Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives 1793635943, 9781793635945

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Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations

Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations Trends and Perspectives Edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Lanham • Boulder • New York • London

Contents

List of Figures and Tables

vii

Foreword ix Olusegun Obasanjo Preface xv C. Nna-Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu Acknowledgements xix List of Abbreviations

xxi

Introduction 1 C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu 1  B  ilateralism and Interstate Relations: Theoretical and Conceptual Explanations Bernard Nwosu and Chinyere Ibeh 2  The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations Osita Agbu

13 27

3  F  oreign Policy Options for Socio-­Cultural and Economic Development between Cameroon and Nigeria, 1960–1992 Primus Fonkeng

41

4  B  order Policies and Border Communities in Post-­Independence Cameroon and Nigeria: The Ejagham Community in Perspective Raphael Achou Etta

59

5  Cameroon-­Nigeria Bilateral Economic Relations Adeola Caroline Akindoju

71

6  The Role of External Actors in Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations Tola Odubajo

85

v

vi

Contents

 7  A  nalysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) 97 Greg Fah Fombo and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke  8  M  anaging National Interests in Evolving Security Environment between Cameroon and Nigeria: A Historical Review C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Greg Fah Fombo

117

 9  U  nderstanding Security Relations and Defence Cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Roger Kuitche

147

10  C  ounterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Engagements of Cameroon and Nigeria along Common Border Areas Usman A. Tar and Nufaisa Garba Ahmed

175

11  S  muggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Cameroon-­Nigeria Borders Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha and Jasper Chidiebube Uche

199

12  E  nvironmental Governance and Related Human Security Issues in Nigeria-­Cameroon Relations: Lagdo Dam in Perspective Christian Ichite and Olanrewaju Lateef Yusuf

217

13  M  aritime Domain Management and National Security: Cameroon-­Nigeria Boundary in Perspective Patrick Chibueze Nwatu

233

14  C  ameroon-­Nigeria Diplomatic Relations: Bakassi Crisis and International Court of Justice Decisions in Perspective Osita Agbu

261

15  T  he Bakassi Question: Beyond the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Verdict Sharkdam Wapmuk and Solomon Ayegba Usman

275

16  Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations in the Light of the Anglophone Crisis 291 C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Obinna Ukaeje 17  C  ameroon-­Nigeria Relations: Some Informed Projections C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu

315

18  Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations: A Select Annotated Bibliography Pamela Ogwuazor Momah

327

Index 343 About the Editors and Contributors

353

Figures and Tables

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 11.1: Trend of pipeline vandalization in the Niger Delta region, 1999–2018 209 Figure 11.2: Price (in naira) of petrol in some West and Central African countries (August 2019)

211

Figure 13.1: Map showing maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon

238

Figure 13.2: Diagram of security architecture of the Nigerian maritime domain

240

Figure 13.3: A draft of the organizational structure for the bilateral joint maritime border operational security between Nigeria and Cameroon

256

LIST OF TABLES Table 7.1: Summary of the amount donated by Igbos in West Cameroon towards the civil war in Nigeria

106

Table 11.1: Some interceptions of petroleum products smuggled across the Cameroon-­Nigeria border

205

Table 13.1: Eastern Naval Command holdings and requirements, May 2017

250

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Foreword Olusegun Obasanjo

Osita Agbu and Nna-­Emeka Okereke have added another work to the literature on Nigerian foreign policy studies and practice, which puts them at the forefront of scholars on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. Apparently, both scholars have brought to bear in this project their wealth of experience as researchers and superb academics at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, and the National Defence College, Abuja, respectively, alongside rich teaching and research experiences at the university level. This is demonstrated by the broad range of topics and the pool of brilliant contributors, showcasing a good mix of subject matter experts and seasoned scholars in Cameroon and Nigeria whose articles are well researched and informative. I must therefore commend the proactive action of the scholars for the efforts at documenting and updating existing literature on the trends in Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations since the 1960s. I am personally interested in this book as it dwells significantly on issues that I had the privilege of engaging with during my service years as a very young officer in the Nigerian military, posted to serve in Bamenda in 1959–1960 and much later as a military Head of State (1976–1979) and subsequently as the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999–2007). The issues at stake range from the diplomatic relations before and during the Nigerian Civil War, to cross-­border crimes, to poorly demarcated border issues and the Bakassi Peninsula and its aftermath. It must be recalled that initial efforts at amicably addressing the border disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria at bilateral levels failed as armed skirmishes intermittently erupted between defence and security forces of both countries. By 1996, the government of Cameroon sought adjudication of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague. And Nigeria went into defence at the ICJ. This was the position I met when I resumed ix

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Olusegun Obasanjo

office as President in May 1999. It is instructive to categorically state that the administration before mine was advised by the governments of Britain, Germany and France that the area in contention did not belong to Nigeria. It became obvious that we should have resolved the Bakassi question politically instead of allowing it to go to the ICJ, but we failed to do so. I understood that the Nigerian government lawyer urged the government on, while his fees were mounting. However, since we already inherited an on-­going international adjudication at the inception of my administration, we continued with the process but requested that the adjudication process be extended beyond the Bakassi peninsula to focus on the whole poorly demarcated border areas between Cameroon and Nigeria, which ran from the Atlantic Ocean in the south to Lake Chad in the north. It is this concern that guided my administration to continue with the adjudication process despite an unequivocal note previously received by the last administration before mine. It is instructive to note that while the ICJ ruling of 10 October 2002 granted the ownership of the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon, Nigeria gained more territory through the judgement, and we were honour bound to respect the judgement since we defended our case at the ICJ and we obeyed the rule of law. The ICJ verdict on the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula however became a highly politicized issue especially as the 2003 general elections approached, and the opposition parties made it a political campaign issue to sway public opinion and earn electoral sympathy from the voters. Part of the issues at stake was the constitutional implication of losing the Bakassi Local Government Area to Cameroon, bearing in mind that Part 1 of the First Schedule, Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria listed Bakassi in Cross River State as one of the 774 Local Governments in Nigeria. It was to address this matter that we created the new Bakassi Local Government out of Akpabuyo Local Government Area. Subsequently, efforts were made through the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission and with the support of well-­meaning international partners including the United Nations to work out modalities for the peaceful transfer of territories between both countries, based on the ICJ judgement. It was these efforts that informed the achievements recorded in the implementation of the ICJ verdict, which included the peaceful withdrawal and transfer of authority involving about 32 villages in the Lake Chad area, along the land area and in the Bakassi Peninsula. These successes opened both countries to further functional cooperation, especially in defence and security matters. In relation to the Bakassi Peninsula, Cameroon was informed that although it won the legal battle for the ownership of the territory, it needed to be assisted to also win the political aspect, and President Paul Biya accepted the offer of an olive branch to win the political dimension of the contest.



Foreword xi

Consequently, as part of the concerns for the welfare of Nigerians affected by the ruling in the Bakassi, an agreement concerning the modalities of withdrawal and transfer of authority was reached between Cameroon and Nigeria at Greentree, New York, on 12 June 2006. Core to this was that the indigenous Nigerians in Bakassi could either remain in Bakassi as Nigerians living in another country along with almost two million living in the Cameroons or as Cameroonian nationals henceforth. They were also given the option of returning to be resettled in Nigeria, especially in the New Bakassi Local Government Area or other locations in Nigeria since they were mostly fishermen from different coastal states such as Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Ondo and Rivers States in Nigeria. In addition, the Green Tree Agreement mandated Cameroon not to force Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula to leave the zone or to change their nationality and to respect their culture, language and beliefs. Cameroon was further required not to levy or tax Nigerian nationals living in the Bakassi Peninsula in discriminatory manner and to also take every necessary measure to protect Nigerian nationals living in the zone from any harassment or harm, among other things. It is instructive to note that the peaceful settlement of Cameroon-­Nigeria border question remains an outstanding testament of preventive diplomacy, which has proved very cost-­effective for the concerned parties. As part of the dividends of the peaceful settlement of the border issues, both countries have intensified infrastructural developments that are mutually advantageous as demonstrated by the completion of the trans-­African highway linking Enugu (Nigeria) with Bamenda (Cameroon). The road has facilitated trade and commerce between both countries and has been used by Nigerian businessmen to import goods shipped to Douala seaport in the Littoral region of Cameroon. In addition, the full implementation of the ICJ ruling relating to the maritime boundary has been completed, and both parties have accepted all technicalities pertaining to the delineation of the maritime boundary. The fear of the Nigerian Navy was allayed. It is also important to note that the blossoming rapprochement between Cameroon and Nigeria further resulted in the signing of several other agreements, especially on issues of mutual security. In February 2012, there was the Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-­border Security Committee between the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Government of the Republic of Cameroon. This agreement has proved useful for annual review of trans-­border security issues affecting both countries where far-­reaching resolutions that inform government actions are taken. Further improvement of the bilateral relations following the peaceful settlement of the border disputes has resulted in high-­level exchange of visits involving top government functionaries, even at the highest level of

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Olusegun Obasanjo

government. These exchanges of visits have been instructive in tackling the threats of terrorism perpetrated by Boko Haram in the shared Lake Chad basin area. The participation of Cameroon and Nigeria alongside Benin, Chad and Niger in the Paris summit on security in the Lake Chad area held in May 2014 as well as in the follow-­up regional security summit held at Abuja in 2016 were also dividends of the growing rapprochement between Cameroon and Nigeria that accompanied the peaceful settlement of the border question. To this effect, it can unequivocally be stated that the peaceful settlement of the border dispute opened a floodgate of beneficial bilateral relations between both countries. Cameroon and Nigeria have further come under new security challenges following the outbreak of armed struggle in the English-­speaking region of Cameroon. This new threat which began with trade union agitations in late 2016 has since 2017 escalated to armed struggle for the independent State of Ambazonia for the population of former British administrations—Southern Cameroons Trusteeship territory—that were prior to 1961 administered from Nigeria. It further coincides with the renewed outbreak of separatist agitations for Biafra in Nigeria and has been compounded by the merger agreement between pro-­Biafra elements in Nigeria and some pro-­Ambazonia elements in Cameroon. Evidently, both countries have come under new threats requiring sustained beneficial bilateral cooperation as refugees continue to flee the conflict zone in English-­speaking regions of Cameroon into Nigeria with some of the pro-­Ambazonia fighters masquerading as refugees. With the escalation of the conflict, it is not surprising that there is an increase in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), especially in their shared border areas. Drawing from my years of experience as peacemaker across the continent of Africa and having participated actively as a federal troop during the Nigerian Civil War, it is my sincere position that the problem of secession can better be settled politically than through armed conflict. It is now important that both Nigeria and Cameroon reconsider their responses to secessionist tendencies through a peaceful search for solutions. The agitators’ grievances, if any, must be understood, and their fears allayed and put to rest. I believe in that inclusiveness, sense of belonging and having a stake in the national entity and project with a full sense of belonging. This book is a notable contribution which comes at a critical phase in the bilateral relations between both countries that swings between collaboration and mutual hostility to increasing rapprochement alongside evolving security threats to their stability and national interests. There is no doubt that this book carefully enumerates the complex nature of relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, especially since their political independence in 1960 and the reunification of former British Southern Cameroons and the French Cameroon in



Foreword xiii

1961. This volume is enriched by diverse perspectives from different authors who engaged varied methodological mixed approaches that effectively combined field work, situation reports and literature search and still remained logical and outstanding. The prognosis of the book is germane and attests to the fact that Cameroon and Nigeria are major state actors in Central and West Africa respectively and that sustained functional cooperation between both countries will reduce bilateral conflict while also contributing to further integration, foster good relations and enhance security and development in Africa. Olusegun Obasanjo Former Military Head of State (1976–1979) Former President/Commander-­in-­Chief Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999–2007) January 2022

Preface C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu

Bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria since they attained independence in 1960 have been characterized by conflicts and cooperation driven by the perceived national interests of the political leadership at each point in time. This book therefore focuses on the trends and dynamics in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since independence while also examining some pre-­independence interactions that informed the foreign policy considerations and outcomes defining their bilateral relations. A tacit reflection on the thrust of relations indicates that the first decade of independence was characterized by mutual collaboration as both countries subscribed to dialogue to address the unfinished business of border demarcation in the first two decades of independence. This partly informed Cameroon’s support to the Nigerian government against secessionist Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). Both countries, however, experienced diplomatic strain in May 1981 following the killing of five Nigerian military personnel by Cameroon forces in the Bakassi Peninsula. While war was averted in 1981, military skirmishes further erupted between Cameroon and Nigeria in the Bakassi Peninsula in 1993, leading to adjudication at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. The national and international attention stimulated by the judgement delivered in October 2002 by the ICJ on the boundary dispute between Cameroon and Nigeria further stimulated several academic and policy interventions. Likewise, the modalities for the peaceful implementation of the ICJ judgement on the boundary dispute. With the outbreak and subsequent escalation of the Boko Haram crisis leading to cross-­border attacks between both countries, it became obvious that mutual cooperation was necessary for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against a mutual enemy that was fast establishing cells and threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both countries. xv

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C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu

Similarly, the resurgence of pro-­Biafra separatist agitation in Southeast Nigeria and outbreak of armed struggle for an independent state of Ambazonia for the population of former British Southern Cameroons, which constitutes the Anglophone regions in the Republic of Cameroon, strengthened the need for bilateral cooperation and the imperative to critically analyse and document these occurrences. While it is noted that several efforts at documenting the trends and perspectives in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations have been published, there exists an observable gap in the dearth of literature on this subject matter, especially since February 2012, when both countries adopted the trans-­border security agreement. This book is therefore designed to serve as a veritable handbook that adequately captures the major themes and milestones in Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations since independence. It provides the reader with sufficient historical and empirical account of the trends and dynamics as well as the determining factors that informed policy options and decisions by actors in both countries. The decision to write this book was driven by the realization that there exist several lessons to draw from bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, bearing in mind that both countries are contiguous neighbours sharing about 1,800-kilometer boundaries from the coast in the Gulf of Guinea to the hinterland up to the Lake Chad basin in the Sahel. Both countries also occupy significant positions in West and Central Africa such that continued rapprochement between them holds great potential to foster the course of security and integration at regional and continental levels in Africa. In addition to their respective domestic challenges, Cameroon and Nigeria also share common cross-­border threats requiring cooperation to avert preventable diplomatic misunderstanding and conflicts. While both authors had previously initiated separate efforts at writing a book on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, the decision to co-­author this book was finally taken when they met as panellists at the Roundtable on the Proposed Emergence of a United Nations Organisation State of Cameroon: Implications and Challenges for Nigeria, organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island, Lagos, held on 27 February 2020. Subsequently, Lexington Books graciously accepted the proposal and offered the publication contract that has culminated in this book. This book is therefore a fulfilment of the long-­standing need to contribute to the study of trends in Cameroon and Nigeria relations, which since their attainment of independence in 1960, have been characterized by conflicts and cooperation. The various contributors were drawn from scholars, experts and seasoned professionals from institutions in Cameroon and Nigeria, especially the academic, military and government officials who have informed opinions on the



Preface xvii

subject matter. These distinguished personalities drew from their respective professional experiences and also engaged primary and secondary sources of data in preparing their respective chapters. Of interest is the fact that the authors and some contributors have also lived and been schooled in both Cameroon and Nigeria while also travelling between both countries in the course of their professional careers. These attributes significantly equipped them with the competence to participate objectively in the project. The foreword is provided by former President Olusegun Obasanjo, in which he gives high-­level insights as a key decision maker on several contentious issues between both countries’ relations. Finally, some of the challenges encountered in the course of this book project stem from the fact that some contributors found it difficult to get letters of authorization from their sources because some of the data were collected during fieldwork for previous research which became useful for their respective chapters. The outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic also added to the difficulties encountered in this project. In addition,the authors were also engaged in various other demanding tasks in their respective locations. It is therefore worthy of celebration that this project has finally been successfully completed.

Acknowledgements

In the course of conducting the book project, we received tremendous support from several quarters, which enabled us to devote time to the rigorous process involved. First, we thank God for His infinite mercies and protection all through the project, especially throughout the COVID-19 challenge. In addition, we express our appreciation to all the contributors who found the time to conduct the research which formed the crux of this book. They are Nufaisa Garba Ahmed, Adeola Caroline Akindoju, Raphael Achou Etta, Greg Fah Fombo, Chinyere Fatima Ibeh, Christian Ichite and Roger Kuitche. Others are Pamela Momah, Patrick Nwatu, Bernard Nwosu, Tola Odubajo, Freedom Onuoha, Usman Tar, Chidiebube Jasper Uche, Obinna Ukaeje, Solomon Ayegba Usman, Sharkdam Wapmuk and Olanrewaju Lateef Yusuf. We do not take your commitment to the project for granted. We do not forget our families, especially our wives, Professor Jane-­Frances Agbu and Dr Aniefiok Emeka-­Okereke, who took care of the family front while we continued working on the book. In addition to this, we appreciate our children Obiefuna Emeka-­Okereke, Jideofor Emeka-­Okereke and Obidike Emeka-­Okereke, as well as Fidel Agbu, Onyekachukwu Agbu and Isabel Agbu, for their patience and understanding throughout the project. We are also grateful to the authorities of the National Defence College Nigeria and the Baze University Abuja which have provided us the institutional affiliation under which we carried out our respective activities leading to the publication of this book, as well as our numerous colleagues in both institutions whose encouragement and disappointments contributed to sustaining our commitment to the project. Bearing in mind that the final decision to write the book was taken at a forum at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, we consider it important to express our appreciation to the leadership of the Institute which has, since inception, contributed xix

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Acknowledgements

to the shaping of Nigerian foreign policy. It is very elating to say that your symposium on the Cameroon question played a key role in the conception of delivery of this book. It is very important that we acknowledge the support provided by the staff of Lexington Books whose constant reminders and scrutiny kept us going. We missed deadlines, but they kept urging us on. Specifically, Sydney Wedbush, Shelby Russell and Trevor Crowell took turns at different times to drive this project. At this juncture, we consider it worthwhile to express appreciation to Professor Usman Tar, who introduced us to Lexington Books. We sincerely appreciate all your support that has resulted in the successful completion of this book.

List of Abbreviations

AAC All Anglophone Conferences ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data ADMM ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting AFCSC Armed Forces Command and Staff College AGO Automated Gas Oil African Festival for Arts and Craft Exposition AFAC African Continental Free Trade Area AfCTA Ambazonia Governing Council AGovC AK-47 Avtomat Kalachnikov, 1947 AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan ANDP Africa Nations Development Programme ANOR Cameroon’s National Agency for Standards and Quality AoR Area of Responsibility African Peoples Liberation Movement APLM APSTA African Peace Support Trainers Association AQIM Al-­Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU African Union AUPSC African Union Peace and Security Council AWC Army War College BAMOSD Bakassi Movement for Self-­Determination BFF Bakassi Freedom Fighters BIR Rapid Intervention Battalion Capt Captain CAR Central African Republic CACSC Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium CCDS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff xxi

xxii

List of Abbreviations

CDC Cameroon Development Corporation CDS Chief of Defence Staff CDSD Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation CENU Continuous Engagement for National Unity CFA Communautaire Financière Africaine CFSVA Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis CIPP Community Initiative for Promoting Peace CN Cameroon Navy CNMC Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission CNS Cameroon Navy Ship Col Colonel CONOPs Concept of Operations COSOMAS College of Social and Management Sciences COVID-19 Coronavirus 2019 CSID Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Defense CSIS Chiefs of Security and Intelligence Services CSRS-­NDC Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College CPDM Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement CRTV Cameroon Radio and Television CSIS Chiefs of Security and Intelligence Services CST Cross Border Security Committee CTCOIN Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency CWE China International Water and Electric Corporation DAE Economic Affairs Directorate DCA Defence Cooperation Agreements DO Divisional Officer DPK Dual Purpose Kerosene DPR Department of Petroleum Resources DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DSS Department of State Security ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECOMOG ECOWAS Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECSC European Coal and Steel Community EEC European Economic Community ENC Eastern Naval Command EOE Exercise Obangame Express EPZ Export Promotion Zone ESIG Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Guerre EU European Union



List of Abbreviations xxiii

EVD Ebola viral disease FAR French Rapid Deployment Force FDI Nigerian Foreign Direct Investment FOB Forward Operationational Base FOC Flag Officer Commanding FOMAC Central African Multinational Task Force FTZ Free Trade Zone GIABA Group against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism GGC Gulf of Guinea Commission GGC-­MCF Gulf of Guinea maritime Collaboration Forum GoG Gulf of Guinea GTA Green Tree Agreement GTR Ghost Town Resistance HDSS Higher Defense and Strategic Studies ICG International Crisis Group ICJ International Court of Justice ICMC Institute of Chartered Mediators and Conciliators ICT Information and Communication Technology IDP Internally Displaced People IFRA Institute Française de Recherche en Afrique IG Interim Government IOM International Organization for Migration IOMR Institute of Oceanography and Marine Research IPOB Indigenous People of Biafra IR International Relations IRCC Inter-­Regional Coordination Centre IRIC International Relations Institute Cameroon ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance ISWAP Islamic State in West Africa Province JDA Joint Development Agreement JDZ Joint Development Zone JEFCAS John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for Africa Studies JTF Joint Task Force LCBC Lake Chad Basin Commission LCR Lake Chad Region LGA Local Government Areas LNG Liquefied Natural Gas Lt Lieutenant Lt Col Lieutenant Colonel Maj Major

xxiv

List of Abbreviations

MASSOB  Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra MDA Maritime Domain Awareness MENA Middle East and North Africa MEND Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta MGC Maritime Guard Command MICOPAX Peacebuilding Mission MINADT Ministry of Territorial Administration MN Mozambican Navy MNLA National Movement of Azawad MNTJF Multinational Joint Task Force MoU Memorandum of Understanding NAFDAC  National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control NAM Non-­Aligned Movement NAMSI North American Maritime Security Initiative NBA Niger Basin Authority NCJC Nigerian Cameroon Joint Commission NCMC Nigeria-­Cameroon Mixed Commission NCRMDP National Commission for Refugees, Migrations and Displaced Persons NCS Nigeria Customs Service NCTBSC Nigerian Cameroon Trans-­Boundary Security Committee n.d. No Date ND Niger Delta Nigerian Defense Academy NDA NDC National Defence College NEMA National Emergency Management Agency NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NGO Nongovernmental Organisations NIHSA Nigerian Hydrological Services Agency NIIA Nigerian Institute of International Affairs NIJA Nigerian Journal of International Affairs NIMASA Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency nm Nautical Mile NN Nigerian Navy NNS Nigerian Navy Ship NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation NORDEFCO Nordic Defence Cooperation NOUN National Open University of Nigeria NPSA Nigerian Political Science Association



List of Abbreviations xxv

NSAGs Non-­State Armed Groups NSCDC Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps NSIA Nigerian Society of International Affairs OAU Organization of African Unity ONSA Office of the National Security Adviser OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries PCPRB Proper Resettlement of Bakassi PMS Premium Motor Spirit PSC Peace and Security Council PTA Preferential Trade Agreements RECs Regional Economic Communities RIFU Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit RMAC Regional Maritime Awareness Capability RoA Republic of Ambazonia SA South Africa SALWs Small Arms and Light Weapons SARChI South Africa Research Chair Initiative SCACUF Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front SCAPO Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization SCDDD Savanna Centre for Diplomacy and Development SCINGA Southern Cameroons in Nigeria Association SCNC Southern Cameroons National Council SDO Senior Divisional Officer SIARC International Exhibition of Crafts in Cameroon SLOC Sea Lanes of Communication Standards Organization of Nigeria SON SON Standards Organization of Nigeria SPSP Society for Peace Studies and Practice SSRCAPN  Social Science Research Council’s African Peacebuilding Network STP Sao Tome and Principe UBA United Brothers Association UK United Kingdom UNCLOS United Nations Law of the Sea UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNEP United Nations Environmental Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commission for Refugees UNO United Nations Organisation UNOWAS United Nations Office for West Africa and Sahel UNSC United Nations Security Council UPC Union Populaire du Cameroun

xxvi

USA USG VNSAs VOA WFD WFP WGMB WHO

List of Abbreviations

United States of America United States Government Violent non-­state actors Voice of America Westminster Foundation for Democracy World Food Programme Working Group on Maritime Boundary World Health Organisation

Introduction C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu

BACKGROUND Cameroon and Nigeria stand out clearly as two contiguous neighbours in Africa whose bilateral relations have implications for international relations in West and Central Africa. This is not unconnected to the fact that both countries share contiguous borders estimated at about 1,800km along land and maritime domains (Okereke, 2009). In addition, both countries are key actors in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), which are the respective Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in West and Central Africa. Historically, relationships between the indigenous peoples of Cameroon and Nigeria have existed for several centuries. These indigenous populations, especially along the shared border areas, had established beneficial socioeconomic relations for several centuries. Such relations cut across ethnic affiliations, trade, fishing, farming, marriage, governance and even religious interactions. For example, in the northern parts of the two countries, grazing lands, informal trade as well as fishing in local rivers such as the River Benue, which runs through both countries, have existed and sustained mutually beneficial relationship between the peoples. Such interactions served to enhance integration of the peoples living in the border areas. However, with the advent of European colonial interests in Africa, strange borders were crafted that separated the communities, bringing them under different alien administrative regimes which often distorted the economic and cultural affinities between the local inhabitants. New forms of political loyalties emerged, originally between inhabitants of German Kamerun, ruled from Buea, and British Nigeria, administered from Lagos. World Wars I and II 1

2

C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu

further redefined political obligation of German Kamerun through the Mandate and Trust systems of the League of Nations and United Nations, respectively, such that at the advent of political independence in 1960, the future of Cameroon became a major issue for the United Nations. This became more glaring as British Southern and Northern Cameroons were administered through Lagos. and there was need to define the future of Cameroon through the February 1961 plebiscite (Ebun, 1992; Ngoh, 1996). In the aftermath of independence, both countries established diplomatic relations to foster bilateral relations. This relationship was greatly influenced by many factors that are historical, cultural, political, geographical and economic in nature and has culminated in the signing of several treaties. Core among these treaties are the Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of 6 February 1963, the Memorandum of Understanding on the control of movement of persons and goods of 6 February 1963, the cultural, social and technical agreement of 22 March 1972 and the Trade Agreement of 6 February 1963, revised on 13 January 1982 and 11 April 2014 in Yaoundé. Others are the Air services Agreement of 19 May 1978, the Agreement on Police Cooperation of March 27, 1972, the Mutual Cooperation agreement of 27 March 1972 and the Memorandum of Understanding on the transnational highway project to facilitate transportation between Cameroon and Nigeria on 29 March 2006 in Yaoundé, among others (Okereke, 2009). Yet, despite these treaties and efforts at fostering peaceful bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, the extensive length of poorly demarcated borders running from the Atlantic Ocean in the south to the Lake Chad basin areas in the north emerged as a major contentious issue that intermittently border skirmishes and tensions between both countries, stimulated cross-­ leading to international arbitration. The boundary disputes between the two countries have a colonial origin and were a defining factor for direct bilateral relations between the two countries as recorded in 1965, 1981, 1993, 1994 and 1996, within which time two bloody boundary skirmishes were recorded in May 1981 and on 25 December 1993. On 10 October 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a verdict on the territorial disputes between Cameroon and Nigeria, on shared land and sea borders, especially the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, which had stimulated military skirmishes between 1981 and 1993/94. The efforts to implement the ICJ verdict culminated in the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) on 12 June 2006 and subsequent transfer of territories and withdrawal of Nigeria’s military and police presence in the previously disputed territories between August 2006 and 2008, as spelt out in the ICJ verdict and the GTA. As a build-­ up to the new rapprochement, both countries entered into closer collaborations to address emerging security concerns relating to illicit



Introduction 3

cross-­border trafficking, terrorism, secessionist movements, flooding, disease control, piracy and sea robbery as well as other cross-­border security issues. This formed the basis for the Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-­ border Security Committee between the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the government of the Republic of Cameroon in Abuja on 28 February 2012. Drawing from the above, it is not an overstatement to assert that bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria are rich in history, lessons and opportunities as captured in extant literature, as shown below. EXTANT LITERATURE Prior to 2008, several scholarly works were written on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, such as Nweke (1990), Ate (1992) and Adekeye (2008). However, these were dominated by the contentious issues of disputed Cameroon-­ Nigeria border areas, which were addressed in the 10 October 2002 verdict of the ICJ and the Green Tree Agreement. For instance, Bassey Ate (1992) asserts that “the boundary dispute between Nigeria and the Cameroon arising from their long, but ill-­defined border (1680 kilometres or 1050 miles) is of colonial origin and that it has remained a source of conflict in the direct bilateral relations of the two countries since their independence.” During and after the ICJ judgement in 2002, Adekeye (2008) had argued that Nigeria’s relations with Cameroon were the prickliest of all its relations with its neighbours. He noted a conflictual atmosphere in the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon. He further asserted that as far back as 1914, Nigerian troops along with French colonial troops annexed Cameroon from Germany between 1914 and 1916. Nweke (1990), in his contribution, argues that the May 1981 Cameroon-­Nigeria crisis demonstrates that Nigeria does not seem to generate the political will to confront foreign aggression. The scholar’s perception was that Nigeria as a nation is yet to understand the fundamental logic of foreign policy. The above literature demonstrates that many scholars apparently tended to view Cameroon-­Nigeria relations from the conflict prism, either territorial border disagreements, and maritime as well as the recent ICJ judgement concerning the Bakassi. Fombo (2008) focuses on the imperial antecedents of the Cameroon-­ Nigeria border dispute and situates the roots of the dispute in the imperial ambition of metropolitan Europe, which attached little premium on the right of the indigenous Africans along the border areas. He insists that this imperial negligence became more pronounced in the aftermath of the 1961 plebiscite on the future of British Northern and Southern Cameroons. On the contrary, Okereke, Onuoha and Emmanuel (2008) located the struggle for Bakassi

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on the logic of economic nationalism as opposed to the claims of colonial mandate and the so-­called, uti possidetis juris. However, looking beyond territoriality, Fombo (2011) focuses on managing cabotage in the Bakassi area and argues that beyond the provisions of international jurisprudence emphasizing the exclusive right of littoral states to navigation and trade along the coast which Cameroon is desirous to protect, the aspirations of Cameroon in the Bakassi area should be made to accommodate interests of the locals who crisscross the border to earn their living. To this effect, he prescribed functional integration rooted in human needs as opposed to a strict emphasis on territoriality as key to resolving contending realities, post ICJ verdict, on the Bakassi Peninsula and environs. Beyond the border conflicts, it is important to note that relations between both countries, especially their respective populations, transcend conflict dynamics. This is because the citizens of both countries have for centuries engaged, and still engage, in mutually beneficial economic, political as well as cultural activities and also informal trade, especially along the shared border communities and beyond. Okereke (2010) observes that despite the contentious border crisis that dominated the thrust of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations prior to the ICJ judgement in 2002, there exists enormous potential to be maximized by both countries in the realm of functional cooperation, and he maintains that both countries stand to gain if they reduce the propensity to conflict in favour of bilateral cooperation to address mutual interests. He perceives the signing of the GTA in 2006 as a welcome development that will open new opportunities for good and beneficial relations. Yet, following the settlement of the boundary dispute, new realities relating to threats and collaborations have emerged between both countries, which have not been adequately reflected in previous scholarly writings. Such new realities include issues relating to separatist nationalism in Nigeria and Cameroon, terrorism and cross-­border crimes between both countries, including maritime-­domain awareness, especially maritime security challenges relating to illegal and unreported fishing, sea robbery and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and recurrent attacks on critical oil infrastructure in their shared and respective maritime domain. Furthermore, there has also been human security issues associated with disease control like Ebola viral disease (EVD) and environmental management, especially associated with water management of the Lagdo Dam, which has repeatedly caused flooding in communities along the banks of the River Benue and River Niger up to the Niger Delta region. In light of the above, this book, Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, will reinforce and strengthen existing literature on the subject matter while also addressing the inherent gaps in literature arising from emerging and evolving dynamics.



Introduction 5

Drawing from the above, it is anticipated that Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives will therefore serve as a compendium that will run the gamut of historical, socio-­cultural, economic, political and diplomatic relations between the governments and peoples of Cameroon and Nigeria. In pursuit of these objectives, the book places emphasis on issues that have characterized relations between both countries from the pre-­colonial, colonial and postcolonial periods. This is against a backdrop of intermittent conflicting relations that have tended to overshadow the significant cordial relations existing between the two countries, especially southern Cameroon and south eastern Nigeria. The book not only documents the background of and current relations between both countries, it also prognosticates on the future bilateral relations between the countries while identifying the real and potential triggers and drivers of trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria bilateral relations. Specific attention is focused on the following questions: a.  What have been the nature of and trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since independence? b.  How did colonialism and external interests impact the economic and social relationships between the peoples of Nigeria and Cameroon? c.  How are Nigeria and Cameroon addressing the possible triggers for conflict in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations? d.  What are the emerging security trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations? e.  What informs Nigeria’s response to the separatist agitation for an Ambazonian state in Cameroon? f.  What factors could influence the future of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations? g.  How can both countries maximize the opportunities provided by proximity and association to strengthen security and foster integration in Africa? THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS To better understand and appreciate the thrusts in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, two distinct theoretical foundations, notably functionalism and reciprocity, come in handy. The essential doctrinal kernel of functionalism is that progressive economic integration would gradually eliminate sources of conflict and build the foundations for political unification to still remain intact. In espousing functionalism, David Mitrany stressed the need for states to explore the functional alternative in the management of international order. In his work titled a Working Peace System, Mitrany argued that world peace could best be promoted if international activities were to be organized around functional needs such as transportation, health and welfare necessities, scientific and

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cultural activities, trade and even production. The successful performance of these functions by institutions that had taken over specific tasks and authorities from governments would bring nations closely together and build a common interest for peace. This process for him would not involve the surrender of national sovereignty but would promote international peace and security (Mitrany, 1943). Ernst B. Haas modified Mitrany’s ideas into what is now referred to as neo-­functionalism. In his study of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Haas argued that the essence of functionalism is that step-­by-­step economic decisions are superior to certain political choices and that shared interests in economic welfare would ultimately bring about the establishment of a new supranational authority (Haas, 1958). G. Aforka Nweke extended the debate by arguing that functionalism is not just a theoretical formulation but also a practical policy action concerned with how best the world could be organized so as to eliminate violent conflicts and wars (Nweke, 2000). The importance of functionalism for this work cannot be overemphasized, bearing in mind that Nigeria and Cameroon are two prominent actors in West and Central Africa with a shared interest in promoting integration and security in Africa repeatedly being threatened by transnational organized crimes, armed conflicts and environmental threats. The utility of the functionalist thesis therefore manifests in the engagements of Nigeria and Cameroon through multilateral platforms like the Gulf of Guinea Commission; Lake Chad Basin Commissions; especially the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), in combating the scourge of piracy at sea; transnational terrorism and insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin. It is anticipated that effective cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon could serve as building blocks that strengthen institutions established to achieve these objectives, especially within the Lake Chad Basin and Gulf of Guinea. Beyond the functionalist leaning, the understanding of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations is also explained through the prism of reciprocity in international relations. Reciprocity, in the views of Robert Keohane, implies actions that are contingent on rewarding reactions from others, which cease when these expected reactions are not forthcoming (Keohane, 1986, 5–6). Reciprocal behaviour, for him, returns ill for ill as well as good for good; (for) people should meet smiles for smiles and lies with treachery. Put slightly differently, reciprocity suggests some tit-­for-­tat requiring some rough balancing out. He notes that there exists distinction between “specific forms of reciprocity which is exemplified by international trade negotiations and diffuse reciprocity which points to a wider institutionalization of trust (Keohane, 1986). Ibrahim extends the explanation by emphasizing that reciprocity is the practice of making an appropriate return for a benefit or harm received from



Introduction 7

another state and is often used in both positive and negative senses. For him, positive reciprocity (altruistic reciprocity) is expressed in formal bilateral cooperation agreement as in the “most-­favoured-­nation status,” generally applied to trade and tariff matters, or informally as friendly gestures among states (Ibrahim, 2010). He further describes negative reciprocity as the “concept of ‘tit-­for-­tat’ which manifests through retaliation, counteraction, counterattack, counterblow, reprisal, requital, retribution, revenge, vengeance or ‘do-­me-­I-do-­you’ in popular Nigerian parlance.” In other words, negative reciprocity depicts the utility of “an eye for an eye,” a tooth for a tooth, measure for measure. For Fred Agwu, reciprocity is neither an unfriendly act nor a sanction. Rather, it is a friendly and kind gesture, a favour exchanged between states, which as illustrated in Article 47 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, is provided by international law (Agwu, 2010, 31). Writing on reciprocity, George Obiozor argues that reciprocity in international politics is, in practice, a privilege and not a right, as international law and diplomacy tend to project. He conceives of it as an ideal which state actors selectively implement depending on their defined national interests, bearing in mind the contradictions of selective morality, outrageous paradox and double standards that characterize the behaviour of actors within the international system (Obiozor, 2010, 83). Drawing from the above, reciprocity between states emphasizes that countries should strive to respond to each other based on the behaviour exhibited by one country towards the other. It presupposes that the behaviour of country A towards country B should to a significant extent reflect the nature of conduct exhibited by country B towards country A. This notwithstanding, reciprocity is one of the numerous orientations explaining how states relate to one another in the international arena but is also a very useful tool for understanding the nature of interstate relations. It forms a basis for power relations between states, especially in terms of military capability and response to diplomatic manoeuvres that ensure that a country is not put at a capability disadvantage in relation to others, depending on the issues at stake. The choice of reciprocity as an explanatory tool to understand the trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since independence in 1960 cannot be overemphasized as it readily provides the basis for understanding the dynamics and trends inherent in the bilateral relations between both countries. In practical terms, Cameroon declined pressures to provide support for secessionist Biafra during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), and this strengthened Nigeria’s blockade policy that eventually crippled the Biafra rebellion. Consequently, Nigeria reciprocated this measure by refusing to provide any form of support to the pro-­independence groups in former British Southern Cameroons

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who have been fighting for the independence of Ambazonia for the English-­ speaking population of Cameroon since 2017. It will be recalled that Nigeria arrested 37 suspected pro-­Ambazonia militants on 30 December 2017 and another 12 Ambazonia leaders on 5 January 2018 and transferred them to Cameroon to face prosecution. Furthermore, Nigeria and Cameroon embarked on high-­level meetings and meetings of experts targeted at resolving the contentious boundary disputes prior to the May 1981 killing of five Nigerian soldiers in the disputed Bakassi Peninsula by the Cameroon gendarmerie. Yet both maintained the policy of mutual distrust and suspicion in the aftermath of this incident and even engaged in military skirmishes in 1993 and 1994 after which they resolved to seek international arbitration at the ICJ between 1996 and 2002. So far, the thrust in diplomatic relations between Cameroon and Nigeria has steadily improved since the ICJ verdict and the signing and implementation of the Green Tree Agreement, adopted on 12 June 2006. Further explanations of the trends and dynamics in the diplomatic relations between both countries will be explained in succeeding chapters of the book. In terms of relevance, it is anticipated that this book will be useful to policy and scholarship. Consequently, foreign and defence policy professionals and policy makers, including security analysts, will find it as a useful compendium covering trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, especially in the first six decades after independence. The book will also be relevant to academia as a students’ companion for undergraduate and postgraduate studies as well as an instructor’s guide for lecturers handling courses on diplomacy, foreign policy analysis, comparative foreign policy and issues in interstate relations, among others. Apparently, it will have a much wider market and readership within and beyond Nigeria and Cameroon where there already exists a large expectant market for the book. Furthermore, the book will also serve as a catalyst that will stimulate further research on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. By implication, the expectation is that the outcome will serve as veritable source material on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, relevant for policy, students, teachers, diplomats and the general public. In chapter 1, Bernard Nwosu and Chinyere Ibeh provide a conceptual and theoretical explanation of bilateralism and its utility in interstate relations. It is their informed position that cordial bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria are necessary for the pursuit and attainment of their respective national interests. In chapter 2, Osita Agbu examine bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria through the prism of the “Good Neighbour Policy.” He notes that Nigeria has, since independence in 1960, remained consistent and faithful to her policy of good neighbourliness to her contiguous neighbours, a policy to which Cameroon adheres because it is sacrosanct to her national security.



Introduction 9

The foreign policy options for social-­cultural and economic development in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations (1960–1992) constitutes the crux of concern in chapter 3. Primus Fonkeng examines the degree of political, economic and socio-­cultural intercourse between the governments and peoples of Cameroon and Nigeria after independence and before the eruption of the Bakassi conflict. It is his view that despite a prolonged period of border dispute that adversely affected their developmental endeavours, Nigeria and Cameroon always strive to maintain a fruitful cooperation. In chapter 4, Raphael Achou Etta focuses on how post-­independence border policies affected border communities such as the Ejagham. Etta observes that some essential border policies were established between Cameroon and Nigeria to enhance movement and interactions among the inhabitants of the border communities with shared socio-­cultural and historical affinities in both countries. This notwithstanding, he observes with examples that Ejagham communities in both Cameroon and Nigeria remain determine to circumvent policies which do not favour their socio-­cultural and economic interactions. Adeola Caroline Akindoju examines the bilateral economic relations between Cameroon and Nigeria in chapter 5. Adeola notes that commercial opportunities and interactions between Cameroon and Nigeria had existed since the pre-­colonial era as several trade routes, such as the Garoua-­Yola and Maroua-­Mubi trade routes, were already in existence. The core commodities of exchange were largely glass, beads, leather, cowries and clothing. The trade relations between both countries have persisted, and in April 2014, Cameroon and Nigeria signed a formal trade agreement during the sixth meeting of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission, held in Yaoundé. This agreement is designed to foster commercial activities between both countries to take advantage of the completed Ikom-­Mamfe link road of the trans-­ African highway connecting both countries. In chapter 6, Tola Odubajo examines the role of external actors in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. He identifies Britain, Germany and France as major state actors that play a historic role in the interactions that shape the thrust of relations between Cameroon and Nigeria. Odubajo further identifies the role of international personalities like Kofi Annan and international organisations like the United Nations, among others, whose activities influence the trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. The role played by Cameroon in the Nigerian Civil War forms the centre of analysis in chapter 7. Greg Fah Fombo and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke note that Cameroon’s support for the federal cause against the secessionist Biafra was instrumental to Nigeria’s victory in the war. Cameroon’s commitment to the government of Nigeria during the war was also targeted at attracting Nigeria’s support in preventing the Union Populaire du Cameroun (UPC), which

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was a rebel group in Cameroon’s west region threatening the sovereignty of Cameroon by having a base in Nigeria. C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Greg Fah Fombo examine the role of national interest in the conducting of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations in the era of threatening security scenarios in chapter 8. The focus was on the evolving security dynamics in both countries and how these threats interact to shape the thrust of bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria. Chapter 9 focuses on defence and security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria. C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Roger Kuitche argue that it is in the interest of both countries to collaborate in defence and security matters to address the evolving physical security challenges threatening them. It is their view that the annual Cameroon-­Nigeria trans-­border security meetings and the exchange programmes for defence and security personnel have proved to be veritable platforms for such engagements. In chapter 10, Usman A. Tar and Nufaisa Garba Ahmed examine the counterterrorism and counterinsurgency measures adopted by Cameroon and Nigeria in their mutual border areas. They observe that the border areas remain vulnerable to Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and other non-­state armed groups (NSAGs), and compliment the cooperation of both governments at bilateral and multilateral levels, especially the role of the Multinational Joint Task Force, to which Nigeria and Cameroon are troop-­contributing countries. The activities of smugglers engaged in illicit transnational trafficking of crude oil and petroleum products between Cameroon and Nigeria forms the crux of analysis conducted by Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha and Jasper Chidiebube Uche in chapter 11. It is their view that smuggling of crude oil and petroleum products between Cameroon and Nigeria constitutes economic, fiscal, environmental and security threats to the Nigerian economy. Furthermore, they note that the diversity of actors and profitability of the illegal enterprises explains why it has proved difficult to eradicate despite various measures adopted by both countries. In chapter 12, Christian Ichite and Olanrewaju Lateef Yusuf examine human-­security issues associated with the Lagdo Dam, especially how the management of the dam has stimulated human-­security issues of flooding and the accompanying destruction of farmland, wildlife and human habitations. They draw attention to the imperative of effective governance of the environment to address the accompanying challenges. In chapter 13, Patrick Chibueze Nwatu examines the management of the maritime domain between Cameroon and Nigeria. He argues that the tendency of Cameroon and Nigeria to join deployed basic infrastructure for maritime domain surveillance in isolation inhibits their capacity to collate



Introduction 11

common pictures of the entire maritime domain required to boost national security. In chapter 14, Osita Agbu focuses on the nexus between the International Court of Justice verdict on the Bakassi crisis and how it affects Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations. In a related study, in chapter 15, Sharkdam Wapmuk and Solomon Ayegba Usman examine the Bakassi question in the aftermath of the ICJ judgement with emphasis on how it has contributed to shape Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations. As a follow-­up on Cameroon’s role in the Nigerian Civil War, in chapter 16, C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Obinna Ukaeje examine trends in Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations since the degeneration to armed struggle in Southern Cameroons. They posit that in the armed struggle for the independence of former British Southern Cameroons, Ambazonia provides Nigeria with an opportunity to reciprocate Cameroon’s support against secessionist misadventures of Biafra between 1967 and 1970. In chapter 17, C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu provide a prognosis on the trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. They contend that both countries have a lot to gain by sustaining the blossoming rapprochement, especially in containing their mutual security threats. It is anticipated that Cameroon and Nigeria will have enormous roles towards fostering integration in West and Central Africa. Finally, in chapter 18, Pamela Ogwuazor Momah provides a select annotated bibliography on extant literature on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. REFERENCES Adekeye, A., and A.R. Mustapha. (2008). Nigeria’s Foreign Policy After the Cold War. Scottville, South Africa: University of Kwazulu Natal Press. Agwu, Fred Aja. (2010). “Reciprocity and its implications in international relations,” in Osita Eze (ed.), Reciprocity in International Relations. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Ate, B. (1992). “Nigeria and Cameroon.” In B. Ate and B. Akinterinwa (eds.), Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-regional Security in the 1990s. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Ebun, J. (1992). The Growth of Political Parties in Southern Cameroons 1916–1960. Yaoundé: Center d’Edition et de Production pour l’Enseignement et la Reserche (CEPER). Fombo, G.F. (2008). “Imperial antecedent of the contentious Cameroon-­Nigeria border dispute.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1. Fombo, G.F. (2011). “Territoriality: Cabotage and the Cameroon-­Nigeria Bakassi conflict.” Africa Strategic Review 2, no. 2.

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Haas, E. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces (1950–1957). Stanford: Stanford University Press. Ibrahim, M.K. (2010). “Nigeria-­Libya relations: Reciprocity as a tool of foreign policy.” In Osita Eze (ed.), Reciprocity in International Relations. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Keohane, Robert O. (1986). “Reciprocity in international relations.” International Organisations 40, no. 1. Mitrany, D. (1943). A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Ngoh, J.V. (1990). Southern Cameroons, 1922–1961: A Constitutional History. Aldershot: Ashgate. Ngoh, V. (2001). Southern Cameroon, 1922–1961: A Constitutional History. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Nweke, G.A. (2000). “Functionalism and the new world order: The dwindling options for Africa.” Africa Political Science Review 1, no. 1. Nweke, G.A. (1990). “Policy response to the May 1981 Nigeria-Cameroon border crisis.” In G. Olusanya and R. Akndele (eds.), The Structure and Processes of Foreign Policy Making and Implementation in Nigeria. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Obiozor, A. George. (2010). “The issue of reciprocity in Nigeria-­United States relations.” In Osita Eze (ed.) Reciprocity in International Relations. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Okereke, C.N. (2009). “Cameroon: A strategic frontline state.” Africa Strategic Review 1, no. 2. Okereke, C.N., Onuoha F., and Emmanuel, M. (2008). “Nationalism, struggle over Bakassi and the changing face of diplomacy between Nigeria and Cameroon.” Africa Peace Review, 4–8, no. 1.

Chapter One

Bilateralism and Interstate Relations Theoretical and Conceptual Explanations Bernard Nwosu and Chinyere Ibeh

INTRODUCTION The history of relations between sovereign political jurisdictions goes back to ancient times. In the early days of diplomacy, it was mostly between sovereign principalities and kingdoms. Most treaties of relationship between principalities or sovereigns, as reported by Hamilton and Langhorne (2010), were bilateral. Bilateralism therefore provided the background against which other approaches to international relations were built. While the idea of collective security, which involves more than two parties, is equally old, the dominant form of ancient diplomacy was bilateralism between pairs of sovereign formations (Langhorne, 2010). In contemporary international relations, bilateral interests continue to be an important part of diplomacy in a world in which multilateralism features prominently in international politics. Indeed, where the core interests of actors are best served by bilateralism, they give it priority in the absence of encumbrances. Phonologically, bilateralism hints the number of parties involved in a relationship. In that regard, Berridge defined it as a “conduct of relations or communication limited to two parties at any one time” (Berridge, 1995, cited in Kiatpongsan, 2011). Similarly, it describes a process of coordinating national policies between two states or parties. The latter definition takes into account the various relations between any given number of players in which pairs of clusters of actors act on the basis of reciprocity. Bilateralism usually revolves around trade or political relations between two states. It includes treaties between two states, exchange of ambassadors and state visits. Beyond the foregoing meanings, the most recent version of the same concept is “new bilateralism.” While old bilateralism mostly relates 13

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to, but is not limited to, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (see Lampe, 2010), new bilateralism refers to US reintroduction of bilateral approaches to support its attempts to solve trade conflicts with its partners by putting direct pressure on them to open up their markets or consider trade-­related issues like intellectual property rights. This was a response to the US realization that despite promoting multilateralism in her diplomacy after 1945, it has not enabled her to solve her trade-­related problems. Subsequently, the Ronald Reagan administration applied new bilateralism as an instrument of direct pressure on their partners to open up their markets. With new bilateralism, the field of international economic relations in the 1990s witnessed several bilateral negotiations on the “side lines” of multilateralism. Indeed, the politics of bilateralism became the leading economic policy trend (see Kiatpongsan, 2011). The experience of the First World War highlights the dangers of bilateralism, since complex series of bilateral treaties made the war inevitable. Despite that, effective diplomacy is still done at the bilateral level. Bilateralism can be as broad as political, economic, social, education, health, security and cultural relations between two sovereign states irrespective of their geographical region (Reich, 2009). It concerns relations or policies of joint action between two parties. It can be contrasted with unilateralism (where one party acts on its own) and multilateralism (where three or more parties are involved). In looking at the theoretical and conceptual issues around bilateralism, this chapter considers the various contexts in which bilateral relations between two states take place, and the two central defining features of bilateralism, which are conflict and cooperation, and then grounds the concept of conflict and cooperation on Nigeria-­Cameroon relations. CONTEXTS OF BILATERAL RELATIONS Generally speaking, bilateralism plays out in the economic and development context, political and security contexts and of course the cultural contexts. What is most common in the entire context of bilateralism is the conduct of age-­old bi-­national alliances. Mutual defence treaties were quite common among states in the past and even until the present day in spite of a preponderance of multilateralism in security and defence matters. These alliances are set up against various fronts considered as potential sources of threats to the contracting parties. Special note needs to be taken of the fact that security agendas, more often than not, are pursued in direct relation to other policy areas like economics and politics. For instance, the spread of terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin area



Bilateralism and Interstate Relations 15

and the Sahel is pulling countries into bilateral and multilateral relations for resolving the security challenges. The point of this cooperation is to restore peace for economic and development interactions to thrive. In pursuit of economic, development and other engagements, nations are either cooperative or conflictive as they navigate their various national interests. As the case may be, one instance of bilateral relations could be characterized by both cooperation and conflict. Nigeria-­Cameroon relations can be viewed from the broad lens of being neither wholly cooperative nor wholly conflictual as it presents a mix of both. CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN BILATERAL RELATIONS The origins of conflict and cooperation in international relations go back to realist and idealist theses on the behaviour of nation-­states in relating with others. The realists view international politics purely in terms of hardnosed pursuit of interest and power. They view human beings as inherently self-­ interested to the extent that such interest trumps moral principles. Indeed, in Thucydides’ book, the ancient Athenians prioritized self-­interest over morality. Hence, the international arena, which lacks a common rule making and enforcing body, is a self-­help system in which each state is responsible for its own survival (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). Further, a case of rejection of morality in bilateral relations could be seen in ancient times when Athens invaded the Island of Melos around 416 BCE. The envoys of Athens gave Melians two options, either destruction or surrender, and advised them not to make an appeal based on justice because justice principles are made in human relations only when both sides are under equal compulsion. However, when one side is stronger, it gets as much as it can. The above classical notion of realism continues to contemporary realist formulations, especially in Morgenthau’s (1948) six principles of realism. The main tenet of these principles is that politics is governed by objective laws, and these laws have roots in human nature; national interest is defined in terms of national power, and it is always dynamic. Finally, abstract moral principles cannot be applied to politics. The essence of these principles was presaged in E. H. Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis. Morgenthau’s bold declaration that international politics is pursuit of interest defined in terms of power captures the thrust of the realist view of international relations. Accordingly, the international system is a sort of international anarchy and a competition for interests in which power frames outcomes for strong and weak states. So while the desire and search for peace is common, the reality of conflict is also constant.

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Beyond realism, idealists have a view of international relations distinct from the realist power-­dominated viewpoint. According to Wilson (2011), idealism is an optimistic doctrine which seeks to transcend the international anarchy and create a more cosmopolitan and harmonious view of the world order. When International Relations emerged, idealism dominated its early theorizing. Idealists emphasize the power of reason in their search for a harmonious world order. This drew from several philosophers of old, but Immanuel Kant’s work Towards A Perpetual Peace (first published 1795) stood out in this regard. Kant’s argument in this work is that stable peace among nations can only be guaranteed when nations of the earth are republics governed by citizens who depend on rule of law for the security of their properties. In such a federation, peace is realized and maintained by the free moral choices of elected leaders of nations. His conditions of perpetual peace among nations presents articles of relations that advocates mutual non-­ intervention, rejections of violence, equality and reasoned interaction as the basis of decision making (see Kant, 1917). Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian theory of International Relations (IR) also resonates the idealist thinking. Like Kant, Bentham identified with the power of human reason and vested a lot of confidence on public opinion as the guiding signpost in decision making in both bilateral and multilateral relations (Hoogensen, 2000). It is this liberal pathway of Kant and Bentham that supports advocacies for peaceful relations among states. In fact, it influenced the formation of the League of Nations, which, however, failed to prevent the outbreak of World War II. Although the moral principle of equality of nations, which is a product of liberal idealism, continues to be important in global bilateralism and multilateralism, it only exists on paper. Besides, in bilateral relations, nations are also known to flout the tenets of equality and fall back more on neo-­realist power politics to assert their interests. The most poignant issues in the bilateral relations of Nigeria and Cameroon and how they have been handled render power and interest rather too visible and make aspects of the relations appear conflictive. Overall, however, Nigeria-­Cameroon relations swing between conflict and cooperation. This is not strange in bilateral relations because several instances of bilateralism are equally so characterized. Sino-­US relations, Franco-­German relations, Australia-­China relations, among others, share stories of conflict and cooperation (Blanchard and Shen, 2015; Sangar, 2020; Wilson, 2017). In Nigeria-­ Cameroon relations some events stand out as important issues of continuing reflection within the rubrics of idealism and realism, on the one hand, and conflict and cooperation, on the other hand. We can locate these idealist and realist elements in political relations, economic and development cooperation, border relations and security cooperation between the two states.



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CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN NIGERIA-­CAMEROON RELATIONS Political Cooperation The major symbol of political relations between countries is the existence of diplomatic ties and exchange of ambassadors. Nigeria and Cameroon established diplomatic ties in 1960, the same year they both got their independence and also sent high commissioners to each other’s capitals. Nigeria’s foreign policy goals and objectives are built on principles that promote friendly and cooperative relations, especially with immediate neighbours, and these include: peaceful coexistence with other sovereign nations and respect for the territorial integrity of other states (Familugba and Ojo, 2013). Similarly, Cameroon’s foreign policy, as Amin (2020) observed, has objectives driven by broader economic, social and political cooperation. It was the advantages of cooperative engagements that led Nigeria and Cameroon to establish diplomatic relations. This is, however, not oblivious to the fact that people in the two geographical areas of Nigeria and Cameroon have strong historical, geographical, economic and cultural ties that makes formal political relations inevitable. In spite of these ties, the relationship between the two states is understood in contrasting terms. Some writers qualify it as characterized by warmth, cordiality and mutuality of interest and purpose (Funteh, 2015, cited in Amin, 2020), while others see the relationship as uneasy, difficult and tense due to Cameroon’s perception of Nigeria as a threat (Akinyemi 2014, citied in Amin 2020). Those who qualify the relations in cooperative, friendly terms focus on engagements that are of mutual benefit to the citizens and governments of the two countries. For instance, during the 1960s in the northern sections of the two countries, especially the Adamawa and Mandara Hills, livestock farmers from both sides engaged in cattle grazing. Also, fishermen from Nigeria and Cameroon used local rivers for fishing and other domestic purposes (Familugba and Ojo, 2013). In fact, what formal political relations have done is to give political backing to other levels of relations that had long existed at informal levels, and manage ones that arise at formal levels. Of course, when we separate economic and political relations, it is merely for convenience, because part of the core of diplomacy is the use of political instruments for the promotion of economic relations between peoples and nations. While various engagements of Cameroon and Nigeria could be classified as political, some of them need to be treated under a separate subhead because of their peculiar character. In the area of security cooperation for instance, Cameroon’s supportive disposition towards Nigeria during the civil

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war is squarely political, yet security is central to the cooperation. Also, some more recent security challenges like terrorism and cross-­border banditry have attracted attention at the diplomatic level so that political tools of relations had to be deployed to address security problems. These forms of issues would be addressed under security cooperation. The point being made is that political relations are only a point of official coordination of approaches for other forms of interactions. Economic and Development Cooperation Beyond the historical and cultural ties that continue to bring the people of Nigeria and Cameroon together, their interactions are supported by a massive stretch of border with multiple formal and informal entry points. These informal borders are important facilitators of both the informal and underground economy between the peoples of the two countries. This makes it relatively difficult to sufficiently capture the figures of their economic activities. At best, scholars work with figures that are officially available. In a study of informal cross-­border trade with immediate neighbours of Nigeria (Benin, Cameroon and Niger), between 2013 and 2014, Cameroon was second only to Benin with 17.1 per cent of the informal exports from Nigeria and 14.5 per cent of the informal imports into Nigeria (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2016). In spite of uncaptured figures of economic relations between the two countries, Nigeria is “still the number one trade partner of Cameroon before China and France” (Republic of Cameroon, 2015, 2). Further indicators of economic and development cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon include: a.  Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2006 on the transnational highway project to facilitate transportation between Nigeria and Cameroon, b.  Signing of an MoU between the Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON) and Cameroon’s National Agency for Standards and Quality (ANOR), c.  Holding of economic and trade days every year in Nigeria and Cameroon, d.  Nigerian Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Cameroon with Dangote Cement production being a conspicuous one among such ventures (Republic of Cameroon, 2015). There also exist records showing that trade in building materials, spare parts, cosmetic products, fertilizers, home electronic gadgets, clothes, agricultural produce and utensils exists between both countries.



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Border and Geo-­strategic Relations Nigeria’s border relations with Cameroon appear to be the most pronounced aspects of their relations. Significant incidents connected with border relations between Nigeria and Cameroon are linked to the outcome of the two world wars, especially the future of British-­administered Cameroons, which were a Trustee territory of the United Nations. Central to this was the United Nations–supervised plebiscite of February 1961, which resulted in the transfer of the Sarduana Province of Northern Cameroon to Nigeria and the reunification of former British Southern Cameroon that was initially jointly administered with Eastern Nigeria to the Republic of Cameroon, which attained independence from France on 1 January 1960. In addition to this were the contentious border demarcations, especially the struggle over ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula. The history of border tensions between Nigeria and Cameroon goes back to the Berlin conference of 1885, where Africa was geographically divided up among the European powers of the time. According to a historical account in the work of Familugba and Ojo (2013), on 10 September 1884, an agreement was signed between the British government and the kings of Old Calabar, in which Britain offered to protect all of the places controlled by the Obong of Calabar. Incidentally, Bakassi, which was predominantly populated by the indigenous Efik ethnic group, was among these territories because it was under the authority of the Obong of Calabar at the time. The Germans had earlier, on 14 July 1884, signed a treaty agreement with two Douala chiefs, leading to the hoisting of German flags in Douala and Bimba. This agreement led to the identification of Cameroon as a political entity in the German sphere of influence. Thus, there arose boundary issues between Britain (which was occupying Nigeria) and Germany over their spheres of influence, where they were mutually trying to repel each other from their claimed overseas territories. Germany made maritime passage in the area difficult for Britain. This tension lingered until 1885, when the Berlin conference took place, and Britain agreed to pay compensation to Germany while Germany started allowing Britain an uninterrupted maritime passage from Lagos to the Niger Delta (Familugba and Ojo, 2013). Also, it was at that conference that the issues of boundary demarcation between the colonial powers commenced. The line which first emerged as the Eastern international boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon was the Rio del Rey to Yola line, described in the Anglo-­German agreements of 1885 and 1886. This refers to the boundary of Eastern Nigeria and Western Cameroon and includes the area of the Cross River and its tributaries that run from the Cameroon Mountains. The Anglo-­ German agreement of 1885 provided a map-­based description from a point

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between longitude 89 degrees 42 minutes, and 80 degrees 46 minutes east, at which Rio del Rey enters the sea, to the Cross River Rapids. By a convention of July–August 1886, this line was extended north east to Yola (Familugba and Ojo, 2013). Another slight modification was made by a convention of July 1890 from the coast to the Cross River when it was discovered that there was no river named Rio del Rey. Therefore, the starting point was adjusted to the head of Rio del Rey Creek. Further, Britain and Germany in 1893 signed an agreement that defined the Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary from Yola to Lake Chad at 35 minutes east of the meridian of the centre of the town of Kuka (Familugba and Ojo, 2013). The boundaries did not give consideration to physical features or cultural ties. The Borno Kingdom as well as Adamawa and Marghi were each carved up between Germany and Great Britain. This was also the case with the Bakassi Peninsula, which is more culturally bonded to Nigeria but was made part of Cameroon (see Familugba and Ojo, 2013). The boundary conflict of Britain and Germany was more pronounced at the southern borders of Nigeria and Cameroon. Around the northern borders, France was also engaging in activities of territorial interest. This led the British and Germans to put their differences aside to fight off the French presence and activities in the area. However, following World War I and the defeat of Germany, Cameroon was taken away from Germany and made a Mandate Territory of the defunct League of Nations and divided between French and British colonial administration. Cameroon was then split into two unequal parts for Britain and France. Britain in turn divided its own part in two and treated them as two different territories under their Nigerian colonial administration. While Southern Cameroon was administered from Enugu under Eastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon was administered from Kaduna under the Northern Nigeria administration. By the end of British colonial rule in Nigeria, it became important to determine the future of the British-­administered Northern and Southern Cameroons through the February 1961 United Nations–supervised plebiscites. The purpose of the plebiscite was for the people to decide whether they wanted to join Nigeria or Cameroon. Northern Cameroons voted 146, 296 to 97, 569 to join Nigeria while Southern Cameroons voted 3756 to 2552 in favour of uniting with Cameroon (Amin 2020). While Cameroon reluctantly gave up Northern Cameroons, it was difficult for Nigeria to withdraw claims over the Bakassi Peninsula, which was predominantly inhabited by Efik people of Nigeria and is located in former British Southern Cameroons. Thus, boundary disagreements by occupying European powers were carried over by the new post-­colonial states of Nigeria and Cameroon. Hence, for many years, the two countries struggled over the ownership of the peninsula until the International



Bilateralism and Interstate Relations 21

Court of Justice judgement on 10 October 2002, which granted ownership of the peninsula to the Republic of Cameroon. The struggle over the Bakassi Peninsula was more than just a border fight. It is economic and geo-­strategic. The swampy peninsula, which is cut by series of channels, covers an area of 50 square kilometres and is historically inhabited by Efiks, Ibibio, Annang, Oron, Andoni, Ijaw and Itshekiri, which are Nigerian ethnic groups. Apart from having crude oil, the place is surrounded by a deep sea rich in marine resources such as fish, shrimp, prawns and lobsters. In fact, the place is believed to have the highest concentration of shrimp and fish in the world (see Familugba and Ojo, 2013). Beyond its economic value, the peninsula is strategic for the maritime security of both countries. During the Biafran war of 1967–1970, Jabane, on the Bakassi Peninsula, was made available to Nigeria by Cameroon’s President Ahidjo to monitor supplies to the secessionist Eastern Nigeria (Amin 2020). This meant that the area could provide an important base for a possible security threat to Nigeria. This is more so because, the issues of militancy, secession and terrorism continue to be major security issues in Nigeria’s recent history. It therefore suffices to assert that the post-­independence struggle for the ownership of the peninsula was not only a carry-­over of pre-­independence tensions from European powers or a mere border struggle, but also a geo-­strategic one. Security Cooperation The common borders between Nigeria and Cameroon and the nature of security threats along these borders necessarily warrant security cooperation. Even in situations where special security cooperation had not been formalized, situations have arisen to present a need for such cooperation. Nigeria’s common border with Cameroon spans about 1,800 kilometres from Lake Chad at the northern border down to the Atlantic Ocean at the southern border (Familugba and Ojo, 2013). A number of activities that warrants security cooperation take place along these borders. During the Biafran war, Cameroon supported Nigeria not only as a member of the defunct Organisation of African Unity, which did not favour Biafran secession, but as a strategic neighbour that shares a common border. Cameroon permitted Nigeria the free use of the contested Bakassi Peninsula and banned the shipment of arms, medicine, foodstuff and other vital supplies to Biafra. Ahmadu Ahidjo, the leader of Cameroon at the time, strongly criticized those who supported or assisted the secessionist Biafra (Amin 2020). Cameroon was quite committed in its war support to Nigeria, so that even when a staunch ally like France assisted Biafra, she still firmly identified with Nigeria (Amin 2020). This pragmatic move by Cameroon, in spite of its

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strained relations with Nigeria for loss of the Sarduana Province to Nigeria via plebiscitary decision, ushered in a moment of cooperation with Nigeria. Such pragmatic diplomacy made Nigeria sign the Maroua Accord of 1975, which acknowledged Cameroon’s ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula. However, the accord did not end the counter-­claims and conflicts over the Bakassi Peninsula. When General Murtala Mohammed seized power in 1975, he reneged on Nigeria’s promises and agreements to recognize Bakassi as a Cameroonian territory. The war diplomacy of Cameroon and the peaceful and cooperative relations it supported between the two countries began to take a downward slide. By 1981, the two countries nearly went to war over the territory as a result of the killing of five Nigerian military personnel by Cameroonian gendarmes at Ikang District in old Cross River State. More recent issues of security that have reopened cooperation between the two countries are secessionist movements in them, terrorism and banditry across the northern borders, especially in the Lake Chad Basin area. In terms of secessionist agitations, Nigeria has witnessed the revival of demands for a separate state of Biafra by various separatist groups since 1999, after the restoration of elective rule in the country. Tensions created by the engagements between these groups and security agencies are an important source of security concern to the government. Similarly, the English-­speaking Southern Cameroon has recently witnessed the rise of demand for the separate statehood of Ambazonia following claims of marginalization by the central government and the French-­speaking majority. Consequently, the secessionist movements have risen to challenge the political authorities. The backlash from the government made some Southern Cameroonian separatist leaders take refuge beyond the Cameroonian borders, including in Nigeria. On 5 January 2018, the Nigerian authorities arrested 12 leaders of Southern Cameroon who were members of the Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe–led interim government of Ambazonia. Ten of the leaders were transferred to the Cameroonian government on 18 January 2018. While this arrest was possible through the extradition treaty between Nigeria and Cameroon, which was signed in 1977, it could be understood as an important quid pro quo from Nigeria for Cameroon’s support during Nigeria’s civil war (1967–1970). Also, Nigeria is witnessing on-­going secessionist agitation with a possibility of cross-­border refuge from members or leaders of such groups in neighbouring countries. Perhaps the deportation of Cameroon’s separatist leaders was done in anticipation of reciprocal goodwill from Cameroon should Nigeria have a similar need. The other important area of security challenges between the two countries that has led to cooperation is terrorism and banditry in northern Nigeria, especially the north eastern flank of Nigerian borders with Cameroon. Boko



Bilateralism and Interstate Relations 23

Haram terrorists and bandits in the area take advantage of the geography of the zone, which contains a large tract of land with virtually no government presence, to set up their nefarious activities and camps. The common border of the two countries provides an easy escape route for the terrorists after their violent crimes in any of the countries. Considering the increasing wave of terrorism at these borders, the two states have taken some bilateral measures to mitigate the activities of the criminal elements. One such measure is the closure of borders, even though the borders in that area are generally porous. Further steps include the signing of an agreement on 28 February 2012 to create the Cameroon-­Nigeria Border Security Committee (Nkwi 2013; Republic of Cameroon, 2015). Besides, the bilateral understanding that security challenges have created between the two states is even reinforced on multinational fronts for engaging with security issues. For instance, this security cooperation is reinforced by their joint membership of the Multinational Joint Task Force and Lake Chad Basin Commission. These organisations provide multilateral security fronts for confronting the problems of terrorism and banditry in the Lake Chad Basic areas. Speaking on Nigeria-­Cameroon recent security cooperation, a high-­ranking military officer, Olufemi Odeyinde of the Nigerian Air Force War College, remarked during a visit to Yaoundé, the Cameroonian capital, that militaries of the two countries have conducted exchanges, competitions and training and collaborated in the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. According to him, Nigeria and Cameroon are neighbours and brothers and do cooperate at all levels including the Multinational Joint Task Force (Xinhua News, 2020). SYNTHESIS This chapter examined the central concepts and issues around bilateralism. It began with an exposition on the meaning of the concept and expressed its essential characteristics, which centrally involve conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation in international relations are, themselves, underpinned by the broad principles of idealism and realism. To properly explain these essential concepts, they are historically presented with the main events on Nigeria-­Cameroon relations with a view to understanding the concept through its practical unfolding in the relations between the two countries. For the purpose of demonstrating conflicts and cooperation in the relations of the two states, we explored some important context of relations between Nigeria and Cameroon. They include the contexts of political relations, economic and development cooperation, border relations and security cooperation. Political relations establish and formalize relationships

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between states and coordinate other levels of interaction. Economic and development relations are mostly about trade relations. Border and geo-­ strategic relations focus on the geopolitics of the two countries, especially the ownership of some territories around their land and sea borders. These territories were sources of contestations and tensions in diplomacy for the two states because of European colonial demarcations of Africa that divided cultural groups without regard to their historical ties. In particular, the Sarduana Province, which belongs to Cameroon, was given to Nigeria through plebiscitary decision in 1961. Also, the Bakassi Peninsula has people who are culturally bonded to their Nigerian kith and kin but geographically assigned to Cameroon. Another level of relations that was considered in the chapter is security cooperation, which goes back to Cameroon’s assistance to Nigeria during the latter’s civil war and continues with the recent rise and growth of secessionist groups in Southeast Nigeria and Southern Cameroon, and terrorism and banditry at the north eastern borders of Nigeria and Cameroon. The two countries have series of bilateral understanding to work jointly against the terror and banditry which affect their common borders. The range of relations between Nigeria and Cameroon is characterized in terms of conflict or cooperation. These two core characteristics of bilateral relations arise as the nations pursue their interests in international politics. Conflictive relations are understood through the prism of realist and neo-­ realist formulation about international relations, while cooperative relations are seen from the viewpoint of idealist formulations. Some high-­water marks of the two countries’ relations were examined from these conceptual lenses. Overall, while there are conflictive aspects in the relations between the two countries, the cooperative side is quite significant, and the trend towards peaceful cooperation stands out. REFERENCES Amin, J. A. (2020). “Cameroon’s relations towards Nigeria: A foreign policy of pragmatism.” Journal of Modern African Studies 58, no. 1, 1–22. Blanchard, J. F., and S. Shen. (2015). “Taking the temperature of China-­US conflict and cooperation.” In J. F. Blanchard and S. Shen (eds.), Conflict and Cooperation in Sino-­US Relations: Change and Continuity, Causes and Cures. Abingdon: Routledge, 2–21. Carr, E. H. (1946). Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939. London: Macmillan. Central Bank of Nigeria. (2016). “Measuring informal cross-­border trade in Nigeria.” https://www​.cbn​.gov​ ng/out/2018/sd/measuring%20informal%20cross-­border%20 trade%20in%20nigeria​.pdf 9 (accessed 24 December 2020).



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Familugba, J. O., and O. O. Ojo. (2013). “Nigeria-­Cameroon border relations: an analysis of conflict and cooperation (1970–2004).” International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3 no. 11, 181–190. Hamilton, K., and R. Langhorne. (2010). The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theories and Administration. New York: Routledge. Hoogensen, G. E. B. (2000). “Jeremy Bentham and the theories of International Relations.” PhD Diss., Department of Political Science, University of Alberta. Kant, Immanuel. (1917). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. Kiatpongsan, C. (2011). The EU-­Thailand Relations: Tracing the Patterns of New Bilateralism. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Lampe, M. (2010). “Explaining nineteenth century bilateralism: Economic and political determinants of the Cobden-­Chevalier network.” Economic History Review 64, no. 2, 644–668. Morgenthau, H. (1948). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf. Nkwi, W. G. (2013). “Cameroon, too much to carry: The perception and ramifications of Boko Haram’s activities on Cameroon.” Conflict Studies Quarterly 5, 67–87. Reich A. (2009). “Bilateralism versus multilateralism in international economic law: Applying the principle of subsidiarity.” University of Toronto Law Journal 60, no. 2, 263–287. Republic of Cameroon. (2015). “Nigeria our neighbour, our partner.” https://www​ .prc​ .cm/files/5c/54/51/2557cb3d83672494dd9fc0c0b87b9e14.pdf accessed (24 December 2020). Sangar, E. (2020). Diffusion in Franco-­German Relations: A Different Perspective on a History of Cooperation and Conflict. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2017). “Political realism in international relations.” https://plato​.stanford​.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/realism-­intl-­relations (accessed 27 November 2020).Trading Economics. (2020). “Nigeria exports to Cameroon.” https://tradingeconomics​.com/nigeria/exports/cameroon (accessed 24 December 2020). Trading Economics. (2020). “Nigeria imports from Cameroon.” https://tradingeconomics​.com/nigeria/imports/cameroon#:~:text=Nigeria%20imports%20from%20 Cameroon%20was,updated%20on%20December%20of%202020 (accessed 24 December 2020). Wilson, P. (2011). “Idealism in international relations.” LSE Research Online. http://eprints​.lse​.ac​.uk/41929/1/Idealism%20in%20international%20relations%20 (LSERO).pdf (accessed 20 October 2020). Wilson, J. D. (2017). International Resource Politics in the Asia-­Pacific:Tthe Political Economy of Conflict and Cooperation in the Asia-­Pacific. Cheltenham and Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing. Xinhua News. (2020). “Cameroon-­Nigeria military cooperation steady: Official.” http://www​.xinhuanet​.com/english/africa/202010/22/c_139458296.htm (accessed 22 November 2020).

Chapter Two

The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations Osita Agbu

INTRODUCTION In the practice of international relations and the application of foreign policy, it is often opined that there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies. However, with the “Good Neighbour Policy,” it is the case that in the past five decades, Nigeria has shown consistency, indeed, faithfulness to the application of this policy in her relations with her immediate neighbours in the West and Central Africa regions. To what extent can we say that the application of this policy has guided or modulated Nigeria’s response to her troubled relations with her neighbour to the east, the Republic of Cameroon? Could it be argued that this policy has been beneficial to Nigeria, or indeed, to both countries’ relations? What lessons if any, can be learned from the application of this policy for other countries, not just in Africa, but also beyond? Since attaining political independence on 1 October 1960, Nigeria has remained committed to the pursuit of friendly relations with her immediate neighbours, as ably articulated in the Concentric Circles theory postulated by Ibrahim Gambari, Nigerian scholar and statesman. This policy orientation is partly drawn from the understanding that her security frontiers extend beyond her geographical boundaries and that functional cooperation with neighbours is necessary to addressing the mutual challenges of security, governance and development. Nigeria shares land borders with the Republics of Benin, Cameroon and Niger. She also has littoral boundaries with Benin, Cameroon, Chad and Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Togo and Sao Tome and Principe (STP). These countries fall largely within West and Central Africa and have large populations of Nigerians living and working there (NDC Concept Note, 2018, 1). 27

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Unfortunately, most also have a history of armed conflicts with implications for Nigeria’s political stability. Aside from the security challenges in the Lake Chad Basin area, Nigeria’s littoral neighbours that fall within the Gulf of Guinea also share mutual security concerns of sea robbery, insurgencies, illicit transnational trafficking of arms and persons and illegal fishing. There are also emerging threats associated with the politics of nation-­building and separatist agitations that involve the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the various Southern Cameroon pro-­independence nationalists demanding an independent State of Ambazonia for the English-­speaking people of the north west and south west regions of Cameroon (NDC Concept Note, 2018, 2). Against the backdrop that Nigeria’s security is invariably interwoven with that of her neighbours, it is therefore expected that Nigeria take up serious relations with those neighbours, especially as this relates to governance and security matters. However, there exist some contentions that Nigeria has been rather aloof with trends with her eastern neighbour Cameroon beyond the resolution of the Bakassi crisis, and this has grave security implications. Since Nigeria’s political independence, it has amazingly acted with magnanimity towards her neighbours. She has often assisted them materially and diplomatically in times of need. She has also played a crucial role in the maintenance of regional security, and had even sent troops to Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone, apart from championing the formation of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). She had also built roads to facilitate communication with Benin (Okereke, 2009). She has often strained herself to prop up the economies of neighbouring states through the ECOWAS and other bilateral agreements. Considering these political investments, it is expected that it is in Nigeria’s interest to ensure stability and progress in the neighbouring states and Africa in general. In pursuing the goal of regional economic cooperation and development, Nigeria helped create ECOWAS in May 1975, which seeks to harmonize trade and investment practices for its fifteen West African member countries and ultimately to achieve a full customs union. Nigeria has also taken the lead in articulating the views of developing nations on the need for the democratization of the United Nations in a manner in which the interests of the developing world and African Diaspora are protected and projected (Okereke, 2005). In line with the Good Neighbour Policy, Nigeria played a central role in the ECOWAS efforts to end the civil war in Liberia and contributed the bulk of the ECOWAS peacekeeping forces sent there in 1990. Nigeria also provided the bulk of troops for ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leone (Okereke 2009). Nigeria has generally enjoyed good relations with her immediate neighbours, except perhaps Cameroon.



The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations 29

NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICY, VITAL INTERESTS AND THE GOOD NEIGHBOUR POLICY From Nigeria’s political independence in 1960 and beginning with the Tafawa Balewa administration, the guiding principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially as it concerns Africa, had been well articulated and understood. Generally, Nigeria’s foreign relations revolved around the principal issues of Nigeria’s international economic relations, relations with Europe, the European Economic Community (EEC), and later, the European Union (EU), United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) before its collapse, and with multilateral organizations like the OAU/AU, ECOWAS, the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the Non-­Aligned Movement (NAM). There is no gainsaying that Nigeria’s foreign policy and the execution of this by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been a function of the strength of the domestic environment as reflected in independent domestic thought and local/national assessment of affairs in the world outside. In Section 19(a-­e) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as Amended, we find enshrined the foreign policy objectives as outlined in the fundamental objectives and directive principles of State policy, whose provisions fall within the well-­known goals that have always underpinned Nigeria’s foreign policy as follows: a.  promotion and protection of national interests; b.  promotion of African Integration and support for African unity; c.  promotion of international cooperation for the consolidation of universal peace and mutual respect among all nations, and elimination of discrimination in all its manifestations; d.  respect for international law and treaty obligations as well as the seeking of settlement of international disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication; and e.  promotion of a just world order (Agbu 2011, 24). Conceptually, it could be argued that Nigeria has an Afro-­centric foreign policy. We note that since political independence, Nigeria has consistently pursued a policy of “good-­neighbourliness,” especially within its immediate sphere of influence. One principle therefore, which runs through Nigeria’s conduct of her relations with other countries, is her consideration of the pursuit of peace and enduring unity in Africa as purely a function of a historical role conferred on her by virtue of the fact that she has the largest

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concentration of black people in the world. Nigeria’s foreign relations in general have therefore, been actively guided by her focus on African issues and peoples of African descent in the diaspora. In other words, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been largely benign, and could be said to have a moral framework. The reason or reasons for this perceived disposition in Africa was very early articulated by Nigerian political leaders glorifying their achievement upon the attainment of independence. Nigeria therefore, willingly led the way in pre-­empting the emergence of a “Continental African Unity.” Nigerian leaders in fact interpreted the national interest in the early 1960s as consistent with a “functional association” of independent African states. This singular act was to set the pattern of Nigeria-­ OAU relations. To a considerable extent, all the Nigerian governments since independence had been faithful to the principles of the then-­OAU. Nigeria has in practice been consistent in its adherence to the policy of non-­interference in the internal affairs of other states. Further, Nigeria believes strongly in the sanctity of territorial boundaries as they were inherited at independence (uti possidetis). The defining principles of Nigeria’s foreign policy could also be found generally articulated in careful statements, pronouncements, and policies in respect of her national interests. After gaining independence in 1960, the Prime Minister of the Federation, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, articulated these basic principles in his inaugural address to the Plenary of the 15th Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 7 October 1960, in New York, when Nigeria became the 99th member of the world body, thus: (i) Firstly, it is the desire of Nigeria to remain on friendly terms with all nations and participate actively in the work of the United Nations Organisation (UNO). (ii) Secondly, Nigeria, a large and populous country of over 35 million (in 1960, now 206 million approximately) has absolutely no territorial or expansionist intention; (iii) Thirdly, we shall not forget our old friends and we are proud to have been accepted as a member of the British Commonwealth. Nevertheless, we do not intend to ally ourselves as a matter of routine with any of power-­blocs. We are committed to uphold the principles upon which the United Nations is founded; and (iv) Fourthly, Nigeria hopes to work with other African States for the progress of Africa and assist in bringing all African territories to a state of responsible Independence (Third Press Publications, Nigeria at the United Nations, 1960).



The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations 31

For Mbachu (2018), the four principles enunciated above could be summarized to mean that the contours of Nigeria’s foreign policy embody non-­alignment, legal equality of states, Africa as the centrepiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy, non-­interference in the domestic affairs of other states, and the predisposition to the principle of multilateralism. Since the foreign policy of any country is guided by its national interest, Nigeria’s foreign policy, therefore, could be said to be characterized by certain imperatives. According to Mbachu (2008, 30), national interest “expresses core socio-­economic and political ideals, values and aspirations which are well defended at home, and pursued or promoted or defended beyond national boundaries.” He further clarified that by national interest, we refer to a set of goals or objectives which a state intends to promote to achieve the greatest happiness for the majority of the people. Indeed, the national interest of any country could be classified according to the importance we place on the contending issues or interests. Hence, there are core/vital interests, secondary or variable interests, as well as the general or complementary interests. For Nigeria, this is encapsulated in the Concentric Circles theory articulated by Ibrahim Gambari, Nigeria’s former Minister of External Affairs, scholar and statesman who placed more emphasis on Nigeria’s relations with her immediate neighbours with this reducing centrifugally as she engages with Africa, the United Nations and other parts of the world. This, in a way, relates to the articulation of a country’s strategic interests which refer to the desires and aspirations that are of direct importance to the security, military, social and economic advancement of a state (Mbachu, 2011). In addition is the geo-­strategic importance of Nigeria’s immediate neighbours of which Cameroon is well positioned. Nigeria is surrounded by Francophone states, which includes Cameroon. Generally, Nigeria’s policy toward her neighbours has since independence been based largely on the following four principles: a.  The sovereign equality of all African states b.  Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every African state c.  Non-­interference in the internal affairs of other African countries d.  Commitment to functional cooperation as a means of promoting African unity As a result, Nigeria has been totally indifferent to the internal political dynamics and power tussles in in her neighbourhood. Of much speculation is the idea that Nigeria has been largely apathetic to political dynamics among her Francophone neighbours because of the possible direct and indirect consequences that may arise if France, their “godfather” decides to react. Not that

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France has not been reacting clandestinely over the years, as seen from the numerous times that extra African actors have come to the aid of Cameroon in her skirmishes with Nigeria in the Bakassi Peninsula. However, it should be noted that Nigeria has deep respect for the principle of non-­interference in the internal affairs of other African states as well as a feeling of being a role model among other African countries, especially in the West Africa region, that adds to her penchant for indifference to political events occurring in her immediate neighbourhood. Nigeria’s foreign relations in general have, therefore, been actively guided by her focus on African issues and the welfare of blacks in diaspora. The reason for this self-­appointed mission in Africa was clearly spelt out by the former President Shehu Shagari in one of his presidential addresses: The size, the population and the economic potential of this country have imposed on us a special duty to respond responsibly to international issues and problems. When it is realised that Nigeria’s population makes every fifth African, as well as every sixth black person in the world a Nigerian, it becomes doubly incumbent upon us, in formulating our policies, to bear in mind our historical responsibilities to Africa and the black Diaspora. (Shagari, 1982, 871)

The analysis of the relations between Nigeria and her neighbours reveals that Nigeria is seriously threatened by the various activities of her immediate neighbours, which are mostly Francophone countries. Some of the north eastern neighbours were initially suspected of arming and harbouring the Boko Haram insurgents for example. This is the insurgent group that has been terrorizing the north of Nigeria for over one decade. The bilateral military, political and economic agreements between France and her erstwhile colonial states are largely suspected of contributing to the frequency with which these countries infringe on the sovereignty of Nigeria (Mbachu 2018, 10). The Good Neighbour Policy, which Nigeria adopted in its diplomatic relations with her neighbours since independence in 1960, was founded on the premise that Nigeria’s neighbours should have nothing to fear from her geo-­ strategic size and military might. While this “big brother” policy sometimes undermines her national security interest, it has however, undoubtedly been a guiding principle of Nigeria’s foreign relations especially with her immediate neighbours. This is true, even with her Francophone neighbours who more often than not had courted Nigeria’s military and diplomatic displeasure, invariably tempered by the application of this policy. Cameroon is the major culprit here. For instance, there are several cases of harassment and assault of Nigerians sharing borders with the Republic of Cameroon that ultimately culminated in the Bakassi crisis, and the eventual judgment by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague.



