British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950 (Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies) [New ed.] 9783034318310, 9781787075542, 9781787075559, 3034318316

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Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies

Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies

British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950

Gioula Koutsopanagou (BA Athens, MA and PhD LSE) is founding director of the Media History Workshop (ETMIET) in the Research Centre for Modern Greece at Panteion University, Athens and adjunct academic staff of the Faculty of Humanities in the Hellenic Open University, co-editor of the four-volume Encyclopaedia of the Greek Press, the author of the monograph The British Press and the Greek Crisis, 1943–1949. Orchestrating the Cold-War ‘Consensus’ in Britain. She is currently writing a monograph on From the War for Freedom to Democracy: the BBC Greek Service, 1939-2005.

13 Gioula Koutsopanagou

This book sheds new and revealing light on British cultural and information policies in Greece by unearthing previously unexamined or insufficiently examined primary sources. These sources draw an intricate picture of a complex moment when, in the ruins of post-war southern Europe, British institutions, principally in this case the British Council and the BBC, sought to infiltrate and shape Greek society by promoting British political and social values. As Cold War tensions became increasingly evident, the book shows how British information and cultural policy increasingly became embodied in a sustained anticommunist propaganda campaign. As the civil war in Greece became an epicentre of the early Cold War, the successes and failures of British policy, and their impact on Greek society more generally, are scrutinized in detail.

Gioula Koutsopanagou

British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950 Exercising Public Diplomacy in the Formative Early Cold War Years

13

Peter Lang

www.peterlang.com

9783034318310_cvr_eu.indd All Pages

23-Sep-22 14:29:33

Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies

Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies

British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950

Gioula Koutsopanagou (BA Athens, MA and PhD LSE) is founding director of the Media History Workshop (ETMIET) in the Research Centre for Modern Greece at Panteion University, Athens and adjunct academic staff of the Faculty of Humanities in the Hellenic Open University, co-editor of the four-volume Encyclopaedia of the Greek Press, the author of the monograph The British Press and the Greek Crisis, 1943–1949. Orchestrating the Cold-War ‘Consensus’ in Britain. She is currently writing a monograph on From the War for Freedom to Democracy: the BBC Greek Service, 1939-2005.

13 Gioula Koutsopanagou

This book sheds new and revealing light on British cultural and information policies in Greece by unearthing previously unexamined or insufficiently examined primary sources. These sources draw an intricate picture of a complex moment when, in the ruins of post-war southern Europe, British institutions, principally in this case the British Council and the BBC, sought to infiltrate and shape Greek society by promoting British political and social values. As Cold War tensions became increasingly evident, the book shows how British information and cultural policy increasingly became embodied in a sustained anticommunist propaganda campaign. As the civil war in Greece became an epicentre of the early Cold War, the successes and failures of British policy, and their impact on Greek society more generally, are scrutinized in detail.

Gioula Koutsopanagou

British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950 Exercising Public Diplomacy in the Formative Early Cold War Years

13

Peter Lang

www.peterlang.com

9783034318310_cvr_eu.indd All Pages

23-Sep-22 14:29:33

British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950

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15-Sep-22 18:34:44

Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies Vol. 13 Edited by Andrew Louth FBA and David Ricks

PETER LANG

Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Wien

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Gioula Koutsopanagou

British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950 Exercising Public Diplomacy in the Formative Early Cold War Years

PETER LANG

Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • Frankfurt am Main • New York • Wien

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Bibliographic information published by Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche National­biblio­ grafie; detailed bibliographic data is available on the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Koutsopanagou, Gioula, author. Title: British information and cultural policy in Greece, 1943-1950 : exercising public diplomacy in the formative early Cold War years / Gioula Koutsopanagou. Description: Oxford ; New York : Peter Lang, [2022] | Series: Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies ; 13 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019008340 | ISBN 9783034318310 (alk. paper) | ISBN 9781787075559 (epub) | ISBN 9781787075542 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Great Britain--Foreign relations--Greece. | Greece--Foreign relations--Great Britain. | Great Britain. Foreign Office. Information Research Department. | Propaganda, British--Greece--History--20th century. | Propaganda, Anti-communist-Great Britain--History--20th century. | Propaganda, Anti-communist--Greece-History--20th century. | Great Britain--Cultural policy--History--20th century. | Cold War--Propaganda. | Greece--History--Civil War, 1944-1949--Propaganda. | Great Britain--Politics and government--1936-1945. | Great Britain--Politics and government--1945-1964. Classification: LCC DA47.9.G7 K68 2022 | DDC 327.49504109/044--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019008340 Cover design by Peter Lang Ltd. ISSN 1661-1187 ISBN 978-3-0343-1831-0 (print) ISBN 978-1-78707-554-2 (ePDF) ISBN 978-1-78707-555-9 (ePub) © Peter Lang Group AG 2022 Published by Peter Lang Ltd, International Academic Publishers, Oxford, United Kingdom [email protected], www.peterlang.com Gioula Koutsopanagou has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this Work. All rights reserved. All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed.

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To Iason

Contents

Preface ix Acknowledgements xi List of Abbreviations

xv

Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Post-​War British Information and Publicity Policy in Greece

21

Chapter 2 The Implementation of British Publicity Policy in Greece from 1946 87 Chapter 3 British Broadcasting Policy in Greece, 1945–​1950

205

Chapter 4 Cultural Aspects of British Policy in Post-​War Greece

289

Conclusion 395 Bibliography 405 Index 433

Preface

Patiently, and with a wealth of detail culled from a wide range of British and other archival sources, Gioula Koutsopanagou builds on her earlier research in the field to produce this valuable study. It will surely become a key point of reference for scholars working on post-​war Greece and on cultural policy and public diplomacy more widely. Dr Koutsopanagou draws closely on her sources to illuminate a cluster of related topics: the policy of the British Information Service as the Cold War took hold; reports from the field, many of them rich in detail and realist in tone; the crucial area of broadcasting; and British efforts to assist –​and exert some influence over –​the Greeks in the educational and cultural sphere. The reader will find detail on many neglected areas, including public health, along with sober assessment of what was, in the end, limited success of Britain’s efforts, given the countervailing forces of geopolitics. But her book is not merely a study in failure. It carefully assesses the outcomes case by case, and it will prove a valuable resource for scholars in more than one field and for British diplomats too. David Ricks King’s College London

Acknowledgements

While undertaking research for my PhD thesis at the London School of Economics in the early 1990s, I happened upon a wealth of additional primary evidence relating to the historical relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and Greece in the mid-​twentieth century, which at the time rested outside the immediate scope of my doctorate. In the years that followed its completion, however, I returned to London on numerous occasions to dig deeper into what I increasingly understood to be not only a rich but also a largely unexplored stream of evidence. This book is the outcome of that work. The historical literature on Cold War propaganda and cultural diplomacy in the mid-​1990s was, I found, dauntingly thin. However, as the years passed, the subject attracted considerably more scholarly attention, and today it has generated a substantial volume of literature, becoming a field of academic research in its own right and taught more widely in universities internationally. This book seeks to make a distinctive contribution to that ongoing process. In formulating the original idea for this volume, I owe a great debt of thanks to Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, who found the original proposal to be ‘extremely interesting’. Furthermore, David Ricks suggested that the book be included in the Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies Series (Peter Lang), which he co-​edits with Andrew Louth. My gratitude to them is immense. The greatest debt of gratitude I owe is to Aled Gruffydd Jones, as I have benefited enormously from talking over my ideas with him. I also hugely appreciate the support of Siân Nicholas. They both generously granted their time, insightful remarks, inspiration and encouragement, all of which were exceptionally helpful and greatly contributed to the improvement of the text and the sharpening of the argument. I doubt whether I could have written this book without the enthusiasm and support they so discreetly provided. Yanis Yanoulopoulos, with his extensive knowledge of Anglo-​Greek relations and his intimate understanding of Greek history and politics, also

xii

Acknowledgements

provided valuable comments and suggestions. I owe an additional debt of gratitude to him since on his recommendation the Department of Political Science and History, Panteion University entrusted me to teach in 1998/​9 and for ten years thereafter a course on Cultural Diplomacy, the first course of its kind ever to be taught in any university in Greece. I would especially like to thank Tom O’Malley and David Ricks for their perceptive comments and advice. Finally, I would also like to thank Lucy Melville, Publishing Director, Ashita Shah, Editorial Assistant, and Shruthi Maniyodath, Project Manager, at Peter Lang for facilitating the production of the book, Clare Church for the copyediting and Danna R. Messer for indexing it with such care. I could not have conducted the necessary research without the generous assistance of a number of individuals and institutions. These include the staff of many archives and libraries, particularly those at The National Archives, Kew, London, and Trish Hayes and Samantha Blake, archivists at the BBC Written Archives Centre. Thanks are also due to the Elliniki Radiofonia Tileorasi [Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation] Archives, Athens; the Radcliffe Science Library, Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford; the Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge; the King’s College London Archives; Historical Archives, Benaki Museum, Athens, especially their head, Tassos Sakellaropoulos; the Historical Archive of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens; the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive (ΕLΙΑ), Athens; Library of the General Secretariat of Communication & Information, Athens; and the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. During the course of my research, I co-​organized the ‘National Audiovisual Memory and the BBC Greek Service, 1939–​2005’ conference on the occasion of the service’s eightieth anniversary, the first conference of its kind. My special thanks goes to the Research Centre for Modern History at Panteion University, and in particular to Christina Koulouri, its director and now rector of Panteion University, for hosting the event, and, of course, to all the speakers, many of whom were senior staff of the Greek Service and came to the conference from the UK and Cyprus: Pavlos Nathanail, Viron Karidis, David Perman, Christos Pittas, Rosy Voudouri, Babis Metaxas, Richard Clogg, Ersi Vatou and Thanasis

Acknowledgements

xiii

Gavos. I would also like to thank the Research Centre for Modern History/​ Panteion University for supporting the eighth international conference of European Society for Periodical Research, hosted by the National Library of Greece/​Stavros Niarchos Foundation Cultural Centre and honoured by the presence of Philippos Tsiboglou, its inspiring and energetic general director. Both conferences were closely related to my research on cultural history, of which this book forms such a central part. Most of all, a great deal of thanks goes to my family and friends. I owe special thanks to my lifelong friend Marion Dinwoodie, who so generously accommodated me during my frequent research visits to the UK. I also owe a very great thanks to my parents for their unvarying support. My father’s personal memories of his experiences during the Greek Civil War always fascinated me as a child, and this helped shape my subsequent career as a historian of that troubled and troubling period. Most of all, I would like to thank my son, Iason, who is a teenager now, a rock star in a class by himself with his own band. His intelligence and humour has sustained me throughout the many difficulties of completing this book, and he brings me such joy. I thank him for his patience and for living with this book for so long. I dedicate this book to him. It goes without saying that the sole responsibility for the book should be attributed to the author alone.

Abbreviations

AERE Anonimi Eteria Radiophonikon Ekpompon [Radio Broadcasting Company] AGIS

Anglo-​Greek Information Service

AIC

Athens Information Centre (also referred to as the Churchill Street Information Centre and the Anglo-​Hellenic Information Centre)

AIS

Allied Information Service

AKSS Anargyrios kai Korgialenios Sxoli Spetson [Anargyrios and Korgiallenios School of Spetses] AMAG American Mission for Aid to Greece AME

Aeroporike Metaphore Ellados [Air Transport of Greece]

AOS

Anotato Oikonomiko Symvoulio [Supreme Economic Council]

ASKI

Arxeia Sygchronis Koinonikis Istorias [Contemporary Social History Archives]

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

B C

British Council

B GNS Balkan General News Service BIS

British Information Service

COI

Central Office of Information

CRD

Cultural Relations Department (UK Foreign Office)

DSE

Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas [Democratic Army of Greece]

EAM

Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo [National Liberation Front]

xvi

ECA

Abbreviations

Economic Cooperation Administration

EDES Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos [National Republican Greek League] EEID

East European Information Department (UK Foreign Office)

EIR

Ethniko Idryma Radiofonias [National Radio Foundation]

ELAS

Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos [National People’s Liberation Army]

ELIA

Hellenic Literary and Historical Archive

ERT

Ellinikí Radiofonía Tileórasi [Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation]

FO

Foreign Office (UK)

HPA

Heracles Petimezas Archives

IES

Institute of English Studies

INS

International News Service

IPD

Information Policy Department (UK Foreign Office)

IRD

Information Research Department (UK Foreign Office)

KKE

Kommunistiko Komma Ellados [Communist Party of Greece]

LPS

London Press Service

MGM

Metro-​Goldwyn-​Mayer

MI6

Security Intelligence Service, Section 6

MIME Ministry of Information, Middle East MOI

Ministry of Information (United Kingdom)

MRC

Medical Research Council

OEPEC Overseas and Emergency Publicity Expenditure Committee PEAT

Praktoreio Ephimeridon Athinaikou Typou [News Agents of the Athenian Press]

Abbreviations

xvii

PID

Political Intelligence Department (UK Foreign Office)

PWB

Political Warfare Bureau

PWE

Political Warfare Executive

RCA

Radio Corporation of America

RF

Rockefeller Foundation

SOE

Special Operations Executive

TAE

Technike Aeroporike Ekmetaleyseis [Technical Air Transport Exploitations]

TNA

The National Archives

TTT

Tachidromeia, Tilegraphoi, Telephoneia [Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones]

TUC

Trades Union Congress

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration USIS

United States Information Service

VOA

Voice of America

WAC

Written Archives Centre (British Broadcasting Corporation)

XAN

Christianiki Adelfotita Neon [Young Men’s Christian Brotherhood] (part of the Young Men’s Christian Association)

YRE

Ypiresia Radiofonikon Ekpompon [National Broadcasting Service]

ΦΕΚ

Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως [Government Gazette]

Introduction

This book sheds a new and revealing light on British cultural and information policies in Greece and on the ways in which the practices of public diplomacy were welded to the political imperatives of the Cold War. Thanks to the discovery of previously unexamined primary sources and a more detailed examination of some that have not been subjected to rigorous scrutiny by historians, this book draws an intricate picture of a complex moment in which –​in the ruins of post-​war southern Europe –​British institutions sought to infiltrate and shape Greek society by promoting British political and social values. With the significant focus on the Greek Civil War during the early stages of the Cold War, Greece came to be used as a testing ground for the British propaganda effort embedded in the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign, providing evidence of the effectiveness of this strategy and its broader applicability as a platform for British post-​war public diplomacy. This book explores in detail the successes and failures of British publicity and cultural policy in Greece as Cold War tensions became increasingly evident, and it shows how British policy progressively embodied a sustained anti-​communist propaganda campaign. As it turned out, this campaign  –​particularly in the Greece of the late 1940s –​proved to be little more than an act of ‘preaching to the converted in respect of anti-​communism’,1 one that merely provided ‘additional ammunition for [the] already heated guns’ of Greek state propaganda.2

1 2

The National Archives (hereafter, TNA):  FO  1110/​30, PR  1273, Secret Letter, A. G. R. Rouse to Ralph Murray, Foreign Office (hereafter, FO), 13 December 1948. TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  1540, ‘Quarterly Report from the Information Office, Athens for (the) Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’.

2

introduction

While it remains to be a matter of dispute whether the history of public diplomacy3 began with the Cold War,4 what is certain is that the practice of public diplomacy had never before been applied to such an extent and in such an intricate way, as in the Cold War. Public diplomacy, either as an aphorism or as an embellished definition of propaganda, was recognized as a foreign policy practice which became an integral part of the Cultural Cold War.5 Shortly after the end of the Second World War, British wartime 3

4 5

Since 1981, an extensive literature has been produced on the practice of ‘public’ and ‘cultural’ diplomacy. A semantic confusion exists between the two, but both are meant as tools for diplomacy. Public diplomacy has been examined from different perspectives –​historical, in the realm of ideology and as a form of national self-​representation –​as well as in different political, ideological and socio-​ economic contexts in different places at different times. Philip M. Taylor and Frank Ninkovich were contemporaneous pioneers in the field. Important works that cover this genre during the early Cold War years include the following: Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency:  American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–​1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Laura A. Belmonte, Selling the American Way:  U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor, eds, Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (New York:  Routledge, 2009); Kenneth A. Osgood and Brian C. Etheridge, eds, The United States and Public Diplomacy: New Directions in Cultural and International History (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); Giles Scott-​Smith and Nikolas Glover, National Relations: Public Diplomacy, National Identity and the Swedish Institute 1945–​1970 (Lund:  Nordic Academic Press, 2011); and Justin Hart, Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). This book follows the historical trajectory pioneered by these historians. Helmer Helmers, ‘Public Diplomacy in Early Modern Europe:  Towards a New History of News’, Media History 22/​3–​4 (2016), 401–​420. Christopher Lasch was among the first to incorporate the cultural dimension into the historiography of the Cold War. See in particular: ‘The Cultural Cold War’, The Nation (11 September 1967); ‘Τhe Cultural Cold War:  A Short History of the Congress for Cultural Freedom’, in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History (New York: Pantheon, 1968), 322–​359; and The Agony of the American Left (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969). One of the first texts to associate the policies of the Cold War with art was Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). Nora Sayre, in Running

Introduction

3

propaganda mechanisms were again mobilized and subsequently, the dividing lines between publicity, information, propaganda and psychological warfare were blurred. British governments, despite their skilful performance in matters of propaganda during times of war, were traditionally averse to its use in peacetime. Britain’s relative post-​war decline, however –​aggravated as it was by its dire economic condition combined with the changing dynamics of international politics, including British involvement in the Greek political crisis6 –​rendered it important for British policymakers to continue to explain Britain’s position both within and beyond its borders. The British approach was to deal not only with national ‘promotion’ but also and perhaps more importantly, to influence ‘public opinion’ at home and abroad where its ‘decline had to be explained or disguised’ and in so doing project Britain’s national image in a ‘world of competing

6

Time: Films of the Cold War (New York: The Dial Press, 1982), and Peter Biskind, in Seeing is Believing:  How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love the Fifties (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), dealt with the role of American cinema in the Cold War. Aspects of the cultural dimension of the Cold War were also addressed in a collection edited by Larry May titled Recasting America:  Culture and Politics in the Age of Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). Informative references to the cultural shift in the study of the Cold War were provided in Robert Griffith, ‘The Cultural Turn in Cold War Studies’, Reviews in American History 29/​1 (March 2001), 150–​157. Important literature on this subject has been collected gradually, including the following: Walter S. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–​1961 (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (Granta Publications, 1999; British edition) and The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters (New York: The New Press, 2000; American edition); David Caute, The Dancer Defects:  The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy during the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange & the Cold War:  Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park:  Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003); Victor Rosenberg, Soviet-​American Relations, 1953–​1960:  Diplomacy and Cultural Exchange during the Eisenhower Presidency ( Jefferson, NC:  McFarland & Company, 2005); and Kenneth A. Osgood, Total Cold War:  Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006). As well as in events in India and Palestine. See Philip M. Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century:  Selling Democracy (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 1999), 229.

4

introduction

ideologies’.7 As this book will show, the Greek political crisis complicated British propaganda efforts. The bloody events of December 1944 in Greece,8 in which British military forces were deeply involved, left Britain exposed to critical opinions from the world stage regarding its intervention in a newly liberated allied country. Moreover, the events provoked sharp reactions in the British Parliament and much of the British press presented a hostile view towards British policy in Greece.9 Explaining British foreign policy and making it better understood at home and abroad was deemed by the British government to be absolutely necessary. In part, since propaganda had acquired such negative connotations, the British preferred to call these efforts ‘information work’ or ‘publicity’. However, while the distinction between publicity and propaganda in the British context was narrow, they were both elements of the same project, both working towards the same objective: to influence opinions in a desired direction. Information departments were located within British overseas embassies and, together with their information officers, became an established feature of the British Foreign Service.10 After the dissolution of the UK’s Ministry of Information (MOI) on 31 March 1946, the Foreign Office (FO) became responsible for the administration of a large information organization. Due to an acute shortage of specialist personnel, this organization would need to recruit and train a specialist staff at pace to meet its fundamental requirements.11 The creation of the Central Office of Information (COI) in April 1946 is evident of the urgent need perceived at the time for a permanent and 7 8 9 10

Taylor, British Propaganda, 227. See also Martin Moore, The Origins of Modern Spin:  Democratic Government and the Media in Britain, 1945–​ 51 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). This refers to the series of bloody clashes in Athens, known as the Dekemvriana [December events], that occurred when Greek police opened fire on a civilian crowd demonstrating at Syntagma Square. On British press attitudes towards Greece in the period 1943–​1949, see Gioula Koutsopanagou, The British Press and the Greek Crisis, 1943–​1949:  Orchestrating the Cold-​War ‘Consensus’ in Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). G. R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 180; Philip M. Taylor, The Projection of Britain: British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919–​1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 4–​7; Taylor, British Propaganda, 227.

Introduction

5

co-​ordinated dissemination of official information. However, while the MOI’s functions on disseminating wartime propaganda were dispersed into the various FO information departments,12 the COI was called to operate as a common service department in Whitehall, thereby leaving the FO to conduct the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign to the rest of the world.13 Existing information officers were entrusted with tasks, in addition to their duties as wartime press attachés, that were often related more to the domain of public relations –​a field as yet unestablished as a profession in Britain.14 Therefore, the information officers were called on to play both roles, often without the required training. Given the particularities of the political crisis in Greece, the process of finding someone with the appropriate qualifications and ‘calibre’ required of a ‘competent’ information officer to take up office in the Athens Embassy was particularly challenging. The information officer’s main task was ‘to project Britain’15 and with this purpose in mind, all means of communication –​print and visual propaganda, broadcasting, sponsorships, cultural exhibits and foreign visits –​were included in its armoury. The subsequent overload of assorted tasks and the lack of a clear pattern of work to follow, led to a degree of confusion among British agents on the ground. The British information officer in Athens, Sidney Hebblethwaite, for example, complained in January 1950 to the FO’s Information Policy Department (IPD) that he ‘got very confused, […] radio one day, visual material another, written material (projection of Britain) the next, then anti-​communist material and so on’.16 In January 1950, with the Greek Civil War finally over, Hebblethwaite again found himself bewildered by his role. He expressed doubt about the message he Sir Robert Marett, Through the Back Door:  An Inside View of Britain’s Overseas Information Services (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1968), 130. 12 Marett, Through the Back Door, 126–​128; J. M. Lee, ‘British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946–​61’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 9/​1 (1998), 112–​134. 13 Taylor, British Propaganda, 232. 14 Jacque L’Etang, Public Relations in Britain: A History of Professional Practice in the 20th Century (New York: Routledge, 2009), 58. 15 TNA: FO 953/​894, PG 11932/​7, Personal Letter, Hebblethwaite to Foote, IPD, 1 December 1950. 16 TNA:  FO  953/​894, PG  11932/​2, Letter, Hebblethwaite to Tahourdin, IPD, 17 January 1950. 11

6

introduction

was being asked to promulgate in Greece –​not least because his experiences there had persuaded him that the entire strategy behind the British government’s ‘projection of Britain’ campaign had from the start been inadequately conceptualized.17 The greatest challenge for Britain’s cultural propaganda strategy was to preserve the country’s moral and political prestige in the world. Reginald Leeper was the British ambassador to Greece from 1943 to 1946, and a fervent advocate of cultural diplomacy. Given the experience he gained from weathering the December 1944 crisis and his central role in the subsequent course of political developments in Greece until the election of 1946, Leeper urged that British propaganda needed to be more carefully targeted and that it should be undertaken by experts. As he reported from Athens, only the ‘[m]ost expertly directed propaganda’ could ‘modify [the] popular view of Great Britain in this country or substantially […] repair the damage our prestige will inevitably sustain’.18 Initial post-​war British foreign propaganda aimed to promote the British values that had been formulated in the interwar period and which had acquired renewed pertinence in the post-​war years. These values centred on the idea of a ‘Third Force’ led by Britain, independent of the United States and based on the ‘spiritual aspects of the Western Union’.19 The promotion of a positive image of Britain in British propaganda followed a parallel yet independent trajectory to another more aggressive post-​war propaganda approach that was embodied in the anti-​communist activity of the Information Research Department (IRD), established in the FO in 1948. By 1951, the FO had concluded that the effectiveness of its ‘positive’ propaganda policy was open to considerable doubt. As the Cold War intensified, an approach that favoured explicitly anti-​communist propaganda was deemed more appropriate. As the ‘positive’ propaganda of the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign diminished, anti-​communist propaganda correspondingly accelerated. What is clearly indicative of this transition 17 1 8 19

TNA: FO 953/​894, PG 11932/​7, Personal Letter, Hebblethwaite to Foote, IPD, 1 December 1950. TNA: FO 930/​476, FP35, Telegram No. 89, Leeper, Athens, to FO, 12 January 1946. Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-​Communist Propaganda 1945–​53:  The Information Research Department (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004), 113.

Introduction

7

is that while in 1946, one of the first directives sent by the IPD to British information officers abroad was titled ‘The Projection of Britain’,20 by 1949, an FO circular issued to the British information officers stressed not so much the ‘ethical and spiritual forces inherent in Western Civilisation’ but a belief in ‘the virtues, practices and values of Western democracy’, in direct and deliberate opposition to Soviet communism.21 That shift in policy, together with the abandonment of the idea of a British-​led Third Force, led to closer Anglo-​American co-​operation in the field of propaganda. In 1950, an FO official remarked that the British information officer in Athens was ‘to be congratulated’22 for achieving closer relations with his American counterpart, particularly since poor alignment in the field of information was a key holdout against what had otherwise been effective co-​operation between other British and US agencies in Greece. Nevertheless, both the British and the Americans recognized the inherent value of maintaining their own independent propaganda campaigns, or in their own words, ‘shoot[ing] at the same target from rather different angles’.23 Owing to its strategic importance for British interests in the eastern Mediterranean and the continuing strength of its domestic communist forces, Greece became a key focal point of the Cold War. Following the swift collapse of wartime allegiances and even before the geopolitical consequences of the end of the Second World War were manifest –​indeed arguably even before the Second World War had come to an end –​Greece became, along with Italy,24 one of the first countries in Europe to experience the dynamics of a new confrontation that has only very recently been defined by scholars as the Cultural Cold War. From 1943 to the early 1950s –​ taking in the period covered by this book –​propaganda, which started (in Defty, Britain, America and Anti-​Communist Propaganda 1945–​53, 29. TNA: FO 953/​481, P8128/​129/​950, Minutes (handwritten), R. L. Speaight, IPD, FO, 24 August 1949; Confidential Letter, Speaight to U.  O.  V. Verney, British Embassy, Paris, 30 August 1949. 22 TNA: FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​1, Minutes, Tahourdin, Speaight, 7 February 1950. 23 TNA: FO 1119/​6, PR 229/​1/​G, FO Circular to British Missions, 12 May 1948. See also Defty, Britain, America and Anti-​Communist Propaganda 1945–​53, 104–​112. 24 Cf. Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff, Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture & Society, 1948–​1958 (Oxford: Berg, 1995).

20 21

8

introduction

the context of Greece) as a supplement to Britain’s foreign policy, became an integral part of Britain’s Cold War strategy. Britain’s post-​war involvement in Greece thus played a major part in the broader evolution of the IRD. Indeed, Christopher Mayhew, who was instrumental in creating the IRD, later acknowledged that it was his experience at the United Nations –​where the British were ‘under heavy attack’ from the Soviets ‘for Colonialism, the Empire, [and their] activities in Greece’ –​that made evident to him the urgent need to establish such a department.25 This book concerns British-​Greek relations during the early post-​war years, primarily with regard to issues relating to publicity policy, cultural activities and foreign cultural rivalry in Greece. Britain’s involvement in Greece’s military and political environment of the period has been well documented in both Greek and international literature. This study goes further by examining in detail the resonance of those events, their impact and the extent to which they influenced political decision-​making on the ground; this is principally done by applying the lenses of information and cultural publicity policy. Little work has been done on this aspect of British policy in Greece, perhaps due to the prevalence of American culture in Greece since mid-​1947, which quickly overshadowed that of all other cultural competitors, including Britain or France. The two linchpins of British propaganda in Greece were the British Council (BC) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) –​two institutions that receive significant attention in this study. While the history of the BC, especially in the early post-​war years, has been the subject of much scholarly research,26 other areas of the British cultural presence in Greece –​such as the particularly important history of the BBC and its unquestioned popularity in Greece –​remain to be told.27 Based almost exclusively on a large and 25 Lyn Smith, ‘Covert British Propaganda: The Information Research Department, 1947–​77’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 9/​1 (1980), 67–​83, 68. Cf. Christopher Mayhew, A War of Words: A Cold War Witness (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 121. 26 Cf. Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018). 27 The author is currently writing a history of the BBC Greek section (1939–​2005), commissioned by Palgrave Macmillan.

Introduction

9

significant collection of archival material –​much of it brought to light here for the first time –​this book explores British information and cultural policy with regard to Greece during the formative early Cold War years. While much of this policy has been, until now, only partially understood (or indeed wholly unknown), this book provides new evidence and, in some cases, challenges unsubstantiated and undocumented speculations about British cultural presentation in Greece during the period in question. It also demonstrates in detail how, as early as 1945, Britain became the first country to formulate a co-​ordinated cultural response to communist propaganda.28 Greece was subject to a number of activities designed to influence the hearts and minds of its people and which reached all aspects of everyday life, including activities targeting post-​war reconstruction, health and welfare services and broadcasting as well as intellectual, artistic and cultural life. The BC and the BBC were perennial conduits for publicizing British ‘life and thought’. The Athens branch of the BC was one of the first to resume activities after the Second World War and was even upgraded –​at least for its first few critical years –​to a Grade I post. It collaborated closely with the Information Department of the British Embassy Athens and became actively involved in key sectors of post-​war Greek life, including education, the dissemination of English language, the establishment of chairs of English studies at the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (hereafter, University of Athens) and the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (hereafter, University of Thessaloniki), the promotion of British political thought and social welfare policies, reconstruction, health, law and public administration. The BBC’s influence in Greece, in effect, remained Britain’s ‘most powerful weapon’29 in the region, despite intense American competition and influence in the Greek information spheres. This Anglo-​American competition is evident when looking to the British efforts to influence the post-​war reorganization of Greece’s National Broadcasting Foundation 28 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-​Communist Propaganda 1945–​53,  26–​52. 29 TNA: FO 953/​891, PG 11915/​2, Minutes, Baker, 14 April 1950; Braslow, 17 April 1950; Eland, 17 April 1950; Ackland, 18 April 1950.

10

introduction

(ΕΙR) and in interest shown by the British in the US radio activities in Thessaloniki and Cyprus. The Americans, for their part, used film publicity as ‘their main propaganda arm in Greece’30 –​but here too the British competed for their own share of influence. In the early 1940s, Britain surpassed the US in terms of its propaganda and national projection activities.31 However, due to the major financial crisis facing Britain, which rendered it unable to sustain the costs of its overstretched worldwide commitments, Britain ceded its dominant position in Greece to the US in March 1947 and considerably reduced its publicity activity in the region. Numerous complaints by British information officers about the insufficient supply of publicity material, lack of staff and limited resources to develop and expand British cultural activities are indicative of the consequences of that process of strategic disengagement. In May 1947, BC representative J. C. S. Runciman (also known as Steven Runciman) gave voice to this challenge, stating that ‘our only danger from foreign rivalry is of a loss of prestige owing to the greater expenditure of other nations’.32 The more ‘glamorous projection of the American way of life’33 proved unchallengeable in a country that had already been placed under the Marshall Plan. The internationalization of the Greek crisis,34 caused by the hardening of Cold War tensions, served once more –​as in the case of the founding of the IRD –​as a pretext for accelerating the establishment of the US propaganda machine. In the face of the rapidly escalating ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, American policymakers consciously 30 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31 December 1948’. 31 Defty, Britain, America and Anti-​ Communist Propaganda 1945–​ 53; John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944–​ 49 (Leicester:  Leicester University Press, 1993); Taylor, British Propaganda; Tony Shaw, ‘Britain and the Cultural Cold War’, Contemporary British History 19/​2 ( June 2005), 109–​115. 32 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947. 33 TNA: FO 953/​29, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31 March 1947’. 34 Co-​ordinated action by the FO and the British Embassy in Greece led to a greater willingness on the part of the British press to see the Greek issue as an episode of the growing Cold War estrangement (see Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 251).

Introduction

11

emphasized the Greek case in order to build public support for the US State Department’s strategic priorities at home and abroad. Throughout policy discussions regarding the most effective public relations strategy to accompany the Truman Doctrine, the situation in Greece presented American policymakers ‘with [the] best possible occasion to tell [the] story that has to be told’.35 Greece was symbolically referred to as the birthplace of democracy and thus served rhetorically to underpin the Truman Doctrine as a defence of democracy against autocracy (an ironic trope given that it was generally acknowledged that the then royalist Greek government was anything but democratic). Moreover, this provided American policymakers with the opportunity to demonstrate the value of American aid, as shown by their efforts to support an economy on the verge of collapse in the wider context of the European economic crisis. Greece’s position was also emphasized by members of the US State Department throughout their efforts to formulate a public relations strategy aimed at selling the Marshall Plan to a reluctant Congress and an indifferent American public. The resulting shift in American public opinion in regard to the extension of foreign aid was remarkable. In May 1947, the Marshall Plan bill passed, ushering in a new rhetoric and language: that of the Cold War. As Justin Hart observed, this was ‘the first time that the State Department called on the domestic wing of its public diplomacy shop to sell the politics of [the] Cold War’, and it led to the consolidation of the first phase of American post-​war public diplomacy.36 In January 1948, Congress passed Public Law 80-​402 –​typically known as the Smith-​Mundt Act –​which institutionalized US public diplomacy as a coherent structure to wage the Cold War’s ideological battle. In so doing, this act authorized the main thrust of the US information and cultural programme. As C. F. A. Warner, assistant undersecretary for foreign affairs for northern and southern Europe, observed, the US publicity machine abroad was ‘only beginning to get underway’ in 1948.37 British officials noted that after a clumsy start, American publicity and cultural policy from 1948 onwards was presented in a far more 3 5 36 37

Francis Russell, 28 February 1947, quoted in Hart, Empire of Ideas, 121, footnote 32. Hart, Empire of Ideas, 122–​123. The creation of the United States Information Agency marked the conclusion of the first phase (see Hart, 198). TNA: FO 1110/​128, ‘Secret Memo by C. F. A. Warner’, 6 October 1948.

12

introduction

spectacular way than that of its British predecessor. Moreover, American mass culture –​in which the potency of the image was a key component –​ had generally proved to be highly attractive to international audiences, especially those whose previous understanding of the world had relied heavily on print.38 In the practice of public diplomacy, the US post-​war momentum found a convenient platform for national promotion around the world. The ideology of US exceptionalism and its world mission –​which had, in effect, existed before the Second World War –​now stepped strongly into the post-​war limelight.39 Conversely, for the British government, inadequate funding limited its capacity to further its cultural propaganda agenda; the BC was, to this end, the first to suffer.40 In the battle for hearts and minds, the immediacy and directness of publicity was chosen at the expense of long-​term cultural activity. The IRD was the main bearer of British Cold War propaganda –​not the FO’s Cultural Relations Department (CRD).41 British cultural programmes were supplanted by information programmes. However, the issue of prestige remained a central theme within the rhetoric of British Cold War propaganda. In December 1951, an FO memorandum on British information and propaganda in the Cold War observed that ‘the “cold war” […] is not solely a conflict between two sets of ideas [East and West]. Power enters into it and a third factor is that intangible product of power and ideas which is called prestige.’42 This book relies heavily on institutional reports from the FO and the archives of the IRD, the BC and the BBC, juxtaposed with Greek sources where possible. Although the opening of the IRD archives has led to the publication of many valuable studies, which have shed a considerable light on IRD work, a number of substantial documents remain inaccessible. Nevertheless, though the IRD files concerning liaisons between Britain and Greece, as well as other countries, have been rigorously vetted (often 38 Cf. Victoria de Grazia, ‘Mass Culture and Sovereignty: The American Challenge to European Cinemas, 1920–​1960’, Journal of Modern History 61/​6 (March 1989), 53–​87,  84. 39 For an important analysis of the origins of US public diplomacy, see Hart, Empire of Ideas. 40 The Athens branch of the BC entered a state of decline in November 1947. 41 Lee, ‘British Cultural Diplomacy’, 112, 115. 42 Quoted in Taylor, British Propaganda, 227.

Introduction

13

remaining classified for an indefinite duration), the reports and the briefings from staff in various FO information departments and in the British Embassy Athens have not been so rigorously screened. These reports and briefings were produced by staff in various FO information and cultural relations departments and comprise the British Embassy and the BC correspondence with the FO and with its staff in Greece, in addition to the correspondence between the BBC and the FO. These documents provide exhaustive information on every aspect of British information, publicity and cultural policy in Greece. Additionally, they have made it possible to study the editorial output sent to Greece by the FO and other state departments and institutions and to investigate the local uses of such material, the resources that were made available for anti-​communist activities in Greece and the significance attached by official decision-​makers to such actions. Moreover, the information liaison arrangements developed between the British Embassy Athens and various Greek agencies (official and private), the press, broadcasters, film publicists and more have shed new light on the events of the period, clarifying matters never before subjected to scholarly investigation. Apart from their value as detailed descriptions of activities covering the whole of Greece in the time period covered here, they are also important sources of statistical data that would otherwise be quite scarce, incomplete or missing altogether in Greek records. Further, it has been thought preferable to retain –​as far as possible –​the voices of the sources in order to provide the reader with an authentic echo (as much as is possible) of the political climate of the time. In addition to demonstrating the volume of qualitative and quantitative evidence, the sources provide a better understanding of the choices faced by both the British and the Greeks as well as showing the degree of willingness of the Greek public to accept and absorb foreign information and cultural inflows. British officials were tasked with identifying Greece’s requirements for post-​war reconstruction and the ways in which the promotion of British trade interests and cultural values could most effectively be carried out. In short, the reports issued as part of the information liaison arrangements constitute a substantial body of multilayered evidence covering a wide range of decisions and activities in the field of information transfer and culture in Greece during 1943–​1950.

14

introduction

Given the fact that so much of the evidence cited in this book is drawn from official sources, it behoves the historian to consider not only what these illuminate about the past, but also what they may obscure. In other words, official sources such as these, as well as providing additional depth and breadth to our existing knowledge, are subject to epistemological limitations. All historical records contain, implicitly or explicitly, individual or institutional internalized prejudice that may, to some degree, distort the lived realities as they existed locally. Many records reflect the expectations of their writers –​even perhaps the writers’ misinterpretations and self-​deceptions about what they held to be true or possible on the ground. In the context of the documents in question, the primarily British authors’ own individual conceptions are inevitably shaped by their experience of observing Greece and the Greeks from the outside –​even if they were stationed in the country itself and were in regular communication with its inhabitants. In addition, the ‘British’ position on any given issue was not always consistent; in some instances, the perceptions of British officials in London differed vastly from those in stationed in Greece. What is more, some of the policy decisions taken in London ran counter to recommendations made by British officials in Athens. The best a historian can do in such circumstances is be aware of the inflections and tensions in the records and –​where possible –​triangulate the evidence with a range of other sources. In order to broaden the range of sources, I have attempted to draw on public and private Greek archives as well as the Greek press. The goal was to provide a Greek counterbalance, however slight, to the weight of British official sources. Similar attempts were made to broaden the British sources and (where possible) to interrogate further any material that might lie in the private correspondence or in the personal diaries of the key figures, thereby exposing nuances, doubts or forms of understanding that were hidden from official records. This book deals with a wide range of activities undertaken in the name of British public diplomacy, many of which relate to the post-​war reconstruction of Greece. However, it cannot claim to be exhaustive; more specific studies regarding a number of those diverse activities remain to be undertaken. Thus, at this stage of our knowledge, it is practically impossible to fully account for and understand the entire nature and impact of British

15

Introduction

Cold War propaganda in Greece. However, the lengthy and extremely detailed reports written by the British provide us with an essential starting point in the longer-​term project of assessing the power and effects of that impact. This study does not end here; further questions remain to be answered in ongoing investigations. Like any study that deals with a novel subject area, it suffers from a paucity of existing historical literature on which to draw and with which to engage. However, this book seeks to begin that process and, in so doing, set new challenges for historians to contend with, now and into the future. ◊ ◊ ◊ ◊ The book is divided into four chapters. Chapter 1 considers the post-​war reorganization of the British government’s overseas information and publicity services, in particular the British Information Service (BIS) in Greece. The objective of this reorganization was to bring the existing BIS –​inherited from the MOI and the Political Intelligence Department (PID)  –​into closer alignment with the aims and activities of the FO. In so doing, the British information structure in Greece would be more closely linked with policy and therefore could be used more effectively to support the immediate objectives of the British government abroad. This reorganizational operation involved discussions with various agencies on a wide range of topics. For one, it was necessary to understand the demarcation of the functions of the FO’s CRD and those of the BC. Additionally, dialogues with the BBC considered the organization, nature and content of the news outlet’s foreign services. Discussions were held with the British Board of Trade and the Travel Association concerning the form and future development of trade and tourist publicity. Finally, conversations took place with the news agencies, press, publishers, film companies and private organizations that disseminated British information abroad; these consultations focused on clarifying each agency’s relationship with the FO. In January 1948, when the British government adopted its new foreign publicity strategy, which was designed to ‘check the inroads of communism’,43 the IRD became the co-​ordinator of Britain’s Cold War 43 TNA: CAB 129/​23, ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy’, 4 January 1948.

16

introduction

propaganda publicity policy. Moreover, the British government by this time was less concerned with the rather vague ‘projection of Britain’ campaign, based on printed matter –​previously the main conduit of propaganda. Its focus shifted more to broadcast media and other means of communication and to developing contacts with prominent opinion formers, politicians and officials. Chapter 2 deals with the various reports prepared by British officials –​ those prepared on a monthly or quarterly cycle as well as those which followed specific tours in the provinces. These reports were normally written in a standardized fashion and were in general accordance with the instructions sent to missions abroad; this would ensure that the information departments of the FO, the COI and the BBC received the material they each required. The reports contained assessments of local conditions as well as practical and strategic recommendations for future activities, as proposed by the information officers. These were then sent to London, following approval by the British ambassador. They provided detailed descriptions of the developments of each of the media employed (press, radio, visual material, films, visitors and lecturers, commercial publicity, books and periodicals, information centres and libraries) and the uses made of them by British officials and other foreign powers. These information reports were integrated into the regular political and economic communications from British missions in Greece. From these reports, a wealth of valuable material emerges that vividly describes and provides extensive contemporary analyses of the full range of British publicity employed in Greece –​in addition to including assessments of their effectiveness. Chapter 2 also traces the implementation of the new British publicity policy launched in Greece in January 1948. The new policy greatly altered the work of the FO IDs, which until then were largely designed to carry out the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign in the long term. Initially, their work consisted mainly of sending out publicity guidance that reflected the new policy, for use in the daily news. Gradually, their work switched from projecting Britain in general to projecting British views, plans and achievements cast in sharp contrast to those of communism and its outcomes. When the IRD initiated this strategy, the Italian election of April 1948 were given top priority. In addition to the COI publications and officially

Introduction

17

published digests distributed throughout Greece to promote Britain’s progress in economics, politics, industry, labour relations and social welfare, the dissemination of IRD material in Greece was also far-​reaching. As the British information officer observed in December 1948, IRD materials ‘served a most useful purpose in orientating people on the right lines on current issues’; as such, it was expressed that ‘the whole problem of anti-​ communism, as far as the Greek press […] [is] concerned, […] [is] largely an academic one’.44 Chapter 3 tells the story of the British interest –​after 1929 –​in the development of Greek broadcasting and the involvement of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company Ltd in establishing the country’s first radio station. It follows British wartime publicity in Greece until the latter’s liberation from Nazi occupation in October 1944, focusing in particular on the establishment of the BBC Greek section in September 1939, immediately after the declaration of the Second World War, and its functioning during that war and the Greek Civil War. This chapter also includes new evidence unearthed in regard to the establishment of the Ethniko Idryma Radiofonias (EIR [National Radio Foundation]) in June 1945 and the role that the British played in its legal foundation. This is coupled with details of the Greek government’s efforts to intervene in the EIR’s operations. The secondment of a BBC engineer as a technical director to the EIR in July 1948 and the broader interest Britain manifested in the EIR’s formative years clearly demonstrate Britain’s close involvement with Greek radio broadcasting during a crucial political period. At the same time, the crisis in Cyprus threatened to expose Britain’s foreign policy towards the island to public criticism in Greece, thereby further underlining the importance for Britain to maintain a degree of control over Greek broadcasting media. Chapter 4 focuses mainly on British educational and cultural activities in Greece. In 1945, the re-​establishment of the BC’s Athens branch –​in which Reginald Leeper played a key role –​was regarded as a key defence against the cultural activities of rival foreign agencies that reactivated in Greece after the war. It was generally admitted that the success of the BC’s 44 TNA: FO 1110/​30, PR 1273, Secret Letter, A. G. R. Rouse to Ralph Murray, FO, 13 December 1948.

18

introduction

endeavour would depend largely on the appointment of appropriate staff, which ultimately proved to be a difficult process. Apart from the BC’s core objectives –​to project British institutions and to promote the English language –​the BC also took a particular interest in the reorganization of Greek state secondary schools and reform of the Greek educational system. In this sense, three issues were interconnected: the renewal of the Byron professorship and the creation of new university chairs in Athens and Thessaloniki; the proposal that a competent person be sent from Britain –​ under the auspices of the FO –​to study the future of English teaching in conjunction with the Greek Ministry of Education; and the provision of British assistance in the reorganization of the University of Athens. The chapter discusses the establishment of chairs in English language and history and the founding of the Department of English Language and Literature all of which ran in parallel to efforts on the part of the Americans and the French to set up their own chairs at Greek universities. Granting scholarships had always been one of the most effective aspects of the BC’s work. For example, given the BC’s interest in urban planning during Greece’s post-​war reconstruction phase, the body subsequently granted scholarships to Greek architects –​many of whom, in addition to their academic careers, were later employed as state officials in major public works. Several proposals for cultural activities were also put forward in 1945, to be undertaken by the BC in Greece. They included a project to establish a branch of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (also known as Chatham House) in Athens and a modern hospital and nurse training centre in Thessaloniki. The BC also expressed interest in providing financial support to the British School at Athens. Additionally, the BC urged the speedy conclusion of the Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention, given the BC’s unclear status in Greece, which hampered the success of its work. This was especially pertinent given that the country had settled into a more peaceful state following the end of the civil war. Yet, the BC’s main focus remained on educational matters. The diffusion of British scientific, technological and industrial institutions in Greece –​which had begun in the interwar years –​was to continue after the Second World War. This diffusion was meant to meet the intense need for relief work, improve health care, solve the acute food crisis and deal with other pressing needs generated by reconstruction. Like most countries

Introduction

19

after the Second World War, Greece urgently needed to rebuild and reorganize almost all of its public services, most notably the Greek public health system. The US and the British anti-​malaria campaigns, for example, had an enormous impact in the propaganda space, though public health proved to be yet another field of competition between Britain and other countries, especially the US. The scale of Britain’s cultural investment in Greece reached new heights in the immediate post-​war period. This book explains the disproportionate attention bestowed on Greece by the British and demonstrates the ways in which the British-​Greek relationship was formulated in the aftermath of the Second World War. It also argues that the case of Greece can be highly indicative of Britain’s changing status as a world player and its declining post-​war position as a major power. In April 1945, Britain –​from the point of view of its own strategic interests –​saw itself as the sole rescuer of Greece, having the unique ability get the country out of its ‘great many years of chaos, impotence and distress’.45 Britain’s government set this task as an experiment; it needed to succeed in order to secure Britain’s role as moral leader in an uncertain post-​war world. On the cultural and intellectual front, as Kenneth Johnstone estimated, Britain was closer to Greece’s needs than the other two allies: the US and Russia. As Johnstone wrote: Russia, in spite of the immense interest of her social, political and economic experiment, differs too widely both in her problems and in her mentality to have much to offer to Greece; while America, though interested platonically in Greece and a source of inexhaustible material supply, cannot really understand or help the Greeks in their present situation.46

Of course, the next few years would prove to capsize this view. Russia stood as an enemy, while Britain withdrew into the shadows of the US. By early 1950, the British position in Greece, as vividly described by Hebblethwaite, was ‘to keep our heads above water’.47 Until the late 1940s, 45 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, ‘British Council Work in Greece: 1945/​6’, 7 March 1945. 46 Ibid. 47 TNA:  FO  953/​894, PG  11932/​7, Personal and Confidential Letter, Foote to Hebblethwaite, 11 December, 1950; PG  11932/​7A, Personal and Confidential Letter, Hebblethwaite to Foote, 10 February 1951.

20

introduction

British foreign policy continued to experiment with different formulas, which in many cases proved unsuccessful. With regard to Greece, British information work lacked ‘a reasonable definition’48 of its short-​and long-​ term purposes. Hebblethwaite noted in December 1950 that a more concrete information policy was urgently needed in order to establish future policies and activities on firmer, evidence-​based grounds, rather than clinging to ‘a blind faith’ in the ongoing formulas.49 British publicity and cultural policy, however, while designed to project a national image abroad of a confident country in rapid recovery from the wreckage of war, was not in line with the reality on the ground. Ultimately, the country proved unable to muster the resources it needed to respond to the ensuing challenges. Britain was viewed as fighting ‘a losing battle’,50 as demonstrated so clearly by the Suez crisis only a few years later.51

48 TNA: FO 953/​894, PG 11932/​7, Personal Letter, Hebblethwaite to Foote, IPD, 1 December 1950. 49 Ibid. 50 Taylor, British Propaganda, 229. 51 James R. Vaughan, ‘“A Certain Idea of Britain”: British Cultural Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1945–​57’, Contemporary British History 19/​2 ( June 2005), 151–​168; Taylor, British Propaganda, 228.

Chapter 1

Post-​War British Information and Publicity Policy in Greece

By 1943, though the war against the Axis powers continued on, the process of post-​war planning by the British Foreign Office (FO) had already begun. The resistance movement in Greece –​led predominantly by republicans and the political left, and largely supported by a British government anxious to secure victory against the same foe –​became politically more active and demanded a greater share of the fruits of victory. These demands, however, would soon come into conflict with the British plans to restore an unpopular Greek monarchy as the cornerstone of Greece’s post-​war settlement. In anticipation of the post-​war political challenges and with the goal of engineering consent to post-​war British policy objectives both at home and abroad, the FO developed an information management strategy. The strategy focused on centralizing control over the flow of information, presenting British policy to the public in the most favourable ways and measuring the effectiveness of the presentation and dissemination of information on the ground. In Greece, the existing extensive network of the wartime British Information Service (BIS)1 provided a secure filter for controlling information and propaganda; this ultimately proved helpful in the early post-​war years. This chapter recounts and analyses the transition process that the BIS underwent in Greece from 1943 up to the first post-​war Greek election at the end of March 1946. In particular, this chapter looks to the priorities, successes and failures of this transition process. During the war, the British Allied Information Service (AIS) (subsequently the Anglo-​Greek Information Service (AGIS)) –​a political warfare mechanism –​covered all the functions of a large-​scale press attaché 1

Marett, Through the Back Door,  78–​85.

22

chapter 1

in most principal towns in Greece. The AIS operated under the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and depended financially on the PWE and the War Office. In liberated Greece, British publicity services continued to function post war on ‘a larger scale than in any other European country except Italy’.2 It seemed apparent that British troops and advisors would remain in Greece for a considerable time. Furthermore, the various British technical missions assisting the Greek reconstruction effort would, in effect, exercise wide authority over the country’s politics and administration. It was intended that the policies of these missions be understood by the Greek public, based on ‘much careful explanation’.3 The FO’s objective was to co-​ ordinate more closely with the AIS and use it more effectively to support British foreign policy in Greece. Given that crucial political developments were expected following the liberation of Greece, Reginald Leeper, British ambassador to Greece, preferred that the transfer of responsibilities be slow and that the core duties of the AGIS would remain until the time was right. The ‘extraordinary effect’ of the bloody events of December 1944 in Athens on British and world public opinion became a key indicator of the important role that the British Embassy’s Information Department would need to play as a major publicity conduit in Greece to prevent the recurrence of similar unfortunate events in the future.4 This led the FO to prioritize the efficiency of the Embassy’s Information Department. British policy in liberated Greece imposed special responsibilities on the Embassy’s Information Department, which not only had to conduct the usual department functions more intensively than in other countries of similar size, but also was required to accept additional obligations. Leeper expected that the ID would undertake work that was traditionally the function of the Greek Ministry of Press and the Greek National Broadcasting Foundation 2 3 4

TNA: FO 930/​426, FP 47/​1/​907, Summary of a Ministry of Information (MOI) paper on the Balkans, Oswald Scott, MOI, to Alan Dudley, FO, 9 January 1946. See more in footnote 9, Chapter 1. TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, Overseas and Emergency Publicity Expenditure Committee (OEPEC), ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st February-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946.

Post-​War Information and Publicity Policy

23

(ΕΙR) –​both of which were in their infancy. Moreover, it was decided that the work of the British Embassy and the British Council (BC) in Greece should be more closely aligned; priority would be given to the information programmes of the Embassy, while cultural programmes were expected to be more supportive in nature. Thus, it was proposed that the BC should restrict its activities to the fields of education and culture and that broader activities would be undertaken by the Embassy’s Information Department. In short, the wartime information and publicity machinery remained very much in effect until the Greek election in March 1946; the very first information officer assumed his duties following the election. He, together with his staff, would form ‘the strong team’ that Britain needed in Athens to face the ‘difficult months ahead’.5

Planning ahead: British propaganda in Greece and the creation of the Greek Ministry of Information By mid-​1943, questions regarding post-​war reconstruction  –​including those involving British publicity and information services in Greece6 –​ were firmly on the British political agenda. Additionally, post-​war policy considerations began to receive the primary attentions of the FO.7 Britain’s information service in Greece was the largest and the most 5 6 7

See footnote 99, Chapter 1. TNA: FO 930/​273, Ministry of Information, FP1/​306, Part A, ‘Organisation in Liberated Greece’, June 1944–​August 1945. On the conflict between the FO and the Special Operations Executive (SOE) on Greece, see: Phyllis Auty and Richard Clogg, eds, British Policy towards Wartime Resistance in Yugoslavia and Greece (London: MacMillan, 1975); Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-​East Europe in the Second World War (London: MacMillan, 1976); Richard Clogg, ‘The Special Operations Executive in Greece’, in J. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 1940s: A Nation in Crisis (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1981), 102–​118; Procopis Papastratis, British Policy towards Greece during the Second World War, 1941–​1944 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 133–​143.

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high-​powered of all its missions abroad, with the exception of Italy, Cairo and Singapore.8 The FO considered Greece and Italy as the two countries on the continent to which ‘the highest priority should be given’.9 For the FO, the restoration of the Greek monarchy –​despite its unpopularity with the local population –​remained a key policy objective. As in the pre-​war period, the Greek king continued to be regarded as a safeguard for British strategic interests in the eastern Mediterranean. In April 1943, the Greek king and his government-​in-​exile under Emanuel Tsouderos left London10 for Cairo. Their arrival occurred in the midst of two serious crises in Egypt: in March with politically motivated unrest within the Greek armed forces in the Middle East and in August when the demands of the three main Greek resistance organizations –​the Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM [National Liberation Front]), the Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (EDES [National Republican Greek League]) and the Ethniki Kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosi [National and Social Liberation] –​were rebuffed by the Greek government-​in-​exile with the support of the British.11 In relation to the latter, a delegation consisting of key members of the three resistance organizations was sent to Cairo with the goals of achieving recognition of their status as part of the Greek armed forces and obtaining an unequivocal statement from the king that he would not return to Greece prior to the direction of a plebiscite. With the support of the British, however, the king refused to pledge himself 8 TNA:  FO  930/​ 441, P28/​ 222, Monthly Statement of Overseas Personnel, 1 May 1946. 9 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3062, Letter, William H. Montagu-​Pollock to Johnstone, 28 July 1945. In May 1945, in a politically significant text, Montagu-​Pollock analysed the role of cultural policy with respect to Britain’s position after the Second World War. For the FO directive regarding the activity of the BC in Greece and Italy, see D. W. Ellwood, ‘“Showing the World What It Owed to Britain”: Foreign Policy and “Cultural Propaganda”, 1935–​1945’, in N. Pronay and D. W. Spring, eds, Propaganda, Politics and Film (London:  The Macmillan Press, 1982), 50–​73, 72, footnote 62. It is not accidental that there were strong communist parties in both these countries (cf. David Stafford, Mission Accomplished:  SOE and Italy, 1943–​ 1945 (London: Vintage Books, 2012), 258–​259. 10 Their residence in London lasted from 29 September 1941 to 15 April 1943. 11 Papastratis, British Policy, 74–​85, 104–​112.

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to these demands. This widened the gap between the resistance groups and the government-​in-​exile, the king and the British authorities even more.12 In this charged atmosphere, armed clashes broke out between the Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (ELAS [National People’s Liberation Army]), the military branch of the EAM, and the EDES in the early autumn of 1943. Moreover, the British cut off all supplies to the ELAS and modified their policy towards EAM/​ELAS, enforcing a complete break with its leadership. At the same time, the British attempted to win over the so-​called moderates in Greece.13 Matters relating to Greek information services had originally been assigned to Andreas (André) Michalopoulos, the Greek minister of information.14 However, on 25 May 1943, soon after the departure of the Tsouderos government for Cairo in April that year, Michalopoulos resigned and decided to remain in London. Following the formation of the George Papandreou government on 25 May 1944, George Kartalis took on the role of the Greek press and information minister from 8 June to 23 October 1944. The Papandreou government remained in Cairo until the liberation of Greece on 18 October 1944 and then returned to Greece as government of ‘national unity’. For more than a year –​from the E. C. W. Myers, Greek Entanglement (London: Hart-​Davis, 1955), 236–​265; Auty and Clogg, British Policy, 136–​166; J. L. Hondros, Occupation and Resistance: The Greek Agony, 1941–​1944 (New York:  Pella, 1983), 163–​169; Papastratis, British Policy, 104–​112. 13 Papastratis, British Policy, 221. 14 Andreas Michalopoulos studied law at Oxford and later became a barrister. He actively collaborated with the Anglo-​Hellenic League; see George Angeloglou, This is London, Good Evening/​Edo Londino, Kalispera sas: The Story of the Greek Section of the BBC, 1939–​1957 (Athens: Efstathiadis Group, 2003) 133–​136. He was private secretary to Eleftherios Venizelos (1920–​1923), minister of information of the exiled Greek government (1941–​1943) and liaison between the Greek government and British and American secret services; see André Michalopoulos, Greek Fire (London: Michael Joseph, 1943); see also Petros St. Makris-​Staikos, ‘Ο Άγγλος Πρόξενος’. Ο υποπλοίαρχος Noël C. Rees και οι βρετανικές μυστικές υπηρεσίες Ελλάδα-​ Μέση Ανατολή 1939–​1944 [‘The British Consul’. Lieutenant Noël C. Rees and the British Secret Services Greece-​Middle East 1939–​1944] (Athens:  Okeanida, 2011), 82. 12

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resignation of Michalopoulos to the appointment of Kartalis as minister in June 1944 –​the bulk of Greek news arrived through BIS and Embassy channels. Issues pertaining to information services were largely managed by the Hellenic Information Service –​an embryonic Greek ministry of information, much criticized for incompetence. As the ministry began to gain legitimacy, Kartalis was anxious to take control of issuing all Greek news. With a view to laying ‘the foundations of a close and continuing collaboration’15 between the Greek Ministry of Information and the BIS, Kartalis met Leeper in early June 1944. At this meeting, Kartalis asked for direct and immediate access to all British information, intelligence and propaganda material (including reports, photographs and underground and official press) that concerned Greece or came from Greece, in order to make use of the material deemed suitable for Greek propaganda work. In an aide-​memoire, Kartalis stated that the existing system was not satisfactory and should be discontinued. Up to this point, all news-​related regulations and censorship issues were dealt with by the BIS without any collaboration with the Greek government. Kartalis suggested that a representative be appointed by the Greek Ministry of Information to work with the British authorities on a revision of the existing restrictions on reporting of Greek affairs. He put forth that the Greek Ministry of Information was best placed to assess the advisability of any such restrictions or other censorship. Kartalis concluded that ‘all propaganda directed towards Greece and touching purely Greek affairs (leaflets, broadcasts, etc.) should not be released without previous agreement with the [Greek] Ministry’.16 However, he reassured the British services that among the Greek government’s main priorities were issues of military security, secrecy and confidentiality regarding the actions of the Greek Ministry of Information and that it was in the Greek government’s best interests to be in line with British objectives. Broadcasting issues were also raised in Kartalis’ aide-​memoire (this is discussed further in Chapter 3).17

1 5 16 17

TNA: FO 930/​273, Ref. No. 2598, ‘Aide-​Memoire’, Kartalis to Leeper, 13 June 1944. Ibid. Ibid.

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As the points raised in Kartalis’ aide-​memoire concerned a number of British departments, it was sent to the Office of the Resident Minister, the British Embassy to Egypt, the Political Warfare Bureau (PWB) (Lieutenant Colonel K. Johnstone and Major Edward Malan), the Ministry of Information, Middle East (MIME) (Curteis N. Ryan), Force 133, the Anglo-​Egyptian Censorship, the Political Intelligence Centre and the Inter-​ Services Liaison Department.18 A special meeting chaired by Leeper was held on 6 July 1944 at the Office of the Resident Minister to discuss the ‘problems’ raised by Kartalis’ aide-​memoire. Before the meeting, Leeper distributed a specially drafted discussion paper, entitled ‘Greek Propaganda and the Greek Ministry for Information’, in which he analysed some of issues brought up in the aide-​memoire and presented his own recommendations. ‘For convenience sake’, this paper, not Kartalis’ aide-​memoire, formed the main basis for discussion at the meeting.19 Four possible courses of action, as set out by Leeper’s discussion paper, were covered at the meeting. The first possible action was that political and guerrilla intelligence gathered regarding Greece should be passed along directly, unvetted, by British intelligence departments to the Greek Ministry of Information. In order to enact this, new security arrangements would be required. The second option was that all liaison should –​as previously –​be channelled through the PWB, which from a security point of view, would then provide rapid clearance of all intelligence about Greece and promptly pass it along to the Greek Ministry of Information, who would in turn select for release whatever they considered suitable. Leeper favoured this option. The third option was that the PWB should retain some control over the selection of releases and merely pass to the Greek Ministry of Information for formal release such material as they approved. The final option was the setting up of a separate body to perform the function of security vetting. This final option was preferred by the PWB, which considered the second 18

This was the cover name of the British Secret Intelligence Service Section 6 (MI6) for operations in occupied Europe. 19 TNA: FO 930/​273, Secret, Major Wallace, British Embassy to Greece, Cairo, 28 June 1944. Major David John Wallace, attd. King’s Royal Rifle Corps, SOE, lost his life in August 1944 while attached as an observer to the 10th Greek Division, a national resistance force fighting against the Germans.

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option (Leeper’s preference) to be ‘mechanically unsound’ –​as it would place on them the burden of responsibility for the security of a large volume of material that they had neither the time nor resources to deal with.20 The PWB was persuaded that British codes and cyphers would be endangered by the release of such great volumes of raw, ‘unparaphrased’ intelligence to the Greeks. The PWB therefore strongly recommended that a small body be set up to represent all the military intelligence bodies (including the Inter-​Services Liaison Department, Force 133 and MI14 –​Security Intelligence Service, Section 14) that produced the material. This body would then be tasked with ensuring that large amounts of security-​vetted information could be made available to the Greek government.21 However, Curteis N. Ryan22 –​controller of MIME and advisor to the resident minister on publicity and information matters –​stated that it was not part of the PWB’s duty to give out news. He also thought it inadvisable to allow a Greek representative to attend meetings of the resident minister’s Censorship Stops Committee, as it might create ‘an awkward precedent’. Ryan proposed that the Greek Ministry of Information should have ‘one officer, and one only’ to contact. He further suggested that the officer in question should be responsible for the preliminary co-​ordination of material with all the British departments concerned. This officer should be located at the British Embassy to Greece and should be either a member of the Embassy’s staff or closely associated with it.23

20 TNA: FO 930/​273, ‘Greek Propaganda and the Greek Ministry for Information’, Appendix A: Comment by the PWB on Paper by HM Ambassador to Greece, n.d. 21 Ibid. 22 Curteis  N. Ryan was appointed in April 1943 as controller of the Ministry of Information’s services in the Middle East to maintain liaison with the minister of state, Casey, as the local controller of the ministry (Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III: The War of Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970), 526). 23 TNA: FO 930/​273, ‘Greek Propaganda and Greek Ministry of Information’, Ryan to Major Wallace, n.d.

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The appointment of a press attaché at the British Embassy to Greece Ryan had felt ‘for some time’ that a press attaché should be appointed to the British Embassy to Greece ‘in order to secure proper liaison and planning with PWE (now PWB) and for the purpose of giving out the British angle on the complications of the Greek situation in Egypt’.24 With this reasoning, immediately after the 6 July 1944 special meeting, he prepared a note entitled ‘Appointment of Press Attaché to the British Embassy to Greece’.25 On the basis of Ryan’s note, it was unanimously agreed at the Ministry of Information (MOI) that a press attaché was needed whose duties, inter alia, would be to co-​ordinate with the various British service departments regarding news about Greece that could be passed on to the Greek Ministry of Information for issue. Kenneth G. Grubb, controller of the MOI Overseas Division, suggested that once the British Embassy had left Cairo for Athens and the press attaché came into the European jurisdiction, the MOI could get involved.26 Leeper, however, was anxious to delay this development, as the absence of such an officer undoubtedly assisted him in controlling the dissemination of news. The British MOI saw many advantages to making an early appointment of the press attaché, but it was ‘clearly important that [such a person] be most carefully selected’.27 Oswald A. Scott, director of the European Division of the MOI, suggested to A. J. Henderson, head of the MOI Balkan section, that he should cast the net wider for appropriately qualified candidates.28 At least sixteen candidates were proposed, all with a connection to Greece in one way or another. Some had a partial knowledge of modern Greek or had served during the war with the British information services in Cairo, with the Intelligence Corps and the SOE, and some were AGIS agents or members 24 TNA: FO 930/​273, Note by Controller, MIME, ‘Appointment of Press Attaché to the British Embassy to Greece’, 8 July 1944. 25 Ibid. 26 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Grubb to D. A. Routh, MOI, 24 July 1944. 27 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Routh to Grubb, Grubb to Routh, 24 July 1944. 28 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Henderson to Scott, 27 July 1944.

