Business & slavery: the New York merchants & the irrepressible conflict [Reprinted]


115 44

English Pages [376] Year 1968

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD PDF FILE

Recommend Papers

Business & slavery: the New York merchants & the irrepressible conflict [Reprinted]

  • Commentary
  • TruePDF (scan) | TOC | Cover
  • 0 0 0
  • Like this paper and download? You can publish your own PDF file online for free in a few minutes! Sign Up
File loading please wait...
Citation preview

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2014

https://archive.org/details/businessslaverynOOfone

BUSINESS

& SLAVERY

Business

The &

NEW

&

YORK

Slavery

MERCHANTS

the IRREPRESSIBLE

PHILIP

S. FONER,

CONFLICT

Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, LINCOLN UNIVERSITY

NEW

YORK

/ RUSSELL

^ RUSSELL

COPYRIGHT, I 941, BY THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS COPYRIGHT © I968, BY PHILIP S. FONER REISSUED, I968, BY RUSSELL & RUSSELL A DIVISION OF ATHENEUM HOUSE, INC. BY ARRANGEMENT WITH PHILIP S. FONER L. C. CATALOG CARD NO! 68-1 5 I 22 PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

'BOSTO

N PU

TO

JACK

Preface

THIS is the story of a group of people in the antebellum North who earnestly believed that it was possible to save their country from the horrors of civil war, who struggled for many years to stave off the threatened dissolution of the Union, and who, in the end, zealously supported the armed forces of the United States in the hope that war would achieve what peace had failed to accomplish— the preservation of the Union. As the foremost business men in the nation, they were linked by economic and social ties to the planters of the South. Since they were dependent upon the Cotton Kingdom for much of their prosperity, they were always the first to oppose any policy which they believed would disturb these vital relations and would ultimately undermine the foundations upon which their prosperity rested. To prevent this tragedy, they were again and again compelled to abandon their counting rooms for the arena of politics. It is the purpose of this book to relate the story of their activities in this arena, at the same time pointing out the relations that existed between business and politics. The word merchants as it is used in this book, refers to one engaged in business, whatever his special trade or function might be. In this sense, of course, the word loses its original meaning of one who bought and sold outright in foreign trade. But by 1850, in New York City, bankers, capitalists, brokers, commercial lawyers, railroad speculators, and manufacturers referred to themselves as merchants. The author had intended to include a chapter on the "Merchant Princes," in which consideration would have been given to the background and social and economic activities of the business men. But the appearance, after the first draft of this chapter had been completed, of Robert G. Albion's excellent studies, Square Riggers on Schedule, and The Rise of New York Port (18 15-1860), which devote so much space to these issues, rendered this superfluous. vii

viii

PREFACE

To Professor Allan Nevins of Columbia University, under whose direction this study was made, I owe a debt of gratitude for advice and encouragement. Professors Harry J. Carman, David S. Muzzey, Henry Steele Commager, Luther H. Gulick, and Mr. Louis Hacker, all of Columbia University, offered important suggestions and helpful criticisms. Professors Joseph E. Wisan and Michael Kraus, and Dr. Harry Rudman of the College of the City of New York, gave me the benefit of careful readings of the manuscript. However, full responsibility for the development of the study and the conclusions, rests with myself alone. I am indebted to Professors Nelson P. Mead and Holland Thompson, of the College of the City of New York, for arousing my interest in the ante-bellum period in American history. I am also indebted to the following institutions for opening their collections to me, and to their staff members, who were uniformly courteous and helpful: The Albany State Library, The Baker Library of the Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, The Buffalo Historical Society, The University of Chicago Library, The University of Rochester Library, The Kansas State Historical Society, The New York Historical Society, The Library of Columbia University, New York City, The New York Public Library, The Library of the Chamber of Commerce of New York State, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania. The Library of Congress, and the Library of the College of the City of New York. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Roslyn Held Foner, whose good-humored assistance lightened considerably the task of preparing the manuscript for publication. Philip S. Foner June , 1940

Contents

PAGE Vii

PREFACE I. THE EMPIRE

CITY AND THE COTTON

II. THE COMPROMISE III. DEFENDING

IV. THE

OF 185O

V. "BLEEDING"

SAFETY

COMMITTEE,

185O-1852.

viii. the election of 1 860 ix. crisis x. a friendly appeal

55 88

REPUBLICANISM .

34

.

KANSAS

vii. business and slavery, 1857-1859

1 15

THE COMPROMISE

UNION

VI. "black"

KINGDOM

.

106 139 169 208 224

xi. secession

239

xii. compromise

248

xiii. the war

of the tariffs

275

xiv. the republic of new york

285

xv. decision

297

xvi. the glorious

uprising

306

xvii. conclusion

318

bibliography

323

index

337

ix

BUSINESS

& SLAVERY

1

The

Empire

City

and

the Cotton

Kingdom

IN the years just before the Civil War, it was customary for antislavery writers and speakers to refer to New York City as "the prolongation of the South" where "ten thousand cords of interests are linked with the Southern Slaveholder." 1 If, by some magic, one of the countless visitors to the "World of Tomorrow" had suddenly been transported back to the New York World's Fair of 1853, he would have had no difficulty in discovering the reasons for these remarks. Had he arrived in the city late in June or early in July, he would have noticed that the lobbies of the Astor, St. Nicholas, Fifth Avenue, St. Denis, Clarendon, and Metropolitan hotels were thronged with Southern merchants and planters.2 The pages of the morning and evening newspapers, he would have observed, were filled with advertisements addressed to these Southerners, urging them to visit this or that store, to inspect the latest assortments of dry goods, hardware, boots and shoes, and other types of merchandise.3 Had our visitor studied these advertisements carefully, he would have noticed that many of these firms emphasized that they specialized in merchandise exclusively for the "Southern" trade.4 And had he chanced upon the following card in his newspaper, he would have learned that there were many firms in the city who were referred to as "Southern" houses. It was entitled "The Tailor's Appeal," and read: 1 Cf. The Uprising oftthe People (United States, 1861), passim; New York Times, Jan. 22, 1859; Aug. 4, i860; hereafter cited as Times; J. Weiss, Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker, II, 177. 2 De Bow's Review, XXIX, 577; New York Herald, July 10, 1853; hereafter cited as Herald. 3 Cf. New York Journal of Commerce, July 16, 1853; hereafter cited as Journal of Commerce. * New York Tribune, July 20, 1853; hereafter cited as Tribune. See also Philadelphia Press, Feb. 15, 1861; W. E. Dodge, Old New York, p. 10.

2

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

To the merchants from the South who have come to New York to purchase clothing: Gentlemen: Whereas, a number of the "Southern" work employers, refuse to give us a fair remuneration for our labor, and as it is utterly impossible, for us, working for them, to earn bread for ourselves and families, and as we wish you to fully understand who are the friends of the workingmen, we subjoin a list of employers 5 who have signed a bill of prices, and earnestly call upon you to patronize only those employers who have acted so honorably. . . « Our visitor would also have noticed, when he read the advertisements of the New York firms, that many of them mentioned that they had branch houses in the South.7 Some, like J. P. Marshall and Company, Rogers and Company, and Phelps-Dodge and Company, referred to branch houses in New Orleans; 8 some, like Trenholm Brothers, to branch houses in Charleston; 9 and some, like Daniel Parish and Company, to branch houses in five different Southern cities.10 Had our visitor turned to the shipping news in his paper, he would have noted with interest that a vessel had just been completed "to be employed regularly in the coasting trade," and that it was hailed not merely as a new ship, but mainly because it would "add another and stronger link to that chain of union which the patriotism of the good men of both the North and the South are anxious to cement." 11 He would also have been interested to learn that the vessel was owned jointly by Spofford, Tileston and s Sixty-nine firms were listed. Among them were Devlin and Company, Brooks Brothers, Rogers and Company, and Zellner, King and Company. 6 Tribune, Aug. 19, 1850. f Several New York firms, on the other hand, were branches of Southern establishments. To mention but a few: Brown Brothers, Edward Matthews and Company, Finley and Company, John Frazer and Company, Hewitt, Lees and Company. See Times, Dec. 7, 1852; June 7, 1859; Journal of Commerce, Oct. 24, 1857; New Orleans Prices Current, Sept. 15, 1849, and Brown Brothers Letterbooks, Aug. 16, 1858; March 30, Sept. 20, 1859. 8 Times, Aug. 12, 1853; Sept. 29, 1855. See also Phelps-Dodge Papers, Nov. 14, 1848; July 19, 23, Oct. 15, Dec. 13, 21, 1853; and J- H- Colles, Jr. to J. H. Colles, Sr., Dec. 81, 1858, Colles Papers. 9 Journal of Commerce, Aug. 12, 1853. 10 J. A. Scoville, The Old Merchants of New York, IV, 134-139. 11 Journal of Commerce, July 12, 1853; Jan. 12, 1847; May 8, 1850; Tribune, March 1, 1850; New York Courier and Enquirer, Sept. 9, 1846; hereafter cited as Courier and Enquirer; New York Evening Post, May 17, 1856; hereafter cited as Post; New York Evening Express, Jan 12, 1858; hereafter cited as Express.

THE

EMPIRE

CITY

3

Company of New York and Thomas G. Budd of Charleston,12 and that many other coasting steamers and packets were owned jointly by New Yorkers and Southerners.13 Another newspaper item that might have attracted the attention of the stranger was that which appeared in the Evening Post on May 10, 1853. "Scarcely a day elapses," it declared, "that this sheet does not contain lengthy appeals from Southern corporations for money to work mines, to build roads, and to make other improvements." Had he remained in the city for but a few weeks, the visitor would have discovered that these appeals rarely went unanswered. For he would have learned that mines in Georgia, South Carolina, Alabama, Virginia, and North Carolina had "been purchased and taken possession of by New York companies," 14and that their Boards of Directors were "composed mainly of New York capitalists." 15 Also, that a Southern railroad company was being organized in the city, that his newspaper predicted that "the New York City," 16 described as "a New and others, with a he might even have

whole of the stocks will be subscribed in and that a railroad project in Virginia was York scheme just set on foot by E. K. Collins capital of four million dollars." 17 Finally, seen a report in his newspaper stating that in

the sale of a Southern planter's property, a New York creditor took over the slaves.18 Had he consulted some bystander, he would have discovered that this was by no means an infrequent practice, and that as a result, a good many merchants at one time or another owned "slave-work plantations." 19 One partner in "a Broad12 Mary Tileston, Life of Thomas Tileston, p. 12; Scoville, op. cit., V, 219. 13 See Philadelphia Press, Nov. 21, i860; Journal of Commerce, May 19, 1851; Charleston Courier, Dec. 19, i860; Tribune, March 9, 1859; June 8, 1854; Jan. 16, 1858; New Orleans Picayune, Oct. 29, 1850. i*Post, Aug. 30, Sept. 8, Dec. 5, 7, 30, 1853; Jan. 3, 6, March 21, 1854; Nov. 19, 24, 1856; Times, Feb. 21, 1853; Herald, Oct. 10, 1857; De Bow's Review, XXVIII, 332. ^ Post, June 1, 1850; Jan. 6, 1854. Simeon Draper was President of the East Tennessee Mining Company, Mortimer Livingston and Frederick Talcott, New York dry goods merchants, were President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Guilford County Mining Company in North Carolina, and F. Pentz, another New York dry goods merchant, was a director in the Phoenix Mining and Manufacturing Company of Virginia. See Post, Jan. 6, March 21, 1854; Aug. 26, 1853. itPost, July 15, Aug. 13, 1853; K. Bruce, Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era, p. 215. See also Tribune, Jan. 8, 1850; Sept. 11, i860. 17 Times, Dec. 25, 1852; Herald, June 2, 1854; De Bow's Review, XVIII, 523. is Liberator, July 30, 1853; Feb. 16, 1849; Post, Feb. 6, 1849. See also Hackett Letterbook, I, 59. is London Times, Oct. 2, 1859.

4

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

way firm" was said to possess twelve hundred slaves, and another three hundred.20 Had the visitor remained in the city until September, he would have seen the daily departures of packets for the South, burdened with huge cargoes of dry goods, boots and shoes, hardware, clothing, liquors and even fruits, butter, and cheese.21 The same vessels, he would have noticed, soon returned to New York, this time loaded with cotton, tobacco, tar, resin, turpentine, wheat, pork and molasses.22 By the time our visitor was ready to return to the Twentieth Century, he should have been quite ready to agree that New York was "almost as dependent upon Southern slavery as Charleston itself." 23 Perhaps he might even have agreed with James Dunmore De Bow, who said in reply to a query by the London Times, asking, "What would New York be without slavery?" 24 The ships would rot at her docks; grass would grow in Wall Street and Broadway, and the glory of New York, like that of Babylon and Rome, would be numbered with the things of the past.25 Regardless of what our mythical visitor might have thought, there is no doubt that many New Yorkers in the years before the Civil War accepted De Bow's dire predictions as the gospel truth.28 Nor is it difficult to see why this should have been the case. The influence of the South upon New York's economic life started at the port, and proceeded uptown, touching every form of business activity on its way. Without Southern cotton and tobacco, the shipping merchants would have found it almost impossible to carry on their oceangoing commerce profitably, for they depended upon Southern 20 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 19, i860. Probably Isaac Bell, Jr., was the one mentioned. See Post, Oct. 25, i860; Nov. 3, 1848; Tribune, Oct. 15, i860; Cincinnati Gazette, May 27, 1857, for other examples of merchants who owned slaves. For evidence of Southern investment in Northern land during this period, see Paul W. Gates, "Southern Investments in Northern Lands Before the Civil War," Journal of Southern History, V, 156-186. 21 See especially Nov. 2, 18, 27, i860; and Annual Report of the Chamber of Commerce for 1861-1862, p. 43. 22 De Bow's Review, II, 53-54. See also the manifests of the Southerner from New Orleans in New York Shipping and Commercial List, Jan. 12, 1850; hereafter cited as Shipping and Commercial List. 23 See J. De Bow, Interest in Slavery of the Southern Non-Slaveholder, p. 6. 24 Quoted in New York Daily News, Dec. 20, i860; hereafter cited as News. 25 De Bow's Review, XXIX, 318. 26 See Journal of Commerce, Feb. 2, Sept. 13, i860.

THE

EMPIRE

CITY

5

products to supply return cargoes for the vessels bringing dry goods, hardware, and "human freight" from Europe.27 Even when western wheat and corn poured into the city by canal and railroad, the chief cargo of the east-bound ocean packets was still cotton. 28 Moreover, since no inconsiderable part of Southern cotton, tobacco, and other products were exported from New York City, the coasting vessels were also supplied with cargo on their downward trips.29 As early as 1761, cotton was being carried to Europe by way of the Empire City, for in that year the scow Mary, with eighteen bales of cotton on board, was reported "riding in the harbor of New York and by God's grace bound for London." 30 In 1788, 282 bales of cotton were exported, 62 from New York.31 By the year ending September 30, 1825, receipts at New York amounted to 174,465 bales, and exports to 153,757 bales.32 A New York commercial journal concluded at the time "that a great increase has taken place in the course of this year of cotton from the South, to be afterwards either exported thence for foreign countries or consumed at home." 33 Early in 1850, the Herald predicted that within a few years New York would become the "great distributing point of the raw material." 34 However, due to the rise of the cotton in transitu trade, and to the increase of domestic consumption, New York's position in the export of cotton declined. In 1859, only 28,800 bales were shipped to New York from New Orleans and Mobile, whereas six years before, 94,000 bales had been sent.35 For the three years ending August 30, 1859, exports averaged only 148,734 bales a year out of total receipts averaging 396, 497. 38 The transitu trade in cotton grew considerably during the mid-fifties.37

Cotton was purchased in the Southern markets,

27 R. G. Albion, The Rise of the New York Port, p. 93. 2« Ibid., p. 116, and especially Appendix IX, p. 400. See also Herald, Aug. 1, 1853; July 20, 1855; Tribune, April 21, 1859. 29 Albion, op. cit., p. 99. so Barrett and Hamilton, Cotton, p. 78. si J. De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States, I, 120. 32 L. C. Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern States to i860, II, 696. m Niles Register, Oct. 15, 1825. 34 April 20, 1850. 35 Annual Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce for 1859, pp. 334-339; Times, Jan. 10, 1859. 36 Gray, op. cit., p. 696. 37 Annual Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce for 1859, pp. 337-339.

6

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

carefully classed and sampled, and, having been consigned to order, was placed on board a vessel bound for Europe. The samples were then forwarded by steamer or express to New York, where they were exposed for sale. When a sale was made, the bills of lading were transferred and the cash paid.38 Although the development of this trade meant a loss to shipowners, since it eliminated the extra trip to New York,39 it provided a harvest for cotton speculators.40 What is more important, itdid not alter the position of New York in the cotton trade, for the Empire City still remained the apex of what a recent writer has called the "cotton triangle." 41 Down to the outbreak of the Civil War, New York dominated every single phase of the cotton trade from plantation to market. The cotton factors in the South were either themselves New Yorkers or agents of New York firms.42 The shipping vessels which carried the cotton either directly to England or coastwise to New York or New England were frequently owned by New Yorkers.43 New York companies took charge of the insurance of the cotton cargoes.44 The advances necessary for the planting of the new crop came from New York firms and banks.45 Finally, the domestic and imported merchandise used in the cotton kingdom came mainly from New

York.46

"Our

merchants," said the

38 See the cotton reports of T. Stewart and Company in Times, Jan. 24, 1855; Aug. 1, 1858; Tribune, March 31, 1857; Post, Oct. 29, 1856; March 13, 1858. wPost, April 12, 1859; Shipping and Commercial List, May 14, i860. 40 See "Commission Merchant," Times, Aug. 7, 1858; "A Cotton Merchant," Times, May 20, 1857, an(^ circular of "Cotton Brokers," Tribune, Oct. 20, 1853. 41 See Albion, op. cit., Chapter VI. 42 See A. H. Stone, "Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States," American Historical Review, XX, 557-565; Freeman Hunt, ed., Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review, XXIX, 64; XLII, 318; hereafter cited as Hunt's Merchants' Magazine; De Bow's Review, XX, 713, ff.; M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry, p. 111; R. R. Russell, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, pp. 101-102. For a good picture of how the factor was connected with New York firms, see the papers of William Bostwick (MS, Yale University Library). Some excerpts are printed in Albion, op. cit., pp. 112-113, and N. Buck, Anglo-American Trade, 1800-1850, pp. 4382-89. Albion, op. cit., p. 114. 44 See Bird and Neilson Cash Book, 1853-1857 (MS, New York Public Library). They were insurance brokers in New York City. See also Buck, op. cit., pp. 86-88. 45 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, IV, 221; N. Myers, The New York Money Market, I, 70; Annual Report of the New York Chamber of Commerce for 1859, pp. 1-2; De Bow's Review, XXIX, 204. 4s De Bow's Review, XXIX, 203. Even goods manufactured in Massachusetts were sold to Southerners in New York. See Boston Post, reprinted in T. Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, p. 60. See also pocket memorandum books in William Bostwick Papers.

THE

EMPIRE

CITY

7

Journal of Commerce on March 15, 1856, "are to a great extent the factors through whom its [cotton] exchange for foreign commodities isconducted, and thus and in other ways, our interests and prosperity are intimately connected with the activity which the swelling streams will impart to the movement of the Southern product." Four years later, Thomas Prentice Kettell wrote in his widely publicized polemic, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits: 47 "All the profitable branches of freighting, brokering selling, banking, insurance, etc., that grow out of the Southern product are enjoyed in New York." 48 What profits did New Yorkers gain from their control of Southern economy? Early in the thirties, a committee appointed by the legislature of Alabama to investigate this problem concluded that fully one-third of the price of cotton went to New Yorkers.49 Two decades later, another group of Southerners estimated that New York business men received as much as forty cents out of every dollar paid for Southern cotton.50 Just what the exact figures were, it is almost impossible to estimate, but a Virginian declared that his state alone paid out about $9,539,037.76 annually to New York merchants.51 Late in 1849, the Journal of Commerce stated that the South had purchased more than $76,000,000 worth of merchandise in New York during the year.52 A decade later, Stephen Colwell estimated in his pamphlet, The Five Cotton States and New York, that merchandise valued at $131,000,000 had been sold to Southerners by New York firms in 1859. 53 Moreover, he stated that the total business provided for New Yorkers by the five cotton states amounted to $200,000,000 annually.54 The total value of the annual Southern trade was probably much greater than the sum presented by Colwell, for he failed to consider the fact that New Yorkers gained considerable profits from goods manufactured in Newark, Hartford, Boston, etc., and distributed to the South by firms in the Empire City.55 Nor did 47 p. 98. 48 For evidence that the control of the cotton trade by New York was also carried on in tobacco, see Russell, op. cit., p. 101. 49 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States, III, 93. so Ibid., 93 n. 51 Bow's Review, XIV, 501. Dec. 12, 1849; Oct. 25, 1850. 5352 P. 23. 54 Pp. 23-24. 55 See Newark Ledger, in Herald, Feb. 2, i860; Newark Post, April 12, 1861; Boston Post, reprinted in Kettell, op. cit., p. 60.

8

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

he take into consideration the fact that a good deal of the funds received by Western farmers for foodstuffs sent to the South came to New York for purchases of dry goods, hardwares, boots and shoes, and other merchandise.56 Although it is difficult to estimate the exact profits amassed by New Yorkers from Southern production and consumption, it is easy to see that this issue would be the subject of endless discussions in the South. Some Southerners took pride in the preeminence of the Empire City in commercial affairs, for they regarded it as a living symbol of the powerful influence of King Cotton. "New York, by it," wrote one Southerner, "has become the emporium of the Western world, and will, in time, rival London and Paris." 57 John B. Floyd told a group of New York merchants: "I rejoice that the great staples of the South are the chief means by which your commerce is fostered, and your mechanics and artisans kept constantly at work." 58 Many Southerners prized the close social connections that grew out of the economic ties between New York and the South. Contacts initiated in the counting rooms or at the watering places often flourished into intimate friendships.59 Partnerships between Southerners and New Yorkers in the same business venture produced warm relationships, 60 as did marriages between sons and daughters of New York and Southern business men.61 Even the dusty files of business letter-books reveal frequent instances of the cordial feeling existing between New Yorkers and their Southern customers. Many an order requesting a New York firm to "Please send us via Savannah by first packet twenty cases of hardware," conluded with a statement similar to the following: 62 "For the kind and cordial hospitality which has been meted out to the writer during his sojourn in your great metropolis, he will treasure up the same in a grateful heart." 66 Herald, Nov. l, i860. 87 De Bow's Review, XXIX, 209. Ibid., XXI, 530-538. 5» See R. H. Shryock, ed., Letters of Richard D. Arnold, passim. See also J. H. Colles to his father, New Orleans, Dec. 6, 1857, Colles Papers. ©0 See Charleston Courier, Feb. 26, 1861; Scoville, op. cit., IV, 138, 157; V, 260; Express, Sept. 15, 1858; and News, March 2, 1861. si Scoville, op. cit., IV, 111, 136, 146, 290; I, 171. 92 See Express, Sept. 15, 1858; G. T. Beaureaugard to Cooper-Hewitt, New Orleans, Dec. 31, 1857, Cooper-Hewitt Papers; John Boones, Augusta. Ga., Dec. 10, 1852; A. Whiting, New Orleans, May 19, 1852; W. H. Mahamy, Augusta, Ga., June 1, 1853; Conway and Dickinson, Knoxville, Tenn., Aug. 15, 1852, to Phelps, Dodge and Company, Phelps-Dodge Papers.

THE

EMPIRE

CITY

9

Many Southerners often expressed gratitude to New Yorkers for their frequent contributions to aid Southern communities in need or in distress. When an organ was needed for a Southern church, a group of New York merchants speedily raised the funds necessary to purchase it.63 When a Southern educational or charitable institution conducted a campaign for funds, New York business men led the list of contributors.6* When Southern clergymen appealed for aid in spreading the gospel, after the split in the American Home Missionary Society, a group of New York merchants formed the "Southern Aid Society," and contributed thousands of dollars to assist the organization in its work.65 Finally, whenever a yellow fever epidemic swept through a Southern city, as it did in 1847, 1853, 1854, 1855 and 1858, the New York merchants would appoint a special committee to collect funds. Within a week or two, fifty or sixty thousand dollars would be sent to the stricken city.66 Scores of Southerners publicly expressed their gratitude to New Yorkers for these examples of "common brotherhood." 67 In 1856, the Howard Association of Norfolk presented a gold medal to the New York merchant who had headed the committee to raise funds for the yellow fever victims of that city.68 Three years before, the leading citizens of New Orleans held a public meeting to honor the many business men of New York who had contributed so liberally to help check the ravages of disease in the Southern city. One of the resolutions declared: We thank you heartily for those generous exertions which have enabled us to comfort our sick and bury our dead. May you never need a return of our sympathy, but rest assured our hearts are throbbing with gratitude, and will ever be open to the call of humanity.69 65 Times, April 9, i860. •* Tribune, Nov. 19, 1850; Journal of Commerce, Aug. 18, 1853. 05 See letter in Journal of Commerce, Aug. 24, 1853. See also Annual Meeting of the Southern Aid Society, pamphlets (New York, 1854-1861); Journal of Commerce, Nov. 12, 1853; Nov. 12, 1856. William E. Dodge, James Boorman, Sherman Brothers, Allen, McLean and Bulkley, Anson G. Phelps, Trowbridge, Bright and Company, and Gerard Hallock were active in the Society. See Journal of Commerce, Jan. 19, 1861. Herald, Aug. 31, 1853; Sept. 26, 1854; Aug. 18, Oct. 7, 1855; Journal of Commerce, Aug. 6, Sept. 24, 1853; Aug. 17, 1855; Sept. 25, Oct. 30, 1858; Post, Sept. 28, 1847; Aug. 25, 1853. 67 See Times, April 9, i860. 68 Journal of Commerce, May 31, 1856. **Ibid., Sept. 19, 1853. See also New Orleans Picayune, in ibid., Aug. 23, 1853. In 1855, the Howard Association of New Orleans appropriated $2,000 to aid the suffering poor of New York. Herald, Jan. 11, 1855.

10

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

Despite all this, one cannot overlook the fact that to many people in the South, New York was the symbol of Northern "bloodsucking," which had robbed the South of the trade and wealth to which she was entitled. To the readers of the Charleston Mercury, the New

Orleans Picayune, the Savannah Republican,

and, of course, DeBow's Review, New York City represented Northern exploitation, extortionate prices, excessive financial charges, and in general, a higher cost of living.70 New York fattened and grew rich upon the South, these journals shrieked week after week.71 Said the Vicksburg Daily Whig: New York City, like a mighty queen of commerce, sits proudly upon her island throne sparkling in jewels, and waving an undisputed commercial sceptre over the South. By means of her railways and navigable streams, she sends out her long arms to the extreme South; and with avidity rarely equalled, grasps our gains and transfers them to herself— taxing us at every step and depleting us as extensively as possible without actually destroying us.72 Similarly, DeBow's Review cried out: Southern toil and labor . . . has been showering down gold for fifty years into her lap amounting to countless millions. The patronage of the South has furnished its full quota towards supplying the means to rear that immensely wealthy city. Unsuspecting Southern liberality has done its utmost to feed and pamper that monster city.73 It is not necessary here to recount in detail the many efforts made by Southerners to free themselves from what they regarded as a position of complete economic subservience. R. R. Russell's study, Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, has presented a complete picture of the direct trade conventions held in the South in the late thirties, and of the various movements in later decades to establish lines of ocean steamers for direct trade, all of which "came to naught," and "accomplished no tangible results in the way of changing the course of Southern commerce." 74 to For a defense of New York against these charges, see F. L. Olmstead, The Cotton Kingdom, II, 301-302; Stephen Colwell, The Five Cotton States and New York, pp. 23, 27 passim; and Daniel Lord, The Effect of Secession Upon the Commercial Relations Between the North and South, and Upon Each Section, p. 15. 71 For representative views in Southern papers, see Charleston Mercury, Oct. 27, i860, and Virginia Argus, reprinted in News, Feb. 1, 1861. 72 Quoted in D. C. Dumond, ed., Southern Editorials on Secession, p. 14. 73 De Bow's Review, XXIX, 82; also XXVIII, 201. 74 Russell, op. cit., pp. 22, 32. See also H. Wender, Southern Commercial Conventions, passim.

THE

EMPIRE

CITY

11

It is of some interest, however, to analyze the intensive propaganda campaign conducted to convince the Southern people to purchase their domestic and imported goods in Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, and other Southern commercial centers rather than in New

York. For years Southern commercial writers had bewailed the fact that "almost every country merchant who visits Charleston has a through ticket for New York in his pocket,"75 and they had appealed again and again to these merchants to aid in building up the economic life of the South. Millions spent at New York could be used "to start new branches of industrial development" which would soon turn out commodities "as cheap as they can be purchased in New York." 76 Moreover, in addition to aiding his state and section, the merchant could even save himself considerable sums of money. The ultimate cost of goods in the Southern cities would be much less than that paid in New York. After all, house rents and store rents were twice or three times as high in New York as they were in Charleston; clerks' wages were higher; and the expenses of families and living were considerably greater. In Charleston or New Orleans the country merchant could deal directly with the importer, who combined in his business all that was done in New York by both importer and jobber. In this manner, an unnecessary middleman could be eliminated. At the same time, the cost in traveling to and from New York, the interest which accrued on his money while idle, the risks, insurance, and cost of shipping to and landing at Charleston, Savannah, or New Orleans, and commissions on forwarding to the country merchant when landed at the points of stoppage on the way to his home, also could be eliminated, and thereby the final cost of the merchandise would be considerably reduced.77 De Bow estimated that on merchandise sold in New York at $123.50, $18.16 "exclusive of expenses of traveling to the North," could be saved if it were purchased in Charleston.78 Finally, the simple country merchant would be much more at home in some friendly Southern city than in that den of vice and iniquity— New York. Who were the merchant princes of 7» William Gregg in De Bow's Review, XXIX, 776. 76 New Orleans Picayune, in Courier and Enquirer, Sept. 26, 1849; De Bow's Review, XXIX, 776. 77 See Niles Register, LVI, 253; De Bow's Review, IV, 496-501; XXVIII, 222; XXIX, 80, 229, 555, 776-777, 800. 78 De Bow's Review, IV, 498. See also Baltimore Patriot, in Charleston Mercury, Sept. 4, i860.

12

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

New York? Adroit men, who lived in luxury, and in order to maintain their sumptuous palaces on Fifth Avenue, obtained "exorbitant profits" from naive merchants from the interior. Being "reckless of character," they never hesitated to cheat a man. All in all, New York was "the last place where an inexperienced, impractical merchant should venture to purchase a stock of goods." 79 Stay away from New York, the New Orleans Crescent cried: 80 New York with her rotten bankruptcies permeating and injuring almost every solvent community in the Union. New York, the centre of reckless speculation, unflinching fraud and downright robbery. New York, the prime cause of four-fifths of the insolvencies of the country; New York, carrying on an enormous trade with capital mostly furnished by other communities. Every few years, a Southern journal announced that the country merchants had resolved to patronize business firms in the larger Southern cities and thereby to "escape the profits of the New York agents." 81 In the main, however, the foregoing appeals, like the direct trade conventions, and the steamship projects, went for naught. What the extreme Southern propagandists generally overlooked was that New York provided advantages to merchants that no other city could equal. Most important of all for Southern traders was the ability to obtain goods on long credits. The planters lived on credit during most of the year; hence the country merchants required eight to ten months credit terms. These advantages the Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans business houses could not provide, since the Southern banks were in no position to sustain them.82 In New York, moreover, the country merchant could purchase from importers or commission merchants who specialized in certain assortments of merchandise; he could purchase from merchants who replenished their stocks frequently, and he could purchase at auctions where goods were sold cheaply enough to cover costs of transportation.83 In addition, he could bring home goods stamped and hethemselves knew fromin experience that Southern women"New did York," not consider fashion unless 79 so si 82 83

De Bow's Review, XXIX, 777. Reprinted in Herald, Dec. 14, 1857. See Charleston Courier, Sept. 25, i860. Russell, op. cit., p. 21; De Bow, Industrial Resources, III, 98. De Bow's Review, XXIX, 771.

THE

EMPIRE

CITY

13

their clothes came from the Empire City.84 Finally, he could visit the theatres in New York, and spend the summer weeks far from hot, fever-ridden regions of the South.85 A letter from a country merchant in Louisiana summarizes the preceding points most clearly. He wrote in 1859: I have also offers from New York for our clothing much more satisfactory than any in New Orleans. ... I would in six weeks have everything delivered. It can't be done at all in Alexandria. In New Orleans I found too many ifs and ands. New York is the great commercial center of America, and it would be in my judgment extreme squeamishness to pay more for a worse article.86 In spite of this, the movement for Southern economic independence persisted, and as long as it did, it continued to fill the merchants of New York with fear. Not because they were worried by commercial conventions— in fact, they applauded many proposals which they believed would "tend to develop the resources of the South and populate its vast aggregations of uninhabited territory" 87— but mainly because of another influence which they regarded as more important than all the movements for direct trade and all the propaganda campaigns urging the people to "Buy Southern." That influence was the struggle over slavery. What the merchants feared was that owing to this sectional conflict, the words "New York" printed on a box of merchandise would symbolize to the Southerners hostility to slavery and to "Southern Rights." Above all, they feared that the struggle over slavery would lead to the dissolution of the Union, thereby achieving what direct trade conventions, commercial conventions, and propaganda campaigns could not accomplish. These fears haunted the merchants for more than three decades. They were born early in the thirties when the abolitionist movement really got under way in the North. Some merchants, like the brothers Lewis and Arthur Tappan, welcomed the movement 8* De Bow's Review, XXX, 222. As a result of this tendency, Southern-manufactured goods had to be sent to New York to be sold to Southern merchants. *f>De Bow's Review, XXIX, 768; Russell, op. cit., p. 112. 8« See letter to W. T. Sherman, Dec. 25, 1859, in W. L. Fleming, ed., General Sherman as College President, p. 92. See also statement of Governor Wise of Virginia in Tribune, Feb. 6, 1856; ". . . It is absurd," he ended, "to think of deposing New York from her position. New York is irresistibly made, by the law of the trade winds, by the law of icebergs, by her position, the first seat of commercial trade for the country." 87 See Herald, May 24, 1853; Times, Sept. 13, 1856, Feb. 23, 1858.

14

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

and contributed time and money to the cause,88 even after they had been threatened that they would "lose the benefit of Southern trade." 89 But they were the few exceptions, for the vast majority of the merchants regarded "the agitation of the slave question, and the interference with the rights of Southern slave-holders as inexpedient, unjust and pregnant with evils." 90 Their attitude was well expressed by one merchant who said in a conversation with Samuel J. May, a prominent abolitionist: 91 Mr. May, we are not such fools as not to know that slavery is a great evil, a great wrong.92 But a great portion of the property of the Southerners is invested under its sanction; and the business of the North, as well as of the South, has become adjusted to it. There are millions upon millions of dollars due from Southerners to the merchants and mechanics alone, the payment of which would be jeopardized by any rupture between the North and the South. We cannot afford, sir, to let you and your associates endeavor to overthrow slavery. It is not a matter of principles with us. It is a matter of business necessity. . . . We mean, sir, to put you abolitionists down, by fair means if we can, by foul means of we must. Truly, as this merchant pointed out, no group had more to lose than the business men of New York from a "rupture between the North and the South." A study of the decade before the Civil War proves that no group was more active in that long struggle to prevent that rupture. For the best treatment of these courageous men, see Gilbert Barnes, The AntiSlavery Impulse, Chapter II. 89 Post, Oct. 8, 1833; Richmond Whig, in ibid., Sept. 5, 1835; Lynchburg Virginian, in The Emancipator, Oct. 1835. so These words were used by the firm of Bailey, Keeler and Remsen, who inserted a "card" in the newspapers in 1835, assuring their Southern customers that they were not abolitionists. See Albion, op. cit., p. 257. For evidence that these words represented the views of the merchants, see the list of signers to the call printed in the Post, Aug. 26, 1835, denouncing the abolitionist movement. Among the signers were: William Dodge and Sons, Carleton and Company, Suydam and Company, Prosper M. Wetmore, Philip Hone, Charles A. Davis, Robert Kelly, Robert Jaffray, Davis and Brooks, and Stout and Ingalsby. See also Elizur Wright, Jr., to James Birney, July 26, 1835, Birney Letters. 9i S. May, Some Recollections of the Anti-Slavery Conflict, pp. 127-128. »2 For evidence that this was not an exaggeration, see H. V. Kemp to De Witt Clinton, Nov. 3, 1824; Stephen Allen to De Witt Clinton, Dec. 10, 1824, De Witt Clinton Papers; David Hale to the American Colonization Society, Sept. 7, 1826, in E. J. Fox, The American Colonization Society, 18 17-1840, p. 80; Papers of Anson G. Phelps in Phelps-Dodge Papers, Box 5; and the New York Colonization Journal, Jan., March, April, Dec, 1850.

2

The

Compromise

of 1850

THE decade of the fifties opened auspiciously for the business men of New York. The early demand from the South and West was unusually brisk,1 and the requirements of the California trade were so enormous that the merchants were kept busy long after closing hours filling orders for "dry goods of all kinds, hardware, provisions, breadstuff s (and) boots and shoes." 2 Throughout business circles there was a feeling of great optimism. Thus Cyrus W. Field and Company wrote gleefully to one of their customers: "Our Spring trade has already commenced, and promises to be very large, and we hope therefore to do much more with you this year than we have ever yet done." 3 The only black spot was on the political horizon, but it was to grow until it darkened the entire business scene. In December, 1849, one °f tne stormiest sessions of Congress had opened. For days the House fought over the choice of a Speaker. "The contest for Speaker continues with accumulating violence," wrote Philip Hone on December 15th. "Madness rules the hour, faction, personal recrimination and denunciation prevail, and men for the first time in our history do not hesitate openly to threaten a dissolution of the Union." 4 Reports from the South also told a dismal story. It appeared that should Congress enact the Wilmot Proviso, abolishing slavery in the territories acquired from Mexico, a secession movement would sweep through the Cotton Kingdom.5 This was by no means the first time that the merchants had faced the issue of the expansion of slavery. Moreover, though they had taken the lead in efforts to silence the abolitionists 1 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXIII, 370; 15Journal of Commerce, Feb. 2, 1850; Tribune, Jan. 1, 17, 1850. 2 Tribune, Jan. 8, 15, 23, 1850. s Field and Company to Owen and Hurlbut, Jan. 29, 1850, Owen and Hurlbut Papers. * The Diary of Philip Hone (MS, New York Historical Society), Dec. 15, 1849. 6 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 12-16, 1850.

i6

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

by fair means or foul, they had also been foremost among the Northern opponents of the further expansion of slavery. Actually, the very first expression of the New York merchants on the slavery question was the protest which two thousand merchants registered on November 16, 1819 against the defeat in Congress of the Tallmadge amendment, prohibiting the further introduction of slavery into Missouri.6 At a mass meeting, these merchants announced that although they had no intention of interfering with the existence of slavery where it was already established, they were fully as determined "to prevent the extension of the alarming evil of slavery in the states and territories hereafter to be organized in the wide domain of the United States." And they spoke out directly against "further extending that principle of representation" which gave the Southerners increased political power in the government "through the votes derived from the possession of slaves." 7 A committee of twenty-five merchants was set up "to correspond with individuals, and public bodies in this and other States, requesting their cooperation in supporting the principle of freedom and checking the progress of slavery in our country." 8 A quarter of a century later, the merchants again voiced opposition to the expansion of slavery. This time the issue was related to that "crowning curse of national legislation, the annexation ofTexas." 9 The pro-annexationists made a determined effort to win the support of New York business men. Annexation, they argued, would guarantee "a very considerable market, and a growing one for our domestic manufactures," and, they assured, the merchants would "have the carrying trade of these goods to Texas and the cotton taken in exchange to Europe." 10 If annexation failed, they warned, it would severely "injure the trading communities of the middle states who live by their labor as factors, commission agents and carriers"; for "the commission on sales and investments" from the vast produce of what would shortly become "the greatest cotton and sugar growing section of the *Post, Nov. 16, 17, 1819. 1 1bid., Nov. 17, 1819. s For the list of committee members, see Post, Nov. 17, 1819. Among them were: Matthew Clarkson, William Bayard, Henry Rutgers, John T. Irving, Richard Varick, Jonathan Goodhue, Robert Bogardus and Jonathan Thompson. All were prominent merchants. * Diary of Philip Hone, Sept. 9, 1850. 10 "A Whig," Tribune, April 18, 1844. The writer added as a postscript: "I own no lands in Texas and never expect to."

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

17

Western world" would "be quietly conceded to England or France." 11 In addition, the rejection of the annexation treaty would soon destroy the Union, since the Southern states would find it to their interest to join with an independent Texas, "thus striking down nearly one-half of the commerce of the great city of New York and transferring it to the South and Southwest." 12 And defeat of the treaty would open a vast field for smuggling. The "fair trader" would find himself "undersold and driven out of the market by the illicit traffic, and smuggling [would] become almost universal, and the commerce of the country TRANSFERRED FROM NEW YORK AND THE PORTS OF THE NORTH TO THE PORTS OF TEXAS." 13 Finally, it was emphasized that "the great city of New York," more than any other port of the country, had a "vast and transcendent interest in this question, for it is, in truth, a question to be settled ... by the re-annexation of Texas, whether New York or Liverpool shall command her commerce." With Texas in the Union, New York City "would take a mighty step in advance towards that destiny which must place her above London in wealth, in business and 14 population." These were fine words, but they made little impression upon the merchants.15 After a thorough discussion of the Texas question with scores of business men, Charles A. Davis concluded that none of them, "except those who own lands in Texas, supported annexation," and that these were only a "few noisy speculators." 16 Most merchants regarded Texas "as the merest humbug 11 See the letter signed "A Merchant," and entitled "Texas— A Business Question," Post, Jan. 20, 1845. 12 Robert J. Walker, Letter to the Citizens of Carroll County, pamphlet. This is probably the most important of all these appeals. is Ibid., especially pp. 24-25. 14 Ibid., p. 20, p. 7. 1* See the letter to the Post, Jan. 20, 1845, in which the writer complains that "but little attention has been given to the business aspects it [annexation] presents." Even Charles A. Davis was amazed at the little attention most merchants ("from their pecuniary interest") paid to the acquisition of Texas. "It is this that puzzles me," he wrote to Crittenden, and he attributed it to the fact that merchants and capitalists were "proverbially timid." Crittenden Papers, March 18, June 5, Sept. 25, 1844. is Davis to Crittenden, March 18, June 5, Aug. 31, 1844, Crittenden Papers. See also L. Benedict to Thurlow Weed, Feb. 2, 1844, Weed Papers, and Daniel Lord to Crittenden, Feb. 10, 1844, Crittenden Papers. Actually, there were fewer speculators among the merchants than most studies seem to indicate. It is true that New York had for years been "the principal seat of operation" in "Texan scrip, stocks and bonds," and that some of the "most re-

i8

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

in the world," and they agreed with Philip Hone that "we have already more territory than we know what to do with, and more slavery within our borders than we choose to be answerable for before God and man." 17 On April 23, 1844, soon after the treaty of annexation had been sent to the Senate for ratification, a call appeared in the news-

papers of the city headed "No Annexation of Texas." It invited all citizens of New York, "without distinction of Party," to attend a mass meeting to express their opposition "to the Ratification of said Treaty." Appended to this call were the names of practically every important merchant in the city, and hundreds of smaller business men. Included in the list were even the names of two directors of the "Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company," George Griswold and Stephen Whitney.18 Some of the other merchants and firms signing this call were: William B. As tor, Prime, Ward and King, Howland and Aspinwall, Moses Taylor, Nevins, Townsend and Company, Spofford, Tileston and Company, Brown Brothers and Company, Hiram Ketchum, Philip Hone, and James G. King.19 Most of these important merchants further indicated their hostility to annexation by serving as officers of the meeting. spectable and monied men" in the city— George Griswold, Stephen Whitney, Barney Corse, Anthony Dey and Dudley Selden— were connected with the Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company which sold Texas land "by hundreds and thousands of acres at five cents per acre." But very few merchants took up any of the stocks and scrip, for it was the general opinion in business circles that the entire Texas land business was a "fake." Texan emissaries visiting New York in 1832, 1835 and 1836, discovered each time an amazing lack of interest in Texas, "an apparent apathy in the land companies," and an "unaccountable apathy of the citizens generally to the The above analysis is based upon the following sources: Benjamin Lundy, The cause." War in Texas, pamphlet, p. 40; D. L. Child, History of the Texas Conspiracy, pamphlet, p. 12; N. J. Ware, "Land Speculation and the Mexican War," Historical Outlook, XIX, 317-323; James E. Winston, "New York and the Independence of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVIII, 368-385; Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1922, II, 508, 557, 559, 561, 615, 696, 881-882; Austin Papers, III, 244-245, 342, 334-335. 338"339> 342-344> 421-423; w- C. Binkley, ed., Official Correspondence of the Texas Revolution, II, 1039-1040; E. C. Barker, "Texan Revolutionary Finances," Political Science Quarterly, XIX, 634; Post, Nov. 10, 12, 14, 19, 1835; Tribune, Nov. 14, 1842; May 16, Sept. 20, Oct. 13, 1843; Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 3-Nov. 1, 1843; Journal of Commerce, May 19, 25-27, 1843; and Riggs-Corcoran Papers, Box 23. "Charles A. Davis to Crittenden, Aug. 31, 1844, Crittenden Papers; Diary of Philip Hone, May 14, 1844. is Lundy, op. cit., p. 35. is For the complete list of signers, see Post, April 24, 1844. It will be noticed that both Whig and Democratic merchants signed the call and served as officers-

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

19

The meeting revealed that the merchants feared that annexation would revive the slavery controversy, as well as "involve us in a war in which the feelings of the Civilized World must be against us." "The annexation of Texas is war with Mexico," Davis Dudley Field warned in his address, and one of the resolution flatly stated that annexation would, "according to the acknowledged laws of nations, be a positive declaration of war with Mexico." Such consequence, it was stressed would hardly be compensated for by any supposed commercial benefits annexation might produce. As for these economic advantages, it was asserted that "the debt incurred by Texas, and the immense grants which cover nearly the whole territory she claims, would in all probability render this acquisition of no pecuniary value." 20 In fact, even should Texas "grant commercial favors to other nations prejudicial to the United States," 21 the merchants would be "consoled" by "a consciousness that no lasting prosperity can be secured when just principles are disregarded." 22 Finally, no economic consideration could outweigh the fact that annexation would strengthen and expand the institution of slavery in the nation.23 On this last point, the merchants took a forthright stand. One resolution warned that "Texas should in no case be annexed without proper guards against slavery." Again, the merchants reaffirmed their hostility to any movement which sought to interfere with slavery where it already existed, but they stated just as firmly that they would under no circumstances "consent to any further extension of slavery, and of the principle of unequal representation to territories lying beyond the actual limits of the United States." 24 In the summer of 1848, another meeting took place in the city which indicated that hostility to expansion of slavery was still "deep and all pervading" in the business community.25 On July 20 Post, April 25, 1844; J. W. Edmonds to Van Buren, April 30, 1844, Van Buren Papers. 21 For an answer to this argument, see Theodore Sedgwick, Thoughts on the Proposed Annexation of Texas to the United States, especially pp. 30-33. 22 Post, April 25, 1844. 23 Ibid., Sept. 17, Oct. 29, 1844. 24 Ibid., April 25, 1844. See also S. J. Tilden, G. B. Davis to Van Buren, April 30, May 4, 14, 1844, Van Buren Papers; Eli Moore, Henry E. Riell, Clinton Roosevelt to Polk, Aug. 7, 8, 28, 1844, Polk Papers. 25 Cf. J. W. Edmonds to Van Buren, Aug. 16, 1848, Van Buren Papers; Freeman Hunt, Willis Hall, David Graham, Horace Greeley, Nicholas Dean, and John L. Lawrence to Henry Clay, June 9, 12, 20, 21, 23, July 27, 1848, Clay Papers; and Moses H. Grinnell to Thurlow Weed, July 7, 1848, Weed Papers.

20

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

28, 1848, a "call" signed by over a thousand merchants was published in every newspaper in the city. It urged all citizens to attend a "No Compromise Meeting." It declared: 26 All Persons opposed to the Bill now pending before the Senate of the United States, compromising Freedom in the Territories, and who desire that in the organization of the Government of Oregon, New Mexico, and California, Slavery should be expressly Prohibited, are requested to meet at the City Hall Park ... to express their sentiment on this subject. The huge meeting, presided over by Henry Grinnell, took no position in support of any candidate for office, national or state.27 However, it did urge that every effort be made by citizens of New York, irrespective of party, "to secure the election of men known to be in favor of the enactment of a law expressly prohibiting the existence of slavery in the territories of Oregon, New Mexico and California, so long as the same shall be under the government of Congress." Most of the discussion, however, was confined to the Clayton Bill, which had just passed the Senate.28 David Dudley Field, one of the speakers, struck the keynote of the meeting when he said, "We are opposed to all compromises on this subject. We are against surrender of an inch of free-soil to slavery." The resolutions "unhesitatingly" denounced the Clayton Bill as an "evident design to fasten upon the free soil of these territories, the curse of human slavery in such a way as to prevent the same from ever being removed or mitigated by any action of the federal government." And they listed ten reasons to substantiate this charge.29 After this, the resolutions condemned Senator Daniel S. Dickinson for his vote in favor of the bill, and issued a warning that any New York member of the House who aided "directly or indirectly" in the passage of "this Bill of 26 Times, July 20, 1848; Benjamin Drake Papers, July 20, 1848. Henry Grinnell, William H. Webb, Edward Corning, Daniel A. Cushman, Gilbert Davis, William E. Dodge, William S. Howland, Samuel Hotaling, Abraham M. Wetmore, and Myndert Van Schaick were among those who signed the call. For the entire list, see Tribune, July 28, 1848. 2T Cf. Tribune, July 24, 1848. 23 The bill had been reported by a special committee of the Senate. It called for the organization of territorial governments for Oregon, California and New Mexico, and left the question of slavery to be referred to the territorial courts, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court. The bill passed the Senate, but in the House, on the motion of Alexander H. Stephens, it was laid on the table.— J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, I, 95-96. 29 These reasons are listed in the Post, July 29, 1848.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

21

Abominations" or failed to vote on the measure, would be considered "faithless to the wishes of his constituents." The meeting was brought to an end after the thousands present had all taken a pledge "to labor with unremitting zeal" in case the Bill became a law, to achieve the passage of a new law "securing to Freedom, in the most explicit terms, all Free Soil, which the Union now has, so long as it remains under the government of Congress." 30 V" Thus the merchants faced the major sectional crisis in 1850 with a deep feeling of hostility to the expansion of slavery. "I am one of the people mingling daily with merchants and business men," Chesselden Bliss wrote to Calhoun, "and I am utterly astonished at what I hear and see on this subject among them." 31 Nor did the merchants seem ready to abandon their views on this question because of threats of disunion. Frederick Wolcott, the commission merchant, found his business colleagues disgusted but unconcerned by the "blustering on the part of the Southern members of Congress." 32 Philip Hone even went as far as to write on the threats of a dissolution of the Union: "Well, be it so: if faction is to prevail and the South can get along without us, the sooner the issue comes the better. New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts are able to take care of themselves." 33 George B. Butler, editor of the Journal of Commerce, was convinced that the majority of the business men shared this view. He was certain that "nothing but a shock" would get them "thinking on the 3* subject." The shock was soon to come, and when it did, it not only set the merchants to "thinking on the subject," but it so completely frightened them that they never fully recovered from it. Moreover, it shaped their views on the entire sectional issue for years to come. The merchants were in an excellent position to learn how serious was the anti-Wilmot Proviso feeling in the South, and how mistaken they had been in believing that the secession threats so Tribune, July 29, 1848. 31 Calhoun Correspondence, in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1929, p. 447. 32 Wolcott Diary, Jan. 9, 1850 (MS, New York Public Library); Francis Stryker to Weed, Jan. 12, 1850, Weed Papers; Prosper M. Wetmore to W. R. Marcy, Jan. 14, 1850, Marcy Papers. 33 Diary of Philip Hone, Dec. 15, 1849. 34 Calhoun Correspondence, op. cit., p. 1196; Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, Nov. 15, 1849, Marcy Papers.

