Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict 9789814380362

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.Buddhism~ft9itimation) and Conflict The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organisation in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the multi-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organisations. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The Social Issues in Southeast Asia (SISEA) programme was established at the Institute in 1986. It addresses itself to the study of the nature and dynamics of ethnicity, religions, urbanism, and population change in Southeast Asia. These issues are examined with particular attention to the implications for, and relevance to, an understanding of problems of development and of societal conflict and co-operation. SISEA is guided by a Regional Advisory Board comprising senior scholars from the various Southeast Asian countries. At the Institute, SISEA comes under the overall charge of the Director while its day-to-day running is the responsibility of the Co-ordinator.

Buddhisrrtf€ 'timation,

andCon ict

The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism

PETER A. JACKSON Thai National Curriculum and Materials Project, Canberra

I-Bm liilliillliil

Social Issues in Southeast Asia

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1989 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Cataloguing in Publication Data Jackson, Peter A. Buddhism, legitimation, and conflict : the political functions of urban Thai Buddhism. 1. Buddhism and state--Thailand. 2. Buddhism and politics. 3. Buddhism--Thailand--History. I. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) II. Title. 1989 BQ554 J14 ISBN 981-3035-20-X (soft cover) ISBN 981-3035-21-8 (hard cover) The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the author and his interpretations. do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

Typeset by The Fototype Business Printed in Singapore by Kin Keong Printing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Contents

Foreword Notes on Transliteration and Translation Chapter One: Introduction Sociological Structure of Urban Thai Buddhism Traditional Legitimatory Function of Thai Buddhism Appendix: Thai Clerical Titles and Sangha Administrative Positions

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xu

1 7 11

15

SECTION ONE: BUDDHISM AND THE THAI ELITE

Chapter Two: Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite Period of the Absolute Monarchy 1932 Revolution and Its Aftermath Rise of the Thai Middle Class Thai Politics in the 1980s

23 25 27 32 36

Contents

Vl

Chapter Three: Forms of Urban Buddhism Establishment Buddhism Prince Mongkut's Partial Religious Rationalism and Contemporary Establishment Buddhism Reformist Buddhism Reformist Buddhism as an Oppositional Force Thai Supernaturalism

40 40 43 47 53 57

Chapter Four: State Control of the Sangha in the Twentieth Century

63

Sangha Act of 1902 Sangha Act of 1941 Sangha Act of 1962 Agitation to Reform the 1962 Sangha Act Thammayut-Mahanikay Conflict Today

66 70 79 82 85

Chapter Five: Persecution of Phra Phimontham (Vimaladhamma) Bhikkhu Phra Phimontham in the 1970s and 1980s

94 103

SECTION TWO: CONTEMPORARY URBAN BUDDHIST MOVEMENTS

Chapter Six: Reformist Monks

115

Reformist Monks and the Buddhism of Dissent Phra Phutthathat (Buddhadasa) Bhikkhu Phra Panyanantha (Paiiiiananda) Bhikkhu Phra Thepwethi (Devavedhi) Bhikkhu Conservative Critics of the Reformist Monks Anan Senakhan- Phra Chayanantho Oayanando) Bhikkhu Phra Kittiwuttho (Kittivuddho) Bhikkhu

119 126 135 137 140 140 147

Contents

Chapter Seven: Phra Phothirak (Bodhiraks'a) Bhikkhu and Samnak Santi Asok

vii

159

Phothirak on Phutthathat Phothirak's Supporters Opposition to Phothirak Anan Senakhan's Criticisms of Phothirak Problem of Unofficial Buddhist Movements Chamlong Srimuang and Phothirak Appendix: Anan Senakhan's Criticisms of the Political Establishment

164 166 168 170 177 181

Chapter Eight: ~t Phra Thammakaay Movement Thammakaay Teachings Thammakaay and the Dhutanga Tradition Organisation of the Thammakaay Movement Dhammadayada Student Training Programme Thammakaay - Middle Class or Establishment? Thammakaay and Santi Asok

199 200 206 207 209 216 218

Concluding Remarks Glossary Bibliography Index

222 226 230 239

189

Foreword

Ethnic and religious issues have, in the last few decades, confounded many social analysts by refusing to disappear. The "liberal expectancy" among social analysts used to be that modernisation would blur ethnic distinctions, achievement would replace ascription and particularistic criteria, and wide-ranging communication and education systems would homogenise populations. The "radical expectancy" was that differences in religions, languages, and culture would be swallowed up, perhaps even across national boundaries by emergent class consciousness. Instead, religion and ethnicity continue to cut across and envelop almost every facet of Southeast Asian life. Indeed, if anything, such divisions in many societies have become sharper, ethnic and religious interest groups more insistent, and opposition more politicised and strident. Much of this activity seems to be increasingly played on the urban stage - and this at a time when the pace of urbanisation in Southeast Asia is increasing rapidly, to the extent that by the turn of the century, cities such as Manila, Bangkok, and Jakarta could have populations of more than 10 million each. In these settings, Southeast

Foreword

IX

Asian ethnic, religious, and linguistic complexities are likely to be even more challenging than in the past. It was therefore only natural that among other aspects of the Southeast Asian social and cultural scene, the Institute should identify the study of contemporary religion as one of its key areas of interest. Southeast Asia is after all not only home to all the major religions of the world - Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism - but the geographical spread of these is such that the bonds that bind their adherents at one and the same time defy and accentuate political and territorial divides and boundaries. The case of Islam is especially striking in this respect, as its followers are present in significant numbers in almost every Southeast Asian country, and in several of these across constraining political borders. Acting on this, a group of Southeast Asian scholars met in 1980 and proposed a project to increase our understanding of Islam in its regional context. Towards this end, two clusters were identified. The first of these was centred on the nature of Islam in the region, Islam and societal change, and Islam and education. The second concentration was to be on Islam and problems of economic development. The completion of the first cluster of research activities saw the publication of three volumes: Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, Islam and Society in Southeast Asia, and Muslim Society, Higher Education and Development in Southeast Asia. Building on the foregoing studies, work commenced on the second cluster of research, that is, "Islam and the Economic Development of Southeast Asia". The research here too is in three phases, spread over three years. They are: Islamic banking; Islam and resource mobilisation through the voluntary sector; and Islam and the role of the private sector in economic development. The project on Islam stimulated considerable interest in not only other major religions in the region, but also issues relating to ethnicity and development, another of the Institute's long-standing and primary areas of research. Moreover, the experience gained in managing the project on Islam proved valuable in terms of co-ordinating comparative research involving numerous scholars from diverse backgrounds and

X

Foreword

disciplines with the result that the Institute was encouraged not only to plan parallel projects on Buddhism and Christianity in Southeast Asia, but also to think in terms of developing a longer-term programme of research that would encompass all its projects on contemporary religions, together with those that might grow out of the Institute's interests in ethnicity, urbanism, and related areas. To facilitate this, the Institute convened a meeting in 1985 of senior Southeast Asian social scientists to discuss issues of social change in Southeast Asia, in order to identify firm areas of research and a sharper focusing of such research and associated activities. The group were unanimous in their conclusion that it was "essential and desirable" to encourage research on social issues in Southeast Asia, in particular religion, ethnicity, urbanism, and population dynamics. To allow for proper planning and incremental research, the group felt that work in these areas could be most effectively developed within the structure and support of a programme, rather than as ad hoc projects. Accordingly, it was proposed there be established a programme of research to be known as the "Social Issues in Southeast Asia (SISEA)" programme. This programme would address itself to the nature, persistence, and impact of religjons, ethnicity, urbanism, and population change in terms of their intrinsic dynamism and potential for societal conflict, coexistence or co-operation in the context of development, stability, and nation-building. SISEA would also allow for the consolidation of the various publications emanating from the Institute's work in ethnicity, religion, urbanism, and population change within a single and integrated series, "Social Issues in Southeast Asia". Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict: The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism by Dr Peter A. Jackson, who was a Research Fellow in Australian-Southeast Asian Relations at the Institute in 1987-88, is the latest addition to the series. SISEA and the preparation of Buddhism, Legitimation, and Conflict: The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism have benefited greatly from the financial support provided by the Ford Foundation and by the Federal Government of Australia. The Institute would like to record its appreciation of all such help and support and to express

Foreword

XI

the wish that the various numbers of "Social Issues in Southeast Asia" will circulate widely amongst all concerned with the social dynamics of the region. In wishing the volumes in the "Social Issues in Southeast Asia" series all the best it is clearly understood that responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in them rests exclusively with the individual authors, editors, and compilers, and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the Institute or its supporters. K.S. Sandhu Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Notes on Transliteration and Translation

The accurate transliteration of the many vowel sounds of the Thai language using the limited Roman alphabet must always involve a number of compromises, in particular, when diacritical marks are not used. However, the transliteration system used in this study, using the following principles, attempts to present as accurate a phonetic rendering of Thai terms as possible. 1. All Thai terms are transliterated phonetically and no attempt has been made to reflect the Sanskrit or Pali origins of words. Some exceptions to this principle are allowed where a nonphonetic spelling of a proper name is already well established. Where a Thai term has a clear Sanskrit or Pali origin the source term is occasionally included in parentheses after the phonetic rendering for clarity's sake, for example, Phra Phothirak (Bodhiraks'a) and Wat Mahathat (Mahadhatu). 2. The English letters or letter groups most similar in sound to Thai consonants are used wherever possible, for example, jor jaan, chor chaang, and yor yak.

Notes on Transliteration and Translation

Xlll

3. Wherever possible short vowels are written with a single letter, that is, a, e, i, o, u, y, while long vowels are written with double letters, that is, aa, ee, ii, oo, uu, yy. The exceptions are the vowels ae, or and oe ("er"), whose respective short and long forms are both transliterated in the same way because of the awkwardness of using four letters, that is, aeae, oror, oeoe, to stand for the long vowel forms. 4. For the sake of brevity, and in order to follow the already established ways of spelling certain proper names in English, long vowels are often not marked when transliterating proper names, for example, Mahathat, not Mahaathaat; Uppaseno, not Uppaseenoo. 5. Where the Thai letter yor yak is the final part of a diphthong, the English letter y is used rather than i, that is, naay (Mister), not naai; noey (butter), not noei; and so forth. The English letter y is thus used to represent the Thai vowel as in nyk (to think) and dyan (month) as well as the semi-vowel yor yak. This double usage only rarely leads to possible confusion in words such as yyyt (to stretch) or ryay (regular), but the correct representation of the letter will usually be evident from the context. Quotes translated from Thai by the author are indicated by "(T)" in the text.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Buddhism is recognised as a key social and political institution by all participants in the Thai political system. Speaking from a Thai standpoint, Somboon Suksamran observes, Buddhism is a social institution which is important in giving meaning to and being a symbol of national unity. It is a source and medium of the culture and traditions of the Thai nation. Speaking generally, Buddhism is like a root of our national existence and of the original social, cultural, and political identity of the Thai nation.(T) 1

Buddhist teachings provide an explanation of the place of human beings in the natural cosmos and the social world. Since the Sukhothai period in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries this explanation of human existence has also been used to provide a theoretical justification of the forms taken by the political institutions of Thai society. In turn, as the political legitimating function of the religion developed in the succeeding centuries, the sangha, or order of Buddhist monks, became an important social institution in its own right whose

2

Chapter One

continued existence and welfare came to be regarded as essential to the security and survival of the Thai nation as an independent political entity. Buddhist teachings have long been interpreted in Thailand as providing an explanation for the holding and use of political power. By describing the hierarchical structure of traditional Thai society as a reflection of the structure of the cosmos itself, as realised by the Lord Buddha, and by describing each person's place in the social hierarchy as being determined by the impersonal law of moral retribution or kamma, Buddhism provided a common intellectual and cultural identity for the Thai people that encouraged collective allegiance to the social and political order. Despite significant changes in the structure of the state and in the forms of political relations in the past century, Buddhism continues to fulfil its historicallegitimatory function in Thailand today. However, the interpretation of the Buddha's teachings, the religious practices of both the renunciate monks and the lay people, and the administration of the order of Buddhist monks have all been subject to a continual process of reappraisal and restructuring. This ongoing restructuring has been necessary in order to ensure that the religion's teachings and ritual expressions continue to mirror the rapidly changing social, political, and intellectual order and so maintain their important historical role as a key theoretical and ritualistic basis of the exercise of political power. This ongoing reappraisal of Thai Buddhism is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that each new political regime in the past century has attempted to restructure the organisation of the order of Buddhist monks in its political image in order to maintain a legitimatory parallelism between the symbolic religious domain and the secular power structure. At root, the changing forms and complex trends within contemporary Thai Buddhism represent attempts to uphold the traditional honoured place of the religion in Thai society by developing doctrinal interpretations and approaches to moral and meditative practice which are consonant with contemporary expectations, aspirations, and forms of working and living. The high degree of centralised control exercised by the Thai state over the teaching and administration of Buddhism in the past two

Introduction

3

centuries has succeeded in conferring the status of national ideology upon the religion. All of the competing political groups in Thailand today, excepting the Christian and Muslim minorities and the remnants of the Communist Party of Thailand, claim allegiance to Buddhism. Public discussion about the key political, social, and economic issues in contemporary Thailand is often conducted through the medium of debates about Buddhist doctrine. Debates about capitalism versus socialism/communism, authoritarianism versus democracy, the rate and form of socio-economic development, the political education of the common people, and so on are often couched in Buddhist terms. Buddhism therefore has a unique symbolic value in Thailand as a medium for expressing hopes and aspirations not only for religious salvation from suffering but also, just as importantly, for material prosperity and social and political success. In debates on contemporary issues, such as those referred to above, different sections of Thai society tend to support monks and religious movements whose interpretations of the Buddha's teachings and whose approaches to religious practice provide support for and most clearly reflect their particular secular interests. Buddhist teachings and practices, and the structure and administration of the sangha which maintains and propagates the religion, have then become foci of competition and conflict. This is because competing political groups seek to promote doctrinal interpretations and organisational forms of the sangha which symbolically support their social and political aspirations and which legitimise their claims to a place at the apex of the pyramid of political power in Thailand. While more determined by than determining of political events, Buddhism nevertheless has a fundamental impact on the conduct of Thai political life. However, this impact cannot be quantified or easily isolated. Often its only expression lies in political actors' subjective sense of security that, in following ostensibly Buddhist models, their actions, even if later proved wrong or misguided, have a validity and significance which demand the serious consideration of all other participants in the political arena. I do not argue that the Buddhist movements analysed in the

4

Chapter One

following chapters have in any sense been caused by either the political environment or specific events in Thailand's political history. However, I do maintain that the degree of popularity of different Buddhist movements among the various sections of Thai society and the history of these movements as social phenomena are related to the political purposes for which their ostensibly religious teachings and practices have been able to be used. While Buddhist doctrine can be analysed as a system of ideas, while Buddhist religious practice can be understood in terms of attempts to attain individual spiritual liberation, and while the administration of the sangha can be studied in terms of the efficient promotion of religious goals, the dramatic changes in each of these three aspects of Thai Buddhism in the past century can only be accounted for by analysing the influences on the religion which have originated from changes in the secular world. Philosophical and anthropological studies of the meaning and internal structure of Buddhist thought and practice are useful in analysing the content of the religion. However, such internalist analyses are unable to explain the transformations which have occurred in the interpretation and expression of Thai Buddhism. While a socio-political analysis cannot fully account for the individual or spiritual content of Buddhism, such an analysis can nevertheless provide an explanation of the changes in the ways that spiritual content has been expressed and approached in recent times. The key to understanding these changes lies in clearly appreciating Thai Buddhism's politicallegitimatory function, that is, the giving of meaning, significance, and authority to activity in the secular domain. In modern secular societies religion (that is, human relations with a posited source of superhuman or sacred power) and politics (that is, human competition for control over social and natural resources) in general are distinct and independent domains. This distinction is reflected in the clear disciplinary division within Western universities between the study of religious and political phenomena. However, the retention of this theoretical distinction when studying Thai political and religious life, in which notions of sacred and temporal power cannot be categorically distinguished, can lead to a failure to appreciate

Introduction

5

the significance of the real and continuing relationship between Theravada Buddhism and political activity in Thailand. Gehan Wijeyewardene has put forward the view, which he derives from Trevor Ling's 1975 study, The Buddha - Buddhist Civilisation in India and Ceylon, that Buddhism in Thailand should not be regarded as "a distinct institutional complex separate from other secular institutions". 2 Wijeyewardene argues that Buddhism influences and defines conduct in all aspects of Thai social life, not simply the specifically religious. Wijeyewardene also argues that this "sociological view" of Buddhism in Thailand, that is, an appreciation of the religion's general social and political import, is explicitly understood by Thais. He says, for the majority [of Thais], at every level of society, there can be little doubt that participation in the religious life is affirmation of membership of Thai polity and society, and that all activity, however secular it at first sight may appear, is never too far away from a religious interpretation. 3

I agree with Wijeyewardene, but wish to develop his synchronic sociological observation into an appreciation of how this socially allencompassing form of Buddhism has been established and how it is maintained. Adding to Wijeyewardene's account, I suggest that Buddhism's historical legitimating function for the Thai state, together with the increasingly intensive and extensive control of the sangha by that state and the systematic suppression of subversive expressions of the religion in the past century-and-a-half, has contributed to the unique institutional status of Buddhism in modern Thai society. The "sociological view" of Buddhism, to use Wijeyewardene's phrase, has not been a purely internal or organic development prompted by the operation of some implicit sociological principles in the teachings of the Buddha. 4 The comprehensive social expression of Buddhism has also been imposed upon Thai society because of the religion's role as the primary theoretical legitimation of the rule and domination of the political elite. The original socio-political thrust of the Buddha's teachings has been manipulated throughout recorded Thai history to

6

Chapter One

make the political structures of the Thai state and rule by various aristocratic, military and, of late, middle-class elites appear not only desirable but also natural and inevitable. This work presents case-studies of a number of significant religious developments in Thailand over the past one hundred years, relating them to the political events of the time and the legitimatory functions that they have fulfilled. The aim of this study is to demonstrate the value of a socio-political analysis of Thai Buddhism by revealing how the complex patterns of competing religious movements, teachings, and practices are structured by and reflect the conflicting political interests of the competing groups in modern Thai society. Abercrombie et al. have characterised the theoretical political functions of religions espoused by the rich and dominant as compared with religions of the poor and dominated in the following way: The privileged develop a theodicy of legitimacy which justifies their position in the class structure, whereas the disprivileged . . . require a theodicy of compensation. 5

Following Abercrombie's typology, the analysis of the legitimatory function of Thai Buddhism undertaken in the following chapters concentrates on the religious forms of the Thai elite, that is, those sections of Thai society which have the greatest access to the country's social and economic resources and which have the greatest participation in and control over the political processes. This elite includes not only the politically dominant groups such as the aristocracy and the ethnic Thai military and civilian bureaucracies, but also the economically dominant Sino-Thai commercial and business groups and the newly developed middle-class and professional groups. The elite or legitimatory form of Buddhism can also be called urban Thai Buddhism because, unlike the religion of the farming population which has historically been centred around rural village monasteries or wat, the religion of the elite is centred on the royal and other monasteries of the capital and large provincial centres. The central thesis of this study is that the recent history of urban Thai Buddhism reflects the historical development and differentiation

Introduction

7

of the Thai elite, and that conflicts within urban Buddhism reflect conflicts between competing factions of the elite. It follows from this thesis that the history of urban Thai Buddhism must be developed upon a clear understanding of the growth and differentiation the Thai elite in the past century, and this analysis is undertaken in Chapter Two. It should be emphasised that the analytical approach of this study is only applicable to those aspects of Thai Buddhism related to the exercise of political power. This study does not exhaust the content of the religious movements analysed in the following chapters but rather approaches these complex and multifaceted phenomena from one angle. Here I wish only to demonstrate that one common feature of the movements discussed below is their symbolic relationship to the exercise of political power. This analysis cannot be generalised to the phenomenon of Thai Buddhism as a whole and cannot, without significant modification, be applied to the religion of the politically disenfranchised rural and urban labouring populations. This study is thus a specific analysis of a limited but nonetheless influential group of movements and trends within Thai Buddhism. Furthermore, this study concentrates on the institutionalised systems of Buddhist thought and doctrine in Thailand, in particular, those theoretical systems which have been expressed in the written word. I am aware that this literary approach to the study of the political functions of Thai Buddhism excludes the vast body of popular nonliterary systems of religious and political thought. Nevertheless, I believe that, notwithstanding this limitation, the systematic analysis of recent Thai writings on Buddhism undertaken below has significant value, being an area which, with a few exceptions, has not been subjected to critical scrutiny within a political conceptual framework. Sociological Structure of Urban Thai Buddhism

The state-promoted image of Thai Buddhism as a united national church, uniformly adhered to, uniformly understood, and acting as a unifying national force, is by and large a fa~ade which has been created by the force of state domination and control of the sangha

8

Chapter One

administration. This fayade of unity masks real divisions within the religion which in turn reflect the social and political divisions in Thai society. There is, for example, a significant history of resistance to the domination of the sangha by the Central Thai authorities. This resistance has been variously expressed in regional religiously based revolts, in reform movements among junior monks, and in the growth of religious movements outside the formal state-imposed structure of the sangha. Some Western students of Buddhism have mistakenly accepted the state-created fayade of unity as reality. For example, Charles Keyes has said, Thailand is fortunate in being able to face the future knowing that it does not have to overcome marked communal dissent which is rooted in local and regional religious traditions or in sectarianism. Such threats to national unity which might have appeared in these guises were successfully countered nearly seventy years ago as part of the integrative revolution wrought by King Chulalongkorn. 6

When Keyes wrote the above comments in 1970 the preceding decades of authoritarian military rule had successfully quashed the expression but not the existence of dissent from the official state forms of Buddhism. However, with the intellectual explosion which followed the overthrow of the regime of Thanom Kittikachorn in October 1973, the fayade of Thai Buddhism's unity was shattered and has not been successfully reconstructed. Keyes' observations were never true but nevertheless did reflect the superficial appearance of Thai Buddhism in the 1960s and early 1970s. Since 1973, however, the divided reality of Thai Buddhism has been clearly apparent. The recent history of urban Thai Buddhism is a history of attempts by competing factions of the elite to gain control over the interpretation and administration of the key religious symbol of political legitimacy. This struggle has been waged on two fronts. The first front of conflict within Buddhism has been at the level of formal state control over the administration and functioning of the sangha. In contrast, the second front of conflict is less focused and has occurred at the level of debates on doctrinal interpretation and religious practice

Introduction

9

between competing sects and movements within the religion. This dual character of elite conflicts over Buddhism reflects the dual sociopolitical structure of urban Buddhism itself. Urban Thai Buddhism has two parallel and largely independent structures. The first structure reflects the formal relations between the state and the organisation and administration of the monkhood or sangha as codified in the state-decreed Sangha Act. This formal state-imposed and state-controlled structure is built upon a hierarchy of state-appointed senior administrative monks supported by echelons of junior monks appointed through the sangha's own internal procedures. This structure involves formalised relations between sangha and state, such as are evidenced at state-sponsored religious rituals, and is oversighted by an arm of the secular government, the Department of Religious Affairs (Krom Kaan-saasanaa) within the Ministry of Education. The second sociological structure of urban Buddhism reflects the informal systems of lay patronage of the sangha and consists of fluid and constantly changing groupings or audiences associating themselves with and sponsoring one or other individual monk or Buddhist movement. The first, official structure of urban Buddhism is imposed by state edict, from the top down, and changes in this institutional, administrative form of the religion reflect the aspirations and interests of the groups which dominate and control the political system. Changes in this formal structure have great symbolic significance, reflecting the historical struggle amongst different sections of the elite to control a key symbol of political legitimacy. In contrast, the second, informal structure develops organically, from the bottom up, as one or other monk over a period of time attracts an audience of lay supporters. Changes in this unofficial structure, as denoted by the rises and falls in the popularity of various Buddhist movements, reflect the aspirations and interests of the broad body of the lay population, both those who are politically dominant and those who are politically subordinate. Changes in the formal, state-imposed structure of Thai Buddhism thus reflect changes in the Thai political structure, while

10

Chapter One

changes in the informal system of lay audiences reflect the changing sociological structure of Thai society in general. Historically, the formal structure of Buddhism has reflected the interests of the politically dominant section of the Thai elite. In contrast, the politically disenfranchised have only been able to express their aspirations and interests through the medium of the unofficial structure of Buddhism by sponsoring monks or movements whose teachings lend support to their own social and political aspirations. As a consequence the unofficial structure of lay-sponsored Buddhist movements bears little relation to the official state-imposed administrative hierarchy of the sangha. The dual character of urban Thai Buddhism determines that this study must be undertaken in two distinct but nonetheless related sections. The first section involves an analysis of aspects of the historical development of official Buddhism, as sponsored and controlled by the state, in the past century. This history of official Buddhism concerns the long conflict between the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders of monks, which in turn is related to the state-imposed organisational structure of the sangha as codified in the three Sangha Acts of 1902, 1941, and 1962. The second section of this study of urban Buddhism involves an analysis of some of the most prominent Buddhist movements sponsored by the various factions of the Thai elite. This analysis includes a description of the history of each movement together with its teachings and practices and an account of how these elements relate to the socio-economic position of the movement's lay audience. That is, the second aspect of this study involves an analysis of the alignment of various sections of the elite with different Buddhist movements, together with an analysis of the political import and legitimatory function of each movement's ostensibly religious beliefs and practices. This study owes much to Krajaang Nanthapho's work on the internal contradictions of the Thai sangha.7 Krajaang explains the recent history of Thai Buddhism in terms of a conflict between what he calls the feudal and dictatorial forces - that is, the political and economic establishment - and the supporters of democracy - that

Introduction

11

is, the professional and middle classes. He maintains that this political conflict is mirrored in the conflict between the establishment-aligned Thammayut Order of monks and the popular Mahanikay Order, now broadly aligned with the middle class. However, while Krajaang's model is able to provide a satisfactory account of the development of urban Thai Buddhism in the period of the absolute monarchy up until 1932, his simple bipolar notion of political conflict in Thailand is unable to account for the complexities of urban Buddhism in the latter decades of the twentieth century. This is because Krajaang's analysis lacks a detailed model of the historical development and structural differentiation of the Thai elite. Nevertheless, Krajaang's basic premiss, that the history of urban Buddhism reflects the history of social conflict in Thailand, is valid and this study is indebted to his pioneering analysis. Krajaang has attempted to systematically link the concrete events of Thai political history with the history of statesangha relations and the history of the urban Buddhist movements of the elite. This present study expands and refines Krajaang's analysis by developing a more sophisticated model of the development and differentiation of the Thai elite and of the growth of conflict between competing factions of the elite. Furthermore, this study is based upon a clearer formulation of the structural division of urban Thai Buddhism into state-sponsored administrative systems and individually sponsored movements, a distinction which is implicit in Krajaang's analysis but which he does not explicitly formulate. Finally, this study makes explicit and describes in detail the legitimatory functions of the interpretations of Buddhist teaching and practice promoted by the diverse range of recent and contemporary Buddhist movements, something which Krajaang mentions but fails to develop. Traditional Legitimatory Function of Thai Buddhism

Fundamental to the legitimatory function of Thai Buddhism, both in the past and in the present, is the belief that the welfare of the country is intimately related to the welfare of the dhamma, the teaching

12

Chapter One

and practice of the Buddha's message of salvation. It is believed that the dhamma prospers when the order of monks or sangha maintains strict ascetic practice (patipatti) according to the clerical code or vinaya and accurately upholds and interprets the teachings of the Buddha (pariyatti) recorded in the scriptures of the Tipitaka. This belief in the interrelationship between the welfare of Buddhism and of the country was linked with the belief that the monarch derived his right to rule from his possession of great religious merit. As Charles Keyes has observed, Not only was the right of a man to occupy the throne legitimised in the popular mind by the idea that only a person with an exceptionally meritorious component to his kammic legacy could occupy the throne, but it was also believed that the welfare of the kingdom during a man's reign was dependent upon the degree to which he possessed a "merit" which could be shared by his subjects. 8

The king's merit and right to rule were demonstrated both by the welfare of the state and by the welfare of the sangha as measured by such criteria as the number and opulence of functioning monasteries, the strictness of monks' ascetic practices, and the demonstration of clerical erudition and scholarship in the scriptures. Thai monarchs consequently intervened in sangha affairs to ensure that the religious symbol of their right to rule was maintained: enforcing proper clerical practice among monks, promoting the scholarly study and teaching of the scriptures, and building or renovating monasteries, religious sanctuaries, and images of the Buddha. In Thai the relationship between the state and the sangha is called kaan-upatham, "sponsorship" or "patronage", and the Thai monarch's traditional religious role is termed saasanuupathamphok (sasanupatthambhaka) which, while often translated as "upholder of the faith", literally denotes a patron or sponsor of the teaching or sasana. However, the vaguely benign term "sponsorship" masks the actual control and direction of the sangha which have historically been exercised by the Thai state. The term "sponsorship'' includes all of the following state functions:

Introduction

13

1. controlling clerical practice by issuing secular edicts on monkly

conduct; 2. controlling the administration of the sangha, firstly, by legally defining and enforcing the administrative structure of the sangha and, secondly, by ensuring that monks sympathetic to and supportive of state policies fill key administrative posts; 3. maintaining the religious legitimacy of the sangha by: a. ensuring the line of succession of ordination into the sangha, and so the transfer of spiritual authority, can, at least in theory, be traced back to the Buddha; and b. ensuring the Buddhist scriptures maintained by the Thai sangha are as close as possible to the original teachings of the Buddha; and 4. building monasteries and places of religious worship and instruction and providing opportunities and encouragement for suitably qualified men to become religious experts. In maintaining and adapting Buddhism to suit its requirements in the past two centuries, the Thai state has periodically and systematically acted in all of the above areas. Indeed, the history of Theravada Buddhism in Thailand in the Bangkok period has been dominated by a gradual but ever-increasing extension of state control over the order of monks and the teaching and practice of the dhamma, exercised through ever more refined and encompassing legal guidelines and administrative procedures. In the Sukhothai and Ayutthaya periods, monarchs periodically intervened to purge the sangha and to institute strict clerical practice. However, with the accession of the first Chakri monarch to the Thai throne in 1782, this intervention was formalised in a series of legally enforceable royal edicts. Three subsequent Sangha Acts dealing with clerical conduct and administration have been enforced (1902, 1941, and 1962), and a fourth was presented to the Thai House of Representatives in 1975 but was not proceeded with after the coup of October 1976. The domain of the Buddhist sangha, or sasanacakka, is regarded as a separate and distinct "world" from the domain of political and

14

Chapter One

mundane affairs, or anacakka. The "purity" or religious strength and power of the religious domain is defined in terms of monks' renunciation of worldly attachments and their separation from mundane affairs. Buddhism is regarded as losing its "purity", and its spiritual and political legitimating authority, when it enters into too explicit a relationship with temporal affairs. Politically this religious doctrine permits the secular domain to draw its legitimacy from the spiritual purity or worldly detachment of the sangha at the same time as enforcing the separation of the Buddhist church from all matters related to the exercise of political power, so ensuring that the sangha does not become an alternative, competing power base. This risk of the politicisation of the sangha is real and has materialised at times of political crisis in Thai history, such as the military campaigns of the monk Phra Fang after the Burmese destruction of Ayutthaya in 1767 and the rise of political monks in the 1973-76 period. The sangha is a large, finely structured organisation and, while this administrative structure has been established by the Thai state in order to ensure the execution of its policies, there is always the risk that control of the organisation of the monkhood may be usurped and that the activities of the sangha may be directed against the state. Because of the intensive nature of state control of the sangha, Thai Buddhism has not historically had an independent existence apart from the state and has responded to rather than initiated social and political change. The independent exercise of authority or initiative by monks in the social or political domains has generally been regarded as subversive and has usually been forcefully suppressed. Furthermore, monks not sympathetic to state policies are structurally neutralised, being excluded from senior administrative positions within the sangha because of the value-laden nature of the selection criteria used to determine clerical promotion. In contrast, monks supportive of the regime in power receive material and financial sponsorship and career advancement in the sangha hierarchy. However, Thai Buddhism is caught in a fundamental paradox. While Buddhism is intimately linked to the exercise of political power through the state-enforced system of clerical administration,

In troduc tio n

15

the religion's legitimatory power is regarded as deriving from its "purity", defined as the separation of the sangha from the lust-tainted corruption of worldly affairs. This paradox requires the actual political position of the sangha to be obscured behind a fa~ade of worldly detachment, and for the sangha's legitimatory support of the political order to take highly ritualised forms in order to remain within the confines of acceptable Buddhist practice. This is despite the fact that the administrative hierarchy of the sangha is affected by the same conflicts and tensions that pervade Thai social and political life as a whole. The separation of the sangha from political affairs is enforced by such things as a prohibition on monks voting in elections and standing as candidates at elections. 9 The actual relations between Buddhism and politics have traditionally been denied by the Thai political authorities. Krajaang Nanthapho comments on this, saying, Political administrators have always enjoined not to mix religion and politics, but in fact they have always used religion as a political tool, but have said that [Buddhism and politics are separate] in order to prevent others claiming or seeking their own power.(T) 10

Nevertheless, monks are able to demonstrate their support for some political activities, government programmes, or commercial enterprises by such means as accepting invitations to conduct ceremonies to bless the opening of a new bank or factory, the initiation of a new government programme, and so on. APPENDIX Thai Clerical Titles and Sangha Administrative Positions

The system of clerical titles or samanasak (samanas'akti) awarded to monks of the Thai sangha and the administrative positions of the sangha organisational hierarchy are referred to extensively throughout this study and are summarised here as a reference guide.

Clerical Titles The most senior clerical titles, collectively called Phra Ratchakhana (rajagana)

16

Chapter One

or the "royal group", are awarded by the King upon the recommendation of the Department of Religious Affairs and the Mahatherasamakhom (Mahatherasamagama), or Council of Elders, the supreme governing body of the sangha. New titles are traditionally awarded annually on the King's birthday, 5 December. While clerical titles can be rescinded in cases of misconduct, titles and the privileges they confer are usually awarded for life. In descending order of seniority the various Phra Ratchakhana titles are as follows: 1.

Sangharaja or Supreme Patriarch. This is the most senior title conferred in the Thai sangha and strictly speaking is above the rank of all other Phra Ratchakhana monks. Upon the death of an incumbent this supreme title is usually awarded to the most senior (that is, the longest ordained) of the six monks of Somdet Phra Ratchakhana rank. The complete title of a non-royal Sangharaja is: Somdet Phra Ariyawongsakhatayan (Ariyavam'sagatafiana) Somdet Phra Sangharaja In the Bangkok period Sangharaja who have been closely related to the royal family have each been awarded a unique title, commonly containing such epithets as Phra Maha Samana Jau or Sangharaja Jau.

2.

Phra Ratchakhana titles of Somdet rank, also called chan supphanabat (gold plate rank). There are six titles of this rank: Somdet Somdet Somdet Somdet Somdet Somdet

3.

Phra Phra Phra Phra Phra Phra

Phutthakhosajan (Buddhaghosacariya) Phutthajan (Buddhacariya) Thirayanamuni (Dhirafianamuni) Mahawirawong (Mahaviravam'sa) Yanasangworn (Nanasam'vara) Wanarat (Vanaratna)

Phra Ratchakhana titles of Rorng Somdet (Deputy Somdet) rank, also called chan hiranyabat (silver plate rank) or chan romg jau khana (deputy group leader rank). There are twelve titles of this rank: Phra Phra Phra Phra Phra Phra Phra

Phimontham (Vimaladhamma) Thammawarodom (Dhammavarottama) Wisutthathibodi (Visuddhadhipati) Phutthaphotjanaworaphorn (Buddhavacanavarabharana) Phutthiwong(sa)muni (Buddhivam'samuni) Yanawarodom (Nanavarottama) Phrommakhunaphorn (Brahmagunabharana)

Introduction Phra Phra Phra Phra Phra

17

Phrommamuni (Brahmamuni) Thammapanyajan (Dhammapafifiacariya) Sasanasophana or Sasanasophon (S'asanasobhana) Wisutthiwongsajan (Visuddhivam'sacariya) Ubalikhunupamajan (Upaligunupamacariya)

4.

Phra Ratchakhana titles of Tham (dhamma) rank contain the term Tham as the first part of the title. There were fifteen titles of this rank in 1985. 11

5.

Phra Ratchakhana titles of Theep (deva) rank contain the term Theep as the first part of the title. There were forty-six titles of this rank in 1976. 12

6.

Phra Ratchakhana titles of Raat or Ratcha (raja) rank contain the term Ratcha as the first part of the title. There were 107 titles of this rank in 1976. 13

7.

Phra Ratchakhana titles of Saaman (samafifia) rank have no special prefix to the title. There were 313 titles of this rank in 1976. 14

Popularly, monks of Phra Ratchakhana rank are often referred to as Jau Khun. There is also a series of titles below the rank of Phra Ratchakhana collectively called Phra Khruu (gurn). The title Phra Khruu Sanyabat (limited number of titles) is awarded by the king, while the two lesser titles, Phra Khruu Saaman and Phra Khruu Thaanaanukrom (unlimited number of titles), are awarded by monks of Phra Ratchakhana rank to junior monks who show promise in one or other field of activity. The title of Maha is automatically conferred upon any monk who has passed Pali studies to the final grade of parian 9. Because the holders of various titles change over time, it is common practice to also refer to a titled monk by his lay given name and his clerical chaya or Pali name, placed within parentheses after the title in writing, in order to distinguish the various holders of the same title. Often the name of the temple at which the monk resides or of which he is the abbot is also cited to identify him even more precisely. For example, Somdet Phra Sangharaja (Juan Utthayi) of Wat Makut Somdet Phra Sangharaja (Waat Wasano) of Wat Ratchabophit.

Clerical Administrative Positions The Sangharaja also occupies the most senior administrative position in the

sangha as head of the Mahatherasamakhom or Council of Elders. The name given to this most senior administrative position held by the Sangharaja is

18

Chapter One

Sakalamahasangkhaparinayok (Sakalamahasanghaparinayaka). At various times in the Bangkok period, notably during the reigns of King Rama IV (Mongkut) and King Rama V (Chulalongkorn), a monk was appointed to administratively head the sangha but was not awarded the title of Sangharaja, which was deliberately kept vacant. However, for most of the twentieth century the supreme administrative position has been held by an incumbent Sangharaja. The various sangha administrative positions below the level of the Sakalamahasangkhaparinayok are referred to as Jau Khana (Head of Group) or Sangha Governors. There are Sangha Governors for each level of administration, that is, province, district, and so forth. The different levels of Jau Khana are as follows: 1.

Jau Khana Yai - Sangha General Governor. There are four of these positions, one for each of the four main geographical administrative regions: Hon Klaang (Central Region), Hon Nya (Northern Region), Hon Tawan Ork (Eastern Region), and Hon Tai (Southern Region). In general, only monks with titles of Somdet Phra Ratchakhana rank are appointed, by the Sangharaja, to Jau Khana Yai positions.

2.

Jau Khana Phaak - Sangha Regional Governor. There are eighteen of these positions and in general only monks of at least Phra Ratchakhana Chan Theep rank are appointed, by the Sangharaja upon the recommendation of the Mahatherasamakhom and the Jau Khana Yai.

3.

Jau KhanaJangwat - Sangha Provincial Governor. There are seventy-three of these positions and in general only monks of at least Phra Ratchakhana Chan Saaman rank are appointed, by the Sangharaja upon the recommendation of the various Jau Khana Yai and Jau Khana Phaak.

4.

The most junior administrative positions are Jau Khana Amphoe or Sangha District Governor, Jau Khana Tambon or Sangha Community Governor, and Jau Aawaat or the abbot of an individual monastery.

NOTES 1. Somboon Suksamran, Phutthasaasanaa Kap Kaan-plian-plaeng Thaang Kaan-

myang Lae Sangkhom [Buddhism and political and social change] (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 2527 [1984] ), p. 4. 2. Gehan Wijeyewardene, Place and Emotion in Northern Thai Ritual Behaviour (Bangkok: Pandora, 1986), p. 14. 3. Ibid., p. 32.

Introduction

19

4. Nevertheless, as Wijeyewardene rightly points out, the Buddha himself sought out the patronage of the political rulers of his time: The doctrine was preached [by the Buddha] to the rulers and arbiters of contemporary society and the sangha was not a religious elite concerned only with the individual salvation of its members outside this world, but the exemplars of a way of life in this world. (ibid., p. 14) 5. Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, and Brian S. Turner, The Dominant Ideology Thesis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 33. 6. Charles F. Keyes, "The Wheel and the Garuda - Buddhism and National Integration in Thailand" (Paper presented at the Symposium on Regional Integration in Northern Thailand at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Francisco, 3-5 April 1970), p. 28. 7. Krajaang Nanthapho, Mahanikay-Thammayut: Khwaam-khat-yaeng Phaay-nai Khorng Khana Song Thai [Mahanikay-Thammayut: The internal contradictions of the Thai sangha] (Nonthaburi: Samnak-phim Santitham, 2528 [1985] ). 8. Charles F. Keyes, "The Power of Merit", in Visakha Puja (Bangkok: Buddhist Association of Thailand, Phrytsaphaakhom 2516 [May 1973] ), p. 98. 9. There have been some exceptions to this. Some monks did stand for election in the 1973-76 period but were strongly criticised, and were unsuccessful at the poll. 10. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 11. 11. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Khwootaa Samanasak Song" [Quota of sangha titles], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 13 Mokaraakhom 2528 [January 1985], p. 29. 12. Somboon Suksamran, Buddhism and Politics in Thailand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 19. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid.

SECTION 0 ·N ·E BUDDHISM AND THE THAI ELITE

CHAPTER TWO

Development and Differentiat~n of the Thai Elite

The recent history of urban Buddhism can be divided into a number of periods which roughly coincide with major changes in the structure of the Thai political elite and in the patterns of conflict and alignment between its various factions. In this study the historical development of urban Thai Buddhism is analysed in terms of the changing influences upon the religion during the following six periods in Thailand's recent political history: The period which saw the beginnings of significant Western economic and cultural impact on Thailand in the reigns of King Rama III and King Rama IV, Mongkut. 1868-1910 The period during which King Rama V, Chulalongkorn, consolidated the absolute monarchy in response to the economic and political pressures generated by Thailand's increasing participation in the European colonial systems. 1830-68

Chapter Two

24

1910-32

1932-57

1957-73

1973 to present

The period of growing tension between the traditional aristocracy and the newly recruited non-aristocratic bureaucracy, which ultimately led to the revolutionary overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932. The period of elite conflict, largely under the political domination of Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, who distrusted the aristocracy and who unsuccessfully attempted to transfer control of the economy from the Chinese to the ethnic Thai bureaucracy through the imposition of state capitalism. The period of elite consolidation and reconciliation under Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who forged political and economic alliances between the bureaucracy, the aristocracy, and large Chinese commercial interests, which established a powerful alliance of interests in the modern Thai establishment. The contemporary period, characterised by the growth of an urban professional and middle class in conflict and competition with the aristocratic-bureaucraticcommercial establishment.

While the sociological structure of the Thai political and economic elite in the 1980s presents a complex pattern of alliances and conflicts between a number of factions, two broad groups or general alignments can be nevertheless be isolated. The first group can conveniently be called the establishment, and is composed of the traditional aristocracy, the senior members of the civilian, and military bureaucracies dominated by ethnic Thais, and big business interests dominated by ethnic Chinese. The second competing group can be called the Thai middle class, and consists of educated professionals, small to middle-level business interests and lower ranking military officers and civilian bureaucrats. Recent Thai political history and the history of urban Buddhism in the 1970s and 1980s have been dominated by the competition for political power between these two broad groupings.

Development and Di}Jerentiation of the Thai Elite

25

Period of the Absolute Monarchy

The origins of the present structure of the Thai elite can be traced to the signing of the Bowring Treaty with Britain in 1855. This treaty, and other treaties signed with other European powers in subsequent years, ended the Thai monarchy's historical monopoly on foreign trade and restricted the king's ability to impose duties on exports. This liberalisation of trade led to the integration of Thailand into the colonial economic system in Southeast Asia and ultimately led to a radical restructuring of the administration of the Thai state. Because of the widespread introduction of plantation and cash crop agriculture in the colonised countries of Southeast Asia in the nineteenth century, rice production dropped dramatically and severe food shortages developed in Java and other colonies as land and labour were diverted to the production of raw materials for the colonial powers. With the liberalisation of Thailand's export trade after 1855, Thai rice production became increasingly commercialised, and in the second half of the nineteenth century Thailand became an important supplier of rice to its rice-deficient colonised neighbours. The opening of the Suez Canal in the second half of the century opened another market for Thai milled rice in Europe and provided a further impetus to the commercialisation of rice production in Thailand. The Thai bureaucracy expanded rapidly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the commercial production of rice expanded into the provinces and as the Bangkok-based monarchy sought to extend and intensify its political and administrative control over the countryside. As the number of new administrative positions outstripped the number of aristocrats and traditional retainers available to fill them, non-aristocrats were increasingly trained and recruited to the Civil Service. In time, a significant non-aristocratic bureaucratic clique developed in Bangkok and the provincial centres. At the same time, reliance on Chinese traders for internal trade and as collectors of various production and consumption taxes led to increasing ethnic Chinese control of the Thai economy and to the establishment of Chinese business interests as an important economic force in the country. As Harold Crouch observes,

26

Chapter Two The aristocratic-bureaucratic elite was able to enrich itself by extracting tributes on agricultural production and trade, and thus had no interest in engaging directly in trade itself, while peasant holdings were too small for the peasants to go into trade on anything but a very small scale. In these circumstances domestic trade became dominated by the Chinese. Chinese merchants had co-operated with the Thai aristocracy in traditional foreign trade and in the nineteenth century many became tax farmers for the government. As rice became a commercial crop in the second half of the century the Chinese dominated rice trading and milling, and they also engaged in the production of other exports such as rubber, teak and tin. 1

In the late nineteenth century, in concert with the development of the infrastructure required for expanded trade and as a consequence of the expansion of commercial rice production into ever more distant provinces, and the threatening incursions of Britain and France into regions traditionally dominated by Thailand, King Chulalongkorn embarked on a programme of national political integration and administrative reform. These administrative reforms led to the replacement of the traditional regional elites by Central Thai officials and resulted in the imposition of Thai political control over the formerly semi-autonomous regions. Linked with this political integration, Chulalongkorn established the basis of a national education system to provide training for the growing number of bureaucrats required to administer the expanding state apparatus. Overall, the economic changes in the second half of the nineteenth century reinforced the political position of the monarchy and led to a more extensive and intensive form of centralised absolute rule than had previously existed in Thailand. As Yoneo Ishii remarks, The modernisation of Thailand, planned and executed by the ruling classes, had as its aim the entrenchment of their privileged position by rationalising the enforcement of their authority. 2

Buddhism played an important role in King Chulalongkorn's programme of political and economic integration. Central Thai Buddhist practices and teachings were standardised and subsequently imposed on the regional forms of the religion as a symbol of the political

Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite

27

domination of Bangkok. And in addition, Buddhist monks and monasteries provided some of the first teachers and schools for the new national education system. In this period the Thammayut Order of monks established by Prince Mongkut in the 1830s was developed as an aristocratically dominated administrative elite within the sangha. The Thammayut Order functioned to extend the monarchy's control over Buddhism in the provinces in a way similar to the Bangkok bureaucracy's extension of political and administrative control over the secular aspects of provincial life. However, in the first decades of the twentieth century the growing aspirations of the new administrative and bureaucratic groups of Thai society, created and nurtured by Chulalongkorn's policies, came into increasing conflict with the established interests of the monarchy and aristocracy. David Elliott observes, By the 1930s, the material foundation of the pre-capitalist ruling class had crumbled. Corvee labour was no longer required . . . commercial activities were completely separated from the state apparatus. . . . The ideology which helped to maintain the dominance of the King in pre-capitalist times began to fall into disrepute within the ruling class itself. The old ideology was eroded by ideologies of European origin. 3 1932 Revolution and Its Aftermath

Finally in 1932, twenty-three members of the Army, fourteen navy officers, and twenty-four civilian bureaucrats mounted a bloodless coup against the monarchy and the predominantly aristocratic senior bureaucratic elite, establishing themselves as the new political rulers of the country. However, the 1932 revolution, which abolished the absolute monarchy and established King Rama VII, Prachathipok, as a figure-head constitutional monarch, did not lead to any substantial restructuring of Thai society. Rather, the revolutionary group merely replaced the royal segment of the bureaucratic elite with the recently developed non-aristocratic bureaucracy. The period from 1932 to 1957 saw the replacement of the originally civilian-led revolutionary government by an authoritarian military

28

Chapter Two

rule under Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram. Under Phi bun Songkhram the monarchy was de-emphasised and the traditional aristocracy remained demoralised as it was increasingly stripped of its former prestige and influence. For much of this twenty-five-year period Thailand was effectively without a monarch as King Rama VIII, Ananda Mahidon, and King Rama IX, Phumiphon Adunyadet, were both children at the time of their respective accessions to the throne in 1935 and 1947, and the two child Kings spent most of World War II and the 1940s at Swiss schools. Phibun Songkhram tried to entrench the position of his military bureaucratic elite economically as well as politically by establishing state-run production monopolies in an attempt to wrest control of the economy from the ethnic Chinese. However, Phibun Songkhram's attempts to restrict the economic activities of the Chinese did not have the desired effect as many Thais, especially in the bureaucracy, established "front" companies, giving their names to Chinese businesses in exchange for profit shares and other payments. Indeed, Phibun Songkhram's policies fostered a growing interrelationship and interdependence of the Thai bureaucracy and Chinese business interests, a linkage which was openly exploited by Phibun's successor, Sarit Thanarat. During Phibun Songkhram's rule the Thammayut Order of monks and the royal forms of Buddhism fell out of favour and were regarded with suspicion by the new regime as representing potential foci of conservative pro-monarchist tendencies. In 1941 Phibun Songkhram actively sponsored the passage of a new Sangha Act which undermined the authority of the royal-aligned Thammayut Order and effectively transferred administrative control of the sangha to the popularly aligned Mahanikay Order of monks. In 1957 Phibun Songkhram was ousted in a coup led by a competing military faction composed of younger officers, including Sarit Thanarat, Praphaat Jarusathian, Thanom Kittikachorn, Prasert Ruchirawong, and Pramaan Adireksaan. This military group, initially led by Sarit and later by Thanom, dominated Thai politics for the subsequent decade-and-a-half. Chai-Anan Samudavanija notes,

Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite

29

The coup in November 1957 marked the emergence of a younger group of army officers who were more traditionalist than the 1932 coup promoters. They had not had the same degree of exposure to Western education and culture and thus were less interested in the parliamentary process. 4

The relative lack of Western influence on this group of younger army officers was reflected in their more traditional attitudes to Buddhism and to the royal form of the religion. Furthermore, the highly authoritarian and centralised nature of the new regime meant that the traditional monarchical religious ideology, which emphasised social hierarchy and the centralisation of political power, provided a more appropriate legitimatory system than the rationalist, doctrinal Buddhism which had been supported by liberals among the 1932 revolutionaries such as Pridi Phanomyong. Traditional forms of Buddhism were revived under Sarit, who in 1962 promulgated a new Sangha Act which recentralised control of the monkhood in the hands of a few stateselected appointees. In fact, Sarit re-instituted an administrative form of the sangha that King Chulalongkorn had decreed in 1902 as part of the process of national integration but which had been replaced by a democratically modelled administration under the 1941 Sangha Act. Sarit instituted a much more absolute form of military authoritarianism than had existed under Phibun Songkhram. In an effort to legitimise his regime Sarit rehabilitated the Thai monarchy and the traditional symbols of centralised authoritarian government associated with it. After the 1932 revolution the Thai military inherited, and developed, the institutional and ideological trappings of the absolutist state. This was as true of the nominally "democratic" regime of Phibun Songkhram in the 1940s and 1950s as it was of the explicitly autocratic and dictatorial regimes of Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikachorn in the 1960s and early 1970s. But despite the practical similarities between the military regimes of Phibun and Sarit, there was, nevertheless, a significant difference in the legitimatory symbolism employed by the Thai military during these two periods. The nominally "democratic" character of Phibun's rule in part resulted from the ambivalent attitude of the 1932 revolutionaries to the symbolism

30

Chapter Two

and rituals associated with the old absolutist government. This was manifested in attempts to legitimate the post-1932 government by emphasising its difference and independence from the absolute monarchy. For Phibun "democratic" terminology and political forms, often used in parallel with or even to mask quite autocratic actions, denoted "antimonarchism" rather than any real commitment to popular participation in government. Nevertheless, Phibun's commitment to "democratic" forms as a counter to monarchism did lead to some genuine structural changes, such as the democratisation of the administration of the sangha under the 1941 Sangha Act, a move taken largely in an attempt to mute the influence of the pro-monarchist Thammayut Order of monks over the sangha. However, by the time of Sarit Thanarat the military-led state was well-established and no longer needed to fear the threats of royalist counter-revolutionaries. Consequently, Sarit no longer needed to distance his regime symbolically from earlier autocratic forms of government and he dispensed completely with any pretence of democracy. It was in this context that Sarit rehabilitated the monarchy and revived monarchist symbols of authoritarianism in order to bolster his position and the political role of the Thai military. The 1957 coup group also became heavily involved in commerce. As Chai-Anan Samudavanija comments, They built up their economic base by setting up their own business firms, secured control over state enterprises and semi-government companies, and gained free shares from private firms owned mainly by Chinese merchants. 5

Making up only 10 per cent of the country's population in the mid-twentieth century, the ethnic Chinese lacked the political influence to match their economic dominance and consequently were often forced into the military-controlled patronage system established by Sarit and his group in order to promote their business activities. As Crouch comments, The Chinese businessmen therefore were at the mercy of the Thai bureaucrats for the licences, approvals, contracts and credits they needed

Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite

31

to carry out their enterprises.... The Chinese businessmen were forced to give a share in the profits of their enterprises to the bureaucrats who furnished them with the commercial facilities they required. When foreign investment increased in the 1960s and 1970s, it had to fit into the established system and this usually took the form of joint ventures with local companies in which both indigenous Thai bureaucrats and Chinese businessmen were represented. Capitalists worked within an environment determined by the bureaucrats rather than the other way around. 6

Sarit's and Thanom's rapprochement with the monarchy and senior aristocracy, and their clique's participation in Chinese-operated businesses, created a strong community of interests between the monarchy, the civilian and military bureaucracies, and the larger Chinese business interests. This powerful alignment of economic, political, bureaucratic, and traditional symbolic power has welded the strong establishment which continues to dominate Thailand politically today. As Andrew Turton observes, despite the high number of militaryled coups and revisions of the Constitution, Thailand has in fact had a high degree of institutional stability since the 1932 revolution. 7 Thailand has not experienced any formal colonialism, has had no change of dynasty since 1782, and republican and other oppositional forces have, until quite recently, remained weak and largely ineffectual. The military has dominated national politics for over half a century and political parties have been relatively weakly developed. Turton concludes, These factors have led to a weak institutional development of "civil society" and a close identification of bureaucracy, (military led) government, state, nation, monarchy and religion. This gives the state, and associated institutions, a monopoly of legitimacy rarely found to such a degree. 8

In this study the expression "Thai political establishment" is used as a convenient shorthand to denote the close identification of interests and connections between the bureaucracy, government, military, monarchy, and Buddhism described above by Turton.