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of British cultural institutes in Greece before the war.29 The search for likely 29 David Wallace of the Press Office in Athens in 1940, which was run mainly by G.  M. Young, director of the British School of Archaeology from 1936. Major Nolbe (TNA:  FO  930/​273, Brief particular for Major Robert Cotlam Noble), a journalist, joined the MOI in November 1942 and in February 1943 was made head of the News section. Lawrence Durrell (TNA: FO 930/​273, Brief particular for Lawrence George Durrell) was a writer and journalist. He had seven years of journalism experience, including six months as dramatic critic for the International Post as well as being the assistant editor for Delta Paris and assistant manager at Cecil Press. He was also a contributor to ‘Purpose’ N.E.W., to Night and Day, and to Time and Tide. He was also the director for the Kalamata Institute of the BC in Greece (1939–​1941). For three months, he was in the press attaché’s office at the British Legation in Athens (1941). He was then in the Alexandria office in January 1943. Ryan praised him for his excellent work at Alexandria and his masterly knowledge of the Greek language. David Walker was probably David Esdaile Walker (1907, Darjeeling, India–​1968, Malta), son of Major General Sir Ernest Walker. Walker was foreign correspondent for the Daily Mirror (1936–​1952) and a representative of the Reuters news agency for the Balkans (1939–​1941) while simultaneously working as an agent of MI6 in Switzerland, the Balkans and Greece. He was chief leader writer for The News Chronicle (1955–​1959). His war experiences provided the background for several books, such as Adventure in Diamonds (London: Evans Bros, 1955). His books with Greek interest were Death at my Heels (London:  Chapman & Hall, 1942), The Greek Miracle by ‘Athenian’, translated, with a foreword by David Walker (London: Chapman & Hall, 1942). Sir Thomas Blomefield served as a public relations officer at the Piraeus Electricity Co. and from 1939 was assistant naval attaché (Intelligence). Dilys Powell was a celebrated film critic, wife of Humfry Payne, who was the director of the British School of Archaeology in Athens (1929–​1936), and member of the Political Intelligence Department (PID) (TNA:  FO  930/​273, Minutes, Miss Monroe to Henderson, Routh and Grubb, 20 July 1944). D. Abercrombie was a lecturer at the Institute of English Studies in Athens (1940–​1941). J. O. Catford is presumably John Cunnison ‘Ian’ Catford (1917–​2009), the renowned Scottish linguist and phonetician. He was a lecturer at the Institute of English Studies in Athens (1939–​1941) and was then evacuated to Egypt. Norman F. Joly was a ‘wireless technician’. V. J. G. Stavridi served with the Foreign Publicity Directorate of the MOI and was son of Sir John Stavridi (1867–​1948), a banker and diplomat at the Greek Consulate General in London (TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes to Scott, 21 August 1944). W. Hillier lived in Greece most of his working life. The MOI knew of Hillier as he worked at the Cairo broadcasting services until P.  C. Vellacott took over (TNA:  FO  930/​273, Letter, Vellacott to R. M. Meikle, PID, 2 September 1944).

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candidates soon extended to the Balkan section of the MOI30 and the Ministry of Labour.31 The strongest nominees were ‘a Major in the PWB’, who Leeper had spotted as a contender, and Francis Noel-​Baker, who had served with the Intelligence Corps and the SOE during the war and knew Greece well. Henderson and Scott also regarded Noel-​Baker as being ‘better than any of the other names suggested’.32 The ‘Major in the PWB’, who Leeper had in mind, was most likely Major Malan –​the PWE’s man for the PWB Cairo, a former classics master at Harrow with a good command of modern Greek and who was recommended by Dilys Powell33 of the PID and P. C. Vellacott.34 Major Malan had briefly served at the British Embassy in Cairo via an arrangement between Leeper and Vellacott, and he subsequently became head of the Greek section of the PWE.35 The PWE, however, as they were preparing for the arrival of the Greek government from Cairo, refused to release Malan, who was about to enter Greece on ‘some PWE mission before Greece reverts to being purely a MOI territory’; Malan could not be released for other work until this mission was completed. What is more, Malan did not have the necessary journalistic experience, and the PWE agreed that he was more suited to BC work.36 The PWE’s refusal brought about a deadlock to the search for a suitable press attaché. Leeper then suggested David Balfour,37 already a member of his 30 3 1 32

TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes (handwritten), Scott to O’Donovan, 17 August 1944. TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes (handwritten), O’Donovan to Scott, 21 August 1944. TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Henderson to Scott, 14 August 1944; Minutes, Scott to Henderson and O’Donovan, MOI, 22 August 1944. 33 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Henderson to Scott, 28 August 1944. 34 Paul Cairn Vellacott, CBE, DSO (1891–​1954) served as headmaster of Harrow School (1934–​1939) and master of Peterhouse, Cambridge (1939–​1954). In October 1942, he was appointed director of Political Warfare Middle East (David Garnett, The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive 1939–​1945 (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2002), 154). 3 5 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Henderson to Scott, 28 August 1944. 36 TNA:  FO 930/​273, Royal Air Force:  07183, Personal and Confidential, Secret Cipher Message from PWB Allied Forces Headquarters to Air Ministry Kingsway (Passed to PID London), repeated to PWB Cairo, 7  October 1944; see also, Minutes, Scott to Henderson and Grubb, 11 October 1944. 37 David Balfour had undertaken the work of a press attaché for Leeper in Cairo. David Balfour (priest-​monk Dimitris) had an unusually diverse career as ‘a Roman Catholic Benedictine, a later priest monk in the Russian Orthodox Church, an unofficial chaplain to the Greek royal family, a member of the British Intelligence

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staff in Cairo.38 As very little was known at the MOI regarding Balfour,39 the search continued –​this time focusing on the availability of Political Warfare personnel who had gone to Greece. However, such personnel were already engaged in both Allied Information Services (AIS) and those of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA).40 Two days before the Greek government’s arrival in Greece on 18 October 1944, the first AIS personnel arrived in Athens. Until this point, British publicity needs had been served largely by the AIS. It constituted one section of the Press Department of the British Embassy, and its head was Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Johnstone, the BC representative in Greece before the Second World War. From October 1944 to October 1945, the AGIS (formerly the AIS) developed into a considerable organization. It used this first critical year after liberation to lay a foundation for British policy in Greece –​in the face of the growing momentum of the left-​wing forces in Greece, which were gathering genuine popular support. The AGIS reached its peak expansion in June 1945 with a staff of 800, which was subsequently reduced to 567 by October 1945. Its staff were comprised of British Army officers and civilians as well as locally recruited individuals.41 The AGIS was funded by the PWE and the War Office. The Greek section of the PWE provided a great deal of material for the AGIS, and service, a diplomat and an interpreter and in his final years an expert Byzantinist’; see Kallistos Ware, ‘David Balfour (1903–​89)’, Sobornost (incorporating Eastern Churches Review) (1990), 52–​61; Makris-​Staikos, ‘Ο Άγγλος Πρόξενος’, 69, note 15. Before the war, Balfour had been in Paris, working in Russian émigré circles. He had taught at the University of Athens until the German invasion and had spent part of the war as an agent disguised as Father Dimitris, a Greek Orthodox monk; see Stephen Dorril, MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty’s Secret Intelligence Service (New York: Touchstone, 2000), 306, 409. 38 TNA: FO 930/​273, Secret Cypher Message, PWB Allied Forces Headquarters to PID, London, Confidential, 11 October 1944. 39 TNA: FO 930/​273, Scott to Resmed, Caserta, for Leeper; Telegram No. 5, Empax to Casetra; a copy was already sent to Lord Cage, 16 October 1944. 40 TNA:  FO  930/​273, Secret Letter, Lord Gage, PID, to Scott, ‘P.W. Mission to Greece’, 24 October 1944. 1 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 4 1st Feb-​31st July 1946’, 11 January 1946.

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the War Office provided trained staff and non-​military technical supplies, including paper and wireless equipment. On the arrival of the Greek government in Athens, Leeper settled in the city. Subsequently, the issue of the press attaché appointment returned to the agenda. Leeper assured the FO that he could ‘do very well with Balfour’ until a man with more journalistic experience could be attached to the Embassy as a press attaché ‘when the time is ripe’.42 However, ‘all information’ received in London suggested that Balfour was unsuitable for the role.43 Leeper then proposed A. K. Milne,44 as he had the necessary journalistic experience.45 The director general of the MOI, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, confirmed to the deputy undersecretary for foreign affairs at the FO, Sir Orme Sargent, that the MOI had no alternative candidate. Radcliffe then instructed that the MOI could go ahead with the arrangements to take Milne on as the press attaché and to open an office for British publicity services in Greece –​even if the appointments would be only temporary.46 This demonstrates that the MOI considered it necessary for British publicity services to acquire reliable representation in Greece, even if only on a temporary basis until a suitable press attaché was found. It was also clear that without Leeper’s consent, nothing could move forward in this regard. Leeper, with his vast experience in the field of propaganda warfare,47 was 42 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 30, Leeper, Athens, to FO, 26 October 1944. 3 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 6, Scott to Leeper, 8 November 1944. 4 44 A.  K. Milne was the nephew of A.  A. Milne of Punch. He was educated at Westminster and Christ Church Oxford and was a freelance journalist before the war. He served with the Field Propaganda Unit in the Western Desert in 1941 and the Command Unit in October 1942–​August 1943. Subsequently, he was PWE liaison officer with Force 133, then acting head of the PWE Greek section in Cairo (August–​October 1944) and news officer in AGIS, Athens (November 1944) (TNA:  FO  930/​273, Telegram No.  3 Leeper, Athens, to Scott, MOI, 27 November 1944). 45 TNA: FO 930/​273, Henderson’s handwritten comments to Scott; Telegram No. 10, Scott to Leeper, Athens, 22 November 1944; Telegram No. 3, Leeper, Athens, to Scott, 27 November 1944. 46 TNA:  FO  930/​273, Confidential, follow-​up, Radcliffe to Sargent, 25 November 1944. 47 He served as head of the FO News Department in 1935 and was a member of the original PID during the First World War, and its head when it reformed in 1939. He

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essentially the main lever in the decision-​making. However, the mounting political tension in Greece relegated the issue of the press attaché. Under these new circumstances, what was required was not only a qualified press attaché, but the experienced AGIS organization. On 4 November 1944, the Athens correspondents for The Times and the Daily Herald reported on an EAM procession –​the gravest example of the growing tensions thus far. On the Home Service, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) referred to the EAM demonstrations as well, noting them as ‘impressive’. On 6 November, the FO asked Leeper to do his best ‘to convince correspondents in Athens of the heavy responsibility which rests on them and to persuade them to take a moderate and helpful line’.48 The MOI made it clear to Leeper that it was undisputable that the PWB propaganda staff should continue to operate in Greece and that the status of the AGIS should not change.49 Further clarifying this point, Radcliffe and Sargent agreed that a telegram should be sent to Leeper proposing: so long as the PWB mission of British personnel remained operative in Greece under General Scobie [Lieutenant General Ronald Scobie, British General Officer Commanding Greece], their work should be limited to the political object of combating the dissident Greek forces, while the Press Office should be solely responsible for the projection of Britain and the distribution of British publicity material.50

In the event that the FO accepted Milne’s appointment as press attaché, the PWE asked the FO to clarify how a press attaché attached to the Embassy would fit in with AGIS activities.51 As this was a question that should be answered by Leeper in accordance with the prevailing conditions on the ground, the FO asked him whether the need for a press was executive head of the PWE in 1941–​1943. He was a fervent advocate of cultural propaganda and one of the prime movers in the establishment of the BC (in 1935). 48 TNA:  FO  371/​43781, R17015, Minutes, FO to Athens, 6  November 1944, in Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 113. 9 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 6, Scott to Leeper, 8 November 1944. 4 50 TNA: FO 930/​273, Confidential, follow-​up, Radcliffe to Sargent, Confidential, 25 November 1944. 51 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Scott to Routh, O’Donovan, 29 November 1944.

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attaché meant that the AGIS should cease operations or whether an arrangement could be found to enable the AGIS to work ‘during the military period’ with a press attaché. In any case, the FO made it clear that any arrangements Leeper might recommend should ensure that British publicity –​in other words, the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign –​should be the exclusive function of the press attaché.52 In reply, Leeper explained that AGIS work covered all functions of a press attaché and was focused on three major objectives: first, to restore the flow of information into Greece from or about the outside world; second, to provide technical help for the running of Greek information services; and, third, to survey and report on the state of Greek public opinion in all parts of the country. He also acknowledged that he did not wish to appoint a press attaché while the AGIS operated in Greece, and emphasized that he wanted to get the right person for the post. For that reason, he recommended Milne, who was then working in the AGIS.53 The FO agreed54 that Milne would be selected for the post. In the meantime, the AGIS would continue to be responsible for Milne.55 This outcome was exactly what Leeper had sought from the outset. He wanted to have a free hand in his dealings with the press and to use the military personnel he had worked with during the war years and who he trusted. For Leeper, the war had not ended as long as rebel forces in Greece threatened British interests. As the true dimensions of the Greek crisis became more apparent, new priorities arose for the British government. Leeper found great difficulty in keeping the correspondents ‘on the rails’.56 On 3 December 1944, a mass demonstration at Syntagma Square in Athens was fired on by the police, causing many deaths and injuries.57 On 5 December, Churchill 52 5 3 54 55

TNA: FO 371/​43708, Telegram No. 292, FO to Athens, 27 November 1944. TNA: FO 371/​43708, Telegram No. 405, Leeper to FO, 1 December 1944. TNA: FO 371/​43708, Minutes, O’Donovan to Scott, 2 December 1944. TNA: FO 371/​43708, Scott passed to Henderson and O’Donovan FO Telegram No. 292 and Athens Telegram No. 405, 7 December 1944. 56 Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 132. 57 Two eyewitnesses give detailed accounts of the events on 3  December 1944:  W. Byford-​Jones, The Greek Trilogy:  Resistance  –​Liberation  –​Revolution (London:  Hutchinson, 1946), 136–​ 142; William Hardy McNeil, The Greek Dilemma: War and Aftermath (London: Left Book Club Edition, 1947), 165–​171.

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sent a strong directive to Lieutenant General Scobie, charging him with the responsibility ‘for maintaining order in Athens and for neutralising or destroying all EAM/​ELAS bands approaching the city’. The directive ran: Do not however hesitate to act as if you were in a conquered city where a local rebellion is in progress. […] We have to hold and dominate Athens. It would be a great thing for you to succeed in this without bloodshed, if possible, but also with bloodshed if necessary.58

In an urgent telegram on 5 December 1944, Lieutenant General Scobie complained that the situation demanded not a press attaché ‘but a man trained in dealing with our own press’.59 Leeper had expressed difficulties in winning the press corps over to his side; his relations with the press and in particular the American reporters had deteriorated much earlier in Cairo.60 Due to this complexity and the fact that the PWB personnel under Scobie and the Public Relations section were likewise insufficient for keeping the foreign journalists at bay, Osbert Lancaster was brought to Athens. Previously of the FO News Department, he was judged ‘the best man’ for the job as press attaché.61 Lancaster had journalistic experience as a cartoonist for the Daily Express, as an art critic for The Observer and as a book reviewer for The Spectator. In 1939 he joined the MOI in a ‘department responsible for the release of overseas news to the British press, and as part of the propaganda war, to enemy, neutral and allied nations’.62 By The former was then a major and press officer with III Corps, and the latter was an American military attaché in Athens. See also Lars Baerentzen, ‘The Demonstration in Syntagma Square on Sunday the 3rd of December, 1944’, Scandinavian Studies in Modern Greek History 2 (1978), 3–​52. 58 W.  S. Churchill, Closing the Ring:  The Second World War (London:  Cassell, 1952), 252. 59 Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 132. 60 TNA: FO 371/​43708, Telegram No. 474, Athens to FO, 5 December 1944. For more on Leeper’s relations with the British press, see Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 115–​167. 1 TNA: FO 371/​43708, Telegram No. 479, Athens to FO, 6 December 1944. 6 2 J. Knox, Cartoons & Coronets: The Genius of Osbert Lancaster (London: Frances 6 Lincoln, 2008), 48–​ 49; R. Boston, Osbert:  Portrait of Osbert Lancaster (London: Collins, 1989), 119, 151, 188.

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1941 he was transferred to the FO News Department. Aside from being a well-​known cartoonist, whose works were frequently reprinted in PWE leaflets and other periodicals during the war, evidence additionally shows that he worked directly for the PWE. His exact role at the PWE remains unclear, but it has been argued that ‘his social and professional connections with PWE figures were notably extensive’.63 Evidently, Leeper knew Lancaster from Leeper’s time as executive head of the PWE from 1941 to 1943. Lancaster’s task in Athens was to restore British relations with the international press, which had since been negatively affected as a result of the December events. Lancaster arrived in Athens on 13 December 1944. The FO had been in such a hurry to send him to Athens that the MOI was not informed until 16 December –​days after his arrival.64 Radcliffe agreed with the FO’s decision, treating this case as an exceptional incident due to the sudden emergency in Greece and concluding that it was ‘plain that the time ha[d] not yet come for the work of a [press attaché] in the ordinary sense to begin’.65

The AGIS in the role of press attaché: Talks on the establishment of the press attaché’s Athens office Once the storm of the December events had subsided, the appointment of a press attaché was again discussed by the FO and the MOI. As Lancaster’s mission was already underway and the situation on the ground in Greece appeared to be ‘somewhat less disturbed’, Sargent thought that Leeper might have changed his views on the matter.66 But before they 63

Guy Woodward, ‘Cartoons and Propaganda: Osbert Lancaster at the PWE’, PWE, Covert Propaganda, and British Culture (28 January 2020), . 64 TNA:  FO  371/​43708, Letter, FO to MOI, 16 December, and MOI to FO, 23 December 1944. 5 TNA: FO 930/​273, Letter, Sargent to Radcliffe, 16 December 1944; Radcliffe to 6 Sargent, 23 December 1944. 66 TNA: FO 930/​273, Letter, Sargent to Radcliffe, 1 March 1945.

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could decide on the new press attaché, enquiries were to be made by the MOI Balkan section about the current and future position of the AGIS. At this point, a large number of issues that vitally affected the future of the AGIS had already been resolved.67 Moreover, after consultations with Leeper and the Brigadier General Staff, it was agreed that the next step would be to formulate proposals for the future of the AGIS, for presentation to the Allied Forces Headquarters. In principle, it seemed likely that the continuation of the AGIS in Greece –​as a military organization and with the same number of staff as previously –​would be required for the next few months at least. The AGIS, it was noted, was doing all that a press attaché’s office would do, ‘and indeed more’ than had been contemplated for its post-​war work.68 With this in mind, Leeper was asked to provide an approximate date when a changeover from the AGIS to a press attaché would be desirable and to comment on Milne’s suitability for a permanent press attaché appointment or to say if he wished to put forward other names.69 Lancaster, who was in London at that time, was authorized to convey Leeper’s views on these matters to Scott and Henderson.70 As a result, Henderson prepared a set of recommendations regarding the size and organizational structure that would be required of the press attaché’s office when it took over from the AGIS. Henderson’s report estimated that a total staff of forty officers plus fifty individuals of other ranks would be required to ensure a smooth transition. Leeper, for his part, was reluctant to trust the information and news management to civilians from the MOI, and his persistence in retaining military personnel led the MOI to make the mordant comment: ‘70 officers + 200 other ranks,  +  not a potential P[ress] A[ttaché] apparently among the lot!’71

7 TNA: FO 930/​273, AIS Report from Athens, No. 19, 18–​24 February 1945. 6 68 TNA:  FO  930/​273, Minutes, Henderson, Turkey and Balkans, to Scott, 14 March 1945. 69 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 405, Scott to Leeper, 1 December 1944; copy to FO, 16 March 1945; see also Letter, Radcliffe to Sargent, FO, 20 March 1945. 70 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 3, Leeper to MOI, 21 March 1945. 71 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, handwritten comment to O’Donovan, 25 March 1945.

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While the complex matter of the appointment of a press attaché continued, Leeper estimated that the political situation in Greece appeared to be growing more favourable towards British policy, especially with the government in power being willing to consult the British ‘at every stage without friction’.72 Following the December 1944 crisis, two governments –​ led by George Papandreou and Nikolaos Plastiras –​fell in rapid succession. These were soon followed by the government of Petros Voulgaris in April 1945, which was considered by Leeper to be ‘much the best we have had so far’.73 Leeper believed that if the British could get the Greek government to solve ‘boldly and firmly’ the problem of controlling the economy and to establish its authority over the country, the election would be ‘much smoother’ and Voulgaris would have every chance of emerging the victor.74 The immediate aim of British policy in Greece was to isolate the EAM and reinforce the ‘centre’ against the two opposing poles: the EAM and the old party system. In June 1945, Leeper –​along with Johnstone and H. Paniguian75 of the AGIS –​was in London for a consultation with the FO. At a meeting held at the FO on 19 June, at which the director general of the PWE Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart was also present, the future of the AGIS in Greece was discussed. Lockhart made it clear that there was significant pressure from the Treasury regarding the high costs of the AGIS. Moreover, the PWB in Italy would shortly be liquidated and therefore new arrangements for the AGIS would be necessary, given that the AGIS depended financially on the PWB. All present agreed that the AGIS should continue at its current strength until the forthcoming election and a plebiscite had been held in Greece. They also contemplated whether the AGIS should be transferred 72 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 1123, Leeper, War Cabinet distribution, Athens to FO, Important, following for the Prime Minister, 5 May 1945. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Hracia (Hratchia) Paniguian (‘Pan’) (Constantinople, 1903–​London 1973; family name of Armenian origin) was at Columbia School of Journalism (1926), then was with the advertising firm of J. Walter Thompson, Co. Ltd, of London (1927) and Special Departments of the FO and PWE (1939–​1944), and was Special Advisor to AGIS (1944–​1945).

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to the MOI or the War Office. Paniguian stressed the importance of preserving the London end of the AGIS–​PWE network during the critical upcoming months. The Greek section of the PWE, he argued, provided a considerable amount of valuable information that the AGIS would continue to require. Those at the meeting agreed that the Greek section of the PWE should continue for as long as the AGIS existed. When the AGIS ceased to function, the MOI would be invited to make plans to take over the publicity work in Greece from that point on. The meeting then considered the measures that should be adopted immediately in order to ensure that when the AGIS did disappear, its ongoing work could be continued, albeit via a new organizational structure. The most important of these measures was the reorganization of Athens Radio. The station would be reformed as a state-​controlled company along similar lines to the BBC, and British assistance would be given in the form of equipment and technical advisors.76 On 20 June, from Athens, Lancaster sent his recommendations to the FO on the future of British publicity services in Greece once the AGIS was dissolved, highlighting the need to reinforce the press attaché’s office ‘without delay’.77 His main concern was the key AGIS personnel who were coming up for demobilization, noting that a significant risk remained ‘of losing the services of men exactly suited for the work ahead’. Lancaster, however, was ignorant of the decisions made at the 19 June meeting in London regarding the future organization of British information services abroad and so was unable to assess the proposed method of recruitment, rates of pay and job criteria. Lancaster urged that firm decisions regarding the future needed to be taken imminently. The Embassy’s Press Office, he wrote, needed a press attaché and an assistant press attaché. The first –​ the press attaché –​would be of first secretary rank and would deal almost exclusively with the Greek press and related organizational issues, all of which would be run in accordance with directions given by the ambassador. The press attaché would, at the same time, work closely with the BC 76 TNA: FO 371/​48238, R 10564, records of the meeting, 19 June 1945. See Chapter 3 on the reorganization of Athens Radio. 77 TNA:  FO  930/​273, FP1/​306, Osbert Lancaster’s Memorandum, ‘Memorandum on Future of Publicity Services in Greece’, copies to Sir Orme Sargent, FO, and Grubb, MOI, 20 June 1945.

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representative in Athens. The assistant press attaché would hold the rank of second secretary and have a more general assistance role focused on facilitating all British, American and other foreign correspondents in Greece. It was Lancaster’s idea that the assistant should be given a short-​term mandate and be selected from the FO News Department. This move would both secure staff with experience working abroad and keep the press attaché’s office ‘fully informed of trends in public opinion and the main personalities to watch in London generally and Fleet Street in particular’.78 By the same token, in the event of an unforeseen crisis the ambassador would be certain of having a staff at his disposal with experience in handling British and foreign correspondents. The Embassy’s Press Office had competencies in circulating features, films and radio programmes. So far features, photographs and special articles were supplied to Greek newspapers by a department of the AGIS that, according to Lancaster, was ‘experienced, efficient and comparatively small’. As such, Lancaster suggested that this AGIS department be integrated into the press attaché’s office in order to remedy the delays caused by the current arrangements wherein both the PWE and the MOI exercised control. According to him, the current supply of film –​a key facet of propaganda –​was far from satisfactory; he thought it advisable, therefore, that corrective measures be taken before these problems became ‘insurmountable’. Finding a person from London who possessed the right qualifications as well as a technical knowledge of film was a matter of great urgency. Simultaneously, the British Embassy had sent to London a thoroughly processed plan for the development of Athens Radio, which –​if implemented –​would enable the station to become an efficient and largely self-​contained body, thereby allowing the press attaché to focus on issues of general policy. As for the appointment of a press attaché –​and since little had been heard about Milne from the MOI –​Lancaster assumed that he had been rejected.79 Lancaster therefore suggested that R. T. Eland, then with MIME, 78 TNA:  FO  930/​273, FP1/​306, Osbert Lancaster’s Memorandum, ‘Memorandum on Future of Publicity Services in Greece’, copies to Sir Orme Sargent, FO, and Grubb, MOI, 20 June 1945. 79 Scott and Henderson  –​who met Milne in April in London  –​did not consider him ‘quite good enough’ to be a press attaché; see TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes,

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should work under him for a trial period. Eland had dealt with Greek affairs in Cairo for the past three years and had been solely responsible for the production of AERA,80 the Greek illustrated paper published twice a month by the British Information Service, Middle East in Cairo, which was commonly agreed to be ‘an unqualified success’,81 Eland wanted to come to Greece, where he had ‘numerous friends and where his work in Cairo [was] well-​known and appreciated’.82 Captain Arthur Fosse, who was in charge of AGIS work in Epirus, and Captain Scott-​Gilbert, who was in the press section in Athens, had both already approached Lancaster about the future. Lancaster also suggested that Lawrence Durrell, then in Rhodes,83 would be most useful either as an assistant press attaché or as head of the Thessaloniki office.84 Grubb agreed that Durrell ‘would be very useful in Greece’.85 That said, Leeper expressly did not want Durrell as an assistant press attaché in Athens, for reasons not mentioned in his correspondence with the MOI but which had been previously mentioned to Ryan in Cairo.86 The existing regional organization for gathering and distributing news –​into which the press attaché would be inserted –​was a separate issue and one that required careful diplomatic handling. During the time

80 81 82 83

84 8 5 86

Henderson to Mrs Burges, 28 March 1945; A.  H. to Henderson, 9 April 1945; Henderson to A. H., 13 April 1945. The title was a war slogan identified with the Greek war against the Axis powers in 1940–​1941 and analysed metaphorically in A (Britain), E (Greece), R (Russia), A (United States). TNA:  FO  930/​273, FP1/​306, Osbert Lancaster’s Memorandum, ‘Memorandum on Future of Publicity Services in Greece’, copies to Sir Orme Sargent, FO, and Grubb, MOI, 20 June 1945. Ibid. Durrell became BC representative in Rhodes, and he looked after the Embassy’s interests in the area under the reorganization of the Embassy’s Information Department in 1946, (TNA: FO 930/​423, Letter, Confidential, Harrison to Rouse, 5 September 1945; Minutes, Harrison to Major Becher, Middle East Information Department, 6 September 1946). TNA: FO 930/​273, Personal Letter (handwritten), Lancaster to Herbert, n.d. TNA: FO 930/​273, Note/​Minutes, Grubb to Herbert, 28 August 1945, and Leeper to FO for Scott, 16 November 1944. TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 6, Scott to Leeper, 8 November 1944; Telegram No. 244, Leeper to Scott, 16 November 1944.

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that the AGIS had been in Greece, it had built up an organization for both collecting and disseminating information, ‘which has proved invaluable and constitutes the major part of their achievement’.87 Lancaster was of the view that to discard this elaborate and well-​structured system would be damaging and ultimately prove ineffective in terms of economy of scale. He felt that these concerns were especially pertinent for a country like Greece given that neither road nor rail communications were easily accessible and that Athens was often cut off from public opinion in the provinces. It was essential, then, that so long as the various British missions in Greece remained, some form of information services be maintained at the regional centres, even if on a considerably reduced scale. Just how far information services could be reduced, however, depended largely on the regional plans of the BC. At the time, Lancaster had planned an imminent tour of the various information centres in northern and western Greece and subsequently planned to visit the islands in order to draft a report on the existing conditions and organizational structures therein.88 The MOI’s comments on Lancaster’s memorandum89 formed a draft ‘Basic Establishment for Greece’,90 which could be modified in response to specific local conditions and could be discussed in relation to other papers that dealt with news organization in Greece. John Amery, of the MOI Balkans section, was required to write the proposals, which would then be passed on to the Establishment Division of the MOI and subsequently used in the preparations for the relevant OEPEC paper. Input from the Treasury and the FO was also required prior to final acceptance. Amery found that Lancaster’s memorandum had served its purpose as a point of departure for further careful consideration of the future shape of the publicity establishment in Greece.91 However, certain issues still had 87 TNA:  FO  930/​273, FP1/​306, Osbert Lancaster’s Memorandum, ‘Memorandum on Future of Publicity Services in Greece’, copies to Sir Orme Sargent, FO, and Grubb, MOI, 20 June 1945. 88 Ibid. 89 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP1/​306, Minutes, Ruthven-​Murray to Amery, 27 June 1945. 90 FO 930/​273, Amery to Scott and O’Donovan, ‘Basic Establishment for Greece’, 10 July 1945. 91 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes, Amery to O’Donovan, 11 August 1945.

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to be clarified and further resolved, including that of the FO wanting the MOI to take over AGIS responsibilities and an estimate by Lancaster of ‘the essential long-​term part of the work done by AGIS’.92 Amery set out the proposed ‘Basic Establishment for Greece’ as follows. With regard to staff recruitment, Amery reckoned that a staff of three –​the press attaché and two assistant press attachés –​would be the bare minimum requirement; this would constitute one assistant press attaché more than the MOI’s standard practice. These three top people would help Lancaster manage the transition and would form the basis for the future work of the MOI in Greece. One of the two assistant press attachés would be in charge of networking with British and foreign journalists as well as administrative tasks to assist the press attaché, while the other assistant press attaché would write summaries of news items and assist the information officer with Embassy duties. An assistant press attaché from the FO News Department, as Lancaster suggested, would ‘doubtless take a load off the Ambassador’s mind’.93 Given the nature of the work, it was deemed necessary that at least one of the assistant press attachés be fluent in Greek so they could help co-​ordinate the work of the staff in the regions. The supervision of regional posts would also be a key function assigned to the press attaché and the two assistants. The broader issue of how to organize regional structures would await Lancaster’s anticipated nationwide report on the press. Milne and Eland might well be recruited for posts in Greece, while Fosse remained the MOI’s best choice for Crete, Rhodes or Thessaloniki. After consultation with Dilys Powell, three more small offices were added to the proposed basic establishment for Greece: one in Corfu to cover the whole of Epirus; one in Patras to deal with the western and southern parts of the Peloponnese; and one in Volos to cover the eastern areas of Greece.94 Considering the ‘very special political situation’ in Greece, the lack of communications and the scale of AGIS operations, both the MOI and the FO saw a considerable case for these small provincial posts.95 A British consul –​preferably 9 2 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP1/​306, Amery’s Note to Scott, 5 July 1945. 93 Ibid. 94 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP1/​306, Amery’s Note to Scott, 9 July 1945; Amery’s Note to Scott and Routh, 10 July 1945. 95 TNA: FO 930/​273, Minutes (handwritten), Scott, 10 July 1945.

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a British national and not a career diplomat –​would be assigned to each of these posts. Should a Greek citizen be appointed –​as had been the case previously –​they would not be able to undertake future MOI or BC tasks and would be subsequently restricted to only support work roles for the British staff. The MOI wanted further information from Lancaster concerning staff requirements, the arrangements for which would be worked out in London.96 In the outstanding points of Lancaster’s memorandum, which referred to the importance of appointing a film and/​or radio officer, the extent of the film office’s future activities remained unclear. However, as soon as the ‘emergency’ period was over, it was decided that films would be handled on a commercial basis only and would not be the responsibility of the press attaché’s office. The question of a radio officer depended largely on the decisions taken regarding Athens Radio –​a matter still under active discussion. Lancaster also urgently requested publicity material from the PID, which at the time was entirely responsible for providing Greece with material. The PID responded by sending material on economic subjects, a collection entitled the ‘Balkan Round-​Up’ (a weekly compendium of British newspapers and periodicals that mentioned the Balkans), The Times and political weeklies, British and American press cuttings, reviews of the American-​Greek press, special reference documents –​such as those on elections and any subject of outstanding interest –​and copies of important White Papers.97 However, as soon as the MOI assumed responsibility over publicity in Greece, its Establishment Division would be able to cite ‘high policy’ on the appropriate levels of publicity work required in Greece. Therefore, the question of the publicity establishment in Greece could not be taken any further until Lancaster had responded and London had been given the appropriate approval from the Athens Embassy in regard to their proposals.98 96 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP1/​306, Amery’s Note to Scott, 9 July 1945; Amery’s Note to Scott and Routh, 10 July 1945. 97 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP1/​306, Minutes, Ruthven-​Murray to Amery, 27 June 1945. 98 TNA:  FO  930/​273, Amery to Scott and O’Donovan, ‘Basic Establishment for Greece’, 10 July 1945; handwritten comments by Scott, 13 July 1945; by O’Donovan, 17 July 1945; Minutes, Trenaman to O’Donovan, 23 July 1945; Minutes, O’Donovan to Trenaman, 23 July 1945; Minutes, O’Donovan to Amery, 23 July 1945.

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After the necessary discussions with the Finance and Establishment divisions, a letter was sent to Lancaster along the above lines. Grubb explained to Lancaster that the MOI’s proposed scheme was necessarily tentative and had not yet been approved by the FO and the Treasury. Members of the MOI were anxious to fill all the posts in the proposed establishment. The press attaché and his two assistants would form a ‘strong team’ and work in harmony with the MOI officer in the Embassy’s Press Office; this co-​operation would be of paramount importance given the nature of the difficult months ahead. As such, the MOI accepted the proposal to add one more assistant press attaché from the FO News Department to the team. This assistant press attaché would be appointed for a six-​month period, then undergo an assessment. Lancaster was required to give detailed specifications for the job profile in question so that the post could be considered separately on its own merits. With the consent of the Treasury, the Features Service and the Monitoring Unit would be integrated into the MOI as UK-​based bodies, while the film and radio section –​on account of its regional work –​would form a separate entity attached to the consular remit.99 The MOI’s proposed scheme was considered by the Embassy in Athens ‘perfectly adequate and considerably more lavish than [they] dared hope’.100 Establishing the press attaché’s office ‘without delay’ became the most urgent preoccupation for the Embassy in the summer of 1945. This was necessary given the recently announced acceleration of demobilization, which ultimately required the involvement of certain AGIS personnel at a period when the Embassy needed them most and when a general election and a referendum on the king’s return to Greece were set to take place. Lancaster, in a letter to Grubb on 21 August, emphasized again that acquiring a member from the FO News Department on a temporary basis was essential to cover the election, particularly since the number of British and American correspondents was rapidly increasing. He also asked the MOI to properly equip –​as soon as possible –​the Features Service’s small reference library of newspapers and reference books, which had proved very 99 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP 1/​306, Letter, Grubb to Lancaster, 1 August 1945. 1 00 TNA: FO 930/​273, Telegram No. 33, Harold Caccia, Athens Embassy, to MOI, following for Grubb from Lancaster, repeated to Resmed, Caserta, [personal for Mr Broad], 19 August 1945.

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popular with the Greek press. With regard to the regional reorganization, Lancaster, after a tour of the north-​west, suggested that regional information officers should be stationed in Ioannina to cover Epirus and western Greece, in Crete to be responsible for the Cyclades and at Volos and Patras to cover the Sporades and the Ionian Islands, respectively.101 That said, the regional reorganization remained an open matter. The MOI foresaw certain difficulties in appointing a member of the FO News Department as an assistant press attaché. Instead, the MOI suggested that an administrative officer stationed in Athens with the rank of assistant press attaché act as Lancaster’s personal assistant, the aim being that they gradually take on the greater part of the co-​ordination and administrative tasks for the staff and work in Greece. However, they could not appoint this assistant press attaché until the establishment of said post could be confirmed. The MOI put forth that if Lancaster thought that Major Ian S. Scott-​Kilvert was a strong candidate for one of the assistant press attaché positions, he should secure his services.102 As for the post of press attaché itself, it would take a further year for this to be filled.

The MOI delegation in Greece: Preparing the transition process for the MOI to assume responsibility for British information and publicity work in Greece As the Greek election had been arranged for 31 March 1946, the AGIS continued to function so as to avoid any interruption of information services at this crucial time. In the meantime and to enable the MOI to make provisional arrangements for assuming larger responsibilities following the dissolution of the AGIS, on 8 October 1945 the British Treasury approved  –​in principle  –​the creation of an information department attached to the Athens Embassy. As the MOI lacked a precise understanding 101 TNA: FO 930/​273, FP 1/​306, Letter, Lancaster to Grubb, MOI, 21 August 1945. 1 02 TNA:  FO  930/​273, Telegram, MOI to Athens, following for Lancaster, 31 August 1945.

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of the work done by the AGIS, the deputy director of the MOI’s European Division, S. Mervyn Herbert –​who was accompanied by John Amery of the Balkans section –​and J. H. Waddell of the Establishment Division spent three weeks in Greece throughout November and December 1945 with the goal of observing on the spot how the takeover from the AGIS could be best effected. They were subsequently required to submit their proposals in the context of a broader plan on the development of MOI work in the Balkans (i.e. in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece).103 During their stay in Greece, the MΟΙ representatives aimed to review and report on the staff requirements and operations to be undertaken. They participated in a meeting on 16 November 1945 at the AGIS headquarters, which was chaired by Lancaster and attended by Colonel D. MacFarlane and Paniguian from the AGIS, as well as the BC representative J. C. S. Runciman and Major Cardiff, also from the BC.104 Two main issues were discussed at the meeting: the future of the information centres in Greece, with a focus on the functions of the Athens Information Centre (AIC); and the relationship between the MOI and the BC.105 Lancaster emphasized at the outset that the most important consideration was the dovetailing of MOI and BC functions in regard to their personnel, premises and information centres, among other factors. It was discussed, however, that in Athens and Thessaloniki, MOI and BC representation would remain separate. Thessaloniki –​the second-​largest city after the capital and located in northern Greece –​was stated to be an important yet difficult area for British publicity due to its sensitive geographical location. As such, it was suggested that its information centre should be strengthened by two staff members: a press attaché and an assistant press attaché. Since the MOI would then have an assistant press attaché at Thessaloniki, they would not require further representation in northern Greece. Thus, BC 103 TNA: FO 930/​426, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, FP1/​306, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st February -​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 104 TNA:  FO  930/​425, ‘Minutes of Meeting held at AGIS HQ on Friday, 16 November 1945, at 10.00’. The minutes were distributed to all present: Director of the PWB, General Headquarters (2), Lieutenant Colonel Rounce and Major Gaylard. 105 On the BC in Greece during the period covered by this study, see Chapter 2.

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representation was not needed in Kavala despite the fact that the BC considered this post valuable. In other major cities, the BC would continue either by co-​operating closely with the regional information centres in the places deemed most strategically important or by keeping an eye on behalf of the MOI in those places where the BC had a representative, as in the Aegean Islands of Mytilene, Chios and Samos. In other cases, as in the cities where the BC would not have representation, the MOI representative would also look to the interests of the BC, on its behalf. In this context, Corfu would retain its energetic BC representative (Maria Aspioti) as well as its local information centre; this was not an expensive commitment for the MOI given the island’s active Anglo-​Hellenic League. In Ioannina, the MOI intended to appoint someone from London. Ioannina was an important centre politically owing to its proximity to the Albanian frontier; Greek dispute linked it to a so-​called area of Northern Epirus. Moreover, Ioannina was also the location for the former headquarters of the resistance organization EDES. Patras was also considered an important centre as it had already exerted a strong influence over the local press and G. R. Coate –​the present AGIS officer in charge –​had initiated a broad cultural scheme. Fosse had been put forward as the MOI man for Patras; he could also look after the interests of the BC. Volos, a ‘very left-​wing’ area, needed ‘careful handling’ in regard to its representation.106 Both Lancaster and the BC representatives considered that an information centre should be opened at Kokkinia107 and that the centre at Piraeus should remain open, due to the sociopolitical and topographical particularities of these areas.

106 TNA:  FO  930/​425, ‘Minutes of Meeting Held at AGIS HQ on Friday, 16 November 1945, at 10.00’. 107 After the great German bombardment of Piraeus in January 1944, the district of Kokkinia was identified with the armed action of the ELAS in Piraeus. At this location, on 17 August 1944, took place one of the most dramatic scenes of the Resistance, which became the theme of the Greek film directed by Adonis Kyrou, Το μπλόκο [The Block] (1965). Iasonas Chandrinos, Το τιμωρό χέρι του λαού. Η δράση του ΕΛΑΣ και της ΟΠΛΑ στην κατεχόμενη πρωτεύουσα, 1942–​1944 [The Punishing Hand of the People. The Action of ELAS and the OPLA in the Occupied Capital, 1942–​1944] (Athens: Themelio, 2012), 189–​193, 233–​238.

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After the BC representatives left the meeting, the rest of the discussion focused on the information centres. The meeting covered the future of the information centres in Greece, especially the main centre in Athens –​the AIC (also known as the Anglo-​ Hellenic Information Centre or the Churchill Street Information Centre) in Stadiou Street (which was also referred to as Churchill Street). A key feature of the information work in Greece –​which was not generally adopted in other countries –​was the presence of a large number of information centres maintained by the AGIS across the country. The information centres were based mainly in local shops. Some were provided rent-​free; others were provided at a low rent; and still others were provided at market rent. Their purpose was to provide ‘reliable’ information, within Greece, in Britain and globally, on the state of affairs in Greece.108 At its peak, the AGIS ran eighty-​six such centres; their number gradually reduced after the summer of 1945, however –​first to seventy-​one and then by the end of the year to fifty-​four, the intention being to further reduce this to twenty-​four by January 1946.109 Each of these centres were provided with the same materials, which included a selection of English magazines and newspapers, all AGIS publications, including the Αnglo-​Elliniki Epitheorisi (hereafter, Anglo-G ​ reek Review), Eklogi, AERA, Photo Nea and Eikonografimena Nea, as well as a small library of English books. The AGIS also provided current news with feature articles, photographs and display sets. Usually, these centres were managed by one or two Greek persons, who were in charge of selling printed material, organizing displays and occasionally reading out radio news. Greek broadcasts from the BBC and Athens Radio using a public address system were also carried out by the regional offices.110 In Athens, all information centres other than the AIC had to be closed. It was then proposed, after consulting with the company that handled British films, that some of these information centres could be used as cinemas. In the provinces, it was deemed reasonable to keep open only those centres 108 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st Feb-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 109 TNA: FO 930/​476, Minutes, Scott to Grubb, 9 January 1946. 110 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st Feb-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946.

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that could be serviced reasonably well by rail or sea or those on main roads. It was further proposed to make better use of the shops, taverns or rooms located in municipal buildings within the smaller villages. The new Greek information minister, Heracles Petimezas, appeared willing to co-​operate on matters of transportation and accommodation in the provinces, especially on issues concerning requisitioning.111 The precise functioning of the AIC was discussed extensively at the meeting of 16 November, as its operation was considered a major contributor to projecting an image of post-​war Britain and British values, and preserving morale in Greece. According to the MOI’s proposal, Eland was to be in charge of the AIC, its regional services, which provided exhibitions and displays, and information centres operating in other districts of Athens and throughout Greece. Another of Eland’s roles was the production and distribution of MOI publications and the organization of filmstrip tours. However, the most complex part of his job description concerned the AIC. The AIC’s work was divided into two sections: local administration, which dealt with personnel, finance, publications, sales and the library; and servicing regional displays and exhibitions as well as the local purchasing of materials. Furthermore, there were two distinct dimensions to the provision of displays and exhibitions: their manufacture by the studio and their organization and distribution. Touring displays and exhibitions required a separate process for organization, monitoring and troubleshooting in the event of delays. The need for an AIC officer post was discussed at a meeting between Colonel D. MacFarlane of AGIS headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Rounce, Major Gaylard of AGIS Publications, the Athens Region Greek supervisor, Captain Arapis, and Eland, who was in charge of the AIC. On this occasion, it was decided that a British national should head the AIC and be in charge of all policy and publicity particulars. This would include a focus on the centre’s news section, which would be handled under what was deemed to be proper supervision and ‘not left almost entirely to [the] Greeks who after all are little more than amateurs at it’.112 Eland suggested 111 TNA:  FO  930/​425, ‘Minutes of Meeting held at AGIS HQ on Friday, 16 November 1945, at 10.00’. 112 TNA: FO 930/​425, FP1/​306/​5, Eland’s report to Amery, n.d.

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to Amery that the posts of studio manager and head of the AIC should be combined. For Eland, this post required a ‘tip-​top Studio Manager’ who possessed expertise in exhibition and display work, because, as he argued: ‘that more than any other factor is what the information centres will stand or fall by –​i.e. their artistic presentation of facts’.113 Eland asserted it was ‘very essential for [the British] reputation’ that the AIC be ‘FIRST CLASS, nothing else’. His preference was for the appointment of an English person, ‘for the displays will all be about England or most of them will’.114 Among the staff, Greek nationals would also be appointed. One such staff would be tasked with collecting and providing information, answering visitors’ questions and using the latter as a gauge of the public state of mind, thus acting as a ‘barometer of the public mood’.115 Indeed, of all the information centres located in various parts of Greece, the AIC –​ the only one to be retained in the capital –​turned out to be particularly successful in attracting large numbers of people. With its thirty-​one staff, the AIC was used as a hub for making and assembling all the exhibition materials that were regularly sent to the other centres. Other issues discussed at this meeting included the handling of film activities, which was an important feature of British work in Greece. The MOI had not hitherto been responsible for cinema arrangements in the Balkans. Even after the end of the war, experience showed that these activities were best conducted by officers in military uniform; the responsibility was therefore left to the PWB in the field and to the PID in London. The PWB was, at the time, in the process of liquidation, and the MOI had been requested by the PID to take over its responsibilities in Greece, thus absorbing the AGIS film section (two UK-​based posts and ten locally recruited staff ) following the dissolution of the AGIS. The intention was that the MOI only take responsibility for these tasks for a short period –​that

113

TNA: FO 930/​425, Eland, Information Centre, British Embassy, Athens, to Amery, Personal, ‘Studio Manager’; ‘Piraeus Information Centre’, 19 December 1946. 114 TNA:  FO  930/​425, Eland, Information Centre, British Embassy, Athens, to Amery, Personal, ‘Studio Manager’, 19 December 1946. 1 15 TNA: FO 930/​425, FP1/​306/​5, Eland’s report to Amery, n.d.

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is, until production and distribution arrangements could be made by the commercial interests that were ultimately set to take over.116 The time had also come to make a decision regarding the appointment of the assistant press attaché for broadcasting in Athens. The British government had ‘considerable interest’ in the Ethniko Idryma Radiofonias (EIR [National Radio Foundation]), whose founding law was passed in June 1945; at the time, Keith Newlands117 was in charge of this work for the AGIS and the PID. MOI representatives had been impressed with the quality of his work and strongly recommended that he be kept on. Leeper was also keen to retain Newlands. As Newlands had been born in Germany, Leeper asked the secretary of state to make an exception to the rule requiring British nationality –​as did the MOI.118 In reply, the first reaction of the FO was to oppose Newlands’ appointment on the grounds of his German birth, despite high recommendations from the PID. The MOI had been looking for alternative candidates since the autumn, but as yet had been unable to find anyone approaching Newlands’ ability and experience, his comprehensive knowledge of Greece and its personalities, his technical proficiency and the very fact that he had been accepted by the Embassy and a long succession of Greek governments. As such, the FO soon relented and agreed to retain Newlands as the broadcasting officer.

116

TNA: FO 930/​426, Minutes, Waddell to Welch, 5 January 1946; see also Minutes, Scott to Grubb, 9 January 1946. Draft Letter to W. E. Phillips, HM Treasury, [no date] January 1946. 117 Newlands was born Neuburger, of German parentage, and naturalized only in November 1944. He was educated at the University of Hamburg, the London School of Economics, the University of Belgrade and the Sorbonne. Before the war, he was employed by subsidiaries of Sassoons and in that capacity managed Radio Belgrade, the establishment of which was financed by his company. He was at the BBC Balkan section from 1941, before going to the PID in December 1943. In 1946 he was chief radio officer, AGIS. He was fluent in French, German and Serbo-​Croat and possessed a fair knowledge of Italian and some Greek, Bulgarian, Slovene and Spanish. 1 18 TNA: Mentioned in O’Donovan’s letter to Dudley (FO 930/​476, FP 25/​1/​907, 3 January 1946).

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However, Newlands was not granted clearance to access secret material; nor was he accorded indefinite FO employment.119 The MOI representatives’ visit to Greece enabled them to review the staff and operations plans thus far. The MOI did not expect to operate on the large scale found necessary by the AGIS. Leeper, however, maintained the view that the BIS should continue working on a large scale. It was agreed that a complement of some 40 UK-​based staff and 180 locally recruited personnel would be necessary until the election in March at the very least.120

The MOI’s proposed expenditure in Greece: Overseas and Emergency Publicity Expenditure Committee Paper No. 2304 As a result of the MOI delegation to Greece, the MOI could be much more specific in its preparation of a report and budget. To enable the MOI to estimate the cost of future operations, the AGIS supplied statements of income and expenditure from January to October 1945.121 H. G. G. Welch (of the MOI) was assigned to prepare OEPEC Paper No. 2304 on the MOI’s proposed expenditures in Greece, which was then discussed with the Treasury at a subcommittee meeting on 21 January 1946. The MOI was to take over responsibility for AGIS staff and operational expenditures. By October 1945, AGIS staff numbered 567. The proposed alternative would consist of approximately 200 posts, 119 TNA: FO 930/​476, Letter, O’Donovan, MOI, to A. A. Dudley, FO, 3 January 1946; Letter, Dudley to O’Donovan, 8 January 1946. 120 TNA: FO 930/​426, Minutes, Scott to Dudley, 9 January 1946. 121 TNA:  FO  930/​426, marked A and B, Appendix AGIS, CMF, ‘Statement of Income & Expenditure for Period Oct 44 –​Oct 45’, Appendix ‘A’ regarding Films, Publications, Waste Paper. Also, Miln to Waddell, MOI, ‘October Accounts -​ AGIS’, 27 December 1945; see also Letter, Miln to Waddell, 21 December 1945; Minutes, Waddell to Welch, 31 December 1945. See also detailed AGIS expenditure and income charts and charts of estimated rate of expenditure for the period 1 February to 31 July 1946.

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46 of which would be based in the UK. More reductions were envisaged over the course of the first six months under the ministry’s responsibility. Further, some posts and functions would be subcontracted, including film distribution to commercial agencies.122 Britain’s profound involvement in Greece imposed special responsibilities on the Embassy’s ID, resulting in a greater intensity of work compared to that in departments in countries of similar size. Both the British military forces that were established in Greece and the technical missions involved in the country’s reconstruction exerted authority over vital sectors of the Greek economy and administration. In order for the policies of these missions to be readily understood in Greece, ‘more careful explanation’ was needed. This task was hitherto provided by the AGIS and could only be taken on by the Embassy’s Information Department going forward. Along with this task, the Information Department gave assistance to the British missions when asked and at times of increased alert, such as during the election and the referendum.123 On 21 January, the Treasury approved the proposed OEPEC budget, subject to review after three months. The War Establishment in Athens also approved the proposal124 with the only changes relating to certain conditions for costs and expenditures.125 As stated in the OEPEC report and agreed on between the ambassador and the FO, the structure of the Embassy’s Information Department comprised four main sections: the press; production and distribution; broadcasting; and administration and finance. The press section was in charge of writing daily summaries of the most salient news reports appearing in the Greek press, with the goal of distributing them to all the relevant departments of the British Embassy. Further, the press section liaised with Athenian and provincial newspaper editors, providing them with features 122 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st February-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 123 Ibid. 124 TNA: FO 930/​426, Telegram, Empax 05025, Herbert to Balkan section, MOI, 26 January 1946. 125 TNA: FO 930/​426, Catling to Scott, ‘Budget for Greece, 1st Feb to 31 July 1946’, 8 February 1946; Norman Davis, Balkan section (Greece), to Press Department, Athens, ‘Budget for Greece February 1-​July 31, 1946’, 20 February 1946.

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and photographic material ‘calculated to produce an understanding in Greece of British policy and thought’.126 The press section also made available a space –​the reference and information room –​to be used as an information hub by journalists, broadcasters, writers, lecturers and publicists. The production and distribution section was assigned the task of publishing Eklogi127 (the Greek version of the Central Office of Information’s (COI’s) International Digest) and distributing ΑΕRΑ. The section also managed the AIC’s studio, which produced and distributed exhibitions in Athens and provincial towns, while also distributing material to the regional offices and information centres. The role of the broadcasting section was to connect with broadcasting organizations across Greece, to supervise Greek-​ language BBC programmes and, more generally, to advise and assist the EIR –​a role for which the British government had ‘a major interest for as long as can be foreseen’.128 This section was also responsible for managing material from the London Press Service (LPS) and monitoring events in ‘the present period of tension’.129 The work of the administration and finance section was particularly difficult given the financial circumstances in Greece at the time. All financial and accounting transactions were especially hard to deal with on account of the instability of the drachma. A film section was temporarily added and two cinema vans were also placed under the British Embassy’s Information Department control. This film section’s purpose was to ensure a proper mechanism for the distribution of British films of all types, including features, shorts and newsreels, thus filling in a crucial gap until the British film industry established its own organizations in Greece. Eagle-​Lion Films, a British film production company, had made 126 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st February-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 127 Gioula Koutsopanagou, ‘Moulding the Western European Identity:  The Role of the Central Office of Information International Digest and its Greek version Eklogi (1945–​1960)’, Media History 23/​3–​4 (2017), 391–​404 (also published in Siân Nicholas and Tom O’Malley, eds, War and Society in the 20th Century: Journalism, Reportage and the Social Role of the Press (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019) 391–​404). 128 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st February-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 129 Ibid.

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considerable headway with preparations, but was not expected to be ready to take over before the end of March 1946. The OEPEC report mentioned that the MOI would guarantee payment of AGIS staff who worked in film production for a few months before private British film distributors could take over the whole venture. A specialist features service section was also added at the Information Department. Additionally, appointment of a qualified editor from among former AGIS staff was to be made. The features section would supply articles, photographs and reference material to newspapers in Athens. Similarly, in the provinces, the press was given access to all the services and materials provided through its regional organizations. For the MOI, this was an important area of work –​as Lancaster also pointed out in his memo in June 1945 –​and deserved more attention than was given by the Greek government. In respect to the organization of activities in the regions and in tandem with the MOI’s proposals set out in the OEPEC paper, the Treasury agreed that the Embassy’s Information Department would operate through five regional offices in addition to its main headquarters in Athens. The first of these offices would be in Thessaloniki, thus catering also to Kozani, Florina and Kavala, and populated by a staff of twenty-​one persons (less than a third of the number working for the AGIS). Aside from being the capital of northern Greece, Thessaloniki maintained a special realm of importance due to the fact that it was a centre point of the political turbulence concerning the ‘Macedonian Question’.130 The presence of a governor general 130 In the 1940s the ‘Macedonian Question’ revolved around tensions between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria  –​both of which at the end of WWII belonged to the Soviet camp –​over the province of Macedonia, a territory of disputed borders and conflicting national identities since the time of the Ottoman Empire. In 1945, Tito renamed the southern part of the old Kingdom of Yugoslavia to ‘Socialist Republic of Macedonia’, and made it one of the six constituent Republics of Yugoslavia. Bulgarian complaints that the Bulgarian speaking minority in Tito’s Macedonia was systematically oppressed gained new impetus in 1948 following the rift between Stalin and Tito, who was by then considered by the Soviet Union as an ‘apostate’. It was in 1948 and the beginning of the new phase of the ‘Macedonian Question’ that the Kommunistiko Komma Ellados (KKE [Communist Party of Greece]) became involved in it. Under pressure from Slav-​speaking members of the rebel Democratic Army, the KKE supported for a time the idea of an Autonomous Socialist Macedonia in a Balkan

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with ministerial rank in the regional offices of Ioannina and Corfu was a key indicator of the strategic importance attributed to northern Greece. The Ioannina, Patras and Volos regional offices employed eight persons each. The Ioannina office was given special attention, partly because it was responsible for the Corfu and Agrinion offices, but mainly due to increasing concerns regarding developments in Northern Epirus.131 The Peloponnese had only one office, located in Patras, and this was in charge of the information centres in Patras, Tripoli and Kalamata. Volos, despite its industrial and strategic significance, could not satisfactorily service information centres due to its very poor transportation and communication services. To counter this, an idea was proposed to develop information centres in Larissa, Karditsa and Lamia. In Crete, the main information centre was based in Heraklion, while an office with nine persons was established in Chania. The information centre for the Dodecanese islands, located in Rhodes, was run from Cairo until such time as the Dodecanese reunited with Greece. The staff in the regional offices were in addition to those who worked in the information centres. The MOI offered to take control of twenty-​four information centres for a period of time. It was deemed of paramount importance that the key centres remain operational until after the election and that most would be maintained until the end of 1946 at the least. In the meantime, the press attaché was given the task of visiting all the centres in order to advise them on ways they could provide their services at lower cost. The centres to be taken over from the AGIS included those in Athens (plus Piraeus, Corinth, Chalkis and Levadia), peninsula off non-​antagonistic Socialist Republics, where minority rights would be respected. For its opponents, the adoption of this position ‘proofed’ the ‘anti-​ Greek’ politics of the KKE, and evidence of its involvement in a Cominform plot to subvert the Tito regime by supporting Bulgaria’s plan to create its own ‘Macedonia’ which would have included parts of northern Greece. Considering Moscow’s hostility to the KKE plan for autonomous republics in the Balkans, such criticisms of the KKE position are difficult to justify. For more see Dimitris Livanios, The Macedonian Question: Britain and the Southern Balkans, 1939–​1949 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), and Alexis Heraclides, The Macedonian Question and the Macedonians: A History (London: Routledge, 2021). 131 Cf. Tom Winnifrith, Badlands-​ Borderlands:  A History of Northern Epirus/​ Southern Albania (London: Duckworth, 2002).

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Thessaloniki (including Kozani, Florina and Kavala), Ioannina (with its satellites in Corfu and Agrinion), Volos (with Larissa, Karditsa and Lamia), Patras (Tripoli and Kalamata) and Crete (Chania and Heraklion). The MOI continued to supply material to, and regularly serve, all the above centres. Some of the work of the AGIS, however, was taken over by the BC rather than the MOI. This was the case with the Samos centre, which, together with those of Mytilene and Chios, was previously supervised by the BC representative in Mytilene. The future of these three centres was to be decided following the election; they would either be closed down or kept running on a voluntary basis, with only Mytilene staying under BC supervision. This partnership with the BC underlined the connection between the work of the BC in Greece and that of the MOI. This connection was reinforced by the fact that –​on request from the BC’s representative in Athens –​a number of posts in the interim War Establishment were taken up by BC appointees. In this way, the MOI recovered the cost of these posts from the BC.132 A major arena for British publicity in Greece was print propaganda. Initially, Basic News –​a mimeographed news report in English, produced in Athens and Thessaloniki –​was the only source providing world news to the Greek press. In actuality, it served as a newspaper substitute for Allied military and official personnel in Greece. As such, most (almost 80 per cent) of the work of the AGIS Monitoring Service was dedicated to finding material for Basic News from various sources, including Globereuter European (via the Hellschreiber system), Globereuter Far Eastern (via Morse code), the LPS, the MOI (via Morse code) and the main BBC news bulletins at 9:00 and 18:00 GMT.133 The staff of Basic News numbered fifteen persons in Athens and nineteen in Thessaloniki. The Athens circulation reached 412 copies per day, though demand was lower than in Thessaloniki. Basic News ceased publication on 31 January 1946.134 Eklogi and AERA continued to be issued as publications of the British Embassy. Eklogi continued to 132 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st Feb-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 133 Ibid. 134 TNA:  FO  930/​426, Minutes, Waddell to Catling, 23 January 1946; Telegram, Empax 06229, Herbert to Balkan section, MOI, 29 January 1946.

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be translated and printed in Athens from editorial material from the UK. AERA continued production through MIME in Cairo, as Leeper considered its continuation an ‘essential part’ of the British propaganda services in Greece.135 A scheme for printing AERA in Athens was met with scepticism from representatives in both Cairo and Athens.136 A proposal to transfer both AERA and Eklogi to the Greek Publishing Company collapsed following a bout of financial and political difficulties; but the question was to be revisited when possible. The AGIS’ stocks of paper and ink, which were sufficient to meet a year’s supply at the existing rate of use, were placed in the care of the MOI. British publicity in Greece, however, depended principally on broadcasting. One factor that was certain from the outset –​even before the details of its operation were determined –​was that the officer appointed as head of broadcasting operations had to be knowledgeable and possess considerable experience in both administrative matters and basic technical matters. The plan to supply the EIR with two British engineers and an editor would maintain an adequate level of British government representation within the foundation –​a point of central concern throughout this process. In this context, provisions were made in the OEPEC report for three specialist posts. However, the report did not provide criteria for the appointments, and this was left for further consideration. There was consensus between the MOI and the FO regarding the need to supply Athens Radio with equipment and staff. It was feared, however, that such arrangements might raise political objections from the Americans and possibly from the Soviets. As a result, the British needed to maintain an air of caution with their interventions. In the event that those apprehensions materialized, two alternative actions would be taken. Herbert discarded the first of these proposed actions –​whereby the two engineers and the news editor would be directly employed by the EIR –​as impracticable, since it did not provide enough safety to the persons concerned. Herbert also rejected the second scenario –​in which the MOI would be part of 1 35 TNA: FO 930/​426, Leeper, Athens, to Cairo, 6 February 1946. 136 TNA:  FO  930/​426, Minutes, Mrs Oliver, Middle East Division, to Arnold Harrison, Balkans section, East European Information Department (EEID), FO, Burrows, Finance Division, 12 February 1946.

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a broader contract agreement catering to the transfer of radio equipment to the EIR –​on the basis that it would be unlikely to include the editors in the agreement. He advocated for passing the initiative to the British authorities in Athens and allowing them to table their own proposals for sale or loan –​including a clause for the two engineers and possibly the editor as well. The MOI had already instructed Athens that the Embassy’s Information Department would cover the editor’s expenses in the absence of other arrangements.137 Concerning broadcast propaganda itself, so long as the crisis conditions prevailed in Greece, exceptional measures in monitoring voice broadcasts were considered of paramount importance. The AGIS Monitoring Service was secured with a staff complement of twenty-​ two, and the MOI envisaged additional voice broadcasts in Greek from Russian and other Balkan stations.138 Herbert stayed in Greece until mid-​February to supervise the setting up of the MOI organization. He then left Scott-​Kilvert temporarily in charge, as acting head of the Embassy’s Press Department. This appointment was considered necessary139 given the volume of work that needed to be done and the fact that Lancaster could not take on this ‘vital but heavy commitment’ unaided.140 Moreover, Leeper described the Greek political situation at the time as ‘very ticklish’ and stressed that Lancaster was also in charge of all emergency information services operated by the Embassy ‘on behalf of the Greek government in the event of a total breakdown’.141 The nature of British involvement in the Greek crisis was so great that one could say the British were –​in essence –​in charge of the country. The stakes for British publicity in the country were high at this time, and the election 1 37 TNA: FO 930/​426, Minutes, Waddell to Miss Knott, 30 January 1946. 138 TNA: FO 930/​426, FP1/​306, Paper No. 2304, OEPEC, ‘Expenditure in Greece, 1st Feb-​31 July 1946’, 11 January 1946. 139 TNA: FO 930/​476, FP 5/​1/​907, Telegram No. 11, Leeper, Athens, to FO, 2 January 1946; Draft Telegram to Athens, 8 January 1946; Telegram No. 61, FO to Athens, 10 January 1946. 140 TNA:  FO  930/​476, FP  35/​1/​907, Telegram No.  89, Leeper, Athens, to FO, 12 January 1946. 141 TNA:  FO  930/​476, FP 35/​1/​907, Telegram No.  89, Leeper, Athens, to FO, 12 January 1946; Minutes, Dudley, 15 January 1946; Laskey, 17 January 1946.

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was only a few months away. The ‘centrist’ forces, which the British supported, ultimately did not hold on to power following the 31 March 1946 election, from which the EAM abstained. Instead, ‘an entirely different set of personalities’ gained power, as Leeper had anticipated before the election.142 This prospect most likely explained Leeper’s sense of urgency to accelerate some projects, including the re-​establishment of the BC, and to support –​with British help –​Greek state infrastructure schemes in the crucial period of national reconstruction. These schemes encompassed education reform, founding of the EIR and more. Leeper’s central goal was to safeguard British interests in Greece and to ensure the continuation of British cultural and technical influence in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In this effort, he insisted on maintaining pre-​war structures –​like the AGIS –​that had proved extremely successful in the past.

Before the plebiscite: Testing the staff capacity of the Athens Embassy Press Department Between the winding down of the AGIS on 1 February 1946 and the Greek election of 31 March 1946 was a period marked by transition leading up to the MOI takeover. It was hoped that by April, the Embassy’s Press Department could dispense altogether with its military establishment. This did not prove to be the case, however; while civilian personnel had steadily increased, none of the Class B releases143 –​over which the MOI was still negotiating –​had yet to materialize. There remained some fear that those officers who held key positions might be lost after the election, ‘when the importance of stating the British case and keeping British propaganda to the fore was paramount’. Such a lacuna would doubtless have a seriously negative effect on the work of the department. A hiatus

1 42 TNA: FO 924/​424, LC 1236, Letter, Leeper to Montagu-​Pollock, 1 March 1946. 143 After the end of the war, Class B was a special skill (doctor, electrician, etc.) military release that was given after request. Class A was the standard release that was given in accordance with age and length of service.

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of staff due to delays in London would be particularly unfortunate in the immediate aftermath of the election.144 On 4 April 1946, Lieutenant Colonel A. G. R. Rouse145 –​an MOI nominee146 –​arrived in Athens to take up his post as the first press attaché.147 Among his priorities were the staffing of the Embassy’s information networks in Athens and in the regions, and a comprehensive review of the work and establishment three months following his arrival. The most pressing gap in the complement of staff was the post of chief administrative officer –​a role that could take much of the administrative burden off Rouse’s shoulders. At this time, Rouse also had to make his first tour of the regions, visiting Patras and Ioannina first and the other offices shortly thereafter. Another matter to be tackled with urgency was the commercial sale of newspapers and periodicals, about which Rouse had already written fully to the FO. In the view of a likely and imminent propaganda push in Greece from the Soviets, and before the plebiscite, Sir Clifford J. Norton –​the new British ambassador –​was set to send the FO a request for immediate action in regard to the supply of newspapers, publications and periodicals.148 Until this point, the Mosquito Service had been delivering London newspapers to Athens within forty-​eight hours. However, this service was due to be discontinued at the end of June. In this eventuality, Athens would have to wait five or six days at least for these newspapers to arrive. In view of the Mosquito Service suspension and the scarcity of qualified personnel that could edit the Reuters News Bulletin, the Press

144 TNA: FO 930/​422, J. M. Kirkman, B. G. S. Lieutenant General Comd, HQ Land Forces, Greece, ‘Subject-​Proposal for a New W[ar] E[stablishment]’, ‘CM/​1200-​ 1 -​Increment to Information Department of British Embassy (Greece)’, copy to Press Department, British Embassy, 26 March 1946. 145 Rouse (later Sir Anthony), KCMG, OBE was Counsellor, Australia (1955–​1957), Counsellor (Information), Berlin (1959–​1962), Deputy Minister, Berlin (1962–​ 1964), Minister, Italy (1964–​1966), Consul General, New York (1966–​1971). 146 TNA: FO 930/​508, Minutes, A. Dudley, 15 February 1946. 147 TNA:  FO  930/​422, Empax 250, following for Stewart, Rome, from S. Mervyn Herbert, Deputy Director, European Division, MOI, 2 April 1946. 148 FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Serial No. 179, A. G. R Rouse, Press Attaché, HM Embassy, Athens, to Harrison, 25 April 1946; see also Minutes from Harrison to E.  J. Southern, FO, 29 April 1946.