The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations 33

STATE OF CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS Ordinarily, Nigeria and Cameroon should be very good neighbours with the potentials for complementing each other’s economies and exchanging human and material resources positively. Unfortunately, beginning from the 1960s, the situation has been a case of good citizen to citizen relationship, but very fair to poor government to government relations. How can this be explained? Indeed, it may not be farfetched to assume that the chequered state relations could be attributed to the external influence on Cameroon, and the suspect here will be France. Cameroonian citizens of the north west and south west regions find it most comfortable to live, trade and attend school in Nigeria, whereas they often complain of suppression, discrimination and brutality of the Cameroonian authorities. Nigerians of the border communities with Cameroon also complain of the same harsh treatment meted out to them by Cameroonian gendarmes. This scenario can only set the stage for conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. It was the case that on 13 December 1946, Northern and Southern Cameroons (British Cameroons) were placed under the United Nations International Trusteeship System. The UN Trusteeship Council executed a Trust Agreement with Britain over the Trust Territories. The UN General Assembly approved the bilateral agreement at the 62nd Plenary Meeting of its first session. Pursuant to the Trusteeship Agreement, Britain undertook to lead the Trust Territories and their inhabitants ultimately to self-­government or independence, in accordance with Article 76(b) of the United Nations Charter. It was after this that the UN General Assembly recommended that a plebiscite be held in order to ascertain whether the inhabitants of the Trust Territories wished to join Nigeria or Cameroon. In the plebiscite subsequently held and supervised by the United Nations in February 1961, a majority of the inhabitants of Northern Cameroon and Southern Cameroon voted freely and secretly to be part and parcel of Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. The UN General Assembly endorsed the results of the plebiscite and by Resolution 1608 (XV) of 21 April 1961, terminated the Trusteeship Agreement. Administratively, Northern Cameroon formally joined Nigeria on 1 June 1961, while Southern Cameroon likewise joined Cameroon on 1 October1961 (Igbinedion, 2020, 2). This state of affairs existed until about 1991, when a group of people commenced agitations for the separate statehood of Northern and Southern Cameroons. The group contends, among other grievances, that Britain failed to deliver under the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement and instead proposed independence that saw to the integration of the Trust Territories into Cameroon and Nigeria. The agitation for a separate state of Ambazonia, which has attracted the intervention of the United Nations, has seen intermittent protests

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and violence from both the separatists and the Cameroonian government sides. All through this period beginning from 1991, the Nigerian government had remained aloof, and hardly interfered in the events in the Cameroons. Was this because of its Good Neighbour Policy or some other considerations such as France’s reaction, implications of her stance for the agitations within her own territory for an independent state of Biafra by the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), or just outright mischief. While it is early to attempt a conclusive analysis of the reason(s) for Nigeria’s initial lukewarm attitude, it is however, important to note that the agitation for independence in Cameroon has increased in tempo and sophistication and may sooner, rather than later, attract outside interests and support from beyond the Cameroons that will have serious implications for Nigeria and her oil and gas economy. This apart, Nigeria has had a long-­standing dispute with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, potentially rich in oil and fishery resources. It was not until 2002 that this dispute was heard by the International Court of Justice, which granted Cameroon ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula followed by the 2006 signing of the Green Tree Agreement, which led to the withdrawal of Nigerian defence and security forces from Bakassi by 2008. Cameroon assumed complete administrative control in August 2013. Prior to this period, the trends in Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations were at most conflictual, with potential for degeneration. At the same time, both countries have immense potential for cooperation and a mutually beneficial relationship, were Cameroon to reject France’s influence and colonial sentiments in addressing what are purely good governance issues, and within her borders and immediately beyond. However, with the cross-­border escalation of the Boko Haram terrorism and the expanding waves of secessionist activities with Cameroon and Nigeria (especially the alliance between the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC) and the Indigenous People of Biafra, including the lessons associated with their shared maritime domain awareness) relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have significantly improved. AFTERMATH OF THE BAKASSI QUESTION AND STATE OF RELATIONS While anticipating the final decision of the International Court of Justice over the Bakassi conflict, then-­UN Secretary-­General Kofi Annan invited Presidents Paul Biya of Cameroon and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria to a meeting in Paris on 5 September 2002. It was at this meeting, that Mr. Annan was able to convince both presidents to commit themselves to respect and



The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations 35

implement whatever decision the ICJ arrived at. He was able to obtain an agreement from them “to establish a mechanism to give effect to the decision (Christofides, 2005, 211). Mr. Annan was also able to get France, the United States and Britain to back this initiative. It was also to the credit of both presidents that they had the political will to agree to negotiate an implementation plan for the decision of the Court. From a Nigerian perspective, this was not difficult, especially since the Nigerian President prided himself on being a Pan-­Africanist and wanted to be accepted globally. Mr. Annan further invited both presidents to a seminal meeting in Geneva on 15 November 2002, where both leaders agreed to request the secretary-­ general to set up the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission, made up of representatives of both countries and UN experts chaired by a Special Representative of the Secretary-­General. Within the African community, especially on matters of boundary disputes, the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission was considered a novel approach to preventive diplomacy. Of even more significance was the timing of its creation, its mandate and its membership composition (UNOWA, 2007). The function of the Mixed Commission was to work out ways of implementing the ruling of the Court and moving the process forward. Annan’s proposal of his Special Representative for West Africa, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-­Abdallah, from Mauritania, to chair the Mixed Commission was considered acceptable by both sides. In that atmosphere of brotherhood, the two countries agreed to identify a number of confidence-­building measures. The mandate of the Mixed Commission included: (i) Demarcation of the land boundary; (ii) Withdrawal of civil administration, military and police forces and the transfer of authority; (iii) Eventual demilitarization of the Bakassi Peninsula; (iv) Protection of the rights of the affected population; (v) Promotion of joint economic ventures; and (vi) The reactivation of the Lake Chad Commission (UNOWA, 2007). Indeed, the fact that Cameroon and Nigeria could cooperate on this matter is a lesson in rapprochement and an added innovation for the implementation of the ICJ’s decisions. The first meeting of the Mixed Commission was held in Cameroon’s capital city, Yaoundé, on 1 December 2002. To carry out the various aspects of its work, two sub-­commissions and five working groups were created. To assure the smooth functioning of the Mixed Commission, the UN established a support team of experts with its base in the Senegalese capital, Dakar. This team provided technical and logistical assistance to the Commission as well as substantial support to the sub-­commissions and working groups. The Commission met once every two months, alternating between Yaoundé and Abuja. The Commission started its work of field visits by deploying its Observer Group made up of members from both countries to

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the land boundary for a period of one year. The Observer Group had the task of presenting a report one month after handover. In addition to the Mixed Commission, the UN deployed a team of civilian observers to the region to monitor and assess the transfer of authority according to the Court’s ruling and to see whether the rights of the affected populations were guaranteed or not. However, the fact that Cameroon remained calm in the face of this was clear proof of the confidence it had in the work of the Mixed Commission. Mr Ould-­Abdallah’s endless energy and enthusiasm in maintaining contact with the two parties through shuttle diplomacy between the two capitals was of enormous importance in avoiding the breakdown of the entire process (UNOWA, 2007). On 13 June 2003, the Commission discussed progress toward the planning for and implementation of the border demarcation between Cameroon and Nigeria. Nigeria agreed to withdraw its troops from the Lake Chad area on 3 and 4 December 2003. Subsequently, a subcommittee of the Mixed Commission visited the Bakassi Peninsula and met with authorities, citizens and traditional rulers from 13–20 February 2004. This was the Commission’s first visit to the peninsula since the Commission was established in 2002. Between 6 and 7 April 2004, the Commission met again in Yaoundé. The modalities for Nigeria’s final withdrawal from the disputed area, however, defied the efforts of the Mixed Commission. On 12 June 2006 at the Greentree Estate in Manhasset, New York, Secretary-­General Annan concluded days of intensive mediation between Cameroon and Nigeria. The mediation yielded dividends, leading to a settlement/agreement by both countries under which Nigerian troops were to withdraw within 60 days from the date it was signed (12 June 2006), with a likelihood of extension. Additionally, transitional arrangements for Bakassi, which was the last of four areas to be demarcated in accordance with the ICJ ruling, were to be completed by 2008. At the signing ceremony, Annan heralded the “stunning” cost effectiveness of the Mixed Commission. He argued that the Commission had no peacekeeping force and cost only $5 million per annum compared with $200 million annually for the UN’s Ethiopia and Eritrea mission. Along the same lines, Olusegun Obasanjo, of Nigeria, praised the agreement as “a great achievement in conflict resolution, which practically reflects its cost effectiveness,” adding that the agreement “should represent a model for the resolution of similar conflicts in Africa, and the world at large” (The Economist, 2008). Finally, Cameroon President Biya followed suit in his praises of the agreement. He described the agreement as “an efficient instrument to implement the court’s decision, bringing a definitive conclusion to our border conflict.” The Office of the UN Secretary-­General played the role of honest broker just before and after the ICJ’s disposition in the Bakassi Peninsula case, thus



The “Good Neighbour Policy” and Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations 37

introducing a new approach to the implementation of ICJ rulings in disputes between member states. International law, which is normative at best, was facilitated by the goodwill of Cameroon and Nigeria and with the assistance of the UN. The Secretary-­General of the UN used his good office to set up modalities for the ICJ ruling. This is a novelty, for never before has the Secretary-­General of the UN used the world organization as an instrument for the implementation of ICJ decisions. This new approach is cost effective and result oriented and could serve as a model for the future (Sama and Ross, 2016). Having said this, however, there are still serious problems with the implementation of this aspect of the Mixed Commission’s mandate on protection of the rights of affected populations. The indigenous people of Bakassi, mainly Nigerians, have become refugees in their own land, and their human rights are daily infringed upon by the Cameroonian authorities. This is because the Cameroonian government has not kept up its own end of the Agreement in protecting Nigerians who decided to stay on the Cameroonian side after the takeover. It has been a tale of woe from the indigenes, mainly fishermen, who lament that the Cameroonian authorities force them to pay heavy taxes and subject them to constant harassment, to the extent that several of them opted to relocate to the Nigerian side as refugees/displaced persons. The impact of the situation, for instance, is that the area which used to be a plentiful resource for fisheries, especially shrimp, has become a shadow of its former self as the fishermen are no longer able to ply their trade because of constant harassment by the Cameroonian authorities. Further, the separatist agitation for an independent state of Ambazonia has also not helped matters as displaced persons from Cameroon move into Nigeria and are increasingly becoming a security threat to the local population of Cross River State, as resources are stretched to the limit trying to accommodate them. CONCLUSION Notwithstanding the achievements of Cameroon and Nigeria with respect to the resolution of the Bakassi conflict, there still exists a need for Nigeria to re-­examine the framework policy of “good neighbourliness” against the backdrop of contemporary political and economic realities. Despite all of Nigeria’s friendliness and assistance to several countries in West Africa, and indeed Africa over the years and especially its neighbours, the general perception and attitude of the neighbours have been one of self-­effacement. Thus, Nigeria’s “good-­neighbour” posture calls for a redefinition and refocusing, especially when it comes to addressing sensitive matters such as the contested

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ownership of Bakassi Peninsula and the separatist agitations in Cameroon and Nigeria, respectively. With the possible exceptions of countries like Sierra-­ Leone, Liberia, Gambia and in recent times the Republic of Benin and Niger, Nigeria seems to be rather unpopular in West Africa. There is something to be said for Nigeria’s approach to addressing the border conflict with Cameroon. In spite of several acts of intransigence and infractions, subsequent Nigerian governments over the years refrained from escalating the conflict with Cameroon. It could be argued that this was as a result of the Good Neighbour Policy, which restrained Nigeria from responding, and not necessarily the French factor. This policy has obviously been more beneficial to Nigeria’s immediate neighbours, including Cameroon, than Nigeria, as has been presented. Indeed, Nigeria has benefitted very little from its Good Neighbour Policy, and this has given rise to calls for its redefinition. This is not however, to say that if applied with sagacity, the country will not benefit from it. As for the on-­going internal conflict in Cameroon and its implications for Nigeria, a destabilized Cameroon will be a major source of instability in Nigeria. While Nigeria is cautious in intervening openly in this, probably because of her own internal politics, it will however, be more damaging if she does nothing and Cameroon implodes with implications for states in Nigeria that share borders with Cameroon. The least Nigeria should do is to understand the remote and immediate factors fuelling the separatist agitation in Cameroon and use diplomacy through third parties to seek an immediate solution to the crisis. It will be in Nigeria’s interest to more closely engage with Cameroon on other irritants in their relationship beyond the Bakassi crisis. Diplomacy, consultations, and indeed, bilateral mutual defence pacts may be necessary outside of the purview of France to improve on political and military relations between both countries. Finally, the economies of both countries could augment each other as Cameroon with its diverse natural resources, fertile land and agriculture could provide Nigeria with relevant primary raw materials for her industries in a mutually beneficial arrangement. The language factor however, is something Nigeria needs to work more on to enhance people-­to-­people trade and cultural engagements. This implies that private sector penetration of the Cameroon economy is imperative to enhance the thawing of conflictual relations between both countries.



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REFERENCES Agbu, O. (2011). “Overview of Nigeria’s foreign policy and engagements.” In O. Ogaba and O. Agbu (eds.), Nigeria in the Global Arena: Past, Present and Future. Lagos: Fourth Ventures. Christofides, J. (2005). “How good offices changed the nature of the border conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria.” In B. G. Ramcharan (ed.), Conflict Prevention in Practice; Essays in Honour of Jim Sutterlin. Boston and London: M. Nijhoff. The Economist. (2008). “Ceding control: Nigeria hands territory to Cameroon.” http:// www​.economist​.com/node/11950441 (accessed 15 October 2011). Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN). (1979). The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 As Amended. Government Printer. Igbinedion, S. A. (2020). “Proposed Emergence of a UN State of Cameroon: Implications and Challenges for Nigeria.” Paper presented at the Roundtable discussion at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 27 February. Mbachu, I. O. (2018). “Nigeria and her immediate neighbours: Trade and dynamics.” Lead paper presented at the Seminar on Nigerian Foreign Policy and Regional Security, for Participants of the National Defence College, Abuja, Course 26, 17 January. Mbachu, I. O. (2008). Foreign Policy Analysis: The Nigerian Perspective. Kaduna: Joyce Graphic Printers and Publishers. Mbachu, I. O. (2011). Nigeria’s Strategic Interests in Africa: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Strategic Studies. Kaduna: Medusa Academic Publishers. NDC Concept Note. (2018). Concept Note for the Conduct of Foreign Policy and National Security Conference on Nigeria and Her Immediate Neighbours. Department of Area and Regional Studies, National Defence College, Abuja, 27 November. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. (2005). “Nigeria and permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council: An appraisal.” Nigerian Forum 26, no. 9–10. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. (2009). “Nigeria in international peacekeeping operations.” In Miriam Ikejiani-­Clark (ed.), Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria: A Reader. Ibadan: Spectrum Books. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka, and Emeh Ares Alexander. (2009). “Foreign policy and national security in Nigeria: An assessment of Pax Nigeriana.” Constructive Engagement 1, no. 1.Osita, Agbu, and Ogaba Oche (eds.). (2011). Nigeria in the Global Arena: Past, Present and Future. Lagos: FOG Ventures. Sama, N., and B. Ross. (2005/2006). “Reclaiming the Bakassi Kingdom.” Afrika Zamani, no. 13/14. http://www​.codesria​.org/IMG/pdf/06_Sama_Ross​.pdf, accessed 10 October 2019. Shagari, Shehu. (1982). “Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” Nigerian Forum, NIIA, December. Third Press Publications. (1960). Nigeria at the United Nations. New Rochelle, NY. United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). (2007). The Mandate of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission, 30 March.

Chapter Three

Foreign Policy Options for Socio-­Cultural and Economic Development between Cameroon and Nigeria, 1960–1992 Primus Fonkeng

After achieving independence, African states sought to reinforce and ameliorate their bilateral and multilateral relations, especially with their neighbours. During the early days of independence, formal relations were established with several countries all over the world and most especially with other African states. New fields of bilateral cooperation were exploited, and regional and international organizations also influenced relations between the newly independent states. The UNO and later the OAU were the common forum which contributed in defining and determining intra-­African relations in the area of decolonization, non-­interference in the internal affairs of other states, peaceful resolutions of disputes and socioeconomic cooperation among states. Following the attainment of political independence in 1960, Cameroon and Nigeria entered a changing heterogeneous international community, which was characterized by the interaction of several state and non-­state actors, including the international organizations. Both countries pursued their respective foreign policies towards African states and interacted with these various actors in different ways and forms: diplomatic, economic, military and socio-­cultural (Ewang, 1987). The most important international actor with whom Cameroon established formal links with in 1962 is Nigeria. Nigeria’s foreign policy in Africa was best defined within the framework of a concentric circle, whereby emphasis was placed more on its relations with its immediate neighbours in West Africa, the wider Africa and the world. Thus, after the 1961 plebiscite and reunification, relations between Cameroon and Nigeria were based on cautious cooperation and mutual mistrust following the loss of Northern Cameroons to Nigeria. In 1962, the two 41

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countries established bilateral relations through the signing of treaties. These relationships developed in a friendly manner until 1967 to 1970, during the civil war. Cameroon played an important role, which led to the eventual end of the civil war. Between 1970 and early 1980, relations between the two countries experienced improvement, even though there were some minor problems along their border (Kombi, 1996). The improved relationship was marked by the signing of many treaties and agreements in the political, economic and socio-­cultural domains. Prior to this situation was the exchange of diplomatic representations, official visits at the highest level by government representatives and heads of state, the creation of a bilateral joint commission and of a technical commission in charge of border issues. This chapter posits that although diplomatic relation between Cameroon and Nigeria were characterized by conflicts and mutual mistrust, both countries experienced and continued to experience decades of cordial relations. CONCEPTUAL ANALYSES OF FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Foreign policy, like most concepts in international relations, has been variedly defined and approached by scholars. Klaus Knort sees the foreign policy of states as the action and strategies to terminate, reduce, sustain and expand cooperation and conflict. He further views it as being the use of different resources by states for achieving various kinds of advantages from their relations with other states (Knorr, 1975, 22–27). Approaching this concept from the standpoint of states relations with their external environment, Howard Lentner defines foreign policy as that policy which is directed towards or which responds to the environment of territorial states and its environment (Lentner, 1974). The notion of foreign policy is one of the many aspects in political science and international relations that do not subscribe to a standard definition. Joseph Frankel defines it simply as consisting of decisions and actions which involve, to some appreciable degree, relations between one state and the others (Frankel 1970). To Professor Ohanbamu of the University of Lagos, the foreign policy of a nation consists of those of her policies that regulate her national goals in relation to her international interests. It includes the sum total of the general assessment of state’s military, economic and international position, objectives in relation to the other states; the specific objectives and national interest which the state seeks for herself and its tactics and strategy for realizing those interests; and the broad principle and conduct which the state holds and which its government advocates in the international system (Ewang, 1987, 45).



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 43

During the period prior to independence, in debates, the basic principles and objectives that would guide the new Nigerian state in her external behaviour were of great concern. Thus, on 20 August 1960, Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa, in a statement in the House of Representatives, spelt out some fundamental principles that were to constitute the bases of Nigerian foreign policy objectives. An attempt to reiterate and clearly delineate these principles and objectives took place in April 1986, when the All-­Nigerian Conference was held at Kuru. The conference reiterated as the permanent and fundamental objectives of the Nigerian foreign policy: the respect for the independence and territorial integrity of all states, sovereign equality of all states, passionate concern for peace in the world, decolonization of African states, support to all United Nations objectives, non-­alignment with any geopolitical bloc, African unity and international cooperation (Akindele and Ate, 2001). International cooperation as an objective of Nigeria’s foreign policy influenced the country to establish political, economic and socio-­cultural cooperation with other countries. Nigeria’s foreign policy under Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa (1960–1966), otherwise referred to as the First Republic, was described as being conservatively dependent on British foreign policy. This is linked to the fact that after independence, Nigeria maintained firm cooperation with Britain through the Anglo-­Nigerian Defence Pact of 1960, which was however abrogated in 1961, and the retention of some high-­ ranking British civil and military personnel in Nigeria (Fanso, 1984). Nigeria is a strong advocate of South-­South cooperation and has been actively involved in the preparation of the various economic cooperation programmes among the developing nations of the world. This contribution has not only promoted closer cooperation among the developing countries, but has also enabled them to present a common front in the negotiations with the developed nations for political, economic and technical assistance. Several African countries benefited from Nigeria’s foreign policy options of international cooperation and Cameroon, which shares the longest border with Nigeria, benefited enormously through this cooperation. The promotion of world peace and international cooperation is a major objective that shapes Cameroon’s foreign policy. The great revolution in the fields of science and technology has contributed fundamentally to the evolution of the global community. Interdependence has thus tended to magnify and transform several domestic upheavals into international conflicts. Therefore, the promotion of international cooperation was one of Cameroon’s foreign policy objectives which was manifested towards Nigeria. The Cameroon conception of international cooperation insists upon the pacific coexistence of and respect for the identity of national, political, economic and socio-­cultural systems, especially in bilateral cooperation. Believing that

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international cooperation provides numerous opportunities among states and could be used to monitor many types of economic and political exchanges between individual states seeking to influence the formulation of community values in the image of specific national preferences, Cameroon sought excellent cooperation with Nigeria through the signing of many treaties and agreements (Kombi, 1996). POLITICAL RELATIONS After the establishment of diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level in November 1960, and the signing of bilateral agreements, relations were improved through official visits and meetings by the Heads of State and Heads of Government. The creation in May 1964 of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was an event which attests to the commitment of the leaders of the two countries to cooperate in a multilateral organization and to strengthen their bilateral cooperation (Fonkeng, 2018). It was also in this spirit that should be appreciated the visit to Garoua in December 1965 of Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Northern Region of Nigeria, hosted by then-­President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon. This visit was necessary because, in spite of the problems created by the plebiscite, both countries realized that they had similar historical, geographical and socio-­cultural linkages and began looking at bilateral relations in terms of good neighbourliness and brotherhood. This was even more necessary given the presence of large numbers of Nigerians in Cameroon. One needs to look at the consequences that an abrupt repatriation of the Nigerians in Cameroon could have on both countries. Nigeria’s dreaded problem of overcrowding would inevitably have been worsened, while a vacuum would have been created in the economic life of West Cameroon. It was perhaps with this in mind and with obvious reference to Nigeria that Ahidjo told Cameroonians: “Since our accession to independence we have held out our hands to everyone, trying to forget, in spite of painful and serious events, the resentment that subjective irritability would have amply justified. We turned our backs to it, feeling that all gathering must begin around ourselves, based on relations of good neighborliness, friendship and fraternity” (Ahidjo, 1965). This new attitude was partly responsible for the improvement in the relations between Cameroon and Nigeria by 1965. This attitude was, all the same, realistic because even after reunification, some parts of West Cameroon continued to live as if they were still parts of Nigeria. This was particularly the case of Akwaya in Manyu Division. It had no communication links with the rest of Cameroon except through Nigeria. Much of the economic transaction



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 45

of the area was done with the neighbouring parts of Eastern Nigeria, and the pound sterling was more current in the area than the Communautaire Financière Africaine (CFA) Franc or FCFA Franc, which was introduced in West Cameroon in 1962 by Ahmadou Ahidjo’s government to replace the British pound sterling. Even Cameroonian administrators in the sub-­division had to pass through Nigeria to get to the Divisional headquarters in Mamfe. This movement was made possible through the protocol agreement on the movement of persons and goods signed by the two countries in 1963 to strengthen their bilateral relations (Protocol Agreement, 1963). Notwithstanding the improvements that were made during the early periods of independence, Cameroon and Nigeria did not reach levels of relations that were expected for neighbours with such geographical, cultural and historical linkages. At the official level, the relations continued to be cautious. In spite of the official declaration of friendship and solidarity between the two countries, memories of the plebiscite tarnished their relations such that until 1966, 1 June was still being observed as a day of national mourning all over Cameroon because of the loss of northern Cameroon, an indication that the plebiscite had not yet been forgotten (Atem, 1984). In addition, both countries were more concerned with domestic affairs than their foreign policies in the early years of independence. This is because their most immediate problems at this period were socio-­cultural and economic development and the reduction of the numerous centrifugal forces that could threaten their states. SOCIO-­CULTURAL RELATIONS Article 4 of the Bilateral Cooperation Agreement between Cameron and Nigeria, signed on 6 February 1963, encouraged free movement of persons and cultural and technical cooperation, and the two countries decided to facilitate the mutual admission of qualified students into their respective institutions of higher learning (Bilateral Cooperation Agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria, 1963). After independence, there were many Nigerians in Cameroon because the treaty made travel between the two countries easier. A sizeable proportion of Nigerian residents in Cameroon whom the author interviewed in the course of the study arrived Cameroon between 1963 and 1964. Most of them were in West Cameroon for several reasons: the problem of language and the differences in culture made it difficult for them to penetrate East Cameroon; they preferred living in West Cameroon, which they had known in the previous years, and in the border areas where they had similar cultural traits. Between the Bantu-­speaking people of the coastal areas and the Sudanese ethnic groups of the northern section of the Cameroon-­Nigeria border,

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several cross-­border similarities and relations existed, and these were highly manifested after the independence of the two countries (Fanso, 2006). Several cultural traits were allowed to manifest in both countries to improve socio-­cultural relations. The Keyaka and Banyang of Manyu Division in Cameroon speak a language similar to that of the Ekoi of south eastern Nigeria and share many cultural traits such as mask societies. During initiation ceremonies, members from one side of the border cross to the other side to perform rituals. The Ekpe culture, which is the traditional government of the Bantu-­speaking groups like the Ejaghams, the Bayangs, the Balundus and the Bokis in Cameroon, is also an important cultural element within the Efiks and Ibibios of the Cross River and the Akwa Ibom states in Nigeria (Ntui, 2004). The Obasinjom, the traditional god of the people of the Cross River basin, who settle disputes between individuals and groups, is also highly respected in the Ejagham ethnic group in Cameroon. The ethnic groups with similar cultural traits in both countries evoked the Obasinjom during important ceremonies or during periods of crisis. These cultural similarities between the people of the two countries influenced cordial relations after independence. The cordial socio-­cultural relations between Cameroon and Nigeria after independence were also manifested in the large population of citizens of each of the countries who live in the other. About 5,000 Cameroonians were resident in Nigeria and were mostly students. Most of them came from West Cameroon, which is understandable because the English language made communication with the Nigerians easier and facilitated their studies in Nigerian universities (Fonkeng, 2018). Moreover, the absence of institutions of higher learning in West Cameroon influenced many West Cameroonians to travel to Nigeria to pursue university education. Although a university was opened in Yaounde in 1962, the fact that courses there were delivered predominantly in French did not attract West Cameroonian students. Therefore, many Cameroonians who were interested in the Anglo-­Saxon style of education turned to neighbouring Nigeria. On the contrary, there were many Nigerians in Cameroon who were attracted to the area because of its socioeconomic activities. The 1964 demographic survey of West Cameroon showed in effect that Nigerians formed a respectable proportion of the population of the state. Nigerians were highly represented in West Cameroon towns, forming over 60 per cent of the population of four out of the six major townships in the state. It is observed that the bulk of the Nigerians in Cameroon originated in ethnic groups in Nigeria whose land territory is contiguous to the border or quite close to it. Inside Cameroon they also tended to concentrate their settlements and activities in the border regions closest to their home, which mostly satisfied their motivating



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 47

goals. Often, such areas were generally inhabited by people of inherently the same or similar ethnic or cultural background. Dominant groups thus include the Igbo, Efik, Ibibio and Ijaw of the former forest region of Eastern Nigeria. These groups mostly resided in the Southwest Province of Cameroon, especially in Tiko, Kumba, Victoria and Mamfe towns. The Fulani and Hausas, of Northern Nigeria, prefer the grassland towns of Bamenda, Banso, Nkambe and Wum (Fonkeng, 2004). Both geographical proximity and socio-­cultural affinity contributed to the cordial relations between these ethnic groups and influenced economic cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria. ECONOMIC RELATIONS At independence Nigerians controlled about 70 per cent of small-­business enterprises and trade in West Cameroon. Their control of trade in the area dated back to the colonial period. Willard Johnson remarked that although Africans in the British Cameroons, unlike those in French Cameroon, perhaps had more freedom and were encouraged to become traders and small entrepreneurs, the Africans were usually not Cameroonians. He estimated that before reunification, Nigerians, particularly, the Igbos controlled 85 per cent of the small commerce of the Southern Cameroons and most of the African-­run transportation services (Johnson, 1970, 94). By 1964 they still had control of West Cameroon small businesses, especially after the signing of the protocol agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria covering control of movements of peoples and goods and the control of trade in 1963. The priority domains of cooperation included economic, financial and custom matters, border exchanges and free movement of goods. The economic relations between Cameroon and Nigeria appeared to be marginal from 1962 to 1965. This was due largely to geography and to the postcolonial experiences of the two countries. Geographically, Cameroon’s national products were much the same as those found in Nigeria, both those for local use (such as millet, yams, cocoa, cotton, palm products, hides and skins) and others. For these reasons, neither country could substantially export to or import from the other. Both countries also had their seaports, which handled their trade. There was therefore little transit trade between them, except for a small amount of seasonal trade along the Benue up to Garoua (Ndifontah, 1979). At the same time, however, there was a substantial volume of official trade between the two countries, and Nigerians had a great impact on the economy of West Cameroon. Cameroon-­Nigeria relations experienced a new phase from 1966 when Nigeria was plunged into an ominous confusion that rocked the country

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through two military coup d’états, and secession by the Eastern Region that brought the country into a tragic civil war. The role played by Cameroon during this civil war was significant, given its geographical proximity to Eastern Nigeria, which attempted secession as the Republic of Biafra. Cameroon’s position during the Nigerian Civil War was very delicate. This was because there were alleged pressures from France on Cameroon to emulate the examples of Gabon and Ivory Coast and recognize Biafra (Akindele and Ate, 2001). France itself had supported Biafra and, according to the Sunday Times of London and Le Monde of Paris, offering explanations for the French attitude to the conflict, “French supplies of arms and ammunition greatly boosted the collapsing Igbo rebellion against the Nigerian Federal Government” (Ojukwu, 1989). Other pundits believed that Cameroon would have rejoiced and even supported Biafra against the Nigerian government, which had occupied part of its territory after the 1961 plebiscite. On the contrary, Cameroon withstood all such pressures and came out solidly in support of the Nigerian government such that the Nigerian Civil War had a great impact on the relations between the two countries. It ushered in a new era of cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria. CAMEROON-­NIGERIA POLITICAL RELATIONS AFTER THE CIVIL WAR Immediately after the surrender of secessionist Biafra was announced, President Ahidjo dispatched his Foreign Minister, Nko’o Etoungou, to congratulate the Federal Military Government of Nigeria. Speaking at the ceremony, the Minister told General Gowon that the Nigerian victory was of tremendous joy to the people of Cameroon. Later that year, President Ahidjo visited Lagos and announced that he was profoundly happy to be in Lagos because he considered Nigeria as his second home. Ahidjo visited Nigeria five times between 1970 and 1975 (1970, 1971, 1972, 1974 and 1975). Each time he was treated to a very rousing welcome, and further steps were taken to improve bilateral cooperation between the two countries. During the 1971 visit, the frontier between the two countries, which had been closed as a result of the war, was reopened, and visa requirements for travel between the two countries were suppressed. The Nigerian press hailed this development as a realistic approach towards African unity (Protus, 1994, 17). During the 1974 visit, three agreements were initiated between the two countries: the Agreement on Cooperation in Judicial Matters; establishment of the Rights of Police and Custom Officers around the Frontier; and Socio-­Cultural and Technical Cooperation. On the eve of the visit, a Nigerian



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 49

newspaper based in Kaduna wrote: “Broadly, there are two types of visits made by foreign Heads of State: the one whose presence scarcely excites public interest outside governmental protocol circles; the other whose arrival is eagerly and spontaneously awaited. Such a visitor is President Ahidjo. He is more than a visitor: he is a friend and a brother” (Pondi and Zang, 2000, 169–186). Major General Yakubu Gowon, Head of the Nigerian Federal Military Government, did not pay as many visits to Cameroon as Ahidjo paid to Nigeria, most probably because he was engaged in the efforts of reconstruction and rehabilitation. However, he paid an important visit to Cameroon in 1971 to personally convey Nigeria’s gratitude to Cameroon for the brotherly help during the Nigerian Civil War. Gowon arrived in Yaoundé on a state visit with a delegation of 42 personalities on 3 April 1971, and before leaving Cameroon on 7 April, he declared that all misunderstanding between Cameroon and Nigeria had been resolved (Uwechue, 2004, 172). In his welcoming address, Ahidjo declared that “the Nigerian drama was in fact the problem of all African States which were far from mastering the centrifugal forces which threatened their integrity and their unity” (Ndifontah 1979, 175). Gowon and Ahidjo met for the fourth time in Maroua in June 1975 and produced the Maroua Declaration, which delimited the maritime border between the two countries to the satisfaction of the two heads of state. In order to avoid potential conflict from oil prospectors off the seacoast, the two Heads of State signed an agreement in Kano in August 1974 to create a two-­kilometre corridor on either side of the precise line of the proposed maritime boundary. In June 1975 in Maroua, the two leaders reached complete agreement on the precise tracing of the maritime frontier. Later that year while receiving the new Cameroonian ambassador to Nigeria, Gowon summed up his views on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations thus: “Along the smooth and bumpy road through which nations inevitably have to pass in the course of history, Cameroon and Nigeria have always marched together. We have been trusted companions, good neighbors and faithful friends at all times” (ibid., 180). The trust and faith which Gowon referred to had been manifested by Cameroon during the Nigerian Civil War. It was also manifested by Nigeria at the OAU summit in Rabat-­Morocco in June 1972. During the summit, the election of the new Secretary-­General for the organization was due, and while some Commonwealth countries pressured Nigeria to nominate a candidate, the Nigerian government resisted and instead proposed Cameroonian Minister Nzo Ekang Nghaky, who got the job (Ojukwu, 1989). The cordial political relations that existed between Cameroon and Nigeria during the Gowon era declined when Murtala Mohammed came to power. Murtala Mohammed declared that the boundary between Cameroon and

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Nigeria extended to the Mungo River, that is, to the eastern boundary of the then–West Cameroon (Folasade, 1988, 53). This declaration created tension between the authorities of the two countries and before the two leaders could meet to discuss on the matter, Murtala Mohammed was assassinated, on 13 February 1976, following an attempted counter-­coup d’état. Contacts between leaders of both countries resumed after the assassination. In 1976, the Nigerian chief of staff, Brigadier Shehu Yar Adua, held discussions with Cameroonian authorities in Yaoundé. In February 1977, President Ahidjo and General Olusegun Obasanjo held talks in Kaduna. When they reconvened in Garoua in August of the same year, they reaffirmed their will to pursue a policy of dialogue and concentration between them and to encourage meetings at all levels between the dignitaries of both countries (ibid., 54). Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria during the 1980s and the early 1990s were marked by relative peace, though there was an occasional outburst of tension, which was often settled amicably. The most striking event at the beginning of this period was the killing of five Nigerian soldiers, whom Nigeria claimed were on patrol at Ikang District by Cameroonian security men on 16 May 1981. After this incident, various segments of the Nigerian public, including political parties, the press, labour unions, student organizations, individuals and even the armed forces, advocated a confrontation with Cameroon (Asafor, 1995, 63). In reaction to this, President Shehu Shagari abruptly cancelled his participation at the OAU Summit in Nairobi in June 1981, with the excuse that the Secretary-­General did not include the border crisis between Cameroon and Nigeria on the agenda (ibid., 64). Cameroon’s decision to pay reparations for the soldiers killed and President Ahidjo’s visit to Nigeria calmed the tension between the two countries (ibid.). When President Paul Biya took over from Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1982, he paid his first official foreign visit to Nigeria in 1983, a sign that he was ready to work towards the amelioration of relations between Nigeria and Cameroon. The thrust of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations deteriorated during the military government of General Muhammadu Buhari, who overthrew the Shagari Regime in 1983. It was also during this year that foreigners were expelled from Nigeria. Cameroonians, Chadians and Nigerians, were accused of all kinds of ills, and about 5,000 Cameroonians were among the foreigners expelled. Cameroon-­Nigeria bilateral relations under the Buhari regime (1 January 1984 to 27 August 1985), were characterized by threats and intimidation such as border closure, deployment of troops along the common border and the building of military bases in states sharing borders with Cameroon. The thrust of relations between the two countries, however, improved when General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida came to power in 1985. The willingness of the two leaders to pursue dialogue on outstanding issues was evident in Biya’s two visits



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 51

to Nigeria in 1985 and 1987 and Babangida’s two visits to Cameroon in 1989 (Asiwaju, 1989, 56). It was during this period that the first joint commission between Cameroon and Nigeria took place in Yaoundé from 24 to 27 August 1987, which resulted in 59 recommendations and the creation of several ad hoc commissions (Tonye, 1989). During an exclusive interview with West Africa, General Babangida confirmed that relations between Cameroon and Nigeria had improved since he became military president. Apart from the exchange of visits between Presidents Paul Biya and General Ibrahim Babangida, other regular contacts between their two countries at various levels were observed including, for instance, the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs Major General Ike Nwachukwu paid a friendly visit to Cameroon in 1991. Major General Abacha, Nigerian Minister of Defence paid a visit to Cameroon in 1990 and a return visit was paid to Nigeria by Cameroon’s Minister Delegate in charge of Defence, Edouard Akame Mfoumou in 1992 (Aji, 2005). Though the two countries employed several measures to cohabit peacefully, relations between them deteriorated after General Sani Abacha became Nigeria’s Head of State in November 1993. Some misunderstandings resulting from the safeguarding of some specific interests in the domain of oil, energy, fisheries and other resources along their border subsisted. The two countries had equally divergent interpretations of the Maroua Declaration following the accession to power of General Sani Abacha. This misunderstanding degenerated into conflict between the two states when in December 1993, the Nigerian army attacked the Bakassi Peninsula and occupied several localities (Fonkeng, 2004). Despite the conflicts experienced by these two neighbouring countries after the Nigerian Civil War, there existed blossoming economic and socio-­cultural relations between them. ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-­CULTURAL RELATIONS After the Nigerian Civil War, economic and socio-­cultural relations between Cameroon and Nigeria were facilitated by four agreements signed in 1972, 1974, 1978 and 1983. These agreements dealt with bilateral trade and organized the rights of establishment by the nationals of the two countries in either territory. On bilateral trade, Cameroon and Nigeria reiterated their belief that non-­discriminatory practices should govern trade between them. They therefore agreed to grant each other the most favoured treatment in all matters affecting their import and export trade, in matters of currency circulation and foreign exchange control (Trade Agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria, 1972, Articles 1, 23). The rights of establishment for the nationals of the two countries were aimed at safeguarding and protecting the landed

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property and investment of the nationals of one country in the territory of the other. Each party agreed not to take discriminatory measures against nationals from the other country but to encourage the nationals of the other country to settle and invest in agriculture, industry and commerce and to carry out cultural activities in the other country. With respect to bilateral trade, Cameroon and Nigeria were really marginal to each other. In 1973, Cameroon accounted for only 0.5 per cent of Nigeria’s African imports and bought only 0.4 per cent of her exports destined to African countries. In the same year, Nigeria supplied 2.7 per cent of Cameroon’s African imports, and bought only 2.2 per cent of her exports to African countries. Cameroon and Nigeria were evidently not crucial trading partners from 1971 to 1975 (Achu, 1995, 16). From 1971 to 1973, an average 2.5 per cent of Cameroon’s exports to African countries were destined for the Nigerian markets. Within the same period, only 0.26 per cent on the average of Nigeria’s exports to African countries was directed to Cameroon. With respect to imports, the figures were slightly higher, especially for Cameroon, which was slightly more stable. Between 1973 and 1975, an average of 2.5 per cent of Cameroon’s African imports came from Nigeria, while an average of 2.56 per cent of Nigeria’s African imports originated in Cameroon. These figures, however, do not represent all the volume of trade between Cameron and Nigeria during this period because there existed a substantial volume of underground trade between the two countries. Large quantities of goods entered either country through the numerous entrances along their common boundary. This trade was accompanied by an alarming degree of smuggling. From 1971 to 1973, the custom post at Ekok-­Mamfe, recorded as much as 17 million francs for penalties on smuggling and other irregularities (Government of Cameroon, 1973). Many settlements, all along the coastal link and deep into both Cameroon and Nigeria, became incorporated into these networks of contraband activities, servicing as depots, hideouts and re-­diffusion centres. The smuggled goods not only flooded the markets in the region but were redistributed from there to invade the other market centres beyond it into Douala, Yaoundé, Ebolowa and other towns (Achu, 1995, 18). Those to other centres, especially to the north west and north were largely smuggled in by head-­loads along footpaths across the unguarded borders, from motor-­able roads in Nigeria to other areas in Cameroon. This was done with the complicity of local residents who were employed as carriers and guides of certain products, such as radios, cassette-­recorders, watches, films, as well as petrol retailing and currency exchanges. The floating of the official exchange rate of the Naira indirectly devalued its foreign exchange value by about 30 times vis-­à-vis the CFA francs.



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 53

Consequently, Nigerian imports into Cameroon, especially those smuggled without payment of customs dues, could sell at half their cost price, with a profit of 1,200 per cent still made on them, or of 200 per cent if sold at one-­tenth of the Nigerian cost price. The profit margin, less transportation costs, made it extremely lucrative and highly patronized despite the high risk entailed. Many dealers either used fishing boats for camouflage, concealment and transportation of their goods or sailed under cover of night to evade capture by customs and security raids. Some capsized while being pursued by customs patrols and raiding pirates, or experiencing rough seas and stormy weather. Others burnt when the petrol being transported was accidentally ignited. Legalization of the black-­market exchange rate, though floating the official rate of the naira, only opened the floodgates to the trade. Thus, while it might be illusory to attempt to quantify the volume of clandestine trade between Cameron and Nigeria, it might equally be misleading to conclude on the basis of official figures that trade between the two countries was negligible during the period under study. Moreover, there was always high mobility of labour between the two countries, especially in Cameroon, where several Southern Nigerians migrated into the Southwest Province (Region) to work in the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC) and Pamol, Ltd., in Ndian Division. The over 80 per cent Nigerians of the 3,454 residents at Bekora, on the periphery of Lobe Pamol Estate, specialized in transforming cassava into commercial garri and palm-­wine tapping. The large population of the nearby plantation camps and Ekondo Titi Towns provided guaranteed markets for their products (Achu, 1995). After the accumulation of a target investment capital, the Nigerians would quit their plantation jobs and establish themselves in commercial activities in a town of their choice. They involved themselves in service-­ sector activity, particularly in transportation and repairs, or in commercial food, growing crops on rented or purchased plots. Part of the Nigerian population along the Cameroon-­Nigerian border has a fishing tradition. This situation encouraged the immigrant Efik fishermen from the adjacent Cross River State in Nigeria and the Ijaws, Elijas and Ibibios from the coastal region to settle around the creeks in Cameroon and control fishing in the region. By 1976, Nigerians, dominated by the industrious Efiks, made up about 75 per cent of the fishermen on the Cameroon coastal creeks and fishing towns. The largest concentrations of Efik settlers were found in the fishing towns of Rio Del Rey at the far western section of the coast, inside the Cameroonian zone of the border. The Ijaws and others from further west of Calabar were mostly settled in the sector east of Bamusso as far as the Moungo Estuary. Their settlements were more stable in this area, with the most prominent town, Mabeta, having a population concentration of

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about 95 per cent Nigerians, composed mostly of Ijaws. It increased to 1,748 inhabitants by 1976 and to over 2,200 by1987 (General Population and Housing Census, Yaoundé, 1976 and 1987). Many of the Nigerian plantation workers, traders and fishermen, intermarried with local men and women to stabilize and legitimize their positions in their communities or residences in Cameroon. This gave birth to an important colony of Nigerian residents in Cameroon. According to the 1976 census in Cameroon, 1–3 per cent of the total population of Cameroon was made up of Nigerians, that is, nearly 150,000 out of about 7.5 million. This figure was however smaller than the estimate before the Nigerian Civil War, and it was evident that it was more spread out than it was then. For instance, before the Nigerian Civil War, the Nigerians in Cameroon were concentrated in West Cameroon and the northern parts of the country, but by 1976, they had penetrated into all of the seven existing provinces of Cameroon. The two English-­speaking provinces, which constituted the former West Cameroon, however, still accounted for over 50 per cent of the Nigerians in Cameroon, but the highest concentration of population was found in the Southwest Province (Region) with 10.4 per cent (Fonkeng, 2018). The two provinces with the lowest concentrations of Nigerians were the Eastern and the Western Provinces with 0.09 per cent and 0.056 per cent, respectively. The proportion for the Eastern Province, though very low, was significant in that it showed how far the Nigerians had been able to penetrate Cameroon. The low concentration in the Western Province was understandable in that most of the local population of the province were mostly traders and farmers who certainly faced the Nigerian residents, whose vast majority were also traders, with bitter rivalry. With regard to the number of Cameroonians in Nigeria, it was impossible to obtain exact figures owing to the cancellation of the 1973 census in Nigeria. However, more Cameroonians, especially from the former West Cameroon travelled to Nigeria since the end of the Nigerian Civil War to seek employment or engage in business. According to Nyamndi Ndifontah, over 500 Bayangs from Mamfe and its environs were living in Enugu during this period. There also existed a population of about 1,000 Cameroonians studying in Nigerian universities (Ndifontah, 1979). However, unlike Nigerians in Cameroon, who were mostly self-­employed, Cameroonians in Nigeria were mainly government employees; others served as French teachers or as translators. These were concentrated in the eastern states. Despite the rapidly improved political, economic and socio-­cultural relations between Cameron and Nigeria after the Nigerian Civil War, border problems constituted the only obstacle which strained diplomatic and other relations between the two countries.



Foreign Policy Options for Development between Cameroon and Nigeria 55

CONCLUSION The establishment of the Federal Republic of Cameroon ushered in a new phase of relations between the Federation of Nigeria and the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria during the period from 1960 to 1992 were not characterized by major problems. Nonetheless, there were intermittent challenges along their common border. By 1963 some agreements and treaties had been signed between the two countries to regulate trade, the movement of goods and citizens, and improvement in socio-­ cultural relations. However, this new wave of cooperation was disrupted by the political instability and the consequent civil war which occurred in Nigeria from 1966 to 1970. Cameroon’s contribution to the cessation of hostilities in the Nigerian Civil War brought both countries closer than ever before and introduced a new form of cooperation and mutual understanding. Summit meetings between the leaders of the two countries multiplied, and several agreements were signed to regulate their bilateral relations and solve their border crisis on the maritime and land boundary. The principal objectives of Cameroon and Nigerian foreign policies are to promote and protect each country’s national interest and values in its interactions with the outside world and its specific relationships with other African countries. As observed in Nigeria’s and Cameroon’s foreign policy objectives, they pursue similar goals. This similarity in views and congruity in predisposition inclined the two governments to establish excellent political, economic and socio-­cultural cooperation, which has produced far-­reaching effects to the citizens of the two countries and to the international community. This study recommends that African countries should emulate the excellent cooperation that exists between Nigeria and Cameroon and pursue international cooperation as a vital tool in their foreign policy objectives. REFERENCES Achu, Emmanuel. (1995). “The Nigerian-­Cameron boundary and Nigerian migrants in Cameroon.” Cameroon Geographical Review 3, no. 1. Akindele, Rudolf, and Bassey Ate. (2001). “Nigeria’s foreign policy, 1986-2000: Background to the reflections on the views from Kuru.” Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 12, no. 2. Aji, James. (2005). “The dynamics of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations,” MA Thesis, International Relations Institute of Cameroon (IRIC), University of Yaoundé 11. Asafor, Adeline. (1995). “Diplomatic immunity in Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon: Inviolability of diplomatic premises and pouches. PhD Thesis, University of Calabar, Nigeria.

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Asiwaju, Anthony. (1989). Development of Border Regions, Lagos, National Boundary Commission. Ewang, Zume. (1987). “Participation in the United Nations General Assembly: A study of Cameroons participation.” Doctoral du 3e Circle Thesis, IRIC, Yaoundé. Fanso, Verkijika. (1984). “Trans-­ frontier relations and resistance to Cameroon-­ Nigeria colonial boundaries 1916–1945.” PhD Thesis, University of Yaoundé, 1984. Fanso, Verkijika. (2006). “Bakassi: From pre-­colonial to modern times.” Voice of Peace Magazine 1, no. 2. Folasade, Emmanuel. (1988). “Civil military as foreign policy actors: The case study of Nigeria 1975–1983,” Thesis, IRIC. Fonkeng, Primus. (2004). “The Views of the Herald and the Post Newspapers on the Cameron-­Nigeria border crisis over the Bakassi Peninsula, 1993–2002?” Master’s Diss., University of Yaoundé 1. Fonkeng, Primus. (2018). “Socio-­cultural and economic integration between Nigeria, British and French Cameroons 1922–1961.” In Isidore, P. N. Nyobe, and Jean B. Nzogue (eds), Le Cameroun sous Domination Europeenne: Entre Rencontres, Partages et Conflictualite. Yaoundé: Editions Afrikiya. Fonkeng, Primus. (2018). United Nations Peacebuilding Process in Cameroon and Nigeria. From Decolonization to the Resolution of the Bakassi Conflict: Governance, Economic and Socio-­Cultural Development. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishers. Frankel, Patterson. (1970). The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making. London: Oup. General Population and Housing Census, Yaoundé. (1976 and 1987). George, Atem. (1984). “Cameroon-­Nigeria relations 1884–1961: A study of political, economic and social interactions between two neighbouring states.” PhD thesis (Unpublished) University of Calabar-­Nigeria. Government of Cameroon. (1973). Customs Report, Ekok-­Mamfe. Johnson, Willard. (1970). The Cameroon Federation: Political Integration in a Fragmentary Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Knorr, Kensa. (1975). The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations, New York: Basic Books. Kombi, Mouelle. (1996). La Politique Entrangere du Cameroun. Paris: Edition L’Harmattan. Lentner, Harris. (1974). Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach. Columbus, OH: Merrill Publishing. Ndifontah, Nyamndi. (1979). “Cameroon-­Nigeria relations.” MA Diss., IRIC, University of Yaoundé. Njoya, Augustin. “Le Cameroun dans les Relations Internationale,” Paris: LGDJ, 1976. Ntui, Oben. (2004). “Cameroon-­Nigeria relations: Bonds of sanguinity.” The Herald, August 31. Ojukwu, Emeka. (1989). Because I Am Involved. Ibadan-­Nigeria: Spectrum Books.



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Pondi, Jean Emmanuel, and Laurent Zang (1998). “The Cameroon-Nigeria border cooperation: Presentation and analysis of bilateral agreements and treaties.” Mimeograph, International Relations Institute of Cameroon, (IRIC), University of Yaoundé. Pondi, Jean Emmanuel and Laurent Zang (2000). “The Cameroon-Nigeria border cooperation: Presentation and analysis of bilateral agreements and treaties.” Cameroon Review of International Studies 5, no. 1–2 (May). Protocol Agreement. (1963). Protocol Agreement Covering Control of Movements of Peoples and Goods between the Federal Republic of Cameroun and the Federation of Nigeria, February 26. Protus, Nouck. (1994). “Troubled frontiers,” Cameron Life Magazine 3, no. 1 (April/ May). Tonye, Martial. (1989). “Les Commission Mixtes dans la diplomatie cameroonaise.” MA Thesis, International Relations Institute of Cameroon, IRIC, University of Yaoundé 11. Trade Agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria. (1972). Lagos. Uwechue, Ralph. (2004). Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future. Abuja-­Nigeria: Heritage Press.

Chapter Four

Border Policies and Border Communities in Post-­Independence Cameroon and Nigeria The Ejagham Community in Perspective Raphael Achou Etta INTRODUCTION The Ejagham community, like many other African polities, were victims of the European arbitrarily and haphazard partition of the continent. The Ejagham were divided into Cameroon and Nigeria by Germany and Britain after a series of border agreements and a failed negotiation on whether or not they should be grouped in one of the territories or not (Anene, 1970). The two territories were administered in parallel throughout the colonial period by Germany and Britain until 1916, when Germany was defeated in the First World War by a joint Anglo-­French contingent and later evacuated from Cameroon (Etamba Eta, 2018). After a failed effort by Britain and France to jointly administer Cameroon, the territory was subsequently partitioned by the two powers into two unequal parts (Elango, 1987). Britain occupied one-­fifth of the total former German territory, consisting of two disconnected strips of land bordering Nigeria, which stretched from the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad. The southern part was named Southern Cameroons, which included the Ejagham, and the northern part was named Northern Cameroons. Both territories were merged into Eastern and Northern Nigeria, respectively, and administered as an integral part of Nigeria for administrative convenience (Chem-Langhёё, 2004). The French on their part administered the French Cameroons as a distinct unit of French Equatorial Africa. After the plebiscite of 11 February 1961, Southern Cameroons completely severed links with Nigeria. The Ejagham of both countries were further separated from each other by a permanent boundary between two states. But the plebiscite reunited the Southern Cameroons territory with the French 59

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Cameroons, which had gained independence from France on 1 January 1960. From October 1961, Cameroon became a federal republic, excluding the Northern Cameroons that had voted in its own plebiscite to remain an integral part of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Historically, Cameroon and Nigeria had a lot in common from the colonial period. Socio-­culturally, the two countries had a lot of similarities in language and culture shared by border groups like the Ejagham, the Boki and the Mandara found in both territories (Etta, 2013). For these people to maintain their historical and cultural links, both countries needed to reason together diplomatically to foster social networking among the divided people sharing common origins. The policies provoked the interaction of border communities at the grassroots that were definitively divided between the two countries. This chapter intimates that some border policies put in place by Cameroon and Nigerian governments after independence also enhanced relations among the Ejagham communities at the grassroots. The chapter further highlights some strategies adapted by the people to overcome policies which did not favour inter-­community relations across the border. POST-­INDEPENDENCE BORDER POLICIES After a failed attempt by the British government to constitute communities with common origins and cultural affiliations, the Ejagham underwent the hurdles of being hived off and administered separately by the Germans and British into Cameroon and Nigeria throughout the colonial period. In post-­ independence arrangements, both governments of Cameroon and Nigeria were mindful of the inextricable relations of the divided communities along the edges of their borders to formulate policies which would guide and maintain grassroots relations and movements. SOCIO-­CULTURAL AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION Prior to the abolition of federalism in Cameroon, the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria agreed on cultural, social and technical cooperation to develop and consolidate friendly relations in 1965. This agreement stated as follows: the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon, with a view to developing and consolidating friendly relations between the two states and their peoples; conscious that both countries will benefit from promoting cultural and social co-­operations; aware



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of the special links which united the peoples of both states morally and spiritually and the solidarity of the two countries as African nation. (NBA file no 0.1545, 1965)

The agreement further stated that both nations should strive to cooperate in socio-­cultural and technical matters to the best of their abilities and on the basis of equality. Both parties agreed, as far as possible, to accord to the citizens of the other the same educational facilities as are accorded to its own citizens. They should also grant to students and pupils from the other country the same privileges and advantages available to its own students. Each state should further allow citizens of the other state entry into schools and institutes of scientific and technical research in so far as entrance requirements for the students were complete. They should endeavour to offer scholarships to meritorious students in their universities and other institutions of higher learning irrespective of their country of origin. For the purpose of training teachers of English and French, both countries should be able to put at their disposal a number of places on a scholarship or exchange basis in training colleges or other appropriate institutions in their respective states. This cooperation agreement on education concluded that each state might request the other to place at its disposal experts in this field as it might require (NBA file no 0.1545, 1965). This cooperation agreement on education formed the platform on which the Ejagham of Cameroon acquired complete access to the educational institutions of Nigeria, even after the creation of similar institutions in their own country. The agreements reinforced the 1926 Educational Ordinance, whereby the British colonial educational system in the Southern Cameroons and Nigeria were harmonized. Cooperation agreements like that of 1965 were necessary to integrate the already educated elites of divided groups like the Ejagham who had studied and worked in Nigeria to continue to serve in the new reunified state of Cameroon. The agreements obviously encouraged the Ejagham communities on either side of the borders to choose in which state to pursue their education since jobs were guaranteed on both sides to holders of equivalent certificates from either side. Another interstate agreement signed to foster cultural exchanges and information between the two modern states, which benefited the Ejagham of both sides, stipulated that: Nationals of each of the two countries shall have such freedom within the field of art in the territory of the other as shall be compatible with the laws of that country. . . . all forms of cultural exchanges, including exchanges in the fields of sports and folk-­lore, in order to promote the circulation of information and African cultural development. (NBA file no p.1418, 1965)

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This agreement, though at the administrative level, had a strong influence on the relationship at the grassroots, particularly those at the borders of Cameroon and Nigeria such as the Ejagham. Agreements like this formed another platform for the people to continue to manifest their togetherness, which neutralized the negative effect of the border on them. PROTOCOL ON THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT The Ejagham also benefited from a protocol agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria on the right of establishment. This agreement was meant to safeguard and protect the real estates and fixed assets of nationals of either side in the two countries. The agreement stated that “it is essential and vital for their nationals that a common guarantee by the two states should be solemnly applied to goods which are legitimately owned” (NBA file no 0.1545, 1965). The two governments agreed that there should be no discriminatory action against personal property and real estate belonging to nationals of a state living in the other state. These properties referred to in the agreement were “movable and immovable property” or long-­term investment. These properties were listed as follows: Buildings, commercial and industrial installations and their equipments, long-­ term leases on commercial and industrial buildings and equipment, freehold and leasehold land, plants and machines and their main accessories, working capital, road, river and railway equipment, agricultural equipment, stocks, shares, bonds and insurance policy, household goods and savings. (NBA file no 0.1545, 1965)

This agreement further stressed that on the basis of reciprocity, any national of either state was entitled to the right of settlement, acquiring a building, investing in agricultural, industrial or commercial undertaking or in handicrafts, or any other form of business. It however noted that this should be in respect of the rules and regulations enforced in the state concerned. The agreement emphasized that any expropriation on the part of any of the contracting parties of properties belonging to a national of the other state shall be vulnerable to fair compensation payable in local currency within a reasonable time. Any disagreement arising from the determination of rights or amount of compensation payable shall be resolved by the competent court of justice of the country where the property is located (NBA file no 0.1545, 1965). The agreement also acted as a legal framework binding the activities of the Ejagham people on both sides of the borders. Whether the Ejagham people were conscious of this agreement or not, it laid a better foundation for them to continue relating with each other economically, socially and otherwise.



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For instance, those who lived and owned properties on both sides were: Pa Jerome Egemene from Ayaoke in Cameroon, who lived and owned a cocoa farm in Aborkem in Nigeria for over half a century; Pa Mboyam Ojong of Ekok in Cameroon, who also lived and owned properties in Aborkem (Nigeria); and Pa Anderson Oben Etem who lived and owned properties in Ayaoke village (Cameroon) (Etta, 2013). Independent African states, through the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU) (which has been known since 2001 as the African Union (AU), were conscious of African communities and nations that lay astride international boundaries that they inherited from the colonial masters. An agreement like this consolidated the historical and cultural connections between the Ejagham communities across the Cameroon-­ Nigeria divide. CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY The most outstanding characteristic of international borders is the erection of physical barriers. These barriers were usually accompanied by state personnel made up of customs officials who controlled the entry and exit of goods. Immigration officers scrutinized the movement of people in and out of the territory (Etta, 2013). The international boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon that cut across the Ejagham ethnic group was characterized by these physical and human barriers. The two major barriers put in between the Ejagham people were located on the Cross River at Mfum Bridge Ekok and the bridge at Awa River that linked the two territories and people of Otu and Ekang (Etta, 2013). These checkpoints were first established by the Germans and British, though not at the positions where they were at the turn of the 21st century. At the time there were neither roads nor bridges, but checkpoints existed at major river crossings (Etta, 2013). These were nullified after Britain took over the administration of the Southern Cameroons. After independence, the borders were reinstated by Cameroon and Nigeria. Internationally, the boundary was recognized by the OAU after its formation in 1963. Specifically, one core resolution adopted at the 1964 summit of the OAU, held at Cairo in Egypt, was the adoption of the principle of uti possidetis juris, which stipulates that all colonial boundaries inherited at independence shall be accepted and maintained as the territorial limits of member states. In other words, all international boundaries inherited from the colonial time should be respected after independence (Zartman, 1985). Through a protocol agreement between the Federal Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria, both countries recognized that the movement of persons and properties had always existed between the two

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territories, in both the pre-­colonial and colonial periods. They agreed that unnecessary restrictions of persons and properties along these borders might hinder commercial and mutual understanding, not only among the nation-­ states but also among the small states like the Ejagham. The agreement stated: Conscious of the fact that the two territories and the two nations will benefit from the co-­operation aiming at taking measures which prevent from backing out of or tempting to back out of obligations imposed by customs laws in the territories; desirous of tightening up the friendly links existing between the two countries. . . . The contracting parties will instruct their officers on the absolute necessity to facilitate the legitimate movement of persons and of properties between the two countries. (NBA file no 146, 1965) The contracting parties instructed their officers at the various check points of the absolute necessity to facilitate the legitimate movement of persons and property between the two territories. Some vital internal travelling documents were however recommended to facilitate these inter-­state movements. These documents included, a passport without visa obligations, pass or travel book and official permit delivered by the police or the responsible emigration and immigration service confirming the holder’s nationality. (NBA file no 146, 1965)

According to the agreement, the above documents would satisfy the emigration and immigration officers subject to the respect of the laws in each country. The two states ended the agreement by declaring that; “if a person cannot present one of the above listed documents, the entry into the country could be refused him by the authorities controlling the border of either of the two states.” (NBA file no 146, 1965)

This clause made the agreement harsh because the travelling documents demanded might prevent the Ejagham communities on both sides from relating. They did not deem it necessary to obtain any of the documents before travelling to visit their kith and kin on either side. They therefore continued their traditional but now illicit crossing of the border using bush tracks leading from one territory to the other (Etta, 2013). MOVEMENT OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY This protocol agreement discussed above was to secure appropriate sites for the location of both states’ custom offices. They decided that states should operate common custom sites established adjacent to each other at Mfum and



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Ekok, and Otu and Ekang, respectively, accompanied by immigration offices. The custom site checked the declaration of goods transported by vehicles. To better carry out this function properly, both territories were to adopt the method of writing down the content of vehicles on the declaration form, the size of which was determined by the customs officers concerned. Vehicles crossing the border were to be thoroughly examined by the customs officers of both sides. Every driver had to be in possession of a certificate of vehicles insurance valid in both countries and an international licence (NBA File no P.146, 1965). This agreement never affected the trans-­border activities of the Ejagham, even though drivers on either side had no international driving licences and insurances. These unlawful movements were carried out with the complicity of border officials of both sides. The only condition required of the drivers was that they had to belong to and be recognized as members of the trans-­ border transportation union known as the United Brothers Association (UBA) (Etta, 2013). A collaboration agreement was also reached between Cameroon and Nigeria to combat smuggling along the borders. This was to be carried out through patrols in the territorial waters, the Cross River and the Awa River. This agreement states as follows; The contracting parties decide to allow patrol-­boats, Cameroonian or Nigerian to take up activities against smuggling in their territorial waters and to arrest the persons guilty of possessing goods which will be judged by the tribunals of the territory in which they have been seized. (NBA file no. 146, 1965)

Through this, both parties agreed to encourage closer collaboration between the customs officers in order to facilitate the exchange of information. This information concerned knowing about illegal activities that could lead to loss of revenue by either state. The post-­independence border control was much reinforced compared to the more permeable colonial boundary that was characterized by a limited number of border officials. The whole of the Ejagham area from Eyumojock in Cameroon to Oban and Ikom in Nigeria had a number of checkpoints (Etta, 2013). The checkpoints confirmed that the borders were economic and political targets for both states and not zones of interactions. Checkpoints were staffed by government officials, men or women, who stopped the flow of traffic, usually vehicular and quite often pedestrian, by asking questions to those who passed by. They were always located where vehicles and people could easily cross to the other side (Jeganathan, 2004). These checkpoints rather enhanced Ejagham interaction across the border because when it was impossible for them to cross at will, they used their bush tracks. Besides, only the two bridges of Mfum and Awa were checked by

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police. The rest of the area from Okuri to Nsanakang had no checkpoints on either side. A Cameroonian police post at Okuri existed only on paper (Etta, 2013). Movement between the Ejagham population of both Cameroon and Nigeria was much uninterrupted throughout this area. THE BORDER ZONE POLICY Border zone policy was designed as a consequence of some deterrence policies to cross-­border movements. Stringent border policies led to excessive involvement of the Ejagham indigenes of both sides in high-­level smuggling and inter-­border criminality as a way to circumvent some stringent border control measures. Efforts were further made by the two governments to soften these conditions through the creation of a “border zone” to encourage interactions among border communities. The border zone was a zone of interaction created by the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria for both groups of citizens inhabiting the immediate border area. They were not allowed to go beyond this zone except with the required travelling documents (Etta, 2013). This was to facilitate the traditional movement of people to visit daily markets, visit relatives and attend schools. The width and the length of this “circulation zone” was to be determined by the two governments. The “border zone” was only applied to those people inhabiting the border areas who were entitled to benefit from the special circulation facilities. This bilateral co-­operation recognized the difficulties of people astride the border. They were excluded from those required to use the “laisser-­passer” or the “travel certificate.” These documents were required for “occasional travelers,” those who did not frequent the border or came from afar for business purposes further into the territory. (NBA file no 0.1545, 1965)

The issue of definition and application of the border zone was controversial and remained a serious problem for both the Ejagham people and the government officers of both states. According to one senior police officer at Otu border, the border zone ended at Eyumojock town covering villages such as Ayaoke, Otu, Ekoneman, Nsanarati, Nsanakang and Ekok. Any Ejagham indigene from Nigeria who required travelling beyond Eyumojock town was by law supposed to be in possession of a travelling document whether he or she was an Ejagham person or not (Etta, 2013). Officially, the application of a border zone did not delineate any particular Ejagham town in Nigeria or in Cameroon. Travelling documents other than passports for those going beyond the border zone were obtainable at the border. The “pass” or “laissez-­ passer” was obtained in one’s territory and presented across the border



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before permission was given to visit people beyond the zone. The pass or laissez-­passer was an official travelling document issued by the immigration authorities of Cameroon or Nigeria, given to a person crossing the border for a short stay. The pass or laisser-­passer represented, at the grassroots, a legal procedure in crossing the border, particularly for those who were not in possession of a passport. The person had to present a national identity card before the pass was issued, usually for free (Etta, 2013). On the other hand, the Nigerian immigration officers delineated the border zone at the Ejagham towns of Nyaje and Ikom. They claimed that going beyond these towns, the person was no longer considered to be going for a visit but on a business trip. He or she was required to obtain a pass. They also maintained that although obtaining the pass entailed no money, it was a procedure they had to respect. The Ejagham communities around believed that the border officials were hard on them visiting their relations and were determined to cross the border by hook or by crook. In many cases, when a person was refused entry, he or she asked the chief of Ekang or a relative on the Nigerian side to testify to their relationship. Some people, particularly the youths, became hostile when the officers prevented them from crossing at their wish (Etta, 2013). The officers on both sides in general were very sympathetic and usually allowed them to cross, especially when they expressed themselves in the Ejagham language. According to an immigration officer at Mfum Nigeria, they just needed to cooperate with the indigenes for the sake of their own lives . Many incidents of harassment of government officers occurred both in Nigeria and Cameroon. A Cameroon police officer whose name was given as Pa Nico, the Chief of Post at Otu border was held hostage by Ejagham boys in Nigeria and threatened with death if he dared to prevent them from crossing the border to Cameroon the next time. Another Cameroonian, this time a customs officer, Njoya, was beaten in Nigeria for preventing the smuggling of goods into Cameroon (Etta, 2013). This was a strategy by the youths to counter the tight government policies that prevented them from networking freely across the border. These acts of violence were mostly attributed to the Ejagham youths of Nigeria who were not even lawbinding in their country. Many officers complained that the neglect of the border zone by the government of Cameroon posed a lot of problems for those who were located in very remote areas with no facilities for them and their families. They depended solely on the Nigeria side for their daily needs. For the sake of their lives and those of their families, they had to compromise with the youths because they visited Nigerian towns very often. Their office windows, doors and gate had been destroyed on several occasions when the immigration officers denied the youths entry into Cameroonian territory.

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At certain hours of the night, the immigration officers did not allow people to cross the border. However, when some desperate people came in a group and the immigration police were few in number, they were bound to cooperate with them for their own security and that of their families (Etta, 2013). Ejagham solidarity across the border in some cases was thus manifested through force or the threatened of force. Those considered as human barriers to traditional movements were put under duress in order to have their way across the borders at all hours of the day. Both states made policies in good faith to keep the flow of people and property across the border with little or no restrictions, but those using them complicated issues for selfish reasons. CONCLUSION State policies at diplomatic levels are generally designed to guide interstate relations at the helm, but the age-­old relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria and their excessively long border of about 1,800 km cutting across ethnic groups gave them reasons to diplomatically make policies which did not only affect the governments at the top but also provided an enabling environment for the enhancement of inter-­community relations at the grassroots. Border policies such as the creation of a border a zone, rights of establishment and freedom of movement across the international divide were some of the border policies which were not only meant for interstate diplomatic cooperation but also to maintain a cordial relation within the grassroots population with socio-­cultural and historical affinities. This chapter asserts that border policies between Cameroon and Nigeria at independence consciously or unconsciously reconstructed the broken links that existed between the Ejagham before they were split into Cameroon and Nigeria by Germany and Britain. At independence, both countries understood and considered the ethnic connectivity of the border communities in the pre-­colonial and colonial period by cordially putting in place policies capable of linking the people across the new lines of division despite their new identities. REFERENCES Anene, J. C. (1970). The International Boundaries of Nigeria 1885–1960: The Framework of an Emergent African Nation. London: Longman. Chem-Langhёё, B. (2004). The Paradoxes of Self-­Determination in the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration: The Search for Identity, Well-­Being and Continuity, Lanham, Boulder, New York & Oxford: University Press of America.



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Elango, Z. L. (1987). The Anglo-­French Condominium in Cameroon 1914–1916: History of Misunderstanding. Limbe: Navi-­Group Publications. Etamba Eta, Thomas. (2018) “The Cameroon phase of the First World War in Ossidinge 1914–1916.” PhD Thesis in History, University of Bamenda. Etta Achou, Raphael. (2013). “The Ejagham of Cameroon and Nigeria 1884–2003: A historical assessment of the impact of European partition.” PhD Thesis in History, University of Yaounde I. Jeganathan, Pradeep (2004), “Checkpoints: Anthropology, Identity, and the State.” In Das and Poole, Anthropology in the Margins of the State. New Mexico and Oxford: School of American Research Press and James Currey. Zartman, J. W. (1985). Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.

National Archives Buea File no O.1545, Co-­operation between Nigeria and Cameroon, 28th Oct. 1965. File no p.1418, Agreement on Cultural, Social and Technical cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon, 1965. File no P.146, Agreement protocol governing the control of movement of persons and properties, 1965.

Chapter Five

Cameroon-­Nigeria Bilateral Economic Relations Adeola Caroline Akindoju

INTRODUCTION Nigeria’s economy is unparalleled in Africa for its complexity and dynamism. It is potentially the engine of growth for an entire region, both as a centre of production and as a consumer of neighbouring countries’ exports. On account of its size and its location between Central and West Africa, the country is at the core of the economic transformation of the Sub-­Saharan region. Nigeria is directly connected to a flourishing global market. Its population of perhaps 180 million, the largest on the continent, acts as a magnet for transnational flows of goods and people in the region. For the many communities that straddle the country’s long and porous land borders with neighbouring states and for which shared ethnic, linguistic and cultural ties transcend national boundaries, cross-­border trade is a fact of life. A large volume of goods from around the world enters Nigeria across these borders, and such trade movements, as well as those in the opposite direction, are mostly unrecorded, untaxed, informal and difficult to regulate as are the flows of money that finance them (Hoffmann and Melly, 2015). Nigeria and Cameroon are neighbouring nations that share a common border, people and history. Both nations relied on this proximity to create opportunities that benefited them in the economic, social and the political domains. But considering the ethnic character of and the stakes involved in controlling the natural resources of the borderlands, these opportunistic benefits were intermittently perturbed by incidences of conflict and hostility typified by the Bakassi territorial dispute, pirates’ actions and the transnational insecurity orchestrated by Boko Haram and hence placing the relationship on the balance of a paradox (Funteh, 2015). 71

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The primary cause of conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria was the discovery of natural crude oil in the region, and it is important to note that long before the discovery of oil in Bakassi, Cameroonians and Nigerians in the region lived in harmony, although a few squabbles were registered here and there. The reason both countries did not pay attention to Bakassi in the past is in part because it was a remote area inhabited by people considered to be non-­consequential. However, when oil and other natural resources and minerals were discovered in the peninsula, attention from both countries and also from their colonial connections was ignited, thus creating tension, argument and in some cases death. This was pathetic and really hypocritical because if oil had never been discovered in this region, both regimes would have cared less about the region with its poverty, remoteness, marshes and non-­consequential inhabitants. The Nigerian and the Cameroonian regimes at the time could say that conflict started as a result of the scramble for oil. Although oil played a fundamental part in the conflict, deeper issues related to fighting, destruction and displacement equally played key roles in the whole saga (Tarleb and Baron, 2010). Cameroon and Nigeria have also had a good relationship due to the peaceful co-­existence of the two countries. As neighbours in need of each other, these two countries have placed their human and material resources at the disposal of their citizens and have stood firm against any social, economic and political disagreement that might disrupt their relations. Cameroon and Nigeria exhibit good neighbourliness in a continent plagued with sporadic regional crisis, and trade between the two countries has been going on for so many years and will continue, thanks to their excellent socio-­cultural and economic relations. Thousands of trade items move across to either side of the 1,800-kilometre border separating both countries, and like most colonial boundaries in Africa, the Cameroon-­Nigeria border cuts through villages, tribes and families (Menkene and Fonkeng, 2010). The boundary dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon Republic arising from their long, but ill-­defined border, is of colonial origin. However, it has remained a source of conflict in the direct bilateral relations of the two countries since their independence. The dispute has engaged the attention of almost all Nigerian governments since 1960. It is believed that the Tafawa Balewa government in the first republic lost an opportunity to resolve the dispute to Nigeria’s maximum satisfaction in the 1960s, and this they claim was lost because of a myopic and fratricidal conception of national interests in Nigeria’s domestic politics. The loss still continues to haunt the country till date, especially the maritime sector, where it is claimed that vital security and strategic interests stand threatened and where Nigeria continues to suffer the humiliation of seeing the Cameroonian authorities administer a territory in the disputed area whose population is 90 per cent Nigerian nationals (Ate and Akinterinwa, 1994).



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The role African countries play in the global system and in the continent majorly depends on the type of relationship the various countries have with each other; therefore this chapter proposes to analyse the economic relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria in spite of the hitches and crises that have occurred between them over time, even though the two countries have moved on successfully. This peaceful relationship over time cannot only be attributed to the bilateral relations between them but also to the socio-­cultural, geographical and historical affinities which brings them together. HISTORY OF NIGERIA-­CAMEROON RELATIONS Nigeria and Cameroon are bound by several natural factors, which include vegetation, a 1,700 kilometre-­long permanent border, language, culture, gastronomy, colonial history, economy, education, and lots more. The problems that seem to divide the two nations ended up galvanizing them all the more, like the joy that followed the signing of the historic Green Tree Agreement. The dreaded trans-­border Boko Haram syndrome has compelled forces from the two brotherly countries to tighten their belts against the irksome abductors, bombers and heartless killers. Many more opportunities are now opening up to foster and consolidate the bond between Nigeria and Cameroon (Eden Newspaper, 2018). Bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria were established in 1960, and this relationship was greatly influenced by historical, geographical and economic factors. Several agreements govern these relationships, which include the Memorandum of Understanding on the control of movement of persons and goods of 6 February 1963 and the Trade Agreement of 6 February1963, which was revised on 13 January 1982 and on 11 April 2014 in Yaoundé. Historically, relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have been based primarily on the internal situation, temperament of the men in power, politicians, and governors of Nigerian border states, and the problem inherent in the demarcation of the border, which includes the lake area, sea and land and recently the presence of suspected Boko Haram members in Cameroon. Concerning the border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the matter on 10 October 2002, and the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission was created for the implementation of this judgement and was faced with hesitations from Nigeria. The then-­ Secretary-­General of the UN, Kofi Annan, successfully brought the two Heads of State to adopt measures for the implementation of this judgement on five different occasions, the Green Tree Agreement being signed during the fifth meeting, on 12 June 2006 in New York. The transfer of authority and

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the withdrawal of Nigerian troops in the Bakassi Peninsula took place on 14 August 2008, and on 14 August 2013, the special transitional regime came to an end (“Cameroon-­Nigeria political and diplomatic relations,” n.d.). Cameroon was subsequently partitioned between Britain and France when a joint Franco-­British contingent defeated the Germans in 1916. The British territory that comprised about one-­fifth of the total area and population of the former German protectorate consisted of two narrow non-­contiguous regions bordering Nigeria and stretching from the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad. The southern part became known as British Southern Cameroons while the northern part as British Northern Cameroons, and they were merged with, and ruled as integral parts of, Nigeria for purposes of easy administration. In 1960, French Cameroon got its independence as the Republic of Cameroon, and in 1961 following the results of United Nations–organized plebiscites to determine the future of British Cameroons and Northern Cameroons, both got their independence by joining the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which got its independence earlier in 1960 (Funteh, 2015). The origin of the border conflict between Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon could be traced to the colonial era. On 6 August 1861, an agreement was concluded between King Dosumu and the British Crown, in which the former agreed to cede Lagos to the British Crown, and by 1862, Lagos was proclaimed a colony. In the same vein, on 10 September 1884, a similar agreement was signed between the kings and chiefs of old Calabar and the British government. In this agreement, the British government agreed to protect all the territories controlled by the Obong of Calabar, and true enough, Bakassi was one of these territories. The Bakassi was under the jurisdiction of the Efik Kingdom at the time the 10 September 1884 agreement was signed. The political and commercial hegemony enjoyed by Britain on the West African Coast soon came to an end as the Germans, on 14 July 1884, under the German Consul General, entered into a treaty agreement with two Douala chiefs. This was followed by the hoisting of German flags in Douala and Bimba, which belonged to Cameroon. Thus, the identification of Cameroon as a political unit in this area brought to the fore the question of demarcation of the spheres of influence between Britain and Germany, thus leading to the establishment of boundaries (Familugba, 2013). ASSESSING NIGERIA-­CAMEROON ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CRUX OF THE MATTER Before the colonial period , owing to their geo-­historic proximity, the people of Northern Cameroon and Nigeria carved out commercial opportunities. The



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most prominent and important trade routes were Garoua-­Yola, Maroua-­Mubi and Mora-­ Maiduguri. There was another route from Ngoundere through Kontcha to Yola. From Northern Nigeria, the principal products imported to Northern Cameroon included glass, beads, leather goods, cowries and stencilled cloths. Most of these came from Sokoto and Kano. These trade items were brought into Cameroon by the Hausa and Fulani traders. They went as far as the southern part of Cameroon (Funteh, 2015). The discovery of oil in the Bakassi Peninsula was a blessing to Cameroon as she was suffering a major economic crisis in the mid-1980s. The economic situation in Cameroon did not get better for its citizens even after the advice of the International Monetary Funds and the World Bank that the country needed the peninsula for the survival of her citizens. Besides oil, the Bakassi Peninsula and its surrounding waters is located where two great ocean currents meet, making conditions very favourable for a large variety of fish and other forms of maritime wildlife to grow and reproduce. The fertility of Bakassi as a fishing grounds was comparable only to new-­found land in North America and Scandinavia, in western Europe, which was one of the reasons why the Germans were so keen on securing Bakassi at the Anglo German treaty of 1913. The prospect of discovering oil reserves in Bakassi and the sale of fishing rights were reasons which motivated both countries to fight over sovereignty for it, especially in the case of Cameroon, where revenue from the exploitation of oil had been on the decrease at the time, despite the increase in the price of oil products in the world market (Ngang, 2007). On 10 October 2002, the ICJ delivered its verdict on the border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and the rulings had far-­reaching impacts and effects for Nigeria. For instance, the loss of Bakassi not only placed the multi-­million-­naira Export Promotion Zone (EPZ) in serious danger but also the Calabar region, which had depended solely on this important segment. Thus, with respect to the ICJs ruling, the port was handed to Cameroon outright and Nigeria was meant to pay charges if they wanted to continue using it. Nigeria lost 100 million barrels of oil deposits and four cubic feet of gas deposits because these oil companies, where they had invested huge amount of money, fell within the territory of the peninsula that was to be handed over to the Cameroonians (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor, 2006). The implication of this was that the huge revenue that was realized as a result of the Bakassi oil was predicted to be lost. A nation like Nigeria, which at the time was facing economic problems and was striving to improve the lot of its people during the inception of the conflict, faced a big problem by utilizing their sources adequately. At this point, the rulings of the court were not only severely felt but had a great impact on its economic situation since the oil was

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exported and in balancing their economic situation at the time. (Aghemelo and Ibhasebhor, 2006). Nigeria’s Institute of Oceanography and Marine Research (IOMR) revealed that the continental shelf in the south eastern sector, which is the area in dispute, was the broadest along the entire Nigerian coastline, and very rich in both fish and mineral resources, including oil, and also estimated that the area was yielding close to 100,000 metric tonnes of fish yearly. Furthermore, Nigerian policy-­makers argued that the Bakassi Peninsula and the Calabar Channel were keys to the economic survival of the port of Calabar and the Export Promotion Zone (EPZ). More importantly, Nigeria’s oil resources, which provide about 90 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings, occur predominantly in a zone from 10 to 41 nautical miles off the coast of Calabar. It is believed oil accounts for only 35 per cent of Cameroon’s foreign exchange earnings, and it also has oil installations adjacent to the disputed area, which is effectively exploiting the same oil field as Nigeria, from the opposite side. Also, the supplies of crude to its only oil refinery came almost exclusively from the area in dispute; therefore, giving up the Bakassi Peninsula and its adjacent areas to Nigeria would result in the closure of its only oil refinery. These important economic resources led to mutual distrust and suspicion between the two countries (Ikome, 2004). In April 2014 after the sixth mixed commission on cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon, which took place in Yaoundé, the two countries’ foreign ministers signed a series of cooperative agreements, including a formal trade agreement that was based on governing trade relations between the two nations. This agreement came about not only a few days after Nigeria, a potential market of 170 million inhabitants, became the largest economy in Africa, surpassing South Africa, but also at a time when Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities were preparing to inaugurate the Enuga-­Bamenda road that was envisaged to increase the already considerable trade between the two countries. Indeed, according to figures from the Economic Affairs Directorate (DAE) at the Ministry of Finance, in 2012, Nigeria was the destination for 3.5 per cent of Cameroon’s formal trade. This was far behind China, which received 15 per cent of the country’s exports. At the same time, the same report reveals that the most populated country in Africa remained Cameroon’s main supplier as 22.6 per cent and 17.8 per cent of Cameroon’s imports, respectively, in 2011 and 2012, originated there. France (12.8 per cent and 11.8 per cent) and China (10.8 per cent and 10.4 per cent) lagged behind. These statistics are probably more significant in light of the fact that, according to official sources from both countries, Nigeria and Cameroon share a long tradition of contraband smuggling due to their shared 1,400-kilometre border that is hardly monitored and is therefore highly penetrable (Business in Cameroon, 2014).



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At the level of formal exchanges in 2013, Nigeria was second in exporting to Cameroon (13.8 per cent of imports;1,039,064 tons worth FCFA 452.018 billion, after China (14.2 per cent) and ahead of France (12.2 per cent), India (5 per cent) and the United States (3.9 per cent). Cameroon’s exports to Nigeria in 2013 stood at fourteenth (1.8 per cent of exports; 65,388 tons worth FCFA 39.531 billion). In addition to spare parts, building materials, cosmetics, fertilizers, oranges, household appliances, plastic buckets and fabrics, Nigeria mainly sells petroleum products in Cameroon as well as fuels and lubricants. In return, Cameroon’s exports to Nigeria are composed mainly of food products, livestock, vegetable oils and soap. For geographical, historical and cultural-­proximity reasons, the bulk of trade between Cameroon and Nigeria takes place at the informal level, through the Far North, Southwest and, to a lesser extent, Adamawa regions. Added to that is the determining factor of the naira, which serves as currency which was not easily convertible and subjected to occasional devaluations. The Trade Agreement of 11 April 2014 between the two countries can be described as historic, as it granted access to the Nigerian market for many Cameroonian products, including soap, vegetable oil, wood, art, textiles or cocoa powder. The agreement facilitates transactions in both currencies (Ewangue, Shuyang and Amayena, 2015). THE BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND ITS IMPACT ON NIGERIA-­CAMEROON ECONOMIC RELATIONS Nigeria and Cameroon cooperate bilaterally and multilaterally to effectively fight against the threat posed by the dreaded Boko Haram group, which is manifested by the terrorist attacks in both territories. To fight against insecurity along their common border, the two countries signed an agreement on the establishment of the Cross Border Security Committee (CST) on 28 February 2012 in Abuja. In this context, officials in charge of surveillance and intelligence gathering meet when necessary. The Committee meets twice a year in ordinary sessions, alternately in Cameroon and Nigeria, and it may be convened in an extraordinary session. The Cameroon-­Nigeria Cross Border Security Committee held its first session on 6–8 November 2013 in Yaoundé. The second session was held on 8–11 July 2014 in Abuja, while Yaoundé again hosted the third session on 18–20 February 2015 (Ewangue, Shuyang and Amayena, 2015). Nigeria-­origin radical Islamist group Boko Haram extended armed attacks into northern Cameroon in 2014 but was substantially beaten back by joint Cameroonian, Chadian and Nigerian armed forces in early 2015. Thereafter, it has waged an asymmetric campaign of bombings, largely targeting

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civilians in urban areas. The Cameroonian government’s response to the conflict has focused on militarizing the Far North region, closing border crossings, and concentrating displaced persons in and around urban centres. Disruption of internal and cross-­border trade and seasonal migration to Nigeria and Chad has further diminished livelihood opportunities. Recruitment of Cameroonian youths by Boko Haram is reportedly forced or, when voluntary, is motivated by economic gain rather than solidarity. For instance, Kanuri youths are a particular target due to cross-­border cultural, familial, and economic ties, but Boko Haram now recruits young adults from many different communities. It is believed that a more joint approach to stabilizing the region should include greater civil-­military cooperation to expand humanitarian space, the reopening and securing of trade corridors, linking voluntary return of displaced persons to state commitments to restore and extend basic services, and a commitment to community reintegration (Rackley, 2017). Nigeria and Cameroon in 2016 signed a number of deals aimed at strengthening the security and economy of the Lake Chad Basin nations in what appears to be an attempt to restart what were previously cold relations between the two countries. Currently, Nigeria and Cameroon find themselves united against the threat of terrorism as several agreements on military cooperation and trade have been signed by leaders of the two countries. Among them is the shared resolve to defeat Boko Haram completely. They also agreed that security and economic issues are important and should be focused on. The Cameroonian president Paul Biya also emphasized the need to re-­establish livelihoods and revamp the local economies in areas affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, while his Nigerian counterpart President Muhammadu Buhari on his own applauded the contribution by Cameroon and other Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) countries in the fight against Boko Haram. The Nigerian president also emphasized the role played by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF), which was formed as a result of the need by Lake Chad Basin Commission member countries to jointly tackle insecurity, particularly the threat of terrorism (Mwakideu and Ubale, 2016). ASSESSING NIGERIA’S CLOSED BORDERS AND ITS EFFECTS ON NIGERIA-­CAMEROON ECONOMIES Nigeria’s economy is of a complexity and dynamism unparalleled in West Africa. With a domestic market of perhaps 180 million people and a manufacturing base far outstripping that of any neighbour, it has the scale and weight



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to become the engine of trade growth across the entire region. Despite the modest personal spending power of Nigerian consumers, the weakness of transport and technical infrastructure, financial and administrative hurdles and the gradual pace of regional economic integration, Nigeria already generates vast cross-­border trade involving networks of sophisticated activity across a diverse range of commodities (Ghins and Heinrigs, 2019). Numerous border incidents between Nigeria and Cameroon have been sources of irritants in the relationships between the two countries. They have not only caused suspicions, distrust and infractions, but have made undesirable headlines in the annals of neighbourhood of border studies. However, border incidents have remained a source of bilateral relations of the two countries since independence. Indeed, this disagreement has led to border clashes between both countries resulting in the loss of lives and property, which ought not to be so because of the various close affinities and joint cooperative activities between the two important West and Central African countries. Among the many border disputes that Nigeria and Cameroon had in the past, the Bakassi issue remains the most contentious. Although recently there has not been any crisis over Bakassi, the discovery of oil and other natural resources triggered hostilities in the region. The two countries struggled over the mineral-­rich peninsula, which culminated in the use of military force. Both countries were locked in defence and security skirmishes over the ownership of the mineral-­rich peninsula, leveraging on historical instruments such as the 1913 Anglo-­German Treaty entered into by Imperial Britain and Germany as well as the 1975 Mauro Declaration adopted by General Yakubu Gowon and Alhaji Ahmadou Ahidjo, who were the then-­heads of state of Nigeria and Cameroon respectively The Cameroonians’ arguments was based on the treaty of 1913 signed by Britain and Germany with a clause to rearrange the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon from Yola to the Sea and regulate the navigation of the Cross River on the ownership of the region. Hence, the inability to find a lasting solution to the crisis in the area aggravated not only the hostile relationship between the two countries but also brought about the militarization and internationalization of the dispute (Akinyemi, 2014). Trade between Cameroon and Nigeria stagnated following the closure of the border in 2012 in an attempt to prevent Islamist terrorists from launching attacks from Cameroonian territory. The closure of the border led to a sharp fall in food exports while basic commodities imported from Nigeria like fuel could not enter Cameroon. Communities at the Cameroonian border town of Amchide, especially, were greatly affected, as much of their livelihood depended on cross-­border trade. Everything became expensive, and huge quantities of agricultural produce piled up in Cameroon because

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of the sealed borders. For its part, the Nigerian army expressed that it was exercising emergency powers because it was imperative to seal off the border between Cameroon and parts of Nigeria to prevent illegal crossings (Kindzeka, 2020). Furthermore, the closure of Nigerian borders often affects Nigeria-­ Cameroon relations adversely as the inhabitants of both countries often depended on the cross-­border exchange of basic commodities, especially foodstuffs. According to Cameroon’s National Institute of Statistics about 15,000 Cameroonians trade across the 2,000-kilometer border with Nigeria. But in October 2019, Nigeria closed its land borders to all trade to end rampant smuggling, and in Cameroon, the move seems to be having the opposite effect. Cameroonian authorities have seized more smuggled shipments of goods, including drugs, since Nigeria closed its border, and each time the security forces apprehend somebody who has any contraband goods and drugs, the security forces seize them. Critics argue that Nigeria’s closed border pours doubt on Africa’s continent-­wide free trade agreement signed in July 2018, even though Nigeria says the country is still open to trade through its ports and that the land border closure means it’s simply better regulated (Kindzeka, 2020). Cameroon reopened its south western border with Nigeria in 2018 after closing it for a year because of conflicts between Cameroon’s military and armed separatists fighting to create an English-­speaking state. When Cameroon declared war on the armed separatists in November 2017, gunmen had attacked border localities in Cameroon’s south west and escaped to Nigeria. Nigeria denied the assailants were crossing over from its territory into Cameroon (Kindzeka, 2018). Again, in October 2019, Nigeria closed its borders to the movement of goods, and the unexpected nature of the announcement gave traders and communities little time to prepare for the economic shock that followed. The move, aimed at curbing smuggling, led to price increases, while critics claimed it threatens free trade across the region, and Nigeria’s unilateral action came two months after it reluctantly signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), which aims to remove barriers to trade and promote the free flow of goods, services and people across the continent. The border closure is inconsistent with Nigeria’s multilateral commitments, including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AfCFTA, and this is seen as a major disruption to Nigeria’s relations with the entire region, including Cameroon. It is believed this will frustrate the momentum of removing trade barriers in the region and across Africa as it undermines the systems agreed to and destroys trust and goodwill (Ubah, 2019).



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CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION The economic relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria is said to have been enhanced by their geographical contiguity and shared historical linkage as it shows both nations shared worthy moments of mutual socio-­political colonial era. These interactions and economic interactions since the pre-­ were exemplified by the opportunities both nations created for and enjoyed from each other. Even when these cordial dealings were intermittently interrupted by some disheartening circumstances of victimization and secessionist tendencies, territorial dispute and the terrorizing actions of pirates and the Boko Haram menace, the respective governments remained connected in an attempt to close these gaps in their relationship. The historical analysis and strategic examination of Cameroon-­Nigeria political and economic relations reveals a considerable level of warmth, cordiality and mutuality of interest and purpose. It is hoped that the resolution of the territorial differences between both states and the joint efforts of containing the Boko Haram will serve as a springboard to revisit, reconsider and ascribe value to the cordial side of the interaction they have enjoyed since the pre-­colonial era. As both Nigeria and Cameroon have ceased confrontational demonstrations of military power over the peninsula, it is necessary to take full advantage of conflict resolution to positively explore areas of possible cross-­border collaborations and economic relations in the area of joint resource explorations and other common cross-­border businesses that could benefits their citizens, including the displaced Bakassi indigenous populations. Nigeria and Cameroon’s peaceful conflict resolution should be seen as a model for all nations that are still in military battle over conflicting national interests to drop their guns, renegotiate, re-­solve for the sake of lives and properties at risk and to give room for development as well as progress in the affected zones (Shaibu, Azom and Nwanze, 2015). Furthermore, Nigeria needs to strengthen its border by increasing the capacity of border agents to do their job well by enforcing laws and regulations effectively which requires professionalizing staff, creating systems of accountability that discourage corruption among border officials and pushing for the implementation of a common external tariff among ECOWAS states and Africa as a whole. This would likely lead to a better outcome than the blunt, short-­sighted reaction of border closing, and instead lead to a better long-­term outcome and strengthen ECOWAS as a trade body, as well (Ubah, 2019). In sum, while the border closure in Nigeria is having contrasted short-­term impacts, it will not help to address the root causes of smuggling and the key constraints to accelerated productive transformation. In the meantime,

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it severely hurts the legal trade that is vital to livelihoods in local border economies. African decision makers should endorse long-­term policies that take potential adverse effects on consumers into consideration and seek to improve the overall business climate. This implies considering the realities of an increasingly interconnected world and relying on well-­identified comparative advantages to allow countries to move positively into the world economy. It is hard to believe that keeping borders closed in Africa’s largest economy is a step in that direction (Ghins and Heinrigs, 2019). REFERENCES Aghemelo, T. and S. Ibhasebhor. (2006). “Colonialism as a source of boundary dispute and conflict among African states: The World Court Judgement on Bakassi Peninsula and its implications for Nigeria.” Journal of Social Science 13, no. 3. Akinyemi, O. (2014). “Borders in Nigeria’s relations with Cameroon” Journal of Arts 3 no. 9. Ate, B. and Akinterinwa, B. (1994). Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbors: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-­regional Security in the 1990s. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Business in Cameroon. (2014). “Cameroon and Nigeria bound by formal trade agreement.” www​.businessincameroon1604-4782-cameroon-­and-­nigeria-­bond-­by​ -­formal-­trade-­agreement (accessed 31 May 2020). “Cameroon-­Nigeria political and diplomatic relations.” (n.d.). www​facebook-­on/​ notes/president-­p aul-­b iya/Cameroon-­N igeria-­p oliticalanddiplomatic​ r elations (accessed 10 June 2020). Eden Newspaper. (2018). “Cameroon, Nigeria will become biggest trading partners.” www​.edennewspapers​.net (accessed 14 June 2020). Ewangue, J. L., B. V. Shuyang and N. Amayena. (2015). “Cameroon-­Nigeria Fraternal Consultations Summit: Nigeria Our Neighbor, Our Partner.” A publication of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. Familugba, O. (2013). “Nigeria-­ Cameroon border relations: An analysis of the conflict and cooperation (1970–2004).” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Francis Ikome. (2014). “The inviolability of Africa’s colonial boundaries: Lessons from Cameroon-­Nigeria border conflict.” Institute for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper no. 47, ed. Garth Le Pere. Johannesburg, South Africa. Nigeria relations: Connecting Funteh, M. (2015). “The Paradox of Cameroon-­ between the edges of opportunity, benefit and quandary.” International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 6 no. 3, ISSN 1993–8825. Ghins, L. and P. Heinrigs, P. (2019). “Nigeria’s border closure: Why it will not pay off.” OECD Development Matters. 19th International Economic Forum on Africa. www​.oecd-­development-­matters​.org (accessed 17 June 2020).