32

Chapter Two

Rise of the Thai Middle Class

Up until the 1960s the small Thai middle class was by and large restricted to bureaucrats in government employment. These bureaucrats were historically ethnic Thais who after Sarit's coup in 1957 participated in the establishment's patronage system financed by Chinese business interests. The ethnic Thai bureaucracy, at least at the senior levels, has thus historically been aligned with the establishment. A significant independent middle class in competition with the establishment has only developed since the 1960s, and has a large ethnic Sino-1'hai component. In the 1960s and 1970s rapid socio-economic growth and an increase in the numbers of people undertaking tertiary education led to the development of a commercial and professional middle class distinct from the aristocratic-bureaucratic-commercial establishment. This middle class consists of some more educated middle and lower ranking bureaucrats, administrative and clerical employees in commercial and industrial enterprises, professionals such as doctors and lawyers, university lecturers, school teachers, journalists and technicians, as well as middle and small-scale businessmen. Crouch says of the Thai middle class, As beneficiaries of the process of economic development, they have reason to support the established political order but their education tends to make them more ready to evaluate government actions and their relative economic security makes them more confident in criticising government leaders. 9

Since the early 1970s the Thai middle class has entered into competition for political power with the establishment. Members of the middle class have increasingly demanded access to and control over the political system but in general have been blocked by the military bureaucracy and its aristocratic and big business supporters. As a rule, members of the middle class support the notion of political democracy as a counter-ideology to the authoritarianism of the establishment in order to press their demands for a degree of political participation commensurate with their growing economic significance. The middle

Development and Di}Jerentiation of the Thai Elite

33

class assumed some measure of power in the civilian governments between 1973 and 1976. However, this temporary assumption of power was only made possible by divisions within the military-bureaucratic establishment, divisions which had been accentuated by the collapse of the authoritarian military regime of Thanom Kittikachorn in the wake of student-led demonstrations in October 1973. This period of middle-class power did not have a strong social base and the establishment subsequently regrouped and regained political power in a military coup in October 1976. Nevertheless, since 1976 Thailand's economy has continued to grow rapidly, considerably strengthening the economic position of the middle class in its competition for power with the establishment. Furthermore, the fluidity of the political situation after the collapse of the old form of military authoritarianism in 1973 has made political patrons on the model of Sarit and Thanom more unstable and unreliable. To an extent this has undermined the strength of the Sino.:fhai business groups' commitment to the patronage relationships developed with military and civilian bureaucrats in the 1950s and 1960s. In turn, this has meant that the larger business groups have begun to stand more on their own feet in a loose alliance with the middle class in order to promote their economic and political interests. Economic factors are also weakening the old patronage system. As Crouch observes, economic efficiency is promoted in a political environment in which the government is responsive to the demands and expectations of the business community as a class rather than the requests of particular businessmen.. . . It is in the interests of the business community as a class for the rules and regulations to be applied without discrimination. 10

That is, as Thailand's economy continues to grow and more and more businesses compete for contracts and market shares, the personalitybased patronage system developed under Sarit Thanarat and his successor Thanom Kittikachorn is becoming an increasing barrier to further economic expansion. Business owners excluded from the patronage networks have become increasingly frustrated with the establishmentdominated politico-economic structure and are increasingly aligned

34

Chapter Two

with the middle class. The vocal middle-class support for "democracy" over dictatorship carries with it an implicit call for free-market operations unhindered by the patronage system, which is disparagingly called the "feudal system" (rabop sakdinaa, or rabop jau khun muun naay) and which is criticised as corrupt. The conflict between the political stances of the establishment and the middle class has been sustained by the rapid expansion of the export sector of the Thai economy in the 1980s. As Thailand's economic growth has increasingly been based on production for exports, business groups have required greater independence from state regulation and patronage networks in order to be able to take advantage of the rapid changes in the world market. Paisal Sricharatchanya, commentator for the Far Eastern Economic Review, has interpreted the results of the 1986 Thai general election as a turning point in the expansion of the political power of Thai business groups and the largely Sino.:Yhai middle class: In the general election of July 1986, after decades of sheltering behind influential military patrons and bribing the bureaucracy, Sino-Thai business groups decided to have a direct role in mainstream politics. Eighty six businessmen, many of them scions of wealthy Sino-Thai families, were elected and formed the largest professional group in the 347 member House of Representatives .... What happened after the last election was another turning point [after the 1973 student-led popular uprising]; big business interests decided it was time they had a direct say in shaping national policies. 11

Nevertheless, while there is increasing tension between the Thai middle class and the establishment, it is still the case that the Thai business community is closely tied to the holders of political power and is still heavily dependent upon official patronage. Consequently, there remains a disjuncture between the holders of economic power and politico-ideological power in Thailand. The middle classes do not effectively control the state, despite having close connections with it. The state, on the other hand, does not primarily function to serve the economic interests of the professional or business groups but rather serves the interests of the establishment, which in recent decades has been dominated by the military bureaucracy.

Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite

35

It is true that the Thai middle class does not exist as a distinct socio-economic grouping independent of the establishment. There is a high degree of social mobility within the Thai elite as a whole, as evidenced by marriages between the children of wealthy Sino-Thai businessmen and leading military and government figures, and by the complex financial interrelationships between business groups and the civilian and military bureaucracies. Furthermore, patronage relationships between senior military and political figures and businessmen, which cut across any simple formulation of class or factional distinctions, are still a prominent feature in Thailand. Nevertheless, there are sufficient tensions and points of difference between the professional and commercial groups and the establishment to speak of the existence of a marked socio-political divide within the Thai elite. Richard West, a journalist, has, perhaps simplistically, characterised this divide between the largely Sino-Thai middle class and the establishment in terms of a rivalry between, on the one hand, the countryside, the peasants, the military and the ethnic Thais, and on the other, Bangkok, big money, democracy and the Chinese. 12

Despite the tensions between the establishment and the middle class, there appears little chance of a "bourgeois revolution" in Thailand in the near future, that is, a middle-class overthrow of the political establishment. In part this is because of a high degree of ambivalence within the Thai middle class about whether its most fruitful political strategy is to seek incorporation within the establishment and the existing political and bureaucratic framework, or to seek political power in its own right within a restructured and rationalised socioeconomic system. Both competing trends, towards incorporation into the establishment and towards political independence and dominance over the establishment, are prominent within the middle class and this leads to considerable equivocation on a wide range of issues. In this fluid socio-political context key political and religious terms, such as "democracy", "the monarchy", "the people", "the state", and "Buddhism", rarely achieve clear definition and take on a range of ambiguous nuances.

36

Chapter Two

While recogmsmg the analytical limitations of the notion of an establishment-middle class divide in Thailand, the distinction nevertheless has considerable heuristic value in characterising the diverse competing and often conflicting forms of Buddhism in modern Thailand. As noted in Chapter One, this study assumes that the diverse range of urban Buddhist movements in Thailand reflects the competition between different sections of the Thai elite for political power and for access to and control over the interpretation of key symbols of political legitimation. While the following analysis, particularly in the later chapters, may at times err by overemphasising the extent of the political and religious conflicts between the establishment and the middle class, I believe that the benefits of this approach in permitting the development of a broad schematisation of contemporary urban Thai Buddhism outweigh any losses at the level of describing the details of modern Thai political life. Thai Politics in the 1980s

It should be emphasised that this study is an analysis of factionalism within the Thai elite. Despite its opposition to the establishment, the Thai middle class should not be confused with the leftist groups whose critical and radical rhetoric is sometimes adopted by middleclass intellectuals. Middle-class professionals and some pro-democratic members of the military are ultimately concerned to maintain the existing social order in Thailand. This was shown by the tacit support of many sections of the middle class for the military coup of October 1976, which, despite its violence, was regarded as necessary by many in the middle class in order to restore law and order and to avert the threatened subversion of established social relations. However, the temporary alignment of the middle class with the establishment in 1976, forged by a common perception of social crisis, soon collapsed with the restoration of what was perceived to be an acceptable level of social order, which was achieved by the suppression of radical political dissent. The factional conflict between the middle

Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite

37

class and the old guard of the military establishment soon resurfaced in early 1977 and was a significant factor contributing to the coup of October 1977, which replaced an authoritarian military clique with one more aligned to the interests of the middle class and the democratic soldiers group. The major political conflicts in Thailand in the 1980s have been between the military, bureaucratic, and commercial factions that make up the establishment and those groups aligned with the middle class. For example, some junior military officers, such as the "Young Turks" or Young Military Officers Group, have aligned themselves with the democratic ideals of the middle class in opposition to the establishment. The unsuccessful coup of April 1981, led by the Young Turks, acted out the political frustrations of the younger sections of the military and also reflected middle-class frustrations with the entrenched position of the establishment. The Young Turks opposed what they saw as the corruption of the established patronage system operating within the military, not only out of idealism but also because as junior officers they were excluded from the material and social benefits that membership of one or other patronage network conferred. The Young Turks declared that they wanted to adhere to political principles not to individuals in their political allegiances. As Chai-Anan Samudavanija observes, What the Young Military Officers Group had been trying to combat were patron-client forces, so deep-rooted and so strong in the Thai social set-up. 13

In terms of Crouch's analysis of the political requirements for economic growth cited above, the Young Turks can be regarded as having acted for the benefit of the middle class as a class (that is, acting from "principles") in opposing the patronage system which had developed under Sarit and Thanom. Like many members of the professional and new commercial groups, the Young Turks sought to establish the principle that political and social success should be based on merit and open competition within a social and political framework

38

Chapter Two

of explicitly defined rules. While the Young Turks' rebellion failed politically, their ideas and aspirations remain strong among the middle class and have increasingly become the focus of political debate in Thailand. Chai·Anan Samudavanija summarises, As long as the Young Turks remained merely a pressure group within the army bargaining for military positions and keeping close patron· client ties with senior officers, as their counterparts did in the 1950s, they would have become powerful and replaced their patrons in due course. But the forces of socio-economic changes which rapidly increased in the past decade were too strong to bear. The Young Turks, most of whom were of middle class background, had the same frustration and discontent as other underprivileged groups in society. They gradually became more concerned with larger political issues which went beyond the sphere of their corporate interests. Eventually they became antiregime and anti-establishment, and were determined to reform the decadent system of which they had long been a pillar. 14

Middle-class concerns for a rationally regulated social order, for democracy, and for career advancement as a reward for qualifications and skill rather than because of connections with influential patrons are all reflected in a number of reformist Buddhist movements which have become increasingly popular since the 1970s. Chamlong Srimuang, a former member of the Young Turks military group and present Governor of Bangkok, strongly supports an ascetic reformist Buddhist movement founded by the monk Phra Phothirak Bhikkhu, and his commitment to this movement has demonstrated the increasing political importance of middle-class forms of Buddhism. However, a number of financially well-endowed establishment-backed movements have also become increasingly popular in recent years and a propas-anda battle is now being waged between the two camps of reformist and establishment-aligned Buddhist movements. This propaganda battle reflects the continuing political conflict between the increasingly economically powerful middle class and the politically and militarilY dominant establishment. The broad characteristics of the competing establishment and middle-class forms of Buddhism are discussed in Chapter Three.

Development and Differentiation of the Thai Elite

39

NOTES 1. Harold Crouch, Economic Change, Social Structure, and the Political System in Southeast Asia - Philippine Development Compared with the Other ASEAN Countries (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 20. 2. Yoneo Ishii, Sangha, State and Society - Thai Buddhism in History, translated by Peter Hawkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), p. 149. 3. David Elliott, "The Socio-Economic Formation of Modern Thailand", in Thailand - Roots of Conflict, edited by Andrew Turton, Jonathan East, and Malcolm Caldwell (Nottingham: Spokesman, Russell Press, 1978), p. 27. 4. Chai-Anan Samudavanija, The Thai Young Turks (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), p. 13. 5. Ibid., p. 14. 6. Crouch, op. cit., p. 20. 7. Andrew Turton, "Limits of Ideological Domination and the Formation of Social Consciousness", in History and Peasant Consciousness in Southeast Asia, Senri Ethnological Series, no. 13, edited by Andrew Turton and Shigeharu Tanabe (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984), p. 21. 8. Ibid. 9. Crouch, op. cit., p. 30. 10. Ibid., p. 53. 11. Paisal Sricharatchanya, "Happy Together - Chinese in Thailand Gain Affluence and Influence but Avoid Antagonism", Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 February 1988, p. 47. 12. Richard West, "The Prosperous Diaspora - Chinese Are the Most Successful Ethnic Group in Southeast Asia", Spectator, reprinted in Canbe"a Times, 7 April 1988, p. 2. 13. Chai-Anan, op. cit., p. 37. 14. Ibid., p. 68.

CHAPTER THREE

Forms of Urban Buddhism

From the theoretical or doctrinal perspective three different forms of Thai Buddhism can be distinguished. These are the metaphysical form of Buddhism emphasised by the establishment, the rationalist and doctrinal form espoused by the middle class, and the magical and supernatural form of the religion adhered to by many peasants and urban workers. There is a significant ongoing debate in Thailand about the validity and value of each of the respective metaphysical, rationalist, and supernatural forms of Buddhism. However, because there tends to be a relationship between the form of the religion adhered to and the socio-economic position of the adherent, religious and doctrinal debates also tend to reflect the political conflicts and competition for power between antagonistic sections of Thai society. Establishment Buddhism

The interpretation of Buddhism supported and most emphasised by the Thai establishment is the traditional royal form of the religion

Forms of Urban Buddhism

41

historically used to legitimate the institution of the absolute monarchy. This religious form places particular emphasis on the notion of kamma. The notion of kamma originally denoted an ethical and psychological theory which related a person's present states of well-being or suffering to the moral or immoral quality of his or her past actions. However, this psychological theory was subsequently developed into a sociological theory that equated seniority in the social order with well-being and past morality, and correspondingly related a low social position with present suffering and immorality in previous lives. That is, in the sociological interpretation of kamma those who occupy the most senior positions in the social hierarchy are regarded as having been the most moral in previous existences and so the most deserving to rule in this life. The king was traditionally regarded as the most meritorious person in the kingdom and so was placed at the apex of the social and political order. This kammic explanation of the traditional monarchical Thai social order was also supported by a metaphysical cosmology involving a hierarchy of multi-levelled heavens and hells inhabited by gods, deities, humans, and demons, according to their respective grades of kammic merit or demerit. This cosmology was systematised in the Traiphuum Phra Ruang (Traibhumikatha), a religious text attributed to the Thai Prince Lithai of the late Sukhothai period. The Traiphuum synthesised the metaphysical sections of the Buddhist scriptures and presented a hierarchical view of the cosmic order which provided a model for the socio-political hierarchy of medieval Thai society. The Traiphuum taught that just as the gods Brahma, Ishvara, and their divine attendants or devata occupied the higher heavens because of their great merit, so the king and the aristocracy occupied the higher ranks of the temporal order because of their greater merit. With the subsequent influence of Khmer Brahmanism upon the Ayutthaya court, the Thai king also came to be endowed with a semidivine status. Brahmanical rituals symbolically linking the monarchy with the gods and devata occupying the higher levels of the cosmic order were integrated into the royal religious cults. The semi-divine status of Thai monarchs was confirmed by the establishment of cults

42

Chapter Three

and rites associated with the spirits of past kings. These cults remain popular even today and statues of revered kings such as Narai and Naresuan of Ayutthaya, Taaksin of Thonburi, and all of the Chakri kings of Bangkok continue to be objects of veneration and supplication. While temporarily out of official favour in the decades immediately following the 1932 revolution, the royal form of Buddhism was rehabilitated in the late 1950s under Sarit Thanarat and continues to be emphasised and strongly supported by both the royal and non-royal sections of the Thai establishment. Royal Buddhism provides an interpretation of the cosmic and social orders that justifies a hierarchical and pyramidal structure of political authority. While the king is no longer the effective ruler, he remains the symbolic political head of the country, and those sections of the elite supportive of a centralised and authoritarian form of government find the traditional royal form of Buddhism a convenient source of their own political legitimacy. Since the regime of Sarit Thanarat the senior echelons of the Thai military have actively sought to establish symbolic links with the monarchy and have promoted the traditional legitimatory religious cults and practices of the monarchy together with the metaphysical and hierarchical interpretation of the cosmic order contained in the Traiphuum. However, supporters of metaphysical or establishment Buddhism now rarely speak openly of the centralisation of political power that they seek to maintain. Popular antipathy towards the symbology and language of military authoritarianism and the now almost universal acceptance of democracy, however loosely defined, as the only acceptable political idiom for Thailand in the 1980s together preclude explicit references to the virtues of dictatorship or oligarchical rule. Instead, the establishment employs the indirect device of appealing to traditional symbols of political authoritarianism, in particular, the monarchy. The reason for the strength of the Thai establishment's and, in particular, the Thai military's support for the monarchy lies in the fact that the monarchy provides the most convenient acceptable symbol of the legitimacy and virtue of the centralisation of political power. Establishment support for the monarchy and the relationship

Forms of Urban Buddhism

43

between establishment forms of Buddhism and the monarchy therefore should not be read as monarchist in the traditional sense but as the manipulation of a historical symbol for quite contemporary political purposes. The relationship between metaphysical interpretations of Buddhism and the monarchy is demonstrated in the following prayer composed by Somdet Phra Yanasangworn (Nanasam'vara), abbot of the royal Thammayut monastery of Wat Bowornniwet (Pavaranives'a). The prayer, called "To Be Thai [that is, 'Free'] Forever" (Phya Khwaampen-thai Nirandorn), was composed for a royal religious ceremony in 1986: Our nation, religion, and monarch are now threatened by dangers, and I beseech the protection of the might of the Buddha, the dhamma and the sangha, of the god Brahma resplendent with grandeur and of all holy things residing in all places - please extinguish the fortune and power of those who think evil and intend to destroy the nation, the religion, and the monarchy. May this Thailand which our ancestors loved with all their hearts and protected with their lives remain secure, and prosper with the Great Chakri [kings] forevermore.(T) 1 Prince Mongkut's Partial Religious Rationalism and Contemporary Establishment Buddhism

The rationalist and anti-metaphysical aspects of Prince Mongkut's religious reforms in the 1830s and 1840s have, however, introduced a contradiction into the hierarchical Buddhist metaphysic which has been rehabilitated by the Thai establishment since the late 1950s as a convenient legitimatory symbol of its political authoritarianism. Mongkut's religious rationalism is as a consequence de-emphasised and deflected by contemporary establishment ideologues. Nevertheless, this rationalism cannot be fully repudiated because of the religious and political stature of its propounder, who in 1851 became King R.ama IV, Mongkut. Furthermore, the Thai middle class has now developed this contradiction within establishment Buddhism into a powerful critique of metaphysical accounts of Buddhist doctrine which, in turn, has formed the basis of an alternative interpretation

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Chapter Three

of the Buddha's teachings that provides theoretical support for the political aspirations of the middle class. Mongkut's religious reforms and his establishment of the Thammayut movement within the Thai sangha paralleled the beginnings of significant Western economic, political, and cultural influence in Thailand. At one level these religious innovations can be interpreted as an attempt by the nineteenth century Thai aristocracy to intellectually assimilate the impact of European culture and technology. Mongkut attempted to develop an interpretation of Buddhism consistent with Western science and learning and this attempt marked the beginning of a fundamental epistemological shift in doctrinal Thai Buddhism. The theoretical shift, which continues to have significant religious implications today, involved the rejection of the layered or hierarchical notion of truth which underlay traditional Buddhist teachings and its replacement with the notion of a single, universal, and allencompassing truth. Traditionally there has been a clear distinction between the popular lay form of Buddhism centred on the notions of kamma and ritually acquired merit, and the clerical form of the religion aiming at complete liberation or nibbana. This practical division between the lay and clerical forms of Buddhism was founded on the philosophical notion that there were various levels or forms of religious truth. Lay beliefs and practices were regarded as representing an approximation of the ultimate truth of nibbana, which provided the focus of the renunciate form of the religion. These notions of relative and absolute truth, sammatisacca and paramatthasacca, were in turn related to the idea of bun (puiiiia) or merit. Despite being ignorant and having only an imperfect understanding of reality, a worldling (putthujana) or person still infected with wisdom-obscuring cravings (taiiha) could morally improve through meritorious actions to a point where he or she was spiritually capable of appreciating ultimate truth. That is, in traditional Thai Buddhism there was no conflict between the predominantly lay religious path focused on the accumulation of kammic merit and the predominantly clerical path of seeking ultimate salvation or nibbana through meditative insight. This was because

Forms of Urban Buddhism

45

human understanding of religious truth was viewed as existing along a continuum extending from absolute ignorance (avijja) to absolute wisdom (paiiiia), a continuum along which every human being was placed according to their kammic merit and along which they could progress or regress according to their moral or immoral actions. This notion of an epistemological continuum underlay the elaborate hierarchical cosmology described in the Traiphuum of Lithai. Increasing merit was not only regarded as granting closer access to truth or salvation but also corresponded to higher positions in the cosmic order and, by extension, the social order. In this system the ideal Buddhist king, who was regarded as having the greatest merit in the land, was regarded as a cakkavattin, a future Buddha who had postponed the attainment of nibbana in order to become a world ruler. However, in Mongkut's writings are found the first Thai expressions of the alien, non-Buddhist notion of a single universal truth to which all beliefs must be linked by the strictest of logical relationships. In an epistemological system based on the notion of a single universal truth, beliefs are regarded as valid not because they approximate that truth at one or other level, as in the traditional Buddhist epistemology, but rather because they directly and unerringly represent the absolute truth. In such a system all ideas are classified as falling into one of two mutually exclusive categories - true or false. No gradations or approximations of truth are permitted. If only a single universal truth, nibbana, is accepted, the ignorant approximations to truth of the traditional beliefs of the lay person are no longer any truth at all, but rather are falsehoods to be totally rejected. However, Mongkut's religious rationalism was not complete. While he used a strictly doctrinal view of Buddhism to criticise the supernaturalism of indigenous Thai religious forms, he did not fully accept the empiricism of Western science and when he became king be. co~tinued to support the traditional metaphysical view of Buddhism 'VVJ.th Its belief in heavens and hells populated by a diverse range of SU~atural entities. That is, while Mongkut criticised local and llgio?al forms of Thai religion as superstitious, he did not radically qUestion the legitimating ideology of the monarchy and, indeed, by

46

Chapter Three

attempting to establish the religious dominance of his Thammayut movement over the Thai sangha he tried to supplant local religious traditions with his own semi-rational royal ideology. Mongkut's criticisms of local and regional religious beliefs were taken up by the royal-sponsored Thammayut Order in the reign of his son and successor, King Chulalongkorn, as part of the process of undermining the religious and cultural bases of the traditional regional elites. Chulalongkorn's administrative reforms in the late nineteenth century restructured the political form of the Thai state. The structure of a central realm focused on Bangkok surrounded by peripheral local lords exercising semi-independent authority over their subjects was abolished. Instead, under the new system all political authority flowed directly from Bangkok via centrally appointed and approved functionaries dependent upon and obedient to the single authority of the Thai King. Mongkut's partial "purification" of Buddhism, which rejected local and regional beliefs as superstitious, was used by King Chulalongkorn to support and intensify the religious focus on the royal Buddhism of the Thai court. Mongkut's reforms thus laid the theoretical groundwork for the development of a religious absolutism that paralleled and legitimated the political absolutism of the Thai monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth century by undermining the authority of religious forms which had traditionally been used to legitimate the political position of the regional elites. It should be emphasised, however, that the partial rationalism of Mongkut's interpretations of Buddhist teachings sits uneasily with the rehabilitated metaphysical beliefs now supported by the Thai political establishment. This is because Mongkut's incomplete rationalism always retains the potential of becoming a complete rationalism that debunks not only local supernatural or magical beliefs but also the hierarchical metaphysic of the royal form of Buddhism. The establishment-aligned monk, Phra Kittiwuttho (Kittivuddho) Bhikkhu, provides an example of the kind of rhetoric required to balance Mongkut's rationalist legacy with the contemporary need to validate the traditional Buddhist metaphysic. At a royal ceremony in 1986 to cast images of the protective

Forms of Urban Buddhism

47

deity of the Chakri dynasty, Phra Sayamthewathirat (Sayamdevadhiraja), Kittiwuttho maintained, The faithful worship of Phra Sayamthewathirat is something sublime and rational, because it gives us something to cling to and develops in us the will to protect the country.... If we Thais come together and chant [the Sayamthewathirat prayer] and pray with a united mind of many millions of people all over the country, then a [spiritual] power will certainly be generated. This is because it is generally accepted, both in the secular and religious spheres, that a mind which is still and in samadhi [concentration meditation] creates power, and mental power is the most important power capable of leading to success.(T) 2

It is evident that sections of the Thai establishment feel a need to validate the continuing worship of images of deities or devata in a contemporary intellectual environment increasingly dominated by rationalism and empiricism. The same book containing Kittiwuttho's address on Phra Sayamthewathirat excerpted above also contains a brief article by an ex-monk, Somkhuan Laulapha, on "The Worship of Devata in Buddhism" (Kaan-buuchaa Theewadaa nai Phra Phutthasaasanaa). This article, by someone presented as an authority on Buddhism, was included in the book in an apparent attempt to lend authority to the metaphysical beliefs and rituals associated with the Thai monarchy. After discussing a number of references to the worship of devata in he Tipitaka, Somkhuan concludes, Consequently, the worship and propitiation of devata is not forbidden by Buddhism, as demonstrated by the above-mentioned evidence from the Tipitaka.(T) 3

Reformist Buddhism

Mongkut's incomplete rationalism, which repudiated traditional Thai supernaturalism but left the metaphysical royal form of Buddhism used to legitimate the monarchy largely intact, has been criticised by those sections of the Thai elite politically opposed to the establishment,

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Chapter Three

that is, the middle-class professionals and intellectuals. Middle-class intellectuals accept not only Western rationalism but also scientific empiricism and they reject the hierarchical metaphysic of royal Buddhism as empirically unsustainable. Doctrinally, reformist Buddhists emphasise that Buddhist doctrine should conform to rational and scientific standards of analysis. The acceptance of a form of scientific empiricism leads reformists to reject both supernatural and metaphysical interpretations of Buddhist doctrine involving belief in spirits and deities, and some reformists deny even the truth of such traditional Buddhist doctrines as rebirth. Reformist Buddhism is based on a thoroughgoing demythologisation of the religion's doctrines and a reduction of metaphysical entities to psychological states of mind or to mere metaphors of states of wisdom (pafifia) or salvation (nibbana). For example, the prominent reformist monk, Phra Phutthathat (Buddhadasa) Bhikkhu, maintains that the terms "heaven" (sugati, svarga) and "hell" (dugati, naraka) in the Buddhist scriptures are merely metaphorical references to mental states of well-being and of woe. He says, "Heaven is in one's breast, hell is in one's mind, nibbana exists in the human mind. "(T) 4 Similarly, Phutthathat claims that references to gods, divine beings, and hellish beings in the scriptures do not denote actual entities in supernatural realms but rather refer to human beings who experience either "heavenly" states of well-being or "hellish" states of loss and woe. This anti-metaphysical interpretation of Buddhist doctrine is associated with an emphasis on human life in this world here and now and a religious validation of the hope for socio-economic development and material prosperity. The religious reformists justify their radically empirical view of Buddhist doctrine by rejecting most of the post-canonical commentaries on the scriptures, which support metaphysical interpretations of the doctrine, as non-Buddhist or Brahmanical accretions which obscure the true message of the Buddha. They instead turn to the original Buddhist scriptures in the Suttapitaka and Vinayapitaka and claim that only the words of the Buddha recorded in these two sets of scriptures provide an accurate picture of the true original teachings.

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The rejection of supernatural and metaphysical interpretations of the doctrine also leads reformists to reject traditional Buddhist practices based on the notion of accumulating kammic merit in order to assure a better rebirth as either a human or a divine being. Instead, the reformists emphasise individual salvation and the attainment of insightful wisdom into reality through meditation. While nibbana has traditionally been regarded as a spiritual goal appropriate for only a few renunciate monks, Phutthathat and other reformists maintain that nibbana should be a universally accessible goal for all, both monks and laity. 5 This emphasis on nibbana represents a lay assumption of religious authority and contrasts with the establishment form of Buddhism which teaches that the role of the lay person is to perform merit by supporting the efforts of renunciate monks to attain nibbana. By claiming the ultimate religious goal of nibbana as their own, lay reformists reject the traditional interpretation that the laity can attain spiritual progress only by supporting the sangha hierarchy. While the reformists do not reject the sangha as such or the tradition of renunciate ordination, they are vehemently critical of the state-imposed sangha administrative system and of the links between senior administrative monks and the establishment. By and large the middle class views the senior members of the sangha hierarchy as supporting the establishment and as being associated with oppressive forms of political authoritarianism. The reformist critic Krajaang N anthapho reflects the attitudes of many middle-class Buddhists when he says, It is appropriate and has reached the time that the [lay] people must study and understand clearly the affairs of the sangha that we bow to and worship. This is so that they can play a part in protecting what is good and beautiful and in eradicating that which is deleterious and which will have damaging consequences for both the religious and secular domains of society.(T) 6

That is, Krajaang proposes that lay people should sponsor the religion and he implies that the laity should assume the role of upathamphok or upholder of the sangha's purity, a role that was traditionally ascribed to the king.

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Chapter Three

Religious reformists place special emphasis on the notions of rational orderliness and logical consistency. Reformists insist that the interpretation of Buddhist teachings must be consistent with fundamental principles of doctrine expressed in the Buddha's discourses. Reformists also maintain that individual ethical practice should strictly accord with the moral instructions given by the Buddha in order to lead the adherent to the ultimate spiritual goal of salvation. Furthermore, the reformists demand that social and political structures should be founded on Buddhist ethical principles, which they interpret as being based on notions of equity and justice. In terms of ethical teachings, reformists emphasise strict abidance by Buddhist moral principles for both monks and laity. This is often associated with an emphasis on ethical practices which can be regarded as promoting the personal qualities valued by the middle class as requisites for commercial success in the market-place. For example, reformists extol the virtues of self discipline, systematicity, and rational orderliness. Many religious reformists emphasise a this-worldly asceticism and contentment with a frugal life-style. However, this asceticism and frugality is not associated with inactivity but is linked with calls to productive and fruitful activity in the world. For example, Phutthathat maintains that one should work for nibbana through productive material activity. He identifies work, in the sense of an occupation or career, with one of the ethical foundations of the attainment of nibbana: The word "working" [kaan-tham-ngaan] is Thai. If it were rendered into Pali it would be the word sammakammanto, which translates as "having right work". When there is "right work" then it is one component of the practices of the Noble Path [ariyamagga] for advancing towards nibbana.(T) 7

Such emphases on work and frugality can be regarded as providing a justification for the accumulation of wealth that is required for capitalist investment by middle-class entrepreneurs. That is, the doctrine of this-worldly asceticism and religiously inspired work adhered to by the reformist sections of the Thai Buddhist middle class provides a

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religious justification for the commercial activities of the new business groups who must forgo immediate consumption in order to accumulate the capital required for investment in their enterprises. Middle-class reformists are vehement critics of what they call corruption, by which they often mean the continuing operation of the traditional patronage systems in Thai society and which involve the interference of the political and bureaucratic authorities in the operation of the economy. Such criticisms of corruption represent an ethical intellectualisation of the attempts of the middle class to free the Thai economy from political intervention and the rigidities imposed by patronage networks, and so also represent an attempt to establish the economy as an independent field of activity operating according to its own internal laws of exchange. There are many parallels between the reformist Buddhism of the nascent Thai middle class and Protestantism during the Industrial Revolution in Europe. Nicholas Abercrombie notes, legitimation in early capitalism does not take the form of an overarching cultural tradition, but is instead based on reciprocal exchanges in a market. 8

Abercrombie maintains that, whereas the religions of traditional societies are based on notions of supernatural hierarchical realms that mirror the super-normal power and authority of a god-king, the religions and ethical philosophies of capitalist societies are founded on the notion of a just and equal exchange of goods and money in the market. This notion is often generalised into the idea of a social order in which equity and justice are in principle available to all. The reformist religion of the Thai middle class can thus be interpreted as representing the development of a Buddhist legitimatory system for Thai capitalism. In the past decade the reformist rejection of metaphysical establishment Buddhism, which is often disparagingly called Brahmanism, has also been developed into a political critique of centralised, authoritarian forms of government symbolised by the notion of the absolute monarch. The reformists attempt to undermine the legitimacy and

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validity of establishment Buddhism by maintaining that it is tainted with Brahmanism and other non-Buddhist elements. It is claimed that the introduction of these non-Buddhist elements was related to the efforts of the monarchy to incorporate the medieval Khmer tradition of the god-king into the legitimatory ideology of the Thai monarchy. As Krajaang Nanthapho comments, It should be noted that in the Ayutthaya period, when the Thai monarchs vanquished Nakhorn Wat [Angkor] and Nakhorn Thorn, the bringing of royal Brahmin instructors from the Khom [Khmer] royal palace to work in the Thai royal palace led to the influence of Brahmanism dominating the palace. From that time the influence of Brahmanism also spread out to dominate Buddhism in Thailand. The Thai monarchs productively used Buddhism mixed with Brahmanism as a tool in their administration. But this led to the growth of confusion and conflict in Buddhism and to the growth of titthiya [heterodox monks] and alajji [sham monks].(T) 9

The importance of Buddhism in legitimating the traditional Thai political structures centred on the monarchy lay in the fact that it provided a theoretical linking of the natural or cosmic order with the social order. The hierarchical cosmology of the Traiphuum, based on a correlation of ascending degrees of religious merit with higher levels of wisdom and heavenly existence, provided a religious reflection and justification for the social hierarchy focused on the king. However, in an ideal democratic system, such as that espoused by groups of middle-class religious reformists, the lines of power and authority are decentralised rather than centralised. In contrast to the hierarchical ordering and positioning of individuals according to their individual stores of merit, the reformist interpretations of Buddhism emphasise the direct access of the individual to the ultimate reality of nibbana. This view of the universal relevance of nibbana parallels the desire for a democratic political system in which individuals, in particular individual members of the middle class, have more direct access to the manipulation of political power. Those who emphasise the traditional supernatural and cosmological aspects of Buddhism also tend to emphasise the centralisation of power

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under either the monarch or the military. On the other hand, those who criticise supernatural Buddhism and Brahmanism, and who reject the traditional Buddhist cosmology in favour of a psychological interpretation of the spiritual truth of the religion, also tend to criticise the centralisation of political power and seek to decentralise the operation of political power and religious authority. Phonsak Jirakraisiri has shown that, at least among monks in Bangkok, there is a close relationship between the holding of rationalist views about Buddhist doctrine and support for democratic political principles. From an analysis of questionnaires completed by 439 monks in 114 different Bangkok monasteries Phonsak established that there is a statistically significant relationship between the strength of a monk's commitment to democratic principles and his approach to interpreting Buddhist doctrine. Phonsak found that those monks with the most rationalist interpretation of Buddhist teachings and who most emphasised the doctrinal significance of the original scriptures of the Tipitaka were also the strongest supporters of political democracy, both in the administration of the sangha and in the secular society. 10 On the other hand, those monks who held a more traditional or supernatural view of Buddhist teachings and who placed more emphasis on scriptural commentaries rather than the scriptures of the Tipitaka had the weakest commitment to democracy and tended to support authoritarian political structures. Reformist Buddhism as an Oppositional Force

Middle-class and intellectual Thais critical of the political dominance of the establishment have considerable difficulty in developing a politically acceptable independent symbology to support their social and political aspirations. The establishment has succeeded in defining alternative critical ideologies such as Marxism as subversive and "unThai". Furthermore, there is a constant campaign by the establishment to monopolise the only acceptable symbols of national unity and political legitimacy, namely, the nation, Buddhism, and the monarchy. As Andrew Turton has noted, the high degree of establishment

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monopolisation of the symbology and forms of political legitimacy in Thailand means that legitimate or claimable space for more democratic, alternative or participative, let alone, fundamentally oppositional ideas and forms of organisation, has been severely restricted. 11

Because of the strength of Thai lese-majeste laws, significantly often enforced by military rather than civilian courts, any public discussion of a redefinition of the political role of the monarchy is at present impossible in Thailand. In order to develop an alterative legitimatory symbology, critics of the establishment must therefore focus their efforts on reforming the only other acceptable intellectual raw materials that are available, namely, the notion of the "nation" and the interpretation of Buddhism. The notion of democracy or of political legitimacy as flowing from the participation of "the people" is one of the strongest planks of the alternative ideology of the middle class. Military regimes from the 1940s to the 1970s tried to neutralise the symbolic power of the notion of democracy by claiming that Thailand was not yet ready for full participatory democracy and that the conflicts associated with party politics undermined the Thai cultural values of compromise and harmony. Nevertheless, the democratic ideal has demonstrated considerable resiliency in Thailand, not only because of the strengthening socio-economic position of the middle class over the past two decades but also because the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, which eventually brought the military to power, was originally justified in terms of democratic ideals. The reinterpretation of Buddhist doctrine also provides an important means for the middle class to develop an alternative symbolic and theoretical system to that promoted by the establishment. Buddhism is the only indigenous Thai theoretical system capable of being formed into the ideological basis of an alternative socio-political structure. The nationalist sentiments of all Thais, of whatever political alignment, are very strong and Buddhism has great sentimental significance as a symbol of the independent cultural and political identity of the Thai

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nation. For this reason the institution of the sangha and Buddhist teachings in general often produce a greater emotive force among the Thai people than more abstract notions such as participatory democracy. In a sense, democracy, development, and many other concepts associated with modernism do not exist as independent notions in Thai intellectual life but rather assume significance by being refracted through the meaning- and value-giving medium of Buddhist doctrine. Consequently, Buddhist justifications of democracy, economic development, human rights, women's rights, and so on represent much more than mere attempts to justify the relevance of Buddhism in the modern age. Rather, such middle-class analyses represent attempts to fashion an acceptable indigenous expression of their class's political, social, and economic aspirations. As a consequence, critical intellectuals are particularly concerned to break the establishment's monopolisation of control over the system of teaching and practising Buddhism in the country. Rationalist reinterpretations of Buddhist doctrine, and calls for the decentralisation of decision-making power in the sangha therefore also tend to be associated with calls for democratic political structures based on the direct participation of the people. Religious rationalism and political democracy then are the basic elements of the alternative ideology which the Thai middle class uses to criticise the establishment and to promote its position in Thai social and political life. Furthermore, the growth of reformist lay Buddhist movements and heterodox organisations of the sangha reflect the attempts of the middle class to wrest control of the administration of the religion from the official state structure. Criticism of the sangha hierarchy is thus related to criticism of the state which controls that hierarchy. At a more general level efforts to demonstrate Buddhism's scientificity and rationality and its compatibility with Western ideas and practices also provide educated and middle-class Thais with a means of affirming their cultural and political identity and independence while still accepting foreign ideas and technologies. Consequently the religious rationalism of middle-class Buddhism is not only important as a legitimatory ideology for the political aspirations of a particular

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social class but may also act as a cultural lubricant for the process of socio-economic change. When a fundamental consistency is seen between intellectual, political, and economic modernism and the culture-defining and identity-giving institution of Buddhism then the possibility of fundamentalist reactions against development would appear to be considerably lessened. Indeed, there is a consensus in Thailand among all social groups, including the establishment, that socio-economic development and the introduction of scientific and industrial modes of production are essential for Thailand's future prosperity. No groups oppose development per se as anti-Buddhist. However, there is heated debate about the form and character that development should take and the political structures required to implement and manage social and economic change. Buddhism can thus be expected to remain politically important in Thailand so long as Thais seek to retain their cultural and political specificity and to define their national identity in Buddhist terms. However, many Thais, of both the establishment and the middle class, regard Buddhism as being threatened by the growing secularism of modern Thai society. There is a widespread concern that the breakdown of village-based social systems in the growing towns and cities is undermining the historical commitment of the Thai people to Buddhism. As Abercrombie argues, religious systems do not provide the only justification of the exercise of political authority in industrialising societies. A political regime, of whatever character, to a certain extent obtains a practical legitimation from the fact that it is able to provide a steadily increasing level of material well-being. 12 In the face of the secularist threat to Buddhism both establishment and middle-class Thais alike are committed to redefining the social role of Buddhism in order to ensure that the religion continues to attract Thais' emotional commitment. This widespread concern to establish new, more "relevant" forms of Buddhist teaching and practice represents more than an interest in upholding the spiritual insights of the Buddha, which is the justification commonly given for developing innovative approaches to the religion. Such moves also represent attempts to maintain the political legitimatory function of

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the religion in the face of rapid social and economic change. There is a widespread fear that a weakening of Thais' traditional adherence to Buddhism would undermine the legitimacy of the entire political structure and threaten social order. Both establishment and middleclass Buddhists share this fear because, despite their disagreements, both groups seek to uphold stable political institutions based on the legitimatory authority accorded by their respective interpretations of Buddhism. The Thai middle class does not seek to destroy the Thai political system but rather to realign it to promote its own economic interests. Secularism is not the only threat to the royal and reformist forms of Buddhism respectively sponsored by the Thai establishment and middle class. In recent decades there has been a marked increase in expressions of traditional Thai supernaturalism, particularly in Bangkok and the provincial cities. Both the middle class and the establishment agree that supernaturalism undermines commitment to Buddhism and poses a threat to stability and to their respective interests and aspirations. Thai Supernaturalism

Traditional Thai beliefs in spirits, mediumship, and magic are variously referred to as thyy phii, thyy phii saang theewadaa, "believing in spirits", or as saiyaasaat. This latter term denotes the systematic study and practice of what the Buddha called the "base arts", tiracchanavijja. Saiyaasaat is concerned with the manipulation of protective spiritual power focused in or through material objects such as magical amulets (phra khryang) and cloths inscribed with magic formulas (phaa yan). Saiyaasaat also refers to the propitiation of locality spirits Uau thii) associated with spirit houses (saan jau) and with spirits and ghosts associated with natural phenomena such as old trees, large rocks, caves, and termite mounds. Both reformist and establishment-aligned monks are also critical of the widespread practice of astrology (hoorasaat) and prophetic mediumship (song jau khau phii) . . . Reformist monks criticise saiyaasaat as being irrational and superStitious. Saiyaasaat's emphasis on supernatural powers and influences

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is totally at odds with the rationalist and empirical interpretation of Buddhism presented by reformist monks, who reject all magic and supernaturalism outright. However, monks aligned with the establishment are often prepared to concede a minor place to saiyaasaat within the totality of Thai Buddhism. In an article published in the Thammayut Order journal, Thammajaksu, in 1987 Phra Sophanakhanaphorn (Sobhanaganabharana) 13 says, The Buddha did not deny the reality or efficacy of saiyaasaat, but rather taught that it was not the highest spiritual refuge and could not lead to a complete release from suffering.(T) 14

Nevertheless, both reformist and establishment monks concur that Thai supernaturalism is a threat to social integrity and Buddhist values. Sophanakhanaphorn says that he is concerned that Thai society might reject religion [sasana, that is, Buddhism] and return to relying on saiyaasaat, astrology, and mediumship, until we lose ourselves and abandon the use of reason and wisdom in conducting our lives.. . . If we really reached such a point it would show that society had begun returning to the dark ages.... It would mean that people would be debased. One could not speak of protecting the nation and the religion, only of protecting oneself in order to live happily.(T) 15

That is, because of its individualistic emphasis on personal protective power, Thai supernaturalism is seen as undermining the collective or community identity nurtured by participation in the national Buddhist church. As indicated by Sophanakhanaphorn's reference to "the nation" and "religion" above, supernaturalism is regarded as weakening the authority of Buddhism and as threatening its legitimatory function in Thai society. The perceived threat of supernaturalism has long been a concern of Thai rulers, and Craig Reynolds notes that several of King Rama I's edicts on sangha conduct in the late eighteenth century included warnings against monks undertaking activities such as making magic potions and making astrological predictions. 16 Mongkut's religious reforms in the 1830s also involved a rejection of supernaturalism. This was because the inherently local or regional character of

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supernaturalism, which is often tied to specific geographical locations or natural phenomena, lacked the unifying quality required of a national ideological system capable of focusing the sentiments and loyalties of diverse communities upon the political centre of the Thai monarchy. In some respects the Brahmanical cults and metaphysical beliefs that Mongkut and subsequent Thai monarchs have continued to support differ little from the local forms of supernaturalism. Both assume a transcendent other-world intimately related to the structure and pattern of events in this world. However, the Brahmanical deities worshipped by Mongkut were universalised and devoid of restricting associations with limited geographical areas. But, just as importantly, the deities conceived within Mongkut's Buddhist theoretical framework were part of an orderly and consistently structured cosmic hierarchy. The religious function of these supernatural beings was protective and benign and human relations with them through ritual supplication were determined and predictable. In contrast, the local spirits of Thai supernaturalism are regarded as free agents independent of human control whose actions and involvement with human beings are often unpredictable. Spirits may be either protective and benign or destructive and evil and they may be offended by the seemingly innocuous actions of human beings. This disorderliness of the supernatural realm of local spirits would appear to provide a poor symbolic basis for the stable and secure administration of large and complex social systems operating over a wide geographical expanse. Dependence upon a form of supernaturalism based on possibly unpredictable and erratic spiritual injunctions or demands would ultimately subvert the systematic and orderly administration of any large social system. For this reason, both the Thai establishment and the middle class reject Thai supernaturalism, for both groups seek to impose a stable social and political order upon the country. The Thai establishment and middle class differ only on the form that that socio-political order should take and who should manage and administer it. The following quote from a discussion by Phonsak Jirakraisiri on the Purportedly democratic character of Buddhist doctrines demonstrates

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the importance attached to the socialising function of Buddhism by middle-class commentators: Buddhism helps in explaining why people should have principles, use reason, and know how to scrutinise different things without unthinkingly believing in stupid things. . . . [Buddhism helps make people] appreciate their duties as citizens, take an interest in collectively helping society, and take responsibility for the collective welfare.(T) 17

Reformist middle-class Buddhists thus reject saiyaasaat because the unpredictability of its supernatural source of power makes it unsuitable as a legitimating ideology for a highly structured technological society. In contrast, the reformist emphasis on Buddhism as mirroring the predictable laws of logic and reason and the laws of nature revealed by modern science can be regarded as providing a more suitable intellectual justification for a social structure based on complex lines of interaction and which requires predictable and determinable relations between actions and results. Reformist or doctrinal Buddhism thus provides a more amenable and politically efficacious doctrine of social control in a rapidly developing society such as Thailand. A number of observers 18 have stated that saiyaasaat and supernaturalism appear to be gaining rather than losing popularity in Bangkok and other urban centres. In December 1983 the Siam Rat weekly magazine reported that various spirit shrines in Bangkok, such as the Thaaw Mahaaphrom Shrine at the Erawan Hotel and the Saan Jau Phor Lak Myang or City Pillar Shrine near the Grand Palace, had been receiving increasing donations and public support in the previous two to three years. Siam Rat speculated that the then downturn in the economy had led to people seeking supernatural assistance for problems no other source had been able to help them with.19 A further, more fundamental reason for the increase in supernaturalism could lie in the breakdown of the village-based sense of community among the many recent rural immigrants to Bangkok, a phenomenon which reformist and establishment Buddhists alike cite as undermining traditional commitments to Buddhism. The individualistic focus of saiyaasaat may provide a more meaningful and

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immediately accessible means of expressing and dealing with the anxieties of life among the anonymous competitive masses of Bangkok than the more collective religious forms and rituals of Buddhism. With its emphasis on personal protective power and personal success in the present, saiyaasaat would also appear to have strong affinities with the practical experience of life in the commercially and socially competitive urban context. NOTES 1. Cited by Phra Udornkhanaphirak [Kittiwuttho] Bhikkhu, Ryang Phra Sayamthewathirat [About Phra Sayamthewathirat] (Bangkok: Saphaa Sangkhom Songkhror Haeng Pratheet Thai, 2529 [1986] ), p. 12. 2. Ibid., pp. 11, 15. 3. Ibid., p. 51. 4. Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Kharaawaat Tham [The lay person's dhamma] (Bangkok: Samnak-nangsyy Thammabuuchaa, 2525 [1982] ), p. 111. 5. See Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Nipphaan [Nibbana] (Bangkok: Samnaknangsyy Thammabuuchaa, 2524 [1981]), p. 25; and also by the same author, Nipphaan Nork Khamphii Aphitham [Nibbana outside the Abhidhamma scriptures] (Samut Prakaan: Ongkaan Fyyn-fuu Phra Phutthasaasanaa, n.d. ), p. 14. 6. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 5. 7. Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Kaan-ngaan Khyy Tua Khwaam-kaaw-naa [Working is progress itself] (Bangkok: Samnak-nangsyy Thammabuuchaa, 2521 [1978] ), p. 3. 8. Abercrombie et al., op. cit., p. 17. 9. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 10. 10. Phonsak Jirakraisiri, Kaan-myang Kap Phutthatham [Politics and Buddhist doctrine] (Bangkok: Suun-nangsyy Mahawitthayalay Srinakharinwirot Prasaanmit, 2529 [1986] ), p. 159. 11. Turton, op. cit., p. 21. 12. Abercrombie et al., op. cit., p. 16. 13. Phra Sophanakhanaphorn is the Assistant Secretary for Propagation of the Education Council of Mahamakut Buddhist University, which is operated by the Thammayut Order and is located at Wat Bowornniwet in Bangkok. 14. Phra Sophanakhanphorn [Rabaep Thitayano] Bhikkhu, "Saiyaasaat Kap

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15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

Chapter Three Chiiwit Chaaw Baan" [Supernaturalism and the life of the common people], Thammajaksu 70, no. 10 (Kumphaaphan 2530 [February 1987] ): 68. Ibid., p. 72. King Rama I, Sangha Law 3, 1783, pp. 177-78, cited by Craig J. Reynolds, "The Buddhist Monkhood in Nineteenth Century Thailand" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1972), p. 41. Phonsak, op. cit., p. 63. See Niels Mulder, Everyday Life in Thailand - An Interpretation (Bangkok: Duang Kamol Publishers, 1979), p. 152; and Stanley J. Tambiah, The Buddhist Saints of the Forest and the Cult of the Amulets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 344. "Aathit Thii Phaan Pai" [The past week], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 18 Thanwaakhom 2526 [December 1983], p. 2.