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Office was authorized to continue its Bulletin.149 One enterprise that had been operating under the AGIS so far with considerable success was the mobile film units, consisting of four vans that covered the entire country. As there was a pressing need for driver-​projectionists to aid in this endeavour,150 the FO’s EEID sped up the departure of at least two directors of photography to Athens at this time.151 Both the AGIS and the Embassy’s Information Department considered it necessary to employ Greek interpreters to accompany the mobile film units, since the vans often visited remote villages where little to no English was spoken; the Establishment and Finance divisions of the MOI and FO agreed.152 The issue of driver-​ projectionists was finally settled in early June 1946 when the first cinema van began its tour of the region surrounding Thessaloniki. As soon as vans became available, another would be sent to Volos to service Central Greece while another would be sent to Patras to cover the Peloponnese and western Greece. A fourth van was expected to be operational as soon as the EEID obtained a driver-​projectionist.153 By the end of June, several personnel issues had been settled, including the urgent appointment of an administrative officer and a specialist post in the Reference and Feature Department. Moreover, Rouse asked the FO to confirm Class B releases for certain individuals, among them Sergeant A. G. Ellis. Based on his artistic qualifications and management skills, the sergeant was selected ‘to control a large staff of Greeks’; these abilities would help him manage the 149 TNA:  FO  930/​422, Minutes, Harrison to Southern Department, reference to Athens Telegram No. 469, 6 June 1946. 150 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Telegram, Athens to Miniform, London, Empax 342 for Films Division for Dowen from Rouse, 9 April 1946. 151 TNA:  FO  930/​422, P  1/​306, handwritten comments from Harrison to Miss Southern, 3 April 1946. 152 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Serial No. 204, Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, FO, 4 May 1946; Minutes, Harrison to Southern Department, reference Athens Serial No.  204, 11 May 1946; Balkan section (Greece) to Press Department (Athens), 18 May 1946; Letter, Establishment and Finance Department to Miss Dawson, Treasury Chambers, 20 May 1946; Letter Atkinson, Treasury Chambers, to E. J. Southern, FO, 28 May 1946. 153 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Draft Telegraph, Harrison to Athens, 3 June 1946; Serial No. 215, Harrison to Rouse, 5 July 1946.

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AIC and its studio. Similarly, Sergeant Pariente’s services were considered very valuable in Athens. Accordingly, the EEID secured his release and fitted him into the organization.154 In Thessaloniki, Coate –​now regional officer –​and Edward Peck, vice-​consul (1945–​1947), took control of the information office.155 These preparations fit into Rouse’s aims to have a full staff ready for the September plebiscite.156 In light of the June review of the entire staff, Norton, Lancaster and Rouse agreed that a reorganization plan to ensure the future efficiency of the Press Department was urgently required. This was outlined in Lancaster’s report, which was forwarded to the FO at the end of June. In this context, the Embassy recommended merging the press and radio sections of the Press Department under Newlands, who would act as Rouse’s deputy. The Embassy dispatched Newlands to London on 26 June, with the view that he needed to engage in discussions regarding this reorganization, especially as it pertained to the radio section.157 Even though Newlands’ absence of up to a month would burden Rouse at what was a feverish period leading up to the plebiscite, Rouse did not wish to jeopardize the reorganization plan.158 At the same time, Rouse was hesitant, fearing Newlands might not return. Norton thus urged the FO to accept Newlands’ retention. ‘Since Rouse was satisfied that Newlands was fully capable of running both sections and acting as his deputy,’ Norton wrote, ‘I think it would be a mistake not to accept his considered recommendation.’ In any case, the Embassy needed an experienced person who was as ‘good all round’ as Newlands, and it

154 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Minutes, Harrison to Gaines and Davis, reference Athens Serial No.  273, 11 June 1946; Empax  486, Press Department for Balkan section, 12 June 1946. 155 TNA:  FO  930/​422, P  1/​306, Serial No.  250, Rouse to Harrison, 17 May 1946; Draft Telegram, Harrison to Athens, 22 May 1946; Minutes, Harrison to Gaines, 31 May 1946. 156 TNA:  FO  930/​ 422, P  1/​ 306, Letter, Rouse to O’Donovan, Establishment Division, FO, 25 June 1946. 157 TNA:  FO  930/​422, P  1/​306, Empax  305, FO to Athens, Personal for Rouse, 4 June 1946. 158 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Empax 482, Norton to FO, Personal for Scott from Rouse, 7 June 1946.

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seemed unlikely that someone else would be found at that time.159 While the future of the broadcasting section was still under active discussion, the FO assured the Embassy that they accepted –​in principle –​the proposed amalgamation of the press and radio sections. That said, the Embassy outlined that Newlands could not act as Rouse’s deputy, as he did not satisfy the FO nationality rules.160

Intertwining policy and propaganda: Osbert Lancaster’s report of 20 June 1946 and the extension of the British publicity network across Greece The Embassy’s reorganization plan for the future efficiency of the Press Department was outlined in Lancaster’s report of 20 June 1946, which also contained the ambassador’s comments on the future of the BIS in Greece and Rouse’s additional notes on staff reorganization. Norton transmitted this file to Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and described it as an ‘extremely interesting and valuable’ report that ‘clearly brought out the interaction between policy and propaganda’.161 The report delved extensively into the past and future of the BIS in Greece and into the question of British publicity in the country extending from the ‘critical and difficult’ period of December 1944 to May 1946. As this strenuous period coincided with Lancaster’s position as press attaché, Norton suggested that Lancaster deserved commendation from the British government for his services. At the beginning of his report, Lancaster provided background on BIS activities in Greece. In the first year after the country’s liberation in October 1944, the AGIS –​a spin-​off of the PWB –​handled all 159 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Empax 508, Norton to FO, ‘Your Tel. No. 332’, 21 June 1946. 160 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Empax 364, FO to Athens, following Personal for Rouse from O’Donovan, 5 July 1946. 161 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Letter No.  171, C.  J. Norton to Ernest Bevin, 21 June 1946.

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propaganda and information services in Greece. The administrative part of this task was handled by the British Army, while the policy work was in the hands of the Embassy. A lot of the work done by the AGIS in this first year was commendable and indeed laid the foundations for future work in the country. However, the AGIS also left behind some ‘unfortunate legacies’.162 One such legacy was that the organization was disproportionately large, which subsequently fostered illusions as to the size and scale of BIS operations required in times of peace. It also handed down a habit that could only be described as administrative permissiveness. And though this tendency may have been justifiable in times of war, it would not be allowed by the Treasury during peacetime. Further, many AGIS staff members –​who were recruited by the Press Department –​had acquired a way of thinking that was quite specific to the field of military intelligence and would make it difficult for them to settle into any parallel civilian organization. Additionally, the Press Department was still affected by long-​term uncertainty regarding its future and the speed of a transition. Lancaster explained that the Press Department, which had been operating independently only three months prior, could not be held accountable for all that had happened before. The two central themes of the report were as follows: first, the enactment of a British propaganda policy in Greece during four defined periods (the December 1944 crisis, the aftermath of the Varkiza Agreement,163 the governments of Voulgaris and, later, Themistocles Sofoulis, and the period following the March 1946 election); and, second, all aspects of BIS organization, including its work in press, publications, radio and film as well as its regional structure, and the role of British press correspondents in Greece. The conclusion of Lancaster’s report provided four core principles and a series of proposals. Four appendices were also included, focusing on the 162 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 163 The December events ended with the defeat of the EAM and the signing of the Varkiza Agreement in February 1945. Although vague and subject to conflicting interpretations, the Varkiza Agreement offered a practical basis for compromise and eventual reconciliation. Instead, it was followed by a wave of rightist terror against the left.

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proposed regional organization, the information office in Rhodes (not yet part of Greece), the role of BC representatives in the provinces and the retention of some services for the purpose of monitoring. Lancaster’s report gave a significant account of British propaganda strategy in Greece up to the March election. He took stock –​from a British point of view –​of the closure of a period that was deemed highly favourable in the prevailing conditions, in which British interests in Greece were secured as the British had the means at their disposal to enforce their policies and political guidelines. In attempting to isolate the EAM politically and militarily, the British left the most dynamic and promising elements of Greek society offstage. At the same time, the British also failed to win over moderate elements in Greece and, thus, could not prevent the old political parties from coming to power. And while the liberal-​centrist forces owed much of their rise and position in power (up to the election) to the British, they failed to decisively dominate and ideologically reorient the mechanisms of the state according to their long-​term sociopolitical goals.164 In due course, this failure ushered in the return to power of the conservative right, which embodied in its ranks extreme right-​wing elements as well as legacies of the dictatorial Metaxas period. Many have argued that the March election marked the last chance to prevent a full-​blown civil war. The Lancaster report monitored this critical period for British propaganda in Greece and shed light –​from the British perspective –​on the reasons for its lack of success. The report focused on the objectives pursued by the British government, the resources it employed and ultimately its failure to create the preconditions for a smooth post-​war transition in Greece. Within this context, it may be instructive to outline the main points of Lancaster’s report. During the December 1944 crisis, the main driving force behind British propaganda in Greece was the crisis itself; as such, efforts were put in place to end what Lancaster termed ‘the resistance of the revolutionary

164 One such example was their abortive effort to deliver  –​while in power  –​the long-​awaited reform of the Greek educational system; this is discussed in detail in Charalambos Noutsos, Ο δρόμος της καμήλας και το σχολείο. Η εκπαιδευτική πολιτική στην Ελλάδα:  1944–​1946 [The Road of the Camel and the School. Educational Policy in Greece, 1944–​1946] (Athens: Bibliorama, 2003). See more in Chapter 4.

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forces’.165 With that said, the British government soon found itself obliged to justify these actions to an unfavourable public, both in Greece and at home. Following the Varkiza Agreement, British propaganda efforts attempted to gather support –​in Greece and abroad –​for a series of consecutive governments that the British believed would adopt moderate central policies and might be conducive to a positive future for Greece. In this spirit, the BIS displayed their support to the government in place at the time by providing ‘gifts of newsprint and special facilities’ to friendly newspapers. They also convinced the Voulgaris government to replace Anonimi Eteria Radiophonikon Ekpompon (AERE [Radio Broadcasting Company]) (which was controlled by the Germans) with a national broadcasting board. This new institution, as outlined by the BIS, should be directed by persons whose impartiality and sense of responsibility were to the satisfaction of the British government. Moreover, those in charge should safeguard the new institution against political interference by means of appropriate legislation, and they would be tasked with forging an effective reputation for the Greek government, ‘through the guidance given to the Foreign press’, in both the country itself and internationally. Aside from these general policies, the British adopted propaganda lines that catered to more specific needs. The first line was in response to Soviet propaganda attempts in the region. Throughout the December crisis, the Soviet press and radio broadcasts were cautious in that they avoided explicit attacks on British policy and instead directed their criticism to the Greek government. After the Voulgaris government took office, however, the Soviets and their satellites changed the tone of their propaganda significantly, becoming progressively more averse to Greece. The second specialized line of propaganda that developed at this time was motivated by the economic situation in Greece and the subsequent British support for an economic policy put forth by Minister of Supply Kyriakos Varvaressos,166 who worked in the Voulgaris government. Despite the publicity the British gave to Varvaressos’ economic 165 TNA:  FO  9 24/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 166 For the financial experiment of Varvaresos, its main components, the results and the causes of its failure, see Andreas Kakridis, Κυριάκος Βαρβαρέσος, Η Βιογραφία ως Οικονομική Ιστορία [Kyriakos Varvaressos, The Biography as Economic History] (Athens: Bank of Greece, 2017), Chapter 11.

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policy, Varvaressos failed to explain to the larger public the financial measures that would be adopted. This failure hampered the efforts taken by the BIS to convince the public that this economic policy was not only fully backed by the British government, but also that it was –​as the British believed –​the only sure road to recovery. The BIS now had to change tactic and convince the Greek public that there could be others –​apart from Varvaressos –​who could lead the country to a safe haven, with assistance from the British and with the proviso that public put an end to partisan squabbles and instead co-​operate loyally under the leadership of the veteran statesman Themistocles Sophoulis.167 By this time, however, the British faced additional difficulties stemming from an ever-​increasing wave of criticism, especially from the Soviet Union, in regard to British policy in Greece. As a result, the British were cautioned to be more careful with the wording of their broadcasts so as not to feed into the growing criticisms against them, which largely insinuated that Greece was henpecked by the British. This was a particularly sensitive issue at the time, Lancaster believed, as the Greek government now included personalities such as G. Kartalis and Heracles Petimezas, who were regarded as the favourites –​or the so-​ called ‘“white-​headed” boys’ –​of the Embassy and the Eleftheria group, which had enjoyed British support for some time. The British policy line in Greece, which aimed to strengthen the ‘centre’ and counteract the two poles of the EAM and the old-​party political system, ultimately brought the British into fighting against the extremists of both sides in ‘a war on two fronts’. Lancaster argued that the communist strategy was ‘framed expressly with the intention of sabotaging the Government’s programme’, while the ‘Extreme Right were soon as active as the Communists in intriguing against the Government’.168 In Lancaster’s words, throughout the period following the civil war, one of the major difficulties for the British emanated from ‘the guilelessness of left-​wing publicists in England in swallowing hook, line and sinker, all stories emanating 167 The Sofoulis government (November 1945–​April 1946) took over with British intervention following the resignation of two previous governments and the temporary takeover by the regent, Archbishop Damaskinos. The major issue on the political agenda in the autumn of 1945 was the referendum and parliamentary election. 168 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946.

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from Communist controlled sources in Greece’.169 To further aggravate things, ‘an extremely efficient EAM Information Service (Maritpress)’170 was established in London, thus obliging the BIS to halve its habitual work, resort to counter-​propaganda and take on ‘the negative role of denying slanders and exposing gross distortions of fact’.171 Apparently in connection with this, a plan was worked out in early February 1946 between Paniguian of the AGIS, Cecil Fleetwood-​May, Reuters European Manager, and the Greek authorities to establish a branch in London of the Athens News Agency ‘to ensure continuous contact with the British press and more complete enlightenment of the British people on Greek matters’ as well as ‘to enable the significance of the political and economic trends in Great Britain to be correctly assessed’. This plan, however, did not go ahead.172 Additionally, the BIS had two more issues to contend with: the sentiments fostered by the December 1944 events, which remained unabated, and some occasional, yet ongoing, agitation and anti-​British propaganda in some parts of the country. Lancaster incidentally pointed out that the BIS work ‘was not rendered any easier by the action of the British military authorities themselves’, as in the case of the requisitioning policy, which in his words ‘seemed on occasion expressly designed to alienate the affections of just that section of the Greek public whose support we had hitherto regarded as unwavering’.173 The election presented yet another difficulty, to which BIS developed two lines of argumentation. According to the first, the British government was interested only in ensuring the free expression of the people, irrespective of the result. According to the second, the voters were able to cast their ballots without fear of intimidation thanks to the presence 169 Ibid. 170 Maritpress was a news agency associated with the League for Democracy in Greece (1945–​1975), a British pressure group to campaign for a change in policy in post-​war Greece and to inform Members of Parliament and the British and international public about EAM/​ELAS. Records of the League for Democracy in Greece are held by King’s College London: Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives. 171 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 172 Heracles Petimezas Archives (hereafter, HPA): 387/​7, File ‘EIR (1945–​1946)’. 173 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946.

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of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections. But as Lancaster wryly noted, ‘it was by no means easy to convince the Greek public of the former, or the British and American public of the latter thesis’.174 Lancaster estimated that the widely held conviction held by the Greek public that the British government was eager for the king’s return would be near impossible to alter.175 As a result, it became clear that the core efforts of the BIS had largely failed up to that point. Despite these efforts, a right-​wing government gained power in Greece, and outside the country public opinion was doubtful as ever of the sagacity of the Greek policy deployed by the British. Given the circumstances, the Press Department needed to adopt a very different policy line to the one it had hitherto pursued; abandoning the ‘active and dynamic line’ and instead becoming ‘largely passive’ in nature. In this new order, Lancaster argued two courses of action should be adopted. For one, they should exert ‘all their power’ to counter the propaganda disseminated by Maritpress in London and the KKE in Greece. In this way, Lancaster suggested that the BIS should expose ‘to the best of our ability’ the attacks launched against the Greek government in the British and American press while avoiding being branded as the voice of that government. While the British would give no material support to any particular group of newspapers, they would try to ensure that opposition papers did not fold, given that these papers may, in the future, be an ally to British policy. The second course of action was more long term in nature and involved maintaining stable levels of British cultural influence in Greece. This second point put forward by Lancaster was marked as especially interesting by the reader of the document in London. In promoting the positive projection of Britain in Greece, Lancaster suggested that everything possible should be done to ensure the regular and consistent flow of books, articles and films. He was persuaded that in this respect, the BC and its language classes could play an important role –​even more so than that of the Press Department –​and that for this very reason the two bodies should co-​operate closely. As such, implementing Lancaster’s suggested ‘largely passive’ and ‘long-​run’ future plan

174 Ibid. 175 This was, however, the pursuit of British intervention in the country’s political affairs, as historical research has plainly shown. The Greek and foreign literature on the subject is extensive.

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for British propaganda in Greece would require the adjustment and reorientation of British information and cultural policy in the country. On the of print propaganda front, the AGIS era was over. While British publications (via the AGIS) had enjoyed a wide distribution either as newspapers or as specially produced periodicals and posters, the information apparatus under which this operated could not be sustained –​and this was for reasons beyond the financial. By June 1946, British publications were restricted to only three: Eklogi, AERA and the Anglo-​Greek Review. Eklogi was a digest of articles produced by the PWE. AERA was a twice monthly paper with illustrations (bearing similarities to the publication Picture Post) printed in Cairo and circulated in the Middle East and Greece. Despite the occasional threat of closure, Lancaster believed it was important to continue publishing the latter because –​in his words –​it was ‘the most influential piece of British propaganda of its kind that we produce’.176 The Anglo-G ​ reek Review was at this point taken over from the AGIS by the BC and addressed to a more intellectual public; as such, it could render ‘a very useful service’.177 The distribution of publications, however, was a major hurdle given that commercial channels had not proved satisfactory. In the face of the potential end of Eklogi as a result of PWE’s closure as well as the possible discontinuation of AERA, Lancaster proposed the establishment of an Anglo-​Greek publishing house. Such an organization would take control over the entirety of British publications in Greece and ensure the translation of an annual selection of British books. The publishing house project was deemed highly desirable given that the British wanted to counteract competition from their foreign rivals in the publishing field. This was especially the case given the renewed publishing activities of the political left and consequent potential intellectual influence of the communists and ‘possibly the Soviets indirectly’, who, according to Lancaster, had already established themselves by getting ‘a firm footing in this sphere’. 176 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 177 See D. Tziovas, ‘Between Propaganda and Modernism: The Anglo-​Greek Review and the Rediscovery of Greece’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 123–​154.

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Certainly, this was something that the British ‘by no means’ wanted to ‘see enlarged’, Lancaster pointed out. To this end, Lancaster suggested that the British government should give the printing house considerable support’ and provide it with paper while also helping it to buy new press hardware from Britain.178 In fact, a British publishing scheme in Greece had been discussed in May 1945 (one year prior) at a series of meetings between the British Embassy and the AGIS in Athens. The British felt that the Greek publishing space possessed a significant vacuum in regard to the types of publications it circulated, lacking especially those that were of increasing interest in a post-​war era, including illustrated weeklies and political and financial reviews. However, many felt that it ‘may not be long before [this vacuum] is filled’, given that once rivals were allowed to enter into competition, the task ‘will be infinitely harder’.179 The British considered the most ‘dangerous’ rival in this field –​whether or not they were aided by the Americans –​to be D. Lambarakis, the publisher of two major daily Athenian newspapers: To Vima and Ta Nea. The British were also keenly aware of the ‘apparently large funds of the Left in this field’.180 Thus, plans were laid for the following enterprises: an illustrated weekly to keep the Greek public up to date with world events; a weekly political and financial review to be produced via the Eleftheria presses, with Heracles Petimezas as its director; a monthly book (focusing on topical subjects) to be translated from a select list drawn up by British representatives; and a supplementary book programme. It was unanimously agreed at the meetings between the British Embassy and the AGIS that, of these endeavours, priority would be given to an illustrated weekly and a political and financial weekly review.181 The proposed enterprises, however, failed to materialize despite Lancaster’s repeated attempts to revive the idea. Lancaster anticipated certain difficulties in the future that would affect the privileged position of the British in Greece and as a result he was not very optimistic about their ability 178 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 179 HPA:  I.  S. Scott-​Kilvert, Athens Embassy Press Department, to Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, AGIS, CMF, 18 May 1945 (File 387/​7, ‘Ministry of Press and Information –​ Broadcasting’). 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid.

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to maintain influence with the same ease. In this scenario, according to Lancaster, it would be necessary for the Press Department to deploy different activities to those undertaken in the past. Indeed, the AGIS policy that involved providing feature articles, news commentaries and more to individual newspapers had as yet yielded limited results. He believed that increasing the circulation of British articles in the Greek press would not, in itself, bring about any great changes. On the contrary, he held the view that it might be more beneficial to instead limit their services to a single daily newspaper, namely the H Kathimerini –​‘a moderate royalist [paper] in policy [with] the largest circulation in Greece’.182 What is more, the paper had already published a respectable number of articles sent by the British Embassy’s Press Office. Lancaster remarked that in his experience, the best way to keep up a regular supply of British news to the Greek press would be through indirect means. If any evidence of this was needed, he noted that four Athenian newspapers and one Thessaloniki newspaper had already signed contracts with Reuters. Additionally, the Embassy’s Press Office had already built ‘excellent relations’ with the official news agency of Greece: the Athens News Agency. Of the competencies of the Press Department, Lancaster mainly prioritized radio183 and film work. The situation of British films especially, was rather bleak, owing greatly to the difficulty the British faced in securing adequate distribution channels. This state of affairs inevitably pointed the finger at London, as it should be for the British government to follow a timely and more ‘firm and consistent policy’ to provide an effective solution for these problems. In contrast, American film interests had successfully ensconced themselves within the Greek market, largely thanks to the Skouras group. Soviet propaganda was also flourishing in the film sector, enjoying the ‘greatest measure of success’. Even the French were in a better position than the British, in that they controlled the majority of newsreels shown in Greece. As for the British position in Athens, their only hope –​even for meagre success –​was to secure ‘a large first-​run cinema in the centre of the 182 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 183 Lancaster’s remarks on matters pertaining to radio were the subject of a separate report; see more in Chapter 3.

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town’.184 Lancaster added that if all else failed, their only hope of improving the British position would be to take advantage of the rivalry –​both commercial and personal –​between Skouras and his competitors, especially Theofanis Damaskinos.185 Lancaster felt that the British position faced an added level of difficulty due to the fact that, at that moment, ‘a number of the most influential figures in the Greek film world [were] either openly EAM or closely connected with the Communist party’.186 Indeed, many Greek intellectuals and artists had either joined the EAM or the KKE, or had embraced their ideas –​and together constituted the majority of members in many Greek literary and art associations. However, the presumed intellectual hegemony of the left –​at least in the literary world –​was not a reality. One of the reasons was the lack of a unified political orientation and ideological homogeneity among the EAM and communist intelligentsia, as opposed to the relative uniformity of the bourgeois intelligentsia in defending their own chosen political system.187 Given the strong impression the December 1944 events had made on British public opinion, Lancaster proposed an additional role within the Press Department. To prevent a recurrence of the ‘unfortunate developments’ of the recent past, Lancaster pressed for a permanent officer –​properly trained to handle British correspondents –​to work in the Embassy. He stipulated that the press attaché should make it a priority to find someone for this new post. With the principle of ‘maximum efficiency’ in mind, Lancaster drew up a list of operating principles for the Press Department. Firstly, the Press Department should be part of the Embassy. Had this been the case with BIS in the past, many of the recurring problems would have been avoided and an economy of scale achieved. Instead, the BIS was previously ‘at the mercy of two separate organizations in London, [the] PWE 184 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 185 Film matters are discussed in Chapter 2. 186 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 187 See Vasilis Moschos, Οι λογοτέχνες στην ταξική αναμέτρηση της δεκαετίας 1940–​1950 [The Literature World in the Class Confrontation of the Decade 1940–​1950] (Athens: Synchroni Epochi, 2019), 113, 128, 140.

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and the Ministry of Information’.188 If the press attaché enjoyed London’s full confidence, he should also be allowed –​with the ambassador’s consent –​to take full responsibility for publicity. Further, policy discrepancies between the Embassy and the BBC, pertaining to their Greek broadcasts, had caused significant difficulties in the past. Lancaster was therefore persuaded of the need for closer co-​operation between London and Athens; this would come in the form of a directive issued weekly by the press attaché, which the BBC news editors would implement as instructed. Secondly, the BC and the Press Department should work in close proximity so as to benefit from even greater integration of their respective functions. This co-​ordination, however, could be primarily achieved in London. Thirdly, London should recognize the superior value of indirect and unofficial influence, as opposed to direct and official propaganda. As a result, the BIS should immediately increase and then sustain the volume of British periodicals, newspapers and books sent to Greece. Fourthly, provision of a long-​term and dependable voice-​monitoring service should be continued in order to mitigate the effects of communist propaganda. Additionally, the impact of the information disseminated by Soviet-​controlled sources should be dissipated by keeping ‘a very close watch on what is being said in the Greek press, by foreign radios in their Greek programmes and by the American press and the extreme left-​wing newspapers and Publicists in London’.189 Finally, according to Lancaster, it was necessary to monitor the BBC and some other radio foreign broadcasts on an ongoing basis. In doing so, the British would be able to react in a more timely fashion to important policy statements made in London and to minimize delays by Reuters or other agencies. This would enable them to correct the frequently outlandish dispatches made by London-​based Greek correspondents to their papers in Athens. Against the background of these issues, Lancaster considered it important for the press attaché to co-​operate very closely with the intelligence services of the British Embassy.

188 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 189 Ibid.

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However, Greece was not limited solely to Athens; moreover, the British had never adhered to the practice, followed by virtually every Greek government, of neglecting the provinces. The AGIS had established and maintained a wide network of regional officers in the country assigned to various tasks, which included the dissemination and monitoring of information, intelligence gathering and English language teaching. Still, the significant scale of the AGIS in wartime rendered it vulnerable to funding reductions in peacetime conditions. It was therefore decided to restrict the activities of the AGIS to a few locations only, namely Ioannina, Patras, Volos, Thessaloniki and Crete. This decision however proved impracticable owing to insufficient officers with the appropriate skills and experience to fill the posts in these locations. Further, the regional officers in question now had a much larger area in their remit, with considerably fewer resources at their disposal. The solution to this dilemma was to develop a policy that enabled closer co-​operation with the BC. At the time, the BC was also appointing its own regional officers –​unrelated to the Press Department –​while local intelligence was adequately catered for by consular reports. It was believed that such a synergistic scheme might avoid overlapping activities while also creating a pool of staff that could be used in a more efficient and logical way. To this end, Lancaster suggested appointing two permanent regional officers, based in Athens and Thessaloniki. The officers should speak Greek fluently and be intimately acquainted with Greece on the ground and as it had been shaped after the end of the war. The officers would travel around the country, meet with staff in the various centres and work together with the vice consuls and BC representatives.190 Norton laid out a vision for the task ahead in his comments to Bevin, addressing Lancaster’s suggestions for press section policy, the supply of publications, the position of regional staff, films and the role of British correspondents in Greece.191 Norton agreed generally with the suggestions 190 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 191 TNA: FO 930/​490, P 497/​1/​907, Despatch No. 171, Sir C. J. Norton to Ernest Bevin, HM Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘British Information Services in Greece’, 21 June 1946.

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submitted by Lancaster and in particular with the policy to be adopted under the current circumstances. In this regard, the BC’s role would be an important one. Norton did not agree with Lancaster’s contention that the Embassy’s Information Department should concentrate their services on H Kathimerini, but instead believed that the Information Department should endeavour to place as many British feature articles as possible in all sections of the Greek press. In this way, the British could inflate their indirect influence while also countering any possible charges of exclusive support for a single paper. In addition to the retention of AERA and Eklogi, friendly private agents should be placed throughout the country with the aim of selling approximately 20–​25 per cent of the publications. It was predicted that this would result in a material improvement in sales. Norton additionally attached great importance to the commercial sale of British daily newspapers and periodicals. This market was entirely dependent on the continuance of an adequate daily air service from the UK to Greece. The Embassy also gave Arthur Lee, the representative for Eagle-​Lion, ‘every possible support in his efforts’ to improve the present position in regard to film.192 On the issue of the reorganization of regional structures, Norton agreed with Lancaster’s suggestions in principle. He put forth, however, that the process of reorganization should be gradual, co-​ordinated closely with the BC and, in any case, secondary to the reorganization of the Athens office, which would require extremely careful handling and consideration. The agency with responsibility to act on these reports was the EEID; copies were also passed on to the MOI for reference only. The FO had clearly retained a central role on information matters. The Cultural Relations Department, the Southern Department, the News Department and the BBC also reviewed copies. The Cultural Relations Department was involved only insofar as the file contained several references to the work of the BC in Greece. In general, it was considered ‘an extremely interesting report’, based on ‘good sense and judgement’ and was of ‘much of value’ particularly in relation to organizational matters. As broadcasting was a key priority within British political circles at the time, considerable attention 192 TNA:  FO  930/​490, P  501, Letter, No.  172, Sir C. Norton to Ernest Bevin, 22 June 1946.

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was given to the level of support the British government should give to radio services in Greece. Much of the policy discussion in London concerned the management and handling of information within the Embassy’s Information Department, the co-​ordination of its activities with the BC and the overlapping areas of responsibility between British and Greek staff. Head of the EEID, M. H. Lovell, confirmed that concrete steps had been taken to tackle some of the issues raised in the report, namely those issues that pertained to the press section, publications and the radio.193 In Athens, the events leading up to the referendum of September 1946 created a series of complexities, to which the reorganized Information Department was called on to respond.

Post-​war reorganization of the British wartime foreign publicity machinery: The Athens Embassy’s Information Department The continuation of AGIS services until April 1946 can be seen in the context of a broader line adopted in Britain in September 1945, which kept virtually all of the wartime information apparatuses  –​domestic and overseas –​intact.194 The FO had retained much of its pre-​war control over the flow of information, rendering the COI  –​previously the MOI  –​more of a technical service department.195 In dealing with foreign publicity, the FO set up a number of information departments, each concerned with separate parts of the world. In 1949, these were absorbed into the Information Policy Department. In the context of the Cold War 1 93 TNA: FO 930/​490, P 497, Minutes, 11 and 22 July 1946 and 12 August 1946. 194 Moore, The Origins of Modern Spin, 17; cf. R. Cole, Britain and the War of Words in Neutral Europe, 1939–​45: The Art of the Possible (London: Macmillan, 1990). 195 Sir Fife Clark, The Central Office of Information, The New Whitehall Series, No. 15 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970); Mariel Grant, ‘Towards a Central Office of Information:  Continuity and Change in British Government Information Policy, 1939–​1951’, Journal of Contemporary History 34/​1 (1999), 49–​67.

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confrontation, the Information Policy Department handled most of the open propaganda,196 while the Information Research Department –​ which was initiated in 1948 –​dealt with the anti-​communist propaganda. Within the overall post-​war reorganization of the British foreign publicity structure, July 1946 saw a change to the title and status of information officers in overseas posts. By 1946, the title of ‘press attaché’ –​even more so than in the days of the MOI –​was largely a misnomer. The officers in question were now members of the Foreign Service, did not belong to any other service, and were attached to either the British Embassy or the British Legation.197 In Athens, Rouse –​whose title at that point was information officer198 –​suggested a diagram of the intended new set-​up of the Embassy’s Information Department. He needed to prime his full complement of staff for the September plebiscite, an event that was expected to consume all of the Press Department’s energy. In his diagram, he combined the press and broadcasting sections and split up the former feature, photo and reference sections into their component parts. Within this scheme, E. Eliascos –​ hitherto employed as news advisor to the EIR –​was responsible for all of the outside work of placing the LPS and other feature material with the Athenian press and the Athens News Agency. From the former press section, Eliascos would take over the task of routine liaison with the local press and the Ministry of Press. From the former broadcasting section, Eliascos would absorb the charge of servicing the EIR with material for broadcast talks and features. The subsections of press liaison, press services, and photo and reference library would have joint use of a UK-​based secretary, while Eliascos would be responsible for all Greek staff in the pool. The other subsections, including press summary, Reuters summary, broadcast 196 Cf. J. B. Black, Organising the Propaganda Instrument: The British Experience (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 25–​27, 30–​31. 197 An FO circular was issued to that effect: TNA: FO 930/​490, P 509, FO Circular No. 95, 20 July 1946. 198 Harrison informed Rouse accordingly (TNA: FO 930/​422, FO Minutes, Scott to Dudley, 5 June 1946; Robert Fraser, COI, to Alan Dudley, FO, 3 July 1946; Serial No. 254, Harrison to Press Department, Athens, 7 August 1946; Serial No. 519, Athens to Harrison, 16 August 1946.

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programmes and monitoring would not be changed.199 Objections, however, were raised by the MOI regarding the large responsibility attributed in the plan to Eliascos, detailing that this would leave ‘all press liaison and servicing to Greeks’. Instead, they suggested that the assistant press attaché in Athens should take an active part in this process. The EEID agreed that leaving too much responsibility to the Greek staff would be a ‘great danger in the next [twelve] months’ and subsequently concluded that it would be essential to have both an assistant press attaché and a locally engaged British head of both the press and broadcasting sections.200 At the same time, Rouse was also focused on the regional organizational issues. One of the main pillars of Lancaster’s scheme for Information Department reorganization had been the retention of its regional network. Rouse had already toured the country and visited all of the Press Department’s information centres on the mainland and the islands –​apart from those on Chios, Mytilene and Samos (which Eland had visited between 10 and 21 June 1946). Rouse’s visits to Rhodes and Crete were put on hold, however, as he was preoccupied with administrative work in Athens.201 The purpose of these tours was to scrutinize the operation of the regional information centres and to report on their present utility within the broader post-​war strategy. Recommendations would then be made regarding the future of each centre. Closer co-​operation with the BC –​ something on which both Norton and Rouse agreed –​should be a core principle observed throughout the country.202 Rouse was also convinced that if the ‘right people’ –​particularly the Greeks –​staffed the new structure, their plan would be sound and would lead not only to an efficient working environment but also to closer control of regional activities. 199 TNA: FO 930/​422, Rouse, Press Attaché, British Embassy, Athens, Confidential, ‘Staff Reorganisation’, 22 June 1946. 200 FO  930/​422, Minutes, Harrison to Norman Davis, Balkan section (Greece), MOI, 4 July 1946; Minutes (handwritten), Harrison to Lovell, 9 July 1946; Lovell to Harrison, 10 July 1946. 201 TNA: FO 930/​422, Rouse to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, ‘Further to My Letter of the 6th August Concerning the Proposed Regional Reorganisation’, 19 August 1946. 202 TNA: FO 930/​422, Serial No. 419, Rouse to Balkan section, FO, 4 July 1946.

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To Arnold Harrison of the EEID, Rouse submitted a series of provisional staff appointments for the various posts as well as for the position of deputy and head of the press and radio sections –​a post that Rouse considered an absolute priority but which had remained vacant. With the plebiscite period fast approaching, Rouse worked ‘virtually single-​handed[ly]’ and under considerable duress. He was anxious to have Newlands, then still in London, help put the new organization into effect. It was decided by the FO that Newlands was to stay in Athens for the remainder of 1946.203 Coate, Eland and Newlands then returned to Athens, which eased Rouse’s burden of work. In the meantime, the FO presented J. C. McMinnies as candidate for the post of deputy; he would also take responsibility for the press and radio sections. The Embassy promptly approved McMinnies’ appointment204 and the new deputy arrived in Athens in late September 1946.205 With Rouse’s deputy selected, it was then feasible to decide which posts would be necessary for the new structure.206 The size and scale of activities in the regional offices were considerably reduced. With the FO’s consent,207 the Ioannina office closed down altogether on 31 July, and the area was then covered by the Patras office and the BC representative in Corfu. In this way, the Embassy’s Information Department would adequately cover Epirus.208 The Volos office was also reorganized.209 The future of the Crete office was more complicated as it 203 TNA:  FO  930/​422, Letter, Strictly Confidential, Rouse to Harrison, Balkan section, FO, 6 August 1946. See also handwritten comments by Harrison in the margin of the page. 204 TNA:  FO  930/​423, Telegram, Empax  648, Rouse to Harrison, Balkan section, FO, 31 August 1946. 205 TNA:  FO  930/​ 423, Draft Telegram to Athens, 25 September 1946. See TNA: FO 930/​427, ‘Organisation in Greece, Movements of Staff ’. 206 TNA:  FO  930/​422, Letter, Lovell, EEID, to Rouse, 26 August 1946; Minutes (handwritten), Lovell to Ruthven-​Murray, 26 August 1946; for Harrison to see, 27 August 1946. 207 TNA: FO 930/​424, Minutes, Southern to Gaines, 26 July 1946; Draft Telegram to Athens, 31 July 1946. 208 TNA:  FO  930/​422, Letter, Strictly Confidential, Rouse to Harrison, Balkan section, FO, 6 August 1946. 209 TNA: FO 930/​424, Telegram, Empax 667, Athens (Rouse) to Balkan section, 11 September 1946; Telegram, Empax 463, to Athens, 13 September 1946.

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experienced difficulties in appointing a Greek national to take charge. In the case of Crete, a traditionally liberal stronghold, a section of the Greek public –​especially those who leaned to the left –​regarded the activities of information offices in the country as ‘“the Intelligence Service of the British”’ and part of an overarching ‘spy ring’; many also held the view that the efforts of these offices were ‘simply for propaganda and other dark designs’.210 In response, the intention of the FO was to transfer a British national to the region in the spring of 1947.211 Rouse initiated the process of regional reorganization by filling the post of touring officer –​who would be based in Athens –​with Captain Mayes, a former AGIS employee who spoke Greek and was ‘extremely experienced’ in all aspects of information work. The implementation of other arrangements could be put on hold pending Rouse’s October meetings in London, giving time to observe how the suggested changes to the organization would function.212 The evidence cited in this chapter strongly indicates that Leeper, as ambassador, wished to have as free a hand as possible in managing information and propaganda issues in Greece. Since the British government had made significant political investments in the country’s post-​war development, Leeper was also mindful of –​and often perhaps unnecessarily anxious about –​issues that the FO treated with more pragmatism. While Leeper was a relentless supporter of efforts by the FO and others to project positive images of Britain in Greece and fervently believed in the persuasive power of cultural propaganda, he nonetheless had poor relations with the press and found it difficult to gain their trust. He trusted only those with whom he had collaborated in the past and whose work he knew. The 210 TNA: FO 930/​424, Letter, Commander F. G. Pool, Consul for Crete to the Press Attaché, British Embassy, 6 November 1946. 211 TNA: FO 930/​424, Serial No. 813, Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, 20 December 1946; Letter, F. G. Pool, Consul for Crete to the Press Attaché, British Embassy, 6 November 1946; Minutes (handwritten), Harrison to Ruthven-​Murray, n.d. 212 TNA: FO 930/​422, Letter, Private and Confidential, Rouse to Lovell, Private and Confidential, 29 August 1946; Letter, Strictly Confidential, Rouse to Harrison, 6 August 1946; Harrison to Ruthven-​Murray, 31 August 1946. TNA: FO 930/​423, Minutes, Ruthven-​Murray to Gaines, 6 September 1946; Harrison to Gaines, Ref. Rouse’s letter of 29 August to Lovell, 19 September 1946.

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appointment of the ‘right men’ to the BIS in Greece led to long and often strained interactions between London and the British Embassy in Athens, but was also indicative of lingering procedural tensions that led to delays in urgent decision-​making. Leeper was convinced that the ultimate success of the British work abroad depended largely on the heads of overseas missions and their personal initiative.213 There were, however, important areas of agreement between London and the Athens Embassy. The transition from diplomatic structures dominated by military personnel to ones that were principally guided by civilians occurred gradually. Moreover every attempt was made by both the FO and the Embassy to maintain continuity during the handover from the AGIS to the newly established post-​war Information Department of the Embassy. Both also recognized that regional networking and the maintenance of key information posts across Greece would be central to the future success of British publicity policy. As will be seen in the following chapters, the systematic and detailed gathering of information from each of these nationwide information networks would, in time, not only significantly shape Greek attitudes towards Britain, but also influence the ways in which British publicity and information policy was applied in Greece.

213

Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 141.

Chapter 2

The Implementation of British Publicity Policy in Greece from 1946

Once the reorganization of the British Information Service (BIS) was complete and a communication network was installed between the British Embassy and regional offices in the major cities of Greece, a vast flow of communication commenced, covering every aspect of British print, illustration, broadcasting and commercial publicity in Greece. Highly detailed reports were transmitted by the British Embassy’s Information Department principally to the Foreign Office (FO) information departments, the Central Office of Information (COI) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Gradually these reports took on a more formalized and indeed formulaic shape. Based largely on these reports –​a rich vein of previously under-​researched evidence –​this chapter analyses the variety of British publicity strategies employed in Greece and evaluates their effectiveness. With the adoption in January 1948 of a British foreign policy designed to ‘check the inroads of communism’,1 the Information Research Department (IRD) became the main co-​ordinator of Britain’s Cold War publicity policy. Its key task was to ensure that existing channels were used more effectively for the new purposes. After a difficult period of transition that necessitated considerable reorganization, the progress made during 1946 was deemed satisfactory. The British Embassy’s Information Department was now ‘“on its feet”’, nearly complete and working ‘smoothly’,2 with the regional reorganization proceeding according to plan. Rouse anticipated even greater progress and 1 2

TNA: CAB 129/​23, ‘Future Foreign Publicity Policy’, 4 January 1948. TNA: FO 953/​27, A. G. R. Rouse to Balkan section, East European Information Department (EEID), ‘Quarterly Report from Athens for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’.

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achievements in 1947. The Information Department headquarters were on the fifth floor of the Metohikon Tameion building, located in the heart of the capital, where other high-​ranking Greek, British and American military services also hosted their offices.3 The Information Department held firm to this location despite multiple pressures. For one, the building was damaged by a fire on 5 July 1947; access restrictions followed due to stricter security measures being imposed.4 Further, the American Mission exerted substantial pressure, wishing to absorb the accommodation as part of its own expansion plans within the building.5 Nevertheless, the Information Department stayed put. The Information Department had to perform the huge task of cutting back the greatly expanded British wartime publicity services in Greece, as well as administering staff, premises, equipment and transport. ‘The change, when it comes’, Barbara Ruthven-​Murray of the Information Policy Department (IPD) remarked, would be ‘so noticeable that some agreed formula will be needed to explain it away!’6 Ruthven-​Murray visited the Information Department in April 1947 to observe in person the progress toward the drastic ‘axing’ imposed by London following the redirection of publicity policy, which had to be completed by the end of April 1947.7 The number of British staff was reduced from twenty-​three in April 1947 to eleven by the end of 1948. With the closing of the Patras and Volos offices in May 1948 and the Rhodes office in July, there was also a reduction of Greek staff. Due to the closing of the Athens Information Centre (AIC) in October 1948, yet more Greek staff were dismissed. From the end of 1946 to the end of 1948, the Athens office was gradually reduced from thirty-​seven rooms to eighteen. 3 4 5 6 7

Headquarters of the Greek War Service, headquarters of the British Air Force, British Naval Mission, American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 4286, Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’, 15 October 1947. TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June’, Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, 21 July 1947. TNA: FO 953/​27, PE 346, Minutes, Ruthven-​Murray, 7 March 1947. TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’, 19 April 1947.

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Reports from Greece: last quarter of 1946 to 1950 A principal role of the British Embassy’s Information Department was to act as the central point for intelligence and information gathering from across Greece. This involved the production of quarterly or monthly reports, based partly on tours of the provinces and prepared by British officials. Other British missions in Greece, including the British Military Mission and the Royal Air Force, also supported the department as circumstances required. These reports contained assessments of the local conditions along with the information officer’s general recommendations regarding appropriate actions. The reports also included detailed descriptions of a variety of media employed by British officials and other foreign powers (including press, radio, visual material, films, visitors and lecturers, commercial publicity, books and periodicals, information centres and libraries). These reports were then integrated into the regular political and economic reports assembled by the British missions in Greece. These reports provide remarkably detailed insights into the various forms of British publicity used in Greece, complete with assessments of their effectiveness. They were submitted in a standardized format and in general accordance with the instructions sent out to the missions abroad; this was to ensure that the information departments of the FO, the COI and the BBC received the material they required. The reports were subsequently sent to the COI, where the assessments on the suitability, use and quantities of materials were examined and arrangements were made to correct any irregularities.8 Close scrutiny of the issues raised and the means whereby they were addressed in local practice reveals the ways in which the British government organized its post-​war publicity and cultural policy in Greece. The main subject of these reports was publicity: printed, visual and commercial. As such, the reports provided details regarding press servicing, COI official publications and magazines, book imports, rival magazines (both local and foreign), the use of posters and gravures, and copyright issues. Photographs, exhibitions, film shows and the activities of the information centres and mobile libraries were categorized as visual publicity. Commercial publicity, as per these 8

TNA:  FO  953/​26, PE  244, Letter, Lovell, Director, Overseas Press Services Division, COI, to Harrison, 19 March 1947.

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reports, included programmes of visitors and lectureships in addition to intelligence on the activities of foreign competitors –​particularly the Americans, the French and the Soviets. Regional reports were a separate category. These were concerned with the servicing of the regions, especially in centres that no longer had information offices under British management and staff. Following the reorganization of the Embassy’s Information Department in 1946, reporting forms were expanded to include details of the ways in which ‘the British way and purpose have been publicized to Greece’.9 During the first two years of its operation, the system of reporting to the FO on the information work carried out in Greece –​a system that had been established in the early post-​war period –​proved to be both burdensome and inadequate. The information received in London from the Athens post was considered to be ‘very unequal’ in outcome, content and volume. Following a review, the FO devised a new template that was expected to generate accurate yet broad-​based progress reports –​which also included the technical information required by the COI –​in a more standardized form. This new format would discourage superfluous details and repetition while at the same time protecting the workload of the information officers, whose capacities were stretched at many locations due to staff reductions. In March 1949, a circular letter was dispatched by the FO to inform information officers of this new light-​touch reporting system.10 British publicity conduits: (i) printed publicity Rouse’s first quarterly report covered the last quarter of 1946 and followed the completion of the reorganization of the British Embassy’s Information Department. Detailed monthly reports covering feature placing, the servicing of photographic material and the functions of reference libraries and broadcasting services11 in Greece were prepared separately by McMinnies, 9 10 11

TNA:  FO  953/​27, PE  346, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. TNA: FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​1, Speaight, IPD, FO, Circular Letter to Information Officers No. 5, 3 March 1949 (mentioned in Warner’s letter of 20 April to Norton). The reports on broadcasting are discussed in Chapter 3.

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who served as head of the Information Department press and radio section from December 1946 until March 1947. In addition to the uses made of printed material, the Information Department was also concerned with the distribution of English-​language books throughout Greece. The Information Department recorded data on book sales, books distributed freely, translation of English titles into Greek and French, and the number of copies of Eklogi and AERA circulated in each region. A monthly ‘Field Report from Regions’, based on this data, was compiled by R. T. Eland, the head of the publications section. The press and radio section undertook efforts to continue distribution of its standard publicity materials to the Greek press.12 The Information Department’s press liaison officer, E. Eliascos, cultivated personal contacts with Athenian editors and journalists, who offered ‘invaluable aid’. Aside from the routine print and pictorial matter, the Embassy’s most important items –​ including speeches and authoritative policy statements made by the FO or other British ministries –​appeared ‘on countless occasions’ in the Greek press, thanks to successful liaisons with the latter.13 The Embassy’s bulletins were also included in the Athenian press, except when space constraints were imposed due to exceptional local or international events –​especially those of Greek interest.14 The section also supplied some Athenian newspapers at no cost with a selection of British dailies and periodicals. In this way, the daily London Press Service (LPS) editorials and comments, along with other material drawn from the British press, found a sustained market in the Greek press. These items were ‘avidly devoured’ by the Greek public, especially when international events had a direct connection with the country.15 The increase in 12 13 14 15

TNA: FO 953/​27, ‘Quarterly Report from Athens for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. Ibid. For instance, in February 1947, less British publicity material was carried in the Athens press due to the reporting of the work process of the United Nations Commission for the Investigation of Greek Frontier Incidents ( January–​September 1947). Such as Greek national claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, the mining of British destroyers off Corfu in 1946, the announcement on 23 October 1946 of the British reform plan for Cyprus or when the ‘Greek question’ was brought before the UN Security Council three times during 1946 as result of the growing friction between Britain and the Soviet Union over their post-​war aims.

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circulation of British newspapers was, therefore, deemed necessary to project the British perspective among the Greek public, to enhance goodwill and to meet a growing public demand for information. The increase in circulation of the daily Athens Press Summary, the weekly Survey of Public Opinion, the monthly Regional Press Review and the daily Reuters News Summary continued at pace; meanwhile, regular requests for full translations of articles and summaries were duly supplied by the section. In addition, signed political articles and industrial and economic items found a regular market, often on an exclusive basis, taking into account the known requirements of the editors. Thus, W. N. Ewer’s16 articles were published regularly each week in the leading liberal paper To Vima –​second in circulation among the Athens dailies –​and proved to be ‘the most successful’17 of all LPS features, while Henry Wickham Steed’s18 work appeared in H Kathimerini and John Gretton’s19 appeared in Ta 16 William Norman Ewer (1885–​1976) was a journalist and was foreign editor of the Daily Herald (1919–​1929). It has been argued that Ewer had Bolshevik (refers to Soviet Union from 1917 until 1923) links and he was active in organizing espionage networks that targeted British and French bourgeois governments. The Ewer case did not lead to prosecution. See Christopher Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorised History of MI5 (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 152–​159. He became disillusioned with the Soviet Union and was an anti-​communist member of the Labour Party after the Second World War. See Huw Richards, The Bloody Circus: The Daily Herald and the Left (London: Pluto Press, 1997). He continued to write on foreign affairs into the Cold War years, taking an anti-​Soviet line. 17 TNA: FO 953/​27, ‘Quarterly Report from Athens for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. 18 Henry Wickham Steed (1871–​1956) was a journalist and historian, foreign correspondent and editor of The Times (1919–​1922). Steed strongly disapproved of the Bolshevik regime in Russia and was among the first to express alarm about the rise of Adolf Hitler and argue against appeasement; cf. Henry Wickham Steed, Vital Peace:  A Study of Risks (London:  Constable, 1936). He lectured at King’s College London (1925–​1938) and was a prominent BBC broadcaster on world affairs (1937–​1947). His works include: The Meaning of Hitlerism (London: Nisbet And Co. Ltd, 1934); The Press (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1938); Our War Aims (London: Secker and Warburg, 1939); and The Fifth Arm (Some Call It Propaganda) (London: Constable, 1940). 19 John Gretton, 1st Baron Gretton (1867–​1947) was a Conservative Member of Parliament.

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Nea and Ellinikon Aima. In addition, John Kingsley’s ‘Economist’s Notebook from London’ was published in the fortnightly Oikonomologiki and was also translated and printed by Mellon –​a new financial weekly –​and some regional papers. Political features by Lindley Fraser20 were supplied to Ethnos. In general, all signed articles were distributed for broad circulation. Both the FO and the COI acknowledged the success of the Embassy’s Information Department in ensuring that articles on a variety of subjects were ‘faithfully’ reprinted by all the main Greek newspapers.21 Particular attention was given to translating as many feature materials as possible into Greek. This would render the material more digestible to the Greek public. What is more, Rouse found that translated material was in higher demand, as very few Athenian press outlets –​and even fewer regional outlets –​had adequate translation staff. It was considered essential to maintain the existing level of space available for British placements, especially in the regional press and at a time when there were no longer regional information centres to cover the entire country. The same rationale was followed when distributing the Regional Bulletin, the weekly press bulletin for the regions; the bulletin was prepared in Athens in both English and Greek, sent directly to some 150 provincial editors and then issued to and printed in the provinces several days ahead of Athenian press. The Regional Bulletin consisted of LPS and COI items on politics, economics, naval and aeronautical subjects, commerce, science and invention. A similar newsletter in Greek, issued fortnightly, was launched by the Patras office and comprised of extracts from the British press, English lessons prepared by the British Council (BC) and advertisements for Eklogi. It was distributed free of charge to the leading personalities in Patras, which included 20 Lindley Macnaghten Fraser (1904–​1963) was a Scottish academic and broadcaster. He held university posts in the UK and US and in 1940 was recruited by the BBC to become head of its German service. His works include: Protection and Free Trade (London: L & V Press, 1931); Economic Thought and Language: A Critique of Some Fundamental Economic Concepts (London: A. & C. Black, 1937); Germany Between Two Wars:  A Study of Propaganda and War-​Guilt (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1944); and Propaganda (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1957). 21 TNA: FO 935/​26, PE 244, J. G. McMinnies, ‘Report for February 1947: Features, Photo and Reference Library’, 3 March 1947.

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businessmen, doctors, lawyers and teachers. In total, this newsletter had a circulation of 300. Rouse instructed that similar bulletins should be issued by the Crete and Thessaloniki offices, as he considered them ‘an excellent additional means of furthering our aims’.22 When the Patras and Volos offices closed in May 1948, however, it became necessary to reorganize the servicing of the provincial press outlets. As a result, a new service was inaugurated on 1 June 1948. Thereafter, the Athens office chose two weekly articles to edit and translate into Greek: typically one that was political in nature, selected from the LPS, and one with more general appeal, drawn from the COI features. These articles –​illustrated where possible –​were distributed to the provincial press with the immediate prospect of being used as material for broadcasts, in an arrangement between the Athens office and the Greek National Broadcasting Foundation (EIR). In addition to this new service, the Regional Bulletin, in Greek, continued to be sent to all provincial papers and to a number of influential persons in the regions. The usefulness of the Regional Bulletin was witnessed by McMinnies and Eland on their visits to Crete and Rhodes, respectively. The servicing of the regional press outlets continued according to plan during the third quarter of 1948. Three additional regional tours were conducted during this quarter, the aim being to evaluate the servicing of the regional press and to put in place any necessary improvements.23 The routine outputs described here worked towards the sustained and long-​term projection of specific themes, including the British economy and trade as well as British social and industrial welfare. As an example, following a series of requests from the Board of Trade, Rouse ensured that ‘the fullest possible publicity’ was given to all statistics concerning the recovery of Britain’s export trade. Moreover, on special occasions, the press and radio section launched publicity campaigns with the goal of either countering adverse political messages about Britain or promoting a particular purpose. For example, following the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, Greek public opinion about Britain faltered with the UK’s rejection 22 TNA: FO 953/​27: ‘Quarterly Report from Athens for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. 23 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’.

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of Greece’s territorial claims.24 In response, the section organized a publicity campaign aimed at pointing out the economic, military and political support Britain had previously provided to Greece. On key occasions, the section was also obliged to confirm or deny rumours circulating in the Athenian press about the British missions. Additionally, the section sometimes undertook publicity work on behalf of British military and political organizations. To this effect, among the topics featured most frequently in the Greek press were visits from important British personalities –​both sponsored and official visits25 –​and senior officials attached to the British military. After an agreement was made with the COI, the Reuters photographic service aided the section by providing photographic publicity for such events.26 In addition, the numerous British journalists who passed through the Embassy’s Information Department were tasked with keeping the press correspondents on the rails. However, some of the journalists were themselves critical of British policy towards Greece and 24 Cf. Vasilis Kondis, ‘Greek National Claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946’, Balkan Studies 32/​2 (1991), 309–​324. 25 Among the British politicians whose visits during 1947 and 1948 were considered important are: Sir Guildhaume Myrddin–​Evans, undersecretary to the Ministry of Labour and National Service and chair of the governing body of the International Labour Organisation; Sir Horace Seymour, in his capacity as chief British delegate to the United Nations Committee on the Balkans; Anthony Eden, who visited Athens at a critical stage of the second battle of Konitsa; George Thomas, Labour Member of Parliament; Central Viscount Long, conservative politician and Territorial Army officer (he was awarded the Knight Commander, Order of George I of Greece and Freedom of the City of Athens awards). Among other distinguished British visitors throughout this period were General Sir Ronald Adam, director of the BC, Lady Baden-​Powell in her official capacity as chief of the World Girl Guides at the end of 1948, Professor Arnold J. Toynbee under BC auspices (TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’). By early 1948, American officials outnumbered all visitors from other countries. Numerous American missions started to gather in Greece from early 1947, arriving steadily (TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’). Greece had undoubtedly entered the constellation of the US. 26 TNA: FO 953/​27, PE 346, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 21st December 1946’.

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of the Greek government’s handling of the political crisis.27 Thus, whenever there was a notable reaction from the Greek government regarding any of the visits, the Information Department was tasked to intervene.28 The Information Department assisted all the visitors by producing relevant publicity materials, handouts and photographs and by supporting their sojourns in the country. From January 1947 until the end of 1948, a new quarterly reporting system was introduced by which accounts from all sections of the Information Department –​containing detailed information on everything related to British publicity in Greece –​were assimilated into a single report and sent by the information officer to the FO. The report consisted of three parts. The first portion had an assessment of the suitability and use of written, visual and broadcasting material sent from London, along with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the materials and suggestions for better adapting them to local conditions in the context of ongoing political developments in Greece. In addition, this first part focused on the activities of British information centres, British and foreign visitors and lecturers, production services and commercial publicity. This segment looked especially to the activities of foreign countries in Greece, in particular the US and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union and France. The second part included matters concerning the administration and functioning of the Information Department. The third part provided statistical data and reports on special events held during the period covered by the report. In order to clearly assess the suitability of materials and their reception, the Information Department carried out qualitative and quantitative surveys of the Greek press as well as systematic monitoring of LPS transmissions in Greece. The Information Department sought to understand the publishing environment in Greece and ensure the effective placement of British publicity materials in Greek newspapers and periodicals. On the whole, the Greek public paid a lot of attention to British matters. Among major sections of the population, there was a ‘keen interest’ in visits by 27 On the British press attitudes towards Greece in the period 1943–​1949, see Koutsopanagou, The British Press. 28 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’.

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British writers and journalists to Greece. Lectures by writers attracted large audiences and were quoted by many Greek publishers and editors. Articles written by British correspondents were reprinted extensively in the Greek press, as they were regarded as carrying ‘much more weight’29 than the views expressed by other foreign journalists. The Information Department’s monitoring process provided details on the suitability and use made of each transmission and evaluated their impact. Of the LPS programmes, the most successful was ‘very definitely’ its Leader Summary, particularly summaries concerning Greek affairs. In Greece, many believed that these summaries expressed the official British voice, and as such they were reproduced throughout the Greek press. The Summary of Weeklies –​which covered European events and closely followed Greek developments –​was likewise in high demand. In late 1947, G. Syriotis, a former London correspondent and later an editor of To Vima, acquired the exclusive rights to this publication. The Westlock ‘News Letter from London’ was considered appropriate for the regional outlets, many of which were interested in British daily life. The demand for political feature articles on topical subjects remained constant, especially those written by well-​known writers such as ‘Scrutator’,30 Harold Nicolson,31 Lord Vansittart, Robert Waithman of the News Chronicle, L. D. Gammans, Conservative Member of Parliament, Hugh Massingham political correspondent of The Observer, E. M. Forster,32 Edith Sitwell,33 Laurie 29 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 30 An important outlet of editorial opinion in the Sunday Times was the leader page articles contributed by Robert Ensor under the pseudonym Scrutator. He held this post from 1941 to 1953. See ‘Sir Robert Ensor’, in Daniel Griffiths, ed., Encyclopedia of the British Press 1422–​1992 (London: Macmillan, 1992), 222. 31 T.  G. Otte, ‘Nicolson, Sir Harold George (1886–​1968)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, . He had written on Greece in his ‘Marginal Comment’ in The Spectator. 32 Edward Morgan Forster (1879–​1970) was an English novelist, nominated many times for the Nobel Prize in Literature. His best-​known novels include A Room with a View (London: E. Arnold, 1908), Howards End (London: E. Arnold, 1910) and A Passage to India (London: E. Arnold, 1924). 33 Dame Edith Louisa Sitwell, DBE (1887–​1964), was a British avant-​garde poet and critic. Some of her poems were published in the literary journal Ποιητική Τέχνη

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Lee,34 Ernest Barker35 and Cyril Falls.36 Among the British writers, Ewer’s commentaries in To Vima and several provincial papers, Gretton’s articles in Ta Nea and Ellinon Aima, and the weekly articles by John Kingsley in Oikonomologiki continued to be popular. The articles written by Guy Eden37 were also considered good quality. However, as trade unionism was a ‘rather delicate subject’38 in Greece,39 Herbert

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[Poetics Art], translated by the Greek poet Kleitos Kyrou. On the journal, see Aggela Kastrinaki, Η λογοτεχνία στην ταραγμένη δεκαετία 1940–​1950 [Literature in the Turbulent Decade of 1940–​1950] (Athens: Polis, 2005), 377. Laurence Edward Alan (Laurie) Lee, MBE (1914–​1997), was an English poet and writer. He was the screenwriter of the MOI film Cyprus Is an Island, a black-​and-​ white documentary shot on location in 1946 by Greenpark Productions, which specialized in corporate and government films; see Laurie Lee and Ralph Keene, We Made a Film in Cyprus (London: Longmans, 1947), 1–​2. Sir Ernest Barker (1874–​1960) was an English influential political scientist. Among his writings is The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (London: Methuen, 1906); see more in Julia Stapleton, Englishness and the Study of Politics:  The Social and Political Thought of Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Michael Howard, ‘Falls, Cyril Bentham (1888–​1971)’ Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, . Falls was a professor of military history at the University of Oxford. He was assigned at the historical section of the UK government’s Committee of Imperial Defence to contribute to writing the government’s Official History of the War. Eden was political correspondent of the Daily Express and author of Portrait of Churchill (London:  Hutchinson, 1950) and The Parliamentary Book (London:  Staples Press, 1953). TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. The Greek trade unions were facing acute and unsolvable problems after many years of suppression well before the Second World War. A Trades Union Congress (TUC) delegation visited Athens in 1945 (22 January–​3 February) to collect evidence on the spot on the issue of Greek trade unions, but it failed to convince in terms of its objectivity. Following Churchill’s instructions, the delegation avoided holding talks with Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM [National Liberation Front])/​Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (ELAS [National People’s Liberation Army]) members (TNA: FO 371/​48248, R1415, Draft Letter, Churchill to Sir Walter Citrine, General Secretary of the TUC, 16 January 1945). The publication of the TUC delegation report on 9 February, which had accepted the official version of events, unfavourably changed the atmosphere for EAM/​ELAS (Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 143–​146). For more, see G.  F.

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Tracey’s40 articles were not particularly appreciated by Greek readers.41 Feature articles were also welcome, especially those on economic subjects by Oscar Hobson,42 Kessler43 or Gordon Schaffer44 and articles about aviation, shipping or the global food outlook. Since there was not a dependable trade journal published in Greece, the daily press became the best source of industrial news about inventions, patents and more. This material was reproduced both in Athens and in the provinces. Sports articles were widely published in the Union Jack, the daily paper for the British troops in Greece, while scientific features by Ian Cox45 appeared occasionally in Athenian journals –​though medical articles were generally more popular. Summaries of parliamentary debates could be obtained from Reuters, and records of entire debates could be retrieved from Hansard. Even though the Greek press was primarily occupied with ongoing domestic problems and restricted by severe quotas on their newsprint, comments from British leaders on Greek affairs still found space in newspapers across the political spectrum. Comparable coverage was also given to international news

40 41 42 43 44

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Kouloules, Το ελληνικό συνδικαλιστικό κίνημα και οι ξένες επεμβάσεις (1944–​1948) [The Greek Trade Union Movement and Foreign Intervention (1944–​1948)] (Athens: Odysseas, 1995). Herbert Tracey (1884–​1955) worked in the TUC Publicity Department from 1917 to 1949, producing press statements, publications and the TUC magazine Labour. TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. Oscar Rudolf Hobson (1886–​1961) was a financial journalist and editor (Manchester Guardian, 1920–​1929; Financial Times, 1929–​1934; News Chronicle, 1935–​1939). He was knighted in 1955. This refers to Arthur Koestler (1905–​1983), the Hungarian-​born British writer and journalist. He is author of Darkness at Noon (New York: Macmillan, 1941). Schaffer was a British journalist and writer. From 1937 to 1953, he contributed to Reynold’s News. Among his works are:  Riches and Poverty (London:  Victor Gollancz, 1939); Labour Rules (with Elizabeth Shaw; London: Muse Arts, 1946); and Russian Zone (London: Allen and Unwin, 1947). Cox was a scientist by training. In 1936 he replaced Mary Adams, the pioneering science producer (1930–​1936), in the Talks Department of the BBC. He remained in post until the outbreak of war and returned briefly after the war. See Allan Jones, ‘Mary Adams and the Producer’s Role in Early BBC Science Broadcasts’, Public Understanding of Science 21/​8 (2011), 968–​983, 979.