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Hoffmann, L. K, and P. Melly. (2015). “Nigeria’s booming borders: The drivers and consequences of unrecorded trade.” Chatham House Report. Ikome, F. (2004). “The inviolability of Africa’s colonial boundaries: lessons from Cameroon-­ Nigeria border conflict.” Institute for Global Dialogue, Occasional Paper no. 47, ed. Garth Le Pere, Johannesburgm South Africa. Kindzeka, M. E. (2018). “Cameroon reopens border with Nigeria.” www​.voanews​ .com​.africa/cameroon-­reopens-­border-­nigeria 208 (accessed 24/6/2020). Kindzeka, M. E. (2020). “Nigeria’s closed border boosts smuggling to Cameroon.’’ www​.voa​news​.com (accessed 22 June 2020). Menkene, J. K, and P. Fonkeng. (2010). “Cameroon-­Nigeria relations: A model for posterity” Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 36, no. 2. Mwakideu, C., and M. Ubale. (2016) “Nigeria and Cameroon seek closer security economic ties.” www​.dw​.com (accessed 10 June 2020). Ngang, C. K. (2007). “Understanding the Bakassi conflict: A showcase of conflict prevention in practice” EPU Research Papers, Issues 04/07, Citizens Rights in Africa Initiative. Ojo Familugba. (2013). “Nigeria-­Cameroon border relations: An analysis of the conflict and cooperation (1970–2004).” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science. Rackley, E. (2017). “Cameroon’s Far North: Responding to Boko Haram.” Oxford Research Group Briefing, Oxford Research Group. Shaibu, M., Stephen Azom and E. Nwanze. (2015). “An appraisal of the dominant causes of boundary conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon: The Bakassi Peninsula perspective.” Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 3, no. 9, 25–47. Tarleb, N. and S. Baron. (2010). “The Cameroon and Nigeria negotiation process over the contested oil rich Bakassi Pennisula.” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in Social Sciences 2, 203–204 Ubah, L. (2019). “Nigeria border closure causes economic shock.”African Business. www​.africanbusinessmagazine​.com (accessed 27 June 2020).

Chapter Six

The Role of External Actors in Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations Tola Odubajo

INTRODUCTION The pre-­colonial history of contemporary African states is a radical deparcolonial societies of Africa were ture from subsisting reality. The pre-­ composed of autonomous political units that functioned on the basis of unique political, administrative, economic, and socio-­cultural systems and practices (Segboye, 2018; Diop, 1987). The various groups were distinct in their languages, cultural belief systems and religions. These relatively small units were generally homogeneous; hence, their commonalities afforded some semblance of peaceful coexistence (Shumway, 2016). They related on the basis of shared ancestry, which was a remarkable way of warding off external intrusion in their affairs. Each of the units possessed the latitude to practise political arrangements that suited their conditions. In most cases, though, the monarchical system was the preferred choice, although with each adopting patterns that suited their peculiarities. For instance, there were varying degrees of political and administrative responsibilities for the layers of the government. However, the existence of these hitherto autonomous political entities suffered great distortion with the advent of colonialism in the 19th century. Specifically, the autonomy of the political entities was formally undermined with the scramble for Africa at the Berlin Conferences of 1884/1885, which heralded the conversion of Africa’s autonomous political entities to the possessions of the European colonisers (Griffiths. 1986). This was followed by the arbitrary and destructive border demarcations of the colonised territories, which continues to have negative reverberating effects on post-­colonial African states. According to Adenuga (2018, 270): 85

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The partitioning was conducted without any regard for the socio-­cultural, economic and political relations subsisting between the peoples of the continent and thus, nations such as the Yoruba nation was divided between two colonial masters with the larger part of the nation falling in the British controlled area which is now modern Nigeria while some Yoruba speaking people found themselves in the French controlled area which is today’s Republic of Benin. These divisions of formerly united socio-­cultural, political and economic groups between different European warlords were of grave consequences to the peoples of the continent.

Furthermore, the colonial intrusion also triggered the need to recreate the African societies by carving them into European conceptualization of states as proclaimed in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Falk, 2002). Thus, post-­ colonial African states emerged as coteries of heterogeneous groups that were forcefully merged for the immediate benefits of the Europeans. It is pertinent to emphasise that prior to the advent of colonialism, Africa’s autonomous political entities interacted at both formal and informal levels of engagement. In other words, while the highest political authorities related with one another (for instance, in respect of treaties and agreements), individuals and groups also established relations, such as socio-­cultural exchanges, economic and trade relations, among others (Sundstrom, 1974). It is on this basis that the chapter commences the examination of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. In the attempt to achieve the objectives of this chapter, we shall interrogate the three phases (pre-­colonial, colonial, and post-­colonial) of Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations. This approach is aimed at isolating the critical actors that impact Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. The chapter is divided into five segments, which commence with the introduction, followed by an examination of the theoretical perspectives to the roles of actors in international relations. The third part is an excursion into the historical development of the relations between Nigeria and Cameroon under the three phases, pre-­colonial, colonial, and post-­colonial of relations. This sets the stage for isolating the actors that have impacted Cameroon-­Nigeria relations across the ages. Furthermore, the chapter highlights the learning points in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations before the conclusion is presented. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS The international system is the terrain of international relations where various actors interact for the purposes of achieving set objectives (McGlinchey,



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2017). Indeed, it is a market place for both positives (negotiation, mediation, agreements) and negatives (coercion, force, antagonisms), including all forms of the expression of will by actors (Krishna-­Hensel, 2010). These interactions are sine qua non to the continued existence of humanity, because no human society can exist in isolation, and this is even more the case in the contemporary international system in which globalization has reinforced unlimited interactions across divides; politics, economics and socio-­cultural factors (Heywood, 2014; Haynes et al., 2013). According to Haynes, et al., (2013, 5): The phenomenon of globalisation referred to an increased interdependency that was not only limited to the realm of economics, but which extended to technology, culture, and the way states and institutions related to one another. Now, in the early twenty-­first century, it is difficult to think about international relations without considering the impact globalisation has had on the way power is shared in the world.

It is against this backdrop that international actors dominate the global space. However, there are two divergent ideological perspectives to the relevance of the two broad sets of actors in international relations: state and non-­state actors (Weenink, 2001). The dominant narratives about the relevance of actors in the international system are led by the realist scholars, and the others are the idealist scholars. For the former, we have the following intellectual giants: Hans Morgenthau, Edward Carr, Kenneth Waltz, among others. The latter group parades such outstanding scholars as: Immanuel Kant, John Keynes and Hedley Bull, among others. The realist perspective is driven by the notion of a selfish international system composed of states as the primary actor, on the one hand, and non-­state actors that exist for the benefit of the states, on the other hand. For the realist scholars, the international system is characterized by the interactions among states for the purposes of dominating others in the system in consonance with the stated objectives of their national interests. The process of achieving the aims and objectives of the national interest may involve non-­state actors, but these are merely deployed as pawns on the chessboards of the states for the purpose of enhancing the state’s interests. According to Donnelly (2000, 9): Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make international relations largely a realm of power and interest.

The pursuit of power and interest is the remit of states. For the realists, therefore, the powers reposing in the state by its possession of territory, sovereignty, government, and people exist to dominate the other actors.

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The idealists’ position of the state as an actor in the international system differs remarkably from the realists’ perspectives. Essentially, the idealists argue that the international system is not limited to an arena of power play among state actors, and that even the fixation about the projection, promotion, and protection of the national interests of states should not be construed to mean the existence of a perpetual volatile international system that is constantly on the brink of collapse. In contrast to the realists’ notion, the idealists acknowledge the existence of the state as an international actor, but argue that there are non-­state actors that are equally of immense relevance to the functionality of the international system, particularly because the international system is not merely an arena for power play. The idealists are of the opinion that non-­state actors, such as international organisations and multinational corporations, have been able to counter the presumed dominance of state actors in the international system. In the final analysis, the two categories of actors are relevant for the continued sustenance of the international system; thus, while recognising the status of the state as a relevant actor in the international system, it is pertinent to accommodate the impact and powers of the non-­state actors as well. As the globalization of international relations continues unabated, both the state and non-­state actors require mutual reinforcement in their relationships to fulfil their responsibilities to the international system. Flowing from this, both state actors and non-­state actors have impacted Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. ACTORS AND THEIR ROLES IN CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS Here, we focus on both state and non-­state actors in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. The state actors identified in the relationship are Britain, France and Germany. The non-­state actors in the relationship are international organisations, an insurgency group and an individual with international clout. STATE ACTORS: BRITAIN, FRANCE AND GERMANY As with all neighbouring African states, Cameroon-­Nigeria relations date back to pre-­colonial times. This was a period when the current political entities did not have the appellation of modern statehood. Most were nations of tribes with fluid boundaries that allowed for direct interactions. With the advent of colonialism, rigid and formal boundaries were created to enhance the political status of the units and enable the legal claim of ownership by the colonialists (Ajala, 1993, 178).



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For the groups occupying the geographical space of modern-­day Nigeria and Cameroon, the determination of ownership was complicated by the counterclaims of the three European imperial powers: France, Germany, and Great Britain. As Ikome (2004, 9–10) succinctly asserts: The political entities of Nigeria and Cameroon are British and German creations respectively. . . . However, today’s Cameroon is a product of the territory’s colonial history that saw it first administered by the Germans, and then partitioned by the French and the British.

While the ownership of a large chunk of Nigeria’s geographic space was not in dispute, the three European powers laid claim to the geographical space making up modern Cameroon. Prior to Cameroon’s independence in 1961, the three powers administered Cameroon at different times. This development confirmed Britain, France, and Germany as major actors in Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations. Incidentally, the intrusion of the imperial powers for the purposes of colonialism disrupted the harmonious coexistence among the pre-­colonial groups within modern day Nigeria and Cameroon. The experience of Nigeria and Cameroon is even more pathetic because the autonomous units that once coexisted without strict formal borders became demarcated through colonial instrumentalities (Ani et al., 2018; Funteh, 2015). The intrusion has continued until contemporary times, particularly through France’s role in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. The reason is not so far-­fetched! France’s relationship with its ex-­colonies across Africa is unique in the sense that strong bonds exist even after the declaration of independence (Benneyworth, 2011). In the West and Central Africa sub-­region, France remains a dominant player, and is very protective of its former colonies, particularly for its own interests. Benneyworth (2011) surmises: Recent geopolitical events have spurred realignment of French foreign policy from being too African-­centric, yet old habits die hard when French interests are involved, which have often revolved around energy resources and raw materials.

Of particular attention in France’s relations with its former African colonies is France’s perception of Nigeria as an aspiring regional hegemon. This point is buttressed by Alao (2012, 13) thus: At the centre of the enmity between the two countries was the competition to exercise influence over Francophone West African states. France was determined to ensure control over the affairs of these countries, even after independence. It perceived Nigeria as its main “rival” in this objective.

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In effect, French policy in Africa is driven by the perception of threat posed by Nigeria to its dominance on the African continent. Instructively, the nature of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations has for long been influenced by the attitude of France towards Nigeria. In many of the confrontations between Nigeria and Cameroon, France never hid its interest in committing to war against Nigeria in support of Cameroon. This position is substantiated by the existence of a military pact between France and Cameroon. The border dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi peninsula almost tilted to a disastrous end, had it not been for the recourse to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Indeed, there are speculations that France was strategically waiting in the “wings” to support Cameroon against Nigeria if war had ensued (Punch, 2016). THE DEFUNCT REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA The short-­lived Republic of Biafra was the creation of the Igbos, who were bent on seceding from Nigeria in the post-­independence era. They achieved this objective between 1967 and 1970 before they capitulated under the superior firepower of the federal forces. The remarkable occurrence thrown up by the Biafra war, which had implications for Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, was the determination of Cameroon to withhold recognition of Biafra despite pressures particularly from France, whose influence on Cameroon and its other former colonies was immense (Adigbuo, 2019). From a military strategic point of view, there were indications that if Cameroon had been sympathetic to the Biafra cause, and had extended recognition to Biafra, this would have had great impact on the outcome of the civil war (Kemedjio, 2018). Kemedjio (2018) points out: When France asked the resulting state of Cameroon to back the Republic of Biafra during the Biafra war (1967–1970), then President of the Republic of Cameroon Ahmadu Ahidjo declined the request. This decision deprived the Republic of Biafra with its only territorial border.

By implication, therefore, Biafra could have had greater leverage in the prosecution of its war agenda if it had the moral backing from such a strategically located neighbour, and the possibilities of using the neighbour’s influence for contact with the outside world. The gesture of withholding recognition from Biafra by Cameroon and other states bordering Nigeria triggered the adoption of the Good Neighbour Policy in the post–civil war foreign policy pursuits of the Nigerian government.



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INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY: KOFI ANNAN Kofi Anan was the seventh Secretary-­General of the United Nations. He served as the Distinguished Secretary-­General of the United Nations between 1997 and 2006. It was during the tenure of Kofi Annan that the legal tussle (1996–2002) for the ownership of the Bakassi was conducted and completed, including the signing of the Green Tree Agreement in June 2006. As an international statesman, Kofi Annan stepped on the stage and discharged himself creditably by using his “good offices” to conduct the processes of the settlement of the dispute at the International Court of Justice. Perhaps, armed with the knowledge of the consequences of a confrontation between Nigeria and Cameroon, “Mr. Annan met in Paris with the two Presidents who both promised to respect and implement whatever decision the International Court of Justice might give on the case” (https://www​.un​.org/press/en/2006/afr1397. doc​.htm). Even when judgement had been passed, the Secretary-­General continued to play a stabilizing role in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. According to the UN Press Release (2006): At another summit called by Mr. Annan on 15 November 2002, the two Heads of State agreed to establish a United Nations-­backed implementation mechanism- the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission, which will be chaired by the Secretary-­General’s Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould-­Adballah.

Mr. Annan’s role as a non-­state international actor under the auspices of the United Nations in the border dispute challenges between Nigeria and Cameroon was instrumental to the maintenance of peace in the region. Under his leadership, peace returned to the Bakassi Peninsula, and Cameroon-­Nigeria relations have been more cordial than was the case in the pre–ICJ judgment era. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS: UNITED NATIONS The United Nations is the first international organisation to be involved in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations as an external actor. The direct involvement of the UN as it concerns Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, dates back to the early days of Nigeria’s independence. The UN’s involvement in their relations concerned the right to self-­determination of the people that were initially based in north eastern part of Nigeria but later opted for Cameroonian citizenship. The UN organized a plebiscite in 1961 for the people to make a choice between being citizens of either the Nigerian or Cameroonian state (Percival,

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2008; Awasom, 2000). For its role in the exercise, the UN merely played the part of an international actor interested in protecting and respecting the self-­ determination of a people, which aligns with its mandate as stated in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter. Another epochal intervention of the United Nations in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations is the organisation’s role in the course of the border dispute between the two nations over the Bakassi peninsula (UN News, 2006). The UN urged restraint in the interactions between the two nations, and encouraged them to abide by the decisions of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. The UN’s role of moral suasion was instrumental in dousing the tension that arose over the border dispute, and both sides pledged to work in concert in ensuring the continued peace of the sub-­region. According to UN News (2006): The UN-­sponsored Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC), chaired by its Special Representative for West Africa, Ahmedou Ould-­Abdallah, has been working over the past several years to finally resolve all issues of the dispute, which has its origin in the colonial borders established in the early 20th century by Britain and Germany.

In summary, therefore, the UN has been instrumental in providing the platform for smooth and cordial relations between both countries, as exemplified in the UN-­monitored plebiscite of February 1961, and the implementation of the terms of settlement of the Bakassi border dispute. INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE As an international institution charged with the responsibility to adjudicate legal matters concerning sovereign political entities, the International Court of Justice played a significant role in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations by its judgment of the case over the Bakassi border dispute on 10 October 2002. The ICJ’s judgement “is final, without appeal, and binding for the Parties ” (UN Press Release, 2002) The decision to resort to the ICJ for final determination of the merit of the cases prevented a possible catastrophe of immense proportion between two neighbouring countries. After the judgement, both parties have worked in concert to ensure the implementation of the court’s decisions. THE LAKE CHAD BASIN COMMISSION The Lake Chad Basin Commission is an international organisation established to protect the interests of all states bordering Lake Chad and cutting



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across sub-­regions in Africa. The Commission is made up of the following eight states: Cameroon, Nigeria, Sudan, Central Africa Republic, Algeria, Libya, Chad and Niger. The desire to protect the security of the basin led to the creation of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) by the Commission. The MNJTF was established in 1994 to counter banditry and all other forms of cross-­border crimes across the basin. The mandate and outlook of the MNJTF was however expanded in 2015 to include a regional response of the war against terrorism. Under the new arrangement, Nigeria worked in collaboration with Cameroon, as with other member states to increase the number of troops, expand the mandate, and relocate the base to an appropriate headquarters in N’Djamena, Chad. This collaborative venture is a demonstration of the cordial relationships that are emerging in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations in the post–ICJ judgment era. TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS: BOKO HARAM Boko Haram is an insurgent group that deploys terrorist tactics to achieve its objectives. It has its roots in northern Nigeria, where the north east region has been severely ravaged. However, the group’s sphere of destructive influence eventually extended to Nigeria’s neighbours. Cameroon continues to bear the brunt of the extra-­territorial assaults of the Boko Haram insurgency. For this reason, Nigeria and Cameroon collaborate in the effort to find enduring solutions to the Boko Haram menace. Thus, the efforts to solve a common security problem have led to further cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon. In line with the newfound security collaboration, both countries continue to partner in cross-­border security arrangements. LEARNING POINTS FOR CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS The nature of relations among geographically contiguous states is a critical variable in the existential realities of a region. There is the great risk of external sabotage for feuding neighbouring states in international relations. The Cuban Missile Crisis (Clinton, 1993) offers a great example of the possibilities of the violation of the borders of a state by an enemy through a disgruntled neighbouring state. For Nigeria and Cameroon, it is important to sustain their cordial and warm relations, particularly because of their many years of association, dating back to the pre-­colonial period. Instructively, the original borders that were created were not at the behest of the indigenous tribes, and Nigeria and Cameroon

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exist today as two independent states as a result of the Westphalia Treaty of 1648, and subsequent Berlin Conferences of 1884/1885 and accompanying international agreements. In other words, present-­day Nigeria and Cameroon may have existed as one political unit if the dominant imperial actors of the 19th century had wished it. In effect, their relationship should be reassessed along the lines of improving cordiality and the further establishment of stronger ties, particularly because of the long history of socio-­cultural, economic and political relationships that exist between them. Both states should, equally, be mindful of the intrusive external actors in their relationship. In this respect, Nigeria and Cameroon should continually reassess their relationship in the light of France’s relationship with its former colonies, and by extension, France’s presumed anxiety over Nigeria’s hegemonic ambitions in Africa. It is therefore pertinent that both states hold dear their long history of connection that dates back to the pre-­European intrusion in African politics. Nigeria and Cameroon should be wary of the possible divide-­and-­rule tactics of third parties in their relationship. In line with the above, viable means of resolving intra-­Africa squabbles should be explored as the need arises. Specifically, series of protocols and processes exist within the ambit of the African Union, which should be preferred to seeking succour and solution offered by extra-­African powers. Just like the collaboration and cooperation that exist in the security arrangement, aggressive steps should be taken to ensure collaboration and cooperation in all fields of human endeavour. The settlement of the border dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula should offer a great opportunity for continued collaboration and cooperation between the governments of the two states, and peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the border communities, and beyond. CONCLUSION This chapter made an attempt to highlight some of the major international actors that have impacted Cameroon-­Nigeria relations over time. The chapter undertook this process by analysing the three main phases of Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations. France’s presence is noted in the colonial and all through post-­colonial periods. The two most significant issues that have warranted the involvement of external actors are the border dispute and the cross-­border security situation involving both states. Finally, recommendations are made for closer ties between both states and among their citizens.



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REFERENCES Adenuga, A. (2018). “The colonial experience and the imperative of real independence in Africa.” In S. Oloruntoba and V. Gumede (eds), State and Development in Post-­Independent Africa. Texas: Pan-­African University Press, 269–278. Adigbuo, E. (2019). “Role conflicts in foreign policy: Nigeria’s dilemma over Bakassi Peninsula.” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 37, no. 4, 404–420. Ajala, A. (1993). “The Nature of African Boundaries.” Africa Spectrum 18, no. 2, 177–189. Alao, A. (2011). Nigeria and the Global Powers: Continuity and Change in Policy and Perceptions. Occasional Paper No. 96. South Africa Institute of International Affairs. Ani, K., G. Kinge and V. Ojakorotu. (2018). “Nigeria-­Cameroon relations: Focus on economic history and border diplomacy.” Journal of African Foreign Affairs 5, no. 2, 147–166. Awasom, N. (2000). “The reunification question in Cameroon history: Was the bride an enthusiastic or a reluctant one?” Africa Today 47, no. 2, 91–119. Benneyworth, I. (2011). “The ongoing relationship between France and its former African colonies.” E-­International Relations. See: https://www​.e-­ir​.info/2011/06/11/ the-­ongoing-­relationship-­between-­france-­and-­its-­former-­african-­colonies/. Clinton, S. (1993). The Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Children’s Press. Diop, C. (1987). Precolonial Black Africa: Comparative Study of the Political and Social Systems of Europe and Black Africa, from Antiquity to the Formation of Modern States. Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books. Donnelly, J. (2000). Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Falk, R. (2002). “Revisiting Westphalia, discovering Westphalia.” The Journal of Ethics 6, no. 4, 311–352. Funteh, M. (2015). “The paradox of Cameroon-­Nigeria interactions: Connecting between the edges of opportunity/benefit and quandary.” International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 6, no. 3, 30–48. Griffith, I. (1986). “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited political boundaries.” The Geographical Journal 152, no. 2, 204–216. Haynes, J., P. Hough, S. Malik and L. Pettiford. (2013). World Politics: International Relations and Globalisation in the 21st Century. New York: Routledge. Heywood, A. (2014). Global Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Ikome, F. (2004). A Historical Reconstruction of the Cameroon-­ Nigeria Border Question. Institute for Global Dialogue. See: https://www​.jstor​.org/stable/pdf/res​ rep07742.5.pdf Kemedjio, C. (2018). “Taking stock of Biafra’s ghosts in Cameroon’s current events.” Critical Investigations into Humanitarianism in Africa. See: https://www​.cihablog​ .com/taking-­stock-­of-­biafras-­ghosts-­in-­cameroons-­current-­events/. Krishna-­Hensel, S. (2010). Order and Disorder in the International System. Montgomery: Ashgate. McGlinchey, S. (2017). International Relations. E-­International Relations.

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Percival, J. (2008). The 1961 Cameroon Plebiscite: Choice or Betrayal. Langaa: RPCIG. Punch. (2016). “Ceding Bakassi to Cameroon saved Nigeria from major war—Ajibola, former world court judge.” 29 October. See: https://punchng​.com/ceding​ -­bakassi​-­cameroon-­saved-­nigeria-­major-­war-­ajibola-­former-­world-­court-­judge/. Segboye, A. (2018). “Politics and society in pre-­colonial Africa: Implications for governance in contemporary times.” In S. Oloruntoba and T. Falola (eds), The Palgrave Handbook of African Politics, Governance and Development. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shumway, R. (2016). “Pre-­colonial Political Systems.” In T. Spear (ed.). Oxford Bibliographies in African Studies. New York: Oxford University Press. Sundstrom, L. (1974). The Exchange Economy of Pre-­colonial Tropical Africa. London: C. Hurst and Company. UN News. (2006). “Under intensive United Nations mediation, Nigeria and Cameroon sign accord ending border dispute,” 12 June. See: https://news​.un​.org/en/ story/2006/06/182162-under-­intensive-­un-­mediation-­nigeria-­and-­cameroon-­sign​ -­accord-­ending-­border. UN Press Release. (2002). International Court of Justice gives judgment in Cameroon-­Nigeria boundary dispute, 10 October. See: https://www​.un​.org/press/ en/​2002/icj603.doc​ htm. Weenink, A. (2001). “The relevance of being important or the importance of being relevant? State and non-­state actors in international relations theory.” In B. Arts et al. (eds). Non-­State Actors in International Relations. Surrey: Ashgate.

Chapter Seven

Analysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) Greg Fah Fombo and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke

INTRODUCTION The continuous eruption of civil conflicts in Africa and their rising negative impact on development and cost in human lives have led to renewed interest in the subject. One civil conflict of unparalleled enormity in Africa was the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). Fifty years after the war ended, some critical elements that contributed to its course and outcome remain shrouded in mystery. The involvement of Cameroon in the conflict remains till date a partially told story with the most critical aspects largely left out. By Cameroon, in this case, we mean not only the government and people of Cameroon but also the many Nigerians who were resident in Cameroon well ahead of the war and those who moved in while the war was raging. The war was of grave concern in Cameroon, the only country that had a common boundary with both sides in the conflict when it started. Research into this conflict and external involvement has often been inclined towards participation in the supply of arms and ammunitions to the belligerents. Or it is skewed in favour of the high-­profile diplomatic recognition of the secessionists and Organisation of African Unity (OAU)–initiated conference diplomacy to secure a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Little is available in the literature on the quadrilles within neighbouring states towards the belligerents and the impact of their domestic policies during its course to influence the outcome of the conflict. This chapter attempts to show, with the benefit of hindsight, that Cameroon played a vital role in propping up the beleaguered Nigerian Federal Government during the civil war, through austere domestic policies. Studies on this conflict, as we shall show below, have often emphasised the role of big powers that supplied arms to the Federalists and those that stood by and assisted 97

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Biafra to prosecute the war. Cameroon’s ignored role is a model of how a neighbouring state could dampen the embers of a civil conflict. It stands in contrast, for example, to the role subsequently played by Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe, more than three decades later, in the DRC. Arguably, it was during the Nigerian Civil War, more than during the Cameroon-­Nigeria crisis over the Bakassi, that the state security services, the administration in general and the population of Anglophone Cameroon were seriously challenged in dealing with Nigeria. Recently declassified materials have revealed the discord, fears and suspicions of the various elements involved within Cameroon. The simple conclusion that Cameroon backed the Federal Government of Nigeria during the war glosses over the important strains, strands and contradictions, and some of the critical elements of the jigsaw in relations between the peoples of the two states. The study divests from attempting to categorize the disposition of Cameroon and Cameroonians into any school of thought. This for sure runs the risk of an inordinate narration of events that are not ordered by a body of theory. It, however, allows for a clearer exposition of the internal contradictions and twists in the Cameroon polity vis-­à-vis this conflict. It will also allow for a deeper and fuller appreciation of the considerations of the various interests in Cameroon even if that of the central government prevailed. Four elements were involved in the tussle on the Cameroon side of the border, which are of interest to this study. First, there was the Cameroon government and its institutions (state security agencies, particularly police, BMM, and gendarmerie; customs, and the civil administrators); second, the federal government of Nigeria and its institutions in Cameroon (embassy in Yaoundé and consulate in Buea, West Cameroon). The third element was the population of West (that is, Anglophone) Cameroon that had shared colonial experience with secessionist Biafra for over 40 years, and the fourth element was the large immigrant population of Nigerians (mainly Ibos) resident in West Cameroon, whose numbers were swelled by the civil war. The first two elements, broadly speaking, perceived the war through the same prism, which was in favour of the Federalists. On the other hand, the third and fourth elements sympathised with the secessionist cause. Because of these discordant loyalties, West Cameroon became a theatre of the war fought mainly in the economic sphere, but also psychologically. There was a chasm within Cameroon engendered by similar feelings of good neighbourliness conceived at two levels. The state of Cameroon was impelled to commiserate with the cause for unity within the territory of its neighbour, Nigeria. With the same logic but taking the opposite side were the people of West Cameroon, who frankly felt for their neighbours, and in a sense, their brethren, in the secessionist Eastern Region of Nigeria with whom



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they had lived and shared a common lingua franca (English). It also exposes the precarious decision of the Cameroon government to support the federal side by waging an economic war of blockade for the federalists instead of doing brisk business with both sides. More importantly, this chapter aims at exposing the reasons for the position of the Cameroon government, in relation to the war, to be rooted in its strong attachment to the founding principles of the Organisation of African Unity and its perception of national interest to be entwined with this principle. Revisionist interpretations of Cameroon’s policy to be based on a secret pact with the federalist leadership to cede the Bakassi Peninsula in exchange for support are exposed as spurious. Existing studies have often been sweeping and brash in concluding that Cameroon backed the federalists or largely ignored the role of the former. This simplistic conclusion is arrived at because of the lopsided emphasis on Cameroon’s role to have been diplomatic under the aegis of the OAU. John Stremlau is especially inclined to considering mainly the involvement of Cameroon as a member of the OAU consultative committee. The economic warfare Cameroon waged, especially in controlling pro-­Biafran elements from sending food, other essential items and war materials across the border was critical in the blockade of Biafra, a major strategy of the federalists in the war (Strernlau, 1977). One of the most scintillating studies on external involvement in the war, especially of Nigeria’s neighbours, is that by G. Aforka Nweke. This study reveals much about the involvement of France, Francophone West Africa, as well as the rest of the African states, which either sympathised with Biafra going against the stance of the OAU or those that backed the federal cause in line with the predominant view within the OAU (Nweke, 1976). Equal1y considered are the rest of the world powers. In spite of its comprehensiveness on the French and the rest of West African involvement as suggested by the title, scant information is available on Cameroon and its motivation, compared with the rest of Nigeria’s neighbours. John de St Jorre’s work, largely journalistic in style, as far as external involvement is concerned, focuses more on the intriguing and contradictory roles of major powers, especially France (covertly) on the Biafran side and Britain and Russia (overtly) on the Federalist side. Also of great interest to him (an issue he handled with great candour) was the murky world of mercenary involvement on either side of the conflict. He barely mentions Cameroon in relation to a gunrunning plane that crashed in Garoua, Cameroon, in 1967 (St Jorre, 1972, 77–201). These sources are rather keen on the diplomatic intrigues of the war. Considered in this vein, Cameroon’s involvement in the sub-­region pales compared to those of Ivory Coast and Gabon, which recognized Biafra and became staging posts for relief and military shipments

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to Biafra. Meanwhile, other immediate neighbours, as Nweke rightly points out, for economic and social (mainly ethnic and religious) reasons, could not afford to offend the federal government despite French involvement and subtle pressure on behalf of the opposite side (Nweke, 1976, 35–36). Little is revealed by these sources on the Cameroon government’s devout effort to enforce a blockade of Biafra and the counter-­attempts by Biafrans resident in West Cameroon and West Cameroonians to loosen the stranglehold and send food and other materials to Biafra as well as provide relief to refugees in Cameroon. The relative lack of interest in the role of the non-­state actors in Cameroon on behalf of Biafra can be surmised from two perspectives: the generally statist focus of most political studies at this level and the usual frustration involved in obtaining official information in Cameroon, worse still, information involving covert intelligence-­cum-­security units of the state. The involvement of the Cameroon state in the civil war raises some fundamental questions: Why did Cameroon side with the federalists, flouting the secessionists treated with sympathy by France, Cameroon’s principal economic benefactor? How did Cameroon translate its pro-­federalist stance into effective territorial policies that favoured Nigeria against secessionist Biafra? What were the reactions of West Cameroonians and the many Biafrans in West Cameroon to the policies and the Nigeria crisis? If the attitude of Nigeria’s West African neighbours that backed the federal side can be explained mainly by their economic dependence on Nigeria, as Nweke demonstrated, that of Cameroon definitely was not. This chapter argues that Cameroon, unlike the rest of Nigeria’s neighbours, was not under any direct economic compulsion to support Nigeria. Nor were the socio-­ cultural influences on Cameroon unidirectional. Rather, pragmatism, which is consistent with Cameroon’s conservative leadership and OAU stance, reinforced by its smouldering domestic civil conflict. drove it to back the federalists so tenaciously. This chapter also argues that, had the Cameroon state sided with Biafra, it would have been of more critical importance to the latter than the support given Biafra by its other principal backers, notably Zambia, Tanzania, Gabon and Ivory Coast (now Cote d’Ivoire). CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS PRIOR TO THE CIVIL WAR Cameroon-­Nigeria relations were off to a chilly start following the results of the United Nations–conducted election in British Northern Cameroons, which the former claimed was rigged by the colonial authorities in favour of Nigeria (Federal Republic of Cameroon, 1961). Nevertheless, relations between



Analysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) 101

them did not remain strained for long. Between 1961 and 1963, relations improved as they both found themselves singing from the same hymn sheet in African diplomacy preceding formation of the OAU. Importantly, Cameroon and Nigeria belonged to the Monrovia bloc, which included Liberia, Congo Brazzaville, Ivory Coast, and so on, which opposed the creation of an African organisation with political union as its immediate objective, as desired by the rival Casablanca camp. Indeed, other members of the Brazzaville group that evolved into the Monrovia bloc dissuaded Cameroon from pressing its case against Nigeria and Britain in order not to antagonise Nigeria, whose active support was required in the group (Touval, 1972, 75). This trend of patching up the initial hostilities was also observable in February 1963, when they signed several cooperation agreements (Rubin, 1971, 189). Cameroon and Nigeria continued to cooperate more closely after the formation of the OAU, although new sources of tension began to emerge over their southern border. Having agreed on the inviolability of colonial boundaries as handed over at independence, their boundary differences appeared easy to resolve. A commission was quickly constituted to settle these differences (CNAB, File No PMO 197/TEMI, 1965; Fombo, 2007). These events pointed not to complete harmony in relations but, rather, a willingness on both sides to dialogue over issues of concern. In geopolitical terms also, Cameroon and Nigeria share a common border of over 1,700km, which is longer than between any one of them and a third party. Comparing population and GDP, Cameroon was and remains a poor second to Nigeria, among their immediate neighbours. In addition to these, both countries share strong ethno-­cultural links. The Hausa-­Fulani that lived for centuries across the region also inhabit northern Cameroon as in northern Nigeria. Also from north to south, they share common ethnic groups straddled over the border. WARTIME ACTIVITIES IN CAMEROON Besides the Cameroon government’s avowed diplomatic action in support of Nigeria, examined in existing literature, local administrators and security agencies were directed to enact various measures to implement the anti-­ Biafra posture of the central government. Overlapping control instruments against the movement of goods to bordering districts with Nigeria, especially those of Mamfe, Kumba, Ndian and Victoria Divisions, were issued by divisional and district officers (Sone,1 1967). Measures were also enacted closing many beaches and ports to forestall undetected clandestine departures from there. Those that were allowed to function were not opened to vessels

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between 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. (Prefectorial Order, 1967). These measures also banned unauthorized movement of trucks and cars to the port vicinities. By fiat of various government officials, existing permits to carry goods to border districts were revoked and a few, detailing quantities, items to be carried and vehicles conveying them, were reissued, all in a bid to check the movement of essential items to Nigeria, particularly Biafra (CNAB Memo No MCI. WC/S. 1/190, 1967). The effects of the Cameroon government’s economic policies were not only severely felt in war-­torn and blockaded Biafra but, equally, in other neighbouring districts of Nigeria (in Ogoja and Calabar provinces, which changed hands early in the war) and border districts of West Cameroon. In the latter, for instance, there were reports of shortages of essential goods and even famine in most of Ndian Division, including Bamusso (ibid.). On the whole, the effort at requisitioning as though Cameroon were at war caused untold hardship on the masses in the border districts. More specifically, it caused a scarcity of such items as salt, stock fish, tinned tomatoes and cigarettes in West Cameroon as restrictions were also imposed on their movement from East Cameroon. Notwithstanding these restrictions, some quantities were still smuggled across the border into Biafra and Nigeria by two principal categories of people. First, there was direct smuggling of goods from Cameroon to Nigeria by people who had no permits of any kind to do business. Second, there was smuggling of goods across the border by people who were given permits to trade in Bamusso, Lobe and the rest of the neighbouring districts, but who diverted their merchandise across the border. Those who broke these regulations were either out to profit from the situation or sympathised with Biafra and were determined to pause the economic stranglehold on Biafra. Significantly for the state, as O. S. Ebanja, Director of Economic Services in West Cameroon, noted, “the results of the ineffectiveness of the ban [were] . . . loss of customs revenue, tendency towards irregular practices, increase in prices in West Cameroon of those popular goods which [were] smuggled out” (ibid.). Critically too, there were serious misgivings within the population of West Cameroon, who had clear sympathy for Biafra, against a government that adopted such strong measures in controlling even legitimate business in non-­military material, just to enforce the economic blockade of Biafra and increase the death toll from starvation and malnutrition. There was a growing perception, and with it, resentment, that the government cared less about the economic interest of Cameroonians and the international concern over the humanitarian situation in Biafra, among the people of West Cameroon. It was not difficult for the common man to understand that the trade embargo was a



Analysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) 103

questionable proactive policy of restricting all supplies to Biafra, even though the rest of Nigeria was included in the ban. Security-­wise, everything concerning Nigeria and Biafra had to be noted by the ubiquitous security agencies. Refugees from the war were registered; their movement within Cameroon recorded, as well as those who interacted with them. Any form of assistance to these refugees by Cameroonians or Nigerians resident in Cameroon was treated with suspicion and had to be cleared with the government authorities (CNAB Security report no S.11/55, 1967). This was in addition to the cumbrous duty of enforcing the economic blockade of Nigeria or specifically, Biafra. Even so, it was in investigating perennial claims raised by Nigeria that the security services were most preoccupied. Many claims were made by the Federal Government of Nigeria through the Nigerian consulate in Buea and embassy in Yaoundé or directly by the Ministry of External Affairs in Lagos. The main allegations were made in three areas: financial contributions from Ibos in Cameroon to aid Biafra prosecute the war, establishment of guerrilla camps in West Cameroon by Biafran agents for recruitment and training of Ibo conscripts and Cameroonian volunteers with the tacit connivance of some Cameroonian officials, and gunrunning and clandestine shipment of arms through Cameroon to Biafra. In a five-­page report from the Consul General in Buea to the Ambassador, Alhaji Bello Malabu in Yaoundé (CNAB Memo no. CBN.Ol/SEC, 1968), the consul alleged Ibos in Cameroon were raising money to aid Biafra prosecute the civil war in Nigeria. He also claimed that Biafran agents had opened centres and were training guerrillas in several places in West Cameroon, including Bomi and Oshie in Bamenda Division. The home government in an aide memoir from the Ministry of External Affairs, Lagos, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yaoundé, also raised the claim of guerrilla training camps. According to the document, Biafra had opened a training camp at a location four miles from the Bisong Abang airstrip in Mamfe, through which instructors were flown in from Biafra. In the document, Nigeria further made a plea urging Cameroon to investigate the matter “in the spirit of fraternal cooperation [and for] the authorities of the Federal Republic of Cameroon [to] take measures to prevent the rebel agents from taking undue advantage of the ready sympathy they are known to receive in West Cameroon” (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1968). It was, however, the consul who took on the duty of reiterating the concerns in two memos in quick succession to Jean-­Claude Ngoh, Federal Inspector of Administration, Buea (CNAB, File no TCl966114, 1969). The Consul not only stated where the guerrilla camps were allegedly located, he veered into listing suspected non-­Ibo collaborators in the training scheme, among them a West German, a Tanzanian, a Chinese

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person and Cameroonians. The guerrillas, according to the memos, were to complete their training in China after preliminary instruction at the camps in Cameroon. Significantly, and probably in an attempt to ride the wave of strong anti-­UPC feeling within government circles in Cameroon, the Consul claimed that the UPC rebels in Cameroon (popularly known as marquizards) were in league with Biafra, training guerrillas for the latter in remote places, with some of its fighters actually enlisting to fight for Biafra. The Consul, in his memos, launched a scathing attack on the general population of Anglophone Cameroon and also strongly accused some top civil servants of being collaborators with the Biafra agenda in Cameroon. According to him, three reasons could be adduced for the sinister disposition in West Cameroon. The first relates to a remark which he attributes to Mr B. E. Chu, a Chief of Service in Mamfe Division made on 20 August 1968. Chu is alleged to have uttered that: the President of the Federal Republic of Cameroon is bound [ultimately] to support the cause of Biafra soon or late since Cameroon is in the French community of nations. Every Cameroonian civil servant, therefore, who fails to toe the line of General de Gaulle, in the Nigeria/Ojukwu crisis would, when time comes, be brought to book.

The assumption of the consult was that West Cameroonians were of the opinion their government was doing wrong by backing the federalists, but would eventually turn around to support Biafra as desired by Paris. The next reason he advanced was that Anglophone Cameroonians were unhappy with their union with French-­speaking Cameroon and perceived Biafra as a trailblazer and pacesetter in secession and a potential source of assistance when they would eventually opt out of the francophone-­dominated union. This, according to the consul, was not out of wishful thinking on the part of West Cameroonians. It was as a result of a promise made to them by Sir Louis Mbanefo, the Biafra emissary, in a speech delivered at the Buea Mountain Hotel, when he visited Buea in July 1967. The third reason the Consul posited was that of “moral weakness.” According to him, many top civil servants were susceptible to heavy bribes from the Igbos and Biafran agents in Cameroon. He even went as far as to accuse Mr Kisob, senior divisional officer (SDO) for the former Mamfe Division (now called Manyu Division), to have “got enough money [from bribes] to buy a new car and at the same time to send his wife to study overseas.” The Consul concluded that Nigeria should not count on the cooperation of the Cameroon government for effective border controls and its security. (He probably had as a way forward, among other measures, the continuous maintenance of their network of spies in Cameroon.)



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The security services were literally swept into intense investigations on the activities of Nigerians of Eastern extraction, resident in West Cameroon, by the depth of the allegations levelled by the Nigerian authorities. Indeed, the assertions of the Consul in particular became more of an embarrassment to a government that was a leading supporter of Federal Nigeria on the African diplomatic front. Less than a month afterward, reports were filed on the specific claims of the Consul relating to activities of former Biafran combatants who were refugees in Mamfe and Kumba (CNAB, File no TCI966114, 1968). The findings did not corroborate what the consul alleged. Another investigation was launched in Bamenda to uncover the alleged rebel activities and training camps in Bomi, Oshie and Mbingo, including their collaborators as claimed by the Consul. In a five-­page security report (by the Chief of Service, Federal Security Bamenda, also endorsed by the SDO for the Division), the issues raised by the consul, which the security agent described as dangerous, were addressed (CNAB Report no. S. III ANOL. 1/1281, 1968). It was stated emphatically in the report that after thorough checks, there were no guerrilla camps in Bomi, Oshie and Mbingo. In the Mbengwi Catholic Monastery, there was nobody named Reverend Father Johnston, whom the consul claimed to be an expert in judo involved with the training at Bomi. To further clarify the matter, a full list of the occupants of the monastery was appended to the report. The report also revealed that there was no Tanzanian national within the Division, which precluded the possibility of any being there, instructing guerrillas, as purported by the Consul. It was however, admitted in the report that most Ibos in Bamenda were known staunch supporters of Biafra, many of whom had made financial contributions to aid the Biafra government. Nevertheless, they had not translated their sympathy into massive conscription for a guerrilla army for Biafra. It was also admitted that there had been earlier reports of Cameroonians enlisting to fight for Biafra, but no concrete evidence was found to support the claim. Meanwhile, other sources on the civil war (St Jorre, 1972) have not confirmed that mercenaries from Cameroon fought for Biafra, although such fighters could have easily been considered as being from the non-­Ibo areas of the former Eastern Region. Furthermore, this report also revealed uneasiness within security circles over the tactic of the Nigerian consulate and embassy relying on information from Cameroonians whom they have drafted as spies. The report named Rabui Tita as a spy for Nigeria, whose activities had already been the subject of an earlier report (Report no. S.11Vol​.l/203, 1968). This disquiet, as we shall see below, later boiled over. Another report was submitted on the alleged secret financial contributions of Ndigbos resident in Cameroon for the aid of Biafra. This inquiry had been

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underway before the memos from the Consu1. It implies that either Cameroon security agents had picked up leaks of these activities and had decided to investigate, or the Nigerian Consul had raised earlier concerns that triggered the findings. In a detailed report dated 4 September 1968, the Chief of Service Federal Surete, Bamenda, provided information which confirmed the allegation. Table 7.1 presents a summary of the sums and groups involved with the contribution by September 1968. Table 7.1.  Summary of the amount donated by Igbos in West Cameroon towards the civil war in Nigeria

 1.   2.   3.   4.   5.   6.   7.   8.   9. 10. 1l. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 17. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27 28. 29 30. 31. 32.

Names and Addresses

Amount (Francs)

Mr. & Mrs. Michael Uba and forty-­three other residents in Mankon Bamenda Ekwudor Family Abroad—Biafrans in Kumba town Nkume Family meeting, Kumba Ihechiowa—Ututu and Isu people Kumba Akwa Women and Men in Kumba Ezeagu Divisional Union Udi, Kumba Branch Onitsha Community in Bamenda Amodu Awkunanaw Oji River Province men resident in Kumba Akeze Welfare Union in Ekondo Titi, Ndian Division Mr. Emmanuel Ihekweaba, Mr. & Mrs. Ugwu Idam and 16 others of Awomama from Bai Kuke Mbonge—Kumba Arochuku Welfare Association Ndogore Council men resident in Ekondo Titi Ndian Division Owerri Residents in Lobe Edda Community in Mbonge Umahia men in Bai Rubber Estate Okigwe family meeting Mbonge-­Marumba Biafrans in in Ngusi Bakossi Uboma Family Okigwe in Kumba NemEi in Orlu Division living In Kumba MbemoOkigwe men and women in Mankon town, Bamenda Ogwa Worri’s resident in Bai Estate Umuahia Ccnmnunity resident in Mbonge, Kumba Aro Chuku Committee in Mbonge Enugu Branch Mbonge Kumba Amasiri Afikpo Element at Bedura Lobe Onitsha Southern District Union Kumba Branch Amaseri Family Afikpo living Kumba Nnewi, Onitsha people living in Bamenda Afikpo Division Aekoha in Mbonge Marumba Umunama Attah Orlu resident in Bekura—Barombi Lobe Estate Owerri Branch Mbonge town Kumba Ibo Community in Boa-­Bakundu Aro Ibi people in Kumba

302,825 143,100 177,650 147,000 93,000 32,600 220,000 44,700 6,000 20,550 21,400 98,109 9,900 6,100 75,600 4,000 19,200 24,450 39,500 14,500 31,050 37,500 15,800 17,500 106,000 69,100 47,000 24,000 3,500 19,250 10,000 30,200



33. 34 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

Analysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) 107 Names and Addresses

Amount (Francs)

Urualla Orlu Province Biafra in Kumba. Ekwerazu Mbaise Owerri resident in Kumba The Uli Family—Orlu in Kumba Mr. And Mrs. Ayaekwezu Okafor of Awkwa Etiti Ibos of Ngugo Ikeduru Owerri resident in Bamusso Bakolle Item Community Mbonge Awo Omamma-­Kumba Branch Miscellaneous, Umuaka Orlu No. A & B West Cameroon Sub-­total Typewritten document with 1,830 names GRAND TOTAL

34,450 32,800 43,000 4,500 14,500 2,000 238,000 89,500 2,369,934 2,437,125 4,807,059 +US$10

Source: CNB, FiIe no TC1966119.

NB: Mr Samuel Izuegbu of the family of Mathew Izuegbu of Alot Onitsha and university student in transit donated c/o S. N. Ozim, Box 13, Kumba, US $10. In spite of this revelation, the Cameroon authorities did not make any arrests, contrary to the desire of the consul. The transfers were not incriminating, as no law forbade repatriation of wealth by Nigerians in Cameroon. In addition, there was no evidence to show that the money was physically transferred in CFA, which is not permissible by law. The sheer number of contributors (over 2,600) discouraged any effort at harassing them. Evidently, the amount of money could have been much more than revealed by the investigation because as early as 3 August 1967 a report appeared in the Biafra Sun that the Ifite Ukpo community in Kumba, West Cameroon, donated 4,400 francs (about 55 Nigerian pounds) to the Civil Defence Fund, Enugu. During the war, other discreet investigations were carried out at the behest of the Nigerian diplomatic missions. The futility of many of them provoked outright bitterness in the ranks of security operatives in West Cameroon. Such was the fate of a dramatic search party that left Yaoundé to uncover alleged caches of arms hidden in Ubenekang, Bamusso. The search party was dispatched at the request of the Nigerian Ambassador following what he considered to be a tip-­off by an informant. Inspector Joseph Esomba of the Federal Security Yaoundé; Eyo Ekanem, the informant; joined by the Nigerian Consul in Buea, Kieran Okpokam; and security agents from the Brigade Mixe Mobile, Lobe, arrived at Bamusso on 28 January 1969. After a meeting with the District Officer, Bamusso, in his company, they went to the supposed location of the buried arms and ammunitions. Following several hours of searching at the residence of Ndigbo in the area, among them Chief Boniface Iheanacho, no arms were found (CNAB, File no TC 1966114).

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The fruitless expedition led to hard feelings on the part of Cameroon local administrators, who were somewhat frustrated by the unflinching support and cooperation that Yaoundé continued to give the Nigerian authorities, even in the wake of what they considered to be activities inconsistent with their status. In the first place, the informant on whom the Nigerian Ambassador relied was a known criminal in Bamusso, who had been detained before for impersonating as a security officer, among other misdemeanours (ibid.). In addition to this were earlier unfounded allegations raised in memos by the Nigerian Consul and Ambassador, and the highly critical and personal attacks on the character and professional competence of some Divisional administrators and members of security services in West Cameroon. See for example, the claim that Mr Kisob, SDO Mamfe, collected bribes from Ibos to buy a new car and send his wife overseas for studies. The disquiet in West Cameroon led to a note verbale censuring the Consul. This led the Chargé d’ Affaires at the Nigerian embassy to request an audience with the Head of the African Service at the Ministry of External Affairs. It offered the Service Chief, J. R. Booh, an opportunity to hammer out the concerns of the West Cameroon administration. According to him, it was inadmissible for the Consul to continuously foment baseless allegations that there were Biafran training camps and arms caches in Cameroon. Meanwhile, “la position officielle et consequente de notre gouvernement est bien connue,” which undoubtedly, was pro-­Federal Government of Nigeria. REACTIONS OF NIGERIANS At the outbreak of the civil war, there were many Nigerians in Cameroon, probably millions, but the exact number was not known. The number was increased by the influx of refugees from the conflict. Although the Ndigbo were by far the majority ethnic group from Nigeria in Cameroon, many others were living there as well. This mix largely reflected the diversity and polarization back in Nigeria. The lines of division were mainly ethnic, though not wholly so. Ibos mostly supported Biafra, while the minority groups of the secessionist former Eastern region supported the federal side, particularly, after the fall of Calabar into federal hands. Following security reports of strife and impending civil disorder among different Nigerian communities, Cameroonian authorities waded in, ostensibly as honest brokers, to avert any bloody clashes. In Bamusso, for instance, a meeting was organized on 7 November 1968 by the Divisional Officer (DO), Mr S. B. Diffang, at Ubenekang, which had the highest number and diversity of Nigerians in the district. He addressed leaders of various Nigerian



Analysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) 109

ethnic groups at the Council School Hall, enjoining them to ensure peace and security in Ubenekang. The group leaders, drawn from the Ibeno, lbo, Ibibio, Rivers, Yoruba, Efik, Eket, Okobo and Ekot ethnic groups in Nigeria entered a peace pact. The tensions were considered to be emanating from poor relations between the Ndigbo, who then called themselves Biafrans, and Ibibios, who identified with the federalists. News from the warfront was reacted to in provocative ways by both sides. Owing to the war as well, the Igbo merchants who thrived in trade could not carry out their business between Ikang, Oron and Bamusso. They became somewhat “jealous” of the Ibibios, who were the “masters of the sea,” and constantly attempted to blackmail them. While the Ndigbo claimed to be on good terms with the local administration and security forces, the Ibibio group cooperated with federal forces, who mounted raids from across the border in search of Biafran supporters and suspected arms suppliers. Similar meetings were held by local administrators in Muyuka, Buea and Victoria. Orders were issued banning “public meetings, provocative speeches, loose talk, tribal meetings, jubilant assemblies, processions and dancing (CNAB, File no TC1966119, 1967). MARITIME BORDER POLICIES DURING THE WAR In its policies along the coastal district of Bamusso, Cameroon’s discrete sympathy with the federalist appeared to have gone over the top. Time and again, Nigerian officers continued their cross-­ border raids, which were apparently sanctioned or at least condoned by Yaoundé. These raids led to a number of incidents which further exposed the extent to which the Cameroon government accommodated the federalists. On 13 December 1968, three Nigerian soldiers were captured following a clash with Cameroon gendarmes in Bamusso (Memo no ABBC.8/60 ). In the wake of such activities of Nigerian federal forces, the DO appealed for reinforcements, but his request was ignored. Rather, the captured soldiers were handed over to Nigerian consular officials in Buea. The Nigerian forces therefore continued to maraud Atabong and Abana. It did not take long before these areas completely fell under their control (CNAB, File no TC 1966/19, 1968). Meanwhile, the Nigerian federal navy was also allowed to establish bases in the Bakassi, unperturbed. According to the above intelligence report, Nigerian forces made a concerted push into Atabong, Abana and the Bakassi Peninsula in December 1968 and maintained their control until after the war. Ostensibly, this was done to cut off arms supplies through the creeks to Biafra, particularly masterminded by Ibos in West Cameroon. Food supplies and other essential items

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like medicine were also targeted. While supplies to Biafra were certainly minimized, and Cameroon’s assistance to the federal side was made more conspicuous by these actions, it had higher significance in retrospect as being the dangerous precedence that lay at the root of the subsequent Bakassi conflict between Cameroon and Nigeria. It was from this period that Bakassi entered the mind-­ set of military strategists and pseudo-­nationalists in Nigeria as being of cardinal (strategic) importance, in spite of Gowon’s inadvertent acknowledgement of this area to be part of Cameroon in the Maroua Accord (Fombo, 2007). It was a precarious policy for Cameroon to have supported the federalists to the extent of allowing them set up military bases on Cameroonian territory, The Cameroon-­Nigeria international boundary, which had been largely obfuscated by the colonial administration between 1916 and 1961, and which had not been fully clarified during the early years of independence, was thrown into more confusion by these actions. Little wonder then that post-­war developments along the border eventually became unpleasant to Cameroon. While Nigeria’s wartime leader, Gowon, evidently understood Cameroon’s concessions and recognized the international boundary, his successors, on the face of it, converted control of the Bakassi and outlying islands. Therefore, when the political atmosphere at home synergized with the strategic calculations of controlling the region, a forward revisionist policy was implemented by Nigeria that led to war in 1994 (Fombo, 2007). After the above illumination of how Cameroon supported the federalists cause, the obvious question begging for an answer is, Why did Cameroon so strongly side with federal Nigeria? The answer to this question is couched in the ethno-­political dynamics of Cameroon and its foreign policy orientation. In the first instance, the policy accorded well with internal politics. There is an inextricable nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy. Cameroon’s conservative leadership dominated by northern elements, similar in ethnic and social background to the dominant class in the federal government of Nigeria, found it more natural to support the federal side. Besides, Cameroon also had its own internal dissent in a more quiet civil conflict that pitched the Ahidjo-­Ied government on one side and the radical, leftist UPC on the other. Though the exiled elements of the UPC got their revolutionary literature through Nigeria into Cameroon, the former never harboured any of these elements, as did Ghana, Guinea and Egypt. Had Nigeria offered any tacit support to the UPC, there is no doubt Cameroon would have seen the Nigerian Civil War as an opportunity to repay Nigeria in kind. Crucially, too, it should be recalled that the Biafran cause particularly struck a sympathetic note in West Cameroon. Many in Western Cameroon, including the mainstream political leadership, desired some form of support



Analysing Cameroon’s Role in the Nigeria-­Biafra War (1967–1970) 111

for Biafra. This rather alarmed Ahidjo and played into his hands to assume complete dominance in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy of the Federal Republic on the issue. Ahidjo was not blind to the adage “Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones.” The Nigerian Consul’s memo in which he claimed Biafran emissary Louis Mbenefo promised to help West Cameroon free itself from Francophone domination evidently fell on receptive ears in Yaoundé (CNAB File). Ahidjo therefore saw it expedient to support the federalists to avert a scenario in the future where secessionist tendencies in Cameroon could be fuelled by active support from across the border. Nigeria also mounted great pressure on Cameroon to translate its diplomatic support into effective territorial policies of controlling the border to maintain the stranglehold of its blockade policy on Biafra. Without the unwavering cooperation of Cameroon, the policy would have been less effective. For instance, the severance of international trade links with Nigeria was actually done at the request of Alhaji Malabu, then Nigeria’s Ambassador to Cameroon (CNAB, File No. TC1966/19, 1967). As earlier pointed out, the Nigerian Consul went all out to convince the Ahidjo government that its domestic villains—the UPC—were accomplices to Biafra. As early as 1967, there were already claims that UPC rebels had enlisted in the Biafran army (CNAB, File No. TC1966119, 1967). The alleged association of Ndigbo and UPC elements, whether founded in truth or not, was bound to be of intense interest to the Yaoundé government. In any case, there was really nothing concrete to prove this link. It was most likely a ploy to put the Cameroon government on the back foot and secure its fullest sympathy in checking the Igbos in Cameroon. To further step up pressure, Nigeria requested Cameroon to ban planes to and from Biafra from overflying the latter’s territory. However, because of pressure from France as well, Cameroon maintained its facade of “neutrality,” stating that refusing over-­flight rights to these planes would be indirectly recognising Biafra as a separate state. This was the only serious request which the Nigeria government made and Cameroon resisted. Had Cameroon caved in to this demand, it would have not only dealt a grave blow to the relief flights that originated in Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, it would also have also hampered the importation of arms by Biafra that followed the same route. IMPACT OF CAMEROON’S ROLE ON THE WAR The impact of Cameroon’s involvement in the conflict cannot be overemphasised. Geography and history placed Cameroon in a unique position vis-­à-vis

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the belligerents in the civil war. Cameroon government’s dogged territorial policies were a net invaluable gain for the federalists’ cause, which greatly helped in delivering ultimate victory to the government of Nigeria. No other neighbouring state could afford this. Cameroon’s policies nipped in the bud potential reinforcements to Biafra from the ranks of the millions of avowed Biafran enthusiasts among Ndigbos in Cameroon. Movements of Igbos in Cameroon were closely monitored to foil any attempts at recruiting fighters for the Biafran army. By so doing, supporters of Biafra in Cameroon were hampered from offering more active support beyond the financial contributions they made. Efforts at delivering arms to besieged landlocked Biafra suffered greatly from the Cameroon government’s hostility. All other routes used in transporting arms to Biafra were more expensive and dented the latter’s capacity to wage war. Being the only country with a land boundary with both sides at the start of the war, it was possible for materials to be moved from Cameroon to supply either side in the war. However, it was Biafra that would have benefited more had Cameroon sided with it. After the fall of Port Harcourt in May 1968, which followed the earlier loss of Calabar to federal forces, Biafra was cut off from the rest of the world except by air. It was following this that Nigeria’s strategy of blockading Biafra became largely effective. Only Cameroon, and not Biafra’s other regional backers—Ivory Coast and Gabon—could have thwarted the strategy. Cameroon, rather, complemented the action of the Federal Government of Nigeria by closing its own border to trade and movement of people into Nigeria. Doubting its capacity to control the coastal approaches of Biafra, Cameroon even allowed the federal army and navy to operate from its territory to maintain the stranglehold. By so doing, Cameroon effectively became the strongest ally of the Federal Government of Nigeria, rendering assistance through its territorial policies that no other neighbour could. On the diplomatic scene, Cameroon’s backing was frontline, as already well documented. The Cameroon government’s unwavering support had the net effect of making the federalists less amenable to compromise. By so doing, the very essence of the OAU overtly preferred diplomatic initiative to bring the belligerents to a negotiated settlement, and that which Cameroon was charged with as a member of the Consultative Committee was negated. With such support, the federal side in the conflict became more confident that it would have its way militarily. Thus, by playing the incongruous role of an “aligned mediator,” Cameroon’s territorial policies as a neighbour to the warring parties contributed to subverting the OAU’s diplomatic initiative. While the Cameroon government in fact backed the federal cause, Biafra still gained from the sympathy of West Cameroonians and the Ndigbo in Cameroon. West Cameroonians made no secret of their sympathy for Biafra.



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They collaborated with resident Igbos to smuggle considerable amounts of essential items, including food and medicine, into Biafra in spite of the Cameroon government’s embargo and the patrols of Nigerian federal forces. But the cost of such items was hiked by the manoeuvres required to get them into Biafra. More importantly, Cameroonians contributed significant relief materials to refugees that entered the country. Relief such as temporary accommodations, medical care, food and clothing was provided through the churches, as well as arranging schools for children of school age (Memo no. PCO.371/8712). As shown in Table 7.1, Ibos in Cameroon contributed financially to the war effort of Biafra. Although the total sum might not have been very great, considering what it took to run the war, they provided a readily acceptable foreign currency to pay for imports, especially in the dire period immediately following the currency switch by the Federal Government of Nigeria. Frequent messages of support from Ndigbos in Cameroon to Biafra strengthened, at least psychologically, besieged Biafrans who suffered sustained bombardment by federal forces. Through their efforts, too, essential goods and medicines were smuggled into Biafra. Meanwhile, in Cameroon they were equally instrumental in providing relief to refugees. CONCLUSION In every conflict situation, neighbouring countries can play very crucial roles. These roles have always been performed in diverse ways, which are informed by the perception of the national interest by neighbours and not the dictates of the international community. Cameroon’s intervention was not simply an execution of the OAU agenda. Rather, the OAU position of backing the status quo in Nigeria fitted neatly into Cameroon’s perception of national interest. This explains why Cameroon so strongly sided with the federalists and literally went beyond the role ascribed to it as mediator. It was also in the interest of Cameroon to see Biafra fail so as not to be an example to its own minority Anglophone West Cameroon, especially in the early years of its independence. The role of Cameroon stands in contrast to that of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Angola, which intervened in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1999. While Cameroon was largely motivated by domestic concerns of forestalling future secession at home and articulated this in line with OAU position, the latter group of countries was inspired by a strong desire for economic plunder and ethnic geopolitics. Consequently, while the role of Cameroon engendered stability in Nigeria and remained unquestioned by the

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international community, the later performance of the neighbours of the DRC brought unsettling instability to the seemingly jinxed country and disapproval from the international community. In retrospect, the conduct of Cameroon during this conflict has been instructive in defining Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since then. While it has been shown that the policies of Cameroon during the Nigerian Civil War had a bearing on the subsequent conflict over the Bakassi in the 1990s, it also dictated the low-­key nature of the fighting. Most of the Nigerian political and military elite have not truly had grounds to be suspicious of Cameroon’s since then. NOTE 1.  This order specified that salt, tobacco, stockfish, flour, tinned foods, kerosene, and second-hand clothing should not be brought into his area of administration for fear that they would be shipped to Nigeria, specifically Biafra.

REFERENCES CNAB. (1965). “Minutes of the meeting held at the Senior Divisional Officer, Mamfe’s Office on 9th June, 1965 between Delegates from Nigeria and those from the Cameroon for Preliminary Discussions on the Danare (Nigeria)/Boudam (Cameroon) Boundary Dispute” File No PMO 197/TEMI. CNAB. (1967). File No. TC 1966/19. Memo No MCI. WC/S. 1/190 of October 25 from Director of Economic Services; West Cameroon, to the Federal Inspector of Administration, Buea. CNAB. (1967). Security report No S.11/55 of December 17 from Federal Security, Ndain to District headquarters Buea in File No. TC1966119 on a small reception by Mbaise, Afikpo and Umuahia elements in Mundemba, Ndian Division, to their brethren who came in from Nigeria as refugees from the war elicited a full security report. CNAB. (1968). Memo No. CBN.Ol/SEC of October 15, 1968 in file No. TC19661I9. CNAB. (1968). Security Report No S.SNOL.3/996 of November 4, from Chief of Service, Federal Security, Kumba to the state headquarters in Buea, CNAB File no TCI966114. CNAB. (1968). Report No. S. III ANOL. 1/1281 of November 25, 1968 from Chief of Federal Security, Barnenda to Chief of District, Federal Security, Buea (CNAB, File no TCI966/14). CNAB. (1969). File no TC 1966114, Security report no. S.1I84 of January 28, from Chief of Service, National Security Ndian to Chief of District, Federal Security, Buea.



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CNAB. (1967). File no TC1966119, Orders nos DNA.170/8 of 1967 by SDO Ndian; ABB.148/4 by the DO Bamusso. CNAB. (1968). File no TC 1966/19, Security report no HWC.539/S.1/2/ 451A of December 14, 1968 from PLACOM Atabong to COM POL, Buea. CNAB. (1967). File No. TC1966/19, Telegram no. 594/TO/IFA/COC/CB of December 27, 1967 citing another No. 1387/CABIDIPL from Federal Inspector of Administration, Buea informing prefects of Victoria, Kumba, Mamfe, Wum, Nkambe and Gwofon (through Bamenda) that “Honneur vous informer que’ ambassade du Nigeria announce fermeturefrontiere a tout traffic commercial lourd du 23 Janvier . . . .” CNAB. (1967). File No. TC1966119, Security report no, 199/BMM/KBA of July 14, 1967 from BMM Kumba to the Federal Inspector of Administration, Buea, claiming that two Cameroonians of Bamileke origin (names not given) had enrolled for the Biafran Army. Federal Republic of Cameroon. (1961). Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et Secretariat d’Etat a 1 ‘Information, La Position de la Republique du Cameroun a la suite du Plebiscite des 11 et 12 fevrier 1961 dans la partie septentrional du Territoire du Cameroun sous Administration du Royaume-­Uni de Grande-­Bretagne et d’lrlande du Nord. Paris: Edition Diloutremer. Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1968). Aide memoir from Ministry of External Relations Lagos dated 18 October 1968 to Cameroon’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs redirected to the Ministry of State for Territorial Administration. Fombo, G. F. (2007). “International politics of border conflicts: A study of the Nigeria-­ Cameroon dispute, 1960–2002.” PhD Thesis, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Memo no. ABBC.8/60 from DO Bamusso to Federal Inspector of Administration, Buea. Memo no. PCO.371/8712 from the Synod Clerk, Presbyterian Church in Cameroon to the SDO, Kumba dated 10 September1968 in CNAB, File no TC1966/9. Nweke, G. A. (1976). External Intervention in African Conflicts: France and French-­ speaking West Africa in the Nigerian Civil War, 1967–1970. Boston: African Studies Centre, Boston University. Prefectorial Order. (1967). Order No. DKA.28660/S.1/118 13/1967 of the Senior Divisional Officer Kumba, banned “exportation” of imported goods of all description from Kurnba Division or through Kumba to anywhere outside the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Report no. S.11Vol​.l/203 of March 3, 1968 from Chief of Service, Federal Security Bamenda to the Chief of District, Buea. Rubin, N. (1971). Cameroun: An African Federation. London: Paul Mall. Sone, H. P. (1967). Order no. DNA.170/8 of 1967, Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Ndian Division, outlawing the “importation of imported goods from other divisions of West Cameroon into Ndian Division.” St Jorre, J. (1972). The Nigerian Civil War. London: Hodder and Stockton. Strernlau, J. I. (1977). The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967– 1670. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Touval, S. (1972). The Boundary Politics of Independent Africa. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chapter Eight

Managing National Interests in Evolving Security Environment between Cameroon and Nigeria A Historical Review C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Greg Fah Fombo INTRODUCTION Nigeria and Cameroon are contiguous states in West and Central Africa belonging to two geopolitical and economic zones that possess enormous potential to strengthen cross-­regional integration in the two regions. Certain factors buttress this assertion. Firstly, their geographical location as adjoining countries in West and Central Africa position them as a vital link between member states of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Second, citizens of both countries have long established historical and cultural ties that predate colonialism and consequent demarcations into separate countries. Third, both are major actors in their respective regional economic groupings and are committed to integration in Africa and the pursuit of international peace and security. These truisms informed the assertion by former Nigerian Minister of External Affairs Major General Ike Nwachukwu that in facing the challenge of cooperation, we remain mindful that our two countries and people are not strangers to each other. Geography and history have thrust us together as neighbour with a common destiny . . . our two countries and people share common bonds of language, culture and tradition nurtured by centuries of continuous and meaningful interactions. The long-­standing links and interactions of our people continue to transcend the artificial barriers imposed by colonialism. (Nwachukwu, in Bonchuk, 2014)

However, despite the enormous potential to steer and maximize beneficial bilateral relations, diplomatic interactions between both countries have been 117

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characterized by recurrent security challenges that stir an atmosphere of mutual suspicions and sometimes hostility. The major areas of concerns have revolved around the problems associated with: poor demarcation of their shared border, including the Lake Chad area; land and maritime boundaries; Boko Haram; and the fight to safeguard specific interests such as energy resources, wildlife, forest and aquatic resources. In addition, the divergent interpretation of texts such as the 1975 Maroua Declaration and the Anglo-­ German Treaty of 1913; closure of the land border due to the outbreak of the Ebola virus; and the significant presence of Nigerians on Cameroonian territory (estimated at 4 million) have all contributed in raising policy and public sensitivities on bilateral relations between both countries (Republic of Cameroon, 2015). The implication is that neither country can be said to have effectively maximized its full potentials in terms of bilateralism. The trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations have been characterized by new dimensions of threats since the Green Tree Agreement was reached on 12 June 2006. Prominent among these include the scourge of terrorism, resurgence of separatist agitations and the Boko Haram challenge as major threats affecting bilateral relations between both countries. Others are flooding along the banks of the River Benue, sea piracy and sea robbery in the maritime domain and public health risks. The chapter also reviews the old conflicts, from poorly demarcated international boundaries to cross-­border violations and management of water resources. It argues that bilateral relations between both countries have improved from the recurrent disagreement over territorial boundaries to meaningful cooperation, not least in combatting the Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency in their respective northern zones. It also observes that High Level diplomacy and international adjudication have at intervals been deployed to avert a decline to war. It is also the position of the chapter to argue that beyond the mutual insecurities confronting both regional powers that could be better solved in coordinated policies, there exists more to gain from the increased rapprochement at national and regional levels. It argues that mutual cooperation leading to positive reciprocity in relations between Nigeria and Cameroon constitutes vital building blocks for trans-­ regional and continental unity in Africa. Data for the study were gathered through a secondary analysis and survey method and were qualitatively analysed and subsequently presented descriptively. In light of the above, this chapter reviews Cameroon-­Nigeria relations in a historical perspective and mirrors the doctrine of reciprocity and functionalism to its analysis. To this effect, it identifies and discusses the nature of shared security threats and the potential of both countries for reciprocal relations through bilateral and multilateral platforms in pursuit of mutual interests. Conscious efforts are made to appraise the functionality of multilateral



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institutions like the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the Gulf of Guinea Commission at addressing shared challenges affecting both countries. OVERVIEW OF CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS Several scholarly endeavours have been made to explain the dynamics of Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations by academics and policy makers from both countries. Duyile Abiodun focuses on Cameroon-­Nigeria boundary relations in the north of Nigeria between 1914 and 1994; that is, prior to the adjudication of the International Court of Justice which lasted between 1996 and 2002. He is of the view that Nigerian and Cameroonian communities along the border areas maintained relatively cordial relations and often performed some social functions together, as some of these communities shared cultural links in terms of language, descent and kingship systems. Abiodun therefore identified colonialism as responsible for the boundary crisis in northern parts of both countries. He specifically identified the Anglo-­French Declaration of 1931 as the critical legal instrument that defined the international boundary of communities along the border areas. It is his position that some of the pillars that defined the boundaries were either removed or shifted by visiting Cameroonian officials into Nigerian territory to distort the boundaries and gain undue advantages (Abiodun, 2014). This trend created room for Cameroonians nationals to farm within Nigerian territories, and this contributed to the border tensions between both countries. Rebecca K. LeFebvre focuses on the history of the Bakassi Peninsula conflict and the impact of the negotiated settlement on the people of Nigeria and Cameroon. She acknowledges the fact that the struggle for the Bakassi Peninsula lasted for almost half a century before the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and subsequent implementation through the Greentree Agreement (GTA) leading to the peaceful transfer of the territory by Nigeria to Cameroon in 2008. Although LeFebvre describes the Bakassi episode as success at a negotiated settlement to territorial disputes, she noted that the locals in the peninsula, who were mostly Nigerians, remained unhappy with the settlement. This stimulated tensions and attempted secession from which she generated her first research question: Did the Bakassi Peninsula dispute resolution neglect the identity-­based aspects of the situation leaving an underlying conflict unresolved (Le Febvre, 2014)? In her findings, she observed that whereas there were expressions of unfulfilled identity needs and an unresolved identity-­conflict potential on the part of Nigerians towards the ICJ verdict and the implementation of the GTA, Cameroonians demonstrated a new identity fulfilment over the Bakassi transfer, and the official Cameroon

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response was a conscious move to firm up ownership through populating the territory with Cameroonian citizens, culture, and connectivity to the rest of the country. The neglect which Cameroon is determined to correct is what, as Fombo pointed out, significantly contributed to the initial flux. For his part, Mark Bolak Funteh argues that the geographical and historical proximity between Nigerian and Cameroon and the resultant interdependence between them has been beneficial. In his view, Nigeria and Cameroon relied on shared propinquity to create opportunities that benefited them in the economic, social and political domains. He however noted that the ethnic character of people along border areas and the stakes involved in controlling the natural resources of their border areas intermittently led to conflicts and hostilities as typified in the Bakassi territorial dispute, pirate actions and the transnational insecurity orchestrated by Boko Haram, thus placing relations between both countries on a paradox (Funteh, 2015). Nigeria and Cameroon are developing countries whose economies are significantly based on the export of essentially primary products. The link between Nigeria and Cameroon dates back to their colonial history. Anglophone Cameroon was administered by Britain as part of Nigeria through the mandate system for the defunct League of Nations and later as a trust territory of the United Nations from 1945. In 1961, the United Nations organized a referendum to decide the future of Cameroon. The outcome of the 1961 referendum was the merger of British Northern Cameroons with Nigeria and British Southern Cameroons as part of Republic of Cameroon (Asobie, 2005). Bonchuk analysed the notion of the cross-­border area and its relevance to development and integration in Cameroon-­Nigeria border areas. For him, international boundaries between both countries separated ethnic groups and natural features such as rivers and highlands. He traced the origin of the underdeveloped realities of the border areas to colonial times and maintained that the governments of both countries have continued to neglect the development of such peripheral locations (Bonchuk, 2014). He acknowledged the relevance of civil society groups to cross-­border integration and subsequently recommended the establishment of shared administrative institutions that will provide opportunities for dialogue among civil societies in Cameroon and Nigeria to facilitate cross-­border integration. It is now imperative to give a brief historical overview of the trend in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since their attainment of political independence from their erstwhile colonial overlords. Following the attainment of independence in 1960, Nigeria established diplomatic relations with Cameroon and presently has a High Commission in Yaoundé and two consulates—in Buea (Anglophone) and Douala (Francophone). This is replicated in Nigeria with the existence of the Cameroon High



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Commission in Abuja and two consulates, in Lagos and Calabar. There exist indications that Nigeria’s consulate in Buea could be closed down as part of economic measures of the present administration of President Muhammadu Buhari aimed at reducing the cost of running foreign missions. Meanwhile, plans have been concluded by Nigeria to open a consulate in Garoua to ease attending to issues in the northern regions of Cameroon, while Cameroon plans to reciprocate with a consulate in Maiduguri for a similar reason. Proposed consulates in Garoua (Cameroon) and Maiduguri (Nigeria) are planned to come into operation when the insecurity associated with Boko Haram is assessed to have been significantly brought under control. The Nigerian High Commissioner in Yaoundé heads the Nigerian mission in Cameroon, while the two consulates are headed by a Consul General each. It is worthwhile to note that these diplomatic missions and their consulates have been effectively deployed by both countries in the management of their bilateral concerns. The importance of Cameroon to Nigeria is predicated on the fact that first, Cameroon shares geographical boundaries along land and sea borders with Nigeria. This brings her directly within the first circle in Nigeria’s concentric circle doctrine. Under the concentric circle doctrine, Nigeria’s foreign policy orientation is characterized by sphere of interest in foreign policy direction. The first circle is her immediate neighbour. The second circle is the West African region, while the third circle is Africa and the wider world. Second, over four million Nigerian nationals live and work in Cameroon and the welfare of these Nigerians remains crucial to Nigeria’s national interest in line with the Doctrine of Citizens Diplomacy. Citizens Diplomacy is a new orientation in the conduct of Nigeria’s foreign policy, which attaches a high premium on the welfare of Nigerian nationals in the conduct of interstate relations. This foreign policy orientation is popularized by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ojo Maduekwe. It is also noteworthy to observe that despite the developing nature of their economies, there still exist enormous trading activities between citizens of both countries which affect the welfare of their nationals. It is in the respective national interests of both countries to engage foreign policy measures that strengthen beneficial reciprocity. The prime interest areas for Nigeria and by extension Cameroon include: a.  The defence of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; b.  The creation of the necessary political and economic conditions in Africa and the rest of the world which will facilitate the defence of the independence and territorial integrity of all African countries while at the same time fostering national self-­reliance and rapid economic development; and

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c.  The defence and promotion of world peace (Federal Ministry of Information, 1978). It is for the realization of their inherent potential and the pursuit of the above prime interests that the leadership of Nigeria and Cameroon have embarked on high-­level exchange visits and deliberations that have resulted in the signing of several agreements and protocols as seen on the checklist below: a.  The Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation of 6 February 1963. b.  The Memorandum of Understanding on the control of movement of persons and goods of 6 February 1963. c.  The Trade Agreement of 6 February 1963 (revised on 13 January 1982 and 11 April 2014 in Yaoundé). d.  The cultural, social and technical agreement of 22 March 1972. e.  The Agreement on Police Cooperation of 27 March 1972. f.  Mutual Cooperation Agreement of 27 March 1972. g.  Air services Agreement of 19 May 1978. h.  The Memorandum of Understanding on the transnational highway project to facilitate transportation between Cameroon and Nigeria on 29 March 2006 in Yaoundé. i.  The Green Tree Agreement of 12 June 2006. j.  The Cameroon-­Nigeria electrical interconnection Agreement, signed on 18 February 2011 in Yaoundé. k.  Cooperation Agreement in the field of Sports and Physical Education, signed on 18 February 2011 in Yaoundé. l.  Agreement Establishing the Cameroon-­Nigeria Border Security Committee, signed on 28 February 2012 in Abuja. m.  Cooperation Agreement in the fields of science and technology, signed on 11 April 2014 in Yaoundé. n.  Memorandum of Understanding relating to the implementation of the programme on cooperation and cultural exchanges, signed on 11 April 2014. o.  Agreement on Youth Development, signed on 11 April 2014 in Yaoundé (Republic of Cameroon, 2015). Other bilateral agreements between Nigeria and Cameroon that are not reflected above include the Schedule to Extradition Treaty, the Protocol on the Right of Establishment, Protocol on Palm Groove, Agreement on Telecommunication and the Agreement on Exchange of Money Order. These additional agreements were adopted in 1965. Following the visit of President Biya to Nigeria in May 2016, Nigeria and Cameroon signed another agreement on trade cooperation and conservation of the River Benue. It is, however,



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pertinent to note that despite these agreements, relations between both countries have been characterized by mutual suspicions and tensions. The (outline of) contending issues between both countries are discussed below. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF CONTENDING ISSUES IN CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS Diplomatic relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have been characterized by several contending issues, which include border demarcation, maritime threats, public health control, flooding and terrorism and population displacements. These are discussed below. Border Demarcation Between 1961 and 2002, contentions over territorial boundaries featured prominently in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. In his study “Imperial Antecedent of Cameroon-­ Nigeria Border Dispute,” Greg Fombo categorized the border areas between Nigeria and Cameroon as four distinct physical and ecological sectors. a.  The northernmost part characterized by lacustrine and land boundaries which traverse Lake Chad and neighbouring plains at an average altitude of about 300 metres above sea level. b.  Land boundaries characterized by a continuous chain of mountains and valleys, only broken by the Benue Valley near Yola. This area provides the headwaters for many rivers that drain into the Benue and Cross River basins. The Mambila Plateau and Obudu mountain ranges are located in this area. c.  Coastal region that extends to the Bakassi Peninsula and adjoining islands. This area encompasses the Akpayafe, the Rio Del Rey and Ndian River to the east; while Calabar and Cross River adjoin it in the west. d.  Maritime zone characterized by a broken and adjacent coast, which ends at a tri-­point with Equatorial Guinea (Fombo 2008). In the Lake Chad area, Fombo noted that farmers, fishermen and herdsmen from Nigeria and Cameroon are drawn across the international boundaries of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger by the quest for pasture and dwindling water resources due to seasonal variation of rainfall within the shared basin region. Difficulties experienced by nationals in these border areas are exacerbated by the fact that erstwhile colonial authorities did not clearly demarcate

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international boundaries and also partly because the nationals in the border areas have established historical and cultural ties with their kith and kin across international borders that predate colonialism and political independence. Insecurities along border areas are compounded by alleged corruption of border officials, where nationals of both countries and other travellers face extortion along the Cameroon-­Nigeria borders. Incidents of misconduct by border control officials contribute to heighten the vulnerability of the borders to the activities and movement of criminals, with serious implication for the national security of both countries. Efforts at resolving the contentious border issues between Nigeria and Cameroon as inherited at independence are outlined below: a.  Conveyance of the Joint Boundary Commission in Yaoundé (Cameroon) between 12 and 14 August 1970 to find a solution to the border misunderstandings. b.  Meeting of General Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria and President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon (the Heads of State of both countries) in April 1971 at Yaoundé to examine the submissions of the Joint Boundary Commission. This is referred to as the Yaoundé I Accord c.  Another meeting of the Joint Boundary Commission took place in Lagos between 14 and 21 June 1971. The agreement reached on the maritime boundary of both countries during the talks came to be known as the Ngoh/Coker line after the respective leaders of the Cameroonian and Nigerian delegation to the meeting. This is referred to as the Yaoundé II Accord. d.  There was also the Kano Declaration of 1 September 1974, which delimited a 4-kilometre buffer corridor comprising two kilometres on either side of the line joining Fairway landing bouy to bouys no. 1, 2, and 3 of the Calabar Channel. e.  Meeting of President Ahmadou Ahidjo and General Yakubu Gowon between 30 May 3and 1 June 1975 at Maroua in Cameroon, which extended the course of the boundary from Point 12 to Point G (Okereke, 2009). Notwithstanding the above diplomatic initiatives, armed skirmishes by security agencies of both countries led to the killing of five Nigerian military personnel by Cameroon gendarmes in disputed waters off Ikang District of Cross River State on 16 May 1981. Other confrontations between Nigerian and Cameroonian security agencies along contentious border areas include the short-­lived occupation of 16 border villages in Borno State by Cameroon gendarmes in May 1987 and the abduction of four Nigerian customs officials



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on routine border patrol duties by elements of Cameroon gendarmes in October 1989 (Adetula, 2008). Further hostilities by Cameroonian gendarmes and tax officials against Nigerian nationals, especially fishermen at Bakassi, in December 1993 led to the deployment of Nigerian troops to the peninsula, leading to renewed tensions and escalations on 18 February 1994. It is from this backdrop that the International Court of Justice adjudication and subsequent judgement on the Case of Land and Maritime dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon can be appreciated (International Court of Justice, 2002). The ICJ judgement formed the basis of the Green Tree Agreement, which set out modalities for the implementation of the ICJ verdict. Maritime Domain Awareness The geographical complexities of the border between Nigeria and Cameroon are more pronounced along the coastal and shared maritime domain, which is characterized by narrow adjoining creeks around the Bakassi Peninsula. The maritime challenges between both countries include questions of cabotage, robbery and piracy. It is pertinent to note that the right of littoral states to exclusive navigation and trade along its coastal areas (cabotage) guarantees it the power to exclude foreign nationals and vessels from fishing in its territorial waters. Articles 1 and 2 of the Geneva Convention on the Law of the Territorial Sea (1958) and Article 2 of the United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982) safeguard the sovereignty of a state over its territorial sea, airspace, seabirds and subsoil thereof (UNCLOS, 1982). As such, littoral states can exercise policing functions over their Exclusive Economic Zone to safeguard custom duties and the secrecy of its coastal fortifications (Fombo, 2011). It is important to note that the challenge of implementing cabotage powers has become more delicate since the ICJ verdict of 2002. For instance, naval ships leaving Calabar estuaries have to sail into Cameroonian waters, as Bakassi Peninsula has now been handed over to Cameroon in line with the ICJ verdict and the outcome of Green Tree Agreement. Both countries, however, signed an agreement in August 2008 which permits the Nigerian Navy to conduct naval exercises along the creeks of Bakassi Peninsula without violating Cameroon’s sovereignty. In addition to the challenges associated with the cabotage regime, the Cameroon-­Nigeria maritime domain is characterized by sea piracy and sea robbery, which extend to the larger Gulf of Guinea waters. The annual cost of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is estimated at $565 million to $2 billion (Madsen, 2015). In 2013, about 1,871 seafarers were attacked by pirates in the Gulf of Guinea, with about 279 victims taken hostage. Increased incidents of piracy in the waters between Nigeria and Cameroon could be a consequence of the

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withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Bakassi, as stipulated in the Green Tree Agreement, without commensurate replacement by Cameroon. The checklist of incidents of sea piracy along the Cameroon-­Nigeria waterways includes: a.  Attacks on Cameroon gendarmes between November 2007 and June 2008. b.  Attack on the Fako, a ship travelling from Calabar to Limbe on Friday, 20 December 2007. c.  Attack on the Achouka, a ship travelling from Tiko to Calabar in September 2008. d.  Recurrent attacks on commuter speedboats along the creeks of Bakassi Peninsula. e.  Gun running and illegal traffic in persons and piracy through the porous creeks, especially between Ikang Landing Jetty in Nigeria and EkondoTiti in Cameroon. f.  High-­profile bank robberies in Limbe (Cameroon) using speedboats by about 50 robbers operating along the porous creeks in October 2008. g.  Attack and seizure of the Bourbon Sagitta, owned by the French maritime services company Bourbon in October 2008 in Cameroonian waters on the coast between Nigeria and Cameroon. h.  Attack on speedboats along the creek on 25 December 2008. i.  Alleged involvement of Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND) and Bakassi freedom fighters in the February 2009 attack on the Presidential Palace in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. Note that the Bakassi Freedom Fighters emerged from the resentment of aggrieved indigene of Bakassi Peninsula and their sympathisers with the outcome of the ICJ verdict and subsequent implementation of the GTA in the previously disputed peninsula on Nigeria’s maritime border with Cameroon. The allegation was made by Equatorial Guinea officials on State Radio. j.  Kidnaping of five Chinese fishermen along the creeks of Bakassi on 7 July 2009 (Okereke, 2010). Ecological Threats and Displacements The Lagdo Dam in northern Cameroon has also featured in security challenges between Nigeria and Cameroon. The dam, which is 308 metres long, 40 metres in height and 9 metres, thick was constructed by the China International Water and Electric Corporation (CWE) between 1977 and 1982 to aid irrigation and electricity generation. It is located about 50 kilometres south of Garoua, capital of North region (Jansson, 2009). Following a 2007 agreement with the Nigerian government, Cameroon authorities approved the delivery of 60MW (megawatts) of electricity from the Lagdo Dam to Adamawa State



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in Nigeria. While this could rightly be considered as one of the positive gains and confidence-­building measures from the Green Tree Agreement of June 2006, the management of the Lagdo Dam has, however, been associated with humanitarian emergencies in several parts of Nigeria. In 2007, parts of Adamawa state were devastated by flooding with about 23 persons killed following the opening of the Lagdo Dam release gates to ease water pressure. (International Rivers, 2010). The vast Benue Valley in Nigeria, including parts of Adamawa state, Lokoja in Kogi state, up to Omoku in Rivers state of Nigeria also experienced severe flooding arising from the release of water from the dam in 2012. The accompanying humanitarian disaster included the death of over 10 persons, submerging of more than 10,000 homes for more than two weeks in September 2012 and flooding of over 10,000 hectares of farmland and properties, amounting to several million naira. The flooding further exposed the public to several creeping creatures including crocodiles whose natural habitats were disrupted. The devastating consequences of the flooding raised public uproar in Nigeria against Cameroon and the management of the Lagdo Dam, and the problem became a matter of priority for the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission. Agreement was reached with the Cameroon authorities in 2013 to give early warning signals to Nigeria prior to releasing water from the dam to enable various stakeholders make adequate preparations against flooding. It was on the basis of this understanding that the Cameroon authorities in Garoua notified Nigeria through the High Commission in Abuja in June 2015 of possible flooding that could accompany the planned routine release of excess water from the Lagdo Dam between June and November 2015. Then-­Director General of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Alhaji Muhammad Sani Sidi, notified state governments and at-­risk communities along the River Benue from Garoua up to the Nigerian side to be alert and be ready for evacuation in case of possible flooding (NEMA, 2015). Despite the 2013 agreement about early warning, the Cameroon authorities also released water from the Lagdo Dam in October 2019 without alerting the Nigerian authorities. The consequence was the rise in the water levels above the 2012 level, as revealed by the Director-­General of Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency (NIHSA), Engr Clement Nze as follows: As of today, 04-11-2019, the flood level on River Benue measured at Makurdi is 11.28m, against a much lower 9.01 on 4-11-2012 and the corresponding levels downstream the confluence of the two rivers in Lokoja are as follows: 10:97m for 4-11-2019 and 8.04 for 4-11-2012. The year 2012 is taken as the reference year considering the magnitude of that year. As could be seen from the above figure, the flood level in each hydrological station as at today is far above the corresponding value in 2012. (Ewepu, 2019)

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At-­risk communities in Adamawa, Benue, Edo, Kogi and Taraba states experienced flooding as a result of the release of water while the NIHSA raised alarms with the governments of Anambra, Rivers and Bayelsa states of probable flooding arising from the action (Ewepu, 2019). However, the periodic release of water from the Lagdo Dam is necessary when the water level rises above the safety limit. This is to prevent excess water pressure from causing the sudden collapse of the dam, which comes with an accompanying uncontrollable flooding disaster. Cameroon’s Lake Nyos constitutes another ecological threat to Nigeria as it flows into the tributaries from where the Katsina-­Ala River takes it source. It is a volcanic ridge located on the Cameroon Mountains at an elevation adjoining the Benue and Katsina-­Ala plains in Nigeria and runs for about 1,500 kilometres from Cameroon’s southwest to the northern parts of both countries. Lake Nyos is associated with the risk of volcanic eruption and could again release toxic gases over a wider area than it did in 1986, thereby endangering the well-­being of Nigerians living in Benue-­Katsina-­Ala plains, who remain at risk (Odiogor, 2020). Scourge of Terrorism Boko Haram started in Nigeria around 2002 as a group seeking religious purity under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf. The group, which engaged in proselytization and radicalisation of vulnerable persons across northern Nigeria at inception, later resorted to violent extremism and acts of terrorism against the Nigerian state, leading to confrontation between Nigerian security agencies and Boko Haram fighters. Following the emergence of Abubakar Shekau as its leader after Yusuf’s death in July 2009, Boko Haram was transformed into a globally known terrorist group, such that in June the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee approved the inclusion of Boko Haram and its leader, Abubakar Shekau, on its list of entities and individuals targeted for financial sanctions (UNSC, 2014). This listing prohibits the provision of financial support to the sect and subjects to sanctions any individual or entities providing such support. It was on the basis of Boko Haram activities that Nigeria was ranked fourth in the Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). The intensification of the Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency (CT-­ COIN) offensives against the group by Nigeria forced them to focus activities in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in northeast Nigeria, which share borders with Cameroon. The group later resorted to crossing the boundary into sanctuaries in sparsely populated parts of northern Cameroon after attacks



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or while fleeing from the Nigerian military, and from there regrouping and unleashing further audacious attacks on the Nigerian state and its assets. Such terrorist attacks on Nigeria by Boko Haram coordinated from borderlands between Cameroon, Chad and Niger have contributed to heighten insecurity along border areas between both countries. It was on this basis that Nigeria closed its northern border with Cameroon in February 2014 to forestall the movement of Boko Haram members, who use the area as a launch pad for attacks. Areas affected by the border closure extend from northern Borno State, by Lake Chad, to the southern end of Adamawa State (Al Jazeera, 2014). The exportation of Boko Haram violence beyond Nigeria’s frontiers to the wider Lake Chad Basin area since January 2013 has contributed to increased sensitivity between Nigeria and Cameroon. Prior to the abduction of the Moulin-­Fournier family around Waza National Park in the Far North region of Cameroon by the Ansaru, a splinter cell of Boko Haram, and the killing of 20 gendarmes in the Bakassi area in November 2007 by suspected armed militants wearing uniforms similar to the Nigerian army’s, the scourge of terrorism had largely remained alien to Cameroon. Besides the initial cross-­border assaults of Boko Haram from Nigeria to Cameroon, the group also established an active presence in Cameroon, where it is engaged in recruitment and indoctrination of youths and under-­ age persons, some of whom have been used to carry out suicide bombings on Cameroon society. Since January 2016, about 32 persons were killed when Boko Haram attacked markets in Bodo village, in Cameroon’s Far North near the border with Nigeria. This led to the closure of the market attended by foreigners from Niger, Nigeria and Chad (Laccino, 2016). It is these activities of Boko Haram that made Cameroon a country of concern for terrorism analysis. It is important to note here that cross-­border movement of violent extremists between Nigeria and Cameroon has a long history. Mohammed Marwa, slain leader of the Maitasine religious group that unleashed extreme violence on the inhabitants of Kano, Yola and Gombe in 1980, 1984 and 1985, respectively, was a migrant from Cameroon. A report by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, noted that mercenaries from Central African countries like Cameroon and Chad have taken active parts in several ethno-­ religious conflicts in Nigeria, especially in Taraba and other states in northern Nigeria (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2003). Closely associated with the Boko Haram assaults is the challenge of forced migrations, which has resulted in thousands of refugees and internally displaced persons. In November 2014, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) declared that about, 13,000 Nigerians fled from the northeast states of Adamawa and Borno to Guider, Gashiga, Bourha, Mogode

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and Boukouda in northern Cameroon following Boko Haram attacks on Mubi in late October 2014. Prior to the Mubi attacks, an estimated 43,000 Nigerian refugees were already in Cameroon, of which 17, 000 were at the Minawao refugee camp (UNHCR, 2014). Within Nigeria, the UNHCR also estimates that deadly and audacious attacks executed by Boko Haram have led to the displacement of 2.2 million people since 2013 (UNHCR, 2016). Meanwhile, over 100,000 Nigerians have fled to Niger since 2013 to escape Boko Haram attacks, while about 2,700 Nigerian refugees are in Chad. The management of Nigerian refugees in Cameroon has become a critical issue between both countries. The UNHCR estimated that about 15,000 to 17,000 Nigerians who fled to Cameroon were not officially registered as refugees (UNHCR, 2015). With the escalation of Boko Haram aggression in Cameroon from July 2015, Cameroonian authorities in Yaoundé approved the forceful expulsion of over 2,500 Nigerians in Kouserri, Far North Cameroon. This response irked domestic public opinion in Nigeria, as the measure was considered cruel. Cameroon authorities, however, described the expulsion as a counterterrorism measure while insisting that those expelled were neither registered as refugees nor persons with requisite permits to reside and work in Cameroon (Imogen, 2015). It is remarkable to note that some registered Nigerians refugees in Cameroon objected to the acceptance of new arrivals to their refugee camps on the grounds that the new arrivals could be Boko Haram members or sympathisers, as that could be the only reason for their survival in Boko Haram–held territories in northeast Nigeria long after other inhabitants had fled. Ebola Disease Challenge Following the outbreak of Ebola viral disease (EVD) in West Africa and, specifically, the spread of the disease to Nigeria, the government of Cameroon responded with the closure her air, land and sea borders with Nigeria on 14 August 2014. Announcing the closure of borders, then-­Minister of Communication in Cameroon Issa Tchiroma Bakary stated that “all borders (land, sea and air) between Camerron and Nigeria are closed. Our thinking is that it is better to act preventive rather than have to heal later those who may fall ill” (Business Standard, 2014). Consistent with this directive, Cameroon barred international flights between Cameroon and Nigeria. International airlines were further directed not to carry passengers from Nigeria whose final destination was Cameroon. Author C. Nna-Emeka Okereke personally experienced the effect of border closure between Nigeria and Cameroon over EVD, as he found it difficult to book a flight to Cameroon to attend a seminar organized by the Lake Chad Basin Commission between 14 and 18 October, 2014.