CHAPTER FOUR

State Control of the Sangha in the Twentieth Century

Thai Buddhism fulfils its political function of giving credence and authority to the administration of the country by symbolically reflecting the secular power structure. Historically the Thai sangha has reflected the secular political system by providing interpretations of religious doctrine which justified the patterns of social and political relations and the key policies of the government of the day. However, the sangha has also provided a direct mirror image of the state in its own internal system of administration. In the twentieth century each major shift in the Thai political system has been followed by a major state-initiated restructuring of the system of sangha administration, which has re-established a parallelism between the administrations of the secular and religious domains. After his reforms of the state bureaucracy in the 1890s King Chulalongkorn restructured the sangha administration in 1902 to provide for a parallel centralisation of bureaucratic control over all Buddhist monks in the country. Nine years after the 1932 revolution, Chulalongkorn's centralised sangha administration was replaced by a system

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of sangha councils and ministries modelled on the democratic patterns of the revolutionary government. Five years after Sarit Thanarat assumed power in a military coup in 1957 and instituted his highly centralised form of military authoritarianism the democratic sangha structure established in 1941 was abolished and replaced with a recentralised administrative system which closely resembled the structure originally established by King Chulalongkorn in 1902. Since the overthrow of Sarit's successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, in October 1973, there has been a persistent and growing but as yet unsuccessful movement to re-establish the democratic system of sangha administration implemented under Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram in 1941. These major changes in the ways in which the sangha has been internally governed have been accompanied by political conflicts and agitation among monks which have indirectly reflected the political conflicts in secular Thai society. Yoneo Ishii has made the following comments on the three Sangha Acts promulgated in this century: The consequences of the 1902 Sangha Act were the development of a national Buddhist ecclesia in Thailand and the further use of Buddhism to bolster the polity.... Even though in 1941 and 1962 the law was twice revised, in essence it has remained unchanged; neither amendment was more than a modus vivendi set up to accommodate the original act to altered circumstances. 1

While I agree with Ishii's interpretation of the political functions of the various Sangha Acts, I disagree with his claim that the 1941 and 1962 Acts represented mere minor variations of the original1902 Act. Rather, the two subsequent Acts represented significant changes in the administration of the monkhood, which respectively paralleled the secular political transformations from absolute monarchy to civilian rule, and from nominally democratic to explicitly authoritarian forms of government. While it is true that the 1902 Act signalled the formalisation of state-sangha relations and the legal subordination of all Thai monks to the Central Thai government - a situation which was continued and developed under the subsequent Acts - the

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character of the state-sangha relationship has altered significantly under the different Sangha Acts promulgated in the twentieth century. In the middle decades of the twentieth century the political conflicts within the sangha over the system of clerical administration were centred on conflicts between the originally royal-sponsored Thammayut Order and the popularly aligned Mahanikay Order. Thammayut monks received significant royal sponsorship throughout the reign of King Mongkut and the reigns of his immediate successors, King Chulalongkorn and King Wachirawit. As a result Thammayut monks were and continue to be resented by many monks in the Mahanikay Order because they are regarded as having "received a special royal favour" (dai-rap phra raatchathaan phorn phiseet). The royal and aristocratic associations of the Thammayut monks are reflected in the popular epithets phra sakdinaa or "feudalist monks" and phra phuu-dii or "aristocrats' monks" used to refer to them. Mahanikay monks particularly resent the way in which the "special royal favour" was used to entrench Thammayut control over the entire Thai sangha in the reign of King Chulalongkorn. A number of critical Thai scholars, such as Krajaang Nanthapho, have identified the Mahanikay Order with the interests of the "Thai people" and with the struggle for democracy and social justice in Thailand. On the other hand, these same scholars identify the Thammayut Order with the entrenched interests of the Thai establishment, which originally consisted of the monarch and aristocracy hut now also includes senior military figures and wealthy businessmen. Krajaang maintains that political conflicts within the sangha represent a contradiction between the progressive force of the majority and the retarding force of the minority who oppose change and whose interests are firmly established in the system of the old, decaying society.(Tf

Indeed, the social groups aligned with and supportive of the Mahanikay Order share a common opposition to the political establishment, hut they are also diverse and are not united into any coherent social or political force. Mahanikay supporters include both rural peasants and urban labourers as well as the newly formed urban middle class,

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students, and professionals. Identification of the Mahanikay Order with the interests of "the people" dates from the period of the 1932 revolution but has received renewed emphasis and popularity since the student agitations of early 1970s and the rise of the middle class. When analysing religious conflicts in Thailand it is important to remember that the Thai sangha has a dual allegiance, both to the state that officially protects and sponsors it and to the common people who daily give alms food to the monks and who financially and materially sponsor their local temple or meditation centre. When there is a political conflict between those who wield the power of the state and certain sections of Thai society, then the dual allegiance of the sangha leads to divisions between monks. The primary dividing line in these conflicts is between those monks who emphasise the sangha's responsibilities to the state and those who maintain that a monk's primary responsibility is to the welfare of the common people who support his renunciate religious quest. Divisions due to disagreements over the proper emphasis to be given to the state and to the people have been the source of most political conflicts within the sangha in the twentieth century, in particular, conflicts between the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders. Sangha Act of 1902

Because of the significant extent of royal patronage of the Thammayut movement, and because of the appointment of senior members of the royal family to strategically powerful administrative positions within the sangha, the Thai monarchy was able to exercise an unparalleled degree of control over Buddhism in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century. In the 1880s King Chulalongkorn encouraged his half-brother, Prince Wachirayan, to pursue a career in the sangha, arguing that his remaining a monk would not mean abandoning a prestigious career in government service. Wachirayan's subsequent appointment as head of the Thammayut Order in 1892 established an important link between the aristocracy and the administrative hierarchy of the sangha.

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Chulalongkorn and Wachirayan fashioned the Thammayut into an administrative elite which functioned as a controlling nucleus and catalyst for change within the sangha and which provided a focal point for royal control over the monkhood. In 1881 Chulalongkorn formalised the legal and administrative position of the Thammayut as a minority elite within the sangha, mirroring the aristocratic elite that ruled the country, by recognising the Thammayut and Mahanikay as distinct nikaya or administrative orders of the Thai sangha. 3 The religious reforms originally introduced by Mongkut were institutionalised by his son, King Chulalongkorn, to support the structural changes in the administration of the country that were implemented in response to the economic requirements of Thailand's participation in the world economy and the political pressures imposed by European colonial powers. These administrative changes intensified and solidified the centralised political control of the country and led to the integration of the peripheral and previously semi-autonomous outer regions. King Chulalongkorn's reign was characterised by a restrengthening of the apparatus of feudal domination, which functioned to ensure that, despite the economic changes wrought by growing foreign trade, the mass of the population remained in their traditional subordinate position. In this period of rapid change the traditional system of royal patronage of the sangha proved inadequate to guarantee the sangha's support for the monarchy's social and political initiatives. In this situation, the administrative domination of the sangha by an elite of royal monks dedicated to the monarchy ensured that the vital ideological institution of Buddhism remained in harmony with and supportive of state policies. State control over Buddhism increased markedly during the second half of the nineteenth century in concert with the introduction of commercial rice production and Thai participation in the world market economy, and in parallel with the extension of central government political controls. The new systems of economic and political relations in Thailand required a work-force trained in commercial and administrative skills, and in order to meet this demand King Chulalongkorn introduced his programme of promoting primary education in the

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provinces in the final decade of the nineteenth century. Expanded primary-level education not only provided training in the skills required by the commercial and administrative work-force, but also provided a convenient medium for the dissemination of values and beliefs which encouraged popular allegiance to the newly centralised socio-political order. As Andrew Turton observes, a new legitimacy was required by Rama V (Chulalongkorn reigned 1868-1910), a new consent for a massive increase in royal power, a new absolutism. In the drive to establish this hegemony, the new state bureaucratic structures spread the new state ideology. 4

The Thammayut Order played an important role in this statedirected process of social transformation as a vehicle and instrument of the new social and religious ideology. However, this was only achieved by establishing a united sangha supportive of the state. The development of the Thammayut Order into an elite corps of highly educated and trained monks and the policy of placing members of the royal family in senior administrative positions within the new religious Order provided the Thai monarchy with a well-honed mechanism for administratively reforming the entire sangha in order to fashion it into an appropriate ideological expression of the absolutist state. Consequently the increased royal interest in Buddhism represented one aspect of the extension of the monarchy's centralised control over the country in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Following the introduction of the 1898 law on education in the provinces King Chulalongkorn gave his half-brother, Prince Wachirayan, abbot of Wat Bowornniwet and head of the Thammayut Order, the responsibility of co-ordinating the use of monasteries to introduce formal primary education throughout the country. However, Wachirayan met a number of obstacles in implementing this educational programme because of his limited administrative power to effect change within the sangha. Chulalongkorn consequently legislated a Sangha Act in 1902 which for the first time centralised administrative authority for the entire Thai sangha in a Council of Elders or Mahatherasamakhom headed by the Sangharaja and including four senior Regional Sangha

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Governors Oau Khana Yai) and four Deputy Regional Sangha Governors (Rorng Jau Khana Yai), all of whom were appointed directly by the King and ~h?se decisi~ns could ~ot be ~uestione~ or ~ppealed. Previous Thai kings had Issued vanous edicts and duectives governing clerical conduct and behaviour. For example, in 1859 King Mongkut promulgated a decree directing the unfrocking of delinquent monks, the registration of monastic residents and limiting the age of novices. s However, only the royal monasteries - mostly located in Bangkok and the Central Region of the country - were affected by this decree. 6 The 1902 Act for the first time brought all monasteries and monks under uniform royal control. The 1902 Act led to a reform of the administrative structure of the sangha that paralleled the reforms of the secular bureaucracy which King Chulalongkorn had instituted in 1892. Indeed, the Act explicitly specified that the sangha administration should be reformed, so that the domain of Buddhism [Buddhacakka] has an administration in line with the [administration of the] secular domain [anacakka], which has already been improved.(Tf

In addition to creating the central Mahatherasamakhom, the 1902 Sangha Act also established a regional sangha administration which mirrored the structural divisions of the secular bureaucracy at each level, with monks being appointed administrative heads of provinces Uangwat), districts (amphoe), and communities (tambon). The 1902 Act also included the clause: "Thammayut monks can govern Mahanikay monks. Mahanikay monks can govern Thammayut monks."(T)S In practice, however, Mahanikay monks were invariably governed by Thammayut monks rather than the converse. In other words, the 1902 Act provided a legal framework for, and legitimised, the Thammayut Order's administrative control of the entire Thai sangha. The implementation of the 1902 Sangha Act also led to the establishment of a centrally controlled doctrinal orthodoxy with regard to ~he interpretation of Buddhist teachings. Almost all the textbooks used 1ll the new national clerical education system set up under the 1902 Act were written by Prince Wachirayan. Furthermore, the development

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of a nationally co-ordinated system of clerical examinations after 1902 also reinforced the trend towards a homogeneous, Bangkok-controlled interpretation of Buddhist doctrine throughout the Thai sangha. Yoneo Ishii comments, As the Thai sangha came to need highly trained monks to operate its new administrative machinery, its members tended to view the ecclesiastical examinations as a means of obtaining official rank. Moreover, because the marking of examinations required the standardisation of answers, the examinations became ultimately the most effective mechanism by which the sangha's orthodox doctrine was propagated. 9

The 1902 Act then had two main political effects. Firstly, it led to a consolidation of Bangkok control over the sangha and prevented Buddhism from becoming a site of anti-state agitation. Secondly, the establishment of Bangkok control over the regional sang has was linked to the propagation of the Central Thai cultural view and system of religious practice, which broke down the traditional regional interpretations and practices that formed a basis for regional identity and provided a focus for agitation for regional autonomy. It is noteworthy in this respect that the 1902 Act was passed soon after a number of religiously inspired millenarian rebellions against the Central Thai authorities in the north and northeast of the country, which have been interpreted as responses to the breakdown of regional power structures and local patronage systems.lO Sangha Act of 1941

The centralisation of power in a Mahatherasamakhom or supreme Council of Elders made up mainly of an administrative elite of Thammayut monks created considerable antagonism and opposition among Mahanikay monks. In particular, after the 1932 revolution the centralisation of authority in the royal-appointed Thammayut Sangharaja was regarded as an anachronism which reproduced the structure of the deposed absolute monarchy within the sangha. A democratic spirit influenced many Mahanikay monks after the 1932 revolution and agitation increased during the 1930s to introduce a more democratic

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form of sangha administration. Krajaang Nanthapho comments that younger Mahanikay monks in the 1930s maintained that "Buddhism already possesses progressive democratic principles and methods",(T) 11 and Krajaang further argues that the complete centralisation of clerical authority in one royal-appointed Supreme Patriach, as under the 1902 Act, was a situation which "violated the progressive principles of Buddhism".(T)12 In 1933, one year after the revolution, a group of pro-democratic Mahanikay monks calling themselves the Group to Restore the Religion (Khana Patisangkhorn Phra Saasanaa) was formed with the objective of repealing the 1902 Sangha Act and replacing it with a new law based on equity and democratic principles. While the group drafted a new sangha law, it met considerable opposition from lay and clerical conservatives, and members of the Khana Patisangkhorn were accused of being in rebellion to the Thammayut Sangharaja, Prince Chinaworasiriwat, and were disrobed. 13 Senior Thammayut monks, who continued to head and dominate the sangha administration after the 1932 revolution, succeeded in delaying the passage of the new law for eight years. While Thai governments in this century have attempted to manipulate the structure of the sangha administration to mirror the secular political structure, there has usually been a significant delay between a major political transformation in the secular society and equilibrating changes in the form of government within the sangha. This is because, unlike secular politicians, monks are in general appointed to clerical titles for life and so monks representative of and appointed under a former regime may continue to hold senior sangha posts for many years after that regime's eclipse. Unlike the situation in previous centuries, Thai governments in this century have rarely intervened directly in the sangha in order to remove monks unsympathetic to their policies from positions of authority. The most notable recent exception to this unwritten policy of avoiding direct intervention in sangha affairs was the disrobing of the pro-democratic monks Phra Phimontham (Mahanikay) and Phra Sophanakhanaphorn (Thammayut) in 1962 during the regime of Sarit Thanarat in order to clear the way

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for the reintroduction of a centralised and authoritarian sangha administration. In general, however, recent Thai governments have been prepared to wait for senior sangha positions to fall vacant naturally due to the death of the incumbent and then to encourage the appointment of a more sympathetic monk to the position. This general avoidance of direct political intervention in the sangha in the twentieth century reflects the overthrow of absolute political structures based on the centralisation of power in the monarchy and the consequent increasing reliance upon legal and regulatory principles as the basis of government, rather than upon an individual monarch's personal edicts. It was then no accident of history that Sarit's direct intervention in the Phra Phimontham case coincided with the greatest recentralisation of political power in a single individual and clique in Thailand since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy. Sangharaja Chinaworasiriwat died in 1937 and in 1938 was replaced by the Mahanikay monk, Somdet Phra Phutthajan (Phae Tissathewo), of Wat Suthat (Sudassana). With a supportive Mahanikay Sangharaja, the government was able to pass a new Sangha Act in 1941 modelled on the recommendations of the Khana Patisangkhorn. The explicit intention of establishing a sangha administration in parallel with the new constitutional form of government was made clear in the government announcement accompanying the passage of the Act: This Sangha Act has received the approval of the sangha and has been passed by the House of Representatives without dissent. The importance of this Sangha Act is that it adjusts the administration of the sangha so that it accords with the system of administering the country, to the extent that that is possible without conflicting with the dhammavinaya.(T) 14

Mahanikay monks regarded the 1941 Sangha Act as providing a constitution for the sangha and as establishing a democratic approach to administering Buddhism in Thailand. Under the 1941 Act the Sangharaja became titular head of the sangha on the model of the constitutional monarch and was only able to proclaim clerical directives or regulations, sanghanati, on the advice of a legislative Sangha Council, Sangkhasapha (Sanghasabha), headed by the equivalent of

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a Clerical Prime Minister or Sangkhanayok (Sanghanayaka). This paralleled the situation of the King who under the 1932 Constitution exercised legislative authority with the advice and consent of the Parliament or R.atthasapha. The close relationship between the form of secular government under the 1932 Constitution and the clerical administration established by the 1941 Sangha Act is demonstrated by the fact that the names of the sangha's new administrative organs were coined simply by replacing the term rattha or "state", contained in the names of the new parliamentary institutions, with the term sangha. Thus the term Ratthamontri, "Minister of State", became Sangkhamontri, "Ecclesiastical Minister"; the term Khana R.atthamontri, "Cabinet of Ministers", became Khana Sangkhamontri, "Ecclesiastical Cabinet"; the term Nayokratthamontri, "Prime Minister", became Nayokasangkhamontri (popularly in Thai: Sangkhanayok); and the term R.atthasapha, "Parliament", became Sangkhasapha.ts Under the 1902 Act the Mahatherasamakhom had been composed of only the most senior titled monks, which ensured that the administration was placed in the hands of those monks favoured by the King, who conferred clerical titles. The 1941 Sangha Act broke with this system, giving authority and influence to a wide section of senior titled and non-titled monks according to their demonstrated ability in either scholarship or administration. This system also guaranteed the numerically larger Mahanikay Order an absolute majority in the Sangkhasapha, with the Thammayut representatives effectively becoming a minority opposition. Thammayut monks vigorously criticised the new administrative system. This was not only because of their relative loss of influence within the sangha but also because of the specific intention of the government to reintegrate the two nikaya into a single administrative unit. The government announcement accompanying the passage of the 1941 Act stated, What is heartening and pleasing about this law is that it opens the way for a large sanghayana [Buddhist council] of the Tipitalw, and when the sanghayana is completed . . . we may be able to unite the

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Many in the new government were interested in reuniting the two nikaya and in abolishing the factional clerical conflicts. Some members of the government also intended the 1941 Act to provide the basis for the administrative absorption of the Thammayut Order into the larger Mahanikay Order, in order to remove an anti-democratic legacy of the absolute monarchy and a source of anti-democratic agitation within the sangha. Senior members of the government, such as Prime Minister Phraya Phahon and General Phibun Songkhram, strongly supported the re-amalgamation of the two nikaya and sponsored the building of a new monastery, Wat Phra Simahathat (Srimahadhatu), on the northern outskirts of Bangkok, where it was planned that both Mahanikay and Thammayut monks would reside and provide an example of unity and harmony to the rest of the sangha. 17 However, neither this symbolic gesture nor the political attempts to integrate the sangha through a Buddhist council (sanghayana) proved successful. The stated objective of the sanghayana or official review of sangha teachings and practices was to develop a consensus between the conflicting nikaya in order to provide a basis for re-unification. In accord with the intentions of the 1941 Act, a second Act was passed in 1943 to regulate the sanghayana that was intended to lead to the amalgamation of the two nikaya. In order to placate monks of both Orders and to ensure that there was unanimity on the amalgamation, item 60 of the 1943 Act provided that Until the sanghayana of the dhammavinaya has been completed, at the latest no longer than eight years from the date of the enactment of this law, no sanghanati, katika [sangha rules], directives of the Sangharaja, ministerial directives, or other directives which order a compulsory change of belief [latthi] which has been long held to and practised are to be issued.(T) 18

However, when the Mahanikay-dominated Sangkhasapha began finalising the details of the sanghayana, the Thammayut members

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complained that they had passed "sanghanati [sangha laws] directing the government to collectively abolish the long-established administrative authority of the Thammayut" .(T) 19 Despite this opposition, the sanghayana was convened in 1943 in accord with the law, but disagreements soon arose between the representatives of the two nikaya. Each side had its own interpretations of clerical practices which neither was prepared to compromise or abandon, and finally the sanghayana collapsed without agreement between the two Orders. In August 1951, after the elapsing of the legally specified period of eight years, the then Thammayut Sangharaja, Wachirayanawong (Vajirafianavam'sa), called senior representatives of the two nikaya to his residence at Wat Bowornniwet. The following agreement was then reached between the two Orders: 1. The central Khana Sangkhamontri would only administer in accord with the respective principles and practices of the two nikaya. That is, the Khana Sangkhamontri would not overrule the practices of one nikaya by imposing the practices of the other nikaya on it; 2. The administration of the sangha in the provinces would be divided according to nikaya; and 3. Minor matters were to be agreed upon on at a later date.zo

Recognising the failure of the sanghayana and the attempt to reunify the sangha, both the government and the Khana Sangkhamontri acknowledged the agreement. In practice the agreement led to the formal establishment of two parallel sangha administrations, one for each Order. However, de focto separate sangha administrations had in fact already been in existence since 1949. In that year the Thammayut Sangharaja, Wachirayanawong, ordered all Thammayut monasteries to "secede" from the sangha administration and set up their own parallel Thammayut administration at each level.21 Wachirayananwong ordered this secession in his capacity as head of the Thammayut Order. This extreme move was precipitated by Thammayut monks' growing resentment of the administrative system established after 1941, under which the small minority of Thammayut monks in the provinces

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often found themselves subordinate to Mahanikay sangha provincial governors. While Mahanikay monks initially acceded to the formal administrative separation agreed to in 1951, the issue became the focus of a controversy later in the same year when the Thammayut monk Phra Sasanasophana (Juan Utthayi) was appointed as the new Sangkhanayok. All previous Sangkhanayok since the passage of the 1941 Sangha Act had also been Thammayut monks. Both the first Sangkhanayok, Somdet Phra Mahawirawong of Wat Boromniwat (Paramanivasa) and the second Sangkhanayok, Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan (Yanawaro) of Wat Thepsirin (Devasirindra) were Thammayut monks. Several years after his appointment in 1946 Phutthakhosajan became incapacitated due to old age and the then Sangkhamontri for Propagation, Juan Utthayi, 22 took over the old monk's duties as Acting Sangkhanayok. After Phutthakhosajan's death in 1951 Juan Utthayi was formally appointed Sangkhanayok with the support of the Sangharaja, Wachirayanawong. This appointment aroused considerable antipathy among senior Mahanikay monks, forty-seven of whom wrote to Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram complaining about the systematic discrimination against the Mahanikay Order by the Sangharaja's policies and activities. 23 In the letter to the Prime Minister the Mahanikay monks argued that since the Thammayut Order, at the direction of the Sangharaja, had seceded from and no longer recognised the authority of the Sangkhasapha, the sangha administration established under the 1941 Act had effectively become merely the administration of the Mahanikay Order rather than of the entire Thai sangha. The appointment of a Thammayut monk, Juan Utthayi, to head an administration that Thammayut monks in fact ignored was then interpreted as an attempt by the Thammayut Order to again dominate the Mahanikay as in the days of the absolute monarchy. After an internal investigation instigated by the pro-democratic Mahanikay monk Phra Phimontham, Juan Utthayi .was demoted to his former portfolio of Sangkhamontri for Propagation, and the senior Mahanikay monk Phra Wanarat was appointed as the new Sangkhanayok.24

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Throughout the 1950s Thammayut monks persistently criticised the new sangha structure as obstructing the Sangharaja, whom they regarded as the rightful chief administrator of the sangha, from fulfilling his duties. On this point a Thammayut history of the administration of the sangha published by Mahamakut Buddhist University makes the following comment: [Sangha] administration is a method of ensuring that the dhammavinaya is followed. Hence the wisdom and virtue of the Somdet Sangharaja Sakalamahasangkhaparinayok will afford benefit in the peaceful and orderly administration of the sangha domain. To have friendliness and unity at a single point is better than dividing and balancing administrative power between each other.(T) 25

The anonymous author of this official history regards the diminution of the power of the Sangharaja under the 1941 Act as having been a violation of the traditional administration of the sangha domain .... The administration of the sangha throughout the kingdom as a single group, that is, as the Thai sangha, is the hope of Thai society, which has as its basic institutions the nation, religion, and the monarchy. These institutions function to support the country's sovereignty securely through time. It is clear from the evidence that it has been the policy of successive Thai kings since the first reign of the Bangkok period to appoint the Somdet Phra Sangharaja as the Sakalamahasangkhaparinayok of the sangha domain throughout the kingdom in order to build up the harmony and unity of the people of the entire nation. For this reason the Somdet Phra Sangharaja should be the person controlling the sangha by being the sole and only central [controlling] point of the sangha domain, not dividing or balancing power between various responsible officials in the sangha.(T) 26

This Thammayut history of the sangha presents an interpretation of events that justifies the centralisation of the administration of the sangha in order to accord with the objectives of the monarch and the government in promoting national unity. In this publication there is a clear continuing identification of the Thammayut Order with the policies of the Thai political establishment. Significantly, this

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Thammayut version of sangha history was published in 1978, just two years after the coup which ended the three-year period of civilian government during which there had been concerted but unsuccessful attempts to promulgate a further Sangha Act, modelled on the 1941 Act. The official Thammayut publication explicitly supports a centralisation of religious administrative authority and opposes the reintroduction of democratic or decentralised administrative systems into the sangha. Unlike Krajaang Nanthapho's history of the sangha, which is written from a Mahanikay perspective and which justifies the administrative reform instituted under the 1941 Act in terms of the Sangkhasapha's promotion of democratic principles, the Thammayut history emphasises the conflict and administrative inefficiency of the sangha after 1941. The Thammayut history documents that in the twenty-one years of its existence, until it was abolished by the 1962 Sangha Act, only ten sangha regulations or sanghanati were passed by the Sangkhasapha. The minor legislative achievements of the democratically structured Sangkhasapha are then compared with the large number of legislative decisions made by the reconstituted centralised Mahatherasamakhom after 1962. The Sangkhasapha was rendered ineffective because of conflicts between the two nikaya, and originated from the fact that the 1941 Act gave the Mahanikay a majority of the membership of the Clerical Council. The 1941 Act also limited the scope of the regulations that could be passed by the Sangkhasapha until the completion of the sanghayana to reunite the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders. When the sanghayana to unify the two nikaya broke down and two parallel Mahanikay and Thammayut administrations were set up, there was little that the Sangkhasapha could decide that would be of equal relevance to both nikaya. Thammayut monks also claimed that the 1941 Act undermined the rightful authority of the Thammayut Order. However, Krajaang Nanthapho contends that the actual impact of the 1941 Act was to redress the previous administrative imbalance favouring the Thammayut by ensuring that monks of both nikaya held senior sangha administrative positions.

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The period of intense sectarian conflict between the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders in the middle decades of this century did not reflect any concrete situation in the secular Thai polity. Rather, the sectarianism represented the playing out of residual contradictions within the Thai sangha, in which royalist and royal-appointed elements had not had their power base undermined to the same extent as the politically dispossessed monarchy and aristocracy. Because of the continuing monarchist legacy within the sangha, royalist Thammayut monks persisted in seeking to exercise their authority and influence within the sangha long after their original royal sponsors had been stripped of effective political power. Only with the formal separation of the Mahanikay and Thammayut administrations and the passage of the 1962 Sangha Act have explicit expressions of religious sectarianism subsided. Sangha Act of 1962

In 1947 the Thammayut Sangkhanayok, Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan, and twenty-one other Thammayut members of the Sangkhasapha published a book criticising the 1941 Act as being unworkable and urging the government to repeal it. The group petitioned the Thammayut Sangharaja, Wachirayanawong, to approach the government on the issue. However, these efforts to repeal the 1941 Sangha Act fell on deaf ears in the government for the following decade. Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram, who remained in power until 1957, had supported the passage of the 1941 Act and was unsympathetic to attempts to reintroduce what he saw as an expression of monarchism in the sangha. However, with Phibun Songkhram's ousting by Sarit Thanarat in 1957 the political climate shifted further to the right and a more favourable situation was created for the activities of Thammayut monks keen on recentralising authority within the sangha. Sarit Thanarat did not believe that democracy was the most effective means to modernise Thailand and maintained that the post1932 democratic experiments had been a failure. After the coup of 20 October 1958, Sarit dissolved the Thai Parliament, suspended

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the Constitution, banned political parties, and instituted martial law. Yoneo Ishii comments, Sarit thought that national integration must be strengthened to realise national development. To attain this goal he planned to start with fostering the people's sentiment for national integration through the enhancement of traditional values as represented by the monarchy and Buddhism. 27

In contrast to Phibun Songkhram, Sarit was a strong supporter of the monarchy and rehabilitated the King as a symbol of Thai national unity and identity in his strident campaigns against the perceived threat of communist subversion. Sarit regarded the sectarianism which had divided the sangha over the previous decades as weakening its administrative effectiveness in responding to the state's new initiatives and ideological requirements, and consequently he was receptive to the arguments of Thammayut monks who maintained that the source of the problems within the sangha lay in the democratic systems introduced by the 1941 Sangha Act. The campaign to repeal the 1941 Act was led by senior Thammayut monks within the Sangkhasapha, in particular Somdet Phra Mahawirawong (Juan Utthayi), who held the position of Sangkhanayok from 1960 to 1962. In 1962 Sarit promulgated a new Sangha Act that abolished the Sangkhasapha and the other administrative organs set up under the 1941 Act, arguing that the democratic system had led to an inefficient administration of the sangha. 28 The 1962 Act recentralised administrative authority in the position of the Sangharaja, who became both titular and actual leader of the sangha as head of a reconstituted Mahatherasamakhom consisting of the most ~enior titled monks of Phra Ratchakhana rank. Under the 1962 Act the legislative power previously held by the Sangkhasapha and the positions of Sangkhanayok and head of the Khana Winaythorn (Gana Vinayadhara or Ecclesiastical Court) were all centralised in the position of the Supreme Patriarch. Sarit and the Thammayut monks regarded this new structure as being "in accord with the traditional administration of the sangha, which has been passed down since the time of

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the Buddha".(T) 29 The 1962 Act also specified that the DirectorGeneral of the Department of Religious Affairs was to act as Secretary to the Mahatherasamakhom. A further feature of the 1962 Act was il confirmation of the administrative separation and independence of the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders. A regulation issued by the reconstituted Mahatherasamakhom in 1963 stated that monks and religious establishments at each level of the sangha should be oversighted by authorities from their own nikaya. This further formalised the establishment of parallel Mahanikay and Thammayut administrations from the regional down to the commune level, and marked the end of the various attempts by one group to either absorb the other or to direct and control the administration of the other Order. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable legacy of enmity between many Mahanikay and Thammayut monks and the respective political alignments of the two Orders remain strong. The restructured sangha that come into being after the implementation of the 1962 Act had a much greater potential for being directed by the state, and the recentralisation of clerical authority in the position of the Sangharaja paralleled the recentralisation of secular political power effected by Sarit. Sarit made the following announcement when opening the first meeting of the newly reconstituted Mahatherasamakhom in 1963: The reason for the enactment of this Act is that the administration of the sangha is not a matter to be based on the principle of separation of powers for the sake of balance among them, as is the case under the current law. Such a system is an obstacle to effective administration. It is therefore appropriate to amend the existing law so that the Supreme Patriarch, head of the ecclesiastical community, can command the order [of monks] through the Council of Elders in accordance with both the civil law and the Buddhist principle, thereby promoting the progress and prosperity of Buddhism. 30

Sarit aimed to end the sectarianism in the sangha, not because of any preference for or bias against one Order or the other, but because schisms in the sangha lowered the institution's prestige in the people's

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eyes, which in turn threatened the use of Buddhism in the legitimation of Sarit's recentralised and authoritarian state. 31 Nevertheless, there was a basic similarity in the interests of both Thammayut monks and the Sarit government in centralised political structures, and this led to the development of a de facto alignment between the government and the Thammayut Order in opposition to the Mahanikay Order. This de facto alignment was demonstrated by Sarit's support for Thammayut monks' efforts in the 1960s to destroy the career and reputation of senior Mahanikay monks, such as Phra Phimontham, in order to bring the Mahanikay leadership into disrepute and to demoralise critical pro-democratic Mahanikay monks. Sarit lent his hand to this vendetta in order to prevent junior, popularly aligned Mahanikay monks from establishing a site of opposition to the authoritarian policies of his government within the sangha. During Sarit's rule the same tactics of control by fear and direct force which were used to keep the civilian population in check were also used within the sangha. Sarit's intervention in the sangha is discussed in detail in Chapter Five on the persecution of Phra Phimontham. Agitation to Reform the 1962 Sangha Act

With the overthrow in October 1973 of the dictatorial regime of Sarit's successor, Thanom Kittikachorn, a wide range of suppressed political and social grievances were able to be publicly aired and debated in Thailand. Prominent among these grievances was the centralisation of administrative authority within the sangha which had been effected by Sarit's 1962 Sangha Act. A journalist for Wiwat magazine captures the attitude of many junior monks and middle-class lay Buddhists to the 1962 Act when he says, It can be said that this [1962 Act] closed off the opportunity for monks with knowledge and ability to participate in sangha administration.. . . Consequently, it can be clearly seen that the sangha has deteriorated in the estimation of the Thai people.(T) 32

The same author adds that the 1962 Act

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centralises power in some groups within the sangha and leads to the growth of dictatorship within the religious sphere. Furthermore, it leads to the decay of Buddhism and to the creation of divisions within the sangha.(T) 33

In the liberalised political situation after October 1973 a number of pressure groups were established within the sangha, mainly by young, junior Mahanikay monks, in order to press for justice in the administration of the sangha and for the introduction of a more democratic system of governing the monkhood that would give monks with demonstrated intellectual and administrative skills a greater role in sangha affairs. The largest and most broadly based of the sangha pressure groups established in the 1973-76 period was the Federation of Buddhists of Thailand (FBT) (Sahaaphan Phutthasaasanik Haeng Pratheet Thai). Somboon Suksamran has commented on the membership of the Federation as follows: Most of the FBT members were not and still are not, office holders or titled monks in the sangha hierarchy. They are young men, whose average age is in the early thirties, and most of them are well-educated. In general . . . they come from peasant stock, but have been living in the cities for a few years. In terms of institutionalised power, they are not part of the establishment. 34

The Federation pushed for reform of the sangha administration, arguing that Sarit's 1962 Sangha Act had been designed to serve oppressive political purposes and had also rendered the sangha administrative system oppressive and undemocratic. The FBT maintained that regulatory control over the sangha was overcentralised in the office of the Sangharaja and the Mahatherasamakhom, not permitting other monks to participate in the administration of the sangha. They described the present sangha system as "a means by which the government intended to subordinate the monks to its authority and to minimise the autonomy of the sangha". 35 In the mid-1970s the Federation proposed that a new system of sangha government should be established paralleling the legislative, executive, and judicial institutions of the democratically elected secular

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government. The Federation also proposed that the sangha should be free of political control and that lower-level monks should have a recognised right to participate in sangha administration. In detail, the Federation sought to re-institute the structure laid down in the 1941 Act, with a Sangha Parliament, Sangkhasapha, Sangha Prime Minister, Sangkhanayok, Sangha Cabinet, Khana Sangkhamontri, Ecclesiastical Court, Khana Winaythorn, and six administrative departments. In 1975 the FBT began publishing a fortnightly journal from Wat Mahathat called Vc>ice of the Young Monks (Siang Yuwasong) in order to promote its views. In 1975 the United Socialist Front Party of Thailand and the Socialist Party of Thailand supported the FBT's proposal to reform the administration of the sangha and submitted a reform bill for a new Sangha Act, along the lines outlined by the Federation, to the Thai Parliament. The bill passed its first reading in the House of Representatives but the Parliament was dissolved before the second reading, and after the coup of October 1976 the bill was abandoned. Agitation for change within the sangha ceased in the oppressive political climate after the 1976 military coup and all the young monks groups except the Federation disbanded. Formal agitation for administrative reform within the sangha began again in August 1984 when a group calling itself the Young Monks Group of Thailand (Khana Yuwasong Haeng Pratheet Thai) issued an announcement critical of senior members of the sangha administration, who were accused of abandoning their responsibilities to the monkhood. 36 The Khana Yuwasong called for a change in the law governing the sangha and for the reintroduction of an amended 1941 Sangha Act. The Khana Yuwasong's proposal obtained the support of some more reform-minded senior monks, such as Phra Ratchawiramuni (Rajaviramuni), Sangha Provincial Governor of Loei province. The then Assistant Minister for Education, Samphan Thorngsamak, also supported the move and sent a submission to the legal section of the Department of Education to begin drafting a new Sangha Act. However, in an interview with Wiwat magazine, Samphan said that he saw the Mahatherasamakhom as the major obstacle to introducing a new Act, because the approval

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of the Council of Elders was required to ensure parliamentary support for the billY Samphan stated that members of the Mahatherasamakhom would be unlikely to support a reform of sangha administration which decreased their power, and he compared attempting to restrict the power of the Mahatherasamakhom to trying to pull sugar-cane out of an elephant's mouth. He stated that any successful reform of the system of governing the sangha would have to be carried through solely as a government initiative without passing the Mahatherasamakhom. To date (July 1988) no new Sangha Act has been tabled in the Thai Parliament, as the Mahatherasamakhom continues to resist administrative reform and none of the various coalition governments formed under the former Prime Minister, Prem Tinsulanond, were prepared to unilaterally override the senior sangha hierarchy. The successful unilateral enactment of legislation to reform the administration of the sangha along democratic lines by a Thai government would be an important symbolic event. Such an action would indicate the political ascendancy of the Thai middle class and other supporters of political democracy to the point where they could enforce their view of Thai society and politics through the symbolic medium of Buddhism. However, it appears that until the Thai middle class attains significant political power in its own right, efforts at sangha reform are unlikely to be successful. Thammayut-Mahanikay Conflict Today

The historical disagreements between the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders have predominantly been about matters of practice rather than about doctrine or interpretations of the Buddhist scriptures. The two Orders use the same scriptures in their respective education systems and monks of both Orders sit for the same system of clerical examinations. Today the teachings and most of the practices of the two Orders are to all intents and purposes identical. As the Siam Rat commentator Khaamhuno has observed, The differences [between Thammayut and Mahanikay monks] are very small and related to the strictness of following certain practices, which

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at the present time amounts to almost no difference at all because strictness in [clerical] practice has now become a personal matter for each individual monk.(T) 38

The real difference between the two Orders lies in their respective alignments within the Thai political structure. King Chulalongkorn maintained the predominantly contrived differences between the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders for political reasons in order to establish a distinct privileged royal-controlled order of monks. However, when the absolute monarchy was overthrown, the elite royal Order no longer fulfilled any political function and in the two-and-a-half decades after the 1932 revolution the Thammayut Order was placed in a politically defensive position. When Sarit Thanarat struck an alliance between the monarchy, military, and larger business interests, senior members of the Thammayut Order developed and expanded the Order's original role as the sect of the Thai monarchy and aristocracy, reforming it into the sect of the new authoritarian military establishment. The Thammayut's historical association with the monarchy and its support for centralised political structures within the sangha, which mirrored the centralisation of secular political power under the military, meant that there was a close affinity between the Order and Sarit's political policies. This affinity was not shared by many Mahanikay monks, who supported the more democratic principles of the previous regime and the original 1932 revolutionaries. This alignment of the Thammayut with the Thai military was forcefully demonstrated when the former dictator Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn returned to Thailand from exile in September 1976 and sought sanctuary by being ordained into the Thammayut Order at the royal monastery of Wat Bowornniwet. Phonsak Jirakraisiri has shown that there is still a consistent difference in political attitudes between the monks of the two 0rders. 39 Phonsak interviewed 278 Mahanikay and 161 Thammayut monks in Bangkok to determine if there was any correlation between a monk's nikaya affiliation, his beliefs about Buddhist doctrine, and his political attitudes. Among Mahanikay monks Phonsak found that the more doctrinal a monk's view of Buddhism, the stronger his support for democratic principles. Phonsak defines a doctrinal view of Buddhism

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as meaning "believing in Buddha-dhamma", which from his description appears to be very similar to the reformist and rationalist form of Buddhism described in Chapter Two. Phonsak's study confirms the existence of a relationship between the promotion of reformist interpretations of Buddhist doctrine and support for non-authoritarian forms of government. Phonsak found that all Mahanikay monks, both those classified as doctrinal and non-doctrinal, or traditional, strongly supported democratic principles. He found that doctrinal Thammayut monks also supported democracy. However, Thammayut monks with traditional beliefs about Buddhist teachings were found to hold strongly authoritarian political attitudes. That is, Phonsak found that the stronghold of politically authoritarian beliefs within the sangha remains within the Thammayut Order, although only among the doctrinally conservative monks of that Order. Phonsak's results also indicate that Thammayut monks as a group cannot all be classified as pro-authoritarian, as doctrinal reformists in that Order do support democracy both within the sangha and in the secular Thai society. While the fortunes of the Thammayut Order improved under Sarit, it was not able to re-establish the same degree of control over the entire sangha as it had exercised in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. By the time Sarit took power in 1957 a high degree of uniformity in clerical practices had been established nationwide, a national system of clerical education had been formalised and put in place and a national sangha administration was in operation. That is, by the late 1950s the major restructuring and systematisation of the sangha which the Thammayut Order had directed and implemented in the reigns of King Chulalongkorn and King Wachirawut had been achieved. The major historical function of the Thammayut Order had thus been fulfilled. By the mid-twentieth century the concern of Thai military governments was not with establishing uniformity and structure within the sangha but rather with the manipulation and direction of the already well-established structures of sangha administration. In this political context monks of either the Mahanikay or Thammayut Order who were sympathetic to

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government policies could function equally well as agents of government policy within the sangha. The Thammayut Order consequently no longer has the same structurally privileged position with relation to the Thai state which existed during the reign of King Chulalongkorn. While many Thammayut monks still retain close connections with and an identification with the establishment for historical reasons, state-sangha relations are no longer mediated solely through monks of the Thammayut Order. Senior titled and administrative monks of both Orders now enjoy close relations with the political establishment and both Thammayut and Mahanikay monks are active supporters of state policies. Similarly, monks of both Orders who are critical of the state are subject to harassment and commonly have their clerical careers blocked by either direct or indirect means. The Thai political establishment continues to give relatively greater support to the Thammayut Order than to the Mahanikay because of the historical connections between the monarchy and the Thammayut. However, this historical structure is being increasingly overlain and superseded by the sponsorship of individual monks sympathetic to the interests of the establishment. The postulation of a simple bipolar conflict between the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders, as assumed by Krajaang Nanthapho in his study of Thai Buddhism, no longer provides an adequate explanation of the character of urban Buddhism or of state-sangha relations in the 1980s. Appointment to senior administrative positions is now open to monks of either Order who demonstrate their support for the political establishment by meeting the criteria used to determine the allocation of clerical titles. These criteria, administered by the Department of Religious Affairs and the Mahatherasamakhom, are now the most important means of establishment control over appointments to senior sangha positions. Khaamhuno lists the following seven criteria as being used to decide appointments to vacant Phra Ratchakhana titles: 1. the number of years spent as an ordained monk; 2. the number of years for which the present clerical title has been held;

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the present administrative position held in the sangha; the quality of administrative work; the level of clerical education and learning; the extent of support and sponsorship from lay followers and from other monks; and 7. the appropriateness of the appointment, or the benefits to the religion and the country that would result from the appointment. 40

3. 4. 5. 6.

Somboon Suksamran observes that the three qualifications traditionally taken into account in conferring sarnanasak or clerical titles were ability and intelligence in studying the vinaya, knowledge of Pali and Sanskrit (ganthadura ), and strictness in clerical practice. 41 The other criteria mentioned by Khaamhuno and cited above are recent additions which reflect the changing qualities required of senior administrative monks in the contemporary socio-political situation. These additional criteria reflect those qualities that the state rewards, and the monks who meet these state-determined criteria are selected to become the senior administrators of the sangha. Such monks are entrusted with the internal administration of the sangha according to the vinaya and, more importantly from a political perspective, with the administration of the state's policies with regard to the sangha. The system of allotting clerical titles is thus the basis of the state's administrative control of the sangha today, for this system ensures that only monks sympathetic to the state's policies are eligible for titles and so for appointment to senior administrative positions. Because the senior administrative positions are restricted to senior titled monks, and because Thammayut monks still hold a disproportionately large number of the senior titles relative to their absolute numbers, Thammayut monks do continue to exert a disproportionately large influence over the administration of the entire sangha. Krajaang Nanthapho notes that in 1984, 28,902 of the registered monasteries in Thailand were under the charge of the Mahanikay Order, while 1,557 were controlled by the Thammayut Order - a ratio of 19 to 1 - while in 1977, 202,165 monks and novices were affiliated

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with the Mahanikay Order and only 11,010 with the Thammayut a ratio of 18 to 1. 42 Khaamhuno maintains that an unofficial quota system is in effect which allocates senior sangha positions equally among monks of both the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders. 43 According to this quota system three of the six Somdet Phra Ratchakhana titles are allotted to the Mahanikay Order, namely, the titles of Wanarat, Phutthajan, and Thirayanamuni, and three Somdet titles are also allotted to monks from the Thammayut Order, namely, the titles of Phutthakhosajan, Mahawirawong, and Yanasangworn. The quota of Phra Ratchakhana monks of Rorng Somdet rank is also equally divided, with six positions being reserved for each nikaya. Khaamhuno reports that only at the more junior levels do the Mahanikay monks obtain a majority. Of the fifteen Phra Ratchakhana monks of Tham rank in 1985 ten titles were held by Mahanikay monks and five titles by Thammayut monks. 44 The equal division of the sangha's most senior titles and administrative positions45 between the two nikaya, despite the far greater size of the Mahanikay, continues to be a major source of tension within the sangha and leads to accusations of unfair privilege being accorded the Thammayut Order. Khaamhuno has commented on this issue, saying, The Mahanikay should be given more (administrative] positions from the level of Somdet Phra Ratchakhana down, because Mahanikay monks and monasteries have a much greater role in the country and have many times the responsibilities of the Thammayut.(T) 46

While the historical conflict between the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders has been lessened and contained within formally and informally defined regulatory mechanisms, the history of bitterness between the Orders has not been fully surmounted and continues to occasionally provoke disputes between monks. Rather than having been overcome, the historical conflict between the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders has been rendered peripheral to the central issue of state control of Buddhism. Like other cultural and political inheritances from the period of the absolute monarchy, the conflict between

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the two Orders has been preserved as one, now minor, component of the complex Thai social order, which has never been fully purged of pre-existing social and political forms.