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of Greek interest, including the activities of the United Nations Security Council, the Moscow Conference and British press comments regarding the Soviet Union. In contrast, British comments on non-​Greek events were more difficult to place. The Embassy’s Information Department also had difficulty in projecting stories regarding Egypt, Palestine, India or British home affairs in general. Also of little or no interest to the Greek press was material about affairs relating to the British Commonwealth or the British Empire, ‘which in Greece immediately call(ed) to mind the vexed question of Cyprus’.46 A distinctive feature of this period was the increasing interest in pictorial publishing. Beginning at the end of 1947, there was a growing demand for feature articles accompanied by photographs. ‘There are many instances where an otherwise acceptable article is refused for lack of illustration’, the information officer noted.47 At the end of 1947, a new British service offered the daily press one or two carefully selected features per week and endeavoured to attach a photograph to each one. While shortage of space limited the placing of many pictorial features, the articles most favoured for inclusion often had fashion photographs or lifestyle illustrations. COI feature articles on the British film industry and fashion enjoyed considerable popularity and were frequently highlighted in the Athenian press. British fashion articles began to be published in the Greek press as well, alternating with those supplied by the French Embassy’s Information Service. In general, Athenian editors and readers often demanded more feature articles and more signed articles with brief and clear sentences; this would make translation easier, facilitate more comments and consist of less straight reporting. All newspapers preferred exclusive articles. Since the daily press showed little to no interest in cultural material, such articles were placed instead in literary reviews and condensed for the Regional Bulletin. Among the literary journals that published British cultural material were leftist publications, such as Elefthera Grammata.48 It 46 TNA: FO 953/​26, PE 224, McMinnies to Balkan section (Greece), EEID, ‘LPS Report for January 1947’, 7 February 1947. 47 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 48 Elefthera Grammata (May 1945–​March 1951) was a forum for intellectuals of the (philo) communist left, especially the new generation of intellectuals of the wider

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should be noted that the spring of 1945 witnessed an intense surge in Greek publishing activity –​a kind of ‘Editorial Spring’ –​during which many new literary magazines appeared and many foreign works were translated into Greek.49 However, the optimism of European social idealism and political radicalism, generated throughout the Second World War, gradually yielded to a more cautious and pessimistic mood over this period. In the early years of liberated Greece, with political polarization yet to harden, a wave of socially oriented intellectual innovation emerged in Greek literary and artistic circles. A core component of this era was the dialogue opened up by literary journals with the West; this process involved organs of the Greek left such as Elefthera Grammata, which in its early years included many contributions from writers who were not normally associated with the left.50 This period of optimism and dialogue, in which the Greek government sought to convince international public opinion of its democratic inclinations, lasted only until 1947; it was at this point that freedom of expression witnessed a series of restrictions in line with the emergence of the Cold War.51 By 1948, Britain’s fresh anti-​communist emphasis led the Embassy’s Information Department into closer co-​operation with the BC in Athens, and from that summer onwards, new structures began to bear fruit. A notable example was Nea Hestia –​one of the longest-​running Greek intellectual reviews with a moderate, centrist profile and which, Rouse noted, had ‘never before printed any pro-​British article’. Beginning

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left who had been nurtured in the spirit and action of the EAM resistance, at a time when the country was inescapably facing the spectrum of a civil war with the hardening of ideological conflicts. The review regularly published translated articles and texts highlighting the principles of the socialist sense of the world; see Panagiotis Noutsos, Η σοσιαλιστική σκέψη στην Ελλάδα απο το 1875 ως το 1974 [Socialistic Thought in Greece from 1875 to 1974] (Athens:  Gnosi, 1995), 88, 89–​90,  95. Alexandros Argyriou, Η Μεταπολεμική Πεζογραφία. Από τον πόλεμο του ’40 ως τη δικατορία του ’67 [The Post-​War Prose. From the War of 1940 to the Dictatorship of 1967] (Athens: Sokolis, 1988), 48–​49, 51–​52, 72, 81; Kastrinaki, Η λογοτεχνία, 141, 143–​144,  225. Argyriou, Η Μεταπολεμική Πεζογραφία, 72. Argyriou, Η Μεταπολεμική Πεζογραφία, 76, 79, 83.

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in the first quarter of 1948, Nea Hestia started to publish regular excerpts from the weekly feature the ‘Cultural Newsletter’.52 But the steady flow of British publicity matter in Greece –​which until early 1947 had remained largely unchallenged –​faced a new and powerful competitor in the form of a print-​producing behemoth: the US. On 21 February 1946, the British government informed the US State Department that because of domestic economic difficulties, it would have to suspend economic aid to Greece by the end of March. Then, with the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947, Greece entered the zone of American responsibility. This had an impact on Greek public opinion in a number of ways, as Greek readers demonstrated a keen interest in the US perspective on world affairs and on Greece’s domestic difficulties. The Information Department –​which carefully monitored the public’s reception to its press activities –​found that after April 1947 a significant shift occurred in the general outlook of the Greek press, especially in relation to American output. Up until that point, Greek knowledge of US political developments and the aims of its foreign policy had been limited. However, following the announcement of the Marshall Plan, public interest increased rapidly and Greek newspaper editors considered it vital to inform people about related issues. With this objective in mind, leading Athenian daily newspapers signed contracts with major US newspapers for exclusive copyright of their articles in Greece, including H Kathimerini with the New York Herald Tribune, Eleftheria with The New York Times and Acropolis with the International News Service (INS). Although by the spring and summer of 1947 the British press had been slightly overshadowed by the proliferation of American news media, Greek interest in the American press was not accompanied by any coolness towards the British press. As a matter of fact, the Greek press continued to cite the British almost as often as they had previously.53 Generally speaking, British press articles on both national and international matters had almost regained their former position in the Greek press by the year’s end. Among the factors leading to an increase in British material was 52 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 53 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’.

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the British effort to further develop personal contacts with the leading Athenian newspapers and make British material available to them. After signing a contract with The Times, the editor of H Kathimerini, Emilios Hourmouzios, was invited to visit London and was given a very warm reception when he did so at the end of 1947. The next most important Greek daily, To Vima, never rejected articles by Ewer. The liberal outlet Ta Nea used large amounts of British material, in particular serializations of fiction –​a practice that also spread to other titles. Of these fiction pieces, Classical Landscape with Figures by Osbert Lancaster attracted the most attention.54 Ta Nea likewise published excerpts from the New Zealand author John Mulgan’s Report on Experience,55 which recounted his adventures while fighting with the Greeks in Thessaly during the occupation. H Kathimerini also serialized British books, though Rouse estimated that the paper demonstrated a preference for works by American authors.56 Thanks to an intensive effort on the part of the Embassy’s Information Department, British printed material maintained decent placements in the Greek press during 1948. Moreover, it was noted that most Greek papers published ‘most sympathetic and complimentary’ articles about Britain.57 In addition, the serialization of works by British authors and the reproduction of British articles –​especially those that were signed –​continued. H Kathimerini published the memoirs of Captain Farran, who served in Osbert Lancaster, Classical Landscape with Figures (London: Murray, 1947). This was ‘[a] highly unorthodox guide to Greece […] with a certain iconoclastic satire’ (Herbert M. Couch’s review, The Classical Weekly, 44/​11 (February 1951) 171–​172). It was written in Lancaster’s piercing witty style in an attempt to present a picture of Greece as it appeared to his own eyes. His book met with criticism by some Greek newspapers; cf. Embros, 8 November 1947, p.  3. See also Brian Howard’s review, ‘Through an Embassy Windscreen’, New Statesman (November 1947), mentioned in Marie-​Jaqueline Lancaster, Brian Howard:  Portrait of a Failure (London: Antony Blond, 1968), 287–​289. 55 John Mulgan, Report on Experience (London: Oxford University Press, 1947). 56 Notably such prominent figures as Joseph and Stewart Alsop, Summer Welles, Mark Sullivan, Walter Lippmann and James Byrnes (TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’). 5 7 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’.

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Greece during the German occupation. Ta Nea and Ethnos published, in a series, articles by E. H. Cookridge58 on the subject of wartime British intelligence work. Embros began publishing Field Marshal Lord Montgomery’s book From Alamein to the Sangro in serial format as well. The Information Department also launched a press campaign on 5 July 1948 –​with the aid of a series of articles provided by the COI –​to publicize the start of Britain’s new era of social security. Similarly, Britain’s role in the formation of the Western Union was well placed in the Greek press. On the occasion of the 1948 Olympics Games in London, with the Greek interest in mind, the British Embassy’s Information Department took up an initiative to ensure that H Vradyni staged an essay competition; its prize would be a free visit to the games. By the end of 1948, the Information Department made ‘two fruitful contacts’ with the popular magazines Thisavros and O Ilios, supplying both with illustrated sports articles, fashion features and more. In regard to the popular scientific journal O Ilios, the Information Department arranged –​through the BC –​to publish in its pages a regular English-​language lesson. Rouse reported that the published lessons proved to be a ‘great success’, especially in the provinces.59 As the outcome of the Greek Civil War neared a critical phase at the end of 1948, the Greek press was naturally more interested in international and domestic political developments pertaining to this subject, leaving less room for other material. As a result, material on the projection of Britain necessarily declined in favour of more overtly anti-​communist material. During this period, the Embassy’s most successful efforts were anti-​communist writings and scientific articles focusing on the menace of the atomic bomb and items on the Lysenko controversy, in addition to aeronautical and fashion articles.60 58

E. H. (Edward Henry) Cookridge (1908–​1979) is the pseudonym of Edward Spiro. Most of his works are concerned with spies and spying. In 1948 he wrote Secrets of the British Secret Service: Behind the Scenes of the Work of British Counter-​Espionage during the War (London: Sampson Low Marston & Co, 1948). He is the writer of the well-​known Orient Express: The Life and Times of the World’s Most Famous Train (London: Allen Lane, 1978). 59 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 0 Ibid. 6

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A further factor contributing to the Embassy’s success was that the British responded directly to the editorial needs of the Athenian afternoon papers, which were attracting more readers. All of the material supplied for publication was delivered from early in the morning and in accordance with ‘the requirements stated by telephone by each editor’.61 As an example, Rouse noted that H Vradyni was printed earlier than most others and its editor selected exclusive news items that were translated and sent by telephone directly to the press. Two more factors favoured the British material. Rouse detected that the moment was right for the British to promote their own cultural profile and develop a sense of prestige through the press. He spoke of a ‘general revival of Anglophilism’, which was partly accounted for ‘by the decline in the interest taken in French culture’, on which the Greeks had been ‘nurtured’ for years. Both the Embassy and the BC attributed this decline to criticisms of the French propaganda efforts for their association with the far left. Additionally, some criticism had been levelled at the American methods employed in Greece, which may also have contributed to this change in attitude. US press releases in Greece were considered by some to constitute little more than ‘direct, unscreened propaganda for American production and so on’.62 In contrast, Rouse estimated, British articles about international matters signed by well-​known writers were not perceived in the same way, and the BIS was frequently ‘highly praised for having propagated the British opinion rather than the British argument’.63 The concentration of military operations against the rebels on the northern border of Greece shifted interest from Athens to Thessaloniki, as the latter became the focal point of competition among foreign missions. By the end of 1947, the competition between foreign interests became more intense. Foreign news agencies were fast to render their services to newspapers in Thessaloniki. The four news agencies to sell rights in northern Greece were Reuters (Makedonia), the Associated Press (Makedonia), the INS (To Phos) and Agence France-​Presse (To Phos). Ellinikos Vorras and 61 62 63

TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. Ibid. Ibid.

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Nea Alithea had yet to make any contracts with a foreign news agency.64 From mid-​1948 onwards, the United States Information Service (USIS) –​ both in Athens and the regions –​supplemented its Daily News Bulletin with features and photographs. As a result, the bulletin typically received good coverage, especially in Thessaloniki, as indicated by the steady increase in published American features by the Thessaloniki press. To Phos substantially reduced its items from Reuters, and from July 1947 onwards, the newspaper became almost completely serviced by the INS; at a later stage, the paper came to an agreement with the INS that provided copyright on all its reports, features and photographs for all of northern Greece.65 There was also increasing interest –​especially from the Americans –​in servicing and providing facilities (mechanical equipment in particular) for newspapers in Thessaloniki. Nea Alithia put into operation an American Linotype machine in the summer of 1948 and received a second by the end of the year. Ellinikos Vorras received two American-​made Linotype machines, which were operational by mid-​December 1948 and, it was claimed, produced very satisfactory results.66 Elinikos Vorras likewise acquired a powerful wireless set supported by efficient monitoring services. A new INS teletype machine was installed in the offices of To Phos. This was widely publicized in the paper’s efforts to boost sales. Meanwhile, Ioannis Ioannides, the chief editor of Makedonia, visited Paris at the invitation of the French government. The information officer noted that this was ‘the first instance of an officially sponsored visit abroad by a representative of the Salonica (Thessaloniki) press’.67 At the height of the civil war, in late 1947, strict censorship rules came into force in Greece. The scarcity of news items prompted Greek readers to seek out information from foreign sources. Foreign missions, particularly 64 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. 65 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 66 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 67 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’.

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those of Britain and the US, made significant efforts to disseminate news material. Moreover, the press offices of foreign embassies released news bulletins for the Greek press to use. The censorship rules were imposed in the context of Resolution C of 18/​25 June 1946 on ‘emergency measures against those who conspire against the public order and the integrity of the State’. On 17 October 1947 (Resolution LA), press-​related legislative measures ‘concerning public order and security’, were expanded, and on 18 October (Resolution LB) three articles were added to Resolution C.68 The new resolution was implemented with such unprecedented speed that even Rouse was impressed. He reported that ‘less than 24 hours after the offending proclamation had been published, Rizospastis and Elefteri Ellada were suppressed,69 their editors and printers arrested and their offices and equipment seized’.70 By the end of 1947, left-​wing newspapers had been completely suppressed.71 By December 1948, the Greek authorities enforced preventive censorship measures on military news within the Greek media to such an extent that one paper bitterly complained that the only news to come out of Greece was that ‘a Greek had been swallowed by a shark and that a hawk had attacked an airplane’.72 While targeting the left in particular, these rules also affected the general tone of journalism in the country, as the news about Greece that was available to foreign readers both decreased and was more one-​sided. The Greek press received a summary of world news, either from the news bulletins issued by foreign missions’ press 68 Kostas Mayer, History of the Greek Press (Athens, 1959) 146–​152. 69 On 18 October 1947 (no. 3219 of the Council of the Athens Court of Appeal). 70 TNA: FO953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 71 The above-​mentioned resolutions created a legal mesh in the form of Compulsory Laws 509 (ΦΕΚ 293, 27 December 1947) and 511 (ΦΕΚ 299, 31 December 1947), segregating citizens on the basis of their political views and institutionally criminalizing communist ideology. Kostis Karpozilos, ‘Αντικομμουνισμός και Λογοκρισία’ [Anticommunism and Censorship], in P. Petsini and D. Christopoulos, eds, Λεξικό Λογοκρισίας στην Ελλάδα. Καχεκτική Δημοκρατία, Δικτατορία, Μεταπολίτευση [Dictionary of Censorship in Greece. Cachectic Democracy, Dictatorship, Metapolitevsi] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2017), 54–​65, 62. 72 TNA: FO 953/​554, ‘Quarterly Report, for the Period 1 October to 31 December 1948’.

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offices, their own correspondents abroad,73 their own independent sources or foreign news agencies. Several news agencies were already operating in Greece: Reuters had an Athens office while the Agence France-​Presse, the Turkish ‘Anatolia’, the United Press International, the Associated Press, the INS and the Overseas News Agency had correspondents in the country. The Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union] had a correspondent in Athens; that said, Greek papers –​ aside from the communist press –​were not regular subscribers to its service. For example, the Athens News Agency mainly monitored Reuters for its occasional quotes from the telegraph agency’s reports.74 Still, in the information battle, the British remained prolific –​at least until late autumn of 1947. Since the arrival of US Chief Information Officer George Edman, the USIS provided limited output, consisting of: the daily Bulletin sent to the Greek press from the US Embassy; a weekly airletter in Greek; special releases promoting American industrial production; and above all statistics on American economic aid to Greece. The USIS did not issue any articles, features or other written material for the use of the local press.75 Other foreign legations were not particularly active either on the information front. The French Consulate’s Press Department sent a bulletin with news and comments to Greek papers, though the British Embassy’s Information Department estimated that it found little resonance in the Greek press. The Canadian Embassy’s Information Service in Athens circulated the Airmail Bulletin as well as the Weekly Review of current events, while a similar publication in the form of a newsletter was distributed by the South African Legation.76 While overtly anti-​communist material had yet to be systematically channelled into the Greek publishing sphere, the flow gradually increased from early 1947, with the British again at the forefront. H Kathimerini, To Vima and, before its suppression, Rizospastis had their own correspondents in London. 74 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 7 5 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 76 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 73

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The change in British publicity policy and its hardening stance towards the Soviet Union led to a significant shift in both emphasis and tone of the material produced for release by the Athens Embassy. Rouse noticed that since the beginning of 1947, there was a ‘more unfortunate’ tendency of the LPS to issue ‘plain and obvious propaganda’, which had not normally been the case during the previous period.77 The trend towards such ‘obvious propaganda’ became more noticeable during the next phase of the Embassy’s Information Department’s development, as Britain’s foreign policy priorities shifted towards Cold War political polarization. From the second quarter of 1948 onwards, the Information Department began to place new anti-​communist IRD publicity material in both the Athens and Thessaloniki press, though the Information Department was initially met with ‘considerable and perhaps unexpected difficulty in finding an editor who was agreeable to publishing them all’. For some editors, the material was regarded as being ‘in too serious a vein’, whereas for others, certain articles were interpreted as being ‘double-​edged’.78 H Kathimerini rejected IRD materials on the grounds that its print space was already occupied by Churchill’s Memoirs, which at that time was being reproduced in a series. Nevertheless, Parliamentary Undersecretary Christopher Mayhew –​who was also the prime mover behind the creation of the IRD –​granted an ‘exclusive’ interview to H Kathimerini’s editor Hourmouzios during his British-​sponsored visit to London at the end of 1947, which featured ‘very fully and prominently’ in the newspaper.79 In general, the IRD material was ‘very satisfactorily’ shared among most of the Greek press, especially those with anti-​communist leanings. H Vradyni, the principal organ of the Populist Party, printed three of these articles on its front page and stated that their source was ‘a personality well acquainted with communist methods in Russia’. Five articles were published on consecutive front pages of Hestia, an intensely nationalist and anti-​communist paper. The sources published therein were presented as ‘official’, with the paper assuring its 77 Ibid. 78 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’ 79 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’; H Kathimerini, 10 December 1947, p. 1.

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readers that the information obtained was ‘of the highest integrity’. Ethnos, an anti-​communist paper, accepted a series of four articles in their original format, claiming them to be based on ‘authentic documents’ which revealed the ‘real situation’ in the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. In Thessaloniki, the IRD material was divided among Makedonia (the leading Thessaloniki newspaper), To Phos (the official organ of the Populist Party), Nea Alithia (whose material was almost exclusively based on reproducing articles from British and American newspapers) and Ellinikos Vorras. By the third quarter of 1948, the anti-​communist publicity material had in essence ‘all been placed’ in the Greek press. The weekly British Digest also supplemented this material, since its shorter items were often more accessible to ‘smaller and less serious papers’ in Athens and Thessaloniki, as well as to the provincial press and occasionally to the Greek National Broadcasting Foundation (EIR).80 While the British had begun to channel anti-​communist material into the Greek press at the beginning of 1947, the Americans had yet to develop their own official publicity machine and consequently often relied on British sources. American journalists, members of American missions and US Embassy employees even consulted the British Embassy’s Information Department press library. What is more, ‘in some cases’, Rouse noted, ‘Edman himself sends Americans to us for our help in their work’. Moreover the American publicity machine had yet to find its readers in Greece. In light of this, Rouse reported that the Greek press ‘unanimously agreed’ that they seldom used the USIS Bulletin for publication.81 Actually, the British estimated that the American anti-​communist publicity was ‘very ham-​handed’, and therefore the British line ‘very often’ differed from that of the Americans.82 Thus, American anti-​communist propaganda, in terms of both organizational and material production, lagged well behind the efforts of the British. Moreover, it was not until late 1948 that the Americans began to send a large number of information officers abroad. To 80 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’. 81 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 82 TNA: FO 1110/​1, PR 7, Letter, Warner to Sir John Balfour, British Ambassador to the USA, 16 February, 1948.

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the astonishment of the British, the American publicity machine abroad was ‘only now [October 1948] beginning to get underway’.83 While the British were interested in collaborating with the Americans on the anti-​ communist campaign and in exchanging anti-​communist material, they also maintained their own independent propaganda campaigns. The British information officer confirmed that he collaborated ‘as closely as is possible with USIS’ in exchanging periodicals and books.84 By mid-​1948, the USIS extended its news distribution activities. Fully supported financially by the AMAG, the USIS daily Bulletin broadened its content with more US news and comments as well as world headlines, excerpts from American newspapers and news features translated into Greek. On the AMAG’s first anniversary, the USIS facilitated publication of the mission’s annual report –​fully illustrated with photographs –​in all major Greek newspapers, despite their having limited space.85 Printed publications of all kinds were a major channel for British publicity in Greece. These publications included a wide spectrum of materials distributed without charge or for sale. In addition to official COI publications, arrangements were made for the distribution of a range of books, magazines, posters and gravures along with the commercial promotion of the main British daily and weekly newspapers and illustrated journals. Efforts were also made to enhance the circulation of British books exported to Greece and to facilitate public access to materials promoting the British library service in Greece and especially the reference library of the British Embassy’s Information Department. At the same time, the distribution of books from other countries –​mainly the US and France –​was kept under careful surveillance. Further, records were kept of the titles of books and magazines –​local and foreign –​that competed or had the potential to compete with the British corpus of printed publications. Full details of 83 TNA:  FO 1110/​128, Secret Memo by Warner, 6 October 1948, mentioned in Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 42–​43; see also Defty, Britain, America and Anti-​Communist Propaganda 1945–​53, 108. 84 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 85 TNA:  FO  953/​236, PE  1001, ‘Quarterly Report for Period January 1st to 31st March 1948’.

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the quotas allocated to book and magazine importers and specimens of successful foreign ventures were sent to London for further analysis. While the ‘principle’ of the Embassy’s Information Department was to sell ‘everything we receive whenever and wherever possible’,86 depending on the subject at hand, free copies of some COI books were distributed to specific recipients.87 However, Rouse complained that the numbers of COI official publications, books and booklets were insufficient to rival their competitors and that the existing book stocks were out of date. In contrast, he noted that the USIS had distributed many publications free of charge and shelved other attractive ones: ‘It is obviously not possible to achieve much with negligible supplies.’88 Rouse concluded by noting a need for bright, attractive booklets published by the COI on up-​to-​date topics. He continued that an attractive booklet in English on a popular, interesting topic could sell at least 500 copies, whereas more specialized books could probably sell only 200 or so.89 This indicates a more general issue for many areas of British publicity, but not for other foreign competitors, especially the Americans. The British were primarily concerned with projecting Britain as a global power, as opposed to garnering popular support through appealing or engaging presentation formats. The COI magazines for sale in Greece were the Echo, British Digest and To-​Day. The latter was not in great demand. Similarly, British Digest attracted little interest in Greece, being ‘too solid and pedantic’ compared with the American digests in English. American digests were some of the most successful English-​language magazines in the country, with sales

8 6 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for 1st January to 31 March 1947’. 87 These included certain sanatoria, orphanages and the Greek Armed Services through their welfare organizations. Another ‘very useful’ batch of Tourist Association booklets and leaflets from COI Balkans section was distributed free through the Information Department to regional posts and through leading tourist agencies in Athens and the provinces (in TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’). 88 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 89 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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figures running into the thousands. Readers Digest,90 for instance, sold –​ according to the commercial distributors –​4,500 copies per issue. Rouse estimated that the British Digest could only compete if its contents were ‘slightly lighter and more attractively presented’.91 Subsequently, the British Digest ceased publication in mid-​1947. In addition to the COI’s in-​house magazines, two other titles were actively promoted: Eklogi92 –​the Greek edition of Echo, which was locally produced and published by the British Embassy –​and the magazine of the British Information Service, Middle East, AERA, which was edited and published in Cairo. Eklogi and AERA were sold at the AIC and the Piraeus centre, and their sales figures were monitored on a quarterly basis. This data demonstrates that during the first quarter of 1947, the sales drive had not yet succeeded as Rouse had hoped. This was partly due to the fact that in the big towns, kiosks were flooded with predominantly American publications. For instance, Colliers Magazine sold 12,000 copies monthly in Athens alone –​a fact that likewise affected the circulation of all Greek publications, even the most popular magazines such as Thisavros and Romantso, whose readership dropped during this quarter. Moreover, distribution networks had been affected by the deterioration of communications owing to the raging civil war, especially in northern Greece. Mounting anxiety regarding the events unfolding in the north had deleterious effects on sales. After the closure of AERA, Eklogi became the only COI magazine distributed in the Greek market, albeit with back numbers of AERA. Evidence suggests that the FO contemplated a new illustrated magazine in Greek, which would be published in London, to replace AERA. The FO requested a recommendation for its production, which the Embassy sent to London in June 1947. The COI remained undecided about the merits of this project, and the proposal was eventually dropped in the spring of 1948. Nevertheless there was growing popular demand for more pictorial material, as this would convey messages visually and not require any knowledge of English. The Embassy voiced 90 The emblematic magazine of the American political culture; see Joanne P. Sharp, Condensing the Cold War:  Reader’s Digest and American Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 91 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for 1st January to 31 March 1947’. 92 See Koutsopanagou, ‘Moulding the Western European Identity’.

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complaints that it did not get enough pictorial items –​such as posters, gravures and other wall materials –​from the COI and continuously asked for more. In response, the COI sent a small quantity of sets of coloured gravures and photogravures,93 posters by the Tourist Association94 and some coloured pictorial maps of London. Such material was distributed to regional information offices, British consulates, the AIC, distributing agents, the Greek government’s Bureau of Tourism, Greek government ministries, the Greek Young Men’s Christian Association, clubs, cinemas (for foyer displays) and leading shipping agencies.95 No COI posters or gravures were sent to Athens until March 1948, despite the ‘very large and frequent’96 demand for this type of material. In June 1948, some British posters were distributed to various recipients including British European Airways, Scottish Airlines, travel agents, the Anglo-​Hellenic Chamber of Commerce and various clubs and societies.97 Once again, British publicity was called on to respond more effectively to the popular preferences of the people on the ground. In addition to newspapers and periodicals, British publicity services also relied on the publication and distribution of books. After the war, foreign books and magazines were in high demand in the Greek book market.98 The COI was ‘anxious’ to get the British Book Export scheme working in Greece. And while the Board of Trade wanted ‘normal trade channels to be made to work’,99 the 93

94 95 96 97 98 99

Fifty sets of ‘The Port of London’ and 24 sets of ‘Britain’s Cotton Industry’ (April–​ June 1947); ‘Recreation’ posterette in the ‘Life in Britain Today’ series; sets of the ‘Heart of the British Empire’ consisting of six small coloured photogravures of London (September 1947); royal wedding (last quarter of 1947) and royal family posters; souvenir posters to commemorate the royal birth (September 1948). Sets of the ‘Britain’ series (April–​July 1947); ‘Come to Britain’ photogravure posters; large picture maps called ‘London, the Bastion of Liberty (August 1947). TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. TNA:  FO  953/​236, PE  1001, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. Cf. Maria Rezan, Με νοσταλγία… [With Nostalgia] (Athens:  Patakis, 2000), 84, 113, 118. TNA: FO 953/​26, PE 244, Minutes, Miss J. Aitken, 3 February 1947.

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position regarding British book imports was considered by many to be unsatisfactory. In the first quarter of 1947, the Embassy’s Information Department conducted a survey among the seven major book-​importing organizations in Athens,100 assessing the percentage of books imported to Greece from different countries. The resulting data demonstrated that the US held the lion’s share with approximately 65 per cent of the trade in book and journal imports. Books from the United Kingdom came in second with a share of 25 per cent, while other countries –​mainly France –​absorbed the remaining 10 per cent. In explaining this disparity, the Greek organizations in question referred to the difficulties they experienced in obtaining British books and periodicals. They also averred that the quality of American material was often superior to that of the British. On account of the bleak state of the Greek economy, at the end of 1946 and beginning of 1947, the import of British books practically ceased. At the same time, the Greek government curtailed its imports to essentials and mandated that it would no longer be possible for book buyers to pay in sterling. The American aid to Greece (under the Marshall Plan) that entered into force in June 1947 was expected to ease the financial situation. Even with this support, the amount of foreign currency spent on books was not expected to match levels prior to 1946. With this in mind, the COI, the FO Balkans section of the Overseas Information Services and the Cultural Relations Department, along with the Board of Trade, investigated the possibility of an interim scheme that would allow Greek book buyers to purchase British books without having to pay in foreign currency.101 Nonetheless, the new quota allotted after April 1947 was ‘extremely unfavourable’ to British commercial interests.102 The quota was set in US dollars and as such acted as an incentive for buyers to purchase 100 The International Book Agency, Kaufman, Eleftheroudakis, Hachette, Tsivoglou, Ta Nea Vivlia and Lazarakis. 101 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 102 In April 1947, in view of the financial aid following the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, the first American ‘fact-​finding’ mission to Greece, headed by Paul A. Porter, submitted its report. One of its key recommendations  –​agreed by the Greek government (in October 1947) –​was the formation of the Foreign Trade Administration, headed by an American, to control foreign trade to Greece, mainly imports. Cf. Giorgos Stathakis, Το Δόγμα Τρούμαν & το Σχέδιο Μάρσαλ [The Truman Doctrine & the Marshall Plan] (Athens: Bibliorama, 2004), 165.

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from the US rather than other countries. Moreover, in terms of periodicals, the ‘sale or return’ practice of both the Americans and French was more attractive to the Greek tradesmen, prompting them to do business with those countries instead of Britain. For this reason only, very small quantities of The Illustrated London News, The Sphere, The New Statesman, The Economist and The Spectator were purchased. The Embassy’s commercial counsellor was set to negotiate with the Greek government to alter this quota to allocate space for sterling. But Rouse recognized that this would be ‘a long and arduous task because the Americans are not likely to release their grip on the new quota’. Given the American financial predominance in Greece, the British doubted whether the relevant Greek government department would ‘take very much notice of our representatives’.103 The position of the British book import trade continued to be ‘deplorable’ for the remainder of the summer and deteriorated further by September 1947.104 In September, Rouse informed the FO that Kauffman and Eleftheroudakis –​the two main bookshops in downtown Athens and ‘the oldest and best customers of the British book trade in this country’ –​expressed that they had exhausted their credit in Britain. They continued that unless the British could come to their aid quickly, they would both be obliged, ‘very unwillingly’, to approach the American market.105 Book importers in Athens and Thessaloniki explained that the disproportionate purchasing of American titles was largely due to delays from British exporters in processing purchase orders.106 American books and magazines dominated the Greek bookshops and kiosks. Booksellers and buyers alike frequently preferred the US editions of books because of their ‘slicker presentation’ –​this was especially the case for the cheap American versions of the British Penguin books. According to 103 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 104 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 105 Ibid. 106 According to leading book importers Cacoulides and Mazarakis in Athens and Molho in Thessaloniki, books ordered from the UK were received within thirty to thirty-​five days from the date of order, with an additional five to six days for books ordered to reach Thessaloniki. On the other hand, orders placed by them in America were taking seventy-​five days. The only books to arrive in Athens quicker were the French ones, which were delivered in fourteen days.

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information obtained by Rouse from the leading Greek book importers, the Greek public actually preferred British authors to American ones and were attracted to ‘serious subjects’ in fiction, principally by well-​known authors. However, anthologies and British classics were in short supply. The same was true of primary and secondary school books, which resulted in the production of cheap and poor-​quality US/​Greek textbooks. Despite this competition and the relatively weak commercial drive of British publishers, Rouse found that the demand for British books –​especially reference works, including the Encyclopaedia Britannica, textbooks and dictionaries, such as the Concise Oxford Dictionary –​was as high as ever.107 In contrast to the practically moribund British book market, the French book policies of the time were agile and flexible to the barriers of foreign currency transactions. Further, the French trade proved to be imaginative in making their commercial products attractive to the Greek public. According to Rouse, British publishers and their agents –​unlike their French counterparts and the Germans before the war –​showed far too little interest in what he termed ‘the propaganda side of the book trade’. This lack of interest on the part of the British book exporters was due to the paucity of orders, which in turn was partly attributed to a lack of initiative to supply Greek booksellers with catalogues. Rouse admired the way in which the French had made ‘a speciality of this side of book export’ and alerted London to the example set by the firm Hachette, which produced a monthly book catalogue –​or Bulletin Bibliographique du Department Étranger, called ‘Avez-​Vous lu?’ –​for the Greek market.108 However, following an exhaustion of the Greek supply of francs, a Franco-​Greek clearing exchange that had previously vastly privileged the French book export trade ceased to function. As a result, the export of French books to Greece came to a standstill (though magazines continued to be supplied on credit, at least until September 1947). Similar conditions applied in Thessaloniki. In this region, it appeared that the French were among the leaders in the book trade. The French trade was closely monitored by the French attaché d’information, who made occasional enquiries regarding 107 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 108 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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the price, suitability and accessibility of all books offered for sale in the location.109 G. R. Coate, the regional information officer, reported that aside from dictionaries, school books, a very small amount of fiction, and books on art, medicine and technical subjects, there had been an absence of English books or other publications in the area since March 1947. In an effort to explore readers’ thematic preferences, Coate consulted with Solomon Mair Molho, the biggest bookseller in Thessaloniki. Molho drew Coate’s attention to the ‘quality and seriousness’ of the French publications his bookshop received.110 The French prioritized scientific periodicals over fiction magazines, with examples being magazines such as Atome, La Science et la Vie and Science et Technique Pour Tous. Numéro Special was another successful French innovation. This published issues only occasionally, but devoted to one exclusive topic, usually pertaining to science and technology. And while these editions may have been expensive, they attracted subscribers. Rouse enclosed copies of these publications in his report with the intention to use them as samples for further analysis in London. Specimens of American books and booklets were also enclosed in Rouse’s report for the FO.111 By September 1947, the USIS became even more active. It provided a service that was met ‘with a tremendous response’ from the Greek public; the service acted as an ordering agent for American books and magazines and accepted payment on delivery in the local currency.112 In contrast to the British and French, the Americans did not need to actively promote their books or publications; nor did they monitor their circulation, as their publications flooded the market by virtue of their 109 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  (EEID)  2458, Serial No.  985, Rouse, Athens, to Balkan section, EEID, 19 April 1947. 110 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 111 Some of the enclosures included:  Laurence B. Chenoweth and Whitelaw Reid Morrison, Community Hygiene:  A Text Book in the Control of Communicable Diseases (New York: F. S. Crofts, 1941); Donald Hough, Captain Retread (New York: W. W. Norton, 1944); Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Teheran; The Story of Russia and America, 1781–​1943 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1944); Clifton Fadiman, Three Readers: An Omnibus of Novels, Stories (New York: The Press of the Readers Club, 1943). 112 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’.

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physical bulk, quality of presentation and popular appeal. On the other hand, the Soviet publishers passively supported the circulation of their periodicals in Greece by offering booksellers indefinite lines of credit. From the end of 1946, their sole exporting agency Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga supplied Thessaloniki with two Soviet propaganda publications –​New Times and Soviet Woman –​ essentially free of charge and issued in four languages: English, French, Greek and Russian. Other forms of Soviet literature were exported in French and English only. In addition, the publications Izvestia, Pravda and Troud were also sent to booksellers. However, owing to lack of demand, very few works of Russian literature were imported into Greece.113 Eventually, the Americans, as the key economic players in Greece, set the rules for the book market as well. From January 1948, import licences for books or magazines were not granted without the signature of an official from AMAG;114 this official was attached to the Greek Ministry of National Economy and personally vetted each application. In Athens, approximately 15 per cent of the magazine quota during January–​March 1948 was spent on orders for British magazines and periodicals, and 40 per cent of the book quota was allocated to orders for British books. So while the position of British magazines and periodicals remained basically unaltered, the position of British book imports to Greece was much improved in the new year. In Thessaloniki, half of the quota during January–​March 1948 went to French publications, largely owing to the devaluation of the franc. The other half was split between British and American publications. In the case of the American orders, there had been a reduction in sales of entertainment magazines –​including comics, cinema and detective titles –​in favour of more heavyweight fare like The Atlantic Monthly, Life and Foreign Affairs.115 The second quarter of 1948 113 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  (EEID)  2458, Serial No.  985, Rouse, Athens, to Balkan section, EEID, 19 April 1947. 114 On 20 June 1947, the agreement for US financial aid to the Greek government was signed. This agreement provided for the establishment of the AMAG, which was given a special operating status with extensive responsibilities in regard to financial management. AMAG staff were placed in each ministry as special advisors. In fact, many suggested that the AMAG should operate as a ‘parallel government’; cf. Stathakis, Το Δόγμα Τρούμαν, 164–​165. 115 TNA:  FO  953/​236, PE  1001, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’.

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saw ‘a big slump’ in book sales in Greece; the British book export trade suffered along with others. Of the total quota of foreign exchange for books and periodicals for the first of 1948, the British Embassy’s Information Department was informed ‘on good authority’ that approximately 60 per cent was spent in America, 30 per cent in Britain and the remaining 10 per cent in other countries. Of the 30 per cent spent on British material, some 70 per cent was spent on books with the remainder spent on periodicals. This difference between books and periodicals later widened even further to approximately 80 per cent in favour of books.116 The question of book exports to Greece was discussed by the Embassy in September 1948, and during the last quarter of 1948 preparatory steps were taken to launch a commercial distribution scheme in Greece to support British publishers. By the last quarter of 1948, booksellers in both Athens and Thessaloniki reported ‘a tremendous improvement’ in terms of being able to place more orders with British publishing houses. Furthermore, the booksellers announced that demand for British books was increasing on account of lower prices and suitability of subject matter, especially those that dealt with economics or with a range of scientific, technical and medical subjects that were of interest to the Greeks. And though sales of modern English novels were modest, the classics remained popular.117 The data discussed here elucidates the value of the quarterly information officer reports to London. They contained information regarding imported publications, comparative analyses of the British titles’ main competitors and significant details regarding the evolving ecology of the foreign titles circulating in Greece at the time. They also provided information on the evolution of British library services in Greece. These services encompassed the reference library of the British Embassy’s Information Department in the Metochikon Tameion building, the headquarters library, the public library in the AIC and the British Institute Library. The two main purposes of the reference library were: first, to supply ‘raw material’ to British and foreign inquirers and journalists (both from within the Information Department and outside) along with contextual information 116 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June, 1948’. 117 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’.

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about this material, in the format of articles, broadcasts or leaflets; and, second, to provide sources for interested parties. The reference library steadily established itself as a major source of reference and general information in Athens. Apart from serving as a reference library, it also distributed books to other cognate Greek libraries, especially the Greek Ministry of Press Library. The reference library was enhanced with the stock of library books from the AIC following its closure at the end of 1948. To ensure that the information at hand could be used widely, the Thessaloniki branch of the reference library was thoroughly reorganized and attempts were made to reorganize the regional reference libraries in Patras and Volos.118 This led to ‘a steady increase’ in requests for books and other material from editing houses locally as well as other actors in the field.119 Partly as a consequence of such elaborate arrangements to distribute information and materials about and aligned with British policy, Rouse concluded that ‘in general’ the Greeks ‘took a pro-​British line’ in regard to some of the more important international events of the time.120 Rouse’s chief criticism of the library service in 1947 was that many of the books received were of interest only to the Embassy’s staff or individuals seeking information in particular reference books. He also claimed that practical –​as opposed to theoretical –​books on town planning, housing and reconstruction would be ‘of great interest’ to the corresponding ministries. Rouse stingingly stressed the lack of agricultural technical books and scientific technical books –​especially those containing practical information. Rouse noted too that the sheer quantity of books supplied to the library had always been ‘very disappointing’. The near complete cessation during the August–​September 1947 period in the supply of books, illustrated and technical periodicals, pictures and other material for the library gave the impression that, owing to the British economic crisis, the BIS had suddenly deserted Greece. This view ‘was firmly held by many people and proved very difficult to dislodge’.121 Rouse hoped that it would be possible to 118 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 119 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid.

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avoid such a major gap in future supplies, as it had ‘undoubtedly produce[d] a very bad impression of stability’.122 However, the supply of material continued to dwindle such that by March 1948 hardly any new material was received, aside from statistical and reference material. The books destined for free distribution were also few and far between. Few other foreign agencies were as active as the British in the field of libraries, aside from the Americans and the French. In the USIS Library in Athens, the Greek public and representatives from the press could find US books, reference materials, periodicals editions and the daily press. US consulates in provincial towns were equipped with reading rooms where readers could consult general material.123 In mid-​1947, the Alliance Française rented a three-​storey building in the centre of Athens. They used one room for reading while the others became classrooms for French-​ language students.124 The British also faced difficulties in trading their newspapers, periodical editions and magazines.125 Greek import agencies found the British trading terms to be unsatisfactory compared to those of US and French publishers. For example, the Americans calculated prices in drachmas and offered buyers a discount and the right to return up to 20 per cent of unsold copies. There were three deliveries per week by air, the cost of which was borne by the supplier. Furthermore, British periodical editions and magazines126 were sold at higher prices than US or French ones. The principal reason for this was the no-​right-​of-​return policy practised by the British, forcing foreign bookstores to raise their prices in anticipation of possible losses. As a result, most US127 and 122 Ibid. 123 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 124 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 125 All British daily and Sunday papers were received, as well as The Times and the Daily Herald. 126 The following periodicals were on sale: The Illustrated London News, Picture Post, New Statesman & Nation, Economist, Tribune, Time and Tide, Sphere, Vogue, Harper’s, Men Only and London Opinion. 127 Such as Esquire, Woman’s Home Companion, Life and Colliers.

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French128 magazines were considerably more affordable. The style of British publications also suffered in relation to the American titles, which Rouse described as offering a ‘bulk and a smart, if flashy, presentation’, despite the fact that their publications consisted in large part of advertisements that would be of interest to US readers only.129 British publications faced competition, particularly from the Americans, in relation to the speed at which publications arrived in Greece. The speed of delivery from Britain to northern Greece improved during the second quarter of 1947, with the use of the Orient Express, which held an escort of armed guards.130 On the one hand, newspapers like the New York Herald Tribune (Paris edition) reached Athens within twenty-​four hours of its release, or the following day at the latest. Among the US papers, the quickest to arrive was Colliers; it was also cheaper and antedated. This paper outsold all other foreign publications; in Thessaloniki alone, it sold 300 copies per week. In comparison, The Illustrated London News –​ the British bestseller –​sold only twenty copies per week. On the other hand, by the summer of 1948, the USIS reached agreement with the publishers of the New York Herald Tribune (Paris edition) to supply the paper regularly to officials of the Greek government, newspaper editors and other bodies with authority in the country. In a public announcement, the USIS declared that this arrangement was one of the best possible means to bring to the public current trends in American news and opinion. They added that it would provide Greek editors and other moulders of public opinion with a source of information entirely divorced from any government input. Moreover, this arrangement would provide proof that the American people and their government believed in uncensored news about the American position on domestic and foreign affairs.131 Such as Le Monde, France Soir, Le Populaire, Paris-​Presse L’Intransigeant and Combat. 129 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’ 1 30 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 131 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’. 128

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Almost any French newspaper or periodical could be purchased in Athens, as they were delivered weekly by special military aircraft. Since payment was governed by the clearing agreement in place between the two countries, issues of currency variation were easily avoided. By the end of 1948, conditions had ‘greatly improved’ in regard to the sale of French newspapers, which compared very favourably in quality and cost with Greek newspapers. Figaro was sent daily from Paris by air and could be found in all central kiosks, costing no more than the Greek daily press. This arrangement was exclusive to the International Book and News Agency. Similarly, Kauffman –​another bookseller in Greece –​became the hub via which French newspapers reached the kiosks. There were also a number of Russian newspapers on the market, including Investia, Pravda and other Russian dailies. Here, again, few difficulties arose in regard to payment, since the Russians distributed these titles free of charge. The French, German, English and Russian editions of the weekly review New Times were also on sale in Greece, as was La Vie Soviétique.132 However, Soviet publications were stopped completely by September 1947. During the third quarter of 1947, imports of Italian publications133 reopened under a clearing agreement.134 By the end of 1948, the Italian Corriere della Sera and the Corriere del’ Information were sold at lower prices than the Greek papers.135 In regard to the distribution of British publicity material, from mid-​ 1947 onwards the Embassy relied ‘practically entirely’ on their Greek commercial distributors, namely the Praktoreio Ephimeridon Athinaikou Typou (PEAT [News Agents of the Athenian Press]).136 As the AIC closed down at the end of 1948, the Embassy was ‘particularly anxious’ to support

132 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 133 The newspapers received were Corriere Della Sera, La Domenica del Corriere and Corriere d’Informazione, while women’s magazines, such as Gioia, as well as scientific and technical publications were also available. 134 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 135 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 136 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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PEAT’s bookshop, which was to open in early 1949 on the AIC’s premises.137 In the first half of 1949, London sent approximately two hundred books to be distributed by the British Embassy’s Information Department free of charge to bookshops, libraries, consulates and selected individuals, while an additional one hundred copies could be called on for distribution if required. The supply of commercially published books was adequate throughout this period, and it was now much easier to find British these books at bookstores in major Greek cities –​including in Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki. Greek booksellers demonstrated a preference for British editions of the classics, as they cost less than the American equivalents, while preferring the American ‘cheaper editions’ as they cost less than British ones.138 The reporting mechanism adopted in 1949 required more substantial estimates from the ambassador regarding the value of the Embassy’s information work, thereby leaving the information officer to record a chronology of the events at hand. In April 1949, C. F. A. Warner –​assistant undersecretary for foreign affairs for northern and southern Europe –​explained to Norton why this change had been made and what the FO expected from the new reporting mechanism. The FO required the Embassy to provide not so much an outline of events, but an overall assessment of the value of the information work conducted, linked to other aspects of the activities undertaken by the British Mission, plus a more general report by the ambassador himself. The reason for this change in emphasis, it was explained, was to acquire a better understanding in London of the extent to which the objectives of publicity policy in Greece had been achieved, as well as to learn lessons from specific forms of publicity or branches of information work that were or were not successful. Sydney H. Hebblethwaite139 replaced Rouse as information officer in Athens on 5 April 1949. Hebblethwaite had no previous experience of 137 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’. 138 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 139 Hebblethwaite (1914–​1987), CMG, was Counsellor and Head of Chancery, British Embassy in Sweden (1958–​1962), Counsellor, Embassy and Head of Chancery in Burma (1962–​1965) and Counsellor (Information) in the US (1965–​1968).

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information work, and this marked his first posting as an information officer.140 In his first detailed report to the FO, which covered the period January–​June 1949, he assessed local conditions and suggested some general guidelines regarding the most effective forms and content of printed material intended for Greece. British publicity output at the time consisted principally of official publications. One such publication by Sir Harold Alexander (Commander-​ in-​Chief, Middle East), entitled ‘Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff Greece 1944-​5’ (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office) was in great demand, while another by the same author, called ‘Post-​War Britain 1948-​9’, met with less success. Hebblethwaite noted that the latter made for ‘heavy reading and goes into too much detail for the Greek public’.141 The most important paper received during this period was ‘The European Recovery Programme –​a Review to November 1948’, issued as a supplement to the International Survey. The Embassy’s Information Department library reissued the piece as a reference paper and distributed it to several recipients,142 as they also did with the ‘European Recovery Programme Summary of the Economic Survey 1949’. The supply of White Papers –​including those dealing with the North Atlantic Treaty, the Economic Survey for 1949, the Budget White Paper, Hansard and the series of papers on the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Mission (the American agency responsible for distributing US aid to Europe under the Marshall Plan), and other official publications –​was deemed as adequate during the first half of 1949. Hansard was at all times used as a source of information, while the library incorporated all of its references to Greek affairs into a special index that was noted as being ‘very useful’ in checking the many questions and issues raised 140 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  1704, Letter, Hebblethwaite, Athens, to Speaight, IPD, FO, 13 May 1949. See also TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2338, Letter, P. M. Crosthwaite (for the Ambassador) to Warner, 13 July 1949; Letter, Speaight to Hebblethwaite, 26 May 1949. 141 TNA:  FO 953/​554, PE 2613, ‘Six-​monthly Report for the period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 142 These recipients included the biggest Athenian dailies and periodicals, especially those of economic and financial content (Paratiritis, the organ of the British-​ Hellenic Chamber of Commerce, and Oikonomika Nea, a monthly economic and social review, reproduced the text in full), the Chamber of Commerce and economists and private individuals who were keen on international affairs.

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in the House of Commons. The free distribution of unofficial papers was limited ‘to certain leading military and political personalities’,143 while the remainder of the copies reached Athens via commercial channels and from there were sold across Greece. Other reference papers144 were displayed in the Information Department’s library for general reading; copies were also sent out to those individuals, organizations or government departments that were interested in the subject matter.145 While the Information Department prioritized distributing material from the LPS to the Athenian press, it also sent such material to provincial press outlets by means of the Weekly Regional Bulletin and Provincial Features, both of which were issued in Greek. Direct contacts with Greek editors were arranged regularly by Hebblethwaite, his assistant and the press liaison officer. Hebblethwaite listed the principal Athenian newspapers, weeklies and reviews146 to which the Embassy supplied material. The majority of items were 143 Two of them –​‘Social Services in Britain’ and ‘Social Insurance in Britain’, drawn from the Home Affairs Survey –​were given to the chief inspector of the Idryma Koinonikon Asfaliseon [Social Insurance Institute]. During that period, the institute began to look into new methods of social insurance that could be applied in Greece. 144 The most interesting were:  ‘The Austrian Treaty:  Negotiations’; ‘Inter-​ Parliamentary Union’; ‘Western Union:  Cultural Associations’; ‘Planning the North Atlantic Pact’; and ‘Britain and the Berlin Air Lift’. 145 Regular recipients of appropriate papers included:  the Centre of International Studies (Greece-​Europe), the League for the Union of Free Europe (President Leon Maccas), J. Pezmazoglou, Private Secretary to P. Pipinelis (Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs), the Library of the Greek Parliament, the Hellenic League for European Co-​operation (President Panos Poulitsas, President of the Council of State), the Chamber of Commerce in Athens and Piraeus, the ministries of Reconstruction, National Economy, Press, Social Welfare, Education, etc., the British Police and Prisons Mission (for use in lectures to the Greek police) and the British Military Mission for Greek Army Information Board. 146 Athenian morning dailies included H Kathimerini (the most widely read daily), Acropolis, Eleftheria, Embros, Ethnikos Kiryx, Oi Kairoi and Messager d’Athenes. The afternoon dailies included Estia, Ethnos, Ta Nea and H Vradyni. The Athenian weekly papers were: Anexartissia, Ellas and Machi. The journals were Aeroporika Nea, O Ilios, To Naftiko Mas, Nea Economia, Thisavros, and Viomichaniki Epitheorisis, which had the largest circulation of any weekly. There were, in addition, innumerable weeklies and reviews which followed party lines, but their

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issued exclusively to particular newspapers, and some reviews were –​by special agreement –​served with translated material. Leader Summaries were still considered to be of the utmost importance and were edited daily and distributed to Greek newspapers, personalities, institutions and foreign diplomatic missions. The features that were most in demand continued to be those signed by well-​known writers, and these were distributed to select recipients.147 Illustrated COI articles also stood a much better chance of being placed. Nearly all signed articles in the Weekly Commentary series were published and recorded wide circulation figures.148 The Political Transmissions series was sent to the populist paper Oi Kairoi, and the General Transmissions series was sent exclusively to the populist outlet H Vradyni. The Diplomatic Transmissions series, whenever the subject had an international flavour, was given a general release in both Athens and the provinces under the heading ‘London Commentary’. The Industrial Transmissions series was offered for distribution according to its subject, as requested by industrial journals. The COI periodicals received by Greece in the first half of 1949 were: Echo, To-​Day and Books to Come. Eklogi also held a position of great importance, with its most serious rival being the Readers’ Digest. The Embassy carried out a brisk publicity campaign at this time to promote the sales of such titles both in Athens and in the provinces. Hebblethwaite also tightened up the existing distribution machinery and personally supervised the distribution of material via daily morning conferences with those involved. At these meetings, the groups discussed the news of the day and how the LPS material had been or could be used. The main competitor of the British services in terms of supplying features to the Greek circulations were extremely small. Special mention was made to Antaios, a high-​ class intellectual review edited by a board of left-​wingers, which, for lack of financial support, appeared irregularly. 147 Exclusivity for the ‘Summary of Weeklies’ was given to the liberal daily To Vima; the ‘Cultural Newsletter’ was given to Nea Hestia, while parts of its content, regarding music, were supplied to Mousiki Kinisis, a new musical review issued in May 1949. Exclusivity for ‘Labour News’ was given mostly to Machi, the socialist weekly. 148 The ‘Wickham Steed’ article was exclusive to H Kathimerini, the Ewer article was exclusive to the Ta Nea, and Lindley Fraser’s articles were supplied to Ethnos. Finally, Grafton Greene (‘In Britain Today’) was often published by the populist daily H Vradyni and was sometimes edited for distribution in Greek as a feature.

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press was again the USIS, although Greek editors found many USIS features to be propagandistic in nature. However, the USIS service was smooth and its distribution significantly faster and broader than that of the British, covering a vast portion of the territory. For reasons of economy, press bulletins were no longer issued by the Embassy’s Information Department. In remedy to this situation, an effective innovation was developed during this period. A wall board was placed in the Information Department’s reference library to be used for posting press cuttings of comments on Greece sent from London. The library already issued a monthly bulletin promoting new books, government publications and various reference papers, with 200 to 250 regular readers.149 There remained a sustained demand for booklets and pamphlets in Greece, and it was commonly held that insufficient copies were being distributed. Hebblethwaite emphasized the need for all books and booklets to be ‘bright, simple and easy to read’,150 with as many pictures and diagrams included as possible, using attractive colours and tasteful layouts and employing good production values. He observed that kiosks and bookshops in Greece were full of colourful magazine covers, which looked attractive to readers, but British publications often looked serious and dull. He argued that, instead, illustrated pamphlets –​preferably those that covered international subject matter as opposed to those which embodied purely the British domestic perspective –​should be sent in sufficient quantities for a fairly generous free distribution. This, he believed, would be beneficial in promoting the British perspective and projecting its way of life. The language gap was already a significant challenge for dissemination and adoption of British ideas. Thus, a combination of numerous illustrations and diagrams alongside short pieces of text was recommended as an effective print format. Similarly, maps and posters151 were considered good 149 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 150 Ibid. 151 Posters were distributed through British consulates to several recipients, including Greek government ministries, the welfare services of the Greek Armed Forces, the gendarmerie and police, local communities, youth organizations, clubs, hospitals, sanatoria, schools, universities, public libraries, shipping agencies, tourist offices and the Information Department’s distributing agents in the provinces.

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forms of publicity in Greece, where illiteracy was ‘high and visual publicity, if colourful and attractive’, played ‘an important role’.152 Here, again, it would be essential that posters were made in vivid colours, since ultimately they would compete for the public’s attention with visual material sent by other foreign competitors –​not to mention the posters produced by the Greek Bureau of Tourism, which were of a high standard.153 Hebblethwaite had identified precisely the disparity between British publicity and that of its competitors: British-​oriented material was presented in an unattractive way and was not easy for Greeks to read. Since British publicity focused mainly on the collection and distribution of official information, the Embassy’s Information Department actively assisted the Greek government and the press ministry to develop information structures based on the British model. In particular, the Information Department helped their public relations offices –​which were crucial information outlets during the final phase of the civil war –​to reorganize and improve their services.154 Military news and official statements were issued by the Greek General Staff Press Office from January 1949, when General A. Papagos took over as commander-​in-​chief. Preventive censorship was in force for all military news, affecting the Greek press and radio only, not foreign correspondents.155 This meant that the Greek press usually relied on the BBC or other foreign news agencies for its information about Greece and the course of the civil war. The Press Office also took on –​among its many other functions –​the management and distribution of propaganda against the rebels, through the use of leaflets, loudspeakers and broadcasts.156 152 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 153 Ibid. 154 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2338, Letter, Crosthwaite (for the Ambassador) to Warner, 13 July 1949. 155 The imposition of preventive censorship on military news was announced on 25 January 1949 via the government’s policy programme statements for 1949, in the presence of General Papagos. This was lifted on 21 December 1949 (ΦΕΚ: 352, 21 December 1949, 2479–​2480). The ban did not apply to the telegrams of foreign correspondents (Embros, 26 January 1949, p. 4, and 25 December 1949, p. 8). 156 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’; Minutes, Clairy-​Fox, 24 August 1949.

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In assessing the overall value of the printed material sent to Greece during his nine-​month tenure as information officer, Hebblethwaite questioned the overall effectiveness of distribution efforts, concluding that some of the material was inappropriate or out of date. He pointed out that British publicity in Greece consisted overwhelmingly of material drawn from the contents of official publications, in marked contrast to the publicity efforts of other governments, few of which were so indebted to official documents. The American, French and Italian missions, in particular, resorted primarily to commercial magazines in order to promote their cultural identities, political outlooks and social conditions. As a result, the British material was viewed as relatively heavy and dull. Various factors determined the usability of reference material, including its content, treatment and topicality. The material that was considered to be of ‘great interest’ to the Greek public included themes of adult rehabilitation, new educational models for the very young, medical articles covering new treatments and medications, hospital organization, the nursing profession and defence measures for the Armed Forces. Sports news was described as being ‘extremely popular’, though Hebblethwaite complained there was rarely enough material. International political material was also of considerable value, especially in contrast to the corresponding British domestic products. The least useful papers were those dealing with the affairs of the British Commonwealth. This was largely due to the thorny issue of Cyprus, which ‘invariably provokes a discussion of Greek claims to Cyprus –​a topic of conversation which we go a long way to avoid’.157 Economic information and analyses were of interest if they touched on the economic problems that affected Europe, including the ECA, the Marshall Plan and other related issues. Less useful were papers on industry and capital projects in the UK, which had very limited appeal in Greece. Hebblethwaite suggested that more emphasis be given to what could be achieved, ‘by suggesting what is possible and practicable to a country which is poor, badly equipped and still stricken by a war’. Likely subjects of interest would be important issues like housing, social services and health. On the other hand, the IRD’s 157 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’.

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anti-​communist material had been put ‘to good use’ and endeavours were made to increase its circulation among carefully selected groups of readers. Circulation figures for anti-​communist material were passed to both the IPD and the IRD. But, as the Embassy estimated, ‘there is […] little need at present of persuading the Greeks of the disadvantages of a communist regime’.158 The civil war was in its final stages, with a victory for the government already practically assured. The lack of suitable cultural material left ‘an important gap to fill’, which the Information Department’s Cultural Newsletter and its recent arrangement with the BC found difficult to satiate. In regard to the book market, insufficient attention had been paid to the selection of books in accordance with local tastes and needs. For instance, Hebblethwaite considered that far too many books dealing with British industrial development had been sent to Greece; these studies were of little interest to the general reading public and had a similarly limited value as reference works in a country that was barely industrialized and which faced far more urgent problems. At the same time, there were six large-​circulation popular reviews in Greece: Romantzo, Thisavros, Trast, Kinimatoigrafiki, Kinimatoigrafiki Zoi and Humour. These reviews were constantly in demand, demonstrating a strong preference from many for lighter material. The information officer could not disregard the popularity of these reviews and considered that their efforts would likely benefit from providing material that was more representative and in line with the demand. Moreover, the idea of including fashion articles in the COI service was described as a ‘happy inspiration’ that could dispel ‘many myths about British fashion’.159 Hebblethwaite also evaluated the material produced by the COI Overseas Press Service, which consisted mainly of LPS transmissions. This material, he concluded, could not be considered effective in terms of projecting Britain, as the information therein was drawn heavily from news and policy documents for which the primary intended audience was British; as such, the material was not targeted towards Greek or Balkan 158

TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2338, Letter, Crosthwaite (for the Ambassador) to Warner, 13 July 1949. 159 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’.

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readers. Publicity that was more deliberately focused on its intended recipients could, he argued, better highlight the value of and explain British policy in the region, thereby improving the chances not only of publication but also of being ‘read and digested’. In general, the Embassy’s Information Department had received far too little guidance from London in regard to important domestic and international issues, especially those concerning the Balkans and Cyprus. In terms of COI feature articles, fewer and higher-​ quality articles with more illustration were preferred; some of the existing articles tended to be dry academic essays rather than newspaper articles or factual papers. Hebblethwaite suggested that such stories would be better received if they were authored by writers with Greek connections, like C. M. Woodhouse, Kenneth Lindsay or Francis Noel-​Baker. ‘One page of inspired or intelligent comment on international events is worth ten pages of facts which are usually reported by agencies much faster’, Hebblethwaite remarked. In this context, W. N. Ewer’s international commentaries of ‘high standard’ and Wickham Steed’s ‘useful’ diplomatic commentaries were published regularly. In short, according to Hebblethwaite, the best contributions to a more efficient service would be to reduce any duplication of material with commercial agencies, provide more guidance on Balkan political developments, and issue shorter COI articles and improve their journalistic quality. He added further that stories focused on developments in Britain should be written using the broadest possible background information.160 Hebblethwaite’s criticisms of the LPS’ effectiveness prompted the IPD to request more details. In response, he commented on the official nature of the LPS, stating that this was a key feature distinguishing it from commercial agencies. The majority of Greek newspapers –​if not all of them –​ relied on news items drawn from the main commercial agencies and the BBC Greek Service. As far as ‘hot’ news was concerned, the LPS could not compete with the BBC. Commercial agencies typically ran LPS items relatively quickly; the local press often received and published LPS items two or three days before they were even made available to the Embassy’s 160 TNA: FO 953/​890, PG 11910/​4, ‘Extract from the Six-​Monthly Report 1st July to 31st December 1949’, Overseas Press Service, Appendix B.

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Information Department. The value of the Information Department’s LPS material, therefore, was not in its ‘hot’ news value, but rather its economic, social, political and scientific importance, underpinned by its special authority as an official source. Hebblethwaite also recommended further developing the regional services so that they might be able to cater more to local requirements.161 The LPS service, reorganized broadly along the proposed lines, resumed on 15 May 1950.162 With 1950 being a pre-​election year for Greece, political debates monopolized the interest of newspapers and the public. The Cypriot referendum would soon become a thorny issue for British publicity in Greece and the ‘only theme to mar [the current] atmosphere of harmony’.163 However, a strike organized by Enosis Syntakton Hmerision Efimeridon Athinon [ Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers] paralysed the Greek press during the period of crisis over the Cypriot referendum, and this benefited the British by reducing the visibility of the Cyprus issue in print. Furthermore, the war in Korea further relegated the Enosis issue –​at least temporarily –​thus averting the immediate heightening of national sentiment in Greece. But as Hebblethwaite rightly anticipated, the ‘Cyprus bugbear’ would re-​emerge with a vengeance in the years to follow.164 British publicity conduits: (ii) visual publicity Among the most immediate forms of cultural communication employed by the British in Greece was that of visual publicity. This involved the use 161

TNA: FO 953/​890, PG 11910/​4, Letter, Confidential, Hebblethwaite to Speaight, IPD, FO, 23 February 1950. 162 TNA: FO 953/​890, PG 11910/​10, Letter, H. R. Hayles for Hebblethwaite to IPD, 6 April 1950; Minutes, Bartlett, 19 April 1950; J. A. Robinson, 2 May 1950; Letter, Confidential, IPD, FO, to information officer, 9 May 1950; Letter, Hayles for Hebblethwaite to IPD, 26 May 1950. 1 63 TNA: FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​4, Information Department of the British Embassy Athens to C. F. A. Warner, FO, 8 August 1950. 164 TNA: FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​4, Letter, Confidential, Crosthwaite, Information Department, British Embassy, Athens, to C.  F.  A. Warner, FO, 8 August 1950; Minutes, 19 August 1950; 21 August 1950; 29 August 1950.

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of images –​still or moving –​for publication in the press, for display in information centres or for film distribution across the country. It encompassed press photography, sets of photographs on a featured theme (feature sets), photographic collections and displays (picture sets), Adiescope projectors for film shows in mat (reproductions of illustrations) and stereo services and a basic photographic archive of leading personalities. Since the announcement of the American offer of aid to Greece in April 1947, the country witnessed a noticeable increase in American photographs in circulation. Furthermore, the supplies of both photography and film came to be dominated by the US. British observers expected that the reflection of American life in the Greek press would continue to increase in the near future. American consulates in the main provincial cities competed strongly with British efforts by operating on the basis of ‘exclusivity’ for each newspaper. Three picture agencies were established in Athens in early 1947 –​Planet, Keystone View Company, and International News Photos (subsumed by United Press International), none of which were British in origin. These were represented by the same person.165 The US dominance in picture supply became even more pronounced from July 1947 onward, by which time the Associated Press remained the only functioning picture agency in Greece. Although it was the role of commercial agencies, not the British Embassy’s Information Department, to supply pictures to the press, Rouse considered it ‘unfortunate’ that the Information Department could do little to counter the American dominance in visual publicity, owing to the dearth of British-​themed pictures that had news value to the press.166 However, the shortage of newsprint for daily newspapers meant that the market in Greece for press photographs was limited. The British 165 This person was Alkeos Angelopoulos. He also ran two other services:  the International News Service and the Balkan General Service. Angelopoulos was correspondent of the Athenian liberal newspaper Eleftheria and in June 1947 started his Times service, as the paper’s ‘own correspondent’ (see Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 68). In the early 1950s, he became a representative of intellectual properties, such as Encyclopedia Britannica and Disney. In 1997, he was nominated among Disney Legends. 166 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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estimated that in the first quarter of 1947, the main daily newspapers in Athens –​ like H Kathimerini and To Vima –​carried no more than one photograph every three months. Other dailies printed and reprinted their own political cartoons, but the number of photographs they carried was quite small. Moreover, there were no illustrated newspapers in Greece, and the papers that were issued every one or two weeks contained few illustrations, despite occasional articles with two or three pictures. Local news photographs that could attract the attention of the daily press often arrived too late to be included and thus tended to be placed in reviews.167 The widespread piracy of pictures made things even more complicated, as Rouse noted. In addition to appropriating news photographs from British, American and French newspapers, many papers pirated wholesale photographs from other Greek newspapers. However, as Rouse indicated, ‘they all do it and nobody seems to object to this large-​scale evasion of the copyright laws’.168 The demand for photographic material reflected the events of the time. The predominant interest of most of the Greek dailies was inevitably the fighting in Greece and the country’s domestic affairs, not world events. The foreign news that was of interest was mainly items related to the Greek political crisis. On the other hand, photographs presenting local events were keenly accepted, mainly because of their topicality. US photographs occupied a fair share of this content, especially those focused on reconstruction in the country in the context of US aid. Secondary interest focused on film stars, new fashions, novelties and new inventions. Photographs of internationally known personalities –​service chiefs and so forth –​also figured in the news of the moment, especially if the subjects had been to Greece before. The Greek press tended to disregard ‘timeless’ pictures, including views of the countryside, photographs of factories, engineering plants or other pictures related to the drive for exports. The press also stayed away Notably in Aeroporika Nea and in two other air journals, Aeroporiki Echo and Ikaros. There was a steady market for illustrated articles on aviation at that time. They were also placed in Autokinistiki Epitheorisis, O Ilios, and Mitera Kai Paidi, a family magazine. 168 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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from photographs on the subject of the British Empire or those exhibiting colonial themes. And while the latter were key to projecting an image of Britain, most were rejected. These photographs were, however, used as display material in the AIC and provincial information centres. The mat and stereo services, on the other hand, were considered by Rouse to be the ‘most promising’ for British photos and disseminating information about Britain. This was not so much the case in Athens, where block-​making facilities already existed and where the newspapers preferred to use their own pictures; but it was true in the provinces given that the only option for illustration in the provincial press was to use blocks provided by the Embassy’s Information Department. In the spring of 1947, the Information Department prepared a catalogue of blocks available for circulation to regional editors. However, due to the closing of regional information centres, provincial press outlets encountered difficulties in finding mats and blocks. As such, a central lending library was organized in Athens, from which provincial press outlets could withdraw mats and blocks.169 In the period from April to June 1947, the stereos supplied were used almost exclusively by the provincial press. The Information Department estimated that the free provision of stereos had a positive impact on the provincial press outlets, which used them frequently –​much more in fact than the stereos supplied by US photographers, even though they were far more numerous. By the summer of 1948, it was obvious that the US government was also supplying blocks free of charge to the provincial papers. British intelligence gathered –​according to the information available to them –​ that this US distribution had quick success in some provincial parts of the country.170 Yet, as Rouse estimated, the demand for British content was steadily increasing, because the content was becoming more attractive.171 From the end of 1947 onwards, more popular illustrations –​including pictures to illustrate cultural articles on theatrical plays and the ballet, 169 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 170 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’. 171 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’.