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Spokesman of the Cameroon Foreign Ministry, Chiroumma Boukkari, rationalized the border closure, stating: The decision on border closure and suspension of all flights to and from Nigeria is to protect the lives of Cameroonian citizens living within and outside from contracting Ebola, as Nigeria, our main trading partner in Africa had been facing since July 20, 2014 when Patrick Sawyer sneaked into the country aboard a flight with the deadly virus. . . . The border closures with our main trading partner will be lifted as soon as Nigeria contains the spread of the deadly viral disease. We also urge all border security agencies of the two countries to be vigilant by complying with this border closures made yesterday (Saturday) by the foreign office. (Godwin, 2014)

The sudden closure of Cameroon’s borders with Nigeria had severe effects on traders plying between both countries, as many were caught up on the spot while on a business trip, thereby leading to calls for the opening of a humanitarian corridor to allow controlled cross-­border movement. In Gamboru, Borno State, Nigeria, dozens of trucks loaded with goods belonging to Cameroonian and Chadian business groups were trapped at Ngala and Dikwa (Idris, 2014). This compounded the difficulties of residents of northern Borno State who were concurrently experiencing Boko Haram attacks. In a related development, the cost of various seafood such as crayfish, prawns, fish and Afang leaf, which are imported from Idenau Beach in Cameroon’s southwest region, escalated as traders at Oron Beach in Akwa Ibom state, Nigeria, complained that these commodities no longer came in through the sea route to meet the demand in Nigeria as a result of the border closure.2 Cameroon’s Information Minister, Issa Tchiroma, also acknowledged that while the closure of borders had adverse economic effects on Cameroon, it did not undermine the warm diplomatic relations between both countries (Clotey, n.d.). Cameroon reopened her borders with Nigeria on 20 October 2014 following the World Health Organization (WHO) report that declared Nigeria free from the EVD. It is on note that the sudden outbreak of the EVD in West Africa and its controlled spread to other continents led to several deaths, so that the WHO declared it a global health emergency. Between December 2013 and August 2014, when Cameroon closed her borders with Nigeria, the WHO reported that West Africa had recorded the infection of about 2,599 people in Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria of which 1,422 died, and between August and 1 October 2014, the number of infected people tripled to about 6,553 (Anioke, 2016). By February 2015, the number of persons that contacted the EVD in West Africa increased to 22,859, with a recorded death toll of 9,162 (ibid.). The spread of the EVD was facilitated by the absence of a cure and a deficiency of public health infrastructure in the countries affected.

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The above narratives reveal that Cameroon-­Nigeria relations require cautious management and strategic policy directions to enhance the capability of both countries to navigate through the intermittent security turbulence and maximize the advantages of geographical contiguity. This premise forms the basis for exploring mechanisms to strengthen their mutual interests. STRENGTHENING CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS THROUGH FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION The diplomatic realities between Nigeria and Cameroon have brought to the fore the imperative of functional cooperation in interstate relations as a recipe for tackling social, economic and political realities that generate and sustain diplomatic rifts between states in the international arena (Haas, 1958). With regard to Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, both countries have exploited bilateral and multilateral levels of interaction to address their shared security challenges. These engagements have been largely through the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission. The utility of high-­level meetings and exchange visits and effective use of diplomatic missions in both countries has been put to the fore in promoting their bilateral relations. Given their centrality, effort is made here to review these mechanisms accordingly. Lake Chad Basin Commission The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) comprises Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Niger, Nigeria and Libya. Its primary mandate is to ensure equitable and sustainable management of Lake Chad while preserving the ecosystem and promoting sub-­regional integration, peace and security in the basin. (LCBC, n.d.) The LCBC was established on 22 May 1964 following the signing of the Fort Lamy (now N’Djamena) Convention by Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, which share access to Lake Chad. CAR and Libya joined in 1996 and 1998, respectively, while the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt and Sudan were admitted and placed on observer status in the year 2000 pending their ratification of the Fort Lamy Convention. The LCBC area is not new to armed conflicts and environmental stress. However, since the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in general and Libya in particular, there has been an enormous influx of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), which extremist groups like Boko Haram exploited to launch audacious attacks beyond Nigeria to the larger Lake Chad area especially in Cameroon, Chad and Niger.



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Beginning from Nigeria, Boko Haram extended its assaults first to neighbouring Cameroon. Cameroon’s Far North region, with headquarters in Maroua, has since July 2015 experienced over 10 different incidents of suicide bombings. It further launched cross-­border attacks in Niamey and Bosso, the Diffa region of Niger Republic, between 2015 and 2016 while also raiding a Chadian military camp near the village of Ngouboua and launching bomb attacks in Ndjamena. President Idris Derby of Chad captured the Boko Haram threat, when at the 14th Ordinary Summit of the LCBC Heads of State and Government held at Ndjamena in April 2012, he observed, “Our basin is exposed to insecurity because of Boko Haram’s permanent threat. If we don’t eradicate them, we won’t be capable of saving our Lake Chad. The time has come to act and we must decide today.”1 As a follow-­up to the 14th Summit of the LCBC countries, security meetings involving the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states were held in Niamey in May 2012. This security meeting resolved to upgrade the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) on border security involving Chad, Niger and Nigeria with a counterterrorism mandate as a response to the scourge of terrorism and related insecurities in the Lake Chad Basin area. The structure and mandate of the MJTF was expanded to include Cameroon and the Central African Republic (Omaki, 2014). Libya was excused from participating in the MJTF because of its daunting security challenges. At the summit level, the Heads of States and Governments of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, France, Niger and Nigeria met with representatives of the European Union, United Kingdom and United States in Paris, France, on 17 May 2014 to deliberate on security in Nigeria. This summit strengthened efforts at international mobilization to combat Boko Haram activities in Nigeria. In the bid to strengthen international responses against Boko Haram, the Paris summit adopted bilateral and multilateral measures. The measures initiated and sustained at the bilateral levels by LCBC members are: a.  Implement coordinated patrols with the aim of combating Boko Haram and locating the schoolgirls abducted at Chibok in northeast Nigeria. b.  Establish a system to pool intelligence in order to support this operation. c.  Establish mechanisms for information exchange on trafficking of weapons and bolster measures to secure weapons stockpiles. d.  Establish mechanism for border surveillance (LCBC Office of Military Adviser, 2014). Resolutions reached at the Paris summit further emphasized the importance of regional cooperation by Nigeria and her neighbours to build analysis and

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response capabilities that will contribute to enhancing the security of all population and the rule of law in the areas threatened by Boko Haram. This informed the decision of the summit to establish an intelligence-­pooling unit and also draw up and implement a sub-­regional counterterrorism strategy in the framework of the LCBC. The United States, United Kingdom, France and the European Union agreed to coordinate their support for these regional measures through technical expertise, training programmes and support for border-­area management programmes (LCBC Office of Military Adviser, 2014). In addition, participants pledged their commitment to accelerating the implementation of international sanctions against Boko Haram, Ansaru and their leadership at the United Nations framework, and this was achieved in June 2014 with the inclusion of Abubakar Shekau and Boko Haram on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Al-Qaeda Sanction List. As a follow-­up to the Paris summit, a ministerial-­level meeting chaired by the United Kingdom was held in London on 12 June 2014 to discuss the Boko Haram threat in Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin. This meeting attracted participation of the Foreign Ministers of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, including the representatives of Benin. Others in attendance included representatives of the African Union, European Union, United Nations, France, United States and Canada. The ministerial follow-­up meeting reaffirmed their strong and united commitment to fighting terrorism and insecurity in the region and also condemned the series of atrocities perpetrated by Boko Haram and other groups. In addition, they reaffirmed commitments to resolutions adopted at the Paris summit and progress made since then, especially the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit (RIFU) signed in Yaoundé, Cameroon on 9 June, 2014. Other resolutions of the London Ministerial follow-­up meeting are: a.  Each member state of the LCBC to contribute a battalion to the Multinational Joint Task Force and support its headquarters through a military adviser. b.  Work with the UNSC to include the Ansaru and leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau to the Al Qaeda Sanctions list. c.  Commitment to continue the close cooperation between countries of the region and the international partners represented at the meeting in the search for the abducted girls and the fight against Boko Haram and other groups. d.  Ensure quick operationalization of the new RIFU arising from the MoU of 9 June 2014. e.  Offer direct tactical training and advice to Nigerian and regional forces engaged in the fight against Boko Haram and other terrorist groups.



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f.  Continue regular dialogue on a political level to ensure that operational agreements are followed up and remain united in efforts to end terrorism and bring security to the inhabitants of the region. g.  Welcomed the work of United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) including the development of a UN integrated support package to assist Nigeria’s efforts against Boko Haram, the African Union Strategy for the Sahel, including the Nouakchott process on regional security, the Global Counter Terrorism Forum and other regional initiatives on border security and border management (LCBC Office of Military Adviser, 2014). Besides the Paris summit and London ministerial follow-­up meetings held in May and June 2014, the 3rd Meeting of Ministers of Defence, Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) and Chiefs of Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) from member states of the LCBC and the Republic of Benin was held from 22 to 23 July 2014 at Niamey in the Republic of Niger. The Niamey meeting, among other things, tasked the Executive Secretariat of the LCBC with liaising with member countries to constitute a dedicated team, who will identify the means to be implemented and design a regional strategy to combat terrorism under the umbrella of the LCBC, as decided at the Paris summit of 17 May 2014. Another meeting of the Ministers of Defence, CCDS and CSIS was held at Niamey on 6 October 2014 under the chairmanship of Major General Karidio Mahamadou, Chief of Defence Staff of Niger Republic, which appraised the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin and assessed the implementation of measures adopted during the third meeting held in July 2014. The Executive Secretariat of the LCBC was tasked to call on member states to strengthen cooperation and judicial collaboration in the fight against terrorism and organized crimes in the sub-­region. In the aftermath of these series of meetings, the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the LCBC member countries and the Republic of Benin was held in Niamey on 7 October 2014 under the chairmanship of President Issoufou Mahamadou of Niger and attended by Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. The deliberations focused on “An Assessment of the security situation and immediate common strategy in the fight against terrorism caused by Boko Haram group in the region.” This Extraordinary Summit noted with deep regret, the persistence of horrible atrocities committed by the terrorist group Boko Haram against the population and security forces in Nigeria and other neighbouring countries and resolved to fight Boko Haram in synergy throughout the region. Other decisions reached at Niamey summit include:

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a.  Expression of determination to reinforce their operational and intelligence capabilities as well as the coordination of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the Lake Chad Basin. b.  Directed experts to develop as soon as possible, a common strategy to fight Boko Haram. c.  Decided to finalise the establishment of the Headquarters of the Multinational Joint Task Force in a secured place by 20 November 2014. d.  Reaffirmed a firm commitment towards bringing a common and coordinated response to the current security challenges linked mainly to Boko Haram in the sub-­region, in conformity with Resolution 1556 (2004) of the UNSC, which considered terrorism as the greatest threat to international security. e.  Finally, the extraordinary summit directed Minsters of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the LCBC countries and Benin to meet immediately to draft a common resolution to the United Nations and the African Union in order to put in place an appropriate legal framework for cross-­border military operations against Boko Haram (LCBC Resolution, 2014). Subsequently, the Executive Secretariat of the LCBC organized the sub-­ regional workshop “Elaboration of a Strategy for the Joint Fight against the Terrorist Threat in the LCBC Area” at Yaoundé from 15 to 18 October 2014. This was in response to the decisions reached at the July meeting of Ministers of Defence, CCDS and Chief of Intelligence Services with the LCBC and the October extraordinary summit of Heads of State and Government of LCBC countries and the Republic of Benin both held at Niamey. One thing is quite certain here; the LCBC provides Nigeria and Cameroon with a credible multilateral platform for addressing mutual security challenges occasioned by the Boko Haram insurgency, which might have caused diplomatic strife, if not tactfully contained. It is instructive that membership of the LCBC is extended to Central Africa and North Africa. The active collaboration of member states of the LCBC, especially Cameroon and Nigeria, in finding a lasting solution to their shared security challenges, is an indicator to the potential of functional cooperation and diplomatic rapprochement between Nigeria and Cameroon to regional integration in Africa. Gulf of Guinea Commission The Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) was established through a treaty adopted in Libreville on 3 July 2001 by Angola, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe (STP) as an intergovernmental institution and permanent framework for collective action to foster cooperation, promote



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peace and defend the common interests of countries bordering the Gulf of Guinea (Gulf of Guinea, n.d.). The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Cameroon joined the GGC in 2008. Through its membership, the GGC brings Nigeria and Cameroon together with some countries of West, Central and southern Africa to foster integration and secure common interests. In the preambles to the 2012 Luanda Declaration of Peace and Security in the Gulf of Guinea, the GGC considers peace, security and stability of member states as key conditions for economic development and social progress of its people and relies on dialogue, consensus building, non-­aggression, and ties of friendship, solidarity and fraternity in the pursuit of these objectives (Gulf of Guinea, 2012). Similarly, in June 2013, the Heads of State and Heads of Government of the West and Central African countries adopted the Yaoundé Agreement on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain at a Joint Summit on the Regional Strategy to Combat Piracy, Armed Robbery and other illicit activities at sea in the Gulf of Guinea. This declaration among other things required the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the GGC to promote activities aimed at cooperation, coordination, pooling together and interoperability of resources between member states by: a.  Establishing between them an inter community framework for cooperation, in maritime safety and security; b.  Monitoring the maritime sector by developing joint operational procedures; c.  Facilitating the harmonisation of the legal and institutional framework of member states; d.  Establishing a common mechanism of sharing information and intelligence; e.  Institutionalising a conference on development and maritime security; and f.  Putting in place a contribution-­based funding mechanism (Yaoundé Declaration, 2013). Presently, the GGC has established the Inter-­Regional Coordination Centre (IRCC) based in Yaoundé to coordinate and disseminate intelligence and security information to all member states of the Commission. It is instructive to note that both Nigeria and Cameroon have exploited the platform of GGC towards tackling the scourge of criminality in their maritime domain. Both countries now embark on joint naval training exercises code-­named EX UBANGAME to strengthen naval capabilities and interoperability in policing their shared maritime domain. Further military cooperation is evident in training senior military officers from both countries at the National Defence College Nigeria and at Cameroon’s Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Guerre (ESIG) in Yaoundé.

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Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission In November 2002, Mr Kofi Annan, then Secretary-­General of the United Nations, brought Presidents Obasanjo and Paul Biya to a summit held in Geneva as part of measures to foster the goodwill necessary for implementing the ICJ verdict on disputed boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon. This meeting led to the establishment of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) as a confidence-­building mechanism to facilitate the successful implementation of the ICJ verdict on the contested border areas. At inception, the CNMC was composed of 12 representatives; six from Nigeria and six from Cameroon and was headed by a representative of the UN Secretary-­General. The Special Representative of Kofi Annan for West Africa based in Dakar, Ahmedou Ould-­Abdallah, was designated as a UN representative. CNMC meetings were held alternately in Yaoundé and Nigeria. These meetings provided a platform for both countries to discuss issues relating to security cooperation in the consular, economic, commercial, scientific, judicial and socio- cultural milieu. The mandate of the CNMC covers the following fields: a.  Demarcation of the land boundary and delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two countries. b.  Withdrawal of troops and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, along the land boundary and in the Bakassi Peninsula. c.  Addressing the situation of populations affected by the demarcation activities. building measures d.  Development of recommendations on confidence-­ aiming at promoting peaceful cross-­border cooperation (United Nations Office for West Africa, n.d.). The first meeting of the CNMC was held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, on 1 December 2002 followed by a second meeting at Abuja in February 2003. Within one year, the Commission had worked out modalities that led to the peaceful exchange of 32 villages between Nigeria and Cameroon. The process to delimit the boundaries was underway and subsequently led to the signing of the GTA between Heads of State of Nigeria and Cameroon on 12 June 2006 at the Greentree estate on Long Island, New York, on 12 June 2006 to transfer Bakassi to Cameroon. Officials from the UN, United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany witnessed the signing of this agreement. In line with the provisions of the GTA, an initial handover of Bakassi to Cameroon was conducted on 14 August 2006. This exercise was accompanied by the withdrawal of Nigerian troops stationed in the peninsula on 24 August 2006. Nigeria finally transferred the territory to Cameroon on 14



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August 2008. In the spirit of the new rapprochement, both countries signed an agreement which permits the Nigerian Navy to conduct naval exercises along the creeks of Bakassi Peninsula without violating Cameroonian sovereignty in August 2008 (Okereke, 2009). By July 2015, the CNMC had so far held 33 regular sessions and five special sessions. The contributions of the CNMC in fostering economic, commercial and technical cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon remain enormous. The efforts at actualizing its resolutions led to the following: a.  Hosting of Open Days on trade and economy in various cities in both countries. Such enlightenment conferences on Nigeria’s economy and trade were held at Douala in February 2009 with a similar event focusing on Cameroon held in Calabar (2009), Kano and Port Harcourt (2010) and Lagos (2012). b.  Cooperation in the field of Post and Telecommunications has been consolidated through the holding of a sector-­by-­sector joint committee on Posts and Telecommunications 28 October to 4 November 2009 in Abuja. c.  Nigeria’s continuous participation in the International Exhibition of Crafts in Cameroon (SIARC) and Cameroon participation in the annual African Festival for Arts and Craft Exposition (AFAC) held in Abuja yearly since 2008. d.  Expert works on the management of protected areas shared between Cameroon and Nigeria, on 11 November 2010 in Limbe, Cameroon, and the subsequent draft agreement approved by both governments. e.  Facilitating the implementation of the Agreement on the electrical interconnection project for the transfer of energy from Cameroon to Nigeria through meetings between their national experts in the field of electricity management held at Yola, Nigeria, from 7 to 10 June 2010. f.  Negotiation of Memorandum of Understanding for the Establishment of a Warning System on Flood Risk Management in the Benue Basin that could arise from the Lagdo Dam and Lake Nyos, both in Cameroon, to mitigate the effects on communities and ecosystems along the Rivers Benue and Niger. g.  The construction of Bamenda-­Enugu transnational highway which started on 21 June 2010 and was completed in 2013 and the proposed construction of a bridge over the Mayo Tiel border river in the Adamawa state, Nigeria, to facilitate cross-­border movement of persons and goods between both countries. h.  Growing collaborations between Nigeria’s National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) and Cameroon’s National Agency for Standards and Quality (ANOR) since 27 February to 2 March

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2013 on establishing a partnership between them to facilitate the fight against the trade and circulation of counterfeit drugs between Cameroon and Nigeria. Related negotiations have led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ANOR and the Standards Organisation of Nigeria (SON). i.  Meeting of Nigerian and Cameroonian experts at Abuja from 11 to 14 November 2013 as part of the implementation of the Cooperation Agreement in the field of Sports and Physical Education (Republic of Cameroon, 2015). It was on the basis of these achievements, especially the peaceful settlement of the dispute over Bakassi, that the United Nations Security Council issued a press statement (SC/11094) on 15 August 2013 describing the CNMC as an outstanding outcome of preventive diplomacy (UNSC, 2013). Evidently, the significance of the CNMC as a functional instrument for fostering positive reciprocity in bilateral relations between Nigeria and Cameroon cannot be overemphasized. High-­Level Exchange Visits Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations have also been pursued through high-­ level exchange visits at the level of Heads of State. As shown earlier, between August 1970 and June 1975, Nigeria’s General Gowon and his Cameroonian counterpart, President Ahmadou Ahidjo, met at Yaoundé and Maroua in Cameroon to work out peaceful ways to resolve the lingering border disputes between both countries. Alhaji Shehu Shagari also visited Yaoundé in an attempt to reduce border tensions arising from the killing of five Nigerian troops in Bakassi in May 1981. Virtually all Nigerian Heads of State visited Cameroon between 1999 and 2016. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo visited Cameroon twice between 1999 and 2004 (while in office). In 2007, His Excellency Umar Musa Yar’Adua paid a courtesy visit to President Biya of Cameroon on 12 May as President-­elect, a move considered a demonstration of the willingness of his administration to foster the existing rapprochement between their countries. Such high-­level visits were continued by succeeding administrations in Nigeria. For instance, former President Goodluck Jonathan’s first foreign trip was to Cameroon on 20 May 2010 to participate in the activities marking Cameroon’s 50thanniversary of independence celebration. He was accompanied by former Nigerian Heads of State, General Yakubu Gowon and General Olusegun Obasanjo; both of whom adopted peaceful means to resolve the border disputes between Nigeria and Cameroon while in power.



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Then President Goodluck Jonathan also participated in the Summit of Heads of State and Government on Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea held in Yaoundé in June 2013. President Paul Biya reciprocated visits by Nigerian Heads of State since his assuming office as president of Cameroon in 1982. He visited Nigeria in 1983 under the Shehu Shagari administration and also took part in the 1991 Summit of the defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) held at the International Conference Centre Abuja, Nigeria. In 2003, President Paul Biya attended the Commonwealth Summit in Abuja and was also present at the swearing-­in ceremony of President Olusegun Obasanjo on 29 May 2003. Other visits of President Biya to official Nigerian government events include participation at the inauguration of President Yar’Adua on 29 May 2007 and celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of Nigeria’s independence on 1 October 2010, both held at Eagle Square, Abuja (Republic of Cameroon, 2015). With the intensification of the Boko Haram insurgency and subsequent internationalisation of the conflict, the Presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon intensified their bilateral cooperation to exorcise the spectre of terrorism and other insecurities involving both countries. It was to shore up the gains and goodwill in beneficial bilateralism bequeathed by the administration of Goodluck Jonathan that inspired President Muhammadu Buhari to visit Cameroon in July 2015 and May 2016. Cameroon’s President Paul Biya has also reciprocated these gestures with his official visit to Nigeria in May 2016 in which both Presidents held bilateral talks culminating in the signing of agreements on trade cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon, conservation of the River Benue, security, agriculture, infrastructure and immigration issues, among others (Channels Television, 2016). These visits acted as confidence-­ building measures that strengthened bilateral engagements at addressing mutual threats in both countries. Beside the high-­level exchange visits by Heads of State, one can also discern clear political will and determination of the leadership of both countries at exploring avenues to peaceful resolution of the armed conflict. It is within this context that Nigeria and Cameroon accepted the adjudication of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), whose verdict on 10 October 2002 set the stage for the Green Tree Agreement on 12 June 2006 and the associated exchange of territories. It is pertinent to note here that both President Paul Biya of Cameroon and his Nigerian counterpart, Olusegun Obasanjo, met with the then-­serving UN Secretary-­General Kofi Annan in Geneva, Switzerland, on 15 November 2002, where they pledged to adopt peaceful means to implement the ICJ verdict on their boundary dispute. It is pertinent at this stage to highlight that the thrust of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations has encountered new stress since the outbreak of the armed struggle for the

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independent state of Ambazonia for the population of the former British Southern Cameroons. NOTES 1.  President of Chad at the opening of the annual summit of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Ndjamena, April 2012. 2.  Findings by C. Nna-Emeka Okereke while on a field trip to Oron beach in Akwa Ibom state, Nigeria, on 2 October 2014.

REFERENCES Abiodun, D. (2014). “Cameroon-­Nigeria boundary relations in the north of Nigeria, 1914–1994.” International Affairs and Global Strategy” 27. Adetula, V. (2008). “Cross border crime in West Africa and implications for Nigeria’s national security and external relations.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1 (April): 81. Agreement on Trade Cooperation and Conservation of the Benue River. (May 2016). Channel Television. Retrieved from http://www​.channelstv​.com/2016/05/03/ nigeria-­signs-­agreement-­trade-­cooperation-­cameroun/ (accessed 15 June 2016). Al Jazeera. (2014). “Nigeria seals state border with Cameroon.” http://www​ .aljazeera​.com/news/africa/2014/02/nigeria-­seals-­state-­border-­with-­cameroon​ -2014223154723696322 html. Anioke, C. (2016). “ECOWAS and the Ebola pandemic: Implications for integration and regional security in West Africa,” BSc Thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Caleb University, Lagos. Asobie, A. (2005). “The conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over land and sea borders and territories: The political context and the contending principles.” University of Nigeria Journal of Political Economy 1, no. 1, 77. Bonchuk. M. O. (2014). “Cameroon-­ Nigeria borderland: Prospects of economic cooperation and integration.” American Journal of Social Issues and Humanities 4, no. 2. Business Standard. (2014). “Cameroon closes all borders with Nigeria over ebola outbreak,” 14 August. https://www​.business-­standard​.com/article/pti-­stories/ cameroon-­closes-­all-­borders-­with-­nigeria-­over-­ebola-­outbreak-114081900056_1​ html (accessed 2 October 2021). Centre for Chinese Studies. (2009). “Patterns of Chinese investment, aids and trade to Central Africa: Cameroon, the DRC and Gabon.” http://www​.ccs​.org​.za/wp​ -­content/uploads/2009/11/CCS-­Central-­Africa-­Briefing-­Paper-­August-2009.pdf (accessed 2 June 2016).



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Clottey, P. (n.d.). “Cameroon denies diplomatic row with Nigeria over Ebola.” http:// www​.voanews​.com/content/cameroon-­denies-­diplomatic-­row-­with-­nigeria-­over​ -­ebola/2422587.html (accessed 6 July 2016). Declaration of the Heads of States and Government of Central and West African States on Maritime Safety and Security in their Common Maritime Domain. (2013). Adopted at Yaoundé, Cameroon, on 25 June. Derby, I. (2012). President of Chad at the opening of the annual summit of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Ndjamena, April. Ewepu, Gabriel. (2019). “More flooding to hit Nigeria from Lagdo dam in Cameroon-­ NIHSA” Vanguard, 5 November. http://www​ .vanguardngr​ .com/2019/11/more -­flooding-­to-­hit-­nigeria-­from-­lagdo-­dam-­in-­cameroon-­nihsa/ (accessed 20 February 2022). Federal Republic of Nigeria. (1976). Federal Ministry of Information, News Release No. 780, 29 June. Flood warning: NEMA issues alert as Cameroon releases water from Lagdo Dam. http://sunnewsonline​.com/new/flood-­warning-­nema-­issues-­alert-­as-­cameroon​ -­releases-­water-­from-­lagdo-­dam/ (accessed 15 June 2016) Fombo, F. F. (2008). “Imperial antecedents of the contentious Cameroon-­Nigeria border dispute.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1, 24 Fombo, G. F. (2011). “Territoriality, cabotage and the Cameroon-­Nigeria Bakassi conflict.” Africa Strategic Review 2, no. 2 (April/May): 70–81 Funteh, M. B. (2015). “The paradox of Cameroon-­Nigeria interactions: Connecting between the edges of opportunity/benefit and quandary.” International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 6, no. 3 (March): 30–48 Godwin, A. (2016). “Ebola: Cameroon closes border, suspends all flights from Nigeria.” http://www​.dailypost​ ng/2014/08/18/ebola-­cameroon-­closes-­border​-­suspends​ -­flights-­nigeria/ (accessed 6 July 2016). Gulf of Guinea Commission. (n.d.). http://cggrps​ .org/en/the-­ gulf-­ of-­ guinea​ -­commission/ (accessed 23 June 2016). Gulf of Guinea Commission. (2012). “Luanda declaration on peace and security in the Gulf of Guinea Region.” Luanda, Angola, 29 November. Haas, E. B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950–1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 16. Idris, H. (2014). “Nigeria-­frustration over closure of border with Cameroon because of Ebola.” http://www​.africajournalismtheworld​.com/2014/08/22/Nigeria-­frustration​ -­over-­closure-­of-­border-­with-­cameroon-­because-­of-­ebola (accessed 6 July 2016). Imogen, C. (2015). “Cameroon rounds up and deports 2,500 ‘illegal’ Nigerians in fight against Boko Haram.” Daily Mail, 1 August. http://www​.dailymail​.co​ .uk/news/​article-3182342/Cameroon-­rounds-­deports-2-500-illegal-­Nigerians-­fight​ -­against-­Boko-­Haram​ html, accessed 5 June 2016. Institute for Economics and Peace. (2014). Global Terrorism Index (GTI) 2014: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism New York: Institute for Economics and Peace. Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR). (2003). Strategic Conflict Assessment: Consolidated and Zonal Reports, Nigeria, Abuja, 21.

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International Court of Justice. (2002). Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders: Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening) Judgement, 10 October. International Rivers. (2010). “African Dams Briefing 2010. http://www​ .circleof​ blue​.org/waternews/wp-­content/uploads/2015/08/afrdamsbriefingjune2010.pdf (accessed 20 May 2016). Laccino, L. (2016). “Boko Haram: Cameroon closes markets along Nigeria borders following deadly attacks.” Ibtimes, 28 January. .cblt​ .org/en/lake-­ chad-­ basin​ Lake Chad Basin Commission. (n.d.). http://www​ -­commission-0 (accessed 27 November 2014). Lake Chad Basin Commission Office of the Military Adviser. (2014). “Conclusions of the Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria, 17 May. Lake Chad Basin Commission. (2014). Resolutions adopted at the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the LCBC member countries and Republic of Benin held at Niamey, 7 October. LeFebvre, R. K. (2014). “Interests and identities in peace negotiations: Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Bakassi Peninsula.” African Social Science Review 6, no. 1 (August). Madsen, J. V., C. Seyle, and K. Brandt et al. (2014). The State of Maritime Piracy 2013, Colorado: Ocean Beyond Piracy. Mitrany D. (1943). A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organisation. London: Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affair, 97 Nwachukwu, I., in Michael O. Bonchuk. (2014) “Cameroon-­Nigeria Borderlands: Economic Cooperation and African Integration across Border Area.” In Godwin Ichimi (ed.), Perspectives on Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor Bolaji Akinyemi CFR. Abuja: Salwin, 153–174. Nweke, G. A. (2000). “Functionalism and the new world order: The dwindling options for Africa.” Africa Political Science Review 1, no. 1, 24–48. Odiogor, Hugo. (2020). “Nigeria faces the threat of Lake Nyos dam break.” Vanguard, 15 November. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2010/11/nigeria-­faces-­the​ -­threat​-­of-­lake-­nyos-­dam-­break/ (accessed 21 March 2022). Okereke, C. N. (2009). “Cameroon: A strategic frontline state.” Africa Strategic Review 1, no. 2. Omaki, A. (2014). “Terrorism and global security in the Sahel region: Need for effective containment strategy by the Lake Chad Basin Commission.” Paper presented at the Workshop organized by the Lake Chad Basin Commission to contain Terrorism and Foreign Terrorist Fighters in the Region, held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, October 14–18. Osinowo, A. A. (2015). “Combating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.” Africa Security Brief, no. 30 (February 2). Report of the United Nations Assessment Mission on Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. (2011). (UN doc. S/2012/45, January 2012), 7–11 November.



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Republic of Cameroon, Presidency. (2015). “Visit of H.E President Muhammadu Buhari, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.” Press Kit, Yaoundé, July 2015. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2014). “UNHCR—Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria force 13,000 to flee to Cameroon,” 11 November. www​.unhcr​ .org/546228896 html (accessed 17 November 2014). United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). (2015). “Nigerian Refugees move from volatile border in Cameroon.” UNHCR Briefing Notes, 21 July. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2016). “Thousands newly displaced by Boko Haram in Niger.” http://www​.unhcr​.org/news/latest/2016/1/569e32389/ thousands-­newly-­displaced-­boko-­haram-­niger​.html (accessed 6 July 2016). United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). (1982). United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA). (n.d.). “Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission.” http://unowa​.unmissions​.org/Default​.aspx?tabid=804 (accessed 11 July 2016). United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2013). “Security Council press statement of Bakassi Peninsula development,” 13 August. http://www​.un​.org/press/en/2013/ sc11094.doc​htm (accessed 11 July 2016). United Nations Security Council. (2014). Resolution 2161, 26 June. http://unscr​.com/ en/resolutions/2161 (accessed 19 November 2014).

Chapter Nine

Understanding Security Relations and Defence Cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Roger Kuitche

INTRODUCTION Defence cooperation focuses on any arrangement between two or more countries in which their respective militaries work together to achieve mutual objectives. As an element of national power, the defence industry is a key player in the conduct of foreign policy of states and can be used in peace and war time in pursuit of national interests. It is in recognition of the role of the defence and security forces to both national and international peace and security that the states are increasingly promoting cooperation between friendly militaries. As part of measures at defence diplomacy, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2006 and expanded it to engage Dialogue Partners through the ADMM-­Plus in 2010 (ASEAN, 2020). In Africa, France has continuously sustained structural cooperation engagements in the sphere of defence and security through which it provides high-­level advice, training and logistical assistance to partner countries while taking into account the defence-­security-­justice continuum. To this effect, France extends technical supports for counterterrorism, maritime and air safety, illegal migration, civil protection, internal security and teaching of French language in military environment (Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, n.d.). The imperative of defence cooperation is not lost to Nigeria as she has also activated several such cooperation arrangements at bilateral and multilateral levels in the furtherance of her foreign and defence policies in Africa. Nigeria’s willingness to engage in defence cooperation flows from the realization that military relations between states are meant to facilitate better understanding with the intent to prevent, manage or resolve conflict situations. Militaries 147

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of different countries relate through a number of ways, which include the exchange of defence advisers, alliance formations, defence pact or defence cooperation with a view to helping each other whenever the need arises. Drawing from the above, this chapter examines the dynamics of security relations between Cameroon and Nigeria by reflecting on the historical and socio-­political trajectories that chart the thrust of defence cooperation between both countries. It discusses the measures adopted by both countries to foster defence cooperation, noting that they have evolved varying bilateral defence cooperation agreements that facilitate the implementation of their defence policies with emphasis on the defence of sovereignty, education and training, exchange of classified information, joint military exercises and combating shared security threats at bilateral and multilateral platforms. Data for the chapter were derived from extant literature on the subject matter as well as the professional contacts and personal experiences of the authors on the subject matter spanning over two decades. UNDERSTANDING THE NOTION OF DEFENCE COOPERATION By defence cooperation, we mean cooperation between militaries and actors within the Ministries of Defence of separate countries in peace and war times. Such cooperation manifest through a number of channels, which include high- and expert-­level visits and meetings, conduct of courses, seminars and workshops for military and civilian personnel of strategic ministries, departments and agencies as well as joint military exercises. Generally, there exists the understanding that effective cooperation between militaries contributes to the defence transformation process, supports development of the defence capabilities, strengthens resilience and deterrence, while also enhancing interoperability (Ministry of Defence of Georgia, n.d.). These programmes have contributed significantly to the pursuit of their mutual military-­political aspirations. The objective of defence cooperation is to facilitate and sustain secure interstate relations in the field of defence in such a manner that contributes to the formation and implementation of security policies of states. Drawing from this, the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) identifies the general purpose of defence cooperation as to strengthen national defence of participating states, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions to shared concerns and threats (NORDEFCO, 2009). It further outlines the specific objectives of defence cooperation to include the following:



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a.  Establish a comprehensive, enhanced and long-­term approach to defence-­ related issues. b.  Identify, discuss and strive for a common understanding of defence-­related strategic and policy issues of common interests. c.  Increase operational effect and quality of the armed forces. d.  Strive for an optimum resource allocation and cost efficiency in defence-­ related areas. e.  Enhance interoperability within existing standards and the capability to act jointly. f.  Develop cooperation in the area of multinational operation, defence-­related security sector reforms and capacity building in support of international peace and security. g.  Achieve technological benefits. h.  Promote the competitiveness of the defence industry. i.  Strengthen cooperation on any other possible future areas of cooperation (NORDEFCO, 2009). Beyond the objectives, the forms of defence cooperation manifest in various ways and are rooted in the principle of reciprocity and in compliance with domestic and international laws. In 2021, the United Kingdom and Kenya evolved a defence cooperation agreement along the following lines: a.  Mutual visits by delegations of high-­ranking representatives from the defence sector; b.  Staff talks and technical meetings; c.  Meetings between equivalent defence institutions; d.  Exchange of teaching and training personnel as well as students from military training institutions; e.  Participation in training courses, practical training, seminars, roundtable discussions and symposia; f.  Visits by Service personnel, warships and other government ships and aircraft; g.  Military exercises; h.  Any other form of military cooperation in areas agreed upon (UK-­Kenya Cooperation, 2021) Article 3 of the agreement spells out the scope and goals of the defence cooperation agreement between the United Kingdom and Kenya to centre on the following areas: a.  Security and defence policy; b.  Initial, advanced and follow-­ on training of military and Ministry of Defence civilian personnel;

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c.  Defence administration and welfare matters of military personnel; d.  Counter-­piracy and other maritime security activities; e.  Peacetime military activities; f.  Protection of the environment; g.  Military medical services including research and development; h.  Military sports; i.  Disaster relief and humanitarian operations by the armed forces; j.  Military exercises; k.  Counter-­terrorism; l.  Information operations training; m.  Defence civilian component; n.  Exchange visits of military personnel; o.  Mapping/survey and exchange of geographic materials; p.  Other areas of mutual interest, which may be decided upon in future (UK-­ Kenya Cooperation, 2021). Explaining the reasons for the increase in defence cooperation agreement, Brandon J, Kinne notes that states use DCAs to modernize their militaries, respond to shared security threats, and establish security umbrellas with like-­ minded states. Kinne further notes that for militaries to cooperate in defence matters, their governments must also overcome dilemmas of mistrust and distributional conflicts (Kinne, 2018). As part of efforts at sustaining and strengthening long-­term bilateral cooperation, Cameroon and Nigeria also engage in defence and security cooperation in furtherance of their foreign policy objectives. The core areas of the cooperation revolve around mutual exchange of visits, training of military personnel, exchange of defence advisers, sharing of information, as well as the management of mutual security threats. The nature and processes of defence and security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria often attract academic and policy interests. BACKGROUND TO DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA The history of Cameroon-­ Nigeria relation also extends to the sphere of defence and security cooperation which dates back to the immediate post-­ independence era. It is on record that since former British controlled Northern and Southern Cameroons were administered through Nigeria, several indigenous people of both trust territories enlisted and were commissioned into the Nigerian military prior to the February 1961 plebiscite on the future of



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both trust territories. The outcome of the plebiscite therefore had far-­reaching consequences on the nationalities in and careers of the Cameroonian military personnel enlisted or commissioned into the Nigerian military. The outbreak of the political crisis that culminated in the Nigerian Civil War in 1967 set the stage for the transfer of several commissioned and non-­ commissioned military personnel of Cameroonian origin back to the Cameroonian authorities through well-­crafted diplomatic channels and agreements, leading to their absorption into the Cameroonian military to form the nucleus of the country’s new post-­independence army. Some of the officers are listed below with the ranks they held in Nigeria at the time they were transferred to the Cameroon military: a.  Capt. T Malonge (N/0028) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 22 March 1958 and transferred to Cameroon on 5 July 1967. b.  Maj. AJ Kweti (N/0086) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 5 March 1960 and transferred to Cameroon on 21 December 1968. c.  Maj. HA Anagho (N/0118) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 4 November 1960 and transferred to Cameroon on 12 September 1966. d.  Maj. JT Tataw (N/0133) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 15 Decemebr 1960 and transferred to Cameroon on 5 June 1967. e.  Col. CSS Chinbi (N/0133) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 3 March 1961 and transferred to Cameroon on 5 July 1967. f.  Lt. C Nanagonga (N/0155) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 25 March 1961 and transferred to Cameroon on 5 July 1967. g.  Lt. J Formbor (N0161) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 25 March 1961 and transferred to Cameroon on 30 November 1977. h.  2nd Lt. RJE Mbu (N0190) was commissioned into the Nigerian Army on 28 July 1961 and transferred to Cameroon on 5 July 1967. The wealth of experience of these officers formed the bedrock of defence relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, as they had served and held both staff and command positions in several military formations in Nigeria prior to their transfer back to Cameroon. Specifically, Maj. James T. Tataw later rose to become Cameroon’s Chief of Army Staff, a position he held for 15 years until 2002, when he was deployed to the Ministry of Defence as Inspector. He was a member of the Cameroon delegation at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague during the Bakassi case and further served as a member of the Cameroon delegation at the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission. Like their Cameroonian counterparts, several Nigerian military personnel, such as Olusegun Obasanjo, also served in the English-­speaking regions of Cameroon prior to the 1961 plebiscite. General Obasanjo later

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became the Nigerian Head of State, in both military and civilian dispensations, when he played a crucial role in the peaceful settlement of Cameroon-­ Nigeria border disputes. DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATIONS PRIOR TO INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION Defence relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have also been characterized by cooperation, cross-­border violations and skirmishes as well as mutual responses to real or perceived threats by the military and security agencies of both countries. Such cross-­border violations include raids on villages, abduction of security personnel and incidents of deaths. A major incident in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations in the third decade of post-­independence diplomacy was the killing of five Nigerian military personnel, which included a lieutenant, by Cameroonian forces, and another three Nigerian soldiers were also wounded during the attack (Okereke, 2009). This incident occured on the Akwayafe River in Ikang District in Cross River State on 16 May 1981. Subsequently, some elements of Cameroonian gendarmes invaded and temporarily occupied 16 Nigerian villages on the fringes of the Lake Chad area in May 1987, following which they conducted a census of the population as Cameroonians (Adetula 2008). In October 1989, another group of Cameroonian gendarmes abducted four Nigerian customs officials on routine patrol of the border areas in Borno State (Country Listing, n.d.). These cross-­border violations in the Lake Chad axis is an indication that the areas of border disputation between both countries transcend the maritime domain. With the advent of the 1990s, new boundary hostilities between Cameroon and Nigeria erupted in the Bakassi area that led to the quest for international adjudication. Specifically, in 1991, some of Cameroon’s gendarmes invaded, annexed and changed the names of three previously presumed Nigerian villages, namely, Aban, Atabong and Ine-­Odiong and renamed them Jabane, Didiabatu and Kaubae, respectively (New Nigerian, 1991, 24). The intermittent harassment of Nigerian nationals on the Bakassi Peninsula continued up to 1993 with Cameroon authorities’ forced imposition of taxes on Nigerians living in the area. As a response, the General Sani Abacha administration deployed soldiers to secure the territory and protect lives and assets of Nigerian nationals living and doing business there. Thereafter, Cameroon approached the ICJ to adjudicate on the contentious border dispute over the Bakassi (Okereke, 2008).



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DEFENCE AND SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA SINCE THE ICJ JUDGEMENT The ICJ judgement of October 2002 is considered very instrumental to the resolution of Cameroon-­Nigeria border conflict. This judgement confirmed Cameroon’s claims over the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula while also transferring the ownership of 32 villages in the Lake Chad area to Nigeria. This was followed by the actual transfer of territories between both countries in line with the ICJ judgement. However, following the withdrawal of Nigeria’s defence and security assets from the territory, new forms of trans-­border violence, involving non-­ state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in the border areas and Nigeria’s delta region, erupted. For instance, in November 2007, about 21 Cameroonian gendarmes were killed while another six were wounded on the Bakassi Peninsula following attacks by suspected armed men belonging to a militant group from Nigeria which also attacked some Nigerian naval troops at Ibeka within Nigerian territory. While distancing the Nigeria defence and security forces from perpetrating the attack, Nigerian Defence Spokesman Solomon Giwa-­Amu, a Brigadier General, declared that Nigeria was willing to cooperate with Cameroon to investigate the incident to ensure that the criminals that perpetrated the dastardly incident were brought to justice (Shirbon, 2007a). This incident marked the first such attack on Cameroonian defence and security forces by elements from Nigeria. border security breaches in Cameroon involving armed Other cross-­ militants from Nigeria include the abduction of 10 hostages, comprising six French nationals, two Camerooninas, one Senegalese and one Tunisian, by suspected gunmen under the command of Ebi Dari of the Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF) on the night of 30–31 October 2008, as well as the killing of a member of the police by the BFF operating from a canoe off Bakassi in December 2009 (UNHCR Refworld, 2008). The maritime area between Cameroon and Nigeria further recorded 53 piracy-­related incidents between 2013 and 2014 (Kindzeka, 2017). Despite these security breaches in the border areas, the peaceful implementation of the ICJ judgement opened a new phase in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, which was corroborated by defence and security cooperation. This increasing rapprochement between the countries was strengthened by the exchange of defence advisers, provision of training slots in the various categories of military training schools, participation in mutual military exercises and in functional cooperation at the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) combating terrorism in the Lake Chad area.

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SPHERES OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA The scope of defence cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria covers a wide range of subjects. Core among these planks are the mutual exchange of visits of high-­ranking defence officials, staff talks and technical meetings, meetings between equivalent defence institutions, including the exchange of teaching and training personnel as well as students from military-­training institutions. Others include participation in training courses, practical training, seminars, roundtables, symposia and military exercises. It also involves piracy and other maritime security security and defence policy, counter-­ priorities, as well as peacetime military activities including protection of the environment. Others are military sports, disaster and humanitarian operations by the armed forces, information operation training, mapping, survey and exchange of geographic materials and any other areas of mutually beneficial military cooperation to be agreed upon in the future. SECURITY AND DEFENCE PROTOCOLS As part of measures at fostering defence and security cooperation at bilateral levels, the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria entered into the Agreement on the Establishment of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee. This agreement was signed in Abuja on 28 February 2012. Article 5 of this agreement spells out the areas of cooperation as follows: a.  Exchange of information and experiences on security. b.  Investigation, survey, studies and research to prevent acts of trans-­border security. c.  Conduct of border control operations between the two countries (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2012). In furtherance of this agreement, Cameroon and Nigeria agreed to rotate the hosting rights of the trans-­border security meeting annually to provide platform for review and deliberation of various security issues threatening both countries. Since the commencement of the agreement, due compliance was kept with respect to holding the annual sessions of the Committee. The first session of the Committee was held in Yaoundé from 6 to 8 November 2013. The second session was convened in Abuja from 8 to 12 July 2014. The third session took place in Yaoundé from 17 to 21 February 2015. And the fourth session took place in Abuja from 18 to 20 November 2015 (Tatason, 2016).



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No session of the Committee was held in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic and safety protocols. As a result, the eighth meeting of the Committee was postponed to 2021. The Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee meetings have so far proved a veritable platform for information sharing on common security-­related issues between the countries. Barely a year after Cameroon and Nigeria signed the Trans-­ border Security Committee agreement, the Ansaru, which is a splinter group of Boko Haram, abducted seven French nationals, of the Moulin-­Fournier family, from around Waza National Park in the far north region of Cameroon. The hostages were held captive in Nigeria for two months before their release was secured (France24, 2013; Vanguard, 2013). This incident brought to the fore the need for strengthening defence and security cooperation between the countries. With respect to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), both countries reached an understanding at the seventh session of the Cameroon-­ Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee to sustain support for the MNJTF combating terrorism in the Lake Chad basin. Efforts were also to be made to reinforce security along their shared northern border through the deployment of sufficient troops to check the activities of the Boko Haram terrorists (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). In addition, all vessels sailing in the waterways of both nations were to be escorted by the respective navies to the common maritime border to avoid attacks from sea robbers. Both nations also agreed to share necessary information on sea robbery and vessels of interests. At the Eighth Session of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee, held in Abuja from 23 to 26 August 2021, deliberations focused, among other things, on (a) the upsurge in transnational organized crime along the shared border area, (b) the synergy between the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and Ambazonia secessionists, notably the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC), (c) incidents of banditry, and (d) security threats within the maritime domain. MULTILATERAL PLATFORMS IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN Defence and security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria was also pursued through multilateral platforms such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). For instance, senior officials of the Ministry of Defence in Cameroon and Nigeria often participate in high-­level meetings of the LCBC states, where issues of mutual defence and related security concerns are discussed. One such platform

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was the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defence and Chiefs of Defence Staff of member states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). Cameroon and Nigeria also participates in the Meetings of Ministers of Defence, Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff (CCDS) and Chiefs of Security and Intelligence Services (CSIS) from member states of the LCBC and the Republic of Benin. The Executive Secretariat of the LCBC was tasked at the Niamey meeting of the Ministers of Defence, CCDS and CSIS held in July 2014 to constitute a dedicated team to design a sub-­regional strategy for the joint fight against Boko Haram. To this effect, the Concept of Operation (CONOP) of the MNJTF was designed in Yaoundé, Cameroon by experts assembled by the Executive Secretariat of the LCBC, which involved Nigerian and Cameroon participation. Furthermore, the various Heads of State are also the Commanders in Chief of the armed forces in their respective countries, and in this capacity, they held security summits of the LCBC at the highest levels of political leadership. One such meeting was the Paris summit of 17 May 2014, which was attended by former President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria and President Paul Biya, among other Heads of State. This summit focused on security issues in Nigeria, especially the escalation of Boko Haram aggression beyond Nigeria’s national boundaries to contiguous countries of the Lake Chad Basin (LCBC Resolution, 2014). The administration of President Muhammad Buhari consolidated the bilateral relations of his predecessor through his state visit to Cameroon in June 2015, which President Biya reciprocated with visits to Nigeria from 3 to 4 May 2016 and also through participation in the Regional Security Summit of the Lake Chad countries hosted in Abuja by Nigeria from 14 to 15 May 2016 (Tatason, 2016). The regional security summit provided another platform to foster defence and security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria, which are troop-­contributing countries (TCCs) to the MNJTF. EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY MILITARY HIGH COMMANDS Within the framework of defence relations, Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Gabriel Olonisakin, embarked on strengthening existing bilateral cooperation with Nigeria’s immediate neighbours. In Cameroon, General Olonisakin met with the country’s Defence Minister, Edgard Allain Mebe Ngo’o, and Chief of Defence Staff, General Rene-­ Claude Meka, and they stressed the importance of stronger cooperation in the maritime environment, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, with a view to strengthen countermeasures against illegal bunkering, oil theft and piracy (Channels



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Television, 2016). General Olonisakin, after retirement from the military in 2021, became Nigeria’s High Commissioner to Cameroon. Like his predecessor, General Lucky Irabor, who succeeded Olonisakin as Defence Chief on January 26, 2021, visited Cameroon in April 2021 to sustain and strengthen military cooperation between the countries. General Irabor led a delegation of top military personnel and was received in an audience with the Chief of Staff of the Cameroonian armed forces, Lieutenant General Rene Claude Meka, at the Ministry of Defence in Yaoundé. The high-­profile Nigerian delegation comprised the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), the Force Commander, Multinational Joint Task Force (FC MNJTF), and the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI), among others. Central to discussions between the top military commanders were issues associated with the joint fight against Boko Haram and the cross-­border dimensions of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon (Teke, 2021). MARITIME SECURITY PRIORITIES Defence and security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria have also been demonstrated through bilateral engagements in their shared maritime domain. This importance of such cooperation cannot be overemphasised in view of the persistence of maritime threats which are both mutual and persistent. One key trend that accompanied the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from the Bakassi Peninsula in 2006 was the observable rise in the incidents of piracy and sea robbery in their domain of interest, and this brings to the fore the imperative of effective maritime-­domain awareness. Nigeria’s former Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Marshal Usman Jibril, acknowledged this gap during the pulling-­out ceremony of his predecessor, Vice Admiral Dele Ezeoba in March 2014 noting that: the lack of Navy presence at Ibaka is as a result of the ICJ judgment in the dispute over Bakassi Peninsula that marked Ibaka as a demilitarise zone . . . that is why criminals are operating there. It is like a free man’s area. But we are now in talks with the navies of Cameroon and Benin Republic to have joint patrols around Bakassi. . . . We cannot just show presence on our own because it will be in violation of the court judgment and the GTA. Something is however, being done underground to curb the criminality at Ibaka. (Igbonwelundu, 2014)

In addition, the implementation of the ICJ judgement raised concerns over the ease of manoeuvrability by the Nigerian Navy in the Calabar channel and wider Cross River estuary, bearing in mind that the limits of Nigeria’s maritime boundaries were redefined in such a manner that ships from the Eastern

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Naval Command have to seek approval from Cameroon before they can set sail or berth in Calabar, or risk attracting aggression (Ate, 1987). As part of defence cooperation against piracy and other threats in the Gulf of Guinea, the Nigerian Navy received the Cameroonian warship Le Ntem at the Calabar port. This visit was part of the cooperation agreement reached between both navies in 2014 permitting each other’s navy to enter their territorial water in pursuit. Both navies also have a communication system that provides backup during operations (Kindzeka, 2017). The navies of Cameroon and Nigeria also collaborate against illegal fishing and kidnapping for ransom, illicit transnational trafficking and ecological threats around Calabar Channel and the Bakassi general area. In furtherance of efforts are combating piracy and other maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), and the Inter Regional Coordination Centre, ICC, Yaoundé, Cameroon, initiated the Gulf of Guinea maritime Collaboration Forum (GGC-­MCF/SHADE) as a partnership to galvanise regional and international efforts to combat the maritime security threats. The objective of the forum is to: counter piracy and armed robbery at sea by bringing together regional, international, industry and NGO partners to advance and coordinate near term maritime activities with a view to working toward a set of common operational objectives in order to protect seafarers and ships operating off the coast of West and Central Africa. (Oritse, 2021)

The NIMASA works in collaboration with the Nigerian Navy in ensuring the safety of Nigeria’s maritime domain. By implication, the Nigerian Navy shall be a key partner agency in the implementation of the GGC-­MCF. To this effect, it shall partner with its Cameroonian counterpart including the navies of other countries in the Gulf of Guinea towards the pursuit of the objectives of the GGC-­MCF. This brings the implementation of the project within the realm of defence and security relations. EXCHANGE OF DEFENCE ATTACHÉ OR ADVISERS The other field of military cooperation is the exchange of Defence Attachés that started long before the outbreak of the Bakassi Peninsula dispute in recognition of the improvement of the relationship between them. A Defence Attaché is in a diplomatic mission as the head of the military section. Generally mandated directly by the armed forces or their respective ministries of defence to execute three main tasks, which are: to represent, to advise and to



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gather information. Cameroon appointed the following Defence Attachés and their deputies to Nigeria: a.  Colonel Chi Ngafor in Lagos b.  Navy Captain Bikok Réné Military, naval and air attaché c.  Navy Captain Nsola Jean Pierre from 6 April 2001 to 5 September 2005 d.  Colonel Kouna Louis Marie from 5 September 2005 to 9 June 2010 with LCL Anoma Erick as Assistant Defence Attaché e.  Colonel Nka Valère from 9 June 2010 to 17 February 2016 with Navy Captain Vikram Tatason as Assistant Defence Attaché f.  Colonel Kuitche Roger from 17 February 2016 to 10 April 2019 with, successively, Navy Captain Tatason and Col Mbamba Benjamin as Assistant Defence Attaché g.  Col Fonkong Djio Venant Michel from 5 March 2019 till date with Lieutenant commander Mbu Tabala Bernard as Assistant Defence Attaché Nigeria reciprocated Cameroon’s deployment of Defence Attachés with the appointment of the following Defence Advisers to Cameroon: a.  Cdr DA Onoja b.  Capt (NN) OTI Alibo c.  Capt (NN) GTA Adekeye d.  Capt (NN) NK Wyom e.  Capt (NN) PS Adeniyi f.  Capt (NN) UO Jibrin g.  Capt (NN) MS Garba h.  Capt (NN) SS Garba i.  Capt (NN) PC Nwatu j.  Capt (NN) MY Abba k.  Capt (NN) NC Ekwom

19 June 1985–25 September 1986. 30 September 1992–20 August 1995. 21 August 1995–30 June 1997. 1 July 1997–7 November 2000. 8 November 2000–22 January 2003. 14 March 2003–29 January 2006. 4 July 2006–20 November 2009. 30 November 2009–31 December 2012. 1 January 2013–29 April 2016. 29 April 2016–20 May 2019. 20 May 2019–

Navy Captain Patrick Chibueze Nwatu was conferred with the national medal of Knight of the National Order of Valor vide Decree No 2016/188 of 11 April 2016 by President Paul Biya on behalf of the government and people of Cameroon. This medal was awarded in recognition of his exceptional contributions in fostering cooperation between the defence forces of Cameroon and Nigeria (Tatason, 2016, République du Cameroun, 2016). This medal was awarded on behalf of His Excellency President Paul Biya, by the Cameroon Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence, Mr Joseph Beti Assomo. It is reasoned that the fact that none of the Defence Attachés of either Cameroon or Nigeria were recalled back home during the Bakassi

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dispute and the outbreak of secessionists movements in English-­speaking regions of Cameroon remains evidence of the good military cooperation between both countries amid delicate diplomatic balancing. DEFENCE RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA SINCE ANGLOPHONE CONFLICT In the English-­speaking regions of Cameroon, the escalation of political turmoil to armed conflict for an independent state of Ambazonia has opened new concerns for defence and security relations between Cameroon and Nigeria. This is unconnected with the cross-­border movement of persons and commodities of security interest to both countries, ranging from refugees genuinely in search of safety to separatists, mercenaries and dealers of illicit arms, ammunitions and explosive devices of different grades. The implication is heightened insecurity and threats to the sovereignty and blossoming rapprochement between both countries and the imperative for sustained implementation of existing defence and security protocols and agreements. The use of Nigerian territory for subversive activities against Cameroon by pro-­Ambazonia nationalists attracted significant concerns at the Sixth Session of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee, held in Abuja from 5 to 6 February 2018, as both countries pledged commitment to cross-­border threats that are mutual in nature. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs in Nigeria, Hajia Khadija Bukar-­Ibrahim, acknowledged that cooperation between Cameroonian and Nigerian troops had contributed to decimating Boko Haram and that the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon had serious implications for both countries and deserved a careful approach in being addressed (Daily Trust, 2018). In furtherance of this, Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Babagana Monguno, encouraged the Cameroonian authorities to engage all aggrieved parties in a constructive manner to deescalate tensions in Anglophone regions, while also stressing that the Nigerian government would not allow its territory to be used for subversive activities (Odunsi, 2018). Within the context of Nigeria’s official position against the use of her territory for subversive activities, the Nigerian authority took custody of Sisiku Jukius Ayuktabe and 11 other pro-­Ambazonia leaders at Nera Hotel, Abuja, in January 2018 and transferred 10 of these leaders, along with 37 other Anglophone Cameroonians arrested in Taraba State (Northeast Nigeria) on 30 December 2017, to Cameroonian authorities for prosecution. This measure was conducted within the framework the extradition treaty of 17 March 1972 and the Protocol of Judiciary Cooperation of 30 June 1977 between the



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two countries. This incident came to be known thereafter as the Nera Hotel Episode. Furthermore, as part of efforts to prevent the influx of foreign fighters from Nigeria into its Anglophone regions, the Cameroonian military, working in concert with the Nigerian military, stopped hundreds of Nigerian mercenaries from crossing the borders to join the separatist groups in the conflict zone. Cameroon’s former Minister of Communications Issa Tchiroma Bakary made this public noting: Two hundred people from neighbouring Nigeria were trying to cross the frontiers by force at Ekok. They were pushed back aided by the Nigerian Army posted there on the Nigeria side. . . . On behalf of the government of the Republic of Cameroon, I pay tribute to the Nigeria authority in the struggle against separatism and the terrorist peril to which Cameroon and Nigeria are being confronted with. (Deutsche Welle, n.d.)

The imperative of cooperation in defence and security matters was further reiterated at the Eighth Session of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee held in Abuja in August 2021. This view was expressed by Cameroon’s Minister of Territorial Administration, Atanga Nji Paul, who stressed that to eradicate trans-­ border insecurity between Cameroon and Nigeria, both countries defence and security forces must intensify intelligence gathering and information sharing and, in addition, check religious radicalism while promoting socio-­economic development along their common borders (Kindzek, 2021). Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Babagana Mongonu, a retired Major General of the Nigerian army, affirmed that both countries would jointly combat secessionists operating within their borders and that Nigeria would continue to support the efforts of Cameroonian authorities to stop the separatist crisis in Cameroon’s English-­speaking western regions (Kindzeka, 2021). Addressing the Cameroon delegation, he stated: President Buhari reassures you that Nigeria’s territory will never be used by any group of secessionists to destabilise another friendly sovereign country. In addition, we would work closely together to ensure that any real or perceived attempt to form any alliances between secessionist groups in Nigeria and Cameroon are decisively dealt with. (Kindzeka, 2021)

Nigeria demonstrated commitment to its declaration with the arrest of Ntui Lambert, a 36-year-­old indigene of Cross River State for arms trafficking in August 2021. He was arrested by Nigeria’s security operatives at Ikom in Cross River State with a Thuraya phone, 216 live rounds of ammunition for AK-47s and 58 wraps of explosives suspected to be dynamite, which he

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obtained from criminals in Jos in Plateau State, Nigeria. These prohibited substances were for supplying to separatist fighters in Cameroon. His father is Nigerian while his mother is Cameroonian. Similarly, the Cross River State police command arrested Fobi Kingsley Mbaku (32 years old) along Ranch Road in Obanliku Local Government Area (LGA) in October 2021 for allegedly conveying firearms and bullets in bags from Nigeria to Cameroon. While parading the suspect alongside 29 others before the media, then-­ serving Police Commissioner in Cross River State Aminu Alhassan noted the existence of a hideout for locally fabricated automatic rifles in the area and that two hundred rounds of 7.62 mm live ammunition were recovered from the suspect, who feigned ignorance of the contents while claiming that he was paid $25 each time he successfully conveyed such consignments to agents across the border (Daily Post, 2021), CROSS-­BORDER VIOLATIONS BY DEFENCE AND SECURITY AGENCIES While there have been remarkable incidences of cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria since the outbreak of armed struggle in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, there however exist several instances of violations by both Cameroon and Nigeria’s defence and security forces while in combat operations against different dissident groups. For instance, following the escalation of the Boko Haram attacks in August 2014, several Nigerian soldiers crossed into Cameroonian territory in hot pursuit of Boko Haram fighters, but without authorization. The Cameroon military estimated that over 400 Nigerian soldiers “sought refuge in the country after fleeing intense fighting against the Boko Haram militants in Nigeria’s Borno State” (Voice of America, 2014). The fleeing soldiers arrived at Amchide, a border town in the Far North region of Cameroon, where they turned over their weapons, arms and ammunitions to the Cameroonian military (ibid.). The Defence Headquarter in Nigeria, however, clarified that contrary to media reports that hundreds of Nigerian troops in Gamboru Ngala and Banki towns fled to Cameroon to escape from Boko Haram attacks, the troops, instead, “pursued fleeing Boko Haram terrorists past international boundaries of both countries against international law. Hence they needed to surrender to Cameroonian authorities as required by law to show they were not on a hostile mission (Omonobi, 2014). Subsequently, they were safely escorted back to Nigeria under bilateral defence procedures (Fulani, 2014). This discordant information between Cameroon and Nigeria in this incident draws attention to the importance of information sharing in defence diplomacy.



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With the outbreak of the armed struggle in the Anglophone regions of Cameroon, several informal sources noted that that while in pursuit of Ambazonia fighters in December 2017, some Cameroonian soldiers repeatedly entered villages in Cross River State, Nigeria, without authorization. Nigeria’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Geoffrey Onyeama, however, declared that the Nigerian government investigated the reports and found them to be false (Carlston, 2017). These alleged cross-­border violations in pursuit of pro-­Ambazonia separatist fighters became more pronounced in the new year as Cameroon soldiers allegedly carried out cross-­border raids at Danare-­ Daddi and Danare Bodam communities in the Boki Local Government Area of Cross River State to abduct five asylum seekers/refugees considered by Cameroonian authorities as separatist fighters. Another similar raid was executed by Cameroon’s defence and security forces at Mfum village in February 2018, leading to the death of three fishermen who were fishing on the river while two other persons sustained bullet wounds. Such incidents have repeatedly been reported in some communities in Cross River State that have common borders with the conflict zone in Cameroon’s Anglophone region, as experienced by the inhabitants of Ekang village in Akampa Local Government Area of Cross River State, and inhabitants of Ajasor have also experienced such cross-­border violations (Vanguard, 2018). The violation of shared border areas by Cameroonian troops assumed another dimension on 20 February 2018, when personnel of Cameroon’s military mounted an armoured tank with a plethora of well-­armed personnel on the Cameroon end of the Ekok-­Mfum bridge linking both countries (Negroid Haven, 2018). This action was vehemently challenged by the Head of Nigerian Immigration post at Mfum, Lawrence Asuquo, who described the situation as a war situation and an infringement on international protocols (Journal du Cameroun, 2018). In response to the plethora of cross-­border violations into Nigeria’s territory in pursuit of suspected pro-­Ambazonia fighters, the upper chamber of Nigeria’s Parliament, the Senate, summoned then–Minister of Defence, Honourable Mansur Dan Ali on 7 February 2018 to give an account of the repeated territorial violations by Cameroon’s forces. The invitation of the Defence Minister was the outcome of the debate titled “Influx of Refugees from the Republic of Cameroon to Some Border Communities in Cross River State and Its Attendant Security Fall Out,” which was co-­sponsored by the three senators from Cross River State during the 8th Senate as follows: Senators John Owan Enoh, Senator Gershom Bassey and Senator Rose Oko, representing Cross River Central, Cross River South and Cross River North, respectively (Opara, 2018).

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As part of Nigeria’s official response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tasked Nigeria’s then-­High Commissioner to Cameroon, Lawan Gashargar, to covey the country’s concerns over these excesses to the highest level of Cameroon’s government. Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry also summoned Cameroon’s High Commissioner to Nigeria, Salaheddine Abbas Ibrahima, to explain the unauthorized cross-­border incursions of Cameroon’s defence and security forces in apparent violation of Nigeria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity with advice to his government not to abuse the country’s cooperation. In addition, Nigeria’s Foreign Ministry also requested an explanation from Cameroon’s High Commissioner over the killing of 97 Nigerian fishermen in Bakassi by Cameroonian gendarmes over non-­ payment of a N100,000 boat levy estimated at about $250 (The Guardian, 2017; Ndukwu, 2017). Despite the above official measures adopted by Nigeria to halt such cross-­ border violations by Cameroonian defence and security forces, new concerns and anxieties resurfaced in October 2021 as the Chairman of Kurmi Local Government Area in Taraba State, Mr Amamzalla John Danladi Joseph raised alarm over the alleged incursion of Cameroon defence and security forces in his jurisdiction. Mr Joseph noted that “the residents of Mairogo and Tosso villages are repeatedly being intimidated by Cameroonian soldiers, who claimed they are searching for Ambazonian agitators who fled Cameroon in the heat of their clash and taking refuge in some communities in the area” (The Guardian, 2021). Kurmi Local Council along with Takum, Ussa and Sardauna are among the Local Councils accommodating Cameroon refugees in Taraba State. It is, however, important to note that several of these cross-­border violations by Cameroon’s defence and security forces were not necessarily conceived of as acts of aggression against Nigeria and often not with the approval of authorities in the command centres and Yaoundé. Rather, they were often occasioned by hot pursuits of suspected separatist fighters in real-­time operations. While such infringements on territorial spaces might not be driven by hostile intents against Nigeria, they constituted vulnerable points for distrust and hostilities if not mutually addressed. TRAINING OF SENIOR DEFENCE AND SECURITY OFFICERS Following the peaceful resolution of the border conflict and activities of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission, both countries have expanded the frontiers of defence and security relations through the offering of slots for training of senior officers in military training institutions of both countries.



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Nigeria started sending her military personnel for training to Cameroon’s Cours Superieur Interarmées de Defense (CSID), in Yaoundé, which is now the Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Guerre (ESIG), in Yaoundé, from the fourth batch of participants in 2008/2009. The Nigerian military officers trained at ESIG are: a.  Lt Col Okwuei Simon Sunday b.  Cdr Dangwell Domnan c.  Col Baltu Danladi Yusufu d.  Lt Col Laleye Olajide e.  Col NVU Nnorum f.  Capt (NN) Iliya Danladi g.  Col Sylvanus Useni Maikollo h.  Col Istafanus Sunday Aliyu i.  Capt (NN) Shammah Richard j.  Col Danat Dominic k.  Capt (NN) Ekwom Nnamdi C l.  Maj Tagwoi Victor Kasai m.  Cdr Abduraheem Sikiru Onipe n.  Cdr Paul Salomon o.  Maj Yusuf Emmanuel p.  Maj Alkali Mohammed q.  Maj Nwokolo Victor Chukwuemeka r.  Col Babatunde Abdullahi Ajadi s.  Lt Col Toro Hussaini Rabiu t.  Col Ifeanyi Ajumuka u.  Lt Col Osakwe v.  Wg Cdr Williams

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Nigeria reciprocates the training of senior military officers done by Cameroon through the training of Cameroon’s defence and security personnel at Nigerian military institutions such as the Army War College (AWC), Abuja, and the Armed Forces Command and Staff College (AFCSC), Jaji, for tactical- and operational-­level cadres since 2011 in both the Junior and Senior Cadre courses. It is remarkable to note that Capt (NN) N. C. Ekwom later returned to Cameroon as Nigeria’s Defence Adviser to Cameroon, heading the military component of the Nigerian High Commission in Yaoundé. The advantages drawn from his era as a participant in the course at the ESIG significantly contributed positively in fostering bilateral cooperation in defence and security matters between both countries.

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Furthermore, some Cameroonian senior officers have been sent for Higher Defence and Strategic Studies (HDSS) at the National Defence College (NDC) located in Nigeria’s capital city of Abuja. A checklist of Cameroonian senior defence and security personnel trained at the NDC, Abuja, as at December 2021 is as follows: a.  Col Joseph Mbu b.  Lt Col MT Adeck c.  Col Ndougou Hypollyte Jean d.  Lt Col AM Tingwei e.  Col Nka Valere f.  Capt (CN) Tatason Vikram Baba g.  Col Kuitche Roger, h.  Col Djella Youndje Parfait i.  Lt Col M Ekwaingen j.  Capt (CN) ES Ebwekoh k.  Capt (CN) Agberndiffor Francois l.  Capt (CN) Ade Kenty Hillary m.  Lt Col GR Momong n.  Lt Col M Youssoufu

Course 16 Course 17 Course 18 Course 19 Course 20 Course 21 Course 22 Course 23 Course 24 Course 25 Course 26 Course 27 Course 29 Course 30

Gendarmerie Gendarmerie Army Army Army Navy Army Air Force Army Navy Navy Navy Army Army

The advantages of this joint training of senior officers for strategic-­level military education has positively contributed to fostering defence and security relations. Specifically, Col Nka Valere and Col Roger Kuitche both served as Defence Attachés in Nigeria, while Capt. (CN) Tatason was deputized during their terms. In addition, Valere and Kuitche further served as military commanders at the fourth inter-­army military region (RMIA4) in the Far North against the Boko Haram terrorists in northern Cameroon, who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015 (Al Jazeera, 2015; Business in Cameroon, 2017). Both senior officers, acting in their respective capacities as Commander, 5th Military Legion (RMIA5), in Bamenda, Northwest Cameroon, and Defence Attaché of Cameroon to Nigeria, respectively, played active roles in counterinsurgency operations of the Cameroonian military against separatist fighters in the country, which publicly announced their ideological alliance with their counterpart in southeast Nigeria in 2021. The social capital and networks developed as participants of Course 20 and 22 at the National Defence College became useful assets. The Cameroonian military have also sent cadets for training at the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) in Kaduna. However, the two cadets sennt for training were withdrawn, and the reason was not made known to Cameroon



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authorities. The withdrawal of the Cameroonian cadets from the NDA is interpreted in certain official quarters in Cameroon as a diplomatic refusal of the slots, especially as no cogent reason was given, bearing in mind that the cadets were medically fit and competent in written and oral English, which are prerequisites for the cadet training. The military courses are further complemented with exchange visits by students or participants from military training institutions. In March 2021, participants of NDC Course 29 visited ESIG, Cameroon, as part of activities to mark the Regional Study Tour package of the institution. Similarly, military officers in courses at the ESIG reciprocated through a study tour at the NDC, Abuja, in May 2021. Such esteemed exchange visits are another platform for fostering defence and security cooperation between the countries. JOINT MILITARY TRAINING EXERCISES Cameroon and Nigeria further sustain defence and security cooperation through joint military exercises such as EX OBANGAME Express, Operation Flintock and Operation Deep Punch 2 and 3. These exercises are part of a joint training program between the US naval component in Africa and the navies of Cameroon and Nigeria. Since 2013, the US Naval Forces Africa (NAVAL) at-­ sea exercise has been organized annually for the Nigerian Navy and other navies of countries in the Gulf of Guinea. This exercise is tagged EX OBANGAME Express and is designed to enhance cooperation and capacity of the navies of the participating countries to combat maritime threats (AFRICOM, n.d.). The word Obangame was derived from the Fang language of southern Cameroon and means “togetherness.” It was selected by African participants at a proof of concept for the exercise to promote regional cooperation of all navies in the Gulf of Guinea (Defence Wed, 2017). EX OBANGAME is usually characterized by drills on maritime interdiction operations, visits, board, search and seizure techniques and routine operations for the participating navies. The EX OBANGAME was conducted off the coasts of Cameroon and Nigeria in 2014 with most ships moving from the Lagos port. In 2015, the US joint high-­speed vessel USNS Spearhead (JHSV 1), its detachment of US Navy sailors, civil service mariners, and Spanish and British Marines participated alongside Nigerian and Cameroonian forces to simulate maritime interdiction boarding as part of the interoperability exercise (AFRICOM, n.d.). The EX OBANGAME Express was conducted within Nigeria’s maritime area from 24 to 28 March 2017. The Nigerian Navy assets deployed for the exercise were Nigerian Navy Ship (NNS) Okpabana, NNS Centenary, NNS

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Sagbama, alongside one helicopter with a French Navy ship, Jacoubet, which sailed into the Nigerian waters from Cameroon (Dahun, 2017). The objective of this particular exercise was to give naval forces practice in realistic scenarios that reflect past piracy incidents, whereby a hijacked vessel will transit from one territory to another (Dahun, 2017). In other words, EX OBANGAME Express is targeted at enhancing the capacity of participating navies in the Gulf of Guinea to combat maritime violations such as piracy, IUU fishing, including illicit transnational trafficking in drugs, arms and human cargo and has supported the seizure and prosecution of perpetrators of maritime violations in the Gulf of Guinea (Heyl, 2013). Operation Flintlock is a special operation of the AFRICOM-­led exercise focused on the G5 Sahel Forces and their interoperability with United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) special operations forces designed to counter malign influence, aggression and activity (US AFRICOM, n.d.). In 2020, Operation Flintlock was hosted in multiple locations in Mauritania and Senegal and attracted over 1,600 participants from over 30 countries, including Cameroon and Nigeria. It was designed to strengthen the ability of key partner nations in the region to counter violent extremist organizations, protect their borders, and provide security for their people (US AFRICOM, n.d.). These exercises have contributed to strengthening the relations between Cameroon’s and Nigeria’s militaries, as participating military personnel always meet on such occasion, which usually create avenues for cordial relations. In furtherance of the blossoming bilateral relationship between Cameroon and Nigeria, a detachment of the Nigerian military participated in the parade to mark the 46th edition of Cameroon’s National Unity Day celebration on 20 May 2018 as special guests of President Biya (Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon, 2018). In his remarks at the event, Commander of the Nigerian contingent, Lt Col Mochtar Sani Daroda noted that his troops drawn from the elite brigade that “provide security of the president and the entire federal capital city [Abuja ] and they have been selected to participate in one of the parade we hold in very high esteem. A very special corps to take part in your [Cameroon] parade” (Kindzeka, 2018). This participation of Nigerian troops was also a reciprocal visit to the visit by a Cameroon Navy ship, CNS Le Ntem, berthed at the Nigerian Navy ship NNS Victory jetty at Calabar Naval Base a year earlier as part of activities to mark Cameroon’s National Unity Day celebrations in May 2017. This friendly visit presented an opportunity for Cameroon’s naval personnel on board to display their flag and also conduct naval exercises with personnel of the Nigerian Navy at the Eastern Naval Command, Calabar (Affe, 2017).



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CONCLUSION The importance of defence and security cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria is considered necessary to enhance security and development while serving as another building block for integration in Africa. The scope of defence cooperation between both countries revolves on a number of planks. Core among these planks are security and defence policy, counter-­piracy and other maritime security priorities as well as military activities in peacetime. It further extends to the mutual exchange of visits of high-­ranking defence officials, technical meetings, exchange of information and participation in training courses, seminars, roundtables, symposia and military exercises. Certainly, quite a lot has been done by both countries in this regard, which has contributed to managing mutual threats and diplomatic tensions associated with interstate relations. There is therefore no doubt that such cooperation will be sustained. It is, however, important to note that since defence cooperation involves several issues of national security, which sometimes encompass access to classified information and coordination of defence policies, the issue of trust becomes imperative. This requires that Cameroon and Nigeria continue to invest in confidence-­building measures already put in place while also accommodating new mechanisms to boost cooperation, such as the exchange of directing staff and instructors in military academies and participation in military games, among other things. This become necessary as both countries have, since the settlement of their boundary disputes, been confronted with new security threats associated with terrorism, secessionist activities, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea as well as epidemics and a pandemic. So far, the gains from defence cooperation between both countries remain the prevention of international war between both countries and joint efforts at combating mutual security threats confronting them, but there still exists much to be done to maximize the advantages of contiguity in a dedicated security environment. It is therefore pertinent for both countries to make overtures towards cordial military relations between their respective militaries. REFERENCES Abah, Isidore. (2018). “Tension escalates between Cameroonian forces, Nigerian citizens at Ekok border.” Journal du Cameroun, 21 February. https://www​.journal​ ducameroun​.com/en/tension-­escalates-­cameroonian-­forces-­nigerian-­citizens-­ekok​ -­border/ (accessed 8 February 2022). Adetula, V. (2008). “Cross border crime in West Africa and implications for Nigeria’s national security and external relations.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no, 1 (April): 81.

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Affe, Mudiaga. (2017). “Cameroonian Navy visits Calabar, urges collaboration against maritime crime,” Punch, 22 May. https://punchng​.com/cameroonian-­navy​ -­visits-­calabar-­urges-­collaboration-­against-­maritime-­crime/ (accessed 19 April 2022). Al Jazeera. (2015). “Boko Haram pledges allegiance to ISIL, report says.” 8 March. https://www​.aljazeera​.com/news/2015/3/8/boko-­haram-­pledges-­allegiance-­to-­isil​ -­reports-­say (accessed 22 February 2022). Asare, Asare. (2021). “I convey arms from Cross River into Cameroon.” Daily Post, 22 October. https://dailypost​.ng/2021/10/22/i-­convey-­arms-­from-­cross-­river-­into​ -­cameroon-­suspect-­confesses/ (accessed 12 February 2022). Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2020) “Defence cooperation: ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Retreat.” 19 February, Hanoi, Vietnam. https://asean​.org/our-­communities/asean-­political-­security-­community/peaceful​ -­secure-­and-­stable-­region/defence-­cooperation/ (accessed 12 February 2022). British Broadcasting Corporation. (2006). “Nigeria hands Bakassi to Cameroon,” 14 August. https://news​.bbc​.co​.uk/1/hi/world/africa/4789647.stm (accessed 9 February 2022). Business in Cameroon. (2017). “Cameroon: Brigadier General Valere Nka in charge of fight against boko haram,” 2 February. https://www​.businessincameroon​.com/ public-­management/0202-6861-cameroon-­brigadier-­general-­valere-­nka-­in-­charge​ -­of-­fight-­against-­boko-­haram (accessed 20 February 2022). Carston, Paul. (2017). “Exclusive: Cameroon troops entered Nigeria without seeking authorisation, sources in Nigeria say.” Reuters, 20 December. https://www​reuters​ .com/article/us-­cameroon-­separatists-­nigeria-­idUSKBN1EE2II (accessed 17 January 2022). Channels Television, (2016). “Nigeria’s defence chief visits Niger, Cameroon to deepen military ties,” 30 April. https://www​.channelstv​.com/2016/04/30/defence​ -­chief-­visits-­niger-­cameroun-­deepen-­military-­ties/ (accessed 8 February 2022). Country Listing. (n.d.). “Nigeria: local and bilateral issues.” www​.country-­data​.com/ cgi-­bin/query/r-9454 html (accessed 8 February 2022). Dahun, Suleman. (2017). “Nigerian Navy deploys ships, helicopter for Obangame Express,” 22.March 22. https://prnigeria​ .com/security/nigerian-­ navy-­ obangame​ -­express/ (accessed 25 September 2017). Daily Trust. (2018). “Nigeria won’t be used to destabilise Cameroon—Monguno,” 5 February. https://dailytrust​.com/nigeria-­wont-­be-­used-­to-­destabilize-­cameroon​ -­monguno-3 (accessed (12 February 2022). Deutsche Welle. (n.d.). “Cameroonian troops deploy heavily along Nigeria border.” https://www​.dw​.com/en/cameroonian-­troops-­deploy-­heavily-­along-­nigeria-­border/​ a-40877538 (accessed 8 February 2022). Federal Republic of Nigeria. (2012). Agreement on the establishment of the Transborder Security Committee between the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the government of the Republic of Cameroon, 28 February. France24. (2013). “French family kidnapped in Cameroon describes ordeal,” 23 April. https://www​ france24.com/en/20130423-french-­family-­kidnapped-­hostages​ -­cameroon-­released-­moulin-­fournier.



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Fulani, Iro Dan. (2014). “Boko Haram: Runaway Nigerian soldiers return from Cameroon,” 26 August. https://www​.premiumtimesng​.com/opinion/167327-boko​ -­haram​-­runaway-­nigerian-­soldiers-­return-­from-­cameroon​ html (accessed 8 January 2022). Guardian. (2017). “FG summons Cameroon envoy over killing of Nigerians in Bakassi,” 9 July. https://www​.pressreader​.com/nigeria/thisday/20170709/282114931608993 (accessed 12 February 2022). Heyl, Philip J. (2013). “West and Central African leaders unite against piracy in the Gulf of Guinea” Paper presented at the 3rd United Arab Emirates International Counter Piracy Conference; Dubai, 11–12 September. Igbonwelundu, Precious. (2014). “Why criminals operate freely at Nigeria/Cameroon border.” The Nation, 10 March. https://thenationonlineng​net/why-­criminals​ -­operate​-­freely-­at-­nigeriacameroon-­border/ (accessed 11 February 2022). Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. (2017). “Cameroon, Nigeria collaborate against piracy.” Voice of America, 23 May. https://www​.voanews​.com/a/cameroon-­nigeria-­collaborate​ -­against-­piracy/3868384 html (accessed 10 February 2022). Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. (2018). “Killings, kidnappings mar Cameroon national day celebrations.” Voice of America, 20 May. https://www​ .voanews​ .com/a/killings​ -­kidnappings​-­mar-­cameroon-­national-­day-­celebrations/4402248.html (accessed 12 February 2022). Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. (2021). “Cameroon, Nigeria announce efforts to jointly fight separatists.” Voice of America 27 August. https://www​.voanews​.com/a/ africa​_cameroon-­nigeria-­announce-­effort-­jointly-­fight-­separatists/6210045 html (accessed 7 January 2022). Kinne, Brandon, J. (2018). “Defence Cooperation Agreements and the emergence of a Global Security Network.” International Organisation 72, no. 4 (fall): 799–837. Lake Chad Basin Commission Resolution. (2014). Ministry of Defence of Georgia. (n.d.). “Bilateral Defence Cooperation.” https://mod​ .gov​.ge/en/page/40/bilateral-­defence-­cooperation (accessed 29 December 2021). Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). “Security and defence cooperation in Africa.” France Diplomatie, https://www​.diplomatie​.gouv​ fr/en/country-­files/ africa/security-­and-­the-­fight-­against-­terrorism/security-­and-­defence-­cooperation​ -­in-­africa/ (accessed 12 February 2022). Ndukwu, Ebere. (2017). “FG summons Cameroonian ambassador over 97 Nigerians killed in Bakassi.” Ripples Nigeria, 8 July. https://www​.ripplesnigeria​.com/ fg-­summons-­cameroonian-­ambassador-97-nigerians-­killed-­bakassi/?fb_comment​ _id=1347788098675700_3963220653799085& (accessed 22 February 2022). New Nigerian. (1991). May 30. Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). (2009). Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Finland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland and the Ministry of Defence of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden on Nordic Defence Cooperation, Helsinki, 4 November. https://www​ nordefco​.org/Files/nordefco-­mou​.pdf (accessed 4 February 2022).

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Nyok, Efio-­ Ita, (2018). “Video: Cameroun’s armoured tanker placed on Nig-­ Cameroun border, tanker faces Nig! Custom official frowns.” Negroid Haven, 16 March. https://www​.negroidhaven​.com/2018/03/video-­camerouns-­armoured-­ tanker​-­placed/ (accessed 7 January 2022). Odunsi, Wale. (2018). “NSA blows hot, says Nigeria won’t be used as ‘staging ground’ against Cameroon.” Daily Post, 6 February. https://dailypost​ng/2018/02/06/nsa​ -­blows​-­hot-­says-­nigeria-­wont-­used-­staging-­ground-­cameroon/ (accessed 12 February 2022). Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. (2009). “Cameroon: A strategic frontline state.” Africa Strategic Review 1, no. 2. Okereke, C.N., F. Onuoha, and M. Emmanuel. (2008). “Nationalism, struggle for Bakassi and the changing face of diplomacy between Nigeria and Cameroon.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1. Omonobi, Kingsley B’Haram. (2014). “Nigerian troops flee rampaging Boko Haram fighters.” Vanguard, 26 August. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2014/08/bharam​ -­nigerian​-­troops-­flee-­rampaging-­boko-­haram-­fighters/ (accessed 6 January 2022). Ona, Emma. (2018). “Cameroon soldiers invade Cross River community, kill three.” Vanguard, 26 February. https://www​ .vanguardngr​ .com/2018/02/cameroonian​ -­soldiers​-­invade-­cross-­river-­community-­kill-­three/ (accessed 6 February 2022). Opara, George. (2018). “Senate summons defence minister over invasion by Cameroon soldiers,” The Guardian, 8 February. https://guardian​ng/news/senate​ -­summons​-­defence-­minister-­over-­invasion-­by-­camerounian-­soldiers/ (accessed 12 February 2022). Oritse, Godwin. (2021). “Nigeria, Cameroon move to counter piracy in Gulf of Guinea.” Vanguard, 27 April 2021. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2021/04/nigeria​-­cameroon​ -­move-­to-­counter-­piracy-­in-­gulf-­of-­guinea/ (accessed 11 February 2022). Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. (2018). “Cameroon celebrates military cooperation with Nigeria on 46th National Day.” https://www​.prc​.cm/en/​news/​ 2846-cameroon-­celebrates-­military-­cooperation-­with-­nigeria-­on-46th-­national​ -­day (accessed 12 February 2022). Republic of Kenya. (2021). Agreement between the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the government of the Republic of Kenya concerning Defence Cooperation London, 27 July 2021 and presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs by Command of Her Majesty in November. https://assets​.publishing​.service​ .gov​.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1034481/CS​_ Kenya_1.2021_Defence_Cooperation_Agreement​.pdf (accessed 4 February 2022). République du Cameroun, Decret No. 2016/188 du 11 April 2016. (2016). Portant nomination a titre exceptionnel dans I’Ordre National de la Valeur. Shirbon, Estelle (2007a), “Nigeria rejects rebel claim it killed Cameroonians,” Reuters, 17 November, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL15186147 (accessed 29 August 2022). Shirbon, Estelle. (2007b). “Up to 21 Cameroon troops killed in Bakassi,” Reuters, 13 November. https://www​reuters​.com/article/idUSL1382294 (accessed 8 February 2022).



