Buffer States in World Politics [Reprint ed.] 9780367010799

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Buffer States in World Politics   Edited by John Chay and Thomas E. Ross

ISBN 978-0-3670-1079-9

Buffer States in World Politics

Edited by John Chay Thomas E. Ross

www.routledge.com  an informa business

9780367010799.indd 1

8/28/2018 5:42:31 PM

Buffer States in World Politics

About the Book and Editors Buffer states-countries geographically and/or politically situated between two or more regional or global powers-function to maintain peace between the larger powers. Contributors to this book, the first devoted to the buffer state concept, analyze the geographical and political factors necessary for the establishment and maintenance of a buffer state and examine its role in helping to maintain world peace. The problems and prospects of buffer states and buffer zones and the multiple roles played by the buffer in international politics are also explored. Using information from a number of countries, including Lebanon, Afghanistan, Korea, and Uruguay, the contributors argue that the function of the buffer state has not diminished with the advance of modern technology, but that the prospects for a long life for any particular buffer state are tenuous. Nevertheless, they conclude that although the international benefits from any one buffer state tend to be short term, the continued existence of the sy stem will be an important element in preventing armed conflict in many parts of the world.

John Chay is chairman and professor in the Department of History

at Pembroke State University. Thomas E. Ross is professor of ge­ ography and chairman of the Department of Geology and Geography at Pembroke State University.

Buffer States in World Politics edited by John Chay and Thomas E. Ross

�t

Routledge

Taylor&!

Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1986 by Westview Press Published 2018 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1986 by Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Ubrary of Congress Cataloglng-ln-Publlcatlon Data Buffer states in world polltlcS. (Westvlew special studies In International relations) Includes Index. 1. Buffer states. 2. World Politics. I. Chay, John. II. Ross, Thomas (Thomas E.) Ill. Serles.

JX1391.B84 1986

327.1'1

86-13318

ISBN 13: 978-0-367-01079-9 (hbk)

For June and Cheryl

CONTENTS

Li st of Tables and Fig u res . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x i i i l ntrod uction , John Chay and Thomas E. Ross . . .. .. 1 .

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Part 1 Review and Theory

1 . Buffer States: A Geographer's Perspective, Thomas E. Ross . 11 2. Buffer States: The Issue of Sovereig nty, Joseph Mai/a . . . . .. . . . . . 29 3. Southern Africa: Buffer States Without a Conventional Buffer System, Sheridan Jo hns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4. Buffer Systems of M iddle America, Philip Kelly . . . . . . . . . 67 .

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Part2 Region and Country Case Studies

5. Eastern Europe: The Buffer Effect of a Cordon Sanitaire, Ola v Fa gelund Knudsen . . . . . . .. . . 87 6. The Al ban ian Lands: Conti n u i ty and C h a n g e i n a B u ffer Region, A lbert M. Tosches . . . . . . . 111 7. The Gee-Political Dem i se of Lebanon : Consequences of a Pol itical and M i l itary Buffer, Robert W. McCall . . . . 1 33 8. Asia's Pivotal Buffer States, Lawrence Ziring . . 1 53 9. The H istory of Afg han i stan As A Buffer State, Da vid B. Jenkins . . . 1 71 1 0. Korea, A B u ffer State,John Chay . . .. 1 91 1 1 . U rug u ay: The Q u i ntessential Buffer State,Josep h S. Tu/chin . . . . . . . . . 213 1 2. Buffer States: Out l i n i ng a n d Expan d i n g Existing Theory, Gera ld L. Ingalls . . . .. . . . . . . 231 About the Contri butors . 241 I ndex 243 .

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ix

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TABLES AND FIGURES Tables

1 . 1 Twentieth Centu ry Buffer States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.1 Cari bbean Spheres of l nfluence/ Shatterbelt Eras . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Figures

1 .1 1 .2 2.1 4.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 9.1

The M iddle East, c i rca 1 400 A.O .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 Partition o f Charlemag ne's Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 Territorial I ntegrity and M i l i tary A l l i ance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 South American Balance of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 The A l banian Lands i n H istory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 2 The A l banian Lands Ottoman Adm i n i stratio n (1 88 1 ) . . . . . . . . 1 1 6 Partition of the Al ban ian Lands (1 91 2-1 91 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 22 The Albanian Lands i n the l n terwar Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 27 Key Town s and Fam i l ies of Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 39 Expansion of Britai n and Russia Toward Afghanistan . . . . . . 1 76

xi

PREFACE

Buffer states are cou ntries geog raphically and/ or politically situated between two or more l arge powers whose function i s to mai ntai n peace between the larger powers. Thi s book i s a study of the buffer state concept and its effect uo on world pol itical affai rs and as such analyzes the geograp h i cal and pol i t i cal factors necessary for the estab l i shment and mainte nance of a buffer state and exam i nes the i mportance of the b uffer state i n mai ntai n i n g world peace. A pri mary objective of this vol u me is to provide an exami nation of the cond itions, problems, and prospects of buffer states and buffer zones. The major aspects of the study i n c l ud e a defi nitio n of the buffer system , an analysis of the structure and functions of the system , and studies of the roles p la yed by the system. Accordi ngl y, one i m portant q uestion to be raised i s: what i s the meani n g of the buffer system and why are particular countries defined as buffers? Add itional ly, an effort w i l l be made to c l arify the nature , characteristics, structure, and operation of a buffer. The most i mportant pu rpose of the book, however, is to provide a c lear understand i n g of the m u l t i p l e roles p layed by the system: hence, the roles of buffer states are stud ied in relation to specific regions and to the entire i nternational pol itical com m u n i ty. B oth the negative and posi tive roles of the buffer w i l l be explored and the f uture of the buffer concept w i l l be eval u ated. The book g rew out of two sessions of papers on buffer states presented at the 25th Ann ual M eet i n g of the I nternational Stud ies Association in Atlanta, Geor g i a in M arch 1 984. Chapters by John Chay, Joseph M ai la, Joseph Tu l c h i n , Sheridan Johns, and Thomas Ross were among the presentations in Atlanta that eventually were devel oped i nto chapters of this book. A l l the remai n i ng chapters were written especial ly for this book and have not been p u b l ished elsewhere. I n com p i l i ng t h i s vol ume we have attem pted to collect articles that d i scuss aspects of the "buffer state concept" from several d i fferent scholarly poi nts of view. Contributors come from various d i sc i p l i nes, i n c l u d i n g h istory, geography, and pol itical science. The d iversity of the material should enable many social scientists to find perti nent i n formation relevant to their particular field of study and will be particularl y beneficial in the study of geopo l itics. To t his end several case studies i l l u strat i n g the role of and effectiveness of buffer states are presented . xiii

xiv We wish to express our appreciation to the authors of the c hapters i nc l uded and to col leagues and others who g ave val uable suggestions and assi stance. We thank Professor El izabeth Kuo, of the Pembroke State U n ivers i ty Department of Geology and Geography, for d rafti ng a map used in this book. Other Pembroke State col leag ues to whom we are g rateful i nc l ude Professors Thomas Leach of the Department of Com m u n i cative Arts and Barney Pauze of the Department of Soci ology. Both read and made comments on one or more of the c hapters i n this book. Professor D. Gordon Benn ett, of the Department of Geography, the U n iversity of North Caroli na at G reensboro, is also acknowledged for h i s val uable comments on some o f the works i n t h i s vol u me, a s i s Professor Emeritus Shannon M cc u ne o f t h e U n iversity o f Florida; We are also i ndebted to Professor M ic key East of George Was h ington U ni versity. Shi rley Deese, secretary in the H istory Department at Pem b roke State U n ivers i ty, i s t h a n ked and commended for a l l the typi ng and c lerical assi stance she provided. We appreci ate the fine typesetti n g and layout work of Betty Evans, A l i ce Britt, and Roy Barn h i l l . We are g ratefu l to edi tors Bruce Kel li son and Barbara El l i ngton at Westview Press for their encouragement and assistance i n thi s project. And fi nal ly, Cheryl Ross i s thanked for proofreadi ng assi stance. The ed itors and contributors alone are responsible for errors, omissions, and i n terpretations presented in the book. John Chay Thomas E. Ross Pembroke Sta te University Pembroke, North Carolina

INTRODUCTION John Chay Thomas E. Ross

A l l of the earth's surface has, with few exceptions such as Antarctica, been subd ivided i nto pol itical u n its referred to as s ta tes. Si nce the most i m portant part of the state is land area (territory), mankind has developed many schemes to mai ntai n or expand state territory. Usual ly, expansionistic activities i nvolve armed confl i ct or the threat of force. Thus an everpresent risk of m i l itary confrontation exi sts between states, especially among those who share a common border. To red uce the risk some ancient powers created u n popu l ated "waste" zones between the two powers. Another buffer scheme, used by Rome, i nvolved the estab l ishment of zones cal led march states to keep u nfriend ly forces away from Roman territory. I n more recent times, particularly in the late n i neteenth and early twentieth centu ries, the buffer state idea g rew in pop u l arity as a means to keep hostile neighbors from engag i ng i n m i l i tary activities agai nst each other. I n many i n stances, however, the buffer was not a permanent sol ution to the adversarial nature of nei g h bori ng states and many of the buffers were eventual ly absorbed by other states. The d i sappearance of the buffer cond ition in a cou ntry has in the past led to conflict, such as that in what is now North and South Korea and what was N orth and South Vietnam, both of which have recently served as buffers. But what exactly is a b uffer state or b uffer system? The buffer state, as a concept, is not new, although the term buffer s ta te i s relatively recent, probably bei n g first appl ied b y t h e British i n 1 883 to refer to Afg han istan. The buffer concept, or "buffer effect," as used by Knudsen i n this vol u me, is probably as old as manki nd's endeavors to del i m i t territory based u pon sovereignty of the earth's s u rface (see Ross' c hapter in this vol u me). In a real sense, the buffer phenomenon is a u n iversal one as h umankind has been, i n 1

2 a l l parts of the world , i ngenious i n creat i n g a l l kinds of cushions of buffers to serve as protective mechan isms. Before proceeding further, let us provide a cl arification of the terms buffer state and buffer system, both used throughout this book. Although similar i n several respects, each term possesses d i stinguishing characteristics. M ost importantly, thoug h, they are si milar in that buffer refers to region s or zones situated between conflicting spheres of infl uence and whose primary fu nction is to separate the conflicting sides and thus red uce the likelihood of physical (mil itary) contact. The sim plest defintion of a buffer state is that it is a smal l independent country located between two or more large rival powers. This definition can be elaborated as m u c h a s o n e wishes, but it contains t h e three crucial elements of the buffer state: (1) A smal l cou ntry, in area and pop u l atio n , (2) Two or more large, adj acent rival powers, and (3) the geograp hical location of the smal l state betwee n the opposing large powers. In our i n terpretation a buffer state denotes a cou ntry in a buffer situation while the buffer system refers to any level of pol itical organ ization, whether a portion of a sing le state, a g roup of cou ntries, or a l arge reg ional area of conti nental proportions such as Eastern Europe or M iddle America. The b uffer state i s thus more confi ned and defi n ite whi le the buffer system is more broad and genera l. Today m a n y of the pol itical trouble spots fou n d on the earth once fu nctioned as buffers between g reater powers, but with the removal of b uffer status i nternal, as wel l as external, factions were allowed to exert thei r dormant host i l ities. Places such as Lebanon, I ran, and I raq in the M iddle East; Korea, Afg hanistan, and Cambodia in Asia; Poland and other Soviet sate l l i tes in Eastern Europe; El Salvador, N icarag ua, and other cou ntries in M iddle Ameri ca; and South Africa and her neigh bors in southern Africa are among the most obvious areas of pol itical and m i l itary confl ict. What Is d isturb i n g about the u n rest in these places is that it i s not momentary, but appears to be, in most cases, a pere n n i a l pol itical problem with the potential to g row i nto confl i cts i nvolving the su perpowers. Th us pol itical leaders and scholars m u st study and analyze the cond itions i n these trouble spots that are prod u c i n g threats to world pol i tical stab i l ity and i m pact i n g u pon i nternational re lations. They m ust also determ i ne if buffer states are a useless re lic on the i nternational pol itical l andscape or do they conti nue to have i m portant functions to perform in modern i nternational relations. Several q uestions emerge in an attempt to study the world's pol itical " hot spots." Fi rst, does a system or method of analysis exi st that wou l d allow us to gai n a better u nderstand i n g of these

3 pl aces? Are common c ult, u ral , pol itical, strategic, or econom ic factors present i n a l l the troubled p laces? Or i s there a s i m i larity in relat ive (vic i nal) location? Are the trouble spots about the same size i n terms of popu l ation and land area? These and s i m i lar q uestions emerge in a study of i nternational relations, especially in the context of the above mentioned "trouble spots." We have in this vol u me attem pted to develop an explanatory framework with emphasis on buffer states i n order to provide a better u nderstan d i n g of how i n ternational rel ations are affected by areas of c on f l i ct such as those mentioned above. As a m atter of fact, many of the " reg ional trouble spots" d i scussed during the N ovember 1 985 s u m m i t meet i n g of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev are or have been buffer states. Our hope for this vol ume is that it w i l l provide a better u nderstan d i ng, through an exam i nation of the buffer state concept, of the common problems experienc ed in pol itically troubled areas. The part i c u l ar objectives of this vol u me are to expla in the structure and operation of the buffer state, the roles of the buffer for i nternational relations, and future prospects of the buffer concept. To e nhance our u nderstandi ng of the subject we m ust exam i ne the nature, c haracteri stics, and struc tu re of the buffer state. To these ends we h ave i n c l uded review and theoretical essays as wel l as case stu d ies of several conspicuous buffer states/systems. Absolute location (the actual geograph i c position accord i n g to longitude and latitude) is very i m p o rt a n t in the b u ffer co n cept; however, the most fundamental and basic component of the buffer state i s vici nal location, which is more fully d i scussed i n a fol low i n g chapter. It i s i m portant to recogn ize that although modern transportation and m i l itary tec hnology have greatly affected the val ue of geographical location (ai rcraft and m i ssi les can flyover the buffer to reach the enemy), vic i na l l ocation has not been substantially altered. Even as the d istance between oppos i n g powers i s bei n g red uced b y modern technology, t h e buffer remains as a moderat i n g i nf l uence i n reg ions of confl ict and a potent peacekeeping force regard less of the abi l i ty of its neighbors to destroy it or each other. The buffer i s in a precarious situation, then, and can not remove itself from this position. But the situation i s not j ust spatial; it can be conceptual. For example, the buffers between two major ideolog ical camps • capitalism and com m u n ism can be fou nd anywhere on the g lobe and do not necessari ly have to be geograp h i cal ly located between the two confl i ct i n g ideolog ies. H owever, such a conceptual buffer does not l i m it the i m portance of the locational factor. •

4 I n add ition to the locational factor, a n u m ber of secondary elements are i nvolved i n the ori g i n and mai ntenance of a buffer state/system and are more f u l l y d i sc ussed in the fol lowi ng chapter. One i s the topography of the state, i n c l u d i ng such elements as marshes, mou ntai ns, deserts, and other p hysical barriers. Another factor of considerable s i g n i ficance i s the strateg i c val ue of the buffer reg ion because of the exi stence of i mportant transportation l i nes, natural resources, and other i nd ustrial ly and m i l itari ly strategi c resou rces. I f the physical barrier is an i n h i biting or repe l l i ng factor, i t i s attractive in terms of the development of a buffer. The t h i rd secondary factor i nvolves c u ltural and econom ic considerations. The buffer state i s not j ust a h i g hway for the "king's men and horses," but it becomes a hig hway for cultural and econom ic i nteraction between the various social g roups l iving in the reg ion. Chay's chapter on Korea focuses on this element. H e poi nts o u t that w i t h a " new age" comes a new product; for exam ple, the post-World War Two era produced a new element for the buffer syste m - o n e c l ea r l y i nv o l ved w i t h p r i m ari l y i d e o l og i c a l ram ifications rather than com petition for land o r resou rces. H e poi nts out that wherever tyran n ical com m u n ism and democracy come in co ntact, an i nvisible barrier is erec ted, and someti mes it i s even more man i fested i n visible barriers s u c h a s t h e i nfamous Berl i n wal l . But i f the barrier i s i nvisible it i s more d ifficult to deal with effectively and becomes extremely form idable. Another i mportant element relevant to the effectiveness of the buffer is the condition of power d i stribution among the pol itical entities i nvolved - usual ly the buffer state and its two neighbori ng powers. The buffer situation cannot evolve and exist even i f the location factor and secondary factors are present u n less the power d i stri bution with i n the above mentioned three pol itical entities i s d ivided i n a particular way. T o c larify, there are a t least three aspects of power d istri bution which m u st be considered. The fi rst is that the buffer state shou ld be smaller and weaker than the two nei g h bori ng big powers. The buffer state, however, does not necessari ly h ave to be smal l ; i t cou ld be a m iddle sized or even a l arge state but the key i s that the buffer m ust be smaller and weaker than the two neighbori ng powers. If the state located between the two powers is stronger and larger than the powers it w i l l become a " m iddle ki ndgom" rather than a buffer state. I n other words, the two neig h bori ng powers should be more powerf u l than the m i d d l e state. The second cond ition is that the m iddle state shou ld have strength adeq uate to mai ntai n self-determ i nation. The buffer then m ust be strong enoug h to absorb shock exerted by the neighbori ng l arge

5

powers yet rem ain i ndependent. I f the buffer i s too weak i t wil l e ither be destroyed or become i ncapable of executi ng its buffer role. H istory provides n umerous i n stances in which expansionistic neighbori n g powers i n tervened in the affai rs of buffer states because of the weakness of the buffer. The excuse provided by the powers was that si nce the buffer was so weak it coul d no longer fu nction as a bufer and therefore threatened the power's secu rity. The resu l t of i ntervention usually was the dem ise of the buffer. The t h i rd cond ition is that the two big powers m ust mai ntai n an approx i m ate parity or balance of power. I n addition to the balance of power, a balance of i nterests i s vital ly i mportant because power without an i nterest w i l l not exh i bit any i nfluence i n i nternational rel ations. One of the best i l l u strations of the need for a balance of power and a balance of i nterest i s Korea. When the power balance there broke down twice near the tu rn of the centu ry (in 1 895 and 1 905 at the end of the S i no-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, respectively) the buffer system d i sappeared and with it Korea's i ndependence. Chay develops this concept more f u l ly I n his c hapter on Kor ea. In addition to the structural nature of the buffer system , an u nderstand i n g of the operational c haracteristics, or fore i g n pol i cy operations, i s also i m portant. The most i mportant element i n t h i s category i s neutrality. U n less a certai n degree of neutral i ty i s mai ntai ned b y a state i t can not effectively operate a s a buffer. There is, however, a la rge g ray zone between the black and white of strict neutrality and close or overly friendly relationshi p with one of the two neighbori ng powers. J oseph M ai ta, in his chapter in thi s vol u me, d ifferentiates neutrality i nto four categ ories: ( 1 ) sovere i g n neutrality, (2) neutral ization or m u lti lateral declaration o f neutra l i ty, (3) legal neutra l i ty, and (4) prag matic neutrality. Thus it may be hypothesized that a buffer state plays its buffer role to the l i m it or extent of its neutral i ty. Once i t beg i ns to deviate from it s neutral position the buffer role is com prom i sed and when or if it a l l ies itself with one of its powerf u l neighbors its value as a buffer term i n ates. Lean i n g toward or estab l i s h i ng c loser rel ations with one of the powers i s a del i cate game for the buffer state, but i t does have advantages as wel l as risks. Some buffer states have deviated from neutral i ty by turn i ng to and form i ng an a l l i ance with a t h i rd power located outside the i m med i ate reg ion. Thi s ploy has its own set of risks. For example, i t i s not easy for t h e t h i rd power, especial ly i f it i s located a long d i stance from the buffer, to generate sufficient i nterest in a cou ntry, espec ial ly a cou ntry i n a buffer situation; however, i f the

6

buffer is fortunate enoug h to secure a "thi rd power" benefactor there always exi sts the danger that another "th i rd power" may be brought i n and the buffer state may find itself in an even more com p l i cated pred icament i n which it must deal not with j ust two rival powers, but with two sets or four powers. For exam ple, presently, wherever the Soviet U n ion becomes i nvolved in the Th i rd World - Africa, the M iddle East, or M iddle America - the U n i ted States finds it necessary to become i nvolved in the same area and vice versa.

Many q uestions arise concern i ng the operational aspect of the butter system . Perhaps most i m portant is what is the role of the butter system for modern world society? Is it positive or negative? Also, what i s the role of the butter effect for the buffer state and how does i t affect the buffer? As observed earl ier, the fact that most of the world's trou ble spots are or have been buffers seems to i nd i cate that the buffer states are among the most u n fortunate of all states. H owever, carefu l analysis reveals that the u n fortunate situation comes mai n l y from the vicinal location factor and not from the act or fu nction of bei ng a buffer. Thus a state with the " bad l uck" of bei ng located between two warri ng powers is more l i kely to be i nvolved because of i ts location than for any other reason . Actual ly, successfu l p l ayi ng of the buffer role means neutra lity, strength, and i n dependence for the state and i ncreases the l i ke l i hood that it will not become i nvolved in d isputes i nvolvi ng its powerf u l neighbors. A state i n t h e buffer situation does not appear t o have any mean i ngful choice; it has to do its best to play the assig ned role of peacekeeper. Successful function i n g of the buffer system also makes an i m portant contri bution to the system i tself by lesse n i ng the probab i l ity of con f l i ct between the two nei g h bori ng powers or g roups of powers. I f the buffer fai ls to funct ion, it becomes a transport route for the i nvasion forces or a battleground for its strong neighbors. This i s what happened to Bel g i u m during two world wars. We m ust keep i n m i nd , though, that if the two powers are determ i ned to fig ht, the buffer system is not an effective deterrent. But, if the pressu re or shock com i n g from either side i s rel atively smal l and manageable, the buffer state i s capable of p l ayi n g its role and maki n g an i m portant peacekee p i ng contri bution to the reg ion and hence the world . We concl ude that the buffer system has a def i n ite l i m it, i n terms of its effectiveness, but with i n those l i m its i t can and shou ld play a pos itive role i n i nternational relations. Few wou l d deny that many buffer states and buffer systems have

7

served wel l as peacekeepers, but the major q uestion today i s are buffers sti l l a val id force i n i nternational relations i n terms of prevent i n g host i l i ties betwee n m ajor powers? M any of the fol low i n g chapters foc us on this i m portant q uestion. Here the key is on the role of modern and future tech nology for the operation of the system . An i m portant fact is that tec hnological i mpact has l i m its, and at least the locational factor w i l l remain in the future much as it has been i n the past. I f the l ocational factor remains stable, the buffer system will also remain stable far i nto the fu ture. future. The book consists of an i ntroduction section and twelve chapters, i nc l u d i n g a conc l usions c hapter. A geograph i c portrayal of buffer states, past and present, i s the focus of Chapter 1 . Def i n itions of states, territories, and buffer states and the i r fu nctions are provided a s a general review t o t h e evolution and mai ntenance of buffer states. Chap ter 2 cont i n ues the review, but is centered u pon the pol itical perspective of buffer state sovereig nty. Sem i nal ideas rel ated to buffers are presented in Chapter 3 in which a non-trad itional concept, that al l buffer states do not have to be located between other states to keep states apart but can be used to separate races of m a n k i n d , is p resented by u s i n g the " homelands" of South Africa. Th i s i s fol lowed by another provocative essay in which M iddle America i s defined as a buffer between the Soviet U n ion and the U nited States. Part Two is com p os ed o f essays o n t h e h i st o r i c a l a n d s t rateg i c ro l e s of various regions and states as buffer zones. Emphasis i s upon the parti c u l a r h i st ori c a l and p o l i t i c a l factors re l ev a n t to t h e development a n d mai ntenance o f t h e buffer cond ition i n t h e areas studied .

NOTES 1 . M ichael G. Partem , "The Buffer System i n I nternational Relations," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 (1 983) : 1 3- 16 .

PART1 REVIEW AND THEORY

CHAPTER 1 BUFFER STATES: A GEOGRAPHER'S PERSPECTIVE THOMA S E. ROSS Many countries have served as buffer states since the evolution of the state concept early in mankind's recorded history. Where and why they came to be is, of course, clearly within the scope of the

discipline of geography.

Few

geographers have,

however,

generated published works concerned specifically with buffer

states. Most of the references in the geographic literature have

been brief discussions within a broader topic, such as boundary or

frontier studies. The primary purpose of this cha pter is to pre se nt one geographer's perception of buffer states. Identification of some

past and present buffer states and factors important in their evolution will be discussed from that geographer's point of view.

THE STATE IDEA Understanding of buffer states is predicated upon knowledge of

the state concept itself. The following synopsis of the state idea is

presented as a prelude to the buffer state discussion.

All states, buffer and nonbuffer, are creations of mankind and, as such, are depicted on maps as territory enclosed by boundary lines

·

established by man. States are, to the geographer, however, much

more than portions of the earth's surface in which human beings have established a way of life • a culture • that may or may not be

similar to that of their neighbors. It is important to realize that the

state is not just people, but is territory with a distinct homogeneous core and fro m this core extends into marginal areas of heterogeneity.1 ·

12 Altnougn many characteristics are ubiquitous to all countries,

others are found in some but not in other states, a fact which helps

make one unique and different from all others. The geographer,

therefore, is concerned with the state as a whole, with the synthesis of physical and cultural phenomena that together

constitute it, and with the characteristics that make it distinct from

all the others. He is also interested in the location of the state and

how this location affects its relations with other states.

Grounded upon the premise that all states include territory and

population, geographers look at territory as more than merely a

piece of real estate or an area of land inhabited by homo sap iens saplens. Area by itself does not constitute territory, especially if

territory is regarded as land which is inhabited "and to whose

intrinsic value man has added an extrinsic value of his own."2 Along this line of reasoning, Jean Gottmann defined territory as "a spatial

notion establishing essential links between politics, people, and

the natural setting" and he perceived territory "as the unit in the political organization of space that defines, at least for a time, the

relationships between the community and its habitat on one hand, the community and its neighbors on the other. . . . "3Thus, the c o m p o ne nts of any state are territory and a human society which has organized an independent government to occupy and exercise sovereignty over the territory.

Hence, the state can be defined as a politico-geographical

phenomenon whose relationships with other countries are based upon the sovereignty of its population over the terrltory.4 More importantly, though, is the reality that the population must believe its state has a reason to exist. If that reason evolves from within the boundaries of the state territory, that Is, has its roots among the

state's populace, the state may be more likely to remain viable than if the reason for its existen ce is externally derived. The importance

attached to internal forces of creation and the strength of

conviction of the inhabitants to support the state was emphasized by . Derwent Whittlesey when he wrote:s

Because . ev ery infant is born into a state, mankind grows up with an unreasoned conviction that his country or people is immutable, a force inseparably linked to a specific portion of the earth's surface. This feeling transformed into argument underlies many of the attempts to make political geography to serve the purposes of this or that particular state ... The brutal, temporary dissection of territory incidental to warfare, and the more permanent and hardly less rude dismemberment produced by

13 dictated peace terms do not dislodge this faith that the state is inherently entitled to its proper space, to its 'place in the sun.' Even the stubborn fact that two different states may lay equal claim to the same border zone fails to undermine the devotion of the opposing nationals to their respective articles of faith. Closely associated with the reason for existence i s the idea that

all the diverse territorial regions within the state must be unified

into a single organized political unit if the state is to prevail. It is

important to realize that regional differences in physiography,

climate, or mineral deposits rarely are directly responsible for serious problems within a state. Neither are regional disparities in

economic production a major barrier to unification. In fact, regional diversity In economic development may in some instances

"stimulate Interchange and so encourage Interregional coherence. Marked differences in regional economic levels may lead to more

serious difficulties, not as economic problems but rather as social problems · i.e., results of differences in human attitudes."s Within the state, racial or ethnic group differences are not problems

unless the diverse groups hold negative attitudes in regard to the racial or ethnic differences present in the state.

Also of

considerable importance is the fact that the citizens of a state must

possess or accept a common body of political attitudes a political •

ideology that supercedes differences in languages and racial· ethnic background. Moreover, an independent state must be

capable of operating as a unified unit in its external relations or "it may disintegrate and vanish from the map."1 To ensure its existence, a state must have the resources and desire among its

populace to implement and execute the purposes for which it was

created. Therefore, each state must develop purposes which are

based upon its own unique circumstances and which are acceptable to the great majority of its Inhabitants. These purposes, "with which the citizens of the state can Identify themselves, constitutes the state idea. "e It is within this framework that all states, buffer and nonbuffer, must operate to remain as

independent political entities.

THE BUFFER STATE CONCEPT One of the most geographically significant factors in the study of

buffer states is their location in reference to their neighbors, or vicinal location. In general, we can utilize three "methods of expressing th� geographical location of a specified place or area:

14 (1)

in terms of degree of latitude and longitude;

relation to water bodies and land masses; and

(2) in terms of (3) in terms of

its

its

position with reference to its immediate neighbors (vicinal location)."9 The generally accepted notion is that buffer states owe their existence to the location of two or more politically or militarily

powerful spheres of influence within close proximity to each other

and that these opposing powers, in an effort to maintain peace,

may cooperate in the establishment of an independent state to

separate their interests. In other instances, secondary factors, not

just simply location between two powers, usually were associated with creation of buffer states or buffer zones. Such factors would

include:

(1)

hostile physical environments, such as deserts,

marshlands, or rugged terrain;

(2) the presence within their territory (3) the

of strategically important transportation routes; and

existence of zones of cultural transition.

In the first case, the country may have become a buffer state

because

the

states

which

grew

up

around

environmentally hostile territory chose

isolated

to not

absorb

and the

undesirable area into their political territory, leaving it instead as a "no-man's land" until finally it came to be used as a buffer to

separate its neighbors. A state could also evolve into a buffer in a region if strategic transportation routes passed through its

territory; thus neighboring states unable, because of the strength of another neighboring power, to lay sole claim to the important

routes would accept the presence of an independent buffer state with sovereignty over the plains, passes, and rivers connecting the

opposing spheres of influence.Closely related to and influenced by the

location

of

strategic

transportation

gateways

is

the

multicultural character of many buffer states.The buffer area might

be populated by and located between two distinctly different cultural spheres, in part because of its function as a strategic

transportation route. Thus the buffer might possess linguistic,

ethnic, and religious characteristics of both cultures and thus serve as a transition area not incorporated into the state area of either of

its neighbors because neither state wishes to become entangled with the possibility of irredentist activities by the minority segment

of

its

population;

a minority

that

would result

from

the

incorporation of the buffer zone in one of the existing states. Thus

the multicultural aspect of many buffer states can be attributed to

their location at continental or axial positions; buffer states not

located thusly will most likely have a more homogeneous population than states located in zones of intense and frequent intercultural contact.

·

15 Regardless of the secondary factors, vicinal location is of utmost

importance in the creation of buffer states. Thus geographers accept that a buffer state is a country located between two or more

powerful states or spheres of influence and whose continued

existence as an independent country is tolerated because It serves to spatially separate the powerful states. 1 0 According to Nicholas Spykman, "When . . . pressures are approximately equal, and it still proves difficult to arrive at a stable common frontier, a buffer state

provides a certain degree of security for both sides by acting as a

neutral zone, and functions as a keeper of the peace by affecting at least temporarily physical separation of the potential com­ batants. " 1 1 One example of how buffer states were established to maintain peace

is the agreement between the

British and Russians

concerning India and Southwest Asia. The Anglo-Russian accords were developed because Russia was, in the nineteenth century,

extending its Influence into Central Asia and was thus exerting

pressure upon the British controlled Indian frontier, which was at

best weakly held by the British. According to Spykman, in his discussion of this agreement:1 2 British

and

Russian

influence

clashed

in

Afghanistan, Persia, and Turkestan, where each

power was trying to establish its own domination in

order to check the advance of the other. Boundary agreements between 1887 and 1889 offered no final solution, and it was not until the Anglo-Russian

agreement of 1 907 that danger of a conflict was finally past.This agreement recognized Afghanistan as a British sphere of influence, and divided Persia into three zones, the northern to be a Russian sphere

of influence, the southeastern a British sphere, and the third a neutral zone between the other two.

Although the British-Russian agreement prevented hostilities

between the two powers, peace is not always achieved by the

creation of a buffer state. In some cases, the buffer becomes a battleground between opposing forces, as for example, Poland,

whose vicinal location unfortunately made it a zone of conflict between the countries situated on opposite sides of It. However,

regardless of the importance of vicinal location, buffer states are

not maintained simply because of their location. Some have, with the passage of time, outgrown buffer state status and remain independent because the will of the people to retain autonomy is

16 f i rm ly held by the general pop u l ace. F i n land, for exam ple, has remai ned free partly be ca use of its fiercely i n dependent-m i nded ci tizenry.1 3 Ideal ly, buffer states are not sate l l ite or puppet states of either of thei r powerfu l neighbors, nor are they necessari ly strictly neutral states. The concept of a buffer state : 14 in presuppos i n g a free and effective organism i n the reg ion i n terposed, rules out partition o r any form of breakup enforced by the g reat powers on either flank. I ndeed, the small states most notable i n h i story for contri but i n g towards the successfu l m a i ntenance of eq u i l i b ri u m between powerfu l neig h bors are made u p of an amalgam of the peo p l e s , l a ng u ages and t rad i t i o n s s u rrou n d i n g them. Thus, many buffer states can be c lassed as zones of cu ltural transition and "as such partake of the cultural and ideolog ical patterns on e i_t her side of them. " 1 s In short, buffer states absorb the shock exerted , whether it i s cultural, pol itica l , or m i l itary, by the powers on its borders. It appears, however, that in terms of buffer states, vicinal location is the most s i g n i ficant factor in the states ori g i n and conti nued existence and that the popu l ation of the state m u st work with i n this context i n form u l at i n g thei r pu rposes and reasons for existen ce. To acq u i re a geog raph i c perspective on buffer states, i t is i mportant to take i nto account that we are deal i ng with h u m an bei ngs resid i ng w ith i n a specific territory that m ust adjust to the powers s u rrou n d i n g t h e m . A l so, i n n u me rab l e com b i na tions of physical and c u ltural phenomena are possible that cou ld affect the g rowth and wel l be i n g of the state. Thus knowledge of the physical and c u ltural envi ronments present in buffer states i s necessary i n any geog raph ical analysis o f buffers. EARLY BUFFER STATES

The term

was fi rst appl ied to a pol itical entity i n 1 876; was first used i n 1 883.1s The buffer state concept, however, i s not a n i neteenth century development. Its roots reach back about 3500 years, to the fifteenth century B.C., when the Ki ngdom of Kadesh was establ ished on the Orontes R iver of Syria by the king of M itann i to keep the Egyptians away from his territory i n the Eup h rates R iver reg ion (Fig. 1 . 1 ). Fifteen h u n d red years l ater, Pompey, i n an attempt to secu re a neutral zone between Rome and Pers i a, u sed Syria as a buffer.1 1

buffer s ta te

buffer

17

The worl d ' s earl i est states, for secu rity reas o n s u t i l ized . transition or border zones to spatially separate themselves. For the most part, these were sparsely populated or u n i nhabited areas that Spykman referred to as "waste border zones."1 s I n t i me, because of

Fig. 1.1

The Middle East, circa 1400 A.O.

Source: M od ified from R.R. Pal mer, ed.,

( New York: Rand M c N al ly, 1 957).

Atlas of World History

·- ......

..... .... .

-·'

. _, '·

'·

I

Mediterrdnean

Se a

0

SOO

-.c:::::::i-::::111iii M I l ES

18

popu lation pressure on and popu l ation g rowth i n the natural waste zones, they became i neffective as buffers and were supplemented by artificially created waste zones. The G reek c i ty-states probably created the fi rst m an-made waste zones. Rome fol lowed suit when she "transformed twenty-th ree Volscian c ities i nto the Pontine marshes and destroyed. the towns of Lat i u m i n order to surround herself with waste territory."19 The Romans eventual ly used the wastelands concept to create states, w h i c h were p ri m ari ly m i l itary outposts with few c ivi l i ans, whose prime responsib i l i ty and function was to g uard the frontier of the Roman e m p i re. The march states were expected to uti l ize t he i r own resources to ensure that the b u i lt-up territory beh i nd the frontier cou ld exi st with comparative security. Because the popu lation of these marc h states learned to organ ize the i r own resou rces and not depend upon Rome, leaders h i p abi l ities were developed that most l i kely were responsible for some of these march states eventually becom i n g i ndependent European powers. Others were consolidated or an nexed i nto nei g h bori ng states, and sti l l others became gen u i ne buffer states.20 One of the best examples of a p re-n i neteenth century buffer state resulted from the d i smantl i ng in 843 A.O. of Charlemag ne's e m p i re. His hol d i ngs, wh ic h i n c l uded muc h of central and western Europe, were d ivided i nto three parts, shown in Figure 1.2 superi m posed ove r p rese n t state bo u n d aries. The d om i n an t l y Lat i n c u l t u re western portion was i n herited by Charles the Bald and i n c l uded what is now France. The eastern part, pri mari ly Germanic in cu lture, was taken by Lou is the German w h i l e the " m iddle portion, an area of transition between the two cu ltures, fel l to Lothair l . " 21 Accord i ng to Sam uel Van Val kenburg and Carl Stotz, the midd le ki ngdom:22

march

has stood out throug h h istory as a physical and c u ltural barrier between the states of Lat i n culture i n the west and the states o f German ic culture i n the east. The modern political u n its in this buffer portion are the N etherlands, Belg i u m , Alsace-Lorrai ne, and western Swi tzerland; a l l of these states with the exception of Switzerland, have been the scenes of many wars. Except for Alsace-Lorrai ne, which is a part of France, a l l of them are sti l l i ndependent. One note of c l arification: western Swi tzerland did not evolve i nto a separate state but merged with other territories to form the present­ day cou ntry of Swi tzerland.