22

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

were "hardly worthy of notice." 35 For one thing, they received scores of letters from Southern customers informing them that purchases for the spring trade would be delayed and possibly entirely curtailed because of "the agitation of great national questions at Washington." 38 In addition, there were numerous reports from the South telling of the rapid development of movements to establish non-intercourse with Northern firms. Believing that the only way to arouse the Northern merchants in opposition to the passage of the Wilmot Proviso was "through their pockets," many Southerners had resolved not to "purchase articles manufactured or imported from the North." 37 Rather than patronize New York merchants who were either hostile or indifferent to Southern rights, a large group of Alabama planters vowed to reduce their purchases in the Empire City and to patronize "foreign commercial houses favorable to Southern interests and policy." 38 Two publications appeared at this time which were widely discussed in business circles, and which were instrumental in creating a feeling of alarm among the merchants. Muscoe R. H. Garnett's The Union, Past and Future, How it Works and How to Save it was one.39 It painted a vivid picture of the value of the Union to the Northern merchants, and it described in gruesome language how seriously secession— which Garnett predicted would surely come if concessions were not granted to the South— would affect the prosperity of the business men. The other publication was the widely reprinted article by Thomas Prentice Kettell, Stability of the Union.410 The theme here was also that of the value of the Union to the merchants, and the dire necessity of the business men exerting their efforts to preserve the structure of government upon which so much of their prosperity depended. Kettell placed great emphasis, moreover, upon the machinations of British merchants and manufacturers, whom he described as 35 Calhoun Correspondence, op. cit., p. 506; Simeon Draper to Weed, Sept. 23, 1849, Weed Papers. 36 Extracts of many of these letters from Southern merchants to New York firms appeared in the Journal of Commerce, Jan. 8, 10, March 6, June 27, 1850. 37 Charleston Mercury, reprinted in Post, Sept. 15, 1849; Richmond Enquirer, in Express, Feb. 5, 1850; and New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, in Journal of Commerce, Jan. 8, 1850. See also "A Traveller," in ibid., Jan. 24, 1850. 38 De Bow's Review, IX, 213. 39 Ibid., XVIII, 289-297, 432-445, 681-690; XIX, 38-47; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXIII 371-383; XXIV, 659-681. 40 Democratic Review, XXVI, 83; De Bow, Industrial Resources, III, 357-366.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

23

being unusually active in stirring up secession sentiment in the South in order to hasten the establishment of direct trade with England. Unless the merchants awoke to the serious crisis facing them, Kettell warned, they might very soon discover, to their dismay, that the valuable Southern trade had passed into the hands of foreign merchants and manufacturers. If there were still doubts in the minds of the merchants as to whether or not they were confronted by a dangerous situation, Southern correspondents of the New York press took care to dispel them. From them, the merchants obtained a clear picture of the rising tide of secessionist sentiment throughout the South. By the second week in February, they had already learned of the calling of the Nashville Convention, and that six states had already appointed delegates, some having even appropriated money for "necessary measures for protecting the State ... in the passage of the Wilmot Proviso." 41 By this time the merchants were thoroughly frightened.42 What they had regarded but a few weeks before as idle threats now assumed the aspect of grim realities, threatening the destruction of the Union, and endangering the prospects of future prosperity. "A dissolution of the Union, which until now it was treason to think of, much more to utter," Philip Hone wrote in horror, "is the subject of daily harangues of Congress." 43 Daniel D. Barnard, visiting the city on January 31, found the merchants "seriously alarmed for the peace of the country and for the Union," and he also noticed that the very same business men who had been the leaders of the "Free-Soil— No Compromise" Meeting in the Park during the summer of 1848 now took the lead in the movement in support of Clay's compromise plan.44 A striking illustration of this change was the case of Myndert Van Schaick, the leading dry goods merchant. It will be recalled that Van Schaick had been an officer at the Park meeting to support the Wilmot Proviso. Furthermore, during the spring of 1849, he had campaigned for mayor on a "Free Soil and Wilmot 4i Journal of Commerce, Express, Herald, Post, Jan. 4-Feb. 17, 1850. See also A. C. Cole, "The South and the Right of Secession in the Early Fifties," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I, 375-399; and H. D. Foster, "Webster's Seventh of March Speech," American Historical Review, XXVII, 245-262. *2 E. J. Fowle to Weed, Jan. 28, 1850; D. H. Abell to Weed, Feb. 6, 19, 20, 1850; E. G. Spaulding to Weed, Feb. 18, 1850, Weed Papers; John A. Dix to Fillmore, Jan. 5, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 43 Diary of Philip Hone, Feb. 9, 1850. 44 Barnard to Fillmore, Jan. 31, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

24

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

Proviso" ticket, and he had been denounced by leading crats as an "Abolitionist." 45 Now, a, year later, in two letters, he urged the merchants to support a settlement slavery dispute which meant the complete abandonment

Demopublic of the of the

Proviso. "There is danger in delay," he warned, and he went on to point out that the merchants might lose the enormous profits which they received annually "out of the slave labor of the South," and which were even greater than that secured by the planters and traders of "the Southern States themselves." 46 The business men of England, he declared, were preparing for the secession of the South, and the merchants should realize that the "dissolution of the Union would transfer some of our best customers to another market for supplies." True, abolitionists and other Northern extremists who 'would destroy all this prosperity at one blow" did not usually "look at consequences, particularly those of a pecuniary description." But men of business had no choice when it came to deciding between "the principles of philanthropy" and the dangers of secession and economic chaos. They should unite regardless of their political views, he concluded, to urge that Congress "at its present session, make a final disposition of the most exciting subjects before them." To achieve this, the merchants should throw their powerful influence behind the compromise plan sponsored by Henry Clay. Van Schaick's volte face was symbolic of the stand taken by the majority of the merchants. On January 23, E. D. Morgan informed Thurlow Weed that Whig merchants had assured him that they were prepared to support a resolution by the State legislature instructing the New York delegation in Congress to vote against any proposals which entailed any abandonment of the Wilmot Proviso. They were determined, he wrote, "that the principle of prohibition of slavery in the Territory now free, should be asserted firmly and clearly." 47 Three weeks later, after the merchants had learned of the serious dangers confronting the Union, Jerome Fuller reported to Fillmore that every business man he met in the city had "undergone a change" in sentiments.48 "There is evidently a reaction beginning to take place on the question of slavery," he added, "and the tendency is to be less *s See circular issued by Augustus Schell, Daniel E. Sickles, James T. Brady, E. A. King and Mike Walsh, in Post, April 14, 1849. 46 The letters appeared in the Journal of Commerce, June 10, 13, 1850. 47 Morgan to Weed, Jan. 23, 1850, Weed Papers. *8 Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Feb. 18, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

25

ultra." 49 At the same time, Daniel D. Barnard, after several conferences with leading Whig merchants, drew up a new set of resolutions endorsing compromise.50 These were introduced into the State Assembly by Colonel Monroe of New York City, who announced that his mercantile constituents were clamoring for compromise. "Let New York," they had told him, "step forward and speak out loud and strong for the Union." 51 To enable the Empire State to speak out for compromise, a group of merchants, among whom were some "of the strongest and some of the wealthiest men of the city," met on February 16 at the home of Morris Ketchum. The purpose of the meeting was the launching of an opposition paper to the Albany Evening Journal, which would voice the desire of New Yorkers for compromise. Close to ten thousand dollars was subscribed by the merchants present,52 and later William B. Astor contributed one thousand dollars himself, with the understanding that the paper would fight all "isms." 53 On February 18, this group united with several other merchants and issued a call urging the business men, "irrespective of party," to join in a mass meeting for the purpose of "sustaining Mr. Clay's compromise" as the best way of achieving "the permanent settlement of the great questions now agitating the nation." 54 Among the members of the committee were: Henry Grinnell, Stephen Whitney, Hiram Ketchum, George and Nathaniel Griswold, Frederick R. Lee, William B. Astor, Suydam, Sage and Company, Kent, Poag and Company, Daniel Lord, N. T. Hubbard and Sons, William H. Livingston and Company, Marshall O. Roberts, Ralph Mead and Company, and Olyphant and Sons.55 Two years before, every one of these merchants had attended the anti-compromise meeting. Within three days, the committee secured the signatures of 49 Ibid. so Daniel D. Barnard to Fillmore, Jan. 31, Feb. 25, 1850. si Journal of Commerce, Feb. 26, 1850. 52 John L. Bush to Fillmore, Feb. 23, 1850; Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Feb. 18, 1850, Fillmore Papers. Morris Ketchum contributed $500, Daniel Lord $200, Marshall O. Roberts $250, and Hammond and King $100. 53 Simeon Draper to Thurlow Weed, July 22, 1850, Weed Papers. The name of the journal was the Albany State Register. 54 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 19, 1850; Lorenzo B. Shepard to W. R. Marcy, Feb. 22, 1850, Marcy Papers. 55 Journal of Commerce, Express, Feb. 21, 1850; Hugh Maxwell to Fillmore, Feb. 25, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

26

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

2,500 merchants and firms to the call,56 and so enthusiastic was the response of the business men that the Whig General Committee voted to cooperate in sponsoring the committee.57 It was understood, however, that the meeting was to be distinctly non-partisan, and no statements were to be made which "in any manner favor any party views." 58 Even the Tribune, hostile though it was to the purposes of the meeting, admitted that it represented the point of view of "the Commercial and Business interests of our city." 59 The merchants expected much from their endorsement of Clay's plan, and believed that their influence "must be felt throughout the Union, but especially in Congress, upon the deliberate and cautious action of whose members such tremendous issues are now suspended." 60 The secession movement in the South was now at its height,61 and the merchants waited anxiously for news from Washington which would indicate that the compromise measures they had endorsed were gaining new adherents. During the opening days of March, they were excited to learn from the reports of Washington correspondents that Daniel Webster would deliver a pro-compromise, Union speech in the Senate.62 The merchants were overjoyed, for they felt confident that Webster would clearly express the longing of conservatives for a cessation of the prolonged tension, as well as their desire for the preservation of the Union at all costs.63 They were not disappointed. As bitterly as the abolitionists denounced Webster's seventh of March address, so did the New York merchants enthusiastically welcome it. His call for concessions to the South as the sole means of preserving the Union 64 won instant approval from the vast majority of the merchants who were ready to place peace and prosperity above principles. For weeks, nothing could be heard on Wall Street, Broadway, and Pearl Street but excerpts from the seventh of March speech. Philip Hone reported that the famous exordium was "in every se Journal of Commerce, Feb. 21, 1850. 5T E. G. Spaulding to Weed, Feb. 18, 1850, Weed Papers; E. D. Smith to Fillmore, Feb. 15, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 58 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 25, 1850. 59 Tribune, Feb. 25, 1850; Journal of Commerce, Feb. 27, 1850. «o Nicholas Dean to Henry Clay, Feb. 28, 1850, Clay Papers. 61 Cf. Journal of Commerce, Herald, and Express, Feb. 21-28, 1850. 62 Journal of Commerce, March 2, 1850. «3 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, March 5, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Diary of Philip Hone, March 5, 1850. 64 The Works of Daniel Webster, V, 353-355.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

27

man's mouth," 65 and Lewis Tappan heard with disgust "merchants," "brokers," "monied men," and "owners of Bank, Railroad and manufacturing stocks" quoting excerpts from the address.66 "In this city," John Young informed Fillmore, "the feeling is very general in favor of his position." 67 He was present at a meeting, he added, where merchants had contributed close to one thousand dollars to print and circulate the speech. The interior of New York, they felt, was in special need of a "showering" of the speech.68 A number of merchants voiced their opinions in letters to Webster. Charles March assured him that his speech would "live side by side with the Constitution." 69 Daniel Lord declared that all merchants agreed that the address presented "the only statesmanly and practical view of the subject." 70 Robert B. Minturn, of Grinnell, Minturn and Company, likewise assured Webster that "it has almost the unanimous support of this community," and he went on to add: "Your speech has the approval of my judgment. Its tranquilizing effect upon public opinion has been wonderful." 71 The merchants noted with glee the strong effect the address had in restoring business confidence, and they gaily watched the rise in stocks immediately after reports of the speech reached Wall Street.72 Spofford and Tileston honored Webster for his part in ending business anxiety by naming a steamer (The Union) after his address,73 and they joined with Moses H. Grinnell, George Griswold, Davis, Brooks and Company, Henry Chauncey, and several other "sons of New England and merchants of New York" to present Webster a gift as a reward for the services he had rendered, by his address, to the commercial metropolis.74 At the same time, several hundred merchants sent Webster a long statement thanking him for his support of compromise.

"The

65 Wolcott Diary, March 12, 1850; Diary of Philip Hone, March 14, 1850. 66 Tappan to John Scoble, April 24, 1850, Tappan Correspondence, in Journal of Negro History, XII, 429. 67 Young to Fillmore, March 14, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Simeon Draper to Weed, March 6, 1850, Weed Papers. 68 John Young to Fillmore, March 14, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 6» April 5, 1850, Webster Papers. 70 April 4, 1850, Webster Papers. 71 April 4, 1850, Webster Papers. 72 Journal of Commerce, March 9, 13, 15, 16, 23, 1850. 73 Tribune, March 29, 1850. 74 Webster Papers. See also Journal of Commerce, March 18, April 16, 1850.

BUSINESS

28

AND

SLAVERY

citizens of this commercial capital," they wrote, "have watched with deep solicitude the progress of social and political movements tending to estrangement between the Northern and Southern sections of our country." 75 Unfortunately, this reference to certain "political and social movements" was soon utilized by the "Satanic Press" to stir up a series of riots against the abolitionists, who were scheduled to hold their annual convention in the city. The Globe shrieked: "No public buildings, not even the streets must be desecrated by such a proposed assemblage of traitors." 76 The Herald appealed directly to the merchants, and urged: 77 The merchants, men of business, and men of property in this city, should frown down the meetings of these madmen, if they would save themselves! What right have all the religious lunatics of the free States to gather in this commercial city for purposes which, if carried into effect, would ruin and destroy its prosperity? Will the men of sense allow meetings to be held in this city, which are calculated to make our country the arena of blood and murder, and render our city an object of horror to the whole South? Such appeals, coming in a period of extreme tenseness, had their effect. The meetings of the abolitionists were interrupted by gangs,78 and they were finally forced to leave the city.79 Before they went, however, they voiced their opinions of the commercial metropolis in no uncertain terms. Thus they declared: That we leave the odium of these disgraceful facts to rest upon this city— a broad and black stain; and proclaim to this world, that freedom of speech, and the right peaceably to assemble together in New York, are enjoyed only to the extent that a lawless mob choose to allow.80 The press was, of course, quick to reply that the meetings had been disturbed by rowdies, and that those who said "that our merchants or any respectable portion of our citizens, encouraged the mob, Lie purposely or are under a most grievous error of the truth of the case." 81

But they did not mention the fact that not

75 Webster Papers, June 27, 1850. 76 Reprinted in Express, May 10, 1850. 77 Reprinted in Liberator, May 10, 1850. 78 Journal of Commerce, May 10, 1850. 7» S. H. Gay, in Tribune, May 13, 1850. 80 Journal of Commerce, May 10, 1850. 81 Express, May 14; Journal of Commerce, May 10; Liberator, May 10, 20, 1850.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

29

a single merchant denounced the attack upon the meeting. No doubt they believed that even such activity could be condoned if it aided in the preservation of the Union, and the continuance of business prosperity. If so, they were in for a deep disappointment, for more than this was required to settle the sectional dispute. Despite Webster's speech, the situation was still critical. In the Senate, week after week, the discussion continued, mainly over the issue of whether the admission of California should be considered by itself, or together with the other matters at stake. For days, senator after senator discussed at length some particular resolution he was about to introduce, and invariably followed this by tracing the entire history of slavery from its very origins in the ancient world.82 Meanwhile, in New York City, the merchants almost went frantic as they read the reports of the interminable discussions over what they regarded as insignificant points.83 "Our Legislators do nothing but talk," 84 groaned Frederick Wolcott, and everywhere in the city other merchants could be overheard expressing similar sentiments.85 As far as they were concerned, there was one and only one issue: end the discussions and restore peace; let the measures be enacted in any order as long as sectional tranquillity could thereby be secured.86 As the Independent put it in its analysis of "merchants who cannot afford to keep a conscience": They would favor any man and any speech which would settle the slavery question and leave commerce unthreatened and unimpaired. They do not care so much how it is settled, as that it be in some way settled.87 Commerce was anything but "unthreatened and unimpaired." On the contrary, trade reviewers were repeating each week the brief dismal report: 88 "Business very dull."

The stock market

82 See Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 1st session, pp. 1000-1266. 83 Augustus Schell and Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, June 7, 13, 1850, Marcy Papers. 84 Wolcott Diary, May 11, 1850. 85 Journal of Commerce, March 27, April 17, 1850; Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, May 23, 1850, Marcy Papers. 86 Gideon Hard to Fillmore, April 4, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Simeon Draper to Weed, April 15, May 10, June 29, 1850, Weed Papers. 87 March 7, 1850. 88 Cf. Journal of Commerce, June 8, 15, 22, 29, 1850 (Dry Goods Reports); Wolcott Diary, April 22, Aug. 10, 1850; S. B. Ruggles to Fillmore, May 2, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

BUSINESS lost the 30 sank.89 English Prosper

AND

SLAVERY

impetus Webster's address had given it, and securities At the same time, reports from London revealed that investors were losing confidence in American stocks,90 and M. Wetmore, discussing this very point in a letter to

Marcy on the effect of the crisis upon business, wrote: "Unless something be done before long, the Englishmen will begin to send home our stocks again." 91 To cap the climax, reports from the South stated that although the Nashville Convention had adjourned on June 12 without accomplishing anything,92 the secession movement was by no means a closed issue. Thus a New York merchant who was traveling throughout the South, urged his partners not to ignore the significance of the movement for secession. Since his letter was published in the Journal of Commerce at the request of the firm, it came to the attention of all the merchants. I am sorry to say [he concluded] the idea of disunion is largely more prevalent among leading men of the South than is generally supposed. It is a painful fact, but one impossible to be concealed, that unless this slavery controversy be speedily disposed of, there is serious reason to believe the subject of peaceful secession will become a public question in the Southern States.93 No wonder, then, that merchants suggested that the entire slavery dispute be turned over to the Chamber of Commerce, where it "could be more amicably and satisfactorily disposed of . . . than in Congress." 94 Here, at least, there would be "no convulsions, no earthquakes, no civil wars." "Were the capital in Wall Street instead of at Washington," one merchant declared, "all this talk of secession and civil war would speedily cease." 95 Unfortunately, from the point of view of the business men, it was not, and they were therefore urged to halt their daydreams and get into action again. "Look to other sources, ye merchant MPost, June 8-12, 1850. so Journal of Commerce, April 12, May 3, June 10, 1850. »i Wetmore to Marcy, May 19, 1850, Marcy Papers; James Brooks to Fillmore, July 29, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 92 The convention met from June 3 to June 12, but only adopted resolutions on the powers of Congress relating to slavery. See D. T. Herndon, "The Nashville Convention," Alabama Historical Society Publications, V, 203 ff. »3 Letter of W. F. C, June 17, 1850, in Journal of Commerce, June 27, 1850. See also a similar letter from Columbus, Georgia, in Journal of Commerce, Aug. 9, 1850. »4 Herald, Jan. 16, June 23, 1850. 95 Express, March 19, 1850.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

1850

31

princes of New York," one writer appealed, "if you would save the Union. For if that perish you perish too." 96 Once again the merchants spoke out in favor of compromise. Late in June, a committee of business men brought a monster memorial to Washington requesting the New York Senators and Representatives to vote for the compromise bill. The idea of a petition originated at a "private" meeting of several Whig and Democratic merchants, who were convinced by reports from the capital that the New York Congressmen were reluctant to vote for Clay's proposals. Believing that upon their votes "the whole result may depend," they framed the petition, and arranged to have it signed by the merchants of the city.97 Within two weeks, 20,000 signatures had been obtained, and by the time the petition was presented to Congress, 5,000 more had added their approval to the following appeal: 98 We the citizens of New York, without distinction of party, respectfully state, that our people are tired of the agitation and discussion, which is engrossing the attention of Congress and the country, to the manifest injury of all interests, disturbing the harmony and endangering the Union of the States. We believe all these matters can be readily and permanently settled, if met in a proper spirit of concession." The petition recommended

that the New

York members

of

Congress should "cordially" support the bills reported by the Committee of Thirteen "as the most eligible mode yet presented of adjusting these difficult questions." 100 Coming at the height of the conflict between President Taylor and Henry Clay,101 the petition did a great deal toward influencing the New York delegation to support the latter.102 Moreover, the wide publicity it received in Washington and in the South probably accomplished a great deal towards strengthening the Union »6 "Patrick Henry," in Herald, May l, 1850. 87 Journal of Commerce, June 8, 1850; D. D. Barnard to Fillmore, July 10, 1850, Fillmore Papers. For evidence that holders of Texan securities were most active in organizing the petition, see Chandler Starr to Thurlow Weed, Sept. 20, 1850, Weed Papers. »8 See Journal of Commerce, June 18, July 10, 1850. E.g., see Journal of Commerce, June 8, 1850. 10088 Ibid. 101 For an analysis of this conflict, see Poage, Henry Clay and the Whig Party, pp. 229-240. 102 John C. Clark to Weed, July 29, 1850; D. Matteson to Weed, July 14, Sept. 4, 1850, Weed Papers.

32

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

forces.103 In fact, Howell Cobb declared later that the memorial of the New York merchants had more pro-Union influence in the South than even the speeches of Webster or Clay.104 The news of the death of President Taylor and the succession of Millard Fillmore to the presidency aroused mingled feelings in New York business circles. While there was grief for the deceased executive, there was relief at the prospect that with Fillmore in the White House, the peace measures would soon be adopted. "The sincere and general grief for the late President," wrote Edward Cooper after a conference with leading merchants, "is accompanied with gratification." 105 Naturally, the inclusion of Webster in the cabinet did much to advance this feeling.106 Thus, Hiram Ketchum informed Fillmore: Since my return to this city ... I have gathered as much public sentiment as I could in respect to your selection of a cabinet, and I am quite sure that the sentiment is very favorable; the persons chosen are regarded as men of pre-eminent ability, and unquestionable patriotism. The universal opinion is, within the spheres of my enquiries, that they are all National, in their sentiments and purposes.107 The merchants now waited anxiously for the end of the discussions and maneuvers in Congress. During the opening days of September, when it appeared that the struggle over the Texas boundary bill might drag on indefinitely, a number of merchants met privately to discuss what steps could be taken to end the deadlock. It was decided that a huge Union demonstration should be called at which the merchants would "furiously" demand the adoption of the compromise plan.108 But on September 7,before the movement got under way, the Journal of Commerce in a special edition announced: "Glorious News from Washington." The House had finally passed the chief compromise measures and the New York City delegation had voted with the majority. Soon after came the news of the passage of the California and Utah Bills, and the Fugitive Slave measure. On 103 See Journal of Commerce, Washington correspondent, Sept. 3-5, 1850. 104 For Cobb's statement, see Washington Union, Dec. 19, 1850. i°s Cooper to Fillmore, July 15, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 106 Samuel B. Ruggles to Fillmore, July 10, 1850; Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, July 16, 1850; Daniel D. Barnard to Fillmore, July 12, 1850; Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, July 16, 20, 1850; Caleb S. Woodhull to Fillmore, July 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 107 Ketchum to Fillmore, July 27, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 108 Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 7, 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

THE

COMPROMISE

OF

September 18, the papers carried promise had been fully adopted, wind up its session. There was great exultation in one hundred guns was fired at the

1850

33

the information that the comand that Congress would soon the Empire City. A salute of Battery House to celebrate the

end of so many weary months of agitation.109 The merchants looked as if a plague had ended and, for the first time in months, greeted each other joyfully.110 ''The commercial, trading, manufacturing interests," wrote Lewis Tappan to an English friend, "are exulting over the victory that has been achieved." 111 The stock market reflected this new feeling of confidence,112 and the financial editor of the Journal of Commerce reported on September 11: The market is steadier. . . . The prospect of an entire settlement of the vexed questions which have agitated the country, has a favorable influence upon all classes, and none feel it more than capitalists whose means are always at a greater risk in troublesome times. 108 Courier and Enquirer, Sept. 11, 1850; Journal of Commerce, Sept. 13, 1850. no Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Sept. 7, 1850; John L. Graham to Fillmore, Sept. 9, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 111 Tappan to John Scoble, Jan. 17, 1850, Tappan Correspondence, op. cit., 444. 112 See Commercial Advertiser, Tribune, Post, Sept. 7-16, 1850.

3

Defending

the Compromise

AFTER the passage of the Compromise Bill, the New York Xjl merchants turned with a sigh of relief to business affairs. They were only too happy to bid farewell to public meetings, private conferences, petitions, and delegations to Washington. As each merchant returned to his counting room, he must surely have felt as Philip Hone did when he joyfully penned in his diary: "These horrible slavery questions, which have suspended the public business for more than eight months, are settled." 1 But the peace that had descended upon the business community lasted for less than two months, and by the end of October, the merchants were again attending public meetings, and again sending delegations to Washington. The slavery questions were by no means settled. True, the Compromise had been enacted by Congress, but throughout the North and South sectional animosities still flourished, and it appeared that it was going to be even more difficult to obtain public endorsement for the "Peace Measures" than it had been to effect their passage. In the South the extremists were denouncing the supporters of compromise as betrayers of Southern interests, and were waging a strong campaign to secure the election of delegates to State Conventions who would vote to reject the Compromise and demand immediate secession from the Union. Would these extremists succeed? Much depended upon what happened in the North. Should the Northern people endorse the Compromise in its entirety and cooperate in enforcing it, the pro-Union elements in the South would be able to convince their people that Southern interests could be protected within the Union. However, if the Compromise or any vital part of it were rejected or nullified by the North, then it was very likely that the secessionists would carry the day.2 1 Sept. g, 1850. 2 For an analysis of reactions in the South, see Shyrock, op. cit., pp. 304-315; A. C. Cole, The Whig Party in the South,34 pp. 183-184.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

35

The outlook in the North was anything but promising. Very few people were really convinced that they had obtained "Peace with Honor" by the passage of the Compromise. Since there was especially tremendous resentment throughout the North at the incorporation of the new Fugitive Slave Act in the Compromise, a movement was rapidly developing calling lor the repeal of the measure. In Syracuse, Lowell, Boston, Concord, and in other parts of the North, meetings were held at which thousands pledged themselves to resist the enforcements of the new law.3 Even in New York City, a considerable number of the merchants who had been the first to sign the monster petition, came out for repeal of the Act. Some believed that such action would end all opposition to the "Peace Measures" in the North. Thus Charles A. Davis wrote to President Fillmore, urging him to take the lead in demanding the repeal of the Act on the sole ground that this would truly bring peace. He wrote: The great and stirring questions which occupied Congress for over nine months, seem all adjusted. The ultras, of course, will seek to cling like bats to the last twig they may fall on, and perhaps unfortunately there is a twig now they may hang to with some success till Congress in its wisdom may give that a hinge and let them fall to the ground. I refer to the "fugitive slave bill." As it now stands it may furnish unrighteous capital. Its severity, though rendered necessary as a law to carry out a constitutional provision, is still objectionable. It seems to me that our Southern brethren will do wisely to remember that although many of us are willing to hold the cup for them "brim full," they can't expect us to avoid a running over if they insist on putting in the drop too much.4 Other merchants were in favor of the repeal of the Act from the humanitarian standpoint as well. The first case involving the new law occurred in New York City itself, and brought home very sharply the inhuman features of the Act. James Hamlet, a fugitive slave, had worked for three years as a porter for the firm of Tilton and Maloney. Soon after the adoption of the Compromise, he was arrested, tried before the United States Commissioner, and was ordered sent back to his former owner in Baltimore.5

He left behind him a wife and two children, and

3 Tribune, Sept. 26, Oct. 1, 3, 5, 1850; Independent, Oct. 3, 10, 17, 24, 1850; J. F. Rhodes, History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, I, 196-197. * Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 7, 1850, Fillmore Papers, s Journal of Commerce, Sept. 29-Oct. 1, 1850.

36

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

the description of the tearful parting from his family before being "hurried off into slavery . . . probably to wear out his life quickly in severe and unrequited labor on a cotton or sugar plantation," 6 aroused great indignation in the city, which even permeated the business circles.7 Simeon Draper, finding the merchants aroused about the case, wrote to Thurlow Weed: I can say with sincerity that since I have known anything of the opinion of men, I have never seen such unanimity in favor of any one thing as in favor of the repeal of that fugitive slave law. . . . Our old straight backs are rampant about it. . . . Why even John A. Stevens and Goodhue and Co. are on our side up to the hub, saying nothing of men named to you yesterday.8 But, indignant though they were, the merchants could not persist very long in their demands for the repeal of the Act. Reports from the South indicated only too clearly that this action would play right into the hands of the secessionists, and aid in reviving the sectional struggle.9 This was too great a price to pay. Hence the merchants sought to maintain both the Fugitive Slave Act and their own consciences. Thus they cooperated to restore the freedom of John Hamlet. Messrs. Tilton and Maloney, his former employers, wrote to his owner, and inquired what it would cost to purchase his freedom. When it was ascertained that the required sum would amount to eight hundred dollars, this firm advanced one hundred dollars, and appealed to the Journal of Commerce to call the undertaking to the attention of the other merchants. Contributions poured into the office of the paper, and two days after the call for funds had been issued, the required sum was raised.10 Moreover, John H. Woodgate, a New York merchant who was well known in Baltimore, went to that city at his own expense, transacted the purchase of Hamlet's freedom, and brought him back on October 8 to New York, where he received his former position as porter.11 The action of the merchants in restoring Hamlet to freedom was widely praised in the conservative press of the North, and by the Union men of the South.12 Here was a striking illustration, 6 Tribune, Oct. l, 1854. 7 Post, Oct. 1, 1850; Liberator, Oct. 3, 1850. s Draper to Weed, Oct. 2, 1850, Weed Papers. 9 See Journal of Commerce, Oct. 1-6, 1850. wibid., 11 Ibid. Oct. 4, 1850. 12 See reprints in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 8-14, 1850.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

37

they declared, of the determination of the conservative Northerners to utilize only constitutional methods in eradicating what they believed to be a wrong, for they had taken no step without the consent of the Southerners involved. In the leading Northern commercial metropolis, they added, the Fugitive Slave Act would be enforced, and the entire Compromise would be sustained.13 But the merchants learned to their dismay that the impression created in the South by their determination to uphold the Compromise was completely overshadowed by the actions of the rival up-state elements who were decidedly opposed to the "Peace Measures." They also learned that, unless they did something to prevent it, the Empire State would register its opposition to the Compromise in the forthcoming state elections. The Democratic State Convention had endorsed the Compromise,14 but the Whig party was controlled by the Seward-Weed elements which opposed the measures, and were intent upon reopening the slavery issue. This created a serious conflict for the merchants, since "ninetenths of our business men, capitalists and merchants" were Whigs.15 It all stemmed from the era of Jacksonian Democracy, when it seemed to the merchants that the atmosphere was reminiscent of "the hottest days of the French Revolution." 16 Most of them had turned to the Whig party for refuge,17 and from that time on, they had regarded the party as a pillar of conservatism against those "noisy demagogues"— the Democrats.18 But now the Democrats had endorsed the Compromise, and it 13 See letter of "W," in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 9, 1850. 14 Post, Sept. 3, 14, 1850; Journal of Commerce, Sept. 19, 1850; A. S. Alexander, Political History of the State of New York, III, 155-156. The "Barnburners" and "Hunkers" buried the hatchet temporarily at the convention, and nominated a united ticket, headed by Horatio Seymour for Governor. is Tribune, April 6, 1850; Jan. 21, 1855. is N. M. Solomon to Webster, March 17, 1830, Webster Papers; J. W. Webb, James A. Hamilton, Myndert Van Schaick to Van Buren, April 12, 1831, Jan. 18, 1834, Van Buren Papers; John Wurts to Polk, Dec. 19, 1833, Polk Papers; and Diary of Philip Hone, June 12, 1833; March 15, 1834; Feb. 23, June 6, 1836. See also D. R. Fox, The Decline of the Aristocracy in the Politics of New York, Chapter XII. 17 Journal of Commerce, April 26, June 23 Nov. 4, 1837. "The Democratic merchants," wrote Joseph Scoville, the Boswell of the New York business men, "could have easily been stored in a large Eighth Avenue railroad car." Scoville, op. cit., I, 81. Among the Democratic minority were: Preserved Fish, William F. Havemeyer, Peter Cooper, Moses Taylor, William C. Wetmore, E. K. Collins, Robert Kelly, Myndert Van Schaick, and Wilson G. Hunt. is Diary of Philip Hone, Feb. 24, 1851; John A. Dix, William F. Havemeyei, Charles A. Davis to Van Buren, April 9, 1840; Dec. 31, 1842; Oct. 7, 1848, Van Buren Papers.

38

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

appeared that the Whigs would reject a similar proposal. Little wonder that the merchants were disturbed. There were two schools of thought in business circles as to the best method of meeting this crisis. One group of merchants believed that every effort should be made to dethrone the SewardWeed elements from control of the Whig party in the state, and to replace them with a conservative leadership, friendly to the Compromise and to the national administration.19 Another group believed that a new party should be organized, uniting the proCompromise elements in the Democratic and Whig parties.20 These merchants, wrote Charles A. Davis to Daniel Webster, were convinced that the old parties were "possessed by this 'potato rot' of negroism," and that it was too deeply imbedded to be eradicated. Describing his own reaction to the suggestion offered by some of these merchants that a new party be formed, Davis went on to say: "For one I feel that the bugs have got too far into my bed, and I have the choice of getting into a clean, new bed to finish my nap, or spend the night hunting out the bugs." 21 In the beginning, the first group won out. To the Whig State Convention came a delegation of conservative "mercantile" Whigs from New York City, determined to lead a struggle against the up-state delegates for the endorsement of the Compromise.22 The result was a split in the party. The breaking-point was reached on the issue of endorsing Seward's role in the Senate and the principles of the Wilmot Proviso. The conservative Whigs were willing, although reluctantly, to accept the nomination of Washington Hunt for governor, even though they believed that Weed had determined what Hunt "should do." 23 But they made it clear that they would never endorse Sewardism or the Wilmot Proviso. Hence when the convention upheld the report of the majority of the Resolutions Committee which had endorsed the radical resolutions, the conservatives walked out of the hall.24

Subsequently, the seceders, or "Silver Greys," as they

19 Simeon Draper to Weed, Aug. 5, 1850; S. P. Lyman to Weed, Sept. 23, 1850, Weed Papers; Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Aug. 5, 1850; John A. King to Fillmore, Aug. 22, 1850; D. D. Barnard to Fillmore, Sept. 17, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 20 Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Sept. 15, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 21 Charles A. Davis to Webster, Aug. 9, Sept. 12, 1850, Webster Papers. 22 Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Sept. 15, 1850; D. D. Barnard to Fillmore, Sept. 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 23 John Young to Fillmore, Sept. 29, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 24 Fillmore Papers, Sept. 28, 1850.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

39

were to be known,25 agreed to hold a separate convention on October 17 at Utica.26 The Whig merchants in New York City received the news of the split calmly. To them it was but the logical conclusion of the division between radicals and conservatives that had just come to the surface earlier in the year in the struggle over the resolutions in the state legislature.27 Hiram Ketchum, who had been present at the Syracuse convention as the unofficial representative of the mercantile Whigs, reported that the merchants were ready to support the seceders. They were convinced, he wrote to Fillmore, that Weed and Greeley together with "some of the members of the convention believed to be abolitionists or free soilers" had forced the adoption of the radical resolutions. These groups, they believed, were determined "to revive agitation on the slavery question," which, if they were successful, would certainly result in "dissolution of the Union." But they were mistaken if they believed that they would receive the support of the business men in their campaign. "They ought to be resisted as extremists," the merchants had declared in their conference with Ketchum, "as all other extremists ought to be resisted." 28 It is not difficult to see why many merchants should have taken such a strong stand in opposition to the action of the convention. They knew full well that the endorsement of Seward would be regarded in the South as evidence that the most powerful state in the North would not abide by the Compromise.29 More important, perhaps, it would supply the secessionist elements in the South with the necessary ammunition to conduct their struggle against the Union forces that existed in every state.30 The publication at this time in several newspapers of 25 Among the seceders was Francis Granger, the Chairman of the convention, whose flowing grey locks bestowed the name "Silver Greys" upon the conservatives. 26 John Young to Fillmore, Oct. 2, 12, 1850; J. B. Mowrer to Fillmore, Oct. 3, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 27 Daniel D. Barnard to Fillmore, Sept. 30, 1850; Hugh Maxwell to Fillmore, Sept. 28, 1850; Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 14, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 28 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Sept. 30, 1850; John Young to Fillmore, Sept. 29, 1850; Daniel D. Barnard to Fillmore, Sept. 30, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 29 J. B. Mowrer to Fillmore, Oct. 3, 1850; Daniel D. Barnard to Fillmore, Oct. 14, 1850, Fillmore Papers. so On Oct. 19, 1850, the Journal of Commerce declared: "The Union party of the South are struggling with all their might against the efforts of disunionists and secessionists, and they need the moral aid which would be afforded by a generous expression of confidence and conciliation on the part of the Empire State."

4o

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

many letters from the South, emphasizing this very point,31 served to strengthen the conviction of these business men. One writer, assuming the title "A Georgia Whig," sent the following appeal: Permit one at this distance to make a suggestion. While the friends of the Union here are battling for its continuance, how are we to be backed in New York? Is the late endorsement of Senator Seward by the majority of the Whig convention an answer to the question? If so, then we may as well abandon the contest at the South, and at once allow the disunionists to carry the day. Because if Seward and men of his ilk are sustained, we cannot long be sustained in this section. It is a question for New Yorkers to decide, which is of most importance to them, the Union, or such men as William H. Seward.32 Other letters from the South told of the revival of non-intercourse sentiment as news reached that region of meetings in the North where the Compromise had been denounced, and resolutions pledging the participants not to abide by the Fugitive Slave Act adopted.33 Once again the merchants were reminded of the fact that dissolution of the Union was close at hand. "Again we repeat," the Journal of Commerce declared, after describing the revival of secession spirit in the South and anti-Compromise feeling in the North, "the Union is in danger. Again we call upon every patriot to rally for its defence, and to frown down, and if need be put down rebellion." 34 Once again the gruesome picture was painted of the economic chaos which would follow secession. And at the end of the account, there appeared again the familiar exhortation to the merchants: "You must wake up and bestir yourselves if you wish to save your business." 85 The answer of the merchants to such appeals was not long in coming. On October 11, sixty "leading merchants" assembled at the Fifth Avenue home of Morris Ketchum to adopt measures "necessary to carry out the objects of the national Whig party." Hugh Maxwell, who had urged the meeting, wrote of its purpose: My object was to feel the pulse of gentlemen so generally moderate, prudent and conservative, all of them extensively engaged in busi31 See Journal of Commerce and Express, Oct. 4-21, 1850. 32 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 15, 1850. 33 See the letter received by a New York merchant from a firm in Mobile, in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 30, 1850, and letters from merchants in Mississippi and South Carolina, in ibid., Oct. 24, 1850. 34 Ibid., Oct. 17, 1850. 35 James W. Gerard, in ibid., Oct. 23, 26, 1850.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

ness, and chiefly concerned in the prosperity of our city and country. As there were present some gentlemen recently elected as delegates to Utica, a decision of leading merchants would be heeded as giving a due tune to proper action. One object of this meeting was to secure sufficient funds for future operations and to select a proper committee by whom the expenditures might be made. This was most important, and such a committee has been secured.36 A merchant who was present added his account of the meeting in a letter to Fillmore: I attended a large and influential meeting of our friends in Fifth Avenue last evening, composed mostly of the heavy merchants of New York. Luther Bradish presided and James Brooks was secretary. A large sum was raised at the meeting to diffuse true political intelligence among the people of this State during the next four weeks. . . . The merchants were alive to the vast interests New York City has in stopping agitation.87 One thing was evidently agreed upon at the meeting. This arose in reference to the possible endorsement by the Utica convention of Washington Hunt's candidacy. Hunt would be supported, the merchants resolved, only if he came out openly and unequivocally in favor of the Compromise and the national administration. "If there be any question as to his course," they stated, "if he shall leave us in doubt as to his opinions, if we cannot confide in him upon those great public principles recently adjusted, then we cannot support him. We will go for either another candidate or an open avowal of opposition to Mr. Hunt." 88 The next two weeks were to reveal that many merchants were not willing to trust the man they regarded as Seward's candidate. Although the Utica convention voted, after adopting resolutions applauding the Compromise and denouncing Seward, to support Hunt's candidacy,39 the gentlemen who had assembled together on October 1 1 were disgruntled.40 Moreover, Hunt's open letter to Francis Granger, in which he criticized the Fugitive Slave Act 36 Maxwell to Fillmore, Oct. 12, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 37 C. B. Stuart to Fillmore, Oct. 12, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 38 Maxwell to Fillmore, Oct. 12, 1850; D. D. Barnard to Fillmore, Oct. 14, 1850; Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 19, 1850, Fillmore Papers. ^Journal of Commerce, Oct. 18, 1850; Hiram Ketchum, in ibid., Oct. 26, 1850; Francis Granger to Fillmore, Oct. 19, 22, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 40 C. B. Stuart to Fillmore, Oct. si, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

4i

42

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

and urged "essential modifications." 41 still further antagonized these merchants. They were convinced that if Hunt were elected, the South would definitely regard it as conclusive evidence that the powerful state of New York would not abide by the ComAs a result, several important movements developed. The promise.42 committee appointed at this meeting of Whig merchants conferred with leading representatives of the Democratic business men. After several meetings and a consultation with Webster, it was agreed to sponsor a Union electoral ticket and a mass Union meeting.43 Thereupon, a joint committee of Whig and Democratic merchants, consisting of Moses Taylor, William H. Aspinwall, Paul Spofford, Francis Lathrop, Charles A. Davis, Charles Carleton, Robert C. Wetmore, Nicholas Caroll, Joshua J. Henry, Hiram Ketchum, Morris Ketchum, George Griswold, Shepherd Knapp, George Howland, E. K. Collins, William F. Havemeyer, and William H. Webb, issued a call to the business men of New York "without distinction of party" to assemble together to voice their approval of the "Peace Measures" of the last session of Congress, their determination to sustain these measures without change, and to take any action as was "best calculated to arrest the further progress of political agitation" in the North.44 Charles A. Davis, a member of the committee, put it well when he said that these merchants were convinced "that certain disturbers are still disposed to agitate and will not be quiet until they receive the signal rebuke which I think is in store for them." 45 The effect of the Union meeting [he went on] can injure no interest, except perhaps that of certain new platforms and isms which find their origin in the selfish hearts and dangerous brains of demagogues, and the sooner they are rebuked and driven back or driven off the better. The notice for the meeting at the Castle Garden first appeared in the press on October 23. The next day there was published in the Journal of Commerce a "Union State Ticket." 46 Headed by ■*i Washington Hunt to Francis Granger. . . . Pamphlet. See also E. D. Morgan to Weed, Oct. 31, 1850, E. D. Morgan Letterbook (MS, University of Rochester Library). 42 Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 18, 1850, Fillmore Papers. ±3 F. S. Lathrop and C. Carleton to Webster, Oct. 23, 1850; Webster Papers; Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers. Journal of Commerce, Oct. 23-25, 1850. *s Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 48 See also Washington Hunt to Fillmore, Oct. 25, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

43 Horatio Seymour for Governor, the ticket consisted of three Whigs and two Democrats. There was no address or additional explanation attached to the ticket, and it is evident that the committee sponsoring the Castle Garden meeting merely had published itas a trial balloon to test public reaction. Nothing further, however, was heard of the ticket until after the Union meeting, the committee having decided to let the issue wait until a successful demonstration had been had of the Union sentiments of

the New York merchants.47 No doubt a further reason for the dropping of this subject at this particular time was the reluctance on the part of a number of merchants who wished to carry on the struggle within the Whig party to sign the call for the Union meeting until they were first convinced that its purpose was merely to uphold the Compromise and to rebuke agitators. Should its object be "to favor this or that party, or to get up a new ticket for the elections," they declared, they would not endorse the meeting.48 The committee sponsoring the Union meeting met with little difficulty in obtaining signatures to the call. Within a week, ten thousand merchants and firms had already endorsed the meeting, and more signatures were coming in than could be recorded. Indeed, it was reported that of all the business firms on Broad Street, Pearl Street, Wall Street, and Exchange Place, only eight had refused to sign the call. To be sure, some questions arose on this score. The proSeward and the anti-slavery journals asserted fear of reprisals was responsible for these endorsements. According to these journals, the Union movement was nothing more than "an attempt on the part of one or two silk houses in this city, to break down certain more successful competitors for the Southern trade." 49 Should any merchants refuse to sign the call, "their names would be published and a mark would be set upon them, that Southern purchasers in our market might know and avoid them." 50 It was not at all surprising, therefore, these journals concluded, that under the pressure of this "Cotton Terror," the merchants should have rushed to endorse the meeting.51 *7 ±8 4» 50 si

F. S. Lathrop, in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 4, 5, 1850. See letter of "Many Peace Men," in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 26, 1850. See Post, Oct. 30, Dec. 9, 1850. Post, Oct. 30; Tribune, Oct. 29; Courier and Enquirer, Oct. 23, 28, 1850. Tribune, Oct. 30; Post, Nov. 9, 1850.

SLAVERY AND BUSINESS 44 The occurrence of a number of incidents before and after the meeting lent color to these charges. One business man wrote several years later that he had been visited in his store by Joshua J. Henry and two other merchants to request that he sign the call. "When I refused, Mr. Henry was quite displeased. The few of us— for we were only a few— were threatened with being published to the South." 62 Moreover, on October 24 the Journal of Commerce announced that several merchants, including the proprietors of the Independent j had refused to endorse the meeting. And on the next day the Day Book printed the names of eight firms which, it claimed, had rejected the proposal to sign the call, and which it therefore characterized as "Abolitionists." Considerable excitement was aroused in business circles by these actions, especially when it was learned that the Day Book had sent the names to newspapers in the South, and had urged Southern merchants to "shun these fanatics" and "drop them like a viper." 53 Many merchants who, because of the brief time allotted, had not yet had an opportunity to sign the call, were still further worried when it was announced that the sponsoring committee would publish a pamphlet which would include a list of all merchants and firms which had endorsed the meeting.54 The business men would be able to "obtain copies to send to their correspondents in the South and elsewhere." 65 It was not surprising, therefore, that some merchants who had been listed among those refusing to endorse the meeting should now make haste to announce their willingness to sign the call.66 One firm, however, remained steadfast. This was the silk house of Bowen and McNamee, also known as the publishers of the religious anti-slavery weekly, the Independent. These merchants inserted a card in the newspapers in which they stated their opinions in no uncertain terms. For years, it was referred to 52 Letter to Tribune, Dec. 22, 1859. 53 See Tribune, Dec. 6, 1850; March 24, 1851. Some of these firms sent "cards" to the newspapers, denying these charges. See cards of Chittenden and Bliss, reprinted in Tribune, Dec. 6, 1850, and of Perkins, Warren and Company in National Intelligencer, Dec. 17, 1850, and their letter to the Post, Dec. 24, 1851. 54 See letter of "A Firm in Maiden Lane," in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 2, 1850. "We doubt not," wrote these harassed merchants, "there are hundreds in like position with ourselves." 55 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 1, 1850. 56 E.g., See the letter of Chittenden and Bliss to Journal of Commerce, Oct. 25, 1850.. and of Perkins, Warren and Company, printed in Post, Feb. 24, 1851.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

by anti-slavery men as illustrating a courage rare among merchants of New York.67 Their card stated:

45 the

The public, including the Journal of Commerce, are informed that we are silk merchants, and keep an extensive and well assorted stock of goods which we offer to responsible buyers on reasonable terms. As individuals we entertain our own views on the various Religious, Moral and Political questions of the day, which we are neither afraid nor ashamed to declare on all proper occasions. But we wish it distinctly understood that our goods, and not our principles, are in the market. The attempt to punish us as merchants for the exercise of our liberty as citizens we leave to the judgment of the community.58 The Castle Garden meeting is significant not only because it initiated a series of similar Union meetings throughout the nation,59 but also because it throws considerable light on the attitude of the merchants toward the slavery issue.60 An examination of the speeches and resolutions reveals three main themes that were stressed. One dealt with the general position of the merchants on the slavery question and especially on the abolitionist movement. Then there was the attitude of the merchants toward the Compromise, particularly the new Fugitive Slave Act. Finally, there was the problem of what action should be taken by the merchants in the future to "put down agitation on the subject of slavery." As for the first theme, there was general agreement that the institution of slavery was an evil that should be eradicated from the country. There was also complete agreement, however, that the institution was so intimately connected with the social and economic life of the South that its eradication was something which could be accomplished only over a long period of years. Furthermore, the people of the South should be permitted to judge for 57 See speech of Horace Mann, printed in Independent, April 24, 1851. A campaign was actually started to persuade Western and Northern merchants to patronize Bowen and McNamee, thereby compensating them for the loss they would suffer in their Southern trade. See Albany Evening Journal, Oct. 28, 1850; Tribune, Nov. 13, 1850; and Post, April 19, 1851. 58 Tribune, Oct. 28, 1850; Post, Oct. 26, 29, 1850. 59 See reprints in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 5-20, 1850, of meetings in Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, etc. 6° George Wood, probably the leading lawyer in the city, was Chairman of the meeting. Moses Taylor, William H. Aspinwall, William H. Webb, E. K. Collins, Henry Chauncey, Robert C. Wetmore, Thomas C. Buckley, and Thomas W. Phelps were among the other officers. Journal of Commerce, Oct. 31, 1850.

46 * BUSINESS AND SLAVERY themselves when it should be abolished and the North should not "interfere with them" in this work.61 For the abolitionist doctrine that slavery was a sin and should be immediately abolished regardless of the consequences, the merchants of New York could have nothing but contempt. More than that, it was their duty "to wage relentless warfare upon the doctrine and the propagators of it." 62 "I will have no compromise with abolition principles or abolition leaders," said James W. Gerard. "We must root them up as poisonous weeds; and we must put upon them the ban of public opinion, and drive them from our midst." 63 For if the abolitionists had their way, the entire economic and social structure of the country would collapse. It would mean business chaos, and "would be attended with the prostration of industry as it was in the West Indies." 64 The "Peace Measures" of the last session of Congress were discussed at length by the various speakers. It was emphasized that the merchants had agreed to support Clay's plan because they were convinced that it provided the only means of safeguarding the Union, as well as of ending the serious threats to business prosperity created by the prolonged conflict in Congress.65 Nor was the support of the plan an indication, as some charged, that the merchants had abandoned their opposition to the extension of slavery. They simply believed, with Webster, James W. Gerard declared, that "the God of nature . . . has created a proviso against the further extension of slavery stronger than ten thousand Wilmots can draw." 66 It was granted that some merchants, because of their dislike of the fugitive slave clause, experienced misgivings over their former support of the Compromise. But this timidity arose from a mistaken conception of the law. Five of the outstanding lawyers of New York devoted much time during the evening to convincing the merchants that their fears over the new law were entirely unwarranted.67

Thus, James W. Gerard spoke at length

61 See speeches of George Wood, James W. Gerard, James T. Brady, and Ogden T. Hoffman, Proceedings of the Union Safety Meeting held at Castle Garden, Oct. 23, 1850, pp. 6-8, 14-15, 31, 35-37. e2 Ibid., pp. 6-9, 31, 34-37, 32. 63 ibid., p. 36. 64 Speech of George Wood, ibid., p. 9. 65 Speech of Ogden Hoffman, ibid., pp. 31-32. 66 ibid., p. 14. 67 They were George Wood, the Chairman of the meeting, James W. Gerard, John T. Brady, Edward Sandford, and William M. Evarts. Ibid., pp. 23-27.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

47

in an effort to prove that the new Act had not "superseded the law of 1793" but was "merely an amendment to it," and therefore entirely constitutional. "As I stand before you," he pleaded, "I declare that according to my best judgment, after a careful perusal of the law, of its scope and object, no argument can be held against its constitutionality." The speakers granted that the merchants, like many others in the North, were moved by the thought of forcing men to return to slavery after undergoing so many risks to achieve freedom.68 They should realize, however, that the South regarded the new law as the only gain achieved by that section in the Compromise, and that if this part of the settlement should prove worthless, because of opposition to its enforcement in the North, the forces in the South seeking a dissolution of the Union would emerge victorious. Furthermore, violations of the law endangered the security of not only the Southerner. The law, after all, protected property, and the unchecked violation of this type of law might produce serious consequences to owners of business property in the North. Now it was property in slaves that was being denied protection. Why not property in trade and commerce next? As William E. Evarts, one of the speakers, put it: "Let us know and feel that he who strikes at a law, strikes at the law." More important than either of the two issues discussed above was the problem of organizing the merchants to put down agitation on the slavery question. Unless some steps in this direction were taken, each succeeding year might bring paralysis in business, and uncertainty in the entire conduct of commercial affairs. And soon enough the prospects of a decade of business prosperity would completely vanish. "Let us not jeopardize these prospects by dissension about the African," said Charles O'Conor, as he urged the merchants to organize against sectional agitation.69 The course of action to be followed was the organization of a Conservative Union party, which would have the political and financial support of the merchants. All of the speakers devoted much time to the task of persuading the merchants "on the great question of the preservation of the Union" to "rise above the billows of the party spirit," and help in the formation of "a great National party." 70 Some of the speakers, in fact, took the opporto'Ibid., p. 8. 68 Ibid., p. 14. 60 Ibid., pp. 17-19.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

tunity to announce that they no longer considered themselves 48 members of either of the old parties. Thus, James W. Gerard declared that although he had been a member of the Whig party from its very beginnings, the domination of the party by leaders with "abolition principles" left him no choice but that of abandoning his former blind allegiance to the organization: 71 I here tonight for one, renounce all party allegiance, when it comes in conflict with my allegiance to the Union. My motto is, my country first, my party last. I will render no personal subservience to any candidate who is not sound on that subject. . . . Hereafter, I will see who are the conservative candidates, not where they are, and if my party gives itself up to leaders who will betray its principles, I will no longer fight under its banner, but if need be I will go over to the old Democratic party, and with a bucktail in my hat, and the tattered banner of old St. Tammany waving over me, I will there aid in fighting the battle of the Constitution, the Compromise, and the Union. Gerard was joined in this declaration by Charles O'Conor, a prominent Democrat, who called for the formation of a Union party, and then announced: "I will support any National Whig in preference to any of that class of pretended Democrats known as free-soilers." 72 To cap the climax, Edward Sandford called for the immediate application of the determination of the merchants to elect to office only those who would support the Compromise: Let no man who is not known to be firmly and resolutely opposed to all further agitation, who is not known to be an ardent supporter of the Constitution AS IT IS, be entrusted with political power. In politics, let us know no cause but that of our country, no party but that of the Union. Let us support no nomination, come from where it may, which does not present to us a candidate who is animated by a love for his whole country, and who is not ready to execute all its laws and maintain its institutions in their full vigor and purity.73 The resolutions (adopted unanimously by the several thousand merchants present in the Garden) emphasized the same principles advocated by the speakers. There was approval of the Compromise measures, and a declaration that the settlement was "a fair one." The Fugitive Slave Act was upheld as both necessary and constitutional, and the determination of the merchants nibid., pp. 13-15. 72 Ibid., p. 21. " Ibid., p. 30.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

49

of New York to uphold the law was expressed. "We will sustain this law, and the execution of the same by all lawful means," they declared. Then followed an elaboration of the means to be used by the merchants to halt "further agitation of the slavery question in Congress," which "would be fraught with incalculable danger to our Union." We will support no candidate at the ensuing, or any other election, for State officers or for members of Congress, or of the Legislature, who is known or believed to be hostile to the peace measures recently adopted by Congress, or any of them, or in favor of re-opening the questions involved in them for renewed agitation.7* The next resolution asserted that the merchants of New York no longer considered themselves tied to "any of the political parties to which we may have hitherto belonged." In the future, the merchants would "range" themselves "under the banner of that party whose principles and practice are most calculated to uphold the Constitution and perpetuate our glorious Union." And the final resolution, of great importance, announced the formation of a Union Safety Committee of merchants, charged with the duty, by correspondence and otherwise, of carrying out the objects of this meeting, which are hereby declared to be . . . to revive and foster among the whole people of the United States, the spirit in which the Union was formed and the Constitution was adopted; and to resist every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.75 One of the immediate effects of the Castle Garden meeting was the formation of a Union ticket in the state election. At the first meeting of the Union Safety Committee on October 31, it was decided that an appeal should be issued to citizens, urging them to vote for only those candidates "who are known to be opposed to re-opening the great peace measure, which has passed the recent session of Congress and against agitating the slavery question in the national councils." 76 In addition, about forty members of the committee determined to sponsor a ticket which could be "consistently" voted for by "the ten thousand patriots at Castle Garden." Assuming the name "Union Association," ""Ibid., pp. 15-16. ™ Ibid., pp. 37-38. ™ Francis Lathrop, in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 4, 5, 1850.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

these0 merchants drew up an address in behalf of the "Anti-Dis5 union, Anti-Abolition, Anti-Seward, Anti-Demagogism Ticket." 77 This declared: An association has been organized without reference to party among those who gave their hearty assent and support to the resolutions adopted at the late meeting at Castle Garden, and particularly that one which declares that we will support no candidate in the ensuing or any other election, for State Officers hostile to the Peace Measures. Acting in what they conceive to be the spirit of the resolution, the association have resolved to support the following Union Ticket for State Officers at the coming election. For For For For

Governor Lieut. Governor Canal Commissioner Clerk Court of Appeals

Horatio Seymour George J. Cornell John C. Mather Wessel S. Smith

And to pursue all honorable measures for the successful support in the City of New York, they ask the countenance and cooperation of all those who entertain similar sentiments with their own. The ticket recommended for support is adopted from those on both political parties of the State, under the honest conviction and belief that the candidates thus selected, better than the others represent the principles declared by the great meeting at Castle Garden.78 The Union ticket won the support of the "men of wealth and character" in the city.79 How many of them voted for the ticket, it is impossible to ascertain. But evidently a great many did. The Tribune had predicted before the election that the ticket would gain the votes of a majority of the merchants, and it had warned the rural Whigs to intensify their efforts so as to nullify "the Mercantile defection." 80 The results amply justified these fears. Hunt was elected by barely three hundred votes, and in New York City received 962 fewer votes than Seymour. On the other hand, Cornell, the Whig and Union candidate for Lieutenant Governor, received a majority of 4,437 votes in the city; James Brooks, the Union candidate for Congress, was re-elected in a district which was carried by Seymour; and Ambrose C. Kingsland, the Whig candidate for mayor, won by over five thousand 77 Ibid. See also Courier and Enquirer, Nov. 5, 1850. 78 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 3; Tribune, Nov. 4, 1850. 79 Diary of Philip Hone, Nov. 4, 1850; Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Oct. 7, 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers; John Slidell to James Buchanan, Oct. 9, 15, 18, 1850, Buchanan Papers. so Tribune, Nov. 3, 4, 1850.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

51

votes.81 Unquestionably, then, the conservative "mercantile" Whigs had cast their votes for Seymour, fearing that Hunt was a Seward man.82 The Tribune estimated that "at least two thousand Whigs in this city, with a considerable number more who do business here, but reside in the adjacent counties, voted against Washington Hunt, and in favor of Horatio Seymour," and that "the spirit and bearing of Castle Garden [was] embodied in their votes." 83 The results of the election aroused considerable joy in business circles.84 Reports from the South revealed that they were interpreted inthat section as a decisive blow to the "Seward faction," and as a victory for the Union and the Compromise. In addition, letters from Southern Unionists revealed that the news of the existence of a Union ticket in the Empire City had aided considerably in the victories scored by the Union forces in several state elections.85 "We of the South," wrote a Union merchant from Alabama, "honor and thank the good citizens of your city, who have come out so boldly for Union and good faith in compromise." 86 Aroused to fury by the results of the election, the anti-Compromise forces launched a bitter attack upon the Union movement. The fact that the same business men who had sponsored the "No Compromise" meeting in 1848, should, two years later, have become the leading proponents of compromise, assumed a prominent position in their diatribes. They explained the volte face simply. The Union movement, they argued, was merely a device to gain profits. Thus it had been supported by newspapers who were anxious to increase their advertising by posing as champions of the business men.87 The merchants had joined and thrown si Journal of Commerce, Nov. 2, 1850. 82 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 9, 14, 1850; Charles E. Stetson to Weed, Nov. 10, 1850; D. H. Abell to Weed, Nov. 7, 1850, Weed Papers; Washington Hunt to Fillmore, Nov. 16, 1850; J. Phillips Phoenix to Fillmore, Nov. 6, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Moses H. Grinnell to Crittenden, Nov. 18, 1850, Crittenden Papers. 83 Tribune, Nov. 28, 1850. 84 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 7, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 85 See Journal of Commerce, Nov. 7-14, 1850. zeibid., Nov. 10, 1850. 87 Herald, April 10, 1851. In this connection the following note from Fillmore's secretary to the President is significant: "Private. Mr. Brooks called to say that his paper, the Express, has been through the last administration deprived of all the government advertising for cause and that under these orders all that advertising in the city was running in adverse channels. Mr. B. would, therefore, be much obliged if the President would permit Mr. Campbell to say to Mr. Graham, Mr. Conrad and Mr. Smith that the Express should not be under the ban." Fillmore Papers, Sept. 26, 1850.