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Tatason, Vikram Baba. (2016). “Welcome speech delivered on the occasion of the Cameroon military common meal, ‘repas de corps’ in Abuja.” Teke, Elvis. (2021). “Diplomacy: Nigeria chief of defence staff visits his Cameroon counterpart.” Cameroon Radio and Television (CRTV) News, 2 April. https://www​.crtv​.cm/2021/04/diplomacy-­nigeria-­chief-­of-­defence-­staff-­visits-­his​ -­cameroonian-­counterpart/ (accessed 11 February 2022). United Nations High Commission for Refugees (Refworld). (2010). “Cameroon rebels threaten security in oil-­rich Guinea,” 24 November. https://www​refworld​.org/ docid/4cf4dafc2.html (accessed 8 February 2022). United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). (n.d.). “Flintlock.” https://www​.afri​ com​mil/what-­we-­do/exercises/flintlock (accessed 17 February 2022). United States Navy. (2017) “Exercise Obangame Express 2017 concludes.” https:// www​.defenceweb​.co​.za/sea/sea-­sea/exercise-­obangame-­express-2017-concludes/ (accessed 19 April 2022). Vanguard. (2013). “Father of abducted French family speaks in Boko Haram recording,” 18 March. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2013/03/father-­of-­abducted-­french​ -­family-­speaks-­in-­boko-­haram-­recording/ (accessed 11 February 2022). Vanguard. (2012). “The Bakassi sovereignty and international politics,” 25 September. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2012/09/the-­bakassi-­sovereignty-­and-­international​ -­politics/ (accessed 8 February 2022). Voice of America. (2014). “Report: Nigerian troops flee to Cameroon,” 4 September. https://www​.voanews​.com/a/report-­nigieria-­troops-­boko-­haram​-­cameroon/​ 2438586 html (accessed 8 January 2022).

Chapter Ten

Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Engagements of Cameroon and Nigeria along Common Border Areas Usman A. Tar and Nufaisa Garba Ahmed

INTRODUCTION The nature and dynamics of armed conflicts had transformed at the end of the Cold War, from ideological and territorial quagmires between sovereign states (Laqueur, 2004) to new forms of security threats independent of national boundaries (Wenger and Simon, 2008). This change in national security threats from orthodox aggression to asymmetric confrontation was made easy by the advent of globalization, eruption of new and improved technologies, and proliferation of a web of criminal networks that raised up to challenge the sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation-­states. The emergence of non-­state actors borne out of this circumstance and their activities against nation-­states have bred an ambience for grave security threats in the form of insurgency, terrorism, crime, arms proliferation, illicit trade, forced displacement and migration across international borders. According to Abott et al. (2006) the commonest form of armed conflict and greatest jeopardy to global peace and security in the 21st century is insurgency perpetrated by violent non-­state actors. In Africa, the inability of nations to apply sovereign force and capacity in the protection of their territory against internal and external aggression, as well as efficiently police their borders, has subjected the continent to the scourges of insurgency and terrorism (Herbst, 2000). Insurgent/terrorist groups whose activities have adversely disrupted the stability, peace and development of the African continent include the Lord’s Resistance Army in northern Uganda, the Al-­ Shabaab in Somalia, the National Movement of Azawad (MNLA) in northern Mali, the Al-­Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the M23 175

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Rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Boko Haram in Nigeria and a host of others. However, a dire implication of this loophole in governance and functionality of security architecture is cross-­border criminalities in the form of cattle rustling; armed banditry; smuggling of illicit arms, drugs and unlawful commodities; human trafficking; and so on. Many scholars have attributed these security situations to the porosity of African borders, which is premised upon their artificial and arbitrary creation by the colonial masters without due consideration to the continent’s distinct peculiarities (Herbst, 1989). In addition to this assertion, Ahmad (2013) submits that African borders were poorly defined/encircled, ill-­ partitioned and over time, mismanaged by ill-­trained, ill-­equipped and de-­motivated personnel tasked to safeguard the borders against cross-­border crimes which has birthed transnational crimes and insurgencies. Insurgency as a form of transnational crime, according to Salehyan (2010), involves the translocation of the act across international boundaries, which metamorphosed from an exclusively domestic affair to a collective (in)security threat, given that insurgents have amplified and established themselves on external soil, among other reasons, in search of safety and convenience for training combatants, stockpiling arms and enjoying a level of dominance. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram insurgency has had a spill-­over effect across the Lake Chad Basin and exposed the porous borders of African countries, especially in West Africa, where the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of persons is binding. More so, the infiltration of the insurgency in the border communities of north eastern Nigeria, bounded by Chad, Cameroon and Niger, has become a major regional security concern. Cross-­ border free movement has been an enabler to the Boko Haram insurgency, which relies heavily on recruitment and radicalization across a collection of divergent actors and sophisticated weaponry acquired through international borders (Christopher, 2016). A strategic operational area for Boko Haram has been the Nigeria-­Cameroon border where communities residing along the border areas have been subjected to abject terror since 2011. Cultural, religious and geographic similarities between north-­ eastern Nigeria and Cameroon’s Far North exposed the region’s vulnerability to the plight of insurgency. Cameroon initially regarded the insurgency as a Nigerian problem until the sect began using communities along the Nigerian-­Cameroon border such as Bodo, Kouyape and Nguetechewe, among others, as transit routes and recruitment centres, while launching series of attacks in the areas (Luccino 2016). Over time, as the sect’s activities continued to gain momentum in several communities in Cameroon, the Cameroonian government was forced to reverse its decision and reconsider its approach. One of which was



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the immediate closure of its border with Nigeria at Amchide and Fotokol, which served as a supply route to Mayo-­Moskota, where the sect reportedly sells stolen goods in markets around the area (International Crisis Group, 2016). On 14 May 2014, Cameroon officially declared war on Boko Haram, and on 2 December 2014, without hesitance, recruited 20, 000 defence and security forces for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations (Kindzeka 2014). Regional security cooperation, interdependence and collaborative engagements have become necessary in combatting transnational insurgency. Taking the form of Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency (CT-­COIN) strategies, which involves series of states’ interventions in policies and operations conducted by forces within and outside a sovereign territory, the ultimate goal is to crush the insurgents operating within the borders and fringes of the state and restore governmental control (Kilcullen, 2010). Against this backdrop, it is factual to state that national and transnational CT-­COIN efforts deployed through the unification of state’s defence and security assets to confront terrorism and insurgency are imperative to combat global war on terror in the 21st century. Therefore, in cognizance of this fact, Nigeria and Cameroon have collectively deployed both soft- and hard-­power approaches, that is, military and non-­military perspectives in combatting the Boko Haram insurgency across its common border areas in the form of bilateral and multilateral agreements. This chapter therefore examines CT-­COIN operations along the Nigeria-­Cameroon common border areas, ranging from military operations to cross-­border security measures and refugee crisis control as some of the key responses that will submerge the insurgency. The chapter argues that trans-­ border incursions of Boko Haram and the exploitation of vulnerable areas along the Nigerian-­Cameroon border areas have posed immense security risks to the LCB. The chapter further reveals that although CT-­COIN initiatives have received considerable attention and investments in contemporary times, there is also the need for states to wholly employ more strategic CT-­ COIN initiatives that are more encompassing and sustainable. This chapter therefore proceeds in five parts. After the introduction, the second part offers a conceptual discourse of CT-­COIN in order to unearth divergent scholarly debates on the concept and provide a lens through which the Boko Haram insurgency and many others can be classified. The third part of the chapter then proceeds to unveil the evolution and dynamics of insurgency and terrorism along the Nigeria-­Cameroon border areas. While the fourth part examines the frontiers of CT-­COIN operations in the form of bilateral and multilateral arrangements between the parties, the fifth part concludes the chapter and offers valuable recommendations.

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CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK From a variety of divergent perspectives and scholarly debates, the search for an all-­encompassing definition of, and between, terrorism and insurgency has proven abortive despite the concepts’ relevance in the field of peace and conflict. Because both terrorism and insurgency are relative and subjective, although similar, and often used interchangeably, the provision of a universally acceptable and recognized definition has been difficult to ascertain. Therefore, the following paragraphs will offer some relatable definitions of the concept of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as insurgency and counterinsurgency, that will serve as working templates for this chapter. Terrorism and Counterterrorism Terrorism is a contested term with numerous surrounding complexities, given the inference that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Manu, 2021). In broad terms, terrorism is the use of violence or threat by individuals, groups, sub-­state or state actors to register their opposed grievances over unfavourable existing political, social or economic situations. This tactic is carried out by instilling fear in the population, thereby compelling the government to act in a certain way or, vice versa, take a particular decision or another. For the purpose of this chapter, the definition of the African Union’s (AU) (1999) Convention on the Prevention and Combatting Terrorism, Article 3, is adopted, as it provides a comprehensive definition accepted by African leaders. It states: “Terrorism is any act that is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party, and which may endanger the life, physical integrity, or freedom of; or cause serious injury or death to, any person, member, or group of persons; or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental, or cultural heritage and is intended to: a.  Intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government, body, or institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or b.  Disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or c.  Create general insurrection in a state. Counterterrorism, on the other hand, is among the several mechanisms adopted by states in responding to violence perpetrated by non-­state armed groups and other violent actors such as rebels and terrorists. It involves



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multifaceted measures or operations conducted internally within the boundaries of a state or across international borders in conjunction with foreign bodies or entities. Deflem (2010) views counterterrorism as a tool of social control that incorporates various apparatuses and institutions that are at the forefront of responding to terrorism. In his view, central to this is government of nation-­states and international bodies. He further states that the criminal justice system, including its agents such as the police, is the most formal component if social control. To Bamidele (2016, 111), counterterrorism is primarily concerned about safeguarding “homeland security,” in particular, the protection of unarmed civilians via extreme alertness through the application of safety measures, intelligence, law enforcement, interagency synergy, and the utilization of force, if required. Another submission is by Ladan (2012), who views counterterrorism as measures or initiatives deployed by the state to prevent and control any act of terror irrespective of perpetrators or victims. Ladan’s definition of counterterrorism lays emphasis on the need to prevent terror against the state or its infrastructure of which civilians are at the centre. He also reinforces the essence of preservation of lives and properties through state security agents, including the police, military, intelligence community and the judiciary, who must cooperate to counter the activities of religious extremists, separatist organisations and political actors, among others, whose aim is to unleash terror. Ladan’s definition and perception is considered appropriate for this chapter because it offers full coverage of the counterterrorism operations needed to create an ambience of peace, security and socioeconomic stability of the nation. Therefore, the definition is considered suitable and, thus, adopted. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Insurgency, like terrorism, has existed throughout history but has ebbed and flowed in strategic significance (Metz and Millen, 2004, vi); and like terrorism, insurgency is an ambiguous concept that has defied all efforts at a globally accepted definition (Folarin and Oviasogie, 2014, 2). According to the Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency (2012), published in the mid-1980s by the US government (USG), insurgency is “a protracted political-­military activity directed toward completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organisations. Insurgent activity including guerrilla warfare; terrorism; and political mobilization, for example, propaganda, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activity, is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy.” Similarly, Saud Al Otaibi, Emir of AL Qaeda in the Arabian

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Peninsula, as captured by Kilcullen (2010), views insurgency as a grassroots rebellion movement aimed at removing a legitimate government and existing social structures through the use of instruments of the weak (subversion, guerrilla tactics and terrorism) against a legal government or its conventional military forces. One common consensus among the definitions offered by these scholars, according to Manu (2021, 233), is the belief that the goal of insurgents is to remove and replace an existing government. However, not all insurgent groups aim at toppling the existing government. To Manu, the overall aim of reformist insurgents is to compel the ruling and governing elite to introduce new radical reforms aimed at changing the status quo and not changing the government. From these definitions, it can be deduced that insurgency can be seen as a subversive movement by a group of dissatisfied actors over feelings of discontent, marginalization or alienation by the state or ruling class, who deploy militant force among other subversive means to achieve their desired motives. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, is perceived to be measures aimed at thwarting any anti-­state or anti-­establishment threats through collaborative efforts of security and strategic agencies internally and externally, with the aim of protecting citizens. Put simply, the US Department of Defense (2001) definition of counterinsurgency reads as follows: “Those military, paramilitary, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.” On the other hand, the US Army-­Marine Corps COIN Field Manual 2006 as captured by Nagl et al. (2008) defined COIN as military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. These definitions offer little aid in understanding the nature of counterinsurgency or its expected end state. Furthermore, Osakwe and Esseien (2013, 392) defines counterinsurgency as coordinated action of the state towards “filling the gaps,” such as societal problems on which insurgents capitalize. The authors further submit that it is war waged within a state by a government using the instruments of state power in a combination of military, political, economic, civil, legal and psychological means. However, this definition is also deficient in recognizing the involvement of foreign partners or state actors in an expeditionary CT-­COIN operation. In cognizance of the complexities and dynamics of conflicts, any definition of counterinsurgency must acknowledge the nature, characteristics and strategy of insurgency. In this regard, this chapter adopts the definition of counterinsurgency by Moore (2007) as “an integrated set of political, economic, social, and security measures intended to end and prevent the recurrence of armed violence, create and maintain stable political, economic, and social structures, and resolve the underlying causes of an insurgency in order to establish and sustain the conditions necessary for lasting stability.” This



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definition is adopted because its prescriptive in dissecting the ultimate and end-­state objective of counterinsurgency acknowledges the causes, dynamics and complexities of insurgency and recognizes military and security operations within the wider prism of the conflict. FIRE IN THE NEIGHBOURHOOD: TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY ALONG CAMEROON-­NIGERIA BORDERS Contemporary border insecurity in Africa as articulated by some scholars is a recurrent phenomenon that owes to the arbitrary and artificial creation of African borders by colonialists without consideration of the continent’s social, political and regional distinctiveness, thereby altering the original structural composition of nations (Fonkeng, 2014). According to Anene (1970), the borders between eastern Nigeria and Cameroon were arbitrarily drawn by the colonialists (British and French) with a pencil and ruler, stretching from Calabar to Yola, without prior familiarity with the domains. However, security analysts and experts have dismissed this assertion by associating contemporary threats to national security in the form of terrorism and insurgency, illicit trade, migration, transnational organized crime, among others, as a repercussion of border mismanagement and ungoverned spaces that have paved an avenue for diverse local and foreign hostilities (Okoli and Ochim, 2016). This claim is reinforced by Okumu (2010, 22), as he opined that “the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them.” The aftermath of the Arab Spring in North Africa, the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime and the subsequent rundown of Libya into a failed state birthed new security challenges and vulnerabilities associated with terrorism and insurgency on the African continent. This event marked the unprecedented proliferation of arms in Africa and the militarization of civilians, thereby enabling the rise in violent conflicts and extremism across international borders (Eveslage, 2013). The Nigeria-­Cameroon border which covers a distance of 1,690 kilometres, stretching from Lake Chad in the north to the Bight of Biafra in the Atlantic Ocean, is a classic reference point to the potential spread of terrorist activities given its poorly delimitated nature, porosity and vagueness (Fonkeng, 2019). Both Nigeria and Cameroon share similar cultural and religious characteristics bound by political antagonism and religious spirituality embedded in Muslims in both countries. Moreover, parts of modern Borno and Adamawa were administered under the United Nations Trusteeship as the British Northern Cameroons until 1 October 1961 (Lenshie and Gambo, 2014) The fact

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that Cameroon shares a border with some states in northern Nigeria and that security threats and quagmires could trigger instability and spill over into regional boundaries was evident in the Maitatsine uprising of 1980s. History has recognized this to be one of the worst insurgencies perpetrated by a Cameroonian cleric, Mahomammed Marwa, who steered an uprising with his message that “denounced the affluent elites as infidels, opposed Western influence, and refused to recognize secular authorities” (Human Rights Watch, 2012, 22). Even in contemporary times, the potential spread of terrorist activities across the Nigerian-­Cameroon border is premised by this reality, including the fact that Nigeria’s insurgent group Boko Haram exerts immense influence in the northern Nigerian states bordering Cameroon. The recent outbreak of the Anglophone crisis in the two English-­speaking regions of north west and south west Cameroon, which ensued from an armed struggle for independence by Ambazonia nationalists, and the spill-­over of the Boko Haram insurgency to Cameroon’s Far North are two key events that provided a level playing ground for violent confrontations to thrive in Cameroon (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2020). Despite efforts put in place by military and security forces to maintain law, decorum and peace within the territory, violent agitations and conflicts remain unabated, thus subjecting Cameroon to the scourges of terrorism and insurgency. As construed by history, the Boko Haram insurgency at inception in 2002 domiciled its operations within the Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and Taraba states of northern Nigeria. Advocating for the imbibition of strict Islamic Sharia Law as a substitute for the dominance of Western values, the sect formed alliances and extended its networks to other northern states in Nigeria with the aim of denouncing Western influences, culture, beliefs, etiquette and prescriptions for education and governmental control (Hashim et al., 2012; Aliyu et al., 2015; Iyekekpolo, 2016; Aguwa, 2017). What began as a local religious and social movement by the Boko Haram within the confines of the Nigerian state soon metamorphosed into a regional crisis across the Lake Chad Basin (Tar and Mustapha, 2017). The prevalence of porous borders in the West African sub-­region further amplified the capacity and efficiency of Boko Haram to expand its operational reach, mandate and influence, taking into cognizance the nature of Nigeria’s porous borders, as well as the demographics and socioeconomic realities of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries (Weeraratne, 2017). The agitation for expansionism, territorial infringement and sculpturing of a “Caliphate” across the Lake Chad region led to the transnationalization of the insurgency across the margins of Niger, Cameroon and Chad being Nigeria’s immediate neighbours (Pieri and Zenn, 2016). A Cameroonian political analyst and lecturer in international law at the International Relations Institute Cameroon (IRIC) posited:



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Cameroon should worry about Boko Haram. We have a civilized Islamic practice in Cameroon. However, we are not sure that we won’t have radicals one day. Boko Haram’s fight is due to the economic and political context of northern Nigeria, with disputes over the equal sharing of national resources. Cameroon finds itself in a similar context and so measures must be taken. (Tembang, 2012)

According to a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2016), Boko Haram, as far back as 2001, actively leveraged the web of local Cameroonian imams, wandering preachers and young Islamic scholars who had studied and trained in Nigeria, Sudan, or the Middle East to recruit and radicalize people in the Mayo Tsanaga, Mayo Sava, Logone and Chari divisions of Cameroon. Later, in 2009, traces of the sect at the border between Cameroon and Nigeria became obvious when members of Boko Haram fleeing Nigerian security forces were forced to settle or pass through Fotokol, Mora, Maroua, Kousseri, Bornori, Tolkomari, Kolofata and few other border communities (Vincent et al., 2017). With the rise and spread of Boko Haram ideology and activities between 2011 and 2013, the sect’s interest in Cameroon became palpable as they began recruiting Cameroonian fighters in the Logone, Chari and Mayo Sava divisions of the Far North, while also using the territory as a safe haven for carrying out their illicit ventures (Heungoup, 2016). Similarly, the Mandara Mountains, which cut across the border areas of north eastern Nigeria and Cameroon also provide the group with cover and concealment for planning and executing cross-­border atrocities in Nigeria and Cameroon, due to their complex terrain (Seignobos, 2015). Structural and economic gaps along with cultural and religious similarities between Cameroon’s Far North province and north eastern Nigeria has made the region an advantage for Boko Haram (Rackley, 2017). Also, high unemployment, limited educational infrastructure, poverty/impoverishment and marginalization, among other factors, are forces that have consumed structural development in Cameroon’s Far North (Schrieder and Knerr, 2000). This explains why the Mayo-­Sava Division of Cameroon’s Far North (the poorest region) produced the highest number of Cameroonian militants that joined Boko Haram while they were forming a logistic and recruitment base in the region. Coupled with the high inflow of refugees to Cameroon from 2012 as a result of hostilities toward them by Boko Haram in Nigeria, the sect took advantage of this edge to recruit new members who submitted to radicalization due to harsh living conditions (Vincent et al., 2017). In addition to these gaps, Cameroonian militants, who were mostly men, joined the sect for various other reasons, according to consolidated data from the International Crisis Group (ICG) (2016a); between 3,500 to 4,000 Cameroonians submitted themselves to insurgency for exploration and adventure, retaliation, opportunism and radicalization, among other reasons, while more than 1,000 abducted in 2014 alone were recruited by the sect by force.

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The activities of Boko Haram on Cameroonian soil started between 2011 and 2013.The Far North of Cameroon became transit points for weapon acquisition by Boko Haram from Libya and Sudan; the Fotokol area became one of the entry points of these arms into Nigeria, while the Kousseri area served as their logistic base. Furthermore, the kidnapping of foreigners and abductions of Cameroonians became intensified by the sect. Between 2013 and 2014, the sect abducted 22 foreigners residing in Cameroon, comprising Italian, French, Chinese and Canadian people, notable among whom were a French priest, two Italian priests and the wife of Cameroon’s Deputy Prime Minister Ahmadou Ali (Menner, 2014) According to reports, a total of about $11 million and at least 40 Boko Haram members detained in Cameroon were offered in exchange for the release of the captives (Zenn, 2018). In addition, Boko Haram attacked critical infrastructure, such as the Elbedei Bridge, which links Nigeria and Cameroon, located between Gamboru Ngala and Fotokol, as well as security/military bases at Mayo-­Sava (Gendarmerie brigade in Bounderi), Karewa and Assighasia camps, among others (Okereke and Ibeh, 2019). The Boko Haram insurgency at first was considered to solely be a Nigerian problem by its immediate neighbouring countries, including Cameroon’s government, which was hesitant at first to adopt measures that would address the insurgency’s looming effects. However, with the spread of the sect’s activities across the Lake Chad Basin and the series of events that unfolded in the form of abductions, bombings, and attacks in Cameroon, the Cameroonian government officially declared war on Boko Haram on 14 May 2014 and promulgated Law No. 2014/028 of 23 December 2014 on the suppression of acts of terrorism (Kingah, 2018). Since then, Cameroon has become a theatre of war characterized by an alternation of conventional war from 2014 to guerrilla/asymmetrical warfare in mid-2015, which was seen as a hybrid strategy to respond to military counterinsurgency operations (Mbarkoutou, 2016). Overall, Nkwi (2013, 56) submits that Boko Haram operations in Cameroon are motivated by the need to recruit fighters to replace the dwindling source in Nigeria, flee from activities of security agencies in Nigeria that have intensified counterterrorism measure, and the determination to punish Cameroon for collaborating with Lake Chad Basin area countries in counterterrorism operations. He also attributed the choice of Cameroon as a puppet of the insurgency due to the porous nature of her borders with Nigeria’s north eastern states of Adamawa and Borno, which constitutes the frontline theatres of Boko Haram. The impacts of the Boko Haram insurgency, especially in Cameroon’s Far North, are duly exhibited by the recurrent cases of suicide attacks, military assaults, abductions, mass murder and other crimes against humanity.



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According to consolidated data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), in conjunction with l’Œil du Sahel (a highly acclaimed triweekly newspaper known for its rigor in detailed reports on insurgent activities in Cameroon), between January 2013 and June 2017, about 556 attacks and 77 suicide bombings were carried out by the dreaded Boko Haram in the Far North region. The data also showed that half of these attacks occurred at the Mayo-­Sava Division, the hotspot of the insurgency, while about 157 attacks occurred in the Kolofata district alone (Institute for Peace and Security Studies, 2020). This period marked the intensification of Boko Haram activities as for the first time in 2016, out of the 52 per cent of total incidents carried out by Boko Haram outside Nigeria, an estimated 45 per cent were staged in Cameroon, a figure that rose from the recorded 21 per cent in 2015 (Institute of Security Studies, 2017). Similarly, ACLED data, as captured by the African Research Institute (2017), has shown that between 2016 and early 2017, the group launched an estimated 150 attacks in the Cameroonian region, including 22 suicide bombings killing about 260 civilians. Equally alarming is the perturbing and derogatory issues of human-­security protection, particularly the millions of refugees, internally displaced people (IDPs) and burdened host communities who have become vulnerable victims to the insurgency. The influx of refugees from Nigeria to Cameroon has reached an alarming level and caused dire humanitarian challenges. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017), around 200,000 Cameroonians had been internally displaced and about 74,000 Nigerians travelled into Cameroon for refuge due to the Boko Haram crisis. Many of these refugees, as posited by the UNHCR, entered Cameroon through border areas such as Fotokol, Kewara, Tourou, Amchidé and Mogodé and have lived in the Minawao camp since 2013. The camp, which has a capacity of just about 20,000, is said to be hosting about 60,000 people, the majority of whom are Nigerian (Human Rights Watch, 2017). In the same vein, communities along the Nigeria-­Cameroon border, particularly the Logone-­Chari, Mayo-­Sava, Mayo-­Tsanaga and Far North, are identified as areas with high insecurity and a mass humanitarian burden. According to the results of the Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) study carried out in May 2017, across the entire territory of Cameroon (10 regions), around 16 per cent of households are estimated to be food insecure (3.9 million people), including 1 per cent that are severely food insecure (around 211,000 people) (UNWFP, 2017). In May 2018, Cameroon’s Far North had an estimated 96,000 Nigerian refugees (including 65,000 at the Minawao camp) and about 238,000 IDPs (Reliefweb, 2018). Although the Cameroonian government since 2015 has forced more than 120,000 refugees to return to Nigeria and also signed a tripartite

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agreement in 2017 between Cameroon, Nigeria and UNHCR to ensure the voluntary return of refugees to their home country, this has proved abortive as refugees have shown little interest or readiness to go back home (UNHCR, 2017) Given that most of the IDPs in the Far North are from border communities in Nigeria that have been shattered by the brutality of war, they remain compelled to permanently live in camps where they are hosted. This situation of complex emergency breeds social tensions and dissuades social cohesion between refugees, IDPs and host communities, especially, on issues concerning access to resources. This of course triggers pre-­existing stress factors and immense pressure on the environment, natural resources and the institutions that manage them. Most importantly, border closures and other ad hoc restrictions between Cameroon’s Far North and Nigeria have adversely affected cross-­ border trade, local markets and livelihoods, given that 80 per cent of consumer goods in northern Cameroon are imported from Nigeria across the border. The insurgency along border communities has also made transporting the few cultivated crops across the cities and towns. This is because key bridges over which these goods are transported have always been ambushed by the insurgents, crops are being destroyed and people killed. This has long-­term consequences on food supplies across the two countries. The Far North region of Cameroon had experienced three consecutive years of poor harvests and disrupted markets, as an assessment by the Emergency Food Security unit of the World Food Programme (WFP) has shown that in the four most fragile regions of Cameroon, almost 250,000 people are severely food insecure and 1.7 million are moderately food insecure. Also, in June 2015 alone, over 200,000 people in the Far North region of Cameroon lived with acute food insecurity and about 35 per cent of the children in the border areas were estimated to be malnourished (ACAPS, 2015). Furthermore, the much-­used Nigerian petrol in Northern Cameroon, called “zua-­zua,” which is often smuggled across the Nigerian-­Cameroon border, became scarce due to strict border-­control measure. Thus, the price of the petrol skyrocketed from 400 CFA to 600 CFA per litre (IRIN, 2013). In some areas in the Far North of Cameroon, about 4,500 hectares of fields were said to be abandoned by displaced farmers and nearly 80 per cent of the regional economy withered due to closure of borders, which inhibits trade exchanges, especially the importation of fertilizer from Nigeria that was banned due to allegations that the Boko Haram manufactured explosives from fertilizers to wreak havoc (Nkwi, 2013). Overall, the Boko Haram insurgency which spread over the Lake Chad Basin and whose main causes are exogenous has exacerbated pre-­ existing vulnerabilities and structural development crises in both Cameroon and Nigeria.



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FRONTIERS OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS The Nigeria-­Cameroon border that stretches from the Bight of Biafra on the south eastern axis to the Lake Chad area in the far north has been subjected to heavy military reconnaissance in the form of bilateral and multilateral engagements between Nigeria and Cameroon. This strategic cooperation is driven by the need to police and guard the common border areas of the two countries and respond actively to the exigencies of the Boko Haram insurgency. Therefore, the following paragraphs will unpack the various CT-­COIN operations carried out as responses to counter the continuous threat of Boko Haram to the Nigeria-­Cameroon border areas Bilateral Framework The fight against insurgency, owing to the high rate of attacks committed by Boko Haram along the Nigeria-­Cameroon common border areas, necessitated the federal government under President Goodluck Jonathan to establish a special Joint Task Force (JTF) in June 2011, consisting of the military (Army, Air Force and Navy), the Department of State Security (DSS) and the Nigerian Police Force, headquartered in Maiduguri (Amnesty International, 2015). In order to control, monitor and check the smuggling of arms in and out of Nigeria’s porous borders and dislodge Boko Haram members seeking safety in border communities, the Nigerian government closed down the borders between Northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries, including Cameroon (Baldauf and Writer, 2012). Closely following was the deployment of 30,000 security personnel of the JTF to implement the state of emergency and curfew declared in hotspot areas including border communities (Omede, 2011). In addition to this effort, Nigeria and Cameroon signed an agreement to set up the Trans-­border Security Committee in 2012. The bilateral agreement had the sole objective of exploring and adopting measures to deny the insurgents easy access to penetrate either Cameroon or Nigeria through common borders. With both parties’ full-­fledged support to this agreement, the committee meets twice a year in ordinary sessions alternately in Cameroon and Nigeria. Furthermore, the Cameroonian government submitted fully to the mandate of its agreement with Nigeria by deploying about 700 troops in March 2014 under the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR) to patrol common border areas between northern Cameroon and north east Nigeria. Additionally, a presidential decree in August 2014 reorganized the structure of Cameroon’s military command to accommodate the Boko Haram insurgency by creating a new military establishment

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headquartered in Maroua and the 41st Motorized Infantry with headquarters in Kousseri, both in Far North Cameroon (Fonkeng, 2019). The plight of refugees and IDPs has always been the dilemma of returning to the home country due to continued instability and difficulty in adjustment and recovery after trauma (Czaika, 2009). More worrisome is the burden that rests on neighbouring states or asylum countries that host these refugees and IDPs (for instance, Cameroon in the case of Nigeria), who are engulfed in both the provision and welfare of their own citizens and the refugees. As such, voluntary repatriation has always been an option and durable solution to the continued stay of refugees in host countries (Hathaway, 2005). Therefore, in March 2017, the Cameroonian government opted for repatriation as a lasting solution to its refugee crisis. In a bid to foster bilateral relations between Nigeria and Cameroon in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, a tripartite agreement was signed between these parties; it was perceived to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of about 4,000 Nigerian refugees living in Cameroon (UNHCR, 2017). The agreement was a legal framework that stipulated the modalities for the return of Nigerian refugees back home without the use of force, but voluntarily, safely and in dignity. Also, several developmental projects aimed at restoring trust and friendship between Nigeria and Cameroon ensued for the realization of basic infrastructures (roads, bridges, etc.) in common border areas. This realization came to the forefront in recent developments of bilateral discussions on 5 May 2016, due to the massive socioeconomic impacts suffered by both countries in trade and tourism, among other things, from the insurgency. To bridge the gap in infrastructural deficiencies and facilities for growth in trade, especially the free flow of people, goods and services across common border areas, both Nigeria and Cameroon welcomed an agreement to construct a bridge across the river to link Beleri in Nigeria and Densa in Cameroon and also provide adequate infrastructure within the confines of the project. A Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and terms of reference on the execution of the project was signed by President Buhari of Nigeria and Biya of Cameroon in this regard (Chilaka and Onyebuchi, 2019). Joint operations along the Nigeria-­Cameroon border areas, being some of the hotspots of Boko Haram insurgency, have also ensued bilaterally between Nigeria and Cameroon. In February 2016 under Operation Deep Punch 2, Cameroonian forces conducted joint operations along with the Nigerian Army on Nigeria’s territory of Ngoshe and the dreaded Sambisa Forest where 497 Cameroonian soldiers were pre-­positioned as a blocking force in Pulka (The Guardian, 2018). Closely following was the joint operations between Cameroonian and Nigerian forces under Operation Thunder 1 in December 2016 that was launched along the Mandara Mountains, known for their use as



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a safe haven and refuge for the insurgents. The year 2018 also marked an era of increased cooperation between Cameroon and Nigeria. The scope of the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR), an elite infantry, and Operation ALPHA, which primarily controlled the Kolofta, Limani and Amchide regions of Cameroon, was widened to accommodate operations targeted at reducing cross-­border insurgent activities. Specifically, Operation ALPHA established Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) observation posts for monitoring and reporting cross-­border crimes and insurgent activities by digging series of trenches of about 100km along the Nigeria-­Cameroon border (African Aerospace, 2019). The BIR Special forces and Operation ALPHA were also instrumental in many incursions in various local government areas such as Gwoza and the reopening of the Road to Banki (Nwachukwu, 2018). Most importantly, Cameroonian troops have successfully conducted numerous internal military operations alongside Operation LAFIYA DOLE against the Boko Haram in the Nigerian territory. Multilateral Framework The Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was an establishment formed by the Lake Chad Basin countries of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria that came into being on 22 May 1964 as a multilateral platform in the Lake Chad Region (LCR) for the management and preservation of marine and aquatic resources in the region. The operational mandate of the Commission was expanded in the 1990s to check the excesses of robbery, banditry, trans-­border crimes involving trafficking, smuggling and rustling in the Lake Chad Basin (Comolli, 2015; Angerbrandt, 2017). In response to this, a legal framework was invoked by the LCBC in 1998 for the establishment of a Multinational Task Force that would police the activities of armed bandits and criminal groups from Chad and Niger terrorizing and undermining Nigeria’s national security. This security arrangement was later reinvigorated due to the escalation of trans-­border crimes, most especially as instigated by the civil war in Chad (Albert, 2017). The transnationalization of insurgency, especially the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria in the 2000s and its incursion to other Lake Chad Basin countries mandated governments of the region to agitate for multilateral security cooperation. This new threat to the region compelled the LCBC countries to revisit the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) initially established in 1988 and elaborate its operational mandate to accommodate joint and combined military offensive actions that would counter Boko Haram incursions in the Lake Chad region. The remodelling of the structure and doctrine of the MNJTF took place in April 2012 in Chad at the fourteenth summit of heads of states and governments. Thus, it

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can be deduced that the expansion of the Boko Haram terrorism and the long-­ overdue national response from Nigeria to combat extremist threats translated into the quest for a regional dimension of securitization (Tar and Mustapha, 2016). Furthermore, according to the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) report of 2017, deployment of the MNJTF offensives and operations has facilitated “the conduct of joint/simultaneous/coordinated patrols and other types of operations at the borders of the affected countries.” The revisited mandate of the MNJTF was to primarily patrol the Lake Chad region, conduct military operations against terrorists and arms smugglers and facilitate the free movement of people, goods and services within a safe corridor (Kindzeka, 2014). Through contributions from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin (who later joined the coalition), the task force increased its troops from 7,600 in 2015 to 10,250 by July 2019 (Premium Times 2019). The MNJTF has recorded huge successes on its path, especially in dislodging the Boko Haram group and considerably minimizing their military might and force and the reduction in civilian casualties from 2,000 in 2015 to 573 in 2018 (Nextier SPD, 2019). Also, the MNJTF has collaborated with sister agencies such as the Nigerian Air Force, which in June 2016, provided aerial cover for the MNJTF in an air strike operation that was targeted at identifying and bombing various enclaves of Boko Haram within the Lake Chad Basin (Mutum, 2016). Sector 1 of the MNJTF, located on the Cameroonian territory, has been actively operational since 2016. National units in collaboration with the MNJTF have carried out large-­scale operations, which includes a 24 February 2016 operation in Kumshe town along the Nigeria-­Cameroon border where the insurgents are said to have a support base; the 16 March 2016 operation at the Nigeria-­Cameroon communities of Djibrili and Zamga under the umbrella of Operation Tentacule; and the 10–16 May 2016 operation in the Madawya Forest in Nigeria carried out by the MNJTF’s Sector 1, Cameroonian Operation Emergence 4 and the Nigerian Army. Likewise, Operation Emergence 4 actively participated in the reopening in important trade routes for Nigeria and Cameroon, particularly the roads between Fotokol and Gambur Ngala and the reopening of cross-­border areas between Maiduguri, Bama, Amchide, Banki and Limani (Blum, 2014). According to Tar and Bala (2021, 386), despite the successes recorded by the MNJTF in its operations against insurgency within its Areas of Responsibility, it is still impeded by certain challenges. These range from the lack of adequate equipment to prosecute its operations to an inadequate financial base and to lack of complete willingness of the formally agreed troops contributed by member states to insert a full complement of manpower as they pledged. These and several other factors stand on the way to a more robust defence and security for the LCB region.



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CONCLUSION The evolution of violent non-­state actors (VNSAs) in the international system, including insurgents, terrorists and rebels, has threatened the existence of the modern state and questioned the sovereignty and legitimacy exclusive to the state and its role as the chief propagator of security (Varin and Abubakar, 2017). In Africa, the activities of terrorist/insurgent groups around different factions of the continent have metamorphosed into transnational incursions across international boundaries and over time created a regional political, social and economic malady. The Boko Haram insurgency is today one of Africa’s biggest nightmares, given its scope, intensity, lethality and resilience in wreaking havoc in the peace, stability and security of lives and properties across Nigeria and the LCR (Tar and Bala, 2019). The intensification and intractability of the Boko Haram insurgency in the LCR, as opined by Buzan (2008), has birthed a “regional security complex”—that is, a complex security concern among sovereign states that drives an interconnectivity of cooperative alliances to mitigate the scourges. Stemming from this collaboration is the staging of Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency operations by national or regional authorities as responses to this security quagmire. In this regard, this chapter examined Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency engagements of Nigeria-­Cameroon along common border areas with a view to unveiling cooperative responses to this “common enemy” and an impediment to global peace and security. In doing so, the chapter approached CT-­COIN operations conducted with collaboration between Cameroon and Nigeria through a bilateral and multilateral prism in order to unearth the divergent soft and hard approaches deployed to pilot the situation. On this note, the chapter revealed that CT-­COIN actions between Cameroon and Nigeria have taken the form of a series of bilateral agreements in areas of military operations (to neutralize insurgent activities in border areas), refugee crises and best practices to solve the problem, and general trans-­border security measures to curb the insurgency along territorial boundaries. Additionally, the LCBC and MNJTF have been recognized as establishments formed to respond to the transnationalization of the Boko Haram insurgency across the LCR and its successes and challenges have been evaluated. Findings from this chapter reveal that the Boko Haram insurgency has evolved as unconventional and opportunistic warfare that has blossomed through the exploitation of various socioeconomic, geographic, political and religious realities and indices to gain asymmetric advantage over territories and boundaries. Findings further reveal that the Boko Haram insurgency has been able to command influence over the fringes of the LCR through tactical and strategic opportunism by leveraging on the porosity of African borders

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and the scarcely governed spaces such as the Nigeria-­Cameroon border. Therefore, this chapter recommends that in order to cripple the enabling factors that had paved way for insurgency to spill over and thrive across the Nigerian-­Cameroon territory, the governments of both countries should improve their bilateral engagements in the areas of social infrastructures and developmental projects in health, education and trade, among other important sectors of human security. This is because recruitment for terrorist activities tend to be most successful in regions that lack developmental projects. If this is done, there would be equilibrium between efforts in military operations and social empowerment in diffusing tensions, which ultimately guarantees sustainability. Last, the MNJTF as a key regional security apparatus in the LCR should be strengthened in areas of mobility, finance, communication and intelligence to enable it to operate effectively and efficiently. This could be done when parties to its establishment live up to their pledges and put more efforts and resources into material, financial and technical assistance to the course. REFERENCES Abbott, Chris, Paul F. Rogers, and John Sloboda. (2006). “Global responses to global threats: Sustainable security for the 21st century.” Briefing Paper, June 2006. Oxford Research Group. https://reliefweb​.int/sites/reliefweb​.int/files/ resources/​DD0790353EF97B53C1257187005191FD-­ORG%20-%20Global%20 Responses%20to%20Global%20Threats​.pdf. ACAPS. (2015). “Cameroon: Displacement in the Far North.” Briefing note, 1 June 2015. https://www​ .acaps​ .org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/cameroon​ -­displacement-1-june-2015.pdf. African Aerospace. (2019). “Cameroon’s eyes in the sky focus on Boko Haram.” https://www​.africanaerospace​.aero/cameroon-­s-eyes-­in-­the-­sky-­focus-­on-­boko​ haram​.html. African Research Institute. (2017). “Boko Haram’s shifting tactics in Cameroon: What does the data tell us?” https://www​.africaresearchinstitute​.org/newsite/blog/ boko-­harams-­shifting-­tactics-­cameroon-­data-­tell-­us/. African Union. (1999). Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Addis Ababa: African Union. Aguwa, Jude. (2017). “Boko Haram: History, Ideology, and Goal.” International Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Society 7, no. 2, 11–23. Ahmad, Muhammad B. (2013). “African boundaries and the imperative of definition in delimitation and demarcation of boundaries in Africa: General issues and case studies.” http://www​.peaceau​.org/uploads/au-2-en-2013-delim-­a-demaruser-­guide​ .pdf.



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Iyekekpolo, Wisdom Oghosa. (2016). “Boko Haram: Understanding the context.” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 12, 2211–2228. Kilcullen, David. (2010). Counterinsurgency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. (2014). “Cameroon says 20,000 more troops needed to fight Boko Haram.” VOA News, 2 December 2014. http://www​.voanews​.com/content/ cameroon-­says20000-more-­troops-­needed-­to-­fight-­boko-­haram/2542151 htm. Kingah, Stephen. (2018). “Legal treatment of Boko Haram militants captured by Cameroon.” African Journal of International and Comparative Law 26, no. 1, 44–63. Ladan, Muhammad Tawfiq. (2012). “Concept of counter terrorism operations.” Interview by Department of Law, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, 22 December . Laqueur, Walter. (2004). “The terrorism to come.” Policy Review 126, 49–64. Lenshie, N. Edward, and Jiebreeal Yakubu Gambo. (2014). “The United Nations plebiscites in the Northern Cameroons: Post-­Colonial issues and challenges in Sardauna Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria.” Research on Humanities and Social Science 4, no. 19, 156–170. Luccino, Ludovica. (2016). “Boko Haram: Cameroon closes markets along Nigeria border following deadly attacks.” International Business Times, 28 January 2016. Manu, Yusuf Abdullahi. (2021). “United States counterterrorism and counter-­ insurgency strategy in Africa.” In Tar Usman Alhaji (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency in Africa. London: Taylor and Francis, 230–245. Mbarkoutou Mahamat. (2016). “Boko Haram: évolution des modes opératoires au Cameroun.” Revue Le Didiga (Côte d’Ivoire) 14, 55–76. Menner, Scott. (2014). “Boko Haram cross-­border regional activities.” Combatting Terrorism Centre 7 no. 10 (October). https://ctc​.usma​.edu/boko-­harams​-­regional​ -­cross-­border-­activities/. Metz, Steven, and Raymond Millen. (2004). “Insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan: Change and continuity.” USA: Strategic Studies Institute. Moore, R. Scott. (2007). “The basics of counterinsurgency.” Small Wars Journal, no. 14, 1–24. Mutum, Ronald. (2016). “Boko Haram: Air force intensifies raids with ‘Operation Gama Aiki.’” http://www​.dailytrust​.com​ ng/news/general/boko-h­ aram​-a­ irforce​ intensifies-­raids-­with-­operation-­gama-­aiki/151853 html. Nagl, John A., James F. Amos, Sarah Sewall, and David H. Petraeus. (2008). The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nextier SPD. (2019). “MNJTF: So far so so.” https://reliefweb​.int/sites/reliefweb​.int/ files/resources/20190902_SPD_Weekly_MNJTF_SO%20FAR%20SO%20SO.pdf. Nkwi, Walter Gam. (2013). “Cameroon, too much to carry: The perception and ramifications of Boko Haram’s activities on Cameroon.” Conflict Studies Quarterly 5, 67–87. Ntuda, Ebode, Joseph Vincent, Mark B. Funteh, Mbarkoutou M. Henri, Nkalwo N. Joseph Léa. (2017). The Boko Haram Conflict in Cameroon: Why Is Peace So Elusive? Yaoundé: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

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Chapter Eleven

Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Cameroon-­Nigeria Borders Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha and Jasper Chidiebube Uche

INTRODUCTION Transnational smuggling operations, whether involving licit or illicit products, is an enduring thorny issue in interstate relations. Smuggling represents the illegal and usually subterranean transportation of goods across or along a country’s border in contravention of the laws prohibiting or regulating commerce in such goods (Imobighe, 2000). State security officials, particularly customs and border control agents, face herculean challenges in preventing illicit trade and combating transnational smuggling operations. Thus, “maintaining the delicate balance between facilitating legitimate trade flows while concurrently deterring those that are illicit is a complex operational task” confronting both developed and developing states in their relations with their neighbours (Basu, 2014, 15). Cross-­border smuggling is one of the serious economic, political and security irritants in Nigeria’s relationship with her neighbours (Omede, 2006; Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992). Nigeria shares international boundaries with six countries, namely: Benin in the west, Niger in the north, Chad and Cameroon in the east, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe in the south east, that is, in the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). In Nigeria, smuggling thrives in most of the communities that share borders with the Republic of Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Cameroon, for instance, depends on goods from Nigeria for 70 per cent of its basic commodities. Nigerians also buy agricultural produce including cattle, rice, onions and cotton from Cameroon for its booming market of some 190 million people (Kindzeka, 2020). However, smuggling is a major challenge along their borders. While rice accounts for largest amount of smuggled goods 199

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into Nigeria, petroleum products, especially fuel (petrol), make up the largest amount smuggled from Nigeria to Cameroon (Soud, 2020, 20). Diverse measures have been taken to prevent or combat the scourge. In 1985, for instance, the challenge of cross-­border “smuggling became such a major concern to the Muhammed Buhari regime that a Decree No.20 (Miscellaneous Offences Decree) stipulating death for those guilty of smuggling of dangerous drugs and petroleum products was introduced” (Mohammed, 1992, 173). Successive Nigerian administrations have also undertaken several other measures such as construction of border posts, setting up of special task forces, withdrawing operational licenses of oil marketers, and outright closure of borders, among other measures, to stem the tide of cross-­border smuggling of crude oil and petroleum products. Despite several efforts at containing the menace, the fuel smuggling operations had, for decades, created and sustained a huge illegal fuel trading market around countries bordering Nigeria (Eboh, 2019). Yet this destructive practice has received scant attention in the growing literature on Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations. This chapter, therefore, examines the nature, actors, and effects of the smuggling of crude oil and refined petroleum products across Cameroon-­Nigeria borders. It demonstrates how the transnational community phenomenon, porosity of borders, fuel subsidy regime, and corruption, among other factors, constitute core impediments to combating transnational smuggling operations. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION This chapter revolves around several key concepts, but the terms smuggling, crude oil and refined petroleum products are so pivotal that they merit clarification. For the purposes of aiding clarity, a conceptual overview of the terms will be undertaken. Smuggling The concept of smuggling continues to attract wide coverage in academic, media and official circles. Although smuggling is a perennial global phenomenon, there is no single definition that is generally agreed upon. The Encyclopaedia Britannica (2013), for instance, defines smuggling as the conveyance of things by stealth, particularly the clandestine movement of goods to evade customs duties or import or export restrictions. For the purposes of this chapter, smuggling is defined as “the offence of importing or exporting prohibited articles, or defrauding the government of expected revenue



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by importing goods into the country without the payment of relevant duties that are chargeable” (Wakili, 2009, 90). In other words, it is the clandestine transfer of goods from one jurisdiction to another, which may involve the importation and exportation of prohibited goods or the evasion of custom duties when importing or exporting unprohibited goods. The imposition of tariffs and trade controls by nation-­states led to the emergence of inter-­border economic hustlers and organized criminal networks that undercut governments’ oversight and revenue collection. Hence, smuggling is an economic and security reality “that cannot be disassociated from the development of the national state and laws of taxation” (Wakili, 2009, 91). Crude Oil Crude oil, commonly known as petroleum, is a liquid found within the Earth comprising hydrocarbons, organic compounds and small amounts of metal. While hydrocarbons are usually the primary component of crude oil, their composition can vary from 50 to 97 per cent, depending on the type of crude oil and how it is extracted. Organic compounds like nitrogen, oxygen, and sulphur typically make up between 6 and 10 per cent of crude oil, while metals such as copper, nickel, vanadium and iron account for less than 1 per cent of the total composition (Oilprice​.com, 2009). Crude oil is customarily characterized by the type of hydrocarbon compound that is most prevalent in it: paraffins, naphthenes, and aromatics. Put simply, crude oil is drawn from oil wells, then transported to local refineries or exported to international market. Petroleum Products Petroleum products are derived from crude oil that has undergone some refining process. In other words, they are derived from crude oils through processes such as catalytic cracking and fractional distillation. These products have physical and chemical characteristics that differ according to the type of crude oil and subsequent refining processes (United States Environmental Protection Agency, n.d.). This usually means it is processed into a variety of products such as Premium Motor Spirit (PMS), Automated Gas Oil (AGO), fuel oil, Dual Purpose Kerosene (DPK), Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), kerosene, grease and any other lubricants. It equally covers any liquid product which is obtained or recovered from petroleum, whether by distillation, condensation, or absorption, and which, by combustion, develops the power required for operating internal combustion engines. Refined petroleum products are substances obtained from crude oil that has undergone industrial or artisanal heating, or a conversion and distillation process. Having defined the

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key terms in this chapter, it is pertinent to highlight the nature of oil exploitation in Nigeria to enhance the understanding of the context of cross-­border smuggling of petroleum products. OVERVIEW OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS EXPLOITATION AND DISTRIBUTION IN NIGERIA The Niger Delta region of Nigeria, which shares borders with Cameroon, is Nigeria’s main source of oil and gas production (Onuoha, 2016). Nigeria’s petroleum industry has witnessed significant expansion since the first shipment of crude oil from the country in 1958. Its oil industry encompasses a complex infrastructure, consisting of more than 600 oil fields, (60 percent of these oil fields are onshore while the remaining 40 per cent are offshore), 5,284 wells, 10,000 kilometres of pipelines and flow lines, 10 export terminals, 22 petroleum storage depots, 275 flow stations, 10 gas plants, 4 refineries, and massive LNG projects. In order to enhance the distribution of crude oil products from the Niger Delta to other parts of Nigeria, a grid of oil pipelines was constructed to link some of the states at strategic locations. The network consists of multi-­ product pipelines and crude oil pipelines that crisscross the country, interlinking some 22 strategically located petroleum storage depots, the four refineries at Kaduna, Port Harcourt (I and II) and Warri, the offshore terminals at Bonny and Escravos, and the four jetties at Atlas Cove, Calabar, Okirika and Warri. Apart from the crude oil refined locally for domestic consumption, a larger quantity is sold on the international market. Nigeria has six terminals for the export of crude oil. The refineries are operating far below their installed capacities, due mainly to corruption, poor maintenance, and incessant sabotage of pipelines that supply crude oil to them. Nigeria has to import almost all of its petrol and kerosene because of the decrepit state of the refineries. Petrol and kerosene prices are equally subsidized by the Nigerian government, making the smuggling of these products to neighbouring countries a lucrative affair. The nature of Cameroon-­Nigeria international borders significantly contributes to the dynamics of transnational smuggling of petroleum products. GEOGRAPHICAL SETTING OF CAMEROON-­ NIGERIA INTERNATIONAL BORDERS Cameroon-­Nigeria relations have long been strained due to problems along their common border, which is approximately 2,000 kilometres long and



Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Shared Borders 203

extends from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea. The border region can be differentiated into roughly four eco-­physical sectors. In its northernmost part, the land boundary traverses Lake Chad and the neighbouring plains at an average altitude of about 300 metres above sea level. The waters of the lake have varied over time, and it is common knowledge that various native groups across the borders tend to follow the receding lake and cultivate the arable land it leaves behind (Oduntan, 2015). Some of the peoples that inhabited the northern border zone, apart from the Hausa-­Fulani, are included in the conglomeration known as the Jukun, the Chamba, the Batta, Fudbe, and the Mandara, among others. Boko Haram terrorists have equally established safe havens in this Lake Chad border area, which hosts a complex terrain of deep forest, islands and caves. The second sector, which can be characterized as the land boundary, is a near continuous chain of mountains and valleys only broken by the Benue Valley near Yola. It provides the headwaters for many rivers that drain into the Benue and Cross River Basins, which flow into Nigeria or the Sanga and its tributaries that flow into the Atlantic on the Cameroon coast. In southern borderlands with Cameroon are diverse but related ethnic groups—the Ejagham, Boki, and Becheve Akwaya, who occupy a contiguous territory along and astride the boundary zone in Cross River State and Southwest Cameroon (Bonchuk and Majuk, 2015). The predominant livelihood system in “this sector is grazing although there are patches of cultivated grounds. Herdsmen pay scant attention to imaginary lines of international boundaries in their livelihood endeavour” (Fombo, 2008, 24). This sector continues with a gradual descent from the Savanna Mountains region through more peaks and valleys and traverses very dense equatorial forests before approaching the coast. The third geographical sector is the coastal region that descends into the Bakassi Peninsula and the adjoining islands. This area is in the trough of the GoG, with predominantly mangrove swamp vegetation. The Rio del Rey and Ndian River to the east, as well as the Calabar and Cross Rivers to the west, dominate the hydrology of this generally wet environment (Fombo, 2008). This area abounds with not just marine and aquatic life but also huge hydrocarbon deposits. The knowledge that the Bakassi Peninsula harbours important deposits of oil/gas reserves triggered military confrontations in the early 1990s between Cameroon and Nigeria (Baye, 2010). It resulted in a prolong competition and boundary dispute that was finally adjudicated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 10 October 2002 (Nwokolo, 2020; Konings, 2005). The last sector of this boundary concerns a maritime zone characterized by a broken adjacent coast. This maritime boundary between Nigeria and

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Cameroon also ends in an ill-­defined tri-­point with Equatorial Guinea. The presence of Bioko Island (Fernando Po), belonging to Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome and Principe within this gulf, further complicated delineation and demarcation efforts. Considerable oil deposits in this area and the marine life have impassioned emotions. And the fact that the latter pair was not party to the dispute at ICJ precluded a comprehensive judicial ruling on the entire maritime boundary between these countries (Fombo, 2008, 24). MAPPING CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SMUGGLING ALONG CAMEROON-­NIGERIA BORDERS Smuggling of oil across Nigeria’s borders is one of the major threats to the nation’s economy. An estimated seven million litres of petrol (PMS) valued at N1,085 trillion naira is smuggled daily from Nigeria to neighbouring West African countries as of 2019 (Olayinka and Jeremiah, 2019). Data in table 11.1 is not exhaustive and only provides recent confirmation of the persistence of the smuggling of petroleum products along Cameroon-­Nigeria borders. In May 2019, for instance, Nigerian security officials arrested five Nigerians and three Ghanaians for allegedly attempting to smuggle 105 drums of PMS from Nigeria to Cameroon, while another group of eight men were nabbed while trying to smuggle over 200,000 litres of petroleum products valued at over N50 million out of Nigeria. The first set of smugglers were alleged to have sourced the PMS from Oron in Akwa Ibom State, while the second set of smugglers sourced the products from illegal refining sites in the Niger Delta and were arrested on the Taraba jetty waterways while trying to take the products outside the country (Eboh, 2019). In January 2018, the NSCDC in Borno State said it seized 1,000 litres of petrol from suspected Boko Haram fuel suppliers. The smuggling activities operate in different domains and scales, involving different conveyance and concealment methods. In terms of domain, smuggling takes place along land and maritime borders, during day and night hours. In the maritime domain, vessels, ships, barges, speed-­boats, canoes and Cotonou boats are some of the conveyances utilized in transporting such contraband from the point of sourcing to the desired destination, depending on the quantity, distance and actors involved. Once the products are obtained from the ruptured pipelines or terminals, they are loaded into barges, tanks or drums, which are transported through the difficult terrain of creeks, swamps and estuaries to discharge or reception points. Smuggling through the maritime domain is predominant in the South-­South geopolitical zone (Niger Delta) and across the waters of Lake Chad in the north east zone. The

April 2020

February 2020

February 2020

January 2020

July 2019

February 2019

February 2018

June 2018

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

River Benue Channel linking Cameroon border Sahuda border, Adamawa State Nigeria

Loaded from Bille Creek Niger Delta enroute Cameroon Fulani settlement in Mubi LGA of Adamawa State near Cameroon border Northern Town of Mbe, Enroute Central African Republic

Adamawa/Taraba border with Cameroon Calabar Fairway, Buoy and Tomshot Island Nigeria/Cameroon border

Location

Source: Authors’ Compilation (December 2020)

Date

S/No

A truckload of PMS (90 drums of 20,550 litres)

Nigeria Customs Service (NCS)

NCS

Cameroon Policy & Elite Corps

1500 drums of PMS

23 jerry cans of AGO confiscated

Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)

Operation Swift Response Task Force, Nigeria NCS

Sealing of smuggling depot with unapproved petrol stations

144 drums of AGO worth about (N15,504,000)

295 petrol tankers

NCS

31,125 litres worth about (N 3.9 million) 181 drums of PMS Nigerian Navy

Intercepting Security Formation/Agency

Quantity Seized

Table 11.1.  Some interceptions of petroleum products smuggled across the Cameroon-­Nigeria border

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smuggling of the products thrived at Ikom and Etung, two local government areas in Cross River that share borders with Cameroon. Smuggling operations accomplished over land involve the use of such conveyances as fuel tankers or trucks and vehicles loaded with jerry cans of crude oil or petrol. Tricycles specially designed for fuel smuggling, motorcycles and scooters are equally used by locals in the border communities. Overland, petroleum is smuggled into Cameroon across the Mambilla border, which lies between Taraba State and Cameroon. Several other communities in frontier states that border Cameroon have routes for such smuggling operations. In relation to scale, transnational smuggling operations operate at large, medium, and small scales. The large-­scale smuggling involves the shipment of stolen crude or petroleum products using vessels or outright diversion or haulage of petroleum products across the borders using fuel tankers. This level of operation involves top government officials, oil company staff, security agents, oil marketers and vessel operators. The medium-­scale level involves clandestine operations perpetrated by fuel station operators, fuel tanker drivers, artisanal refinery operators, and militant or criminal gangs who engage in some low-­level stealing or diverting of crude oil or petroleum products across the borders. Smuggled products are usually loaded in drums for cross-­border supplies. The quantity involved is quite significant, augmenting domestic market consumption. Proceeds of such criminal activity are huge but not to be compared to enormous earnings from large-­scale smuggling. Small-­scale smuggling largely involves the transportation of small quantities of contraband petrol in small containers (jerry cans or gallons) in cars or on tricycles, motorcycles, and bicycles. The quantity involved tends to serve subsistence needs. To evade detection, smugglers adopt diverse concealment methods depending on the facility, route, conveyance, and quantity involved as well as the amount of money available for paying bribes at security checkpoints. In a bid to trick government inspectors, the owners of frontier stations purposely leave some of them uncompleted or without dispensing pumps, but they are actually used as reservoirs of fuel before smuggling to neighbouring countries. Sometimes, petrol is poured into iron or plastic drums, which are loaded on trucks and covered with straw or even legitimate goods. They can equally be filled in jerry cans and concealed in sacks loaded onto conveyances. In sum, the smuggling operations are as diverse as the actors who benefit from them. Both men and women of diverse nationalities are involved in the smuggling business. Government officials, oil companies’ staff, oil marketers, fuel station operators, security agents, militants, terrorists, and local residents, among others, are complicit in transnational smuggling of petroleum products across Nigerian borders.



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FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO TRANSNATIONAL SMUGGLING OF CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS The persistence of cross-­border smuggling along Cameroon-­Nigeria borders is a product of several factors. These include, among others, the transnational community phenomenon, porous borders, oil theft in the Niger Delta (Kpoo Fire), corruption, politics of fuel subsidy, and the lucrative nature of the underground market. The problem of smuggling is largely compounded by the transnational community nature of international borders. The original intention of the colonialists in the Balkanization of Africa was not to create a boundary per se, but to create a sphere of influence driven by politico-­economic interests. These boundaries split several ethnic and cultural communities. As a result, successive Nigerian governments have found it extremely difficult to administer these artificial international boundaries (Olufemi, 2020). As rightly noted by Imobighe (2000, 456): Virtually every ethnic group found on one side of the border is duplicated on the other side. The result is that there is frequent movement across Nigeria’s international boundaries irrespective of official attitudes on both sides. There is therefore a basic contradiction between the official perception of the international boundaries and the perception of the local inhabitants.

Formal and informal trading across the borders is facilitated by pre-­colonial ethno-­cultural linkages between the inhabitants on both sides of the borders. Hence, the intersection of cross-­border flows, ties and informal institutions creates the permissive environment for smuggling. In addition, most of these border communities have long been neglected by their governments, making it difficult for state officials to leverage them to curtail illicit cross-­border activities. While Nigeria’s border problem is traceable to this colonial history, the borders’ porosity has been exacerbated by the failure of succeeding governments to properly administer its 4,047-km land borders and 853-km coastline. As of 2013, there were over 1,499 illegal and 84 legal officially identified entry routes into Nigeria (Ojeme and Odiniya, 2013). Cross-­border smuggling of products in Nigeria has been exacerbated by Nigeria’s porous land and maritime borders with Cameroon. In Adamawa State, for instance, there are about 25 illegal routes into Nigeria from neighbouring Cameroon. Also, the Maiduguri-­Damaturu axis has over 250 routes that have links with the Republic of Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Musa, 2013). Recently, Cameroon security officials acknowledged that they could only police about 50 out of more than 100 entrances into Nigeria via the sea (Kindzeka, 2020). Criminal

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elements take advantage of these vast leaky borders to smuggle arms, petroleum products, drugs and other contraband without being detected. In addition, Nigerian borders are known for the limited presence of security and law enforcement officials. The few that are deployed are poorly trained, work with inadequate and obsolete equipment, and are sometimes poorly remunerated (Onuoha, 2013). An important feature of Nigeria’s borders, which has a lot of implications for smuggling, is the complicity of state actors—military, police, border and customs officials. In March 2020, for instance, President Muhammadu Buhari directed that appropriate sanctions should be placed on customs and security officials involved in the smuggling of 295 tankers of fuel across the country’s borders (Echenim, 2020). Meanwhile, the numerous security checkpoints on both sides of the Cameroon-­Nigeria border only serve as a cover-­up, as security officials take bribes at these checkpoints to overlook smuggling operations (Tamfu, 2008). Thus, systemic corruption has long meant that apprehending oil smugglers is unlikely, prosecuting those arrested less so, and securing conviction even more difficult. Perhaps the most critical factor in the persistent smuggling of crude oil and petroleum products across the borders is the prevalence of oil theft in Nigeria. Oil theft in the form of illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism and artisanal or illegal refining of stolen oil (known in local parlance as Kpoo fire) is rife in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region (Onuoha, 2012). Activities of oil thieves in the region sustain the environment for sourcing and smuggling crude oil and petroleum products across borders. Nigeria crude oil is stolen on an industrial scale with the complicity of government officials, security agents, foreign vessels owners, international oil companies and local collaborators (Onuoha, 2012; Katsouris and Kayne, 2013). According to NEITI (2019), Nigeria lost a total of 488.6 million barrels of crude oil between 2009 and 2018 to theft and sabotage. Between 2009 and 2019, it also lost $41.9 billion to crude oil and refined products smuggling. Allegations are rife that Nigeria security forces—Army, Navy, Air Force and the Police, Customs and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC)—are complicit in oil theft and smuggling of petroleum products. Security officials of the Joint Task Force (JTF) stationed in the Niger Delta are complicit in oil theft in three ways: provision of security while installing taps on ruptured pipelines, collection of a passage fee or transportation tax from this oil and “regional security payments” for protection of the racket (Stakeholder Democracy Network, 2015). As of 2016, NNPC notes that majority of pipeline breaks across the country were due to activities of vandals with the intention of scooping fuel for smuggling activities (Okere, 2016). Refined products are tapped from both



Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Shared Borders 209

the onshore and offshore pipelines, and subsequently smuggled to Cameroon and other neighbouring countries where the price of oil is higher (Uche and Akpuru-­Aja, 2018). As shown in figure 11.1, Nigeria recorded the highest incidence of pipeline vandalism between 2005 and 2007, which was the peak of militancy in the Niger Delta. The stolen crude oil is locally refined by militants to obtain petroleum products for lighting their camps or powering their speedboats, in addition to exchanging a huge chunk of the stolen crude oil for arms around coasts. Security operations against oil theft in the region have recorded modest successes. The Nigerian Navy reportedly destroyed a total of 2,287 illegal refineries in the Niger Delta region between 2015 and 2019 (Umeh, 2020). However, locals in the region have honed the practice of sabotaging oil pipelines for illegal or artisanal refining or “cooking” of siphoned crude oil, accounting for the persistence of pipeline vandalism. The politics of fuel subsidy contributes to the smuggling dynamics. The Nigerian government subsidizes petrol—paying the difference between the cost to produce and the cost charged to customers—in order to make it more affordable. It has subsidized fuel for decades and fixed retail prices of petroleum products. The opaque nature of the fuel import regime in turn fuels corruption in the process of fuel subsidy payment by the federal government. Government-­approved oil marketers or distributors collect the subsidy reimbursement on imported products, or buy them from Nigerian refineries at the subsidized price (Onuoha, Ezirim and Enyiazu, 2017). Nigeria spent at least N10 trillion between 2006 and 2018 on the petrol import subsidy (BudgIT, 2019). Proponents of the subsidy argue that it represents the only

Figure 11.1.  Trend of pipeline vandalisation in the Niger Delta region, 1999–2018. Source: Authors’ compilation from NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin for the various years

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tangible benefit of oil wealth for most Nigerians, but the subsidy and weak market regulation create enormous distortions and opportunities for corruption (Nwosu, 1996). Distributors import refined products at the international market price and sell them on the Nigerian market at the subsidized price, and NNPC subsidiary reimburses these companies for the difference. These payments are often delayed for months, creating incentives for the companies to induce government payments. The subsidy also allows for other high-­profit rackets. Allegedly, distributors collect the subsidy reimbursement on imported products, or buy them from Nigerian refineries at the subsidized price. They then reimport the same products so as to receive the subsidy refund again or sell them for much higher prices on the black market or smuggle them abroad (Gillies, 2009). However, the Nigerian government, in April 2020, announced that it had finally removed the fuel subsidy. The alarming proliferation of fuel stations in Nigerian communities with international land and coastal borders compounds the challenge. Data from the NNPC revealed that 16 states in Nigeria, having among them 61 Local Government Areas (LGAs) with border communities, accounted for 2,201 registered fuel stations, with a combined fuel tank capacity of 144.99 million litres of petrol. Also, eight states with coastal border communities spread across 24 LGAs among the states, account for 866 registered fuel outlets with a combined petrol tank capacity of 73.44 million litres (Eboh, 2019). The proliferation of such frontier stations enables the smuggling of petrol to neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, the uncoordinated response by the authority concerned not only hampers measures to sanitise the fuel supply and distribution matrix in Nigeria, but also permits illegal movement of the products out the country. The situation is exacerbated by what observers view as “administrative tolerance” by the government of Cameroon, which has allowed the illicit trade to thrive in order to fill its national shortages. Cameroon sells crude oil on the international market, and the products refined abroad for its domestic consumption are costlier than Nigeria’s fuel. Due to the subsidization of petroleum products, Nigeria has about the lowest official pump price for petrol in West and Central Africa (see figure 11.2). Smugglers take advantage of the low price in Nigeria to transport the products across borders in a bid to make huge profit. Meanwhile a litre of stolen Nigerian fuel costs 500 CFA (€0.90) on Cameroon’s black market, whereas a petrol station charges 700 CFA for fuel from the country’s only oil refinery. About 742 filling stations are in Cameroon’s ten regions, which are mostly located in three regions: Centre, Littoral and West. The South West region where 90 per cent of the oil is produced has no



Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Shared Borders 211

Figure 11.2.  Price (in naira) of petrol in some West and Central African countries (August 2019) Source: Authors’ compilation from Olayinka and Jeremiah (2019)

petrol filling station (Mbom, 2018). Most parts of Cameroon have no petrol stations. The smuggled fuel from Nigeria, known as Funge or Zoa Zoa, mostly traded in plastic gallon containers, fills the void. Given the obvious differential in petrol price between Nigeria and the neighbouring countries, it had become lucrative for smugglers to use frontier stations as conduits for the smuggling of products to Cameroon. IMPACT OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS SMUGGLING ALONG CAMEROON-­NIGERIA BORDERS The persistence of smuggling of petroleum products along Cameroon-­Nigeria borders has diverse political, economic, environmental, and security implications for Nigeria. Until recently, fuel scarcity has been a common crisis of Nigeria’s political economy. In addition to other sharp practices such as increased diversion, pump adjustment and hoarding, smuggling occasions a scarcity of products and an abnormal surge in national consumption. Officials blamed the increased smuggling recorded in 2017 for the spike in the supply of petrol to meet domestic consumption. The daily supply of petrol rose from 24.15 million litres in September 2017 to 27.06 million litres in October, then 31.27 million litres in November before increasing to 36.7 million litres in December (The Cable, 2018). Hence, if the nefarious activities of the

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smugglers were left unchecked, it would be absolutely difficult to guarantee steady availability of petrol throughout the country. Another notable impact of petroleum products smuggling is the massive revenue losses it engenders, worse during the fuel subsidy era. According to BudgIT (2019), the N10 trillion Nigeria spent on subsidies between 2016 and 2018 is enough to produce 27,000 megawatts of electricity or build 2,400 units of a 1,000-bed standard hospital in each of the 774 Local Government Areas in the country. Besides the fiscal losses, the lucrative nature of smuggling contributes to the persistence of pipeline vandalism and illegal refining of crude oil in Nigeria. The hazardous process of refining stolen crude is equally harmful to the environment. Oil spills associated with the practice, coupled with the incineration of such refining sites by security forces, destroys farmlands, water formations, and biodiversity of the fragile Niger Delta ecosystem. In addition, the huge illegitimate income the smugglers earn also makes them a real or potential security risk. In early 2018, a discrete media investigation revealed how soldiers, police, customs agents, and immigration and civil defence operatives frequently receive hefty bribes and turn a blind eye as fuel marketers and smugglers divert truckloads of petrol to Boko Haram enclaves and neighbouring countries (Isine, 2018). Boko Haram has relied on such smuggled fuel to meet its logistics needs such as cooking, lighting their camps, improvisation of incendiary weapons, operation of fabrication machinery, and powering of vehicles and motor cycles used in deadly attacks. Cameroon’s security forces in early 2019 tracked down and seized hundreds of drums of illegally transported fuel from the northern town of Mbe, noting that “an unknown quantity of oil is smuggled from Nigeria through its territory because the border is so porous” (Kindeka, 2020). The petroleum products were sold to rebels fighting the central government in the Central African Republic. The rebels exploited the CAR border with Cameroon for illegal supplies of fuel with trucks and tankers from Nigeria. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Transnational smuggling of crude oil and petroleum products constitutes severe economic, fiscal, environmental and security threats to the viability of the Nigeria economy. The diversity of actors and the profitability of the criminal enterprise underpin its persistence despite some measures adopted by several administrations to combat it. There is the need, therefore, for the Nigeria government to muster the right political will in implementing radical measures to drastically limit or eradicate it. To this end, the Nigerian



Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Shared Borders 213

government should tighten surveillance and a control noose around the nation’s fuel supply and distribution matrix. The importance of deploying drone technology for robust monitoring of the nation’s critical oil infrastructure as well as the installation of electronic devices to track fuel transportation and distribution processes across the country cannot be overemphasized. Furthermore, computerization of the daily report on loading from the refineries, depots and tank farm and use of digital fuel measurements to check under-­dispensing in fuel stations will help to curtail sharp practices. The rule of law should be strengthened to enable vigorous prosecution of those complicit in smuggling. There is equally the need to strengthen border security, through proper, adequate deployments and installation of border-­domain awareness infrastructure. In addition to total removal of fuel subsidy, the government should allocate more resources to the development of border communities as a means of winning their hearts and minds in supporting counter-­transnational smuggling operations along the borders. At the same time, serious efforts should be geared towards addressing unemployment and poverty, which heighten the vulnerability of individuals to criminal indulgence. REFERENCES Ate, B., and B. Akinterinwa. (eds). (1992). Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-­Regional Security in the 1990s. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Basu, G. (2014). “Combatting illicit trade and transnational smuggling: Key challenges for customs and border control organizations.” World Customs Journal 8, no. 2, 15–26 Baye, F. M. (2010). “Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10, no. 1, 9–34. Bonchuk, M. O., and S. E. Majuk. (2015). “Nigeria-­Cameroon cross-­cultural co-­ operation and development.” Scholar Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 3, no. 6A, 1107–1114. BudgIT. (2019). “Nigeria’s petrol subsidy regime: Dilemma of the world’s most populous black nation.” Policy Brief. Lagos: BudgIT. Eboh, M. (2019). “As border closure bites . . . Petrol smugglers lose big.” Vanguard 24 November. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2019/11/as-­border​-­closure-­bites​ -­petrol​-­smugglers-­lose-­big/. Echenim, S. (2020). “Buhari moves to remove Customs, other security agency heads over 295 tankers of smuggled fuel,” BusinessAMLive, 1 March. https://www​ .business​amlive​.com/buhari-­moves-­to-­remove-­customs-­other-­security-­agency​ -­heads​-­over-295-tankers-­of-­smuggled-­fuel/. Encyclopaedia Britannica. (2013). “Smuggling,” October 8. https://www​.britannica​ .com/​topic/smuggling.

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Fombo, G.F. (2008). “Imperial antecedents of the contentious Cameroon-Nigeria border dispute.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1. Gillies, A. (2009). “Reforming corruption out of Nigerian oil? Part one: Mapping corruption risks in oil sector governance.” U4 Brief, No. 2, CHR Michelson Institute. Imobighe, T. A. (2000). “Public order and border security.” In H. I. Ajaegbu, B. J. St Matthew-­Daniel, and O. E. Uya (eds), Nigeria: A People United, A Future Assured, vol.1, A Compendium. Abuja: Federal Ministry of Information. Isine, I. (2018). “Bribe-­taking Nigerian security men pushing petrol, food to Boko Haram, sabotaging war—Report.” The Eagle Online, 12 December. https://the​ eagleonline​.com​.ng/bribe-­taking-­nigerian-­security-­men-­pushing-­petrol-­food​ -­to​ -­boko​-­haram-­sabotaging-­war-­report/. Katsouris C., and A. Kayne. (2013). “Nigeria’s criminal crude: International options to combat the export of stolen oil.” London, Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs. Kindzeka, M. E. (2020). “Nigeria’s closed border boosts smuggling to Cameroon. VOA News 4 March. https://www​.voanews​.com/africa/nigerias​-­closed-­border​ -­boosts​-­smuggling-­cameroon. Konings, P. (2005). “The Anglophone Cameroon-­Nigeria boundary: Opportunities and conflicts.” African Affairs 104, no. 415, 275–301. Mbom, S. (2018). “Smuggling in fuel to fill demand in one of Africa’s biggest oil-­ producers.” African Arguments, February 5. https://africanarguments​.org/2018/02/05/ smuggling-­in-­fuel-­to-­fill-­demand-­in-­one-­of-­africas-­biggest-­oil-­producers/. Mohammed, I. (1992). “Nigeria and Francophone states: The problem of border management between Borno State of Nigeria and the Republics of Niger, Chad and Cameroon.” In B. Ate and B. Akinterinwa (eds), Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-­Regional Security in the 1990s. Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Musa, S. (2013). “Border security, arms proliferation and terrorism in Nigeria.” http:// saharareporters​.com. NEITI—Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative. (2019). “Stemming the increasing cost of oil theft to Nigeria.” Policy Brief, no. 5. Nwachukwu, M. U., and H. Chike. (2011). “Fuel subsidy in Nigeria: Fact or fallacy.” Energy 36, no. 5, 2796–2801. Nwokolo, N. N. (2020). “Peace-­building or structural violence? Deconstructing the aftermath of Nigeria/Cameroon boundary demarcation.” African Security Review. https://doi​.org/10.1080/10246029.2020.1734644 Nwosu, N. I. (1996). “The politics of oil subsidy in Nigeria.” Africa 51, no. 1, 80–94 Oduntan, G. (2015). International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa. London: Routledge. Oilprice​.com. (2009). “What is crude oil? A detailed explanation on this essential fossil fuel, July 24. https://oilprice​.com/Energy/Crude-­Oil/What-­Is-­Crude-­Oil-­A​ -Detailed-­Explanation-­On-­This-­Essential-­Fossil-­Fuel​.html. Ojeme, V., and R. Odiniya. (2013). “Nigeria has over 1,499 Illegal entry routes— Interior Minister.” Vanguard, 19 June. http://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2013/06/ nigeria-­has-­over-1499-illegal-­entry-­routes-­interior-­minister/.



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Okere, R. (2016). “NNPC spends ₦103.4 billion to protect oil pipelines in one year.” The Guardian, 28 March, https://guardian.ng/news/nnpc-spends-n103-4-billion-toprotect-oil-pipelines-in-one-year/ (accessed 30 August 2022). Olayinka, C., and K. Jeremiah. (2019). “Nigeria losing N1,085t daily to fuel smuggling.” The Guardian, 18 August. https://guardian​.ng/news/nigeria​-­losing​-­n1085t​ -­daily-­to-­fuel-­smuggling/. Olufemi, A. (2020). “Many Nigerian borders artificial, difficult to manage—­ Minister. Premium Times, 11 June. https://www​.premiumtimesng​.com/news/top​ -­news/397131​-many-­nigerian-­borders-­artificial-­difficult-­to-­manage-­minister​ html. Omede, A. J. (2006). “Nigeria’s relations with her neighbours. Studies in Tribe and Tribal 4 no. 1, 7–17. Onuoha F. C. (2016). “The resurgence of militancy in Nigeria’s oil-­rich Niger Delta and the dangers of militarisation,” 8 June. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. https:// studies​.aljazeera​.net/en/reports/2016/06/resurgence-­militancy-­nigerias-­oil-­rich​ -­niger​-­delta-­dangers-­militarisation-160608065729726 html. Onuoha, F. C. (2014). A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone: Boko Haram’s Transnational Reach and Regional Responses. Abuja: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Regional Office. Onuoha, F. C. (2013). “Porous borders and Boko Haram’s arms smuggling operations in Nigeria.” Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies. Onuoha, F. C. (2012). “Illegal oil bunkering: Nigerian context and transnational ramifications for the Gulf of Guinea.” Politeia 31, no. 2, 5–27. Onuoha F. C., G. E. Ezirim and C. Enyiazu. (2017). “Unbridled pillage: The political economy of oil theft in Nigeria.” South East Journal of Political Science Review 1, no. 1, 19–36. Soud, D. (2020). “Downstream oil theft: Countermeasures and good practices.” Atlantic Council, Washington, DC. https://www​.atlanticcouncil​.org/wp-­content/ uploads/2020/05/AC_OilTheft-­Final-1.pdf. Stakeholder Democracy Network. (2015). “Communities not criminals—Illegal oil refining in the Niger Delta.” Porth Harcourt, SDN. The Cable. (2018). “Rising crude oil prices fuelling smuggling of petrol from Nigeria,” 17 January. http://petrobarometer​.thecable​ ng/2018/01/17/rising​-­crude​-o­ il​ -­rices​-­fueling-­smuggling-­of-­petrol-­from-­nigeria/. Uche, C. J., and A. Akpuru-­Aja. (2018). “Between regime security and security of nationals in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region: A case of ‘illegal’ oil refinery development.” South East Journal of Political Science 4, no. 2. Umeh, K. (2020). “Nigerian navy destroy 2,287 illegal refineries, The Guardian, 22 May. https://guardian​.ng/news/nigeria/nigerian-­navy-­destroy-2287-illegal-­refineries/ United States Environmental Protection Agency. (n.d.). “Types of refined petroleum products.” https://www​.epa​.gov/emergency-­response/types-­refined​-­petroleum​ -­products. Wakil, A. (2009). “The challenges of trans-­border crimes: Smuggling, crime constraints and challenges.” In O. A. Onafowokan and O. D. Oche (eds), Transnational Crime and Security in West Africa. Lagos: Foreign Service Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chapter Twelve

Environmental Governance and Related Human Security Issues in Nigeria-­Cameroon Relations Lagdo Dam in Perspective Christian Ichite and Olanrewaju Lateef Yusuf INTRODUCTION Environmental governance, within political ecology—which explores relations between society and the environment—aims to manage individual behaviours or collective action in pursuance of the public environmental good and related societal outcomes (Bennett and Satterfield, 2018). In Nigeria-­ Cameroon relations, more prominent challenges such as questions over ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula, conflicting border claims, violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin, and maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea dominated the discourse on bilateral/bi-­national relations. However, management of disasters accruing from shared water resources has also arisen in the last one or two decades as one more portent challenge to the bilateral environmental governance and human security capabilities of the two countries. Individually, water remains one natural resource abundantly available in both countries. However, lapses in respective water resources management in both countries (particularly as demonstrated in recurrent flood disasters occasioned by the release of excess water from the Lagdo Dam in Cameroon with corresponding fatalities in Nigeria) suggest the imperative for review of environmental governance for enhanced human security between both countries, within a broader political ecology discourse. In Nigeria, water is one of the most essential natural resources, available as rivers, streams, fountains and waterfalls, crisscrossing the entire country, especially from the middle belt to the southern tip of the country, where they drain into the Atlantic Ocean. The abundance of this natural resource in the country is widely affirmed by scholars, including Okoye (2019). Water is 217

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essential to the health, daily living, means and livelihood of the Nigerians, and to the socioeconomic sustenance and development of the country. This is exemplified by the importance of the two major river systems which demarcate the country via the River Niger (entering from Nigeria’s north west) and the River Benue (entering from Nigeria’s north east). The two rivers divide Nigeria and converge at Lokoja in Kogi State, Nigeria. From the confluence, the water moves south and eventually discharges into the Atlantic Ocean. Despite the presence of a huge water resource, Nigeria is yet to have a standardized water management strategy that balances the harnessing of this natural resource, on the one hand, and tackling the perennial flooding experienced in different parts of the country, on the other. Oladokun and Proverbs (2016) argue that the unavailability of such a strategy is responsible for the pervasive flooding being faced by the country. In an earlier study, Plate (2002) posited that mitigation of flooding effects can only be made possible by an understanding of the problem and causes backed by strategic actions through robust national policy and/or strategy. In recent times, Okoye (2019) believes that the primary focus of Nigeria water policy has been on hydroelectric power generation, water supply for domestic and industrial consumption, irrigation purposes and sanitation. Thus, flood control and management have been largely ignored. In Cameroon, water resources are abundantly available. Precipitation ranges from 9,000mm/year in the south to less than 300mm/year in the extreme north of the country. The average annual rainfall is 1,684mm (Sigha-­ Nkandjou et al., 2002). Rainfall is normally high, thereby generating an abundance of surface- and groundwater, which makes the country the second in Africa (after the Democratic Republic of Congo) in terms of quantity of available water resources, estimated to be 322 billion cubic meters (Mafany and Fantong, 2006). Thus, annual available water per inhabitant is 21,000m3 in Cameroon, which is three times the world’s average of 7,000m3 (Mfany and Fantong, 2006). Therefore, Cameroon is ranked 49th out of 182 countries in the world in terms of abundance of water supply. The country has a dense network of rivers, most of which have their origin and source in the Adamawa Plateau at the centre of the country and flow north and southwards. There are six main river basins in Cameroon, viz: the Sanaga Basin, Sanaga West Basin, Sanaga South Basin; and the Niger, Congo and Chad basins. The Ngoko, Sangha and the Dja Rivers main tributaries of the main Congo basin have their source in Cameroon. Available water resources in Cameroon also includes many rivers that it shares with other countries, such as the River Benue as well as the Cross River and River Munanya shared with Nigeria (Ako et al., 2010). However, the “biggest problem in Cameroon



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is not the availability of water; it is the poor management and development of the resources, coupled with inadequate political will and commitment for the long term” (MINMEE, 1997). Consequently, respective inadequacies in the management of abundant water resources in both Nigeria and Cameroon began to take a toll on human security and overall environmental governance in both countries—separately as well as jointly. Most recently, in October 2019, the federal government of Nigeria accused Cameroonian authorities of breaching the Lagdo Dam pact, after flooding occasioned by opening the Lagdo Dam vanes without prior information to the Nigerian authorities. Earlier in 2012, the flood disaster, which severely affected the West-­Central African region, had attracted greater public attention to political ecology issues in the Nigeria-­Cameroon relations. The incident was unprecedented, as such had not been experienced for more than three decades after the disastrous Ogunpa flooding incident in southwest Nigeria in the early 1980s. During the 2012 floods in Nigeria, most adjoining states along the Rivers Benue and Niger were hit harder, in terms of human security, and this led to an increase in public outrage, most especially after it was revealed that the flood was mainly due to the trans-­border overflow of water after the release of dam water from Lake Lagdo in Cameroon, which had the banks of the Rivers Benue and Niger flooded. The 2012 flooding havoc exposed critical lacuna in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, especially on joint environmental governance for human security. This chapter, therefore, explores environmental governance and human security issues in Nigeria-­ Cameroon relations from a political ecology perspectives, using the Lagdo Dam flood-­related disasters as a critical point of departure. THE HUMAN SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE NEXUS Human security presents a reliable paradigm for understanding global human vulnerabilities. Its proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security, arguing that the proper referent for security should be the individual rather than the state. The central tenet of the human security paradigm, which is therefore of interest in this study, is that a people-­centred view of security is necessary for national, regional and global stability. Thus, it is the protection of “the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfilment” (Ogata and Sen, 2003). Human security therefore encompasses the security of individuals, their livelihoods, and human rights, including economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.

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Human security, before now, had been enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), with multiple references to people’s strategic and material security, as well as setting up a framework for ensuring human security at every level. The first section on strategic security rights encompasses civil and political rights; the second includes material security and economic, social and cultural rights (Moore, 2004). In addition, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which links strategic and material rights, has attained the status of customary law and obliges states to promote human security. For example, Article 3 affirms “the right to life, liberty and dignity.” The declaration also stresses the non-­ discriminatory character of human rights, including the equal rights of women and men. Thus, the universal acclaim of the concept of human security goes back decades in the history of human efforts at collective security. Furthermore, the concept of human security facilitates in-­depth understanding of the complex interactions that determine the relative distribution of security and insecurity and offers a comprehensive, integrative framework for analysing the various insecurities faced by people throughout the world. It shows how interactive systems can generate insecurities, neutralize each other, or enhance security. From a human security perspective, then, environmental change is important in two ways. First, it can itself be a source of insecurity. Even if the state does not register a given form of environmental change as a threat to its core values or national interests, fragments of its citizenry may feel otherwise. On the other hand, if the state does appreciate the security relevance of environmental change, it may still be constrained in terms of its response, insofar as the problem has distinguishing transnational dimensions, as is the case with management of the Lagdo Dam. Second, modes of environmental change can exacerbate other real or potential forms of insecurity such as poverty or discrimination or terrorism (Homer-­ Dixon, 1996). Insofar as these two general claims are valid, it is crucial that analysts and policy makers consider security/insecurity from the comprehensive vantage provided by the analytical framework of human security. This will foster a better understanding of causal relationships, which are almost always network-­based. Better understanding will in turn help reduce the likelihood of recommending or implementing bad policies. For example, an attempt to reduce insecurity by alleviating poverty may fail if it involves increasing environmental degradation or scarcity, creating a situation in which short-­term gains are almost certain to be undermined by medium or long-­term losses. There is indeed much truth to the environmentalist dictum, “Everything is connected to everything.” Human insecurity can therefore arise when population growth, economic development, regional tensions, and weak enforcement of environmental law place enormous stress on ecosystems.