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as well as pictures of famous personalities from the world of literature and music –​were in steady demand, particularly by some of the evening newspapers. According to Rouse, this was the result of the Information Department’s ‘intensive preliminary work’ with the editors and correspondents of the weekly and fortnightly press over the last few months. The morning papers, on the other hand, increasingly demanded illustrated feature articles, and so the Information Department made every possible effort to provide a photograph for each of these articles. On the whole, Rouse felt the Information Department’s photographic service in 1948 was satisfactory –​so much so that by the end of the year, the demand for photographs had ‘never been so great’. More interest was taken in Britain’s export drive, and a greater proportion of material on industrial and social subjects had been placed. Fashion photographs were regularly placed. All of this, Rouse felt, was mainly due to the steady increase in picture space in the reviews and in the various fortnightly and monthly periodicals.172 ‘“Little, often and fast”’ with no wasted material was Hebblethwaite’s guiding principle moving forward.173 In 1949, the COI’s main conduit for the distribution of photographic material remained the Information Department’s general photo service, which normally succeeded in placing some 70–​75 per cent of its photographs within the pages of the Greek press. Given that Athens did not have any illustrated magazines –​like The Illustrated London News or Picture Post –​and that the two most popular Greek magazines were not interested in photographic features, placing Information Department features was a challenge. Hebblethwaite found that the best way to circumvent this issue was to edit or even rewrite feature articles, adjusting them to the needs of the daily press.174 The requirements in Athens differed from those in the provinces, so the information officer 172 Ibid. 173 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 174 H Vradyni (with a circulation of 27,000–​30,000), Ta Nea (20,000–​23,000) and occasionally Ethnos (22,000–​25,000) took features that were rewritten to suit their needs. There was also a steady demand, albeit small, for features from O Ilios, a popular scientific review, and from specialized reviews, such as Mousiki Kinisis, on appropriate subjects.

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dealt with them separately. The mat and stereo service was used mainly for the provincial press outlets. Although it was difficult to accurately assess the number of stereos carried by the provincial papers, the Information Department estimated that these outlets carried some 45–​50 per cent of those supplied and potentially another 10–​15 per cent of those they could not trace. Aside from the British, the only other mat service for provincial press outlets was provided by the USIS, thought they concentrated more on the pictorial aspect and supplied more pictures of well-​known people partaking in political and cultural activities. With its expanded network and provincial officers, the USIS supplied the whole of the provincial press and ultimately provided many more stereos and pictures of celebrities than the British. In contrast, the British mostly supplied pictures of political figures,175 industrialists and relatively unknown British officials. The consequences of this disparity pointed to a wider issue: though British publicity was worthy, it was dull and self-​focused, whereas American publicity was generally more oriented towards subjects of a popular and transnational appeal. Practically any subject matter176 could be ‘“got across”’, provided it was treated in ‘a popular, eye-​catching manner’ and had news and pictorial appeal.177 Consequently, Hebblethwaite asked for more pictures and stereos of events in Britain that directly concerned Greece or the welfare activities of Greeks living in Britain. He also urged the faster delivery of these materials. Due to the lack of a substantial market for commercial photographic features, there was an absence of British commercial feature agencies 175

Pictures of well-​known personalities, such as Attlee, Bevin, Cripps, George Bernard Shaw, Harold Nicolson, Sir Adrian Boult, Vivien Leigh and Ralph Richardson, were requested from London. 176 These were the following, not given in order of priority:  popular scientific and medical subjections, new inventions, machines, handicrafts, hobbies, light industries (especially ‘one-​man’ industries), aspects of everyday life in Britain, historic buildings and places of interest, theatre, music, films, opera, ballet, youth activities, radio and television developments, children and child welfare, and an occasional sporting feature. Features on heavy industries, heavy engineering or life stories of prominent industrialists were not of much interest. 1 77 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’.

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operating in Greece. Among commercial news photo agencies, Reuters and the Balkan General News Service (BGNS) were the only agencies to do business in Greece and thus represented quite a few British and American agencies. American agencies, however, soon became quite competitive, sending approximately a hundred pictures per month by airmail at a low price. This practically forced Reuters to stop selling news pictures, as the cost of airmail postage alone was so high that the agency could no longer justify the sales. In order to preserve a fair balance of British pictures, the general manager of Reuters –​Mario Modiano –​suggested that the Information Department should provide additional ‘news photographs’ at a faster rate so that they would not lose their freshness.178 Aside from International News Photos and their British branch (BINP and Keystone (British)), the BGNS represented the following agencies, given in order of sales volume: the Associated Press and their British branch, The New York Times photo service (British branch), Acme Photos (US) and Planet News Service (British). There had been a gradual drop in sales since early 1948, however, and Alkeos Angelopoulos179 –​who ran the BGNS –​projected a further decline in sales from commercial agencies in Greece. This decline was attributed to the Greek market being fairly limited and the relatively small press not allowing for an expansion of sales. Additionally, the heavy cost of airmail postage took a toll on sales, as the Greek market could only absorb a small number of pictures. There was also an accelerating competition with Greek photographers,180 whose standard of work over the previous two years had improved considerably; about 50 per cent of published pictures were by that time locally sourced. An additional negative factor for the British photo features was the widespread and unstoppable practice of piracy by all sections of the Athenian press, which severely reduced the sale of pictures.181 178 Ibid. 179 See footnote 165, Chapter 2. 180 Photography exhibitions by D. A. Harissiadis –​who was a Greek staff member in the post of photographer at the Information Department of the British Embassy until 31 March 1947  –​and Maria Chrousaki were among those hosted at the Athens Information Centre, in 1946 and in 1948, respectively. 181 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’.

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Films Cinema, as the dominant mass medium after the Second World War, was a major form of visual entertainment and publicity all over the world, particularly in the immediate post-​war years, when audience figures grew rapidly and exceeded the pre-​war period. Rouse attributed this increase to a desire by the public to view films from a wider range of sources –​rather than just Germany or Italy, which were the only sources during the occupation. He considered that American and British films were preferred because of the favourable public sentiment towards the two Allied countries following liberation. Moreover, due to a loss of faith in the national currency, any spare drachmas were either converted to gold, spent on necessities or used for entertainment. Additionally, urban populations –​especially in Athens and Thessaloniki –​ had grown due to an influx of people from the provinces during the occupation. Due to the unsettled political situation which followed liberation, many of these people stayed in the cities, thereby contributing to the number of cinemagoers. This tendency was more evident in Thessaloniki, as more people flowed into the town as a result of the raging war in the north. British film shows in the main cities consisted largely of commercial features, COI information films and newsreels. Apart from the Information Department’s mobile film unit programme –​which continued to run throughout the country –​Eagle-​Lion Greece distributed British commercial features and British official films. Following the closure of the Eagle-​Lion Athens office in June 1949, Eagle-​Lion Gloria Films also distributed Arthur Rank films. In 1947, some 182 cinemas in Greece operated during the winter and 205 did so in the summer. Over the course of the year, the British information officer estimated that Greek film audiences had reached approximately one million admissions per week, of which the cinemas in Athens, Piraeus and suburbs contributed approximately half the numbers.182 The major film distributors and exhibitors in Athens at this time were Theofanis Damaskinos–​ Victor Michaelides and Skouras Film Ltd; between the two, they controlled 182 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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all the main premiere cinemas in Athens, which were key to Greek distribution channels. They also represented the principal American film studios.183 Spyros Skouras,184 through his subsidiary firm Gloria Films, sought to conclude a contract with the Korda185 Company –​a rival186 to Arthur Rank’s Eagle-​Lion Films.187 These developments occurred at a time when film censorship –​through the method of cutting scenes and otherwise –​continued to be applied in Greece, carried out by state officials.188 The two main reasons cited for cutting scenes were perceived immorality or depictions of extreme communism. In practice, however, most censorship was prompted by political anxieties and applied most stringently to Soviet films.189 The only British 183 Damaskinos-​ Michaelides represented Warner Bros, Universal and Metro-​ Goldwyn-​Mayer (MGM). Skouras Films, which controlled Fox, Paramount and RKO took over representation also for Parthenon Film Co (nominally controlled by Papachristofilou, formerly of the Anglo-​Greek Information Service (AGIS)), which had represented Columbia in Greece. 184 The nephew of Spyros P. Skouras, who was president of 20th Century-​Fox (1942–​1953). As S. P. Skouras wrote in his autobiography, in 1944 his company made an agreement with the Arthur Rank Organisation for film rentals, by which the American company was ‘greatly benefited’; in Ilias Chrissochoidis, Spyros P. Skouras. Memoirs (1893–​1953) (Stanford: Brave New World, 2013), 145. 185 Alexander Korda (knighted in 1942) was a British citizen, of Hungarian origin, a film producer, director and screenwriter who founded his own film production studios and film distribution company. 186 Alan Wood, Mr. Rank:  A Study of J. Arthur Rank and British Films (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1952), 58–​63. 187 Eagle-​Lion Films Ltd was a worldwide British distribution organization owned by J. Arthur Rank. It was the most powerful organization in British film industry until early 1950s; cf. Geoffrey Macnab, J. Arthur Rank and the British Film Industry (London: Routledge, 1993). To learn more about Rank, an industrialist and Methodist, see Michael Wakelin, J. Arthur Rank: The Man Behind the Gong (Oxford: Lion, 1996). 188 The strict censorship law (Legislative Decree 1108/​1942, Article 9) imposed during the German occupation remained in force until 1961 (Legislative Decree 4208/​ 1961, Article 44). 189 Greek-​Soviet war films (distributor:  Savvas [Pylarinos] films) were a huge box office success in 1944–​1945, with Rainbow (originally Raduga, Mark Donskoy, 1944) topping the box office (155,034 admissions). Equally successful were Zoya (1944, Lev Arnshtam, 81,943 admissions), the documentary film Stalingrad

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film that censors prevented from being shown was Fame is the Spur,190 which was considered by the authorities to be ‘too “risky” for public security’.191 Presumably, this meant that the film was considered too risky politically, as the subject matter dealt with a socialist politician betraying his cause. The worsening economic situation in Greece and the intensification of the civil war during the autumn of 1947 led to a 30–​40 per cent decrease in box office admissions throughout the country.192 Reports surfaced that many cinemas were operating ‘under practically wartime conditions’. In some areas, curfews were in continuous operation, while in others, cinemas were forced to close due to military activities in close proximity. As a consequence, some 30 per cent of cinemas in Greece –​which represented half the provincial cinemas outside Athens, Piraeus and Thessaloniki –​were either partly or wholly deactivated. Some were destroyed, others were restricted due to municipal curfew regulations, and others still closed due to their locations, which were not easily accessible to the distributors. Such disruptions in the availability of film entertainment, engendered by the civil war, led to a marked drop in cinema attendance. In turn, this decline adversely affected distributors and exhibitors, who were obliged to raise admission prices in late 1947. Increases in customs duties and the imposition of a retrospective tax of 40 per cent on all imported goods193 also reduced

190 191 192 193

(1943, Leonid Varlamov, 53,554 admissions) and The People’s Avengers (1943, Vasili Belayev, 40,841 admissions). During 1945–​1946, the historical drama Lenin in October (1937, Mikhail Romm and Dmitriy Vasilev) came third at the box office (85,395 admissions). It was still a time when relations with the Soviet Union had not yet hardened. Cultural events of Soviet interest, such as film screenings, were put ‘under the protection’ of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Gioula Koutsopanagou, ‘Προπαγάνδα και Απελευθέρωση. Το Βρετανικό Συμβούλιο και ο Ελληνοσοβιετικός Σύνδεσμος στην Αθήνα τις παραμονές του Εμφυλίου Πολέμου (1945)’ [Propaganda and Liberation. The British Council and the Greek-​Soviet League in Athens on the Eve of the Civil War (1945)], Mnimon 22 (2000), 171–​190. Released in 1947 by Roy Boulting and based on the novel Fame is the Spur by Howard Spring. TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. ΦΕΚ: 243, Legislative Decree 456, 31 October 1947.

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the number of films imported between liberation day and 31 March 1947, when the British financial support to Greece came to an end. The Marshall Plan facilitated US capital and foreign exchanges and provided investment facilities on very favourable terms for American companies; these conditions were established by the necessary legal regulations that granted tax exemptions.194 The law governing the importation of foreign films passed in June 1948 and adjusted the import duties to a rate of 23 per cent of the invoice price. However, this reform favoured American films solely, since only the section of the act that covered the import of American films was agreed to by the US government. Under these terms, American film earnings over 500,000 US dollars were retained by the Bank of Greece in the name of the respective American production company. Until the spring of 1948, no other country had reached an agreement. Arthur Lee, manager of Eagle-​Lion in Greece, made great efforts to extend similar fiscal terms to cover the imports from other countries. For British films shown in Greece, Lee proposed a return of the full amount of gross earnings, on the grounds that while American films were decreasing in popularity, British films were increasing.195 By late summer 1948, potential cinema audiences had decreased enormously due to military conscription and heavy army casualties. Businesses suffered especially in the provinces because of the internal domestic situation, which made it unsafe to send films out to large swathes of the countryside. According to British estimates, by the end of 1948, the film business suffered a drop of 20 per cent compared to 1947, and a drop of 30 per cent compared to 1946. A decree came into force in January 1949 that increased the admission tax on tickets –​following a 3.5 per cent increase on customs duties.196 However, cinemas were not allowed to raise their ticket prices accordingly. Despite these obstacles, the importation of films into Greece became less troublesome for the British owing to the greater availability of sterling. The importation of other foreign films –​including those from Italy –​was based on bartering between 1 94 ΦΕΚ: 152, Compulsory Law 702, Chapter VI, 5 June 1948. 195 In the 1948–​1949 season, British films were preferred to those of the US; of the top four films for this season, three were British (Hamlet, Oliver Twist and Brief Encounter) and one American (Johnny Belinda); E [Eleni Vlachou], H Kathimerini, 4 May 1949, p. 2. 196 ΦΕΚ: 18, Compulsory Law 881, 15 January 1949.

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various individuals. Meanwhile, French films were imported on the basis of the French government’s clearing agreement with the Greek government. Turkish films tended to be imported via illegal routes –​typically through Egypt –​on account of the Turkish government rejecting the Greek government’s proposed barter agreement for films.197 While American films had invaded the Greek film market under favourable terms –​especially after the proclamation of Marshall aid –​British commercial films experienced increasing difficulty in their efforts to increase exports to Greece. Rouse blamed Skouras Films Ltd. and Damaskinos-​ Michaelides, who, due to their power over the premiere cinemas in Athens, chose to show and market their own products. ‘They still both appear to be doing all they can to block the Eagle-​Lion product’, Rouse reported. Rouse gleaned from comparative figures at his disposal –​particularly those relating to the open-​air summer season of 1947 –​that British films sold more tickets per film than any other domestic or foreign film. This was despite open-​air cinema programmes consisting entirely of films shown during the previous winter. Rouse was convinced that these two major Greek distribution companies, as the main distributors of US films in Greece, feared the growing popularity of British films over American ones. ‘I think people find them a great change from the average American film’, he surmised, ‘liking them especially for their directness, realism and good acting and production’, in contrast to the American style of ‘removal-​from-​reality’ and ‘their primary intention to achieve glamour’.198 In defence of Rouse’s comments came two leading Greek film critics, Eleni Vlachou and Marios Ploritis. Vlachou argued that the ‘level of American film was constantly deteriorating’.199 Ploritis, in his account of the 1947 season, warned the foreign film importers, distributors and exhibitors that ‘the public is satiated by dressed provocatively scarlet “girls” and [a] well-​weighted dosage of conventional emotions’ in certain American films. He went on to say that this restricted commercial interest deprived Greek filmgoers of good films, 197 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 198 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE 3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 199 E [Eleni Vlachou], H Kathimerini, 29 July 1947, p. 2.

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past or contemporary. He used Henry V as an example: this ‘remained dusty in the warehouses because those interested considered it anti-​commercial’, but when the film was shown, it ultimately proved to be a great success.200 Rouse had no doubt that both Skouras and Damaskinos wanted to monopolize the distribution of Eagle-​Lion films in Greece. His impression was that they sought ‘to squeeze the Eagle-​Lion office out of the country and then both compete to get the distributing agency for British films themselves’.201 Skouras himself sought open discussions with Eagle-​Lion’s head office in London in order to buy films from them outright, thus bypassing the Athens office. Gloria Films, the distributing agency for Skouras, had already started to represent Korda in Greece. Rouse was confident that if Eagle-​Lion managed to break through, the Athens monopolies would yield a satisfactory share of the Greek cinema market –​something which indeed came to pass following Arthur Lee’s clever handling of an opportune moment (discussed in the following paragraph). In short, Lee contributed greatly to the positioning of British films within the Greek market. Rouse praised Lee’s ability to make ‘the public conscious of the quality of British films so that they flock to most of them in large numbers when they get the chance’. Thanks to Lee’s efforts, the prospect for British film in Greece had become ‘very much brighter’.202 Aside from succeeding in creating public demand for British films, Lee also managed to bypass the Skouras and Damaskinos-​Michaelides monopolies and obtain a shop window for Eagle-​Lion Films in Athens. In October 1947, ‘[a]fter long and arduous negotiations with the owners’, Lee managed to acquire the Astor Cinema, which, after enlargement and redecoration work, could seat 800 people.203 Previously responsible for showing classic films, newsreels and a ‘large number’ of Soviet films,204 the Astor Cinema was now used exclusively to show Eagle-​Lion Films in 200 Marios Ploritis, ‘Account of a Year: The Good and the Other Films’, Eleftheria, 4 September 1947. 201 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 202 Ibid. 203 Elliniki Kinimatographiki Epitheorisis, 8 October 1947, in D. Fyssas, Τα σινεμά της Αθήνας, 1896-​2013 [The Cinemas of Athens, 1896–​2013], (Athens, 2013), 204. 204 Akropolis, 21 December 1946, in Fyssas, Τα σινεμά της Αθήνας, 203, 844, 847.

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Athens. In Thessaloniki, Lee arranged for the Theatro Pallas [Pallas Theatre] to show ten British pictures during the winter 1947 season. With these arrangements in mind, Lee had placed himself in a strong position to demand ‘a more vociferous presence in the independent cinemas of Thessaloniki and the provinces’, a step that provided an alternative to the monopoly of the Skouras and Damaskinos-​Michaelides groups.205 In the late summer of 1947, after a business visit to the US, Damaskinos-​Michaelides further strengthened its position –​vis-​à-​vis Skouras –​by buying the distribution rights to MGM and subsequently cancelling all contracts previously made by MGM in Athens for the winter 1947 season. During this hiatus and pending negotiations regarding future arrangements, other studios and agencies attempted to get their own films into the independent cinemas. In this way, Lee succeeded in bypassing both monopolies, aiding his efforts to extend the distribution of British films in the provinces. The information officer and the FO paid fulsome tributes to Lee’s ability and astuteness in this regard. During 1947, a number of British films were shown in Athens206 and in Thessaloniki;207 Rouse stated that he was pleased about the publicity for these films, which he called ‘very good indeed’. Newspaper mentions of British film shows were frequent, and the space they occupied in newspapers was ‘exceptionally good’. Such was the extent of Eagle-​Lion’s visibility that ‘an important member of the French Legation’ was reported to have said that every time he opened a Greek newspaper he saw ‘either

205 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 206 From January to July 1947: The Magic Bow (1946), Caesar and Cleopatra, Henry V, Men of Two Worlds, The Years Between, Madonna of the Seven Moons, The Seventh Veil (the 1945 top box office hit), The Silver Fleet, Love Story (1944), Mr. Emmanuel, Dangerous Moonlight, Lisbon Story, Latin Quarter, Night Boat to Dublin, Captive Heart, I’ll Be Your Sweetheart (1945), They Were Sisters (1945), Stranger, Dead of Night, The Overlanders and Theirs Is the Glory. All of these films were called ‘Gainsborough melodramas’; their popularity peaked in the mid-​1940s (cf. Pam Cook, ed., Gainsborough Pictures (London:  Cassell, 1997); Robert Murphy, Realism and Tinsel:  Cinema and Society in Britain 1939–​48 (Abingdon: Routledge, 1992). 207 From January to July 1947: Journey Together, Theirs Is the Glory, Rake’s Progress, The Captive Heart and Dead of Night.

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[…] something about Eagle-​Lion or something about Queen Frederica’s latest visit to somewhere in Greece!’208 Although the American monopolies –​through their Greek distribution and exhibition firms –​had access to a larger range of cinemas and effectively dominated the film market in Greece, it was in fact two British films –​ Henry V and Great Expectations –​that enjoyed the greatest box office success in 1947, each drawing by far the largest attendances in both Athens and Thessaloniki. In Thessaloniki, the screening of Laurence Olivier’s 1944 Henry V209 took place at one of the largest cinemas in the area. The Consulate General’s Information Department had hoped to launch the movie with a gala premiere, but the plans were scrapped due to either ineptitude or a deliberate lack of co-​operation between the cinema owners and Gloria Films, its distributing agency in Thessaloniki. Invitations for the premiere were eventually issued only to foreign consular representatives. Nevertheless, by late September 1947, Henry V became the most popular film of the summer season in Thessaloniki.210 Not only did the film attract an audience of more than 14,000, but it was also shown simultaneously at ‘two of the best cinemas of the town’ and was considered the best film of the 1946–​1947 season.211 Its unexpected success, according 208 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 209 The film was intended as morale-​boosting propaganda for British troops fighting in the Second World War. In his autobiography, Olivier describes being summoned to the ministry and asked to undertake film projects ‘intended to enhance the British cause’ (Laurence Olivier, Confessions of an Actor:  An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 123). There are numerous cases where the MOI apparently prompted certain projects and was quite closely involved in their production. There was a working relationship  –​a two-​way process  –​between the MOI and the film industry. The MOI was prepared to assist films of popular propaganda potency ( James Chapman, The British at War:  Cinema, State and Propaganda, 1939-​1945 (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 82). 210 In Thessaloniki, the only film to remove Henry V from the list of favourites was one from Turkey, Şehvet Kourbani [The Victim of Lust; in Greek, Θύμα του πόθου] (1940, Muhsin Ertugrul). This sold 21,000 seats in two cinemas. Other popular films were Hello Frisco (American, 11,000 admissions) and the Greek film Η Κρήτη στις Φλόγες [Crete on Fire] (1947, A. Papadantonakis), the latter for its popular subject more that for its technical quality. 211 Ploritis, ‘Account of a Year’.

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to the information officer, was apparently due not so much to its appeal to the handful of intellectuals in the audience, but to ‘the attraction of its technicolour which drew the masses’.212 The gala premiere of David Lean’s celebrated Dickens adaptation Great Expectations213 at the Astor Cinema’s opening night on 24 October 1947 was another major film event organized by the Embassy’s Information Department. The event was held under the patronage of the British Ambassador Sir Clifford Norton and Lady Norton and was given in aid of Queen Frederica’s Fund. It attracted a great deal of public attention and was considered to have served British publicity efforts in Greece well and to have given the Astor Cinema a good launch. Following these two successes, more British films214 were shown in Greece. The biggest financial successes were Carol Reed’s Irish Republican Army fugitive-o​ n-t​ he-r​ un thriller Odd Man Out215 and the historical melodrama Jassy. Eleni Vlachou –​H Kathimerini’s film critic –​in summing up the film season of 1947, described Great Expectations and the American film Lost Weekend216 as ‘the two more exceptional films’ shown in Athens. Of the next eight best films according to Vlachou, seven were American and one was British.217 Elliniki Kinimatographiki Epitheorisis, a Greek weekly 212 In fact, much of the film’s impact came from the vivid technicolour cinematography and its colourful sets and period costumes (Kevin Ewert, Henry V: A Guide to the Text and its Theatrical Life (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 117). 213 It was one of David Lean’s best films (1946) and the first of his two films based on Charles Dickens’ novels of the same name; the other was his 1948 adaptation of Oliver Twist. 214 From October to December 1947, at the Astor Cinema:  A Matter of Life and Death, Odd Man Out, Beware of Pity, The Man Within, Dear Murderer, Jassy and Nicholas Nickleby. In other Athens cinemas: Carnival, Theirs Is the Glory, Hungry Hill, School for Secrets and The Overlanders. 215 Odd Man Out (1947, Carol Reed), a film noir, ranked the eighth most popular movie at the British box office in 1947. 216 Billy Wilder’s Lost Weekend (1945) was an expressionist film noir based on Charles R. Jackson’s 1944 novel of the same name. Shooting in real locations gave the film a style of a documentary. It won the Grand Prize at the first post-​war Cannes Film Festival. Wilder’s other films were the classics Sunset Boulevard (1950), Sabrina (1954), The Seven Year Itch (1955) and Some Like it Hot (1959). 217 In order of priority: Suspicion, Odd Man Out, Razor’s Edge, To Be or Not to Be, The Dark Mirror, Humoresque, Intermezzo and A Song to Remember, H Kathimerini, 25 December 1947, p. 5.

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film review, placed both British and American films at the top of its list.218 In Thessaloniki, the most financially successful British films shown during the three last months of 1947 were Odd Man Out (12,450 admissions) and Great Expectations (8,700 admissions). Other British films that rose above average popularity in Thessaloniki were the adventure film The Man Within219 and the melodrama The Brothers.220 Rouse was pleased that British films had ‘undoubtedly’ broken into the Greek market. However, despite the well-​deserved ‘great credit’ given to Lee ‘for this achievement’, this success was not replicated in the first three months of 1948.221 During this time, the films222 shown in Athens –​ including Nicholas Nickleby, The End of the River and Piccadilly Incident –​ were met with failure. Rouse attributed their lack of success to the fact that the films did not possess ‘the same reputation or star power’ as ones shown previously.223 However, the following months would prove far more successful. During the 1948 summer season, Eagle-​Lion films –​including 218 Rated as ‘in a class of their own’ were: The Lost Weekend (American), Odd Man Out (British), A Matter of Life and Death (British) and A Song to Remember (American). Rated ‘very good’ were: Great Expectations (British) and The Razor’s Edge (American). Of the eight leading film stars, there was only one British male star and no female stars –​all others were American. See Fanis Kleanthis, ‘Καλλιτεχνικός Απολογισμός’ [An Artistic Appraisal], Elliniki Kinimatographiki Epitheorisis, Issue 11, 28 December 1947, p. 3. Included in each issue of this weekly cinema review was a table showing the number of tickets issued for the first-​run films. 219 Bernard Knowles’ The Man Within (1947) was a Technicolor adaptation of Graham Greene’s novel. 220 David MacDonald’s The Brothers (1947) [Φλογισμένοι Πόθοι in Greek]. 221 Rouse estimated that the average British film shown at the Astor Cinema received less success than an American film. He approximated that British films reached about 12,000 to 15,000 admissions compared to an average attendance of 20,000 admissions at an American film; popular American films could see even higher numbers, even up to 100,000. 222 January–​March 1948: The October Man, Nicholas Nickleby, Dear Murderer, Take My Life, The End of the River, The White Uniform, Root of All Evil, The Upturned Glass, Piccadilly Incident. On the other hand, those on a specifically British subjects, like Homes for All, had little or no appeal. 223 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’.

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Power and Pressburger’s Black Narcissus and A Matter of Life and Death, as well as Odd Man Out, Jassy and Great Expectations224 –​achieved ‘“top business”’ in the open-​air cinemas, with profits surpassing those of their American counterparts.225 Rouse suggested that the results of the regular releases of British films at the Astor Cinema the previous winter were ‘now bearing fruit’. In the provinces, Eagle-​Lion grew to become ‘the greatest individual supplying Company’ for films.226 In addition to the fact that the Athenian public had already acquired a taste for British films, Rouse attributed the company’s success in the summer of 1948 to the following factors: firstly, whereas most of the leading American films shown during the summer had already been released in two or more premiere cinemas during the winter, the British films were all new releases; and, secondly, there was ‘a noticeable dawning’ on behalf of Greek cinemagoers that the average British film was superior to the American equivalent.227 Moreover, during the 1948 summer season, older AGIS and COI ‘non-​theatrical’ films228 were shown commercially in Greek cinemas. The ‘most successful cinema event’ to ever take place in Athens ‘either before the war or since the liberation’, Rouse reported, was the gala premiere of Hamlet. This took place at the Rex Cinema on 19 November 1948 under the patronage of Sir Clifford J. Norton and Lady Norton. It was also attended by the king and queen of Greece, the whole diplomatic corps and leading members of the Greek government –​or, in Rouse’s words, ‘in fact by everyone of any importance’. This gala performance –​organized by Lady Norton in co-​operation with the Greek Red Cross –​was organized in support of the Bone Tuberculosis Sanatorium, which was in the process 224 Other films mentioned: Beware of Pity, Freida and The Upturned Glass; the latter two achieved 30,000 admissions each. In Thessaloniki: Jassy (10,748 tickets), Black Narcissus (9,928), They Met in the Dark (5,840) and Captain Boycott (4,930). 225 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid. 228 From the COI: This is Britain No. 1, No. 2, No. 10, No. 12, English Criminal Justice and They Live Again. From the AGIS:  Holyland, Report from China, People of Canada, Men of Timor, Left of the Line, Conquest of a Germ, Africa Freed, Burma Victory and Western Approaches.

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of construction near Thessaloniki.229 Following this premiere, Hamlet went on to break box office records. It ran for the equivalent of eight weeks in the first-​run cinemas of Athens, being shown simultaneously in four cinemas and drawing a total of 115,000 admissions. Later, it proved to be an immediate success in Piraeus and the suburban areas of Athens. Once its screening in Athens and Piraeus was over, the film was shown in the main first-​run cinema of Thessaloniki for three weeks and sold 55,000 tickets. Rouse held that the unprecedented success of Hamlet signalled a broader Greek approval of the British film industry despite the film’s poor reception from the ‘more intellectual’ film critics,230 who judged it inferior to Henry V.231 Hebblethwaite reported that British commercial feature films remained popular and that their position at the end of June 1949 had probably improved compared to late 1948. Of the 268 new films232 shown during the 1948–​1949 winter season, Hamlet ranked first in ‘popularity and prestige’, according to Rouse, compared to other foreign films.233 Powell and Pressburger’s The Red Shoes and David Lean’s Oliver Twist rated thirteenth and fifteenth, respectively, according to their admissions. The mermaid 229 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 230 Ibid. 231 From October to December 1948, the next most successful British films were the Technicolor costume melodrama Blanche Fury (1947, Marc Allégret) and Oliver Twist, each of which achieved nearly 60,000 admissions. Brief Encounter (1945, David Lean) did not receive the same acclaim from the viewers as it did from the film critics. 232 The most popular American films shown during the first half of 1949 were: Green Dolphin Street, Johnny Belinda, Letter from an Unknown Woman and Forever Amber. A Greek film, Χαμένοι Άγγελοι [Fallen Angels, Nikos Tsiforos], came second to Hamlet in the number of admissions (107,000), and Green Dolphin Street came third (97,000). The French waterfront drama Dédée d’Anvers (1948, Yves Allégret) and the Italian drama Furia (1947, Goffredo Alessandrini) were liked because of their realism. The French film Monsieur Vincent (1947, Maurice Cloche), on the other hand, was criticized as pro-​communist propaganda. Other French films shown in 1949 were the police crime drama Quai des Orfèvres (1947, Henri-​Georges Clouzot) and L’ Aigle à deux têtes (1948, Jean Cocteau). 233 See also E [Eleni Vlachou], H Kathimerini, 4 May 1949.

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comedy Miranda and the Victorian melodrama Esther Waters were less successful.234 Eagle-​Lion’s Athens office closed in June 1949 and the Rank Film Company collapsed due to a debt crisis in the autumn of 1949.235 From the 1949–​1950 winter season onwards, Skouras Films distributed Arthur Rank films via Eagle-​Lion Gloria Films.236 Audience reactions: local taste Audience reactions to films were monitored closely. Rouse estimated that after the initial burst of interest in March 1947 for anything American, American films slowly declined in popularity, so much so that by early summer 1947 the British product demonstrated ‘a slow but distinct upward trend’ with filmgoers. This was in part due to ‘the unrealistic stories of American films and the general “canned” policy of the Hollywood film companies’.237 British films were at this time gaining a reputation for ‘natural realism and honesty’, which seemed to be more attractive to the Greek audience.238 By the end of the 1947 summer season, British films were ‘easily the most popular’239 in the open-​air cinemas of Athens and Piraeus. However, American films again led the field in Athens240 and Thessaloniki241 during the winter season of 1947–​1948, with 2 34 E [Eleni Vlachou], H Kathimerini, 6 October 1948. 235 Wood, Mr. Rank, 228–​236; Macnab, J. Arthur Rank, 193. 236 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 237 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for 1st January to 31 March 1947’. 238 Ibid. 239 Caravan, Madonna of the Seven Moons and The Wicked Lady in particular. Their ‘only serious rival’ was the American drama Always in My Heart (1942, Jo Graham). 240 The top films at this time were: Schéhérazade and A Song to Remember (November–​ December 1947), Sentimental Journey and Leave Her to Heaven ( January–​March 1948). During November–​December 1948, the top films were Hamlet and the Greek film Χαμένοι Άγγελοι, which received 108,000 admissions (one of the most successful Greek cinema productions in box office terms). 241 From November to December 1947, the three favourite American films were: Balalaika (30,850 admissions over two weeks), A Song to Remember (28,700 admissions over two weeks) and Schéhérazade (26,500 admissions in two cinemas simultaneously). For the January to March 1948 period: Kahveci Güzeli (Turkish, 1941, Muhsin Ertuğrul, over 45,000 tickets in two weeks), the American Leave

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the notable exception of the Greek production Οι Γερμανοί Ξανάρχονται [The Nazis Strike Again, Alekos Sakellarios]. A further development in the last three months of 1947 was the growing popularity of French films. The Greek and French governments had made a special trade agreement favouring French films,242 which were much cheaper than any other imported foreign films.243 Rouse noted that during the summer season of 1947, nine French films244 ‘of no importance’ were Her to Heaven (35,000 in two weeks) and the Bandit of Sherwood Forest (23,000 in two weeks). The only notable Greek production was Marinos Kondaras (1948, Y.  Tzavellas, 31,000 in two weeks). During November–​December 1948, the favourite films were Χαμένοι Άγγελοι (87,000 tickets in five weeks) followed by Hamlet. There had been no exceptionally successful American films; the most popular were Anna Karenina, Sinbad the Sailor, The Yearling, Letters from an Unknown Woman; ‘but none of these did better than Blanche Fury, at least in Athens’, Rouse reported (in TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31 December 1948’). Blanche Fury was considered by its producer (Anthony Havelock-​Allan) as a ‘disappointment’ (see Brian McFarlane, Autobiography of British Cinema (London: Methuen, 1997), 231, 292–​293, 305) in terms of its reception in British cinemas in 1948, but it was a hit in Athens, which many believed should be attributed to its rich technicolor photography. Italian films were also shown, including Rigoletto and the neorealist drama Roma città aperta [Rome, Open City] (1945, Roberto Rossellini), which surprisingly did not receive due attention by viewers. The first Mexican-​American film, La perla [The Pearl] (1947, Emilio Fernández) made its appearance in Athens and Thessaloniki at this time. 242 French cinema was in decline after the German occupation, although some films shot during this period are now regarded as classics. The founding of the Cannes Film Festival in 1946 contributed to the development of French cinema which would occur in the 1950s. During the last quarter of 1946, some of the French films shown in Greece were: Les Deux Gosses (1936, Fernand Rivers), Le Quai des brumes (1938, Marcel Carné), Symphonie Fantastique (1942, Christian-​Jaque), La Ferme aux Loups (1943, Richard Pottier), Les mystères de Paris (1943, Jacques de Baroncelli) and Un Ami Viendra ce Soir (1946, Raymond Bernard). 2 43 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 244 Some of them were: Le Joueur d’échecs (1938, Jean Dréville), La nuit fantastique (1942, Marcel L’Herbier), Le secret de Madame Clapain (1943, André Berthomieu), Domino (1943, Roger Richebé), La Boîte aux rêves (1943, Yves Allégret and Jean Choux), L’aventure est au coin de la rue (1944, Jacques Daniel-​Norman) and La femme fatale (1946, Jean Boyer).

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shown.245 Local taste for films –​as for books, magazines and other printed materials –​generally favoured those that avoided contentious issues and instead allowed audiences to escape from the immediate impacts of the civil war. As Rouse observed, the most popular film genres among Greek audiences were drama and musicals, followed by comedies and documentaries.246 Looking to the box office successes, it appears that Greek audiences liked Shakespeare and Dickens adaptations best (which one might expect, since they are emblematic of certain kinds of ‘British’ culture), but also the films of Powell and Pressburger, which explored a more complex type of Britishness. Audiences also liked historical melodramas, especially those set in the Regency period, like The Wicked Lady; these films are typically more lavish and histrionic than dramas set in the Victorian era, like Esther Waters. Melodramas like the Gainsborough costume melodramas The Wicked Lady (1945, Leslie Arliss), Madonna of the Seven Moons (1945, Arthur Crabtree) and Caravan (1946, Arthur Crabtree) proved the most appealing. As a film genre, melodrama is built on intense emotions; the protagonists are usually confronted with personal tragedies that the spectators can identify with. In the early post-​war period, British cinema often engaged in themes of the traumatic experience of the war and its painful aftermath. Eliding the existence of the war, trauma was often expressed in these films in terms that were metaphoric.247 In these films, Greek cinemagoers found a common point of reference regarding their own Second World War trauma and that of the ongoing civil war.248 At the end of 1947, romantic dramas –​also called ‘tear-​jerkers’ or ‘weepies’ –​superseded adventure dramas as the favourite 245 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 246 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 247 Adam Plummer, ‘The British Trauma Film:  Psychoanalysis and Popular British Cinema in the Aftermath of the Second World War’, DPhil thesis, Queen Mary University of London, 177. 248 Further research into this area will be contemplated in a forthcoming joint article with a British colleague. The article will shed more light on how 1940s British cinema found an audience in Greece and whether this phenomenon had an impact on Greek filmography of that period.

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with Greek audiences. Adventures and musicals ranked equal second in popularity, with adventure films slightly more popular in Athens, while musicals were marginally more popular in Thessaloniki. Popular taste in films remained very similar in 1948.249 ‘Non-​theatrical’  films One of the means by which the British government information machine relayed its wartime messages at home and abroad was through the films produced at the MOI Films Division. After the Second World War, the COI continued this practice, by producing ‘non-​theatrical’ films (including one-​minute short films, newsreels and longer features) –​that is, they were not intended for theatrical release. Vis-​à-​vis their immediate visual and audio appeal, these films satisfied the audience demand for information and entertainment, and compared to written pieces in the press, they reached a wider audience and left a more lasting impression. Audiences tended to be drawn from units of the Greek Armed Forces, the gendarmerie, the police and other state-​sponsored institutions, including refugee camps, schools, clubs and hospitals. Screenings were also held in the large squares of the suburbs in Athens and Piraeus. During regional tours, the mobile film units –​with their 35 mm or 16 mm screenings –​ brought the moving image to even the most remote areas and consequently caused sensational reactions. After the dissolution of the AGIS in April 1946, Eagle-​Lion took on responsibility for the commercial distribution in Greece of both these films and the old AGIS features and documentaries, which had been handed over from the Embassy’s Information Department. By the end of June 1947, the Eagle-​Lion office had received three COI films.250 In the spring of 1948, it received a further ten shorts

249 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’; PE  1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. 250 These films were Britain Can Make It, No.  6, Britain Can Make It, No.  2 and New Minds (most likely a misnomer for the film The New Mine (1945, Gaumont British)).

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from the COI.251 However, Rouse reported that such films were not at all easy to distribute widely in Greece. By the end of 1948, it had become almost impossible to present British official shorts in Greek commercial cinemas, as the latter showed little interest in them. Moreover, given the strictly commercial nature of American shorts, the USIS made no effort to place American official documentaries in the Greek cinema market. Therefore, despite Lee’s efforts, the placement of COI documentaries –​ either in Athens or in the provinces  –​was an extremely difficult task. Lee even encountered obstacles when trying to place Rank’s series This Modern Age.252 In the meantime, the American rivals, considered more commercial and popular, continued to succeed. However, in the first half of 1949, non-​theatrical showings of COI films253 increased. This was due, firstly, to the British Embassy’s Information Department receiving a 16 mm projector towards the end of 1948, which they promptly made use of. Secondly, the Information Department’s film library, by then, possessed nearly as many 16 mm films as 35 mm films. Such films arrived without undue delay, though hardly in sufficient quantities. On the question of matching film subject matter to local conditions, Hebblethwaite sent a separate letter to Richard Speaight of the IPD noting that the main issue was not whether the films were suitable for the location, 251 These films included: Britain Can Make It, No. 1, No. 2, No. 6, No. 10, No. 12, English Criminal Justice (1946, BC film), Heir to the Throne, The New Mine, They Live Again and We of West Riding. 252 This series was similar in style to the American The March of Time ‘screen magazine’, sponsored by Time Inc (P. Baechlin and M. Muller-​Strauss, Newsreels Across the World (Paris:  UNESCO, 1952), 69). Palestine (1947, No.  6)  –​among other notable productions –​was shown in Greece. 253 These were:  Moving Millions, The Centre, Power Lines in 16  mm; Children on Trial, Fly about the House, Flawless but British in 35 mm; and Falklands –​the Story, Factory Inspector and This Is Britain No. 20, No. 31, No. 29, No. 30, in both 35 mm and 16 mm. In addition, the following films were handed over to the department by Eagle-​Lion (Greece) when their office closed: the 16 mm Desert Victory and the 35 mm Africa Freed, Coastal Command, Close Quarters, Journey Together, Paris to the Rhine and Burma Victory. During the period under review, seventy were loaned to users by the department’s film library. Returns showed that an approximate total audience of 11,820 was reached.

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but that they were generally perceived as dull or unattractive. Almost all the documentaries they received could be described as uninteresting, heavy, deprived of any relief or humour and demonstrating a tendency to patronize the audience. The series This is Britain was a typical example. Something lighter –​including funny cartoons or a form of comic relief –​would suit better, he argued. Hebblethwaite continued that films of general interest, addressed to the ‘man in the street’, seemed to be missing.254 Moreover, twice as many Greek-​dubbed films were needed.255 Non-​dubbed films had Greek subtitles printed on a separate film and projected by a manual film projector called a τιτλέζα [titler]. Frequently, the dialogue in the film was not synchronized with the Greek subtitles or the translation itself did not align in subject matter to the film script; as such, the result may have been quite amusing in its incongruity.256 Hebblethwaite suggested that in order to better facilitate the selection of COI films for Greece, the Embassy’s Information Department should be made aware in advance of what COI films were being produced or were being planned. In this way, the Information Department would be able to ask the FO if there were any titles they had ‘a particular interest’ in. The Information Department would also be able to better assess the suitability of the films for local conditions. Films that could be shown to children, for instance, were ‘very badly’ needed.257 Juvenile delinquency –​along with other matters relating to young people –​had become a major issue in Greece as the turbulent post-​war social environment was further exacerbated by the political tensions of civil war.258 The Information Department had already

254 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, Hebblethwaite to Speaight, IPD, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’, Appendix A, 1 July 1949. 255 A hundred copies of films, some of which were duplicates. Forty-​eight were supplied with Greek dubbing, of which twenty-​nine were from the This is Britain series. Thirty-​two were supplied with only English commentary. 256 G. Lazaridis, Φλας Μπακ [Flash Back] (Athens:  ‘Nea Sinora’ A.  A. Livani, 1999)  31–​32. 257 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 258 Cf. Efi Avdela, ‘Youth “in Moral Danger”: (Re)Conceptualising Delinquency in Post-​Civil-​War Greece’, Social History 42/​1 (2017), 73–​93.

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received a copy of Children on Trial259 –​a feature documentary dealing with the work of approved schools for child delinquents in the UK –​for release in Athens. In April 1949, a royal command performance of the film was given at the Rex Cinema to an audience of approximately 900 spectators, including Queen Frederica, Minister of Justice G. Melas and members of the diplomatic corps. Also in the audience were members of the judiciary, senior police officers, university professors, law students and others who demonstrated an interest in youth criminality. Children on Trial was provided with Greek subtitles locally at the expense of the Greek Ministry of Justice. Melas also put the Information Department in touch with various people he thought should see the film. The film was a success and it was because of this result that the Information Department was permitted to give regular film shows to boys and girls in juvenile prisons in Athens and Piraeus. In May 1949, a special showing of Children on Trial was given at the Astor Cinema to about 500 students from the Faculty of Criminal Law of Panteion University; this followed the arrangements made by Ioannis Georgakis, who was a professor for the faculty. A showing of Children on Trial was also held in Patras.260 This film is demonstrative of the fact that in most cases, problems stemmed from lack of co-​ordination between the COI and those on the ground in Greece regarding whether or not a film would be appropriate or successful. In this key example, the film was better targeted and therefore a better outcome was achieved. Despite the success of Children on Trial, the Embassy’s Information Department still faced difficulties in distributing non-​theatrical films, mainly due to the fact that there was no film exchange agreement between the Greek and British governments. Hebblethwaite considered it both worthwhile and possible to negotiate such an agreement. This was further exacerbated when Eagle-​Lion, Greece –​which handled the commercial distribution of COI films –​closed its office in June 1949. For about a year, Eagle-​Lion did not receive any new films. What is more, Cineac –​the 259 For more on Jack Lee’s short film Children on Trial (1946), see Leo Enticknap, ‘The Non-​Fiction Film in Britain 1945–​1951’, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Exeter, 1999, 206–​219. 260 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’.

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only news cinema in Athens –​rejected the last film Eagle-​Lion had received: West Riding, a short film about Yorkshire mill towns. Furthermore, COI films could not be exploited commercially in Greece as ‘shorts’, as when these films were made available to exhibitors, they largely wanted to show them for free. As such, the British chances against the Americans in the competition for visual publicity were ultimately quite slim. The USIS also placed significant emphasis on the persuasive power of cinema and had, as Hebblethwaite observed, ‘made films one of their largest operations here’.261 To this extent, the USIS even placed the former representative of MGM in Athens in charge of the USIS film section. He also was in charge of touring the country with a large number of 16 mm projectors. In general, this competition remained an issue for British propaganda in Greece, whether printed or visual. In a new era of commercialising the visual, the US became the leading exporter of eye-​catching images, designed to hold the viewers’ attention with their flashiness and visual appeal. For the Americans, film would become one of the more powerful tools in the Cultural Cold War; Greece and Italy were at the frontlines of these efforts.262 Mobile film units The only way that the British Embassy’s Information Department could distribute official films via non-​theatrical channels was by means of its last remaining mobile film unit, which commenced a winter programme in early November 1946, running through to mid-​February 1947. Throughout these months, the mobile film unit gave forty performances to 30,000 soldiers from the Greek National Army, just eight shows (due to a shortage of films with naval subjects) to 5,000 cadets from the Royal Hellenic Navy, only 261 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’; Film Report, Appendix A, Letter to Speaight, IPD, 1 July 1949. 262 The ECA film units arrived in Greece in late 1949. See Katerina Loukopoulou, ‘Classical Antiquity as Humanitarian Narrative: The Marshall Plan Films about Greece’, in Michael Lawrence and Rachel Tavernor, eds, Global Humanitarianism and Media Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019), 39–​58. See also Regina M. Logo, ‘Between Documentary and Neorealism:  Marshall Plan Films in Italy (1948–​1955)’, California Italian Studies Journal 2/​3 (2012), 1–​45.

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four shows (for similar reasons) to 1,100 attendants from the Royal Hellenic Air Force and two shows to 1,060 scouts from the Rover Scouts of Greece Association and orphanages. However, film shows in the Thessaloniki area were severely curtailed due to ongoing curfew regulations imposed on the city. Two further film tours were organized for the first half of 1947: one from 5 to 17 May and the other from 26 May to 7 June 1947. The first of these tours was intended as a tour of the Peloponnese (the Kalamata and Tripolis areas, the Argos and Navplion districts, and Corinth). For security reasons, however, J. J. Grant –​the film projectionist in the Embassy’s Information Department –​held shows at schools only in Tripolis and the surrounding villages. The second tour headed for the Patras area. During the two tours, approximately 16,100 people saw the films.263 Between July and September 1947, thirteen film shows were screened in Athens and Thessaloniki to an audience of approximately 5,405. The new COI films sent out to the Information Department were chosen for to their suitability for schools and specialized audiences, with a particular emphasis on targeting the summer youth camps organized by the Greek Ministry of Health and Welfare. It was believed that these camps held an audience of the ideal demographic for British films. They either had parents in the civil service (aged 10 to 16) or were from poorer families and were in work (aged 12 to 18). Greek Minister of Health Theodoros Desyllas regarded these films as serving a constructive, educational purpose. In this light, he organized a special ‘rally’, attended by Lady Norton, with a programme of various entertainments and games and concluding with the film showing.264 The main focus of the mobile film unit during the last quarter of 1947 was in connection with the ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ exhibition held in Athens and Thessaloniki. However, Grant also ran a programme of film shows265 at the AIC, the American College of Greece, the Ministry of Reconstruction, the School of Engineering in 263 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 264 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 265 This Is Britain No.  3, No.  6, Pacific Hitch Hike, West Riding, They Live Again, Instruments of the Orchestra, Indian Background, Victory Parade, Heir to the Throne and Looking through Glass.

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Piraeus.266 In total, an estimated 35,763 people watched these films. During this period, however, the Ministry of Reconstruction’s staff members most likely constituted the films’ most important audience. In its staff training package, the ministry’s director general, C. A. Doxiades, included instructional programmes delivered via lectures, presentations and film shows. ‘We are, of course, anxious to take full advantage of this opportunity’, the information officer noted. In December 1947, the largest single audiences thus far were recorded. Two film shows were presented to the night classes at the School of Engineering, where in one single evening, attendances reached 4,000 people. The Embassy’s Information Department also assisted the BC, the Canadian Embassy and the South African Legation in organizing some of their film shows and, in so doing, partially counterbalanced the growing American cultural dominance in Greece. Co-​operation with the BC formed part of the Information Department’s policy of pooling resources. In return, the BC occasionally loaned the Embassy its 16 mm projector while Grant repaired their equipment.267 When Thessaloniki hosted the ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ exhibition in January 1948, Grant again took the opportunity to show films. When the exhibition was over, he extended his stay until the end of February and toured Greek Army and Greek Air Force bases with the mobile film unit. While in the area, he also showed films to the American Farm School in Thessaloniki, as well as to the Anglo-​Hellenic League, the Greek and British YMCAs and the Alissida Shoe Factory. Before returning to the UK at the end of March, Grant also participated in the daily screening of aviation films at the International Civil Aviation Exhibition in Athens. Following Grant’s departure, the mobile film unit’s activities became more limited in scope. A number of film shows were given at the AIC and at some outdoor venues in Athens. In April 1948, the British Embassy’s Information Department organized the premiere of the documentary The World is 266 In Piraeus, there had been quite a few schools of engineering –​many bearing ancient Greek names –​before the Second World War, such as Πειραϊκός Σύνδεσμος [Piraeus Society], Prometheus, Archimedes, Heron. Some were reactivated after the war, and a few more were added, including the Pythagoras School in 1948. 267 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’.

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Rich268 at the Christianiki Adelfotita Neon (XAN [Young Men’s Christian Brotherhood]; part of the YMCA) in Athens under the auspices of the British ambassador. Some 100–​150 people attended this performance, which was by invite only. Invitees included the American Chargé d’Affaires Carl Rankin, as well as representatives from the Greek government ministries, the AMAG, the World Health Organizationn, the Save the Children Fund, the health departments of Athens and Piraeus municipalities, the University of Athens and some leading Greek doctors. In his report of the event, Rouse was adamant that it would have attracted an even larger audience if not for the actions of the USIS. At the same time as the premiere, the USIS –​without much advance notice –​gave a reception at the US Embassy to honour Maxwell Anderson,269 an American playwright who was visiting Athens at the invitation of the Greek government for the premiere of his play ‘Joan of Loraine’.270 Further showings of The World is Rich were given in April at the American College and at the Anglo-​Hellenic League in Athens and Piraeus. In June 1948 ‘a very successful’ series of film shows was held at the Greek Gendarmerie School at Goudhi, near Athens. The series was intended as an experiment of indefinite duration, demonstrating to the students different aspects of police work and civilian life. The audience for these film shows usually encompassed cadets and trainees from all over Greece –​though the show’s initial audiences also included Greek staff officers and Karl Rudkin of the US Embassy. The mobile film unit also visited the concentration camp on the island of Makronisos between 14 and 21 July 1948. This was a camp for left-​wing deviationists and run

268 This was one of the two post-​war sequels (1948) (along with Land of Promise, 1946) of Paul Rotha’s World of Plenty (1943), which adopted an optimistic approach about solving post-​war questions (Murphy, Realism and Tinsel, 79). 269 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 270 Obviously, there is some confusion for Rouse regarding the date and subject of the exhibition. Rather, he referred to the exhibition ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ at the XAN opening on 19 November 1947 (Eleftheria, 20 November 1947, p. 2). Anderson’s visit to Athens for the premiere of his play (on 13 November) lasted for a few days. His visit was widely reported in the Greek press. Cf. Embros, 15 October, 12, 13, 25 November, 20 December 1947; Eleftheria, 1, 14 November 1947.

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by the Greek Army;271 the camp itself played a central role in the Greek state propaganda machine. Approximately 26,000 people from the camp attended the film show. During the last quarter of 1948, the Information Department’s 35 mm film unit also gave non-​theatrical film shows272 all over Athens and its surrounding area.273 These shows were seen by approximately 22,300 people in total. The department also loaned 16 mm films274 for film shows to several other institutions.275 The filmstrip programme The British filmstrip programme in Greece –​an important channel for pictorial publicity, aimed at facilitating direct contact with the public  –​had 271 Rouse called this ‘the Greek Army Reformatory Camp for suspected left-​wing subversive soldiers’. It was a political detention and forced-​labour camp (1947–​1950) that functioned as an indoctrination station for left-​wing political prisoners in Greece under an institutionalized ‘re-​education’ and ‘rehabilitation’ programme. The Makronisos concentration camp occupied a central role in Greek state propaganda. Apart from being a place for persecution and repression of left-​wing soldiers, it served the specific purpose of depriving the ELAS of a large recruiting bank and it supplied a number of ‘deformed’ soldiers to the national army; cf. Voglis Polimeris and Stratis Bournazos, ‘Στρατόπεδο Μακρονήσου, 1947–​1950. Βία και προπαγάνδα’ [Camp Makronissos 1947–​1950. Violence and Propaganda], in Christos Xatziiosif, ed., Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα [History of 20th-​ Century Greece] (Athens: Bibliorama, 2009), 51–​81. 272 Heir to the Throne, N.E. Corner, This is Britain No. 1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 9, No. 11, No. 22, No. 23, Journey Together, The Way Ahead, Country Policeman, Our King and Queen, West Riding, The Ghost Train, In Which We Serve, Victory Palace, Indiana Background, The Gentle Sex, The House of Windsor, V.E. Day Parade, Britain Can Make It, Instruments of the Orchestra, Down to the Sea, Candlelight in Algeria, Caller Herring and The Foreman Went to France. 273 The Kavouri Welfare Camp; Greek Army School of Artillery (Officers), Megalo Pefko; Gendarmerie School, Goudhi; Gendarmerie School, Ano Heraklion; Greek-​Canadian League, Athens; Training School for Naval Officers, Piraeus; School of Artillery, Megara; Training School for Civil Police, Hymettus; Greek Gendarmerie Signals School, Daphni. 274 This is Britain No. 16, Civil Aviation, Royal Wedding, Return to Action, etc. 275 Poros Naval School, British Academy in Patras, World Health Organization, Athens.

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proved to be a very popular medium up to June 1948. At this time, the Americans brought a large number of 16 mm projectors into Greece, which provided better resolution than the older 35  mm projectors used by the British. Until this point, the British Embassy’s Information Department had developed a filmstrip programme for the Adiescope projectors received from London, which operated in parallel with an ambitious programme of filmstrip lectures in the Athens area. Copies of the filmstrips276 were sent to Thessaloniki, Volos, Patras, Crete, Corfu and the AIC. Among the attendants of the filmstrip programme were members of Greek military units, Red Cross nurses, civil servants, Boy Scouts, Girl Guides and representatives from YWCA clubs, hospitals, children’s homes and juvenile prisons. These shows were mentioned in the local press and were sometimes accompanied by commentaries from the AIC’s local manager; this could be heard over the AIC’s loudspeaker. In Corfu, energetic BC Regional Secretary Maria Aspioti organized a successful series of filmstrip lectures in the winter of 1947 and in the first quarter of 1948. However, the public reaction was not always positive. At the Tubercular Hospital in Chania,277 for instance, some viewers described this activity as a clear propaganda exercise. 276 Some of the titles in 1947:  Nursing in Great Britain, Queen May, Flying Bombs over London, Wartime London, Britain Today and Tomorrow, Winston Churchill, Britain Produces the Goods, Nazi Concentration Camps, Battle of Food, Story of Penicillin, English Gardens, Malaria, B.O.A.C., BBC in Wartime, British Overseas Airways Corporation, The Potteries, Housing Britons, Crown and Commonwealth, British Ports, The British Chemical Industry, Heir to the Throne, The British Film Industry, Education in Britain, Inpington Village College, Britain Builds Ships, Division of Cell Nucleus, Mount Everest, A British Housewife, Capt. Scott’s Last Antarctic Expedition, British Parliamentary Government, Resettlement Courses for Service Women and The People of Canada. In 1948: The Face of Canada, Life of Princess Elizabeth, India, Life in New Zealand, Oxford and Cambridge Universities, The River Tyne, An English Child at Home, An English Village, Coventry and City of Wheels. 277 The long inaction of the Greek state mechanisms on public health issues –​which dated back well before the Second World War –​the diffuse popular discontent and the radicalization of labour unionism in the interwar years led a number of tuberculosis patients to organize into unions. Tuberculosis was a disease with intense social characteristics. In the rhetoric of the Communist Party, tuberculosis was a ‘disease of the workers’ and the patients ‘victims of capitalism’ (in Yannis Stoyannidis, Τα σανατόρια και το κοινωνικό ζήτημα της φυματίωσης στην Αθήνα,

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From May 1948, however, the British filmstrip programme in Greece was significantly restricted by the closing down of the Patras and Volos offices. Moreover, it had become difficult to attract schools and clubs, as more and more 16 mm projections and films were sent by the Americans to the provincial areas of Greece. Volos was one place where the problem became obvious, with various Greek service clubs and units already losing interest in the once welcomed British Adiescope shows. The AMAG and the USIS prepared an extensive programme of 16 mm films278 that was much appreciated, to the extent that people no longer showed interest in film strips. Rouse requested that the FO stop sending film strips to Athens unless they were of exceptional interest or on subjects ‘to which you wish us to give special emphasis’. Otherwise, Rouse feared that tremendous amounts of money and labour would be wasted on a medium that was not paying off.279 By the end of 1948, the British filmstrip lecture programme was further reduced because of the closure of the AIC and also due to staff layoffs, leading to the shrinking of some information officer activities. However, British film strips and Adiescope projectors were still used in Corfu and Rhodes. Moreover, the Information Department gave seven filmstrip projectors on indefinite loan to the Greek Ministry of Education, along with a hundred film strips to be given to students at the National Technical University of Athens (hereafter, Athens Polytechnic) and pupils 1890–​1940 [Sanatoriums and the Social Issue of Tuberculosis in Athens, 1890–​ 1940], PhD thesis, University of Thessaly, 2015, 316). 278 Although the American motion pictures dominated the overseas film market and the US State Department was well aware of its value as US cultural projection abroad, it was not until 1948 –​with the establishment of the US Informational Media Guaranty Program (of the US Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948) –​that the US government took direct control of the national image sold in films and other popular forms. A.  W. MacMahon of the American Political Science Association emphasized the importance of the ‘educational and cultural 16 mm’ non-​theatrical films as an ‘antidote’ to correct ‘the current overemphasis upon bigness, power and mechanized energy and the underemphasis upon good material products’ (quoted in Paul Swann, The Hollywood Feature Film in Postwar Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 121–​123). 2 79 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’.

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in high schools and at technical schools. The Information Department also loaned out filmstrip projectors in Kozani, to the BC’s English school in Thessaloniki, to the British Consulate in Patras and to the BC representative at Pyrgos in the Peloponnese. Newsreels Even more than the print media, newsreels were a source of current events, information, propaganda and entertainment. They were usually screened during leisure time, often before a movie, and thus secured a regular audience of moviegoers. Among the characteristics that marked them as different from short films was their straightforward presentation in contrast to more interpretative and didactic short films,280 which enabled them to be immediately understood regardless of the knowledge, language or literacy level of the spectator. Newsreels served as an important channel for the projection of Britain to foreign audiences. There were five companies producing British newsreels, directly or indirectly attached to mostly American companies, which dominated the world market.281 Gaumont British Newsreel presented newsreels in the Greek cinemas and was, in Rouse’s opinion, ‘undoubtedly the best and most popular for Greek cinema audiences’. Rouse strongly believed that the newsreel had immense potential for publicity, as it could easily reach large audiences and took the ‘audience unaware in a place where they have paid to be entertained’.282 Consequently, he considered Gaumont’s decision in February 1948 to stop commentating in Greek as ‘unfortunate’ and a major loss for British publicity. Both Fox Movietone News and the French Actualités continued to be dubbed in Greek. Thus, British newsreels found themselves at a distinct disadvantage in this important field and in Rouse’s opinion could only be rescued through the restoration of commentary in Greek. When Rouse questioned Lee as to the reasons for making this change, Lee blamed the increases in taxes and customs duties that led to Eagle-​Lion’s financial loss in importing newsreels. ‘In my opinion’, Rouse 280 Baechlin and Muller-​Strauss, Newsreels Across the World, 9. 281 Baechlin and Muller-​Strauss, Newsreels Across the World, 13, 53. 282 FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’.

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reported, ‘this is a most unfortunate situation’. As such, Rouse suggested that the matter be taken up with the COI in order to judge whether the situation could be rectified.283 To this effect, Rouse sent a separate letter to the FO on 10 September 1948 in which he complained that ‘the monopoly of the medium of the newsreel now rests entirely in American and French284 hands’. He subsequently suggested that they explore with the J. Arthur Rank Organisation –​based in London –​the possibility of using newsreels from Gaumont British, at least in English.285 When Hebblethwaite took over in April 1949 as the new information officer, he continued his predecessor’s efforts. On 12 May 1949, he wrote to R. Speaight of the IPD,286 emphasizing the ‘considerable importance’ the Embassy’s Information Department attached to the stoppage. Since February 1948, the showing of the English edition of the Gaumont British Newsreel in Greek cinemas had been sporadic and irregular and by September 1948, ceased altogether, owing to financial losses. Hebblethwaite believed that this took a big toll on British publicity in Greece, notably manifested in the fact that the Astor –​the only British cinema in Athens –​ did not have a British newsreel to show with its films. To fill the gap, the Astor resorted to showing American newsreels instead. For ‘reasons of prestige’, Rouse stated that this would be better than showing no British newsreel at all. Under the contract whereby Skouras Films took over the distribution of Rank products in Greece (effective 1 June 1949), it was also agreed that they would import the Gaumont British Newsreel with its English commentary, beginning on 1 October 1949, when the winter cinema season began. Despite these gains, Hebblethwaite continued to push for Greek commentary, arguing that it would be much more successful than the English version. Greek commentary –​if restored –​could 283 Ibid. 284 Fox Movietone (Greek commentary), Actualités (Greek commentary), Universal (US, English commentary) and MGM (US, French commentary). France pioneered newsreels and was a leading producer before the war. 285 Athens Telegram No. 852 to FO, 10 September 1948 (mentioned in TNA: FO 953/​ 237, PE 2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’). 286 A copy of which is in Appendix C of the ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’ (TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2613).

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help Gaumont British Newsreel to quickly regain its former position as the most popular foreign-​made newsreel (formerly garnering approximately 400,000 viewers per week in the summer season). Hebblethwaite suggested that Lee, who was then in London, should discuss the matter with the IPD. Hebblethwaite stressed that in so doing, it might be possible for Gaumont British Newsreel to return to Athens before 1 October; open-​air cinemas thrived in the summer and therefore Gaumont British Newsreel could capitalize on a very large audience.287 The popularization of cinema as a leisure activity rendered the motion picture field to foreign competition. Among the most revealing commentaries on this competition in Greece was Rouse’s estimation of the relative and evolving balance of power between the two main competitors: Britain and the US. He observed that American films were principally focused on commercial considerations and that the Americans did not ‘use films officially [underlined by Rouse] for propaganda purposes in Greece’. Rather, he opined, they relied on ‘their glamorous projection of the American way of life for their film publicity, just as they relied on Time and Life and such magazines in the magazine sphere’. By now, Rouse added, people throughout the world had ‘got used to looking at America and “getting to know her” through these commercial “windows” over a longish period of years’.288 British publicity lacked this crucial element, as it neither had the advantage of ‘such ready-​made publicity vehicles’, nor was considered an affordable option ‘to be glamourised’ in a similar manner. That being said, Rouse noted that even though the Americans had held occasional gala performances in aid of Greek charities and had utilized some of their most notable films for commercial publicity purposes, they had failed to meet with the same levels of success as seen at the British Embassy gala for Henry V.289 This proved to Rouse, in any case, that British films retained some of their appeal in Greece. Rouse noted a new development as well, namely the increasing use of documentary films by the USIS from April 1947 onwards. By September 287 Ibid. 288 TNA: FO 953/​29, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31 March 1947’. 289 Ibid.