NOTES

1. Ishii, op. cit., pp. 68-69. 2. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 16. 3. Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalay (Mahamakut Buddhist University), Prawat Kaan-pok-khrorng Khana Song Thai [A history of the administration of the Thai sangha] (Bangkok, 2521 [1978)), pp. 51-52. 4. Turton, op. cit., pp. 25-26. 5. Ishii, op. cit., p. 71. 6. Ibid., p. 72. 7. Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalay, op. cit., p. 14. 8. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 85. 9. Ishii, op. cit., p. 81. 10. See Keyes, "The Power of Merit", op. cit.; and John B. Murdoch, "The 1901-1902 'Holy Man's' Rebellion", Journal of the Siam Society 62, part 1 (January 1974): 47-66. 11. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 94. 12. Ibid., p. 97. 13. Ishii, op. cit., p. 101. 14. Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalay, op. cit., p. 19. 15. Ishii, op. cit., p. 102. 16. Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalay, op. cit., p. 25. 17. Ishii, op. cit., p. 107. 18. Mahamakut Ratchawitthayalay, op. cit., p. 25. 19. Ibid., p. 64. 20. Siriwat Khamwansaa and Thorngphan Ratchaphak, Song Thai Nai 200 Pii - Lem 2 [The Thai sangha in the past two hundred years - Volume 2] (Bangkok: Mahajulabanakhan, 2525 [1982] ), p. 168. 21. Ishii, op. cit., pp. 107-8. 22. Juan Utthayi held a number of clerical titles during his eventful career in the Thai sangha, which ended when he died in a car accident in the early 1970s. These titles included Phra Thepwethi (Devavedhi), Phra Thammapamok (Dhammapamokha), Phra Sasanasophana, Somdet Phra Mahawirawong, and Sangharaja.

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23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.

Chapter Four Ishii, op. cit., p. 109. Ibid., p. 113. Maharnakut Ratchawitthayalay, op. cit., p. 22. Ibid., pp. 35-36. Yoneo Ishii, "Church and State in Thailand", Asian Survey 8, no. 10 (October 1968): 869. The new Sangha Act was promulgated on 31 December 1962 and carne into effect on 1 January 1963. Ishii, Sangha, State and Society, p. 116. Maharnakut Ratchawitthayalay, op. cit., p. 36. "The Prime Minister's Message to the President of the Council of Elders in the Opening Ceremony of the First Session of the Meeting of the Council of Elders", Office of the Prime Minister, 21 January 1963, cited by Somboon Suksamran, Political Patronage and Control over the Sangha, Research Notes and Discussions Paper no. 28 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981), p. 41. Ishii, Sangha, State and Society, p. 166. "Phaa-tat Kaan-borihaan Khana Song Thai: Kaan-yaeng Ooy Jaak Paak Chaang" [Operating on the administration of the Thai sangha - Snatching sugar-cane from an elephant's mouth], Wiwat 1 (3), no. 48 (67), 8-14 Thanwaakhom 2527 [December 1984], p. 33. Ibid. Somboon, Buddhism and Politics in Thailand, p. 86. Ibid., p. 123. Wiwat 1 (3), no. 48 (67), 8-14 Thanwaakhom 2527 [December 1984], pp. 30-34. Ibid. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Nikaay Song Saasanaa Phut - Thang Thyan Lae Mai Thyan" [Orders of the Buddhist sangha - Both official and unofficial], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 2 Thanwaakhom 2522 [December 1979], p. 36. Phonsak, op. cit., p. 210. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Keen Phijaaranaa Samanasak Song" [Criteria in considering clerical titles], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 23 Thanwaakhom 2527 [December 1984], pp. 27-28. Somboon, Phutthasaasanaa Kap Kaan-plian-plaeng Thaang Kaan-myang Lae Sangkhom, p. 47. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 163-64. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Khwootaa Samanasak Song". Ibid.

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45. Under the 1962 Sangha Act, award of a title of Somdet rank automatically qualifies the recipient for membership of the Mahatherasamakhom. 46. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Khwootaa Samanasak Song".

CHAPTER FIVE

Persecution of Phra Phimontham (Vimaladhamma) Bhikkhu

One monk in particular, Phra Phimontham (Aat Asaphathera) Bhikkhu, has been at the centre of efforts to democratically reform the administration of the Thai sangha in the twentieth century. Because of his unconventional and progressive views, Phimontham became the victim of a concerted campaign against dissent in the sangha during the regime of Sarit Thanarat. The movement to obtain legal justice for Phimontham has been an important focus of agitation for change within the sangha and Phimontham's biography provides many insights into the relationships between the state and Buddhism in the past three decades. Phra Aat Asaphathera (lay name: Aat Duangmala) was born in the northeastern province of Khon Kaen in 1901. 1 He proved to be an able scholar and administrator and progressed rapidly within the ranks of the Mahanikay Order after his ordination. He obtained a degree in Pali studies at the grade of parian 8 in 1929 and in 1932 was appointed abbot of a royal monastery in Ayutthaya north of Bangkok, subsequently being appointed abbot, and then Sangha Provincial Governor

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of Ayutthaya province. In 1943 Phra Aat was appointed Sangha Regional Governor for the Central Region of the country and in 1945 he became Sangha Minister for Clerical Education. He was awarded a Phra Ratchakhana title of Theep grade in 1946 and of Rorng Somdet grade in 1947. Phra Aat is most widely known by the Phra Ratchakhana title of Phimontham that he held for over three decades. In 1947 Phimontham was appointed abbot of Wat Mahathat in Bangkok, the administrative centre of the Mahanikay Order, and in 1949 he became Sangkhamontri for Sangha Administration. Because of the speed with which he rose through the ranks of the sangha hierarchy and because of his recognised administrative skills, many monks, especially in the Mahanikay Order, regarded him as a likely future Sangharaja. Phimontham was innovative in his approach to Buddhism, travelling to Burma to study vipassana (insight meditation), visiting the West, and sending Thai monks to study Buddhism in India. Phimontham became well known as a strongly pro-democratic monk who supported the new form of sangha administration introduced in 1941. He had many supporters among the junior, educated Mahanikay monks whose sympathies lay with the farmers, labourers, and rising middle class rather than with the establishment. Conversely, he developed enemies among the senior echelons of both the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders. Phimontham had close connections with former Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong and was Sangha Provincial Governor of Pridi's home province of Ayutthaya in the early years of the civilian government after the 1932 revolution. This connection with Pridi Phanomyong became a political liability after Phibun Songkhram staged a coup in October 1947 and Pridi was forced into exile. Phimontham disagreed with the way in which Phibun Songkhram attempted to prevent the sangha becoming a base for communist operations when the Prime Minister directed the Sangkhasapha to issue a decree forbidding the ordination of communists. Phimontham opposed the decree on doctrinal grounds, arguing that it was inconsistent with Buddhist principles because it discriminated against those who might wish to seek ordination. Phimontham deliberately delayed the implementation of the resolution, for which he was responsible

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as Sangkhamontri for Administration. He consequently came under suspicion of being a communist sympathiser and, while there was no evidence to support this, he became labelled as anti-establishment by the political authorities. Phimontham also developed enemies among the senior echelons of both the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders. In 1954 the Thammayut Sangharaja, Wachirayanawong, reappointed the then Somdet Phra Mahawirawong (Juan Utthayi) of Wat Makut (Thammayut) to the position of Sangkhanayok. This appointment was made despite the fact that a number of more senior Mahanikay monks of full Somdet rank were available to fill the position, namely, Somdet Phra Phutthajan (Phutthasaro) of Wat Anongkharam (Anangarama) and Somdet Phra Wanarat (Plot Kittisophana) of Wat Benjamabophit. Phimontham, who was then Sangkhamontri for Administration, criticised the appointment and lodged an appeal which led to an internal investigation and the eventual appointment of Somdet Phra Wanarat as Sangkhanayok. While Utthayi subsequently became Sangkhanayok in 1960, and Sangharaja in 1965, he was widely believed to have held a grudge against Phimontham because of these events, which motivated him in his subsequent efforts to have Phimontham expelled from the sangha. Wiuut magazine has claimed that another opponent of Phimontham's was Plot Kittisophana (Mahanikay) who, as Somdet Phra Wanarat, had been elected Sangkhamontri for Education in the early 1950s. Wiuut reports that Kittisophana was jealous of Phimontham's influence as Sangkhamontri for Sangha Administration and had sought to swap positions with him, but Phimontham had refused. 2 Kittisophana became Sangkhanayok in 1954 and in 1960 he was appointed Sangharaja. Krajaang Nanthapho cites the late Somdet Phra Thirayanamuni (Thii Punyako) of the Mahanikay monastery, Wat Jakrawatratchawat (Cakravartirajavasa), as claiming that before Kittisophana was promoted from the position of Somdet Phra Wanarat to Sangharaja in 1960 he was visited at Wat Benjamabophit by Krommamyyn Bidyalabh, then head of the Council of Ministers in Sarit's government.3 Bidyalabh told Kittisophana that if he was appointed Sangharaja, his then current title

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of Somdet Phra Wanarat should be left vacant, because Phimontham was the most senior monk of Rorng Somdet rank and so was next in line for promotion to full Somdet rank and the title of Somdet Phra Wanarat. Soon after Kittisophana was appointed Sangharaja in 1960 a systematic campaign to discredit and ultimately disrobe Phimontham was begun. This campaign appears to have been orchestrated by Plot Kittisophana as Sangharaja and Juan Utthayai as Sangkhanayok, in concert with the government of Sarit Thanarat, and was designed to prevent Phimontham from being awarded a senior clerical title and its associated privileges and administrative authority. Plot Kittisophana was appointed Sangharaja on 5 May 1960 and on 12 May 1960 a new Khana Sangkhamontri or Ecclesiastical Cabinet (most of whose members were Thammayut monks) was announced, with Juan Utthayi, then Somdet Phra Mahawirawong, being appointed Sangkhanayok. However, Phimontham, who had been Sangkhamontri for Education in the previous Sangkhasapha, was not given any ministerial position. 4 The new Khana Sangkhamontri declared that its policies, among other things, would be to prevent the communist infiltration of the sangha and to detect and get rid of those monks who expressed opinions which were regarded as undermining the religion and who were opposed to government policies. Somboon Suksamran observes, This declaration was widely criticised by the monks, especially by those of the Mahanikay Order. Anonymous letters were circulated among monks and laymen urging them to protest against the appointment of the new [Khana] Sangha Montri and accusing the [Khana] Sangha Montri of being the lackeys of the government, of using its power to oppress the majority [that is, Mahanikay monks], and of being a dictatorship. Policemen were sent to search many monasteries. Phra Phimondham [Phimontham] was suspected of being the architect of this anti-government movement. 5

Siriwat Khamwansaa states that Juan Utthayi then plotted with the police to remove Phimontham from his position as abbot of Wat Mahathat. 6 On 18 July 1960 the Bangkok police announced that Phimontham had violated the vinaya and had committed the offence

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of homosexuality, a parajika or serious crime against the clerical vow of celibacy, which entails automatic expulsion from the monkhood. This charge was based upon the accusations of a monk from Wat Mahathat who subsequently confessed to having been coerced into making the allegations by the police. At a sangha legal hearing subsequently convened to investigate the accusation, it was revealed that on 9 June 1960 a policeman had requested a monk from Wat Mahathat, Phra Maha Phae Yanawaro, to go to a nearby police station, where an accusation against Phimontham was extracted from him after a lengthy interrogation. 7 A second accusation was extracted by the Bangkok police from a former novice of Wat Mahathat, Wirayut Watthananusorn, on 28 July 1960. 8 The police claimed that they had witnesses that Wirayut had masturbated Phimontham and told Wirayut that if he went along with the story his career and business would prosper. He was shown a document signed by Sarit Thanarat indicating that the Prime Minister was interested in prosecuting the case, and out of fear he signed the accusation against Phimontham prepared by the police. On 30 August the police took Wirayut to Wat Makut (Thammayut) to confirm his statement before the Sangkhanayok, Juan Utthayi, and two other Sangkhamontri. At this meeting Wirayut was also forced to state that Phimontham had had anal sex with him. Later on the same day, a further meeting was held between Juan U tthayi, Phra Thammakhunaphorn (Fyyn Chutinatharo) of Wat Saamphraya (Mahanikay), who was the Sangkhamontri responsible for the administration of the Bangkok area, and the Bangkok police. At this meeting it was resolved that Phimontham could no longer remain a monk and this decision was conveyed to the Sangharaja. 9 On 9 September 1960 the Sangharaja ordered Phra Phimontham to disrobe. However, Phimontham appealed against the Sangharaja's directive, saying that under the 1941 Sangha Act, which was then still in force, the Sangharaja had no authority to order a monk to disrobe. This severe disciplinary act was instead the sole jurisdiction of the sangha judiciary, the Khana Winaythorn. On 25 September 1960 400 Mahanikay monks met at Wat Mahathat and collectively vouched for

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phimontham's strict ascetic purity, and informed the Sangharaja, the Sangkhanayok, the Khana Sangkhamontri, and the government of their decision. 10 But despite this show of support, Phimontham was removed from his position as abbot of Wat Mahathat on 25 October 1960.11 Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat subsequently accused Phimontham of causing disorder and ordered the rescission of his clerical title on 11 November 1960, which reduced him to the status of simply Phra Aat Asaphathera. Phimontham was not the only senior monk to have his position undermined by slanderous accusations of misconduct orchestrated by the new Khana Sangkhamontri led by Juan Utthayi and Plot Kittisophana. At the same time as the accusations were being made against Phimontham, several monks from the Thammayut temple of Wat RAtchathiwat (Rajadhivasa) informed the Sangkhanayok that the abbot, Phra Sasanasophana (Plort Atthakari), had met secretly with a woman, regularly ate in the evenings in contravention of ascetic practices and greedily hoarded personal wealth. The Sangkhanayok met with five Thammayut Sangkhamontri, resolved that Sasanasophana had violated the vinaya and removed him from his positions as the abbot of Wat RAtchathiwat and as Thammayut Sangha Governor for the seventh, eighth, and ninth administrative regions. Like Phimontham, Sasanasophana was also ordered to disrobe. On 7 October 1960 the Sangharaja ordered that Sasanasophana be removed from all ecclesiastical positions, however, like Phimontham, he refused to obey.1z On 11 November 1960 both Phimontham and Sasanasophana were simultaneously stripped of their clerical titles and the Department of Religious Affairs confiscated the clerical fans which symbolised their clerical status. A committee of monks was subsequently established to investigate the allegations against Phimontham, and after Phimontham's two accusers confessed that their allegations were fabricated he was cleared for lack of evidence. However, Phimontham's acquittal was not publicised under the regimes of either Sarit Thanarat or Thanom Kittikachorn, neither was his title returned nor was he reinstated as abbot of Wat Mahathat.

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While Phimontham was removed from his administrative positions, Juan Utthayi's and Plot Kittisophana's attacks had not succeeded in disrobing him and in the early 1960s he remained at Wat Mahathat, providing a focus for agitation against Sarit's authoritarian government and moves to abolish the 1941 Sangha Act. Sarit subsequently resorted to the exercise of secular power to attack Phimontham after the use of religious means had failed to expel him from the sangha. On 20 June 1962 Phimontham was arrested on charges of being a communist and a threat to national security.13 Phimontham was accused of sending monks to India for Marxist training and heading a body called the Sangha Organisation for the Liberation of Thailand (Ongkaan Song Kuu Chaat Thai), which allegedly co-ordinated the Communist Party of Thailand's operations within the sangha. Phimontham was also charged with accusing the Sarit regime of dictatorship and corruption, and urging the general populace to revolt. After Phimontham was arrested the Khana Sangkhamontri ordered him to disrobe, but he again refused. Sarit consequently wrote to the Sangkhanayok (Juan Utthayi), ordering that Phimontham be disrobed because of the serious nature of the charges against him. Two Mahanikay Sangkhamontri, Phra Thammakhunaphorn and Phra Thammawarodom, then went to the police station where Phimontham was being held and forcibly stripped him of his robes. Soon after Phimontham was disrobed, and the source of any serious form of democratic opposition within the sangha had been removed, Sarit repealed the 1941 Sangha Act and issued a new Act which recentralised administrative power within the sangha in the hands of the Sangharaja, Plot Kittisophana, and the senior titled monks, who included Juan Utthayi and the Mahanikay monks who had disrobed Phimontham. Phimontham was held in jail until 30 August 1966, three years after Sarit's death, when he was finally cleared of all charges by a military court. 14 Krajaang Nanthapho comments on these events as follows: While Phra Phimontham was suffering the torture of imprisonment, the domain of the sangha of the original nikaya [that is, Mahanikay] was oppressed, interfered with, and broken apart, being placed under

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the influence of an empire of evil. At the same time, the tyrannical group used all forms of power to change and completely destroy the progressive features of the administrative system of the sangha.(T) 15

Krajaang Nanthapho maintains that the attacks against Phimontham were not purely personal but rather were part of a concerted campaign against Mahanikay monks. He claims that the recentralisation of power within the Mahatherasamakhom under the 1962 Sangha Act, the discrediting and removal from authority of the most vocal pro-democratic Mahanikay monks, in particular Phimontham, together with a manipulation of appointments to senior sangha positions enabled the Thammayut Order to regain administrative dominance over the Thai sangha under Sarit. Krajaang claims that the chief instigator of the attacks against Phimontham was the then Thammayut Sangkhanayok, Juan Utthayi, abbot of Wat Makut. However, Krajaang's simplistic analysis that the campaign against Phimontham and the recentralisation of power within the sangha under the 1962 Act represented a straightforward conflict between the Mahanikay and Thammayut does not explain the active participation of senior Mahanikay monks in the attacks on Phimontham and in the movement to abolish the 1941 Act. For example, the Sangharaja at the time of Phimontham's arrest was the Mahanikay monk, Plot Kittisophana, who in fact played a significant role in pressing for Phimontham to be disrobed. Krajaang attempts to explain this inconsistency in his analysis by claiming that Kittisophana had royal connections and so was sympathetic to the establishment's attacks on pro-democratic monks. He says that Kittisophana's father had been a royal page close to King Rama V and his mother was also related to the royal family. Krajaang claims, Consequently, even though he [Kittisophana] had been ordained into the old nikaya [Mahanikay], he was a person who was very close to the system of royal patronage. He was consequently able to follow the advice of the tyrannical group fully without thinking of the rightness or wrongness of his actions.(T) 16

However, Krajaang does not explain why the two monks who disrobed Phimontham in 1962 while he was under arrest were also from

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the Mahanikay Order, that is, Phra Thammawarodom (Sawai Thitawiro) of Wat Sangwet and Phra Thammakhunaphorn (Fyyn Chutinatharo, now Somdet Phra Phuttakhosajan) of Wat Saamphraya. Krajaang also does not explain the arrest of the senior Thammayut monk, Sasanasophana, on charges similar to those laid against Phimontham. Rather, what the evidence more clearly suggests is that most senior monks, of both nikaya, are now supportive of or co-opted by the secular political authorities with whom they are intimately connected. It is only the rare monk, like Phimontham, who upon promotion to a senior sangha position does not bend to support the political establishment. It was Phimontham's continued opposition to government policies and his refusal to become part of the conservative "club" of senior monks which drew such a critical response from both secular and clerical opponents and subsequently led to his downfall. The similar scapegoating of the senior Thammayut monk, Sasanasophana, further demonstrates the pressures to conform to state policies and to the conservative outlook of the establishment which are placed upon senior sangha administrators of both the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders. While the secular establishment continues to control the sangha administration, the traditional political favouring of the Thammayut over the Mahanikay has waned considerably in recent decades. While historical resentments and animosities do remain between the two nikaya and Thammayut monks do continue to hold a disproportionately large number of administrative positions, the establishment no longer sponsors the Thammayut Order as the sole vehicle for maintaining political control over the sangha. Two of the most prominent conservative and establishment-supported Buddhist movements in recent times, Phra Kittiwuttho and his Jittaphawan College and the Wat Phra Thammakaay movement, are both affiliated with the Mahanikay Order. Furthermore, the fact that the Thai Government has recently permitted the publication of a number of books critical of the historical domination of the sangha by the Thammayut Order, such as those by Krajaang Nanthapho and the monk historian Phra Wanna Wanno, 17 indirectly indicates that the Thammayut is no longer the

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focus of establishment control over the sangha. The publication of these books suggests that exposure of the past sins of the Thammayut Order and its supporters now poses no threat to the present systems of establishment patronage and control over the sangha, which no longer rely solely upon Thammayut monks. Phra Phimontham in the 1970s and 1980s

Phimontham continued to be subject to direct and indirect harassment from both within and outside the sangha throughout the 1970s and 1980s, in what amounted to an ongoing campaign to obstruct his rehabilitation and promotion to a senior administrative position. However, his continuing persecution became a rallying point for those monks and lay people dissatisfied with the centralised structure and conservative political alignment of the sangha hierarchy. Phimontham's case focused public attention on the sangha and provided a catalyst for the increasingly vehement lay and clerical calls for reforms of the sangha administration. The struggle for justice for Phimontham became a central part of the efforts by younger monks in the 1970s and 1980s to reform the administration of the sangha and to break the power of the state patronage system over senior administrative positions. The figure of Phra Phimontham thus became a symbol of a general disenchantment and frustration among junior monks with the conservatism of the sangha hierarchy, and his case has an historical significance for Thai Buddhism beyond the details of an individual monk's struggle for justice. As noted in Khlet LAp magazine: The problem in this matter [of Phra Phimontham] is not only the problem of an individual but rather is something that affects the entire sangha and which points clearly to the future of the religious domain. [Its outcome will determine] whether the sangha will remain sunk in a situation where the administration has been seized by a minority of individuals who have never faced the conditions of reality and only play off against each other, oppressing those who have constructive ideas and who should have the opportunity to administer and progressively develop the sangha.(T) 18

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In the mid-1970s a number of the young monks' groups which had been formed to lobby for the reform of the 1962 Sangha Act also began agitating for the return of Phimontham's and Sasanasophana's clerical titles. This agitation culminated in the week of 10-17 January 1975 when the Federation of Buddhists of Thailand and the Organisation of the Sangha Brotherhood (Ongkaan Sahaa Thammik) organised a protest sit-in of monks at Wat Mahathat to demand that the Mahatherasamakhom return the wrongfully rescinded titles. 20,000-25,000 monks joined the protest, including titled and senior administrative monks. After a week of growing tension among the protesting monks and their lay supporters and an initial refusal to agree to the protesters' demands, the Supreme Patriarch finally agreed to return Phimontham's and Sasanasophana's Phra Ratchakhana titles on 17 January 1975. 19 The Mahatherasamakhom also acceded to another of the demonstrators' demands, to forward the Federation of Thai Buddhist's revised Sangha Act to the Parliament. On 30 January 1975 the Mahatherasamakhom resolved that there were no outstanding charges against either Phimontham or Sasanasophana and on 22 February 1975 the Sangharaja returned the two monks' titles and symbolically conferred them with new sets of robes. On 5 June 1975, Niphon Sasithorn, the then Minister for Education, returned the two monks' clerical fans, which had been confiscated by the Department of Religious Affairs upon their demotion in 1960. 20 Sulak Sivarak claims that in 1975 the government of Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj decided not only to reinstate Phimontham but to promote his title to full Somdet rank, that is, Somdet Phra Phimontham, which would have automatically entitled him to a position in the Mahatherasamakhom. However, Kukrit subsequently announced that the King had not deigned to promote Phimontham to full Somdet rank "because his fate [duang-chataa] was not consistent with that of the King".(T) 21 Sulak adds the comment that Phimontham was a product of Wat Mahathat, which he says has a history of being in conflict with the "royal monasteries" in almost every period. He notes that this conflict dates back to the time of King Rama I, when Wat Mahathat was the monastery of the wang-naa or second king (uparaja).

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Sulak observes that previous abbots of Wat Mahathat had come into conflict with royal-sponsored, mainly Thammayut, monasteries in the last century and the first decades of this century, but after being intimidated most had quietly acquiesced in the demands of the Thammayut Order. 22 However, Phimontham was not so accommodating to the wishes of the abbots of the royal monasteries and Sulak comments, "It can be said that this is a matter of [the conflict between] the wang-naa [palace of the second king] and wang-luang [royal palace] being raised again." (T) 23 That is, like Krajaang N anthapho, Sulak Sivarak sees the long series of conflicts between Phimontham and establishment-aligned senior monks as a continuation of the historical conflict between the Thai state and its critics. In the early 1980s Phimontham's promotion to full Somdet status was consistently blocked by a clique of conservative Mahanikay monks within the Mahatherasamakhom led by Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan (Fyyn Chutinatharo). In 1984 Khlet Lap magazine made the following comments about Phutthakhosajan's role in the Council of Elders: Even though there are many senior thera in the Mahatherasamakhom who are members either by dint of their position [as Somdet rank monks] or by appointment, and who have the Somdet Phra Sangharaja as head, the Sangharaja is not the person with the most important role and influence. The people who have the biggest role are the Somdet of Wat Saamphraya [Fyyn Chutinatharo] and the Jau Khun of Wat Traimit [Sawai Thitawiro].(T) 24

Phutthakhosajan (Fyyn Chutinatharo) was one of the two monks who forcibly stripped Phimontham of his robes in 1962, and he has been dubbed the Mahanikay Sangharaja because he is the most powerful Mahanikay monk in the Mahatherasamakhom. Krajaang Nanthapho observes that Phutthakhosajan has tremendous power, which is a gratuity or prize for having served the tyrants up until the present. Thus one can decide for oneself the extent to which he can be relied upon as a base for the fight for democracy and justice in the sangha.(T) 25

Sawai Thitawiro, the present Phra Wisutthathibodi, abbot of the

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Mahanikay monastery, Wat Traimit (Trimitravidyarama), assisted Phutthakhosajan disrobe Phimontham in 1962. Thitawiro is very close to Phutthakhosajan and has also been appointed to the Council of Elders. Thitawiro even holds Phutthakhosajan's former Phra Ratchakhana title of Wisutthathibodi. Another Mahanikay monk in the Mahatherasamakhom closely associated with Thitawiro and Phutthakhosajan is Suwan Suwannachoto, the present Phra Phutthawongmuni, who, despite his youth, has been appointed to a senior position ahead of many more senior monks because of the patronage of his two powerful mentors. Krajaang calls these three monks "The voices of the dictatorship who hold power today".(T) 26 After Phimontham was removed from his position as abbot of Wat Mahathat in 1960 he was replaced by Phra Thammapanyabodi. When Thammapanyabodi died on 15 September 1980 Phimonthan was the obvious choice as a replacement but it was not until almost a year later, on 1 September 1981, that Phimontham was reappointed to his former position. The delay was caused by the Mahatherasamakhom, which at the instigation of Phutthakhosajan, had appealed to the Committee of Royal Decrees (Khanakammakaan Kritsadika) on 24 June 1981 to determine whether reappointing Phimontham as abbot of Wat Mahathat would conflict with the regulations of the 1962 Sangha Act. The Committee ruled on 26 August 1981 that there was no legal barrier to Phimontham's reappointment. On 27 July 1983 Somdet Phra Phutthajan (Sa-ngiam), abbot of Wat Suthat (Mahanikay), died, which created a vacant Somdet position in the Mahatherasamakhom. Subsequently, a vocal popular movement to appoint Phimontham to the vacant position was formed because, it was claimed, Phimontham was the most senior and most suitable of all monks of Rorng Somdet rank available for promotion. Indeed, Phimontham is the most senior titled monk in the entire Thai sangha, having been promoted to Rorng Somdet rank several years before the previous two Sangharaja were awarded titles of equivalent rank. The previous Sangharaja, Pun Punyasiri of Wat Phra Chetuphon (Mahanikay), was awarded the Rorng Somdet title of Phra Thammawarodom in 1956, seven years after Phimontham received his title,

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and the present Sangharaja (Waat Wasano )27 of Wat Ratchabophit (Rajapabitra) (Thammayut) was awarded the Rorng Somdet title of Phra Ubalikhunupamajan in 1957, eight years after Phimontham. All of the monks who held titles of full Somdet rank in 1983, when Phutthajan died, had been promoted to Rorng Somdet rank after Phimontham. In September 1983 Phra Ratcharatanobon [Rajaratnopala], Sangha Provincial Governor of Ubonratchathani province in the northeastern region of Isan, and secretary of the Co-ordinating Centre for Buddhist Affairs of the Northeast Region, sent a letter to the Sangha Provincial Governors in the seventeen northeastern provinces seeking their opinions on who was the most appropriate monk to be awarded the vacant Somdet title. The responses showed that there was unanimous support among the Isan sangha for the promotion of Phimontham. The results of this survey were then forwarded to each member of the Mahatherasamakhom for their consideration. 28 On 20 November 1983 Somdet Phra Thirayanamuni, abbot of Wat Jakrawat (Mahanikay) and member of the Council of Elders responsible for the Northeast Region, wrote to the Sangharaja, Waat Wasano, proposing that Phimontham be appointed to the vacant position. Upon receiving Thirayanamuni's advice, the Sangharaja wrote to the Department of Religious Affairs on 28 November 1983, recommending that the administrative aspects of the promotion of Phimontham to the vacant title be proceeded with by placing the matter on the agenda of the next meeting of the Mahatherasamakhom. However, the Sangharaja's letter was "misplaced" and the matter was not raised in the Council of Elders. Traditionally awards of Phra Ratchakhana titles are made on King Phumiphon's birthday, 5 December, but because the Department of Religious Affairs had not brought the matter of the vacant title to the Mahatherasamakhom for resolution by that date no appointment was made in 1983. 29 In February 1984 Matichon magazine published an interview with Thirayanamuni, who, like Phimontham, was himself from the northeast, about his support for the promotion of Phimontham and the failure of the Department of Religious Affairs to forward the Sangharaja's

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letter to the Council of Elders. 30 The Matichon article accused the Director-General of the Department, Chamlyang Wutthijan, of being remiss in his duties as secretary of the Mahatherasamakhom by not conveying Thirayanamuni's or the Sangharaja's recommendations to the Council of Elders in time for Phimontham's promotion to be considered. Matichon reported sources within the Department of Religious Affairs as saying the matter had been dropped at the instigation of several senior members of the Council of Elders, including Phutthakhosajan, of whom senior staff of the Department were close followers or luuk-sit. A subsequent issue of Matichon 31 reported that the Department of Religious Affairs had responded to the previous article by claiming that the author, Rungryang Priichaakun, had bad intentions towards Buddhism. The Department then refused to make any further comments on the issue. Matichon also reported that Phra Thirayanamuni had been visited by the police who wished to know if Matichon had forced him to give the interview for, if so, the magazine could be charged with a security violation. The Matichon article concluded with the following comments: The present problem has arisen in the most part because of the weaknesses of the 1962 Sangha Act now in force, which concentrates power in the central body of the Mahatherasamakhom and does not distribute administrative power, as was the case under the now rescinded 1941 Act.. . . This is an important problem that all sections [of society] must take an interest in resolving before degeneration sets in in the religion, which is an institution that unites the hearts and minds of the entire nation.(T) 32

The Department later announced that no new appointment could be made to the vacant Somdet title because the body of the former Phra Phutthajan had yet to be cremated. This was widely regarded as an irrelevant delaying strategy. Sulak Sivarak commented on Phra Phutthakhosajan's role in the affair as follows: Even though senior administrative monks from all provinces and Members of the House of Representatives from I san have made representations on this matter [of the promotion of Phimontham to Somdet

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rank], he [Phra Phutthakhosajan] is not afraid because he has never listened to popular opinion. He likes the autocratic form of dictatorship more than dhammadhipateyya [justice or rule by dhamma]. And as the time of the celebration of the King's birthday passes he claims that the King is dissatisfied with Phra Phimontham, as seen from the fact that His Majesty has not attended a thort kathin [robes conferring] ceremony at that monastery [Wat Mahathat] for many years.(T) 33

The senior monk Somdet Phra Thirayanamuni died in mid-1984, which then left two Mahanikay Somdet titles and positions in the Mahatherasamakhom vacant. However, senior monks within the Council of Elders, in particular, Phutthakhosajan and Wisutthathibodi, continued to instigate a series of delays in awarding the vacant titles in order to keep Phimontham out of the Council of Elders - perhaps in the hope that he might die of old age in the interim - and in order to manoeuvre the award of the titles to Mahanikay monks who would be more amenable to becoming part of the establishment. Krajaang Nanthapho suggests that there was royal influence behind the delays but says the legal restrictions of Thai l'ese-majeste laws prevent him from commenting further. 34 In 1984 Phutthakhosajan nominated his protege, Phutthawongmuni of Wat Benjamabophit (Mahanikay), for the vacant title of Somdet Phra Phutthajan but other monks in the Mahatherasamakhom rejected the proposal because Phutthawongmuni was too junior. Nevertheless, at Phutthakhosajan's instigation Phutthawongmuni was appointed the Sangha General Governor of the Northern Region, which had been the administrative position of the late Somdet Phra Phutthajan and which had previously been filled only by monks of full Somdet rank. At the end of 1984 Wisutthathibodi, another close supporter of Phutthakhosajan in the Council of Elders, was appointed Sangha General Governor of the Eastern Region, the late Somdet Phra Thirayanamuni's administrative position. At the same time, Phutthakhosajan occupied the positions of Sangha General Governor of both the Central and Southern Regions and was also influential in Pali education. That is, Phutthakhosajan and his clique used the delay in appointing new Somdet rank monks in order to arrogate greater administrative power

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to themselves and to monopolise the four most powerful administrative positions after that of the Sangharaja. The two Somdet titles of Phutthajan and Thirayanamuni remained vacant for a second year with no new appointees being named in the King's honours list on 5 December 1984. As frustrations mounted in the sangha, Phra Ratcharatanobon sought a meeting with Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond in November 1985 about the appointment of Phimontham to one of the vacant Somdet positions. Ratcharatanobon, representing the Co-ordinating Centre for Buddhist Affairs in the Northeast Region, conveyed the news that all seventeen Isan Sangha Provincial Governors had threatened to return their royal fans and insignia of clerical rank to protest the delay in promoting Phimontham. This highly symbolic threat of ceasing to recognise the status of titles conferred by the state, which as it turned out did not have to be carried out, was backed up by a further threat to entirely dissociate the Isan sangha from the Thai sangha. On 5 December 1985, Phra Phimontham was awarded the Somdet title of Somdet Phra Phutthajan and Phra Thammawarodom was awarded the title of Phra Thirayanamuni. 35 However, as might be expected, the conflict between Phimontham, now Somdet Phra Phutthajan, and Phutthakhosajan did not end with his promotion and appointment to the Mahatherasamakhom. As part of the celebration of King Phumiphon's sixtieth birthday on 5 December 1987, the Department of Religious Affairs decided that a sanghayana or Buddhist council should be convened to review and correct the Pali canon, the Tipitaka. It was announced that the committee reviewing the Suttapitaka would be headed by Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan, while the committee reviewing the Abhidhammapitaka would be headed by Somdet Phra Phutthajan (Phimontham). However, the sanghayana fell behind schedule and was not completed in time to republish the entire Thai Tipitaka for the King's birthday. Many monks refused to co-operate with the undertaking, arguing that the function of a sanghayana was to purge the scriptures of errors which threaten the religion and not simply to perform merit for the king. Other monks complained that a significantly longer period

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of time was required to complete a systematic review of the entire Tipitaka than the deadline of 5 December 1987 set by the Department of Religious Affairs. However, Matichon magazine reported a further serious obstruction to the conduct of the sanghayana.36 The Thai Government decided that, for historical reasons, the sanghayana should take place at Wat Mahathat, the location of the first sanghayana of the Chakri dynasty convened by King Rama I in the late eighteenth century. However, because of personal enmity Phra Phutthakhosajan refused to visit Wat Mahathat, of which Phimontham remains the abbot, and the sanghayana of the Suttapitaka, for which Phutthakhosajan was responsible, was as a result significantly delayed.

NOTES 1. The following biographical details have been summarised from Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 175-218. 2. Wiwat 1 (3), no. 48 (67), 8-14 Thanwaakhom 2527 [December 1984], p. 34. 3. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 130-31. 4. Ibid., pp. 127-28. 5. Somboon, Buddhism and Politics in Thailand, p. 59. 6. Siriwat Khamwansaa and Thorngphan Ratchaphak, Song Thai Nai 200 Pii - Lem 1 [The Thai sangha in the past two hundred years - Volume 1] (Bangkok: Mahajulabanakhan, 2524 [1981]), p. 13. 7. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 133. 8. Ibid., p. 136. 9. Siriwat and Thorngphan, op. cit., p. 182. 10. Ibid., p. 183. 11. Ibid., p. 184. 12. Ibid., p. 185. 13. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 142. 14. Ibid., p. 149. 15. Ibid., p. 156. 16. Ibid., p. 129. 17. Phra Wanna Wanno Bhikkhu, Prawat Thammayut Lae Mahanikay [A history of the Thammayut and Mahanikay] (Damnoen Saduak Ratchburi: Wat Lak-hok-ratanaram, 2529 [1986] ).

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18. "Khwam Phra Phimontham - Chanuan Phaa Aanaajak Song" [The toppling of Phra Phimontham - A fuse to split the sangha], Khlet Lap, 4-10 Kumphaaphan 2527 [February 1984], pp. 13-14. Cited by Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 181-82. 19. Sornboon, op. cit., p. 122. 20. "Phra Phimontham Kap Tamnaeng Somdet" [Phra Phimotham and the Somdet position], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 8 Thanwaakhom 2528 [December 1985], pp. 9-10. 21. Sulak Sivarak, "Karanii Phra Phimontham Wat Mahathat" [The case of Phra Phimontharn of Wat Mahathat], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 5 Kumphaaphan 2527 [February 1984], p. 17. 22. Ibid., p. 18. 23. Ibid., p. 19. 24. Khlet Lap, 4-10 Kumphaaphan 2527 [February 1984], pp. 13-14, cited by Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 181-82. 25. Ibid., p. 171. 26. Ibid., p. 174. 27. Waat Wasano died in late 1988 after this chapter had been completed, and at the time of publication no official appointment had been made to fill the vacant position of Sangharaja. 28. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 196-97. 29. Ibid., pp. 197-98. 30. Rungryang Priichaakun, "Tamnaeng 'Somdet' Raboet Luuk Yai Nai Wongkaan Song" [The big bomb of the "Somdet" position explodes in the sangha], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 5 Kumphaaphan 2527 [February 1984], pp. 11-14. 31. Aatamaa Awiroot [pseud.], "Chamlae Krom Kaan-saasanaa - Chamra Phya Khwaam-sawatdii" [Cutting open the Department of Religious Affairs A clean-up for the sake of welfare], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 18 Miinaakhom 2527 [March 1984], pp. 15-17. 32. Ibid., p. 17. 33. Sulak, op. cit. 34. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 212. 35. Ibid., p. 325. 36. "Chae Byang-lang Sangkhayana Phra Traipidok - Syk Somdet 2 Sarnnak" [Revealing the background of the sanghayana of the Tipitaka - A battle of two Somdets], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 15 Mithunaayon 2530 [June 1987], p. 10.

SECTION T ·W · 0 CONTEMPORARY URBAN BUDDHIST MOVEMENTS

CHAPTER SIX

Reformist Monks

As noted in Chapter One, Buddhism in Thailand is not only structured by the official state-imposed system of the sangha administration. Thai Buddhism is also patterned by a complex and fluid system of unofficial relations between the Buddhist laity and individual monks and monasteries. Occasionally, some monks with distinctive intepretations of doctrine or systems of religious practice develop such a large following of faithful lay supporters that it is appropriate to regard the monk and his lay audience as a distinct movement or sect within the body of Thai Buddhism. In the second half of the twentieth century a number of such Buddhist movements centred on the teachings of a particular monk have grown rapidly in size and influence. The largest movements, in terms of the numbers of lay adherents, tend to be those whose interpretations of Buddhist teaching and practice reflect the political aspirations and economic interests of a certain section of Thai society, and which consequently attract significant numbers of followers from that social stratum. Most of the larger urban Buddhist movements thus have a socially identifiable audience and it is possible

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to characterise such movements in terms of the socio-economic position of their audiences as being pro-establishment, anti-establishment, intellectual-professional, lower middle class, and so on. The analysis of urban Buddhist movements and their lay audiences, as opposed to the study of formal state-sangha relations, is an important component of the study of the legitimatory function of contemporary Thai Buddhism. This is because of the growing influence of groups outside of and in opposition to the traditional political establishment. Controlling neither the sangha administration nor the official interpretation of Buddhist teaching and practice propagated by the state-controlled hierarchy of monks, many members of the professional and middle classes have instead turned to a number of sympathetic monks - such as Phutthathat, Panyanantha, and Phothirak to provide a religio-political justification of their aspirations. Because of the establishment's effective monopoly of the mechanisms of state control of the sangha and of Buddhist education in state-run schools and colleges, the true extent of the ideological conflict between the establishment and its middle-class adversaries is not revealed by a study of state-sangha relations alone. While the political struggles of Phra Phimontham and conflicts about senior clerical appointments have great symbolic significance, the most important developments in Thai Buddhism, in terms of the present and future political role of the religion, are taking place outside the convention-bound hierarchy of administrative monks. Since the 1960s, and paralleling the country's rapid socio-economic growth, a virtual market-place of competing Buddhist movements has developed in Bangkok outside the formal structure of state-sangha relations. In this Buddhist market-place access to lay supporters' funds, printing facilities, press space, and radio and television time are all important in determining which movements convey their teachings to the audience of lay Buddhist consumers. For the average lay urban dweller the reporting and promotion of individual monks and religious movements in the printed and electronic media have far greater importance than the remote and increasingly irrelevant activities of the members of the Mahatherasamakhom, provincial sangha councils, and so on.

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There appear to be at least two major mechanisms by which a monk develops a system of teaching and practice that reflects the interests of an identifiable section of Thai society, and so develops a significant lay following among that group. The first mechanism is the conscious development of an outlook on Buddhism specifically tailored to the requirements of one group by a monk who either has political sympathies with that group or who opportunistically hopes to benefit from and promote his own clerical career by currying the favour of influential lay supporters from that group. While the conscious tailoring of a system of teaching and practice to a specific target audience is found in all the larger religious movements sponsored by both the establishment and the middle class, this direct approach appears to be more important among right-wing monks supportive of the establishment. The most obvious example of an opportunistic monk is Phra Kittiwuttho, who, while not a member of any establishment group by birth, has managed to attract a significant and influential following among members of the establishment by espousing conservative interpretations of Buddhist doctrine and by judiciously cultivating the friendship and support of influential patrons. In the process, Kittiwuttho has obtained a clerical title and massive financial support to fund his various projects based at the Jittaphawan College for monks which he founded in Chonburi province east of Bangkok in the late 1960s. In contrast, monks who consciously develop religious teachings reflecting the aspirations and outlook of the middle class tend to be members of the middle class by birth and appear to be motivated more by a sense of class solidarity and opposition to the establishment than by opportunistic attempts to promote their own careers. Because the middle class does not control the state-operated mechanisms of career advancement within the sangha, and because its members are generally not as wealthy as individual members of the establishment, monks who explicitly align themselves with the middle class may achieve little in terms of promoting their clerical careers or amassing wealth and influence. On the contrary, they are more likely to suffer set-backs and obstructions in their careers and propagatory work because of

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antagonism and opposition from the more influential and administratively more senior monks who are aligned with the establishment. The second mechanism by which a monk develops a class-specific interpretation of Buddhism and so attracts an identifiable following is through the less explicitly political approach of attempting to develop "relevant" interpretations of the religion. Many Thai monks and lay people are concerned to prevent the decay of the teachings, practices, and traditional institutional relations of Thai Buddhism in the face of rapid socio-economic change. The most common response to the perceived threat of social change to the traditional place of Buddhism in Thai society is to develop interpretations of doctrine and approaches to religious practice which attempt to demonstrate the value and relevance of the religion to contemporary beliefs, patterns of life and work, and institutional structures. As the lay academic Siddhi ButrIndr observes, Unless the spiritual principles of religion can be translated in terms of social ideals, values and interests or can influence worldly affairs, they will not survive as far as society as a whole is concerned. 1

The reformist monk Phutthathat (Buddhadasa) uses the notion of "benefit" (prayoot) to justify his reinterpretations of Buddhist doctrine. Phutthathat maintains that Buddhism must be interpreted so that it is "beneficial" for modern people, meaning that it should be appropriate and relevant to contemporary concerns. For example, when explaining his demythologised interpretation of nibbana as being a spiritual condition attainable in and relevant to this life here and now, Phutthathat says, What benefit is there in the teaching that we will attain nibbana after we have died? It is as a result of such teachings that modern people are not interested in nibbana. Moreover, Buddhism is made barren by such teachings.(T) 2

The widespread concern for relevance in religion has promoted a rapid growth in analytical studies of Buddhism in an attempt to select, interpret, and re-present teachings and practices regarded as appropriate to contemporary lay life. However, because most monks

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and lay interpreters consciously or unconsciously accept the values of one or other social group their analyses and reinterpretations also tend to reflect the values and interests of one section of society. Consequently attempts to provide a link between the past and present tend to be biased towards one group or certain related groups in Thai society. That is, contemporary reinterpreters of Buddhist teachings tend to focus on a certain view of the ideal Thai society and their theoretical demonstrations of the relevance of the religion to that interpretation of the social ideal simultaneously function to provide a religious justification for that particular form of society. In this way, monks may develop a religio-politicallegitimation of one group's socio-political dominance in Thai society while pursuing the ostensibly religious activity of demonstrating the relevance of Buddhism's universal truths to the contemporary human condition. In analysing the legitimatory function of an urban Buddhist movement it is necessary to establish the relationship between the socio-economic position and political interests or aspirations of the movement's lay audience and the precise interpretations of doctrine and forms of religious practice promoted by the movement. In such an analysis the biography of the movement's founder or prime propagator and of the more prominent lay followers can often provide useful insights. Reformist Monks and the Buddhism of Dissent

As noted in Chapter Three, reformist monks as a group reject the epistemological dualism of traditional Thai Buddhism which has historically been used to justify the practical distinction between a lay religious path based on a partial and inadequate understanding of truth and a clerical religious path founded on complete insight into religious truth. Reformist monks, such as Phutthathat, Panyanantha (Pafifiananda) and, to a lesser extent, Thepwethi (Devavedhi), 3 maintain that a true and accurate reading of Buddhist doctrine must be based on a consistent and logical development of the fundamental theoretical principles of the religion.