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DAMS AND HUMAN INSECURITY Dams, on the one hand, are structures that block the flow of a river, stream, estuary or other waterway, while on the other, they are built to retain water. Some dams divert the flow of river water into a pipeline, canal or channel. Others raise the level of inland waterways to make them navigable by ships and barges. In recent times, a lot of dams have been constructed to harness the energy of falling water to generate electric power. Dams are built to provide water for human consumption, for irrigating arid and semiarid lands, for recreational opportunities and for use in industrial processes. Furthermore, they are used to increase the amount of water available for generating hydroelectric power and to act as flood control through reduction in peak discharge of floodwater. Thus, contemporary dams are multipurpose in nature. Most dams include an important safety feature called a spillway for use during extreme flood conditions. A spillway provides a way for excess floodwater flowing into a reservoir to be diverted around a dam. Without a spillway, the floodwater could overtop the dam’s crest and erode the backside of the dam, which might cause it to collapse. When this happens, millions of cubic meters of water can rush downstream and may destroy whatever it meets in its way. Consequently, dams lead to alteration in the river flow, elimination of microhabitats and, in some cases, elimination of the flora and fauna in the habitats. Furthermore, nutrient-­laden silt is prevented from flowing unhindered downstream and, eventually, into the river. Accordingly, dams have generated controversies and have become a focus of environmental concern, most especially due to their impact on riparian ecosystems. In addition, large reservoirs can submerge large expanses of land which serves as a home to many people. Dams, according to Komolafe, Adegboyega and Akinluyi (2015), are often perceived as not only structures which transform the environment to serve human needs but also as structures that destroy the environment and cause massive destruction of the flora, fauna and picturesque landscapes. The environmental impact of reservoirs comes under ever-­increasing scrutiny as the global demand for water and energy increases and the number and size of reservoirs increases. However, adverse environmental and sociological impacts have been identified during and after many reservoir construction projects. Scudder and Gray (2005) posit therefore that whether reservoir projects are ultimately beneficial or detrimental to either the environment or surrounding human populations has remained a continual source of debate since the 1960s. The damming of a river creates a reservoir upstream from the dam. The reservoir waters spill out into the surrounding environments, flooding the

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natural habitats that existed before the dam’s construction. To date, over 400,000 km2 of the earth have been flooded due to damming (Dinan, 2017). The newly created reservoir has more surface area than the river would have had, and therefore more evaporation occurs than previously. This can lead to a loss of up to 2.1 meters in depth per year in some climes, thus contributing to greenhouse gas emissions. The initial filling of a reservoir floods the existing flora, thereby decomposing the carbon-­rich plants and trees. The decomposing organic matter subsequently releases a sizeable amount of carbon into the atmosphere. Oladokun and Proverbs (2016) opined that the plant matter itself, which in this case is decaying, settles to the non-­oxygenated bottom of the reservoir, and the decomposition—unmitigated by a flow pattern that would oxygenate the water— produces and eventually releases dissolved methane. Plummer and Mann (2000) argue that reservoir sedimentation rivers carry four different types of sediment down their riverbeds, allowing for the formation of riverbanks, river deltas, alluvial fans, braided rivers, oxbow lakes, levees and coastal shores. Due to dam construction, the flow of sediment downstream is blocked, leading to downstream erosion of these sedimentary depositional environments, and increased sediment build-­up in the reservoir. Given that the rate of sedimentation varies for each dam and each river, McCully (1996) states that all reservoirs develop a reduced water-­storage capacity due to the exchange of storage space for sediment eventually. West Africa has a total of 28 trans-­boundary river basins. Of the 28, the Niger River Basin is the most important due to the fact that it is shared by 11 countries, as stated by Wolf, Yoffe, and Giordano (2003). All West African countries, except Cape Verde, share a minimum of one watercourse with one of its neighbours such that the countries are more or less interdependent on each other. Accordingly, ECOWAS (2006) underscores the fact that only two West African countries are below the international standard for water scarcity, contrary to prevalent belief. Thus, the citizens of all West African countries, except Burkina Faso and Cape Verde, have access to 1,700m3 of renewable fresh water per year per person. Climate variability of the region sees peak water level during the rainy season and low water level during the dry season. This is one of the reasons attributed to the construction of dams in West Africa (UNEP, 2006). Hence, dams are used to store fresh water during seasons, so much so that dams have been described as effective tools in combating supply uncertainties and water shortages. Besides acting as a storage facility, dams in West Africa are used to generate electric power, thereby reducing the dependence on petroleum products for energy. Despite these advantages, however, dams pose a number of environmental challenges. Africa has a total of 1,300 large dams, with about 150 in West Africa (WCD, 2000). Diverse dam projects are being constructed across trans-­boundary



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rivers within West Africa, and such projects are conceived only at the national governmental level as against the regional “purpose” of the rivers. According to Ravenga et al. (2000), damming leads to alteration of the water quality due largely to increased river fragmentation, change in the hydrologic regime as a result of intra- and inter-­basin transfers, disruption of fish migration along the river and between the river and the sea, destruction of natural habitats and of reproduction areas for species such as water birds, slowing down of water flows, change in sedimentary load of the water and of its temperature as well as the modification of the ecology of coastal and delta areas. Thus, damming severely affects the ecology of respective sites, with attendant consequences for humans and their livelihoods. THE LAGDO DAM NARRATIVE Lagdo Dam, situated in Cameroon, is one of such developments that has had an adverse effect on people living around its catchment area. Lagdo Dam, which became operational in 1982, was planned together with the Dasin Hausa Dam in Fulfure Local Government of Adamawa State, Nigeria, with an expected capacity of 16,000 million m³. The dam was constructed, 700 km2 on the River Benue, in Cameroon, next to the town of Garoua, and has a total capacity of 8,000 million m³, is 308 m long with a height of 40 m and a thickness of 9 m. The reservoir is a lake and this covers a land area of 586 km². The dam was targeted to allow irrigation of 15,000 hectares of crops downstream. Apart from irrigation purposes, the dam covers the energy supply for northern Cameroon. Lagdo Dam is thus located at about 100 km upstream of the neighbouring Nigerian border, and it’s been argued by Danjibo, Adeoye and Ojo (2019) that no protocol was adopted for downstream users before construction commenced. This stance was further corroborated by Anugwara and Emakpe (2013), where they argued that since operation of Lagdo Dam commenced, Nigeria downstream has experienced an increase in siltation of river beds and diverse water infrastructures with resultant severe ecological and socioeconomic changes. The Lagdo Dam has significantly changed the ecology and hydrology of the downstream floodplain. Due to the operational priority given to hydropower generation of 72 MW installed capacity, discharge of water at the dam is kept to the barest minimum. Thus, the river overflows only when heavy rainfall leads to compulsory release of water from the dam. Consequently, the interval and propensity of the releases are largely erratic and only permit the flooding of a given marginal area, thereby raising questions about the use of the term floodplain for the downstream of the River Benue. The disappearance

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of the floodplains downstream of the dam has been further exacerbated by the large-­scale irrigation schemes which kicked off in the aftermath of the commissioning of the dam. These irrigation schemes have triggered environmental damage and led to massive migration, thereby increasing pressure from human activities on the environment and natural resources. According to Lambi (1999), more than 450 families belonging to over 20 ethnic groups now reside in Gounougou, the east bank of the River Benue. Notably, the Gounougou village consisted originally of a total of 15 Bata fishermen families; hence, the increase in population compared to the available natural resources more or less put tremendous pressure on the environment, most especially in light of the fact that the floodplain was initially the mainstay economy of the fishermen. The water level in the river during the rainy season is always low. Consequently, the runoff erodes the already steep riverbank. Once the dam is opened, the resultant effect of the rush of water from the dam is erosion. By acting as a water storage facility and ultimately preventing floods, the Lagdo Dam invariably orchestrated the transformation of the ecosystem into a large-­scale irrigation development scheme which has eventually extended to as much as thousands of hectares of land. Thus, the land along the floodplains is now state owned, and newly irrigated plots are subsequently leased to interested farmers. River bank erosion along the confluence of the Rivers Gongola, Kilange, Chauchi and Mayo Inne has been attributed to the Lagdo Dam. In explaining this phenomenon, Clarke (2013) suggests that floodplains and wetlands often get disconnected from rivers after dam commissioning. The altered speed at which water flows impacts the migratory patterns of aquatic animals, waterfalls, rapids, riverbanks, and wetlands. This results in the depopulation of the aquatic creatures in the downstream habitat of the Lagdo Dam. In 1979, the discharges of the River Benue at Yola in Gongola State (now Adamawa State) were recorded at around 2,463m3/second during the rainy season and 188m3/second during the dry season. The rate of discharge changed after the construction of the Lagdo Dam. In 1983, the average discharge of the River Benue at Wurobokki, Jimeta and Lau fell to 1,130m3/second and 117m3/second in the rainy season and dry season respectively. This number fell further in the subsequent years to as low as 305m3/second and 65m3/second in 1984. The River Benue, an internationally shared water body, originates in the Mbakana and Mandara Mountains in Cameroon. The river passes through Nigeria, traversing the states of Adamawa, Taraba, then the Benue before connecting with the River Niger in Lokoja. The resultant volume of water and loads of the two rivers are then discharged into the Atlantic Ocean via the delta area. Nigeria and Cameroon reached an agreement in 1980 before the construction of the dam. Despite the agreement, however, Umar, Tukur



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and Mustapha (2016) posit that the international nature of the River Benue, as a shared trans-­boundary natural resource, was not adequately considered during the pre- and post-­construction phases. This negates the Helsinki Rules on the uses and employment of international rivers and their waters, of which Nigeria and Cameroon are signatories. Falkenmark (2004) argues that consequences of such an act, despite international rules on the management of trans-­boundary rivers, can be a source of conflict. Occasionally, management of the infrastructure entails release of excess water when necessary, to prevent bursting of the dam. The consequence has always been an overwhelming and destructive effect on the surrounding towns and villages downstream of the dam. POLITICAL ECOLOGY AND THE LAGDO DAM NARRATIVE Political ecology provides a contemporary framework for contextualizing political and ecological implications of human behaviour (Okoli, 2013). These implications may be seen in the fact that ecological conditions influence the development of social structures and institutions, by imposing challenges as well as opportunities. This is true in the sense that the environment in its totality—resources and conditions—represents the fundamental life-­support system for all life forms including humans, especially in Africa where more than 80 per cent of the population are rural and depend more directly on their interaction with the environment (ecology) for survival and resilience (Ichite, 2012). Political ecology therefore makes sense of ecological concerns within considerations of political economy. Thus, issues around the Lagdo Dam and related flood disasters are put in better perspective within the larger Nigeria-­ Cameroon relations, especially in assessing the human security implications of disasters and the bilateral environmental governance efforts. In Nigeria’s perspective, recent lingering tensions in Nigeria-­Cameroon relations, in which Cameroon is blacklisted by ordinary citizens in Nigeria, derives significantly from Cameroon’s perceived handling of Lagdo Dam– related flooding incidents, given its impact in Nigeria. In 2012, water released from the Lagdo Dam flooded surrounding areas, including Adamawa State in Nigeria. The flood caused the River Niger to flow over its banks, an experience that had not occurred in 48 years. The flooding resulted in more than 10 deaths and loss of properties worth millions of Naira in Nigeria. A bigger effect of the flooding was, however, in the lower River Benue region, where more than 10,000 homes were submerged for more than two weeks. This left more than 10,000 hectares of farmland flooded, and the streets of Makurdi town in Nigeria’s Middle belt area were occupied by dangerous aquatic

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animals. This is not the first time such problems had occurred. Uyigue (2006) averred that an incident in July 2003 led to the damage of the Obudu Dam spillway, which resulted in a catastrophe that claimed approximately 200 houses, settlements, a lot of farmland, and business concerns. The disaster was allegedly caused by the release of excess water from the Lagdo Dam in Cameroon which caused the Benue and Niger to flood. Moreover, the 2012 Lagdo Dam–related flooding also claimed 14 lives in Cameroon. In October 2019, according to the Nigerian Hydrological Services Agency (NIHSA), although the flood level on the River Benue measured at Makurdi was 11.28m, against a much lower 9.01m in 2012, the disaster was not as severe as in 2012, which is taken as the reference year for considering the magnitude of damage to lives and property (Ewepu, 2019). The states contiguous to the Rivers Benue and Niger in Nigeria, were warned to watch out for and prepare for more flooding, owing to confessions from Cameroonian dam authorities of the release of water from the Lagdo Dam from 10 to 31 October 2019, information which was not transmitted to Nigeria prior to the release, and which led to initial accusations from the Nigerian authorities. According to Rasheed (2018), the Federal Government of Nigeria anticipated the possibility of the Lagdo Dam flooding some Nigerian communities when water was released. Thus, a holding dam idea was floated in 1982. The general consensus of the two governments—Nigeria and Cameroon—was to construct a water-­holding dam in Daisin Hausa, a community in Furore Local Government Area of Adamawa State. The dam was projected to curb, hold and ultimately limit the overflowing water coming from Lagdo Dam in Cameroun. Danjibo, Adeoye and Ojo (2019), however noted that 28 years after the conceptualization, the Daisin Hausa Dam was yet to be constructed. Moreover, it is generally perceived that there are other causes of flooding in Nigeria, with far greater consequences compared to the contributions from Lagdo Dam excess water releases. Flooding regularly wreaks havoc in Nigeria. In 2017, floods affected 250,000 people in the eastern-­central region; in 2016, 92,000 were displaced and 38 died; in 2015, more than 100,000 were displaced, with 53 deaths; and in 2012, devastating flooding forced 2 million Nigerians from their homes and 363 died (Reality Check Team, 2018). Data from the Nigerian Meteorological Agency from 1981 to 2017, analysing 13 affected locations, reveals a rising trend in annual rainfall, which it says is likely to be a significant factor responsible for floods (Reality Check Team, 2018). In addition to the Lagdo Dam, Nigeria’s three main electricity-­ generating dams, at Kainji and Jebba on the River Niger and the Shiroro dam on the Kaduna River, are said to be bloated by heavy rains, and excess water has had to be released downstream. Also, the Zungeru Dam in Niger State



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is also believed to be affecting areas once free from flooding. Thus, dams in Nigeria are not entirely blameless for flooding incidents across the country. Besides actual flooding related to dam releases, town planning is poor in Nigeria as in Cameroon, both with expanding populations. Most urban centres lack adequate drainage networks, which compounds the challenges of flooding. Developments in both countries are unregulated, with people building on floodplains without constructing drainage systems, thereby reducing the surface area for water to travel. Moreover, pressure is mounted on urban drainage systems in both countries by the dumping of waste on the streets and into the few drainage networks. Thus, there are more factors to blame in both countries than just the release of excess water from the Lagdo Dam. PRIORITIZING HUMAN SECURITY VIA ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA-­CAMEROON RELATIONS Constructive engagements on collective action in the pursuit of public environmental good and related societal outcomes would guarantee greater human security in Nigeria-­Cameroon relations. Beyond current narratives on flood disasters along the River Benue Basin and the contributions of water releases from the Lagdo Dam to the quagmire, human insecurity issues due to poor environmental governance by both countries present ample opportunities to smooth relations and improve livelihoods for respective citizens. The Lagdo Dam narrative may underscore a classic example of a political ecology decision aimed to improve livelihoods as well as reduce disasters in two countries, which however has been challenged by associated environmental governance issues. Such issues are beyond just mere inadequate proactive measures to contain adverse side-­effects (Okoye, 2019). In the case under consideration, the critical opportunities worth exploring include: (1) the Nigeria-­Cameroon Protocol Agreement concluded in 2000 under the supervision of the Niger Basin Authority (NBA) aimed at coordinating the release of water from the shared dams, consultation between both nations with respect to the projects as well as the development and implementation of joint projects; (2) efforts by the governments of Cameroon and Nigeria after the 2012 floods, to revisit the 1980 agreement with the hope of a review; (3) the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission established after Lake Chad receded in order to settle the conflict over the blurred border between the two countries; and (4) implementation of the protocol signed with Cameroon to exchange daily data on flows, especially release from the Lagdo Dam. Exploring these opportunities will be of mutual benefit to both countries. Often, Nigeria appears more of a victim with regard to Lagdo Dam–related

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flood disasters. However, both countries actually bear the brunt. The 2012 incident actually “killed some 180 people across the north of both countries” (Ngalame, 2013). The two nations resolved to cooperate on building new flood-­control structures, sharing weather information and relocating people from flood-­prone areas in an effort to avoid further losses (Ngalame, 2013). The resolution was concluded as a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) established by a joint team of water management experts from both countries, as announced by Cameroon’s prime minister after meeting with Nigeria’s minister of water resources on 26 July 2013 (Ngalame, 2013). More importantly, both parties must prioritize human security in their own country as well as across the shared border instead of trading blame. Poor management of both their own water resources as well as shared water resources is common in the region. In 2015 for instance, floods killed dozens of people and displaced thousands in June and July particularly in Yaoundé and Douala, both in Cameroon (UNDRR, 2015). The UNDRR estimates indicated that over 130 floods struck Yaoundé, the capital, from 1980 to 2014, causing more than 80 deaths as well as economic damage, while Douala, the commercial hub, has faced over 300 floods in the past three decades, which also claimed an estimated 700 lives (UNDRR, 2015). Even as recent as July 2020, heavy rainfall in Mayo-­Danay Division, Far North region of Cameroon, caused widespread flooding in seven districts, which displaced about 5,553 people who also lost livestock and field crops (OCHA, 2020). The case of related water resources management lapses in Nigeria has already been discussed above. The point in emphasis therefore is that energy dissipated over trading blame could constructively be utilized in implementing critical agreements on the challenge at hand. For instance, after the 2012 incident, Nigeria, Cameroon and even Chad traded accusations over who had aggravated the disaster. Cameroon was slammed for releasing large amounts of water from its Lagdo Dam, while Cameroon blamed Chad for unilaterally raising the dike along the banks of the trans-­boundary River Logone, prolonging the flood and causing excess water flow from heavy rains into the Lagdo Dam (Ngalame, 2013). Thus, the enormous cost to human security in the region, of poor management of shared water resources, far outweigh any gains from dysfunctional cross-­border politicking in the region, and should be enough reason to incentivize concerted efforts on regional environmental governance. CONCLUSION In order to reduce the impact of flooding in the future as well as smooth the Nigeria-­Cameroon bilateral relations on issues of flooding, taking advantage



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of opportunities presented by environmental governance or lack thereof, (1) the consequences of rapid urbanisation and poor urban planning need to be urgently addressed by both governments within their respective territories; (2) both countries will also need greater cooperation in the control of river levels in order to avoid dangerous surges in water levels during the periods of heavy rains; and (3) both countries must prefer bilateral constructive diplomacy to separate counterproductive propaganda within their own territory, which increases tensions in inter-­citizen relations. In this way, environmental governance would have provided more opportunities than challenges in Nigeria-­Cameroon relations. REFERENCES Adedeji, O., B. Odufuwa and O. Adebayo. (2012). “Building capabilities for flood disaster and hazard preparedness and risk reduction in Nigeria: Need for spatial planning and land management.” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 14, no. 1, 45–58. Agada, Susan, and N. Nirupama. (2015). “A serious flooding event in Nigeria in 2012 with specific focus on Benue State: A brief review.” Natural Hazards 77, 1405–1414. Ali, D., and S. Hamidu. (2014). “Environmental hazard: climate change and flooding, the impact on the built environment in Nigeria.” Journal of Environmental Science and Resource Management 6 no. 1, 136–144. Ako A. A., G. E. Takem and G. E. Nkeng. (2010). Water resources management and integrated water resources management (IWRM) in Cameroon. Water Resources Management. Anugwara, B., and G. Emakpe. (2013). “Will FG save Nigerians from another ‘Tsunami’”? Newswatch, 17 April. http://www​mynewswatchtimesng​ .com/ will-­fg-­save-­nigerians-­another-­tsunami/. Bennett N. J., and T. Satterfield. (2018). “Environmental governance: A practical framework to guide design, evaluation and analysis.” Conservation Letters; A Journal of the Society for Conservation Biology 11, no, 6. Clarke, R. (2013). Water: The International Crisis. London: Routledge. Danjibo N. D., A. E. Adeoye and O. S. Ojo. (2019). “The Relationship between flooding and food security in Kogi State.” African Journal of Environment and Natural Science Research 2 no. 2, 31–47. Dinan, T. (2017). “Projected increases in hurricane damage in the United States: The role of climate change and coastal development.” Ecological Economics 138, 186–198. ECOWAS-­SWAC/OECD. (2006). Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa: Transboundary River Basins. OECD, 9 October. https://www​.oecd​.org/regional/​ atlasonregionalintegrationinwestafrica​.htm.

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Ewepu, Gabriel. (2019). “More flooding to hit Nigeria from Lagdo Dam in Cameroon—NIHSA” Vanguard, 5 November. https://www​ .vanguardngr​ .com/2019/11/ more-­flooding-­to-­hit-­nigeria-­from-­lagdo-­dam-­in-­cameroon-­nihsa/. Falkenmark, M. (2004). “Towards integrated catchment management: opening the paradigm locks between hydrology, ecology and policy-­making.” International Journal of Water Resources Development 20, no. 3, 275–281. Ichite, C. (2012). “Environmental stress and state fragility in Nigeria.” In Isaac O. Albert (ed.), History of Social Conflicts and Conflict Management in Nigeria; A Festschrift in Honour of Professor Biodun Adediran. Ibadan: John Archers. IGRAC. (2014). Transboundary Aquifers of the World. International Groundwater Resources Assessment Centre, 18 October. https://www​ .un-­ igrac​ .org/trans​ boundary-­aquifers-­world-­map. Komolafe, A., S. Adegboyega and F. Akinluyi. (2015). “A review of flood risk analysis in Nigeria.” American Journal of Environmental Sciences 11, no. 3, 157–166. Lambi, C. (1999). “The Bamendjin Dam of the Upper Nun Valley of Cameroon: No human paradise.” In J. Dunlop and R. Williams (eds), Culture and Environment. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde. Mafany, G.T. and W.Y. Fantong. (2006). Groundwater Quality in Cameroon and Its Vulnerability to Pollution. Balkema, Rotterdam: Taylor & Francis. McCully, P. (1996). Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams. London: Zed Books. MINMEE (Ministry of Mines, Water and Energy). (1997). “Alimentation en eau des populations rurales du Cameroun: Synthese globale et par province des donnees extraite de progres, Yaoundé,” June, 12 pp. Moore, J. (2004). “Collective security with a human face: An international legal, framework for coordinated action to alleviate violence and poverty.” Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 22. Ngalame, Elias Ntungwe. (2013). “Cameroon, Nigeria cooperate on flood prevention plan.” Thomson Reuters Foundation, 19 August. OCHA. (2015). “Cameroonians plagued by urban flooding.” United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Reliefweb. 1 July. https://reliefweb​.int/ report/cameroon/cameroonians-­plagued-­urban-­flooding. OCHA. (2020). “Cameroon: Floods—Aug 2020.” United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Reliefweb, 19 August. https://reliefweb​.int/report/ cameroon/cameroon-­humanitarian-­bulletin-­issue-­n-13-october-2020. Ogata, S. and A. Sen. (2003). “Empowering People for Human Security,” Payne Lecture, Standford University. https://sarpn.org/documents/d0001513/documents/4_ Empowering_People_Ogata.pdf (accessed 15 September 2022). Okoli, A.I.C. (2013). “The political ecology of Niger Delta crisis and the prospects of lasting peace in the post-amnesty period.” Global Journal of Human Social Science, Political Science 13, no. 3. Okoye, C. (2019). “Perennial flooding and integrated flood risk management strategy in Nigeria.” International Journal of Economics, Commerce and Management 8, no. 9, 364–375.



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Oladokun, V., and D. Proverbs. (2016). “Flood risk management in Nigeria: A review of the challenges and opportunities.” International Journal of Safety and Security Engineering 6, no. 3, 485–497. Plate, E. (2002). “Flood risk and flood management.” Journal of Hydrology 267, no. 1, 2–11. Plummer, L., and C. C. Mann. (2000). “Can science rescue salmon?” Science 289, no. 5480 (August): 716–19. Rasheed, A. (2018). “Flood: The terror from Lagdo Dam.” Punch, 11 May. https:// punchng​.com/flood-­the-­terror-­from-­lagdo-­dam/PunchNewspapers. Ravenga, C., J. Brunner, N. Henninger, K. Kassen and R. Payne. (2000). Pilot Analysis of Global Ecosystems. Washington, DC: WRI. Reality Check Team. (2018). “Why does Nigeria keep flooding?” BBC, 27 September. https://www​.bbc​.com/news/world-­africa-45599262. Sigha-­Nkamdjou L., D. Sighomnou, G. Lienou. (2002). “Vers une approche globale de la gestion de la resource comme solution aux crises d’eau des dernières Lanen, S. Demuth (eds), “FRIEND décennies au Cameroun.” In H. A. Van-­ 2002-Regional hydrology: Bridging the gap between research and practice.” Proceedings of the 4th international FRIEND conference, Cape Town, South Africa, March. International Association of Hydrological Sciences, Publication no. 274, 337–343. Accessed online via researchgate​net. Umar, D. A., A. I. Tukur and A. Mustapha. (2016). “Environmental consequences and potential trans-­border conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon resulting from damming of River Benue at Lagdo, Northern Cameroon.” Journal of Geography 3, no. 1, 1–12. UNEP. (2006). “Challenges to international water: Regional assessments in a global perspective.” https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/8404 (accessed 15 September 2022). Uyigue, E. (2006). “Dams are unrenewable: A discussion paper.” Benin City: Community Research and Development Centre. Wolf, A. (2001). Water, Conflict, and Cooperation. IFPRI, 30 May. http://www​.ifpri​ .org/2020/focus/focus09/focus09_14 htm. Wolf, A. T., S. B. Yoffe and M. Giordano. (2003). “International waters: Identifying basins at risk.” Water Policy 5, 29–60. World Bank. 2016. “World Development Indicators.” World Data Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Commissions on Dams (WCD). (2000). Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making. London: Earthscan.

Chapter Thirteen

Maritime Domain Management and National Security Cameroon-­Nigeria Boundary in Perspective Patrick Chibueze Nwatu INTRODUCTION The prosperity of littoral states depends largely upon their abilities to harness the enormous resources and economic advantages conferred on them by their access to the sea. Accordingly, most littoral nations put in place measures to harvest and transfer the resources within their maritime domain in order to enhance and guarantee the well-­being of their citizens. The need to harness this vast sea and adjourning land requires the coordination of all maritime activities through the employment of a robust maritime domain management mechanism. Maritime domain management covers measures taken to organise, control and secure the resources, industry, shipping and trade, as well as the way of life of maritime communities. It is also associated with maritime defence, safety and security concerns of a maritime state and constitutes a veritable means for managing the maritime domain to optimally derive benefit from resources therein to promote their national security. National security involves a complex and coordinated range of engagements that nations adopt to secure their citizens and manage resources as well as protect cultures and values to prevent a violation of their sovereignty and territorial integrity. For nations bordering the sea, the attainment of national security creates the enabling environment for political and economic security as well as the right condition for the management of the maritime domain against foreign and domestic threats (National Security Bureau of Taiwan, 2010). Efficient management of maritime domain helps to achieve maritime security towards enhancing national security. Management of the adjoining maritime domain between two or more contiguous nations sometimes requires each nation deploying resources and maritime assets to advance its interests and secure its territorial integrity. The safeguard of each nation’s 233

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territorial integrity requires the employment of diplomacy in addition to other measures to manage areas of mutual interest that could otherwise lead to adverse consequences. Accordingly, major maritime nations have always considered the maritime domain as indispensable to the pursuit of their interests and an integral component of their national security. The United States maintains a large naval force and is the foremost advocate of sea power in the world. According to Mabus, “sea power has been and will continue to be the critical underpinning of national power, prosperity and global prestige for the USA” (Mabus, 2015, 12) The US thus recommends collective policing and collaboration with other maritime nations for the management and sustenance of common maritime areas. The current US maritime strategy, as captured by Mabus, states that US naval forces are stronger when operating jointly with allies and partners. Hence, by working together, it is possible to address threats to mutual maritime security interests (Mabus, 2015, 12). Accordingly, the US maritime strategy is premised on cooperation with other maritime nations for the protection of the maritime domain, especially around shared maritime environment for the benefit of all. The US commenced a maritime alliance with Mexico in 2005, under the North American Maritime Security Initiative (NAMSI), adopting a joint regional protocol to check maritime crimes in order to secure the maritime domain of both countries (Maximo et al., 2016, 187). The initiative covering 1,933 nautical miles (nm) of maritime boundary between the nations led to the seizure of over 30 tonnes of cocaine and over 17 tonnes of cannabis in 5 fishing vessels and 7 small boats in 2012. This collaboration led to over 47 percent success in the rate of arrest of illegal trafficking of narcotics and other maritime crimes within the North American maritime domain between 2012 and 2015 (Maximo et al., 2016, 187). The impact of NAMSI demonstrates that mutual collaboration by contiguous maritime nations can result in effective detection, deterrence and overall management of the maritime domain. This has helped in checking maritime crimes and enhancing the management of the maritime domain as well as collective national security of the US and other contiguous maritime nations in North America. South Africa (SA) maintains one of the most advanced navies in Africa and is a dominant naval force in southern Africa (Baker, 2012, 1). Since 2011, SA has initiated a maritime partnership with the Republic of Mozambique in an anti-­piracy operation code-­named Operation COPPER. The operation is focused on the protection and management of the Mozambique Channel and maritime domain along the eastern coast of South Africa (Athawale, 2012). The objective of Operation COPPER is to support the Mozambican Navy (MN) in joint regional patrols over the 1,000 nm maritime boundary in order to check piracy and other maritime crimes within the maritime domain of



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both countries (Martin, n.d.). The operation led to arrests on 13 pirate ships and 21 illegal fishing vessels in 2015, leading to a reduction in the incidence of piracy within the Mozambique Channel from 32 per cent in 2013 to 18 per cent in 2015 (International Maritime Bureau, 2016). These maritime domain measures have restored reasonable security and confidence within the maritime environment of southern Africa with positive effects on the national security of South Africa and Mozambique respectively. Nigeria is centrally located on the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) and has maritime interests spanning the entire region from Dakar in Senegal to Luanda in Angola (Lyall, 2016, 13). Nigeria shares maritime boundaries with the Republic of Benin to the west, Republic of Cameroon to the east and Equatorial Guinea as well as Sao Tome and Principe to the south east (Chatham House, n.d.). While Nigeria maintains the strongest navy in West Africa, Cameroon has the largest naval fleet in Central Africa. Both nations are separated by a sea area of about 8,000 square metres south of the Bakassi Peninsula (Roberts, 2015). The two countries also occupy strategic positions in the GoG, and their respective maritime domain represents important sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) between West and Central Africa, with access to South Africa and Asia. Presently, out of about eight million barrels of crude oil produced daily in Africa, the maritime domain of the GoG accounts for about 4.5 million barrels, representing about 10 per cent of world crude oil production (Chatham House, n.d.). Incidentally, the huge economic potential of the GoG is threatened by increasing incidents of maritime crimes and growing insecurity, particularly south of Nigeria’s Niger Delta (ND) area, adjacent to Cameroon. The maritime domain between Nigeria and Cameroon is thus replete with incidents of piracy, sea robbery, kidnappings and various forms of trafficking, among other crimes (Onuoha and Hassan, 2009). Efforts to address these maritime crimes are weakened by the age-­long suspicions and mistrust between Nigeria and Cameroon, with negative consequences to their respective national security. Despite separate efforts by Nigeria and Cameroon over the years, a total of 47 successful attacks on vessels were reported between the two countries from January 2016 to February 2017.1 This implies that individual states would need to collaborate more effectively to manage the domain as well as combat transnational crimes that have negatively impacted shipping and maritime activities, with adverse national security consequences. The maritime domain between Nigeria and Cameroon is strategically important because of the enormous resources therein and the huge potential for vibrant maritime trade between them. Ideally, efficient management of their maritime domain within the common waters should stimulate economic prosperity for both nations. However, in spite of the moderate capabilities of

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the navies of both nations, the lack of synergy and apparent suspicion and distrust have provided gaps exploited by criminal elements to perpetuate crimes that threaten the security of both nations. For instance, between 2012 and 2016, there were 26 specific attacks on shipping between the ports of Calabar in Nigeria and Limbe in Cameroon (Ahmed, 2016) This has affected the maritime industries and SLOCs as well as trade between both countries. Although there are periodic maritime exercises incorporating regional maritime forces working together for improved maritime security, the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon largely work independently to address these threats, with little success. The chapter therefore examines the dynamics of maritime domain awareness between Cameroon and Nigeria with a view to proffer ways of enhancing the management and security of the sea area between Cameroon and Nigeria. It is motivated by a commitment to improve Nigeria-­Cameroon border relations and the fact that both countries are dominant naval powers within their regions who ought to be able to articulate a robust mechanism to address threats within their common maritime domain and enhance their security. In terms of scope, it covers the sea area within the Eastern Naval Command Area of Operation from longitude 0080 E at Ikot Abasi, eastward across Nigeria’s maritime boundary with Cameroon, up to longitude 0090 20′ E in Limbe, Cameroon. OVERVIEW OF MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT ALONG THE NIGERIA-­CAMEROON BOUNDARY One of the legacies of colonialism in Africa is the inconsistency of international boundaries. The history of the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon typifies the artificial and arbitrary nature of Africa’s colonially inherited boundaries (Akinterinwa, 2012). Nigeria and Cameroon have shared a 2,100-km land boundary since the German-­Doula Treaty of 12 July 1884, which made Cameroon a German protectorate (Ntuda, 2010, 48). Over time, the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula has been the single most strategic feature that has dominated events in the management of the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. The peninsula is a network of islands and creeks of about 1,800 square km, east of the Cross River estuary, situated between latitudes 040 50′ and 040 25′ north; bounded to the west and east by the Akwa Yafe and Rio Del Rey Rivers respectively and the Atlantic Ocean to the south (Okoi, 2016, 43). The ownership of the peninsula is key because rights over the maritime domain are drawn from the ownership of adjoining coastal lands.



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The first major event concerning responsibility over the maritime domain was the treaty between the Obong of Calabar and the British monarchy on 10 September 1884, wherein the British government pledged to protect all territories and adjoining waters under the jurisdiction of the Obong (Ahmed, 2015). Hence, at that time, Bakassi was under the jurisdiction of the Obong, with the Rio Del Rey River at the eastern side of the peninsula as the maritime boundary of the Efik Kingdom with German Kamerun. This placed the management of the entire maritime domain under Nigerian authority. However, the Anglo-­German Agreement of 11 March 1913 moved the maritime boundary westward from Rio Del Ray to the Akwa Yafe River (Ate, 1990), contrary to the earlier agreement between the Obong and the British government, with serious implications to Nigeria’s territorial integrity and national security. After World War I and the subsequent defeat of Germany, her territories were divided between Britain and France at the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. All of Western Cameroon, or British Cameroon, including the Bakassi, were thus placed under British mandate and administered from Nigeria, as a separate country (Ahmed, 2015). Again, no observation was raised by Nigeria regarding the need to correct the disparity in the maritime boundary until the independence of French Cameroons on 1 January 1960 and Nigeria on 1 October 1960, as well as the plebiscites conducted by the United Nations in 1959 and 1961 (Jadesola, 2012, 82). The exchange of notes between colonial authorities and the new states ratified old boundaries showing the Bakassi Peninsula as part of Southern Cameroons and not Nigeria. This led to disputes regarding the extent of each nation’s maritime domain. After the Nigerian Civil War, a series of negotiations were conducted on either side to resolve lingering disputes and boost maritime trade in the region. Notable among them were the Ngoh Coker Line of 1971 and the Maroua Accord of 1975. For Nigeria, her strategic interest and national security could only be assured through unfettered access and control of the Calabar Channel and the Bakassi. Several negotiations between both nations throughout the 1980s failed, resulting in military altercations in 1987 as well as a series of confrontations between 1992 and 1994 that led to several military and civilian casualties (Ahmed, 2015) This prompted Cameroon to file an action against Nigeria at the ICJ in The Hague on 29 March 1994 over the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula; the Court ruled in favour of Cameroon on 10 October 2002. To forestall further disputes in the region, the Nigeria-­ Cameroon Mixed Commission (NCMC) was initiated on 15 November 2002 at Geneva, and the GTA in 2006 (Green Tree Agreement, 2006), to ensure to the implementation of the ICJ ruling over the Bakassi Peninsula. However, no concrete mechanism was agreed on the security of maritime resources within the common boundaries of both nations. The maritime space

Figure 13.1.  Map showing maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon Source: Naval Headquarters, Operation Room Abuja, 2016.



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between Nigeria and Cameroon (Figure 13.1) is replete with cases of poaching, piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and so on; all of these have continued to impinge on the nation’s security. This situation reiterates the need for both countries to put in place a management arrangement that would enhance the security of the domain to foster the peaceful harvest and transfer of the resources therein for enhanced national security. The delineation of maritime boundaries constitutes a critical requirement for putting in place effective maritime domain management within the maritime space between Nigeria and Cameroon for enhanced national security. Incidentally, since the ICJ ruling of 2002, the Working Group on Maritime Boundary (WGMB) observed that maritime surveyors are yet to agree on a tripartite maritime boundary between Nigeria, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea. Thus, a clearly demarcated maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon would help to stave-­off disputes over resources that are spread across both nations’ maritime borders. Furthermore, it is expected that such delineation would foster the deployment of maritime domain assets for efficient and effective maritime domain management for enhanced national security. Nigeria and Cameroon deployed maritime domain management infrastructure along their coastlines as part of an effort to boost maritime surveillance in order to check maritime threats and secure available maritime resources. Unfortunately, their respective surveillance equipment is deployed in isolation to each other, not permitting a common picture of the entire maritime domain required to boost national security. Additionally, considerations were not given to the activities of maritime agencies that could have enhanced the management of the region for enhanced national security. Hence, the maritime domain management between Nigeria and Cameroon has not optimally delivered on its potential, largely due to the lack of comprehensive architecture for enhanced national security in Nigeria. ARCHITECTURE OF NIGERIA MARITIME SECURITY The Nigerian maritime security architecture and infrastructure was approved in 2016 by President Muhammadu Buhari to be jointly coordinated by the Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and the Nigerian Navy. The maritime agency is under the Federal Ministry of Transport but also responsible to the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) for security and safety issues within the nation’s maritime domain. The Nigerian Navy, on the other hand, is statutorily charged by both the Nigerian Constitution and the Armed Forces Act Cap A20 for the seaward

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defence of Nigeria against all threats and security breaches. The navy is further charged to conduct other Coast Guard roles in aid of Customs and Immigration as well as anti-­pollution and hydrographic duties. Hence, while NIMASA remains the major government coordinating agency concerned with safety and security issues, the Nigerian Navy provides the teeth to secure the maritime environment. NIMASA has therefore entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Nigerian Navy in the form of the Maritime Guard Command (MGC) domiciled within NIMASA to provide an enforcement role towards the actualization of its mandate. Other security agencies support NIMASA in one form or another in performance of its role. The author’s appraisal of the nation’s maritime security architecture in Figure.13.2 indicates responsibility from the President, Commander In Chief to ONSA and Chief of Defence Staff to NIMASA, the Nigerian Navy and other armed services and maritime agencies.

Figure 13.2.  Diagram of security architecture of the Nigerian maritime domain Source: Researcher’s Conceptualization. 2017.



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The framework of the maritime security architecture above is built around eight key objectives, which include: safe and secured maritime domain, enhanced ease of doing business, boosting of investors’ confidence and facilitation of indigenous and foreign direct investment into the maritime sector. Others are: ploughing back profits by investors into the trusted and secured business system, increased revenue generation into the government coffers and economic development and advancement of the nation. Dakuku Peterside2 (quoted in Salau, 2017) noted that existing maritime security frameworks seek to strengthen maritime security by empowering the joint task forces between NIMASA and the Nigerian Navy and Army to conduct law enforcement and anti-­piracy patrols backed by electronic surveillance assets that can track the International Maritime Organization number for all cooperating vessels in Nigerian waters. Also the new architecture will further improve maritime domain awareness by detecting and monitoring the movements of all craft transiting Nigerian waters for enhanced maritime domain management and national security in Nigeria. Within the limit of the area of study, NIMASA works in conjunction with all the mentioned stakeholders to provide security and safety for users of the nation’s maritime domain between Nigeria and Cameroon. The Nigerian Navy, on the other hand, through the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) in Calabar, is also expected to provide sufficient deterrence and support to NIMASA and other agencies as well. NIGERIAN NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE AND MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT The statutory responsibility of national security in Nigeria is vested in the President (the executive arm of government) through all such security agencies established by law. As noted by Bryden et al. (2008, 245), Nigeria’s security sector comprises the armed forces (army, air force and navy), the Nigerian police force and paramilitary bodies including Nigeria’s customs service, the Nigerian immigration service, intelligence services—including military intelligence and the state security services. Others are Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Federal Road Safety Corps and Nigeria Correctional Services, among others. Also, the security structure also identifies private security outfits, militia groups and community vigilante groups as part of its architectural framework. All of these agencies have their statutory functions in combating insecurity in the country. However, Ezeobi (2017) noted that the statutory responsibilities of the Nigerian Navy have always been mapped out; these include protecting the

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nation’s maritime domain from threats, which might come in the form of piracy, crude oil theft and trafficking. As expected, navy personnel constantly seek ways to hone their skills in carrying out their constitutional duties, and one such way is participating in sea exercises, either local or international. Furthermore, he added that in carrying out these mandates, the Nigeria Navy has actively participated in the international and regional Operation OBANGAME Express, a maritime interdiction and interoperability exercise, designed to not only boost the capacity of individual navies that participated, but also provides an opportunity for partner nations to work together, share information and refine tactics, techniques and procedures to assist African maritime nations in building capacity to monitor and safeguard their territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Ibas (n.d.) affirmed that the nation’s lifeline was sea based; therefore, it had become necessary to protect such an area, as the core mandate of the service was to protect the nation’s critical national assets. He further revealed that in fulfilling its mandate of security, the Nigeria maritime environment, with a coastline of about 420 nautical miles (nm) and EEZ of 200nm, which translates to an area of about 84,000nm2 available to be explored and exploited, the service had so far embarked on a series of operations such as Operation Tsare Teku, Operation SAFE DELTA, Operation POUNCER, and exercises RIVER SWEEP I and II, among others, to secure the Nigerian maritime domain (Tumaka, 2017) .These efforts by the service have resulted in the destruction of over 425 illegal refineries and the arrest of over 1,051 pirates between 2015 and 2017. Furthermore, 22 vessels were arrested within seven months in 2017 in the Lagos area. These arrests have enhanced Nigeria’s maritime and national security. MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY WITHIN NIGERIA-­CAMEROON BOUNDARY The issues associated with maritime domain management within the Nigeria-­ Cameroon maritime boundary and Nigeria’s national security include bilateral instruments, activities of maritime agencies and maritime resource security. Others are boundary delineation and maritime domain infrastructure. These are discussed subsequently. Bilateral Instruments Bilateral relationships between two states are usually guided by appropriate instruments formulated as a basis for their interactions security within areas of



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mutual interests and objectives. The relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon following the ICJ ruling is guided by five main bilateral instruments, including Nigerian Cameroon Joint Commission (NCJC), the ICJ ruling of 2002 and The Nigerian Cameroon Mixed Commission (NCMC). Others are the Green Tree Agreement (GTA) and the Nigeria-­Cameroon Trans-­border Security Committee (NCTBSC). Among these, the GTA and the NCTBSC are most relevant to maritime domain management. The GTA was endorsed by both countries to facilitate the peaceful implementation of the ICJ ruling across the common maritime domain and to promote joint economic ventures and cross-­boundary cooperation, which are essential to a vibrant maritime domain management for enhanced national security. The GTA as a bilateral instrument imposed the responsibility of protecting beliefs and the way of life of Nigerian nationals residing in Bakassi and other ceded portions of the maritime domain on Cameroon. However, it is estimated that only about 60 per cent of the terms of the GTA are complied with by Cameroonian officials, especially in the area of rights violation (Nwoko, 2016). For instance, officials at the Nigerian High Commission in Cameroon, who opted for anonymity, revealed that in 2012, nine Nigerians were arrested within Bakassi, tortured to confess to crimes they did not commit and detained by Cameroon security operatives on 16 December 2012. Also, another twenty Nigerians were abducted on 19 April 2013 on their way from Nigeria to Cameroon around Ibaka, which is within the Nigerian territorial waters. Furthermore, in 2015, twelve Nigerians and four community leaders were arrested by men of the Rapid Intervention Brigade from Isu Community of Kombo Itindi in Bakassi on 13 and 19 February 2015.3 Another bilateral instrument is the NCTBSC, which came into effect in 2012 to enhance trans-­border security cooperation along the frontiers of Nigeria and Cameroon from the Lake Chad region, extending to their common maritime boundaries. However, since the ratification of the instrument, the NCTBSC has only facilitated operationational of joint security along land borders, while collaboration along the maritime domain is yet to be achieved. Primarily, this is due to the immediacy of collaboration in the fight against insurgency on land. Security agencies on either side of the maritime boundary continue to work independently of each other, to the detriment of effective maritime domain management. So far, there exist perceptions that the conduct of the NCTBSC has been more focused on collaboration along the land borders than the maritime boundary. This negates the original terms of the NCTBSC agreement that seeks to enhance trans-­border security cooperation across all frontiers for improved national security. As such, the NCTBSC has remained largely underutilized as a bilateral instrument on

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maritime domain due to delayed operationalization of the NCTBSC across the maritime boundaries. Activities of Maritime Agencies A harmonious working relationship is critical to the attainment of hitch free maritime domain management among the various maritime agencies in the maritime domain. Several agencies, contribute one way or another to the maritime domain management along the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon. For example, while NIMASA is responsible for compliance with statutory international maritime safety procedures and the protection of lives and property within the maritime domain (Anele, 2016), other agencies and maritime stakeholders like the Nigerian Port Authority, Nigeria Navy, Nigerian Customs Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, as well as Cameroon’s equivalent agencies, among others, have roles in managing the maritime domain along the Nigerian-­Cameroon boundary. However, it is noted that these stakeholders operate independently as their actions are not coordinated and fall below par to effectively contribute to maritime domain management. This has not permitted optimal exploitation of the benefits of maritime domain management for enhanced national security in Nigeria. For instance, the non-­serviceability of boats has prevented some Nigerian Customs officials from visiting several offshore locations. Similarly, surveillance teams of the Nigerian Immigration Services often experienced difficulties in the course of their duties due to inadequate platforms and insecurity in the maritime domain. Improved cooperation with the Nigeria Navy or NIMASA could address some of the challenges experienced by the Customs and Immigration personnel. This underscores the need for intra- and interagency collaboration between maritime agencies with related maritime domain functions including the Nigerian and Cameroonian Navies. Maritime Resource Security Maritime resources are an essential dividend of the sea, which are available for exploitation by coastal states. The maritime domain between Nigeria and Cameroon is endowed with enormous living and non-­living resources like assorted fish, hydrocarbons and other mineral deposits. The exploitation of these resources has huge implications for the well-­being of the citizenry. Hence, a robust management is necessary to safeguard these resources in the maritime domain from unauthorized exploitation that could undermine national security. The Federal Department of Fisheries is responsible for the regulation of fishery resources in the country, while the Nigerian National



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Petroleum Cooperation oversees FGN’s interest as regards hydrocarbon deposits and its exploitation by numerous oil and gas companies within the maritime domain of Nigeria and Cameroon. The huge numbers of actors engaged in resource exploitation indicates the enormous resources available, as the wide continental shelf between Calabar and Cameroon has some of the richest pools of fish and shrimp within the GoG. The incidents of piracy, pipeline vandalism and poaching within the shared maritime domain between Nigeria and Cameroon have hindered peaceful resource exploitation, leading to wide-­scale destruction 423 of illegal refineries between January 2016 and March, 2017. It is therefore anticipated that strengthening existing maritime security architecture would guarantee the unhindered exploitation of these resources. Boundary Delineation The maritime boundaries are usually the outermost limit of a nation’s maritime domain and indicate exclusive rights over marine resources in the water and seabed against other nations or international waters. The delineation of maritime boundary is critical to establishing the limits of the domain available for the maritime domain. After decades of disputes with Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, the ICJ ruling of 2002 necessitated a review of her maritime boundary with Nigeria. In compliance with the judgement, the Working Group on Maritime Boundary (WGMB) including experts from both countries and the UN, conducted the maritime boundary delineation to determine the extent of each nation’s maritime domain to facilitate the design of the maritime domain management, with implications for their respective national security. The WGMG, in their interim report, produced a boundary delineation between Nigeria and Cameroon. This was to fully determine the extent of their respective maritime domains as well as a common significant portion within the maritime spectrum. Furthermore, in addition to some hydrocarbon reserves, there exist some disputed sea spaces within the maritime domain, which are spread or straddled across the designated boundary between both countries’ security. Yet there exist ungoverned spaces, which sometimes traverse crude reserves that are capable of affecting the operation of maritime domain management and national security. Investigation reveals that the delineation of the boundary affects maritime domain management and national security, as the completion of all boundary delineation matters involving demarcation of straddled hydrocarbon reserves across the maritime boundary is of immediate concern to maritime domain management. Unfortunately, the delineation process is hindered by the delay in resolution of the straddled hydrocarbon reserves. Despite the benefits of

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collective security, the clear delineation of borders define areas of responsibility. Hence, maritime boundary delineation is a factor in considering the maritime domain management imperatives along the Nigerian-­ Cameroon boundary, with the capacity to influence Nigeria’s national security Maritime Domain Awareness Infrastructure Maritime domain awareness anticipates a comprehensive knowledge and awareness about the entire surface, subsurface and air space above the maritime domain, which is critical to guarantee the safety of goods and services, towards effective maritime domain management. This is usually achieved using appropriate maritime surveillance equipment, like the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) equipment supplied by the US government. This is the main maritime domain awareness architecture available for maritime domain management in both Nigeria and Cameroon. Although Nigeria has also acquired the Falcon Eye surveillance radar, the RMAC equipment forms the main coastal surveillance radar architecture for both nations’ security. However, considering the limited range of the RMAC system at just 45 nm for the radar and 12 nm for its camera, additional modification is required to enhance its coverage towards enhanced maritime domain administration and Nigeria’s national security. Available maritime domain awareness equipment has been useful in facilitating maritime domain administration within the nation’s maritime domain. However, a Cameroonian naval official who preferred to remain anonymous confirmed that in 2016, three suspicious vessels successfully evaded arrest beyond Cameroonian waters into Nigeria due to lack of a common or integrated maritime domain administration equipment covering the Nigerian and Cameroonian maritime domain.4 Criminal elements and economic saboteurs have reportedly exploited this gap to vandalize oil pipelines and siphon over 118,000 metric tonnes of crude oil for local refining in 2017 alone, along the QUA IBO Terminal within the common maritime space, to the detriment of Nigeria’s national security. However, although there has been some collaboration with respect to maritime domain awareness infrastructure, particularly during EX OBANGAME, a synergy in maritime domain administration equipment utilized by both nations would greatly enhance the security of the maritime domain towards improved national security. Hence, the emplacement of an effective maritime domain awareness infrastructure covering the entire maritime domain of both countries would increase surveillance range and enhance overall maritime security.



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IMPLICATIONS OF MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT WITHIN NIGERIA-­CAMEROON BOUNDARY ON NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY Some implications of maritime domain management along the Nigeria-­ Cameroon boundary on Nigeria’s national security are discussed below. These include regional maritime security, confidence building and maritime boundary management. Others are capacity building and economic security. These are discussed subsequently. Regional Maritime Security Efficient management of the maritime domain between Cameroon and Nigeria would impact directly on the security of the entire Gulf of Guinea (GoG). The sea lanes of both countries link Europe to South Africa and the Indian Ocean through West and Central Africa and account for about 60 per cent of the entire maritime traffic of the GoG (Venture Africa, 2014). Hence, improved collaboration between Cameroon and Nigeria through a more efficient management of the maritime domain will lead to a more positive regional maritime security arrangement in the GoG. This is because restoring safety, peace and prosperity within the maritime domain of both countries is a key driver to establishing lasting peace within the entire GoG. Confidence Building Confidence building is critical to restoring trust and reducing fear of attack, reprisal or intimidation, particularly in a pre- or post-­conflict tensed environment. Following the resolution of the Bakassi dispute and Nigeria’s formal handover of the peninsula to Cameroon, about 300,000 Nigerians were compelled to live under Cameroonian administrative authority. According to Okon (2015), despite the ICJ ruling, the battle over the Bakassi Peninsula is far from over, as the Republic of Cameroon appears clearly unsure on how to proceed with the territory. This accounts for the activities of the Bakassi Strike Force and other agitators who have carried out attacks in Cameroon over issues of marginalization. It is therefore anticipated that effective maritime domain management will help build confidence regarding unity of purpose and final restoration of normalcy among the local population in the Bakassi area.

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Maritime Boundary Management The delineation of international maritime boundaries has strategic, economic and environmental implications on the maritime boundary management of contiguous states. Following the ICJ ruling of 2002 on the Bakassi Peninsula, the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon was formally delineated in 2006. This was targeted at promoting effective maritime boundary management by both countries and mitigates the propensity to interstate conflicts. Capacity Development Capacity development involves a process through which individuals, organizations and even communities acquire capabilities that could enable them to attain their own developmental objectives over time. This is necessary to boost skill acquisition and enhance the involvement of local communities in profitable harbour works at the Calabar Export Promotion Zone (EPZ), which is hampered by the lack of adequate skills and low patronage at the port. It is therefore anticipated that increased skill acquisition and local participation will lead to greater socioeconomic and capacity development. The establishment of effective maritime domain management along the Cameroon common maritime boundary would greatly enhance Nigeria-­ acquisition of knowledge, skills and experience among the youth and local communities. This would develop capacities in maritime trade and curb restiveness and enhance the overall national security of both countries. Economic Security Economic security and prosperity is invaluable to national security and development. The maritime domain has huge economic potential as well as diverse opportunities to be capable of boosting trade and financial benefits for the people and government. The efficient maritime domain management of critical maritime economic potential like the Calabar Channel, which is the gateway to the Calabar Port, and other strategic assets like the Export Promotion Zone (EPZ) and Free Trade Zone (FTZ) will boost the economic indices of Nigeria and Cameroon as well. This would provide a secure environment for diverse economic activities to thrive towards improved national economic dividends and national security. However, the activities of smugglers and poor revenue generated from international maritime activities between 2014 and 2016 resulted in a reduction in national earnings from the Customs Command in Cross River State, which is among the border states with Cameroon. The imperative for efficient



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maritime domain management in the shared boundary with Cameroon become glaring, since Nigeria is one of the largest African exporters to Cameroon, and most of these goods are moved by sea. It therefore supposes that an efficient maritime domain is crucial to the security, economic growth and development of both countries. CHALLENGES OF MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT WITHIN NIGERIA-­CAMEROON BOUNDARY TO NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY The challenges of maritime domain management within Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary and Nigeria security as uncovered by findings of the study, in fulfilment of objective 4, are delayed operationalization of the NCTBSC along the maritime boundary, absence of a maritime collaborative framework and inadequate maritime security architecture. Others are straddled hydrocarbon reserves across Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary and limited integrated maritime domain architecture. These are discussed subsequently. Delayed Operationalization of the Trans-­border Security Agreement along the Maritime Boundary Combined maritime border patrols are commonly applied by contiguous maritime states as a means of enhancing the management of their maritime domain. Unfortunately, the NCTBSC agreement has not been operationalized along the Nigeria-­Cameroon maritime boundary, thus hindering the complete implementation of the agreement towards putting in place an efficient maritime domain management for enhanced national security. The implementation of NCTBSC along the maritime corridor would create a holistic maritime border security mechanism for the management of the maritime domain for enhanced national security. Delay in adopting a combined maritime border mechanism in line with the transnational security/border security agreement is attributed to current attention on the combined operational security of land forces in the fights against the Boko Haram insurgents. Hence, in 2016 alone, a total of five specific incidents of piracy and 13 sea robberies were recorded along the common maritime areas, necessitating a combined collaborative mechanism. While the NCTBSC agreement encouraged trans-­border security collaboration on both land and maritime boundaries, there was a visible absence of a sustainable combined operation between the Cameroonian and Nigerian Navies. This called for the sustained operationalization of the NCTBSC agreement along the maritime boundary.

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Absence of a Maritime Collaborative Framework An effective collaboration between various maritime agencies is synonymous with incremental synergy and improved collective output necessary for the maritime domain. However, most of the maritime agencies operating in the Nigerian and Cameroonian maritime domain operate independently, thus, inhibiting their capacity for interoperability needed to guarantee the safety and security of their shared maritime areas. A comparison of the level of collaboration between Nigerian maritime boundary agencies and their equivalent in Cameroon indicates barely 20 per cent interaction. This is dismal and has led to frequent safety and security breaches within their common maritime domain, to the embarrassment of both nations’ security. It is anticipated that much of the maritime crimes committed in the shared border areas could be prevented and perpetrators arrested if the navies of both countries could build a strong and sustainable collaborative structure for maritime domain awareness. Inadequate Maritime Security Architecture Maritime security architecture includes patrol ships, aircraft and surveillance equipment available to security agencies for sustaining maritime security. Sufficiency of these platforms and equipment would enhance maritime resource security and create an environment conducive to efficient maritime domain management within the common waters of Nigeria and Cameroon. In 2017, the Nigerian Navy made an effort to procure over 50 Epenal Inshore boats for distribution across its units. However, more such boats, aircraft and surveillance system are required to adequately meet the demands of maritime security. Holdings of security assets in the Eastern Naval Command are shown in Table 13.1. This reveals an average of about 40 to 50 per cent availability of capital ships, inshore craft and coastal surveillance radar in various operational states. Considering the need to secure over 25,000 square nautical miles of the ENC maritime domain, available platforms are inadequate to effectively Table 13.1.  Eastern Naval Command holdings and requirements, May 2017 Inshore Patrol Craft

Capital Ships Holding

Required

(a) 4

Holding

Required

(b) 10

43

Holding

Required

(c) 100

Surveillance Radar

Air Craft

2

Holding (d)

4

2

Source: Eastern Naval Command Ops Room, May 2017. Printed with permission.

Remarks

Required (e) 4



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cover the domain, with negative consequences on national security. When compared with the Cameroonian Navy, which has over 30 Seagoing Assault Boats deployed across her narrow entrance, it gives another insight into why there were several repeated incidents of pirate attacks on vessels within Nigerian waters as compared to attacks in Cameroonian waters between 2010 and 2016. Evidently, Nigeria should address the deficits in platforms and surveillance equipment to enhance the security of the country’s maritime domain. This has resulted to the reliance on private maritime security architecture by some multinational oil corporations like Total Nigeria to protect their offshore facilities and platforms. In the interim, the Nigerian Navy should invent ingenious strategies to optimize available assets for the protection of critical infrastructure in the maritime domain. Straddled Hydrocarbon Reserves across the Nigeria-­Cameroon Boundary The exploitation and the peaceful harvest of marine resources is an essential requirement towards improved maritime domain management and national security. However, when there is an extraneous invasion of the maritime space, it gives room for much concern. Despite efforts to delineate the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, significant hydrocarbon reserves and other marine resources have been observed to straddle the boundary into Cameroon’s maritime domain. These straddled hydrocarbons are contained in oil wells being exploited by Nigerian oil and gas companies. In particular, three oilfields, OPL 230 (MONIPULO), OPL 98 (Addax) and OPL224 (Oriental) all straddle onto the Cameroon side, while a significant part of their reserves remains on the Nigerian side of the boundary. It is important to note that top Cameroonian government functionaries are displeased with the perceived encroachment of Nigeria into Cameroon territory for crude oil exploitation despite the 2002 verdict of the International Court of Justice on the international boundary between both countries. However, both countries resorted to bilateral engagements through high-­level inter-­ministerial committee meetings to work out a peaceful resolution of the problem. Limited Integrated Maritime Domain Awareness Infrastructure The synergy in the use of available maritime domain awareness infrastructure deployed between Nigeria and Cameroon would enhance the development of sufficient situational awareness necessary for a vibrant maritime domain management in the common waters of both countries. The RMAC equipment

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is the maritime domain awareness infrastructure supplied by the US in use by both countries. For a long time, there existed the absence of synergy as both countries operated their maritime domain awareness infrastructure independent of each other, and the inherent gaps were exploited by criminals for illegal activities. The importance of synergy in maritime domain awareness between Nigeria and Cameroon comes to the fore with the activities of Bakassi freedom fighters and other militant groups operating freely across both boundaries. Thus, limited integration or equipment synergy constitutes another challenge to maritime domain management between Nigeria and Cameroon. Despite these challenges, there are prospects of improving maritime domain management along the Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary for enhanced national security in Nigeria. PROSPECTS OF IMPROVING MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE NIGERIA-­ CAMEROON BOUNDARY FOR ENHANCED NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA The prospects of improving maritime domain management within the Nigeria and Cameroon boundaries for enhanced national security in Nigeria include; the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 (AIMS 2050) and the Inter-­ Regional Coordination Centre (IRCC), Yaoundé. Others are the Nigeria-­ Cameroon Trans-­Boundary Security Committee (NCTBSC) and the Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS (Exercise Obangame Express). These are discussed subsequently. African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 The African Union (AU), having realized that member states have common maritime challenges and opportunities, envisioned AIMS 2050 in 2012. The aim of the strategy is to create a blue economy for Africa that will increase wealth from the African Maritime Domain to positively contribute to socioeconomic development as well as increase national, regional and continental stability through the development of collaborative, concerted and coordinated building blocks that would increase overall maritime opportunities (MarEX, 2014). Accordingly, AIMS 2050 strategic goals and objectives include establishing a combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa and building synergies and coherence between sectorial policies across regional and national maritime agencies. The AIMS 2050 proposes to deepen bilateral and regional collective management and security of the maritime domain among African



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maritime nations to enhance maritime domain management by efficient utilization and security of the common maritime domain. Accordingly, AIMS 2050 is perceived to be the future of an African blue economy, and a necessary tool to break the continent away from the vice of poverty into prosperity before 2050 through efficient management of the common maritime domain. Therefore, if Nigeria and Cameroon key into the objectives of AIMS 2050, the strategy will serve as a good initiative, and is a useful prospect for improved maritime domain management and national security. Inter-­Regional Coordination Centre Yaoundé The IRCC was inaugurated on 11 September 2014 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, following the Yaoundé Declaration by Heads of States and Governments of ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) in 2013 for improved maritime security in the GoG. The Centre is to serve as a coordinating body between the ECOWAS, ECCAS and the GGC, in the fight against national security maritime crimes within their common waters. Maritime experts from the various regional bodies and member states are represented at the ICC to coordinate issues relevant to efficient management of the maritime domain within ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC. This is in line with the tenets of the CST. Considering the strategic location of Nigeria and Cameroon in West and Central Africa respectively and at the heart of the GoG, it is anticipated that the ICC will encourage common surveillance, security and management of the maritime domain and boost inter-­regional maritime cooperation. This would lead to greater peace and prosperity in the maritime industry of both countries and the GoG. Thus, the ICC is a huge prospect for the improved maritime domain management and security between Cameroon and Nigeria. Nigeria-­Cameroon Trans-­Boundary Security Committee The NCTBSC was set up in 2012 as a bilateral committee to coordinate trans-­ boundary security issues from Lake Chad at the extreme north to the maritime boundary south of the Bakassi Peninsula. While emphasis has been more on joint operational security across the land boundaries, owing to the Boko Haram insurgency, more attention is now shifting to the maritime domain. The NCTBSC is expected to provide an impetus for improved collaboration and management of the maritime domain. It is anticipated that improved collaboration between the Cameroonian and Nigerian navies within the framework of the NCTBSC will significantly mitigate the incidents of maritime crimes and security breaches in the maritime

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domain along the Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary. This aligns with the CST, which advocates collective security collaboration for maritime domain. The NCTBSC therefore serves as a credible prospect that could be leveraged for speedy enhancement of the maritime domain along the maritime boundary of Nigeria and Cameroon for improved national security. Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS The Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS is a US-­African Command flagship annual maritime exercise. designed to encourage cooperation among participating nations in order to increase maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. The exercise currently has participation among African countries that are signatories to the Yaoundé Accord and is inspired by the conviction that improved maritime security will benefit all nations and boost economic prosperity and security. The 2017 edition of the Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS component of the Africa Partnership Station (APS) was hosted by the Nigerian Navy at Calabar in March 2017 with one Cameroonian Navy ship in attendance. The essence of the exercise is to encourage African nations within the Gulf of Guinea to build human capacities, exercise and jointly collaborate in the common security and management of the maritime domain. The exercise has greatly increased the interaction between the Nigerian Navy and Cameroonian Navy. To this end, the Cameroonian Navy ship Le Ntem visited Calabar Naval Base as part of the Cameroon National Day Celebration on 20 May 2017 to show her flag and participate in the exercise with the Nigerian Navy (Odok, 2017). Hence, if sustained, Exercise OBANGAME EXPRESS holds tremendous prospects for improved maritime domain management in the Nigeria-­Cameroon maritime domain, as it would discourage illegality in the maritime domain towards enhanced national security in Nigeria. STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE THE CHALLENGES MILITATING AGAINST MARITIME DOMAIN MANAGEMENT ALONG THE NIGERIA-­CAMEROON MARITIME BOUNDARY TOWARDS NIGERIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY The study proffers strategies to improve maritime domain management along the Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary for enhanced national security in Nigeria. These strategies include activation of the maritime phase of the Nigeria-­ Cameroon trans-­ border security operation, the establishment of a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) was observed to be an effective means of resolving



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common boundary resource matters like straddling maritime hydrocarbons. Additionally, a bilateral joint maritime border operation incorporating maritime agencies of both countries was identified as capable of addressing the absence of a maritime collaborative framework along common maritime boundaries. Activation of the Maritime Phase of Nigeria-­Cameroon Trans-­ Border Security Community The activation of the maritime phase of the NCTBSC would allow for the full consummation of all the objectives of the bilateral instrument on trans-­ border security across the entire frontiers, land and maritime. This strategy would check the excesses of piracy and sea robbery perpetrated by militant groups across the maritime boundary of both nations to create a calm and peaceful atmosphere around the Bakassi and maritime boundary waters that would improve maritime domain towards enhanced national security. Since the NCTBSC is already in existence, all that is required is to operationalize the agreement by designating participating ships and marking out border patrol areas along the maritime border between the states. To achieve this, designated ships under the Nigerian Navy and Cameroon Navy would have to be mobilized under a uniform command, with each nation’s forces under the tactical control of their own commander. Accordingly, the Flag Officer Commanding (FOC) East could head the Nigerian Maritime Force while the Cameroon Commander of Naval Base Limbe could lead the Cameroon Maritime Force. Thus, the activation of the maritime phase of Nigeria-­Cameroon trans-­border security operationational security would address the challenge of non-­operationalization of the NCTBSC along the maritime boundaries. Establishment of a Bilateral Joint Maritime Border Operation between Nigeria and Cameroon The establishment of a bilateral joint maritime border operation would involve leveraging the expertise of equivalent agencies beyond the navies operating on either side of the boundary to optimize their collective strengths and improve security in the maritime domain. The combined bilateral maritime border arrangement could include the navies, customs, immigration, fisheries and Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) and equivalent agencies, among others. A draft organizational structure for the bilateral joint maritime border patrol is presented in Figure 1.3. The combined joint security patrol would ensure a seamless collaborative synergy that would guarantee an efficient maritime domain management for enhanced

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Figure 13.3.  A draft of the organizational structure for the bilateral joint maritime border operational security between Nigeria and Cameroon Source: Researcher’s Work. 2017

national security. The Nigerian and Cameroonian Navies would be the lead agencies on either side of the border with Security Coordination Centres at Calabar and Limbe in Nigeria and Cameroon respectively. The establishment of a bilateral joint maritime border operation would address the challenge of absence of a maritime collaborative framework for the operation of maritime agencies along the maritime border between Nigeria and Cameroon. Establishment of a Sea-­Based Forward Operational Security Base A Forward Operationational Base (FOB) is usually a secured forward position used to support operationational security of a military or strategic nature. The establishment of a sea-­based FOB within the nation’s territorial waters would entail having a huge sea barge equipped with berthing facilities for patrol boats, a helicopter pad, petroleum storage, hospital and accommodation for about 600 men anchored offshore. The objective would be to provide a round-­the-­clock presence of the Nigerian Navy and other maritime agencies at the approaches to Nigeria waters. This would permit a sustained presence and improve reaction time for boats and ships at sea necessary to check all forms of maritime resource theft to enhance maritime domain management



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and national security. To achieve this, the FGN, through the Ministry of Defence, would need to procure a suitable sea-­based barge or facility with helicopter pad to serve as an FOB under the command and control of the Nigerian Navy with Immigration, Customs, Fisheries and NIMASA personnel on board. The FOB patrol boats can be deployed to enable the Nigerian Navy to maintain a presence within the Nigerian side of the maritime domain towards ensuring improved maritime resource security. Most importantly, establishing a sea-­based FOB would save critical funds that would have been required to procure and sustain more ships at sea. Accordingly, the establishment of a sea-­based FOB would mitigate the challenge of inadequate maritime security architecture. Establishment of a Joint Development Zone along the Nigerian Cameroon Border The establishment of a Joint Development Zone (JDZ) along the common maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon would promote joint exploitation of straddled resources within the JDZ in an equitable, transparent and harmonious manner that would exhibit the best practices in maritime domain management. To achieve this, a Nigerian-­Cameroon joint development authority could be set up to manage the resources accruable from the JDZ, for amicable distribution to both countries. This is similar to the example of existing JDZs between Senegal and Guinea Bissau as well as that between Nigeria and Sao Tome and Principe, which has been in existence since 2001. The JDZ would permit common exploitation of resources straddled along the boundary towards enhanced maritime domain management and national security. The establishment of the Nigerian-­Cameroon joint development authority could be preceded by a detailed survey of straddled marine resources along the maritime boundary and the size of the JDZ to be covered. The headquarters of the authority could be located in Cameroon while the training and operating centre would be in Nigeria. To this end, a bilateral expert committee to articulate the details of the JDZ with members from the Federal Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the Federal Ministry of Petroleum and the National Boundary Commission and equivalent institutions in Cameroon would be necessary. Integration of Nigeria-­Cameroon Maritime Domain Awareness Infrastructure The integration of the Nigeria and Cameroon maritime domain management equipment into a common seamless system would ensure that maritime

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operations on either side of the border could maintain continuous radar tracking of any suspicious contact from one side of the maritime border to the other. To achieve this, there would be need for joint training on the integration and maintenance of the maritime domain equipment. Since both countries are equipped with similar RMAC equipment supplied by the US, achieving the linkage to obtain a common picture is achievable. This would enable the compilation of a common picture of the maritime domain to facilitate information sharing and enhanced maritime domain management. The equipment suppliers could be contacted through the US government for the integration of the equipment. Therefore, the integration of the Nigeria and Cameroon maritime domain awareness equipment into a common seamless system would address the lack of synergy in the utilization of maritime domain awareness equipment. NOTES 1. The collection of this data was authenticated with Ref/NHQ:015/51/22/OPS/ VOL.TY/28 dated 14 April 2022. Data was collected by Patrick Chibueze Nwatu in 2017 for the purpose of academic research. 2.  Please note that Dakuku Peterside was the Director-General of Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) in 2017. 3. Interview held in 2016 with Nigerian official in Cameroon who opted for anonymity. 4.  Cameroon Naval official who preferred to remain anonymous made the revelation during an interview in 2017.

REFERENCES Agbaminoja, Peter. (2017). “Maritime domain management and national security: Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary in perspective.” Author interview at the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Lagos, 26 April. Ahmed, B. L. (2016). “An analysis of Nigeria-­Cameroon relations.” Journal of International and Diplomatic Studies 4, no. 2, 1–15. Akinterinwa, Bola. (2012). “Implications of colonially determined boundaries in Africa.” Nigerian Journal of International Affairs 38, no. 3. Anele, Kalu. (2016). “A study of the role of seafarers in combating piracy off the coast of Nigeria.” The WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 16, no. 30. Ate, B.E. (1992). “Nigeria and Cameroon.” In Ate Bassey and Bola Akinterinwa (eds.), Nigeria and its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Subregional Security in the 1990s. Lagos: Nigeria Institute of International Affairs.



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Athawale, Yogesh. (2012). “Maritime developments in the south western Indian Ocean and the potential for India’s engagement with the region.” Strategic Analysis 36, no. 3 (May): 424–439. Baker, Deane-­Peter. (2012).“The South African Navy and African maritime security.” Naval War College Review 65, no. 2 (Spring): 1–21. Bryden, Alan, Boubacar N’Diaye, and Funmi Olonisakin. (2008). “Understanding the challenges of security sector governance in West Africa.” In Alan Bryden, Boubacar N’Diaye, Funmi Olonisakin (eds.), Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa. Vienna: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance. Burromvyat, Nanbyen. (2016). “Maritime domain management and national security: Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary in perspective.” Interview by author at the Nigeria Ports PLC, Calabar, December. Chatham House. (n.d.). “Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.” Conference Report,. https://www​.chathamhouse​.org/sites/confreport​.pdf (accessed 13 December 2016). Defence Web. (2015). “South African Navy helps catch pirates,” 22 April. http://www​ .safety4sea​.com/south-­african-­navy-­helps-­catch-­pirates/ (accessed 10 November 2016). Ezeobi, Chiemelie. (2017). “Illegal bunkering: Navy arrests, hand over vessel, seven crew to EFCC.”. http://www​.thisdaylive​.com/index​.php/2017/08/19/illegal​ -­bunkering​-­navy-­arrests-­hands-­over-­vessel-­crew-­to-­efcc (accessed November 10, 2017). Green Tree Agreement. (2020). “Agreement between the Republic of Cameroon and the Federal Republic of Nigeria concerning the Modalities of Withdrawal and Transfer of Authority in the Bakassi Peninsula.” https://ucdpged​.uu​.se/peace​ agreements/​fulltext/Cam-­Nig%2020060612.pdf (accessed 19 April 2022). Ibas, Ibok-­Ete. (n.d.). “Navy committed to Nigeria’s maritime domain security.” https://www​.google​.com/amp/s/shipandports​.com​ ng/navy-­committed-­to-­nigerias​ -­maritime-­domain-­security-­ibas/ (accessed 10 November 2017). International Maritime Bureau. (2016). “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Annual Report.” http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france fr/files/2016-Annual -IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf (accessed 15 September 2022). Jadesola, Tai Babatola. (2012). “Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary dispute: The quest for Bakassi Peninsula.” International Affairs and Global Strategy 4, no. 6, 81–95. Lyall, Nicholas. (2016). The Criminalisation of Politics and the Politicisation of Crime: The Rise of Sophisticated Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. Sydney: University of Sydney. Mabus, Ray. (2015). A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Sea Power. US Department of Defense. MarEx. (2014). “African Maritime Action Plan Adopted.” The Maritime Executive, February 14. http://www​ maritime-­executive​.com/article/African-­Maritime-­Action​ -­Plan-­Adoptedhttp://www​.maritime-­executive​.com/article/African-­Maritime​-­Actio n-­Plan-­Adopted-2014-02-022014-02-02 (accessed 2 March 2017).

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Martin, Guy. (n.d.). “Operation Copper now only with South Africa and Mozambique.” Defence Web. http://www​.defenceweb​.co​.za/index​.php (accessed 13 November 2016). Maximo, Mejia Jr., Chie Kojima and Mark Sawyer. (2016). Piracy at Sea. New York: Springer Heidelberg. National Security Bureau of Taiwan. (2010). A Nigerian Navy Annual Report of National Security Policy. Ntuda, Eboden Joseph. (2010). “La Nouvelle posture geopolitique du Cameroun et la lute contre la piraterie danational security le Golfe de Guinee.” In Terrorisme et Piraterie de nouveaux defies securitaries en Afrique Centrale. Yaoundé: Presses Universitaries d’Afrique. Nwoko, Kenneth Chukwuemeka. (2016). “Human rights abuses against the Bakassi people: Are Nigeria and Cameroon liable?” 11 January. http://forums​.ssrc​.org/ kujenga-­amani/2016/01/11/human-­rights-­abuses-­the-­bakassi-­people-­are-­nigeria​ -­and-­cameroon (accessed 11 March 2017). Odok, George. (2017). “Cameroonian Navy ship visits Calabar to strengthen maritime relations,” 22 May. http://sundiatapost​ .com/2017/05/22/cameroonian-­ navy​ -­ship​visits-­calabar-­to-­strengthen-­maritime-­relationational security/. Okoi, Obasesam. (2016). “Why nations security fight: The causes of the Nigeria-­ Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula conflict.” African Security 9, no. 1 (March), 42–65. Okon, Edet. (2015). Bakassi Peninsula—The Untold Story of a People Betrayed. Singapore: Patrige Publishing. Onuoha, Freedom, and H. Hassan. (2009). “National security and implications of sea piracy in Nigeria’s territorial waters.” The Nigerian Army Quarterly Journal 8, no. 1. Roberts, D.B. (2015). “International institute for strategic studies country comparison—Commitments force levels and economics.” Journal of the Military Balance 115, no. 1. Salau, Sulaimon. (2017). “Government approves new maritime security framework.” The Guardian, 19 July. https://guardian ng/business-services/government -approves-new-maritime-security-framework/ (accessed 31 August 2022). Tumaka, Lami Queen. (2017). “Maritime security is a national obligation—NIMASA DG.” http://nimasa​.gov​.ng/press-­center/post/maritime-­security-­is​-­a-national​ -obligation​-­nimasadg. Ventures Africa. (2014). Maritime Lawlessness off Nigeria’s Coast Hurting Trade. Report.

Chapter Fourteen

Cameroon-­Nigeria Diplomatic Relations Bakassi Crisis and International Court of Justice Decisions in Perspective Osita Agbu INTRODUCTION It is quite appropriate to note that Nigeria-­Cameroon relations have over the years been characterized by conflicts and cooperation. Indeed, Nigeria and Cameroon do actually have many things in common which serve as cementing factors in their relations. These factors ironically include political, economic, cultural and social similarities. In spite of these, it is the frequent border skirmishes that dominated the attention of both governments from independence in the 1960 until 2012. Generally, Nigeria’s aspirations of a regional power status, her Good Neighbour Policy and its front-­line role in championing African issues have acted in concert in modulating any hard-­line measures which it may contemplate in addressing the knotty issues between it and Cameroon. It is against this scenario that one should understand the rather soft approach which Nigeria had maintained in its relations with Cameroon. Nigeria, indeed wields a very awesome credential as a regional power when compared with Cameroon: numerically, politically, militarily, economically and in terms of its geographical size. Nigeris’s landmass of 923,768 square kilometres and population of about 207 million (Worldometer, 2020a), and Cameroon’s size of 183,568 square miles (or about 475,440 square kilometres) and population of about 27 million (Worldometer, 2020b), make Nigeria an awesome neighbour. While Cameroon obviously realizes it, she is also optimistic that this “giant” is benign to the extent that it will not go to war with her, which might have encouraged the recurrent intransigence at 261

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their borders and the temerity to take the boundary dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Initial diplomatic relations between Nigeria and Cameroon, which ideally should be cordial, were characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility mirroring the kinds of problems inherent in the diplomatic relations between many African countries, which can be traced to their colonial history and legacies. It is widely believed that it is the carelessness and lackadaisical attitude of the colonial rulers in Cameroon and Nigeria that laid the foundation for the border disputes between both countries. Prior to the political and legal resolution of the border disputes, both countries’ relations remained largely “cautious” and occasionally moved towards brinkmanship. POLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA AND CAMEROON To some extent, the political histories of Nigeria and Cameroon are somewhat intertwined. Whereas Nigeria was predominantly under British colonial rule for about a century, Cameroon passed through French, German and British rules. It is equally important to remember that former British Southern Cameroons in present-­day Cameroon was initially administered through Nigeria by the British under the UN Trusteeship until the plebiscite on 11 February 1961. It was the outcome of this plebiscite that led to the transfer of former British Southern Cameroons, initially administered as part of Eastern Nigeria, to the Cameroon Republic. However, the population of British-­administered Northern Cameroons, which was a part of the defunct northern region of Nigeria, voted to remain in Nigeria. Therefore, in examining the face-­off between Nigeria and Cameroon over the ownership of Bakassi Peninsula, it is important to always remember that the border peoples on both sides have a very close cultural affinity and in reality do not necessarily respect artificially created boundaries except when the fact is very rudely brought to their consciousness by their respective governments and the international community. In the aftermath of the February 1961 plebiscite on the future of the Cameroons, the former France-­administered Cameroon, which gained independence on January 1, 1960 as La Republique du Cameroun, merged with the British-­ administered Southern Cameroons to form a federation on 1 October 1961 under the name Federal Republic of Cameroon. The federating regions of Cameroon became East Cameroon and West Cameroon respectively. In general, Cameroon shares a long and ill-­defined border of about 1,680 square kilometres, or 1,050 square miles, with Nigeria. However, it is only about 168 square miles of the border area of the West Cameroon/Nigeria



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border which had become a serious source of dispute and litigation between the two countries. Like Nigeria, Cameroon is a multi-­ethnic state. However, its major ethnic groups include the Bali, Bamileke, Bassa, Doule, Ewondon, Hausa and Fulani. As is the case with Nigeria’s other neighbours, the Cameroon-­Nigeria border cuts across some ethnic groups who are found on both sides of the frontier, such as the Boki, Efiks, Ejagam, Fulani and the Hausa, among others. These indigenous peoples often move across the frontier and are not generally hampered by the formalities of official border controls such as passports, identity cards and immigration procedures. Cameroon’s natural resources include iron ore, bauxite and oil reserves estimated at about 50 million barrels as of 1979. It was Cameroon’s desire to possess the Bakassi Peninsula, reputed to have rich crude oil deposits, which precipitated the border problem with Nigeria, especially since 1975, when Nigeria’s Head of State Yakubu Gowon signed the Maroua Agreement inadvertently extending Cameroon’s claim over the Bakassi Peninsula. Cameroon’s two-­state federalism adopted following the reunification of French- and English-­speaking Cameroons was replaced by a unitary system on 2 June 1972 and the formation of a single party, Union Nationale Cameroonaise (Cameroon National Union), under the leadership of late President Ahmadu Ahidjo. Subsequently, the country adopted a multiparty democracy which permitted the existence of opposition parties. However, the ruling Cameroon Peoples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM), previously known as the Cameroon National Union until 1985, has dominated Cameroon’s politics since independence in 1960. It is important to note that close economic and military ties with France have helped to suppress dissent and prop up stability, which had allowed for a good measure of the development of communications infrastructure, agriculture and the mining industry. Cameroon is largely a neo-­colonial state with strong links with France. Indeed, this close relation with France as with other former colonies of France had made it difficult for it to forge close ties with other African neighbours. Nigeria’s neighbours (Cameroon, Benin, Niger and Chad) have a different colonial history from its own. It appears that France had done a more through psychological and cultural assimilation of her former colonial subjects, especially the educated elites, as they appear incapable of cutting the umbilical cord with France, and explore alternative ways of relating with other African countries without “advice” from France. The colonial enterprise in Nigeria is traced to the British invasion of Lagos in 1851. This was accompanied by several war campaigns against indigenous empires and traditional institutions, and by 1861, Lagos was annexed to the

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British Empire and became a Crown Colony in 1862. Nigeria became a British Protectorate in 1901, and the northern and southern protectorates were amalgamated in 1914. Colonization lasted until 1960, when the independence movement led by the educated nationalists from the west, east and north of the country put enough pressure on the British Empire to grant political independence to the territory, albeit with political designs that ensured that the British will still have some influence after their exit. On 1 October 1963, Nigeria became a republic, but unravelled to military rule on 15 January 1966 followed by a countercoup on 29 July 1966 after a bloody coup d’état. Since then, Nigeria could be said to have been largely politically unstable, except when facing external threats. It has had alternatively military and civil governments since 1966. However, in 1999 it succeeded once more in transiting to civil rule, and has since then had 21 years of an unbroken presidential system of government which comprises the Olusegun Obasanjo, Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, Goodluck Jonathan and Muhammadu Buhari administrations. This fact, in spite of its political fragility, consciously designed by the outgoing British colonial government speaks much about the resilience of its peoples. Nigeria, since political independence, has amazingly acted with magnanimity towards her neighbours. She has often assisted them materially and diplomatically in times of need. She has also played a crucial role in the maintenance of regional security, and had even sent troops to Chad, Liberia and Sierra-­Leone, in addition to championing the formation of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). She had also built roads to facilitate communication with Benin. She has often strained herself to prop up the economies of neighbouring states through ECOWAS and other bilateral agreements. Considering these political investments, it is in Nigeria’s interest to ensure stability and progress in the neighbouring states and in Africa generally. On the Bakassi crisis, although it still remains a sensitive issue, Nigeria should continue to be guided by enlightened principles of international relations in her relations with her neighbours and other states among the comity of nations. Indeed, it is instructive to note that in spite of Cameroon’s aggression at their common border, in Nigeria, during Yakubu Gowon’s years, Shehu Shagari and Ibrahim Babangida had to go against public opinion by refusing to send troops to repel aggressions from Cameroonian gendarmes. On several occasions, villages in Borno, Benue, Akwa-­Ibom and Cross River States had been violated by Cameroon security services and Nigerian citizens harassed and arrested for various undefined reasons.



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BORDER HOSTILITIES Much has been said about the hostilities at the common border between Nigeria and Cameroon. It suffices to say that the picture could be graphically presented by two incidents in particular. The first was the May 1981 incident at Bakassi Peninsula in which five Nigerian military personnel were killed and three wounded when a Cameroonian patrol boat fired on a Nigerian vessel off the coast of the Rio del Rey area, which was thought to be rich in oil, gas and uranium deposits. Coming in the wake of incursions by Beninoise troops, this incident provoked public demands for compensation for punitive measures and even war (Phemoskygate, 2014). In fact, this particular incident nearly led to a war between both countries in 1981. It was only the sagacity of the “doves” in the Nigerian government, as opposed to the “hawks,” which prevented the country from going to war. Indeed, Cameroon had over the years been more aggressive over the Bakassi dispute. Apart from the 1981 incident, in 1996, two years after she went to the World Court, Cameroon again invaded Bakassi, twice, in February and March. Also, in 1997, she also invaded the place twice, and over 300 Nigerians were allegedly held captive (Wole, 2002). Apart from the hostilities at the Bakassi Peninsula, in the second incident, which occurred in May 1987, Cameroon gendarmes crossed into north eastern Borno State, northern Nigeria, close to Lake Chad and openly conducted a census in the border villages. This generated criticisms from Nigerians, some of whom called for the invasion of Cameroon. Again, the Nigerian government did not heed the calls, though it warned that it would retaliate further attacks from any country (Guardian, 1987). By 1991, Cameroon gendarmes annexed three Nigerian villages of about 18,000 people and changed their names from Aban to Jabane, Atabong to Didiabatu and Ine Odiong to Kaubae (New Nigerian, 1991, 24). It was not until 1996, under the late General Sani Abacha ,that Nigeria militarily responded to these attacks by driving the gendarmes back into Cameroonian territory. However, Cameroon still occupied a substantial part of Bakassi, including Atabong East, until the implementation of the ICJ decisions. DEVELOPMENTS ON THE BAKASSI PENINSULA AND INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE ADJUDICATION The problem of proper borders between Nigeria and Cameroon at the Bakassi Peninsula dates back over 100 years, when the colonial powers left the status

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of the area undecided after agreement on the rest of the border between their colonies. However, it was Cameroon that internationalized the dispute by inviting French military assistance and war machines into the area and formally submitting the dispute for adjudication at the ICJ and a petition to the then–Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Nigeria’s Position Basically, Nigeria’s position on the Bakassi problem was that Bakassi belongs to Nigeria, historically, geographically and administratively. It gave several reasons why it believed so. The Efiks, Efiats or Efuts, who are historically indigenous to Nigeria, occupy the place. Altogether, there are eight clans in the Bakassi and all are historically Nigerians. These are Abana—the headquarters—Atai Ema, Akwa, Amato/Efut Iwang, Ekpot Abia, Archibong, Odiong and Ambai Ekpa (Wole, 2002, 27). According to His Royal Highness Etubom Okon Etim Okon Asuquo, then–Chairman of Bakassi Council of Chiefs, Atabong was established in 1630 CE and belongs to Calabar. Different groups of people left Calabar and founded settlements in communities of the Bakassi. Whereas there were 300,000 Nigerians citizens then living in Bakassi, Cameroonians make up only 5 per cent of the population in this place. Again Nigeria, rationally argued that both Nigeria and Cameroon are ex-­colonial countries and that you cannot own anything in terms of territory except that which was left for you by your colonial ruler. Crucial to the Nigerian case is Article 1 of the Treaty of Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar and Britain of 10 September 1884, under which the British government agreed to protect the territories controlled by the Obong of Calabar, which included the Bakassi Peninsula. Also important to the Nigerian case were agreements signed in 1885, 1886, 1890 and 1893 that considered Rio del Rey as the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon (Check, 2011; Ibrahim, 2019). The Nigerian government argued that the demarcation arising from these various agreements clearly put Bakassi on the Nigerian side of the map. Nigeria’s case rested on four claims. First, it claimed original title as evidenced by the Treaty of the King and Chiefs of Old Calabar. Second, it built its case on effective occupation. Third, it claimed long and uninterrupted occupation and administration. Fourth, it claimed title to the peninsula based on acquiescence by Cameroon over many years (Check, 2011). Assuming that Nigeria prevailed on the issue of the 1913 Britain-­ to-­ German cession of Bakassi, there is a strong presumption in international law against incidental loss of sovereignty that closely mimics the common law concept of “adverse possession.” Nevertheless, it is a rebuttable presumption when Nigeria contended that the case against the kings and chiefs of



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Old Calabar was not weakened by the treaty. Yet the behaviour of kings and chiefs of Old Calabar, and Nigeria’s subsequent behaviour had that effect. Most notable was their failure to protest at the cession of their territory to the Germans in the Anglo-­German Treaty in 1913. The mere fact that the kings and chiefs remained silent in the face of momentous events not only had a profound impact on their status but compels one to conclude they gave their consent to that transfer, thus pre-­empting injury to one who consents. As Justice Awn Al-­Khasawneh stated with aplomb in his concurring opinion, one cannot but notice an extreme passivity and inaction on the part of Cameroon and Nigeria that managed to rebut the presumption (Ngang, 2007). On a sombre note is the apparent lack of coordination of Nigeria’s various governments, lack of due diligence and the penchant for their leaders to append signatures on agreements (Agba et al., 2010). Nigeria’s argument that because the Maroua Declaration was issued less than two months before the overthrow of General Gowon, her efforts at underplaying this Declaration were not found tenable by the Court (Agba et al., 2010). Cameroon’s Position On the other hand, Cameroon’s tenacious claim to the Bakassi Peninsula and Cross River estuary had been based predominantly on legal grounds, by virtue of the 1913 Anglo-­German Treaty and other subsequent agreements, notably the controversial 1975 Maroua Declaration between General Yakubu Gowon and the late President Ahmadu Ahidjo and the Yaoundé II Agreement of 1971. Cameroon predicated its case on a number of treaties and agreements, most importantly the treaties between Britain and Germany delineating the official border between Cameroon and Nigeria, as well as a Cameroonian and Nigerian exchange of diplomatic notes. Cameroon further bolstered the 1913 treaty with the presentation of two diplomatic notes exchanged between Nigeria and Cameroon in 1962, shortly after the referendum of 11 February 1961 (Agba et al., 2010). These notes placed Bakassi in the east of the map, with which Nigeria agreed and expressed its satisfaction. However, the first maritime agreement came nine years later in 1971 in Yaoundé, when the Heads of State of Cameroon and Nigeria initially fixed the first segment of the maritime boundary. The Cameroon position was that the 1971 agreement was meant to recognize and affirm the validity of the Anglo-­German Treaty of 1913. Cameroon presented as evidence the agreements reached in Kano, Yaoundé and Maroua, all of which placed Bakassi on Cameroonian soil, to give historical symmetry to its case. Simply put, while Nigeria’s case focused on its claim to original title and agreements between Nigeria and Britain, Cameroon persuasively presented a coherent case built

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on agreements between Britain and Germany and between Cameroon and Nigeria, at each step of the way delimiting the boundary from 1913, when Bakassi was purportedly ceded to Cameroon (Agba et al., 2010). The Court’s Decision In the final presentation by Ian Brownlie, a renowned authority on international law and Nigeria’s counsel at the ICJ, Nigeria maintained that “Bakassi is the historic homeland of the Efik and Effiat people, and is the permanent home of 156,000 Nigerians.” However, the ICJ ruled on 10 October 2002 that: pursuant to the Anglo-­German Agreement of March 11, 1913, sovereignty over Bakassi lies with Cameroon. Similarly, the Court fixed the boundary in the Lake Chad area in accordance with the Henderson-­Fleurian Exchange of notes of January 9, 1931 between France and Great Britain and rejected Nigeria’s claims to the Darak area and the neighbouring villages. The Court asked Nigeria to withdraw her administration of the affected areas and evacuate the areas placed under the sovereignty of Cameroon and vice-­versa.