19 Fig.1.2 Partition of Charlemagne's Empir�

PARTITION OF CHARLEMAGNE'S EMPIRE

"· '

i ( \

i

/

( ·� I

'·

'

'---·-

'

·'

-·-·PRESENT BOUNDARIES

:::

LOT HAIR

::·;.:.CHARLES lHE

)fr)f LOUIS

BAl.D

THE GERMAN

0

20 TWENTIETH C E N T URY BU F F E R STAT ES

Of the 200 or so national pol itical entities on the p lanet today, at least t h i rty-two have at some period d u ri n g this century served as buffer states (Table 1 . 1 ). M ost buffer states of the twentieth century can be c haracterized as possessi ng an i nterior location, espec i a l ly those on the Eurasian land mass. A l l buffer states, however, were not land loc ked and/or d i d not have a conti nental i nterior location. Eac h buffer states possesses its own d i sti nctive h istory, but generally grou p i ngs can be developed pertai n i n g to the political and m i l itary motives for the i ntrod uction of the buffer cond ition in a cou ntry. Afghanistan and I ran, for example, assumed buffer status i n t h e n i neteenth century i n order to separate Russian and Eng l i sh spheres of i nfl uence in the southwestern part of Asia w h i le Belg i u m , The N etherlands, and Luxembourg, si nce the 1580s, have kept the British, French, and Germans apart i n Europe. I n southern Asia, Nepal, B h utan, and Sikkim served to separate British and Chi nese i n terests. F i n land, Estonia, Latvia, Lith uania, Roman ia, B u lgaria, Czechos lovakia, H ungary, and Austria in eastern and central Europe were used in the 1 920s and 1 930s to avoid territori al contact between Germany and the Un ion of Soviet Soc i al ist Republ ics (Soviet U n i on). Th is g roup of rather smal l to m id-sized states was created after the First World War to h i nder any potential German i m peri a l i stic threats to the Soviet U n ion.23 Thei r fai l u re to prevent German movements agai nst the Soviet U n i on is evident by the outbreak of the Second World War and the i l l-fated German i nvasion of Soviet territory. Today these states, with the exception of Latv i a , L i t h u a n i a, and Esto n ia, which have bee n forced to become constituent re p u b l i c s of the Soviet e m p i re, cou l d be considered as buffers between the cou ntries of Western Europe and the Soviet U n ion, even thoug h they are, with the exception of Austria and F i n land, sate l l ites of and subord i n ate to the Soviet U n ion. Recent events i n Poland, such as the rise of the Sol idarity Labor M ovem e n t , m ay be an i n d i c at i o n t h at a l t h o u g h these cou ntries are u nder the control of the Soviet U n ion, they may not necessarily be counted as totally supportive of the i m peri a l i stic, expansi o n i st i c , and tota l i tarian objectives of the Soviet U n i o n . Although Poland, Romania, H ungary, and Yugos l avia appear at ti mes to be at odds with Soviet pol i cies, the Soviets have shown t h at t hey s t i l l possess g reat c o n t ro l and i n f l u e n c e over t h e countries o f Eastern Europe. For exam p le, i n 1 984 a sched u led meet i ng between the heads of state of East Germany and West Germany was abru ptly cance l l ed by the East German leader,

21 TA B L E 1.1 TW E N T I ET H C E N T U RY B U F F E R STAT ES Country

Buffer Between

Afghanistan Albania

Russia (prior to 1 9 1 7) . England Austria- H u ngary· Russia; Italy· Austria- H u ngary; Italy· Greece; Yugoslavia · Sovi et bloc; Rep u b l i c of South Africa · black states of Africa Germany . U n ion of Soviet Socialist Rep u b l ics (USSR) England and France - Germany Eng land · China Germany - USSR England France Germany · USSR Germany · USSR Germany -·ussR Germany - USSR England - Russia (prior to 1 9 1 7) Japan - Chi na; J apan· Russia; U n i ted States . USSR Germany · USSR I srael Arab states Germany· USSR England, France· Germany J apan - USSR South Africa · b lack states of Africa England - China England, France · Germany USSR - I nd i a Germany· USSR Sou t h Africa - b lack states of Africa Germany · USSR England · China Northern· Southern European countries England · France England · China Braz i l - Argen t i n a Germany · USSR

Angola Austria Belg i u m B hutan B u lgaria Cambod ia Czechoslovakia Estonia Finland H u n gary I ran Korea Latvia Lebanon Lithuania Luxembourg Mongolia M ozambique Nepal Netherlands, The Pakistan Poland Rhodesia (Zi mbabwe) Romania Sikkim Switzerland Tha i l and Ti bet Uruguay Yugoslavia

•

•

presumably at the i nsistence of the Soviet U n ion. To the Soviet way of t h i n ki n g a d ivided Germany and conti n ued control over the countries of Eastern Europe are necessary for Soviet sec urity as these states serve as a buffer between the Soviet U n ion and the countries of Western Europe and the i r American al ly. In Southeast Asi a, portions of Thai l and (Siam) were used in the twentieth century by the Bri t i s h and French to separate the i r

22 respective spheres of i nfl uence i n that reg ion of the world . I n 1 907, the British and French ag reed to a plan to establ i sh a buffer i n Thai land. Accord i n g to the ag reement, the territory west o f the Menam R iver and the G u l f of Siam wou l d be in the British zone and all lands to the east wou l d be in the French zone of infl uence. After t h e F i rst Wor l d War both c o u n tries recog n ized T h a i l a n d ' s i ndependence. Korea has bee n u sed by at l east t h ree E u ras i a n countries (Russia, J apan, and Chi na) as a buffer state. It i n itially served as a buffer between J apan and Chi na, l ater between J apan and Russia, and i n more recent ti mes between the Soviet U n ion and the U n i ted States. J apan perceived Korea as an i deal buffer between herse l f and C h i n a u n t i l the J apanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War of (1 89495) ended C h i nese i nfl uence on the Korean Pen i nsula. Problems between Japan and her Asian neighbors did not cease with victory over C h i na, however. The Russians began to cast covetous eyes toward J apanese territory and J apan reacted by dec i d i n g that Korea once agai n shou ld serve as buffer between her interests and the Russians. The role of Korea as a buffer between Asian powers ended w i t h the J apanese victory over Russia i n 1 905 and the subsequent absorption of Korea i nto the J apanese Em p i re. At the conclusion of the Second World War, Korea was d ivided i nto two cou ntries, N orth and South Korea. S i nce that time South Korea especially has served as a buffer between American and Soviet spheres of i nfl uence in Eastern Asia althoug h she is c l osely a l l ied with the Americans. Mongolia, for a few years in 1 930s, separated J apanese and Soviet i nterests on the Asian mai n land. Other buffer states of the twe n t i et h-ce n t u ry i n c l ud e U r u g u ay, separat i n g B raz i l a n d A rg e n t i n a; i n Africa, Zi m babwe ( R h odes i a), A n g o l a , a n d M ozambique have been used a s buffers. The latter three were used in the 1 960s to control contact between the Rep u b l i c of South Africa and the m i l itant, national i stic, and usually Soviet supported states of Blac k Africa. B U F F ER STAT E P H YS I O G RA P H Y

The concept o f a physical barrier between two or more antagon i stic states appears to have devel oped early i n man's pol itical h istory. Early civi l izations used, as have more recent societies, swampy or marshy lowlands, deserts, mountai ns, a nd rugged h i l l or plateau country as buffer zones. I n ma ny i n stances, i ndependent states without a buffer fu nction g rew out of the desert and mou ntai nous reg ions that served earl ier as buffers, for

23 exam ple, I ran and Afghanistan. Of the thi rty-two twentieth century b u ffer states identi fied i n t h i s chapter, twenty-s ix possess considerable territory that is e ither desert or h i g h l ands (hi l ls, d issected p l ateaus, or mountai ns); this is, however, not meant to i m p l y that the bu ffer cond i t i on evo lved solely because of physiograph i c characteristics. Although spatial i n teraction i n these areas was not p revented because of rugged terrai n , i t was severely constrai ned; thus terra i n served as a temporary barrier and usually slowed m i l itary activities, thus serving to keep the peace. I n some cases, thoug h, the roug h terrai n with i n a reg ion resu lted i n local ized areas, part i c u l arly those with mounta in passes o r gaps, becom i n g focal p o i n t s and t r a n s p o rt c rossroads for t h e surrou nd i ng reg ions. Afg hanistan, Austria, and Yugoslavia are th ree excel lent exam ples of a "crossroads" situation resu lting from the rugged topog raphy with i n a reg ion. Th is meet i n g p l ace of d iverse cu ltures and the subseq uent tard i ness by the c rossroads reg ion to develop a strong sense of nation is one causal factor for the reg ion evolvi ng i nto or bei ng uti l ized as a buffer. Exam i nation of the landsurface forms of buffer states i n d i cates that many of them are located i n areas that m i g ht be descri bed as waste zones, suc h as deserts, h i l l country, or mountai nous land. Most buffer states, however, regard less of thei r topog raphy and other physical attri butes, have i n common the presence of strateg ically i m portant transportation routes. Hence, the buffer state shou l d be considered i m portant in terms of neutral izi ng the use of strateg ic routes by opposing forces. In some i nstances the l ocation of these strateg ic routes was perhaps more i m portant i n the c reation of the buffer state than was the idea of a s i m p le physical barrier. Furthermore, several buffer states have been the target of numerous i nvaders and have been conquered many ti mes, especially those in lowland plai ns, such as Poland. The powerful neighbors, i n many cases not w i s h i n g to risk having the buffer area come u nder the control of an enemy state, ag reed to the formation of an i n dependent state to act as a barrier and at the same time neutral ize the strategic routes through the buffer zones. Also i mportant is the fact that si nce many of these buffer areas have been freq uently i nvaded, the popu lation is an amalgam of d i fferent peoples who may have been perceived by the powerful neighbors as u nable, because of the i r diversity, to c reate a nation u n i fied or strong enough to chal lenge either of the nei g h bori ng powers. Thus because of the cultural heterogeneity of the buffer area resu lting, i n many cases, from the reg ion's physiography, the neighbori n g powers held a synoec ious att itude toward t h e buffer area and thusly i ndependence was, i f not assu red, g reatly encouraged by the powers.

24

ET H N I C G RO U PS, R E L I G I O N S, A N D LAN G UAG ES O F B U F F E R STATES

It wou l d be expected that because of the transitional and border c haracter of buffer states and the n umerous i nvasions to which many of them have been subjected that a diverse eth n i c situation wou l d p reva i l . Furthermore, it i s assumed that the i n habitants wou l d fol low a variety of rel i g ions and possess a polyg lot of lang uages. Many buffer states do i ndeed possess g reat d iversity of eth n i c g roups, languages, and rel i g ions. M uc h of this d iversity can be attributed to the fact of location that these states are at strategic poi nts of contact between two d i verse c u ltures or astride h i storic trade and/or i nvasion routes: thus many cultures have been i ntrod uced to these areas. The n umerous cultural d i fferences also may have worked to ensure the development and maintenance of the states and the i r subseq uent buffer status. Because of the i r complex cultural nature, areas that became buffer states were p robably deemed no threat to the adjacent states si nce it was thought by the powers that such an amalgam of cultures cou l d never u n ite a n d form a viable nation u n ified enough t o challenge the neighbori n g powers. The development of buffer status i n several states, namely Austria, Bel g i u m , Bhutan, I ran, Nepal, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, owes m uch to the i r location as i nvasion routes or poi nts of contact between d i fferi ng peoples. Because these states were in strateg i c locations, the more powerful cou ntries i n the reg ion agreed to or accepted the idea of an i ndependent country located between the compet i n g states. The cont i nued existence of these states as i ndependent entities rests u pon the i r rel ations with their neighbors; relations w h i c h m ust not favor one or the other of the neighbors. The powers must view the buffer state as serv i n g a usef u l purpose in keeping peace and ensuring that the i r i nterests are not com prom i sed. If one of the powerful states separated by the buffer perceive an advantage i n destroying the buffer there i s l ittle the buffer can d o to prevent it. Someti mes when war occ u rs between the two powers, the bu ffer, because of i ts location between the warri ng states, is the fi rst casualty. H owever, because of its location, during peacti me the buffer i s in a position to benefit econom ically because it may have extensive trade relations with both neighbors. •

25

S U M M A RY A N D CO N C LU S I O N S

With the advent o f h i g h ly soph isticated modern technolog i cal warfare one m i ght argue that the reason for the existence of buffers has d isappeared . It is accurate to say that jet bombers and i nterconti nental bal l i stic m i ssi les have made the deserts, swam ps, and mounta i n s that for so long served as physical barriers to m i l itary movements i m m aterial to warfare if the concept of conventional warfare has been d iscarded by the cou ntries of the world. N one of us des i re war, conventional or otherwise, but we m u st hope that if wars occu r that they w i l l remai n of the conventional type, otherw i se there is l ittle futu re for the h u m an race. Ass u m i n g that the potential for m i l itary conf l i cts w i l l rema i n w i t h us far i nto t h e future w e m ust attem pt t o use a l l t h e resources ava i l able to prevent that potential from becom i �g real i ty: buffer states sti l l are one i m portant resource i n keeping world peace. N u merous i n stances cou ld be c ited of places and situations where a buffer state, i n the trad itional sense, wou l d be beneficia l. F o r exam ple, evidently the dem i l itarized zone between North a nd South Korea, c reated i n 1 953, is effective, although somewhat ten uously. The countries of central and eastern Europe are sti l l usefu l i n preventi ng border skirmi shes that cou ld lead to a broader scale m i l i tary c o n f l i ct between Sov i et and A m e r i c a n -West European forces. Cou ld not Aryan I ran and Arabic I raq benefit from a buffer i n the i r c u rrent confl ict? And what about the Christians of Lebanon as a buffer between Israel and the Arab states? The i dea of buffer states i s old, but it apparently conti n ues to have merit i n many p l aces and the concept should not be total ly d iscarded s i m p ly because of the potential of h i g h technology warfare i n this l atter part of the twentieth centu ry. In summary, a country with buffer state status is the result of two powerfu l states desi ri ng a stable or neutral zone located between them. The buffer serves to keep the peace by function i ng as a physical barrier between the potential com batants. Although buffer states have served as p hysical barriers, the geog rapher m ust exam i ne more than such a s i ngle variable i n h i s study of states. It is i m perative that the geographer consider how a l l parts o f the envi ron ment work together to c reate an end resu lt. It has been establ ished that buffer states are located between two u nfriendly countries and are someti mes c ursed , or, perhaps because of i ts role i n the i r creation, blessed with a hostile physical envi ronment. Parts of this same i n hospitable envi ronment may serve, however, as the m ajor con nection between the cou ntries that des i re spatial separation.

26

Thus it is evident that the location between two powers i s of paramount i m portance i n determ i n i ng if a cou ntry is to function as a buffer state. The survival of buffers depends u pon their abi l i ty to mai ntai n peace between their neighbors and the wi l l i ng ness of their strong neighbors to resist any attempt at conquest of the buffer by another state. The buffer state, the n , depends u pon the abi l ity of i ts neighbors for its defense because it usually is not strong enough to protect i tself. The survival of the buffer state is, furthermore, enhanced by the opinion of the neighbori ng cou ntries that i t i s in the i r best i nterests to have a smal l , weak neighbor rather than a l arge strong one that i s antagoni stic towards them. Thus rel ation with neig h bori ng states i s critical in the development and d u rabi l i ty of states serv i n g as buffers. The physical geography of the buffer is, however, a most i mportant factor in that it may have served as a physical barrier separat i n g the powerful states or served as a fu n ne l of i nvasion that made the buffer states' vici nal location i mportant to compet i n g states withi n the reg ion. Contrary to what some bel ieve, the useful ness of buffers i s not an h i storical rel ic . Unti l mankind ceases to fight conventional wars and u nti l pol itical d ifferences can be abol ished or moderated, a need for buffer states or buffer zones w i l l remai n . With present technology, thou g h , rugged or otherw i se host i le terrai n may not be a s i g n i ficant factor in determi n i ng the l ocation of the buffer state: it m ay be more a political decision acceptable to a l l concerned without regard to the p hysical geography of the reg ion. I n conclusion, the methods employed by geog raphers i n the study of i nternational relations resu lts in several theses. Accord i n g t o Fitzgerald:24 (1 ) Geography establ i shes a c lose re lationsh i p between types o f h uman organ ization a n d thei r env i ronments, . . . . (2) The political pattern of the world i s subject to ceaseless mod ification . . . . (3) The i n terre l at i o n of States becomes eve r c l oser · though not necessari ly more sym pathetic as man surmounts the geog raph ical d i fficu lties of d i stance, c l im ate, and terra i n . Pol i t i cal i solation i s i m possible today, a s a l l states have been brought to rA al ize. .

·

27 N OTES 1 . Preston E. J a mes and Clarence F. Jones, eds., A merican Geography: Inventory and Prospect (Syracuse : Syracuse U n iversity Press, 1 954), p. 2 1 6. 2. Y . M . Goblet, Political Geography and the World Map (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1 955), p. 37. 3. Jean Gottmann, The Significance of Territory (Charlottesv i l le: The University Press of Virg i n ia, 1 973), p . ix. 4. W.A. Doug las J ackson, ed. , Politics and Geographic Relationships: Readings on the Na ture of Political Geography (Englewood C l i ffs: Prent ice- H a l l , I nc. , 1 964). p. 87. 5. Derwent Whittlesey, The Earth and the Sta te: A Study of Political Geography (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1 944), p . 8. 6. Richard Hartshorne, " M orphology of the State Area: Significance of the State," i n Essays o n Political Geography, edited b y Charles A. Fisher (London : Metheun and Company, 1 968) p. 29. 7. J ames and Jones, p. 1 92. 8. Preston E. J ames, " Some Fundamental Elements in the Analysis of the Viab i l ity of States, " i n Essays on Political Geography, edited by Charles A. Fisher (London: Metheun and Company, 1 968), p. 33. 9. Samuel Van Valkenburg and Carl L. Stotz, Elements of Political Geography 2nd. edition. (Englewood C l i ffs: Prentice- H a l l , I nc. 1 954), p. 41 . 1 0. J . R.V. Prescott, Political Geography (London: Metheun and Company, 1 972), p. 59; a n d N i c h o l a s John Spyk m a n , " F ro n t iers, Sec u rity, a n d I nternat i o n a l Organ ization," Geographical Review, 3 2 (1 942):440. 1 1 . N icholas J o h n Spykman and Abbie A. Rol l i ns, "Geog raphic Objectives i n Foreign Pol icy," The American Political Science Review, 3 3 (1 939):4 1 0.

1 2. Ibid., p. 405. 1 3. Hans W. Weigert and others, Principles of Political Geography (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, I nc., 1 952), p. 1 76. 1 4. " Buffer States: Their H i storic Service to Peace," Round Table, 45 ( 1 955):341 . 1 5. Samuel Van Valkenburg and Carl L. Stotz, p. 51 . 1 6. J . M u rray and others, eds., The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1 933), vol u me 1 , p . 1 27 and p. 1 1 58. 1 7. Spykman and Rol l i ns, p. 406. 1 8. Ibid., p. 396. 1 9. Ibid., pp. 396-97. 20. Ibid., p. 403.

28

21 . Van Val kenburg and Stotz, p. 5 1 . 22. Ibid., p . 52. 23. Luci l e Carson, Geography and World Politics (Englewood C l i ffs: Prentice- H a l l , I nc., 1 958), p. 32. 24. W. Fitzgerald, "Geography and I nternational Settlement," Na ture, 1 52 (1 943): 589-590.

C H APT E R 2 B U F F E R STAT ES: T H E I SS U E O F SOV E R EI G N TY JOSEPH MA /LA

N o attem pts have been m ade to develop a general theory of the buffer state. The subject has atways been studied within the framework of case studies rel ating to foreign pol icies of smal l and/or various buffer states.1 This approach appears to leave u nanswered many q uestions reg ard i n g the genera l n at u re and patterns of behavior of buffer states. A general theory wou l d i n itially have to address such issues i n a very prec i se way. The i ntent of this paper is not to look to the requ i s ite issues of a general theory of buffer states, but to l ook at buffer states from the spec ific view poi nt of sovereignty status. O u r arg u ment is that b u ffe r states are states i n w h i c h the i s s u e of sovere i g nty i s at stake. By view ing i t from this perspective we are not only tryi n g to put the problem i nto a new framework, but we are also ai m i ng at provid i n g a typology of the buffer state's behavior. G EO G RA P H Y A N D SOV E R E I G N TY O F B U F F ERS: T H E CO M P L EXITY O F T H E D E FI N IT I O N A L PRO B LE M

Previous defi n itions o f buffer states have emphasized their spatial location between two or more powerful states. P.B. Potter for exam ple wrote that the term buffer state i s "often used to describe a weak state, smal l in size, probably without foreign pol icy."2 M athise n , on the other hand, considers a buffer state as "a small i ndependent state lyi n g between two larger, usua lly rival, states (or block of states)."3 In both defi n i tions, the geog raph ical criteri u m is combi ned with the political one. The buffer state is indeed a smal l state sandw iched between two or more powerfu l n e i g h bors. It is c l ear, however, that neither geog raphy nor pol itics alone can qualify a state as a buffer state. 29

30 N either Switzerland nor Lebanon i s s i m i lar to Poland i n terms of geog rap h i c a l s i ze , yet t h ey are, or were, as i n t h e case of Switzerland, buffer states. O n the other hand, Bel g i u m and Hol land are smal l states, but they cannot presently be considered buffers because of the l ac k of rival ry among thei r neighbor states. Thus, it i s not only the power of geog raphy that establ ishes a state as a buffer, it is also the geography of power which determ i nes whether a state can be c l assified as a buffer. The d i st r i b u t i o n of power w i t h i n the reg i o n a l context, i .e . , balance o f power among t h e rival states, c reates t h e conditions for emergence of buffer entities.4 Alternatively, the mod ification w h i c h may occu r w i t h i n t h e reg ional context o f power may bri ng about a d rastic c hange with i n the natu re of the buffer state and m ake i t lose its buffer zone status. Bel g i u m , for example, has been for a long time a buffer state between Germany and France. However, the emergence of a new European order after World War Two created a situation i n w h i c h Bel g i u m was no longer a buffer. Variations in the rel ationsh i ps between the neighbors of buffer states help to explai n the chan g i ng nature of buffers. When rival ry i nc reases between two or more powerful states surroun d i n g a t h i rd smal ler one, the l atter i s caught i n a d i fficult situation where its weakness becomes evident. As a smal l state, a buffer i s not able to c hange the pol i cy of other states, and i s frequently not strong enough to oppose such pol i cies. As D. Vital explai ns: "the meas u re of state's power i s the capaci ty of government to i nd uce other states - or governments - to fol l ow l i nes of conduct or fore i g n pol i cy w h i c h they m i g h t otherw i se n ot p u rsue; a lternatively i t i s the capacity to withstand the p ressu re of other state� or governments which are i ntent on deflecti ng_ i t from a course which the national i n terest - or the i nterests of its leader - wou ld appear to req u i re."s Therefore, u n less the buffer state succeeds i n remai n i ng neutra l, i ts sovereig nty i s threatened and at ti mes i ts very existence is pl aced in jeopardy. The buffer state may be compel led in certa i n situations to form an al l i ance with one of i ts neighbori ng powers. It m ay accept m i l itary presence on its territory and a l i g n i tself with that of the strongest neig h bor. H owever, the buffer state m i g h t be exposed to a far more d ramatic situation where its u nity may be endangered, and the cou ntry may be d ivided, as for example, Germany and Korea. F u rthermore, a bu ffer state may no longer exi st as a n i ndependent state and m ay be an nexed by one of its m i g hty neighbors, as was the case with Ti bet. In all of these cases, the sovere i g nty of the buffer state appears to be the most i m portant

31

issue. Thus buffer states are not only cou ntries that d i ffer from others because of part i c u lar spat i a l s i t u at i o n s , t h ey a re a l so cou ntries i n w h i c h the gee-po l i t i ca l envi ronment affects, i n a specific way, the exerc i se of sovere i g nty as a fu ndamental attri bute of the state. s SOV E R EI G N TY A N D T H E B U F F E R STAT E

It h as been said that "sovereig nty i s the criteri u m of the state." 1 Sovereig nty i s general ly u nderstood as the i ndependent rig h t of the state over i ts own territory and its autonomyvis-a-vis other states i n the i nternational system . Sovereignty means the right of the state atone to wield power over its territory and popu l ation. It also means the power of the state to act without bei ng subord i n ated to the authority of another country. Therefore territory and autonomy are the two c ruc ial elements i n the conceptual ization of sovereig nty. Fi rst, territory, as an i mportant element of sovereignty, i n d icates the power and extent of a state's authority w i th i n recog n ized bou ndaries. On its territory, the state has the sole and abso l u te rig h t to exerc i se any authority. Second, the autonomy of the state refers to the self-determ i nation of a state i n its fore i g n pol i cy and i ndependent al l i ances. These two c haracteristics have never been pure e lements and h ave been c h a l l e n g e d s i n c e the Treaty of West p h a l i a ( 1 648) because of changes w h i c h have occurred at social, econom ic, and tech nolog ical levels in world soc iety. In buffer states, the q uestion of sovere i g nty i s very frag i le, espec i a l l y when exposed to the i n f l uence of powerf u l n e i g h bors. B u ffe r states have so many constrai nts work i n g against them that the i ssue of sovereignty w i l l conti nue t o b e the aci d test o f i n dependence. On the terri tori a l l eve l a b u ffer state ofte n comes u nd e r c o n t rad i ctory b o r d e r c l a i m s f r o m i t s n e i g h bors. H i st o ri c a l l y , portions o f Poland have been clai med b y Russia, Prussia, and A u s t r i a . B razi l and Arge n t i n a h ave c o n s i d e red U r u g u ay as a territory of t h e i r own . U r u g u ay, c al led the Banda Oriental by Argenti n a and Cisptati ne by Brazi l , has been a d isputed area for a tong ti me. Occupied at the beg i n n i ng of the n i neteenth century by Brazi l and Argenti na, U ruguay was establ ished as an i ndependent buffer state, thanks to British med iation, in 1 828. Another example i s Lebanon, w h i c h is one of the ori g i nal members of the U n i ted N ations and the Arab Leag ue but has never been recogn ized by Syria as an i ndependent state. From the Syri an poi nt of view Lebanon was artificially c reated by the French i n 1 920 when the

32

Lebanese territory of Mount Lebanon was e n larged and extended to areas which, accord i n g to Syrian clai ms, belonged to former Syrian V i l l ayets (d istri cts) of the former Ottoman E m p i re. a Therefore Syria's i n tervention i n the Lebanese strife was often j ust ified by Syria's contention that Syri a and Lebanon was a u n i q ue country which was d ivided as a result of French colon ialism. F u rthermore, the Syri an foreign m i n ister d i d not ru le out, i n January 1 976, the poss i b i l ity that, in case Lebanon was partitioned , Syria "wou ld not hesitate to an nex parts of Lebanon which are, in real i ty, parts of Syria."e The territories of buffer states can also be d ivided by powers who decide to extend thei r own territory or spheres of i n f l uence. Thus Poland was divided in 1 772 and in the aftermath of World War Two partition occu rred i n Germany, Korea, and Vietnam. On the i nterreg ional leve l , the buffer state's behavior may be s u bj ected to p ressure from its n e i g h bor in order to establ i sh a l i g n me nts. The buffer remains neutral , and thus com m its i tself to very spec ific behaviors, or it forms m i l itary al l i ances. In the fi rst i n stance, the buffer state g ives up one of its most i mportant rig hts, namely, the Jus Belli (except in sel f defense). In the second i n stance it rel ies on other states in order to exist as an i n dependent country. In both cases the n ature of i ts sovereignty i s affected in a specific way. Territorial i nteg rity and m i l itary a l l iances can be used as two mean i ng f u l vari ables to h e l p us u nderstand the s ituation and behavior of a buffer. Whether or not a buffer state has a u n i ted territory or has c o n c l uded m i l itary a l l i ances, is u sefu l as an i n d icator of the fore i g n pol icy and overal l behavior patterns of that state. A matrix combi n i ng these two elements and generat i n g the i r possible outcomes i s i l l u strated i n F i g u re 2. 1 . Territori al I ntegrity M i l itary A l l iance

Case

+

+

1

2

+

+

2

3

Fig. 2.1 Territorial Integrity and M i litary Alliance

When a buffer state enjoys territorial i ntegrity and has no m i l itary al l i ances, as i n Case 1 , the state is i n a postu re of neutralized sovereignty. When a buffer has concl uded a m i l i tary a l l i ance and enjoys territorial i ntegrity or has concl uded m i l itary al l i ance without territorial i nteg rity (Case 2), the state i s in a postu re of controlled sovereignty. And when a buffer state has no m i l itary a l l i ance and no territorial i nteg rity (Case 3) the state is i n the

33

post u re of what m ig ht be termed cha llenged sovereignty. The above d ifferentiated set of sovereignty d i lemmas are of utmost i m portance for buffer states. These d i lemmas become the source of pol i cy and not merely an outcome of it. They determ i ne what the buffer state w i l l transmi t or receive from the world envi ronment and its neighbors. Because these d i lemmas are so s i g n i ficant, they tend to weaken the pol i cy m aking mechanisms and the fore i g n pol i cy problems solving capab i l ity of the state. I n general , because these elements are so absorb i n g , the leaders h i p o f a buffer state tends to b e unable t o search f o r creative, successfu l answers and, therefore, appears to stagnate and fai l . Thus, a student o f buffer states m u st deal w i t h the d i lemmas of sovereig nty i n order to be able to contri bute to the pol itics and theory of buffers in the contemporary i nternational system . FO R E I G N PO L I C I ES O F T H E B U F F E R STAT E

I n order to avoid i nvolvement i n host i l ities and to preserve their trad itional i nteg rity buffer states seek to rema i n neutral. To be neutral is vol u ntari ly to com m it oneself to non-i nterference i n d isputes of other states and the refusal o f using one's territory or area for the m i l itary activities of others. N eutral ity in its legal sense resu lts from an i nternational treaty or from a b i n d i n g u n i lateral declaration of the state. H owever, in order to be effective, the neutra l i ty of the state m u st be recogn ized by other countries. Neutral ity, l i ke al l other i nternational relations, d i ffers from one political context to another and one time period to another. Switzerland, for example, has made an option in favor of an abso l ute neutral ity 1 0 whereas Austria has always tended to p ract i c e a n act i ve n e u t ra l i ty . 1 1 Austria has been i nvo l ved i n i n ternational pol itical med iation promot i n g , for exam ple, Arab· Israe l i tal ks, and had one of its countrymen selected as Secretary General of the U n i ted N ations. Switzerland, on the other hand, i s tec h n ical ly n o t a member o f t h e U n i ted N ations. F i n l and is a n i n terest i n g exam p l e of a n o t h e r k i nd o f neutral i ty. 12 F i n l an d ' s neutral i ty stems from t h e Fi n n i s h-Sovi et treaty (The Treaty of Friendsh i p, Cooperation and M utual Assistance ) of Apri l 6, 1 948 . The treaty takes i nto consideration the des i re of F i n land "to rema in outside t h e com p l icating i n terests of the G reat Powers." M ore exp l ic i tly, Article 4 states that "The H i g h Contracti n g Parties confi rm thei r p ledge, g iven u nder Article 3 of the Peace Treaty sig ned i n Pari s i n February 1 0, 1 947, not to i nc l ude any al l i ance or joi n any coal ition d i rected aQai nst the Soviet U n ion."1 3

34

Yet neutrality as a legal status has to be d i sti ng u ished from two others, n a m e l y n e u t ra l izat i o n and p rag m at i c n e u t ra l i ty. A l s o , n e u t ra l i ty has to be d i st i n g u i s hed f r o m n e u t ra l i s m o r n o n ­ a l i gnment. T h e former i s legally recogn ized a s a b i n d i n g status wh i le non-al i g n ment is an ideolog ical or pol itical posture which i s not always fol l owed b y t h e cou ntries that claim it. The Th i rd World cou ntries, for exam ple, despite the i r non-al i g n ment pol i cy, may lean i n fact towards one of the two super powers. M any non-alig ned countries seek i nvolvement in world affai rs and do not want to stand as witnesses in the game of nations. Neutral ization i s the status of neutral i ty of a state i m posed by other countries. As C. Black exp lai ns: 14 I n t h e m a i n . . . n e u t ra l izat i o n s h o u l d be u nd e rstood as a f l ex i b l e i n st r u m e n ta l i ty of statecraft. Its role i s l i m ited to the search for ways to remove m i nor states from arenas of destructive reg i o n a l a n d g l obal c o m p et i t i o n . I n an area of stalemate and standoff, there i s room in d i p lomacy for tec h n i q u es d es i g ned to t ran sform m i l i t a ry stalemates i nto pol itical stalemates. Neutral ization offers the possib i l ity for such a transformation i n some c i rc u m stances, es pec i a l l y t h ose w h e re i n m i nor state i s the scene o f domestic stri fe and com petitive i ntervention. To defi ne the rel ation between neutral i ty and neutral ization "one m ight characterize neutral ization as an al l i ance not to al i g n with a specific state, and neutra l i ty as a dec laration by a state not to a l i g n w i t h others. I n this fashion, neutral ity a n d neutral ization represent dual versions of a s i m i lar posture." 1 s Neutral ization occ u rs when su rround i ng neighbors or fore i g n powers w h o have clai med rig hts over t h e region ag ree t o p u t an e n d to t h e i r con f l i ct ove r a b u ffer state. I n 1 83 1 , for exam p l e , Sw i tze r l a n d w a s n e u tral i zed b y e i g h t states; Be l g i u m was neutral ized by five states in 1 831 ; Luxembourg was neutral ized i n 1 867; and i n the twentieth century Afghan i stan was neutralized by the 1 907 Ang lo-Russian ag reement. In this latter agreement Russia recog n ized that Afghanistan "was outside the sphere of i n f l uence" and Brita i n dec lared that i t wanted to exerci se its i nfl uence "in a pacific way." 1 6 O n J u ly 23, 1 962, i n Geneva, a " Declaration on the Neutral ity of Laos" was sig ned by t h i rteen countries from Asia and Europe. It i s i m portant to note that neutral ization by other states is often combi ned with a dec laration of neutral ity by the state itself. The pol itics of pragmatic neutral ity i m p l ies that the state without bei ng neutral de jure may remain practical ly de fa cto so. Th i s was

35 the case of Belg i u m for a short period of its h istory. Although a neutral state, Belg i u m was nevertheless i nvaded by Germany i n 1 9 1 4. After World War One, Bel g i u m d ropped its neutrality and s i gned a m i l itary ag reement with France on September 7, 1 920. At the Locarno Conference (1 925) five European cou ntries g uaranteed Bel g i u m 's frontiers. But with the threat of war becom i n g more real, Bel g i u m reached an agreement with France in 1 936 and term i n ated the 1 920 accord . Thus a new trend for neutral ism was proc laimed. Fore i g n M i n i ster Spack stated that the new pol i cy of Bel g i u m was "to g i ve assurance to al l its neighbors that, i n any c i rcumstance, Bel g i u m wou l d not perm i t its territory to serve either as a passage or base of occupation for fore i g n arm ies which wou ld profit from i t i n order t o attack more eas i ly another o f h e r neig h bors."11 K i n g Leopold's add ress on October 1 4, 1 936 stated that Belg i u m pol i cy " m ust ai m resol utely at kee p i n g us outside of the quarrels of our neighbors. 1 e Therefore, during 1 936�1 939 Bel g i u m practiced a pol i cy of prag matic neutrality, althou g h this d i d not prevent the country from bei n g i nvaded i n 1 940. Lebanon is another case of p rag matic pol icy of neutra l i ty. Although a mem ber of the Arab League and the Arab Supreme Defense Cou nci l , Lebanon has always managed to avoid bei n g i nvolved i n reg ional m i l i tary confl i cts. It d i d not partici pate i n the Arab-I srae l i wars after 1 948. The u nwritten N ational Pact of 1 943 was a com promise among Christians and M us l i m s which, at the external leve l , was expected to shape an eq u i l ibrium in foreign pol icy. Yet, i n 1 958 and 1 975, Lebanon was caught i n situations which made i t an arena of the many reg ional wars of the M iddle East. D u r i n g t h e 1 975 war, c o n t rad i c tory te n d e n c i e s p u shed Lebanon towards Syria and other external parties, thus caus i n g the foreign pol i cy of p rag matic neutrality to break down. N eutral ity, w hether legal or prag matic, is not an i nsurance pol i cy for success. Laos was crushed i n 1 971 when the U n ited States and South Vietnam fought agai nst N orth Vietnam on Laotian territory. Cambod i a fel l u nder control led sovereignty after Vietnam gai ned an overw he l m i n g pos i t i o n i n the reg i o n . Lebanon today is a cl assical case of what appears to be the u n fortunate future of prag m atic neutralities. It is i mportant to assert that neutral ity is not an easy com mod i ty for small and relatively weak states. So often, buffer states fi nd i t necessary to tilt to one of thei r more powerfu l neighbors, thus encourag i n g dom i nation. Control led sovereig nty means that the buffer state, u nable to d i sentangle itself from the p ressu re of the two surround i ng powers, has to enter i nto a pol itical-m i l itary al l i ance, thus relyi ng u pon one