52

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

overboard their former hostility to the advance of slavery in order that they might secure the support of Southern congressmen for the establishment of a much needed Branch Mint in New York City.88 The mint bill in 1849 had been defeated because South* ern Senators had resented the fact that the merchants had supported the Wilmot Proviso in the famous Park meeting.89 This had convinced the business men, declared the Post, "that if New York City expected this act of expediency and justice, she must become conservative, cease agitation, and generally do all that the spirit of slavery required of her." 90 Hence the Castle Garden meeting, and hence the Union Safety Committee.91 It was also charged that much of the energy displayed by many merchants in behalf of the Compromise plan was due to that part of the Bill which granted Texas $10,000,000 in consideration of that state's agreement to abandon claims to territory in New Mexico. Since this provision provided a source of enormous profits for the New York creditors of Texas, these capitalists, the charge went, had worked frantically to gain full support for the Compromise in city.92 the Southern votes, went another explanation, had been needed for steamship contracts, and in order to obtain them, many of the shipping merchants had abandoned their support of the Proviso and did the bidding of the slaveholders.93 Thus, the Union movement was "purely a business transaction" to "secure sufficient Southern support" for government appropriations, and it "derived its whole force and vitality from the Steamboat interests." 94 Finally, when the merchants shouted their love for the Union and the Constitution, they did not mean "the musty parchment and the existing institutions existing under it." 95 s« On the importance of the mint to the merchants, see James G. King to the New York merchants, Jan. 8, 1850, Bankers' Magazine, V, 378-379; J. P. Mowerer to Fillmore, Jan. 20, 1850; J. P. Phoenix to Fillmore, Nov. 16, 1850, and Charles A. Davis to Fillmore, Feb. 8, 1851, Fillmore Papers. so See Herald, March 5, 1849. »o Feb. 7, 1851. 81 Post, Sept. 24, 1852. 82 Tribune, Sept. 2, 1850; S. P. Lyman to Thurlow Weed, Sept. 1, 1850, Weed Papers. On this whole question of the grant to Texas and her creditors, see M. J. Ware, "Land Speculation and the Mexican War," op. cit., p. 322. 83 Post, Sept. 24, 1852. 84 Ibid., Sept. 20, 24, 1852. For evidence on this issue, see James Brooks to Fillmore, Oct. 18, Dec. 26, 1850; William H. Aspinwall to Fillmore, Dec. 20, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 9« Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society for 1855, pp. 80-81.

DEFENDING

THE

COMPROMISE

53

They mean the clipper ships, Government contracts, warehouses bursting with merchandise, large profits, great dividends; they mean houses in Fifth Avenue or Beacon Street, services of plate, servants in livery, Potiphar Balls, dinners of seven courses and twenty-five kinds of wine, fine carriages and horses; they mean tours in Europe, winters in Paris and Rome, summers in Switzerland, presentations at court, tuft-hunting, and toadying, purchases of pictures, books, statues— whatever, in short, money can buy. The pro-Compromise journals were quick to leap to the defense of the merchants. They pointed out that some of the outstanding champions of a branch mint refused to support the Castle Garden meeting because they still upheld the Wilmot Proviso.98 Then again, a number of merchants who were directors of steamship companies and who had joined in petitioning Congress for government contracts, had also refused to endorse the call for the Castle Garden meeting, and maintained their stand as "eminent free soilers." 97 On the other hand, many of the merchants most active in the Union movement were owners of sailing vessels, and were decidedly hostile to the grants of subsidies to competing steamship lines, having petitioned Congress urging the rejection of these appropriations.98 Furthermore, William H. Seward, an outstanding opponent of Compromise, was a leading champion of steamship contracts.99 It is not necessary to delve further into this controversy. The chief point still remains— the Union movement included the vast majority of the merchants, regardless of political affiliations, and regardless of particular economic interests. True, these merchants had abandoned much of their former opposition to the expansion of slavery, but they had not abandoned their major political and, Journal of Commerce, Nov. 12, 1850. 97 ibid., Sept. 21-23, 1852. Moses H. Grinnell, Simeon Draper, Edwin D. Morgan, and Jacob Westervelt were a few of these merchants. All were interested in steamboat contracts, but were bitter opponents of the Union Committee. See the letter, which they signed, to T. Butler King of Georgia, praising him for his work in securing the passage of the mail contract bill in 1847. Post, March 22, 1847. See also their letter to Edward K. Collins, in Journal of Commerce, Sept. 5, 1851. »8 Ibid., Sept. 22, 1852. Henry Grinnell, David B. Ogden, Moses Taylor, and John Griswold were among the merchants who petitioned Congress against these contracts. See Post, Feb. 20, 1852, and Journal of Commerce, Sept. 26, 1852. It is obvious that if the Union Committee was formed only to obtain these contracts, Moses H. Grinnell would have been active in it, and Henry Grinnell would have opposed it. 89 Ibid. See also the speech of William H. Seward in the Senate of the United States, April 27, 1852, for the Collins steamers, pamphlet.

54

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

economic interests. For however they might have opposed the expansion of slavery, this had been and still was outweighed by their fear of the "threatened disaster" that would follow a dissolution of the Union. The chief interest of "the men who represent the business interest of the country," said one merchant, was "to save the Union." They would continue their activities, he went on, until they were convinced that the Union was no longer in danger.100 100 See Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1851.

4

The

Union

Safety

Committee,

1850-1852

THE Castle Garden meeting was but the beginning of a struggle waged for two years by the New York merchants in behalf of the Compromise. Their aim was to strengthen the Union forces in the Empire State, and in this way to consolidate the Union movement throughout the nation. As a result, victories could be achieved by the pro-Compromise elements in the state and congressional elections, all of which would lead inevitably to a Union victory in the presidential election in 1852. Once this was achieved, the sectional agitators would be so completely silenced that the slavery issue would disappear from American politics, and the Compromise of 1850 would remain as the basis for harmonious relations between the North and South until slavery was eventually abolished.1 It was a beautiful dream, and for a while it almost seemed that it would be fulfilled. The history of these two years of incessant struggle in behalf of the Union can best be revealed by an analysis of the manifold activities of the Union Safety Committee.2 The organization was composed of one hundred outstanding merchants, among whom were: 3 William B. Astor, Moses Taylor, E. K. Collins, George Griswold, Jr., William H. Webb, Stephen Whitney, Henry Grinnell, Marshall O. Roberts, Schuyler Livingston, George Wood, Ogden Hoffman, Stewart Brown, Francis S. Lathrop, and Joshua J. Henry. These merchants gave considerable time, energy, and money in carrying out the task assigned to them at the Castle 1 For evidence of these aims, see Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Feb. 15, 17, 1851, Fillmore Papers, and ibid., Jan., 1851 -March, 1852. 2 Throughout this entire period, only one merchant publicly attacked the work of the Committee. He was Moses H. Grinnell, who denounced the efforts of the organization to force the Whig merchants of New York to abandon the position on slavery extension that they had adopted in 1848. See Courier and Enquirer, Nov. 23, 1850; Hiram Ketchum to Peter Harvey, Nov. 29, 1850, Webster Papers; Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 25, 1850, Fillmore Papers. s For a complete list of the members of the committee, see Official Proceedings of the Union Safety Meeting Held at Castle Garden, Oct. 23, 1850, pp. 37-38. Most of the members were Whigs. 55

56

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

Garden meeting— "to revive and foster among the whole people of the United States, the spirit in which the Union was formed and the Constitution was adopted; and to resist every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts." At first the Union Safety Committee concentrated upon creating a favorable public opinion to the Compromise of 1850, especially in the rural regions of the state. These regions were the stronghold of Sewardism, the great obstacle (so the merchants believed) to a peaceful solution of the sectional conflict. Here public opinion was definitely set against the Compromise, and hence the Committee determined "to sow the good seed" plentifully in these rural regions.4 "Africa must be converted and the negro heathen brought to see the light," became the Committee's leading slogan.5 To accomplish the conversion of the "heathen," the Union Safety Committee appointed a special Committee of Correspondence.6 This group immediately dispatched scores of letters to outstanding individuals throughout the nation, urging them to express their views in a manner "tending to allay excitement and revive national feelings" on the necessity of maintaining the Compromise.7 Special efforts were made to obtain sermons and letters from members of the clergy defending the Fugitive Slave Act. It was recognized that in upstate New York, the "higher law" doctrine was making rapid headway, as discontent over the operation of the new act mounted. What better weapon with which to meet this doctrine than the voice of religious leaders? Thus, the Committee addressed the following letter to several score ministers: Your studies have led you to a profound examination of the Word of God, and the principles of private and public morality, and your character and position entitle your opinions to the respectful consideration of the public. We should therefore be pleased to learn your 4 Hiram Ketchum to Peter Harvey, Nov. 29, 1850, Van Tyne, ed., Letters of Webster, p. 463. 5 James Brooks to Fillmore, Jan. 5, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 6 A. G. Benson to Daniel Webster, Nov. 10, 1850, Webster Papers. The members of the committee were: Edward K. Collins, Moses Taylor, George Wood, Henry Grinnell, Francis Griffin, Hiram Ketchum, George B. Butler, A. G. Benson, L. B. Chase, George Douglass, and James T. Brady. See Journal of Commerce, Jan. 11, 1851. 7 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 11, 17, 1851.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

57

views upon the attempt now boldly made, to convert conscience into a nullifier of the Constitution of the country. . . . The Republic has a right to look to the sons whom she has reared or who have sought her protection, to vindicate the principles which lie at the foundation of the Social Order.8 The response to this appeal was even greater than the Committee had expected. Many clergymen wrote letters to the Committee praising its work, and urging the support of the principles it represented.9 More than this, the clergymen of New York and neighboring regions agreed to set aside December 12, 1850 as a day on which sermons would concern the "Peace Measures" and the Fugitive Slave Act. Practically all the sermons advised acquiescence on the part of the people to the law and denounced the "higher law" doctrine.10 The members of the Union Committee were jubilant. Hiram Ketchum wrote joyfully to Fillmore: "The pulpit did its duty yesterday in this city and vicinity. The 'higher law' doctrine received no quarter." 11 What particularly pleased the Committee was that several clergymen who usually vigorously supported the anti-slavery movement now joined in defending the Compromise with fervent sermons. These alone, the Committee believed, would sink "disunion forever into oblivion." 12 But the sermons, as well as other letters and speeches, had to be circulated, and the raising of a fund to accomplish this was the next task of the Union Committee. A sub-committee of five was appointed to visit leading merchants and solicit contributions. In a very brief time, $25,000 was raised, Brown Brothers heading the list of contributors with a subscription of $i,ooo.13 With this money the Committee fully developed its campaign to convert the upstaters. The sermons were published in pamphlet form and distributed in all parts of the state.14 Letters of leading Senators 8 Ibid., Jan. 7, 1851. 9 Some of these letters were printed in the Journal of Commerce, Jan. 11, 17, 1851, and in the Albany Evening Journal, March 10-12, 1851. 10 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Dec. 13, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 11 Ketchum to Fillmore, Dec. 13, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 12 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Dec. 13, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 13 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Dec. 13, 1850, Fillmore Papers. On this committee were Hiram Ketchum, E. K. Collins, Morris Ketchum, Robert C. Wetmore, and Henry Grinnell. 14 James Brooks wrote to Fillmore on Jan. 5, 1851: "I have already sent off a cartload of Dr. Stile's sermon . . . more and more sermons are to come." Fillmore Papers. See the pamphlet, The Law-Abiding Conscience and the Higher Law Conscience, with Remarks on the Fugitive Slave Question (New York, 1850).

58

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

and Governors, defending the Compromise, speeches of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster on the Union., and letters and sermons of clergymen were inserted by the Committee as paid advertisements in many newspapers throughout the state.15 The Journal of Commerce, again speaking for the Union Committee, summarized the work for the first few months: Thousands and thousands of speeches, letters and sermons . . . have been distributed in different parts of the State. All this costs money, and a good deal of it. But men are found among us, with their hearts and purses open, ready to give liberally for an object so dear to their patriotic hearts, and odious to "wooly heads" and rebels.16 Finally, the Committee collected the outstanding speeches made in Congress in behalf of the Compromise, and published them in pamphlet form. Thousands of copies were distributed throughout the state.17 In a long preface to the pamphlet, the Committee explained the necessity for its activities to defend the Compromise. It assured the people of the state that the New York merchants, whom the Union Committee represented, would much rather have devoted all their time to their business affairs. Unfortunately, however, agitation over the slavery issue still threatened "the peace and safety of the Union." Many people were being aroused by dangerous elements to oppose the Compromise and to urge its repeal. Incidents were occurring which involved the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, and therefore boded ill for the future of the Union. Finally, the abolitionists were finding their doctrines being readily accepted in many parts of the state. These were the reasons why the merchants were ready to sacrifice their time, money and energy on Union Committees. We cannot close our eyes to the fact [the Committee declared] that the people of our State have permitted their honest judgment to be misled and their generous sympathies to become enlisted by specious appeals to their feelings against the system of slavery that has existed in the Southern States since the formation of our government. is Journal of Commerce, March 13, 19, 1851; George Wood to John C. Spencer, in ibid., Nov. 3, 1851. is March 13, 1851. 17 Selections from the Speeches and Writings of Prominent Men in the United States on the subject of Abolition and Agitation, and in favor of the Compromise Measures of the last session of Congress. Addressed to the People of the State of New York by the Union Safety Committee. Pamphlet.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

59

Unless their attitude changed, they concluded, the sectional controversy would grow in intensity and the Union would shortly be dissolved. "Are you willing then," they said, "to break the bonds of our confederacy by such means in the vain attempt to remove this one evil from which we at the North are exempt, which we all feel and know is without practical remedy?" 18 At the same time that it was "sowing the good seed" throughout the state, the Union Committee devoted much time to planning celebrations in honor of prominent defenders of the Union. They collected a fund to purchase carriages for President Fillmore and Daniel Webster.19 They sponsored a public meeting to bestow the thanks of the merchants of the city upon the Democratic Senators Cass, Cobb, and Dickinson for their work in behalf of the Compromise.20 They honored Senators Foote and Downe for their struggle against the secessionists in the recent Georgia election.21 They joined in promoting the huge annual ball on the occasion of the birthday of Henry Clay.22 A very important celebration sponsored by the Union Committee was that which occurred on Washington's Birthday. A month before this date, the Committee issued an appeal in which it urged the friends of the Union to hold meetings "in every city, every village, and every hamlet to hear the farewell address read to assembled citizens." 23 It is thought [the Committee wrote] that at no previous period of our history have the people of our country been more imperiously called on to rally around the principles of Washington, and refresh their recollections with his parting words of counsel and advice.24 This appeal brought forth a ready response. Meetings were held in the North and the South at which the "Peace Measures" were extolled and Washington's warning against sectional struggles !8 Ibid., preface. 19 Marshall O. Roberts, Charles H. Marshall, etc., to Fillmore, Nov. 25, 1850; J. B. Varnum to Fillmore, Dec. 24, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Charles E. Stetson to Webster, Feb. 14, 1851, Webster Papers. 20 Journal of Commerce, Post, Nov. 28, 1850; Prosper M. Wetmore to W. R. Marcy, Nov. 30, Dec. 4, 1850, Marcy Papers; Garret Dyckman to Fillmore, Nov. 27, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 21 Journal of Commerce, Tribune, Dec. 10, 1850. 22 N. Carroll to Fillmore, Feb. 28, March 20, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 23 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Jan. 10, 1851; C. Goodrich to Fillmore, Feb. 7, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 24 Moses Taylor, Henry Grinnell, etc., to Fillmore, Feb. 3, 1851, Fillmore Papers.

6o

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

reemphasized.25 In New York City the merchants closed their stores for the day,26 and the city government recognized the meeting as an official affair.27 Another action of the Union Committee, fully as important as the Washington celebration, was the invitation to Webster to address the New York merchants. This invitation was sent after the Mayor and Aldermen of Boston had refused the use of Faneuil Hall for a meeting honoring the Secretary of State.28 The action infuriated the merchants in New York,29 and when the Union Committee circulated a memorial inviting Webster to visit the city so that the business men could have the opportunity to "express to him in person their deep and grateful appreciation of his devotion to the great public interests of the country," it received within a few days the signatures of five thousand firms.30 Although Webster never addressed the merchants except briefly on his visit to the city with President Fillmore, to attend the New York and Erie Railroad celebration,31 this memorial was widely hailed as a thorough rebuke to the "Boston faction." 32 In addition to these activities, the Union Committee also won considerable publicity because of its activities in defense of the Fugitive Slave Act. Most significant was the case involving Henry Long, who had been seized by the federal authorities in New York City. His case was moving along quickly and appeared to be about over, when the New York Anti-Slavery Society came to Long's aid and supplied funds to defend him. As a result, the case began to drag in the court, adding considerable expense 25 Reports of these meetings appeared in the Journal of Commerce, Feb. 25March 1, 1851. See also the leaflet of the committee for the Washington Birthday celebration in Macon, Georgia, in Fillmore Papers, Feb. 7, 1851. 26 Prosper M. Wetmore to W. R. Marcy, Feb. 22, 1850, Marcy Papers. 27 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 24, 1851. 2« Boston Journal, April 15, 1851. 2» Diary of Philip Hone, April 19, 1851 (MS, New York Historical Society). so Post, April 21, 25, 1851; Hiram Ketchum to Webster, May 5, 1851, Van Tyne, ed., Letters of Daniel Webster, p. 474; James Brooks to Fillmore, May 3, 1851, Fillmore Papers. For the complete list of signers, see Herald, May 7, 1851. si H. Maxwell to Fillmore, April 30, 1851; Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, May 30, 1851; D. D. Howard to Fillmore, May 8, 1851; James Brooks to Fillmore, May 3, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 32 Emerson, however, noted in disgust: "All the praises of the Advertiser and the Journal of Commerce, or the salvos of the New York Committee cannot com1851. pensate him (Webster) for the wreck of his fame." Boston Daily Advertiser, May 22,

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

61 to the Southern claimant.83 At this point, the Union Safety Committee entered the picture. The Committee regarded the case as crucial from the point of view of Southern opinion of the Compromise. Should Long's owner fail, after spending much time and money attempting to recover his slave, the attitude on the part of the South toward the value of the new law would undergo a rapid change. The failure of the law [the Committee further declared] to accomplish its object in a case so plain and palpable in the City of New York, too, where so strong a Union sentiment has been manifested, would have been regarded as equivalent to an acknowledgment that the law could not be enforced.3* The organization therefore appealed to merchants to contribute to a fund with which to hire a lawyer to aid in restoring Long to his owners.35 Five hundred dollars was quickly raised, and George Wood, the prominent lawyer and chairman of the Union Committee, was engaged to appear in court against Long.36 After an elaborate hearing, the court ruled that Long be delivered up to his owners. The Committee made an effort a while later to purchase Long's freedom and a fund was actually subscribed for this purpose.87 But Long's owner, who intended to sell the slave to a planter in Georgia in order that he might serve as an object lesson, refused. If the slaves of the South knew, he said in giving his reason, that they would have their freedom purchased once they fled to New York, the new law would prove to be of little value.38 About a year later, the Committee became involved in the famous Lemmon case. Jonathan Lemmon was a Virginia planter who had left that state for Texas. Accompanying him were his family and eight Negro slaves. In order to obtain the steamship connections for Texas, it was necessary for the group to come to New York City. While waiting in the city to be transferred to the proper steamer, Lemmon was separated from his slaves, and due to several delays, missed the boat. He soon received word 33 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Dec. 30, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 34 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 16, 1851. 85 Ibid., Jan. 11, 1851. 36 The Committee offered to pay the expenses of Long's owners, but this was refused by the claimant. Letter of W. W. Parker to Richmond Enquirer, in Journal of Commerce, Jan. 16, 1851. 37 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 18, 1851. 38 Richmond Enquirer, in Journal of Commerce, Jan. 16, 1851.

62

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

that his slaves had been taken into court, and that according to New York State Laws they could be set free.39 The case came before Justice Paine of the New York Superior Court. On November 13, 1852, he ruled that the eight slaves, under the laws of the State of New York prohibiting the importation of slaves into the state, were free men. He therefore ordered them discharged from Lemmon's possession.40 The decision immediately aroused great rejoicing among the anti-slavery men, who were jubilant over the fact that New York City, despite the Union Safety Committee, was still a free city in a free state. But in the South, when the decision was announced, there were many outbursts of indignation, and it soon became clear that this decision counterbalanced any impression that the activities of the Union Committee had created. Among the New York City merchants, there was a feeling of dismay. Even the Courier and Enquirer admitted that the merchants had good cause to worry. "It will do more to separate the North and South," it declared in reviewing the decision, "than any other event which has happened since the birth of our confederation, and will open at once the gaping breach which has but now with so much solicitude been closed." 42 In their indignation over the decision, a number of merchants wrote to the Union Safety Committee, urging its members to initiate a campaign to repeal the "obnoxious ' law which freed slaves brought into the state.43 The Committee, however, realized that there was little possibility of succeeding in this endeavor, and concentrated instead on a plan of its own. It issued an appeal to the merchants, urging them to subscribe to a fund to compensate Lemmon for his loss.44 The response was immediate, and in less than a week, $5,280 was raised.45 One merchant wrote: 46 "The decision of Judge Paine may be legal, but it does not carry out the spirit of the Constitution of the United States nor that of 39 This account is based on a letter sent by Jonathan Lemmon to the Journal of Commerce, Nov. 17, 1852. 40 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 16, 1852. ^Liberator, Dec. 3, 1852; Tribune, Nov. 15, 17, 29, 1852. See also Augusta (Ga.) Constitutionalist, in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 17, 1852. 42 Courier and Enquirer, Nov. 16, 1852. 43 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 23, 1852; Lewis Tappan to John Scoble, Dec. 10, 1852, Tappan Correspondence, op. cit., p. 494. 44 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 13, 17, 23, 1852; Jan. 17, 1853. 4s Ibid., Nov. 22, 1852. For the list of contributors, see ibid., Nov. 19-22, 1852. 46 Ibid., Nov. 22, 1852.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

63

equity." H. Brower and Company added to their contribution of one hundred dollars a long comment, in which they agreed that the decision "could not have been otherwise." 47 Nor were they in favor of changing the state laws, for nothing would be accomplished bythis. We think we know enough political abolitionists to feel sure that they would lose no opportunity to effect the escape or kidnapping of a negro in any way, to keep up a continual ferment of this question to the irritation and disquiet of our friends in the South. We therefore prefer the prevention to the cure.48 The most significant activities of the Union Safety Committee were those in the political field. Indeed, the work thus far was but a prelude to these activities. The Empire State had to be "Unionized" politically as well as morally. True, the people were "waking up," but they were still represented in the state and national legislatures by men who were indoctrinated with the radicalism of the Seward brand. All this had to be changed. The Committee was determined "that Mr. Seward and his doctrines must and shall be put down in this State," and any one who opposed "the wise and just measures of the last Congress" and was even slightly tainted with Sewardism must be swept from positions of power.49 With these objectives in mind, the Union Safety Committee entered the field of politics. Thus they participated in the battle taking place in Albany to elect a successor to Daniel S. Dickinson, whose term in the United States Senate expired on March 4, 1851. Although the Committee agreed that former Governor Hamilton Fish, the Whig choice for the position, was "conservative in his inclinations," 50 they feared that because of his closeness to Weed and Seward, his selection "would be claimed as another endorsement of Seward Abolitionism by the Empire State." 51 Especially was this true since it was widely known that Fish was opposed to the Fugitive Slave Act and advocated its modification.52 Hence, the Committee determined to take im47 Times, Nov. 22, 1852. *« Ibid. *9 Ketchum to Fillmore, Dec. 13, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 50 J. B. Varnum, Jr., to Fillmore, Nov. 22, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 51 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 25, 1850; Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Jan. 10, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 52 Fish to Fillmore, Nov. 27; John Williams to Fillmore, Dec. 5, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Charles Cooke to Thurlow Weed, Nov. 8, 1850, Weed Papers. See also A. Nevins, Hamilton Fish (New York, 1936), pp. 37-40.

64

*

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

mediate steps to prevent what they believed would be a complete victory for the Seward- Weed forces. Late in January 1851, several members of the Union Committee left for Albany to confer with the conservative Whigs in the legislature. At the conference it was decided that unless Fish publicly announced his willingness to support the Compromise "without qualifications," these conservatives would unite with the Democrats to reject his selection as Senator.53 Fish, of course, refused to yield before such pressure, and informed the conservatives that he was ready to support the national administration and all parts of the Compromise, except the Fugitive Slave Act. Moreover, he assured them that, despite his desire to see this act modified, he would wait until sectional animosities had lessened before pressing for these changes.54 Most of the conservatives agreed that this reply was satisfactory and declared that they would cast their votes for Fish.55 But one conservative Whig demurred. This was James W. Beekman, himself a close friend of Fish. Beekman was intimately connected, however, with the Union Safety Committee, and he conferred again with the representatives of the Committee.56 The result of the conference was revealed on February 4, the date set for the vote in the State Senate. Beekman cast his vote for Francis Granger, thereby causing a tie and preventing Fish's election.57 The next day, the Union Safety Committee ordered the firing of a cannon at the Battery in honor of "a victory for the Union," 58 and they adopted a resolution in praise of Beekman. "This is the ground adopted at the Castle Garden meeting," they declared, "and it is the true ground, the only ground . . . where a Union man can consistently stand." 59 A few days later, the Committee succeeded in getting the Whig General Committee 53 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Jan. 10, Feb. 17, 1851; Jerome Fuller, S. P. Lyman to Fillmore, Jan. 7, 22, Feb. 3, 4, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 54 See Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Feb. 7, 1851, and Joseph B. Varnum, Jr., to Fillmore, Feb. 1, 1851, for a detailed analysis of the interview with Fish, Fillmore Papers. For Fish's reply, see Nevins, op. cit., p. 41. 55 J. B. Varnum, Jr., to Fillmore, Feb. 1; John T. Bush to Fillmore, Feb. 3, 1851; Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Feb. 7, 1851, Fillmore Papers. se Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Feb. 17, 1851; Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, Feb. 7, 1851; James Beekman to Fillmore, March 4, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 57 Tribune, Feb. 5, 1851; A. B. Stanton, Random Recollections (New York, 1886), p. 172; Nevins, op. cit., p. 41. 58 Journal of Commerce, Feb. 12, 1851; S. P. Lyman to Fillmore, Jan. 22, 1851; Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Feb. 17, 1851, Fillmore Papers. so Journal of Commerce, Feb. 15, 1851.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

65

and the Whig Young Men's General Committee to adopt similar resolutions.60 The rejoicing of the Committee lasted for a little more than a month. Beekman was "closeted with the Union Committee during the whole time," 61 and at the advice of the Committee, he announced repeatedly that he would not alter his position until Fish asserted his readiness to support the Compromise, including the Fugitive Slave Act.62 Nor could letters from Webster and Fillmore, urging him to vote for Fish and end the conflict, shake his determination.63 Indeed, had it not been for an accidental development, the conflict might have been prolonged through the spring and summer. But on March 19, the supporters of Fish pounced upon an opportunity to carry the election. Two Democratic Senators were absent at the session, and if a vote could be taken, the dispute would be ended. Amidst cries of "fraud" and "robbery," raised by the conservative Whigs and the Democrats, the resolution calling for a vote was debated. Fourteen hours after the resolution was introduced, Hamilton Fish was elected to the United States Senate.64 To the Union Committee, the election came as a distinct shock, and more than one member wrote that they felt "terribly crushed." 65 Not because there was any danger that Fish would join the sectionalists in Congress,66 but because they feared that in the South the election would be regarded as "Seward's victory." Already, in fact, the members of the Committee were receiving letters from all parts of the South, characterizing Fish's election as a distinct defeat for the Union, and emphasizing that such incidents, small though they appeared, would actually be responsible for the victory of the secessionists.67 The election of Fish, 60 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Feb. 14, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 61 See Hamilton Fish to Thurlow Weed, Feb. 4, 11, March 1, 1851, Weed Papers. 62 Washington Hunt to Fillmore, March 23, 1851; George R. Babcock to Fillmore, March 21, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 63 Washington Hunt to Webster, March 23, 1851; Webster Papers; Fillmore to Washington Hunt, Feb. 23, 1851; to George R. Babcock and Jerome Fuller (two letters), Feb. 23, 1851, in Fillmore Papers; Clay, however, supported Beekman. See Hamilton Fish to Henry Clay, Feb. 18, 1851, Clay Papers. 64 H. B. Stanton, op. cit., p. 172; Nevins, op. cit., p. 42; Alexander, op. cit., II, 162-163. For a detailed analysis of how this scheme originated and was carried through, see George R. Babcock to Fillmore, March 18, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 65 James Brooks to Fillmore, March 21, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 66 Albany State Register, March 20-24, 1851; Henry E. Davies to Fillmore, March 21, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 67 Jerome Fuller to Fillmore, March 27, 1851, Fillmore Papers.

66

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

therefore, was taken very seriously by the members of the Union Safety Committee, for they were in a better position to know the reactions of Southerners than most groups in the North. . . I found them in general down-hearted and despondent in consequence of Fish's election," wrote William Duer to Fillmore after an interview with the Committee.68 "They seemed to feel that it was, or rather would be popularly regarded as a Seward victory, and would make it difficult to fight against that interest hereThe Committee soon received another setback. They had after." hoped that the split in the Whig party would cause conservative Whigs to unite with conservative Democrats to form a Union party in the state. This, in turn, would influence the organization of similar Union parties in other states, and would eventually lead to the birth of a National Union party for the election of Union candidates in the presidential election of 1852. All this, of course, depended to a large extent upon the continuation of the split in the Whig party.69 But the Seward- Weed elements in the party also understood that the way to forestall the "mercantile" Whigs was to re-unite the party. Hence they initiated overtures to the "Silver-Greys," urging them to return to the fold,70 and in the state legislature a committee was appointed by the Whig caucus to undertake negotiations for healing the breach in the party. The committee then called upon the "Woollies" and "Silver-Greys" to send representatives to a conference at which the terms necessary to achieve peace would be hammered out. On July 31, twenty-two delegates met in Albany in answer to this call and after two days of intense bickering, agreed to issue a joint address to the Whigs of New York, setting forth the principles which would dominate the state convention in September.71 This document expressed approval in general terms of the national and state administrations, and spoke of the dangers that would follow a Democratic victory. The parts dealing with the Compromise were naturally of the highest importance. Opposition was exes Duer to Fillmore, March 27, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 69 Hiram Ketchum to Fillmore, Feb. 15, 17, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 70 Charles A. Stetson to Thurlow Weed, May 10, 1851; Simeon Draper to Thurlow Weed, June 13, July 5, 7, 1851; Watts Sherman to Thurlow Weed, July 18, 1851, Weed Papers; Erastus Brooks to Fillmore, June 15, 1851; James Brooks to Fillmore, July 1, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 71 An abstract of the proceedings of the conference is in the Fillmore Papers, Aug. 4, 1851.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

67

pressed to any further expansion of slavery into territories then free, although care was taken to point out that the Whig party opposed any interference with the right of a state to regulate its own institutions as it saw fit. While there was no direct endorsement of the Compromise, the declaration was made that all laws of Congress and the state legislatures pronounced constitutional byjudicial tribunals "must be enforced and implicitly obeyed." This was followed, however, by the statement entitling any citizen to "discuss the expediency of such laws and the propriety of any of their provisions and seek by constitutional means, their repeal or modification." 72 President Fillmore bestowed his blessings upon the unity conference.73 He had been influenced in this stand by Hamilton Fish, Washington Hunt, Thomas Corwin, his Secretary of the Treasury, and many other prominent Whigs who had deluged him with letters urging him to abandon the proscription policy, and restore peace and harmony to the party.74. Any attempt to obtain complete adherence to principles set down by the Union Committee, these Whigs argued, would only result in destroying the party. As Moses H. Grinnell put it: I will candidly admit there is a difference among our friends upon the great question of the day, but I will ask whether this point is to be reconciled by threats from Government officials that unless old lines are broken down, and all go in for certain rules laid down by them, that they must be cast off, or thrown out of the places they fill. . . . Heaven knows we all go for the Union and for a Whig administration and for the entire carrying out of the law of the land. ... In the name of heaven what is to become of the Whig party? 75 Fillmore was besought "to let bygones be bygones," 76 and to forget the former opposition displayed by Seward to the administration, aswell as Weed's savage attacks upon him in the Albany Journal. All these leaders now wanted, he was assured, was unity in the party, harmonious relations with the president, a fair share 72 Journal of Commerce, Aug. 5, 1851. 73 On the letter addressed to Fillmore by T. Van Vechten, a Silver-Grey delegate to the conference, the President wrote: "I hope the Union may be cordial and permanent." Fillmore Papers, Aug. 4, 1851. 74 Fillmore Correspondence, Nov. 10-Dec. 30, 1850, especially Washington Hunt to Fillmore, Nov. 30, 1850, Fillmore Papers. For evidence of the proscription policy, see Daniel Ullman to Fillmore, Dec. 23, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 7» Grinnell to Crittenden, Nov. 18, 1850, Crittenden Papers. 7« Hamilton Fish to Fillmore, Nov. 18, 1850, Fillmore Papers.

68

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

of the patronage, and a reorganization of the Custom House to include men "striving to make friends instead of enemies." 77 Thomas Corwin pointed out to Fillmore that much of the talk of the aim of Seward and Weed to break the administration was sheer nonsense. I don't believe all those men desire your destruction. What motive have they for this; they would not, if acted on, kill themselves. Let there be a truce hollow or solid as it may be. At this time a truce of any sort is best. These men feel and know that they are in your power. Weed has too much sense to throw up his hat and spirit.78 Finally, Fillmore yielded and welcomed the unity conference. But the Union Safety Committee refused to regard the movement as anything but a defeat for the cause of conservatism. To the Committee, the conference was simply an indication that the politicians, worried over the loss of jobs if the split in the party continued, were willing to swallow certain principles temporarily. But only temporarily. The Seward radicals, the Committee argued, simply could not afford to stop agitating, for therein resided their campaign issues.79 Furthermore, the joint address would never meet with the approval of the South. Already, Southern Whig papers were expressing the opinion that the platform accepted by the conference would "never suit the Whigs of the South." 80 Finally, in an address to the people of New York, the Union Committee emphasized that the Albany conference had increased rather than lessened the need for vigilance: The present calm [it warned] is but the result of necessity, produced by the wholesome powerful corrective which i beginning to be felt in a conservative public opinion; but that corrective must continue to be applied, for Agitation by its own confession, only awaits a more auspicious period to pursue its headlong course.81 The Committee was more than ever determined to apply this "corrective," and it was more than ever convinced that although it had lost two battles, it would win the war. " S. A. Johnson to Fillmore, March 17, 1851; S. P. Lyman to Fillmore, Feb. 9, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 78 Thomas Corwin to Fillmore, Dec. 7, 1850; Henry E. Davies to Fillmore, Nov. 23, 1850, Fillmore Papers. 79 Journal of Commerce, Aug. 14, 1851; John Slidell to James Buchanan, Aug. 8, 1851, Buchanan Papers. s° Baltimore American, in Journal of Commerce, Aug. 9, 1851; Savannah Republican, in ibid., Aug. 20, 22, 1851. si Appeal to the People of the State of New York by the Union Safety Committee. Pamphlet.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

69

The first significant victory scored by the Union Committee in the political field occurred in the state election in 1851. This victory was of value to the Union movement throughout the country, and was so vital in the national political scene that it was carefully watched by observers in all sections. Moreover, it was more than a little responsible for the pro-Compromise victory in the presidential election of 1852. The Union Safety Committee entered into the campaign at its very inception. When the Whigs and Democrats arrived in Syracuse in September for their conventions, they found a letter from the Committee awaiting them. This simply stated that the merchants of New York City had resolved at the Castle Garden meeting not to support any candidate "for State officers, or for members of Congress, or of the Legislature," who was "known or believed to be hostile to the Peace Measures ... or any of them, or in favor of reopening the questions involved in them for further agitation." 82 In the Democratic convention, the Committee's letter occupied considerable time. A group of delegates from the Empire City demanded that the convention meet the Committee's request squarely, and urged the adoption of resolutions stating that the party would "faithfully adhere to the recent settlement by Congress of the questions that have unfortunately divided the people of this State," and would "neither countenance nor sanction any sectional agitation." 83 The upstate delegates, however, refused to agree to this demand, and asserted that the type of platform demanded by the Union Safety Committee might win votes in New York City, but would cause a revolt against the party in the rural areas.84 It was to be expected, one delegate declared, that the merchants of New York, "largely engaged in commerce and the cotton trade," and "alarmed at the idea that there was going to be trouble down South," would be ready to "swallow anything to settle that trouble." 85 But the people in the rural areas would not tolerate a sweeping endorsement of every part of the Compromise, including the Fugitive Slave Act.86 Finally, after a heated discussion, the 8« The plan for sending such a letter was adopted at a full meeting of the Committee on Sept. 9. Journal of Commerce, Sept. 10, 30, 1851. For evidence of earlier negotiations for such a letter, see Simeon Draper to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 30, 1851, Weed Papers. 83 Post, Journal of Commerce, Sept. 12, 13, 1851. 84 Ibid. See also W. R. Marcy to Prosper M. Wetmore, Sept. 9, 1851, Marcy Papers. 85 Post, Sept. 13, 14, 1851. 8« Ibid,

70

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

resolutions requested by the Union Committee were tabled. As a result a group of conservative delegates from New York City left the convention in a huff, and returned' home to consult with the Committee.87 In the Whig convention, the Union Committee's letter hardly aroused any excitement. Indeed, like all other controversial issues, it was conveniently ignored. The Whigs were anxious to present a united ticket in the forthcoming election, and knew very well that even the mere discussion of touchy points might start an explosion. So a fairly innocuous set of resolutions was adopted, voicing approval of Fillmore's administration and the Compromise, although once again asserting the right of individuals to urge "in a constitutional manner" the modification of any of the "Peace Measures." Like their opponents, the Whigs nominated a ticket composed of radicals and conservatives.88 The two conventions adjourned on September 16. In New York City, the opposition press immediately heralded the actions at Syracuse as a stunning defeat for the Union Committee, and predicted the early death of the organization. "The Union Safety Committee," the Post remarked gleefully, "may as well be quiet, and look after its silks and cottons." 89 It was further observed that since the conventions had both approved of the Compromise, there was no longer any raison d'etre for a body whose prime purpose had been to defend it.90 But these newspapers entirely miscalculated the reaction of the merchants in New York City.91 To them the failure of both parties to express unequivocally their readiness to maintain the Compromise unaltered, and their willingness to aid in its enforcement, was but proof of the charge that the radicals exercised the controlling influence of the political machinery.92 Moreover, the merchants could easily see that in the South the secessionists 87 Journal of Commerce, Sept. 13, 14, 1851. 88 Ibid., Sept. 13, 1851; Alexander, op. cit., Ill, 165. &*Post, Sept. 17, 1851. 0° Tribune, Sept. 20, 21, 1851; Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 20, 1851; Courier and Enquirer, Sept. 19, 1851. 91 A leading Whig politician in New York described the rude awakening he had received when he attempted to raise funds for the Whig ticket in New York City. Many merchants who had heretofore contributed generously, had turned down all requests for money. "I find," he added, "by occasional consultation, that the pocketbook is shut and will be pretty much kept so this fall." Philip C. Full to Fillmore, Oct. 6, 1851. See also F. Sheldon to Fillmore, Oct. 30, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 62 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Sept. 29, 1851, Fillmore Papers; John Slidell to Buchanan, Sept. 29, Oct. 10, 1851, Buchanan Papers.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

71

would publicize the action of the conventions as evidence of the unwillingness of even the conservative states in the North to abide by the settlement.93 To voice their disapproval of the proceedings at the conventions, four hundred and fifty leading merchants, Whigs and Democrats, sent a letter to Henry Clay, urging him to visit New York City and address the business men in a manner which would "reprove and denounce" the politicians of both parties. After praising Clay for the introduction into Congress of measures which had "arrested the nearer approach of national calamity," they declared: We have a well-founded conviction that the great body of the American people are in favor of maintaining and enforcing the Compromises of the Constitution; nevertheless in the resolutions and addresses adopted at conventions lately assembled around us, we have seen with regret as well as alarm, that the question of adherence to the Compromise measures is avoided or evaded, that modification and amendment are declared to be requisite, and repeal itself, admissible; as if the requirement of the Constitution in carrying out an integral part of our national compact was of no higher obligation than any ordinary act of legislation.94 As for the Union Safety Committee, not only did it refuse to die, but it even took on greater life. Two days after the conventions had adjourned, the Committee unanimously voted to issue the following pledge for the endorsement of the merchants: We, the undersigned, do pledge ourselves that at the ensuing election to take place in this State, on the 4th day of November next, we will, in voting, faithfully and fairly carry out the 8th Resolution of the Union Meeting at the Castle Garden, held on the 30th of October last. . . ,95 Then

followed the exact text of the resolution, which, it will

be recalled, asserted that the merchants of New York would support no candidate for office who was "hostile" to the Compromise, or favored modification of any part of it. The pledge was placed in the Merchants Exchange, Mechanics Exchange, and was also posted at the principal hotels and "places of resort" 93 See the Savannah Republican, Charleston Mercury, in Journal Oct. 23, 1851, and Richmond Whig, in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 9, "A Carolina Cooperationist," in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 15, 1851. For the list of business men who signed this letter, see Journal Oct. 17, 1851. 95 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 4, 1851.

in the city. of Commerce, 1851. See also of Commerce,

72

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

The number of signers mounted rapidly; so rapidly, in fact, that the Tribune, although sneering at the .movement as a plot upon those "busy in the cotton trade and sugar line," confessed that "several thousand of our city traders" signed each week.96 Since by the first of October seven thousand merchants and firms had endorsed the pledge, the Union Committee at a special meeting the next day termed the movement a huge success, and adopted a resolution urging citizens "in the cities, villages and towns of the State of New York, who concur in sentiment with the Committee ... to prepare a pledge similar to that signed by the Committee and circulate the same for signature." 97 On November 4, the day of election, it was announced that close to twenty thousand merchants and firms had affixed their signatures to the As each day brought several hundred more signatures, the pledge.98 Union Committee determined to issue an address to the people of the state, in which the reasons for the pledge would be set forth. Another cause for this statement arose from the incident which occurred at this time in Syracuse, involving the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act. In that city, a Negro, Jerry McHenry, had been seized in the courtroom by a group of men led by Gerrit Smith and the Reverend S. J. May, who later smuggled him across the Canadian border to freedom.99 In the South, the news of the rescue created tremendous excitement, and the Unionists in these states grew anxious again. Several Union newspapers printed editorial appeals urging the Union Safety Committee to allay the effect of the Syracuse incident by publicizing the Union pledge of the New York merchants. In response to these appeals, the Committee widely distributed its pledge and its address to the people of the state. In this latter document, it related in detail the story of the organization's manifold activities. In the eyes of the merchants of New York, it declared, the chief accomplishment of the Committee had been its success in creating the feeling among Southern people "that their rights and interests would be respected and upheld." True, there were occurrences, such as the Jerry-rescue, but then, "Syra»6 Tribune, Oct. 6, u, 1851. »7 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 6, 1851. Journal of Commerce, Oct. 24, Nov. g, 5, 1851. The list of at least 9,000 merchants and firms who endorsed the pledge is printed in the Journal of Commerce, Oct. 4, 1851. »9 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 2-4, 1851.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

73

cuse, unfortunately, for its own fame" had "for some time past, been selected for the periodical displays and outpourings of fanaticism and abolitionism in the worst of forms." 100 Against this incident should be placed the speedy and effective enforcement of the law in the Long and Bolding cases of New York City.101 The "principal danger" that still threatened "the future peace and integrity of our Union" arose not merely from an incident or two involving the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act, but rather from unscrupulous politicians who fanned the flames of sectional agitation in the hope of winning adherents. It was, therefore, "with pain and mortification" that the merchants of New York City had observed the powerful influence these politicians had wielded at the two conventions, where they had prevented the adoption of "a plain and explicit acknowledgment of adherence to these Compromise measures which secured the peace of the Union, and the firm maintenance of which can alone preserve the harmony of the Confederacy." For mittee knew from its vast correspondence with business political leaders in the South that the modification of promise, particularly the Fugitive Slave Act, which would

the Commen and the Comcertainly

follow the election of "higher law" men, "would be a virtual dissolution of the Union." 102 The address made no mention of what the organization intended to do in the forthcoming election, except for the statement that "the exertions of the Committee will not be wanting at the proper time." The Tribune took this to mean that the committee would not organize a Union ticket, and, considerably relieved, even found words of praise for the group. Thus, it termed the appeal "a moderate and sensible address." 108 100 Washington Union, Wilmington (N. C.) Commercial, in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 10, 1851; New Orleans Bulletin, in ibid., Oct. 22, 1851. 101 For the Long case, see above, pp. 65-66. John Bolding was tried before the United States Commissioner in New York City in August, 1851. He was turned over to his former owner, Robert C. Anderson of South Carolina. The case was pointed to as indicating the efficaciousness of the Fugitive Slave Act, despite the fact that the expenses incurred by Anderson amounted to $500. The Union Safety Commit e , in conjunction with other groups in Poughkeepsie and Albany, raised $2,000 (the amount required by Bolding's owner) to purchase his freedom. After six weeks of delay, Bolding was brought back to New York City, a free man. See Journal of Commerce, Sept. 2, 4, 13, and a letter of a subscriber to the fund to the Journal of Commerce, Oct. 24, 1851. 102 Address to the People of New York State by the Union Safety Committee, signed by E. K. Collins, Chairman, and Henry Grinnell, Joshua J. Henry, and David W. Catlin, Secretaries, in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 21, 1851. 103 Tribune, Oct. 21, 1851.

74

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

There was good reason for this feeling of relief. The Whigs were truly worried over the course the Union Committee would adopt. As a leading Whig put it in analyzing the prospects for a party victory in the election: "Much depends on the action of the Union Safety Committee. In the close division of parties, the diversion of a few thousand votes may be all controlling in the 104 result." On October 24, the Journal of Commerce, the recognized organ of the Union Safety Committee, published the following announcement: Last evening, the Union Safety Committee, fifty in number being present, adopted by nearly a unanimous vote, the following ticket for state officers, which had been reported to a subcommittee of eight, consisting of four Democrats and four Whigs. The ticket consisted of four Whigs and three Democrats, for the offices of Judge of Appeals, Secretary of State, Comptroller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Canal Commissioner, and Engineer and Surveyor.105 No candidate was nominated for the office of State Inspector, since the sub-committee had found both candidates acceptable. Likewise, the Senatorial candidates, with one exception,106 were all deemed acceptable. In addition, no nominations on the Union ticket were made for candidates for the Assembly, because the sub-committee studying the views of the different men running for that office had not yet reported. The idea of a Union ticket was, of course, by no means a new one. The experience of the Union Association the year before was certainly in the minds of the members of the Committee. And from the beginning of 1851, several letters had appeared in the newspapers urging the formation of a Union party or a Union ticket in the state elections of that year.107 Soon after the pledge was distributed by the Committee, calls for a Union ticket again appeared. "Now is the time for the 'Union Safety Com104 Thomas N. Foot to Fillmore, Oct. 20, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 105 The men selected for these offices were: Samuel A. Foote (Whig), Henry S. Randall (Democrat), John C. Wright (Democrat), James M. Cook (Whig), Daniel Ullman (Whig), Henry Fitzhugh (Whig), and William P. McAlpine (Democrat). Journal of Commerce, Oct. 24, 1851. 106 The exception was the candidate from the downtown Senatorial district, where William McMurray (Democrat) was nominated against Alex H. Schultz (Whig). Ibid. 107 See "A full private in the Union Party," in Journal of Commerce, Jan. 9, 1851, and Herald, April 29, 1851.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

75

mittee' to give a lesson to the politicians of this State," one merchant wrote. "Let the Union Safety Committee reassemble at once, and select from the two tickets such men as are known to be in favor of the Compromise Measures." 108 A group of merchants also wrote: We will vote for Union men and no others. . . . Will the Union Committee give us a ticket of "men strong in the faith" who will carry out these principles? The tickets now before the people are horribly intermingled with all the "isms" that party is heir to. We cannot consistently vote either ticket as a whole, and we are hardly capable of selecting our men.109 It was the occurrence of a number of significant events in other states that finally convinced the members of the Union Committee that they should sponsor a conservative coalition ticket. In the first place, there was the announcement during the second week of October of the overwhelming Union victory in the Georgia state election.110 Soon after came reports of similar results in Alabama and Mississippi, where the Union forces scored tremendous victories in the state elections.111 At the same time, news came of the defeat of Governor Johnson in Pennsylvania and the election instead of his conservative opponent, William Bigler, the Democratic candidate.112 The fact that more than two thousand Whig merchants in Philadelphia cast their votes for the conservative Democrat made a profound impression upon many business men in New York. All told, the feeling was widespread that it was up to the Empire State to add to the sweeping Union successes. But unless a Union ticket was formed, this would hardly be possible, for the election of either the Democratic or Whig parties by itself would prove nothing.113 Hence the Union Safety Committee set about forming its Union ticket. As we have already seen, the Union Committee appointed two sub-committees to sound out the various candidates on their attitudes toward the Compromise and related issues, and to report 108 "B," in Journal of Commerce, Sept. 18, 1851; "Union," in ibid., Sept. 23, 1851. 109 "Men," in ibid., Oct. 14, 1851; Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Sept. 29, 1851, Fillmore Papers. no Journal of Commerce, Oct. 11, 1851; Shyrock, op. cit., pp. 353-354in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 16-21, 1851. 112 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 16, 1851. See also H. R. Mueller, The Whig Party in Pennsylvania, p. 191. 113 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 12, 16, 17, 1851; Address of the Union Safety Committee to the People of New York, in ibid., Oct. 25, 1851.

SLAVERY AND BUSINESS 76 to the full Committee the names of those men whom they regarded as deserving to be placed on a Union ticket. After several conferences with some of the candidates, and a full correspondence with the others,114 one of the sub-committees, consisting of four Whigs and four Democrats, reported its findings to the parent body.115 Over the opposition of John A. Thomas, who demanded that the Committee support "the entire Democratic ticket, on the ground that the Democratic party in this state has placed itself on a national platform, quite as wide as that made at Castle Garden," 116 the organization accepted the Union ticket.117 Two weeks remained until election day. During this comparatively brief period, the Union Committee initiated an extensive campaign in behalf of its coalition ticket. Thousands of leaflets and pamphlets were either distributed to the people directly or reprinted in the leading newspapers.118 Often these leaflets contained letters from various people in different parts of the state praising the Union Committee for nominating a conservative ticket, and calling upon the voters to support the ticket.119 One "Farmer," addressing himself to his "Brother Farmers," urged the rural voters to prove in the forthcoming election that others besides the merchants "in the Metropolis" were interested in the cause of the Union. "We must now do our part," he added, "and let it be seen that the great agricultural interests view with disapprobation, the contempt of the Law and Order, which has recently exhibited itself. To the polls then— rain or shine— and vote the Union ticket. And if a neighbor has no horse give him a ride; and see that he votes for Union men, and nothing else." 120 In the upstate districts no small amount of publicity for the Union ticket was also created by the 114 George Wood, in Journal of Commerce, Nov. i, 1851; George Wood to John C. Spencer, ibid., Nov. 2, 1851. us E. K. Collins was Chairman of the sub-committee. For the other members, see Post, Oct. 24, 1851. us See J. A. Thomas to Post, Oct. 24, 1851, and ibid., Oct. 25, 1851. 117 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 24, 1851. 11* See Address of the Union Safety Committee to the People of New York State. See also George Wood to E. K. Collins, Nov. 3, 1851, in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 4, 1851; Wood to John C. Spencer, in Tribune, Nov. 3, 1851; and James W. Gerard, in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 3, 1851. 110 Some of these letters were reprinted in the Journal of Commerce, Oct. 28, 29, 30, 31, 1851. 120 Reprinted in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 3, 1851. See also "Rustic," in ibid., Oct. 30, 1851.

THE

UNION SAFETY COMMITTEE 77 formation of local Union Committees to distribute literature in behalf of the slate, and organize support for it.121 It took several weeks to determine the effect of the Union

ticket on the election,122 and even then there were so many conflicting interpretations that it was almost impossible to decide just what the Union Safety Committee had really accomplished. Both parties, on viewing the returns, asserted that the coalition ticket had operated to the detriment of their candidates. The Tribune, a few days after the election, declared: "The Union Safety business worked against us throughout. In no instance did we see one of the cotton ballots voted by any but a Whig." 123 Two months later, when the final returns had been made public, it estimated that several thousand Whig merchants in New York City, and a large number of Whigs in the interior had voted for the Democrats endorsed by the Union Committee. "But for that Committee, and its Silver-Grey auxiliaries ... we should have carried our whole State ticket and a Whig majority in each house, by a large vote over that of our adversaries." 124 On the other hand, the Democratic papers claimed that the Union ticket had only helped the Whigs, and their party would have scored a sweeping victory but for the fact that Democrats in New York City and upstate had cast their ballots for the Whigs running on the coalition ticket. "The Union movement in New York City and Kings," said the candidates. Albany Atlas, but much to the Democratic . . ."did We nolosegood members of theharm Senate and Assembly by the arbitrary action of this party. The invitation of the Cotton Committee seems to have operated only on Democrats, the Whigs apparently ignored the movement as they approached the polls, and voted their full party ticket, leaving their Democratic allies in the lurch." 125 121 See the article, "Cotton in Canandaigua," Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 17, 1851, and Journal of Commerce, Oct. 28, 29, 1851. For other evidence of Union Committee activity, see D. D. Howard, Hugh Maxwell, Daniel Bokee, Gilbert Davis, Hamilton Fish to Fillmore, Oct. 29, 30, Nov. 1, 3, 4, 1851, Fillmore Papers; and Hamilton Fish to D. D. Barnard, Nov. 10, 1851, Barnard Papers. 122 "A fortnight has been necessary to determine with certainty who have been elected and with whom the power of the legislature will be," Hamilton Fish declared in a letter to Daniel D. Barnard. Nov. 10, 1851, Barnard Papers. 123 Tribune, Nov. 7, 1851. See also Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 5, 7, 17, 18, 1851. 124 Tribune, Dec. 1, 1851. See also Hamilton Fish to Thurlow Weed, Nov. in, 1851, Weed Papers. 125 Albany Atlas, Nov. 15, 17, 1851; Post, Nov. 6, 11, 21, 1851.