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The reformist monks, as epitomised by Phutthathat, are intellectuals who approach Buddhism primarily as a theoretical system and secondarily as a system of religious practice. While not devaluing clerical and renunciate practices, and in fact placing considerable emphasis on the individual practice of morality and vipassana or insight meditation, the reformists nevertheless approach and analyse Buddhist practice in terms of their rationalist view of Buddhist doctrine and are prepared to criticise and abandon traditional practices which they regard as inconsistent with their interpretation of the Buddha's teachings on salvation. That is, the reformist monks also apply their philosophical rationalism in the domain of religious practice. Just as they accept only those beliefs which are consistent with the theoretical principles of the religion, so too the reformists accept only those practices which they believe are directly related to promoting the individual attainment of nibbana. This rationalist approach to the teaching and the practice of Buddhism leads the reformists to reject both the supernaturalism of the traditional village forms of Buddhism and the metaphysical or royal form of the religion. This rejection of all forms of supernaturalism, both traditional animism and royal metaphysics, places the reformists in opposition to both the traditional rural, peasant forms of Buddhism and to the royal cults which, since the regime of Sarit Thanarat in the late 1950s, have been used to legitimise military authoritarianism in addition to the traditional institution of the monarchy. Reformist or middle-class Buddhism is often articulated in terms of the political aspirations of the Thai "people", by which is meant not only the middle class but also the rural and urban labouring populations. However, the reformist religion of these spokesmen for the rights of the Thai "people" is at odds with the popular religion of those they claim to represent. The religion of the Thai "people" is more likely to be dominated by supernatural or metaphysical beliefs than by the rationalism and empiricism of the reformists. Furthermore, the spokesmen of the "people", who present reformist Buddhism as a vehicle of general politico-religious dissent rather than simply as a medium of middle-class aspirations, are invariably well-educated and

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occupy professional or semi-professional jobs. Even if they come from poor rural or urban backgrounds, by occupation and income level these spokesmen are part of the middle class. For this reason reformist Buddhism is here categorised as a middle-class phenomenon arising from the educational and politico-economic context of contemporary bourgeois life in Bangkok rather than from a rural or urban workingclass setting. There is, nevertheless, a strong association between the philosophical rationalism of the reformist monks and their common political stance as vocal supporters of democratic government and liberal, egalitarian social structures. As noted in Chapter Two, Phonsak Jirakraisiri has shown that there is a close relationship between the holding of rationalist views of Buddhist doctrine and support for democratic political principles. 4 From these results Phonsak deduced that Buddhist doctrine, as contained in the original scriptures of the Tipitaka but not as interpreted in the historically later commentaries traditionally emphasised in Thailand, is inherently supportive of democratic and liberal principles. Phonsak's views are common amongst reformist monks and their lay supporters in the middle class. For example, Krajaang Nanthapho claims that Buddhism is in contradiction with the principles of feudal [sakdinaa] or dictatorial and tyrannical government. However, in Thailand the feudal groups have long used Buddhism as a tool in governing and in protecting the power of their own group.... The feudal groups have at all times relied upon ritualistic expressions, which are but the outer coating of religion, to build up the people's belief in the feudal system of government of the group of the supposed devaraja [Brahmanical god-king]. ... As for the Buddhist sangha, it has become a mere tool of the government in pulling in the people to respect and bow to the feudal group.(T) 5

Phra Phaisaan Wisaalai, a younger reformist monk, hearkens back to what he regards as the more truly Buddhist Thai state of Sukhothai under King Ramkhamhaeng, whom he regards as having been truly concerned for the welfare of the people. Phaisaan claims that under genuine Buddhist principles of government, as exemplified by

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R.amkhamhaeng's administration of Sukhothai in the fourteenth century, the king was like a father who, abiding by the dasarajadhamma or ten principles of moral leadership, gave priority to the welfare of his people. In contrast, Phaisaan maintains that the authoritarian emphasis in Thai politics dates from the pollution of genuine Buddhist principles by the Brahmanical devaraja or god-king notions in the Ayutthaya period. According to the Khmer devaraja theory the monarch was regarded as an incarnation of a Hindu god, usually Shiva or Vishnu. The strong influence of this theory in medieval Thailand is shown by the names of Ayutthayan kings. For example, the name Narai is an epithet of Vishnu, while the name Naresuan combines the terms nara, "man", and ishvara (Thai: isuan) or Shiva. 6 Phaisaan claims that the historical authoritarianism of Thai governments after Sukhothai resulted from the establishment of Khmer Brahmanism in the [Thai] Royal Palace from the beginning of the Ayutthaya period and the acceptance of the belief that absolute authority based on harsh and strong punishments was necessary for government.(Tf

Phaisaan continues, It can be said that the Sukhothai form of government (which was influenced by the [Buddhist] dhammaraja theory) was a government for the benefit and well-being of the people, but the Ayutthayan form of government (which accepted the [Brahmanical] devaraja theory ... ) was a government for the power of the state.(T) 8

Phaisaan sees an ideological continuity between the authoritarianism of the Ayutthayan monarchy and the military authoritarianism of Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikachorn: Although Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat said that he governed like a father looking after his children, on the model of Sukhothai, the facts show that this method was little different from the Ayutthayan form of governing. That is, he used harsh and strong absolute authority.(T) 9

However, despite many reformist monks' strong claims about

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the incompatibility of Buddhist doctrine with dictatorship and authoritarianism, and of the inherently democratic quality of Buddhist principles, the relationship between the Buddha's teachings and democracy is not so straightforward. Somboon Suksamran describes the canonical Buddhist account of government contained in the Agaiiflanna Sutta of the Suttapitaka as describing a form of government that combines elements of democracy and authoritarianism and which provided a compromise between the competing political systems of the Buddha's time. Somboon also maintains that the Agafliia Sutta provides a relevant political model for contemporary Thailand. In the creation myth presented in the Agaflfla Sutta the final stage of human society is structured around a single strong leader or king who is chosen by the mass of the people and who is entrusted with significant political power in order to govern for the welfare of the people. However, as Somboon observes, This governor or leader will remain in the position so long as he does not use power wrongly or tyrannically. If he acts wrongly the people have the right to remove him or kill him.(T) 10

According to Somboon, the fact that Buddhism arose in a period of political change and conflict between monarchies and oligarchical or semi-democratic states in North India is reflected in the Buddha's pragmatic approach to political structures. As Somboon observes, "In the view of Buddhism a good political system may be of any administrative form"(T) 11 provided it adheres to certain principles that permit the people to follow spiritual practices. Somboon regards Buddhism as adaptable and particularly well-suited as the religious ideology of a society undergoing rapid social change: Because the Buddha gave importance to the forces of political and social change . . . this has made the principles of Buddhism highly flexible and capable of adjusting well to changing conditions without losing any of its integrity.(T) 12

Nevertheless, Somboon reveals his personal bias towards democratic political systems when he describes the principles that a Buddhist

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government, whatever its structural form, should adhere to. The three main principles of Buddhist government outlined by Somboon are: 1. The accumulation and use of political power should lead to the benefit of the greatest number of the people. 2. The security of the administrative system or of the government and those who govern [should] neither become an objective in itself nor the ultimate objective of the system of political administration but rather [should be] used as an aid or tool in promoting the benefit, welfare, unity, and peace of the people. 3. The political system [should] give importance to human values by emphasising equality, freedom from birth-defined castes, equality of the sexes ... and [it should] emphasise freedom by prohibiting slavery and including advice on the use of rational principles in considering and deciding on various issues.(T) 13

In the light of Somboon's comments, Phonsak's strong claim that Buddhist principles are fundamentally democratic cannot be sustained. However, it is valid to state that the reformist monks' rationalism and return to the canonical scriptures are linked to a movement to give authority to new, democratically inclined readings of Buddhism. While Buddhist principles do not unambiguously support democracy, the doctrinal basics of the religion are nevertheless being read in a democratic way by reformists. Furthermore, as indicated above in Somboon's list of principles that a Buddhist government should adhere to, Buddhist doctrine is also being used by reformist monks and their lay supporters to promote liberal social values and the social and political rights of individuals. For example, Phra Phaisaan Wisaalai maintains that Buddhist values have traditionally emphasised the welfare of the collectivity and should now also give equal emphasis to the welfare and rights of the individual. He proposes that the development of the Buddhist theory of collective or social welfare should go together with an acceptance of the values of the modern form of society, so that they too become a part of the Buddhist ethical system. Such values are new for Buddhism in Thailand or at least were not basic values in Thailand in the past .... If Buddhism in Thailand is to keep up with the new society there

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should be a realisation that justice, liberty, and equality . . . should be Buddhist values no less than love, helping others, honesty, or humility. What is more, the importance of Buddhism's role in modern society will be relative to the extent to which these contemporary values are thoughtfully accepted.(T) 14

Few commentators have appreciated the fundamental political significance of rationalist Buddhism as the alternative Buddhist ideology of the Thai middle class and intelligentsia. For example, Charles Keyes has said, If we were to assume, as many do who approach Buddhism from the theological or textual side, that the quest for niroana is the sole essence of Buddhism, it would then follow that Buddhism could not be looked to as providing a basis for power to be utilised in achieving this worldly or samsaric ends. 15

Keyes concludes that only popular or kammic Buddhism, with its concern for merit, is intimately related to issues of secular power. He maintains that nibbanic or doctrinal Buddhism severs its practitioners' connections with the domain of political activity because of its goal of completely ending suffering, by attaining nibbana. In contrast, he maintains that kammic Buddhism retains a link with worldly affairs by seeking only to alleviate suffering by acccumulating bun or merit within the context of worldly existence. However, Keyes takes too narrow a view of the theoretical potentials latent in the vast array of Buddhist teachings and he ignores the socio-political significance of nibbanic Buddhism for the Thai middle class. By the judicious selection of texts, careful exegesis and selective emphasis and de-emphasis of doctrines, such as systematically carried out by Phutthathat, even nibbanic Buddhism can be forged into a potent expression of contemporary social and political aspirations. Keyes' comments, admittedly made before the efflorescence of middle-class power in the 1973-76 period, ignore the close association between rationalist or nibbanic Buddhism and calls for democracy. He also ignores the fact that rationalist Buddhism is opposed to the state orthodoxy of metaphysical or kammic Buddhism which, even independent of its actual theoretical

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content, automatically imbues rationalist Buddhism with subversive political implications. Phra Phutthathat (Buddhadasa) Bhikkhu 16

Phutthathat was born in 1906 in the southern Thai province of Suratthani where his Chinese father and Thai mother owned a general store in the small town of Chaiya. 17 He was ordained into the Mahanikay Order in Chaiya in 1926 and he spent a couple of years in Bangkok from 1930 to 1932 studying for a Pali ecclesiastical degree. However, Phutthathat became deeply disenchanted with what he regarded as the lack of insight into the Buddha's teachings among Bangkok monks. He returned to Chaiya just before the 1932 revolution and spent the following two years in solitary contemplation and private study of the canonical scriptures. Phutthathat has remained based at Chaiya since 1932 and is the abbot of a forest monastery he established there and named Suan Mok, the Garden of Liberation. Since the mid-1930s Phutthathat has written prolifically and has developed a distinctive and innovative approach to the interpretation of the Buddha's teachings. Phutthathat is undoubtedly the most influential contemporary Buddhist philosopher monk in Thailand and his consistently rationalist and reformist approach to the interpretation of Buddhist doctrine has won him a strong following among educated Thais. Sanitsuda Ekachai, religious journalist for the English-language Bangkok Post, calls Phutthathat "Thailand's greatest contemporary spiritual leader". 18 The academic philosopher Seri Phongphit has remarked, His [Phutthathat's] line of thought has an influence on a large number of Thai intellectuals, thinkers, and writers and he seems to be accepted and admired by intellectuals more than by other groups, especially since 14 October 1973, when his thought - as presented by himself and by others - has become increasingly clearly concerned with social and political affairs. (T) 19

It is noteworthy that Phutthathat appears to have been strongly influenced by the rationalist aspects of the religious reforms of Prince Mongkut and Prince Wachirayan and to have had close relationships

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with monks of the Thammayut Order during his early years as a monk. His first contact with Thammayut monks was in the mid-1920s when monks from Wat Ratchathiwat in Bangkok established a temple school for monks at Wat Photharam (Bodharama) in Phutthathat's home town of Chaiya. The popularity of Phutthathat's reformist approach to Buddhism among at least some Thammayut monks is indicated by the fact that in 1937 his translation of the history of the Buddha's life was accepted as a textbook by the Thammayut-run Mahamakut Buddhist University. In the same year, the senior Thammayut monk, Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan (Jaroen Yanaworn) of Wat Thepsirin, who was then also Chairman of the Mahatherasamakhom, paid Phutthathat the honour of visiting him at his remote forest retreat of Suan Mok. Phutthathat also agreed to write a book in honour of the royal Thammayut Sangharaja, Prince Chinaworasiriwat, who died in 1937.20 Phutthathat received personal encouragement for his rationalist analyses of Buddhist doctrine from several senior Thammayut monks throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In a biographical review of Phutthathat in the magazine Matichon 21 it has been noted that the Thammayut Sangharaja, Wachirayanawong, of Wat Bowornniwet and Phra Sasanasophana (Plort Atthakari) of Wat Ratchathiwat 22 were among his strongest supporters in this period. Sasanasophana in particular was instrumental in Phutthathat's being awarded a clerical title so that he could play a greater role in sangha affairs. While Phutthathat is officially abbot of the royal monastery of Wat Phraboromthat (Varaparamadhatu) Chaiya, he has never in fact taken up that position, preferring to remain at his forest hermitage of Suan Mok. The extent of Thammayut support for Phutthathat and his reformist work is further indicated by the fact that when the conservative Phra Thipprinya made representations to Prime Minister Phibun Songkhram and Sangharaja Wachirayanawong in 1948 accusing Phutthathat of being a communist, the Sangharaja took no action against Phutthathat other than to direct him to study the scriptural commentary of the Visuddhimagga. 23 Phutthathat has continued to receive support for his ideas from reformist members of the Thammayut Order, as

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well as from monks and lay followers of his own Mahanikay Order, as indicated by the regular inclusion of articles by or about him in official Thammayut journals such as Thammajaksu, the journal of Mahamakut Buddhist University. Thammajaksu, like many other Buddhist journals and news magazines, published a long article noting Phutthathat's important contributions to Thai Buddhism on the occasion of his eightieth birthday in 1986.24 The extent of support for an innovative Mahanikay monk like Phutthathat by senior members of the Thammayut Order is unusual and contrasts sharply with the vehement criticisms and persecution of Phra Phimontham during the 1960s. Phutthathat appears to have received support from some senior Thammayut monks because his reformist ideas were recognised as continuing the rationalist intellectual tradition begun by Mongkut and continued by Wachirayan. When he went to Bangkok to study Pali in the early 1930s Phutthathat became deeply disenchanted with the supernaturalism and ignorance of the Tipitaka among his fellow Mahanikay monks. Like many Thammayut monks, Phutthathat was very critical of traditional Thai supernaturalism and, like Mongkut and Wachirayan, he supported such innovations as the teaching of Buddhism to lay people in the vernacular rather than in Pali and the translation of the Tipitaka into Thai. He also adopted some of the dhutanga or ascetic practices of Thammayut monks, such as not wearing shoes and eating only one meal a day, and he followed the example of the strict Buddhist anchorites by retreating to the forest to meditate and seek personal insight. There are therefore a number of reasons why Phutthathat should have received support from those members of the Thammayut hierarchy who continued to support rationalist interpretations of Buddhist doctrine. Phutthathat's criticisms of the beliefs and practices of his fellow Mahanikay monks and his adoption of some Thammayut teachings and ascetic practices was undoubtedly regarded as supporting the interests of the Thammayut Order in imposing its own system of Buddhism as the national religious norm. Furthermore, Phutthathat's retreat from sangha politics in Bangkok to the monastic isolation of southern Thailand meant that, unlike Phimontham who based himself

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in Bangkok, he posed no threat to the administration of the sangha. While Phimontham struggled to have his reformist ideas implemented by gaining political power in the sangha hierarchy, Phutthathat was happy simply to write, publish, and lecture. Phutthathat did not join any of the protest movements to reform the sangha in the 1930s or later decades but rather withdrew to his own self-created zone of reform and intellectual freedom at Suan Mok. But while Phutthathat was disenchanted with the supernaturalism and lax practices of his fellow Mahanikay monks, he did not seek re-ordination into the Thammayut Order like some other prominent Mahanikay monks of his generation, despite his many intellectual affinities with the reform Order. This was because he was also critical of the clerical politics and monarchist associations of the Thammayut Order. Phutthathat did not re-ordain into the Thammayut Order because he supported the democratic principles espoused by the revolutionaries in 1932 and because his social background in the middle class put him in a social and political position of conflict with the aristocratically dominated Thammayut. Instead, Phutthathat adopted aspects of the Thammayut Order's intellectual doctrinalism and strict clerical practice and retreated from association with either the Mahanikay or Thammayut Order by becoming a forest monk in southern Thailand temporarily dissociated from formal relations with any monastery. Despite his close links with the Thammayut Order, Phutthathat did not abandon his formal association with the Mahanikay Order, and when he established his own monastery at Suan Mok in the 1930s it was officially registered within the Mahanikay Order. While Phutthathat regards the sangha politics of the two Orders as largely irrelevant - he considers himself first and foremost to be a Buddhist and not a member of any subdivision of the sangha - his continuing formal association with the Mahanikay Order is nevertheless important for many of his middle-class supporters who, like Krajaang Nanthapho, regard the Mahanikay as progressive and aligned with the interests of the common people. While Phutthathat received support for his work from influential Thammayut monks from the 1930s to the 1950s, he nevertheless came

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under suspicion of being a communist during the regime of Sarit Thanarat in the 1960s. The reformist monk Phra Phothirak, under the pen name of Saawok (savaka, "disciple"), has written that Phutthathat was once approached by a forang ("Westerner") of unspecified nationality involved with the anti-communist campaign of the Thai Government. The forang offered material assistance to support Suan Mok in return for Phutthathat's co-operation with the official anticommunist campaign. Phutthathat refused to co-operate, saying that he would follow the path of the Buddha and would not use Buddhism to oppose communism. Phothirak states that the forang then attempted to find ways to discredit and blacken Phutthathat's name and implies that the campaign waged against Phutthathat by Anan Senakhan (see later section) in the late 1970s and early 1980s was linked with this forang's activities. 25 The use of rationalist interpretations of Buddhism as a legitimatory basis of the exercise of political power by those actually in power was a feature of the government of most Thai rulers, both kings and commoners, from the time of King Mongkut to the mid-1950s. However, during the regime of Sarit Thanarat the Thai establishment by and large abandoned rationalist Buddhism and returned to the earlier metaphysical forms of the religion to provide legitimatory support to military rule. Under Sarit there was an atavistic reversion to more traditional religious beliefs among the political establishment, which transformed rationalist Buddhism into an "oppositional" or subversive religious form. The content of rationalist Buddhism did not change but in the altered political environment of the 1960s the significance of rationalist teachings was redefined to represent an oppositional politico-religious force. This decline in the political fortunes of reformist Buddhism under Sarit and Thanom explains the corresponding decline in the fortunes of reformist monks such as Phutthathat, Phimontham, and Sasanasophana during the same period, when progressive monks of both Orders were harassed and persecuted. The intellectual history of Thai Buddhism in the past two centuries has represented anything but a triumph of rationality or a linear progression from superstition to reason. From the 1960s up until the

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present, religious rationalism has been placed on the defensive after earlier successes over traditional beliefs under Kings Mongkut and Chulalongkorn and during the governments of Pridi Phanomyong and Phibun Songkhram. The intellectual history of Thai Buddhism is thus intimately related to the political and economic history of modern Thailand. Sarit's religious atavism in fact reinforced the association between reformist Buddhism and progressive political movements and served to reinvigorate the religious rationalist movement by linking it with the forces opposed to authoritarian military rule. While Phutthathat's early supporters in the 1930s and 1940s were Thammayut monks who saw him as continuing the intellectual traditions of their Order, he developed a wholly new following among students and the middle class in the 1970s. Rather than destroying the religious reformists, Sarit and Thanom instead unintentionally succeeded in transforming Phutthathat and other religious rationalists into the politico-religious symbols of an alternative, non-authoritarian social order. The historical significance of Phutthathat's work lies firstly in his having introduced the intellectual rationalism and practical strictness of the Thammayut Order to Mahanikay monks. And secondly, his importance lies in his having developed Mongkut's and Wachirayan's original incomplete religious rationalism to its logical conclusion by criticising both traditional Thai beliefs and royal-sponsored supernatural cults. That is, Phutthathat has combined the intellectual rationalism and modernism of the Thammayut Order with a critique of the traditional Thai social order to create the theoretical foundation of an interpretation of Buddhism which is both rationalist and socially progressive. The Thammayut Order has not been able to continue the intellectual momentum of Mongkut's initial attempts to develop a rationalist interpretation of Buddhism because of the historical legacy of its conservative political associations. When Sarit Thanarat rehabilitated the monarchy and revived the traditional metaphysical form of Buddhism which legitimated the centralisation of political power, the Thammayut's historical function as a medium of royal policies exerted a theoretical inhibiting force on the Order. Because of the

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royal associations senior Thammayut monks were prevented from too strongly or too openly endorsing rationalist interpretations of doctrine which could be used to subvert the re-emphasised role of the monarchy and its military supporters. In contrast, Phutthathat has allowed Mongkut's original rationalist intellectual momentum to continue and develop further by transferring it to the politically more suitable medium of the popularly aligned Mahanikay Order. Phutthathat has thus permitted a new generation of educated, professional, and middleclass Thai Buddhists to identify the Mahanikay Order as both the most intellectually progressive and the most politically progressive religious Order. Despite his personal disavowal of political involvement, Phutthathat is nevertheless one of the most important intellectual and political influences on contemporary Thai Buddhism. However, unlike Phimontham, Phutthathat's political importance lies not in his own actions but rather in the actions of those who use his ideas and interpretations to justify their criticisms of the establishment and of political authoritarianism. While Phutthathat has eschewed personal political involvement, he has nevertheless maintained contacts with pro-democratic politicians and he has written extensively on politics. In the 1940s Phutthathat maintained contact with Pridi Phanomyong and the pro-democratic lawyer Sanya Thammasak, and in the 1950s he sought out and maintained a relationship via correspondence with the progressive author and journalist Kulaap Saipradit (Sri Burapha). 26 His explicit interest in developing Buddhism as a theoretical vehicle to support political democracy was shown as early as 1947 when he addressed the Buddhist Society of Thailand on the topic "Buddhism and the Objectives of Democracy"Y When the rationalist approach to interpreting Buddhism is wedded with a strong commitment to socio-economic advancement and is expanded into a criticism of the traditional structure of the political and economic domains it has the potential of becoming an intellectual justification for the overthrow of the hierarchical, patronage-based social order in the pursuit of socio-economic development. This radical Buddhism is associated with virulent criticisms of corruption, the

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operation of privilege, and what are perceived as the other abuses associated with the traditional social order. Norman Jacobs has made a distinction between what he terms modernisation and development. 28 Jacobs defines modernisation as the maximisation of the productive potential of a society within its existing socio-economic structure and cultural system, while he defines development as the maximisation of a society's productive potential regardless of the limits imposed by its present social, economic, cultural, or political structures. That is, for Jacobs development denotes the preparedness to overturn and restructure social relations where they become a barrier to economic expansion. Jacobs maintains that because Thailand is developing its productive capacity while preserving its traditional social structure - in which personal and political considerations prevail over considerations of technical competence or economic efficiency - it is a modernising economy but it is not developing. However, in contrast to Jacob's analysis of Thai society, the intellectually and politically radical type of Buddhism characteristic of the religious reformists can be regarded as providing a potential theoretical base for actual development, in Jacob's sense of the term, by offering a Buddhist justification for the overthrow of the traditional social structure. However, it is not yet clear whether middle-class movements based on the teachings of reformists such as Phutthathat are criticising only the excesses of the traditional system or the fundamental character of the system itself. The political interests of those middle-class groups presently outside the traditional system of patronage and privilege could be promoted either by finding a way into the establishmentdominated social order, or by attacking it and usurping the traditional political role of the establishment. Only the latter more radical position could form the basis of a Buddhist theory of development, while the former position would at best lead only to modernisation in Jacob's sense of the term. Phutthathat in fact oscillates between these two options in his work, at times supporting centralised political systems and at other times supporting more explicitly democratic systems. His intellectual ruthlessness does, nevertheless, provide a potential

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theoretical foundation for a Buddhist theory of bourgeois revolution and there are indications that a new generation of younger reformist monks and lay people are beginning to develop Phutthathat's work in just such a direction. Phutthathat's lifetime of work is now being subjected to critical evaluation and is being used as a theoretical base for the further development of Buddhist social and political theory by middle-class Buddhists. For example, Phra Phaisaan Wisaalai has criticised Phutthathat's notion of dhammik-socialism in order to develop a stronger Buddhist argument for democracy and the rights of the individual. Phaisaan maintains that Phutthathat's political writings emphasise the importance of dhammik or moral leadership based on the dasarajadhamma or ten Buddhist principles of moral leadership. In this Phutthathat follows the traditional pragmatic Buddhist approach to political structures already outlined above. Namely, that the system of government, whether decentralised and democratic or centralised and authoritarian, is irrelevant provided the political leaders are moral. However, Phaisaan contends that the traditional Buddhist model of leadership is no longer valid in modern Thai society where power is dispersed among diverse groups of politicians, bureaucrats, technicians, and businessmen. He maintains that in such a society, where there is no single focus of power or social responsibility as in a traditional monarchy or dictatorship, there must be an emphasis on the morality and social responsibility of the individual members of society and not only of the nominal political leaders. Phaisaan concludes that Buddhism must now emphasise the importance of the welfare and morality of the individual in contrast to the traditional emphasis on the welfare of the collectivity as mediated through a righteous and moral leader. Phaisaan contends that Phutthathat places too much emphasis on the collectivity and the notion of a strong moral leader and too little emphasis on the development of the moral and intellectual capabilities of the individual members of society. Phaisaan says, The core of Buddhism will have much greater value for modern society if we can unite the individual and institutional levels of dhamma in a common relationship. Phutthathat's notion of dhammik socialism

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should then be thought through further. Phutthathat has established this notion upon the conventional theoretical foundation of looking only to the hopes and interests of the collectivity (which even though it is absolutely essential is not the only important thing).(T) 29

Establishment Thai Buddhism legitimises centralised authoritarian rule by emphasising the notion of a strong leader taking responsibility for the welfare of the collectivity. By criticising Phutthathat's lack of emphasis on the political importance of the individual, Phaisaan is attempting to develop Phutthathat's thought into an even stronger theoretical weapon against the conservative religious ideology of the establishment. Phaisaan's criticisms are typical of a large number of younger educated and professional people. While Phutthathat's reinterpretations of doctrine provide a strong criticism of supernatural and royal Buddhism, his political views still lean more towards authoritarianism than democracy. Consequently, younger pro-democratic members of the middle class have found it necessary to accept Phutthathat's interpretations of spiritual doctrine but to criticise and further develop his political views. Phra Panyanantha (Paiiiiananda) Bhikkhu

Phra Panyanantha of Wat Chonprathaanrangsit (Jalapradana) in Nonthaburi immediately north of Bangkok has had a close association with Phutthathat and shares his reformist interpretation of Buddhist doctrine. 30 However, in contrast to Phutthathat, Panyanantha has unequivocably expressed his support for democracy and his abhorrence of authoritarian rule, and as a consequence he has developed a significant following among the middle class in Bangkok. In 1933 the young Panyanantha joined the campaign of an Italian bhikkhu, Lokanatha, to call for reform and revitalisation of the Theravada sangha by undertaking a pilgrimage through the mainland Southeast Asian Buddhist countries. Panyanantha accompanied Lokanatha to Burma and India. However, Lokanatha's campaign was regarded as subversive by the Thai sangha authorities and Panyanantha was ostracised when he returned to Thailand, being unable to find a Thai

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temple willing to accept him. He consequently became abbot of a Thai temple in Penang in order to avoid the antagonism against him in Thailand. In the early 1950s when Phutthathat lectured in Chiangmai he was approached by some local Buddhists concerned about the activities of Christian missionaries among Thai youth. Phutthathat was invited to establish a centre like Suan Mok at Wat Umong in Chiangmai in order to counter the inroads of the missionaries. Phutthathat personally declined the offer but undertook to find an appropriate monk to become the abbot of Wat Umong. Phutthathat subsequently contacted Panyanantha, who took up the offer and became abbot of Wat Umong in 1952. In 1962 Panyanantha moved to Nonthaburi to become abbot of Wat Chonprathaanrangsit, which had been built by the Department of Irrigation (Krom Chonprathaan). In the 1970s and 1980s Panyanantha's criticisms of religious supernaturalism and political authoritarianism became more vocal. In June 1982 he criticised the renovation and expansion of the Bangkok city pillar shrine, sau lak myang, because he regarded such officially sponsored ritualism as making the Thai populace stupid. He maintained that for Thailand to be saved from dictatorship and tyranny the people must be discerning and responsible, and officially sponsored supernaturalism such as the cult of the city pillar only inculcated blind faith and submission to supernatural beings.3 1 In July 1982 he was barred from broadcasting a dhamma sermon on national radio because of this outspoken criticism. However, because of the extent of public outcry at this "punishment" for his remarks on the city pillar shrine the authorities relented and permitted him to resume broadcasting at the end of September 1982. Panyanantha has often spoken of the need to educate the Thai public about politics and democracy. When interviewed by Siam Rat magazine in September 1982 he said, Thailand has been a democracy for fifty years but they [the government and bureaucracy] do not teach the people about democracy. They are afraid for their power and so don't teach it [democracy]. If they

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act like this then we may survive as individuals but the nation will be lost.(T) 32

Panyanantha has promoted the use of his monastery, Wat Chonprathaanrangsit, as a venue for pro-democratic rallies by political parties, saying that temples should be places of political as well as religious and social education: [We should] develop the general public's interest in politics, then the country will survive, because politics is a matter for everyone [to be interested in), including the sangha too.... It is good to take an interest in politics. If in any country the public is not interested in national affairs then that country will not survive, dictators will take over. The people must realise their duty in building the country.(T) 33

There are a number of government-sponsored moral education and moral development programmes in Thailand that emphasise the development of a sense of responsibility and orderliness, in short, the qualities required of an efficient but submissive work-force for an industrialising society. Reformist monks like Panyanantha who are sympathetic with the aspirations of the middle class also emphasise training in orderliness and responsibility but, in contrast to the government-sponsored programmes, also emphasise the development of critical insight and the ability to make informed decisions and to show independence and initiative in accord with Buddhist principles. Like Phutthathat, Panyanantha has also had close connections with pro-democratic politicians. Upon the death of the former Prime Minister, Pridi Phanomyong, in exile in France in 1983 a number of monks including Phimontham and Panyanantha made public statements of his important contribution to Thai politics after the 1932 revolution. Panyanantha officiated at Pridi's cremation in Paris and held a memorial ceremony for him at Wat Chonprathaan on 20 June 1983. 34 Phra Thepwethi (Devavedhi) Bhikkhu

Another monk commonly cited by middle-class intellectuals as supporting a modernist, progressive, and anti-authoritarian interpretation of Buddhism is Phra Thepwethi (Prayut Payuttho) of Wat Phra Phiren

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(Mahanikay) in Bangkok. Thepwethi was born in Suphanburi province west of Bangkok in 1939 and is a brilliant scholar who obtained the highest grade of Pali education, parian 9, while still a novice. At the very early age of twenty-five, Thepwethi was appointed Deputy Secretary-General of Mahachulalongkorn Buddhist University at Wat Mahathat, where he was instrumental in revising and expanding the clerical curriculum to make it more relevant to the sangha's increasing role in community development and social service. He has written an impressive number of carefully researched and documented texts, the most influential of which is his 1,000-page review of Buddhist doctrine, Phutthatham (Buddhadhamma).3 5 Thepwethi is a true academic scholar in the Western sense of the term, with an eye for detail and a penetrating analysis of concepts and theories. However, Thepwethi cannot be regarded as a Buddhist philosopher in the same way as Phutthathat. Rather, he is an academic theologian. In his work Thepwethi aims to demonstrate the relevance of Buddhism to contemporary Thai society, but because he has a deep respect for the intellectual history of Buddhist scholarship he is not prepared, like some other reformist monks, to reject traditional views and interpretations where they contradict modernist ideas. Thepwethi's sympathies are definitely reformist, but because of his balanced presentation and analysis of traditional and contemporary interpretations of doctrine his work has not had the same political impact as Phutthathat's unequivocally critical analyses of Buddhist doctrine. Thai intellectuals appear to laud Thepwethi not only for his actual views or interpretations of doctrine but also for his analytical, academic approach to the study of Buddhism. Thepwethi is the first Thai scholar monk to systematically and thoroughly reference his citations. In contrast, Phutthathat can be regarded as a philosopher more than a scholar. Phutthathat deals with ideas and concepts as such and is prepared to develop his theories to their logical conclusions without feeling bound by the history of doctrinal interpretation. Unlike Thepwethi, who seeks to find intellectual compromises between traditional and contemporary views, Phutthathat is prepared to reject traditional views where they contradict his own analyses.

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Phutthathat's and Thepwethi's different intellectual approaches to Buddhism parallel their respective personal histories. Phutthathat turned his back on the sangha hierarchy in a personal quest for truth and his critical, philosophical style reflects his position outside the confines and strictures of sangha politics. Thepwethi, on the other hand, has had a career within the sangha hierarchy and his method of intellectual compromise reflects the realities of living and working within a large and complex organisation. Thepwethi often presents quite similar reformist ideas to Phutthathat, however, he arrives at reformist conclusions after first analysing and theoretically traversing the history of Buddhist scholarship on the particular issue at hand. The strength of Thepwethi's work is that reformist interpretations of Buddhism are then seen in a historical context as developing from and being based upon the intellectual traditions of the religion. This gives his conclusions an intellectual legitimacy within the conservative and tradition-bound sangha that Phutthathat's views, often supported by no more than logical arguments, cannot obtain. However, the weakness of Thepwethi's approach, from the political perspective of the middle class, is that he does not completely reject the traditional metaphysical interpretations associated with the royal form of Buddhism now adopted by the Thai establishment. His work is useful in giving intellectual credence and authority to reformist interpretations of doctrine but his emphasis on intellectual balance and compromise makes his work less amenable to being manipulated to support the political ambitions of sections of the middle class in undermining the legitimacy of establishment Buddhism. While Phutthathat's more philosophical approach to Buddhist doctrine lacks the rigorous scholarly foundation that Thepwethi develops, his work is ultimately more intellectually productive and innovative and is potentially capable of developing Buddhist doctrine into further novel directions. Furthermore, Phutthathat's vehement and uncompromising denunciations of traditional Buddhist teachings give his work an unambiguous political significance because of his explicit support for the social and political aspirations of the middle class.

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Conservative Critics of the Reformist Monks

Anan Senakhan - Phra Chayanantho (Jayanando) Bhikkhu

The reformist monks' rationalist interpretations of Buddhist doctrine have been vehemently criticised by a number of religious conservatives. One of the most prominent of these critics in the 1970s and early 1980s was a former police officer, Anan Senakhan, who sought ordination into the Thammayut Order in 1976 in order to defuse a political controversy he had become embroiled in. Anan, writing under his clerical name of Phra Chayanantho (Jayanando) Bhikkhu, together with several lay and clerical supporters, strongly criticised Phutthathat's reformist interpretations of Buddhism in a 1979 book entitled Heretical Teachings (Kham-sorn Diarathii). 36 Anan's criticisms of Phutthathat's reformism were not limited to matters of doctrine but also included attacks on Phutthathat's implicit opposition to the political establishment and his rejection of the traditional forms of Buddhism used to legitimate the place of the establishment in Thai society. Anan accused Phutthathat and other reformists of "abandoning traditions that are good and which have existed from ancient times". 37 For Anan, Phutthathat's denial of the supernatural aspects of traditional Buddhist beliefs makes him a heretic, titthiya (Thai: diarathii). Another conservative critic of Phutthathat, Bunmii Meethaangkuun, head of the Abhidhamma Foundation (Muunnithi Aphitham) at Wat Phra Chetuphon, goes further in his criticism, saying that Phutthathat is a person who has opened the door wide to accept those who like politics and do not hold to our religion . . . in order to destroy Buddhism.(T) 38

Bunmii regards Phutthathat's rationalist interpretation of Buddhism as accommodating Buddhism to materialists, that is, communists, and as subverting both the religion and national security. Bunmii maintains, Buddhism is still the collective nucleus of the sympathies of the Thai

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people - in this they are solidly united. When Buddhism gradually degenerates what will happen? How could the nation and king continue?(T)39

The theoretical and political conflict between religious reformists and conservatives is also a conflict over the character of Buddhism as a religion. The reformists view Buddhism first and foremost as a doctrine of personal salvation, while the conservatives reject this individualism and maintain that the social or institutional function of the religion is paramount. Because the conservatives regard the institutional function of Buddhism as being of primary importance they also value those things which contribute to maintaining the solidarity of institutional Buddhism. They consequently value conformity to the traditionally defined religious goals and to the historical sources of social cohesiveness such as the rule of state-imposed law and the symbol of the monarchy. Conversely, the conservatives regard the reformists' individualism and critical theoretical stance as subversive and as threatening the place of Buddhism in Thai society. Indeed, reformist Buddhism does undermine Buddhism's historical role as the legitimating ideology of the establishment, and it is precisely this that Anan and Bunmii regard as threatening. However, at the same time, reformist Buddhism provides a carefully elaborated justification for the values and aspirations of the Thai intelligentsia and the commercial middle class. Anan Senakhan's views and activities will be referred to again in the following chapter and a brief political biography of this controversial figure is presented here. Anan Senakhan comes from an ethnic Thai family with a history of employment in the bureaucracy, in particular, the police force. Anan was born in 1935 in Bangkok, the only child of Sawai and Siriwatthana Senakhan. He completed high school at St Gabriel's School in Bangkok in 1952 and graduated from the Saam Phraan Police Officers School in 1962. He is married and has three children. Anan appears to have been deeply influenced by his uncle, Sawaeng Senakhan, a policeman who was a vocal critic of official corruption.

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Anan espouses similar views to his uncle on the evil of official corruption. Anan maintains, The evil of corruption is a cancer which has been eating away the nation for the past sixty or seventy years; until now the country is almost comatose. If we don't operate urgently then the Thai nation, Buddhism, and the lineage of the Thai monarchy will probably remain only in name, as memorials for future generations. Who knows, the Thai nation may have to change its name to the People's Republic of Thailand or the Socialist Union of Thailand.(T) 40

Between 1973 and 1976 Anan was a leading figure in a movement called Opposing Corruption (Tor-taan Chor Raat Bang Luang), which took the acronym of Chanuan or "fuse". The movement published a fortnightly magazine, also called Chanuan, whose stated goal was to oppose dictatorial cliques in the army; the ideology of dictatorship; evil politicians; evil newspapermen and evil businessmen, [evil] capitalists and [evil] civil servants.(T) 41

Anan's Chanuan movement exposed the corruption of a number of influential people. Anan and other members of Chanuan and their families received numerous threats and Anan was threatened with death if he ever visited the provinces of Ratchburi, Samutsakhorn, Chonburi, Nongkhai, Roi-et, or Ubon. 42 However, Anan claimed he was not afraid of the threats or of dying because he had faith in the law of kamma and in the power of goodness. He stated that he had faith in the holiness of Phra Sayamthewathirat, the protective deity of the Chakri dynasty, and a strong belief that the spirits of past Thai hero kings looked over and took care of his movement. 43 In 1975 Anan became deeply involved in a police agitation against the then Prime Minister, Kukrit Pramoj. The agitation arose because of the government's handling of an incident at Mae Wa village in Lamphun province. The villagers of Mae Wa had sought the assistance of the Thai Farmers Federation (Sahaaphan Chaaw Naa Chaaw Rai) and the Chiangmai University Students Association in their efforts to oppose the activities of a company mining antimony ore near the

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village. The villagers claimed that the company's operations were seriously polluting their rice fields and destroying their livelihood. On 12 May 1975 the villagers and their supporters took over the mining operations by force and three senior members of the Thai Farmers Federation (Bunmaa Aarii, Inkham Sunthorngthong, lnthaa Siiwongwan) and six Chiangmai University students were arrested by the police. On 30 July 1975, in an unrelated event, lnthaa Siibunryang, leader of the Thai Farmers Federation, was shot and killed by a rightwing assassin. lnthaa was lauded as a martyr by leftist groups and the case of the nine Mae Wa detainees, who included some of lnthaa's fellow Farmers Federation members, was taken up as an example of state repression and persecution of the common people. A popular movement calling for the release of the nine Mae Wa detainees arose, claiming that they were political prisoners and were innocent of any civil offence. Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj responded to the movement's demands by ordering the trespassing and other charges against the nine to be dropped. However, the police regarded Kukrit's response to the popular movement as impugning their integrity and undermining the authority of the police force. On 19 August 1975 a large crowd of police officers reportedly led by Anan Senakhan demonstrated outside Kukrit's Bangkok home, waving placards proclaiming that mob rule was overriding the rule of law (kot muu nya kot-maay). Kukrit addressed the angry demonstrators, saying that the evidence against the nine detainees was insubstantial. Soon after, a group of forty to fifty demonstrators broke into and ransacked Kukrit's house. Anan was subsequently accused of instigating and participating in the break-in and he and two other police officers were charged with causing a public disturbance and damaging Kukrit's house. Anan then became the focus of a public debate and on 21 April 1976, one month before his case was due to be heard in court, he took ordination as a monk at the Thammayut monastery of Wat Janthanaram in Chanthaburi province. Anan cited the reason for his taking ordination as being that his involvement in the Chanuan anticorruption campaign had led to conflict and injury. He regarded his

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ordination and withdrawal from public life as reducing the political "pressure" of the situation he had become involved in and as giving him an opportunity to think over his past actions and to find mental peace. 44 Normally a person charged with a civil offence cannot be accepted for ordination. However, at a meeting between Somdet Phra Yanasangworn, a Sangha General-Governor of the Thammayut Order and abbot of Wat Bowornniwet, and the Thammayut Provincial Sangha Governor of Chanthaburi province it was decided that the evidence against Anan was not unequivocable. The senior Thammayut monks also noted that Anan had been morally strict as a lay person and would not be a stain on the sangha. He was consequently given permission to be ordained into the Thammayut Order. Krajaang Nanthapho points out that after he was ordained Anan did not criticise the authoritarian, anti-democratic senior administrative monks in the sangha but rather focused his attacks on the prominent Mahanikay monks who criticised the traditional metaphysical beliefs associated with the royal Buddhist cult. 45 In his campaigns Anan also enlisted the support of conservative senior Mahanikay monks from Wat Phra Chetuphon and Wat Benjamabophit in Bangkok. Krajaang argues that the fact Anan had such senior associations, particularly with senior Thammayut monks, indicated support for his vocal criticisms of Phutthathat and other reformist monks among senior members of the sangha hierarchy. In 1979 Anan established a movement within the sangha, the Organisation to Protect Buddhist Teachings (Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaat). Under the auspices of this movement Anan conducted a series of concerted campaigns against reformist monks such as Phutthathat and Phothirak (see Chapter Seven), as well as against religious conservatives, such as Suchaat Kosonkittiwong, 46 whose form of supernaturalism he regarded as improper and misinformed. The religious commentator Khaamhuno reports that upon the formation of the Organisation to Protect Buddhist Teachings, Anan visited the Sangharaja, Waat Wasano, at Wat Ratchabophit (Thammayut) to obtain his support and approval for the organisation's objectives and activities. 47 Krajaang Nanthapho notes that in 1980 Phothirak, Phutthathat, and

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Panyanantha were collectively denounced as communists in anonymous leaflets distributed in Bangkok under the name of the Movement to Protect Buddhism (Khabuankaan Phithak Phutthasaasanaa). This clandestine movement bore a name remarkably similar to Anan Senakhan's Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaat and Krajaang voices suspicions that Anan was indeed behind the publication of the defamatory leaflets. In part, the leaflets said, My dear Thai brothers, at the present time it has become clear that some individuals masquerading in yellow robes are joining hands with the Communist Party of Thailand. The radio station, Voice of the Thai People, has broadcast propaganda instructing my brothers to make the mistake of following the practices of Phutthathat of Suan Mok, Panyanantha of Wat Chonprathaanrangsit, and Phothirak or Rak Rakphong of N akhornpathom. My fellow Buddhists, why does Radio Voice of the People not broadcast that we should practise according to the Abdhidhamma, the Sutta or the Vinaya? My fellow Thais, please use your intelligence to consider this and do not be misled to believe in false things. Also, please continue to observe whether this group are thorns in the side of Buddhism sowing the seeds of communism, or whether they are followers of the Buddha. If we do not do this Buddhism will surely be destroyed and disappear from Thailand.(T) 48

Anan's strident anti-communism, his connection with the Thammayut Order, his support for metaphysical interpretations of Buddhism, and his former career within the police bureaucracy all reveal him to have been aligned with the political establishment. In the demonstration that he organised outside Kukrit Pramoj's house in 1975 Anan reflected the establishment's fear in the mid-1970s that the law and social order that they implemented and upheld were being undermined by popular activism. Nevertheless, Anan's vocal stand against corruption and military dictatorship show that he disagreed with and was not a part of the entente cordialle between the artistocracy, senior military, and civilian bureaucrats and big business that Was established under Sarit in the 1950s and 1960s. While supporting the conservative religious forms of the Thai establishment, Anan

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nevertheless criticised the political stance of the establishment. This tension informed Anan's activities throughout the 1970s and early 1980s and introduced an element of ambiguity and complexity to his religious and political pronoucements. Anan's views represented those of the junior members of the Thai bureaucracy, whose cultural and political conservatism has been influenced by their identification with their role as the vehicle for the implementation and administration of state policies. While part of the state apparatus and supportive of the establishment which guarantees their careers and financial welfare, many junior bureaucrats nevertheless do not participate in the spoils of power and wealth and are critical of the corruption of the senior figures of the political establishment. Anan's religious and political ambiguity reflected the ambiguous relationship of junior bureaucrats to senior figures within the establishment. Anan regarded the patronage system of the Thai establishment as corrupt and as undermining the proper orderly conduct of government and state affairs according to the rule of law. Anan's strong moral and religious stand crystallised the politico-religious position of the junior echelons of the bureaucracy. In one sense Anan can be regarded as a true Thai conservative and a royalist who interpreted his duty as being to uphold law and order and to be loyal to the King. It was because of their strong attachment to the traditional ethico-religious system that Anan and his small band of supporters were critical of the system of financial and political patronage operated by the establishment. This traditionalism influenced Anan's criticisms of military dictators, corrupt politicians, and wealthy Chinese businessmen, because he regarded these senior members of the establishment as staining the moral purity and thus the religious legitimacy of the monarchy and the traditional Thai system of government. However, this strong attachment to traditional Thai values and Buddhism also underlay Anan's criticisms of the religious reformists and the middle-class supporters of popular democracy, because he regarded their teachings as undermining the traditional hierarchical and centralised authority structure centred on the monarchy. As a traditionalist Anan regarded both the religioUS

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reformists and the bureaucratic and financial autocrats as undermining the institutions and legitimatory symbols upon which Thai society and politics has historically been built. Once within the sangha, Anan turned his vitriol towards all those he regarded as undermining the supernatural royal form of Buddhism used to legitimate the traditional political structure. Anan first criticised reformist monks like Phutthathat, who rejected the metaphysical and supernatural form of Buddhism and who emphasised the individual soteriological rather than the institutional aspects of Buddhism. Anan also criticised heterodox reformist monks such as Phothirak, who has rejected the authority of the Mahatherasamakhom and established his own independent nikaya or order of monks. Anan regarded Phothirak as undermining the institutional character of Thai Buddhism which integrates the religion into the formal structure of the state and which in turn guarantees Buddhism's spiritual and political security. Anan also exposed spiritualists such as Suchaat Kosonkittiwong who presented alternative metaphysics which challenged the authority and legitimacy of the traditional Buddhist cosmological system. Anan's criticisms of reformists and some conservatives were determined by political factors as well as by doctrinal disagreements. The reformist monks Anan attacked were the democrats and progressives who sought to undermine the traditional centralised and authoritarian power structure that Anan supported. In contrast, the most prominent supporters of Suchaat Kosonkittiwong and his Hupphaasawan movement were members of the Thanom-Praphat military clique whose military authoritarianism Anan regarded as corrupting the moral purity and legitimacy of the ideal of the constitutional monarchy. Phra Kittiwuttho (Kittivuddho) Bhikkhu

Another prominent conservative monk who has been a vocal critic of reformist Buddhism is Phra Kittiwuttho, who is also known by his Phra Ratchakhana title of Phra Ratchathammaphani (Rajadhammahhani), formerly Udornkhanaphirak (Uttaraganabhiraks'a). A number of detailed studies of Kittiwuttho's teachings and his connections with

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the Thai establishment have already been published and here I wish only to summarise this controversial conservative monk's clerical career and outlook on Buddhism in order to place him within the context of contemporary urban Buddhist movements. 49 Kittiwuttho was born into a Sino-Thai family at Nakhornpathom west of Bangkok in 1936. He was ordained at Wat Mahathat (Mahanikay) in 1957 and rose quickly in influence by establishing close patronage relations with senior monks and political figures. 50 He also curried favour by propagating a conservative interpretation of Buddhism that justified centralised authoritarian rule and the use of force to eradicate political threats to the establishment, in particular the Communist Party of Thailand. Kittiwutho's most important early sponsor in the sangha was Somdet Phra Wannarat (Pun Punyasiri), abbot of Wat Phra Chetuphon (Mahanikay). Wannarat was a senior member of the Mahatherasamakhom, President of the conservative Abhidhamma Foundation and he was appointed Sangharaja in 1972. Kittiwuttho became Wannarat's personal aide in 1965 and with Wannarat's support he re-established the Abhidhamma Foundation at Wat Mahathat. Krajaang Nanthapho comments that Kittiwuttho's early career as a monk in the 1960s was promoted when he was groomed to provide a countervailing force to Phra Phimontham at Wat Mahathat. 51 Phimontham had introduced the Burmese-influenced study of the Abhidhamma at Wat Mahathat in the 1950s and it was on this aspect of Buddhist teachings that Kittiwuttho focused his early activities. In addition to heading the Abhidhamma Foundation at Wat Mahathat, Kittiwuttho also taught Abhidhamma at the Mahachulalongkorn Buddhist University run by the Mahanikay Order and located at Wat Mahathat. With Wannarat's patronage Kittiwuttho was also able to secure connections with senior political figures in the 1960s such as Praphat Jarusathian, Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister under Thanom Kittikachorn and one-time Vice-President of the Abhidhamma Foundation. Another prominent early supporter of Kittiwuttho's was Luangjop Krabuanyut, the father-in-law of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn. 52 Kittiwuttho established his own Buddhist training centre, Jittaphawan College, in Chonburi province in the late 1960s

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with significant financial and political support from members of the establishment. King Phumiphon conferred the name of the college, Jittaphawan, and Queen Sirikit laid the foundation stone in 1967. The King and Queen performed the official opening ceremony in 1969 and Thanom Kittikachorn and his wife were founding presidents of the college. From this independent base Kittiwuttho was able to co-ordinate a wide range of political and semi-political activities during the 1970s, including effective leadership of a right-wing paramilitary organisation, Nawaphon. Kittiwuttho has been involved in a number of controversial activities, including alleged gun-running to Khmer resistance forces on the Thai border. The most recent controversy surrounding Kittiwuttho has been associated with debate about the appointment of a new abbot at Wat Rakhangkhositaram (Mahanikay), a second-class royal monastery on the banks of the Chao Phraya River in Bangkok. Wat Rakhang is the site of a veneration cult surrounding a famous former abbot, Somdet Phra Phutthajan Too Phrommarangsi, who is credited with having attained supernatural powers and deep spiritual insight. Partly as a result of the large number of pilgrims who visit Wat Rakhang the monastery is very wealthy, and reputedly enjoys an annual income from donations of between ten and thirty million baht. 53 The previous abbot of Wat Rakhang, Phra Thepyanamethi (Devafianamedhi), died on 26 March 1987 and Phra Ratchawisutthimethi (Rajavisuddhimedhi), a long-time resident of the monastery, was appointed interim acting abbot. A conflict subsequently developed between Ratchawisutthimethi and another senior monk at Wat Rakhang, Phra Ratchawathanaphorn (Rajavadhanabharana), about who should be appointed as the next permanent abbot. Phra Wisutthathibodi, abbot of Wat Traimit (Mahanikay), Sangha Provincial Governor of Bangkok and member of the Mahatherasamakhom suggested that one way to resolve the conflict might be to appoint an external monk as abbot, his nomination for the position being Kittiwuttho. This move also gained the support of Somdet Phra Thirayanamuni, abbot of Wat Pathumkhongkha (Padumaganga) (Mahanikay), and Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan, abbot of Wat Saamphraya (Mahanikay). It will be

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recalled that Phutthakhosajan and Wisutthathibodi have been implicated in the long persecution of Phra Phimontham dating from the 1960s (see Chapter Five), and that both monks have strong links with the political establishment. Siam Rat has commented that the senior monks' support for Kittiwuttho as the new abbot of Wat Rakhang has aroused many people's suspicions as to its propriety.... [That] this appointment is not only a matter of patronage and connections but is also a matter of [financial] advantageY

The move to appoint Kittiwuttho as abbot of Wat Rakhang further demonstrates the ways in which monks aligned with the political establishment seek to entrench their clique's position and influence both financially and politically. Kittiwuttho presents a conservative interpretation of Buddhist doctrine, teaching that social and economic inequality are determined by an individual's kamma. He maintains that equality in social status and wealth are as unattainable as equality in intelligence and physical ability. 55 But while Kittiwuttho teaches a conservative interpretation of Buddhism, he is nevertheless supportive of socio-economic development and a degree of social justice for the poor. In 1976 he led a demonstration of community (tambon) and village headmen in Bangkok to demand a resolution of corruption and national economic problems, speedy land reform and stronger suppression of communist activities. Kittiwuttho has also used Jittaphawan College to initiate a wide range of educational and training programmes for both monks and laity. Kittiwuttho urges monks to become actively involved in social welfare and development programmes. In 1987 he proposed that temples should set up rice mills so that local farmers are not exploited by rice mill owners. Kittiwuttho is also a strong supporter of Army Commander-in-Chief General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth's programme of tree planting in the northeast (Isaan khiaw). Kittiwuttho's social activism has a number of similarities with reformist monks' calls for social justice. Both Kittiwuttho and the reformists promote improved efficiency in work practices and socio-economic

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development through the application of dhamma; a strengthening of Buddhist morality to fight corruption; and self-sacrifice for the common good. However, Kittiwuttho combines these reformist elements with a conservative political analysis which supports the position of the establishment and opposes the democratisation of Thai society which is called for by middle-class reformists. Kittiwuttho teaches a sophisticated conservatism which seeks to undermine left-wing critiques of socio-economic inequalities in Thailand by ensuring that the mass of farmers and workers do in fact benefit to some extent from the development process. Kittiwuttho seeks minor social reforms and a minimal level of economic redistribution which, however, do not threaten the position of the establishment but which can nevertheless be used to demonstrate to workers and farmers the purported economic benefits of remaining in their traditionally subordinate political position and in support of the status quo. Religious reformists argue that the need to fight corruption, to increase worker efficiency, and to overcome poverty and injustice demonstrates the importance of introducing true democracy and overthrowing the power of the establishment. However, Kittiwuttho highlights the same issues while arguing for the retention of the traditional centralised political and economic structures. Both the senior civilian and military bureaucrats and big business interests who support Kittiwuttho and the middle classes who sponsor reformist monks would benefit from harmonious labour relations, greater bureaucratic efficiency, and socio-economic development. However, the two groups disagree about the appropriate political framework within which development should be administered. The middle class maintains that justice can only be attained by an extension of political rights through a democratic system, while Kittiwuttho argues that a strong but benevolent central government composed of representatives of the establishment can benefit the people and best promote both development and social welfare. Kittiwuttho's social activism, particularly his involvement with the conservative Nawaphon movement and political demonstrations

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in the mid-1970s, raised the issue of the proper political role of the sangha in modern Thailand. Commenting on the politicisation of the sangha in the 1970s Charles Keyes observes, The rise of militant Buddhism in Thailand is a direct consequence of a political crisis in which the moral basis for political authority became problematic. 56

Keyes does not expand on this statement but his interpretation of the rise of "militant Buddhism" appears to be based on the proposition that in Thailand Buddhism provides the ethical framework within which legitimate political activity takes place and by which it is judged. Furthermore, Keyes implies that when secular political activity loses its moral legitimacy in a crisis situation Buddhist monks themselves move to participate directly in the political domain, because they alone continue to possess the ethical standing which authorises legitimate political activity. The Phra Fang rebellion in the north of the country after the fall of Ayutthaya in 1767 and the rise of right-wing and left-wing political monks directly involved in political struggles in the 1973-76 period provide two instances of the phenomenon identified by Keyes, of the sangha filling a political vacuum caused by the destruction or undermining of the legitimacy of the secular political authorities. This phenomenon clearly demonstrates the fundamentally political nature of the role of Buddhism in Thai society, which in periods of stable government is carefully obscured and controlled. Nevertheless, an explicit political role for Theravada Buddhist monks is ultimately unsustainable. This is because the ethical legitimacy - which monks confer on the state in politically stable periods and which also draws them into the political arena in times of crisis - is founded upon the notion of worldly renunciation and retreat from the spiritually polluting influence of involvement in lustdriven political conflicts. Theravada Buddhist theocracies are inherently unstable in the long term because of the contradiction between monks' active political involvement and a notion of political legitimacy defined in terms of world renunciation.

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In the mid-1970s many monks and lay people across the political spectrum regarded the politicisation of the sangha and monks' participation in demonstrations and political rallies as undermining the spiritual and ethical purity of the sangha. Consequently, both reformist and establishment-aligned Buddhists called for monks to desist from social and political activism and return to their traditional monastic occupation. For example, at this time the reformist monk Phutthathat said, Monks should not co-operate directly in social welfare activities or in any of the people's developmental works.. . . They should be a group that provides the people with mental and spiritual development, progress, and safety.(T) 57

On 21 November 1974 the establishment-aligned Mahatherasamakhom issued a directive that monks were forbidden to be present at any political rally for the purposes of electioneering; advocate political parties or candidates; participate in any rally, demonstration, or protest; or take part in public speech-making or political discussions. ss The broad-based nature of the opposition to the politicisation of the sangha in the 1973-76 period demonstrated the limitations of the Thai sangha as a base for a Buddhist approach to social action. The theoretical contradiction between monks' worldly involvement and Theravada notions of spiritual purity has not been satisfactorily resolved by Thai Buddhist theoreticians. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that sanctions against monks' active involvement in social and political affairs are applied in a particularly partisan way. Members of the respective factions of the Thai elite tend only to criticise the political involvement of those monks who are aligned with an opposing political faction. In contrast, the activism of monks sympathetic to a faction's own political views is often supported and is justified either in terms of participating in maintaining national security or in terms of the need to struggle for social

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justice. For example, after the issuing of the Mahatherasamakhom's 1974 directive that monks should not become politically involved, left-wing monks pointed out the contradiction between the Council of Elders' active participation in implicitly political government-sponsored activities, such as the Dhammadhuta and Dhammacarika Buddhist propagatory programmes, and the Council's opposition to the political activities of monks who were critical of the government. 59 Furthermore, it was pointed out that Kittwuttho's involvement in right-wing demonstrations and political movements went without official comment, while similar activities by left-wing monks were strongly condemned. Despite the theoretical problems associated with monks' worldly involvement as outlined above, increasing clerical involvement in social and semi-political activities appears inevitable in Thailand as more and more monks come to regard active participation in community development programmes as the most appropriate role for the sangha in contemporary Thai society. Many monks, including Kittwuttho, believe that the sangha's relevance to modern life can only be demonstrated through concrete participation in the affairs of lay people. In this situation the debate over the sangha's worldly role in the 1980s has tended to focus not on the theoretical contradiction between spiritual renunciation and worldly involvement but rather on the pragmatic political issue of whether the worldly involvement of monks either supports or opposes the political position of the establishment or of the anti-establishment groups. While the overt political involvement of monks ceased with the re-imposition of military rule in October 1976, there is nevertheless now a general acceptance among Thai Buddhists that the sangha should participate in national development programmes to some extent. However, Kittwuttho has remained a focus of controversy in the 1980s as his various programmes have been criticised as overstepping the vague and undefined line which separates acceptable sangha social activities from unacceptable pollutions of the sangha's spiritual status.

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NOTES 1. Siddhi Butr-Indr, The Social Philosophy of Buddhism (Bangkok: Mahamakut Buddhist University Press, 1979), p. 8. 2. Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Nipphaan Nork Khamphii Aphitham, p. 6. 3. Phra Thepwethi (Prayut Payuttho) Bhikkhu formerly held the clerical title of Ratchaworamuni (Rajavaramuni), and this latter name occurs on many of his earlier publications, such as those cited in this volume. 4. Phonsak, op. cit., p. 159. 5. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 254-55. 6. Ishii, op. cit., p. 151. 7. Phra Phaisaan Wisaalai, Phutthasaasanaa Kap Khun-khaa Ruam-samay [Buddhism and contemporary values] (Bangkok: Muunnithi Koomon Khiimthorng, 2529 [1986]), p. 119. 8. Ibid., pp. 120-21. 9. Ibid, p. 121n. 10. Somboon, Phutthasaasanaa Kap Kaan-plian-plaeng Thaang Kaan-myang Lae Sangkhom, p. 19. 11. Ibid., p. 20. 12. Ibid., p. 12. 13. Ibid., p. 20. 14. Phra Phaisaan Wisaalai, op. cit., pp. 139-41. 15. Keyes, "The Power of Merit", p. 95. 16. For a comprehensive study of the life and work of Phutthathat, see Peter A. Jackson, Buddhadasa - A Buddhist Thinker for the Modem World (Bangkok: Siam Society, 1988). 17. On 5 December 1987 Phutthathat was awarded the Phra Ratchakhana title of Phra Thammakosajan (Dhammakosacariya). His former title was Phra Thepwisutthimethi (Devavisuddhimedhi). Source: Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Phra Song Chan Phuu-yai Thii Dai Phra-raatchathaan Samanasak [Senior monks who have been awarded royal clerical titles], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 13-19 Thanwaakhom 2530 [December 1987], pp. 33-34. 18. Sanitsuda Ekachai, "Capturing the Spirit of the Slave of Buddha", Bangkok Post, 27 May 1988, section 3. 19. Seri Phongphit, "Thamma Kap Kaan-myang - Than Phutthathat Kap Sangkhom Thai" [Dhamma and politics - Phutthathat and Thai society], in Than Phutthathat Nai Thatsana Khomg Nak-wichaakaan [Phutthathat in the view of academics] (Bangkok: Khana-kammakaan Saasanaa Phya Kaan-phatthanaa, 2525 [1982] ), p. 83.

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20. "Phutthathat Kap Sahaay Tham Panyaachon Lae Pridi Phanomyong" [Phutthathat and his intellectual comrades in the dhamma and Pridi Phanomyong], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 1 Mithunaayon 2529 [June 1986], pp. 18-19. 21. Ibid. 22. Phra Sasanasophana was subsequently framed and jailed together with Phra Phimontham by Sarit Thanarat in 1962 (see Chapter Five). 23. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 1 Mithunaayon 2529 [June 1986], p. 19. 24. "Than Phutthathat: Pratyaa-meethii Phuu Ying-yai Thaang Phutthasaasanaa" [Phutthathat - The great Buddhist sage philosopher], Thammajaksu (Special Issue) 70, no. 1 (Phrytsaphaakhom 2529 [May 1986] ). 25. Saawok [pseud.], Wiwaatha Kap Phra Anan Senakhan [A debate with Phra Anan Senakhan] (Bangkok: Samnak-phim Santitham, 2528 [1985] ), introduction. 26. Orasii Ngaamwitthayaaphong, ed., Ruam Jot-maay Too-torp Rawaang Than Phutthathat Phiksu Kap Sii Buuraphaa [Collected correspondence between Phutthathat Bhikkhu and Sri Burapha] (Bangkok: Khroongkaan Nangsyy Chut Phutthasaasanaa Samrap Khon Num Saaw, 2529 [1986] ). 27. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 1 Mithunaayon 2529 [June 1986], p. 19. 28. Norman Jacobs, Modernisation without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 9. 29. Phra Phaisaan Wisaalai, op. cit., pp. 137-38. 30. On 5 December 1987 Panyanantha was awarded the Phra Ratchakhana title of Phra Thepwisutthimethi, the former title of Phutthathat, a move which demonstrates the sangha hierarchy's perception of the close relationship between the two monks. Panyanantha's former title was Phra Ratchananthamuni (Rajanandamuni). 31. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 265. 32. "Sonthanaa Tham Kap Phra Ratchananthamuni" [A conversation on the dhamma with Phra Ratchananthamuni], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 5 Kanyaayon 2525 [September 1982], p. 26. Cited by Krajaang, op. cit., p. 267. 33. "Phra Prachaathipatai" [Democratic monk], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 18 Karakadaakhom 2525 [July 1982], p. 2. 34. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 270. 35. Phra Ratchaworamuni Bhikkhu, Phutthatham - Matcheenathammatheesanaal

Matchimaapatipathaa Ryy Kot Thammachaat Lae Khun-khaa Samrap Chiiwit [Buddhadhamma - M~henadhammadesana!Majjhimapatipada, or the laws of nature and their value for life] (Bangkok: Thammasathaan Chulalongkorn Mahawitthayalay, 2525 [1982] ).

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36. Phra Anan Senakhan, Khamsom Diarathii [Heretical teachings] (Bangkok: Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaasanaa, 2522 [1979] ). 37. Phra Anan Senakhan, Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay [Phothirak - The highly dangerous prophet] (Bangkok: Niwat Siisathaaphorn & Jaroen Attaphat, 2525 [1982]), p. 96. 38. Bunmii Meethaangkuun, "Phiksu Phuu Thamlaay Phutthasaasanaa" [The monk who is destroying Buddhism], in Anan Senakhan, Khamsom Diarathii, p. 94. 39. Bunmii Meethaangkuun, Too Thaan Phutthathat Ryang Jit-waang - Lem 1 [Criticisms of Phutthathat on the matter ofJit-waang - Volume 1] (Bangkok: Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaasanaa, 2522 [1979]), p. 48. 40. Phra Anan Senakhan (Phra Chayanantho Bhikkhu), Taay Pen Taay [Dead as dead] (Bangkok: Roong-phim Phikkhaneet, 2520 [1977] ), p. 45. 41. Ibid., introduction. 42. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 286. 43. Phra Anan Senakhan, Taay Pen Taay, introduction. 44. Phra Anan Senakhan (Phra Chayanantho Bhikkhu), Phoey Byang-lang Khadii Phang Baan Khykrit [Revealing the background to the case of the break-in at Kukrit's house] (Bangkok, 2521 [1978]), p. 76. 45. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 285 ff. 46. For a detailed account of Suchaat Kosonkittiwong's teachings and his Hupphaasawan movement, see Peter A. Jackson, "The Hupphaasawan Movement: Millenarian Buddhism among the Thai Political Elite", SOJOURN: Social Issues in Southeast Asia 3, no. 2 (August 1988): 134-70. 47. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Ongkaan Koet Mai Nai Sangkhom Saasanaa Phut" [A newly formed organisation in Buddhist society], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 21 Tulaakhom 2522 [October 1979], p. 36. 48. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 288-89. Voice of the Thai People was the name of the radio station of the Communist Party of Thailand which broadcast from southern China until the early 1980s. 49. For further detail on Kittiwuttho's teachings and political biography see: David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand Reform, Reaction, Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1981), pp. 246-48; Charles F. Keyes, "Political Crisis and Militant Buddhism in Contemporary Thailand", in Religion and Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos and Burma, edited by Bardwell L. Smith (Chambersburg, Pa.: Anima Books, 1978), pp. 147-64; and Somboon, Buddhism and Politics in Thailand, pp. 92-99, 132-57.

158 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59.

Chapter Six Krajaang, op. cit., p. 233. Ibid., pp. 233-34. Ibid., p. 233. "Syk-ching Tamnaeng Jau-aawaat Wat Rakhang - Thammai Torng Kittiwuttho?" [The battle for the position of abbot of Wat Rakhang - Why must it be Kittiwuttho?], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 24-30 Meesaayon 2531 [April 1988], p. 11. Ibid. Somboon, Religion and Politics in Thailand, pp. 138-39. Keyes, op. cit., p. 148. From an interview with Phutthathat reproduced in Sulak Sivarak, Khanchomg Somg Phra [Reflections on the monkhood] (Bangkok: Samnak-phim Laay-syy Thai, 2522 [1979] ), p. 255. Somboon, Religion and Politics in Thailand, op. cit., p. 102. The Dhammacarika and Dhammadhuta programmes, both established in the late 1960s, respectively sought to bring non-Thai hill tribes peoples into the mainstream of Thai Buddhist life and to strengthen the allegiance of remote Thai populations, especially in the northeast, to the Thai polity in order to counter the spread of communist ideology.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Phra Phothirak Bhikkhu and Samnak Santi Asok

The controversial reformist monk Phra Phothirak (Bodhiraks'a) Bhikkhu and his Santi Asok movement provide a clear demonstration of the fundamental practical and organisational incompatibility between middle-class reformist Buddhism and the establishment form of the religion controlled by the sangha hierarchy. The three reformist monks discussed in Chapter Six, Phutthathat, Panyanantha, and Thepwethi, deal with the contradictions between reformist and establishment Buddhism primarily at the theoretical level and all three have remained within the official sangha hierarchy, although firmly aligned with the Mahanikay Order rather than the Thammayut. Phothirak, on the other hand, has acted out Phutthathat's and Panyanantha's theoretical rejection of the teachings of establishment Buddhism at the practical and organisational level by rejecting the administrative authority of the Mahatherasamakhom and of both the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders. Phothirak claims that if his religious practice is to be truly consistent with reformist critiques of establishment Buddhism he must separate himself from the traditional Thai sangha in deed as well as in

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word. As a consequence Phothirak's Santi Asok movement effectively represents the formation of a third, although as yet unofficial, nikaya or order within the Thai sangha. Phra Phothirak (Rak Rakphong) was born in Srisaket province in northeast Thailand in 1934 of a Chinese father, Thorngsuk Sae Ngow, and a Thai mother, Bunhoom Rakphong. When he was ordained, Rak Rakphong took the Pali clerical name of Phothirakkhito (Bodhirakkhito) but he prefers to use the Sanskritised form of this name, Phothirak (Bodhiraks'a). Rak studied fine arts and majored in creative writing at a vocational college in Bangkok, graduating in 1958. Rak subsequently worked at a Bangkok television station in art, design, and directing, and comparing television programmes. After a successful career in television, he became interested in Buddhism and in September 1970 visited Phra Ratchaworakhun (Rajavaraguna), abbot of the Thammayut monastery of Wat Asokaram Paak-naam, south of Bangkok city, and soon after took ordination as a chiipakhaaw, an intermediate ascetic stage between laity and monkhood. One month later, on 7 November 1970, he was fully ordained as a monk by Phra Ratchaworakhun. 1 Rak chose to be ordained at Wat Asokaram because he was interested in the ascetic practices of the forest monks of the school of the sage Luang Puu Man, whose system had been introduced at that monastery. Phothirak appears to have been significantly influenced by the dhutanga practices of the forest tradition and even when he subsequently rejected the authority of both the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders he continued certain of the forest monks' practices. For example, Phothirak and his followers wear the brownishred robes traditionally associated with forest monks rather than the usual saffron coloured robes worn by most Thai monks. As a monk Phothirak became a vegetarian and he ate his food separately from the other monks at Wat Asokaram. After a while distinct vegetarian and non-vegetarian groups of monks formed at the monastery and Phothirak began accusing the non-vegetarian monks of not being pure Buddhists. In 1971 and 1972 he began giving sermons to the laity, criticising the other monks in the monastery for being lazy, eating meat, smoking, and chewing betel nut. He maintained

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that if they were not able to give up crude kilesa (moral blemishes) such as these they would not be able to give up subtle kilesa and so progress towards nibbana. Phothirak subsequently developed a lay following and gave sermons at a number of Bangkok temples, where he regularly criticised monks who performed magical and supernatural rites. In turn Phothirak was increasingly criticised by other monks at Wat Asokaram for his strong denunciations of the sangha and in 1973 he determined to set up his own religious centre or samnak at Nakhornpathom, west of Bangkok, in order to follow his own renunciate practices without interference. On 25 April1973 Phothirak returned his monks registration card to the abbot of Wat Asokaram and took up residence on land donated by the father of a sympathetic fellow monk, Phra Somphong Kalyano, at Kamphaeng Saen in Nakhornpathom province. 2 Phothirak called the centre Phutthasathaan Daen Asok. Phothirak refused to officially register his samnak or religious centre according to the regulations of the Department of Religious Affairs, saying, I do not need to be affiliated with either the Thammayutnikay or the Mahanikay because I was ordained into Buddhism. I do not wish to be either Mahanikay or Thammayutnikay because in the time of the Buddha there were no nikaya.(T) 3

Phothirak was subsequently requested by the Provincial Sangha Governor of Nakhornpathom province and the District Sangha Governor of Kamphaeng Saen district to officially register Daen Asok as a monastery. However, Phothirak refused. He relented, however, when the Mahanikay Provincial Sangha Governor threatened to notify the police under the provisions of the 1962 Sangha Act, which requires religious centres to be officially registered with the Department of Religious Affairs. Phothirak then accepted re-ordination into the Mahanikay Order at Wat Norngkrathum in Kamphaeng Saen by the abbot, Phra Khruu Sathitwutthikhun (Sathitvuddhiguna). However, conflicts similar to those which occurred at Wat Asokaram developed at Wat Norngkrathum and as a consequence Phothirak announced his

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complete independence of the Thai sangha on 6 August 1975, saying that he was not affiliated with any formal nikaya or order of the sangha, nor with the Mahatherasamakhom or the Sangharaja. 4 At this time, Phothirak sent an announcement to the sangha administration explaining his dissociation from the Thai sangha in which he said that he had joined the sangha with pure and genuine intentions but had met many obstacles. 5 He claimed, among other things, that there had been attempts to prevent his followers from being ordained at Daen Asok; that monks who became his followers after having been ordained elsewhere had had their clerical careers obstructed and had been prevented from sitting for the usual clerical examinations; that he had been threatened with being disrobed if he continued teaching the dhamma; and that he had been obstructed by the pedantic application of sangha rules and regulations. In his announcement Phothirak also stated, My group and I have tried to conform for many years, in order to co-operate in pushing the buddhacakka, dhammacakka, and sanghacakka forward. But it has been difficult and has become increasingly difficult with each passing day. Consequently, I must reject the various conditions [placed upon my teaching of the dhamma] that the sangha administration has presented, as I am no longer able to follow them.(T) 6

At Daen Asok Phothirak then turned his attention to the strict practice of Buddhism, and in developing his own independent Buddhist movement he has had the goal of giving renewed strength and meaning to ascetic Buddhist practices: I was not ordained in order to relax and enjoy a life of ease and convenience that undermines the national economy and which leads to the decay of religious values through seeking personal benefit from people's ignorance by using various rituals to suppress and oppress the people.(Tf

Phothirak emphasises his uttarimanussadhamma or personal spiritual attainment as being the basis of his religious authority. That is, he emphasises his own ability to approach and practise the dhamma

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independently of official control and formalities. Scripturally, this stance is difficult to repudiate as the centralised state control of the sangha exercised in Thailand is a non-canonical historical development. In the Mahaparinibbana Sutta the Buddha says that after his death the vinaya (code of ethical practice) and the dhamma (doctrine) should be the people's spiritual lamp, and Phothirak uses this scriptural injunction to justify his dissociation from the sangha. Phothirak and his followers maintain several minor differences in practice compared with other Thai monks of the Thammayut and Mahanikay Orders. Phothirak also distinguishes his movement from the remainder of the Thai sangha by calling his centres Phutthasathaan (Buddha-sa thana), literally "Buddhist places" rather than wats. In addition, his followers refer to him by the honorific title Phor Than, "respected father", which contrasts with the more common Thai honorific of Luang Phor used to address and refer to senior respected monks. Nevertheless, in most respects Phothirak's system of practice directly mirrors official sangha practices. Phothirak has established his own system of monks registration cards, bai sutthi, which he uses to regulate the formal association of monks who follow his system. In order to receive such a registration card a monk must be guaranteed by another registered monk to be strictly abiding by the movement's practices and teachings. There have been cases of monks associated with Phothirak's movement having their re-registration denied because of misdemeanours or divisive behaviour. For example, the April 1987 edition of the movement's journal, Saan Asok, included a formal announcement from the Khana Song Chaaw Asok (the Sangha Group of the People of Asok) centred at Phutthasathaan Santi Asok near Bangkok that one monk named Suphot (Pali name: Subajja) had been formally deregistered as a monk of the Khana Song Chaaw Asok and his application to renew his registration card had been refused. The announcement accused Suphot of breaking away from the Khana Song Chaaw Asok and of having no other registered monk ready to vouchsafe for the genuineness of his intentions or his strictness of practice. Significantly, the announcement stated that if Suphot continued to present himself as

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a monk after his deregistration he would be a phra thyan, a sham or unofficial monk. 8 This same term, thyan, has been used by Anan Senakhan and others to describe Phothirak and his heterodox followers and religious centres, because they are not officially registered with the government authorities. Thyan literally means wild, untamed, or outside the control of law and order, that is, unauthorised. Phothirak has thus borrowed some of the bureaucratic procedures of the official Thai sangha administration and he uses these procedures for similar purposes, namely, to maintain unity in teachings and practice in order to control the development of break-away factions which could threaten the original movement, either directly by challenging its authority or indirectly by drawing away supporters and undermining confidence. Phothirak thus fulfils the spirit of most of the bureaucratic procedures laid down in the 1962 Sangha Act, which sought to ensure that monks abide strictly by the vinaya and other officially sanctioned clerical practices. In other words, while refusing to recognise the authority of the Mahatherasamakhom or the administration of the Mahanikay or Thammayut Orders, Phothirak nevertheless abides by the spirit of the Sangha Act and does not criticise or attempt to undermine the established procedures for regulating the sangha. By fulfilling the spirit if not the letter of the Sangha Act, Phothirak confuses the issue of the legality of his movement and so continues to evade direct official opposition. Phothirak on Phutthathat

In his book, Social Problems Which Cannot Be Solved Because of Incorrect Study of Buddhism, 9 Phothirak explicitly acknowledges the significant influence of the ideas of the prominent reformist monk, Phutthathat, on his work. Phothirak shows his respect for Phutthathat by referring to him as "Than Bhante Ariya Phutthathat"lO and page 29 of the book contains a photograph of Phothirak kneeling in front of Phutthathat at his forest monastery of Suan Mok in southern Thailand. In Social Problems Phothirak states that he respects Phutthathat but nevertheless disagrees with him on several points. While beginning

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his book with a positive survey of Phutthathat's ideas Phothirak goes on to point out what he regards as the mistakes in Phutthathat's work and where his own teachings represent a development and an improvement over those of the senior monk. The aim of Phothirak's book appears to be to attempt to convert supporters of Phutthathat to his own system, or at least to make the supporters of Phutthathat more sympathetic to his reformist position. Phothirak says that even though Phutthathat teaches that people should not cling strongly (Yyt-man-thyy-man) to anything, his views have become so widely accepted as to have become a new orthodoxy that is dogmatically clung to. Phothirak maintains that this strong attachment to Phutthathat's ideas by many people blocks perception of truth. 11 As noted in Chapter Six, Anan Senakhan denounced Phutthathat and his teachings in 1979 in his book Heretical Teachings (Kham-sorn Diarathii). Phothirak subsequently responded to Anan's criticisms of Phutthathat in a book called A Debate with Phra Anan Senakhan (Wiwaatha Kap Phra Anan Senakhan), published under the pseudonym of Saawok (savaka). 12 This book contains a detailed defence of Phutthathat\ interpretation of Buddhism and debunks Anan's criticisms of Phutthathat in Heretical Teachings point by point. Saawok's book also shows the close affinity between Phutthathat's individualistic, non-conformist interpretation of Buddhist doctrine and Phothirak's dissociation from the Thai sangha and his rejection of the authority of the Mahatherasamakhom. Phothirak can be regarded as taking Phutthathat's theoretical criticisms of establishment Thai Buddhism and of the sangha to their logical conclusion by rejecting the sangha in practice as well as in word. Indeed, while acknowledging the theoretical importance of Phutthathat's work, Phothirak criticises him for not applying his ideas in practice. Commenting on Phutthathat and on Thepwethi, Phothirak has said, Their thought has similar tendencies but it tends to be rather logical or philosophical. Neither Phutthathat nor Jau Khun Ratchaworamuni [Thepwethi] say much about practice. Both Phutthathat and Ratchaworamuni explain results rather than methods. They don't talk about

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how to do things [that is, Buddhist practice], which is something that is quite important.(T) 13

Phothirak's emphasis on the strict practical application of Buddhist principles and on strict ethical purity can be regarded as an application of the rationalism and doctrinalism common to other reformist monks, such as Phutthathat and Ratchaworamuni, at the level of religious practice. That is, Phothirak maintains that not only the interpretation but also the practice of Buddhism should be consistent with fundamental doctrinal principles. Phothirak's emphasis on religious practice also follows from the need to validate his non-conformist movement in terms of the traditional authority-conferring forms of Theravada Buddhism. In Thai Buddhism spiritual authority has historically been regarded as flowing from strict moral and ascetic practice more than from scriptural knowledge or doctrinal insight. Phothirak consequently attempts to demonstrate the validity of his rejection of the sangha hierarchy by following a stricter ascetic regimen than the mainstream sangha. Phothirak's emphasis on vegetarianism, not openly soliciting financial donations from followers, and the ascetic practices of the forest monks is part of an effort to demonstrate his movement's moral superiority over the establishment and what he regards as its degenerate and corrupt sangha. Phothirak's Supporters

While there is a significant degree of overlap between Phutthathat's and Phothirak's supporters, Phothirak's greater emphasis on strictness in Buddhist practice as opposed to logical consistency in doctrinal interpretation means that he tends to appeal more to the less highly educated strata of the middle class who perceive Buddhism primarily in terms of personal practice. This contrasts with the more intellectual character of Phutthathat's supporters, who tend to see Buddhism in terms of ideas and ideology more than in terms of religious practice. Phothirak's following appears to be largely constituted of merchants, tradesmen, and small businessmen, often, like Phothirak himself, of Chinese or Sino-Thai extraction. That is, Phothirak's followers are mainly from the lesser educated sections of the petite bourgeoisie.

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Nevertheless, Phothirak also has a number of highly educated and professional supporters, the most prominent of whom is Chamlong Srimuang (see later section). Indeed, the distinction between Phutthathat's and Phothirak's supporters should not be overemphasised. Phutthathat's supporters also regard strict moral practice as an important component of reformist Buddhism and Phothirak's supporters also acknowledge the theoretical importance of Phutthathat's doctrinal innovations. Both Phutthathat's and Phothirak's followers are influenced by the same modernist world-view and criticise supernatural beliefs and metaphysical interpretations of Buddhism. However, Phothirak tends to support a less radical religious rationalism than does Phutthathat. For example, he continues to regard traditional Buddhist notions such as rebirth and kamma - notions which Phutthathat de-emphasises to the point of rendering them irrelevant to his view of Buddhism - as denoting real conditions as in the traditional interpretations of Thai Buddhist doctrine. However, as is the case for other reformist monks, Phothirak's audience is drawn from among those who are disenchanted with the establishment's domination of the state and the sangha and whose support for reformist Buddhism amounts to a symbolic rejection of the political centralisation implicitly supported by the traditional forms of establishment Buddhism. Furthermore, the support for Phothirak's emphasis on the religious authority of the individual and his teaching of the possibility of lay persons' direct participation in the spiritual core of Buddhism mirrors his audience's aspiration for direct participation in and authority over the social and political spheres of their lives. Phothirak has developed a significant following outside of Bangkok in the northeastern region of Isan. The popularity of his nonconformist Buddhism in this region can perhaps be attributed to the fact that Phothirak was born and grew up in Isan and so can draw upon local loyalities. His movement may also crystallise and provide a concrete focus for the continuing dissatisfaction of many Northeasterners with the Central Thai-dominated sangha. The continuing strength of personal and regional loyalties in Isan was clearly demonstrated in the Phra Phimontham case discussed in Chapter Five.

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The growing popularity of Phothirak's movement in Isan is causing concern to the sangha authorities in the region. Phra Thepsumethi (Devasumedhi), the Thammayut Regional Governor of the tenth sangha region, which includes Ubonratchathani and Srisaket provinces, has accused Phothirak and his followers of creating divisions amongst the local lay people. Thepsumethi maintains that Phothirak's followers have criticised Thammayut and Mahanikay monks as being phra yak, "monster monks", and phra maan (mara), "demon monks", and have forced all monks who go to his Phutthasathaan in Srisaket province to hand in their official monks registration cards. In an interview with Matichon in 1986 Phra Thepsumethi maintained that Phothirak breaks up the unity of the lay men and lay women and makes them misunderstand the Thai sangha by thinking that monks' behaviour is not appropriate or correct according to the vinaya, while at the same time thinking that Phothirak's practices are correct. This is a very serious problem. At the moment about 10 per cent of people [in Ubon and Srisaket] support Phothirak, but many people are in two minds because they can't decide who is correct. This group has separated themselves out from the sangha by citing constitutional law which they say gives them the right to practise according to their own beliefs .... The Sangha Provincial Governors in different provinces are consulting about how to deal with the infiltration [into the Region] of different groups which are not affiliated with the Thai sangha, because in fact we don't know what to do about it. We have no authority over them because they are not affiliated with the Thai sangha. We have to pass this matter over to the government and the Mahatherasamakhom to resolve.(T) 14 Opposition to Phothirak

After the October 1976 coup Phothirak's group came under the suspicion of the new military government, and his Daen Asok premises at Nakhornpathom were searched by the Special Security Police (Tamruat Santibaan). However, Phothirak and his followers had been forewarned of the police raid and had left the premises several hours earlier. When the police found nothing illegal or incriminating no further action was taken against the movement. However, in November 1979 the

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Mahatherasamakhom met to consider Phothirak and his renegade movement and issued an announcement which, among other things, stated: There are individuals formed into a group who present themselves as bhikkhus and who practise in such a way as to lead people into the mistaken belief that they are strict monks. For example, they refrain from eating meat and follow dhutanga [ascetic] practices for abolishing kilesa, which makes those who do not know them think that they are highly developed [spiritually].. . . The Department of Religious Affairs regards them as subverting the religion.(T) 15

The announcement did not seek to actively restrict Phothirak's movement, serving rather as an attempt to undermine Phothirak's credibility. The announcement made a number of accusations against the movement, claiming that its members had been guilty of - being incorrectly ordained; - advertising themselves as being disaffiliated from the Thai sangha; disseminating propaganda which promoted misunderstanding of the vinaya; criticising monks who practise according to the vinaya and the regulations of the Thai sangha; and establishing themselves into groups with branches in various locations. 16 The Mahatherasamakhom announcement observed that according to the vinaya a monk must have been ordained for a minimum of ten years before he can in turn ordain another into the sangha, and that such a preceptor must also be recognised by the sangha in accord with the regulations of the Mahatherasamakhom as laid down in the Sangha Act of 1962. That is, the Council of Elders accused Phothirak of violating the formalised, state-enforced controls over ordination. Phothirak in fact has two types of clerical followers, those who were officially ordained elsewhere and subsequently became his followers, and those whom Phothirak himself has ordained. It is this latter group whose ordination was questioned by the Mahatherasamkhom.

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The announcement also criticised Phothirak's vegetarianism, reiterating the traditional Theravada belief based on the vinaya that a monk may eat meat given to him in almsfood if it is "pure", that is, if he does not suspect or know that the animal had been killed specifically for him. Phothirak was also accused of establishing a new nikaya, of undermining the administration of the Thai sangha, and of creating divisions between Thai Buddhists which in turn undermined the security of both the religion and the nation. The resolution concluded by giving instructions to all abbots in the country to observe the activities of the movement and its followers and to keep the secular and religious authorities informed. 17 In response to the announcement Phothirak accused the Mahatherasamakhom of cowardice, saying they could not respond to his accusations that members of the Council of Elders were interested only in competing for monasteries (between the Mahanikay and Thammayut Orders), appointing clerical titles and spending their private lives in chanting, eating, fawning upon lay people in order to collect money, and officiating at the opening of commercial establishments, for which they received substantial donations. Anan Senakhan's Criticisms of Phothirak

In 1982 Anan Senakhan (Phra Chayanantho Bhikkhu) published a book denouncing Phothirak, called Phothirak - The Highly Dangerous Prophet (Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay), under the auspices of his movement, the Organisation to Protect Buddhist Teachings of Thailand (Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaat Pratheet Thai). 18 Anan published his criticisms in order to counter Phothirak's teachings which, he claimed, obscure the truth and deceive Buddhists who know only a little, are dull and cannot see through them into believing that this . . . is a true teaching of the supreme sasada [the Buddha].(T) 19

Anan accuses Phothirak of violating Thai secular law; declaring his independence from the authority of the ordinances of the Mahatherasamakhom; giving up his monks identification card, the nangsyy sutthi issued by the Department of Religious Affairs; not being

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affiliated with any monastery or other official organisation of the sangha; and violating the law governing the Thai sangha. Despite the extreme and often personal nature of his criticisms of Phothirak, Anan in fact develops a comparatively sophisticated explanation of Phothirak's popularity and the threat he poses to traditional Thai Buddhism. It is important to note in this regard that both Anan and Phothirak in fact agree that the practice and teaching of Buddhism in Thailand have been corrupted. In response to this perceived corruption Phothirak has sought to separate and insulate himself from the sangha in order to establish his own purer means of following Buddhism. Anan, on the other hand, disagrees with Phothirak's rejection of the sangha saying that, despite the degeneracy of Thai monks, what is needed is a purification and strengthening of the sangha from within rather than the creation of divisive factions that threaten to undermine the security and integrity of Thai Buddhism as a whole. These two divergent approaches to the same perceived problem reflect Anan's and Phothirak's respective positions inside and outside of the organs of the Thai state. Anan is a former member of the Thai bureaucracy and he identifies strongly with the monarchy, symbols of national unity and with political policies which perpetuate the pivotal place of the Thai bureaucracy as an agent and administrator of the centralist policies of the state. Phothirak, on the other hand, a half-Chinese with a previous semi-professional and business career, can be described as a former member of the middle class who is outside of the establishment and who has sought to establish his own independent source of religious-cum-political authority. Phothirak sees no benefit in supporting or remaining within the religious system which supports the establishment and which blocks the social and political advancement of the middle class. Phothirak's criticisms of the restrictions and corruption of the sangha thus also represent implicit criticisms of the restrictions and corruption of the existing sociopolitical order. Anan criticises the corruption of the sangha and what he calls foolish lay beliefs in magic and supernaturalism because he believes that these create an environment conducive to the growth of subversive

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and potentially destructive movements such as Santi Asok. Unlike Phothirak, who rejects the sangha, Anan seeks to reform the Thai monkhood from within in order to strengthen the traditional forms of institutional Buddhism. Anan consequently regards Phothirak as dangerous because he uses legitimate criticisms of the sangha to lead people to what, in his opinion, are misguided and dangerous conclusions. Anan claims that Phothirak took advantage of the fact that he had mixed in artistic, radio, and television circles to get people who did not see through his guise to often invite him to give dhamma lectures at various places. Because Phothirak was a good speaker and knew the deficiencies of the sangha both he and his monastery became well known. His teachings were in line with the thoughts of the general public who could see the bad behaviour and improper practices of the sangha. Phothirak's teachings were consequently widely accepted by the general public.(T) 20

At the same time that he published his criticisms of Phothirak in 1982, Anan also denounced the sangha authorities and the officers of the Department of Religious Affairs for their laxness in prosecuting Phothirak. He claimed that the abbot of Phothirak's original monastery of Wat Asokaram should have informed the authorities when Phothirak returned his monks identity card but continued wearing the robes of a monk. Writing of the abbot and the members of the Mahatherasamakhom, Anan said, Each of them had many faults and errors in their practice and so did not dare to undertake any serious proceedings against Phothirak [for fear of being exposed].(T) 21

Anan accused the officials of the Department of Religious Affairs of being remiss in their duties and the Director-General of the Department of being too afraid of political influence to prosecute Phothirak. As already noted, the Mahatherasamakhom had expressed concern about Phothirak's activities in November 1979. However, no specific action was taken against Phothirak until almost three years later when Anan Senakhan and Winay Siwakun, the respective clerical and lay

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heads of the Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaat, lodged a formal complaint about Phothirak's activities with the Commander of the Suppression Division of Bangkok police on 22 February 1982. 22 The police passed on Anan's letter to the Department of Religious Affairs for comment and advice. On 19 March 1982, the Director-General of the Department of Religious Affairs wrote to the Mahatherasamakhom about Anan's accusation that Phothirak had infringed the 1962 Sangha Act. In this letter the Director-General made the contentious accusation that Phothirak had disobeyed the Sangha Act by holding the Buddha's vinaya as a higher authority. The Director-General also charged that Phothirak was not acting in accord with the "official edition of the Tipitaka of the sangha of which the Department of Religious Affairs is the guardian".(T)23 The Minister for Education, under whose authority the Department of Religious Affairs is placed, subsequently wrote to the Mahatherasamkhom requesting that the validity of the allegations made by Anan and the Director-General of the Department of Religious Affairs be considered. The Minister also sought the Council of Elders' opinion about whether legal action should be taken against Phothirak. On 26 March 1982 the Department of Religious Affairs made a preliminary reply to the Police Department on the issue of whether Phothirak's returning of his monks identity card constituted a legal offence: If Phothirak simply returns his monks identification card to his upachaya [ordaining preceptor] and refuses to be affiliated with any monastery or to be associated with the Thai sangha, but still fully upholds the sila-vinaya [ethical practices] of a bhikkhu, he can be regarded as still retaining the status of a bhikkhu.(T) 24

This represented an interpretation of Phothirak's action in terms of the vinaya or clerical code of conduct recorded in the Buddhist scriptures. However, the Department of Religious Affairs added its own opinion on the matter, saying that Phothirak would nevertheless have infringed the Sangha Act of 1962 if facts demonstrate that after he returned his monks identification card to his upachaya for the last time and announced his refusal to be

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The ambiguity of the Department's and the Mahatherasamakhom's response to the police reflects the existence of a fundamental conflict between the authority of the traditional religious law or vinaya and the secular sangha law. According to the vinaya, which the 1962 Sangha Act explicitly states should not be contravened, Phothirak was in fact still a Buddhist bhikkhu. However, in terms of the secular law, which seeks to exert state control over the sangha, Phothirak was not an officially registered bhikkhu. The Department of Religious Affairs concluded that if Phothirak continued wearing the robes of a monk so that others are led to believe that he is a monk, when in fact he is not a monk, then he would have infringed the secular law. However, the legal issue hinged on what in fact defines the status of a Thai monk - abidance by the vinaya or compliance with the procedures of secular law. This conflict has never been resolved by either a secular Thai court or by the sangha authorities. It represents a conflict between the authority and scope of the respective religious and secular laws relating to the sangha that the secular authorities appear unwilling to bring to general notice. As a consequence the issue of the legality of Phothirak's movement has been side-stepped in an apparent attempt to avoid dealing with this legal complexity. It should be noted in this context that the Thai Constitution of 1978 directs that the monarch appoints the Sangharaja, who in turn is charged with the responsibility of directing the activities of the sangha without contravening the law, the vinaya, or the edicts of the Mahatherasamakhom. 26 However, the Constitution contains no statement of which law, whether secular or religious, is the higher authority in the case of there being a conflict between any of the three sources of authority governing the affairs of the sangha. After considering the various issues, the Mahatherasamakhom eventually wrote to the police advising that they should find more facts and conduct more investigations before proceeding further with the case. 27 The police concluded that, after investigations, they had

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found that both Anan and his followers and Phothirak and his followers had good intentions towards the nation and the religion. This statement was in fact true, although, as already noted, Anan and Phothirak hold very different views on what constitutes the welfare of the religion and the nation. The fact that no action was taken against Phothirak in response to Anan's allegations not only indicates that political pressure was applied to avoid prosecuting Phothirak but also that Phothirak's middle-class supporters are gaining in influence and power. Phothirak's movement began in the mid-1970s, at the same time the new commercial and professional groups first exercised their political muscle against the establishment by ousting the dictatorship of Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphaat Jarusathian. While suffering a temporary set-back in 1976 with the return of a military dictatorship, the middle class has subsequently gradually entrenched its position and influence in a slowly accelerating movement to wrest political power and social influence from the establishment. In 1983, former Deputy Prime Minister and wealthy financier Boonchu Rojanasathian commented on the rise of middle-class and popular movements as follows: The events of 1973 heralded the belated entry into Thai political life of a number of new pressure groups generated out of the rapidly changing socio-economic conditions in the country.. . . With them these relatively small pressure groups brought along millions of ordinary Thais excited by the prospect that they might actually be able to influence the nature and direction of their government for the first time. I see 1973 as a true watershed in modern Thai politics. Its impact is permanent, irreversible. The trend established then towards greater enfranchisement of the people can be slowed down or speeded up. It can even be reversed temporarily but it cannot be eradicated. 28

The fact that the theoretical and practical contradictions between Anan's conservative Buddhism and Phothirak's anti-establishment teachings and practices remain unresolved reflects the political standoff and unresolved political tensions between the establishment and the rising Thai middle class. In the past two decades, with the socioeconomic rise of the middle class and its political competition with

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the establishment, there has been a gradual weakening of state control over the symbols of political legitimacy, in particular, Buddhism. State control of Buddhism is no longer as firm as at the peak of authoritarian military rule under Sarit Thanarat. This is clearly shown by the indecisiveness of the bureaucracy's response to Phothirak's establishment of an independent Buddhist movement which explicitly rejects the state's formal control mechanisms over the sangha. This indecisiveness reflects the conflicts within the state administration resulting from the gradual rise to power and influence of non-establishment and anti-establishment sections of the elite. Phothirak and his movement represent the first successful practical as opposed to theoretical challenge to the centralised state control of the sangha as a symbol of political legitimacy. Furthermore, the continued unhindered growth of Phothirak's movement reflects the growing divisions within the Thai elite and a gradual shift of political power from the establishment to the rising middle class and other associated anti-establishment groups. The political and religious contradictions between the Thai middle class and establishment remain unresolved but in the 1980s the conflict has rarely been open. Rather, in this decade each group has adopted the strategy of developing and sponsoring its own position while attempting to avoid open conflict. However, the more time that passes without action being taken against Phothirak the more entrenched his position becomes. The establishment's avoidance of direct confrontation over the issue has allowed Phothirak to attain a semi-institutionalised status and to continue his gradual and systematic usurpation of the traditional religious authority of the sangha. As a strict traditionalist and conservative Anan Senakhan was consequently highly critical of the inaction of the Mahatherasamakhom, the Department of Religious Affairs and the police in not prosecuting Phothirak. In this, Anan can be regarded to have been a voice of the conscience of the traditional establishment. He maintains that the development or protection of Buddhism must rely upon the secular domain, that is, the law and the dhammavinaya in combination.(T) 29

Anan regards the protection historically afforded Buddhism by the

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secular domain as having ensured the survival of the religion. And he regards attempts to break that traditional association - by abandoning the historical regulatory authority of the state over the sangha as threatening the future of Buddhism by leaving it defenceless in a hostile world. Anan consequently resists the growth of break-away movements, such as Phothirak's Santi Asok, which reject state controls over the sangha and seek independent sources of religious authority by direct reference to the scriptures. Anan points out that in Thai history the state has become increasingly involved in the administration and governance of the sangha: Because of this the religious domain has been of benefit in ensuring the peace, order, and security of society and has not become a source of social disorder and confusion.(T) 30

This statement reflects Anan's recognition of the potential political impact of independent expressions of Buddhism and he emphasises the need to keep Buddhism under firm state control and to not let it "float independently of the recognition and oversight [kaan-khumkhrorng] of the secular domain". 31 Problem of Unofficial Buddhist Movements

It is clear that neither the sangha nor the secular authorities have been able to agree on how to deal with Phothirak and his movement or for that matter with many other unofficial and unregistered Buddhist movements. In August 1986 the commentator Khaamhuno reported an announcement that henceforth all "centres for practices and activities in accord with beliefs" (samnak patibat kiijakam taam khwaam-chya-thyy), including religious centres, would no longer be the responsibility of the Department of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Education, as had previously been the case, but rather would now come under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for internal security. 32 This transfer of responsibility appears to have represented an official perception of non-Buddhist religious movements and unofficial Buddhist movements as matters impinging on national security rather than having a merely religious significance. The transfer

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of responsibility to the Ministry of the Interior also followed significant public outcry in recent years about the inefficiency and indecisiveness of the Department of Religious Affairs in dealing with unofficial and unregistered religious movements and centres. For example, in December 1979 Khaamhuno criticised the Department of Religious Affairs for not controlling the growth of unofficial religious sects and monasteries. 33 Khaamhuno suggested that new sects should either be brought within the ambit of existing Buddhist teachings and practices or, if that is not possible, there should be some formal recognition of such new sects and their distinctiveness from the existing Buddhist Orders. In this way, Khaamhuno maintained, the problem of unscrupulous people masquerading as monks and defrauding the common people and the problem of controlling the moral purity of the sangha or those who claim to be monks could be dealt with. In October 1982 the then Director-General of the Department of Religious Affairs, Chamlyang Wutthijan, estimated that there were 3,500 unauthorised or unregistered monasteries and religious centres in the country. 34 Chamlyang stated that the Department had no legal power to close or pull down unauthorised monasteries unless they encroached onto state land, and he said that the police were reticent to become involved in such matters because there were no legal sanctions which could be applied. The then Minister for Education, Khumthorng Phuuphiwdyan, stated that the establishment of monasteries was a matter of faith and that he did not like to call religious centres unauthorised (thyan) but only "incorrectly established". He pointed out that, while there was a Departmental regulation associated with the administration of the 1962 Sangha Act, )Vhich requires that all monasteries or samnak song (sangha centres) should be registered with the Department of Religious Affairs, there were no legal sanctions which could be invoked to force the registration of monasteries. 35 There appears to be growing popular concern, particularly among sections of the middle class, about unauthorised monasteries. There are a number of reasons for this concern. Firstly, the rapid growth

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of the Hupphaasawan spiritualist movement in the 1970s raised doubts about the integrity of the administration of the Department of Religious Affairs, whose senior officers had been prepared to turn a blind eye to the movement's conservative and extremist activities because of apparent official sympathy if not support for Hupphaasawan teachings. 36 And secondly, there is widespread distrust of the Department among the middle class because of the participation of Departmental officers in persecuting and obstructing the career of Phra Phimontham. That is, there is a widespread perception that the Department of Religious Affairs is an arm of the establishment, supporting reactionary interpretations of doctrine and conservative religious practices. As such, many intellectuals and educated members of the middle class distrust the Department of Religious Affairs and, in line with the already noted trend towards lay people taking greater responsibility for maintaining the purity of the sangha, these members of the middle class are increasingly critical of the laxness of the Department in failing to uphold the moral purity of the sangha and the integrity of Buddhism as a whole. Many of the unauthorised samnak or religious centres which have come to public attention in recent years, like Hupphaasawan, are fringe movements that teach a highly animist or spiritualist religion often only peripherally or nominally related to Buddhist doctrine. Intellectuals and professionals are concerned about the spread of supernatural interpretations of Buddhism and desire the Department of Religious Affairs to more strictly enforce clerical adherence to the doctrinal Buddhism which they support by more stringently enforcing its regulatory procedures. For a wat (monastery) or samnak (religious centre) to be officially registered with the Department it must meet certain criteria, such as its monks being officially ordained and registered with state-issued registration cards, and the wat's head monk or abbot being responsible to either the local Mahanikay or Thammayut administrative hierarchy for the activities of monks under his charge. That is, the middle-class criticisms of the Department of Religious Affairs, as often reported and analysed in magazines such as Siam &t or Matichon, represent attempts to direct the activities of the

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Department. Middle-class critics seek to redirect the activities of the Department of Religious Affairs to promote forms of Buddhism which legitimate their socio-political aspirations and which also undermine those "unofficial" religious forms that either bolster the position of the establishment or are perceived as undermining the legitimatory function of Buddhism as a whole. Khaamhuno claims that the problem of unauthorised religious centres is due to the weakness of the public service. That is, no matter what form a religious situation takes, public servants are usually afraid to touch it because they only think of the people's right to freedom of belief. Even if the movement is illegal the public service still permits it to continue.(T) 37

That is, Khaamhuno argues that state authorities should take a more active role in ensuring that religious centres strictly follow Buddhist teachings and practices. He clearly regards the constitutional right to religious freedom as being abused if it leads to the unchecked growth of conservative religious movements. However, Khaamhuno's and others' criticisms appear to have had little impact, as in October 1985 the then Director-General of the Department of Religious Affairs, Mongkhon Sriphaiwan, announced that the number of unauthorised religious centres had increased to 4,900. 38 The transfer of responsibility for certain religious centres to the Ministry of the Interior in 1986, noted above, may thus have been an attempt by the government to better respond to and deal with the problem of unauthorised religious centres. However, without the enactment of stricter laws enforcing the registration of all religious centres it is difficult to see how a simple transfer of responsibilities will lead to more successful control of unauthorised centres and movements. In this context of administrative confusion and legal ambiguity, official action on Santi Asok remains indecisive and the Mahatherasamakhom has still not reached any formal decision on the correctness or otherwise of Phothirak's movement. The official confusion surrounding the status of Phothirak's movement was shown by the announcement on 20 August 1986 by the Director-General of the Department of

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Religious Affairs, Mongkhon Sriphaiwan, that the Ministry of Education had ordered government schools to cease inviting people associated with Santi Asok to give religious instruction and training to students or staff. The reason given was that Santi Asok was not formally registered with the Department of Religious Affairs. However, on the following day, the Minister for Education, Samphan Thorngsamak, countered the Director-General's statement saying that the Ministry had not directed that teachers from Santi Asok should not be invited. Siam Rat commented on this series of events as follows: This indicates the confusion in the conduct of the public service towards the Santi Asok Centre, which has been a problem for such a long time that it is now difficult to control. The difficulty lies in that it has been allowed to grow and lay down roots.(T) 39 Chamlong Srimuang and Phothirak

Phothirak has not avoided legal prosecution and the imposition of restrictions on his movement merely because of confusion in the sangha about how to deal with him. He has also had some influential political sponsors. The most prominent of these sponsors is the present Governor of Bangkok and leader of the Phalang Tham Party, Chamlong Srimuang. As Anan Senakhan observes, The fact that he [Phothirak] has some important followers (for example, Chamlong Srimuang, who is influential both in politics and in the Army) who support him openly has led to Phothirak becoming popular very quickly.(T)40

Chamlong Srimuang was born in Thonburi in 1935 into a lower middle class family, his father holding an administrative position in the Bangkok General Post Office. He was a bright student and attended the Thai Military Academy, where he was the chief cadet in 1959. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s Chamlong held a variety of army positions, heading an operational attack unit in Laos in 1968 and acting as assistant head of the Thai volunteer forces in Vietnam in 1970. In 1972 he completed a Master of Science degree in Management

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at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where he wrote a thesis on labour unrest in Thailand. Chamlong was one of the six original members of the Khana Thahaan Num, the Young Military Officers Group or "Young Turks", who graduated together as part of the seventh class (run thii jet) of graduates from the Chulachomklao Military Academy in 1960. The Young Turks, while supporting the existing Thai political order and vehemently anti-communist, nevertheless distanced themselves from the corruption of the senior military officers of the generation of Sarit Thanarat and Thanom Kittikachorn. The Young Turks were one of the most cohesive and politically influential military cliques in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It was the support of this clique which placed Thanin Kraiwichian in power in 1976 and it was the Young Turks who subsequently mounted a coup against Thanin in October 1977, replacing him with General Kriangsak Chommanand as Prime Minister. In 1980, the Young Turks withdrew their support for Kriangsak and supported Prem Tinsulanond as the new premier. However, Chamlong's interest in the Army as a means to power gradually declined and in the late 1970s he became a strict follower of Phothirak, adopting strict vegetarianism and abstaining from sex. When Prem Tinsulanond became Prime Minister in February 1980 Chamlong was appointed to the influential position of SecretaryGeneral to the Prime Minister's Office. Chamlong sided with Prem in the abortive 1 April coup of 1981led by other members of the Young Turks group, and he himself was not involved in the rebellion. He subsequently resigned from his position in the Prime Minister's Office in October 1981, partly in protest against a government-sponsored pro-abortion bill, which he helped defeat by running a strong Buddhistbased anti-abortion campaign. Two days after he was promoted to the rank of Major-General in October 1985 Chamlong resigned from the army in order to contest the Bangkok municipal elections for the position of Governor of Bangkok held in November of that year. Under the banner of his Ruam Phalang or United Force group and running on a strong anti-corruption platform he polled almost half

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a million votes, double the vote for his nearest rival. After his election Chamlong stated, The most important thing facing my administration is to persuade the people to accept that they are responsible not only to themselves but to society as well.. . . We must have co-operation. Even the simple, common-sense things, like refraining from throwing one's garbage into the river must be taught anew. 41

Chamlong has been a vocal campaigner for Phothirak's ascetic and moralistic form of Buddhism. The Daaw Sayam newspaper has described Chamlong's propagatory activities in the following way: Because he acts like a monk in military uniform people call him "Maha" even though he does not have the parian in the dhamrna. "Maha-Chamlong" gives sermons everywhere without needing to be invited, and without the need for a sermon podium or a sermon fee. Khun Maha gives sermons about politics with ease, because he once held political positions, including the post of Secretary-General of the Prime Minister's Office.(T) 42

Chamlong lives austerely and when travelling in the countryside to give religious sermons in the early 1980s he followed the practices of a dhutanga monk, sleeping in the open in temple grounds under a klot or mosquito net umbrella used by forest monks. On the numerous propagatory tours Chamlong undertook before becoming Governor of Bangkok he gave talks on dhamma and everyday life, encouraging people to stop eating meat, to give up smoking cigarettes and drinking beer, and to hold to Buddhist ethical commandments. In February 1982, Chamlong was invited to address the Thammasart University Debating Society on the topic of "Religion and Politics". He used this occasion to counter the popular view that religion and politics do not mix by noting that in the countryside political parties find it most convenient and effective to hold their rallies in the grounds of monasteries. He also argued for the need for a religious influence in politics, saying, "If politics is without religion it will be destroyed. "(T) 43 On this occasion Chamlong also referred to Phutthathat's book Dhamma

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and Politics (Thamma Kap Kaan-myang), 44 which had been given to him by Phra Panyanantha when that monk invited him to address the monks at his monastery of Wat Chonprathaanrangsit. Chamlong quoted Phutthathat as saying, If economics and politics do not have dhamma then both economics and politics will become means of destroying the world. That is, they will be destructive in the sense of rendering us devoid of humanity.(T) 45

In 1983 Chamlong published a book of his articles which he evocatively titled The junction of Three Roads (Thaang Saam Phraeng), in which he explicitly portrayed himself as standing at the intersection of three sets of forces, the military, politics, and Buddhism. Chamlong cites Phutthathat liberally throughout this book and he has clearly been significantly influenced by that reformist monk's ideas. With Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond's dissolution of the Thai Parliament in April 1988 and the calling of an early general election for 24 July 1988, Chamlong decided to mobilise his followers into a formal political organisation to contest the election. In early May 1988 he announced the formation of the Phalang Tham (Righteous Force) Party. While Chamlong did not resign his position as Governor of Bangkok to contest the election, he lent his full support to the new political party, which fielded thirty-seven candidates in Bangkok, sixty-nine candidates in the Central "Plains, 113 candidates in the Northeast Region, and thirty-eight candidates in each of the Southern and Northern Regions. 46 The close links between the Phalang Tham Party and Phothirak's movement were demonstrated by the fact that over half of the more than 300 people who initially sought selection as Phalang Tham candidates in the general election were members of Santi AsokY Despite predictions of great political successes for the new party, only ten Bangkok seats and four provincial seats were won by Phalang Tham candidates on 24 July 1988. The politics of Phothirak's movement has increasingly become an issue of concern in Thailand in parallel with Chamlong's growing prominence and political influence and as speculations about his further

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political aspirations at the national level are voiced. The legal status of the Santi Asok movement became a political issue during the 1988 Thai general election campaign when conservative Buddhists, rumoured to be supported by the Prachaakorn Thai Party led by Samak Sunthorawet, criticised what they claimed was Chamlong's political support for Phothirak's movement. While electioneering at Wat Chalerm Phrakiat in Nonthaburi to the north of Bangkok in June 1988, Chamlong became involved in an argument about Santi Asok with Sangwian Pharuhong, Chairman of the Parian Thamma Samaakhom, a conservative Buddhist education association. The Bangkok Post reported that Sangwian alleged that Santi Asoke is illegal because it is not registered with the Sangkha Supreme Council [that is, the Mahatherasamakhom] or the Religious Affairs Department, and that it can exist outside the law only because Maj.-Gen. Chamlong supports it. The Bangkok Governor denied the charge, saying he follows the moral teachings of Santi Asoke because they are practical and teach people to be unselfish. 48

Chamlong subsequently took up a challenge from Sangwian Pharuhong to put his claim that he did not support Santi Asok in writing to the Mahatherasamakhom. Chamlong sent a letter to the Mahatherasamakhom on 21 June 1988 in which he denied ever having used political influence to protect Santi Asok. 49 Nevertheless, Chamlong's letter to the Mahatherasamakhom was carefully worded, stating that if followers of Santi Asok in fact engage in activities which contradict the law of the land and go against peace and order then action should be taken against the movement. Chamlong evaded the issue of the legality of the non-registration of Santi Asok with the Department of Religious Affairs. The then head of the Department of Religious Affairs, Adul Ratanon, commented that while the Mahatherasamakhom "has studied the legal status of Santi Asoke for a long time . . . no conclusion has been reached". 50 While the legality of Phothirak's movement continues to be an issue in certain circles, Thai religious and secular authorities

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are still unprepared to act against Santi Asok, despite continuing allegations of irregularities. There is no doubt that despite his denials, Chamlong's association with Santi Asok lends the movement an air of legitimacy which makes the Thai authorities reticent to act against it. This reticence to act is shown in a story about Santi Asok related by Sulak Sivarak. Sulak has stated that in the early 1980s the Mahatherasamakhom set up an investigative committee led by legal and religious authorities to consider the status of Santi Asok: After four years of investigation the committee agreed that Santi Asoke had indeed violated both religious and secular law concerning the Sangha. The committee then submitted its finding to the security council for action. Much to the Sangha's disappointment, the answer, according to Sulak, was that the controversy was a highly sensitive matter politically. Therefore the [sangha J council agreed to put the matter into abeyance. 51

Sangwian Pharuhong's criticisms of Chamlong and Santi Asok appear to have been based as much on political motives as genuine religious concerns. In 1988 Chamlong's wife, Sirilak Srimuang, stood unsuccessfully as a Phalang Tham Party candidate against Samak Sunthorawet in his inner Bangkok electorate of Dusit, and the Prachaakorn Thai Party's rumoured funding of Sangwian Pharuhong's Buddhist association was linked with attempts to discredit Chamlong and his political party. Nevertheless, the continuing immunity of the Santi Asok movement from legal prosecution is undoubtedly also founded upon political factors, namely, the political popularity of Chamlong Srimuang. Any action against Santi Asok could easily be interpreted as a move against Chamlong, and so long as Chamlong's political star continues to rise, Thai police and religious officials will be reluctant to risk widespread public criticism or possible retribution for being seen to be attacking a popular political figure known for his moral rectitude and propriety. The fortunes of Phothirak and his movement are thus intimately related to the political fortunes of Chamlong Srimuang, and the heterodox Buddhist movement and the ascetic politician can be expected to rise, and fall, together.

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But any action against Santi Asok will also be conditioned by the extent to which the movement is perceived to be a genuine threat to the traditional sangha and the legitimatory religious forms of the political establishment. Ironically, while Chamlong's widespread popularity and political influence provide a degree of security for Santi Asok, the greater his political power the more threatening Phothirak's movement becomes to conservative Buddhists. And the more that Santi Asok is regarded as a real threat to traditional Buddhism because of the political influence of its followers, the more likely it is that some form of punitive action will be taken against the movement. Sanitsuda Ekachai, reporter for the Bangkok Post, suggests that the intensification of attacks on Phothirak and Santi Asok during the 1988 election campaign after a long period of official disinterest was prompted by the apparent popularity of the Phalang Tham Party and the close relations between members of the Party and the Santi Asok movement. 52 However, the disquiet about the possible political repercussions of Chamlong's and Phothirak's policies comes from a number of sources, not only from his political opponents. Chamlong's critics are concerned that he is seen to be giving political sanction to Phothirak's strident criticisms of the sangha and that this is a source of religious and political conflict. Such criticisms also contain an implicit concern that Chamlong's adoption of strict clerical practices is undermining the authority of the sangha by giving increasing religious status to the laity. Indeed, Chamlong's strict Buddhist asceticism can be interpreted as part of an attempt to integrate the religious and secular bases of political legitimation in Thailand. As indicated by the title of his book, The junction of Three Roads, Chamlong seeks to legitimate his political position by directly participating in and usurping the practicebased religious authority of the sangha. This contrasts with the simple sponsoring of the renunciate practices of monks as was the wont of Thailand's traditional rulers. In terms of the traditional division between lay and clerical roles in Theravada Buddhism, Chamlong wishes to be both a cakkavattin, or religious ruler, and an arahant, or ascetic monk.

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Despite the reformist character of Phothirak's movement, Phutthathat and other reformist monks such as Thepwethi remain uneasy about the Santi Asok movement because of the threat it is seen as posing to the traditional sangha. Phra Thepwethi has commented on these issues as follows: He [Phothirak] may have political aspirations.... Some people [followers of Phothirak] may be important in the government, and when they are important they will use political methods to promote their own interests. I do not know whether or not they will use strong methods in the long term when they have considerable political power.(T)5 3

There is an unresolved contradiction in the work of the leading reformist monk Phutthathat between his theoretical abolition of the distinction between the religious role and practices of monks and lay people and his continued support for the monastic institution of the sangha. 54 Phothirak has responded to this contradiction by rejecting the Thai sangha, and Chamlong has gone even further than Phothirak who, despite his attacks on the sangha, nevertheless remains a monk. Chamlong has effectively integrated the monkly role and system of practice with active lay involvement in social welfare programmes and politics. Phothirak's and Chamlong's actions together indicate that the theoretical tensions within Phutthathat's seminal and highly influential reformist teachings cannot be resolved within the present structure of the Thai sangha or within the traditional patterns of lay and monkly roles. Chamlong's puritan life-style and his strong moral political stance has significant support among the middle-class residents of Bangkok. He is highly critical of corruption (that is, the siphoning off of middle-class wealth by the establishment) and he promotes the ideals of self-sacrifice, dedication to duty, and concern for the poor and downtrodden. However, Chamlong's personal ethics are also very conservative. He is against drinking, abortion, prostitution, and gambling. Because he integrates the traditional roles of the lay person and the monk Chamlong often appears to expect other lay people to have the personal ethics of a monk. At one level Chamlong's emphasis on Buddhist ethics and moral

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responsibility can be read as an attempt to instil in the population of Bangkok the personal qualities and working habits he believes are required if Thailand is to be transformed into an industrialised nation. However, Chamlong's ascetic, spartan, low consumption life-style also provides a moral-religious basis for the frugality and saving required of the middle class to enable capital accumulation for further investment. For the middle-class capitalists, Phothirak and Chamlong provide a religious intepretation of the frugality and self-sacrifice that they impose on themselves by reinvesting rather than consuming their business profits. On the other hand, however, Phothirak's and Chamlong's teachings also provide a religious justification for the continuing poverty and low real wages of the working class in the face of rapid economic development. Some Thais fear that Chamlong's rise to power foreshadows a type of theocratic autocracy infringing on individual human rights. Writing for the Far Eastern Economic Review, Kim Gooi has commented, Chamlong is not without his detractors. Some critics fear he will be Thailand's Buddhist Ayatollah Khomeini. Others say he is uncompromising, does not take criticism lightly and he will be a dictator. 55

Chamlong certainly brings Buddhism and the state into a closer relationship, which makes the already tenuous distinction between secular and religious affairs even more difficult to uphold. Chamlong and Phothirak foreshadow the possibility of the political imposition of fundamentalist ethical restrictions on individual behaviour, based on religious ethics and justified in terms of promoting the national good and socio-economic development. While the threat of the development of Buddhist fundamentalist politics in Thailand is at present only potential, Chamlong nevertheless appears likely to have a continuing political influence in Thailand for some time to come. APPENDIX Anan Senakhan's Criticisms of the Political Establishment

In Chapter Five Anan Senakhan was portrayed as a conservative cnuc of reformist Buddhism. However, that study presented only one side of Anan's

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complex and ambiguous political stance. In the early 1980s Anan was also extremely outspoken in his criticisms of a conservative religious movement that he regarded as undermining true Buddhist teachings, and of attempts by the Thai military to entrench its political position. In 1981 Anan published a book, Phii-bun Haeng Hupphaasawan [The meritorious spirit of Hupphaasawan], 56 calling for the destruction of the spiritualistic Hupphaasawan movement founded by the medium Suchaat Kosonkittiwong. Hupphaasawan was a contemporary millenarian movement whose founder, Suchaat, prophesied the destruction of Thailand by communist forces and nuclear weapons unless the Thai people heeded the warnings of the spirit world to return to traditional religious and cultural values. In the late 1970s Hupphaasawan attracted many influential followers among the Thai military who protected the movement, despite the threatening and subversive character of Suchaat's supposedly inspired pronouncements. However, Anan ignored the political risks associated with criticising the movement and in his book called for the destruction of Hupphaasawan, accusing Suchaat of creating social disorder and of deceiving and defrauding his followers by claiming to be a medium for the wishes of the world spirit. Anan claimed that charlatans such as Suchaat attempted to make the profound and difficult teachings of Buddhism appear simple in order to deceive the gullible and induce them to donate money and other gifts. Anan's criticisms of Suchaat and Hupphaasawan provided an official excuse for the government of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond to act against the movement after a long period of growing suspicion but official inaction because of fear of the possible reaction from Suchaat's powerful backers. Police raided the Hupphaasawan centre in Ratchburi province in December 1981, finding a discarded cache of weapons. Suchaat subsequently went into hiding and the movement quickly collapsed. In 1983 Anan entered the political arena in order to attack the attempts of sections of the Thai military and their parliamentary supporters to undermine the democratic processes of government. In 1983 a clause in the Thai Constitution of 1978 which allowed the appointed Senators in the Upper House to share a significant degree of pblitical authority with the popularly elected members of the House of Representatives was due to lapse. This constitutional change threatened to significantly reduce the parbmentary influence of the armed forces, whose appointees dominated the Senate. General Arthit Kamlang-ek, then Army Commander-in-Chief, together with other senior members of the armed forces, agitated against this threatened reduction in their political power. In early 1983 parliamentary supporters of the military such as Samak

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Sunthorawet, leader of the Prachaakorn Thai Party, introduced a series of constitutional amendments into the House of Representatives which, if passed, would have ensured that the Senators retained their political powers and which would also have permitted serving civil servants, including military officers, to be appointed to ministerial positions in the government. These moves were widely interpreted as an attempt by General Arthit and his supporters to clear a way for the general to become Prime Minister without retiring from his position as Army Commander-in-Chief and without abandoning his connections with the Army. The proposed constitutional amendment submitted by Samak Sunthorawet became the focus of an intense political debate about the role of the military in the government. The amendment was brought before the House a total of three times but on each occasion failed to receive the necessary percentage of votes to pass. With the elected Parliament firmly against the constitutional amendment and with General Arthit and other senior military officers vigorously supporting it, a tense political stand-off developed in the first two months of 1983 in which rumours of a military coup led by Arthit were given increasing credence. However, rather than staging a coup, the military's parliamentary supporters persisted in re-presenting the amendment to the Parliament each time it was defeated and the Army applied increasing political pressure, including the rumoured threat of a coup, in an attempt to force sufficient numbers of members of the House to support the bill. Anan Senakhan was strongly critical of the constitutional amendment and of the Army's attempt to entrench its political power. On 8 March 1983 he disrobed in the kuti or residence of Phra Yanasangworn, abbot of Wat Bowornniwet, and publicly declared his opposition to the amendment and his intention to fight against it. On 14 March 1983 he and a group of supporters protested the constitutional amendment by fasting, shaving their heads, and conducting a propitiatory Brahmanical ritual at the Memorial to King Rama VII in Bangkok. At this ceremony Anan called on the spirit of Rama VII, who signed the country's first constitution in 1932, and Phra Sayamthewathirat, the protective deity of Thailand and the Chakri dynasty, to save the country from military dictatorship. As the political tension between the Parliament and the military mounted, Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond dissolved Parliament on 19 March and called a general election for 18 April 1983, two months ahead of time. This move was in part calculated to stave off a potential coup by directing the military's efforts into campaigning in support of their electoral candidates rather than plotting against the government. However, Anan and many others decried the

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dissolution. They argued that the fact that the amendment had already been defeated three times had clearly settled the issue. The calling of an election, with the possibility of a pro-military majority in the new Parliament submitting the amendment to the House yet again, was criticised as playing into the hands of the military and as undermining parliamentary and constitutional processes. Anan and his supporters held a rally at Sanaam Luang in central Bangkok on 21 March 1983. A second rally attended by 30,000 people was held on 29 March at Sanaam Luang, where Anan vehemently criticised Samak Sunthorawet and the military, and implicated the royal family in the early dissolution of Parliament. Siam Mai magazine reported that Anan and his Chanuan movement handed out leaflets referring to the constitutional amendment as "The Operational Plan to Split the Palace" (Phaen-phuum Yutthakaan Phaa Uimg). 57 Anan was reported as claiming that senior military officers had been with Queen Sirikit and Crown Prince Wachiralongkorn immediately before the dissolution of Parliament. Siam Mai reported Anan as having claimed that the Queen and Prince, together with senior military figures such as General Arthit, were behind the dissolution of the Parliament, their motive being to ensure the amendment was presented to the new Parliament and voted on again after the election. Anan further implied that there was a split between the Queen and the Crown Prince, who supported the amendment, and King Phumiphon and Princess Sirinthorn, who did not support continuing pressure to have the amendment re-presented to Parliament after it had already been soundly defeated. Siam Mai reported that after Anan's statements there was a rowdy expression against the monarchy among the crowd, which had to be controlled by the police. On 30 March 1983 Anan was arrested and charged with lese-majeste for defaming the Queen and the Crown Prince. After his arrest Anan claimed that an army group was behind his detention and that the military was making preparations to create another "6 October situation", a reference to the violent military coup in October 1976. He claimed that on 17 April 1983 he would provide further details of the "Operational Plan to Burn the Palace" (Phaen-phuum Yutthakaan Phau Uimg) 58 even if he were still in jail. Anan clearly believed the political situation to be critical and in effect he threatened to instigate a popular rebellion if the military-backed amendment were to pass. A civilian prosecutor subsequently considered Anan's case and dropped the lese-majeste charge for defaming the Queen and Crown Prince due to lack of evidence. After the April 1983 elections, which went off without serious incident, there was considerable competition for ministerial portfolios between the various

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political parties which formed the new coalition government. Anan held a further rally at Sanaam Luang a week after the election, supporting Kukrit Pramoj in his efforts to be appointed Prime Minister. Matichon reported that at this rally Anan criticised King Phumiphon for supporting Prem Tinsulanond to serve a further term as a non-elected Prime Minister instead of Kukrit, who was the elected leader of the party with the largest single representation in the new House of Representatives. 59 Anan was reported to have also criticised royal connections with senior military figures such as General Arthit Kamlang-ek and General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, and as having criticised Samak Sunthorawet for his continuing attempts to push the constitutional amendment through the Parliament. Anan was subsequently arrested and charged with a further count of lese-majeste for defaming the King. The political situation gradually stabilised after the election when Prem was reappointed Prime Minister and efforts to push the amendment were dropped. However, a military court took up the two lese-majeste charges against Anan, even though a civilian court had dismissed the initial charge for defaming the Queen and Crown Prince. Anan was subsequently tried by a secret military court on the first charge on 17 August 1983, being found guilty and sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) of 18 August 1983 reported the case as follows: Anan denied in court that he intended to undermine public respect for the royal family. He said his reference to the palace was designed to thwart attempts by unnamed parties to exploit the image of the royal family for personal gain. Despite his criticisms of Anan's conservative religious views, Krajaang Nanthapho presents a sympathetic interpretation of Anan's statements about the monarchy, arguing that Anan had become outraged that certain politicians were appealing to the monarchy, which Anan honoured and respected, in their attempts to promote their dictatorial ambitions. 60 That is, Krajaang regards Anan's traditionalist outlook as having led him to react against what he perceived as the moral pollution of the monarchy by the crass ambitions of the Thai military and their parliamentary supporters. Anan was tried on the second lese-majeste charge on 10 November 1983, again being found guilty and being sentenced to a further three years' imprisonment. He was subsequently adopted as a "prisoner of conscience" by the international human rights organisation, Amnesty International, which campaigned for his release claiming that his arrest and trial had been politically motivated by elements within the Thai military seeking to silence Anan's

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criticisms of the Army's role in politics. On 19 November 1987 King Phumiphon pardoned Anan, who was subsequently released after serving four-and-a-half years of his original six-year sentence. 61 Anan subsequently entered the political debates associated with the 1988 Thai general election by making a public announcement calling on political parties and the public to prevent an "unelected person" from becoming the country's next Prime Minister. 62 Anan showed his continuing pro-democratic and anti-military stance when he stated, Although this [present Thai] constitution has been amended once, its contents still reflect the line of thinking of the groups which drew it up to serve the dictatorial military factions. 63 Anan sought but failed to gain support from Chamlong Srimuang to run as a candidate for Chamlong's Phalang Tham Party in the 1988 election. He subsequently stood as a candidate for the Liberal Party (Phak Seriniyom) in Suphanburi province, but was not elected. Despite his criticisms of Chamlong and Phothirak in the early 1980s, Anan's political stance appears to some extent to have converged with that of Chamlong since his release from jail. Anan's earlier ambiguous support for traditional Thai cultural values, greater political democracy, and establishment forms of Buddhism has been replaced by a loose political alignment with reformist Buddhists against the authoritarian sections of the military and other conservatives. Before his imprisonment Anan could be described as having been a cultural conservative who opposed both the anti-democratic stance of certain military leaders as well as those religious reformists who were critical of the traditional, establishment-supported forms of Buddhism. However, in the context of the political polarisation of modern Thai Buddhism, Anan's conservative cultural sympathies placed him in the ambivalent position of supporting the religious forms of the Thai political establishment but at the same time opposing the political authoritarianism of the establishment, which he described as corrupt and anti-democratic. Since his release from jail Anan appears to have abandoned his earlier conservative religious position and to have increasingly adopted a more reformist outlook, which is more consistent with his pro-democratic views. Anan's recent political realignment and his gesture at rapprochement with Chamlong and Phothirak further demonstrates the significance of the relationship between reformist formulations of Buddhism and antiestablishment political positions in contemporary Thailand.

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NOTES

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9.

10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Phra Anan Senakhan, Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay, p. 84. Ibid., p. 87. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 91. Ibid., p. 52. Ibid. Ibid., p. 53. "Jot-maay Thalaengkaan Jaak Khana Song Chaaw Asok" [Announcement from the sangha group of the people of Asok], Saan Asok 7, no. 7 (Meesaayon 2530 [April 1987] ): 12-14. Phra Phothirak Bhikkhu, Panhaa Sangkhom Thii Kae Mai Dai Phror Syksaa Phutthasaasanaa Phit-phlaat [Social problems which cannot be solved because of incorrect study of Buddhism] (Bangkok: Muunnithi Thammasanti, 2528 [1985] ). Bhante is a respectful Pali term of address for an older monk. Ariya is a term that indicates that Phothirak regards Phutthathat to be an ariyapuggala or spiritual adept. The term than is a Thai term of respect. Phra Phothirak Bhikkhu, Panhaa Sangkhom Thii Kae Mai Dai Phror Syksaa Phutthasaasanaa Phit-phlaat, p. 51. Saawok [pseud.J, op. cit. Phra Phothirak Bhikkhu, Saan Asok 7, no. 7 (Meesaayon 2530 [April 1987]): 79. "Chamlae Phutthajak" [Cutting open Buddhism], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 2 Kumphaaphan 2529 [February 1986], p. 16. Krajaang, op. cit., pp. 275-76. Phra Anan Senakhan, Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay, p. 59. Ibid., p. 60. The objectives of this conservative organisation were stated as being to prevent distortions of the Buddhadhamma; to eliminate sham monks (alajji) and heretical teachers (titthiya) among the scum of monks (nai khraap phiksu); to oppose and point out the dangers of immorality and involvement in vice (apayamukh); to support bhikkhus who behave well and practise the dhamma correctly; to propagate correct teachings and to advise on practices which are correct; to build up the organisation's members to be good examples to the public; and to promote unity and public acts of merit (ibid., introduction). The organisation was apparently based at the

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19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42.

Chapter Seven Mahanikay monastery of Wat Benjamabophit, whose conservative abbot is a strong supporter of the Wat Phra Thammakaay movement (see Chapter Eight). Phra Anan Senakhan, Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay, p. 23. Ibid., pp. 94-95. Ibid., p. 44. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid., p. 71. Ibid., p. 68. Ibid. Ibid., p. 102. Ibid., p. 75. Boonchu Rojanasathian, "Rice Waiting for Rain - The Need for Evolution in Thai Politics", Bangkok Post, 22 January 1983. Phra Anan Senakhan, Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay, p. 130. Ibid. Ibid., p. 129. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Samnak Santi Asok - Bot-rian Iik Bot Nyng" [The Santi Asok Centre - Another lesson], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 31 Singhaakhom 2529 [August 1986], pp. 33-34. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Nikaay Song Saasanaa Phut - Thang Thyan Lae Mai Thyan". "Wat Thyan: Panhaa Khorng Khrai" [Unauthorised monasteries: Whose problem is it?], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 31 Tulaakhom 2525 [October 1982], p. 10. Ibid. Peter A. Jackson, "The Hupphaasawan Movement: Millenarian Buddhism among the Thai Political Elite", p. 162. Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 31 Singhaakhom 2529 [August 1986], p. 34. Khaamhuno [pseud.], "Krom Saasanaa Kap Prakotkaan Myan Chaang Thyan" [The Department of Religious Affairs and the wild elephant phenomenon], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 27 Tulaakhom 2528 [October 1985], p. 30. Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 31 Singhaakhom 2529 [August 1986], p. 33. Phra Anan Senakhan, Phothirak - Saatsadaa Mahaaphay, pp. 43-44. "Bangkok's Celibate Governor", Asia Magazine, 11 January 1987, p. 25. Daaw Sayam, 14 Kumphaaphan 2525 [February 1982], cited in Chamlong Srimuang, Thaang Saam Phraeng [The junction of three roads] (Bangkok:

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43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57.

58.

59. 60. 61.

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published by the author, 2526 [1983] ), preface. Maha is a title given to monks who pass the Pali parian examinations. Ibid., p. 33. Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Thamma Kap Kaan-myang [Dhamma and politics] (Chaiya: Thammathaan Muunnithi, 2522 [1979] ). Chamlong, op. cit., p. 83. Bangkok Post, 16 June 1988, p. 1. Ibid., p. 3. "Chamlong Denies He Supports Santi Asoke", Bangkok Post, 18 June 1988, p. 1. "Chamlong Says No Protection for Santi Asoke", Bangkok Post, 22 June 1988, p. 5. Ibid. Sanitsuda Ekachai, "Santi Asoke - Symptom Not Sickness", Bangkok Post, 23 July 1988, p. 19. Sanitsuda Ekachai, "The Man behind Santi Asoke", Bangkok Post, 22 July 1988, p. 31. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 26 Tulaakhom 2529 [October 1986], p. 15. Peter A. Jackson, Buddhadasa - A Buddhist Thinker for the Modem World, pp. 247-55. Kim Gooi, "Letter from Bangkok", Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 June 1988, p. 118. Phra Anan Senakhan and Kriangsak Khrordii, Phii-bun Haeng Hupphaasawan [The meritorious spirit of Hupphaasawan] (Bangkok: no publisher given, 2524 [1981] ). "Anan Senakhan -Jut Chanuan Anaathipatai" [Anan Senakhan - Lighting the fuse of anarchy], Siam Mai 2, no. 73 (8 Meesaayon 2526 [April 1983]): 16. Ibid. Note: It is not clear whether the term phaa, "to split", has been misspelt phau, "to burn", in the Siam Mai report, or whether Anan was referring to another military plan to in fact destroy the authority of the monarchy. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 1-7 Phrytsaphaakhom 2526 [May 1983], p. 10. Krajaang, op. cit., p. 290. "Ph.T.T. Anan Senakhan Phaa 'Khuk' Narok Khum Lookan Sut Hoot Lew Thyan" [Major-General Anan Senakhan exposes the hell "jail" of absolute brutality, baseness, and savagery], Siam Rat Sapdaa Wijaan, 29 Phrytsajikaayon to 5 Thanwaakhom 2530 [29 November to 5 December 1987], p. 16.

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62. "Anan Seeks to Stop Attempts to Back Unelected Premier", Bangkok Post, 18 June 1988, p. 6. 63. Ibid.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Wat Phra Thammakaay Movement

The Thammakaay (dhammakaya) movement, based at Wat Phra Thammakaay (Mahanikay) in Pathumthani province just north of Bangkok, is founded on the teachings and novel meditation system of Phra Mongkhonthepmuni (Mangaladevamuni) (Sot Janthasaro), a former abbot of Wat Paak-naam (Mahanikay) at Phasi Jaroen in Thonburi. Sot Janthasaro lived from 1884 to 1959 and is popularly referred to as Luang Phor Wat Paak-naam Phasi Jaroen or simply as Luang Phor Sot. Since the early 1980s the Thammakaay movement has established a firm following among senior members of the Thai establishment as well as sections of the middle class and has grown rapidly in wealth and influence. This rapid growth and the large number of influential patrons who sponsor the activities of Wat Phra Thammakaay have aroused suspicions about the political motives behind the movement. One commentator has asked, Is Wat Phra Thammakaay going the same way as Jittaphawan [College of Kittiwutho]? Is it becoming the "Great Empire" [rnahaa·aanaajak, that is, the dominant force] of Buddhism?(T) 1

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Wat Phra Thammakaay supporters include Princess Sirinthorn, who laid the foundation stone for the boot or temple at Wat Phra Thammakaay on 24 December 1977 and who since 1981 has offered robes to a select number of students participating in the annual student summer vacation ordinations held at the monastery. In recent years, General Arthit Kamlang-ek and General Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, the previous and present Army Commanders-in-Chief, have also attended the initiation ceremony for the summer vacation training programme at Wat Phra Thammakaay. The Thammakaay movement also has the support of some of the most senior Mahanikay administrative monks, including Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan and Phra Phrommakhunaphorn, who are the abbots of Wat Benjamabophit (Mahanikay) and Wat Saket (Mahanikay), respectively, as well as being members of the Mahatherasamakhom. Thammakaay Teachings

The dhammakaya or "dhamma-body" (Thai: thammakaay) from which the movement takes its name refers to a subtle psychic or spiritual body which Luang Phor Sot taught was based at a point in the middle of the body slightly above the level of the navel. Luang Phor Sot developed a novel meditation system aimed at penetrating to a realisation of the dhamma-body and the attainment of spiritual wisdom. Sot's meditation system is based on the visualisation of "bright gems", duang kaew, located at the psychic centre of the body and which the meditator visually penetrates in order to realise ever subtler "gems" or spiritual bodies. Sot's followers maintain that he rediscovered the true spiritual nature of the dhamma-body, which purportedly exists inside everyone, after the true historical insight and teaching of the Buddha had been lost. The Thai academic Rawi Bhawilai notes, Luang Phor Sot claimed that he rediscovered the true teaching of the Buddha which had been lost even before the Third Buddhist Council in the reign of Asoka. Quoting the Satipatthana Sutta, he interpreted a phrase which is generally translated as "contemplating the body as

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a body" differently. He pointed out that the phrase means "contemplating the bodies in the body". His interpretation was that inside the physical body of a person there exists [a] . . . series of astral and spiritual bodies of progressive fineness which could be revealed in meditation. In practice, one is requested to apply concentration and visualisation to the proposed seat of consciousness at the centre of the body, two finger-breadths above the navel. 2

Luang Phor Sot's interpretation of the term dhammakaya and his meditation system, which involves meditations on psychic centres inside the body resembling Yogic cakras, appear to have been influenced either by Mahayana Buddhism or by Yogic meditation systems. In Mahayana Buddhism the term dharmakaya denotes the nature or essential character of the Buddha in his state of perfect wisdom in nirvana. However, in Theravada Buddhism the term - as it occurs in such statements of the Buddha's as "I am the tathagata, the dhammakaya" is regarded as an epithet of the Buddha, meaning one who embodies the dhamma and whose life expresses true wisdom and insight into the dhamma. That is, the Sanskrit Mahayana term dharmakaya refers to an ontological spiritual essence of the Buddha, while the Pali Theravada term dhammakaya is usually taken to refer to a state of wisdom or a condition of being infused by wisdom. In contrast to the traditional Theravada interpretation, Luang Phor Sot taught that the spiritual essence of the Buddha and of nibbana exists as a literal reality within the human body. The anonymous author of a student manual on the Thammakaay movement's teachings says, All of the 84,000 dhammakhandhas [elements of the Buddhist scriptures] are already in oneself. The arahant is already in oneself. The Buddha is already in oneself. Those who still travel searching for the dhamma outside their body will not find the three jewels [tiratna]. They will become tired [of life] and will experience suffering for a long time.(T) 3

Luang Phor Sot's literalist interpretation of the dhammakaya as denoting an actual spiritual body which provides the foundation of human mental and physical existence has been criticised by a number of reformist Buddhists as being doctrinally incorrect. Sathianphong

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Wannapok, an academic and author of a column on Buddhism for the Thai Rat newspaper, has commented, The dhammakaya of the Buddha is attained when one practises according to the eight limbs of the ariyamagga [noble path to nibbana] until "knowledge" and "vision" arise. . . . It is not attained by hypnosis and the seeing of jewels in meditation as some teachers are always insisting.(T) 4

Thammakaay teachings are founded on an ontological interpretation of Buddhism involving a cosmological system composed of ever subtler levels of existence, whose realisation through meditation is regarded as permitting the understanding of ever more profound spiritual wisdom. In contrast with traditional Theravada Buddhist teachings, Luang Phor Sot taught that nibbana is not only a state of absolute enlightenment but is also the most subtle form of transcendent spiritual existence. Sot taught that the mind and body must first be purified by his system of samadhi or concentration meditation in order to bring them to a level of subtlety on par with the transcendent condition of spiritual wisdom before that wisdom, and so salvation, can be attained. There is an important distinction between the type of meditation taught by reformist Buddhist monks such as Phutthathat and that taught by conservative or establishment-aligned movements such as Wat Phra Thammakaay. Buddhist meditation is generally divided into two main forms, samadhi or concentration meditation and vipassana or insight meditation. Samadhi is regarded as preliminary and as preparing the meditator for the practice of vipassana, which is required to attain true insight into reality, and so salvation. However, the intense practice of samadhi can often induce unusual psychic experi,ences and many traditionalist meditation movements in Thailand identify these experiences as deriving from spiritual contact with supernatural beings or transcendent levels of reality. While such movements pay lip service to the practice of vipassana, they tend to concentrate almost solely on samadhi and the attainment of supernatural experiences. Vipassana, on the other hand, uses the mind's analytical faculties and seeks to penetrate to an awareness of truth by casting aside all illusions

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and attachments to temporary things, including the psychic experiences attained by those who practise intense samadhi. While conservative monks such as Luang Phor Sot who are interested in the supernatural teach samadhi or concentration meditation, reformist monks almost invariably emphasise the teaching of vipassana or insight meditation. The reformists' vipassana is associated with a de-emphasis and sometimes a denial of the ontological view of the Buddhist salvation, or nibbana, as a transcendent state of being, such as is taught by the followers of Wat Phra Thammakaay. While samadhi is commonly associated with the belief that nibbana is a transcendent reality, in Thailand the practice of vipassana has come to be associated with the denial of the traditional Buddhist cosmology and Thai supernaturalism. Reformist teachers of vipassana regard nibbana as a state of wisdom or insight into imminent reality in this world here and now. For the reformist supporters of vipassana, nibbana is a condition of imperturbable peace or equanimity attained in this world, not a supreme or super heaven beyond this world. Vipassana supporters such as Phutthathat criticise the complex systems of samadhi, which their proponents believe purify the mind and render its psychic substance subtle enough to apprehend or participate in the transcendent reality of nibbana. Phutthathat maintains that a deeply concentrated mind cannot practise introspection at all. It is in a state of unawareness and is of no use for insight [vipassana J. Deep concentration [samadhi] is a major obstacle to insight practice. 5

The reformists regard samadhi as simply a basic or preliminary form of meditation whose only value lies in stilling and concentrating the mind in order to focus on the development of insight or vipassana into the immanent truths of existence here and now. Phra Thepwethi has commented that many monks outside the Thammakaay movement are concerned that the Thammakaay meditation system does not follow correct Buddhist principles. 6 He observes that samadhi is inadequate to attain vimutti or spiritual liberation, for which panna or wisdom founded on vipassana is required. Thepwethi warns that there are dangers in overemphasising the practice of samadhi

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by becoming attached to the psychic and supernatural experiences often associated with deep concentration, and not developing wisdom in order to penetrate to a true understanding of the nature of existence. On this point, Phutthathat has warned that while the mind is concentrated [in samadhi] it is likely to be experiencing such a satisfying kind of bliss and well-being that the meditator may become attached to it or imagine it to be the fruit of the path. 7

Thepwethi questions whether the Thammakaay system of meditation can really lead to wisdom when most of its followers seem to develop a greater interest in supernatural experiences. As noted, supporters of the practice of samadhi often interpret the psychic experiences associated with this form of meditation in supernatural terms. The Thammakaay movement also places considerable emphasis on the supernatural. For example, in an interview with Baan Mai Ruu Rooy magazine the deputy abbot of Wat Phra Thammakaay, Phra Thattachiwo, has said, The stories they have written are all true. Including the story about the mae chii [nun] of Wat Paak-naam who flew up to push away the bombs [from dropping on Bangkok] during World War II. She pushed the atomic bomb away to drop on Japan. You may ask why it fell on Japan and killed so many people. I can answer by saying that the power of dhamma pulled it to Japan when the Japanese were bellicose and wanted to make war. That pulled the bomb in their direction.(T) 8

The Thammakaay movement teaches a mystical internalisation of the traditional Buddhist cosmology which places the spiritual goal of nibbana in a subtle location literally within the body. In some ways Thammakaay teachings parallel Phutthathat's psychological reduction of Buddhist cosmology to the mental states of the individual. But Thammakaay teachings differ in that the internal spiritual conditions are regarded as real, albeit subtle, material levels of a transcendent reality located within the body's spiritual components. In contrast, in Phutthathat's system mental states are not conferred an independent transcendent or spiritual existence but rather are modes of knowing or perceiving the immediate reality of the here and now. Thus, while

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Thammakaay teachings in some ways parallel those of the reformist Buddhists by bringing nibbana theoretically within the reach of each individual as an inherent condition of human existence, this is done in such a way as to retain the metaphysical cosmology of the Buddhism of the Thai establishment. As noted in Chapter Two, the rationalist outlook of many educated middle-class Buddhists leads them to reject the traditional lay form of Thai Buddhism which emphasises the performance of ritualistic acts in order to accumulate merit for the next life. In contrast, middle-class lay Buddhists have increasingly sought direct participation in the traditionally clerical spiritual effort to attain enlightenment. Lay Buddhists are taking up the practice of meditation in ever-growing numbers and meditation is now widely regarded as a legitimate and appropriate lay spiritual activity leading to the attainment of a direct personal experience of or insight into the Buddha's teachings on salvation. Thammakaay teachings stand in a middle ground between reformist rationalism and the metaphysical beliefs of establishment Buddhism. While emphasising lay meditation and strict moral practice, like reformists, Thammakaay uses samadhi to attain supernatural experiences and to reinforce the traditional cosmological view of Buddhism. That is, Thammakaay teachings combine elements of both middle-class reformist Buddhism and the religion of the establishment. This doctrinal amalgam is appropriate because from the sociopolitical perspective the Thammakaay movement can be interpreted as both the ideology of the establishment and of certain sections of the middle class. The Thammakaay movement is the religious expression of a political establishment which is seeking to retain its power by co-opting members of the increasingly wealthy and influential middle class, in particular, that section of the middle class seeking to establish itself in the traditional patterns of authority and power. Thammakaay has become the Buddhism of the conservative Thai equivalent of Western "yuppies". The phenomenal growth of the Thammakaay movement in the 1980s can be attributed to its satisfaction of middleclass demands for direct participation in the legitimatory spiritual core of Buddhism, in addition to providing links to the traditional symbols

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of secular power and authority in the monarchy, bureaucracy, and big business. In contrast, Phutthathat's Buddhism can be characterised as the religious ideology of that section of the middle class which rejects co-optation by the establishment and instead seeks to establish its own independent bases of symbolic and political power. Thammakaay and the Dhutanga Tradition

Stanley Tambiah has analysed the phenomenon of urban Thai Buddhists seeking out monks of the ascetic or dhutanga tradition living in remote mountain or forest retreats. These forest monks, many of whom are associated with the Thammayut Order and the ascetic tradition founded by the early twentieth century dhutanga monk Acharn Mun, are regarded as possessing supernatural powers achieved through their meditation (usually samadhi) and as embodying the spiritual truths taught by the Buddha. Tambiah suggests that the growing popularity of the Thammayut ascetic monks in recent decades may lie in the internal and external political circumstances confronting Thailand today - circumstances that have eroded and put into question the legitimacy of the ruling elements and privileged sectors of the society. 9

Tambiah does not present a detailed socio-political analysis of the Thai elite, but from his description of what he presents as unsettling trends in modern Thai society it is clear that the "crisis of legitimacy" he refers to is among the political establishment. The Thammakaay movement appears to represent a further development of the phenomenon of members of the urban establishment seeking out new sources of legitimating spiritual power among ascetic monks. However, the Thammakaay movement is innovative in that it laicises the legitimating dhutanga tradition increasingly sought out by members of the establishment. By undertaking ascetic dhutanga practices in intensive meditation sessions and thereby attaining supernatural experiences, lay followers of Wat Phra Thammakaay internalise and appropriate for themselves the spiritual power and legitimacy which has traditionally been attributed to forest monks.

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Significantly, the Thammakaay movement is associated with the Mahanikay Order, not the Thammayut. The Thammakaay laicisation of the forest monk tradition, which the Thammayut Order has attempted to appropriate and dominate during the twentieth century, 10 parallels Phutthathat's (Mahanikay) laicisation of the rationalist elements of Mongkut's and Wachirayan's (Thammayut) religious reforms. Phutthathat developed and transformed Mongkut's incomplete religious rationalism from an establishment religious form to an ideology of a restive anti-establishment middle class. Similarly, the Thammakaay movement has developed the Thammayut-dominated forest monk tradition, which the establishment has used in recent decades to enhance its legitimacy, and transformed it into a system for conferring religio-political legitimacy on both its lay middle-class and establishment followers. Thammakaay thus short-circuits the seeking out of spiritual power from forest monks by relocating that power within the lay followers themselves. Organisation of the Thammakaay Movement

While still drawing its spiritual strength from Luang Phor Sot's residence at Wat Paak-naam, the modern Thammakaay movement is based at a new monastery, Wat Phra Thammakaay, on the northern outskirts of Bangkok. Wat Phra Thammakaay was originally established in 1970 on 196 rai (75 acres) of land at Pathumthani as the Buddhist Centre for Practising Dhamma (that is, meditation) (Suun Phutthajak Patibat Tham) by some student followers of Luang Phor Sot from nearby Kasetsart University. The Suun Phutthajak Patibat Tham formally become a Mahanikay monastery, Wat Phra Thammakaay, in 1977 under the leadership of two of the original group of student followers, the present abbot and deputy abbot of Wat Phra Thammakaay, Phra Chayabuun Thammachayyo (Dhammajayyo) and Phra Phadet Thattachiwo (Dattajivo). Thattachiwo (Phadet Phorngsawat) was born in 1940 into a commercial family in Kanchanaburi province, graduating in agriculture from Kasetsart University in Bangkok and obtaining a Masters degree in Australia. Abbot Thammachayyo (Chayabuun Sutthiphon) also graduated from Kasetsart University.

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The Thammakaay movement did not exist in anything like its present form during the lifetime of Luang Phor Sot, and Thattachiwo and Thammachayyo have been the driving forces behind the establishment and rapid growth of the modern movement. Thattachiwo and Thammachayyo were two university graduates who were dissatisfied with what they saw as the stagnant and increasingly irrelevant ritualism of the sangha and who turned to Luang Phor Sot's teachings for a form of Buddhism acceptable to young university-educated Thais. The two monks have specifically focused their propagatory efforts at tertiary students and professionals in government and private employment and they use sophisticated mass marketing and communication skills to preach their particular form of Buddhism. The success and growing wealth of the movement organised by Thattachiwo and Thammachayyo can be gauged from Wat Phra Thammakaay's recent purchase of almost 2000 rai (800 acres) of farmland around the original site of the monastery in order to develop a Thudong Sathaan (dhutanga sathana), or area for ascetic practices in the style of the forest monk tradition. After complaints from those displaced by the expansion of the monastery's grounds, the Thammakaay Foundation, which manages the movement's finances, agreed to pay 300,000 baht compensation to each displaced family. In addition, each family was granted one rai of land on which to build a house and the Foundation guaranteed to employ the displaced people as gardeners in the monastery's grounds if they were unemployed. This one act of compensation amounted to a total payment of 300 million baht to the 1,000 affected families. 11 In addition, the Thammakaay Foundation paid 25,000 baht per rai to purchase the land, a further amount of 50 million baht. The boot, or temple building, at Wat Phra Thammakaay is an unusual, stylised Thai temple constructed in white stone with graceful curving lines with an emphasis on simplicity. The temple is a stylised version of the boot at Wat Benjamabophit (Mahanikay), whose abbot, Phra Phutthawongmuni, is a keen supporter of the Thammakaay movement. In May 1987 Matichon published an interview with Phra Thattachiwo in which he said that there are now plans to build a

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private university based on Buddhist ethics at the Wat Phra Thammakaay site. 12 Wat Phra Thammakaay has a broad proselytising outreach. The monastery grounds are open to the general public for dhutanga practice each Sunday and Buddhist holy day, and free return bus travel to the Wat is provided from central locations in Bangkok such as Sanaam Luang and Wong-wian Yai. All the lay followers of the movement who visit the monastery wear white clothes; and bans on cigarettes, drinking, and flirting between the sexes are strictly enforced within the monastery grounds. The Thammakaay movement emphasises order, cleanliness, and simplicity in behaviour; and gentleness, purity, and pleasant calm experiences in meditation. There is also a considerable emphasis on mass participation and on the development of the movement into a mass phenomenon, with its professionally prepared publications liberally illustrated with photos of long orderly lines of monks on their morning alms rounds and group photos of thousands of massed white-dad lay followers standing in front of the graceful stylised temple. Dhammadayada Student Training Programme

One of the most widely publicised aspects of Wat Phra Thammakaay's activities is its programme of Dhammadayada ("dhamma-heir") Training and Hot Season Mass Ordination (Khroong-kaan Op-rom Thammathaayaat Lae Upasombat Muu Phaak Ryduu Rom) for specially selected university students. This Dhammadayada (Thai: Thammathaayaat) programme is extensively promoted among tertiary students in Bangkok and has two phases. All students enrolled in the programme undergo an initial month of rigorous physical and spiritual preparation beginning with three or four days' military-style training at Kaeng Krajaan Special Training Camp in Petchburi province under the supervision of serving soldiers of the Thai Army. Following this, the students undertake a month of intensive spiritual training, involving long periods of Thammakaay meditation, strict moral abidance by the eight silas and living the life of a dhutanga monk, sleeping outside

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under a klot or umbrella with mosquito net used by wandering forest monks. During this period of intense spiritual practice many students report unusual psychic experiences. Those who pass this month of Dhammadayada training are then selected to participate in a mass ordination ceremony performed at Wat Benjamabophit by the abbot of that monastery, Phra Phutthawongmuni. The students then remain monks for one month and return to the Dhutanga Sathana or ascetic practices area at Wat Phra Thammakaay before disrobing to continue their studies at the beginning of the academic year in June. Those who complete the full two-month programme are awarded a special certificate. The Dhammadayada summer vacation meditation training is officially supported by the Department of Universities (Thabuang Mahawitthayalay) and the Department of Religious Affairs. The Department of Public Works, the Thai Red Cross, and Kaeng Krajaan Special Military Training Camp (Petchburi province) also officially sponsor the programme. The Dhammadayada programme began in 1979 with sixty students undertaking intensive Thammakaay training and twenty-four being chosen for ordination. The programme has grown rapidly in the 1980s. In 1982 373 students began training and 193 took ordination, while in 1986 1,056 students from eighteen tertiary institutions took ordination. The summer vacation training programme is heavily promoted with full-colour glossy posters, books and television advertisements promising material, as well as spiritual rewards from undertaking the Dhammadayada training. In October 1986 Matichon reported, Recently the Buddhist societies of the eighteen [Bangkok tertiary] institutions placed advertisements on television encouraging youth to undertake a special Dhammadayada training session on 5 December 1986 [King Phumiphon's birthday], pointing out that those who complete the training will be accepted within the general society. In particular, they will have a better chance than others of obtaining work in certain places.(T) 13

A similar ratchabuuchaa (rajapuja, "honouring of the king") Dhammadayada training session was held to mark King Phumiphon's sixtieth birthday on 5 December 1987. This auspicious event was sponsored

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by the Bangkok Bank, Thai Farmers Bank, Siam Commercial Bank, and the Thai Army. Supporters of Wat Phra Thammakay have come to dominate the student Buddhist associations on all Bangkok university campuses except Mahidon University. The Buddhist associations affiliated with Wat Phra Thammakaay include those at Chulalongkorn, Thammasart, Kasetsart, Sri Nakharinwirot, Ramkhamhaeng, and Bangkok Universities, as well as the King Mongkut Institute of Technology and Mae Joo Agricultural Technology Institute. Matichon has reported on the Thammakaay movement's domination of Bangkok university Buddhist societies as follows: The activities of the Buddhist societies [Chom-rom Phutthasaat] of the institutions mentioned above are directed solely at propagating the thought of Wat Phra Thammakaay. Not only that, a considerable amount of money continually flows to these societies to support their activities.(T) 14

Significantly, of the eighteen university and college Buddhist associations dominated by Wat Phra Thammakaay supporters in 1986, seventeen were located in Bangkok. The one provincial college associated with the movement was the Lampang Technical College. This reflects the significant relation between the movement and the Bangkok-based middle class and establishment. Mahidon University is the only Bangkok tertiary institution whose Buddhist society is not dominated by Thammakaay supporters. Matichon reports that the Mahidon University student Buddhist association opposes the Thammakaay movement and has adopted a policy of supporting divergent approaches to the teaching and practice of Buddhism, arguing that there is not just one path to the dhamma. 15 The Dhammadayada programme and the Thammakaay movement as a whole have been accused of elitism. One disgruntled "graduate" of the summer vacation programme interviewed by Matichon said, "If this Wat [Phra Thammakaay] is in fact good then why are only those studying for bachelors degrees accepted for ordination?"(T) 16 The abbot of Wat Phra Thammakaay, Phra Thammachayyo, responded to this criticism saying,

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Chapter Eight The Lord Buddha had to choose those that he taught. It is the same at this monastery when we train people, especially when Thailand is now extremely short of teachers and experts in the dhamma. In this situation we must select those who have ability and are ready for training to help in being teachers. . . . The Buddha was truly good wasn't he? But he did not teach everyone. Some people could not be taught and had to be temporarily discarded [torng thing au wai korn]. (T) 17

In addition to selecting only university students for the Dhammadayada programme, only those students who are regarded as having attained a high degree of proficiency in the Thammakaay meditation system are ultimately accepted for ordination. 18 The selection process appears to be oriented towards ensuring that the students who undertake the complete Dhammadayada training are those who are most likely to succeed in future careers in business and government. The intensity of the Dhammadayada training - during which reading and casual conversation are prohibited and which involves long periods of meditation, little sleep, and living in the most basic conditions in the open air - induces a strong sense of personal moral achievement and also leads to the psychic experiences that the movement takes as an indication of successful attainment of spiritual states. One student described the results of her training in almost pentecostallike terms: All of this was a real life experience that I will never forget. The Dhammadayada training was a progress to the beginning of a clear, new path, a new life for me. . . . We were like people who had been born again, who had found a bright and secure life and a firm destination and goal.(T)t9

The Dhammadayada training induces an almost conversion-like experience amongst many student participants. There is a strong sense of moral transformation achieved through direct contact with what is believed to be the source of spirituality. There are many similarities to charismatic Christian movements, including the demonstration of spiritual attainment through supernatural or miraculous experiences, which are taken as signs of the attainment of true wisdom.

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However, other students emphasise the more worldly benefits of the intensive ascetic training, saying that it leads to greater decisiveness, mental clarity, and peace of mind. The journalist Nithinan Yorsaengrat has observed, It is important to note the inclinations of one group that comes to practise samadhi at Wat Phra Thammakaay who are not only interested in mental peace but also the results that it brings, namely, improved memory and thinking ability. For example, [after practising samadhi] students will study better and people will be more successful in their businesses. Consequently, the names of many students [luuk-sit] of Thammachayyo Bhikkhu and Thattachiwo Bhikkhu are found in large businesses. Some are well-known singers and musicians such as Nakhorn Wetsuphaaphorn of the "Grand X" band.(T) 20

One student summarised the benefits of the Thammakaay practice as leading to the finding of happiness in the present, increasing efficiency in work, and seeing the value of Buddhism. He stated, It made me proud of my Thai ancestors and made me love my country much more.. . . I saw the wisdom of our ancestors who strove to protect Buddhism for their descendants with their blood, their bodies, and their lives. Our Thailand is the only country in the world that upholds the saddhamma of the Buddha to such a great extent.(T) 21

The popularity of the Thammakaay movement among Bangkok university students reflects a growing conservatism among a section of the middle class. This group sees its social advancement in terms of developing an accord with the establishment and building a firm place for itself in the traditional power structure, rather than seeking to oppose the establishment and usurp its dominant political position, which was a prominent trend among students in the 1970s. Nithinan Yorsaengrat observes, Those who have had some experience in student circles in the 14 October [1973] period would probably accept that the practices of these two generations [of students] are not all that different, even if their objectives are different. That is, one group wanted to revolutionise society in the name of justice in accord with the theories of Karl Marx.

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Chapter Eight The other group wants to practise dhamma and propagate the Thammakaay teachings, which they believe are the most perfect way.(T) 22

The Dhammadayada training system instils obedience and loyalty to the traditional values of the Thai establishment and promises selected students the reward of upward social mobility and entrance to elite jobs and positions. The Dhammadayada programme can be regarded as part of a system of training new members of an expanding elite, of systematically and selectively increasing the membership of the privileged classes at a time of economic growth when new positions in business need to be filled. The Dhammadayada programme systematically expands the elite by allowing entrance only to those who demonstrate loyalty to the traditional establishment values. The Dhammadayada training programme is also developing into a nm or "class" or "year" system, a system of contacts and allegiances commonly found among graduates of the same course at Thai universities and military training academies. The notion of run diaw-kan, being a "graduate of the same class", is strong in Thailand and provides the structuring principle of a large number of old boys' networks that continue to provide group solidarity, professional contact, and moral support after graduation. Those students who complete the Dhammadayada training identify themselves by the year they undertook the programme, beginning with run 1 in 1979. That is, the Dhammadayada training not only provides a meal ticket to a better job but also establishes contact with a network of peers who will also be undertaking professional careers and may be able to offer assistance or advice on business and other matters in the future. In addition to training future members of the elite in establishment values, the Thammakaay movement is also involved in "moral education" for workers and employees of government and private enterprises. The conservative tenor of the Thammakaay moral training is made clear in the following statement by deputy abbot Thattachiwo about the relationship between Thammakaay and Dhammadayada training and the labour requirements of Thai industry: Now we find the problem [of graduate unemployment] lies in the

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quality of people. Industrialists are afraid of all these unemployed graduates.... They say that if they employ them they have no guarantee that they won't encourage the workers to strike. They have asked me to help by taking these unemployed graduates to train them in morality. If they are trained they won't strike or destroy the business. Then they would employ them all.(T)23

For Thattachiwo Buddhist ethical training amounts to obedience to the requirements of industry and the state, and he notes that the Central and Merry Kings department stores in Bangkok and several government departments send their staff to Wat Phra Thammakaay for regular "moral training sessions". In an interview with Paajaarayasaan magazine (PhrytsaphaakhomMithunaayon 2529 [May-June 1986]) republished in Matichon, Phra Thepwethi stated that there is now a reaction against Wat Phra Thammakaay in the sangha because of the movement's dogmatic approach to teaching its meditation system, its domination of student Buddhist associations, and the resulting prohibition on presenting alternative views on Buddhism at universities. Thepwethi also observed that Wat Phra Thammakaay is being watched closely within the sangha and he was of the view that the movement must have political aspirations. However, he also noted, When they [Wat Phra Thammakaay supporters] are so strong and intense the sangha does not know how to respond. We must recognise that the sangha is already becoming much weaker and that the people know little about the sangha. The strength of the sangha lies in the faith and respect of the people. When the sangha is weak it must follow those who are strong. It is a feature of the contemporary sangha that the senior administrative monks do not have a comprehensive knowledge of events. Because they don't take an interest in things a gap is created, there is an opportunity for them [new movements] to do various things. There are many worrying matters but the sangha does not have the opportunity to sift through them all.(T) 24

However, despite many reservations amongst the rest of the sangha, Thepwethi says that the other monks fall in behind Wat Phra Thammakaay because

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Chapter Eight they teach good moral principles and make people have faith and return to moral behaviour. At present it is being viewed [by the sangha] from the moral perspective.. . . At least Wat Phra Thammakaay is helping make people interested in religion, which is better than them turning away from the wat for material things.... we probably have to accept that at a time when Thai society has the nation-wide problem of people doing just what they please, being slack and lacking in order and courtesy, both Wat Phra Thammakay and Santi Asok are able to make an impression on a large number of educated people . . . to dedicate themselves to establishing orderliness, strength, and strictness in morality.(T) 25

Thammakaay - Middle Class or Establishment?

Thai commentators generally regard Wat Phra Thammakaay as a middle-class movement and explain its success in terms of its meeting the needs of the middle class. Matichon has provided an interesting analysis of Wat Phra Thammakaay as a middle-class phenomenon: Thammakaay attempts to make Buddhism consistent with the ideals of the middle class of society.... In a period when religious people are losing faith in the practices of the sangha and when intellectual youth are confused about [their roles in] society, Thammakaay thought has provided a new way out through beautiful practices that are consistent with the thinking of the middle class about planned orderliness and about firmly training the mind in preparation for facing the true situation of society. . . . The life of the middle class is one of enduring suffering from unsatisfied wants and the inability to find an answer to the business problems that they face. Thammakaay provides an answer to these issues. . . . Cleanliness, purity, and orderliness are part of the way of life of the middle class. They prosper together with the stability of the existing system. Deep down in the hearts of the middle class they wish for orderliness and beauty. Here at Thammakaay there is everything to meet their wants. With their first step into the monastery grounds they are met by young men and women in pure white clothes speaking in sweet and pleasant sounding words.(T) 26

However, while the overwhelming majority of Thammakaay supporters can be identified as middle class, the movement teaches a

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variation of establishment Buddhism and, as already seen, has significant support from all sections of the Thai establishment, including royalty and senior military and business figures. The characterisation of Wat Phra Thammakaay as a middle-class movement fails to account for its strong establishment direction. The Thammakaay system appears to have had significant associations with the establishment since the time of Luang Phor Sot, as suggested in the following statement by Phra Phawanakoson (Bhavanakosala), deputy abbot of Wat Paak-naam, who entreats Thammakaay meditators to recollect the virtues of the great thera of the past, present, and future, including Phra-detcha-phra-khun Luang Phor Wat Paak-naam, who discovered the Thammakaay system of the Buddha and dedicated himself to passing it on to his mother and father, his preceptors and relatives, to his Majesty the King and senior members of the royal family, administrators, and those who protect the country - whether civilians, military, or police - and who protect Buddhism and the Thammakaay system for all our fellow human beings.(T) 27

The interpretatiQn of Thammakaay as a middle-class movement also fails to recognise the movement's role in the establishment's systematic programme of attempting to strengthen its position by co-opting rather than opposing dissidents. In the past decade the traditional Thai value of disdain of wun-waay, or social disorder, and the Buddhist disdain of conflict have been manipulated by the establishment to criticise and undermine the legitimacy of anti-establishment pressure groups, by branding their political agitation as un-Thai, inappropriate, and demonstrating a lack of Buddhist moral training. Since the late 1970s these values have provided the ethical foundation of a political system based on compromise and the co-optation of dissident groups. The amnesty for defectors from the Communist Party of Thailand in operation since the early 1980s and the partial rehabilitation of the Young Turk colonels who master-minded the unsuccessful April1981 coup attempt both demonstrate the operation of this compromise system, which has undermined expressions of dissent by creating avenues for dissidents to re-enter Thai society and participate in the economic development of the country.

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However, the co-optation strategy adopted by the establishment since the early 1980s assumes a steadily expanding elite, which is only possible in a period of sustained economic growth such as Thailand has experienced since the early 1980s. The compromise co-optation strategy of the establishment can continue so long as economic growth continues to provide increasing wealth and new career openings for potential or actual dissidents and critics. However, there are two risks associated with this strategy. Firstly, an economic decline and an end to the creation of new career positions in the elite would lead to a reappearance of the overt polarisation and conflict between the establishment and middle class that characterised the 1970s. The second risk associated with the co-optation strategy is that, with the growth in the numbers of those in the elite, the traditional members of the establishment may find their historical position of dominance being threatened by alternative and competing factions and groupings. The Wat Phra Thammakaay phenomenon can be interpreted as an attempt to propagate establishment values and attitudes among the newly co-opted professional and middle-class members of the elite in order to ward off the possibility of their undermining or threatening the position of the traditional establishment. The ultimate success of this strategy cannot yet be determined; however, the Thammakaay movement has rapidly expanded its influence among the middle classes and it has become an important contributing factor in the Thai establishment's reconsolidation and restrengthening in the 1980s. Thammakaay and Santi Asok

It is instructive to compare the relative success of Wat Phra Thammakaay and Phothirak's Santi Asok movement in respectively increasing their support among the urban middle class in recent years. While Santi Asok continues to grow at a moderate rate, it has now been significantly outstripped both in size and influence by the Thammakaay movement. Sulak Sivarak believes that highly rationalist and disciplined religious movements in Thailand, such as Santi Asok, have a limited appeal: They [Santi Asok and Bah'ai] demand a lot from their followers in

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terms of rationality and discipline. There are no frills of supernatural powers. And that is why I think the two cannot operate on a larger scale than they do now. 28

The greater and growing influence of Wat Phra Thammakaay can be attributed to the massive financial support for the movement from the political establishment. Because it does not reject the authority of the Mahatherasamakhom the Thammakaay movement has been able to enlist the support of many senior monks in the sangha hierarchy. Furthermore, because of this institutional backing Wat Phra Thammakaay's financial resources now far exceed those of Santi Asok and it can consequently mount much more professional and wide-reaching publicity and promotional campaigns. There are a number of similarities between Wat Phra Thammakaay and Phothirak's Santi Asok in terms of the two movements' common emphasis on moral training and strict ethical and meditative practice. However, the theoretical teachings of the two schools differ significantly. Santi Asok supports a reformist interpretation of Buddhism partially modelled on Phutthathat's thought, while Wat Phra Thammakaay teaches a more traditional metaphysical form of Buddhism. Wat Phra Thammakaay is a movement of the establishment and those who wish to become part of the establishment. On the other hand, Santi Asok's position outside the official sangha reflects the social position of its supporters - the urban and provincial lower middle class - who are outside of and critical of the establishment. However, Santi Asok's "external" position makes it vulnerable. If the politically influential supporters who have protected Santi Asok to date should suffer a decline in their political fortunes then legal formalities focusing on Phothirak's unofficial clerical status could be used to obstruct or even destroy the moveme}it. On the other hand, Wat Phra Thammakaay enjoys the security/ that flows from the full official support of the state and the senior sangha hierarchy. NOTES 1. Nithinan Yorsaengrat, "Kathor Kaew Thammakaay - 'Nang Raan' Korn Pai Suu Saeng Sawaang" [Cracking open the Thammakaay jewel - The

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2.

3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

19. 20. 21.

Chapter Eight "scaffolding" (that is, preliminary supports) before going to the bright lights], Baan Mai Ruu Roay 3, no. 5 (Mithunaayon 2530 Uune 1987]): 13. Rawi Bhawilai, "Buddhism in Thailand: Description and Analysis" (Paper presented to the International Conference on Thai Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, July 1987), p. 4. Anonymous, Thammathaayaat - Suun Phutthajak Patibat Tham ~t Phra Thammakaay [Dhammadayada - Wat Phra Thammakaay Buddhist Meditation Centre], 9th printing (Bangkok: Student Buddhist Associations of Bangkok Universities, 2526 [1983] ), p. 51. Sathianphong Wannapok, Suan Thaang Nipphaan [Two-way street to nibbana] (Bangkok: Sormafai Publishers, 2530 [1987] ), p. 21. Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Handbook for Mankind, translated by Buddhanigama (Bangkok: Sublime Life Mission, 1980), p. 70. "Waek Klot 'Thammakaay': Phuttha-phaanit Nai Thaang Lat Suu Nipphaan" [Penetrating the curtains of Thammakaay - Buddha-business on the short cut to nibbana], Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 26 Tulaakhom 2529 [October 1986], p. 15. Phra Phutthathat Bhikkhu, Handbook for Mankind, p. 70. Nithinan, op. cit., p. 21. Tambiah, op. cit., p. 345. See J.L. Taylor, "From Wandering to Monastic Domestication", Journal of the Siam Society 76 (1988): 64-88. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 26 Tulaakhom 2529 [October 1986], p. 14. "Mai Waa Khat-yaeng Arai Khor Hai Morng Duay Jit Meetaa" [No matter how much conflict there is, please look at things with a compassionate mind], interview with Thattachiwo Bhikkhu, Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 31 Phrytsaphaakhom 2530 [May 1987], pp. 36-37. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 26 Tulaakhom 2529 [October 1986], p. 14. Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid. Ibid. Summarised from: Anonymous, Thammathaayaat - Lem 3 [Dhammadayada - Volume 3] (Bangkok: Khanakammakaan Chom-rom Phutthasaat Sathaaban Mahawitthayalay Krung Theep, 2529 [1986] ). Anonymous, Thammathaayaat - Suun Phutthajak Patibat Tham ~t Phra Thammakaay, 2526 [1983], p. 34. Nithinan, op. cit., p. 18. Ibid.

r#!t Phra Thammakaay Movement 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

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Ibid., p. 14.

Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 31 Phrytsaphaakhom 2530 [May 1987], p. 36. Matichon Sut Sapdaa, 26 Tulaakhom 2529 [October 1986), p. 15.

Ibid. Ibid. Phra Phawanakoson, "Kaan-mii Sati Phijaaranaa Hen Kaay Nai Kaay Thang Na Phaay-nai Lae Phaay-nork Ruam 18 Kaay" [Mindfulness in observing the bodies within the body - Totalling eighteen bodies, both internal and external), Thammakaay 2, no. 1. Mokaraakhom-Kumphaaphan 2530 [January-February 1987), p. 70. 28. Interview with Sanitsuda Ekachai, "The Business of Raising Spirits", Bangkok Post, 17 May 1988, section 3.

Concluding Remarks

In the preceding chapters the political and ideological conflicts between the Thai establishment and middle class have often been portrayed somewhat simplistically as a bipolar conflict between two monolithic and contradictory positions. This simplistic analysis has had a heuristic value in providing a theoretical framework capable of broadly categorising and schematising the divergent trends and movements within urban Thai Buddhism. However, a comprehensive analysis of each religious movement would in fact reveal it to be a complex phenomenon riven with contradictory elements and tendencies. The analytical categories "reformist" and "establishment" used in this study denote ideal types. In fact, there is no pure "reformist" form of Buddhism which is devoid of atavistic "establishment" features just as there is no longer any pure "establishment" form of the religion untouched by modernising "reformist" tendencies. While the terms "reformist Buddhism" and "establishment Buddhism" do have an analytical import in denoting the epistemological differences between the two religious forms, in practice individual Buddhist movements

Concluding Remarks

223

often exhibit the theoretical features of both religious forms to a greater or lesser degree. In such cases the terms "reformist" and "establishment" take on a more descriptive quality, denoting the practical political alignment of a movement's leader or audience and the political functions that a movement's teachings fulfil, rather than any inherent theoretical quality of those teachings themselves. In this concluding section some of the contradictory aspects of "reformist" and "establishment" Buddhist movements, which give each religious form some of the characteristics of its political opposite, are briefly noted. Democracy, the political form espoused by the Thai middle class, draws little support from the traditional metaphysical forms of Thai Buddhism, which have historically functioned to support the centralisation of political power. Middle-class Buddhist theoreticians must therefore repudiate metaphysical Buddhism and break new theoretical ground in order to develop a Buddhist justification for political democracy. However, an unequivocal Theravada Buddhist justification of full representative democracy has not yet been formulated in Thailand. The continuing political ambivalence of such reformist Buddhist thinkers as Phutthathat and Thepwethi, who often oscillate between democratic and authoritarian political stances, can perhaps be taken as reflecting the insecure political position of the nascent Thai middle class in the present Thai social order. While the theoretical rationalisation of Buddhist teachings begun by Mongkut has now largely been completed by Phutthathat, the political legacy of centuries of monarchical and authoritarian governments has yet to be purged from the Buddhist teachings of the Thai middle class. However, such a theoretical development perhaps cannot be expected of the Thai middle class which, despite its opposition to the establishment's monopolisation of political power, retains a strong interest in maintaining social order and the traditional symbols of political authority. After all, Thai middle-class theoreticians are not involved in subverting the institutions of the monarchy, Buddhism, and the state but rather in adapting them to suit their own political aspirations. The establishment's acceptance of the need to adopt scientific procedures and for Thais to improve their level of technological skill

224

Concluding Remarks

introduces a concrete contradiction into the metaphysical form of Buddhism by which they seek to legitimate their political dominance. As middle-class critics eagerly point out, the metaphysical Buddhism of the establishment is theoretically inconsistent with the rationalism and empiricism of the scientific knowledge that the establishment also supports. The Buddhism of the Thai establishment can also be regarded as conflicting with the rationalist theoretical bases of the contemporary international economic and technological order. This suggests the possibility that in the long term, in the absence of a collapse of the present world economic order and a retreat into local politico-economic systems supported by indigenous legitimating systems, the traditional epistemology of establishment Buddhism will either be abandoned or increasingly rationalised even by those whose interests and position it presently supports. However, while the legitimatory ideology of the Thai establishment contains contradictions and theoretical tensions, it nevertheless continues to have significant influence in Thailand. As a medium of political legitimation, the power of the metaphysical Buddhism of the Thai establishment is ultimately determined by the political power and position of its sponsors rather than by merely logical or theoretical criteria. That is, so long as the middle class remains a relatively disenfranchised minority its religious rationalism and associated political pluralism, no matter how convincingly argued, will continue to be a minority or at least an "opposition" intellectual position in Thailand. Conversely, so long as the establishment continues to dominate Thai political life and to control the official expression of Buddhist teachings its metaphysical views, no matter how contradictory, will continue to be buttressed by strong extra-theoretical support. If Thai political history continues to reflect the trends of the recent past - when no single section of the elite has been able to obtain complete socio-economic and political ascendancy and no single group has controlled all the sources of power - then it cannot be expected that the Buddhism of the Thai elite will re-attain any structural or theoretical unity such as was manifested up until the mid-nineteenth century under the absolute monarchy. Rather, urban Thai Buddhism

Concluding Remarks

225

will continue to split into a range of forms aligned with the various groups competing for political control. The myth of the unity of Thai Buddhism may nevertheless remain for some time. However, the abstract notion of a single, unified form of Buddhism is already being challenged by such developments as Phothirak's formation of a de facto third nikaya and by increasing lay assumption of religious authority outside the traditional bounds of the sangha. At this point in Thai history, in the late 1980s, elite Thai Buddhism is characterised by a philosophical stand-off between the rationalist and metaphysical camps. Despite their logical superiority, the rationalists cannot defeat the supporters of metaphysical Buddhism and so become the dominant philosophical group because of the concrete support for the latter from the politically dominant sections of the Thai elite. Conversely, despite their political superiority, the Buddhist metaphysicians cannot completely defeat the rationalists because their own position is founded upon an historical recognition of King Mongkut's partial demythologisation of Buddhist teachings and because of the establishment's concrete reliance upon scientific rationalism in education and the economy. If the assumption underpinning this analysis is correct - that urban Thai Buddhism functions as a system of political legitimation - then this philosophical stand-off will continue so long as the present structure and power distribution within the Thai elite remains unchanged. Only a change in the balance of power between the competing establishment and middle-class factions of the elite could lead to either a resolution or a redefinition of the present philosophical and organisational conflicts within urban Thai Buddhism.

Glossary

Abhidhammapitaka - The third section of the canonical Buddhist scriptures or Tipitaka, comprising a philosophical development of the Buddha's teachings.

Bhikkhu (Thai: Phikkhu or Phiksu) - A Buddhist monk, also used as a suffix in Thai added to the names of monks.

Bodhisattva - In Theravada Buddhism, a highly spiritually developed person destined to become a fully enlightened Buddha.

Cakkavattin - The ideal Buddhist ruler, regarded as a future Buddha who has delayed his own salvation in order to lead humanity.

Dhamma (Thai: Tham) - The teaching and practice of the Buddha's message of salvation from suffering. In different contexts dhamma may mean either "Buddhist doctrine" or "righteousness".

Dhutanga (Thai: Thudong) - A term given to a set of severe ascetic practices that Buddhist monks may choose to follow. In Thailand

Glossary

227

dhutanga practices are traditionally associated with monks of the forest or aranyavasi tradition. ]au Khana - The name of a clerical administrative position in the Thai sangha given to monks in charge of different geographical groupings of the sangha, commonly translated as "Sangha Governor". Kamma (Thai: Kam) - An intentional action which leads to the accumulation of either merit (pufifia) or demerit (papa), depending on whether the intention is moral or immoral, and which subsequently leads to future experiential reactions of the same moral or immoral quality as the original action. Khana Winaythorn - Ecclesiastical Court established under the Sangha Act of 1941. Krommamyyn - A senior title formerly awarded by the Thai king, usually to members of the royal family. Mahatherasamagama (Thai: Mahatherasamakhom) - The Council of Elders (thera) of the Thai sangha, the supreme governing body of the Thai sangha under the Sangha Acts of 1902 and 1962. Nibbana (Thai: nipphaan) the Buddhist salvation.

Complete liberation from suffering,

Nikaya - A formally recognised sub-order of the sangha. In Thailand two main nikaya are recognised, the Thammayut or Thammayutikanikaya and the Mahanikay. Parian - A grade of Pali clerical education in Thailand awarded to monks upon passing an ecclesiastical examination, granted in seven grades from parian 3 (basic) to parian 9 (advanced). Phra - A title prefixed to the names of Thai monks, temples, holy objects, or members of the royal family. Phra Ratchakhana - A term used collectively to denote the senior clerical titles awarded by the Thai king.

228

Glossary

Rorng Somdet Deputy Somdet, a term used to refer to a titled Phra Ratchakhana monk of a rank immediately below that of monks with Somdet titles. Saiyaasaat - Thai supernaturalism and magic, distinct from Buddhism but often incorporating aspects of Buddhist belief. Samadhi - Concentration meditation. Samanas'akti (Thai: Samanasak) - The system of clerical titles awarded by the Thai Government and monarchy which determines organisational seniority in the administration of the sangha. Sangha (Thai: Sangkha) - A collective term for the organisation or institution of the Buddhist monkhood. Sanghamontri (Thai: Sangkhamontri) under the 1941 Sangha Act.

A Sangha Minister elected

Sanghanayaka (Thai: Sangkhanayok) - The Sangha Prime Minister, elected head of the Sanghasabha under the 1941 Sangha Act. Sangharaja - The Supreme Patriarch of the Thai sangha, the most senior clerical title and administrative position. Sanghasabha (Thai: Sangkhasapha) - The Sangha Council, the elected supreme administrative body of the Thai sangha under the 1941 Sangha Act. Sanghayana - A Buddhist council held to resolve practical or doctrinal disputes or to produce a revised recension of the Buddhist scriptures, the Tipitaka. Sasana - Literally, the religious teachings or instructions of the Buddha, often used to denote the Buddhist religion as a whole. Somdet - A senior title conferred by the Thai king to both laity and monks. Monks with a Somdet title are called Somdet Phra Ratchakhana and are the most senior titled and administrative monks in the Thai sangha apart from the Sangharaja.

Glossary

229

Suttapitaka - The second section of the canonical Buddhist scriptures or Tipitaka, composed mainly of the Buddha's discourses. Thera - An Elder, a Buddhist monk who has been ordained for more than ten years.

Tipitaka - The canonical Buddhist scriptures, comprising three main divisions, the Vinayapitaka, Suttapitaka, and Abhidhammapitaka. Vinaya - The clerical code of conduct recorded in the Vinayapitaka. Vinayapitaka - The first section of the canonical Buddhist scriptures or Tipitaka, dealing largely with clerical practice. Vipassana - Insight meditation.

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Index

Abhidhamma Foundation, 140, 148 Abhidhammapitaka, 110, 148. See also Tipitaka Absolute Monarchy, 11, 23, 25-27, 30, 41, 51, 70, 72, 76. See also Thai aristocracy Acharn Man. See Luang Puu Man Adul Ratanon, 185 Aganna Sutta, 123 Amnesty International, 193 Anan Senakhan (Phra Chayanantho), 130, 140-47, 164-65, 170-73, 175-77, 181, 189-94 Ananda Mahidon (King Rama VIII), 28 Arahant, 187 Aristocracy. See Thai aristocracy Arthit Kamlang-ek, 190-93, 200

Asceticism, in Thai Buddhism, 50. See also Dhutanga Authoritarianism, political, 42, 49, 51, 82, 87, 122, 132, 135. See also Thai military Ayutthaya, 13-14, 41, 52, 122, 152 Bidhyalabh, 96 Boonchu Rojanasathian, 175 Bowring treaty, 25 Brahmanism, 41, 48, 51-52, 59, 122 Buddhism. See also Sangha establishment form of Thai B., 38, 40-43, 47, 49, 57-58, 130, 135, 139, 141, 205, 222-25. See also royal form of Thai B. history of B. in Thailand, 26-27 metaphysical form of Thai B. See establishment form of Thai B.

240

Index

and Thai monarchy, 12 and political legitimation in Thailand, 1-7, 10-11, 14-15, 31, 41-42, 51-52, 57-58, 63, 82, 116, 130, 147, 152, 176, 180, 187, 207, 224 rationalist form of Thai B. See reformist form of Thai Buddhism, Mongkut reformist form of Thai B., 29, 38, 40, 44, 48-53, 55-58, 87, 119-21, 124-25, 131-35, 138-39, 166, 202, 218, 222-23, 225. See also Mongkut royal form of Thai B., 26-27, 29, 38, 42, 46, 48, 120, 147 sociological structure of Thai B., 7, 9-10 supernatural form of Thai B., 40, 57-61, 120, 136, 203-4 and Thai state, 2, 5-7, 9, 13, 31, 36, 55, 63. See also Sangha, and Thai state Buddhist ethics, 50. See also Vinaya Buddhist order of monks. See Sangha Buddhist Society of Thailand, 132 Bunmii Meethaangkuun, 140

Cakkavattin, 45, 187 Chamlong Srimuang, 38, 167, 181-89, 194 Chamlyang Wutthijan, 108, 178 Chanuan movement, 142-43, 192 Chaovalit Yongchaiyuth, 150, 193, 200 (Phra) Chayabuun Thammachayyo, 207-8, 211, 213 (Phra) Chayanantho. See Anan Senakhan

Chinaworasiriwat (Sangharaja), 71-72, 127 Chinese, in Thailand, 24-26, 28, 30-32 Chulalongkorn (King Rama V), 18, 23, 26-27, 46, 63, 65-69, 86-88, 101, 131 Clerical titles. See Thai clerical titles Communism, 80, 95, 97, 100, 127, 130, 140, 145, 148, 150, 217. See also Marxism Co-ordinating Centre for Buddhist Affairs of the Northeast Region, 107, 110 Council of Elders. See Mahatherasamakhom

Dasarajadhamma, 134 Democracy, in Thailand, 30, 32, 34, 36-38, 42, 52-55, 65, 70-71, 78-79, 87, 121-23, 125, 135, 151, 223 Department of Religious Affairs, 9, 16, 81, 88, 99, 104, 107-8, 110-11, 161, 169-74, 176-81, 185, 210 Department of Universities, 210 Devaraja, 121-22 Development, in Thailand, 133, 189. See also Thai economy Dhamma, 11-13, 151, 162-63, 201, 204, 214 Dhammacarika Programme, 154, 158 Dhammadayada training, 209-12, 214. See also Wat Phra Thammakaay Dhammadhuta Programme, 154, 158 Dhammakaya, 200-2 Dhammaraja, 122 Dhutanga, 128, 160, 169, 183, 206, 208-9

241

Index Ecclesiastical Court. See Khana Winaythorn Ecclesiastical Council. See Mahatherasamakhom Elite. See Thai political elite (Phra) Fang, 14, 152 Federation of Buddhists of Thailand, 83-84, 104 Feudalism, 34 (Phra) Fyyn Chutinatharo (Phutthakhosajan), 98, 100, 102, 105-6, 108-11, 149-50, 200 Hupphaasawan movement, 147, 179, 190 (Phra) Jaroen Yanaworn (Somdet Phra Phutthakhosajan), 127 Jau Khana, 18, 69 Jittaphawan College, 102, 117, 148-50, 199 (Phra) Juan Utthayi (Sangharaja, Sasanasophana), 76, 80, 91, 96-101 Kamma, 2, 12, 41, 44-45, 49, 142, 150, 167 King, of Thailand, 16, 41, 73, 80, 104. See also Thai aristocracy and monarchy King Rama I, 58, 104, 111 King Rama III, 23 King Rama IV. See Mongkut King Rama V. See Chulalongkorn King Rama VI. See Wachirawut King Rama VII. See Prachathipok King Rarna VIII. See Ananda Mahidon King Rama IX. See Phumiphon Adunyadet

(Phra) Kittiwuttho, 46-47, 102, 117, 147-51, 154 Khabuankaan Phithak Phutthasaat, 145 Khana Patisangkhorn Phra Saasanaa,

71-72 Khana Sangkhamontri, 97-100 Khana Winaythorn, 80, 84, 98 Khana Yuwasong, 84 Khmer culture. See Brahmanism Khumthorng Phuuphiwdyan, 178 Kriangsak Chommanand, 182 Krom Kaan-saasanaa. See Department of Religious Affairs Kukrit Pramoj, 104, 142-43, 145, 193 Kulaap Saipradit, 132 Laity, role in Thai Buddhism, 9-10, 49, 103, 179, 187-88, 205, 207, 225 legitimation, political. See Buddhism, and political legitimation Liberal (Seriniyom) Party, 194 (Phra) Lokanatha, 135 Luang Phor Sot Janthasaro, 199-203, 207-8, 217 Luang Puu Man, 160, 206 Luangjop Krabuanyut, 148 Mahachulalongkorn Buddhist University, 138, 148 Mahamakut Buddhist University, 127-28 Mahanikay Order, 10-11, 28, 65-67, 69-76, 78-79, 81-83, 85-90, 95-97, 100-2, 105-6, 109, 126, 128-29, 131-32, 144, 148, 154, 159-60, 164, 200, 207 Mahaparinibbana Sutta, 163 Mahatherasamakhom, 16-18, 68-70,

242

Index

73, 78, 80-81, 83-85, 88, 104-10, 116, 127, 147-48, 153, 159, 162, 164-65, 168-70, 172-74, 176, 180, 185-86, 200, 219 (Somdet Phra) Mahawirawong, 76. See also Juan Utthayi Marxism, 53. See also Communism Millenarian rebellions, 70 Modernisation, in Thailand, 133 Monks, role in Thai Buddhism, 66, 83. See also Sangha Mongkhon Sriphaiwan, 180-81 (Phra) Mongkhonthepmuni. See Luang Phor Sot Mongkut (King Rama IV), 18, 23, 27, 65, 67, 69, 207 and rationalist Buddhism, 43-47, 58-59, 126, 128, 130-32 Nakhorn Wetsuphaaphorn, 213 Narai, 42, 122 Naresuan, 42, 122 National identity, 56 Nationalism, 54 Nawaphon, 149, 151 Nibbana, 44-45, 48-50, 52, 118, 120, 125, 161, 201-5 Nikaya. See Mahanikay, Thammayut Niphon Sasithorn, 104 Ongkaan Phithak Phutthasaat, 144-45, 170, 173 (Phra) Panyanantha, 116, 119, 135-37, 145, 156, 159, 184 Parian Thamma Samaakhom, 185 (Phra) Phadet Thattachiwo, 204, 207-8, 213-15

Phahon, 74 (Phra) Phaisaan Wisaalai, 121, 134 Phalang Tham Party, 181, 184, 186-87, 194 Phibun Songkhram, 24, 28-30, 64, 74, 76, 79-80, 95, 127, 131 (Phra) Phimontham, 71-72, 76, 82, 94-111, 116, 128-30, 132, 137, 148, 150, 167, 179 (Phra) Phothirak, 38, 116, 130, 144-45, 147, 159-77, 181-89, 194, 218, 225 Phra Ratchakhana, 15-17, 88, 90, 107 Phra Sayamthewathirat, 47, 142, 191 (Phra) Phrommakhunaphorn, 200 Phumiphon Adunyadet (King Rama IX), 28, 107, 110, 149, 192-94, 210 (Somdet Phra) Phutthajan, 72, 109-10. See also Phutthasaro, Sa-ngiam (Somdet Phra) Phutthajan Too Phrommarangsi, 149 (Somdet Phra) Phutthakhosajan, 76, 79. See also Fyyn Chutinatharo, Jaroen Yanaworn (Phra) Phutthasaro, 96 (Phra) Phutthathat, 48-50, 116, 118-20, 125-36, 138-40, 144-45, 147, 153, 155-56, 159, 164-67, 183-84, 188, 202-4, 206-7, 223 (Phra) Phutthawongmuni. See Suwan Suwannachoto (Phra) Plot Kittisophana, 96-97, 99-101 (Phra) Plort Atthakari (Sasanasophana), 99, 102, 104, 127, 130, 156 Prachaakorn Thai Party, 185-86, 191 Prachathipok (King Rama VII), 27, 191

Index Pramaan Adireksaan, 28 Praphaat Jarusathian, 28, 148, 175 Prasert Ruchirawong, 28 Prem Tinsulanond, 85, 110, 182, 184, 190, 191, 193 Pridi Phanomyong, 29, 95, 131-32, 137 (Phra) Pun Punyasiri (Sangharaja), 106, 148 Ramkhamhaeng, 121-22 (Phra) Ratchananthamuni, 156. See Panyanantha (Phra) Ratcharatanobon, 107, 110 (Phra) Ratchathammaphani. See Kittiwuttho (Phra) Ratchawathanaphorn, 149 (Phra) Ratchawiramuni, 84 (Phra) Ratchawisutthimethi, 149 (Phra) Ratchaworakhun, 160 (Phra) Ratchaworamuni, 155. See Thepwethi Rationalism, in Thai Buddhism. See Buddhism, reformist form; Mongkut (Phra) Sa-ngiam (Somdet Phra Phutthajan), 106-8 Saiyaasaat. See Buddhism, supernatural form of Thai B. Samanasak. See Thai clerical titles Sangha, 1-5, 12, 16-17, 46, 49, 55, 58, 63-64, 95, 103, 135, 144, 152-54, 171-72, 187-88, 215. See also Mahanikay; Thammayut and Thai state, 9, 12-15, 65-72, 77, 81, 88-89, 102, 121, 163, 174, 176-77 Sangha Act of 1902, 10, 13, 29, 64, 66, 68-71, 73

243

Sangha Act of 1941, 10, 13, 28-30 64, 70, 72-74, 76-80, 84, 98, 100, 108 Sangha Act of 1962, 10, 13, 29, 64, 78-83, 101, 106, 108, 161, 164, 169, 173-74, 178 Sangha administrative positions. See Thai clerical administrative positions Sangha Council. See Sangkhasapha Sangha Governor. See Jau Khana Sangha Titles. See Thai clerical titles Sangharaja, 16-18, 68, 70-72, 74-77, 79-81, 83, 96-100, 104-8, 110, 144, 148, 162, 174 Sanghayana, 73-75, 78, 110-11 Sangkhanayok, 73, 76, 79-80, 84, 96-97, 99 Sangkhasapha, 72-74, 76, 78-80, 84, 95 Samadhi, 47, 202-6, 213 Samak Sunthorawet, 185-86, 191-93 Samphan Thorngsamak, 84-85, 181 Sangwian Pharuhong, 185-86 Santi Asok movement, 159-60, 163, 172, 177, 180-81, 184-88, 216, 218-19 Sanya Thammasak, 132 Sarit Thanarat, 24, 28-33, 37, 42, 64, 71-72, 79-82, 86-87, 94, 96-101, 120, 122, 130-31, 145, 156, 176 (Phra) Sasanasophana. See Juan Utthayi; Plort Atthakari Satipatthana Sutta, 200 (Phra) Sawai Thitawiro (Wisutthathibodi), 100, 102, 105-6, 109, 149-50 Second king, 104-5

244

Index

Secularism, 56-57 Sirikit, 149, 192 Sirilak Srimuang, 186 Sirinthorn, 192, 200 Somdet Phra Ratchakhana, 16, 90 Somkhuan Laulapha, 47 (Phra) Sophanakhanaphorn, 58, 71 Sri Burapha. See Kulaap Saipradit Suan Mok, 126-27, 129-30, 136, 164 Suchaat Kosonkittiwong, 144, 147, 190 Sukhothai, 1, 13, 41, 121-22 Supreme Patriarch. See Sangharaja Suttapitaka, 48, 110-11, 123. See also Tipitaka (Phra) Suwan Suwannachoto (Phutthawongmuni), 106, 109, 208, 210 Taaksin, 42 Thai aristocracy and monarchy, 6, 24-29, 31, 41-45, 54, 66, 79, 131-32 Thai bureaucracy, 24-28, 31-32 Thai clerical administrative positions, 17-18 Thai clerical titles, 15-17, 89 Thai economy, 25-26, 28, 30, 32-34, 51, 67, 218 Thai Farmers Federation, 142-43 Thai middle class, 6, 11, 24, 32-38, 43-44, 48, 50-51, 53, 55-56, 60, 82, 85, 95, 116-17, 121, 129, 131-35, 137, 139, 141, 151, 159, 171, 175-76, 178-80, 188-89, 199, 205-6, 211, 213, 216-18, 222-23, 225 Thai military, 6, 24, 27-32, 34, 37-38, 42, 87, 131-32, 190, 209. See

also Authoritarianism; Sarit Thanarat; Thanom Kittikachorn Thai political elite, 6-10, 23-24, 35-36. See also Thai middle class; Thai political establishment Thai political establishment, 10-11, 24, 31-38, 42-43, 46-47, 55-56, 59, 65, 77, 86, 88, 102, 116-17, 130, 132-33, 139-41, 145-46, 148, 150-51, 154, 171, 175-76, 194, 199, 205-6, 211, 213-14, 218-19, 222-23, 225 (Phra) Tharnmachayyo. See Chayabuun Thammachayyo Thammakaay movement. See Wat Phra Thammakaay (Phra) Thammakhunaphorn. See Fyyn Chutinatharo (Phra) Thammakosajan. See Phutthathat (Phra) Thammapanyabodi, 106 (Phra) Thammawarodom, 110. See also Sawai Thitawiro; Pun Punyasiri Thammayut Order, 10-11, 27-28, 30, 44, 46, 58, 65-71, 73-82, 85-90, 95-97, 99, 101-3, 105, 127-29, 131-32, 140, 144-45, 159-60, 164, 206-7 Thanin Kraiwichian, 182 Thanom Kittikachorn, 24, 28-29, 31, 33, 37, 64, 82, 86, 99, 122, 131, 148, 149, 175 (Phra) Thattachiwo. See Phadet Thattachiwo (Phra) Thepsumethi, 168 (Phra) Thepwethi, 119, 137-39, 155, 159, 165-66, 188, 203-4, 215, 223

Index (Phra) Thepwisutthimethi. See Panyanantha; Phutthathat (Phra) Thepyanamethi, 149 (Phra) Thii Punyako (Somdet Phra Thirayanamuni), 96 (Phra) Thipprinya, 127 (Somdet Phra) Thirayanamuni. See Thii Punyako Tipitaka, 12, 53, 73, 110-11, 121, 128, 173. See also Abhidhammapitaka; Suttapitaka; Vinayapitaka Traibhumikatha. See Traiphuum Phra Ruang Traiphuum Phra Ruang, 41-42, 45, 52 (Phra) Ubalikhunupamajan. See Waat Wasano (Phra) Udornkhanaphirak. See Kittiwuttho Uparaja. See Second king Uttarimanussadhamma, 162

Vinaya, 12, 89, 163-64, 168-69, 173-74. See also Buddhist ethics Vinayapitaka, 48 Vipassana, 95, 120, 202-3 Visuddhimagga, 127 (Phra) Waat Wasano (Sangharaja), 107, 144 Wachiralongkorn, 192

245

Wachirawut, 65, 87 Wachirayan, 66-69, 126, 128, 131, 207 (Somdet Phra) Wachirayanawong, 75-76, 79, 96, 127 (Somdet Phra) Wanarat, 76. See also Plot Kittisophana, Pun Punyasiri Wat Asokaram Paak-naam, 160-61, 172 Wat Bowornniwet, 43, 68, 86, 144 Wat Chonprathaanrangsit, 135-37 Wat Mahathat, 84, 95, 97-100, 104-6, 109, 111, 138, 148 Wat Paak-naam Phasi Jaroen, 199, 204 Wat Phra Simahathat, 74 Wat Phra Thammakaay, 102, 199-200, 202-19 Wat Rakhangkhositaram, 149-50 Wat Saamphraya, 98 Wat Umong, 136 Winay Siwakun, 172 (Phra) Wisutthathibodi. See Sawai Thitawiro (Somdet Phra) Yanasangworn, 43, 144, 191 Young Monks Group of Thailand. See Khana Yuwasong "Young Turks", 37-38, 182, 217. See also Thai military

THE AUTHOR Peter Anthony Jackson completed his Ph.D. in Philosophy and Asian Studies at the Australian National University, 'canberra in 1986. His Ph.D. thesis, which is published under the title Buddhadasa - A Buddhist Thinker for the Modern World, reflects his interests in the Thai language, the role of Buddhist thought, and the institution of the sangha in modern Thailand. Peter Jackson is currently Senior Project Officer for the Thai National Curriculum and Materials with the Australian Capital Territory Schools Authority.