Nonetheless, The Court held that the 1913 Anglo-­German Treaty effectively ceded Bakassi to Germany. The ICJ declined to enforce the provisions of Articles 18 through 22 of the agreement of 1913, which established that Nigeria held an original title was considered to be earlier in time and therefore superior to Cameroon’s claim (Ibrahim, 2019). On the contrary, the ICJ seemed to agree with Cameroon’s legal strategy against Nigeria, which effectively addressed the legal principle that new law supersedes old law. Cameroon’s case adequately and cogently reflected that from the “period leading to its independence in 1961 and since then and till the early 1990s, Nigeria, by its actions or omissions or through statements emanating from its officials and legal experts” had consented to Cameroonian sovereignty in the Bakassi Peninsula (Baye, 2010). The question of the Anglo-­German Treaty triggered the central issue of the entire case, which Nigeria argued rather unsuccessfully with the timeworn legal maxim “He who hath not cannot give” (nemo dat quod non habet). Simply put, what authority did Great Britain (a mere protectorate per the 1884 treaty) have to give away Bakassi? Nigeria maintains that it is trite that one cannot pass the title of something he does not have. Accordingly, it argues that Great Britain had neither the right nor the capacity to cede its territory, that such transfer was invalid, null and void, and that Great Britain was obviously in breach of its obligations to the kings and chiefs and people of Old Calabar, with an obligation to protect them and not to alienate their land. In response, the ICJ pieced together provisions of the



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Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1890, which state that irrespective of whether the jurisdiction is acquired by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance, or other lawful means, it may be held and exercised in as ample a manner as if it were acquired by cession or conquest of territory (Baye, 2010). In effect, any jurisdiction available to Great Britain in a country under its protection was indistinguishable in legal effect from territories acquired by conquest. Consequently the Anglo-­German Treaty acquired validity on the strength of the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1890. To reach this conclusion, the ICJ further reasoned that the agreement of the kings and chiefs was not between equals but “rather a form of internal organization of colonial territory on the basis of autonomy for the natives . . . and thus suzerainty over the native state becomes the basis of territorial sovereignty as towards other members of the community of nations” (Baye, 2010). That is, the ICJ meant that regardless of how valid and how old the title, and how clear the display of their sovereignty and degree of organization, the people of Old Calabar and Bakassi were deemed as colonies or vassal states under the suzerainty of Great Britain. However, the question of what to do with the indigenous peoples who lived in the area and were mostly Nigerians remained unresolved. Perhaps this necessitated the arrival of the Green Tree Agreement to address the implementation issues. With regard to the right of self-­determination of the peoples living in this area, there is little doubt that the judgement, as it was, threw up an identity crisis for the people living in this area. The implication of this for these people is that they are now a people without a land. These are people who had lived in the shadow of war for decades, had often paid taxes to both governments, of Cameroon and Nigeria, and now may have to change their identities. Perhaps, it was because of this that the Nigerian government was not happy about the decision of the ICJ, and decided to appeal the decision to the Security Council of the United Nations. Public opinion in Nigeria was generally against this judgement, and HRH Okon Asuquo, who was on the delegation to the ICJ, believed that the judgement threw common sense into reverse. According to him, “I am surprised!” “We tendered documents as far back as 18th century to convince them that Bakassi is our home.” To him, the judgment “is a gang-­up by the European powers against Nigeria” (Wole, 2002, 27). Basically, in awarding Bakassi to Cameroon, the Court held by 13 votes to 3 that the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria had been fixed by the treaties concluded during the colonial period, whose validity it (the Court) confirmed (Guardian, 2002, 2). In arriving at this decision, the Court refused to take into account the doctrine of effectiveness (effective occupation) and rejected the theory of historical consolidation deriving from the equitable

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doctrine of laches and acquiescence or prescription, a doctrine of universal application, requiring that remedies be sought without delay. It took the Court and Cameroon a long time to arrive at this decision. However, Nigeria had, as it appeared, resolved not to go to war over the matter. Then Nigeria’s then–foreign minister, Sule Lamido, faulted the use of colonial evidence by the Court; noting that the Court ought to have conducted a referendum for the people of Bakassi to decide for themselves where to belong. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS For Nigeria, this decision has some very serious political and strategic implications. Politically, it is important to stress that Nigeria has a strategic geopolitical interest in the region, which to all intents and purposes should not be jeopardized by the Bakassi ruling. However, it is in Nigeria’s political interest to cultivate a strong base of support among the countries of the contiguous zone for its diplomacy within ECOWAS and in the African Union (AU). The necessity for Nigeria to exercise effective control of the Cross River estuary and the Calabar Channel cannot be overemphasized. Per the ICJ judgment, any ship from the Eastern Naval Command will now have to take permission from Cameroon before it can sail into and berth in Calabar. Also, the treaties on training bases with Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome will be adversely affected. The Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Calabar and the local naval base will become vulnerable in the event that Cameroon assumes sovereignty over Bakassi. In addition, economically, Nigeria’s presence in the Bight of Bonny and the South Atlantic where most of Nigeria’s oil wealth is derived from (over 85 per cent) makes it imperative that she have control over this area. This zone extends from 10 nautical miles off shore within the continental shelf to about 41 nautical miles off the coast of Calabar (Ate, 1987). Also, the disputed area is rich in fishery and mineral resources apart from oil. In fact, according to the Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research (NIOMR), the area is of tremendous economic importance to Nigeria. In addition, it is important that the Nigerian government put a stop to the incessant harassment of its citizens in this area. This is because if protection is not extended to these Nigerians, it may lead to the alienation of the people in this area, which in itself should be of security concern to Nigeria considering the on-­going hostilities in the peninsula. As it is, Nigerian citizens have been consistently displaced in the Bakassi Peninsula since the judgement, as the Cameroonian authorities take pleasure in harassing poor Nigerians on their



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part of the peninsula to pay taxes, resulting in hundreds leaving Cameroon and arriving in Nigeria with tales of intimidation, violence and brutality. This is against the spirit of the Green Tree Agreement that could result in another phase of crisis on the peninsula. CONCLUSION Considering the historical, political and cultural ties between the peoples of the border areas between Nigeria and Cameroon, there is little reason why both countries cannot be good neighbours as Nigeria is with her other immediate neighbours. Therefore, the only cogent reason for the poor bilateral relations between both countries is that the disputed Bakassi Peninsula, in particular, harbours substantial oil deposits and lucrative fishing potential. This accounts for the bellicosity of the Cameroonian government. This bellicosity is further given impetus by French imperial support. Eventually, France may have to weigh the risks of its investments in Nigeria against the value of whatever oil deposits exist in Cameroon’s Bakassi. On the whole, the ruling on Bakassi appears more political than legal, with the potential of creating an identity crisis for border peoples and igniting a new phase of conflict. Though Cameroon tendered strong legal evidence with respect to its claim over Bakassi as against Nigeria’s, what should have been uppermost in taking the final decision is the “spirit of the law” as it relates to the interest of the people living in this disputed area, their right to self-­ determination and the fact that they had effectively occupied this piece of land for over three centuries. However, opinion in certain quarters believed that Nigeria should have ensured a negotiation rather than allow the World Court to adjudicate the matter. Nonetheless, it should be noted that negotiations had been going on intermittently on the matter, including how to open channels of communication and operationalize a Nigerian-­Cameroon joint border commission before the judgement. On the whole, colonial rule bequeathed to Africa numerous border disputes, about 103 on the whole, of which Bakassi is just one. Arbitrary lines drawn on maps, notably by the colonial rulers sitting at the conference in Berlin in 1884–1885, left countries with meaningless boundaries and potentially explosive conflictual situations, which often led to countless disputes, some leading to war, and others to years of diplomatic and legal wrangling. It was not, therefore, for nothing that the founding fathers of the OAU (now African Union) decided against tampering with the inherited colonially negotiated international boundaries (uti possidetis) at the Cairo Summit of 1964 despite their dissatisfaction with them.

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It is of interest to note that A.I. Asiwaju (renowned expert on international boundaries) observed that although Nigeria initially sought peaceful and diplomatic resolution of its protracted border disputes with its eastern neighbour, the unilateral decision of the Nigerian government in late 1991 to publish a new national map indicating the country’s claim line in respect of the contentious peninsula was what exacerbated the disagreement. Ever since, bilateral relations between both countries have suffered greatly, giving rise to militarization of the dispute and subsequent resorting to litigation by the other party. Nigeria was therefore left with a few options as follows: a.  a resolution of the judgement, taking advantage of provisions of Article 94(2) of the UN Charter b.  abandonment of Bakassi and its people, thereby forcing the Bakassi residents probably to declare a separate republic c.  jointly instituting a trans-­ border cooperation policy promotion that includes joint venture efforts for the optimal exploitation of trans-­border resources, and finally d.  resorting to war However, considering Nigeria’s present democratic standing and her role in championing Africa’s interest and the interests of the blacks in diaspora, a more sustainable solution to the Bakassi crisis could have been through diplomatic negotiations and a continued benign approach towards Cameroon, both for political and strategic reasons. Insofar as Cameroon does not trespass on undisputed Nigerian territory or continue to harass innocent Nigerian citizens, this policy should continue to be maintained. Nigeria has invested too much into ECOWAS, the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to allow these go to waste because of the border dispute with Cameroon. We are of the opinion, therefore, that eventually Cameroon will realize the futility of continuing with its belligerent attitude in the Bakassi, and the necessity for rapprochement with its benign African neighbour and brother—Nigeria. REFERENCES Agba, A. M., et al. (2010). “Socio-­economic and cultural impacts of resettlement on Bakassi people of Cross River State, Nigeria.” Studies in Sociology of Science 1, no. 2. Ate, Bassey E. (1987). Cameroon-­Nigeria Boundary Dispute: The Legal-­Political Position, Particularly as It Affects the Maritime Section. Paper presented at a



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one-­day seminar, “Nigeria’s immediate neighbours,” organized by the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), April 28. Baye, Francis Menjo. (2010). “Implications of the Bakassi conflict resolution for Cameroon.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10, no.1. Check, A. N. (2011). Bilateralism and Peaceful Resolution of Conflicts in Africa: Cameroon’s Diplomacy during the Bakassi Peninsula Dispute. Africa Institute of South Africa (AISA). Briefing no. 45, March. Guardian (Nigeria). (1987). “Babangida in Cameroon,” 9 December, 1–2. Ibrahim, Fatima Bala. (2019). Cameroon-­Nigeria Dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula (2002–2017). MS Diss., Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Baze University, Abuja, Nigeria. New Nigerian. (1991). “Cameroon annexes 3 Nigerian villages,” May 30, 24. Ngang, Kevin. (2007). Understanding the Bakassi Conflict: A Showcase of Conflict Prevention in Practice. EPU Research Papers Issue 04/07. Odum, Fabian. (2002). “Bakassi case not lost says Afe Babalola.” The Guardian (Nigeria), 3 November, 1–2. Okon Ekpenyong, Jonathan. (1981). “Nigeria’s unguarded boundaries.” Nigerian Forum, September/October. Phemostigate. (2014). “The Nigeria-­Cameroon border conflict—the Bakassi Peninsula conundrum,” 20 October. https://phemostigate​ .blogspot​ .com/2014/10/the​ -­nigerian​.camerounian-­border​ html. Wole, Adeyemo. (2002). “War looms in Bakassi.” TELL Magazine, 28 October, 24–32. Worldometer. (2020a). Worldometer​.info/world-­population/Nigeria-­population (accessed 26 July 2020). Worldometer. (2020b). Worldometer​.info/world-­population/Cameroon-­population (accessed 26 July 2020).

Chapter Fifteen

The Bakassi Question Beyond the International Court of Justice (ICJ) Verdict Sharkdam Wapmuk and Solomon Ayegba Usman INTRODUCTION The International Court of Justice (ICJ) verdict over Bakassi Peninsula, the oil-­rich region disputed between Nigeria and Cameroon has emerged as one of reference point in the study of boundary conflicts in Africa. This chapter examines the aftermath and implications for the people in the region. No doubt, the 150-page ruling of the ICJ (which states parties cannot appeal) over the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula, delivered by Gilbert Guillaume, a French national and president of the ICJ in The Hague on 22 October 2002, was expected to permanently put to rest all contestation over the ownership of the area. This is particularly so given that both states parties accepted the jurisdiction of the world court on the matter. It is customary for the ICJ to decline jurisdiction in circumstances where there is lack of consent of a states party (or parties) to a case(s) before it. On the jurisdiction of the ICJ on a matter of this nature, it is important to note that the extant statute establishing it makes the issue of jurisdiction of the Court consensual rather than obligatory. The reason for this is simple. Since the ICJ is a court of state rather than individual or non-­state parties, the requirement of state consent tallies with the doctrine of sovereignty of the state. Even though majority of states agreed to obligatory instead of consensual jurisdiction during the 1945 conference in San Francisco (US), where the UN Charter was debated and adopted, both the United States and former Soviet Union strongly opposed it. For the Soviets, their scepticism arose out of the fear that states in the communist bloc might hardly get justice from a capitalist bloc–dominated Court. On the part of the United States, opposing obligatory for consensual jurisdiction of the court was in 275

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tandem with its well-­known tradition. America’s jury system believes that to adjudicate on any matter before the jurors, there must be special agreements reached by parties concerned on modus operandi and modus vivendi of the prosecution. Therefore, Nigeria’s consent to the jurisdiction of Cameroon’s formal complaint to the ICJ on 29 March 1994 makes the judgement binding on it against the backdrop that all evidence such as history, beliefs, linguistic and indeed cultural values of the region suggests that, indeed, Bakassi is indigenous to Nigeria. The only dispute that led to the ICJ ruling that handed Bakassi over to Cameroon, however, lies with the validity or otherwise of the “transfer of the territory either by Nigeria or on behalf of Nigeria to any other country” (Alobo et al., 2016, 108). Otherwise, even the two major versions on the origin and meaning the name or word “Bakassi” by two Nigerian ethnic groups, the Efik and Mbo, in Calabar in the southern region of the country, who populated the peninsula, are suggestive of its Nigerian-­ness. For instance, according to Aye (2003, 6), the Efiks of Calabar believe that, first, the name “Bakassi” is a derivation or Anglicization of the first man, called “Abasi Eke” from Obutong, meaning Old Town of Calabar, who was the first settler in that area that had contact with foreign sailors. The inability of these foreigners to pronounce his name and “Akai,” the Efik word for “settlement” properly resulted in their distortions or corruptions of Akai Abasi Eke, that is, “the settlement of Abasi Eke” to “Bakassey” or “Bakassi,” since it is easier to pronounce “Abasi” as “Bassey.” Similarly, the Mbo version, according to Odiong (2008), derived the name from the Mbo expression “Bakkasi,” which literarily means “go early and arrive on time.” According to them, the distance between Mbo and the area where the people go for fishing was very far, requiring that whoever wanted to go there must go early in order to arrive early (Odiong, 2008, 13). As a result, Mbo people popularly knew this area as “Bakassi.” Giving further credence to the argument that Bakassi, in relation to all available international documents including treaties, is primarily a Nigerian territory, or within the area that became Nigeria, it is noteworthy to state categorically here that beyond being the subject of international dispute, the peninsula was a bone of contention locally when it was under Nigeria’s territory. For example, following the creation of the twelve state structure by Yakubu Gowon’s military regime in 1967, it was under the South-­Eastern State. Eventually, when the South-­Eastern State that was later renamed Cross River State, it was split into two states; Cross River and Akwa Ibom in 1987, a dispute over where Bakassi arose between the two states, especially between the Efiks of Calabar and the Mbo people of Akwa Ibom. The two ethnic groups were giving different interpretations to the origin



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and meaning of Bakassi as proof of ownership of the area (Odiong, 2008; Alobo et al., 2016). By virtue of the creation of the Bakassi Local Government Area under Cross River State in 1992 by President Ibrahim Babangida, the local dispute over the area was technically resolved even though intense rivalries were going on between the contenders in the background. Hence, what the cession of the area to Cameroon has done is to permanently resolve inter-­ethnic crises that contest the region and local government area would have created between Efiks and Mbos even though many Nigerians viewed the ICJ verdict and subsequent cession of the region as Western conspiracy against Nigerian sovereignty. In ensuring that actions that could trigger violent confrontations between two neighbouring countries be avoided after the ICJ verdict, the then–United Nations Secretary-­General, Kofi Annan, alongside Britain, France, Germany and the United States, enjoined leadership of both countries to commit their respective states to signing the UN peaceful transfer framework called the Green Tree Agreement (GTA). Indeed, the signing of the GTA on 12 June 2006, by President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon and subsequent implementation of the accord by President Musa Yar’Adua on 14 August 2008, precipitating replacement of Nigeria’s flag with that of Cameroon at Archibong Town, near Ikang, marked the finality of the question of ownership of the area. However, despite peaceful handing over of the Bakassi to the Cameroonian authority by the Nigerian government, several snags that constitute the “Bakassi question” remained unresolved. This raises the Bakassi question beyond the ICJ verdict that this chapter interrogates. Few questions are worthwhile in this regard. First, to what extent is the welfare and well-­being of Bakassi people guaranteed by the international community since the ceding of their ancestral land to Cameroon, against their volition and right to self-­ determination, as enshrined in the UN Charter? What impact does the ceding of the disputed territory to Cameroon have on bilateral relationships between both countries? To what extent is the on-­going demand for self-­determination, which started with secession announcement on 9 July 2006, and declaration of the “Democratic Republic of Bakassi” by groups of militant Bakassians, including but not limited to Southern Cameroons under the aegis of Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) and Bakassi Movement for Self-­ Determination (BAMOSD), justified under the UN framework? Finally, what are the post-­verdict and handing-­over peace- and confidence-­building initiatives by the Nigeria government in particular to assuage the bitterness of the displaced people of Bakassi? While this chapter does not claim an exhaustive analysis of these Bakassi question(s), it intends to make some robust interventions and suggests the way forward.

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The chapter is categorized into six sections. The first section provides a general introduction, the second identifies the problematic area, while the third briefly interrogates the study area, the Bakassi Peninsula. The fourth segment examines the Bakassi question, whereas the fifth takes a cursory look at the specificities of efforts geared towards addressing the Bakassi question. Finally, the sixth part concludes the chapter. THE PROBLEMATIC Several studies on the ICJ ruling on the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula exist in extant literature (Akonye and Nwapi, 2019; Adoke, 2012; Asobie, 2005; Bekker, 2003; IPI, 2008; Nwokedi, 1984; Oluyemi-­Kusa, 2007; Shagari, 2001). Despite a plethora of these studies, many of them focused on the historical narration of both causes of dispute over the area and its impacts on relations between Nigeria and Cameroon that were frosty for a number of years. Yet others essentially dwelt on the 2002 verdict of the ICJ vis-­à-vis the biased nature of the ruling that handed over a supposed Nigerian territory by all historical characteristics to Cameroon on the basis of a technicality of the Anglo-­German treaty of 1913 based purely on uti possidetis (that is, the sanctity of colonial frontiers). Thus, to many writers like Oluyemi-­Kusa (2007) and Alobo and Obaji (2016), this is indicative of the alleged Western conspiracy to deny Nigeria justice over its traditional oil-­rich territory of Bakassi to Cameroon through the (in)famous ICJ verdict. Okoi (2016) is also of the view that the Nigeria-­Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula conflict is one of the throwbacks to the neo-­colonial contradictions on the African continent. He also draws attention to the dynamic relationship between geopolitics and conflict, and the strategic attraction of the Bakassi Peninsula as an oil rich territory located on the Gulf of Guinea, which stretches across a geographical territory of approximately 1,800 square kilometres, thus attracting extra-­African powers to what may seem to be an intra-­African issue. Therefore, for this particular work, the identified problematic area has a dearth of studies on the post-­ICJ verdict on the Bakassi question, which, among other things, revolves around issues bordering on the plight of the Bakassi people over their dislocation from ancestral lands and identity. This is with a view to examine efforts by relevant stakeholders such as the federal government of Nigeria, Cross River State government, various non-­ governmental organizations (NGOs) and the international community in their relocation and resettlement to start new life.



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THE CONTENTIOUS AREA: BAKASSI PENINSULA Geographically speaking, the Bakassi Peninsula lies approximately between latitudes 40 25′ and 5010′ north of the equator, and longitudes 80030′ and 90008′ east of the Greenwich meridian (Alobo et al., 2016, 108). It is located at the extreme eastern end of the Gulf of Guinea, where the warm east-­flowing Guinea Current meets with the cold north-­flowing Benguela Current (Efiong-­ Fuller, 2007). According to Familugba and Ojo (2013), the Bakassi Peninsula lies between the Cross River estuary near the city of Calabar, which is located in Nigeria in the west, and the Rio del Rey estuary on the east. The Rio del Rey is a drainage basin located in West Africa within Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. The peninsula is estimated to be 1,600km long, bordering the area between Nigeria and Cameroon, which extends from Lake Chad to the Gulf of Guinea. It has a rough population index that ranges from 150,000 to 300,000. The people of Bakassi are mainly from Calabar, Cross River and Akwa Ibom States of Nigeria. The major ethnic groups that occupy the peninsula are the Ibibio, Efik, Ekoi, Semi-­Bantu and Bantu people. Therefore, it is a great source of fishing, which constitutes the major source of income for the inhabitants (Yerima and Singh, 2017). Most intra- and inter-­state boundary disputes resulting in violent conflicts in Africa today, including the contention over the peninsula between Nigeria and Cameroon is a reflection of Africa’s colonial past dating back to imperialist adventures, compromises and agreements among European colonial powers at the Berlin West African Conference of 1884–1885 (Olaniyan, 1990, 4). Thus, according to Oluyemi-­Kusa (2007, 114), The crux of the Nigerian argument was that the letter and spirit of this Treaty makes it impossible for Great Britain to have ceded the Bakassi peninsula to Germany through the Anglo-­German Agreement of 11 March [in] 1913 that the claimant Cameroon relied mainly for its title.

All overlooked issues and facts that experts in international politics and law continue to insist ought to have better informed the ICJ ruling are now stricto sensu, post mortem since the Court’s verdict on the case is final, notwithstanding its upholding of uti possidetis—the sanctity of colonial frontiers—over terra cognita—territory well known to be Nigeria’s. Nigeria’s helplessness to comply with this judgement even though public opinion in the country is not favourably disposed to it is threefold. First, as a responsible UN member state, Nigeria consented to the jurisdiction of the ICJ over the case, and that implies that it is duty-­bound to respect whatever was the outcome of the ruling. Second, Nigeria cannot ignore and flout the Court verdict

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even if it had wanted to because it lacks requisite capacity and capabilities to face the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which has responsibility to enforce the ruling of the Court in such circumstance. Finally, in the event of confrontation between Nigeria and Cameroon if the latter repudiated the judgement, it has France to contend with. This is particularly so because, as Olaniyan (1990, 8–9) says: Francophone countries in Africa are independent and sovereign in their own right. But they nevertheless remain quite intimately associated with France to the extent that they constitute the satellites in the French orbit, a state-­system that has France as its centre, and one that enhances and promotes the cultural, diplomatic and strategic interests of France.

For example, as Omole (2010, 8) argues, “Since 1960 France maintained 8 defence agreements and 24 military cooperation and technical assistance with her former African states.” He went further to say, “France not only maintains 1,000 military advisers in the Presidency of many Francophone African states, it also has military bases in many of these states.” The French Rapid Deployment Force (FAR) for example is composed mainly of real, well-­trained, and tested professionals who can intervene in any Francophone African country with lethal precision and rapidity (Omole, 2010). Therefore, to Omole, this mostly explains why Nigeria often shilly-­shallies whenever Cameroonian aggression on the disputed border areas occur, even if public opinion persuades it to act. THE BAKASSI QUESTION: BEYOND THE ICJ VERDICT Even though Nigeria and Cameroon belong to different African sub-­regions— Nigeria belongs to West while Cameroon is in Central, the two are conterminous neighbours. Interestingly, too, while Nigeria was purely Anglophone as it was formally colonized by Britain, Cameroon on the other hand, had a mixed colonial experience. Nigeria’s former President, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, in his book Shehu Shagari: Beckoned to Serve—An Autobiography, aptly captured this variedness of Cameroonian colonial heritage. According to him, On Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the United Nations directed that the people of this region decide, through a plebiscite, whether they wanted to join the new Republic of the Cameroon or independent Nigeria. The result of the plebiscite did not satisfy either side since the Southern Cameroon decided to join the Cameroon Republic while Northern Cameroon decided to remain with Nigeria. (Shagari, 2001, 359)



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Thus, Cameroon becomes a country of bilingual status with the eastern part predominantly French speaking (Francophone) while the western region is largely English speaking (Anglophone). Given this geographical contiguity between the two neighbouring countries, several researches have pointed out general intermittent border tensions between Nigeria and Cameroon, often stoking a series of diplomatic rows between them over the years (see Shagari, 2001; Garba, 1987). However, the most popular and specific of the border dispute between them was the naturally endowed region of the Bakassi Peninsula, with hydrocarbon and non-­hydrocarbon resources alike. Cameroon sought ICJ intervention on this border disagreement and with the consent of both Nigeria and Cameroon, the court gave its subsequent verdict that favoured Cameroon. The October 2002 verdict led to the creation of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) in November 2002, the signing of the GTA in June 2006, and eventual handover of the territory to Cameroon by Nigeria in 2007 (Oluyemi-­Kusa, 2007; Opue and Usang, 2019). Thus, the Bakassi question arose from events that saw to the displacement of the people of Bakassi, who lost their ancestral land to a foreign country. Traditionally, given people’s attachment to ancestral land, what are the socio-­cultural, economic and political effects of the involuntary dislocation or uprooting of the Bakassi people from the peninsula on their general well-­being post–ICJ verdict? What efforts have various stakeholders, including, but not limited to, the Nigerian federal government, Cross River State, various NGOs and the international community, put in place to assuage whatever impacts the involuntary uprooting may have had and be having on the affected people and community? How effective or otherwise are these measures? Compared with the past before the October 2002 ICJ ruling and subsequent transfer of ownership claim over Bakassi, what is the nature of the current state of the bilateral relationship between Nigeria and Cameroon on border-­related issues? How has the Court ruling influenced the prevailing and/or post-­verdict pattern of relationship between the two countries? These, among others, are interesting post–ICJ verdict Bakassi questions that this chapter unravels. In the opinion of Ndubuisi (2020), while the border dispute resolved through the ICJ ruling is considered by some as a success due to the willingness of the two countries to obey the judgement without resorting to war, the aftermath of the Nigeria-­Cameroon boundary demarcation has left “Bakassi as an ‘ill-­governed space’” (11). Both the Nigerian and Cameroonian governments have focused more attention on the “boundary” than on the “people displaced from the boundary area.” There have been opinions that while the Nigerian government struggles, albeit half-­heartedly, to provide resettlement for the displaced population that relocated out of Bakassi Peninsula, the

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Cameroonian state seems more interested in the oil and gas reserves in the oil-­rich territory, The lack of interest of the governments in the plight of the displaced people, who seem more disposed to living in Nigeria, as shown by their relocation to the Nigerians side, has led to various forms of self-­ help ventures. Following their relocation to Nigeria, the lives of the Bakassi people did not seem to have improved. This led the governor of Cross River State, Professor Ben Ayade to declare that the poor condition in which the displaced people of Bakassi live, was not fit for any human settlement (Vanguard, 2016). This has been corroborated by Senator Florence Ita-­Giwa, who insists that the people of Bakassi have long been abandoned by the Nigerian government and are suffering. She noted the deplorable situation of those camped at Dayspring Island, a settlement camp that sheltered over 3,000 people who relocated from Bakassi, of having no food, water, shelter and health care facilities in any form in the area (Punch, 2017). According to Eboh (2005), Nigeria’s position since the ICJ verdict has been that the most democratic way in deciding the sovereignty of Bakassi is to hold a referendum, since more than 90 per cent of the people affected by the judgement have openly expressed their unwillingness to become Cameroonian. However, despite the preference of thousands of Bakassi people to remain Nigerians (Borzello, 2004) coupled with the fact that they are entitled to the right to self-­determination as guaranteed under the international law to be inalienable right, the people of Bakassi continue to suffer a crisis of identity, neglect and squalor. For instance, following the handing over of their land to Cameroon, the people who are mostly engaged in fishing and crop farming to eke out a living had their sources of livelihood taken away, thereby subjecting them to hunger and general want (Eguzozie and Abang, 2017). This creates incidents of displacement that forced them to live in internally displaced person (IDP) camps set up by the Federal Government of Nigeria in Akwa Ikot Eyo Ndem, Akpabuyo Local Government Area of Cross River. Not even the new Bakassi Local Government Area created by former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration has assuaged this feeling of displacement, as there is no legal document to back it up since it was created in 2007. This has thrown up both administrative and legal challenges. Administratively, there is no governance structure put up to give any semblance of making it a political entity. Equally, too, the legal implication is that the local government is not recognized under Nigerian law. For example, on the eve of the local council election in Cross River State in 2012, the Federal High Court in Calabar delivered a ruling by Justice Adetokunbo Ademola in Suit File no. FHC/CA/CS/21/2012, ordering stoppage of elections from being conducted in the two Bakassi settlements (Eguzozie and Abang, 2017). The



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court order further noted that the 2012 elections and all other subsequent ones should be conducted only pursuant to the current Bakassi Local Government Area known to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). In expressing his personal disappointment and the frustration of the people, the paramount ruler of Bakassi, Etim Okon Edet, said, Obasanjo made promises to us. We thought that he would be sincere. The way he met us severally at the (Presidential) Villa. The way he talked to us as the father of the nation. He never fulfilled any of those things he promised. (Eguzozie and Abang, 2017) (emphasis ours)

Perhaps resigning to fate and giving up hope on any serious commitment of comprehensive resettlement of the affected people and their communities by the Nigerian state, the traditional ruler went emotional and spiritual saying, “We are sure God will come by in this matter. We would not go to war, but the tears of the people would go to God. . . . My hope is on God and the Nigerian nation” (ibid.). During President Goodluck Jonathan’s administration, the Federal Government set up the Presidential Committee on Proper Resettlement of Bakassi (PCPRB) in 2013 after several protests by the Bakassi returnees on their conditions as a people. Among other things, the PCPRB recommended provision of critical infrastructure in the areas such as Dayspring 1 and 2, and Kwa Island marked as permanent abode for the settlement of the Bakassi people. It further recommended a sum of N100 billion Special Fund for Bakassi Development to cater to education, job creation and enhancement of tourist potential of the area, among sundry long-­term development plans for the people. The neglect of the people has exposed that Nigeria’s position shortly after the ICJ verdict was that its concern and interest over the sovereignty of Bakassi was not a matter of oil or natural resources on land or in coastal waters, but rather the welfare and well-­being of Nigerians on their land (FGN, 2002). Unfortunately, like many unfulfilled promises of the federal government on comprehensive resettlement of the Bakassi people after the ICJ verdict, the PCPRB recommendations, too, has not been implemented in any way. In fact, according to Inyang (2017), even the N37.5 billion disbursement to Cross River State government between November 2012 and February 2017 as compensation for ceding its territory to Cameroon and the transfer of 76 oil wells in the area to Akwa Ibom State have not been accounted for. Thus, left with no electricity, schools, water, health care, jobs, and empowerment programme, this no doubt breeds feelings of both deprivation and frustration among the victims. Such feelings are attributable to aggressive behaviours

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like emerging militancy in the area, sea piracy, kidnapping and more recently, agitation for secession leading to the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Bakassi by a group called Bakassi Freedom Fighters (BFF), originally led by the late Tony Ene. The hoisting of “national flag” with the rising sun emblem on the blue-­red-­white colours at Dayspring Island (formerly Abana), the former headquarters of old Bakassi Local Area, is a pointer to the expression of accumulated frustration of the people of Bakassi post–ICJ verdict. To Ted Gurr (1960), nothing explains “why men rebel” better than feelings of deprivation and frustration, as is presently the case with the displaced people of the Bakassi Peninsula. During the 2017 visit of the Honourable Yacoob Bush-­Alebiosu-­led House of Representatives committee on Treaties and Agreements at the 7th National Assembly to the Calabar on the Bakassi question, the visitors were surprised to learn that the Bakassi people had officially launched their flag, coat of arms, a national anthem, and Freedom Radio station in their determination to secede. Revealing the people’s preparedness to achieve independence for themselves, the monarch, Etim Okon Edet told the bewildered committee members, “We have not been fairly treated by this nation, and what we are looking for now, is to go back to our area by any means possible. . . . Bakassi will be one of them. And when anything happens, God Almighty will exonerate us” (Eguzozie and Abang, 2017). Continuing, he said, “Nigeria will bear us witness that we have waited for long. We don’t have any problem with ICJ, and I don’t want anybody to go and appeal any case, because it will be waste of time and money. We want to take our area out” (ibid,). Understandably, the accumulated frustration for the Bakassi people is manifold. First, since taking over the peninsula, the Cameroonian authorities have assumed full control of the area with their troops put on red alert to deal decisively with anyone or group trying to foment trouble. The Cameroonian gendarmerie, with a history of provocative behaviour, often harasses Bakassi people without provocations. For example, in July 2017, about 97 Nigerian fishermen were alleged to have been killed by Cameroonian paramilitary on the Bakassi Peninsula over failure to pay a £230 ($300) fishing levy (Ndubuisi, 2020). Second, pursuant to Sections 2(1) and 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which stipulates indivisibility and indissolubility of Nigerian state and requires National Assembly inputs on any treaty entered into on its behalf by the executive to give effect, President Obasanjo had no constitutional backing whatsoever in ceding Bakassi the way he did through the GTA unilaterally. According to Ngara and Sam-­Tsokwa (2018), given the relationship between the executive-­legislative in Nigeria, the bickering has not helped the management of the border crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon. Thus, FGN (1999), Mimiko (2017), and Mimiko and Usman (2019)



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have all argued that former President Obasanjo violated his oath of office to protect and preserve the sanctity of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution and act in obedience to its provisions in the discharge of duties required for the Office of the President of the Federal Republic. Third, after flagrantly violating the sacred oath of defending the country’s constitution and sovereignty of Nigeria in the name of good neighbourliness and African policy, the Obasanjo administration and all subsequent ones failed to live up to the promise of comprehensive relocation of the people of Bakassi. Fourth, even though the principle of self-­determination is, believably, held sacred by the UN, it nonetheless failed to conduct a referendum for the affected people to make a decision on their choice of nationality. This is very important, as self-­determination upholds five key principles: (a) government by people’s will; (b) absence of any form of domination—internal or external; (c) free pursuit of socio-­cultural and economic development of the people; (d) enjoyment and respect of fundamental human rights, and (e) non-­discrimination on grounds of race, colour, creed or political conviction. Finally, the UN and its judicial organ, the ICJ, which ought to be the last hope for justice for the people on matters involving nationality questions and must ensure that justice prevails, relied on uti possidetis rather than terra cognita in its October 2002 judgement, without due recognition to the right of Bakassi to self-­determination. POST–ICJ RULING EFFORTS IN RESOLVING THE BAKASSI QUESTION Even though the Bakassi question largely remain unresolved, it is not without modest efforts of government at various levels and self-­help initiatives in tackling it. First, notwithstanding its inchoate status due to unresolved questions of legality, the Federal Government of Nigeria during President Obasanjo’s term “established” a new Bakassi Local Government Area to give the people a feeling of political identity and belonging. In addition, the Federal Government released the sum of N 37.5 billion to the Cross River State government to be used in embarking on some compensatory projects for the state and particularly the Bakassi people over the ceding of the territory to Cameroon and loss of oil wells to Akwa Ibom State. This gesture showed to a reasonable extent the Federal Government’s determined effort to address the nagging Bakassi question. The challenge however remains corruption and misappropriation that often characterize management of public funds in the country.

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Even though they are grossly inadequate, Cross River State government on its part has continued to embark on some interventions to ease the challenges of Bakassi people, especially in the areas of housing, water, school and health facilities, among others. For instance, 5,000 housing units for displaced Bakassi people flagged off by Governor Ben Ayade in 2017 at Ikpa Nkanya village in Ikot Eyo ward, Akpabuyo, had some units already delivered to some beneficiaries. The funding of the project is borne by Africa Nations Development Programme (ANDP) and the state government. In their study, Isokon and Okom (2014) revealed that resettlement of Bakassi returnees is supposed to be within the jurisdictional power of the Federal Government of Nigeria and Cross River State government. However, lack of diligent devotion to the plan on the part of both governments provoked the people themselves to engage in self-­help initiatives to make their living in their new abode worthwhile. Accordingly, Isokon and Okom (2014, 17) observed that through self-­help efforts, the settlers can boast of some basic infrastructural facilities such as a primary school building, a health care facility and many others, even though some of them were yet to be completed at the time of reporting. Also, the returnees provided themselves job opportunities to improve their living conditions at a number of local industries, notably, a rice mill and corn mills. Apart from ensuring their own security in the new settlements, they also supplied the required labour and help at personal cost to ensure a successful resettlement programme when the need arose. CONCLUSION The chapter examined the Bakassi question post–ICJ verdict. It revealed that even though the handing over of the Bakassi Peninsula was against all known norms legally or conventionally, the resettlement programme as well as safety and well-­being of the people have not received the deserved attention from the Nigerian Federal Government and Cross River State. The neglect and failure of both the federal and state governments to guarantee their well-­being, in terms of comprehensive resettlement that the Nigerian government promised them after the ICJ ruling in 2002, bred feelings of deprivation and frustration occasioning aggressive and rebellious behaviour. Specifically, this manifests in rising incidents of militancy in the region, kidnapping, sea piracy, gunrunning and aggressive agitation for self-­determination and secession. For instance, there is a lack of provision of facilities like houses, hospitals, schools, pipe-­borne water, access roads, electricity, job opportunities, and security for the areas given to the returnees. Confronted with and compelled by these grim realities, the people who are embittered by being displaced



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from their ancestral lands against their will are forced to embark on self-­help developments initiatives. Thus, we conclude that to avoid another bout of threats to national security that reactions from aggrieved Bakassi returnees will pose in addition to the already precarious security situation arising from insurgency (e.g., banditry, kidnapping, robbery and secessionist threats from the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB)) that the country is grappling with presently, all promises on resettlement made to them should be actualized. While fulfilment of such promises will go a long way to restoring their prestige as a people, it strengthens their confidence in their abode and Nigerian state, thus saving the country from additional serious unrest. Promises not kept are huge sources unpatriotic acts from the Nigerian populace and have as well become a constant snag, why Nigerians usually cast aspersion on the country. REFERENCES Adoke, C. (2012). “Bakassi: Green Tree Agreement not yet legal—Senate.” Vanguard, Lagos, August 23. Akonye, E. J., and R. O. Nwapi. (2019). “Bakassi peninsula debacle: A critical analysis of the ICJ verdict on the issue and why Nigeria lost Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.” International Journal of Innovative Science, Engineering & Technology 6, no. 11 (November). Alobo, E. E., J. A. Adams, and S. P. Obaji. (2016). “The ICJ’s decision on Bakassi Peninsula in retrospect: A true evaluation of the history, issues and critique of the judgement.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 6, no. 10, 108. Asobie, H. A. (2005). “The conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over land and sea borders: The political context and contending principles.” University of Nigeria Journal of Political Econom 1, no. 1. Aye, E. (2003). Bakassi in international politics. Calabar: EUA. Bekker, P. H. F. (2003). “Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon V. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening).” The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2. Borzello, A. (2004). “My home is another country.” BBC News, 19 January. http://news​.bbc​.co​.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/africa/3401407.stm (accessed August 5, 2020). Efiong-­Fuller, E. (2007). The Bakassi Case at the World Court: 100 Facts You Need to Know. Calabar: University of Calabar Press. Eguzozie, B., and M. Abang. (2017). “15 years after relocation, poverty, neglect claw deeper on Bakassi people.” Business Day, April 23. https://businessday​.ng/life/ article/15-years-­relocation-­poverty-­neglect-­claw-­deeper-­bakassi-­people/ (accessed 5 August 2020). Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). (1999). 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended). Lagos: Government Press.

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Federal Government of Nigeria. (2002). “Nigeria’s reaction to the judgment of the International Court of Justice at The Hague (Nigeria, Cameroon with Equatorial Guinea intervening),” November. http://www​nigeriaembassyusa​ .org/110802_1​ .shtml (accessed 5 August 2020). Garba, J. (1987). Diplomatic Soldiering: Nigerian Foreign Policy, 1975–1979. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Gurr, T. R. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. International Peace Institute (IPI). (2008). Pacific Settlement of Border Disputes: Lessons from Bakassi and the Green Tree Agreement, October. New York: IPI Publications. Inyang, Bassey. (2017). “Bakassi resettlement: FG urged to probe N37. 5b relief materials sent to Cross River.” ThisDay, 29 June. https://www​.thisdaylive​.com/ index​. php/2017/06/29/bakassi-­r esettlement-­f g-­u rged-­t o-­p robe-­n 37-5bn-­r elief​ -­materials-­sent-­to-­cross-­river/ (accessed 5 August 2020). Isokon, B. E., and M. I. Okom. (2014). “Self-­help initiatives and sustainable development in resettlement schemes: The case of Bakassi resettlement programme in Cross River State, Nigeria.” Journal of Sociology and Social Work 2, no. 1, 9–20. Mimiko, N. O. (2017). Democradura: Essays on Nigeria’s Limited Democracy. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Mimiko, N. O., and S. A. Usman. (2019). “The National Assembly in Nigeria’s foreign policy process, 1999–2017.” In O. E. Ojo (ed.), The Legislature and Governance in Nigeria, vol. 2: A Festschrift for Emeritus Professor John A. A. Ayoade. Ibadan: John Archers Publishers, 63–87. Ngara, C. O., and A. T. Sam-­Tsokwa. (2018). “Executive-­legislative relations in Nigeria’s management of the border crisis between Nigeria and Cameroon: The case of the ICJ ruling on the Bakassi Peninsula.” Journal of Politics and Law 11, no. 2, 62–72. Nwokedi, E. (1984). “The politics of inter-­African boundary conflicts: A study of Nigeria and her Franco-­phone neighbours.” Quarterly Journal of Administration 19, no. 1, 2. Nwokolo, N. N. (2020). “Peace-­building or structural violence? Deconstructing the aftermath of Nigeria/Cameroon boundary demarcation.” African Security Review 29, no. 1, 41–57. DOI:10.1080/10246029.2020.1734644. Odiong, O. (2008). Bakassi Peninsula: Growth, Conflict and Evolution. Calabar: Odiong and Sons Publishers. Okoi, O. (2016). “Why nations fight: The causes of the Nigeria–Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict.” African Security 9, no. 1, 42–65. DOI:10.1080/19392206.20 16.1132904. Olaniyan, R. A. (1990). “Nigerian diplomacy: The burden of history.” The 102nd Series Inaugural Lecture of the Department of History, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-­Ife, Nigeria. Oluyemi-­Kusa, D. (2007). The Bakassi: ICJ ruling, Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission and Nigeria’s national interests.” In B. A. Akinterinwa (ed.), Nigeria’s National Interests in a Globalising World: Further Reflections on Constructive



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and Beneficial Concentricism, vol. 3: Nigeria’s National Interests beyond Nigeria. Ibadan: Bolytag International Publishers. Omole, B. (2010). “Nigeria, France and the Francophone states: The joy and anguish of a regional power.” The 226th Series Inaugural Lecture of the Department of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-­Ife, Nigeria. Opue, J. A., and P. M. Usang. (2019). “An analysis of the implications and consequences of ceding Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon.” Ijo-­International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research 2, no. 9 (September). Punch. (2017). “Bakassi people still suffering, says Ita-­Giwa.” 24 January. https:// punchng​.com/bakassi-­people-­still-­suffering-­says-­ita-­giwa (accessed 5 August 2020). Shagari, S. (2001). Shehu Shagari: Beckon to Serve—An Autobiography. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Plc. Vanguard. (2016). “Ayade weeps over plight of displaced Bakassi people,” August 18. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2016/08/ayade-­weeps-­plight-­displaced-­bakassi​ -­people/ (accessed 5 August 2020). Yerima, H. M. and R. D. S. Singh. (2017). “The Bakassi dispute: People’s dynamics and the rise of militancy.” IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Science 22, no. 1, 67–70. DOI: 10.9790/0837-2201066770.

Chapter Sixteen

Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations in the Light of the Anglophone Crisis C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Obinna Ukaeje

INTRODUCTION Interstate relations have for centuries been shaped by the interplay of divergent historical, socioeconomic, political and geographical forces that compel states to define and redefine their national interests. To this effect, the course of action or foreign policy options which states adopt in international relations is targeted at the pursuit of national interests as spelt out by its foreign policy elites. It is this understanding that has since guided the thrust of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since both countries attained independence from France and Britain in 1960. Cameroon is one of Nigeria’s strategic neighbours. First, it is situated within Central Africa, with physical boundaries that cut across West Africa; its boundary with Nigeria extends from Lake Chad through the Bakassi Peninsula to the boundary into the Gulf of Guinea (Baye, 2010, 9–34). Secondly, there are several thousand Cameroonians, mostly from the two Anglophone regions, living and engaged in legitimate activities in Nigeria. Similarly, about four million Nigerians are estimated to be living and going about their legitimate activities in Cameroon, as students, businessmen or professionals. In addition, there are several cross-­border communities along Nigeria’s border areas from the north to south. Though Nigeria and Cameroon’s relations predate independence, their relations since independence have been defined by their respective domestic factors, territorial disputes arising from the poorly demarcated territorial boundaries inherited at independence and mutual security threats. These include flooding, diseases, cross-­border crimes, terrorism and insurgencies in the Lake Chad Basin and secessionist tendencies in former British Southern Cameroons and the defunct Biafra in Nigeria. 291

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A reflection on the thrust of bilateral relations between Nigeria and Cameroon reveals a swinging pattern from mutual cooperation to outright conflict and later a period of progressive rapprochement amid evolving insecurities. In the first decade of their independence, especially in the era of the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), the General Yakubu Gowon–led Federal Military Government in Lagos needed the unflinching support of the Ahidjo administration in Yaoundé to frustrate Biafra’s attempt at secession. This cooperation of the government of Cameroon was one of the significant determining factors that facilitated Nigeria’s victory over Biafra in the war as the Ahidjo regime took measures to ensure that Cameroon territory was not used by Biafra for subversive activities against Nigeria. This point is important in understanding Nigeria’s role in the armed struggle for independent the state of Ambazonia in the two English-­speaking regions of Cameroon. While the first two decades of independence, and especially the civil war years, were characterized by cordial diplomatic relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, the second two decades were characterized by mutual hostilities over poorly demarcated disputed international boundaries. In May 1981, both countries were drawn into military skirmishes that fell short of war following the killing of five Nigerian soldiers at Bakassi Peninsula, formerly under Ikang District in Cross River State. Subsequent skirmishes happened between December 1993 and January 1994 (Okereke, 2019). It was this later round of confrontation that informed Cameroon’s decision to invite the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague to intervene in the boundary dispute in 1996. Since the ICJ verdict on 10 October 2002 relating to the land and maritime boundaries between Cameroon and Nigeria, both countries, with the support of the international community, have taken bold measures through the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC) to implement the verdict. Other confidence-­building measures taken by the leadership of Cameroon and Nigeria to foster their cordial diplomatic relations include the Green Tree Agreement on 12 June 2006 and the transfer of territories as spelt out in the ICJ judgement. In addition, both countries adopted and began the implementation of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-­border Security Committee between the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the government of the Republic of Cameroon. The need for bilateral cooperation to tackle evolving trans-­border threats became imperative with the increase in illicit transnational trafficking between both countries, which threatens the sovereignty, territorial integrity and well-­being of the population. The Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and the activities of smugglers across borders, including sea robbers and pirates, in their shared maritime domain were the critical concerns.



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Within five years of signing the agreement on trans-­border security, the nature of security threats between Cameroon and Nigeria escalated with the advent of separatist agitations and armed struggles for independence in Nigeria and Cameroon. In Cameroon, separatists in the English-­speaking regions of Northwest and Southwest introduced armed resistance in their quest for an independent State of Ambazonia for the population of former British Southern Cameroons. Similarly, another wave of separatist tendencies also erupted as the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB), under the leadership of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, renewed the clamour for the separation of the former Eastern region (1960–1967) from Nigeria. This chapter therefore examines the trends in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations since the outbreak of the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon with a view to making recommendations. It posits that although the Anglophone question in Cameroon brought about new dimensions of mutual security dynamics for both countries, the thrust of their diplomatic relations has continued to experience growing rapprochement. It therefore engages the subject matter by examining the geo-­strategic importance of the Anglophone regions to their bilateral relations and establishes the underlying motivation for Nigeria’s support for Cameroon while also identifying the indicators of diplomatic anxieties. GEO-­STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ANGLOPHONE REGIONS TO CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS The main aspects of the geo-­strategic consideration for this report include territorial contiguity, population and increasing rapprochement between both countries. Specifically, Nigeria and Cameroon share a contiguous border, which is presently estimated to be about 1,800km as against the initial 1,650km prior to the ICJ verdict. The new figure is a result of the boundary adjustments recommended by the Nigeria-­ Cameroon Mixed Commission (NCMC). The shared international boundary covers five regions in Cameroon, which are the Adamaoua, Far North, North, Northwest and Southwest regions. On the Nigeria side, the shared land boundaries cover five states as follows, Adamawa, Benue, Borno, Cross River and Taraba States. The Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon constitute the Anglophone, or English-­speaking, region in the country. This is because they were administered by Britain as mandated and trust territories of the League of Nations and United Nations respectively. By implication, the other eight regions of Cameroon are by this classification considered to be Francophone regions. The two Anglophone regions of Cameroon share maritime

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boundaries with Akwa Ibom and Cross River States in Southern Nigeria and about 600km of land boundary with three Nigerian states as follows: Benue, Cross River and Taraba States. The four divisions of Anglophone Cameroon with shared land borders with Nigeria are Manyu and Ndian Divisions in the Southwest region and Donga-­Mantum and Menchum Divisions in the Northwest region. These are critical geo-­strategic considerations in understanding the implications of the Anglophone to Nigeria-­Cameroon relations. Nigeria and Cameroon relations have progressed from an era of mutual hostility associated with disputed border areas, especially the Bakassi Peninsula to increasing rapprochement following the progress made in the implementation of the Green Tree Agreement. This rapprochement has been strengthened by a series of high-­level visits at ministerial and presidential levels within the past decade. It is this rapprochement that facilitated the collaboration of both countries in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) against the Boko Haram, the Agreement of Trans-­border Security of 2012 and the mutual commitments against domestic insurrections by the Ambazonia and Biafra separatists, who are linked more by ideological leanings than by armed collaboration. BACKGROUND OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN CAMEROONS The build-­up to the armed conflict in the English-­speaking regions of Cameroon has its roots in the colonial trajectory that accompanied the defeat of Germany in the First and Second World Wars of the 20th century. The consequence was the accompanying seizure of colonial territories, previously under German control, by the League of Nations (1919 to 1945) and the successor organization, which is the United Nations. While French-­administered Cameroon attained political independence on 1 January 1960, the Anglophone regions of Cameroon were in favour of joining French Cameroon during the 11 February 1961 plebiscite organized by the United Nations. Consequently, former British Southern Cameroons gained independence through reunification with French Cameroon on 1 October 1961 to form a two-­state federation, which lasted till May 1972. The federating units were East Cameroon and West Cameroon, representing the former La République du Cameroon (French Cameroon) and former British Southern Cameroons respectively. Article 47(1) of the federal constitution unequivocally stipulated that “any proposal for the revision of the present constitution which impairs the unity and integrity of the federation shall be inadmissible.” This implies that any form of amendment to the constitution that violates the nature and



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purpose of the federation is prohibited. The decision of the Ahidjo regime to abrogate the two-­state federation in May 1972 and rename the country United Republic of Cameroon set the stage for sustained grievances of the English-­speaking population. The grievances were deepened by perceived and obvious marginalization of the Anglophone population in terms of political and administrative representation as well as development projects, and the successive regime of President Paul Biya sustained the Ahidjo legacy. For instance, in 1984, the Biya regime changed from United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon, thereby reverting to the original name of French Cameroon prior to the reunification in October 1961. This move was interpreted by the pro-­federalist and pro-­Ambazonia Anglophones as a secessionist attempt to exit the union. The Biya regime’s penchant for centralization and assimilation of the English-­ speaking population was further manifested in the adoption of a unitary constitution for Cameroon on 18 January 1996 in utter disregard for the legitimate aspirations of the Anglophones for federalism, which was a core tenet of the reunification as enshrined in the 1961 federal constitution. Abiem a Choyi, a former experienced civil administrator and Secretary General at the Presidency in Cameroon identified the process of assimilation of the English-­speaking population to include the centralization of state power through the transfer of national decision-­making power to Yaoundé, failure to consider the institutional, legal and administrative cultures and traditions of West Cameroon, disregard for the practice of bilingualism in the public sector and the non-­compliance with the solemn promises made during the referendum campaigns (Choyi, 2017). Although these measures were targeted at the complete assimilation of the English-­speaking population, President Biya affirmed, while responding to questions from Mo Ibrahim at the Lyon conference in 2019, that “we tried assimilating their system into the majority francophone system but because of identity differences, it failed” (Fofung, 2019). In rejection of Yaoundé‘s propensity to centralization and assimilation, the Anglophone population took measures to mobilize and coordinate their position for peaceful engagements with the Yaoundé regime on their grievances through the All Anglophone Conferences (AAC). The first AAC was held in Buea, Southwest region, in April 1993, while the second AAC was held in Bamenda, Northwest region, in April/May 1994. Subsequently, the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) was formed to continue the agitation for Anglophone aspirations through nonviolent means (SCNC, 1994). The government of Cameroon, however, outlawed the existence and activities of the SCNC on the grounds that they are contrary to the constitution and could jeopardize the security of the State, territorial integrity, and national

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integration (IRBC, n.d.). The inability of peaceful measures to redress the grievances lies at the root of the current armed struggle for an independent state of Ambazonia for the English-­speaking population of former British Southern Cameroons. By 2016, trade unions such as the Cameroon Common Law Lawyers Association and the All Anglophone Teachers Trade Union embarked on industrial actions to drive home the demands for basic reforms to strengthen the Anglophone legal and education system. As a follow-­up to the lawyers’ and teachers’ strikes, the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) emerged to mobilize and coordinate the Anglophone population, making the following demands: a.  End to the marginalization and annexation predisposition of Yaoundé. b.  Return to a two-­state federation in the management of public affairs in Cameroon. The imposition of a unitary state on 20 May 1972 was a violation of Article 47 of the Federal Constitution of 1961. Similarly, the change of name to the Republic of Cameroon on 4 February 1984 and subsequent adoption of a unitary constitution on 18 January 1996 were further derailment of the tenets of unity entered in 1961 (cf. McAulay et al., 2019). c.  Preservation of the cherished legal and educational systems of Anglophone Cameroon. d.  Unconditional release of over 100 bona fide Cameroonians arrested in connection with the protests in the Northwest and Southwest regions since September 2016. e.  Restoration of internet services throughout the Anglophone regions (Okereke, 2018, 8–12). The Biya regime in Yaoundé was unable to resolve the impasse with the trade unions by the end of December 2016. Rather, it described the supporters of the new resistance as a group of manipulated and exploited extremist rioters whose activities have led to the loss of lives; destruction of public and private buildings, crippling of economic activities and the desecration of sacred national symbols. The International Crisis Group noted that between October 2016 and February 2017, no fewer than nine people were killed, while several others sustained gunshot wounds. It further noted that Cameroon’s official statistics by the Communication Minister, Issa Tchiroma Bakary, indicate that 82 arrests were made, and those arrested included journalists and lawyers, and they were charged before a military court under the terrorism law. On the list of personalities arrested and prosecuted was Justice Paul Abine Ayah of the Supreme Court.



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The grievances of the English-­speaking population in Cameroon were escalated by the official response of the Yaoundé regime as follows: a.  Harassment and maltreatment of lawyers on a peaceful protest march in Buea and Bamenda in September 2016 against Yaoundé’s insistence on use of civil law in Anglophone regions which have British orientation of common law doctrine (see McAulay et al., 2019). b.  Molestation of students at University of Buea and National Polytechnic Bambui by Cameroons’s security agencies, including the harassment, detention and torture of protesting youths at Kumba and Bamenda in November 2016 as well as the killing of Julius Akum on 8 December 2016. c.  Deployment of security forces across major towns in Anglophone regions. d.  Shut-­down of internet access in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon (Okereke, 2018). In January 2017, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (MINADT), Yaoundé, proscribed the CACSC and the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC), leading to the arrest and trial of CACSC leaders such as Felix Agbor Balla, a lawyer/civil rights activist in Cameroon; Fontem Neba, Lecturer at the University of Buea; and Mancho Bibixy, acclaimed leader of the December 2016 coffin revolution in Bamenda, at the Yaoundé Military Tribunal. This set the stage for the Anglophone diaspora to hijack the struggle, and expanded the aspirations of the English-­speaking diaspora from the quest for a two-­state federation to outright demands for an independent state of Ambazonia for the population of former British Southern Cameroons. DECLINE TO ARMED STRUGGLE IN FORMER BRITISH SOUTHERN CAMEROONS The eventual decline to armed struggle is considered to be the consequence of deploying an out-­dated 20th-­century response to a 21st-­century challenge without adequate appreciation of trends that accompany globalization, information exchange and mass mobilization. Specifically, the events of September 2017 marked a turning point in Anglophone nationalism in Northwest and Southwest Cameroon as the local population conducted a peace protest march in demand for the independent State of Ambazonia for Southern Cameroons (Akwei, 2017). The September 2017 Anglophone protests were coordinated by the Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe–led Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United

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Front (SCACUF), which succeeded the CACSC as the umbrella organization mobilizing the English-­speaking population for independence. The population trooped out in clear defiance of administrative bans on mass gatherings and protests by Cameroonian officials and were met with official repression using defence and security forces (Nanche, n.d. ). Similar protest marches were conducted by Southern Cameroons pro-­Ambazonia nationalists in various capitals across the world, including at the United Nations Headquarters in New York, where President Paul Biya was participating in the Great Debate of the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Ibid.). The protesting population were confronted by the coercive instruments of the state, leading to several arrests, detention and deaths of several protesters perpetrated by government officials, thereby sparking armed resistance by sections of the Southern Cameroon pro-­Ambazonia nationalists. The accompanying conflict sparked human displacement and forced migrations out of the regions. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in collaboration with Nigeria’s National Commission for Refugees and Displaced Persons, registered 2,000 Cameroonian refugees by 31 October 2017, while another batch of about 3,000 new arrivals were awaiting documentation (Vanguard, 2017). President Biya acknowledged the decline to armed conflict while addressing the media at Nsimalen Airport near Yaoundé on 30 November 2017, when he declared that it was now clear that Cameroon was at war and under attack by terrorists masking themselves as secessionists and directed that all measures necessary be taken to restore order (Biya, 2017). With the escalation of violence, several Anglophone Cameroonians, especially in the border areas, fled to Nigeria for safety. The flight of Cameroon Anglophone refugees was facilitated by the reopening of the border on 16 November 2017 and the existence of cultural affinities across the border strengthened by marriage and cross-­border linkages of ethnicity among the Ejagam and the Boki ethnic groups. Furthermore, the release of Communiqué No G38/C62/viii/373 of 1 December 2017, purportedly issued by the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Manyu Division, Oum II Joseph, also escalated the flight of Anglophone population in Cameroon into Nigeria. This communiqué advised inhabitants of 16 villages in Manyu Division to flee their villages to avert the unsavoury consequences of an impending operation by Cameroon’s defence and security forces against the Ambazonia fighters, who allegedly killed 5 gendarmes and 4 soldiers in the Division. The affected villages and Sub-­divisions listed in the three Sub-­divisions are as follows: a.  Akwaya Sub-­division: Bodam, Dadi, Kesham, Badjie, Abonado, Beteme, Ebinsi and Bakem villages



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b.  Eyumojock Sub-­division: Otu, Nsanaragati, Nsanakang, Agborkem German, Nduak and Esaghem c.  Mamfe Sub-­division: Egbekaw village1 While intermittent skirmishes between few armed Ambazonia fighters and Cameroon defence and security forces continued, it was the arrest of Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe alongside 12 other Southern Cameroons pro-­Ambazonia leaders at Nera Hotel, Abuja, Nigeria, on 5 January 2018 and subsequent transfer of 10 of them to Cameroon on Friday 26 January 2018 that led to the full-­scale armed struggle for the independent State of Ambazonia. Those arrested were Sisiku Julius AyukTabe (President of the interim government of Ambazonia), Dr Nfor Ngala Nfor (Chairman of Southern Cameroons National Council-­ SCNC), Dr Fidelis Nde Che, Dr Henry Kimeng, Prof Augustine Awasum and Dr Cornelius Kwanga. Others are Elder Wilfred Tassang, Barister Eyambe Elias, Dr John Ojong Okongho, Barrister Nsoh Nalowa Bih (Director of Administration arranged the hotel reservations), Barrister Shafair Blaise Berinyo, and Dr Ogork Ntui (The Cable, 2018). The arrest and transfer of the 47 refugees and asylum seekers to Cameroon was considered a violation of the principle of non-­refoulement, which under international human rights law guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm (UN OHCHR, n.d.). Out of the 12 leaders of the Sisiku Ayuktabe–led interim government (IG) of Ambazonia, only 10 were transferred to Cameroon authorities. Dr John Ojong Okongho and Barrister Nsoh Nalowa Bih were not transferred to Cameroon. In addition to this, another 37 Southern Cameroonians arrested at Ngoroje village in Gembu, Taraba State (Northeast Nigeria) on 30 December 2017 on suspected allegation of training as Ambazonia fighters were also transferred to Cameroon alongside the Nera 10 (Deutsche Welle, 2018). Critics of the transfer of these asylum seekers and refugees to Cameroon consider such measure as a violation of Article II (5) of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention on Refugees which stipulates as follows: Where a refugee has not received the right to reside in any country of asylum, he may be granted temporary residence in any country of asylum in which he first presented himself as a refugee pending arrangement for his resettlement in accordance with the preceding paragraph. (OAU Convention, 1969)

At the Sixth Trans-­border Security Meeting of Cameroon and Nigeria held in February 2018, Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Maj. Gen. Mongunu, declared that “Nigeria will take necessary measures within the ambit of the law to ensure that her territory is not used as a staging area to destabilise

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another friendly sovereign country” (Vanguard, 2018). This represented Nigeria’s official position and gives insight to understanding the arrest and transfer of the Southern Cameroon leaders and the 37 suspects arrested at Gembu. This position of Nigeria is consistent with Article III (1&2) on Prohibition of Subversive Activities as enshrined in the African Convention on refugees which provides that: Every refugee has a duty to the country in which he finds himself to abstain from any subversive activities against any member state of the OAU and further mandates signatory states to prohibit refugees residing in their respective territories from attacking any State member of the OAU by any activity likely to cause tension between Member States, and in particular by use of arms, through the press or by radio. (OAU Convention on Refugees, 1969)

Following the intensification of violence in 2018, Amnesty International reported that that the Cameroon defence and security forces attacked towns and villages where suspected Ambazonia fighters were operating, such as Buea, Bamenda, Kumba, Dadi, Bodam, Kwakwa, Kombone, Belo, Mamfe, Mbingo, Batibo, Esu, among others (Amnesty International, 2018). The ensuing operations escalated human displacements and forced migrations with more refugees fleeing to Nigeria. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees documented more than 32,000 Anglophone refugees spread out primarily in Akwa Ibom, Benue, Cross River and Taraba States (UNHCR, 2018). The first four years of the conflict (2017–2021) has been characterized by incessant killings and attacks, bombing of houses and public institutions like schools and hospitals, among others, by the belligerent forces. The International Crisis Group Report has it that at least 3,000 have been killed, more than 200 villages destroyed and an estimated 500,000 displaced internally, while an estimated 40,000 others have fled to neighbouring Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2019). CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS AND THE ANGLOPHONE CHALLENGE The outbreak of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon has stimulated new concerns for Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, which both countries are steadily engaging. To appreciate Nigeria’s orientation and policy thrust towards the crisis, it is imperative to understand the considerations that inform Nigeria’s response. First, Cameroon is Nigeria’s immediate neighbour and therefore falls within the inner core of Nigeria’s concentric circles in terms of Nigeria’s defence and foreign policy priorities (Ashaver, 2014, 6–11). Moreover,



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the porous nature of the territorial boundaries between the two countries and the ethnic cleavages among the border communities facilitate and sustain the security problems across the borders of Nigeria with Ambazonia fighters crossing over the border as refugees and using the border communities as staging posts for attacks across Cameroon in violation of refugee conditions (Browne, 2019). It is therefore not surprising that the conflict has generated apprehension and insecurity along Nigeria border communities with implications for the country’s national security. President Muhammadu Buhari has further cultivated friendly interpersonal relations with President Paul Biya, and the regime interests in both countries are directly benefiting from the mutual friendship and understanding of both Heads of State. In addition, the activities of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission, which facilitated the peaceful implementation of the Green Tree Agreement also contributes to strengthening bilateral relations between both countries despite the tensions being generated by the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Nigeria’s interest and orientation towards the Southern Cameroons conflict is further conditioned by the activities of separatist groups within Nigeria, especially the Independent Peoples of Biafra (IPOB) led by Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, which joined alliance with Ayaba Cho Lucas’s–led Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC), a faction in the pro-­Ambazonia struggle (Deutsche Welle News, n.d.). However, despite the much trumpeted alliance between the AgovC and IPOB, there actually exists no practical collaboration in terms of armed struggle beyond their shared ideological leanings that Biafra and Ambazonia have been subjected to extreme marginalization and should exit their respective forced unions. It is also important to note that other Southern Cameroonian pro-­Ambazonia groups like the Samuel Ikome Sako–led interim government (IG) of Ambazonia, Gojim Dimka’s Republic of Ambazonia (RoA), and the Ebenezer Akwanga–led African Peoples Liberation Movement (APLM) have condemned and rejected the alliance as unrepresentative of the interest of Southern Cameroons; there still exists strong concern in policy circles of such eventuality. This fact was acknowledged by Dr Samuel Sako, factional leader of the IG who denied any ties in the past, present or future with the Nnamdi Kanu–led IPOB, contrary to widespread allegations (The Sun, 2021). However, Nigeria’s concern about the alliance has been reinforced with IPOB’s adoption of Ghost Town Resistance (GTR) of Southern Cameroon in Southeast Nigeria (which is the epicentre of the pro-­Biafra struggle) in its quest for the unconditional release of Mazi Nnamdi Kanu, who was extracted from Kenya. The GTR imposes a compulsory sit-­ at-­home protest every Monday by every inhabitant of the affected area, which also prohibits travelling in and out of the area.

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Another dimension to Nigeria’s orientation in the conflict stems from the fact that prior to the arrest of pro-­Ambazonia leaders in Abuja and the subsequent transfer to Cameroon of the authority for prosecution, the bulk of Southern Cameroons pro-­Ambazonia nationalists considered Nigeria as the Big Brother that could support their struggle. This assumption sometimes hinges on shared colonial experience and may have informed the activities of the SCACUF and successor interim government under Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe within Nigeria prior to the Nera Hotel Episode. For instance, SCNC activists such as Nfor Ngalla Nfor, until his arrest in January 2018, considered Nigeria as a safe haven for refuge and exile in the case of a clampdown by the government of Cameroon. Similarly, former Secretary-­General of the SCACUF Elder Wilfred Tassang was also an asylum seeker in Nigeria registered with the National Commission for Refugees, Migrations and Displaced Persons (NCRMDP) prior to his arrest and transfer to Cameroon in January 2018. Meanwhile, the government of Cameroon sought Nigeria’s support in clamping down on Southern Cameroons pro-­Ambazonia nationalists. Drawing from the above, the Anglophone crisis put Nigeria in a dilemma to either remain diplomatically neutral or actively intervene in support of any of the contending parties. But the intense interactions between populations on both sides of the border demand that Nigeria’s government use its diplomatic influence to wade into the conflict and find a lasting solution to it. In March 2017, members of the Southern Cameroons in Nigeria Association (SCINGA) obtained police permission to stage a protest at the High Commission of Cameroon in Abuja against Yaoundé’s continued control of the Anglophone regions in the country. Following a protest by the High Commissioner who accused the Nigerian government of not doing enough to contain the activities of pro-­Ambazonians within her territory, Nigeria declined granting such permission to Cameroon. The government of Cameroon issued an international arrest warrant on 15 Anglophones in November 2017, which included Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe (Mouahidi, n.d.). Cameroon’s uncertainty of Nigeria’s intentions towards the Anglophone crisis was further heightened by the fact that Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe, Tassang Wilfred and Elias Eyambe, who were among the 15 Anglophone Cameroonians listed on the international arrest warrant were based in Nigeria. Others on the list are Mark Bareta, Tapang Tanku Ivo, Milton Taka, Nso Foncha Kem, Ebenezer Akwangwa, Ayaba Cho, Boh Herbert, Kometa Elvis, Harmony Bobga, Elizabeth Bifuh-­Ambe, Milam Atam and Larry Ayamba. In furtherance of Yaoundé‘s interest, the government of Cameroon sent a delegation led by its Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, Mr Emmanuel Rene Sadi, to hold a meeting with the Nigerian government. In a press statement released after the meeting on Wednesday



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15 November 2017 by the Senior Special Assistant in the Office of Nigeria’s Vice President, Laolu Akande, Nigeria and Cameroon pledged commitments to mutual cooperation in fostering peace and security especially in countering extremism and the fight against Boko Haram terrorism and insurgency (Laolu, 2017). To further Nigeria’s efforts to end Cameroon’s distrust towards her intentions in the Anglophone crisis and reassure the government of Cameroon of its commitment towards addressing mutual security challenges especially terrorism, President Buhari dispatched Ambassador Lawan Abba Gashagar (then High Commissioner designate to Cameroon), to deliver a sealed diplomatic envelop to President Biya of Cameroon on 7 December 2017 (Presidency Republic of Cameroon, 2017). Gashargar declared that Nigeria would neither support not encourage secessionists; it would rather collaborate to safeguard Cameroon’s territorial integrity. With this initiative, President Buhari demonstrated willingness to continue collaborating with Cameroon to counter terrorism as defined by both countries. Drawing from the foregoing narrative, it is deduced that Nigeria’s policy orientation towards Cameroon in light of the Anglophone question is informed by the following: a.  Commitment to sustain the growing rapprochement between both countries since the resolution of the boundary dispute following the judgement of the International Court of Justice in October 2002. b.  Commitment to building partnership and international cooperation at checking mutual security challenges associated with Boko Haram in their shared border areas. c.  Resolve not to support subversive activities against a sovereign state in Africa. By this, while she receives Southern Cameroons refugees, the approval for refugee status in Nigeria clearly states that such refugees must not be involved in political activities that constitute subversive activities against a sovereign African state.2 d.  Realization that Cameroon is a strategic partner to counter the separatist agenda of the IPOB and similar groups in Nigeria and in reciprocation to Cameroon’s support to the federal side during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). This is further sustained by the need to cripple the much-­ publicized alliance between IPOB and the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC). e.  To evolve efficient measures to address human security vulnerabilities for Nigeria associated with the continued influx of refugees during the COVID-19 pandemic, cross-­border movement of fighters and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Okereke, 2020).

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The above combination of factors has since 2017 influenced the orientation of Nigeria’s leadership, which seeks strengthened bilateral cooperation with the government of Cameroon to address mutual cross-­border threats between both states. This commitment has repeatedly been pronounced by Nigeria through high-­level exchanges between both countries. So far, Cameroon remains one of Nigeria’s strategic frontline states, and both countries are partners in combating the Boko Haram insurgency in the North and maritime insecurities in the Gulf of Guinea. Their navies are engaged in Operation OBANGAME Express, designed to strengthen regional cooperation, maritime domain awareness (MDA), information-­sharing practices, and tactical interdiction expertise to enhance the collective capacities of Gulf of Guinea and West African nations to counter sea-­ based illicit activities (DVIDS, 2021). NIGERIA’S RESPONSE TO THE SOUTHERN CAMEROONS CONFLICT Nigeria’s direct involvement in the Anglophone agitations in Cameroon dates back to April 2001 when the Nigerian government received and provided temporary asylum status to Justice Frederick Alobwede Ebong of the SCNC and later Ebenezer Akwanga of the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL), who jumped bail from a Cameroon prison on 9 July 2003 and fled to Nigeria prior to their departure to the United States in February 2006 as refugees (Akwanga, 2021). At this stage, it was restricted from receiving fleeing Cameroonians as asylum seekers from a government concerned with prosecuting them for their political views. Moreover, the nature of diplomatic relations between both countries was still influenced by the shadows of the border disputes over the Bakassi Peninsula. However, this trend has changed significantly since the signing of the Green Tree Agreement on 12 June 2006 and the accompanying transfer of Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon in August 2006, which was accompanied by the withdrawal of Nigerian military and security forces from the territory. The focus on trans-­border security assumed relevance in the build-­up to signing the bilateral Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-­border Security Committee in 2012 and the sudden escalation of Boko Haram terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin. In the build-­up to the current wave of the Anglophone crisis in the last quarter of 2016, a top diplomat at the Nigerian Consulate in Buea who claimed anonymity revealed that some Nigerian students at the University of Buea were arrested alongside Cameroonian students during the November 2016 demonstrations in the university, and the Nigerian Consulate in



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Buea engaged the Cameroon authority to secure their release (Nigerian Diplomat, 2017). Subsequently, then–Nigeria’s Consul-­General in Buea, Mr Dan Wari-­Nwazim, hosted the Cameroon community of his alma mater, the University of Nigeria Nsukka to an end-­of-­year-­party at the Nigeria House in Buea. Many of the attendee were Anglophone Cameroonians suspected to have sympathy for the struggle. This event seemed not to have been favourably welcomed by the Cameroon authority and may have culminated in the blockage of internet access to the Nigeria Consulate following shut-­down of internet access to the Northwest and Southwest regions in January 2017.3 Explaining the internet outage, Mr Wari-­Nwazim stated, “Nobody told us anything or informed us that the internet was going to be disconnected. We only woke up to find that we could not communicate with Head Office in Abuja and the rest of the world (Wari-­Nwazim, cited in Asonganyi, 2017).” He considered the severance of access to the internet a violation of the 1963 Vienna Protocol on diplomatic and consular relations and access to diplomatic information, which stipulates that communication of diplomatic and consular missions is invaluable, and the host government should do nothing to tamper with them. He noted that while the Nigerian Consulate was severed from access to the internet, certain categories of public and private businesses in the two Anglophone regions of Cameroon, especially banks and post offices in both Anglophone regions, were granted internet access during the period (Wari-­Nwazim, cited in Asonganyi, 2017). With the cross-­border movements that accompanied the early stages of the conflict, Cameroon and Nigerian officials in Abuja began holding high-­level meetings with a special focus on the emerging security tensions in the English-­ speaking regions of Cameroon and their cross-­border movements’ implications. For instance, in response to Cameroon’s official complaints against the First and Second Conclave meetings of the SCACUF, held in Lagos, Nigeria, the Cameroon High Commissioner to Nigeria, His Excellency Salaheddine Abbas Ibrahimma, held a meeting with Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Maj. Gen. Babagana Monguno, in April 2017 to convince Nigeria to prevent the use of its territory to organize the Anglophone struggles.4 This meeting became necessary because Cameroon’s national security and intelligence network indicated that since January 2017, some CACSC leaders, such as Wilfred Tassang (Secretary-­General of the SCACUF), declared wanted in Cameroon in connection with the increasing tensions in the Anglophone regions, allegedly escaped to Nigeria and continued holding meetings and mobilizing their supporters in Cameroon. Other Anglophone Cameroonians like then-­leader of the SCACUF, Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe, were already living in Nigeria since 2006 when he started work with Sisco Technologies, after which he joined the services of the ABTI-­American University of Nigeria,

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Yola in 2006 as Information Communication Technology engineer and later rose to lead the Department of Information Technology (Fatunde, 2020). Similarly, Augustine Awasum was already a professor in the Department of Veterinary Medicine at the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria in Kaduna State, Nigeria (Aondofa, 2021). Speculatively, several Southern Cameroons pro-­ Ambazonia nationalists anticipated that President Buhari’s sympathy and support for the self-­ determination struggles of Palestinians in the Middle East and the Saharawi population in the western Sahara could be extended to the people of former British-­ administered Southern Cameroons, considering their shared historical, cultural and socioeconomic ties with parts of Southern Nigeria. It is important to note that in the first quarter of 2017, the orientation of the Anglophone struggle was pro-­federation, and this did not attract any significant national security concerns for Nigeria. However, following the outcome of the Third and Fourth Conclave held in Lagos and Zaria (Nigeria) respectively, the shift towards armed struggle and independent statehood for Southern Cameroon became more pronounced, leading to a change in orientation of the Nigerian government, which strongly condemned the use of her territory for subversive activity against a friendly neighbour. With the escalation of hostilities between Cameroon’s defence and security forces against the pro-­Ambazonia armed groups, several contending issues have implications for Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. For instance, there emerged several incidents of Cameroonian soldiers crossing into Nigeria in real-­time pursuit of suspected Ambazonia fighters who crossed the border into Nigeria as asylum seekers, from where they planned attacks against Cameroon, and this trend persisted between December 2017 and December 2021. Such cross-­border violations by Cameroonian soldiers took place in Boki Local Government Area (LGA) of Cross River State (Nigeria) when about 80 Cameroonian soldiers crossed into Danare-­ Dadi/Danare Bodun communities to abduct five Cameroonian refugees suspected to be Ambazonia fighters on 25 January 2018. Similar cross-­border operations of the Cameroonian military reoccurred on 30 January 2018 in Cross River State at Danare community in Boki LGA. Another contending issue associated with Cameroon-­ Nigeria relations in the course of the Anglophone crisis is the case of three Nigerian police personnel, namely, Deputy Superintendent of Police Olutope Falode, Inspector Yohanna Gamida and Inspector Muhammadu Usman, who went missing within Cameroon territory along with an auto mechanic named Momoh Usman in September 2018 (Yahaya, 2019). The police personnel attached to the International Police (InterPol) section of the Nigerian Police departed from Akwa Ibom State into Cameroon on their way to Gabon to recover a



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stolen car tracked there but went missing after logging into InterPol Cameroon on arrival but did not log in to InterPol Gabon in line with the standard procedure (Daily Trust, n.d.). This incident has emerged as a critical issue of discussion at the Seventh and Eight Sessions of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­ border Security meetings held in Yaoundé and Abuja respectively. However, both countries have had to shoulder the intervening variable with resolve to sustain their cooperation in the wake of increasing security challenges. This was demonstrated at the opening ceremony of the Eighth Session of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Trans-­border Security Committee held in Abuja from 23–26 August 2021. Nigeria’s National Security Adviser, Maj. Gen. Babagana Mongunu identified the attempt by secessionist groups in Nigeria to form alliances with secessionist groups in Cameroon to destabilize both countries, and he reemphasized that “Nigeria’s territory will never be used as a haven or staging area by any group of secessionists to destabilise another friendly sovereign country” (Angbulu, 2021). As part of confidence-­building measures to demonstrate the blossoming rapprochement between Cameroon and Nigeria, President Biya hosted a visiting team from the National Defence College Nigeria at the Presidential Palace on 20 May 2017, led by Prof. Gani Joses Yoroms, as Acting Provost, Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Nigeria (Yoroms, 2017). In a similar demonstration of solidarity, the government of Cameroon welcomed a special contingent of the Nigerian military, led by Lieutenant Colonel Muktar Sani Daroda, to participate in the military parade in celebration of Cameroon’s national day in May 2019. These invitations were designed to demonstrate the excellent bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria (Kindzeka, 2018). On 1 March 2019, Justice Anwuli Chikelu ruled that the Nigerian government should protect all refugees and ensure that the all members of the Nera 12 alongside the 37 Anglophone youths deported alongside the Sisiku Julius Ayuktabe be returned to Nigeria. In addition, Justice Chikelu ordered that each of the Nera 12 be paid the sum of N5,000,000 (about $10,000), while each of the 37 youth arrested in Taraba State be paid N200,000 (about $400) as compensation for the violation of their rights. Despite this ruling by the Nigerian court, the government of Cameroon, however, convicted the Nera 10 and sentenced them to life imprisonment over charges of rebellion, complicity in terrorism, financing terrorism, revolution, insurrection, hostility against the States, propagation of fake news and lack of identification (BBC News, n.d.). In addition, the Yaoundé court ordered members of the Nera 10 to pay a fine of FCFA 250 billion francs ($422 million) to the Cameroon state for civil damages and FCFA 12 billion francs as the cost of prosecution. Deported to Cameroon to life imprisonment on 20 August 2019 (ibid.).

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As their mutual security threats continued, Cameroon and Nigeria renewed commitments to cooperate in the fight against terrorism and insurgency in their territories and shared borders. This was part of the resolutions adopted on 1 April 2021, when Nigeria’s Chief of Defence Staff, General Lucky Irabor visited Cameroon, where he held meetings with his Cameroon counterpart, General Rene Meka, and the Cameroon’s Defence Minister, Mr Joseph Beti Assomo. In his remarks, Mr Assomo declared as follows: We are going to examine how to strengthen our cooperation in the fight against Boko Haram and also the terrorist threat in the Northwest and Southwest regions. There too, we have common concerns. The threats being from both sides, we would work in collaboration. (Etahoben, 2021)

CONCLUSION There is no doubt that the southern Cameroon conflict that has escalated since 2016 has serious implications to Nigeria as a close English-­speaking neighbour in the region. Aside the humanitarian catastrophe to Nigeria, the security, economic, political and social implications cannot be underestimated. It exacerbates the already existing insecurity in the country as it opens up another volatility in the eastern and delta regions of the country, where the security forces are also grappling with the menace of secessionist IPOB, and the Niger Delta militants respectively. The conflict in southern Cameroon opens up a serious diplomatic challenge between Cameroon and Nigeria because of the nature and character of conflict, especially with the shared ideological leanings of separatist groups in both countries, which have propelled the AGovC to forge an alliance with the IPOB. In the first four years of the armed conflict in Southern Cameroons, the belligerent forces have continued to escalate the violence. Consequently, in its efforts to ensure that the Republic of Cameroon remains one and indivisible (PRC, 2018), the Biya regime deployed all elements of state power at its disposal, including soliciting international cooperation especially bilateral cooperation with Nigeria, which shares land and maritime boundaries with the English-­speaking regions, in attempts to quell the armed struggle. The Southern Cameroons pro-­Ambazonia nationalists on the other hand stress their right to self-­determination after six decades of reunification with French Cameroon. While the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon introduced new tensions to bilateral relations with Nigeria, the dynamics of the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon has rather strengthened the thrust of diplomacy between both



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countries. Nigeria has clearly approached the situation strictly from a clear definition of her national interest priorities, which seem to be consistent with Cameroon’s interests. These interests include the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity, including both countries’ respective national assets. Consequently, while Nigeria continues to accommodate the influx of refugees from the conflict-­ravaged areas of former British Southern Cameroons into Nigeria, she works to ensure that the refugees do not use their asylum status to engage in subversive activities against the government of Cameroon, which has repeatedly insisted that the Republic of Cameroon is one and indivisible (PRC, 2018). The sustained rapprochement between both countries is therefore considered fundamental to boost the joint fight against Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin and affected border areas and evolve frameworks to strengthen the level of security cooperation within and beyond Africa. Yet Nigeria could consider shifting orientation in its support thrust to accommodate and play a leading role in resolving the conflict, bearing in mind the humanitarian consequences and a history of shared colonial experience with the suffering population for former British Southern Cameroons. This presupposes that Nigeria could explore some flexibility while not compromising its cherished diplomatic rapprochement with Cameroon as both countries engage mutual security threats confronting them. Given the strategic importance of peace in the Anglophone regions to crude oil industry and shipping, Nigeria could facilitate the utility of dialogue and mediated settlement of the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon, bearing in mind that more violence implies more humanitarian emergencies for the already displaced population. NOTES 1. Manyu Communique No. G38/C62/viii/373. (2017). Purportedly issued by Oum II Joseph, the Senior Divisional Officer (SDO) for Manyu Division, Southwest region of Cameroon on 1 December. 2.  As stated by Babagana Monguno, National Security Adviser of Nigeria, during the Opening Ceremony of Cameroon-Nigeria Transborder Security Meeting, February 2018. 3.  Information from an interview session with a Nigerian diplomat who preferred anonymity, held on 2 February 2017 at the Nigeria Consulate in Buea, Southwest region, Cameroon. 4.  Information obtained in May 2017 from a senior Cameroon military personnel in Abuja, Nigeria, who prefers to remain anonymous.

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Kindzeka, E. M. (2018). “Killings, kidnappings mar Cameroon National Day celebrations.” Voice of America. https://www​.voanews​.com/a/killings-­kidnappings​-­mar​-­ca meroon-­national-­day-­celebrations/4402248.html. McAulay, Willis R., J. N. Ndeunyema, and J. Angove. (2019). “Human rights abuses in the Cameroon Anglophone crisis.” http://ohrh​.law​.ox​.ac​.uk/wordpress/ wp​-­content/uploads/2019/11/Cameroon-­Anglophone-­Crisis-­Report-.pdf (accessed 30 November 2021). Mouahidi, K. (n.d.). “Cameroon issues international arrest warrant for 15 separatists.” https://medafricatimes​.com/14313-cameroon-­issues-­international-­arrest-­warrant​ -­for-15-separatists​.html (accessed 14 December 2021). Nanche, Billa Rober. (n.d.). “Protest march restrictions in Cameroon.” https://www​ .intechopen​.com/chapter/75454 (accessed 2 December 2021). Okereke, C Nna-­Emeka. (2018). “Analysing the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 10, no. 2 (March). https://www​.jstor​.org/ stable/26380430?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents (accessed 24 June 2021). Okereke C.Nna-­Emeka. (2019). “Nigeria and International Court of Justice judgement on disputed territories with Cameroon: Lessons for Nigeria.” In Bakut Tswah Bakut (ed.), Nigeria’s Peace Initiatives. Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. (2020). Submission at the expert panel on mediation and negotiation in armed conflict: perspectives and best practices at the virtual international conference on the armed conflict in Southern Cameroons conflict organised by the Coalition for Dialogue and Negotiation, 31 October. https://us02web​.zoom​ .us/j/84887119364. Organisation of African Unity. (1969). Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of States and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 10 September, otherwise referred to as OAU Convention on Refugees. Presidency of the Republic of Cameroon. (n.d.). “Secession in Cameroon: Nigeria says No.” https://www​.prc​.cm/en/news/audiences/2562-secession-­in-­cameroon​ -­nigeria-­says-­no (accessed 14 December 2021). Republic of Cameroon. (2018). “National Day 2018: One and indivisible.” President of the Republic of Cameroon. www​.prc​.cm (accessed 15 November 2021). Southern Cameroons National Council. (1994). https://artsandculture​ .google​.com/ entity/southern-­cameroons-­national-­council/m0287q_p?hl=en (accessed 2 December 2021). Tchoyi, A. (2017). “Anglophone marginalisation: Cold hard facts.” The Rambler 37. The Cable News. (2018). “Cameroon separatist leaders arrested in Abuja.” 7 January. https://www​.thecable​ ng/cameroon-­separatist-­leaders-­arrested-­abuja (accessed 14 December 2021). The Sun. (2021). “Self-­acclaimed Ambazonia leader denies association with Biafra,” 13 August. https://www​.sunnewsonline​.com/self-­acclaimed-­ambazonia-­leader​ -­denies-­association-­with-­ipob/ (accessed 10 December 2021)



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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2018). “Fleeing violence, Cameroonian refugee arrival in Nigeria pass 30,000.” https://www​ .unhcr​ .org/ news/briefing/2018/11/5be551224/fleeing-­violence-­cameroonianrefugee-­arrivals​ -­nigeria-­pass-30000 html (accessed 13 December 2021). United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (n.d.). “The principle of non-­refoulement under international human rights law.” https://www​.ohchr​ .org/Documents/Issues/Migration/GlobalCompactMigration/ThePrincipleNon-­Ref oulementUnderInternationalHumanRightsLaw​.pdf (accessed 14 December 2021). Vanguard. (2017). “UN bracing for 40,000 Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria,” 31 October. https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2017/10/un-­bracing-40000-cameroonian​ -­refugees-­nigeria/ (accessed 11 November 2021). Vanguard. (2018). “Nigeria will not be used to destabilise Cameroon—Buhari.” Vanguard, 12 February, https://www​.vanguardngr​.com/2018/02/nigeria-­ll-­not-­used​ -­destabilise-­cameroon-­buhari/ (accessed 13 December 2021). Yahaya, H. (2019). “Three Nigerian police officers, civilian missing eight months after Interpol assignment.” Premium Times, 3 May. https://www​.premiumtimesng​ .com/news/headlines/328309-three-­nigerian-­police-­officers-­civilian-­missing​-­eight -­months-­after-­interpol-­assignment​ html (accessed 14 December 2021). Yoroms, G. J. (2017). Debriefing on the World Study Tour, 2017, at the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College, Abuja, Nigeria, in May.

Chapter Seventeen

Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations Some Informed Projections C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke and Osita Agbu

INTRODUCTION Nigeria Against the backdrop of the preceding discourses on Cameroon-­ relations, which examined several dimensions of the subject matter, it is germane to conclude that although the relations between the two countries have sometimes been frosty, and problematic, there has emerged some significant rapprochement since the 10 October 2002 verdict of the International Court of Justice on their contentious boundary issues. This could be gleaned from the various contributions that covered the countries’ bilateral relations: historical affinity, border policies and border communities, the Nigerian Civil War and Southern Cameroon conflict, the Bakassi crisis and its aftermath, the refugee situation and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the declaration of the State of Ambazonia, smuggling at the border, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency activities, maritime domain awareness, foreign policies and their economic relations, the role of external actors, cross-­border banditry, human security issues, defence cooperation and the Good Neighbour Policy. Perhaps, the future can be better projected or imagined by our examining some of the issues in their bilateral relations from a prognostic perspective. It suffices to state that relations between the two countries have not only been characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust, as well as friction (Ate and Akinterinwa, 2002), but also mutual cooperation in tackling evolving security threats such as terrorism, insurgencies and secessionist tendencies, maritime threats and cross-­border crimes along their shared border areas. There is little doubt therefore that bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria have so far emerged as the most challenging for Nigeria, compared to her other contiguous neighbours. 315

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There is no gainsaying that the fragility of Nigeria’s domestic environment is a potential threat to the existence not just of Nigeria, but tangentially of Cameroon. As we know, Nigeria’s national security cannot be assured without peace, security and stability in its domain as well as in the neighbouring countries, which also includes Cameroon. Nigeria is as a matter of fact surrounded by Francophone countries often perceived as closely associated with France and the advancement of its geo-­political interests in the West African region; this constitutes a potential threat to Nigeria. Further, because of Nigeria’s fragility and fractured foundation, there is a perennial system threat to the stability of the country resulting from deep ethnic, political, social and religious cleavages. These to a reasonable extent are important determinants of the state of Nigeria-­Cameroon relations in the near future. As the Anglophone question in former British Southern Cameroons persists, Nigeria is confronted with the dilemma of how best to respond to the accompanying challenge without jeopardizing the authority in Cameroon. Abuja is also conscious not to jeopardize its fledgling bilateral relations with Cameroon and at the same time act in a manner that does not lead to renewed or new armed conflict between the two countries. This becomes imperative, bearing in mind that Nigeria is also confronted with domestic agitations for secession as perpetrated by the IPOB. IRRITANTS IN CAMEROON-­NIGERIA RELATIONS Among the several irritants in Nigeria-­Cameroon relations are the contestation over the control of the natural resources of the borderlands, fallout of the Bakassi territorial dispute, piracy, smuggling, the refugee crisis and internally displaced persons, banditry and transnational insecurities as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency and the secessionist bid of Anglophone Cameroon for the state of Ambazonia. So far, the bulwark standing against the total collapse of whatever is left of the Nigeria-­Cameroon rapprochement are the facts of geographical, ethnic and historical proximity that have served to prevent both countries from any long-­drawn-­out armed conflict (Funteh, 2015b, 30). This is because however separated both countries appear to be, their border communities fundamentally remain ethnically one people (Ate and Akinterinwa, 1992). It suffices to state the Nigeria-­Cameroon border is porous enough to allow the border inhabitants from both sides to engage in both traditional and non-­ traditional economic activities, including, indeed, smuggling which is thriving in the border areas (Kate, 1996). Often, socioeconomic activities of the border populations are carried out with little regard to the official boundaries. It is said that indigenes are able to evade both the gendarmes from Cameroon



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and police, customs and immigration officers from Nigeria, given that they are familiar with the terrain (Akinyemi, 2014, 14). As observed by Funteh (2011), smuggling, although a daily occurrence, is no longer an issue of concern for the border inhabitants as it has become an accepted strategy of survival for the people. It is claimed that state officials of both countries also benefit from the proceeds of the smuggling activities. Major items of smuggling from Nigeria include stolen vehicles, agricultural products, and drugs; while human trafficking and currency trafficking occur, and cotton and fish and other products are ferried into Nigeria (Funteh, 2015b). An important issue in Nigeria-­Cameroon relations is the secessionist bid for the creation of the state of Ambazonia. The remote background to this could be traced to the marginalization of the English-­speaking population of Cameroon by the central government, which had maintained a firm grip on almost all aspects of governance in a manner that constricted people’s freedom in the regions, especially in the Southwest and Northwest of the country. A fall-­out of this was the persistent development and infrastructural deficits experienced by the affected citizens. What could, however, be said to be the trigger that led to an upsurge in the tempo of the conflict to the extent of resorting to armed confrontation between the secessionists and the government arose in October 2016 with a protest by Anglophone Common Law Lawyers rejecting their maltreatment and discrimination in the country. Further, the Anglophone Teachers Trade Union joined the industrial action in November 2016 to register their resentment over the distortion of their preferred educational system. The official response from Yaoundé was largely perceived to be in the form of the crackdown on student demonstrators at the University of Buea in the Southwest region. The alleged arrest and torture of the students from across the Northwest and Southwest regions (including Nigerian students) formed one singular factor that strengthened the resistance of the Anglophone population against Paul Biya. This resistance was further strengthened following the December 2016 arrest of leaders of the resistance whom the government described as “extremist rioters.” In more recent times, the Anglophone populations have shifted their demands from a return to a two-­state formation to the demand for a sovereign state of Ambazonia (Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, 2017, 3). We note that while the populations of both the Northwest and Southwest of Cameroon is roughly three million people, the regions account for about 75 per cent of the industries in the country and are responsible for about 70 per cent of the gross domestic product. This basically means that about 22 million other Cameroonians are reliant on the resources of the three million for their economic survival (Akinyeye and Ojo, 2020, 21). This appears similar to the

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experience in Nigeria, where the bulk of the foreign exchange, about 70 per cent comes from the oil fields of the Niger Delta, to be distributed among 200 million others. No wonder that the volatility of the security situation persists in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. For Nigeria and with implications for Cameroon, the specific challenge of the Boko Haram insurgency is a serious threat to the country’s stability, more so if the conflict should continue in the form of guerrilla warfare on the side of Boko Haram. It may remain a long-­drawn-­out conflict with no end in sight. Already, the war is over 10 years old. Further, there is the other challenge to the authority of the Nigerian state by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), with the bulk of its youthful followership from the Southeast of Nigeria, which as an organized body accused by the Nigerian state as structured and governed to be the organizer of marginalization of the peoples of the south eastern states from the governance structures and economic opportunities in the country. Should the Nigerian state not decisively address the clamour for secession from IPOB and other multifarious groups from the South-­South and south west zones of the country, and there is an eventual resort to guerrilla activities or warfare, the implications will be far-­reaching not just for Nigeria, but also for her neighbours like Cameroon and the Republic of Benin. Indeed, while many in and out of government in Nigeria express understanding of the plight of the peoples of Anglophone Cameroon, a major drawback to openly supporting the rebellion are the implications for Nigeria’s own stability as a result of the activities of IPOB that have openly challenged the authority of the Nigerian state, albeit in a peaceful manner, before this gradually degenerated to armed confrontations due to the highhandedness of the Nigerian leadership and security services. We note that besides Boko Haram and IPOB, there are other multifarious challenges to the authority of the Nigerian state in the Middle belt, South-­ South, especially in the Niger Delta, spearheaded by the ethnic militias and more recently, in the Southwest with calls for the formation of an Oduduwa Republic to represent the Yoruba peoples of the Southwest. That Nigeria is indeed an artificial contraption that has not been well managed is not far from the truth, with multiple incidents of unexplained killings of individuals and communities, as well as kidnappings and armed robbery. This situation is further complicated by the herder-­farmer conflict bedevilling the country from north to south. Instructive for Nigerian stakeholders and African countries with colonial experience has been the very loud silence of Nigeria’s colonial master, Britain, which was instrumental to the evolution of the dysfunctional structure that Nigeria is. Her silence is nothing but criminal, notwithstanding that by now Nigerians should have learnt how to organize and govern themselves equitably.