36

of its powerful neighbors or one of the external powers who c l a i m i n terests i n t h e reg ion for i t s defense a n d foreign re l ations. Th i s situation may occ u r in two ways. The buffer may sti l l enjoy territorial integ rity, but it has to enter i nto a m i l itary al l i ance or accept troops on its soi l , thus fal l i ng i nto the sphere of an external state. Th i s was the case of Belgi u m when in 1 870, during the Franco-German War, G reat Brita i n made it c lear to both Germany and France that it wou l d not tolerate the i nvasion of Bel g i u m , and i n 1 920, when i t renou nced its neutral ity and sig ned a m i l itary a l l iance with France. U nequal a l l i ances m ay also occ u r w i th i n the framework of broader m u lt i l ateral a l l i ances. Czechoslovaki a came i nto a buffer s ituation between East and West after World War Two. H owever, subseq uently, as a part of the com m u n i st world led by the Soviet U n ion, i t joi ned the Warsaw Pact and its sovereig nty became l i n ked to the l arger conception of the com m u n ist theory of sovereig nty. 1 e O n August 23, 1 968, Czechoslovakia was i nvaded by troops of the Warsaw Pact u nder the rationale that the i nternal changes w h i c h occu rred i n t h e c o u n t ry c o n s t i t uted a t h reat to the w h o l e com m u n ist world . Th i s w a s k n o w n a s t h e Bresh nev theory o f l i m i ted sove re i g n ty, m a k i n g i t c l ear t h at the sove re i g nty o f Czechoslovakia was a control led one. Control led sovereig nty m ay also be descri bed as a situation i n which a state i s partitioned and each of its two entities concl udes contrad i ctory al l i ances. Th i s occu rred in G e rm any, Korea, and Vietnam. U n less one segment of the d ivided cou ntry, backed by its surround i ng powers or power i nterested in the area, managed to i nvade and an nex the other part of the country (such as N o rth Korea's i nvasion of South Korea in 1 950 and N orth Vietnam's conq uest of South Vietnam) the two cou ntries will rema i n d ivided, sufferi n g fore i g n m i l itary p resence and behaving with i n the sphere of i nfl uence of the g reater powers. Korea, due to its location is caught between powerf u l neighbors and has been descri bed by some as "a spri n g board for J apanese i n f i ltration i nto the Asiatic mai n land" and by others as a "forward base for the i nvasion of J apan . " I n view of Korea's geog rap h i c al conf i g u rat i o n , J apan thought of it as a "dagger aimed at the heart of J apan. " On the other hand, Korea cou ld eq ual ly be viewed as "a hammer ready to stri ke at the head of Chi na."20 After the Sino-Japanese War of 1 8941 895, the trad itional i nfl uence of C h i n a over Korea ceased , and with the Treaty of S hi monoseki (Apri l 1 895), J apan became the m a i n force i n Korea. Fighti ng was renewed between J apan a n d Russia over Korea and ended with the R usso-J apanese War. At the peace

37 of Portsmouth (1 905), Russia recog n ized J apan hegemony over Korea. After World War Two, the Soviet U n ion recovered its place i n Korea, but i t h ad t o share i t this t i me, not with China o r Japan, but with the U nited States. The division of Korea i nto two m i l itary occu pational zones, North and South o f t h e 38th parallel, was at the ori g i n of the creation of two Korean states. South Korea is i n the sphere of i nfluence of the . West, w h i le comm u nist North Korea i s u nder the i nfluence of the East. N orth Korea, however, has to act as a buffer between C h i n a and the Soviet U n ion. In Case 3 situations neither the territorial i ntegrity of the state exists nor a m i l itary al l i ance takes p l ace. It is the case of m i l itary occu pation combi ned with a pol itical d isi ntegration of the state. The chal lenged sovereignty is the evident mani festation of the politics of d i s i ntegration and, therefore, could be considered a complete fai l u re of a buffer state's foreign policy. The pol itics of neutral ization tend to c reate an eq u i l i bri u m based on a m u lti· polarized sym metry toward s the nei g h bori ng states.21 Control is based on u n i-pol arized asy mmet ry fac i n g d i rectl y another, but c o n t rad i ctory, u n i -p ol arizat i o n . C h a l l e n ged sove re i g nty i s the position of d i s-eq u i l ibri u m and is the position of a very weak buffer state, either on the bri n k of i nternal d i s i ntegration or a l ready disi nteg rated , which i s u nable to deal either with territorial partition or with fore i g n m i l itary occupation. Such cases may occu r when fore i g n m i l itary occu pati o n coi nc i des with i nternal civi l strife. Rather t h a n a stab i l ized post u re, the state of c h a l l e n g ed sovere i g n ty rep rese nts p rocesses of brea k u p a n d f req u e n t osc i l l ation i n behavior. Lebanon today is an i l l u stration o f t h i s situation . T H E CASE O F L EBAN O N

From its i ndependence u n t i l 1 985, Lebanon has gone through four d i fferent phases and has experienced fou r d ifferent pol icies. Because of its i nternal rel i g ious composition, Lebanon has succeeded i n fol lowing a p ragm atic pol i cy of neutrality, avoid i ng reg i o n a l m i l i t a ry i n v o l ve m e n t . T h i s po l i cy was c aref u l l y i m p lemented unti l 1 975, with only one exception i n 1 958 when Lebanon clearly shifted to the West and fol l owed an anti-Nasserist­ Arab pol i cy. The pol i cy of prag m atic neutrality was endangered by the activities i n itiated by the Palest i ne Liberation Organization (PLO) against Israel from Lebanese territory. The war between the

38 Lebanese factions, who either sympathized with or fou g ht aga inst the PLO, broke out i n 1 975. I n 1 976 Syrian troops entered Lebanon and Lebanese territory was occu pied by Syrians, with the except ion of smal l parcels in southern Lebanon which was u nder I srael's contro l . At t h at time Le b a n o n s h i fted toward s Syria u n d e r controlled sovereig nty.22 Fol low i ng the " Peace for G a l i lee" operation i n 1 982, Israel i nvaded Lebanon, which was a l ready u nder Syrian occupation. I n order to escape this d i lemma Lebanon fol lowed a rather comp lex path. It combi ned both a shift to power external to the reg ion, namely the U nited States, and at the same time tried to seek m i l i tary neutrality vis-a-vis Israel and Syria. 23 Therefore, provisions made u nder Articles 4 and 6 of the M ay 1 7th Agreement banned the uti l ization of the territory of the contracti n g parties for the purpose of wag i n g host i le actions agai nst one another. The opposition from Syria to the M ay 1 7th Agre ement was very stro n g . Leb a n o n was c om p e l l ed i n M arc h 1 984 to sc rap i t s agreement with I srael w h e n t h e i nternal d isputes were renewed and the U .S. M ari nes withdrew. I n 1 984 Lebanon shifted aga i n in favor of Syria. The switc h i n g patterns of behavior in Lebanon cannot fu l ly be u nderstood outside the i nternal eth n i c and rel i g ious com position of Lebanon and the M iddte East. Yet it is c l ear that its sovereig nty i s sti ll chal lenged from Syria, w hic h wants Lebanon t o s i d e w i t h it agai nst Israe l . O n the other hand, Israel, w hich wants to ensure that Lebanon w i l l never be used to stage attacks agai n st it, w i l l remai n i n contro l of South Lebanon. Syria and I srae l , therefore, occu py Lebanon without the framework of a m i l itary a l l i ance. Partition of the territory between fore i g n forces i s now a real ity. The outcome of s u c h a c h aot i c s i t u at i o n m i g ht be c o n t ro l led sovere i g nty o r permanent i n stab i l ity, or perm anent part i t i o n of the c o u ntry. Neutra l i ty, however, can be a sol ution for Lebanon, i f fore i g n troops w i t h d raw and ag ree to the reesta b l i s h m e n t of a n e u t ra l i zed Lebanon. CON C L USION

In focusing on sovereignty, i ndependence and autonomy have been stressed. There i s however, one i mportant point fou n d i n the l i teratu re on buffer states w hic h shou ld be considered: the issue of asymmetric perceptions of the buffer states and the i r surround i n g neighbors. A buffer w i l l always see itse l f as neutral, and w i l l assert, i n a l l

39 c i rc u m stances, its neutrality by words and deeds. It w i l l focu s on i ndependence, sovereig nty, autonomy, freedom, and the right to exist. Whenever control led or chal lenged, it w i l l tend to d i sentangle itself from its threate n i n g envi ronment and wi l l attempt to stick to its neutral posture, which i t considers as its natural state of affa i rs. Yet the perception of the buffer held by external powers does not in most cases coincide with the buffer's perception of itself. External powers pai nt buffers as a permanent source of problems. External neig h bors of most buffers may even consider neutrality as host i l e behavior. They fear the use of the buffer's territory as a l au n c h i n g pad agai nst them. Thus they try to make buffers choose s ides. Yet, there are some cases i n which agreements on neutral izi n g a buffer have been reached among rival powers. U n fort u n atel y though , the past decade h as only witnessed d isasters and complete breakdowns of such buffers. Laos and Cambod ia, once neutral ized, have collapsed. Lebanon, which fol l owed a path of p rag matic neutrality, i s going through a trau matic period of Its pol itical existence. Sovereignty of buffers, despite a l l claims and idea l i stic statements, has been sacrificed o n t h e altars o f powers' interests. The d i plomacy o f t h e �uffer m u st, therefore, be c reative enough to stress the advantage g reat powers can have i n mai ntai n i ng the neutral ity of a buffer state i n today's worl d . In a period of hard confrontation and confl icts, the buffer m i g ht play the role of a moderator, thus bri n g i n g the powers to change their attitudes and to adopt a positive view of what the world m ust look l i ke. Buffer behavior m ust tend to develop a peacefu l approach to confl ict resol ution and favor d i plomacy over m i l itary strateg ies. Buffers m u st shape the i r pol i cies m ore on i nteg rated reg ional development than on confrontation or isolation. For a buffer, to be neutral i s not to be isolationist, rather it i s to neutral ize war and to stress non-m i l itary approaches. N OTES 1 . T. Mathisen, The Function of Small Sta tes in the Strategies o f the Grea t Powers, (Oslo: Scandi navian U n iversity Press, 1 971); and M. G . Partem, "The B uffer System i n I nternational Relations," Journal o f Conflict Resolution, (1981). 2. P.B. Potter, " Buffe r State," Enclyc/opedla of the Socia/ Sciences, 3-4 (1 930), p. 45. 3. Mathisen. 4. Partem. 5. D. Vital, The /nequallty of Sta tes: A Study of the Small Power in Interna tional Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 967).

40 6. Cyprus, an island, m i g ht be considered a buffer i n which the G reek-Turkish riva l ry is taking p l ace. 7. L. D E B EZ, Les Principles Generaux du Droit Interna tional Public (Paris: LG DJ, 1 964). 8. E. Rabbath, La Forma tion Hlstorique du Liban Politique et Constituionnel: Essa/ de Synthese Publ ications de l ' U n iversite Libanaise, 1 973. 9. R. Cham ussy, Chronlque d'une querre. Liban 1975- 19 77 (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1 978). 1 0. F. Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality: Its His tory and Meaning (Londo n : George Allen and Unwin Ltd ., 1 946).

1 1 . F. Bock, "Austrian Neutral ity," i n A. A. Bauer, (ed.) The Austrian Solu tion,

In terna tional Conflict and Cooperation (Charlottesv i l le: U n iversity Press of Virg i n ia, 1 983).

1 2. G. Maude, The Finnish Dilmemma: Neutrality In the Shadow of Power (Toronto: Toronto U n iversity Press, 1 976). 1 3. M. J akobson, Finnish Neutrality, A Study of Finnish Foreign Polley Since the Second World War (New York: Praeger, 1 969). 1 4. C.E. Black, et. a l . , Neu traliza tion and World Politics (Pri nceton : Pri nceton U n iversity Press, 1 968). 1 5. N. Choucri, " I nternational Nonal i g n ment," in M. H aas, A Behavloral Approach (New York: Chand ler, 1 977). 1 6. Partem. 1 7. R.C. Rothstei n , A l/lances and Small Powers (New York: Col u m bi a U niversity Press, 1 969), p. 1 1 1 . 1 8. Rothste i n , p . 1 1 2. 1 9. G . I . Tu n k i n , Theory of Interna tional Law (Cambridge: Harvard U n iversity Press, 1 974).

20. Y. Koo, "The Conduct of Foreign Affairs, " in A. Wri g h t (ed), Korean Politics in Transition (Seattle: U n iversity of Wash i n gton Press, 1 975) p. 208.

21 . In the case of F i n land, bias in favor of the USSR Is evident. The president of F i n land t u rned down in 1 948 an offer to benefit from the Marsh a l l Plan in order not to offend the Soviet U n i o n , which considered the Marshall Plan an American counter. offensive i n Europe.

22. E. Azar, et. al., Lebanon and the World in the 1 980 s ((Col lege Park, M d . : U n iversity of Maryland Press, 1 983); and A. i . Dawisha, Syria a n d the Lebanese Crisis (New York: St. Mart i n ' s Press, 1 980). '

23. Leaning to a t h i rd party can be an effective strategy for a buffer. Many examples i l l ustrate such a strategy. I n 1 827 Uruguay escaped from the Argent i n e/Braz i l d i lemma a n d leaned towards Great Britai n . Belg i u m , i n 1 870, escaped t h e German/French riva l ry b y g a i n i n g t h e s u pport o f Great Britai o . I n order n o t to sh ift towards N asserist Syria, Lebanon sought and obtai ned, i n 1 958, the aid of the U n i ted States, who sent troops there.

C H APT E R 3 SO U T H E R N A F R I CA: B U F F E R STAT ES W IT H O UT A CO N V E N TI O N A L B U F F E R SYST E M SH ERIDA N JOHNS

U n l i ke i n the M iddle East, Lat i n America, Asia, or Europe, there have not been s i g n i fi cant buffer states i n post-colonial Africa south of the Sahara. The partic u lar envi ronment which led to the i r emergence (and someti mes promi nence) on other conti nents has not been present i n post-colonial Africa. Although there are real d ifferences in the strength of African states and the i r fore i g n pol i cy orientations, they have, for the most part, been preoccupied with securing their i ndependence and alteri ng the colon ial structures i nherited from the erstwh i le European colonial powers. When frictions between the new states of Africa have heated they have generally been between neighbori ng states and have been hand l ed often by ad hoe med i at i ng arrangements through the Organization of African U n ity. Although in recent years a more obvious h ierarchy of states ranged accord i ng to their d ifferent econom i c and m i l itary strengths has become apparent, the emerg i ng regional powers (e.g. N i geria, Zai re) have general ly been preoccu pied with preserving n ational cohesion and have not focused externally upon potential rival ries with each other of the sort which elsewhere has been conducive to the emergence of buffer states. In this setting of i nternational rel ations neither wou ld-be regional powers, nor the much l arger n u m ber of smal l African states, have concerned themselves with c reating, or becom i ng , buffer states. The partial, but significant, exception to the conti nent-wide pattern is, not surprising ly, found at the southern end of the conti nent where the rel ationshi ps between reg ionally powerf u l South Africa a n d i t s neighbori ng states have i ncreasingly engaged the attention of scholars. In a pathbreaki ng analysis in the l ate 41

42 1 960s, rejecting earl ier analyses of the region wh i c h focused either u pon racial d i mensions of politics of particu lar states in i solation or only su perficially and geog raphically upon l i n kages between the states of the reg ion, Larry Bowman arg ued that southern Africa shou l d be conceptual ized as a subord i n ate state system , l argely autonomous with i n the g l obal i nternational system , in which South Africa mai ntai ned its reg ional preemi nence pri mari ly through u neq ual econom i c l i n kages which tied both i ts white-ru led and b l ac k-ru led neighbors to it.1 Ken neth G ru ndy's s u bseq uent book­ length study provided systematic docu mentation to substantiate Bowman's assertion of the existence of a subord i n ate state system i n southern Africa.2 Other scholars conti n u ed to analyze the reg i o n w i t h i n t h i s framework even a s Portuguese rule i n its colonies o f Angola and Mozambique was col l apsing and African national i st goverments came to power.3 I n the wake of the c hanged situation i n the reg ion and reflecting the ascendancy of an alternate paradi g m for the study of i nternational relations - the nature of l i n kages with i n the reg ion have more recently been conceptual ized with i n a world system approach, in which South Africa i s viewed as a subi m perial or sem i peri pheral power, su bord i nate to the capita l i st core of N orth A m e ri c a , Western E u rop e, a n d J apan , b u t , by v i rt u e of i t s i n d ustri a l i z i n g economy, s u ff i c i e nt l y powerf u l to m a i n t a i n domi nance over its non-i ndustrial ized and peri pheral neig h bors. 4 Both conceptualizations of southern Africa, whether regard i ng i t as a reg ional su bsystem or as i ntegral part of the world capita l i st system i n w h i c h se m i pe r i p h eral South Africa d o m i n ates i t s n e i g h bori n g states, can i ncorporate w i th i n the i r analyses a n exam i nation o f southern Africa a s a buffer system i n w h i c h the prime focus i s upon the behavior of South Africa as it has sought to mai ntai n its p ree m i nence with i n the reg ion. With its entrenched soc i o l pol itical order of white m i nority rule chal lenged by blac ks i nside and outside the country (as wel l as by more d i stant opponents beyon d the African conti ne nt), South Africa has labored d i l igently i n the l ast two decades to assure that the potential threat posed by new blac k-ru led states on its borders and elsewhere i n southern Africa cou l d be m i n i m ized. It was only i n early 1 984 that the N ational i st government o f South Africa seemed to have ac hieved a breakthroug h in its p reviously thwarted efforts to formal ize a stance of neutra l i ty on the part of its black-ru led neig h bors. The sig n i ng of the N komati accords between South Africa and M ozam bique on M arch 16 marked the fi rst time that South Africa had reached exp l i c i t and formal open ag reement with

43 one of the new blac k-ru led states on its borders to regu l ate the terms u nder which forces regarded as hostile by the South African state are to be controlled by the neighbori n g states.s Under the terms of the N komati accord s M ozamb i q ue has agreed to convert itself from a hostile state p rovid ing support and transit for south Africa's exi led b l ac k oppos i t i o n i nto a n e i g h bor com m i tted to denying fac i l i ties to the same opposition. The d ramatic shift i n Mozam bique's stance m arks further evol ution i n the buffer system which white-ru led South Africa has pai nstaki ngly soug ht as part of its broader determ i n ation to protect itself on a conti nent i n which power i n t h e l ast q uarter century has steadi ly passed from w h i te­ ru led c o l o n i a l states or l o c a l l y-based w h i te g ove r n m e n ts to govern ments representi ng the b l ack m ajority of the popu l ation. South Africa's q uest for an adeq uate buffer system has been animated by its g row ing fears of the potential vu l nerabi l ity of its system of white-m i nority ru le. S i nce its accession to power in 1 948 the Afri kaner N ational ist g overnment has uti l ized a variety of tec h n i q ues to contai n threats to its hegemony withi n the reg ion. A d isti nctive feature of its strategy has been the creation of black­ ruled ' i ndependent' m i ni-states out of territories with i n its own accepted i nternational borders. More conventional ly, outside of its borders, the South African government has util ized conventional d i p l o m a t i c c h a n n e l s , reg i o n a l econom i c and com m u n i cati o n s dom i nance, a n d t h e threat o f m i l itary action (more recently and f req u e n t l y actu a l l y i nvoked) to be n d its n e w l y sovere i g n n e i g h bori n g states t o acq u i escence t o i t s d e f i n i t i o n o f a n appropriate reg ional order.s Althou g h there are certai n featu res of the present South African buffer system w hic h resemble bufferi ng arrangements devised on other conti nents, the South African system i s more d isti n g u i shed by its vari ance fro m the conventional buffer systems. 7 The various strateg ies w h i c h the Nationa l i st g overn ment has e m p l oyed to advance i ts goal of securing i ts environ ment at the southern t i p of the conti nent w i l l be exam i ned and then the buffer system which has evolved wi l l be assessed from the dual perspective of the conform i ty of its featu res to buffer systems elsewhere and the prospects for i ts mai ntenance. In all of i ts endeavors the N ationa l i st leaders h i p has sought to b l u n t the challenge of an 'enemy' or rival which it views as seeking the demise of white-m i nority ru le and Afrikaner pree m i nence. I n the perception of the South African government this 'enemy' i s a trip le­ headed hydra - m i l itant black nationalism with i n South Africa, black national ism outside of South Africa which identifies with the goal of majori ty-ru le w i t h i n South Africa, and more d i stant ' i nternational

44

com mun i sm, led by the Soviet Union, which is seen to sustai n , i f not t o c reate, al l m i l i tant opposition t o t h e present South African reg i me. a Confront i n g such an extensive and often amorphous riva l , man i festing itself both i nternally a n d external ly, t h e South African state has so u g h t to c o n s t ruct a m u l t i -fro n ted buffe r system appropriate both to its i n c reas i n g l y exposed position as wel l as to its unusual i nternational situation. B U F F E R STAT ES W I T H I N

I t i s South Africa's ' i nternal' buffer states, the Bantustans, or 'homelands; which represent the most i nnovative feature of the South African buffer system at the same time that they reflect the perhaps su i generis nature of the South African case. The Bantustans were c reated as part of the g rand des i g n of apartheid to provide separate political structures for govern ment-approved African political activity. I n 1 951 , the government passed the Bantu Authorites Act w h i c h provided for the establ ishment of tribal, reg ional, and territorial authorities in the t h i rteen percent of South Africa's land designated exc l us ivel y for Africans (and hitherto known as the ' n ative reserves'). Prev i o u s l y mori b u n d local i n stitutions, headed by 'chiefs' appoi nted and paid by the South African govern ment, were g iven new authority beyond the l i m i ted responsi b i l ities which they had p reviously exerci sed in sett l i ng local d isputes and regu l at i n g land usage. U nder Pri me M i n ister H e ndri k Verwoerd the Bantustan concept was further art i c u l ated i n the Promotion of Bantu Sel f-Government Act of 1 959. I n terms of the leg i s l ation i t was stated that Africans were not a homogeneous g roup but i nstead consisted of a n u m ber of separate eth n i c g roups d isti n g u i shed by language and c u lture and associ ated with part i c u l ar land areas or 'homelands: It was to terri torial authori ties in these 'homelands' that the South African government proposed to devolve power progressively u n t i l they were to become "self. govern i n g Bantu national u n its:' Throug hout the 1 960s and 1 970s the South African govern ment stead i ly moved to i m plement its vision for the Bantustans by g ranting more and more power to territorial authorities as they were created in each of the ten eth n ical ly-based 'homelands' recogn ized by the government, most of which consisted of a n u m ber of smal l 'spots' of land i nterspersed among the 'wh ite' eighty-seven percent of South African territory. The Transke i , a relatively l arge and basical ly contiguous area i n eastern Cape Province (consist i n g o f only three separate blocks of land), served as a showpiece model for separate development u nder the Transkei Constitution Act of 1 963; analogous provisions

45 tor the rem a i n i ng territories were authorized by the Bantu H omelands Conso l idation Act of 1 971 . Although al ready in 1 962 Pri me M i n ister Verwoerd had recogn ized the poss i b i l i ty that the Bantustans cou ld u lti m ately advance to the point where they cou l d seek a n d b e g ranted ' i ndependence' b y South Africa, it was not u nt i l 1 976 that the Transkei took this option after successful negoti ations with the South African government. Subseq uently Bophuthatswana in 1 977, Venda in 1 979, and Ciskei in 1982 also became ' i ndependent�. The other six Bantustans, G azu n k u l u , KaN gwane, KwaZu l u , Lebowa, N debele, a n d QwaQwa, have t o d ate remai ned a part of South Africa, with KwaZu l u 's leader, Chief G atsha Buthelezi , outspokenly proc l ai m i ng his i ntention never to seek ' i ndependence! By g rant i n g ' i ndependence' to tou r Bantustans South Africa has d i vested itself of m i l l ions of its b l ac k popu l ation since, u nder South African leg i s l at i o n , a l l c i tizens . of ' i ndependent' Bantustans automat i c a l l y l ose rig hts to South African c i tize nsh i p . Yet 'sovereign ity' has not brought i nternational recogn ition except by South Africa and the other ' i ndependent' Bantustans. While the ' i ndependent' Bantustans no longer have to rely upon South African government for fi nal passage of leg islation the i r changed status h as hard l y altered the fundamental structures of dependence w h i c h tie both the ' i ndependent' and the non-i ndependent Bantustans firmly with i n the South Africa which created them. All Bantustans cont i n ue to receive substantial fi nancial aid from South Africa enab l i n g them to balance the i r budgets. All Bantustans conti nue to rely upon South Africa for support for the i r pol i ce and defense forces. All Bantustans remain u nable to provide work tor the overwhelm i ng majority of the i r able-bod ied males and m u st cont i n u e to send them to South Africa with i n the establ ished channels of the m i g rant l abor system in order to earn money to support the i r dependants sti l l forced to remain in residence in the Bantustans. The i n habitants of both ' i ndependent' and non­ i ndependent Bantustans remai n as enmeshed withi n the South African pol itical economy as they were before the establ ishment of the Bantustan system .s As conti n u i ng dependent appendages of white South Africa the Bantustans serve effectively as buffers for the dom i nant w h i te­ m i nority government. I ndeed, i t appears that the i r existence has provided the white govern ment of South Africa with a cushion that has en hanced its secu ri ty. The i r creation and steady expansion m ust be seen agai nst a backdrop of an eq ually steady l i m itation of African pol itical expression i n the government-designated 'white' areas in tandem with a ruthl ess and relentless strengthen i ng of

46

government sec urity forces app l ied against a l l opponents of the reg i me who have refused to accept its defi n ition of perm i ssable pol i t i cs.10 B l ac k n ational i st organizations, such as the African N ational ist Congress (AN C) and the Pan African i st Cong ress (PAC), w h i c h seek part i c i p at i o n i n c o m m o n South A f r i c a n p o l i t i c a l i n stitutions, h ave been outlawed. Thei r leaders a n d other blacks have bee n den ied govern ment-accepted p l atforms for pol i t i ca l expressi o n . M any m i l itant b l ac k national i st leaders have been banned, i m p risoned, or d riven i nto exi le. In the eyes of the South African government the only leg itimate arena for African politics i s the Bantustans. With i n the separate Bantustans new structu res of employment and patronage have been c reated to p rovide l i m ited opport u n ities i n areas where other econom i c and pol itical opport u n ities are even more l i m ited . Emerg i ng structures of vested i nterest with i n the Bantustans advance their own ends as wel l as those of the South African government in mainta i n i ng the apartheid system w h i c h gave t h e m b i rth. N ot surpri s i n g ly, almost al l o f t h e Bantustan leaders have kept South African security leg islation in force · and even Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of KwaZu l u seem s to have term i n ated h i s i nterm ittent overtu res for some sort of modus vivendi with the exi l ed ANC.1 1 In a someti mes sop h i sticated, and someti mes crude, fashion the South African government throug h the Bantustans has constructed an edifice of pseudo-sovere i g n ity w h i c h serves to buttress its hegemony with i n the country. B LAC K B U F F E R STATES W IT H O UT

Its present considerable success with the newly-created i nternal B a n t u stan b u ffe r states has bee n para l l e l l e d by s u c cess i n mai ntai n i ng external buffer states along its i m medi ate borders and e l sewhere in the southern African reg ion · despite the s h i ft to black ru le which began in the reg ion i n 1 964. For the most part South Africa has been able to ach i eve this situation of compatible external buffer states throug h the exerc ise of its s u perior economi c power a n d d i p lomacy without formal recogn ition. Yet South Africa has also i nc reasing ly fou n d it necessary to project m i l itary force outside of its (and N a m i b i a's) borders to ach i eve its goal s of b l u nting chal lenges from m i l itant blac k national ism in the reg ion, particularly i n t h e l ate 1 970s and the early 1 980s. The fi rst s i g n i ficant changes req u i ri n g adj ustments i n South Africa's reg ional buffer arrangements came in the m id-1960s with Britai n's vol u n tary and i nvol untary withdrawal from southern Africa. H avi n g rejected South Africa's i nvitation to become a part of

47 t h e evo l v i n g B a n t u st a n syste m , t h e m o d e rate n at i o n a l i st leaders h i ps of the three h i g h com m i ssion territories of Basutoland, Bec huanaland, and Swazi land (each of which was contig uous to South Africa but not to each other) negotiated i ndependence from Brita i n respectively as Lesotho (1 966), Botswana (1 966) and Swazi land (1 968), joi n i ng M alawi and Zambi a to the north which had achi eved the i r i ndependence also u nder black majority-rule i n 1 964 i n the wake of the breaku p of the w hite-domi nated Central African Fede rat i o n . Rhodes i a , the t h i rd component of the defunct Federation, ach ieved its own brand of i ndependence from Brita i n w h e n i t s w h i te-m i n o r i ty g overn m e n t u n i l at e ra l l y d e c l a re d i n dependence (U D I) i n l ate 1 965 i n defiance o f both Britai n a n d the U n i ted N ations. For South Africa the changed situation req u i red no rad i cal new departures, but a mod ification in style and strategy to accommodate the newly sovere i g n entities which succeeded Brita i n in the reg ion. It uti l ized d ivergent approaches in deal i ng with its five blac k-ru led neighbors and its lone white-ru led neighbor. In the cases of Lesotho (wh i c h i s surrounded completely by South Africa), Botswana, and Swaziland, South Africa cou l d bu i ld u pon econo m i c and social ties w h i c h had effectively i ntegrated the three territories with South Africa s i nce the n i neteenth century. From the c reation of the U n ion of South Africa in 1 9 1 0 the three territories were formally l i n ked with South Africa i n a common monetary and customs u n ion. With the advent of i ndependence Brita i n's p l ace as partner of the South African state was taken by the three African successor states who e lected to mai ntai n the Southern African Customs U n ion, albeit successfu l ly persuad i ng South Africa to renegotiate terms more to thei r advantage i n 1 969. Si m i l arly the de fa c to monetary u n ion was formal ized as the Rand Monetary Area in 1 974, althou g h Botswana c hose to withdraw and estab l i s h its own c urrency in 1 976. As new econom i c activities were undertaken i n each of the countries the vol u me of trade with South Africa i nc reased . Transportati o n l i n ks t h roug h South Africa became even more essential to each of the landlocked states. Despite the c l oseness of econom i c l i n ks eac h of the three states refused to enter i nto formal d i plomatic relations with the South African government. The l atter, for i ts part, showed its flexib i l i ty by acce pt i n g i ts n e i g h bors' sym bo l i c assert i o n s of d i p lomatic i nd e p e n d e n c e (w h i c h i n c l u d e d , to vary i n g deg rees, ve rbal condem nation of apartheid i n i n ternational fora and recog n ition of both African and com m u n i st states) and agree i n g to new monetary and customs arrangements which enlarged the benefits accru i n g to South Africa's three partners w ithout i n any fashion d i m i n is h i n g South Africa's overwhel m i ng econom ic dom i n ance. Yet i n the

48 pol icy area central to South Africa's sec urity it was able to gai n private assu rances that the territories of the neighbori ng state!S wou ld not be avai lable to exi led South African black nationa l i sts for trai n i ng or transit of armed guerri l las. No b l u n t p u b l i c threats were needed and South Africa cou ld accu rately argue to i ts external critics that it was successfu l l y coexisti ng with black-ru led states on its borders at the same time that it cou ld contend to domestic critics that i t s i m med i ate buffer states were bei ng mai ntai ned as secu rity barriers as rel i able as those which had existed before their achievement of i ndependence from Britai n .12 It was in approaches to the more d i stant new b lack-ruled states of the reg ion that South Africa cou ld c la im its most d ramatic sym bo l i c success in the 1 960s, despite the absence of i ntertw i n i ng formal econom i c l i n kages which tied South Africa's i m medi ate n e i g h bors to her. A l t h o u g h Zam b i a ' s pol i t i c a l l eade rs g ave sanctuary to South African (and Zi m babwean) exi le g roups at the same t i me that they mai ntai ned a thrivi ng trade with South Africa, they refused to negotiate d i rect ag reements with the South African govern ment even d u ri ng the m id-1 970s when both governments became actively i nvolved with eac h other and a range of outside powers in efforts to settle the Rhodesi a/Zi m babwe conf l i ct. 13 I n contrast, ti ny M alawi i n 1 967 startled the cont i nent when i t agreed to estab l i s h formal d i rect d i p l omatic relations with South Africa, becom i n g the fi rst (and to d ate, the only) i ndependent b l ac k African state to exchange envoys with South Africa. D i plomatic relations were accompan i ed by South African fi nancial aid perm itti n g the construction of a new capital in central M alawi and by expanded b i l ateral trade. Malaw i , w h i c h had remai ned aloof from most of the nat ional i st strugg les of the reg ion, did not seem s i g n i ficantly to alter i ts fore i g n pol icy orientation, which also cont i n ued to i n c l ude verbal condemnations of apartheid. In this fas h i on South Africa made M al aw i a model for i ts dec lared wi l l i ngness to cooperate with any African state despite its expressed opposition to apartheid. 14 ·

W H ITE- R U L E D B U F F E R STAT ES

It was in Rhodesia that South Africa made its most d i rect material com m itments to susta i n a neig h bori ng state as a buffer. Along with Portugal , South Africa defied U ni ted N ations sanctions to keep the Rhodesian economy operat i n g . From the l ate 1 960s it g ave the U D I government o f I a n Smith m i l itary assi stance i n its strugg le agai nst the g u erri l l a cam pai g n s of Z i m babwean national i sts (jo i ned , u l t i mately u n successful ly, for several years i n the l ate 1 960s by p uerri l las from the ANC). Desp ite the g row i n g closeness between

49 the two reg i mes i n the econom ic and m i l itary spheres South Africa refused, however, to g ive formal d i p lomatic recogn i tion to the U D I government. N evertheless, through t h e m id-1 970s South Africa seemed to treat Rhodesi a muc h as an al ly, the support of which was crucial i n mai ntai n i n g a ri ng of states on South Africa's borders which wou l d deny the i r territory to the slowly g row i ng g u e rri l l a forces of Sou t h Africa's exi led b l ac k n at i o n a l i s t o rg a n i zat i o n s . R h od e s i a u n d e r I a n S m i t h w a s , t h u s , a n u n recog n ized ally which served a crucial function i n bufferi ng South Africa from more host i l e blac k national ism to the north. An analogous stance was adopted by South Africa towards the Portuguese colonial government of neighbori ng Mozamb i q ue (as wel l as that of more d i stant Angola which adjoi ned not South Africa, but N a m i b i a). Long establ ished ag reements were conti n ued with the metropol itan Portug uese government by which black l abor was recru i ted in M ozamb i q ue for South African m i nes and farms and South Africa routed a su bstantial portion of its trade through t h e M ozam b i c a n p o rt of Lo u re n c o M arq u e s . When b l ac k national i sts i n both territories, denied any platform for pol itical expression by the very nature of the Salazarian system , turned to guerri l l a activities in the early 1 960s South Africa reaffi rmed its comm itment to the exist i n g s ta tus quo. As the m i l itary struggle i n both territories escalated and the i nvolvement of the com m u n ist bloc with the black national i st guerri l l as deepened , the South Africans step ped u p the i r contact with the Portuguese and almost certa i n ly provided m i l itary, as wel l as moral, support to ensure the conti n uation of Portug uese ru le. For South Africa the loss of either Port u g uese terri tory , but part i c u l arly M ozam b i q u e , to b l ac k national ists wou ld rai se the spectre o f proxi m ate host i le force, c losely al l ied with ' i nternational com m un i s m ' , i m medi ately on South Africa's borders. Such a development would pose a potential threat to the South African system which cou ld not so i mmed i ately be contai ned in the way that the moderate black national isms of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swazi land had been.1 5 With the u nexpected ly speedy exi st of Portugal from its colon ies in 1 975 in the wake of the army cou p of 1 974 South Africa's buffer system rece i ved a rude j o l t . For t h e f i rst t i m e South Africa c o n fron ted g ove r n m e n ts in c o n t i g u o u s territories headed by m i l i tant blac k national i sts who had fought thei r way to power ded icated to a p rog ram of non-rac ial majority ru le and soc i a l i st transformation. South Africa reacted d i fferently to the chal lenges i t saw i n M ozam bique a n d Angola. I n M ozambiq ue, where FRELI M O had ach i eved power unchal lenged b y other national ist g roups and

50 was i n itially preoccupied with assistance to Zi m babwean guerri l las rather than to South African g uerri l l as, the South Africans i n d icated t h e i r w i l l i n g ness to accept t h e transfer of power a n d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of e x i st i n g econom i c re l at i o n s h ps s u bj ect to renegot i ation w ith the F R E L I M O government. In Angola South Africa's stance was colored by its deepe n i n g em broi l ment in a struggle with the g uerri l las of SWAPO, the Na mi bian national i st movement, which stood to gai n bases adjacent to N a m i b i a with Angolan i ndependence. The Portuguese departure came i n the midst of an escal ating civi l war between the M PLA, backed by the Soviet U n ion and Cuba, and the FN LA/U N ITA a l l iance, backed by the U n i ted States and other Western powers. Fearful that an M PLA victory wou l d mean both bases for SWAPO as wel l as the advance of ' i nternational com m u n ism' and m i stakenly confident that the U n i ted States wou ld support them, South Africa i ntervened on behalf of FN LA/U N ITA only to withdraw several months l ater when i t became c l ear that the U n i ted States wou l d not back South Africa's m i l itary exped i t i o n . In su bseq uent years South Africa refused to deal with the M PLA government in Luanda; in add ition, it cont i n ued m i l i ta ry i n c u rs i on s i nto southern Angola to h a rass SWAPO g ue rri l l as w h i le g i v i n g s u p po rt to U N ITA g uerri l las who cont i n ued to battle the M PLA government in Luanda, creati ng the pattern for its 'destabi l ization' pol i cy extended e lsewhere in the reg i o n i n the early 1 980s. I n c o n t rast, i n its d e a l i n g w i t h Mozambique South Africa through the l ate 1 970s conti n ued i n its efforts to fashion a rel ations h i p of coexistence with a m i l itant blac k nationa l i st government s i m i lar to the type of coexi stence w h i c h existed w i t h its other i m med i ate n e i g h bors where more moderate leaders h i ps remai ned i n power. 1e ' I N T E R N A L S ETT L E M E N T' A N D ' D ESTA B L IZAT I O N '

The ' l oss' o f the previously 'sec u re' Portuguese-control led colonial buffer states of M ozambique and Angola heightened South Africa's need to adapt its buffer system to the c h an g ed c i rcu mstances rep resented by the i m m i nent poss i b i l ity of further transfers of power from white-mi nority govern ments to b lack· majority governments i n the rema i n i ng white-control led contiguous territories of Rhodesi a and N a m i bia. In both territories b l ack n at i o n a l i st g u e rr i l l as w e re e x p an d i n g t h e i r act i v i t i es a n d i nternational p ressure from the Western powers, a s wel l a s from the U n i ted N ations, was mounting for moves to black-majority ru le. To thwart the l i ke l i hood of success by the m i l itant blac k national i sts i n

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51 both territories (SWAPO i n Namibia and ZAN U and ZAPU i n Zim babwe), the South African authorities moved to deracial ize the i r buffer arrangements through encouragement of m u l t i racial ' i nternal settlements' in Namibia and Zi m babwe to bypass i nternationally sponsored efforts in which SWAPO, ZAN U , and ZAPU were strongly represented . S i m u l taneously p ressu ri n g entrenched white territorial leaders t o work together w i t h moderate blac k pol iticians and encourag i n g black leaders opposed to SWAPO, ZAN U , and ZAPU to negotiate with the South African authorities in N am i bia and Ian Smith's government in Rhodesi a, the South African govern ment soug ht to gai n acceptance for new constitutional arrangements perm itt i ng the transfer of power to m u lt i rac i a l g overnme nts in w h i c h b l ac ks were prom i nently rep resented. I n N a m i b i a the South Africans used their control of the territorial ad m i n i stration for l i m ited deraclal ization of the local constitutional structure and en hancement of prospects for the Democratic Turnhal le All iance, a m u l t i racial g roup i ng headed by a local white pol itician, Dirk M udge, w i l l i ng to work with eth nlcal ly­ based b l ac k leaders who had qual ifiedly accepted South African sponsored change in the territory. In Rhodesi a South Africa used its econom i c and m i l itary leverage to n udge Ian Smith to the n e g ot i at i n g tab l e a n d s u bseq u e n t l y e n c o u raged t h e ne w government which emerged u nder Bishop Abel M uzorewa in a l l i ance with Ian Smith in 1 978. When Bi shop Muzorewa's government p roved u n able to stop the advances of the ZAN U/ZAPU g uerri l las a l l ied in the Patriotic Front, and in 1 979 rel uctantly accepted the terms of the Lancaster House conference for Zi m babwean i ndependence u nder British and i nternational auspices, (as d id the Patriotic Front), the South African government seemed to have remained convinced that Bishop Muzorewa would d raw suffi cient black electoral support to mai ntai n the viabi l i ty of h i s m u lt i rac ial government i n a l l i ance with Ian Smith. It was thus a particular shock for the South African government when the ZAN U w i n g of the Patriotic Front captured a c lear majority of parl iamentary seats i n the new Zimbabwean parl iament elected in early 1 980 enab l i ng it, in a l l i ance with the smal ler n u m ber of rep resentatives of the ZAPU wing of the Patriotic Front, to form the fi rst blac k-maj ority government of a fu l ly­ i ndependent Zi m babwe. ' I nternal settlement' in Zi m babwe was shown to be a c h imera at the same time that prospects for the Democrati c Turn halle A l l i ance and ' i nternal settlement' in N a m i b i a were underm i ned b y t h e d ramatic electoral success o f t h e black Zim babwean n ational i sts and by the staying power of SWAPO,

52 which, l i ke its Zimbabwean counterparts, cont i n ued its armed struggle in oppostion to the reg i me-supported i nternal i nstitutions for black pol itical part i c i pation. 1 1 The fai l u re of the ' i nternal settlement' strategy to mai ntai n , a l beit i n deracial ized form, the previously secu re white-control led buffers on South Africa's borders was comp lemented i n the l ate 1 970s by a d ramatic upsurge i n i nternal blac k chal lenge withi n the cou ntry and a resurgence of support for, and sabotage campaig n s by, the exi l e­ based ANC.1 e The South African government was able to contai n the widespread demonstrations which eru pted i n Soweto i n m id1 976 and the subseq uent manifestations of d i scontent and l abor u n rest w h i c h h ave c o nt i n ued to s i m m e r i nto the 1 980s. I t s determ i n ation t o cont i n ue t o uti l ize t h e fu l l range o f i t s security arsenal agai nst i nternal opponents of a l l races has been repeated ly shown - symbol ized most d ramatically by the deaths in detention of Steve B i ko, the B l ac k Consciousness leader, in 1 977, and N e i l Aggett, a white labor organ izer, 1 982. Yet it has not been able to p reve n t the ex p a n s i o n of A N C act i v i ty w i t h i n t h e c o u n t ry. Strengthened i n exi le by thousands of angry post-Soweto refugee recru its and g iven new potential for access to South Africa by FRELI M O's w i l l i ng ness to perm it transit and office fac i l ities (and the wi l l i ng or unwi l l i ng toleration by Lesotho and Swazi land of an organ ized A N C presence), the ANC demonstrated new capab i l ities to chal lenge the South African government in many reg ions of the country by i n c reasing ly soph i sticated attacks on m i l itary/po l ice fac i l i ties and strateg i c econom i c i n stal l ations, c u l m i nating in the sabotage of the nearly-completed Koeberg nuclear reactor in l ate 1 982, and the car bom b explosion before a i r force offices i n downtown Pretoria i n early 1 983. The success of the A N C has been reflected in p u b l i c expressions of support for the ANC and renewed pol i t i c a l act i v i ty by a ran g e of anti-g overn m e n t org a n i zat i o n s coalesc i n g i n t h e U n i ted Democratic Front and t h e N ational Foru m which were formed i n m id-1 983. The new advances by m i l i t a n t b l a c k n at i o n a l i s m a n d i t s supporters with i n South Africa, i n tandem w i t h t h e persistence of SWAPO activity in N a m i b i a and the conti n u i n g support for ex i led South African b l ac k national i sts by blac k-ru led states in the reg ion, c learly accelerated South Africa's readi ness to use its m i l itary and econom i c s u p e r i o rity to m a i n ta i n i t s h e g e m o n y in t h e s u b­ continent. The strategy of 'destabi l ization' came to the forefront, and Mozam bique joi ned Angola as a prime target.19 As the u nviable ' i nternal sett lement' option p layed itself out in Zi m babwe, anti­ F R E L l MO d i ss i d e nts, g ro u ped in t h e Resistencia N a c io n a l

53 ( M N R) lost the i r base of log i stical and m i l itary s u pport with the dem i se of the Rhodesia n government. South Africa stepped in to g i ve new sanc tu ary to the M N R w h i c h apparently had not received s i g n ificant d i rect support from i t i n the m id-1 970s. With renewed resources and prom ising prospects for expansion in a M ozambique weakened by both brutal Rhodesian attacks i n the l ate 1 970s and econom ic dislocation and d rought in the 1 980s, the M N R successfu l ly expanded its capab i l ities to c h a l l e n g e F R E L I M O aut h o r i ty a n d f u rther d i s r u p t t h e frag i l e economy of the country. South Africa itself took d i rect action agai nst A N C targets in Mozambi que, conducti ng com mando forays a n d bo m b i n g attac ks i n the wake of m aj o r A N C sabotage successes with i n South Africa; it also u ndoubted ly gave log i stical s u p port for sabotage ag a i n st the petro l e u m storage a n d transportation fac i l ities w h i c h M ozam b i q ue wanted t o reopen for Zi m babwe. Sout h Africa's agg ress ive stance agai nst M ozam b i q u e was rep l icated agai nst Lesotho when its em battled reg i m e perm itted A N C activists to asse m b l e i n i t s c a p i t a l . South A f r i c a n commandoes raided ANC head q uarters i n late 1 982, ki l l i ng both A N C members as wel l as women and c h i ldren, and support seems to h ave been g iven , as wel l , to domesti c opponents of C h i ef Leabu a J o h nathan e n g aged i n g u erri l l a activ i t i es aga i nst h i s govern ment. I n Angola t h e South Afri can m i l itary successively extended i t s p e n e t rat i o n w i t h i n t h e co u nt ry i n a n effort to e l i m i nate SWAPO bases wh i le s i m u ltaneously mai ntai n i ng support for U N ITA i n its campaig n agai nst the M PLA government. Elsewhere i n the reg ion South Africa has h i nted at its w i l l i ng ness to g ive m i l i tary trai n i ng to opponents of other neighbori ng reg i mes (most notably to d i ss i de n t s f rom Z i m babwe after the d i s b u rbances i n M atabeleland of 1 982-83). 20 It has also not hesitated to flex its econom i c m uscles, particularly before Zimbabwe, by restricti ng the transit of petroleum and the supply of rai lway cars, c ruci a l to the Zimbabwean economy u nt i l alternate l i nks through Mozamb i q ue are restored . With its 'destab i l ization' tactics (wh i c h had roots i n earl ier commando raids i nto Zambia agai nst SWAPO bases and occasional delays in supplying goods in transit through South Africa to states in the reg ion) South Africa has d isplayed the . external face of its 'pol itics of survival; its u lt imate read i ness to use force to persuade its weaker opponents to accommodate its secu rity i nterests.21 From South Africa's perspective the 'destab i l ization' strategy has beg u n to reap a harvest w hic h suggests the i naug u ration of a Mocambicana

54 new stage i n its evolvi ng reg ional buffer system . M ozambique has acquiesced i n shifting its stance towards South Afri ca. The p resent joint Angolan-South African mon itori ng mac h i nery to ensure the i m plementation of the term s of the 'truce' agreement of February 1 6, 1 984, between the two countries could be translated i nto a longer term arrangement, poss i bly l i n ked with either reg ional or i nternat i onal ly-recog n ized m ac h i n ery to perm i t e lect i o n s i n Nami bia and the transfer of power from the present South African authorities to a black-majority Nami bian govern ment. Zi m babwe m ig ht now be more wi l l i ng to negotiate with South Africa at the m i n i sterial leve l , a p roced u re which it has rejected si nce the achievement of i ndependence. In such a fashion South Africa's most recently i ndependent black-ruled neighbors are bei n g d rawn back towards the buffer state status which they occupied under white-m i nority rule. As suc h they would joi n South Africa's older black-ruled i nternational ly-recog n ized neighbors - althoug h without necessari ly g iving the formal d i p lomatic recog nition w h i c h M alawi alone has done. CO N ST E L LAT I O N VS. SA D C C

In 1 979, shortly after rep l ac i n g Pri me M i n ister B. J. Vorster, Pri me M i n ister P.W. Botha and h i s col leagues began the articulation of a p roposal for the c reation of "a peaceful conste l l ation of southern African states with respect for eac h other's cultures, trad itions, and ideals! ' The p roposals as they were elaborated i n subsequent p ronouncements systematical ly out l i ned South Africa's ideals of a reg ional order i n which a l l states would joi n together to strengthen and extend i nstitutions for cooperation in the econom i c and tech nological spheres and would consult upon possible common approac hes to other p roblems, i nclud i ng the ' Marxist threa� throug h formal ized cou nci ls of states and i nternational secretariats w h i c h wou l d serve execut ive fun c t i o n s . 22 M e m bers h i p i n t h e c o n s te l l at i o n w a s to i n c lude Sout h A f r i c a , ' i n d e p e n d e n t ' Bantustans, a n d recogn ized sovere i g n black-ruled states i n the reg ion. The conste l l ation concept was rejected by all except the ' i ndependent' Bantustans and, i ndeed, South Africa's sovere i g n blac k-ruled neighbors responded w i t h n e w efforts to d i sengage from South Africa's econom i c embrace th roug h the creation of the Southern African Development Coord i nation Conference (SADCC) which d rew together Zim babwe and the five front l i ne states most c losely i nvolved i n its struggle in the 1 970s (Angola, Botswana, M ozambi que, Tanza n i a, and Zam b i a) as we l l as the rem ai n i ng

55 b l ac k-ru led states i n the reg ion (Lesotho, M alaw i , and Swazi l and). 23 Despite the i n itial fai l u re of South Africa to attract its neighbors i nto a formally estab l i shed constel lation South Africa d i d not stop its efforts to d raw its neig hbors closer. Its surprise offer of J u ne, 1 982, to transfer two p ieces of Bantustan territory to Swazi l and can be seen as an i m ag i n ative 'soft' d i p lomatic gambit w i th i n the premi ses of the constellation concept to cou nterpoint the 'hard' d estab i l izat i o n strategy bei n g p u rsued ag a i n s t M ozam b i q u e , Lesotho, a n d more d i stant Angola. W i t h t h e offer t o cede t o Swazi land the South African Swazi Bantustan o f KaN gwane and the l ngwavuma d i strict of northern KwaZu l a stretch i ng from Swazi land to the I nd ian Ocean, the South African government dang led a n attractive prospect before the conservative Swazi govern ment then headed by its entrenched trad itional i st leader, King Sobhuza lands contro l l ed by Swazi authori t i es in the preco l o n i a l n i nete� n t h century wou l d b e retu rned t o them a n d s i m u ltaneously landlocked Swazi l a n d wou l d g ai n access to the sea. The bou n da ry s h i ft promi sed m u ltiple benefits to South Africa the e l i m i nation of a particularly u nviable Bantustan whose i n habitants wou l d become citizens not of an ' i ndependent' Bantustan but of an i nternational l y recognized sovere i g n state; t h e deepe n i ng o f Swazi land's already g reat econom i c dependence u pon South Africa i nasmuch as a majority of its citizens wou l d then be working i n South Africa; the territori al agg rand izement of a buffer state fac i ng antagonistic Mozam biq ue; and the hope that Swazi land m ight be m o re w i l l i n g t o j o i n t h e conste l l at i o n form a l l y at some f u t u re d ate . F i e rc e opposition b y t h e leaders o f KaN gwane a n d KwaZu l u , supported by successfu l chal lenges with i n the South African courts, led the South African govern ment, in mid 1 982, to establ ish a com m ission u nder Ch ief J ustice R u m pf to further i nvestigate the proposal and then to shelve the plan in early 1 984.24 Although the Swazis have not recovered thei r patri mony and So u t h Africa d i d not reap t h e fu l l benefits of i t s s c h e m e , nevertheless Swazi land's uti l i ty a s a buffer state was i m p roved through the maneuver. The 1 984 revelation of the 1 982 s ig n i ng of a n o n -ag g res s i o n accord betwee n Swazi l a n d a n d South Afri c a suggests that Swazi land traded the prospect o f future territori al agg rand izement for an i m med i ately operative agreement to l i m it the use of its territory as an organ izational and transit poi nt for A N C g u erri l l as. 2 5 T h e rec ent ex p u l s i o n s of A N C m e m bers from Swazi land offer confi rmation that South Africa cont i n ues to reap the benefits of its aborted plan for the d ivestment of Bantustan •

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l a n d s . 26

56 The episode poi nts u p the ongoi ng util ization of d i p lomatic tools (i nc l ud i ng , for the fi rst ti me, offers of boundary adj ustment) to raise the viab i l ity of South Africa's buffer system . S i m u ltaneously harassed b y 'destabi l izat i on; b l a n d i shed by constel l ation-i nsp i red d i plomacy, battered by harsh d rought i n the early 1 980s, and unable col lectively through SADCC (or i n d ividual ly) to m ob i l i ze s u bstant i a l o u t s i d e fore i g n ass i stance, both recalci trant m i l itants and more sym pathetic conservatives have yielded to South African pressu re i n the early 1 980s. South Africa has not been able to achieve a retu rn to the pre-1 974 reg ional s ta tus quo nor has it yet been able to extend the constel lation des i g ned to re p l ace it o u t s i d e its borders, but it does seem to h ave reconstituted a reg ional buffer system which enhances its secu rity for the s hort term . For the longer term its goal of a reg i o n al conste l l ation remai ns. 27 S O U T H A F R I CA'S B U F FE R SYST E M I N P E R S P ECTIVE

The South African buffer state system of the 1 980s i s at variance from more conventional buffer systems - as i t was i n its earl ier form in the 1 960s. A buffer system u s u a l ly ass u m e s two l arge rival states, roughly eq ually powerfu l , between which there are smal ler and much weaker states conti g uous to both l arge rivals. The smal ler and weaker states, whether one or more, i ncapable themselves of determ i n i n g the outcome of the riva l ry between thei r powerful neig h bors, act to preserve thei r own secu rity by refusi ng to enter i nto a l l i ance with either of the two larger rival powers w h i c h may or may n o t also b e members o f more encompass i n g rival all iances.28 In the reg ional state system of southern Africa there are not two large rival powers with smal ler and m uch weaker states between them; i nstead there i s one dom i nant powerful state, South Africa, (d i rectly contro l l i ng N a m i b i a), and e i g ht neighbori ng states, five of which (Botswana, Lesotho, M ozamb i q ue, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe) are contiguous to South Africa and three of w h i c h (Angola, Malaw i , a n d Zam bia) have no d i rect border with South Africa but are either contig uous to Nami bia or h i storically tied to South Africa through l i n ks forged in the period of British colon ial rule. I n the eyes of the National i st government of South Africa there does ex i st a s i n g l e pote n t i a l l y powerf u l reg ional rival - black national ism, rooted i n South Africa, but also su pported externally i n t h e reg ion (and beyond), a n d dedicated t o t h e destruction o f the existi ng w h i te-dom i n ated soc i opol i t i cal order. I n its efforts to

57 m i t igate the threat of this non-state reg ional rival South Africa has acted in many ways s i m i lar to a state faced with a powerful rival state by mov i n g to prevent any ne i g h bori ng state from c l ose a l l i ance w i t h its dec l a red opponent. A l t h o u g h South Africa's n e i g h bori n g b l ac k-ru led states have l i m i ted maneuverabi l ity by vi rtue of the i r weakness and the lack of a strong proxi m ate black­ ruled state to rival South Africa, they have attempted to keep the i r d i stance from South Africa. I n s o d o i n g they have shown behavior s i m i lar to that of some buffer states elsewhere geograph i cally caught between two prox i m ate larger state rivals. South Africa, as the powerful arc h i tect of the regional system , has been successful i n recraft i n g a buffer state network i n the 1 980s, w h i c h , together with i nternal pol icies suppressi ng d i ssent, provides a partial shield against black nationali sm in South Africa and its supporters northward on the continent. The South African b u ffer system is u n i q u e I n i ts .t wo- t i e red n at u re and I n t h e geog raph i cal location o f i t s components. O n e t i e r o f buffer states, the ' i ndependent' Bantustans, are spots scattered in the m idst of South Africa's own territory, g iven 'sovereignity' as a device to en hance thei r c red i b i l ity as part of the overal l program of separate deve l o p m e n t w h i c h i s c e n t ra l to apart h e i d . T h ro u g h t h e i r 'sovere i g n ity' they have been made e l i g ible t o p l ay a role i n a South African-defi ned constellation system of i nternational relations i n which states with d ifferent soc iopol itical orders w i l l be joi ned together in common struct u re s to m a i n t a i n t h e regi o n a l s ta tus quo u nder South African hegemony. The second tier of buffer states, consist i n g i n itially of w hite-ru led a l l ies (u n recogn ized R hodesi a a n d Portuguese-control led Angola a n d M ozambique) a n d newly­ i ndependent blac k-ru led states, now consists enti rely of Black­ r u l ed states (wi t h the conti n u i n g excepti o n of South African­ control led N am i bi a). Either exp l icitly through accords ( i n the cases of M ozambique and Swaziland) or tacitly throug h d i plomatic u nderstandi ngs (in the cases of the other states which have not s i g ned ag reements but have ag reed to l i m it the activities of South African exi les), the n e i g h bori n g states have y i e lded to South Africa's w i l l . S O U T H A F R I CA'S D I P LO M AT I C WEAPO N S

South Africa's pol icies o f the last few years, not only towards Angola, M ozam b i q ue, and Zi m babwe, but also toward s Swazi land and Lesotho particularly, have g iven i t the opportun ity to d i splay the fu l l range of its arsenal for reg ional strategic d i p lomacy. Its

58 b l u nt weapons have consisted of air and com mando stri kes on the bases of South African exi led national ists complemented by the fi nanc i ng and trai n i ng of guerri l l a opponents of neighbori ng reg i mes, i n A n gola and M ozambique (and a lso i n Lesotho a nd probably i n Zimbabwe), 29 as wel l as log istical support for economic sabotage ag a i nst key transport and fuel fac i l ities (ut i l ized i n Mozambiq ue). South Africa has also effectively used its econom ic stre n g t h a n d geog rap h i c a l advantage to d e n y ra i l transport fac i l ities tem porari ly (i n the case of Zimbabwe particul arly) and to l i m i t border movement (i n the case of Lesotho). Its actions h i g h l ight vul nerab i l ity and encourage acq u i escence. The i n strumental ities of econom i c p ress u re and denial of com m u n icat i o n s have been continually supported as wel l by the 'soft' tools of d i rect d i p lomacy, through secret meetings (in the case of Swazi l and), less visible i nterchanges of com m u n i cations and m idd le-ranking offic i als, and also through upper level meetings and formal ag reements, capped by the s ig n i ng of the N komati accords by President Samora M achel for Mozam b i q ue and Prime M i n i ster P.W. Botha for South Africa. Si nce South Africa's nearest potential rival state (or states) on the con t i nent (e. g . Zai re, N igeria, Algeria, Et h io p i a) are weak i n d i v i d u a l l y rel ative to South Africa and d i stant (and preocc u p ied with i nternal affai rs) South Africa's even weaker neighbori ng buffer states do not have the opt ion which buffer states el sewhere have had of choos i n g to lean towards one of two proxi m ate rivals. Nor have the southern African buffer states had part i c u l ar success i n p u rs u i n g a "t h i rd power strategy: • The Western powers have refused to g ive more than very l i m ited m i l itary support (e.g. to Botswana and Zam bia during Rhodesian U D I), and the i r econom ic aid has never met the targets which states of the reg ion have establ ished (whether it was support for Zam bia, Botswana, and Malawi in the wake of sanctions agai nst Rhodesi a, or funds for Zimbabwean reconstruction after i ndependence, or ass istance for SADCC projects). Furthermore, and c ruc ial ly, the Western powers have never been w i l l i ng to cut their i m portant trade and i nvestment ties with South Africa (althoug h they have to varying deg rees, particularly s i nce 1 977, com pl ied with the U n i ted N ations arms embargo upon South Africa). The com m u nist powers have also proved l i m ited in thei r capacity and w i l l i ng ness to a i d states i n the reg ion with the notable exception of Angola where Cuban troops and Soviet weapons have buttressed the M PLA reg i me · (althoug h t he i r a i d h a s n o t been a b l e e i t h e r to p reve n t South A f r i c a n i nc u rsions i nto southern A n g o l a n o r t o achieve suppression o f the South African-supported U N ITA g uerri l l as). ·

59 Constrai ned by the i r isolation and powerlessness i n the shadow of the South African colossus, the neig hbori ng states have o n ly had one option - to susta i n , i n effect, a pol i cy of uneasy neutral i ty i n w h i c h stances o f i n d ivid ual states towards the South African government and its blac k national i st opponents have been n u anced in keepi ng with specific vul nerab i l i ties and d i fferi ng sympathies for part i c u l ar South African ex i l ed n at i o n a l i st org a n i zat i o n s . The recent experience of M ozambique has demonstrated how even a most m i l itant opponent of the South African government can be forced to accept South African terms for term i nat i n g active support for national i st exi les. South Africa's neighbori ng states have a l l aga i n been molded i nto i t s second t i e r o f buffer states. From South Africa's perspective they are neutral in the sense that they do not d i rectly support the organizational and m i l i tary activities of South Africa's national i st opponents nor are they yet w i l l i ng to enter i nto the conste l l ation offered by South Africa and thus lend leg i t i m acy to the South African reg i m e and its ' i ndependent' Bantustans, the fi rst tier of South Africa's buffer states. From thei r own perspective the neig h bori ng states have been neutralized from act i ng fu l ly upon thei r cont i n u i ng com m i tment to bri ng an end to white m i noritty ru le i n South Africa. I n the reg i o n a l context of southern Afri c a n i neq ual ity fu l l a n d activist neutral ity, balancing between proxi mate rival states or blocs, on the Austrian or Swi ss model , has never been a viable option for South Africa's neighbors. L I M ITAT I O N S OF T H E B U F F E R SYSTE M A P P ROAC H FO R SO U T H E R N A F R I CA

The South African buffer system does not display a balanced, almost bi nary, d i stribution of power between two rival states, with smal ler weaker state(s) maneuveri ng, or bei ng maneuvered , through strateg ies of neutral ization, leani ng to one rival state or the other, or seeki n g t h i rd-power support, to mai ntai n themselves i nviolate and free from i nvasion by the larger neighbors.3� The pree m i nence of South African state power and the absence of a rival state i n the reg ion with capab i l ities approac h i n g those of South Africa h i g h l i g h t the l i m i tati ons of concept ua l izi n g the i n terrelationsh i ps between South Africa and its neig h bors as a buffer system of the conventional type. S i m i l arly, the lack of options for bufferi ng d i p lomacy open to South Africa's neig h bori ng states u nderl i nes the i r d i ss i m i larity to buffer states positioned between two l arge and powerf u l states. N evertheless, South

60 Afri ca's behavior towards its neighbors as it has sought to en hance its secu rity i n a more threate n i n g i n ternational envi ronment does have the earmarks of the actions of one of the large powers in a conve n t i o n a l b u ffer syste m s . From the perspec t i ve of t h e N at i o n a l i st g ove r n m e n t Sou t h A f r i c a d oes face a pote n t i a l l y powerfu l and threate n i n g rival which m u st b e bloc ked b y creat i n g b uffers agai nst i t s advance. From t h e perspective o f t h e other states in southern Africa, however, the power of the South Afri can state and the pol icies of the National i st govern ment which controls i t are more fru i tfu l l y considered as the acti o n s of a G u l l iver threaten i ng its Li l l i putian neighbors. U nable to find G u l l iver asleep or ropes strong e:ioug h to tie h i m , and with no rival G u l l iver in sight to a p peal for h e l p , So u t h Afric a's n e i g h bo rs m u st res i g n themselves i n the i m med i ate futu re t o exi stence as dependent states subord i nate to the domi nant reg ional power. South Africa, however, man i fests not on ly the behavior of a domi nant reg ional power but also that of one of the two major powers in a buffer system . In this sense it i s of interest to consider t h e southern Afri c a n system as a part i a l b u ffer syste m , a conceptual ization complementary to that of a su bord i nate state s y s t e m i n w h i c h So u t h Africa is t he " s u bsystem d o m i n a n t " reg i o n a l power. See i ng t h e system as a b u ffer syste m a l s o com plements analyses consideri ng South Africa a s a s u b i m perial power seeking to i m p rove its sem i peri p heral status in the world system. H OW V IA B L E I S SO U T H A F R I CA'S B U F F E R SYST E M ?

South Africa's reconstructed buffer system of t h e 1 980s seems to hold pro m i se in the short run as a means for South Africa to conti nue to protect its soc iopol itical order and its position as the pree m i nent reg ional power su rrounded by a co rdo n sanitaire. In the 1 970s the viab i l ity of the system was threatened by the col l apse of the Portuguese emp ire and by the success of the Zi m babwean national i st guerri l l as. South Africa has c learly stemmed the d i s i n tegration through its activist 'destabi l ization' and d i p lomacy of the early 1 980s which has forced its most m i l itant reg ional state antagon i sts to rei nteg rate themse lves w i th i n the buffer syste m . Shou l d it perm it N am i bi a t o become i ndependent (even u nder a SWAPO govern ment) it wou ld also seem possible for South Africa to conti nue to u t i l ize its overween i ng m i l i tary, econom ic, and d i plomatic strengths to keep N am i b i a with i n any marg i na lly mod i fied version of the reg ional buffer system . I n the i m med i ate

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future i t i s neither l i kely that the Soviet bloc or the Western powers w i l l project themselves i nto southern Africa in a massive fashion nor w i l l potentially strong African states elsewhere on the continent real ize thei r latent power. South Africa's blac k ru led neighbors thus w i l l neither be able to lean to the side of a strong b l ac k conti nental rival to South Africa nor w i l l they be able to i nvoke effectively a t h i rd power strategy to change thei r present status. Li m i ted maneuverabi l ity withi n an u neasy neutrality w i l l rem a i n their only alternative. The most i m mediate threat, i f any, to South Africa's buffer system is most l i kely to arise withi n South Africa itself through the contrad ictions of its own dynam i c soc i opol i t i cal order. An i ncreas i n g ly mob i l ized and crucial black labor force, i n teracti n g w i t h t h e g row i n g n u m ber o f better ed ucated blacks w h i c h the m od i fied structures of apartheid are u nable fully to accommod ate, w i l l pose new chal lenges to both the South African government and to the govern ments of the ' i ndependent' Bantustans. I n response to s u c h c h a l l e n ges b l ac k national i s m w i l l have opport u n i t i e s i nternally t o deepen a n d w iden its organ ization a n d capacity to u nderm i ne w h i te-m i n ority ru le, even if in the short ru n i ts capac ity for sabotage by g uerri l l as i s l i m i ted . Heig htened tensions with i n the poorest and worst governed o f the ' i ndependent' Bantustans (e.g. the C iskei)31 cou ld become the Ach i l les heel of the buffer system . The costs of staun c h i n g the i r vul nerab i l ity (and cop i ng with widen i ng d i ssent with i n South Africa) w i l l stretch South Africa's capabi l i ty to deploy resources to deal with the second tier of buffer states outside of its borders. For the i m mediate future the threat to South Africa's buffer system (and to its apartheid soc iopol itical order) w i l l come primari ly from with i n the country and not from outside - despite a conti n u i ng hostile i nternational environment i n which apartheid w i l l rem a i n al most u niversally condemned and South Africa w i l l remain a pariah state. N OT ES 1 . Larry W. Bowman , "The Subord i n ate State System of Southern Africa," Interna tional Studies Quarterly, 12 (September 1 968): 231 ·261 . 2. Kenneth W. G ru ndy, Confrontation and Accommoda tion in Southern Africa: The Limits of Independence (Berkeley: U n iversity of Cal iforn ia Press, 1 973). 3. Sympathetic reeval u ations of Bowman's analysis can be found in Ti mothy M . Shaw, "Southern Africa: Cooperation a n d Confl ict i n an I nternational Sub-System �· Journal of Modern A frican Studies, 1 2 (Decem ber, 1 974):633-655 and Susan Aure l i a G itelson, "The Transformat ion of th e Southern African State System , " Journa l of

62 A frican Studies, 4 (Wi n ter, 1 977):367-39 1 . A col lection of essays by eighteen authors analyzi ng southern Africa from the springboard of Bowman's analysis is found i n Timothy M . Shaw and Kenneth A . H eard (eds.), Cooperation and Conflict in Southern A frica: Papers on a Regional Subsystem (Wash i ngton: U n iversity Press of America, 1 976).

4. Timothy M. Shaw, "South Africa, Southern Africa and the World System;• i n Thomas M . Cal laghy, South A frica in Southern A frica: The In tensifying Vortex o f Violence (New York: Praeger, 1 983), 45·68. Shaw's analysis marks a further evolution of the views expressed i n h i s 1 974 article (see n . 3) as wel l as i n s u bseq uent articles, Timothy M . Shaw, " I nternational Stratification in Africa: Sub- i m perialism in Eastern and Southern Africa;• Journal of Southern A frican A ffairs, 2 (April 1 977):1 45· 1 65 and Timothy M. Shaw, " Kenya and South Africa: 'Sub-im peri a l i st States�· Orbis, 21 (Summer 1 977):375-394. 5. For the text of the N komati accords and the speeches of President Samora Machel and Prime M i n ister P.W. Botha see "Supplement to A I M l n formatation B u l let i n No. 93" (Maputo: Mozambique I n formation Agency, 1 984), 1 · 1 7. The full text of the accords and extracts of the speeches are also found in South A frican Digest (Pretoria: Department of Fore i g n Affairs), M arch 23, 1 984, 3-7. 6. A recent extensive assessment of the evo l ution of South Africa's reg ional pol icy in Southern Africa (but not one cast exp l icitly i n reg ional subsystem terms) is to be found in Deon Geldenh uys, "South Africa's Regional Pol icy:• in M ic hael Clough (ed.), Changing Realities in Southern Africa: Implica tions tor A merican Policy (Berkeley, I nstitute of I nternational Studies, U n iversity of Cal i fornia, 1 982), 1 23·1 60. The subject is a l so treated from the perspective of South African fore i g n pol icy strategy (rather than from a regional subsystems approach) i n Sam C. Nolotsh u n g u , South A frica I n A frica: A Study of Ideology a n d Foreign Polley (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1 975), 1 1 4-258. 7. A m p l ification of t h i s point is made subse.q uently in analysis start i n g on p. 24. 8. The flavor of the conceptual ization of the South African government of the nat u re of the •enemy' t h reat can be found i n Rep u b l i c of South Africa, Department of Defence, White Paper on Defence 1977 (Laid upon the Table i n the Senate and the House of Assembly by the M i nister of Defence, 7. 9. A carefu l assessment of the si gni f icance of ' Independence' for the Bantustans if provided by Newe l l M . Stul tz, "Some I m p l ications of African 'homelands' in South Africa" i n Robert M. Price and Carl G. Rosberg, The Apartheid Regime: Political Power and Racial Domina tion (Berkeley: I nstitute of I nternational Studies, U n iversity of Cal i fornia, 1 980), 1 94·21 6. The analysis is amplified with respect to the Transkei i n Newe l l M . Stu ltz, Transkei's Half Loa f: Race Separatism in South A frica (New H aven Yale U niversity Press, 1 979). A d ivergent assessment, expl i city d i sagree i n g with St u l tz, is to be found i n Roger South a l l , South A frica 's Transkei: The Political Economy of an 'Independen t' Ban tus tan (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 983), 281 -304, but particu larly 297-300. 1 0. The p rocess and mac h i nery by which African rights have been l i m ited and civil rights c i rc umscri bed for a l l South Africans i s concisely deli neated i n Study Comm ission on U.S. Pol icy Toward Southern Africa, South A frica: Time Running Out (Berkeley: U niversity of Cal i forn ia Press, 1 98 1 ) 48-79. 1 1 . For an exam ination of the tense relations h i p between the ANC and Ch ief Gatsha

63 Buthelezi see Thomas Karis, "The Res u rgent African National Congress: C ompet i n g f o r Hearts and M i nds i n South Africa" i n Thomas M . Cal laghy, South A frica in Southern A frica, 21 7-223. 1 2. The evolution of rel ations between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland i nto the early 1 970s Is traced i n Nolotsh u n g u , South Africa in A frica, 1 30· 1 55. A more recent update describ i n g the deterioration i n relations, particularly with Lesotho, is found i n Bernard Mag u bane, " Botswana, Lesotho, and Swazi land: South Africa's Hostage's in Revolt�· in Thomas M. Cal laghy, South African In Southern A frica, 355-370. 1 3. On Zambia's shift i ng rel ationships with South Africa see Doug las Angl i n g and Timothy M. Shaw, Zambia 's Foreign Polley: Studies in Diplomacy and Dependence (Bou lder: Westvies Press, 1 979), 272-309. Another perspective is provided from a n enthusiastic supporter o f South Africa's policy i n F.R. Metrowich, South Africa 's New Frontiers (Sandton, South Africa: Valiant Publishers, 1 977), 53-64. 1 4. For d i scussion of the reason s for M alawi's w i l l i ng ness to expand South Africa's offers of economic assistance i nto d i plomatic recognition see Nolotshu n g u , South Foreig n Polley and A frica In A frica, 1 92-2 1 8 and Car� lyn McMaster, Mala wi Development (London: J u l ian Friedman, 1 974), 88-1 1 2. •

1 5. Analysis of the evolution of South Africa's l inks with Rhodesia and Portugal through the early 1 970s i s also provided i n Nol otshungu, South A frica in A frica, 1 62· 1 90. 1 6. Del i neation of South Africa's policy towards Angola and Mozambique ( I n c l u d i n g the post-1 980 s h i ft to antagonistic 'destab i lization' i n Mozambique) m a y be f ou n d i n Thomas M . Cal laghy, "Apartheid a n d Socialism: South Africa's Relations with Angola and Mozambique i n Cal laghy (ed.), South A frica In Southern Africa, 267-322. For more specific i nformation on Mozambican-South African relations see Mario Azevado, " A Sober Commitment to Liberat ion?: M ozambique and South Africa 1 974-1 979:' African A ffairs, 79 (October 1980): 567-584. 1 7. For a summary of the evo lut\on of South African pol icy I n Namibia through the early 1 980s see John Sei l er, "South Africa i n Namibia: Persistence, M isperceptlon and U l t i mate Fai l u re" i n Thomas M . Cal laghy, Southern A frica In Southern A frica, 1 65-1 90. 1 8. The rise of the ANC is assessed against the backdrop of broade n i n g black political and trade u n i on activity i n Karis, "The Resurgent African National Congress". See also Joseph Lelyvel d , " Black Chal lenge to Pretoria;• New York Times, October 1 2, 1 983. 1 9. For assessments of the 'destab i lization' policy see Deon Geldenhuys, "The Destabil ization Controversy: An Analysis of a H i gh-Risk Foreign Pol icy Option for South Africa!' Polltikon 9 (December 1 982): 1 6-31 and Richard Leonard, South A frica a t War: White Power and the Crisis In Southern A frica (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence H i l l & Co., 1 983), 86-95. 20. See, for example, statements by Prime M i n ister P.W. Botha indicating the w i l l i ng ness of h i s government to consider requests for aid from "anti-comm u n ist g uerri l l a forces In southern Africa"; Botha i n d i cated that, " I f It i s i n the i nterests of South Africa and stabi l ity on our borders, we shall certai n ly consider it�· New York Times, February 1 7, 1 983.

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21 . The i n ternal d i mensions of the 'politics of survival' as they were devised i n the early 1 960s have been d e li neated in Newe l l M . St u l tz, "The Pol itics of Security: South Africa under Verwoerd , 1 969 - ," Journal of Modern A frican Studies, 7 (Apr i l 1 969):320. 22. For articu lation of the "constel lation" concept by South African officials see A ddress by the Honora b le P. W. B o tha, Prim e Minis ter, Carlton Cen tre, Johannesburg, 22. November 1 9 79 (Pretoria: Department of Fore i g n Affai rs, 1 979) and Address by the Hon. R. F. Bo tha, South A frican Minister of Foreign A ffairs, to Members of the Swiss-South A frican A ssociation in Zurich, on 7th March 1 9 79 (Berne: South African Embassy, Press Sect ion, 1 979). Assessments of the constel lation concept by South African scholars i n c l ude: W.J. Breytenbach, The Cons tellation of Sta tes: A Consideration (Johannesburg: South Africa Fou ndation, 1 980); Deon Geldenhuys, " Regional Cooperation i n Southern Africa: A Conste l lation of States;• Interna tional A ffairs Bulletin 2 ( 1 979):36-72; Wolfgang H . Thomas, "A Southern African 'Constel lation of States': Challenge or Myth?;' Sou th A frica Interna tional, 10 (J anuary 1 980): 1 1 3-1 28; and Wolfgang F. Thomas, "South Africa and Black Africa: The Future of Econom ic I n tegration:• Politkon 6 (December 1 979): 1 03-1 35. 23. Among the many analyses of SAC DD are M i c hael Clough and John Rave n h i l l , " Reg ional Cooperation i n Southern Africa: T h e Southern African Development Coord i nation Conference," i n M ichael Clough (ed .), Cnanging Realities in Southern A frica, 1 6 1 - 1 86, and R i chard F. Weisfelder, "The Southern African Development Coord i nation Conference: A New Factor i n the Li beration Process;• i n Thomas M . Callaghy, South A frica in Southern A frica, 237-266. See also Christopher R . H i l l , " Reg ional Cooperation i n Southern Africa," A frican A ffairs, 8 2 (Apri l , 1 983):21 5-239. For the papers of the f i rst SADCC meet i n g , i n c l u d i n g the Lusaka Declarat ion of Apri l 1 980, see Amon N sekela (ed.) Southern A frica: Toward Economic Liberation (London: Rex Col l i ngs, 1 98 1 ). 24. For a report of i n itia l opposition i n KaNgwane and KwaZ u l u see New York Times, J une 1 8, 1 982. The decision to withdraw the plan, along with an account of the South African government's hand l i ng of the matter, is d iscussed in Washington Post, J u n e 20, 1 984. 25. See A frica Research Bulletin: Political Social and Cultural Series, 21 ( May 1 5, 1 984):7201 BC-7202AB. 26. New York Times, J u ly 1 5, 1 984. 27. As Prime M i n ister P.W. Botha put it on the occasion of s i g n i n g the N komati accords with M ozambique, " I have a vision of the nations of Southern Africa cooperat i n g with each other in every field of h u m an endeavou r; a veritable constel lation of states work i n g together for the benefi t of a l l on the basis of mutual respect." Supplement to A I M I nformation B u l let i n No. 93 (Maputo: M ozambique I nformation Agency, 1 984) 1 6. 28. This def i n ition is a d i s t i l lation of a more formal and mathematically precise defi n i tion offered in M i c hael Greenfield Partem, "The Bu ffer System in I n ternational Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 (March 1 983): 1 6. 29. For Zimbabwe's case against South Africa see Washington Post, J une 23, 1 984.

65 30. For elaborat ion of how t hese t h ree st rateg ies can be exercised by bu ffer states in conventional buffer systems see Partem, "The Buffer System;• 1 9-25. 3 1 . For a description and assessment of the vu l nerab i l ities of the ' i ndependent' Ciskei see Joseph Lelyfeld, " M i sery in a South African ' Homeland; " New York Times Magazine, September 25, 1 983, 37-39, 54-55, 58-63.

C H A PT E R 4 B U F F E R S Y ST E M S O F M I D D L E AM E R I CA PHILIP KEL L Y

M iddle America i s a fragmented geographic reg ion, weak i n relation to l arger states, yet possessi n g a central and strateg i c l ocation w h i c h attracts o u t s i d e i nterference and authority. Ori g i nally i n habited by a variety of Amerid peoples, whose com p l icated i m m ig ration patterns sti l l are seen throughout the area in isolated islands, j u n g les, val leys, and plateaus, the reg ion l ater became exposed to an add itional array of races and national i ties in the centuries after d iscovery by Europe. The Span ish i ntroduced u nassi m i l ated African slaves to the Cari bbean; the Dutc h , Eng l i s h , French, and N orth Americans brought their own c u l t u res and attracted i m m ig rants from Africa, As i a , and el sewhere. A melting pot for u n ifyi ng the fragmented parts was not feasible because formidable geograph i c barriers and rival colonial j u ri sd i ctions p revented amalgamation. Turmoi l of subseq uent centuries extended and sol id ified these c leavages, and today we cont i n ue to see M iddle America d i s u n ited, exposed to outsiders' i nterventions, and consequently without an i ndependent or neutral voice in i nternational affai rs. Withi n the scope of this c hapter, M iddle America i n c l udes Central America, Panama, M exico, northern South America, and the i s l ands of the Cari bbean Sea. H ardly a compact or u n i ted geog rap h i c territory with i n itself, it merits a reg ional labe l , in my opi n ion, because of its buffer position between N orth and South America and between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. For c o n ve n i e n c e , t h e t e r m s " M i d d l e A m e r i c a , " " C a r i b b e a n , " "Caribbean Bas i n , " and " Basi n " w i l l b e used i nterchangeably.

67

68

Among types of areal config u rations, I argue that fou r are appropri ate as contem porary models for i n terpreti n g the Cari bbean as a world reg ion:1 buffer system: reg ions which isolate and separate other areas from each other. spheres of influence: reg ions which are dom i n ated by one fore i g n state or al l i ance. shatterbelts: reg ions in w h i c h two or more outside G reat Powers compete for control. n eutral o r independent political zones: reg ions which are not strongly penetrated by any fore i g n powers. It i s contended i n this chapter that M iddle America i s a natural b uffer system , permanently exi st i n g because of the Bas i n ' s rugged terra i n a n d its centra l l ocat i o n . I n fact, two u n i q ue b u ffer d i mensions, occ u r a series of i nternal b uffers w i t h i n M id d l e America a n d a Cari b bean-wide buffer w h i c h affects pol i tical happen i ngs in adjacent territories. I n addition, transpiring s i m u ltaneously with these buffers, and i nfl uenced by them, spheres of i nfluence and shatterbelts l i kewise occ u r in M iddle America, rotati n g the i r appearances based u pon regional and i n ternational events. I mai ntai n below that at present a shatterbelt exi sts i n the reg ion. I n contrast, it wou ld be q u i te u n l i kely to expect the Cari bbean to be a sphere of i nfl uence or a neutral or i ndependent entity, i n large part because of d isruptions c reated by the buffers exi sti n g there. R EV I EW

For five h u n d red years, M idd le America has alternated between bei n g l abeled by scholars and statesmen either a sphere of i nfluence of Spai n , Britai n , or the U n i ted States, or bei n g labeled a shatterbelt, caught between power struggles of large n ations. Spa i n estab l ished paramountcy over the reg ion after d i scovery u n t i l m id-seventeenth century. Dutch, French, a n d Eng l i s h territorial and economic i n roads i nto the Bas i n gradual ly eroded t h is dom i nance, the Dutch i n Curacao (1 630) and Suri nam (1 652), the French in G u adal u pe and M arti n i q ue (1 635), and the Eng l ish i n Barbados (1 624) and Jamaica (1 655). Fol lowi n g the demise of Spanish control, M iddle America became entang led in European warfare, particu larly between France and Eng land after 1 739, and the region c hanged to a shatterbelt config u ration. The Eng l ish by the early n i neteenth century successful ly asserted their hegemony

69 over the Cari bbean, whereu pon this sphere of i nfl uence transferred to the U n i ted States after 1 895. I have arg ued e lsewhere2 that M iddle America i n the 1 960s retu rned to a shatterbelt because of the Soviet-Cu ban al l i ance, reveal i ng another h i storic shift in the Bas i n 's sphere of i n f l uence/shatterbelt rotation. These eras are l i sted i n Table 4.1 below: TAB L E 4.1

Ca ribbean Spheres of ln fluence/Sha tterbelt Eras

Span ish Sphere of I nfl uence 1 520s · 1 650s Shatterbelt 1 659 - 1 820s British Sphere of I nfl uence 1 820s 1 890s United States Sphere of I nfluence 1 890s · 1 960s Shatterbelt 1 960s · present N ot ever during this period of alternat i ng eras has the Cari bbean Bas i n taken an exc lusivel_y neutral or i ndependent character, never breaki n g the above tendency for G reat Power intervention in the reg ion. M iddle America's strateg i c location, its m ineral and agricultural wealth, and its pol itical weakness derived from frag m e n te d g e o g rap h i c a n d d e m o g ra p h i c feat u re s , h ave cont i nual ly made it an arena for i ntervention and control by large outside n ations. Although less recog nized in the extant l iterature, a buffer status l i kewi se i s c haracteristic of M iddle America. U n l i ke spheres of i nfl uence, shatterbelts, and neutral or i n dependent pol itical zones, all of which are m utual ly exc l u sive, Cari bbean buffers have appeared permanently throughout the entire period s i m ultaneously with the first two phenomena. A variety of i n teresting and i m portant b uffers with i n and beyond M iddle America may be descri bed, based u pon the area's u n i q ueness as a world reg ion and its h istory of G reat Power riva lry or contro l . T o m e , buffers are territories w h i c h separate a n d isolate other geog raph i c areas from each other, caused by the qual ities of rugged topog raphy, rac i a l or demog rap h i c variances among peop les, smaller central ly l ocated countries, territories sufferi ng pol i tical breakdown, strateg i c land or maritime choke poi nts, agreements for non-i nvolvement by large powers, or large and sparsely i nhabited spaces. These buffer separations normal ly possess some type of geopo l itical consequences in the foreign pol ic ies o f adjacent and i nterested foreign states. Buffers may •

·

70 res i d e w i t h i n reg i o n s o r c o u n t r i e s , f u n ct i o n i n g to b l o c k com m u n ications and t o lessen areal u n ity. Some o f these sub­ system b uffers located with i n the Cari b bean Bas i n are descri bed below. In add i tion to sub-system or i nternal buffers, a reg ion-wide M iddle American buffer exi sts which separates or isolates m u c h l arger territorial a n d maritime spaces a n d whose i m pact projects wel l-beyond the bounds of the Cari bbean. Today, Brazi l and the Soviet U n ion, in my o p i n ion, benefi t from these buffer featu res; comparable U n i ted States objectives are made more d i fficult to attai n . Lastly, I bel ieve that dynam ic and s i g n i ficant l i n kages among buffers, shatterbelts, s p heres of i nfl uence, and neutral or i ndependent pol itical zones occu r with respect to M iddle America. I NT E R N A L B U F F E R S

M iddle American topography once was descri bed to a Spani s h k i ng b y cru m p l i ng a seg ment o f paper, t h e n al low i ng it partial ly to u nfol d . This resemblance shows the Cari bbean to be primari ly an u n patterned col lection of h i g hlands, val leys, i n land seas, and i slands, featu res encourag i n g pol itical and econom i c d i ffusion rather than u n ity. Such terra i n creates a m ultitude of buffer cases, some dynam i c i n reflection of shifting national a l i g nments, others determ i n ed naturally by the i r permanent geopo l itical position. H ad N orth America approx imated M iddle America's terra i n , a s i m i lar varigated patchwork of sma l l states and fragmentation might have arisen there as wel l . Ce n t ra l A m e r i c a p rov i d e s seve ra l e x a m p l es o f b u f f e r phenomena. T h e republics of El Salvador a n d Honduras, traditional antagonists, separate Guatemala and N icaragua, the two pri mary powers of the area. Thi s buffer corridor prevented attem pts d u ri n g t h e n i neteenth century t o forge reg ional pol itical u n ion at the i nsti gati o n of both G uatemala and N icarag ua, and i t l ater represented a major reason why the recent Central American Common M arket was u nable to succeed in joint econo m i c development. I ron ical ly, t h e El Salvador-Honduras war of 1 969 strengthened thi s buffer corridor. If G uatemala today were d i rectly to border Sandi n i sta N icarag ua i n stead of weaker Ho nduras , frontier strife probably wou ld be much more serious and escal ation to reg ional warfare more l i kely. Neutra l i st and unarmed Costa Rica l i kewise cou l d be labeled a b uffer, separating her northern neighbors from Panama. In sum, there i s no rational reason for the existence of six weak and antagon i stic Central American states,

·

71

·

other than the c haotic geograph i c source which has spawned these buffers and thus the separations and turmoi l . Mountai n p l ateaus a n d i ntervening j u n g les kept Panama a n d its canal potential d i sconnected from northern and southern H ispan ic neighbors. It i s i n teresting that the i sthmus, so vital to commerce and so central to M iddle America, itself exhi bited a strateg i c buffer which d rew as a magnet the hegemonic ambitions of the U n i ted States. The i solation of Panama and North American conti nental objectives combi ned to eventual ly bri ng U n ited States control over the canal zone. The U n i ted States in the twentieth century has shown a keen i nterest i n Central American pol itical stab i l i ty, a factor tied to her protection of the vital i sthm i an transit. Favori ng a d ivide-and· conquer approac h , she cont i nuously sought a balance between N icaragua and G u atemala in hope of mai ntain i ng the El Salvador­ Honduras buffer corridor. Further,. the U n ited States has util ized strong ties with G uatemala for preventing Mexican penetration i nto Central American affairs. In this latter regard , the U n i ted States fears a poss i b le Mexican sphere of i nfl uence over these territories and trad itionally has ai med to divert the Republic's interests from poi nting southward ly. The G u atemalan buffer serves this deflecti n g purpose a n d i s reflected i n t h e close United States-G uatemala rel ationshi p d u ri ng much of the twentieth century. Mexican peace pl ans for resolvi ng contemporary turmo i l in N icaragua and El Salvador are disregarded by the U n i ted States in part to l i m i t Mexican i nfl uence i n Central America. Mexican Americans or C h icanos, a l argely u n noticed but n evert h e l ess i m portant n a t i o n a l i st g ro u p s w h i c h c o u l d be considered a part of Lat i n America as wel l as the U n i ted States, i ncreas i n g ly are seen as cultural and potentially as pol itical "bridges" between Anglo and Lat i n Ameri ca.3 Currently n u m beri ng more than seven m i l l ion c i t izens, fifth among ethn i c backgrounds withi n the total U n i ted States popu l ation, Chicanos are u ni q ue i n that a majority reside near the southwestern border with Mexico, thei r ori g i nal homeland. V i l l arreal and Kel ly assert that:4 N o m ajor n at i o n a l i ty g ro u p except M e x i c a n Americ a n s m ay c l a i m a d o m e st i c territor i a l perspective with political overtones, seen i n the 'Azt l a n ' concept, a very weak yet pote n t i a l ly s i g n i f i cant secess i o n i st s u g gest i o n fo r C h i cano leaders h i p of a 'Southwestern Q uebec.' These two u n ique featu res, c u ltural and geographic, as wel l as

72 other traits, exten d M exican Americans nat u ra lly a n d i nevi tably i nto the i nternational realm. Th i s Aztlan nationhood of Chicano mythology, spann i ng territory from Texas to Cal ifornia, l i kewi se represents a buffer between the two Ameri cas. H e re c ou l d rest a f u t u re fac i l i ty for c u l t u ra l u nderstand i n g , a neutral area for resi st i n g contacts between the two cultures, or a zone for perpetuating racial antagonism. The G uiana h i g h l ands, the Andean mountains, and the Amazon j u ngle effectively d ivide the northern ri m l ands of South America from the continent's central and southern regions. Considered more Cari bbean in orientation than South American, the fore i g n pol icies o f Colombia, Venezuela, G uyana, a n d Suri nam5 are more concerned with problems i n Central America, Cuba and the U n i ted States than with events of the Southern Cone. These geographi c obstacles, which i solate territories, buffer the pol itics of the two So u t h Ame ricas, frag m e n t i n g t h e c o n t i n e n t a nd retard i n g deve l o p m e n t a n d i nteg rat i o n o f t h e A m azo n i a n a n d Andean h i nterlands. Position of islands and straits in the Cari bbean c reates several i m portant buffer situations. The eastward Atlantic island stri ngs, the Bahamas, H ispanol a, Puerto Rico, and the Lesser Ant i l les, separate the Atlantic from the Caribbean Sea and obstruct access to i nterior spaces. Thi s factor has i nfl uenced n aval strateg ies from the early buccaneers to contemporary submarine warfare. C u ba itself figures as a buffer by its isolating the northern from the southern Cari bbean and i n this way blocki ng the U n ited States from J amaica, Panama, and northern South America.6 Long considered the heartland of M iddle America, Cuba as a Soviet ally has meant the dec l i ne of U n i ted States reg ional hegemony, al lowing other republ ics of M iddle America to assert i ndependence from northern dom i nation as wel l . The lessening of U n i ted States i n f l uence has te nded to m ake b u ffer system s w i t h i n M id d l e America m o re noticeable and to augment thei r political i m pact. M ar i t i m e stra its i n M i d d l e A m e r i c a n waters revea l b u ffer c haracteristics. An overwhe l m i n g proportion of strateg ic m i nerals i m ports e n te r the U n ited States via the G u l f of M ex i c o a n d Cari bbean Sea, enroute through t h e M ississippi waterway where they are desti ned for processi ng plants and factories i n the M iddle Western i nd u strial heartland. U n ited States Atlantic and Pacific ports i n contrast absorb relatively smal l amounts of such materials, for local i nd ustries do not handle large sums of these m inerals and fai'f s ystems from coastal harbors to m i d w e stern p lants c'a nnot

73 com pete with the effic iency and conven ience of central river barge transport. Hence, because the primary fu n nel for strategic m i nerals i s the Cari bbean, no matter whether the African, Australian, or Lat i n American source,7 t h e reg ion o f most i m mediate U n i ted States sensitivity for guarantee of mari t i me passage of these materials c learly i s M iddle America, partic ularly in fou r c l usters of choke poi nts which cou ld eas i ly d i srupt traffic if attacked d u ri ng war. These part i c u l ar choke poi nts i n c l ude the Panama Can a l , the Straits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel, and the several Lesser Ant i l les passages. Strateg i c m ateri a l s dest i ned for g u l f ports o ri g i n at i n g from southern African sou rces m u st pass thro u g h the M ozam b i q ue Chan nel, the Cape of Good H ope, the Atlantic N arrows, and the Florida Straits, each of which pose promising opport u n ities for enemy i nterd iction. South American trade paths first cross the Atlantic N arrows, then may traverse the Dom i n ica Chan nel, the Tri n idad Passage, the Carios Passage, the Sai nt Vi ncent Passage, and/or the G uadal u pe Passage of the Lesser Cari bbean Ant i l les, and later northward throug h the Yucatan Strait. Cari bbean strateg ic m i nerals travel a s i m i lar d i rection, sans the Atlantic N a rrows. M i nerals s h i p ments from Austra l i a to the U n i ted States extend through choke poi nts situated along southern Austral i a before fac i n g the open Pac i f i c , the Panama Canal , and the seve ral Cari bbean passages. In eac h of these fou r M iddle American choke areas, geographic restrictions to passage buffer one area from another. In s u m , buffers with i n M iddle America are n umerous, created by topographical and other d i srupting featu res which have contri buted to often chaotic geopol itical relationsh i ps among the nations of the reg ion and with states beyond the Caribbean. For the most part, these b uffers thwart reg ional u n ity and i ndependence, i solat i n g part i c u l arly the weaker states. I bel ieve that i nternal buffers have p reve nted M i d d l e A m e r i c a as a w h o l e from i t se l f assert i n g i ndependence or n e utrai l i ty, and therefore, local states have become pawns to larger states' i n terventions as a resu lt. Buffer­ created fractional ization apparently has ass isted strong fore i g n powers f o r five h u nd red years toward estab l i s h i n g spheres of i n f l uence or shatterbelt bases over the Caribbean, revea l i n g a strong l i n kage among buffer, sphere of i nfl uence, and shatterbelt confi g u rations. These l i n kages, as wel l as the i r extraterritori al projections of i n f l uence shown in the M iddle America-wide buffer, w i l l now be exam i ned .

74

EXT E R N A L F U N CT I O N

From its central position astride Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and between N orth and South America, a Caribbean-scope buffer exerts a strong i m pact u pon the i nternational re lations of large outside states who hold i n terests in the reg ion. For exam ple, I mai ntai n that Brazi l ian and Soviet U n i o n obj ectives cu rrently are en hanced by this larger M iddle American buffer perspective. I n contrast, attai nment of U n i ted States defense req u i rements are made more d ifficult because of the Basin's pec u l i ar spacial d i mensions. M ost of this section w i l l explore these featu res of the Caribbean buffer's external i m pact. The fact that the Central American land buffer between North and South America effectively i mpedes Europe and Africa from d i rect access to Asia has contri buted to a variety of geopol itical c o n seq u e n c e s . A b s e n c e o f n a t u ra l At l a n t i c to Pac i f i c passageways t h ro u g h M i d d l e America d i m i n i s hed Weste rn penetration of Chi na, J apan , and elsewhere i n the East. Europeans and Africans i nstead settled predomi nately in America, and not Asia, maki ng the New World an arena not only for racial blend i n g a n d antagonism b u t also for exploiting a rich environment w i t h new ideas and a w ide-variety of i m m i g rant c l asses. M iddle America probably bloc ked extensive Asian contact with Europe and Africa as we l l . B y l i m i t i n g exchange between oceans despite t h e relatively short d i stances i nvolved, the i sth m i an buffer i ncreased the strategic i m portance of certai n territorial and mari t i me zones throug hout the Americas which were to be considered potential or actual i n ter­ oceanic transit routes. The several Cari bbean and G u l f of Mexico i sth m ian areas, in Panama, N icarag ua, and Teh uantepec, d rew particu lar fore i gn notice. Certai n conti nental routes as wel l have become s i m i lar mag nets of i n ternational transit riva l ry, some of these i n c l u d i n g the N orthwest passage of Canada, the southern straits of M age l l a n , Beag le, and Drake, the southwestern reg i o n of the U n i ted States, and the several Andean passes of Bol ivia and Ecuador in South America's i nterior. Contro l l i n g these ocea n i c passages h ave posed seri o u s d i plomatic problems for t h e U n i ted States a n d for Brazi l , each bei ng conti nental powers desiring access to both oceans. In the case of the northern rep u b l i c , the attai nment of Cal i forn i a made control of a M iddle American canal a vital national i n terest. Panama remains a key to North American conti nental u n ity as wel l

75 as to U n i ted States projection of i nfl uence onto the r i m lands of Eurasia.8 For Brazi l , the " M arch to the West" meant dom i n ation of the strateg ic C harcas Triangle of Bol ivia, the alleged " heartland" of South America and gateway to the Pac ific.9 Recently, her i nterest l i kewise extends to the southern passages and to Antarctica as i ntra-oceanic aven ues of commerce and power. 1 0 I n add ition to b locking western pentration to the East, M iddle America red u ces contact between N orth and South America. One conseq uence of this separation i s that the southern conti nent never has come u nder U n ited States domi nance. Nor has South · America experienced a sh atterbel t i n w h i c h the U n i ted States c o m peted i n t h e area ag a i n st another G reat Power riva l . ( N evert h e l ess, Spa i n , E n g l a n d , a n d Port u g a l dom i n ated So uth America u nder a sphere of infl uence or rivaled each other with i n a shatterbel t d u ri n g muc h of the reg ion's European-d i rected h i story.) Today, South America, from the Amazon and Andean watersheds to the Southern Cone, conti n ues to be free of European and U n i ted . States contro l , show i n g it to be o n e of the few world areas at present which i s i ndependent of G reat Power penetration. Because of South American i solation from the U n ited States for reason of the Cari bbean buffer and i nternal buffer-induced Central American strife, and the wan i n g of European i m pact during the n i neteenth century, several geopol itical patterns have emerged i n the reg ion's i n ternational relations which wou ld not have su rfaced had these fore i g n powers been able to i nterfere. Two h i stori ans of S o u t h A m e r i c a n d i p l om acy1 1 d i scovered a b a l a n c e of power confi g u ration among Southern Cone nations operating during the n i netee n t h a n d early twe ntie th c e n t u ries. C h i l d s u ggests t h i s pattern can b e appl ied t o contemporary pol itics and extended to Cari bbean S o u t h A m e r i c a n states as we l l , t h u s form i n g a conti nental l i n kage of al l i ances and antagonisms. 12 (See Fig. 4.1 . Bold horizontal and vertical l i nes s i g n ify i nternational rival ries; dashed d i agonal l i nes i nd i cate harmon i c relationsh i ps.) FIG. 4.1 South American Balance of Power

Colombia

/Ecuador Peru ··

I

C h i le

Venezuela ••

••

••

••

••

· ·· · · · ·:: ··· ·· ·· ·· ··· - �--- - ·· ·· · · · · ······ ·· ··· · · ·· -· •• • · •• •• ·· ··· ·· ··· ·· ·· ··· •·· ·· ··• • ·· ••

••

••

••

••

•

G uyana

. . .. .. . . .. ,..,. . -

B raii I ·

I

A rg e n t i n a

76

C h i l d arg ues that t h i s balance pattern has retu rned to South America because U n i ted States and E u ropean i n f l u e n c e has d i sap peared , res u l t i n g in t h e res u m pt i o n of trad i t i o n a l antagonisms. I n part, the Cari bbean buffer's location enabled these balances to re-appear. I have written elsewhere that Brazi l appears on the verge of bei n g t h e hegemon ic power o f South America, fitting a role o f conti nental rule maker and enforcer, stabi l izier and i nteg rator. My reason i n g is contai ned in this passage. 13 Why should Brazi l be i n a position to enforce reg i o n a l order? F i rst, among So uth American nations, Brazi l , as a geopol itically satisfied cou ntry, has the most to lose from u ncontrol led reg ional strife, i n lessened i nternational prestige, econom ic prosperity, i ntern al development, and even possible l oss of Amazon territories. With these strong i nterests at stake, Brazi l possesses ample i ncentive for perform i ng pac ifier and i nteg rationist roles. Second, Brazi l has necessary power for project i n g i nfl uence across the continent, a n d h e r central l ocation, bol stered by an i m p rovi n g transportation network, fu rther en hances this q u a l i fication. Th i rd , Spanish American neighbors lack sufficient u n ity or power to form an effective bloc agai nst Brazi l ian hegemony, and in most cases i ncent ives for cooperating with Brazi l outwe i g h any advantages for oppos i n g her hem ispheric objectives. Last, South America no longer is u nder outside G reat Power pol it ical contro l , maki n g it feas i b l e for Brazi l to occu py the strateg ic vac u u m which has ensued. In the latter case, Brazi l ' s abi l i ty as a hegemonic power to fi l l the reg ion's pol itical vac u u m is a d i rect conseq uence, in my opi n ion, of the M iddle American buffer, with i n which the U n i ted States has become entang led and from which Brazi l enjoys its present i solation from the north. S i m i lar to Brazi l , the Soviet U n ion's i nternational objectives have been advanced by Cari bbean buffer frag mentation. The Soviets trad itionally have lacked sufficient i nfl uence in Lat i n America for estab l i s h i ng bases, but the avai lab i l ity of C u ba for social i st-bloc al l i ance agai nst the U n ited States perm itted the i r fi rst m i l itary entry i nto the reg ion. N ot only were they now able to consol idate their hold on territories and straits in the Bas i n 's heartland but also they cou l d widen i solation of South America from northern territories and encourage rebe l l ion in Central America and elsewhere.

77 From a U n i ted States fore i g n and secu rity pol i cy perspective, the buffer system of M iddle American poses a variety of very seri ous d i fficu lties. The U n ited States has sought stabi l ity along its frontiers, a pol icy fi rst emerg i n g in reaction to weaknesses in Span i s h F l o r i d a and Lou i s i a n a , 1 4 l ater extend i n g to p o l i t i c a l vac u u m s i n Texas a n d t h e Pacific, a n d more recently reac h i n g to turmo i l throughout the Cari bbean Bas i n and in some Eurasian ri m land areas. A secu rity th reat arises agai nst the U n i ted States not i m med iately from frontier power vac u u m s themselves but from possible enemy m i l itary i ntrusions i nto these vacuums which could threaten the U n i ted States core. Contemporary revol ution and depressi o n i n M iddle America do not endanger U n i ted States defenses, but serious consequences accrue from enemy armed a l l i a nces w i t h rad i c a l a n t i - U n i ted States c o u ntries of t h e Cari bbean. These vac u u m spaces i n fact are buffers; they separate the U n i ted States from a l l ied or neutral states and s i g n i fy anchors onto w h i c h fore i g n powers may attac h themselves. With t h i s frontier pol i cy, the worst-case scenario for U n i ted States secu ri ty is a M id d l e American shatterbelt because t h i s cond ition, b y its i n herent nature, means t h e existence o f rival m i l itary bases In the Caribbean, North America's best alternatives f i g u re to be either a U n i ted States sphere of i n fl uence or a completely neutral or i n dependent M iddle America, both of which p rec l ude enemy encroac hments. B u ffer q u a l ities with i n M id d l e America. I arg ue, contri bute t o t h e weake n i ng o f U n i ted St a tes hegemony, prevent the emergence of Cari bbean i ndependence, but prompt i n stead a shatterbelt confi g u ration in the reg ion. Therefore, buffers have contri buted to a loose n i ng o f North American co n trol and have provided opport u n i ties for Soviet Cari bbean i n roads. Because Was h i ngton's post World War Two vision of the most dangerous threat to her vital interests is Soviet expansion, defense strateg ists natural ly stress Eurasia, not Latin America, i n the i r i m med i ate m i l itary calc u l ations. The essence of U n i ted States sec u ri ty po l i cy s i nce 1 947 has been to p roject m i l i tary force effective l y onto certa i n E u rasian terri tories so as to p revent i ncl usion of these i nto the Soviet e m p i re. 1 5 Three term i nals of contemporary American power projection are Western Europe, the Pers i an G u l f , a n d East A s i a ; ad d i t i o n a l zo nes of E u ras i a i nvolvement have emerged from time t o time as wel l . Conseq uently, the U n i ted States secu rity peri meter l ies in Eurasia, not in America, and a "fortress America" conception, a q uarter-sector sphere, and s i m i lar defense p l an s where Lat i n America becomes an eq ual

78 partner of the U n i ted States have never been widely contemplated by Pentagon analysts.1s With i n this Eurasian thrust, Lat i n America's contri bution to North American defense, from the U n i ted States geopol itical viewpoi nt, l ies i n these areas: a) prevent hosti le bases from ari s i n g in the hemisphere; b) en hance U n ited States m i l i tary efforts with bases, materi a l , and troops; and c) assist i n protecti n g transit rou tes u t i l ized for i m port i n g resou rces to America and for p roject i n g U n i ted States power ove rseas . 1 7 T h i s Lat i n American defense contri bution i s secondari ly i m portant to U n i ted States strateg i sts, who cou nt primari ly on hemisp heric acq u i escence toward U n i ted States secu rity efforts beyond the N ew World. Foc u s i n g u po n t h i s aspect in h i s c l as s i c work, America 's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, Spykman mai ntai ned:1s

There i s no poss i b i l ity of ac h i evi ng an adeq uate i nteg ration of the states of the New World i n the face of German opposition, and even if there were, the balance potential of the Ameri cas wou ld sti l l be i nadequate to balance the Old World. Because of t h e d i s t r ib u t i o n o f l a n d m asses a n d m i l i ta ry potentials, a balance of power i n the transAtlantic and transPacific zones is an absol ute prereq u isite for the i ndependence of the N ew World and the p reservation of the power position of the U n i ted States. There is no safe defensive position of t h i s s i d e of t h e ocea n s . H e m i s p h ere defe n se i s n o defense a t a l l . T h e Second World War wi l l b e lost o r won i n E u rope a n d A s i a . T h e strateg i c p i c t u re demands that we conduct our m i l i tary operations i n the form of a g reat offensive across the oceans. I f our al l ies i n the O l d World are defeated , w e can not h o l d So u t h A m e r i c a ; if we defeat t h e G e r m a n ­ J apanese al l i ance abroad , our good neig h bors w i l l need n o protection . Spykman p red i cted U n ited States encirc lement and eventual defeat if "the three l and masses of the Old World can be brought u nder the control of a few states and so organized that l arge u n bal anced forces are ava i l able for pressu re across the ocean fronts." In the poss i b i l i ty of i nvasion, a loyal Lat i n America wou ld be no compensation for the loss of the Eurasian balance of power, and the U n ited States cou l d be strang led i nto s u b m i ssion by the vast resou rces of the encirc l i ng nations. This geopol itical scenario was s i g n i ficantly to i nfl uence post war contai n ment pol icies of George

79 Ken nan and others,19 a sec u rity approach which has cont i n u ed to the present day. The buffer of M iddle America tends to l i m it this U n i ted States extension of power to Eurasia and to d i srupt her hem ispheric defenses as wel l . Projecti n g m i l itary force would be q uite d i fficult so long as v i ta l c hoke p o i n t b u ffers in the Cari b bean were suscepti ble to enemy i nterd iction, such as Soviet al ly Cuba i ntends those adjacent her shores to be. In add ition, the U n i ted States s i m p ly can not afford to i g nore M iddle American turmoi l on her southern frontier, and consequently she m ust partia lly retrench from Eurasia i nvolvement to protect her New World flank as a res u lt. F i nal ly, M id d l e America separates N orth America from pote n t i a l S o u t h A m e r i c a n al l i e s , restri c t i n g U n ited States leaders h i p in South Atlantic and Pacific defense and her abi l i ty to coord i n ate a n orthern and southern q uarantine of the Cari bbean buffer. The central location of the M iddle American buffer isolates and separates other areas from each other, s i m i larly to the function i n g o f s ub-system buffers withi n the Cari bbean Bas i n . For each level of geopo l i t i cal i m pact, these b u ffers c l osely i n teract w i t h other reg i o n a l c o n f i g u rat i o n s , p ri m ari l y s p h e res of i n f l uence and shatterbelts, and these con nections have characterized the h i storic pol i tical perspect ive of the e n t i re Bas i n and its ties to other territories as wel l . Some of the shapes of this nexus are drawn i n the section wh ich fol l ows. A N A LYSI S

I n comparison to shatterbe lts, spheres of i nfl uence, and neutral or i ndependent political zones, buffers are u n ique geopo l itical entities i n a variety of spec ial ways. For example, they may operate w i t h i n su b-reg ions of fairly l i m i ted scope, as was noted i n Central America and elsewhere in the Caribbean, and s i m u l taneously occ upy a complete reg ion. Each of the other config u rations normal ly do not exi st in both isolated sections and in the whole reg ion conc u rren t l y. Spheres of i nfl uence i nd icate absol ute authority over a certai n tier of states by one outside power or a l l i ance. Anyt h ing less than p reponderance is not an i n f l uence sphere. Neutral and i ndependent zones m ust be free of all outside dom i nation; fore i g n bases with i n the area can not trans p i re. Shatterbelts are reg ions where rival G reat Power bases exi st, an arena of potential confl i ct escalation which cannot be red uced to smal ler d i mensions.

80 Buffers d i ffer by projecting an i mpact to adjacent reg ions. Because the Cari bbean sh ields South America from the U n i ted States, Brazi l may be able to assert hegemon i c leaders h i p over the Southern Cone, a feat Mexico can not attem pt relative to Central America, bei n g u nder the political shadow of its northern nei g h bor. Where the other geopol itical conste l l ations seem to exert an external i n f l uence, it usual ly means t hose reg ions are buffers also, and i t i s from t h i s l atter source that an i m pact beyond t h e i m med i ate reg ion is created.20 A further variation among the fou r conf i g u rations derives from the permanency of buffers; they cont i n ue to occu r despite other p o l i t i c a l t ra n s format i o n s w i t h i n a reg i o n . Th i s constancy i s bec a u se b u ffers o ri g i n ate from u n i q ue g eog rap h i c q u a l i t i es; terra i n , demog raphy, vacant spaces, choke poi nts, and the l i ke, and from strateg i c position, both of w h i c h usual ly do not change. U n l i ke other reg ional models, b uffers are cond iti oned more d i rectly by an areas's i m med iate geog rap h i c attri butes and position. In contrast, neutral or i ndependent zones onl y arise when outside major powers do not i ntrude i nto their areas, spheres of i nfl uence emerge only after one G reat Power is i n areal command, and shatterbe lts are born of two or more forei g n com petitors vyi ng for territorial control. Because buffers function to separate and to i solate adjacent territories, they sharp ly d i ffer from pro m i nent characteristics of the other confi g u rations. Shatterbelts are noted for G reat Power riva lry, spheres of i n fl uence for t h e i r exc l usive control by one m ajor outside power, and neutral or i ndependent reg ions for an absence of fore i g n po l i tical i nvolvement. B uffers are compatible with the p resence of any l eve l of o u t s i d e state s ' e n t ry. F i n a l l y , as s hatterbelts, spheres of i n fl uence, and neutral or i n dependent zones are m utual ly exc l u sive, they can not function s i m u ltaneously with eac h other. An i ndependent area can not also be a sphere of i nfl uence, and neither can be a shatterbe lt. Nevertheless, a buffer comfortably performs its fu nctions s i m u l taneously with a l l three, both in its i n ternal and external aspects. Cou l d a Cari b bean n e u t ra l or i nd e p e n d e n t p o l i t i c a l zo n e someday rep l ace o r become an add ition t o t h e sphere o f i n f l uence­ s h atterbe l t rotat i o n w h i c h has reg u l arly tra n s p i red i n M id d l e America for t h e past five centuries? Does there exist a potential for a federated M i ddle American state, or at least a widely recog n ized zone of neutra l ity, to arise? I be l i eve t h i s possibi l ity to be very rem ote, based u pon the b u ffer c haracteristics i n herent to the Caribbean Bas i n . Fi rst, the U n i ted States l i kely will remai n deeply i nvolved i n M iddle America for the foreseeable future. She m u st be

81 so, for the reg ion w i l l cont i n u e to be her most vital frontier defense area. Second, the pro m i nence of the Basi n 's fragmenting i nternal and external b uffer q u a l i ties, and the Soviet's consequent al l i ance with C u ba, w i l l ass u re the cont i n u ance of a Cari bbean shatterbelt. Th i rd , at p resent no U n i ted States rival, not the Soviet U n ion or Brazi l , possesses sufficient power in M iddle America to i nd uce a w i t h d rawal of o u t s i d e bases from t h e Cari bbea n . H e n c e , a n i nternational sponsori n g of neutra l i ty or i ndependence for the reg ion i s n o t l i kely. Four, any s h i ft away from a shatterbelt wou ld be a rotation aga i n toward a U n i ted States sphere of i n f l uence, w h i c h cou ld occu r i f t h e Soviet U n ion were t o red uce i t s i nterventions i n M iddle America. I am also of the opi n ion that a res u m ption of a U n ited States sphere of i n f l uence over the Carib bean is not poss i b l e u nder present c i rc u m stances. Cond itions in the Bas i n are ri pe for a shatterbelt i n stead . M iddle America l i terally is torn apart now, part i c u l arly in a p ol i t i ca l sense, b u ffered i ntern a l l y from one section to another and attracti n g the estab l i s h ment of rival Soviet and U n ited States m i l i tary al l i ances. And the C u ban-Soviet a l l i ance see m s h e al t h l y, d e s p i te occas i o n a l stra i n s of pa rt i s an s h i p . Con seq u e n t l y , n e i t h e r a s p h e re o f i n f l uence nor a n e u t ra l or i ndependent status i s evident because c u rrently M iddle America can not be freed of the escalation of G reat Power confrontation. It appears most probable, therefore, that a Cari bbean shatterbelt wi l l characterize the reg ion for the remai nder o f the twentieth centu ry. I n m a n y respects, aspects of t h e Cari b be a n b u ffer a n d shatterbel t appear t o resem b l e eac h other q u i te c l ose ly. Eac h en hances the other's vis i b i l ity and i m portance with i n reg ional and i nternational geopol itics. For i n stance, b uffers normal ly reflect and sti m u l ate a frag mented environ ment, a cond ition favori ng the rise of shatterbelts. Th i s is because b uffers p rovide more opportu n ities for fore i g n states to establ i sh armed footholds in M iddle America, a situation w h i c h wou l d not be perm itted d u ring spheres of i nfl uence or n e utra l - i ndepende nce p red o m i nance. L i kewide, shatterbe lts i ncrease the s i g n i ficance of b uffers, both i nternal ly to the area and in their external projection. The Cuban buffer paved the way for R u s s i an penetrat i o n of t h e Cari bbea n , h e n ce a s h atterbe l t emerged . From this event, the rise o f Central American and other subsystem bu ffers to g reater prom i nence was fac i l itated as wel l as was the advance of B razi l i an hegemony in the Southern Cone and the i ncreas i n g d i fficu lty of U n i ted States power extensions toward Eurasia. The b uffer of M id d le America l i kely has contri buted to a rise of add itional Eurasian shatterbe lts as we l l . I n these ways, the

82

M iddle American bu ffers and shatterbe lts rei n force each other, making the emergence of both spheres of infl uence and neutral or i ndependent zones m u c h less real istic. In another sen se, shatterbe lts ref l ect b u ffer c h a racte r i s t i c s themselves. They red uce d i rect confrontat ion a m o n g G reat Power homelands by deflecti n g this rivalry to more isolated reg ions.21 Competition between the U n ited States and the Soviet U n ion i s p l ayed out i n t h e Cari bbean, where escalation is less threate n i n g t h a n i n M i d d l e E u rope o r East A s i a a n d w h e re c o n t ro l ove r s u rrogates or a l l i es can be more flex i b l e . I n another case, a potential for con f l i ct between Braz i l and the U n i ted States i s h idden by both the shatterbelt and the buffer system of the Bas i n . S U M M A RY

I n conc l usion, M iddle America is a natural buffer zone, held permanently in this mode because of its rugged terra i n and its strateg i c location. Two particu lar buffer featu res stand out: a series of s u bsystem i nternal buffers throug hout the Bas i n w h i c h have tended to frag ment pol itical relationsh i ps and a reg i on-wide buffer w h i c h has separated adj acent areas from eac h other, pos i n g p roblems or opport u n ities for large fore i g n states i nvolved i n Cari bbean affai rs. But, these buffers of M iddle America never operate i n vac u u m ; they i n stead h o l d close l i n kages t o other types o f reg ional confi g u ration. Conseq uently, these re lationshi ps, such as we have seen in M iddle America, m ust be stud ied i n u n i son and not separate ly. In the Cari bbean, buffers exert a d i sru pting i m pact on i nternational affai rs during shatterbe lt eras and tend to be q u iescent if spheres of i nfl uence and neutral or i ndependent constel lations predom i n ate. Li kewi se, strong buffers fac i l i tate the emergence of shatterbe lts but tend to restrict spheres of i n fl uence and neutral or i ndependent zones from develop i ng . H ow w i l l these geopo l itical re l ationsh i ps i nfl uence fut u re pol itics i n the Cari bbean Basi n? I wou ld suggest several outcomes for i m med i ate decades ahead, based u pon the tandem assoc iation i n M iddle America of buffer and shatterbelt. F i rst, i f the Soviet presence i n the Cari bbean conti n ues u n d i st u rbed despite U n i ted States opposition, a shatterbe lt w i l l remai n in p l ace along side pro m i nent i nternal buffers and external b uffer projections. M iddle Ame�ica conseq uently will cont i n ue to be a secu rity problem for the U n i ted States and a fore i g n policy opport u n ity for Braz i l and for the Soviet U n ion, factors w h i c h may press these states toward more

83 i nvolvement i n the Bas i n . Second, turmoi l and depression i n M iddle America may i ncrease because of stronger buffer capacities as wel l as more s i g n ificant G reat Power i ntrusions. Final ly, g reater Cari b bean ten s i o n s cou l d either erupt someday i nto a seri ous U n i ted States-Soviet U n ion escalation toward war s i m i lar to the 1 963 m i ssi le crisis over C u ba, or force the Soviets to withdraw their power from M iddle America, a retrenchment caused by Russian fai l u res elsewhere i n add ition to America. In the latter case, the Bas i n i t s e l f . Pe rhaps for o t h e r wo rld b u ffer areas, pote n t i a l agai n . I n these respects, t h e buffers o f M iddle America contri bute more to a ri se of shatterbelts than to a rise of spheres of i nfl uence and of i ndependent or neutral pol itical zones. Combi ned with a strategic Cari bbean location, t hese buffers i nvite add itional outside m i l itary i n te rvention and frequent rivalry among G reat Powers because they create reg ional hemispheric d i sun i ty and thus bri ng a b u i l t- i n suscept i b i l i ty for escalation o f tensions with i n a n d beyond the Bas i n itself. Perhaps for other world buffers areas, potential antagonists are separated and isolated, bri n g i ng some poss i b i l ity for peace. But i n M iddle America, buffers seem to encourage fore i g n i ntervention, either toward spheres of i nfl uence or toward shatterbelts. This attractiveness to outsiders, more than other aspects, appears to be the d i sti n g u i s h i n g qual ity of the M iddle American buffer system. N OTES 1 . F o r more analysis of shatterbelts, see P. Kel ly (Political Geography Quarterly) a n d S. Cohen , "A N e w Map of G lobal Geopol itical Eq u i l ibrium: A Developmental Approa c h , " Political Geography Quarterly, 1 ( 1 982):223·241 and S. Cohen, Geography and Politics in a World Divided (New York: Oxford Univers ity Press, 1 973). For spheres of i n fl uence, see C.S. Gochman and J . L. Ray "Structura l Disparities in Lat i n America a n d Eastern Europe, 1 950-1 970," Journal of Peace Research, 1 6 (1 979):231 · 254 and for buffer systems, M . G . Partem, " B u ffer Systems i n I nternat ional Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 ( 1 983):3-27. 2. P. Kel ly, " Escalation of Reg ional Conflict: Testi n g the Shatterbelt Concept," Political Geography Quarterly, accepted for publ ication. 3. A.B. Rendon, The Chicago Manifes to (New York: M ac m i l lan, 1 97 1 ). 4. R. V i l l arreal and P. Kel ly, " Mexican Americans as Participants in U.S.·Mexico Relations,"lnterna tiona l Studies No tes, 9(1 982) : 1 -6. 5. J . Ewel l , " Development of Venezuelan Geopolitical Analysis Si nce World War I I , " Journal o f lnteramerlcan Studies a n d World A ffairs, 2 4 (1 982):295-320. 6. A.T. Mahan, The Interes t of A merica in Sea Power: Present and Future (Boston : Little, Brown, a n d Company, 1 9 1 8).

84 7. Congressional Budget Office report on foreign sou rces for strateg ic m i nerals, November 1 983, as reviewed i n the Christian Science Monitor, December 1 2, 1 983, pp. 24-25. While many of these m i nerals could be rep laced by substitutes or synthetics, the cost and time elements for conversion would be s i g n ificant, and thus beyond the capabil ity for a short d u ration conf l ict. U.S. Department of Com merce, Mid-American Ports Study, 1 (1 979), and U.S. Department of Commerce, Essential World Trade Routes, (1 975 ). 8. J . C h i l d , " M i l itary Aspects of the Panama Canal I ssue," U.S. Naval Ins titute Proceedings, 1 06 (1 980):46-51 . 9. M . Travassos, Pro;ecao Continental do Brasil, (Sao Pau lo: Ed itorial Nacional, 1 947). 1 0. H .T. Pittman, "Geopo l itics in the ABC Cou ntries: A Comparison," Paper presented before the Western Pol itical Science Association, (1 983), Seatt le; Was h i ngton. 1 1 . R . L. Secki nger, "South American Power Real i ties During the 1 820s, " Hispanic A merican Historical Review, 56 (1 976):241 -267. 1 2. J. Chi ld, Geopolitics and Conflict in South A mereica: Quarrels A m ong Neighbors, (New York: Praeger, 1 985). 1 3. P. Kel ly, "Geopo li tical Tension Areas in South America: The Question of B razi lian Territori a l Expans ion," Texas Journal of Political Studies, accepted for publica tion. 1 4. S . M . Bemis, A Diploma tic History of the United Sta tes, (New York: H . Holt and Company, 1 936). 1 5. N . J . Spykman , America 's Strategy in World Politics: The United Sta tes and Balance of Power (New York: H arcourt, Brace, and Company, 1 942); E.B. Atkeson , " H em ispheric Den i a l : Geopolitical I mperatives a n d Soviet Strategy," Strategy Review, 4 (1 976):26-36; and C. G ray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era: Heartlands, Rimlands, and the Technological Revolution (New York: Crane, Russak, 1 977). 16. J. C h i l d , " Lat i n America: Strateg ic Concepts," A ir University Review, (1 976):27-42.

27

1 7. D.F. Ronfeldt, United Sta tes Security Policy in the Caribbean (Santa Monica: Rand Corporat ion/paper No. 3 1 6, 1 983). 1 8. Spykman, p. 457. 1 9. G ray, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era. 20. Shatterbelts obviously wou l d make an i m portant external effect if political riva l ries w i t h i n such areas were to spark serious escalation to i nternational war, a characteristic of shatterbelts. Beyond th i s exception, nevertheless, shatterbelts, s i m i lar to spheres of i n f l uence and to neutral or i n dependent political zones, s how a n i n ternal ly-d i rected focus. 21 . S. Cohen , Geography and Polities in a World Divided, (New York: Oxford U n iversity Press, 1 973).

PART 2 R EG I O N AN D CO U N T RY CAS E ST U D I ES

C H APT E R S EAST E R N E U RO P E: T H E B U F F E R E F F ECT O F A CO R D O N SAN ITAI R E• OLA V FAGELUND KNUDSEN

* The cordon sanitaire worked also the other way rou nd, thoug h this was less perceived for some years. It exc l uded Russia from Europe, but it also exc l uded Europe from Russia. I na perverse way, t h e barrier d e s i g ned ag a i nst R u s s i a became Russia's protection. (A.J .P. Taylor. The Origins o f the Second World War. New York: Atheneum, 1 961 , p . 37)

I NT RO D U CT I O N

T h e p urpose o f this c hapter i s t o assess a n d explai n t h e buffer effect of a belt of smal ler states located on the peri phery of a g reat power, in casu the Soviet U n i o n . Here "buffer effect" means the deg ree of "res i stance" of such smal ler states to encroachments from the g reat powers, whether nearby or farther away. The concept w i l l be elaborated further later in the chapter. First, the general subject w i l l be i ntrod uced in stepw ise fashion, beg i n n i ng with identification of the problem, moving to conceptual u nderp i n n i ngs, and fi nally and most i m portantly, app l i cation of the concepts to the case of Eastern Europe. T H E P R O B L E M IN P R I N C I P L E

A l l g reat powers a n d emp ires have sooner o r l ater had t o face the q uestion of where their u l t i mate peri meter is to be. Even i f in the i r expansive phases they have been able t o keep the i r boundaries 87

88 u ndefi ned and stead i ly moving outward , a time al ways came when they had to del i m i t their bou ndaries. I f this has been a d i fficu l t issue t o t h e g reat power, it has been a matter o f exi stence itself to the smal ler neighbors on its border. The size of the territory effectively control led w i l l reflect the power of the ru l i ng gro up. Where several g roups control adjacent areas, the d raw i n g o f boundaries w i l l i nd i cate their relative power position. H owever, there w i l l always be u ncertai nties that keep bou ndaries from bei n g e x a c t powe r re p rese n t at i o n s . S o m e a re g e o g rap h i c a l , o r topog rap h i c a l . Others are soc i o-c u l t u ra l , part i c u l arly et h n o­ l i ng u istic, or econom ic. Moreover, power i n itself is often a vag ue phenomenon, seldom uneq u ivocal ly c lear to the parties i nvolved except when w i l l s are bei n g tested to the l i m it. In the i n teri m , the rep utation for p revai l i n g serves as a usable substitute. A rep u tation for power can make the effect of a demonstrated power edge l i nger on for an extended t i me w ithout any true confrontations tak i n g place. The d i sti nction between what i s part of the state and w hat i s outside it i s therefore always i n a pol i tical sense u n clear, even i f it . may be c l early defi ned on a map and i n the actual physical terrai n . · The political n e i g hbor-re l ation revolves around this ambigu ity. Boundaries, then, are rou g h power d ivisions; they show where the exc l u s ive control i n eac h side dec l i nes sharply, although i n o u r case sharper on one s i d e t h a n t h e other. I n Karl W. Deutsch's p e rs p e c t i ve the u n i v e r s a l v a r i ety o f p a t t e r n s of soc i a l com m u n i cation each pattern bei ng at the base o f a com m u n ity may i n i tsel f be a p recondition for the exerc ise of power.1 The domai n of power tends, perhaps, to become coextensive with a g iven pattern of soc i a l com m u n i cati o n . Deutsc h's perspective p rov i d e s a reaso n a b l e i n te r p retat i o n of t h e l i m i t s to l ateral extensions of power. Boundaries are not absol ute. The ambigu ity of the g reat power's bou n dary i s at the very heart of the smal l neighbor's existence. N ot only i s the smal l state at the mercy of the g reat power; at the other end of the rel ation, the g reat power also feels threatened by its smal l neighbor. That threat, w h i l e often i mag i nary, may at times t u rn out to be real. Even a smal l state may be able to consp i re with others agai nst the g reat power's secu rity, perhaps even lett i n g its territory be u sed for such p u rposes. In a sense, therefore, the g reat power's acceptance of the cont i nued existence of a smal l neighbor rep resents its dec i sion to ru n a calc u l ated risk: that of leaving what i s outside its boundary, or part of it, to the d i scretion of others, even ·

·

89 as it sti l l asp i res to the max i m u m possi ble i nfl uence over what happens there. Eastern Europe, h i storically an area of m u ltiple, crisscrossi n g e m p i re bou ndaries, w i l l b e analyzed a s a reg ion i n w h i c h t h e larger portions have for substantial periods been firmly in the grip of one or another of the g reat powers. Over ti me, however, there have also been su bstantial changes in overlordshi p , with power shifting back and fort h . The nations of the reg ion have, moreover, long been part of the g reater econom ic system of Europe. I n the fol l ow i n g , the relationsh i p of Eastern Europe to the neig h bori ng g reat powers and to the E u ropean system as a larger entity, with emphasis on the two most recent generations, w i l l be d i scussed . TY P E S O F R E LAT I O N S H I PS B ETW E E N G R EAT A N D S M A L L POW ERS

Several factors are i nvolved in maki ng up the relationshi p of power d i sparity on the fri nge of a g reat power. One is the degree of con trol exerc i sed at any g iven t i me over the smal ler state by the l arger - c o n te m porary F i n l a n d , P o l a n d , and Czec h os l ovak i a i l l ustrate d i fferent poi nts along the cont i n u u m . Another factor i s the q uestion o f whether a n opposing g reat power is also i nvolved the symme try factor.2 Conceivably the degree of power d isparity may be red uced or cancelled out by the appearance of a rival g reat power. The two factors are rel ated: The g reater the i nterest and i nvolvement of a rival g reat power, the smaller the deg ree of control exerc i sed by one side on ly. Conversely, as the deg ree of great­ power sym metry dec l i nes, the poss i b i l ity of u n i lateral g reat-power i ntervention i ncreases. For the relationsh i p to be operative there wou ld conceivably be a threshold, a certa i n m i n i m u m level of g reat­ power i nvolvement that had to be exceeded before the deg ree of symmetry cou ld be expected to infl uence the degree of contro l . As we shal l presently see, the rel ationsh i p between sym metry and control i s central to what is cal led "the buffer effect." A t h i rd factor i s t h e a ttractiveness of the small s ta te to the grea t power(s). Th i s factor concerns the possession by the smal l state of somet h i n g des i red by the g reat neighbor or its opponent, whether a m i neral resource, a potential m i l itary base site, or some other attractive item. The i m p l i cations of this ki nd of factor for smal l state s u rvival are not c lear-cut. Conceivably, to the smal l state such "g reat-power l u res" cou ld be l iabi l ities equally as wel l as be i n g assets. If they attract both g reat-power sides equal ly they wou ld rei n force the sym metry factor. H owever, if g reat-power i nterest

90 became extreme, that m i g ht bri ng the g reat powers together for a joint exploitation of the smal l . A fou rth a n d fi nal factor concerns the i ntri nsic strength o f the small state itself. M i l i tary power i s one aspect. Domest i c , or i nternal, cohesiveness i s another: The g reater the deg ree of i nternal confl ict, the smal ler the external strength of the u n it. Comm i tment to i ndependence among the e l i tes and pop u l ation of the smal l state is a t h i rd aspect. The other side of the coi n is the extent to which there are elements of dependency redu c i n g the strength of the sma l l state, and what deg ree of dependency is i nvolved. The foregoi ng factors affect the situation of all smal l states situated on the fri nge of a g reat power. I n the fol l ow i ng the focu s w i l l b e somewhat narrowed t o exam i ne what may b e cal led "buffer relationsh i ps " in particu lar. B U F F E R SYST E M S

An area m ay be referred to as a potential buffer area i f i t is control led b y o ne or more smal l states and located between two oppos i n g - and m u c h g reater - powers. There are three key defi n i ng characteristics: Cont i g u ity, a su bstantial power d i sparity between the g reat and small powers i nvolved, and rou g h power parity between the g reat. The com p lete col lection of g reat and smal l powers may, as suggested by M ichael G . Partem , be termed a potential buffer system.3 The term buffe r state trad itional ly refers to a relatively smal l state that separates areas contro l led by two oppos i n g g reat powers.4 The b u ffer phenomenon can be conce ived as an effect, the resu l tant of a variety of causal factors. The buffer effect m ay be defi ned as the degree of " resistance" of a b uffer area to outside encroac h ments, s u perficially observable as the persistence over t i me of the smal l states of the b uffer system as i ndependent pol i tical u n its. The strength or weakness of the buffer effect i n empi rical cases i s a q uestion o n which some time w i l l be spent i n the fol lowi n g . Accord i ng t o Partem , "The log i c o f t h e buffer system d ictates that neither (g reat power) can dom i nate the system . "5 I ndeed , a central point of a strong b uffer effect i s that neither g reat power attacks or encroaches on the state i n between , because they deter each other.s On the other hand, a side effect is presumably that tension and c o n f l i ct between them is s u bd ue d . As in other deterre n c e rel ationshi ps, however, t h e system may become u n stable for a

91 variety of reasons. If the strateg i c i m portance of the buffer area is not eq ually g reat to both g reat-powers, that wou ld be o ne element of i n stab i l i t y . I f the c o m m i t m e n t of the s m a l l b u ffer state's leadersh i p to cont i n ued i ndependence decreases, that could be another. In rea l i ty, of course, the overal l buffer effect may vary both between i nd ividual cases and over t i me. The specific variables which seem to i nfl uence the strength of the buffer effect may be s u m marized as fol lows: A. variables rel ated to the symmetry factor: 1 . the degree of power parity (ratio of capabi l ities) between the great powers; 2. the deg ree of eq ual i ty of sal ience of the buffer area to the g reat powers (also l i n ked to the attractiveness factor); 3. (a function of the preced i n g two:) the probabi l ity that each g reat power wou ld resist an attempt by the other to attack or i nte rvene in the system 's smal l state; 4. the apparent cost to each g reat power (as perceived by themselves) of subd u i n g the smal l state (also l i n ked to the factor of smal l state strength);7 B. variables rel ated to the control factor and to that of smal l state strength: 5. the deg ree of power d i s parity (ratio of capabi l ities) between g reat power/smal l state; 6. the com m itment to cont i nued i ndependence on the part of the buffer state's leaders h i p , especially des i re for freedom from g reat power i nfl uence or i ntervention, as evidenced in recurri ng public statements and visible acts. The i ntensity of conf l i ct between the opposing g reat powers i s an exogenous variable. He re i t c a n s i m p l y b e treated a s a constant, assu m i ng that it is fairly h i g h (though not extreme - that m i g ht i ntrod uce a new dynam i c element). The variables are hypothesized to be positively rel ated to the buffer effect. In other words, the way they i n teract (especia lly items 5 a n d 6 ) serves to mai ntai n the buffer system, keeping the smal l-state part of the system from becom i ng on the one hand too weak (lead i ng the system to col lapse), and on the other hand too strong, so that it becomes a prospective a l l iance partner to either g reat power. In this analysis cases w i l l mai n ly be exam i ned i n which one o r more of these conditions are o n ly weakly present or fai l to occur.

92

T H E CORDON SA NITA IRE

The term cordon sanitaire was used by the French to denote the i r contai n ment policy towards t h e new Bolshev i k state a n d i t s smal l western ne i g h bors after World War O ne.8 M ore general ly, and d isregard i n g the pejorative connotations, it may be used to refer to a re lations h i p in which a stri ng of smal l powers on the peri meter of a great power are made by a rival g reat power to serve as a barrier . or themse lves seek to form one i n order to isolate, and i ns u l ate, the great power from the rest of the world . Hence it may be a strategy by which a g reat power seeks to shut out the world , perhaps i n order t o consolidate its i nternal power position; or it may be a strategy e mp loyed by another g reat power "on the outside" seeking to hem in the target power and contai n its i nfl uence. The Mo n roe Doctri ne sought to establ ish a type of cordon sanitaire i n the Western Hemisphere i n the n i neteenth century, and su bseq uent U.S. pol i c ies have in one way or another p u rsued the same goal with some success even u p to the p resent ti me. A cordon sanitaire may take the form of an asym metric pattern of a l l iance or assoc iation. The extent to w h i c h the smal l states are bei n g control led i n the p rocess may vary from negative g reat-power i nfl uence at one end of the spectru m , consisting s i mply of denial of the area to its opponent, to absolute dom i nance at the other end. The d i fference between denial and domi nance may be i l l u strated by the situation of F i n land si nce 1 948 vs. that of the rest of Eastern Europe i n the same period; or poss i bly by the situation of Central America as opposed to that of Eastern Europe. The success of a pol icy to establ ish a cordon may h i nge on the extent to w h i c h the small ne ig hbori ng states are able to cooperate with the external i nstigator(s) on the need for such action, and/or the extent to w h i c h the i n stigator is able to control what goes on i nside the smal l states. C learly, as a pol icy the cordon sanitaire has strong defensive con notations, regard less of why or by whom it is p u rsued. It is not exc l us ively defensive, however. If i n itiated "from the i nside," it may be combi ned with an expansion ist strategy, seeki ng to add new territory to the area control led. Some, perhaps, m ight cal l that a pol icy of seeking "secu rity i n depth." Converse ly, if rooted on the outside, the pol icy may be used by the outside power(s) as a spring board for the u lti mate conquest of the state beh i nd the cordon. In short, the cordon sanitaire has two main functions. The first one overlaps with that of the bu ffer area: separating a g reat power ·

93 from another g reat power or g ro u p of powers. The second fu nction i s to e n l i st the s u pport of pol itical e l i tes in the area for the cordon, or - fai l i ng that - to control the politics of the area, at least where fore i g n pol i cy i s concerned, i n ways i n i m ical to the i nterests of the oppos i n g g reat-power side. SY M M ET R I C VAR I AT I O N S: T H E B U F F E R CO M P LEX

Com b i n i ng aspects of the two p reced i n g sections, one m i g ht conceive of a system that i s partly control led by one side, partly by the other, and partly u ncontrol led by either. At the center there wou l d be an u n control led core area consisting of one or more non­ a l i gned states. In the wider setti ng around the core, there wou ld be several more or less contig uous smal l states, u nder the i nfl uence or partial contro l of oppos i n g g reat powers. In a model or ideal type as d i scussed here, rather than any spec ifi c case, the i n f l uence and control exerc i sed by the g reat powers wou ld dec l i ne g radually as the d i stance from their own borders i ncreased. This type of system i s considered as a "buffer com p lex."9 I n this ki nd of complex some states " lean" to one side, others to the other side, w h i le some are non-a l i g ned. The b uffer effect i s conceived as before; i .e., as the deg ree of "resistance" of a buffer area to outside encroac hments, but this time with the added proviso that with i n the area there may be a dec l i n i ng degree of resistance to outside pressu re as one moves from the center towards the peri phery. What d isti n g u ishes the buffer com plex from other buffer areas is above all that the buffer effect at the center may "sp i l l over" - to a g reater or lesser exte n t - to the s u rrou n d i n g s m a l l states. H e nce it m ay be hypothesized that the stronger the b uffer effect at the center, the g reater its geog rap h ical exte nsion beyond the core area. The reasons for this w i l l be elaborated in the fol l ow i n g . I n confronting the su rrou n d i n g g reat powers, t h e smal l states of the com p l ex derive added p rotective strength from the agg regated effects of m utual relations amongst themselves. To the extent that they are actively cooperat i n g with eac h other, and are strongly com m i tted to preserving the i r i ndependence, the i r protection from g reat-power control may be en hanced . The Nord i c reg i o n , whose so-cal led " N ord ic Balance" emerged after 1 948, i l l u strates this.10 If cond itions are rig ht, the overal l effect m ay be a flexible ki nd of strength, rep u l s i ng encroac h ments from both (or al l) adjacent g reat powers. Some degree of outside i nfl uence or even control over

94

fore i g n pol icy and domesti c pol itics i n the peri p heral states may be expected to occ u r, however, because the peripheral cou ntries of the complex are more l i kely to have the i r own relationsh i ps to o u t s i d e powers, and so eac h m ay e x p e r i e n c e l ess of t h e s i m u l taneous k i nd o f pressu re from both g reat powers w h i c h often rel ieves the s i tuation of the ord i nary buffer state. The stab i l ity of a buffer com p lex h i nges on the success of eac h smal l member i n resisti ng u n i lateral g reat power pressu res. I n s h ort, t h e s m a l l mem bers o f the b u ffer com p l ex w i l l tend to priorit ize the i r m u tual peacefu l re lations over and above t h e i r i ndividual b i l ateral rel ations w i t h the i r respective g reat powers. This amou nts to a reg ional so l i darity - t h i n k i n g of the possi b l e ram i fications o f n e w fore i g n pol i cy moves, n o t j ust t o one's own state, but also to neig h bori ng states. In a real-world exam ple N ord ic states, to fend off g reat power pressu res, arg ue that any demand for change in the status q u o i n one country i s bou n d to lead to demands for s i m i lar changes by other g reat powers in other cou ntries. For a long ti me, the p rospect to ei ther s u perpower gai n i n g a new concession in the Nord i c reg ion wh i le g iving the opponent a s i m i lar advantage has not appeared des i rable, and so the reg ion has gai ned some protection from the existing conste l lation of forces. The b uffer com p l ex may beg i n u n rave l i ng, however, i f the arg u ment about s i m i lar concessions to com petitors does not take hold and · the revisionist g reat power persists in its demands. The outside powers may in fact both (al l) come to feel that it would be better i f the two (or al l) of them control led more of the buffer complex d i rectly. Another and even m o re destabi l izi n g e l e m e n t wou l d be i ntrod uced i f one of the smal l states were to concl ude on its own that it wanted a closer relationsh i p to "its" outside g reat power. 1 1 The danger here, o f cou rse, i s that t h i s cou ld trigger demands for "compensation" from the other g reat-power side. In short, the buffer comp lex has flex i b i l i ty and strength, but also a b u i lt- i n element o f i n stabi l i ty. I f there is conf l i ct among the smal l powers in the comp lex, the l i ke l i hood of fend i n g off g reat power p ressu res nat u ra l ly becomes m u c h red uced. I ndeed , the g reater the amount of smal l-power confl i ct, the weaker the i r position in the over-al l buffer system , and the weaker the buffer effect of the comp l ex itself. I nfighting among the smal l , then, i s one reason why a buffer comp lex may col l apse. To the extent that the core area fal ls u nder the contro l of the

95 s u rrou n d i ng g reat powers, the buffer effect thereby d isappears. Thou g h always a matter of degree, the buffer effect (i n the context of t h e b u ffer c o m p l ex) i s d e f i n i ti o n a l l y c o n t i n ge n t on some m i n i m u m level of resistance to g reat power encroachments at the core. As g reat power contro l over the core i ncreases beyond that leve l , we wou l d be deal i n g with an ord i nary, d i rect g reat-power confrontation, which shou ld be seen as a conceptually d istinct phenomenon. In the fol low i ng , the above mentioned concepts are appl ied i n order to i m p rove our u nderstan d i n g of Eastern Europe. A N A N A LYSI S OF T H E EAST E U R O P EA N SYST E M

The estab l ishment of the c urrent (post-1 948) state of affai rs i n Eastern Europe m ust be seen as a step i n a gradual process of change i n it i ated when the stable cond ition of previous centu ries started g iving way. Duri n g the n i n eteenth century, the Ottoman E m p i re experienced a long period of dec l i ne, erosion and u l t i mate d i s i ntegration which repeated ly jolted the European balance-of. power system . The process cont i nued unti l the beg i n n i ng of World War One. By 1 9 1 7-1 8 there were, in add ition to the highly sign ificant Ottoman dec l i ne, no less than three empires and g reat powers which col lapsed around the Vistu l a and Danubian basi ns. Rapidly and almost s i m u ltaneously they fel l , setting a l l of the East E u ropean nationalities free i n a vast power vac u u m . Russia c o l l apsed from w i th i n , Austria- H u n gary and Germany 1 2 from external stra i n · but a l l u l t i mately from the stresses i nd uced by the war. This tri ple col lapse affected the northern part of Eastern E urope more d i rectly than the southern part, many of whose nations had a l ready g a i ned t h e i r i nd e p e n d e n c e p rev i o u s l y . H owever, t h e notorious i n stabi l i ty o f the Bal kan south, compou nded b y t h e beg i n n i ng dec l i ne o f Austria-H u ngary a n d b y Russia's attem pts to replace her, were i m portant contributing factors to the outbreak of the g reat war. I ro n i ca l ly , t h e n , t h e c h a n g i ng of g reat power pos i t i ons, as t hey were compet i n g to dom i n ate the area, a lso hel ped to bri n g about the u l t i mate break-down of the Eastern dom i n ance system itself. In sum, wh i le at the time of the Congress of Vienna of 1 8 1 5 Eastern Europe was subject t o a reasonably stable system of domi nation, over the next century that system d issolved almost comp letely.

96 The story of Eastern Eu rope i n this century is the account of a p ro g ressive t ran s i t i o n from the c o l l apse of o n e system of dom i nance to the establ i sh ment of another, from m u l ti-power domi nance to s i n g le-power hegemony.13 I n the analysis that fol l ows an exam i nation of the latter part of this transition w i l l be sought by re lati ng historical events to the mai n analytical factors i n itially out l i ned. Si nce 1 9 1 8 the buffer effect for Eastern Europe seems to have been weak. The theme of the analysis w i l l be that a weak buffer effect is probably re lated to the i ntensity and degree of sym metry of g reat-power interests in the area. There are good reasons to consider the q uestion in two stages before and after World War Two. I n the i nter-war period, when no g reat power control led Eastern E u rope, one m i g ht have thought - as d i d many contem porary observers - that cond itions were q u i te favorable for a buffer effect. The late 1 930s proved them wrong . Then , w i t h t h e war, cond itions c hanged d rastical ly. After 1 945 there were u n i q ue opport u n ities for a fresh start: Previous reg i mes erased in Eastern Europe, two new g reat powers opposi ng each other over the shap i n g of the future in E u rope. Yet, once, more the changes were d i fferent than many had expected - or hoped . N ot u n t i l the end of the war, i n 1 9 1 9, were the i m med iate pol itical i m p l i c at i o n s of the l o n g i m pe r i a l d ec l i n e in Easte rn E u ro p e apparent. Ch ief among t h e m was a widespread d is i n tegration o f power. The Versa i l les Conference, u nderstandably, was not m u c h concerned with that aspect, but focused rather on t h e prom ise o f see i n g s o many long-oppressed nati onal ities l i berated from fore i g n domi nation. I n t h e W ilsonian s p i rit, t h e conference g ranted self­ determ i nation to al l major national g roups i n the reg ion. The authority of the settlement rested with the victorious powers of the west, who had no part i c u l ar des i g ns or i nterests of the i r own i n Eastern Europe. Hence, when they accepted the reg ional power vac u u m which ensued, it was by default rather than des i g n . The i nter-war period saw the conseq uences of Eastern E u rope's p o l i t i c a l b reakdow n and of the Versai l l es sett l e m e n t o n t h e European system a t large: I n add ition t o an u n sett l i ng lack o f any d i sc e rn i b l e power struct u re , t h e re were n e i g h bo rly c o n f l i cts, authoritarian excesses and si l ly demonstrations o f smal l-power arrogance. I nteracti ng with such m i nor d i stu rbances and pol itical defi c i e nc i e s were other post-war deve l o p m e nts, above all the stepwise restitution of German power - on ly su perfic i a l ly overcome in 1 9 1 8 - and the slower stabi l ization of Bolshevik power in Russia.

97 By about the m id-1 930s s i g n s of serious stress were visible, in the shape of mounting tension, at d ifferent poi nts in the European system . Some o f t h e stress ori g i n ated i n t h e war itself, s u c h a s t h e anti­ Bolshev i k i nte rventions in Russia by British, French and U.S. forces; also the territorial i m modesty of the Poles after they had successfu l ly beaten back the Red Army from Warsaw in 1 9 1 9-21 . H owever, m u c h of the i nternal East European stress had l i tera lly been built i n a t Versail les. The Baltic states and Poland (the part that was recog n ized as Pol i sh by the Peace Conference) were carved out of formerly Russian and German territory. Most of Austria- H u ngary was res haped i nto Czec hoslovaki a , H u ngary and a n A u strian s uccessor state, and parts of i t were transferred to the new Yugoslavian state, joi n i ng together the Serbians and n u merous other stro n g n at i o n a l i t i e s , n otab l y the G roats a n d S l ove n e s . Roman ia received Bessarabia (formerly Russian) a n d Transylvania (formerly Austro- H u ngarian), decisions never accepted whether by Russia o r H u n g ary. In res p onse to the i r new s i t u a t i o n , Czec h os l ovak i a , R o m a n i a a n d Y u g os l av i a s o o n ( 1 920-2 1 ) got together to form the L ittle En tente, a set of al l iances d i rected pri mari ly aga i n st revisionist H u ngary. I n the mean t i m e G e rmany, t h o u g h defeated, had not been c rushed . The Versai l les settlement was, territoria l l y speak i n g , c o n s i d e ra b l y l ess favora b l e to R u s s i a t h a n t o G e r m a n y . A restorat i o n of G e r m a n power c o u l d n ot be r u l e d o u t . The widespread rejection of the Versai l les settlement in the German pop u l at i o n g ave that potential i ty c lear i nternational re levance. After 1 925 Western fears were cal med by the Locarno Treaty, i n which Germany exp l i c i tly accepted her new western borders. But Locarno never h ad a n eastern c ou n te rpart. To t h e c o n t ra ry, Germany u nam b i g uously c i ted the eastern borders a s targets for future revision. H itler's accession to power became a catalytic factor, re leas i n g these tensions in revisionist action. Both R u s s i a a n d Germany h ad been abse nt from - and su bseq uently also rejected - the territorial settlement of Versai l les. H owever, for a buffer effect to be present, the g reat powers next to the buffer area m ust accept the status q uo. In the i nter-war period Germany and Russia, both European outcasts, had a common i n c l i nation to reject the status quo - as demonstrated by thei r s u rprise Rapa l lo Treaty i n 1 922 and u lti mately confi rmed by the M olotov- R i bbentrop Pact in 1 939, w h i c h d ivided a l l of Eastern Europe between them.

98 The small neighbors between Germany and Russia d id not seem to g rasp the wider i m p l ication of these tendencies - or, if some of them d i d , they were unable to gai n the necessary pol itical support to i n stitute defensive measures. Other preoccu pations got i n the way. I ndeed , among the East European nations there was scarcely any feel i ng of sol idarity, nor any real izat ion of a need for it. There was no sense of bei ng i n the same boat, tossi n g about between Scy l l a and Charybd is. When they were not preocc u p ied with the i r own territori al c l a i ms, East E u ropean pol it ical leaders seemed almost exc l u sively concerned with the Russian pol itical threat. As one of them observed, "If the Germans come, we w i l l lose our freedom, but with the Russi ans we will lose our sou ls."14 As we shal l see, these preoccupations had long been n u rtured by Western pol i cies in the reg ion, parti c ularly the French pol icy s u c ceed i n g t h e p ol i cy of d i rect i nterve n t i o n i n R u s s i a a n d conceived t o conti n ue the anti-Bolshevi k l i ne when i ntervention fai led. In the i nternal post.war politics of the reg ion France and Russia were the m a i n potential cou nterweig hts to g rowing German power. But France, whose pri mary concern si nce 1 9 1 9 had been to keep Germany weak, also wanted to p revent the westward spread of com m u nism. M any French feared Bolshevism almost as m u c h as they feared the renewal of German ambitions. App l ied to Eastern E u rope, these two F re n c h g o a l s m ay at f i rst h ave seemed compat ible. Encourage a strong Eastern Europe, and the resu lt m ig ht be both a barrier to com m u nism and a counterweight to Germany. I n fact, a cordon s a n i ta ire, c ou nterba l a n c i n g a " G e rm a n ­ H u ngarian b l oc " a n d a " Russian bloc , " was an early goal of Romanian pol i cy after the war.15 Other East Europeans were more concerned with other dangers, especially the threat from revisionist H u ngary. To the extent that the i r fears converged , this motivated the succession of treaties that g rew i nto the Little En te n te. France, after some i n itial hesitation, s u pported these developme nts and from 1 924 joi ned the treaty system herse lf. But the reg ion was hard to fit i nto the ideal French (and Romanian) scheme. For one t h i n g , Poland and Czechoslovakia were France's c h i ef access poi nts. H owever, these two states were u nable to get along, bei ng d ivided by border d i sputes. For another com p l i cation, Italy soon entered the East Eu ropean scene in a d i p lomaiic; competition of sorts with France, eventual ly conc l u d i ng an ag reement with H u ngary that sti rred u p strong en m ities and contri buted to keeping the area d ivided .16

99 Eq ual ly serious, perhaps, Eastern Europe was hard ly a potential g reat power even if the states in the area had al l welded together. M i l i tari l y they were weak. If contai n i n g G e r m a n eastward expansion had been a serious French goa l, then Russian backing ought to have been a welcome addition i n support i n g cou ntries l i ke Po l a n d o r Czec h o s l ovak i a . B u t t h at, of c o u rse, wo u l d mea n cooperation with the Bolshevi ks. N ot u n t i l H itler's take-over i n 1 933 were the French w i l l i n g to consider that alternative. (The Russians, for the i r part, had been eq ual ly reserved towards the Western powers and were not ready, e ither, to cooperate with the French until that ti me.) Part of the p roblem of France's eastern pol icy was that w hatever strength Eastern E u rope rep resented l ay more i n motivat i o n espec i a l l y ave rs ions - than i n m i l i tary m u scle. East E u ropean senti ments, in add ition to bei n g d ivisive with i n the reg ion, were c learly less anti-German than anti- R ussian. H ad the East European nations been pol itical ly cohesive and m i l itari ly strong, Germany as wel l as Russia - wou ld have had to take that strength i nto account. Such pol itical and m i l itary strength cou ld have been an i ndependent and i m part i a l power factor, p rop p i n g u p Eastern Europe in resi stance to encroac hments from either side, Russian or German. But to the extent the French were preoccu pied with the Cordon sanitaire as a way to contai n Bolshevism, the i r 'bui ld-u p ' of Eastern Europe was robbed of any neutral flavor. Subsequently, the com i n g to power of rig htist, q uasi-fascist reg i mes in Poland and other cou ntries in the area did l ittle to i m p rove the situation. The East E u ropean trends ref lected not j u st anti-com m u n i st se nti ment, b u t also anti-Russian fee l i n g . Many East E u ropean cou ntries, h avi n g been c reated l i te ra l ly at Russia 's territori a l expense, h a d reason to fear Russian moves to revise t h e Versai l les settlement. G ranted, those that had been created at Germany's expense hardly slept any better for it, but the ideolog ical factor was m u c h weaker. In s hort, among the two motivations tor the French pol icy only one - that of isolat i n g Russia, strateg ical ly, the less i m portant motivation - was really served by France's eastern a l l ies. As long as the German threat seemed remote, the French pol i cy was a l l right. But the moment H i tler acceeded to power, the p roblem became acute. N ow France needed the Russian l i nk. Sti l l , both sides m oved slow ly. O n ly i n 1 934 d i d the Soviet U n ion j o i n the Leag ue of N ations. Another two years were req u i red before a Franco-Soviet agreement was comp leted . Then, very l ittle was ever done at the m i l itary level to g ive su bstance to the re lations h i p.

1 00 Despite obvious common i n terests, the pol itical d i stance remai ned too great. As the l i ke l i hood of war i n c reased d u ri ng the 1 930s, French priorities became more u ncerta i n . France had wanted Easte rn E u rope to s u p p lement her power i n confronti ng Germany, or d iverting Germany's attention from the West; she never i ntended to comm i t herself to a war with Germany i n order to save her Eastern al l ies. The bu i ld i ng of the " M ag i not l i ne" i l l u strated this. To protect her a l l i es from Germany, France wou ld need to move offensively; not j u st sit in waiting beh i nd a wal l . The French "regarded the i r Eastern a l l i ances a s assets, not l iabi l ities; bri ng i ng protection to France, not com m i tment." 1 7 French i nconsi stencies came to a head over Czechoslovakia in 1 938. In the Eastern belt Czec hoslovakia was somewhat an except ion. She was neither strongly anti-Russian nor m i l itarily weak; i n fact, she was m i l itari ly q uite wel l prepared to defend herself. 1 8 At t h i s poi nt, however, t h e French (and t h e British) were concerned above al l to stay out of armed confl ict. France wanted to keep German attention focu sed eastward , but was not prepared to get i nvolved. The Russians saw the i m p l ications and may have been ready to act alone in Czec hoslovakia's defense. 1 9 But for the Soviet U n ion to honer her com m i tment to Czechoslovakia she needed (i n add ition to a req uest) perm ission to transit Roman ian territory or ai rspace, or conceivably that of Poland; yet the actual g ranti n g of such perm i s s i o n was reg a rded as rat h e r u n l i ke l y g i ven t h e bas i c orientation o f the reg i mes i nvolved . I n the end, Czechoslovakia fou n d herself with two nom i nal . and un coord i nated · supporters. To Prag ue, bei ng defended by Russia but not France was out of the q uestion, u nti l at the very last moment, when the o n l y alternative was s u rre n d e r. G i ven the chan g i n g French preferences, Czechoslovakia had made the worst possi ble choice. U nderlyi ng the sym metry d i mension is the q uestion of the degree of sal ience of the buffer area to the relevant great powers. For the buffer effect to work, the area m u st be seen as i m portant by lead i ng status-q u o powers. When sal ience i s h i g h to revisionist powers, trouble m ay be brew i n g . I n t h e i nter-war period t h e sal ience o f Eastern Europe t o status­ q uo powers was consistently h i g h only to France. As a matter of fact, for a long t i me there was on ly one other power · Brita in · that fit the status-q u o descri ption, and British i n d i ffere nce to Eastern Europe was hardly a novelty at M u n i c h in 1 938. Soviet pol i cy i n th i s area may superfic ial ly seem ambiguous, but

1 01 i s perhaps better c haracterized as u n stable: " Do whatever it takes to e n s u re s u rviva l . " From 1 933 o n , the Soviet U n i o n became i nc reas i n g ly stat u s-qu o oriented . There was a five-year period d u ri ng w h i c h three g reat powers - France, the Soviet U n ion, and Germany - were strongly and actively concerned with the fate of Eastern E u rope. I t tu rned out to be an u n fortunate com bi nation. To offi c i a l We i m ar G e r m a n y , t h e eastern part of t h e Versai l le s settlement was u n acceptable. N o less t o H itler's Germany: Eastern Europe was the l iving space of the future and ipso facto a vital i n terest. The Bolshev i k reg i me b roke off from the trad itional Tsarist obsession with Eastern Europe, Constanti nople and the Straits. I ndeed , u n t i l H itler came to power, Stal i n seems not to h ave regarded Eastern Europe as a vital ly i m portant area, nor had Len i n before h i m . Germany, however, was i mportant - t o Len i n as the eventual scene of revolution; to Stal i n as a powerful capital ist cou ntry - but Eastern Europe held l ittle i nterest, except for its poss i b l e rol e in a capital ist e n c i rc lement scheme. With H i tler com i n g to power there was a new kind of chal lenge. Now there was a recogn izable th reat - physical as wel l as ideological - to the socialist state. The Soviet reaction was predi cated above a l l on the need to safeg u ard the Russian socialist experi ment agai nst t h i s n e w German threat: support t h e status-qua for Eastern Europe as long as that cou l d keep the Germans at bay - and even seek the cooperat i o n of the W e s t e r n p o w e rs i n t h e p ro c e s s ; b u t t u r n revision i st i f the status q u o pol icy were to fai l . The Soviet status-q u o p h ase petered out a s its lack o f success became i nc reas i ng ly c lear. The Soviet demands for F i n n ish territory i n 1 938 are hard to see as anyt h i n g but revisionist, even i f they were presented by the Russians as a defensive move. Other Soviet moves in 1 939-41 make it no easier to see Russia i n retrospect as a stable status-q uo power where Eastern E u rope i s concerned, even i f the motives may have been basical ly defensive a n d the a n nexat i o n s were u nd e rtake n i n a state of near­ desperation. The p ressu res o n t h e Versa i l l e s system peaked w i t h t h e Czechoslovakian crisis i n 1 938. From this poi nt on, an acelerated erosion of the established European order took place. During 1 939· 41 the eastern belt was rapidly d igested by Germany and Russia. As we know, the meal fai led to satisfy either Germany's appetite or Russia's fear of starvation. The l ack of i nternal reg ional stab i l i ty i n the i nter-war period stands out. Clearly, Eastern Europe d i d not take on the appearance

1 02 of a bu ffer comp lex d u r i n g t h i s period. The Versa i l les Treaty brought about a settlement i n Eastern Europe that was sati sfactory pri m ari ly to the weak, not to the strong at least not to those of the strong that cared most i n tensely about the area. Change · even d rastic change · was wanted by most of those who m i g ht be able to bri ng it about. French pol i cy, potentially a stab i l izi ng factor, was d iverted to anti-com m u n i st p u rposes. Th i n ki n g they cou ld make a cordon sanitaire constra i n Russia and at the same time absorb some of Germany's external pressu re, France ended up with a pol i cy that worked on ly agai nst the Russians. Even as a one-way i n strument it d i d not function very we l l . It probably &ntagon ized the Soviets more than it constrained them, and also brought home the fact that Russia's stri ng of western neighbors cou ld be used agai nst them . The coi nc idence of French and German pu rposes may have looked less coi nc idental at the receivi n g end. On a d ifferent leve l , the two most powerf u l malcontents were sti l l h i g h ly unequal. Versa i l les · and a civi l war · had left Russia a good b i t weaker t h a n Germany. Eve n if R u s s i a n power i n c reased tremendously d u ri ng the 1 930s, she sti l l was not the counterwei g ht to G e r m a n y t h at s h e had been · or seemed to be · i n 1 9 1 4. Russian power was also u nderm i ned by the rel uctance of the West to join i n a serious a l l iance with the Soviet Union. H itler's confidence i n that factor seemed we l l p l aced and was part of the u nd e rm i n i n g process. With al most a l l i nterested powers, d i scontented with the status q uo, and most status q u o powers bei n g m i ld l y i n d i fferent, the system had poor p rospects of long-term surviva l. T h e German attack on Russia, along with the J apanese attack on the U n i ted States were contests which came to determ i ne the shape of the post-war power balance. The Second World War, u n l i ke the F i rst, d i d more than j ust trigger collapse. It led to the emergence of a new set of lead i n g powers. There was more, however, than j ust the shift i n g balance of power · even if fundamental at this poi nt . which determ i ned the fate of Eastern Europe. I ndeed, the bisection of Europe was g rad u a l ly prod uced by the confl uence of a n u m ber of more specific factors, among which were the fol low i n g : ( 1 ) Russia's practical monopoly i n p u s h i n g t h e Germans bac k from The east; (2) the agreement at Yalta that Russia was to have "fri e n d l y reg i mes" on h e r western borders; •

1 03 (3) the total ity of Germany's defeat; (4) the weakness of Britai n and France after the fighting ended; and (5) the g radual substitution of U.S. power for the col lective col lapse at the Center and West of Europe. When the R u s s i a n s f i n a l ly t u rned the t i d e and c h ased the Germans home, the absence of other partici pants on the Eastern front was a straightforward conseq uence of the g rand pattern the A l l ies had chosen for the fi nal push. Churchi l l's idea of Western arm ies moving up east of the Alps from the Med iterranean had fai led to w i n Roosevelt's support and was pred ictably opposed by Stal i n . The wider conseq uences, i n terms of post-war great-power relations, were probably seen more clearly by the British than by the Americans. Stal i n 's demand for "fri e n d l y reg i mes" was hard to oppose effectively the way it was p h rased. The Yalta agreement sanctioned it for l ack of an alternat ive acceptabl e to al l. In the aftermath of the war, with Russian troops all over Eastern Europe, the enforcement of this vag ue phrase came, as it were, automatical ly, Its ulti mate Russian i n terpretation d i d not come out, however, unti l early 1 948, when the central party l i ne was c lamped down over East European attem pts to defi ne d i sti nct national " roads to socialism," and a coup was i nstigated i n Czec hoslovakia. As an as ide, Poland's s i tuation is worth mention i n g in t h i s con nection. C hurc h i l l a n d Rooseve l t s o u g h t t o c o u n t e r Stal i n ' s demand for "friendly reg i mes" by i n serting in the Yalta agreement a cal l for free elections. They had Poland particularly i n m i nd . But the strateg i c real i ty of postwar Poland proved more weighty than free elections cou l d ever be. Poland was moved westward at Germany's expense - j ust as she was a l l owed to move eastward after World War One at Russia's expense. Th i s t i me it was Russian troops that g ave Poland the power she needed - not Pol ish ones. Si nce that t i me Poland has been utterly dependent on the Soviet U n ion to g uarantee her western border. The total ity of Germany's defeat in 1 945 was largely a plan ned event, brought on - in a longer time perspective - by experiences after World War One; i n the shorter perspective by the al l ied goal of u ncond itional su rrender. But in a more i m med iate sense it also resu l ted from the i m p rovi sed Russian strategy of i m med i ately d i s m a n t l i ng m u c h of the econom i c i n frast r u c t u re i n t h e i r occupation zone. Germany was destroyed not o n l y a s a m i l itary power, but also as an economi c power. The postwar d ivision of the cou ntry, which had not been plan ned by the al l ies, but grew out of

1 04 t h e i r s u bseq u e n t d i sag reem e n t s , i n s u red t h e l o n g-term stab i l ization of a Germany weaker than her potential. The weakness of France and G reat Brita i n was p robably a matter of long term change, acce lerated by the conseq uences of the war. H owever, thei r dec l i ne added to the effects of the d i sappearance of Germany from the structure of European power. Here was another i nstan ce of power co l l ap s i n g in the central part of E u rope's pol i tical system · but this time affecti n g areas further west. Althou g h Russia qu ickly took over the eastern half of the system , there was no rapid cou ntermove i n t h e west. T h e British appeal to the U n i ted States in early 1 947 · focused i n itially on the Eastern M ed i terranean · a l on g w i t h c o n c u rre n t eve nts i n East-West relations, made the United States reconsider its p l ans to withdraw from Europe. The Tru man Doctrine (M arc h 1 947) offered fi nancial and m i l itary assistance to free peop les threatened by com m u n ist agg ression. In J u ne of that year the Marshal l Plan added depth to the fi nancial side by enab l i n g European cou ntries to p u rchase American goods u sing American g rants. It also got E u ropean econom i c cooperation started in the framework of the O E EC. Further developments i n 1 948 sol i d i fied those dec i sions and set in motion the negotiations lead i n g to N ATO's fou n d i n g i n the spri n g of 1 949. Thus, in contrast, to the col lapse of 1 9 1 7-1 8 and its aftermath , after 1 945 no u ncontrol led center was al lowed t o remai n i n the European system. Europe was d ivided neatly in two. The new system estab l i shed by 1 948 has proven rather d u rable. J ud g i ng by the p ropen sity of either side to res i st i ntervention attem pts by the other, it Is a strongly asymmetric syste m . (On l y the Russians intervened there, and the U n i ted States never resists other than verbal ly.) In periods this low degree of sym metry has even been dec l i n i ng. Throug hout, the i n c l i nation of the USSR to i n tervene has been rather h l g h . 20 The Western powers have mostly, and perhaps w i sely, foregone their opportun ities to get i nvolved. The H u ngarian uprising i n 1 956 was met with tremendous sympathy in the West but was, pol itical ly speaking, i g nored . In the case of Czechoslovakia w hether i n 1 948 or in 1 968 · there was, agai n , outrage, b u t l ittle or no counterpressure. I n 1 948 strong reactions a l l over Western Europe eventual ly flowed i nto the creation of N ATO, but there was no reactive push to restore the su bverted democracy of Czechoslovakia. I n 1 968 the Johnson ad m i n i stration even gave expl icit notice that it wou ld not i nterfere with the Soviet measures.21 The West has also refrai ned from getti ng i nto more s u btle forms •

1 05 �

of i nvolvement. Yugoslavia went her own way after 1 948. Despite h e r s u bseq u e n t m e m bersh i p i n several West E u ropean i nternat i o n a l org an izat i o n s , s h e h as n ever been a channel of Western i n f l u e n c e i nto Eastern E u rope. T h at a l so goes for Romania's maverick l i ne i n fore i g n pol icy si nce the late 1 950s, w h i c h may have garnered i nfl uence for Romania i n some contexts and q uarters, but has hard l y been the wedge for the West that some expected it to become. More recently, the Reagan Adm i n istration's way of reacting to events in Poland si nce 1 981 may be a deviation from the pattern of leaving Eastern Europe to the Russians. Through the entire period , Germany and Berl i n in part i c u lar · have been i n the focus of pressu res and cou nterpressu res between east and west; pred ictably, si nce this is where the i r spheres of i nfl uence i ntersect and to some extent overlap. The d ivision of Germany reflects the degree of parity between the g reat powers i n Europe a s a whole. Superficially there has been a rough pari ty here for a long time. But a real concern is the degree of parity i n the most restricted geog raphic area of Eastern Europe. Taking the geog raph i cal d i mension i nto consideration, the power balance in Eastern Europe i s heavily lopsided in Russia's favor. Even i n Western Europe, from a g eo-strateg ic poi nt of view, the potential Soviet advantage i s hard to overlook. 22 M utual strateg ic deterrence may have rig hted the balance, but it has not kept the superpowers out of Europe. On the contrary, they have . each in ·

t h e i r o w n c h aracte r i st i c way · t ak e n h a l f of i t u n d e r t h e i r p rotec t i ve

wi ngs and i nfl uence.

The c losest neighbor tends to be the most concerned . Si nce the 1 930s conditions in Eastern Europe have never been as i m portant to a western power as they have been to Russia. The major powers of the West p u l led out of thei r engagements in Eastern Europe d u ri ng the 1 940s. Regard less of c u rrent American pol itical rhetoric, those ties are not l i kely to be reestabl i shed in any i m portant way in the foreseeabl e future. The stab i l ity of the U.S. relations h i p with Russia i s i mportant to the West probably sufficiently so to make it u n l i kely that it will be jeopard ized b y medd l i ng i n matters vital only to Russia. Part of the cu rrent tong-term asym metry, then, is due to the cont i n ued low sal ience of Eastern Europe to the West. Duri n g the 1 920s and 1 930s there may have been only one factor i n h i biting g reat-power i ntervention in smal ler East European states: The l i ke l i hood that other g reat powers wou ld fol low the act. That i n h i bition, part of the notion of the buffer complex, has not been present s i nce 1 945. H owever, it may sti l l be worth consideri ng what ·

106

has happened to the cost of i ntervention d u ri ng t h i s period. It has been suggested above that the h i g her the apparent cost of subd u i ng a small state, the lower (ce teris paribus) the propensity to i ntervene. There i s a companion to that hypothesis: The more extens ive the demands put on the smal l power by the g reat, the h i g her the l i ke l i hood of non-com p l i ance, and the g reater the need for eventual i ntervention. As Stal i n fou nd, keepi ng troops on the spot i s one way to solve that problem. But as h i s successors fou nd, the troops-and­ tanks so l ution, in add ition to bei ng expensive, tends to bri ng on a vicious c i rc le: It generates hatred i n the local popu lation, w h i c h i n t u rn i ncreases the need for troops. Relax i n g the demands on the smal l n e i g h bor i s another possibi l i ty. Si nce the end of the Stal i n era that has c learly also been attem pted by the Russians, but the trouble that fol lowed in the wake of Khrushchev's anti-Stal i n speech in 1 956 i l l u strates that even this approac h has l i m i ted u t i l ity: As long as some control i s felt t o b e mandatory t h e basic d i ffi c u lty remains. A better alternative from the Soviet viewpoint wou ld be to try to i m p rove the combi ned leg i ti macy of the local reg i mes and thei r c o m p l i a n c e w i t h Russi an w ishes, a strategy which has i n fact been p u rsued. H owever, p l a i n pol itical log i c - as wel l as post-war events in the reg ion - i nd i cate these objectives are not necessari ly compat i ble. The Soviet leaders do not seem to have fou n d any hard­ and-fast sol ution. On a cou ple of occasions i nterventions have not been forthcom i n g when one m ig ht otherw i se have expected them; perhaps s i g n i f i cantly, they have mostly concerned Poland (i n J u ne 1 956, 1 970, and 1 980-81 ). H owever, Soviet actions i n the 1 956 and 1 980-81 cases lend themse lves to confl icting i nterpretation; one version m i g ht arg ue that these were i n terventions as good as any, even i f troops were not put i nto more than sym bo l i c action. Si nce 1 948 the domestic pol itics of the East E u ropean cou ntries has basically been p layed out in the tensions between what is thought to benefit the leg itimacy of the reg i m e and the kinds of pol i cies the Russians prefer. The recent exam ple of Solidarnosc is a d ifficult challenge for the other East European reg i mes. The leaders of Poland, H u ngary and B u laria even the East Germans and Czechos l ovakians - are looking for concessions in areas other than u n ion freedom. Sti l l it remai ns an open q uestion j ust when the free trade- un i o n idea is going to come back to haunt them al l . On balance, then, t h e cost o f Soviet i ntervention i n Eastern Eu rope seems to have been i n c reas i n g steadi ly s i nce the 1 950s, but especial ly d u ri n g the 1 970s and 1 980s. O n the other hand, the ·

1 07 leg it i m acy of some kind of soc i a l i sm or "state capital ism" i n Eastern Europe may sti l l be fai rly strong i n most of the cou ntries concerned . Such trends may be work i n g slowly together towards a more stabi l ized, and a s l ightly more i ndependent, reg ion. What, then, m i g h t be an appropriate characterization of the East European borderlands during t h i s period? M uch l i ke i n the 1 920s, Eastern Europe serves as a cordon sanitaire, only this t i me with the pri mary function of protecting the USSR from Europe - and the world . But contrary to Taylor's suggestion concerni n g the '20s and '30s, the protection no longer seems to work both ways. Western Europe does not appear to have any reason to feel safer after the new territorial status quo of the early 1 970s, even if Russia does. Topp i ng it off, i ronical ly, neither side seems to actual ly have that fee l i n g of secu rity. N o doubt the over-al l level of armaments in Europe i s too h i g h to nourish fee l i ngs of m utual trust. However, as long as the Soviet U n ion needs troops in Eastern Europe to assure its own hegemony there, the side effect of i n s p i ri ng West European fear and d i strust is going to stay on and encourage new armaments efforts on the Western side. The Soviet need for i nternal control in Eastern Europe - only remotely a matter of defense - is i ndeed to blame, therefore, for the general East-West i m passe in that part of the world. CO N C L U D I N G R E M A R KS

Cou l d the East European cordon sanitaire develop i nto a buffer complex over ti me? As long as Germany remains d ivided , that wou l d seem u n l i kely. A d ivided Germany, moreover, i s Russia's most fu ndamental pre mise for the establ ished European order. No matter how neutra l i st - to the point of submissiveness - a reu n ited Germany were to be, the U .S.S.R. wou ld be u n l i kely to tolerate the creepi n g riva l ry over Eastern Europe that wou l d ensue. Europe as a whole has evolved i nto something aki n to a buffer complex after the bisection of the late 1 940s, but it has always had a soft center: The u ncontrol led portions - the neutrals Austria, F i n land, Sweden and Switzerland - have been rather smal l and weak, and not unambig uously "control led" either, com pared to the more control led portions. As a result the two superpowers confront each other d i rectly in Central Europe, i ncreasing and perpetuat i ng the tension i n the European system as a whole. The buffer effect i n t h i s kind o f system is s o weak a s t o b e almost nonex i stent. I t i s conceivable that the West European nations cou ld use the post-45 Nord i c exam ple of a buffer complex more actively in an

1 08 effort to promote Russian restraint i n Eastern Europe. That, however, wou l d req u i re a new pol i cy in Bonn . If the West Germans were to i n itiate, q uite cautiously, a somewhat more d i stant rel ationsh i p to the Un ited States, they might be able to use that as a leverage for coax i ng and nudg i n g the Russians - with j u d icious backing from other European nations, east or west . i nto a less assertive stand in the East. Bon n cou ld uti l ize this as an approach to ach ievi ng a closer rel ationsh i p with East Germany. But a s i g n i ficant buffer compl ex wou ld only evolve from that i f Germany were somehow reu n i ted and perm itted a nonal i g ned status between East and West. In concl u d i n g the d i scussion it bears repeati n g that the poi nt of the buffer concept is the i m p l ication of a buffer effect a restrai nt; on the part of the g reat powers, from intervention and medd l i ng i n countries located i n the m iddle, and a n attendant l i m itation o r even reduction of g reat power tension and conf l i ct. We have seen, h owever, t h at t h e b u ffer e ffect does n ot fo l l ow in any straig htforward man ner from the i ntermed iary position of a sma l l state or g o u p o f smal l states. I ndeed, perhaps the key lesson o f the foregoi n g exam i nation of Eastern Europe is how far the buffer effect is from be i n g a n a u t o m at i c f u n c t i on of location. ·

N O T ES 1 . Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communica tion, An Inquiry into the Founda tions of Na tionality. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: The M . l .T. Press, 1 966) pp. 75-82, 1 04-1 06.

2. By our definition, the degree of symmetry Is greater the more eq ual the power of the outside parties I nterested in the small state. The deg ree of control may more suitably be regarded as a dual factor, i n that it appl ies both to foreign pol icy and to domestic policy. Control over foreign pol icy i s p robably more common than control over domestic pol icy. Domestic control on the part of a big neig h bor is not l i kely to occu r without foreign policy control also being effected. On the other hand, foreign pol icy may often be control led without any med d l i n g i n domestic affai rs taki ng place. 3. See M i chael G. Partem, "The Buffer System In I nternational Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27 (1 983): 1 6 for a more elaborate def i n ition. On the term buffer state see, in addition to Mat h i sen and Partem, Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1 930 ed., s.v., " Buffer State, " by P. B. Potter. 4. There is a b u i lt-in ambigu ity here which the exist i n g l iteratu re does not resolve. Several positions may be d iscerned, of which three w i l l be cited. In one view the buffer effect derives from the intrinsic strength of the sma l l state; in another view it derives from the stalemate of the two oppos i n g g reat powers over their i n terest in the area between them. Partem apparently i n c l i nes to the latter view, although his use of comtemporary Cambod i a as an example makes h i s position less than crystal

1 09 c lear. Potter seems to take a t h i rd position, treati n g strength or viab i l ity as i rrelevant or u n i nteresti n g , i nasm uch as he regards a l l Eastern European nations in the 1 920s as buffer states. In our view it is d ifficu l t to regard the i ntrinsic strength of the sma l l state a s a phenomenon u n related i n the state's "extrinsic strength," or t o overlook the connection of t hese factors to the riva l ry of the sma l l state's neighborlng g reat powers and to other power. 5. Partem, p. 1 0.

6. However, the buffer Idea also often i m p l ies t hat the buffer is expandable. Thus, West German defense m i n ister Manfred Worner recently expressed satisfaction that " France no longer regards Germany merely as a buffer," A ftenposten, January 25, 1 986" . 7. Valerie Bu nce, "The Empire Strikes Back: The Transformation of the Eastern B loc from a Soviet Asset to a Soviet Liab i l ity," Interna tional Organization, 39 (1 985): 1 ·46. 8. See, e.g., Tay lor, pp. 35ff; and Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Col umbia U n iversity Press, 1 968), pp. 1 28·1 78, esp. pp. 1 40ff.

9. I reserve the term "buffer system " for the aggregate of all the g reat and small powers i nvolved i n a buffer rel ationship. I n s h ort; the most general term used here Is " buffer area", which may take the form either of a "buffer state" i f one state only (or If the small states in the Intermed iary area are considered I ndividual ly) or "buffer complex" I f we are concerned with a more complex relationsh i p as descri bed in the text.

1 0. Arne 0. Brundtland, "The Nord i c Cou ntries as an Area of Peace," In Sma ll Sta tes in In terna tional Relations, eds. August Schou and Arne 0. Brundtland (Stockholm: A lmqvist & W i kse l l , 1 971). Cf. Rothste i n , p. 31 and pp. 1 93·4.

1 1 . There Is an i mportant exception to t h is, namely if the objective is to Improve side, Kekkonen used th is poi nt to defend h i s c lose relationship with the Russians: The better the ties with Moscow, the easier it would be for F i n l and to i m p rove her relations with the west. Subseq uently N orway's Foreign M i n ister Knut Fryden l u nd used the same arguments: The better Norway's relations with the U n i ted States, the better the prospects for i mproving relations with Russia. See Knut Fryden l u n d , Lllle land hva na ? Refleksjoner on Norques utenrikspolitlske situasjon, (Oslo: Uni versitetsforlaget, 1 982). relat ions w i t h the grea t power on t h e opposln g

•

1 2. Germany did not strictly speaking col lapse, but in terms of her loss of territorial control and foreign i n f l uence the effects were the same.

1 3. The stabi l ity of that hegemony is open to debate. For the view that it is slowly moving away from hegemony see (e.g.) Dan iel N . Nelson, " B u rden Shari ng i n the Warsaw Pact," i n A ll/ance Behavior in the Warsa w Pact (Boulder: Westview Press, forthcoming 1 986). 1 4. Polish marshal! Smig iy·Rydz, as quoted by M ax J akobson, The Diplomacy of the Win ter Wa r (C a m b r i d g e : H a rvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 96 1 ) , p . 92. 1 5. Rothstei n , p. 1 40.

1 6. Taylor, pp. 37-38. Rothste i n , pp. 1 45ff. 1 7. Taylor, p. 38. See also Rothste i n , p. 228.

1 10 1 8. David Vital, The Survival of Small Sta tes. Studies in Small Power/Grea t Po wer Conflict (London: Oxford U n iversity Press 1 97 1 ) , pp. 1 4·1 7. 1 9. Vital, p. 50. Also: Jonathan Haslam, The Soviet Union and the Strugglew for Collective Security in Europe, 1 933-39 (London/New York: Macm i l lan Press/St. Martin's Press 1 984), pp. 1 9 1 - 1 92. 20. See Stephen S. Kaplan et al., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet A rmed Forces as a Political Instrument (Was h i ngton, D.C.: The Brooki ngs I nstitution, 1 981) for a comprehensive and systematic overview of Soviet uses of armed i n tervention i n Eastern Europe a n d elsewhere. 2 1 . J iri Valenta, Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1986. Ana tomy of a Decision (Balti more: The Johns Hopkins U n iversity Press, 1 979); Richard Falk, "Zone II As A World Order Construct, " In The Analysis of In terna tional Politics, Essays in Honor of Harold and Margaret Sprout, eds, J . Rosenau, V. Davis & M. East (New York: Free Press, 1 972). See also J i ri Valenta, "The Explosive Soviet Peri phery, " Foreign Policy, ( 1 983) 84-1 00. 22. This is not the m i l itary capabil ity arg u ment, which is somewhat harder to eval u ate, and where It may be easier to u nderesti mate Western potential. However, the most i m portant task of the Western position is to counter the geo-strateg ic d i sadvantage.

I g ratef u l l y acknowledge the s u p port of The Norweg ian Research Cou n c i l for Science and H u manities as well as the Department of Pol i t ical Science of The University of Kentucky. My thanks to col leagues Jens A. Christopherson , Vi ncent Davis and Arild U nderdal for usef u l comments on a previous d raft.

C H A PT E R S T H E A L BAN IAN LAN DS: CO N T I N U ITY AN D C H AN G E I N A B U F F E R R EG I O N A L BER T M. TOSCHES

The i n herent contrad iction of a buffer region is that despite the i ntention of red u c i ng the threat of d i rect confl i ct between hosti le states, i ts existence as a sphere of competitive i nfl uence often leads to serious political and m i l itary confrontations. For centu ries prior to the establishment of an i ndependent Alban ia, and, su bsequently, u p to the present ti me, the lands i nhabited by the A l ban ians in the southern Bal kans retain this characterization with i n chang i n g h i storical and political contexts. Tradition, toponym i c and other evidence suggest that the Albanian lands encompass the entire western portion of the Balkan Pen i n s u l a. H owever, w h i le this extensive territory was populated by the ancient l l lyrians, from whom the modern Albanians claim descent, a more strictly defi ned reg ion i s identified on the basis of more specific evidence of the Albanian h i storical and pol itical experience. Thi s area l ies in the center of the southern Balkans bounded on the west by a l i ne extend i ng along the river Dri na to the G u l f of Kotor and on the east by the l i ne of the Vardar and Morava rivers, and from the river Sava i n the north to the G u l f of Cori nth i n the south (Fig. 6.1 ). A considerable extent o f coast i s i nc l uded from the G u l f of Kotor to theG u l f of Cori nth fac i ng the Strait of Otranto, which l i n ks the Adriatic Sea to the central Mediterranean . The i nterior is mostly rugged and mountai nous, and except for peri pheral lowlands, such as the Adriatic coastal plai n , relatively extensive zones of low rel ief are fou nd only in the i nterior tectonic basins that form the Kosova Plai n and the Dukaj i n Bas i n . Of special 111

112 F i g . 6. 1 The Albanian Lands I n H istory

20

25

1 13 s i g n i ficance for ag ri c u l t u re and sett lement both here and throughout the western Bal kans are the n umerous l i mestone depressions (Doline, po/je) scattered throug hout the reg ion i n various sizes. Otherw ise, the many sma l l river val leys have been i m portant both for settlement and com m u n i cation withi n the rugged terra i n . They are more n u merous to the south where they are oriented toward the southeast than i n the north where they are d i rected more toward the east. Wh i l e the l ast among the Bal kan peoples to secu re their national i ndependence, the A l banians were clearly among the fi rst to occupy the reg ion, in the person of the ancient Thraco- l l lyrians. The l l lyrians d i stri buted themselves throughout the western Balkans, but there i s d ispute as to the extent of thei r i n d i genous settlement. In s u pport of A l banian claims, i t i s arg ued that this area constituted not only the reg ion of the Shku m b i n and Devo l l basi ns, the Adriatic coastlands and the d i stricts of Shkodra and Korce, but extended beyond the river Ori n to the Kosova Plain and beyond.1 Together with Albania p roper this reg ion wou ld presently i nc l ude areas of western M acedon ia, southeastern Monteneg ro and an extensive portion of southern Serbia. The cou nterpoint to this arg u ment is that these extended areas were settled by Albanians subseq uent to earl ier Slav occu pation d u ri n g a period of considerable d islocation and m i g ration. 2 Disputes over the ori g i n s of A l banian settlement aside, a broad d i s t r i b u t i o n of A l b a n i a n s i n t h e s o u t h w e s t e r n B a l k a n s i s recog n i zed t h ro u g h o u t the n i neteenth and i nto the twe n t i eth century.3 They formed a su bstantial and often com pact element wel l beyond the boundaries of present-day Al bani a: to the northeast as far as the Leskovac Bas i n and the reg ion of Nyssa (N is); to the east beyond Lake O hrid to the d istricts of Pri lep and Manast i ri (Monast i r); to the south to western Thessaly, throughout Epirus, and as far as the Gulf of Cori nth. These were the lands of the A l ba n i a n e thnicum where a cont i n u ity of A l banian sett lement s i nce l l lyrian t i m es cou l d be arg ued, but where other Bal kan peop les wou l d assert the i r own national and historic claims. Whatever the extent of the i r national territory the A l banians fou nd themselves with i n an eth n i c frontier where d i fferent cultural and pol itical c urrents converged, but the d i sti nctiveness of the A l banian element persisted. Among the I nda-European languages A l banian occu p ies an i ndependent p l ace though with considerable i n f l u e n c e from Lat i n , G reek, S l av i c a nd T u r k i s h so u rces. Unfortunately, the l i terary expression of the lang uage had to await the acceptance of a common d ialect and the adoption of a u n i fied

114

al phabet which d i d not occ u r u n t i l late i n the n i neteenth centu ry. N evertheless, language was to be the most i m portant formative element i n the development of A l banian national consciousness.4 The i m print of rel i g ion u pon the A lbanian lands was even more complex i n its res u lt. Although predom i nantly Christian u n t i l the m iddle of the fifteenth century the d ivisions in C h ristian ity were m i rrored i n the d isposition of the northern (G heg) Albanians toward Rome and the southern (Tosk) A l banians toward Constanti nople. After nearly five centu ries of pol itical and c u l t u ral dom i nation by the Ottoman E mp ire, however, the g reat majority of Albanians wou ld profess Islam. This cond ition wou ld stri k i n g ly d i fferentiate them from the su rroun d i n g Orthodox Slavs and G reeks, although the lslam ization of many Serbs and M acedonians (together with the existence of O rthodox A l ba n i ans) wou l d often b l u r the eth n i c bou ndaries.5 The fact i s , that a s lslamization spread among the A l banians, they were d i stributing themselves in more com pact fashion with i n the eth n i c frontier. Unti l the late n i neteenth cent u ry a recog n ized lack of political u n ity among the A l banians was both a d i st i n ctive featu re of their s i tu a t i o n a n d a weakness w h i c h t h e s u rrou n d i n g po l i t i c a l format i o n s sought t o exploit. The pri mary social a n d pol itical u n i t cont i n ued t o b e t h e tribe or f i s , w h i c h consisted o f o n e or more ancestral stocks which were further d i fferentiated i nto a n u m ber of extended fam i ly u n its. They were generally d i stributed in isolated terri tori al u n its and d ispe rsed sett lements i n response to the d i fficu lties of com m u n ication in the mou ntai nous terra i n and the poverty of ag ricu ltural land and resources. Althoug h this form of social and territori al organ ization m i l itated agai nst a broad national u n i ty, i t nevertheless p rovided an objective bas i s for the se l f­ government of A l banian tri bes on the i r own land .6 Wh i le provid i n g cohes i o n a n d cont i n u ity w h e n t h e overri d i n g i m perial or state system s were ex h i bi t i n g weakness or d i s i nteg ratJ o n , it a l s o suppl ied sufficient cohere nce t o resi st i n tegration with i n hostile territorial frameworks. The situation of the A lbanian lands as a crossroads and frontier of i n teraction and confl ict among various economic, c u lt u ral and pol itical i nterests has been an enduring real i ty. Even before the Christian Era the reg ion had become the canter of a commercial network l i nk i n g E u rope w i t h the eastern M ed i terranean lands. Consistently on the frontiers of i m perial control it wou ld become an arena of com petition among emergent nation states. Three d i sti nct ethn i c formations wou ld converge here with the A l banians strivi n g t o resi st t h e efforts o f t h e G reeks a n d Slavs t o encroach on their

115 national territory. The c ultural and pol itical development of the Albanian lands as a buffer zone, with i n the context of reg ional i nteraction and confl ict, represents a major chapter i n the h i storical and pol itical geography of the southwestern Balkans. T H E I M P E R IA L P E R I O D

T h e real ity o f t h e geog raph i c situation o f t h e southwestern Balkans, as the strategic l i n k between central Europe and the eastern M ed i terranean , was recog n ized by the Ottomans no less than by the Romans and Byzanti nes. Effective control was especially crucial when the area was transformed from a spearhead of expansion to a m i l itary frontier in the eig hteenth and n i neteenth centu ries. The des i g n and function of Ottoman adm i n i stration served to heig hten the antagonisms among the national ities of the A l banian lands and ensure the d ivisions among the Albanians themselves. I n the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Ottoman Empire was d ivided i nto large u n its cal led eya le ts, that were further subd ivided i nto sanjaks of varyi ng size and population. The Albanian lands were d i stri buted among at least twelve sanjaks. 7 Fo l l ow i n g a n ad m i n i st rat ive reform i n the m i d d l e of t h e n i neteenth century t h e eya le ts were rep laced b y s m a l l e r entities cal led vilayets as the f i rst order ad m i n i strative u nits (Fig. 6.2). Wh i le i ntendi ng to provide g reater recog nition of national characteristics, A l banians wou ld cont i n ue to be d i stri buted among four vilaye ts: Shkod ra, J a n i na, Manasti ri, Kosova. These were also subd ivided i nto sanjaks w h ic h, although more u n i form in size and popu l ation than previously, were smal ler and more n u merous.8 The i ntention was to ensure g reater effectiveness of ad m i n istration and contro l w h i l e m i n i m iz i n g ten d e n c i es toward g reater u n i ty among the A l banians as wel l as the other national ities. To sec u re A l ba n i a n s u p port and cooperat i o n , the Ottoman authorities encouraged the trad itional A l banian d i strust of the Slavs. From the seventeenth century a pol i cy to resettle A l banian s throughout Kosova, western M acedon i a a n d a s far a s t h e Leskovac Bas i n was vi ewed by the A l ba n i an s as an attempt to recove r ancestral lands from the Serbs as much as an Ottoman effort to create a defensive zone. Placement of Albanian v i l lages among the Serbs a n d B u l g a r i a n s c o u l d be i nte n d ed to p reven t S l av e n c roac h m e n t o n A l ba n i a n l a n d s , as m u c h as to m a i n t a i n s u rve i l lance of Serb activities for the Ottoman authorities.9

1 16 Fig. 6.2 The A l banian Lands Ottoman Adm i n istration ( 1 88 1 )

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1 17 lslamization among the A l banians served as both a support and i n strument of Ottoman ad m i n i stration. Some accepted Islam, with its assoc i ated privi leges, s i nce, as Christians, the alternative u nder Ottoman ru le was social and econom i c deprivat i o n , and most recog n i zed i n t he i r acceptance of I s l am a f u rther element of security agai nst the Slavs. But as more than two-t h i rds of the Albanian population came to accept Islam, they became more sharply d ifferentiated from the Christian Slavs and G reeks and tended to l ose t h e i r eth n i c i d e n t i ty. The s u bject n at i o n a l i t ies considered the A l ba n i ans as synonymous with ' M oslems' and 'Tu rks' and i n stru m e n t s of t he i r s u bj ug at i o n w i t h w h o m cooperation agai nst Ottoman dom i n ation was i m possible. B A L KA N N AT I O N A L I S M A N D T H E F I R ST PARTITIO N

T h e d eve l o p m e n t of n at i o n a l i sm i nvari a b l y i n vo l ves a n identification w i t h a more o r less defi ned territory.1 0 I n a reg ion of complex eth n i c and cultural diversity, such as the southwestern Balkans, national isms often arise with associ ated confl ict over ' national territory' and 'et h n i c bou ndaries' and become stead i ly more destructive and d i ff i c u l t to control. On the frontier of the d ec l i n i n g i m pe r i a l system of the Ottomans the A l b a n i a n s c o n f ro nted t h e i n c reas i n g terri tori a l n at i o n a l i s m o f t h e S l avs a n d

G reeks. In pol i t ical terms the- d ubious choice for the Albanians was between support for the Ottoman i m perial system which had m an i pu l ated t he i r sense of territori a l i ty and s u b m e rged t he i r nat ional identity, and com mon cause with emergent nation states to whom the Albanians were an i n d i st i n g u ishable part of the oppressive system of the Ottomans. First to exh i bit i ntentions for territorial expansion in the reg ion were the M ontenegri ns, eth n i c Serbs who had escaped i nto the mou ntai ns of the western Bal kans after the Ottoman conquest. The pri n c i pal i ty of Montenegro emerged as a sem i-i ndependent enclave at the southern end of the Di naric Alps at the beg i n n ing of the sixteenth centu ry. By the end of the eig hteenth century her territory i m p i nged u pon the Albanian lands i n the vic i n i ty of the Shkod ra Bas i n and i n the coastal reg ion where her territorial objectives wou l d conti n u e to be focused throug hout the n i neteenth century. While the Montenegri ns were the first to threaten the i ntegrity of the Albanian l ands, the Serbs wou ld have the g reatest i m pact upon the pol itical and territorial status of the reg ion. The focus of the

118 modern Serb state was i n the rugged and forested Sumadija d i strict south of Bel g rade - far from the core of med ieval Serbia, which had largely been abandoned by the Serbs and where the A l banian pop u l ation had cont i n ued to i ncrease. Serbia managed to expand her territory with i n a framework of cond itional autonomy, so that by 1 833 it i n c l uded most of the area of the Belgrade Pashal i k and reached the vici n i ty of N is. 1 1 Outlyi n g areas of A l banian settlement were i ncorporated and the A l banians subjected to harassment and exp u l si o n in a manner c h aracteristic of the advance i nto the A l banian lands at l ater periods. 1 2 Future expansion w i t h i n the framework of a 'Serbian Idea' was seen as an attempt to fu l fi l l h istorical goals that had been i nterru pted by the Ottoman conq uest and to i ncorporate all Serbs i nto a sing le state.13 Medieval Serbi a a n d much of northern A l ban ia were i n c l uded with i n t h e terri torial scheme. G reek pretensions toward Epirus and western Thessaly were contai ned withi n the broader framework of the " M egale ldea." 14 The f u t u re G reek state was meant to i ncorporate not o n l y eth n i c G reeks, b u t a l l H e l l e n ized i n habitants o f adjacent l a n d s . The i nc l usion of southern Alban ia cou ld be j ustified because of its O rthodox popu lation wh i le the existence of eth n i c A l banians in the G reek lands cou ld be denied. While the pol itical c i rcumstances d i d not al low for the fu l l real ization o f territorial goals a t t h e t i m e of Greek i ndependence (1 830), t h i s rationale wou ld cont i n ue to be a basis for territorial claims. The territorial ambitions of B u lgaria confl icted with those of both Serb i a and G reece and i nvolved the A l ba n i a n s of western M aced o n i a a n d southern Serb i a. A s i m i l a r ro m a n t i c concept envisaged a B u l garian state whose territory wou ld conform to the l i m its of the med ieval B u l garian empires. With i n its bou ndaries wou l d be i nc l uded all of M acedonia and a l arge area extend i n g westward beyond Lakes Prespa a n d Ohrid. After the R usso-Turkish War of 1 877-78 M onteneg ro succeeded i n g reatly enlarg i n g her territory and popu lation. The amount o f arable land was s u bstan t i a l l y i n c reased and many new tow n s were acq u i red i n c l u d i ng Podgorica, Shpuza, Tivari and U l q i n i . A smal l coastal stri p was also obtai ned that extended from U l q i n i to the mouth of the Boyana R iver. M ontenegro derived considerable economic and strateg ic val u e from these areas at the expense of A l banian territorial i n terests, w h i l e many A l banians were d i splaced and forced to reti re beyond the newly-establ ished boundary. The acq u isitions of the Serbs were more consi derable in the i r exte n t and i m pact on A l b a n i a n lands a nd po p u l at i o n . Serb i a

1 19 confi rmed her possession of the entire Leskovac Bas i n and the d i stricts of Kurs h u m l i a and Vranja together with the major center of N i s. Thousands of A lbanians who were estab l i shed in these reg ions were su bjected t o w holesale cont iscat i o n s and evictions and forced across the new i n ternational bou ndary. 1 5 The i r departure was fol lowed by a systematic colon ization of these d i stricts by the Serbs, anxious to affi rm the i r historic claim. Large n u m bers of A l banian refugees settled to the north of Prishtine and i ncreased the A l banian concentration i n Kosova.16 G reece was able to sec u re territory i n Thessaly, though except for Arta and Preveza fai led to obtai n any territorial concessions i n E p i ru s . B u l g a r i a was d e p rived o f terri tori a l g a i n s i n weste rn M acedon ia, though she would conti n ue to pursue her claims there i n com petition with G reece and Serbia. A fer 1 878 the ent i re reg ion of A lbanian settlement became a zone of transition in which pol itical control was i nsecu re and uncertai n . Territories acq u i red b y M onteneg ro a n d Serbia corresponded t o the concept of "settlement frontier" in that effective control had yet to be achieved despite the estab l i shment of de jure boundaries. 17 The re m a i n i n g large area of A l ba n i a n sett lement was a " p o l i t i ca l f ro n t i e r" i n t h at i n ternat i o n a l bo u n d aries were te m p o rary or transitional i n nat u re and effective adm i n istration was lacking. The G reeks and Serbs sought to extend their infl uence i n the contested zones through c ultural penetration as much as through m i l i t a ry c o n f r o n t at i o n w i t h t h e O t t o m a n a u t h o r i ty . A p o l i c y o f

H e l l e n izat i o n was p u rsued in southern A l ba n i a t h rou g h the establishment of G reek schools and the monopoly of the G reek Orthodox C h u rch, whi le the Serbs establ ished n umerous schools and c h u rc hes throughout Kosova and mai ntai ned two sem i naries in Prizren. 1 8 The Ottoman ad m i n istration generally acq uiesced i n these po l i c ies, partly because o f p ressu re from the E u ropean powers but most ly because i t encouraged d ivision among the A l ba n i ans and competition betwee n the Serbs and G reeks. I n essence, the reg ion was a true frontier zone o f uncertai n pol itical control o n the peri p hery of five compet i n g territorial pol i tical syste m s t h e Otto m a n E m p i re, A u s t r i a- H u n g a ry, Serb i a , Monteneg ro a n d G reece. For more than t h i rty years subseq uent to the Congress of Berl i n , t h e danger t o the i nteg rity o f t h e Albanian nation a n d territory stead i ly i ncreased . Together with the territorial pretensions of the Slavs and G reeks and the i nterference of the European powers, the i nconsistency of the Ottoman Adm i n i stration made the A l banian response to the situation extremely comp l i cated . I n itial support for ·

1 20 Ottoman authority i n the pol itical frontier was often viewed as an attem pt to p romote the broader aims of Ottoman and Austrian p o l i cy rat h e r than an effort to p reserve A l ba n i a n terri t o r i a l i ntegrity.19. Recog n izi ng the l i m i tations of u n i lateral m i l itary action for the advancement of their pol itical aims and the prevention of a further partition i ng of A lbanian territory, many Albanians emphasized an i nte l lectual response to the s ituation.2° Concerted efforts were appl ied to u n i fy the lang uage and develop a standard ized a lphabet, as wel l as to overcome the m utual suspicions and antagonisms among M oslem, Cathol i c and O rthodox Albanians. The i n c reased l i terary output of p ro m i nent expatri ate A l ba n i ans g ave form al expression to the A lbanian cause. · The d i p lomatic response cantered i n itial ly u pon a plan to create a s i n g le, autonomous A l banian vilayet by u n i t i n g the four v i l ayets of Shkoder, Kosova, J a n i n a and Monasti r. Apart from i nterferi ng with the i r territori al ambitions the Bal kan states rejected this proposal si nce it wou ld separate large n u m ber of Slavs a nd G reeks and m a i ntai n Ottoman aut hority i n the reg i o n . N o r were the Ottomans wi l l i ng to al low the p recedent which an autonomous A l banian unit wou l d establ ish. A com pletely i ndependent Albanian state as an alternative was not seriously advocated by A l banian s p o kes m e n u n t i l , left w i t h o u t o p t i o n s , t h e c reat i o n of a n i ndependent A l bania gai ned acceptance a s a means o f preservi ng at least a portion of Al ban ian national terri tory from bei n g acq u i red by the Slav states and G reece. T H E S E CO N D PART I T I O N A N D ITS A FT E R M AT H

The events o f 1 9 1 2-1 3 resu l ted i n t h e effective partition i n g o f the core of Al ban ian terri tory and pop ulation and rad ically altered the pol itical and territorial context. The appearance as wel l as the real ity of Ottoman authority d i sappeared and the reg ion was subseq uently partitioned among fou r territorial pol i tical systems. Altogether nearly two-t h i rds of A lbanian national territory wou ld be permanently separated from the new Albanian state and half of all Albanians wou ld become a pol itical m i nority d i stri buted among the su rrou nd i ng states. Henceforth the character of socia l, econom ic and poli tical deve lopment i n the A lbanian lands wou ld u n fold separate ly with i n the d isti nct adm i n istrative frameworks of the A l banian national state and those of the reg ional nation states and their successors.

121

The ex i stence of the A l banian state has always depended on ti mely support by an extrareg ional power, exped iently viewing Al ban ia as an i nstru ment to promote its own territorial, pol i t ical and economic i nterests agai nst those of reg ional states or other external powers. Such was the case when the Alban i an Provisional Government sought pol i t i cal and territorial recog n ition for an i n de p e n d e n t A l ban i a . The A l ba n i an s p roposed a state of considerable terri torial extent that wou ld i ncorporate those areas where Albanians were either preponderant or in a clear majority the old vi layets of Shkoder and Janina i n add ition to substantial portions of the former v i l ayets of M onast i r and Kosova. (Fig. 6.3). Austria- H u ngary and I taly s u pported the concept of a 'big' Albania, recognizing that "the l arger Alban i a became, the more q u ickly wou ld she establish herself as a prog ressive and prosperous State, a 'buffer' agai nst Pan-Slavism, and a 'buffer' between the two powers themselves . . . "2 1 But w h i le they opposed the efforts of the Bal kan a l l ies, s u pported by Russia and France, to red uce the coastal zone and the depth of territory to be allotted to Albania, they ac q u i esced in the an nexat i o n of s u bstantial port i o n s of A l banian national territory to the extent that their own economic and pol itical i n terests were not affected . U n t i l the Fi rst World War the confl icting strateg ic and econom ic i nterests of Austria-H u ng ary and Italy converged i n their support of A l banian i n dependence and territorial i n tegrity. Austria- H u ng ary so u g h t to f r u s t rate S l av as p i rat i o n s i n northern a n d eastern A l ban i a

to p revent the expansion of Russian infl uence i n the southwestern Bal kans, wh i le Italy opposed G reek control of southern Albania as a d i rect threat to her secu rity i n the Adriatic. At the same time both Austria- H u n g ary a n d Italy strived to p reve nt eac h other from exte nd i n g and consol idat i n g each other's i nfl uence in Albania. The pe rce p t i o n was c l early t h at the e x i stence of a c o n d i t i o n a l l y i ndependent A l ba n i an state was necessary t o preve n t f u rther i ntrusions by the Slavs and G reeks toward the Adriatic, as wel l as to red uce the threat of conflict between Italy and Austria- H u ngary themselves. After World War One Italy was i n itially thwarted in the attempt to ass ume a mandate over a l l of A l ba n i a. She assu med g reater i n f l u e n c e i n A l ba n i a aft e r 1 925 d u e l arg e l y to an expanded econom ic role which i nc l uded both loans and d i rect i nvestment for transportation and construction projects and a predomi nance i n trade relations.22 Despite efforts by the Albanian govern ment to m i t igate Ital ian i nfluence by expand i ng trade with other states and i m p rovi ng relations with Yugoslavia, Italy gradually i ncreased her

122

Fig. 6.3 Partition Of The Albanian Lands (1 91 2-1 9 1 3) 19

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1 23 po l i t i ca l and m i l i tary rol e . As Yugos l av i n terest d ec l i ned and Alban i a i ncreas i n g ly sought to assert her pol itical sovereig nty, Italy decided on d i rect action to secure her pol itical, econom ic and strateg ic objectives. With the Ital ian i nvasion and occu pation of A l ban i a in 1 939, the Albanian lands were fully partitioned and without any i ndependent national identity. I nternal u n i ty and stab i l ity was sufficiently d i fficult to achieve even w i thout the i n terference of external forces. No Albanian g overn m e n t was a b l e to ove rcome c o m p letely the local and reg ional antagonisms, often fomented and supported by fore i g n elements, unti l Ah med Zog u estab l ished h i mself a s king i n 1 928. Surpri s i n g ly, there were some successes as in the formation of a c e n t ral i zed ad m i n i st rat ive stru c t u re foc used o n T i ra n a , i m provements i n transportation a n d com m u n ication, an i m p roved financial situation and prog ress toward the systematic exploration and development of m i neral resou rces. Probably the major ach i evement of Albania d u ri ng the l n terwar Period was the assertion of her personal ity as a sovere i g n and i ndependent pol i t i c a l e n t i ty. At i n ternat i o n a l conferences and through the Leag ue of N ations articulate spokesmen eventual ly s ucceeded i n convi n c i n g the world of A l b a n i a's n at i o n a l and territorial d isti nct iveness. U n fortunately, claims to the partitioned A l banian lands in Yugoslavia and G reece were u n l i kely to gai n effect ive i nternational recogn ition and support. While m a i n t a i n i n g a c o n s i ste n t po l i t i ca l a n d terri tori a l i n te rest i n the new Albanian state after 1 9 1 2, the Slav states and G reece not only focused attention on the secu rity and functional control of the i r new i nternational bou ndaries with Al ban ia, but were also equally concerned with estab l i s h i ng firm control in those portions of t h e A l ba n i a n l a n d s w h i c h they h ad rece n t l y a n nexed . Ad m i n i strative pol i cy was desig ned to effectively i ntegrate these areas with i n new soc ial and pol itical systems toward which the A l b a n i a n p o p u l at i o n was s u s p i c i o u s and often host i l e . Con seq u e n t l y , a syste m a t i c effort to red uce separat i s t a n d i rredentist tendencies among t h e Albanians became a d i sti nctive feature of ad m i n istrative pol i cy d u ri n g the l nterwar Period. G reece h ad obta i ned a m i xed popu l at i o n of Orthodox and M oslem A l banians through the acq u isition of the southern portion of the v i l ayet of J a n i na. Consistent with a pol i cy of identifyi ng national i ty with rel ig i o n , G reece refused to recog n ize the ethn i c d isti nctiveness o f t h e O rthodox A l banians w h i le M oslem A l banians were considered as Turks. Thi s attitude of non-recog n ition tended to j u stify the virtual proscription of Albanian l i ng u istic and cultural

1 24 expressi o n as we l l as t h e repatriation or exp l us i o n of eth n i c Al ban i a n s t o Tu rkey.23At t h e same t i m e these eth no-re l i g i o u s arg uments con t i n ued t o support G reek territorial claims t o portions of southern A l ban i a with an O rthodox popu lation. The A l banians with i n the Yugoslav state were more n u merous and com pact in d istri bution than in the Albanian lands under G reek ad m i n istration. From a core in the Kosova and Dukaj i n (Metohija) Bas i n s a n d t h e adjace n t h i g h l an d s , t h ey extended i n to southeastern Montenegro and western M acedonia and remai ned n u merous but less com pact in the southern and eastern parts of Serb i a proper and central M acedo n i a. Between 1 921 and 1 948 official Yugoslav statistics i n d i cate that the A l banians mai ntai ned a consistently h i g h rate of natural population growth (over 2 percent per year com pared to a national rate of 1 .5 percent) and showed ari absol ute i ncrease of over 70 percent from 450,000 to 750,000-or from 3.7 to 4.8 percent of the total national popu lation.24 A w i d e s p read t h o u g h com pact d i stri b u t i o n of A l ba n i a n s throughout ' O l d Serbia' a n d western M acedonia is recog n ized on 1 924 census maps which show only a few Slav enclaves, while i n most com m u nes Albanians com prise at least 75 percent of the total popu l ation.25 M ost of the A l ban ians were Moslem with a smal l m i nority of Cat h o l ic s, eas i ly d i st i ng u isha ble from the l a rg e l y Orthodox Serbs, M onteneg ri ns a n d M acedonians w h o were located i n prox i m i ty to Albanian d i stricts or in m i xed settlement areas. The A l banians were m uc h too numerous and wel l estab l i shed to be i gnored or easily d i splaced . These facts notwithstand i n g , the statistics also i nd i cate a dec l i ne i n the Moslem proportion of the pop u l ation of the Kosova and Dukaj i n (Metohija) plains d u ri n g the first half of the l n terwar Period. From 1 921 - 1 931 t h i s proportion dec l i ned from 75. 1 to 68.8 percent w h i l e the Serb O rthodox popu lation increased from 21 .2 to 27.3 percent of the total in the same period .26 Th is was a d i rect resu l t of the pol i cy of i n ternal colon izat ion u nder w h i c h l arge n u m bers of Serbs and M onteneg ri ns were settled with i n Alban ian d i stricts, whi le the local Albanian Moslem populations were often forced to abandon the i r trad itional lands. The offic i al rat i o n a l e for the pol i cy of colon izat i o n was to a l levi ate the s e r i o u s arg i c u l t u ra l ove rpop u l a t i o n and low agricultural prod uctivity that characterized much of Montenegro as wel l as parts of Serbia proper and Bosnia-Hercegovi na. Lands made avai l able consisted of p u b l i c lands, parts of large estates, and

1 25 -

rec lai med lands, but also i nc luded u nused or abandoned lands resulti ng from the d isplacement of he A l banian popu l ation. The colon ization prog ram had establ i shed nearly 1 0,000 fam i l ies and 40,0000 - 50,000 persons in 'Old Serbia' by 1 930. 27 By 1 940, nearly a q uarter m i l l ion hectares of arable land had been distri buted in the d i stricts of Pee, U rosevac, Kosovska M itrovica and Prizren alone.28 Together with a standard a l l ocation of arable l and each fam i ly was provided with a residence i n a new or expanded vi l l age in which a zadruga organization prevai led, with houses aligned on straight and broad streets in contrast to the enclosed kula of the Albanians. I n the Dukaj i n Plain (Metohija) v i l l ages between Pee and Djakovica contai ned the g reatest n u m ber of coloni sts w h i le the l argest of the new vi l l ages were found i n the Kosova plai n between Vucitern and U rosevac.29 The economic goals of the program of i nternal colon ization were not ac h i eved d u e to t h e l a c k of s u ff i c i en t org a n i zat i o n a n d supervision, i n su fficient i nvestment, a n d a l i m ited appeal because whole fam i ly u nits were req u i red to partici pate.30 G reater secu rity and control i n the settlement frontier were obtai ned through the establ i shment of several thousand Serbs and M onteneg r i n s i n areas of compact Albanian settlement. But by d i sp laci ng Alban ians and otherwise exc l ud i ng them from any positive consequences of agrarian reform, i nterwar Yugoslavia m issed an opport u n ity to sti m u l ate i nteg ration and i m prove the prospect for stab i l ity and p rog ress i n t h e soc i a l a n d e c o n o m i c d eve l o p m e n t of t he A l ba n i a n m inority. Throug hout the l n terwar Period the efforts of the Yugos l av govern ment to estab l i s h effective pol i ti ca l and ad m i n i strative co n tro l w i t h i n its terri tory were i m peded by a n u m ber of c i rcumstances: reg ional d i fferences in legal and adm i n i strative t rad i t i o n s , t h e varied soc i a l a n d c u l t u ra l bac k g ro u n d of a n eth n i c a l l y d i verse pop u l at i o n , stro n g reg i o n a l contrasts i n econom i c development, and a h istory of confl icting nationa l i sms. A h i g h ly central ized pol itical and adm i n istrative system was adopted to prevent these national and regional associ ations from h i nderi ng pol itical u ni ty and threate n i n g the territorial i ntegrity of the state. U nd e r t h e Ottoman ad m i n i st rat i o n the Kosova V i l ayet had e n c o m passed a l l of O l d Serb i a ( i .e. Kosova and western M acedon i a), northern M acedon i a and the d i stricts of Novi Pazar a n d P l ev l j a , a nd c o n s i sted l arge l y of a com pact A l ba n i a n pop u l ation. Th i s territory was now extended t o i nc l ude the rest of Yugoslav (Vardar) M acedon i a, and i ts sizeable M acedcon i an and Serb popu lation, with i n the new provi nce of South Serbia, one of ·

1 26 e i g h t pro vinces estab l i shed i n the early post-war peri od . The p rovi n c i a l system was rep l aced in 1 922 w i t h a c e n t ra l i zed prefectural system based on t h i rty-th ree oblas ts which frag mented h i storic and ethn i c reg ions w h i le supposed ly conform i ng to natura l, social and econom ic cond itions. Kosovo Oblast wa s an elongated reg ion, extend i ng from the A l banian border to the vici n ity of N is, w h i c h exc l uded areas of com pact A l ba n i a n po pu l at i o n w h i l e i nc l u d i ng some Serb d i stricts.3 1 The adm i n i strative reorgan ization of 1 929 rep l aced these u n its with n i ne banovinas, which aga i n l argely avoided eth n i c a n d h i storic assoc i ations ( F i g . 6.4). The territory and pop u l at i o n of Kosova was conseq u e n t l y d ivided among the banovinas of Morava, Vardar and Zeta. The c reation of a system of supposed ly functional reg ions across eth n i c and h i storic bou ndaries was u n real istic in consideri ng that fu nctional relationsh i ps w i th i n such "rationally efficient" reg ions cou ld supplant trad itional relationsh i ps within the h i storic reg ions. Stress with i n the Yugoslav ad m i n istrative and territori al framework deve loped between two sets of f u n c t i o n a l rel a t i o n s h i ps - a soc i a l /c u l t u ra l set based o n h i storic assoc i a t i o n s , a n d a pol i tical/econom ic set based on the rationale of centralized control and defined in economic terms. Kosova with the adjacent areas of A l banian settlement represented but one reg ional su b-system with a h i stroc ial d isti nctiveness which the territori a l ad m i n i strative system of i n terwar Yugoslavia hoped to erase. U n l i ke other reg ions, however, the extreme soc i a l , cultural, and econo m i c backward ness of Kosova p reve nted the art i c u l at i o n of a reg i o n a l p o l i t i c a l response to the pol icy of centralization. At the same t i me pol itical development, as a positive movement toward the goal of wider part i c i pation and cooperation among g roups w i t h i n a territorial pol itical system , made l i ttle prog ress among the A l banians with i n the Yugoslav state. LAT E R D EV E LO P M E N TS A N D R EC E N T T R E N DS

During World War Two most of the area of compact Albanian pop u l ation in Kosova, western M aced o n i a and southeastern M o nteneg ro was u n ited with A l bania, which had been u nder Ital ian occupation and control si nce 1 939. There su bseq uently devel oped a n u m ber of resistance movements u n ited in their opposition to the Ital ians and Germans, but in conflict over the post-war d i sposition of the A l banian lands as much as over social, econom ic and pol i tical ideolog ies. Some Albanian u n its in Yugoslavia attached themselves to the Partisans u nder the leaders h i p of the Yugoslav

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