sub-state (cities and regions) echelons. The national level constitutes the second tier of the multilevel pyramid and is important due to the seminal significance which national-level policies continue to have for the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance in France. Yet, while Chapter 4 examined the historical evolution of multilevel environmental governance in France over the last few decades under Presidents Chirac, Sarkozy and Hollande, this chapter concentrates on the current Presidency of Emmanuel Macron. This chapter examines the policies, strategies and legislation enacted under Macron to mobilize sub-state entities in the implementation process and in the achievement of nationally defined objectives. More specifically, this chapter assesses the different ways in which Macron’s government has been able to support the enactment of local climate initiatives for the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region. The first Section (2) will examine multilevel climate governance from the sub-national to the national echelon during President Macron’s first term (2017–2022), while the following Section (3) will examine these issues during Macron’s early second term (since 2022), along with remaining shortcomings associated with the French climate policy framework. As © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_5

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with Chapter 4, comparative perspectives involving the French and US multilevel climate frameworks are elaborated across this chapter. Although Macron’s environmental record has received extensive criticism from the opposition, closer analysis reveals that his government has in fact enacted a number of noteworthy climate policies, strategies and legislation during his first and early second terms. In this regard, Macron has been able to continue on the momentum generated by the successful outcome of COP21 held in Paris in 2015; since then, France has endeavored to upgrade its climate policies and become a leader in Europe. Yet, while Macron’s initiatives have contributed to reinforcing France’s national climate framework, they did not substantially alter the multilevel paradigm for climate issues stemming from laws enacted under previous Presidents, leading mostly to marginal upgrades during his first term. However, the ‘ecological planning’ announced as a green policy blueprint for his second term is likely to reinforce the centralized nature of the French paradigm in terms of the ways in which the national government interacts with sub-state actors on climate policy. Therefore, France’s multilevel governance system continues and is likely to be increasingly characterized by close and direct association of ‘territorial communities’ in the achievement of nationally defined climate objectives. All echelons are legally required to produce specific types of policy frameworks under certain timeframes, whose elaboration process, content and evaluation procedures are defined under national law.1 Such a hierarchical and stratified centralization in France stands as a point of contrast to the US federal system, which relies on a form of ‘cooperative federalism’ that provides states with broad autonomy (see Chapters 2 and 3). However, like the US system, the centralized French paradigm also displays both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance, and the ways in which substate entities are mobilized in the implementation process. As explained in Chapter 4, France is rendered more complex a case study because of its interactions with the European Union,2 since there is a legal requirement

1 See: Collectif (2021). 2 Like Chapter 4, this chapter will acknowledge where appropriate the multilevel

dimension stemming from France’s position as a core EU member state, including the transposition of EU climate initiatives at the national level. However, this will not represent a focus area since this chapter, like the previous one, will concentrate instead on the

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for EU climate initiatives (directives and regulations) to be transposed at the national level. Despite the prospect of improvements during Macron’s second term with ‘ecological planning’, the articulation of multilevel climate governance with sub-state entities in France still remains inadequate on a number of counts. This chapter will rely on the French example to highlight how even ‘best case studies’ may in some cases fall short of providing an effective paradigm for the articulation of multilevel climate governance between the national and sub-state echelons. For instance, Section 3.2 will analyze how the involvement of non-state actors within structures to formulate and develop national French climate policy has not been sufficiently institutionalized; this has served to weaken their potential monitoring role. The same also applies in the case of the US, as examined in Chapter 3, even though there have been improvements under Biden. Thus, if even ‘best case studies’ in developed countries are inadequate, the international community as a whole is probably failing to provide an adequate framework for multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement. In this respect, the example of France is even more revealing than the US, since the centralized French political system has led to more consistent efforts to integrate sub-national actors in the enactment process for climate policies. This represents a point of contrast to the American paradigm, whereby federal climate initiatives have been very volatile during the last few administrations, depending on which Party is in power, leading to a highly inconsistent level of interaction with sub-state entities.3 French multilevel framework, and how the national government has interacted with substate entities like Paris and the Île-de-France inside the country. The multilevel paradigm of the European Union is a very broad topic, which would necessitate an entire book in and of itself. The European Union mostly falls outside the ambit of this chapter and research project more generally. 3 Similarly to previous chapters, the issues covered in this chapter are based on an extensive range of interviews with a gamut of experts and public officials. This includes French officials working at the national, regional and municipal levels on climate policy matters, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks and NGOs. They provided relevant insights about the different types of climate policies, strategies and legislation enacted by President Macron during his first and early second terms, and how the French government has sought to mobilize sub-state entities in the achievement of national climate objectives over the last few years. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1).

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2 Modest Evolutions in Multilevel Climate Governance During President Macron’s First Term (2017–2022) 2.1 National Climate Strategies Enacted During President Macron’s First Term (2017–2022) and Interfaces with Sub-State Entities Relatively unknown to the general public before entering the French government, Emmanuel Macron appeared in the media spotlight only after becoming Finance Minister in 2014 under President Hollande. He surprised the French political establishment by succeeding at a daring attempt to launch his own political movement ‘The Republic Moving Forward’ (La République En Marche—LREM) in 2016, after leaving Hollande’s government. Only one year later, he defeated Le Pen and won the Presidential election in May 2017, becoming the youngest French Head of State since Napoleon.4 While his main rival from the Conservative Party was embroiled in a corruption scandal that undoubtedly contributed to Macron’s meteoric rise to power, the young candidate’s ability to bridge the left-right political divide was also instrumental. Macron sought to position himself and his movement at the center of the political spectrum, to attract voters from both the center-left and the center-right.5 Hence, Macron engaged in tactical maneuvering throughout the first term of his Presidency. Much like a tightrope walker, he combined and merged policies from both sides of the aisle. On the right-wing of the political spectrum, and to the disappointment of some of his supporters, Macron emphasized economic liberalism and security as pillars for his administration. In this regard, he successively nominated two Prime Ministers—Edouard Philippe and Jean Castex—along with a number of Cabinet Ministers such as Gérald Darmanin at the Interior, who were former members of the Conservative Party (Les Républicans ).6 On the left-wing of the political spectrum, fresh from his experience of serving

4 In this regard, see: Cole (2019), Pedder (2018), Raynaud (2018). 5 In this regard, one of Macron’s famous slogans during the 2017 campaign was ‘neither

left nor right’ (ni droite ni gauche). 6 Concerning the evolution of the French Party System and the Centre Right over the last few years, see: Rispin (2021).

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under a Socialist government in a coalition with the Green Party, Macron has also made attempts to place climate change and the environment as a salient theme of his Presidency, at least on paper. Despite extensive criticism of Macron’s green record from the opposition (especially on the left),7 a closer analysis reveals that his government enacted a number of interesting initiatives during his first five-year term. While many of these initiatives involved updating or implementing provisions which had already been set out by the LTECV passed under Hollande, they still represented a clear attempt to balance his policy record towards the left. Several prominent members from the Green Party (EELV) also chose to join Macron’s movement, either as Cabinet Ministers—with François de Rugy and Barbara Pompili successively becoming Environment Ministers, for example—or as LREM candidates for the European Parliament (Pascal Canfin and Pascal Durand, for instance). Likewise, his initial appointment of Nicolas Hulot, a famous French environmental activist and founder of a prominent NGO (Fondation pour la nature et l’homme), to serve as Minister for the Ecological Transition, sent a clear signal in this regard. For reasons that will be examined in more detail below, while Macron’s initiatives contributed to bolstering France’s climate framework on a national scale, they did not substantially alter the multilevel governance paradigm stemming from previously enacted laws such as Grenelle II , LTECV or NOTRe, nor the ways in which the national government interacts with sub-state actors on climate issues (see Chapter 4). With the exception of what had initially been presented as constituting a fourth phase of decentralization, the policies enacted during Macron’s first term have led to relatively marginal upgrades in terms of multilevel climate governance. What is more, even the latest decentralization law has been criticized for not going far enough in this regard, as discussed below.

7 The opposition, particularly the extreme left represented by La France insoumise or ‘France Unbowed’, has frequently highlighted what they perceive as contradictions inherent in Macron’s ‘centrism’ and his attempts to combine policies involving economic liberalism with others to address climate change and protect the environment. The official policy manifesto of La France insoumise contains a detailed blueprint which compares the party’s proposals to measures enacted by Macron’s government during his first term (along with Macron’s proposals for the 2022 Presidential campaign), with environmental issues featuring prominently. See: Mélenchon (2021).

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The first major green initiative launched under Macron’s government was a new National Climate Plan (Plan Climat ), developed by the Environment Minister at the time Nicolas Hulot and presented in July 2017. Its main provisions can be summarized as follows:8 • Turning away from fossil fuels and committing to a carbon-neutral approach: with the aim of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, this upgrades France’s previous target of an 80% reduction from a 1990 baseline.9 • New policies to generate carbon-free electricity, by leaving fossil fuels in the sub-soil, raising the carbon price to put a fair price on pollution and removing GHG emitting vehicles from the market by 2040. • Improving Everyday Life for all French Citizens: a number of different measures to develop clean mobility, eradicate fuel poverty, use energy more responsibly, as well as transition towards a circular economy to reduce waste. • Making France a leader of the green economy: turning Paris into a capital for green finance and bolstering scientific climate research. The broad thematic goals set out in the 2017 National Climate Plan demonstrate the previously examined pattern, whereby the higher the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more general policy approaches are. In this case, the French national government set out broad objectives, in contrast to climate goals for the city of Paris (see Chapter 8) which target specific sectors that are well adapted to the municipal level. In terms of interactions between the national government and substate entities, the Climate Plan merely states that ‘co-construction’ and ‘contracting’ with territorial communities should be sought whenever possible, in all relevant fields. This applies especially to investments, with the aim of enabling sub-state actors to contribute towards implementing the objectives of the National Climate Plan. The goal of turning Paris into a capital for green finance is notable since, as will be examined

8 République française—Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2017). 9 At the time, France was the third country in the world to make such as pledge (after

Sweden and Costa Rica). This highlighted the desire of Macron’s government to turn France into a global climate pioneer.

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in Chapter 8, this matches with several elements in the capital city’s latest Climate Plan or PCAET, set out a year later in 2018. The same also pertains to clean mobility—including the removal of GHG emitting vehicles—, the development of a circular economy, the generation of carbon-free electricity, as well as the responsible use of energy (especially concerning the ecological renovation of buildings, both public and private). It is true that the 2017 National Climate Plan appears to have anticipated the objective of reaching carbon neutrality officially established by Paris’ PCAET only a year later in 2018.10 Nonetheless, the Municipal Council had already pledged to do this earlier in 2017. Paris’ latest Climate Plan went through several years of elaboration and was only finalized in 2018, even though the objective of achieving carbon neutrality had been decided beforehand. Hence, the national government and the capital city were relatively well aligned on these key climate policy issues.11 What is more, the French government set out the objective to achieve carbon neutrality in 2017, four years ahead of the US, which at that time had announced its intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement under Trump’s Presidency. While achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century was one of the main climate pledges from the Biden administration upon assuming office in 2021, this still highlights a striking point of contrast between France and the US, in terms of their level of consistency towards climate action over time. Similar patterns are also apparent regarding the other climate policy frameworks which were subsequently enacted by Macron’s government. As a follow-up to the 2017 National Climate Plan, and in particular to achieve the objective of reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, a French Strategy for Energy and Climate (Stratégie française sur l’énergie et le climat ) was presented in November 2018 by François de Rugy, Hulot’s successor as Environment Minister. The initiative was made up of two primary strategic planning documents: the first, the ‘National

10 Ville de Paris (2018). 11 The same also applies to the Île-de-France, as will be discussed in Chapter 8. While

the region set out the aim of reaching carbon neutrality by mid-century in its 2018 Regional Energy and Climate Strategy, the latter underwent several years of preparation. Hence, like the city of Paris, the objective of carbon neutrality had in fact been approved beforehand.

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Low Carbon Strategy’ (Stratégie nationale bas carbone—SNBC), constitutes a roadmap for France to reduce its GHG emissions over the short, medium and long run. The second, the ‘Multiannual Programming on Energy’ (Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie—PPE), establishes priority actions in the energy sector over the next few years. It should be noted that both the SNBC and PPE were framed under the LTECV enacted by President Hollande in 2015. Hence, an initial version of the SNBC had been approved in 2015, while the first PPE was set out in 2016, before their subsequent update under President Macron (finalized by 2020). The second versions of the SNBC and PPE also partly aim to transpose the EU’s latest and ambitious climate objectives at the national level, as defined under the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans Package’12 and the ‘European Green Deal’,13 announced in 2016 and 2019, respectively.14 The SNBC aims to provide a concrete policy framework for transitioning the French economy towards carbon neutrality by 2050, while reducing the national carbon footprint across the country.15 It does so by establishing so-called ‘carbon budgets’ (budgets carbone) every five years

12 See: European Commission, Clean Energy for all Europeans Package, announced in 2016 and adopted in May 2019: https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-strategy/ clean-energy-all-europeans-package_en. 13 European Commission, A European Green Deal: Striving to be the First Carbon Neutral Continent, announced in December 2019: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/ priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en 14 In this regard, the SNBC and PPE constitute the two main pillars of an ‘integrated national plan on energy and climate’ (Plan national intégré énergie climat —PNIEC), which France must produce under the framework of the EU’s latest initiatives in this area. The PNIEC itself represents a consolidated version of the French Strategy for Energy and Climate, presented in November 2018. 15 République française—Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2020, March). Stratégie nationale bas carbone: La transition écologique et solidaire vers la neutralité carbone.

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starting in 2018 up until 2033 (with the current period spanning 2019– 2023 and the next one 2024–2028), which constitute GHG emission ceilings or limits and apply to all sectors across the economy:16 • Buildings: 49% cut in GHG emissions by 2030 (from a 2015 baseline) and complete decarbonation by 2050, with concrete policies to enhance energy efficiency for existing buildings through large-scale eco-renovation projects, along with strict low-carbon standards for the construction of new buildings. • Transportation: 28% cut in GHG emissions by 2030 (from a 2015 baseline) and complete decarbonization by 2050, with concrete policies such as providing financial incentives for the purchase of cleaner vehicles (especially electric/hydrogen), decarbonization of public transport, along with the encouragement of non-polluting transport methods such as cycling. • Energy Production: 33% cut in GHG emissions by 2030 (from a 2015 baseline) and complete decarbonization by 2050, with concrete policies involving the enhancement of energy efficiency and the development of renewables like solar photovoltaic or geothermal. • Waste Management: 35% cut by 2030 and 66% cut by 2050 (from a 2015 baseline), with concrete policies including the promotion of a circular economy or improving the sorting of waste at the source through eco-conception. The PPE seeks to complement the SNBC by focusing more specifically on decarbonization of the energy sector, which plays a key role in terms of transitioning the French economy towards carbon neutrality. There is a legal obligation for the PPE to be compatible with the objectives set out in the SNBC and its associated ‘carbon budgets’, which means that the more specialized policies of the former (PPE) must contribute towards

16 It should be noted that the initial carbon budget had spanned 2015 up to 2018, in alignment with the first version of the SNBC.

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achieving the broader objectives of the latter (SNBC).17 The PPE is based on two main pillars (current period from 2019 to 2023):18 • Reduce energy consumption across all sectors: 40% cut in GHG emissions from energy combustion (1990 baseline), along with a 35% cut in primary energy consumption and a 16.5% reduction in final energy consumption (2012 baseline), up to 2028. This includes concrete policies such as ending the sale of fossil fuel vehicles by 2040 or enhancing the energy efficiency of buildings through eco-renovation and strict standards for new buildings. • Diversify the national energy mix by developing renewable energies: double the installed capacity of electricity-based renewable energies and increase the share of renewables in final energy consumption to 33% by 2030. Several concrete policies are outlined including greater reliance on renewable energies for heating, in particular for buildings. Like the 2017 National Climate Plan, many of the policies set out in both the SNBC and PPE across different targeted sectors are relatively well aligned with those enacted by the city of Paris in its latest 2018 PCAET. As will be examined in Chapter 8, this includes enhancing the energy efficiency of existing buildings through eco-renovation and strict standards for the construction of new buildings (especially for heating), the provision of financial incentives for purchases of cleaner vehicles and reduced use of combustion vehicles, the decarbonization of public transport and the encouragement of cycling, the development of renewables like solar photovoltaic or geothermal, as well as promotion of a circular economy and improved waste sorting at the source. This also applies to the Greater Paris Metropolis with its 2018 PCAET, along with the Île-deFrance via the SRCAE and 2018 Energy and Climate Strategy, albeit to a lesser extent due to their more limited competence allocation in these areas.

17 Compatibility (compatibilité) means that the PPE cannot introduce measures that are directly contradictory to the orientations and dispositions of the SNBC. Under French law, this is a stronger obligation than merely ‘taking into account’ (prise en compte). 18 République française—Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2020, April). Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie.

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Like other policy frameworks examined above, France’s SNBC and PPE appear to be exceptions to a previously examined pattern of nationallevel policies that are more general when compared to municipal initiatives. National governments tend to set out broad objectives, in contrast to cities which target specific sectors well adapted to the municipal level. Yet, while the SNBC and PPE both establish detailed policies across targeted sectors, much like the city of Paris, they still adopt a more holistic approach by covering a broader range of fields. This includes agriculture, forests, woods and soil which are addressed by the SNBC, along with the PPE’s aim to reduce nuclear and coal-based energy sources, which mostly fall outside the ambit of municipal governance. Hence, this arguably serves to corroborate the pattern of a more holistic approach at the national echelon. In addition, even in cases where the SNBC and PPE cover the same targeted sectors as the municipal level, national policies tend to be formulated in a more general manner when compared to Paris’ latest Climate Plan, whereby municipal climate initiatives often provide granular detail, as explored in Chapter 8. Likewise, France’s SNBC and PPE may appear to refute another previously examined pattern, as they aim to transpose nationally defined policies on sub-state actors across key sectors that are essential for municipal climate policy. Yet, much like the elaboration process for the GII and LTECV Laws, the city of Paris’ ambitious local green initiatives set out in its latest 2018 PCAET seem to have impacted, at least to a certain extent, several key elements within the SNBC and PPE.19 Paris’ pioneering climate policies in sectors such as buildings, transportation, energy or waste management appear once again to have influenced the development of national policies in similar areas. This partly explains the relatively effective alignment between municipal and national initiatives across such targeted sectors, since the SNBC and PPE borrow from, or at least are influenced by, similar elements within Paris’s latest Climate

19 Yet, as explained in Chapter 8, the GII Law had been influenced by Paris’ initial municipal Climate Plan in 2007, while the LTECV was mostly impacted by Paris’ second Climate Plan or PCET in 2012. By contrast, the latest versions of the PPE and SNBC were influenced instead by Paris’ latest Climate Plan or PCAET, enacted in 2018.

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Plan.20 Thus, the city of Paris continues to display a higher level of ambition across these different areas, especially when it comes to specialized fields like transportation, buildings, clean energy or waste management, which characterize the municipal approach to climate policy.21 Consequently, such a state of affairs supports once again the pattern whereby cities and sub-state entities may act as catalysts within the climate regime, galvanizing national governments into raising their level of ambition. This also underscores the role of sub-state actors as ‘laboratories of democracy’ where new, innovative climate policies can be tested on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment by national governments. Hence, municipalities may drive changes in economic/ technological arrangements from the bottom-up, which represents a key aspect of the contributions from local actors within the climate regime.22 Furthermore, both the SNBC and PPE demonstrate the key role of sub-state entities in the implementation of nationally defined climate and energy objectives. French territorial communities, and especially regions, were closely associated with the process to update these two strategic policy documents, which began in 2017.23 However, like Hulot’s National Climate Plan, the SNBC and PPE’s upgrade during Macron’s first term did not substantially modify the multilevel governance paradigm stemming from previously enacted legislation such as Grenelle II , LTECV or NOTRe. In fact, they only marginally altered existing frameworks under which the national government interacts with sub-national actors on climate policy, including the PCAET, SRCAE or SRADDET. Instead, the SNBC simply states that regions and territorial communities are required to ‘take the strategy into account’ (prise en compte) during the next updating phase of their respective local climate policy

20 Paris’ latest Climate Plan was approved in 2017 and finalized in 2018, while the second versions of the SNBC and PPE were approved later in 2019, and subsequently finalized by 2020. 21 See literature on sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal

level sectors: Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020). 22 See: Hale (2018). 23 For instance, presentations of these two national strategic policy documents were

conducted across several regions in France, with many local debates involving territorial communities.

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frameworks. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, this mostly refers to the SRCAE, the SDRIF and the Regional Energy and Climate Strategy for the Île-de-France. In the case of the city of Paris and its metropolis, this chiefly applies to their latest climate plans or PCAETs.24 Under French law, ‘taking into account’ involves not deviating from the fundamental orientations of a policy except under the control of a judge, and in the name of an imperative public interest.25 Interestingly, there is no legal obligation for territorial communities to ‘take into account’ the PPE, in the same way as for the SNBC; they are simply encouraged to do so. The city of Paris’ municipal Climate Plan or PCAET, and that of the Greater Paris Metropolis are not scheduled for another update until 2024 or six years after the latest 2018 versions, at which point both the SNBC and PPE will have been updated (with the next period spanning 2024–2028). The Île-de-France needs to renew both its SRCAE and SDRIF in the near future,26 so the Regional Council might have to take current national SNBC guidelines into account, or will otherwise follow those of the next version. For Paris and its metropolis, along with the Île-de-France, the main orientations of the SNBC must eventually be declined into concrete and operational local public policies across all relevant sectors. Even though they are not legally required to do so, it is likely that Paris, Greater Paris and the Île-de-France will seek to do the same with the main orientations of the PPE, so as to bolster their climate leadership credentials. Therefore, the SNBC and PPE will both have a clear impact on the implementation of local climate initiatives for Paris and the Île-de-France over the next few years.27 In this regard, the SNBC provides for the elaboration of synthetic guidelines in key sectors like buildings, transport, energy or waste, so 24 The SNBC articulates the requirement for sub-national actors to ‘take into account’ its main objectives; this applies more generally to any local planning strategy which has a significant impact on GHG emissions. Hence, this covers local policy frameworks in other related fields such as urbanism, transport or housing, which have been examined above (see also Chapter 8). 25 See: Collectif (2021). 26 While the timeline is still under consideration for the SRCAE, the process to renew

the SDRIF was launched in November 2021, with final approval scheduled for 2024. 27 In fact, the initial SNBC in 2015 already had an impact on Paris’ current climate policies, since it had to be ‘taken into account’ by the city during the third update of its municipal Climate Plan or PCAET in 2018. The same also applies to the initial PPE in 2016, albeit on a voluntary basis.

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as to assist territorial communities when transposing its main orientations at the sub-national level; this includes the development of more harmonized data tools for comparing local and national climate trajectories.28 On the reverse side, the SNBC and PPE both emphasize that regional climate policy frameworks such as the SRCAE should be taken into account during the next update of the French Strategy for Energy and Climate.29 Starting with the 2019 upgrade, the latter are based on five-year review cycles, with the current one from 2019 up to 2023, and the next cycle for 2024–2028.30 This helps to explain why the local climate policies of Paris and the Îlede-France are relatively well aligned with those of the SNBC and PPE, and why the national strategy borrowed from or was at least influenced by them across a range of targeted sectors. Yet, the French Strategy for Energy and Climate also introduced a number of novel elements in these key areas, which Paris, Greater Paris and the Île-de-France will need to integrate during the next upgrade of their local climate policy frameworks (or do so voluntarily in the case of the PPE). The aim is to establish a symbiotic relationship between the French government and sub-national entities, whereby each echelon takes into account and learns from the climate/clean energy initiatives of the other.31 This was made possible thanks to the hierarchical nature of the centralized French political system, which evidently involves a deeper level of inter-connection between the different echelons when compared to the US paradigm of cooperative federalism. This highlights once again some of the strengths of the centralized French multilevel framework, especially in terms of 28 As a follow-up, the French Ministry for the Environment also developed a ‘working group on territorial ecology’, which collaborates with local officials in order to assist territorial communities in transposing the objectives of the SNBC and PPE at the subnational level. 29 In this regard, a synthesis of the various SRCAE from regions across France was developed by an expert committee in 2017, which helped to inform the first upgrade of the SNBC and PPE under Macron. 30 This is to enable each new entering government to update priorities on energy and climate, since Presidential and Parliamentary elections in France are scheduled every five years, under a timeline which roughly corresponds to that of the SNBC and PPE. 31 One of the aims of the SNBC is to enhance cooperation between regions and communes or groups of communes (inter-communalities).

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fostering a good level of policy harmonization and a tight coordination between the different echelons, which leads to a higher minimum standard across the country; as indicated above, this prevents the emergence of ‘climate laggards’ among sub-state entities, at least when compared to the US. 2.2

National Climate Legislation Enacted During President Macron’s First Term (2017–2022) and Interfaces with Sub-State Actors

Many similar patterns are also apparent in the texts of the two main climate laws passed during President Macron’s first term. In order to legally enshrine the objectives and policies established by the French Strategy for Energy and Climate, Macron pushed through two significant pieces of legislation in 2019 and 2021; yet, the latter introduced several novel elements, as well.32 The first law, passed in July and promulgated in November 2019, is known as the ‘Energy and Climate Law’ (Loi énergie et climat ) and is based on four main pillars:33 1. Gradual phasing out of fossil fuels and development of renewable energies: • Legally enshrines the objective of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.34 • Reduce energy consumption from fossil fuels by 40% up to 2030 (from a 2012 baseline).35

32 Like the second versions of the PPE and SNBC, these two pieces of legislation also constituted an attempt to transpose on a national scale the EU’s latest and ambitious climate objectives, as set out by the ‘Clean Energy for all Europeans Package’ and the ‘European Green Deal’. 33 XVE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017–2022). LOI n° 20191147 du 8 novembre 2019 relative à l’énergie et au climat. 34 Likewise, a reference to the ‘urgency of the ecological and climate crisis’ was enshrined into the law. 35 This constitutes an upgrade from the previous goal of the LTECV to cut energy consumption from fossil fuels by 30% up to 2030 (also from a 2012 baseline).

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• Legally enshrines the PPE’s goal of enhancing the share of renewable energies to 33% by 2030, including by facilitating the development of solar, geothermal and hydrogen power.36 2. Improving the insulation of housing by addressing thermal leakage: • Large-scale eco-renovation program for housing across France suffering from thermal leakage.37 Includes a number of detailed policies through several phases to gradually enhance energy efficiency in order to insulate buildings, to be completed by 2028. 3. Establishing new tools for climate policy governance and evaluation: • Endorses the High Council on Climate (Haut Conseil pour le Climat ), an independent institution madeup of technocratic experts and placed directly under the aegis of the Prime Minister, to evaluate the adequacy of France’s climate policies and strategies.38 • Legally enshrines the SNBC as the main framework for climate mitigation policies and establishes the obligation for the government to produce an assessment each year (budget vert ) on the environmental impact of its yearly budgetary law (loi de finances ). • By July 2023, the Parliament must adopt a five-yearly programming law to legally enshrine the various energy-related policies and objectives set out by the upgraded PPE. 4. Regulating the electricity and gas sectors: a number of different measures to diversify the energy mix, reduce dependence on nuclear energy and regulate electricity and gas markets.

36 The law includes a focus on developing solar photovoltaic energy, especially on

rooftops. 37 These represent up to 20% of GHG emissions in France. The latter are referred to as passoires thermiques. 38 This institution was framed on the model of the British ‘Committee on Climate Change’ (since 2008). The French High Council on Climate was created beforehand in November 2018, shortly before passage of the law.

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The 2019 Energy and Climate Law was followed by an extensive public consultative process known as the ‘Citizens’ Convention for the Climate’ (Convention citoyenne pour le climat ), which derived from the ‘great national debate’ (grand débat national ) triggered by the French ‘yellow vest’ protest movement. The Citizens’ Convention for the Climate was convened in October 2019, bringing together 150 individuals picked randomly among the population, who were asked to propose a series of concrete measures to ensure that France would reach its medium- and long-term climate objectives. This unprecedented exercise in participatory democracy led to the formulation of 149 proposals,39 which were relied on for the development of the ‘Climate and Resiliency Law’ (Loi climat et resilience). The latter was elaborated by Environment Minister Barbara Pompili and approved by Parliament in July 2021. While the legislation integrated some, but not all of the 149 proposals,40 it was still framed around the same broad thematic areas which had emerged out of the Citizens’ Convention:41 A. Sustainable consumption modes • Policies involving better labeling or ‘eco-scores’ to render various goods and services (such as food or clothing) more sustainable, together with stricter rules on advertising42 and the encouragement of vegetarian meals in schools and universities. B. Sustainable modes of production and working environments • Various measures to promote sustainable modes of production and working environments. Declination of the PPE into 39 On the exercise in participatory democracy involved in the Citizens’ Convention for the Climate, see: Pech (2021). 40 For instance, a notable proposal which came out of the Citizens’ Convention was to render the allocation of public funds for private firms conditional on reducing their carbon footprint, which was subsequently rejected by the government; Macron came under sharp criticism for this. In the end, many of the 149 propositions were not included in the Climate and Resiliency Law or were integrated in a watered-down format. 41 XVE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017-22). LOI n° 20211104 du 22 août 2021 portant lutte contre le dérèglement climatique et renforcement de la résilience face à ses effets. 42 This includes advertising for various types of fossil fuel energies.

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regional level targets to develop renewables such as solar and wind power, including through ‘renewable energy communities’.43 C. Sustainable transportation • Creation of ‘low emission zones’ for urban areas of more than 150,000 inhabitants by 2025.44 Ending the sale of new polluting cars by 2030 and of new heavyweight vehicles by 2040. • The possibility for regions to establish eco-road taxes on merchandise from 2024 onwards, along with a requirement for them to propose attractive tariffs on local trains. • Financial incentives to encourage the purchase of less polluting vehicles (including electric/hydrogen). Support for the development of cycling and more lanes for clean vehicles. D. Sustainable housing • Additional measures to accelerate eco-renovation and improve the insulation of housing to address thermal leakage through several phases: more control instruments for renting and selling, along with financial incentives and public assistance to renovate buildings.45 • Policies to slow down the artificialization of soils, which must be cut in half by 2030 (from a 1990 baseline) and reach net zero by 2050, with the objective of maintaining 30% of protected lands. The law imposes that such targets be declined at the sub-national level.46 43 The concept of ‘renewable energy communities’, already introduced in the Energy

and Climate Law, was consolidated by the Climate and Resiliency Law. It refers to independent, non-profit entities relying on open and voluntary participation from members (which often includes territorial communities or private sector actors) located nearby, for renewable energy projects which have subscribed and contributed to its development. 44 This has led to the creation of 33 new ‘low emission zones’ across France, which limit access for certain types of polluting vehicles within a number of predefined zones across a city or urban area. 45 These measures include the creation of a national support network (‘rénov’ ) to simplify procedures and render the eco-renovation of buildings more effective across France. 46 The Climate and Resiliency Law also reinforced existing sanction mechanisms for non-compliance, while creating new offences such as ‘endangering the environment’ (délit

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Like the 2017 National Climate Plan and the French Strategy for Energy and Climate, there is a relatively good alignment with the climate policies of the city of Paris, its metropolis and the Île-de-France. The Energy and Climate Law, along with the Climate and Resiliency Law, once again borrowed several elements from Paris’ latest PCAET in 2018, or were at least influenced by the latter (which predates both national pieces of legislation). This applies especially to the aim of improving the insulation of housing by addressing thermal leakage, as well as the development of more sustainable transportation, where Paris has enacted pioneering initiatives in such targeted areas at the municipal level (see Chapter 8).47 As the capital city, Paris continues to influence the national echelon in these key sectors.48 For example, the aim to develop renewable energies such as solar, geothermal and hydrogen power, especially solar photovoltaic on rooftops, matches well with the ‘energy’ section of Paris’ latest municipal Climate Plan. Similarly, the objective of launching a massive ecorenovation program for housing suffering from thermal leakage, with the aim of gradually enhancing energy efficiency and insulation, includes better control instruments for renting or selling and financial incentives/ public assistance to renovate buildings; this shares a number of similarities with the ‘buildings’ section of Paris’ 2018 PCAET. Likewise, the goal of the Climate and Resiliency Law to eventually end the circulation of polluting vehicles, and encourage cycling and the purchase of clean vehicles (electric/hydrogen) through policies involving financial incentives for instance, bears many parallels with the ‘transport/mobility’ section

de mise en danger de l’environnement ), as well as ‘ecocide’ (délit d’écocide) for the more serious cases. 47 As will be examined in detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this is characteristic of urban approaches to climate policy, where cities tend to focus on specific sectors like transportation, buildings, energy production and supply or waste management, which are well adapted to the municipal echelon. In this regard, see literature on sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors: Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020). 48 Once again, this applies to a certain extent with regard to the Greater Paris Metropolis’ PCAET, along with the SRCAE and Energy and Climate Strategy of the Îlede-France, albeit to a lesser degree because of their more limited competence allocation in such key areas.

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of Paris’ PCAET.49 This is particularly apparent in the creation of ‘low emission zones’ by 2025 for urban agglomerations of more than 150,000 inhabitants. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, Paris established its first low emission zone in 2015 and is collaborating with the Greater Paris Metropolis to develop common zones over the next few years.50 Such elements within the two national pieces of legislation were formulated in a more general manner, so as to render them better adapted to the national echelon, in comparison with Paris’s 2018 PCAET (with granular detail for municipal-level policies). Yet, like the SNBC and PPE, the Energy and Climate Law, along with the Climate and Resiliency Law, illustrates the pattern whereby cities and sub-state actors act as catalysts within the climate regime, galvanizing national governments into raising their level of ambition. As ‘laboratories of democracy’, cities promulgate innovative climate policies tested on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment at the national echelon.51 This can trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up, representing a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state entities within the climate regime.52 Even though the Energy and Climate Law, along with the Climate and Resiliency Law, seem to borrow from, or was at least influenced by, the capital city’s policies across a range of targeted sectors, they still aim to introduce a number of new initiatives which Paris, the Greater Paris Metropolis and the Île-de-France may eventually need to integrate.53

49 It should be noted that these points of comparison are mostly aspirational. Hence,

while it is positive that the capital city and the national government are relatively well aligned in terms of their climate objectives on these issues, this still needs to be confirmed in practice during the implementation phase over the next few years. 50 As will be examined in Chapter 8, ‘low emission zones’ are also referred to as ‘restricted traffic zones’ (zone à circulation restreinte). Furthermore, the objective to encourage vegetarian meals in schools and universities is related to Paris’ goal of reducing meat consumption. 51 See: Hale (2018). 52 The French paradigm substantiates once again the notion of an enhanced role and

participation of sub-state actors in the process of policy formulation, along with the importance of democratic processes at the local level in the articulation of multilevel governance (see: Bache and Flinders 2004). 53 While the Energy and Climate Law, along with the Climate and Resiliency Law, represent the two main pieces of climate legislation enacted during Macron’s first term, other more specialized laws have been passed which also have an impact on the local

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Like the French Strategy for Energy and Climate (comprising both the SNBC and PPE), both legislative initiatives seek to transpose a number of nationally defined policies onto local actors. This includes, for example, the adoption of measures to slow down the artificialization of soils and increase protected land area, as the Climate and Resiliency Law requires the declination of objectives in this field at the sub-national level. Likewise, the establishment of regional eco-road taxes on merchandise, along with policies relating to sustainable consumption and production such as better labeling or stricter rules on advertising,54 contain innovations which territorial communities may adopt within their respective spheres of competence. The Climate and Resiliency Law also aims to translate the PPE into regional-level targets for developing renewables like solar and wind power, including through ‘renewable energy communities’ that often include representatives from territorial communities.55 Even in areas where these two national pieces of legislation borrow elements from Paris’ latest municipal Climate Plan, such as the insulation of housing to address thermal leakage or the development of sustainable transportation, they still introduce several novel mechanisms. These include stricter control instruments for renting and selling, as well as additional national public assistance to eco-renovate buildings through clearly defined phases.56 Finally, both national laws indicate that the High Council on Climate should assess the effectiveness of policies at the regional/intercommunal levels, and that sub-national actors should climate policy frameworks of Paris, its Metropolis and the Île-de-France. This includes the Law on Mobility and Transport (loi d’orientation des mobilités—LOM) adopted in 2019, and the Law on Waste Management and the Circular Economy (loi anti-gaspillage et pour l’économie circulaire—AGEC) passed in 2020. Likewise, the successive stimulus packages enacted by the French government in response to the economic recession stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic also integrated a number of climate-related dispositions. 54 In fact, the Climate and Resiliency Law explicitly enhances the powers of Mayors to regulate advertising within their communes on matters relating to the environment. 55 This is significant because, as previously explained, territorial communities are not required to legally ‘take into account’ the PPE, in the same manner as the SNBC. Hence, the establishment of such regional-level targets, which regions across France need to take into account during the next upgrading of their local climate policy frameworks, will help to ensure that the objectives of the PPE are effectively transposed at the sub-national level. 56 Another example is that the Climate and Resiliency Law requires territorial communities to include a weekly vegetarian menu within certain canteens, and encourages them to voluntary experiment with the introduction of a daily vegetarian option.

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take into account the Council’s opinions when elaborating or updating their local climate policy frameworks.57 Therefore, the Energy and Climate Law, along with the Climate and Resiliency Law, have not substantially modified the multilevel governance paradigm stemming from previously enacted legislation such as Grenelle II , LTECV or NOTRe. This means that like the other climate strategies and policies enacted during President Macron’s first term, they have only marginally altered existing frameworks under which the national government interacts with sub-state entities on climate issues, including the PCAET, SRCAE or SRADDET.58 Nonetheless, it is also clear that the two main pieces of climate legislation enacted by Macron in his first five years in office still introduce a number of novel elements across a range of fields, many of which will need to be adopted by local actors over the next few years. While some of these new measures may have to be transposed over the short run, both national laws provide flexible temporal latitude for territorial communities to decline them at the sub-state level.59 As previously explained, Paris and the Greater Paris Metropolis are scheduled to update their PCAETs in 2024, while the Île-de-France must do the same with its SDRIF by the same year. Hence, like the French Strategy for Energy and Climate, it is clear that the two main climate laws enacted under Macron will have a notable impact on the implementation of local climate initiatives for both Paris and the Île-de-France over the next few years. For these reasons, a symbiotic relationship between the national echelon and sub-state entities is clearly identifiable, whereby each level

57 In fact, the Climate and Resiliency Law establishes a permanent evaluation system, whereby the High Council on Climate must now assess every year the actions of the national government, and every three years those of territorial communities in terms of reducing GHG emissions. 58 Still, the Climate and Energy Law requires the French government to submit a report to Parliament regarding contributions from sub-state policy frameworks, such as the PCAET, SRCAE or SRADDET, towards achieving national climate/clean energy objectives. The report must include an assessment on the adequacy of national support to territorial communities in the development of their local climate policy frameworks. 59 This includes delays of up to five or six years to provide territorial communities with enough time to progressively upgrade their local urbanism frameworks.

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learns from the climate policies and objectives of the other.60 Indicative of the hierarchical nature of the centralized French political system, this manifestly involves a deeper level of inter-connection between the different echelons when compared to the US paradigm of cooperative federalism (see Chapters 2 and 3).61 One of the strengths of the centralized French multilevel framework is a good level of policy harmonization and a tight coordination between the different echelons, which leads to a higher minimum standard across the country.62 Overall, the various policies, strategies, laws and frameworks enacted by successive French governments over the last few decades and examined throughout this chapter clearly demonstrate a more consensual, consistent and robust level of commitment towards climate action over time, in comparison with the US. What is more, this trend has spanned conservative (Chirac and Sarkozy), socialist (Hollande) as well as centrist (Macron) administrations, each of which has continued and even enhanced the climate policies of previous administrations. By contrast, while the US had initially emerged as a pioneer on environmental matters during its socalled ‘environmental decade’ (spanning the 1960s and 1970s),63 the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant ideological paradigm within the Republican Party since the 1980s led to persistent opposition and obstruction.64 A corollary to the rise of neoliberalism has been the growth in influence of powerful lobbying groups over the last few decades.65 These have come

60 In spite of this, the city of Paris continues to display a higher level of ambition on the whole for targeted sectors such as buildings, housing and transportation. This corroborates the role of sub-national actors as pioneers within the climate regime. 61 Like the US, there is also a dimension of political will (often linked to the political affiliation of the officials in charge), which impacts the extent to which the different levels are committed to climate action, and thus able to actively engage with one another. Yet, and for reasons examined above, the centralized and hierarchical nature of the French paradigm tends to lower the risk of multilevel discord, in contrast to the more decentralized American federal system (see Chapters 2 and 3). 62 This has served to prevent the widespread emergence of ‘climate laggards’ among sub-state entities, at least when compared to the US. 63 On the history of US environmental politics, see: Kraft (2000), Hays (2000). 64 See: Turner and Isenberg (2018). 65 On the influence of special interest groups over the US political system, see: Drutman (2015), Charnock (2020), Quirk (2016) and Brown (2016).

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to exercise a notable sway over politicians by seeking to prevent the adoption of stringent federal environmental laws and regulations, often leading to gridlock. While the rise of neoliberalism and the influence of lobbying groups have also impacted French politics, France has clearly been less prone to gridlock on climate change in the same manner as the US. This may be partly linked to salient political differences, whereby French conservative voters usually do not deny climate science like their American counterparts, and thus generally support the enactment of climate policies, as long as they can be reconciled with economic development.66 Moreover, due to notable disparities in relation to the nature of their respective political systems and economic infrastructure, neoliberalism has not acquired the same level of influence in France as in the US, nor has French politics been subject to the same degree of obstruction by lobbying groups. Thus, such factors help to explain why climate policies enacted by successive French administrations over the last few decades, as examined in this chapter and in Chapter 4, demonstrate a higher level of ambition on the whole, along with a deeper inter-connection between the different echelons, when compared to the US.

3 Towards More Hierarchical Centralization? Ecological Planning and Multilevel Governance During President Macron’s Early Second Term (Since 2022) 3.1

Ecological Planning and Multilevel Climate Governance During President Macron’s Early Second Term (Since 2022)

Emmanuel Macron was reelected as President on April 24, 2022, once again defeating Marine Le Pen from the Rassemblement National (National Rally) on the extreme right, with a comfortably score of 58.55%

66 On the degree of polarization in the US on climate issues, see: Brewer (2012). Regarding US public opinion and the environment, see also: Konisky (2020). For a contrast with the situation in France, see: Cautrès et al. (2021).

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of the vote in the second round.67 Environmental issues did not feature prominently during the first part of Macron’s campaign, which was marked by discourse about the President’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic situation, as well as the War in Ukraine and the energy crisis. Thus, it was mostly in the two weeks between the first and second round that Macron began to emphasize his ecological platform in more detail.68 This led to criticism from the opposition on the political opportunism of the outgoing President, whom they accused of ‘greenwashing’ by seeking to lure voters from the left to defeat Le Pen in the second round of the election, without a genuine commitment to tackling climate change. Regardless of his motivations, it is important to examine the policy platform which Macron’s campaign chose to highlight in the finishing line of the Presidential race, and the implications for multilevel climate governance and interactions between national and substate entities. In fact, Macron even borrowed a formulation which had characterized the environmental manifesto of the extreme left (La France insoumise—‘Unbowed France’) over the last decade, if not before. Such a formulation, known as ‘ecological planning’ (Planification écologique), has deep roots in French political history as a reference to post-World War II economic planning during the ‘glorious thirty years’, as well as nineteenth-century economic planning. ‘Ecological planning’ is a tool or method of governance, rather than an ideology per se. This is because the ecology which Macron supports continues to be quite different from that of La France insoumise, even though they now both rely on the same formulation. While Macron’s ecological platform aims to reconcile economic development and tackling climate change in order to stimulate innovation, green growth and job creation, ‘Unbowed France’ argues that capitalism and environmental protection are oxymorons and inherently contradictory, and that a rejection of liberal capitalism is the only way to genuinely address climate change. Hence, the sole element which both Parties have in common

67 Despite this comfortable victory, Le Pen was able to progress significantly compared to her score in the second round of the 2017 Presidential election, where she obtained 33.9% of the vote—compared to 41.45% in 2022, a substantial increase in the space of only five years. 68 During a political rally in Marseille on 16 April, Macron announced that if reelected, his next term as President would be characterized by the ecological transition (Ce quinquennat sera écologique ou ne sera pas ).

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is their understanding of what ‘ecological planning’ entails as a tool or method of governance. As explained in Macron’s political manifesto during the 2022 campaign,69 this involves four main aspects. The first is the establishment of ambitious objectives over the medium to long run, supported by the political executive at the highest level. Second, significant public investment is necessary; this will lead to corresponding private investment. Third, such planning entails widespread collective mobilization and a tight association of all actors in society, with a particular emphasis on the importance of sub-national entities and territorial communities, as discussed below. Finally, ecological planning requires rigorous tracking and follow-up procedures to measure progress over time with specific benchmarks and binding mechanisms, including the possibility of sanctions in cases of non-compliance. The third element is most relevant for multilevel governance. Ecological planning in France clearly aims to reinforce the close and direct association of ‘territorial communities’ in the achievement of nationally defined climate objectives. As examined in Chapter 4, under the centralized French political system, all echelons are already legally required to produce specific types of policy frameworks under certain timeframes, whose elaboration process, content and evaluation procedures are defined under national law.70 Macron’s ecological planning clearly aims to enhance this framework and bring it to the next level, with potentially important impacts on the articulation of multilevel climate governance in France. For instance, Macron’s new government after reelection, led by Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne, released a policy blueprint on October 21, 2022,71 laying out in more detail how territorial communities will be associated more closely in the implementation process. The blueprint is built around five environmental categories72 and six thematic areas73

69 See: En Marche! Le programme d’Emmanuel Macron pour l’environnement et la transition écologique: https://en-marche.fr/emmanuel-macron/le-programme/environne ment-et-transition-ecologique 70 See: Collectif (2021). 71 France Nation verte (2022). 72 This includes health, climate change, biodiversity, adaptation and resources. Ibid. 73 These comprise mobility, housing, production, food, consumption and preservation.

Ibid.

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which are declined into twenty-two ‘operational projects’ (chantiers opérationnels ) for concrete action on the ground, where sub-national entities will play a key role. In particular, the policy blueprint seeks to decline national climate, environmental and clean energy objectives into specific targets, strategies and calendars for each territorial community through a system of ‘territorial differentiation’ and ‘contractualization’, at least for regions and possibly also for départements . This would apply to multiple policy fields which have a bearing on tackling climate change, especially transportation, buildings and waste management. For instance, Macron explicitly indicated that territorial communities will have a key role to play in reaching the objective of renovating 700,000 new public and private buildings by the end of his second term to make them more energy efficient. Likewise, they will be closely associated with the launching of a new ‘leasing’ system to make electric vehicles more affordable, the expansion of train track networks at the local level, along with the creation of new ‘restricted traffic zones’ (zones à circulation restreinte) and additional ‘low emission zones’ (zones à faibles émissions ) in urban centers across France.74 It is still too soon at the time of writing to determine exactly what this new type of ‘ecological planning’ will entail in practice; many questions remain open, with specific details yet to be fleshed out by Borne’s government. Much will depend on how precise requirements for territorial communities are established and the ways in which the enactment process unfolds over the next few years. Still, it is quite likely that ‘ecological planning’ will reinforce the hierarchical and stratified centralization which is characteristic of the French framework in terms of the articulation of climate multilevel governance. At the same time, several climate policies enacted by the Borne administration in Macron’s early second term provide some indication in this regard. For instance, in conformity with pledges made during the 2022 Presidential campaign in Macron’s policy manifesto, the enactment of ‘ecological planning’ is now supported by the political executive at the highest level, since it has been placed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is to be supported by a General Secretariat for Ecological Planning (Secrétariat général à la planification

74 See Chapter 8 with the example of the city of Paris.

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écologique) created in July 2022, under the banner of ‘France as a Green Nation’ (France nation verte). Likewise, out of the two Cabinet Ministers charged with overseeing the implementation of ecological planning (under the supervision of the Prime Minister), one is explicitly tasked with ensuring ‘territorial cohesion’. The Minister in question is Christophe Béchu (at the time of writing), whose official portfolio is ‘Ecological Transition and Territorial Cohesion’ (Ministre de la Transition écologique et la Cohésion des territoires ). Clearly, this highlights an intention at the highest political level to associate sub-state entities more closely in the achievement of national climate objectives during Macron’s second term. Prime Minister Borne and her government announced in the fall 2022 the creation of an unprecedented ‘National Green Fund’ (Fonds vert ), involving two billion euros to support and accelerate the ecological transition across France’s territorial communities (Fonds d’accélération de la transition écologique dans les territoires ). Launched in January 2023, this Green Fund aims to support sub-national projects focusing around three main environmental domains and thirteen different ‘working areas’ (chantiers ). This includes the renovation of local buildings to make them more energy efficient, better waste management via more recycling, improving public lighting to waste less energy, the protection of biodiversity, as well as the reduction of traffic in urban areas (through additional ‘restricted traffic zones’ and ‘low emission zones’). Territorial communities throughout the country and overseas are eligible to apply directly for funding to support local green projects of this nature. The money is subsequently managed and disbursed via local Prefects (Préfets represent the national government at the sub-national level), in close collaboration with elected officials in territorial communities at all echelons. Furthermore, Prime Minister Borne and Minister Béchu announced in the fall 2022 the creation of a ‘National Council for Refoundation’ (Conseil national de la refondation - CNR) in order to ensure the coconstruction of ecological planning with a broad range of different actors, where territorial communities will have a key role to play. Hence, not only are multiple sub-national entities members of the CNR focusing on ‘Climate and Biodiversity’,75 but territorialized CNRs were launched towards the end of 2022 and in early 2023, focusing on issues such as transport, 75 The CNR specifically for ‘Climate and Biodiversity’ was launched on October 21, 2022, the same day that Prime Minister Borne set out her policy blueprint on ecological planning.

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housing and biodiversity. The objective of these CNRs is to reinforce dialogue and consultation with a large selection of stakeholders, especially territorial communities, so as to facilitate the implementation of national climate policies, with an emphasis on the importance of local actors. The portfolio of the other Cabinet Minister charged with overseeing ‘ecological planning’, in the person of Agnès Pannier-Runacher as Minister for the Energy Transition (Ministre de la Transition énergétique), also demonstrates that sub-national entities are closely associated with the achievement of national clean energy objectives. For example, one of the first green legislative proposals by Prime Minister Borne’s government early in Macron’s second term was a law to accelerate the production of renewable energies (Loi relative à l’accélération de la production d’énergies renouvelables 76 ) passed in March 2023, where territorial communities are given a key role to play. This law aims to facilitate the installation of renewable energy projects across the country to enable France to catch up with upgraded EU objectives, in conformity with pledges made by Macron during the 2022 campaign.77 The law contains a special clause for the ‘territorial planification of renewable energies’ (planification territoriale des énergies renouvelables ) in order to win over local support for renewable energy projects and facilitate their adoption at the sub-state level. This clause requires the national government to provide territorial communities with all available information on the potential for deploying and embedding renewable energies on a local scale. Subsequently, communes and territorial communities must go through a public consultation process to identify zones that are favorable to the accelerated deployment of new renewable energy projects. Finally, sub-national entities have also been closely associated with the national consultation process launched by Prime Minister Borne in the Fall 2022 concerning the future of France’s energy mix over the next three decades, to ensure the country achieves carbon neutrality by 2050. This consultation was declined at the sub-state level, where each region 76 XVIE Législature de la Cinquième République française (2022–2027). LOI n° 2023175 du 10 mars 2023 relative à l’accélération de la production d’énergies renouvelables. 77 Macron pledged during the campaign to set new clean energy objectives for 2050,

such as multiplying by ten France’s solar energy production to surpass 100 gigawatts (GW) and deploying fifty new offshore wind farms to reach 40 GW. These pledges had initially been made by Macron during his ‘Belfort speech’ in February 2022 (discours de Belfort ), where he had outlined his vision for France’s clean energy future over the next thirty years.

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organized its own local consultation open to all citizens. The objective is for this process to lead to the upgrade of France’s Strategy for Energy and Climate (Stratégie française pour l’énergie et le climat ) by 2024. As explained above, the latter is composed of two primary strategic planning documents: the ‘National Low Carbon Strategy’ (Stratégie nationale bas carbone—SNBC), constituting a roadmap to reduce national GHG emissions over the short, medium and long run; and the ‘Multiannual Programming on Energy’ (Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie— PPE), establishing priority actions in the energy sector. Both the SNBC and the PPE will also be upgraded for the third time by 2024 so as to comply with the European Union’s enhanced climate and clean energy objectives, developed in the European Green Deal.78 Overall, the new ‘ecological planning’ set out by Macron as a green policy blueprint for his second term clearly aims to enhance the close and direct association of ‘territorial communities’ in the achievement of nationally defined climate objectives. This is likely to reinforce the hierarchical centralization which characterizes the French political system. There are potentially important ramifications in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance, even though it is still too soon (at the time of writing) to ascertain the exact implications over the medium to long run. However, it is likely that ecological planning may reinforce several of the advantages stemming from the centralized French system, especially in terms of the high level of policy harmonization and tight coordination between the different echelons. This could lead to a higher minimum standard across the country. At the same time, however, it also possible that ecological planning could exacerbate several previously highlighted weaknesses associated with French centralization. This includes its rigid nature, which may not leave enough margin of maneuver for territorial communities. The latter might find themselves constrained under an ever more hierarchical system, hampering their ability to innovate and enact ambitious local policies.

78 To pave the way for these important upgrades, a new ‘Law for the programming of energy and climate’ (Loi de programmation sur l’énergie et le climat—LPEC) is scheduled to be adopted by the end of 2023 to establish enhanced national objectives in these areas.

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Remaining Shortcomings with the Centralized French Climate Policy Framework, Including in Terms of Multilevel Governance

While exhibiting a more consistent level of commitment on climate action compared to the US, the French climate policy framework, including the legislation and strategies enacted under President Macron, still suffers from a number of inadequacies and shortcomings. Like the situation in the US (see Chapters 2 and 3), these can generally be divided into two broad categories. First, there are weaknesses in terms of the actual climate policies themselves, their level of ambition and their ability to achieve medium- to long-term climate objectives. Second, there are also shortcomings related to the articulation of multilevel climate governance, and how effectively the national echelon is able to mobilize and integrate sub-state entities in the implementation process. When it comes to weaknesses in terms of climate policy, the French government has already failed to achieve the targets in its initial 2015– 18 ‘carbon budget’, along with a number of climate and energy goals it had set out for the year 2020.79 This includes not only general objectives in terms of GHG emission reductions, the development of renewable energies or energy efficiency, but also more specific targets in sectors like buildings or transport, for example.80 As will be examined in detail in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this bears some similarity to the cities and regions/ states in our sample, which have also failed to reach several of their initial 2020 objectives. Such a situation is problematic for entities that seek to play a leadership role on climate issues not only nationally, but also on the global stage, since they need to set the example by meeting their own targets. If even ‘best case studies’ in developed countries are unable to achieve their initial objectives, however ambitious, then the international community as a whole will probably also fail to reach short-, mediumand long-term climate goals. Nevertheless, the cities and regions/states in our sample have still come fairly close to meeting their initial 2020 targets, and most of them demonstrate a high level of ambition for their policies across multiple targeted sectors. Our sample cities have tended to excel in different areas such as transportation, buildings, waste management and clean energy, including 79 In this regard, see: Comité d’expert pour la Transition Energétique (2018). 80 Ibid.

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in terms of enhancing renewables and improving energy efficiency. As a result, they are still largely on track to achieve their medium-term goals for 2030, as well as their long-term objective of carbon neutrality by 2050.81 According to independent studies, however, it seems as though the national French government has had more trouble reaching its climate goals. For instance, the High Council on Climate has published several reports since 2018 which emphasize that current national policies and frameworks are insufficient to achieve the objectives of the Strategy for Energy and Climate over the medium (2030) and long run (2050).82 The High Council has acknowledged that many positive developments have taken place under Macron’s Presidency, and that the policies enacted are generally ‘going in the right direction’. Yet, the independent institution has warned that unless additional structural reforms are enacted in the near term, France is likely to fail to reach its objective of reducing GHG emissions by 40% up to 2030, as well as transition towards full carbon neutrality by 2050.83 The High Council has been critical of the Climate and Resiliency Law enacted during Macron’s first term, which it considers insufficient on a number of counts. For instance, the legislation has been criticized for providing too much temporal latitude in the implementation of the new policies it sets out, which need to be adopted sooner and under a stricter timetable, according to their analysis.84 Likewise, the ambit and field of application for many proposed measures are overly narrow, with too many possible exemptions from the rules, which reduces the latter’s effectiveness in terms of reducing GHG emissions. The new restrictions on advertising, for example, apply only to fossil fuel energies and do not include polluting vehicles or food products. On the whole, the Climate 81 Please see detailed evidence and examples in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, which are not repeated here in the interest of concision. 82 See: Haut Conseil pour le Climat, https://www.hautconseilclimat.fr 83 These conclusions were shared by a number of other independent public institu-

tions such as the National Council for the Ecological Transition (Conseil national de la transition écologique), along with the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (Conseil économique, social et environnemental ). In response, the French government asked the Boston Consulting Group to conduct another study, which mostly corroborated the adequacy of Macron’s climate policies. The latter study was criticized for a lack of transparency in its methodology and for being under the influence of private interest groups. 84 Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2021).

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and Resiliency Law was criticized for lacking an overall ‘strategic vision’ (vision stratégique) and for not being sufficiently well aligned with the objectives established by the SNBC. In its 4th report published in June 2022 shortly after Macron’s reelection,85 the High Council on Climate confirmed its verdict, highlighting that as of 2021, France’s national emissions had declined by around 23.1% (from 1990 levels), making the 40% emissions reduction target for 2030 difficult to reach. The High Council acknowledged that since 2005, GHG emissions across many major sectors have generally declined, especially in fields like buildings, industry and energy. Yet, progress has been uneven in other sectors like transport and agriculture, and only six of the 25 orientations set out by the SNBC have benefitted from adequate measures to reach national climate goals.86 The High Council argued that the policy framework enacted under Macron is insufficient for achieving France’s own national climate/clean energy goals, as well as the latest upgraded objectives established at the EU level. France’s national target of reducing GHG emissions 40% by 2030 (from a 1990 baseline) manifestly no longer shares the same level of ambition as the EU’s new target of cutting emissions 55% by the same date (also from a 1990 baseline).87 In this regard, the Conseil d’Etat, France’s highest administrative court, ruled in July 2020 that the policies of Macron’s administration were inadequate to tackle air pollution, and subsequently imposed in August 2021 a fine of e10 million on the French State.88 Moreover, in response to lawsuits launched by a coalition of French environmental NGOs, the Conseil d’Etat ruled in July 2021 that the policies enacted by the national government were insufficient to achieve legally enshrined climate objectives for the year 2030, thus corroborating the analysis of the High Council on Climate. The court imposed a nine-month ultimatum

85 Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2022). 86 Another criticism from the High Council on Climate has been that Macron’s govern-

ment chose to lower the level of ambition for the second carbon budget (spanning the period from 2019 to 2023), which is likely to make it even harder to achieve the objectives of the third one (for 2024-28). 87 While the EU previously shared the target of cutting emissions by 40% up to 2030, it chose in 2020 to enhance this goal to 55% (from a 1990 baseline), consistent with the objective of achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century, as set out in the European Green Deal. 88 République française – Conseil d’Etat (2021).