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However, a subsisting issue not yet conclusively addressed is the plight of the Nigerian inhabitants of the Bakassi Peninsula that were given the not-­too-­palatable option of either remaining in their traditional abode as Cameroonians or relocation to mainland Nigeria. They had pleaded to no avail that they had the right to decide where they wanted to be and to the right of self-­determination. Their disapproval of how they had been treated by the Cameroonian and Nigerian authorities, as well as the United Nations, later found expression in increased piracy in the waterways and low-­intensity rebellion in the area. Indeed, in July 2016, the Bakassi Movement for Self-­ Determination (BMSD) joined with the Southern Cameroons Peoples Organization (SCAPO) and the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in declaring the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Bakassi, an unsuccessful attempt at founding a new nation. They re-­declared the independence of Bakassi in 2008 after the Nigerian Senate ruled the handover and transfer of sovereignty of the peninsula to Cameroon as illegal. BMSD declared that it would subsume all its activities under the joint leadership of MEND, while the secessionist SCAPO movement had a different plan that included Bakassi and the Southern Cameroons in the design for a secessionist Republic of Ambazonia (Funteh, 2015a, 227). Many Nigerians that agreed to relocate to “New Bakassi,” some 30km inside Nigeria, got there only to discover that the area had no water body that would enable them engage in their traditional occupation of fishing, and living conditions were inadequate. Many resorted to farming with little success. The grievance continues. TOWARDS STRONGER CAMEROON-­ NIGERIA RELATIONS: KEY PRIORITIES So far, indications abound that demonstrate the existence and preference for good neighbourliness in the conduct of Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. This is not unconnected to the avowed preparedness of the political leadership of both countries to first explore peaceful avenues for tackling potential and manifest sources of diplomatic tensions between them. This has manifested in several ways through the use of very high-­level exchanges of visits and other platforms such as the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission and the utility of the Trans-­border Security Meetings that accompanied the signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-­border Security Committee between the government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the government of the Republic of Cameroon in February 2012. Apparently, President

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Biya, who has been in power in Cameroon since 1982, sustained the diplomatic channels adopted by his predecessor, Ahmadou Ahidjo. In the realm of economic realities, the achievements of the CNMC portend advantages which could be exploited to boost economic interactions between the countries. This array of economic opportunities has been widened with the development of critical infrastructure like telecommunication agreement, transfer of electricity projects through the Lagdo Dam and construction of vital link bridges that facilitate cross-­border movement of persons and goods where appropriate. The construction of the Enugu-­ Ikom-­ Bamenda road, which links West Africa with Central Africa under the trans-­African superhighway, has significantly reduced time, by more than 20 hours, and stress experienced by commuters in transit between the two. In the bid to facilitate international trade between both countries, the government of Nigeria under President Buhari embarked on the construction of the 1.5-km Mfum/ Bamenda bridge and the 1.2-km Ikom bridge linking Nigeria and Cameroon in Cross River State (Ochayi and Una, 2021). Socially, both countries have cultivated long-­lasting cultural linkages that have continued till date. It is important to note that students from English-­ speaking Southwest and Northwest Cameroon have been attending school in Nigeria for decades. Likewise, a significant proportion of Nigerian students living in Cameroon attend publicly owned primary, secondary and tertiary institutions. In addition, the Nigerian Law School has been providing Common Law education for law graduates of Cameroon nationality, and this has contributed to building social and professional bonds among the population of both countries. Such educational orientations remain useful for fostering friendship between nationals of both countries and for projecting Pan-­African aspirations. Bearing in mind the security challenges and acts of criminality along their shared border areas at land and sea, there exists a need for cooperation in legal matters such as extradition. Nigeria and Cameroon could also work towards enacting mutual legal codes on punishment for similar offences to discourage criminal element from taking advantage of perceived favourable discrepancies in terms of punishment to perpetrate cross-­border crimes. Similarly, succeeding political leaders in Nigeria have also pursued the principle of good neighbourliness with Nigeria’s contiguous neighbours as encapsulated within the country’s concentric circle doctrine. This presupposes that for Nigeria and Cameroon to sustain the gains of existing positive bilateralism, both countries need to groom corps of strategic leaders within the policy and intellectual cycles that attach a high premium to good neighbourliness. Failure to encourage and sustain such initiative could be detrimental for healthy bilateral relations between both countries.



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In the sphere of military activities, the existing collaboration between Nigerian and Cameroonian armed forces in countering the Boko Haram and security threats in their maritime domain holds positive prospects for evolving nonaggression pacts between the countries. The prospect of evolving nonaggression pact is further enhanced by the existing training partnerships for strategic-­ level officers in military academies at Abuja and Yaoundé. Consequently, the current exchange of participants for strategic-­level courses at National Defence College, Nigeria, and Cameroon’s Ecole Supérieure Internationale de Guerre (ESIG) in Yaoundé should be sustained and complemented beyond military spheres. It can be concluded that effective cooperation between Nigeria and Cameroon, which are major actors in ECOWAS and ECCAS respectively holds bright prospects for trans-­regional integration and the larger Pan-­African aspiration of integration and development in the continent. The place of functional cooperation along political, social, economic and technological spheres towards the quest for integration, security and development in Africa is reflected in the thrust of Cameroon-­Nigeria bilateral relations, which multilateral institutions like the LCBC and the GGC have fostered. It is therefore anticipated that sustained rapprochement between Cameroon and Nigeria constitutes another vital building block for continental integration in Africa. It is, however, important to note that for Cameroon and Nigeria to sustain the growing rapprochement and help foster Pan-­African aspiration of continental integration effectively, both countries need sustained peace and political stability, which have eluded them since the second decade of the 21st century. This requires conscious efforts at addressing deep-­rooted political grievances that stimulate centrifugal tensions and overt violence. The Anglophone question in Cameroon and the Biafra agitations in Nigeria, which are both targeted at secession, are glaring examples of such centrifugal issues that not only threaten national security but also frustrate the quest for continental integration. CONCLUSION In concluding, what needs to be said is that Nigeria as a country has oftentimes been predisposed to engaging in mutually beneficial bilateral relations with her immediate neighbours in the spirit of good neighbourliness. Nigeria’s foreign policy, as avowed at independence, has always been Africa centred, and this played a significant role in Nigeria’s acceptance of the decisions of the ICJ with respect to the Bakassi conflict. Indeed, for Nigeria, cross-­border security encapsulates the safety of not just territories but also the populations as well

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as the policies that are adopted for the preservation of peace and security (Akindele and Akinterinwa, 2011). Against this backdrop, Nigeria’s efforts at cooperation, not conflict, with her immediate neighbours have resulted in the formation of liberal commissions with all, including Cameroon. For Cameroon, the troubles in Nigeria do have the tendency to spill over into Cameroon. Already, it is said that some Nigerians, especially from the Niger Delta serve as mercenaries on the side of the Ambazonian secessionists in Cameroon. Participating in this conflict will further sharpen their martial skills and experience. On the other hand, Nigeria has taken steps to repatriate the key leadership of the Cameroonian dissidents who had sought asylum in Nigeria. It is to be noted that Cameroon was on the side of Nigeria during the Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970); perhaps this is why the Nigerian government has not given a listening ear or tolerated the overtures of the leadership of the secessionist movement in Cameroon. This notwithstanding, it is equally necessary for Nigeria to realize that it is plausible that Ambazonia could become a reality in the near future. What will be Nigeria’s faith? An overt demonstration of support for Cameroon as presently constituted embodies the risk of Nigeria having a hostile neighbour (Akinyeye and Ojo, 2020, 21). The situation therefore calls for astute diplomacy. However, it should be understood that, indeed, human rights issues exist in Cameroon that have made a part of its citizenry disenchanted, marginalized and now recalcitrant to the extent of engaging in secession. We have heard stories of how human rights abuses by the Cameroonian gendarmes and marginalization of Anglophones in the public school system in Cameroon made it imperative for many of the youth to leave the country to study abroad, with many in Nigeria found at the Universities of Calabar and Benin and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. Further, beginning in the 1940s, Southern Cameroonians made their way to Nigeria to benefit from the political, economic and social opportunities available. They came as students, teachers, journalists, petty traders, businessmen or employees in Nigerian institutions and/or firms (Funteh, 2015b, 39). However, despite the various irritants in relations between Nigeria and Cameroon, both countries have realized that any conflict of an armed nature will not be in their best interest. This position has further been strengthened since the rapprochement achieved with the verdict of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on land and maritime boundaries between them. In addition, both countries are cooperating in recent times with other countries under the Lake Chad Basin Commission–driven Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the joint war against Boko Haram/Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP). These spheres of collaboration have contributed to strengthening bilateral relations between both countries and further provide



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clear insights into the benefits of good neighbourliness. Therefore, beginning with the formation of the Cameroon-­Nigeria Mixed Commission on 15 November 2002 at Geneva as a fallout of diplomatic efforts at resolving the Bakassi dispute, as well as the Greentree Agreement articulated on 12 June 2006 when the two parties met at the Greentree Estate in Manhasset, New York, it could be argued that there is the potential for redeeming Nigeria-­ Cameroon relations and moving them forward. LOOKING AHEAD Drawing from the trends and dynamics in Cameroon-­Nigeria relations, the future of bilateral relations between the countries remains promising despite the evolving domestic and external threats. This is demonstrated by the capacity of both governments to convert the threats to new opportunities for strengthened diplomatic cooperation, especially as it concerns the Boko Haram/ISWAP threat and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea along their shared border areas. There has been increasing capacity of the militaries of both countries to engage in joint operations in the Lake Chad Basin area under the Multinational Joint Task Force as well as the capabilities of their navies to participate in joint exercises such as OBANGAME Express in the maritime domain. These collaborations have strengthened their respective operational effectiveness and further opened conversations on the possibilities for joint patrols along other common border areas to check existing, emerging and imagined threats to their security. The economic advantages of good neighbourliness between both countries will increase significantly in view of the provision of basic infrastructures such as telecommunications facilities, new roads and bridges that boost trade and commerce. It is further anticipated that both countries will also leverage the prospects of the Africa Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement to foster cross-­border economic activities. As Cameroon and Nigeria are mutually confronted by secessionist tendencies, the quest for the preservation of their respective sovereignty and territorial integrity presupposes closer ties to intercept and neutralize the activities of separatist groups within their respective domestic milieu. Goodwill has been demonstrated by Nigeria since January 2018 through the arrest of some Southern Cameroons pro-­Ambazonia nationalists in Abuja and Calabar who were later transferred to Cameroon for prosecution: a measure of solidarity which Cameroon appreciates. It is therefore anticipated that Cameroon will reciprocate this gesture when the need arises, bearing in mind that Nigeria is also confronted with active separatist agitations and related violence.

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The welfare of nationals in both countries constitutes another matter of concern in analysing Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. This is because both countries play host to each other’s nationals who are actively engaged in their legitimate businesses, including education. Similarly, as domestic conflicts erupt in each country, there have been cross-­border movements from refugees fleeing from conflict-­ravaged communities. The accompanying dynamics associated with the management of refugees have opened new frontiers of concerns in considering Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. The issue of citizens’ welfare constitutes the significant strand of Nigeria’s doctrine of citizen diplomacy, which attaches a high premium to the well-­being of her citizens in diaspora as a core objective of foreign policy. It is therefore anticipated that the thrust of Nigeria relations with Cameroon will significantly be influenced in the near future by how the government protects the safety and welfare of her nationals in Cameroon. The role of extra-­continental powers such as France and China is another core determinant of bilateral relations between Cameroon and Nigeria. For instance, France was Cameroon’s erstwhile colonial power and still possesses significant political and economic interest in the country. France is also known to have special economic and military pacts with Cameroon, which could have implications for Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. On its part, China is a new entrant into Cameroon’s economic corridor and has granted enormous loan facilities to Cameroons. As an economic giant in the world with enormous trade and military capabilities, China’s trade interest in Cameroon could constitute hindrance to trade relations between Cameroon and Nigeria, which is core to fostering stronger bilateral relations between both countries. REFERENCES Akindele, Rafiu, A., and Bola A. Akinterinwa. (2001), Cross Border Security, Cooperation and Integration: Focus on Nigeria’s Immediate Neighbours in the North West Zone. Lagos: NIIA. Akinyemi, O. (2014). “Borders in Nigeria’s relations with Cameroon.” Journal of Arts and Humanities (IAH) 3 no. 9, 13–20. Akinyeye, O. A., and Samuel Onochie Ojo. (2020). The Colonial History of Cameroon: A Background to the Understanding of its Current Crisis and Lessons for Nigeria. Paper presented at a roundtable held at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos, 27 February. Ate, Bassey E., and B. Akinterinwa. (1992). Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-­regional Security in the 1990s. Lagos: NIIA and Pumark Nig. Ltd.



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Centre for Strategic Research and Studies. (2017). Concept Note for the Conduct of Foreign Policy and National Security. Abuja: NDC. Funteh, Bolak Mark. (2011). “Cameroon-Nigeria dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula: A specimen of collective resolution dynamics.” In Daniel Abwa, Albert Fomin Temgoua, and Ngwa Willibroad Dze (eds.), Boundary and History of Africa: Issues in Conventional Boundaries and Ideological Frontiers, Studies in Honour of Verkijika G. Afanso. Bamenda: Langaa RPCIG. Funteh, Bolak Mark. (2015a). “The concept of boundary and indigenous application in Africa: The case of Bakassi border lines of Cameroon and Nigeria.” International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies 1 no. 4, 220–237. Funteh, Bolak Mark. (2015b). “The paradox of Cameroon-­Nigeria interactions: Connecting between the edges of opportunity/benefit and quandary.” International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 6 no. 3, 30–48. Kate, M. (1996). “Informal integration or economic subversion? The development and organization of parallel trade in West Africa.” In R. Lavergne (ed.), Regional Integration in West Africa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ochayi, Chris, and Emma Una. (2021). “Fashola inspects Mfum, Ikom bridges, declares both boost international trade.” Vanguard, 26 July. https://www​ .van​ guard​ngr​.com/2021/07/fashola-­inspects-­mfum-­ikom-­bridges-­declares-­both​-­boosts​ -­to-­international-­trade/ (accessed 19 December 2021).

Chapter Eighteen

Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations A Select Annotated Bibliography Pamela Ogwuazor Momah

INTRODUCTION The Republic of Cameroon is located in Central Africa. Nigeria is its western neighbour and both countries share about 1,800km of contiguous border running from the Lake Chad Basin in the north to the Atlantic Ocean in the south. Cameroon also shares borders with Chad in the northeast and with the Central African Republic in the east, while to the south the country is surrounded by Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo. It is not a member of ECOWAS but has a lot of ties with ECOWAS and is geographically located in West Africa. After World War I, Germany was dispossessed of her colonies in Africa, and they were handed over to France and Britain as mandated territories of the League of Nations. The United Nations inherited colonial assets of the League. Consequently, French- and British-­administered Cameroon became Trustee Territories of the United Nations. On 1 January 1960, French Cameroon gained independence from France, and President Ahmadou Ahidjo emerged as the first President of the newly independent Republic of Cameroon. The United Nations organized a plebiscite to decide the future of British-­administered Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons in February 1961. Whereas northern Cameroons voted in favour of remaining with Nigeria, the population of Southern Cameroons voted in favour of reunion with the Republic of Cameroon, which was, prior to independence, administered by France as a Trustee Territory of the United Nations. Following the outcome of a vote in the UN General Assembly, British Southern Cameroons gained independence from Nigeria to form a federation with the Republic of Cameroun on 1 October 1961. 327

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Due to the unclear demarcation of the land and maritime boundaries between Nigeria and Cameroon, both countries were for decades engaged in contentious border disputes along the shared border areas, especially over the Bakassi Peninsula, which is rich in oil, gas, and aquatic resources. On 10 October 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on the boundary case between Cameroon and Nigeria, leading to a redefinition of some territories, in which the ownership of the Bakassi Peninsula was given to the Republic of Cameroon. This verdict opened a new thrust of diplomatic relations between both countries. The evolving trends in Nigeria-­Cameroon diplomatic relations have been influenced by emerging security challenges associated with separatist struggles, dynamics of piracy and terrorism, health concerns and environmental issues. In 2016, what began as peaceful agitations and industrial actions by aggrieved lawyers and teachers in the two English-­speaking regions of Cameroon attracted official repressions by security agencies, and the inability of Cameroon authorities to amicably contain the escalating tensions sparked off armed resistance by separatist groups now fighting for an independent State of Ambazonia for former British Southern Cameroons. Official concerns over the presumed alliance between Ambazonia separatist and pro-­Biafra groups, especially the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), which seeks the actualization of a sovereign state of Biafra has emerged as another sphere of concerns for both countries. This bibliography has brought together various works from experts on Nigeria-­Cameroon relations from books, journals, websites, newspapers, and magazines. These works provide additional reading materials for those who are working on the subject matter and would make use of this book. It also provides more insightful literature spanning topics such as historical ties, economic and trade relations, border issues, the Bakassi question, the Green Tree Agreement, insurgency, Boko Haram, foreign policy, politics, defence cooperation, and the question of good neighbourliness between Nigeria and Cameroon, to mention a few. The bibliography is arranged alphabetically by the name of the author, and spans the independence years to the present time. CAMEROON-­NIGERIA BIBLIOGRAPHY Ada, Egbufor. “The Bakassi Peninsula Issue.” Daily Times, 23 October 2002, 11. The article says that the bad news about the ICJ’s ruling is that there is no appeal; neither does it have any binding effect on any party unless the parties avail themselves of it.



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Ada, P., and Mbida Mbida, R. “International organizations as shields in Cameroon foreign policy,” in African Foreign Policies in International Institutions Warner, edited by J. Warner and T. Shaw, 354–370. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. Adeniyi, Olusegun. “Africa and International Law: Succession to Treaties Re-­ visited,” in International Law and Politics: An African Perspective, by Akin Oyebode. Lagos: Bolabay Publications, 2003. Looks at issues that surround African States in respect to succession of treaties, especially their pre-­independence treaties and agreements. Adigbuo Ebere, Richard. “Role of Conflicts in Foreign Policy: Nigeria’s Dilemma over Bakassi Peninsula,” in History Unlimited: Essays in Honour of Professor Abednego Ekoko, edited by Leo Otoide, 371–396. Lagos: Mindex, 2012. Afaha, Philips. “Inter-­state Boundary Conflicts between Akwa Ibom and Cross River States: Matters Arising,” in History Unlimited: Essays in Honour of Professor Abednego Ekoko, edited by Leo, Otoide. 411–434. Lagos: Mindex, 2012. Afe, Babalola. “Bakassi Peninsula, Before and After Judgement of the International Court of Justice.” Nigerian Tribune, 10 September 2012, 19. The article agitates for recourse to the UN Security Council redemption. Agbu, Osita and Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. “The Future of Nigeria-­Cameroon Relations,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Aghemela, A.T. and Ibehasebhor, S. “Colonialism, Source of Boundary Dispute and Conflict among Africans—The World Court Judgment on the Bakassi Peninsula: Implications for Nigeria.” Journal of Social Science, no. 3 (2006): 180. Agwu, Fred Aja. National Interest, International Law and Our Shared Destiny. Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2009. Whenever there is a challenge to the status quo in territorial matters, the response is to demonstrate firmness, rather than make concessions. Ahmed, Mohammad, Bose E. “Nigeria and Her Neighbours Securing Peaceful Co-­ Prosperity through Effective and Border Management,” in History Unlimited: Essays in Honour of Professor Abednego, Ekoko, edited by Leo Otoide, 397–410. Lagos: Mindex, 2012. Akindoju, Adeola. “Nigeria-­Cameroon Bilateral Economic Relations,” in CameroonNigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­ Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Akinterinwa, Bola. “Bakassi: ICJ Ruling and Dissenting Opinions.” ThisDay, 21 October 2002, 14. The article wonders why the ICJ is against the principle of effective occupation. A closer look at the provisions of the 1913 agreement, as well as the dissenting view of some of the ICJ judges, shows that the verdict was political and not legal. Akinyemi, A. Bolaji. “Lead Us Not into Temptation.” Remarks by Professor. A. Bolaji Akinyemi, CFR, at the 12th NIIA Brainstorming Session on the Bakassi Peninsula at NIIA. Lagos, 23 August, 2012. Sees the crisis brewing over the Bakassi Peninsula as having the potential of becoming a “Nigerian-­Cameroun Kashmir.” Akinyemi, O. “Borders in Nigeria’s Relations with Cameroon.” Journal of Arts and Humanities 3, no. 9 (2014): 13–19.

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Amaazee, V.B. “The ‘Igbo Scare’ in the British Cameroons, c. 1945–6.” Journal of African History 31, no. 2 (1990): 281–93. Amazee, V. “Nigeria/Cameroon: Blundering into Battle.” Africa Confidential 35, no. 8, (16 April 1994): 6. The article wonders why the dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon had to degenerate into a war. Amazee, V. “The Role of the French Cameroonians in the Unification of Cameroon, 1916–1961.” Transafrica Journal of History 23 (1994): 195–234. The article discusses the role of the French Cameroonians in the unification of Cameroon. Amin, Julius A. “Cameroon’s Relations toward Nigeria: A Foreign Policy of Pragmatism.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 58, no. 1 (2020): 1–22. This study argues that Cameroon’s foreign policy was neither timid nor makeshift. Its strategy was one of pragmatism. By examining the nation’s policy toward Nigeria in the reunification of Cameroon, the Nigerian Civil War, the Bakassi Peninsula crisis and Boko Haram, the study maintains that, while the nation’s policy was cautious, its leaders focused on the objectives and as a result scored major victories. Aning, K., Abdallah, M. and Aubyn, F. “Responding to Boko Haram: Interrogating the Effectiveness of State and Regional Intervention Approaches,” in Understanding Boko Haram: Terrorism and Insurgency in Africa, edited by J.I. Hentz and H. Solomon, 237–54. New York: Routledge, 2017. Anyangwe, Carlson. “Question Concerning the Nationality of the People of Ambazonia: A Critical Inquiry.” Theory and Event 23, no. 2 (April 2020): 352–380. Over the past forty years, even high Cameroonian government officials have repeatedly declared publicly, without reproach from any quarter, that Ambazonians should go back to where they came from; that they are enemies within Cameroon; that they are Nigerians; that they are Biafrans; that they are apatrides (stateless); that they are “les gens abandonnés par les Anglais” (people abandoned by the English); and that they are Anglofools (dummies). Anyu, J. Ndumbe. “The International Court of Justice and Border-­Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Bakassi Peninsula Conflict.” Mediterranean Quarterly 18, no. 3 (2007): 39–55. The dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula is a unique case, reflective of both the colonial heritage and the modern thirst for oil. At the same time, Bakassi emerges as an example of conflict resolution through the rule of law and without resort to arms. Asiwaju, A. I. Partitioned Africa: Ethnic Relations across Africa’s International Boundaries, 1884–1984. Lagos: University of Lagos Press, 1984. Asuquo, Mike. “Gowon Didn’t Cede Land to Cameroun, Says Okoi Arikpo.” Guardian, 22 March 1990, 90. Ate, Bassey E. “Nigeria and Cameroon,” in Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-­regional Security in the 1990s, edited by B.E. Ate and B.A. Akinterinwa. Lagos: NIIA and Pumark Nig. Ltd, 1992. Takes a look at the boundary dispute between Nigeria and the Cameroun Republic arising from their long but ill-­fated border (1,680 kilometres or 1,050 miles), which is of colonial origin. Ate, E., and Akinterinwa, B. Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-­Regional Security in the 1990’s. Lagos: NIIA and Pumark Nig.



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Ltd, 1992. Looks at Nigeria’s immediate neighbours and the consequences of having such neighbours. Azimazi, Momoh, J. “Ajibola: How ICJ Went Wrong on Bakassi.” The Comet,17 October 2002, 1. Prince Bola Ajibola, one of judges at the Bakassi case, said the ICJ should have considered three sentences of paragraph 63 of its judgement in the frontier dispute between Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali before ceding the Bakassi Peninsula. Babatola, J.E.T. “Nigerian-­ Cameroon boundary Dispute: The Quest for Bakassi Peninsula.” International Affairs and Global Strategy (2012). This paper appraises African boundary politics within the theme of boundary conflicts, questions after independence—irredentism, the concern and intervention of OAU/AU and the international bodies. Babatunde, Felix Obamamoye. “Insurgency and Nigeria’s Relations with Her Immediate Neighbours in the Twenty-­first Century.” Jadavpur Journal of International Relations 20, no. 2 (2016): 157–177. This article interrogates the rise of insurgency in Nigeria and its influence on Nigeria’s relations with her immediate neighbours. The article argues that the insurgent uprising reinvigorates rapprochement between Nigeria and the nearby states. It concludes that cooperation in this context for national security is inexorable for mutual survival. Bahri-­Domon, Y. “Paul Biya Resolves to Eradicate Boko-­Haram: All United.” Business in Cameroon (2015): 25. Baye, F. “Implications of the Bakassi Conflict Resolution for Cameroon.” African Journal on Conflict Resolution 10, no. 1 (2010). This paper sketches a conceptual framework of international conflict dynamics and resolution, examines the geopolitics of the Bakassi dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, and outlines socio-­ economic implications of its peaceful settlement. Bekker, P. “Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria; Equatorial Guinea Intervening).” American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 (2003): 387–398. Discusses conventional and maritime boundary-­ colonial arrangement establishing conventional title. Bola, Akinterinwa. “Nigeria and Cross-­Border Armed Banditry.” ThisDay, the Sunday Newspaper, 14 November 1999, 26. The article says that France has always tried to maintain a balance in her relationship with Nigeria on one hand and Nigeria’s immediate francophone neighbours who are militarily weak. Campbell, John. “Refugees from Anglophone Cameroon Enter Nigeria, Straining Relations.” Africa in Transition and Africa Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, 11 October 2018. Cameroonian officials went as far as accusing Nigeria of sheltering separatist groups, though Nigeria vehemently denied such allegations. Tensions peaked after the Cameroonian military crossed into Nigeria while pursuing rebels without permission from the Nigerian government in December 2017. Dakas, C.J. Dakas. “Bakassi: Nursing the Wounds of Our Colonial Past.” ThisDay, 5 November 2002, 42. This article is of the opinion that a plebiscite would be the most appropriate thing for the inhabitants of the disputed area.

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Daniel, Kolawole. “ICJ Judgment: Can the House of Representative Save Bakassi People.” Nigerian Tribune, 4 September 2012. The Bakassi people are insisting on having a United Nations supervised plebiscite where they will exercise their right to self-­determination, which is an inalienable right provided for in article 1 of the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, General Assembly Resolution, 2004. Ede, Oscar B. “The Nigerian-­Cameroun Boundaries.” Nigeria Forum 1, no. 7–8 (September/October 1981): 292–300. Looks at Nigeria’s five International borders and concludes that Nigeria’s border with Cameroun has posed the most problems. Edem, Edem. “Bakassi: Cameroun Violates Major Provision of Green Tree Agreement.” Leadership 8, no. 22 (2012). The changing of names of Nigerian communities to those of Cameroon, constant harassment of Nigerians and imposition of heavy taxes and levies all go contrary to the terms of the Green Tree Agreement. Edung, Mike T.U. “The Culturo-­Linguistic Factor as a Facilitator of Peace in Present-­ Day Nigeria-­Cameroun Border Relations.” Journal of Language and Communication 2, no. 2 (2015): 50–64. This paper submits that the cultural-­linguistic affinities between the peoples across the border could be exploited to facilitate peace. Edward, Dickson. “Nigeria Rejects Biya’s Request.” The Punch, 11 March 1994, 1. Nigeria has rejected President Paul Biya’s request that Nigeria should withdraw its troops from the Bakassi Peninsula before he could meet with General Sani Abacha in Maiduguri. The meeting is scheduled to resolve the matter peacefully. Ekaney, N. “The ICJ Decision on the Cameroon-­Nigeria Bakassi Dispute and Issues Arising: A Cameroonian Perspective,” in The Bakassi Dispute and the International Court of Justice, edited by E.E. Egede and M.O. Igiehon, 58–79. London: Routledge, 2017. Eke, U.E., and Eke, O.A. The Truth about Bakassi Peninsula and the Dynamics of Nigeria’s External Relations. Abakaliki: Willyrose & Appleseed Publishing, 2007. Ekpenyong, Jonathan. “Nigeria’s Unguarded Boundaries.” Nigerian Forum 1, no. 7–8 (September/October 1981): 270–291. Takes a look at Nigeria’s boundaries with its West African neighbours and the enormity of the problem of patrolling these boundaries. Emeka, Madunagu. “Bakassi People Threaten Secession.” The Punch, 19 October 2002, 1. Article 61 (1) of the ICJ, recognizes the right of an unsatisfied party to seek revision of its verdict, but that can only be done when new facts which were not there when the judgment was given are produced. Enabulele, A.A. “Implementation of Treaties,” in “Nigeria and the Status Question: Whither Nigerian Courts?” African Journal of International and Comparative Law 17, no. 2 (September 2009): 326–341. Etta, Raphael. Border Policies and Border Communities in Post-­Independence Nigeria and Cameroon: The Ejagham Communities in Perspective, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Ezeogo, Elege Williams. “Lessons from Bakassi.” ThisDay, 27 October 2002, 6. Article says that the whole of Bakassi for all practical purposes was regarded as Nigerian territory, was incontrovertible before 1975 and unchallenged until 1981.



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What led to Nigeria’s present receding control appears to be due to the irresponsibility of state and national amnesia. Familugba, J., and Ojo, O. “Nigeria-­Cameroon Border Relations: An Analysis of the Conflict and Cooperation (1970–2004).” International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 3, no. 11 (2013): 181–186. Takes a look at the Nigeria-­Cameroon border conflicts over thirty years. Fawole, W.A. “Militaries, Militias and Mullah: National Security Issues in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,” in Gulliver’s Troubles: Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Abdul Raufu Mustapha. Scottsville: University of Kwazulu-­Natal Press. 2008. Briefly assesses six case studies of some of the most important national security issues. The Bakassi dispute, Nigeria/Chad border clash, Libya’s presence in Chad, South Africa’s presence in Equatorial Guinea. Fombo, Greg Fah. “Territoriality; Cabotage and the Cameroun-­Nigeria Bakassi Conflict.” Africa Strategic Review 2, no. 2 (April/May 2011). Fombo, Greg Fah. “Imperial Antecedent of Cameroon-­Nigeria Border Conflict.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1 (April 2008). Fonchingong, Tangie. “The Quest for Autonomy: The Case of Anglophone Cameroon.” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 7, no. 5 (2013): 224–236. Another group of activists has emerged with a third objective. The group does not have a name, but its members claim to represent what they refer to as “United Nations Organisation (UNO) State of Cameroon” and are requesting the UNO to cede to them the former British Trust Territories of the Northern and Southern Cameroons (Vanguard 4 February 2010). This group is inspired by a clause contained in the so-­called Green Tree Accord signed by Nigeria and Cameroon in the aftermath of the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) ruling on the Bakassi crisis between the two countries. Fonkeng, Primus. “Foreign Policy Options for Social-­Cultural and Economic Developments in Nigeria and Cameroon 1960–1992,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Frizell, S. “West African Leaders Agree on Plan to ‘Crush’ Boko Haram,” Time, 17 May 2014. Funke, Aboyade. “Bakassi: Legal Options for Nigeria.” This Day, 3 December 2002, 34. The state Attorney-­General for Cross River State, Nella Andem, discusses legal options for Nigeria. Funteh, M.B. “The Paradox of Cameroon-­Nigeria Interactions: Connecting between the Edges of Opportunity/Benefit and Quandary.” International Journal of Peace and Development Studies 6, no. 3 (2015): 30–48. This paper, based on written data, argues that the geographical and historical proximity—and therefore interdependence between Cameroon and Nigeria—has been beneficial for both countries and has reinforced their willingness to work together in seeking lasting solutions for their conflicts and the growing trans-­border insecurity threats. Funteh, M.B. “The Concept of Boundary and Indigenous Application in Africa: The Case of the Bakassi Border Lines of Cameroon and Nigeria.” International Journal of Humanities and Cultural Studies 1, no. 4 (2015): 220–236.

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Gbolahan, Gbadamosi. “Government Allots Bakassi to Cross River.” Guardian, 15 December 1999, 3. The boundary tussle between Cross River and Akwa Ibom has come to an end as the government has allotted the entire Bakassi to Cross River State. Gbolahan, Gbadamosi. “Bakassi: Court Accepts Nigeria’s Claim against Cameroun.” Guardian, 6 July 1999, 79. Nigeria’s counter-­claim to Cameroon’s on the Bakassi Peninsula has been accepted by the ICJ, which has ordered both countries to submit their final positions on the boundary dispute by 4 January 2001. Ichite, Christian. “Lagdo Dam, Environmental Governance and Human Security between Nigeria and Cameroon,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. “ICJ Ruling and the Maritime Security Implications for Nigeria’s South East.” Paper presented by Associate Professor Charles Dokubo at the 12th Brainstorming Session on Bakassi at the NIIA: Lagos, 23 August 2012. “ICJ Ruling and the Status of the Green Tree Agreement.” Paper presented by Professor Akin Oyebode at the 12th Brainstorming Session on the Bakassi Peninsula. NIIA, Lagos, 23 August 2012. “ICJ: The Rulings That Never Were.” Paper presented by Associate Professor Fred Agwu, at 12th Brainstorming Session on the Bakassi Peninsula. NIIA, Lagos, 23 August 2012. Igho, Alex. “Bakassi: Two Discordant Notes.” Guardian, 12 October 2002, 18. Says that the two dissenting opinions on the Bakassi dispute have coloured the verdict as a miscarriage of justice, which portends grave danger for peace and security in the region. Ikelegbe, Onovughe. “Peaceful Co-­Existence and Sustainable Border Development between Nigeria and Her Contiguous Neighbours,” in History Unlimited: Essays in Honour of Professor Abednego Ekoko, edited by Leo, Otoide, 435–454. Lagos: Mindex, 2012. Ikome, Francis Nguendi. “The Inviolability of Africa’s Colonial Boundaries: Lessons from Cameroun-­Nigeria Border Conflict.” Occasional paper no. 47, Institute of Global Dialogue. Johannesburg, South Africa, November 2004. “Impact of Human Rights Abuses on National Security: The Case of the Bakassi Peninsula.” Paper presented by Conel Tony Nyiam and Dr Bassey Ekpo Okon, at NIIA: Lagos, 23 August 2012. International Crisis Group. 2016. “Cameroon: Confronting Boko Haram,” 2016. https://www​.crisisgroup​.org/africa/central-­africa/cameroon/cameroon-­confronting-­ boko-­haram, accessed 30 June 2020. Johnbosco, Agbakwuru. “The West’s Hand in Bakassi Peninsula Verdict.” Daily Times, 21 October 2002, 25. In 1913 the British unilaterally, without the knowledge of the landowners, ceded the territory to Germany. The then-­Obong of Calabar protested and sent a delegation headed by Bassey Duke to raise the matter in the House of Commons that same year. Johnmary, Ani Kelechi. “Nigeria-­ Cameroon Relations: Focus on Economic History and Border Diplomacy.” Journal of African Foreign Affairs 5, no. 2 (2018):



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147–166. This study centres on the theory of historical materialism, adopts a historical method of inquiry to investigate the dynamics of Nigeria-­Cameroon relations. Keke, R.C. “Southern Cameroons/Ambazonia Conflict: A Political Economy.” Theory & Event 23, no. 2 (2020): 329–351. Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari vowed to prevent the separatists from operating from Nigerian territory. Buhari’s body language and actions suggest that Nigeria is taking necessary measures within the ambit of the law to ensure that its territory is not used as a buffer zone to destabilize another friendly sovereign country. The article points out that although this may be true, Nigeria the self-­styled giant of Africa, should step in to resolve this crisis as it has done in other African countries in the past. Konings, Piet. “The Anglophone Cameroun-­Nigeria Boundary: Opportunities and Conflicts.” African Affairs 104, no. 415 (2005): 275–301. The article demonstrates the ambiguous nature of the Anglophone Cameroon-­Nigeria border. Emeka Okereke. “Analysing Defence Cooperation Kuitche, Roger, and C. Nna-­ between Nigeria and Cameroon,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. LeFebvre, Rebecca K. “Interests and Identities in Peace Negotiations: Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Bakassi Peninsula,” African Social Science Review 6 no. 1 (2014). For close to fifty years, the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon continued over the region along their border known as the Bakassi Peninsula. The dispute almost led to war in the mid-1990s, was settled by the International Court of Justice in 2002 and resulted in the hand-­off of the territory by Nigeria to Cameroon in 2008. Lukong, H.V. “The Cameroon–Nigeria Border Dispute: Management and Resolutions, 1981–2011.” Bamenda: Langaa Research & Publishing CIG, 2011. Macebuh, Stanley. “Public Opinion and the Nigeria/ Cameroun Crisis.” Nigerian Forum 1, no. 7–8 (September/October 1981): 301–306. Looks at the reasons why the Shagari-­led administration at the last minute decided not to go to war with Cameroun over the killing of five Nigerian soldiers by the Cameroonian gendarmes on 16 May 1981. Martins, Ayankola. “The Bakassi Issue, Crude Oil and the French Government.” Nigerian Tribune, 21 October 2002, 27. The article states that the Bakassi area holds in its bowels about 330 million barrels of recoverable reserves of crude oil. France, the erstwhile colonial master of Cameroon, could be the key to the solution as it has huge investments on both sides and stands to lose a lot in the event of war. Mbuh, Muluh. “The Bakassi Peninsula Dispute,” in International Law and Conflicts: Resolving Border and Sovereignty Disputes in Africa, by Justice M. Mbuh. Universe Inc., 2004. Says that Cameroun has accused Nigeria of using its population advantage to populate the Bakassi Peninsula as a tactic to claiming the area. Merrills, J. “Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria Merits, Judgment of 10 October 2002.” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 52, no. 3 (2003): 788–797. The judgement, which addresses a number of issues of general international law concerning maritime boundaries and territorial

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sovereignty, as well as providing a detailed treatment of the particular facts, concludes a case that began in 1994 and has had an unusual history. Momoh, Tony Abu. “Nigeria Set to Lose 24 Local Governments to the United Nations.” The Herald, 5 June 2020. Nigeria is set to lose 24 local governments to the United Nations by 10 July due to a joint agreement signed with Paul Biya of Cameroon and former President Olusegun Obasanjo. The LGAs were ceded to Cameroon in 2013 and would form part of a new state, Ambazonia, being formed by the United Nations on the border of the Republic of Cameroon. Ngo Mbe, Maxi. “Human Rights Issues in Cameroon in the Case of the Independentists Arrested in Nigeria and Extradited to Cameroon,” 21 October 2019. Avail.com/abstract=3472963 or http://dx​ .doi​ .org/10.2139/ able at SSRN: https://ssrn​ ssrn.3472963. The Office of the High Commissioner negotiated the release of certain asylum seekers arrested by the Nigerian authorities. For those in detention, including the leader of the pro-­independence group, the Nigerian government agreed to grant the High Commission access to determine their status. The government has also reaffirmed to the High Commissioner that those in detention will not return to Cameroon. The article intends to present human rights challenges in Cameroon and how they can be overcome. Njobinkir, Ida Ngo. Enhancing Maritime Safety in Cameroon through Port State Control: An Analysis. World Maritime University, The Maritime Commons: Digital Repository of the World Maritime University of impediments to adhesion to the Abuja MoU on PSC. An analysis of impediments to adhesion to the Abuja MoU on PSC, 2019. Nuno, Sérgio Marques Antunes. “The Pending Maritime Delimitation in the Cameroon v. Nigeria Case: A Piece in the Jigsaw Puzzle of the Gulf of Guinea.” The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 15, no. 2 (2000). On 29 March 1994, Cameroon seized the International Court of Justice of a dispute against Nigeria. Inter alia, Cameroon requested the Court “to proceed to prolong the course of its maritime boundary with the Federal Republic of Nigeria up to the limit of the maritime zones which international law places under their respective jurisdictions.” Nwati, M. “The Anglophone Crisis: The Birth of Warlords, the Impact of Warlords Activity on the People of North West and South West Region of Cameroon.” Advances in Applied Sociology 10 (2020): 157–185. With the trial of the leaders of the Ambazonia, including Sesiku Ayuk Tabe, who had already spent one year in prison. The trial was complicated as the Nigerian Court condemned the deportation of the Ambazonia leaders from Nigeria as unconstitutional and ordered their return to Nigeria. Journal du Cameroon highlights: “Nigerian Court Orders the Return of Ambazonian Leaders,” its 1 February 2019 news release. Nevertheless, the government of Cameroon ignored such claims and continued with the trial. Nwoko, Kenneth Chukwuemeka. “Footsteps in History, Colonial Origins of African Conflicts: An Insight from the Nigeria/Cameroon Border Conflict.” Ubuntu Journal of Conflict and Social Transformation 1, nos 1–2 (2012): 15–35. This article investigates the Nigeria/Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Peninsula from a historical perspective. It seeks to critically expose the level of colonial involvement



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in terms of establishing the nexus between the arbitrariness of colonial boundaries and the enduring tensions and conflicts in post-­colonial Africa. Nwosu, Ben, and Ibeh, Chinyere. “Bilateralism in Inter-­State Relations: Theoretical and Conceptual Issues,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Obasesam, Okoi. “Why Nations Fight: The Causes of the Nigeria-­Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict.” African Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 42–65. Drawing on the theoretical insights of neoclassical realism, the article surveys evidence from the importance of domestic political and economic conditions to the relevance of cultural and historical factors as well as from territorial and geo-­political issues to contend that the Nigeria-­Cameroon conflict emerged from three theoretical logics: the territorial logic of aggression, the geo-­strategic logic of aggression, and the diversionary logic of aggression. Obodo, Ijie Nneamaka, Akwen Gabriel Tyoyila. “Nigeria-­Cameroon Border Relations: A Historical Analysis of the Bakassi Peninsula Region.” Kaduna Journal of Humanities 1, no. 1 (2017). Interstate border relations predate the Westphalia era. States have been involved in border relations at various points. The border relation between Nigeria and Cameroon from the Bakassi Peninsula angle is peculiar in nature due to its long-­standing history and wide attention from the international community. Odubajo, Adetola. “The Role of External Actors,” in Nigeria-­Cameroon Relations, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­ Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. “Cameroon: A Strategic Frontline State.” Africa Strategic Review 1, no. 2 (2009). Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. “Analysing the Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis 10, no. 2 (March 2018). Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka. “Nigeria and International Court of Justice Judgement on Disputed Territories with Cameroon: Lessons for Nigeria” in Nigeria’s Peace Initiatives, edited by Bakut Tswah Bakut. Abuja: Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2019. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka, and Ibeh, Chinyere. “Cameroon: Counterterrorism and Counter-­Insurgency in a Volatile Neighbourhood,” in New Architecture of Regional Security in Africa: Perspectives on Counterterrorism and Counter-­Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, edited by Usman Tar. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019. Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka, and Fombo, Greg Fah. “Nigerian Civil War and Southern Cameroon Conflict: Cost-­Benefit Analysis for Nigeria-­Cameroon Relations.” In Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria’s former External Minister, discusses the fact that the General Gowon administration did not, in appreciation of Cameroun’s solidarity during the Nigerian Civil War, give out part of Nigeria’s territory to Cameroun.

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Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka, Onuoha, Freedom, and Emmanuel, Monica. “Nationalism, Struggle over Bakassi and the Changing Face of Diplomacy between Nigeria-­ Cameroun.” Africa Peace Review 4–8, no. 1 (April 2008). Okereke, C. Nna-­Emeka, and Ukaeje, Obinna. “Nigeria-­Cameroon Relations in the Light of Southern Cameroons Crisis,”in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Okoi, B. “Limits of International Law: Settlement of Nigeria–Cameroon Territorial Conflict,” International Journal on World Peace 33, no. 2 (2016): 77–102. Okoi, B. “Why Nations Fight: The Causes of the Nigeria–Cameroon Bakassi Peninsula Conflict,” African Security 9, no. 1 (2016): 142–165. Olusegun, Adeniyi. “Again Provocation from Cameroun.” Daily Times, 28 February 1994, 14. At Nigeria’s Instance, Nigeria and Cameroun, have agreed to meet at Abuja to resolve their differences, although it is clear that Cameroun has incessantly harassed and killed defenceless civilians in the Bakassi area of their common border. Olusegun, Adeniyi. “Ita-­Giwa, the ‘Cameroonian’ Senator.” ThisDay, 17 October 2002, 64. Today many Nigerians are left hanging with their fate in the balance and nothing depicts it more than Ita-­Giwa, who now has to seek military clearance before she can be allowed and escorted to her place of origin where she last registered as a voter recently. Olusegun, Paul Adesanya. “The Dynamics of Nigeria’s Relationship with Its Immediate Neighbours in the Gulf of Guinea,” in Contemporary Issues in Nigeria’s External Relations. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2016. The article takes a holistic look at Nigeria’s relations with her immediate neighbours in the Gulf of Guinea. Olusegun, Paul Adesanya. “Nigeria-­Cameroon Military and Economic Relations,” in Contemporary Issues in Nigeria’s External Relations. Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2016, 183–206. Olusoji, Akinrinade. “Nigeria-­Cameroun Border Dispute Revisited.” The Punch, 16 April 1982. “We have engaged in drawing lines upon maps where no white man’s foot ever trod. We have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other only hindered by the small impediment that we never know exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were.” These were the sentiments expressed by Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister in 1890. Omede, Adedoyin J. “Nigeria’s Relations with Her Neighbours.” Studies of Tribes and Tribals 4, no. 1 (2006): 7–17. This study examines Nigeria’s relationship with immediately neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad, the Republic of Benin, Equatorial Guinea and the Niger Republic. These countries, like Nigeria, are vestiges of colonial creation. Omolara, Akinyemi. “Borders in Nigeria’s Relations with Cameroun.” Journal of Arts and Humanities 3, no. 9 (2014). The Joint Cameroun-­Nigeria Border Commission was entrusted with the task of demarcation of the land and maritime boundaries between the two countries, as mandated by the 2002 judgement. However, the demarcation exercise has caused confusion and anxiety with the inhabitants of



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Cross-­River State, Nigeria, resulting in the inability of the team to locate pillar 133A, thereby erecting a new pillar. Omole, B. “Nigeria, France and the Francophone States: The Joy and Anguish of Regional Power.” Inaugural lecture delivered at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-­ Ife, 2010. Takes a look at the role France has played in the West African sub-­region. Onuoha, Freedom. “Smuggling of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products across Nigeria-­ Cameroon Borders,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­ Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Reuben Abati. “Bakassi and Gowon’s Dilemma.” Guardian, 13 October 2002, 12. Takes a look at General Gowon’s involvement with the Bakassi issue and how he is seen as the man that caused the Bakassi trouble. Richard, Ikiebe. “The Ikang Debacle: Call for Stronger Military Presence.” Daily Times, 6 June 1981, 16. Calls for Nigeria to strengthen its hold on villages near Ikang because of the audacity with which Cameroun has been violating the Yaoundé agreement. Calls for the construction of a bridge on the Atimho River to make the journey between Calabar and Ikang shorter and establishing an air force base while upgrading the naval and army units in Calabar to something bigger. Richard, Akinjide. “Why Bakassi Belongs to Nigeria.” ThisDay, 24 March 2002, 20. Chief Richard Akinjide’s address at the ICJ, stating his reasons for saying that Bakassi belongs to Nigeria. Segun, Fatuase. “Nigeria Cameroun Agree on Border Demarcation.” The Punch, 20 January 1990, 15. Cameroonian Minister of Trade, Mr Njoya, told President Babangida of Cameroun’s desire to begin meetings between officials of both countries in preparation for the demarcation of the borders. Sesekou. Julius Ayuk Tabe. “Resolution of the 4th SCACUF Conclave Held from the 27th–31st of October, 2017,” Cameroon Intelligence Report. Southern Cameroons/ Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF). Nigeria: Cameroon Intelligence Report, 27 October 2017. With the decision outlawing these groups in Cameroon, the various leaders, based mostly in Nigeria, came together to strategize a way forward. Six different groups (including the teachers and lawyers trade unions) eventually came together and created a common platform known as the Southern Cameroons/Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF) on 28–31 October 2017 in Nigeria. Shaibu, M.T., Azom, S.N., and Nwanze, E.S. “An Appraisal of the Dominant c\ Causes of Boundary Conflict between Nigeria and Cameroun: The Bakassi Peninsula Perspective.” Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences 3, no. 9 (2015): 25–47. Sina, Fadare. “Referendum, Way Out of Bakassi Dispute.” Daily Champion, 5 December 2002, 15. The article points out that the only way out of the raging controversy over the Bakassi Peninsula dispute would be to have a referendum and ask the Bakassi people where they want to be. Tar, Usman, and Nufaisa G. Ahmed. “Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency Engagements of Nigeria-­ Cameroon along Common Border areas.” In

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Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Tarlebbea Nicholas, K., and Baroni Sam. “The Cameroon and Nigeria Negotiation Process over the Contested Oil Rich Bakassi Peninsula.” Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences 2, no. 1 (2010): 198–210. This paper is aimed at exploring the negotiation process between Cameroon and Nigeria over the resource-­rich Bakassi Peninsula, located along the Gulf of Guinea, although relations between neighbouring Cameroon and Nigeria have been strained over issues relating to their1,600-kilometer land boundary. Titilayo, Abiodun. “Bakassi: A Surveyor’s Explanation.” Guardian, 27 October 2002, 27. Article explains exactly what happened during the 1971–1975 delimitation exercise of the Nigerian/Cameroun Maritime boundary. Tolu, Ajayi. “ICJ and the Bakassi Mistake.” Saturday Champion, 19 October 2002, 5. The article points out that the same Anglo-­German Treaty of 1913 had been conveniently thrown out in 1918, by the international community at the end of the First World War, for the British and French to take Cameroon from the Germans and carve it up between them. Also, the part of Cameroon that had been given to Nigeria under British rule had returned to the French half in 1960, not under the Anglo-­German treaty of 1913 but via referendum: Why should the ICJ judgement still be based on a treaty that has been violated and ignored in the past? Tony, Etim Ita. “Bakassi: Cross River May Expel Aka Ibom Natives.” The Punch, January 31, 2002, 1. A resolution adopted by the Cross-­River House of Assembly said that the presence of Akwa Ibom State natives in the Peninsula could pose a security threat to the state. Tony, Icheku. “Bakassi: Travails of an Oily Peninsula.” ThisDay, 13 February 2002, 15. The article states that first it was the Republic of Cameroon that lusted after the oil-­rich territory, now it is two sister states that are flexing muscles over same parts of it. The question is asked: Does the federal government owe the citizens more, beyond laying claims to the territory? Udogu, E.I. “Historicizing and Contextualizing the Discourse on African International Law and a Concise Overview of the Pacific Settlement of the Cameroon– Nigeria Bakassi Peninsula Dispute.” African and Asian Studies 7 (2008): 77–99. United Nations Office of West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS). “The Cameroon-­ Nigeria Mixed Commission: A Success in the Resolution of Boundary Dispute,” 9 July 2019. https://unowas​.unmissions​.org/cameroon-­nigeria-­mixed-­commission​ -­success​-­resolution-­boundary-­dispute, accessed 30 June 2020. Victor, Ifijeh. “Cameroun’s Claim on Nigerian Islands.” ThisDay, 28 April 1998, 7. Cameroun lays claim to 27 Islands in Bomo State in the border regions straddling the two countries. Wale, Adebayo. “Nigeria Accuses Cameroun, France of Mischief.” Guardian, 3 March 1994, 1. Acrimony between Nigeria and France, over France’s Interference in the Bakassi Peninsula dispute as Nigeria claims that Paris deployed more troops and military equipment to aid it, in its aggression towards Nigeria. Wapmuk, Sharkdam, and Usman Ayegba, “The Bakassi Question: Beyond the International Court of Justice Verdict,” in Cameroon-Nigeria Relations: Trends and



Cameroon-­Nigeria Relations: A Select Annotated Bibliography 341

Perspectives, edited by Osita Agbu and C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2022. Wifa, E.L. Amakoromo, M., and Johnson-­Ogbo, I. “The Role of a Joint Development Agreement (JDA) in Resolving the Conflicts and Uncertainties over Maritime Boundary Delimitation: A Missed Opportunity in the Bakassi Case,” in The Bakassi Dispute and the International Court of Justice, edited by E.E. Egede and M.O. Igiehon. London: Routledge, 2018. Zenn, J. “Boko Haram’s Backyard: The Ongoing Battle in Cameroon.” Terrorism Monitor 16, no. 6, 2018.

Index

Aban, 265 Abasi Eke. See Bakassi Aborkem, 63 Abubakar Shekau, 128 Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 30 Abuja, 165 Adamawa, 182 state, 127, 226 administrative tolerance, by Cameroon, 210 African Union, 94 African Unity, 30 AFRICOM, 168 agreements Agreement on the Establishment of the Trans-border Security Committee (Cameroon and Nigeria), 292 between Cameroon and Nigeria (1965), 60 Green Tree Agreement (Cameroon and Nigeria), 91, 292 Ahmadou Ahidjo, 44, 263 Ali, 184 Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, 35, 138 Alhaji Malabu, 111 Al-Qaeda, 134, 175 Al-Shabaab, 175

Ambazonia, xii, 8, 22, 33, 160, 163, 182, 294 fighters, 299 leaders, 299 Anderson Oben Etem, 63 Andoni, 21 Anglo-French Declaration, 119 Anglo-German Agreement, 19, 237 Anglophone, 160 All Anglophone Conferences (AAC), 295 Cameroon, 104, 120 crisis, 291, 300, 303, 308 population, 296 question, 316 regions, 163, 293 Annan’s proposal, 35 Annang, 21 Ansaru, 155 AQIM. See Al-Qaeda armed conflicts, 28, 294 separatists, 80 struggle, 297 assimilation, 295 asylum, 299, 302, 304 Atabong, 265 AU Convention on the Prevention and Combatting Terrorism, 178 343

344

Index

awareness, 246, 251, 257 B. E. Chu, 104 Babagana Monguno, 161 Bakassi, 72, 74, 79, 110, 140, 152 clans, 266 conflict, 110 Council, 266 crisis, 261, 315 dispute, 247 Freedom Fighters, 153 Movement for Self-Determination, 319 Peninsula, x, 2, 21, 34, 73, 75, 76, 139, 152, 158, 203, 217, 236, 237, 245, 247, 265, 266, 267, 275, 278, 279, 304 problem, 266 question, x, 11, 34, 275, 285 returnees, 286 Bamenda, 76, 105 Bamusso, 108 banditry, 22 Bauchi, 182 bauxite, 263 Bekora, 53 Bello Malabu, 103 Ben Ayade, 282, 286 Benin, xii Benue Valley, 127 Berlin Conferences, 85, 94 BFF (Bakassi Freedom Fighters), 284 Biafra, 90, 103, 112 Biafran, 110 agents, 103 war, 21, 90 Big Brother, Nigeria as, 302 bilateral, 8, 13, 14 agreements, 122 committee, 253 cooperation, 45, 141 discussions, 188 framework, 187 instruments, 242, 255

relations, xii, xv, 1, 3, 15, 16, 50, 73, 118, 228, 321 trade, 51, 52 Biya, 122 Bodo, 176 Boko Haram, 73, 77, 93, 128, 129, 132, 133, 155, 162, 176, 182, 184, 189, 304, 318 insurgency, 77 Bonny, 202 border, 2, 10, 18, 19, 67, 80, 81, 101, 118, 125, 131, 163, 175, 181, 199, 207, 262, 327 agents, 81 areas, 120, 123 checkpoints, 63 closure, 79, 81, 131, 186 communities, 59, 185 conflict, 4, 74, 164 control, 65 demarcation, 36, 123 disputes, ix, xi, 3, 73, 272 hostilities, 265 incidents, 79 issues, xi, 124 operation, 255 peoples, 262 physical barriers, 63 policies, 9, 59, 60, 66 region, 203 relations, 19 smuggling, 207 tensions, 19 zone, 66 Borno, 182 boundary, 27, 233, 236, 245, 291, 293 conflict, 20 delineation, 245 disputes, 72, 279 issues, 19 management, 248 Britain, x, 20, 150 foreign policy, 43 territory, 74



Index 345

Calabar, 74, 108, 202, 245, 248, 266 and Britain, 266 Channel, 76 Cameroon, xii, 1, 16, 20, 41, 42, 60, 71, 74, 80, 89, 97, 98, 110, 111, 112, 131, 147, 150, 152, 153, 218, 223, 225, 236, 244, 263, 281, 291, 316, 327 and Nigeria, 59, 117 Attachés, 159 authorities, 127 conflict, 308 conservative leadership, 110 exports, 77 foreign policy, 43 gendarmes, 152, 153, 265 government, 78, 99, 101, 112 Lake Nyos, 128 local administrators, 108 nationals, 119 nationals in Nigeria, 54 military, 80, 166 Nigeria borders and, 199 policy, 99, 112 territorial policies, 112 Cameroon-Nigeria border, 120, 153 boundary, 110, 119 during the 1980s, 50 maritime domain, 125 Mixed Commission, 35, 127, 138 relations, 3, 5, 27, 33, 47, 48, 85, 88, 90, 93, 100, 118, 119, 123, 132, 140, 315, 327 capacity development, 248 Central African countries, 211 Chad, xii China, 324 Citizens Diplomacy (doctrine), 121 civil society groups, 120 civil war, 42, 48, 100, 105, 108 clans, 266 Clement Nze, 127 closed borders, 78

CNMC. See Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission CNS Le Ntem, 168 colonialism, 1, 85, 86, 88, 119, 236 commercial property, 64 common border, 202 confidence building, 247 conflict, 15, 24, 72, 160, 308 resolution, 81 conflictive relations, 24 cooperation, 15, 24 in defence, 161 counterinsurgency, 10, 128, 175, 179, 180 counterterrorism, 10, 155, 175, 178 court, 2, 268, 307 Cross River, 162, 163, 286 cross-border, 305 area, 120 movement, 129 security, 153 Security Committee, 77 smuggling, 199 violations, 152, 162, 163, 164 crude oil, 72, 199, 201, 204, 235 CT-COIN (Counterterrorism and Counter Insurgency), 177, 191 Cuban Missile Crisis, 93 cultural, 176 linkages, 320 links, 101 ties, 18 traits, 46 custom sites, 64 Dakar, 235 dams, 221, 222 defence advisers, 159 relations (Cameroon and Nigeria), 152 and security, 169 Attachés, 158 cooperation, 147, 148, 154, 158

346

Index

diplomacy, 147 industry, 147 relations, 151, 152, 156, 160 treaties, 14 delineation of boundaries, 245 demarcation of borders, unclear, 328 development cooperation, 18 Didiabatu, 265 diplomatic relations, 120, 123, 261, 262 displacements, 126 Douala chiefs, 19 drone monitoring, 213

Escravos, 202 ethnic affiliations, 1 character, 120 groups, 263 European colonisers, 85 EX OBANGAME, 167 Exercise, 254 exchange, 140, 184, 237 Export Promotion Zone, 75 external actors, 9, 85 extradition, 160

Eastern Nigeria, 19 Ebenezer Akwanga, 304 Ebola, 130 ecological threats, 126 ecology, 223 economic, 18, 51 blockade, 103 Economic Community of Central African States, 117 Economic Community of West African States, 117 development, 41 policies, 102 relations, 9, 47, 71, 74, 77, 320 relationship, 81 security, 248 war, 99 ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), 28 education, 61 Efiks, 21 Ejagham, 62, 66, 68 community, 59 people, 62 Ekang, 65 Ekok, 65 Ekondo Titi, 53 emigration, 64 Enugu, 76 environment, 221, 227 challenges, 222 governance, 217, 219

famine, 102 farming, 1 fertility, 75 fishing, 1, 53, 244 flood, 127, 219 Fobi Kingsley Mbaku, 162 food, 185 security, 186 foreign policy, 41, 42, 111 formal exchanges, 77 relations, 41 Fotokol, 184 France, x, 9, 32, 89, 90, 99, 147, 263, 324 policy, 90 Francophone states, 31 Frederick Alobwede Ebong, 304 French Cameroon, 47 frontiers of counterterrorism, 187 fuel subsidy, 209 Fulfure, 223 functional cooperation, 132 needs, 5 functionalism, 5, 6 Geoffrey Onyeama, 163 geographical boundaries, 121 location, 117 setting, 202



Index 347

geo-strategic, 293 relations, 19 German protectorate, Cameroon as, 74 Germany, x, 9, 20, 89 globalisation, 87 Gombe, 182 Good Neighbour Policy, 8, 27, 29, 32 Goodluck Jonathan, 140, 264 Gounougou, 224 governance, 217 Gowon, 110 Great Britain, 89, 269 Green Tree Agreement (GTA), 118, 127, 138. See also agreements guerrillas, 104 Gulf of Guinea, 28, 235 Commission, 136 Hausa-Fulani, 101 hostilities at the border, 265 human security, 10, 217, 219, 220, 227 hydrocarbons, 251 reserves, 251 Ibibio, 21, 109 Ibos, 105, 113 ICJ (International Court of Justice), x, 35, 75, 203, 266, 268 decisions, 261 judgement, 153, 157 rulings, 37, 278 verdict, 275, 277 IDP (internally displaced person), 282 Idris Derby, 133 Igbo merchants, 109 Ijaw, 21 Ike Nwachukwu, 117 Ikot Abasi, 236 immigration, 64 imperial powers, 89 imports, 52 independence, xv, 2 indigenous populations, 1 Ine Odiong, 265 insecurity, 124, 181

insurgency, 176, 179, 184 operations, 191 intelligence, 134, 137 internal politics, 110 international actors, 87 adjudication, 152 borders, 63 boundaries, 19, 120, 124 cooperation, 42, 43 Court of Justice, 92, 119, 141. See also ICJ politics, 15 relations, 13, 16, 86 smuggling, 212 system, 86, 87 trade, 111 interstate agreement, 61 relations, 13 IRCC (Inter-Regional Coordination Centre), 137, 253 iron ore, 263 Islamist terrorists, 79 Issoufou Mahamadou, 135 Itshekiri, 21 J. R. Booh, 108 Jabane, 265 James T. Tataw, 151 Jebba, 226 Jerome Egemene, 63 joint operations (Cameroon-Nigeria border), 188 training, of Cameroonian and Nigerian military officers, 166 Kaduna, 202 River, 226 Kainji, 226 Kaubae, 265 King Dosumu, 74 Kisob, 104 Kofi Annan, 9, 34, 73, 91, 138, 277

348

Index

Kousseri, 184 Kouyape, 176 Lagdo Dam, 126, 128, 217, 219, 223, 225, 226, 227 Lagos, 74 Laissez-passer. See pass Lake Chad, 44, 123 area, 152 Basin, 155 Basin Commission, 92, 132 land borders, 27 boundary, 203, 328 LCBC (Lake Chad Basin Commission), 135, 136 countries, 189 Le Ntem (ship), 254 littoral boundaries, 27 states, 125 London, 135 Lord’s Resistance Army, 175 Louis Mbenefo, 111 Luanda Declaration, 137 Lucky Irabor, 157, 308 Mahomammed Marwa, 182 Maitatsine, 182 Makurdi, 225 Mali, 175 management, 10, 247 Mandara, 224 mandate of MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force), 190 marine resources, 251 maritime, 246, 252 agencies, 242, 244 alliance, 234 border policies, 109 boundaries, 328 boundary, 238, 242 challenges, 125, 249, 252 domain, 10, 233, 235, 242 domain awareness, 125

environment, 242 management, 242, 254 opportunities, 252 phase, 255 resources, 244 security, 157, 239, 241, 247, 249, 250, 253 strategy, 252 Maroua Accord, 22, 237 Agreement, 263 Declaration, 49, 79 Mboyam Ojong, 63 Mfum, 64 Middle East and North Africa, 132 militancy, 284 military, 31 cooperation, 158 High Commands, 156 training, 167 Mixed Commission, 35 MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force), 133, 189, 190 Mohammed Marwa, 129 Mohammad Yusuf, 128 Monrovia bloc, 101 MoU (Memorandum of Understanding), 18, 240 Moulin-Fournier family, 129 Muhammad Sani Sidi, 127 Muhammadu Buhari, 50, 78, 121, 239, 264, 301 multilateralism, 14, 132 multilateral framework, 189 multilateral platforms, 6, 155 naira, 77 nation-building, 28 national assets, 242 defence, 148 Defence College, 19 interest, 10, 30, 31, 117 products, 47 security, 233, 241, 247



natural resources, 263 NCTBSC (Nigeria-Cameroon Transborder Security Committee), 249, 253, 255. See also bilateral instruments Ndian Division, 102 Ndigbo, 105, 108, 109 NEMA (National Emergency Management Agency), 127 neo-functionalism, 6 Nera Hotel, 161, 299 New Bakassi, 319 Nguetechewe, 176 Niamey summit, 135 Niger, xii Niger Delta, 202 Nigeria, xii, 1, 16, 19, 28, 41, 71, 79, 80, 81, 111, 147, 150, 152, 153, 264, 318 aspirations, 261 border, 207 concentric circle doctrine, 121 consulate, 121 defence and security, 153 economy, 71, 78 foreign policy, 29, 41 foreign relations, 29, 32 Institute of Oceanography and Marine Research, 76 national interest, 121 neighbours, 99 oil resources, 76 policy, 303 position, 266 Nigeria-Biafra War, 97 Nigeria-Cameroon, 77 border, 181 , 316 economies, 78 relations, 17, 23, 73, 317 Nigerian army, 80 borders, 80, 208 Civil War, 9, 48, 97, 98, 151, 237, 322 consulate, 105

Index 349

forces, 109 High Commissioner in Yaoundé, 121 maritime domain, 240 nationals, 121 Navy, 125, 139, 158 officers, 109, 165 refugees, 130 security, 241 soldiers, 109 troops, 157 NIHSA (Nigeria Hydrological Services Agency), 226 NIMASA (Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency), 239, 255. See also maritime agencies Nnamdi Kanu, 301 NNPC (Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation), 210 NNS Victory, 168 Nordic Defence Cooperation, 148 Nsukka, 305 Ntui Lambert, 161 OAU (Organisation of African Unity), 97, 266 OBANGAME EXPRESS, 167, 254 Obasanjo, 138 Oduduwa Republic, 318 oil, 75, 79, 199, 208 distribution, 202 exploitation, 202 terminals, 202 theft, 208, 209 Okirika, 202 Old Calabar, 267 Olonisakin, 156 Olufemi Odeyinde, 23 Olusegun Obasanjo, 140, 264, 282 Ondo, xi Operation, 190 ALPHA, 189 COPPER, 234 Flintlock, 168 OBANGAME, 242

350

Index

POUNCER, 242 SAFE DELTA, 242 Tsare Teku, 242 Oron, 21, 204 Otu, 65 Pa Nico, 67 Paris summit, xii, 134 pass (laissez-passer, for border), 66 Patrick Chibueze Nwatu, 159 Paul Biya, 78, 138, 141, 159, 295 petroleum, 199 price, 211 products, 201, 204 pipeline vandalisation, 209 piracy, 158, 316 plebiscite, 20, 33, 59, 91, 150, 262 politics campaigns, x political ecology, 225 political history (of Cameroon and Nigeria), 262 political relations (of Cameroon and Nigeria), 44, 48 Port Harcourt, 112, 202 pre-colonial history (Africa), 9, 85 pro-Biafran, 99 Rabui Tita, 105 realism, 15 reciprocity, 5, 6, 7 referendum, United Nations on Cameroon (1961), 120 refugees, 103, 113, 188, 307 Rene-Claude Meka, 156 RIFU (Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit), 134 Rio del Rey, 237 river systems, 218 SALWs (small arms and light weapons), 132 Sambisa Forest, 188 Sani Abacha, 152, 265 Sarduana Province, 22

sea-based Forward Operationational Base, 256 secession, xii, 21, 22, 119, 323 secessionist movements, 22 security, 14, 22, 103, 244, 299 agencies, 124, 241 and defence protocols, 154 architecture, 239, 249 challenges, xii, 22, 23, 28, 118, 320 cooperation, 21, 167, 169 evolving environment, 117 sea-based Forward Operationational Base, 256 separatist, 294 agitations, xii, 28 groups, 301 Shehu Musa Yar’Adua, 264 Shagari, 280 Shiroro dam, 226 Sir Louis Mbanefo, 104 Sisiku Jukius Ayuktabe, 160 smugglers, 10, 204 smuggling, 65, 199, 200, 204, 207, 209, 211, 316 concealment methods, 206 operations, 206 socio-cultural, 41, 60 intercourse, 9 relations, 45, 46, 51 South Africa, 234 Southern Cameroon, 20, 294, 297, 308 state actors, 88 surveillance, 244, 246, 250 Taraba, 182 territory disputes, 2 policies, 111, 112 terrorism, 14, 78, 128, 178 groups, 175 and insurgency, 181 ties (between Cameroon and Nigeria), 17



trade, 1, 76, 79, 201 agreement, 9, 73, 77 relations, 9 routes, 9, 75 unions, 296 trafficking, 10 training, 164, 165 trans-border, 160 Cameroon-Nigeria Trans-border Security Committee, 154 security, 10, 249, 255, 299 treaties, 2, 86, 160, 237, 266 Umar Musa Yar’Adua, 140 UN Trusteeship Council, 33 United Kingdom, 134 United Nations, 91, 120 High Commissioner for Refugees, 129 UPC (Union Populaire du Cameroun), 9, 110, 111 USNS Spearhead, 167 utilitarian theory of International Relations, 16

Index 351

vandalism, 209 violation, of borders, 163 VNSAs (violent non-state actors), 191 Warri, 202 wartime activities (Cameroon), 101 water, 217, 228 resources, 218 welfare, 324 West Africa, 222 Westphalia Treaty, 94 World Health Organization, 131 World War I, 14, 20, 237 Yacoob Bush-Alebiosu, 284 Yakubu Gowon, 49, 140, 263, 267 Yaoundé, 165, 317. See also IRCC Agreement, 137 Yobe, 182 zua-zua (Nigerian petrol), 186

About the Editors and Contributors

ABOUT THE EDITORS Osita Agbu PhD is Professor of International Relations and Dean, Faculty of Management and Social Sciences, Baze University, Abuja. He obtained his first degree in Political Science from the University of Ibadan, and his Masters and Doctorate degrees in International Relations from the University of Nigeria in 1988 and 1993 respectively. He has specializations in Governance and Democratization, Post-­Conflict Peacebuilding, Africa-­China Relations, and Science, Technology and Development. He was editor of the Nigerian Journal of International Affairs (NJIA) for several years. Professor Agbu has to his credit numerous publications in Political Science and International Relations. He is co-­editor of The Politics and Selection of UN Secretary General (2018) and co-­editor of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under the Administration of President Muhammadu Buhari (2020). He had lectured at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka; Caleb University, Lagos, and the University of Lagos before joining Baze University in 2017. Professor Agbu was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, Sweden; Institute for Global Dialogue, Johannesburg, South Africa; and Institute for Developing Economies, Chiba, Japan. C. Nna-­Emeka Okereke PhD is a Chief Research Fellow with the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence College (CSRS-­NDC), Nigeria, and also Visiting Professor at the Nile University of Nigeria. He has served as Facilitator, Peace and Conflict Studies at the National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN). Dr Okereke holds a PhD and MSc in Political Science (International Relations) from the University of Nigeria Nsukka and the University of Lagos respectively. He also holds a Fellowship of the 353

354

About the Editors and Contributors

National Defence College, having completed the Strategic Level course in Higher Defence and Strategic Studies (HDSS). While on sabbatical from Caleb University, Lagos, he was the Deputy Dean, College of Social and Management Sciences (COSOMAS). Subsequently, he served as Head, Department of Area and Regional Studies, National Defence College. He is presently the Director of Research for the Nigerian Political Science Association (Northcentral) and has been on the Expert List of the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism, Algiers, for over a decade and also consults for the Intergovernmental Group against Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (GIABA). He is a member of the Nigerian Political Science Association (NPSA), and his areas of research interest focus on geo-­politics and geo-­strategy, foreign policy analysis and terrorism studies in Africa. ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS Nufaisa Garba Ahmed is Assistant Lecturer at the Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA). She holds a BSc. in International Studies from Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and an MSc in Defence and Strategic Studies from the NDA. She is an ardent contributor of chapters in edited books and has published in reputable national and international journals. Her most recent publications include “Gendered Dimensions of Extremism in West Africa” (with U. A. Tar, S. B. Ayegba and G. Ahmed Nufaisa) (2021) and “Towards Effective Prescriptions for Addressing the Effects of Youth Unemployment on Nigeria’s National Security” (with B. Bala and G. Ahmed Nufaisa) (2020). Her research interests are in the thematic fields of Security, Peacebuilding, Conflict Mitigation and Consequences. Adeola Caroline Akindoju is a Research Fellow at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, (NIIA), Lagos, with the division of International Politics in the Research and Studies Department. She has attended and participated in many local and international conferences including think tanks and academic dialogues. While her geographic areas of interest include Africa and Nigeria, her research interests are in Poverty Reduction, Gender, Security, Migration, Women and Children in Conflict zones and International politics. She obtained her BSc in Political Science from the University of Ibadan and MSc in Social Research Methods from the London Metropolitan University, United Kingdom. She is a member of scholarly bodies including the Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA) and the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. Her articles have been published in national and international journals and books. Email: adeolaakindoju@gmail​.com.



About the Editors and Contributors 355

Raphael Achou Etta PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of History and Archaeology at the University of Bamenda, Northwest region in Cameroon. His area of specialization is in the History of International Relations with a focus on African colonial boundaries. Dr Etta holds Bachelor of Arts (BA) and Master of Arts (MA) degrees in History from the University of Yaoundé I and also a PhD in the History of International Relations. Two of his major publications are “Ejagham in the Anglo-­German Diplomatic Entente 1884– 1916” (2020) and “Administrative Reconstitution and Political Solidary of the Ejagham of Cameroon 1916–1961” (2021), which examines the British interest to reconstitute the Ejaghams of Cameroon under one political unit. Greg Fah Fombo is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bamenda, Northwest region of Cameroon. He holds Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) and Master of Science (MSc) degrees in Political Science from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with specialization in International Relations. In addition, he has a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in History from the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon. In 2020, he was appointed as Associate Dean, Faculty of Law and Political Science, at the University of Bamenda. Dr Fombo has published several articles on Cameroon-­Nigeria relations. Primus Fonkeng is Associate Professor in the Department of History at the University of Buea, Cameroon, where he lectures on Cameroon, Africa and World History at the undergraduate and post-­graduate levels. He is a graduate of the University of Yaoundé 1, Cameroon, where he obtained a BA, MA, DEA (MPhil) and a PhD in History of International Relations. He was also a part-­time lecturer in the Department of Arts, Education and Humanities (DAEH), Saint Monica University (SMU), Buea, where he lectured in courses on International Relations. His areas of research are the Political History of Africa, the History of International Relations, with a focus on Conflict Resolutions, Peace Building, Governance and Human Rights in Africa and other parts of the world. Pr Fonkeng also has a keen interest in the United Nations and its activities in Africa and the dynamics of the management of natural resources in Africa. He has attended many international conferences and workshops and published in journals at home and abroad. He has a book titled United Nations Peace Building Process in Cameroon and Nigeria. He is the Regional Coordinator for Africa in a non-­governmental organization based in the US, Global Aid for Africa (GAA). He also belongs to several scholarly societies including the African Center for Research in Peace and Sustainable Development (ACRPSD), Cameroon Society of History (CSH), Cameroon Commonwealth Association (CCA) and West African Association

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About the Editors and Contributors

for Commonwealth Literature and Language Studies (WAACLALS). Currently, he is researching topical international issues such as Conflicts Resolution and Terrorism in Central and West Africa and War Crimes on the African Continent. Primus Fonkeng is the Chair of Education Committee, in the South West Regional House of Assembly, Buea, Cameroon Chinyere Ibeh PhD is a Research Fellow in the Department of Area and Regional Studies at the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies, National Defence, Abuja, Nigeria. She holds a BSc, MSc and PhD degrees in International Relations from the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, and the University of Abuja respectively. Her broad research interest includes Foreign Policy Analysis, Peace and Conflict Resolution with a particular focus on Preventive Diplomacy. Her most recent publications are “Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Era of Terrorism in Nigeria” and “Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation of Former Boko Haram Combatant in Nigeria: Operation Safe Corridor Explained.” Christian Ichite holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Zoology from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria; Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy & Theology from the University of Navarre – Pamplona, Spain; and a Master of Arts in Peace & Conflict Studies, from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. He is currently in a PhD programme at the Institute of Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan. Mr Ichite is a Research Fellow at the National Defence College Nigeria, currently on secondment as Deputy Executive Secretary/ Programmes Coordinator at the Secretariat of African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), Yaoundé, Cameroon. Laureate of the University of Navarre for Bachelor’s Scholarship and the Institute Française de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA) Research Grant for Best Master of Arts project in Peace & Conflict Studies, University of Ibadan-­Nigeria, Mr Ichite is also a certified UN/AU Regional Senior Mission Leader (Grade A), with years of academic formation and professional training on Peace & Security at Centres of Excellence across Africa and Europe. Roger Kuitche is a retired military professional of the rank of Colonel and graduate of the Yaoundé Combined military academy in Cameroon. He also completed training programmes in field artillery in Great Britain and in the United States. In addition, he attended peacekeeping courses at the Koulikoro Staff School in Bamako, Mali, and the Lester B. Pearson Center. In August 2014, Colonel Kuitche completed a strategic-­level course in Higher Defence and Strategic Studies (HDSS) at the National Defence College, Nigeria leading to the award of the Fellowship of Defence College, fdc. In the course of



About the Editors and Contributors 357

his professional military career, Col Kuitche defended his country’s pride on operational theatres in Bakassi and against Boko Haram in the capacity of Commander of the 41st Motorised Infantry Brigade, Kouserri, Far North region in Cameroon, which is dedicated to the war against Boko Haram and also served on two international scenes: the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the Peacebuilding Mission (MICOPAX) in the Central African Republic (CAR) under the Central African Multinational Task Force (FOMAC). Between 2016 and 2019, he was Cameroon’s Defence Attaché in Nigeria with concurrent accreditation to the following 10 different countries: Benin, Togo, Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Niger, Guinea, The Gambia, Mali. Col Kuitche co-­authored two papers with Dr Charly Ndiapi Fopa as follows: “Stratégies cybernétiques de guerre non-­cinétique pour lutter contre l’insurrection et la cybercriminalité au Cameroun” and “Non-­kinetic Measures against Insurgency: Prospects for Cameroon.” Col Kuitche is a devout Christian and was born in Cameroon on 10 April 1958. He speaks both English and French fluently and is happily married and a father of five children. Pamela Ogwuazor Momah is the Acting Director of Library and Documentation Services at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA). She holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Studies from Marymount Manhattan College, New York, and a Masters in Library Science from the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. She has published many scholarly articles, among which are “Post COVID-19 Reference Services: NIIA Library the way forward” and “Reference services at the NIIA Library: Moving to Reference 2.0.” Patrick Chibueze Nwatu is a Rear Admiral in the Nigerian Navy and was granted a Presidential Commission to the navy on 10 September 1993. Nwatu has served in various capacities in the Nigerian armed forces. Importantly, he served as Nigeria’s Defence Adviser in Yaoundé, Republic of Cameroon, between 2013 and 2016 with concurrent accreditation to the Central Africa Republic and Republic of Congo (Brazzaville). He equally served as Principal Staff Officer to Chief of the Naval Staff until his current appointment as Deputy Commandant, Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji-­Nigeria. After a First Degree in Mathematics, he later gained a Masters Degree in International Law and Diplomacy from the Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. The senior military officer also earned a Master of Philosophy (M.Phil) in Security and Strategic Studies at the Nigerian Defence Academy. Rear Admiral Nwatu is decorated with the national honours of the Superior Knight of the National Order of Valour of the Republic of Cameroon as well as the Distinguished Service Star (DSS) for unblemished service in the armed forces of Nigeria. He is a Fellow of the Defence College of Nigeria (fdc) and

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About the Editors and Contributors

was also awarded the Passed Staff College Dagger (psc+) from the Armed Forces Command and Staff College Jaji. He is a member of the Nigerian Institute of Management and a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Public Diplomacy and Management (FCIPDM) as well as a subject-­matter expert on Nigeria-­Cameroon trans-­border relations. The senior officer is married to Mrs Adarema Nwatu and the union is blessed with five children, four boys and one girl. He enjoys reading and swimming at his leisure. Bernard Nwosu PhD is Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. He obtained a BSc (Hons) and MSc in Political Science from the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. He further attended the University of Waikato in New Zealand for a PhD in Political Science. Ben has published in the areas of democracy, governance, conflicts and diplomacy of transitional states. His recent book, titled Civil Society and Democracy in Nigeria: A Theoretical Approach, examines the nexus of the two spaces in the struggles for democracy in Nigeria. Tola Odubajo PhD is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, Nigeria. He obtained both his Bachelor and Master’s Degrees in International Relations from the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-­Ife, Nigeria, and later earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Lagos, Nigeria. His teaching and research endeavours are focused on the sub-­fields of: International Relations, and Comparative Politics. He has published extensively in peer-­reviewed journals and book chapter contributions on Africa-­themed issues of peace and conflict, democracy and leadership. He gained remarkable research experiences with stints at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, and the South Africa Research Chair Initiative (SARChI): African Diplomacy and Foreign-­Policy, Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He combines his active lectureship and research responsibilities as both a reviewer for international journals and an External Examiner for universities across Africa. Dr Odubajo is both the Coordinator of the MSc program of the Department of Political Science, University of Lagos, and a member of the Editorial Board of the UniLag Journal of Politics. Freedom Chukwudi Onuoha PhD is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. In addition to a doctorate degree in Political Economy, he holds a certificate in Higher Defence and Strategic Studies, Disaster Management, Protection of Civilians, Defence and Security Management, and United Nations Framework, among others. His current teaching and research interests focus on diverse aspects of security



About the Editors and Contributors 359

and strategic studies, with an emphasis on violent extremism, terrorism, insurgency, maritime security, violent conflict, organized crime, security sector reform, and state fragility. Dr Onuoha has published extensively in this broad area. With Temitope Oriola and Samuel Oyewole, he co-­edited Boko Haram’s Terrorist Campaign in Nigeria Contexts, Dimensions and Emerging Trajectories (2021); with Varin Caroline, Security in Nigeria: Contemporary Threats and Responses (2020); and with Oshita Oshita and Alumona Ikenna, Internal Security Management in Nigeria: Perspectives, Challenges and Lessons (2019). Usman A. Tar PhD is Professor of Political Science and Defence Studies and distinguished endowed Chair of Defence and Security Studies at the Nigerian Defence Academy, and Director of the Academy’s flagship Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation (CDSD). Prof Tar has held faculty positions in Africa, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Iraq. He is a member of the Board of Social Science Research Council’s African Peacebuilding Network (SSRC/APN), New York. Prof Tar was a member of the Nigerian Presidential Committee to review Nigeria’s National Defence Policy (2017) and presently is a member of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Defence Think Tank on National Security. He was formerly Associate Research Fellow at John and Elnora Ferguson Centre for Africa Studies (JEFCAS) at the University of Bradford, UK. He was also Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations and Director of Postgraduate Studies at the University of Kurdistan-­Hewler, Northern Iraq. Prof Tar is the author of The Politics of Neoliberal Democracy in Africa (2009); Globalization in Africa: Perspectives on Development, Security, and the Environment (2016); Defence Transformation and the Consolidation of Democracy in Nigeria (2018); and New Architecture for Regional Security in Africa: Counter-­Terrorism and Counter-­Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin (2020). P ​ rof Tar has consulted, or consults, for the Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD, Nigeria): the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, Nigeria); the United States Institute for Peace (Nigeria Office) and the Konrad Adaneur Stiftung (German Development Fund, Nigeria). He also serves as visiting professor and external examiner to several institutions of higher learning in Nigeria. Address: Centre for Defence Studies and Documentation, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna. email: uatar@nda​.edu​.ng Jasper Chidiebube Uche PhD until recently was Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, but currently is on a parallel appointment as a Research Fellow at the Institute for Development Studies, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus. He holds a PhD in Political

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About the Editors and Contributors

Science with specialization in political economy. His research interest spans Government and Strategic Studies. He worked in different tiers of government in Nigeria for over 10 years before joining academia. He is a member of the Nigeria Institute for International Affairs (NIIA), Victoria Island, Lagos. Among his major publications are: “Shia Islam Clampdown in Nigeria: A Recipe for Insurgency” (2019) and “Outbreak of COVID-19 Pandemic and the Sustainability of Democratic Processes: The Nigerian Case” (2021). He is the author of the book Footprints of Excellence—80 Leadership Lessons from Global Titans. Obinna Ukaeje is a Research Fellow with the Department of Defence and Security Studies at the Centre for Strategic Research and Studies (CSRS), National Defence College, Nigeria. He holds a Master of Science degree in International Relations, and Bachelor of Science degree in Political Science, both from the University of Abuja, Nigeria. His area of interest is defence and security studies, especially Nigeria’s national security. He has published and actively contributed to discourses on Nigeria’s national security. He was a member of the National Quarterly Desk Review Committee for Community Initiative for Promoting Peace (CIPP), organized by the Savanna Centre for Diplomacy and Development (SCDDD) in 2019, and a member of the Savannah Centre’s research team on Continuous Engagement for National Unity (CENU), 2020. Solomon Ayegba Usman is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science in Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-­Ife, Nigeria. He holds a Bachelor of Science (BSc) (Hons) degree from Kogi State University, Anyigba, Kogi State, and Master of Science (MSc) and Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degrees in Political Science from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-­Ife, Osun State, Nigeria. His teaching and research interest areas cover International Relations/Comparative Politics, Peace and Conflict Studies, and Political Economy and Development Studies. Dr Usman has published many books, including Rudiments of Government and Politics, which he co-­ authored with Dr Najeem Folasayo Salaam in 2019, as well as A Political Economy of Core-­Periphery Relations, which he authored alone in 2019. In addition, his contributions have appeared in several reputable peer-­reviewed journals and edited books both local and international. Besides teaching and conducting research, Dr Usman is a regular guest on major TV and radio stations in Nigeria, where he continues to grant interviews on major national, regional and global issues. He has also granted interviews to several leading national dailies in Nigeria.



About the Editors and Contributors 361

Sharkdam Wapmuk PhD is Associate Professor with the Department of Defence and Security Studies, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna. Prior to joining the NDA, he was a Senior Research Fellow and served as Ag. Director of Research and Studies, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. Dr Wapmuk has several publications to his credit. He is co-­editor, Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under the Administration of President Muhammadu Buhari: 2015–2019 (with Bukar Bukarambe, Osita A. Agbu, and Tola Ilesanmi) (2020); co-­editor; African Perspectives on ACP-­EU Relations (with Amadu Sesay and Chinasa A. Ugwuanyi) (2020); co-­editor, Civil Society and National Security in Nigeria: A Strategic Analysis (with E. N. Kalu) (2020); co-­editor, Culture and Nigeria’s Foreign Relations in a Globalizing World (with Louis Eriomala) (2020); co-­ editor, Perspectives on Contemporary Nigerian Politics and International Relations: Essays in Honour of Professor Warisu Oyesina Alli (with Usman A. Tar and Efem N. Ubi) (2020); co-­editor, Gas Flaring in the Niger Delta: The Internal and External Dimensions (with Bukar Bukarambe and Osita Agbu) (2018). He edited the Nigerian Forum: A Journal of Opinion on World Affairs (NIIA). He serves as a Research Consultant and Resource Person for research think tanks, international organizations and academic institutions. His current research and teaching interests, and publication focus, are in the areas of defence, security, conflict, cooperation and integration, foreign policy, and Nigeria-­India relations. Olanrewaju Lateef Yusuf PhD is the current chairman of the Oyo State chapter of the Society for Peace Studies and Practice (SPSP). He also doubles as the Oyo State secretary of the Institute of Chartered Mediators and Conciliators (ICMC). He is a researcher at the Department of Peace, Security and Humanitarian Studies, University of Ibadan, with research interests in environmental conflict, sustainable development and good governance. He holds a BA degree in Linguistics and Yoruba from Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba-­Akoko, Ondo State, an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies and a PhD in Peace and Conflict Studies from the Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His published works includes “World Approaching Extinction: Bio-­diversities, Human Security and the Amazon Rainforest Wildfires,” published with the Ibadan Journal of Peace and Development as well as “Phases of Boko Haram: Manipulation of The Name of God and Religion” published by the Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies.