Campaign Finance and American Democracy: What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters 9780226713137

Citation preview

Campaign Finance and American Democracy

Campaign Finance and American Democracy What the Public Really Thinks and Why It Matters

d av i d m . p r i m o a n d   j e f f r e y   d.   m i lyo the universit y of chicago press

chicago and london

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2020 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations in critical articles and reviews. For more information, contact the University of Chicago Press, 1427 E. 60th St., Chicago, IL 60637. Published 2020 Printed in the United States of America 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20

1 2 3 4 5

isbn-13: 978- 0-226- 71280-2 (cloth) isbn-13: 978- 0-226- 71294- 9 (paper) isbn-13: 978- 0-226- 71313- 7 (e-book) doi: https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226713137.001.0001 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Primo, David M., author. | Milyo, Jeffrey, author. Title: Campaign fi nance and American democracy : what the public really thinks and why it matters / David M. Primo, Jeffrey D. Milyo. Description: Chicago ; London : The University of Chicago Press, 2020. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: lccn 2019052056 | isbn 9780226712802 (cloth) | isbn 9780226712949 (paperback) | isbn 9780226713137 (ebook) Subjects: lcsh: Campaign funds—United States. | Campaign funds—United States— Public opinion. | United States—Politics and government—Public opinion. Classification: lcc jk1991 .p75 2020 | ddc 324.7/80973—dc23 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019052056 This paper meets the requirements of ansi/niso z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).

For Neeta and Naveena —David Primo For Lynn, Audrey, and Luke —Jeff Milyo

Contents List of Figures and Tables

ix

Acknowledgments xiii chapter 1.

Introduction 1

chapter 2.

Weak Link?

chapter 3.

The Uninformed Public

chapter 4.

The Malleable Public 56

chapter 5.

The Cynical Public

chapter 6.

The Pragmatic Public

chapter 7.

What Do the Experts Think? 121

chapter 8.

Campaign Finance Laws and Trust in Government 135

chapter 9.

Conclusion 156

18 37

76 100

Appendix A: 2015 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Survey Background, Methodology, and Questions 169 Appendix B: CCES Questions for Chapter 3

199

Appendix C: CCES Questions for Chapter 4

203

Appendix D: CCES Questions for Chapter 5

209

Appendix E: CCES Questions for Chapter 6

215

Contents

viii

Appendix F: Expert Survey Background, Methodology, and Questions 219 Appendix G: Survey Questions for Chapter 8 Notes

233

References Index

259

247

225

Figures and Tables Figures Figure 1.1. Figure 1.2. Figure 3.1. Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3. Figure 4.1. Figure 6.1. Figure 6.2. Figure 7.1. Figure 7.2. Figure 8.1. Figure G.1.

Two conventional wisdoms about money in American politics, 2016–17 / 8 Average trust in the federal government, 2007–18 / 14 Campaign fi nance knowledge quiz (including super PAC and privacy questions) / 38 Performance on the campaign fi nance quiz, 2015–16 / 45 Campaign fi nance knowledge, 2015–16: Proportion of super PAC spending in the most recent election / 52 Liberty vs. equality in political participation, by ideology and partisanship, 2015–16 / 60 Can campaign fi nance reform reduce corruption?, 2015–16 / 105 Support for restrictions on campaign spending and contributions, 2015–16 / 113 Comparing experts’ and Americans’ attitudes on campaign fi nance / 124 Can campaign fi nance reform reduce corruption?, experts vs. Americans / 131 Trends in state-level trust, before and after campaign fi nance reform / 152 Survey observations by year / 231

x

List of Figures and Tables

Tables Table 3.1. Table 3.2. Table 3.3. Table 3.4. Table 4.1. Table 4.2. Table 4.3. Table 4.4.

Table 4.5. Table 4.6. Table 4.7. Table 4.8. Table 4.9. Table 4.10.

Table 5.1. Table 5.2. Table 5.3. Table 5.4. Table 5.5.

Knowledge of campaign fi nance regulations, 2015–16 / 45 Campaign fi nance knowledge by group, 2015–16 / 46 Campaign fi nance knowledge, 2015–16, regression results / 48 Campaign fi nance and political privacy, 2016 / 50 Government regulation of speech accuracy and political balance, 2016 / 61 Does the First Amendment go too far?, 2015–16 / 62 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for First Amendment protections of political activities, 2016 / 63 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for First Amendment protections of political activities, 2016, regression results / 64 Support for political speech restrictions, various speakers, 2016 / 67 Support for corporate political speech restrictions, 2016 / 69 Support for corporate political speech restrictions, 2016, regression results / 70 Support for US Supreme Court campaign finance rulings, 2016 / 72 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for constitutional campaign fi nance reform, 2016 / 73 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for constitutional campaign fi nance reform, 2016, regression results / 74 Trust in the federal government, pre- and postelection 2016 / 80 Perceptions of federal government corruption, pre- and postelection 2016 / 81 Changes in trust and perceptions of corruption, pre- and postelection 2016 / 82 How often do elected officials deviate from voter preferences?, 2015 / 83 The scope and prevalence of corruption in elective office, 2015–16 / 86

List of Figures and Tables

Table 5.6. Table 5.7. Table 5.8. Table 5.9. Table 5.10. Table 5.11. Table 5.12. Table 5.13. Table 5.14. Table 5.15. Table 6.1. Table 6.2. Table 6.3. Table 6.4. Table 6.5. Table 6.6. Table 6.7. Table 6.8.

Table 6.9. Table 7.1. Table 7.2. Table 7.3. Table 7.4.

xi

Cynicism score, 2015 / 87 Corruption scope index, 2016 / 87 Cynicism score, 2015, regression results / 88 Corruption scope index, 2016, regression results / 88 Is meeting with a lobbyist or making a campaign promise to a group corrupt?, 2016 / 90 Is policy agreement with an interest group corrupt?, 2016 / 91 Is legislative bargaining corrupt?, 2016 / 93 Is using model legislation from a think tank corrupt?, 2016 / 94 “Rigged elections” rhetoric and faith in the 2016 election, 2016 / 96 “Rigged elections” rhetoric and faith in the 2016 election, 2016, regression results / 97 Skepticism about campaign fi nance reform, 2015–16, regression results / 104 Introducing the “True Believers” / 105 Support for public fi nancing of campaigns, 2015–16 / 107 Support for campaign fi nance disclosure requirements, 2015–16 / 109 Support for restrictions on campaign spending and contributions, 2015–16 / 110 Support for restrictions on campaign spending and contributions, 2015–16, regression results / 112 The benefits and costs of campaign spending, 2016 / 117 Beliefs about campaign spending and support for campaign fi nance restrictions, 2016, regression results / 118 Using regulations to harass political opponents, 2015–16 / 119 Liberty vs. equality in political participation, experts vs. Americans / 125 Support for US Supreme Court campaign finance rulings, experts vs. Americans / 126 Support for constitutional campaign fi nance reform, experts vs. Americans / 126 The benefits and costs of campaign spending, experts vs. Americans / 127

xii

Table 7.5. Table 7.6. Table 7.7. Table 8.1. Table 8.2. Table 8.3. Table 8.4. Table 8.5. Table 8.6. Table A.1. Table G.1.

List of Figures and Tables

The scope of corruption in elective office, experts vs. Americans / 129 Perceptions of federal, state, and local government corruption, experts vs. Americans / 130 Can campaign fi nance reform reduce corruption?, experts vs. Americans / 132 Descriptive statistics for individual-level pooled survey data / 140 State campaign fi nance laws, 1987– 2017 / 141 Descriptive statistics for state-level variables / 143 The effect of state campaign fi nance laws on trust in state government, 1987– 2017 / 144 The effect of campaign fi nance laws on trust: States with N > 250, 1987– 2017 / 146 The effect of Clean Elections and Citizens United on trust in state government / 149 Descriptive statistics for CCES variables / 177 Survey observations by state / 231

Acknowledgments

T

he publication of this book marks the twentieth anniversary of our fi rst joint publication in the area of campaign fi nance: a 2000 article, “Corporate PAC Contributions in Perspective,” which was also coauthored with Tim Groseclose. In that article, we take on the conventional wisdom that corporate political action committees (PACs) are a dominant and nefarious force in American politics. Our independent and collaborative research has since continued to focus on subjecting “obvious” claims about campaign fi nance that are near and dear to the hearts of reformers—that money in politics hurts trust in government, suppresses turnout, and so on—to empirical scrutiny. This is risky research. If you fi nd that reformers’ claims are borne out, well, you have established the obvious. If you fi nd that they are not borne out—this is where most of our fi ndings lie—you are faced with publishing “null” results, a notoriously difficult task in the social sciences. This book, then, can be thought of as really risky research—it is a book-length treatment of the idea that campaign fi nance reform is not a cure-all for what ails American democracy—at a time when it is viewed by many academics and practitioners as essential medicine. The University of Chicago and its press are known for a commitment to free inquiry, and for us, it was clear that Chicago would be the ideal home for this project. We therefore are immensely grateful to Chuck Myers, our editor at Chicago, who was enthusiastic about the idea from day one and understood the importance of the questions we tackle in this book. Chuck is known in political science for his professionalism, judgment, and insight—all of which we experienced throughout the review process. We are also grateful to Chuck’s colleagues at Chicago who helped manage the many details associated with getting the book into production.

xiv

Acknowledgments

We had discussed a book project over the years, but it might never have come to fruition had it not been for the vision of Bob Bauer, Ben Ginsberg, and Nate Persily, three leaders in election law who were determined to convene a task force of leading social scientists to write a report about how campaigns are fi nanced today. After they invited us to join the task force, we proposed conducting national surveys of public attitudes regarding money in American politics over a two-year period, as we were not aware of any multiyear studies of this sort conducted by social scientists since the US Supreme Court’s controversial Citizens United decision in 2010. Bob, Ben, and Nate were fully supportive and helped make the surveys—and ultimately this book—a reality. We are also grateful to the Democracy Fund and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation for their fi nancial support of the task force, which ultimately made our surveys possible. We also thank the National Science Foundation for its long-standing support of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. That said, we had full control over the research design, our analysis, and the interpretations of our fi ndings. (Portions of the literature review and results in this book fi rst appeared, in some cases verbatim, in reports we prepared for the task force. For clarity of presentation, we only note this once, here.) Our work on the task force reflects our belief in the importance of scholarship for public policy debates. Campaign fi nance law is the subject of frequent litigation, and both of us have served as expert witnesses in several campaign fi nance cases (and fi led amicus briefs in others) because we believe that judges can make more informed decisions if social scientists’ input is part of the record. We served as experts in many of the cases mentioned in this book, including McConnell v. FEC (Primo), Speechnow.org v. FEC (Milyo), and McComish v. Bennett (Primo). In addition, we both signed on to an amicus brief in the Citizens United v. FEC case. Few academic books exist without the input and assistance of others, and ours is no exception. The anonymous reviewers at the University of Chicago Press and reviewers of our task force work improved the quality of our argument with their constructive suggestions. We received very helpful feedback on the surveys during task force meetings and are especially grateful to Steve Ansolabehere and Charles Stewart for their feedback. Andrew Dominic, Nick Foti, and Rochelle Sun provided excellent research assistance and offered extremely useful feedback on a draft of the manuscript. We also thank Shuaiyu Chen for assisting us with the book’s figures, Susanna Supalla for help designing the

Acknowledgments

xv

interface for our expert survey, and Mitch Sanders for his guidance on Qualtrics. Gretchen Helmke, John Matsusaka, Paul Sherman, and Brad Smith offered feedback on various aspects of the project. We also thank the many individuals at seminars and conferences around the country who offered comments on a working paper version of what became chapter 8 of the book. Lastly, we are grateful to those inside and outside the profession—including those who disagree with us on many campaign fi nance matters—who have encouraged and supported our research. We also have some individual acknowledgments to offer. From David: I thank the University of Rochester for granting me a sabbatical during which much of this book was written. I am grateful to Ani and Mark Gabrellian for their vision in establishing a professorship recognizing the importance of multidisciplinary research addressing real-world issues and for their subsequent interest in my work. We all could stand to break out of our disciplinary “silos” more often. I have been fortunate to work with amazing undergraduate and graduate students at Rochester, including several who helped with this book. The students I have worked with, taught, and learned from are committed to the open exchange of ideas, and their enthusiasm and energy power our universities. On a personal note, for my daughter Naveena, the book writing process was a new experience. She helpfully asked why anybody would want to write (or read!) a book on money in politics—an excellent question! She also contributed to the project, offering advice on writing (“always write the chapters in order”—turns out she was onto something) and even drawing mock-ups of the book cover. Finally, and most importantly, I want to send my everlasting gratitude and love to my wife, Neeta, for her understanding during the process of making this book a reality. She has been down this road before with previous books. But, like running a race on a familiar course, just because you know what’s coming doesn’t always make it easier. Neeta stuck with me even when the fi nish line seemed very far off. Neeta is, in a word, amazing. Finally, from Jeff: I am grateful to the taxpayers of Missouri, who through their support for Mizzou have provided me the opportunity to conduct this research. Most importantly, I am thankful for my wife, who said on more than one occasion, “You need to write a book,” and for her love, support, and patience as it became clear just what that suggestion entailed.

Chapter One

Introduction

C

ampaign fi nance reformers, politicians, and academics have been arguing for decades that democracy is imperiled by a threat that permeates all of politics: money. Money in politics, these elites tell us, is to blame for a wide array of ills in American society that threaten democracy: moneyed interests buying elections, rampant corruption, and declining trust in government. The elites are wrong, yet the American public believes them. This book is about why that matters. Just a few days after the US Supreme Court issued its 2010 Citizens United decision striking down several restrictions on political spending, President Barack Obama used his State of the Union address to warn that the decision would open the “floodgates for special interests.”1 Later in 2010, he warned that a “loophole” in campaign fi nance law posed a “threat to our democracy.” 2 Obama even used his fi nal speech to the United Nations as president to opine that “there is too much money in American politics,” and at his farewell address to the nation as president, he claimed, “When trust in our institutions is low, we should reduce the corrosive influence of money in our politics.”3 Obama is not alone. During her 2016 presidential campaign, Hillary Clinton pledged that she would work to overturn Citizens United and fight for constitutional campaign fi nance reform. In 2018, she identified overturning the decision as essential for “saving our democracy.”4 Donald Trump, while not mentioning Citizens United by name, railed against money in politics during a 2015 debate of Republican presidential candidates, calling the campaign fi nance system “broken.”5 US Senator and 2020 presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren (2019, 361), in a speech bemoaning the loss of faith in government, referred to “big money” as

2

Chapter One

a “gut punch to [US] democracy,” with the “rich and powerful buy[ing] their way into congressional offices.” And remarkably, in a late 2018 interview soon after his retirement, the author of the majority opinion in Citizens United, Anthony Kennedy, said, “All of us are concerned with money in politics,” and “It’s true there’s a problem of money in politics.”6 Reform groups and even some scholars follow a similar script. The Campaign Legal Center calls undisclosed campaign spending a “serious threat to our democracy.” 7 If “serious threat” were not ominous enough, American Enterprise Institute scholar Norman Ornstein argues that campaign fi nance represents “an existential threat to our democracy.”8 Fred Wertheimer of Democracy 21, in criticizing the “corrupt” campaign fi nance system, puts it succinctly: “Citizens United is ruining democracy.”9 Entertainers—no strangers to script reading—also get into the mix. Actor Martin Sheen rues the “poverty of spirit” engendered by money in the political system.10 Not to be outdone, superstar actress Jennifer Lawrence took a year off from her craft to advocate for reforms that will “unrig” American politics. In a compelling video watched more than one million times as of February 2020, Lawrence asserts, “We are witnessing a total political system failure in America.”11 The hyperbole of Lawrence’s and Sheen’s statements fits right in with the long-standing claims of professional political observers, but the rhetoric has become particularly heated in the wake of Citizens United. The media’s coverage of campaign fi nance often adopts the language of reformers. The term “dark money,” for instance, is hardly impartial and yet is commonplace in media reports, often without scare quotes around the term. The Center for Public Integrity even calls it a “term of art,” as though it is neutral expert jargon.12 It is tempting to dismiss all of this language as just political bombast and media hype, but the relentless negative framing of money in politics surely influences the views of Americans. How could it be otherwise? After all, the typical American is not scouring Federal Election Commission (FEC) fi lings or studying the relationship between roll call votes and campaign contributions to understand money’s influence or lack thereof. It is therefore not surprising that Americans believe the political system is rotten to the core—that is the incessant message they receive from the media, politicians, reform groups, and scholars. These elites nurture

Introduction

3

the public’s cynicism with their rhetoric and in turn use this cynicism as evidence of the need for reform. For example, Harvard Law professor Lawrence Lessig points to the “nihilist politics of resignation” among the public as evidence of the need for wholesale reform of the political system.13 Arguments for campaign fi nance reform are often not so much wellinformed, well-reasoned policy briefs, as cri de coeur (“cries from the heart”) followed by the assertion that a particular reform will make it all better. This formulation works because of the widely held conventional wisdom regarding the dominant, pernicious role of money in American politics and the associated need for reform. But what if the conventional wisdom is fundamentally wrong? What if there is no good reason to think that stricter campaign fi nance rules would have much effect on attitudes toward government? What if the Supreme Court’s decades- old justification for restricting political speech rests on the mistaken belief that campaign fi nance laws will reduce “the appearance of corruption” associated with campaign contributions? What if the usual justifications for campaign fi nance reform reflect a naïve and starry- eyed view of democracy? To answer these questions requires a deep dive into what Americans think about money in the US political system. The interplay of public opinion, corruption, and campaign fi nance is the focus of Campaign Finance and American Democracy. In an area that generates more heat than light, more assertions than evidence, our book will be relentlessly empirical in its approach, using survey data to study the foundations of public opinion on money in American politics. Despite all the attention given to campaign fi nance, scholarly and otherwise, ours is the fi rst book-length treatment of public opinion and campaign fi nance written after the Citizens United decision, and it is the fi rst research to contrast public opinion and the scientific consensus on the role of money in American politics. Using original survey data, we ask what the public thinks about money in politics, what drives these perceptions, and why it matters. Our primary line of inquiry is whether public opinion regarding corruption and the undue influence of money in politics is connected to reality, and whether changes in campaign fi nance regulations are likely to affect attitudes toward government. Questions like these arise out of a political economy tradition that

4

Chapter One

rejects the romantic view of democracy on which most justifications for campaign fi nance reform rest. For the romantics, if we could just get money out of politics and get the “right” people in office, democracy would produce the “correct” policies and, in doing so, help us save the environment, provide government-funded health care for all, and otherwise implement a very particular view of government—what John Samples (2006, 42), in an important account of the historical roots of campaign fi nance law, calls the “progressive vision of politics.” The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, known colloquially as “McCain-Feingold,” was signed into law in 2002 and is an excellent example of how campaign fi nance reform is “sold” to the public. Supporters of this legislation, which among other provisions banned unlimited contributions to political parties known as “soft money,” claimed that it would limit the power of special interests, end the appearance of corruption, reduce political advertising, promote democracy, increase political equality, realize the public interest, restore trust in government, increase electoral competition, improve political discourse, and reduce spending on elections (Samples 2006, 3– 6).14 Apparently this didn’t come to pass, as similar promises are offered in support of new reforms that will work this time around (“Really!,” you can hear the reformers saying). The progressive vision of what ails America remains alive and well today. After the Democrats took control of the US House in the 2018 midterm elections, Democratic House leader Nancy Pelosi and Rep. John Sarbanes wrote in a Washington Post op- ed that it was time to “end the dominance of money in politics. For far too long, big-money and corporate special interests have undermined the will of the people and subverted policymaking in Washington—enabling soaring health- care costs and prescription drug prices, undermining clean air and clean water for our children, and blocking long- overdue wage increases for hardworking Americans.”15 In 2019, US senator Sheldon Whitehouse proposed legislation to increase the disclosures associated with independent campaign spending, stating, “On issues from climate change to gun safety, a torrent of dark money spending has for too long prevented Congress from pursuing solutions that are overwhelmingly supported by the public. We need to pass this legislation to put power back where it belongs—in the hands of the American people—and restore trust in democracy.”16 Later that year, in announcing his entry into the 2020 presiden-

Introduction

5

tial race, Tom Steyer spoke of the “stranglehold that corporations have over  our politicians” and how reducing “the influence of corporate money in our democracy” will allow us to “fi nally solve the many challenges facing our country.”17 Pelosi, Sarbanes, Whitehouse, and Steyer are not outliers. This is the standard rhetorical script for campaign finance reformers. The romantic view of democracy also extends to survey design. For instance, in a late 2015 poll, 41 percent of voters answered 10 on a 10-point scale when asked whether changing campaign fi nance rules in order to “get money out of politics” would help their families personally.18 The phrase get money out of politics conjures up images of an idyllic view of government where all influence from nefarious sources is excised from the system, producing the Platonic ideal of a representative government. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, Americans in this survey felt that campaign fi nance reform is more family-friendly than improved job-training programs. The belief that a new layer of campaign fi nance regulations will improve perceptions of government by clearing a path for the enactment of “better” public policies stems from a fundamental misunderstanding of preference aggregation in a collective. By contrast, a political economy approach takes into account the features and limits of collective decision-making as well as the incentives of politicians who enact campaign fi nance laws and the reformers who propose them. Our perspective is one of “politics without romance,” to borrow from Nobel Prize– winning economist James Buchanan’s (1984, 11) description of a branch of political economy known as “public choice theory.” In short, we approach the topic of money in American politics as scientists, relying on logic, evidence, theoretical insights, and careful consideration of data. In national surveys conducted in 2015 and 2016, we fi nd that while the public is very cynical about the role of money in politics, it is also skeptical about the potential for reforms to dramatically alter the political process. Americans do not see campaign contributions as uniquely corrupting, nor do they view reforms as a panacea. Consequently, public opinion simply does not offer a strong foundation for expanding campaign finance regulations; the argument that reform will improve trust in government or public perceptions of democracy does not hold up in the data. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. How did we get to the point where the public’s perceptions of democracy became the primary justifi-

6

Chapter One

cation for restrictions on campaign contributions and expenditures? For this, we can thank the US Supreme Court.

The US Supreme Court and the Appearance of Corruption In the aftermath of Watergate, Congress in 1974 amended the Federal Campaign Finance Act of 1971. These amendments created the Federal Election Commission, the regulatory body that oversees federal campaign finance; imposed spending and contribution limits on campaigns; and reformed the system of publicly financed presidential campaigns, among other changes. (For a detailed history of campaign finance law and its evolution through the early 2000s, see Corrado et al. 2005.) The law was challenged on First Amendment grounds, opening the door for the US Supreme Court to lay the groundwork for modern campaign finance law. In its 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo, the court “split the baby,” ruling that spending limits were unconstitutional impositions on the free speech of candidates for public office, while contribution limits to campaigns were permissible. The court’s rationale was that the primary purpose of the law, “the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption,” could justify limits on campaign contributions, since large contributions created the potential for quid pro quo corruption whereby politicians explicitly traded contributions for official actions.19 (Spending limits are overkill, the court ruled, given the permissibility of contribution limits.) Moreover, the court wrote, “of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual fi nancial contributions.” Referencing and quoting an earlier case, the court continued, “Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.’” 20 Now let’s fast-forward to the 2010 Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC. In Citizens United, the court ruled that corporations and unions could not be prohibited from spending money on campaigns if that spending is uncoordinated with candidates because such expenditures “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 21

Introduction

7

And in a follow-up decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC, which paved the way for the rise of political organizations known as super PACs, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit ruled that “the Supreme Court has recognized only one interest sufficiently important to outweigh the First Amendment interests implicated by contributions for political speech: preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.” 22 So there you have it. With some twists and turns along the way, for the past forty years, the foundation of campaign fi nance law has largely rested on appearances (actual quid pro quo corruption is rare)—“the . . . imagined coercive influence of large fi nancial contributions on candidates’ positions and on their actions if elected to office.” 23 In this way, campaign fi nance is sui generis among policy issues in that public opinion determines the constitutionality of regulations that restrict political speech and participation—hence, the importance of the questions we ask in this book. 24 After all, if the American public is uninformed or misinformed about campaign fi nance law, if its views on corruption encompass “normal” aspects of the political process like currying favor with party leaders or seeking media coverage, and if its attitudes toward speech are malleable depending on who is doing the speaking, then we must seriously question whether the imaginations of Americans regarding politics should be the basis for an entire body of constitutional law. Imaginations, after all, can sometimes run wild. In the case of campaign fi nance, as we will now show, they do.

Two Conventional Wisdoms about Money in Politics The Supreme Court opened the door to making public perceptions of American politics front and center in how we evaluate the merits of campaign fi nance laws. Those perceptions are, at fi rst glance, grim. The conventional wisdom in American politics is that money is at the heart of democracy’s failures. This perspective can be fairly summarized as follows: There is too much money in American politics, and it is used to buy elections and pay off politicians. Moreover, the system is fundamentally corrupt and reform is needed to save American democracy. Part of this conventional wisdom—that elective offices are for sale to the highest bidder—is clearly false, while the remaining claims are suspect, overstated, or both.

Chapter One

8

We asked Americans before the 2016 election whether they agreed or disagreed with the following five statements: • There is too much money in politics. • Elective offices are for sale to the highest bidder. • Campaign contributions are the equivalent of bribes. • The campaign fi nance system is corrupt. • Campaign fi nance reform is needed to restore the integrity of American democracy.

In 2017, we also asked a group of experts in campaign fi nance to evaluate the same five statements. The results of this exercise show that there are two conventional wisdoms about money in politics: that of Americans and that of experts. Figure 1.1 presents the percentages of each group who answered “agree” or “strongly agree” to each question. (The other possible replies were “neither agree nor disagree,” “disagree,” or “strongly disagree.”) The conventional wisdom among Americans is very, well, conven-

Figure 1.1. Two conventional wisdoms about money in American politics, 2016–17 Note: Data for experts is from a survey conducted in late 2017; data for Americans is from the preelection 2016 CCES. Percentages for Americans are calculated using survey weights. N for experts varies by question and is approximately 150. N for Americans varies by question and is approximately 1,900.

Introduction

9

tional. Each statement receives the backing of at least 70 percent of Americans. More than half of all Americans agree or strongly agree with all five statements, and nearly a quarter of Americans answer “strongly agree” to all five questions. In contrast to many of the fi ndings in this book, partisan and ideological differences in these opinions are minimal. Democrats are in sync with Republicans, liberals with conservatives, Trump voters with Clinton voters: money is a malign force in American politics. 25 Clearly, the idea that the system is rotten to the core resonates. The second conventional wisdom is the one shared by experts. Fewer than 15 percent of experts believe that campaign contributions are the equivalent of bribes or that elective offices are for sale to the highest bidder. Experts are split as to whether the campaign fi nance system is corrupt and whether there is too much money in American politics, but even this divide is indicative of a very different perspective on politics compared with the public at large. The unifying feature of the two conventional wisdoms is a belief about the need for campaign fi nance reform to restore integrity to the US political system. About 70 percent of experts strongly agree or agree that reform is needed, with 80 percent of the public feeling the same way. This overwhelming support for reform may make you think, “See, experts and Americans agree that we need reform; end of story!” But this is the beginning of the story, not the end. The question as posed to Americans and experts presumes that changes to campaign finance laws could achieve the end of restoring integrity to American democracy. Once we probe further, however, we see that Americans are skeptical that campaign fi nance reform will reduce corruption in practice. And there is good reason to trust this skepticism—even though, as we will see in chapter 7, campaign fi nance experts are more optimistic about the efficacy of reform.

Campaign Finance in Tense Political Times A review of 1990s survey data reaches six conclusions about attitudes toward money in politics: 1. The public is remarkably cynical about the current campaign fi nance system and the general role that money plays in American elections.

Chapter One

10

2. The public is not particularly knowledgeable about how current campaign finance laws work. 3. The public strongly supports limits—of just about any kind—on campaign contributions and spending. 4. The public is quite ambivalent about or opposed to proposals for public financing of election campaigns. 5. Whatever their preferences as to specific reforms, most Americans don’t seem very concerned about campaign fi nance. 6. Americans seem skeptical about the political prospects of reform and its likely consequences. (Mayer 2001, quoted verbatim)

It is remarkable how accurate most of these fi ndings are today. Continuing to turn back time, about twenty years ago, the two of us teamed up with Tim Groseclose to write that corporate political action committees (PACs) were not the nefarious force in American politics that they were made out to be (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000). Still, in 2020, we observe many candidates refusing to take money from . . . corporate political action committees. 26 The phrase the more things change, the more they stay the same seems apt here. Yet even though the themes are similar, much has changed in American politics in the past twenty years. In the campaign finance arena, the new millennium brought with it the demise of soft money via new regulations written into McCain-Feingold. In 2010, as we noted earlier, the US Supreme Court issued its decision in Citizens United v. FEC, which, combined with SpeechNow.org v. FEC, opened the door to the creation of super PACs that can accept contributions from individuals and organizations such as corporations and unions for political purposes, including spending on elections independent of candidates. Politically, perhaps the biggest change in recent decades has been the increase in—and increased attention given to—political polarization. Campaign fi nance plays into this concern, though sometimes in unexpected ways. For example, Raymond La Raja and Brian Schaffner (2015) argue that stricter campaign fi nance laws with regard to political party fundraising have empowered extreme ideologues at the expense of party organizations, with deleterious consequences for polarization. Consistent with La Raja and Schaffner, Michael Barber (2016b) fi nds that higher individual campaign contribution limits foster political polarization among legislators at the state level, while higher limits on PAC contributions reduce polarization. And Andrew Hall (2019) notes that pub-

Introduction

11

lic fi nancing laws emphasizing small contributions by individuals as a qualifying condition for receiving public campaign funds have actually increased legislative polarization in those states that implemented such rules. A thread running through all these analyses is the empirical generalization that “individual donors are ideologically extreme” relative to interest groups (Barber 2016b). Polarization remains a major area of inquiry, but the election of 2016 focused scholars’ attention on a new question: Is democracy in danger? Prior to the election, hundreds of political scientists signed a letter condemning presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rhetoric and positions, calling the potential of a Trump presidency “a grave threat to American democracy and to other democratic governments around the world.” 27 In the wake of Trump’s victory, a group of political scientists began to survey others in the discipline, as well as the American public, in order “to monitor democratic practices, their resilience, and potential threats.” 28 Books have been written, seminars held, debates had. One scholar even constructed a new course, Democratic Erosion, that has since been adopted at other universities. 29 The dual concerns of political polarization and democratic erosion fit squarely into the argument of our book. Specifically, we will show that views about campaign fi nance are also deeply polarized, especially among those who follow politics closely. This polarization is a relatively new phenomenon. For instance, in a 1996 Gallup poll, when asked about three types of campaign fi nance restrictions (limits on total campaign spending by candidates, limits on self-funding of campaigns, and limits on individual contributions to political parties), Democrats and Republicans gave statistically indistinguishable answers, with the modal Democrat and Republican supporting all the restrictions. 30 In the 2015 and 2016 surveys we analyze in this book, Democrats are far more supportive of these same sorts of regulations compared to Republicans; in fact, the modal Democrat supports all the restrictions, while the modal Republican supports none of them. 31 As we will show in this book, concerns about democracy run far deeper than money in politics. There is, indeed, a general disgust with politics in the United States today. In this way, the aversion toward money is perhaps better thought of as a proxy for disenchantment with the political system overall rather than about campaign fi nance per se. Worries about Donald Trump’s brand of politics and about political polarization make us wonder if our efforts would be better served focusing on improving

12

Chapter One

the quality of policy debates rather than continuing to point the blame at a convenient villain: money. We will return to this idea in the conclusion.

The Problem with Campaign Finance Reform As we noted earlier, the “appearance of corruption” standard does not require that campaign contributions actually corrupt elections and the policy process; it instead necessitates only that one could imagine that they do. Given the media coverage and elite discourse around campaign fi nance, the specter of corruption is pretty easy to conjure. What, then, are the mechanisms by which campaign fi nance laws are thought to ameliorate those imagined appearances of corruption? One possibility is that awareness of strict laws might have such an effect. If the public knows that under current law, corporations are not permitted to contribute directly to federal candidate campaigns, perhaps this will cause them to view politics as less corrupt. By this logic, imposing stricter rules—say, a ban on super PACs—and advertising the existence of such reforms broadly could have salutary effects on public perceptions. Unfortunately, we cannot count on Americans to have a deep knowledge of campaign fi nance laws. In our surveys, when asked about basic details of federal campaign fi nance regulations, the public fares about as well as a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at possible answers. A second possibility is that changes in campaign finance laws will alter the trajectory of policy or electoral outcomes in such a way that the public’s cynicism will vanish. However, there is no “correct” policy or electoral outcome that is being blocked by current campaign fi nance rules. The nature of majoritarian politics in a diverse collective is that there will often be large segments of the public discontented with politics. Nor is there likely to be agreement about what kinds of reforms would lead to “better” outcomes. As William Riker (1980) argues, debates over the rules of the game “inherit” the confl icts in policymaking, because decisions about the rules ultimately influence policy. Riker’s logic is also useful for thinking about the relationship between public attitudes toward government and the identity of officeholders: attitudes toward government “inherit” one’s views on current officeholders. As Charles Stewart writes in the context of voter confidence in electoral integrity, “The literature on voter confidence suggests that very little in the way of election reform can move voter confidence. What

Introduction

13

does move it is the election results. If your guy wins, you’re more confident than if your guy loses.”32 Stewart’s claim extends to trust in government, which is a function of who controls Congress and the presidency (Keele 2005). A third possibility is that campaign fi nance reform will change how “Washington does business” and how our elections are run in ways that will make the public stand up and take notice. Elections will be less negative. Candidates will be less polarized. Parties will work together to “get things done” once more. This is the romantic view of politics at work. The bottom line is this: improving public attitudes about government is a lot to ask of any process reform. In The Limits of Electoral Reform, Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan (2013, 18) argue, “Electoral reform may, in the end, not do anything to satisfy voter discontent with politics and politicians. . . . As rules are changed to supposedly cure the disease of voter discontent, voters may likely not notice, or if the expectations of reforms are set too high, they may be disappointed by reforms. Reformers’ appeals to citizens’ values and procedural concerns may well fall on deaf ears.” These authors view their cross- country research on electoral reform as speaking to both reformers and academics, as “the disappointment of electoral reform poses questions not just for reformers but for the academic understanding of institutions, too” (2013, 16). Tellingly, “Campaign Finance Reform: A Collection of Null Results” is one of the chapters in their book. We should not be surprised, then, if we fi nd that campaign fi nance laws are not up to the task. Recent data on trust in the federal government bears this out. Writing about long-running trends in trust, Jack Citrin and Laura Stoker (2018, 49) caution “against confidence that the decline in trust can be quickly or easily reversed.” Nathaniel Persily and Kelli Lammie (2004) note that trust in government was not appreciably affected by the last major piece of federal campaign fi nance legislation (the McCain-Feingold law discussed earlier in the chapter). What about Citizens United, which the Brennan Center for Justice claims has “severely undermin[ed] public confidence in our government”?33 Figure 1.2 depicts trust in the federal government measured yearly from 2007 to 2018—for all Americans, Democrats only, and Republicans only. A solid vertical line separates surveys before and after the 2010 Citizens United decision. (The 2010 data was collected after the decision.) One would be hard pressed to frame Citizens United as

14

Chapter One

Figure 1.2. Average trust in the federal government, 2007–18 Note: This figure depicts yearly replies of “just about always” or “most of the time” to the question, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government to do the right thing?,” from the annual CCES, 2007–18, University of Missouri module. Percentages are calculated using survey weights for each annual survey of 1,000 adults; noncitizens and nonresponses are omitted from the calculations. N = 11,730 across all years.

a disaster for democracy based on this figure. Americans’ collective reaction to the decision, as reflected in this data, is more of a yawn than a yell. In fact, from the trends shown in this figure, it appears that Democrats and Republicans are much more affected by the election of a copartisan president. We are skeptical, therefore, that attitudes toward government will be meaningfully affected by reform. It could be, though, that the end game for campaign fi nance reformers is not (just) restoring confidence in government. One analyst writes, “In fact it is far from clear that campaign fi nance reform is about the elimination of corruption at all. That is because corruption—understood as the implicit or explicit exchange of campaign contributions for official action—is a derivative problem. Those who say they are concerned about corruption are actually concerned about two other things: inequality, and the nature of democratic politics. If somehow an appropriate level of equality were achieved, much of the reason to be concerned about corruption would no longer exist” (Strauss 1994, 1370). Indeed, many scholars and reformers are homing in on political equality as the focus for reform efforts. Political scientists Benjamin Page and Martin Gilens (2017, 185) claim that “money profoundly corrupts U.S.

Introduction

15

politics. . . . Even perfectly legal money corrupts the most fundamental principle of democracy, the principle of political equality,” which they argue includes “equal responsiveness from elected officials.” Legal scholar Richard Hasen (2016, 5) calls for reformers to focus squarely on the issue of equality as it relates to campaign fi nance: “The new Citizens United era is not full of corrupt politicians taking bribes or of elections going to the highest bidder. To claim it is so puts the public’s spotlight in the wrong place, looking for elected officials to use large amounts of money for private gain. The more central problem of money in politics is something just as troubling but much harder to see: a system in which economic inequalities, inevitable in a free market economy, are transformed into political inequalities that affect both electoral and legislative outcomes.” We will return to these arguments in the conclusion when we discuss the road ahead for campaign fi nance reform.

Where We Are Headed In this chapter, we have given you reason to be skeptical of the purported link between campaign fi nance laws and attitudes toward government, but we would not blame you for being skeptical of our skepticism. After all, our argument stands in contrast to how the media and opinion leaders frame the issue of money in politics. Stick with us, though, as we develop our argument. In chapter 2, we demonstrate that the foundations of campaign finance reform rest on a conception of government at odds with decades of political economy research on the pathologies of collective decisionmaking. We argue that money does not “buy” elections or policy and that campaign fi nance laws cannot “fi x” American politics so long as policy confl icts exist. Abstract theory, however, is not enough. Beginning in chapter 3, we make use of original survey data. In 2015, Republican attorney Benjamin Ginsberg, Democratic attorney and New York University law professor Robert Bauer, and Stanford University law professor Nathaniel Persily began an ambitious effort to generate a report about the state of knowledge in campaign fi nance. We served on the task force they created, which was modeled on President Barack Obama’s Presidential Commission on Election Administration. As part of our work on the task force, we constructed a battery of

16

Chapter One

questions regarding money in politics for the 2015 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a nationwide survey that brings together teams of researchers from dozens of universities. The survey runs each year, with two waves in election years (one before and one after the election). About half the questions on the surveys were written by us, and the other half consisted of Common Content questions that are the same across all survey teams. Appendix A presents additional background on the CCES, as well as all the questions we wrote for the 2015 and 2016 surveys, in the order in which they were asked. 34 Each chapter’s appendix presents the list of questions used in that chapter. In chapter 3, we establish that the public has little understanding of basic campaign fi nance facts, ranging from the prevalence of super PAC spending in elections to what information the government collects about contributors to candidates for federal office. The breadth and specificity of our surveys provide a deep understanding of what the public knows, what it does not know, and what factors influence knowledge about money in politics. In chapter 4, we explore the role values play in driving perceptions of campaign fi nance. We study the tension between liberty and equality in campaign fi nance law, attitudes toward Supreme Court jurisprudence, and whether the public believes constitutional campaign fi nance reform is advisable. We also examine the malleability of support for free speech when campaign fi nance is framed as an issue of money instead of speech, as well as when the identity of the speaker varies. The results are troubling. In chapter 5, we focus on attitudes toward the political process and show that the public’s concerns about politics are about more than money. Americans believe most political activities, even those many of us would consider “normal” politics, are potentially corrupt, and given this expansive conception of corruption, Americans view politics as being rife with malfeasance. Money may merely be a convenient target for the public’s ire. Chapter 6 offers some evidence in this regard. Even though the public is cynical about the political process and favors many campaign fi nance reform proposals, it is nonetheless skeptical that reform will actually do much to limit corruption. Moreover, we fi nd that the less Americans know about campaign fi nance laws or about campaign spending, the more favorable they are toward reform. These fi ndings raise profound questions about the underlying legal justifications for campaign fi nance laws.

Introduction

17

Having made the case that public perceptions about money in politics offer a weak justification for campaign fi nance reform, we turn in chapter 7 to a survey of campaign fi nance experts that we conducted in late 2017. We previewed some of the differences and similarities between the public and the experts earlier in this chapter, and in chapter 7, we address other ways in which the public and experts differ. For instance, experts are far more polarized than Americans in their attitudes about campaign fi nance. In chapter 8, we directly examine the relationship between campaign fi nance rules and perceptions by studying the variation in state-level laws and their effects on attitudes toward state government. Using public opinion data spanning thirty years, we fi nd, consistent with our earlier work on this subject (Primo and Milyo 2006), that stricter campaign finance laws have no appreciable effects on attitudes toward government. The results of the analysis in chapter 8 undercut decades of court rulings on campaign finance, so we conclude in chapter 9 by offering a path forward for thinking about campaign fi nance and the future of American democracy.

Chapter Two

Weak Link?

D

oes the case for campaign fi nance reform rest on a mistaken belief—one articulated by politicians, journalists, judges, reform groups, and even some academics? In a word, yes. That belief: There is a “will of the people” that is not being realized due to money’s role in the political system. If we regulate money in politics appropriately, we’ll limit corruption or its appearance, obtain the “correct” outcomes in elections and in policymaking, and as a result, confidence in government will be restored. But if there is no such thing as the will of the people—if, instead, it is at best a useful fiction—then this syllogism falls apart. Admittedly, the notion that, in general, there is no will of the people sounds heretical to the uninitiated, but among political economists, it is an uncontroversial and foundational result of social choice theory, which we will explicate in detail toward the end of this chapter. For now, consider an intuitive explanation for what academics usually demonstrate with complex mathematics. First, different people have different ideas and preferences. So while a group of people may share some common ideas and interests at a point in time, they are not literally of one mind, and it is impossible in general to characterize the group’s will (in a manner analogous to that of an individual) independent of the rule used to aggregate those preferences. Instead of there being one true public interest, you may have a particular notion of what is in the public interest, as does everyone else. This lesson is as profound as it is simple. So if there is no one true will of the people to be implemented, what does money in politics distort—and what is it that reforms are meant to accomplish? At best, political reforms will induce different outcomes,

Weak Link?

19

but those outcomes still won’t conform to the will of the people, because that “true will” is a fiction. Even putting this difficulty aside, the notion that campaign fi nance reform is a cure-all is further challenged by the reality that reforms cannot change fundamental truths. Politics is about confl ict and competition for power among groups with often incompatible goals; no reform will eliminate the desire for power or resolve differences in opinions. And when government plays such a significant role in the economy and the lives of ordinary citizens, no reform will eliminate the incentives for citizens to band together to try to affect political outcomes. From Donald Trump to Nancy Pelosi, politicians may promise to “drain the swamp” through reforms, but doing so will just create a new—and not necessarily improved—institutional ecosystem for political competition. As Issacharoff and Karlan (1999, 1705) write, “Electoral reform is a graveyard of well-intentioned plans gone awry. It doesn’t take an Einstein to discern a First Law of Political Thermodynamics—the desire for political power cannot be destroyed, but at most, channeled into different forms—nor a Newton to identify a Third Law of Political Motion— every reform effort to constrain political actors produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with power to hold onto it.” In this chapter, we will offer a theoretical foundation for why and how public perceptions of American democracy are thought to be tied to the role of money in the political system. Money, we are told, buys access to politicians, affects election outcomes, and ultimately, influences public policy outcomes. At each step, public trust is damaged by a belief that it is money rather than voter preferences that drives public policy. We cast doubt on these microfoundations and explain our skepticism that the root cause of disenchantment with the political system is election fi nancing.1

Campaign Finance and Perceptions of Government: A Theoretical Framework Public perceptions of government are shaped by interrelated concerns about electoral and policy processes and electoral and policy outcomes. Process concerns are grounded in an interest in equality and the idea that whether you have a seat at the table when policy is being made or a

20

Chapter Two

candidate determines her policy positions should not depend on your financial resources. The instrumental rationale for caring about process, of course, is that rules shape electoral and policy outcomes. The fear is that money threatens democracy because it short- circuits the relationship between elected officials and their constituents, leading to negative perceptions of government. These concerns can be broken down further into the perceived evils of access and influence. First, campaign fi nance may pollute lawmaking by helping donors get the ear of government officials (access), with these advantages in access often translating into inappropriate sway in the policy process (influence). Influence on policy can also be channeled through influence over who gets elected to office: campaign contributions may affect election outcomes and, by changing the composition of government, alter public policy. Finally, campaign contributions may facilitate quid pro quo corruption, where elected officials are bribed to undertake official actions or, at the very least, engage in actions that appear corrupt. As a result, so the story goes, the public becomes disenchanted with money’s role in the electoral and policy process, and trust in government suffers. Access Money is often thought to be a corrosive element of the political system because it creates inequalities in political power and advantages wealthy Americans over average citizens. This may manifest itself in policy outcomes, which we discuss below, but an underlying equality- driven concern is that moneyed interests get a seat at the table, while the mass public is ignored. Francia et al. (2003, 18) write, “The increasing amounts of time that candidates spend talking with donors is troubling if these donors do not ‘look like America’—that is, if they have a distinctive demographic profi le.  .  .  . When political activists have distinctive views and special access to policymakers, representation and democracy may become distorted.” Contributors indeed are not representative of the mass public. Individual contributors tend to be wealthier and better educated, and men and whites are overrepresented among donors (Francia et al. 2003; Hersh and Schaffner 2017). Some donors contribute because they receive consumption value from attending fundraisers, hobnobbing with politicians, and the act of giving itself (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo,

Weak Link?

21

and Snyder 2003; Hersh and Schaffner 2017). Others contribute simply because they are asked or for ideological reasons—or yes, with the explicit goal of securing access to elected officials (Hersh and Schaffner 2017). Barber (2016a) concludes that the contribution patterns of political groups are consistent with seeking “access and influence,” while individual donors are motivated by ideological considerations. Historically, the empirical literature studying the benefits of campaign contributions (e.g., Langebin 1986; Hall and Wayman 1990) has faced a statistical problem plaguing many sorts of studies in campaign finance: endogeneity. Donors may give to ideologically like-minded candidates because they want to keep them in office, and ideologically likeminded elected officials will be more likely to give access to those who think like them and who have useful information about specific policies to share (a group that likely includes lobbyists and other contributors). These factors confound the ability of a researcher to identify the causal effect of contributions on access. In recent years, there have been creative attempts to mitigate the endogeneity problem through the use of methodological innovations and experimental designs. For instance, using a statistical technique known as differences- in- differences, Fouirnaies and Hall (2018) fi nd that interest groups will increase contributions to state legislators who gain procedural powers in the state legislature, such as control over committee assignments. The differences-in- differences approach helps isolate the impact of a particular “treatment”—in this case, an increase in procedural power. Kalla and Broockman (2016) conducted a field experiment in which congressional offices received letters requesting a meeting between the legislators’ offices and an interest group. Only some of the letters revealed, however, that the interest group’s members were “local campaign political donors,” while the remaining letters indicated only that the members were “concerned constituents.” The authors fi nd that legislators and their senior staffers were much more likely to be available for such meetings when offices were told that attendees were political donors in addition to being constituents. Kalla and Broockman (2016, 548) acknowledge, however, that “congressional offices could have seen the act of revealing an individual’s donor status as a signal that the group itself cared more about the issue rather than have been reacting to the information that the individuals were donors.” In other words, contributions could be a proxy for intensity and engagement with politics

22

Chapter Two

(Samples 2006). (Kalla and Broockman believe political equality concerns exist in this scenario even if contributions are just signals.) There is some evidence, therefore, that campaign contributions are given with an eye toward securing access. Given disparities in political giving by wealth, it is not a huge leap to then argue that this unequal access creates negative perceptions of government, including creating “the appearance of corruption.” Influence: Policymaking Concerns about access extend beyond equity considerations to whether access is altering policy outcomes, legally or illegally. The latter concern is captured by the quid pro quo corruption that the Supreme Court has focused on in its campaign fi nance decisions. In other words, it’s not just that money gets you a seat at the table or influences how a politician thinks; it’s that the money is used to pay off politicians to secure particular outcomes. Rampant corruption of this sort would provide plenty of justification for limited faith in government. The fact is, such corruption appears to be rare, especially at the federal level (Cordis and Milyo 2016). However, even if they are breaking no laws, elected officials could still be more likely to do the bidding of donors, with contributions facilitating “legalized bribery” or “legalized corruption.” Scholars have studied this phenomenon by examining how legislators vote on policy issues and whether contributions affect voting patterns. But legislators may seek out, and receive, contributions from donors who are like-minded, so any relationship between campaign contributions and voting is correlational rather than causal. Most studies, including those that address this endogeneity problem using an instrumental variables analysis, have failed to fi nd much impact of contributions on roll call votes (Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder 2003, but see Stratmann 2005). In addition to influencing legislative voting patterns, campaign contributions may also redirect the attention and effort of legislators. Powell (2012) fi nds a relationship between campaign contributions and legislative activities based on her surveys of state legislators, and McKay (2018) shows that a senator is more likely to use the preferred language of lobbyists in legislation when the lobbyist hosts a fundraiser for that senator. Hall and Wayman’s (1990) work connects the dots between access and influence in arguing that US House members give more attention to legislation important to contributors, sometimes at the expense

Weak Link?

23

of issues that matter a great deal to their constituents. Wawro (2001), on the other hand, does not fi nd such evidence in his study of legislative entrepreneurship in the US House. Here too, the issue of endogeneity looms large since, for instance, contributors may give to legislators who are already sympathetic to their position on an issue—and active on that issue—in an effort to solidify those relationships. These lines of inquiry, however, beg the question: In a world without campaign contributions or fundraisers, would contributors still have the ear of legislators due to other resources at their disposal and, more generally, their incentive to be involved in the process? For instance, donors may have specialized knowledge about a topic and thereby provide legislators and staffers with a “legislative subsidy” by reducing their workload (Hall and Deardorff 2006). More generally, contributions could be a proxy for the provision of information that is intended to persuade. This certainly is a form of influence, but it is hardly on par with quid pro quo corruption. Influence need not be a dirty word. Still, limits on contributions introduce constraints into the optimization problem of political actors seeking access and influence. Whether those constraints bind (i.e., change strategies and outcomes in meaningful ways) is an empirical question. Witko (2017) shows that states with less restrictive limits on corporate campaign contributions have a larger ratio of business to labor groups, which he views as evidence of “upper class bias” in the system. Prabhat and Primo (2019) fi nd some evidence that the imposition of shareholder approval and greater disclosure of corporate political contributions in the United Kingdom hurt the value of politically active fi rms, suggesting that these fi rms’ strategies were constrained by the new regulations. On the other hand, Flavin (2014) fi nds that campaign contribution limits do not reduce the skew of statelevel policy decisions toward the opinions of higher-income residents. Of course, even if corruption is rare and the relationship between campaign contributions and policymaking is complex, the Supreme Court has held that even the appearance that money could be corrupting the process is sufficient to justify campaign contribution limits. This book subjects that holding to empirical scrutiny. Influence: Elections There is another way in which policy can be affected even if donors are not explicitly seeking policy influence: If campaign contributions alter

24

Chapter Two

who is in office, then they alter the distribution of preferences in the legislature (or the executive branch), which in turn produces different policy outcomes. In other words, if a donor can affect an election outcome, he or she may not need to do anything more to have an impact on public policy. While estimates differ across various studies, the effects of campaign spending on election outcomes are not nearly as large as commonly believed. There are diminishing returns to spending (i.e., the one-millionth dollar of campaign spending is less effective than the fi rst dollar), so in a typical competitive race, the marginal effects of spending will be small (see Milyo 2013 for an overview of the literature). Moreover, one recent study using forty-nine field experiments found that campaign spending has limited persuasive effects on voters, though the authors argue that reallocating spending toward other goals, such as the mobilization of existing supporters, may improve the efficacy of spending (Kalla and Broockman 2018). But if opponents are mobilizing their supporters, as well, it is easy to see how in equilibrium the marginal effects of spending could be negligible. (More research is needed to study the effects of campaign spending by outside groups such as super PACs.) Campaign fi nance laws may alter this equilibrium by affecting who can contribute—and in what amounts. Stratmann (2006) studies state lower house elections and fi nds that campaign contribution limits affect the productivity of campaign spending for both challengers and incumbents, though he is not able to control for unobserved features of states that may also affect election outcomes. Hall (2016) is able to control for such features, and he fi nds that corporate contribution bans increase the Democratic seat share in state legislatures. On the other hand, in joint work with Tim Groseclose, we do not fi nd that campaign fi nance laws confer a partisan electoral advantage in gubernatorial elections (Primo, Milyo, and Groseclose 2006). We do, however, fi nd that individual contribution limits narrow the winning margins in gubernatorial races, though this effect does not appear to be concentrated on close races (where winning margins are especially important). Stratmann and Aparicio- Castillo (2006) and Stratmann (2010), focusing on state legislative elections, also fi nd that individual contribution limits lead to smaller winning margins. Given these fi ndings, is there something to the argument that campaign fi nance laws, by altering the strategic calculus in elections, might improve attitudes toward government? The best science to date says no.

Weak Link?

25

Coleman and Manna (2000) fi nd no relationship between perceptions of government and campaign spending in US House races. And research on what is often viewed as the most pernicious use of campaign money— negative advertising—also has produced little evidence of harmful effects on attitudes toward government (see Fowler et al. 2016 for a review and Jackson, Mondak, and Huckfeldt 2009 for an example of a study in the literature). To be sure, there is room for more research on how specific changes to campaign fi nance laws influence election outcomes and whether Coleman and Manna’s fi ndings extend to outside spending (i.e., super PACs) or the sources of a candidate’s campaign funds (e.g., interest groups vs. individuals). Given that 75 percent of Americans believe the myth that “elections are for sale to the highest bidder,” it is difficult to see how reforms will alter perceptions of the process, especially when this myth is reinforced by the media and politicians in how they characterize the role money plays in elections. For example, a 2011 CNN / USA Today / Gallup poll asked respondents whether they agreed more with the statement “Elections are generally for sale to the candidate who can raise the most money” or, alternatively, “Elections are generally won on the basis of who is the best candidate.” 2 President Barack Obama, in a State of the Union address, argued, “I don’t think American elections should be bankrolled by America’s most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. They should be decided by the American people.”3 Having laid out the way in which scholars, journalists, judges, and reformers think about campaign fi nance, we now turn to showing why the theoretical connections proposed above are held together by weak links. We do so by using the tools of political economy to study the role of rules in structuring decision-making and focusing on the idea that a change in one set of rules will propagate through a system and produce reactions that must be accounted for in institutional analyses (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999).

The Hydraulic Theory of Influence The belief that campaign fi nance reform will reduce or eliminate the power of “special interests” is central to reform efforts. If the amounts or sources of money in the political system are limited, the argument goes, then interests that rely on that money to gain access and, ultimately, in-

26

Chapter Two

fluence will be stopped in their tracks. For campaign fi nance reform to work as intended, it needs to be the case that (a) those interests would not fi nd other ways to secure access and (b) the reform does not increase the power of other “special interests” whose ability to obtain access is based on factors besides campaign contributions. In other words, to use the language of economics, one must assume that if campaign money from interest groups is removed from the political system, there will be no substitutes for campaign contributions available to affected interests, and other interests will not take advantage of changes in the resources available to opponents.4 Neither scenario is likely. Interest groups restricted from using campaign contributions in the access and influence market will either fi nd that they have other resources at their disposal (say, jobs in a congressional district, relationships with lobbyists), or they may lose out to interests that are able to secure access through other means (say, labor unions who can promise to help get out the vote using volunteers). Campaign finance restrictions may also give more power to the media (Smith 2001). While not an interest group in the traditional sense, the media through its news coverage and its editorial positions can affect policy. As a thought experiment, consider a world with full public fi nancing and no campaign contributions to candidates or even outside spending independent of candidates. In such a world, will corporations and unions stand by while their influence wanes, or will their political strategies evolve to account for new rules? Suppose, even, that some interests lose relative power. This implies that other interests will gain power. Reformers like to believe that these interests will better reflect the will of the people, but for reasons we discuss below, we are doubtful. Thus far, we primarily have focused on the demand side of the access and influence market, with elected officials as the suppliers. But we can also consider the demand side for campaign resources, with politicians as the demanders and contributors as the suppliers. Politicians will still seek out campaign resources even if limits are placed on fundraising, because their ultimate goal is not fundraising but reelection and the power associated with holding office. Restricting fundraising further (constraining supply), therefore, may lead politicians to spend more time fundraising, among other unintended consequences (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999). The hydraulic theory of campaign fi nance (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999) can narrowly be construed as saying that if you try to push money

Weak Link?

27

out of the political system, it will fi nd its way back in. But focusing solely on money in the system misses the larger hydraulics of influence—any attempt to limit money will propagate throughout the system: “Political money, like water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air. Second, we think political money, like water, is part of a broader ecosystem. Understanding why it flows where it does and what functions it serves when it gets there requires thinking about the system as a whole.” (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999, 1708). It may be more useful, then, to consider a hydraulic theory of influence rather than a hydraulic theory of campaign fi nance; money, in other words, is but one means for influencing the US political system. 5 Campaign fi nance researchers discuss “substitution effects” whereby restrictions lead political actors to “shift resources into other forms of political advocacy and association” (Sullivan 1998, 312). This resource-shifting affects not just how elections are fought but also what happens after the dust settles, once the election is over. Much ink has been spilled, for instance, on how Citizens United, which loosened restrictions on independent spending by corporations while maintaining restrictions on direct contributions to candidates, has empowered independent groups at the expense of political parties (Persily, Bauer, and Ginsberg 2018). Weaker political parties affect the nature of the policymaking process, making it more difficult to craft legislative agreements. Whether weaker parties are a positive or a negative is open to debate, but they are an excellent example of the unintended consequences of reform. The hydraulic theory of influence extends beyond campaign fi nance reform. Consider, for instance, another perennial on the reform agenda: legislative term limits. By limiting how long elected officials can hold office, the argument goes, they will better represent their constituents because they are not “career politicians” focused on fundraising and amassing power. Improved perceptions of government will follow. Things haven’t turned out as planned. Cain and Noll (2009, 1525, 1540) argue that term limits “have weakened legislative leadership and undermined the expertise and oversight capacities of legislative committees,” especially in California, where legislative term limits have “shifted power from the legislature to the executive and increased lobbyists’ influence on the legislative process.” Miller, Nicholson- Crotty, and Nicholson- Crotty (2011) fi nd that term limits have increased the influence of interest groups in several states—

28

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which hardly seems like a recipe for improving perceptions of government, at least if we take seriously reformers’ fears about interest group influence. Meanwhile, we are aware of no published papers establishing that legislative term limits are associated with improved perceptions of government. These fi ndings regarding campaign fi nance and term limits also highlight the challenges of predicting the effects of changing a single law or rule in a complex institutional environment. Primo (2007, 14) discusses “institutional interactions” whereby “a new rule interacts with an existing set of institutional arrangements,” sometimes producing unexpected effects on an outcome of interest. Writing on campaign fi nance, Hall (2019, 65) notes, “Most reforms have many unintended consequences. It is difficult to create a reform that isolates only a single factor.” Modeling this interdependence in politics is very challenging, so it should be no surprise that attempts to model changes in campaign finance rules using game theory have reached different conclusions depending on the assumptions and structure of the models. For example, Coate (2004), in a model where interest groups attempt to curry favor with candidates and candidates use campaign funds to inform voters about their qualifications, fi nds that campaign contribution limits combined with public campaign fi nancing (with matching funds) benefit society. On the other hand, Ashworth (2006) fi nds that the effect of public financing with matching funds on voter welfare depends on the size of the incumbency advantage in the election, and Meirowitz (2008) fi nds that contribution limits tend to benefit candidates with other advantages (i.e., incumbents, typically). Moreover, changes in the rules can sometimes alter the larger institutional and strategic environment. For instance, if contributions were previously used as signals in a signaling model, a contribution ban would typically be assumed to prevent such signaling. But an interest group may be able to send a signal in some other way. Changes in campaign fi nance laws may alter the strategies of interest groups, but they will not eliminate the incentive to influence policy. As suggested by the paper title “A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger,” if a larger government creates more winners and more losers, it should not be surprising that there will be more intense efforts to affect the process (Lott 2000). Determining the relationship between campaign spending and the size of government is challenging, but the intuition is clear.6

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As Gehl and Porter (2017, 6– 7) write, “Diminishing the influence of money alone cannot be expected to transform our political system. The real answer is to dramatically reduce the attractive return on investment that donors currently receive.” While there is a robust academic debate about whether political spending, especially by business interests, produces a positive return on investment (Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov 2010; Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang 2012; Stratmann and Verret 2015), there is little doubt that corporations and other economic interests have strong incentives to grab a seat at the table in the policy process, lest they “be on the menu,” as the old saw goes. Any “solution” to the “problem” of money in politics will, ultimately, be partial. So long as there are disagreements in the political process, interests will seek influence over it. That influence could be viewed as benign (the staff member working hard to implement the public policy he believes will help a state or the country, based on information given to him by an interest group) or malign (the cigar- chomping lobbyist pressuring a staffer to insert a line favorable to his client but harmful to the nation’s fisc in a piece of legislation).

There Is No “Will of the People” An underlying assumption in the discussion thus far is that outcomes in the current system skew away from what the public wants. In other words, to the extent that campaign contributions have the effect of producing policy A rather than B, money has “distorted” the policy process. Samples (2006, 101) notes that the “distortion standard” enshrined in a since overturned Supreme Court decision, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,7 “makes the will of the people—as measured by current surveys—the benchmark for assessing corruption.” He fi nds this approach problematic because of the implication that “any policy that runs counter to that majoritarian preference distorts the political process” (2006, 102). Burke (1997, 49) fi nds the decision concerning because it expands the notion of corruption so much that it loses all meaning: “Austin’s proclamation that the political system is corrupted when campaign contributions don’t mirror public opinion cannot be maintained. ‘Corruption’ will be drained of meaning if it becomes a mere synonym for ‘inequality.’”8 Burke and Samples are correct, but the problem goes beyond simply

30

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favoring majoritarianism. The notion that reducing the power of moneyed interests will lead to better government (and, in turn, increased trust in government) often relies on a particular conception of what constitutes “good public policy.” As an example, former US labor secretary Robert Reich, now a professor at the University of California at Berkeley, argues in a blog post and accompanying video that to increase economic opportunity, it is necessary to enact policies such as a $15 minimum wage, “free” public higher education, and an expansion of Social Security. He then writes, “But none of these is possible if we don’t get big money out of politics. In fact, nothing we need to do as a nation is possible unless we limit the political power of the moneyed interests.”9 “We must not,” he writes elsewhere, “let them buy our democracy” (Reich 2017, 18). We use Reich as an illustration to demonstrate how these ideas are communicated to the public, since public perceptions play a significant role in justifying the existence of campaign fi nance restrictions. But we can also fi nd well-respected political scientists who make similar claims in their scholarship. In a recent study claiming that policy outcomes more closely match the preferences of the wealthy than the general public, Page and Gilens (2017, 278) identify “money gone wild” as one of the “defects in the political system” responsible for the “feeble state of democracy.” These arguments are grounded in the belief that the will of the people cannot be realized due to money’s taint. A Google search containing both the terms campaign fi nance and will of the people pointed us to over one hundred thousand webpages when we conducted the search in mid-2019. References to these phrases are not relegated to obscure corners of the internet. For instance, in a 2011 dissent on a campaign fi nance case regarding the public funding of elections, Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan wrote, “It is the law struck down today that fostered both the vigorous competition of ideas and its ultimate object—a government responsive to the will of the people.”10 In his dissenting opinion in a 2014 case regarding aggregate contribution limits, Justice Stephen Breyer invoked “the will of the people” (quoting a previous decision) and wrote, “Where enough money calls the tune, the general public will not be heard.”11 The implausibility of this rationale would be unremarkable—many fantastical arguments are made in the realm of politics—if beliefs about distortions of the democratic process were not at the heart of the justifi-

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cations for campaign fi nance laws.12 The reality, though, is that reforms will not get us to a policy nirvana. To see why, we need to discuss the roots of what is known as social choice theory, which studies the ways in which voting rules affect policy outcomes for a fi xed set of preferences. Social choice models typically take individual preferences as given and aggregate them into a collective choice. One of the most famous results in social choice theory is Arrow’s Theorem, which states that if a “social welfare function” (i.e., voting rule) satisfies some fairly uncontroversial conditions, then that voting rule produces a set of policy outcomes matching the preferences of a single person (a “dictator”), regardless of the preferences of all others in the group (Arrow 1963). Arrow’s Theorem is the starting point for thousands of research papers seeking to understand the properties of voting rules. One line of research categorizes voting rules based on whether they satisfy certain desirable properties, especially in the context of elections. For instance, Dasgupta and Maskin (2008) argue that majority rule, despite failing to meet the transitivity requirement of Arrow’s Theorem, is “the most robust voting rule” in that it meets conditions very similar to Arrow’s for the largest set of possible preference orderings. Others have made the case for approval voting, which allows voters to cast a ballot for as many candidates as they wish in an election, with the candidate receiving the most votes being the victor (Brams and Fishburn 1978). Posner and Weyl (2015) advocate for quadratic voting, where individuals can cast multiple votes for the same alternative, but at a cost, allowing for intense minorities to overcome the preferences of majorities (unless the majorities are either very large or intense). The very fact that the voting systems just discussed, all of which can fairly be called democratic, have the potential to produce different results for the same set of preferences demonstrates that there is no will of the people. Game theory adds to the study of voting rules by helping us understand how strategic interactions and institutional complexity mediate the role of rules in influencing outcomes. Arrow’s Theorem considers social welfare functions that translate a set of individual preferences into a ranked group choice, but voters do not vote strategically in this hypothetical world. Moreover, there are no strategic agenda setters determining the order of votes, and as anybody who has been to a meeting knows, how the agenda is structured can often determine the outcome

32

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(McKelvey 1976). Game theoretic models also allow for the endogenous, strategic selection of institutional features like the fi libuster or committees, which can further affect outcomes. Shepsle (1979) shows that a unique policy outcome (“a structure-induced equilibrium”) can result from imposing institutional constraints on decision-making in situations where an equilibrium might otherwise not exist (see also McKelvey 1976). Shepsle’s work highlights the importance of rules—after all, a different institutional configuration may very well produce a different structure-induced equilibrium. What does it mean, then, to assert that money in politics “distorts” policy? Relative to what? One can impose a particular standard, of course—for instance, economic efficiency, majoritarianism, or adherence to a particular property of a voting rule, such as transitivity—but these standards are subject to great debate. Should the United States eliminate the Electoral College? Should the US Senate maintain the fi libuster? Should representation in the US House shift to multimember districts? These are all important questions, but the answers depend on one’s vision for democracy—and in beliefs about how these rules will affect policy outcomes. They are, in essence, debates over what “the will of the people” should mean. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the rules of the game will be made by benevolent beings who just want to divine this true will. Instead, they will be proposed and voted on by individuals with preferences. Even if one could construct optimal campaign fi nance laws that have the effects reformers hope for, the discussion thus far gives us no reason to believe that such optimal laws would emerge out of the legislative process. In fact, skeptics of reform efforts fear that campaign fi nance laws often amount to incumbent protection acts. Even the initiative process at the state level, which tends to increase the consistency of policies with public opinion because voters are allowed to cast binding votes directly on an issue (Matsusaka 2018), has not, in general, had much effect on the design of election laws, with direct democracy amounting to “largely a sideshow in electoral reform” (Matsusaka 2006, 154). Matsusaka (2018, 132– 34) reviews the existing literature, including papers focused on campaign finance, and fi nds the results to be “inconclusive,” with the exception of term limits. To be sure, the will of the people may be a useful phrase in the context of whether an election identifies a clear winner under accepted procedures. (The people have spoken is another example.) But those who use

Weak Link?

33

it in the context of campaign fi nance mean something very different, as the illustrations above show. In addition, we encourage further study of who wins and who loses in the policy process under alternative institutional arrangements—having done research of this type ourselves. For instance, does the ideal point of the median voter in a district tend to determine a representative’s vote? How do corporate strategies shape public policy? But seeking to understand why outcomes deviate from specific policy targets (such as universal health care) or generalized principles (such as policies reflecting the preferences of the majority) is different from claiming that any such deviation denies the will of the people. And it is worlds apart from arguing that campaign fi nance rules are needed to reduce policy distortions and that doing so will improve perceptions of government.

We Are All Corrupt Now Thus far, our focus on corruption has centered on the quid pro quo variety articulated in Buckley and the distortion rationale in Austin. But these are just two ways to conceptualize corruption. Harvard Law professor Lawrence Lessig (2011, 7) advocates for a broader view of corruption—what he calls dependence corruption, which has at its root a belief that the entire system is “infected” and that we would have different policies if we stamp out corruption: The great threat today is instead in plain sight. It is the economy of influence now transparent to all, which has normalized a process that draws our democracy away from the will of the people. A process that distorts our democracy from ends sought by both the Left and the Right: For the single most salient feature of the government that we have evolved is not that it discriminates in favor of one side and against the other. The single most salient feature is that it discriminates against all sides to favor itself. We have created an engine of influence that seeks not some particular strand of political or economic ideology, whether Marx or Hayek. We have created instead an engine of influence that seeks simply to make those most connected rich.

The consequence? “When democracy seems a charade, we lose faith in its process” (Lessig 2011, 7). As a result, Lessig does not want to muddy the reform waters with additional motivations such as equality. Instead,

34

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the “only aim [of campaign fi nance reform] should be to end corruption” (2011, 240). We hear echoes of dependence corruption in the claims made by reformers such as Fred Wertheimer: “The corruption in the U.S. does not stem from officeholders putting money in their pocket. . . . This is systemic corruption of the process itself. When you are dealing with billions and billions of dollars, much of that focused on buying influence, it overwhelms the system, and it is much harder to defend against and maintain representation for ordinary Americans.”13 Lessig, Wertheimer, and others up the ante for campaign fi nance reform, as now it needs to address the wholesale rot of the system. Lessig (2011, 244), like many others, is worried about “distortions.” The act of buying political speech, if “procuring it or inspiring it to be spent requires distortion in the work of government,” is a justification for cynicism. But he also worries about just how bad politics looks these days: “attitudes don’t follow logic alone,” so “it is perfectly plausible that an individual would look at our current system and lose faith in that system” (2011, 244). Taken to its logical conclusion, Lessig’s argument could be used to justify nearly all restrictions on free expression if things just look bad. But politics is not all puppies and rainbows. Politics is about confl ict, and today we have profound disagreements about the direction in which the country should head. These disagreements, while perhaps nastier than in previous years, are long-standing. Moreover, the public’s distaste for politics is not new, nor did Citizens United appear to do much to change those perceptions, at least in the aggregate. (Recall figure 1.2 from chapter 1 showing that trust in American government was largely unaffected by the Citizens United decision.) Lessig believes that the dependence of elected officials on money from a narrow slice of the American public is the cause of Americans’ despair. We believe that suspicion of money is a symptom of that despair: “Money is only one symptom of a deeper problem that requires addressing more fundamental pieces of our political culture and institutions” (Issacharoff and Karlan 1999, 1718). Scholars like Lessig have broadened the defi nition of corruption so much that it encompasses all of those aspects of politics that we fi nd distasteful, thereby holding government up to an impossible standard. There is a paradox here. By defi ning corruption so broadly, it takes a massive leap of faith to believe that campaign fi nance reform will rad-

Weak Link?

35

ically alter perceptions of corruption. On the other hand, the broader one’s defi nition of corruption, the easier it is to justify restricting speech rights in order to limit “the appearance of corruption.” In critiquing Justice Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion in Austin, Burke writes, “Marshall’s opinion suggests that in his ideal state expenditures are calibrated to actual public support. A deviation from this constitutes corruption and may be regulated. Because just about any private fi nancing scheme is likely to have ‘distortions’—to not reflect underlying public support—Marshall’s principle would justify very strong regulatory measures. Indeed it is difficult to square Marshall’s principle with any system of private fi nancing for political campaigns” (1997, 135). It’s no coincidence that public fi nancing is held up as the Holy Grail of campaign fi nance for many reformers. In subsequent chapters, we will show that Lessig is correct about the public’s disdain for politics, with many Americans sharing his broadbased view of corruption. But unlike Lessig, most Americans are skeptical that campaign fi nance reform will have much effect on politics.14 On the other hand, as we will see in chapter 7, experts are more optimistic about the possibilities for reform. While the remainder of this book is empirical, many of Lessig’s claims about the expansive public fi nancing systems he has in mind are (for now) untestable. But given what we know about the pathologies of democratic decision-making, we are dubious that the nature of politics will be fundamentally altered by campaign fi nance reform.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have built a theoretical foundation for our argument that the nature of democratic politics makes it unlikely that campaign finance reform is going to reduce the appearance of corruption in American politics or otherwise improve perceptions of government—a key facet of the Supreme Court’s justification for upholding the constitutionality of existing laws. Money does not “buy” or “distort” elections or policy, and changes to campaign fi nance rules, while possibly altering the methods by which interests attempt to influence policy, are not going to eliminate the underlying confl icts in our society. Because there is no such thing as the will of the people, the notion of campaign fi nance as “distorting” politics

36

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requires a normative benchmark—the selection of which itself will be the subject of political disagreement and conflict. This hardly seems like a recipe for improving perceptions of government. Or maybe we are completely wrong. While we believe we have made a compelling theoretical argument in this chapter, the purported relationship between public perceptions and campaign finance is, ultimately, an empirical claim. And that is where we turn for the remainder of this book, starting with what the public knows about money in politics.

Chapter Three

The Uninformed Public

T

he public is woefully misinformed about campaign fi nance, and it has been for years. For example, a 1997 survey found that only 4 percent of Americans were aware that corporations cannot contribute directly to the campaigns of candidates for president and Congress (Mayer 2001; Primo 2002). In that same survey, nearly 90 percent of respondents answered fewer than three of five factual questions correctly (Primo 2002). Fast-forward to surveys conducted soon after the Citizens United decision was handed down, and not much has changed: in a 2012 survey, a majority of respondents answered incorrectly or “don’t know” to all six questions about campaign fi nance law as applied to corporations as well as to four of six questions as applied to individuals (Dowling and Miller 2014). These are not impressive showings. The fi ndings from our 2015 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) questions reveal that the public is still woefully uninformed about money in politics. We subdivided the regulatory structure into disclosure, spending limits, and contribution limits, and we asked additional questions regarding political privacy and super PACs. In this chapter, we’ll dig into our fi ndings and use regression analysis to study the factors that determine differentials in knowledge across the population. But before you read further, we encourage you to take the quiz in figure 3.1 and see how well you do compared to our survey respondents. Not a single respondent answered all of the questions in figure 3.1 correctly, and overall, respondents scored well below what would be expected from random guessing. How do you measure up to the American public?

Figure 3.1 Campaign Finance Knowledge Quiz (Including Super PAC and Privacy QuesƟons) InstrucƟons: Answer all of the following quesƟons, giving yourself 1 point for each correct answer (see answers at the end of the quiz.) The total number of possible points is 22. The expected score for guessing randomly on all quesƟŽns is approximately 10 points. The average performance in the 2016 CCES on these quesƟons with the same point allocaƟons as below was 6 points. 1. (1 point) Do you know approximately how large a contribuƟon to a candidate for federal oĸce has to be in order to trigger disclosure requirements? __________ (enter amount in $) 2. (5 points) Do you know what kind of informaƟŽn must be disclosed about contributors to candidates for federal oĸce? Mark all that apply. _____ amount of contribuƟon _____ name of contributor _____ address of contributor _____ union membership _____ name of contributor’s employer _____ none of the above 3. (1 point) True or False: In nearly all cases, it is against the law for a company to Įre an employee because of his or her poliƟcal views. 4. (1 point) True or False: It is against the law for company oĸcials to search government databases for the purpose of learning whether employees have made contribuƟons to parƟĐƵůar poliƟĐĂl campaigns. 5. (1 point) True or False: It is a violaƟon of federal privacy laws for people to search public databases to see whether their neighbors have contributed to parƟcular poliƟĐĂl campaigns. 6. (4 points) Under current law, do you think the federal government limits contribuƟŽns made by individuals to the following groups? Place each opƟon a.-d. into the appropriate category below. a. b. c. d.

Candidates for federal oĸce NaƟonal poliƟĐĂl parƟes PoliƟĐĂů acƟon commiƩees that contribute directly to federal candidates PoliƟĐĂů groups that independently support or oppose federal candidates

________ Yes ________ No

Figure 3.1. Campaign fi nance knowledge quiz (including super PAC and privacy questions)

The Uninformed Public

39

7. (5 points) Under current law, does the federal government limit the following acƟviƟes? Place each opƟŽn a.-e. into the appropriate category below. a. b. c. d. e.

The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate for federal oĸce Candidates for federal oĸce using personal funds for their campaigns ContribuƟons by poliƟcal parƟes to aĸůŝated candidates for federal oĸce ContribuƟons by poliƟĐĂl groups made directly to candidates for federal oĸĐĞ Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate for federal oĸĐe

________ Yes ________ No 8. (3 points) Under current law, do you think [the federal] government limits/prohibits the following types of poůŝƟĐĂl acƟviƟes by corporaƟons and unions? Place each opƟon a.-c. into the appropriate category below. a. ContribuƟons made directly to candidates b. ContribuƟons to groups that independently support or oppose candidates c. Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate _____ Prohibits _____ Limits _____ Does not limit 9. (1 point) Approximately $6 billion was spent by candidates, parƟes and other poliƟcal groups on the 2016 PresidenƟĂů and Congressional elecƟon. About what percent of this total do you think was spent by super PACs? __________ (enter percentage between 0 and 100)

Answers: 1. $200 (we accept as correct answers of $1,000 or less); 2. 1 point each for marking amount, name, address, employer; 1 point for not marking union membership; 3. false; 4. false; 5. false; 6. yes: a, b, c no: d; 7. yes: c, d no: a, b, e; 8. prohibits: a, does not limit: b, c; 9. approximately 16% (we accept as correct answers of 30% or less)

The Rationally Ignorant Public How did you do on the quiz? If the answer is “not so well,” don’t feel bad. There are good reasons people shouldn’t be expected to have encyclopedic knowledge about politics. Over sixty years ago, Anthony Downs (1957) introduced the concept of rational ignorance to explain

40

Chapter Three

why voters have little incentive to gather information about candidates, and his argument extends to knowledge about politics more broadly. Here is the basic logic: If a voter is a staunch partisan, then gathering information about candidates is unnecessary, since doing so is unlikely to cause the voter to switch allegiances. If a voter is on the fence between two candidates, then gathering information is unlikely to be worthwhile, since altering the outcome isn’t very important to the voter. As a result, an investment in making the “correct” choice is outweighed by the costs of searching for information. It gets worse. This logic implicitly assumes that one’s vote will affect who wins the election, which is nearly always untrue. Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) show that because the probability of being “pivotal” in an election is typically vanishingly small (approximating 0 in an election with many voters), rarely is it instrumentally rational to gather information about, and vote in, most elections. Similarly, it is unlikely that a single citizen will be “pivotal” in altering public policies. It is therefore not a great logical leap to conclude that citizens have little rational basis for becoming invested in the details of most public policy areas, including campaign fi nance. This rational ignorance hypothesis is aligned with the well- established fact that Americans are poorly informed about politics. In a classic study, Michael Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter (1996) conducted a comprehensive review of thousands of survey questions over several decades, establishing that public knowledge of politics is limited, albeit with considerable variation across questions. For instance, in 1978, 71 percent of Americans knew that Democrats controlled the US House, but only 17 percent knew the percentage of the federal budget devoted to health care (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 74, 81). We see similar variation today. Just about half of respondents in our 2015 and 2016 CCES surveys knew that Republicans controlled both chambers of Congress in those years, but only about a third of respondents in the 2016 American National Election Study1 knew that John Roberts was the chief justice of the Supreme Court, even when provided with his name and asked his current position. 2 And in another recent poll, fewer than 20 percent of respondents were aware that foreign aid constituted 5 percent or less of the federal budget. 3 But is it reasonable to expect that voters should have high levels of knowledge about public affairs? We take seriously Lupia’s (2006) concern that political scientists’ focus on detailed knowledge questions is

The Uninformed Public

41

unfair as a measure of the public’s understanding of politics. Perhaps the share of federal spending devoted to foreign aid is more like a trivia question than essential knowledge for being an informed citizen. Lupia and others have argued that citizens can often make “correct” political choices with cues such as party labels. The important debate about the consequences of political knowledge, or lack thereof, on the quality of democratic decision-making (e.g., Wittman 1995; Caplan 2007; Achen and Bartels 2016) is relevant to the argument in this book, albeit with a twist. As we noted in chapter 1, campaign fi nance is sine qua non among political issues because public perceptions about the role money plays in American politics form the basis for judicial decisions in this area. Consequently, public ignorance of campaign fi nance and its regulation matters because of how that ignorance may shape perceptions of the American political system and the role money plays in the political process and because, in turn, these attitudes are critical inputs for judicial decision-making relating to money in politics. In other words, factually incorrect information may ultimately be shaping the foundational rules of democracy. Not only, then, does public ignorance about money in politics potentially feed cynicism about the quality of our democracy, but it also provides the rationale for stricter regulation of political activity. There is an implicit contradiction here as well: If Americans are largely unaware of existing restrictions on money in politics, then how can campaign finance reform have any meaningful impact on public perceptions about the American political system? The fact that reforms emerge out of public ignorance implies that these same reforms may not work in practice (at least if the purpose of campaign fi nance regulation is to improve public perceptions about politics—which it is, according to the Supreme Court). In chapter 8, we put this idea to the test and examine whether changes in campaign fi nance laws influence trust in government.

Constructing the Campaign Finance Knowledge Score In both the 2015 and postelection 2016 CCES, we asked respondents the same seventeen factual questions regarding federal campaign fi nance law. We award 1 point for each correct answer and construct a knowledge score out of 17 possible points. (The seventeen questions are a subset of the quiz questions in figure 3.1; we discuss the other questions,

Chapter Three

42

regarding privacy and super PACs, later in the chapter.) The complete text of all questions discussed in this chapter appears in appendix B. The questions focus on the basics of the law, not its intricacies—there are no trick questions. For instance, we ask whether contributions are limited by federal law, but we do not ask respondents to state the maximum permissible contribution amount in cases where limits exist. We ask whether independent expenditures are legal, but we do not ask for details about what is considered a coordinated expenditure for the purpose of determining whether an ad paid for by a super PAC is independent of a campaign. Disclosure (5 Points) We defi ne disclosure as the government-mandated collection and provision of information related to campaign contributions or spending that is then made available to the public. Our survey questions focus on only the most basic facts about federal campaign fi nance disclosure. Once a contributor meets the federal disclosure threshold of $200 to a single candidate for federal office in a single election cycle, the following information must be collected and made public by the campaign: the date and amount of the contribution as well as the contributor’s name, mailing address, employer, and occupation.4 We ask respondents which of the following—name, address, amount, employer, and union membership—is required to be disclosed. 5 Correct answers are each worth 1 point. Limits on Contributions (9 Points) Campaign contributions, by defi nition, involve two entities: the contributor and the recipient. We categorize our questions around contributors, with recipients italicized. We ask four questions about individuals as contributors, two questions about corporations and unions as contributors, and one question each about self-funded candidates, political parties as contributors, and other political groups as contributors. Again, correct answers are each worth 1 point. • Individuals as contributors (4 points): Individuals may contribute a limited amount to candidates for federal offi ce, national political parties, and political action committees (PACs) that contribute directly to federal candidates

The Uninformed Public

43

and an unlimited amount to political groups that independently support candidates for federal offi ce. • Corporations and unions as contributors (2 points): Corporations and unions are prohibited from making contributions directly to candidates for federal offi ce, but they are permitted to make contributions to groups that independently support or oppose a candidate for federal offi ce.6 • Political parties as contributors (1 point): Political parties may contribute a limited amount of money to candidates for federal offi ce. • Candidates as self-funding contributors (1 point): Candidates may contribute an unlimited amount of money to their own campaigns for federal offi ce. • Political groups as contributors (1 point): Political groups such as political action committees (PACs) may contribute a limited amount of money to candidates for federal offi ce.

Limits on Spending (3 Points) Our surveys also ask about political expenditures related to advocacy for or against the election of a candidate to federal office (“electioneering spending”). Once again, correct answers are each worth 1 point. • Candidates may spend an unlimited amount of money on campaigns for federal office. • Political groups that act independently of candidate campaigns may spend an unlimited amount of money to support or oppose candidates for federal office. • Corporations and unions may spend an unlimited amount of money in independent support or opposition to a candidate for federal office.

The Campaign Finance Knowledge Score: Randomness Reigns A simple criterion for assessing performance on these questions is to ask how much better respondents do compared with random guessing. This benchmark is akin to the famous suggestion that fi nancial experts will do no better than chance when picking stocks due to the randomness of

44

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stock price movements, or as Malkiel (1973, 16) describes it, “A blindfolded monkey throwing darts at the newspaper’s fi nancial pages could select a portfolio that would do just as well as one carefully selected by the experts.” The Wall Street Journal did just this for many years. We didn’t seek the necessary approvals to have a monkey throw darts—or anything else, for that matter—at our survey, but we can just as easily assess what random guessing would look like by calculating the expected score for answering each question with a coin fl ip (or in the case of the questions that had three options, rolling a three-sided die). Calculated this way, and assuming respondents try to answer every question (i.e., never respond “don’t know”), the expected score on these knowledge questions is eight out of seventeen correct, or just under 50 percent. The actual performance of respondents, whether we use the mean or the median, is five out of seventeen correct, or 29 percent. Even if we remove the “don’t know” responses or skipped questions from the calculations (42 percent of replies were either a skip or a “don’t know”) and consider only attempted questions, respondents still performed essentially no better than chance.7 Survey respondents answered 51 percent of attempted questions correctly compared to the 48 percent performance expected from random guessing (factoring in the number of choices in a given question as well as which questions were attempted). 8 There are few standout “students” in this class of Americans. Only 1 of 3,558 respondents correctly answered all seventeen questions comprising the knowledge score, but even this star student didn’t correctly answer the question about super PAC spending (discussed later in the chapter). Only about 1 percent of respondents answered thirteen or more questions correctly. By contrast, 1 in 6 respondents answered none of the questions correctly, and over half answered five or fewer questions correctly. Figure 3.2 presents the entire performance distribution. Digging further into the results, we subdivide the questions by category. The average respondent performed the worst on the disclosure questions (23 percent correct) and the best on questions regarding limits on individual contributions (37 percent correct). For both the disclosure questions and the questions about limits on spending, the median number of correct answers is zero; for limits on individual contributions, the median is one correct answer out of four; and for limits on contributions by nonindividuals, the median is two correct answers out of five. Table 3.1 summarizes the results by question, with subscores by question group.

Figure 3.2. Performance on the campaign fi nance quiz, 2015–16 Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 3,558.

Ta ble 3.1 Knowledge of campaign fi nance regulations, 2015–16

Question

Correct answer

% answering correctly

% answering incorrectly

% providing no answer

Disclosure requirements Amount contributed Name of contributor Address Employer Union membership Disclosure (avg)

Yes Yes Yes Yes No

32.9 29.9 8.7 9.5 33.2 22.8

8.4 11.4 32.6 31.8 8.1 18.5

58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7 58.7

Campaign spending limits Candidates Super PACs (independent) Corporations and unions (independent) Campaign spending (avg)

Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited

38.7 33.7 24.6 32.3

28.1 29.0 38.3 31.8

33.1 37.2 37.1 35.8

Individual contribution limits Individual giving to candidates Individual giving to parties Individual giving to PACs Individual giving to super PACs Individual contributions (avg)

Limited Limited Limited Unlimited

43.3 34.9 34.4 35.4 37.0

26.4 33.1 32.5 31.3 30.8

30.3 31.9 33.1 33.3 32.2

Other contribution limits Candidate giving to own campaign Parties to candidates PACs to candidates Corporations and unions to candidates Corporations and unions to super PACs Other contributions (avg)

Unlimited Limited Limited Prohibited Unlimited

42.9 30.3 34.0 8.5 25.1 28.2

23.6 29.7 26.3 56.0 36.8 34.5

33.6 40.0 39.7 35.5 38.1 37.4

29.4

28.4

42.2

Total averages Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 3,558.

Chapter Three

46 Ta ble 3.2 Campaign fi nance knowledge by group, 2015–16 Group All respondents 2016 respondents Politically knowledgeable College degree or higher Interested in politics Politically active on social media (2016 only) Politically active (2016 only)

N

% correct within group

3,558 1,592 1,904 1,106 1,712 301 105

29.4 30.6 34.6 36.0 36.1 37.6 48.0

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights.

Table 3.2 presents the performance for groups that we might think would do better than others, such as the college educated, individuals who are interested in politics, or respondents in an election year. The best performing group was individuals who exhibited high levels of political activity in 2016. This group answered nearly half of the questions correctly—far above the 29 percent rate for all respondents but still about the same performance as could be expected of our hypothetical monkey.

What Explains Knowledge of Campaign Finance? The results presented so far do not allow us to account for multiple individual traits in understanding performance, so we now utilize regression analysis to help us identify which factors are driving respondents’ knowledge. Our dependent variable of interest is CF knowledge, which measures the number of correct answers for each respondent compared with what would be expected under random guessing. We construct this measure by rewarding correct answers, penalizing incorrect answers, and treating nonresponses or “don’t know” replies as neither helping nor hurting one’s score.9 If we simply add the number of correct answers to construct the measure, then an individual who guesses on a question or tends to be overconfident will do better on that question, in expectation, than somebody who answers “don’t know.” Our approach gives an individual who guesses at each question an expected score of 0, which is identical to the score of somebody who answers “don’t know” to each question. The measure CF knowledge ranges from −8 (attempting all seventeen questions and getting them all wrong) to 9 (attempting all seventeen

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questions and answering them all correctly) and, based on actual performance, has a minimum value of −6 and a maximum value of 9. (This asymmetry in the potential range is due to the varying number of answer options in the questions; see note 9 for further details.) Our independent variables account for demographics (race, gender, age, education, and income), party identification, ideology, political knowledge, and political interest. We also include an indicator variable for 2016 to examine whether respondents are more knowledgeable in an election year. All specifications include state fi xed effects and standard errors clustered by state. Details on the methodology we use in chapters 3 through 6, as well as more information on these variables, appear in appendix A. Column (1) of table 3.3 reports the results for 2015 and 2016 combined. (In the remainder of the book, we primarily focus our attention on how political variables affect perceptions, while still controlling for demographic factors. We show all of the results here to highlight which demographic variables we use in the book.) The typical respondent’s knowledge level is lower in an election year, though the effect is substantively negligible. Income has a positive effect on performance, age has  no effect, gender has a negative effect, and the effects of race are mixed. Surprisingly, education does not affect campaign fi nance knowledge in a meaningful way. While there are some statistically significant differences between individuals of different educational backgrounds, any such differences are substantively modest. For instance, a respondent with a high school degree does worse than a respondent with a graduate degree by about 0.6 points, which is less than half of a standard deviation in the dependent variable. The results are similarly modest for political views and affi liations. Compared with independents, the baseline category in the regressions, liberals and conservatives do slightly better on the quiz, while Republicans do worse. There are no statistically significant differences between Democrats and Republicans or liberals and conservatives in their performance on the quiz. Even an interest in politics and general political knowledge barely move the needle on knowledge of campaign fi nance laws. Individuals who exhibit high levels of political interest increase their score by 0.4 points compared with those at lower levels of interest. Being knowledgeable about politics is associated with an improvement of 0.2 points.

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Ta ble 3.3 Campaign fi nance knowledge, 2015–16, regression results (1) 2015 and 2016 Politically active Social media usage News consumption Political interest Political knowledge Democrat Republican Liberal Conservative Female Black Hispanic Other race High school degree Some college Four-year college degree Graduate/professional degree Log age Log family income Income missing Year = 2016 State fi xed effects R2 N

.46*** (.05) .24*** (.06) −.01 (.06) −.14** (.07) .15** (.07) .12** (.04) −.19*** (.05) −.32*** (.08) −.13** (.06) .10 (.09) −.19 (.12) −.01 (.12) .18 (.15) .40** (.18) −.04 (.07) .05* (.03) .63* (.32) −.08* (.05) Y .09 3,557

(2) 2016 only .76*** (.17) .16 (.12) .11 (.10) .35*** (.09) .21*** (.07) −.04 (.08) −.05 (.10) .13 (.10) .13 (.11) −.23** (.10) −.12 (.16) −.09 (.11) −.10 (.13) −.20 (.24) −.01 (.26) .04 (.30) .30 (.30) −.01 (.11) .07 (.05) 1.12* (.57) Y .11 1,591

Note: The dependent variable is CF knowledge, which has a mean (std. dev.) of .36 (1.55) in 2015, .38 (1.56) in 2016, and .37 (1.55) in 2015 and 2016 combined. Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

For 2016, we have access to additional data for respondents: their politically related social media activity, news consumption, and measures of political activity, such as working on a campaign. We add these variables to the regression and report the results in column (2) of table 3.3. Due to the inclusion of these new variables and the smaller sample size, some of the results reported for the combined sample are weakened when we look just at 2016—the effects of education and income are attenuated, for instance, and we can no longer distinguish independents from partisans or ideologues. Political activity is the only one of the three added variables that has a statistically significant effect on performance, and only a small subset of respondents meet our criteria for being “politically active.” These Americans perform 0.76 points higher on the quiz, which is about half a standard deviation improvement—hardly anything to brag about. Even if we generously interpret these correlations as reflecting causal

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relationships, our 2016 results suggest that becoming politically active, politically interested, and politically knowledgeable would still not be enough to move one’s score up by a standard deviation of 1.6 points. Based on this fi nding, it is difficult to argue that even the most politically engaged and knowledgeable citizens know much more about campaign fi nance regulations than the general public. Perhaps the most fascinating result to emerge from the regressions is on the social media variable. In our survey, increased usage of social media has no effect on campaign fi nance knowledge, adding to a body of literature challenging the conventional wisdom about its oft-presumed pernicious influence. For instance, Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017) fi nd that social media usage does not appear to be driving political polarization, contrary to the conventional wisdom, although Allcott et al. (2019) fi nd some evidence of reduced polarization upon deactivating Facebook. Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2018) fail to fi nd evidence that “fake news” crowded out “real news” in the 2016 election, and Allcott et al. (2019) fi nd that deactivating Facebook reduces political knowledge. Given the fears about the dangers of “fake news” and social media generally for democracy, these results should be heartening.

Americans Think They Have More Political Privacy Than They Really Do We now consider two additional components of our knowledge quiz focused on particularly salient topics given the current political environment: political privacy and super PACs. Political polarization has fueled concern about how much others, especially employers, should know about an individual’s political activities, including campaign contributions, and whether and how they can act on that information. Campaign fi nance disclosure laws often facilitate the acquisition of information that can be used against an individual. The reality is that many political activities, including small contributions to candidates, are publicly available for the world to see (neighbors and employers included),10 and private-sector employers, generally speaking, have wide latitude to fi re employees based on their political views or activities.11 We asked one question in both the 2015 and 2016 CCES and an additional three questions in the 2016 CCES regarding political privacy. Earlier, we showed how little the public knows about the types of infor-

Chapter Three

50 Ta ble 3.4 Campaign fi nance and political privacy, 2016

% answering each question correctly within group

Group All respondents (2016) Politically knowledgeable College degree or higher Interested in politics Politically active on social media Politically active

N

Neighbor look-up

Employer look-up

OK to fi re

All three questions

1,959 1,026 702 899 395 105

32.0 39.9 44.4 39.6 41.4 62.5

16.7 21.3 23.0 21.1 22.8 41.7

12.2 15.0 14.0 15.5 18.0 26.1

5.7 8.5 8.5 8.7 9.5 18.9

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights.

mation that must be disclosed under the law, and we now turn to an assessment of how much respondents know about the dollar threshold for a contribution to trigger the federal disclosure mandate, who has access to the information, and how it might be used. Americans fare even worse here than in our primary set of questions; selected results are detailed in table 3.4. First, we wanted to know if the public is aware of just how low the federal threshold is for the disclosure of an individual’s campaign contributions to a candidate. Only about 23 percent of respondents even attempted to answer the question about the disclosure threshold, and of those that answered, less than half answered $1,000 or less. (The correct answer is $200.12) In other words, only about 10 percent of respondents could even come close to identifying the federal threshold for disclosure of contributor information. Second, we studied whether respondents are aware that companies and neighbors can access this information—and in many circumstances, act on it: • About 1 in 3 respondents knew that people can access contribution records of their neighbors. • About 1 in 6 respondents knew that employers have access to contribution records. • Fewer than 1 in 8 respondents knew that employers have broad leeway to fi re employees on ideological grounds. • Fewer than 1 in 16 respondents knew all three facts.

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51

What’s more, respondents appeared to be particularly confident in their (often incorrect) answer to the question about being fi red; only 10 percent answered “don’t know” to that question. Campaign fi nance disclosure is often viewed as a policy with few costs and significant benefits. The results of our survey show that the potential costs of disclosure are poorly understood by the public.

Americans Are Woefully Misinformed about Super PACs In 2000, we wrote with Tim Groseclose, “The director of the National Association of Business PACs, Steven Stockmeyer, has even claimed that business PACs receive a higher proportion of negative media coverage (98.4 percent) than did the Oklahoma City bomber, Timothy McVeigh.” At that time, we were writing about corporate PACs that make contributions directly to candidates, noting “the attention given to PAC contributions is far in excess of their actual importance” (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000, 75). Fast-forward two decades, and the story remains the same, with the new boogeyman being super PACs. We asked respondents what percentage of federal campaign expenditures were made by super PACs in 2014 (asked in the 2015 CCES) or would be made in 2016 (asked prospectively in the preelection 2016 CCES). Of the $3.8 billion spent on 2014 federal campaigns, approximately 9 percent was spent by super PACs; comparable figures for 2016 are $6.4 billion and 16 percent.13 Figure 3.3 plots the distribution of the replies. The public is stunningly misinformed. Over 75 percent of respondents in 2015 and 2016 thought that super PACs accounted for over half of spending in the most proximate election season. Only 5 percent answered 30 percent or below. The results are similar across years, so the timing of the survey questions is not a relevant factor in the answers. Given the outsized attention that super PACs receive in discussions of campaign fi nance, respondents can be forgiven for thinking that super PACs dominate election spending. But are there patterns to who gets these questions really wrong? If we regress an indicator variable equaling one if the respondent states that super PACs account for more than 70 percent of campaign spending on the same set of independent variables we have been using throughout the chapter, we fi nd that individu-

52

Chapter Three

Figure 3.3. Campaign fi nance knowledge, 2015–16: Proportion of super PAC spending in the most recent election Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 3,925.

als who are interested in politics are 6–12 percent more likely (depending on the specification) to get this question utterly incorrect than those with a low level of political interest. Liberals are also 6–12 percent more likely to get this question utterly incorrect compared with independents or conservatives. As we will show in chapter 6, these erroneous beliefs influence attitudes about what our campaign finance laws should look like, with troubling implications for democracy. These fi ndings are consistent with previous research demonstrating that the public misestimates the sources and amounts of campaign spending. Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder (2005) show that from 1996 to 2000, the median House incumbent spent $406,000 on a campaign, with average spending of $785,000. They compare these figures with the results of a 2003 survey asking respondents to estimate the amounts and sources of House campaign contributions. Respondents’ estimates were grossly inflated. $1.1 million was the median guess, and $5.8 million was the average guess—and that is after dropping the top and bottom 5 percent of answers. Respondents also do not know where campaign funds come from, overstating the amount of party money and underestimating the amount of individual contributions and self-fi nancing.14 Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder (2005) point to a likely culprit (or, at the very least, a contributing factor) for these errors: the mass

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53

media. They show that the media overemphasizes PAC contributions relative to individual contributions in news stories, and the races journalists focus on tend to involve more spending than the typical race. They also fi nd that the education of respondents is negatively correlated with the quality of estimates (with education being a proxy for media exposure). Neither Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder nor we are able to establish a causal link between exposure to media coverage of campaign fi nance and erroneous beliefs. Both sets of fi ndings, however, are consistent with the idea of the media as an agenda setter, helping focus the public’s attention on certain aspects of campaign fi nance (e.g., expensive races) over others (e.g., the benefits of campaign spending). The concept of agenda setting is closely related to the concept of issue framing (Weaver 2007), and we study framing effects for campaign finance issues in chapter 4. That’s not all. Even in cases when the media does educate, it may do so in a way that cuts against the goals of reform. For instance, Hardy et al. (2014) fi nd that exposure to the satirical television program The Colbert Report increased public knowledge about super PACs, though even frequent viewers still didn’t do much better than chance.15 The irony, though, is that college students who were exposed to election-related material from The Daily Show (Baumgartner and Morris 2006) and super PAC–related clips from The Colbert Report (Brewer, Young, and Morreale 2013) become more cynical toward the political process—the very phenomenon reformers want campaign fi nance laws to mitigate. Is the portrayal of campaign fi nance on programs like The Colbert Report— and in the “mainstream media,” for that matter—partially to blame for Americans’ cynicism? More generally, it is worth considering whether the persistent hyperbole about money in politics that the public is exposed to from the media, entertainers, politicians, and even scholars is more a cause of public distrust than the actual phenomenon (money in politics) being decried. If so, reforms may have little impact on public attitudes about American democracy or trust in government. We return to this subject in chapters 5 and 8.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have shown that Americans are for the most part poorly informed about campaign fi nance. They don’t understand cam-

54

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paign fi nance laws, think they have more political privacy than they do, and vastly overstate the role of super PACs. While there are some differences based on ideology, party identification, demographics, and socioeconomic status, even the most politically active members of our sample fail to outperform a dart-throwing monkey. Here’s one more statistic to give you a sense of how poorly informed Americans are about campaign finance. If we defi ne well-informed respondents as individuals who correctly answer at least nine of the seventeen questions used to construct the knowledge score, answer $1,000 or less for the disclosure threshold question, and answer 30 percent or less for the super-PAC-spending-share question, then of the 3,558 respondents in our sample for whom we have all of this data available, just 9 people—this is not a percentage, we really mean 9 people—are well-informed. But maybe there is no reason to fret. After all, campaign fi nance regulation emerges from an overlapping array of federal and state laws that even experts don’t always agree on (hence the continuing stream of lawsuits and evolving jurisprudence in the area). How can we expect the public to do well? Perhaps we can’t and shouldn’t. What’s more, the public is uninformed about politics—period. Is campaign fi nance really that different? That’s a difficult question to answer, owing to the challenges of directly comparing knowledge across political topics. Is being able to identify a Supreme Court justice more or less impressive than being able to identify whether a particular campaign finance activity is legal? Moreover, Lawrence and Sides (2014) fi nd that “innumeracy” doesn’t have much effect on public opinion, consistent with some (but not all) previous work, so what’s the big deal if the public doesn’t know how much super PACs spend on political campaigns? The republic has survived for two centuries despite a public largely ignorant of politics. We can think of no policy issue, though, where public perceptions weigh so heavily in court decisions. To be sure, it is generally agreed that the courts take public opinion into account in their decision-making (Ura and Merrill 2017), but that is different from public perceptions serving as the constitutional justification for a body of law. Americans’ perceptions of campaign fi nance issues are grounded in faulty knowledge, yet these perceptions are the foundation for major legal decisions in this area. It matters, therefore, that Americans misunderstand the potential costs associated with campaign fi nance disclosure. It matters that Amer-

The Uninformed Public

55

icans do not know corporations are prohibited from contributing to the campaigns of federal candidates. As for innumeracy, the public is wildly misinformed about super PACs, and as we will show in chapter 6, this has implications for their preferences regarding campaign fi nance. It matters, then, that the public has no idea that super PAC dollars are a tiny fraction of overall campaign spending. In this chapter, we established that Americans know virtually nothing about federal campaign fi nance laws in the United States. This does not stop Americans from having opinions on the role of money in the American political system—and these opinions are relevant, especially given the Supreme Court’s emphasis on perceptions of government as a justification for campaign fi nance restrictions. We now turn to an analysis of attitudes toward campaign finance, beginning with an exploration of how values and issue framing shape those views.

Chapter Four

The Malleable Public

P

erhaps the greatest tension in American politics is between the competing ideals of liberty and equality. The Declaration of Independence sets out that all men are created equal but are also endowed with the inalienable right to liberty. The US Constitution explicitly limits government infringement on political participation but also guarantees equal protection under the law. These foundational ideals of liberty and equality inexorably come into confl ict when dealing with the regulation of money in politics, all the more so in a society marked by increasing income inequality. How can the ideal of equality be squared with the differential abilities, incentives, and motivations among citizens to support favored political causes? How can a people be free if checked in the effort and enthusiasm they can exert to participate in the democratic process? Campaign fi nance policy necessitates some trade- off between these grand ideals, but what should the terms of this “unfortunate trade- off” be? As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has navigated these choppy waters by occasionally veering toward equality but ultimately hewing closer to liberty, consistently upholding the constitutionality of campaign fi nance regulations narrowly tailored to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption—which brings us back to the central role of public attitudes in campaign fi nance jurisprudence. So how does the public view the inherent tension between liberty and equality on campaign fi nance issues? In the eyes of the average American, is money spent on politics a manifestation of liberty and free speech, or does it advantage certain groups over others and, in doing so, create or perpetuate inequalities in the political process? Individual values surely affect how people answer such questions, but

The Malleable Public

57

this tension between confl icting ideals also provides an opportunity for opinion leaders to characterize the issue of money in politics in ways that influence beliefs. Writing in the early 2000s, Tobin Grant and Thomas Rudolph (2004, 118) argue that “the ultimate fate of campaign fi nance reform will depend, in significant measure, upon which side of the debate is best able to control how the issue is framed.” Since then, party divisions on campaign fi nance have intensified, especially in the post– Citizens United era. That decision has become a rallying cry for Democrats, and pledges to overturn Citizens United, whether through Supreme Court appointments or a constitutional amendment, are a staple of recent campaigns. One distinction that plays an important role in this chapter is whether political activities are framed as expenditures of money or as expressive behaviors. This money versus speech distinction takes center stage in disputes over campaign fi nance issues. Reformers are skeptical of decades of Supreme Court rulings assessing the constitutionality of limits on money in politics with respect to their effects on political speech. Reformers brand these decisions as creating a false equivalence between money and speech, and not surprisingly, in their arguments for campaign fi nance reform, advocates for change focus on money rather than the speech that money facilitates. In this chapter, we analyze how values intersect with partisanship and ideology in shaping public attitudes on campaign fi nance in the post– Citizens United era. We study the trade- off between free speech and equality in the political process, how beliefs about this trade- off affect public attitudes toward money in politics, and how the framing of questions—in terms of both the values emphasized and which group is doing the speaking—shapes the answers Americans give when asked about money in politics. In doing so, we also explore the role values, party, ideology, and knowledge play in mediating the effects of issue framing. Using survey questions and experiments from the 2015 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we also show that Americans tend to have libertarian views toward political participation (i.e., value freedom), but these libertarian tendencies can be undone by framing an activity in terms of money and influence rather than speech and participation, or by focusing on disfavored groups. In fact, as we show, the rhetoric of money as a corrupting force is powerful enough to swing public opinion dramatically. The public, in other words, is malleable.

58

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Framing Effects in Campaign Finance Chong and Druckman (2007, 103–4) defi ne framing as “the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue” and framing effects as occurring when “(often small) changes in the presentation of an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion.” Politicians, interest groups, journalists, and others engage in framing through variations in terminology—estate tax versus death tax; welfare versus aid to the poor—and in how issues are described. The Trump tax plan enacted in 2018 could be framed as a reform that, at least in the short run, increased economic growth or increased the national debt. Both statements are true, but tax reform that is “growth enhancing” will sound more appealing than one that is “budget busting.” The power of framing is thought to be affected by values and knowledge. Strong values are argued to “reduce framing effects by increasing one’s resistance to disconfi rming information” (Chong and Druckman 2007, 111). Chong and Druckman (2007, 112) also note that research focused on knowledge has “produced confl icting results,” but they go on to argue that once prior attitudes are taken into account, knowledge enhances framing effects. Two studies have examined framing effects in the context of campaign fi nance. Druckman and Nelson (2003) fi nd in a 2001 experiment that framing effects are enhanced by knowledge but dissipate over time and when followed by conversations among individuals with differing perspectives. The limited duration of framing effects suggests significant malleability in attitudes about campaign fi nance, which should make us more, not less, concerned about relying on public opinion to justify campaign fi nance laws. Most surveys reflect an immediate response to a particular posed question rather than a more deliberative and informed consideration of an issue in a broad context. Moreover, we should expect frames to be particularly important in shaping public opinion about campaign fi nance, given the typically one-sided and extreme nature of discourse on money in politics in American society (e.g., contributions are bribes; elections are for sale to the highest bidder; the system is corrupt; etc.). Grant and Rudolph (2004) consider the competing frames of group

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59

rights and group influence in their 2000 campaign fi nance survey. These authors adapt the approach in Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus’s (1982) classic study demonstrating that support for free speech is contingent on individuals’ attitudes toward the group speaking, with support declining if the group is disliked by the respondent. Grant and Rudolph (2004, 58) fi nd that “the public is, on balance, fairly supportive of group rights,” with Americans supporting the free speech rights of even groups they dislike. For instance, 61 percent believe that contributions from “leastliked” interest groups are “a legitimate form of political expression.” However, they also fi nd that Americans are more likely to favor speech rights for groups they like than groups they dislike. This research on framing and campaign fi nance relies on surveys that are at least fi fteen years old, meaning they were conducted before the passage of the last major piece of federal campaign fi nance legislation, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and about a decade before the Citizens United decision that has galvanized reformers. American politics and the state of campaign fi nance has changed considerably in the interim (Persily, Bauer, and Ginsberg 2018). So how should we think about the importance of framing effects in today’s America? Notably, politics in the United States has become more polarized along partisan lines, and recent research from the post– Citizens United era fi nds that partisanship and ideology are among the most important factors driving attitudes about money in politics (Brewer, Lambe, and Jones 2017). How parties frame the issue of campaign fi nance is also relevant. Slothuus and de Vreese (2010) fi nd that frames articulated by one’s political party tend to carry more weight than frames from another party, especially when Americans are divided along party lines on an issue—as is the case with campaign fi nance today. We also know that many Americans today live in an ideological echo chamber, especially when online (Peterson, Goel, and Iyengar 2018) and using social media (Schmidt et al. 2016), so they are less likely to be exposed to competing perspectives. Of course, party, ideology, and values are intertwined, and in what follows, we will do our best to disentangle these factors along with studying the impact of knowledge as we consider the beliefs underlying attitudes toward money in politics using data from the 2015 and 2016 CCES. Details on the wording of the survey questions and possible responses appear in appendix C.

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Values and Campaign Finance We begin with a gut check on our instinct that the trade- off between liberty and equality will be resolved along partisan and ideological lines. We asked 2015 and 2016 CCES survey respondents whether it is more important that everyone is free to participate in political activities or that everyone has equal influence in the process. On a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the belief that freedom is more important, and 7 reflecting the belief that equal influence is more important, Americans came down more on the side of liberty, with about 43 percent answering 1, 2, or 3; about 33 percent answering 5, 6, or 7; and the remaining 24 percent in the middle with an answer of 4.1 These results mask marked partisan and ideological differences that are depicted in figure 4.1. As one might expect, liberals and Democrats favor equality over liberty, while Republicans and conservatives favor liberty over equality. True to form, independents (not depicted) tend to be more balanced, though with a preference for liberty.2 The ideological and partisan splits could be due to the fact that our question posits a

Figure 4.1. Liberty vs. equality in political participation, by ideology and partisanship, 2015–16 Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 2,261 across the top two panels; N = 2,142 across the bottom two panels.

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Ta ble 4.1 Government regulation of speech accuracy and political balance, 2016 Agree or disagree: “The government should be able to . . .” (% of replies for each question)

Question Review campaign ads for accuracy Review news content for accuracy Regulate news content for political balance Regulate social media content for political balance

Strongly oppose

Somewhat oppose

No opinion / not sure

Somewhat support

Strongly support

10.0

15.2

25.0

30.3

19.6

18.6

19.0

25.2

23.7

13.5

29.2

23.2

25.4

15.3

6.8

33.6

23.9

26.9

10.7

4.9

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N varies from 1,889 to 1,957.

very strong form of equality—equality of influence—rather than asking about equality of opportunity to participate in politics. The value of equality also relates to notions of fairness. How willing, then, are Americans to let the government regulate the accuracy and balance in news coverage or the accuracy of campaign advertising— both of which are important forms of speech in a democracy? Consider table 4.1, which presents the results of questions asked in 2016 about government regulation of news and campaign ads. Government oversight of accuracy, while generally viewed by the courts as unconstitutional except perhaps in extreme circumstances (such as defamatory statements covered by libel laws), is likely to be viewed as far less intrusive than oversight of ideological balance, which was once attempted via the defunct Fairness Doctrine, a Federal Communications Commission regulation mandating that broadcasters airing political content provide competing opinions on the issues discussed. While there are some partisan and ideological differentials in the results, Americans overall are much more willing to grant the government the power to regulate accuracy rather than balance and somewhat more willing to regulate candidates than the news media. A majority of Americans support government preapproval of campaign ads for accuracy, while 40 percent support government preapproval of news accounts for accuracy. Meanwhile, there was much more hesitation to allow the government to weigh in on the political balance of news content—especially as presented to social media users.

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Money vs. Speech Next, we consider how Americans think about First Amendment rights, both generally and with regard to specific policies. In 2015 and 2016, we presented respondents with the text of the First Amendment and then asked whether the First Amendment goes “too far” in the rights it protects. Table 4.2 provides the breakdown by party and ideology. The ideological divide is smaller than the partisan divide, with Democrats being much more likely to agree with the statement than Republicans.3 Importantly, however, all respondents, including a majority of all partisans and ideologues, disagreed with the statement that the First Amendment goes too far. This question is abstract, so we next explore specific activities that might be regulated by the government. In the 2016 survey, we assigned respondents randomly to one of two frames—a speech frame and a money frame—in how we described five political activities: candidate/ party campaign spending, campaign contributions, lobbying, independent campaign spending (i.e., spending by groups like super PACs), and independent campaign contributions (i.e., contributions to groups like super PACs). We then asked respondents whether those activities should be protected by the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. The money and speech frames describe the same behavior in alternative ways. For instance, the money frame refers to “lobbying by interest groups,” while the speech frame describes the same activity as “the ability of interest groups to communicate their views to public officials.” For the two questions asking about campaign contributions, we used the

Ta ble 4.2 Does the First Amendment go too far?, 2015–16 Agree or disagree: “The First Amendment goes too far in the rights that it guarantees.” (% of replies within group)

Group All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree

No opinion / not sure

Somewhat agree

Strongly agree

43.4 34.5 50.1 44.0 53.2

15.3 16.5 17.2 20.0 14.4

21.3 24.1 13.7 15.2 14.4

11.5 12.9 12.0 12.5 9.3

8.5 12.0 7.0 8.4 8.8

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 3,919 for all respondents.

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Ta ble 4.3 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for First Amendment protections of political activities, 2016 Money frame

Political activity Campaign spending Campaign contributions Lobbying Independent expenditures by political groups like super PACs Contributions to political groups like super PACs

Speech frame

Support (%)

Do not support (%)

21.7 27.0 21.5 30.4

46.9 42.0 48.4 36.6

63.9 38.6 59.9 63.5

10.7 31.5 17.2 12.4

27.6

41.0

43.4

27.1

Support (%)

Do not support (%)

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. Results for the response category “not sure / no opinion” are omitted. N within each question varies from 1,899 to 1,957; respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two frames.

term campaign contributions in the money frame and the ability of individuals to provide fi nancial support in the speech frame. While fi nancial support may seem like it is also a money frame, the term also implies a form of expression in the use of the word support. However, the inclusion of the word fi nancial should make us less likely to find a framing effect for the questions related to contributions. When we get more specific about the types of activities that might be regulated by the government, we see clearly that issue framing affects responses, often in dramatic fashion. For instance, when respondents are asked whether the First Amendment should protect the “ability of candidates, parties and political groups to communicate with voters,” 64  percent agree. If instead they are asked whether “campaign spending by candidates, parties and political groups” should be protected, only 22 percent agree. The differentials are similar when we ask about lobbying and independent expenditures, but they are smaller when we ask about campaign contributions, most likely for the reason described above. Table 4.3 provides the results for each question, by frame. Chisquared tests for each question indicate that the frames affect responses in a statistically significant way. This experiment demonstrates the importance of elite rhetoric and suggests that those opinion leaders who favor strict campaign fi nance laws have been very effective in framing the issue as being about money and influence, not speech and participation. But are all Americans equally susceptible to such framing?

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To study this question, we create a variable, support FA, that sums the replies to each question related to First Amendment protections, awarding a +1 for each instance where a respondent agreed that the activity should be protected by the First Amendment, a −1 in each instance where the respondent disagreed, and 0 when the respondent selected “no opinion / not sure.” This variable ranges from −5 (for a respondent who believes the First Amendment protects none of the activities we asked about) to 5 (for a respondent who believes that all the activities we asked about ought to be protected by the First Amendment). We then regress this variable on an indicator variable for the money frame, party, ideology, and the demographic variables described in chapter 3 and in appendix A. Support FA has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.42 (3.28). The coefficient on money frame in column (1) of table 4.4 shows that the money frame reduces support FA by about 2.4 units on the 10-point scale compared with a speech frame. Partisans are more supportive of First Amendment rights than independents (though we cannot statistically differentiate between Democrats and Republicans), and conservatives are more supportive of First Amendment protections than liberals Ta ble 4.4 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for First Amendment protections of political activities, 2016, regression results

Money frame Democrat Republican Liberal Conservative CF knowledge Strong liberty Strong equality Money × Democrat Money × Republican Money × liberal Money × conservative Money × CF knowledge Money × strong liberty Money × strong equality Demographic variables State fi xed effects R2 N

(1)

(2)

(3)

−2.42*** (.16) .40** (.19) .51*** (.17) −.34 (.20) .97*** (.18)

−2.60*** (.21) .14 (.24) .38 (.27) −.11 (.28) .94*** (.21)

−2.68*** (.29) .24 (.28) .43 (.30) −.07 (.31) .88*** (.25) .13* (.07) .88*** (.25) −.50* (.29) .62* (.37) .24 (.45) −.56 (.45) .11 (.34) −.15 (.09) .43 (.41) −.05 (.40) Y Y .24 1,448

.55* (.32) .26 (.39) −.46 (.40) .08 (.27)

Y Y .18 1,851

Y Y .18 1,851

Note: The dependent variable is support FA, which has a mean (std. dev.) of .42 (3.28). Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

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and independents. Note that the magnitude of the ideology and partisanship coefficients is dwarfed by the magnitude of the framing effect. For instance, moving from being an independent to a conservative shifts an individual’s replies by about 1 unit on support FA, but “treating” that same individual with the money frame rather than the speech frame has 2.4 times that effect in the opposite direction. In other words, framing trumps ideology and partisanship in its influence on attitudes toward campaign fi nance. Next, we explore the roles that party and ideology play in mediating framing effects. In column (2), we add interaction effects between the frame and party as well as the frame and ideology. Using joint significance tests, we do not fi nd differences in framing effects across party or ideology, which provides further evidence that the impact of the money frame transcends party and ideology. Earlier in this chapter, we discussed the ways in which values and knowledge may mediate framing effects. To study this in the context of our survey experiment, we include CF knowledge (the knowledge score variable from chapter 3), strong liberty, and strong equality, as well as the interactions of these variables with money frame, to assess the role knowledge and values play in framing. Strong liberty (strong equality) takes on a value of 1 if respondents answered 1 or 2 (6 or 7) to the liberty versus equality question discussed earlier in the chapter. Both strong liberty and strong equality have a mean (standard deviation) of 0.27 (0.44) in the 2016 survey containing the framing experiments, and the mean (standard deviation) of CF knowledge in 2016 is 0.38 (1.56). The results in column (3) show that a strong liberty orientation increases support for First Amendment protections, while a strong equality orientation has the opposite effect. But money vs. speech framing effects dominate the effects of values. Moreover, these framing effects do not differ based on values. Framing effects are similarly unaffected by knowledge. In other words, the effect of switching from the speech frame to the money frame does not vary with levels of knowledge. We do fi nd, however, that the effect of knowledge on attitudes differs by frame. In the speech frame, increased knowledge of campaign fi nance laws makes respondents modestly more sympathetic to speech rights. However, in the treatment where the campaign fi nance issue is framed as one of money rather than speech, the effects of knowledge are not statistically significant (based on a joint sig-

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nificance test of the knowledge variables). In other words, the framing of campaign fi nance in terms of money rather than speech appears to tamp down the impact of knowledge. Our fi ndings thus far (based on the First Amendment question and the survey experiment focused on specific speech-related activities) show that values, partisanship, and ideology affect support for First Amendment rights. What unites Democrats and Republicans, and liberals and conservatives, is that they are more likely to protect an activity that they view as speech compared with one viewed through the lens of money.

Corporate and Union Speech Grant and Rudolph (2004) fi nd, like many scholars before them, that Americans are more likely to support speech rights for groups they like rather than groups they dislike, and Bowler and Donovan (2016) fi nd that Democrats view independent expenditures made by corporations to be much more corrupt than those made by unions, with the opposite relationship holding for Republicans. We study both of these phenomena in our 2016 survey. In one set of questions, we varied the type of speaker, focusing on individuals, interest groups, corporations, and unions. In another set of questions, we varied the identity of the speaker, focusing on two major corporate entities, Ben & Jerry’s (a subsidiary of Unilever) and ExxonMobil. The first question asked about speech in ballot measure campaigns. There is very little support for speech restrictions with regard to ballot measures (which allow voters to cast ballots directly on issues). Even liberals—typically viewed as hostile to corporations—muster only 36 percent support for restrictions on corporations, and conservatives—typically viewed as hostile to unions—muster only 37 percent support for restrictions on unions. But it’s perhaps more interesting to fl ip the question and instead focus on how many are willing to disagree with the statement (i.e., actively defend against restrictions). When we focus on the fi rst two columns of table 4.5, we see that majorities across the board disagree with restrictions on individual speech rights, but these numbers dip below majorities in some cases for interest groups, unions, and corporations. Why? Because liberals and Democrats, which had majorities willing to take a stand against political speech restrictions for individuals, found it more

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Ta ble 4.5 Support for political speech restrictions, various speakers, 2016 % of replies within group, by speaker agree = support for speech restrictions Strongly disagree

Disagree

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

28.9 22.8 38.5 20.6 42.4

27.3 27.8 24.9 39.2 21.1

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

17.2 13.3 22.9 16.4 26.1

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

Neither agree nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

Speaker: individuals 27.7 26.4 20.3 22.2 21.7

11.2 17.5 11.0 12.5 9.7

4.9 5.6 5.4 5.6 5.2

31.4 27.5 37.3 35.0 30.1

Speaker: interest groups 31.7 33.8 24.7 31.7 26.0

13.8 19.2 11.8 12.5 10.6

6.0 6.3 3.4 4.4 7.2

11.1 6.0 20.7 5.0 20.6

24.8 22.8 29.3 24.9 30.1

Speaker: corporations 36.4 32.7 29.7 34.0 24.7

18.7 23.5 16.5 18.3 20.4

9.0 15.0 3.9 17.8 4.2

19.4 24.2 14.8 31.6 11.9

25.7 25.5 27.6 30.4 22.6

Speaker: unions 31.8 28.3 23.8 23.6 28.5

14.8 16.4 23.2 10.0 22.1

8.3 5.6 10.6 4.4 14.9

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 1,952 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four speaker treatments.

difficult to do so in the case of corporations and interest groups. Conservatives and Republicans felt the same way about unions (and also about corporations, perhaps owing to the populist themes of the 2016 campaign). This set of fi ndings highlights that a willingness to defend speech rights depends to some degree on the group doing the speaking. What happens when we get more specific and focus on who is doing the speaking? In the same 2016 survey, we asked respondents about Exxon Mobil and Ben & Jerry’s. Both of these companies are politically engaged and take stands on environmental issues. Neither is politically extreme or hateful, and both are household name brands. One is vilified by environmental

68

Chapter Four

groups, and the other is lionized by them. Would Americans choose to give them different speech rights? To make the example as realistic as possible, we focused on whether the companies should be permitted to provide consumers with information about candidate positions on issues important to the respective company: in the case of ExxonMobil, oil exploration in the United States, and in the case of Ben & Jerry’s, global warming. US offshore exploration for oil is a policy concern for ExxonMobil, and Ben & Jerry’s concern for global warming led the company to create the cleverly named ice cream flavor “Save Our Swirled.” We presented half of our sample with the following statement: “It should be illegal for a company like Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream to include information on its products about which candidates support or oppose policies to prevent global warming.” We presented the other half with this statement: “It should be illegal for a company like ExxonMobil to post information on gas pumps regarding which candidates support or oppose policies to promote oil exploration in the United States.” These activities are the equivalent of “issue ads” in that they state a candidate’s position on an issue but do not advocate for his or her election or defeat, and they are legal under federal campaign fi nance law. As table 4.6 shows, in the Ben & Jerry’s treatment, about half of the sample somewhat or strongly disagreed with the statement and therefore oppose restrictions on corporate issue advocacy, compared with about 37 percent of the sample exposed to the ExxonMobil treatment—a statistically significant difference. Breaking these results down by ideology and party, more than 50 percent of Democrats disagreed with this statement in the Ben & Jerry’s condition, but just 25 percent did in the Exxon Mobil condition. In other words, twice as many Democrats stand up for the basic speech rights of Ben & Jerry’s as compared to ExxonMobil. The comparable figures are 53 percent and 33 percent for liberals. Meanwhile, Republicans and conservative differentials were on the order of 5 percent. The corporate behaviors referenced here are identical save for the identity of the companies and the type of environmental issue referenced, so this fi nding is consistent with previous work fi nding that popular support for speech rights is contingent on who is doing the speaking. The effects in our analysis appear to be particularly pronounced for Democrats and liberals.

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Ta ble 4.6 Support for corporate political speech restrictions, 2016 % of replies within group, by speaker agree = support for speech restrictions Strongly disagree

Disagree

Neither agree nor disagree

Agree

Strongly agree

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

23.4 25.1 18.9 37.6 20.2

Political speech by Ben & Jerry’s 25.2 27.8 15.3 26.6 25.3 14.7 23.9 26.7 20.6 25.9 14.6 15.0 23.2 27.3 19.1

8.4 8.4 9.9 6.9 10.3

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

15.5 8.6 25.0 8.1 26.0

Political speech by ExxonMobil 21.8 28.4 21.0 16.9 28.5 26.4 21.8 22.1 20.5 24.7 22.9 25.6 22.3 21.2 16.6

13.4 19.6 10.7 18.8 13.9

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 1,943 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the two speaker treatments.

Thus far, the analysis has focused on the role of party and ideology, but the Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) experiment hinges on identifying a group disfavored by the respondent. We construct a single variable to capture attitudes toward the companies and issue: favorability toward environmental regulation, specifically whether the respondent favors giving the Environmental Protection Agency the power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions. The mean (standard deviation) of pro environmental regulation is 0.66 (0.47). This variable will be useful in a regression analysis with the dependent variable corp speech ban measured from 1 to 5, where a higher value indicates stronger support for strict speech rules. We interact the party, ideology, and environment variables with the treatment to assess whether treatment effects vary based on policy preferences, ideology, or party, holding constant other factors. Because 88 percent of Democrats and 94 percent of liberals in the sample support EPA oversight of carbon emissions, we consider alternative specifications for the regressions with interaction terms. Column (1) of table 4.7 shows that across all respondents, the ExxonMobil treatment makes respondents more likely to support speech restrictions, as does being in favor of environmental regulations. Across

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Ta ble 4.7 Support for corporate political speech restrictions, 2016, regression results (1) ExxonMobil treatment Pro environmental regulation Democrat Republican Liberal Conservative CF knowledge Strong liberty Strong equality ExxonMobil × pro env reg ExxonMobil × Democrat ExxonMobil × Republican ExxonMobil × liberal ExxonMobil × conservative ExxonMobil × CF knowledge ExxonMobil × strong liberty ExxonMobil × strong equality Demographic variables State fi xed effects R2 N

.38*** (.05) .31*** (.06)

(2) −.12 (.07) −.05 (.07)

.28*** (.07) .21** (.09) −.19** (.08) −.10 (.08)

(3) .29*** (.09)

.24*** (.08) .27** (.12) −.37*** (.10) −.08 (.12)

.75*** (.09)

(4) −.08 (.13) .03 (.08)

−.07 (.20) −.07 (.09)

.24*** (.08) .26** (.12) −.38*** (.10) −.08 (.13)

.21** (.10) .22 (.13) −.40*** (.13) −.02 (.13) −.13*** (.03) −.19 (.12) .04 (.10) .58*** (.16)

.55*** (.13) .22* (.13)

(5)

.12 (.13)

.09 (.16)

−.10 (.16)

−.09 (.16)

−.13 (.18)

.43** (.17) −.22* (.13)

.35** (.17) −.05 (.15)

.41* (.21) .01 (.19) .08* (.04) −.17 (.17) −.02 (.12)

Y Y .08 1,940

Y Y .09 1,940

Y Y .09 1,940

Y Y .11 1,940

Y Y .14 1,507

Note: The dependent variable is corp speech ban, which has a mean (std. dev.) of 2.8 (1.3). Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

both treatments, partisans are more likely than independents to support speech restrictions, and liberals are less likely to support speech restrictions than independents. If we remove partisanship and ideology from the regressions and include an interaction term for ExxonMobil treatment and pro environmental regulation (see column [2] of table 4.7), we fi nd that individuals who favor environmental regulations are much more likely to favor speech restrictions in the ExxonMobil treatment compared with the Ben & Jerry’s treatment. Individuals opposed to environmental regulations are not affected by the frame. Next, focusing on whether treatment effects vary by party and ideology, joint significance tests using the results in column (3) indicate that the Exxon treatment makes liberals and Democrats more likely to sup-

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port speech restrictions, but the frame does not have a statistically significant effect on conservatives and Republicans. This fi nding is consistent with our earlier discussion comparing the average answers across groups. Column (4) combines the party, ideology, and policy variables. Using joint significance tests, we find that the influence of the policy variable dominates. Supporters of EPA regulation of carbon emissions are much more affected by the treatment than those who are against such regulations. In column (5), we add CF knowledge, strong liberty, and strong equality, plus their interactions with the ExxonMobil treatment, to the specification. We fi nd that the liberty- equality continuum and knowledge are secondary to environmental values in mediating framing effects. While our earlier fi ndings point to the importance of money and speech frames, this set of experiments highlight the usefulness of identifying “villains” in building the case for speech restrictions—especially when the audience comprises Democrats, liberals, or advocates for stringent environmental regulations.

The Courts and the Constitution Campaign fi nance jurisprudence in the past four decades has favored liberty over equality. We asked respondents whether the court underreached, overreached, or got it about right in three First Amendment– driven decisions: Buckley v. Valeo (1976), Citizens United v. FEC (2010), and SpeechNow.org v. FEC (2010). Since Citizens United has on the left become a catchall for all that is wrong with American politics, we do not reference the decision name in our question, instead describing the ruling in neutral terms as follows: “In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that government cannot limit campaign spending by corporations, unions and other groups, as long as the spending is done independently and not coordinated with any political candidates. However, government can prohibit corporations and unions from making contributions directly to candidates.” We utilize the same question structure when asking about the Buckley and SpeechNow cases. The results for Citizens United and SpeechNow are similar, so we focus on the Buckley and Citizens United fi ndings for 2016 respondents (when we asked about all three cases). Majorities believe that the decisions are about right or give too much power to government. Americans view Citizens United more suspiciously than Buckley. Liberals are the

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group most concerned about Citizens United, with 40 percent believing that it did not give enough power to government. On the other side of the partisan and ideological spectrum, only about 10 percent of Republicans or conservatives believe that the deregulatory bent of these decisions is problematic; in fact, about a quarter of Republicans or conservatives believe neither decision went far enough in restricting government authority over speech. These breakdowns are detailed in table 4.8.4 Next, we explore whether Americans support amending the Constitution as a means to circumvent these court decisions. We asked half of our 2016 sample about a proposed amendment using a speech frame (“expand the power of government to regulate political speech and the activities of political groups”), and the other half using a money frame (“expand the power of government to regulate the use of money in the political system”). However, there is very little support in either frame for such an amendment. As table 4.9 shows, just 39 percent of respondents in the money frame support an amendment, compared with 15 percent in the speech frame. There is one exception: in the money frame, majorities of Democrats and liberals support an amendment; this is not the case in the speech frame. In order to estimate regressions isolating the effect of the frame and other factors, we create the variable support new amend measured on a

Ta ble 4.8 Support for US Supreme Court campaign fi nance rulings, 2016 % of replies within group, by court case Too much power to govt

About right

Not enough power to govt

Don’t know / no opinion

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

18.7 12.7 25.3 12.3 24.2

42.1 46.6 39.6 47.1 42.0

Buckley v. Valeo 13.6 19.3 8.3 21.8 8.6

25.6 21.4 26.9 18.9 25.2

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

17.5 16.5 22.0 13.7 23.0

Citizens United v. FEC 32.9 23.8 33.5 28.8 42.4 10.2 27.4 40.9 40.2 12.3

25.8 21.2 25.4 18.0 24.6

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 1,954 (1,630) for all respondents for the Buckley (Citizens United) question.

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Ta ble 4.9 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for constitutional campaign fi nance reform, 2016 % of replies within group, by frame agree = support for reform Strongly disagree

Somewhat disagree

No opinion / not sure

Somewhat agree

Strongly agree

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

15.7 2.6 33.2 1.9 30.9

12.8 9.0 19.5 10.1 16.8

Money frame 32.5 32.7 25.9 27.9 26.8

22.6 28.7 16.6 28.2 14.6

16.4 27.0 4.8 31.9 11.0

All respondents Democrats Republicans Liberals Conservatives

29.7 18.2 42.4 21.0 45.5

16.3 20.3 15.6 22.6 11.6

Speech frame 38.6 36.8 35.3 36.9 29.8

12.4 20.1 5.4 13.5 10.7

3.1 4.5 1.3 6.0 2.4

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. N = 1,956 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the two frames.

scale from 1 to 5, with a higher value indicating more support. As column (1) of table 4.10 shows, shifting from the speech frame to the money frame increases support for an amendment by a substantively meaningful three- quarters of a point on the 5-point scale, with Democrats and liberals being more supportive than Republicans and conservatives. In column (2), we add interaction terms for party and ideology. Joint significance tests indicate that the magnitude of the framing effects varies by party and ideology in statistically and substantively meaningful ways, with Republicans and conservatives less influenced by the money frame compared with Democrats and liberals. Tests using the results in column (3), which add in knowledge and values to the model, indicate that framing effects are unaffected by campaign fi nance knowledge, but support for equality versus liberty enhances the money frame.

Conclusion The American public leans somewhat libertarian when it comes to speech rights, but this tendency is easily manipulated. In fact, what unites Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, liberty lovers and those who favor equality, is that they are less likely to support

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74

Ta ble 4.10 Money vs. speech framing effects: Support for constitutional campaign fi nance reform, 2016, regression results

Money frame Democrat Republican Liberal Conservative CF knowledge Strong liberty Strong equality Money × Democrat Money × Republican Money × liberal Money × conservative Money × CF knowledge Money × strong liberty Money × strong equality Demographic variables State fi xed effects R2 N

(1)

(2)

(3)

.73*** (.07) .33*** (.07) −.15** (.07) .22*** (.08) −.46*** (.06)

.74*** (.11) .31*** (.08) .02 (.13) .07 (.10) −.41*** (.11)

.80*** (.14) .31*** (.10) .12 (.13) .09 (.13) −.38*** (.12) −.08*** (.02) −.29*** (.09) .20* (.12) .08 (.13) −.40** (.19) .15 (.15) −.11 (.21) .04 (.03) −.13 (.15) .24 (.16) Y Y .27 1,519

.04 (.12) −.31 (.20) .33** (.14) −.11 (.19)

Y Y .20 1,955

Y Y .22 1,955

Note: The dependent variable is support new amend, which has a mean (std. dev.) of 2.74 (1.25). Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

speech rights if the question is framed using the language of money and influence as opposed to the language of speech and participation. As further evidence of the malleability of support for speech, the survey experiments in this chapter also show that for many Americans support for free speech remains contingent on who is doing the speaking. The ExxonMobil and Ben & Jerry’s survey experiment provides clear evidence that some Americans—liberals and Democrats in particular— are more willing to wield government power against groups with which they disagree. And lest you think this is just an artifact of a survey experiment, Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2018) fi nd that Supreme Court justices’ decisions on free speech cases are affected by the ideological orientation of the speech in question. So there is evidence that these biases have real-world effects. To be sure, Americans are not blank slates. Factors such as partisanship, ideology, values, knowledge, and context all play a role in shaping attitudes or mediating framing effects with regard to campaign fi nance. The disproportionate effect of corporate identities on Democrats and liberals just mentioned is one example. Another is the finding that framing effects vary based on orientations toward liberty and equality on the

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75

question of constitutional campaign fi nance reform. We also fi nd some evidence that knowledge of campaign fi nance laws makes Americans slightly more likely to support First Amendment protections for political activities—but only when the activities are framed in terms of speech rather than money. The fi ndings in chapters 3 and 4 suggest that framing effects tend to trump knowledge in shaping attitudes. The dominant narrative in campaign fi nance discourse is one of money rather than speech, and this chapter shows that such framing is very effective in turning the public against First Amendment rights. We wonder whether a frame using the overheated rhetoric of reformers rather than our more neutral and subtle language would result in even more dramatic proregulatory effects. We leave this as a possibility for future research. In the meantime, one role for social scientists might be to explain to Americans what science tells us about campaign fi nance rather than let the rhetoric and anecdotes of reformers drive the public narratives about money in politics.

Chapter Five

The Cynical Public

L

et’s start chapter 5 with a quiz: Which of the following statements was made by Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential campaign?

a. “Americans think the political system is fi xed, rigged on behalf of corporations . . . and they’re right.” b. “I want you to say with me, out loud together, .  .  .  ‘The system is rigged.’ [crowd chants] No, better than that, come on, ‘The system is rigged.’” c. “Hundreds of millions of ordinary Americans are on the outside looking in at Washington’s rigged system.” d. All of the above

We would never do this to our students, but since we aren’t grading you, we decided to make this a trick question. The answer is “none of the above.” To be fair, Trump does use the term rigged quite a bit, as do Democrats like Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren.1 In the question above, however, (a) is from the president of Public Citizen, which advocates for stricter campaign fi nance laws, 2 (b) is from Harvard Law School professor and 2016 presidential candidate Lawrence Lessig, 3 and (c) is from Democracy 21 president Fred Wertheimer.4 It’s one thing for elected officials and candidates to use terms like rigged, as demagoguery and instigation are in the DNA of many politicians. But what are the implications for democracy when respected law faculty and ostensibly nonpartisan campaign fi nance reform groups employ such loaded language? Perhaps there are differences between statements like Wertheimer’s and Lessig’s compared with Trump’s claims that the election was going to be rigged against him—a subject we’ll revisit later in the chapter. But is it responsible for reformers to make these highly questionable claims?

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Is it possible that Americans’ mistrust of the political system is rooted to some degree in the ways in which it is characterized by self-styled champions of the public interest? As we saw in chapter 1, the conventional wisdom that money is a cancer on the American political system unites Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, and even Trump voters and Clinton voters. This is where the typical analysis of attitudes toward money in politics stops. We believe this is a mistake, as a more complete portrait of attitudes toward government reveals a public with a deep-seated distaste for politics transcending the influence of money. In fact, as we will show in this chapter, Americans’ conceptions of what constitutes corruption are so broad, and their beliefs in the prevalence of corruption so deep-seated, that they call into question whether the term corruption has lost all meaning. More importantly, given such cynicism, is it possible for campaign fi nance reform to actually accomplish much of anything with respect to public attitudes about corruption in American politics? Consider a 2015 New York Times / CBS News survey, which found that two-thirds of Americans believe the wealthy have more of a chance to influence the elections process than other Americans. 5 This fi nding may be taken as strong evidence of the need for reform, but is it, really? Is it advisable to regulate speech based on its influence? To show how this reasoning leads one down an ominous regulatory path, in the 2015 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), we asked respondents the same question as in the NYT/CBS poll, but we also added a second question replacing “wealthy Americans” with “reporters for major media outlets like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal.” In our survey, more than 70 percent of Americans believe that the wealthy have more influence than average Americans, but more than 60 percent feel the same way about reporters for major media outlets. There are some partisan differences—Democrats are more suspicious of the wealthy than the media, and Republicans distrust the media slightly more than the wealthy—but majorities of partisans on the left and the right are suspicious of both sets of actors. These fi ndings are consistent with a February 2016 Rasmussen Reports poll fi nding that the public is split on whether “media bias” or “big campaign contributions” is the bigger problem in politics.6 Perhaps the real problems are how money in politics is portrayed by reform advocates and the media, and how the media are portrayed by politicians like Donald Trump.7

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In this chapter, we will explore attitudes about politics writ large and, specifically, influence, corruption, and the role of money in the political system. We do this by asking respondents to decide whether activities such as a legislator meeting with a lobbyist amount to corrupt behavior, and then compare these responses to activities related to campaign contributions. We adopt a similar approach when asking about what influences the behavior of elected officials. For instance, how do campaign contributions compare with pressure from party leaders in their influence on rank-and-fi le legislators? Which is more corrupting? We fi nd that Americans are indeed cynical about the political process, but they also have an expansive view of what constitutes corruption that goes far beyond the quid pro quo conception of it articulated by the US Supreme Court. Two-thirds of the American public believe that it is corrupt for a politician to act counter to voter preferences in order to secure favorable media coverage. Moreover, Americans believe by wide margins that corruption permeates the political system. This suggests that the key phrase in campaign fi nance jurisprudence—the appearance of corruption—may have little meaning. If respondents see corruption as inextricably linked to what it means to engage in politics, then campaign fi nance laws are unlikely to change these perceptions, raising questions about the Supreme Court’s standard for upholding the constitutionality of campaign fi nance laws. In fact, as we will see at the end of the chapter, it may be easier to improve public attitudes about American democracy by encouraging reform groups to tone down their rhetoric. We also fi nd that Americans’ views on whether a particular behavior is corrupt depend very much on the group or individual engaging in the behavior—what we call contingent cynicism. Or as Bowler and Donovan (2016) put it, partisanship “structures cynicism” as it relates (in their analysis) to the corrupting nature of campaign spending and contributions by corporations and unions. Among the fi ndings in this chapter are the following:

• Americans are skeptical that elected officials will “do the right thing” and believe that government corruption is widespread. • In the wake of the 2016 election, perceptions that the system is corrupt declined across the board, but trust in government shifted along party lines (it went up for Republicans and down for Democrats).

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• Americans defi ne corruption very broadly to include behaviors such as securing media coverage. • Americans who are more knowledgeable about politics and use social media for political purposes have a more expansive defi nition of corrupt behavior. • Americans who are more interested in politics are also more cynical about the system. • Knowledge of the campaign fi nance system is unrelated to cynicism or the defi nition of corrupt behavior. • Perceptions of corruption are heavily influenced by policy preferences and attitudes toward the group or individual undertaking the behavior in question. • Reform groups’ rhetoric about elections being rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy harms faith in the electoral process.

Trust and Corruption (and Trump) In order to understand Americans’ cynicism regarding money in politics, it is helpful to take a step back and consider the broader issue of faith in the political system. In chapter 1, we showed that trust in the political system has not markedly declined in the past decade (though there were partisan shifts in trust in the wake of President Obama’s election in 2008). The pre/post structure of our 2016 CCES survey allows us to study how President Trump’s surprise victory in 2016 affected perceptions of the political system. The list of questions used in this chapter appears in appendix D. We asked the same individuals before and after the 2016 election whether they trust the federal government to do the right thing (the standard wording in the literature). The choices were “hardly ever,” “some of the time,” “most of the time,” or “just about always.”8 We also asked them about the prevalence of corruption in the federal government. The choices were “widespread,” “limited,” “rare,” or “nonexistent.” Answers to both questions are converted to a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 to 4, with 4 representing a high level of trust and a belief that corruption is widespread, respectively. The pre- and postelection results appear in tables 5.1 and 5.2.

29.6 13.6 36.4

25.4 15.7 27.3

Post %

Pre % 47.8 48.4 50.0

% chg. −4.2 +2.1 −9.1 54.5 53.5 56.0

Post %

Some of the time

+6.7 +5.1 +6.0

% chg. 20.9 35.2 12.4

Pre % 18.2 27.3 15.5

Post %

Most of the time

−2.7 −7.8 +3.1

% chg.

1.8 2.9 1.1

Pre %

2.0 3.5 1.1

Post %

+.2 +.7 +.0

% chg.

Just about always

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. Only respondents who answered both the pre- and postelection surveys are included in this table. % change column may not equal (Post % − Pre %) due to rounding. N = 1,581 for all respondents.

All respondents Democrats Republicans

Pre %

Hardly ever

Trust the federal government to do the right thing? (% of replies within group)

Ta ble 5.1 Trust in the federal government, pre- and postelection 2016

1.4 .3 1.3

1.3 .6 .4

Post %

Pre % 4.2 7.8 1.2

% chg. −.0 +.3 −.9 11.0 14.1 9.1

Post %

Rare

+6.8 +6.3 +8.0

% chg. 34.2 45.3 25.9

Pre % 40.3 48.8 35.4

Post %

Limited

+6.1 +3.5 +9.6

% chg.

60.2 46.7 71.7

Pre %

47.4 36.6 55.1

Post %

Widespread

−12.8 −10.1 −16.7

% chg.

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. Only respondents who answered both the pre- and postelection surveys are included in this table. % change column may not equal (Post % − Pre %) due to rounding. N = 1,567 for all respondents.

All respondents Democrats Republicans

Pre %

Nonexistent

How widespread is corruption in the federal government? (% of replies within group)

Ta ble 5.2 Perceptions of federal government corruption, pre- and postelection 2016

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The tables offer a grim portrait of widespread mistrust of government and omnipresent corruption. Both before and after the election, virtually no American trusted the government to do what is right just about always, and a quarter or more of Americans hardly ever trusted the federal government. Elections can, however, change perceptions—to a point. After the election, 40 percent of respondents changed their response to the trust question, but within that group, only 10 percent (or 4 percent of the overall sample) shifted their responses by more than one point. As one might expect, Democrats trusted government less and Republicans trusted it more after Donald Trump’s victory. The most common Republican movement was from “hardly ever” to “some of the time,” and the most common shift for Democrats was from “most of the time” to “some of the time.” With respect to corruption, before the election, more than 60 percent of Americans believed that corruption in government was widespread, and it declined to just under 50 percent after the election. After the election, 37 percent of respondents changed their answer, but of those who changed, only 16 percent did so by more than one point. Surprisingly, Democrats and Republicans both had a view of government as less corrupt in the wake of President Trump’s victory.9 For members of both parties, the most common shift was from the “widespread” to the “limited” category. The net effect of these changes is shown in table 5.3. On balance, trust in government was largely unchanged, in part because Democrats and Republicans moved in opposite directions postelection. However, corruption perceptions improved across the board. The results are consistent with a sense of relief among Democrats, perhaps due to Trump’s conciliatory behavior on election night,10 that democracy did not crumble Ta ble 5.3 Changes in trust and perceptions of corruption, pre- and postelection 2016 Preelection trust All respondents Democrats Republicans

1.95 2.27 1.78

Chg. in trust +.02 −.09** +.12***

Preelection corruption 3.53 3.38 3.68

Chg. in corruption −.20*** −.17*** −.23***

Note: Mean levels of trust and corruption are measured on 4-point scales, with 4 representing high levels of trust and a belief that corruption is widespread, respectively. Means are calculated using weighted data. For each row, the statistical significance of changes is based on a regression of changes in corruption and trust in a constant- only regression with weights and robust standard errors. For the trust (corruption) question, N = 1,581 (1,567). ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

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overnight upon his victory and a belief among Republicans that Trump was indeed going to “drain the swamp.” But as we will show later in this chapter, this does not mean that perceptions of corruption are in general independent of partisanship.

Representation Americans’ broad mistrust of institutions is further reflected in their perceptions of representation. In 2015, we asked CCES respondents whether politicians hewed to the preferences of the electorate when making policy choices. We randomly assigned respondents to one of four treatments—asking them about elected officials, members of Congress, their representative in the US House, or the president—and inquired about how closely those politicians’ actions reflect voter preferences. The term voter preferences is not defi ned to allow for varying conceptions of how, say, a member of the House should balance competing views among his constituents. The results in table 5.4 provide evidence for a phenomenon in American politics known as Fenno’s paradox—that Americans dislike Congress but like their member of Congress (Fenno 1978). When asked about elected officials generally, nearly 60 percent of Americans replied that they deviated from voter preferences very often or almost always. When asked about “your representative,” however, that percentage plummets to below 30 percent, which is to be expected given that most House members are reelected by a wide margin.

Ta ble 5.4 How often do elected offi cials deviate from voter preferences?, 2015 % of replies within treatment Treatment

Never

Elected officials Members of congress Your representative The president Dem. respondents GOP respondents

0.6 0.7 1.0 1.3 10.0 4.2

Hardly ever 4.3 5.9 15.1 6.7 11.1 3.3

Sometimes

Very often

Almost always

28.6 32.2 25.6 38.9 52.5 27.7

41.7 38.9 20.1 31.3 23.6 41.6

14.1 8.1 8.8 13.7 2.8 19.2

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. Results for the response category “don’t know / no opinion” are omitted. N = 1,962 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

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While Republicans generally are more suspicious than Democrats of politicians’ fealty to voters, the evaluation of the president—who is clearly identifiable with a particular party—was particularly partisan in nature. Among Republicans, 70 percent believed President Obama deviated from voter preferences very often or almost always, while only about a quarter of Democrats felt similarly.

Cynicism and Corruption We hope you are noticing the emergence of a pattern in this chapter: Americans are cynical in general when it comes to politics, but these views are mediated by which politician they have in mind when answering a question. In other words, cynicism is contingent. This idea of contingent cynicism extends to questions about specific behaviors. In 2015, we asked respondents about nine factors that might influence a politician’s policy positions, once again randomly assigning respondents to one of four treatments varying the category of politician. The question reads How common is it for [elected officials / members of Congress / your representative in the US House / the President] to support policies . . . • in order to gain favorable media coverage? • because of pressure from party leaders? • in the hope of generating campaign contributions? • because of a promise made to a campaign contributor? • in order to benefit a favored special interest group? • because it is in the best interest of the country? • out of personal conviction about what is morally right? • in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage? • just to make the other political party look bad?

Respondents could give one of the following five answers for each item: “almost always,” “very often,” “hardly ever,” “never,” or “don’t know / no opinion.”

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In 2016, we asked respondents about the same behaviors, except now we asked whether these behaviors are corrupt rather than how common they are. We also limited our experiment in 2016 to two treatments: “an elected official” or “your representative.” Answers were arrayed along a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (defi nitely not corrupt) to 5 (defi nitely corrupt). Two of these items are either defi nitely corrupt (in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage) or borderline corrupt (because of a promise made to a campaign contributor) using the Supreme Court’s quid pro quo standard. Another two (because it is in the best interest of the country; out of personal conviction about what is morally right) are difficult to classify as corrupt unless one rejects the Burkean notion of a legislator as a trustee using her own judgment as opposed to a delegate simply mirroring voter preferences. Respondents’ assessments of the remaining categories ought to depend heavily on beliefs about the underlying motivation for the behavior. If a legislator seeks favorable media coverage in order to achieve a high profi le that in turn helps secure more leverage on issues that matter to her district, one could imagine this being smart politics. If it is instead intended to set the legislator up for a lucrative career as a commentator post- Congress, one could imagine it being less than honorable. The most neutral treatment in both questions asks about elected officials, and in table 5.5, we focus on this treatment in assessing Americans’ perceptions of corruption. More than 60 percent of respondents believe that it is very often or almost always corrupt for a politician to undertake all the behaviors, with the exception of acting with regard to country or conviction. Yet more than 20 percent of respondents express skepticism of even these behaviors! Americans also believe that potentially corrupt behaviors are quite common. Perhaps most remarkably, over half of the public believes that elected officials routinely take policy positions for personal fi nancial advantage. Table 5.5 shows that the concept of corruption has become so all- encompassing that “the appearance of corruption” has perhaps lost all meaning. If one insists on taking this standard seriously, then the scope of permissible government restrictions on speech increases dramatically to encompass limits on the media, political parties, and lobbying. To explore this data further, we construct a corruption scope index reflecting how many behaviors are viewed as potentially corrupt, and a

Chapter Five

86 Ta ble 5.5 The scope and prevalence of corruption in elective offi ce, 2015–16 An elected official supports a policy that is not supported by the voters . . . In exchange for personal fi nancial advantage Because of a promise to a contributor To benefit a favored special interest group To generate campaign contributions Because of pressure from party leaders To gain favorable media coverage To make the other party look bad Because it is morally right Because it is in the best interest of the country

Is behavior corrupt? (%)

Is behavior common? (%)

84.4

56.3

75.6

62.0

74.6

69.0

66.9 63.3

73.8 63.9

63.1 62.8 22.6 21.7

64.2 53.0 17.2 13.4

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. The fi rst column is the percentage of respondents on the 2016 CCES who answered 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale that the specified action is likely to be corrupt. The second column is the percentage of respondents on the 2015 CCES who answered that the specified action is undertaken “almost always” or “very often.” These replies are for the “elected official(s)” treatment only. N varies from 971 to 977 for the fi rst column and from 454 to 484 for the second column.

cynicism score reflecting how common those behaviors are thought to be. For corruption scope index, a respondent receives one point for answering 4 or 5 to an item (on a 5-point scale, with 5 representing “definitely corrupt”). For cynicism score, a respondent receives one point for answering “very often” or “almost always” to all but the conviction or country items. For these two items, a respondent receives one point for answering “hardly ever” or “never.” Both measures range from 0 to 9. The breakdowns by party and treatment appear in tables 5.6 and 5.7. Contingent cynicism is clearly visible in table 5.6. The cynicism score for Democrats is 5 in the elected officials treatment, but this declines to 3 for their own representatives and 2 for President Obama. Republicans are similarly charitable in evaluating the motives of their own representatives relative to elected officials but are much harsher on President Obama (and members of Congress). Partisan differences within each treatment are minimal or modest with the exception of the presidential treatment. Democrats average a cynicism score of 2.2 when evaluating President Obama; Republicans score a 5.4. Contributing to this difference are results like these: over three- quarters of Republicans believe that President Obama took policy positions to generate favorable media coverage, but just one- quarter of Democrats hold this view.

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Ta ble 5.6 Cynicism score, 2015 Treatment All versions Elected officials Members of congress Your representative The president

All respondents

Democrats

Republicans

4.0 5.1 4.4 3.0 3.6

3.8 5.1 4.3 3.2 2.2

4.4 4.9 5.2 2.6 5.4

Note: Cynicism score ranges from 0 to 9, and the means above are calculated using survey weights. N = 1,854 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

Ta ble 5.7 Corruption scope index, 2016 Treatment All versions An elected official Your representative

All respondents

Democrats

Republicans

5.3 5.3 5.2

5.0 5.0 4.9

5.6 5.7 5.4

Note: Corruption scope index ranges from 0 to 9, and the means above are calculated using survey weights. N = 1,945 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the two treatments.

As table 5.7 shows, Americans cast a wide net in defi ning corruption. On average, 5 of the 9 behaviors described earlier are viewed as almost always or very often corrupt. And keep in mind that these behaviors include taking an action “because it is morally right” or “in the best interest of the country.” There is relatively little treatment sensitivity when it comes to determining what defi nes corruption, whether we ask about an elected official or “your representative,” and minimal differences across parties. As we soon will show, though, treatment sensitivity returns once we get a bit more specific in our questions. To study the foundations of beliefs about the scope and prevalence of corruption, we focus now on the neutral elected officials treatment. Table 5.8 reports regression results for cynicism score, and table 5.9 reports the results for corruption scope index. We include political interest, knowledge (general and campaign fi nance), and demographic factors in the analyses, adding in social media usage, political activity, and news consumption when those variables are available. In the neutral treatment, there are no statistically significant differences between Republicans and Democrats or liberals and conservatives on either corruption’s defi nition or its prevalence, though when compared to independents (the baseline category), Democrats have a less expansive view of corruption and Republicans are less cynical in some specifications.

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88 Ta ble 5.8 Cynicism score, 2015, regression results

CF knowledge Political interest Political knowledge Democrat Republican Liberal Conservative State fi xed effects Demographic variables R2 N

(1)

(2)

(3)

−.16 (.24) −.50 (.40) .86** (.35) .53 (.45) Y Y .11 454

.97*** (.28) .45 (.35) −.16 (.24) −.65* (.37) .48 (.38) .35 (.44) Y Y .15 454

.10 (.11) .91*** (.28) .44 (.34) −.15 (.24) −.62 (.37) .48 (.38) .33 (.44) Y Y .15 454

Note: The dependent variable is cynicism score, which has a mean (std. dev.) of 4.88 (2.91). Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

Ta ble 5.9 Corruption scope index, 2016, regression results

CF knowledge Politically active Social media usage News consumption Political interest Political knowledge Democrat Republican Liberal Conservative Demographic variables State fi xed effects R2 N

(1)

(2)

(3)

−.57*** (.20) −.23 (.30) .39* (.22) .24 (.23) Y Y .06 972

.25 (.25) .35* (.18) .24 (.20) .19 (.15) .50** (.17) −.45** (.20) −.22 (.31) .14 (.23) .28 (.23) Y Y .08 794

−.02 (.05) .26 (.25) .36* (.18) .25 (.20) .19 (.15) .50*** (.17) −.45** (.20) −.21 (.31) .14 (.23) .29 (.23) Y Y .08 794

Note: The dependent variable is corruption scope index, which has a mean (std. dev.) of 5.36 (2.46). Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

The behavioral variables offer further insights into the roots of cynicism. Social media usage is associated with a more expansive view of what constitutes corruption. (This question was only asked in 2016, so we cannot assess its effect on cynicism score.) We also fi nd that politically interested individuals are more cynical about politics.11 General political knowledge leads to a more expansive view of corruption but has no effect on cynicism, while knowledge of campaign fi nance laws has no effect either on the defi nition of corruption or on cynicism.12

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Is Corruption in the Eye of the Beholder? A central fi nding in chapter 4 is that support for speech rights varies based on who is doing the speaking. Does a similar phenomenon occur in the identification of corruption? Do Americans view activities undertaken by a favored interest as on the up-and-up but view the identical activity undertaken by a disfavored interest as corrupt? Does the nature of the activity matter, as well? In the preelection 2016 CCES, we conducted a series of experiments studying whether public perceptions on what constitutes corruption vary based on the identity of the interest group or entity attempting to influence policy, as well as the means of influence. Given the fi ndings in chapter 4, there is good reason to think that both the nature of the activity and the group’s identity should matter. A 2015 survey conducted by the Public Affairs Council motivates what follows. Americans were asked whether they would undertake each of a list of activities if they ran a company and were concerned about the effect of regulations on their business. Only 46 percent said that they would hire a lobbyist to contact elected officials, and 54 percent would make campaign contributions to elected officials already sympathetic to their position. Yet a whopping 84 percent would personally contact an elected representative to communicate concerns, and the same proportion would band together with other companies to try to change the rules. In other words, the public understands that corporations cannot ignore the political sphere, but their suspicions of the system kick in when lobbying or campaign contributions are referenced.13 Bias against Corporations Infl uences Beliefs about Corruption in American Politics We fi rst asked respondents about whether it is corrupt for an elected official to meet with one of the following entities (randomly assigned): a corporate lobbyist, a union lobbyist, party leaders, or a nonprofit group. We left the question about the activity intentionally vague to gauge how respondents interpreted it depending on the treatment: Did the group or its agent attend the meeting to provide policy-relevant information or with a more nefarious intention?

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90

Ta ble 5.10 Is meeting with a lobbyist or making a campaign promise to a group corrupt?, 2016 Lobbying corrupt (% within group, by treatment) Treatment

All

Corporation Union Nonprofit group Political party

44.5 32.1 17.7 17.1

Liberals Conservatives 47.1 19.7 13.9 8.5

51.7 49.6 22.5 19.3

Campaign promise corrupt (% within group, by treatment) All 61.8 40.0 35.0 33.0

Liberals Conservatives 77.3 22.0 30.4 25.5

58.0 56.5 35.5 35.4

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. The columns represent the percentage of respondents in the 2016 CCES within the specified group who answered 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale that the specified action was corrupt, by treatment and with survey weights. For the lobbying (campaign promise) question, N = 1,952 (1,947) for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

We then asked about a campaign appearance where an elected official promises to support a piece of legislation supported by one of the following groups (randomly assigned): a corporation, a union, a political party, or a nonprofit group. Here we offered a bit more information—the elected official promises to support the legislation—but again, we leave room for interpretation. Would respondents suspect that the elected official must have received something in return for his vote, or would they instead believe that the elected official was speaking to a friendly audience and seeking citizens’ support in the upcoming election? Table 5.10 presents the percentage of respondents answering 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale to the questions (with 5 being “defi nitely corrupt”), broken down by ideology (which has more explanatory power than party in regression analyses for this set of questions). We fi nd that Americans are more suspicious of campaign promises made at campaign events compared with those made in meetings with lobbyists or other groups. This is not surprising, as the link between a promise and corruption arguably is an easier one to make than the one between a meeting and corruption. More importantly, within each question, corruption is indeed in the eye of the beholder. For all Americans, bias against corporations runs high, consistent with the populist themes of the 2016 campaign. To unpack this fi nding further, we estimate a regression using the full 1 to 5 scale as the dependent variable. Independent variables include ideology and party interacted with treatment, along with demographics. In this analysis, we fi nd that liberals are less hostile to unions than corporations, and conservatives are consistent in their distaste for both corporate and union influence relative to the sway of nonprofits and parties.

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Policy Preferences Shape Beliefs about Corruption Just as the identity of speakers affects beliefs about corruption, so too do policy differences. We asked Americans about a candidate who promises to support legislation important to an interest group in one of four randomly assigned scenarios: the candidate has made a campaign stop to speak to the group, the candidate has received campaign contributions from the group, the candidate has been endorsed by the group, or the candidate has been supported by the group’s independent advertising. Respondents are asked whether the promise is corrupt when made to both the National Rifle Association (NRA) and Planned Parenthood in the context of gun rights and abortion rights, respectively, though the treatments are assigned separately for each interest group. The results in table 5.11 break down the percentage of respondents, by position on gun rights and abortion rights, who answered 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale that policy agreement with an interest group is corrupt.14 Within each treatment, a given activity is viewed much more suspiciously if the respondent opposes the interest group. For instance, only 23 percent of respondents who oppose an assault rifle ban (i.e., support the NRA’s position) believe that policy agreement with the NRA is corrupt if the NRA had contributed to a candidate’s campaign, but over half believe the situation reflects a corrupt bargain if they oppose the NRA on the assault rifle ban. Much the same pattern emerges in the Planned Parenthood condition. In each treatment, at least 40 percent, and in some cases a majority, of respondents who are not in accord with

Ta ble 5.11 Is policy agreement with an interest group corrupt?, 2016

NRA policy agreement corrupt (% within group, by treatment)

Treatment Camp. appearance Endorsement Ind. expenditures Campaign cont.

Planned Parenthood policy agreement corrupt (% within group, by treatment)

Resp. supports assault weapon ban

Resp. opposes assault weapon ban

Resp. opposes abortion limits

Resp. supports abortion limits

24.5 21.1 27.9 23.5

41.8 45.6 44.7 53.6

13.0 26.1 21.4 39.5

39.5 51.1 51.3 60.3

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. The columns represent the percentage of respondents in the 2016 CCES within the specified group who answered 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale that the specified action was corrupt, by treatment and with survey weights. For the NRA (Planned Parenthood) question, N = 1,933 (1,932) for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

92

Chapter Five

Planned Parenthood or the NRA believe that policy agreement with the disfavored interest group is corrupt. Next, we regressed the 5-point scale on the treatment interacted with policy preferences (controlling for party, ideology, and demographics). We fi nd that opposition to an interest group increases perceptions of corruption, regardless of the treatment, with campaign contributions viewed as more corrupting than any of the other behaviors. And now for what might be the strongest test of how the identity of the speaker affects attitudes toward corruption: if we restrict attention to individuals who received the same treatment for the NRA and the Planned Parenthood questions (i.e., were asked about the same behavior for both of the groups), we fi nd that over half of them gave different answers depending on the interest group asked about. Keep in mind that these questions were asked back-to-back, making the inconsistency all the more remarkable. This is perhaps the clearest evidence that policy preferences shape our beliefs about whether behavior is corrupt. “The appearance of corruption” is as much about disfavored interests as it is about corruption. Legislative Bargaining Is Corrupt Legislators will often trade their votes on legislation in exchange for certain benefits. We constructed two scenarios, one in which a legislator trades his vote for a committee assignment, and the other where he does so to secure highway funds for his district. We also varied whether the trade was to support or oppose a minimum wage increase, which allows us to study whether policy preferences affect perceptions of corruption in a legislative bargaining scenario. Table 5.12 shows that Americans tend to view legislative bargaining as corrupt, especially under conditions of policy confl ict. Large majorities who oppose a minimum wage increase believe that vote trading is corrupt—regardless of how a legislator voted—and seeking to secure a committee assignment is viewed as more corrupt than seeking out highway funds. Americans who support a minimum wage increase believe that voting against the minimum wage in exchange for either a committee assignment or highway funds is corrupt, but minimum wage supporters are much less likely to believe that this behavior is corrupt if an elected official supports a minimum wage increase in exchange for these benefits.

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Ta ble 5.12 Is legislative bargaining corrupt?, 2016 Legislative bargaining corrupt? (% within group, by treatment)

Treatment Oppose min. wage increase for committee assignment Oppose min. wage increase for highway funds Support min. wage increase for committee assignment Support min. wage increase for highway funds

Resp. supports min. wage increase

Resp. opposes min. wage increase

69.1

71.4

50.0

55.9

38.5

76.9

34.4

64.1

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. The columns represent the percentage of respondents in the 2016 CCES within the specified group who answered 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale that the specified action was corrupt, by treatment and with survey weights. N = 1,933 for all respondents, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

Partisanship and Ideology Shape Beliefs about Corruption It is common for legislators, especially at the state level, to receive assistance in the writing of legislation by groups such as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). Critics of such model legislation argue that it is a way for interest groups to shape legislation behind the scenes, leading one Huffi ngton Post headline to declare, “ALEC: The New-and-Improved Political Corruption.”15 This seems to be a stretch, but if it is indeed corrupt, then the beliefs of the group writing the model legislation should be irrelevant—right? We asked respondents whether it is corrupt for a legislator to propose a bill that is nearly identical to “model legislation” written by a think tank. We randomly assigned respondents to one of four treatments: Democratic legislator and liberal think tank; Republican legislator and conservative think tank; Democratic legislator and nonpartisan think tank; and Republican legislator and nonpartisan think tank. Table 5.13 reinforces that corruption is indeed in the eye of the beholder, though overall this behavior is viewed less suspiciously than others we have discussed thus far. Let’s focus fi rst on the distinction between types of think tanks. If the legislator and survey respondent are of the same party, then whether the think tank is ideological or nonpartisan makes little difference: the behavior is rarely viewed as corrupt. If the legislator and respondent are of different parties, then ideological think tanks are viewed more suspiciously by members of the oppo-

Chapter Five

94 Ta ble 5.13. Is using model legislation from a think tank corrupt?, 2016

Model legislation corrupt (% within group, by treatment) Treatment: partisanship of legislator; politics of think tank

Democrats

Republicans

Democratic legislator; liberal think tank Democratic legislator; nonpartisan think tank Republican legislator; conservative think tank Republican legislator; nonpartisan think tank

16.8 17.8 45.4 26.0

46.7 28.2 18.2 14.4

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. The columns represent the percentage of respondents in the 2016 CCES within the specified group who answered 4 or 5 on a 5-point scale that the specified action was corrupt, by treatment and with survey weights. N = 1,207 for Democrats and Republicans combined, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

site party than nonpartisan think tanks. Over 40 percent of Democrats think a Republican legislator receiving assistance from a conservative think tank is corrupt, but that figure drops to 26 percent if the think tank is described as nonpartisan. We see similar splits with regard to Republican attitudes about Democratic legislators seeking assistance from liberal versus nonpartisan think tanks. Continuing the focus on confl icts in respondent-legislator partisanship, we fi nd that a Democrat is nearly three times as likely to view a Republican legislator using legislation from a conservative think tank as corrupt compared with a Democratic legislator seeking input from a liberal think tank; an analogous pattern holds for a Republican respondent.

“Weaponizing Distrust” Republican US senator Ben Sasse of Nebraska has criticized Donald Trump’s attacks on the media, arguing that the president is “weaponizing distrust” with dangerous implications for democracy.16 For their part, scholars have criticized Donald Trump’s claims that elections are “rigged,” arguing that his brand of populism “fuel[s] mistrust in many of the core institutions of liberal democracy” (Norris and Grömping 2017). Trump, however, is not the only one taking up rhetorical arms. Consider the following terms routinely used by journalists, politicians, scholars, and reformers when describing money in politics: dark money, secret money, legalized money laundering, legalized bribery, and the “politics

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of plutocracy.”17 Money isn’t part of the system; it “floods” it.18 A letter from a group of US senators to a Senate committee chair ups the ante on liquid references, referring to “unlimited secret money flowing into elections,” “the sea of anonymous dark money drown[ing] out [Americans’] voices,” and a “tsunami of slime.”19 The New York Times, in a “straight news” story, even helpfully defi nes the term dark money as though it were value-free, writing about “contributions [that are] known as dark money because their source is hidden.” 20 And as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, reformers and even professors do not hesitate to claim that the system is rigged. In fact, at least two scholars have argued that there is an important distinction between arguing the system is rigged and arguing the election is rigged, with the former “enhancing” democracy and the latter “degrading” it. 21 It is far from obvious that there is a meaningful distinction between the “rigged” rhetoric of reformers and the president. (See the quotations that began the chapter.) And not everyone agrees that reformers’ rhetoric is helpful. One commentator noted that the “rigged” language coming from multiple sources is potentially corrosive for democracy. 22 Some reformers are concerned too; one wrote, “It’s important to note that repeatedly declaring how badly the system is rigged or how corruption is pervasive is likely counter-productive. Reform at the federal level can only happen if Members of Congress take action, and those messages imply that nothing can be done due to the special interests’ stranglehold on Washington. Americans are already acutely aware of the problem, and reinforcing how bad things are can make them feel it is futile to try and fi x it.”23 A study of Italians supports this perspective; respondents who believe corruption is common are more likely to view bribery as justifiable and, in turn, are more likely to express support for the corrupt Italian politician Silvio Berlusconi (McNally 2016). The author concludes, “The refrain of ‘they’re all corrupt!’ likely does much more harm than good” (McNally 2016, 997). Brookings Institution scholar William Galston notes how broadbased attacks by reformers on populism are dangerous for democracy: But we need to distinguish between the aspects of populism that pose a fundamental threat and mere policy disputes that do not. The Brexit vote did not weaken democracy in the U.K.; nor would Mr. Trump’s wall along the Mexican border make the U.S. illiberal. Threats to core liberal institutions—

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the free press, independent civil society, constitutional courts and the rule of law—are another matter altogether. Yet many alarmists conflate policies they abhor with threats to the republic. Their effort to place these controversies beyond legitimate debate itself weakens liberal democracy. 24

In our postelection 2016 survey, we compare the effect of Donald Trump’s rhetoric with the rhetoric of others. Specifically, we study whether claims by reform groups that elections are “rigged” in favor of corporations and the wealthy are as damaging to public perceptions of the process as statements by Trump that the election was going to be “rigged” against him. All respondents were asked, “[On a scale from 1 to 7,] how confident are you in the honesty and integrity of the 2016 elections?” Prior to being asked this question, a control group received no additional information. A second group was told, “Donald Trump has stated that elections in the United States are rigged and that he ran against a rigged system.” A third group was told, “A national reform group has stated that elections in the United States are rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy.” And a fourth group was told, “A legal scholar from a top national university has stated that elections in the United States are rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy.” Table 5.14 shows the percentage of respondents who answered 5, 6, or 7 to the confidence question. In the control group, Clinton voters are half as confident as Trump voters (33 percent vs. 64 percent), almost surely reflecting their disappointment with the 2016 election outcome. We requote Charles Stewart from chapter 1 here: “If your guy wins, you’re

Ta ble 5.14 “Rigged elections” rhetoric and faith in the 2016 election, 2016 Confident in honesty and integrity of 2016 election (% within group, by treatment) Treatment: entity claiming elections are rigged No claim (control group) Legal scholar Donald Trump National reform group

Clinton voters

Trump voters

33.4 31.1 42.3 20.1

64.2 58.4 48.5 52.0

Note: Percentages are calculated using survey weights. The columns represent the percentage of respondents in the 2016 CCES within the specified group who answered 5, 6, or 7 on a 7-point scale regarding their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the 2016 election, by treatment and with survey weights. N = 1,211 for Clinton and Trump voters combined, with respondents randomly assigned to one of the four treatments.

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Ta ble 5.15 “Rigged elections” rhetoric and faith in the 2016 election, 2016, regression results

Trump treatment Reform group treatment Legal scholar treatment Trump voter Trump voter × Trump treatment Trump voter × reform group treatment Trump voter × legal scholar treatment Demographic variables State fi xed effects R2 N

(1)

(2)

.45** (.20) −.53** (.21) −.06 (.18) 1.19*** (.22) −.76** (.30) .31 (.27) .06 (.25) Y Y .12 1,211

.45*** (.15) −.67*** (.17) −.25* (.15) 1.12*** (.18) −.78*** (.20) .37* (.21) .09 (.19) Y Y .13 1,870

Note: The dependent variable is confi dent 2016, which has a mean (std. dev.) of 3.99 (1.89) in column (1) and 4.13 (1.89) in column (2). Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p  250, 1987–2017 DV: state govt trust Regression using campaign fi nance law index CF law count Regression using campaign fi nance law regimes Regime 1: corp cont lim Regime 2: (corp + ind) cont lim Regime 3: (corp + ind) cont lim + gub pub fund Regime 4: (corp + ind) cont lim + (gub + leg) pub fund Corporate independent expenditure bans

−.26 (.28) −1.86** (.76) −1.76*** (.46) .18 (1.00) .07 (1.48) .39 (.78)

Note: Robust standard errors clustered by state are in parentheses. All specifications are identical to those presented in table 8.4, except restricting the analysis to states with more than 250 observations. The excluded states are Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. N = 58,112. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

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These tests suggest that public fi nancing may counteract the negative effects of limits—hardly a ringing endorsement. However, caution is in order. These fi ndings also show that the effect of a deregulated system on public trust is no different statistically from a fully regulated system. It bears repeating once more that all these effects—the negative, the positive, and the counteractive—are substantively tiny.

Political and Economic Variables Have Modest Effects on Trust Do other political or economic phenomena have an impact on trust? Sort of. Starting with the political variables in table 8.4, we fi nd that Americans trust their state government less when Democrats are in power, although this effect is small. The effects of party concordance are more meaningful, albeit still on the modest side. For instance, the coefficients on unified democratic govt, resp pty same as unified govt pty, and resp pty diff than unified govt pty imply that a Democrat’s trust in government will increase on net by about 3.4 points if party control of state government shifts from divided government to a unified Democratic government. On the other hand, if instead party control were to shift from divided government to Republican control, a Republican respondent’s trust in state government would increase, while the Democratic respondent’s trust would decrease. This effect of partisan concordance on trust in government raises questions about using attitudes toward democracy as the basis for justifying campaign fi nance laws, as faith in government is at least somewhat tied to who is in power. A state’s economy and government fi nances also have statistically significant effects on trust in state government. Our measures of per capita income and state expenditures are in logs, which means that we can interpret the coefficients in terms of the change in trust due to a percentage change in an independent variable. For instance, the coefficients of 12.65 on per capita income and −5.22 on per capita state spending imply that a 10 percent increase in per capita income improves trust in government by a little over 1 point, while a 10 percent increase in per capita state spending reduces trust in government by 0.5 points. Unemployment also has a negative, statistically significant effect: a 1 percent increase in unemployment (say, from 5 percent to 6 percent) reduces trust in government by a little under 1 point. Because all these effects are small compared to the standard devia-

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tion in trust, the upshot is that attitudes toward government are fairly sticky. While political and economic variables have effects at the margins, trust in state government is fairly stable, consistent with our fi nding that campaign fi nance reform does not move the needle on trust.

Sweet Dreams and a Nightmare? Clean Elections Reforms and Citizens United Public fi nancing—especially Clean Elections– style reforms, where candidates agree to forgo most fundraising in exchange for receiving public subsidies to run for office—is often held up as the Holy Grail of campaign fi nance reform, while Citizens United is viewed by reformers as ushering in the End Times for democracy. Our dataset allows us to conduct the fi rst large-scale test of the effects both have had on trust in state government.12 Clean Elections reforms have occurred in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, and as we noted in chapter 6, one express goal of these and other public fi nancing laws is to improve faith in government. Because we have survey data from these states before and after the reforms went into effect, we can rerun the regression from column (2) of table 8.4 to capture the average levels of trust in a state before and after the intervention (i.e., the implementation of these laws). Specifically, we include a new indicator variable that takes on a 1 if a respondent lived in one of these states in the six years prior to the implementation of the law in that state and a second indicator variable that takes on a 1 if a respondent lived in one of these states after implementation of the law. In order to isolate the effects of Clean Elections, we no longer defi ne these states as being part of regime 4 once the fi rst election cycle using Clean Elections begins (AZ = 1999, CT = 2007, ME = 1999). When we include these variables in the same regression as in column  (2) of table 8.4, we fi nd no statistically significant difference between the coefficients of the “before” and “after” variables. We then interact these indicator variables with variables for Democrat, Republican, and independent for a series of six interaction terms that we include in our regression analysis.13 The results of this latter analysis are reported in table 8.6. Here we see that Clean Elections reforms reduced trust in government

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Ta ble 8.6 The effect of Clean Elections and Citizens United on trust in state government Clean Elections (Arizona, Connecticut, Maine)

Democrat Republican Independent

Before Clean Elections

After Clean Elections

Effect of Clean Elections on state trust

5.41*** (1.89) 3.10 (3.81) 5.58*** (1.87)

1.41 (2.73) 4.00** (1.61) 3.28*** (1.18)

−4.00** +.90 −2.30

Citizens United (twenty-three state-level laws affected)

Democrat Republican Independent

Before Citizens United

After Citizens United

2.87** (1.31) .79 (1.72) 2.78** (1.36)

.96 (1.38) 2.52** (1.22) 1.97 (1.39)

Effect of Citizens United on state trust −1.91 +1.73 −.81

Note: The fi rst two columns of cells include coefficients and robust standard errors clustered by state for a regression identical to the regimes regression from table 8.4, with the following changes. In both the Citizens United and Clean Elections regressions, we include a new set of interaction terms for states affected by Citizens United or a Clean Elections reform, respectively. Before reflects an interaction term for (party X pre- event) for six years prior to the event, and after refers to an interaction term for (party X postevent) for the years after the event. The third column reports the differences in the coefficients for each group, with statistical signifi cance based on F-tests of whether the two coefficients are the same. N = 59,117 for both regressions. In the Citizens United regression, there are 6,998 observations in the treatment group prior to the event, and 7,405 after the event. For the Clean Elections regression, the comparable figures are 410 and 1,227. ***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .10.

among Democrats in states that implemented these campaign fi nance changes, but these reforms had no effect on Republicans or independents. The partisan differential between Democrats and Republicans is statistically significant but substantively modest. It is possible that these reforms were implemented in too few states— states that were “special” in some way that confounded the analysis. There is no way to rule this possibility out completely, but this concern is addressed in our specifications by the inclusion of state fi xed effects, which control for unobserved and time-invariant differences across the states, and in the next section by examining state-level trends in trust in state government. It is also possible that these reforms were not in effect for long enough to have the desired impact, but when placed in the context of the other fi ndings in this book, we are doubtful that a longer implementation time would make much difference. Clearly, the dream of Clean Elections reforms as an elixir for improving trust in government has not panned out. And it is Democrats— the biggest supporters of such reforms—who seem most disenchanted.

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One possibility for these fi ndings is that the promises associated with reforms like Clean Elections are illusory and far exceed the realities of what changes in campaign finance law can achieve. This failure to bring about meaningful change in state politics may then leave supporters (in the case of Clean Elections, Democrats) even more disillusioned with the politics in their state. We performed a similar analysis of the Citizens United decision, which wiped away bans on independent expenditures by corporations in over twenty states. Unlike in the Clean Elections regression, we fi nd no effects of Citizens United on trust, whether we assume that the effects are the same across parties (not reported in table 8.6) or allow for differential effects across parties (see table 8.6). Simply put, public trust in government does not seem to have crumbled in the wake of Citizens United. One possible reason for the weak fi ndings on Citizens United—and one that merits further scrutiny—is that the effects of the decision were felt nationwide, not just in states with corporate independent expenditure bans. Figure 1.2 shows little national movement in trust after the 2010 decision, but to examine this idea further, we reestimated the results reported in table 8.4 using trust in the federal government as the dependent variable and replacing year indicator variables with a linear time trend variable plus a separate indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the year is 2010 or later and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on this indicator variable is positive and statistically significant, even after controlling for whether the respondent’s party matches the party of the president in the survey year. There is no evidence of a negative effect of the decision on trust in the federal government. If anything, trust in the federal government increased after Citizens United (albeit in a substantively modest way). The minimal movement in trust after Citizens United is not surprising if one considers what the decision actually did rather than the caricatures of the decision. The Supreme Court’s decision permitted organizations like corporations and unions to make independent expenditures on elections, and a subsequent federal court decision (SpeechNow.org v. FEC) opened the door for corporate and union contributions to super PACs. While super PACs have become an important part of elections, individual contributions—not corporate dollars—comprise the lion’s share of super PAC funding, and corporations have not availed themselves of these new opportunities for political engagement to nearly the degree that was predicted by reform groups. If nothing else, this sec-

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tion of the book reinforces our view that campaign fi nance would benefit from more rigorous research and less rhetoric.

Is Trust Trendy? The clear takeaway from this chapter so far is that the effect of state campaign fi nance reforms on trust and confidence in state government is small and often negative or statistically indistinguishable from 0. However, simply comparing average trust before and after a reform may be misleading if the trends in trust reverse before and after reform. For example, perhaps trust falls for several years prior to a reform but then rises after the reform is implemented (indeed it may have been declining trust in government that was a factor in the adoption of the reform in the fi rst place). In this scenario, it is possible for the average level of trust in government to appear very similar before and after a reform, which would not be an accurate reflection of the impact of the reform on trust in government. Consequently, in study designs like ours, it is good practice to check for differential time trends. In particular, we check to see whether the apparent noneffects of reform that we observe thus far are really masking a strong V-shaped pattern in trust and confidence centered at the onset of reform. In order to consider this possibility, we estimate the model from table  8.4 using indicator variables for each type of campaign fi nance reform discussed in this chapter (corporate limits, individual limits, gubernatorial public fi nancing, legislative public fi nancing, and independent expenditure bans). For each of these reforms, we reestimate the model with a series of variables, interacting the reform with indicator variables for each of the six years before the reform was implemented in a given state and each of the six years after its implementation. We also include a single indicator variable for seven or more years after its implementation. (For independent expenditure bans, we focus on changes in the laws resulting from Citizens United.) We also perform a similar analysis to examine the effects of Clean Elections reforms in Arizona, Connecticut, and Maine, producing six sets of regression results in all—one for each of the five types of laws and one for Clean Elections. In this way, we are able to observe state-specific time trends in trust in state government before and after reform implementation. The results are displayed in figure 8.1, with the coefficients from each

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Figure 8.1. Trends in state-level trust, before and after campaign fi nance reform Note: Solid lines depict the estimates of trends in trust before and after the respective reforms, with the 95 percent confidence intervals plotted with dotted lines. The range of the y axis approximates a ±1 standard deviation change in the state trust measure.

regression standardized so that the coefficient in the year prior to reform implementation is 0. In other words, the time trends are all relative to levels of trust in the state immediately prior to a reform. For each reform, the coefficient estimates on these time trend variables are plotted with solid lines and the 95 percent confidence intervals are plotted with dotted lines. The range of the y axis approximates a ±1 standard deviation change on our state trust measure (i.e., ±22 points). With few exceptions, none of the figures depicts time trends that are statistically significant (i.e., most of the confidence intervals include 0 throughout the time period before and after a reform). We do see a statistically significant dip in state trust three years prior to the implementation of legislative public funding (t = −2), but this effect dissipates the following year. And as with all the results in the chapter, even these statistically significant shifts in trust are substantively small. For the most part, these time trends suggest that very little is happening to trust in state government either before or after any of the reforms studied, and there are certainly no strong V-shaped patterns centered at the onset of a reform. Figure 8.1 should further allay any concerns about the robustness of our fi ndings.

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Campaign Finance Reform Is the Wrong Cure for the “Trust Deficit” Volumes have been written on the decline in government trust in the United States since the 1970s, and campaign fi nance reform is often pegged as a solution for this decline. In a 2018 op- ed, US House member Ro Khanna and former senator Russ Feingold, in advocating for public fi nancing of congressional elections, write, “Would anyone deny the need for bold action to address the trust deficit in American democracy itself?”14 So why doesn’t campaign fi nance reform have more of an impact on public perceptions? One possible explanation is that popular mistrust of government is the product of the contentious nature of democratic politics in a pluralistic society, which, while often blamed on the role of money in politics, is about much more. In this respect, it is no surprise that campaign fi nance reforms (or other institutional or electoral reforms, for that matter) have little impact on public perceptions. Persily and Lammie (2004, 174) write, “In the end, we must admit that large shares of the American population distrust their government and believe the campaign fi nance system is a source of undue influence. However, as surveys from other countries indicate, Americans are not alone in their distrust of government, and countries with radically different campaign fi nance regimes also have populations registering a high level of government distrust. For those who would look to campaign fi nance reform to restore ‘confidence in the system of representative [g]overnment,’ they may be disappointed by the intractability and psychological roots of that lack of confidence.” In reference to the federal Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that banned unlimited contributions to political parties, Malbin (2008, 2) writes, “It is true that some of the bill’s sponsors, reformers and newspaper editorial boards talked about contribution limits as if they would reverse the public’s cynicism about government. But it was never plausible to expect changes in campaign fi nance law by themselves measurably to improve citizens’ views about government.”15 Gross and Goidel (2003, ix)—who in Goidel, Gross, and Shields (1999) identify themselves as supporters of reform—theorize that seemingly endless reform debates wear the public down: “The consideration

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of reform temporarily appeased an increasingly cynical and alienated public while feeding the media establishment with sound bites on the evils of money. But, in the long run, it undoubtedly increased public cynicism and added to public alienation, even as it protected individual members of Congress who could claim to be in favor of reform without ever having to abide by its provisions.” Building on the sentiments of these scholars, our fi ndings regarding Clean Elections reinforce the conclusion that imperfect reform implementation or unrealized goals make things worse, not better. When reforms don’t work as advertised, or politicians make end runs around them, Americans get cynical. One response to this fi nding might be that we just need to do reform better. Reforms just need to be bolder . . . and bigger. But as we showed in chapter 2, there is no reason to believe that campaign fi nance reforms, which are themselves the products of a democratic process, are going to improve that process in meaningful ways. We now have forty years of experimentation with campaign fi nance reform and virtually no evidence that it actually improves how Americans view their democracy. Given our fi ndings, the onus is on reformers to demonstrate why we should believe the next incarnation of reform will be any different.

Conclusion In this chapter, we conducted the fi rst repeated cross-sectional statistical evaluation of the effect of state campaign fi nance regulations on trust and confidence in state government, and we found that public opinion on the integrity of state government is largely unrelated to such regulations. These null results are important because they challenge the viability of campaign fi nance reform as a means to restore trust in government. Recall the two conventional wisdoms about money in politics from chapter 1. Americans and campaign fi nance experts have very different views on money in politics, but they agree that “campaign fi nance reform is needed to restore the integrity of American democracy.” Our fi ndings suggest that Americans’ skepticism about the ability of reform to deliver on this promise (which we discussed in chapter 6) is warranted. We close the chapter by asking readers to consider the possibility that perhaps democracy is not well served if the public trusts government too much. Mistrust of government may be an important defense mech-

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anism in a pluralistic democracy—a sign of vigilance in defense of individual liberty. Such a perspective calls into question the legitimacy of increased trust in government as a policy goal: rather than search for institutions that will increase trust, perhaps government should act in ways that merit more trust from the governed. Further, distrust in government can be a catalyst for political engagement. As Shaw, Roberts, and Blass (2012, 393) put it, “Perceptions of political corruption do not demobilize people. In fact, they seem to energize them.” We should be open to the possibility that the fundamental justification for reform is not only faulty but counterproductive. We hope that future research will explore this idea and deepen our understanding of the interplay of reform and public attitudes toward government. In the meantime, one thing is fairly certain: state campaign fi nance laws have little impact on public trust and confidence in state government.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

H

.R. 1, the For the People Act of 2019, was the fi rst bill introduced in the US House of Representatives after the Democratic takeover of the chamber in the 2018 midterm elections. It passed the House on March 8, 2019, and then languished in the Senate, but similar proposals were made during the 2020 Democratic presidential primary campaign. Seven Democratic presidential candidates, for instance, signed on to a “Reform First” pledge promising to make “comprehensive, anticorruption, money-in-politics, and voting rights reform legislation that is similar to or builds upon the For the People Act the very fi rst bill” they send to Congress if elected president.1 The backer of “Reform First”? A political action committee (PAC) named End Citizens United. H.R. 1 is a textbook case of how campaign fi nance reform is viewed as the linchpin for “fi xing” democracy, and it is also Exhibit A for why we need to reboot the campaign fi nance debate. The legislation has multiple parts focused on voting, campaign fi nance, and ethics rules. The campaign fi nance portion of the bill includes stricter disclosure requirements, a “small dollar” public fi nancing system for federal offices, a call for a constitutional amendment to overturn Citizens United, and changes to the composition of the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which regulates the fi nancing of federal campaigns. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi said at a press conference that the campaign fi nance portion of the legislation is “about ending skepticism. . . . It’s about money in politics and how that destroys the confidence people have in the political process.” 2 A New York Times news report described the bill as “devised to restore public trust in government.”3 An American Prospect analysis declared that “Fixing Our Democracy is officially Cool.”4 Some evidence of the “cool factor”: the actress Alyssa Milano

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penned an op- ed for USA Today trumpeting the legislation as a “oncein-a-generation reform” that will ensure that “everyone has a voice in our system.”5 From Jennifer Lawrence and Martin Sheen in chapter 1 to Alyssa Milano in chapter 9—is this a sign that the debate over campaign fi nance has jumped the shark?

What the American Public Really Thinks about Money in Politics . . . We have presented dozens of nuanced fi ndings in this book, and this concluding chapter is a place to highlight what we view as the main takeaways from our analyses. These fi ndings are of scholarly interest, but just as importantly, they are policy-relevant because the US Supreme Court places great weight on the relationship between campaign finance laws and public perceptions of government. Keep this in mind as you read on. Americans know very little about money in politics, and ignorance about campaign fi nance is associated with greater support for reform. Our surveys establish that, consistent with historical patterns, Americans know very little about campaign fi nance law, and factors such as education, ideology, and even interest in public affairs have negligible effects on knowledge of the law. In fact, Americans do about as well in answering questions about campaign fi nance law as a blindfolded monkey throwing darts at possible answers. Americans also badly misestimate the share of campaign spending attributable to super PACs, with politically engaged Americans and liberals being more likely to make such errors. Survey respondents can be forgiven for these errors in light of the outsized attention lavished on super PACs in media coverage of campaign fi nance. Such misinformation is troubling in its own right, but what’s worse is that this misinformation has consequences for policy preferences. Ignorance about the state of current laws and about super PAC spending is associated with stronger support for additional campaign fi nance restrictions. Moreover, Americans are more supportive of campaign fi nance reform if they believe that campaign spending hurts trust in government or produces no informational benefits for voters—positions that are contrary to the consensus of the scientific literature. Finally, Americans also are unaware that detailed information about their campaign contributions is publicly available and that in many cases,

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employers can use this information to terminate an employee. This fi nding is noteworthy given that corporations are being increasingly drawn into contentious political issues. Americans value First Amendment rights, but this support weakens for disfavored speakers (such as corporations) or if the issue is framed in a manner to emphasize money rather than political speech and participation. Americans are, broadly speaking, supportive of First Amendment rights. In the abstract, only 20 percent of Americans believe that the First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees. Americans are also deeply suspicious of government attempts to ensure “balance” in news coverage or on social media feeds—an important fi nding in light of attempts to regulate Facebook and other social media providers. (Americans are more supportive of attempts to regulate accuracy in campaign ads and news content.) Notably, when we describe the substance of court decisions rather than use their names, less than a quarter of Americans believe that Buckley v. Valeo and Citizens United v. FEC gave too little power to government to regulate campaign fi nance. This libertarian streak, however, has its limits. In survey experiments, when we frame the campaign fi nance issue as one of money rather than speech, Americans’ views on First Amendment protections for activities such as campaign spending and campaign contributions fl ip from supportive to unsupportive. This framing even blunts the effect of knowledge on support for First Amendment protections, highlighting the power of elite rhetoric. Americans also are less tolerant of speech if they disagree with or dislike the speaker. Democrats and liberals are more willing to protect the speech of individuals and unions than corporations, and Republicans are more willing to protect the speech of individuals than unions. And the identity of the speaker matters, even for corporate political speech. For example, Democrats are twice as likely to defend the speech rights of Ben & Jerry’s compared with ExxonMobil, and individuals supporting stricter environmental regulations also are more willing to silence ExxonMobil relative to Ben & Jerry’s. Americans believe that corruption has infected nearly all aspects of the political process, and this cynicism is heightened by policy disagreement—what we call “contingent cynicism.” Americans defi ne corruption broadly and see it everywhere, so much so that the concept seems to have morphed into a catchall for a broad distaste for politics. Can it really be

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that taking a policy position at odds with constituents to secure favorable media coverage is “corrupt”—as 63 percent of Americans believe? Is it really corrupt to trade a vote on the minimum wage in exchange for highways funds for one’s constituents—as a majority of Americans believe? No doubt there is disagreement among experts about how precisely to defi ne corruption, but Americans cast a very wide net in this regard. This is perhaps due to the overuse of the term by reformers peddling “the cheap cynicism that falsely regards outcomes with which one disagrees as the product of corruption rather than diversity of opinion.”6 What’s worse, just as with support for speech rights, perceptions of corruption are often contingent on policy congruence. For instance, 47  percent of liberals believe that it is likely corrupt for an elected official to meet with a corporate lobbyist, but only 20 percent of liberals view a meeting with a union lobbyist as corrupt. Is a campaign contribution from the NRA or Planned Parenthood corrupt? The answer, it turns out, depends heavily on whether you support the NRA or Planned Parenthood’s policy positions. These survey experiments are not just of academic interest. If Americans see corruption in many common political activities—and if those perceptions hinge on the identity of the individuals or groups involved— then we wonder exactly what the Supreme Court’s “appearance of corruption” standard means in practice. Americans are polarized by party and ideology with regard to restrictions on campaign spending and contributions. They are less polarized on disclosure (which they like—at least in part) and public fi nancing (which is thoroughly unpopular). Seven of twelve potential and actual restrictions on campaign contributions and spending had majority support when we asked Americans about them in 2015 and 2016. Eleven of twelve, however, had majority support from Democrats, while only three had majority support from Republicans. And True Believers, defi ned as liberal Democrats who are interested in politics, supported all twelve actual and possible restrictions. There was less dissension on the issues of campaign contribution disclosure and public fi nancing. Americans are broadly supportive of disclosing contributors’ names and the amounts of their contributions, but they are much less comfortable with disclosing addresses, employers, or other more personal information. Public fi nancing, on the other hand, is thoroughly unpopular. Less

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than a quarter of Americans support public fi nancing, and even a majority of True Believers cannot get behind the concept. That said, over a third of True Believers do favor public fi nancing, which could explain why it is often proposed by Democratic politicians (as in the 2020 presidential campaign or H.R. 1) seeking to appeal to their base. There is no scientific evidence that campaign fi nance reforms actually increase public trust in government. Americans overwhelmingly believe in the need for campaign fi nance reform to “restore the integrity” of democracy, but they are much more skeptical that reforms are capable of achieving this goal. The exceptions to this are campaign fi nance experts and True Believers. Both of these groups are relatively optimistic about the restorative potential of campaign fi nance reform. In chapter 8, we took advantage of the different campaign finance regulatory regimes in the US states to study whether reforms increase public trust and confidence in government. We statistically evaluated the track record of campaign fi nance reforms in the states over thirty years, and the results do not look good for experts and True Believers. We fi nd no evidence that the adoption of campaign fi nance restrictions or public fi nancing improves trust in state government. Moreover, a major deregulatory shock, the Citizens United decision, did not produce meaningful changes in attitudes toward government. This finding is also corroborated by the simple time trends of trust in the federal government before and after Citizens United, as shown in chapter 1. Our analysis of the relationship between actual campaign finance reforms and trust in government is the largest and most comprehensive scientific study of this question to date, and the results are very robust. No matter how we slice the data, campaign fi nance reforms do not increase public trust and confidence in government in any meaningful way. This is a surprising result to anyone familiar with the popular debate over money in politics, but by now, hopefully not for readers of our book. In chapter 2, we explained that there is no coherent theoretical explanation for why reforms should be expected to increase trust in government in the fi rst place. In chapters 3 through 6, we then provided empirical evidence that casts doubt on the potential for reforms to significantly influence public trust and confidence in government. Viewed in this light, the evidence in chapter 8 from decades of experience with reforms in the states is not so surprising after all.

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. . . And Why It Matters Our fi ndings present a fundamental and profound challenge to over forty years of campaign fi nance jurisprudence. Simply put, the courts have made incorrect assumptions about how Americans think about politics in general and campaign fi nance in particular. In short, Americans know very little about money in politics. They mistrust politicians and believe that politics is inherently corrupt, yet they are skeptical that campaign fi nance reform will do much to reduce this corruption. Our study of decades of public opinion data in chapter 8 bears this out, as we fi nd no meaningful relationship between campaign fi nance laws and attitudes toward government. These fi ndings matter because they call into question the very foundations of campaign fi nance law. Grim stuff. Or is it? The answer depends on your priors about democracy. If you live in Reformland, where money in politics is the main roadblock on the path to policy nirvana, then yes, this is depressing stuff. If instead you are more of a political realist, then these results are not nearly so disturbing. Instead, they simply reflect the limitations of democracy. But our fi ndings also suggest an opportunity to improve American politics by working from a new understanding of what we can reasonably expect from campaign fi nance reform. We are decidedly in the realist camp. For more than forty years, the country has endured a Groundhog Day–like cycle of complaint-reformcomplaint-reform, but the reforms always fall short of their stated goals for a simple reason: politics doesn’t work the way that True Believing reformers think it does. We are not the fi rst scholars to point out that political reforms often fail to achieve their objectives. In their book The Limits of Electoral Reform, Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan study this phenomenon on a global scale. The authors focus on reforms ranging from the very general (electoral system changes) to the very specific (the implementation of term limits), showing how difficult it is to implement reforms that work as intended. In the US context, Bruce Cain (2015, 213) argues in Democracy More or Less: America’s Political Reform Quandary that the populist approach to reform often fails because “the priority is on achieving momentum and taking advantage of opportunities for change when they

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can rather than considering the possibility that some change might actually make things worse.” Reformers instead ought to be “setting aside the dream of fully engaged citizens and individual equality even as [they work] to improve civic engagement.” However, voices like Cain’s may be in the academic minority, at least according to the results of our expert survey. About 70 percent of the campaign fi nance experts we surveyed believe that campaign fi nance reform is needed to restore the integrity of American democracy, and 60  percent believe there is a particular set of reforms that can achieve this goal. Benjamin Page and Martin Gilens are perhaps more representative of expert sentiment in their support for reform. In Democracy in America? What Has Gone Wrong and What We Can Do about It, Page and Gilens (2017, 185) devote an entire chapter to institutional and electoral reforms, including a complete overhaul of the US electoral system and proposals for “curbing the political power of money.” Page and Gilens’s preferred campaign fi nance reform is a system of public fi nancing called “democracy vouchers” that would give every voter a set amount of funds that they could distribute to participating candidates as they see fit. Make the size of these vouchers large enough, Page and Gilens argue, and all candidates would opt into the system, leading to the collapse of private fi nancing. As we discussed in chapter 1, scholars like Page, Gilens, and Richard Hasen view political equality as the appropriate goal for reform efforts. Hasen (2016, 10) views the anticorruption rationale articulated by the Supreme Court in Buckley and reaffi rmed in subsequent decisions as a distraction from where the focus of reform efforts should be: implementing campaign fi nance reforms to level the political playing field, or what he calls the “equality of inputs” rationale for campaign fi nance. This shift only gets us so far though. First, there is the question of whether this is even a viable standard. Money is just one input into the process. What about time? Intelligence? Political smarts? By focusing on equality of monetary inputs into the process, individuals whose ideas may be no better but who have more free time, media savvy, or political skills become advantaged in the process (Smith 2001). Should we also limit the time individuals can spend volunteering on a campaign or speaking to reporters? The focus on equality of inputs sends us down a rabbit hole.

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Second, proposals for change tend to be justified by a well-blended anticorruption and equality rationale, making it difficult to know when one motivation begins and another ends. (See chapter 2 for more discussion on this point.) For instance, in H.R. 1, the justification for overturning Citizens United via a constitutional amendment, according to the legislative text, is to “protect the integrity of democracy and the electoral process and to ensure political equality for all.” 7 Perhaps supporters of H.R. 1 have in mind a two-step process by which reform leads to political equality, which in turn increases trust in government; however, neither of these causal assertions has been put to a formal test (as far as we know), so they are best viewed as aspirations for how such reforms might work. Our fi ndings, however, cast serious doubt about proposals like H.R. 1. Third, unintended consequences, especially in complex systems of electoral and legislative rules, are always a real possibility even for simple reforms. For instance, at the state level, Raymond La Raja and Brian Schaffner (2015) show how campaign fi nance laws advantaging “purists” over “pragmatists,” such as limits on political party fundraising or Clean Elections public fi nancing laws, produce increased political polarization. Now imagine trying to “equalize inputs” in the federal elections process. The problem is that these laws are made piecemeal by self-interested politicians under conditions of uncertainty, not by an omniscient and benevolent central planner with the ability to design the entire system like an engineer (or, in the context of social science, a formal modeler). Campaign fi nance is perhaps best described as a kludge—an “ill-assorted collection of poorly-matching parts, forming a distressing whole.”8 We simply cannot count on campaign fi nance laws to improve perceptions of government.

Educating the American Public . . . Once we move away from the idea that campaign fi nance reform is the golden ticket to a better democracy, we can focus on better managing our policy confl icts in this area by encouraging a deeper understanding of the role that money plays in the political system. And the need for education is clear. Bradley Smith, the former chairman of the Federal Elec-

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tion Commission, once spoke to a group of high school students visiting Washington, DC, as part of an educational program. In the evenings, students would draw up policy proposals that they then would debate. One of the proposals shared with Smith was couched in the typical reform rhetoric but actually would have deregulated federal rules at the time. As Smith notes, “The misunderstandings start early.”9 As we have shown in this book, the lack of knowledge about money in politics doesn’t stop at one’s high school graduation—instead it permeates Americans’ preferences and attitudes, and these attitudes in turn form the foundation for campaign fi nance jurisprudence. Worse, politicians and reformers carefully exploit popular misconceptions and prejudices about money “buying” elections and policy with rhetoric that either is not grounded in science or is outright false. This rhetoric is damaging; recall our fi nding from chapter 5 that the “rigged” rhetoric of reformers harms perceptions of electoral integrity among voters—in some cases more than the “rigged” rhetoric of Donald Trump. The media aid and abet reformers in the manner that they cover money in politics. We could fi ll a second book with examples, but one in particular provides clear evidence of how bad information drives out good information in this debate. During a hearing regarding H.R. 1, Rep. Alexandria Ocasio- Cortez played a “lightning round game” during which she asked witnesses questions with the goal of helping hypothetical “bad guys” get away with corrupting the system—all legally. The problem is, her scenario was riddled with misunderstandings about the campaign fi nance system, which one of the witnesses, Bradley Smith (who we just discussed correcting high school students’ misunderstandings), pointed out during the hearing. Ocasio- Cortez’s “game” received over two million views on CNN alone as of May 2019. Smith’s reply during the hearing received closer to ten thousand views across several platforms. We’re the fi rst to admit that educating the American public about any policy issue is a tall order. That’s why we need to enlist journalists, scholars, and foundations to make it a priority. Reporters who play an agenda-setting role could stop using loaded terms like dark money and place campaign spending and contribution data in context. In addition to reporting on how Donald Trump’s rhetoric about voter fraud is harmful with stories such as “Exaggerating Voting Issues May Juice a Base— but It Also ‘Undermines Our Democracy,’” reporters could also cover how extreme rhetoric about campaign fi nance undermines trust in government.10 We believe that most journalists who cover campaign fi nance

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are well-meaning but also fi nd it difficult to break away from the readymade and simplistic narrative that money in politics is evil, especially given the time pressures they face and the complexities of campaign fi nance law. Foundations and scholars could also devote their time and energies to educating journalists (who cannot be experts on all subjects they write about), judges (who could benefit from education in this area apart from the specifics of a legal case), and the American public about the facts regarding campaign fi nance. As Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan (2016, 289) note, “There may be some space in American politics . . . for promoting information about why campaign money is raised, about how expensive campaigns can be, and about how campaign money may be needed in democracies that do not provide state support for campaigns.” For the most part, however, public education about campaign fi nance has been left to advocacy groups that stick to the rhetorical script on the evils of money in politics. It is no surprise, then, that we fi nd that misunderstandings about money in politics are related to support for stricter campaign fi nance laws, suggesting that preferences for campaign fi nance reform may be rooted to some disagree in ignorance and misinformation.11 But will facts and evidence persuade True Believers and other ardent supporters of reform? Philip Fernbach et al. (2019, 255), in a study of the relationship between scientific knowledge and attitudes toward genetically modified organisms, write, “Those with the strongest anti- consensus views are the most in need of education, but also the least likely to be receptive to learning; overconfidence about one’s knowledge is associated with decreased openness to new information. This suggests that a prerequisite to changing people’s views through education may be getting them to fi rst appreciate the gaps in their knowledge.” These authors speculate that people’s overconfidence, and not simply a knowledge deficit, may be responsible for scientists’ lack of success in using public education to bring perceptions in line with scientific understandings. It’s also possible that attempts to educate could have the opposite of the intended effects. Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler (2010) identify what they call “backfi re effects,” where individuals who are provided with a news story containing a false claim by an ideologically aligned politician alongside a correction strengthen their misperceptions relative to ideologically aligned individuals who do not receive the correction. Wood and Porter (2019), however, are unable to fi nd strong evidence for

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backfi re effects when they study a broader array of policy issues than those Nyhan and Reifler examine. What’s worse, today many Americans treat political opponents as the enemy, in what’s known as affective polarization. Americans are polarized on the basis of party as a social identity in ways that are not necessarily tied to policy disagreements (Mason 2018; Iyengar et al. 2019). Moreover, partisan loyalties are increasingly driven by this hostility toward members of the opposing party rather than an affinity with members of one’s own party—a phenomenon known as negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster 2016).12 (It is tempting to think additional campaign fi nance restrictions would “fi x” affective polarization and negative partisanship, but we are, for all of the reasons discussed in this book, skeptical.) The affective polarization of partisans has the potential to short- circuit democratic debates and drive Americans apart even in cases where policy disagreements may not be pronounced. We harbor no illusions, then, that education is a silver bullet, and any such education campaign needs to be developed with an eye toward the concerns we have just raised. But we are unwilling to throw in the towel and permit bad information to drive out good information in this debate.

. . . Even as We Have More to Learn Science only progresses if there is an acknowledgment that our understandings of how the world works are subject to revision—or even rejection—as more research is conducted. In the area of campaign fi nance, there is still more work to do in order to understand public attitudes toward money in politics, and the effects of money in politics on democracy more generally. First, because super PACs and other forms of outside spending are relatively new phenomena in campaigns, there is not much known about their effects on attitudes toward government. In research underway, we examine how outside spending in US Senate contests affects trust in government. Second, we encourage scholars to focus on the role better information might play in shaping public attitudes toward campaign fi nance. Are perceptions likely to change, or might backfi re effects dominate, causing partisans to become even more locked into their worldviews? Is education enough to overcome any overconfidence campaign fi nance sup-

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porters might have in their knowledge of campaign fi nance issues? What about how the issue is framed in educative contexts? James Druckman and Kjersten Nelson (2003) discuss how framing effects in campaign finance dissipate if competing positions are articulated, but there has been no similarly sophisticated work done since Citizens United.13 Can any amount of information overcome the dominant narrative on this issue—that money is evil? Third, and related, in the era of “big data,” we should be able to better study the role that the media—traditional and nontraditional—plays in structuring the public’s understanding of campaign fi nance and its effects on election and policy outcomes. Would removing loaded references to “dark money” from news stories, for instance, or covering the ways in which money enables environmental and civil rights groups to have their voices heard, change perceptions of the issue among liberals? The challenge in studies of this sort is measuring long- term effects. It’s one thing to fi nd that perceptions temporarily change upon reading a more balanced news story. It’s another for those effects to persist. Fourth, a lesson that comes out of chapter 8 is that it is very difficult to change perceptions of government. One thing we do know, though, is that campaign fi nance reforms are not likely to be part of the solution—if, that is, you believe that low levels of trust are a problem. (Recall that in chapter 8 we also encouraged more research on whether high levels of trust in government are desirable for a democracy.) Some might argue that if a wide-ranging election reform bill like H.R. 1 were to pass, it would have more impact than piecemeal reform. We are skeptical, since the reforms in H.R. 1 do not resolve the underlying policy confl icts and partisan divisions in the country. We encourage foundations, then, to redirect support from efforts to reduce the role of money in politics as a means to improve perceptions of government (this book tells us that is wasted money) and instead to support exploratory research focused on turning down the heat (and turning up the light) in the campaign fi nance debate—and politics more generally.

Final Thoughts In this book, we have eviscerated a pillar of campaign fi nance jurisprudence built up in the past four decades of US Supreme Court decisions— that campaign fi nance laws restricting First Amendment rights are jus-

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tifiable if they prevent or limit “the appearance of corruption.” In fact, we should be skeptical of the very concept the appearance of corruption given how broadly corruption is defi ned by the American public. This book may be unsatisfying to some because we fi nd that campaign fi nance reform is not the solution for improving perceptions of American government but do not provide an alternative way to “fi x” democracy. Our fi ndings, however, are akin to those of a medical researcher who fi nds that a particular vitamin supplement turns out not to have a beneficial effect on heart health. Such fi ndings should be welcomed by the scientific community, because they help redirect research efforts toward other, potentially more effective means of improving health—whether of hearts or democracies. Social science can play a vital role in helping us understand which threats we need to worry about and which represent political posturing. Such research is often controversial because it takes on the conventional wisdom and the establishment. This makes it all the more important to pursue.

Appendix A 2015 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Survey Background, Methodology, and Questions

T

his appendix provides information on the surveys that form the basis for the analyses in chapters 3 through 6, along with the methodological approach taken in those chapters. (Some of these questions are also used in chapters 7 and 8.)

The 2015 and 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), which began in 2006, brings together teams of researchers from dozens of universities to ask questions of a nationally representative online sample (in 2016, this included over 60,000 Americans). The survey runs each year, with two waves in election years (one before and one after the election). The Common Content portion of the survey is administered to the full sample and includes questions about basic demographics and political attitudes, behavior, and knowledge. Each research team also produces a team content module to be administered to a subset of the full sample (typically 1,000 people). Additional details on the CCES can be found at https://cces.gov.harvard.edu. We led the survey effort for the campaign fi nance task force convened by Robert Bauer, Benjamin Ginsberg, and Nathaniel Persily. This effort

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was made possible by funding for the task force provided by the Democracy Fund and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation. The questions included in the task force survey modules were almost all written by us. (A handful of questions were written by other task force members.) In this book, we make use of the questions we wrote as well as Common Content questions. The 2015 task force module was fielded to 2,000 Americans from November 6 through December 3, 2015. The preelection wave of the 2016 task force module was in the field from September 28 through November  7, 2016, and the postelection wave occurred between November 9 and December 14, 2016. Of the 2,000 respondents who completed the preelection survey, 1,621 also completed the postelection survey. The list of all questions asked in these modules appears at the end of this appendix, and for easy reference, we also constructed separate chapter appendices listing the questions used in each chapter. In all analyses, we consider only responses from individuals who indicated that they are citizens. This is nearly all of the sample; just 75 of the 4,000 respondents across the two years indicated that they are not citizens.

Weights and Representativeness The CCES uses a variety of techniques, including sample matching and weighting, to ensure the representativeness of its sample (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2017). The online survey format adds an additional layer of complexity to the process, as there may be concerns about the representativeness of online panels. However, Chang and Krosnick (2009) show that a well- designed online survey—one that attempts to build a representative sample of the population—may actually be more accurate than a traditional telephone survey. The CCES sample is chosen from an online panel based on age, gender, race, education, and state. The CCES uses matching to make its sample representative of the US population by selecting the respondent from its existing online panel who is closest on several key features (e.g., age, race) to each individual in a random sample of respondents to the US Census’s American Community Survey, which approximates the US population. Despite a survey researcher’s best efforts, matching will always be

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imprecise to some degree. Weighting helps reduce the remaining imbalances in a sample by assigning some individuals more consideration in the data and others less. For instance, if the sampling frame consists of equal numbers of men and women, but respondents are 53 percent female and 47 percent male, female respondents would be assigned a weight less than one and male respondents a weight greater than one for use in the calculation of results. Weighting is complex in practice, since there are many demographic factors that must be considered (e.g., race, gender, age, etc.). Variables used in the calculation of CCES weights include age, gender, education, race, voter registration, ideology, party identification, born-again status, and political interest (Ansolabehere, Schaffner, and Luks 2017). In the CCES, each team is assigned a unique set of weights to ensure the representativeness of the subsample. To demonstrate the effectiveness of weights, consider the question regarding presidential vote choice in 2016, when 46.1 percent of voters cast ballots for Donald Trump, and 48.2 percent selected Hillary Clinton. In our sample, 41.5 percent replied that they voted for Donald Trump, and 47.1 percent indicated a Clinton vote. When we recalculate these figures using weights, the percentages change to 45.9 percent and 47.9 percent, respectively—much closer to the actual outcome. We apply weights whenever we describe basic survey results. We do not use weights in regressions, for reasons described below; therefore, the reported summary statistics for variables used in regression analyses are calculated using unweighted data.

Methodology To avoid bogging the reader down in technical complexities in each chapter, we discuss our approach to regression analysis here. Our goal is to write a readable account of campaign fi nance that is methodologically sound, and we think we have done so. Even a relatively straightforward analysis of survey data and survey experiments necessitates dozens of choices, with each choice being the subject of debate in the literature. Rather than produce a jumble of findings by implementing various methodologies for each of the dozens of analyses performed for this book, we instead have settled on a simple, conservative, and econometrically justifiable approach that is common to all of our analyses. Data

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analysis always requires a set of choices, and our goal is to be transparent about what we have done and why. Specifically, we utilized the following techniques in our analyses: • ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; • unweighted data; • state fi xed effects; • robust standard errors clustered at the state level; and • joint significance tests, as needed, to test for the statistical significance of effects captured by multiple variables.

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) We use OLS regression (technically the linear probability model when working with dichotomous dependent variables) in all of our analyses, avoiding the use of nonlinear models such as logit, probit, and ordered probit, which are often used when dependent variables are dichotomous in nature or are scales. There is a robust debate in the literature regarding nonlinear versus linear models when working with “limited dependent variables” (e.g., dichotomous variables). We selected OLS because the technique will be familiar to the most readers and allow for consistency in the presentation of results. Moreover, as Angrist and Pischke (2009, 107) show, the estimates of marginal effects in OLS are usually similar to those of nonlinear techniques such as probit or tobit: “This optimistic conclusion is not a theorem, but . . . it seems to be fairly robustly true.” We typically implement OLS using Stata’s xtreg command. Unweighted Data As noted earlier, we do not use weights when implementing OLS on the 2015 and 2016 CCES in chapters 3 through 6. As with all other methodological choices, there is ample debate in the literature about whether weights are needed in regression analysis, and as usual, there are tradeoffs, including that weights can sometimes produce less precisely estimated coefficients (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015). As Gelman (2007, 163) writes, “The weighting approach has the advantage of giving simple estimates for population averages but has several disadvan-

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tages. First, it is not generally clear how to apply weights to more complicated estimands such as regression coefficients. . . . A second problem with weighted estimates is that standard errors are more difficult to evaluate. . . . Finally, weighting may be ‘dirty’ but it is not always ‘quick’: actually constructing the weighting for a survey is more difficult than you might think.” We adopt the approach recommended by Winship and Radbill (1994, 230): “When sampling weights are solely a function of independent variables included in the model, unweighted OLS estimates are preferred because they are unbiased, consistent, and have smaller standard errors than weighted OLS estimates.” We do not have access to the exact manner in which survey weights for the CCES are constructed (this is proprietary), but as noted earlier, we are aware of the variables that were used to construct the sample and the survey weights. We incorporate many of these variables, as well as state fi xed effects, into our models and then implement the following test recommended by Winship and Radbill: For each model, we run two OLS regressions. The fi rst simply replicates the original model but without a standard error correction. The second includes the independent variables, an additional variable with the survey weights, and then an interaction of all independent variables with the survey weights. Then we perform an F-test to see whether the addition of the weights variables improves model fit at better than p < 0.05. If so, then this suggests that the weights are necessary. If not, then an unweighted specification is preferred. In no regressions reported in our chapters was an F-test significant at the 0.05 level or better, so the results we present rely on unweighted data. Our decision not to use weights in the regressions is ultimately an informed judgment call based on these F-tests and the fact that we are including in the regressions many of the variables that are used to construct the weights. Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge (2015, 310–11) offer a realistic, reassuring perspective on the issue: Of course, we need again to acknowledge that, in practice, one’s model is almost never perfectly specified. At best, it is a good approximation to the data-generating process. As a result, just as theorems in microeconomic theory based on unrealistically strong assumptions provide only rough guidance about what is going on in the actual economy, theorems from theoretical econometrics provide inexact (though valuable, in our view) guidance about how to do empirical research. In that light, reconsider the example in the pre-

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vious paragraph. If the sampling probability varies only across states and the regression model that controls for state dummies is a good, though imperfect, approximation to the true model for the conditional mean, then one might reasonably hope that OLS estimation would come close to unbiased and consistent estimation of the effects of the explanatory variables. The same goes for WLS [weighted least squares] estimation (which also would fall short of perfect unbiasedness and consistency), but WLS might be less precise.

State Fixed Effects and Robust Standard Errors Clustered by State We modify OLS in two ways. We include state fi xed effects in our regressions to account for the fact that respondents are selected in part due to the state in which they reside. There are also substantive reasons for this decision, as respondents may be influenced by the political culture of their state. We implement state fi xed effects using the fe option in xtreg and report the “within R 2” value that excludes the variance in the dependent variable that is captured by the fi xed effects. Second, we implement robust standard errors clustered by state using the “cluster” option in xtreg. Clustered standard errors account for correlation of the error term for individuals living in the same state (Primo, Jacobsmeier, and Milyo 2007). Fixed effects will absorb much of this “within- cluster correlation,” but “in general they will not completely control for within- cluster error correlation (not to mention heteroscedasticity)” (Cameron and Miller 2015, 329). Joint Significance Tests Much of our analysis compares subgroups within our sample, including comparisons across party affi liations, ideologies, and experimental treatments. Moreover, many of these comparisons are made simultaneously using interaction terms. For instance, we may be interested in the differential effects of an experimental treatment on Democrats and Republicans. As Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) and Braumoeller (2004) have noted in the context of interaction terms, one rarely can examine a single coefficient’s size or statistical significance to discern the effect of interest. Instead, one often needs to perform joint significance tests using F-tests and/or to estimate marginal effects using multiple coefficients. We do all of this behind the scenes, and in the text, we simply reference whether the effects of interest are statistically significant.

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A Word on Experiments We embed several experiments into our surveys, randomly assigning respondents to different versions of a question. These experiments enable us to study how variations in question wording affect survey responses. Random assignment is the gold standard in experimental design, but it is complicated by the fact that samples may not necessarily be perfectly representative of the population as a whole. As Miratrix et al. (2018) note, there is a debate in the literature about whether studies of treatment effects in survey experiments need to include survey weights. These authors conclude that for the most part, unweighted data suffices for estimating population treatment effects, though the incorporation of weights or covariates “is a conservative choice for precision improvement” (2018, 276). Given the fi ndings of Miratrix et al., we are comfortable using the same regression procedure outlined above when analyzing survey experiments (i.e., unweighted data but with the incorporation of covariates).

Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics for the 2015 and 2016 CCES In each chapter, we provide summary statistics for dependent variables used in regressions in the results tables and, for independent variables unique to that chapter, we provide summary statistics in the main text or in endnotes. However, many variables are used in multiple chapters. To streamline the presentation, they are detailed here and summarized in table A.1 for all observations. These summary statistics are calculated using unweighted data. In what follows, the discussion of specific Common Content questions references the original variable names in the CCES data (e.g., pid5, CC16_ 300b). Demographics • Education: set of indicator variables for highest level of education completed (omitted category is no high school degree)—high school degree; some college; four-year college degree; graduate/professional degree. • Ln age: natural log of age in years.

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• Female: coded 1 for female respondent and 0 for male respondent. • Race: set of indicator variables for race (omitted category is White)—Black; Hispanic (race or ethnicity); other race. • Ln family income: the natural log of family income in 2016 dollars, where family income is defi ned as the midpoint or top- coded value of the income range response to CCES Common Content question faminc. • Missing income: coded 1 if faminc is not provided or missing and 0 otherwise.

Ideology and Partisanship • Ideology: liberal (conservative) coded 1 if respondent answers “very liberal” or “liberal” (“very conservative” or “conservative”) to CCES Common Content question ideo5 and 0 otherwise. Ideo5 measures ideology on a 5-point scale, with the middle option being “moderate.” • Party Identification: Democrat (Republican) coded 1 if respondent answers “Democrat” (“Republican”) to CCES Common Content question pid3 and 0 otherwise. Pid3 measures party ID on a 3-point scale, with the middle option being “independent.”

Political Behavior (2015 and 2016) • Political interest: coded 1 if respondent answers “most of the time” to the CCES Common Content question newsint, which reads, “Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs . . . [most of the time / some of the time / only now and then / hardly at all /don’t know].” Coded 0 otherwise. • Political knowledge: coded 1 if respondent knows that Republicans controlled a majority of seats in the House and Senate at the time of the survey. Coded 0 otherwise.

Political Behavior (2016 Only) • Voted for Trump (voted for Clinton)—postelection survey question: coded 1 if respondent reports voting for Donald Trump (Hillary Clinton) in the 2016 presidential general election and 0 otherwise.

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Ta ble A.1 Descriptive statistics for CCES variables

Demographics High school degree Some college Four-year college degree Graduate/professional degree Ln age Female Black Hispanic Other race Ln family income Income missing Ideology and partisanship Liberal Conservative Democrat Republican Political behavior Politically active Social media usage News consumption Voted for Trump Voted for Clinton Political interest Political knowledge N

2015

2016

2015 & 2016

.36 (.48) .35 (.48) .17 (.38) .09 (.28) 3.84 (.38) .57 (.50) .12 (.33) .13 (.34) .05 (.23) 10.66 (.89) .11 (.32)

.26 (.44) .35 (.48) .23 (.42) .13 (.33) 3.81 (.39) .53 (.50) .12 (.33) .10 (.30) .08 (.26) 10.82 (.87) .10 (.30)

.31 (.46) .35 (.48) .20 (.40) .11 (.31) 3.82 (.38) .55 (.50) .12 (.33) .11 (.32) .06 (.25) 10.74 (.89) .11 (.31)

.28 (.45) .33 (.47) .38 (.49) .24 (.43)

.27 (.44) .32 (.47) .38 (.48) .25 (.43)

.27 (.44) .32 (.47) .38 (.49) .24 (.43)

.46 (.50) .51 (.50) 3,925

.07 (.25) .20 (.40) .34 (.48) .41 (.49) .47 (.50) .46 (.50) .52 (.50) 1,966

.46 (.50) .52 (.50) 1,959

Notes: Means and standard deviations are calculated using unweighted data. Standard deviations are in parentheses. One observation is missing for the party identification variables in 2016. N for ln family income is 1,742 in 2015, 1,756 in 2016, and 3,498 overall. N = 1,592 for politically active. N = 1,372 for voted for Trump and voted for Clinton.

• Politically active—postelection survey question: coded 1 if respondent reports having participated in three or more of the following activities in the past year (or in the case of running for office, ever): attended local meetings (such as school board or city council); put up a political sign (such as a lawn sign or bumper sticker); worked for a candidate or campaign; donated money to a candidate, campaign, or political organization; ran for elective office at any level of government (local, state, or federal). Coded 0 otherwise. • Social media usage: coded 1 if respondent was active on social media within the twenty-four hours prior to taking the survey in three or more of the following ways: posted a story, photo, video, or link about politics; posted a comment about politics; read a story or watched a video about politics; followed

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a political event; forwarded a story, photo, video, or link about politics to friends. Coded 0 otherwise. • News consumption: coded 1 if respondent had (1) watched a local or national newscast (CC16_ 300b) and (2) read a print or online newspaper (CC16_ 300c) within the twenty-four hours prior to taking the survey. Coded 0 otherwise.

Questions Asked on the 2015 CCES Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust [randomize: government / elected officials in government] to do the right thing? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: just about always; most of the time; some of the time; hardly ever Question: The First Amendment became part of the U.S. Constitution more than 200 years ago. This is what it says: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Based on your own feelings about the First Amendment, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees. Possible responses: strongly agree; somewhat agree; no opinion / not sure; somewhat disagree; strongly disagree Question (order of questions randomized): First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. • Do you think campaign spending by candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign contributions to candidates, parties and political

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groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment?

Possible responses for each question: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that government regulations of campaign fi nances are permissible, but only if such regulations limit corruption or the appearance of corruption. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question: When government regulates political activities, it may bring into confl ict the ideals of equality and liberty. Which statement better  represents your opinion about a potential tradeoff between these ideals? • It is more important that everyone is free to participate in political activities, even if this means some people or groups wield more influence in the political process. • It is more important that everyone has the same influence in the political process, even if this means restricting the participation of some people or groups.

Possible responses (order of alternatives randomized): Version 1: 1 = freedom is more important; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = equal influence is more important Version 2: 1 = equal influence is more important; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = freedom is more important

Question (order of questions randomized): • Thinking about U.S. elections, do you think all Americans have an equal chance to influence the elections process, or do you think wealthy Americans have more of a chance to influence the elections process than other Americans? • Thinking about U.S. elections, do you think all Americans have an equal chance to influence the elections process, or do you think reporters for major media outlets like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal have more of a chance to influence the elections process than other Americans?

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Possible responses for each question: equal influence; wealthy have more influence; don’t know / no answer Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Government should give taxpayer dollars to candidates to pay for their campaigns. • Candidates should be allowed to use public funds to pay for their campaigns.

Possible responses: 1 = strongly disagree; 2; 3; 4; 5 = strongly agree Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • [Version A] Do you think that candidates and political groups that support candidates should be required to disclose information about their contributors and make it available to the public on the internet? • [Version B] If you make a contribution to a candidate or a political group that supports a candidate, should information about your contribution be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet?

Possible responses: yes, public disclosure should be required; yes, but only for large contributions [pop-up: how large a contribution should trigger required disclosure?]; no, public disclosure should not be required; not sure / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents to match randomization above): • [If Version A above] What kind of information about contributions to political candidates and groups that support candidates should be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet? • [If Version B above] What kind of information about your contributions to political candidates and groups that support candidates should be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet?

Possible responses (mark all that apply): amount of contribution; name of contributor; home address of contributor; union membership; name of contributor’s employer; none of the above; not sure / no opinion Question: Do you know approximately how large a contribution to a candidate for federal office has to be in order to trigger disclosure requirements? Possible responses: specific dollar amount (open- ended); don’t know

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Question: Do you know what kind of information must be disclosed about contributors to candidates for federal office? Possible responses (mark all that apply): amount of contribution; name of contributor; home address of contributor; union membership; name of contributor’s employer; none of the above; not sure / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents; respondents were asked about all items below the question): • Do you think government should limit contributions made by individuals to the following groups? • Do you think government should limit your contributions to the following groups? °

Candidates for elective office

°

Political parties

°

Political action committees that contribute directly to candidates

°

Political groups that independently support or oppose a candidate

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: Under current law, do you think the federal government limits contributions made by individuals to the following groups? • Candidates for federal office • National political parties • Political action committees that contribute directly to federal candidates • Political groups that independently support or oppose federal candidates

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; don’t know Question: Do you think government should limit the following activities? • The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate • Candidates’ use of personal funds for their campaigns • Contributions by parties to affi liated candidates • Contributions by political groups made directly to candidates • Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: Under current law, does the federal government limit the following activities? • The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate for federal office

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• Candidates for federal office using personal funds for their campaigns • Contributions by political parties to affi liated candidates for federal office • Contributions by political groups made directly to candidates for federal office • Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate for federal office

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; don’t know Question: Do you think government should limit/prohibit the following types of political activities by corporations and unions? • Contributions made directly to candidates • Contributions to groups that independently support or oppose candidates • Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate

Possible responses for each item: prohibit; limit; no limit; no opinion / not sure Question: Under current law, do you think government limits/prohibits the following types of political activities by corporations and unions? • Contributions made directly to candidates • Contributions to groups that independently support or oppose candidates • Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate

Possible responses for each item: prohibits; limits; does not limit; no opinion / not sure Question: Would you say that corruption of public officials is widespread throughout government, limited to few individuals or offices, rare, or nonexistent? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: widespread throughout government; limited to a few individuals or offices; rare; nonexistent Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • (Version A) How common is it for elected officials to support policies that are not supported by the voters? • (Version B) How common is it for members of Congress to support policies that are not supported by the voters in their districts?

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• (Version C) How common is it for your Representative in the U.S. House to support policies that are not supported by the voters in your district? • (Version D) How common is it for the President to support policies that are not supported by the voters?

Possible responses: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question (preamble assigned randomly to respondents to match randomization above; respondents were asked about all items below the preambles): • [If Version A above] How common is it for elected officials to support policies . . . • [If Version B above] How common is it for members of Congress to support policies . . . • [If Version C above] How common is it for your Representative in the U.S. House to support policies . . . • [If Version D above] How common is it for the President to support policies . . . °

in order to gain favorable media coverage?

°

because of pressure from party leaders?

°

in the hope of generating campaign contributions?

°

because of a promise made to a campaign contributor?

°

in order to benefit a favored special interest group?

°

because it is in the best interest of the country?

°

out of personal conviction about what is morally right?

°

in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage?

°

just to make the other political party look bad?

Possible responses for each item: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption through campaign fi nance reform, or is politics always corrupt? • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption by reforming current ethics and election laws, or is politics always corrupt?

Possible responses: 1 = the right package of reforms will greatly reduce public corruption; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = reforms are ineffective and politics will always be corrupt

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Appendix A

[Here we omit several questions about super PACs that were written by other members of the task force for their own research.]

Question: In the 2014 Congressional election, about $3.5 billion was spent by candidates, parties and other political groups. About what percent of this total do you think was spent by super PACs? Possible responses: 0 percent to 100 percent (using sliding scale) [Here we omit several questions about how often individuals seek out and use campaign fi nance data and how individuals use campaign information to make decisions; these questions were written by other members of the task force for their own research.]

Question: When it comes to government regulation of political activities, should the same rules that apply to individuals also apply to corporations, unions, and other groups, or should different rules apply to corporations, unions and other groups? Possible responses: same rules; different rules; no opinion / not sure Question: When it comes to government regulation of political activities, how common is it for government officials to misuse their authority in order to harass political opponents? Possible responses: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question: Please indicate to which of the following groups or people you donated money over the last four years. Select all that apply. Possible responses (mark all that apply): candidate for U.S. President; candidate for U.S. House or U.S. Senate; candidate for state office; candidate for local office; political party committee (such as the DNC or RNC); political action committee; other political committee; none of the above Question: Approximately how much did you contribute to all candidates and political committees over the last four years? Possible responses: specific dollar amount (open- ended)

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Questions Asked on the Preelection 2016 CCES Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the role of money in American politics? • There is too much money in politics. • Elective offices are for sale to the highest bidder. • Campaign contributions are the equivalent of bribes. • The campaign fi nance system is corrupt. • Campaign fi nance reform is needed to restore the integrity of American democracy.

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about campaign spending? • Campaign spending increases voter turnout in elections. • Campaign spending increases voters’ information about candidates. • Campaign spending decreases trust in government.

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust [randomize: government / elected officials in government] to do the right thing? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: just about always; most of the time; some of the time; hardly ever Question: The First Amendment became part of the U.S. Constitution more than 200 years ago. This is what it says: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Based on your own feelings about the First Amendment, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees.

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Possible responses: strongly agree; somewhat agree; no opinion / not sure; somewhat disagree; strongly disagree Question: First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. [Note: Some, but not all, questions below were asked in 2015 as well. In order to aggregate responses across all items, we consider only 2016 in the analysis.] Asked of half the sample • Do you think campaign spending by candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign spending by political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign contributions to candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign contributions to political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think lobbying by interest groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? Asked of half the sample • Do you think the ability of candidates, parties and political groups to communicate with voters should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties to communicate with voters should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of individuals to provide fi nancial support to candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of individuals to provide fi nancial support to

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political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of interest groups to communicate their views to public offi cials should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment?

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that government regulations of campaign fi nances are permissible, but only if such regulations limit corruption or the appearance of corruption. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question: In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that government cannot limit campaign spending by corporations, unions and other groups, as long as the spending is done independently and not coordinated with any political candidates. However, government can prohibit corporations and unions from making contributions directly to candidates. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question: Later in 2010, a federal appellate court ruled that government cannot limit contributions to political groups that run campaign advertisements, as long as these groups are independent and do not coordinate with political candidates. However, government can limit contributions to groups that are directly connected to political candidates. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign finance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure

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Question: When government regulates political activities, it may bring into confl ict the ideals of equality and liberty. Which statement better  represents your opinion about a potential tradeoff between these ideals? • It is more important that everyone is free to participate in political activities, even if this means some people or groups wield more influence in the political process. • It is more important that everyone has the same influence in the political process, even if this means restricting the participation of some people or groups.

Possible responses (order of alternatives randomized): Version 1: 1 = freedom is more important; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = equal influence is more important Version 2: 1 = equal influence is more important; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = freedom is more important

Question: Please indicate whether you believe each statement is TRUE or FALSE: • In nearly all cases, it is against the law for a company to fi re an employee because of his or her political views. • It is against the law for company officials to search government databases for the purpose of learning whether employees have made contributions to particular political campaigns. • It is a violation of federal privacy laws for people to search public databases to see whether their neighbors have contributed to particular political campaigns.

Possible responses for each item: true; false; don’t know Question: When it comes to government regulation of political activities, how common is it for government officials to misuse their authority in order to harass political opponents? Possible responses: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? • The government should be able to review campaign ads for accuracy before they are disseminated to the public.

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• In the last few weeks before an election, the government should be able to prevent the airing of documentaries or the publication of books that are critical of candidates. • In the last few weeks before an election, the government should be able to review news articles for accuracy before they are published. • The government should be able to regulate the content of news to make sure it is politically balanced. • The government should be able to regulate social media companies like Facebook to make sure that the information that these companies show users is politically balanced.

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? • It should be illegal for a company like Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream to include information on its products about which candidates support or oppose policies to prevent global warming. • It should be illegal for a company like ExxonMobil to post information on gas pumps regarding which candidates support or oppose policies to promote oil exploration in the United States.

Possible responses: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): Many states and localities allow people to vote directly on legislation via ballot measures (sometimes called initiatives or referenda). To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? • The government should prevent corporations from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures. • The government should prevent unions from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures. • The government should prevent interest groups from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures. • The government should prevent individuals from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures.

Possible responses: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree

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Question: Political activities are often described as “corrupt” or “crooked.” In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? [Randomize: An elected official / Your representative] supports a policy that is not supported by the voters . . . • in order to gain favorable media coverage. • because of pressure from party leaders. • in the hope of generating campaign contributions. • because of a promise made to a campaign contributor. • in order to benefit a favored special interest group. • because it is in the best interest of the country. • out of personal conviction about what is morally right. • in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage. • just to make the other political party look bad.

Possible responses for each item: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question: In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? An elected official meets with [randomize: a corporate lobbyist / a union lobbyist / party leaders / a non-profit group] to discuss pending legislation. Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • In a campaign appearance in front of a non-profit group, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that is favored by members of that group. • In a campaign appearance at a corporate headquarters, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that would benefit that corporation. • In a campaign appearance at a union hall, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that would benefit that union. • In a campaign appearance with party leaders, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that is favored by the party leadership.

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt

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Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • In a campaign appearance before the National Rifle Association (NRA), a candidate for elective office promises to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits. • A candidate for federal office who has received campaign contributions from the political action committee for the National Rifle Association (NRA) promises to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits. • A candidate for federal office who is endorsed by the National Rifle Association (NRA) promises to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits. • A candidate for federal office who has promised to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits is supported by independent advertising from the National Rifle Association (NRA).

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • In a campaign appearance before Planned Parenthood, a candidate for elective office promises to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. • A candidate for federal office who has received campaign contributions from the political action committee for Planned Parenthood promises to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. • A candidate for federal office who is endorsed by Planned Parenthood promises to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. • A candidate for federal office who has promised to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice is supported by independent advertising from Planned Parenthood.

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • A legislator agrees to oppose a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per

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hour in exchange for a promise from party leaders to increase federal highway funds in his district. • A legislator agrees to support a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise from party leaders to increase federal highway funds in his district. • A legislator agrees to oppose a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise of a better committee assignment from party leaders. • A legislator agrees to support a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise of a better committee assignment from party leaders.

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • A Republican legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a nonpartisan think tank. • A Democratic legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a nonpartisan think tank. • A Republican legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a conservative think tank. • A Democratic legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a liberal think tank.

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question: Would you say that corruption of public officials is widespread throughout government, limited to few individuals or offices, rare, or nonexistent? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: widespread throughout government; limited to a few individuals or offices; rare; nonexistent Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption through campaign fi nance reform, or is politics always corrupt?

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• Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption by reforming current ethics and election laws, or is politics always corrupt?

Possible responses: 1 = the right package of reforms will greatly reduce public corruption; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = reforms are ineffective and politics will always be corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Government should give taxpayer dollars to candidates to pay for their campaigns. • Candidates should be allowed to use public funds to pay for their campaigns.

Possible responses: 1 = strongly disagree; 2; 3; 4; 5 = strongly agree [Here we omit several questions about how often individuals seek out and use campaign fi nance data and how individuals use campaign information to make decisions; these questions were written by other members of the task force for their own research.]

Question: Approximately $6 billion is being spent by candidates, parties and other political groups on the 2016 Presidential and Congressional election. About what percent of this total do you think will be spent by super PACs? Possible responses: 0 percent to 100 percent (using sliding scale) Question: When it comes to government regulation of political activities, should the same rules that apply to individuals also apply to corporations, unions, and other groups, or should different rules apply to corporations, unions and other groups? Possible responses: same rules; different rules; no opinion / not sure [Here we omit several questions about how often individuals seek out and use campaign fi nance data and how individuals use campaign information to make decisions; these questions were written by other members of the task force for their own research.]

Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): Do you support or oppose the following proposal? • “Amend the Constitution to expand the power of government to regulate the use of money in the political system.” • “Amend the Constitution to expand the power of government to regulate political speech and the activities of political groups.”

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Possible responses: strongly support; somewhat support; no opinion / not sure; somewhat oppose; strongly oppose

Questions Asked on the Postelection 2016 CCES Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust [randomize: government / elected officials in government] to do the right thing? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: just about always; most of the time; some of the time; hardly ever Question: Would you say that corruption of public officials is widespread throughout government, limited to few individuals or offices, rare, or nonexistent? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: widespread throughout government; limited to a few individuals or offices; rare; nonexistent Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the role of money in American politics? • There is too much money in politics. • Elective offices are for sale to the highest bidder. • Campaign contributions are the equivalent of bribes. • The campaign fi nance system is corrupt. • Campaign fi nance reform is needed to restore the integrity of American democracy.

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • [Version A] Do you think that candidates and political groups that support candidates should be required to disclose information about their contributors and make it available to the public on the internet?

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• [Version B] If you make a contribution to a candidate or a political group that supports a candidate, should information about your contribution be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet?

Possible responses: yes, public disclosure should be required; yes, but only for large contributions [pop-up: how large a contribution should trigger required disclosure?]; no, public disclosure should not be required; not sure / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents to match randomization above): • [If Version A above] What kind of information about contributions to political candidates and groups that support candidates should be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet? • [If Version B above] What kind of information about your contributions to political candidates and groups that support candidates should be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet?

Possible responses (mark all that apply): amount of contribution; name of contributor; home address of contributor; union membership; name of contributor’s employer; none of the above; not sure / no opinion Question: Do you know approximately how large a contribution to a candidate for federal office has to be in order to trigger disclosure requirements? Possible responses: specific dollar amount (open- ended); don’t know Question: Do you know what kind of information must be disclosed about contributors to candidates for federal office? Possible responses (mark all that apply): amount of contribution; name of contributor; home address of contributor; union membership; name of contributor’s employer; none of the above; not sure / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents; respondents were asked about all items below the question): • Do you think government should limit contributions made by individuals to the following groups? • Do you think government should limit your contributions to the following groups? °

Candidates for elective office

Appendix A

196

°

Political parties

°

Political action committees that contribute directly to candidates

°

Political groups that independently support or oppose a candidate

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: Under current law, do you think the federal government limits contributions made by individuals to the following groups? • Candidates for federal office • National political parties • Political action committees that contribute directly to federal candidates • Political groups that independently support or oppose federal candidates

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; don’t know Question: Do you think government should limit the following activities? • The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate • Candidates’ use of personal funds for their campaigns • Contributions by parties to affi liated candidates • Contributions by political groups made directly to candidates • Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: Under current law, does the federal government limit the following activities? • The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate for federal office • Candidates for federal office using personal funds for their campaigns • Contributions by political parties to affi liated candidates for federal office • Contributions by political groups made directly to candidates for federal office • Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate for federal office

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; don’t know Question: Do you think government should limit/prohibit the following types of political activities by corporations and unions? • Contributions made directly to candidates • Contributions to groups that independently support or oppose candidates • Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate

CCES Background, Methodology, and Questions

197

Possible responses for each item: prohibit; limit; no limit; no opinion / not sure Question: Under current law, do you think government limits/prohibits the following types of political activities by corporations and unions? • Contributions made directly to candidates • Contributions to groups that independently support or oppose candidates • Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate

Possible responses for each item: prohibits; limits; does not limit; no opinion / not sure Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption through campaign fi nance reform, or is politics always corrupt? • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption by reforming current ethics and election laws, or is politics always corrupt?

Possible responses: 1 = the right package of reforms will greatly reduce public corruption; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = reforms are ineffective and politics will always be corrupt Question (preamble assigned randomly to respondents): • Donald Trump has stated that elections in the United States are rigged and that he ran against a rigged system . . . • A national reform group has stated that elections in the United States are rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy . . . • A legal scholar from a top national university has stated that elections in the United States are rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy . . . • Control (no preamble)

How confident are you in the honesty and integrity of the 2016 elections? Possible responses: 1 = no confidence; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = great confidence

Appendix B CCES Questions for Chapter 3 Questions Used to Construct Knowledge Score (All Asked in the 2015 and Postelection 2016 CCES) Question: Do you know what kind of information must be disclosed about contributors to candidates for federal office? Possible responses (mark all that apply): amount of contribution; name of contributor; home address of contributor; union membership; name of contributor’s employer; none of the above; not sure / no opinion Question: Under current law, do you think the federal government limits contributions made by individuals to the following groups? • Candidates for federal office • National political parties • Political action committees that contribute directly to federal candidates • Political groups that independently support or oppose federal candidates

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; don’t know Question: Under current law, does the federal government limit the following activities? • The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate for federal office • Candidates for federal office using personal funds for their campaigns • Contributions by political parties to affi liated candidates for federal office • Contributions by political groups made directly to candidates for federal office

Appendix B

200

• Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate for federal office

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; don’t know Question: Under current law, do you think government limits/prohibits the following types of political activities by corporations and unions? • Contributions made directly to candidates • Contributions to groups that independently support or oppose candidates • Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate

Possible responses for each item: prohibits; limits; does not limit; no opinion / not sure

Questions for Extension: Political Privacy Question (2015 and 2016 Post): Do you know approximately how large a contribution to a candidate for federal office has to be in order to trigger disclosure requirements? Possible responses: specific dollar amount (open- ended); don’t know Question (2016 Pre): Please indicate whether you believe each statement is TRUE or FALSE: • In nearly all cases, it is against the law for a company to fi re an employee because of his or her political views. • It is against the law for company officials to search government databases for the purpose of learning whether employees have made contributions to particular political campaigns. • It is a violation of federal privacy laws for people to search public databases to see whether their neighbors have contributed to particular political campaigns.

Possible responses for each item: true; false; don’t know

Questions for Extension: Super PACs Question (2015): In the 2014 Congressional election, about $3.5 billion was spent by candidates, parties and other political groups. About what percent of this total do you think was spent by super PACs?

CCES Questions for Chapter 3

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Possible responses: 0 percent to 100 percent (using sliding scale) Question (2016 Pre): Approximately $6 billion is being spent by candidates, parties and other political groups on the 2016 Presidential and Congressional election. About what percent of this total do you think will be spent by super PACs? Possible responses: 0 percent to 100 percent (using sliding scale)

Appendix C CCES Questions for Chapter 4 Questions Asked on the Preelection 2016 CCES Question: First Amendment: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. [Note: Some, but not all, questions below were asked in 2015 as well. In order to aggregate responses across all items, we consider only 2016 in the analysis.]

Asked of half the sample • Do you think campaign spending by candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign spending by political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign contributions to candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think campaign contributions to political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment?

Appendix C

204

• Do you think lobbying by interest groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? Asked of half the sample • Do you think the ability of candidates, parties and political groups to communicate with voters should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties to communicate with voters should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of individuals to provide fi nancial support to candidates, parties and political groups should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of individuals to provide fi nancial support to political groups that are independent of candidates or political parties should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment? • Do you think the ability of interest groups to communicate their views to public offi cials should be protected by the rights that are guaranteed in the First Amendment?

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that government cannot limit campaign spending by corporations, unions and other groups, as long as the spending is done independently and not coordinated with any political candidates. However, government can prohibit corporations and unions from making contributions directly to candidates. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question: Later in 2010, a federal appellate court ruled that government cannot limit contributions to political groups that run campaign advertisements, as long as these groups are independent and do not coordinate with political candidates. However, government can limit contributions to groups that are directly connected to political candidates. Do

CCES Questions for Chapter 4

205

you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): Do you support or oppose the following proposal? • “Amend the Constitution to expand the power of government to regulate the use of money in the political system.” • “Amend the Constitution to expand the power of government to regulate political speech and the activities of political groups.”

Possible responses: strongly support; somewhat support; no opinion / not sure; somewhat oppose; strongly oppose Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? • The government should be able to review campaign ads for accuracy before they are disseminated to the public. • In the last few weeks before an election, the government should be able to prevent the airing of documentaries or the publication of books that are critical of candidates. • In the last few weeks before an election, the government should be able to review news articles for accuracy before they are published. • The government should be able to regulate the content of news to make sure it is politically balanced. • The government should be able to regulate social media companies like Facebook to make sure that the information that these companies show users is politically balanced.

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? • It should be illegal for a company like Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream to include information on its products about which candidates support or oppose policies to prevent global warming. • It should be illegal for a company like ExxonMobil to post information on

Appendix C

206

gas pumps regarding which candidates support or oppose policies to promote oil exploration in the United States.

Possible responses: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): Many states and localities allow people to vote directly on legislation via ballot measures (sometimes called initiatives or referenda). To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? • The government should prevent corporations from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures. • The government should prevent unions from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures. • The government should prevent interest groups from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures. • The government should prevent individuals from communicating directly to voters about issues that appear on ballot measures.

Possible responses: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree

Questions Asked on the 2015 and Preelection 2016 CCES Question: When government regulates political activities, it may bring into confl ict the ideals of equality and liberty. Which statement better  represents your opinion about a potential tradeoff between these ideals? • It is more important that everyone is free to participate in political activities, even if this means some people or groups wield more influence in the political process. • It is more important that everyone has the same influence in the political process, even if this means restricting the participation of some people or groups.

Possible responses (order of alternatives randomized): Version 1: 1 = freedom is more important; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = equal influence is more important Version 2: 1 = equal influence is more important; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = freedom is more important

CCES Questions for Chapter 4

207

Question: The First Amendment became part of the US Constitution more than 200 years ago. This is what it says: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Based on your own feelings about the First Amendment, please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: The First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees. Possible responses: strongly agree; somewhat agree; no opinion / not sure; somewhat disagree; strongly disagree Question: In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that government regulations of campaign fi nances are permissible, but only if such regulations limit corruption or the appearance of corruption. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure

Appendix D CCES Questions for Chapter 5 Questions Asked on the 2015 CCES Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • (Version A) How common is it for elected officials to support policies that are not supported by the voters? • (Version B) How common is it for members of Congress to support policies that are not supported by the voters in their districts? • (Version C) How common is it for your representative in the US House to support policies that are not supported by the voters in your district? • (Version D) How common is it for the President to support policies that are not supported by the voters?

Possible responses: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question (preamble assigned randomly to respondents to match randomization above; respondents were asked about all items below the preambles): • [If Version A above] How common is it for elected officials to support policies . . . • [If Version B above] How common is it for members of Congress to support policies . . . • [If Version C above] How common is it for your representative in the US House to support policies . . . • [If Version D above] How common is it for the President to support policies . . .

Appendix D

210

°

in order to gain favorable media coverage?

°

because of pressure from party leaders?

°

in the hope of generating campaign contributions?

°

because of a promise made to a campaign contributor?

°

in order to benefit a favored special interest group?

°

because it is in the best interest of the country?

°

out of personal conviction about what is morally right?

°

in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage?

°

just to make the other political party look bad?

Possible responses for each item: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question (order of questions randomized): • Thinking about US elections, do you think all Americans have an equal chance to influence the elections process, or do you think wealthy Americans have more of a chance to influence the elections process than other Americans? • Thinking about US elections, do you think all Americans have an equal chance to influence the elections process, or do you think reporters for major media outlets like the New York Times and Wall Street Journal have more of a chance to influence the elections process than other Americans?

Possible responses for each item: equal influence; wealthy have more influence; don’t know / no answer

Questions Asked on the Preelection 2016 CCES Question: Political activities are often described as “corrupt” or “crooked.” In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? [Randomize: An elected official / your representative] supports a policy that is not supported by the voters . . . • in order to gain favorable media coverage. • because of pressure from party leaders. • in the hope of generating campaign contributions. • because of a promise made to a campaign contributor. • in order to benefit a favored special interest group. • because it is in the best interest of the country. • out of personal conviction about what is morally right.

CCES Questions for Chapter 5

211

• in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage. • just to make the other political party look bad.

Possible responses for each item: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question: In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? An elected official meets with [randomize: a corporate lobbyist / a union lobbyist / party leaders / a non-profit group] to discuss pending legislation. Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • In a campaign appearance in front of a non-profit group, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that is favored by members of that group. • In a campaign appearance at a corporate headquarters, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that would benefit that corporation. • In a campaign appearance at a union hall, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that would benefit that union. • In a campaign appearance with party leaders, a candidate for elective office promises to vote for a particular piece of legislation that is favored by the party leadership.

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • In a campaign appearance before the National Rifle Association (NRA), a candidate for elective office promises to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits. • A candidate for federal office who has received campaign contributions from the political action committee for the National Rifle Association (NRA) promises to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits. • A candidate for federal office who is endorsed by the National Rifle Asso-

Appendix D

212

ciation (NRA) promises to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits. • A candidate for federal office who has promised to support legislation making it easier for people to obtain concealed- carry permits is supported by independent advertising from the National Rifle Association (NRA).

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • In a campaign appearance before Planned Parenthood, a candidate for elective office promises to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. • A candidate for federal office who has received campaign contributions from the political action committee for Planned Parenthood promises to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. • A candidate for federal office who is endorsed by Planned Parenthood promises to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice. • A candidate for federal office who has promised to support legislation to always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice is supported by independent advertising from Planned Parenthood.

Possible responses: 1 = definitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = definitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • A legislator agrees to oppose a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise from party leaders to increase federal highway funds in his district. • A legislator agrees to support a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise from party leaders to increase federal highway funds in his district. • A legislator agrees to oppose a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise of a better committee assignment from party leaders. • A legislator agrees to support a bill raising the minimum wage to $12 per hour in exchange for a promise of a better committee assignment from party leaders.

CCES Questions for Chapter 5

213

Possible responses: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? • A Republican legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a nonpartisan think tank. • A Democratic legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a nonpartisan think tank. • A Republican legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a conservative think tank. • A Democratic legislator proposes a bill that is almost identical to “model legislation” written by a liberal think tank.

Possible responses: 1 = definitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = definitely corrupt

Question Asked on the Postelection 2016 CCES Question (preamble assigned randomly to respondents): • Donald Trump has stated that elections in the United States are rigged and that he ran against a rigged system . . . • A national reform group has stated that elections in the United States are rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy . . . • A legal scholar from a top national university has stated that elections in the United States are rigged in favor of corporations and the wealthy . . . • Control (no preamble)

How confident are you in the honesty and integrity of the 2016 elections? Possible responses: 1 = no confidence; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = great confidence

Questions Asked on the 2015, Preelection 2016, and Postelection 2016 CCES Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust [randomize: government / elected officials in government] to do the right thing? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Appendix D

214

Possible responses for each item: just about always; most of the time; some of the time; hardly ever Question: Would you say that corruption of public officials is widespread throughout government, limited to few individuals or offices, rare, or nonexistent? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: widespread throughout government; limited to a few individuals or offices; rare; nonexistent

Appendix E CCES Questions for Chapter 6 Question Asked on the Preelection 2016 CCES Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about campaign spending? • Campaign spending increases voter turnout in elections. • Campaign spending increases voters’ information about candidates. • Campaign spending decreases trust in government.

Possible responses to each question: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly agree

Questions Asked on the 2015 and Preelection 2016 CCES Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Government should give taxpayer dollars to candidates to pay for their campaigns. • Candidates should be allowed to use public funds to pay for their campaigns.

Possible responses: 1 = strongly disagree; 2; 3; 4; 5 = strongly agree Question: When it comes to government regulation of political activities, should the same rules that apply to individuals also apply to corporations, unions, and other groups, or should different rules apply to corporations, unions and other groups?

Appendix E

216

Possible responses: same rules; different rules; no opinion / not sure Question: When it comes to government regulation of political activities, how common is it for government officials to misuse their authority in order to harass political opponents? Possible responses: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion

Questions Asked on the 2015 and Postelection 2016 CCES Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • [Version A] Do you think that candidates and political groups that support candidates should be required to disclose information about their contributors and make it available to the public on the internet? • [Version B] If you make a contribution to a candidate or a political group that supports a candidate, should information about your contribution be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet?

Possible responses: yes, public disclosure should be required; yes, but only for large contributions [pop-up: how large a contribution should trigger required disclosure?]; no, public disclosure should not be required; not sure / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents to match randomization above): • [If Version A above] What kind of information about contributions to political candidates and groups that support candidates should be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet? • [If Version B above] What kind of information about your contributions to political candidates and groups that support candidates should be disclosed and made available to the public on the internet?

Possible responses (mark all that apply): amount of contribution; name of contributor; home address of contributor; union membership; name of contributor’s employer; none of the above; not sure / no opinion Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents; respondents were asked about all items below the question): • Do you think government should limit contributions made by individuals to the following groups?

CCES Questions for Chapter 6

217

• Do you think government should limit your contributions to the following groups? °

Candidates for elective office

°

Political parties

°

Political action committees that contribute directly to candidates

°

Political groups that independently support or oppose a candidate

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: Do you think government should limit the following activities? • The total amount of campaign spending by a candidate • Candidates’ use of personal funds for their campaigns • Contributions by parties to affi liated candidates • Contributions by political groups made directly to candidates • Campaign spending by groups that independently support or oppose a candidate

Possible responses for each item: yes; no; no opinion / not sure Question: Do you think government should limit/prohibit the following types of political activities by corporations and unions? • Contributions made directly to candidates • Contributions to groups that independently support or oppose candidates • Campaign spending that independently supports or opposes a candidate

Possible responses for each item: prohibit; limit; no limit; no opinion / not sure

Question Asked on the 2015, Preelection 2016, and Postelection 2016 CCES Question (wording assigned randomly to respondents): • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption through campaign fi nance reform, or is politics always corrupt? • Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption by reforming current ethics and election laws, or is politics always corrupt?

Possible responses: 1 = the right package of reforms will greatly reduce public corruption; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = reforms are ineffective and politics will always be corrupt

Appendix F Expert Survey Background, Methodology, and Questions Constructing the Sampling Frame

I

n June 2017, we used Google Scholar’s advanced search feature to search for the following terms (applying the “with all of the words” option): campaign fi nance; campaign contributions; campaign spending; campaign disclosure; campaign speech; money elections; American elections. We conducted one search per year from 1995– 2017 for each search term (so ninety- one searches in all). For the fi rst page of each search, we checked every result to verify that the research identified was relevant to the topic of money in American politics (e.g., was not about election forecasting). For works with multiple authors, we omitted coauthors from disparate fields with no other relevant scholarship or teaching experience (e.g., a scholar working exclusively on corporate fi nance or game theory). We also eliminated government officials, journalists, attorneys, public policy practitioners, and others who did not meet one of two criteria: (a) they currently had a university affi liation, or (b) they recently had a university affi liation and were presently engaged in scholarly endeavors, broadly defi ned. Finally, we eliminated individuals who did not readily have an email address available. This resulted in a sampling frame of 309 individuals.

Appendix F

220

Protocol After receiving approval from our schools’ human subjects review boards for the survey, on October 20, 2017, we sent an email to all individuals on our list from David Primo’s University of Rochester email account. This was done to alert the sample that the survey was on its way soon and to ensure that email addresses were valid. After updating the email addresses as needed, we used Qualtrics software to distribute the survey to participants. The software enables us to anonymize the survey responses, including who completed the survey and who chose not to do so. The fi rst email was sent out on October 23, 2017, and a reminder was sent on October 31, 2017, to those individuals who had not yet completed the survey (as identified by the Qualtrics software). On November 6, 2017, a fi nal reminder was sent to individuals who had still not completed the survey. The survey was closed on November 8, 2017, at 11:59 PM Pacific Time. In total, 152 individuals completed the survey and 158 answered at least some questions, for a response rate of 51 percent and a completion rate of 49 percent.

Expert Survey Questions Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the role of money in American politics? • There is too much money in politics. • Elective offices are for sale to the highest bidder. • Campaign contributions are the equivalent of bribes. • The campaign fi nance system is corrupt. • Campaign fi nance reform is needed to restore the integrity of American democracy.

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question: To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about campaign spending? • Campaign spending increases voter turnout in elections. • Campaign spending increases voters’ information about candidates. • Campaign spending decreases trust in government.

Expert Survey Background, Methodology, and Questions

221

Possible responses for each item: strongly agree; agree; neither agree nor disagree; disagree; strongly disagree Question: Political activities are often described as “corrupt” or “crooked.” In your opinion, are the following activities corrupt? An elected official supports a policy that is not supported by the voters . . . • in order to gain favorable media coverage. • because of pressure from party leaders. • in the hope of generating campaign contributions. • because of a promise made to a campaign contributor. • in order to benefit a favored special interest group. • because it is in the best interest of the country. • out of personal conviction about what is morally right. • in exchange for some personal fi nancial advantage. • just to make the other political party look bad.

Possible responses for each item: 1 = defi nitely not corrupt; 2; 3; 4; 5 = defi nitely corrupt Question: How common is it for elected officials to support policies that are not supported by the voters? Possible responses: almost always; very often; sometimes; hardly ever; never; don’t know / no opinion Question: Would you say that corruption of public officials is widespread throughout government, limited to few individuals or offices, rare, or nonexistent? • Federal government • State government • Local government

Possible responses for each item: widespread throughout government; limited to a few individuals or offices; rare; nonexistent Question: When government regulates political activities, it may bring into confl ict the ideals of equality and liberty. Answering on a scale from 1 to 7, which statement better represents your opinion about a potential tradeoff between these ideals? Possible responses (half the sample): 1 = it is more important that everyone is free to participate in political activities, even if this means some people or groups wield more influence in the political process; 2; 3; 4; 5;

222

Appendix F

6; 7 = it is more important that everyone has the same influence in the political process, even if this means restricting the participation of some people or groups Possible responses (half the sample): 1 = it is more important that everyone has the same influence in the political process, even if this means restricting the participation of some people or groups; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = it is more important that everyone is free to participate in political activities, even if this means some people or groups wield more influence in the political process Question: In 1976, the Supreme Court ruled that government regulation of campaign fi nances is permissible, but only if such regulations limit corruption or the appearance of corruption. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question: In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled that government cannot limit campaign spending by corporations, unions and other groups, as long as the spending is done independently and not coordinated with any political candidates. However, government can prohibit corporations and unions from making contributions directly to candidates. Do you think this ruling goes too far in protecting First Amendment rights, or does it go too far in giving government power to regulate campaign fi nance? Possible responses: this ruling goes too far in protecting rights; this ruling is about right; this ruling goes too far in giving government power to regulate; no opinion / not sure Question: On a scale from 1 to 7: Is it possible to address the problem of political corruption through campaign fi nance reform, or is politics always corrupt? Possible responses: 1 = the right package of reforms will greatly reduce public corruption; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7 = reforms are ineffective and politics will always be corrupt Question: Do you support or oppose the following proposal? “Amend

Expert Survey Background, Methodology, and Questions

223

the Constitution to expand the power of government to regulate the use of money in the political system.” Possible responses: strongly support; somewhat support; no opinion / not sure; somewhat oppose; strongly oppose Question: What is your primary occupation? Possible responses: political science faculty; law school faculty; economics faculty; business school faculty; other faculty or university appointment Question: In general, how would you describe your own political viewpoint? Possible responses: very liberal; liberal; moderate; conservative; very conservative; not sure Question: Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a . . . ? Possible responses: Democrat; Republican; independent; other Follow-up Question (if answered Democrat or Republican): Would you call yourself a strong [Democrat/Republican] or not so strong [Democrat/Republican]? Possible responses: strong; not so strong Follow-up Question (if answered independent or other): Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic or Republican party? Possible responses: the Democratic Party; the Republican Party; neither; not sure Question: For which candidate for President of the United States did you vote in the 2016 general election? Possible responses: Donald Trump (Republican); Hillary Clinton (Democrat); Gary Johnson (Libertarian); Jill Stein (Green); other; I didn’t vote in this election

Appendix G Survey Questions for Chapter 8

T

he analyses in chapter 8 rely on data from fi fty- one different surveys from 1987– 2017. Below we list the surveys along with their sample sizes, organized by question subversion. (The number of usable observations from each survey may differ from the numbers below due to data availability.) The question wording may vary slightly within subversion.

Version 1A: Trust and Confidence How much trust and confidence do you have in your state government to do a good job in carrying out its responsibilities? 1. A great deal 2. A fair amount 3. Not very much 4. None at all

Surveys Gallup 1987: N = 1,044 Gallup 1992: N = 1,045 Pew 1997: N = 1,503 Meyner Center 1999: N = 1,007 Meyner Center 2002: N = 1,036

226

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Meyner Center 2004: N = 1,000 Meyner Center 2009: N = 1,004

Version 1B: Trust and Confidence How much trust and confidence do you have in your state government when it comes to handling state problems? 1. A great deal 2. A fair amount 3. Not very much 4. None at all

Surveys Pew 1997: N = 1,762 Gallup 1998: N = 1,055 Gallup 2001: N = 1,004 Gallup 2003: N = 1,025 Gallup 2004: N = 1,022 Gallup 2005: N = 921 Gallup 2007: N = 1,010 Gallup 2008: N = 1,007 Gallup 2009: N = 1,026 Gallup 2010: N = 1,019 Gallup 2011: N = 1,017 Gallup 2012: N = 1,017

Version 2A: Confidence And now I will name some other institutions in America. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one . . . (state government). 1. A great deal 2. Quite a lot 3. Some

Survey Questions for Chapter 8

227

4. Very Little 5. None (vol.)

Surveys Gallup 1994: N = 1,509 Gallup 1996: N = 2,719 Gallup 1996: N = 2,047 Gallup 1998: N = 1,035 UVA 2000: N = 1,203 Hart Teeter 2004: N = 1,637

Version 2B: Confidence And now I will name some other institutions in America. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one . . . (state government). 1. A great deal 2. Some 3. Not very much 4. No confidence at all

Survey Belden 2007: N = 1,633

Version 2C: Confidence How much confidence do you have in . . . (government leaders in your state, including the governor and the state legislature)—a great deal, a moderate amount, not much, or none at all? 1. A great deal 2. A moderate amount 3. Not much 4. None at all

228

Appendix G

Survey Harvard/USNWR 2005: N = 1,374

Version 3A: Trust How much of the time do you trust your state government to do what is right? 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time 3. Only some of the time 4. None of the time (vol.)

Surveys ABC/WaPo 1990: N = 1,518 ABC/WaPo 1990: N = 1,011 ABC/WaPo 1991: N = 1,536 ABC/WaPo 1995: N = 1,524 CNN 2010: N = 1,023

Version 3B: Trust How much of the time do you trust your state government to do what is right? 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time 3. Only some of the time 4. None of the time

Survey Kaiser/Harvard/NPR 2000: N = 1,557

Survey Questions for Chapter 8

229

Version 3C: Trust How much of the time do you trust your state government to do the right thing? 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time 3. Only some of the time 4. None of the time (vol.)

Survey Harvard/Kaiser/WaPo 1995: N = 1,514

Version 3D: Trust How much of the time do you trust the state government in the state where you live to do what is right? 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time 3. Only some of the time 4. None of the time (vol.)

Survey ABC 1996: N = 1,024

Version 3E: Trust How much of the time do you think you can trust your state government to do what is right? 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time

230

Appendix G

3. Only some of the time 4. None of the time

Survey NORC 1996: N = 1,200

Version 3F: Trust Next I’m going to read a list of institutions. For each one, please tell me whether you feel that you can trust them a lot, some, only a little, or not at all . . . (your state government). 1. A lot 2. Some 3. Only a little 4. Not at all

Survey Pew 1997: N = 1,003

Version 3G: Trust How much of the time do you think you can trust government? Please answer for each level of government listed below . . . (state government). 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time 3. Some of the time 4. Hardly ever

Surveys (all from CCES; MIZ = University of Missouri module; CFT = campaign fi nance task force module) 2007 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2008 (MIZ): N = 1,000

Ta ble G.1 Survey observations by state State

N

State

N

AK AL AR AZ CA CO CT DE FL GA HI IA ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS

28 932 605 1,002 5,935 990 691 213 3,180 1,671 75 726 321 2,356 1,361 639 919 908 1,340 1,183 373 2,016 1,199 1,348 573

MT NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA RI SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY

281 1,796 153 0 (see note) 345 1,611 369 417 4,026 2,509 751 909 3,154 253 819 185 1,304 3,923 537 1,553 204 1,492 1,316 479 147

Note: Total N = 59,117. All values are net of observations dropped due to missing data or, in the case of Nebraska, because it has a nonpartisan legislature.

Figure G.1. Survey observations by year Note: N = 59,117 across all years. This figure excludes observations dropped due to missing data and Nebraska because it has a nonpartisan legislature.

232

Appendix G

2009 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2010 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2011 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2012 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2013 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2014 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2015 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2015 (CFT): N = 2,000 2016 (MIZ): N = 1,000 2016 (CFT): N = 2,000 2017 (MIZ): N = 1,000

Version 3H: Trust (Split Sample) On a scale from 0 to 100 . . . What percent of the time do you think you can trust the government in [state] to do what is best for [state]? OR How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in [state] to do what is right? Just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? 1. Just about always 2. Most of the time 3. Only some of the time 4. Never (vol.)

Survey ANES 2006; N = 675

Notes Chapter One 1. Barack Obama, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” 1 Pub. Papers 75 (January 27, 2010). 2. Barack Obama, “Remarks at a Rally for Gubernatorial Candidate Mark B. Dayton in Minneapolis, Minnesota,” 2 Pub. Papers 1668 (October 23, 2010). 3. Barack Obama, “Address by President Obama to the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” September 20, 2016, https://obamawhitehouse .archives .gov/the -press -office/ 2016/ 09/ 20/address -president-obama-71st-session -united-nations-general-assembly; and Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President in Farewell Address,” January 10, 2017, https://obamawhitehouse.archives .gov/the-press-office/2017/01/10/remarks-president-farewell-address. 4. Hillary Clinton, “American Democracy Is in Crisis,” Atlantic, September 16, 2018. 5. “Republican Candidates Debate in Cleveland, Ohio,” August 6, 2015, online transcript, by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley as part of the American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=110489. 6. “The David Rubenstein Show: Anthony Kennedy,” Bloomberg, November 28, 2018, video, 48:01, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2018 -11-28/the -david-rubenstein-show-anthony-kennedy-video?srnd=peer-to -peer. 7. Campaign Legal Center, “Why Our Democracy Needs Disclosure,” August 17, 2011, https://campaignlegal.org/update/why-our-democracy-needs -disclosure. 8. Sarah Kleiner, “Democrats Say Citizens United Should Die. Here’s Why That Won’t Happen,” Center for Public Integrity, September 1, 2017, https:// publicintegrity.org/ federal -politics/democrats -say -citizens -united -should -die -heres-why-that-wont-happen/. 9. Fred Wertheimer, “Legalized Bribery,” Politico, January 19, 2014.

234

Notes to Chapter one

10. RepresentUs, “Unscripted: This Is What Corruption Really Costs Us,” YouTube, January 12, 2017, video, 1:44, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0p _yn2riyzk&feature=youtu.be. 11. RepresentUs, “Unbreaking America: A NEW Short Film about Solving the Corruption Crisis,” YouTube, February 27, 2019, video, 12:36, https://www .youtube.com/watch?v=TfQij4aQq1k&feature=youtu.be. 12. Michael Beckel, “What Is Political ‘Dark Money,’ and Is It Bad?,” Center for Public Integrity, January 20, 2016, https://publicintegrity.org/federal-politics/ what-is-political-dark-money-and-is-it-bad/. 13. Lawrence Lessig, “Campaign Finance and the Nihilist Politics of Resignation,” Atlantic, April 10, 2014. 14. Versions of the phrases in this sentence appear as headings in the Samples citation. 15. Nancy Pelosi and John Sarbanes, “The Democratic Majority’s First Order of Business: Restore Democracy,” Washington Post, November 25, 2018. 16. Sheldon Whitehouse, “Whitehouse Introduces DISCLOSE Act to Restore Americans’ Trust in Democracy,” news release, April 11, 2019, https:// www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/whitehouse-introduces-disclose-act-to -restore-americans-trust-in-democracy. 17. Tom Steyer, “Tom Steyer Announces Candidacy for President,” news release, July 9, 2019, https://www.tomsteyer.com/press/tom-steyer-announces -candidacy-for-president/. 18. Third Way, “Third Way Nationwide Registered Voter Project,” https:// www.thirdway.org/polling/december-2015 -national-poll-of-registered-voters. 19. For an overview of the term corruption and its uses in campaign fi nance law, see Strauss (1994) and Burke (1997). 20. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 21. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 22. SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 559 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 24. Persily and Lammie (2004, 124) discuss the “unique place of public opinion in campaign fi nance law.” 25. When we asked Americans the same questions after the 2016 election, Trump voters, Republicans, and conservatives were somewhat less cynical than before the election—but not by much. Clinton voters, Democrats, and liberals were roughly constant in their cynicism. 26. Bridget Bowman, “Corporate PACs in Spotlight as Candidates Reject Their Money,” Roll Call, August 16, 2018, https://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/ corporate-pacs-in-spotlight-as-candidates-reject-their-money. 27. University of Rochester, “Political Scientists Nationwide Voice Concerns about Trump Presidency,” news release, November 7, 2016, https://www

Notes to Chapters one and two

235

.rochester.edu/newscenter/political-scientists -nationwide -voice -concerns -about -trump -presidency. 28. Bright Line Watch, “Home,” accessed on September 27, 2019, http:// brightlinewatch.org/. 29. Democratic Erosion, “About,” accessed on September 27, 2019, http:// democratic-erosion.com/. 30. Gallup Organization, “Gallup News Service Poll: Clinton/Presidential Campaigns/Military, Nov, 1996,” dataset, USAIPOGNS1996- 9611036, Version 3 (Cornell University, Ithaca, NY: Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, RoperExpress). 31. Looking across time using these same surveys, overall support for these three regulations has declined markedly. For instance, in 1996, 72 percent of Democrats supported limited individual contributions to political parties. In 2015 and 2016, only 58 percent felt the same way. 32. Charles Stewart, “Graphic of the Week #1: Polarization in State Voter Confidence,” Election Updates (blog), June 5, 2017, https://electionupdates .caltech .edu/ 2017/ 06/ 05/ graphic -of -the -week-1 -polarization -in -state -voter -confidence. 33. Brennan Center for Justice, “Appearance of Corruption,” May 31, 2012, http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/appearance-corruption. 34. A handful of questions were written by other task force members. We do not use these questions in our analyses, nor do we list them in appendix A.

Chapter Two 1. There are other forms of money in the political system besides campaign contributions (e.g., spending on lobbying). The arguments in this chapter also apply to lobbying, but we focus primarily on campaign fi nance. 2. CNN / Opinion Research Corporation, CNN Opinion Research Poll, June 3– 7, 2011, http://i2 .cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/images/06/09/rel10d-2 .pdf. 3. Barack Obama, “Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union,” 1 Pub. Papers 75 (January 27, 2010). 4. See Issacharoff and Karlan (1999) and Smith (2001) for further discussion. 5. In a classic political science work, David Easton refers to a “hydraulic theory of power” he attributes to a 1908 work by Arthur Bentley. Easton (1953, 177– 78) describes the theory as follows: “The pressure among interests over the content of social policy can be described as a ‘push and resistance between groups’ for control of governmental apparatus. Pressure here seems to be transmitted from one group to the other in much the same way as hydraulic pressure exerts its force on objects.” 6. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) challenge Lott’s fi ndings

236

Notes to Chapters two and three

using state gubernatorial elections, fi nding that expenditures (made possible by donations) in gubernatorial elections are related to a state’s economic performance but not its government expenditures. This fi nding is consistent with the view of campaign contributions as consumption goods, since consumers tend to purchase more consumption goods as their income increases. 7. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 8. Persily and Lammie (2004, 122) express a general frustration with how campaign fi nance decisions have displayed “the alternating tendencies of the word ‘corruption’ to mean everything and nothing.” 9. Robert Reich, “#12. Most Important of All: Get Big Money Out of Politics,” blog, June 22, 2015, http://robertreich.org/post/122221596470 (emphasis in original). 10. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett 564 U.S. 721 (2011; dissenting opinion). 11. McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, 572 U.S. 185 (2014; dissenting opinion). 12. There is another possibility, as well, which is that when reformers refer to “the will of the people,” they are thinking of a Rousseauvian “general will,” where individuality is subsumed for the good of the collective. However, so long as voting is used to divine “the general will,” everything we have just written applies. 13. Celestine Bohlen, “American Democracy Is Drowning in Money,” New York Times, September 20, 2017. 14. Lessig (2011, 272) acknowledges that the public fi nancing program he proposes will not address “all the troubles that confront this democracy,” though he believes it is a “fi rst step.”

Chapter Three 1. American National Election Studies, “The ANES 2016 Time Series Study” (dataset), Stanford University and the University of Michigan, https:// electionstudies.org/data-center/2016 -time-series-study/. 2. Gibson and Caldeira (2009) argue that open- ended questions of this type understate Americans’ knowledge about the Supreme Court, and they show that Americans perform better on multiple choice questions. See Lupia (2006) and Prior and Lupia (2008) for a more general critique of knowledge questions asked on surveys. 3. Bianca DiJulio, Jamie Firth, and Mollyann Brodie, “Data Note: Americans’ Views on the U.S. Role in Global Health,” Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, January 23, 2015, https://www.kff.org/global-health-policy/poll-fi nding/data -note-americans-views-on-the-u-s-role-in-global-health/.

Notes to Chapter three

237

4. We did not ask about occupation because it is similar to employer. The threshold is technically $200.01, since reporting is required for contributions in excess of $200.00, but we use $200.00 in the text to simplify the discussion. 5. We inadvertently asked about home address rather than mailing address in our survey. However, given that the proportion of correct answers was nearly identical for the address question and the employer question, we are confident in our fi ndings. The correlation between the knowledge scores calculated with and without this question is close to 1. 6. The questions about corporations and unions inadvertently omitted the fact that they pertained to federal elections, but prior questions on the survey were focused on federal law, so we are confident that respondents were not considering state laws in their answers. The correlation between the knowledge scores calculated with and without these questions is close to 1. 7. We treat skips on knowledge questions as equivalent to answering “don’t know” and combine these responses into a “no answer” column in table 3.1. 8. As a check that campaign fi nance law is more obscure than other types of election regulations, we can compare these fi ndings to two other areas of election law that may be more salient for voters: term limits and same- day voter registration. Questions about both topics were asked in a 2016 CCES module directed by Milyo, and for both sets of laws, approximately one-third of the respondents knew whether their state had the policy in place. 9. For the fourteen two-part questions, we award half a point for correct answers and deduct half a point for incorrect answers. For the three questions that have three answer options, those amounts are 0.67 and −0.33, respectively, to account for the lower likelihood of getting a correct answer by guessing. 10. There are some minimal restrictions on how federal campaign fi nance disclosure data may be used by others. For instance, this data cannot be used by another entity to build a mailing list for future solicitations (11 C.F.R. 104.15). 11. State-by-state as well as federal exceptions exist that vary in scope (see Volokh 2012). 12. This threshold is for contributions made directly to candidates. For a discussion of how even tiny contributions of as little as a $1 to a candidate may be subject to disclosure if made through “conduits” such as the Democratic group ActBlue or its Republican equivalent, WinRed, see David M. Primo, “Personal Data about Small-Donor Democrats Is All Over the Internet,” New York Times, August 18, 2019. 13. These calculations are based on data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics and available at www.opensecrets.org. 14. Shaw, Roberts, and Blass (2012), in a survey conducted right before the Citizens United decision, identify much the same pattern but also fi nd that respondents tend to understate how much is spent on Senate campaigns even as they overstate how much is spent on House campaigns.

238

Notes to Chapters three, four, and five

15. LaMarre (2013) fi nds similar effects using an experimental design where respondents are exposed to various treatments, including a clip of The Colbert Report.

Chapter Four 1. This balance is less liberty-leaning than in Shaw, Roberts, and Blass (2012), who asked a differently worded question that is similar in spirit to ours. 2. In an analysis regressing the liberty versus equality scale on ideology, party, and demographic variables, these differences are all statistically significant. 3. In an analysis regressing answers to the First Amendment question on ideology, party, and demographic variables, these partisan differences are statistically significant, while the ideological differences are not. 4. We suspect that many more Americans would have expressed hostility to the Citizens United decision had we mentioned it explicitly, given the rhetoric used by many to describe the decision. Many reformers and politicians have called for a constitutional amendment to overturn the decision.

Chapter Five 1. Emily Bazelon, “Is the Election ‘Rigged’?,” New York Times Magazine, June 7, 2016. 2. Alice Miranda Ollstein, “Clinton Announces Campaign Finance Reform Plan, Includes More Donor Disclosure,” Think Progress, September 9, 2015, https:// thinkprogress .org/ clinton -announces -campaign -finance -reform -plan -includes-more-donor-disclosure-bf20d248924a/. 3. Lessig, Lawrence, “Lessig on Equal Citizens,” YouTube, August 10, 2015,  video, 38:42, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pb_aXrjSorw&feature= youtu.be. 4. Fred Wertheimer, “U.S. Politics Are Rigged. It’s Time for a Small-Donor Revolution,” NBC News, October 29, 2017, https://www.nbcnews.com/think/ opinion/u-s-politics-are-rigged-it-s-time-small-donor-ncna815181. 5. “Americans’ Views on Money in Politics,” New York Times, June 2, 2015, https:// www.nytimes .com/ interactive/ 2015/ 06/ 02/ us/ politics/ money-in -politics -poll.html. 6. “Voters Say Money, Media Have Too Much Political Clout,” Rasmussen Reports, February 16, 2016, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public _content/ politics/general _politics/ february_2016/ voters _say_money_media _have _too _much _political _clout. 7. Concerns about media bias are not new. According to Rasmussen Reports,

Notes to Chapter five

239

more voters distrusted the media than big campaign contributors in polling dating back to 2008. 8. We asked the question with slight wording variations. However, the differences were trivial, so we present the results combining the questions. We control for question version in any regressions we report in this section. 9. If we regress the changes in trust and corruption on ideology, party, and demographics along with state fi xed effects and clustered standard errors, we fi nd that there is a statistically significant difference between the changes in Republican trust compared with the changes in Democratic trust pre- and postelection. However, we cannot say that there are differences between Republican and Democratic shifts in perceptions of corruption after the election. The same is true if we replace respondents’ parties with their vote choices in the 2016 presidential race. 10. David M. Primo and Trung A. Dang, “Markets Weren’t Spooked by a President Trump,” Wall Street Journal, November 14, 2016. 11. If we consider only questions asked in the preelection 2016 survey (i.e., omit CF knowledge and politically active) to increase our sample size for the analysis of corruption scope index, the effect of social media is no longer statistically significant, while the effect of political interest is positive and statistically significant. 12. Our fi ndings on general political knowledge relate to recent work by Donovan and Bowler (forthcoming), who fi nd that knowledge about Congress makes respondents more likely to view unlimited independent expenditures by corporations and unions as corrupt but less likely to view direct contributions to congressional candidates as corrupt. Our questions are not comparable to theirs, but one reason they may fi nd a negative effect of knowledge on attitudes toward direct contributions is that they ask about whether a $5,000 contribution used to buy TV ads is corrupt, and somebody knowledgeable about Congress is more likely to know that $5,000 is a relatively small amount of campaign money in the context of a campaign for federal office. 13. “What Would You Do If You Were CEO?,” Public Affairs Council, September 1, 2015, https://pac.org/pulse/?p=484. 14. We measure support for gun control by the binary answer to the following CCES Common Content question: “On the issue of gun regulation, do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? ‘Ban assault rifles.’” We measure support for abortion limits by the binary answer to the following CCES Comment Content question: “Do you support or oppose each of the following proposals? ‘Always allow a woman to obtain an abortion as a matter of choice.’” 15. Barbara J. Easterling, “ALEC: The New-and-Improved Political Corruption,” Huffi ngton Post, March 21, 2014, last modified December 6, 2017. 16. Deena Zaru, “Sasse Warns of ‘Weaponizing Distrust’ after Trump’s Media Attacks,” CNN, July 2, 2017.

240

Notes to Chapters five and six

17. John Cassidy, “Alexandria Ocasio- Cortez’s Message to the Democratic Party,” New Yorker, June 29, 2018. We offer a specific cite for politics of plutocracy because we had not encountered the phrase in multiple settings prior to researching this section. 18. A Google search for [“flood of money” campaigns] on July 5, 2018, returned over 600,000 hits. 19. Letter from US Senators, June 27, 2018, https://www.whitehouse.senate .gov/imo/media/doc/ DISCLOSE%20Hearing%20Letter%20Signed.pdf. 20. Patricia Cohen, Kenneth P. Vogel, and Jim Tankersley, “I.R.S. Will No Longer Force Kochs and Other Groups to Disclose Donors,” New York Times, July 17, 2018. 21. Russell Muirhead and Nancy L. Rosenblum, “‘Rigged Election’ Claims Degrade Democracy, But ‘Rigged System’ Charges Enhance It,” American Prospect, November 7, 2016. For further background on the use of the term rigged in politics historically, see Emily Bazelon, “Is the Election ‘Rigged’?,” New York Times Magazine, June 7, 2016. 22. Gerald F. Seib, “If Faith in Democracy Ebbs, Danger Rises,” Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2018. 23. Tyler Cole, “How to Talk about Campaign Finance Reform,” Third Way, May 9, 2016, http://www.thirdway.org/memo/ how-to -talk-about-campaign -fi nance-reform. 24. William A. Galston, “Populism’s Challenge to Democracy,” Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2018. 25. Curtlyn Kramer and Norman Eisen, “Finding Solutions to the Campaign Finance Crisis,” Brookings Institution FixGov Blog, January 29, 2016, https:// www.brookings .edu/ blog/ fi xgov/ 2016/ 01/ 29/ fi nding-solutions -to -the -campaign -fi nance-crisis/.

Chapter Six 1. Nicholas Confessore and Megan Thee-Brenan, “Poll Shows Americans Favor an Overhaul of Campaign Financing,” New York Times, June 2, 2015. 2. State of Arizona, Citizens Clean Elections Act, A.R.S., title 16, chapter 6, article 2, §16– 940. 3. We fi rst encountered the use of this phrase in the disclosure context in Carpenter (2007). 4. Prior to asking this set of questions, we had asked respondents within the same experimental treatment whether they supported disclosure of contributor information / “information about . . . your contributions” (depending on the treatment) for no contributions, all contributions, or large contributions. (Those who answered “large contributions” were then asked to provide a dollar figure.)

Notes to Chapter six

241

About 31 percent of the respondents answered “no disclosure” to the general question but then indicated support for specific forms of disclosure. About 9 percent indicated support for disclosure generally but then did not support any specific reforms. This is a puzzle, but one possibility for the fi rst anomaly is that respondents were not sure what disclosure entailed but became more open to it once specific options were presented. The second anomaly might be due to a related issue: in the fi rst question, disclosure may have sounded good in theory, but these respondents became less enthusiastic once presented with specific options. 5. For the question regarding individual contribution limits, half the sample was asked about individual contributions, and the other half was asked about “your contributions.” In contrast with the disclosure experiment, the treatment effects were minimal, so we combine the replies in our analysis. 6. In addition to asking Americans where they stood on a dozen possible restrictions on spending and contributions, we also asked them whether they believed that “the same rules that apply to individuals [should] also apply to corporations, unions, and other groups.” Majorities of Democrats, Republicans, and True Believers agreed. Yet 37 percent of the respondents gave inconsistent answers on this question and questions about specific regulations. For example, it is inconsistent to agree that the same rules that apply to individuals should also apply to corporations and then answer that there should be no limits on individual contributions but limits on corporate contributions. Democrats were more inconsistent than Republicans. One possibility for the inconsistency is that the socially desirable answer is that the rules should be the same. Another possibility is that respondents interpreted the question to mean that if a rule applies to an individual, it should also apply to a corporation, but not necessarily vice versa. Of the inconsistent responders, only 11 percent supported stricter regulations for individuals compared with corporations and unions. 7. Questions asking about restrictions on spending and giving by corporations and unions gave respondents a choice of “no limit,” “limit,” or “prohibit.” Surprisingly, only about one in six Americans support the existing federal ban on direct corporate and union contributions to candidates. The level of support is not much larger for True Believers: 19 percent. We combine the “limit” and “prohibit” answers in our analyses. 8. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, about two-thirds of contributions to super PACs in 2016 were made by individuals. See Center for Responsive Politics, “Super PACs: How Many Donors Give,” accessed on August  23, 2018, https://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_stats.php ?cycle=2016. 9. For 2016, the year of analysis, the means (standard deviations) of these independent variables are as follows: increases turnout = 3.03 (1.00); increases information = 2.99 (1.05); reduces trust = 3.78 (0.98); super PAC low spending = 0.07 (0.25); super PAC high spending = 0.42 (0.49).

242

Notes to Chapters six, seven, and eight

10. The results are qualitatively similar if we split the policies into current restrictions and potential restrictions. 11. Bradley A. Smith, “Statement for the Record, in the Matter of The Coalition, National Republican Congressional Committee, et al., MUR 4624,” Federal Election Commission, November 7, 2001, p. 2, https://www.fec.gov/fi les/ legal/murs/current/35100.pdf.

Chapter Seven 1. See Benoit and Wiesehomeier (2009) for an overview of expert surveys in political science. 2. See Bright Line Watch, “Bright Line Watch Survey Report: Wave 6,” August 1, 2018, http:// brightlinewatch.org/wave6/. 3. To create this figure, we transformed responses into binary variables. For instance, we defi ned support for a constitutional amendment as answering “strongly support” or “somewhat support” when asked, “Do you support or oppose the following proposal? ‘Amend the Constitution to expand the power of government to regulate the use of money in the political system.’” 4. Comparisons in this chapter are to identically worded questions. In cases where the wording in the CCES sample differed across respondents due to an experimental design, we used responses to the version where the wording was identical to the expert survey. In cases where we asked the same CCES respondent a question before and after the election, we use the preelection replies. 5. One expert who received our survey emailed us to suggest that this question was vague, as it is not clear which voters we are referring to. This was intentional on our part, as given the challenges of preference aggregation, elected officials could be responsive to voter preferences in any number of ways. A legislator might consider the preferences of only the most intense voters on a particular issue, may pay particular attention to the preferences of primary voters in a lopsided district, and so on.

Chapter Eight An earlier version of this chapter was prepared by Jeffrey Milyo as a working paper titled “Do State Campaign Finance Reforms Increase Trust and Confidence in State Government?” 1. “Pols Weigh in on Citizens United Decision,” Politico, January 21, 2010. 2. Initiative 1464 (Wash. 2016), https://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets/elections/ initiatives/fi naltext _997.pdf.

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243

3. Corruption is a notoriously difficult concept to measure. Convictions for political corruption are rare, and since such convictions are produced by a political process that may itself be compromised, it is unclear to what extent convictions are a meaningful measure of corruption (Boylan and Long 2003). Nevertheless, scholars frequently employ convictions for public corruption as proxies for political corruption in the United States (Cordis and Milyo 2016). Cordis and Milyo (2014) examine public corruption convictions among state-level officials over several years; this differences-in- differences approach reveals no consistent relationship between corruption and state campaign fi nance regulations. 4. The direction of the endogeneity bias is uncertain due to countervailing forces. States may adopt more restrictive campaign fi nance regulations in response to perceived corruption (leading to a downward bias). On the other hand, states that adopt more restrictive regulations may also have populations that exhibit less cynicism about the efficacy of government intervention in general (leading to an upward bias). 5. We do not weight the survey data because some of the surveys in our dataset (a) use weights to establish representativeness in ways that give extremely different weights to some observations or (b) do not include weights. In addition, given the sheer number of surveys from multiple sources, making the weights comparable across the surveys would require some methodological contortions. Especially given that the benefits of weighting in regressions are highly debated, we err on the side of methodological simplicity. 6. If a respondent volunteered an answer—say, for example, “none of the time”—we calculated that respondent’s latent scale based on the possible responses in the question plus the volunteered option. 7. We defi ne public fi nancing as the provision of funds to candidates that agree to abide by a voluntary spending limit. Some states provide candidates or parties with small and unconditional subsidies, but this is not typically what most scholars mean when they refer to public fi nancing. 8. We categorize education slightly differently than in earlier chapters: no high school degree; some college; and four-year college degree or higher. High school degree is the omitted category. We also combine Hispanic and other race in this chapter’s specifications. 9. Age and income are not measured in the same way across all surveys. For example, respondent age is sometimes reported in continuous years and sometimes only as a range (with categories differing across surveys); a similar problem exists for income. For both measures, we assign values according to the midpoint of each range, or the top- coded value (i.e., if a respondent answers $100,000 or more for her income range, it is coded as $100,000), with income adjusted for inflation. 10. The results are qualitatively similar if we instead drop observations with

244

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income or party missing. Other demographic variables, such as age and race, also have some missing data; we simply drop observations with missing data on these demographic variables, as they are missing at much lower rates. 11. The results are qualitatively similar if we instead include indicator variables for each poll in lieu of the response and version indicator variables. 12. Miller and Panagopoulos (2011), referenced earlier in the chapter, use a single year of survey data to study Clean Elections reforms. 13. Independent is coded 1 for individuals who do not identify as a Republicans or Democrats. Individuals for whom party is missing are coded as 0 for independent and 1 for party missing. We created separate interaction terms for party missing but do not report the results. 14. Russ Feingold and Ro Khanna, “A New Approach to Big Money in Politics,” Concord Monitor, May 15, 2018. 15. Some scholars have made a positive link between public opinion and BCRA. In McConnell v. FEC, a case challenging the law, Robert Y. Shapiro served as an expert for the defendants in support of the public opinion justification for campaign fi nance law. One of us, Primo, was an expert on behalf of the plaintiffs.

Chapter Nine 1. Reform First homepage, accessed on October 4, 2019, http://reformfi rst .com/. 2. Nancy Pelosi, “Transcript of Pelosi Weekly Press Conference Today,” news release, March 7, 2019, https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/3719 -2/. 3. Catie Edmondson, “House Democrats Will Vote on Sweeping Anticorruption Legislation. Here’s What’s in It,” New York Times, March 7, 2019. 4. Miles Rapoport and Cecily Hines, “A New Playing Field for Democracy Reform,” American Prospect, December 24, 2018. 5. Alyssa Milano, “Democratic Anti- corruption Bill Is a Power Grab in Congress—for the People,” USA Today, February 28, 2019. 6. Greg Weiner, “The Shallow Cynicism of ‘Everything Is Rigged,’” New York Times, August 25, 2019. 7. H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019). 8. As fi rst defi ned by Jackson W. Granholm in 1962. Merriam-Webster, s.v. “kludge (n.),” accessed September 23, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ kludge. 9. Correspondence on fi le with the authors. 10. Pam Fessler, “Exaggerating Voting Issues May Juice a Base—but It Also ‘Undermines Our Democracy,’” NPR, March 10, 2019.

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245

11. The effects of information on policy preferences are not consistent across policy areas. Sides (2016) fi nds that respondents provided with information about who is subject to the estate tax are more likely to support it, compared with a control group. On the other hand, Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin (2019) do not fi nd that information about the size of the immigrant population in the US affects attitudes toward immigration. 12. A silver lining, perhaps: Morris Fiorina (2017) notes that much of the electorate is independent—in our data, only 60 percent of respondents identify as a Democrat or Republican—and that members of the “political class” are much more divided than typical partisans. 13. We are aware of only one recent published paper focused on framing effects related to campaign fi nance, and this study (Jorgensen, Song, and Jones 2018) only considers frames that are hostile to the role of money in politics and is therefore of limited utility.

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Index Page numbers followed by “f” or “t” refer to figures or tables, respectively. access, money and, 20– 22 advertising, negative, 25 affective polarization, 166 Americans: beliefs about corruption, 158– 59; beliefs in equality vs. liberty, 60– 61, 61f; conceptions of corruption, 77; faith in political system, 79– 83; fi ndings about, 78– 79; First Amendment rights and, 62– 66, 62t, 158; knowledge of money in politics, 157– 58, 161; knowledge of super PACs, 51– 53, 52f; perceptions of representation, 83– 84, 83t; political polarization and, 159– 60 Arrow’s Theorem, 31 Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 29, 33 backfi re effects, 165 Bauer, Robert, 121 bias, against corporations and corruption, 89– 90, 90t Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. See McCain-Feingold (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act) Bowler, Shaun, 161, 165 Buchanan, James, 5 Buckley v. Valeo, 6, 33, 74, 136, 158, 162 Cain, Bruce, 161– 62 campaign fi nance: framing effects of, 58– 59; hydraulic theory of, 26– 27; jurisprudence, 71s– 75; knowledge quiz for,

37, 38– 39f; political privacy and, 50t; public education about, 165; theoretical framework of perceptions of government and, 19– 25; values and, 60– 61, 125– 26 campaign fi nance knowledge: explanations for, 46–49; regression results, 48t campaign fi nance knowledge score, 45t, 46t; constructing, 41–43; randomness and, 43–46 campaign fi nance laws, 163; attitudes toward, 137– 38; changes in, 28– 29; methodology used to estimate effect of on trust, 142–43; partisan electoral advantages and, 24; political polarization and, 10–11; results of on trust, 143–47, 144t, 146t; types of, 140; in US states, 139–42, 141t campaign fi nance reform, 167; arguments for, 3; conventional wisdom and, 3; as cure-all, 19; as cure for “trust deficit,” 153– 54; elimination of corruption and, 14; problems with, 12–15 campaign spending: beliefs about, 118t; benefits and costs of, 116–18, 117t; knowledge and, 115; trust in government and, 115–16; turnout and, 115 campaign spending knowledge, 114 campaign spending limits, 109–14, 110t, 112t, 113f campaign spending misinformation, support for reform and, 114–18

260 CCES. See Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) Citizens United v. FEC, 2, 6, 10, 13–14, 34, 37, 51, 71– 72, 100, 111, 135, 158, 160, 163; effects of, on trust, 150– 51 Clean Elections reforms, effects of, 148– 51, 149t, 163 Clinton, Hillary, 1, 123, 171 confidence in government, 14 contributions, campaign: elections and, 23– 25; literature on benefits of, 21– 22; negative advertising and, 25; policymaking and, 22– 23; quid pro quo corruption and, 20. See also donors contributors. See donors conventional wisdoms about money in politics, 7– 9 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), 16, 37, 169– 97; methodology, 171– 75; questions asked for chapter 3, 199– 201; questions asked for chapter 4, 203– 7; questions asked for chapter 5, 209–14; questions asked for chapter 6, 215–17; variable descriptions and summary statistics, 175– 85; weighting, 170– 71 corporate speech, 66– 71 corporations, bias against, and corruption, 89– 90, 90t corruption, 243n3; Americans’ beliefs about, 158– 59; Americans’ conceptions of, 77; appearance standard of, 12, 78, 168; bias against corporations and, 89– 90, 90t; campaign fi nance experts and, 128– 30; changes in perceptions of, 82– 83, 82t; cynicism and, 84– 88; dependence, 33– 35; elimination of, campaign fi nance reform and, 14; eye of the beholder and, 89– 94; legislative bargaining and, 92, 93t; perceptions of federal government, pre- and postelection 2016, 81t; policy preferences shaping beliefs about, 91– 92, 91t; quid pro quo, 6, 7, 20; think tanks and, 93– 94, 94t; trust and, 79– 83 corruption scope index, 85– 86, 87t, 88t cynicism, corruption and, 84– 88 cynicism score, 87, 87t, 88t dark money, 2, 95, 164, 167 Delli Carpini, Michael, 40

Index democracy: concerns about, 11–12; threat of money to, 1 democratic erosion, 11 Democrats, campaign fi nance restrictions and, 11 dependence corruption, 33– 35 disclosure, campaign fi nance, 108– 9, 109t donors, 20– 21. See also contributions, campaign Donovan, Todd, 161, 165 Downs, Anthony, 39 Druckman, James, 167 elections: campaign contributions and, 23– 25; influence and, 23– 25 elite rhetoric, power of, 158 equality, 14; vs. liberty, Americans’ beliefs in, 60– 61, 61f erosion, democratic, 11 expenditures, campaign. See campaign spending experts, campaign fi nance: vs. American public, 123– 24, 124f; on corruption, 128– 30; methodology used by, 122– 23; on political polarization, 125– 26, 125t, 126t; on the public’s knowledge, 115; on reform, 130– 32; surveys of, 121– 22; surveys of, background, methodology and questions, 219– 23 faith of Americans in political system, 79– 83 Federal Campaign Finance Act of 1971, 6 Federal Election Commission, 6 Feingold, Russ, 153 Fenno’s paradox, 83 First Amendment rights, 62– 66, 62t, 158 For the People Act of 2019 (H.R. 1), 156, 163 framing: effects, 167; effects of, in campaign fi nance, 58– 59; effects of, in money vs. speech, 62– 66, 63t Galston, William, 95– 96 game theory, 31– 32 Gilens, Martin, 14–15, 162 Ginsberg, Benjamin, 121 government, state, measuring trust in, 138– 39 Grant, Tobin, 57

Index Hasen, Richard, 15, 162 H.R. 1 (For the People Act of 2019), 156, 163 hydraulic theory of influence, 25– 29, 235n5 ideological think tanks, 93– 94 ignorance, rational, 39–41 inequality. See equality influence, 20; campaign contributions and, 22– 23; elections and, 23– 25; hydraulic theory of, 25– 29, 235n5; policymaking and, 22– 23 journalists, educating, 165 Kagan, Elena, 30 Keeter, Scott, 40 Kennedy, Anthony, 2 Khanna, Ro, 153 knowledge: campaign spending and, 115; experts and, 127– 28; of money in politics, improving American public’s, 163– 66. See also campaign fi nance knowledge La Raja, Raymond, 163 Lawrence, Jennifer, 2, 157 legislative bargaining, corruption and, 92, 93t Lessig, Lawrence, 3, 33– 35, 34, 76 liberty vs. equality, Americans’ beliefs in, 60– 61, 61f Lupia, Arthur, 40–41 Marshall, Thurgood, 35 McCain-Feingold (Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act), 4, 10, 153 media, studying the role of, 167 Milano, Alyssa, 156– 57 money: access and, 20– 22; dark, 2, 95, 164, 167; in politics, central problem of, 15; soft, 4; vs. speech, framing of, 62– 66, 63t; as threat to democracy, 1; trust and, 19 money in politics: Americans’ knowledge of, 157– 58, 161; conclusions from 1990s survey data about, 9–10; conventional wisdoms about, 7– 9 National Rifle Association (NRA), 91– 92 negative advertising, 25

261 Nelson, Kjersten, 167 Nyhan, Brendan, 165– 66 Obama, Barack, 1 Ocasio- Cortez, Alexandria, 164 Ornstein, Norman, 2 PACs, 10. See also super PACs Page, Benjamin, 14–15, 162 Pelosi, Nancy, 4, 5, 19, 156 perceptions, public, of government, 19– 20 Persily, Nathaniel, 121 polarization, political: affective, 166; Americans and, 159– 60; campaign finance laws and, 10–11; democratic erosion and, 11 policymaking: campaign contributions and, 22– 23; influence and, 22– 23 policy preferences, influencing beliefs about corruption, 91– 92, 91t political action committees (PACs), 10. See also super PACs political equality, 14–15 politics: conventional wisdoms about money in, 7– 9; progressive view of, 4– 5 populist approach, to reform, 161– 62 pragmatism, American, 100–102 privacy, political, 49– 51; campaign fi nance and, 50t “progressive vision of politics,” 4– 5 public choice theory, 5 public fi nancing, unpopularity of, 159– 60 public fi nancing reforms, 106– 8, 107; trust in government and, 160 public trust. See trust quid pro quo corruption, 6, 7; campaign contributions and, 20 quiz on campaign fi nance, 37, 38– 39f randomness, campaign fi nance knowledge score and, 43–46 rational ignorance, 39–41 reforms: campaign fi nance disclosure, 108– 9, 109t; campaign fi nance experts and cleansing power of, 130– 32; campaign spending limits, 109–14, 110t, 112t, 113f; dark side of, 118–19; effects of Clean Elections, 148– 51, 149t; misinformation about campaign spending

Index

262 reforms (continued) and support for, 114–18; political, international, 161; public fi nancing, 106– 8; public support for, 101– 2; skepticism about efficacy of, 102– 3, 104t; “True Believers” and, 103– 6 Reich, Robert, 30 Reifler, Jason, 165– 66 representation, Americans’ perceptions of, 83– 84, 83t Republicans, campaign fi nance restrictions and, 11 rhetoric, elite, power of, 158 “rigged elections” rhetoric, 95, 96t, 97t Rudolph, Thomas, 57 Sarbanes, John, 4, 5 Sasse, Ben, 94 Schaffner, Brian, 163 Sheen, Martin, 2, 157 Smith, Bradley, 163– 64 social choice theory, 18, 31– 33 social media, 49 soft money, 4 speech: corporate, 66– 71; government regulation of accuracy of, 61, 61t; union, 66– 71; vs. money, framing of, 62– 66, 63t SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 6, 10, 71, 111 spending. See campaign spending state government, measuring trust in, 138– 39 Steyer, Tom, 5 super PACs, 7, 12, 111, 166; Americans’ knowledge of, 51– 53, 52f term limits, 27– 28 think tanks: ideological, 93– 94; using

model legislation from, and corruption, 93– 94, 94t True Believers, 166; public fi nancing and, 160; reform and, 103– 6, 105t Trump, Donald, 1, 11, 19, 76, 77, 94, 123, 133– 34; rhetoric of, and trust, 94– 98 trust: changes in perceptions of, 82– 83, 82t; corruption and, 79– 83; effects of Citizens United decision on, 150– 51; effects of political/economic variables on, 147–48; experts and, 128; in federal government, pre- and postelection 2016, 80t; in government, and campaign spending, 115–16; long-running trends in, 13; measuring, in state government 1987– 2017, 138– 39; methodology used to estimate effect of campaign fi nance laws on, 142–43; money and, 19; public fi nancing reforms and, 160; results of campaign fi nance laws on, 143–47, 144t, 146t “trust deficit,” campaign fi nance reform as cure for, 153– 54 turnout, voter, campaign spending and, 115; experts on, 127– 28 union speech, 66– 71 values, campaign fi nance and, 60– 61 Warren, Elizabeth, 1– 2 “weaponizing distrust,” 94– 98 Wertheimer, Fred, 2, 34, 76 Whitehouse, Sheldon, 4, 5 “will of the people,” fiction of, 18, 29– 33