78

4

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

The members of the Union Safety Committee, however, were jubilant.126 The final results showed that every candidate on the Union ticket with the exception of Daniel Ullman, whom the antirenters and their associates had managed to defeat, had been victorious.127 The weeping of the Seward Whigs and the gloom of a number of Democratic politicians only added to the joy of the members of the Committee. "They now see," said the Journal of Commerce for the organization, "that the adoption or rejection of a candidate was about equivalent to his election or defeat." 128 Moreover, the election had proved conclusively that the merchants of New York City considered the cause of the Union more important than the success of their party. Even the Whigs themselves now admitted that it was now evident that the merchants would rather "destroy the Whig party than aid in the election of Seward men." 129 "The majority against Patterson and his defeated associates," the Tribune declared, "imply that no man who is recognized as a friend of Governor Seward and a condemner of the fugitive slave law must be run on our state ticket hereafter, or he will be beaten by the cotton influence in this city." 130 Finally, the election results were national in their influence, and the Union Committee expressed the belief that it would stimulate a great wave of Unionism throughout the country. In short [the Journal of Commerce concluded] this Union movement has revolutionized the State. It has defeated Sewardism and Free-Soilism. It has placed in power (with only one or two exceptions) the most patriotic, law-abiding, Union-loving, anti-sectional, conservative candidates who were in nomination by either party. ... It has encouraged the Union men of both parties, so that in the Legislature, and in future conventions, they will speak out, and speak plainly in favor of the Union as it is, the constitution as it is, and the Compromise as it is. It has spoken words of consolation to the Union men in the South, and words of terror to the enemies of the country, wherever found.131 126 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 7, 1851; James Brooks to Fillmore, Nov. 11, 1851, Fillmore Papers. 127 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 18, 1851. 128 Ibid., Nov. 20-26, 1851. 129 Hamilton Fish to D. D. Barnard, Nov. 10, 1851, Barnard Papers. See also Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 7, 11, 18, 1851. 130 Tribune, Nov. 20, 1851. 131 Nov. 20, 1851.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

79

What effect would the election in New York have upon the presidential campaign of the following year? The Union Safety Committee looked forward hopefully to the organization of a Union ticket on a national scale.132 This, too, was by no means a new idea. As a matter of fact, back in January 1851, the Committee had joined with Senators Foote, Cobb, and Clay in sponsoring the famous "Union Pledge," which bound its signers not to support any candidate for president, vice-president, or any other office— state or national— who was not wholeheartedly in favor of the Compromise and opposed to further agitation upon the issues involved in the settlement.133 Several members of the Committee went to Washington to exert personal influence upon the representatives in Congress. Thus, E. G. Spaulding wrote to Thurlow Weed from the nation's capital: "I would inform you that George Wood of the Union Safety Committee in New York seems to be busy with Brooks, Duer and Co. in urging members to sign the pledge." 134 All told, eight members of the New York congressional delegation signed, and the Union Committee's representatives left Washington fairly well pleased with their work.135 The Committee next undertook to organize support for a National Union party which should present a conservative coalition ticket for the presidential election in 1852. Much impetus had been given to this movement by Henry Clay, who had called for the formation of a Union party in his address before the Kentucky legislature on November 15, 1850. "I announce myself in this place, a member of that party, whatever may be its component element," he had declared." 136 The Committee proceeded todevelop the foundations for such a party. At the meeting it held in honor of Senators Cass, Cobb, and Dickinson, and the one for Foote and Downe, the necessity for a Union party was stressed by the speakers for the Committee.137 Then the organization sent letters to Union leaders throughout the country, urging 132 Address by the Union Safety Committee to the People of New York State. 133 E. G. Spaulding to Thurlow Weed, Jan. 22, 1851, Weed Papers. 134 Ibid.; Journal of Commerce, Jan. 26, 1851. 135 However, all the signers from New York were Whigs. Only four Democrats, altogether, signed the pledge. !36 Poage, op. cit., p. 266; Journal of Commerce, Nov. 23, 1850. !37 Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, Nov. 30, 1850, Marcy Papers; Journal of Commerce, Nov. 28, Dec. 10, 1850; Post, Tribune, Dec. 10, 1850; Simeon Draper to Weed, Dec. 10, 1850; S. P. Lyman to Weed, Dec. 19, 1850, Weed Papers.

8o

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

them to sponsor the establishment of Union Safety Committees in their particular districts and organize local Union parties. Unscrupulous candidates for office [the appeal stated] have vastly increased the nullification and abolition excitement, by yielding to its demand for the purpose of obtaining votes. The most effectual method of arresting the evil is to teach all aspirants for political honors that they will lose more Union votes than they will gain from the disorganizers.1*8 And when the response to this appeal appeared to be extremely favorable, the Union Committee helped organize a "General Union Association," which would combine "all associations in various parts of the country, whose object may be to perpetuate our Union and brotherly affection." This organization would also coordinate the local Union parties into a national form.139 Finally, the Union Committee, after conferences with several leaders of the Whig party, issued a call for a National Union Convention to be held in Washington on February 22, 1851. 140 At first it appeared as if this plan would materialize. The Union group in Newburyport, Massachusetts joined readily in the movement,141 and the strong Whig element in the Georgia Union party welcomed the plan.142 In fact, the New York Union Committee even suggested a national Union ticket to consist of either Fillmore and Cobb or Clay, and Cass.143 But the convention never met. Toombs, Stephens, Clay and Foote labored in vain to persuade the Democrats to endorse the proposal. However, Cobb and the other leaders of the party refused, and insisted that the struggle for Unionism be carried on in the old parties.144 In a final effort to gain their support, Foote urged the Union Committee to drop all questions of the presidency !38 This letter is printed in the Congressional Globe, 31st Congress, 2nd session, pp. 306-307. 139 See the leaflet issued by the Association, Jan. 16, 1851, in Caleb Cushing Papers. 1*0 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 6, 9, 1851; Herald, Jan. 5, 26, 1851; F. P. Blair to Van Buren, Dec. 30, 1850, Van Buren Papers. 141 Benjamin Blache to Fillmore, Dec. 25, 1850, Fillmore Papers; Blache to Howell Cobb, Jan. 10, 1851, Toombs, Stephens and Cobb Correspondence, in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 191 1, II, 220-221. 142 Shyrock, op. cit., pp. 347-349. i*3 Foote, in Washington Republic, reprinted in Journal of Commerce, Jan. 13, 1851. I** Letter of Cobb to the Macon Union Celebration, Feb. 22, 1851, cited in Shyrock, op. cit., pp. 347-348; Lewis Cass to Caleb Cushing, Jan. 22, 26, 1851, Cushing Papers; Francis P. Blair to Van Buren, Feb. 6, 1851, Van Buren Papers; E. K. Spaulding to Weed, Jan. 20, 22, 1851; Thomas Corwin to Weed, Jan. 28, 1851, Weed Papers; R. F. Nichols, The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854, pp. 27-28.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

81

from the agenda. When this failed to gain the approval of the Democrats, he advised the Committee to abandon the plan altogether.145 The victories scored by the Union movement in the South, in Pennsylvania, and finally in New York, during the state elections of 1851, caused the revival of efforts to organize a National Union ticket, which would exclude "the fanatics and higher law factions." 146 Once again, a call was issued for a national convention to nominate a Union ticket— Webster and Cobb being prominently mentioned as candidates.147 Once again, outstanding Senators urged the support of the movement in Congress.148 But the Democratic leaders again turned down the proposal. Cass, after consulting Douglas, Dickinson and Buchanan, informed Foote that he could not support the call for the convention.149 Once again the movement collapsed. But although no Union party was established in 1852, the influence of the Union movement was of great significance in the presidential election. In New York City, it was the determining element. The Whig merchants, extremely anxious to have the national convention nominate a conservative candidate, started public agitation to accomplish this several months before it met. Early in March, a meeting of the friends of Webster was held in the city to nominate him for the presidency, "subject to the Whig National Convention." 150 Most of the Union Safety Committee merchants endorsed the meeting,151 and a number of them were members of a committee set up to gain support for Webster in 145 Foote, in Washington Republic, reprinted in Journal of Commerce, Jan. 13, 1851. 146 George S. Bryan, a Charleston Whig, in National Intelligencer, reprinted in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 1, 1851; Governor Thomas Brown of Florida to W. G. M. Davis, printed in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 22, 1851; Governor Brown of Virginia, in Norfolk Herald, reprinted in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 22, 1851. 147 c. W. March to Webster, Nov. 25, 1851, Webster Papers. For the call, see circulars in Webster Papers, Oct. 21, 1851; Feb. 25, 27, 1852. 1*8 A. S. Foote, Caskets of Reminiscences, p. 83; Nichols, op. cit., p. 28; Alexander H. Stephens to Linton Stephens, Dec. 10, 1851, Toombs, Stephens and Cobb Correspondence, op.cit., II, 271-273; W. L. Marcy to Buchanan, Nov. 24, 1851, Buchanan Papers. 149 Foote, op. cit., p. 83. 150 The call for this meeting was signed by at least 5,000 merchants and appeared in Times, March 5, 1852. "Wall Street is in the field," said the Herald on the sametheday. 151 A Speech delivered by George Wood before a Committee of the Friends of Daniel Webster at Constitutional Hall, New York, pamphlet; Charles W. March to Webster, April 8, 1852; Hiram Ketchum to Peter Harvey, April 12, May 10, 1852; Van Tyne, ed., Letters of Webster, pp. 523, 526

82

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

other sections.152 There were other Whig merchants, however, who believed that Fillmore had demonstrated himself to be a true conservative, and was entitled to the' nomination.153 But, divided as they were on a specific candidate, the Whig merchants were united in their determination to oppose anyone who owed his nomination to the influence of Seward. And when it appeared that Winfield Scott was Seward's choice, a delegation of merchants visited Simeon Draper, who was a leading Scott manager, and warned him that the merchants "would never go for Scott." 154 Draper considered this merely an idle gesture, but he was to discover all too soon that the merchants were in earnest. The Democratic merchants were no less anxious to insure the nomination of a conservative candidate. There was little danger, however, that anyone but such a candidate would gain the approval of the national convention. The question was only who this conservative would be. Since there was considerable sentiment for William R. Marcy in the Empire City, John A. Thomas, Myndert Van Schaick, and Prosper M. Wetmore, who were working feverishly for the former governor, obtained favorable responses from "many merchants." They found that the fact that Marcy was known to have supported the Compromise, and was anxious to halt further agitation on this issue was responsible for most of this support.155 Meanwhile, John Slidell and his nephew, August Belmont, were endeavoring to win the endorsement of the merchants for the conservatism of James Buchanan. Belmont especially labored to set up a Buchanan newspaper in the city, contributing ten thousand dollars to the fund himself, and receiving "assurances 152 The committee consisted of George Griswold, William H. Webb, Cornelius Vanderbilt, Hiram Ketchum, Moses H. Grinnell, William Brown, Robert B. Minturn, Nathan C. Piatt, and Matthew Morgan. See Post, March 6, Commercial Advertiser, April 9, 1852; Charles W. March to Webster, April 15, 1852, Webster Papers. 153 See the speech of Daniel A. Cushman at the Fillmore meeting in the city, Post, April 29, 1852. Daniel Lord, Henry Brevoort, Shepherd Knapp, Daniel A. Cushman, Gilbert Davis, and Hugh Maxwell were active in the movement to nominate Fillmore. See Gilbert Davis, Hugh Maxwell, Robert G. Campbell, L. N. Fuller, to Fillmore, March 6, 7, 31, April 5, 24, May 5, 1852, Fillmore Papers. 154 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 10, 1852; John Livingston to Fillmore, June 10, 1852, Fillmore Papers. 155 j. A. Thomas to Marcy, May 6, June 20, Oct. 27, 1851; Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, June 4, 1851; John Slidell to Marcy, Oct. 10, 1851; Myndert Van Schaick to Marcy, April 10, 1852, Marcy Papers.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

83

from a number of the wealthiest merchants of cooperation." 150 But, largely because several prominent Democrats in the city insisted that the paper adopt a neutral position on the presidency, this project also never developed.157 Douglas derived his support in New York City from one source only. "It is confined," wrote Slidell to Buchanan, "to one clique, not very numerous, but active and unscrupulous, the ocean mail contractors." 158 At the head of the combination stood George Law, the powerful and wealthy steamboat contractor. Law's support for Douglas had developed after the Illinois Senator had pushed the bill appropriating funds for steamboat contracts. In return, the influence of the steamboat lobby had been exerted in favor of his project for a railroad from Illinois to Mobile.159 Doubtless, Douglas's appeals for the acquisition of Cuba served to endear him further to Law, who knew that his steamship lines stood to gain if that island belonged to the United States. At any rate, the New York contractor devoted much of his time and "large sums of money" to the task of winning the New York City delegates for his candidate.160 "It is . . . becoming quite evident," Lorenzo B. Shepherd wrote to Marcy, "that the Douglas men have a great deal of money at their disposal. In my district, George Law, Col. Curtis and other steamboat Democrats are expending large sums of money to procure the return of the latter to Baltimore." 161 Thomas W. Carr added in another letter to Marcy: "Two of our delegates are known Douglas men. This has been brought about principally by means furnished by Law." 162 George The nomination of Franklin Pierce as the Democratic candidate came as a distinct shock to Law and to other merchants, who ise John Slidell to Buchanan, Oct. g, Dec. 16, 1850; May g, July g, Aug. 8, Sept. 2g, Oct. g, 1851; August Belmont to Buchanan, April 13, Dec. 6, 1851, Buchanan Papers. !57 Francis B. Cutting and Charles O'Conor were two of those who balked at supporting the project. See Slidell to Buchanan, Dec. 27, 1851; and Belmont to Buchanan, Dec. 6, 1851, Buchanan Papers. Belmont, however, did purchase the Morning Star, a "small but widely circulated morning paper." Belmont to Buchanan, March 11, April 5, 15, 1852, Buchanan Papers. 158 Slidell to Buchanan, Sept. 2g, 1851, Buchanan Papers; W. R. Marcy to Prosper M. Wetmore, Nov. 26, 1851, Marcy Papers. 159 Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, Nov. 28, 1851, Marcy Papers. 160 ibid. lei Shepherd to Marcy, Dec. 15, 1851, Marcy Papers. 162 Carr to Marcy, Feb. 3, 1852, Marcy Papers.

84

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

were campaigning for their own special choices.163 But the mass of the Democratic merchants, though not particularly enthusiastic about supporting a man who was widely regarded as a nonentity, were fairly pleased.164 Later, even those who nursed a grudge at the rejection of their candidate joined the Pierce movement. Marcy's friends among the merchants worked actively for Pierce, and Belmont forgot his disappointment over the failure of the convention to nominate Buchanan, and campaigned feverishly for the party, even contributing a huge sum to the national committee to make up the lagging state quota.165 So active, in fact, was Belmont, that he became a leading issue in the campaign, the Whigs constantly reminding the voters that he was the agent of the Rothschilds, "by far the wealthiest family in the world, and the managers of the gigantic loans by which the European despots retain their subjects in vassalage or reduce them again when they have revolted." Belmont, they further charged, Pierce's behalf "European money, contributed turing capitalists and bankers of the Old World keep down their American rivals in the struggle

was spending in by the manufacto break down or for the American

market." 166 However, these charges seem to have gained but few votes for the Whig candidates.167 Support for Pierce in New York City was to come not only from the Democratic merchants. For the nomination of Winfield Scott by the Whig convention had really enraged the conservative business men. Since both Whigs and Democrats had endorsed the Compromise, the slavery issue did not play an important part in the campaign in most states.168 But in New York City, the Union Safety Committee had for two years developed such a strong hostility on the part of the merchants toward Seward that the issue was to dominate the scene throughout the campaign, and, as the Tribune itself admitted, the "mercantile Whigs by the thousand have ever been ready not merely to defeat but to

163 John Addison Thomas to Marcy, Dec. 8, 18, 22, 29, 1851; Jan. 12, 1852; May 3, 21, 22, 1852; W. J. Staples to Marcy, May 22, 1852; Thomas N. Carr to Marcy, April 16, 1852; Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, Jan. 15, 21, May 14, 1852, Marcy Papers. is* J. A. Thomas to Marcy, Oct. 25, 1852; L. B. Shepherd to Marcy, Sept. 29, 1852, Marcy Papers. 1WC. H. Reaslee to Marcy, May 9, 1853; J. A. Thomas to Marcy, July 31, 1852, Marcy Papers, lee Tribune, Oct. 26, 28, Nov. 1, 1852. M Herald, Post, Oct. 25-29, 1852; August Belmont to Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1852, Buchanan Papers. 168 E. Stanwood, History of the Presidential Elections, p. 185.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

annihilate the Whig

COMMITTEE

85

party if they might thereby demolish

Seward." 169 Scott was personally popular in the city, but the feeling was very widespread that he was Seward's man. Hence the merchants believed that he would be nothing more than a puppet as president.170 Thus, one of Fillmore's supporters described the reaction of the merchants to the nomination: 171 I find since my return home,172 that the great mass of our merchants, and of the quiet law-abiding people entertain the opinion that in the event of success, your Weeds, your Greeleys, and others of that ilk, will have a predominating influence. . . . And the opinion is founded upon the course adopted by the papers controlled by such men and the boasts of others who were connected with the convention.173 Despite the fact that Seward himself wrote a public letter to James B. Taylor of New York, denying any intention on his part to influence Scott,174 the resentment of the merchants mounted. "They have selected their man, let them elect him," was the immediate reaction of the average Whig merchant to the question of whether he would support the party candidate.175 So aroused were the merchants that those who had supported Webster and Fillmore united with the intention of holding a National Union Convention in Philadelphia.176 This plan was never fully developed, but a petition was circulated among the merchants calling for a separate Webster electoral ticket for the state of New York.177 There can be no doubt that the Democrats cooperated with the Whig merchants in sponsoring this ticket.178 As a matter of fact, there were many Whig merchants who quite openly admitted that they would vote for Pierce rather than aid a Seward candidate. John Addington Thomas stressed this point in a letter to Marcy: 179 169 Quoted in Alexander, op. cit., Ill, 175. 170 See C. W. Elliott, Winfield Scott, the Soldier and the Man (New York, 1937), p. 627. 171 Augustus Hudson to Fillmore, July 2, 1852, Fillmore Papers. 172 He had attended the Baltimore convention. 173 See also in this connection, R. J. Everett to Fillmore, June 28, 1852; Daniel A. Bokee to Fillmore, July 24, 1852, Fillmore Papers. 174 Times, June 29, 1852. 176 Gilbert DavisJames to Fillmore, 5, 1852; N. Carroll to Fillmore, Fillmore Papers; W. Webb July to Webster, Sept. 10, 1852, Webster July Papers.27,' 1852, 176 Journal of Commerce, July 15, 1852. 177 Post, Sept. 16, 1852. 178 Simeon Draper to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 13, 1852, Weed Papers. 179 Oct. 22, 1852, Marcy Papers. See also James W. Beekman to Fillmore, Aug. 30, 1852; J. B. Varnum to Fillmore, Sept. 4, 1852; J. Brooks to Fillmore, Sept. 9, Oct. 20, 24, 1852, Fillmore Papers.

86

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

I had a conversation yesterday with George Griswold [he wrote] who I thought showed some solicitude for the success of our ticket. He said that he did not give a cent to the Whigs when they called upon him, nor would he give anything. Duff Green assured me that he had been at the Webster club room and he thought they would vote for Pierce. This may be done by them especially if Webster dies, as the telegraph reports that he cannot live through the day. Their sympathies may be turned to our account. This prediction proved to be accurate. Webster's death did not completely destroy the separate Union movement in his behalf,180 but most of the Whig merchants now threw their votes to Pierce.181 The Post, after an exhaustive analysis of the attitude of the conservative class in New York, concluded: "The vote of the mercantile, manufacturing and moneyed classes, which was once thrown on the Whig side, will at least be refused it now, if it does not go to the side of the Democracy." 182 The election returns indicated how widespread the defection among the mercantile Whigs had been. Pierce carried New York City by more than eleven thousand votes, the largest majority in any presidential election in twenty years.183 In the silk-stocking wards, the Whig majorities of 1848 were markedly reduced, at least four hundred merchants in the fifteenth ward who had hitherto voted with the Whigs cast their ballots for Pierce.184 Gilbert Davis, one of these merchants, summed up the reason for their change succinctly: "The whole Whig Union party knew full well if Scott would have been elected, Seward would have been his right hand man. That has caused the defeat and I am glad of it." 185 Greeley himself admitted that the merchants, or "cotton," as he chose to call the mercantile influence, had seriously hampered the Whig party. "Our wealthy and mercantile 180 The Webster Committee in New York City published an address in which they blamed the treachery of the Whig Convention for Webster's death, and they declared they would not support Scott. Post, Oct. 30, 1852. The Webster ticket received 237 votes in New York City. 181 A. C. Flagg to G. N. Newalls, Nov. 3, 1852, Marcy Papers (Albany State Library). See also August Belmont to James Buchanan, Oct. 27, 1852, Buchanan Papers. 182 Post, Oct. 21, 1852. 183 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 23, 1852. The total vote in the city was 34,277 for Pierce, 23,115 for Scott, 237 for Webster. 184 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 10, 1852, Fillmore Papers; Davis to Marcy, Feb. 28, 1853, Marcy Papers. 185 Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 10, 1853, Fillmore Papers. See also John K. Peters to Marcy, Feb. 28, 1853, Fillmore Papers; Jonathan Nathan to Weed, Nov. 10, 1852, Weed Papers.

THE

UNION

SAFETY

COMMITTEE

87

Whigs," he added, "generally kept away from the polls, or took little interest in the election." Others had voted either for "the dead 'Union' ticket," or for the Democratic candidates.186 To the Union Safety Committee, the results were a dream fulfilled. For they were convinced that not only would the election "kill Seward and his faction forever," but as a distinct victory for the Union and the Compromise, it would settle the slavery issue permanently.187 186 Tribune, Nov. 13, 1852; Jan. 14, 1853. 187 Gilbert Davis to Fillmore, Nov. 10, 1852, Fillmore Papers; August Belmont to Buchanan, Nov. 5, 1852, Buchanan Papers; Journal of Commerce, Nov. 8, 10, 1852.

# 5

Bleeding"

Kansas

N January 4, 1854, the beautiful dream of the New York merchants came to an end. On that day, Stephen A. Douglas introduced a bill into the Senate calling for the organization of the territorial government of Nebraska, and providing that whenever this area should be admitted as a state or states, it should enter "with or without slavery" as fixed by its constitution at the time.1 This simple action was to have tremendous consequences. Throughout the entire North the alarm was sounded, and instantly all elements in the population— farmers, workers, manufacturers, and merchants— voiced their indignation at the attempt of the Slave Power and its Northern allies to destroy the Missouri Compromise and to nullify the Compromise of 1850.2 No groups in the North were more active in opposing the "Nebraska infamy" than the "solid men" of Boston, Philadelphia and New York. In the first city, the merchants, meeting at Faneuil Hall on Washington's birthday, called upon the South "to pause before they proceed farther to disturb the peace which we hoped the Compromise measures of 1850 would have made perpetual." 3 These were words which every New York merchant would readily have echoed. From the election of Franklin Pierce until the introduction of the Nebraska Bill, the merchants had paid little attention to national affairs.4 They sincerely believed that the sectional struggle was a thing of the past, and they took more than a little pride in the fact that their Union Safety Committee was receiving considerable credit for this achievement.5 Then came the news of the Douglas bill, and instantly their hopes 1 Senate Report No. 15, 33rd Congress, 1st session, p. 3. 2 G. F. Milton, The Eve of Conflict, pp. 190-200; J. G. Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, p. 133. s Boston Times, Feb. 23, 1854. See also Philadelphia Press, Feb. 24, 1861, and New York Tribune, Feb. 24, 1861. 4 Journal of Commerce, Aug. 12, Sept. 13, 1853. 5 Ibid., Oct. 16, 1853. 88

"BLEEDING" KANSAS 89 and their pride vanished. In their place came a feeling of great bitterness. The merchants were by no means ignorant of the role played by the struggle over a route for a Pacific railroad in Douglas's decision to open the Nebraska territory for settlement.6 Indeed, under ordinary circumstances they would have greeted this move with intense enthusiasm, for there were no stauncher proponents of a transcontinental railroad than the New York business men. It had been a New York merchant, Asa Whitney, who had first publicized the need for such a railroad.7 Though he gained little support at first from his colleagues, after the discovery of gold in California and the development of an important trade with the Pacific Coast, the issue aroused tremendous interest in commercial circles.8 In the summer of 1849, tne New York Chamber of Commerce endorsed Whitney's plan for a transcontinental railroad,9 and four years later the Pacific Railroad Company was incorporated by the state legislature.10 Among the directors were the leading merchants of the city— to mention but a few: William B. Astor, Moses H. Grinnell, Peter Cooper, Robert Bayard, Peter Lorillard, James Boorman, and Stephen Whitney.11 The merchants now turned to the national government for aid in behalf of their project. Despite Pierce's insistence on a strict construction policy, they expected to encounter little opposition. For one thing, the merchants knew from personal experience that Congress was quite willing to grant subsidies for steamships « Most recent students of the subject agree that this was the chief reason for Douglas's action. E.g., see F. H. Hodder, "The Railroad Background of the Kansas-Nebraska Act," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII, 3-22; and G. F. Milton, op. cit., pp. 150-151 * N. Loomis, "Asa Whitney: Father of Pacific Railroads," Mississippi Valley Historical Association Proceedings, VI, 168-175; M. L. Brown, "Asa Whitney and His Pacific Railroad Publicity Campaign," ibid., XX, 209-224. s John A. Dix to the Pacific Railroad Convention in St. Louis, in Post, Nov. 2, 1849. See also the petition circulated in the Merchants' Exchange for a proposed railroad to the Pacific, in Journal of Commerce, Feb. 2, 1850. » Minutes of the Chamber of Commerce, August 10, 1849 (MS, New York Chamber of Commerce); Post, Aug. 2, 11, 1849. ™Post, Feb. 4, 1853. 11 See ibid., for the entire list of incorporators. For other connections of the merchants with the Pacific Railroad projects, see Memorial of the President and the Directors of the Pacific Railroad, pamphlet; Third Annual Report of the Pacific Railroad Company; Documents Exhibiting the Organization, Conditions and Relations of the Pacific Railroad of the State of Missouri, pp. 37, 75.

go

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

and railroads.12 Then again, both Secretary Guthrie and Secretary Davis of Pierce's cabinet had emphasized, during their visit to attend the opening ceremonies of the New York World's Fair, the value of a Pacific railroad and the ability of the government, even "within the strict limits of the Constitution," to aid in its construction.13 Unfortunately, the merchants soon learned that the administration was interested only in a transcontinental railroad via the Southern route, and that if any subsidy were granted, it would be to this project.14 Indeed, the news of the Gadsden Purchase seemed to render the selection of a Southern route inevitable.15 To bankers and merchants, who intended to invest their capital in a Southern railroad to the Pacific if this route were selected, there was nothing startling in this news; 16 but to most business men, it presented a serious threat, since they knew only too well that a Southern Pacific railroad would result in increased prosperity for New Orleans, Savannah and Charleston at the expense of New York, and it would endanger the economic ties between the Empire City and the West, which were just being cemented.17 These merchants also knew that in order to defeat the proposed Southern railroad project, it would be necessary to arouse popular sentiment speedily for the building of a railroad via the central or northern route,18 and to accomplish this, it was 12 Francis P. Blair to Van Buren, Nov. 27, 1853, Van Buren Papers. See especially the report of the Senate Committee on lobby activities in Report of Commttees, No. 1, Special Session of the Senate, 33rd Congress; and Watts Sherman to Marcy, March 9, 1853, Marcy Papers. 13 V. H. Davis, Memoir of Jefferson Davis, I, 518; Herald, July 12-16, 1853. I* On the movements for a Southern Pacific Railroad, see R. S. Cotterill, "Memphis Railroad Convention, 1849," Tennessee Historical Magazine, IV, 83; R. S. Cotterill, "Early Agitation for a Pacific Railroad, 1845-1850," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, V, 366, 415; E. Mayes, "Origin of the Pacific Railroads, and especially of the Southern Pacific," Publications of the Mississippi Valley Historical Society, VI, 307-377. is P. N. Garber, The Gadsden Treaty, Chapter II; Executive Documents, 33rd Congress, 2nd session, No. 78, p. 29. 16 For evidence of the interest of New York business men in the Southern Railroad project, see De Bow's Review, III, 447; Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of Stockholders of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company; Times, Jan. 6, Feb. 8, 185317 Post, Jan. 10, March 4, 14, April 6, 7, June 23, Oct. 28, 1853; A. L. Kohlmeier, The Old Northwest as the Keystone of the Arch of the American Federal Union, Chapter III; E. C. Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War, Chapter I. ifi Post, March- June, 1853. See also speech of Seward in the Senate on Dec. 27, 1853, Congressional Globe, 33rd Congress, 1st session, p. 97; and Journal of Commerce, April 7, 1854.

"BLEEDING" KANSAS gi essential that the Nebraska territory be opened for settlement. In fact, it is significant to note that in October, 1853, three months before Douglas proposed his Nebraska bill, a merchant, in a pamphlet widely circulated in the city, called for the organization of the Nebraska territory on the ground that it would facilitate the building of a Pacific railroad "by a central or northern route." 19 It is obvious, therefore, that had Douglas's proposal ended with the clause opening Nebraska for settlement, the "Little Giant" would have been hailed as the champion of. the Empire City. But important as was a northern transcontinental route for the merchants, it was completely overshadowed by that part of the bill which related to slavery in the new territory. Perhaps Douglas believed, as his most recent biographer points out,20 that this issue was of minor significance compared with the securing of a northern transcontinental railroad, inasmuch as many people already agreed that the Compromise of 1850 had itself repealed the Missouri Compromise. But the merchants knew very well that the bill would bring to an abrupt end the all too brief period of sectional harmony. As one merchant put it, the measure would "renew agitation, breed distrust between the North and South, alienate friendly feeling, and resuscitate the hydra of sectional controversy." 21 But the position of the merchants was best expressed in the words of the author of the aforementioned pamphlet, who wrote that "the Missouri Compromise shall be inviolate . . . [and] that the Pacific Railroad shall be built where right demands, as near to the straight line from New York to San Francisco as it can be run. . . ." 22 Without the first part, however, the second was scarcely worthwhile. The renewal of sectional agitation was too big a price to pay for a transcontinental railroad. Few merchants in the city were more enraged by the Nebraska bill than those who had formerly been most active on the Union Safety Committee. Moses H. Grinnell informed Senator Crittenden that William H. Aspinwall, Henry Chauncey and James is Letters to the People on the Present Crisis (Pamphlet, New York Public Library). 20 Milton, op. cit., p. 318. 21 Anthony J. Bleecker to Gilbert Dean, Feb. 17, 1854. This letter was made public in 1856, and was printed in full in the Post, Oct. 1, 1856. See also George Wood, in Journal of Commerce, Aug. 24, 1854; and Post, March 17, 1854. 22 Letters to the People on the Present Crisis.

92

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

W. Gerard, all Union Safety men, had offered a toast at a dinner to the Kentucky Senator in honor of his stand against the measure.23 When, in his famous speech against the bill, Seward lashed out against the efforts of the Slave Power to introduce slavery into Kansas, he received enthusiastic applause from the merchants who had previously fought him so bitterly. "You would be grateful to hear," wrote Andrew Corrigan to Thurlow Weed, "the terms he [Seward] is spoken of for the roasting he gave that Committee on Territories, by Gentlemen who have not been overfriendly to him before." 24 And it was the Castle Garden meeting," the "solid men of New of bone and sinew of the city," who were now officers at the many meetings called in the Empire

"the leaders of York, the men to be seen as City to protest

against the Nebraska bill.25 It is not difficult to understand why those merchants should have adopted this position. After all, they had believed that the Compromise would put an end "to all slavery legislation," and they had insisted for over two years that if Northern agitators were silenced, the South would remain content with the status quo.26 Not only would their efforts now be rendered useless, but they would also be placed in a most humiliating position. No wonder, then, that they were bitter. Shepherd Knapp, himself one of the leaders of the Union movement, voiced the burning resentment of the Union Saving merchants when he declared at the end of a long speech devoted to the Nebraska Bill, "In New York we do not understand, and we will not tolerate the doctrine of repudiation." James W. Gerard, another of the leaders of the Union movement, completed an address at an antiNebraska meeting, by holding up a copy of his speech at the Castle Garden meeting, and inquiring indignantly whether he 23 Grinnell to Crittenden, Feb. 23, 1854, Crittenden Papers. Grinnell, who was very much interested in the Pacific Railroad question, believed "this scheme of Douglas the most villainous one ever presented to Congress." Grinnell to Crittenden, Feb. 22, 1854, Crittenden Papers. 24 Feb. 21, 1854, Weed Papers. 25 Commercial Advertiser, Jan. 31; Post, Jan. 24, 30, 31; Tribune, March 15; Herald, Feb. 1, 1854. William B. Astor, Moses Taylor, Moses Grinnell, William F. Havemeyer, Myndert Van Schaick, A. A. Low, Hiram Ketchum, George Griswold, H. B. Clafflin, Peter Cooper, George Wood, William H. Aspinwall, and Robert B. Minturn were among the leaders in the anti-Nebraska movement in the city. 26fileecker to Gilbert Dean, Feb. 17, 1854, in Post, Oct. 1, 1856; George Wood, in Journal of Commerce, Aug. 24, 1854; Henry Grinnell, in Journal of Commerce, March 16, 1854; Thurman Smith to Weed, March 9, 1854; J. Cooley to Weed, April 18, 1854; Alvah Hunt to Weed, March 29, 1854, Weed Papers.

"BLEEDING" KANSAS 93 had been duped in 1850 into believing that the South would be satisfied with the Compromise.27 One thing all merchants could see, whether they had been supporters or opponents of the Union Safety movement: the introduction of slavery into Kansas would have serious political and economic consequences. For, as was pointed out at one of the merchants' anti-Nebraska meetings, this "would inevitably retard the progress of our western emigration, and that of the free States and Territories on the Atlantic from those on the Pacific." 28 More important, perhaps, was the effect of the bill upon the political strength of the Slave Power. The merchants announced that they were decidedly opposed to the extension of "the unequal rule of representation, which makes one man owning five slaves the equal in political power to four farmers, mechanics or merchants of New York" to a territory "from which may be created ten States . . . with twenty Senators, Representatives of indefinite numbers, and capable of sustaining forty millions of people." 29 It is interesting to observe that the merchants became more vehement in their denunciations of the Nebraska measure as the debate in Congress continued. At the first meeting they held to protest against the bill, the tone of the proceedings was rather calm. Hope was expressed that the Southern members of Congress would heed the advice of their best friends— the New York merchants— and abandon the attempt to repeal the Missouri Compromise. For the passage of the bill, the merchants warned, would "destroy all faith in the permanency of the past or future compromises having any bearing upon the subject of slavery." 30 But this moderate appeal was of no avail. In fact, the resolutions of this meeting were refused a reading when presented by Hamilton Fish to the Senate.31 As a result, the indignation of the merchants mounted. On March 14, after the bill had passed the Senate and while it was being discussed in the House, another huge protest meeting of 27 Tribune, Jan. 31, 1854. See also ibid., March 17, June 17, 1854; Journal of Commerce, March 16, 1854; L. B. Shepherd to Marcy, July 6, 1854; J. Cochrane to Marcy, March 18, 1854; H. J. Redfield to Marcy, Feb. 27, 1854; John Van Buren to Marcy, March 31, 1854, Marcy Papers. wPost, Jan. 31, 1854. 29 Tribune, March 17, 1854. This statement was drawn up by A. A. Low, H. B. Clafflin, and David Leavitt. so Tribune, Jan. 31, 1854. This was the first of several meetings held at the Broadway Tabernacle. si Tribune, Feb. 20, 1854.

94

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

the merchants was held.32 The call for this gathering, signed by hundreds of merchants, itself indicates the growing rage of the business men. It declared categorically that the merchants did not intend to sit quietly and see themselves "defrauded of territory which is theirs by compact, nor to yield to slavery soil which our fathers consecrated to freedom." Instead, they were to take all necessary steps to insure that "this crime be consummated, that despite corruption, bribery and Nebraska, the heart of our continent, shall forever

prepared shall not treachery, continue

free." The83 proceedings of the protest meeting perfectly illustrate the strong determination of the merchants to meet the Nebraska issue squarely. From the moment Moses H. Grinnell called the assembly to order until the motion to adjourn was adopted, there was not the slightest equivocation or hesitation expressed. Throughout, the indignation of the merchants at the failure of the administration to pay any attention to their views on the Nebraska bill was clearly revealed. Thus, John A. King declared, in discussing this point: Are you nobody in the estimation of the people at Washington? Are you not worthy to be heard, and obeyed as to the fate of the mighty tracts of land which lie in the center of the country? They may say that, immersed in business, you will soon forget it. Not so! They mistake your temper and intelligence. . . .34 The resolution, unanimously adopted, reminded Southerners that the merchants of the Empire City had always been the first to support the legitimate claims of the South, but though they were "divided on other points," they were united "against allowing slavery on a single foot of free soil where it is not now authorized by law." 35 It was resolved to have the merchants and others who were serving as officers of the meeting constitute themselves a Committee of Correspondence "to take such proper steps as they may deem expedient toward defeating the objects of the Kansas and Nebraska bill now pending in the House of Rep32 On Feb. 18, a huge meeting of mechanics and workingmen of New York gathered to concur "in the stern protest recently uttered by the great meeting called by the leading merchants and bankers of this city against the threatened repeal Tribune, of the Missouri Compromise." Tribune, Feb. 20, 1854. March 14, 1854. 34 Tribune, March 15, 1854. 85 Ibid. The resolutions also attacked "a sectional aristocracy" which was anxious to spread slavery in all parts of the country.

"BLEEDING" KANSAS 95 resentatives . . . and that they be instructed forthwith to circulate petitions for this purpose among the people at large. . . ." Among the members of the committee were: George Wood, William F. Havemeyer, Hiram Ketchum, Pelitiah Perit, Robert B. Minturn, Moses H. Grinnell, Abraham Van Nest, Luther Bradish, Myndert Van Schaick, Anson G. Phelps, Theodore McNamee, William E. Dodge, Ogden Hoffman, Henry Ward Beecher, and Peter Cooper.36 Grinnell, McNamee, and Samuel J. Beebe were designated as a sub-committee to raise funds for the struggle against the Nebraska bill. The committee promptly set about organizing the opposition to the Nebraska bill. Petitions were circulated in the business districts to be signed and dispatched to Washington, and a fund was raised to enable the committee to correspond with similar organizations throughout the country.37 On May 11, when it appeared that the bill might pass the House within a few days, the committee issued a call for a mass meeting in the Park "to consider the steps proper to be taken by the Free States at this momentous crisis," and to urge upon the members of Congress opposed to the bill that "they resort, if necessary to the most extreme measures, to prevent the perpetration of an act of perfidy, fraught with fearful and perhaps irreparable disaster to the peace, the harmony, and the stability of the Union." 38 Along with this call, the committee issued a burning address to the citizens of New York. In this document, they assailed those who sought to "mislead" the merchants by claiming the Nebraska bill intended only to establish the doctrine of squatter sovereignty. After denouncing Pierce for his efforts "secretly and openly to interfere with the freedom of our federal legislation," the address urged the merchants and other citizens to remember constantly that the extension of slavery to the Nebraska territory "would secure to the slave states a permanent preponderance in the Federal Union which would enable them to sway the Government in all its branches— legislative, executive, and judicial. ..." Finally, the address called for the organization in every town of "Committees of Correspondence as in the days of our fathers, when plots less treasonable were rife against our liberties," and 36 Post, April 24, 1854. Abraham Van Nest, one of the oldest and most respected merchants in the city, was elected Chairman of the committee. Shepherd Knapp, Joseph P. Simpson, and Erhard Richter were the Vice-Chairmen. 37 Post, April 20-26, 1854, and especially issue of April 24. fi8 Tribune, May 12, 1854.

96

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

advised the citizens of New York "in anticipation of the worst [to] organize promptly an emigration to Kansas and Nebraska, of intelligent and free laborers, who will not permit the soil consecrated tofreedom to be polluted by a slave." 39 On May 14, 1854 the City Hall Park was thronged by thousands of merchants, workingmen, and other citizens of New York. On the specially constructed platform sat the most important merchants of the city, Whigs and Democrats alike. Among them were: William F. Havemeyer, George Griswold, Moses Taylor, William B. Astor, George Wood, Moses H. Grinnell, Wilson G. Hunt, William E. Dodge, James W. Gerard, Hiram Ketchum, Charles H. Marshall, William H. Aspinwall, Myndert Van Schaick, and Robert C. Goodhue.40 The theme of the meeting was sounded by Daniel Lord who, unable to attend, sent a letter in which he outlined why he opposed the Nebraska bill. He wrote: It opens the country anew to agitation on the subject of Slavery, not to end until it be driven off or the Union severed . . . and it tends to the indefinite prolongation in this country of Slavery. On every principle the proposed bill is objectionable as a radical and vital evil.41 The merchants admitted that the Nebraska measure probably would be adopted, and they placed the blame for this more upon Northern "traitors" like Stephen "Arnold" Douglas than upon the Southerners alone, many of whom were known to be opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. Nevertheless, the merchants issued the warning "that no man who from this hour votes to repeal the Missouri Compromise, or to our knowledge, aids its repeal, directly or indirectly, shall ever receive our votes for any office in the People's gift," and they resolved to rally together all groups in the state who were convinced that "the rights of the free States are in jeopardy from Southern aggression and Northern treachery." Thus, the General Committee appointed to oppose "the Nebraska perfidy" was to be "continued permanently," and they were assigned several specific tasks. First, they were to organize immediately "an effective scheme of emigration to the southernmost border of Kansas and Nebraska . . . with a view of excluding slavery from all territories from 39 "Address Tribune, May *o Tribune, *i To Moses

of 1854. the Committee appointed to oppose the Nebraska perfidy," in 12, May 15, 1854. H. Grinnell, May 13, 1854, in Tribune, May 15, 1854.

"BLEEDING"

KANSAS

97 which it was excluded by the Missouri Compromise." To accomplish this the committee was to appeal "to the generous liberality of our merchants and citizens generally" for contributions to an Emigration fund. Finally, the committee was assigned the duty of calling a convention of all citizens of the state

"without distinction of party," who were disposed "to maintain the right and principles of the North, to stay the extension of slavery to new territories, to rescue from its control the Federal government, and so far as can be properly done to aid the citizens of the South in peaceably hastening its end, as a system unjust in itself, and unworthy of this great Republic." 42 Immediately after the meeting, the General Committee took up the task of aiding the movement of emigrants to Kansas. They particularly interested themselves in the "Plan of Operations" which had been drawn up by the recently formed Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Company and circulated throughout several Northern states. The "Plan" called for subscriptions to the stock of the company to aid in the transportation and settlement of twenty thousand free laborers to Kansas.43 On May 27, Eli Thayer of the Massachusetts Company came to New York to solicit subscriptions for the stock. He persuaded Greeley to urge the business men to invest in the company, thereby not only doing something for "the great cause of Freedom," but assuring themselves as well a reasonable profit on their investment.44 Thayer, finding the idea "eagerly seized upon by some of our best and most distinguished citizens," delivered addresses at the homes "of capitalists," and public lectures to business men, the most important being at Astor House.45 In no time, he made excellent headway, finding "no difficulty in enlisting supporters of the scheme among the most prominent and influential citizens." Within a few days more than one hundred thousand dollars had been subscribed.46 Actually, however, very little of this huge sum wTas paid by the subscribers. For while Thayer was arousing sentiment for 42 Tribune, Post, May 15, 1854. 43 Post, May 25, 1854. For the details of the plan, see Eli Thayer, A History of the Kansas Crusade, pp. 27-29. 44 Eli Thayer, The New England Emigrant Aid Company, pp. 20-23; Kansas Crusade, pp. 36-51; Tribune, May 29, 30, 1854. 45 Tribune, June 1, 1854; Thayer, New England Emigrant Aid Company, pp. 24-25. 46 Thayer, New England Emigrant Aid Company, pp. 24-25.

98

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

his enterprise among New York capitalists, he received news that several of the original incorporators of the company had resigned from the organization, because of their fear of becoming personally liable for the debts of the company. This news struck Thayer "like a thunderbolt." "Over one hundred thousand dollars had been subscribed in New York," he wrote later, "and by the timidity of the Boston men all this was to be lost." 47 He immediately rushed back to Boston and together with Amos A. Lawrence organized a voluntary association to be known as the New England Emigrant Aid Company. This organization was to have a capital of two hundred thousand dollars in shares of twenty dollars each, and to be supervised by three trustees, each of whom

was "to be responsible for his own acts and neglects

But 48 Thayer all too soon encountered several other snags in only." his work in New York. The subscribers in the city refused to invest in the voluntary association, and "took no further part" in the Emigrant Aid Company.49 In addition, Moses H. Grinnell, who had been invited to serve as one of the three trustees, rejected the offer.50 His decision caused Lawrence "much regret and mortification." He wrote to Grinnell: "With yourself and Mr. Thayer I am willing to serve. With other associates I am not." He went on: But, my dear Sir, great movement to be offices, nor honors: we we can act effectively,

we shall inflict a great wrong if we allow this checked at this time. We are not aspirants for are not politicians, or partisans, and therefore when others cannot.51

In order to meet the objections of the New York subscribers, and particularly those of Grinnell, to the voluntary organization form, Thayer procured a charter for a company from the Connecti47 Ibid. See also Samuel A. Johnson, "The Genesis of the New England Emigrant Aid Company," New England Quarterly, III, 90-100; Robert E. Moody, "The First Year of the Emigrant Aid Company," Nezu England Quarterly, IV, 148-149. 48 Thayer, New England Emigrant Aid Company, p. 25; Moody, op. cit., pp. 149-150. Thayer, New England Emigrant Aid Company, p. 27; Kansas Crusade, p. 164; Johnson, op. cit., p. 103. so Grinnell's refusal was based on his reluctance to assume any of the liabilities of the company. See Moody, op. cit., p. 151. si Amos A. Lawrence to Moses H. Grinnell, June 21, 1854, New England Emigrant Aid Company Papers (MS, Kansas State Historical Society). This letter is in the Lawrence Letterbooks.

"BLEEDING"

KANSAS

99 cut legislature.52 But even this did not help matters much, since by this time the severe financial panic which hit the country prevented the New York merchants from taking up many shares.53 If any further proof were needed at this late date of the tremendous effect the Nebraska measure had upon public opinion in the North, the startling and swift organization of the New York merchants during the first six months of 1854 should certainly be sufficient. Here were business men, who, but two years before, had sponsored a Union electoral ticket to defeat the anti-slavery extension candidates, and had rejected the Whig presidential candidate on the ground that he would be controlled by the leader of the free soil forces. Yet by August 1854 they had at several meetings employed language in attacking the Slave Power at which they would previously have shuddered. In addition, they had organized a General Committee to raise funds to save Kansas from slavery, and to unite the people of the North against the growing power of the "Southern Aristocrats." And these steps were taken not only by confirmed anti-slavery men in mercantile circles (Grinnell, Draper, Bowen, and McNamee), but by hundreds of merchants who had been foremost in the Union movement— men like Wood, Aspinwall, Ketchum, H. B. Clafflin, Moses Taylor, and William B. Astor. In fact, the entire atmosphere in New York seemed to have been changed by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.54 The Herald lamented that it was almost impossible for federal officers to arrest fugitive slaves in city, and that one might think that the name had been changed overnight to Syracuse or some other anti-slavery center.55 The Tribune, commenting joyfully on this, declared: Yes, right here in the great metropolis of the cotton trade, whence fugitive slaves might, one year ago, have been carried off into everlasting bondage as easily, openly, and regularly as a bale of cotton or hogshead of tobacco, could have been shipped to Liverpool, it is now necessary— the Herald being witness— for United States officers to sneak, and skulk and palter, and hurry, and lie . . . in order to accomplish their hideous purpose.56 52 Johnson, op. cit., p. 103; Moody, op. cit., pp. 150-153; Thayer, Kansas Crusade, p: 164. 53 Tribune, Journal of Commerce, Sept. 10-14, 1^54 (financial columns). 54 E.g., see F. B. Cutting to Marcy, Aug. 18, 1854, Marcy Papers. 55 May 28, 1854. 56 May 29, 1854.

ioo

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

What was even more amazing to contemporary observers was the ease with which the abolitionists, who, it will be recalled, were practically expelled from the city in 1850, obtained the use of "the largest and handsomest church" in New York for their annual meeting in 1854.57 The fact that the wealthy merchants who attended this church had endorsed the proposal permitting its use for the American Anti-Slavery Society astounded even the abolitionists themselves, and in their annual report they remarked: Our meetings, since we have recovered our position here have excited an interest, and have attracted crowds unknown before. We believe that we have at last conquered a peace, as far as the right of Free Speech in this city is concerned. We accept this fact as a hopeful augury for the future. If the most extreme doctrines of Anti-Slavery can be allowed an utterance in the City of New York, we are sure that they can find a hearing everywhere else in the Free States.58 That this amazing change in sentiment was not confined to New York merchants is clearly revealed in the following excerpt from the Boston Times. It announced on May 30, 1854: The memorial for the repeal of the fugitive slave bill has been signed by a large number of the most prominent merchants in the city. We recognize among the signers the names of many leading men, who have never before given their influence on the anti-slavery side. We may possibly copy some more of the names hereafter, in order to show that the commercial class have taken a new position upon the great question of the day. To those familiar with matters of social life here, and acquainted with past movements in regard to the compromise measures, the petition above named indicates that "there is a North," at last. There were still greater surprises in store for the leaders of the anti-slavery movement. During January and February of 1856, New York papers carried stories of various movements in the South to aid Southern emigration to Kansas.59 Soon after came reports of fresh outbreaks in Kansas and the destruction of homes by "Border Ruffians," all culminating on May 24 in the news of the "Sack of Lawrence." Once again a wave of indignation swept over the North. In New York City the resentment of the merchants reached a high pitch. Thus, Eli Thayer, who 57 Tribune, May 15, 1854. 58 Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society for 1855, pp. 106-108. 58 See especially Tribune, Jan. 4-Feb. 13, 1856; Rhodes, op. cit., II 150-153.

"BLEEDING"

KANSAS

101

arrived in the city at this time "to raise the money necessary to enable the Emigrant Aid Company to continue its Kansas Work," met with an enthusiastic response. Moses H. Grinnell, Simeon Draper, and George W. Blunt arranged to have him speak at the homes of several capitalists to solicit stock subscriptions for the company, and at Blunt's home he spoke before "about thirty prominent and wealthy business and professional men." 60 Thayer's appeals to the merchants were both humanitarian and practical. He tried to impress the business men with the fact that they were more "interested pecuniarily . . . than any other people in the Union," whether Kansas was a free or a slave state, inasmuch as the amount of goods they would sell to the state would be considerably increased if it were occupied by many free farmers and their families rather than by a few large planters and their slaves.61 He also stressed the possibilities for profits in land speculation in Kansas, provided it remained a free state.62 Again he pointed out that the constant invasions of Kansas by armed bands were rapidly destroying "a very flattering business." Then he quoted the appeal of the Kansas merchants to the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce, in which they asserted that their trade was "not St. one-third as large asmen it was months ago." Reminding the Louis business thatthree if these conditions continued their remittances would "be very limited," the Kansans urged all interested in commerce and trade "to intercede" in their behalf by "staying the hand of the evil doers." 63 When New York merchants received word from correspondents in Missouri informing them that fewer remittances would be sent east because the excitement in Kansas had prevented the interior merchants from "making their collections," 64 they understood more clearly the significance of Thayer's remarks. Thayer also influenced William Cullen Bryant, the poet and editor of the New York Evening Post, to publish a series of eo Thayer, Kansas Crusade, pp. 202-209. 6i Ibid.; Tribune, Jan. 18, 1856. See also the article, "The Trade of Kansas— Who Shall Have It?" Post, April 1, 1856. 62 /bid. "A great deal of interest is felt among capitalists to purchase land in Kansas," the Post's financial editor wrote on Nov. 7, 1856. See also Leavenworth City (Kan.) correspondent of the Post, Dec. 3, 1856; letter in Post, Nov. 15, 1856, from that city; speech of John A. Dix, in Journal of Commerce, Sept. 22, 1856; letter in Post from Chicago, Dec. 5, 8, 1856; Tribune, June 30, 1857; Herald, April 7, Sept. 9, 1857; anc* Tribune, May 25, 1859. 63 See St. Louis Democrat, in Post, Feb. 28, 1856. 64 Independent, July 10, 17, 24, 1856.

io2

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

articles attacking the credit of the state of Missouri. He hoped thereby to get the bankers and merchants who held Missouri bonds "active in preventing the invasions and outrages of the border ruffians." 65 Later the Post ran a long article entitled "The Alarm in Wall Street," in which the troubles in Kansas were described as having "a disastrous influence upon Commercial enterprise." Moreover, the "monied men" were said to be afraid to withdraw their deposits from the bank in order "to employ them in any manner while the prospects of the future are so uncertain. It is not at all to be wondered at, that when such things (the 'Sack of Lawrence') are done in our country with the approbation of the chief Magistrate and his Cabinet, an alarm should be felt which unnerves all commercial confidence." 66 These appeals deeply impressed the merchants. At the meeting at Blunt's home, William M. Evarts contributed one thousand dollars to the Emigrant Aid Company, and he paid tribute to the manner in which Thayer had demonstrated the "practical" effects of the extension of slavery upon business men of New York.67 In Brooklyn, Thayer raised $21,710, and at one meeting in New York, over $7,660. By January 17 he had collected forty thousand dollars, and expected soon to make it one hundred thousand dollars.68 Much of this came in the form of outright contributions, for the list of citizens of New York and Brooklyn who held stock in the New England Emigrant Aid Company reveals that twenty-five thousand dollars was all that was received by the company in subscriptions.69 Some of the subscribers were Moses H. Grinnell (100 shares— $2,000); H. C. Bowen (50— $1,000); Horace Clafflin (150— $3,000); William Evarts (50— $1,000); E. D. 65 Thayer, Kansas Crusade, pp. 207-208; Post, Feb. 13-16, 1856. ee Post, June 18, 1856. 67 Thayer, Kansas Crusade, pp. 203-204. According to Thayer, Evarts made the following remarks: "Ever since my Castle Garden speech, you know I have been called a Hunker Whig. Now, what reason you had to suppose that such a man could care whether slavery was extended or restricted I do not know. Therefore I do not know your reasons for inviting me to attend this meeting. But you did invite me, and I have come. I am glad that I am here, and I thank you for willing me. . . . Like thousands of others, I have been waiting for an opportunity to contend successfully against slavery without violating the laws or sacrificing the Constitution and the Union. . . ." 68 R. V. Harlow, "The Rise and Fall of the Kansas Aid Movement," American Historical Review, XLI, 9-10. 69 Stock Register, New England Emigrant Aid Company Papers (MS, Kansas State Historical Society).

"BLEEDING"

KANSAS

103

Morgan (50— $1,000); Theodore McNamee (50— $1,000); Marshall O. Roberts (50— $1,000); George W. Blunt (25— $500); Condit and Noble (io-$20o); H. A. Chittenden (25— $500); Henry W. Law (5— $100); Miller and Develin (5— $100); J. S. Whitney (20— $400); R. E. Lockwood (15— $300); Dudley Field (25— $500; William Kent (5— $100). The entire list reveals that almost one hundred business men in New York subscribed to the stock of the company. Most of these subscriptions were taken out on February 11, 1856, and a few during March and August.70 The outbreaks in Kansas caused the merchants to unite once again in voicing their protests. On June 9, a meeting was held at the Tabernacle "to consider the recent alarming events in Kansas," at which "the lawless outrages of the invading Missouri mob and their activities" were condemned.71 In addition, a fund was raised "for the suffering freemen of Kansas," 72 and a committee of merchants was appointed to solicit further contributions for the same purpose.73 The committee published a long appeal describing the dire needs of the Kansans who had been "driven from house or home or prevented from putting in their crops by the invasions of armed marauders from without the Territory." Since many of the Kansans were "in absolute want of bread and meat," it was the duty of New Yorkers to see that no starvation occurred. Not only because of humanitarian principles, but because there was "ample reason to believe that a part of the infernal scheme ... is to drive them from the territory by starvation," and the merchants of the great commercial metropolis, "whose teeming wealth is in so great a degree derived from the Great West," simply could not afford to abandon those 70 A list of stockholders of the New England Emigrant Aid Company holding fifty or more shares has been printed in Appendix II of Samuel A. Johnson's "The Genesis of the New England Emigrant Aid Company," op. cit., pp. 121-122. The writer has seen the entire list of New Yorkers who subscribed to the company's stock. 71 Tribune, Post, June 10, 1856. 72 Henry A. Chittenden, the dry goods merchant, contributed $500. However, the total sum collected was not announced. 73 Actually, this was an enlarged committee, the original body having been set up at a meeting of the New York Kansas League on March 25, 1856. See Post, March 26; Journal of Commerce, March 26, 1856. Some of the members of the committee were: Peter Cooper, Simeon Draper, John A. King, Seth Hunt, Moses H. Grinnell, Samuel B. Ruggles, Theodore McNamee, Roe Lockwood, Charles H. Marshall, and Dexter Fairbanks. Tribune, June 16, 1856.