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on the Macron administration to adopt additional new measures or face the prospect of further judicial sanctions, a deadline that was subsequently extended to December 2022.89 Nevertheless, missed targets are only partly due to the inadequacy of policies enacted under Macron. The failure to meet climate targets is the result of an accumulated lack of ambition from his predecessors, going back to Chirac in the 1990s as discussed in Chapter 4.90 Moreover, Prime Minister Borne announced at the beginning of Macron’s second term that France will enhance its national climate objectives in the near future, as part of an upgrade of its Strategy for Energy and Climate (Stratégie française pour l’énergie et le climat ). The extensive consultation process launched in the Fall 2022 concerning the future of France’s energy mix over the next three decades is designed to ensure that the country achieves carbon neutrality by 2050. This will also lead to a corresponding update of the SNBC and PPE, with an increase in France’s national climate goals across a range of specific sectors, to be finalized in 2024. More generally, the ‘ecological planning’ announced as a green policy blueprint for Macron’s second term illustrates potential for an increase in France’s level of national ambition and may possibly address several of the weaknesses highlighted above. However, at the time of writing, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not Macron will succeed in sufficiently enhancing France’s climate policy framework before the end of his second term to put the country on a trajectory that will allow it to meet its GHG emission reduction goals for 2030, as well as the long-term objective of carbon neutrality by mid-century. In the meantime, territorial communities such as Paris and the Île-deFrance continue to have an essential role to play in compensating for remaining climate policy inadequacies at the national level. As will be analyzed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, while the cities and regions/states in our sample have not met their 2020 objectives, they have still come fairly close to reaching their initial targets and continue to demonstrate a high level of ambition with their local policies across multiple, targeted sectors. Consequently, they are still largely on track to achieve their medium-term 89 This constituted an unprecedented decision from France’s highest administrative court. See: Garric and Mandard (2021). 90 Still, Macron’s administration has probably enacted more policies and laws to tackle climate change than any of its predecessors, including Hollande who was in a coalition with the Green Party during part of his Presidency.

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goals for 2030, as well as their long-term objective of carbon neutrality by mid-century. The compensatory role of sub-national actors is not as important in the case of France as in the US, since the French government has demonstrated a much more consistent level of support for addressing climate change. Yet, given the climate policies enacted by the Île-de-France and the Greater Paris Metropolis, the far-reaching nature of the municipal climate policy framework in the city of Paris as discussed in Chapter 8, along with their strategic position at the heart of the French economy, their potential in terms of compensating for inadequacies at the national level remains important. Thus, Paris, Greater Paris and the Île-de-France, as well as many other cities, metropolises and regions across France, clearly have an essential role to play when it comes to closing the emissions gap, possibly helping to keep the country on track to meet its medium- and long-term climate goals. This represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state actors within the climate regime.91 Nonetheless, a number of shortcomings can also be identified in relation to the articulation of multilevel climate governance itself, and how effectively the national government is able to mobilize and integrate sub-state entities in the enactment process. Despite previously examined instances of effective mobilization, there remain situations where the national French government and territorial communities are still not well synchronized on climate policy. This reveals that even ‘best case studies’, like the French multilevel paradigm, have room for improvement in terms of the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Like the US framework examined in Chapter 3, implementation of climate initiatives in France may also in some cases lead to problematic interactions between the different tiers of governance. For instance, there have been issues of temporal discord, which have to do with divergent choices regarding baseline years against which to measure the impact of climate policies. The French government has relied on 1990 as a baseline year for its GHG emission reduction targets. As will be discussed in Chapter 8, Paris chose 2004 as a baseline year for its municipal emissions targets, while the Île-de-France initially adopted 1990 under the SDRIF plan, before opting for 2015 as a baseline year in the Regional Energy and Climate Strategy. This is not an isolated case,

91 See: Hale (2018).

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since there exists a variety of choices for baseline years across France at the regional and municipal levels. According to the latest IPCC reports, different choices for baseline years are linked to certain types of advantages, depending on the echelon of governance.92 Shorter baseline years are useful for measuring the achievement of climate goals in targeted sectors like buildings, transportation or waste management. By contrast, longer baseline years can support more holistic policy approaches to tackling climate change. France’s principal GHG emissions reduction pledges, going back to the 1990s and continuing up to the present, have in most cases adopted the year 1990 as a baseline. The same applies to France’s NDC, initially submitted under President Hollande in 2015, before being updated under President Macron. This also matches the baseline of the EU’s pledges under the 2020 Climate and Energy Package, the Framework for 2030, along with the latest European Green Deal. Yet, there are notable exceptions to this pattern, since a number of France’s climate and energy objectives in targeted sectors like buildings, transportation or energy production, as established under the SNBC, the PPE or climate legislation, have adopted shorter baselines, analogous to the city of Paris. This suggests that short baselines can also support the enactment of policies at the national level in some cases, especially within targeted sectors, and that there are no clearly established rules on this issue.93 For French cities or regions which have adopted the goal of carbon neutrality by 2050 like the French government at the national level, such a discrepancy in terms of baseline years is not overly problematic. The end result in terms of reaching carbon neutrality by mid-century will in all likelihood end-up being relatively similar, since they share the same long-term objective. Moreover, discrepancies for baseline years are not as much of an issue with cities or communes because the French government has prioritized interaction with regions as the privileged echelon for transposing national climate/clean energy targets at the sub-state level (see Chapter 4). Consequently, divergences in baseline years are arguably more challenging in the case of regions, which can generate problems when it comes to the 92 IPCC (2014) and (2022). 93 As examined in Chapters 2 and 3, another notable exception is that the US federal

government, whether under Obama or Biden, has consistently adopted 2005 as a baseline year for the American NDC.

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articulation of multilevel climate governance. These divergences may lead to issues in terms of policy coordination and harmonization, which can render it more challenging to compare climate goals and results over the medium to long run. Even when they share the same objective of carbon neutrality by 2050, such a situation tends to exacerbate discrepancies between the national and regional echelons, thus compromising the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Still, this could be mitigated by the fact that regions continue to possess relatively limited competences under the centralized French political framework, at least when compared to states operating under the US federal system. Given the ambitious nature of sub-national climate initiatives developed by French territorial communities over the last few years—exemplified especially by Paris but also the Île-de-France to a certain extent (see Chapter 8)—there is a risk of duplication with the climate policies and legislation enacted under President Macron. As analyzed above in the context of Macron’s first term, the French Strategy for Energy and Climate (which comprises both the SNBC and PPE), the Energy and Climate Law, along with the Climate and Resiliency Law, seem to borrow from, or were at least influenced by, the capital city’s policies across a range of targeted sectors. This includes specific fields where Paris has acted as a pioneer through innovative policies at the municipal level such as buildings (notably in terms of thermal leakage from housing), transportation, energy production and supply, as well as waste management.94 On the reverse side, the SNBC underlines that regions and territorial communities are required to ‘take the Strategy into account’ (prise en compte) when updating their respective local climate policy frameworks. Under French law, ‘taking into account’ involves not deviating from the fundamental orientations of a policy except under the control of a judge, in the name of an imperative public interest. As explained above, while the aim of these laws and policy frameworks has been to establish a symbiotic relationship between the French government and sub-national entities whereby each echelon takes into account the policies of the other, the risk of duplication is apparent. Overlaps and

94 As will be examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8, this is characteristic of the urban approach to climate policy, where cities tend to focus on specific sectors that are well adapted to the municipal echelon. On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see: Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020).

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redundancies between the different echelons are problematic, since they can hinder effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. This is especially challenging in terms of interactions between the national and sub-state levels, given the highly strategic position which the national echelon continues to occupy in a centralized country like France.95 Although this bears some similarity to the multilevel paradigm in the US, there are a number of notable differences. The risk of duplication between climate policies and legislation enacted under President Macron and initiatives from territorial communities is mitigated by the fact that regions still possess limited competences under French law.96 As examined above, despite consecutive phases of decentralization where regions have seen their powers increase, their competences remain quite narrow and are limited on the whole to a few specific policy areas, which is in stark contrast to states under the US federal system. French cities, as communes, continue to benefit from a ‘general competence clause’ (unlike regions), allowing them to implement initiatives at the municipal level which go beyond the strict wording of competence allocation under the law, in the name of ‘local public interest’. This might explain why the risk of overlap with national policies has been greater for large urban areas, such as the city of Paris in our sample. There are other elements in the centralized French framework which may increase the risk of duplication. The hierarchical nature of the system has generated a heavily bureaucratic and complex multilevel paradigm. For instance, despite more emphasis on the function of ‘leader in line’ (chef de file), this represents a limited, non-coercive and vaguely defined ‘coordination role’. Likewise, in spite of improvements linked to more specific competence allocation through successive phases of decentralization, it is still not always clear which echelon is in charge over specific policy areas. This has led to a situation where there are apparent overlaps between the different echelons, which can reduce the effectiveness of multilevel

95 Although a certain degree of duplication is arguably inevitable, especially for a complex policy area like climate change that touches upon multiple different sectors, these examples highlight clear weaknesses in the French multilevel governance framework and how effectively the national government is able to mobilize sub-state entities in the implementation process. 96 See: Collectif (2021). Moreover, on the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see: Verpeaux and Janicot (2021), Faure (2021).

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climate governance. This is especially problematic since policy sectors relating to the environment, like transportation, buildings, energy or waste management, are often spread-out across all echelons, which increases the risk of bureaucratic redundancies. Such a situation is different from the American federal system, where multilevel governance tends to be more dynamic, since competence allocation is generally speaking more clearly defined. As explained in Chapters 2 and 3, all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states according to the Tenth Amendment of the US Constitution,97 which makes it clear that local governments and cities fall under the authority of states, not the federal government.98 Yet, both the centralized French system and the federal US polity share in common that duplication may not be as serious as it appears. In cases of overlap, climate initiatives from sub-state entities like cities or regions/ states can in fact help governments achieve their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) at a faster pace, as well as more thoroughly. In such instances, overlaps may actually enable governments to over-achieve their NDCs, since they have the effect of accelerating and reinforcing the implementation process.99 This represents a key aspect of the contributions from local actors within the climate regime.100 Such a state of affairs is more pronounced in the case of France, since national authorities have provided a more consistent and consensual level of support towards climate action in contrast to the US. In this regard, territorial communities in France usually have more flexibility in terms of budgetary and fiscal

97 On US federalism, see: Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018),

Robertson (2017) and LaCroix (2010). 98 On the other hand, as previously examined, the centralized French political framework has the advantage of enabling a relatively high level of policy harmonization and tight coordination between the different levels of governance. This means there is less of a risk of conflict in terms of policies enacted between the various echelons, in contrast to the US federal system (see Chapters 2 and 3). While duplication involves the enactment of similar and overlapping rules between different echelons, conflicting norms lead to the opposite problem. 99 In some cases, it is even possible to identify a process whereby national governments ‘subcontract’ the implementation of policies to sub-state entities for achieving the objectives set out within NDCs. 100 See: Hale (2018).

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deficits, compared to states and local governments in the US, where rules on spending for sub-national entities are often stricter.101 The French government under President Hollande made special efforts to associate non-state and sub-state actors with the COP21 conference, enshrining their roles and contributions in a decision accompanying the Paris Agreement focusing on pre-2020 action and declaring the Action Agenda from non-state actors a ‘fourth pillar’ of the conference. The contributions of non-Party stakeholders in reaching the long-term objectives set out by the Agreement were formally recognized and encouraged;102 this marked a notable shift, since non-state actors had previously been on the periphery of the UNFCCC. Such processes were also reflected on the domestic level, since Hollande’s administration sought to associate sub-state and non-state actors in the elaboration of the initial French NDC. In addition, cities were involved through the Association of French Mayors (Association des Maires de France—AMF) in contributing to the preparation of the official NDC before the Paris conference, as well as its implementation at the municipal level. The same also applies to French regions, which meet through organizations such as ‘Regions of France’ (Régions de France—RDF). While the AMF and RDF do not focus exclusively on climate change, environmental issues still constitute one of their priorities.103 This has continued under the Macron administration, with organized consultations in the months preceding the COP26 summit in Glasgow in November 2021 to associate sub-state and non-state actors in the formulation of the renewed French NDC under the Paris Agreement. Once more, the AMF and RDF played a role in terms of associating cities and regions in the elaboration process, including Paris and the Îlede-France in our sample. This illustrates how coalitions of local actors may help to reinforce pro-climate groups and communities on a domestic scale. Nevertheless, an institutionalized framework to integrate sub-state entities within national climate policy formulation is still lacking in both France and the US, while consultative processes remain inadequate on 101 See Chapter 3 for details. 102 On the role of non-state actors in UNFCCC processes, see: Chan et al. (2016),

Hale (2016), Bäckstrand et al. (2017), Van Asselt (2016). 103 See: Association des Maires de France, https://www.amf.asso.fr; Régions de France: https://regions-france.org/missions/

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the whole. Such processes are clearly more robust in the case of France when compared to the US, because the French government has demonstrated a more consistent and consensual level of support for climate action; likewise, the influence of lobbying groups remains less pervasive in France than in the US (see above). In spite of this, there is still no formal institutionalized mechanism to permanently associate sub-state and nonstate actors, such as Paris and the Île-de-France in our sample, in the development of national climate policies.104 While initiatives from networks such as the AMF and RDF coalitions have had a role in this regard, these are organized on an ad hoc basis, since no structure currently exists to legally enshrine contributions from cities or regions within the official French NDC.105 Likewise, there is no formal or institutionalized process for local actors to effectively monitor the implementation of the NDC over time, including in terms of assessing progress and remaining shortcomings. Hence, the potential monitoring role for sub-state entities to act as ‘watchdogs’ with respect to national climate policies remains underdeveloped. This weakens the level of accountability and transparency deriving from the French NDC. Under the relatively centralized French political system, territorial communities are directly mobilized in the achievement of national climate objectives due to the obligation for them to produce certain types of policy plans or frameworks, following specific procedures. This includes precise legal requirements regarding the elaboration process,106 as well as the main elements which have to be integrated, detailed rules for the implementation and follow-up phases, and assessment over time. This forms a notable point of contrast to the US, as federal environmental statues like the Clean Air Act provide states with a wide margin for

104 These types of shortcomings are not unique to France or the US, as they concern most countries around the world. In fact, they tend to be even more pronounced in poorer, developing nations, especially those operating under authoritarian regimes. However, there are a few countries, especially Scandinavian nations in northern Europe, where frameworks and consultative processes to integrate sub-state entities within national climate policy formulation are more robust by comparison. 105 This remains true even though networks such as the AMF have a permanent legal structure for their own mode of operation; it is their collaboration with the French government in the formulation of the official NDC that is ad hoc. 106 See: Collectif (2021). See also literature on the legal aspects of decentralization in France: Verpeaux and Janicot (2021), Verpeaux (2020), Faure (2021).

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maneuver and a high degree of autonomy in the development and enactment of their own local policy frameworks, while establishing relatively loose minimum federal requirements on issues such as national ambient air quality standards (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, there is room for improvement even in the case of the relatively centralized French political system, as sub-state actors are not sufficiently integrated within national policies which the French government promulgates to achieve its NDC. For instance, there are still no adequate mechanisms to ensure that the sum of local climate policy frameworks is coherent with national climate and energy objectives—as set out in the SNBC or PPE. Despite previously examined systems in place to ensure the mobilization of sub-state entities, it remains highly challenging to determine precisely whether or not the aggregation of PCAETs from cities and metropolises, or SRCAE and SRADDET from regions across the country, is consistent with the objectives of the French Strategy for Energy and Climate—which constitutes the principal roadmap to implement the official NDC. An important factor has been that Préfectures (the administration under the authority of the Prefect) suffer from chronic staff and funding shortages, due to budgetary cuts and restrictions, which has hampered their ability to carry out their mandates. This is problematic since, as examined above, the French government has relied on the Prefect as a primary intermediary for transposing national policies and objectives at the sub-state level for climate and environmental matters. Prefects are directly associated with the elaboration, implementation and follow-up processes for all regional policy frameworks examined throughout this chapter. Because the ‘ecological planning’ announced as a green policy blueprint for Macron’s second term seeks to associate territorial communities more closely in the achievement of national objectives and the enactment process, this applies to multiple policy fields which have a bearing on tackling climate change such as transportation, buildings or waste management. This includes plans for a system of ‘contractualization’ and ‘territorial differentiation’, which would decline national environmental and clean energy objectives into specific targets, strategies and calendars for each territorial community, at least for regions and possibly also for départements . This clearly has potential to strengthen the institutionalization of contributions from sub-state entities within the official French NDC, as well as enhance their monitoring role to ensure that the sum of local climate policies is coherent with national objectives. It is

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still too soon at the time of writing to determine precisely what the impact of ‘ecological planning’ will be in terms of improving the French multilevel climate governance framework. Much will depend on the manner in which it is enacted over the next few years, especially when it comes to spending priorities for administrations like the Préfectures. Finally, while containing many positive provisions, Macron’s reform on the governance of territorial communities, initially presented by his government as constituting part of a ‘fourth phase of decentralization’, has been criticized by a number of local representatives and members of parliament for not going far enough on several counts. The law is colloquially referred to as the ‘3DS Law’, or ‘Law relating to differentiation, decentralization and de-concentration, with a simplification of local public action’.107 The 3DS Law contains a number of elements pertaining to the articulation of multilevel climate governance. As its name indicates, the bill is framed around three main priorities: concerning ‘differentiation’, it seeks to provide territorial communities with wider latitude to establish their own regulations adapted to local specificities. Regarding ‘decentralization’, it consolidates the respective competences of territorial communities at different echelons in several key fields such as transport, housing, biodiversity and the ecological transition (transition écologique), which have a bearing on climate policy. In terms of ‘de-concentration’, the aim is to enhance national support for and proximity with territorial communities, for example by making the regional Prefect a ‘territorial delegate’ (délégué territorial ) of the ‘Agency for the Environment and Energy Control’ (Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie – ADEME). The aim is to reinforce the multilevel articulation of policies through greater access to national funding on issues like the circular economy. When it comes to ‘simplification’, various measures are enacted, one of which enables Mayors to oversee the installation of wind turbines within their communes through local urbanism plans. These measures adopted by the 3DS Law undeniably constitute an improvement in terms of multilevel governance in the field of climate change. Nevertheless, they do not amount to a comprehensive overhaul of territorial governance and the so-called French ‘administrative layer 107 While the final version of the law was passed in February 2022, preparations go as far back as 2020. See: XVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017– 2022). LOI n° 2022-217 du 21 février 2022 relative à la différenciation, la décentralisation, la déconcentration et portant diverses mesures de simplification de l’action publique locale.

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cake’ (millefeuille administratif ); in fact, they probably do not constitute a ‘fourth phase of decentralization’ as initially announced by Macron’s government.108 Like the Climate and Resiliency Law, the 3DS Law also emerged out of the ‘great national debate’ triggered by the French ‘yellow vest’ protest movement.109 The national debate took place from January to March 2019; a number of local representatives expressed their desire for a comprehensive overhaul of the bureaucratic framework governing relations between the national echelon and territorial communities, with the need for much more flexibility and autonomy. However, several territorial community associations and members of Parliament have expressed dissatisfaction with the 3DS Law, arguing that it does not achieve aspirations presented during the national debate.110 In their view, the new law falls short. It does not sufficiently enhance competence allocation to subnational entities, with only marginal improvements emerging from the reform in fields pertaining to climate policy.111 Likewise, redundancies between the different levels continue to be problematic, since measures introduced by the law to ‘simplify local public action’ have not gone far enough and mostly involve a series of technical changes.112 Overall, the issues examined above reveal that even ‘best case studies’ such as France do not always display effective coordination in terms of multilevel climate governance with sub-state actors, and still have room for improvement. In order to successfully address the systemic risk posed by climate change, effective articulation of multilevel governance is essential. Each echelon must be well coordinated and mutually support the others on climate policy. Without such an effective multilevel articulation, countries risk not being able to deliver on their overall climate targets set out in NDCs. Consequently, the international community as a whole may 108 In this regard, after initially presenting the 3DS law project during the ‘great national debate’ as part of a ‘fourth phase of decentralization’, Macron’s government subsequently backtracked and admitted that the reform would be more modest. The Prime Minister at the time, Jean Castex, cited the Covid-19 crisis as the main reason why the timing was not appropriate for a comprehensive overhaul of sub-national governance. An overhaul would risk destabilizing territorial communities, which played a key role in managing the Covid-19 pandemic, at a time of national emergency. 109 On the ‘yellow vest’ protest movement and the ‘great national debate’, see Drake et al. (2020) regarding new developments in French politics. 110 See: Armand (2021). 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid.

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fail to reach the collective objectives established in the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature increase below the 2 °C threshold and aim for 1.5 °C. This highlights problems which can result from instances of partial multilevel climate governance between the French government and territorial communities. If even ‘best case studies’ located in developed countries are unable to develop an effective articulation of multilevel climate governance, then the rest of the international community is less likely to meet the long-term goals set out in the Paris Accord.

4

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the articulation of multilevel governance in France under President Macron and the interaction of the national echelon with sub-state entities on climate policy. The latter constitutes the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid which, as demonstrated in Chapters 2–4 and this chapter, remains essential due to the highly strategic importance that national policies continue to have for the effective articulation of multilevel governance. Chapter 5 has analyzed the ways in which climate policies, strategies and legislation enacted during Macron’s first term and early second term have either supported or hindered the implementation of sub-national climate initiatives for Paris and the Île-de-France. More generally, this has involved assessing recent evolutions for multilevel climate governance in France, along with the nature of interaction between the national and sub-state echelons. This chapter has argued that even though Macron’s environmental record has been criticized by the opposition throughout his time as President, a more detailed analysis demonstrates that his administration has implemented several notable climate initiatives. Macron has built on the positive momentum spawned by the COP21 that took place in Paris in 2015, which galvanized France into enhancing its green policies. Nonetheless, even though Macron’s initiatives have helped to bolster France’s national climate framework, they have led to marginal changes in terms of multilevel governance during his first term. Macron’s ‘ecological planning’, however, declared as a green policy blueprint for his second term, will probably enhance the centralized nature of the French system and the ways in which the national echelon interacts with sub-state entities on climate policy.

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For these reasons, France’s multilevel framework is likely to be increasingly characterized by close and direct association of ‘territorial communities’ in the achievement of nationally defined climate goals. All echelons of the French multilevel pyramid are legally mandated to develop particular policy frameworks or strategies according to precise timeframes. The processes for elaboration, the content and follow-up procedures are established under national law.113 This type of stratified centralization represents a notable contrast to the American federal system which, as examined in Chapters Chapters 2 and 3, is based on cooperative federalism involving a high degree of autonomy for states in the implementation process. As this chapter has highlighted, one point of similarity with the US is the inadequacies in the articulation of multilevel climate governance from the sub-state to the national echelon in France. As previously examined, this includes temporal discord in terms of baseline years, the risk of overlap and duplication, along with the lack of an institutionalized framework to integrate local actors within national climate policy formulation and enactment. While partly due to inadequate consultative processes, this might improve with ‘ecological planning’ during Macron’s second term. Yet, if developed countries such as France, where the national government has provided consistent support to sub-state entities, fall short of providing effective synchronization on climate policy, then the international community as a whole may fail to produce an adequate framework for multilevel coordination, required to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Accord. When it comes to ‘best case studies’, it is correct to assume that France does not constitute the most ambitious country for climate policies in terms of the level of support provided to sub-state actors in this area. Other European nations, especially Scandinavian countries like Denmark, Sweden, Norway or Finland, have consistently enacted more far-reaching, multilevel climate initiatives over the last decade and beyond, often surpassing France with their objectives and results. Yet, ever since the hosting of COP21 in Paris in 2015, France has been able to successfully improve its green credentials, as demonstrated throughout this and the previous chapter. France now regularly positions itself among the top five

113 See: Collectif (2021).

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or ten EU Member States in terms of climate performance rankings,114 while Europe constitutes the most ambitious continent in the world on climate issues. Therefore, qualifying France as a ‘best case study’ is certainly no longer out of place and further justifies its choice as a sample country for the purposes of analyzing multilevel climate governance. This chapter has also showcased a number of patterns involved in the articulation of multilevel governance, which substantiate those already identified in Chapter 4. This includes sub-state entities (regions, metropolises and communes in the case of France) acting as pioneers and catalysts, leading the way with ambitious climate initiatives and galvanizing the national echelon into enhancing its level of ambition. Sub-state actors can also serve as ‘laboratories of democracy’ where innovative climate policies may be tested on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment by national governments. This emphasizes the notion of local entities playing an essential role in terms of setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework.115 Likewise, this chapter has demonstrated how the centralized French political system displays both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance: a high level of policy harmonization and tight coordination between the different echelons; a high minimum standard across the country; and less of a risk of conflict regarding policies enacted between the different echelons, which reduces the possibility of ‘carbon leakage’ and ‘freeriding’. Cities are not under the authority of the regional echelon since all sub-state entities are placed at the same level under French law. While cities are under the jurisdiction of the national government, the latter tends to interact mainly with regions. Communes also benefit from a ‘general competence clause’, which allows them to go beyond the strict wording of the law to enact innovative municipal policies. Certain disadvantages of the centralized French system for the articulation of multilevel governance include its rigid, centralized paradigm which does not always leave enough margin for maneuver to allow subnational entities to enact policies that are specifically well adapted to the 114 See, for example: Transport and Environment & Carbon Market Watch (2017). 115 Such patterns that are apparent in the case of France are quite similar to those

revealed by the US federal system (see Chapters 2 and 3), highlighting a transatlantic and international dimension concerning the role of sub-national actors in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance.

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local context (this is less true for communes due to the general competence clause). In spite of several phases of decentralization, there are still relatively few competences allocated to French regions, which are constrained by a hierarchical system. This tends to hamper their ability to innovate and enact far-reaching policies and also leads to a partial multilevel framework since there is only so much regions can do to support municipalities. Finally, competence allocation at the sub-national level is not always clearly defined, due to a highly complex and bureaucratic multilevel structure. There are redundancies and duplications between the different echelons, which can reduce the effectiveness of multilevel climate governance. These insights represent an original contribution of this book to the academic literature. Certain authors mentioned in the last two chapters such as Kada et al., Aubelle and Kerrouche, Elgie et al. or Drake et al.,116 have discussed various aspects related to French politics. This book develops an extensive analysis about the adequacy of the French political framework specifically in the context of multilevel climate governance and the nature of interactions between the different echelons. This innovative study centers on the fact that the French paradigm displays both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance, involving an original comparison with the US. In fact, the advantages and disadvantages of the centralized French multilevel paradigm often function as polar opposites to those of the US federal system, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Many of the strengths of the French system correspond to weaknesses in the US framework and vice versa. As discussed throughout this book, France and the US possess very distinctive constitutional frameworks, which define the nature of their interactions with sub-national entities, resulting in rich contrasts between French political centralization and American federal decentralization. Overall, the contrasting strengths and weaknesses of the US and French multilevel paradigms are particularly well suited to their respective political frameworks. American sub-state entities play a vital role in terms of compensating for inadequacies at the national level; thanks to extensive autonomy under the federal system, states have the possibility 116 Kada et al. (2017), Aubelle and Kerrouche (2022), Elgie et al. (2016), Drake et al. (2020).

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of enacting their own innovative policies at the local level. By contrast, the centralized French system has allowed successive administrations to provide consistent sponsorship to sub-national actors over the last few decades, since climate issues enjoy broad-based support across the French political spectrum. In this case, national policies permeate in a top-down manner towards territorial communities, providing essential support in the implementation of local climate initiatives.

Bibliography Books and Articles Armand, C. (2021, December 16). ‘Décentralisation: la loi 3DS n’est pas à la hauteur de l’espérance des collectivités (Alain Lambert)’. La Tribune. Aubelle, V., & Kerrouche, E. (2022). La décentralisation: Pour, contre ou avec l’État ? La documentation française. Bache, I., & Flinders, M. (2004). Multi-Level Governance. Oxford University Press. Bäckstrand, K., Kuyper, J. W., Linnér, B.-O., & Lövbrand, E. (2017). ‘NonState Actors in Global Climate Governance: From Copenhagen to Paris and beyond’. Environmental Politics, 26(4), 561–579. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 09644016.2017.1327485 Brewer, P. (2012). ‘Polarisation in the USA: Climate Change, Party Politics, and Public Opinion in the Obama Era’. European Political Science, 11, 7–17. Brown, H. (2016). Pay-to-Play Politics: How Money Defines the American Democracy. Praeger Publishers. Cautrès, B., Chopin, T., Nguyen, P.-V., & Pellerin-Carlin, T. (2021, April 28). ‘Les Français et l’Environnement: Evolution d’une Préoccupation Politique Croissante’. Institut Jacques Delors—Policy Paper n° 265. Chan, S., Brandi, C., & Bauer, S. (2016). ‘Aligning Transnational Climate Action with International Climate Governance: The Road from Paris’. Review of European Comparative & International Environmental Law, 25(2), 238–247. https://doi.org/10.1111/reel.12168 Charnock, E. J. (2020). The Rise of Political Action Committees: Interest Group Electioneering and the Transformation of American Politics. Oxford University Press. Cole, A. (2019). Emmanuel Macron and the Two Years That Changed France. Manchester University Press. Coleman, A. N., & Leskiw, C. S. (2018). Debating Federalism: From the Founding to Today. Lexington Books.

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Drake, H., Cole, A., Meunier, S., & Tiberj, V. (2020, 6th edition). Developments in French Politics. Red Globe Press—Bloomsbury Publishing. Drutman, L. (2015). The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate. Oxford University Press. Elgie, R., Grossman, E., & Mazur, A. G. (2016). The Oxford Handbook of French Politics. Oxford University Press. Faure, B. (2021—6th edition). Droit des collectivités territoriales. Dalloz. Fisher, L., & Harriger, K. (2019—12th edition). American Constitutional Law, Volume 1: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism. Carolina Academic Press. Garric, A., & Mandard, S. (2021, July 1). ‘Le Conseil d’Etat demande au gouvernement de « prendre toutes mesures utiles permettant d’infléchir la courbe des émissions de gaz à effet de serre’. Le Monde. Hale, T. (2016). ‘All Hands on Deck: The Paris Agreement and Nonstate Climate Action’. Global Environmental Politics, 16(3), 12–22. https://doi. org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00362 Hale, T. (2018, November). ‘The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes’. Chatham House—Research Paper. Hamin Infield, E. M., Abunnasr, Y., & Ryan, R. L. (2018). Planning for Climate Change: A Reader in Green Infrastructure and Sustainable Design for Resilient Cities. Routledge. Hays, S. P. (2000). A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945. University of Pittsburgh Press. Hickman, R., & Banister, D. (2014). Transport, Climate Change and the City. Routledge. Kada, N., Pasquier, R., Courtecuisse, C., & Aubelle, V. (2017). Dictionnaire Encyclopédique de la Décentralisation. Berger Levrault. Konisky, D. M. (2020). Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. Kraft, M. E. (2000). ‘U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From the 1960s to the 1990s’. Journal of Policy History, 12(1), 17–42. https://doi.org/10. 1353/jph.2000.0006 LaCroix, A. L. (2010). Ideological Origins of American Federalism. Harvard University Press. Mélenchon, J.-L. (2021). L’Avenir en commun: Le programme pour l’Union Populaire. Éditions du Seuil. Pech, T. (2021). Le Parlement des citoyens—La Convention citoyenne pour le climat. Éditions du Seuil. Pedder, S. (2018). Révolution Française: Emmanuel Macron and the quest to reinvent a nation. Bloomsbury Continuum.

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Pincetl, S., Gustafson, H., Federico, F., Fournier, E. D., Cudd, R., & Porse, E. (2020). Energy Use in Cities: A Roadmap for Urban Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan. Quirk, P. J. (2016). Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton University Press. Raynaud, P. (2018). Emmanuel Macron: une révolution bien tempérée. Desclée De Brouwer. Rispin, W. (2021). The French Centre Right and the Challenges of a Party System in Transition. Palgrave Macmillan. Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Transport and Environment, & Carbon Market Watch (2017, March). EU Climate Leader Board: Where Countries Stand on the Effort Sharing Regulation—Policy Briefing. Turner, J. M., & Isenberg, A. C. (2018). The Republican Reversal: Conservatives and the Environment from Nixon to Trump. Harvard University Press. Van Asselt, H. (2016). ‘The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and Compliance in the Paris Agreement’. Climate Law, 6(1), 91–108. Verpeaux, M. (2020—6th edition). Les collectivités territoriales. Dalloz. Verpeaux, M., & Janicot, L. (2021—2nd edition). Droit des collectivités territoriales. Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence. Wheeler, S. M., & Rosan, C. D. (2021). Reimagining Sustainable Cities: Strategies for Designing Greener, Healthier, More Equitable Communities. University of California Press.

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Public Policy Documents and Laws Collectif (2021—25th edition). Code général des collectivités territoriales. Dalloz. Comité d’expert pour la Transition Energétique (December 2018). Respect des budgets carbone: Rapport sur la mise en œuvre de la SNBC pour le premier budget carbone 2015–-2018. France Nation verte (21 October 2022). Présentation de la planification écologique. Dossier de presse. Haut Conseil pour le Climat (February 2021). Avis Portant sur le Projet de Loi Climat et Résilience. Haut Conseil pour le Climat (June 2022). Rapport annuel 2022: Dépasser les constats, mettre en œuvre les solutions. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). Fifth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Sixth Assessment Report. XVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017–22). LOI n° 20191147 du 8 novembre 2019 relative à l’énergie et au climat. XVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017–22). LOI n° 20191428 du 24 décembre 2019 d’orientation des mobilités. XVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017–22). LOI n° 2020105 du 10 février 2020 relative à la lutte contre le gaspillage et à l’économie circulaire. XVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017–22). LOI n° 20211104 du 22 août 2021 portant lutte contre le dérèglement climatique et renforcement de la résilience face à ses effets. XVe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2017–22). LOI n° 2022217 du 21 février 2022 relative à la différenciation, la décentralisation, la déconcentration et portant diverses mesures de simplification de l’action publique locale. XVIe Législature de la Cinquième République française (2022–27). LOI n° 2023-175 du 10 mars 2023 relative à l’accélération de la production d’énergies renouvelables République française—Conseil d’Etat (4 August 2021). Communiqué de presse. Pollution de l’air: le Conseil d’État condamne l’État à payer 10 millions d’euros. République française—Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2017, July). Plan Climat: 1 planète, 1 plan. République française—Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2020, March). Stratégie nationale bas carbone: La transition écologique et solidaire vers la neutralité carbone. République française—Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire (2020, April). Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie. Ville de Paris (2018, March). Plan Climat de Paris: Vers une ville neutre en carbone, 100% énergies renouvelables, résiliente, juste et inclusive.

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Websites Association des Maires de France. Retrieved January 27, 2023, from https:// www.amf.asso.fr En Marche! Le programme d’Emmanuel Macron pour l’environnement et la transition écologique. Retrieved January 27, 2023, from https://en-marche.fr/ emmanuel-macron/le-programme/environnement-et-transition-ecologique European Commission. Clean Energy for all Europeans Package. Retrieved January 27, 2023, from https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-strategy/ clean-energy-all-europeans-package_en European Commission. A European Green Deal: Striving to be the First Carbon Neutral Continent. Retrieved January 27, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/ info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en Haut Conseil pour le Climat. Retrieved January 27, 2023, from https://www. hautconseilclimat.fr Régions de France. Retrieved January 27, 2023, from https://regions-france. org/missions/

CHAPTER 6

Cities as Pioneers: Multilevel Climate Governance in New York

1

Introduction

This chapter analyzes multilevel climate governance in the US from the municipal to the state echelon, focusing on the distinct case study of New York City and the state of New York. More specifically, it assesses the various approaches adopted by city of New York to implement its local climate initiatives, and how this has impacted collaboration with the governance tier right above it, i.e., the state of New York. This chapter differs from the previous four chapters, which concentrate on the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid involving the national and the subnational tiers in the US and France. By contrast, this chapter, along with Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the first echelon of the multilevel pyramid, concerning interactions from the municipal to the state or regional echelon. Chapter 6 is divided into two sub-sections: Section 2 sets out the federal context and historical background of multilevel climate governance between the city and state of New York; Section 3 analyzes the enactment of ‘Green New Deals’ by the city and the state of New York, with elements of effective articulation and remaining shortcomings in terms of multilevel climate governance. New York City and the state of New York are global leaders on environmental issues. As large, prosperous sub-national entities located in a developed country, they have at their disposal substantial budgets © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_6

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and resources, allowing them to develop advanced infrastructure and enact far-reaching climate policies. From an analytical perspective, this provides for rich material involving relevant frameworks of multilevel climate governance. By examining in detail the implementation of local climate initiatives by the city and the state of New York, this chapter also identifies the strengths and weaknesses of their multilevel paradigm. The aim is to illustrate that world-leading sub-national entities can, in some cases, fall short in providing effective multilevel synchronization on climate policy. If even ‘best case studies’ in developed countries are inadequate, then the international community as a whole may fail to deliver an adequate framework of multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement. In addition to these factors, the city and the state of New York constitute a distinctive paradigm in terms of multilevel governance, linked to specific legal arrangements at the state and municipal levels, along with fluctuating levels of enthusiasm for climate policy from elected officials over the last few years. Another factor, though less essential, is the variation in personal relations between Mayors and Governors from one administration to the next.1

2 Context About US Federalism and Historical Background of Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York 2.1

Context of Environmental Politics for States and Cities Under the US Federal System

As discussed in Chapter 2, the US constitutes a highly relevant paradigm for multilevel governance due to the distinctive characteristics of its federal system. The Tenth Amendment to the American Constitution explicitly states that: “powers not delegated to the US by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 1 Similarly to previous chapters, an extensive range of interviews with various experts and public officials has provided relevant insights about the different types of climate policies enacted by the city and state of New York, as well as the nature of their multilevel interactions. This includes public officials working at the municipal and state levels on climate and environmental matters, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks and NGOs. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1).

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respectively, or to the people”.2 Thus, any powers not spelled out in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution covering so-called ‘enumerated powers’3 are reserved to the states (so-called ‘reserved powers’). Moreover, certain powers of the federal government can be shared with states through ‘concurrent powers’, covering matters such as taxation. According to Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers, if the Constitution does not explicitly indicate that a power is simultaneously delegated to the federal government while also being denied to the states,4 then it can be assumed to be shared between them, with states retaining a part of their sovereignty in that policy field.5 Hence, through the constitutional assertion of ‘reserved powers’, as well as the implied existence of ‘concurrent powers’, states enjoy a broad range of legal competences under the US federal system in a variety of areas. This includes state-level or ‘intrastate’ commerce, as well as state-level transportation, land use and taxation, which play a key role in enacting environmental policies. Due to the US constitutional system,6 states possess not only their own executive, but also their own legislative and judicial branches, allowing them to enact laws at the state level. This means that the national US government shares sovereignty with its constituent units (states), and both of them enjoy a relation of parity under the system of ‘cooperative federalism’ discussed in Chapter 2 and 3.7 States thus enjoy sovereign rights that are constitutionally enshrined,8 and which the federal government cannot unilaterally abrogate without states’ express consent through a process of constitutional amendment.

2 Constitution of the United States of America, Tenth Amendment, 1791. 3 These are also referred to as ‘expressed’, ‘delegated’ or ‘explicit’ powers. 4 These are also known as ‘denied’ powers. 5 Still, the US Constitution does not expressly mention the notion of ‘concurrent

powers’, even though the latter’s existence is clearly implied. See: Hamilton (1788), Federalist Papers No. 32. 6 On US federalism, see: Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018). 7 The American federal system has undergone many transformations over the course

of US history. As indicated in Chapter 2, a number of different appellations, such as ‘dual federalism’ or ‘new federalism’ more recently, have been used to describe different historical periods. In the environmental field, the notion of ‘cooperative federalism’ is generally considered the most appropriate denomination. 8 See: Robertson (2017), LaCroix (2010).

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These constitutional elements represent some of the main strengths of the American federal system and have a direct bearing on the articulation of multilevel governance and interactions between the different echelons. The high level of decentralization and autonomy granted to states allows environmental policies to be well adapted to the local context and tailored to changing local conditions. Due to the multiple competences given to states, they may innovate and enact far-reaching environmental policies, enhancing performance over time and making it easier to go beyond minimum national environmental standards, if motivated to do so. This constitutional allocation of powers usually contributes to rendering multilevel governance more dynamic and flexible. This can help to reduce redundancies and duplications between the different echelons, further enhancing the effectiveness of multilevel governance. While perhaps an obvious point, it should be noted that since the American Constitution was written in the eighteenth century long before the rise of modern ecological concerns, the text does not explicitly refer to the environment.9 Attempts to infer an implicit constitutional right to environmental protection from various unrelated Articles in the Constitution have generally been dismissed by the federal court system. Hence, based on the Tenth Amendment, it might be assumed that all powers to legislate the environment would be reserved to the states. Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2, Congress and the federal government have relied on enumerated powers, such as the ‘interstate commerce clause’ (Article I, Section 8—Clause 3), to enact federal environmental statutes, mostly during the 1960s and 1970s.10 At the time, environmental issues enjoyed bipartisan support, which allowed Congress to pass ambitious legislation11 in this area during America’s co-called environmental decade. A change in paradigm occurred in the 1980s with the advent of neoliberalism in conservative circles, depicting governmental regulations on environmental matters as an impediment to economic growth. Powerful

9 Rowell and van Zeben (2021). 10 As examined in Chapter 2, while the interstate commerce clause has been the main

legal vehicle for enacting federal environmental statutes, Congress has also relied at various times on other enumerated powers, including the ‘property clause’, or federal taxing and treaty power, for example. 11 See: Hays (2000) and (2008), Kraft (2000).

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industrial lobbying groups also exercised notable pressure over politicians to support a deregulatory and pro-fossil fuel agenda.12 This has hampered the enactment of any major new environmental legislation since the 1980s. Such a state of affairs has led to legislative gridlock in Congress, with conservatives endeavoring to block federal environmental legislation and policies. This has generated a vacuum at the national level over the last few decades, especially in the field of climate change. While Obama became the first US President to enact ambitious climate policies, he chose to do so mostly during his second term.13 Once Democrats lost their Congressional majority after the 2010 mid-term elections, Obama could no longer pass legislation and had to rely on executive orders and regulations, which may lack durability. As a result, his climate legacy was vulnerable. Ironically, Trump also relied on executive action to dismantle many of his predecessors’ policies,14 including the ‘Clean Power Plan’, Obama’s main climate initiative. As discussed in Chapter 2, the federal vacuum on climate change policy was exacerbated under Trump’s Presidency. Biden’s election as President raised high hopes for enacting ambitious climate policies at the national level, but his administration has faced significant obstacles on the domestic front. As explained in Chapter 3, Democrats have become increasingly divided between centrists and progressives, making it harder to reach compromises over legislation, while the Senate has remained split in half with Democrats only holding a short majority.15 Like Obama, Biden has been forced to rely either on budgetary legislation—making it possible to avoid the Senate filibuster— or on executive action, an approach that contains certain limitations. Thus, while Biden has enacted a number of noteworthy climate initiatives, federal gridlock has been perpetuated during his Presidency. This situation has created opportunities for more progressive states like New York, which have bypassed federal gridlock by enacting their own bold climate policy agendas. The federal policy void on climate issues over the last few decades has had the unintended effect

12 On the influence of special interest groups in the US political system, see: Drutman (2015), Charnock (2020), Quirk (2016) and Brown (2016). 13 Bailey (2019). 14 Shafie (2020). 15 See: Barichella (2021).

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of enhancing the margin of maneuver for sub-national entities, turning climate change into an ‘open policy field’. Even though federal law preempts state law in the event of a conflict, the lack of consistent federal action means that states have substantive autonomy for implementing national environmental statutes. As a result, more than one-third of American states have been able to implement innovative climate policies at the local level to reduce GHG emissions over the last few decades.16 US states possess responsibilities for GHG emission controls, which are tied to their traditional functions concerning the regulation of electricity.17 This trend accelerated during the Trump administration’s dismantling of Obama’s climate policies, and the momentum has continued under Biden’s Presidency. It should be noted that lobbying groups do not spend the same resources to obstruct climate initiatives at the sub-national level; politicians at this echelon are more likely to enact policies based on the preferences of their constituencies. Hence, the US paradigm emphasizes the enhanced role and participation of sub-state actors in the process of policy formulation, along with the importance of democratic processes at the local level in the articulation of multilevel governance.18 These factors also point to the importance of individual leadership at the state level when analyzing the climate policies enacted by New York and Massachusetts. This chapter and Chapter 7 emphasize the key role of individual leadership (or lack thereof) in the successful development of ambitious climate initiatives for the states in our sample, in terms of the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance with the municipal echelon. Nonetheless, these chapters adopt a broad-based analysis that takes many factors into consideration, rather than conflating the role of a particular Governor with the level of climate ambition in their state. The same also applies to cities, which are even less hindered by lobbying groups at the municipal level.19 Unlike states, the US Constitution does not enshrine extensive powers for cities or local governments

16 Barichella (2018). 17 For these reasons, and as previously explained, states are often able to enact climate

policies that are particularly well adapted to the local context. 18 Bache and Flinders (2004). 19 Barichella (2018).

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(counties,20 towns or townships); in fact, the latter are not mentioned in the Constitution at all.21 The Tenth Amendment articulates that the level of autonomy granted to local governments is a matter for state law, falling outside the ambit of the federal government.22 Thus, each state is free and has full authority, either through its state constitution or via laws enacted by state legislatures, to confer the level of autonomy to local governments it deems appropriate. As mentioned in previous chapters, this is why the US possesses a so-called ‘dual system’ of local government, “which maintains a formal separation of central and local government. Although the center is sovereign, local authorities are not seen as part of a single State structure”.23 Consequently, relations between states, cities and other local governments have developed into a variety of different forms across the US, with sometimes mixed configurations existing within the same state. Yet, states always enjoy substantially larger budgets compared to cities and local governments, even in the case of large, cosmopolitan cities such as New York and Boston.24 State-local relations have tended to cluster into two broad categories—those states which provide limited autonomy to local governments (so-called ‘Dillon’s Rule’ states) and those which offer them more governance authority (so-called ‘Home Rule’ states):

20 While the state of New York possesses a total of 62 counties, the city of New York is so large that it encompasses five different counties, which fall under the authority of the Mayor. These counties correspond to the five ‘boroughs’ that make-up the city of New York. The fact that the city does not fall under the jurisdiction of a single county has enhanced its margin of maneuver even further with respect to environmental and climate policy. 21 See: Fisher and Harriger (2019). 22 As examined in Chapters 2 and 3, this does not mean that the federal government

does not have any sway over cities or local governments. The national Congress can enact general statutes, including on environmental matters, which may contain some provisions applying to all entities across the US including states, cities, firms or even individuals in some cases. In fact, a number of environmental statutes enacted during the 1960s– 70s possess such characteristics, even though most provisions usually apply specifically to states due to the US federal system, which are often granted a high degree of autonomy in the implementation process. However, the federal government does not have the legal authority to decide which powers to ascribe to local governments, which is wholly a matter for states to determine under the Tenth Amendment. 23 Hague and Harrop (2007), p. 243. 24 Thus, even though New York City is the largest and most prosperous American city,

the state of New York still enjoys a substantially larger budget.

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“Dillon’s Rule, which is derived from an 1868 court ruling, states that if there is a reasonable doubt whether a power has been conferred to a local government, then the power has not been conferred. Dillon’s Rule allows a state legislature to control local government structure, methods of financing its activities, its procedures, and the authority to make and implement policy. Due to the rigidity of this system, however, some states began to adopt ‘Home Rule’ provisions in the early 1900s. Home Rule limits the degree of state interference in local affairs and delegates power from the state to local governments. That power is limited to specific fields, and subject to constant judicial interpretation”.25

Cities operating under ‘Home Rule’ tend to possess more latitude to enact their own laws and policies, known as ‘local ordinances’ (different from legislation at the state or federal levels26 ), including in the realm of the environment and climate change. For instance, Article IX of the state of New York’s Constitution, which defines the extent of powers enjoyed by local governments, was amended in 1963 to enshrine and enhance the state’s ‘Home Rule’ provisions.27 Despite ‘Home Rule’, the Court of Appeals, New York state’s highest court, has in most cases upheld state authority over local governments. Likewise, the doctrine of preemption, which has been developed by the jurisprudence of the court system, tends to give state statutes priority and higher status over local ordinances in cases of conflict (much like the preemption and supremacy of federal law over state law). Moreover, studies have confirmed that preemption of state statutes over city ordinances has been increasing over the last few years across the US.28 Yet, despite these limitations, New York’s City’s ‘Home Rule’ status has still reinforced its autonomy in several key municipal policy areas. As will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7, the same also applies to the city of Boston, which benefits from an analogous ‘Home Rule’ 25 National League of Cities (2018), p. 5. 26 Because cities do not enjoy sovereign rights and powers under US constitutional law,

this means that they cannot legislate in the same way as states or the federal Congress. Hence, municipal acts passed by the City Council are usually referred to simply as ‘local ordinances’, sometimes also as ‘local laws’. 27 The state of New York operates under a mixed model, relying on some elements of the Dillon’s Rule for issues or public entities not covered in Article IX of the state constitution. 28 See, for instance: National League of Cities (2018).

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position within the state of Massachusetts. As indicated in Chapter 1, cities have an essential role to play within the global climate regime, since Mayors possess direct control over a number of targeted domains which are essential in terms of climate mitigation.29 These include zoning, building codes (heating and cooling regulations), transportation (such as municipal vehicle fleets), infrastructure planning, waste management and recycling, as well as several key aspects of the power sector and energy. Mayors thus have the ability to enact policies that directly impact these sectors, and can play a key role in terms of reducing emissions. Municipalities contain more than half the world’s population and consume over two-thirds of the world’s energy, accounting for around 75% of global CO2 emissions30 ; such trends are projected to accelerate over the next few decades. Consequently, cities are both a root cause and a vital actor for finding solutions to address climate change. Furthermore, cities are usually nimble political actors, less burdened by large bureaucratic administrations or complex legislative procedures when compared to governance processes at the national or state levels. Thus, Mayors can take more direct action on climate change.31 This has a straightforward impact on constituents, since cities represent the bottom echelon of the multilevel governance pyramid. Municipalities play an essential role in terms of transforming policy into action at the grassroots level. Moreover, as discussed above, cities represent the echelon that is least obstructed by lobbying pressure, providing them with the greatest margin for maneuver in this respect. 2.2

Historical Background of Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York, with Partial Coordination Between the Two Echelons

Over the last few decades, the state of New York has made efforts to strictly comply with federal environmental statutes, most of which were enacted during America’s ‘environmental decade’ spanning the 1960s 29 On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see: Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020). 30 UN Environment, Cities and climate change: https://www.unenvironment.org/exp lore-topics/resource-efficiency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change. 31 See: Barichella (2018).

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and 1970s.32 This is apparent with regard to the Clean Air Act (CAA) whereby states can choose to develop a ‘State Implementation Plan’ (SIP),33 outlining how they intend to achieve so-called ‘national ambient air quality standards’ within their borders for different types of air pollutants. If a SIP is approved by the EPA, the state receives federal funding to support local implementation of the CAA. The state of New York has enacted laws requiring the development of a SIP to comply with the CAA for a number of different air pollutants, which subsequently delegate enforcement responsibility to relevant state agencies (mostly the ‘State Department of Environmental Conservation’). New York has thus received federal funding during the last few decades to support local enforcement of national ambient air quality standards.34 The state of New York has consistently enacted a number of SIPs which often surpassed national minimum standards under the CAA. When it comes to addressing climate change specifically, however, New York City has been a pioneer in comparison with the state. Over the last two decades, NYC has had several Mayors who considered climate change policy to be a top priority. Thus, while former Republican Mayor Rudy Giuliani (1994–2001) had not been particularly interested in environmental issues, Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s second term (2005–2009) was marked by a noticeable policy shift for the city; this coincided with his personal transition from being a Republican during his first term to becoming an Independent in 2007.35 That year, Bloomberg launched PlaNYC , a far-reaching strategic blueprint to prepare the city for upcoming challenges. Climate change and environmental issues featured prominently within the plan’s 127 different initiatives, which

32 See Chapter 2. 33 On US environmental politics and the Clean Air Act, see: Rinfret and Pautz (2019),

Konisky (2020), Kraft (2021). 34 For many air pollutants, the latest SIPs in the states of Massachusetts and New York were upgraded in 2018 and 2019, with an interruption due to the Covid crisis, before slow resumption since 2021. 35 Bloomberg switched political affiliations to re-become a Democrat in 2018 following

Trump’s election (he had been affiliated with the Democratic Party up until his election as Mayor in 2001), encouraging him to expand his progressive policy agenda. In fact, he played a key role in promoting US efforts to remain engaged with the Paris Agreement under Trump’s Presidency through sub-national and non-state actor initiatives (see Chapter 3).

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included the ambitious objective of reducing city-wide GHG emissions 30% by 2030 (from 2005 levels).36 PlaNYC was updated in 2011 during Bloomberg’s third term (2010– 2014), with climate change defined as a priority issue with a number of new or upgraded green municipal initiatives in sectors such as transportation, buildings, clean energy, as well as water and solid waste management. This included 400 specific ‘milestones’ to be achieved by the end of 2013, many of which specifically targeted these sectors and focused on reducing the city’s GHG emissions. Bloomberg’s second and third terms marked the moment when the city of New York surged ahead of the state in its level of ambition by becoming a national and global climate change pioneer. This supports the notion of cities as focal points and essential building blocks within the climate regime. Hence, multilevel climate governance between the city and the state of New York at the time was partial and not well aligned. Among those states that have implemented ambitious and innovative climate legislation, New York has only gradually risen to a position of national leadership. Since New York has traditionally been a rather progressive state, voters have put pressure on politicians to implement environmental policies over the last few decades. Thus, the state of New York enacted a ‘Renewable Portfolio Standard’ (RPS) in 2004 to increase the share of renewable energies to at least 25% by the end of 2013, which was updated in 2010 with a more ambitious goal of 30% by 2015. Likewise, the state of New York played a pro-active role in launching the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in 2009, the first mandatory carbon market system in the US to target emissions specifically from the power sector, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Former Governor David Paterson signed Executive Order no. 24 the same year, which set a goal for reducing state-wide GHG emissions by at least 80% up to 2050, and created a climate action council with the aim of preparing a climate action plan. Despite such a promising start, however, the election of Andrew Cuomo as Governor in 2010 slowed the momentum on climate policy. Governor Cuomo was criticized by environmental groups for being a ‘centrist Democrat’ with low ambition on environmental issues. Throughout his first term as Governor (2010–14) and even in the early years of his second term (2014–18), while Cuomo accepted that

36 City of New York (2007).

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climate change is real and responsible for more extreme weather patterns, he refused to explicitly acknowledge that it is caused by human activity.37 Such ambiguity in terms of climate change science may help to explain Cuomo’s mixed environmental record during his first term. For instance, Governor Cuomo drew criticism from environmental groups due to his support for a number of fossil fuel infrastructure projects across the state. Yet, Cuomo was never a climate change denier. Hence, he supported the launching of RGGI in its early years and enacted the successful NY-Sun program in 2012 to foster the growth of a sustainable and subsidy-free solar industry across the state by 2023. In spite of this, Cuomo’s first term still lacked any major and far-reaching climate policy initiatives. Due to this mixed environmental record, the state of New York at the time was clearly trailing behind the city under the leadership of Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who enacted ambitious climate policies at the municipal level. Hence, the city and state of New York were not well aligned during Cuomo’s first term (2010–2014), and multilevel climate governance was only partial. As the Governor of a traditionally progressive state, Cuomo found himself under pressure from New York voters and environmental groups to become more pro-active during his second term.38 As a result, shortly after reelection, and relying on the extensive powers and autonomy afforded to states under US constitutional law,39 Governor Cuomo enacted several noteworthy climate policies. For instance, he announced

37 In his memoir ‘All Things Possible’ published in 2014, Cuomo did not explicitly acknowledge the anthropogenic causes of climate change: “There’s debate over global warming, but surely we must all agree that extreme weather patterns have developed”. Likewise, following a snowstorm that hit Western New York in November 2014, Cuomo said during a press conference: “I don’t want to get into a political debate at this time about climate change causes, et cetera. Forget the causes. Is it global warming? Is it reliance on fossil fuels? Forget the causes. What is inarguable is the result.” See: Waldman (2014). 38 In fact, Cuomo faced a first challenge in the 2014 Democratic Primary from Zephyr Teachout, a very progressive candidate who sharply criticized Cuomo’s environmental record, putting pressure on the incumbent to raise his level of ambition during his second term. 39 On US federalism, see: Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018).

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in late 2014 a state-wide ban on the fracking of natural gas40 ; likewise, in 2016, he pledged to phase out coal power sources by 2020. However, it was the launching in 2015 of an ambitious strategy known as ‘Reforming the Energy Vision’ (REV), which allowed the state of New York to become better aligned with the city in terms of its climate policies. The 2015 New York State Energy Plan set out a roadmap to achieve REV’s climate targets, including reducing state-wide GHG emissions 40% by 2030, enshrining the target of cutting emissions at least 80% by 2050 (from a 1990 baseline), raising the share of renewable energy to 50% by 2030,41 as well as increasing state-wide energy efficiency by 600 trillion Btu (from 2012 levels). Furthermore, Cuomo instructed the Department of Public Service to establish a ‘Clean Energy Standard’ in December 2015, with the aim of converting these targets into enforceable rules and regulations. The Clean Energy Standard also updated the RPS, establishing a target of generating 70% of the state’s electricity from renewables by 2030. Likewise, the state of New York played a leadership role in launching national climate networks opposed to Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2017, including the US Climate Alliance and the ‘We Are Still In’ (WASI) coalition. Since New York City also formed part of the WASI coalition at the time, this highlights a relatively good level of coordination. Thus, multilevel coordination on climate policy between the city and the state of New York improved during Cuomo’s second term, when the Governor enhanced his level of aspiration. Nevertheless, Cuomo continued to draw criticism from environmental groups throughout his second term for his inconsistent position on a number of fossil fuel infrastructure projects, which he supported in some cases, but not in others. Cuomo was also accused of implementing an overly slow and sluggish transition towards renewable energies. In fact, by the end of his second term and after eight years as Governor, the state of New York still only produced 1% of its energy from solar and only 3% from wind power. For these reasons, Cuomo’s overall environmental record remained ‘mixed’, despite a clear progression over time,

40 On the controversy surrounding hydraulic fracturing in the state of New York, see: Dodge (2017). 41 It should be noted that the REV subsequently led New York to engage in some of the largest renewable energy procurements in the US.

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especially when compared to his first term.42 Until recently, the state of New York was not considered a national leader on climate issues, as its policies had trailed behind those of other progressive states such as California, the historic US environmental leader. And even during Cuomo’s second term, the state of New York continued to trail behind the city in terms of its level of ambition, leading to a partial multilevel governance paradigm.

3

3.1

The ‘Green New Deal’ and Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York The City and State of New York Achieve Global Climate Leadership by Enacting Their Respective ‘Green New Deals’

Mayor Bloomberg’s successor Bill de Blasio (Democrat) was elected in 2013 with a very progressive policy platform on environmental issues. Although Democrats have historically held strong majorities in the unicameral City Council, New York City’s lawmaking body, they were able to increase their majority to 48 out of 51 seats during the 2013 municipal elections, which they successfully maintained in 2017 following de Blasio’s reelection. This meant that Republicans effectively lost control over municipal policy.43 The Democratic dominance in the City Council, combined with the very progressive policy platform of Mayor de Blasio and his administration, made it possible for New York to enhance its level of ambition on climate policy.44 For instance, in 2014, de Blasio signed Local Law 66, committing to reduce city-wide GHG emissions by at least 80% up to 2050, with an interim target of 40% by 2030 (from a

42 Cuomo’s administration was even sued by one of the state’s poorest cities for not addressing the contamination at its source and for delaying its response. 43 In fact, the City Council has played an important role in pushing the Mayor to enact more ambitious climate policies. 44 Like most large cities in the US, New York operates under the ‘strong Mayor’ form

of the Mayor-Council municipal governmental system. This means that even though the separately elected City Council has a number of competences, including the ability to approve the budget, the Mayor enjoys a high degree of independence and a wide range of powers as head of an executive branch. This has an impact on the Mayor’s ability to carry out far-reaching climate policies, especially when he has the support of the Council.

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2005 baseline, thus upgrading the previous target from PlaNYC ). Moreover, in 2015, the de Blasio administration replaced PlaNYC with a new enhanced strategic blueprint for the city known as OneNYC 2050. This set out far-reaching initiatives across a number of different policy sectors, with climate change featuring as a top priority, with concrete initiatives to allow the city to achieve its sweeping objectives.45 As explained above, this coincided with the year when Governor Cuomo became more pro-active on environmental issues after securing reelection, setting out ambitious state-level climate targets through the REV strategy. This included reducing GHG emissions 40% by 2030 and at least 80% by 2050 (from a 1990 baseline), thus aligning the state with New York City’s climate objectives over the medium and long run, except for the difference in baseline years (to be examined in more detail below). This contributed to improving multilevel climate governance between the city and the state of New York. In fact, the city’s far-reaching climate initiatives probably galvanized the state into gradually raising its aspirations, so as to catch up and become better aligned in terms of short-, medium- and long-term climate goals. Once more, this illustrates the idea that cities may act as catalysts within the global climate regime, pulling the other echelons upwards over time. They can help to set the climate policy agenda within a multilevel governance framework.46 New York City continued to be ahead of the state in terms of its level of ambition. In 2016, de Blasio’s administration released a Roadmap on how to achieve its target of reducing city-wide emissions by at least 80% up to 2050 (Roadmap to 80 X 50) across different sectors. In addition, the day after Trump’s announcement of withdrawal from the Paris Accord, the Mayor signed Executive Order no. 26 in June 2017, which aimed to align New York City with the more ambitious long-term objective of the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature increase below 1.5 °C by the end of the century. Shortly thereafter, the city released another blueprint to establish the timing and pace for reducing GHG emissions, identifying specific policies by 2020 and beyond so that New York becomes aligned

45 City of New York (2015). 46 Creative climate policymaking is also apparent in smaller US cities, as well. See:

Homsy (2018).

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with the 1.5 °C objective set out in the Paris Agreement.47 New York was the first city in the world to release such a plan. Building on these policies, the most ambitious climate initiative promoted by de Blasio was the release of an updated version of OneNYC in April 2019, branded as New York City’s ‘Green New Deal’. OneNYC is a comprehensive strategic plan that seeks to inform all of the city’s objectives and initiatives up to 2050 across a broad range of fields under the rubric of ‘growth, equity, sustainability and resiliency’.48 Climate change features as one of the main focus areas and top priorities. OneNYC contains an enhanced strategic blueprint which not only updates previous policies and objectives, but also sets out a number of new ones. In the field of climate policy, its main provisions can be summarized as follows49 : • Commitment to reaching carbon neutrality in the city by midcentury, as well as 100% carbon-free electricity. • Target of reducing city-wide emissions 40% by 2030 and 80% by 2050 (from a 2005 baseline), with the remaining 20% being offset. • Mandatory emission reductions from buildings through efficiency upgrades, with steep penalties for non-compliance (a global first). • Prohibition of new inefficient glass-walled buildings. • 100% carbon-free electricity with city government operations through greater reliance on hydropower. • Mandatory recycling of organics waste material. • Decreasing carbon-intensive consumption and waste, including through reduced purchases of plastic and processed meat. • Addressing transportation problems through measures such as congestion pricing and improved public transport infrastructure. • Designation of streets for pedestrians through policies such as the creation of new public spaces and people priority zones. • Municipal alignment with UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

47 City of New York (2017). 48 City of New York (2019). 49 NYC Office of the Mayor (2019). Action on Global Warming: NYC’s Green New

Deal: https://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/209-19/action-global-warmingnyc-s-green-new-deal#/0.

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OneNYC represented at the time and continues to constitute one of the most ambitious municipal climate action plans in the world, confirming New York City’s position as a global pioneer and world leader. The de Blasio administration and municipal authorities rapidly began to implement the ambitious targets and policies set out in OneNYC . For instance, the New York City Council approved the ‘Climate Mobilization Act’ (CMA) the same month in April 2019, which contains the most farreaching and legally binding climate objectives for the buildings sector globally. The CMA represents a package of several local ordinances, each of which targets different policy aspects aimed at reducing GHG emissions in the buildings sector, New York City’s largest source of emissions (more than 70%). While the technical details of the CMA are complex, its main provisions can be summarized as follows, based on the blueprint established by OneNYC 50 : • Local Law 97 (the CMA’s centerpiece) requires buildings larger than 25,000 square feet to meet strict GHG emissions caps, beginning in 2024. Applies to more than 50,000 buildings across the city.51 • Local Laws 92 & 94 require green rooftops and solar PV systems on a number of new buildings and renovation projects. • Local Law 96 creates the ‘Property Assessed Clean Energy’ (PACE) program with certain clean energy financing tools for building owners (such as retrofits). In February 2020, Mayor de Blasio embarked on the second wave of his municipal Green New Deal for New York City, expanding on the initiatives launched in 2019. Notable climate policies forming part of this second wave included a pledge to end the use of fossil fuels like natural gas in large buildings throughout the city, beginning with public buildings, as well as ensuring that new building permits conform with the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050. This was supplemented by another pledge to transition the city away from new infrastructure, including pipelines, terminals or power plants, which enhance the municipal supply of fossil 50 NYC Mayor’s Office of Climate & Environmental Justice. The Climate Mobilization Act 2019: https://www1.nyc.gov/site/sustainability/legislation/climate-mobilization-act2019.page. 51 This aspect of the CMA was subsequently updated in October 2020 by the City Council, whereby provisions were reinforced and expanded.

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fuels. Moreover, de Blasio announced in January 2021 that the city’s largest pension fund had successfully divested from fossil fuel reserve owners, one of the largest fossil fuel divestments in the world, involving up to $4 billion in securities.52 This built upon initiatives launched in 2018, when NYC had been the first large US city to declare its intention to divest public pension funds from fossil fuel companies. Yet, in spite of these impressive achievements, doubts remain as to whether or not the ambitious targets set out by New York City’s Green New Deal can realistically be achieved over the next few decades. For instance, OneNYC and the CMA may lack sufficient detail in terms of how the objectives and policies they propose will be implemented in practice. OneNYC , in particular, constitutes a general and overarching policy blueprint. It focuses on establishing targets and objectives on a general level, without actually providing a detailed and concrete implementation agenda to achieve them in practice. This is compounded by the fact that it is especially problematic to transition New York towards more sustainability; the city constitutes one of the largest urban centers in the world and a global economic hub, with continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels across all sectors. By contrast, the other two cities in our sample, Boston and Paris, are much smaller, making their climate objectives more achievable. Thus, successful implementation of OneNYC and the CMA will be needed to confirm New York City’s status as a national and global climate pioneer, and avoid accusations of ‘greenwashing’. Moreover, the ambit of the CMA may be too narrow, since it focuses mostly on reducing emissions from the buildings sector. Although this constitutes New York’s largest source of emissions, there are other major sectors, including transportation, which also generate significant GHG emissions in the city.53 These other sectors are covered by OneNYC , the city’s overarching blueprint. Municipal authorities have chosen to prioritize buildings over other sectors, through rapid enactment of the CMA, which could lead to an unbalanced implementation of the city’s climate 52 New York City (2021, January 25). Mayor de Blasio, Comptroller Stringer, and Trustees Announce Estimated $4 Billion Divestment from Fossil Fuels: https://www.nyc. gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/053-21/mayor-de-blasio-comptroller-stringer-trustees-est imated-4-billion-divestment-from. 53 It should be noted that transportation is responsible for approximately one quarter of global GHG emissions, with the overwhelming majority of these emissions emanating within urban areas; the latter constitutes one of the most rapidly expanding sources of emissions worldwide.

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policies over the next few years. In order for New York City to achieve its GHG emissions reduction objectives over the medium to long run, focusing too narrowly on one sector, regardless of how important it is, will be insufficient. While local authorities in NYC have begun moving in the direction of broadening the scope of regulations enacted following passage of the CMA, this needs to be reinforced in order to achieve a more balanced approach to municipal climate policy. The Democratic candidate Eric Adams emphasized a more balanced approach to climate policy during the 2021 mayoral election, at least on paper. His platform included a focus on other key sectors like transportation, clean energy, waste management, along with food production and consumption, which featured prominently in his proposed climate policy blueprint referred to as ‘A Greener City, A Brighter Future’.54 The proposal covers congestion pricing, along with more street space for pedestrians and additional cycling lanes.55 Likewise, Adams’ climate blueprint spotlights local food production—encouraging a plant-based over a meat-based diet, plus more recycling, adaptation to climate change, along with the development of renewable energies (especially wind and solar power) and energy efficiency to transition the city’s power grid away from fossil fuels. This involves developing community solar energy, decreasing the city’s reliance on polluting ‘peaker plants’ by investing more in battery storage, as well as accelerating the deployment of electric buses. Following Adams’ election as Mayor of New York, there is hope for a more balanced approach over the next few years; since he assumed his functions as Mayor on January 1, 2022, Adams’ administration has begun to implement new policies in these various areas discussed below.56 Nevertheless, Adams was criticized by environmental groups throughout the mayoral race and since assuming office for not sufficiently emphasizing climate issues. Climate change did not feature as a priority during his campaign. Instead, Adams concentrated on enhancing security by addressing crime and homelessness,57 revamping the city’s 54 Adams (2021). 55 Concerning the role of the transportation sector for climate policies at the municipal

level, see: Hickman and Banister (2014). 56 Since the office of New York City Mayor is limited for two terms, de Blasio could not run for reelection a third time. 57 This is unsurprising, since Adams was a police captain, before becoming state senator and Brooklyn borough President prior to his election as Mayor.

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healthcare system in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and boosting the economy. It was only after mass flooding and destruction caused by Hurricane Ida, which hit New York in late August 2021, that Adams was pressured into focusing more on climate change. Even then, his policy proposals have been criticized as lacking detailed metrics and timetables. It is noteworthy that Adams’ climate policy blueprint during the campaign (‘A Greener City, A Brighter Future’) contained only six pages. The new Mayor has described himself as a ‘moderate’ Democrat in contrast to Bill de Blasio, who hailed from the more progressive wing of the Party. Since assuming office, and in accordance with the issues he chose to focus on during the 2021 mayoral election, Adams has concentrated on tackling crime by reforming the police, managing the city’s post-COVID-19 transition from a healthcare and economic perspective (including by addressing the growing issue of homelessness), while promoting innovative sectors like the technology or financial industries to boost growth and accelerate the recovery. The new Mayor has not been inactive on climate and environmental issues, but these have not been priority issues since assuming office. Instead, Adams appears to be freeriding on the climate achievements of his predecessor de Blasio, ensuring they are implemented, but without launching any significant new green initiative himself. For instance, Adams has yet to enact major new local laws comparable to the CMA in ambit and scope for other sectors like transportation, despite his pledge to adopt a more holistic approach to tackle climate change during the campaign, nor has he set out plans to upgrade OneNYC , the city’s overarching municipal policy blueprint, in the near future. Those climate initiatives which he has implemented, while certainly constituting positive steps, do not represent substantive upgrades or enhancements of the municipal climate policy framework established by his predecessor. For example, he announced in March 2022 an agreement to transform a run-down city-owned industrial site in the borough of Brooklyn (South Brooklyn Marine Terminal) into one of the biggest offshore wind power facilities on the east coast, generating power directly to private homes in the city. Likewise, in September 2022, Adams signed an executive order58 to cut GHG emissions from municipal construction 58 New York City Office of the Mayor—Executive Order No. 23 (2022, September 22). Clean Construction.

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projects by requiring the city’s capital project agencies to pledge actions to lower their carbon footprint in manufacturing, transportation, installation and maintenance. Any municipal construction project funded by new federal programs launched under President Biden will have to rely on sustainable equipment, materials and practices. Another example in November 2022 was Adams’ initiative to invest $4 billion for electrifying schools across New York City, especially in disenfranchised communities. The aim is to upgrade heating and lighting systems, with a requirement for all new public schools to be completely powered by electricity, along with the retrofitting of one hundred schools by 2030.59 While notable on a number of counts, these climate policy initiatives do not amount to a major improvement or reinforcement of de Blasio’s Green New Deal. Moreover, concerns have been raised about the prospect of the new Mayor shying away from enacting sufficiently robust regulations to ensure successful implementation of the CMA, the signature policy of de Blasio’s Green New Deal. Adams’ ties to the real estate industry have raised doubts about his genuine level of commitment, since the industry has been adamant in its opposition to the CMA, accused of imposing excessive costs on property owners. In fact, Adams received substantial contributions from real estate industry lobbying groups for his campaign during the 2021 mayoral election, and a sizeable proportion of funding for his planned reelection campaign in 2025 has already been provided by that industry. This is problematic, since many of the CMA’s core elements are scheduled to be enacted over the next few years, with the first major phase in terms of requirements for certain types of buildings to reduce GHG emissions and enhance energy efficiency via retrofitting, set to begin in 2024.60 What is more, Adams has made contradictory declarations during the campaign and since assuming office regarding his intentions on how strictly he plans to fully enact the different clauses of the CMA.61 At

59 Adams has adopted an approach that also puts more emphasis on issues of environmental justice, along with adaptation to climate change. For instance, Adams pledged to complete the city’s first ‘comprehensive study of environmental justice’. See: Rachal (2022). 60 Buildings covered under this first phase include all those in the city over 25,000 square feet, with a requirement for this category of buildings to reduce GHG emissions by 40% up to 2030. 61 See: Durkin and Dunn (2022).

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the time of writing, his administration has procrastinated (and is possibly stalling) by taking much more time than expected to release regulations needed to launch the first phase of the law in 2024. The initial rules which were released have been criticized for being unbalanced, with positive provisions on some issues and key weaknesses in other areas. For instance, the initial set of rules concerning the establishment of pollution limitations for a large variety of different types of buildings (in line with the goals of the CMA) appears to be rigorous, as they pointedly address building-by-building emissions limits. At the same time, however, the rules provide the possibility for landlords to rely on ‘renewable energy credits’ (RECs) to circumvent such limits by purchasing exemptions. This could significantly weaken the law by providing a large loophole to avoid or delay compliance, potentially rendering the law void of any binding incentive.62 Nevertheless, Adams is still under pressure from voters to continue with the climate policies launched under de Blasio.63 In addition, Democrats possess an unassailable majority in the City Council, where most municipal representatives hail from the progressive wing of the Party.64 These elected officials have been pushing to raise the level of green ambition over the next few years, insisting that the new Mayor not derail full implementation of the CMA. For these reasons, it is unlikely that Adams will significantly backtrack on the municipal Green New Deal established by his predecessor. Many key elements of the CMA will in all likelihood be enacted, although perhaps not as strictly as they would have been under de Blasio. As a result, New York City will carry on acting as a leader on climate issues in the near future, riding on the green momentum established by the previous Mayor, albeit with less enthusiasm and fewer ambitious initiatives than under the preceding administration. New York City’s high level of ambition under Mayor de Blasio played an important role in spurring the state to boost its climate policies during Andrew Cuomo’s third term (2018–21). The former Governor was aware of criticism on his mixed environmental record during his first two terms 62 See: Sikora (2022 July and October). 63 It is notable that climate change has risen to become a top priority for voters in

New York City, and this trend is likely to continue as the city faces more environmental disasters in the years to come. 64 While Democrats lost two seats in the City Council during the 2021 municipal elections, they still possess an unassailable majority with 46 seats out of 51.

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and concerned that the state was trailing behind the city of New York in its level of climate ambition. As a result, Cuomo endeavored to better align the state’s climate targets with those at the municipal level during his third term, following in the footsteps of de Blasio’s very ambitious local climate policies. This once again suggests a pattern whereby cities may act as pioneers within the global climate regime and set the agenda within a multilevel governance framework. This also supports the notion that local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, galvanizing further action from the bottom-up, which represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-national actors within the climate regime.65 Other factors also pushed Cuomo to raise the level of climate ambition during his third term. For the first time in over a decade (and only the third time in fifty years), Democrats won back the state Senate during the 2018 mid-term elections, giving them a solid majority in both houses of the state legislature; this became a springboard for enacting farreaching climate policies.66 Secondly, as examined in Chapter 3, climate change has risen in importance within the Democratic Party, driven by changes in public opinion. Partly due to outrage at the former Trump administration’s dismantling of Obama-era climate policies, as well as the increasing impact of extreme weather events across the US, environmental issues rose in importance to become one of the top priorities for liberal voters. Democratic politicians have duly responded to this change in their electoral base, which was highlighted during the 2020 Presidential Democratic Primary when candidates competed with one another for the most prominent climate action plan.67 Therefore, centrist Democrats such as Governor Cuomo found themselves under pressure by younger and more progressive politicians within the Party.68 A noteworthy example, which created controversy at the time, was US Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal for a

65 See: Hale (2018). 66 In fact, a number of moderate Democrats from the so-called ‘Independent Demo-

cratic Conference’, which had traditionally allied with Republicans in the state Senate to block progressive legislation, were also swept out of office by more liberal contenders. 67 See: Barichella (2019). 68 Like the 2014 election, Governor Cuomo once again faced an unexpected challenge

from a more progressive candidate (Cynthia Nixon) during the Democratic primary for the 2018 gubernatorial race in New York. Nixon vocally challenged Cuomo’s record on climate change.

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national ‘Green New Deal’ in February 2019, with far-reaching targets to completely transition the US out of fossil fuels. Although the latter did not come close to obtaining Congressional approval and was accused of being unrealistic, it still succeeded in encouraging a number of senior Democrats to enhance their climate aspirations. In response to Cortez’s proposal at the national level and de Blasio’s ‘Green New Deal’ at the municipal level, Governor Cuomo announced his own version of the ‘Green New Deal’ at the state level.69 Known as the ‘Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act’ (CLCPA), the bill was approved by both state houses and signed into law by the former Governor in June 2019.70 The CLCPA is remarkable in its level of ambition, since it establishes some of the most far-reaching and legally binding climate targets in the US, with New York becoming the second state after California to enshrine a climate neutrality and 100% clean electricity pledge before 2050. In fact, as will be examined below, New York was able to surpass even California, the historic US climate leader, on a number of different metrics. The main provisions of the CLCPA enhanced targets established by previous policies such as the REV.71 Cuomo was able to sign a bill that is innovative, ambitious and well adapted to local conditions in New York72 : • 40% reduction in state-wide GHG emissions by 2030 and 85% by 2050 (from 1990 levels), with the remaining 15% being offset so as to achieve full carbon neutrality by mid-century. This is legally enshrined in the Act.73 • 100% carbon-free electricity by 2040 (five years ahead of California).

69 In fact, Governor Cuomo was under particular pressure, since Cortez is a Representative from New York’s 14th congressional district. 70 Previous versions of the CLCPA had failed three times to win approval from the state Senate after being passed by the House, so the Democratic victory in the 2018 mid-term elections was instrumental in this regard. 71 The CLCPA also contains provisions that target other sectors such as environmental

justice, which fall outside the scope of this book. 72 New York State Senate 2019–2020 Legislative Session. Senate Bill S6599: Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act . 73 Like New York City, the state of New York has sought to align itself with the more ambitious long-term objective set out in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temperatures below 1.5 °C by the end of the century.

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• • • • •

70% renewable energy by 2030. 9000 MW of offshore wind power by 2035. 3000 MW of energy storage by 2030. 6000 MW of solar power by 2025.74 22 million tons of carbon reduction through energy efficiency and electrification, equivalent to a 23% increase in energy efficiency by 2030 (from 2012 levels). • Creation of the State Climate Action Council, a 22-member committee tasked with overseeing implementation of targets set out by the Act, including by developing a ‘scoping plan’ with policy details. Due to the extensive powers afforded to them under US constitutional law,75 along with the inconsistency of federal climate policies,76 a number of other states have also taken legislative or executive action over the last few years to move towards 100% clean energy. At the time of writing, this includes twenty-two states (plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico), and the list keeps expanding every year.77 Many of these states, including New York, joined national coalitions such as the US Climate Alliance or ‘We Are Still In’ (WASI) during Trump’s Presidency. By doing so, they voluntarily chose to commit to the former American NDC under the Paris Agreement, set out in Obama’s Clean Power Plan (and subsequently rescinded under Trump). Therefore, the state of New 74 To jumpstart implementation of these objectives, the CLCPA also set out $1.5 billion in competitive awards for 20 different large-scale wind, solar and energy storage projects, mostly in upstate New York and operational since 2022. This included up to $200 million in port infrastructure, with the objective of turning New York into a national offshore wind hub. 75 On US federalism, see: Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), Robertson (2017). 76 As examined in Chapter 3, this includes radical policy shifts on climate issues from one administration to the other with the last three Presidents (Obama, Trump and Biden). Thus, even though Biden has been able to push through noteworthy green initiatives since taking office, Democrats have continued to face a number of significant obstacles for implementing their ambitious climate agenda, which worsened after the 2022 mid-term elections and the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives. 77 At the time of writing, this includes California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Virginia, Washington and Wisconsin.

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York’s CLCPA is in many ways linked to such a pledge, and the same can also be said of the CMA and OneNYC at the municipal level, since New York City made similar commitments through its membership of WASI or the Climate Mayors network.78 While the climate policies enacted by the city and the state of New York during Trump’s Presidency ended-up surpassing Obama’s former NDC, they were still symbolically tied to the targets of the former Clean Power Plan. In this regard, as will be analyzed in more detail below, the CLCPA allowed the state of New York to finally catch up with the city in its level of ambition, with the two becoming relatively well aligned on their climate objectives over the medium and long run. Although some disparities remain, the CLCPA is significant in terms of the effective articulation for multilevel governance through close coordination with the City’s OneNYC and the CMA at the municipal level. In fact, both the city and the state of New York vowed to reinforce and accelerate implementation of their local green initiatives following Biden’s election in 2020, in order to align their policies with the Democrats’ climate agenda at the national level. The ‘America is All In’ Coalition (WASI’s successor) has played a key role in terms of synchronizing the efforts of sub-national actors with federal climate initiatives under the Biden administration. This has not been particularly challenging since, as examined in Chapter 3, the carbon neutrality and clean electricity pledges from the city and state of New York anticipated those of the Biden administration, and probably even played a role in terms of encouraging Democrats’ ambitious policies at the federal level on these issues. The same also applies to states like California, which enacted equally far-reaching clean energy legislation during Trump’s Presidency. What is more, the level of ambition displayed by New York’s CLCPA in terms of achieving 100% carbon-free electricity by 2040, five years ahead of California, is impressive.79 This has transformed the state of New York into a pioneer on climate policy, as well as a global leader in this area—at least on paper. It should be noted that the Biden administration has announced an even more ambitious goal of transitioning towards a national carbon-free power sector by 2035, five years ahead of New York 78 This clearly highlights the ways in which coalitions of sub-national actors may reinforce or create new pro-climate groups and communities on a domestic scale. 79 Yet, the state of California remains ahead of New York on several other issues, such as a target to achieve carbon neutrality by 2045, five years ahead of New York.

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and ten years ahead of California.80 This may encourage these states and others across the country to upgrade their targets on clean energy over the next few years.81 Much will depend on how durable the Biden administration’s pledges become, and whether Democrats succeed in winning the Presidential election in 2024 and beyond. Indeed, a Republican administration is likely to rescind a number of Biden’s climate policies, at least in part, as Trump did with Obama-era pledges. Andrew Cuomo was replaced by Lieutenant Governor Kathy Hochul following his resignation in August 2021 over harassment allegations. Like NYC Mayor Eric Adams, Kathy Hochul initially presented herself as a ‘centrist Democrat’, who had not considered climate change a priority issue until that point.82 In fact, Hochul’s margin for maneuver was quite limited during the first 18 months, as she lacked political legitimacy to launch any major new climate initiative until her full election as Governor in November 2022. In the year and a half before then, she mostly followed in the footsteps of Cuomo by keeping to the implementation schedule for the CLCPA. For example, Hochul oversaw the expansion of state-level solar initiatives begun under Cuomo, unveiling the largest green hydrogen plant in the US, as well as the development of the state’s first offshore wind farm. Perhaps the most noteworthy initiative before Hochul’s full election was an executive order signed in September 2022,83 which aims to accelerate efforts to make state operations more sustainable in terms of environmental performance for state agencies. This includes a commitment to 100% renewable energy in state-level operations by 2030. Likewise, state agencies representing an estimated $50 billion in investments pledged 80 See: Biden-Harris Democrats, The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and

Environmental Justice, https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/. 81 The same also applies to the Biden administration’s national carbon neutrality pledge by 2050, which is likely to encourage other states to follow California and New York’s lead by establishing comparable pledges at the state level. For instance, as will be examined in more detail in Chapter 7, Massachusetts legally codified its own carbon neutrality pledge in March 2021, followed by other states such as Washington. 82 In this regard, Hochul won a special election in 2011 for the US House of Representatives, becoming the first Democrat in forty years to represent a largely Republican Congressional district in the Western part of New York state, which pushed her towards the center politically. 83 New York State—Executive Order No. 22 (2022, September 20). Leading by Example: Directing State Agencies to Adopt a Sustainability and Decarbonization Program.

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to achieve net zero for their portfolios by 2040. This ensured that the state’s financial resources became aligned with clean energy requirements under the CLCPA, consolidating the streamlining of New York’s lead-byexample sustainability directives launched under Cuomo. While certainly representing positive steps, environmental groups criticized the first year and a half of Hochul’s Governorship for falling short in terms of climate ambition, with mostly incremental steps.84 This was also apparent in the state legislature where, following passage of the budget in April 2022 with an increase in funding for the decarbonization of public buildings and electric school buses, little noteworthy legislation was passed to address climate change and support enactment of the CLCPA.85 Despite this incremental approach, from a multilevel governance perspective, Hochul’s first year and a half as Governor led to a realignment with the city of New York. This time however, there was a relative decrease in the level of ambition at both echelons. Like Adams at the municipal level, Hochul did not prioritize environmental issues during the first part of her Governorship, partly freeriding on the green momentum established by Cuomo after passage of the CLCPA. As examined above, this is comparable to Adams’ lack of major new climate initiatives since becoming Mayor, also freeriding on the momentum created under de Blasio with initiatives like the CMA in the buildings sector. Both Adams and Hochul assumed office only a couple of months apart. They both chose to concentrate on similar issues at the start of their respective mandates, such as tackling crime, homelessness, managing the city’s postCOVID transition from a healthcare and economic perspective, as well as promoting growth in innovative sectors like the technology and financial industries to accelerate the recovery. This underlines the pattern whereby multilevel governance is not static but evolves over time due to changes in administration, with occasional (relative) relapses. Kathy Hochul won the November 2022 gubernatorial election, defeating Republican Lee Zeldin in the closest New York gubernatorial

84 See: French (2022, June). 85 The 2021–2021 New York state legislative session was mixed overall. A few bills

were able to get passed such as a law applying tighter energy efficiency standards for buildings, along with another one enabling utilities to build and own geothermal district heating. However, several other important climate-related laws failed to pass, including a proposal to allow the New York Power Authority develop and own new renewable energy sources. Ibid.

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election since 1994, and the smallest Democratic victory in the state since 1982. Due to the tightness of the race, Hochul was pushed into appealing to the more progressive side of the liberal Democratic voter base, especially in New York City, by pledging to raise her level of ambition on climate issues if elected. Hochul’s victory coincided with the finalization of the ‘Scoping Plan’ by the state’s Climate Action Council, outlining a series of policy recommendations across a range of different sectors to help achieve the ambitious targets of the CLCPA.86 This plan was presented to the newly elected Governor on the first day of her inauguration on January 1, 2023, providing a policy blueprint for Hochul to legitimize and justify her new level of climate ambition at the start of her first full term. Relying on the recommendations set out in the Scoping Plan, the Governor announced during her ‘State of the State’ speech a range of ambitious new green policy proposals. These include an economy-wide ‘Cap-and-Invest’ program that would establish an annual cap on the permitted amount of GHG emissions in the state.87 Each year, the emissions cap would be reduced, thus incentivizing large-scale polluters to transition towards low-carbon alternatives by requiring them to purchase allowances for emissions linked to their activities. Modeled after California’s long-established cap-and-trade system, the objective is to enable the state of New York to meet the CLCPA’s ambitious climate goals. Moreover, Hochul announced a legislative proposal for a ‘Climate Action Rebate’ that could generate up to $1 billion in cap-and-invest proceeds for investment in climate-related projects, including large-scale electrification, energy efficiency measures and clean mobility solutions. Likewise, the Governor’s proposals included new versions of policies which had been turned down by the state legislature in 2022, such as the idea of enabling the New York Power authority to develop and operate its own renewable power projects. Hochul also revived plans for the widespread electrification of buildings by phasing out the sale of all fossil fuel burning home appliances (including oil and gas heating equipment) by the end of the decade. 86 New York State Climate Action Council (2022). 87 See: New York State (2023, January 10). Governor

Hochul Unveils Capand-Invest Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Combat Climate Change: https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-unveils-cap-and-invest-pro gram-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissions-and-combat.

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These policy proposals are significant, since the year 2023 is of critical importance for putting the state on a trajectory to successfully achieve the far-reaching climate targets of the CLCPA. Moreover, the Scoping Plan sets out a number of additional, detailed proposals targeting a broad range of other sectors,88 which is likely to encourage Hochul’s administration to announce further green policy schemes in the coming years of her Governorship. Clearly, these policy initiatives go beyond freeriding on the green momentum established by the previous Governor and point to a notable increase in the level of climate ambition on the part of the current Governor. In this regard, like Cuomo, it seems as though Hochul has also evolved from being a centrist Democrat into becoming more committed to bold climate action over time.89 At the time of writing, these proposals have yet to be implemented; although several can be enacted via executive action, a number of them will require new legislation. Democrats lost a few seats in the November 2022 elections for the state legislature. And some of Hochul’s far-reaching climate proposals have drawn criticism not only from Republicans, but also from centrist Democrats worried about their economic impact, especially at a time of high energy prices. As previously explained, several related climate bills were turned down during the 2022 legislative session, and Hochul is also likely to face steep opposition from well-funded lobbying groups. Like OneNYC and the CMA at the municipal level, critics have expressed doubts as to whether or not the state of New York will realistically be able to achieve the very ambitious targets set out in the CLCPA through enactment of the latest policy proposals outlined by Hochul.90 This is exacerbated by the fact that while the Scoping Plan does provide a detailed policy blueprint, it does not have binding regulatory effect. Instead, its purpose is to present a number of recommendations for potential new regulations and other measures, which state agencies may then choose to follow. As with the municipal echelon, it is challenging for the state of New York to transition towards greater sustainability, since it

88 New York State Climate Action Council (2022). 89 Still, this transition has happened much more quickly under Hochul, since it took

Cuomo nearly eight years and it was only at the start of his third term that he chose to noticeably raise his level of climate ambition with a state-level ‘Green New Deal’. 90 See: French (December 2022) and Iaconangelo (2023).

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constitutes one of the most vibrant global economic hubs, with continued heavy reliance on fossil fuels. Yet, in spite of relative losses, Democrats continue to hold unassailable majorities in both state houses following the November 2022 elections.91 This means that a good part of the Governor’s new climate agenda is likely to be enacted, even though it risks being watered down due to lobbying pressure or in order to reach compromises with centrist members of the state legislature.92 Hence, like OneNYC and the CMA at the city level, concrete steps towards successful implementation of the CLCPA and Hochul’s latest policy proposals over the next few years are needed to confirm New York’s position as a national and global climate pioneer, and avoid accusations of ‘greenwashing’. 3.2 Effective Articulation and Remaining Shortcomings for Multilevel Climate Governance Between the City and State of New York Effective articulation of multilevel climate governance between the city and state of New York, in the implementation of their ‘Green New Deals’, can be identified across several different dimensions. Firstly, the timing of their respective enactments coincided almost perfectly. Municipal authorities released an updated OneNYC and the City Council passed the CMA both in April 2019, while the state senate approved the CLCPA only two months later in June 2019. This was not coincidence, but in all likelihood represented an effort at the municipal and state levels to coordinate the launching of their Green New Deals at roughly the same time. Such a level of temporal synchronization was made possible by the fact that Democrats currently possess strong majorities at both echelons.93 91 Democrats lost five seats in the state assembly and currently hold 102 out of a total of 150 seats; likewise, they lost one seat in the state senate and have 42 out of 63 total seats. 92 Moreover, it should be noted that Hochul presented her climate policy plans as part of the broader state budget proposal, and there are precedents for important reforms to be passed in this manner by relying on the state budgetary process, including, for example, a law in 2020 concerning the streamlining of renewable energy projects. 93 Republicans had previously hampered such efforts in the state Senate. Still, it is noteworthy that OneNYC and the CMA were enacted two months ahead of the CLCPA. This indicates that New York City was able to set the pace and lead the way in terms of its level of climate ambition compared to the state level, at least under Mayor de Blasio.

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Secondly, effective multilevel governance between the ‘Green New Deals’ at the municipal and state levels is also apparent in that they both share the same long-term climate objectives and high level of ambition, which are legally enshrined. Both aim to transition towards 100% carbon-free electricity and to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century, in accordance with the long-term goals set out by the Paris Agreement. Therefore, New York City has acted as the catalyst, pulling the state towards higher objectives over time, since the two echelons have now become well aligned in their level of ambition and share the same longterm objectives. This demonstrates that multilevel climate governance is not static, but may evolve positively over time, with cities often leading the way as focal points within the climate regime, setting the policy agenda within a multilevel framework.94 What is more, the ‘Green New Deals’ at both the city and state levels established targets which seek to transform New York into a climate leader not only at the national level, but also on a global scale (at least on paper).95 For instance, the CMA made New York the first city in the world to require such far-reaching and obligatory emission reductions from buildings, which involve efficiency upgrades to decrease energy consumption, with steep penalties for non-compliance. Likewise, the level of ambition for many of the targets established by the CLCPA in New York state, especially its transition towards 100% carbon-free electricity by 2040, are among the most extensive not only in the US,96 but also in the world. Thirdly, effective multilevel governance is apparent in terms of the allocation of policy responsibilities between the city and the state of New York in the implementation of their respective Green New Deals. Both echelons have adopted different strategic approaches which, as examined below, enable them to have the most impact in terms of reducing GHG

94 Once again, creative climate policymaking is also apparent in smaller US cities as well. See: Homsy (2018). 95 Nevertheless and as indicated above, successful implementation of the CMA and OneNYC at the municipal level, as well as the CLCPA at the state level, is needed over the next few decades to confirm in practice whether or not New York has indeed become a global climate pioneer. 96 This may change following the Biden administration’s decision to set out the objective of achieving a 100% carbon-free power sector at the national level by 2035.

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emissions in relation to variations in legal competences and policy concentrations between the state and city levels. Thus, OneNYC and the CMA target a number of sectors that are specifically well adapted to what New York City can contribute in terms of climate mitigation,97 as a large urban area operating under Home Rule—specifically buildings, transportation and waste management. The core provisions of the municipal CMA involve mandatory emission reductions from large buildings of 25,000 square feet or more (both commercial and residential), primarily via upgrades in energy efficiency starting in 2024, with gradually more stringent requirements over time through several compliance phases. These large buildings, which are responsible for over a third of the city’s GHG emissions, will be required to reduce emissions 40% by 2030, and more than 80% by 2050, a global first; the two initial compliance phases are from 2024 to 2029, and then from 2030 to 2034 (with more stringent requirements in the second phase).98 Likewise, the CMA’s package of local ordinances includes banning new glass-walled buildings (unless they follow strict performance rules), as well as imposing ‘green roofs’ that involve solar photovoltaic systems on a number of new construction or renovation projects. In terms of transportation,99 the OneNYC blueprint puts in place congestion pricing to lower traffic in the city center, along with improvements in the subway system and expanded bus lanes. The blueprint also commits to developing a carbon–neutral city fleet by 2040 and creates priority zones and public spaces for pedestrians to reduce access from vehicles. Furthermore, OneNYC aims to make the collection of organic waste obligatory throughout the city, turning New York’s organics management program into the largest in the US. Additionally, the plan will reduce and gradually phase out purchases of plastic utensils and processed meat. Mayor Eric Adams has begun to enact a number of

97 On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see: Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), Pincetl et al. (2020). 98 Details are set out in Local Law 97, the centerpiece of the CMA’s package of local ordinances, which created an ‘Office of Building Energy and Emissions Performance’ charged with overseeing implementation of these targets. As noted above, buildings are responsible for over 70% of overall emissions in New York City. 99 On the importance of the transportation sector for municipal climate policies, see: Hickman and Banister (2014).

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these proposals, building on the green momentum established by his predecessor. Such an approach differs markedly from the state-level CLCPA framework, which is more holistic. The state plan involves the establishment of targets in a broad range of sectors on a more general level, which Governor Hochul hopes to expand on. This includes reaching 70% renewable energy by 2030, 9000 MW of offshore wind power by 2035, 3000 MW of energy storage by 2030, 6000 MW of solar power by 2025, as well as 22 million tons of carbon reduction through energy efficiency and electrification, equivalent to a 23% increase in efficiency by 2030. Part of the holistic approach was to mandate the Climate Action Council (created by the Act) to develop a Scoping Plan, with the aim to establish details in terms of how the state will achieve these general GHG emission reduction targets across all major sources. As previously explained, the state Climate Action Council released the final version of the Scoping Plan in December 2022. It constitutes a detailed policy blueprint spanning across a very broad range of sectors, such as buildings, transportation, along with waste management, much like OneNYC . However, it also includes other sectors not fully covered at the city level such as agriculture, as well as important parts of industrial and commercial activities.100 Some policy areas, such as agriculture, as well as certain industrial or commercial sectors, are highly polluting and emit large quantities of GHG emissions. Yet, they mostly fall outside the ambit of municipal authorities, which means that cities have limited impact and control over them. Hence, the Scoping Plan and the holistic approach contained in the CLCPA arguably constitute an essential complement to the more targeted strategy adopted by New York City. This confirms the pattern whereby cities and states tend to adopt different, complementary policy approaches to address climate change. If properly coordinated, each echelon plays a specific role in the multilevel governance pyramid. Moreover, the CLCPA demonstrates another pattern whereby the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more holistic policy approaches tend to become. The CLCPA’s more general approach is clearly different from the strategy adopted by OneNYC and the CMA, which target specific policy sectors

100 New York State Climate Action Council (2022).

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that are well adapted to the municipal scale.101 For these reasons, the distinct approaches taken by the city and the state of New York in enacting their ‘Green New Deals’ are in fact complementary and mutually reinforcing, as they rely on the strengths and assets of their respective echelons. Effective multilevel governance is also apparent in areas where OneNYC and the CLCPA address similar policy issues. While they adopt distinctive approaches, the city and the state of New York inevitably concur in several areas relating to climate mitigation; for example, their shared efforts to enhance reliance on renewable energies are noteworthy. In such instances, the city and the state mutually support one another. As indicated above, OneNYC aims to transition towards 100% carbon-free energy for city government operations, including through the construction of new infrastructure to connect with Canadian hydropower sources. Shortly after releasing the updated OneNYC , de Blasio began negotiations with Hydro-Quebec, in order to reach an agreement by the end of 2020. Although this was interrupted by the coronavirus outbreak, there was some question as to whether Cuomo would support the initiative, since the state’s consent is required for this type of infrastructure.102 Because the former Mayor and Governor had developed a certain level of mutual animosity over the years, the two repeatedly quarreled on a variety of issues during their time in office, with Cuomo often relying on his more extensive powers to undermine de Blasio’s projects. In fact, there appears to be a history of institutional competition between the Mayor and Governor of New York.103 Therefore, Cuomo’s decision in May 2020 to lend his support and follow de Blasio’s lead by jointly relaunching negotiations with Hydro-Quebec is all the more notable because it happened in the middle of the chaos triggered by the COVID19 pandemic. One reason for Cuomo’s support was the fact that the 101 The fact that the state of New York possesses, as previously explained, a much larger budget compared to the municipal government is propitious to enabling a more holistic approach covering all sectors, instead of the more targeted approach adopted by the city. 102 This includes building the ‘Champlain Hudson Express’, a high-voltage direct current submarine power cable that would connect the Montreal area directly to New York City. 103 This sort of rivalry between Governors and Mayors from large cities is not uncommon across the US, even when they both come from the same political Party as was the case with Cuomo and de Blasio. It is interesting to note that Cuomo also had a conflictual relationship with the previous Mayor Michael Bloomberg.

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infrastructure project would also benefit the state of New York, helping it to achieve its own renewable energy targets set out in the CLCPA. Still, this situation indicates that climate change was one area where the former Mayor and Governor were willing to collaborate even under difficult circumstances. Climate change was one of the few subjects where the rivalry between Cuomo and de Blasio may have been constructive, as it galvanized them into mutually raising their level of ambition. The Canadian hydropower sources policy, initiated by the municipality and then supported at the state level, illustrates how cities may act as ‘laboratories of democracy’. It shows how new green initiatives can be tested and launched at the municipal level, before being subsequently enacted by the higher echelons. This supports the idea that local policy experimentations can trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up, which represent a key aspect of the contributions from sub-national actors within the climate regime.104 The personal dynamics between Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul appear to be different, at least at the time of writing. Both have prided themselves on their close partnership since assuming office a couple of months apart, in an effort to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. Throughout 2022, they were able to collaborate closely on a number of different issues, ranging from crime to homelessness. This was also apparent for climate-related issues, including the completion of negotiations for the Hydro-Quebec project. Final approval was granted by both echelons over the course of 2022, and construction began towards the end of that year. Both Adams and Hochul understood that this project would be mutually beneficial, helping the city and the state to accelerate their transition towards clean energy sources. Multilevel coordination between the two echelons appears to have reached a high point under Adams and Hochul. They chose to release together an action plan in December 2022 known as ‘Making New York Work for Everyone’. This constitutes a policy blueprint to jointly tackle shared challenges across a broad range of sectors, so as to ensure a successful post-COVID transition for the city and the state.105 Such unprecedented multilevel alignment highlights an attempt to demonstrate their close partnership, a stark contrast to the personal rivalries which have

104 See: Hale (2018). 105 New New York Panel (2022).

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characterized relations between New York Mayors and Governors over the last few decades. The ‘Making New York Work’ blueprint sets out forty different policy proposals based around three key themes106 ; most proposals do not directly address climate change, but still have a bearing on it since they involve sectors like energy, buildings or transportation. Therefore, a number of elements involving effective multilevel governance on climate issues between the city and the state of New York are apparent as the two echelons were able to successfully coordinate both the enactment and the initial implementation phases of their respective Green New Deals. This represents a notable development and substantiates the pattern whereby multilevel governance is not static, but may positively evolve over time, with cities leading the way, pulling the higher echelons upwards. Nuance is necessary, however, since multilevel climate governance between the city and state of New York still suffers from a number of inadequacies. This reveals that even ‘best case studies’ like New York do not always display effective coordination and have room for improvement. Consequently, and for reasons that will be examined in more detail below, this shows how implementation of local climate initiatives for the cities in our sample may in some cases lead to problematic interactions between the different tiers of governance. For instance, the CMA’s main aim is to reduce emissions from the city’s large buildings, while the OneNYC framework sets out important provisions in the fields of transportation, energy and waste management. Thus, Mayor Adams has outlined a broader policy approach to tackling climate change at the municipal level (see above). Under the holistic approach adopted by the state-level CLCPA, the Climate Action Council was mandated to develop a ‘Scoping Plan’ released in December 2022, proposing detailed recommendations to enable the state to achieve general GHG emission reduction targets across all major sources. This comprises many of the same sectors targeted by OneNYC and the CMA, including buildings, transportation and waste management. Legislators were careful to craft the texts of these documents so as to avoid any direct or overt conflict between them, at least in theory.

106 These three themes are: 1. Reimagine New York’s Business Districts as Vibrant 24/ 7 Destinations. 2. Make It Easier for New Yorkers to Get to Work. 3. Generate Inclusive, Future-Focused Growth.

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Nonetheless, in practice, there are concerns of overlap, in particular following the ambitious climate policy announcements made by Governor Hochul during her ‘State of the State’ address in January 2023. While these announcements have yet to be enacted at the time of writing, they involve the development of green initiatives across a range of sectors covered by both echelons, in accordance with the recommendations of the Scoping Plan. This may lead to divergences in the implementation process in terms of conflicting rules for emissions from large buildings, for example, which remains a point of focus at the municipal level due to the provisions set out by the CMA.107 Under the US federal system, there is no direct obligation of compatibility between the state and municipal levels, including for cities like New York operating under ‘Home Rule’; this represents a potential weakness of the US multilevel paradigm, as it can in some cases open the door to disparities between the two echelons.108 Due to the doctrine of preemption examined above, there is an indirect incentive for compatibility, since any overt conflict between state laws and municipal ordinances within these sectors will be resolved in favor of the state. This provides a legal incentive for both echelons to coordinate the implementation of their Green New Deals. While the action plan ‘Making New York Work for Everyone’, jointly released by Hochul and Adams in December 2022, will probably help to avoid some overlaps and conflicting rules, the plan is not foolproof. As previously explained, the blueprint addresses a broad range of sectors, like buildings, transportation and energy which have a bearing on climate change. However, the blueprint is non-binding and at the time of writing, it has yet to be translated into concrete policies. This will be necessary to confirm the effective articulation of multilevel governance between the city and the state, and thus move beyond mere intentions of goodwill. Despite the fact that Hochul and Adams pride themselves on establishing a close partnership, a growing number of divergences have begun to emerge. For instance, Adams has been quite critical on several key aspects

107 See: Davis Polk & Wardell LLP (2019). While the Scoping Plan does not have regulatory effect, it still proposes regulations and other measures that state agencies would then be able to implement. Such regulations enacted by state agencies are binding in a number of cases. 108 As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, this forms a notable point of contrast to the relatively centralized French political system, where there is a direct legal obligation of compatibility between the municipal and regional levels.

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of the state budget announced in January 2023, accusing the Governor of unreasonable budgetary cuts impacting the city. While this does not directly concern climate change, a spillover is likely since environmental degradation concerns a broad array of different sectors. A further example of multilevel discord is linked to the fact that temporal objectives are still not always well aligned between the city and the state. For instance, whereas New York City has chosen the year 2005 as a baseline for its GHG emission targets, the state has opted for the year 1990 instead. Over the medium run, this means that the city remains more ambitious than the state, since cutting emissions 40% by 2030 from a 2005 baseline constitutes a greater reduction compared to a 1990 baseline, when emissions were lower. Over the long run, the city will need to cut emissions by around 80% to reach carbon neutrality by midcentury since it has chosen a 2005 baseline, whereas the state must reduce emissions slightly more—by 85%—because it has adopted a 1990 baseline; in both cases, the remaining emissions cuts will come from ‘carbon offsets’.109 While a discrepancy is not overly problematic, since the end result by 2050 in terms of reaching carbon neutrality will in all likelihood be relatively similar, the lack of temporal alignment can still cause issues in terms of the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. This may lead to challenges in policy coordination and harmonization, making it more difficult to monitor progress with implementation over time, including in terms of comparing climate objectives and results over the medium to long run. A more apparent divergence, which also has a bearing on temporal synchronization, is that these objectives are set out according to different timelines. While both OneNYC and the CLCPA aim to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century, along with 100% carbon-free electricity, the city seeks to transition towards 100% clean electricity by 2050 at the same time it reaches carbon neutrality. The state enshrines its carbon-free energy target for 2040, ten years before reaching carbon neutrality. Such a discrepancy is exacerbated by the fact that the Biden administration has

109 According to the Cambridge Online Dictionary, carbon offsetting can be defined as: “the process of trying to reduce the damage caused by releasing carbon dioxide into the environment by doing other things that remove carbon dioxide, for example by planting trees” (or through carbon sequestration). See: https://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/dictio nnaire/anglais/carbon-offsetting.

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set out an even more ambitious national objective of transitioning towards a carbon-free power sector by 2035, five years ahead of the state of New York and fifteen years ahead of NYC (see Chapter 3). However, this may not be as problematic as it appears. The state of New York’s far-reaching climate targets, along with Biden’s ambitious national objective, will probably have the effect of galvanizing the city into enhancing its level of ambition over time. This is especially likely because state law has primacy over local ordinances under the doctrine of preemption, and New York’s Court of Appeals has in most cases upheld state authority over local governments, despite ‘Home Rule’ provisions. Interestingly, with the passage of the CLCPA, the state of New York is now slightly more ambitious than the city on transitioning towards clean electricity. This represents a noteworthy reversal compared to the previous situation, whereby the city had historically acted as a catalyst, pulling the state towards a higher level of aspiration. Again, this highlights that multilevel climate governance is not static, but may evolve over time. While the CLCPA passed under Cuomo enabled the state of New York to catch up with the city in its level of climate ambition, the situation may be accelerating under Governor Hochul. As examined above, Hochul announced in January 2023 a range of far-reaching climate policy proposals following her election to a full term as state executive. These involve innovative schemes that go beyond simply freeriding on the momentum established under Cuomo and could lead to a notable reinforcement of the state’s climate policy framework, especially the proposal to establish a state-wide ‘Cap-and-Invest’ program. Depending on how fully Hochul is able to enact her new climate policy agenda over the next few months and years, her policies have the potential to enhance the state of New York’s position as a national and global climate leader, at a time when Mayor Eric Adams has not displayed the same level of green entrepreneurship. Absent a change in prioritization on the part of Adams in the near future, this paradigm may continue to challenge our understanding of multilevel governance. In most cases, the municipal echelon serves as a pioneer on climate issues, with the state striving to catch up. As New York state surges ahead on climate policy, the multigovernance paradigm may become unbalanced once again, although this time, it would be the city under Mayor Adams that lags behind. Overall, instances of interaction, including both effective coordination and more problematic synchronization issues, highlight the ways in which New York constitutes a particularly relevant paradigm in terms of the

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articulation of multilevel climate governance. The far-reaching climate policies developed by the city and the state over the last few years, especially during Trump’s Presidency but also since then, clearly underline the ways in which sub-state actors may contribute towards closing the GHG emissions gap stemming from inadequate national policies. As examined in Chapter 3, while President Biden has endeavored to reinstate an ambitious federal climate agenda, Democrats continue to face a number of obstacles, including staunch conservative opposition in Congress (especially after the November 2022 mid-term elections), as well as in the court system. Hence, the ambitious climate initiatives enacted by the city and state of New York, examined in this chapter, emphasize the potential for sub-national actors to compensate for inadequacies within a federal framework, thus helping to close the emissions gap. This represents a key aspect of their contributions within the global climate regime.110

4

Conclusion

This chapter has examined multilevel climate governance in the US from the municipal to the state echelon, focusing on the distinct case study of the city and state of New York. More specifically, it has explored various approaches adopted by the city of New York in implementing its local climate initiatives, and how this has impacted collaboration with the echelon just above it, i.e., the state of New York. This first echelon of the multilevel pyramid constitutes an essential aspect of multilevel climate governance. The chapter has demonstrated how the city and state of New York constitute a distinctive paradigm of multilevel governance, linked to specific legal arrangements at both echelons. Personal affinities between Mayors and Governors in New York have also played a role, leading to fluctuating levels of enthusiasm for climate policy from elected officials at both echelons over the last few years. This chapter has also highlighted notable patterns in the articulation of multilevel governance, which confirm those addressed in Chapters 2 to 5. While these previous chapters emphasized the role of sub-national entities more generally (cities and states or regions) and their interactions with the national echelon, Chapter 6 has focused more specifically on the importance of cities and the municipal echelon in terms of establishing

110 See: Hale (2018).

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these patterns, through their interaction with the state level. The main pattern consists of municipalities as pioneers and catalysts for innovative initiatives in the enactment of local climate policies, with federal states galvanized by cities into raising their level of ambition over time. Cities may also operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’, since new climate policies can be tested at the local level, before their subsequent enactment by the state echelon. Depending on who is Mayor, municipalities like New York can set the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework.111 Policy approaches become more general and holistic as we move up the multilevel governance pyramid. Consequently, each echelon has a specific role to play within the multilevel pyramid. Cities and states often adopt different strategic approaches to address climate change, which may complement one another if properly coordinated through the right policies. It is also interesting to observe that multilevel governance is not static, but evolves over time, either due to changes in elected administrations at the city or state level, or due to changes in policy platforms within the same administration over time. Although it possesses its own unique characteristics and set of circumstances, multilevel climate governance between the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts shares many similarities with New York, while also displaying a number of differences. This will be the focus of the next chapter (Chapter 7).

111 As discussed above, Kathy Hochul’s climate policy proposals announced after her election to a full term as Governor demonstrate a level of green entrepreneurship that is not (yet) matched at the municipal level by Mayor Eric Adams.

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Bibliography Books and Articles Bache, I., & Flinders, M. (2004). Multi-Level Governance. Oxford University Press. Bailey, C. J. (2019). ‘Assessing President Obama’s Climate Change Record’. Environmental Politics, 28(5), 847–865. https://doi.org/10.1080/096 44016.2018.1494967 Barichella, A. (2018). ‘Multi-actor, multi-level governance for the transatlantic climate and energy dialogue’. Sciences Po Law Review, 14, 71–85. Barichella, A. (2019, December 6). ‘The Battle Heats Up: Climate Issues in the 2020 US Presidential Election’. Éditoriaux de l’Ifri—Édito Énergie. Barichella, A. (2021, January 13). ‘US Climate Politics under Biden: Is the Clean Energy Revolution Under Way?’ Éditoriaux de l’Ifri—Édito Énergie. Brown, H. (2016). Pay-to-Play Politics: How Money Defines the American Democracy. Praeger Publishers. Charnock, E. J. (2020). The Rise of Political Action Committees: Interest Group Electioneering and the Transformation of American Politics. Oxford University Press. Coleman, A. N., & Leskiw, C. S. (2018). Debating Federalism: From the Founding to Today. Lexington Books. Davis Polk, & Wardell L. L. P. (2019). Client Memorandum on New York City’s Climate Mobilization Act. Dodge, J. (2017). ‘Crowded Advocacy: Framing Dynamic in the Fracking Controversy in New York’. VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 28, 888–915. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11 266-016-9800-6 Drutman, L. (2015). The Business of America is Lobbying: How Corporations Became Politicized and Politics Became More Corporate. Oxford University Press. Durkin, E., & Dunn D. M. (2022, March 3). ‘Adams runs hot and cold on climate’. Politico. Fisher, L., & Harriger, K. (2019—12th edition). American Constitutional Law, Volume 1: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism. Carolina Academic Press. French, M. J. (2022, June 9). ‘New York lawmakers fall short of climate goals as session ends’. POLITICO. French, M. J. (2022, December 19). ‘New York Passes Sweeping Plan to Reduce Emissions and ‘Lead the Way on Solving Climate Change’. POLITICO. Hague, R., & Harrop, M. (2007). Comparative Government and Politics. Palgrave MacMillan.

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Hale, T. (2018, November). ‘The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes’. Chatham House—Research Paper. Hamin Infield, E. M., Abunnasr, Y., & Ryan, R. L. (2018). Planning for Climate Change: A Reader in Green Infrastructure and Sustainable Design for Resilient Cities. Routledge. Hays, S. P. (2000). A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945. University of Pittsburgh Press. Hays, S. P. (2008). Beauty, Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955– 1985 (Studies in Environment and History). Cambridge University Press. Hickman, R., & Banister, D. (2014).Transport, Climate Change and the City . Routledge. Homsy, G. C (2018). ‘Unlikely Pioneers: Creative Climate Change Policymaking in Smaller U.S. Cities’. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 8(2), 121–131. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-018-0483-8 Iaconangelo, D. (2023, February 7). ‘3 Issues may Determine N.Y.’s Clean Energy Future’. Energywire. Johnson, C., Toly, N., & Schroeder, H. (2017). The Urban Climate Challenge: Rethinking the Role of Cities in the Global Climate Regime. Routledge. Konisky, D. M. (2020). Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. Kraft, M. E. (2000). ‘U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From the 1960s to the 1990s’. Journal of Policy History, 12(1), 17–42. https://doi.org/10. 1353/jph.2000.0006 Kraft, E. M. (2021—8th edition). Environmental Policy and Politics. Routledge. LaCroix, A. L. (2010). Ideological Origins of American Federalism. Harvard University Press. Pincetl, S., Gustafson, H., Federico, F., Fournier, E. D., Cudd, R., & Porse, E. (2020). Energy Use in Cities: A Roadmap for Urban Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan. Quirk, P. J. (2016). Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies. Princeton University Press. Rachal, M. (2022, February 4). ‘NYC Mayor Reshapes Climate Approach to put Environmental Justice at the Fore’. Utility Dive. Rinfret, S. R., & Pautz, M. C. (2019). US Environmental Policy in Action. Palgrave Macmillan. Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Rowell, A., & van Zeben, J. (2021). A Guide to U.S. Environmental Law. University of California Press. Shafie, D. M. (2020). The Administrative Presidency and the Environment: Policy Leadership and Retrenchment from Clinton to Trump. Routledge.

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Sikora, P. (2022, July 26). ‘Is Eric Adams About to Gut the Nation’s Most Important Local Climate Law?’ New York Focus. Sikora, P. (2022, October 7). ‘Adams Takes First Big Step on Climate Law, Yet Bigger Questions Loom’. New York Focus. Waldman, C. (2014, November 24). ‘Cuomo Abstains from Global Warming ‘Debate’. POLITICO. Wheeler, S. M., & Rosan, C. D. (2021). Reimagining Sustainable Cities: Strategies for Designing Greener, Healthier, More Equitable Communities. University of California Press.

Public Policy Documents and Laws Adams, E. (2021, April). A Greener City, A Brighter Future. City of New York (2015, April). One New York 2050: Building a Strong and Fair City. City of New York (2017, September). 1.5°C: Aligning New York City with the Paris Climate Agreement. City of New York (updated version - 2019, April). OneNYC 2050: Building a Strong and Fair City. Constitution of the United States of America (1791). Tenth Amendment. Hamilton, A. (1788). The Same Subject Continued: Concerning the General Power of Taxation. Federalist Papers No. 32. National League of Cities (2018). City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A Stateby-State Analysis. New New York Panel (2022, December). Making New York Work for Everyone. New York City Council (2019, April). The Climate Mobilization Act. New York City Office of the Mayor—Executive Order No. 23 (2022, September 22). Clean Construction. New York State Climate Action Council (2022, December). Scoping Plan: Full Report. New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (2021). Statewide GHG Emissions Report. New York State—Executive Order No. 22 (2022, September 20). Leading by Example: Directing State Agencies to Adopt a Sustainability and Decarbonization Program.

Websites Biden-Harris Democrats. The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://joebiden. com/climate-plan/

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Cambridge Online Dictionary, Carbon Offsetting. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/fr/dictionnaire/anglais/car bon-offsetting New York City (2021, January 25). Mayor de Blasio, Comptroller Stringer, and Trustees Announce Estimated $4 Billion Divestment from Fossil Fuels. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://www.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/053-21/mayor-de-blasio-comptroller-stringer-trustees-estima ted-4-billion-divestment-from NYC Office of the Mayor (2019, April). Action on Global Warming: NYC’s Green New Deal. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://www1.nyc.gov/ office-of-the-mayor/news/209-19/action-global-warming-nyc-s-green-newdeal#/0 New York State (2023, January 10). Governor Hochul Unveils Cap-and-Invest Program to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Combat Climate Change. Retrieved February 20, 2023, from https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/gov ernor-hochul-unveils-cap-and-invest-program-reduce-greenhouse-gas-emissi ons-and-combat UN Environment, Cities and climate change. Retrieved January 29, 2023, from https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/resource-effici ency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change

CHAPTER 7

Cities as Catalysts: Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts

1

Introduction

This chapter analyzes multilevel climate governance in the United States from the municipal to the state echelon, focusing on the distinct case study of Boston and the state of Massachusetts. More precisely, it examines the various approaches adopted by city of Boston to enact its local climate initiatives, and how this has impacted collaboration with the tier of governance right above it, i.e., the state of Massachusetts. This builds upon the material explored in Chapter 6 which concentrates on the city and the state of New York. While the first half of this book focuses on the second echelon of the multilevel pyramid involving the national and the sub-national echelons in the US and France,1 the second half explores the first or lowest echelon of the multilevel pyramid concerning interactions from the municipal to the state or regional level.2 This chapter will be divided into two sub-sections, with Sect. 2 providing a historical background of multilevel climate governance between Boston and Massachusetts, with the city reaching a new level of climate ambition under Marty Walsh and Michelle Wu. After that, Sect. 3 will examine how partial multilevel climate governance between Boston and Massachusetts 1 Chapters 2–5. 2 Chapters 6–8.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_7

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gradually improved during Baker’s two terms in office, with prospects for an effective alignment with the city under the new Governor Maura Healey. This analysis is enriched by a detailed comparison between New York/NY and Boston/MA throughout these two sections. New York and Boston are global leaders on environmental issues; as large, prosperous urban centers located in a developed country, they have substantial budgets and resources, allowing them to develop advanced infrastructure and enact far-reaching climate policies. The same applies to the two US states in our sample—New York and Massachusetts. Such rich comparative material pinpoints relevant frameworks for multilevel climate governance. By comparing in detail the implementation of local climate initiatives in New York and Boston, this chapter, like the previous one, identifies both the strengths and weaknesses of their respective multilevel paradigms. At the same time, these chapters illustrate that even worldleading municipalities can in some cases fall short in providing effective multilevel synchronization on climate policy with the state level. If even ‘best case studies’ in developed countries fall short, then the international community as a whole may fail to achieve an adequate framework of multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Accord. This chapter also analyzes differences in legal arrangements at the state level in NY and MA, along with the vagaries of electoral politics and divergences in policy platforms between Democrats and Republicans, which tend to impact their level of enthusiasm for climate policy. Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 6, the variation in personal relations between Mayors and Governors in both our US samples has an obvious impact on multilevel governance.3

3 As with previous chapters, the material in this chapter is informed by an exten-

sive range of interviews with public officials working at the municipal and state levels on climate and environmental matters both in the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts, along with civil society experts from academia, think tanks and NGOs. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1).

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2 Historical Context of Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts, with the City Reaching a New Level of Green Ambition Under Mayors Walsh and Wu 2.1

Historical Context of Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts, with an Effective Coordination Early On

Historically, the state of Massachusetts (and the city of Boston) have often been regarded as national and global pioneers on environmental matters. Like New York (see Chapter 6), Massachusetts (MA) is a traditionally progressive state; voters and advocacy groups have consistently pressured politicians to enact green policies. Like the state New York, Massachusetts has made efforts to strictly comply with federal environmental statutes, most of which were enacted during America’s ‘environmental decade’ spanning the 1960s and 1970s.4 This is especially apparent under the Clean Air Act (CAA) in that states can choose to develop a ‘State Implementation Plan’ (SIP),5 outlining how they intend to achieve so-called ‘national ambient air quality standards’ within their borders for different types of air pollutants. As explained in Chapter 2, if a SIP is approved by the EPA, the state receives federal funding to support local implementation of the CAA. Massachusetts has enacted laws requiring the development of a SIP to comply with the CAA for a number of different air pollutants; enforcement responsibility is delegated to relevant state agencies, mostly the ‘State Department of Environmental Protection’. This has enabled MA to receive federal funding during the last few decades to support local enforcement of national ambient air quality standards.6 The state has consistently enacted a number of SIPs over the years which often surpassed national minimum standards under the CAA.

4 On the history of US environmental politics, see Kraft (2000) and Hays (2000, 2008). 5 For more on US environmental politics, see Rinfret and Pautz (2019), Kraft (2021),

and Konisky (2020). 6 For many air pollutants, the latest SIPs in the states of Massachusetts and New York were upgraded in 2018 and 2019, with an interruption since then due to the COVID crisis, before slow resumption in 2021.

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Moreover, like New York, Massachusetts has developed a form of ‘Home Rule’ through an amendment to the state constitution in 1966, which provides a certain level of autonomy to local governments. In its strongest form, Home Rule in Massachusetts involves promulgating a charter, which can provide cities with a good deal of autonomy. For instance, in the nineteenth century the city of Boston enacted its first Charter, which has been regularly updated since then. Yet, as with New York, ‘Home Rule’ in Massachusetts is limited by the doctrine of preemption, whereby state statutes take priority over local ordinances in cases of conflict; in addition, the state constitution identifies several policy areas where the General Court7 conserves the exclusive right to legislate. In spite of this, the latest version of Boston’s City Charter reinforces policy competences for the municipal government in fields that are relevant for enacting environmental policies.8 This has helped Boston to implement ambitious climate initiatives over the last few decades. Another contributing factor is that cities may be nimbler, as they are less burdened by large bureaucratic administrations or complex legislative systems, compared to governance processes at the national or state levels. Thus, Mayors are often able to take more direct action, including on climate change9 ; this also has a more immediate impact on their constituents, since cities represent the bottom echelon of the multilevel pyramid. In fact, municipalities play an essential role in terms of transforming policy into action at the grassroots level. Former Boston Mayor Thomas Menino signed an executive order in 2007 committing the city to reduce GHG emissions 25% by 2020 and 80% by 2050 (from a 2005 baseline) for municipal operations.10 The 7 The General Court is the historical name for Massachusetts’ bicameral state legislature,

comprised of both a state Senate and a state House of Representatives. This is similar to the state of New York’s bicameral legislature (see Chapter 6), and is in fact the norm for every US state except Nebraska. 8 The city of Boston no longer falls under the political or legal jurisdiction of a county, which has enhanced its margin of maneuver even further, including for climate policy. Between 1997–2000, Massachusetts abolished eight out of its fourteen county governments, including Suffolk County where Boston is located. Suffolk County now only exists as a geographical entity and for statistical purposes. 9 Barichella (2018). 10 Municipal operations can be defined as all those stemming from activities that fall

under Boston’s authority (municipal vehicle fleets, public buildings and housing, etc.), as opposed to overall citywide emissions.

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same year, Boston released a ‘Climate Action Plan’, which outlined in detail the policies that the city would follow to reach these goals across a number of targeted sectors, including buildings, transportation and the energy supply.11 In 2011, the Menino administration released the city’s first community-wide blueprint known as A Climate of Progress, which upgraded the initial Plan by establishing the same emissions reduction objectives citywide across all of Boston (not only for municipal operations).12 Since then, the city has been updating its Climate Action Plan every few years. These initiatives represented at the time some of the most far-reaching climate pledges of any city in the world, rivaling even New York’s PlaNYC under Mayor Bloomberg.13 Hence, both Boston and New York City have acted as pioneers in their respective states, leading the way forward on climate policy. This substantiates the pattern whereby cities serve as essential building blocks within the global climate regime, helping to set the policy agenda within a multilevel governance framework. Unlike New York, however, Boston’s initial climate initiatives were well coordinated early on with the state level. Relying on the extensive powers and autonomy afforded to states under US constitutional law,14 plus the federal policy void in this area as discussed in Chapter 2, the Governor of Massachusetts and the state legislature have sought to follow Boston’s lead. Democrats have traditionally enjoyed strong majorities in the General Court; already in 2002, and two years ahead of the state of New York, Massachusetts adopted a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), which set the stage for the ‘Global Warming Solutions Act’ (GWSA). The Governor at the time, Deval Patrick, was a Democrat who embraced a progressive policy agenda on environmental issues. Thus, around a year after Boston released its first Climate Action Plan, the GWSA was signed into law by Governor Patrick in August 2008, turning Massachusetts into one of the first US states (with California) to adopt a comprehensive and legally binding policy agenda to address 11 City of Boston (2007). 12 City of Boston (2011). 13 For instance, while PlaNYC had aimed to reduce NYC’s emissions 30% by 2030

(from 2005 levels), it did not contain long-term targets for the year 2050, unlike Boston’s Climate Action Plan. 14 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017).

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climate change. The GWSA became the principal legislative framework in Massachusetts for reducing statewide emissions, and its main provisions can be summarized as follows15 : • Reduce statewide GHG emissions between 10 to 25% by 2020 (from a 1990 baseline). • Reduce GHG emissions by 80% up to 2050 (from a 1990 baseline). • Set out requirements to ensure implementation of these targets, including mandatory reporting on emissions from the state’s largest sources, baseline assessments of statewide emissions and various emissions projections. • Require the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (EEA) to develop a detailed ‘Clean Energy and Climate Plan’ on how 2020 and 2050 targets will be achieved across different policy sectors, to be updated every five years. Following the enactment of the GWSA, Massachusetts established goals that resembled those of Boston’s Climate Action Plan (except for the difference in baseline years), and the two became better aligned in terms of multilevel governance. Governor Patrick also signed two other major acts in August 2008 to supplement the GWSA: the Green Communities Act (GCA) and the Green Jobs Act (GJA), turning the 2008 legislative session into the greenest in the state’s history (until 2021). The GCA is especially noteworthy, since it updated and enhanced the states’ RPS by launching a far-reaching reform of Massachusetts’ energy market to meet the targets set out in the GWSA, considerably enhancing energy efficiency and expanding renewable energy sources across the state.16 Yet, one of the most interesting aspects of the GCA from a multilevel governance perspective is that it established a system of direct funding

15 Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs, Global Warming Solutions Act Background: https://www.mass.gov/service-details/global-war ming-solutions-act-background. General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts—Chapter 298. An Act Establishing the Global Warming Solutions Act, August 2008. 16 This includes, for example, requiring that utilities ensure “all cost-effective efficiency”, and increasing the share of renewables so as to generate 15% renewable electricity by 2020. Likewise, the RPS was upgraded through the establishment of two separate renewable standards (‘Class I’ and ‘Class II’), along with an ‘Alternative RPS’.

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for green projects developed by municipal governments. Cities and local entities became eligible for the ‘Green Community’ designation, which is awarded if a project demonstrates requisite sustainability credentials; this involves yearly allocations of up to $10 million, which Boston has greatly benefitted from.17 With regard to the nature of multilevel interactions between the different tiers, the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts were able to establish an early, effective and synchronized framework for multilevel climate governance, long before its appearance in New York. As examined in Chapter 6, although the situation improved during Governor Cuomo’s second term, it was only following the enactment of their respective Green New Deals in 2019 that the city and the state of New York were able to achieve a comparable level of coordination. In fact, even today, the system of direct funding for municipal projects established by the GCA for cities in Massachusetts has no real equivalent in the state of New York, at least not on the same scale. Effective multilevel climate governance between Boston and Massachusetts lasted throughout Deval Patrick’s governorship (2007– 2015), since he shared the same progressive policy agenda on climate change as Mayor Thomas Menino (1993–2014). Unlike the situation in New York, collaboration between Menino and Patrick was facilitated by the fact that they got along well on a personal level. Thus, the state of MA released its first Clean Energy and Climate Action Plan in 2010, establishing a 2020 emissions limit of 25% (from a 1990 baseline), at the upper end of what is required by the GWSA. This partly aligned the state with the 2020 target adopted by the city of Boston, even though the city remained more ambitious than the state due to the difference in baseline years (2005 for the city and 1990 for the state).18 Likewise, the MA Electric Vehicle Incentive Program (MassEVIP) was launched

17 Since 2008, the state has designated around 210 (out of a total of 351) cities and local governments as ‘green communities’, awarding more than $85 million in funding through this program, much of which has been granted to Boston, Massachusetts’ capital and largest city. 18 Since GHG emissions were lower in 1990 compared to 2005, the target of reducing emissions 25% by 2020 from a 1990 baseline year is less ambitious when compared to the same target relying on a 2005 baseline.

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in April 2013, and the MOR-EV19 program was initiated in June 2014, offering rebates for electric vehicles. This coincided with several initiatives launched by the city of Boston in the field of transportation to develop its electric municipal vehicle fleet. 2.2

Boston Reaches the Next Level of Climate Ambition Under the Leadership of Mayors Walsh and Wu

Both Mayor Menino and Governor Patrick arrived at the end of their terms at approximately the same time, the former in 2014 and the latter in 2015. This diminished the effective multilevel governance paradigm on climate policy which had characterized relations between Boston and Massachusetts up until then, an impact examined in more detail below. The succeeding Mayor Marty Walsh was a Democrat who shared Menino’s progressive agenda. Shortly after taking office in 2014, Walsh demonstrated his commitment to continuing his predecessor’s ambitious climate policies by upgrading and enhancing Boston’s Climate Action Plan. This included, among other things, “more extensive and inclusive community engagement; an updated, more rigorous greenhouse gas inventory and emission projections; an emphasis on Boston’s 80% by 2050 GHG reduction goal (80 × 50); and a website that tracks implementation, performance measures, and lessons learned”.20 Likewise, the 2014 update set out 35 strategies and 98 actions across five main sectors, reinforcing the original pillars of the Climate Action Plan in areas such as transportation, large buildings and other infrastructure. In order to implement these strategies set out in the Action Plan, Mayor Walsh launched a number of initiatives during his first (2014–2018) and second term in office (from 2019 until 2021). Some of the most noteworthy include21 : • Go Boston 2030: Reducing transportation emissions. • Building Energy Reporting: Informing and supporting buildings to reduce energy use.

19 The full title is the Massachusetts Offers Rebates for Electric Vehicles Program. 20 City of Boston (2014). 21 Walsh also launched initiatives in a number of other areas, including adaptation to climate change (known as Climate Ready Boston), which fall outside the ambit of the book.

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• Zero Waste Boston: Making Boston a waste and litter-free city. • Greenovate Boston: Engaging Boston residents in climate action. Mayor Walsh played a leadership role first as Co-Chair and then as Chair (from 2020 to 2021) of the US Climate Mayors network, coordinating climate-related actions for cities across the US during Trump’s presidency. However, it was Walsh’s announcement during the 2017 ‘State of the City’ address that Boston would achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century which turned the city into a national and global pioneer. This represented a bold objective, going beyond simply updating his predecessors’ policies. It allowed Boston to join the ranks of the world’s leading municipalities on climate policy, such as New York. To reach carbon neutrality, the Walsh administration launched the ‘Carbon Free Boston’ initiative. This was accompanied by release of Imagine Boston 2030, a long-term strategic plan and Boston’s first citywide plan in 50 years, setting out the main objectives for the next two decades across a number of different sectors, including the environment and climate change.22 Imagine Boston 2030 is significant because it added an additional interim objective of reducing citywide GHG emissions 50% by 2030 (from 2005 levels). This objective is slightly higher than New York City’s interim target, which is to cut emissions by 40% up to 2030 (also from 2005 levels), highlighting Boston’s national and global climate leadership in terms of ambition. Taken together, Mayor Walsh’s updated 2030 and 2050 climate goals represented Boston’s commitment to align itself with the long-term objective set out in the Paris Agreement to limit global temperature rise below 1.5 °C. Except for the difference in interim targets by 2030, this is again similar to New York City’s long-term strategic alignment as discussed in Chapter 6. In order to achieve these bold new climate pledges, the Walsh administration released in 2019 another update to Boston’s Climate Action Plan, following extensive consultation with all relevant stakeholders. This constituted the city’s blueprint to accelerate climate action, with the aim to put Boston on a trajectory to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Like its predecessors, the 2019 version of the Climate Action Plan focused on a

22 City of Boston (2017).

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few specific policy sectors where the city can have the most impact, such as buildings, transportation and energy supply. Yet, unlike the 2014 version, the 2019 update set out a smaller number of strategies, albeit more targeted ones (eighteen in total).23 The Action Plan’s most noteworthy policies can be summarized as follows24 : A. Buildings 1. Construct new municipal buildings to a zero net carbon standard. 2. Adopt a zero net carbon standard for city-funded affordable housing in Boston. 3. Strengthen green building zoning requirements to a zero net carbon standard. 4. Invest in energy efficiency and renewable energy generation in municipal buildings. 5. Develop a carbon emissions performance standard to decarbonize existing large buildings. 6. Expand workforce development programs for building decarbonization. 7. Advocate for state building policies that align with carbon neutrality by 2050. B. Transportation 8. Advocate for Boston’s priority transit projects within regional plans. 9. Improve and expand active transportation infrastructure. 10. Encourage mode shift through transportation demand management and sustainable parking policies. 11. Accelerate citywide zero-emission vehicle deployment. 12. Accelerate municipal fleet transition to zero- and low-emission vehicles. 23 Many of the strategies set out in the 2019 Climate Action Plan are derived from policy recommendations developed in the ‘Carbon Free Boston Report’ published in early 2019. This was commissioned by Mayor Walsh from Boston’s ‘Green Ribbon Commission’ and Boston University’s Institute for Sustainable Energy, examining how the city could most effectively transition to carbon neutrality by 2050. See Boston Green Ribbon Commission and Boston University (2019). 24 City of Boston (2019).

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C. Energy Supply 13. Implement and expand Community Choice Energy. 14. Plan for the deployment of carbon-neutral district energy microgrid systems. 15. Support state policies and programs that further decarbonize the region’s and Boston’s energy supply. At the time, this constituted one of the boldest municipal climate policy agendas in the US and globally; the Walsh administration immediately set out to implement the strategies contained in the Action Plan through executive action.25 In this regard, like New York City, Walsh had benefitted from a solid majority within the unicameral City Council, Boston’s lawmaking body.26 For instance, in December 2019, Mayor Walsh signed an executive order that set a zero net carbon standard for all new municipal buildings, as indicated in the Action Plan’s first strategy. This required new municipal buildings to be much more energy-efficient, and to promote clean energy systems.27 Subsequently, the Walsh administration worked towards developing policies to render existing large buildings, which represent the highest source of emissions in the city, less polluting, once again in line with the Action Plan. According to the latest estimates, in spite of these impressive achievements, Boston came close but failed to meet the GHG emissions target it set for the year 2020 of reducing citywide emissions by 25% (from a 2005 baseline).28 This is somewhat problematic for a city that seeks to play a leadership role on climate issues not only at the national level, but also on the global stage. Nevertheless, Boston’s targets were very ambitious to begin with. Even though Boston did not meet its general emissions goal 25 The Action Plan also contains specific strategies in other areas, such as environmental justice (like New York City), which fall outside the ambit of the book. 26 Municipal elections in the city of Boston have to be nonpartisan by law, which means that candidates cannot have a specific political affiliation (unlike New York City). Yet, it has historically been the case that the vast majority of the thirteen city councilors in Boston have either come from the Democratic Party or have served as independents with progressive political views, which was the case under Mayor Walsh. 27 This forms part of the 2019 Climate Action Plan’s updated commitment to reduce emissions from municipal operations 60% by 2030 (as opposed to citywide emissions, which have a slightly lower target of 50% cuts by 2030, as set out in Imagine Boston 2030). 28 City of Boston (2020).

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for 2020, it succeeded in enacting many of the targeted policies across multiple sectors which it had set out for that year. As a result, the city is still mostly on track to achieve its medium-term objectives for 2030, as well as its long-term target of carbon neutrality by 2050. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note the similarities between Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan and New York City’s updated OneNYC discussed in Chapter 6. Both represent strategic blueprints over the medium to long run that enshrine the objective of making their cities carbon–neutral by mid-century.29 Hence, they both seek to align themselves with the more ambitious long-term objective set out in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temperatures below 1.5 °C by the end of the century. In order to achieve this, both cities aim to reduce GHG emissions at least 80% by 2050, while offsetting remaining emissions and relying on the same baseline year (2005). Such a similar choice of baseline years presents certain advantages for measuring city emissions in targeted sectors at the municipal level.30 Both New York’s OneNYC and Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan outline strategies to achieve carbon neutrality by focusing on buildings, transportation, along with clean energy and the power supply. These represent sectors where cities have direct control over policy processes,31 and can thus have the most impact in terms of reducing GHG emissions at the municipal echelon. It is this direct control exercised by mayors over such targeted policy areas, essential in terms of climate mitigation, that provide municipalities with a critical role in the 29 In this regard, New York, like most large cities in the US, along with Boston operates under the ‘strong Mayor’ form of the Mayor-Council municipal governmental system. This means that even though the separately elected City Council has a number of competences, including the ability to approve the budget, the Mayor enjoys a good deal of independence and a wide range of powers as head of the executive branch. This has an impact on the Mayor’s ability to carry out far-reaching climate policies, especially when there is support from the Council, as is currently the case in both Boston and New York City. 30 This should be nuanced by the fact that a number of national governments around the world, including the United States (see Chapter 6), have also adopted 2005 as a baseline year for their NDCs. Hence, such a choice of baseline year appears to present advantages in some cases for measuring emissions at higher echelons of governance as well. 31 On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), as well as Pincetl et al. (2020).

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climate regime. This illustrates how cities are often confronted with similar challenges in their attempt to enact climate initiatives.32 As previously explained, municipalities consume over two-thirds of the world’s energy and account for around 75% of global CO2 emissions,33 since they contain more than half the world’s population; such trends are projected to accelerate over the next few decades. Cities are thus at the heart of climate change challenges, while also being vital contributors to solutions for addressing it. Each city, however, has its own unique characteristics, vulnerabilities and set of possibilities. Thus, OneNYC articulates the goal of reaching 100% clean electricity by 2050, which is not explicitly set out in Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan, even though the latter aims to substantially increase the share of clean electricity. Another difference is that the OneNYC strategic blueprint not only focuses on climate change, but addresses a broad range of related issues that impact the city (even though climate change still constitutes a priority area). While Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan focuses more specifically on climate mitigation, it nonetheless contains provisions on issues like adaptation and resilience to environmental degradation, as well as justice for minority communities disproportionately impacted by climate change. Although OneNYC sets out strategies targeting most of the main areas relating to municipal climate mitigation, there is an emphasis on the buildings sector. This was demonstrated by the CMA, which focuses almost exclusively on buildings and was enacted in April 2019 immediately after the release of an updated OneNYC , becoming the first major municipal ordinance following from the strategic blueprint.34 While Mayor Eric Adams has set out a broader approach to tackling climate change, one of the priorities of his administration concerning climate mitigation has been to establish regulations for emission reductions from buildings, in preparation for the first phase under CMA set to begin in 2024. In contrast, Boston’s Climate Action plan does not seek to prioritize policies in the buildings sector over other

32 For a comparison with three other cities (Copenhagen, Stockholm and Tokyo), see Jones (2018). 33 UN Environment, Cities and climate change: https://www.unenvironment.org/exp lore-topics/resource-efficiency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change. 34 While the buildings sector represents a major source of emissions for both US cities in our sample, this is especially the case in New York, due to the proliferation of skyscrapers.

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areas such as transportation or the energy supply, each of which enjoys its own full section in the action plan. Partly for these reasons, the strategies of Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan on buildings fall short of the level of ambition demonstrated by New York’s CMA. The CMA contains what are perhaps the world’s most far-reaching municipal regulations for cutting emissions in the buildings sector, with New York acting as a global pioneer on this issue with the very innovative policies discussed in Chapter 6. Nevertheless, Boston was also ranked the most energy-efficient city in the US every year from 2014 to 2019 by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE).35 This shows that the two US cities in our sample have often excelled in different areas, even though there has been some convergence over time, with Boston and New York becoming more aligned in their ACEEE rankings since 2021, for example.36 Boston Mayor Marty Walsh resigned from his position in March 2021 to become Secretary of Labor under the Biden administration. His initial successor, Kim Janey, was replaced by Michelle Wu (former President of the City Council), who won the Mayoral election in November 2021 and assumed her new functions shortly thereafter. Wu hails from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party and placed climate change at the heart of her campaign for Mayor. She set out an impressive climate agenda referred to as ‘Planning for a Boston Green New Deal & Just Recovery’, which constitutes one of the most sweeping municipal green policy blueprints ever proposed.37 In fact, Wu became the US first politician to be elected while officially campaigning on a ‘Green New Deal’ platform. The platform aims to raise Boston to the next level of climate ambition, with comprehensive proposals to upgrade the current targets of Boston’s

35 City of Boston (2019), Boston Ranked #1 City for Energy Efficiency: https://www. boston.gov/news/boston-ranked-1-city-energy-efficiency. 36 See Samarripas et al. (2021). 37 Office of Boston City Councilor Michelle Wu (2020).

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2019 Climate Action Plan. Michelle Wu’s detailed policy blueprint can be summarized as follows38 : • Accelerate decarbonization by committing to achieve a ‘net-zero municipal footprint’ by 2024, 100% renewable electricity for the city no later than 2030, along with transitioning towards carbon neutrality by 2040, a decade earlier than the goal set under Walsh. • Ease costs for clean energy infrastructure via ‘Green Municipal Bonds’ and the Property Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) program to accelerate the installation of large infrastructure projects like solar community farms. • Enhance the use of efficiency measures and renewable heating technologies like solar power within public and private buildings, with the objective of mandating that all new buildings be built as net-zero in terms of emissions. • Allot funds to fully electrify public transportation while enhancing its accessibility, including by pursuing fare-free transit. • Expand the urban tree canopy through priority planting zones and a comprehensive urban forest strategy to boost tree coverage for carbon sequestration and cleaner air. • Strengthen the ‘green jobs economy’ to support accelerated decarbonization and new clean infrastructure development. This includes the creation of a paid training program (‘Urban Climate Corps’), to help low-income people access jobs in Boston’s clean energy industry.39 Clearly, Wu’s Green New Deal seeks to reinforce Boston’s municipal climate policy framework across a range of issues, representing a potentially significant leap forward in terms of ambition. This highlights the pattern whereby multilevel climate governance is not static but may evolve over time due to changes in administration, with cities leading the way by acting as pioneers. Since the Green New Deal was placed at the heart of 38 Other provisions than those listed here include climate adaptation, which falls beyond the ambit of this book. 39 This forms part of a broader focus by Mayor Wu to jointly address climate change with issues of economic/social inequality, while also emphasizing the links between environmental degradation and racial injustice. The latter bears similarity to the approach adopted by the new NYC Mayor Eric Adams (see Chapter 6).

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her political campaign during the mayoral election, it was widely anticipated that Wu would rapidly enact her proposals, turning Boston into one of the most enterprising cities in the world in terms of municipal climate policy. Wu’s very first ordinance signed upon assuming her functions as Mayor in November 2021 was to divest city funds from the fossil fuel industry,40 involving 1.3 billion of trust funds. This allowed Boston to join a very small number of US cities that have also taken this step to tackle climate change (including New York City—see Chapter 6). Likewise, on her first day in office, Wu expanded the fare-free buses pilot program with new funding for several new bus lines for underserved communities. Despite such a promising start, however, at the time of writing implementation of the ‘Green New Deal’ by Mayor Wu and her administration has proceeded more slowly than expected, with only incremental policies adopted during her first year and a half in office. In April 2022, for instance, Wu announced the city would replace 20 school buses with electric vehicles for the upcoming academic year and create a training program for their maintenance, a small but positive step towards the Green New Deal’s goal of completely electrifying the city’s school bus fleet by 2030. Likewise, relying on state-level legislation passed under former Governor Baker the same month (see below41 ), Wu announced in August 2022 that she would file legislation to provide Boston with the local option of establishing stricter building standards to eliminate and gradually phase out fossil fuels for new constructions and important renovation projects.42 Moreover, in September 2022, Wu announced efforts to expand and better maintain Boston’s ‘tree canopy’ by launching a new Forestry Division within the Boston Parks and Recreation Department, growing the city’s workforce from 5 to 16 workers.43 In October 2022, 40 More specifically, this local law prohibits public investments in any firm which derives more than 15% of its revenues from fossil fuels or fossil fuel products. 41 This refers to the ‘Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind’, signed by Governor Baker in August 2022. 42 City of Boston (2022, August 16). Mayor Wu Plans to File Home Rule Petition to Establish Fossil Fuel-Free Standards for New Construction and Major Renovations in Boston: https://www.boston.gov/news/mayor-wu-plans-file-home-rule-petition-establ ish-fossil-fuel-free-standards-new-construction. 43 City of Boston (2022, September 26). New Forestry Division and Urban Forest Plan to Enhance and Protect the City’s Tree Canopy: https://www.boston.gov/news/new-for estry-division-and-urban-forest-plan-enhance-and-protect-citys-tree-canopy.

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Wu announced new environmental design standards for certain smallscale green city infrastructure, including curb extensions, with benefits both in terms of climate mitigation and adaptation.44 This was followed in November 2022 by the announcement of new steps to purchase renewable energy for municipal properties through a system of ‘request for qualifications’ and ‘power purchase agreements’, whereby the city purchases renewables from external suppliers. While these certainly constitute positive steps, they are arguably modest achievements involving small-scale pilot programs, far from the structural and transformation changes heralded in Wu’s Green New Deal blueprint. As a result, the slow pace of incremental change during Wu’s first year and a half in office has drawn criticism from environmental activists, who accuse her of setting out lofty promises for the future, but without a concrete plan of action for achieving them.45 In this regard, it took more than ten months for Mayor Wu to finally find a suitable candidate for the created position of ‘Green New Deal Director’, with Mr. Oliver Sellers-Garcia assuming that role in September 2022. The Mayor and her administration may have been distracted by other emergencies since assuming office, including an initial resurgence of the COVID pandemic, along with a homelessness and addiction crisis. Nonetheless, Mayor Wu has also been confronted with difficult practical realities, struggling to translate the very far-reaching proposals of her Green New Deal into tangible policy results on the ground. Some critics have pointed out that Mayor Wu’s climate policy blueprint is too ambitious and not realistically achievable, since it involves launching too many structural reforms and transformational initiatives all at once.46 Concerns have been raised in terms of how Wu is going to finance these structural changes, which could potentially cost billions of dollars. Wu’s administration has sought to rely on federal COVID relief funding to pay for many aspects of the Green New Deal, which is arguably a risky strategy since COVID funding constitutes one-time only investments, limited in time.47 44 City of Boston (2022, October 21). New Environmental Standards for City Infrastructure Announced: https://www.boston.gov/news/new-environmental-standardscity-infrastructure-announced. 45 Platoff and Shankman (2022). 46 Ibid. 47 More specifically, Wu has been relying on $560 million from the American Rescue Plan Act signed by President Biden in March 2021.

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Wu herself has asserted multiple times that she is working with state and federal partners and is confident that she will find additional funding moving forward, especially once the benefits of her municipal-level Green New Deal become apparent. Yet, given how problematic it has been for the Mayor to enact many of the far-reaching proposals and objectives of the Green New Deal, it remains to be seen whether she will succeed in obtaining sufficient funding to make meaningful progress over the next few years. For instance, Wu is currently relying on $20 million from COVID recovery funds to renovate households in Boston and make them more energyefficient; this is only a small fraction of the spending that would be required to fully retrofit all old houses in the city. Moreover, the Mayor is facing a backlash from lobbying groups and the business community, which are trying to rein in some of her more far-reaching green proposals. Consequently, it has taken Wu longer than expected to upgrade Boston’s Climate Action Plan based on the objectives set out in her Green New Deal platform, which has been postponed until 2024. Thus, it has not yet been confirmed at the time of writing whether or not the next version of Boston’s Climate Action Plan will enhance objectives to reach carbon neutrality by 2040, a decade earlier than under the current plan, along with the other far-reaching goals of achieving a net-zero municipal footprint by 2024 and 100% renewable electricity for the city no later than 2030 (see above). Nevertheless, Wu possesses an unassailable majority in the City Council, along with a strong popular mandate resulting from the 2021 mayoral election which she won by a landslide.48 This means that she is still likely to be able to enact many Green New Deal proposals over the course of her four-year term. However, she may not be able to pass all of them, and those policies which are implemented could be watereddown versions of the initial blueprint. Even if only partly promulgated, the initiatives of Wu’s Green New Deal are likely to enable Boston to surpass New York City in terms of climate ambition on many metrics. The

48 As in the previous municipal session, all thirteen city councilors in Boston currently

have ties to the Democratic Party or serve as independents with progressive political views, even though municipal elections are nonpartisan by law (see above explanation). Michelle Wu defeated Annissa Essaibi George in the November 2021 mayoral election by obtaining 64% or 91,239 in the popular vote, one of the largest victories in modern times for the city of Boston.

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only exception will be the buildings sector, where the CMA continues to display a broader ambit. Hence, at a time when New York City has chosen Eric Adams, a ‘moderate Democrat’ as its Mayor, Michelle Wu appears intent on raising the level of Boston’s climate policies in the near future, reinforcing the city’s role as a pioneer on environmental issues. As will be examined below, the city of Boston’s consistent commitment towards climate action has played a critical role in terms of galvanizing the state to raise its level of ambition.

3 Partial Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts Gradually Improves During Baker’s Two Terms in Office, with Prospects for an Effective Alignment Under New Governor Healey 3.1

Baker’s Mixed Environmental Record During His First Term, Leading to a Partial Multilevel Framework with the City of Boston

From a multilevel governance perspective, the seventh and fifteenth strategy outlined in Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan specifically aim to align the city with state-level policies regarding buildings and transportation. While former Mayor Walsh was raising Boston’s climate ambition to the next level, however, the state of Massachusetts did not follow suit during the first term of Governor Charlie Baker, who succeeded Deval Patrick in 2015, one year after Walsh became Mayor. Although multilevel climate governance between the city and the state had been well aligned under Mayor Menino and Governor Patrick, both of whom were Democrats with a progressive policy agenda, the election of Charlie Baker changed this paradigm. Although Baker is a moderate Republican, his record on environmental issues during his first term (2015–2019) was mixed, combining important achievements in some areas with a lack of leadership in others. This recalls the pattern whereby multilevel governance is not static, but evolves over time; in this case though, the change was on the negative side, which suggests the possibility of relapse. Yet, like Andrew Cuomo and even Kathy Hochul in the state of New York, Baker’s environmental record improved over time, with significant progress made during his second term (2019–2022), allowing the state to gradually re-align itself with the city of Boston in its level of ambition.

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It is important to recall a statement made by Baker during his first unsuccessful run for Governor in 2010, when he claimed that he was ‘not smart enough’ to know whether or not climate change was real, or if it was being caused by human development.49 This constitutes an interesting parallel with Cuomo’s refusal to explicitly acknowledge the anthropogenic nature of climate change during his first term as Governor of New York. Since losing that election, however, Baker gradually changed his position on the subject. During his second, successful run in 2014, he no longer openly questioned climate science, and sought to position himself as a moderate Republican, capable of bridging the partisan gap on environmental issues. Since Massachusetts is a traditionally progressive state with a history of bold climate legislation, Baker was hard-pressed to act, regardless of his personal views. In addition to voters, environmental lobbying groups in Massachusetts rank among the most active in the US, and maintained pressure on Baker’s administration from day one. The Governor faced a situation where both the state House and Senate held solid Democratic majorities, with little change from one election to the next. Therefore, Democrats in the General Court were in a position of strength to push through their agenda on climate policy begun under Governor Patrick.50 As a result, Baker’s first term was still marked by several important achievements in the field of climate policy. For instance, the MA Clean Energy and Climate Plan was updated in December 2015, and contained additional details about how the state would achieve the targets set out in the GWSA for 2020 and 2050.51 Likewise, in June 2016, Governor Baker signed an act passed by the state legislature to promote energy diversity, establishing large procurements of offshore wind and hydroelectric power sources that consolidated Massachusetts’ national leadership in the development of renewable energy. This has played a key role in promoting 49 During an interview in 2010, Baker refused to explicitly acknowledge climate science: “I’m not saying I believe in it. I’m not saying I don’t. You’re asking me to take a position on something I don’t know enough about. I absolutely am not smart enough to believe that I know the answer to that question”. See The Boston Globe (2010). 50 This represents a notable point of contrast to the state of New York, where even though Democrats have often enjoyed a majority in the state House, they were only been able to win a majority in the state Senate following the 2018 election, for the first time in ten years. As noted in Chapter 6, the state Senate had previously blocked ambitious climate legislation during Governor Cuomo’s first two terms. 51 Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (2015).

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the wind industry across North America, leading to one of the largest procurements of offshore wind in the US (and the largest in the state’s history), rivaling even the state of New York. In September that year, Baker signed Executive Order (EO) 569 which established an integrated climate strategy for the state; as a follow-up, state agencies promulgated several new regulations, including a Clean Energy Standard to reinforce state policies relating to targets set out by the GWSA. Moreover, in July 2018, Baker signed two additional acts passed by the state legislature: the Environmental Bond Bill codifying parts of EO 569, and an Act to Advance Clean Energy. The latter set new targets for offshore and solar energy development, expanded storage technologies, established a Clean Peak Standard, and permitted fuel switching for state energy efficiency programs. Thus, Baker not only continued, but expanded the climate programs he inherited. In 2019, Massachusetts was named by the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy the most energy-efficient state in the US for the ninth consecutive year.52 As mentioned above, Boston was also ranked the most energy-efficient city in the US every year from 2014 to 2019 under Mayor Walsh. Hence, energy efficiency represents one aspect of climate policy where city and state have remained well aligned. In addition, Governor Baker and Massachusetts officials played a leadership role in making preparations for the ‘Transportation and Climate Initiative’ (TCI) during Trump’s Presidency. This included pushing for the development of a regional cap-and-trade program for cars and trucks, along with nine other states and the District of Columbia, an ambitious program to reduce emissions in the field of transportation, which constitutes around 40% of regional GHG emissions.53 This was accompanied by the launching of a Commission on the Future of Transportation at the state level in the fall 2017. Even more noteworthy was Governor Baker’s willingness in February 2019 to speak and provide written testimony

52 Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (2019, October). Massachusetts Named Most Energy Efficient State in Nation: https://archives. lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/808207/ocn898221737-2019-10-01.pdf?seq uence=1&isAllowed=y. 53 The TCI was eventually cancelled in November 2021 just before its planned launching, partly due to concerns that carbon pricing would raise energy costs. Although Baker had been one of its most vocal champions, he chose not to continue when most other states begun to pull out of the initiative.

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on climate change before a federal Congressional Committee in Washington, DC. He urged his fellow Republicans to act on climate change, and sharply rebuked the Trump administration for rolling back environmental regulations, stating that in Massachusetts, climate change was not a partisan issue.54 This earned Baker national praise from Democrats, who branded him as a model for bridging the partisan divide on environmental matters. In this regard, Massachusetts is representative of the fact that partisanship is sometimes not as strong at the local or state level. Politicians are closer to voters and are more likely to act according to public opinion within their constituencies; citizens can thus have more impact and are more involved in developing policies at the local level. This partly explains why Baker, as a moderate conservative, has been able to implement several noteworthy climate policies which go against skeptical Republican discourse at the national level. Gridlock in the federal Congress along partisan lines, discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, has dominated climate change and environmental issues over the last few decades. Limited partisanship in Massachusetts is not unique, since states such as Vermont and Maryland have also had moderate Republican Governors willing to act on climate change. Nevertheless, these states have been more the exception than the rule, since a majority of conservative representatives across the US continue to follow the national Republican Party line of climate skepticism, although there appear to be signs of moderation following the 2022 mid-term elections.55 Even in the state of Massachusetts, closer analysis of Baker’s policies during his first term reveals a more mixed and nuanced record on environmental issues. The noteworthy achievements analyzed above are counterbalanced by a lack of leadership in other areas, since Baker’s policies and actions have not always matched his rhetoric. For instance, the Baker administration was slow to get started on climate issues and only began to act after losing a 2016 lawsuit against the Conservation Law Foundation, which had sued the state for failing to uphold targets set 54 Bidgood (2019). 55 In response to evolving public opinion, there seems to be a gradual change in

rhetoric from several moderate sections of the Republican Party over the last few years on climate issues. Yet, and for reasons examined in Chapter 3, this may constitute a form of ‘greenwashing’, since the climate policies some Republicans now claim to support are no substitute for those advanced by Democrats.

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out in the GWSA. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered the Governor and relevant agencies to develop a plan and new regulations to accelerate statewide emission reductions as soon as possible, as required by the GWSA.56 In fact, most of the climate change-related acts passed during Baker’s first term were elaborated at the initiative of the state legislature, and Baker was under considerable pressure to sign them since Democrats held solid majorities in both Houses. Thus, many climate policies adopted during Baker’s first term simply involved implementing requirements from laws that were signed by his predecessor.57 Despite Massachusetts’ leadership role in making preparations for the TCI under Trump, the state has been less proactive in other national climate networks. For instance, the US Climate Alliance was founded in 2017 under the leadership of Governors Jerry Brown from California, Andrew Cuomo of New York and Jay Inslee from the state of Washington; while Massachusetts joined the Alliance, Baker chose not to become one of its central figures. This stands as a point of contrast to former Mayor Walsh’s leadership role as Chair of Climate Mayors (2020–2021), the equivalent for US cities at the national level. Even more revealing is the fact that Massachusetts never signed the ‘We Are Still In’ (WASI) Declaration during Trump’s Presidency; WASI became the largest and most diversified climate coalition ever assembled in the US. Only ten states signed the WASI Declaration at the time, all of which had Democratic Governors. Baker’s claim to leadership on climate change and his supposed ability to bridge the partisan divide on this issue are called into question by his refusal to join the WASI coalition. It is likely that WASI was too highly politicized, and Baker could not afford to so openly go against the official position of his own Party during Trump’s Presidency.58 In contrast, the city of Boston not only signed the WASI declaration under Mayor Walsh, but also participated in many of its

56 Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Kain et al v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. Docket numbers: SJC-11961 and SUCV2014-02551. 57 This highlights the push for climate legislation which took place during Deval Patrick’s first term as Governor, in particular the 2008 legislative session, often considered as one of the ‘greenest’ in the state’s history. 58 Thus, it is likely that Baker was only able to play a leadership role in making preparations for the TCI under Trump because it was a localized initiative that was much less politicized compared to WASI or the US Climate Alliance at the national level, which had openly taken a stand against the Trump administration.

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initiatives. Hence, this signals a somewhat partial multilevel paradigm on climate policy between Boston and Massachusetts, at least during Baker’s first term. This is different from New York, where both the city and the state signed the WASI declaration under Trump, highlighting a more synchronized approach. As examined in Chapter 6, WASI members during Trump’s Presidency had voluntarily pledged to commit themselves to the former American NDC under the Paris Agreement, set out by Obama’s Clean Power Plan. Therefore, Mayor Walsh’s 2019 update to Boston’s Climate Action Plan is partly linked to such a pledge. By agreeing to join the US Climate Alliance, Baker also made a similar pledge for the state of Massachusetts, and the climate polices enacted during his first term are in some ways connected to this. Yet, the fact Baker did not play a leadership role in the US Climate Alliance, his mixed environmental record during his first term, along with his refusal to sign the WASI declaration, raise doubts about his initial level of commitment to tackle climate change, in contrast to the city of Boston. Partial multilevel climate governance between the city and the state is apparent in terms of the timing for the enactment of their climate policies. As previously examined, while Mayor Walsh raised Boston’s level of climate ambition to the next level during his first term (2014–2018) by pledging to reach carbon neutrality by mid-century, which he enhanced and accelerated during his second term (2018–2021), Baker waited as long as one year after reelection before finally making a carbon neutrality pledge in January 2020 (see below). This occurred three years after Boston, and Baker did not raise the state’s level of ambition during his first term (2015–2019) in the same way that Walsh did for the municipal level at the time. Hence, the city and the state were not well aligned on climate issues during Baker’s first term, with Massachusetts lagging behind Boston. This represents a point of contrast to New York. As discussed in Chapter 6, while the state has also historically trailed behind the city of New York in terms of climate ambition, both were able to successfully coordinate the implementation of their Green New Deals, pledging to reach carbon neutrality by 2050 at roughly the same time in April and June 2019. This points to a more synchronized multilevel framework in New York/NY at this point in time, compared to Boston/ MA. Another difference is that, unlike New York where an institutionalized rivalry between the Mayor and the Governor has been common over the

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last few decades,59 Mayors and Governors in Boston and Massachusetts have tended to get along relatively well on a personal level. Baker and Walsh, for instance, were able to effectively collaborate across a broad range of issues, even though they came from different political Parties.60 In fact, they even developed a personal relationship described as a ‘bromance’ by the local press, forged by working closely together during historic crises like the 2015 snowstorm or the COVID pandemic.61 This suggests a culture of bipartisan cooperation that is characteristic of Massachusetts, and rarer in other parts of the US.62 In spite of such personal affinities, however, the city and the state were not optimally synchronized on climate issues during Baker’s first term, with a better alignment developing only during his second mandate discussed below. This indicates that personal relations may not be a deciding factor in terms of multilevel coordination for climate policy. The Baker administration’s overall record on environmental issues during his first five years in office was criticized by advocacy groups for being insufficient. A coalition of the state’s main associations in the field63 published an ‘Energy and Environment Report Card’ nearly every year under Baker’s Governorship. The report card evaluated the administration’s environmental policies across a range of sectors, giving grades for performance in individual areas.64 For three consecutive years in a row (2016, 2017 and 2018), the Baker administration was awarded a passing grade of C for its overall performance. In sectors relating to climate 59 As explained in Chapter 6, Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul of New York have worked hard to improve relations between the municipal and state echelons, claiming to have developed a close partnership since assuming office. Still, despite cooperation on certain climate issues, sharp disagreements have gradually become apparent on budgetary matters and regarding state-level funding for the city. 60 For these reasons, the mutual animosity which characterized relations between de Blasio and Cuomo in New York clearly stands as a point of contrast, since they were both Democrats. 61 Platoff (2021). 62 In fact, there is a recent history of good relations between Boston Mayors and

Massachusetts Governors, since their predecessors Menino and Patrick also got along well on a personal level. 63 These include the Charles River Watershed Association, Clean Water Action, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental League of Massachusetts, Environment Massachusetts, Massachusetts Rivers Alliance, Massachusetts Sierra Club. 64 Massachusetts Energy and Environment Report Card (2016, 2017, 2018).

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mitigation (called ‘Energy and Climate Change’), grades were similarly disappointing: • • • •

Energy efficiency: B in 2016, B+ in 2017, B in 2018. Renewable energy: C+ in all three years. Reducing Global Warming pollution: B− in 2017 and B+ in 2018. Reducing transportation emissions: D in 2016 and 2017, C in 2018.

The fourth ‘Energy and Environment Performance Review’ in 2019, also the first year of Baker’s second term, was similarly critical, giving an overall grade of C for ‘Clean Energy and Climate Justice’.65 Criticism included “issuing an inadequate solar incentive program”, “approving an energy efficiency plan that continues to underserve renters and undercount climate benefits”, “ending the MOR-EV rebate” (for electric vehicles), “proposing to weaken the Renewable Portfolio Standard”, as well as “failing to reckon with the environmental and societal costs of fracked gas”.66 The NGOs preparing these reports apply very strict standards when assessing performance in a given field, and their criticism is often highly technical. Yet, the analysis is detailed and arguably convincing, substantiating the idea that the Baker administration’s overall record on climate and environmental issues was mixed during the first five years, combining notable achievements in some areas, with a lack of leadership in others. In relation to multilevel interactions between the different tiers, at a time when the city of Boston under Mayor Walsh was leading the way with innovative and far-reaching climate policies, Massachusetts did not demonstrate a comparable level of ambition. During Baker’s first term, multilevel climate governance between the city and the state was partial. This recalls Andrew Cuomo’s mixed environmental record during his first two terms as Governor of New York, when the state was trailing behind the city in its level of ambition. Once more, the latter suggests a pattern whereby cities tend to act as pioneers and catalysts within the climate

65 Massachusetts Energy and Environment Performance Review & Recommendations for Governor Baker’s Second Term (2019). 66 Ibid. This stands as a point of contrast to New York, where as indicated in Chapter 6, Governor Cuomo banned hydraulic fracturing across the state in December 2014.

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regime, with the higher echelons struggling to catch up.67 As previously examined, this constitutes a notable contrast with the effective multilevel coordination on climate policy that had formerly characterized relations between the city and the state under Mayor Menino and Governor Patrick. For these reasons, Massachusetts illustrates that multilevel climate governance may also evolve negatively over time, with occasional relapses. 3.2

Baker Raises His Level of Climate Ambition During His Second Term, with Prospects for a Far-Reaching Green Agenda Under New Governor Healey Involving Effective Alignment with Boston

The environmental report cards examined above also acknowledged gradual improvements in a number of key areas. For instance, in addition to praising Baker’s development of offshore wind power and his key role in addressing emissions from transportation, they also emphasized a clear increase in the allocation of resources for state-level environmental agencies in 2020. After years of budgetary cuts, the 2020 environmental operating budget, as a share of the overall state operating budget, was the highest since 2010 (even though it remained lower compared to the previous decade).68 Since the allocation of resources in the state budget is often an indicator of policy priorities, this suggested that the Governor had finally chosen to prioritize climate and environmental issues in the second year of his second term.69 In fact, the year 2020 represents the beginning of a turning point in terms of multilevel climate governance, whereby the state of Massachusetts under Baker finally attempted to catch up with the city of Boston in terms of green ambition. In January 2020 during his State of the Commonwealth Address, Baker announced that Massachusetts would achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century, the fourth state in the US to make such a pledge, following in the footsteps of New York (see 67 As explained in Chapter 6, creative climate policymaking is also apparent in smaller

US cities. See Homsy (2018). 68 Baker had pledged during his successful run for Governor in 2014 to increase the budget for environmental agencies, a promise he did not fulfil during his first term, when budgetary cuts continued. 69 Such budgetary patterns have continued during Baker’s second term, in spite of the COVID pandemic, highlighting a clear shift in priorities on the part of the Governor.

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Chapter 6), California and Maine. This was all the more remarkable given that these other states have Democratic Governors. This highlights how far Baker had come from the days when he refused to certify the veracity of climate science during his first unsuccessful run for Governor in 2010. Baker’s progress over time points to his ability to bridge the partisan gap on climate issues during his second term, turning MA into a national climate leader. While other moderate Republican Governors such as Phillip Scott from Vermont or Larry Hogan of Maryland70 also enacted climate initiatives, none equaled Massachusetts’ level of ambition during Baker’s second term, making him an anomaly among US Republicans. Baker also sought to consolidate his state’s leadership role in addressing emissions from the transportation sector, building upon efforts initiated during his first term. For instance, in late 2020, Baker joined the Governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island, along with the Mayor of Washington, DC (all Democrats) to launch a groundbreaking, multi-jurisdictional program, which aims to cut emissions from motor vehicles by at least 26% up to 2032. These elements illustrate the pattern whereby multilevel governance is not static but evolves over time, in this case due to changes within the same administration from one term to the next. A factor that may have influenced Baker into raising his level of ambition on climate issues during his second term is that the Democratic challenger in the 2018 gubernatorial election, Jay Gonzalez, criticized Baker on this topic throughout the campaign.71 Yet, a more decisive factor was probably former Mayor Walsh’s 2017 pledge that Boston would reach carbon neutrality by 2050, followed by his bold, detailed Climate Action Plan update in 2019. This galvanized Massachusetts into raising its level of ambition, so that state-level targets would become better aligned with Boston’s; in this regard, the close and personal relationship between Walsh and Baker certainly played a role. There were concerns that discrepancies between the two echelons of governance might prove problematic over the medium to long 70 In the case of Maryland, the moderate Republican Governor Larry Hogan was unable to run for reelection in 2022 due to state term limits, and was replaced by Democrat Wes More who defeated his Republican opponent. 71 This bears similarity to the challenges Cuomo faced during the 2014 and 2018 gubernatorial elections, except that in New York, it was during the Democratic Primary that the incumbent Governor faced criticism on his environmental record from more progressive activists. Still, the end result was analogous, since Cuomo also chose to raise his level of climate ambition during his third term, as discussed in Chapter 6.

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run. Clearly, Baker did not wish to give the impression that the state was falling behind the capital city in its climate policies, a factor emphasized by the Democratic challenger during the 2018 gubernatorial election. Like the situation in New York discussed in Chapter 6, a pattern is once again apparent whereby municipalities act as drivers and focal points, pulling the other echelons of governance upwards over time. Cities like Boston can set the climate policy agenda within a multilevel governance framework. Because local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, galvanizing further action from the bottom-up, this represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state actors within the climate regime.72 In December 2020, the Baker administration released a 2050 Decarbonization Roadmap,73 along with a Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2030.74 These two documents provided a blueprint on the climate actions and policies the state intends to undertake over the next few decades to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. This prepared the way for the ‘Act Creating a Next Generation Roadmap for Massachusetts Climate Policy’ (also known as the ‘Next Generation Climate Roadmap’ or NGCR), signed by Baker in March 2021, which represented at the time the most significant climate legislation at the state level since the GWSA in 2008. As its name indicates, the NGCR aims to substantively update the GWSA in order to put the state on a trajectory to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, legally enshrining that target.75 The NGCR was reached after several years of complex negotiations and constitutes one of the most comprehensive state-level climate laws in the US, and in the world. On several different counts it rivals the ambit of New York’s CLCPA, thus returning Massachusetts to a position of national leadership as a green pioneer. This certainly contributed to offsetting Governor Baker’s mixed environmental record during his first term, highlighting his ability to bridge the partisan gap on climate change over time.

72 See Hale (2018). 73 Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (2020).

Massachusetts 2050 Decarbonization Roadmap. 74 Ibid. Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2030. 75 While Baker issued a formal determination letter in April 2020 officially establishing

the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050, this was subsequently enshrined in legislation after passage of the NGCR in March 2021.

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Baker is somewhat unique among US conservatives since the Republican Party as a whole has remained skeptical on climate issues under Biden, even though there were some signs of moderation during the 2022 mid-term elections. Yet, while Baker certainly deserves credit for his contributions to the negotiation process, the Governor had vetoed the initial version of the NGCR bill, and returned the second version to the state legislature with many important proposed amendments, a number of which aimed to lower the law’s level of ambition, or at least make it less constraining. The state Senate and House, with strong Democratic majorities, played a key role in maintaining pressure on the Governor in order to find compromise solutions. Therefore, while Baker has certainly come a long way in terms of embracing the issue of climate change during his second term, his leadership on this issue should be nuanced. The NGCR is the result of a general and long-term state-level effort involving multiple different actors and agencies. The NGCR is a complex piece of legislation. Relying on the broad powers and autonomy granted to states under US Constitutional law, Baker was able to sign a bill that is both innovative and ambitious, well adapted and tailored to local conditions in Massachusetts. Its main provisions, or at least those which relate to climate mitigation, can be summarized as follows76 : • Reduces GHG emissions by 85% up to 2050 (from 1990 levels— thus updating the previous GWSA target), with the remaining 15% being offset to achieve statewide carbon neutrality by 2050. This is legally enshrined in the Act.77 • Establishes interim targets to reduce statewide GHG emissions 50% by 2030, and 75% by 2040 (from 1990 levels).

76 192nd General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. An Act creating a next-generation roadmap for Massachusetts climate policy, March 2021. The NGCR also outlines a number of other ambitious policies impacting different sectors such as environmental justice, which fall outside the ambit of this book. 77 By doing this, Massachusetts has, like the city of Boston, sought to align itself with the more ambitious long-term objective set out in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temperature increase below 1.5 °C by the end of the century.

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• Mandates state agencies to develop additional statewide interim targets every five years starting in 2025, along with GHG emissions targets for six major sub-sectors.78 • Enhances the state’s renewable portfolio standard by 3% annually from 2025–2029, so as to ensure that at least 40% of the state’s electricity comes from renewables by 2030. • Mandates an additional procurement of 2,400 MW of offshore wind power by 2027, bringing the statewide total to 5,600 MW. • Updates the state’s Solar Renewable Target Program by supporting 3,200 MW of new solar generating capacity. • Mandates the establishment by 2023 of a ‘stretch energy code’ for net-zero buildings, which municipalities can voluntarily adopt (see below). • Sets standards for light power plants at the municipal level, including purchasing 50% carbon-free electricity by 2030, 75% by 2040 and achieve net-zero by 2050. As previously explained, the NGCR enabled Massachusetts to become one of the first US states to legally enshrine a carbon neutrality pledge by 2050, following on the lead of California and New York. Other states that have enacted similar legislation include Maine, Virginia, Michigan, Montana, Washington, Louisiana, as well as Nevada. Once again, this reveals how local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, galvanizing further climate action. In this case, however, the effect has been both horizontal and vertical, in that California and New York incited other states to enact similar carbon neutrality pledges, while the city of Boston also had an impact. Therefore, it is apparent that local policy innovation can have a demonstration effect, galvanizing further climate action both in a horizontal and vertical manner. As examined in Chapter 3, California and New York’s pioneering 2050 carbon neutrality pledges (along with those of progressive cities such as Boston and NYC) also incited vertical action from President Biden, who

78 These include the electricity sector, transportation, commercial and industrial heating

and cooling, residential heating and cooling, industrial manufacturing processes, as well as natural gas distribution and services. Under an amendment introduced at the suggestion of Governor Baker, these sectorial sub-limits “shall not be found to have been binding for a given prior year if the commonwealth is found to have complied with the statewide GHG limit (of that same year)”. See https://malegislature.gov/bills/192/S9.

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chose to follow their example by making a similar pledge for the US on a national scale during the 2020 Presidential campaign. The pledge was subsequently enacted through executive action, and represents an essential element of the Biden administration’s ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ Agenda at the federal level. For these reasons, Governor Baker’s 2050 carbon neutrality pledge, which was legally enshrined following passage of the NGCR in March 2021, was in part an attempt to align the state of Massachusetts with the national climate targets established by the Biden administration. The same also applies to the NGCR’s focus on the development of renewables and energy efficiency, since Biden’s ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ Agenda sets out extensive national policies and objectives in these areas (mostly via executive orders and budgetary legislation). Due to the impetus at the federal level under Biden, it is likely that other states will also follow suit by enacting their own state-level carbon neutrality pledges, developing more ambitious policies to support renewables and energy efficiency, so as to meet certain upgraded minimum national standards. This is also linked to the fact that sub-national entities have started to receive renewed federal funding for climate initiatives since Biden’s election.79 As discussed in Chapter 3, this includes the ‘Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act’ (IIJA) passed by Congress in November 2021, with a total of $73bn for ‘clean energy’ projects such as modernizing power grids, electrifying public transport, more electric car chargers, as well as $66bn for new train and railway infrastructure, among other elements.80 Likewise, Congress passed the ‘Inflation Reduction Act’ (IRA) in August 2022, the largest federal investment to tackle climate change in US history, with a total of around $369 billion for green projects over the next decade and beyond. This broad array of measures involves clean energy manufacturing, electric vehicle tax credits,

79 See Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of the multilevel mechanisms involved in Biden’s federal climate policy agenda. However, much will depend on whether or not Democrats succeed in winning the next Presidential election in 2024, as well as subsequent ones. Indeed, a Republican administration may rescind a number of Biden’s climate policies, at least in part, as Trump did with Obama-era climate pledges. Republicans will not be able, however, to rescind the fact that many states have already been able to receive significant federal funding to develop sub-national climate initiatives under Biden, spanning at least until 2024. 80 The White House (2021, November 6). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/ 06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisan-infrastructure-deal/.

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tax credits for solar, wind and battery storage, as well as a ‘clean energy accelerator’ with funding to enhance existing green projects and develop new ones, among other things. Because US sub-national entities, including states and cities,81 possess direct control over a number of key policy domains, they are essential in terms of climate mitigation.82 Likewise, due to broad powers granted under the US federal system, states have extensive competences in a wide range of areas, including responsibilities for GHG emissions controls linked to their traditional role concerning the regulation of electricity. For these reasons, a large portion of federal funding allocated under the IRA and IIJA for ‘clean energy’ projects or new railway infrastructure, will be directly channeled towards states and cities. This applies to New York/ NY and Boston/MA in our sample, both of which have developed ambitious state and municipal climate policies discussed in this chapter and the previous one, and are thus eligible to receive federal funding for initiatives in these various sectors.83 Massachusetts and New York now share the same pledge of reducing GHG emissions by at least 85% up to 2050, while offsetting the remaining 15% in order to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. Likewise, both states have adopted the same baseline year of 1990 against which to measure their climate objectives over the medium to long run. In contrast, New York City and Boston have adopted 2005 as a baseline year for their climate goals. As explained in previous chapters, shorter baseline years allow for greater flexibility when measuring the achievement of climate goals in targeted areas; this characterizes the approach at the municipal level for the cities in our sample. Longer baseline years may support more holistic policy approaches for tackling climate change, such as those adopted by the states of Massachusetts and New York, as well as countries like France (see Chapters 4 and 5). Nevertheless, there are some

81 On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Powell (2022), Knox (2020), Hickman and Banister (2014), and Pincetl et al. (2020). 82 As analyzed above in the case of cities, these include fields such as zoning, building codes (heating and cooling regulations), transportation (such as municipal vehicle fleets), infrastructure planning, waste management and recycling, as well as several key aspects of the power sector and energy. 83 It is still too soon to establish a precise figure in this regard, since much will depend on disbursement priorities that will gradually unfold over the next few years.

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notable exceptions to this, including the fact that the US federal government under Obama and Biden has consistently adopted the year 2005 as a baseline for the American NDC. This highlights how short baseline years can support policies at the national level in some cases, and that there are no clearly established rules on this matter. Despite certain similarities, Massachusetts’ NGCR also displays some notable differences with the state of New York’s CLCPA analyzed in Chapter 6 (along with Biden’s ‘Clean Energy Revolution’ agenda— see Chapter 3). Unlike New York’s CLCPA, the NGCR establishes an interim target for the year 2040, and mandates state agencies to develop additional statewide interim targets every five years starting in 2025. This means that Massachusetts will have interim targets for 2030, 2035, 2040, 2045, along with 2050. The NGCR also requires state agencies to establish GHG emission targets for six major sub-sectors (electricity, transportation, commercial and industrial heating and cooling, residential heating and cooling, industrial manufacturing processes, natural gas distribution and services). Such an in-depth approach goes further than the more general provisions outlined by New York’s CLCPA. Nonetheless, New York’s Scoping Plan, released in December 2022, provided a blueprint for Governor Hochul to announce a series a far-reaching green proposals in January 2023; these include an economywide ‘Capand-Invest’ program that would establish an annual cap on the permitted amount of GHG emissions in the state. Depending on how fully Hochul is able to implement these proposals, the state of New York may adopt a more in-depth approach, like that of Massachusetts under the NGCR. In spite of the ambitious climate policy initiatives enacted under Baker during his first and second terms, the state of Massachusetts failed to meet its 2020 climate objective of reducing GHG emissions by 25% (from a 1990 baseline, according to the latest estimates).84 As explained in Chapter 6, neither the city nor the state of New York established explicit interim GHG emission reduction targets for the year 2020, so they avoided finding themselves in a similar situation. Although the city of Boston also failed to meet its 2020 emissions target as discussed above, the latter was more ambitious to begin with, due to the difference in baseline years (2005 for Boston and 1990 for MA). Thus, while Massachusetts still came close to reaching its 2020 target, the fact that it did not meet a

84 See Global Warming Solutions Project (2016).

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less ambitious target indicates that the state remains behind the city in its level of climate action. Massachusetts has still been able to enact many of the policies set out in the GWSA for the year 2020 across multiple sectors; and it is broadly on track to achieve its medium-term objectives for 2030–2040, as well as its long-term goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. This testifies to the progress of the Baker administration on climate change over the last few years, and the ways in which the state of Massachusetts has been able to gradually catch up again with Boston’s level of ambition during the Governor’s second term. After passage of the NGCR, the state and its capital city became much better aligned in terms of their climate objectives over the medium to long run. For these reasons, the NGCR is noteworthy not only in terms of its level of aspiration, but also regarding the effective articulation of multilevel governance between the municipal and state echelons it has helped to foster. The election of Michelle Wu as Mayor of Boston in November 2021 seems to have provided further impetus for Governor Baker to continue raising the state’s level of climate ambition in 2022 during his last year in office. As examined above, Mayor Wu set out a ‘Green New Deal’ for Boston during the mayoral campaign, one of the most far-reaching municipal climate policy agendas ever put forward. The proposal aims to upgrade the city’s climate policy framework to the next level. Although it is true that Wu has faced obstacles and that implementation has proceeded more slowly than expected, her landslide victory provided her with a strong popular mandate, along with an unassailable majority in the City Council. This means that many of her proposals are still likely to be enacted over the next few years (albeit perhaps not all of them and with certain compromises). This puts pressure on the state to raise its level of green ambition in order not to fall behind Boston once again. It is likely that Governor Baker also had an eye on his legacy, having decided he would not seek reelection for a third term in the November 2022 gubernatorial elections. Likewise, the NGCR passed in 2021 needed to be complemented with additional legislation to establish policy details regarding the implementation process, discussed below. Nonetheless, the election of a young, dynamic Mayor in the state’s capital city, hailing from the progressive wing of the Democratic Party with the ‘Green New Deal’ at the heart of her policy agenda, certainly prompted Baker to enhance the policy momentum in this area during his last year in office.

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This is especially the case since, while positioning himself as a moderate Republican and having clearly improved his environmental record after securing reelection, Baker has continued to face criticism from liberal Democrats in the state for a perceived lack of ambition during his second term. Although Mayor Wu and Governor Baker purportedly got along well and endeavored to continue the tradition of close collaboration between Boston Mayors and state Governors, the personal relation between the two was professional and not as close as under Walsh.85 This was partly because political differences between Wu and Baker were more pronounced: the Mayor criticized Baker for not going far enough on climate issues. Hence, Boston incited the state once again to ramp up its policies. This illustrates the pattern whereby municipalities may act as drivers in the global climate regime. Cities like Boston can lay the essential building blocks for climate policy, setting the agenda within a multilevel framework. As a result, Baker saw through the passage of another major piece of climate legislation in August 2022, during his last year in office. Known as the ‘Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind’ (ADCEOW),86 this law set out concrete policy details across a range of sectors in terms of how the state is going to achieve in practice the ambitious climate and clean energy objectives established by the NGCR over the short, medium and long run. Both pieces of legislation are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Of further importance from a multilevel governance perspective, the US federal Congress enacted the Inflation Reduction Act also in August 2022. As examined in Chapter 3, this was the most ambitious federal climate legislation ever passed to tackle climate change, with historic levels of spending on green projects and infrastructure (around $369 billion). Clearly, this played a role in galvanizing Baker to pass the ADCEOW in anticipation of the federal IRA, underlining how Massachusetts was incited both by the municipal level, as well as the federal echelon. The ADCEOW is a far-reaching bill, the result of many months of difficult negotiations and compromises. Its main provisions in the field

85 Platoff (2021). 86 192nd General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. An Act driving clean

energy and offshore wind, August 2022.

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of climate mitigation and multilevel governance can be summarized as follows: • Reforms the bidding process for the state’s offshore wind procurement, with a codification of the pledge to procure 5,600 MW by 2027.87 Includes the creation of a wind industry investment program at the state’s Clean Energy Center. The bill also aims to close solar energy ‘loopholes’.88 • Directs that all new vehicle sales across the state must be zeroemission electric vehicle (EV) or hydrogen-powered starting in 2035. Enhances state EV rebates to $3,500 for new or used vehicles with a cost of $55,000 or less, while providing an additional $1,000 for residents who agree to trade in gas-powered vehicles.89 • Mandates the Massachusetts Bay Transport Authority (MBTA) to purchase only zero-emission buses from 2030 onwards, with a requirement to electrify its entire fleet by 2040. • Creates a ‘Clean Energy Transmission Working Group’ and a ‘Grid Modernization Advisory Council’, to examine ways to collaborate with other neighboring states to develop new grid lines and costeffectively upgrade existing ones, in cooperation with utilities. • Aims to gradually phase out incentives/rebates for heating and cooling systems relying on fossil fuels. This includes launching a pilot program enabling 10 municipalities to apply to ban fossil fuel infrastructure in new construction projects or important renovations (see below). The ADCEOW is a significant piece of climate legislation. It complements the NGCR by providing concrete policy details in terms of how the state will achieve its climate and clean energy goals over the next few decades and transition towards full carbon neutrality by 2050. It represents a laudable conclusion to Baker’s time as Governor from an environmental perspective, demonstrating a clear progression over time 87 This includes scraping a controversial ‘price cap’ for offshore wind projects, which had required each new project to provide cheaper electricity compared to previous ones. 88 This comprises a rule whereby only one solar installation per property could qualify for net metering, with compensation for homeowners. 89 This involves launching a ‘Charging Infrastructure Deployment Fund’ and creating a new coordination council to prepare a plan for accelerating deployment of EV chargers.

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compared to his first term, with the state re-establishing itself as a national green pioneer by the end of his second term. It rivals the level of ambition of other progressive states like California or New York, and even surpasses them on several metrics, especially regarding the detailed policy blueprint for achieving short, medium and long-term climate and clean energy goals. Hence, Baker was able to proudly assert his contribution to raising the state’s climate policy framework to the next level as his second term drew to a close in December 2022.90 While Governor Baker was proactive during the negotiation process, however, his leadership role was more nuanced. As with the NGCR, Baker vetoed an initial version of the ADCEOW, and reluctantly agreed to sign the final version presented to him in August 2022, despite the fact that many of his proposed amendments had been ignored by the state legislature. He decided to sign the bill, arguing that its advantages far outweighed its disadvantages. Nonetheless, this highlights how even at the end of his second term, Baker was not treating climate change as a top priority in the same way as his counterpart Mayor Wu. Because Michelle Wu’s Green New Deal places climate change at the very heart of her municipal agenda, it permeates across all other policy areas. Consequently, the state Governor continued to lag behind the capital city Mayor in terms of his level of climate ambition. This perpetuates the pattern examined above whereby cities tend to be more proactive on climate issues, acting as pioneers, with states often striving to catch up. This framework began to change with the election of Maura Healey as Massachusetts’ new Governor in November 2022.91 Prior to becoming Governor, Healey had served as the state’s Attorney General, where she led groundbreaking initiatives to tackle climate change. In 2019, for example, she sued ExxonMobil in an unprecedented lawsuit asserting that the firm had deliberately lied to investors and consumers about climate risks. Likewise, Healey was able to secure nearly $100 million from Volkswagen in mitigation funding to support electric vehicle infrastructure and

90 On the day the bill was passed, Baker tweeted that: “Addressing climate change requires bold, urgent action … I am proud to have supported the Commonwealth’s leadership on these critical issues to preserve our climate and our communities for future generations”. 91 Charlie Baker was eligible to run again for a third term and would probably have been reelected, given his high level of popularity across the state. He chose not to, citing personal reasons.

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clean transportation modes. As Attorney General, Healey had also been at the forefront of multi-state efforts to block the Trump administration’s environmental rollbacks in court. For these reasons, Healey had one of the strongest proven records on climate issues of any gubernatorial candidate when she ran for office in November 2022. This was apparent in the green policy manifesto she released during her campaign. The manifesto constitutes an aggressive blueprint, one of the most comprehensive ever proposed to tackle climate change at the state echelon, rivaling the level of ambition of Michelle Wu’s municipal Green New Deal. Her main proposals in the field of climate mitigation can be summarized as follows92 : • Achieve 100% clean electricity supply for the state by 2030, and end the sale of new passenger cars/light duty trucks powered by gas or diesel by 2035. • Mandate that all public fleet purchases be electric by 2028, with the goal of placing one million electric vehicles on the road by 2030.93 • Accelerate the electrification of public transportation so that all modes operate on 100% clean power by 2040, beginning with school and MBTA buses by 2030. • Turn Massachusetts into the nation’s offshore wind capital by permitting 5,600 MW of offshore wind procurements currently planned under the law for 2027, and more than double the state’s target to 10,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035. • Accelerate the deployment of other sources of clean energy, by nearly doubling the state’s current goal to reach 10,000 MW of deployed solar power by 2030, and quadrupling energy storage capacities by the same date. • Enable cities and local governments to prohibit natural gas for new buildings, with a pledge to convert one million homes to electric heat by 2030.94 This includes emulating Boston by establishing 92 See Maura Healey for Governor—Climate: https://maurahealey.com/issues/cli

mate/. 93 This includes offering point-of-sale rebates for used and low-cost electric vehicles in order to encourage their broader adoption. 94 To achieve this, gas utilities would be required to adopt transition plans consistent with state-level emission requirements, so as to change the market via workforce and costumer education, while decreasing installation costs.

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stricter statewide standards for large and polluting buildings (see below). • Invest additional resources to develop an international clean energy innovation hub or ‘climate corridor’, with the aim of rivaling the state’s biotech industry. • Establish a cabinet-level ‘Climate Chief’ position, which will be responsible for driving climate policy as a priority across all state agencies. • Pledge to commit at least 1% of the state budget to environmental/ energy agencies, while tripling the budget for the state’s Clean Energy Center. Overall, Healey’s climate policy blueprint aims to take forceful action to tackle each one of the state’s three main sources of GHG emissions— buildings, transportation and energy (power plants), with a detailed program for each sector involving benchmarks and reforms, along with hard deadlines to meet ambitious targets. During her campaign, Healey asserted that “the climate crisis is an existential threat to our state … We need to meet this moment with innovation, aggressiveness, and urgency. I want Massachusetts to be a national and world leader in combating the climate crisis and driving our clean energy economy”.95 Healey clearly set the tone during the campaign, placing climate issues at the heart of her policy agenda for the state.96 The election of Healey as Governor will clearly lead to an upgrade of Massachusetts’ climate policy framework. Moreover, depending on how fully Healey’s proposals are enacted over the next few years, they could go further than what has already been enacted in the state of New York or announced by Governor Hochul in January 2023. Healey confirmed her commitment to aggressive climate action by signing a far-reaching Executive Order (EO) on her very first day in office.97 Fulfilling a campaign promise, this EO created the position of ‘Climate Chief’, charged with overseeing a new Office for Climate Innovation and Resilience within the Governor’s Office, making Massachusetts

95 Statement by Healey during her political campaign on April 19, 2022. 96 See Shankman (2022). 97 State of Massachusetts—Executive Order No. 604 (2023, January 6). Establishing the Office of Climate Innovation and Resilience Within the Office of the Governor.

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the first state in the entire country to establish such a cabinet-level position. Healey chose Melissa Hoffer as the state’s first Climate Chief, a dedicated and experienced environmentalist, confirming her intention for the new position to play a leadership role.98 The Office of Climate Innovation and Resilience is tasked with channeling all authority and resources (including federal funding) necessary to reach the state’s climate and clean energy goals. The Climate Chief serves as a principal advisor to the Governor on climate-related issues, with authority spanning across all executive departments and agencies.99 The EO also mandated the Climate Chief to start a comprehensive assessment of policies, resources and staffing for all Secretariats, in order to establish a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to tackle climate change, with the presentation of policy recommendations to the Governor within 180 days. As part of this ‘whole-of-government’ approach, each Cabinet Secretary is mandated to appoint a ‘Climate Officer’ to oversee climate matters and develop tailored strategies for their respective departments, involving close coordination with the Climate Chief. By signing this EO on her first day in office, Healey clearly sent a signal about her intention to place climate change as a central priority or ‘first order of business’ for her administration, setting the tone for the rest of her mandate. In this regard, Healey appears to share the same commitment for taking ambitious climate action as Boston’s new Mayor Michelle Wu, who placed her ‘Green New Deal’ at the heart of the city’s agenda, spanning all policy fields. As she had done with Governor Baker, Wu may have contributed to galvanizing Healey into raising her level of green ambition during the gubernatorial campaign. Although Healey has always been committed to far-reaching climate action, the fact that she and Wu both hail from the progressive side of the Democratic Party probably played a role. In fact, Michelle Wu’s municipal Green New Deal has had a notable influence in terms of setting the scene and framing political discourse within the liberal wing of Massachusetts’ Democratic Party over the last two years. It has 98 Hoffer has previously served as principal deputy general counsel at the federal EPA, and was former chief of the energy and environment bureau at the MA attorney general’s office, enjoying a close relation with Healey as a result. 99 Governor Healey Signs Executive Order Creating Massachusetts’ First Ever Climate Chief —Press Release: https://www.mass.gov/news/governor-healey-signs-execut ive-order-creating-massachusetts-first-ever-climate-chief.

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helped to establish climate change as a central issue that should permeate all other policy areas. This once again suggests a pattern whereby municipalities may act as catalysts, setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. The fact that Healey and Wu see eye to eye on climate issues is thus likely to usher in a new era of effective multilevel governance between the city and the state, since both echelons now jointly consider the issue a top priority. 3.3

Effective Articulation and Remaining Shortcomings for Multilevel Climate Governance Between Boston and Massachusetts

Effective articulation of multilevel climate governance between Boston and Massachusetts can be identified across several dimensions. Firstly, the municipal and state echelons are now better aligned since they share the commitment to gradually transition towards carbon neutrality by 2050, which is legally enshrined. This means that Boston and Massachusetts have chosen to align themselves with the long-term objective of the Paris Accord to keep global temperatures below the 1.5 °C threshold by the end of the century. They also share the same interim objective of reducing GHG emissions 50% by 2030, even though the city remains more ambitious than the state since it chose 2005 as its baseline year, instead of 1990.100 As discussed above, Boston has acted as a catalyst, pulling Massachusetts towards a higher level of ambition over time, since the state has followed on the footsteps of its capital city in terms of enacting similar long-term climate objectives. This bears resemblance to the multilevel paradigm between the city and the state of New York examined in Chapter 6. Both cases confirm the pattern whereby multilevel climate governance is not static but evolves over time, with cities leading the way in terms of climate change policy. Hence, municipalities like Boston and New York can play a key role by setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. With Michelle Wu’s election as Boston’s new Mayor in November 2021 and her plan for a far-reaching ‘Green New Deal’, this pattern is likely to accelerate over the next few years. Because Wu has committed to 100 As indicated above, this is because emission levels were higher in 2005 than in 1990, which means that Boston’s target remains more ambitious than its counterpart at the state level.

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citywide carbon neutrality by 2040, 100% renewable electricity by 2030, and a net-zero municipal footprint by 2024, these targets now surpass those of Massachusetts, especially in terms of achieving carbon neutrality by 2040, a decade earlier than the current state-level target. Following Healey’s election as the new Governor, there is a better chance of alignment with the municipal level than had been the case under Baker, since Healey, like Wu, has placed climate change at the heart of her policy agenda. For instance, Healey also aims to achieve 100% clean electricity supply for the state by 2030, which aligns with the municipal Green New Deal’s commitment to reach 100% renewable electricity for Boston by the same year.101 Nevertheless, Healey has yet to announce any upgrade to the state’s 2050 carbon neutrality target, which means that if Wu is able to fulfill her pledge of legally enshrining carbon neutrality a decade earlier for Boston, the city will once again lead the state in terms of its level of ambition. As a result, like Baker, Governor Healey might find herself under renewed pressure to continue enhancing the state’s level of climate ambition in the near future. Secondly, and much like the city and state of New York, effective multilevel governance is apparent in the allocation of policy responsibilities between Massachusetts and Boston for the implementation of their respective climate policy agendas. Both echelons have adopted different approaches which allow them to maximize their impact in terms of reducing GHG emissions, according to variations in legal competences and policy concentrations at the municipal and state levels. Hence, like New York’s OneNYC , Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan, along with Wu’s ‘Green New Deal’, concentrate on several sectors that are especially well adapted in terms of what the city may contribute regarding climate mitigation,102 as a large urban center benefitting from ‘Home Rule’ status. Municipal policies targeting buildings, transportation or the energy 101 Another example of multilevel alignment between Wu and Healey, which is beyond the ambit of this book but is still worth mentioning, concerns the issue of environmental justice. Both the new Mayor and Governor have placed this at the heart of their green policy agendas, vowing to take joint measures to protect poorer and minority communities disproportionately impacted by the effects of environmental degradation. This is similar to the city and state of New York under Mayor Adams and Governor Hochul (see Chapter 6). 102 On sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors, see Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Wheeler and Rosan (2021), Pincetl et al. (2020), and Hickman and Banister (2014).

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supply enjoy an entire section in Boston’s 2019 Climate Plan, while constituting priority areas in Wu’s municipal blueprint. For example, as examined above, each section of the 2019 Plan sets a number of targeted policies and benchmarks (eighteen in total), which provide a concrete and detailed implementation agenda across each municipal sub-field. Such an approach clearly differs from the strategy adopted at the state level. Both the states of Massachusetts and New York chose a more holistic approach, involving the establishment of targets in a wide range of sectors on a more general level. The broad powers and high level of autonomy enjoyed by states under the American federal system,103 enables the holistic approach, in contrast to the more targeted strategies at the municipal level. This constitutes one of the strengths of the US multilevel paradigm. Examples of the state’s holistic approach include the NGCR’s general interim targets to reduce statewide GHG emissions 50% by 2030 and 75% by 2040, mandating state agencies to develop additional interim targets every five years beginning in 2025. Another example is the NGCR’s enhancement of the state’s renewable portfolio standard 3% annually from 2025–2029, so as to ensure that at least 40% of the state’s electricity comes from renewables by 2030. Likewise, the ADCEOW reformed the statewide offshore wind procurement process with a codification of the pledge to procure 5,600 MW by 2027, a general target which Governor Healey aims to nearly double to reach 10,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035. Healey also announced during her campaign the general goal of achieving 100% clean electricity for the state by 2030. Moreover, the NGCR requires state agencies to develop supplementary GHG emission targets for six major sub-fields, to be followed by the elaboration of roadmaps and corresponding regulations. Sectors such as transportation, the power supply, as well as commercial and residential heating/cooling (which directly impacts the buildings sector) are included; these sectors even borrow several policy proposals from Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan. Hence, like New York City, Boston underscores how cities may act as ‘laboratories of democracy’, whereby new innovative climate policies can be tested at the municipal level,

103 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017).

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before subsequently being enacted by the higher echelons. This reaffirms the notion that local policy experimentations can trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up.104 Several of the sub-sectors targeted by the NGCR and ADCEOW, including certain aspects of commercial and industrial heating and cooling, industrial manufacturing processes, and some sections of natural gas distribution and services, are not covered at the city level. These sectors (as well as agriculture) are very polluting and emit large quantities of GHG emissions, yet they mostly fall outside the ambit of municipal authorities, which means that cities like Boston have limited impact or control over them. Boston concentrates on those sectors that are well adapted to climate policy at the municipal level. The holistic approach adopted by Massachusetts thus constitutes an essential complement to the more focused strategy of municipal authorities in Boston. This is similar to the multilevel paradigm involving the city and state of New York discussed in Chapter 6. Hence, the distinct approaches enacted by the US cities and states in our sample are mutually reinforcing, since they are based on the strengths and assets of each respective echelon. This buttresses a pattern whereby the various echelons tend to play a specific role within the multilevel pyramid. Cities and states usually adopt different approaches to address climate change, which may complement one another if properly coordinated. Another apparent and related pattern is that the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more general and holistic policies tend to become. As discussed above, this is partly due to the much larger budgets wielded by states like MA and NY, compared to their capital cities; states can cover all sectors, as opposed to the targeted strategies at the municipal level. Nevertheless, one point of contrast between the multilevel frameworks in our sample has to do with the degree of institutionalization regarding state-municipal interactions. As examined above, the 2008 ‘Green Communities Act’ (GCA) had already established a system of direct state-level funding for green projects developed by municipal governments in Massachusetts; the latter has had no real equivalent in the state of New York, at least not on the same scale. The NGCR brought this type of direct multilevel cooperation to the next level, since

104 Hale (2018).

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it mandated the establishment by 2023 of a ‘stretch energy code’ for netzero buildings that municipalities can voluntarily adopt. Massachusetts has long possessed building codes setting out energy efficiency standards; a voluntary ‘stretch code’ has existed for several years, adopted by over 80% of communities across the state (including Boston).105 The NGCR aims to upgrade this ‘stretch code’ with rigorous energy efficiency performance standards, concentrating on new buildings with net-zero emissions (but not limited to this); these standards are designed to match with the new statewide GHG emissions sub-limits established by the Act in related sectors. A public consultation process lasting eighteen months was launched to come up with detailed and precise definitions for these new standards. While the upgraded stretch code is voluntary, Boston has already announced its intention to adopt it.106 The NGCR also aims to set standards for light power plants at the municipal level. Although the majority of electricity in the state is provided by investor-owned utilities, around 14% is distributed via so-called ‘municipal light plants’ (MLPs), involving miniature utilities serving specific cities or towns. Many MLPs operate within and around the city of Boston. While investor-owned utilities have had to comply with clean energy standards for years, this had not been the case for MLPs. Following passage of the NGCR, MLPs are now required to purchase or generate 50% of their electricity from ‘non-carbon emitting’ sources by 2030, 75% by 2040, and achieve net-zero by 2050.107 These types of legally institutionalized multilevel interactions between the municipal and state echelons, whether it be through the ‘stretch energy code’ for netzero buildings or the setting of standards for MLPs, clearly have a positive impact on the articulation of multilevel governance. The same can also be said of the ADCEOW which, as examined above, includes a first of its kind provision allowing ten municipalities to legally ban fossil fuel infrastructure for new and important construction projects, thus changing building codes to prohibit use of fossil fuels like natural gas. Due to its potential impact on affordable housing, this aspect of the 105 Metropolitan Area Planning Council, Improving Building Codes to Prepare for Climate Impacts: https://www.mapc.org/resource-library/building-codes-climate/. 106 In relation to the GCA law previously examined (see Sect. 2), a municipality will not lose its ‘green community’ designation if it chooses not to adopt the new stretch code. 107 Massachusetts 2050 Decarbonization Roadmap (2020).

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law had troubled Baker, who still agreed to sign the bill in the end since the positive impact of the law outweighed the negative aspects.108 As previously explained, Mayor Michelle Wu announced the same month that she would file local legislation to provide Boston with the option of establishing stricter building standards to eliminate and gradually phase out fossil fuels for new constructions and important renovation projects. Clearly, this demonstrates an effective articulation of multilevel climate governance between the state and municipal echelon. In fact, the ‘whole-of-government’ approach adopted by Governor Maura Healey, legally enshrined in the Executive Order she signed on her first day in office, has the potential to bring state-city collaboration to the next level. This is similar to the ‘all-of-government’ approach established by the Biden administration at the federal level (see Chapter 3). In both cases, it involves mobilizing every executive agency and department to take into consideration climate impacts when making decisions. It also has a direct effect on the articulation of multilevel governance and interactions between the different echelons. Like the federal version, the state approach involves all levels of government as well, meaning that Governor Healey has pledged to build on municipal climate initiatives, closely associating local governments in the achievement of statewide climate objectives. In this regard, the EO signed by Healey in January 2023 requires the newly created position of ‘Climate Chief’ to closely collaborate with city and local authorities in the implementation process on all aspects relating to state-level climate and clean energy policies. One concrete example of this is the buildings sector. Healey has announced her intention to require gas utilities to adopt transition plans which are consistent with state emission reduction rules. This is linked to Healey’s ambitious goal of getting one million customers in Massachusetts to adopt heat pumps by 2030, as discussed above. In order to achieve this, the Governor announced she would seek to adopt legislation for a statewide version of Boston’s ‘Building Emissions Reduction and Disclosure Ordinance’ (BERDO), which establishes emission standards for the most polluting buildings. Once more, this illustrates the

108 As a compromise with the Governor, the ten cities which change their building codes in this way will still need to meet Massachusetts’ 10% affordable-housing target. Health care and life sciences facilities are exempted from these provisions.

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pattern whereby cities act as ‘laboratories of democracy’, with new innovative climate policies being experimented on at the municipal level, before their subsequent enactment by the higher echelons. This type of close and institutionalized collaboration between Boston and Massachusetts arguably sets it apart from other progressive states, including New York. As examined in Chapter 6, Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul have sought to establish a close partnership, in contrast to the personal rivalry which characterized relations between New York Mayors and Governors in the past. They co-signed an action plan in December 2022 known as ‘Making New York Work for Everyone’,109 a policy blueprint which aims to jointly tackle shared challenges across a broad range of sectors, most of which do not directly impact climate change, but still have a bearing on it. It should be noted, however, that this blueprint is non-binding; at the time of writing, it has yet to be translated into concrete policies. As a result, there is no real equivalent in New York in terms of institutionalized collaboration between the state and municipal echelons, at least not on the same scale and not enshrined into legislation as is the case with Massachusetts and Boston. For these reasons, effective multilevel governance on climate policy between Boston and Massachusetts is apparent across a number of different elements. This constitutes a notable evolution in comparison to the previous situation when multilevel governance had been more partial, with Boston acting as a pioneer under Walsh and Massachusetts lagging behind during Baker’s first term. With the election of Michelle Wu as Mayor and Maura Healey as Governor, both of whom see eye to eye on climate issues and place it as a top priority that permeates all other policy fields, effective multilevel governance between the city and the state is likely to strengthen. This emphasizes the pattern whereby multilevel governance is not static, but evolves over time, with cities leading the way forward. The above examples of effective collaboration should be nuanced, however, by the fact that multilevel climate governance between Boston and Massachusetts still suffers from certain shortcomings. There remain some areas where the city and the state are still not well synchronized on climate policy. Even ‘best case studies’ like Boston/MA do not always

109 New New York Panel (2022).

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display effective coordination, and have room for improvement. Consequently, implementation of local climate initiatives for the cities in our sample may in some cases lead to problematic interactions between the different tiers of governance. For instance, as discussed throughout this chapter, there have been issues in terms of temporal synchronization. While former Mayor Walsh announced a pledge for carbon neutrality during his 2017 ‘State of the City’ address, Governor Baker made an equivalent pledge at the state level three years later during his 2020 ‘State of the Commonwealth’ address. Likewise, while Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan enshrined the city’s carbon neutrality pledge, this only happened two years later in March 2021 for the state of Massachusetts following passage of the NGCR.110 The COVID pandemic certainly played a role in terms of delaying negotiations over the bill, but the fact remains that the two echelons have not been well aligned from a temporal perspective, with the state clearly trailing behind the city in terms of its level of ambition. While this situation has also been true from a historic perspective regarding the city and state of New York, it is notable that they were able to enact their respective ‘Green New Deals’ less than two months apart in April and June 2019, highlighting a good level of temporal synchronization as analyzed in Chapter 6. Governor Baker’s ability to raise his level of aspiration during his second term is apparent, and the city of Boston clearly played a key role in this regard, highlighting once again a pattern whereby cities may act as catalysts within the climate regime, pulling the higher echelons upwards over time. Nevertheless, the fact that the state of Massachusetts under Baker trailed behind the city of Boston on climate issues was problematic. Given extensive state competences under the US federal system,111 they play a key role in terms of establishing overall policy frameworks for local governments, including cities such as Boston operating under ‘Home Rule’ (in part due to the doctrine of preemption). Governor Baker did not prevent or hinder the capital city from enacting bold climate policies at the municipal echelon. Yet, Boston might have been able to do even 110 As explained above, while Baker issued a formal determination letter in April 2020 establishing the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050, this was subsequently enshrined in legislation after passage of the NGCR in March 2021. 111 See literature on US federalism: Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018), and Robertson (2017).

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more in terms of climate action had Baker adopted a comparable level of ambition sooner at the state level. Preemption by the state over local laws has been on the rise over the last few years across the US,112 which has impacted cities like Boston (or New York) operating under Home Rule. This has served to restrict municipal autonomy and the ability to launch more innovative climate initiatives. Moreover, Mayor Michelle Wu has proposed a far-reaching municipal ‘Green New Deal’, setting out the very ambitious goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2040, a decade earlier than the target established at the state level. Although Governor Healey prioritizes climate action, she has yet to announce a similar pledge for reaching statewide carbon neutrality by 2040. This means that temporal synchronization between the two echelons might become somewhat problematic on this issue, since it will likely prove challenging for Healey to push through a similar target at the state level, despite her commitment to aggressive climate action as a ‘first order of business’. Lobbying groups tend to be more active at the state than the city level, and a number of Republican or centrist Democrats in the state legislature have indicated that they would be opposed to a 2040 target. Moreover, reaching carbon neutrality is far easier on the municipal scale than at the state echelon, meaning it might not be feasible for Massachusetts to advance its target for carbon neutrality by a decade in the same way Boston has. In fact, Healey’s green policy agenda drew criticism during her campaign and again within the state legislature once she assumed office in January 2023. A number of her proposals have been accused of being unrealistic and harmful to the economy. Even environmental advocacy groups which support Healey have expressed doubts as to how she intends to finance many of her environmental initiatives, as they are likely to be very expensive for the state.113 Therefore, it is far from guaranteed that Healey will be able to fully enact her extensive climate policy agenda over the course of her mandate. A number of proposals might be watered down to reach compromises in the state legislature. As examined above, this is strikingly similar to the challenges Michelle Wu has encountered in trying to enact her far-reaching ‘Green New Deal’ for the city of Boston. Implementation of her proposals has proceeded much more

112 See National League of Cities (2018). 113 Shankman (2022).

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slowly than initially hoped, and it remains to be seen how far she is able to legally enshrine her ambitious goals in the next version of Boston’s Climate Action Plan, which has been delayed to 2024. Therefore, if neither Healey nor Wu can fully enact their respective climate policy agendas, this will undoubtedly have a negative impact on the effective articulation of multilevel governance between the city and the state.114 Another example of multilevel discord, albeit of a different nature, has to do with divergent choices regarding baseline years against which to measure the impact of climate policies. As examined above, Boston chose 2005 as a baseline year, much like New York City; by contrast, Massachusetts and the state of New York both adopted 1990 as their baseline year. Previous chapters have analyzed how such variations in baseline years are linked to different advantages, which depend on the echelon of governance. Such a discrepancy is not overly problematic however, because the end result in terms of reaching carbon neutrality will probably be quite similar, except for differences in timing. Yet, this lack of alignment could generate problems in the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance in some cases. For instance, temporal misalignment may impact policy coordination and harmonization, which renders it more challenging to monitor progress with implementation over time, including for comparing climate goals and results over the medium to long run. The new American NDC set out by the Biden administration also adopted 2005 as a baseline year like the cities in our sample, but unlike the states of MA and NY. This seems to indicate that the 2005 baseline year may present advantages for measuring climate policies at both the national and municipal echelons. Such a situation undoubtedly exacerbates discrepancies between the different tiers, compromising the effective articulation of multilevel governance. This is especially the case given the broad powers and autonomy granted to states under the US federal system. A final example of potential multilevel discord between Boston and Massachusetts is the risk of conflicting rules between the municipal

114 As explained in Sect. 2, while municipal elections in Boston are nonpartisan by law,

all city councilors currently either come from the Democratic Party or are independents with progressive political views. A similar situation is also apparent in the state legislature following the November 2022 elections, where the vast majority of representatives in the state senate and house hail from the Democratic Party. These majorities should assist both Wu and Healey to pass through a number of ambitious climate proposals.

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and state echelons in several targeted sectors. As previously explained, Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan outlined eighteen focused strategies across different sectors where the city can have the most impact in terms of climate mitigation at the municipal level. Former Mayor Walsh had rapidly set out to implement the strategies contained in the Action Plan through executive orders. Boston’s current Mayor Michelle Wu has outlined a similar approach in her municipal ‘Green New Deal’ to enhance and upgrade the city’s existing objectives in targeted sectors like buildings, transportation and the energy supply, also relying on executive action.115 The state-level NGCR similarly mandates relevant agencies to develop statewide GHG emission reduction targets for six major sub-sectors including transportation, the power supply, commercial and industrial heating and cooling, as well as residential heating and cooling (which directly impact the buildings sector). Likewise, the Act requires state agencies to elaborate roadmaps covering these sub-sectors by providing policy details on how statewide interim objectives will be achieved, to be followed by the promulgation of appropriate regulations, consistent with policy roadmaps. As a result, there is a risk of conflicting norms between the municipal and state levels in such targeted sectors, as Boston and Massachusetts continue with the implementation of their respective climate policy frameworks over the next few years. Both echelons have anticipated this issue by integrating relevant provisions to foster improved multilevel synchronization. This applies, for example, with regard to strategy number seven (for the buildings sector) and fifteen (for the energy supply) set out by Boston’s 2019 Climate Action Plan. The NGCR has institutionalized state-municipal interactions by mandating the establishment of a ‘stretch energy code’ for net-zero buildings that cities can voluntarily adopt, as well as by setting standards for light power plants at the municipal level. Governor Healey announced she would work with the state legislature to adopt a statewide version of Boston’s ‘Building Emissions Reduction and Disclosure Ordinance’ (BERDO), which sets emissions standards for the most polluting buildings. Since there is no direct obligation of compatibility between the state and municipal levels under ‘Home Rule’, this constitutes a potential weakness of the US multilevel paradigm, as it opens the door to potential 115 This will be fleshed out in more detail in the next version of Boston’s Climate Action Plan, scheduled for 2024.

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disparities between the two echelons. Moreover, the risk of conflicting rules is not limited to the buildings sector, but also applies to other fields like transportation. For instance, Michelle Wu’s municipal Green New Deal allotted funds to fully electrify public transportation, enhancing its accessibility through methods such as fare-free transit (which would also have positive environmental effects by reducing car use). While Governor Baker had also supported the electrification of public transport, he had been quite reticent about the idea of fare-free transit, citing funding concerns. For the same reasons, Governor Healey has likewise been hesitant to make transit fully fare-free, although she has committed to low-income fares. This bears some resemblance to the multilevel paradigm between the city and the state of New York examined in Chapter 6, even though their respective policies vary in a number of notable ways compared to those involving Boston/MA. Although the doctrine of preemption creates an indirect obligation of compatibility, any overt conflict between state and municipal laws within targeted sectors will be resolved in favor of the state. Hence, there is an incentive for both echelons to coordinate the implementation of their respective climate policy agendas, even though issues relating to conflicting norms and standards are still likely to arise in the coming years. Overall, this chapter has argued that instances of interaction, including both effective coordination as well as more problematic synchronization issues, highlight the ways in which the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts constitute a particularly relevant paradigm in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance. The far-reaching climate initiatives developed by Boston and MA over the last few years illustrate the ways in which sub-national actors may contribute towards closing the GHG emissions gap stemming from an inadequate federal framework. This is similar to the configuration involving the city and the state of New York discussed in Chapter 6. While President Biden has endeavored to reinstate an ambitious federal climate policy agenda post-Trump, Democrats continue to face a number of obstacles, including staunch conservative opposition in Congress, in the court system and across many Republican voting states. Thus, Biden’s renewed climate initiatives, while displaying many positive aspects, still suffer from a number of inadequacies, discussed in Chapter 3. As they currently stand, federal climate laws and policies may be insufficient to reach national and global climate objectives over the short, medium and

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long run. This is especially the case following the 2022 mid-term elections when Democrats lost control over the House of Representatives, and given the risk of renewed regulatory rollbacks under a future Republican administration. Therefore, the ambitious climate initiatives enacted by Boston/MA and New York/NY, examined throughout Chapter 6 and this chapter, highlight the potential for states and cities to compensate for shortcomings at the federal level in terms of closing the emissions gap. This represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-national entities within the global climate regime.116

4

Conclusion

This chapter has examined multilevel climate governance in the US from the municipal to the state echelon, with a focus on the distinct case study of Boston and the state of Massachusetts. More precisely, it has assessed the various approaches adopted by Boston in enacting its local climate initiatives, and how this has impacted collaboration with the echelon just above it, the state of Massachusetts. The latter represents the first echelon of the multilevel pyramid, which constitutes an essential building block for multilevel climate governance. Chapter 6 and this chapter have demonstrated how the US cities in our sample constitute distinctive paradigms of multilevel governance from the municipal to the state level. Differences in legal arrangements at both echelons, the vagaries of electoral politics with divergences in policy platforms between Democrats and Republicans, or variations in personal relations and affinities between Mayors and Governors, provide for engaging comparative material. What is more, the patterns for multilevel climate governance revealed by the analysis of Boston/MA in this chapter match many of those highlighted in the context of New York/NY in Chapter 6. Thus, both New York and Boston have underscored the ways in which cities can act as pioneers and catalysts, leading the way with bold policies in the implementation of their local climate initiatives. States like NY and MA often lag behind, but may be galvanized by cities into raising their level of ambition over time. Municipalities can operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ by testing innovative policies at the local level, before their subsequent

116 See Hale (2018).

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enactment by the higher echelons. And as demonstrated throughout this chapter and the previous one, multilevel governance is not static but evolves over time, either due to changes in elected administrations at the city and state level, or changes in policy platforms within the same administration over time. Thus, municipalities like New York and Boston act as focal points within the global climate regime. The US cities and states in our sample are not necessarily representative of the situation facing all cities and sub-national entities around the world, including in developing countries. Each city is unique with its own characteristics, vulnerabilities and set of possibilities; variations in the local context from a political, economic or even a social and cultural perspective, can lead municipalities to enact initiatives specifically adapted to local circumstances. At the same time however, different cities across the world are also often confronted with similar challenges in their attempt to enact climate initiatives, including effective coordination of their policies with the higher echelons, which in many cases may lead them to adopt similar policies. Therefore, while there are probably a number of exceptions to this trend, particularly in the Global South where political, economic and social circumstances are very different compared to the Global North, a general pattern is still clearly identifiable. Municipalities can play a key role as pioneers in terms of setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework, as demonstrated by the examples of New York/NY and Boston/MA. Consequently, while the State-centric nature of international law may constitute an irritant, it is not an obstacle to effective multilevel climate governance. Sub-national actors like the US cities and states in our sample can circumvent the national echelon through proactive climate policies. Overall, it does not appear to matter much whether or not sub-state entities are able to sign the Paris Accord, as long as they remain very engaged in enacting climate initiatives on a local scale. The State-centric nature of international law does not prevent them from taking the initiative at their echelon, and this is arguably what matters most in terms of achieving the long-term objectives set out in the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, the material examined throughout this chapter has suggested a number of shortcomings in the articulation of multilevel governance from the municipal to the state level for Boston/MA, which bear some similarities to those identified in the context of New York/ NY. Whether in relation to disparities in baseline years, the timing for

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enacting climate initiatives, or short, medium and long-term policies and objectives, a number of discrepancies remain between these two echelons. If even ‘best-case study’ sub-national entities like New York/NY and Boston/MA in our sample may fall short of providing effective synchronization on climate policy, then this means that the international community as a whole is probably failing to provide an adequate framework of multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Accord. As previously examined, effective articulation of multilevel governance is essential to successfully address the systemic risk posed by climate change; each echelon must be well coordinated and mutually support the others in the implementation of climate policies. Still, this chapter and the previous one have highlighted that coordinated multilevel climate governance between the US cities and states in our sample has tended to improve over time, despite occasional relapses. Finally, Chapter 6 and this chapter have also corroborated an important point developed in Chapters 2 and 3, in terms of how the US federal system displays both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. Yet, the last two chapters emphasized this from the point of view of municipalities and state-level governance, with less focus on the role of the federal echelon. In terms of advantages, extensive decentralization for states (as well as for cities operating under Home Rule) allows climate policies to be well adapted to the local context. The high level of autonomy and multiple competences allocated to states enables them to innovate and enact farreaching climate policies, making it easier for states to go beyond federal minimum environmental standards. Likewise, multilevel governance has tended to be more dynamic as a result, since competence allocation is clearly delineated. States have precise powers defined under US constitutional law, with local entities (cities, counties, etc.) falling outside the ambit of the federal government. In terms of disadvantages, the examples of New York/NY and Boston/ MA have highlighted once again a relatively weak level of policy harmonization and coordination across the country, since federal environmental laws/policies tend to set only loose minimum national standards, providing states with extensive autonomy in the implementation process. Thus, even a strong central thrust can end up being diluted in practice at the sub-national level during the enactment phase. Such a paradigm also increases the risk of conflict regarding policies enacted between the

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different echelons of governance, and can lead to federal monitoring and enforcement issues due to the multiplication of disparate standards across states. Although it possesses its own unique characteristics and set of circumstances, multilevel climate governance between the city of Paris and Île-de-France region in France shares a number of similarities with New York/NY and Boston/MA, while also displaying notable differences; this will be the focus of the next chapter (Chapter 8).

Bibliography Books and Articles Barichella, A. (2018). ‘Multi-actor, Multi-level Governance for the Transatlantic Climate and Energy Dialogue’. Sciences Po Law Review, 14, 71–85. Bidgood, J. (2019, February 6). ‘Charlie Baker Urges Washington to Act on Climate Change’. The Boston Globe. Charles River Watershed Association, Clean Water Action, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental League of Massachusetts, Environment Massachusetts, Massachusetts Rivers Alliance, Massachusetts Sierra Club (2016). Massachusetts Energy and Environment Report Card. Ibid. (2017). Massachusetts Energy and Environment Report Card. Ibid. (2018). Massachusetts Energy and Environment Report Card. Ibid. (2019). Massachusetts Energy and Environment Performance Review & Recommendations for Governor Baker’s Second Term. Coleman, A. N., & Leskiw, C. S. (2018). Debating Federalism: From the Founding to Today. Lexington Books. Fisher, L., & Harriger, K. (2019—12th edition). American Constitutional Law, Volume 1: Constitutional Structures: Separated Powers and Federalism. Carolina Academic Press. Global Warming Solutions Project (2016). Massachusetts Clean Energy & Climate Scoreboard: Assessing the Commonwealth’s Progress Toward Meeting the 2020 GHG Emissions Reduction Required by the Global Warming Solutions Act. Hale, T. (2018, November). ‘The Role of Sub-state and Non-state Actors in International Climate Processes’. Chatham House—Research Paper. Hamin Infield, E. M., Abunnasr, Y., & Ryan, R. L. (2018). Planning for Climate Change: A Reader in Green Infrastructure and Sustainable Design for Resilient Cities. Routledge. Hays, S. P. (2000). A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945. University of Pittsburgh Press.

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Hays, S. P. (2008). Beauty, Health and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985 (Studies in Environment and History). Cambridge University Press. Hickman, R., & Banister, D. (2014). Transport, Climate Change and the City. Routledge. Homsy, G. C. (2018). ‘Unlikely Pioneers: Creative Climate Change Policymaking in Smaller U.S. Cities’. Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, 8(2), 121–131. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-018-0483-8 Jones, S. (2018). Cities Responding to Climate Change: Copenhagen, Stockholm and Tokyo. Palgrave Macmillan. Knox, H. (2020). Thinking Like a Climate: Governing a City in Times of Environmental Change. Duke University Press. Konisky, D. M. (2020). Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy. Edward Elgar Publishing. Kraft, M. E. (2000). ‘U.S. Environmental Policy and Politics: From the 1960s to the 1990s’. Journal of Policy History, 12(1), 17–42. https://doi.org/10. 1353/jph.2000.0006 Kraft, E. M. (2021—8th edition). Environmental Policy and Politics. Routledge. Pincetl, S., Gustafson, H., Federico, F., Fournier, E. D., Cudd, R., & Porse, E. (2020). Energy Use in Cities: A Roadmap for Urban Transitions. Palgrave Macmillan. Platoff, E. (2021, November 27). ‘Worlds Apart Politically, Baker and Wu Begin to Forge Relationship’. The Boston Globe. Platoff, E., & Shankman, S. (2022, August 17). ‘The Green New Deal Is a Concept, Not a Plan. Advocates Say Mayor Wu Is Missing That So Far’. The Boston Globe. Powell, M. (2022). The Climate City. Wiley-Blackwell. Rinfret, S. R., & Pautz, M. C. (2019). US Environmental Policy in Action. Palgrave Macmillan. Robertson, D. B. (2017—2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Samarripas, S., Tanabe, K., Dewey, A., Jarrah, A., Jennings, B., Drehobl, A., Bastian, H., Vaidyanathan, S., Morales, D., Patronella, A., Subramanian, S., & Tolentino, C. (2021, December). The 2021 City Clean Energy Scorecard. American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy. Shankman, S. (2022, April 19). ‘With New Climate Plan, AG Healey Aims High’. The Boston Globe. The Boston Globe (2010, February 11). ‘Charlie Baker’s Willful Ignorance’. Wheeler, S. M., & Rosan, C. D. (2021). Reimagining Sustainable Cities: Strategies for Designing Greener, Healthier, More Equitable Communities. University of California Press.

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Public Policy Documents and Laws Boston Green Ribbon Commission and Boston University (2019). Carbon Free Boston—Summary Report 2019. City of Boston (2007, December). Climate Action Plan. City of Boston (2011, April). A Climate of Progress: Climate Action Plan 2011 Update. City of Boston (2014, April). Greenovate Boston: Climate Action Plan 2014 Update. City of Boston (2017, July). Imagine Boston 2030: A Plan for the Future of Boston. City of Boston (2019, October). Climate Action Plan: 2019 Update. City of Boston (2020). Climate Action: Fiscal Year 2020 Report. General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts—Chapter 298. An Act Establishing the Global Warming Solutions Act, August 2008. General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (192nd session)— Chapter 8. An Act Creating a Next-Generation Roadmap for Massachusetts Climate Policy, March 2021. General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (192nd session). An Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind, August 2022. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2014). Fifth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2022). Sixth Assessment Report. Office of Boston City Councilor Michelle Wu (2020, August). Planning for a Boston Green New Deal & Just Recovery. Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (2015, December). Massachusetts Clean Energy and Climate Plan. Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (2020, December). Massachusetts 2050 Decarbonization Roadmap. Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs (2020, December). Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2030. Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Kain et al v. Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. Docket numbers: SJC-11961 and SUCV201402551. National League of Cities (2018). City Rights in an Era of Preemption: A Stateby-State Analysis. New New York Panel (2022, December). Making New York Work for Everyone. State of Massachusetts—Executive Order No. 604 (2023, January 6). Establishing the Office of Climate Innovation and Resilience Within the Office of the Governor.

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Websites City of Boston (2019, July 25). Boston Ranked #1 City for Energy Efficiency. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www.boston.gov/news/bostonranked-1-city-energy-efficiency City of Boston (2022, August 16). Mayor Wu Plans to File Home Rule Petition to Establish Fossil Fuel-Free Standards for New Construction and Major Renovations in Boston. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www.bos ton.gov/news/mayor-wu-plans-file-home-rule-petition-establish-fossil-fuelfree-standards-new-construction City of Boston (2022, September 26). New Forestry Division and Urban Forest Plan to Enhance and Protect the City’s Tree Canopy. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www.boston.gov/news/new-forestry-division-andurban-forest-plan-enhance-and-protect-citys-tree-canopy City of Boston (2022, October 21). New Environmental Standards for City Infrastructure Announced. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https:// www.boston.gov/news/new-environmental-standards-city-infrastructure-ann ounced 192nd General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. An Act Creating a Next-Generation Roadmap for Massachusetts Climate Policy. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://malegislature.gov/bills/192/S9 Macmillan Online Dictionary. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www. macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/interaction Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs. Global Warming Solutions Act Background. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https:/ /www.mass.gov/service-details/global-warming-solutions-act-background Massachusetts Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs—Department of Energy Resources (2019, October 1). Massachusetts Named Most Energy Efficient State in Nation. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/808207/ocn 898221737-2019-10-01.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Massachusetts Government—Press Release (2023, January 6). Governor Healey Signs Executive Order Creating Massachusetts’ First Ever Climate Chief . Retrieved February 28, 2023, from https://www.mass.gov/news/governorhealey-signs-executive-order-creating-massachusetts-first-ever-climate-chief Maura Healey for Governor—Climate. Retrieved February 28, 2023, from https://maurahealey.com/issues/climate/ Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effective Metropolitan Area Planning Council. Improving Building Codes to Prepare for Climate Impacts. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www.mapc.org/ resource-library/building-codes-climate/

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The White House (2021, November 6). Fact Sheet: The Bipartisan Infrastructure Deal. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/11/06/fact-sheet-the-bipartisaninfrastructure-deal/ UN Environment, Cities and Climate Change. Retrieved January 30, 2023, from https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/resource-effici ency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change

CHAPTER 8

Cities as Focal Points: Multilevel Climate Governance Between Paris and the Île-de-France

1

Introduction

This chapter examines multilevel climate governance in France from the municipal to the regional echelon, with the distinct case study of Paris and the Île-de-France. It assesses the various approaches adopted by the city of Paris to enact its local climate policies, and how this has impacted multilevel interactions with the tier of governance right above it, i.e., the Île-de-France region. Like Chapters 6 and 7 that examined the US cities and states in our sample (New York/NY and Boston/MA), this chapter addresses the first echelon of the multilevel pyramid involving interactions from the municipal to the regional echelon, in this case with a focus on the centralized French paradigm. Chapter 8 will be divided into two main sections. Section (2) provides a historical background on climate policies in Paris and the Île-de-France, while Sect. (3) focuses on multilevel climate governance from the municipal to the regional level, with Paris leading the way in terms of galvanizing the higher echelons. Although comparative insights between our three sample cities will be developed throughout this chapter, they are elaborated in more detail in Sect. (3), as well as in the conclusion. Like New York and Boston, the choice of Paris as a sample city is warranted because the municipality constitutes a global leader on environmental issues. As large and prosperous urban areas located in developed © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_8

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countries, our three sample cities have sizeable budgets and resources per capita, allowing them to develop advanced infrastructure and enact far-reaching climate policies. The same also applies to the Île-de-France, albeit to a lesser extent for reasons which will be examined below. From an analytical perspective, this provides for rich comparative material on multilevel climate governance. What is more, by analyzing in detail the implementation of local climate initiatives for the city of Paris and the Île-de-France, the following two sections point to both the strengths and weaknesses of this multilevel governance paradigm. As with Chapters 6 and 7, this chapter reveals how even ostensibly world-leading cities such as Paris can fall short of providing effective multilevel synchronization on climate policy with the higher levels. If even ‘best case studies’ in developed countries are inadequate, then the international community as a whole is likely to fall short in providing a robust framework of multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement. This chapter will examine a key aspect of multilevel climate governance that differs from the United States: the region (or région). The municipal to regional level represents the first echelon of the multilevel pyramid in France, as opposed to the city to state echelon under the US federal system. Hence, the three cities in our sample are relevant case studies because each one of them constitutes a distinctive paradigm in terms of multilevel governance. As will be examined in detail below, variations in constitutional and legal frameworks distinguish the more centralized French State from the American federal system. Differences in policy platforms between conservative and progressive Parties on both sides of the Atlantic also impact the level of enthusiasm for climate policy, as do discrepancies in personal relations between elected officials; both present a number of parallels among our sample cities.1

1 As always, the analysis presented in this chapter is based on an extensive range of interviews with public officials working at the municipal and regional levels on climate and environmental matters—in the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region, along with French civil society experts from academia, think tanks and NGOs. Most interviewees have asked to remain anonymous for the purposes of this publication (see Chapter 1).

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2 Historical Background of Multilevel Climate ˆ , Governance Between Paris and the Ile-de-France with a Contextual Comparison Between French Centralization and US Federalism 2.1 Contextual Material on Cities and Regions Under the Centralized French Framework, with Points of Contrast to the US Federal System Paris and the Île-de-France region display a multilevel paradigm on climate policy that shares a number of similarities with the US framework examined in Chapters 6 and 7, while also revealing many significant points of contrast. As examined in more detail below, Paris has been a global pioneer on climate issues, enacting a singularly ambitious and innovative municipal green policy agenda. Like Boston and New York, Paris has consistently led the way in terms of its level of ambition when compared to the Île-de-France region; it has acted as a pioneer, pulling the regional level of governance upwards over time. In addition, Paris (like Boston and New York) has also acted as a ‘laboratory of democracy’, experimenting with innovative climate policies that were subsequently adopted by the higher echelons. Regarding points of contrast, the unitary and relatively centralized political structure in France is fundamentally different from the US federal system. This has a significant impact in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance, resulting in dissimilarities on a number of important issues. To summarize, France has historically been a highly centralized nation, a tradition that was perpetuated and enshrined in the Constitution of 1958, which established the 5th Republic as a unitary State.2 As a result, few powers and competences were attributed to sub-national entities known as ‘territorial communities’ (collectivités territoriales ). It was not until the 1980s and the election of President Mitterrand that France began a gradual process of decentralization, which has unfolded through several stages and continues up to this day, progressively transferring more responsibility to the sub-national level. The first phase occurred between 1982 and 1984 under President Mitterrand, the second from 2003 to 2004 under President Chirac and the

2 See Kada et al. (2017).

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third one from 2013 to 2014 under President Hollande.3 The fourth and latest phase, which began in 2021, is ongoing under President Macron; the content of these reforms are complex, and are examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Today, there are three main echelons for sub-national entities in France, including (from the higher to the lower level): regions, départements and communes (the echelon of municipalities).4 While this may appear similar to the three levels of governance in the US (states, counties and cities/local administration), there are significant differences in terms of competence allocation. US constitutional law defines a federal system where states enjoy very broad powers. The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution makes it clear that competence allocation for local governments is not a matter of federal authority, but falls under the purview of states, which can ascribe to them the level of autonomy they see fit. Building on this, local governments in the US broadly fall into two categories: those operating under ‘Home Rule’ which enjoy more autonomy, and those relying on ‘Dillon’s Rule’ (see Chapter 6). This is very different from the unitary French political system, where all sub-national entities or collectivités territoriales are placed at the same level by the Constitution, below the State.5 Through four consecutive phases of decentralization, the national government has progressively sought to ascribe a growing number of competences to all three levels of sub-national governance.6 Hence, communes , départements and regions have each been granted a different set of core competences in a certain number of specific areas,7 including many that are relevant for environmental policy. In a number of fields, however, responsibilities are shared or overlap; in such cases, French law has established the function of chef de file or ‘leader in line’, which mandates a particular level of governance to coordinate the other echelons in specific fields. For instance, regions are chef de file in areas such as climate change, air quality and energy

3 Aubelle and Kada (2019). 4 Verpeaux et al. (2021). 5 Verpeaux and Janicot (2021) and Verpeaux (2020). 6 This is defined under the ‘principle of free administration for territorial commu-

nities’ (principe de libre administration des collectivités territoriales ), enshrined in the constitutional revision of March 2003. 7 Faure (2021) and Collectif (2021).

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efficiency, while communes fulfill that function when it comes to local transport, development and urban planning. Nevertheless, no one level has authority to exercise tutelle or tutelage over the others,8 unlike in the US where state statutes clearly take precedence over local ordinances in the event of a conflict, under the doctrine of preemption.9 Despite successive phases of decentralization, French regions and départements still enjoy far fewer competences when compared to states in the US. In fact, the two systems are markedly different, since American states enjoy all competences that are not specifically granted to the federal government in the Constitution (so-called ‘reserved powers’); states also share competences with the federal echelon in a number of important areas (known as ‘concurrent powers’). By contrast, French territorial communities only possess those powers that are expressly attributed to them under French law, including through different stages of decentralization.10 Thus, while American states enjoy their own executive, legislative and judicial branches, which enable them to enact their own laws, French regions and départements only have limited administrative functions, which let them pass administrative acts (actes administratifs ). The US political system is often referred to as ‘cooperative federalism’ (see Chapter 2), in which the central government shares sovereignty with its constituent units. In a unitary State, however, only national authorities can delegate specific and limited competences to sub-state entities, but not transfer sovereignty itself.11 While these provisions have impacted competence allocation at the municipal level in France, cities have still tended to enjoy a good deal of autonomy. In fact, since the late nineteenth century, communes have benefitted from what is known as the ‘general competence clause’ (clause 8 In this regard, the ‘principle of free administration for territorial communities’ also applies to relations between territorial communities themselves, in addition to defining their relations towards the State. 9 As examined in Chapter 6, under the Tenth Amendment, the level of autonomy for local governments is a matter for state law, falling outside the ambit of the US federal government. 10 Collectif (2021). See also: Aubelle and Kerrouche (2021, 2022). 11 In this case, sovereignty refers to the power of delegating competences. In a federal

system like the US, states possess sovereign powers that are enshrined in the Constitution, which the central government cannot infringe upon without their express consent (hence the notion of ‘shared sovereignty’); this represents a point of contrast to unitary structures as in France.

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générale de compétence), which allows them to enact regulations that go beyond the strict wording of competence allocation under the law in the name of ‘local public interest’.12 This has provided French cities with a level of autonomy that is comparable to American cities such as Boston and New York, operating under ‘Home Rule’. Yet, unlike their US counterparts, French cities are not subjected to the tutelage of the regional level (the French equivalent to American states), since all sub-national echelons are put at the same level under the French Constitution. This can enhance their margin for maneuver to enact more innovative policies at the municipal level and constitutes one of the strengths of the French multilevel paradigm. French communes are juridically directly under the tutelage of the State, unlike the US where powers ascribed to local entities fall outside the ambit of the federal government.13 National laws define precisely which competences are attributed to communes —outside of the ‘general competence clause’—and also outline the main elements that must be included within local climate plans (see below). As explained in Chapter 4, France thus possesses a ‘fused system’ of local government, whereby “municipalities form part of a uniform system of administration applying across the country, with a centrally appointed prefect supervising local councils”.14 This is very different from the ‘dual system’ in the US, which “maintains a formal separation of central and local government. Although the center is sovereign, local authorities are not seen as part of a single State structure”.15 Beyond setting out guidelines for communes in the formulation of their local climate plans, the French government has tended to prioritize collaboration with regions when implementing national policies at the sub-state level. This provides cities with more de facto autonomy, even though their de jure competences remain limited under national law.16 For these 12 While the first phase of decentralization in 1982 had also provided regions and départements with such a ‘general competence clause’, the third phase in 2015 only kept it for communes , which includes municipal governments. 13 See Collectif (2021). 14 Hague and Harrop (2007, p. 243). 15 Ibid. 16 One of the reasons for this is that following the third phase of decentralization in 2015, which consolidated several regions together, there are now only 18 regions in France, as opposed to nearly 35,000 communes . As a result, this makes collaboration with

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reasons, the French paradigm illustrates the enhanced role and participation of sub-state actors in the process of policy formulation, along with the importance of democratic processes at the sub-national and local levels in the articulation of multilevel governance.17 The above factors also explain this chapter’s focus on individual leadership when analyzing the climate policies enacted by Paris and the Île-de-France. The chapter adopts a broad-based analysis which takes many different factors into consideration, rather than simply conflating the role of particular Mayors or Regional Council Presidents with the level of climate ambition within their respective city or region. Individual leadership, or lack thereof, is critical to the successful development of ambitious climate initiatives for Paris and the Île-de-France, and points to the importance of coordination between the two echelons for effective multilevel climate governance. While this bears some similarity to the focus on individual leadership with the American cities and states examined in Chapters 6 and 7, the centralized French framework remains markedly different from the US federal system. Overall, the French multilevel paradigm represents a form of ‘hierarchical’ and ‘stratified’ centralization, as opposed to the American system of ‘cooperative federalism’. The hierarchical element is apparent because sovereignty in France is clearly held only by national authorities, which sit at the apex of the multilevel pyramid above the other echelons. Only limited transfers of competences to territorial communities are possible, but not sovereignty itself. The ‘stratified’ element can be discerned in the fact that there are so many different layers of sub-national governance in France (regions, départements , as well as communes and intercommunalities), all of which are positioned equally at the same level beneath the State, since no territorial community may exercise ‘tutelage’ over another. Hence, the different layers have a tendency to pile up and become superimposed onto each other, a situation that is colloquially referred to as a millefeuille administratif or ‘administrative layer cake’. As explained in Chapter 4, although scholars such as Verpeaux et al., Vital-Durand, Kada et al. or Aubelle and Kerrouche,18 have implied its regions much easier and more practical for the national government. In turn, regions can then interact directly with the lower echelons, including départements and communes . 17 Bache and Flinders (2004). 18 Kada et al. (2017), Verpeaux et al. (2021), Vital-Durand (2017) and Aubelle and

Kerrouche (2021).

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existence, this book is the first to propose the notion of hierarchical and stratified centralization in relation to an analysis of the French multilevel paradigm. This represents an original contribution to the literature, especially regarding the comparison with US cooperative federalism. 2.2

Historical Background of Climate Politics in Paris and the Île-de-France, with Relatively Effective Multilevel Coordination Early On

The French multilevel configuration has allowed the city of Paris to enact, over the last fifteen years, a world-class municipal climate policy agenda. Because Paris is the capital city incorporating the largest urban area in France, the municipality possesses a special status (collectivité à statut particulier 19 ), since it combines together the functions of a commune and a département , denominated simply as the ‘City of Paris’ (Ville de Paris ). As a result, the Mayor and the City Council simultaneously possess powers and competences attributed to both echelons of governance, which provide them with more leeway to enact far-reaching climate policies. Still, Paris was under conservative rule for the first 24 years following the creation of the position of city Mayor in 1977, when environmental issues did not feature as a priority.20 This changed dramatically in 2001 with the election of Mayor Bertrand Delanoë from the Socialist Party, at the head of a left-wing coalition known as the ‘plural left’ (gauche plurielle), where the Green Party occupied (and continues to occupy) a prominent position.21 This progressive coalition has governed the city for over twenty years, an essential factor in enabling Paris to gradually implement an ambitious municipal climate policy agenda, which has unfolded in several stages. Mayor Delanoë and his coalition rapidly implemented several notable environmental policies, such as the reduction of traffic congestion and heat consumption for buildings. As a follow-up to Agenda 21 at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the city of Paris also set out its own local ‘Agenda 19 On French territorial communities with a special status, see Kada and Fazi (2022). 20 Jacques Chirac from the Conservative Party was Paris’ first Mayor from 1977 until

1995, when he was succeeded by his close associate Jean Tiberi, who then lost the election to the Socialist Bertrand Delanoë in 2001. 21 On the history of the green political movement in France, see: Boivin (2015), Villalba (2021) and Jacob (2016).

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21’ program in 2004, which sought to integrate the notion of sustainable development throughout all aspects of municipal policy.22 This was followed by the realization of an inventory for GHG emissions across the city in 2006 (bilan carbone), which paved the way for the elaboration of Paris’ first ‘territorial climate plan’ in 2007. Relevant stakeholders were involved in extensive consultations, which built on the provisions of the local Agenda 21 program. For the elaboration of both its local Agenda 21 and its ‘territorial climate plan’, the city of Paris followed the guidelines and recommendations set out in France’s 2004 National Climate Plan, as well as the 2003 National Strategy for Sustainable Development discussed in Chapter 4. Because the Parisian electorate has historically been quite sensitive to pollution and environmental matters, this has pushed politicians to act on these issues early on. Hence, Delanoë and the ‘plural left’ coalition were also responding to pressure from their electoral base. These processes were facilitated by the fact that cities can be nimbler than the higher governance echelons, since they are less burdened by large bureaucratic administrations or complex legislative procedures. Thus, Mayors are often able to take concrete action on climate change,23 which in turn has a direct impact on constituents, since cities represent the bottom echelon of the multilevel pyramid. As a result, municipalities play an essential role in terms of transforming policy into action at the grassroots level. All three cities in our sample enacted their first major Climate Plan the same year (2007), demonstrating a comparable level of ambition and certain similarities, even though each plan is unique and adapted to the local context. In fact, a number of cities and sub-national actors around the world sought to pressure their national governments in anticipation of the 2009 Copenhagen COP. Likewise, the publication of the IPCC’s 4th Assessment Report in 2007 might have also played a role in

22 For an explanation about the ‘Agenda 21’ at the local level in France, see Lorach and de Quatrebarbes (2003). 23 Barichella (2018).

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this regard.24 The main provisions of Paris’ first ‘territorial climate plan’ can be summarized as follows25 : • 25% cut in GHG emissions citywide, with a 30% cut for municipal operations,26 by 2020 (from a 2004 baseline). • 25% for the share of renewable energies citywide, with 30% for municipal operations, by 2020 (from a 2004 baseline). • 25% increase for energy efficiency, with a 30% increase for municipal operations, by 2020 (from a 2004 baseline). • 75% cut in GHG emissions citywide by 2050 (from a 2004 baseline). Despite a few small differences, these targets bear a number of similarities to those enacted under Boston’s first Climate Action Plan, including in terms of GHG emission targets for 2020 and 2050, as well as in the choice of baseline years. For instance, Boston’s 2050 objective was slightly more ambitious (with an 80% cut instead of 75% for Paris), and the baselines also marginally differed by one year (2005 for Boston and 2004 for Paris). In order to implement these ambitious targets, Paris’ ‘territorial climate plan’ set out detailed policies in a number of relevant sectors such as buildings, transportation, waste management, air quality, food consumption, as well as energy use. Since 2008, an annual report has been published (Bleu Climat ), which records all spending and actions undertaken each year to implement the Climate Plan. The report has been accompanied by other, more specialized documents, which derive from and seek to complement the Climate Plan. These include Paris’ Mobility Plan (Plan de Déplacement s ), also adopted in 2007 and completed in 2011, with an administrative version to reduce traffic congestion by 40% up to 2020.27

24 IPCC (2007). 25 Ville de Paris (2007). Plan climat territorial. 26 Municipal operations can be defined as all those stemming from activities that fall

under the authority of the city of Paris (municipal vehicle fleets, public buildings and housing, etc.), as opposed to overall citywide emissions. It should be noted that Boston has also made a similar distinction in several parts of its Climate Action Plans (see Chapter 7). 27 Ville de Paris (2007). Plan de Déplacements de la Ville de Paris.

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While Mayor Delanoë and his coalition had voluntarily pledged to update Paris’ Climate Plan every few years, national legislation (loi Grenelle II ) subsequently came into force which rendered it obligatory for any territorial community of more than 50,000 inhabitants to develop a new framework known as the ‘territorial climate and energy plan’ (Plan climat énergie territorial —PCET).28 This constituted an enhanced version of the previous territorial climate plan, with the addition of the word ‘energy’ in the title. In addition, as examined in Chapter 4, while the adoption of territorial climate plans by sub-state actors was merely been encouraged by the national government until 2010, PCETs were legally mandatory by a certain deadline. The main elements to be included in PCETs29 were defined under the Grenelle II Law, along with certain procedural requirements, even though each sub-state entity retained a margin for maneuver in the implementation process. Likewise, territorial communities were henceforth required to develop a Bilan des émissions de gaz à effet de serre—BEGES or ‘inventory’ of GHG emissions within their borders, necessary in preparing the PCET. As explained above, Paris had already developed a bilan carbone on a voluntary basis in 2006, but subsequently updated it according to these new national rules. The latter represents a noteworthy point of contrast to the US since, as previously examined, the federal American government does not have the legal capacity to directly impose policies or actions on municipal and local governments in the same manner.30 This emphasizes once again the differences between a dual system of local government (like in the US) and a fused system (as in France), where “municipalities form part of a uniform system of administration applying across the country”.31 Paris’ second Climate Plan or PCET was adopted by the City Council in 2012, and maintained all targets and objectives

28 The loi Grenelle II was adopted on the 12th of July 2010 (see Chapter 4). 29 For a detailed analysis of the PCET and the territorialization of climate and energy

policies in France, see Rizzoli (2015). 30 As previously indicated, the US Congress may enact national laws, including on environmental matters, which have a general ambit and apply to all entities, including states, cities or even individuals in some cases. Still, this represents an indirect form of interaction with local governments when compared to the centralized French political system, whereby national laws directly impact the municipal echelon by defining the main elements which must be included in local climate plans. 31 Hague and Harrop (2007, p. 243).

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for 2020 and 2050 which had been set out in the previous version.32 However, specific policies to achieve these targets and implement the Plan were updated, falling under five broad categories33 : • Land use and planning (aménagement du territoire) geared towards energy efficiency. • Low-carbon housing and building infrastructure. • Focus on the service industry and its impact on the climate. • Transport and mobility that is more respectful of the environment. • Towards more sustainable consumption patterns that generate less waste. The level of ambition for Paris’ first two Climate Plans in terms of timing and content enabled the city to establish itself as a pioneer on climate issues. Paris’ early and proactive stance in this area also had a catalytic effect on the higher echelons of governance. Indeed, the Îlede-France followed suit to enact its own climate policies at the regional level under the same timeframe, through a process that can be described as a form of emulation. This was linked to the fact that the Regional Council underwent a significant change in leadership in 1998. Like the city of Paris, the Île-de-France had been under conservative rule since the creation of its Regional Council in 1976; thus, environmental issues had not featured as a priority. However, a few years before Delanoë’s victory in 2001, the French Socialist Party achieved a similar historic breakthrough by winning the 1998 Regional elections in the Île-de-France. A ‘plural left’ coalition (gauche plurielle) tapped the Green Party to play an important role. The coalition elected Jean-Paul Huchon from the Socialist Party to be the President of the Regional Council. In both city and region, the alliance with the Green Party prompted their Socialist partners to raise the level of climate ambition. Hence, multilevel climate governance between the municipal and the regional echelons became relatively well aligned under the leadership of Delanoë and Huchon, both of whom served several terms in office during

32 Ville de Paris (2012). 33 It should be noted that Paris’ first two Climate Plans included policies focusing on

other sectors, which are beyond the scope of this book.

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roughly the same timeframe.34 Still, Paris has consistently been ahead of the Île-de-France in terms of climate policy, both from a temporal perspective and regarding its aspirations, with the city stimulating the regional level over time. Thus, while the ‘plural left’ coalition won the Regional elections in 1998, it wasn’t until after 2001, following the victory of the same coalition in the city of Paris, that the Île-de-France Council was spurred into adopting more concrete policies to support renewable energies and energy efficiency for buildings, transportation, housing, as well as public high schools. For instance, when the city of Paris conducted its carbon inventory in 2006, the Île-de-France was encouraged to prepare a Regional Inventory of GHG emissions (Bilan carbone de la région Île-de-France) one year later in 2007, partly to avoid trailing behind the capital city. Likewise, a year after Paris adopted its first Climate Plan establishing the objective of reducing GHG emissions 25% by 2020 and 75% up to 2050 (from a 2004 baseline), the Regional Council subsequently followed suit in 2008 by approving a Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France (SDRIF— ‘Directing Framework for the Île-de-France Region’).35 This framework established the objective of reducing regional emissions 75% by 2030, from a 1990 baseline.36 While this corresponds to a similar medium and long-term trajectory as that of Paris, the target and baseline years are different. The fact that the city of Paris and the Île-de-France have not been ideally synchronized in their long-term objectives and baseline years has been problematic in terms of the coordination and harmonization of

34 Delanoë served as Mayor of Paris from March 2001 until April 2014. Likewise, Huchon was President of the Île-de-France Regional Council from March 1998 up to December 2015. Thus, there is a thirteen-year overlap between their respective mandates, providing ample time for an effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. 35 The SDRIF constitutes an overarching policy framework which focuses on urbanism and territorial management in general, not directly on climate policy. Although the project for the SDRIF was approved in 2008, the final version was not validated until December 2013 following extensive consultations and collaboration between regional and national authorities, including via the Regional Prefect (see Chapter 4). See also Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2013). 36 It is important to emphasize that the Île-de-France, as the French economic epicenter and seat of national government, is the only metropolitan region which has been authorized under national law to maintain an overarching planning framework such as the SDRIF—providing it with a special legal status (statut particulier), similarly to the city of Paris as previously indicated. See Kada and Fazi (2022).

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policies between the two echelons. This represents a potential weakness in the articulation of multilevel climate governance. It wasn’t until 2011 that the Regional Council adopted its own Climate Plan or PCET37 (known as the Plan régional pour le climat d’Île-de-France 38 ), four years after the city of Paris. Such a temporal gap highlights the extent to which the region has shadowed the city in terms of its climate policies, striving to catch up.39 This is similar to the multilevel paradigm between New York City and the state of New York, as well as Boston and Massachusetts, whereby Governors in both states have lagged behind their capital cities for climate action over the last fifteen years or more (see Chapters 6 and 7). Once again, such a configuration points to a pattern whereby cities act as catalysts within the global climate regime, pushing the higher echelons of governance upwards over time. Cities can help to set the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. The Île-de-France Regional Climate Plan not only enshrined the objectives that had been set out in the SDRIF, but also contained detailed policies in terms of how they were to be achieved and enacted, with 24 proposed actions revolving around the four main axes: • • • •

Stop thermal leakage. Balance the energy mix. Enhance public transportation and mobility. Support and accompany territorial communities.

The last axis aimed to reinforce the multilevel dimension by setting out specific measures to enhance coordination on these climate issues with the lower echelons of governance, including the city of Paris. Building on this, the Regional Council adopted in 2012 a ‘Framework for Climate, Air and Energy in the Île-de-France’ (Schéma Régional du Climat, de

37 For a detailed analysis of the PCET, see Rizzoli (2015). 38 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2011). 39 This may also be due to the fact that Jean-Paul Huchon formed part of the ‘old left’, which did not prioritize the environment to the same extent as social justice, in contrast to Delanoë, who sought to embody a ‘new left’ that treated climate change as a priority.

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l’Air et de l’Energie d’Île-de-France—SRCAE).40 This happened the same year that Paris enacted its second Climate Plan. The latter demonstrates a more coordinated approach, with both echelons jointly enhancing their level of ambition. It is true that Paris’ second updated Climate Plan and the SRCAE were rendered mandatory in 2010 under national law (loi Grenelle II ), which set out certain deadlines and procedural rules (see Chapter 4).41 Yet, the fact that a ‘plural left’ coalition was in power at the same time, both at the municipal and regional levels, clearly facilitated the articulation of multilevel governance in this area, since city and region shared similar policy goals and platforms on climate issues. The SRCAE established 17 objectives and 58 strategic orientations for the region in terms of reducing GHG emissions, enhancing renewable energies and promoting energy efficiency, which fell under three broad priority areas42 : • Reinforcing energy efficiency in buildings, with the objective of doubling the pace of renovations in the service sector and tripling it for residential buildings. • Developing urban heating through renewable energies, with the objective of increasing by 40% the number of accommodations relying on this technology by 2020. • Reducing by 20% GHG emissions from transportation, to be combined with a sharp decrease in atmospheric pollutants (such as nitrogen dioxide, for example).

40 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2012). In fact, the Regional Climate Plan subsequently became a ‘Climate Component’ within the SRCAE. 41 The SRCAE, like the SDRIF discussed above, was developed and enacted by regional authorities in close collaboration with the national government and its local representatives, including the Regional Prefect. As examined in Chapter 4, the SRCAE is one of the main frameworks relied upon by the State to transpose national and EU climate objectives at the sub-national level. 42 Like Paris’ Climate Plans, the SRCAE also contained policies focusing on other sectors, which are beyond the scope of this book.

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Comparative Perspectives on Multilevel Climate Governance Between the French and American Cities and Regions/States in Our Sample

While these are ambitious objectives, they are of a different nature when compared to the ones set out by the American states examined in Chapters 6 and 7. Although Massachusetts and the state of New York have adopted a more holistic approach, providing overarching objectives that span across many different sectors, the SRCAE focuses only on specific policy areas. This is due to the fact that, despite consecutive phases of decentralization, French regions still possess only limited competences in particular fields, defined under national law.43 This represents a fundamental point of contrast to the US federal system,44 whereby states enjoy extensive competences through the exercise of both reserved and concurrent powers, as defined under American constitutional law. Another relevant point of comparison with the US has to do with the nature of multilevel interactions between the different tiers of governance under the hierarchical and stratified centralization which characterizes the French political system. As discussed above, following the enactment of national legislation (loi Grenelle II ), there is a legal obligation for both the city of Paris and the Île-de-France to develop specific types of climate plans and frameworks (SRCAE or PCET, for example) under certain deadlines and following specific procedures, whose main elements and composition are defined under the law. In addition, territorial communities are also required to develop a bilan (BEGES) or ‘inventory’ of GHG emissions within their borders, necessary for the preparation of local climate plans and frameworks.45 This is very different to the US, since the American Congress regularly operates under political gridlock and has been unable to ratify national climate legislation over the last few decades.46 As explained in Chapter 3,

43 As examined above, French communes also have specific competences attributed to them under national law. Yet, unlike regions, they continue to benefit from a ‘general competence clause’ (clause générale de compétence) which allows them to enact policies that go beyond the strict wording of the law in the name of ‘local public interest’. 44 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018) and Robertson (2017). 45 See Rizzoli (2015). 46 See Klyza and Sousa (2013).

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only budgetary legislation, which has a more limited ambit and scope, has been enacted under President Biden. Likewise, while Obama’s former Clean Power Plan (CPP) had sought to establish broad emission reduction targets and percentages for each individual state based on differing local circumstances, states were given wide latitude and a high degree of autonomy in the implementation process, especially in terms of flexibility for how to meet national emission standards at the local level. This clearly differs from the top-down French approach. What is more, Obama’s CPP was never enacted since it was stayed by the US Supreme Court in 2016, before being repealed under the Trump Presidency. While a number of progressive American cities and states pledged to voluntarily adhere to the CPP’s objectives under Trump, as part of national networks such as Climate Mayors or the US Climate Alliance,47 they were certainly not under a legal obligation to do so. US constitutional law does not provide the American federal government with the ability, as in France, to pass legislation or policies requiring local/municipal governments to implement certain types of climate plans and frameworks, since the latter falls under the purview of state-level authorities.48 Furthermore, the SRCAE became a regional reference framework for energy and air quality, as well as a ‘policy toolbox’ to help territorial communities of more than 50,000 inhabitants to define and implement their own Climate Plans or PCETs, so as to transpose the SRCAE’s objectives at the local level.49 In fact, one of the characteristics of multilevel governance in France is the direct legal obligation of compatibility between the various echelons50 when developing and implementing plans or strategies across policy sectors such as climate, energy and the environment. This means that Paris’ Climate Plans must be compatible with the orientations defined in the SRCAE, an obligation which can be enforced

47 See Barichella (2018). 48 As examined above, this highlights once again differences between a dual system of

local government like in the US, and a fused system as in France, whereby “municipalities form part of a uniform system of administration applying across the country”. See Hague and Harrop (2007). 49 This ‘policy toolbox’ was referred to as the ‘synthesis of recommended actions for territorial communities’ (Synthèse des actions recommandées aux collectivités territoriales ). 50 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux and Janicot (2021) and Faure (2021).

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through the French court system. This compels the different echelons to work closely together in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, a direct result of the unitary and centralized French political system. Because such a framework tends to encourage a greater degree of policy harmonization and coordination, there is less of a risk of conflict regarding policies and norms enacted between the different echelons. This emphasizes one of the strengths of the centralized French system in the articulation of multilevel climate governance. By comparison, the obligation of compatibility in the American federal system is more indirect (see Chapter 6 and 7). Local ordinances from municipalities cannot be contrary to state law due to the doctrine of preemption, even though there is no direct legal obligation of compatibility per se in the elaboration process, which can in some cases open the door to potential divergencies between the municipal and state echelons. In addition, the legal obligation of compatibility in France also applies in a lateral manner.51 Like Paris’ municipal Climate Plan, the Regional Climate Plan and SRCAE were accompanied by several more specialized policy frameworks focusing on a number of targeted sub-sectors. This includes, for example, the Regional Plan for Air Quality (Plan régional pour la qualité de l’air—PRQA), the Regional Framework for Linking Renewable Energies to the Power Grid (Schéma régional de raccordement au réseau électrique des énergies renouvelables —S3RENR), as well as the Regional Framework for Wind Power (Schéma Régional Éolien— SRE).52 A legal obligation of compatibility is required for these more specialized documents between themselves, and vis-à-vis the SRCAE. In addition, this also relates to policy frameworks in sectors such as urbanism and mobility (Plan de Déplacements Urbains—PDU),53 the protection of the atmosphere (Plan de Protection de l’Atmosphère—PPA),54 along with

51 Ibid. See also Verpeaux (2020. 52 As examined in Chapter 4, the Grenelle II Law established modalities for the elab-

oration of these other more specialized regional policy frameworks, with the aim to complement the dispositions of the more general SRCAE. Following these legal requirements, the Île-de-France approved its PRQA in June 2016 and the S3RENR was passed in February 2015. While the Île-de-France’s SRE was initially approved in September 2012, it was subsequently struck down by the French court system in 2014 due to inadequate following of procedural requirements. 53 The Île-de-France enacted its PDU in June 2014. 54 The latest version of the Île-de-France’s PPA was adopted in January 2018.

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housing and habitat (Schéma Régional de l’Habitat et de l’Hébergement— SRHH).55 These documents all contain provisions that have a bearing on climate policy, which must be compatible with the SRCAE.56 While the juridical specificities of the centralized French system have certainly contributed to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance between Paris and the Île-de-France, the political dynamics at work have also played a key role in this regard. The fact that ‘plural left’ coalitions, where the Green Party occupies a prominent position, achieved historic electoral successes at both the municipal and regional levels only three years apart, was instrumental. It allowed for the prioritization and coordination of climate policies at both echelons of governance during a fifteen-year timeframe (from 2001 to 2015).57 This provided an effective framework for the articulation of multilevel climate governance between Paris and Île-de-France. The latter remains true even though Delanoë and Huchon did not always get along on a personal level. In fact, they developed a rivalry over the years, with a certain level of institutional competition between the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region. Since they both came from the Socialist Party and shared a similar political philosophy within a ‘plural left’ coalition involving the Green Party, this personal rivalry did not significantly hamper the articulation of multilevel climate governance. Their respective administrations and staff, as well as coalition members within the Municipal and Regional Councils, were able to effectively collaborate on climate policy, regardless of personal differences between their leaders.

55 The Île-de-France’s SRHH was implemented in December 2017. 56 As explained in Chapter 4, these other regional policy frameworks, which focus on

different yet related sectors, are also rendered obligatory by various national laws. This covers specific requirements for the elaboration procedure, along with the main elements that have to be included, and is representative of the centralized nature of the French political system. As with the SRCAE, these policy frameworks are developed and enacted by regional authorities in close collaboration with the national government and its local representatives, including the Regional Prefect. 57 Mayor Delanoë was elected in 2001, and his successor Anne Hidalgo (also from the Socialist Party) came to power in 2014. Regional Council President Huchon was elected in 1998 and finished his third term in 2015, before being replaced by conservative Valérie Pécresse. This constitutes roughly a fourteen-year overlap, when both the city of Paris and the Île-de-France were governed by the same ‘plural left’ coalition.

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As examined in Chapter 6, this is similar to the situation in New York, where an institutional competition between Mayor and Governor has been apparent more often than not. In this regard, former Mayor Bill de Blasio and Governor Andrew Cuomo developed a mutual animosity towards each other during their time in office. Yet, the fact that they both came from the Democratic Party, with solid progressive majorities at both the state and city levels, enabled them to work together on climate issues regardless of personal rivalries.58 By contrast, even though Boston Mayor Marty Walsh and his successor Michelle Wu developed excellent relations with Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker, the fact that they come from different Parties was initially problematic. Although Baker is a moderate Republican, he had a mixed record on environmental issues during his first term, at a time when Boston was surging ahead with its climate policies as discussed in Chapter 7. This suggests that personal relations may not be a determining factor for the articulation of multilevel climate governance; sharing a similar political philosophy, due to membership of the same party or coalition, appears to be more important. The evolution of relations between Paris and the Île-de-France over the last few years lends further support to this suggestion. Like Boston and Massachusetts, a change in leadership at the regional level following a conservative victory in the Île-de-France has somewhat hindered multilevel climate governance, at a time when progressives reinforced their majority at the municipal echelon. Thus, although Mayor Delanoë was succeeded in 2014 by Anne Hidalgo from the Socialist Party, who maintained a plural left coalition in Paris’ Municipal Council, the French Conservative Party (Les Républicains —LR) came back to power in the Îlede-France after winning a new majority during the 2015 elections (with a reelection in 2021). Hence, while Paris has continued as a pioneer on climate issues, the momentum has slowed at the regional level, impacting the articulation of multilevel climate governance.

58 This sort of institutional competition and rivalry between the Mayor of a large city

and a regional/state executive appears to be quite common. For instance, over the last decade, neither Mayors Bloomberg nor de Blasio had gotten along with Governor Cuomo. Hence, the traditionally good relations between the Mayor of Boston and the Governor of Massachusetts appears to be more of an exception than the rule (see Chapters 6 and 7).

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3 Multilevel Climate Governance from the Municipal to the Regional Level Under Hidalgo and Pécresse: Paris Leading the Way in Terms of Galvanizing the Higher Echelons 3.1

Paris Enhances Its Level of Climate Ambition Under Mayor Hidalgo, with a Comparison of the Policies Enacted by Our Three Sample Cities

Anne Hidalgo replaced Delanoë as Mayor of Paris in 2014, when she succeeded in securing a comfortable majority for the ‘plural left’ coalition within the City Council.59 The majority of the Parisian electorate, quite sensitive to environmental issues, supported the new mayor’s green policies.60 As a result, right from the start of her mandate, Hidalgo has been adamant about making climate change a top priority for her administration, building upon and surpassing what was accomplished by her predecessor. Hidalgo rapidly implemented many of her campaign promises, such as developing cycling lanes and enhanced public transport, enlarging organic food distribution, accelerating the pace of building renovations and increasing the number of parks and green areas. For instance, less than one year after winning the 2014 election, the ‘plural left’ approved a plan to combat automobile pollution, which unfolded in several phases up to 2020 and focused on gradually banning older vehicles.61 The organization of the COP21 in Paris played a key role in accelerating the momentum for climate policy within Hidalgo’s coalition, pushing them to raise their level of ambition. Hidalgo co-hosted a Climate Summit for Local Leaders in parallel to the official process of UN negotiations in December 2015; she did so in partnership with Michael Bloomberg and several global networks. The event attracted more than 1000 sub-national representatives from all around the world, who signed the ‘Paris City Hall Declaration’, pledging among other things to reduce GHG emissions by 80% and to increase the share of renewable energies to 100% by the year 2050. These pledges formed 59 This comprises 92 seats for the ‘plural left’ coalition out of a total of 163 seats in the Parisian Municipal Council. 60 See Gréco (2019). 61 Ville de Paris (2015).

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the backbone of preparations to update the city’s Climate Plan, which began in September 2016 via a broad and extensive citizen’s consultation, building on the momentum of the COP21 and the historic signing of the Paris Agreement. Even though the city of Paris had voluntarily pledged to update its Climate Plan every few years, it was also under a legal obligation to do so. The adoption of new national legislation in 2015 (loi de transition énergétique pour la croissance verte—LTECV) established mandatory requirements for the elaboration of ‘Territorial Climate, Air and Energy Plans’ (Plan Climat-Air-Énergie Territorial —PCAET) under certain deadlines and following specific procedures. This constitutes an updated version of the previous Plan Climat-Énergie Territorial (PCET), and was accompanied by new rules for the preparation of GHG emission inventories or BEGES.62 The LTECV Law set out upgraded requirements on the elaboration process and follow-up, along with the main elements to be included in the development of both the new PCAET and the updated BEGES (see Chapter 4). Yet, local authorities still maintain a certain margin for maneuver, especially in the implementation phase of their PCAET. As previously discussed, in the American federal system, the national government and Congress cannot direct cities to elaborate specific types of local climate plans, since the latter falls under the purview of state-level authorities.63 This points to a key difference between the

62 As examined in Chapter 4, following the adoption of France’s national LTECV Law,

‘public intercommunal cooperation entities’ of more than 50,000 inhabitants are under a legal obligation to prepare a Plan Climat-Air-Énergie Territorial (PCAET) since 2016 (and from 2018 for those with more than 20,000 inhabitants). While there are a number of differences compared to the previous Plan Climat-Énergie Territorial (PCET), one salient upgrade is that the PCAET must integrate an air quality component, hence the addition of ‘air’ in the new title. Likewise, the loi portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République (NOTRe, also passed in 2015), which forms part of the third phase of decentralization, established more specific requirements for the Greater Paris Metropolis and municipalities that compose it in the elaboration of their PCAETs. 63 As indicated in Chapter 6, the federal Congress may enact general statutes, including

on environmental matters, which can contain certain provisions applying to all entities across the US, including states, cities or even individuals in some cases. However, unlike the PCAET which is directly stipulated under French national law, the US federal government does not have the authority to impose the elaboration of policy frameworks targeting local governments in the same way.

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American ‘dual system’ of local government, and the ‘fused system’ which characterizes the centralized French paradigm.64 Following these new legal requirements, the city of Paris conducted an updated BEGES, which paved the way for the elaboration of its third and latest Climate Plan (constituting the city’s PCAET), finalized after ratification by the Municipal Council in March 2018. The plan was elaborated following widespread consultation with all relevant stakeholders (like New York City and Boston—see Chapters 6 and 7). This plan represents a bold and far-reaching vision, going beyond simply updating its predecessors. The PCAET sets out ambitious objectives corresponding to three distinct timeframes (2020, 2030 and 2050), with the ultimate goal of achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century. Regarding the 2020 timeframe, the updated Climate Plan maintained the objectives of its two predecessors, while seeking to accelerate the pace of policy implementation. The decade from 2020 to 2030 is defined as the ‘decade of ambition’, critical for reaching carbon neutrality by 2050.65 For the year 2030, from a technical point of view, the updated Climate Plan seeks to reduce GHG emissions 50% for municipal operations,66 decrease citywide GHG emissions 40%, as well as enhance energy efficiency by 35% (all from a 2004 baseline). Likewise, another goal for 2030 is to expand the share of renewable energy to 45% (including 10% produced locally), end reliance on domestic heating oil and ensure compliance with WHO guidelines on air quality. Moreover, in line with the objectives pledged in the ‘Paris City Hall Declaration’, the long-term targets for 2050 are defined as reducing GHG emissions from municipal operations by 100%, together with decreasing citywide GHG emissions by 80% (also from a 2004 baseline), while relying on carbon offsets for the remaining 20% so as to achieve carbon neutrality. The mid-century objectives also include expanding energy efficiency 50% citywide (again with a

64 Hague and Harrop (2007). 65 Ville de Paris (2018a). 66 In its latest Climate Plan, the city of Paris refers specifically to ‘intramuros emissions’ (émissions intramuros ). While this is very similar to and integrates the notion of ‘municipal operations emissions’ examined above, it appears to be slightly broader, as it also comprises other emissions linked to energy consumption or waste, produced directly within the city. Still, it remains much narrower compared to citywide emissions (empreinte carbone du territoire), which includes all indirect emissions related to food consumption, construction or external transport (such as air travel).

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2004 baseline), as well as augment the share of renewable and recovered energy to 100%, with 20% produced locally. In order to achieve these objectives across three different timeframes, Paris’ third Climate Plan sets out 500 concrete measures that cover seven broad categories. Some of the main policies include67 : Energy68 • Produce 20% renewable energy locally by 2050, with a focus on developing solar photovoltaic, geothermal energy (especially for heating), as well as recovered energy from waste. • Enhance cooperation with regional territories outside Paris to import energy not produced locally, so as to reach 100% renewable energy by 2050. • Create a Parisian register to map out areas where developing solar photovoltaic is most propitious, especially on rooftops (with the aim to equip 20% of city rooftops by 2050). • Establish a public service for energy data, so as to better take advantage of the possibilities offered by new digital technologies in the energy transition. Buildings • Eco-renovate 1 million homes and more than 50 million square meters in the service sector, with the objective to eco-renovate 100% of existing buildings by 2050, including in terms of improving insulation to address thermal leakage. • The city of Paris is to become one of the main shareholders in the semi-public company Île-de-France Energies, which supports the ecorenovation of buildings across the region.

67 Like Paris’ first two Climate Plans, the third update also incorporates policies in other sectors, such as social inclusion for example, which are beyond the ambit of this book however. 68 Regarding the role of the energy sector for municipal sustainability, see Pincetl et al. (2020).

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• 100% of new buildings constructed in Paris will have to be lowcarbon and energy-efficient with new strict environmental standards (which comprises heating, insulation and thermal leakage). • Create carbon-neutral and resilient eco-neighborhoods, such as ‘Saint-Vincent de Paul’. Transport/Mobility 69 • Zero diesel vehicles by 2024 and zero gasoline vehicles by 2030 in Paris. • Develop appropriate infrastructure to make Paris 100% cyclable by 2020, as well as considerably expand pedestrian streets and pathways. • Develop wholly decarbonated public transport by 2025, with extensive electric bus lines. • Provide financial incentives for purchasing cleaner vehicles. Ex: differentiated parking tariffs for more polluting autos, and reduced costs for buying electric/hydrogen vehicles. • Reform the highway system surrounding Paris to support the use of cleaner vehicles, in cooperation with other echelons, including via the creation of additional restricted traffic zones (zones à circulation restreinte).70 Food consumption • Promote the ‘flexitarian’ diet and reduce meet consumption by 2050. • Render 20% of usable agricultural surfaces organic in the larger Paris area by 2050.

69 Regarding the importance of the transportation sector for municipal climate policies, see Hickman and Banister (2014). 70 It should be noted that Paris instituted its first restricted traffic zone back in September 2015. The latter are also referred to as ‘low emission zones’ (zones à faible émission), and involve limiting the access of certain types of polluting vehicles within a number of predefined zones across an urban area or city.

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Quality of life • Enhance the greening of Parisian streets across all districts of the city. • Increase the ratio of greening for citywide external surfaces by 40% up to 2050. Waste management • Recycle 100% of all city waste by 2050, including by promoting a circular economy and improving the sorting of waste at the source through eco-conception. Finance • Study the feasibility of a local carbon compensation platform in Paris, and develop green finance more generally. Regardless of these impressive objectives, Paris’ climate policies still display several shortcomings. For instance, despite the enactment of three consecutive Climate Plans since 2007, the city’s share of renewable energies remains low at around 18.4% in 2019, with only 6.8% produced locally that year. According to the latest data, Paris has not been able to meet its objective of enhancing renewables and energy efficiency by 25% up to 2020 (from a 2004 baseline).71 Moreover, the city’s policies for renewables and energy efficiency,72 along with waste management, have not been systematic, and there is clearly scope for improvement in these areas. Likewise, again according to the latest estimates at the time of writing, Paris failed to meet the GHG emissions target it had set for the year 2020 of reducing citywide emissions by 25% (from a 2004 baseline).73 As explained in Chapter 7, this is similar to the situation in the city of Boston. In both cases, missed targets are problematic for municipalities that seek to play a leadership role on climate policy not only at the national level,

71 Sénégas and Richard (2021). 72 Ibid. 73 See Ville de Paris (2020). See also: Cosnard (2022).

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but also on the global stage; they need to set the example by meeting their own objectives. Like Boston, however, Paris has come fairly close to meeting its 2020 objectives. In fact, these targets were very ambitious to begin with, perhaps unrealistically so, which may explain why both cities have not been able to achieve them. Even though Paris has not met several of its general targets for 2020, it has still succeeded in implementing most of the policies which had been set out for that year, across multiple sectors. As a result, like Boston, Paris is still broadly on track to achieve its medium-term targets for 2030, as well as its long-term objective of carbon neutrality by 2050.74 Hence, despite these remaining inadequacies, Paris’ third Climate Plan still constitutes one of the most far-reaching municipal policy agendas in the world, and is at least as ambitious when compared to the equivalent programs and initiatives adopted by New York City and Boston. In fact, the Climate Plans of all three cities in our sample share a number of similarities. Firstly, they have articulated policies that are specifically well adapted to the municipal level, focusing on sectors where cities can have the most impact in terms of reducing GHG emissions.75 This includes buildings, transportation/mobility, infrastructure planning, the energy and power supply, as well as waste management and recycling; these constitute domains where cities have direct control over policy processes. While there are variations in terms of competence allocation at the local level in different countries, this applies to many municipalities around the world. Hence, different cities are often confronted with similar challenges in their attempt to enact climate initiatives. Mayors can play an essential role in terms of climate mitigation,76 since they have the ability to enact policies that will directly impact a number of key sectors. This is especially important because municipalities consume over two-thirds of 74 The fact that Paris, as the capital city at the heart of the French economy, has failed to meet its 2020 goals (in terms of GHG emissions reduction, renewables and energy efficiency) is arguably concerning. As will be examined in Chapter 9, France’s national climate targets (in the form of NDCs) are already insufficient to achieve the objectives set out in the Paris Agreement to keep global temperatures below the 2 °C threshold by the end of the century. 75 In this regard, see literature on sustainable urban infrastructure design across targeted municipal level sectors: Hamin Infield et al. (2018), Hickman and Banister (2014), Wheeler and Rosan (2021) and Pincetl et al. (2020). 76 See Powell (2022), Johnson et al. (2017), Rosenzweig et al. (2018) and Sachs (2015).

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the world’s energy and account for more than 75% of global CO2 emissions,77 encompassing more than half the world’s population; such trends are projected to accelerate over the next few decades. Consequently, as discussed throughout this book, while cities are key contributors to global warming, they also constitute vital actors for finding solutions to address climate change. At the same time, each municipality is unique with its own characteristics, vulnerabilities and set of possibilities; hence, there are also some notable differences between our sample cities.78 For instance, even though New York City’s policies address all sectors that are relevant for municipal climate action, it still tends to prioritize the buildings sector. As discussed in Chapter 6, this was demonstrated by the fact that the CMA was enacted in April 2019 almost immediately after the release of the updated OneNYC , becoming New York’s first major municipal ordinance following from the strategic blueprint. In fact, the CMA currently displays one of the boldest set of policies to reduce emissions in the buildings sector of any city in the world, surpassing Paris and Boston in terms of its scale and ambit for this sector. By contrast, climate policies and strategies enacted by Paris and Boston tend not to prioritize one sector over the others.79 Paris’ Climate Plan is the most comprehensive of our sample cities not only in terms of the number of concrete policies that are set out (five hundred), but also due to the breadth of sectors which are covered. This includes original and innovative policy fields such as ‘quality of life’, which are not specifically mentioned in the case of Boston and NYC. All three cities in our sample initially sought to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century. In doing so, they aligned themselves with the more ambitious long-term objective set out in the Paris Agreement to keep global temperatures below 1.5 °C by the end of the century. 77 UN Environment, Cities and climate change: https://www.unenvironment.org/exp lore-topics/resource-efficiency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change. 78 For a comparison with three other cities, see Jones (2018). 79 As explained in Chapter 6, while the buildings sector represents a major source of

emissions for all three cities in our sample, this is especially the case in New York, due to the proliferation of skyscrapers. Therefore, while the new NYC Mayor of Eric Adams has pledged to adopt a broader approach to environmental matters, the priority of his administration in terms of climate mitigation has still been to oversee implementation of the CMA, especially for preparing the launch of its first phase, scheduled to begin in 2024.

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Paris, Boston and New York originally aimed to reduce citywide emissions by at least 80% up to 2050, and to offset the remaining 20% so as to achieve carbon neutrality. As examined in Chapter 7, Boston’s new Mayor Michelle Wu has set out a far-reaching ‘Green New Deal’, which aims to achieve carbon neutrality for the city by 2040, a decade earlier than Paris or New York. If fully enacted, this would turn Boston into the most ambitious city in our sample, at least in terms of its timetable for achieving carbon neutrality.80 However, Paris was selected (together with 8 other French cities and 100 European cities), to be part of an EU-funded project whose aim is to reach carbon neutrality by 2030.81 Municipal authorities in Paris have acknowledged that the objective is unrealistic and mostly aspirational because it is non-binding, but it may serve to galvanize the city to augment its level of ambition.82 This points to the possibility that Paris might upgrade its carbon neutrality pledge during the next revision of its Climate Plan scheduled for 2024 (see below), perhaps joining Boston’s goal of carbon neutrality by 2040. It is also interesting to observe that our three sample cities adopt very similar baseline years, even though there is still a one-year difference between New York and Boston (2005), as opposed to Paris (2004). As explained in Chapters 6 and 7, this choice is linked to the fact that a short baseline can be better adapted for measuring municipal emissions in targeted sectors like buildings, transportation or waste management, which characterizes the approach of our three sample cities. This is different from the more holistic approach adopted by higher echelons like Massachusetts or the state of New York, along with the French government or the European Union, for example, which usually opt for longer baselines like the year 1990.83 Another similarity is that all three cities 80 At the time of writing, it remains to be seen whether or not Wu will be able to legally enshrine this new target of reaching carbon neutrality by 2040, since enactment of her municipal Green New Deal has been challenging and has proceeded more slowly than expected during her first year and a half in office (see Chapter 7). 81 European Commission (2022, April 28). Commission announces 100 cities participating in EU Mission for climate-neutral and smart cities by 2030: https://ec.europa.eu/ commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_2591. 82 See Langlois (2022). 83 There are some notable exceptions to this however, since the US federal government,

whether under Obama or Biden, has adopted 2005 as a baseline year for the American NDC (see Chapters 2 and 3). This indicates that short baseline years can also support policies at the national level in some cases.

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have adopted an intermediary target for 2030. Yet, while Paris and New York chose to reduce GHG emissions 40% by that date, Boston chose a more ambitious target at 50%, which may be further upgraded under Mayor Michelle Wu. Paris and Boston have both implemented a similar GHG emissions target for 2020 (unlike New York City84 ), which spreads their emission reduction objectives across three distinct temporalities in the short (2020), medium (2030) and long run (2040 and 2050). In addition, there are a number of specific differences in terms of the policies chosen to achieve and enact these various climate goals. For instance, while Paris seeks to reach 100% renewable energy by 2050, New York City aims for 100% carbon-free electricity instead, while Boston’s Mayor Wu has announced 100% renewable electricity for the city no later than 2030 under her ‘Green New Deal’. Likewise, although both Paris and Boston sometimes make a distinction in their pledges between municipal (or intramuros ) and citywide emissions, this is often not the case with New York City. Moreover, while NYC explicitly seeks to align itself with the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Paris has tended to put more emphasis on its alignment with WHO guidelines for air quality.85 Finally, another interesting difference is that both Paris and New York have included measures that specifically target food consumption and have attached importance to this issue, especially NYC Mayor Eric Adams who is a self-proclaimed vegan (see Chapter 6). Food has not been as much of a focus area for Boston over the last few years, even though Mayor Michelle Wu has paid more attention to this since coming into office.86 Paris Mayor Hidalgo’s leadership on climate issues has continued over the last few years since ratification of Paris’ third Climate Plan in 2018. The ‘plural left’ coalition in the Municipal Council has worked rapidly to enact the 500 different measures set out in the Climate Plan. The

84 New York developed a number of concrete policy objectives to be achieved by the year 2020, as outlined in the 2017 Strategy for aligning the city with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 °C objective. However, the difference with Boston and Paris is that NYC has not set out an explicit GHG emissions reduction target for the year 2020 (see Chapter 6). 85 See World Health Organization (2021). 86 ‘Food justice’ only appears towards the end of the list of priorities in Michelle Wu’s

‘Green New Deal’ for the city of Boston. See Office of Boston City Councilor Michelle Wu (2020).

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Mayor and her majority have also developed several more specialized programs that derive from and aim to complement, as well as support implementation of the main Climate Plan. These include, for example, the city’s Cycling Plan (Plan vélo), the Local Program for Waste Management (Programme local de prévention des déchets ménagers et assimilés ), the Plan for Sustainable Food Consumption (Plan d’alimentation durable), the Plan for Biodiversity (Plan de biodiversité), as well as the Mobility Plan for Parisian Administrations (Plan de déplacement des administrations parisiennes ).87 Due to the legal nature of the centralized French political system, there is an obligation of compatibility between all of these specialized plans and the city’s main Climate Plan. This is similar to the obligation of compatibility between the SRCAE at the regional level and the various specialized policy plans which derive from it, as examined above. This also applies in a lateral manner to other sectors such as urban planning or territorial management, which have an impact on climate policy; in this case, French law makes a distinction between different levels of compatibility.88 Thus, Paris’ Climate Plan only needs to ‘take into account’ (prise en compte) the Local Urbanism Plan (Plan local d’urbanisme—PLU89 )

87 The latest version of Paris’ Cycling Plan was enacted in January 2021 (spanning the period to 2026), and its Local Program for Waste Management was passed in December 2017. Likewise, the latest version of the Plan for Sustainable Food Consumption was launched in June 2022 (spanning the period to 2027), while the Plan for Biodiversity was released in March 2018 (spanning the period to 2024). Finally, the Mobility Plan for Parisian Administrations was implemented in March 2017. 88 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux and Janicot (2021) and Faure (2021). 89 As examined in Chapter 4, the national LTECV Law also integrated provisions impacting policy frameworks in other related sectors at the municipal level. It set out upgraded environmental and energy requirements in the elaboration of PLUs, which aimed to complement the specialized climate dispositions of the PCAET. Following these new legal rules, the city of Paris launched a process to update its PLU, whose current version dates back to 2006 (even though many adjustments were made over the years). The aim is to place climate change at the center of an upgraded ‘Bioclimatic Local Urbanism Plan’ (Plan Local d’Urbanisme Bioclimatique), to be finalized by the end of 2023 and enter into force in 2024.

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or the Framework for Territorial Coherence (Schéma de cohérence territorial —SCOT90 ). By contrast, as examined above, Paris’ Climate Plan must be compatible (compatibilité) with the SRCAE at the regional level, which is a stronger obligation under French law. Again, this is very different from the American federal system, where the obligation of compatibility is more indirect, since local ordinances cannot be incompatible with state law under the doctrine of preemption, even though there is no direct obligation of compatibility per se in the elaboration process. Nonetheless, the French and US paradigms are similar in that the French obligation of compatibility usually applies from the bottom-up, instead of top-down; thus, it is Paris’ Climate Plan which must be compatible with the SRCAE, not the other way around. 3.2

Paris Leads the Way, Galvanizing the Higher Echelons to Enhance Their Climate Ambition

Hidalgo’s reelection in 2020 enhanced her level of ambition on climate policy. Environmental issues featured as one of the dominant themes of her campaign, and she was able to successfully renew her alliance with the Green Party as part of a ‘plural left’ coalition. What is more, the Green Party achieved a historic breakthrough in the 2020 municipal elections across France, winning many new cities for the first time. This momentum was also apparent in Paris, where the Greens more than doubled their number of seats in the City Council (from 11 to 23 seats), which has increased their political weight within the ruling ‘plural left’ coalition. This happened at a time when other left-wing groups, including Hidalgo’s Socialist Party, lost seats, while opposition groups such as the Conservative Party (Les Républicains ), managed to increase their numbers.91 As a result of the ‘green wave’, Hidalgo’s coalition pledged 90 The Greater Paris Metropolis launched a process to elaborate a SCOT, taking into account the environmental and energy requirements of the national LTECV Law, scheduled to enter into force by the end of 2023. 91 Still, all three of Paris’ Climate Plans received unanimous approval from the City Council. As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, climate change is not a polarizing issue in French politics in the same way as it is in the US, since French conservative parties do not deny climate science. Yet, without the ‘plural left coalition’ and its prioritization of environmental issues, Paris’ Climate Plans would have undoubtedly been less ambitious, both in terms of their objectives, as well as with policies for their enactment over the short, medium and long run.

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to accelerate implementation of Paris’ latest Climate Plan by enacting a number of new policies, which were announced during the 2020 municipal campaign as part of a new agreement negotiated with the Green Party. This includes the maintenance of 50 km of ‘corona bicycle lanes’ that were established in the wake of the pandemic, limiting the speed limit to 30 km within Paris, increasing the number of pedestrian streets, or expanding the range of ‘urban forests’. Despite several disputes with the Green Party, the ‘plural left’ coalition has held since Hidalgo’s reelection, and they are mostly on schedule to enact the new measures pledged during the campaign. Moreover, Hidalgo’s decision to run in the 2022 French Presidential election as the Socialist Party candidate pushed her into further raising her level of green ambition. Like the municipal election in 2020, climate issues were at the heart of her Presidential campaign in 2022. Hidalgo relied on her mandate as Mayor of Paris to showcase her commitment to innovative and far-reaching environmental policies, which she pledged to translate at the national level. Although she received an historically low score in the Presidential race (1.75%), the campaign still motivated her to take proactive measures throughout 2021 and 2022 to accelerate implementation of Paris’ latest Climate Plan.92 In addition to the measures mentioned above, other examples include the opening of a first-of-its-kind ‘Paris Climate Academy’ in September 2021 following a decision from the municipal council, with the aim of providing free education and raising awareness about environmental issues through the organization of regular seminars, conferences, tutorials, debates or exhibitions for citizens of all ages, with an emphasis on youth. Another instance was the city council’s decision in July 2022 to launch a new pact, referred to as ‘Paris Action on Climate and Biodiversity’ (Paris Action Climat Biodiversité), to associate private companies and Parisian/ Metropolitan institutions more closely with the capital city’s climate action plan. The pact seeks to reinforce collaboration between all types of actors, both public and private, to develop common green standards and share best practices so as to improve each actor’s carbon footprint.93 92 Although Hidalgo was knocked out of the first round of the election in April 2022, the green momentum she developed during her Presidential run has continued. 93 This includes a catalogue of concrete measures established by the city of Paris, which signatories pledged to follow. See Ville de Paris (2022, July). Pacte Paris Action Climat Biodiversité.

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Likewise, in October 2022, Hidalgo announced an updated plan94 to eco-renovate private buildings, new financial aids (involving e58 million) along with free and personalized customer services for different project phases, under the aegis of the Parisian Climate Agency. The aim is to enhance the energy efficiency and use of renewables for buildings across the city by engaging in extensive eco-renovation projects95 in order to renovate over 22,500 private homes by 2026, twice as many as under the initial 2016 version of the plan. In addition, the city of Paris joined several public and private partners96 to launch a semi-public company (société d’économie mixte) known as ‘Seine Axis Renewable Energies’ (Axe Seine Énergie Renouvelables ), which held its first meeting in November 2022.97 Another first-of-its kind in France, this entity fosters the development, distribution and storage of renewable energies across the Seine axis territories. By prioritizing solar photovoltaic and wind power, its goal is to generate 230 MW of power through various new projects by 2028, a notable boost to local clean energy production. This green momentum has continued in 2023, with Paris launching a program (EnergieCulteurs 98 ) to deploy new solar stations on the roofs of fifteen municipal buildings, comprising 12,000 m2 of photovoltaic panels. Preparations have also been made to update Paris’ Climate Plan a fourth time following a large public consultation launched in fall 2022, with the goal of finalizing the new plan over the course of 2024. The aim is to enhance Paris’ climate policies across all fields so as to put the capital city on a trajectory to reach carbon neutrality, perhaps sooner than the current 2050 objective, as discussed above.99

94 Ville de Paris (October 2022). Éco-rénovons Paris + : encore plus d’aides à la rénovation pour les copropriétés: https://www.paris.fr/pages/plan-1000-immeubles-pour-la-ren ovation-thermique-3136. 95 Projects will be encouraged to go beyond mere thermal renovation by engaging in extensive upgrades with a strong environmental impact, including reliance on bio-source materials, renewable energies, vegetalization, etc. 96 This includes the Metropolises of Paris, Rouen and Le Havre, along with private entities such as Énergie Partagée Investissement and the Banque des Territoires. 97 Métropole

Grand Paris (2022, November 9). Création de la SEM AxeSeine Energies Renouvelables: 1er outil public de développement des énergies renouvelables: https://www.metropolegrandparis.fr/fr/actualites/creation-de-la-sem-axe-seine-ene rgies-renouvelables-1er-outil-public-de-developpement. 98 Ville de Paris (2023). 99 Likewise, another objective is to transcribe at the municipal level new national climate

and clean energy norms established under President Macron (see Chapter 5).

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Paris’ proactive stance and growing aspirations on climate policy over the last few years under the leadership of Mayor Hidalgo have had a catalytic effect in stimulating other sub-national actors across France. Setting the bar high, Paris became one of the first French cities to adopt a Climate Plan in 2007. Likewise, Paris was one of the very first French territorial communities to adopt a pledge for reaching carbon neutrality by 2050, confirming its position as a national climate pioneer.100 As France’s capital and largest city, Paris has played a key role in encouraging other cities and sub-state actors to follow its lead and high level of climate ambition. This confirms the capital city’s key role as a driver of climate action, in both a vertical and horizontal manner. The horizontal dimension is apparent in the many other large cities or metropolises across France that have followed Paris’ lead; this includes Lyon, Strasbourg and Marseille, which have been galvanized into articulating their own carbon neutrality pledges.101 The vertical dimension is notable when it comes to the higher echelons of governance directly above Paris. This applies to the ‘Greater Paris Metropolis’ (Métropole du Grand Paris - MGP), which constitutes a cooperative framework involving 130 communes located around Paris, in addition to the capital city itself.102 The MGP was established in January 2016, following several reforms enacted during the third phase of decentralization (2014–2015)103 ; these reforms attributed specific competences to metropolises defined under the law, mostly transferred from communes , regions, but also from the national government. This represents a notable difference with the American cities/states in our sample. While the US

100 See Ville de Paris (2018a). 101 For instance, following Paris’ adoption of the objective of carbon neutrality by 2050

via its upgraded Climate Plan in March 2018, several of France’s largest cities including Lyon, Marseille and Strasbourg followed suit over one year later towards the end 2019. 102 Under French law, the precise designation for metropolises such as the MPG is a ‘public framework for intercommunal cooperation with its own fiscal base’ (établissement public de coopération intercommunal à fiscalité propre). Thus, they are not considered as territorial communities from a legal perspective, but instead represent frameworks enabling communes to collaborate and harmonize policies in specific areas. 103 As explained in Chapter 4, this includes: 1. Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles (MAPTAM, January 2014), or “Law modernizing territorial public action and affirming metropolises”. 2. Loi portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République (NOTRe, August 2015), or “Law pertaining to a new territorial organization of the Republic”.

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does have an intermediary echelon between the municipal and the state level in the form of counties, the latter do not hold sway over either New York City or Boston, for reasons examined in Chapters 6 and 7.104 Nevertheless, French metropolises such as the MGP still possess relatively limited competences, which means they currently do not play a major role in the articulation of multilevel climate governance. In France, the three principal echelons remain the commune, département and region, even though the importance of metropolises is likely to increase over the next few years and decades.105 In this regard, the Greater Paris Metropolis does have the requisite competences to enact its own version of the PCAET, referred to as the ‘Metropolitan Climate, Air and Energy Plan’ (Plan Climat, Air, Energie Métropolitain - PCAEM); the final version was approved by the Metropolitan Council in September 2018.106 As examined in Chapter 4, ‘public intercommunal cooperation entities’ (which mostly refers to groups of communes like metropolises) such as the MGP are under a legal obligation to enact a PCAET or PCAEM under a certain deadline and following specific procedures, as stipulated in the LTECV Law (when their population is over a minimum threshold). In addition to such legal requirements, it is clear that Paris’ high level of ambition spurred the MGP into setting out its own climate plan at roughly the same time; the metropolis’ PCAEM was finalized only six months following the adoption of Paris’ latest Climate Plan.107 This is also apparent in terms of their objectives and level of ambition, which are relatively well aligned. For instance, both the city of

104 In the case of Boston, Suffolk County no longer possesses any political competences since 1999 and now mostly has a symbolic role, while in the case of New York, all five boroughs in the city represent separate counties, falling under the jurisdiction of the Mayor. 105 While the MGP and other metropolises currently possess limited competences, their importance is likely to increase, since further decentralization is likely to be enacted by the French government in the near future. As examined in Chapter 4, the LTECV Law refocuses the elaboration of PCAETs or PCAEMs specifically for ‘public intercommunal cooperation entities’, which mostly refers to different types of groups of communes such as the MGP, instead of all territorial communities (as had been the case with PCETs under the Grenelle II bill). 106 Métropole du Grand Paris (2018). 107 As indicated above, Paris’ latest Climate Plan also constitutes a PCAET, albeit one

that is focused on the municipal echelon.

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Paris and the MGP seek to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050, expand their share of renewable energies and enhance energy efficiency, as well as reduce air pollution in line with WHO guidelines. The city of Paris and the Greater Paris Metropolis have been working together to establish a joint action plan to tackle air pollution, which includes the creation of common restricted traffic zones (zones à circulation restreinte), gradually phasing out polluting vehicles by 2030.108 This emphasizes the ways in which municipal policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, inciting further climate action from the bottom-up, a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state actors within the climate regime.109 Yet, due to the centralized nature of the French political system, the legal obligation of compatibility between the different echelons remains in the case of the Climate Plans enacted by the MGP and the city of Paris; this also explains, at least in part, their relatively effective alignment. While Paris (and the MGP to a certain extent) surged ahead in their level of climate ambition under the impulse of Mayor Hidalgo, becoming one the greenest urban centers in the world, the Île-de-France did not follow suit in quite the same manner. After more than seventeen years as President of the Regional Council at the head of a ‘plural left’ coalition, Jean-Paul Huchon did not seek reelection for a fourth term in 2015. The Conservative Party (Les Républicains ) achieved an electoral victory that year, winning back control of the region for the first time since 1998. The new conservative majority in the Regional Council elected political veteran Valérie Pécresse to be its President; she began her mandate in late 2015, only a year and a half after Paris also experienced a change in leadership. While Hidalgo enhanced the climate policies begun under her predecessor, Pécresse and her new conservative majority have a mixed record on environmental issues. Such a situation has impacted the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. Since 2015, the latter has become more partial, after having been relatively well aligned for nearly fifteen years when both echelons of governance had ‘plural left’ coalition majorities. This confirms that multilevel climate governance is rarely static but evolves over time.

108 During the global summit ‘Cities for Air’ held in 2016, Mayor Hidalgo and Patrick Ollier (President of the MGP) co-launched a ‘Global Urban Air Pollution Observatory’, with support from the WHO. 109 See Hale (2018).

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In Boston and Massachusetts, examined in Chapter 7, multilevel governance was well aligned for eight years under Mayor Menino and Governor Patrick, both of whom came from the Democratic Party. The election of Governor Baker, a moderate Republican, in 2014 rendered this multilevel framework more partial. This was due to Baker’s mixed environmental record during his first term in office, when the state was clearly trailing behind the city of Boston in terms of its level of climate ambition. Despite many differences between the French and US political systems, Valérie Pécresse’s election as President of the Île-de-France Regional Council has triggered a similar state of affairs. The conservative majority in the Regional Council has been accused by the opposition of not prioritizing environmental issues, unlike the previous ‘plural left coalition’. For example, during the first half of her initial six-year mandate, the budget allocated by Pécresse for the energy transition was reduced by 75%. Pécresse stopped funding related to energy diagnostics, with the Îlede-France only spending e0.677 million on renewable energies, instead of e7.4 million that had been announced at the outset. Likewise, in 2017, the Regional Council provided just e2 million for energy efficiency (whereas e17 million had been promised). Pécresse was also initially opposed to the banning of diesel vehicles, as well as to regional aid for the replacement of polluting automobiles for people from underprivileged backgrounds.110 According to the latest estimates, the Île-de-France has failed to meet a number of the climate objectives it had set out in the SRCAE for the year 2020.111 While it is true that Paris also did not meet all of its 2020 targets, these targets were far more ambitious to begin with, and the city has still made substantial progress in terms of implementing its climate objectives over the last decade; in contrast, the same cannot be said of the regional level.112 As Pécresse’s first mandate came to an end in 2021, the 110 In addition, Pécresse and her conservative majority have also been sharply criticized by environmental groups for pushing through an industrial project in 2018, despite opposition from local inhabitants, which involved deforestation of the Corniche des Forts in Seine-Saint-Denis. This was considered a unique reservoir of local biodiversity in the Île-de-France. 111 See Airparif (2019). 112 While it is true that the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts have also not

met their 2020 targets, the latter were more ambitious to begin with (similarly to Paris), and they have still made notable progress in terms of implementing climate objectives over the last decade (see Chapter 7).

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Île-de-France remained one of the most polluting and energy-inefficient regions in France, with one of the lowest shares for renewable energies. This remains true even proportionally, taking into account the fact that the region has the highest population and level of economic activity.113 By contrast, the region of Occitanie in the south-west is usually considered one of France’s national champions in terms of renewable energies. In 2018, up to 45.8% of electricity consumption in Occitanie came from renewable energies produced locally; by contrast, the equivalent figure for Île-de-France is less than 5%.114 Finally, under Pécresse’s leadership, the Île-de-France was the last region in France to adopt an updated Energy and Climate Strategy in July 2018. Such a temporal gap may be interpreted as a lack of prioritization regarding environmental issues. In fact, during the six years of their first mandate, Pécresse and her majority appear to have rejected all amendments coming from the opposition, including suggestions from the Green Party to improve the region’s climate policy framework. Thus, Pécresse and the Conservative Party have been accused by the opposition of prioritizing private interests, especially high-tech business growth, at the expense of environmental matters. Combined with the shortcomings highlighted above, this points to a number of issues with the conservative majority’s environmental record during Pécresse’s first term (2015–2021). Hence, at a time when Paris was surging ahead with its level of ambition under Hidalgo’s leadership, multilevel climate governance between the city and the region became more partial on several counts following Pécresse’s election. These limitations need to be balanced against a number of other positive developments in the Île-de-France, which point to an overall mixed record. There is a notable difference between the climate skepticism of the Republican Party in the US and conservative movements in Europe, where climate change denialism is relatively uncommon, especially in

113 Huchon and his ‘plural left’ coalition also bear some share of responsibility for this state of affairs, as they were in power for nearly 18 years before Pécresse. Since France remains a relatively centralized country, most of the population and economic activity is concentrated in the Île-de-France. These factors undoubtedly constitute a challenge in terms of transitioning towards a more sustainable growth model. 114 Observatoire de l’énergie en Occitanie. La production d’énergie renouvelable en Occitanie: https://www.arec-occitanie.fr/la-production-denergie-renouvelable-en-occ itanie.html.

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France. The shortcomings analyzed above reveal that the French Conservative Party has not prioritized environmental issues to the same extent as left-leaning political groups. Yet, like Charlie Baker in Massachusetts, Valérie Pécresse is generally considered to be a ‘moderate’ conservative, who has positioned herself on the progressive fringe of the French Conservative Party (Les Républicains ). She has worked to put pressure on her conservative majority within the Regional Council to take environmental issues more seriously over the last few years. Therefore, Pécresse was able to push through several climate initiatives at the regional level during her first mandate. This includes the ‘Regional Plan for Air Quality’ (Plan Changeons d’Air)115 to reduce air pollution, the ‘Anti Traffic-Jam Plan’ (Plan Anti-Bouchons ),116 an ‘AirWood Fund’ (Fonds Air-Bois ) to replace polluting furnaces, as well as a new Cycling Plan (Plan Vélo 117 ) to encourage greater reliance on cycling for transportation. Another important measure was the launching of ‘100 Ecological and Innovative Neighborhoods’ (100 Quartiers Ecologiques et Innovants ), a program which provides funding to eco-renovate up to one hundred neighborhoods across Île-de-France. Because the program sponsors several projects within the city of Paris, this points to some coordination in terms of multilevel climate governance under Pécresse. In fact, the conservative majority within the Regional Council has found itself under pressure from the capital city to enhance its climate ambition. At a time when Hidalgo and her renewed ‘plural left’ coalition were leading the city towards a third, updated Climate Plan, Pécresse was concerned that the region might be falling behind. Climate issues have risen to become one of the top priorities for voters not only in the city of Paris, but also at the regional level. Partly in response to criticism that the new conservative majority in the Regional Council lacked the same level of climate ambition as the city of Paris, Pécresse endeavored to improve her environmental record. Clearly, the city of Paris’ proactive stance on climate policy under Hidalgo galvanized not only the metropolis (the MGP), but also the regional

115 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2016). 116 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2017). Plan Régional Anti-Bouchons et pour

Changer la Route. 117 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2017). Plan Vélo Régional.

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level. As examined in the two previous chapters, this recalls the situation in the states of New York and Massachusetts, whereby New York City and Boston acted as catalysts to spur their respective states into enhancing their climate policies over time, so as to catch up with their capital cities. Governors Cuomo in New York and Baker in Massachusetts also initially had mixed environmental records, which they improved over the years until eventually becoming national climate leaders, partly in response to pressure from the municipal echelon. Once again, this indicates that multilevel governance may positively evolve over time, with cities acting as drivers within the climate regime, pulling the higher echelons upwards. Local policy innovation can have an illustrative impact, encouraging further action from the bottom-up, with cities setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. In this regard, the parallels with the dynamics operating in New York are particularly notable. As examined in Chapter 6, although a personal rivalry had developed between former Mayor de Blasio and former Governor Cuomo, the rivalry may have been beneficial in the area of climate policy, since it motivated both men to enhance their climate ambitions.118 Likewise, while Huchon and Delanoë already did not get along on a personal level, the situation worsened under their successors Hidalgo and Pécresse, who have developed an acute personal rivalry, made worse by the fact that they come from different political parties. This may have encouraged Pécresse to enhance her climate ambition over time, so as to match Hidalgo’s initiatives at the municipal level. Such institutional competition between mayors of large cities and their regional executives is prevalent both in France and the US, as well as in many other countries around the world. Pécresse has relied on her national political clout to encourage her peers within the French Conservative Party into putting more emphasis on environmental issues, developing her notion of ‘positive’ and ‘realist’ ecology. Partly in alignment with conservative values, this seeks to reward

118 NYC Mayor Eric Adams and Governor Kathy Hochul have endeavored to improve

relations between the two echelons, and have sought to develop a close partnership since assuming office only a couple of months apart. Yet, despite a notable improvement compared to their predecessors, disagreements between the new Mayor and Governor persist, especially regarding budgetary matters where Adams was quite critical over budgetary cuts announced by Hochul in January 2023, for example (see Chapter 6).

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green initiatives and entrepreneurship, while avoiding the ‘punitive ecology’ attributed to the ‘plural left’, accused of enacting mostly taxes and overly strict regulations that hamper the economy. Thus, Pécresse has sought to mobilize the Île-de-France as an experimental arena to showcase her conception of ‘positive’ and ‘realist’ ecology, more apparent during the second half of her first mandate, underlining a clear progression over time.119 As will be examined in more detail below, this also became a central theme of Pécresse’s campaign during the 2022 French Presidential election, when she won the primary and became the official candidate for the Conservative Party (Les Républicains ).120 3.3

Effective Articulation and Remaining Shortcomings for Multilevel Climate Governance Between Paris and the Île-de-France

Effective articulation of multilevel climate governance between Paris and the Île-de-France, in the enactment of their respective climate policy frameworks, can be identified across several dimensions. For instance, Pécresse has worked to prepare an updated ‘Energy and Climate Strategy’ (Stratégie Energie-Climat de la Région Île-de-France) at the regional level, which represents the main climate policy framework enacted during her first term. Although she presented this as part of her concept of ‘positive’ and ‘realist’ ecology, it also constituted an attempt to match Hidalgo’s updated Climate Plan at the municipal level. As explained in Chapter 7, the city of Boston and the state of Massachusetts have not always been well-synchronized on a temporal level over the last few years. While this has also been true from a historic perspective for the city and the state of New York, they were still able to implement their Green New Deals at roughly the same time in 2019. Similarly, the final version of Paris’ third Climate Plan was set out in

119 Again, this evokes the situation in Massachusetts under Governor Baker, a moderate Republican, who likewise succeeded in improving his environmental record over time and especially during his second term, attempting to bridge the partisan gap on climate issues in the US (see Chapter 7). 120 In fact, the rivalry between Pécresse and Hidalgo, including on climate issues, also played out during the 2022 French Presidential election, when they were both candidates for the conservative and socialist parties respectively, and openly highlighted their diverging political stances throughout the campaign.

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March 2018, while the Île-de-France’s new Energy and Climate Strategy was enacted in July 2018, only three months later. As indicated above, the Greater Paris Metropolis also adopted its own Climate Plan in September 2018, two months after the region. Clearly, this was not a coincidence, but highlights Pécresse’s intention not to be left behind on climate issues. The latter demonstrates a good level of temporal synchronization between the city, the metropolis and the region, which is important for the articulation of multilevel climate governance. In addition, and for reasons examined in more detail below, Paris’ latest Climate Plan and the Île-de-France’s new Energy and Climate Strategy are relatively well aligned concerning their medium and long-term objectives. Both rely on the same target years over the medium (2030) to long run (2050); they also share similar priorities, including in terms of enhancing energy efficiency and the share of renewables, along with lowering dependence on energy imports (like the Greater Paris Metropolis). For the year 2030, the Stratégie Energie-Climat de la Région Île-de-France seeks to reduce by half its dependence on fossil fuels and nuclear energy by enhancing energy efficiency up to 20%, increase the share of renewable energies to 40%, as well as double the ratio of renewables produced locally (all from a 2015 baseline).121 For the year 2050, the Strategy aims to achieve carbon neutrality by augmenting energy efficiency up to 40%, by expanding the share of renewable energies to reach 100%, and by quadrupling the ratio of renewables produced locally (also from a 2015 baseline).122 Following the enactment of this strategy, Paris and Île-de-France became better aligned in terms of their long-term objectives and share a similar level of ambition, since they both aim to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 (like the Greater Paris Metropolis123 ), as well as transition towards 100% renewable energies. They also have a similar objective to increase the share of renewables by the year 2030. While Paris is slightly more ambitious since it aims for 45%, instead of 40% for the Île-de-France, the end result is relatively similar due to the difference in baseline years. 121 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2018). 122 Ibid. 123 Therefore, like the city of Paris, both the Greater Paris Metropolis and the Îlede-France have sought to align themselves with the more ambitious long-term objective set-out in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temperatures below 1.5 °C by the end of the century.

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When it comes to enhancing energy efficiency, their objectives also have a similar trajectory, both over the medium (2030) and long run (2050), with Paris being slightly more ambitious once again; this is not necessarily apparent however due to a different choice of baseline years (2004 for Paris and 2015 for Île-de-France). The same applies in terms of increasing the share of renewable energies produced locally, which broadly follows a similar orientation both at the city and regional levels. Yet, the former is expressed through precise percentages, whereas the latter is conveyed with a ratio against a baseline year. Therefore, the timing of enactment, as well as the level of ambition over the medium (2030) to long run (2050), illustrate how the Regional Energy and Climate Strategy allowed the Îlede-France to become relatively well aligned with Paris’ third Climate Plan at the municipal level. Like the city of Paris, the Île-de-France also set out an agenda of concrete policies to be implemented over the next few years, so as to ensure the achievement of its climate objectives over the medium to long run. As examined below, a number of these measures are well aligned with those at the municipal echelon. These regional policies have been divided into two main categories124 : 1. Developing clean modes of transportation • Banning diesel vehicles within the Parisian agglomeration by 2025, and by 2030 for all of Île-de-France. This is well aligned with the objective of Paris’ latest Climate Plan to ban diesel vehicles within the city by 2024 (see above). • Phase-out gasoline vehicles by 2030 within the Parisian agglomeration, and by 2040 for all of Île-de-France. This matches with the goal of Paris’ Climate Plan to ban gasoline vehicles within the city by 2030. • Support cleaner transportation by developing cycling lanes, as well as pedestrian streets. This is well aligned with the objective of Paris’ Climate Plan to make the city 100% cyclable by 2020, as well as expand pedestrian streets and pathways.

124 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2018). Similarly to the SRCAE and Paris’ Climate Plans, the Regional Energy and Climate Strategy also contains policies in a number of other sectors, which are beyond the ambit of this book.

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• Upgrade all public transportation to make it more energyefficient, with greater reliance on renewable fuels such as hydrogen, biogas or electricity in buses, for example. This is well aligned with the goal of Paris’ Climate Plan to develop wholly decarbonated public transport by 2025, including extensive electric bus lines. • Provide financial incentives for purchases of cleaner vehicles. This is well aligned with the objectives of Paris’ Climate Plan to establish differentiated parking tariffs for more polluting automobiles, as well as reduced costs for purchases of electric vehicles. • Create new lanes on the regional highway system dedicated to cleaner vehicles. This is in line with the goal of Paris’ Climate Plan to reform the highway system surrounding the city so as to support cleaner vehicles, in cooperation with the higher echelons. 2. Enhancing renewable energies and energy recovery • Gradual phasing out of nuclear energy. • Call for projects to enhance renewable energies and energy recovery, with a focus on: geothermal power, solar photovoltaic, biogas, wind power, hydrogen, micro electricity, as well as energy recovered from waste. This is well aligned with the objective of Paris’ Climate Plan to enhance cooperation with regional territories outside of the city, so as to import renewable energies not produced locally (still projected to be at 80% by 2050). • Set up a solar land register to identify areas where the development of solar photovoltaic energy is most propitious, especially on rooftops. This is well aligned with the goal of Paris’ Climate Plan to create a similar register in order to enhance the development of solar photovoltaic, especially on rooftops (with the aim to equip 20% of city rooftops by 2050). • Support the eco-renovation of buildings across the region, both public and private, in collaboration with the semi-public company Île-de-France Energies. Since Paris is one of its main shareholders, this is well aligned with the ambitious objectives set out in the city’s Climate Plan in terms of decreasing the carbon footprint from buildings (see above).

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Overall, there is a relatively good level of convergence between the municipal and regional echelons for policies relating to the development of clean modes of transportation,125 as well as renewable energies and energy recovery. Out of the 500 measures set out in Paris’ latest Climate Plan, only 70 actually fall under the direct purview of municipal authorities, partly due to the specificities of competence allocation for the capital city.126 Hence, the vast majority of proposed policies depend on collaboration with other actors or higher echelons of governance, including the Greater Paris Metropolis and the Île-de-France. This points to the legal obligation of compatibility between the different echelons under the centralized French political system,127 which enables a relatively high level of policy harmonization and tight coordination between the different levels of governance. It also means that there is less of a risk of conflict regarding policies enacted between the various echelons. The latter highlights some of the advantages of the hierarchical and stratified nature of the centralized French system in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance; this forms a relevant point of contrast to the US federal paradigm, where the requirement of compatibility between the state and city level is more indirect.128 For these reasons, implementation of sectorial policies to achieve the objectives set out in the Regional Energy and Climate Strategy, along with Paris’ Climate Plan, suggest a relatively effective articulation of multilevel governance between the two echelons. The Île-de-France has followed Paris’ lead for a number of policies that had first been tested at the municipal level, especially in the fields of transportation and energy. Hence, much like New York City and Boston, Paris represents another example of how cities may act as ‘laboratories of democracy’, where innovative climate policies can be experimented at the local level, before subsequently being enacted by the higher echelons. This supports

125 On the role of multilevel climate governance in the transportation sector, see Bache et al. (2015). 126 On French territorial communities with a special status, see Kada and Fazi (2022). 127 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux

and Janicot (2021) and Faure (2021). 128 As explained in Chapters 6 and 7, under the doctrine of preemption, while state law will take precedence over local ordinances in cases of overt conflict, there is still no direct obligation of compatibility per se in the elaboration process, which can in some cases open the door to potential divergencies.

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the pattern whereby cities act as pioneers within the climate regime, setting the climate agenda within a multilevel framework. It also reaffirms the notion that local policy experimentation can trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements from the bottom-up, which represents a key aspect of the contributions from sub-state actors within the climate regime.129 Pécresse sought to further bolster her green credentials in preparation for the 2021 regional elections. For instance, the e1.3 billion regional stimulus package she presented in 2020 as a response to the recession stemming from the COVID pandemic included e238 million specifically to support and accelerate the ecological transition and sustainable transport, an unprecedented sum for the Île-de-France.130 As a followup, Pécresse took the initiative to organize a regional ‘Conference of the Parties’ (COP) in September 2020. Relying on the fact that regions are ‘leaders in line’ (chef de file) for climate-related matters, the Energy and Climate Strategy had set out plans to organize a COP at the regional level, with the intention of bringing together relevant stakeholders from both the public and private sectors. The regional COP addressed a broad range of environmental issues, leading to the adoption of 192 proposals to reduce the artificialization of soils, as well as accelerate the transition to a circular economy and net-zero emissions.131 Building on this, Pécresse placed climate action as one of the main pillars of her policy manifesto during the campaign for the 2021 regional elections.132 This was especially apparent in the second round of voting, when the three main left-wing opposition parties chose to form an alliance under the leadership of the Green Party.133 In response to criticism 129 See Hale (2018). 130 Thévenin (2020). This also included a pledge of e10 billion allocated to envi-

ronmental issues for the period 2020–2024, a notable increase compared to previous periods. 131 Région Île-de-France (2020, September). 192 propositions dans le cadre du Plan

de relance pour la reconstruction écologique de l’Île-de-France: https://www.iledefrance.fr/ 192-propositions-dans-le-cadre-du-plan-de-relance-pour-la-reconstruction-ecologique-delile-de. 132 See Cosnard (2021) and Goth (2021). 133 This includes the Green Party (Europe Ecologie Les Verts —EELV), the Socialist Party

(Parti Socialiste—PS), as well as the extreme left, known as La France Insoumise (LFI); this coalition placed environmental issues at the heart of their campaign and attempted to deny Pécresse a second term. While ultimately unsuccessful, they still managed to increase

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from the left about her mixed environmental record, Pécresse pledged to accelerate and reinforce the climate policies launched during her first term. She focused on the development of clean modes of transportation to tackle air pollution, along with enhancing renewables and energy recovery, including via enhanced collaboration with the city of Paris. Such a strategy at least partly contributed to Pécresse’s relatively easy reelection in June 2021, since her conception of a ‘positive’ and ‘realist’ ecology appealed to a broad range of centrist voters. The results of the 2021 election provided the Conservative Party (Les Républicains ) with a strong renewed majority in the Île-de-France Regional Council for a second mandate (2021–2027). This has enabled Pécresse to rapidly enact her updated climate policy agenda, pledging to raise the level of green ambition compared to her first term. Pécresse relied on the Île-de-France region as a springboard to showcase her conception of ‘positive’ and ‘realist’ ecology. This constitutes an attempt to represent a more progressive strand within the French Conservative Party, which was apparent during her campaign for the 2022 French Presidential election, including during the primary of the Conservative Party.134 To a certain extent, it may have been with the French Presidential election in mind that Pécresse moved to align the region with the more ambitious policies enacted at the municipal level in Paris. Thus, like Hidalgo, Pécresse’s decision to run in the 2022 Presidential election also played a role in terms of encouraging her to enhance her environmental policies. Like Hidalgo, Pécresse obtained a historically low score (4.9%). This still encouraged her to accelerate the enactment of the regional Energy and Climate Strategy by taking additional measures throughout 2021, 2022 and beyond. For instance, a regional study group on climate change (Groupe régional d’études sur les changements climatiques —GREC), made up of non-partisan scientific experts, was launched in February 2021. Its role is to investigate the current impacts and anticipate future effects of environmental degradation across the Île-de-France to guide the

their collective number of seats, and have continued to put pressure on Pécresse and her majority to raise their level of green ambition during her second term. 134 Pécresse distinguished herself during the primary of the conservative Party (Les Républicains ) in the fall 2021 by emphasizing her conception for a ‘positive’ and ‘realist’ ecology, in contrast to most of the other candidates, including her main rival in the race Éric Ciotti, who prioritized security and economic growth.

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region into enacting appropriate actions.135 Likewise, in July 2021, the Regional Council adopted a blueprint known as ‘Acting for our Environment’ (Agir pour notre Environnement 136 ), which established concrete policy details to operationalize and hasten the implementation of the measures set out in the regional strategy, while also introducing several new proposals. These included the creation of a subsidy of e6000 for purchasing a clean vehicle, a e1000 subsidy to renovate furnaces in private homes, expanding the express regional biking network, along with additional measures to reduce the environmental impact of construction of large projects. Furthermore, in November 2021, the Regional Council voted to update the SDRIF, with the objective of turning it into an environmental version referred to as SDRIF-Environnemental (SDRIF-E). Public consultations involving communes across the region (including Paris) were organized throughout 2022, with an initial version presented towards the end of 2023, for final approval in 2024.137 As explained above, the initial SDRIF constituted an overarching policy framework for urbanism and territorial management in general, not climate policy specifically; hence, the decision to make environmental issues a focus area represents a notable development. One objective is to transcribe new national environmental and clean energy norms established under President Macron (see Chapter 5) at the regional level. Another goal of the SDRIF-E is to incorporate proposals from the 2020 regional COP, enhancing current policies and adopting new measures to achieve a circular economy, while accelerating the reduction of waste and soil artificialization, with the ultimate goal of net-zero emissions. Since the updated SDRIF-E has adopted 2040 as a temporal horizon, it is not unthinkable that the goal of reaching carbon neutrality might be advanced by one decade; however, this will probably depend on whether or not such a decision is taken firstly at the municipal level with the update of Paris’ Climate Plan, also scheduled for 2024. 135 Région Île-de-France (February 2021). Mise en place du GREC francilien,

le Groupe régional d’études sur les changements climatiques et leurs impacts environnementaux: https://www.iledefrance.fr/mise-en-place-du-grec-francilien-le-groupe-reg ional-detudes-sur-les-changements-climatiques-et. 136 Conseil régional d’Île-de-France (2021). 137 Région Île-de-France. SDRIF-E: OBJECTIF 2040: https://www.iledefrance.fr/obj

ectif2040.

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Nevertheless, the above analysis should be nuanced by the fact that multilevel climate governance between Paris and the Île-de-France still suffers from a number of inadequacies. Despite effective coordination on a number of issues, there are several areas where the city and the region are still not well synchronized on climate policy. Like the American cities/ states discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, this suggests that even ‘best case studies’ such as Paris have not always displayed effective coordination with the higher echelons, and still have room for improvement. Once again, this emphasizes that implementation of local climate initiatives for the cities in our sample may in some cases lead to problematic interactions between the different tiers of governance. Firstly, the organization of a regional COP in September 2020 covered multiple issues, including how to make cities more environmentally sustainable. Yet, closer examination of participants indicates that very few representatives from the city of Paris took part in the event. This constitutes a rather peculiar situation, given the capital city’s predominant importance for the articulation of climate policies in the Île-de-France. This could be linked to the personal rivalry between Pécresse and Hidalgo, which might have encouraged the Mayor to boycott the event to undermine the environmental credentials of her conservative rival. This type of political calculation clearly undercuts effective multilevel climate governance between the municipal and regional levels. Secondly, coordination problems arise from the fact that Paris and the Île-de-France have not chosen the same baseline years against which to measure the achievement of their climate objectives over the medium to long run. While Paris has chosen 2004 as a baseline year, the region initially adopted 1990 under the SDRIF plan, before opting for 2015 as a baseline year in the Regional Energy and Climate Strategy. Since both echelons aspire to the same long-term trajectory, including the achievement of carbon neutrality and 100% renewable energies by 2050, this is not overly problematic. Such a discrepancy recalls Boston/MA and New York/NY, where baseline years differ between the municipal and state levels, even though each echelon still aims for the same long-term trajectory of achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century. As explained in previous chapters however, such a lack of alignment for baseline years can still be problematic in terms of the effective articulation

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of multilevel climate governance.138 It may lead to problems of policy coordination and harmonization, making it more difficult to monitor progress with implementation over time, and in terms of comparing climate objectives and results over the medium to long run. Such a difference in baseline years may conceal the fact that the city and the region are still not always well aligned in terms of their medium to long-term goals, since Paris remains slightly more ambitious. Examples include their respective targets both to enhance energy efficiency by 2030 and 2050, and to increase the ratio of renewable energies produced locally. Even when baseline years are not relied on, Paris is still ahead of the Île-deFrance and the two are not always ideally synchronized; for instance, while the city aims to enhance renewable energies 45% by 2030, the region has a target of 40% instead. A more apparent instance of multilevel discord between the city of Paris and the Île-de-France relates to their specific competence allocation under French law. It is striking to what extent the regional Energy and Climate Strategy is limited when compared to the municipal Climate Plan. As indicated above, the regional Strategy focuses primarily on two main aspects of climate policy for the Île-de-France: developing clean modes of transportation, and enhancing renewables and energy recovery. By contrast, Paris’ Climate Plan includes policies in a number of diverse sectors such as buildings, transport/mobility, energy, food consumption, quality of life, waste management, as well as finance. Likewise, the Regional Strategy does not establish specific targets in terms of GHG emission reductions for either 2030 or 2050 (even though it still commits to achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century). In contrast, Paris’ Climate Plan sets out detailed emission reduction targets for both 2030 and 2050, which include a distinction between emissions from municipal operations (émissions intramuros ) and citywide emissions (empreinte carbone du territoire). As a result, the Île-de-France’s Energy and Climate Strategy is less ambitious in areas such as renewables, energy efficiency and waste management, and in terms of providing enough funding to achieve the

138 This is exacerbated by the fact that, as examined in Chapters 4 and 5, the French government and the European Union have also tended to adopt 1990 as one of their main baseline years, which could generate further problems in terms of multilevel coordination and synchronization between the different echelons.

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objectives it sets out. While Pécresse certainly has room for improvement on climate issues during her second mandate, especially with regard to the allocation of budgetary resources,139 a number of these shortcomings are related to the limited competence allocation for regions under the centralized French political system. Despite four consecutive phases of decentralization where regions have seen their powers gradually increase, their competences remain quite narrow, and are limited on the whole to a few specific policy areas. This may hamper the ability of French regions to enact innovative and far-reaching measures in the field of climate change. By contrast, as discussed above, cities as communes continue to benefit from the ‘general competence clause’, allowing them to implement initiatives at the municipal level which go beyond the strict wording of competence allocation under the law in the name of ‘local public interest’. French cities are not subjected to the tutelage of the regional echelon, since all sub-national actors are put at the same level under the French Constitution140 ; this enhances their capacity to enact more innovative policies at the municipal level.141 Likewise, Paris’ budget remains substantially larger than the regional budget of the Île-de-France (double the amount, in fact142 ), even

139 As previously explained and as part of a regional stimulus package to tackle the recession stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, Pécresse pledged to invest e10 billion on environmental issues for the period 2020–2024. However, this arguably represents a relatively small investment for a region of 12.21 million people and with a GDP of over e700 billion. It remains to be seen whether or not this represents a short-term response to an immediate crisis, or a long-term commitment towards enhancing the share of the regional budget to address climate change. 140 See Collectif (2021). On the legal aspects of decentralization in France, see Verpeaux and Janicot (2021), Verpeaux (2020) and Faure (2021). 141 As examined in Chapter 6, this forms a point of contrast with the US federal system, whereby local governments such as cities fall under the purview of state authorities; this is exemplified by the doctrine of preemption, whereby state statutes have primacy over local ordinances in cases of conflict. 142 For instance, the budget of the city of Paris for the year 2022 was around e10

billion. The regional budget of the Île-de-France was half that amount for the same year, at around e5 billion. See Ville de Paris (2022). Les données clés pour comprendre le budget 2022: https://www.paris.fr/pages/les-donnees-cles-pour-comprendre-le-budget2022-19952. See also: Région Île-de-France (2021). Budget 2022 voté, la Région Île-de-France poursuit sa dynamique de relance: https://www.iledefrance.fr/budget-2022-vote-la-region-ilede-france-poursuit-sa-dynamique-de-relance.

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after four phases of decentralization.143 Consequently, multilevel climate governance between the municipal and regional levels is necessarily more partial, since there is only so much the Île-de-France can do to support the city of Paris, beyond a few narrowly defined policy areas, such as transportation and energy (despite their obvious importance).144 The contrast is especially apparent with regard to competence allocation for states operating under the American federal system.145 As examined in Chapters 6 and 7, federal states benefit from substantial autonomy under US constitutional law, including through the exercise of both ‘reserved’ and ‘concurrent’ powers. This helps to explain why climate policies adopted by Massachusetts and the state of New York are more extensive, and involve a holistic policy framework, when compared to the narrower approach of the Île-de-France. The budgets possessed by the states of Massachusetts and New York are also substantially larger compared to their capital cities (Boston and NYC); as highlighted above, the opposite is true for Paris and the Île-de-France.146 Because all three states/regions in our sample seek to achieve carbon neutrality by mid-century, they have set ambitious targets to increase the share of renewable energies and energy efficiency by 2030 and 2050. However, the Île-de-France has not been able to establish precise additional intermediary GHG emission reduction targets, at least not in the same way as our three sample cities and the states of Massachusetts and New York. With regard to CLCPA implementation in New York state, 100% carbon-free electricity is scheduled to be reached by 2040, along

143 This is not unique to Paris, since most prominent French cities tend to possess larger

budgets than their respective regions, including Lyon (Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes ), Marseille and Nice (Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur), as well as Bordeaux (Nouvelle-Aquitaine), for example. 144 On the importance of the transportation sector for climate policies at the municipal level, see Hickman and Banister (2014). Concerning the role of the energy sector, see Pincetl et al. (2020). 145 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018) and Robertson (2017). 146 In fact, the budgets allocated to US states such New York or Massachusetts are on a different order of magnitude compared to the much smaller budgets provided to French regions. This applies even in the case of the Île-de-France, France’s largest and most prosperous region. Although New York City is the largest and most prosperous US city, its budget remains substantially smaller compared to that of the state of New York, at $227 billion for 2023–2024. Office of the State Comptroller.

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with specific goals for different renewable energy sectors such as offshore wind and solar power. An important clause of the CLCPA mandated the Climate Action Council to develop a ‘Scoping Plan’, which forms part of the states’ holistic approach. Released in December 2022, the Scoping Plan set out specific policy proposals in terms of how the state will achieve the general GHG emissions targets contained in the Act across all major sources—buildings, transportation, energy, as well as industrial, commercial and agricultural activities. This clearly goes beyond the rather limited ambit of the Energy and Climate Strategy adopted by the Île-de-France, with its focus on transportation and energy. Likewise, the NGCR bill in Massachusetts established interim targets to reduce statewide GHG emissions 50% by 2030, and 75% by 2040 (from 1990 levels). It also mandated state agencies to develop additional statewide interim objectives every five years starting in 2025, along with GHG emissions targets for six major sub-sectors, which epitomizes a holistic approach. This includes the electricity sector, transportation, commercial and industrial heating and cooling, residential heating and cooling, industrial manufacturing processes, as well as natural gas distribution and services. Moreover, the NGCR enhanced the state’s renewable portfolio standard to ensure that at least 40% of the state’s electricity comes from renewables by 2030, and established specific goals for different types of renewables such as offshore wind and solar power. Once again, this represents a clear point of contrast to the limited scope of the Energy and Climate Strategy adopted by the Île-de-France. The more holistic approach adopted by the states of New York and Massachusetts is made possible through to their extensive competences and level of autonomy under the American federal system.147 State action represents an essential complement to the more targeted approach of the cities in our sample. While municipalities focus on sectors such as buildings, transportation, energy and waste management where they can have the most impact, there are certain policy areas such as agriculture, or several aspects of industrial and commercial activities that fall outside the ambit of municipal governance, which means that cities have limited control over them. Therefore, the fact that the Île-de-France possesses such narrow competences under the centralized French political system means that it cannot fully cover these sectors, which are also beyond 147 On the level of autonomy for states under the US federal system, see Fisher and Harriger (2019).

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the ambit of municipal authorities.148 This constitutes another example of the somewhat partial multilevel framework between Paris and the Île-de-France.149 For all of these reasons, the states of New York and Massachusetts have been able to provide more extensive support to the municipal climate policies enacted by their capital cities (NYC and Boston); multilevel climate governance in these two cases is more developed and wideranging. This serves as a point of contrast to the somewhat partial framework between Paris and the Île-de-France, due to the limited competences possessed by French regions. This points to notable weaknesses in the French multilevel governance system when compared to its American counterpart. At the same time, this means that the city of Paris may not have been as impacted by the mixed environmental record of the conservative majority in the Regional Île-de-France Council during the first part of Pécresse’ first term. By contrast, the states of New York and Massachusetts have often trailed behind their capital cities in their level of green ambition, which has been more problematic. Due to the extensive powers afforded to states under the American federal system, they play an instrumental role in setting overall policy objectives for local governments, including those operating under ‘Home Rule’ because of the doctrine of preemption. As a result, while it cannot be said that the state level has prevented or hindered New York City and Boston from enacting far-reaching municipal climate policies, they might have been able to go even further, had their states demonstrated a comparable level of ambition sooner.150

148 As examined in Chapters 4 and 5, it is the national echelon in France which possesses the requisite competences to enact policies in these fields, while in the US, it is often shared between the federal and state levels. 149 This represents a notable exception to a previously examined pattern whereby the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel governance pyramid, the more general and holistic policy approaches tend to become. While this is the case for the US cities and states in our sample, it clearly does not apply with Paris and the Île-de-France. 150 At the same time, the current Governors of NY and MA—Hochul and Healey

respectively—have set out a more proactive approach to tackling climate change, placing it as a central priority (see Chapters 6 and 7). Over the next few years, it is likely that the previous dynamic might evolve, with an effective alignment between the two echelons for Boston/MA, and perhaps a reversal of the dynamic in New York, since Mayor Adams does not appear to be as committed to ambitious climate action as Governor Hochul.

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A final related point of contrast between the American federal system and its centralized French counterpart has to do with the diverging dynamics of their respective multilevel governance frameworks. Under French law, for example, each echelon is ascribed certain core competences in specific fields151 ; in areas where competences overlap, there has been a growing reliance on the role of ‘leader in line’ (chef de file), which assigns a coordinating role to one echelon over the others. This has tended to generate a heavily bureaucratic paradigm in terms of multilevel governance. For instance, despite greater reliance on the function of ‘leader’, the latter occupies a limited, non-coercive and vaguely defined ‘coordination role’. Thus, in spite of improvements linked to more specific competence allocation through successive phases of decentralization, it is not always clear which echelon is in charge over which specific policy areas. This has resulted in bureaucratic overlaps between the different echelons, which can reduce the effectiveness of multilevel climate governance. The latter is especially acute in policy sectors relating to the environment, since transportation, buildings, energy or waste management are often spread out across different echelons, which increases the risk of redundancies. Unnecessary complexity arises when it comes to the actual implementation of policies, making it more difficult to achieve climate objectives over the medium to long run. Such a paradigm forms a notable point of contrast to the American federal system, where multilevel governance tends to be more dynamic, since competence allocation is more clearly defined. All powers not expressly delegated to the federal government are reserved to states,152 and local governments and cities are legally under the authority of states, not the federal government. Such a framework helps to reduce duplication between the different echelons, which enhances the effectiveness of multilevel climate governance.153 151 See Collectif (2021). See also: Verpeaux and Janicot (2021) and Faure (2021). 152 On US federalism, see Fisher and Harriger (2019), Coleman and Leskiw (2018)

and Robertson (2017). 153 Nevertheless, as examined in Chapters 2 and 3, the American federal system also has its disadvantages, since there tends to be weaker level of policy harmonization and coordination. As exemplified by the US cities and states in our sample, this can in some cases open the door to potential disparities and conflicting rules or norms, since there is no direct obligation of compatibility between the different echelons, unlike in the centralized French system. While duplication involves the enactment of similar and overlapping rules between different echelons, conflicting norms lead to the opposite problem.

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Overall, the elements examined above reveal that even ‘best case studies’, such as Paris, have not always displayed effective coordination in terms of multilevel climate governance with the higher echelons, and still have room for improvement. This highlights problems which can result from instances of partial multilevel climate governance between Paris and the Île-de-France. If even this ‘best case study’ located in a developed country is unable to foster an effective articulation of multilevel climate governance, then this does not bode well for the objectives set out in the Paris Agreement. On a general note, this chapter has argued that instances of interaction, including both effective collaboration and more problematic issues of synchronization, highlight the ways in which the city of Paris and the Île-de-France region constitute a particularly relevant paradigm in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance. The far-reaching climate initiatives developed by Paris especially clearly underline the ways in which sub-state actors may contribute towards closing the GHG emissions gap stemming from inadequate policies at the national level. As analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5, national climate strategies and frameworks enacted by the French government over the last few years under President Macron and his predecessors suffer from a number of inadequacies and shortcomings. These policies may be insufficient to reach national, EU and global climate objectives, including the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement to keep temperatures below the 2 °C threshold by the end of the century. Therefore, the ambitious municipal and regional-level climate policies implemented by Paris and the Île-de-France, examined throughout this chapter, demonstrate the potential for sub-state actors to compensate for inadequacies within national frameworks, thus helping to close the emissions gap. Sub-national entities have also played a key role in terms of reducing GHG emissions in the years leading up to 2020 and beyond, whereas the official French NDC only began post-2020 under the rules of the Paris Accord. This is similar to the configuration involving the US cities and states in our sample. Yet, a fundamental difference is that there was no US NDC during Trump’s four-year Presidency, with the US only rejoining the Paris Accord under President Biden in February 2021. Thus, the compensatory role of American sub-state actors has been even more pronounced compared to the situation in France, where the national government has supported climate action more consistently.

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4

Conclusion

This chapter has examined multilevel climate governance in France from the municipal to the regional echelon, relying on the distinct case study of Paris and the Île-de-France. More specifically, it has explored the different climate policies enacted by the city of Paris, and how this has impacted collaboration with the tiers of governance right above it, i.e., the Greater Paris Metropolis and the Île-de-France region. These represent the first echelon of the multilevel pyramid, an essential aspect of multilevel climate governance. Taken together, Chapters 6, 7 and 8 examine the ways in which each city in our sample constitutes a distinctive paradigm of multilevel governance from the municipal to the regional/state level, providing for engaging and diverse comparative material. Differences in legal and constitutional frameworks oppose the American federal system to the more centralized French State, as do the vagaries of electoral politics; differences in policy platforms between Conservative and progressive Parties on both sides of the Atlantic have impacted enthusiasm for climate policy. A secondary factor, less essential, is the variations in personal relations and affinities between Mayors, Governors or Regional Council Presidents. The last three chapters have highlighted a number of salient patterns in the articulation of multilevel governance, all the more notable given that the sample cities and states/regions are located on different continents.154 Thus, New York City, Boston and Paris illustrate the ways in which municipalities may act as pioneers, leading the way with ambitious and far-reaching climate policies. States like NY and MA, or regions like the Île-de-France often strive to catch up, and may be galvanized by cities into raising their level of ambition over time. Municipalities may operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’, whereby innovative climate policies may be tested at the local level, before their subsequent enactment by the higher

154 As explained in Chapter 6, these patterns bear many resemblances to those which were highlighted in Chapters 2–5. Yet, the latter had emphasized the role of sub-national entities more generally (cities and states or regions), and their interactions with the national echelon. Instead, this chapter and the two previous ones (Chapters 6 and 7) have focused more specifically on the importance of cities and the municipal echelon in terms of establishing these patterns, through interactions with the regional level in France and the state echelon in the US.

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echelons. Another interesting pattern is the evolution of multilevel governance, which is not static but evolves over time, either due to changes in elected administrations at the city and state/regional level, or changes in policy platforms within the same administration over time. This confirms the role of cities like Paris, New York and Boston as focal points and essential building blocks within the global climate regime. These explorations represent an original and distinctive contribution to the academic literature. A number of authors examined over the last three chapters such as Hale, Hughes et al., Lee, Fitzgerald, Bache et al. and Wurzel et al.,155 have examined issues in related fields. This book offers a type of structured classification to analyze a broad range of patterns involved in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, as exemplified by the French and American cities and states/regions in our sample. By placing an innovative emphasis on the essential role played by municipalities in terms of establishing these patterns, this book analyzes the ways in which cities can set the policy agenda within a multilevel framework vis-à-vis the higher echelons. As explained in Chapter 7 in the context of the US, the three municipalities and regions/states in our sample may not be entirely representative of the circumstances in different parts of the globe, especially in the Global South. Each city tends to possess unique characteristics and potential, which means that political, economic or social differences in local conditions may trigger varying types of responses. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize how municipalities throughout the world are faced with analogous challenges in responding to the impacts of climate change, which often result in the adoption of similar types of policies, including when it comes to the articulation of multilevel governance with the higher tiers.156 As a result, even though there are exceptions to these patterns in developing countries which face very different conditions than their Western counterparts, a general trend is still distinguishable. Cities worldwide have an essential role to play as pioneers which can establish the climate policy agenda in a multilevel context, as demonstrated by the examples of Paris/Île-de-France, New York/NY and Boston/MA.

155 Hale (2018), Hughes et al. (2018), Lee (2016), Fitzgerald (2020), Bache et al. (2015) and Wurzel et al. (2020). 156 For a comparison with three other cities, see Jones (2018).

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This substantiates the idea that the State-centric nature of international law can be seen as a constraint, but should not be considered as an impediment when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. The last three chapters have demonstrated how sub-national entities can circumvent State-centric processes by being very proactive with their own climate initiatives at the local level. Hence, it does not seem to matter whether sub-state actors can actually sign the Paris Accord, as long as they are able to be proactive in implementing ambitious local climate policies. The latter is arguably what is most important for reaching the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, the material examined throughout this chapter has also revealed several weaknesses in the articulation of multilevel climate governance from the municipal to the regional level for Paris and the Île-de-France. Some of these shortcomings resemble those identified in Chapters 6 and 7 in the context of New York/NY and Boston/MA. These inadequacies involve disparities in terms of baseline years, the timing for the enactment of climate initiatives and discrepancies in terms of short, medium or long-term policies and objectives. As noted in the two previous chapters, if even ‘best-case study’ municipalities like those in our sample fall short of consistent synchronization on climate policy with the regional/state level, then this means that the international community may be failing to provide for an adequate framework of multilevel coordination and support, needed to achieve the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. Effective and consistent articulation is required, so that each echelon coordinates with and mutually supports the others in the enactment of climate initiatives. This chapter, and the two preceding ones, have revealed that multilevel climate governance between the cities and states/ regions in our sample has tended to improve over time, despite occasional relapses. Finally, this chapter has corroborated an important point developed in Chapters 4 and 5, namely that the centralized French paradigm displays both advantages and disadvantages in the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. Chapter 8 has explored this observation from the point of view of municipalities and regional-level governance (Paris and the Île-de-France in our sample), with less of a focus on the national echelon. Once again, it is apparent that the French system possesses a high level of policy harmonization and tight coordination between the different levels. This is due to the obligation for sub-national entities to produce climate plans/frameworks under certain deadlines and following

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specific procedures; their main components and follow-up processes are defined under the law, as is the requirement for such plans to be compatible with one another. Hence, there is less of a risk of conflict for policies enacted across the different levels. Cities are also not subjected to the regional echelon since all sub-state entities are placed at the same level under French law. Communes also benefit from a ‘general competence clause’, allowing them to go beyond the strict wording of the law to enact innovative municipal policies. The example of the Île-de-France also highlights how the rigid, centralized French paradigm does not leave enough margin of maneuver to sub-national entities, especially regions, for enacting initiatives that are well adapted to the local context. In spite of several decentralization phases, there are still relatively few competences allocated to French regions. This hampers their ability to innovate and enact far-reaching policies, and also leads to a partial multilevel framework, since there is only so much regions can do to support municipalities. Likewise, competence allocation at the sub-national level is not always clearly defined, due to a highly complex and bureaucratic structure. There are apparent overlaps between the different echelons, which can reduce the effectiveness of multilevel climate governance. As highlighted in Chapters 5 and 7, the advantages and disadvantages of the centralized French paradigm stand as a point of contrast to those of the US federal system.

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Public Policy Documents and Laws Airparif. (2019). Emissions de polluants atmosphériques et de gaz à effet de serre – Bilan Île-de-France, Année 2019. Collectif. (2021 – 25th edition). Code général des collectivités territoriales. Dalloz. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2011, June). Plan régional pour le climat d’Îlede-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2012, September). Schéma Régional Éolien. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2012, November). Schéma Régional du Climat, de l’Air et de l’Energie d’Île-de-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2013, December). Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2014, June). Plan de Déplacements Urbains. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2015, February). Schéma régional de raccordement au réseau électrique des énergies renouvelables. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2016, June). Changeons d’Air en Île-de-France: Plan Régional pour la Qualité de l’Air 2016-21. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2017, March). Plan Régional Anti-Bouchons et pour Changer la Route. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2017, May). Plan Vélo Régional. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2017, December). Schéma Régional de l’Habitat et de l’Hébergement. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2018, January). Plan de Protection de l’Atmosphère. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2018, July). Stratégie Energie-Climat de la Région Île-de-France. Conseil régional d’Île-de-France. (2021, July). Agir pour notre Environnement – Rapport pour le conseil régional. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2007). Fourth Assessment Report. XIIIe Législature de la Cinquième République française. (2007–2012). LOI n° 2010-788 du 12 juillet 2010 portant engagement national pour l’environnement. XIVe Législature de la Cinquième République française. (2012–2017). LOI n° 2014-58 du 27 janvier 2014 de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles. XIVe Législature de la Cinquième République française. (2012–2017). LOI n° 2015-991 du 7 août 2015 portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République. Métropole du Grand Paris. (2018, November). Plan Climat, Air, Energie Métropolitain. Office of Boston City Councilor Michelle Wu. (2020, August). Planning for a Boston Green New Deal & Just Recovery. Ville de Paris. (2007). Plan climat territorial.

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Ville de Paris. (2007). Plan de Déplacement de la Ville de Paris. Ville de Paris. (2012). Plan climat énergie territorial. Ville de Paris. (2015, February). Plan de lutte contre la pollution liée au trafic routier. Ville de Paris. (2017, March). Plan de Déplacements des Administrations Parisiennes 2017–2021. Ville de Paris. (2017, December). Programme Local de Prévention des déchets ménagers et assimilés. Ville de Paris. (2018a, March). Plan Climat de Paris: Vers une ville neutre en carbone, 100% énergies renouvelables, résiliente, juste et inclusive. Ville de Paris. (2018b, March). Plan Biodiversité 2018–2024. Ville de Paris. (2020, January). Bilan des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ville de Paris. (2021, January). Paris 100% cyclable: Plan Vélo 2021–2026. Ville de Paris. (2022, June). Plan d’alimentation durable 2022–27 . Ville de Paris. (2022, July). Pacte Paris Action Climat Biodiversité. Ville de Paris. (2023, February 7). La Ville de Paris lance «EnergieCulteurs», un programme ambitieux de panneaux solaires sur les toits des bâtiments publics.

Websites European Commission—Press Release. (2022, April 28). Commission Announces 100 Cities Participating in EU Mission for Climate-Neutral and Smart Cities by 2030. Retrieved March 3, 2023, from https://ec.europa.eu/commission/ presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_2591 Macmillan Online Dictionary. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https://www. macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/interaction Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effective Métropole Grand Paris. (2022, November 9). Création de la SEM Axe-Seine Energies Renouvelables: 1er outil public de développement des énergies renouvelables. Retrieved March 3, 2023, from https://www.metropolegrandparis.fr/ fr/actualites/creation-de-la-sem-axe-seine-energies-renouvelables-1er-outilpublic-de-developpement Observatoire de l’énergie en Occitanie. La production d’énergie renouvelable en Occitanie. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https://www.arec-occitanie.fr/ la-production-denergie-renouvelable-en-occitanie.html Région Île-de-France. (2020, September). 192 propositions dans le cadre du Plan de relance pour la reconstruction écologique de l’Île-deFrance: https://www.iledefrance.fr/192-propositions-dans-le-cadre-du-plande-relance-pour-la-reconstruction-ecologique-de-lile-de

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Région Île-de-France. (2021, February). Mise en place du GREC francilien, le Groupe régional d’études sur les changements climatiques et leurs impacts environnementaux: https://www.iledefrance.fr/mise-en-place-du-grec-francilienle-groupe-regional-detudes-sur-les-changements-climatiques-et Région Île-de-France. (2021, December). Budget 2022 voté, la Région Île-de-France poursuit sa dynamique de relance. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https://www.iledefrance.fr/budget-2022-vote-la-region-ile-defrance-poursuit-sa-dynamique-de-relance Région Île-de-France. SDRIF-E: OBJECTIF 2040. Retrieved March 4, 2023, from https://www.iledefrance.fr/objectif2040 UN Environment, Cities and Climate Change. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/resource-effici ency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change Ville de Paris. (2022, March). Les données clés pour comprendre le budget 2022. Retrieved January 21, 2023, from https://www.paris.fr/pages/les-donneescles-pour-comprendre-le-budget-2022-19952 Ville de Paris. (2022, October). Éco-rénovons Paris+ : encore plus d’aides à la rénovation pour les copropriétés. Retrieved March 3, 2023, from https://www. paris.fr/pages/plan-1000-immeubles-pour-la-renovation-thermique-3136

CHAPTER 9

Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Concluding Assessment on the Contrasting Examples of the US and France

1

Introduction

This concluding chapter provides a recapitulation of the core arguments developed throughout the book, piecing them together to generate holistic insights. The conclusion also offers projections on the evolving nature of multilevel governance and its role within the global climate regime, with suggested pathways towards a future research agenda. The various chapters have focused on interactions between the different tiers of multilevel governance and its impact on the implementation of climate policies for the global cities of New York, Boston and Paris. As indicated in Chapter 1, this volume has addressed transatlantic perspectives on multilevel climate governance by seeking to answer the following question: “Can the world’s subnational actors—cities, states and regions—save our planet?” The first two Chapters (2 and 3) examined the implementation of climate policies from the sub-national to the national echelon in the US, while Chapters 4 and 5 did the same in the context of France. The following Chapters 6 and 7 brought the analysis to the municipal and state level, focusing on the enactment of climate initiatives in New York city and state, as well as Boston and Massachusetts as case studies; © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3_9

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Chapter 8 concentrated on the same paradigm in the case of Paris and the Île-de-France region. Each chapter examined different, yet complementary facets in relation to the central question, with Chapters 6–8 exploring the first level of the multilevel pyramid (form the municipal to the state/regional echelon), while Chapters 2–5 focused on the second level (interactions between the national echelon and sub-state entities). This concluding chapter will bring together these different elements to generate holistic insights resulting from the analyses developed throughout this volume. The first section below will recapitulate the core arguments of the book, with the objective of piecing them together to provide an overall assessment. The second section will elaborate on these insights by developing projections on the evolving nature of multilevel governance and its role within the global climate regime, leading to suggested pathways for a future research agenda.

2

Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet? Key Findings in Comparing the US and France

This book has reached a number of conclusions in relation to the central research puzzle. In synthesizing the principal arguments developed throughout the different chapters, the following section aims to juxtapose them in new ways, comparing and contrasting the points raised within the various parts of the book in order to develop holistic insights. 2.1

Patterns Formed by Multilevel Climate Governance, as Exemplified by the US and French Case Studies

This book has explored how each city in our sample constitutes a distinctive paradigm of multilevel governance from the municipal to the regional/state level, providing for engaging and diverse comparative material. Distinctions arise due to differences in legal and constitutional frameworks that oppose the American federal system to the more centralized French State, or result from disparities in electoral policy platforms between conservative and progressive officials on both sides of the Atlantic. A secondary, less essential factor is tied to variations in personal relations between successive Mayors, Governors or Regional Council Presidents in our sample.

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In spite of this, and even though the sample spans two different continents, a comparative examination of the multilevel paradigms in our sample has revealed a number of similar patterns. Whether from the municipal to the state/regional level, or the sub-national to the national level, analogous patterns are identifiable in the articulation of multilevel climate governance in the US and France. For instance, cities, but also sub-state actors more generally, can act as pioneers, drivers and catalysts; they lead the way with ambitious and far-reaching policies in the implementation of their local green initiatives. The higher echelons, such as national governments, are often striving to catch up and may be galvanized by cities or states/regions into raising their level of ambition over time. Cities and sub-state entities can also operate as ‘laboratories of democracy’ where new, innovative climate policies can be tested on a local scale, before their subsequent enactment by the higher echelons. In this sense, cities and sub-state actors play a key role in terms of setting the climate policy agenda within a multilevel framework. Moreover, the higher-up the echelon on the multilevel pyramid, the more general and holistic policy approaches tend to become. National governments often set broad and overarching objectives, in contrast to cities which target specific sectors well adapted to the municipal scale. Thus, each echelon has a distinctive role to play within the multilevel pyramid; these can mutually support and complement one another, if the right policies are enacted. Cities and sub-state entities have a vital function within the climate regime that is likely to increase in the future, while the national echelon remains essential from a strategic point of view when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel governance. In addition, national governments favor interaction with the closest echelon beneath them, which serves as a privileged interlocutor for the transposition of policies at the sub-state level. This means that each echelon usually interacts mainly with the one immediately above or below it. Such a framework often places the intermediary echelon (i.e., US federal states and French regions) in a privileged position. What is more, the different echelons of the multilevel pyramid are not static but evolve over time, either due to changes in elected administrations, or changes of policy platforms within the same administration. While there have been occasional relapses, the articulation of multilevel climate governance for our US and French case studies has clearly improved over the last few years.

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This finely articulated classification represents an original and distinctive contribution to the academic literature. While authors mentioned throughout the book, such as Hale, Hughes et al., Lee, Gordon, Fitzgerald, Bruyninckx et al., Ralston, Bache et al. and Wurzel et al.,1 have examined issues in related fields, no author has presented this type of structured classification analyzing such a broad range of patterns involved in the articulation of multilevel climate governance. This volume has emphasized the essential role played by municipalities in terms of establishing these patterns, along with the ways in which cities and subnational entities can set the policy agenda within a multilevel governance framework vis-à-vis the higher echelons, especially the national level. The three cities and states/regions in our sample are not necessarily representative of the situation facing all municipalities and sub-state entities around the world, particularly in developing countries. Indeed, each city is unique with its own characteristics, vulnerabilities and set of possibilities; variations in the local context from a political, economic or even a social and cultural perspective, can lead municipalities to enact initiatives specifically adapted to local circumstances. At the same time, different cities across the world are often confronted with similar challenges in their attempts to enact climate initiatives, including in terms of effectively coordinating their policies with the higher echelons; in many cases, this may lead them to adopt similar or even analogous policies. Therefore, while there are a certain number of exceptions to this trend, especially in the Global South, a general pattern is still clearly identifiable. Cities in particular, but sub-state actors more generally, can play a key role as pioneers in terms of setting the climate agenda within a multilevel governance framework, as demonstrated by the examples of Paris/Île-de-France, New York/NY and Boston/MA. The State-centric nature of international law may constitute a constraint, but not an obstacle to effective multilevel climate governance. Sub-national entities like the cities and states/regions in our sample may circumvent State-centric processes through proactive climate policies. Hence, it does not appear to matter much whether sub-national actors are able to sign the Paris Accord, as long as they enact ambitious green initiatives on a local scale. The State-centric nature of international law does not prevent them from being proactive at their echelon, and this is 1 Hale (2018), Hughes et al. (2018), Lee (2016), Gordon (2020), Fitzgerald (2020), Bruyninckx et al. (2012), Ralston (2013), Bache et al. (2015) and Wurzel et al. (2020).

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arguably what matters most in terms of achieving the long-term goals set out in the Paris Agreement. Nevertheless, the material examined throughout this book also highlights a number of shortcomings in the articulation of multilevel climate governance from the municipal to the state/regional level for New York/ NY, Boston/MA, as well as Paris and the Île-de-France. These involve disparities in baseline years, the timing for enacting climate initiatives, as well as discrepancies in terms of short, medium or long-term policies and objectives. A comparable situation is also apparent in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance from the sub-state to the national level in the US and France. This includes temporal discord regarding baseline years, the risk of overlap and duplication between national and local initiatives, along with the lack of an institutionalized framework to integrate sub-state entities within national climate policy formulation and implementation, partly due to inadequate consultative processes. A number of general implications result from these conclusions, which can be pieced together to form useful insights. If even ‘best-case study’ cities such as those in our sample, located in the Global North, fall short in terms of providing consistent synchronization on climate policy with the regional/state level, then this means that the international community as a whole is likely to fail in providing an adequate framework of multilevel coordination and support, required to achieve the long-term objectives of the Paris Accord. The same also applies to multilevel interactions with the national echelon in the US, and even in the case of France. The US federal government has provided an inconsistent level of support to sub-national entities on climate policy, depending on which Party has control over Congress and the White House. Republican skepticism towards climate issues has led to obstruction, along with extensive regulatory rollbacks under President Trump, often leaving local actors to do mostly as they please. Likewise, while the national French government has clearly provided more consistent support to sub-state entities since climate action enjoys broad-based support across the French political spectrum, the national echelon has still fallen short in some cases regarding effective synchronization on climate policy. This includes insufficient consultative processes, for example, which have resulted in an inadequate framework to institutionalize contributions from sub-state actors within national climate policy formulation. Yet, this is also true in the case of the US, due to the volatility of federal-level climate initiatives.

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If developed countries like the US and France are unable to consistently foster an effective articulation of multilevel climate governance with sub-national entities, then this does not bode well in terms of reaching the long-term goals of the Paris Agreement. An effective and consistent articulation of multilevel governance is essential, whereby each echelon coordinates with and mutually supports the others in the enactment of policies, in order to address the systemic risk posed by climate change. 2.2

Advantages and Disadvantages of US Federalism Versus French Centralization in Terms of Multilevel Climate Governance, and Its Implications

Chapters 2–5 highlighted a number of other salient reasons as to why the US and France constitute particularly relevant multilevel frameworks. The American federal system and the centralized French paradigm display both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. US federalism has led to extensive decentralization for states (as well as for cities operating under Home Rule), which allows climate policies to be well adapted to the local context and tailored to changing local conditions. The high level of autonomy and multiple competences allocated to states enables some of them to innovate and enact far-reaching climate policies, enhancing performance over time and making it easier to go beyond minimum federal environmental standards (if motivated to do so). For these reasons, US multilevel governance tends to be more dynamic, since competence allocation for sub-national actors is clearly delineated. Hence, states have precise powers defined under US constitutional law, with local entities (cities, counties, etc.) falling outside the ambit of the federal government. This helps to reduce duplication between the different echelons, which can enhance the effectiveness of multilevel governance. The advantages of the centralized French system tend to result in a higher level of policy harmonization and tighter coordination between the different echelons. Sub-national actors are legally obliged to produce climate plans/frameworks under certain deadlines and according to specific procedures; their main components and follow-up processes are defined under the law, as well as the requirement for such plans to be compatible with one another across different levels. This has led to a higher minimum standard across the country, which usually prevents the emergence of ‘climate laggards’ among local actors. Consequently,

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there is less of a risk of conflict regarding policies enacted between the different echelons, which reduces the possibility of ‘carbon leakage’ and ‘freeriding’. Moreover, cities are not subjected to the regional echelon since all sub-state entities are placed at the same level under French law. Yet, while cities are under the jurisdiction of the national government, they interact mainly with regions. Communes also benefit from a ‘general competence clause’, which allows them to go beyond the strict wording of the law to enact innovative local policies. In terms of disadvantages, the US federal system may result in a relatively weak level of policy harmonization and coordination, since federal environmental laws and policies set only minimum national standards, providing states with extensive autonomy in the implementation process. Thus, even a strong central thrust may be diluted in practice at the subnational level during the enactment phase. This is exacerbated by the fact that, due to gridlock in Congress, no substantial federal climate legislation has been passed over the last few decades (except through budgetary laws). On account of relatively loose minimum national environmental standards, a number of laggards have emerged across the US, mostly in Republican-voting areas (between a third to half of all states), which rely on greater flexibility to avoid or delay compliance. This serves to lower the overall level of national climate ambition. Such a paradigm also increases the risk of conflict regarding differentiated policies enacted between the echelons of governance, and can lead to federal monitoring and enforcement issues due to the multiplication of disparate standards across states. This may also trigger related problems such as ‘free riding’ or ‘carbon leakage’ from one state to another.2 While cities are not directly subject to the federal government, they still fall under the jurisdiction of states because of the doctrine of preemption, which has been on the rise over the last few years. The latter has tended to restrict certain cities’ ability to enact innovative policies, even though such constraints are mitigated for municipalities operating under Home Rule. In contrast, the disadvantages of the French system are caused by its rigid and centralized nature, which limits the margin of maneuver for subnational entities, especially regions, to enact measures that are specifically

2 See Chapters 2 and 3 for a detailed explanation of these two terms.

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well adapted to the local context. In spite of several phases of decentralization, there are still relatively few competences allocated to French regions, for example, which remain constrained by a hierarchical system. This tends to hamper their ability to innovate and enact far-reaching policies, and also leads to a partial multilevel framework, since there is only so much regions can do to support municipalities. It should be noted that this is less true for communes due to the ‘general competence clause’ which they benefit from. Moreover, competence allocation at the subnational level is not always clearly defined, due to a highly complex and bureaucratic multilevel structure. There are apparent overlaps between the different echelons, which can reduce the effectiveness of multilevel climate governance. This comparison of multilevel governance in the context of climate policy represents a further original contribution of this book to the academic literature. Certain authors examined in Chapters 2–8 have analyzed issues in related fields either pertaining to the US federal system (see Banks, Kettl, Coleman and Leskiw or Robertson3 ), or the centralized French system (see Kada et al., Aubelle and Kerrouche, Elgie et al. or Drake et al.4 ). Yet, no author has developed this type of comprehensive and structured categorization to assess the adequacy of the US and French political frameworks specifically in the context of multilevel climate governance and the nature of interactions between the different echelons. These conclusions are also significant because they are potentially applicable beyond the choice of case studies in the US and France. While the US federal system and the centralized French paradigm possess their own distinctive characteristics, they share many notable similarities with other countries around the world. Nations like Canada, Germany, Brazil, India or Australia possess federal systems that are comparable in many ways to the American one. Likewise, countries such as Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Vietnam or Indonesia are centralized and unitary States that share certain points in common with the French paradigm. These similarities in constitutional structure mean that advantages and disadvantages stemming from the US federal system versus the centralized French paradigm, regarding the articulation of multilevel governance and the different ways

3 Banks (2018), Kettl (2020), Coleman and Leskiw (2018) and Robertson (2017). 4 Kada et al. (2017), Aubelle and Kerrouche (2021), Elgie et al. (2016) and Drake

et al. (2020).

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in which the national echelon is able to mobilize sub-state entities in the implementation process, may in some instances apply to these other countries as well (see below for more detailed analysis). Furthermore, the advantages and disadvantages of the centralized French multilevel paradigm function as mirror opposites to those of the US federal system. Many of the strengths of the French system correspond to weaknesses in the US framework and vice versa; this is especially apparent when the two systems are juxtaposed, as in this book. The US and France possess very distinctive constitutional frameworks which define the nature of their interactions with sub-national entities. This results in the stark contrast between federal decentralization in the US versus political centralization in France. While this is especially apparent in the area of climate change, as demonstrated throughout this volume, such a distinction is also applicable to other policy realms, as well. Policy areas such as agriculture, health care, labor, transportation, housing or different aspects of industry are also very much influenced by the constitutional allocation of powers and the nature of interactions between the national and substate echelons. A number of these other policy realms (like agriculture, transportation, housing or industry) also have a bearing on climate change issues, either directly or indirectly. Hence, they are similarly impacted by the advantages or disadvantages stemming from the distinctions between federalism and centralization. In the realm of climate change, the contrasting strengths and weaknesses of the American and French multilevel paradigms have provided responses particularly well-suited to their respective political systems. Since the US remains polarized and the level of national commitment to climate action is highly inconsistent due to persistent Republican opposition, federalism has enabled American sub-state entities to carve out a vital role in compensating for inadequacies at the national level. Thanks to extensive autonomy under the federal system, states have the possibility of enacting their own innovative policies at the local level. By contrast, broad-based support across the French political spectrum on climate issues renders the centralized French system particularly suited to offering consistent sponsorship for sub-national actors. In this case, centralization allows national policies to permeate from the top-down towards ‘territorial communities’, providing essential support in the implementation of local green initiatives. This means that French sub-state entities such as regions, départements and communes are well positioned to benefit from support provided by

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the national government, both in terms of policy orientations and funding for concrete initiatives on the ground. This represents a notable point of contrast to the US, where states have in a number of cases been left to their own devices. This has enabled certain states to mitigate the damage from extensive regulatory rollbacks under Republican Presidents Bush Jr. and Trump. Yet, only around half the country, mostly in Democratic voting areas on the East and West coasts, remains committed to climate action in the absence of federal regulations. Thus, many states in the south or Midwest, for example, including large states like Texas, took the opportunity provided by Trump’s rollbacks to stall on any genuine climate action for four years. Although forced to enact new minimum federal standards passed under Biden, they are likely to seize on any opportunity provided by a future Republican administration to stall once again and renege on previous progress. For these reasons, despite certain advantages that palliate some of the difficulties stemming from persistent polarization on climate issues in the US, the advantages of the American federal system cannot compensate for the inconsistency of climate ambition at the national level. Therefore, a country like France, where environmental matters enjoy broad-based support across the political spectrum, clearly represents a more viable polity to tackle such issues when compared to the US. This is especially the case since climate change is a long-term problem, which requires the enactment of consistent policies over several decades and multiple administrations.

3

Projections on the Evolving Nature of Multilevel Governance and Its Role Within the Climate Regime, with Directions for a Future Research Agenda 3.1

Projections on the Evolving Nature of Multilevel Governance and Its Role Within the Climate Regime

The 26th COP conference which took place in Glasgow in November 2021 was highly significant and is widely considered to have been the most important UN climate summit since the 2015 Paris COP21.5 This

5 In this regard, see UNFCCC (2022). See also: The Law Society (2021).

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is because all State Parties had to update their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), setting out renewed climate policy frameworks and enhanced climate objectives over the short, medium and long run. One of the main goals of COP26 was to ‘consign coal to history’ by achieving an ambitious global agreement on this issue. However, mostly due to pressure from China and India (as well as other coal-producing countries), the Glasgow Climate Pact reached at the end of the conference merely ‘phases down’ coal, rather than phasing it ‘out’. What is more, the wording of the Pact on the phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies was weakened so as to include only ‘inefficient’ subsidies. These factors, among others, mean that the long-term aim of the Paris Agreement to keep global temperature increase below the 2 °C threshold by the end of the century remains uncertain.6 The International Energy Agency published a comparative analysis following COP26 highlighting that the aggregation of all renewed NDCs made during the conference might be sufficient to limit global warming to 1.8 °C.7 Nevertheless, a number of other extensive studies, conducted in parallel, strongly call into question this somewhat optimistic appraisal. For instance, Climate Action Tracker (CAT), an independent research consortium, published a report highlighting that in spite of net-zero emission goals from countries around the world, the long-term 2 °C goal remains out of reach.8 The report suggests that this is mostly because pledges in the form of NDCs are not matched with actual policies in practice and ‘action on ground’. Moreover, countries still lack firm and detailed commitments over the medium run, which is crucial to set the international community on a track to reach carbon neutrality by mid-century. As a result, the report concludes that the aggregation of all renewed NDCs is likely to result in at least 2.4 °C warming by the end of the century. And this is only true if all NDCs are fully implemented by all countries around the world; this is far from being the case at present, and has rarely been the case from a historical perspective in the process of UN climate negotiations, since countries have often reneged on previous pledges.9

6 Ibid. 7 See Birol (2021). 8 Climate Action Tracker (2021). 9 Ibid. While certainly a matter of concern, the new 2.4 °C marker still constitutes

substantial progress compared to the previous round of NDCs submitted at the 2015

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Therefore, while constituting an improvement, the new round of NDCs submitted at COP26 still falls short of the level of ambition required to achieve the long-term goals set out in the Paris Agreement. In fact, since COP26, the international energy crisis triggered by the War in Ukraine has prompted a number of countries to prioritize shortterm energy supply by increasing the production and usage of fossil fuels, sometimes at the expense of medium to long-term climate objectives. For instance, while the COP27 held in Egypt in November 2022 led to important breakthroughs on issues such as loss and damage, little progress was made in terms of enhancing NDCs, with a lack of tangible new climate pledges from State Parties over the short, medium and long run. This applies for the two countries in our sample. The United States under President Biden and France under President Macron provide revealing examples in this regard. Although each nation has announced notable climate objectives over the medium to long run, these are still insufficient to reach the long-term goals of the Paris Accord. Moreover, the climate policies which are being enacted in both countries may not go far enough to reach even the current objectives established by their respective NDCs, which are inadequate. In the case of the US, one of the key elements for Biden’s renewed NDC, set out in April 2021 during the Leaders’ Summit on Climate, is for the US to become a 100% clean energy economy and achieve net-zero GHG emissions by 2050 at the latest; this is accompanied by an intermediary objective of reducing emissions by 50–52% up to 2030 (from 2005 levels). Yet, as examined in detail in Chapter 3, the enhanced 2030 target remains insufficient in terms of what the US, as the world’s largest economy and 2nd global GHG emitter, should be contributing to achieve the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement to keep global temperatures below 2 °C by the end of the century. What is more, although the centerpiece of Biden’s climate agenda, known as the Inflation Reduction Act passed in August 2022, establishes the largest climate investment in US history (around $369 billion), it is only expected to help reduce GHG emissions around 40% by the end of

COP21 in Paris, whose aggregation had been calculated as leading to at least 3 °C warming by the end of the century.

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the decade.10 This is largely due to gridlock in Congress, which means that Democrats have only been able to pass a substantially watered-down spending package that is mostly limited to providing economic incentives for reducing GHG emissions, as opposed to legally binding limitations on pollution backed by sanctions. Biden emphasized that ambitious executive action would still enable the US to reach its targets for 2030; he has signed several notable climate-related executive orders since he assumed office (see Chapter 3). Yet, the conservative majority in the Supreme Court issued a ruling in June 2022 considerably limiting the regulatory discretion of federal agencies. This has restricted possibilities for enacting far-reaching executive orders to tackle climate change without explicit support from the legislature.11 Hence, due to persistent Republican opposition on environmental issues, the achievement of US climate targets, as set out in the latest NDC, is in jeopardy over the medium to long run. In the case of France and as examined in Chapter 5, the renewed NDC under President Macron was established in a Strategy for Energy and Climate (Stratégie française pour l’énergie et le climat ), presented in November 2018.12 The French High Council on Climate13 has published several reports since 2018 consistently emphasizing that current national policies and frameworks are insufficient to achieve the objectives of the Strategy in the medium (2030) and long term (2050).14 The Council has acknowledged that a number of positive developments have taken place under Macron’s Presidency, and that enacted policies are generally

10 As explained in Chapter 3, this is corroborated by a number of independent studies, including from the US Senate Democratic Leadership itself. See US Senate Democratic Leadership (2022), Larsen et al. (2022), as well as Mahajan et al. (2022). 11 The legal doctrine embraced by the Court under this ruling, known as the ‘major questions doctrine’, also limited the possibility of relying on general provisions from the Clean Air Act to tackle climate change. This is likely to make it even harder for Biden and future administrations to enact far-reaching climate policies. 12 As explained in Chapter 5, the Strategy for Energy and Climate is made up of two main planning documents: a ‘National Low Carbon Strategy’ (Stratégie nationale bas carbone—SNBC) and a ‘Multiannual Programming on Energy’ (Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie—PPE). 13 France’s High Council on Climate (Haut Conseil pour le Climat ) is an independent institution made up of technocratic experts, placed directly under the aegis of the Prime Minister, to evaluate the adequacy of France’s climate policies and strategies. 14 See: Haut Conseil pour le Climat, https://www.hautconseilclimat.fr.

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‘going in the right direction’. Yet, the independent institution has warned that unless additional structural reforms are set out in the near term, France is likely to fail in reaching its goal of reducing GHG emissions by 40% up to 2030 (from 1990 levels) or that of transitioning towards full carbon neutrality by 2050.15 In its 4th report published in June 2022 after Macron’s reelection,16 the High Council confirmed this by underlining that as of 2021, France’s national GHG emissions had decreased only by 23.1% (from 1990 levels), which means that the 40% emissions reduction target for 2030 will be difficult to reach. France’s highest administrative court, the Conseil d’Etat, ruled in July 2021 that current policies implemented by the national government do not go far enough to achieve legally enshrined climate objectives for the year 2030, thus corroborating the analysis of the High Council on Climate. The Conseil d’Etat imposed an ultimatum on the Macron administration to adopt additional new measures or face the prospect of further judicial sanctions.17 Moreover, the High Council on Climate has argued that the climate policy framework developed under President Macron is insufficient not only to achieve its own national climate/ clean energy goals, but also the latest upgraded objectives established at the EU level. France’s national target of reducing GHG emissions 40% by 2030 (from a 1990 baseline) clearly no longer shares the same level of ambition as the EU’s upgraded target of cutting emissions 55% by the same date (also from a 1990 baseline). Thus, like the US, France’s current NDC is inadequate in terms of what the country should be contributing to achieve the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement to keep global temperatures below 2 °C by the end of the century. For these reasons, sub-national actors—municipalities, regions or states around the world—continue to have a vital role to play in terms of closing the remaining global emissions gap. As exemplified by New York/ 15 These conclusions have been shared by a number of other independent public institutions such as the National Council for the Ecological Transition (Conseil national de la transition écologique), or the Economic, Social and Environmental Council (Conseil économique, social et environnemental ). In response, the French government asked the Boston Consulting Group to conduct another study, which mostly corroborated the adequacy of Macron’s climate policies. This study was criticized for a lack of transparency in its methodology and for being under the influence of private interest groups. 16 Haut Conseil pour le Climat (2022). 17 This constituted an unprecedented decision from France’s highest administrative

court.

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NY, Boston/MA and Paris/Île-de-France in our sample, they can enact climate initiatives that are additional to those established by national governments in their NDCs. When they are additional, i.e., when they do not overlap with NDCs but constitute genuinely innovative and ambitious actions on the ground, green initiatives from sub-state entities can play an essential role in terms of closing the emissions gap. They do so by targeting specific areas or sectors that national governments may not be able to tackle as effectively; this has been demonstrated throughout the different chapters of this book in the context of our sample cities and states/regions. In cases of overlap, sub-national actors may play a key role in supporting national governments to implement their NDCs more rapidly and thoroughly. There are instances where initiatives from cities or states/ regions duplicate those of national governments, with many examples provided in previous chapters. In cases like these, sub-state entities are critical because their local policies will lead to an accelerated and more systematic enactment of NDCs, directly contributing towards the achievement of national climate objectives. Hence, such a configuration is clearly tantamount to a ‘win-win situation’, whereby sub-national actors play a critical role in either case. Whether they introduce actions that are additional to those of national governments, or whether there is overlap with NDCs, cities and states/region are essential to achieving the long-term goals set out in the Paris Agreement of keeping global temperatures below the 2 °C threshold by the end of the century. This is linked to their capacity to promote local policy innovation, which may have an illustrative impact, galvanizing further action from the bottom-up. Local policy experimentation can trigger upgrades in economic and technological provisions from the bottom-up, as exemplified in our sample cases throughout this volume. Cities and sub-national entities are both key contributors to the problem of climate change, as well as potentially vital actors for finding solutions to address it. With urban areas now encompassing more than half of the world population, municipalities are responsible for nearly three quarters of global CO2 emissions, largely due to emissions from transportation and buildings.18 The UN projects that urban population concentration will continue to gather momentum around the world over 18 UN Environment, Cities and climate change: https://www.unenvironment.org/exp lore-topics/resource-efficiency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change.

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the short, medium and long run.19 Cities are well placed to develop more efficient infrastructure with a lower carbon footprint, since Mayors in most cases have direct control over a number of key policy areas that are essential for climate mitigation. In addition to transport (such as municipal vehicle fleets) and buildings (heating and cooling regulations), this includes zoning, waste management and recycling, as well as several key aspects of the power sector and energy supply.20 Hence, local policies focusing on sectors such as these can have a major impact in terms of reducing GHG emissions and mitigating the effects of climate change. As demonstrated in previous chapters, cities especially—and sub-state entities more generally—are usually nimbler, since they are less burdened by large bureaucratic administrations or complex legislative procedures, when compared to governance processes at the national level. Thus, Mayors and sub-national officials may take more direct action to tackle climate change, which has a more direct impact on constituents. Because municipalities represent the bottom echelon of the multilevel pyramid, this allows them to play an essential role in transforming policy into action at the grassroots level. Moreover, as exemplified by New York/ NY, Boston/MA and Paris/Île-de-France, local actors tend to be less constrained by lobbying, which provides them with a greater margin for maneuver. Consequently, they form essential building blocks within the global climate regime. For these reasons, municipalities, regions and states will continue to play an essential role in reinforcing or creating new pro-climate groups and communities on a domestic scale. Likewise, their monitoring or ‘watchdog’ role vis-à-vis national policies and the implementation of NDCs is likely to remain essential, as exemplified by our American and French case studies. Yet, the significant points of contrast between the US federal system and the centralized French paradigm means that multilevel governance clearly develops in very different ways, depending on the nature of the national political framework. As synthesized above, each type of system displays both strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance, and the ways in which sub-state entities are mobilized in the implementation process.

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

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Climate change represents a systemic risk. In order to successfully address such a risk, a comprehensive policy approach is required, whereby every echelon is fully mobilized. An effective articulation of multilevel governance is needed, whereby each echelon is well coordinated and mutually supports the others on climate policy. Without an effective articulation of multilevel governance, each echelon risks not being able to achieve its own climate objectives, which means that countries may not be able to deliver on their overall national climate targets as well. Consequently, the international community may fail to reach the collective objectives set out in the Paris Agreement of limiting global temperature increase below 2 °C by the end of the century.21 Hence, the municipal echelon must be supported by the regional/state level, as well as by national governments. A unified architecture of climate governance is needed, one that encompasses all levels, where the different tiers interact and mutually support one another. Each echelon plays a distinct, yet complementary role in supporting the multilevel pyramid, and only through effective articulation can policies be successfully coordinated to address the systemic risk posed by climate change. 3.2

Questions That Remain Open and Directions for a Future Research Agenda

Therefore, while this book has focused on the articulation of multilevel climate governance in the US and France, many of the conclusions reached have international relevance, which leads us to several open questions and directions for a future research agenda. As indicated above, although the US with its distinctive federal characteristics is the only country to have exited the Paris Agreement for four years before subsequently rejoining, other countries like Australia, Brazil or India have faced (or continue to face in the case of India) comparable political situations. Over the last few years, these countries have been governed by heads of state or government such as Scott Morrison, Jair Bolsonaro and Narendra Modi, who are not enthusiastic about climate policies, and in some cases overtly hostile. These leaders have stalled on the ambitious climate action 21 The articulation of multilevel governance is essential, whereby urban centers should be seen as forming part of a larger policy framework. While cities play a key role, their possibilities, decision-making capabilities and motivations are intricately intertwined within broader processes involving higher echelons of governance.

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and policies initiated by their predecessors. In the case of Bolsonaro in Brazil, his administration embarked on an aggressive rollback of environmental regulations and support for extensive fossil fuel development, in a manner and style reminiscent of Trump in the US; Bolsonaro’s actions have imperiled the Amazon rainforest, leading to international condemnation. Still, unlike Trump, these leaders chose not to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The mechanisms of global climate governance that the accord has ushered in are based on non-binding national pledges and nonadversarial review processes devoid of sanctions, which involve a technical expert review process22 and ‘naming and shaming’. Hence, Brazil, India or Australia were able to remain within the process of the Paris Agreement, all the while doing little to enact their climate pledges. As examined in previous chapters, this highlights the extent to which withdrawal from the Paris Accord under Trump was motivated by internal political factors, a nod to the conservative Republican base which remains very skeptical of climate change and global multilateralism writ large. Moreover, in the case of Australia, the government elected in May 2022, led by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese of the Labor Party, has sought to reverse inaction and rollbacks from predecessor Scott Morrison, setting out an ambitious new climate action plan. The same applies to the new administration of Lula in Brazil, who defeated Bolsonaro during the October 2022 election in a tight race. Australia, Brazil and India have federal systems which possess their own specific characteristics, adapted to distinct national circumstances. Yet, these federal countries all share in common the fact that they provide sub-national entities with a broad level of autonomy. Like the US, this allows states or provinces to enact their own bold climate initiatives at the local echelon, often in response to an absence of national leadership. It is notable that a number of progressive sub-state entities in these three countries have sought to compensate for inadequate policies at the national level by developing their own ambitious climate initiatives, relying on the powers and autonomy provided to them under their respective federal systems. Yet, like the US, the level of commitment to climate action within these nations is unevenly distributed, and has in many cases focused on sub-state actors located in more urban, cosmopolitan and 22 On the Paris Agreement and its implementation, see Klein et al. (2017), Calster and Reins (2021), Salawitch et al. (2017) and Popovski (2018).

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economically developed parts of the country, often with a progressive and left-wing electorate. While the French political system is also unique, a number of other nations around the world operate under a comparable unitary and centralized system of government. This includes European countries like Denmark, Portugal or Poland, along with nations in other parts of the world such as Vietnam or Indonesia, for example. In these cases, multilevel climate governance tends to operate in a similar top-down manner, where objectives and policies are often defined at the national level, before permeating the multilevel framework to the regional echelon and all the way down to municipalities. Consequently, sub-national entities like regions and cities tend to enjoy only limited autonomy and competences under this type of centralized paradigm. Like in France, their role tends to be more restricted in the implementation process and for the articulation of multilevel governance when compared to federal systems like the US, India, Brazil and Australia. This applies even to policy fields such as climate change and the environment, since the latter touch upon other key sectors like energy, transportation or agriculture that are vital to the national economy, which means that governments are keen to maintain control over them. Yet, there is arguably a difference between European unitary/ centralized nations operating under democratic processes such as France, Denmark, Portugal and Poland, and authoritarian regimes like Vietnam, or struggling democracies like Indonesia. In the case of Europe, subnational entities possess more autonomy due to their ability to exercise democratic rights and freedoms, as defined and enshrined under the law. By contrast, sub-state actors in struggling democracies, and especially within authoritarian regimes, have more limited freedoms, since the rule of law is upheld inconsistently, depending on the national political agenda. There is also a difference in terms of the level of ambition and the prioritization of climate issues, with centralized countries in Western Europe like France, Denmark and Portugal far more committed to climate action in comparison to Eastern European ones such as Poland. Likewise, although climate change has risen in importance for Asian nations over the last few years, it remains less of a priority than economic development for countries like Vietnam or Indonesia. As a result, one important question that remains open, constituting a potentially rich avenue for a future research agenda, would be the extent to which the conclusions reached on the articulation of multilevel

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climate governance, in the context of the US and France, are applicable to those nations possessing similar political systems, while displaying several notable differences. For instance, this might include exploring whether or not the strengths and weaknesses identified with the US federal system versus the relatively centralized French paradigm also apply in a comparable manner to other nations in different regions of the world. The same also pertains to the various patterns emphasized in terms of the articulation of multilevel climate governance, as exemplified by the French and American case studies in our sample. It is likely that a number of noteworthy parallels can be established, especially in the context of democratic countries like Australia, Denmark or Portugal. All three operate under comparable democratic processes, and share a similar level of social and economic development. At the same time, distinct political, economic and social circumstances exist in other parts of the world, such as in Asia or Latin America, and even Eastern Europe to some extent. This applies not only in terms of the level of democratic freedoms and the scope of the rule of law, but also economic development and the degree of social inequalities. A European Union country like Poland, for example, remains less developed when compared to Western European Member States, due to the legacy of nearly half a century of communism. Likewise, countries located in Asia or Latin America such as Brazil, Vietnam or Indonesia, face levels of poverty and social inequality that remain endemic and are much more widespread than in Europe, in spite of notable economic GDP growth over the last few years. Sub-national entities located on these continents may lack adequate resources and infrastructure to enact the same type of far-reaching climate initiatives as their Global North counterparts. This could lead to diverging outcomes with respect to the patterns involved in the effective articulation of multilevel climate governance. The same is also true regarding the strengths and weaknesses of federalism versus centralization. Hence, some of the conclusions reached in this book may differ to a certain extent in the context of Eastern European nations, or countries of the Global South. Another important open question for a future research agenda might focus on the interactions between our sample cities and states/regions with other types of non-state actors. As outlined in Chapter 1, this book has explored the climate initiatives of public sub-national actors in the US and France, i.e., cities, states and regions. These differ from other types of non-state actors, such as private sector companies, businesses or

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banks, along with representatives from civil society like NGOs, universities, think tanks and foundations. These actors were occasionally referred to in this volume, especially in terms of cooperation between different types of non-state actors regarding the implementation of climate initiatives. Yet, in order to narrow down the analytical ambit, the focus was on cities and states/regions as public sub-national entities, within the context of multilevel interactions between the different tiers of governance from the city level all the way up to the national echelon. Thus, a future research agenda might concentrate on the important role played by other types of non-state actors, and the nature of their collaboration with public sub-national entities. There is a vast literature on this topic, which cannot be adequately summarized in the space of a few paragraphs. However, it is worth briefly mentioning, for example the book by Vandenburgh and Gilligan about the ‘private governance response to climate change’,23 on how actions from corporations, financial institutions and other private sector actors represent one of the most promising ways to rapidly reduce GHG emissions and close the global emissions gap, in contrast to the slower approach of national governments. The authors argue that effective private sector governance has the potential to cut GHG emissions by one billion tons per year over the next decade. Because businesses need to make long-term decisions about their investments, this has a significant impact on markets around the world and on how the economy develops. Even within the US, many businesses continued to invest in green sectors during Trump’s Presidency, since these types of investments are long term. Hence, a number of firms anticipated that the renewable energy/clean technology transition was going to continue over the medium to long run, regardless of federal administration policies.24 Global investments in green economic sectors have thus accelerated over the last few years. Many governments, including the Biden administration in the US and Macron’s government in France, are providing supportive frameworks for private sector actors to invest in clean technologies and renewables, as part of the implementation of their NDCs under the framework of the Paris Agreement. For these reasons, there is clearly potential to explore in greater detail the types of collaboration

23 Vandenburgh and Gilligan (2017). 24 Barichella (2018).

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and interaction between private sector entities such as businesses, banks and financial institutions, with public sub-national actors like the cities and states/regions in our sample, along with national governments in the US and France. This might also extend to a comparative analysis of the situation in the other countries discussed above. Civil society actors such as NGOs, universities, think tanks, foundations or citizen groups also have an increasingly important role to play in addressing climate change. The US and France both possess vibrant environmental NGO communities that have been key to advancing grassroots efforts to tackle climate change; notable examples in the US include Ceres, Sierra Club, the Environmental Defense Fund or Friends of the Earth. In France, prominent examples include the Fondation pour la Nature et l’Homme, Ecologie sans Frontière or France Nature Environnement, among others. NGOs are essential in terms of bringing environmental concerns to public officials, advocating and monitoring climate policies at the local, national and international levels. They also contribute to information sharing, as well as expertise and analyses in advancing climate objectives.25 After Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Accord, the US community of environmental NGOs vowed to redouble efforts to uphold Obama-era pledges. Likewise, after Biden’s election, they have endeavored to work in close collaboration with the federal government in the achievement of renewed national climate goals. Nonetheless, there may be differences between the US and France in terms of how cities and states/regions interact with these other types of non-state actors. Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement pushed progressive sub-national and non-state actors across the country to join forces by developing extensive national climate networks, in order to compensate for national abdication. Coalitions such as ‘We Are Still In’ (WASI) brought together all non-state and sub-national entities throughout the US that remained committed to climate action despite Trump. Following Biden’s election, the coalition was rebranded as ‘America Is All In’ (AIAI), which seeks to unite the efforts of non-state and local actors across the country by providing a channel to coordinate their climate initiatives with those of the Biden administration at the national level. There is no equivalent in France or even in Europe. Networks tend to involve particular groups of actors, such as the Association des Maires de France and ‘Energy Cities’ for municipalities, or Régions

25 Ibid.

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de France and FEDARENE26 for regions. There are also a number of business networks and environmental NGO coalitions operating in Europe. The absence of a federating framework like WASI or AIAI means that French sub-national entities might not be able to develop as close a partnership with the private sector or civil society, when compared to their American counterparts. This is especially the case since WASI and AIAI joined together cities, states, businesses, NGOs and universities as part of the US non-state actor delegation for each of the COPs throughout Trump’s Presidency. With Biden’s election, AIAI continued to send a delegation to COP26 and COP27 to support the official national US delegation, and show that climate action enjoys broad-base support across American society. There is no equivalent in the case of France, and there has been no need to create one since the national government has demonstrated consistent commitment for climate action. However, this also means that French sub-national entities may have had fewer opportunities to develop close and strong partnerships with the private sector and civil society, in contrast to their US peers. Therefore, the involvement of a broad range of different types of actors from the private sector and civil society constitutes a potentially rich groundswell for global climate action. While cities and sub-national entities play a crucial role for reasons examined throughout this book, other types of non-state actors are clearly essential, as well. Cooperation between different types of non-Party stakeholders is evidently a salient element within the global climate regime. Taken together, this points to new and relevant directions for a future research agenda, building on the material examined and developed across the different chapters. The focus throughout this book has been on mitigation, rather than adaptation policies. And yet, adaptation to the impacts of climate change also starts on a local scale, with municipal infrastructure serving an essential role in this regard. There is a considerable literature on this topic, which cannot be summarized in just one paragraph. However, the work by Shandas et al.27 stands out due to its focus on policy solutions at the city level to manage climate change-related risks for high-population 26 FEDARENE stands for the ‘European Federation of Agencies and Regions for Energy and Environment’ (Fédération européenne des agences et des régions pour l’énergie et l’environnement ). 27 Shandas et al. (2020).

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urban centers located in coastal areas. These policies cover the prevention of sea water intrusion within freshwater coastal aquifers, the construction of dams to manage rising sea levels, infrastructure to deal with heat waves and droughts resulting from rising temperatures, as well as city flooding linked to more extreme weather events like hurricanes and storms. In addition, the volume by Kabisch et al.,28 which relies on inter-disciplinary research from the social and natural sciences, discusses the growing role of nature-based solutions for municipalities in successfully adapting to the effects of climate change. These include the restoration of coastal wetlands or the development of artificial islands to avert sea level rise, for example. Because cities and sub-national entities clearly contribute to climate adaptation, a potential path for new research would be to examine climate adaptation in the context of the articulation of multilevel climate governance. This constitutes an aspect of climate adaptation that remains under-studied in the literature. As with Shandas et al. and Kabisch et al., most academic studies examine adaptation at a more general level, either in relation to cities in general, or broadly with regard to nature-based solutions. Hence, concentrating more specifically on the articulation of multilevel climate governance in terms of adaptation policies, and how the different echelons have interacted in this process, would undoubtedly be worthwhile. This would represent a novel contribution to the literature, especially if it were examined in the context of specific case studies like the cities and states/regions in our sample, as opposed to a broader analysis. These important questions remain open, pointing to additional relevant directions for a future research agenda that would build upon the material explored in this book. There is great potential to examine climate adaptation policies in the context of our three sample cities. Indeed, both New York and Boston are coastal cities located on the Atlantic Ocean, while scientists predict that Paris may become a tidal river city within the next fifteen years due to the impacts of climate change.29 Therefore, our three sample cities represent relevant case studies for analyzing the articulation of multilevel climate governance with the higher echelons from the point of view of adaptation. Another research pathway might explore adaptation comparisons with other countries in the world. This includes those mentioned above— Australia, Brazil and India which share similarities to the US federal

28 Kabisch et al. (2017). 29 In this regard, see Fisson and Lemoine (2016).

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system, or Denmark, Portugal, Poland, Vietnam or Indonesia that resemble the centralized French paradigm. This would broaden the sample and may reveal whether or not the advantages and disadvantages of federalism v. decentralization also apply in the context of climate adaptation, and which parallels can be drawn with mitigation policies. A further exploration might assess whether or not the patterns involved in the articulation of multilevel governance, discussed above, also have a bearing in relation to climate adaptation, and what the differences are compared to mitigation. Based on the conclusions reached in this book, while there might be some equivalents between mitigation and adaptation policies, there are likely to be a number of notable differences. Throughout this volume, many of the patterns formed in the articulation of multilevel climate governance, along with the strengths and weaknesses of federalism v. centralization, are the result of intricate policy mechanisms that apply specifically to the field of mitigation. Climate adaptation represents an altogether different field of study, which operates according to distinct policy dynamics. This would in all likelihood lead to a divergent set of conclusions, even though there might be some surprising similarities.

4

Conclusion

Overall, it is apparent that municipalities and sub-national entities have a vital role to play within the global climate regime. Local policy innovation has an illustrative impact galvanizing further action from the bottom-up, including in terms of policy experimentation which can trigger upgrades in economic/technological arrangements starting at the grassroots level. Sub-state entities have a key monitoring or ‘watchdog’ function of national policies and the implementation of NDCs, and can help to reinforce or create new pro-climate groups and communities on a domestic scale. Above all, they play a critical role in terms of closing the emissions gap stemming from inadequate NDCs, and in cases of overlap, local green initiatives may help national governments achieve NDCs more rapidly and thoroughly. The role and importance of sub-national actors, and of cities in particular, is slated to increase over the next few years. While municipalities already encompass over half the world population and nearly three quarters of CO2 emissions, this figure is likely to become even higher in the future, consolidating their vital importance within the climate regime.

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Hence, the successful articulation of multilevel governance, involving effective interactions between the different echelons, will remain essential in order to address the systemic risk posed by climate change. This applies especially in terms of reaching the long-term goals set out in the Paris Agreement, including the main target of keeping global temperature increase below the 2 °C threshold by the end of the century. The current decade leading to 2030 will be essential in this regard, since a significant and rapid increase in the global level of ambition is needed in order to counteract the worst effects of climate change, before it is too late. Otherwise, scientists warn that climate change could spiral out of control in the following decades after a certain threshold or ‘tipping point’ is reached, with potentially irreversible and devastating consequences that could threaten life on Earth as we know it.30 Cities and sub-national entities can play an essential role in this regard, quickly delivering tangible results on the ground involving innovative green initiatives at the local level, in collaboration with the higher echelons. For these reasons, the articulation of multilevel climate governance is and will remain crucial in global efforts to preserve and safeguard the one and only planet we live on.

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Robertson, D. B. (2017 – 2nd edition). Federalism and the Making of America. Routledge. Salawitch, R. J., Canty, T. P., Hope, A. P., Tribett, W. R., & Bennett, B. F. (2017). Paris Climate Agreement: Beacon of Hope. Springer. Shandas, V., Skelhorn, C., & Ferwati, S. (2020). Urban Adaptation to Climate Change: The Role of Urban Form in Mediating Rising Temperatures. Springer. Vandenburgh, M. P., & Gilligan, J. M. (2017). Beyond Politics: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change. Cambridge University Press. Wurzel, R., Liefferink, D., & Torney, D. (2020). Pioneers, Leaders and Followers in Multilevel and Polycentric Climate Governance. Routledge.

Public Policy Documents and Laws Haut Conseil pour le Climat. (2022, June). Rapport annuel 2022: Dépasser les constats, mettre en œuvre les solutions. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2001). Third Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). Fifth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2022). Sixth Assessment Report. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. (2022, March 8). Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on its Third Session, Held in Glasgow from 31 October to 13 November 2021. US Senate Democratic Leadership. (2022, August). Summary of the Energy Security and Climate Change Investments in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.

Websites Haut Conseil pour le Climat. Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://www. hautconseilclimat.fr The Law Society. (2021, November 19). Reflecting on COP26: What Were the Key Outcomes? Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://www.lawsociety. org.uk/topics/climate-change/reflecting-on-cop26-what-were-the-key-out comes UN Environment, Cities and climate change. Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-topics/resource-effici ency/what-we-do/cities/cities-and-climate-change UNFCCC, What Do Adaptation to Climate Change and Climate Resilience Mean? Retrieved January 18, 2023, from https://unfccc.int/topics/adapta tion-and-resilience/the-big-picture/what-do-adaptation-to-climate-changeand-climate-resilience-mean

Index

0-9 2020 Climate and Energy Package, 140 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, 151

A Act Driving Clean Energy and Offshore Wind (ADCEOW), 112, 292, 312–314, 320–322 Adams, Eric, 249–252, 257, 258, 263, 266–268, 270, 272, 289, 291, 295, 301, 319, 324, 366, 368, 379, 393 Administrative layer cake (millefeuille administratif ), 136, 220, 345 Affordable Clean Energy Rule (ACE), 64–68, 70, 71, 73 Agence de l’environnement et de la maîtrise de l’énergie–ADEME, 133, 142, 144, 154, 219 Agenda 21, 134, 141, 346, 347

All-of-government, 85, 86, 91, 94, 101–103, 110, 122, 323 America is All In (AIAI), 8, 67, 113, 117, 118, 256, 426, 427 American Clean Energy and Security Act (ACES), 46–50, 92 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), 50, 96, 105 America’s Pledge, 6, 8, 66

B Baker, Charlie, 66, 67, 278, 292, 295–308, 310–314, 317, 319, 323–326, 329, 358, 376, 378–380 Baseline year, 111, 112, 122, 152, 211, 212, 222, 245, 282, 283, 288, 309, 310, 318, 327, 331, 348, 351, 367, 381, 382, 388, 389, 398, 409 Best system emissions reduction (BSER), 55, 65

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 A. Barichella, Can Cities, States and Regions Save Our Planet?, Energy, Climate and the Environment, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-33936-3

433

434

INDEX

Biden, Joe, 7–9, 11–13, 15, 45, 47, 51, 55, 61, 66, 67, 69, 73, 74, 85–96, 98, 99, 101–117, 119–122, 166, 179, 183, 212, 235, 236, 251, 255–257, 262, 269–271, 290, 293, 306–308, 310, 323, 327, 329, 355, 367, 395, 414, 416, 417, 425–427 Bilan des émissions de gaz à effet de serre (BEGES), 141, 142, 154, 349, 354, 360, 361 Bloomberg, Michael, 240–242, 244, 265, 281, 358, 359 Borne, Elisabeth, 202–205, 210 Budgetary law, 106, 121, 123, 192, 411 Bush Jr., George W., 11, 41, 51, 52, 62, 71, 73, 137, 414 Bush Sr., George H.W., 38

C Cap-and-invest, 259, 270, 310 Cap-and-trade, 46, 48, 49, 98, 112, 259, 297 Carbon budgets, 184, 185, 207, 209 Carbon capture and storage (CCS), 56, 65, 93 Carbon leakage, 69, 71, 124, 148, 166, 223, 411 Carbon market, 18, 44, 46, 48, 50, 241 Carbon neutrality, 7, 66, 67, 88, 90, 111, 154, 155, 182–185, 191, 205, 208–213, 246, 247, 254, 256, 257, 262, 269, 285, 286, 288, 291, 294, 300, 303–309, 311, 313, 318, 319, 325–327, 361, 365–367, 372, 373, 375, 381, 387–389, 391, 415, 418 Carbon trading, 56, 65 Carter, Jimmy, 28, 38

Chirac, Jacques, 129–132, 135–138, 148, 149, 169, 177, 199, 210, 341, 346 Circular economy, 157, 182, 183, 185, 186, 197, 219, 364, 385, 387 Citizens’ Convention for the Climate, 193 Clean Air Act (CAA), 26–29, 33, 34, 38, 51, 52, 55–59, 64, 65, 72, 73, 94, 104, 107, 120, 166, 167, 217, 240, 279, 417 Clean Energy for all Europeans, 184, 191 Clean Energy Revolution, 7, 85, 87, 89, 90, 92, 93, 106, 113, 122, 257, 308, 310 Clean Power Plan (CPP), 6, 44, 54–61, 64–66, 68–71, 73, 92, 104, 111, 119, 120, 235, 255, 256, 300, 355 Clean Water Act (CWA), 27–29, 33 Climate action plan, 7, 9, 53, 54, 63, 88, 241, 247, 253, 281–291, 294, 295, 300, 304, 319, 320, 325, 327, 328, 348, 371, 422 Climate and Resiliency Law, 193–198, 208, 209, 213, 220 Climate laggard(s), 71, 148, 166, 191, 199, 410 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA), 90, 112, 168, 254, 256–262, 264–267, 269, 270, 305, 310, 391, 392 Climate Mayors, 6, 8, 66, 256, 285, 299, 355 Climate Mobilization Act (CMA), 9, 247–252, 256, 258, 260–264, 267, 268, 289, 290, 295, 366 Clinton, Bill, 12, 24, 39, 40, 46, 51, 70

INDEX

Commune(s), 133, 135, 136, 144–146, 153, 155, 161–163, 165, 167, 190, 197, 205, 212, 214, 219, 223, 224, 342–346, 354, 373, 374, 387, 390, 399, 411–413 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 28, 29 Concurrent power(s), 30, 233, 343, 354 Conference of the Parties (COP), 2, 347, 385, 387, 388, 414 Conflictual federalism, 41, 52, 60, 73 Cooperative federalism, 23, 31, 233, 346 COP21, 2, 9, 151, 165, 178, 216, 221, 222, 359, 360, 414, 416 COP26, 2, 69, 216, 415, 416, 427 COP27, 416, 427 Covid/coronavirus, 34, 73, 96, 116, 201, 220, 240, 250, 265, 279, 293, 294, 301, 303, 325, 385, 390 Cuomo, Andrew, 241–245, 252–254, 257, 258, 260, 265, 266, 270, 283, 295, 296, 299, 301, 302, 304, 358, 379

D de Blasio, Bill, 244–254, 258, 261, 265, 266, 301, 358, 379 Delanoë, Bertrand, 346, 347, 349–352, 357–359, 379 Denied power(s), 30 Département(s), 133, 135, 136, 144, 145, 161, 165, 203, 218, 342–346, 374, 413 Dillon’s Rule, 237, 238, 342 Dual system, 35, 156, 237, 344, 349, 361

435

E Ecological planning, 178, 179, 201–206, 210, 218, 219, 221, 222 Electric vehicle (EV), 95–98, 114, 157, 158, 203, 284, 292, 302, 308, 313–315, 383 Emissions gap, 4, 49, 67, 110, 121, 211, 271, 329, 330, 395, 418, 419, 425, 429 Emission(s) trading, 45 Energy and Climate Law, 191, 193–196, 198, 213 Energy and Climate Strategy, 152, 183, 195, 382 Environmental decade, 24, 27–29, 36–38, 41, 52, 75, 199, 234, 239, 279 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 6, 18, 27, 28, 32–35, 38, 43, 44, 51, 52, 54–57, 59–65, 70–72, 89, 97, 102, 104, 107, 115, 116, 119, 120, 166, 240, 279, 317 European Green Deal, 184, 191, 206, 209, 212 European Union (EU), 5, 10, 47, 111, 130, 131, 134, 137, 140, 141, 144, 145, 147, 151–153, 178, 179, 184, 191, 205, 206, 209, 212, 223, 353, 367, 389, 395, 418, 424 EV Purchasing Collaborative, 98, 114 Express/enumerated power(s), 29, 30, 42, 135, 158, 167, 220, 233, 234, 260, 326, 343, 382, 387 F Federal/public land, 53, 63, 102, 108, 109 Filibuster, 47, 64, 92, 94, 98, 100, 107, 235

436

INDEX

Ford, Gerald, 28, 38 Freeriding, 91, 148, 223, 250, 258, 260, 270, 411 French Strategy for Energy and Climate, 183, 184, 190, 191, 195, 197, 198, 213, 218 Fused system, 156, 344, 349, 355, 361 G General competence clause, 135, 165, 167, 214, 223, 224, 343, 344, 354, 390, 399, 411, 412 Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA), 281–283, 296, 297, 299, 305, 306, 311 Great national debate (Grand débat national ), 193, 220 Green Communities Act (GCA), 44, 282, 283, 321, 322 Green New Deal, 9, 66, 67, 168, 231, 246–248, 251, 252, 254, 260–262, 265, 267, 268, 283, 290–294, 300, 311, 314, 315, 317–319, 325, 326, 328, 329, 367, 368, 380 Grenelle I (GI), 139 Grenelle II (GII), 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 151, 153, 155, 160, 181, 188, 198, 349, 353, 354, 356, 374 H Harris, Kamala, 92, 99, 257 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendment Act (HSWA), 38 Healey, Maura, 278, 314–320, 323, 324, 326–329, 393 Hidalgo, Anne, 9, 357–359, 368, 370–373, 375, 377–380, 386, 388

High Council on Climate (Haut Conseil pour le Climat ), 192, 197, 198, 208, 209, 417, 418 Hochul, Kathy, 257–261, 264, 266, 268, 270, 272, 295, 301, 310, 316, 319, 324, 379, 393 Hollande, François, 129, 130, 150, 163, 165, 169, 177, 180, 181, 184, 199, 210, 212, 216, 342 Home Rule, 237, 238, 263, 268, 270, 280, 319, 325, 326, 328, 332, 342, 344, 393, 410, 411 Huchon, Jean-Paul, 350–352, 357, 375, 377, 379 Hydro-Quebec, 265, 266

I Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), 96–99, 101, 105–109, 113, 114, 116, 121, 308, 309, 312, 416 Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA), 95–99, 101–103, 105–107, 109, 113, 114, 116, 121, 308, 309 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 1, 12, 88, 111, 212, 347, 348, 430 Interstate commerce, 29, 234

J Johnson, Lyndon B., 26, 27, 107

K Kyoto Protocol, 2, 11, 40, 131, 137, 150

L Leader in line (Chef de file), 159, 163, 214, 342, 394

INDEX

Leaders’ Summit on Climate/Leaders’ Climate Summit, 90, 111, 117, 416 Lobby/ies/ing, 4, 11, 24, 38–44, 46, 47, 61, 62, 76, 86, 100, 118, 122, 149, 199, 200, 217, 235, 236, 239, 251, 260, 261, 294, 296, 326, 420 Loi de modernisation de l’action publique territoriale et d’affirmation des métropoles (MAPTAM), 160, 163, 373 Loi portant nouvelle organisation territoriale de la République (NOTRe), 164, 165, 181, 188, 198, 360, 373 Loi relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte (LTECV), 151–160, 162, 164, 165, 181, 184, 187, 188, 191, 198, 360, 369, 370, 374

M Macron, Emmanuel, 10, 11, 13, 15, 177–184, 188, 190, 191, 193, 196, 198–210, 212–214, 216, 218–222, 342, 372, 387, 395, 416–418, 425 Major questions doctrine, 104, 120, 417 Manchin, Joe, 93, 101, 105–108 Massachusetts v. EPA, 52, 57, 64 McCarthy, Kevin, 89, 93, 99, 100 Menino, Thomas, 280, 281, 283, 284, 295, 301, 303, 376 Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs), 58 Mitterrand, François, 136, 341 Municipal vehicle fleets, 3, 97, 239, 280, 284, 309, 348, 420

437

N National ambient air quality standards, 33, 34, 57, 107, 166, 167, 218, 240, 279 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 27 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), 54, 61, 69, 86, 90, 91, 106, 111, 113, 114, 116–119, 122, 165, 212, 215–218, 220, 255, 256, 288, 300, 310, 327, 365, 367, 395, 415–420, 425, 429 Neoliberalism/neoliberal, 11, 24, 37–41, 62, 76, 86, 94, 100, 122, 149, 199, 200, 234 Net-zero emissions, 322, 385, 387 Next Generation Climate Roadmap (NGCR), 112, 305–308, 310–314, 320–322, 325, 328, 392 Nixon, Richard, 27, 28, 253 Nuclear power/energy, 56, 93, 100, 152, 192, 381, 383

O Obama, Barack, 5–7, 9, 11, 12, 23–25, 39, 44–47, 49–57, 60, 62–66, 68–72, 74–76, 87, 89–92, 94, 96, 101, 103–105, 111, 115–117, 119, 212, 235, 236, 253, 255–257, 300, 308, 310, 355, 367, 426 Ocasio-Cortez, Alexandria (AOC), 87, 93, 253 OneNYC, 9, 245–248, 250, 256, 260–265, 267, 269, 288, 289, 319, 366

438

INDEX

P Paris Agreement/Accord, 2, 5–8, 10, 11, 17, 54, 59, 61, 62, 66, 69, 88, 90, 91, 105, 119, 121, 122, 150, 165, 179, 183, 216, 221, 222, 232, 240, 243, 245, 246, 254, 255, 262, 278, 285, 288, 300, 306, 318, 331, 332, 340, 360, 365, 366, 368, 381, 395, 398, 408–410, 415, 416, 418, 419, 421, 422, 425, 426, 430 Patrick, Deval, 281–284, 295, 296, 299, 301, 303, 375, 376 Pécresse, Valérie, 149, 357, 375–381, 385, 386, 388–390, 393 Plan Climat, Air, Energie Métropolitain (PCAEM), 155, 374 Plan Climat-Air-Energie Territorial (PCAET), 9, 152–157, 162, 165, 166, 183, 186–189, 195, 196, 198, 218, 360, 361, 369, 374 Plan climat énergie territorial (PCET), 140–147, 153, 156, 157, 165, 166, 187, 349, 352, 354, 355, 360, 374 PlaNYC , 240, 241, 245, 281 Preemption, 33, 238, 268, 270, 280, 325, 326, 329, 343, 356, 370, 384, 390, 393, 411 Prefect (Préfet ), 144–146, 156, 161, 162, 167, 204, 218, 219, 344, 351, 353, 357 Programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergieProgrammation pluriannuelle de l’énergie (PPE), 184–193, 196, 197, 206, 210, 212, 213, 218, 417 Pruitt, Scott, 62 R Reagan, Ronald, 24, 37, 38, 76

Reconciliation, 94 Reforming the Energy Vision (REV), 44, 243, 245, 254 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 45, 48–50, 56, 98, 102, 112, 113, 241, 242 Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), 44, 45, 50, 112, 241, 243, 281, 282 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 28, 29, 32, 38 S Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 28, 29, 35, 36 Sarkozy, Nicolas, 129–131, 138, 148, 149, 169, 177, 199 Schéma directeur de la Région Île-de-France (SDRIF), 160, 161, 164, 189, 198, 211, 351–353, 387, 388 Schéma régional d’aménagement, de développement durable et d’égalité des territoires (SRADDET), 164, 167, 188, 198, 218 Schéma Régional du Climat, de l’Air et de l’Energie (SRCAE), 144–147, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 186, 188–190, 195, 198, 218, 353–357, 369, 370, 376, 382 Scoping Plan, 255, 259, 260, 264, 267, 268, 310, 392 Shale oil/gas, 65, 74 Sinema, Kyrsten, 93, 100, 101, 105, 106 Spending package(s), 95, 96, 107, 109, 417 State Implementation Plan (SIP), 33, 57, 107, 166, 240, 279 Stratégie nationale bas carbone Stratégie nationale bas carbone

INDEX

(SNBC), 184–192, 196, 197, 206, 209, 210, 212, 213, 218, 417 Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 38 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 28, 32 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 246, 368 Systemic risk/crisis, 1, 4, 59, 121, 122, 220, 332, 410, 421, 430 T Tenth Amendment, 8, 30, 35, 75, 113, 156, 167, 215, 232–234, 237, 342, 343 Toxic Substances Control Act (TOSCA), 28, 29 Transportation and Climate Initiative (TCI), 297, 299 Trump, Donald, 5–9, 23, 25, 41, 49, 51, 53, 60–76, 86, 88–91, 94, 95, 100, 101, 103, 115, 116, 118–120, 183, 235, 236, 240, 243, 245, 253, 255–257, 271, 285, 297–300, 308, 315, 329, 355, 395, 409, 414, 422, 425–427 Tutelage (Tutelle), 135, 136, 343–345, 390

439

U United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2, 5, 12, 30, 150, 216, 414 US Climate Alliance (USCA), 6, 8, 66, 68, 110, 113, 243, 255, 299, 300, 355

W Walsh, Marty, 277, 284–287, 290, 291, 295, 297, 299–302, 304, 312, 324, 325, 328, 358 We Are Still In (WASI), 6, 8, 66, 67, 243, 255, 256, 299, 300, 426, 427 Western Climate Initiative (WCI), 45, 48, 50 West Virginia v. EPA, 104, 120 Wheeler, Andrew, 62 Wu, Michelle, 67, 277, 290–295, 311, 312, 314, 315, 317–320, 323, 324, 326–329, 358, 367, 368

Z Zero-Emission Vehicle (ZEV), 41, 72, 73, 102, 114, 117, 286