104

'

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

who were struggling in Kansas "to extend the area of her [New commerce." 74 YorkNo City's] event during these exciting months stirred the merchants more than the attack upon Senator Charles Sumner by Preston Brooks.75 They certainly did not approve of Sumner's philippic,76 but the cowardly attack aroused the greatest indignation in business circles. A huge meeting wTas held at the Tabernacle at which the merchants united to condemn Brooks's attack.77 What particularly enraged these merchants was the fact that public officials, and the press "of the Slave States" heaped unstinted praise upon Brooks for his conduct. "... We are forced most unwillingly to the sad conclusion," declared one of the resolutions adopted by the merchants, "that the general community of the Slave States is in complicity in feeling and principle, with the system of intimidation and violence for the suppression of freedom of speech, and of the press, of wThich the assault on Senator Sumner is the most signal, but not the singular instance." 78 The speakers at this protest meeting lashed out against the recent actions of the Slave Power. Daniel Lord warned the South that if it persisted New York would be forced Ruggles added to this the these outrages, conservatives

in its "madness" the merchants of to unite against it.79 And Samuel B. warning that if the South continued and radicals of the North would join

together to meet "force with force." He went on: 80 74 "Appeal of the Tabernacle Committee to the Citizens of New York," Tribune, June 16, 1856. In August, the committee turned over $3,500 to the National Committee of the Kansas Emigrant Aid Societies. At a single meeting on August 26, $2,500 was raised. See the report of the Tabernacle Committee to the contributors of the New York Fund, Tribune, Aug. 27, 1856. 75 Daniel Lord wrote to Crittenden on June 2, 1856: "The excitement here is very great. It swallows up all other party issues in this part of the country." Crittenden Papers. 76 E.g., see the letter of D. D. Barnard to Hamilton Fish, May 26, 1856, Barnard Letterbooks, but also printed in Nevins, Hamilton Fish, pp. 57-58. See also Journal of Commerce, May 24, 28, 30, June 4, 1856. 77 Post, May 29: Tribune, May 31, 1856. George Griswold presided, and William F. Havemeyer, Luther Bradish, William Kent, John A. Stevens, Erastus Brooks, Moses H. Grinnell, John A. King, Moses Taylor, Daniel Lord, Charles H. Marshall, Paul Spofford, Samuel B. Ruggles, James A. Hamilton, Peletiah Perit, and James Low were among the other officers. Havemeyer and Moses Taylor were Democrats, Grinnell, Marshall, King and Kent were Republicans, and Bradish, Brooks, Spofford, Hamilton, Ruggles, Lord, Perit, and Low were Anti-Fusion Whigs and Americans. 78 Ibid. Tribune, May 31, 1856. 79 so ibid.

"BLEEDING" KANSAS 105 I advise the South before they go further into this business to look into their arithmetic. There are more free white men within one mile of this platform than in the whole State of South Carolina. There are men enough here in this room to sustain our Senators and Representatives intheir seats, and if necessary we will go. John A. Stevens, President of the Bank of Commerce, was even more vehement. It was not enough, he reminded the merchants, to frown down the aggressions of the Slave Power by drawing up resolutions. It was necessary to take "united, deliberate, persistent and persevering action" that "such men no longer possess the Government." For this there had to be "union at the ballot-box." 81 Once again, the anti-slavery journals expressed amazement. "The city of New York is awake at last," the Post declared joyfully,82 and the Tribune fairly rubbed its eyes in surprise as it described in detail the expressions of hostility to the Slave Power by merchants who had always been "conservative and cotton loving to the last degree." 83 "At no period since the formation of the Constitution," it concluded, "has the public mind of this city been wrought to such a pitch of feeling and indignation as at the present moment." 84 si Ibid. 83 May 31, June 1, 1856.

8482 ibid. May 31, 1856.

Black " Republicanism

ALTHOUGH the leaders of the anti-slavery movement were overjoyed to find so many merchants joining with them in denouncing the aggressions of the Slave Power, they did not expect the business men to become their permanent allies. They remembered only too well that these same merchants had also championed the principles of the Wilmot Proviso, and had attacked any suggestions of compromise. Nevertheless, two years later, the business men had not only advocated compromise, but had sought to destroy any one who opposed the "Peace Measures." Very likely they would display the same vacillations on the Kansas question. Many merchants who denounced the advance of the Slave Power might shortly defend that Power and seek to defeat any political group which conducted a struggle against the slavocracy. To the anti-slavery men these shifting views were quite logical, for to expect "our merchants to participate in measures and opinions offensive to their Southern patrons, is like asking the favor of them to pluck out a right eye, or cut off a right hand." 1 Even Horace Greeley, though he praised the merchants for their denunciations of the "Nebraska infamy," agreed that the merchants were "opposed by tradition and instinct" to a militant struggle against the slavocracy.2 "He who realizes a 1 William Jay to the American Tract Society, pamphlet. For evidence that Southern merchants were already threatening the New York business men that they would withdraw their trade if the latter continued their opposition to the Nebraska Act, see Baltimore Patriot, in Tribune, Sept. 7, 1854. 2 Tribune, Oct. 27, 1854. When Charles H. Marshall, a prominent shipping merchant who had denounced the Nebraska Act as a "public wrong," was nominated for Congress, Greeley urged that he be defeated. The fact that Marshall had served on the Union Safety Committee and had voted for Pierce was enough to cause the editor of the Tribune to distrust him. Nor did Marshall's denunciation of the Nebraska Act, or his promise to vote for the "restoration" of the Missouri Compromise cause Greeley to change his views. Like most conservative merchants, Greeley declared, Marshall could not be trusted to champion "measures calculated to restore to Freedom the ground lost by the passage of the Douglas Bill." "Cap106

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM

107

pecuniary profit from the labor of slaves," he wrote, "must ever sympathize with the masters through whose instrumentality that profit is secured." 3 It did not take long to reveal that the anti-slavery leaders were justified in their fears. In the heat of the sectional controversy over Kansas, the merchants faced the growth of a new political movement which most of them regarded as more dangerous for the nation that even the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, the Kansas outrages, and the advance of the Slave Power. This new menace, of course, was the rise of the Republican party. From the very outset of the Kansas controversy, the merchants made it clear that though they were opposed "to the growing aggressions and assumptions of the Slave Power," they were "equally opposed to the organization of a political party on entirely sectional grounds." 4 They were convinced that without even settling the sectional dispute, the new party would only prolong and embitter sectional hatreds. The struggle against the Nebraska measure, they declared, should and could be conducted in a conservative manner.5 It seemed at first that there was no real reason for the merchants to worry. Neither Seward nor Weed was convinced that the time was ripe for the abandonment of the Whig party, especially since it was still, in view of the split among the Democrats, the most powerful political group in the state.6 Moreover, the state election in 1854 revealed that the Kansas issue could not yet be made the basis for the formation of a new party. In one of the most tangled and confusing campaigns in which the prohibition and anti-foreigner issues almost completely overshadowed the tain Marshall," he concluded, "will naturally vote cotton clear through. He may condemn the passage of the Iniquity, but he will hold it practically irreparable." See Charles H. Marshall to the Chairman of the Whig nominating committee, Oct. 13, 1854, in Tribune, Oct. 27, 1854, and ibid., Oct. 27-30, 1854. See also L. H. and A. Spaulding in ibid., Oct. 30, 1854, and Robert C. Wetmore, in ibid., Aug. 1, 1854. 3 Tribune, Oct. 16, 1854. 4 Ibid., Aug. 7, 9, 1854; Post, Aug. 9, 1854; Horace Greeley to Weed, Aug. 10, 1854; Henry J. Raymond to Weed, Aug. 8, 1854, Weed Papers. 5 Tribune, Sept. 30, Oct. 27-30, 1854; J. L. H., in Tribune, Oct. 28, 1854; Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 12-15, 1854; Courier and Enquirer, Oct. 18-21, 1854. e Thurlow Weed Barnes, Life of Thurlow Weed, II, 226; Horace Greeley, Recollections ofa Busy Life, p. 314; F. Seward, Seward at Washington, 1848-1861, p. 236; Tribune, Sept. 5, 1854.

io8 slavery question,7 Governor, Myron was able to make paign encouraged

BUSINESS the H. the the

AND

SLAVERY

Whigs barely succeeded in electing their Clark.8 The fact that none of the parties Kansas question the sole issue of the cammerchants in the hope that the movement

for a new party would die.9 Perhaps the Kansas issue might also pass out of existence. Certainly, if the influx of Northern settlers into Kansas continued, the territory could be brought into the Union as a free state, and the entire matter could be quickly disposed of. In this event, the rise of Republican or "sectional" parties in various Northern and Western states would be halted.10 The merchants were in for a sad disappointment. On March 30, 1855 the startling news reached New York of the invasion of Kansas by five thousand armed Missourians, who had participated in the elections and who had selected, by the most fraudulent methods, a pro-slavery legislature. Once again the Kansas question filled the columns of the newspapers, and the wave of indignation that swept over the North was "felt even among the temperate and judicious." 11 The movement for a new party in New York to unite all anti-slavery expansion groups quickened. By September, the Whig party had been absorbed by the recently formed Republican organization.12 All this happened so quickly that the merchants awoke to find that the movement they themselves had inaugurated had not only moved far ahead of them, but had, in the process, aided in destroying the party of conservatism to which they still clung. 7 On the hostility of some merchants to the prohibition movement, see Luther Bradish, Robert K. Coleman to Webster, Feb. 21, 1852, Webster Papers; and Robert Kelly to Horatio Seymour, Oct. 7, 1850, Seymour Papers (Albany State Library). s Clark won by 153 votes. In New York City, the vote was Clark 12,248, Seymour (Soft), 26,784, Bronson (Hard), 4,744, Ullman 16,706. Greeley admitted that the election had "resulted disastrously," and blamed this on the "treachery of the Whig Union Savers." Tribune, Nov. 8, 20, 1854. There is little evidence to indicate that the Whig merchants deserted their party at this election. » Commercial Advertiser, Journal of Commerce, Nov. 9-12, 1854. 10 See the correspondence and Letterbooks of Daniel D. Barnard, Nov. -Dec, 1854, and Charles A. Davis to Marcy, Dec. 5, 1854; April 24, May 5, 1855; Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, March 24, 1855; Royal Phelps to Marcy, May 21, 1855, Marcy Papers. n Ogden Hoffman to Thurlow Weed, April 5, 1855; George Law to Thurlow Weed, April 19, 1855, Weed Papers; D. D. Barnard to Hamilton Fish, July (no date), 1855, Barnard Letterbooks. 12 Both the Whig and Republican State Committees had agreed to hold their conventions at Syracuse on the same day, Sept. 26, 1855. Soon after they organized, the Whigs adjourned to the Republican convention, and amid cheers, they took the seats reserved for them. See Tribune, Sept. 19-23, 26-27, 1855.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 109 They were quite willing, to be sure, to unite in condemning the invasion of Kansas, and even suggested that all Whig candidates should be required to pledge that "they are not only opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, but that they will use all honorable means to secure its early restoration." 13 But they were decidedly unwilling to surrender the Whig party to an organization which, they believed, was destined "to be a sectional party," and which, by dividing "the citizens of this great Republic by a geographical line," would pave the way for the dissolution of the Union.14 The Whig convention, however, paid but slight attention to the views of the merchants, which were represented by Washington Hunt in a letter opposing fusion,15 and by five New York City delegates who refused to support any unity with the Republicans.16 In fact, it was stated quite openly at the convention that it did not matter what New York City would do, inasmuch as "the rural districts would outvote them." 17 In addition, merchants like Moses H. Grinnell and E. D. Morgan, both of whom were active in promoting fusion, expressed the opinion that the Whig business men would be forced to come over to the Republican party, since it was unlikely that the conservatives would throw their support to the Democrats.18 Most Whig merchants, at first, did neither; instead they attempted to keep the Whig party alive. In New York City, the action of the convention in fusing with the Republicans evoked a storm of protest. The Whig Executive Committee met on October 1, ostensibly for the purpose of ratifying the fusion, but so much opposition developed that the body was forced to refer the question to a General Committee. Here also the opposition 13 Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 22; Courier and Enquirer, Sept. 21, 1855. I* Commercial Advertiser, June 28, Sept. 19, 22-24, 1855; Washington Hunt, in Commercial Advertiser, reprinted in Post, Aug. 16, 1855; Edward McMullen to Weed, Sept. 20, 1855, Weed Papers. 15 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 4, 1855. Hunt's letter was buried in the committee to which it was referred without a reading. Tribune, Sept. 27, 1855; Washington Hunt to Marcy, Sept. 18, 1855, Marcy Papers. is These delegates were Benedict Lewis, Charles S. Tappan, W. H. Sparks, and M. C. Fordham. After their protest had been rejected, they drew up a formal declaration stating their opposition "to the abandonment or destruction of the Whig Party." They then left the convention and returned to New York City. See Herald, Sept. 27; Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 28, 1855. 17 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 5, 1855. " Cf. Grinnell, Minturn Letterbook, and E. D. Morgan Letterbook, Aug-Nov., 1855 (MS, University of Rochester Library).

1 10

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

was too powerful, and it was voted to leave the issue in the hands of a special investigating committee, which should report its findings to the larger body.19 Meanwhile, across the river in Brooklyn, where many merchants resided, the Whig General Committee voted overwhelmingly "utterly [to] repudiate the action of the so-called Whig Convention held at Syracuse, September 26," and denounced the delegates to the convention who had voted for fusion as "false and traitorous to their constituents." 20 At the same time, the "mercantile" Whigs in various local ward meetings voiced their hostility to fusion, and repudiated "the entire nominations of the Republican- Whig Party" ground that the new party would "embitter one-half the States against the other half, thus widening the breach existing and preparing the ways and means to build

on the United already up two

separate Republics." At a joint meeting of the Whigs of ten wards, the merchants announced: "Against such a party we now protest, and cease all action with them." 21 willmerchants ever the and But were not content with merely registering their protests against the surrender of the Whig Party to the "sectional agitators." A group of Whig merchants publicly urged that a mass meeting be held of all "opposed to the recent course at Syracuse," and refused to "tamely submit to be thus humiliatingly transferred to the Radicals who style themselves 'Republicans.' "22 On October 4 this meeting took place at Constitution Hall. George Wood served as President, and a good many Whig merchants were listed as the other officers.23 In a long address to the meeting, Wood outlined the reactions of the Whig merchants to the action of the convention. He made it clear that they were still opposed to the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and were ready to endorse a conservative movement to repeal that measure. But, he went on, they were convinced that is Herald, Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 2, 3, 1855. See also the proceedings of the Whig Young Men's General Committee, in Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 6, 1855. The vote here against fusion was 31-22. 20 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 4; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, Oct. 4, 1855. The vote on this resolution was 23-9. 21 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 4, 1855. 22 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 2, 1855. 23 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 5, 1855. D. A. Cushman, Henry W. Genet, J. Phillips Phoenix, Benedict Lewis, Jr., J. B. Varnum, and A. M. Binninger were members of the organizing committee. The Post, Oct. 5, 1855, admitted that the meeting represented the point of view of the "mercantile Whigs," and that it "was almost a second edition of the Great Castle Garden meeting." See also National Intelligencer, in Journal of Commerce, Oct. 9, 1855.

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM

111

this could have been successfully accomplished by the Whig party. On the other hand, the Republican party would, by antagonizing the South, deepen the sectional conflict, and eventually provoke a dissolution of the Union. This the merchants could not tolerate, from a business point of view alone. Moreover, the destruction of the Union would also make permanent the existence of slavery, whereas a conservative movement, by appealing to the better judgment of the Southerners, would gradually achieve the abandonment of this institution in the United States.24 In order to keep the party of conservatism alive, it was voted at the meeting to issue a call of all anti-fusion Whigs to a state convention in New York City.25 This call was endorsed several days later by the Whig General Committee of the city, now completely dominated by anti-fusionists.26 It also decreed that where the local ward committees had failed to reject the action of the state convention, the "true Whigs of the ward" should "form new Ward Committees," to keep the party intact. In addition, it nominated several candidates for county offices, among whom was Robert T. Haws, the dry goods merchant.27 The state convention which met on October 23 revealed clearly that anti-fusion sentiment was strong only in the Empire City. For though there were delegates from three-fourths of the counties in the state,28 most of the representatives from the rural areas admitted that there was not much opposition in their districts to the action of the Syracuse convention.29 As a result, the only thing the convention could do was to issue a lengthy address to the Whig voters of the state, appealing to them not to abandon the party of conservatism. The document expressed once more the position of the "mercantile" Whigs. It contained a severe denunciation of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and a statement deploring the "existence" of slavery, and deprecating "the enlargement ofthe area." It pointed out, however, that the South24 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 5, 1855. One of the speakers, Frederick Tallmadge, raised the usual economic defense of the South. "I would not say a word in support of slavery," he declared, "but think what would be the condition of your city if the commerce of the Southern States were transferred to British vessels." 25 The call is printed in the Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 5, 1855. 26 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 15; Herald, Oct. 20, 1855. 27 Ibid.; Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 15, 24, 1855. 28 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 24, 1855. For the methods employed in selecting delegates, see D. D. Barnard to James Brooks, Oct. 11, 20, 1855, Barnard Letterbooks. 29 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 24, 1855.

112

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

erners had the right under the Constitution to hold slaves, and that the Whigs of New York who believed in this fundamental document would "never be party to any attempt to deprive them of those rights." 30 The address then lashed out against the Republicans, especially on the ground that the radical anti-slavery agitators in that party were attempting to intensify the sectional agitation by keeping the Kansas question a burning issue. There was no need for this, it declared, for the people of the North had already voiced their opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. It was likely that Congress would yield to this pressure and adopt measures to prevent the existence of slavery in Kansas. Why then all the haste in "joining a party whose fundamental creed is inconsistent with the compacts of the Constitution and the harmony of the Union?" 31 Finally, the address expressed the disgust of the "mercantile" Whigs at the predominance of the slavery question in public affairs, as a result of which nothing could be accomplished in the way of obtaining internal improvements, railroad legislation, credit, currency, banking, and bankruptcy legislation. Was it not "just as important for the people of the United States to legislate for the white men, as well as for the negroes of the South?" 32 The most serious immediate question confronting Whig merchants was how to cast their vote in the forthcoming state elections. The anti-fusion convention had been unable, for lack of time, to set up a state ticket. It had simply advised all Whigs to vote "for those principles" which were most in accordance with those principles which "we hold are for the interests of the Stateprinciples the very reverse of those held by the fusionists." 83 This was by no means very clear, and did little to help the merchants in their dilemma. As a result, a number of prominent Whig merchants turned to Daniel D. Barnard for advice.34 He promptly replied in a public letter in which he declared: If I see a Union of men of national sentiments and objects, just such as true Whigs have always cherished and maintained, prepared to make a stand for the Constitution and the Union, against combina30 Tribune, Post, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 25, 1855. 31 Tribune, Post, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 25, 1855. 32 See also the address to the convention by Samuel B. Ruggles, in Commercial Advertiser, 33 Ibid. Oct. 24, 1855. 34 See Barnard Letterbook, Oct. 20-28, 1855.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 113 tions which have threatened to overthrow them, I shall be found, so far as my vote and humble influence may go, of their party, by what name soever it may be called.35 Which party would best meet these requirements? The Democrats were, as usual, divided into two factions— Softs and Hards.36 Despite their antagonisms, both agreed in opposing the Republican party.37 But since the Softs were more outspoken in their denunciation of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, it was predicted that their ticket would win the support of a large number of Whig merchants.38 However, many "mercantile'* Whigs would certainly move over to the Know-Nothings, some because they secretly endorsed the nativistic principles of the movement. In fact, the leader of the organization in New York was James W. Barker, a merchant.39 Others may have opposed this phase of the KnowNothing movement, but were attracted by its opposition to all "sectional doctrines." 40 In addition, the fact that Daniel D. Barnard himself endorsed the Know-Nothing ticket, and called upon the merchants to do likewise as "the only means for preserving a great Union party in opposition to abolitionism and sectional names," was an important reason in causing so many Whigs to support the new movement.41 During the closing days of the state election, the Republicans, who had hitherto either ignored or abused the "mercantile" Whigs,42 made several attempts to win their support.43 Greeley reminded the merchants of the noble stand they had taken in opposing the "Nebraska infamy," and he assured them that the Republican party was only carrying into effect the resolutions and addresses they had themselves adopted at their meetings. As for their fears that the Republican party would endanger the 35 See letter of Barnard, Times, Oct. 22, 1855. 36 Herald, Dec. 11, 1854; Post, June 27, 1855; Tribune, Aug. 24, 1855. 37 Post, Sept. 1, 1855; Alexander, op, cit., Ill, 209-211; Tilden Papers, Sept. 3, 1855; John Van Buren to Marcy, Sept. 20, 1855; Lorenzo B. Shepherd to Marcy, Sept. 8, 1855, Marcy Papers. 38 Commercial Advertiser, Nov. 5, 1855; Journal of Commerce, Nov. 5, 1855; Tribune, Oct. 28, 1855; H. J. Redfield to Marcy, Nov. 27, 1855, Marcy Papers. 39 For open hostility to the movement by some leading business men, see letter of Peter Cooper, Royal Phelps, A. Vanderpoel, Fred E. Mather, Richard M. Hoe, James W. Gerard, and Elias H. Herrick, in Tribune, Nov. 6, 1854. 40 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 18; Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 18, 23, 1855. 41 Albany Register, Oct. 24, 1855; Commercial Advertiser, Nov. 5, 1855; Barnard Letterbook, Oct. 24-29, 1855, Barnard Papers. 42 Tribune, Oct. 10, 12, 1855. « Tribune, Oct. 27-Nov. 1, 1855.

ii4 BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

stability of the Union, these arose only because they believed the accusations of political demagogues: They tell you, conservatives, [Greeley wrote on the day before the election] that we who support the Republican platform and ticket, war upon slavery in the Slave States; but that is false. As individuals we should all rejoice to see slavery given up everywhere; but as a party and as citizens of this Union we disclaim any right to interfere with really established slavery in any other states than those which we respectively inhabit.44 These last-minute appeals had no effect. The election results indicated that the vast majority of the anti-fusion "mercantile" Whigs had cast their votes against the Republican candidates. In the Empire City, the anti-Republican vote was overwhelming, being 49,301 to about 6,000 for the Republicans.45 Upstate, the new party had made important gains,46 but in the commercial metropolis, as results revealed, the outlook was seemingly hopeless.47 Here the influence of the merchants ("those huge ulcers upon the body politic," said Thurlow Weed) "had crushed out Republicanism." 48 "We are now beaten by the solid vote of the City of New York," said the Albany Evening Journal, "against which the country will organize and recruit an army of freemen to besiege and conquer the Sebastopol." 49 In New York business circles, however, the results of the election caused great rejoicing. Once again the Empire City had done "itself honor in the conflict with the spirit of sectionalism," 50 and the diatribes of the Republicans were but proof of the significant role it played in national affairs. Perhaps, many merchants now declared, the results of the election might even be the signal for a revival of the Whig party. About two weeks after the election, James A. Hamilton, George Wood, Luther Bradish, Samuel B. Ruggles, and Daniel D. Barnard initiated negotiations for a Whig Convention to nomi-

44 ibid., Nov. 2, 1855. See aIso Horace Greeley to Thurlow Weed, Oct. 23, 24, 26, 1855, Weed Papers. 45 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 3, 1855. 46 Tribune, Nov. 3, 1855. The Know-Nothings received 36 per cent of the total vote in the city. 47 F. Seward, op. cit., p. 258; Edgar McMullen to Thurlow Weed, Dec. 21, 1855, Weed Papers. 48 Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 9, 1855; Tribune, Dec. 5, 1855. 49 Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 13, 1855. so Commercial Advertiser, Nov. 7, 14, 1855; Journal of Commerce, Nov. 9, 1855; D. D. Barnard to James A. Hamilton, Nov. 23, 1855, Barnard Papers.

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM

nate Fillmore for the presidency.51 As a preliminary agreed to hold a meeting of prominent Whigs in New on January 10, 1856. 52 Barnard, who was himself interested in this proposal to prepare in advance the

115 step, it was York City sufficiently resolutions

and address of the meeting,53 conducted an extensive correspondence with prominent Whigs in the state.54 He learned to his dismay, however, that outside of New York and Connecticut, a feeling of futility had come upon the leaders of the Whig party, as they saw the rank and file go over either to the Republicans, as in New England, or to the Americans, as in the South. As a result, the January 10th meeting had to be postponed.55 Finallv, early in February, at a meeting in Hamilton Fish's home, several important Whig leaders agreed that there existed no hope for the reorganization of the party on a national scale.56 However, it was pointed out that in some states, particularly in New York and Connecticut, it might still be possible to keep the party alive. 7 This point of view was also expressed at a subsequent meeting at the Metropolitan Hotel at which some of the most prominent Whig leaders of the state were present. The ability of the party to control about forty-five thousand votes in New York was emphasized, and was considered sufficient justification for the maintenance of the Whig state organization.53 Though keenly disappointed at the failure of the efforts to hold a national convention, Barnard was still hopeful. "I am very sorry," he wrote to Hamilton, "that all your efforts have ended so unsatisfactorily. At present it would seem there is little or si D. D. Barnard to James A. Hamilton, Nov. 14, 1855, Barnard Papers; James A. Hamilton, Reminiscences, pp. 406-407, 411. Barnard had urged this step even before the election. Letter to Hamilton Fish, July 9, 1855, Barnard Letterbooks; and I. N. Reynolds to Crittenden, Oct. 5, 1855, Crittenden Papers. 52 Barnard to James A. Hamilton, Nov. 23, 28, Dec. 3, 14, 17, 1855; Barnard to R. A. West (editor of Commercial Advertiser), Dec. 13, 1855, Barnard Letterbooks. 53 Barnard to James A. Hamilton, Dec. 29, 1855, Barnard Letterbooks. Barnard wanted speedy action so as to get the jump on the Americans or Know-Nothings in nominating Fillmore. See his letters to Hamilton Fish, R. A. West and James A. Hamilton, Dec. 13, 25, 1855, Barnard Letterbooks. Barnard to Francis Granger, Hamilton Fish, Nathan West, Washington Hunt, Dec. 10-30, 1855, Barnard Letterbooks. 55 Barnard to James A. Hamilton, Jan. 8-10, 1856, Barnard Letterbooks. 56 Nevins, Hamilton Fish, pp. 59-60. 5" Barnard to James A. Hamilton, Feb. 15, 1856, Barnard Letterbooks. ss Commercial Advertiser, Feb. 11; Herald, Feb. 11, 1856. Washington Hunt, Luther Bradish. S. B. Ruggles, Frederick A. Tallmadge and George Wood were among those present at this conference.

n6

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

nothing else to be done. We must wait for events." 59 Unfortunately, the events that did occur were not calculated to aid a conservative movement. During the early part of 1856, it is to be recalled, the Kansas issue flared up with even greater intensity than before, and within a few months, the merchants were again uniting, regardless of political affiliations, to register their protests against the "Sack of Lawrence" and the attack upon Senator Sumner. Even leading anti-fusion Whigs, like Daniel Lord and Samuel B. Ruggles had warned the South that the merchants would be forced to act at the ballot-box unless the aggressions of the "fire eaters" ceased.60 Naturally, the Republicans were jubilant, for they believed that they would soon gain new adherents in business circles.61 Not even the Missouri Compromise, said a leading Republican organ, had been able to awaken these merchants completely "to a real sense of the designs of the Slavery propagandists." It had taken "the later acts in the drama" to open their eyes to the fact that party labels were insignificant compared with the need for unity in combating the aggressions of the Slave Power.62 At first it appeared that these Republican hopes for mercantile support would materialize. E. D. Morgan, who had attempted in vain to "entrench the party in this city of trading men," 63 and was about to give up in the belief that the Empire City was "bad soil for free soil," 64 discovered after the invasions of Kansas and the "Sack of Lawrence" that Republican appeals were accepted more cordially in business circles.65 On April 29, 1856, a tremendous mass meeting took place in the city to hear the reports of the delegates to the Republican Convention at Pittsburgh. This was by far the largest meeting the Republican party had held in New York. The long list of signatures to the 60 Barnard to Hamilton, Feb. 15, 1856, Barnard Letterbooks. 60 See above, pp. 104-105. «i Tribune, April 8-12, 1856; E. D. Morgan to Gideon Welles, April 29, 1856, Welles Papers; John A. King to Weed, May 20, 1856, Weed Papers. «2 Tribune, May 31, June 1, 1856. «3E. D. Morgan to Welles, March 18, 1856, Welles Papers. Morgan had been elected Chairman of the Republican National Committee. See C. E. McCarthy, "The First Republican Convention," Western Pennsylvania Magazine of History, XX, 83-100. m Morgan to Welles, April 29, 1856, Welles Papers. See also E. D. Morgan Letterbook, Feb. 26-May 2, 1856 (MS, University of Rochester Library); and Robert B. Minturn to Thurlow Weed, Feb. 7, 14, 1856, Grinnell-Minturn Letterbook (MS, University of Rochester Library). «5 Morgan to Welles, April 29, 1856, Welles Papers.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 117 call proved that many merchants had already overcome their fear of the new party.66 Judging from this list, the leading Republican merchants at this time were (in addition to Morgan, Grinnell, Draper, and John A. King): Charles H. Marshall, John A. C. Gray, Huss and Hunter, Henry Townsend, Henry C. Bowen, S. B. Chittenden, Edgar Ketcham, Anthony J. Bleecker, Samuel L. Griswold, and George Talcott.67 During the summer other business men came over to the Republican party. An outstanding example was George Law, the steamboat and railroad capitalist. Law had become a prominent figure in the Know-Nothing movement, and at one time believed he might obtain the presidential nomination of the American party. But at the national convention on February 22 he had been able to gain only twenty-four votes, the majority of the delegates supporting Millard Fillmore. Denouncing the nomination as a victory for the Slave Power, Law led the Northern delegates out of the convention.68 It was predicted that it would not be long before Law would join the Republican camp.69 This was an accurate prophecy. For a while the boom for Law as a candidate for the North Americans continued.70 But when the convention met, the most serious question confronting the delegates was whether or not to accept the invitation sent by E. D. Morgan, Chairman of the Republican National Executive Committee, urging them "at this crisis of impending danger to vote for a common ticket." 71 Law immediately undertook to induce the delegates to accept the invitation. In a long speech he analyzed the facts that made unity with the Republicans absolutely essential. All the elements of the North, he declared, had to be united "in one solid phalanx to push out the Viper that coiled itself around our liberties. What is to become of this country if it is to go on four years more, drawn and pushed to the precipice that 66 E. D. Morgan Letterbook, April-May, 1856. See also John A. King to Weed, May 20, 1856, Weed Papers; and E. D. Morgan to Welles, April 29, 1856, Welles Papers. 67 Tribune, Post, April 29, 1856. The entire list of signers, which includes many more merchants than cited above, appears in the Tribune. 68 Herald, June 2, 1855; Post, Feb. 26, 1856; A Sketch of the Events in the Life of George Law, pp. 4-6, 24. 69 Daniel D. Barnard wrote to Hamilton Fish on Feb. 29, 1856: "George Law and so many of his 'people' (as the planters call their slaves) . . . will now go where they have all the time belonged— with the sectionalists." Barnard Letterbooks. 70 Largely due to the efforts of Scoville, a newspaper man, who devoted himself to the task of advancing Law's presidential chances. See Scisco, op. cit., pp. 179-180. 71 Morgan's letter is in the Tribune, June 16, 1856.

n8

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

now yawns beneath its feet?" 72 He warned the South that "they have gone to the utmost limits," and while he denied being a sectionalist, he called for the election' of a president who would not "chill his heart to the feelings of a freeman." The business people of the North, he reminded the delegates, were anxious to see a party in power which would supply sorely needed river and harbor improvements, better transportation facilities, and especially atranscontinental railroad. I would have this convention say that the immense commerce of the Pacific shores should find a highway by means of a Pacific Railroad. ... I would favor the construction of a wagon road, as a step towards a railroad, but I would begin them both the same day. The Cincinnati [Democratic] Convention was not clear whether the Constitution will permit them to build a railroad to California. I say to California, that if they want a road they must trust it to the freemen of the North. If the Democrats have been looking at the Constitution ever since it was adopted, and have not yet found out whether a railroad would be constitutional, it is not likely they will find out within the next four years.73 Law was elected chairman of the committee which went to confer with the Republican National Executive Committee at Philadelphia. Although the Republicans were decidedly cool to the proposals of the American Committee, and nominated their candidates without even consulting them, Law persisted in his efforts to achieve unity.74 Finally, over the opposition of a number of delegates who refused to join the Republicans, he carried his point with the result that the North American Convention endorsed the Republican platform and presidential candidate.75 The Convention insisted, however, upon nominating their own Vice-Presidential candidate, William F. Johnson. This caused the Republicans no end of embarrassment, and for more than two months, E. D. Morgan attempted to get either Dayton or Johnson to withdraw.76 72 Ibid. 73 ibid.

It was not until September that he was

74 See the report by George Law to the North American Convention, in Tribune, June 20, 1856. 75 Ibid., June 21, 1856. 76 E. D. Morgan to Gideon Welles, June 28, July 9, 21, Aug. 8, 12, 27, 1856, Welles Papers. This phase of Morgan's work as National Chairman has been ably set forth in Roy F. Nichol's note in the American Historical Review, XXVIII, 492-496.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 119 able to report any success. After an interview with Fremont, Johnson had decided to withdraw. Morgan wrote: ". . . Though I know no promise was made to him, the Colonel (Fremont) said in case of his election he should give all his friends who participated in it fair play." 77 The nomination of John C. Fremont instead of William H. Seward was, of course, calculated to win over still hesitant conservatives to support the so-called "sectional" party.78 In New York City it appeared at first to have exactly this effect.79 However, as the campaign advanced, this was very decidedly altered, and even conservative Fremont began to be regarded as a menace to the Union. By the last week of October, the campaign in the Empire City had almost completely resolved itself into a Republican versus anti-Republican struggle. For a while, the "old line" Whig merchants attempted to wage an independent campaign for Fillmore, the American party candidate. They would continue to adhere to the Whig banner, wrote Luther Bradish, "so long as there is a single shred of its ancient Standard still floating in the breeze. This may be called 'Old Fogeyism'. ... Be it so." 80 Who these "old fogies" were, it was not difficult to determine. On July 24 a mass meeting was held by merchants who supported Fillmore for the Presidency. Among the merchants serving as officers of this meeting were: William B. Astor, Henry Grinnell, A. C. Kingsland, William Chauncey, D. A. Cushman, Shepherd Knapp, Daniel Lord, George Wood, Simeon Baldwin, Samuel Hotaling, Joseph B. Varnum, Jr., and Hiram Ketchum. These were the remnants of the once powerful "mercantile" Whig element, the members of the Union Safety Committee. Rather pathetically, they announced that they could not support the Republicans or the Democrats because 77 Morgan to Welles, Sept. 1, 1856, Welles Papers. 78 Crandall, op. cit., p. 96; F. Curtis, History of the Republican Party, I, 256. See also the account of the meeting at the home of John Bigelow, in Nevins, The Evening Post: A Century of Journalism, p. 251; and Nevins, Fremont: Pathfinder of the West, p. 479. 79 E. D. Morgan to Welles, Aug. 8, 1856, Welles Papers. See also proceedings of the Republican ratification meeting in New York City, in Tribune, June 10, 1856; and John A. King to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 6, 1856, Weed Papers. so Luther Bradish to D. D. Barnard, July 30, 1856, Barnard Papers. See also Horatio Reed to Benjamin Drake, June 5, 1856, Drake Papers; speech of James Brooks at reception to Fillmore in New York City, in Millard Fillmore at Home— His Reception at New York and Brooklyn, pamphlet; Charles A. Davis to Marcy, Aug. 28, 1856, Marcy Papers; S. M. Johnson to Buchanan, Aug. 6, 1856, Buchanan Papers.

120

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

both were "sectionalists." They agreed that the repeal of the Missouri Compromise had been completely unjustified, and they attacked "Border Ruffianism" in Kansas. But they were not willing, they concluded, to allow their indignation at these outrages to drive them over to the Republican party, an organization which threatened to produce even more serious disasters than those in Kansas.81 Many Whig merchants, however, were quite ready to support the Democratic candidate. As early as March 3, 1856, Charles A. Davis wrote: The impression here is— at least in "our Back Parlor"— that Fillmore will be next President unless the Democratic party nominates a strong conservative name— so much stronger than Fillmore as to take a large share of Whigs and good folks who are now wandering among unknown Islands. . . .82 On July 19 a merchant wrote in a public letter to the Commercial Advertiser: I have been and am for Mr. Fillmore. But I am first of all for defeating Col. Fremont. This should be the great measure and object of all true Whigs and honest men. If this can be best accomplished by voting for Mr. Buchanan would we, as Whigs be inconsistent in so doing? . . . However much we may desire it, Mr. Fillmore cannot be elected.83 In August other Northern Whigs published similar appeals. Rufus Choate, in a public letter, announced that he would vote for Buchanan. It was the "first duty" of all Whigs, he asserted, "to defeat and dissolve the new geographical party." 84 Robert Winthrop, Caleb Cushing and Amos A. Lawrence adopted the same position,85 while Fletcher Webster and James B. Clay, the sons of the former Whig leaders, joined in denouncing the Republican party.86 si Commercial Advertiser, July 21, 25, 1856; Herald, July 25, 1856. Hiram Ketchum had been an important delegate to the old line Whig convention at Baltimore on July 10, 1856. See National Intelligencer, July 12, 1856. 82 Davis to Marcy, March 3, 1856, Marcy Papers. 83 "Whig," in Commercial Advertiser, July 1, 1856. s* Times, Aug. 15, 1856; see also the pamphlet, Old Line Whigs for Buchanan. 85 Winthrop Papers, Aug., 1856; C. Fuess, Caleb Cushing, II, 192; Caleb Cushing Papers, Aug. 23, 1856. s« Journal of Commerce, Aug. 28, 1856; J. M. Clay to Breckenridge, June 11, 1856, Breckenridge Papers.

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM

121

Still it was not easy for many merchants to convince themselves that it was their "first duty" to support Buchanan. A powerful group of New Yorkers had for months advertised the Pennsylvanian as a conservative who would put an end to sectionalism,87 but they were unable to overcome several objections raised by business men. For one thing, the Democratic platform with its defense of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and its plea for territorial expansion,88 smacked entirely too much of "slave propagandism." Then again, it was not entirely possible for the merchants to forget that Buchanan had been intimately associated with the "Ostend Manifesto." True, no one had worked more actively for the acquisition of Cuba than the New York banker, August Belmont. For years, Belmont had been concocting a scheme whereby he might gain the support of "the powerful influence of the English and French Bankers" for the purchase of the island.89 Moreover, the intrigues of Cornelius Vanderbilt, George Law,90 Charles Morgan, and C. K. Garrison in Nicaragua indicated that influential New York capitalists were interested in "Manifest Destiny." 91 But neither Belmont nor the others represented the prevailing view of the majority of the merchants. The danger of a war with Spain or Great Britain was enough to frighten them into wishing "the whole region" of Central America and Cuba "to the devil." 92 And they remembered too well "that James K. Polk had involved us in a war with Mexico without 87 George N. Sanders to Buchanan, Feb. 15, 1856; John Barker, Feb. 23; Anson Henrick, Feb. 13; Daniel E. Sickles, Feb. 8; Henry C. Murphy, Jan. 19; Cyrus Hale, Feb. 29; S. M. Johnson, May 8; Moses Block, April 28; Isaiah Rynders, April 18; Fernando Wood, April 23; Royal Phelps, April 23; Edward S. Rowan, May 31, 1856, Buchanan Papers. R. A. Adams, in Post, June 14, 1856. 8e Belmont to Buchanan, Nov. 22, 30, 1852; Jan. 7, 14, 28, March 5, April 4, Nov. 18, 1853; Sept. 25, 1854, Buchanan Papers. »o Law was involved in a scheme to secure Cuba during the last few months of Fillmore's administration. See Hugh Maxwell to Fillmore, Nov. 10, 11, 13, 1852, Fillmore Papers. si W. O. Scroggs, Filibusters and Financiers, passim, especially Chapters XII, XVIII and XXII; Herald, Dec. 4-12, 24 26, 1855; Tribune, March 17, Dec. 25, 1855; Jan. 30, 1856; Herald, Jan. 8, 10, 25, March 31, May 8-9, 13, 1856. See also letters of Cornelius Vanderbilt to Secretary Marcy in Senate Executive Documents 88, 34th Congress, 1st session, p. 11. »2 W. J. Staples to Marcy, Nov. 26, 1852; Prosper M. Wetmore to Marcy, Nov. 23, 1853; Nov. 16, 1855; Nov. 13, 1856; Charles A. Davis to Marcy, March 14, 1853; March 23, 27, 1854; March 14, Nov. 28, 1855; Gilbert Davis to Marcy, March 23, 1853; July 10, 1854; Watts Sherman to Marcy, Nov. 9, 1855; George A. Worth to Marcy, Feb. 23, 1854; Horatio Seymour to Marcy, Dec. j, 1855, Marcy Papers.

122

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

consulting Congress." 93 No wonder, then, that merchants appeared "to hesitate about intrusting the supreme authority to untried and unpracticed hands." e* Probably if William R. Marcy had been nominated by the Democrats, these fears would have been considerably allayed. Marcy's management of foreign affairs, particularly in the dispute with England over Central American issues, had won the approval of all merchants.95 Royal Phelps wrote to Marcy on July 6, 1856: "Even such Black Republicans as Moses H. Grinnell, the two Blunts, are loud in their praises of your dispatches." 96 In the long run, the fear of a Republican victory overcame the dislike for Buchanan's past associations. In addition, since Buchanan himself recognized the necessity of reassuring conservatives, inhis letter of acceptance he announced that he would as president steer a national course in domestic and foreign affairs. William Preston, one of Buchanan's managers, wrote to him from New York soon after his letter appeared: I believe that it has found the utmost favour with the great merchants and commercial people, who are morbidly timid and thirst for tranquillity. The paragraph in relation to our foreign affairs has done much to reassure many who were hesitating at the resolutions adopted by the Convention, and to determine their political course in the approaching contest.07 Some merchants, however, still hesitated. As late as October 3, Albert C. Ramsay wrote to Buchanan: I had an important conversation with Mr. Minturn of the firm of Grinnell and Minturn. . . . You know he was a great gun among the Whig merchant princes. He told me that under no circumstances would he vote for Fremont, as he would in preference support the Democratic ticket. But his objection to you was the Ostend letter. He added that this was the objection also of many of his friends. ... I expressed surprise at this as I remembered that the letter (of acceptance) »3 Speech of Hiram Ketchum at Fillmore meeting, in Commercial Advertiser, July 25, 1856. M S. Dewitt Bloodgood to Marcy, Nov. 17, 1855, Marcy Papers. Horatio Seymour to Marcy, Jan. 22, 1856; Watts Sherman, James A. Hamilton to Marcy, April 14, 1856; Gilbert Davis to Marcy, April 23, 1856, Marcy Papers. 88 Marcy Papers. 87 June 27, 1856, Buchanan Papers. See also S. M. Johnson to Buchanan, June 23, July 25, 26, 1856; F. Wood to Buchanan, Aug. 2, 1856; John Cochrane to Buchanan, Aug. 19, 1856, Buchanan Papers.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 123 was all right and proper giving him a short explanation that seemed new to him. He confessed if this version was correct there was nothing objectionable to it. I left him with the impression that I had convinced him. . . . Would it be well to make some further explanation about the Ostend letter? If that were better understood we could secure more merchants and their material aid.98 When

an anti-slavery Whig like Robert B. Minturn came to

the conclusion that "under no circumstances" would he support the Republican candidate, and would "in preference" vote for Buchanan, it is easy to judge the attitude of the more conservative merchants. It must be remembered that for several months of the campaign, the merchants were literally deluged with warnings that a victory for Fremont would mean the destruction of the Union and economic chaos." The contentions of Republican spokesmen that their party opposed only the extension of slavery were waved aside as "false arguments." "They can only prevent the spread of slavery," the merchants were warned, "by such a course of sectional and hostile action as will most likely provide collision, resulting in the rupture of the Union." 100 Fillmore himself made several speeches emphasizing that the Union was in danger. "We are treading," he declared, "upon the brink of a volcano that is liable at any moment to burst forth and overwhelm the nation." 101 As in the days of the Union Safety movement, reports from the South were of the utmost importance in arousing the fears of the merchants. The statements of Senator Toombs, Governor Wise, Senators Slidell, and Mason, and editorials from the Richmond Enquirer and the Charleston Mercury, predicting that Fremont's election would produce a "certain and immediate disunion," were all reprinted in New York commercial papers.102 Letters from the South carrying similar warnings appealed diss Buchanan Papers. See also Charles H. Haswell to Marcy, Sept. 18, 1856, Marcy Papers. 99 See Journal of Commerce, Sept. -Oct., 1856; and Commercial Advertiser for the same period; and the pamphlets Words of Counsel to Men of Business by a Man of Business, and Stephen Colwell, The South— A Letter from a Friend in the North, P- 45100 Journal of Commerce, Aug. 18, 1856. 101 Tribune, July 2, 1856. 102 Journal of Commerce, Commercial Advertiser, Tribune, Aug. 13, 1856. Fortunately, the Herald was at first hostile to Buchanan, and did not indulge in its usual dire predictions. For Bennett's attitude, see his letter to Buchanan, Oct. 22, 1856, Buchanan Papers.

124

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

rectly to the merchants to protect themselves by defeating Fremont.103 Typical was a letter from Virginia: TO THE NEW YORK MERCHANTS Permit a Southern merchant, always a Union man, one quite familiar with Southern views, to ask whether you have made up your minds to let Fremont be elected, and whether you believe that he can be elected and not disturb the perpetuity of the Union? Have you thought upon the subject, and yet not perceived that you are in the midst of the breakers? Pause for a moment and consider the issue. The nomination of Fremont is considered in the South as a blow aimed at their political, social and pecuniary interests. ... I can assure vou that the time has arrived when the South will insist upon having their equitable rights in the Union considered, and if Fremont is elected, the South will secede.104 The threats of secession, of course, once again seriously worried the merchants. S. M. Johnson, noting that the reports from the South had "fairly frightened business men," wrote to Buchanan: 'This morning I met four merchants, Fillmore men heretofore, who said, 'I shall now vote for Mr. Buchanan,' and they said thev spoke the sentiments of hundreds of their acquaintances." 1:5 Malcolm Ives wrote a month later: The Journal of Commerce has not ceased of late to strike the "Union" note and with signal success. The rapid change in the sentiments of the mercantile community in favor of Democratic conservatism is one of the most significant signs of the times.106 The

Republicans recognized that unless they allayed the

fears of the "morbidly timid" merchants, they would get neither votes nor contributions in the commercial metropolis.107 Again and again thev reminded the merchants of their intention "to let slaver)- alone where it already exists" and of their resolution "that slavery be extended no farther." This, they asserted, was exactly the position the New York merchants themselves had 10s Journal of Commerce, Sept. 24; Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 9: and see Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 26, 1856. 10* Journal of Commerce, Sept. 25, 1856. See also "An Argument for the Merchants of New York," Commercial Advertiser, Sept. 9, 1856, and "A Voice from Virginia," Journal of Commerce, Sept. 24, 1856. 105 Sept. 2, 1856, Buchanan Papers. See also August Belmont to Buchanan, Oct. 31, 1856, ibid., and R. G. Horton to Breckenridge. Oct. 6, 1856. Breckenridge Papers; also August Schell to Buchanan, Oct. 11, 1856, Buchanan Papers. Mi Ives to Buchanan, Oct. 11, 1856, Buchanan Papers. 10" George Law to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 12, 1856, Weed Papers.

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM

125

adopted at their various anti-Nebraska meetings.108 "Fremont," they emphasized, "is the conservative candidate in this campaign, and his election, we confidently believe, would promptly put an end to the sectional agitation which has left the country for years past, a prey to demagogues and noodles." 109 The Republican platform, moreover, was described as "true conservatism and loyalty to the Constitution." And to win over conservative Whigs thev widely circulated the correspondence of Hamilton Fish and James A. Hamilton, in which these two outstanding Whigs announced that since they found in the Republican platform "no assault upon a single Whig principle," they would consequentlv vote for Fremont.110 In addition, they also scattered throughout the city the letter of George Law which defended the Republican party from the charges raised by conservatives. Law appealed directly to his mercantile associates in the Empire City: I would ask whether sectionalism exists at the South or at the North? Is freedom sectional, or is slavery sectional? Was our government created to uphold freedom or slavery? Mr. Fillmore and Mr. Buchanan stand upon slavery. Mr. Fremont is for freedom. Which one is the sectional candidate? . . . My opinion is that the Union will stand much longer upon justice than it will upon injustice, that it will stand longer upon freedom than it will upon slavery.111 But it was not enough to assure the merchants that there was no danger to the Union in a Republican victory. They must be brought to see that as business men it was to their interest to support Fremont. In accordance with this aim, on September 19, more than fifty leading merchants invited N. P. Banks, Jr., the Speaker of the House and a recent convert to Republicanism, to address "the Conservative and commercial classes of our comics Letter of "Conservative," in Post, Oct. l, 1856: "Senex, an old fogy merchant," Post, Oct. 4, 1856; "A Member of the New York Bar," Post, Oct. 23, 1856; F. P. Blair to the merchants of Baltimore, in Post, March 1, 1856; F. P. Blair, Letter of F. P. Blair to E. D. Morgan, etc., April 26, 1856, pamphlet; "Address of the Republican Convention of New York to the Electors of the State," Tribune, Sept. 20, 1856; and "Address of Republican State Committee," Tribune, Oct. 23, 1856. 109 Post, Aug. 2, 1856. no Correspondence between Hamilton Fish and James A. Hamilton, Sept. 12, Oct. 4, 1856, pamphlet. Daniel Barnard wrote of these letters: "It came upon me as a blow under which my senses reeled. I confess that it made me really ill." Letter to James Hamilton, Oct. io, 1856, Barnard Letterbooks. 111 George Laic to Gustavus Scroogs, pamphlet. See also George Law to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 12, 1856, Weed Papers.

126

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

munity on the prominent political questions affecting the commercial interests of the country." 112 Some of the merchants who signed this invitation were the familiar leaders of the Republican movement: Moses H. Grinnell, E. D. Morgan, Charles H. Marshall, and S. B. Chittenden. However, there were many who had never before publicly endorsed the new party: George Griswold, Charles Ely, C. W. Ogden, W. K. Sivan, Samuel Hotaling, and R. H. McCurdy.113 Some, like McCurdy and Hotaling, had but a few months before supported Fillmore, but had become disgusted with his refusal to speak out against the outrages in Kansas.114 Others had been influenced by the appeals of Hamilton Fish and George Law.115 But whatever the reason, the list of signatures amply proves that not all merchants were terrorized by threats and warnings of the dreadful consequences which would follow election. The state of excitement in New YorkFremont's at this time was revealed in the interesting dispute that preceded the address by Banks. The sponsoring committee had hoped to have him speak from the steps of the Merchants Exchange. But Simeon Baldwin, President of the Exchange Company, was a staunch supporter of Fillmore and decidedly hostile to the Republican party. Hence, he took it upon himself to forbid the use of the Exchange for the proposed meeting. He declared that he had talked "with many gentlemen who frequent the Exchange, embracing those from all the political parties," and "with a single exception," they had all agreed that it "would be improper" to grant the request.116 Later, however, several merchants who had signed the invitation persuaded the trustees of the Exchange Company to overrule Baldwin's decision.117 In the midst of a vigorous newspaper debate defending and attacking Baldwin,118 the meeting took place. The meeting itself was described in the Republican papers as one of the most important and distinguished gatherings ever 112 Post, Sept. 24, 1856. 113 The list of the signers is printed in the Post, Sept. 24, 1856. 11* Times, Sept. 26, 1856; "A Union Man of New York City," Post, June 5, 1856; "An Old Line Whig," Tribune, July 31, 1856; "An Original Fillmore Man," Tribune, Nov. 3, 1856; Samuel Hotaling, The Questions in the Canvass Considered by a Merchant of New York, pamphlet. us Post, Sept. 26, 1856. us Letter of Baldwin, in Times, Sept. 22, 1856. 117 Post, Sept. 26; Journal of Commerce, Sept. 26, 1856. us See Post, Sept. 22-24; Tribune, Sept. 22-24; Journal of Commerce, Sept. 25, 1856.

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM 127 held in the city. The Times estimated that at least twenty thou-

sand people "gathered around the Exchange." Wall street [it exclaimed] never witnessed a greater gathering of the representatives of the wealth and commercial enterprise of this metropolis, not even when Daniel Webster, in the noon of his splendid reputation, held forth at the same spot.119 The officers of the largest and These were men, troversy upon no

the meeting, it pointed out, "represented some of most respectable business firms in the city." said the Post, "who took part in political conslight provocation, and who fully realize all the

responsibilities attaching to their action." 120 Banks's address was a masterpiece of economic argumentation, all well calculated to appeal to an audience of business men.121 His discussion of slavery was not on the familiar humanitarian basis, but on a solid economic foundation. This institution, he declared, was slowly ruining the South. The productivity of that section was limited by the fact that several million people were slaves with little inducement to be productive. In the North, people were busy in commerce, industry, mining and agriculture, science, and literature. In fact, they paid less attention to politics than they should. But in the South there was no progress in industry, commerce, mining, science, and even in agriculture, since people gave too much of their time to politics. Perhaps if Fremont were elected, the South might lose many leading offices in the government, but then this might be a blessing in disguise. For it would offer Southerners an opportunity to reflect on the low condition of their agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, with the result that they would soon develop the neglected interests of their section. To prove of statistics. United States vast amount,

his assertions Banks presented a formidable array According to these, the total production of the in 1856 would amount to $4,500,000,000. Of this Banks declared, $1,600,000,000 came from those

employed in manufacturing and mechanical industry, and $1,200,000,000 from commerce. Three fourths of this total amount was contributed, he contended, by the seventeen million people of the us Times, Sept. 26, 1856. The Journal of Commerce, however, maintained that not more than 3,000 were present. 120 Times, Post, Sept. 26, 1856. 121 The full text of the speech is printed in Tribune, Times, and Post, for Sept. 26, 1856.

128

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

Northern states, while not more than $1,500,000,000 at the most came from the slave-holding states. True, forty per cent of the total agricultural wealth of the United States was produced by the South, but only twenty per cent of the wealth from industry and commerce came from that section. Banks next directed himself to a long analysis of the reasons that would warrant mercantile support for the Republican party. He pointed out that there were many prospects for increased trade which were being destroyed by the pro-slavery Democrats. Cuba, for example, sent to this country not more than twenty-five per cent of its whole commerce, and sent "the other three fourths to the ports of Europe and Great Britain. And why? Because we have alarmed the people and the Government of the Islands by threats of descent and annexation." So too with Central and South America. The election of Buchanan, the candidate of the "Ostend Manifesto," would destroy our negligible trade with these countries, whereas the victory of the Republican party, which believed in "respecting treaties and observing amiable relations" with these countries would give us "the whole of that trade, vast as it is, and vast as it may hereafter be, without injury to the slightest possible extent of anything produced in this country, and we can give them everything produced here." Finally, what of the possibilities of increased trade with the Orient, the securing of the "accumulated wealth of 700,000,000 people?" England was making every effort to snatch that trade for herself, contemplating the building of three more overland mail routes and one railway to carry the commerce of the East to the British Empire. Banks then asked: Where is New York? Where are the New Yorkers? Are they, who have outnumbered, outweighed, and outsailed the commercial marine of every nation on the face of the earth, to flag now when we are on the threshold of this new age, and of this new commerce coming to us from the compact millions of people who populate China, Eastern Asia and Western Europe? It was not too late to act. San Francisco was only seven days' travel by railroad from the Empire City. All told, it would take only twenty days, if such a railroad were built, to reach the millions of people in the Orient who were asking that "the enterprise and energy of the great people of the American states should come to them for what they can give to us, and that we may carry to them the surplus of what we produce."

But all this

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 129 would be achieved if a party dedicated to aid business and restore domestic peace were in power. Whereupon Banks appealed directly to the merchants: Will you strike hands with those of us who want to substitute peace and commercial prosperity for those fierce contests between Northern and Southern sections? If so, before another year is past after this election, the question between North and South will not be slavery; but it will be a question of the Pacific Railway and the trade of 700,000,000 people. . . . Give us four more years of peace, four years of domestic peace, four years of peace with foreign nations and we will open all the avenues of wealth, and the voice of industry, of commerce, of mechanics and manufactures. . . . This address had a very profound influence upon many merchants. For days it was the topic of discussion in Wall Street and in other business circles.122 Here was a Republican who spoke the language of business men, and who offered logical reasons for the support of his party. Moreover, his presentation of the vast differences in the productivity of the North and South was decidedly impressive. So important was Banks's address that it was described as "exercising a great influence upon the progress of the campaign." 123 As a result, a number of Whig merchants decided that it would have to be refuted, and they urged Samuel B. Ruggles to prepare a reply. They wrote: We think it [Banks's speech] contained fallacies which ought to be exposed and the task of their exposure cannot be entrusted to any gentleman better qualified, from your long and official connection with the internal and external commerce of the country, to comprehend and review the great commercial theme to which Mr. Banks professedly addressed himself. If you can comply with this request you will greatly serve the cause of legitimate commerce. . . ,124 Ruggles accepted the task and painstakingly prepared a detailed rebuttal of Banks's address.125 He admitted that the Re122 Courier and Enquirer, Oct. 4, 5, 1856; Post, Oct. 2, 1856. See also address of Parke Godwin, in Post, Oct. 15, 1856. 123 Courier and Enquirer, Oct. 8, 1856. 124 Times, Journal of Commerce, Oct. 2, 1856; S. B. Ruggles Papers (MS, New York Public Library), Oct., 1856. The signers of the letter were: William B. Astor, Shepherd Knapp, William Chauncey, Charles A. Davis, A. C. Kingsland, Howell L. Williams, "and others." 125 The draft of the reply is in the S. B. Ruggles Papers and indicates the care with which Ruggles prepared it.

i3o

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

publicans in the city were using the speech "as the great intellectual effort of the campaign," and that it had influenced merchants to support the Republican candidates. But these merchants, he continued, were impressed by inaccurate statistics. For one thing, it was a great exaggeration to place total production of the United States for 1856 at $4,500,000,000. Instead of commerce contributing $1,400,000,000 annually, it did not exceed thirty millions. In other words, Banks had gone "astray to the tune of thirteen hundred and ninety-six millions." As for the productivity of the South, Banks had admitted himself, though in a belittling manner, that this section contributed forty-five per cent of the 1,600 millions produced by agriculture. Yet the South had less than forty per cent of the total population, "and only twenty-five per cent of the white population. Why then should their agriculture be required to produce even forty-five per cent?" And why did not Banks tell the merchants of New York what proportion the North and the South each contributed to the commerce of the country, and thus directly to the wealth of the merchants? The reason he did not, Ruggles declared, was that he knew that only forty millions of the "total product of Northern agriculture," estimated by him at 280 millions, were "exported to foreign countries or coastwise," and "carried at all in the ships of the merchant princes." On the other hand, "of every 100 millions of Southern cotton, at least ninety go to sea, and fourteen of every twenty millions of Southern tobacco." 126 Ruggles then appealed: Does not he see, and do not all of us, whether merchant, banker, landowner, or mechanic, see and feel that the agriculture of the South thus disparaged furnished the very foundation of our commercial prosperity? And can this great trading, navigating city be induced, by any pompous and idle parade of imaginary thousands of millions, to dissolve their fraternal and national connection with the whole magnificent domain spread out South of the Potomac— the very Indies of the American Republic— and aid Mr. Banks and his associates in excluding that grand division of the Union from all participation in the honor and emoluments of the Government? 127 Surely, Ruggles concluded, the merchants recognized the need for a transcontinental railroad, cheaper postage facilities, and 126 Ruggles, American Commerce and the Union. The reply was also printed in the127Times, ibid. Oct. 2, 1856.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 131 increased trade relations with the Orient and South and Central America. But does Mr. Banks or any of his admirers imagine that under the administration of Mr. Fremont, and the violent agitation, if not positive disruption that must inevitably ensue, the country will be in any humor or any condition to prosecute these vast and difficult undertakings, requiring peace and repose, and the cordial acquiescence and patriotic union of all parties, with a wise, upright and conciliatory President at the head? Ruggles was not the only one to answer Banks. The Democratic merchants in the city had originally planned to have former Governor Floyd of Virginia, who was then in New York, follow Banks and present the position of the Democratic party on the political and commercial issues of the day. But when a committee of these merchants asked Banks whether he would consent "to meet Governor Floyd in a discussion of the pending political questions," 128 he referred them to John C. Gray, who was in charge of the meeting.129 The latter avoided the issue by demanding that the committee obtain permission from all the merchants who had signed the invitation to Banks.180 This being obviously impossible within the brief time remaining before the meeting, the plan to have Floyd speak on this occasion fell through. Arrangements, however, were immediately undertaken for another meeting at the Exchange at which Floyd would be the principal speaker. The call for the meeting stated: The merchants of the city of New York, and the public generally, who are attached to the Constitution and the Union, and opposed to the organization of parties on a sectional basis, are invited to attend a public meeting in front of the Merchants Exchange ... to hear exGovernor Floyd of Virginia, on the political issues of the day.131 Twelve hundred merchants and firms signed this call. A study of the signatures reveals clearly that a majority of the leading merchants in the city had by this time moved over to support 128 N. P. Banks, in Post, Sept. 26, 1856. The committee consisted of Mortimer Livingston, Royal Phelps, W. Butler Duncan, and E. K. Alburtis. 129 n. p. Banks to John Gray, in Post, Sept. 26, 1856. Gray, "a merchant of the highest character and respectability," was responsible for scotching the charge of the Fillmore adherents that Fremont was a Catholic. Post, Oct. 13, 1856, and letter of Gray, in Post, same date. 130 Mortimer Livingston to John C. Gray and Gray to Livingston, Sept. 25, 1856, in Post, Sept. 26, 1856. 131 Journal of Commerce, Sept. 28-Oct. 1, 1856.

i32

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

the political party which in their opinion stood the best chance of defeating Fremont.132 Among the signers were: Moses Taylor, Joshua J. Henry, Wilson G. Hunt, W. Butler Duncan, August Belmont, Abraham Binninger, Royal Phelps, William F. Havemeyer, Peter Lorillard, Schuyler Livingston, Mortimer Livingston, R. H. Winslow, Richard Lathers, F. L. Talcott, Isaac Bell, Jr., Henry Chauncey, Matthew Morgan, Shiff Brothers and Company, Gerard Hallock, Abraham Van Nest, Stephen H. Cornell, and Charles A. Lamont.133 Naturally, the Republican organs sneered that the meeting was "nothing but a cunning bid for Southern sympathy and trade," and attended by tobacco, rice and cotton dealers, ship owners, whose ships are employed in carrying Southern produce to market; cashiers and brokers who lend and borrow money on Southern securities, brokers and lame chicks, who furnish the South with stocks and peddle Southern Railroad Bonds and State scrips in Wall Street; and traders whose goods and principles are nailed up in the same cases, and invoiced to Southern customers on the same sheet.134 But this, certainly, could not account for the fact that about four months before, many of these very same merchants had been praised by the Republican papers for their courageous stand against the "aggressions of the Slave Power." Some of them, of course, had always supported the Democratic party, but many were old-line Whigs who had recently endorsed Fillmore, but had become convinced that the support of Buchanan was essential if Fremont was to be defeated. What the meeting did prove was that "the great majority of the merchants of the City of New York" were opposed to the Republican party, and feared the consequences of Fremont's election.135 Floyd's address was described by Republicans themselves as "measured and cautious." 136 He avoided the usual fire-eater oratory,137 and devoted most of his speech to an analysis of the 132 The complete list of signatures is printed in the pamphlet, Proceedings of the Merchants' Great Democratic Meeting at the New York Exchange. 133 Ibid. These are but a few of the important merchants who endorsed the meeting. is* Times, Oct. 7; Post, Oct. 1; "Conservative," in Post, Sept. 27, 1856. 135 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 3, 1856. See also speech of James H. Brower opening the meeting. 136 Post, Oct. 3, 1856. 137 Albert C. Ramsay complained that the speech was a bit too moderate: "I think he was too modest on the subject of a dissolution of the Union." Letter to Buchanan, Oct. 3, 1856, Buchanan Papers.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 133 economic issues at stake in the election. He predicted that New York City would shortly become "the center of commerce for the whole earth," provided, of course, the Union remained intact. However, he warned that England would not suffer this position to be snatched from her "without a struggle." Instead, she would seek to "foment" sectional controversy and "internal strife," by aiding the growth of "folly and fanaticism." A Republican victory would thus be a victory for England and a defeat for American business men. He himself was quite ready to cast his vote for Fillmore, if he was convinced that this was the only way in which Fremont "could be beaten." Floyd also attempted to riddle Banks's charges directed against the productivity of the South.138 Not only had the latter completely underestimated the value of Southern productions (which Floyd maintained amounted to over $1,300,000,000), but he had completely ignored the fact that the products of the South supplied the United States "with European exchange," the very "foundation stone" upon which rested the entire fiscal system, as well as "the mercantile and mechanical prosperity of this city." "Take away from New York," he concluded, "the exchange which Southern States gave to her, and every interest, and every pursuit here, would be thrown into chaos." On October 10 the last Wall Street meeting of the campaign took place. This time it was the mercantile supporters of Fillmore, or at least the old-line Whigs, who had not yet gone over to the Democrats, who held forth. Among these die-hards were: William B. Astor, Henry Grinnell, A. C. Kingsland, E. D. Sprague, Charles A. Davis, Stewart Brown, Daniel Lord, Morris and Hiram Ketchum, James Harper, Samuel B. Ruggles, Chester Driggs, and Wyllis Blackstone.139 The speaker on this occasion was Washington Hunt. The issue before the merchants, he announced, was not what section produced more annually, but the prevention of the success of any movement which threatened "to disturb the unity of the states in their commercial intercourse." 140 "Need we complain," he asked, "because New England employs her industry in manufacturing, or because the South seeks her prosperity in agriculture, while New York with her merchants and vessels innumerable, is providentially placed 138 Proceedings of the Merchants' Meeting. 139 Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 11, 1856. 1*0 ibid.

i34

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

between them to perform the office of factor or carrier?" And repeating the points stressed by Floyd, he reminded the merchants that if the Union was preserved, New York City would soon "equal the grandeur of the most renowned seats of Commerce in the ancient world, and surpass the largest cities of Europe in wealth and occupation." But if the sectionalists prevailed and the Union was destroyed, the Empire City and her merchant princes would soon be reduced to insignificance. Most of the merchants who served as officers at this last Wall Street meeting soon after abandoned Fillmore for Buchanan.141 As a matter of fact, some of them had already contributed to the Democratic campaign fund. Albert C. Ramsay wrote to Buchanan on September 27: On night before last Henry Grinnell attended a private meeting of our friends at the New York Hotel composed principally of our wealthiest merchants and subscribed $200 to carry Pennsylvania declaring that he was now certain Fillmore had no chance and he would go to the Democratic ticket.142 The New York Hotel meetings referred to by Ramsay became an outstanding feature of the campaign. The Democrats looked to New York business men for the means necessary to carry the vital state of Pennsylvania.143 In response to appeals for aid, a committee of merchants was organized, which invited prominent bankers and capitalists "to meet a few friends of Buchanan and Breckenridge at Room No. 1, New York Hotel . . . for consultation." 144 The "consultation," of course, was simply the handing over a specified sum of money to help defeat the Republicans in the Keystone State.

"For this purpose," said the Tribune, "re-

1*1 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1856. See also Shepherd Knapp, in ibid., Nov. 9, 1856, and "Address to the Whigs of the City of New York," in Times, Oct. 2, 1856; and Albert C. Ramsay to Buchanan, Oct. 9, 1856, Buchanan Papers. 142 Buchanan Papers. He added that the Fillmore merchants were determined "that Fremont shall not be elected." 143 s. M. Johnson to Buchanan, Sept. 27, 1856; F. W. Pickens to Buchanan, Sept. 27, 1856; John Slidell to Buchanan, Sept. 25, 29, 1856; John Forney to Buchanan, Aug. 1, Oct. 3, 29, 1856; John R. Brodhead to Buchanan, Oct. 8, 1856, Buchanan Papers. 144 This invitation was found in the Richard Lathers Papers (Library of Congress). The committee consisted of Mortimer Livingston, Watts Sherman, Edwin Ludlow, Royal Phelps, James T. Soutter, Wilson G. Hunt, Matthew Morgan, Charles A. Lamont, S. L. M. Barlow, Reuben Withers, Isaac Bell, Jr., William B. Duncan, E. K. Alburtis, Henry Erben, James Lee, Joshua J. Henry, J. H. Brower, and Augustus Schell.

"BLACK" REPUBLICANISM 135 spectable bankers and merchants of New York have held nightly conclaves and contributed large sums of money." 145 Just how much was collected at these meetings was never made clear. Albert C. Ramsay who was present at the meetings asserted that twenty-five thousand dollars was subscribed at a "private meeting and sent to Pennsylvania." Much more would be collected in the future, he wrote, since "a vast majority of the merchants are now acting with us and willing to subscribe liberally as all deem Pennsylvania the battle ground." 146 The New York Times, which laid claim to inside information, maintained that at a single meeting where "some fifty magnates of finance and cotton were present, representing a capital of not less than twenty millions of dollars . . . $50,000 was raisedall to carry the election in Pennsylvania." 147 The Post was certain that at one meeting, August Belmont himself contributed no less than fifty thousand dollars, and "that one of the largest banking-houses inWall Street (we withhold the name for the present, until we can verify the intelligence from other sources) advanced $50,000 more." 148 All told, the Republican papers estimated that more than $150,000 had been "raised from the bankers and brokers of Wall Street" to carry Pennsylvania for Buchanan.149 Moreover, had it not been for this fund, they asserted, the Keystone State would have been captured by the Republican party by at least ten thousand votes.150 Even the Democrats admitted that "New York money and influence" carried Pennsylvania for them.151 It is impossible to determine accurately the truth of the amounts mentioned in the Republican press. The Congressional Covode Committee investigated the "New York Hotel Fund" in the spring of i860, but Augustus Schell who possessed the documents containing the subscriptions refused to hand them over to the committee. Schell did put the sum at "some $30,000 or $40,000," secured "by voluntary contributions of gentlemen in 145 Oct. 10, 1856. 146 Ramsay to Buchanan, Sept. 27, 1856. See also S. M. Johnson to Buchanan, Sept. 27, 1856, Buchanan Papers. 147 Times, Sept. 27, 29, 1856. 148 Oct. 2, 1856. 149 Times, Oct. 24; Tribune, Oct. 25, 1856. 150 Times, Oct. 24, Nov. 5, 1856; Herald, Nov. 14, 1856; Tribune, April 9, June 5, Sept. 19, i860. 151 James Buchanan to Robert Tyler, in P. G. Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler, Southern Rights Champion, 184J-1866, p. 287.

136

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

the City of New York," and expended "in different places" part of it in Pennsylvania, part of it "in New York, both the City and State." Moreover, the Democratic State Central Committee in 1856 testified that only twenty thousand dollars had been appropriated bythe New York Hotel Committee for the campaign in Pennsylvania.152 But since Schell refused to produce his records, and inasmuch as Piatt had conveniently destroyed his,153 there was no way of checking up on their statements. But it is likely that the sum collected in New York was closer to $100,000 than to the figure set by Schell. The Republicans held no meetings in hotel rooms, but they also made strenuous efforts to gain financial aid in New York, realizing, as Gideon Welles put it, that "money will command some kinds of assistance that cannot be otherwise secured." 154 In August, E. D. Morgan emphasized that fifty thousand dollars "should be raised or agreed to be raised for Pennsylvania and as much more as is necessary for any western State or States." "We in New York," he added, "should be responsible for whatever is right for New York to do." 155 Morgan began immediately to collect funds in the city, and on August 20, he noted gleefully that he had "received of Joshua Carew $1,200 to aid (the) Re156 cause."however, It was publican not, until fairly late in September that a strenuous campaign to raise revenue was undertaken. One of the reasons Banks had come to New York was to obtain subscriptions from the business men.157 He was followed on September 29 by about forty Republicans who visited merchants in the city and obtained pledges for eight thousand dollars.158 Morgan himself set out to raise ten thousand dollars to meet expenses for the 152 House Report No. 648, 36th Congress, 1st session, p. 473; also pp. 476-477, 491, 511, 516, 546-548, 551. Samuel F. Butterworth testified that Augustus and Richard Schell had, been 153 Ibid. p. 551."the largest contributors," p. 491. 154 Welles to E. D. Morgan, Sept. 13, 1856, Welles Papers. 155 E. D. Morgan to Thurlow Weed, Aug. 13, 1856, Morgan Letterbook (MS, University of Rochester Library). See also Morgan to Weed, July 30, 1856, ibid. 156 Morgan to Weed, Aug. 20, 1856, Morgan Letterbook. Several days later, John T. Howard was put in charge of collections. See Nichols "First Republican Campaign, op. cit., p. 494, and Hall to Weed, Aug. 27, 1856, Weed Papers. 157 Morgan to Welles, Sept. 1, 19, 1856, Welles Papers; Richard Mott to Weed, Sept. 17, 1856; Elliott to Weed, Sept. 27, 1856, Weed Papers. 158 Morgan to Welles, Sept. 30, 1856, Welles Papers.

"BLACK"

REPUBLICANISM

137

purchase of newspapers.159 On October 4, he wrote: "It looks well, Grinnell has written me a note of explanation and I have replied. We shall get the $2,000." 160 However, Moses H. Grinnell seems to have been reluctant to make good his pledge, for we Morgansent adding as a postscript: "Since writing aboveI Mr. find Grinnell his check for one hundred dollars thewhich felt bound to return to him." 161 Two days later, he wrote: "Grinnell has not paid. But I have counted it believing he will. I sent notice to Mr. (John A.) King (for) $5,000. He has sent $2,500 making in all $3,000, one-half for Penn(sylvania), and one half for N(ew) York." 162 The next day, Morgan wrote jubilantly: "We feel pretty well, Grinnell stands the $1,000 and says I did right in sending his check back, though he has not 163 Evidently the loss of the state election in Pennsylvania had paid." not completely shattered the hopes of the Republicans. Morgan was feeling "pretty well," and on October 22 he sent a long letter to Welles describing the activities being conducted: "We have been and are now exerting ourselves to raise money for Pa. I have authorized a draft on me for $5,000 and for $25,000 in event of Fremont's election. . . ." 164 Not enough was raised. On October 31, Truman Smith wrote frantically from Philadelphia, "If Fremont is defeated by two or three thousand majority for the want of a little 'material aid' some of my friends in New York will regret it as long as they live." 165 The results of the election in the City of New York were more or less as predicted. Fremont ran third with 18,000 to Buchanan's 41,000 and Fillmore's 20,ooo.166 But the "infected district" 167 of the state went overwhelmingly Republican, and Fremont carried New York by the huge majority of 80,000 votes. Once again, 159 Morgan to Welles, Sept. 30, Oct. 8, 1856, Welles Papers. Morgan complained of the steepness of the sum required. 160 Morgan to Weed, Oct. 4, 1856, Morgan Letterbook. See also F. P. James to Wreed, Oct. 4, 1856, Weed Papers. 161 Ibid. 162 Morgan to Weed, Oct. 6, 1856, Morgan Letterbook. He noted that $6,000 was "not collected." 163 Morgan to Weed, Oct. 7, 1856, Morgan Letterbook. 164 Welles Papers; also Oct. 22, 25, 27, 1856, Morgan Letterbook. i«5 Smith to Francis P. Blair, Oct. 31, 1856, in Thurlow Weed Papers. See also A. Cumming to Weed, Philadelphia, Oct. 28, 1856, and H. C, Bowen to Weed, Dec. 24, 1856, WTeed Papers. 166 Tribune, Nov. 8, 1856. 16" Robert J. Walker to Buchanan, Oct. 3, 1856, Buchanan Papers.

i38

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

the threat of secession had been sufficient to arouse a "political panic" in the Empire City.168 Ever since 1850, the great majority of the New York merchants had operated under the illusion that the sectional struggle would right itself in time if "politicians and fanatics" would only leave the controversial incidents alone. Had the Fugitive Slave Act been permitted to die a natural death, that also might have been settled amicably. All that was necessary was a spirit of compromise and a devotion to the Union, and all would be well. Certainly, the merchants had been the first to evince that spirit. They had disliked the Fugitive Slave Act, but they had been willing to battle for its enforcement. They were enraged by the invasions of Kansas, but they had not permitted their rage to push them over to a "sectional" party. The victory of the Democrats in 1 856 was thus a reward for years of patience and struggle in behalf of conservatism. Perhaps the administration of Buchanan would bring the peace, harmony, and prosperity that the reign of Pierce had failed to produce. But the vote for Fremont indicated that there were important business men in the city who believed that peace and prosperity would never be obtained under an administration dominated by Southerners and oblivious to the pressing needs of Northern business men. Four years of Pierce had proved that nothing could be gained by shouting Union and compromise as long as slaveholders and their Northern allies proceeded to violate agreements and defy public opinion. To them, the victory of Fremont would have been a triumph for conservatism, for it was the "fire-eaters" who were stirring up sectional dissensions with their constant cries of secession.169 Thus the election of 1856 marked a new phase in the relations of the merchants to the irrepressible conflict. The business men were divided into Republicans and anti-Republicans, and those who sought to maintain an intermediate, independent position were "in the smallest minority." 170 This division was to continue and to grow even more marked in the ensuing years. 168 Royal Phelps to Buchanan, Nov. 6, 1856, Buchanan Papers; G. W. Smith to Breckenridge, Nov. 5, 1856, Breckenridge Papers. 169 "Address of the Republican Central Committee to the People of the City and County of New York, Dec. 10, 1856," Tribune, Dec. 11, 1856. 170 Charles A. Davis to William R. Marcy, Nov. 13, 1856, Marcy Papers.

7

Business

ON

and

Slavery,

1857-1859

August 29, 1857, s*x months after the inauguration of James Buchanan, the Ohio Life Insurance Trust Company

failed.1 Three weeks later, a prominent dry goods reviewer wrote, "Since our last report was written, there has been a very serious change in business. Seldom have we seen so great a change in a few days. Sales have fallen from 33 to 50 per cent." 2 A week later he reported, "Large sacrifices are being daily made. Trade is brought to complete standstill. Collections are impossible." 3 These reports were typical. On October 13, Brown Brothers wrote to their London partners, "The excitement today is fearful. Some banks have stopped and we don't know whether the balance can hold out." 4 So severe was the panic that the Journal of Commerce reported that "all classes of dealers seem to think it would be a relief to be cut loose entirely from every connection with trade and commerce." 5 Many were to have this wish fulfilled. During the two months of September and October, close to four hundred failures occurred in the city,6 and for the entire year, the failures in New York City and Brooklyn amounted to $135,000,ooo.7 As the trade journals announced the failure of a "very respectable firm," or the suspension of "one of the oldest houses on the Street," or the collapse of several firms which had "stood 1 Journal of Commerce, Aug. 30, 1856; Brown Brothers Letterbooks (1856-1857), p. 326 (MS, New York Public Library). 2 Independent, Sept. 24, 1857. 3 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1857. See also Isaac Kell to Trotter and Company, Nov. 9, 1857, Trotter Papers (MS, George F. Baker Library, Harvard University). * Brown Brothers Letterbooks (1857-1859), p. 374. See also letters dated Sept. 2, 8, 18, Oct. 21, 31, 1857. s Oct. 3, 1857; also Hull and Company's circular on the leather trade, in Tribune, Nov. 9, 1857; and Willis and Hubbard to William Appleton, Nov. 3, 1857, Appleton Papers (MS, George F. Baker Library, Harvard University). 0 Herald, Oct. 24, 1857; report of B. Douglas and Company, and Tappan and McKillip, in Express, Jan. 14, 1853; Herald,139Feb. 14, 1858. James F. Trow's Business Directory of New York for 1858 reveals that 40,000 fewer firms did business in that year than in 1857. See also Times, June 15, 1858. 7 American Annual Cyclopedia, i860, p. 312.

140

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

amid the general crash of 1837," 8 even those merchants who managed to keep their heads above water waited for the next day with the greatest trepidation. "What houses can stand," one business man wailed, "when such as these are forced into suspension?" 9 The panic itself was short-lived— by 1858 the crisis was over— but it had profound effects upon the economic and political life of the nation. There were any number of explanations for the crash, including "riotous living," "extravagance of wives and daughters," and "excessive importation of silks and laces." 10 But most observers agreed that the financial and commercial crisis was due mainly to overexpansion, unnecessary railroad building, real estate booms— in a word, speculation.11 Too many railroads had been built where there were no towns or cities.12 Too much land had been bought and sold "without buyer or seller knowing where they were or whether they were anywhere." 13 Too many stocks had been bought in Wall Street not "to hold as an investment but for a chance for a rise." 14 Finally, too many merchants were "forsaking their legitimate business" to dabble in Wall Street.15 "The Merchant Princes of the Stock Exchange," as one critic put it, had been responsible for "the present crisis." 16 Some observers, however, saw at least one virtue in the panic. They were convinced that the "hard times" would drive the slavery issue into the background.17 The Herald predicted, "The nigger question must give way to the superior issues of a safe s For the names of these firms, see Tribune, Sept. 2, Oct. 7, 24, Nov. 7, 1857; Independent, Oct. 1, 8, 15, 22, 1857; Herald, Sept. 26, Oct. 4, 9, 18, 1857; Journal of Commerce, Sept. 28, 29, Oct. 5, 9, 15, 16, 17, 23, 1857. » Tribune, Oct. 9, 17, 1857; L. Shiever to Phelps-Dodge and Company, Sept. 16, 1857, Phelps-Dodge Papers. 10 Tribune, Sept. 7, 1857. See also J- C. Hane, Panics of 1837 and 18 57 (n.p., 1896), p. 27; Herald, Sept. 29, 1857; Jan- 2» l858^ Philadelphia Ledger, Oct. 23; Philadelphia Press, Oct. 7, 1857. 11 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXX, 174; J. D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1 789-1897, V, 437; O. M. W. Sprague, ed., Economic Essays of Charles Franklin Dunbar, pp. 267-272. i2Lardner, Railroad Economy, p. 62; North American Gazette, Sept. 19, 1857. 13 London Economist, July 4, 1857; William W. Folwell, History of Minnesota, I, 360-361; Bankers' Magazine, XII, 582. 14 Philadelphia Ledger, Oct. 23, 1857. is Post, Oct. 21, 1857; Philadelphia Ledger, Oct. 23, 1857; Harper's Weekly, Oct. 17, 1857; North American Gazette, Sept. 11, 1857; Herald, Oct. 7, 1857. is Post, Oct. 2, 1857. 17 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 23, 1857; Herald, Oct. 12, 1857.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

141

currency, sound credits, and solid and permanent basis of security upon which all the varied commercial and business interests of the country may repose." 18 But the Republicans saw in the panic a splendid opportunity to add to their influence in commercial circles. The election of 1856 had revealed that their appeals to business men had been outweighed by the belief "that the conservation of the Union, and the peace and prosperity of commerce were to be secured by its (Democratic) triumph." 19 Yet a year after this triumph, the merchants were struggling to maintain their very existence, and business was completely paralyzed. True, the panic was the logical result of undue speculation, unsound banking, and currency systems, but to the Republicans there was still another aspect to the crisis. At the time of the panic of 1837, tne aDO~ litionists had appealed to the merchants to "look at the commercial and political bearing of slavery," and to realize that not only was the Slavocracy responsible for the panic but that it constituted "the great obstacle" to the achievement of much needed reforms in the banking, currency, credit, and transportation systems.20 Now the Republicans reiterated the very same points, adding, however, the appeal that the merchants should support the Republican party for their own economic interests. And they were optimistic that the panic would convince the merchants that they would have been wiser to have voted for Fremont. "The Astors, Griswolds, Lennoxes, Crosbys of our city, and their brethren in other cities," said the Tribune, "ought to be with us, not against us in i860." 21 The panic, went the Republican argument, was no accident. Indeed, it would have been a miracle if the collapse had not occurred. For years, the federal government had been and still was "shamelessly prostituted, in a base subserviency to the Slave Power," and this power had arrogantly utilized the government for its own interests and against the real interests of the business classes of the country. Instead of passing a tariff bill which would permit the merchants to invest their surplus capital in industry, is Oct. 10, 1857. 19 Independent, April 2, 1857. 20 J. P. Bretz, "The Economic Background of the Liberty Party," American Historical Review, XXXIV, 250-264; S. P. Chase and C. D. Cleveland, Anti-Slavery Addresses of 1844 and 184$, pp. 36-42. 21 Jan. 1, 1859.

142

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

in place of speculating "in Bonds, in Lots, or in Dwellings," 22 the Slave Power had fastened the Nebraska bill upon the country. Instead of giving land grants to railroads, thereby inviting capital to a "legitimate investment" and ending needless speculation, the Slave Power had kept the country in a constantly "disturbed condition" by raising sectional issues, and bickering over the "Slavery Question." In the same manner, a new Bankrupt law, which the "intelligent business men of New York" had clamored for, and a strong banking system, that would "as in all other countries is done, furnish a currency that would constitute a circulating medium for its own citizens, with which you could travel and trade in any part of the Union, without a discount at every turn, and would . . . keep the State banks in check, and correct the tendency on their part to over-issues," had been sacrificed to the voracious appetite of the Slave Power for new territory for slavery.23 Small wonder, then, said one Republican in an address to the merchants, that "confidence has been destroyed, trade paralyzed, manufactures closed and sold out under the old sheriff's hammer, that vessels are of employment, that labor is couraged." And he continued: do to lop off a branch here and at the root; you must institute

rotting at your wharves for want unemployed and industry dis"To correct all this it will not a branch there— you must begin a new order of things in Wash-

ington. . . ." 24 It is difficult to determine how effective were the Republican appeals. In the long run, no doubt, they played a part in the Republican victory in i860.25 Immediately, however, there was little evidence that would indicate that the panic aided the Republican cause in the Empire City.26 If anything, it seemed at 22 "We believe," wrote Horace Greeley, "that no truth of mathematics is more clearly demonstrable than that the ruin about us is fundamentally attributable to the destruction of the Protective Tariff of 1842." Tribune, Oct. 22, 1857. 23 See, for example, the speeches of N. P. Banks, Thomas Corwin, and John M. Botts. Times, Oct. 17, 1857; Tribune, Nov. 4, 1859; and John M. Botts, Speech at the Academy of Music (New York, 1859), pamphlet. See also Tribune, June 22, 1858; Times, Nov. 11, 1850. For earlier examples of such appeals, see the series of articles, "The True Policy of New York Merchants," Tribune, Oct. 3, 10, 13, 16, 18, 1851. 24 The Address of Hon. Nathan P. Banks, pamphlet. 25 Cf. Joseph P. Wolstoncraft, "Western Pennsylvania and the Election of i860," Western Pennsylvania Magazine of History, VI, 28; and I. F. Boughter, "Western Pennsylvania and the Morrill Tariff," in ibid., VI, 127. 26 For some examples of the influence of Republican appeals, see speech of Samuel Hotaling in Tribune, Sept. 13, 1859; of John W. Quincy in Herald, Nov. 7, 1859; and E. D. Morgan, C. H. Marshall, and George W. Blunt to Thurlow Weed, June 1, 1858; Feb. 1, March 2, 1859, Weed Papers.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

143

first to benefit the anti-Republicans. The Democratic politicians met the Republican appeals with a campaign to convince the merchants that the only way to solve the problems created by the panic was to support the efforts of President Buchanan to secure "repose from the dangers of sectional agitation," which had cast its "baneful influence upon the credit and commerce of the people." 27 Thus they appealed: Our commercial and financial systems need a thorough reform. . . . Let us, then, fellow-citizens, do what we can to expunge this question of sectional agitation from Congress, and leave the administration free to deal with the great subjects of foreign and domestic interest which await its action and deserve its calmest, wisest and most deliberate counsel.28 But the chief argument of the Democrats was that the administration was succeeding in its efforts to destroy the influence of the Southern secessionists, thereby retaining the valuable Southern trade for the New York business men.29 There was, to be sure, nothing original in this appeal, but it was especially effective this time. During the two years following the panic of 1857, the Western trade seriously declined. Hence the merchants relied more than ever (particularly since their investments had collapsed) upon their economic connections with the South.30 Reports from the West during 1858 and most of 1859 to^ a dismal story. The farmers were said to be "wearing their old, patched clothes, and doing without such necessaries as coffee, sugar and spices," and those who usually ran up "store bills ranging from $100 to $600 per annum," were said to be deprived of the means "to buy their wives even a shilling calico dress, or themselves apair of denim overalls to cover up their rags and hold them on." 31 The following description of conditions by an agent in the West during the latter part of 1858 is typical. He wrote: To travel among the farmers as we have done for the last four weeks, and hear "hard times" repeated forty times a day ... to see men, women and children in threadbare and tattered garments; paper 27 See Grand Mass Meeting of the Democracy of New York, March 4, 1858, pamphlet. 28 Ibid. 29 See Tribune, March 1, 1858. so Herald, Oct. 2, 1857; Jan. 18, Sept. 15, Oct. 23, 1859. si Tribune, April 20, June 16, 1858; Post, Feb. 9, 1858; Journal of Commerce, April 2, 1858. See also letter from a Chicago merchant, in Tribune, June 16, 1858.

144

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

pasted, boards nailed up, or old hats or clothes stuffed into windows, where should be glass . . . one realizes the severity with which the financial pressure is felt.32 Conditions in the South were decidedly different. Not that the panic did not affect the cotton kingdom. A Tennessee merchant, writing early in 1858, declared: The money market, is very tite [sic]. The Banks are not discounting and the Planters have not sold their crops, and it is almost impossible to get money. I have been merchandising in this place for eighteen years, and I have never seen anything like it before.33 Nevertheless, compared with the West, the South was well off. By the fall of 1858, business was bustling in Southern cities, and planters were in a position, owing to the good demand for cotton, to make extensive purchases.3* "If you knew how busy we all are," wrote James Colles, a New Orleans dry goods merchant late in 1858, "you would excuse me. We all have to work day and night, and still at the end of the week find ourselves behind hand with our orders." 35 The report of the mercantile agencies for 1858 presented a similar picture. The same report, which stated the West was recovering "but slowly from her prostration," 36 said of conditions in the South: We have not thought it necessary to go over Southern States seriatim as we have done with the West. The comparative prosperity prevailing there, the general healthy tone of business, and the absence of excessive and wild speculation, have rendered it in our judgment unnecessarv. . . . The accounts from all parts of the South, except portions of Virginia, are uniform in their testimony that trade is in a healthy condition.37 During the next year, conditions in both sections remained much the same. There was some improvement in the West,38 32 Madison (Wisconsin) Journal, in Tribune, Jan. 1, 1859. See also Detroit Free Press, in Journal of Commerce, Aug. 18, 1859. 33 S. W. Frierson to Trotter and Company, Jan. 27, 1858, Trotter Papers; Brown Brothers to Thomas Bartis, April 19, 1858, Brown Brothers Letterbooks, LXXXVIII, p. 4.34 New Orleans Delta, in Journal of Commerce, Dec. 1, 1858. See also ibid., July 10, Dec. 4, 1858. 35 James Colles to James Colles, Sr., Dec. 21, 1858. Colles Papers. 36 See Herald, Jan. 13, 1859; also Nathan Godell to John Jacob Astor, Jr., Green Bay, Wisconsin, Dec. 21, 1857; March 20, May 2, Nov. 20, 1858, Astor Papers. 37 Herald, Jan. 13, 1859. 38 James Colles to James Colles, Sr., April 9, 1859, Colles Papers; Cincinnati Gazette, Aug. 24, 1859; Times, March 7, 1859.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

145

but not enough to make a marked difference in the trade of that section. In the South "unexampled prosperity" continued. "One of our leading private bankers," the Commercial Advertiser reported, "who has just returned from the South, after spending several of the winter months in New Orleans informed us that he has seldom witnessed such evidence of prosperity and rapidly accumulating wealth." 39 As was to be expected, the Southern trade was especially courted by Northern business houses during these two years following the panic. Week after week, the trade reviewers reported that the Western trade was "quite small," or related "the backwardness of merchants in the Western and Northwestern grain growing states in making full liquidations of past arrears." 40 Reports of the Southern trade emphasized the increased demand from that section. "The South has bought largely and trade with that section has been very prosperous," said one dry goods reviewer.41 "The trade is confined almost exclusively to Southern houses," went another report, "who are now making their appearance quite freely in our market; much attention is paid to them and their custom is eagerly courted by the trade in merchant summed it all up himself when he wrote the revulsion of 1857 our chief dependence can on the South. We get some support from the

general." 42 A in i860, "Since only be placed West, but our

business is maintained by Southern customers." 43 Here was a splendid opportunity for the anti-Republicans to crow. For years they had heard the anti-slavery leaders argue that the Southern trade was "not worth the risks taken to secure it," 44 that it was "in the long run a losing business," that "a great majority" of the merchants were ruined by it, and that "New 39 April 1, 1859. See also circular of W. P. Wright and Company, in Tribune, April 14, May 18, 1859. 40 Herald, Aug. 22; Journal of Commerce, Aug. 28, Sept. 25, Oct. 2, 9, 1858; Daniel James to William E. Dodge, July 15, 1859, Phelps-Dodge Papers; D. Littlejohn and Company to N. Trotter, Aug. 28, 1859, Trotter Papers. 41 Express, March 12, April 6, 1858; Tribune, Sept. 16, 23, 1858; April 7, July 1, 23, Nov. 18, 1859. 42 Express, March 13, 1858; Tribune, Jan. 5, 1859. 43 Herald, March 6, June 21, 1858; Journal of Commerce, April 10, 24, 1858; and Tiellkampf and Kitchen's woolen circular for the months of April and May, 1858, in Times, May 3, June 3, 1858. 44 Independent, Oct. 18, i860; Tribune, Feb. 8, 1856; March 24, 1852; Times, March 6, 1855.

146

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

York could well spare it." 46 How different, they cried, was the trade of the West. Here was a region bustling with activity, nor was it composed of slaves and poor whites who lived on the barest necessities and provided an insignificant market for New York business men.48 "A free farmer," the Republicans cried, "is fifty times a better customer than a slave, for his wants are fifty times 47 larger." The reply of the anti-Republicans that the Southern trade was more valuable "than half a dozen Californias," and "the whole trade of the West put together," 48 was never more effective than during the two years following the panic. "When the crisis came upon us in 1857," the Herald reminded the business men week after week, "it was the trade of the South that saved thousands upon thousands of merchants from bankruptcy." 49 There was another aspect to the panic which helped the antiRepublicans in their appeals to the merchants. The panic had aroused considerable resentment in the South against New York City. The proponents of Southern economic independence had long contended that the movement of the cotton crop was entirely too dependent upon financial conditions in New York.50 Financial distress in the Northern city paralyzed the entire South, for if Southern banks failed to sell their sterling bills promptly in New York, they could not purchase these bills from the planters. Hence, the machinery of the cotton trade would come to a complete stop, and the price of cotton would decline, even though there was a great demand for the commodity.51 This was exactly what happened during the panic of 1857. The cotton crop had been short; the demand in England was great, and the price per pound in that country reached the high mark of nineteen cents.52 Suddenly in September news came from New York that exchange was unsalable, and within a few weeks 45 Tribune, Nov. 22, 1850; Independent, Sept. n, 1856. 46 Tribune, March 24, 1852; Feb. 8, 1856; Post, Sept. 4, 1849. 47 Courier and Enquirer, in Independent, July 28, 1858. 48 Herald, May 30, 1851; Feb. 9, May 1, 1855; Sept. 5, 1857; Journal of Commerce, Jan. 4, 9, 1851; March 22, 1852. 49 Dec. 19, 1859. so Charleston Mercury, Oct. 15, 1857. si T. P. Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, pamphlet, p. 93; Bankers' Magazine, X, 421; Richmond Examiner, Sept. 18, 1857, *n Herald, Sept. 26, 1857; Charleston Standard, in Herald, Oct. 17, 1857. 209.52 w. Sumner, History of Banking in the United States, I, 420; De Bow's Review,

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

147

Southern banks refused to accept sterling bills at any price. The planters were helpless; cotton buyers had completely withdrawn from the market.53 Eventually, the crop was sold, but at a price far below what had been expected. Some irate Southerners estimated that the planters had suffered a loss of sixteen million dollars in the cotton crop,54 and Senator Hammond declared in Congress that the sum was actually twice that amount.55 The South was prosperous during the two years following the panic, but the experience of 1857 intensified the movement to break New York's control over the Cotton Kingdom.56 "Let the system of buying cotton," wrote one Southerner, "be changed so that we may be independent of New York." 57 Similarly, the Charleston Mercury inquired: Why does the South allow itself to be tattered and torn by the dissensions and death struggles of New York money changers? Why not trade directly with our customers? What need is there of this gobetween to convey to the markets of the world our rich products, for which the consumers stand ready, gold in hand, to pay the full value? 58 These comments

and many others even more bitter in their

denunciation of New York were reprinted in full in the city's anti-Republican journals.59 They were cited in the speeches of politicians, and they were used again and again to warn the merchants against support of the Republican party in the hope that it would remedy evils in the business system. The only way to meet the growing hostility to New York City among Southerners, declared these journals and politicians, was to demonstrate to them that New York merchants were the strongest defenders of Southern institutions and the staunchest foes of those who sought to interfere with these institutions.60 The reasoning was simple. The South was "our best customer" and, since the 53 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 323. 54 Ibid., 321. 55 Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, p. 961. 56 Russell, op. cit., pp. 103-104. 57 See H. C. Cabell, "Banking at the South with Reference to New York City," Hunt's i860. Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 311-322. See also Charleston Mercury, Oct. 27, 58 Oct. 14, 1857. For a bitter attack upon New York, see New Orleans Crescent, Dec. 14, 1857. 59 See Herald, Oct. 2, 1857; Jan. 18, Oct. 23, 1858; Sept. 15, Nov. 5, 15, 21, 1859. so See Herald, April 28, 1859.

148

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

panic, "our main chance" for trade. "As a commercial people, it is to our interest to cherish and to keep so good a customer." A strong movement was developing in the South to "do without us." Since "at the present moment the South is pecuniarily and commercially the most independent part of the confederacy," she can "dispense with us much better than we can with her." Let us, therefore, "do nothing to estrange the South." Not only "let us avoid making war upon her own peculiar system of labor," but let us become even stronger defenders of the system than the South itself.61 By 1859, tne New York Merchants were being spoken of as the "leading Northern defenders of slavery." Nowhere else "in the free states" had the South "surrounded itself with such influences as in the City of New York," and nowhere "except in the extreme South" were "the doctrines of the pro-slavery leaders so ardently supported." 62 But it took more than newspaper editorials and political appeals to accomplish this. The influence of Southern purchasing power in shaping the views of the merchants on the issue of slavery has been demonstrated several times in this study. It was seldom more clearly revealed than during the period following the panic of 1857. For some time following Buchanan's inauguration, the merchants paid little attention to political issues. There were, to be sure, many meetings held in Wall Street during these months, but the subjects discussed had no immediate connection with the sectional dispute. The business men were too immersed in efforts to reform the credit, currency, and bankruptcy systems to concern themselves with other questions.63 Early in 1858, the Journal of Commerce complained that the merchants were displaying a positive "distaste for public affairs," and in their struggles to maintain themselves in business were even neglecting "the high obligation devolving upon every citizen, of casting their suffrages at every election. . . . The difficulty [it concluded] is to arouse the substantial Union-loving men to action, and induce them to exert their influence and talents against the sectionalism of the day." 64 It was not until a full year of Buchanan's administration «iSee Fernando Wood, in Tribune, Oct. 28, 1859. 62 Philadelphia Press, New York correspondence, Oct. 14, i860. 63 Cf. Journal of Commerce, Herald, Tribune, and Times, Oct.-Dec, 1857, for accounts of these meetings. 6* Feb. 16, 1858.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

149 had passed that the merchants spoke out again on the slavery issue. Kansas had once more begun to bleed. The struggle for statehood in that battle-scarred territory reached a climax in the controversy over the Lecompton Constitution. By methods which were widely denounced as fradulent, the slavery men in Kansas had adopted a pro-slavery constitution in which it was asserted that the "right of property" was "higher than any constitutional sanction," and "the right of the owner of a slave" was "as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever." The constitution had not even been submitted to a direct popular vote, for the people were merely permitted to vote for the "constitution with slavery," or for the "constitution with no slavery." Inasmuch as all free-state men, as well as others who opposed the constitution, abstained from voting, the "constitution with slavery" was adopted by a huge majority.65 The entire issue became especially acute in February, 1858, when President Buchanan urged Congress to admit the state under the Lecompton Constitution. In the Senate, Douglas denounced the constitution as a "trick" and a "fraud upon the rights of the people," and broke with the administration and the proslavery Democrats.66 The opposing forces in Washington awaited the verdict of the people. Petitions for and against the administration poured in daily. The New York merchants were among the last to act. It was not difficult to understand the reasons for their delay. Ordinarily, the merchants would have been among the first to protest against the efforts of the administration to force the Lecompton Constitution upon the people of Kansas. No doubt, many business men were thoroughly disgusted by Buchanan's conduct,67 believing with Daniel D. Barnard that the President was helping "to keep alive Northern agitation just as it was ready to die out from inanition." 68 Nevertheless, the vast majority of the merchants were loath to take a stand in opposition to the President. For one thing, they were more anxious than ever before to have all sectional issues settled quickly, so that what they regarded as the more important questions— economic reforms— might be dealt with. Secondly, they were more anxious than ever before not to 65 66 67 68

Greeley, The American Conflict, pp. 250-251. Tribune, Feb. 10-24, 1858. George Bancroft to Buchanan, Feb. 16, 1858, Buchanan Papers. Barnard to Hamilton Fish, Jan. 21, 1858, Barnard Letterbooks.

i5o

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

antagonize the South, knowing as they did how vital the Southern trade would be during the next few years. Events were soon to reveal that in order to achieve these two objectives, the merchants were even ready to endorse t\\e administration's policy. Soon after Buchanan submitted his special message to Congress urging the admission of Kansas, George Bancroft called upon the people of New York City to take a stand in opposition to the administration.69 He especially appealed to the merchants to speak out in denunciation of "the Lecompton fraud." This city, for its numbers, is the wealthiest in the world. I call on the men of wealth in this great city to take to heart the danger of establishing as a principle that a majority of a single body, elected to a convention perhaps in time of higher excitement, filled, as will sometimes happen, with men desperately daring and corrupt, animated, as men under such circumstances are apt to be, by personal and party passions, should assume the absolute right to change the fundamental law of the country without a reference to the people. If they are not alarmed on account of their own fortunes, I ask them to consider what disposition under such an absolute convention, might be made of corporate property, what changes in the management of trust funds, set apart for purposes of charity, or education, or the support of religious worship.70 Bancroft's appeal evoked no enthusiasm in business circles. Only one merchant, William F. Havemeyer, signed a call for an anti-Lecompton meeting to carry out Bancroft's suggestions,71 and at the advice of a large number of leading business men, the directors of the Academy of Music refused to permit the meeting to be held in that building.72 A week later, a group of the "most eminent merchants and business men" 73 circulated a counter-petition, endorsing President Buchanan's actions in the Kansas question, and sponsored a mass meeting to urge Congress to admit Kansas into the Union.74 Among these business men were: John Jacob Astor, Jr., Moses Taylor, Henry Grinnell, August Belmont, Royal Phelps, Stewart «9 Tribune, Feb. 12, 1858. 70 George Bancroft, in Tribune, Feb. 15, 1858. 71 Tribune, Feb. 18, 1858. See also Journal of Commerce, Feb. 17, 1858. 72 George B. Butler, in Tribune, Feb. 13, 1858; George Bancroft, in ibid., Feb. 15, 1858; and Journal of Commerce, Feb. 15-18, 1858. 73 Journal of Commerce, March 5, 1858. 74 Ibid., Feb. 23, 1858.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859 151 Brown, Matthew Morgan, Charles A. Davis, William H. Webb, Schuyler Livingston, Isaac Bell, Jr., Barclay and Livingston, Gardiner G. Howland, David Ogden, William B. Duncan, and William Whitlock, Jr.75 In a long statement, these merchants explained the reasons that had impelled their action. Originally, they declared, they had not intended to participate in the discussions over the administration's policy, believing that they should only "take a promi- . nent part in political affairs" for "some great national purpose." But they soon realized that the nation was facing a major crisis. "Dark and ominous clouds," they continued, "are impending over the Union, by reason of the disturbed friendly relations of the people of the States with each other." After studying the issues carefully, they had reached the conclusion that the course President Buchanan was pursuing was one which was "best calculated to dissipate those dark clouds, and re-establish friendly relations between all the sections of the confederacy." They were convinced that the Kansas issue had for years occupied "too much of public attention," and that it was "high time this should be directed to far more important objects." Fundamentally, "the peace and quiet of the whole country are of greater importance than the more temporary triumph of either of the political parties in Kansas." The merchants emphasized that they would have "much preferred that the Constitutional Convention of Kansas had submitted the whole of the fundamental law which they framed for the new State, and not merely the question of slavery or no slavery," but this did not cause them to abandon their view that this issue "must now be settled." Buchanan's plan might not be the best solution of the problem, but it did have the virtue of permitting Kansas to enter the Union, thereby eliminating this issue and restoring "repose and quiet." In this respect, if in no other, the President's policy deserved the endorsement of all business men, for they desired more than anything else that "this angry controversy be removed from our national councils, and that peace and concord shall again exist between the Northern and the confederacy." 76 Southern These sections merchantsof were correct. Several thousand business men Tsibid., Feb. 23-25, 1858. wibid., Feb. 27, 1858.

i52

*

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

signed the petition endorsing Buchanan's policy,77 and many more attended the mass meeting held to urge Congress to admit Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution.78 Here John A. Dix voiced the sentiments of the merchants. "We believe," he said, speaking for the business men of New York, "that when the Kansas question is withdrawn from Congress, when it shall become purely local, when it can no longer be made an instrument for promoting party purposes, and when the people of Kansas, without the presence of a Federal army can dispose of their own controversies in their own way, there will be an end of excitement." Domestic tranquility, he added, was essential for men of business. Questions of foreign policy remained unsolved. The President had fortunately put an end to "fiiibusterism in Central America," but "graver and more delicate responsibilities" remained. Our relations with Mexico and Spain were of great importance to business men, and the administration ought to devote all its time to these issues. More important, perhaps, were the serious economic problems arising from the panic. "Our commercial and financial systems need a thorough reform." Let us then [Dix concluded] do what we can to expose this question of sectional agitation from Congress and leave the Administration free to deal with the great subjects of foreign and domestic interest, which awaits its action and deserve its calmest, wisest and most deliberate counsels. . . . Let us then stand by him [the President] and let us be assured that in banishing from the halls of legislation, a subject of sectional controversy, we shall contribute to unite the conservative influence of all sections of the confederacy upon those great public measures with which the prosperity of the country and the tranquility of the Union are closely interwoven.79 Amidst the thunderous applause of the business men, a set of resolutions were adopted which praised Buchanan for his determination to eliminate the Kansas question from national politics, and called upon Congress to cooperate with the President in achieving this desired goal by admitting the territory into the Union. Foremost among the list of reasons cited to justify this 77 For the complete list of the signers, see the pamphlet Grand Mass Meeting for the Democracy of New York, March 4, 1858. 78 Journal of Commerce, March 5, 1858. 79 Ibid. See also Grand Mass Meeting of the Democracy of New York, March 4, 1 8 58.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

153

course of action was the statement: "Because the industrial interests ofthe country, now suffering extraordinary depression, imperiously require repose from the dangers of sectional agitation, and the intestine divisions which threaten the peace of the confederacy shall no longer be permitted to depress enterprise and to cast their baneful influence upon the credit and commerce of the 80 the most significant resolution was the one relating Perhaps people." to the broad issue of slavery in the territories. Just a decade before the merchants had met in the City Hall Park, where they had announced their opposition to any modification of the principles embodied in the Wilmot Proviso, which called for freedom in the territories. "We are against," the merchants had asserted, "surrender of an inch of free-soil to slavery." Although they had abandoned this position at the time of the Compromise of 1850, the business men had later, in the early phases of the Kansas conflict, reaffirmed their opposition to the extension of slavery into the territories. But in 1858, a great many merchants completed the retreat from their original stand. Several thousand leading business men unanimously adopted a resolution at the pro-Lecompton meeting which declared: That the Territories of the United States, having been purchased by the common blood and treasure of the whole people, are the common property of the people of the several states, and every citizen from every section of the United States is entitled to enter upon and enjoy them with or without his property in slaves as he may prefer.81 Undoubtedly the merchants expected the usual bitter attack from Republicans for their endorsement of the Lecompton Constitution. But it is doubtful if they anticipated the fury their actions aroused in Republican circles. The fact that the business men had rushed to the support of the President, the Republicans declared, simply revealed his weakness, and that he required "strengthening of the hands of Wall Street." 82 But that men "high in social position, with banking houses in Wall Street, and pews in the churches and seats in the Episcopal convention," should go out of their way to endorse the greatest fraud ever so ibid. si Ibid. 82 See the pamphlet, Private and Confidential on Government Matters— the Lecompton Crisis. . . .

154

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

perpetrated upon the American people, was a national tragedy.83 Thus, Horace Greeley wrote in what was probably his most bitter diatribe against the New York merchants: They fully adopt and approve the results of years of frauds, violence, outrage and crime. They sustain the fruits of a political conspiracy conducted and perfected by loaferish, drunken, armed vagabonds, whose presence in their counting rooms or their offices, their halls, or their ante-chambers, they would not for an instant tolerate. They put themselves before the world, the confederates and accomplices after the fact, of the most scandalous frauds ever perpetrated in our history. . . . We wish to ask gentlemen of probity, of character, like Mr. Henry Grinnell, and Mr. Moses Taylor, and Mr. Gardiner Howland, and Mr. E. Caylus, who are opposed to forgery in private, why they desire to sustain it in public affairs? Is cheating and swindling any better in Kansas than it is on South Street, that they should countenance and approve it there while they would denounce it here? . . . We say, then, that for what you are doing you have not a shadow of an excuse, and that your volunteered approval of the plan of admitting Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution makes you sharers and participators in the guilt of crimes which should make the nation blush. But, gentlemen, your responsibility does not stop here. By your public acts you are undermining public and private virtue— you are shaking the pillars of national integrity. How do you appear before the country? Why, as substantial citizens, honorable citizens, high-minded citizens claiming consideration for those moral qualities that adorn private life; yet, under no pressure of party or personal exigency, deliberately coming out, and under your own signature, voluntarily endorsing and approving the crimes of lying, fraud and forgery. And it is not done in a corner. Ever ballot-box stuffer, every political swindler and renegade in the country, knows it. Every liquorish scoundrel who makes politics a trade and cheating at elections a practice knows it. Every contemptible pipelayer and political intriguer knows it. Yes, gentlemen; and they must henceforth regard the benevolent authors of Arctic expeditions, the Howlands, the Dillons, the Shermans, the Posts as men who not only wink at such frauds as they practice, and for which they inwardly feel and know they deserve the Penitentiary, but absolutely approve them. The subterranean vaults of crime underlying society everywhere grows resonant with applause over such accessions of respectability, such homage to open-handed villainy. Gentlemen signers of the meeting to approve the final results of intensified Border-Ruffianism, who profess to hold your heads high in society as men of character, we leave you to settle 83 ibid.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

155 this matter with your conscience. Go on in your corrupting and demoralizing process and how long think you before you have sown the wind to reap the whirlwind? 84 Professing to have a stake in society, you prostrate the standard of public morality, prostrate your own character, break down the barriers between honesty and dishonesty, and then wonder, will you, at the rising tide of crime and general debauchery? 85

No doubt many business men winced when they read these burning words, yet as months went by, it was fairly simple for them to settle this matter with their consciences. They had endorsed Buchanan's policy in the belief that it would ensure domestic tranquility, and the course of national events seemed for more than a year and a half to justify their actions. To be sure, a somewhat obscure politician in Illinois had aroused considerable excitement by his assertion that "a house divided against itself" could not stand, and he had attracted national attention by his able presentations in debates with Stephen A. Douglas. But Douglas had narrowly triumphed in the Senatorial contest, and the entire affair could be conveniently forgotten.86 There was, of course, the resentment aroused in the South by Seward's remark at Rochester on October 25, 1858 that the struggle between the North and South was "an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces." Nevertheless, the very fact that Northern business men were so dependent upon Southern trade during the month in which Seward spoke, completely disproved— as far as the merchants were concerned— the validity of the Republican contention. Moreover, had not the merchants demonstrated on numerous occasions, in fact as recently as the Lecompton crisis, that Northern conservatives thoroughly repudiated the principles of Seward and his colleagues? 87 Experience, of course, should by this time have taught merchants that this was but the calm before a new storm. fact, there were a number of business men who believed that mercantile element of the city should more clearly reveal to

the In the the

Similarly, the author of the above pamphlet wrote: "Say nothing of Lecompton as a peace measure that will calm the country and remove Kansas out of sight. Such twaddle may do for Wall Street, but for the rural districts, never. . . . Say nothing, therefore, about its being a peace measure, for our Wall Street gentlemen are the true agitators. They are sowing the wind and may reap the whirlwind." 85 Tribune, March 1, 1858. 86 Journal of Commerce, Nov. 9-11, 1858. a? Ibid., Oct. 28-Nov. 1, 1858.

156

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

South that they could still be depended upon to defend the constitutional rights of that section of the Union. Early in October 1859, a group of merchants met for this purpose and organized the "Democratic Vigilant Association." 88 As the name implied, the organization proposed to maintain a constant vigil in order to combat the "atrocious disunion doctrines of William H. Seward," and to destroy the influence of those who propagated the doctrines of an "irrepressible conflict." 89 Among the founders of the Association were: William B. As tor, Moses Taylor, August Belmont, William H. Aspinwall, Richard Lathers, Royal Phelps, Myndert Van Schaick, William F. Havemeyer, Matthew Morgan, Daniel Develin, Wilson G. Hunt, and Isaac Bell, Jr.90 Barely had the Association been formed, when the storm broke. On October 18, 1859, tne New York papers announced: "Fearful and Exciting Intelligence— Negro Insurrection at Harper's Ferry— The Kansas Free State Leaders at the Head of the Insurrection." For several weeks thereafter, the details of "Ossawatomie" Brown's raid were described at length in the press. Most merchants were not, at first, alarmed by the sensational news from Virginia. Naturally, all business men denounced the affair. "Among the prominent business men who frequent the Merchants' and Corn Exchanges," wrote one reporter, "it may be remarked that but one opinion prevails regarding the late attempted insurrection at Harper's Ferry, and that is one of the severest condemnation." 91 Still a great many business men regarded the incident as but the act of a few insane individuals, and felt that it would be best to ignore it.92 Moreover, they knew from past experience that the execution of John Brown and his colleagues would only aid the abolitionists and "Black" Republicans.93 "Nothing can work greater joy to fanatics like Brown," Charles A. Davis wrote to President Buchanan, "than to be re88 Herald, Oct. 3, 5, 1859. 8» Ibid., Oct. 6, 1859. See also L. S. Johnson to S. J. Tilden, Oct. 26, 1859, Tilden Papers; and the call issued by the Executive Committee of the Association, in Tribune, Oct. 14, 1859. Another aim of the Association was to reform the Democratic party. Herald, Oct. 5, 6, 16, 1859. so Herald, Oct. 3-6, 1859; Journal of Commerce, Oct. 17-19, 1859. 91 Herald, Oct. 28, 1859. 92 Journal of Commerce, Oct. 27, Nov. 1, 4; Times, Nov. 7, 1859. See also the account of a meeting of merchants, in Tribune, Nov. 4, 1859. 93 See the letter from a group of New Yorkers to Governor Brown of Virginia, urging him to commute Brown's sentence. Calendar of Virginia State Papers, XI, p. 3 et seq.; and letter of John R. Pitkin, in Journal of Commerce, Dec. 7, 1859.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

157

garded as State Prisoners and charged with High Treasons and all such nonsense. They seek this notoriety. I would for once deny them this glory." 94 But not all business men were so sanguine. The founders of the Democratic Vigilant Association, for example, were more than ever convinced that it was necessary to reveal to the South that Northern conservatives not only repudiated Brown, but all who preached the concept of an "irrepressible conflict." Since these merchants believed that the raid was part of a huge plot of the Republicans to institute "a war of races in the South," they appointed aspecial committee to investigate the origins of the entire incident.95 The results of the investigation were finally distributed inthe form of a pamphlet bearing the title: "The Rise and Progress of the Bloody Outbreak at Harper's Ferry. . . ." 96 This imposing document asserted that the invasion "was not intended to be an isolated one," that Gerrit Smith had contributed to the fund for the venture,97 and that the raid, as well as others being prepared, were "all founded upon the principles laid down in the speech delivered by William H. Seward, at Rochester, on the 25th of October."98 The pamphlet concluded on a political note. Within a few days, a state election would take place. The results would be carefully scrutinized in the South. Should the Republicans triumph, Southerners would conclude that the Empire State endorsed the theory of an "irrepressible conflict," which, as had been demonstrated, led logically to Harper's Ferry. Fellow citizens [these merchants appealed], we implore you to reflect before casting your votes at the coming State election, whether you will act patriotically, wisely, for the interests of your wives, children, »4 Oct. 24, 1859, Buchanan Papers. Davis also mentioned a conversation he had held with a leading Republican merchant: "I said, 'If this matter of Brown is rightly managed, your party will sink into insignificance.' 'It will so,' was his reply, 'but we see daylight in the almost certainty that the South will save us by overdoing of the remedy.' " Ibid. See pamphlet issued by the Democratic Vigilant Association (New York, 1859). See also Journal of Commerce, Oct. 20, 1858, and letter from "one among many of the celebrated committee who was not present," in Tribune, Dec. 30, 1859. 86 Pamphlet. A year later, Watts Sherman, Royal Phelps and S. M. Barlow, who had drawn up the pamphlet, were forced to issue a public apology to Gerrit Smith. See their letter in the Times, Nov. 16, i860. It is interesting, however, to note that in a recent study, Ralph V. Harlow has concluded that Smith was "an accessory before the fact in Brown's crime." See American Historical Review, XXXVII, 32-60. »8 Pamphlet.

i58

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

sisters, and of posterity in aiding to elevate to power candidates for office who are either directly or indirectly pledged to the support of the doctrine that there is an "irrepressible conflict" between the North and the South, and that "slavery must go out in fire, rape and slaughter." And remember that the endorsement of such disunion theories by the State of New York may possibly elevate some individual to the Presidency, the principles of whose administration would forbid the suppression of outrages similar to those which have taken place at Harper's Ferry, and by whose misrule the future well-being of this now happy country might be destroyed." But even this hysterical appeal did not arouse the business men. The vast majority of them, in fact, did not even trouble to vote in the election. Of 104,000 registered voters in the city, only a little over 56,000 voted.100 Many of the delinquents were the business men themselves.101 Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Republicans carried the day.102 What pamphlets could not accomplish, the South did by economic pressure. Southerners, of course, regarded the calmness of the merchants over the "incident" at Harper's Ferry as a sign of "indifference to Southern Rights," which was "but the first step to open enmity." 103 Moreover, the fact that the merchants did not even trouble themselves to cast their ballots against the Republicans was tantamount to an endorsement to Sewardism. The Richmond Enquirer declared bitterly: New York City, the emporium of trade, the city supported by Southern productions, her merchants enriched by our traffic, her vessels freighted with our produce, the grass kept from her streets, and the bats and owls from her warehouses by Southern trade, has not made even a decent effort to defeat her enemies, as well as those of the South. New York City, so indifferent to the injuries and wrongs inflicted by men of her State, voted 54,000 out of 103,000 votes registered at the late election.104 Thus almost in an instant, the many efforts of the merchants to defend the South against those who attacked her institutions 99 Ibid. 100 Herald, Nov. 10, 1859. io! Journal of Commerce, Nov. 1-12, 1859. See also letter of "A Non-voting Democrat," in Herald, Nov. 12, 1859. 102 However, their majority was considerably reduced. See Tribune, Nov. 9, io, 1859. 1Q3 Richmond Whig, in Herald, Nov. 15, 1859. 104 In Herald, Nov. 16, 1859.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859 159 were rendered valueless. As in 1850, a movement got under way in the South which urged Southern merchants to discontinue purchases from the North and appealed to them to trade in

Charleston and other cities "where their rights are respected and maintained." 105 Soon New York merchants learned to their dismay that Southerners had pledged not to use "any articles or merchandise or manufacture, purchased directly or indirectly in any of the Northern states," and that New York drummers had been expelled from Alabama, South Carolina, and other Southern states.106 The reports of cancelled orders provided further evidence of the wave of indignation that had swept through the South. A typical report stated: A large shipbuilding firm of New York received an order from Charleston, South Carolina recently to build two steamships. They began to make arrangements to execute the order and expected to employ directly and indirectly on their construction, from 200 to 300 workmen and laborers. But upon the display of sympathy at the North for the traitors and murderers, old John Brown and his associates, the order was withdrawn.107 Letters from the South warned the merchants not to prepare for the usual heavy spring trade, for Southerners were simply "not going to New York to buy goods." 108 A Mississippi planter informed amerchant that "the trade of Southern merchants and planters in New York will be greatly diminished in the future if not entirely clogged." 109 Another added: "There will be a short trade in New York, without a more decided evidence of good feeling towards the South among the merchants." 110 Finally, one Southern trader, writing to George Street, a New York merchant, issued the following warning: I have been intending for some time to write you a line with reference to a subject which is at the present time creating great interest in the minds of our Southern merchants. The question with them is "who 105 Charleston Mercury, March 10, i860; Russell, op. cit., Chapter V. 106 See Herald, Dec. 5, 12, 1859; Jan. 30, i860; Times, Dec. io, 1859; and "Blue Ridge," in ibid., Dec. 24, 1859; Express, Jan. 8, Independent, Feb. 23, i860; Post, Feb. 13, i860. See also a letter from a New Yorker expelled from South Carolina, in Times, Dec. 5, 1859. 107 Times, Dec. 24, 1859. 108 Herald, Feb. 10, i860. i°9 Journal of Commerce, Jan. 19, i860, "o/feid., Jan. 12, i860.

i6o

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

among the New not Yorkto merchants is for and against For they are determined enter establishments of those them?" where there is a question as to the soundness of their principles upon the institutions of the South. You may rely upon it that Southern men will have no business transactions with these houses where there is the slightest suspicion of their being tainted with Abolitionism.111 Very well, but what firms were free of the taint of abolitionism? To aid the indignant Southern trader in his quest for information, a "Southern Mercantile and Business Agency" was organized in December, 1859. It announced that it would furnish "Southern merchants and business men with such reliable information regarding Northern mercantile houses, as will enable them to trade exclusively with those who are friendly to the South and her institutions." 112 But before this agency could get under way, the Atlanta, Georgia, Daily Confederacy came to the aid of the Southerners bypublishing its "infamous" lists. The sheet itself had but a slight circulation, but the lists were copied so widely by leading Southern journals that they almost achieved the position of a guide book.113 Forty New York firms were listed by the Daily Confederacy as "abolitionist" and forty-seven as "constitutional" houses.114 In an eloquent preface, it stated the purpose of the classification: From the best and most reliable information we present to the Southern people the names of wholesale merchant firms of New York which are friends and enemies to our institutions. We do this for the reason that we know no Southern merchant will expend the money that he has obtained from Southern Slaveholders in building up and enriching a class of men who are stabbing at the vitals of this section. . . . We have true Southern born men in New York who will keep us 111 The letter was published months later in the Journal of Commerce, June 12, i860. 112 Richmond Whig, Dec. 22, 1859, in Herald, Dec. 17, 1859; Times, Jan. 21, i860; Post, Jan. 27, i860; Fowle and Company to H. B. Cromwell and Company of New York, Nov. 18, 1859. 113 New Orleans Delta, Dec. 15, 1859, in Times, Dec. 29, 1859; Charleston Courier, in ibid., Jan. 21, i860. 114 The entire list was reprinted in the Times, Feb. 22, i860. Many of the merchants blacklisted were the "most national and conservative firms" in the city, and even the Herald admitted that they had always "stood by the constitutional rights of the South." Thus, J. R. Jaffray and Son, who were placed on the "blacklist," had "for fifty years engaged in the Southern trade." Herald, Jan. 28, i860; Times, Dec. 10, 1859; Feb. 3, i860; and Journal of Commerce, Jan. 24, i860.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

161

posted as to the status of each firm or concern who are attempting to do business with the South.115 Some merchants who were on the "white" lists rejoiced at the prospects of increased trade, and one even wrote: "Agitation on the Brown question will help me, I think. I wish they would hang a few more." 116 Most business men, however, were not so happy. The Southern trade had become so vital to them since the panic of 1857 ana< tne subsequent decline in Western business that they could not take chances of being mistaken for enemies of the South. Moreover, when even the Tribune admitted that the Southern trade had been "somewhat affected by political excitements," 1 7and when the Times reported that Southern traders had "adopted the policy of giving their orders to commercial houses whose political views are supposed to be in harmony with those entertained at the South," 118 there were ample reasons for this anxiety. One catches a glimpse of the feeling of the merchants from the fact that even the most indifferent tried to be careful of what they were seen reading, lest they be mistaken for abolitionists. "I am careless of my papers," one merchant declared, "and should our customers see the Tribune not a bill could we sell them." 119 Others went further and sent long letters to Southern journals asserting their devotion to Southern rights. Thus Cameron, Edwards and Company wrote: This firm is and always has been devoted to the rights of the South, the enforcement of the Dred Scott decision, the enforcement of the fugitive slave law and the constitutional administration of the government. And, furthermore, this firm never has exerted any influence, either by vote or contributions, to the detriment of the institution of slavery. The members of the above firm are Union-loving men and are ready to go as far as any Southern men in putting down all attempts of Northern fanatics to interfere with the constitutional rights of the South.120 us Times, Feb. 22, i860. 116 R. M. Bearden to Stone, Hayward and Company, Nov. 9, 28, 1859, Stone Hayward Letterbooks (MS, Library of Congress). 117 Jan. 21, i860. See also Journal of Commerce, Jan. 19, i860, us Jan. 10, i860. 119 See letter in Tribune, Feb. 18, i860. 120 Independent, Feb. 16, i860. See also letter of Davis, Noble and Company, in ibid.; and Alfred Munroe and Company, in New Orleans Delta, reprinted in Tribune, Jan. 13, i860.

l62

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

The only thing needed to fill out the picture was a Union meeting. It was not long in coming. Early in December, a group of merchants met to discuss the various means whereby the South could be assured of the loyalty of New York business men.121 They decided to sponsor a Union mass meeting.122 A committee was appointed to arrange the details. Within a few days a call was circulated in business circles for endorsements. In less than a week, twenty thousand merchants and firms had signed the document.123 The call 124 opened with a denunciation of the "crimes of John Brown and his confederates." It went on to condemn the "unpatriotic and untrue, revolutionary and dangerous idea of an irrepressible conflict" between the North and the South. "On the contrary," it declared, "we maintain that the North and the South were created for each other . . . that even their different climates and different forms of industry add strength to this bond of Union, by enabling them to supply each others' wants." 125 On December 19 several thousand New Yorkers crowded into the Academy of Music to participate in what even the Republican press admitted was "the largest, most enthusiastic, and most instructive meeting ever held in New York." 126 On the platform sat the leading merchants of the city. Among them were: William B. Astor, John Jacob Astor, Jr., Moses Taylor, William E. Dodge, A. T. Stewart, Morris Ketchum, William H. Aspinwall, Stephen Whitney, Henry Grinnell, August Belmont, Hiram Ketchum, Royal Phelps, George Griswold, Jr., Paul Spofford, Arnold Constable, Watts Sherman, Wilson G. Hunt, and George Wood.127 Most of what was said at the meeting was already familiar to the merchants. Once again the cry, "The Union is in danger" was raised; once again the politicians and the abolitionists were attacked; once again the possibilities of secession were outlined; 121 Journal of Commerce, Dec. 8, 1859. See also card of Greene C. Bronson, "To the Public," in Herald, Dec. 17, 1859. 122 Official Report of the Union Meeting, pamphlet. 123 For the list of signers, see Journal of Commerce, Times, Dec. 15-19, 1859, and the Official Report of the Union Meeting. 124 Before the committee drew up the official call, three newspapers (the Journal of Commerce, Day Book, and Express) had already circulated separate calls. These specifically condemned "the principles and policy of the Republican party." But due to the objections of a number of merchants, it was abandoned. See Journal of Commerce, Dec. 6, 1859. 125 Official Report. See also Journal of Commerce, Dec. 8, 13, 1859. ^6 Post,Dec. Dec.16,10,1859. 24, 1859; Tribune, Dec. 12, 21, 1859. See also "Merchant," in Tribune, 127 See Official Report.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

163

and once again the merchants were reminded that none "would be more disastrously affected by a separation of the States than the millions of inhabitants who live in and around this city," and that they would not only lose the trade of the South but of the West as well, since those states would probably "remain with the South." 128 In one respect, however, the meeting was unusual—the references made by several of the speakers to slavery. Hitherto, the merchants had been careful to make clear that, though they denounced the abolitionists, they did not defend slavery, and that, in fact, they believed that it would be better for the nation if that evil were eradicated— only, of course, gradually. But not even such pious utterances were heard in the Academy of Music on December 19, 1859. On the contrary, the "Union Savers" now openly defended slavery. It was not "unjust" and "evil," but "just, wise and beneficent," and it had been "ordained by nature." Finally, slavery was actually a "necessity of both races." 129 There were a few hisses when Charles O'Conor and other speakers expressed these views, but the thunderous applause that immediately followed indicated that many merchants were quite ready to approve.130 It is significant that not one merchant who had endorsed the meeting openly repudiated the pro-slavery position set forth that evening. No doubt, any public protest against these views would have been an open invitation to the Atlanta Daily Confederacy and other creators of blacklists. But there is a more important aspect. After all, the purpose of the Union meeting was to convince the South that the New York merchants were still the foremost defenders of Southern rights (although, to be sure, the Republicans maintained that the purpose was "chiefly to promote Southern trade," and to express "sympathy for the slave holders of the South, for the men who buy, or are to be coaxed to buy A. T. Stewart's silks and Ben Whitlock's brandy").131 Had they simply denounced the abolitionists, but at the same time expressed their repugnance toward slavery, as 12» See speeches of Washington Hunt, John A. Dix, and Charles O'Conor in Official Report. 129 See O'Conor's speech, and those of James S. Thayer, Washington Hunt, and Reverend Bethune. O'Conor's speech was reprinted in a separate pamphlet which bore the title, Negro Slavery Unjust? 130 Day Book, Dec. 24; and Times, Dec. 25, i860. !3i See letter of "A sometime friend and fellow-laborer in the old Whig cause to James W. Beekman," in Tribune, Dec. 9, 1859; and of Leitch, Burnet and Company to Charles O'Conor, in Horace Greeley, The Political Text-Book, i860 (New York, i860), pp. 164-168.

i6±

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

they had done at the Castle Garden meeting almost a decade before, the merchants would hardly have achieved their aim. For in 1859, tne slave-owners and the "fire-eaters" would have considered anything but a clear defense of slavery as evidence that the merchants were neutral in the "irrepressible conflict." 182 Neutrality would, of course, be tantamount to opposition to Southern rights and would obviously merit economic reprisals. There is still another consideration to be kept in mind. These were the years when New York City was gaining the dubious honor of being "the greatest slave-trading mart in the world," 133 and, in fact, "the very depot of this nefarious traffic." 134 So extensive had the trade become that by 1859 ^ almost assumed the position of "a recognized branch of business." 135 The shipbuilding industry, suffering severely as a result of the panic, found a lucrative business in providing vessels for the slave traffic.136 "This trade," wrote a careful investigator, ". . . has absorbed a large proportion of our best ships and helped to raise freights from the North Atlantic ports, to an almost unprecedented 137 figure." While the slave trade in New York City went back "for an indefinite number of years," 188 it was not until after 1857 that almost all expeditions were fitted out from this port, and that the city became known as "the commercial center of the slave trade." 139 During the months from January 1859 to August i860, it was conservatively estimated, close to one hundred vessels left the city for the slave trade.140

"It is seldom that one or more

132 See Macon, Nathaniel, Letters of Nathaniel Macon to Charles O'Conor, Aug. 24-Oct. 5, i860, pamphlet. 133 London Times, in Tribune, Sept. 29, i860. 134 Post, July 24, i860; Times, July 23, i860; De Bow's Review, XXII, 457; Address of District Attorney McKeon, in Tribune, Nov. 10, 1854. 135 Post, April 16, 1861. See also Senate Executive Documents, 1855-1856, p. 64. 136 Herald, Dec. 22, 1857; R. G. Albion, The Rise of the New York Port, pp. 211-212. 137 Post, Aug. 15, i860. 138 See Journal of Commerce, May 5, i860; Niles Register, XXIV, 284; XL VIII, 60; LVIII, 356. The Herald, April 1, 1857, has a fairly complete list of seizures in the slave trade during the decades 1830-1850. For the slave trade in New York City at the opening of the nineteenth century, see E. Donnan, ed., Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade in America, III, 460-461. 139 Post, Aug. 15, i860. See also charge of Judge Smalley to the Grand Jury in the United States Circuit Court, Herald, Dec. 27, i860; and House Executive Documents, No. 7, 36th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 50-51. wo Post, Aug. 15, July 9, i860; New York World, July 31, i860; W. E. Du Bois, Suppression of the African Slave Trade, p. 179; E. D. Fite, The Presidential Election of i860, p. 74; and Savannah Republican, Aug. 17, i860.

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY,

1857-1859

165

vessels," said the United States Deputy Marshal in the city, "cannot be designated at the wharves respecting which there is evidence that she is either in or has been concerned in the traffic." 141 All observers in the city at this time agreed that "the most successful of the Merchant Princes; those who show the most courage in mercantile venture, those who best succeed in the speedy acquisition of wealth, are those who supply the markets of the world with slaves," 142 that "many New York merchants were . . . extensively interested in the slave trade between Cuba and the coast of Africa," 143 that business firms "of highest repute and above suspicion" supplied the capital for these ventures,144 and that "the most successful merchants" were often those who "carry it on as their regular business, who grow rich by it, and live in splendid style and claim and hold high rank in the rich circles of our metropolis by virtue of their wealth thus acquired," 145 and, finally, that "downtown merchants of wealth and respectability are extensively engaged in buying and selling African Negroes." 146 Still, despite the extent of the traffic, it is exceedingly difficult to determine just who these successful "Merchant Princes" were.147 The court trials of captured slavers do not shed much light on this problem, either because the captain and crew (mainly Portuguese or Spaniards) knew nothing of the parties who supplied the capital for the venture,148 or (as was frequently charged) because the prosecuting officials were very reluctant to probe below the surface.149 A detailed description of the trade "as it is carried i4i See the pamphlet, The Appeal of Friends, p. 41. 1*2 Tribune, June 5, i860. See also Times, Oct. 23, 25-26, i860. 143 Times, Aug. 19, 1856. 1*4 Post, Feb. 14, i860; Herald, Nov. 3, i860; Journal of Commerce, Dec. 28, 1857; Tribune, Aug. 23, 1859. 145 Times, Nov. 24, 1854. See also Continental Magazine, I, 87; and Post, July 23, 1859. 146 Journal of Commerce, May 5, i860. See also Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society for 18 57-1858, p. 56. 147 Several newspaper reporters claimed they knew the names of "respectable merchants" connected with the trade, but declared that they could not reveal them for fear of "an action for libel brought in consequence of this publication." See Times, Oct. 23, i860; Tribune, June 5, i860. Several names, however, were generally known; for example: Mora, Alfanso and Company, John A. Machado, McCutcheon and Livingston, Babridge and Valentine, and Yates and Poterfleld. See Tribune, Jan. 16, 1856; Aug. 29, 1861; Oct. 31, 1852; Times, June 20, 1856; Senate Executive Documents, 1855-1856, pp. 89-90; House Executive Documents, No. 7, 36th Congress, 2nd session, pp. 55-57; and Continental Magazine, I, 88. 148 See Baltimore American, New York correspondence, Nov. 28, 1856. 149 Post, Aug. 3, 1858; Tribune, Dec. 5, 1858; Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society for 1857-1858.

i66

BUSINESS

AND

SLAVERY

on today, almost within the shadows of Trinity Church," presented bythe New York correspondent of the Charleston Mercury in August, 1859, reveals the various intermediaries involved. The managers of the trade were "composed of Cubans, Brazilians, Portuguese and occasionally Americans," most of whom "were originally engaged in the legitimate African trade, and while in quest of palm oil and ivory, were drawn into the slave business by becoming acquainted with its facilities and profits." The "go-betweens" were mostly Cubans. Their task, of course, was to obtain the "capital for the trade." Hence they spent their time at the watering places, at expensive hotels, and in all the "wealthy" circles of the city. Confidence once established, the subject is skillfully introduced, speculative avarice is aroused, and the man who swindles his fellow creature in the banking, brokering or other business, is very easily reconciled to the slave trade. It will pay magnificently, or at least it does in seven cases out of ten, and that is all he wants to know. He is introduced to the first class, the managers, and negotiations are soon closed. ... I know of two ladies, now attracting adoration at a fashionable watering place, who invested in a little venture of this kind not so long ago, and as a result have augmented their banking accounts —one to the extent of $23,000 and the other $i6,ooo.150 As this account indicates, the profits in this trade were enormous, particularly at a time when business was slowly recovering from the effects of the panic. It was generally agreed that it was possible to gain almost $175,000 on a single successful voyage, and even if this averaged one out of four trips, the reward was worth the risk.151 The total expenses of the trip usually amounted to about ninety thousand dollars, and a cargo of four hundred Negroes sold in Cuba for six hundred dollars each would bring a total profit of $i50,ooo.152 In several cases, the profits exceeded this estimate.153 The slaver Haidee, for example, landed 950 Negroes in Cuba, the Corsa 705, the Storm King 678, the Bonita 150 Reprinted in Tribune, Aug. 22, 1859. See also C. Lamar to L. Viaria (158 Pearl Street,icanNew City),452. Dec. 26, 1857, in "A Slave Trader's Letterbook," North AmerReview,York CXLIII, 151 See Tribune, Jan. 26, 1857; June 5> 1856; Herald, Jan. 24, 1857; an 389-555PAMPHLETS The American Society for Promoting National Unity. New York, 1861. The Appeal of Friends. Philadelphia, 1858. Appeal to the People of the State of New York by the Union Safety Committee. New York, 1851. An Answer to Governor Hunt. New York, 1850. Banks, Nathan P. The Address of Hon. Nathan P. Banks. New York, 1857. Barnard, Daniel D. The Dangers of Disunion. New York, i860. Blair, Francis P. Letter of F. P. Blair to E. D. Morgan, etc., April 26, 1856. New York, 1856. Botts, John M. Speech Delivered at the Academy of Music. New York, 1859. Child, D. L. History of the Texas Conspiracy. New York, 1845. Colwell, Stephen. The Five Cotton States and New York . . . n.p., 1861. Colwell, Stephen. The South— a Letter From a Friend in the North. Philadelphia, 1856. Correspondence between Hamilton Fish and James A. Hamilton, September 12-October 4, 1856. New York, 1856. Democratic Vigilant Association. The Bloody Uprising at Harper's Ferry . . . New York, 1859. Dodge, William E. Speech in the Peace Conference at Washington. New York, 1861. Millard Fillmore at Home: His Reception at New York and Brooklyn. New York, 1856. Grand Mass Meeting of the Democracy of New York, March 4, 1858. New York, 1858. Hotaling, Samuel. The Questions in the Canvass Considered by a Merchant of New York. New York, i860.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

331 Washington Hunt to Francis Granger, Albany, October 18, 1850. New York, 1850. Jay, William. William Jay to the American Tract Society. New York, 1853. Kettell, Thomas P. Southern Wealth and Northern Profits. New York, i860. Law, George. George Law to Gustavus Scroogs. New York, 1856. Letters to the People on the Present Crisis. New York, 1853. Lord, Daniel. Effect of Secession Upon the Commercial Relations between the North and South and Upon Each Section. New York, 1861. Lundy, Benjamin. The War in Texas. Philadelphia, 1836. Macon, Nathaniel. Letters of Nathaniel Macon to Charles O'Conor, August 24-October 5, i860, n.p., 186?. O'Conor, Charles. Negro Slavery Not Unjust? New York, i860. Old-Line Whigs for Buchanan. Philadelphia, 1856. Proceedings of the Merchants' Great Democratic Meeting at the New York Exchange. New York, 1856. Report of the New York Committee. New York, 1861. Ruffin, Edmund. Anticipations of the Future to Serve as Lessons for the Present Time, in the Form of Extracts of Letters from an English Resident in the United States to the London Times from 1864 to 1870, etc. Richmond, i860. Ruggles, Samuel B. American Commerce and the Union. New York, 1856. Sedgwick, Theodore. Thoughts on the Proposed Annexation of Texas to the United States. New York, 1844. Spear, Samuel T. The Law Abiding Conscience and the Higher Law Conscience, with Remarks on the Fugitive Slave Question. New York, 1850. United States Bonds. New York, 1867. Walker, Robert J. Letter to the Citizens of Carroll County. Kentucky, 1844. Which Is the True Democracy, Hards or Softs? New York, 1856. Words of Counsel to Men of Business by a Man of Business. New York, 1856. SECONDARY Albion, Robert G. York, 1939.

AUTHORITIES

The Rise of the New York Port, 18 iy i860. New

Albion, Robert G. "Yankee Domination of New York Port." New England Quarterly, Vol. V, October, 1932, pp. 665 et seq. Albright, George L. Official Explorations for Pacific Railroads. Berkeley, California, 1912.

332

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bancroft, Frederic. "Seward's Attitude Toward Compromise and Secession." Atlantic Monthly, LXXIV (Nov., 1894), 597-608. Bancroft, Frederic. "Final Efforts at Compromise, 1860-1861." Political Science Quarterly, VI (Sept., 1891), 401-423. Barker, Eugene C. "Texan Revolutionary Finances." Political Science Quarterly, XIX (Dec, 1904), 612-635. Barnes, Gilbert H. The Anti-Slavery Impulse, 1830-1844. New York, *933Bishop, Joseph B. A Chronicle of One Hundred and Fifty Years. New York, 1918. Boucher, Chauncey S. The Secession and Cooperation Movements in South Carolina, 1848 to 1852. (In Washington University Studies, Vol. V, Part 2, No. 2.) Washington, 1918. Boughter, I. F. "Western Pennsylvania and the Morrill Tariff." Western Pennsylvania Magazine of History, VI (Jan., 1923), 106-134. Bretz, Julian P. "The Economic Background of the Liberty Party." American Historical Review, XXXIV (Jan., 1929), 250-264. Brown, M. L. "Asa Whitney and the Pacific Railroad Publicity Campaign." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XX (Sept., 1933), 209-224. Bruce, Kathleen. Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era. New York, 1931. Brummer, Sidney D. Political History of New York State During the Period of the Civil War. (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Volume XXIX, No. 2.) New York, 1911. Buck, Norman S. The Development of the Organization of AngloAmerican Trade, 1800-18 50. New Haven, Connecticut, 1925. Chase, Samuel P., and Cleveland, C. D. Anti-Slavery Addresses of 1844 and I^45- London, 1867. Cole, Arthur C. "The South and the Right of Secession in the Early Fifties." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, I (Dec, 1914), 376;399Cotterill, Robert S. "Early Agitation for a Pacific Railroad, 18451850." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, V (March, 1919), 396-414Cotterill, Robert S. "Memphis Railroad Convention, 1849." Tennessee Historical Magazine, IV (June, 1918), 83-94. Crandall, Andrew W. The Early History of the Republican Party, 18 54-18 56. Boston, 1930. Curti, Merle. "Young America." American Historical Review, XXXII (Oct., 1926), 34-55. De Voe, Thomas F. The Market Book. New York, 1862.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

333 "The Diary of a Public Man." North American Review, LXXIX, (July-Dec, 1879), 125-140, 259-273, 375-388, 484-496. Fite, Emerson D. The Presidential Election of i860. New York, 1911. Foster, H. D. "Webster's Seventh of March Speech." American Historical Review, XXVII (Jan., 1922), 245-270. Fox, Dixon R. The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York. New York, 1918. Fox, Early L. The American Colonization Society, 181J-1840. (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XXXVII, No. 3.) Baltimore, 1919. Gates, Paul W. "Southern Investments in Northern Lands before the Civil War." Journal of Southern History, V (May, 1939), 156-186. Gibbons, J. S. The New York Banks and the Panic of 185J. New York, 1858. Glover, Gilbert G. Immediate Pre-Civil War Compromise Efforts. (George Peabody College Contributions to Education, No. 131.) Nashville, Tennessee, 1934. Harlow, Ralph V. "Gerritt Smith and John Brown." American Historical Review, XXXVIII (Oct., 1932), 32-60. Harlow, Ralph V. "The Rise and Fall of the Kansas Aid Movement." American Historical Review, XLI (Oct., 1935), 1-25. Harner, Philip M. The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 184J1852. Allentown, Pennsylvania, 1918. Herndon, Dallas T. "The Nashville Convention." (In Alabama Historical Publications, V, 1904, 203-237.) Montgomery, Alabama, 1906. Hodder, Frank H. "The Railroad Background of the KansasNebraska Act." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XII (June, 1925), 3-22. Johnson, Samuel A. "The Genesis of the New England Aid Company." New England Quarterly, III (June, 1930), 90-100. Julian, George W. "The First Republican National Convention." American Historical Review, IV (Jan., 1899), 313-322. Kohlmeier, Albert L. The Old Northwest as the Keystone of the Arch of the American Federal Union. Bloomington, Indiana, 1938. Loomis, N. Asa Whitney: Father of Pacific Railroads. (In Mississippi Valley Historical Association Proceedings, VI, 1912, 168175.) Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1913. Mayer, E. Origin of the Pacific Railroads, and Especially of the Southern Pacific. (In Publications of the Mississippi Valley Historical Society, VI, 1902, 307-377.) McCarthy, C. F. "The First Republican Convention." Western Pennsylvania Magazine of History, XX (June, 1937), 83-100. Mellen, G. F. "Henry W. Hilliard and W. L. Yancey." Sewanee Review, XVII (Jan., 1909), 32-50.

334

*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Moody, Robert E. "The First Year of the Emigrant Aid New England Quarterly, IV (Jan., 1931), 148-155. Mueller, Henry R. The Whig Party 'in Pennsylvania. University Studies in History, Economics, and Public ume CI, No. 2.) New York, 1922. Myers, Margaret. The New York Money Market, Vol. I.

Company." (Columbia Law, VolNew York,

J931-Allan. History of the New York Bank and Trust Company, Nevins, 1 j 84- 1 9 34. New York, 1934. Nichols, Roy F. "Some Problems of the First Republican Presidential Campaign." American Historical Review, XXVIII (April, 1923), 492-496. Nichols, Roy F. The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854. {Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XI, No. 1.) New York, 1923. Poage, George R. Henry Clay and the Whig Party. Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1936. Ramsdell, Charles W. "Lincoln and Fort Sumter." Southern History, III (Aug., 1937), 259-288. Randall, James G. The Civil War and Reconstruction. 1937-

Journal of New York,

Russell, Pearl. "Analysis of the Pacific Railroad Reports." Washington Historical Quarterly, X (Jan., 1919), 3-16. Russell, Robert R. Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism, 18401861. Urbana, Illinois, 1924. "A Slave Trader's Letterbook," ed. North American Review, LXLIII (July, 1886), 447-461. Scisco, Louis D. Political Nativism in New York State. (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XIII, No. 2.) New York, 1901. Scrugham, Mary. The Peaceable Americans of 1 860-1861. (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XLVI, No. 3.) New York, 1921. Sears, Louis M. "August Belmont: Banker in Politics." Historical Outlook, XV (April, 1924), 151-154. Sears, Louis M. "New York and the Fusion Movement of i860." Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, XVI (April, 1923), 58-62. Fred A. The Organization and Administration of the Union Shannon, Army, 2 vols. Cleveland, 1928. Shyrock, Richard H. Georgia and the Union in 1850. Durham, North Carolina, 1926. Stone, Alfred H. "Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States." American Historical Review, XX (April, 1915), 557-565.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

335

Swanson, William W. "The Crisis of i860 and the First Issue of Clearing-House Certificates." Journal of Political Economy, XVI (Feb., April, 1908), 65-75, 212-226. Wender, Herbert. Southern Commercial Conventions, 1837-1859. (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series XLVIII, No. 4.) Baltimore, 1930. Winston, James E. "New York and the Independence of Texas." Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVIII (April, 1915), 368-385. Wolstoncraft, Joseph P. "Western Pennsylvania and the Election of i860." Western Pennsylvania Magazine of History, VI (Jan., 1923)> 25-38. GENERAL WORKS Alexander, D. A. S. Political History of the State of New York, 4 vols. New York, 1906-1923. Auchampaugh, Philip G. James Buchanan and His Cabinet on the Eve af Secession. Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1926. Cole, Arthur C. The Whig Party in the South. Washington, 1913. Crawford, Samuel W. The History of the Fall of Fort Sumter. New York, 1896. Curtis, Francis. History of the Republican Party, 2 vols. New York, 1904. De Bow, James D. W. Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States, 4 vols. New Orleans, 1853. De Bow, James D. W. The Interest in Slavery of the Southern NonSlaveholders. Charleston, i860. Dubois, William E. Suppression of the African Slave Trade. New York, 1896. Dunbar, Charles F. Chapters on the Theory and History of Banking. New York, 1891. Fite, Emerson D. Social and Industrial Conditions in the North During the Civil War. New York, 1910. Garber, Paul N. The Gadsden Treaty. Philadelphia, 1923. Gray, Lewis C. History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to i860, 2 vols. Washington, 1933. Greeley, Horace. The American Conflict, 2 vols. Hartford, 18641867. Hammond, M. B. The Cotton Industry. New York, 1897. Helper, Hinton R. The Impending Crisis. New York, i860. Hoggson, Noble F. Epochs in American Banking. New York, 1929. Meyers, Gustavus. The History of Tammany Hall: New York, 1901. Nevins, Allan. The Evening Post, A Century of Journalism. New York, 1922. Olmstead, Frederick L. The Cotton Kingdom, 2 vols. New York, 1862.

336

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Rhodes, James F. History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, 8 vols. New York, 1893-1906. Russell, William H. My Diary North and South. Boston, 1863. Schwab, John C. The Confederate States of America, 1861-1865: A Financial and Industrial History of the South During the Civil War. New York, 1901. Scroggs, W. O. Filibusters and Financiers. New York, 1916. Smith, Edward C. The Borderland in the Civil War. New York, 1927. Sprague, O. M. W., ed. Economic Essays of Charles Franklin Dunbar. New York, 1904. Stanwood, Edward. History of the Presidential Elections. Boston, 1884. Sumner, W. 1896.

History of Banking in the United States.

New York,

INDEX Abolition, support of, 13-14 Abolitionists, denounced, 14; attack Webster, 26; criticize New York City, 28; riots against, 28; denounce Union movement, 53; meetings of, 100 Academy of Music, 150, 162 Advertisements during Panic of i860, 208-209 Alabama, secession movement in, 225; secedes, 24gn; mentioned, 51 Albany Atlas, on Election of 1851, 77 Albany Evening Journal, opposition of New York merchants to, 25; denounces 235 York City, 114; mentioned, 67, New Alburtis, E. K. (Cotton Merchant), confers with N. P. Banks, Jr., 131, 13m; aids Buchanan, i34n; on Civil War, 305» 3H Allen, McLean and Bulkley, o,n American Anti-Slavery Society, meeting of, 100 American Collection Agency, on Southern debts, 219-221 American Conflict, 318 American Exchange Bank, 200 American in, 9 Home Missionary Society, split American party, nominates Millard Fillmore for President, 119. See also North American party. American Society for Promoting National Unity, The, American Tract 27'Society, 168 Anderson, Major Robert, moves troops, 241; popularity of, 242, 242n, 243; mentioned, 280, 306 Anderson, Samuel J., on secession, 293, 293n; on Civil War, 307^ mentioned, 292 Annexation of Texas. See Texas. Anticipations of the Future . . . . (Ruffin), 196-197 Anti-Fusion Whigs, Conventions, 111, i2on; address of, 111-112; support Millard Fillmore for President, 119-120 Arms, traffic in, 2ggn

Aspinwall, William H. (Shipping and Commission Merchant, Banker), defends Compromise of 1850, 42; opposes Nebraska bill, 96; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; role of in Election of i860, 172; at Pine Street meeting, 228; supports Compromise, 248-249, 251; annoyed by Lincoln's speech, 272; plans to reinforce Fort Sumter, 298; mentioned, 45n, 162, 232, 238, 271, 298, 308, 311. See also Howland and Aspinwall. Astor, John Jacob, Jr. (Capitalist), endorses Lecompton Constitution, 150; supports Lincoln for President, 200; mentioned, 162, 201, 204, 271, 308, 311 Astor, William B. (Capitalist), opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; supports Clay's Compromise plan, 25; fights "isms," 25; member of Union Safety Committee, 89; opposes Nebraska bill, 92n, 96; supports Millard Fillmore for President, 133; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; role of, in Election of i860, 172; plans Pine Street meeting, 227; aids Union Defense Committee, 313; mentioned, 119, 129, 162, 178, i8on, ig2n, 232, 237, 274, 298, 308, Astor House, 97 Atlanta (Ga.) Daily Confederacy, publishes black and white lists, 160 of, 223 Malford and Company, failure Atwater, Auction system, 186 Babridge and Valentine, 1650 Bailey, ists, Keeler and Remsen, on abolitioni4n Baldwin, Simeon (Commission Merchant), forbids use of Merchants Exchange for Republican meeting, 126; mentioned, 119 Baltimore, 35 Bancroft, George, denounces Lecompton Constitution, 150 Banister, William A., 222

INDEX Bankers, New York, committee of, 215; 338 send delegation to President Buchanan, 244, 246; demand resignation of Secretary Thomas, 245-246; praise appointment of John A. Dix, 27. See also Merchants, New York. Bank of Commerce, mentioned, 212, 244, 30on, 306 Bank of the Republic, mentioned, 266n, 292 Banks, New York, role of, in Panic of 1857, si 1; action of, in Panic of i860, 211-214; mentioned, 200 Banks, N. P., Jr., invited to address New York merchants, 125-126; address of, 127-129; criticized, 129-134; mentioned, 136 Barclay and Livingston, endorse Lecompton Constitution, 151 Barker, James W. (Dry Goods Merchant), leader of Know-Nothing movement, Barlow, S. L. M. (Lawyer), apologizes to Gerrit Smith, i57n Barnard, Daniel D. (Lawyer), on secession movement in 1850, 23, 25; advises Whig merchants, 112-113; endorses Know-Nothing party, 113; plans Whig convention, 114-115; letter of, to James A. Hamilton, 115-116; on George Law, ii7n; on Fish-Hamilton correspondence, i25n; condemns President Buchanan, 149; on Union ticket in Election of i860, 174 Battery House, 33 Bayard, Robert (Shipping and Silk Merchant), director of Pacific Railroad Company, 89 Bayard, William (Shipping and Silk Merchant), opposes extension of slavery, i6n Beard, Charles A., on causes of Civil War, 318 Bearden, R. M., on business in South, 220-22 i Beebe and Company, 260 Beecher, Reverend Henry Ward, opposes Nebraska bill, 95; mentioned, 315 Beekman, James W., opposes election of Hamilton Fish, 64-65; plans Pine Street meeting, 887n; praises Thurlow Weed, 336; mentioned, 889 Bell, Edward, circular of, 809 Bell, Isaac, Jr. (Cotton Merchant), endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151;

organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; mentioned, 132, i34n, 274, Bell, John, 174, 207 173 State Committee, supports Bellfusion, -Everett Belmont, August (Banker), supports Buchanan for President, 82-83; purchases newspaper, 83n; is an issue in Election3" of 1852, 84; advocates acquisition of Cuba, 111 ; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 150; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; meeting at home of, 172; raises funds for Douglas, 175; advocates Union ticket in Election of i860, 175, i8on; warns of dangers of Republican victory, 204-205; praises Thurlow Weed, 236; on meeting of New York merchants, 238; on Republic of New York, 289; on Civil War, 299; mentioned, 132, 135, 162, 179, 227n, 237, 274, 298, 308, 311 Bennett, James G., i23n, 305 Benson, A. G., 56n. Bigelow, John, on Southern debts, 302 Bigler, Governor William, 75 Binninger, Abraham (Grocery Merchant), opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, non; mentioned, 132 Black, Jeremiah S., on appointment of John A. Dix, 246n Black Lists, in 1850, 43-44; in 1859, l^°> i6on, 161 Blackstone, Wyliss, 133 Blatchford, R. M. (Lawyer), 238 Bleecker, Anthony J. (Broker), supports Republican party, 117 Bliss, Chesselden, on New York merchants, 21 Blunt, George W. (Publisher), aids Eli Thayer, 101; purchases stocks, 103 Board of Currency, committee of, 224225; mentioned, 308 Boot and Shoe trade, depression in, 209-210; credit system in, 216 Bogardus, Robert (Banker), opposes extension ofslavery, i6n Bolding, John, case of, y$n Bonita, slave ship, 166-167 Boorman, James (Tobacco and Iron Merchant), director of Pacific Railroad Company, 89; mentioned, gn, 274, 31(1 Booth, William A. (Banker), supports Lincoln for President, 200; mentioned, 298

INDEX Border Ruffians, 100 Border State plan, terms of, 250-251; support of, 251. See also Compromise. Boston, opposition to Fugitive Slave Act in, 35; opposition to Nebraska bill in, 88; effect of repeal of Missouri Compromise in, 100; slave trade in, 167; mentioned, 7 Boston Times, 100 Bowen, Henry C. (Dry Goods Merchant), supports Republican party, 117; mentioned, 102. See also Bowen and McNamee. Bowen, 223 Holmes and Company, failure of, Bowen and McNamee, on Black Lists, 44-45; mentioned, 45n Bradish, Luther (Lawyer), opposes Nebraska bill, 95; plans Whig Convention, 114; mentioned, 41, io4n, 298 Brady, James T. (Lawyer), defends Fugitive Slave Act, 46n; warns New York merchants, 194; mentioned, 56n Branch Mint bill, 52-53 Breckenridge State Committee, role of, in Election of i860, 176-179. See also Election of i860, Union ticket. Brevoort, Henry (Real Estate), 82n Broadway Tabernacle, meeting at, 103 Brooks, James, re-elected to Congress, 50; appeals to President Fillmore, 5m; letter of, to President Fillmore, 57n; mentioned, 41 Brooks, Preston, denounced, 104-105 Brower, H., and Company, on Lemmon Case, 63 Brower, John M. (Shipping Merchant), on Republic of New York, 290 Brown, Governor Joseph E., recommends confiscation of Northern property, 218 Brown, James (Banker), 274. See also Brown Brothers. Brown, John, denounced, 157-158, 162; mentioned, 156. See also Harper's Ferry. Brown, Stewart (Banker), endorses Lecompton Constitution, 150; mentioned, 55, 133, 227, 271, 274, 298, 311. See also Brown Brothers. Brown Brothers, oppose Annexation of Texas, 18; on Panic of 1857, 139; on Southern debts, 217; oppose Morrill tariff, 262; mentioned, 2n, 57 Bryant, William Cullen, on Kansas, 101-102

339 Buchanan, James, consults with Cass, 81; supported in New York City, 82-83, 122-124; criticized, 121-122, 226; votes received by, 137; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 149; administration endorsed, 150-153; role of, in secession crisis, 240, 242; on secession, 241; interviewed, 241, 244, 246; mentioned, 239, 251, 298 Budd, Thomas G., 2-3 Business, condition of, in 1850, 15, 27, *9-3°> 33; in 1854, 99; effect of Kansas struggle on, 101-102; in 1858, 143-144; effect of struggle in Congress on, 169; in i860, 182-184, 198-199, 208-210; in 1861, 250. See also Panic of 1857, Panic of i860. Business men. See Merchants. Butler, George B. (Publisher), on New York merchants, 21; mentioned, 56n Butterworth, Samuel F., testifies before Covode Committee, i36n California, trade with, 15; mentioned, 29 Cameron, Edwards and Company, upholds Southern rights, 161 Cameron, Simon, supports compromise, 258 Candayaca (Tenn.), 191 Canton (Miss.), 219 Carew, Joshua, 136 Carleton, Charles (Dry Goods Merchant), defends Compromise of 1850, 42 Carleton and tionists, i4nCompany, denounce aboliCarr, Thomas83 W., letter of, to William R. Marcy, Caroll, Nicholas (Lawyer), defends Compromise of 1850, 42 Cass, Lewis, honored by Union Safety Committee, 59; opposes National Union Convention, 81; mentioned, 80 Castle Garden, Union meeting at, 41-49 Caylus, E., denounced, 154 Chamber of Commerce, endorses plan for Pacific railroad, 89; meeting at, 240; 265 delegation of, 241; opposes Morrill tariff, tioned,262; 30, 227 on Civil War, 308; menChandler, Zachariah, denounces merchants, 251-252; on government loan, Charleston, effect of war of tariffs on, 277, 280, 283-284; mentioned, 170

INDEX Charleston Courier, reports of New York 340 correspondent, 188, 266; denounces New York City, 316 Charleston Mercury, on New York City, 147; on direct trade, 283-284; report of New York correspondent, 281, 288, 294, 314-315; mentioned, 200 Chase, Secretary Samuel P., commissions W. C. Noyes to visit New York City, 301; mentioned, 300, 306, 307 Chauncey, Henry, presents gift to Webster, 27; mentioned, 45n, 132, 172, 298 Chauncey, William, 119, i2gn, 298 Chemical Bank, action of, in Panic of i860, 213-214; mentioned, 200 Chittenden, Henry A., aids New England Emigrant Aid Company, 103, io3n Chittenden, S. B. (Dry Goods Merchant), states reasons for supporting Lincoln, 190-191, 203; bids on government loan, 30on; mentioned, 298, 308 Choate, Rufus, urges support of James Buchanan, 120 Cincinnati, 278 Cisco, John J., 311 Civil War, causes of, 282, 302, 318-319; attitude of New York merchants toward, 298-299, 303-311; outbreak of, 304; conditions during, 311-312 Claflin, H. B. (Dry Goods Merchant), opposes Nebraska bill, g2n, 93, 102 Clark, Dodge and Company, 30on Clark, Myron H., 108 Clay, Henry, compromise plan of, 23; conflict of with President Taylor, 31; speeches of published, 58; birthday of celebrated, 59; urges formation of National Union party, 79; supports National Union Convention, 80-81; mentioned, 32, 71 Clay, James B., denounces Republican party, 120 Clayton bill, opposition of New York merchants to, 20-21 Clearing House, 308 Coasting trade, 2-4 Cobb, Howell, on influence of New York merchants, 32; honored by Union Safety Committee, 59; sponsors "Union Pledge," 79; opposes National Union Convention, 80; role of during Election of i860, 199, 202; accused of bankrupting government, 243-244; mentioned, 80, 81, 293, 295 Coe, George S., 244

Coercion, policy of opposed by New York merchants, 299; supported, 301302,- William, 306 Cole, 260 Coleman, W. T., and Company, 298 Orleans, 144 Jr., on business in New Colles, James, Collins, E. K. (Shipping Merchant), organizes railroad company in Virginia, 3; mentioned, 37n, 45n Colwell, Stephen, on Southern trade, 7-8 chants, 194 warns New York mer215 Leslie, Combs, Commercial Advertiser. See New York Commercial Advertiser. Committee of Bankers, on Panic of i860, Committee of Fifteen, draws up Union ticket, members of, i7gn; raises 227 in179; funds Election of i860, ig2n; appeal of, 192-193; invites Southerners to New York City, 194; on dangers of a Republican victory, 194-195, 205; on Republic of New York, 285; mentioned, Committee of Thirteen, compromise plan of, 31 enridge, 134 Committee to aid Buchanan and Breck-

Committee to aid Kansans, 103-104 Committee to check the progress of Slavery, 16 Committee to oppose the Nebraska bill, Committee to support Clay's Compromise Plan, 25-26 94-96 Compromise, during secession crisis, support of, by New York merchants, 248260, 263-269; failure of, 249; opposition to, 251-252, 267, 269; split in RepublJcan party on, 254-255, 257-258; support of by Republicans, 257-258; New York merchants on, 258-259; relation of government272 loan to, 263-265; prospects of, 266, 271, Compromise of 1850, effect of on business, 33; opposition to, 34-35; defense of by New York merchants, 41-49, 71; mentioned, 32, 33, 230. See also Union Safety Committee. Concord (Mass.), meeting in, 35 Condit and sure, 277 Noble, 103 Congress, Confederate, passes tariff mea-

INDEX Congress, U. S., struggle in, 15, 29, 169; members of, 31, 32, 255; grants subsidies, 89-90; and Election of i860, 187-188, 201; anti-Republican strength in, 229; delegations to, 248-249, 250251; rejects Compromise, 271; mentioned, 30, 31, 252, 285 Conkling, Frederick A., on government loan, 300 Constable, Arnold (Dry Goods Merchant), 162 Constitutional Hall, meeting at, 110 Constitutional Union party, 173, i73n, 174. See also Election of i860. Cooper, Peter (Iron Manufacturer), opposes Nebraska bill, g2n, 95; opposes Know-Nothing movement, ii3n; on President Buchanan, 241; supports Compromise, 251; on Civil War, 313; mentioned, 37n, 89, i03n, 271, 274, 298, 308, 311 Cooper 180 Institute, meetings at, 178-179, Corning, Erastus (Hardware Merchant, President, New York Central Railroad), role of in Election of i860, 172; supports Compromise, 248-249, 267, 270; mentioned, 274 Cornell, George J., 50 Cornell, Stephen H., 132 Corrigan, Andrew, letter of to Thurlow Weed, 92 Corsa, slave ship, 166 Corse, Barney, i8n Corwin, Thomas, on split in Whig party, 67-68 Cotton trade, importance of, to New York merchants, 4-5; organization of, 5-6; effect of Panic of 1857 on> 146-147; depression in, 209 Courier and Enquirer. See New York Courier and Enquirer. Covode Committee, investigates "New York Hotel Fund," 135-136, i36n 217 system, Credit need for revision of, 216Crittenden, John J., compromise plan of, 250; mentioned, 239 Cuba, movement for acquisition of, 121 Cushing, Caleb, 120, 307 Cushman, Daniel A. (Dry Goods Merchant), opposes extension of slavery, 2on; opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, non, 119; mentioned, 82n Cutting, Francis B. (Lawyer), 83n

Dailey, W. tisement J. of, F., 208 and Company, adverDavis, Charles A. (Commission Merchant), denounces Abolitionists, i4n; on Annexation of Texas, 17-18; urges repeal of the Fugitive Slave Act, 35; urges formation of Union party, 38; letter of to William R. Marcy, 120; 341 endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151; on John Brown's raid, 156-157; on South Carolina, 239-240; supports Compromise, 248-249; mentioned, 42, i2gn, 133, 179, 228, 274, 298 Davis, Gilbert (Dry Goods Merchant), opposes expansion of slavery, 2on; on Election of 1852, 86; mentioned, 82n Davis, Jefferson, on Pacific railroad, 90; calls for privateers, 310; mentioned, 29»> 295 Davis and Brooks, denounce Abolitionists, i4n; present gift to Webster, 27 Day Book. See New York Day Book. De Bow, James Dunmore, on New York City, 4; on Southern trade, 11 De 10Bow's Review, attacks New York City, De Forest, W. W. (Shipping Merchant), Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad, 306 Democratic party, attitude of New York merchants toward, 37-38; appeals to New York merchants, 142-143, 147-148; Charleston Convention of, 170. See 3" also Election of 1852, Election of 1856, Election of i860. Democratic party of New York, conventions of, 37, 69-70; split in, 107, 113. See also Election of 1850, Election of 1851. Democratic State Central Committee, New York, on "New York Hotel Fund," 136 Democratic Vigilant Association, organizers of, 156; on John Brown's raid, 157-158; address of, 157-158 chants, 199 Detroit Advertiser, on New York merDevelin, Daniel (Dry Goods Merchant), organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; mentioned, 274 Devlin and Company, specialize in Southern trade, 2n Dey, Anthony, i8n Dickinson, Daniel S., condemned, 20;

INDEX 42 by Union Safety Committee, 3honored 59; consults with Lewis Cass, 81 Direct trade. See South, direct trade movements in. Dix, John A., speech of, 152; plans Pine Street meeting, 227; on secession, 228; appointed Secretary of the Treasury, 246, 246n; praised, 298; bids on government loan, 30on; mentioned, 179, 229, 232, 244, 307 Dodge, William, and Sons, denounce abolitionists, 1411 Dodge, William E. (Hardware Merchant, Capitalist), organizes Southern Aid Society, gn; opposes extension of slavery, 2on; opposes Nebraska bill, 95-96; supports Republican party, 174, 200; on politicians, 169-170; on need for Republican victory, 189-190; speech of, 202; supports Compromise, 251, 256-257, 258; speech of, at Peace Convention, 267-269; urges Lincoln to support Compromise, 272-273; on Civil War, 308; mentioned, 255, 298, 311 Douglas, Stephen F., consults with Lewis Cass, 81; supported for President, 83; introduces Nebraska bill, 88; relation of to Pacific Railroad, 89; denounced, 96; attacks Lecompton Constitution, 149; triumphs in Illinois, 155 Douglas National Executive Committee, opposes fusion, 174 Douglas State Committee, role of in Election of i860, 173-179 Douglass, George (Commission Merchant), 56n Draper, Simeon (Auctioneer), on Fugitive Slave Act, 36; opposes Union Safety Committee, 53; visited by delegation, 82; aids Eli Thayer, 101; supports Lincoln, 188; advocates peaceful separation, 276; bids on government loan, soon; mentioned, 3n, io3n, 237, 27 ». 308, 311 Drew, Daniel (Broker), 179 Driggs, Chester (Grocery Merchant), 133 Drug trade, credit system in, 216 Dry Goods Trade, credit system in, 216; failures in, 223; effect of Panic of i860 on, 233, 234; mentioned, 4, 15, 139 Duer, William, letter of to Willard Fillmore, 66 Dun, Boyd and Company, on Southern trade, 217; on Southern debts, 219; on Panic of i860, 223

Duncan, Sherman and Company, 220 Duncan, William B. (Banker), confers with N. P. Banks, Jr., 131; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151; role of in Election of i860, 172; mentioned, i34n East Tennessee Mining Company, 3n Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism (Russell), 10 Election of 1850, issues, 50; results, 50-51. See also Union party, Union ticket. Election of 1851, issues, 69-76; results, 77-78. See also Union party, Union Safety Committee, Union ticket. Election of 1852, issues, 81-85; results, 86; significance, 87. See also National Union party, Union Safety Committee. Election of 1854, issues, 107-108 Election of 1855, issues, 114 Election of 1856, issues, 116-137; results, 137-138. See also Buchanan, James, Fremont, John C, Merchants, New York, Republican party. Election of 1859, Election of i860, Democratic Convention, 170; role of New York merchants during, 172-180; role of Volunteer Democratic Association during, 172-173, 176; negotiations for Union ticket in, 176179; meetings during, 178-179, 189-191, 202-203; Union ticket in, 179-180; funds raised in, 192, ig2n; issues, 193197; danger of Republican victory in, 193-198, 204-206; panic during, 198200; split in ranks of New York merchants during, 200-205, 207; and Congress, 200-202; results, 206-207 Ely, Charles, 126 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, on Webster, 6on Emigrant Aid Company. See New England Emigrant Aid Company. England, business men of and secession, 22-23, 24; danger of war with, 121; trade of, with Orient, 128 Erben, Henry, i34n Erie, slave ship, 167 Evarts, William M. (Lawyer), defends Fugitive Slave Act, 47; on slavery question, io2n; mentioned, 102, 311 Evening Post. See New York Evening Post Express. See New York Express Fairbanks, Dexter, io3n Faneuil Hall, 60, 88

INDEX Farmers Loan and Trust Company, 200 Field, Cyrus W. (Paper Dealer), 298 Field, Cyrus W., and Company, on business conditions, 15 Field, David Dudley (Lawyer), opposes Annexation of Texas, 19; opposes Compromise, 267, 268; mentioned, 103, 3»5 Fillmore, Millard, honored by Union Safety Committee, 59; visits New York City, 60; supports Hamilton Fish, 65; on Whig Unity Conference, 68; suggested as candidate for President, 80; nomination of supported by New York merchants, 82; nomination planned, 114-115; on dangers to Union, 123; votes for, 137; delegated to visit South, 231-232; mentioned, 32, 35, 39, 119 Finley and Company, 2n Firms, New York, branch houses of, 2; Southern, 2n Fish, Hamilton, opposes Fugitive Slave Act, 63-64; opposed by Union Safety Committee, 63-66; on split in Whig party, 67; letter of, to Daniel D. Barnard, 77n; presents resolution to Senate, 93; meeting at home of, 115; supports Fremont, 125; supports Compromise, 248-249; believes Civil War inevitable, 249; mentioned, 238, 271, Fish, 3»» Preserved (Shipping Merchant), supports Democratic party, 37n Fitzhugh, George, on Republic of New York, 287 Fitzhugh, Henry, 74n Five Cotton States and New York, The (Colwell), 7 Florida, secedes, 24gn Floyd, John B., on New York and the South, 8; address of, 132-134; reported aiding secessionists, 243; mentioned, Foote, Henry S., honored by Union Safety Committee, 59; sponsors "Union Pledge," 79; supports National Union Convention, 80-81 Foote, Samuel A., 74n Forbes, John Murray, plans to reinforce Fort Sumter, 298 Fordham, M. C, opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, iogn Forsyth, John, on Republic of New York, 291-292 Fort Moultrie, 241

343 Fort Sumter, plan to reinforce, 298; relief of, 303; fired upon, 304; mentioned, »37 241 John, and Company, 2n Frazer, Fremont, John C, nominated for President, 119; opposition to, 120-123, 129136; support for, 126-129, 137; vote for, Friendly Appeal, A, discussed, 228-232; answer Meeting. to, 238. See also Pine Street Fugitive Slave Act, passage of, 32; opposition to in North, 35; movement for repeal of, 35; operation of, 36; defended, 46-48; enforcement of, 60-63, 72-73; mentioned, 231. See also Union Safety Committee. Full, Philip more, 7onC, letter of to President FillFuller, *4-*5 Jerome, on New York merchants, Gadsden Purchase, 90 Gallatin, James (Banker), supports Lincoln, 200; speech of, 202-203; supports Compromise, 251; bids on government loan, 3oon; mentioned, 237, 298, 308 Galveston Bay and Texas Land Company, mentioned, 18 Garibaldi, Guiseppe, honored by New York merchants, 237 Garnett, Muscoe R. H., on effects of secession, 22 Garrison, C. K., activities of in NicaraGeneral gua, Union Association, 80 121 Genet, Henry W., opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, non Georgia, Union victory in, 75; stay laws in, 218; 249n secession movement in, 225; secedes, Gerard, James W. (Lawyer), denounces abolitionists, 46; defends Compromise of 1850, 46-47; urges formation of Union party, 48; opposes Nebraska bill, 92, 96; opposes Rnow-Nothing movement, nsn; warns New York merchants, 194; mentioned, 298 Globe. See New York Globe Goodhue, Jonathan (Shipping Merchant), opposes extension of slavery, i6n Goodhue, Robert C. (Shipping Merchant), opposes Nebraska bill, 96; supports Lincoln, 200

344 Goodhue and Company, oppose Morrill tariff, 262 Gourdin, Henry, 225, 232n Government loan, failure of, 243-244; payments on, defaulted, 244; bids for, 246, 266, 30on; relation of, to Compromise, 263-265; significance of, 300 Graaf, D. E., and Taylor, advertisement of, 208 Grain trade, depression in, 209 Granger, Francis, and split in Whig party, 39n; supports Compromise, 267, 270 Gray, John A. C. (Commission Merchant), supports Republican party, 117; confers with Democratic Merchants, 131; aids Fremont, 13m Greeley, Horace, on Election of 1852, 86-87; confers with Eli Thayer, 97; attacks New York merchants, 106-107, 154-155; appeals to New York merchants, 113-114; on Panic of 1857, i42n; on Election of i860, 193; mentioned, 315, 318. See also New York Tribune. Green, John C. (Banker), confers with President Buchanan; supports Compromise, 248-249, 25 m Greene, Bronson C. (Lawyer), mentioned, 267, 270, 274, 311 Greenpoint (L. I.) Watchman, on Republic of New York, 288 Griffin, Francis, 56n Grinnell, Henry (Shipping Merchant), opposes extension of slavery, 20; supports Clay's Compromise plan, 25; opposes steamship contracts, 53n; abandons Fillmore for Buchanan, 134; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 150; denounced, 154; role of in Election of i860, 179; mentioned, 55, 119, 134, 162, 227n, 274, 298, 308 Grinnell, Minturn and Company, oppose Morrill tariff, 262; mentioned, 27, 235 Grinnell, Moses H. (Shipping Merchant), presents gift to Webster, 27; attacks Union Safety Committee, 53n, 55n; on split in Whig party, 67; opposes Nebraska bill, 91-92, 94, 95-96; and New England Emigrant Aid Company, 98, 102; aids Eli Thayer, 101; promotes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 109; praises William R. Marcy, 122; contributes toRepublican party, 137; supports Lincoln, 188, 190; approves plan

INDEX to reinforce Major Anderson, 242; home of visited by Lincoln, 271; mentioned, 82n, 89, io3n, io4n, 126, 237, 238, 298, 308, 311. See also Grinnell, Minturn and Company. Griswold, George (Shipping and Tea Merchant, Capitalist), opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; supports Clay's Compromise plan, 25; presents gift to Webster, 27; defends Compromise of 1850, 42; refuses to support Winfield Scott, 86; opposes Nebraska bill, g2n, 96; mentioned, i8n, 82n, io4n, 126 Griswold, George, Jr. (Capitalist), supports Lincoln, 200; mentioned, 55, 162 Griswold, Nathaniel (Shipping Merplan, 25 chant), supports Clay's Compromise Griswold, Samuel L. (Commission Me chant), supports Republican party, 117 Grow, Galusha A., on Compromise, 257, 258 Guilford County Mining Company (North Carolina), 3n Haidee, slave ship, 166 Hallock, Gerard (Publisher), organizes Southern Aid Society, gn; plans Pine Street meeting, 227, 229; mentioned, 132, 237, 274 Hamilton, James A. (Lawyer), plans Whig Convention, 114; supports Fremont, 125; appeals to Southerners, 226; plans to aid i04n Major Anderson; 241-242; mentioned, Hamlet, James, fugitive slave, 35-36 Hammond and King, 25n Hards. See Democratic party, split in. Hardware Board of Trade, on role of Banks, 211; mentioned, 308 Hardware trade, credit system in, 216 Harper, James (Publisher), 133, 274 Harper's Ferry, raid at, 156 248-249 Hart, Emanuel B., supports Compromise, Hartford (Conn.), 7 Havemeyer, William F. (Sugar Refiner), supports Democratic party, 37n; defends Compromise of 1850, 42; opposes Nebraska bill, 92n, 96; denounces Lecompton Constitution, 150; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; role of in Election of i860, 172, i8on; mentioned, io4n, 132, 179, 227n, 237, 274, 308, 311

INDEX Haws, Robert T. (Dry Goods Merchant), 111 Heard, Charles, and Company, advertisement of, 209 Henrey and Company, 226 Henry, Joshua J. (Dry Goods Merchant), defends Compromise of 1850, 42; attacked, 44; role of in Election of i860, 172, 177, 17cm; mentioned, 132, Henrys, Smith and Townsend, move to Savannah, 282 Herald. See New York Herald. Herrick, Elias H., opposes Know-Nothing movement, ngn Hewitt, Abram S. (Iron Manufacturer), 298 Hewitt, Lees and Company, 2n Hide trade, depression in, 209 Hilliard, Henry W., on Election of i860, i92n Hoe, Richard M. (Manufacturer), opposes Know-Nothing movement, ngn Hoffman, Ogden (Lawyer), opposes Nebraska bill, 95; mentioned, 55 Hone, Philip (Auctioneer), denounces abolitionists, i4n; on struggle in Congress, 15; opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; on secession, 21, 23; on Webster's speech, 26-27; on Compromise of 1850, 34 Hotaling, Samuel (Dry Goods Merchant), opposes expansion of slavery, 2on; breaks with Fillmore, 126; mentioned, 119, 126 Howard Association of New Orleans, aids poor of New York, gn Howard Association of Norfolk, honors New York merchant, 9 Howard, George B., praises Thurlow Weed, 235 Howland, Gardiner G. (Shipping Merchant), endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151; denounced, 154. See also Howled and Aspinwall. Howland, George (Shipping Merchant), defends Compromise of 1850, 42 Howland, William S. (Shipping Merchant), opposes expansion of slavery, 2on Howland and Aspinwall, oppose Annexation of Texas, 18; oppose Morrill tariff, 262; bid on government loan, 30on. See also William H. Aspinwall, Gardiner G. Howland.

209

345

Hubbard, N. T.,plan, and 25 Sons, support Clay's Compromise Hull, H. D., and Company, circular of, Hunt, Seth, i03n Hunt, Washington, criticizes Fugitive Slave Act, 41-42; opposition to, 41-42; opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 109; address of, 133-134; advocates Union ticket, 173, 174; on Elecii5n tion of i860, 207; mentioned, 38, 41, Hunt, Wilson G. (Dry Goods merchant), supports Democratic party, 37n; opposes Nebraska bill, 96; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; role of, in Election of i860, 172, i7gn; plans Pine Street meeting, 227; supports Compromise, 251; mentioned, 132, i34n, 162, 179, i8on, 229, 237 Huss and Hunter, support Republican party, 117 Illinois Central Railroad, 214 Importers, 216 Independent, The, on New York merchants, 29; proprietors of, 44 Indian Trust Fund, 243 Irving, John T. (Lawyer), i6n Jackson, Andrew, 252 Jackson, J. P., 200 Jacksonian Democracy, attitude of New York merchants toward, 37 Jacksonville (Ala.), 191 Jaffray, J. R., and Son, blacklisted, i6on Jaffray, Robert (Dry Goods Merchant), denounces abolitionists, i4n Jay, John, on slave trade, 167-168 Jerry -Rescue, 72 Jobbers, 216 Johnson, Herschel merchants, 194 V., warns New York Johnson, S.chanaM., n, 124 letter of to James BuJohnson, W'illiam F., 118, 119 Jones, J. Q. (Banker), 200 Journal of Commerce. See New York Journal of Commerce. Kansas, Southern emigration to, 100; "Border Ruffians" in, 100; merchants of, 101; issue of, 107-108; 149-153- See also Nebraska bill. Kansas League, New York, io3n

INDEX Kansas-Nebraska Act, opposition to, 11046 3111 Kelly, Robert (Dry Goods Merchant), denounces abolitionists, i4n; supports Democratic party, J7n Kennedy, John A., on arms traffic, 29cm Kent, Poag and plan, Company, Compromise 25 support Clay's Kent, William, 103, io4n, 179 Kerrigan, James E., 294 Ketcham, Edgar (Lawyer), supports Republican party, 117 Ketchum, Hiram (Lawyer), opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; supports Clay's Compromise plan, 25; on appointment ofWebster, 32; on split in Whig party, 39; defends Compromise of 1850, 42; letter of to President Fillmore, 57; opposes Nebraska bill, 9211, 95-96; and slave trade, 168; on struggle in Congress, 170; advocates Union ticket, 173-174; on Cooper Institute meeting, 180; on secession, 228; mentioned, 56n, 82n, 119, 133, 162, 179, 227n, 234, 274, 308 Ketchum, Morris (Banker), meeting at home of, 25, 40-41; contributes funds to launch Union paper, 250; defends Compromise of 1850, 42; supports Union ticket, i8on; supports Lincoln, 200; mentioned, 57n, 133, 162, 201, 271, 298, 308 Ketchum and Sons, bid on government loan, 30011 Kettell, Thomas Prentice, on Southern trade, 7; on Union, 22-23 King, James G. (Banker), opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; mentioned, 298 King, John A. (Banker), opposes Nebraska bill, 94; aids Republican party, 137; on Compromise, 267; mentioned, iogn, 10411 King, Preston, on Compromise, 254 King, T. Butler, 53n Kingsland, Ambrose C. (Shipping Merchant), elected mayor, 50-51; opposes fusion of Whig and Republican party, 119; mentioned, i29n, 133 Knapp, Shepherd (Hide and Leather Merchant, Banker), defends Compromise of 1850, 42; opposes Nebraska bill, 92, 95n; endorses Union ticket, i8on; supports Lincoln, 200; bids on government loan, 3oon; mentioned, 82 n, 119, 12911, 201, 204, 298

Know-Nothing party, supported, 113; opposed, nsn; vote for, U4n Labor, opposition of, to Nebraska bill, 94n; vote of, in Election of i860, 206 Lamar, C A. L., on slave trade, 167; mentioned, i67n Lamar, G. B. (Banker), and government loan, 266n; on Republic of New York, 293-294; mentioned, 167, 292 Lambert, Edward, and Company, circular of, 221-222 Lamont, Charles chant), 132, i34nA. (Commission MerLathers, Richard (Commission Merchant, Banker), organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; plans Pine Street meeting, 227; delegated to visit South, 231-232; mentioned, 132 of 1850, Francis Lathrop, 42, 55 S., defends Compromise Law, George (Shipping Merchant), supports Douglas, 83; and Know-Nothing movement, 117; promotes fusion of North American and Republican parties, 117-118; speech of, 117-118; plans to acquire Cuba, 12 in; activities of in Nicaragua, 121; supports Fremont, 125; role of in Election of i860, 172; mentioned, 83 Law, Henry W., 103 Lawrence, Amos A., letter of to Moses H. Grinnell, 98; organizes New England Emigrant Aid Company, 98-99; urges support for Buchanan, 120 Lawrence (Kansas), "Sack" of, 100 Leavitt, David braska bill, 93n (Banker), opposes NeLecompton Constitution, supported, 149, 151; denunciation of, 149-150 Lee, Frederick promise plan,R.,25 supports Clay's ComLee, James, 13411 Lemmon, Jonathan, case of, 61-62 Crisis, to91 the People on the Present Letters Lewis, Benedict, iogn, non Lincoln, Abraham, New York merchants urged to vote for, 184-188; opposition to, 191-198, 205-206; support of by New York merchants, 200-204; visits New York City, 271; annoys New York merchants, 272; on demand for concessions to South, 272-273; inaugural address of, 273; policy of, 303-304;

INDEX calls out militia, 304; meets with Union Defense Committee, 311; mentioned, 252, 301, 302, 307 Livingston, Mortimer (Dry Goods Merchant), confers with N. P. Banks, Jr., 131; mentioned, 3n, 132, i34n Livingston, Schuyler (Commission Merchant), defends Compromise of 1850, 55; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151; praises Thurlow Weed, 236; mentioned, 132 Livingston, William H., and Company, support Clay's Compromise plan, 25; appeal to Southerners, 226 Lock wood, Roe (Book Merchant), iosn Long, Henry, case of, 60-61 London Times, quoted, 4; mentioned, 295, 306 Lord and Taylor, advertisement of, 208 Lord, Daniel (Lawyer), supports Clay's Compromise plan, 25; contributes funds to launch Union paper, 25n; opposes Nebraska bill, 96; warns South, 104; and slave trade, 168; on Compromise, 249; on economic effects of secession, 275-276; mentioned, 82n, io4n, 133, 237 Low, A. A. (Silk, Tea and Shipping Merchant), opposes Nebraska bill, 92n, 93n; supports Lincoln, 200; on Pine Street meeting, 234; confers with President Buchanan, 244; supports Compromise, 248, 251, 256; opposes Morrill tariff, 262; mentioned, 227n, 271, 298, 311 Low, James, io4n Lorillard, Peter (Tobacco Merchant), 89, 132 Louisiana, stay laws in, 218; secedes, 24gn Lowell (Mass.), opposition to Fugitive Slave Act in, 35 Ludlow, Edwin, i34n McAlpine, William P., 74n McCurdy, Robert H. (Shipping Merchant), 126, 311 McCutcheon and Livingston, i65n Machado, John A., i65n McHenry, Jerry, case of, 72 McKeon, John, defends secessionists, 228 McMurray, William, 74n McNamee, Theodore (Dry Goods Merchant), opposes Nebraska bill, 95; mentioned, 103, iosn. See also Bowen and McNamee.

847 Macon (Ga.), 220 Magrath, A. C, 232n Maine, 171, 191 Manifest Destiny, attitude of New York merchants toward, 121 Mann, Horace, 45n March, Charles, on Webster's address, 27 Marcy, William R., supported for President, 82; foreign policy praised, 122 Marshall, Charles H. (Shipping Merchant), opposes Nebraska bill, 96; Greeley's estimate of, io6n, i07n; supports Republican party, 117; menMary, 5 tioned, i03n, i04n, 126, 271, 308, 311 Marshall, J. P., and Company, 2 Massachusetts Emigrant Aid Company, plan tors of,resign, 97; 98stock sold, 97; incorporaMather, Fred E., ii3n Mather, John C, 50 Matthews and Company, 220 Matthews, Edward, and Company, 2n Maxwell, Hugh, on meeting to defend Compromise of 1850, 40-41; mentioned, 82n May, Reverend Samuel J., on New York merchants, 14; aids in Jerry-Rescue, 72 Mead, Ralph, and Company, support Clay's Compromise plan, 25 Mechanics Bank, 200 Meeting, to oppose extension of slavery, 16, 19-21; to oppose Annexation of Texas, 18-19; to circulate Webster's Seventh of March address, 27; to support Clay's Compromise plan, 25-26, 31; to oppose Fugitive Slave Act, 35; to defend Compromise of 1850, 40-42, 45-49; to nominate Webster, 81-82; to oppose Nebraska bill, 93-97; on Kansas question, 103; to denounce attack upon Sumner, 104-105; to oppose fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 110-111; of Republican party, 116-117; °* ant*" fusion Whigs, 119-120; to support Fremont, 126-129; to answer N. P. Banks, Jr., 129-134; to 150-153; endorse toBuchanan's administration, denounce John Brown, 162-163; to support Union ticket, 178-179; to support Lincoln, 188-191, 202-203; on secession, 227-232, 237-238; to honor Garibaldi, 237; to support Compromise, 237-238, 255-258; to support the government, 307-311. See also Pine Street meeting.

INDEX Memminger, C. G., 23211 348 Merchants, Boston, oppose Nebraska bill, 88; urge repeal of Fugitive Slave Act, 100; attend Willard's Hotel meeting, 256; support Compromise, 250 Merchants, New York, invest in Southern mines and railroads, 3; own slaves and plantations in South, 3-4; dominate cotton trade, 6-7; social relations of, with Southerners, 8; aid Southerners in need, 9; attitude of toward slavery issue, 13, 24-25, 45-47, 138, 153, 163, 231, 309, 319-322; fear dissolution of the Union, 13, 54, 120-124, 225, 232233; denounce Abolitionists, 14; oppose expansion of slavery, 16, 16-19, 19-21, 24; oppose Annexation of Texas, 16- 19: and land speculation in Texas, 17- i8n; abandon support of Wilmot Proviso, 23-25, 38; endorse Clay's Compromise plan, 23, 25, 26; contribute funds to launch Union paper, 25; endorse Webster's Seventh of March address, 26-27; present gift to Webster, 27-28; New England background of, 27; attacked, 28, 51-53, 114, 132, 153155, 158-161, 163, 179-182, 251-252, 316; disgusted with politicians, 30-31, 169; welcome enactment of Compromise of 1850, 32-33; urge repeal of Fugitive ^Slave Act, 35; and James Hamlet Case, 36; attitude of toward Democratic and Whig parties, 37, 37n; defend Compromise of 1850, 41, 49, 55-63, 71-80; oppose Washington Hunt, 41-42; confer with Webster, 42; influence of in South, 51; celebrate Washington's Birthday, 59-60; invite Clay to address them, 71; nominate Webster for President, 81-82; urge nomination of Fillmore, 82; oppose Seward, 82, 84-87; oppose Winfield Scott, 82, 84-87; support Pierce for President, 84-87; attitude of toward Pacific Railroad, 89; attack Slave Power, 93, 104-105; oppose Nebraska bill, 88-97, 99^ purchase stock in Emigrant Aid Company, 97, 102103; on meetings of Abolitionists, 100; condemn "Sack of Lawrence," 100; aid Kansans, 103-104; condemn attack upon Sumner, 104-105; attitude of, toward Republican party, 107-114, 116117, 120-138; oppose fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 109-116, 119-120; oppose Kansas-Nebraska Act, 110-111;

and Know-Nothing movement, 113; attitude of, toward Manifest Destiny, 121; appeals to, 124, 127-134, 147-148, 171-172, 191; aid Buchanan, 134, 136; aid Republican party, 136-137; division among on sectional struggle, 138; failure of, 139, i3gn, 223; court Southern trade, 145; called defenders of slavery, 148; apathy of toward politics, 148, 169; endorse Buchanan's administration, 150-153; attitude of toward John Brown's raid, 156-158, 162-163; defend South, 161; role of in slave trade, 165-168; oppose control of slave trade, 167-168; refuse to aid Breckenridge and Douglas, 170-171; role of, in Election of i860, 172-180; welcome Union ticket, 180; poverty of, 186; court Western traders, 184; support Republican party in Election of i860, 188-191, 200-204; fear election of Lincoln, 197-198, 205-207; threaten employees, 206; vote of in Election of i860, 206-207; attack role of Banks, 211; on Southern debts, 221-222, 302; reaction of to Lincoln's election, 224; attitude of toward secession, 224-233, 239-241, 275-276, 282-284, 292-295, 299, 301-311, 314-317; appeal to South, 226232; urge concessions to South, 233, 235-238, 272-273; honor Garibaldi, 237; denounce South Carolina, 239-240; objectives of in secession crisis, 240241; visit President Buchanan, 241, 244, 246; praise Major Anderson, 242-243; and government loan, 243-247; dislike Howell Cobb, 244; support Compromise, 248-249, 251, 253-259; support Border State plan, 251; oppose Morrill tariff, 261-264, 280-281; urge use of financial power to achieve Compromise, 263; advocate peaceful separation, 275276; effect of tariff war on, 280-284; and Republic of New York, 285, 287, 289-290, 292-297; attitude of toward Civil War, 298, 304-305, 306-311, 317; demand enforcement of laws, 297-298, 300-301, 303; attitude of, toward coercion, 299, 301-303; sell arms to South, 299n; condemn privateering, 310; effect of repudiation of Southern debts on, 302; support 306-311, 317 government in Civil War, Merchants, Philadelphia, oppose Nebraska bill, 88; support Compromise,

INDEX 250-251; attend Willard's Hotel meeting, 256 Merchants, Southern, oppose stay laws, 218- 219; oppose repudiation of debts, 219- 220 Miller and Develin, 103 Minturn, Robert B. (Shipping and Commission Merchant), endorses Webster's address, 27; opposes Nebraska bill, 92n, 95; attitude of toward James Buchanan, 122-123; praises Thurlow Weed, 235-236; mentioned, 82n, 227n, 271, 274, 298, 308. See also Grinnell, Minturn and Company. Mississippi, stay laws in, 218; secedes, 249" Missouri, 101 Mitchell, Helson, 232n Mitchell, R. G., on Civil War, 307 Mobile (Ala.), effect of tariff war on, 280 Mora, Alfanso and Company, i65n Morgan, Edwin D. (Grocery Merchant), on Wilmot Proviso, 24; promotes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 109; on Republican party in New York City, 116; invites North Americans to join Republican party, 117; on Republican ticket, 118-119; raises funds for Republican party, 136-137; on Peace Convention, 267; mentioned, 102-103, n6n, 126 Morgan, George D., praises Thurlow Weed, 236 Morgan, M., and Sons, 298 Morgan, Matthew, organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151; supports Union ticket, i8on; mentioned, 82n, 132, i34n Morning Star, S$n Morrill, Justin H., on Fernando Wood, 288n Morrill tariff, provisions, 261; relation of, to secession movement, 262; threatens prosperity of New York City, 261-262, 277-282; opposition of New York merchants to, 261-264, 290, 292; effects of, on warehousing system, 261-262, 266; and Republic of New York, 288, 290, 292 Morse, Samuel F. B., 274 Nashville Convention, accomplishments of, 30; mentioned, 23

349 National Peace Convention. See Peace Convention. 80-81, 85Union Convention, plans for, National National Union Party, plans for, 66, Nebraska bill, introduction of, 88; opposition to,88-99; relation of to Pacific Railroad, 89-91 Neill79-81 Brothers, circular of, 209 Nelson, W., and Sons, 298 Nevins, Townsend and Company, oppose Annexation of Texas, 18 Newark, 7 Newburyport (Mass.), 80 New England Emigrant Aid Company, organization of, 98-99; contributions to,28102-103 3 New Jersey Railroad Company, 200 New Orleans, meetings in, 171, 191; effect of tariff war on, 277-282 New Orleans Bulletin, on direct trade, New Orleans Crescent, attacks New York City, 12 New Orleans Delta, on New York merchants, 168; report of New York correspondent, 281 Newspapers, anti-Republican, 147, 148, 194, 204; Republican, 145-146, 180, 184-188, tioned,203-204, 224, 252, 288; men43, 51 New York and Erie Railroad, 60 New York Central Railroad, 276 New York City, called pro-Southern center, 1, 145, 168; Southern business houses in, 1-2; dependence of on South, 4-8, 130, 133, 145-147, 148; cotton trade in, 5-7; as symbol of Northern "Bloodsucking," 10-12; reasons for domination of Southern trade by, 12-13; Branch Mint in, 52; opposition to Nebraska bill in, 88-94; effect of Kansas issue on, 99, 105; opposition in to "Sack of Lawrence," 100; opposition in to fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 109; vote in, in Election of 1856, 137; Panic of 1857 m> 139_141I pro-Southern influence in, 145, 168; hostility toward in South, 146-147, 158-159; attacked, 168; slave trade in, 164-168; destruction of predicted, 196-197; Panic of i860 in, 208-214; prosperity of threatened by Morrill tariff, 261-262, 277-282; effect of secession on, 275-276;

INDEX 50 movement in, 285-295; senti3secession menttioned, in on29, 35Civil War, 306-311; menNew York Clearing House Association, 212 New York Commercial Advertiser, on business conditions in South, 145 New York Courier and Enquirer, on Lemmon Case, 62 New York Daily News, on Republic of New York, 288; on Civil War, 304; mentioned, 194, 307 New York Day Book, organizes black list, 44; on Republic of New York, 208 New York Evening Post, on Union Safety Committee, 70; on Election of 1852, 86; on Kansas question, 102; on New York City, 105, 168; on meetings of merchants, 127, 135; appeals to merchants, 187; on Morrill tariff, 278-279 New York Express, and government advertising,in; 5 mentioned, 194, 285 New York Firms. See Firms, New York. New York Globe, attacks abolitionists, 28 York Herald, on cotton trade, 5; New attacks abolitionists, 28; on fugitive slaves, 99; on Panic of 1857, 140-141; on New York merchants, 169, 178; on Southern trade, 146, 183; on Election of i860, 193, 205-206; on Southern debts, 217; on government loan, 264; on Morrill tariff, 278; on Republic of New York, 287-288, 290; on Civil War, 304-305; mentioned, i23n, 194, 240 New York Hotel, meetings at, 134-135 New York Hotel Fund, 135-136 New York Journal of Commerce, on Compromise of 1850, 32, 33; and Hamlet case, 36; on secession, 40; and Union ticket, 42-43, 74; on Union Safety Committee, 58; on Election of 1851, 78; on Panic of 1857, 139; on New York merchants, 148; on proLincoln meeting, 204; on Southern merchants, 217; on South Carolina, 240; on Compromise, 250; on Morrill tariff, 261; on government loan, 263; letters to, 285; mentioned, 21, 30, 44, 124, 194, 200, 307 New York State Chamber of Commerce. See Chamber of Commerce. New York State Legislature, on Compromise of 1850, 25; on Peace Convention, 266-267

NewCase,York62 Superior Court, on Lemmon New York Times, on meeting of merchants, 127; on New York Hotel Fund, 135; on Southern trade, 161; on New York City, 168; on Republican party, i85n; on Morrill tariff, 278, 279-280 New York Tribune, on New York merchants, 26, 181; on Election of 1850, 50-51; on Election of 1851, 72, 77, 78; on Union Safety Committee, 73; on fugitive slaves, 99; on New York City, 105, 168; on Southern trade, 161; on New York Hotel Fund, 134-135; appeals to New York merchants, 185, 187-188; on Panic of i860, 214; on Compromise, 252; on government loan, 265; on 303 Lincoln's inaugural address, Sumter, 273; on Morrill tariff, 278; on Fort

Non-Intercourse movements. See South, non-intercourse movements in. North American party, fuses with Republican party, North Carolina, 172117-118 Noyes, William Curtis (Lawyer), on New York merchants, 301; mentioned, 237, 267, 268

O'Conor, Charles (Lawyer), defends Compromise of 1850, 47; urges formation of Union party, 48; defends slavery, 163; warns New York merchants, secessionists, 228; men194; defends tioned, 83n, i79n, 234 Ogden, David B., 53n, 151 Ogden, James Depeyster (Commission Merchant), on mentioned, 298 South Carolina, 239; Ogden, C. W., 126 Ohio Lifeof, Insurance Trust Company, failure 139 Old-Line Whigs, convention of, i2on. See also Anti-fusion Whigs. Olyphant and promise plan,Sons, 25 support Clay's ComOpdyke, George (Dry Goods Merchant), on compromise, 233; on Morrill tariff, 263; mentioned, 298, 3oon, 308 Ostend Manifesto, 121, 123 Pacific Railroad, relation of to Nebraska bill, 89; support of, 89-91; routes, 90-91; Railroa need for, 118, 129, 186 Pacific d Compan y, 89

89 INDEX Panic of 1854, 99 Panic of 1857, cause of, 139-140; failures during, 139-140; effect of on politics, 140-143, 147-148, 153; use of by Republicans, 141-142; effect of on West, 143144; effect of on South, 144, 146-147; action of Banks during, 211 Panic of i860, causes of, 198-199, 215; advertisements during, 208-209; conditions during, 209-211, 222-223; failures during, 223, 260; action of Banks during, 212-214 Parish, Daniel, and Company, 2 Parker, John A., letter of to Richard Lathers, 223n Peace Convention, called, 266-267; delegates to, 267, 27on; speech of William E. Dodge at, 268-269; proposals of for Compromise, 267-268, 270; conflict at, 269; accomplishments of, 270-271 Peace Measures. See Compromise of 1850. Pennsylvania, Elections in, 75, 134-135 Perit, Peletiah (Shipping and Commission Merchant), opposes Nebraska bill, 95; on need for Republican victory, 189; on Civil War, 308; mentioned, 1040, 188, 298, 308, 310 Pentz F. (Dry Goods Merchant), 3n Personal Liberty Laws, movement for repeal of, 230 Phelps, Anson G. (Hardware Merchant), organizes Southern Aid Society, gn; opposes Nebraska bill, 95 Phelps, Royal (Commission Merchant), letters of, 122, 227, 233; supports Lecompton Constitution, 150; confers with N. P. Banks, Jr., 131; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; apologizes to Gerrit Smith, i57n; on South Carolina, 240; on Civil War, 308-309; mentioned, ii3n, 132, i34n, 162, 232, 274, 298, 308, 311 Phelps, Thomas W., mentioned, 45n, 251 Phelps, Dodge and Company, adopt short credit system, 216-217; mentioned, 2, 311 Philadelphia, Election of 1851 in, 75; opposition to Nebraska bill in, 88; slave trade in, 167; Election of i860 in, 20m Philadelphia Press, report of New York correspondent, 221, 250, 260, 277, 281 Phoenix, J. Phillips, non

Phoenix Mining and Manufacturing Company (of Virginia), 3n Pierce, Franklin K., nominated for President, 83; support of, 84-87; policy of, Pierrepont, Edward I., 226 Pinckney, Thomas C, 226 1 Pine Street meeting, attendance, 227, 228, 35 232; plans for, 227; speeches at, 228; address of, 229-230; resolutions adopted at, 231; significance of, 232; mentioned,

308 *75> Nathan Piatt, C, 82n, 179 Polk, James K., attitude of New York merchants toward, 121-122 Pollard, Charles A., 318 Preston, William, letter of, to James Buchanan, 122 Prime, Ward and King, oppose Annexation of Texas, 18 Privateering, condemned, 310 Provisions trade, 15 Publishing trade, credit system in, 216 Rader and Company, circular of, 209 Raid, John Brown's, mentioned, 156 denounced, 162-163; Raleigh (N. Car.) Standard, on New York City, 191-192 Ramsay, Albert C, on John B. Floyd, i32n; letter of to James Buchanan, 134; on New York Hotel Fund, 135 Randall, Henry S., 74n 299 Raymond, chants,Henry J., on New York merRepublican party, opposition to by New York merchants, 107-114, 120-138; absorbs Whig party, 108, io8n; gains support in New York City, 116-117, 126-127, 200-204; appeals of to New York merchants, 125, 141-142, 184-188; split in on Compromise, 254-255, 257258 Republicans, attack New York merchants, 251-252; speeches of on Compromise, 257-258; on government loan, 264-265 Republic of New York, advocated, 285288, 290-294; plans for, 287-288, 290295; opposition to, 288, 297; supported, 287, 289-295; John Forsyth on, 291292; significance of, 295-296 Richmond, Dean, role of in Election of i860, 176-177, 178; mentioned, ig2n Richmond Dispatch, attacks New York City, 316-317

INDEX 352 Richmond Enquirer, on New York City, 158 Richmond Examiner, on New York City, 304 Richter, Erhard, g$n

Rise and Progress of the Bloody Outbreak at Harper's Ferry, The, 157 Rise of American Civilization, The (Beard), 318 "Reign of Terror," The, in Election of i860, 193-199 Roberts, C. R., on Civil War, 306 Roberts, Marshall O. (Shipping Merchant), supports Clay's Compromise plan, 25; contributes to launch Union paper, 25n;55 supports Lincoln, 188; mentioned, Rogers and Company, 2 Roosevelt, Samuel J., 196 Ruffin, Edmund, warns New York merchants, 196 Ruggles, Samuel B. (Lawyer), warns South, 104-105; plans Whig Convention, 114; addresses New York merchants, 129-131; mentioned, i03n, i04n, ii5n, 129, 133, 298, 308 Russell, R. R., on direct trade conventions, 10 Russell, William H., on Republic of New York, 295; on New York merchants, 306; on Civil War, 316 Rutgers, Henry (Landed Magnate), opposes expansion of slavery, i6n Rynders, York, 293Isaiah, on Republic of New St. Louis, Chamber of Commerce in, 101; trade of, 278, 280 Sandford, General C. W., on plan to aid Major Anderson, 241-242 Sandford, Edward (Lawyer), defends Fugitive Slave Act, 46n San Francisco, 128, 261 "Satanic Press," 28, 278 Savannah, effect of tariff war on, 277278, 282 Savannah Republican, New York correspondent of,180; on New York merchants, 282 Sayers, Dr. Louis A., on Republic of New York, 292-293 Schell, Augustus, on New York Hotel Fund, 135-136; role of in Election of i860, 199; mentioned, i34n

Scott, Winfield, opposition to, 82, 84-87; on plan to aid Major Anderson, 242 Secession, Movement for in 1850, 15, 26, 30, 34, 39; in 1856, 123-124; relation of debt question to, 215-216, 302; in South Carolina, 224, 238; attitude of New York merchants toward, 224-232, 239-241, 275-276, 282-284, 292-295, 299, 301-311, 313-317; extent of, 249, 24gn; economic effects of, 275-276; relation of direct trade to, 283-284; in New York City, 285-295. See also Republic of New York. Sectional struggle, effect of, on business, 29-30, Dudley, 158-161 i8n Selden, Sivan, W. K„ 126 Seward, William H., opposition to, 38, 50, 63, 82, 84-87; on Compromise of 1850, 38; champions steamship contracts, 53; letter of, to James B. Taylor, 85; applauded for stand on Nebraska bill, 92; Rochester speech of, 155, 157; attacks merchants, 181-182; on Com107, 119 promise, 253-254, 255n; mentioned, 33, Sewaridsm, 38, 63 Seymour, Horatio, 43, 50 Shepherd,liam R.Lorenzo B., letter of, to WilMarcy, 83 Sherman, John, on Compromise, 258 Sherman, Watts (Banker), organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; apologizes to Gerrit Smith, i57n; role of in Election of i860, 172, i8on; mentioned, i34n, 162, 232, 274, 298 Sherman Brothers, 9n Shiff Brothers and Company, 132 Shoe and Leather Reporter, on Panic of i860, 209-210 York, Daniel 285 Sickles, F., on Republic of New 127 "Silver-Greys," 38, ^gn, 66 Simpson, Joseph P., 95n Slavery, attitude of New York toward, 13-14, 24-25, 45-47, 138, 153, 163-164, 231, 309, 319-322; effect of on South, Slave Power, opposition to, 93, 104-105 Slave trade, New York, history of, 164; extent of, 165-166; role of merchants in, 165, i66n, 166-167; coquet of, 165-167; profits in, 166-167 Slidell, John, letter of, to James Buchanan, 83; mentioned, 82

INDEX Smith, Gerrit, aids in Jerry-Rescue, 72; role of, in John137Brown's raid, 157 Smith, Truman, Smith, Wessel S., 50 Softs, denounce Kansas-Nebraska Act, 113. See also Democratic party, split in. South, The, hostility in toward New York City, 10-14, 146-147, 158-159, 316-317; direct trade movements in, 13, 283-284; secession movement in, 15, 26, 30, 34, 123-124, 224, 238, 249, 24gn; opposition in to Compromise of 1850, 34; Union movement in, 34, 36-37, 39, 39n, 51, 72, 75, 171; non-intercourse movement in, 10-12, 40, io6n, 159161; defended, 11 in; effect of slavery on, 127; effect of Panic of 1857 in, 144, 146-147; prosperity in, 144-145; trade of analyzed, 145-146; droughts in, 184; effect of Panic of i860 in, 210-211, 221-223; merchants in, 217; stay laws in, 218-219; expects support of New York merchants, 314316 Carolina, stay laws in, 218; secesSouth sion movement in, 224; secedes, 238240; Commissioners of, 241; mentioned, 219 Southern Aid Society, organizers of, 9; speech of William E. Dodge at, 169170 Southern corporations, 3 Southern debts, in Election of i860, 195-196, 198, 203; difficulties in collection of, 195, 215-217, 302; problem of, 215; relation of to secession, 216, 302; Republicans on, 217; amount of, 218, 2i8n, 302; opposition to repudiation of, 219-220; effect of on New York merchants, 302; repudiated, 313 Southern Mercantile and Business Agency, 160 Southerners, social relations of with New Yorkers, 8; praise New York City, 9; urged to purchase in Southern cities, 11-12. See also South, The. Southern trade, profits in, for New Yorkers, 7-8; effect of sectional struggle on, 22, 30, 33, 158-161; during Panic of 1857, 144-146, 147; decline in, in i860, 183-184; credit system in, 216; courted by New York merchants, 217; during Panic of i860, 220-221; losses in, 222-223; during secession, 277

353 Southern Wealth and Northern Profits (Kettell), 7 Soutter, James T., i34n, 227 Spain, Sparks, 121 W. H., iogn Spaulding, E. G., letter of to Thurlow Weed, 79; consults New York bankers, 244- 245; on government loan, 245246 Doncho and Strange, 313 Speed, Spofford, Paul (Shipping, Commission Merchant), defends Compromise of 1850, 42; mentioned, io4n, 162. See also Spofford, Tileston and Company. Spofford, Tileston and Company, oppose Annexation of Texas, 18; honor Webster; mentioned, 2-3 Sprague, E. D., 133 Stability of the Union (Kettell), 22 Star thed, West, mentofione 249 fired upon, 239, 242; Stay laws, opposition to, 218-219 Stea mships, and the Union movement, 52-53

Stephens, Alexander H., supports National Union Convention, 80; criticized, 293; mentioned, 295, 307n Stevens, John A. (Banker), condemns Slave Power, 105; mentioned, i04n, 245- 246, 271, 308 Stewart, Alexander T. (Dry Goods Merchant), praises Thurlow Weed, 236237; on Compromise, 236-237, 259-260; on Morrill tariff, 262; on Southern debts, 313-314; mentioned, 162, 227n, 298, Exchange, 308, 311 308 Stock Stock Market, effect on of reports of Compromise, 266, 270-271, 272; effect on of relief of Fort Sumter, 303 Stone, Hayward and Company, mentioned, 196, 220 Storm King, slave ship, 166 Stout and ists, i4n Ingalsby, denounce abolitionStreet, George, 159 of, 223Adriance and Company, failure Strong, Sugar trade, depression in, 210 Sumner, attacked by Preston Brooks, Charles, 104 Suydam andtionists, Company, denounce abolii4n Suydam, Sage and Company, defend Clay's Compromise plan, 25

354

Y.), opposition in to FugiSyracuse (N. tive Slave Act, 35; conventions in, 60-70; Jerry-Rescue in, 72 Talcott, Frederick (Dry Goods Merchant), 3n, 132 Talcott, George, 117 Tallmadge, Frederick A., defends South, 11 in; mentioned, lisn Tallmadge amendment, 16 Tappan, Arthur (Silk Merchant), aids Abolition cause, 13-14 Tappan, Charles S., iogn Tappan, Lewis (Silk Merchant), aids Abolition cause, 13-14; on Webster, 27; on Compromise of 1850, 33 Tariff, Confederate, effect of, on New York City, 277-282 Tariff, need for reform of, 186. See also Morrill tariff. Tariffs, War of the, effect of, on New York City, 277-284; effect of, on Southern cities, 277-284; and Republic of New York, 288, 290, 292; uncertainty created by, 302, 305 Taylor, James B., 85 Taylor, Moses (Shipping, Sugar Merchant), opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; supports Democratic party, 37n; defends Compromise of 1850, 42, 55; opposes Nebraska bill, 9211, 96; supports Lecompton Constitution, 150; denounced, 154; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156; role of in Election of i860, 172, 179, i8on; confers with President Buchanan, 244; supports Compromise, 248-249; opposes Morrill tariff, 262; mentioned, 45n, 53n, io4n, 132, 237, 298, 308 Taylor, Zachariah, conflict of, with Henry Clay, 31; death of, 32 Telkampf and Retching, circular of, 210 Texas, Annexation of, opposed, 16-19; land speculation in, 17-1811; boundary bill, 32, 52; secedes, 24911 Thayer, Eli, solicits aid in New York City, 97, 100-101; on Emigrant Aid Company, 98; addresses New York merchants, 10 1 Thomas, Philip, on condition of Treasury, 243; accused of aiding secessionists, 244; resigns cabinet post, 246 Thompson, J. Edgar, on South Carolina, 239n

INDEX Thompson, Jonathan, opposes extension of slavery, i6n Tilden," Samuel J., i79n, 229 Tileston, Thomas (Shipping and Commission Merchant), mentioned, 22711, 237, 271, and 274, Company. 298. See also Spofford, Tileston Tilton and Maloney, and Hamlet Case, Times. See New York Times. Tobacco trade, importance of, 4-5; de35-36 pression in, 209; credit system in, 216 Toombs, Robert S., supports National Union Convention, 80 Townsend, Henry, 117 of, 223 Traydon, McReery and Company, failure Trenholm, George A., 232n Trenholm Brothers, 2 Tribune. See New York Tribune. Trowbridge, Bright and Company, gn Trumbull, Lyman, 251, 263 Ullman, Daniel, 74n Union, Past and Future, How it Works and How to Save it, The (Garnett), 22 Union, The, steamer, 27 Union Association, in Election of 1850, 49-5o, 74 Union Committee of Fifteen. See Committee of Fifteen. Union Defense Committee, members of, 311; organization of, 31m; activities of, 311, 313; significance of, 312 Union movement, Newburyport (Mass.), 80 movement, New York City. See Union Compromise of 1850, Election of i860, Merchants, New York, New York City, Union Safety Committee. Union movement, South. See South, Union movement in. Union party, in 1850, 47-50; in 1851, 74-77. See also National Union party, Union Safety Union ticket. "Uni on Pled ge,"Committee, 79 Union Safety Committee, formation of, 49, 52; attacked, 51-53; opposition to, 53n, 55n; members of, 55, 56; raises funds, 57; publications of, 57-58; appeals of, 58-59, 60, 62, 72-73, 76, 80; honors defenders of the Union, 59; celebrates Clay's birthday, 59; celebrates Washington's Birthday, 59-60; defends Fugitive Slave Act, 60-63; °P*

INDEX poses election of Hamilton Fish, 63-66; enters politics, 63; opposes Seward, 63; opposes Whig Unity Conference, 6768; role of in Election of 1851, 69-78; sends delegation to Washington, 79; sponsors "Union Pledge," 79; organizes "General Union Association," 80; issues call for National Union Convention, 80; on election of Pierce, 87 Union ticket, in 1850, 42-43; in 1851, 74-78; in i860, 179-181 Utica (N. Y.), conventions in, 39, 41 Vail, Henry P., on Civil War, 306-307 Vanderbilt, Cornelius (Shipping Merchant, Capitalist), activities of in Nicaragua, 121 ; mentioned, 82n Vanderpoel, A., ii3n Van Dyke, Reverend Henry, sermon of, 234-235; on Republic of New York, 289 Van Nest, Abraham, opposes Nebraska bill, 95; mentioned, 132 Van Schaick, Myndert (Dry Goods Merchant), opposes expansion of slavery, 2on; supports Clay's Compromise plan, 23-24; denounced as abolitionist, 23-24; supports Democratic party, 37n; supports Marcy, 82; opposes Nebraska bill, 92n, 95-96; organizes Democratic Vigilant Association, 156 Varick, Richard, opposes expansion of slavery, i6n Varnum, Joseph B., lion, 119 Vicksburg (Miss.) Daily Whig, attacks New York City, 10 Virginia, conditions in, during Panic of i860, 223; and secession, 24gn, 266; calls Peace Convention, 266-267; on Compromise, 271 Volunteer Democratic Association of New York, role of in Election of i860, 172-173, 176, 177. See also Committee of Fifteen, Election of i860. Wadsworth, James W., opposes Compromise, 267 Wall Street, meeting in, 202-203; mentioned, 26, 27, 30, 242 Warehousing system, effect of Morrill tariff on, 261-263 Warren and Wilson, move to Savannah, 282 Washington, George, birthday of celebrated, 59-60 Webb, William H. (Shipbuilder), opposes expansion of slavery, 2on; de-

355 fends Compromise of 1850, 42, 55; endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151; mentioned, 4511, 55, 82n Webster, Daniel, Seventh of March address of, 26-27; praised by New York merchants, 26-28; appointed to Fillmore's Cabinet, 32; confers with New York merchants, 42; speeches of published, 58; honored by Union Safety Committee, 59; invited to address New York merchants, 60; supports Hamilton Fish, 65; nominated for President by New York merchants, 81-82; supported in New York City, 85; death of, 86; mentioned, 32, 38, 81, 127 Webster,cans, 120Fletcher, denounces RepubliWebster, Sidney, on Civil War, 307-308 Weed, Thurlow, attacks President Fillmore, 67; attacks New York merchants, 114; advocates concessions to South, 235; praised by New York merchants, 235-236; mentioned, 36 Weizel and Weidemeyer, circular of, 209 Welles, Gideon, on funds for Republican campaign, 136; mentioned, 295, 303. The, 3°6 effect of Panic of 1857 in, West, 143-144; trade of analyzed, 146; prosperity in, 182-183; Panic of i860 in, 210-211 Western trade, depression in, 143-145; analyzed, 146; revival of, 182-183; courted by New York merchants, 184; as issue in Election of i860, 184-185 Westervelt, Jacob A. (Shipbuilder), 53n Westervelt, James A. (Shipbuilder), 179 Wetmore, Abraham M. (Hardware Merchant), opposes expansion of slavery, 2on Wetmore, A. R. (Hardware Merchant), supports Compromise, 251 Wetmore, Prosper M. (Dry Goods, Shipping Merchant), denounces abolitionists, i4n; on effect of sectional struggle on business, 30; mentioned, 82, 311 Wetmore, Robert C. (Shipping Merchant), defends Compromise of 1850, 25n, 42, 57n Wetmore, William C. (Shipping Merchant), supports Democratic party, 37n; mentioned, 298 Whig Executive Committee, New York City, opposition to fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 109-110

INDEX Whig 356 General Committee, Brooklyn, opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, no Whig General Committee, New York City, endorses Clay's Compromise plan, 26; opposes election of Hamilton Fish, 64-65; opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 111 Whig party, attitude of New York merchants toward, 37-38; Conventions of, 81-82; continuance of planned, 114115. See also Anti-Fusion Whigs; OldLine Whigs. Whig party of New York, conventions of, 38, 70, 109; split in, 38-39; Unity Conference of, 66-68; fused with Republican party, 108, io8n, 109, iogn; continuance ofplanned, 114-115. See also Anti-Fusion Whigs; Old-Line Whigs. Whigs, Anti-Fusion. See Anti-Fusion Whigs. Whigs, Old-Line. See Old-Line Whigs. Whig Young Men's General Committee, New York, opposes election of Hamilton Fish, 65; opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, non White Lists, 160, 16m Whiting and Company, 271 Whitlock, B. A. and E. A., firm of, moves to163Savannah, 282 Whitlock, Benjamin (Wine Merchant), Whitlock, William, Jr. (Shipping, Commission Merchant), endorses Lecompton Constitution, 151 Whitney, Asa, 89 Whitney, J. S., 103 Whitney, Stephen (Shipping, Commission Merchant), opposes Annexation of Texas, 18; defends Clay's Compromise plan, 25; mentioned, i8n, 55, 89, 162

Willard's Hotel, meeting at, 255-258 Williams, E., and Company, advertisement of, 208 Williams, Howell L., i2gn Williams, John E., 200 Williamson, D. D., 200 Wilmot Proviso, hostility of South to, 15, 22-23; supported by New York merchants, 20-21, 24; York merchants, 38 opposed by New Winslow, R. H. (Banker), 132 Winthrop, Robert, 120 Withers, Reuben, i34n Wood, Benjamin, advocates Republic of New York, 288 Wood, Fernando, on dangers of Republican victory, 193; advocates Republic of New York, 288; denounced, 288; mentioned, 289 Wood, George (Lawyer), defends Fugitive Slave Act, 46n, 61; defends Compromise of 1850, 55; opposes Nebraska bill, 92n, 95-96; opposes fusion of Whigs and Republicans, 110-111; plans Whig Convention, 114; mentioned, 45n, lisn,John 119,H.,16236 Woodgate, Wool trade, depression in, 210 Wolcott, Frederick (Commission Merchant), on Congress, 21, 29 "Woolies," 66 World's Fair, New York, 90 Wright, John C, 74n Yancey, William merchants, 194 L., warns New York Young, John, on Webster's address, 27 Zellner, King and Company, 2n

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY businessslaverynOOfone businessslaverynOOfone

businessslaverynOOfone

'h

e

n No lo

Boston

PubKc

Library

Copley Square

General

Library

The Date Due Card in the pocket indicates the date on or before which this book should be returned to the Library. Please do not remove cards from this pocket