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1947, the USIS had installed a 16 mm projector and film library at its information centre,290 and by June 1948, the USIS and the AMAG information section had between them approximately twenty 16 mm projectors. ‘They seem to be making film their most important medium of publicity for the USA’, Rouse remarked, ‘and are now showing most films dubbed in Greek’.291 It was evident to Rouse that the Americans viewed film screening as the main arrow in their quiver to promote their propaganda in Greece, with American 16 mm documentaries now shown across a broad swathe of the Greek territory. Rouse was pleased, however, that the Americans were ‘very co-​operative with’ the British. In instances where the British had no projectors, the Information Department and BC films were shown using American machines and sometimes in a combination with the American programmes.292 In contrast to the commercial nature of American films, Rouse noted that Soviet films distributed in Greece had ‘a definite propaganda theme’.293 However, this notion was contested by some Greek critics who felt that the Soviet message was more against fascism and in favour of social equality. Only eight Soviet films –​all war films save one, which was a literary adaptation –​were exhibited during the first three months of 1947, all distributed by the Soviet film company Sovfilm.294 However, Sovfilm left Greece in June 1947, and from 1948 to 1953295 Soviet films were not shown in Greece. On the other hand, French films at this point were ‘definitely not popular’ among Greek audiences, which resulted in their limited 290 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 291 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 292 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 293 Cf. ‘Are Soviet Films Propaganda?’, Ο Ρίζος της Δευτέρας [O Rizos tis Deyteras], 3 March 1947 (Arxeia Sygchronis Koinonikis Istorias  –​ASKI [Contemporary Social History Archives], Digital Library). 294 K. Kalafatis, ‘The Soviet Films’, Ο Ρίζος της Δευτέρας [O Rizos tis Deyteras], 18 August 1947 (ASKI, Digital Library). 295 ‘Why Aren’t Soviet Films Shown?’, Αυγή [Avgi], 7 May 1953 (ASKI, Digital Library).

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commercial distribution as well. Rouse noted that before the war, French culture had an ‘extremely strong’ impact in Greece, but that this impact had largely been supplanted by British and American cinema by 1947. ‘The French have found it difficult to reconcile themselves to this’, Rouse wryly observed, ‘and they are putting up a hard fight with their limited resources in order to regain some of the ground they have lost’.296 That said, post-​war French film-​making regained some of its former stride in 1947. For the 1947–​1948 winter season, Damaskinos-​Michaelides bought twelve French films, among them the medieval fantasy Les Visiteurs du Soir (1942) and the French Resistance drama La Bataille du Rail (1946). René Clair’s romance Le silence est d’or (1947) was rated among the best foreign films for the 1949–​1950 winter season by the film critics,297 but it went ‘unnoticed’ by the viewers.298 While comparisons continued to prevail between British and other foreign films, Hebblethwaite estimated that British commercial feature films kept much of their popularity. In 1949, Hebblethwaite reviewed the cinematographic field in Greece and reached the conclusion that British films –​if suitably chosen and ‘properly used’ –​were ‘one of our most important and effective media of publicity here’. Along with Rouse, he gauged that Greek cinemagoers preferred the ‘true to life’ quality of British films, as opposed to the lack of realism in American ones.299 Indeed, during the war, British cinema –​largely linked with the documentary film movement –​had produced successful films that reflected on a post-​war society. However, Hebblethwaite’s views ran contrary to newer trends in post-​ war British film-​making, whereby tendencies increasingly turned towards flashy melodramas, costume dramas, escapist adventures, lavish historical epics and stage and literary adaptions.300 The Rank Organisation –​the most powerful agent of the British film industry and the main importer of 296 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 297 E [Eleni Vlachou], H Kathimerini, 4 May 1949. 298 E [Eleni Vlachou], H Kathimerini, 4 January 1950, p. 2. 299 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 300 Murphy, Realism and Tinsel, 78, 81.

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Hollywood films into Britain –​increasingly adopted American cinematic formulas,301 and with some success. British cinema experienced a boom in the immediate post-​war period, and by the beginning of 1947, Rank seemed to promise a new international market for British films.302 In July 1947, under the pressure of the domestic economic crisis, the Labour government imposed an embargo on American film imports to Britain and encouraged domestic production instead, with the Rank Organisation at the frontlines. However, when the boycott was lifted in March 1948,303 the temporary ‘big British film bubble’ burst.304 Though, a number of films –​ including Brief Encounter,305 Odd Man Out, Blanche Fury, The Red Shoes, Black Narcissus, The Fallen Idol and The Rake’s Progress –​left an important legacy, boosting the reputation of British films abroad. All of these films were successful at the Greek box offices.306 It wasn’t till the 1951–​1952 season that British films caught up with their American counterparts in terms of their implicit (or explicit) Cold War rhetoric.307 Exhibitions Less ubiquitous than film shows, exhibitions and displays gradually acquired their own audience in Greece. While in the immediate post-​ liberation years exhibitions had on the whole been on a ‘very modest scale’, the British experience suggested that well-​executed visual displays 301 This fact did not escape the attention of Greek critics and some blamed the ‘barbaric Croesus Rank’ for the ‘incredible degeneration’ of British film-​making. See G.  N. Makris, ‘Europe and Hollywood’, Epitheorisi Texnis, August 1958, p.  111 (ASKI, Digital Library). 302 Murphy, Realism and Tinsel, 75. 303 Swann, The Hollywood Feature Film, 89, 93, 101–​102; Murphy, Realism and Tinsel, 218–​225. 304 Variety, 17 November 1948, quoted in Murphy, Realism and Tinsel, 224. 305 Although David Lean’s romantic drama Brief Encounter (1945) received favourable reviews in the Greek press, it did not do well in terms of ticket sales. 306 Cf. Ploritis, ‘Account of a Year’. 307 Tony Shaw, ‘British Feature Films and the Early Cold War’, in Gary D. Rawnsley, ed., Cold-​War Propaganda in the 1950s (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 125–​ 143, 139, 140.

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were a powerful form of engagement with the Greek public.308 The travelling AGIS exhibitions and the COI displays at the AIC, the main and permanent medium for British visual publicity of this kind, had demonstrated that Greeks were ‘very susceptible to good exhibitions’ and were drawn to them in large numbers. There were several reasons for this. For one, members of the general public who had little money to spend on entertainment could still attend the free exhibitions, thus rendering them ‘a draw’. The exhibitions were also novelties, especially in the provinces. Being ‘very suspicious of any form of publicity’, the Greeks had more faith in photographs and films than in other publicity media. This became clear to British organizers after listening to the visitors’ conversations and noting a pattern whereby photograph captions might be disputed, but the photographs themselves were not. In fact, it was observed that visitors would often gaze at a photograph ‘with a passivity which is rather remarkable in so argumentative a race’.309 For the Greeks –​being also a ‘curious people’ and interested ‘in gaining new knowledge in a potted or easy form’ –​exhibitions were found to be ‘especially attractive’.310 Worthy of note here are the staggeringly condescending comments from Rouse, which reflected some of the British cultural and ethnic stereotyping of their Greek audience. Comments in the same vein were made on other occasions by British officials in official correspondence, showing yet another  –​rather unseen  –​side of British-​Greek cultural interrelations. Sometimes, however, local criticism was of some help to British activities in Greece. For example, in response to the ‘frequently voiced criticism’ that exhibitions consisting entirely of photographs tended towards ‘a certain dullness’, Rouse recommended that exhibition sets sent from London should be ‘modern, clean, interesting in their colour schemes and streamlined’. Rouse cited a Royal Air Force exhibition in 1945 in which ‘models or exhibits in the round’ had elicited more interest than even the best of photographs. The Embassy’s Information Department looked forward with anticipation to the arrival of the ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ exhibition. 308 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 309 Ibid. 310 Ibid.

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They requested as many COI-​produced exhibitions as possible, as they could generate considerable interest and be ‘valuable to British prestige’.311 The ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ presentation was a major exhibition for the Information Department, launching first in the capital on 19 November 1947 at the Young Men’s Christian Association building and then in Thessaloniki in the new year. Considerable emphasis was paid to the export drive and industrial production. The most popular sections of the exhibition included the cable and wireless stand, displays showing the adaptation of industry from wartime to peace production and the film shows on industrial and scientific subjects (which were presented five times daily).312 This exhibition was comparable to a miniaturized version of the 1946 ‘Britain Can Make It’ exhibition.313 Exhibitions with similar content were staged in other European countries over the course of 1947.314 The promotion of British goods and the development of Britain’s export markets were perceived as central to British post-​war industrial regeneration.315 ‘I am fully aware however that the present economic difficulties and productive effort of the UK need to be publicized to the Greeks’, Rouse reported, assuring the FO that ‘my main purpose is to try to “sell” as many pictures as possible on them’.316 The British carefully monitored the number of visitors to the ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ exhibition; approximately 96,000 visitors entered the venue during the twenty-​six days of the exhibition. The British also made efforts to listen to audience reactions and record relevant visitor conversations. The exhibition was met with a good press reception317 –​this was 311 312

Ibid. Acropolis gives a detailed description of the layout of the exhibition, 22 November 1947. 313 Diane Bilbey, Britain Can Make It (Paul Holberton Publishing in association with V&A Publishing and The University of Brighton Design Archives, 2019). 314 Eleftteria mentioned Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy and Czechoslovakia, 18 November 1947. 315 Patrick J. Maguire and Jonathan Woodham, Design and Cultural Politics in Postwar Britain:  Britain Can Make it Exhibition of 1946 (London:  Leicester University Press, 1998), 31. 316 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 3 17 Cf. Stefanos Zotos, Embros, 21 November; To Vima, 4 December 1947.

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especially pertinent given that no other foreign government or agency had organized exhibitions or displays in Greece at the time. With the exception of routine displays at the USIS Information Centre and the Greek-​Soviet League building, only one exhibition was presented by a foreign government –​this was organized by the French-​Hellenic League in Athens. The opening of the exhibition was marked by the presence of the French ambassador, and it featured approximately 200 French book illustrations (including originals and reproductions).318 Second in importance when it comes to publicity was the British Embassy’s participation in the two-​week-​long International Civil Aviation Exhibition, which took place in early March 1948. In 1948, the USIS became more actively involved in display activities, mounting exhibitions on American themes. One such exhibition was held in November 1948 on the occasion of the US presidential election, and on the election day itself, hourly news bulletins on the vote were included among the exhibits. Rouse noted that it had ‘naturally attracted a lot of attention’.319 Churchill Street (Stadiou) Information Centre: the showcase for the projection of Britain and a barometer of public sentiment towards the British As mentioned in Chapter 1, a key factor in the implementation of British publicity was the British information centres, especially the AIC (or the Churchill Street Information Centre320 as it was referred to in the files). However, on 31 March 1947 –​following cuts to the British Services in Greece –​all British information centres, with the exception of the AIC 318

TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘1947 Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 319 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 3 20 This is the centre on Stadiou Street, which was renamed Churchill Street immediately after liberation. The renaming ceremony was celebrated with the participation of the British Embassy and the British general officer commanding Greece, Lieutenant General Ronald Scobie.

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and the Piraeus Information Centre office, were mandated to close down. Rouse issued ‘a word of warning’ about the negative effects of such closures on British publicity distribution, but to no avail. To compensate for this depletion, the British channelled publicity material through Greek information centres willing to make use of this material  –​although in Greece, the practice of information centres was not so widespread and the Greek authorities and clubs did not yet maintain any important information centres. There were, however, some improvised centres run by various Greek services, which made use of free periodicals, photographs and previously used displays supplied to them by the AIC. In the Athens and Piraeus areas, the British assisted the Chaidari Barracks321 in building a small information centre, which was ‘very well’ supplied by the AIC. Other Greek services helped by the British included the Signal School, the Reserve Officers Club, the Security Police and the Greek Military Police. In northern Greece –​for example, in Thessaloniki and Kastoria –​ information centres were sometimes housed in regional administration accommodation or financed by the local authorities; in these cases, Coate supplied the centres with photo displays, posters, flags, magazines and books. In Crete, at the Agios Nicholaos, the British Embassy’s Information Department sent old stocks to the Ethniki Organisis Kritis [National Organization of Crete], an Anglo-​Greek club. However, the AIC continued to look for more ways to offset this retrenchment and, to that end, worked closely with the BC and ‘the broader family of the British Empire’, assisting the Canadian Embassy and the cultural activities of the South African and Australian legations. In December 1947, the AIC and the BC agreed on a book exchange scheme for their respective libraries, mostly for publications on technical subjects, which were in constant demand. The AIC remained the central outlet for British publicity in Greece and, as previously, was one of Britain’s ‘most valuable assets’ in the country. It remained the main showcase for the projection of Britain by means of 321 It was the largest and most notorious concentration camp in wartime Greece and became known as the ‘Bastille of Greece’ (Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of Occupation, 1941–​1944 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993), 377). From the late 1940s, the camp was used by the Greek Army.

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artefact exhibitions, displays of photo sets, filmstrip lectures in Greek given at the AIC studio and English lessons. Rouse noted that the sustained interested taken by the Athens newspapers in the AIC’s work was ‘a very encouraging sign’. Akropolis, To Vima, Ta Nea and especially Hestia publicized AIC film strips and reported on the centre’s new displays. When important foreign policy statements were made, including Ernest Bevin’s House of Commons statement on Greece on 22 January 1948 or the proposal for a Western Union in the House of Commons on the same day,322 the AIC would place in its front window special displays of British newspaper cuttings, which attracted considerable public attention. On occasion, the AIC also used loudspeakers to broadcast announcements and relay special radio programmes to the streets. Visitor numbers to the AIC were carefully recorded, released quarterly and then compared to those of the AIC’s foreign competitors –​mainly the Americans. The number of visitors ranged from 100,500 (peaking in the quarter ending June 1947 with 123,067 visitors) to 68,300 just before closure of the AIC in October 1948. People usually entered the AIC seeking ‘all kinds of information’323 –​including data, guidance and advice –​or inquiring after work, business opportunities, employment prospects and educational courses in Britain and the Dominions. For this reason, younger people formed a ‘distinct category of visitors’ –​particularly those who wished to ‘escape from Greece’.324 The AIC also received intellectuals, journalists and others seeking translation assistance or help with credentials and lecture preparations. Individual conversations held within the centre were monitored, and even the number of people who passed by to look at the AIC’s window displays was recorded. Every reaction that might be considered a positive assessment of the AIC’s work was noted. The AIC collected this data to act as a ‘barometer of the public mood’,325 thus validating its continued existence. Visitors’ attitudes and interests were carefully measured Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, ‘Foreign Affairs’, 22 January 1948, 384–​409. 323 TNA:  FO  953/​236, PE  1001, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. 3 24 Ibid. 325 TNA: FO 930/​425, Report, Eland to Amery, received at MOI on 4 January 1946. 322

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and adduced as indicators of broader public sentiment towards British cultural products. Rouse discerned, for instance, that towards the end of 1947, visitors to the centre appeared to have a more positive attitude towards Britain, which he attributed to a series of factors. Among these were the fact that the British were no longer seen as ‘the main target for criticism’, as the Americans had entered into the political scene. Moreover, a sense of appreciation was expressed towards a foreign nation (Britain) that had provided support despite its own internal difficulties. Above all, though, this positive change and increased interest were attributed, Rouse felt, to the quality of the display material supplied and the constant change in displays. As there is no independent means to corroborate these claims –​apart from reports in the Greek press –​one must assume that Rouse’s defence of the AIC was to some extent a special plea. The AIC’s policy was to display strong visual material in its street-​ facing windows in order to attract the attention of passers-​by who had ‘not the time nor the will to go inside’.326 Whenever a major photography exhibition was mounted on either a British or Greek theme,327 it dominated the central window display. In addition, the AIC constantly renewed its displays of news, topical photographs and stills from new British film releases in Greek cinemas. Such exhibitions and displays lasted from one day to one month, depending on their subject matter and popularity. The COI photographic exhibition on ‘Australia’, for example, ran for over a month until mid-​February 1948, as it attracted a large numbers of young Greeks eager for information about Australian migration opportunities; at the time, Australia had yet to open a consulate in Athens. Additionally, as ‘a gesture to local feeling’, special displays were mounted to mark particularly auspicious national or religious occasions.328 At the beginning of 326 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 327 Among the main exhibitions was a series of photographs of Thessaloniki by the renowned Greek photographer D. A. Harissiadis, some of them showing British United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration help; ‘Britain and the Commonwealth’ (April 1947); ‘Aspects of British Life’, photographs loaned by the BC (May 1947); a set of 25 posters issued by the Travel Association ( June 1947). 328 As on the occasion of Greek Independence Day, on 25 March (in TNA: FO 953/​ 29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’).

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April 1947, a fortnightly ‘English Humour’ display was introduced, which used English jokes and cartoons from magazines and newspapers. Rouse reported that this display was so successful that by the end of the year it had become ‘quite a feature’ of the AIC.329 The principal exhibitions mounted in late 1947 included COI photo displays of ‘London Today’ in October and ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ in November. Other displays included posters from campaigns like ‘Come to Britain’ and COI collotype sets,330 which were augmented by further supplies from London advertising Great Expectations. In order to enhance the publicity given to British films, colourful displays of photographs from British films and of British film stars were regularly displayed and proved to be ‘a big attraction’, as their ‘street interest’ was ‘very high’.331 Moreover, Eagle-​Lion film displays and Arthur Rank film stills were permanent features at the AIC. Also on display were BC photographs of British universities and British art, COI collotype picture sets on British technical innovations and engineering schemes332 and enlargements of photographs of Princess Elizabeth and Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten on the occasion of their engagement. A special permanent display was also mounted in the central window and on the central stand inside the AIC to publicize Eklogi. This was said to have contributed to sales of Eklogi at the AIC. The main display during the first three months of 1948 was the COI exhibition on ‘British Shipbuilding’, accompanied by books and pamphlets regarding British ships and shipping. Greece was traditionally a naval power with a strong lobby of shipowners, many of whom were based in London.333 The chair and members of the Board of 329 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 330 Some titles: ‘One of the World’s Largest Telephone Organisations’, ‘South African Industry’, ‘The Decoration of British Pottery’, ‘Heir to the Throne’, ‘Britain’s Royal Family’, ‘Byzantine Churches of Attica’ and ‘Greenwich Observatory’. 331 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 332 Some titles:  ‘New Deal for South Wales’, ‘Pioneer Health Centre’, ‘Foreign Secretary Bevin’, ‘20th Century Farming’, ‘Port of Liverpool’, ‘Port of London’, ‘British Textiles’, ‘Sheffield Cutlery’, ‘Hill Farming in Britain’, ‘New Health for Dockers’, ‘Colonial Students in Britain’, ‘Modern Secondary Schools’ and ‘Ceylon’. 333 Cf. Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, 1945–​1975:  From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence (London: Athlone Press, 1993).

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the Greek Shipowners’ Union were invited to the opening of this display. Other COI displays included ‘London’s Underground’ in April, ‘British Local Government’ in May, ‘British Justice’ in June and ‘British Health Services and Child Welfare’ in August. There were also occasional displays of Greek interest, including ‘Greek Boy Scouts in Camp’ and another on the occasion of the 1948 London Olympic Games. Other displays on various subjects were provided by the COI or given on loan from the BC.334 An ambitious programme of talks and filmstrip lectures335 began at the AIC’s studio in late 1947. This course was delivered in English, while filmstrip lectures on British history and culture were given in Greek. Filmstrip lectures were held twice weekly, as were a number of film shows. The programme proved popular336 to the point that entrance was sometimes restricted to ticket holders only –​people had to apply for tickets in advance,

334 From the COI:  ‘British Locomotives’, ‘Dorset Supplies the World with Fishing Tackle’, ‘Land of Britain’ Part I, ‘Agricultural Show’, ‘Land of Britain –​Scottish Highlands’, ‘Royal Wedding Anniversary’, ‘Britain’s Housing Drive’, ‘The Nation’s Health’, ‘Local Government’, ‘National Parks’, ‘Lifeboat Service’, ‘Strength of the Nation’. From BC: ‘British Costumes’, ‘British Bridges’, ‘British Flower Patterns’ and ‘State Schools and the Kindergarten’. 335 Up to September 1947: ‘Coventry City of Wheels’, ‘British Railways’, ‘Flying Bombs over London’, ‘The Queen Mary’, ‘Winston Churchill’, ‘Nazi Concentration Camps’, ‘India’ parts 1 and 2, ‘B.O.A.C.’, ‘The Face of Canada’, ‘Malaria’, ‘Penicillin’, ‘Oxford and Cambridge Universities’, ‘London’ and ‘British Overseas Airways’. During October to December 1947: ‘The Face of New Zealand’, ‘Life for the Blind’, ‘Britain Delivers the Goods’, ‘Londoner’s Theatre’ and ‘Tea from the Empire’. April to June 1948: ‘People of Canada’, ‘Health Centre’, ‘Scout Movement’, ‘British Film Industry’, ‘British Criminal Justice’, ‘This Is Britain’ No. 6 and 7, ‘North East Corner’, ‘Jamboree’ (a special private showing for the chief scoutmaster and the Central Committee of the Greek Scouting Movement) ‘The World is Rich’, ‘Civil Aviation’ (a Canadian Embassy film on Canadian aid to Greece since the liberation), ‘The House that Jack Built’, ‘They Live Again’, ‘Instruments of the Orchestra’, ‘West Riding’, ‘Britain Can Make It’, ‘Looking Through the Glass’ and ‘Indian Background’. July to September 1948:  ‘Family Life and the Nation’, ‘Northern Ireland’, ‘Footwear Through the Ages’, ‘Readings of Patriotic Prose and Records of Henry V’ and ‘Canadian Air History’. 336 For instance, filmstrip lectures given during January to March 1948 were attended by an audience of 1,476.

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following announcements in the Athens newspapers. Rouse hoped that when the AIC had acquired their own 16 mm projector, they would ‘be able to give as many film-​shows as the USIS itself, i.e., twice daily during the week’.337 In April 1947, the AIC and the studio were furnished with a new public address system and a gramophone, respectively, with the former being used to announce filmstrip lectures and activities –​including the ‘English Hour’ evening course –​or even to make special announcements, such as when a new edition of Eklogi was released. Another set of activities, which proved to be ‘one of the most popular features’ of the AIC, were the blackboard lessons in ‘Elementary English’ and ‘English Shorthand’. In 1948, an estimated 5,400 people followed these lessons. From the second quarter of 1947 onwards, a weekly ‘English Hour’ course –​devoted to talks on British life, history, arts and other subjects338 –​also proved to be a ‘successful innovation’.339 The first thirty minutes of these hours were typically devoted to a lecture, which was then followed by thirty minutes of British poetry and prose readings.340 From October to December 1947, lectures341 given in the ‘English Hour’ attracted an audience of approximately 1,180 people. In particular, A. G. Ellis –​the AIC’s manager –​gave a lecture on ‘The Psychology of Propaganda’, basing it on an article by Clyde 337 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 338 Subjects included:  ‘British Musical History’ (with gramophone records to illustrate), ‘The Industrial Revolution’, ‘How to Write and Think Correctly’, ‘Psychology of Behaviour’, ‘British Social Services’, ‘Food Rationing in the U.K.’, ‘The Story of Austerity in London and Why there is a Dollar Crisis’, ‘History of British Art’, ‘Britain Today’ (a lecture given by E. Eliascos on his return from England). 339 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 340 Among the British writers whose works were discussed on the course were: Walter de la Mare, Austin Dobson, Sir Walter Scott, Brooke W. H. Davies, Justice Maule, A. H. Houseman, J. E. Flecker, H. G. Wells, William Black, Thomas de Quincey, Charles Dickens, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Charlotte Bronte, Jane Carlisle, Marlow, Shakespeare, A. Burrell, H. G. Kingsley, Asquith and others. 341 ‘Artificial Insemination’, ‘India and Pakistan’, ‘Palestine’, ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ (an introduction lecture to the exhibition), ‘The History of Lawrence of Arabia’, ‘The History of British Steamships’, ‘Cables & Wireless’ and ‘The English Christmas’.

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R. Miller,342 supplied by the COI and printed in Eklogi No. 3 (1947). The lecture was attended by personalities from across the Greek political spectrum, including P. Zervas (brother of Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (EDES [National Republican Greek League]) leader Napoleon Zervas), A. Vamvetzos (former deputy of the Populist Party) and A. Spilios (a commentator from the communist newspaper Rizospastis). Rouse noted these names as an indication of the AIC’s wide appeal across the political strata. A further lecture series343 was held in early 1948. With the closure of the AIC in October 1948 and, by that time, of all the regional centres, the Embassy’s Information Department had to rely almost entirely on PEAT –​the leading press distributors in Greece –​for the dissemination of its publicity. Given the lack of transport, to ensure that PEAT could actively engage in the distribution of their publications, the Information Department negotiated with the Allied Supplies Committee of the Greek Ministry of Finance, which eventually allocated them five former trucks from the British Army.344 PEAT also took over the AIC’s offices in October 1948, but agreed to continue selling British publications on the premises and to provide the Information Department with more or less the same display space as it had previously. The arrangements with

342 Miller was a Columbia University professor, co-​founder and chief executive of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (October 1937–​1942). See more in Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion (London:  Sage, 1986), 136–​137. 343 ‘Australia’ by Karagheusian (Melbourne University), ‘The Channel Islands and Occupation’ by Rumfitt (BC), ‘British Institutions:  (a) Midwifery School (b) Domestic Science School’ by Ellis (lectures given in Thessaloniki), ‘The Work of the Save the Children Fund in Greece’ by Dr Steward, ‘Mental Hospitals in the UK’, ‘Present-​Day Tendencies in the Relationship between Men & Women’, ‘British Idea of the Word Home’ and ‘Greek Independence’ all by Ellis. ‘Man, Woman and Labour’, ‘British Farming’, ‘The History & Science of the Gramophone Record’ (this lecture was given jointly with the representative of Columbia, HMV Parlophone and Odeon in Greece), and ‘Background to Drama in the British Theatre’. 344 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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PEAT soon began to bear ‘good fruit’,345 resulting in increased sales of British publications in the new shop and in the use of their allocated free space as a show window for British publicity. Approximately 1,250 copies of each edition of Eklogi were sold, which accounted for about double its average monthly sales in the two-​month period before the AIC closed. Other COI publications also enjoyed improved sales and the Information Department arranged with the BC to put their own publications up for sale in the shop. This enterprise was so successful that –​in consultation with the Information Department –​PEAT temporarily closed the premises in January 1949 with the intent of turning the shop into the ‘best international book and periodical shop in Athens’, placing an emphasis on British books and periodicals. With the British on their side, PEAT filed an application for an allocation of foreign exchange amounting to 17,000 US dollars, under the 1949 ( January–​March) quota of the Greek government for this purpose, approximately 80 per cent of which would be spent on Britain. However, the plans ran into difficulties and the project did not materialize. The AIC and the USIS, co-​located on Churchill Street The AIC’s main competitor was the USIS. The two centres, being in close proximity, tended to monitor one another’s activities. Members of staff visited each other’s premises frequently, either seeking information openly or acting as visitors and asking for assistance, in order to assess their neighbour’s functions and their use of the building interior. Rouse reported that the USIS had a constant ‘professional interest’ in the AIC. ‘I think they are trying to find out why it is that our less chromium-​plated premises attract far more people than their own’, he wrote in March 1947. According to Rouse, one problem that the USIS faced was a shortage of exhibition and display material, which made users turn to the British centre instead. In the opinion of the British, the USIS display material was also of rather poor quality and not renewed frequently enough. One possible explanation for these weaknesses, Rouse speculated, was that 345 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’.

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American official support for the USIS was ‘rather half-​hearted’ and that American press agencies were unwilling to assist. In fact, the USIS had ‘a curious air of inactivity and seems to make no great effort to attract visitors’. Its premises lacked a homely, welcoming atmosphere; instead, ‘one feels almost afraid to smoke or speak aloud’.346 The British did, however, show courtesy towards the Americans, as when, on 13 May 1947, they relayed General Marshall’s broadcast to Greece to the public inside and outside the AIC. For this British gesture, the US ambassador to Athens expressed his personal thanks to the British Embassy.347 The USIS concentrated almost entirely on the library aspect of information work, and as such their activities were focused on their ‘well-​ patronised’ and ‘excellent library’, which was regarded by Rouse as ‘definitely superior’ to that of the AIC. It comprised a large collection of books on technical subjects presented in popular form and –​perhaps its chief attraction –​a large number of American glossy magazines. By comparison, the AIC library was small and lacked an extensive range of books in popular demand, such as student textbooks and works on medicine, engineering, aircraft construction, psychology, popular science and other technical subjects. As a result, the British were losing a vital opportunity to extend their publicity in this important field.348 From mid-​1947, the Americans increased ‘a little’ of their activities at the USIS and began to ‘glamourise’ its premises, as Rouse wryly averred.349 In June 1947, an American modern art exhibition350 opened; it was accompanied by a catalogue in Greek that described the pictures and artists, as well as a daily film show on the National Gallery. Although Rouse found 346 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 347 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 348 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 349 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 350 The exhibition presented the American Modernism works of Georgia O’Keeffe, Grant Wood, Thomas Hart Benton, George Bellows, Adolf Dehn, Bernard Karfiol, John Marin and others. The exhibition, which was essentially a first acquaintance with American art, was praised in the press with favourable reviews.

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the pictures themselves to be ‘very ordinary’, the exhibition was favourably reviewed in the Greek press, especially in regard to its high-​quality coloured reproductions of the artworks on display.351 During this period, a special series of American documentary films352 covering a broad range of topics was also shown at the USIS offices.353 During the third quarter of 1947, the number of USIS 16 mm film shows354 with Greek commentaries increased to two performances daily. The USIS also started regular weekly lectures in English on themes such as American education and literature, which were delivered by staff members of the US Embassy, the American School of Archaeology and the American College. The lectures were initially scheduled ‘at the same time’ as the AIC’s ‘English Hour’, though this clash was later resolved. Rouse’s reports were once again scathing, stating that ‘many people have told us that they cannot understand them because of the American accent’. However, these remarkable and eye-​catching changes to American publicity were also followed by the appointment of Marvin Sorkin,355 an experienced public relations officer who was set to carry out public information activities in Greece for the AMAG, the ECA and the 351 Cf. Manolis Xatzidakis (director of the Benaki Museum, Athens), Eleftheria, 26 June 1947. 352 Hymn of the Nations (1944), The Tennessee Valley Authority (1944), The True Glory (1945), Autobiography of a Jeep (1943), The Cow Boy, Memphis Belle (1944), The Flying Scourge (this was most likely a misnomer of The Winged Scourge (1943), which was a series of health-​related educational shorts produced by the Disney studios under the auspices of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-​American Affairs). 353 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 354 Some indicative titles:  Steel Town, Freedom to Learn, Molecular Theory of Matter-​Electrodynamics, Body Defenses Against Disease and Insects as Carriers of Disease, Cummington Story, Irrigation Cowboy, Tuesday in November and Under Western Skies. 355 Sorkin’s (1915–​2005) official position was as US information officer for Northern Greece (1947–​1949). In 1942–​1946 he was public relations officer, US Army; in 1946–​1947 he was assistant news chief of the National Housing Agency. After his Greek assignment, from 1949 to 1974, he was chief of the editorial division and deputy and acting chief of the Worldwide Press and Publications Service, USIS; Marvin Sorkin Collection (M. Sorkin Papers, Harry S. Truman Library).

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USIS. The USIS also innovated by organizing and budgeting for their display activities locally, thus removing the need to wait for the US to send displays. They also utilized Greek human resources, for example, by engaging the local OTE356 Advertising Agency, which produced for them ‘quite a striking type’ of window display –​though Rouse felt it was ‘rather flashy’.357 In January 1948, for example, an eye-​catching semi-​permanent window display was mounted to publicize the work of the AMAG in Greece.358 The display featured a large coloured relief map of Greece, filled with radiated cords to identify the locations of US missions. The map was accompanied by statistics showing the number of packets of food that had been distributed, detailing how children were rapidly fighting malnutrition as a result of this assistance. Posters, graphs and photographs of smiling children and feeble old women who held packets with the AMAG initials on them all exalted the vigour of American aid. A quote from Queen Frederica appeared underneath: ‘The work will be yours but the gratitude will be from our people to your people’. For the British information officer though, AMAG posters were ‘not always tactful and in the best of taste’, and the number of visitors could hardly be justified by the content of the AMAG display: Conversations heard among onlookers have sometimes not been very flattering, many people thinking that such self-​advertisement is in bad taste. It may be that 3 56 Ανώνυμος εταιρεία οικονομοτεχνικών επιχειρήσεων [Operational and Technical Ltd]. 357 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. 358 Other window displays were devoted to publicity for US films, such as Night and Day, which was also given a special gala premiere and gramophone records in January. Founders of Peace was also given a display in which an automatic filmstrip projector was used. This was viewed as ‘rather dull but it attracted a lot of people’. The Home of the United Nations was also given a display. Photo displays –​for example, on ‘American life’ (February), ‘American Types’ ( June, July), ‘Workers of the USA’, ‘Flame of Liberty’, ‘The Workers’ Fight for Present-​day Freedom’ (August), ‘The Day of Flying’ –​together with stills of American films (September). In September, a music room with gramophone records was open daily. During the last quarter of 1948, the following subjects were among the themes of USIS interior window displays: ‘American Aid to Greece’, ‘The Berlin Crisis’, ‘The American Election’ and ‘Christmas in America’.

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the Americans are going too far in self-​advertisement of their aid to Greece in comparison with the British who were perhaps too reticent.359

Although USIS displays in the first three months of 1948 were of much better quality than before, the value of their other publicity work, according to the information officer, was still questionable.360 The AMAG’s follow-​up display for the USIS focused once again on the American aid sent to Greece via the Co-​operative Aid Remittances to Europe. This aid was depicted by boxes of goods, which fell from skyscrapers in New York and emptied into Greece. The USIS came up with another window display promoting the AMAG’s aid work, focusing on the relief work for those living in battle areas and the medical aid that was provided to the Greek Army; this display was also ‘very adversely criticized by the general public’ as being of mediocre taste.361 The USIS information programme continued unabated for the rest of 1948. One may surmise that much of the aforementioned criticisms were actually sour grapes on the part of the British, but, in fact, this was not far from how the Greek public saw things. Sniping at American pushiness and vulgarity and championing British reticence and good taste is all very well, but in reality the American approach was more effective, in both the short and long term. In this battle to win the hearts and minds of the Greek people, the British gained a few major publicity wins against the Americans. This 359 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 360 He exemplified two cases. First, the USIS gave away lapel buttons with a background of stars and stripes and the inscriptions:  God Bless America and, underneath, The Land We Love. ‘The Greek we saw wearing one of these said that he had been told he could have as many as he liked for his friends who might care to wear them’. The other case was when the Americans asked the principal of a school to display American milk-​aid posters in the classrooms and to give verbal publicity during classes for the generosity of America. Actually, the principal only put up one poster, which was placed in the hall. ‘Apparently the teachers do not feel happy at having to be so blatant with their milk-​praise. We heard this through a trustworthy source’, the information officer reported (in TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’). 361 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’.

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included a special window display on 7 March 1948 to mark the first anniversary of the return of the Dodecanese to Greece. The AIC also relayed the Greek king’s speech at Rhodes, both inside the AIC and outside on the streets. On that day, an estimated 2,935 visitors came to the centre. On 25 March 1948, the AIC marked the occasion of Greek Independence Day with another window display, which was accompanied by music broadcasts by Athens Radio and the BBC Greek broadcast from London; these were relayed inside the AIC on short wave. This display was previously advertised over the public address system, framed as Britain’s celebratory gesture towards Greek Independence. By contrast, the USIS failed to celebrate either the 7 March or the 25 March events with any kind of special display, an absence that, according to the information available to the British, was received with much negative comment.362 In these examples at least, the publicity battle favoured the British. The AIC’s informants also periodically visited the premises of the Greek-​Soviet League to gauge its operations. This was a small hub, mainly used for learning Russian as a foreign language. Its stock of Soviet publications was fairly considerable, and its fundraising activities included Sunday excursions and social evenings. The British judged that the league struggled to obtain photographs for their displays, as they came directly from the Soviet Union by post. Their photo displays consisted almost entirely of Russian cultural events and figures including authors, poets and playwrights. They held regular film screenings on a projector loaned by Sovfilm and broadcasted daily news bulletins from Moscow Radio. They also delivered lectures of predominantly cultural rather than political content, focusing on Soviet drama and writing. Rouse was of the opinion that many people who went to the league were driven by a genuine interest in Russian history and art, but not by any political convictions.363 The league, it appeared, was not greatly assisted by the Soviet Embassy in organizing these activities, and Embassy officials were usually absent. By the late summer of 1947, the league’s activities were considerably scaled back as a result of the 3 62 TNA: FO 953/​29, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31 March 1947’. 363 Rouse interpreted the fact that the league flew a Greek flag at half-​mast on the death of the Greek king –​while the Rizospastis offices refrained from doing so –​as an indication of avoiding any political motivation.

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political atmosphere in Greece, which had led to the departure for Moscow of Admiral Constantin Rodianov, the Soviet diplomatic representative in Greece. The league offices were also reportedly ‘very closely watched by the Greek police’.364 In fact, by early 1948, the league was under ‘permanent police watch’; the AIC could barely persuade any of its own staff to visit the location and report on its activities. The league closed for some months in the late summer of 1948,365 and by the end of year, it closed its doors permanently.366 The British Embassy’s Information Department also took a lively interest in other national legations. French culture, for example, was known by the British to exercise a continuing fascination for the Greek public. The French did not have an information centre, but they did have ‘an excellent Institute’ with an extensive library on French civilization, culture and history.367 The main purpose of the Institut Français was to teach the French language. Rouse also noted of the institute in his first quarter report of 1947 that politically ‘they are reputed to be rather Left-​wing’.368 Visual propaganda operated as the showcase for the projection of Britain in Greece. For both British information officers –​Rouse and Hebblethwaite –​in order to maintain British influence in Greece, it was imperative that the man on the street be reached. But in this respect, the British lagged behind the Americans.369 The idea that people might prefer ‘honest’ British realism to tacky Hollywood glamour is very characteristic of the British response to Americanization, though perhaps not altogether 364 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 365 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1948’. 366 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 367 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 368 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 369 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’; TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2613, Hebblethwaite to Speaight, IPD, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’, Appendix A, 1 July 1949.

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realistic. Whether this assertion was echoed by the Greek audience may prove a useful avenue for further study, but it is not explored here. British publicity conduits: (iii) commercial publicity In addition to the cultural information activities described, British publicity efforts also prioritized matters of trade and commerce. The scope of British commercial advertising was limited by such factors as the unobtainability of goods, Greece’s lack of foreign exchange for imports and a shortage of space in the press. There were no restrictions, however, on other forms of publicity such as posters and films  –​but until the general supply and foreign exchange position improved, there was little prospect of developing or furthering British advertising in Greece. Owing to the rigid restrictions of articles in the non-​essential category, the British Embassy’s Information Department and the Commercial Secretariat of the Embassy agreed to exercise ‘extreme caution on trade publicity’.370 At the request of the Commercial Secretariat of the Embassy, the Information Department widely publicized the fact that Britain had bought from Greece 30,000 tons of currants and 10,000 tons of raisins,371 rather than exporting British goods into Greece. Despite this imbalance, the information officer was confident that the continued publicity of the British government’s ‘Buy British’ campaign could not ‘fail to lay valuable foundations for better times’.372 The Information Department made full use of the publicity material that dealt with both the general and particular aspects of Britain’s export trade; said material was sent to Athens via the LPS, the COI and other channels. All such material was on display in the Information Department’s reference library. The Information Department also distributed a wide 370 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 371 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 372 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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selection of trade and technical publications to the Greek Chamber of Commerce, to the relevant Greek ministries and to Greek newspapers and periodicals. At London’s request, the Commercial Secretariat of the Embassy and the Information Department made a list of potential subscribers to British commercial and technical periodical content and forwarded this to the FO for action. The idea was to propose free access to selected periodicals for a period of three months, with the expectation that afterwards a number of those on the list would become regular buyers.373 The ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ exhibition of British-​designed goods was widely covered in the Greek press. But the most remarkable Information Department initiative to promote British businesses in 1947 was to support British efforts in the field of civil aviation; this prospect looked promising given the ongoing efforts in Greece to create airline companies. The establishment of an international airline benefited both parties, as it facilitated the exchange of both passengers and goods and opened new trade markets. The first was Technike Aeroporike Ekmetaleyseis (TAE [Technical Air Transport Exploitations]), which was established in collaboration with Trans World Airlines in September 1946. A year later, Hellenic Airlines374 was founded as a joint operation with Scottish Aviation Ltd, which took a 40 per cent stake in the company while the Greek state and Armed Forces jointly held the other 60 per cent. In February 1948, Thessaloniki was connected directly to Britain when it was included in the inaugural Athens–​London/​Prestwick, Scotland, route of Hellenic Airlines.375 In 1947, another two Greek-​flagged airlines were established: Aeroporike 3 73 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June’. 374 Often abbreviated to ΕΛΛ.Α.Σ. in Greek and sometimes known as Hellas in English. 375 From its base in Prestwick, Scotland, Scottish Aviation trained the Greek crews and maintained the company’s fleet; cf. Alexandra Fragoudaki, ‘Greek Domestic Air Transport –​Industry and Policy Developments from Post-​World War II to Post-​Liberalisation’, Journal of Air Transport Management 6/​4 (October 2000), 223–​232, 224. On the post-​war Greek civil aviation development see a recent study, Achilleas Xekimoglou, Ο Ωνάσης και ο Σμηναγός Χ. Η μεταπολεμική αναγέννηση της πολιτικής αεροπορίας: Από την ΤΑΕ στην Ολυμπιακή [Onassis and Sminagos X. The post-​war renaissance of civil aviation: From TAE to Olympic Airways] (Athens, Ekdoseis Papadopoulos, 2022).

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Metaphore Ellados (AME [Air Transport of Greece]) and Dedalus. By July 1951, all four airlines –​TAE, Hellenic Airlines, AME and Dedalus –​ merged into National Greek Airlines-​TAE. The first occasion for the British Embassy’s Information Department to exercise its publicity machinery in regard to air travel was at the inauguration by British European Airways in the spring of 1947 for the daily Viking Air service between London and Athens. The British Embassy, via its weekly fifteen-​minute broadcast on Athens Radio, presented a feature on the Viking service; this was subsequently supported by features and statements in the press and aviation periodicals. The local British European Airways branch office threw a cocktail party for the Athens press to celebrate the landing of the first Viking flight from London. Press and radio publicity was also secured for a BBC Greek transmission, for which statements were given from Greek passengers as they set foot in London after the first return flight. On 30 May 1947, Ian Brown, the business manager of Percival Aircraft Ltd (Luton), arrived in Athens in his own Percival Proctor airplane. Brown chose Athens as a stopover on a long flight across the Mediterranean, the Near East and southern Europe. To coincide with his arrival in Athens, the Embassy’s Information Department issued to the press details of his company’s goods, which were later publicized by several Athens newspapers.376 In the late summer of 1947, arrangements were made by the Information Department to publicize in the Greek newspapers an art competition launched by ΒΕΑ’s advertising department, which would publicize the four Miles Aerovans377 that had visited Athens during a demonstration tour.378 In March 1948, the ‘International Civil Aviation Exhibition’ in Athens provided notable opportunities for advertising British civil aviation. Airline enterprise was a thriving new industry in the post-​war era, as it facilitated international air travel and trade. The exhibition was organized under the auspices of the 376 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 377 A British twin-​engine short-​range low-​cost transport designed and built by Miles Aircraft. Aerovan production started in 1946, primarily for civil use although examples were used briefly by the military. 378 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’.

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British, Canadian, French and American embassies and the South Africa Legation. Despite the resounding title of the exhibition, its grand opening and its sponsorship of many public and Greek and foreign private organizations and agencies, it was met with a rather ‘disappointing’ response. However, the exhibition still provided a valuable platform for advertising the merits of British civil aviation; as such the Information Department gave the event publicity which garnered considerable coverage in the Greek press.379 In May 1948, the Information Department also played a major role in the publicity surrounding the visit of the Percival Prentice, a new British training aircraft. A demonstration was organized for the occasion, with members of the Greek government and Greek aviation invited. The visit of the Gloster Meteor380 to Athens –​the first British fighter plane using Britain’s innovative jet propulsion engineering –​was characterized by similar levels of publicity. This aircraft made an excellent impression, with H Kathimerini singing its praises in an article that described the Meteor as a devastating weapon that –​if used by the military –​would deflect the risk of a new war.381 During the first quarter of 1948, the Information Department also launched publicity campaigns for the British Industries Fair –​an exhibition organized by the Export Promotion Department of the Board of Trade –​and the Ideal Home Exhibition, both of which were annual events held in London and reactivated after 1947. However, Rouse doubted that Greek businessmen would attend the events, let alone place orders, as the Greek government’s policy in terms of the allocation of foreign exchange to Greek businessmen had not yet been clarified. Hence, the Information Department monitored the situation closely and periodically 379 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. 380 The Gloster Meteor was the Allies’ only jet aircraft to achieve combat operations during the Second World War. After the war, it was used for research and development purposes. The Meteor broke several aviation records, such as becoming the first turboprop aircraft to fly (cf. Phil Butler and Tony Buttler, Gloster Meteor: Britain’s Celebrated First-​Generation Jet (Hinkley, UK: Midland Publishing, 2006)). 381 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’.

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sent out information to London, per the FO’s request, in the hope of better trade imports in Greece in the future. The end of the Greek Civil War The failure of the ‘Koronis’ plan, from 30 August to 7 September 1948, to dismantle the main body of the Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas (DSE [Democratic Army of Greece]) located in the Grammos area of northern Greece and the continuing failures of government forces to strike a sufficiently powerful blow against the rebels led the Greek government to make significant changes to the management of its Armed Forces. Under the new leadership of Commander-​in-​Chief A. Papagos, on 11 January 1949 the government forces elaborated a fresh plan to bring about the total defeat of the DSE. The first part of the project, the ‘Peristera’ plan, concerned the liquidation of the rebels in the Peloponnese. It was launched on 19 December 1948 and was successfully completed by early March 1949. By August 1949, the military component of the civil war had ended. On 15 October 1949, the exiled Provisional Democratic Government signalled an end to the hostilities with a radio broadcast from Bucharest. Possibly in response to the changed circumstance brought about by the termination of the civil war, by the end of 1949 the British Embassy’s Information Department staffing levels were further reduced. Eland, one of the two assistant information officers, returned to London without replacement, thereby leaving behind only one British officer locally engaged for the Athens press, one Greek editor and translator for the provincial press, an interpreter clerk and a typist. Yet, few opportunities were missed to use the material available ‘to project Britain’. After the departure of Eland –​who had dealt exclusively with the visual publicity side of the work –​the Information Department was unable to sustain visual publicity at ‘the same efficient level as before’. Nevertheless, ‘a good success’ was attained following a film tour in Macedonia and Thrace, arranged by the Information Department’s film projectionist. Visits were made to a small number villages that did not have electricity and where the inhabitants had not seen a film for several years; the Information Department’s tour

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was consequently reported to have been ‘much appreciated’.382 In regard to matters of the press, personal relations with the Greek press were said to be ‘as good as they can be’.383 The issue of Cyprus had once again emerged as a serious issue, one that further complicated the work of the Information Department, although Norton believed it did not fundamentally alter its relationship with the press. But the most ‘encouraging’ feature of this period was marked by the connections the Information Department developed with the BBC and the BC. Close co-​operation between the Information Department and the BBC resulted in what was described as a process where ‘useful guidance’ was ‘supplied to the BBC whenever the opportunity offers’.384 It was noted that the Voice of America (VOA) also enjoyed considerable popularity in Greece. And while it was considered to be second in popularity to the BBC, the continued publicity by and about the VOA would influence listener habits and thus strength the American voice in Greece. Yet it was the BBC and Information Department radio programmes that continued to be broadcast over Athens Radio, thereby persistently producing what were regarded as ‘good results’. Norton was also satisfied with the establishment of ‘increasingly’ good and close relations between the Information Department and the BC, while those between the Information Department and the USIS were characterized by ‘frequent’ exchanges of information as well as ‘friendly chats about methods of work’. Accounts of provincial tours by British and American officers were also exchanged ‘to mutual advantage’.385 One such was a tour of the Greek islands from 8–​22 November 1949 by Howard L. McVitty, a USIS officer, aboard a Greek navy minesweeper. The first objective of the tour was for the American Ambassador H. F. Grady386 and Chief of the ECA Mission 382 FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​1, Information Department, British Embassy, Athens, to C. F. A. Warner, FO, 20 January 1950. 383 Ibid. 384 Ibid. 385 TNA:  FO  953/​892, PG  11916/​1, Information Department, British Embassy, Athens, to Warner, FO, 20 January 1950; Minutes, Tahourdin 1950, Speaight, 7 February 1950. 386 In October 1945, he was appointed by President Harry S. Truman to be his personal representative to the Allied Commission, supervising the election in Greece, and later he was appointed as US ambassador to Greece (1948–​1950).

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to Greece Paul P. Porter to deliver speeches to the people of each island. The second was to sound out public opinion on the US and the ECA. The last was to develop information work and to show documentary films. The USIS subsequently supplied the Information Department with a copy of McVitty’s report and its accompanied memorandum.387 In the immediate aftermath of the cessation of hostilities and as military operations reached their termination, the British Embassy co-​ordinated a series of tours across Greece with the aim of sampling public opinion in the areas recently freed from rebel control and to discover the extent to which Anglo-​Greek relations had been affected by the conflict. The tours were not only valuable in terms of information work, but also useful in demonstrating to London the extent and outcomes of the efforts made by the Information Department in this regard. Furthermore, the British consul in Patras, D. R. Collard, was instructed to visit Kalavrita on 25 and 26 February 1949 and to call en route at Chalandritsa, Manessi and Kato Vlassia –​all of which were EAM strongholds during the Second World War and guerrilla bases during the civil war.388 Hebblethwaite himself made three tours: the first in eastern Macedonia and Thrace between 10 and 13 January 1950; the second in the Peloponnese from 12 to 18 March 1950; and the third in Crete at the end of August 1950. While on these tours, Hebblethwaite met with representatives of the Greek authorities, British officers, press editors and others. They informed him whether or not they had received British material and how frequently the material was delivered; they also outlined their respective needs, their typographical and translation facilities, the viability of their businesses and the extent to which they would or could use British material. Hebblethwaite was also interested in making new contacts, especially for business purposes. Hebblethwaite considered his short trip to Macedonia and Thrace as ‘worthwhile’ despite its 387 TNA:  FO  953/​ 894, PG  11932/​ 1, Letter, Confidential, Hayles, Information Department, British Embassy, Athens, to IPD, FO, 30 December 1949. 388 TNA:  FO  953/​555, PE  1109, British Ambassador transmitted a copy of Letter from D. R. Collard, British Consul Patras, dated 2 March 1949, ‘Report of Tour to Kalavrita, Chalandritsa, Marassi and Kato Vlassia’ to HMPSS for FO, 16 March 1949: Copy, British Consulate, Patras, 2 March 1949, Confidential to information officer in Athens; Minutes, Hayles, 28 April 1949.

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brevity due to him receiving instructions to return urgently to Athens in order to monitor the development of the Cyprus crisis.389 The consul general at Thessaloniki, Derek Dodson, completed Hebblethwaite’s truncated tour, meeting with newspaper editors in Komotini and Alexandroupolis. Edgar Vedova, the consul at Kavala, met editors in Xanthi and Drama. Despite having visited only Thessaloniki and Kavalla in Eastern Macedonia, Hebblethwaite's subsequent report of his visit is long, detailed and rewards a close reading, as it reveals much about the state of Greece –​and especially regions outside of Athens –​after the civil war. Perhaps more pertinent to this study, the report also exposes Britain’s perception of its role in the future development of Greece. During his short tour in the north, Hebblethwaite noted the extent of public approval for outputs from the BBC, given its good broadcast quality and its quick provision of ‘hot’ news; this is especially significant when compared to Athens, where radio reception was weaker. Greek newspaper editors also found the BBC Bulletin much more useful than USIS material, as it was ‘less verbose and repetitive and contained much more meat’.390 In other areas of publicity, however –​especially the visual –​it was acknowledged that the Americans predominated. Hebblethwaite observed that they had ‘gone in for visual publicity in a big way’, opting for the broad use of both photographs and films. The American Information Department in Thessaloniki numbered eight persons and was run –​together with the consulate –​on a joint system of administration. The department issued a daily summary of the Greek press and a daily bulletin of US news, various reprints from articles of interest supplied by the US State Department and some departmental written accounts. Hebblethwaite felt that the American team was ‘very energetically led and will probably show results in the near future’. However, he judged that they had sacrificed quality for quantity, as they had prioritized volume and speed over content. The French, on 389 A referendum on the unification of Cyprus with Greece took place on 15 and 22 January 1950, resulting in 95.7 per cent in favour of Enosis Syntakton Hmerision Efimeridon Athinon [ Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers]. 390 TNA:  FO  953/​891, PG  11915/​1, Hebblethwaite, ‘Report on Tour in Eastern Macedonia (Salonica and Kavalla) from January 10th to January 13th, 1950’, 25 January 1950.

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the other hand, only organized cultural tours on behalf of their consul in Thessaloniki and offered little else; teaching of the French language was their main preoccupation.391 Hebblethwaite’s next regional tour was in mid-​March in the Peloponnese, where he visited all the major towns.392 In each location, he talked to the local authorities, local police chiefs and editors of local papers, together with local teachers of English and the Information Department’s local agents. He also met with military officers of the Greek Armed Forces in the Peloponnese, the British police and prisons mission officer and the local ECA representative, who happened to be English. He again noted that the BBC, due to its general popularity, provided ‘easily the most effective weapon of publicity’. Attracting many thousands of listeners, its programmes were cited by newspapers and played in cafés, which were often in possession of the sole radio in many smaller towns and regularly tuned in to the BBC (either directly or via Athens Radio); the programmes thus reached a broad audience. The extensive influence of the BBC was acknowledged by the FO’s Southern Department as being Britain’s ‘most powerful weapon’, due to its significant reach, and it thereby recommended that the FO should assist in the further expansion of radio-​based publicity.393 The Americans were again found to have a strong presence in the Peloponnese, presenting regular screenings of USIS films, disseminating daily and weekly bulletins in the Greek language and circulating other occasional features for wider distribution. However, what struck Hebblethwaite most forcefully were the numerous French activities across Greece, despite France having its own difficulties during this period. Apart from the fact that the French language, as opposed to English, was still compulsory in the government gymnasia (secondary schools), French was also taught in many private schools, even in those not subsidized by the French government. The widespread use of the French language was also evident in the use of British publicity material translated from the original into French.394 391 Ibid. 392 Patras, Pyrgos, Xalandritza, Kalavryta, Olympia, Pyrgos, Tripoli, Langadia, Vitina, Kalamata, Megalopolis, Sparta, Mistra, Argos, Navplio and Corinth. 393 TNA:  FO  953/​891, PG  11915/​2, Minutes, Information Services Department, 14 April 1950; Braslow, 17 April 1950; Eland, 17 April 1950; Ackland, 18 April 1950. 394 TNA: FO 953/​891, PG 11915/​2, Hebblethwaite, ‘Report on Tour of the Peloponnese, from Sunday March 12th to Saturday March 18th, 1950’, 23 March 1950.

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Finally, at the end of August 1950, Hebblethwaite toured Crete, visiting the three largest cities: Heraklion, Rethymno and Chania. He met with Piet de Jongh –​prefect and curator of Knossos –​and visited editors of local newspapers. Hebblethwaite paid close attention here to the teaching of the English language; in contrast to French being taught in all schools in most provinces, English was only taught privately. Again, Hebblethwaite stated that the appeal of the BBC in Crete was as great as in the rest of Greece, noting with approval that ‘wherever I went, praise for the news given by the Greek Service of the BBC was warm and unanimous’. The BBC Greek Service was received either directly or relayed via Athens, and as a result BBC programmes enjoyed very clear reception quality in the region. The VOA, in contrast, was only occasionally heard, and some Cretan newspapers did not take on the VOA.395 The FO considered regional reports to be ‘always worthwhile’ and was broadly satisfied with the regional publicity work undertaken in Greece on behalf of British interests, despite the financial pressures that had reduced the scale of visual publicity in the provinces.396 The development of broadcasting, however, was considered by the FO to be ‘excellent’,397 a view that was shared by the IPD.398 Hebblethwaite was also ‘to be congratulated’ on his success in establishing a closer relationship with his American counterpart, and while ‘the lack of co-​operation in the information field’ between the British and the Americans had in the past undermined the efforts of both, the newly established collaboration between the two countries augured well for the future.399 The idea of a British-​led Third Force that would be independent of the US proved untenable at this point. Moreover, the further hardening of Cold War attitudes following the establishment of NATO in April 1949 emphasized the urgency of closer Anglo-​American co-​operation in the propaganda field. Despite this, both powers maintained

395 TNA: FO 953/​891, PG 11915/​3, Hebblethwaite, ‘Report on Tour of Crete from Friday, August 25th 1950 to Wednesday, August 30th, 1950’, 20 September 1950. 396 TNA:  FO  953/​891, PG  11915/​2, Minutes, Information Services Department, 14 April 1950. 397 TNA: FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​1, Minutes, Tahourdin, 7 February 1950. 398 TNA: FO 953/​894, PG 11932/​1, Minutes, H. F. Bartlett, IPD, 17 January 1950. 399 TNA: FO 953/​892, PG 11916/​1, Minutes, Tahourdin, Speaight, 7 February 1950.

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their separate propaganda campaigns, though agreeing to ‘shoot at the same target from rather different angles’.400 Saturation point? Rethinking British publicity in Greece after the civil war With the end of the Greek Civil War, Hebblethwaite sent to the IPD on 17 January 1950 his reflections on the performance of the British Embassy’s Information Department under his nearly nine months of command at the Athens Embassy’s Information Department. He had been plunged, he reported, into information work of a character he had no prior experience with, into unfamiliar and crisis-​ridden territory ‘with [...] little warning and preparation’. While he had duly undertaken fact-​gathering visits in London prior to his departure –​including to the FO, the COI, the BBC and the Greek Embassy –​nothing had prepared him for ‘the actual work’ that awaited him in Athens, and no clear guidance had been provided from London after his arrival in the country. This was particularly damaging given the varied nature of his work at the Information Department, where ‘even the impressions of the London end of the work, I regret to say, got very confused, as I was not following a clear pattern of work, i.e. radio one day, visual material another, written material (projection of Britain) the next, then anti-​communist material and so on’.401 In response, H. F. Bartlett of the IPD was persuaded that crucial members of the FO –​who were asked to assume the highly technical work of an information officer despite their lack of previous experience –​were not being adequately briefed. Bartlett asked Barbara Ruthven-​Murray, G. W. Aldington of the Information Services Department and B. J. Atkins of the Personnel Department in the FO to comment on Hebblethwaite’s letter. John C. Tahourdin of the IPD also sympathized with Hebblethwaite’s predicament. All agreed that the core problem was that the work of information officers varied too much between one post and another so there was in fact no ‘typical’ information role. The FO could not give new information 00 TNA: FO 1119/​6, PR 229/​1/​G, FO Circular to British Missions, 12 May 1948. 4 401 TNA:  FO  953/​ 894, PG  11932/​ 2, Letter, Hebblethwaite to Tahourdin, 17 January 1950.

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officers a sufficiently clear picture of conditions in the various locations, and in consequence it proved difficult to prepare them adequately for the work that awaited them. Tahourdin replied to Hebblethwaite in light of the many responses his report had elicited. The FO, in general, was sympathetic to the view that it was hard for a member of the Foreign Service to assume highly technical work –​such as the work of an information officer –​especially when previous experience was missing. At the same time, Tahourdin noted that this was a rare occurrence, as Hebblethwaite’s case was the only one to have come up in the last eighteen months. No two information posts were the same. Therefore, whatever training scheme the FO might be able to prepare would be considered too expensive given the small number of trainees and the great diversity of jobs for which they would need to be trained. He claimed that each appointment was treated on an ad hoc basis, therefore a simple action –​ such as a document describing the duties of an information officer –​would prove of little use. Still, this problem became of lesser importance as gradually the information officers were recruited from members of the Foreign Service who had gained experience –​especially in information work –​from working in various branches as juniors.402 As can be seen from the reactions, the FO turned Hebblethwaite’s initial questions and existential doubts into technical issues, which, Hebblethwaite asserted, missed the essential point. In a further letter sent to the IRD on 20 January 1950 on the work of information officers in overseas posts, Hebblethwaite requested better co-​ordination among information officers from different locations in an effort to tighten up their ‘efficiency and [make] more effective the use of the material with which we are provided’. Hebblethwaite found it regrettable that we do not receive from you at regular intervals some indication of the way other posts tackle their various information problems. For instance: how do they use the LPS? how do they distribute it? how do they publicize it? how do they infiltrate British official views into the papers?403 402 TNA: FO 953/​894, PG 11932/​2, Minutes, Bartlett, 27 January 1950; Tahourdin, 4 February 1950; Atkins, 20 February 1950; Aldington, 22 February 1950; Ruthven-​Murray, 28 February 1950; Letter, Restricted Personal, Tahourdin to Hebblethwaite, 9 March 1950. 403 TNA:  FO  953/​891, PG  11915/​4, Letter, Hebblethwaite to Tahourdin, FO, 20 January 1950.

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Although different tactics were used depending on the circumstances, Hebblethwaite argued that knowledge of how different posts were tackling their problems –​‘comparing notes’ –​would be of considerable ‘omnidirectional use’. The IPD’s reply, from E. J. Foote, came a year later, as Hebblethwaite’s letter had been misplaced. Foote sympathized with Hebblethwaite’s feeling that there was too little contact among information officers in the field and regretted that the lack of funding for such a scheme meant it would prove unlikely that Hebblethwaite’s proposals would be accepted.404 In the context of the new political circumstances in Greece after the end of the civil war and the wider geopolitical shifts of the emerging Cold War, Hebblethwaite wondered what the purpose of his work at the Information Department was and what the FO wished it to be. In an extraordinary assessment of British publicity in Greece, Hebblethwaite went so far as to question the very meaning and nature of British involvement in the country. Admitting to ‘disconnected thoughts’ and disturbed by what he had heard about British and US messages reaching a ‘saturation point’405 in a country that had grown tired of anti-​communist material, he struggled to work out ‘a reasonable definition’ of the short-​and long-​term purposes of British information work in Greece. In so doing, he sought the IPD’s guidance. ‘The conclusions I have reached are tentative and fairly platitudinous’, he informed London, ‘but they do at least provide a working basis more concrete than blind faith’. While acknowledging that the FO might expect to see different outcomes in different countries, he emphasized that it would be of interest especially if you could tell us what you expect of us here. I presume that you are not prepared to leave the question entirely to the discretion of the individual [information officer] concerned. When I first left London to take up my job here, I was told that my main work was ‘to project Britain’. The formula, I regret, was and is inadequate.406 404 TNA:  FO  953/​891, PG  11915/​4, Letter, Hebblethwaite to Tahourdin, FO, 20 January 1950; Letter, Personal, Foote, IPD, FO, to Hebblethwaite, Athens, 1 January 1951. 405 As he found out during his travels in the Peloponnese and Crete in March and August 1950. 406 TNA: FO 953/​894, PG 11932/​7, Personal Letter, Hebblethwaite to Foote, IPD, 1 December 1950.

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Hebblethwaite’s powerfully expressed doubts elicited from Foote an equally stark response and –​in effect –​an FO manifesto for British publicity policy in the radically changing world of 1950, which warrants quoting at length. ‘[A]s world affairs are moving at such a pace these days’, Foote mused, the long-​term policy is automatically apt to become telescoped into the short term, but I think that on the whole ‘projection of Britain’ is still the main plank in this platform of the long-​term effort of putting our point of view across to Western Europe. Of course, ‘projection of Britain’ (a term which I heartily dislike but which is in general use) covers a variety of points. It should stress solidarity in the Commonwealth, our colonial development (political, commercial, industrial, agricultural etc.), the enormous strength of this vast force comprising all colours and creeds and of course the way of life in Great Britain must be emphasised. You should underline the fact that there is a way of life apart from Communism which functions efficiently, satisfactorily and above all favours freedom of the individual. A large portion of COI material is produced for the purpose of projecting Britain, but we have very recently initiated a series of articles to show that our social reforms –​right through the ages, not recent Labour Party reforms –​are based on Christian principles. These should be coming to you in the New Year. The short term policy is now concentrated almost entirely on defence and rearmament. We want to show the world that [Great Britain] is making a serious effort to increase her military strength and that if only free nations would do the same the Communist menace would largely disappear. You want to show that we are good and strong allies: that our forces are increasing on land, sea and in the air: our industry is being switched, as far as possible, to war production: we are tightening our belts again and going into this period of tension without ‘looking over our shoulders’. You can pick up no end of material on this in budget and other published figures, speeches of Ministers etc. You should also bring out the integration of the forces of Western Europe. The Navy and the Air Forces of Western Europe can go to war tomorrow as one unit, the Army is training fast to be able to do so. […] Our lead in jet production is another point which shows our strength. […] On short term we should also keep the export drive to the fore. It has in some ways become long term because, short of war, we must keep up our exports to live. You will find plenty of material for this in the normal media of LPS etc. […] We are preparing a number of feature articles by authors of a higher calibre than the normal run of COI writers, we are producing a number of films showing our military training. WESCO and LPS carry a large number of items to give you ammunition to fire on these lines. […] If you can, through the press, radio, photographs, films and all the other media, as well as in conversation, put across the points which I have mentioned broadly in this letter, it will be of paramount assistance to the FO.407 407 TNA:  FO  953/​ 894, PG  11932/​ 7, Letter, Confidential, Personal, Foote to

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Hebblethwaite, however, remained puzzled. ‘The nail I was driving at is not quite the one you’ve hammered home’, he responded, before conceding that he hoped to discuss the problem with him at greater length when he was next in London the following June. Until then, Hebblethwaite undertook to ‘try and sort out [his] ideas a bit more’ while dealing with the many immediate practical issues, such as financial cuts. ‘It’s all we can do’, he signed off plaintively, ‘to keep our heads above water’.408 What can be seen through this new exchange of letters between Hebblethwaite and the FO is the reality that started to appear in post-​ war British foreign policy. What it says is that post-​war Britain was overstretched and its global reach tenuous. The FO made every effort to sustain its global stronghold, but on the ground it dawned on frontline officers like Hebblethwaite that this was increasingly a myth told to reassure the politicians and press in London. Due to the appeal of the BBC in Greece, wired publicity remained Britain’s ‘most powerful weapon’ in the country during and after the Second Word War. Radio matters constituted a separate subsection of the information officer’s reports, and British policy in the field of airwaves in Greece will be the core of the discussion in the next chapter.

Hebblethwaite, Personal and Confidential, 11 December 1950. 408 TNA:  FO  953/​ 894, PG  11932/​ 7A, Letter, Personal and Confidential, Hebblethwaite to Foote, 10 February 1951.

Chapter 3

British Broadcasting Policy in Greece, 1945–​1950

British interest in radio broadcasting in Greece dates back to the interwar years. The Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company Ltd –​one of the three largest British manufactures licensed to construct and administer experimental broadcasting stations in Britain before the founding of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and one of the six big manufacturers to support the establishment of the BBC in November 19221 –​was involved in the earliest attempts to establish the first radio station in Greece.2 In January 1938, the Greek government signed a contract with Telefunken, which was ratified in June 1941, after the German invasion of Greece. During the Second World War, British broadcasting publicity in Greece was serviced by the BBC Greek section, which was created in September 1939. The BBC’s influence in Greece proved to be Britain’s ‘most powerful weapon’ both during and after the war. In liberated Greece, the British played a central role in the early formative years of the newly established Greek National Broadcasting Foundation (EIR). Before the British withdrew from Greece in 1947 and thereby left the Americans in charge, a BBC engineer was seconded as technical director to the EIR –​an important post at a crucially important political period in Greece –​partly in anticipation of the potential escalation of the Cyprus crisis, which the 1 2

W. J. Baker, A History of the Marconi Company (London: Methuen, 1970), 192–​193; Asa Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Volume I: The Birth of Broadcasting (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), 19. The lifelong ambition of the founder, Guglielmo Marconi, to set up a Marconi-​ controlled Empire Wireless Communications Network, after protracted negotiations with the Post Office, ended with the formation of Cables and Wireless Ltd and Imperial and International Communications Ltd in April 1929. ‘Its role was from then onwards limited to the areas of research, invention and manufacture’ (Baker, A History of the Marconi Company, 231).

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British government feared might critically expose British policy to Greek public opinion.

British interest in the evolution of the Greek Broadcasting Service, 1929–​1939 Initial British interest in the early development of the Greek Broadcasting Service, in the late 1920s, was shown by the involvement of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company Ltd3 in the establishment of the country’s first public radio station.4 As it was one of the last European countries to acquire a public radio service, the Greek need was urgent and the country’s environment  –​marked by relative political, economic and social stability under the premiership of Eleftherios Venizelos (1928–​1932) –​was 3

4

Marconi had already been active in Greece, having set up a wireless telegraphy station at Thesion in Athens for the needs of the Greek navy just before the First Balkan War (1912–​1913). It was at this time that the Premier and Minister of Marine Eleftherios Venizelos secured a British Naval Mission to assist the reorganization of the Greek navy. The British Naval Mission to Greece arrived in Athens at the beginning of May 1911 under Vice Admiral Lionel Grant Tufnell, who also became naval advisor to the Greek government. See Z. Fotakis, Greek Naval Strategy and Policy, 1910–​1919 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005). A private experimental enterprise began in 1926 and a station was set up in Thessaloniki in 1928  –​or in 1929 as stated by Christos Tsigiridis himself  –​by Tsigiridis, an electrical engineer, wireless enthusiast and pioneer. According to information gathered by the British, this station operated on a wavelength of 373.l m. (later 225  m) with power of 0.8  kW, and it transmitted a two-​hour commercial programme every day (mentioned in TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, September 1949). These figures do not conflict with the technical figures listed in a report by Tsigiridis on the activity of his radio station (wavelength of 218.5 –​225 –​335.5 with a daily four-​ hour programme; on special events, his station made connection to Athens Radio for relays) (Tsigiridis to Government General of Northern Greece, 3 August 1945, Greek government’s Press and Wireless Office in Thessaloniki, No. 417/​4 August 1945 (personal correspondence with Manolis Kandylakis)).

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favourable for such a service.5 On three occasions, Marconi came close to collaborating with the Greek government in the construction and equipping of a national radio station. On the first occasion, the Greek government announced a competition,6 which resulted in a contract signed on 23 May 1929 with Marconi –​represented by Heracles Dimitriadis of Glasgow –​which endeavoured to build a 14 kW radio transmitter with an antenna that would permit clear radio reception. This first contract was submitted to the Greek Parliament for ratification on 24 May, but it was withdrawn for legal reasons.7 A second contract was signed, this time without competition, on 26 January 1930 by Emmanuel Markoglou  –​ merchant and resident of Athens –​on behalf of Marconi. The terms of this contract were not substantially different from those of the first, and after minor amendment, it was ratified by Law 4551 in April 1930.8 There 5

6

7

8

As in the first period (1910–​1915) of Eleftherios Venizelos’ administration, his last term as prime minister (1928–​1932) is characterized by the same modernizing drive to bring the Greek state apparatus closer to Western standards. His objective remained the development and modernization of the state apparatus, the promotion of infrastructure projects to help the economy, the attraction of foreign capital and the restoration of Greece’s external relations. See Spyros Tsokas, Ο Ελευθέριος Βενιζέλος και το εγχείρημα του αστικού εκσυγχρονισμού 1928-​ 1932 [Eleftherios Venizelos and the Venture of Bourgeois Modernization 1928-​1932] (Athens: Themelio, 2002). Americans had also shown an ‘earnest’ interest in taking part in the competition. On 15 May 1929, H. S. Goold, chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy in Athens, expressed to Eleftherios Venizelos the US government’s dissatisfaction that a decision in ‘the radio contract’ was made without taking into account the proposal of the Durham Company representative, who was then in Athens and had presented his proposal in a personal meeting with the Greek premier, despite Goold’s ‘many demarches’ (Goold’s letter to Venizelos, 7 May 1929, File 380-​38, Museum Benaki/​ Archive of Eleftherios Venizelos) on the issue (Goold to Venizelos, File 380-​39, 15 May 1929 (digitalized archive)). The contractor was declared to have forfeited the right by virtue of decision number 4140/​29 of the Greek Legal Council; see Ανώτατου Οικονομικού Συμβουλίου (AOS) [Supreme Economic Council], Περί εγκαταστάσεως ραδιοφωνικού σταθμού εν Ελλάδι: γνωμοδότησις-​εισήγησις-​εκθέσεις. [Re the Establishment of a Radio Station in Greece], Part Two, ‘Εισηγητική Έκθεσις’ [Recommendations], 20 September 1934 (Athens: National Printing House, 1934), p 9. ΦΕΚ: 117, Law 4551, 16 April 1930, 913–​918.

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were, however, problems from the outset in the execution of this contract, not least because Marconi subcontracted the project to another operator: the Durham Company.9 In March 1934, after several court cases, the Durham Company submitted a proposal to the Greek Ministry of Communications –​which had jurisdiction over the matter –​in which it waived the radio franchise on condition that it be granted to Marconi. This was accepted by the Greek government and Marconi –​represented at the time by Rear Admiral (retired) Constantinos Athanasiades10 –​ was called on to submit its terms for a third contract.11 At the request of the Greek government, the Anotato Oikonomiko Symvoulio (AOS [Supreme Economic Council]) reviewed the terms of this new contract and subsequently considered them burdensome for the government. The AOS proposed an international competition ‘between known and serious broadcasting companies’, since only through competition could guarantees be provided regarding the cost of building the installations (the servicing of which would constitute the company’s most serious expenditure).12 The AOS then sought comments from the Wireless Telegraphy Service of the Ministry of Communications. The head of the Wireless Telegraphy Service, Stephanos Eleftheriou, argued that a competition for the lowest bidder would not achieve more competitive prices, as indicated

9 10

1 1 12

AOS, ‘Recommendations’,  9; AOS, Part Three, ‘Report of Mr. S. Eleftheriou, Head of the Wireless Department of the Ministry of Communications’, 3 October 1934,  39–​40. Athanasiades had served as the first head of the Office of Wireless Telegraphy (1910–​ 1920), established in the Ministry of Marine (see ΦΕΚ: 240, Royal Decree, 8 August 1912, Article 17, 1401) (Giorgos Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’ (Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Ραδιοφωνίας) [‘Oh holy ether...’ History of Greek Radio] (Athens: Polaris, 2015), 15; cf. Law 4277 (ΦΕΚ: 265/​1929, 2285). The Telegraphy Service became a monopoly of the Greek state, under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications and managed by the Directorate of the Tachidromeia, Tilegraphoi, Telephoneia (TTT [Post, Telegraphy, Telephones]). Xatzidakis gives a comprehensive chronicle of the history of Greek broadcasting, drawing his material mainly from the Greek press of the time. AOS, ‘Recommendations’, 11; AOS, ‘Report of Mr. S. Eleftheriou’, 40, 47. AOS, ‘Conclusions’, 37.

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by the most recent offers from the German firm Telefunken13 or Marconi’s British rival Philips, whose estimated expenditure was in effect higher than the Marconi bid. The same conclusion was reached by the TTT14 at the Ministry of Communications. In fact, according to Eleftheriou, the Telefunken bid was submitted ‘solely to cancel the negotiations between the State and the Marconi Company’.15 The tender was finally awarded to Marconi, but the contract was again annulled under the Emergency Law of 20 November 1935.16 It is thus evident that the establishment of the first public radio station in Greece had turned into a competitive race between foreign companies. The annulment of contracts, a series of long legal disputes and the inability of the Greek state to make final decisions led to continuous postponement of the establishment of the broadcasting project in Greece. In Eleftheriou’s 1934 report, he expressed the fear that the current state of affairs in Greece would mean the establishment of radio in the country would ‘be postponed indefinitely’.17 It was not until the end of 1936 that the Greek government established a public broadcasting service by decree –​the Ypiresia Radiofonikon 13

For the presence of Telefunken in Greece and Greek-​German relations on broadcasting in the interwar period, see Maria Dimitriadou, ‘Οι ελληνογερμανικές οικονομικές σχέσεις κατά τον Μεσοπόλεμο:  Η περίπτωση της Telefunken’ [Greek-​ German Economic Relations during the Interwar Period: The Case of Telefunken], in S. N. Dordanas and N. Papanastasiou, eds, Ο ‘μακρύς’ ελληνογερμανικός εικοστός αιώνας [The ‘Long’ Greek–​German Twentieth Century] (Athens:  Epikentro, 2018), 111–​129. 14 The TTT General Directorate was attached to the Ministry of Communications. It was established as a separate Ministry of TTT in 1922 (ΦΕΚ: 69, Law 2762, 9 May 1922, 287–​8), abolished in 1923 (ΦΕΚ: 70, Legislative Degree, 16 March 1923, 499–​500) and then returned back as TTT General Directorate to the Ministry of Communications. After the liberation of Greece, the increased but also urgent needs of services related to wireless telegraphy in communications led to its re-​ establishment as a ministry (ΦΕΚ:  10, Law  6, 6 November 1944, 25–​6) and remained so throughout the period covered by this book. 1 5 AOS, ‘Report by Mr. S. Eleftheriou’, 41, 42, 48. 16 ΦΕΚ: 581, ‘Re: Annulment of the Contract Ratified by Law 4551 Dated 26 January 1930 Regranting an Exclusive Franchise to Operate a Radio Station’, 20 November 1935, 2911. 17 AOS, ‘Report by Mr. S. Eleftheriou’, 48.

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Ekpompon (YRE [National Broadcasting Service]) –​which lay within the control and supervision of the Ministry of Communications.18 The Greek government requested bids for the supply of a 10 kW transmitter, but not for broadcasting rights.19 Telefunken offered a 15 kW transmitter instead and on 27 November 1936, the YRE and Telefunken signed a contract for erection of the transmitter at Liossia –​16 km from Athens –​at a frequency of 601 kHz and 643 kHz (a wavelength of 499.2 m and 466.6 m, respectively).20 At the same time, the Greek government approached the BBC for technical advice, but the latter referred the matter to either Marconi or Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd.21 In January 1938, the Greek government turned again to the BBC to request its assistance in studying the organization from a ‘commercial point of view’.22 As a result, Constantinos Dracopoulos,23 introduced by the Greek Embassy as the future head of the non-​technical section of the new Greek broadcasting company,24 was 18 ΦΕΚ:  391, Decree-​Law No.  95, 7 September 1936, ‘Re:  The Establishment of a Broadcasting Service’, 2041–​2043, amended by Decree-​Law No. 404 (ΦΕΚ: 561, 29 December 1936, 3117–​2043, introducing other amendments by Decree-​Law 1057) (ΦΕΚ: 33, 2 February 1938, 169–​170). 19 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, September 1949, p. 1. 20 Ellinikí Radiofonía Tileórasi (ERT [Hellenic Broadcasting Organization]) Archives:  Transmitter 70  kW, F1, D.  K. Svolopoulos, Wireless Director, Undersecretary for Press and Tourism to Voulpiotis, 1 June 1940. 21 BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), Ch. Simopoulos, Greek Minister in London, Legation Royale de Grèce to the Director, BBC, 26 August 1936; Chief Engineer (unnamed), 16 September 1936. 22 BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), Ch. Simopoulos, Greek Minister in London, Legation Royale de Grèce to Basil E. Nicolls, Controller (Public Relations), BBC, 30 December 1937. 23 From information gathered about Dracopoulos before his meeting with Sir Stephen Tallents, Dracopoulos had travelled and lived in Germany, France and England; he was a ‘staunch monarchist’ (BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Whitley to A.C.(P) (Wellington), 13 January 1938), ‘a staunch Anglophile and is strongly opposed to the present German infiltration’ (BBC, WAC:  E  1/​815, Whitley to C(PR) (Sir Stephen Tallents), 24 January 1938). 24 BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), BBC Internal Circulating Memo, Whitley to A. C. (P), 13 January 1938.

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sent on a three-​week trip to London to study the work carried out in the BBC’s studios, including the drafting of contracts and other aspects of programme planning.25 The plan was for Dracopoulos to put what he had learned from his visit into practice when he returned to Greece. Oliver J. Whitley26 of the BBC’s External Department was asked to ensure that Dracopoulos would meet ‘the necessary people’27 who could explain to him all the various elements that should make up the central structures of Greek broadcasting.28 Dracopoulos also visited BBC Bristol and met its director since –​as Whitley noted –​the new Greek broadcasting organization would, in its early stages, be more comparable to a regional station than the national wing of the BBC.29 After Dracopoulos became acquainted with most departments in the BBC, he met Richard Marriott of the BBC’s External Department in order to ascertain what materials might be acquired in the establishment period by means of foreign relay. Marriott explained to him the difficulties of foreign relays in the absence 25

BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), Ch. Simopoulos, Greek Minister in London, Legation Royale de Grèce to Basil E. Nicolls, Controller (Public Relations) BBC, 30 December 1937. 26 Whitley (1912–​2005) was son of J. H. Whitley, chair of the BBC (1930–​1935). He joined the BBC in 1935 and held a succession of posts in its External Services. In spring 1939, he became the chief monitoring supervisor, with Richard Marriott as director of the Monitoring Service at Wood Norton. He rose to become managing director of external broadcasting and chief assistant to the director general (see Leonard Miall, The Independent, Obituary, 24 March 2005; Briggs, The History of Broadcasting, Vol. III, 188, 362–​363). 2 7 BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), handwritten note on Whitley’s Letter to Simopoulos of 31 December 1937. See also Letter, Whitley (for Controller (Public Relations)) to Simopoulos, copy to Marriott, FO, 31 December 1937, and BBC Internal Circulating Memo, Marriott to Whitley, 4 January 1938. 28 BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), BBC Internal Circulating Memo, Marriott to Harman Grisewood, Assistant to the Programme Organizer, 6 January 1937(8). See also, Internal Circulating Memo, Whitley to Grisewood, 13 January 1938. 29 BBC, WAC:  E  1/​815, Countries:  Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​1951), Whitley to. G.  C. Beadle, West of England Regional Director, 26 January 1938.

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of any decent lines, since there was no Greek receiving station in existence as of yet.30 Dracopoulos also met with Sir Stephen Tallents –​BBC controller (public relations) –​‘for a general chat’. C. Nicolopoulos –​the undersecretary of communications –​thanked the BBC for the ‘particular attention’ paid to Dracopoulos, to whom he gave the title Director of the Greek Broadcasting Service. BBC Director General Sir John Reith replied that they would ‘at any time’ allow any other member of the Greek Broadcasting Services to see any aspect of BBC work in which they might be interested.31 In the interim, the Greek government announced an international competition for the right to broadcast and establish a network comprising a 100 kW transmitter for Athens, a 10 kW transmitter for Thessaloniki and a 5 kW transmitter for Corfu.32 Telefunken submitted a bid that was accepted, and a contract was signed on 25 January 1938 between the company, represented in Greece by Ioannis Voulpiotis,33 and the Greek state, represented by Nicolopoulos. Voulpiotis was a strong opponent of

30

BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), Record of Interview of R. Marriott, External Department, BBC, with C. Dracopoulos, 21 January 1938. 31 BBC, WAC: E 1/​815, Countries: Greece, Broadcasting in Greece, A-​Z Files (1936–​ 1951), Letter, Nicolopoulos to the Superintendent, BBC, 7 June 1938; Letter, Director General to Nicolopoulos, 14 June 1938. 32 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, 11 October 1949. 3 3 Voulpiotis (1902–​1999) studied electrical engineering in Germany and was son-​in-​ law of von Siemens. In 1932, he joined the central administration of Siemens and in 1933, of Telefunken. He remained in the central administration of Telefunken after his resignation in 1934 (from an unpublished autobiographical note, in Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 156). Telefunken and Siemens were represented in Greece by long-​term representatives, Alexandros Zachariou and Voulpiotis. After Zachariou’s death in 1939, Voulpiotis represented both companies. Voulpiotis was tried in the midst of the civil war (in 1947 and 1948) on various charges related to his actions during German occupation, but was acquitted of all charges on the benefit of the doubt (see Dimitris Kousouris, Δίκες των δοσιλόγων, 1944–​1949 [Trial of the Collaborators, 1944–​49] (Athens: Polis, 2014), 433–​434). He faced more charges in later years.

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the promotion of British technology and played a key role in promoting German technology.34 The official Greek public radio service began broadcasting on 25 March 1938 on a 15 kW transmitter constructed by Telefunken.35 It was at this time that the Athens station finally went into operation, thus ending the previous private experimental period in Greek broadcasting. During that time, Greek listeners used imported wireless sets, which were powerful enough to receive foreign programmes, particularly those from Bari, Italy.36 According to information gathered by the British, there were about 5,000 listeners in 1934. This figure reached 54,600 by the end of 1939,37 as listening became more widespread.38 The small 15 kW transmitter, however, was inadequate to facilitate such growth. Thus a plan was developed to convert the transmitter from 15 kW to 70 kW, and by mid-​1940 the Greek Isabella Palaska, Άγγελος ή Δαίμονας. Ο Αμφιλεγόμενος Πατέρας μου [Angel or Demon. My Controversial Father] (Athens: A. A. Livanis, 2012), 47. 35 G.  N. Karter, Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία, Τηλεόραση. Ιστορία και ιστορίες [Greek Radio and Television. History and Stories], (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2004), 110. 36 Radio Bari (1932–​1943) was owned and operated by the Ente Italiano Audizioni Radiofoniche [Italian Radio Broadcasting Authority]. It went on air in September 1932 and began its Arabic broadcasts in May 1934. In July 1934, it started its broadcasts in Greek (see Ente Italiano Audizioni Radiofoniche: le trasmissioni speciali per la Grecia, 1 Luglio 1934-​1 Luglio 1937 [Ente Italiano Audizioni Radiofoniche: The Special Greek Broadcasts, 1 July 1 1934-​1 July 1937] (Italy: s.n., 1937)). Bari’s combination of propaganda and entertainment proved successful in attracting listeners in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. After the outbreak of the Abyssinian crisis in September 1935, the tone of its broadcasting turned into overt propaganda against Britain and France (see MacDonald, ‘Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British Countermeasures 1934–​38’, Middle Eastern Studies 13/​2 (1977), 195–​207; Arturo Marzano, ‘“La guerra delle onde”: The British and French Responses to the Arabic Propaganda of Radio Bari (1938–​1939)’, Contemporanea 15/​1 ( January 2012), 3–​24. 37 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, September 1949. 3 8 According to statistics of the undersecretary for press and tourism, the number of radio sets in Greece was estimated at 12,000 in 1938 and 61,000 in 1940 (see Τέσσερα χρόνια διακυβερνήσεως Ι. Μεταξά, 1936-​1940 [Four Years of I. Metaxas’ Governance, 1936-​1940] (Athens: 4th of August Publications, 1940), 149).

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government agreed with Telefunken the cost, the terms of payment, the date of submission of the final construction plan39 and the date of the delivery of the machinery from Germany (set for January 1941).40 However, delayed payment from the Greek government led to the postponement of delivery of the machinery.41 The war and the German occupation of Greece halted the development of Greek broadcasting. When the Germans invaded in April 1941, the occupying military commander seized the Athens Radio station and by June 1941 issued a decree to grant broadcasting rights to Telefunken. The 1941 law was based on the contract drawn up in 1938, which was ratified with some amendments.42 In this agreement,43 Anonimi Eteria Radiophonikon Ekpompon (AERE [Radio Broadcasting Company])44 was formed in November 194145 and assigned to Telefunken, explicitly as a broadcasting monopoly in the capital. According to information from British intelligence services, AERE was worth 500,000 Reichsmarks, increased in October 1941 to 1,200,000 Reichsmarks, while 90 per cent of AERE shares were owned by Germans.46 Voulpiotis took over as 39

ERT Archives: Transmitter 70 kW, F2, S. Zisis, Technical Director, Undersecretary for Press and Tourism to Voulpiotis, 10 February 1940. 40 ERT Archives:  Transmitter 70  kW, F1, Voulpiotis (Telefunken) to the Undersecretary for Press and Tourism, 18 January, 8 February, 13 March, 6 April, 9 December 1940; the Undersecretary for Press and Tourism to Voulpiotis, 29 January, 15 February 1940. 41 ERT Archives: Transmitter 70 kW, F1, Voulpiotis to Undersecretary for Press and Tourism, 14 August and 9 December 1940. 42 ΦΕΚ: 184 Legislative Decree No. 126, ‘Re: Ratification of the Contract Signed on 25 January 1938 between the Berlin-​Based Company Named Telefunken Gesellschaft für Drahtlose Telegraphie M.B.H and the Minister of Communications Mr. C. Nicolopoulos’, 895–​910, 4 June 1941, reissued in ΦΕΚ: 153, 17 June 1942, in both Greek and German. 43 See ΦΕΚ: 184, Article 22, 4 June 1941, 904. According to Article 22, Telefunken was obliged to establish AERE within six months from the ratification of the contract and to transfer to AERE all the rights deriving from this agreement. 44 According to Isabella Palaska, daughter of Ioannis Voulpiotis, the initiative for the establishment of AERE was due to a proposal by Voulpiotis to the Greek Ministry of Press and Tourism; see Palaska, Άγγελος Δαίμονας,  41–​42. 45 ΦΕΚ: 63, Article 2, section II, 17 May 1943, 369. 46 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, September 1949.

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radio director, a position he held for the entire period of the occupation. In the 1941 amendments, the provisions concerning installation of the transmitters in Thessaloniki and Corfu and the short-​wave transmitter were revoked. In their place, a provision was made to strengthen Athens Radio from 15 kW to 70 kW. The company maintained its exemption from tariffs and taxes, as stipulated in the 1938 contract. An article was also added referring to the delivery of the ready-​to-​operate 70 kW transmitter, which would take place twelve months after the restoration of normal railway transport between Athens and Berlin; some technical clauses were also amended.47 In April 1942, the railway connection between Athens and Berlin opened,48 though the transmitter was not delivered until November 1943.49 However, in May 1943, before the machinery could reach the Greek border, the German Administration of Transfer Services banned the installation of the transmitter until further notice.50 The British were aware of the Greek radio landscape during the German occupation, as shown by the data presented in their intelligence reports. According to their information, by April 1942 the Athens and Thessaloniki stations were affiliated with the German network. The Athens short-​wave transmitter at Pallini was used as a German Forces station –​under the name of Soldatensender Mittelmeer –​and relayed entertainment programmes. In September of the same year, AERE began construction of a short-​wave and long-​wave station in Athens and a station in Corfu, and incorporated the private station of Christos Tsigiridis51 in Thessaloniki into the state broadcasting

7 ΦΕΚ: 184, 4 June 1941, 909–​910. 4 48 ERT Archives: Transmitter 70 kW, F1, K. Valvis, Ministry of Communications to AERE, 12 June 1942. 49 ERT Archives: Transmitter 70 kW, F2, AERE to Ministry of Communications, 22 November 1943. 50 ERT Archives: Transmitter 70 kW, F2, AERE to Ministry of Communications, 10 May 1943. 51 It is considered the first radio station in the Balkans; cf. Olga Plehova, Το Πρώτο Ελληνικό Ραδιόφωνο… και το Πρώτο των Βαλκανίων [The First Greek Radio... and the First of the Balkans] (Thessaloniki: Barbounakis, 2002); Nestoras Tyrovouzis, Η εφημερίδα Μακεδονία και το ‘Ράδιο Τσιγγιρίδη’. Ο πρώτος ‘όμιλος’ ενημέρωσης στην Ελλάδα [The Newspaper Macedonia and ‘Radio Tigiridis’. The First Information ‘Group’ in Greece] (Thessaloniki: University Studio Press, 2005).

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organization.52 Greece had never possessed a large number of broadcast receivers. It was estimated that in October 1943 there were some 70,000 radio devices in the country –​with a population of seven million. After the German invasion, some sets were seized, and by order of the German occupation authorities in October 1943, the remainder were sealed in such a way that only Athens Radio could be received. An estimated 35,000 sets were sealed over the course of only one month. With that said, while listening to foreign radio stations involved penalties, Greek listeners were nevertheless able, after adopting various technical modifications to their sets, to tune in to the Cairo medium-​ wave frequency and the London short-​wave frequency.53

British broadcasting policy in liberated Greece Radio matters in liberated Greece were discussed prior to the establishment of the Greek government in Athens on 18 October 1944. By October 1943, the British Army Interrogation Authorities in Cairo had become ‘anxious’ to know the strength and range of Athens Radio transmissions.54 According to information available to the BBC in London,55 the station transmitted on medium wave at 601 kc/​s at 15 kW –​though this was believed to have been increased to 70  kW since the German occupation.56 There was a very-​low-​power transmitter at Thessaloniki, 52 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, September, 1949. 53 Cf. Ραδιοφωνία, Τηλεόρασις [Radio, Television] (periodical), April 1945, 2nd year, no. 1–​2, pp. 15–​17; January 1946, 3rd year, no. 1, p. 2. 54 BBC WAC, E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​1946), C. J. Pennethorne Hughes, Assistant Middle East Director to Head of Overseas and Engineering Information Department, 7 October 1943. 55 The BBC had its own Middle East director on the spot in Cairo from 1942 onwards (Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, 524–​527). 56 This information was not accurate, as even until 1947 the issue of the installation of the 70 kW transmitter was pending (ERT Archives: A3/​K7/​File 3 (Ministries), 169, D. Svolopoulos to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 April 1947) and became the top priority of the new EIR director general, D. Svolopoulos, when he took

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of 804  kc/​s, though according to recent German announcements, a new transmitter of higher capacity was under construction. Regarding short-​wave transmission, the BBC’s information detailed that only one short-​wave transmitter was under the control of the broadcasting authority. There was another short-​wave transmitter situated in the Athens area, controlled by the German Army High Command; this was called Sender Mittelmeer [The Mediterranean transmitter]. The Mittelmeer and Athens short-​wave transmissions were of comparable power –​probably 10 kW.57 The Greek government –​which was at that time based in Italy and preparing its return to Athens after the German evacuation of the country –​held talks with the British about establishing a post-​war network of low-​power radio stations throughout Greece. With the arrival of the Greek government in Athens, new talks followed. Michalis Anastasiades, a physicist,58 was to act as the Greek technical advisor. The first Allied Information Services (AIS) personnel arrived in Athens some days before the Greek government. Steps were taken to reconnoitre –​as soon as conditions allowed –​for the five stations (Patras, Janina, Thessaloniki, Drama and Heraklion) to which this scheme gave priority. Once that task had been completed, the AIS sent weekly reports, covering the period from 15 October to November 1944. Those reports described in detail the contemporary condition of Greek radio broadcasting with regard to both technical and programming issues. The BBC’s European Intelligence Director R. J. T. Griffin regularly forwarded extracts of those reports to the BBC.

office. See D. Svolopoulos, Η Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία (1947-​1948). Ένας σύντομος απολογισμός [Greek Broadcasting (1947-​1948). A brief account] (Athens:  EIR, 1948), 5. Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 196. 57 BBC Written Archives Centre (hereafter, WAC):  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​6), C.  J. Pennethorne Hughes, Assistant Middle East Director wrote to Head of Overseas and Engineering Information Department, 7 October 1943; BBC Internal Memo-​Tatsfield, H.  V. Griffiths, Engineer in Charge (E.i.C.), Tatsfield to Head of Overseas and Engineering Information Department, subject: ‘Athens Radio Station’, 21 October 1943. 5 8 See footnote 102, Chapter 3.

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On the technical side, a British radio technical officer arrived at the Liossia Wireless Telegraphy station in mid-​October and carried out an initial survey with the station officials and engineers. Grenades and traps of various kinds were removed, and an entire minefield around the perimeter wire of the station was located and isolated. In the meantime, a detachment of the 40th Tank Regiment and Royal Engineers took over from the Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (ELAS [National People’s Liberation Army]) guard. Studios in Athens were found to be intact, and both aerial masts were erected at Liossia on 18 October 1944. The Votanikos Wireless Telegraphy station, the Lykavitos Wireless Telegraphy station and the Wireless Telegraphy and Telephone Centre at Pyrgos Vasilissis (near Liossia) were visited and checked. On 25 October, the cable and wireless station at Pallini contacted London on 13 m/​cs; London reported that satisfactory signals were being received and that they were ready for normal traffic. The station officials then began to make an aerial for 8 m/​cs. The British radio officer left Athens on 4 November to carry out a reconnaissance of the Thessaloniki radio station and to report on the repairs or replacements that might be necessary. It was thought best that Thessaloniki be used purely as a relay station for Athens, given that it would not have been possible to find sufficiently trained personnel for two studios and that Greek-​trained studio personnel were in short supply. If it was found that Athens Radio could be effectively heard in northern Greece, it would be possible to recommend the closure of Greek broadcasts from Cairo and Jerusalem. As soon as the opportunity allowed, a more detailed listener survey would be made. The mast at Liossia was ready for erection on 8 November, while the AIS gave ‘all aid possible’ to Pallini. Electricity became readily available owing to the power station being saved from a German demolition squad. The preservation of this station resulted from the actions of the strong resistance from the station workers themselves, with the support of ELAS forces.59

59 It is worth noting that contemporary Greek sources overlooked ELAS’ contribution to the saving of Liosia power station. As commented on in the British document, ‘whether the latter appeared before or after the skirmish is a matter of hot debate’ (in BBC WAC: E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​1946), Secret, R. J. T. Griffin, European Intelligence Director to C (Eur. B.), Greek Editor, n.d.

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In regard to programmes, on 20 October 1944 at a meeting between Xydis of the Greek undersecretariat for press and enlightenment and the broadcasting officer Captain Waller-​Bridge, a few key terms were agreed on. Firstly, in the event that British authorities required air time, the Greek authorities could override normal programming for up to thirty minutes. Secondly, a daily evening news bulletin (from 20:30 to 20:45) in English would be put on the air and be read60 by Captain Waller-​Bridge and G. H. Booty.61 Thirdly, it was agreed that all material used for broadcasting had to first pass through the hands of Xydis before being submitted to the studios. Finally, all news scripts drawn from material supplied by the AIS would –​ before each broadcast –​be stamped by the British radio censor, and ‘these scripts only’ were to be used.62 A further meeting took place the following day, at which point it was arranged that Booty would undertake the work of programme advisor. Moreover, all AIS material for broadcasting would be held at the headquarters of the AIS, and programme material that was requested would be passed through Xydis and Booty on the way to the studios. The AIS broadcasting desk in Cairo would pass along script material and recordings to the AIS Athens office as and when they were received from BBC London. Almost immediately after this second meeting, the daily evening British half-​hour programme (from 20:30 to 21:00) began to transmit news in English, together with other announcements and musical items. On 28 October –​on the anniversary of the outbreak of the war with Italy –​messages to the Greek people by Lieutenant General Scobie and Papandreou were read out after the news. Available English programme material was placed at the disposal of the manager for programmes in Greek, 60 Cf. Heracles Petimezas Archives (hereafter, HPA), Memorandum, D. Xronopoulos to EIR D-​G, n.d., 6 in 387/​7, File ‘EIR (1945–​1946)’. 61 BBC European Liaison Officer (in June 1956). 62 BBC WAC, E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​1946), Secret (meeting held between Xydis of the Greek Ministry of Information and the broadcasting officer, Captain Waller-​Bridge, 20 October 1944), R.  J.  T. Griffin, European Intelligence Director to Controller of European Services, Director of European Broadcasts, Greek Editor, copies to Miss Reeves, Miss Lambert, Head of Overseas and Engineering Information Department, Mr. Greatorex, ‘Liberation of Athens Radio’, 21 November 1944.

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acting under British advice. The Greek authorities accepted ‘with pleasure’ the British control of Athens Radio programming and granted the AIS all functions that constitutionally belonged to the Greek administration.63 It is thus evident that the British authorities maintained tight control over Greek broadcasting, with the explicit consent of the Greek government. The question of reopening the Athens short-​wave transmitter was made moot in October 1944. However, priority had been given to Athens Radio and efforts were thus made to restore its power station in Liossia. In an enquiry by the BBC in London as to whether there was any possibility of using BBC newscasts, Godfrey Talbot64 replied from Rome that he was ‘already sweating on [the] Athens transmitter possibility’ and hoped that it might be used in about a week, though there was nothing yet definite in regard to its operation. In the meantime, British monitors were keeping an ‘ear cocked’ to the old Athens Radio.65 Despite the German destruction of the transmitter antenna at Liossia and the cutting-​off of its electricity supply, Athens Radio began to broadcast almost immediately after liberation.66 As a symbolic act, in November 1944 the BBC handed back 63

BBC WAC: E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​1946), Secret, R. J. T. Griffin, European Intelligence Director to Controller of European Services, Director of European Broadcasts, Greek Editor, copies to Miss Reeves, Miss Lambert, Head of Overseas and Engineering Information Department, Mr Greatorex, ‘Radio in Greece’, 1 December 1944; ‘Liberation of Athens Radio’, 21 November; second weekly AIS report, 29 November; third weekly AIS report, 12 December 1944. 64 Talbot (1908–​2000) was a journalist and BBC broadcaster. He joined the BBC in 1937 and in 1942 followed the Allied troops in North Africa. Talbot was to report on the Allies’ first major victory at the battle of El Alamein (November 1942). Moving on to Italy in early 1944, he reported the Allies’ arrival in Rome on 5 June. 5 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 6 1946), Arthur Baker, BBC London to Godfrey Talbot, BBC Rome; Talbot’s reply, 21 October 1944. 66 It is worth noting here that as a mast of the antenna in Liosia was blown up by the departing Germans, interrupting the Athens Radio broadcast, the liberation of Athens was broadcast on 12 October, rather than 1–​4 October, by a small transmitter owned by the Physics Laboratory of the University of Athens, with which Anastasiades was associated (HPA: Memorandum, D. Xronopoulos to EIR D-​G, n.d., 1–​2 in 387/​7, File ‘EIR (1945–​1946)’). See also Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 152–​153.

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the station’s call sign, which, at the initiative of the BBC Greek Service, had been entrusted to the BBC when the Germans occupied Athens in April 1941. From occupation until its return to Athens Radio, the first few bars of this signal were played before each Greek bulletin.67 The use of the Athens station signal had wide sentimental public appeal,68 and it was considered at the BBC that this ‘rather unusual history of a radio call sign’ could be exploited on a political level. Thus, D. E. Ritchie (acting director of European broadcasts) suggested that J. B. Clark (controller of the Overseas Service) should find –​via the Greek Embassy –​‘a suitable recipient in Athens, preferably a Member of the Greek government and if possible, the Prime Minister’ to formally receive the returned call sign. Clark discussed this proposal with the Psychological Warfare Division,69 which decided that the BBC should make this occasion ‘a broadcasting, rather than a political one’ and that it should not be an opportunity for a political spokesperson.70 Rather, it was considered preferable to demonstrate the BBC’s interest in helping establish independent broadcasting organizations. At a short recorded ceremony, BBC Director General W. J. Haley handed the call sign to the Greek ambassador, Athanasios Agnides.71 The event was presented ‘not only as a trust but as a symbol, a 67

68 69 70 71

Angeloglou, This is London, Good Evening/​Edo Londino, Kalispera sas: The Story of the Greek Section of the BBC, 1939–​1957 (Athens: Efstathiadis Group, 2003), 111–​ 117; BBC WAC: E1/​816/​1, File 1 (1940–​1946), BBC Internal Circulating Memo, G. Angeloglou to European Language Supervisor, subject: Greek Call Sign, 1 May 1941. See also extract from the European Service Weekly Bulletin, 8 May 1941, ‘We Give the Athens Call Sign’, and an extract from Radio Times, 23 May 1941. The signature tune was called ‘To Tsopanopoulo’. BBC WAC:  E2/​190, Foreign Gen., European Intelligence Papers:  Series 1h, Confidential, Ref. No.  12/​43, BBC Surveys of European Audiences, Balkan Countries, 15 March 1943, 25. A Political Warfare Executive (PWE) co-​ordinating division established in London for the invasion of Europe. BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​ 1946), Clark to Assistant Controller (European Services), copy to A/​D Eur. B, 26 October 1944. BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), Harman Grisewood, Assistant Controller, European Services to Controller (European Services), Athens Call Sign, 30 October 1944; Letter, Clark to Aghnides,

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hall-​mark of truth for a free people’ and as a sign that the BBC would ‘continue to cultivate the friendship between the two peoples’. It would also demonstrate that the Greek people could continue to listen to the voice of London in its own language.72 Excerpts of speeches given by Haley and Agnides were subsequently broadcast.73 Athens Radio interrupted its operation again during the December 1944 crisis, and the British installed a temporary transmitter to broadcast news and announcements, which remained until Athens Radio’s formal reopening on 22 January 1945.74 In 1945, the press was the predominant agent of political communication, while broadcasting was still in its infancy in Greece. Many realized, though, that broadcasting was an essential information medium, and the reorganization of Athens Radio was placed among the top priorities on the political agenda in Greece. Among the first legislative acts of the Papandreou government was to re-​establish in November 1944 the Undersecretariat for Press and Enlightenment, which had been abolished immediately after the German invasion.75 The Greek government was set to reconstruct its post-​war institutional and conceptual frameworks for government communication and information management. Broadcasting matters lay in the spheres of two Greek ministries: the Undersecretariat of the Press and the Ministry of Communications. It had also become a matter of serious contention between three lobby groups, each of which sought to prevail over the other. These were led by D. Xronopoulos (Athens Radio director), Stefanos Eleftheriou (of the Radio Directorate at the Ministry of Communications) and Voulpiotis’ former trusted associates, who had Greek Ambassador, 2 November 1944. See also, BBC WAC:  E1/​816/​1, Extract. Original Filed, 5 November 1944. 72 BBC WAC:  E1/​816/​1, File  1 (1940–​1946), BBC European Division, European Productions, ‘The Athens Call Sign’, 5 November 1944; Registered Files  –​War Report Scripts (Extract), 5 November 1944. 7 3 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), American Liaison, Despatch of Cable, 4 November 1944. 74 Eleftheria, 18 January 1945, p.  2 and H Vradyni, 22 January 1945; mentioned in Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 160–​162. 75 Given the special importance of this undersecretariat, its abolition was the first legislative act of the quisling government and its restoration one of the first decrees issued after the liberation.

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remained in their positions at AERE. While Voulpiotis had been removed from leadership at AERE following his collaboration with the occupying German authorities, he remained a powerful figure in Greek radio broadcasting. Many internal memoranda and personal notes from the radio staff addressed to the Undersecretariat for the Press explicitly referred to the disruptive role of AERE and requested further clarification regarding its position. It may thus be seen that the divisive and chaotic conditions of the immediate post-​war period of Greek broadcasting were largely the result of conflicting personal ambitions and the competing interests of various government departments.76 The continued operation of the AERE and a lack of clarity regarding its legal status,77 along with the overlapping responsibilities and conflicting dynamics of the agencies charged with control over broadcasting, brought chaos and confusion into the field. The controversy between the two ministries78 and the crucial question of which government agency would have control over broadcasting79 led to confusion over legislation and a series of interim provisions, which obliged the Undersecretariat for the Press to

76 HPA: File 387/​7, Memorandum by K. (Dinos) Tsaloglou, 1, 3, n.d., File ‘EIR (1945-​ 1946)’. Tsaloglou was the speaker at AERE who, on 23 September 1944, read a message from Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM [National Liberation Front])/​ ELAS about the impeding liberation of Athens (see interview, video archive, E. Kourkoulatou); Letter, Confidential, Xronopoulos to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 February 1945, ‘Radio (1945)’; HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’: Notes by Panagis Delmouzos, wireless operator trained by Force 133, 26 March 1945 and ‘Personal Note for the Minister of Foreign Affairs’, n.d.; HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘EIR (1945-​1946)’:  Xronopoulos to EIR D-​G, 18 June 1945, and Memorandum, D. Xronopoulos to EIR D-​G, n.d., pp. 6–​8, 12, 14–​17, 20–​21. 77 AERE was sequestrated and on 26 February 1945 it was brought under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/​Press and Information Directorate (ΦΕΚ:  11, Law  13 on sequestrating enemy property, 6 November 1944; and ΦΕΚ: B 25, 5 March 1945, Ministerial Order, 99). 78 HPA: File 387/​7, ‘EIR (1945–​1946)’: Minister of TTT Professor L. Sakellaropoulos to Minister of Foreign Affairs, 20 and 21 March 1945; HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’: Note, Minister of TTT to Minister of Press, n.d. 79 In one of many titles that changed, the undersecretariat/​ministry ‘of the Press’ became ‘for Press and Enlightenment’.

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amend its status seven times in only seventeen months.80 It was agreed that broadcasting services in Greece would be settled in the transition period, during which time the AERE was sequestered and the details of its dissolution were regulated by law.81 The Anglo-​Greek Information Service (AGIS) showed a keen interest in forming ‘a single general plan for the rationalisation and reorganisation’ of the broadcasting service and thus played a decisive role in drafting said plan. At the beginning of April 1945, Heracles Petimezas –​director of broadcasting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs –​presented a proposal to the AGIS, which was met with approval and a promise that the AGIS would provide ‘all possible assistance […] for its speedy and effective realisation’.82 AGIS Chief Technical Officer Major Massey and Chief Radio Officer Keith Newlands were appointed to convey how the AGIS could be of assistance. Petimezas represented the Greek perspective in these talks.83 What followed were three months of close and intense co-​operation between the AGIS and the two Greek representatives. On 17 April 1945, Newlands produced the first draft of a ‘skeleton constitution’ for the new broadcasting organization. In the accompanying explanatory notes, he set out the basic principles to navigate the new organization and raised a number of additional issues for further 80 It was re-​established after liberation on 23 November 1944 (ΦΕΚ: 29, Constitutional Act 2, 1 December 1944, 97–​9), only to be abolished in January 1945 to become a directorate at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ΦΕΚ:  A  10/​15 January 1945, Constitutional Act 5, 21–​2). In March, it was defined as ‘an autonomous and independent service’ within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ΦΕΚ:  Decree  64, 21 March 1945, 221–​2), and in May it was re-​established again as undersecretariat (ΦΕΚ: 110, Compulsory Law 308, 5 May 1945, 472). Further still, in November it was upgraded to a ministry (ΦΕΚ: 265, Compulsory Law 637, 1 November 1945, 1349) until April 1946 (ΦΕΚ: 134, Legislative Decree, 17 April 1946, 635), only to become again an undersecretariat in May 1946 (ΦΕΚ: 161, Legislative Decree, 11 May 1946, 827–​33). 81 ΦΕΚ: A 114/​12 May 1945, Constitutional Act 42, 479. The AERE was sequestrated following the abolition of No. 184 of 4 June 1941 of the Government Gazette contract with Telefunken, described as ‘never concluded, as imposed by the enemy’). 82 HPA:  File 387/​7, Letter, Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, Commanding Officer, AGIS, CMF to Minister of Press and Information, 15 May 1945. 83 Ibid.

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consideration. Given the circumstances and fearing an adverse reaction from certain quarters, Newlands recommended that ‘no publicity whatsoever’ was to be given to the initiative until the decree establishing the new organization had been signed, after which time ‘a careful publicity’ campaign would run for ‘at least a few months’.84 On 21 May, Newlands submitted his recommendations concerning the structure of the new organization, which included provisions for programme and news departments, finance and administration sections, and engineering as well as a time schedule to make the organization operational.85 The draft decree was eventually submitted by the Ministry of Press; it was unanimously approved on 30 May by a three-​member Ministerial Advisory Committee86 and was ratified by the Cabinet on 14 June 1945.87 The most fundamental principle stipulated by Newlands –​which passed into the constitutional act that founded the EIR –​was the autonomy of the new organization as a public corporation. According to this principle, the EIR was ‘neither a commercial undertaking nor a government agency in the strict sense of the word, but a non-​profitmaking institution established by the State as a public utility, something on the lines of National Broadcasting Board’, just as Newlands recommended. In order to achieve this, Newlands advised that ‘very careful’ attention should be paid to the way in which ‘the respective powers and the chain of command between the Minister of Press, the Director-​General and the Governing Board’ would be defined. A closely related issue –​one that Newlands believed deserved ‘great attention’ –​was the remit and powers of the director general post.88 Of particular concern for Newlands was the composition and voting procedure of the EIR’s governing board and the role of the director general within it, specifically whether the role 84 HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, K. Newlands, ‘First Draft of Skeleton Constitution for New Broadcasting Organisation’ and ‘Notes on the New Broadcasting Organisation’, Confidential, 17 April 1945. 85 HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, KN/​LK, K. Newlands, ‘Recommendations on Broadcasting Organisation’, Confidential, 21 May 1945. 86 HPA: File 387/​7, No. 300, Report, 30 May 1945. 87 ΦΕΚ: 152, Constitutional Act 54, 15 June 1945, 681–​4. 88 HPA:  File 387/​ 7, ‘Radio (1945)’, KN/​ IMC, K. Newlands, ‘Notes on New Broadcasting Organisation’, Confidential, 17 April 1945.

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should be responsible to the governing board, a member of the board or indeed its chair. The selection process for the appointment of the director general was crucially important given that the role would reflect the very essence of the new organization. Furthermore, Newlands also stipulated that the EIR was to be recognized as having ‘the sole and exclusive rights for broadcasting in the whole of Greece’ and that no other organization should be allowed to initiate a broadcasting station in Greece without its consent. In addition, the constitutional act gave ‘a certain amount of freedom of action’ to the EIR and its director general.89 These freedoms included the ability to appoint or dismiss staff without going through civil service procedure and the ability to provide the director general with discretionary funds for use in connection with programmes or other items of expenditure. The financial side of the EIR –​in particular, budgeting –​was also an area that required urgent attention, especially in terms of securing from the AERE a list of their existing subscribers, collecting licence fee payments and pursuing a revenue stream from ‘controlled advertising’.90 Though the EIR’s accounts were audited by the Ministry of Finance, it was still able to carry out its own budgeting and allocate revenue without further authorization, albeit ‘within certain general limits’.91 But the primary task, Newlands insisted, was the appointment of new staff members. After the December events, the Greek government planned to replace all Greek staff members at Athens Radio, as their positions were –​as reported by Undersecretariat for Press and Enlightenment G. S. Kavounidis92 –​ only temporarily filled. For this purpose, the AIS selected ‘suitable’ staff, with the consent of the Greek undersecretary for the press and subject to the 89 Ibid. 90 Newlands gave more specifications on the issue of the EIR’s revenues in a note on 19 April (HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, KN/​LK). See also HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, Report, Confidential, Newlands to Colonel Johnstone, ‘Subject:  Radio Budget’, 5 June 1945. 91 HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, KN/​LK, K. Newlands, ‘Recommendations on Broadcasting Organisation’, Confidential, 21 May 1945. 92 Kavounidis (Constantinople, 1912–​ London, 1984) worked at the Greek undersecretariat for press from 1936 (and in September 1945, signed on as head of the Foreign Press Department). As a journalist, he worked as a correspondent for the Associated Press and the New York Herald Tribune.

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approval of Security Intelligence Middle East. The names were submitted to the Greek undersecretariat before they could be employed in future British and Greek programmes.93 In staffing the EIR, Newlands recommended the AGIS and Athens Radio staff complements be amalgamated.94 A ‘major problem’ that needed to be solved, however, was the dismissal of about 120 AERE employees; this could be undertaken legally due to a clause in the preamble to the EIR constitution declaring the annulment of the Telefunken agreement and all of its subsequent enactments. However, Petimezas felt strongly that laying off 120 people could generate bad publicity for the nascent EIR and as a consequence the personnel in question were suspended until the staffing issues were settled.95 The question of which personnel would staff the EIR became a serious bone of contention given the conflicting personal ambitions and partisan rivalries.96 Along with discussions on the drafting of EIR’s constitution, a series of meetings97 between the AGIS and Petimezas on one hand and Anastasiades on the other were held in May 1945 to address the remaining broadcasting issues, including the construction of a transmitter network in Greece and the need for technical staff –​both issues were of particular interest to the British. The agreed building programme would include the modernization and reconstruction of the Liossia transmitter and the Zappion studios in Athens and the construction of a 2 kW transmitter for each of the following regions: Thessaloniki (which would ‘relay Radio Athens programmes by means of a 1 kW short-​wave transmitter coupled with Liossia’), Corfu,

93

BBC WAC: E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​1946), Secret, R. J. T. Griffin, European Intelligence Director to Controller of European Services, Director of European Broadcasts, Greek Editor, copies to Miss Reeves, Miss Lambert, Head of Overseas and Engineering Information Department, Mr Greatorex, ‘Radio in Greece’, 12 December 1944. 94 HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, KN/​LK, K. Newlands, ‘Recommendations on Broadcasting Organisation’, Confidential, 21 May 1945. 9 5 HPA: File 387/​7, Letter, Newlands to Johnstone, Confidential, 5 June 1945. 96 There is a lot about this issue in the ERT Archives and the Heracles Petimezas Archive. 97 The minutes of the 24 and 31 May meetings were found at Heracles Petimezas Archives. Minutes were not found for the other two, scheduled for 17 and 28 May.

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Komotini and Larissa.98 All these regional stations would be served by the aforementioned Athens short-​wave relay transmitter. The British wanted clarification on whether the Greek plan for radio covered the whole of Greece or only a portion of the country, along with most of Bulgaria and Albania, the southern part of Yugoslavia and eastern Turkey –​in other words, areas where the Greek government raised territorial claims. If was the ultimate intention of the Greek government was the latter, the British argued that a station should be installed in Thessaloniki and not in Athens. This strategic remark by the British clearly demonstrated their belief that the Greek government intended from the outset to integrate its radio operations into its foreign policy, especially as it pertained to Greece’s northern neighbours. The matter was deemed to be so important that the clarifications obtained would ‘be considered and if necessary, taken up with AFHQ [Allied Forces Headquarters]’.99 Till the building programme was completed, planning work would go ahead for a powerful central station to be erected in Attica. The 70 kW Telefunken transmitter remained incomplete and it continued to be difficult to procure spare parts, thus the transmitter was considered ‘unsatisfactory’.100 It was agreed that the best solution would be to obtain a new or second-​hand British transmitter. On the technical side, Professor Anastasiades and Major Massey worked to understand the technical assistance that would be required.101 The question of EIR’s technical operation was discussed at a meeting on 31 May 1945. It was agreed that foreign technical experts would be required for radio installations in Athens and that regional stations in Thessaloniki, Corfu and Komotini should be erected and begin their initial operations. Technical training of the Greek staff in the regional stations was also raised, and it was proposed that engineer apprentices for all three regional stations should be

98

HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, Minutes of Meeting held at AGIS Office, 24 May 1945. 99 HPA:  File 387/​ 7, ‘Radio (1945)’, AGIS, Subject ‘Wireless  –​Interference’, Confidential, 8 May 1945. 1 00 HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, Minutes of Meeting held at AGIS Office, 24 May 1945. 101 Ibid.

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recruited from students at Anastasiades.102 With few changes, the guidelines set at the meetings on 24 and 30 May were adopted in a report with recommendations for radio installations in Greece. The ‘best solution’ for obtaining a new or used British transmitter was then rephrased, since it would be ‘possible for the British government to deliver a used 50–​100 kW transmitter’. Subsequently, two additional options were suggested: first, to retain the 70 kW Telefunken transmitter and to search for spare parts in Germany or Austria; or, second, to ask commercial enterprises for parts. On the question of technical training in Greek, it was proposed to introduce a wireless theory course at the University of Athens,103 and, if possible, the Greek government was provide scholarships to send four students to Britain to gain practical experience at the BBC or to study at a recognized technical college.104 In June, the EIR was established into law and the entire function and property of the AERE came under its ownership. The EIR came under the control of the Undersecretariat for Press and Information, while its Technical Department fell under the TTT Ministry of Communications. In the interim,105 the Greek undersecretariat for press and information, as it 102 Anastasiades was Professor of Electronic Physics at the Department of Physics at the University of Athens (1953–​1974). He was the first to introduce –​in 1947 –​a graduate course on Electronics and Radioelectrology, training students in the areas of electronics and telecommunications. In 1947, he also founded a private educational institution  –​Ραδιοτεχνική Σχολή Αθηνών, ΡΣΑ [Radio Technical School of Athens] –​which began operating in March 1948. Due to the lack of advanced technical vocational education and training in Greece  –​which was necessary for the post-​war reconstruction needs –​private schools began to be established, with those on radioelectrology the first among them. The ΡΣΑ, the first School of Electronic Education in Greece, evolved in 2018 into the current Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering at University of West Attica (Syllabus, 2016/​2017, pp. 1–​2). 103 See footnote 102 above. 104 HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, Minutes of Meeting held at AGIS Office, 30 May 1945 and HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Personal Archive’, ‘Έκθεσις και Συστάσεις επί των Ραδιοφωνικών Εγκαταστάσεων της Ελλάδος’ [Report and Recommendations on the Radio Installations of Greece], n.d. 105 ΦΕΚ:  152, Editorial Act  54, ‘On the Establishment and Organisation of the National Broadcasting Institute’, Issue 1, 15 June 1945, 681–​684.

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was then named, was established and had jurisdiction over all matters concerning the organization and operation of broadcasting.106 The intention of the Greek government was to integrate broadcasting under the control of a state body and to develop regional networks, particularly on the northern border of the country.107 In Thessaloniki, the Tsigiridis station –​in operation since 1926 –​closed in 1946,108 thus giving way to centrally controlled broadcasting. The organization of the Thessaloniki station was the highest priority. In late March 1945, an AGIS radio officer who had participated in all the preliminary talks on its functioning (most likely Newlands) arrived in Thessaloniki along with P. Montzalas, director of the Press Office of the general administration of Central Macedonia. Discussions were held between the two (and others) concerning the radio station’s independent broadcasts and its potential connections with Athens Radio. It was agreed that the AGIS would provide the machinery to enable a connection with Athens Radio, allowing for the retransmission of its entire programme. The ambitions for the operation of the station were not fully realized, however, due to lack of available financial resources.109 106 ΦΕΚ: 110, Compulsory Law 308, ‘On the Establishment of a State Under Secretary for Press and Information’, 5 May 1945, 472. 107 An announcement was made by the newly founded deputy of the Ministry of Press and Information that the installation and the gradual operation of three new radio stations in Thessaloniki, Corfu and Komotini were underway ‘in order to meet the imperative needs of the enlightenment of the northern borders’, while planning two more without specifying where (Ethnos, 30 May 1945). 108 From December 1944, the Tsigiridis station was put into ‘immediate operation’, placed at the disposal of the Thessaloniki Press Office under the supervision and direction of the government representative, Petros Garoufalias (undersecretary for press and enlightenment, to Military Command, Thessaloniki, 15 December 1944). In 1946, the EIR acknowledged Tsigiridis’ efforts and promised to honour the ‘pioneer of Greek Broadcasting’, which ‘had never been done so far’ (HPA: File 387/​7, K. Thiseos Dimaras (Κ.Θ. Δημαράς), EIR General Manager to Government General of Central Macedonia, 20 March 1946). 109 Governor General of Central Macedonia to the (Greek) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate for Press and Radio (in May 1945 it was named Undersecretariat for Press and Information), No.  145, April 1945; Montzalas to Undersecretary for Press and Information, No. 302, 7 June 1945 (personal correspondence with Manolis Kandylakis).

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As discussed already, the British government played a key role in drafting the law that would underpin the establishment and future structure of the EIR –​a law that was a result of ‘endless negotiations’110 with the Greek government. The proposed law eventually ended up as a decree only, following the imposition of what Osbert Lancaster –​a central figure in these discussions –​observed as ‘considerable British pressure’.111 According to Lancaster, the constitution of the new organization was largely drawn up by the AGIS and closely modelled on that of the BBC. The FO considered the reform of Athens Radio along the lines of the BBC to be a crucial measure –​among others –​for the proliferation of British publicity in Greece, and British assistance was thus given in the form of equipment and technical advisors.112 The objective was to provide Greece with a reliable broadcasting service and good programming. However, this programming could not be provocative in nature, especially as it pertained to Greek relations with its northern neighbours, lest it encourage irredentist claims that Britain would be unwilling to support (as would be demonstrated at the conference in Paris in 1946). In pursuit of this objective, the British faced two main difficulties. The first was to find adequate safeguards to ensure that Athens Radio would not become a government department, an ‘obvious danger that was clearly foreseen’.113 The British wished to guard against a version of the EIR that would reflect the views and put out the propaganda of the government in power and where personnel would change ‘from top to bottom’114 at each change of government. Such an attitude, Lancaster noted, was demonstrated even before the law setting up the EIR was passed, ‘by the frantic efforts made by the party bosses to prevent its ratification’. Indeed as soon as the EIR’s constitution was formally established, ‘a never-​ceasing struggle’ broke out between the director general of EIR and the undersecretary for press of the day.115 The second great difficulty 110 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 111 Ibid. 112 Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 198. 113 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid.

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was ‘the understandable but nevertheless deplorable enthusiasm’ that each successive Greek government displayed for the transmission of ‘invariably futile and frequently highly provocative broadcasts’ to foreign countries, including to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Russia; these countries were most favoured by the Greek government for propaganda. Until April 1946, such broadcasts were made in English, French and Greek; it was at this time that the British strenuously resisted the inclusion of other languages on the grounds of expense but also to avoid controversies over propagandistic expediencies. Furthermore, Lancaster reported that in Greece’s northern neighbours, due to the small number of reception sets that would be capable of picking up Athens Radio, the broadcasts would inevitably be picked up only by governments officials, whose propaganda departments would then make the greatest possible use of these ‘frequently irresponsible diatribes’. To achieve their objective, the British threatened to impose sanctions by ‘a mixture of blandishments, promises and discreet threats’. The EIR was largely dependent on British help, the nature of which Lancaster recorded in detail: It was entirely thanks to us that the EIR enjoyed the use of over 10,000 pounds of radio equipment brought into the country by AGIS; their studio staffs were almost entirely dependent on us both for technical assistance and the provision of an infinite number of spare parts, etc.; it was only through our good offices that they had at that time any hope of increasing the number of radio sets in the country, profits on the sale of which, together with the income derived from license fees would provide them with financial support; and lastly it was only through us that they could hope to obtain the necessary financial guarantees without which Marconis would certainly not enter into negotiations for the supply of further equipment on very favourable terms. […] [But] above all it was Newlands’s tireless energy and inexhaustible patience that enabled us not only to carry out our original plan but to maintain a reasonably high standard on Athens radio for a considerable time.116

The EIR was ultimately established and organized by Constitutional Act 54 in June 1945.117 In addition to its constitutional status, the EIR also 116 117

Ibid. ΦΕΚ: 152, Constitutional Act 54: ‘On the Establishment and Organisation of the National Broadcasting Institute’, 15 June 1945, 681–​683.

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acquired a place in the international forums of broadcasting, including the Union Internationale de Radiophonie [International Broadcasting Union] and the Comité Consultatif International pour la Radio [International Radio Consultative Committee].118 Most importantly, its constitution included a provision that reflected a desire to ensure its independence and protection from government and party interventions.119 The spirit of this provision, however, was destined to be betrayed within a very short period.120 While lip service continued to be paid to the editorial autonomy of Greek broadcasting, in practice this autonomy found no place in the specific wording of subsequent laws relating to public broadcasting in Greece until 2015.121 Understanding the difficulties and deadlocks that had to be overcome in order to reach a final draft decree, in June 1945 Leeper proposed to the FO that the BBC should send a telegram of congratulation to the new EIR board as a sign of their support. The British Embassy had played a pivotal role in selecting the board members. ‘We have been working very hard to bring this about for the last three months and wish to afford the new concern every encouragement’, noted Leeper. However, the FO did not have more definite information on the position or status of the new body, as it had not yet started to function.122 General Haley asked William Ridsdale, counsellor in the FO News Department, for the names of the new EIR

118 ΦΕΚ: 152, Constitutional Act 54, Article 2, para. 5, 681, 15 June 1945. On regulation and control of radio broadcasting in the interwar period and after the Second World War, see: Suzanne Lommers, Europe –​On Air: Interwar Projects for Radio Broadcasting (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012); Alexander Badenoch, Andreas Fickers and Christian Henrich-​Franke, eds, Airy Curtains in the European Ether:  Broadcasting and the Cold War (Baden-​Baden:  Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2013). 119 ΦΕΚ: 152, Constitutional Act 54, Article 2, par. 4, sentence b, 15 June 1945, 681. 120 The vexed Article 2 par. 4, sentence b of the ΦΕΚ: 152, Constitutional Act 54, 15 June 1945, was replaced by Article 1 of Decree Law 818 (ΦΕΚ: 3, 8 January 1946, 11), where this provision was omitted. 121 ΦΕΚ: 44, Law 4324, Article 2, par. 4, 29 April 2015. 122 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), Gordon Fraser, BSD, to Controller of European Services, 22 June 1945.

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board members, but until August 1945 ‘nothing further’ was heard.123 In fact, the appointment of the new director general was delayed. Heracles Petimezas124 was appointed as the first director general of the EIR125 and M. Anastasiades as its technical director, by order of Undersecretary Zakythinos.126 Lancaster communicated to Petimezas the facilities that the British were prepared to provide to the EIR at its foundation. These included transmission equipment and gramophone records on loan for a period of one year, beginning 1 January 1946, after which period the arrangement would be reviewed. Furthermore, two 2 kW AGIS medium-​ wave transmitters were supplied and would remain with the EIR beyond one year should the organization use them to advantage its development. In addition, receiving sets and associated equipment were to be sold to the EIR at a low cost, while the Board of Trade undertook efforts to provide equipment to extend the range of the EIR’s reception. To facilitate the effective early use of this equipment, four Greek technical and programme staff would be sent free of charge to London for training, with the understanding that the EIR would cover their travel and maintenance costs. In exchange, the British would appoint a political advisor to ‘advise and assist’ 123 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), record of telephone conversation with W. Ridsdale’s private secretary, FO, on the subject ‘Message to National Broadcasting Board, Athens’, 26 June 1945; handwritten note, 23 August 1945. 124 Petimezas (1903–​98) was descendant of a historic Greek family that took part in national revolution against the Ottoman rulers. He was a founding member of the Greek resistance movement Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (EDES [National Republican Greek League]) and spokesman for its leader, N. Zervas. He was the editor of the clandestine newspaper Ellinikos Agon, under the pseudonym Nikitas. During the occupation, he served as head of the Allied Middle East Headquarters intelligence network in Athens (HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Βεβαίωσις’ [Affirmation] by Minister of Press, 1 December 1945. See also a short bio, ‘H. N. Petimezas’, in HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Personal Archive’, n.d.). He resigned from the post of EIR director general on 14 March 1946 (HPA: File 387/​7, Royal Decree of 14 March 1946; ΦΕΚ: Γ 83, 18 March 1946). 125 ΦΕΚ: 145, Royal Decree of 20 June 1945, 30 June 1945 (HPA: File 387/​7, Heracles Petizezas’ note, December 1945). 126 Petimezas had proposed Eleftheriou for this post instead, according to his personal testimony, in Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 200.

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the EIR, together with an unspecified number of British technical advisors; the number of advisors would be determined by the EIR, and they would cover their remuneration. Finally, Lancaster assured Petimezas that once the AGIS was terminated, the British Embassy was ‘very eager’ to extend to the EIR ‘all the help’ the AGIS had been given so far.127 Of the facilities the British were prepared to provide to the EIR, some came into fruition, but most remained only good intentions. Among the EIR’s board members were George Seferis (Seferiadis), a diplomat and later Nobel laurel poet, and intellectuals including the renowned writer Nikos Kazantzakis and the distinguished scholar Constantine Dimaras. Despite the refreshing spirit of these choices, which might have ushered in a fresh future for the newly established EIR, the tensions that had been apparent during the formative negotiations leading to the drafting of the decree soon resurfaced. The far right fiercely attacked the new EIR board in the press,128 while D. Xronopoulos129 –​a journalist and writer with radio aspirations –​expressed his opposition to the creation of an organization with autonomy from state control.130 Moreover, in a personal attack on Petimezas’ record of resistance during the occupation, the populist newspaper H Vradyni also criticized the choice of EIR board members, accusing Petimezas of ‘handing over the Athens Radio to “EAM communism”’.131 In a private and confidential service document, Anastasiades was described as a senior member of the EAM and accused 1 27 HPA: File 387/​7, Letter, Lancaster to Petimezas, 9 November 1945. 128 Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 171–​173. 129 Xronopoulos was head of Athens Radio News Programme (December 1938–​ October 1941) and AERE’s employee at the Department of Cultural Talks (October 1941–​1944). On 29 December 1944 he was assigned, by oral order of Undersecretary for Press P. Garoufalias, the general management of the Athens Radio (HPA: File 387/​7, Memorandum, D. Xronopoulos to EIR D-​G, n.d., p. 4; HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Radio (1945)’, Official Note, P. Garoufalias to Xronopoulos, 29 December 1944). 130 In 1944, Xronopoulos submitted to Garoufalias his own plan for organization of the Greek Broadcasting Services (HPA: File 387/​7/​, ‘Radio (1945)’, ‘Note’, n.d.). 131 H Vradyni, ‘Φως εις τα παρασκήνια. Πώς ο ραδιοφωνικός σταθμός παρεδόθη εις τους κομμουνιστάς’ [Light behind the Scenes. How the Radio Station was Handed over to the Communists], 28 November 1945.

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of seeking to create in the EIR an environment that would be sympathetic to the EAM and supporters of the Liberal Party. British Embassy's Information Department Press Liaison Officer E. Eliascos was employed as the news advisor to the EIR; he was accused of collaborating with the EAM while in Cairo and of ‘lacking national consciousness and directions’.132 In January 1946, a few months after the appointment of the first EIR board, Law 818/​1946133 was enacted, thus changing the composition of the board. Moreover, a provision was added to the effect that the Ministry of Press134 could exercise preventive censorship. Petimezas continued to run the EIR from his position as minister of press135 in the government of Themistocles Sofoulis until Sofoulis’ resignation on 14 March 1946;136 the resignation took place shortly before the 31 March election, following his opposition to holding an election on that date.137 The frantic attack by the far right on the politics and the general suitability of the EIR board members should be seen within the wider political context of the time. The year 1945 may be characterized as the prelude to the civil war. There was a growing anxiety regarding the mounting wave of ‘white terror’, which by mid-​1945 reached serious dimensions and was witnessed by British press 132 HPA:  File 387/​7, ‘EIR (1945–​1946)’, ‘Προσωπικόν Απόρρητον’ (Personal and Confidential) n.d. Among the staff targeted for left-​wing tendencies were well-​ known EIR employees, such as K. Krontiras, Antigoni Metaxa, I. Yannopoulos, Mary Veaki, K. Tsaloglou, Aygi Kasigoni, E. Eliascos of the AGIS and I. Veinoglou. 133 ΦΕΚ:  3, Compulsory Law  818, 8 January 1946, 11–​13. Legislative Law  1233 (ΦΕΚ: 285, 31 February 1949, 1862) amended Article 4, para. 1 of Constitutional Act 54/​1945 referred to the composition of the Advisory Programme Committee, which was reduced from nine to seven members without specifying which government agency its members would represent (see Article 2, para. 2: ‘it will consist of seven members appointed between competent Government officials and persons specializing in radio broadcasting’). 134 It retained the status of a ministry from 1 November 1945 to 11 May 1946, when it was again an undersecretariat (ΦΕΚ: 161, 11 May 1946, 827–​833). 135 ERT Archives:  A3/​K3/​File 2, p.  408, Announcement by H. Petimezas, 20 November 1945. 136 HPA:  File 387/​7, Official Note, Ministry of Press and Information (N. Zarifis, General Secretary) to H. Petimezas, 30 March 1946. 137 Cf. HPA: File 387/​7, ‘Personal Archive’, Petimezas’ address to the journalists as Minister for Press, n.d.

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correspondents in Greece. This had a direct impact on international and British domestic opinion, which in turn troubled British policymakers and occasionally gave rise to questions in the British Parliament.138 The fall of the Nikolaos Plastiras government in April brought into the open the forces of the right and enabled them to consolidate their position, thereby dashing the hopes of the republican right to lead the national reaction. Thus, anti-​communism became synonymous with the cause of the return of the Greek king.139 By the end of June, the situation in Athens was explosive and fears of a right-​wing coup d’état were rife.140 Furthermore, soon after the new Labour government came to power in Britain in July 1945, it became clear that there would be little change in the conduct of foreign affairs.141 The British government remained committed to returning the king to Greece. The monarchists could scarcely believe their good fortune, while the republicans were thrown into ‘disorder, if not actual panic’.142 After the post-​war general election of 31 March 1946, political violence –​mostly committed by extreme right-​wing groups –​increased dramatically. This in turn led to further mass insecurity following the plebiscite regarding the monarchy on 1 September 1946, which resulted in a majority win for the return of King George II. The new EIR director general, Panayiotis Sifneos,143 took office on 12 April 1946. On assuming his duties, he issued a dispatch to the EIR 138 139 140 141 142 143

Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 162, 220. G.  M. Alexander, The Prelude to the Truman Doctrine:  British Policy in Greece 1944–​1947 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1982), 108. Special correspondent ‘Dangers…’, and leader, The Times, 17 April 1946, in Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 173. Bevin’s first speech as foreign secretary in the House of Commons; see Hansard, Vol. 413, cc. 289–​291, 20 August 1945. Weekly reports by the AIS: 12–​18 and 19–​25 August 1945, in Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 179, footnote 47. Sifneos (Constantinople, 1904–​Athens, 1979) was a PhD holder in law and political science (Paris, France). In November 1941, he founded the monarchist resistance organization Ethniki Drasis [National Action], and in 1943 he fled to Egypt. He was a commentator on Greek broadcasts on the Cairo radio station and editor of Elliniki Pnoi (1948–​1949), weekly organ of the New Party of his political friend Spyros Markezinis. After his dismissal from the EIR in December 1946, he became head of the Hellenic Army General Staff Press and Enlightenment Office. In 1952

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staff asking for their mobilization ‘in the fight against falsehood and the dissemination of truth’. ‘This is the mission of enlightenment’, he pointed out, and in the process ‘no desertions will be pardoned and betrayal will be mercilessly beaten’. He also warned EIR staff that should anyone hold alternative perceptions of their mission, they should leave the institution forthwith. He further criticized the previous leadership for having ‘distorted and misunderstood [the EIR’s] fundamental character’. He concluded by calling for the ‘patriotism and hard work’ of the staff, which –​together with the support of ‘our National Government and our supporting allies’ –​ would enable the EIR to ‘bring to a close the fight [the civil war]’.144 In this warlike spirit, the EIR embarked on its new course. The EIR’s operational regulation –​enacted only three months previously in February 1946 –​was annulled and the services of the institute were reassembled;145 this was conducted in response to the new political circumstances created by the election and the financial resources available, given the state of the Greek economy. Facing the difficult task of post-​war reconstruction, the Greek government was undoubtedly hard-​pressed to ease the budget of an overstaffed and disorganized civil service. Nonetheless, the remuneration of staff was to be drawn from EIR resources, not the state budget.146 In May 1946, the EIR’s staff numbered 267;147 of these, the director general and the director of financial services, both appointed directly by the Ministry

144 145 146 147

he was elected Member of Parliament and became minister twice:  in General A. Papagos’ right-​wing government (1952–​1954) and briefly during Markezinis’ premiership under the G. Papadopoulos dictatorship (1973). Among his writings are Stoixeia propagandas [Rudiments of Propaganda] (Athens:  Hellenic Army General Staff, Press Directorate, 1950) and Oi ypeythinoi [The Responsible] (Athens, 1954); he also edited I. Metaxas:  Το προσωπικό μου ημερολόγιο [My Personal Diary] (Athens: Ikaros, 1964). ERT Archives: A3/​K3/​File 2, p. 387, P. Sifneos, ‘Dispatch’, 12 April 1946. Sifneos repeated these views in an interview in the first issue of the radio magazine Edo Athinai, 28 September 1946, No. 1, pp. 3–​4. ERT Archives: A3/​K7/​File 3 (Ministries), Letter, Protocol No. 112492, D. Xelmis, Finance Minister to Ministry of Press, 30 April 1946. ERT Archives:  A3/​K7/​File  3 (Ministries), Sifneos to Directorate-​General of Pubic Accounting, Division YI, Protocol No. 9473, 23 September 1946. ERT Archives:  A3/​K7/​File  3 (Ministries), 200, Letter, Sifneos to Ministry of Supply, 2 May 1946.

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of Press, were the only ones to hold permanent positions. The employment of the remaining staff was dependent on political and economic circumstances, a predicament not faced by other sections of the Greek civil service, as pointed out by Sifneos.148 In his capacity as director general, using the powers granted to him by his appointment contract, he proceeded to screen his entire staff on the grounds of their competence and their political leanings. Some he dismissed in order to reduce the size of the establishment and to improve efficiency, while others he purged due to their alleged participation in the December 1944 insurrection. In the period that followed, employment contracts were to be granted only to those approved by EIR management.149 In 1948, the criterion of loyalty to the state –​imposed by law150 –​was added to the criteria that determined the retention or removal of EIR staff; this measure was aimed in particular at left-​wing civil servants, as was the case in the rest of the Greek civil service.151 Sifneos, however, soon followed the same fate as Petimezas, whose reformist and conciliatory policies were disliked by monarchical and extreme right-​wing political circles.152 Equally disliked was the reserved attitude of Sifneos –​ a pro-​monarchist, anti-​communist but moderate right-​winger –​towards the Greek old-​party system.153 In December 1946, he was suspended and 148 ERT Archives:  A3/​K7/​File  3 (Ministries), 198, Letter, Sifneos to Ministry of Supply, 24 May 1946. 149 ERT Archives:  A3/​K3/​File  2, P. Sifneos’ internal correspondence, 386, 18 April 1946; 385, 27 April 1946. 150 ΦΕΚ: 6, Compulsory Law 516, 8 January 1948, 11–​13. 151 ERT Archives: A3/​K3/​File 2, (p. 299), Ministry of Press and Information, General Order (Γενική Διαταγή), Protocol No. 9349/​Ζ) 14 May 1948, M. Ailianos requested Svolopoulos to communicate the order to the EIR staff. Protocol No. 256/​10.528, 18 May 1948; A3/​K7/​File  1 (Ministries), p.  127, Letter, Top Secret  –​Personal, Police Directorate of Athens, Protocol No. 4498Φ150, Α. M. Evert, Greek Police Chief, to Svolopoulos, 6 December 1948. See also P. Papastratis, ‘The Purge of the Greek Civil Service’, in Lars Baerentzen, J.  O. Iatrides and Ole Smith, eds, Studies in the History of the Greek Civil War 1945–​1949 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 1987), 41–​53. 152 Spyros Markezinis, Σύγχρονη Πολιτική Ιστορία της Ελλλαδος, 1936-​75 [Modern Political History of Greece, 1936-​75], Vol. 2 (Athens: Papyros, 1994), 268–​270. 153 Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 191.

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replaced by I. Bettos of the Ministry of Press until the appointment, in February 1947, of the new director general, Dimitris Svolopoulos. Given the highly polarized political tensions of the time and the evident imminence of a civil war, the attempt to reform the EIR along BBC lines and to secure by law a certain degree of autonomy from state control did not succeed. By June 1946, Lancaster admitted to the British defeat over the organization of EIR, due to reasons over which they ‘had no control’. The devaluation of the drachma in early 1946 also had a devasting effect on the EIR’s finances. Staff costs as well as the cost of purchasing equipment abroad increased tenfold, while the rising price of licences ran the serious risk of reducing their quantity and adversely affecting new acquisitions. Under these circumstances, the EIR had little alternative other than to resort to the Greek government for assistance, which meant that ‘their jealously guarded independence became a thing of the past’.154 Moreover, Lancaster was convinced that even if the EIR had not bargained away their rights at this time, the move was ultimately inevitable, given that the new government –​and its overwhelming majority in parliament –​would have lost no time in revoking the 1945 Act and thus ‘turning Athens Radio into a Department of the Ministry of [the] Press’.155 Furthermore, it had become obvious over the previous few months that ‘various American interests’ –​ notably the Radio Corporation of America (RCA) –​would be ‘only too delighted to step in’.156 With an export loan agreement of 25 million US dollars, American producers of technical equipment and/​or programmes were protected, whereas British manufacturers had no such guarantee; Lancaster remarked that this effectively meant their ‘power of control was considerably reduced’. In fact, Lancaster argued the inevitability of this dynamic given that the Americans were prepared to offer their help on a long-​term basis. He considered therefore that the financial costs incurred by the British government in further supporting the EIR would not bear any political benefit, as there was only an ‘extremely faint hope’ that by so doing the British might obtain ‘some shadow of their influence over 154 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 155 Ibid. 156 Ibid.

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Greek propaganda’. In addition, by continuing to help Athens Radio –​ even on a very reduced scale –​there was a risk of ‘grave political disadvantage’, stemming from the fact that the British would be held responsible for the nature of the country’s propaganda output. On the other hand, he suggested that the BBC Monitoring Services should ‘most certainly’ be retained, for two reasons. First, it was essential that on the occasion of important policy statements issued in London, the British should be in a position to check without delay Reuters or other agency reports and correct the ‘frequently bizarre despatches’ sent by Greek correspondents in London to their Athens papers. Second, it was ‘highly important’ that the FO Press Department should know at the earliest possible moment what foreign stations –​particularly in Moscow, Belgrade, Sofia and Tirana –​ were reporting on Greece, so that the BBC Monitoring Services in Cairo could send such reports in a timely manner to Athens. He proposed, therefore, that while they should not withdraw the material already passed to the EIR on loan, additional help –​material or technical –​would not be given. Moreover he suggested that the radio section of the Embassy Press Department should be drastically reduced, retaining only such personnel as was required to pursue the English programme on Athens Radio. And yet, he ‘most strongly’ urged that if the radio section was to be dissolved, Newlands’ services should be retained, as his work in the past had been invaluable and his ‘continued usefulness to the Press Department far exceeds the range of his qualifications as Radio Advisor’.157 Lancaster’s experience from observing British radio activities in Greece from liberation to the March 1946 election (and given the political views of the new Greek government in power) contributed to his belief that the ‘previously envisaged high degree of co-​operation’ between the Embassy’s Press Department and the Greek Ministry of Press was ‘neither attainable nor even perhaps desirable’. He also emphasized that the Embassy’s Press Department should operate at its peak performance. To reach its maximum efficiency, the Press Department’s relations with the Embassy should be embedded in its structure as an integral part of operations. In this case, the FO should allow the press attaché –​in consultation with the ambassador –​to 157

Ibid.

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take full responsibility for publicity. In order to prevent against any difficulties caused by a divergence in policy between the Embassy and the BBC in their Greek broadcasts (as had been seen in the past), it was ‘essential that far closer co-​operation should exist between London and Athens’. With this co-​operation in mind, the press attaché should draft a weekly directive with the intention of this being followed closely by the BBC news editors.158 Lancaster’s memorandum was fully discussed with the British Ambassador Sir Clifford J. Norton and the commercial secretary. There was, however, one point of contention that Norton felt the BBC might resent, most likely regarding it as an encroachment on their charter. This involved the matter of directives to the BBC news editors of the foreign news service. Norton suggested to Bevin that the approach should instead be more indirect and that information should be sent to the BBC news editors not as directives, but as local background information accompanied by letters covering any major issues.159 Copies of the report were sent to M. H. Lovell –​head of the East European Information Department (EEID) since 26 August 1946 –​the Central Office of Information (COI), the Cultural Relations Department, the Southern Department, the FO News Department and the BBC. At this point, Lancaster was expected in London for a discussion regarding broadcasting policy in Greece and the support the British should give to Greek radio, a matter that was considered by the FO ‘as most urgent’.160 Newlands was also expected in London for consultations. Future action was therefore dependent on the outcome of these discussions.

158 Ibid. 159 TNA: FO 930/​490, P 501, Minutes, Sir C. Norton to Ernest Bevin, 11 July 1946. 160 TNA:  FO  930/​422, P  1/​306, Empax 305, FO to Athens, Personal for Rouse, 4 June 1946.

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Amalgamation of the radio section with the press section of the Athens Embassy’s Information Department Deliberating over the future of the British Information Service (BIS) in Greece and the reorganization of the Athens Embassy’s Information Department (discussed in Chapter 2), Norton, Lancaster and Rouse considered that a new staff structure at the Athens Information Department was essential for the future efficiency of the Embassy’s Press Department. A reorganization plan for the Press Department had been outlined in Lancaster’s memorandum, and the amalgamation of the press and radio sections had been proposed by both Rouse and Lancaster. Rouse was also keen to retain Newlands’ services. The Embassy itself recommended dispensing with Major Ian S. Scott-​Kilvert, who was previously assistant press attaché and now worked as acting head of the Press Department; at the time, Scott-​Kilvert was in London and working to merge the press and radio sections under Newlands.161 In principle, the FO accepted the proposed amalgamation but rejected the idea of appointing Newlands as Rouse’s deputy and head of press and radio sections, since he did not satisfy the FO nationality rules.162 It was agreed that the FO would discuss the matter with Newlands after his return to London and postpone the decision until later.163 Newlands left for London on 26 June 1946.164 On 22 June 1946, Rouse sent to the EEID his proposal for the reorganization of staff. In this proposal, he recommended combining the press and radio sections and dividing the former feature, photo and reference sections into their component parts. He presented to the EEID a diagram of the 161 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Empax 305, FO, to Athens, Personal for Rouse, 4 June 1946; Empax 482, Athens (Norton) to FO, Personal for Scott from Rouse, 7 June 1946; Empax 508, Athens (Norton) to FO, following from Ambassador, 21 June 1946. 162 TNA: FO 930/​422, Empax 364, FO to Athens, following Personal for Rouse from O’Donovan, 5 July 1946. 163 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Minutes, 26 June 1946. 164 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Telegram for Scott from Rouse; Minutes, Davis to O’Donovan, 24 June 1946.

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intended set-​up with its various subsections, including comments to help explain the proposed changes. According to the new structure, E. Eliascos –​ hitherto employed as news advisor to the EIR –​would become responsible for liaisons with the local press and the Ministry of Press, and for servicing the EIR with material for broadcast talks and features. The radio technical section would consist of two British electricians, two Greek electricians and one manual worker. There was a contingency plan set out in the proposal, should it be decided in the future to discontinue assistance to the EIR. In this plan, the section could dissolve and leave behind a team of one technical person and an assisting local electrician; such a group would ‘always’ be required to deal with the remaining British technical stores (including radio sets, amplifiers, loudspeakers and monitoring equipment) and to carry out electrical repairs. Should the proposed reorganization be carried out, there would be fewer than six senior UK-​based appointments.165 The EEID found the new staff reorganization plan ‘sensible enough’ and ‘workable’, with the exception that they did not favour the idea of leaving all contacts with the press to the Greek staff of the British Embassy.166 Once decisions had been taken about Newlands, the appointment of Rouse’s deputy and the head of the press and radio sections of the Information Department, the overall size of the staff complement could then be determined. This unsettled state of affairs adversely affected the efficient running of the department, particularly given the approaching plebiscite. Rouse felt himself to be in a desperate position, unable to cope on his own. He could not move away from Athens at a time when it was vital to visit the regions and in particular Rhodes (in the context of the Dodecanese being handed back to Greece). In a ‘very long screed’ to A. Harrison of the FO’s Balkan section, Rouse put forth that while Newlands was barred from becoming his deputy by virtue of his parentage, he should at least be allowed to remain in Greece until the plebiscite had concluded. The implementation of the other staff arrangements could be postponed until the FO

165 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Rouse, Confidential Note, ‘Staff Reorganisation’, 22 June 1946. 166 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Minutes (handwritten) Davis to Harrison, 5(?) July 1946; Minutes (handwritten), Harrison to O’Donovan, 11 July 1946.

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made a final decision about Newlands.167 While in London, Newlands contacted the Marconi company regarding his future employment. He made it clear to Harrison that it was not in his personal interest to return to Athens for only a few months, but that he would do so out of loyalty to Rouse and his desire to see the EIR–​Marconi deal successfully concluded.168 Thus, he returned to Athens,169 where advantage was taken of his presence to affect the reorganization of the press and radio sections into one combined unit.170 In a personal letter to Rouse, Lovell acknowledged the continued staff shortages, gave Rouse the FO’s consent to merge the press and radio sections and assured Rouse that he had acquired the assistance of Coate, Eland and Newlands to lighten his workload. Meanwhile the EEID sent J. C. McMinnies to Athens to train as Rouse’s deputy and head of the two sections. McMinnies had worked on Greek affairs with the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) in Cairo. He also had previous experience with Reuters and until recently acted as chief editor of Weltpress, the British-​run daily newspaper in Vienna. He knew classical Greek and would soon acquire modern Greek. He was also friendly with Newlands and was known to Rouse.171 Rouse found McMinnies to be ‘a very suitable candidate’ and ‘an admirable selection’ at such a hectic time for the department and thus approved his appointment.172 McMinnies duly left for Athens on 28 September 1946.173

167 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Letter, Strictly Confidential, Rouse to Harrison, 6 August 1946. 168 TNA:  FO  930/​422, P  1/​306, Minutes (handwritten), Harrison to Lovell, 21 August 1946. 169 TNA: FO 930/​422, P 1/​306, Draft Telegram to Athens, 20 August 1946. 170 TNA:  FO  930/​422, P  1/​306, Minutes, Harrison to Lovell; see also Minutes, Harrison to Ruthven-​Murray, ‘Reorganisation of the Press and Radio Sections in the Athens Office’, 26 August 1946; Minutes, Lovell to Ruthven-​Murray, 26 August 1946. 171 TNA: FO 930/​422, Letter, Lovell to Rouse, 26 August 1946. 172 TNA:  FO  930/​ 422, Letter, Private and Confidential, Rouse to Lovell, 29 August 1946. 173 TNA: FO 930/​423, Draft Telegram to Athens, 25 September 1946.

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The Foreign Office wired publicity guidelines for Greece The FO was set to receive all information from Greece and issue all central guidelines for British broadcasting policy in Greece. The Athens Information Department sent reports on broadcasting work to London, which followed a standardized format; instructions on reporting were laid down in Circular No. 23 and distributed to all information officers in overseas posts.174 All types of communication (including press, films, other visual, visitors and lecturers, commercial publicity, books and periodicals, information centres, libraries and, of course, radio) were now incorporated under the heading of ‘Channels’. Under the new system, aside from a general assessment of the period under review, the information officer’s broadcasting reports would also focus on a specific area, including technical aspects, programmes, liaisons with the BBC, monitoring foreign transmissions in the area (with comment on their comparative popularity), activities of other foreign governments and local conditions. ‘Local conditions’ included details regarding local transmissions, the availability of medium-​wave and short-​wave wireless sets and the tastes of the local audience generally. The information officers also reported on the uses of local broadcasting facilities, the audibility and audiences of BBC transmissions to their respective areas and suggestions for improvement. Similarly, it was agreed with the BBC that the FO would be the channel for sending ‘all future advance information on schedules’ in regard to Athens Radio to the Information Department of the British Embassy at Athens.175 The BBC considered this channel to be ‘the most satisfactory’ and thought that it would be better ‘for us to continue to use this channel, as we always have done in the past’.176 Extracts from ‘London Calling Europe’ and from The Listener were sent by the FO via the Athens 174 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, Note, H. C. Bowen, EEID, to D. Routh, Controller, COI, 2 May 1947. 175 BBC WAC, E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), J.  W.  T. Eyton to Miss Gillespie, Communications and Broadcasting Division, FO, 2 April 1946. 176 Ibid.

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Information Department broadcast;177 a copy of the new radio weekly Edo Athinai [Athens Calling] was also distributed to the BBC via the FO’s Information Department.178 Finally, in the case that Athens Radio was jammed, the BBC would provide assistance to readjust its transmission to other short-​wave frequencies, through the channels of the FO.179 Newlands left Athens on 27 November 1946, a ‘loss’ for which Rouse ‘was extremely sorry’, leaving McMinnies to carry on work as the second secretary and the head of the press and broadcasting section of the Information Department. After an adequate handover period, McMinnies proved to be ‘a worthy successor’.180 McMinnies prepared the Embassy’s broadcasting reports, which consisted in part of the quarterly reports, until 1948 and the biannual reports for 1949 and 1950 sent by Rouse to the EEID Balkans section. In his first quarterly report on broadcasting –​for the period of October to December 1946 –​Rouse assured the FO that every opportunity to reach a large audience at short notice through broadcasting was ‘thoroughly exploited whenever we have had any announcement or handout which was too late for the press or for which press circulation was considered inadequate’. During this period, the Information Department’s relations with the EIR –​while remaining close in the technical sphere –​ lost ‘much personal intimacy’ following the dismissal of Director General P. Sifneos. His successor, D. K. Svolopoulos,181 took over in February 177 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), J.  M. Best, European Liaison, Bush House to Watford, Copyright Department, ‘FO Use of Athens Radio during September’, 22 October 1946. 178 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File 1 (1941–​ 1946), J. Watford, Broadcasting EEID, FO, to J.  M. Best, European Liaison, 22 October 1946. 179 BBC WAC:  E1/​819/​1, Hellenic National Broadcasting Institute, File  1 (1941–​ 1946), J. W. T. Eyton, BBC, European Liaison to Miss Honeyball, broadcasting section, FO, 3 April 1946. 180 TNA:  FO  953/​27, PE  346, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. 181 Svolopoulos (Kalamata, 1895[1900]–​1978) studied law (at the University of Athens) and spoke French. From 1926, he was a columnist, editor and publisher in various newspapers (including Politeia, Eleftheros Anthropos, Niki, H Vradyni, Ethnikos Kirix, Athinaiki and Makedonia). In 1938–​1940, he was director general

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1947 and was described by Rouse as being ‘less amicably disposed’ to the British.182 Rouse’s main concern during the first quarter of 1947 pertained to the sale of receivers and transmitter equipment, which was scheduled to conclude by the end of 1946; however, due to delays, the material had not yet been disposed of, as previously anticipated. In regard to the Thessaloniki transmitter, by the end of August 1946 and at the request of the Greek authorities, the British had relinquished the building known as the ‘House of the Soldier’ in the centre of the city, which they had used for the entertainment needs of the British Army. The building was deemed the most suitable for the requirements of the Thessaloniki station due to its facilities, which were inherited from the German radio station that was installed at the location throughout the occupation.183 The immediate installation of the station was for the Greek government an urgent priority of ‘national importance’.184 A daily two-​hour transmission of EIR programming via the Thessaloniki station was deemed insufficient; moreover, many believed that the station should carry several more hours of local programming each day. However, the station’s operation and expansion was delayed further due to the absence of appropriate technical equipment and available financial resources.185 In early 1947, H. C. L. Barnett of the Information of the YRE of the Ministry of Press under the Metaxas regime, and EIR director general (1947–​1950). He was the initiator, in 1947, of the radio broadcast ‘Η Ώρα της Βόρειας Ελλάδος’ [The Hour of Northern Greece] known for its nationalist, anti-​communist and anti-​Slavic content. He authored a series of books on Greek political history. See E. Xatzivasiliou, ‘D. Svolopoulos’, in Loukia Droulia and Gioula Koutsopanagou, eds, Εγκυκλοπαίδεια του Ελληνικού Τύπου 1784–​ 1974 [Encyclopedia of the Greek Press, 1784–​1974] (Athens:  ΙΝΕ/​ΕΙΕ, 2008), Vol. 4,  68–​69. 182 TNA: FO 953/​27, PE 346, Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. 1 83 Brig. Easton, Press Department attaché, HM Consulate to the Undersecretary for Press and Information, Thessaloniki, 15 August 1946; Montzalas to Ministry of Press, 19 September 1946 (personal correspondence with Manolis Kandylakis). 184 N. Cottas, Minister, Governor General of North Greece to Ministry of Press and Information, 6 September 1946 (personal correspondence with Manolis Kandylakis). 1 85 Ibid.

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Department’s press and broadcasting section and Eleftheriou of the TTT complied a full list of the equipment due to be bought back by Marconi for resale to the Greek government. Norman F. Joly186 –​who since Barnett, remained at the Information Department’s press and broadcasting section after January 1947 –​went to Thessaloniki to ascertain the details of this list. Live broadcasts from the Thessaloniki station were scheduled to begin on 1 January 1947, but these were postponed ‘through lack of funds and local talent’ until 1 March. The station broadcast with a strength of 2 kW, but the intention was to increase this to 15 kW as soon as arrangements could be made with Marconi’s representative in Athens. The Thessaloniki station was run by the EIR board, and equipment was mainly supplied by the AGIS, to which the Athens Information Department added a considerable amount of material, such as three miles of wire and the loan of haulage.187

Servicing the EIR Competition for EIR’s prime-​time foreign-​language slot was keen. Athens Radio broadcast three transmissions daily, of which the foreign broadcasts  –​two British and one French (the latter prepared by the Institut Français) –​were transmitted in the afternoon and evening programme zones. In an interview to Edo Athinai, Sifneos graphically described the pressures he was placed under while allotting a time slot for foreign language broadcasts at EIR Radio’s peak listening time; as he described it, 186 Smyrna (Izmir) (1911–​?) was a salesperson for RCA radios (Athens, 1930), member of Athens Embassy Press Department (1940) and transferred to the British Embassy in Cairo (April 1940). He was appointed radio monitoring officer of AGIS (October 1944). He was also a news announcer in English and Greek. After the termination of his appointment at the Athens Information Department on 1 January 1947, he was transferred to the British Police and Prisons Mission to Greece as interpreter for Sir Charles Wickham; see Norman F. Joly, The Dawn of Amateur Radio in the UK and Greece (London: Ability Printing, 1990) 92–​114. 187 TNA:  FO  953/​26, PE  244, McMinnies for Rouse to Balkan section, EID, ‘December Report –​Broadcasting’, 4 January 1947.

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the programme director would approach his office ‘having on his side an English army officer in shorts and on his left a French diplomat with a bow-​tie’. The EIR director general was ‘called to exercise all courtesy towards the two foreign gentlemen’ and aimed to negotiate and get ‘their kind consent’ regarding the time slot for their foreign broadcasts in the EIR broadcasting schedule, ‘[for] which they have acquired rights from time immemorial’.188 Considerable use was made by the British Embassy’s Information Department of the Greek broadcasting facilities. McMinnies’ December 1946 report included a schedule of British broadcasts for the month along with ‘routine servicing material’ –​including scripts, recordings and European programme bulletins –​all of which the Information Department serviced to EIR, both in Athens and Thessaloniki. Throughout December 1946, there were daily relays of the BBC news in English (via the Overseas Service); this remained with the same regularity throughout the next two months. Aside from the routine material the Information Department served the EIR, they also occasionally passed on scripts, such as those chosen by Miss Kanavarioti of EIR during her London visit.189 The daily Information Department broadcasts on Athens Radio consisted of a weekly British press summary, an international news commentary by William Norman Ewer and a news commentary by Information Department Press Liaison Officer E. Eliascos. The broadcasts were accompanied by a variety of features on political, economic, scientific and cultural themes, including news about life in England, British industry, science, achievements in medicine, technological progress, British cultural news, popular Greek and English light music and comments on the British way of life. All transmissions were prepared by the Information Department, from sources including the COI, the London Press Service (LPS), the World Digest, BBC features, the British Council (BC), The Times, Picture Post and

188 Edo Athinai, 28 September 1946, No. 1, pp. 3–​4. 189 Kanavarioti was the first (and at least until August 1946, the only) Greek member of the EIR to be sent on the British government’s grant to Britain for training by the BBC. She returned to Greece on 18 September (TNA: FO 930/​422, Minutes, Harrison to Miss Southern, Establishment Division, 27 August 1946).

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Horizon.191 Every evening, a fifteen-​minute broadcast was transmitted under the title I Simerini Anglia [Britain Today]. In addition to this material, the BC prepared a weekly hour-​long concert of British music from records sent by the BBC transcription service, while the British Institute ran a popular course of elementary and advanced English lessons: English by Radio. The latter ran daily for half an hour and the corresponding printed texts were on sale at the Athens Information Centre (AIC). The Information Department prepared all programmes (information and cultural) for both the Athens and Thessaloniki stations. The Information Department/​BC Athens programme was also sent a large collection of ‘newsy’ features for filling Thessaloniki’s tri-​weekly Information Department/​B C programme. The Angliko Tetarto [English Quarter of an Hour] –​which was similar in nature to English by Radio –​was broadcast on Radio Thessaloniki when it commenced regular daily transmissions on 1 March 1947. Angliko Tetarto was played every evening at the peak listening hour of 20:00 in the form of an English lesson, produced under the supervision of the Athens Information Department and presented by a Greek teacher from the Thessaloniki Institute of English Studies. On Sundays, Angliko Tetarto was devoted to English music. Since its inception, the Thessaloniki station broadcast a variety of items, including scripts from the LPS, the Leader Summary and talks on subjects pertaining to British sport, the British police force, medical issues such as malaria, British musical comedy and new teaching systems in Britain. Additional publicity was given to British special announcements and handouts, including a wide selection of London Transcription Service scripts, which were played on the Athens programmes. 190

Horizon, A Review of Literature and Art (London, 1939–​1950, editor:  Cyril Connolly). This journal served as a platform for a wide range of distinguished and emerging writers. Among them were T. S. Eliot, Graham Greene, Bernard Russell, Henry Miller, George Orwell, Jean-​Paul Sartre, and Paul Eluard. Lawrence Durrell, Louis MacNeice, Osbert Lancaster, William Plomer, Alan Moorehead, and others, had a Greek connection as writers, journalists or as British officials. 191 TNA:  FO  953/​26, PE  244, McMinnies, for Rouse, Information Department Embassy, Athens, to Balkan section, EEID, ‘December Report –​Broadcasting’, 4 January 1947. 190

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Many of the compiled scripts came from COI material, including features, highlights and material from the LPS. Occasionally, however, a script from the BBC transcription service was used for a more general appeal. Moreover, the BBC’s twenty-​four-​hour General Overseas Service –​ which began on 16 February 1947 –​formed the subject of a handout to press and radio throughout Greece. On two occasions, the BBC gave the Information Department advance announcements for items that were to be broadcast in their Greek transmission, including talks by Professor Arnold Toynbee and Sir Alexander Fleming. Both of these personalities were known to the Greek public, though for different reasons.192 In each case, handouts were issued to the Greek press and transmissions were announced in the preceding Britain Today programmes. During the first quarter of 1947, BBC scripts and recordings were regularly sent to the Athens and Thessaloniki stations, as were details of the BBC’s projected arrangements and schedules. The BBC news in English was relayed twice daily over Athens Radio. Both the BBC Overseas Service and the Greek transmission in the European Service were satisfactorily received.193 For the remainder of 1947, local transmissions from Athens and Thessaloniki underwent no changes of consequence. Reactions to material from the London Transcription Service were reported to London monthly. McMinnies estimated that –​judging from the listeners’ responses –​there was ‘wide appreciation of the recordings’. The BC subsequently agreed to ask listeners what type of recordings they would like. To resonate more with the Greek market, scripts would need to include some local items suitable for submission to Greek radio publications. Similarly, listeners’ reactions to the BBC Greek transmissions 192 Professor Toynbee was known for the controversy over the Koraes chair at King’s College London. See Richard Clogg, Politics and the Academy:  Arnold Toynbee and the Koraes Chair (London:  Frank Cass, 1986). The other was known as a Nobel laureate (1945), a physician (1953), and husband of Dr Amalia Koutsouri, who was a fellow of the BC (1947), a Greek distinguished physician and human rights activist. 193 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, Confidential, Serial No. 985, Rouse, Athens, to Balkan section, EEID, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’, 19 April 1947.

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were periodically gathered, assimilated and forwarded to the BBC. The BBC’s transcriptions and recordings that had been passed on to Athens and Thessaloniki were also fully reported to the BBC. The BBC’s English lessons were said to be highly appreciated and listeners tuned in regularly to the broadcasts. A publicity campaign increased the demand for these broadcasts further. The campaign involved the distribution of leaflets in Greek throughout the country to advertise the times and wavelengths of the lessons and the printed texts in the European Programmes Bulletins periodical. During the launch of this promotional campaign –​held in January 1947 –​80,000 Greek leaflets were placed in information centres throughout Greece or distributed to Eklogi and the Anglo-​Greek Review, thereby reaching a wide audience. Some highly appreciative letters written by ‘a considerable number’ of listeners were received by the Information Department194 and the regular mailing list for the European Programme Bulletins steadily increased. The Information Department also monitored radio in Belgrade, Sofia and Tirana, relayed on the Political Intelligence Centre Middle East service from Cairo.195 Finally, by January 1947, the technical section was reduced in personnel to one junior Greek engineer, and its activities were restricted to ‘very limited’ maintenance work.196 In Greece, the number of medium-​wave and short-​wave wireless sets available on the market was far from adequate for the needs and demands of the local audience.197 There were very few new American sets and a complete lack of English sets. Furthermore, the cost of a radio set was prohibitive and subject to an import tax of 100 per cent. The radio audience was limited by the scarcity of receivers. To tackle this problem, the 194 TNA:  FO  953/​26, PE  244, McMinnies for Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, ‘January Report –​Broadcasting’, 3 February 1947. 195 TNA: FO 953/​27, PE 346, Rouse to Balkan section, EEID, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st October to 31st December 1946’. 196 TNA:  FO  953/​26, PE  244, McMinnies, ‘January Report  –​Broadcasting’, 3 February 1947. 197 For instance, according to British estimates in Thessaloniki and its suburbs, with a population of approximately 350,000, there were 4,000 radio sets, of which 90 per cent were pre-​war models and 30 per cent were equipped for reception of short-​ wave transmissions.

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Information Department loaned some 200 receivers throughout Greece. These were given to select recipients –​including ‘responsible civic officials’, clubs, institutions, cafés and information centres –​in order to reach the largest and most influential audience. These radio sets were of much better quality than those normally available on the Greek market; what is more, these sets had the BBC wavelengths marked on them, thereby motivating listeners to tune in to the BBC. There were regular reports of crowds gathering round these sets to hear the BBC news. A further 600 sets of this type –​surplus to the needs of the Information Department –​were sold to the EIR for distribution to the Greek Army, the education authorities, welfare institutions and select individuals. These sales were expected to enlarge the Greek audience. Rouse reported that the BBC was given a ‘fair share of attention’ as a result of its reputation and reliability, an advantage Rouse regarded as ‘an undoubted asset among competitors whose interpretation of impartiality and objectivity is, to say the least, broad’.198 Rouse suggested a number of improvements to the Greek transmissions. He rightly sensed that although the Greek audience was ‘absorbed in politics’, it was nevertheless tired of listening only to speeches, political commentaries and ponderous discussions. People often preferred to read about these in the newspapers of their choice. ‘In fact, listeners usually turn off the radio as soon as they hear that a talk is to be transmitted’, he remarked. In contrast, the demand was mainly for music programmes and sketches. He therefore suggested that a larger proportion of the British programmes should be orientated to cultural subjects and in particular modern English literature, theatre and music. Moreover, as a counterbalance to Soviet radio propaganda, Rouse suggested that British broadcasts should also include transmissions representing the British sociopolitical paradigm, advocating social equality in the spirit of the liberal ideal. Finally, Rouse called for evening transmissions that could be presented with greater variety, divided into several parts with an interval for music and comments in the form of debate and using better Greek with fewer grammatical mistakes.199 198 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, Confidential, Serial No. 985, Rouse, Athens to Balkans section, EEID, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’, 19 April 1947. 199 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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The American challenge in radio broadcasting The BBC remained virtually unchallenged in Greece until 14 May 1947, when the American interest in the airwaves was clearly demonstrated by the inauguration of the Voice of America (VOA) in Greek on Athens Radio.200 By early 1948, the Americans had indisputably come to dominate the broadcasting field in Greece. Until that time, apart from the BBC, the only foreign radio station ‘given any degree of attention by Greek listeners’ was Moscow Radio (in Greek), which broadcasted a daily fifteen-​minute programme.201 The arrangement of the programme was of high quality, and as a result Moscow broadcasts were popular. According to estimates by the British Embassy, from as early as 1943 Moscow Radio had acquired a Greek following estimated at ‘30% of radio listeners’, which the British interpreted as a ‘growth of pro-​Russian feeling in Greece’ resulting from Soviet propaganda. This popularity was also attributed to an innate interest in subjects drawn from everyday life, the use of demotiki [demotic] language (which was ‘intelligible to all uneducated people’) and the ‘excellent clarity’ of the reception due to the use of a relay station in Bulgaria; Radio Sofia was the best-​ received medium-​wave station in northern Greece. Furthermore, Moscow Radio broadcast mainly in the north of Greece, while in Athens –​due to the dominance of the daily newspapers –​radio audiences preferred ‘to listen in to light and pleasant transmissions rather than those which blatantly seek to convey a political message’.202

200 The first VOA broadcast was inaugurated by US Secretary of State George Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs William Benton, and President of the US Senate Arthur Vandenberg, and greeted by President of the Hellenic Republic D. Maximos and Greek Foreign Minister K. Tsaldaris (Edo Athinai, 17 May 1947). 201 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, Confidential, Serial No. 985, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’. 202 BBC WAC:  E2/​190, Foreign Gen., European Intelligence Papers:  Series 1h, Confidential, Ref. No. 12/​43, BBC Surveys of European Audiences, Balkan Countries, 15 March 1943.

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From April 1947, however, a new equilibrium came about in Greek-​ British relations, as the British ceded their direct political responsibility for Greece to the Americans and the military refocused its activities against the rebels in the north. Media priorities were redefined. Staff reductions at the BIS in Greece –​which took effect from 1 April 1947 –​led to a drastic curtailment of British broadcasting activities. At the same time, the EIR reduced British broadcasting time from seven periods a week to four, ‘for reasons of policy’. The three daily forty-​five-​minute broadcasting slots for the British Forces on Athens Radio –​including the two that relayed the BBC news in English –​ceased on 15 April. The series presenting British concert music organized by the BC was also reduced in duration from sixty to forty-​five minutes. Despite this retrenchment, British broadcasting time was largely unaffected, as it was maintained ‘within the family of the British Empire’ by arranging for the Canadian Embassy and the South African Legation to be given fifteen minutes each on Athens Radio every week from early May.203 Their programmes were of a similar nature to that of the British and were ‘warmly appreciated by Greek listeners’. One such broadcast, at the request of the British Embassy’s Information Department, was by Professor W. A. Sewell, Byron chair at the University of Athens and former professor of English at Auckland University College in New Zealand. In April, the Greek programme organizer of the BBC Greek section, George Angeloglou, visited Greece and Egypt to investigate their respective listening conditions. In his report, he gave approximate figures on the distribution, availability and types of radio sets in larger and smaller Greek towns and villages, the wavelengths and hours of listening preferred, the reception and problems with interference from neighbouring countries.204 On the occasion of Egyptian-​born Angeloglou’s visit to Egypt, ‘an outstanding piece of publicity’ was given to the BBC Greek Service broadcasts and programming via the local Greek-​language press and social outlets.205 203 BBC WAC:  E3/​ 94/​ 1, OS Audience Research:  Southern Europe:  Greece, April 1947. 204 BBC WAC:  E3/​ 94/​ 1, OS Audience Research:  Southern Europe:  Greece, June 1947. 205 Ibid.

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The concentration of military operations in the north of Greece shifted the broadcasting focus accordingly. From 12 April 1947, the Information Department was the direct responsibility of the Thessaloniki Information Office. On 20 April as a result of instructions from Athens, Salonica Radio started broadcasting daily bulletins to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria with the objective of counteracting propaganda launched by the radio stations of the three neighbouring northern states. These efforts, however, were met with limited success, since the limited range of the Greek transmitters weakened the capacity of their bulletins to reach their intended audiences. The insertion of these bulletins in the daily programmes resulted in the reallocation of British broadcasts to a less popular time that, Rouse observed, virtually excluded ‘all but light music with which to lull the Greeks to sleep’.206 In order to avoid any loss of prestige and also to enhance the presence of the BBC, liaisons between the EIR and the BBC became ‘very much closer’ between April and June, mainly as a result of visits from at least six BBC officials to Athens. In addition, negotiations began with the EIR to send its engineers to the BBC to study the latest techniques in broadcasting.207 A factor that certainly contributed to the closeness of this relationship was the appointment of Svolopoulos as EIR director general in February 1947; though Rouse initially had some reservations about his attitudes towards the British, Rouse reported that Svolopoulos was ‘fanatically pro-​British’ and in an interview had expressed ‘his great willingness to co-​operate with the BBC in any way possible’.208 Furthermore, in order to provide the BBC Greek section with detailed information regarding their transmissions, the Information Department instituted a regular listening panel and a general questionnaire drawn up by the Greek section, which was circulated to ‘many hundreds’ of radio owners throughout Greece. The comments of both the regular and casual listeners were regularly dispatched to the BBC Greek section. In addition, a direct correspondence between the Greek section and a group of listeners in Greece had been established after Frosso 206 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, Confidential, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 207 Ibid. 208 BBC WAC:  E3/​ 94/​ 1, OS Audience Research:  Southern Europe:  Greece, March 1947.

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Sideropoulou’s209 visit to Athens in the summer of 1947 in her capacity as a staff member of the section. It was hoped that this direct correspondence might prove more satisfactory than reporting on reactions only once every three months. Efforts were also made to enhance the audibility of BBC Greek transmissions and thus also the size of their audiences. Two continually repeated demands were made: first, that the evening transmission be transferred to a more convenient time so that ‘many more people would be in a position to tune in’; and, second, that programmes should be delivered in more simplified language, dealing with the problems of everyday life and utilizing more interesting and lively presentations.210 While the time allocated to British broadcasting reduced and its transmission slots moved to less popular times of the day, the daily fifteen-​ minute VOA programme was allocated the ‘very convenient’ listening time of 21:30. It was relayed by the BBC and Athens Radio and attracted ‘very many’ listeners for the additional reason that, as Rouse noted, ‘people are absorbed in American policy’. Nevertheless, he also noted that several criticisms were made of these broadcasts. Some listeners found the VOA broadcasts ‘insipid’,211 while the demotic language used was not naturally spoken Greek. Furthermore, the programmes consisted mainly of news that listeners had already heard. What is more, and rather curiously, complaints were also made by some of the right-​wing Greek newspapers to the effect that the bulletins were ‘tinged with Communist sympathies’.212 This belief stemmed largely from the prominence given to Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Albanian news, which signalled to some the agency of a Greek-​American communist in the compilation of the bulletins. This is indicative of the polarized anti-​communist hysteria that prevailed in Greek official circles at the time. Rouse was confidentially informed that whenever there was 209 Efrosyne (Frosso) Sideropoulou [E.  D.  E.  M. Sideropoulo as listed in the BBC Staff List). In April 1945, she became the BBC Greek section intelligence assistant. 210 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 211 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  4286, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September 1947’. 212 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, Confidential, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’.

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an unfavourable comment about the Greek government or the situation in Greece, the whole broadcast was immediately interrupted on Svolopoulos’ instructions on the pretext of a technical problem. Svolopoulos213 even confessed to Rouse that he censored the broadcasts and gave the signal for these hitches to occur. As Rouse reported: this unusual habit […] has caused something of a stir among Greek listeners and bitter criticism from the press against the Director of the Board. Naturally, Svolopoulos did not openly admit that he censors the broadcasts; he attempts to justify the interruptions with various technical, but unconvincing explanations.214

A new development of significance was the establishment by the rebel forces of a radio station –​on 16 July 1947, Ελεύθερη Ελλάδα215 [Free Greece] began broadcasting twice daily. Setting up a radio station had been on the agenda of the Kommunistiko Komma Ellados (KKE [Communist Party of Greece]) since the summer of 1946.216 It started to broadcast underground from Belgrade on 16 July 1947 and following a transfer in March 1949

213 Svolopoulos exercised full control of the radio programme –​except for the news bulletins  –​and had instructed that no broadcast should be released without his first personally approving and signing it. See ERT Archives: A3/​K3/​F2, 358, Svolopoulos to the Head of Broadcasting Studios, 27 February 1947. Cf. ERT Archives: A3/​K3/​F2, 344, Svolopoulos’s Circular, 13 October 1947. 214 TNA:  FO  953/​29, PE  3388, Confidential, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1947’. 215 The clandestine radio station Free Greece began broadcasting in July 1947 as a station of the Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas (DSE [Democratic Army of Greece]), first from Belgrade and then in March 1948 from Bucharest. It ceased to function in 1956, but resumed again from Bucharest in March 1958 under the name Voice of Truth. It started with a daily thirty-​minute broadcast and reached five daily broadcasts in 1962. After a temporary cessation of its operation (in 1968), the station continued to broadcast from East Germany until 1974. The ASKI have kept almost the complete archive of broadcasts until 1968. Vasso Psimouli, ‘Ελεύθερη Ελλάδα’, ‘Η Φωνή της Αλήθειας’. Ο παράνομος ραδιοσταθμός του ΚΚΕ. Αρχείο 1947–​ 1968 [‘Free Greece’, ‘The Voice of Truth’. The Clandestine Radio Station of the KKE. Archive 1947–​1968] (Athens: ASKI/​Themelio, 2006). 216 Psimouli, ‘Ελεύθερη Ελλάδα’, 11.

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from Bucharest, was transmitted in short wave at a wavelength of 44 m.217 The station was intended to be the authoritative voice of the rebel DSE. Its objectives were to provide a response to the propaganda of the forces ranged against it, to penetrate the pro-​government military and to be a recruitment platform for the DSE. Furthermore, it would also be used as a means of communication with the general public, both in Greece and abroad. This was important given that the left-​wing print media had been outlawed in 1947. With the escalation of the civil war, the rebel station started broadcasting in French in May 1948 with A. Spilios in charge. Its aim was to create across Western Europe a movement of solidarity with the DSE cause and to promote the Greek case to the United Nations.218 However, the information officer reported to London that the station’s ‘audibility has never been good’ and was sometimes reduced to zero, owing to considerable outside interference.219 The audibility and the size of the audience for BBC transmissions to Greece, on the other hand, continued to be ‘very satisfactory’ for British interests.220 The readiness of the public to accept BBC publicity material distributed in large quantities for sale (or for free at the ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ exhibition on display in Athens at that time) was, according to Rouse, a fair reflection of the great public interest in the BBC and proof of its wide audience in Greece. Rouse was also content with the overall performance of British broadcasting in both Athens and Thessaloniki, while the broadcasting time allotted to it by the EIR continued ‘to prove a valuable additional vehicle for British publicity’. Rouse expected an even greater increase in the audience after the EIR’s agreement to relay the BBC midday transmission from 1 January 1948. The British also ensured that a considerable quantity of its material was broadcast during the EIR’s own 217 Ibid., 12–​13, 24. The Yugoslav and Romanian regimes did not want to be identified as hosting the clandestine radio station of a neighbouring country guerrilla movement (Psimouli, ‘Ελεύθερη Ελλάδα’, 17). 218 Ibid.,  18–​19. 219 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 4286, Rouse to EEID, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30th September’. 220 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’.

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time, and on several occasions Svolopoulos issued special requests for features.221 During the London Olympic Games, for example, arrangements were made with the EIR to relay the BBC’s midday Greek transmission for an extra five minutes and to broadcast a special fifteen-​minute BBC Greek bulletin every evening. Since the vast majority of Greeks took a keen interest in the Olympics, both relays were very warmly accepted. From 8 October 1948 onwards, the BC resumed the transmission of British music concerts, which had temporarily lapsed in June. Up to the end of 1948, local transmissions on the medium-​wave and short-​wave transmitters in Athens and the Angliko Tetarto programme in Thessaloniki did not alter much materially, aside from the arrangement between the Embassy’s Information Department and the BC to share the three fifteen-​minute periods available to them per week at Salonica Radio. Of these three periods, the Information Department took one, the BC took another and the last was split evenly between the two. The BC used its time for broadcasting English lessons, while the Information Department broadcast BBC scripts –​mainly extracts from LPS articles and some COI material, which was considered excessively detailed for broadcast. The shared period was used to broadcast British and foreign music.222 When the Thessaloniki Information Office closed, its weekly broadcast on Salonica Radio was suspended and its time slot was taken over by the BC.223 A major development during 1948 was the inauguration in Athens of a new short-​wave transmitter (RCA Type E.T. –​4750) on 25 March, installed under the supervision of an RCA technician.224 Though its strength was nominally 7.5 kW, its potential strength was far greater as it could transmit a radio signal or broadcast in a specified direction. Its target area 221 Ibid. 222 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1948’. 223 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 224 Marconi’s bid was initially selected, in March 1947, and the transmitter was to be delivered within four months. However, a month later, the EIR Board of Directors decided that the offer for the supply and installation of the transmitter would be given to the RCA; see Svolopoulos, Η Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία (1947-​1948), 7, 8, 9.

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was Greece’s northern borders, and its purpose was to counteract communist propaganda from the north and the Greek rebels’ radio. Moreover, it intended to present the official Greek case to Britain, the US, France, Turkey and the Arab States as well as to Greek residents abroad.225 The establishment of the new station was lauded by the Greek press for ensuring that the voice of Greece could be heard in the distant corners of the world. Listeners in Egypt, Turkey, Britain and the US reported that the reception of the short-​wave transmissions was particularly satisfactory. With the installation of this short-​wave transmitter, the Athens medium-​wave broadcasts to Greece’s northern neighbours were transferred to the new station, leaving free time at Athens Radio for Greek, American and British programmes. The Greek broadcasts were devoted to programmes of popular appeal, including music and talks. A daily ten-​ minute News Bulletin in English was added, prepared and read by a member of the US Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG), with the aim of acquainting the Greeks with the mission’s progress and with American policy in general. The programme had only a small following and ultimately ceased broadcasting on 7 June 1948.226 On the other hand, the BBC secured for its daily Greek transmission a ten-​minute relay on Athens Radio at a good time (14:15 local time), which ensured better audibility and an immediate widening of its audience. The relay, instituted on 1 January 1948, was widely advertised in the press and in the radio weekly Edo Athinai, and its technical reception was regarded as ‘most satisfactory’.227 Another request by the British for the full fifteen minutes of the BBC midday transmission to be relayed by Athens Radio was granted by the EIR, with effect from April 1948 on the short-​wave transmitter, ‘which would give it an even wider audience’.228 Equipment provided by the British included two new Greek transmitters, which were inaugurated as relay stations for Athens

225 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, Confidential, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 226 Ibid. 227 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’. 228 Ibid.

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Radio; one was installed at Volos in September229 and the other at Larissa in November. Larissa was one of the main bases of the Greek Army and the transmitter therefore served as a local propaganda medium for the troops.230 Moreover, in the context of the support the Information Department rendered for the improvement of the Press and Public Relations Office of the Greek General Staff, a BBC engineer offered his services (as was published in Athens press231) for the operation of the newly established central radio station of the Greek Armed Forces.232 It addressed both the troops and the general public and its programme combined entertainment and propaganda with nationalistic, religious and anti-​communist content as well as pro-​government news bulletins and ministerial addresses. Despite violating the EIR’s broadcasting monopoly and intervening by default in the ideological, educational and entertaining edification of its listeners, the Armed Forces station gained legal status that ensured continuity after the end of the civil war. It continued to broadcast until 1982.233

229 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30 September 1948’. 230 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1 October to 31 December 1948’. 231 Ethnos, 29 December 1948 (mentioned in Xatzidakis, ‘Ω, άγιε αιθέρα…’, 233). As EIR initially supported the operation of the newly established station, one can assume that H.  F. Humphreys, in his capacity as EIR technical advisor, helped on the technical side. Soon, though, relations with the EIR became competitive (Minas Labrinides, Τριάντα χρόνια στην Υ.ΕΝ.Ε.Δ. Δημοσιογραφικές αναμνήσεις [Thirty Years at Y.EN.E.D. Journalistic Memories] (Athens:  Filippoti, 1982), 44–​45) due to the Armed Forces radio station success, thanks to its great output of Greek folk music. Listeners, saturated with rigid political news via the EIR, speeches and propaganda broadcasts, sought to escape by listening to their favourite popular music, offered in great quantity by the army radio. 232 Κεντρικός Ραδιοφωνικός Σταθμός των Ενόπλων Δυνάμεων (ΚΕΡΣΕΔ). The station came under Division B5 of the Army Geographical Service (ΦΕΚ:  104, Compulsory Law 968, 29 April 1949, 663–​ 664). 233 ΦΕΚ: 32, Compulsory Law 1663, 27 January 1951, 248–​249, and ΦΕΚ: 120, Law 1288, 1 October 1982, 1045–​1051. See also Robert McDonald, Pillar and Tinderbox. The Greek Press and the Dictatorship (New York and London:  Marion Boyars, 1983), 163–​164.

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‘Indirect control over policy’: a BBC British engineer as technical advisor of the EIR Since early 1948, Rouse and his deputy, McMinnies, who was also in charge of the press and broadcasting section, noticed an increasingly active interest by the Americans in the EIR. The Americans made various moves that alarmed the British, including the appointment of radio specialist Stuart Hannon to the AMAG as assistant director of the Information Division.234 Hannon’s previous assignment had been the reorganization of Radio Luxemburg, and before that he had been sent to organize Radio Stuttgart, where he became deputy director of the Information Control Division of the Military Government for Wuerttemberg-​Baden.235 ‘The obvious inference to be drawn from the American appointment is in my opinion that Hannon has come to “organize” Radio Athens’, McMinnies reported ominously to the EEID.236 The Information Department expressed to the EEID its anxiety regarding this development and reminded the FO that Svolopoulos had approached the information officer in December 1947 to express his concern at the possibility of American intervention in the running of the Athens station. He considered that pressure was exerted on Svolopoulos by the Americans in their effort to intrude into the EIR’s evening listening programmes. Svolopoulos suggested that the BBC should send for the duration of one year a senior engineer to undertake the technical restoration of Athens Radio.237 The BBC, however, hesitated due to the EIR’s poor past record of reliability, especially as it pertained to the question of training the Greek engineers. Hebblethwaite insisted that Svolopoulos planned to utilize the BBC offer. Besides, the EIR was busy at that time installing the 234 TNA:  FO  953/​236, PE  100, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st January to 31 March 1948’. 235 He later became assistant director of Radio Free Europe (1959). 236 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 343, Letter, McMinnies for information officer to EEID, 3 March 1948; Minutes, 11 and 15 March 1948. 237 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 1001, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’.

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new short-​wave transmitter, which was expected to be operational after 25 March. McMinnies pressed the case strongly, emphasizing how important from a diplomatic point of view it would be for the BBC to send its engineers to Greece.238 In any case, McMinnies pointed out, ‘the BBC should appreciate that they are greatly indebted to the EIR, not only for the help which the latter has given to all Corporation officials visiting Greece, but also for relay facilities and for the generous publicity which it has consistently accorded to the BBC’. McMinnies envisioned that while the engineer would not ‘be expected to meddle in non-​technical matters’, he could exert ‘indirect control over policy’. For example, McMinnies suggested that if the Director-​General asked him to make the necessary technical arrangements for broadcasts to Cyprus urging the union of that Island with Greece, the engineer would be in a position to dissuade him for one technical reason or another, or at least to inform me so that I could advise against them. But the main point to my mind is that once the station is committed to all-​British equipment, then it must forever rely on spare parts from the same source. Should the station at any time adopt a tone out of keeping with British interests, or fall under the direct control of elements hostile to Britain, the fact that its continued existence will depend on the goodwill of British manufactures is a sharp weapon in our hands’.239

The FO endorsed the suggestion. H. C. Bowen, head of the EEID, passed it on to Richard D. A. Marriott, the BBC European liaison officer. Following this, BBC Chief Engineer Harold Bishop took up the case.240 BBC engineers had a voice in major discussions on policy, not only because of their significant contributions to the technological aspects of the development of the BBC’s services, but more importantly (and in connection with the above) because so many political decisions and strategy depended on technical factors.241 As more information was needed to 238 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 343, Letter, McMinnies for information officer to EEID, 3 March 1948; Telegram No. 330, Mandate, FO, to Athens, 15 March 1948. 239 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 343, Letter, Urgent and Non-​Confidential, McMinnies for information officer, Athens, to EEID, 28 January 1948. 240 TNA:  FO  953/​238, PE  343, Minutes, Matthaei, 6 February 1948; Bowen, 7 February 1948; TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 355, Minutes, Bowen, 5 and 7 February 1948. 241 Edward Pawley, BBC Engineering 1922–​1972 (BBC Publications, 1972), xii. A strategically important service, such as monitoring, which during the war was used by the MOI ‘to co-​ordinate monitoring all over the world’, was dependent on

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determine how high a grade of engineer was required, Svolopoulos ‘made it clear’ to McMinnies that the engineer’s jurisdiction would cover the entire radio service in Greece, of which the largest proportion (95 per cent) was accounted for by Athens Radio, leaving the remaining 5 per cent for Thessaloniki’s small station, which the engineer would be asked to visit and inspect from time to time. The official title of the position was to be Technical Director of the Greek National Broadcasting Foundation.242 McMinnies, after arduous and persistent efforts, succeeded in bringing all EIR technical support under the British supervision for the next critical period. At the same time, BBC Engineering Establishment Officer P. A. Florence suggested H. F. Humphreys –​‘one of their most senior and experienced engineers’ –​to Bowen as a candidate for the technical directorship of the EIR.243 Svolopoulos agreed ‘in principle’ to Humphreys’ appointment.244 The Embassy’s Information Department expressed relief that ‘so far there has, fortunately, been no concrete sign that the Americans have begun any active intervention in the EIR’ and hoped that all the necessary arrangements would be made in London, where Svolopoulos was expected to visit in April.245 But in London Svolopoulos told Florence that he could not to agree to the BBC’s terms for Humphreys. The BBC reconsidered the terms, arguing that the EIR would not be required to pay the engineer’s salary and that his secondment would be for six months instead of one year. The appointment was for a technical director of the EIR, who should be directly responsible

242 243 244 245

engineers. See Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, 488. See also Harold Bishop, ‘The War-​Time Activities of the Engineering Division of the BBC’, Journal of the Institution of Electrical Engineers 94/​11 (March, April 1947), 169–​185 and 94/​82 (October 1947), 481–​482. TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 355, Letter, Confidential, EEID, to information officer, 10 February 1948; Letter, Confidential, McMinnies for information officer to EEID, 17 February 1948. TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 355, Minutes, Bowen, 5 March 1948; Letter, Confidential, EEID to information officer, Athens, 6 March 1948. TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 712, Letter, Confidential, McMinnies for information officer to EEID, 18 March 1948. TNA:  FO  953/​236, PE  1001, ‘Quarterly Report for Period 1st January to 31st March 1948’.

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to the director general.246 Back in Athens, in a meeting on 20 May with McMinnies and Angeloglou (who was in Greece at the time), Svolopoulos ‘immediately’ gave a verbal acceptance to the BBC terms. However, repeated requests from the BBC to draw up a written contract were met with silence, as by the end of June, no draft contract had been received from Svolopoulos. After many abortive attempts to meet Svolopoulos in person, McMinnies, finally succeeded in arranging a discussion. McMinnies was convinced that Svolopoulos himself ‘genuinely and earnestly’ wished for the engineer to be sent. He hoped that the BBC would not withdraw their offer and expressed that it would not be long before the EIR would accept the conditions. It seemed, however, that Svolopoulos had committed himself to something ‘not entirely within his own province’, as McMinnies observed.247 Members of the FO felt that most likely differences of opinion had arisen within the board in regard to the financial portion of the deal. Moreover, the FO expressed that any intervention from the Embassy would be useless and likely ‘bring in the Americans’,248 who had already shown an increasingly active interest in running the EIR. Added to all this, the EIR was under investigation for its conduct; the investigation was ordered by newly appointed Undersecretary for Press and Information Mihail Ailianos. From October to December 1948, the EIR was in a state of unrest. It had been subject to severe criticisms in the press and by a section of former and current employees, who accused the board of inefficiency and financial corruption. Early in 1949, the newspapers reported allegations of financial mismanagement by Svolopoulos.249 In the spring –​particularly in April –​the EIR was faced with a series of wage strikes that interrupted and disorganized its operations for a number of days. Its difficulties continued

2 46 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 961, Letter, Florence to Bowen, FO, 3 May 1948. 247 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 1353, Letter, Confidential, McMinnies for information officer, Athens, to EEID, 25 June 1948. 248 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 1353, Minutes, Ruthven-​Murray, 6 July 1948. 249 Cf. D. Svolopoulos, Απάντησις εις την συκοφαντικήν εκστρατείαν κατά της Ελληνικής Ραδιοφωνίας. Γεγονότα και Αριθμοί [Rejection in the Slander Campaign against Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation. Facts and Numbers] (Athens, 1949).

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up into June 1949. However, Svolopoulos remained at the helm of the EIR and the crisis seemed to gradually blow over.250 In the meantime, the Americans began negotiations with the EIR. The day after Svolopoulos promised to send the draft contract that never arrived, the AMAG’s Weekly Progress Report of 25 May 1948 publicly stated that the Americans were preparing ‘recommendations for a more adequate management of Greek Broadcasting Services’. Aware of the American advances, the British made ‘countless attempts’ to hasten the EIR’s approval of the BBC’s offer in the hope that ‘before the Americans take any drastic action the BBC’s engineer will be safely settled in his post here’.251 It was strongly feared that the Americans were offering the EIR ‘something better and cheaper’ and that the ‘the Greeks now seemed to be changing their minds’.252 And yet this speculation proved to be false, as on 6 July Svolopoulos finally signed the draft contract agreed by the EIR board253 and approved all of the BBC’s conditions.254 The Information Department was ‘glad’ that after ‘nine months of tortuous negotiations’ the arrangements were finalized. The Information Department enthusiastically reported: ‘It is known that Svolopoulos […] had to surmount numerous obstacles, especially with the Americans, in getting sanction for the expenses involved. [We are] convinced that Humphreys’ appointment will be of inestimable value to us and to the BBC’.255 Both the BBC and the EEID were ‘delighted’ that the job was ‘satisfactorily settled’.256 Humphreys eventually arrived in Athens 250 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2613, Appendix X, Radio Activities, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 251 TNA: FO 953/​237, PE 1540, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st April to 30th June 1948’. 252 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 1353, Minutes, Ruthven-​Murray, 6 July 1948. 253 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 1452, Letter (translated into English), Protocol No. 292, Svolopoulos to McMinnies, 6 July 1948. 254 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 1452, Letter, Confidential, McMinnies for information officer, Athens, to EEID, 7 July 1948. 255 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st July to 30 September 1948’. 256 TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 961, Letter, Florence to Bowen, 14 July 1948; Letter, Bowen to Florence, 19 July 1948; PE 1452, Minutes, Hayles, 19 July 1948; Letter, EEID to information officer, Athens, 19 July 1948.

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on 9 October 1948 as technical advisor to the EIR director general. His first priority was to make a thorough investigation of all the broadcasting equipment in Athens, report on its conditions and recommend any changes, improvements or additions he might think necessary. The British Embassy found Humphreys’ report ‘very full and informative’ and his observations and proposals ‘of great value to the EIR’ in the process of bringing Greek broadcasting facilities up to the level required by the European Broadcasting Convention’s Copenhagen Plan of 1948. Humphreys’ appointment served many objectives. He took over the key position of EIR technical advisor at a time when American radio activities in Greece intensified and American interest in EIR became more evident. He reported to London separately on his work and by June 1949 was satisfied with the progress made thus far.257 Humphreys continued his task of advising the EIR until October 1949.

The new American medium-​wave transmitter in Thessaloniki and Limassol, Cyprus: H. F. Humphreys’ ‘Special Report on a visit to Salonica’ (14–​19 July 1949) By mid-​1948, the VOA –​which had been relayed by Athens Radio since May 1947 –​doubled its transmission time from fifteen to thirty minutes; many at the British Embassy believed that this increase was a result of the pressure the Americans exerted on Svolopoulos.258 The Americans also intended to install a powerful transmitter in Thessaloniki to relay VOA programmes and to broadcast directly to the communist countries beyond Greece’s northern borders. While the transmitter had been in Thessaloniki for some time  –​unpacked, or at least not assembled, with an American engineer in its charge  –​it would not be put it into operation until the allocation of broadcasting time was agreed with the 257 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 258 TNA:  FO  953/​237, PE  2371, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1 July to 30 September 1948’.

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EIR. The Americans planned to have full control of the station, with a ‘Control Board’ of three Americans and three Greeks (nominated by the Americans and the American station director) and to monopolize the premium radio time with the highest audience (i.e. the 19:00–​23:00 time slot) for their broadcasts to the Balkans. Svolopoulos communicated to the British that the EIR –​quite naturally –​would refuse their consent to this deal, as it would hand over to the Americans the ‘complete’ control of the station, give the EIR only a small percentage of the most valuable frequency allocations for its own broadcasts and virtually deprive the whole of the Thessaloniki area of a ‘home service’ during these prime hours.259 At the same time, the Americans were pressing for the immediate completion of the Thessaloniki station, as they were contemplating developing a new radio station near Gerolakkos, Nicosia, in addition to the one already in use in Limassol.260 Evidence of the American’s intentions had been available to the British since the autumn of 1948, when the Information Department reported that ‘the Americans do not want the Greeks to share in their propaganda to the northern states’.261 The British were also aware of the American plan to extend radio activities to Cyprus. Additionally, they knew of Svolopoulos’ reluctance to agree to any deal until it was ratified by the Greek Parliament.262 Amid these developments and as the Anglo-​American radio-​ wave competition in the eastern Mediterranean and south-​east Europe intensified, a team of senior BBC officials visited Athens from 3 to 8 May 1949 before continuing to Cyprus. The team was headed by Major General Sir Ian Jacobs –​former BBC controller of European services and since 1947 259 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1 October to 31 December 1948’. 260 ‘A New Radio Station Is Set Up in Cyprus’, from our correspondent in Ta Nea on 3 June 1949; ‘Two Radio Stations in Cyprus’, from our correspondent in To Vima on 18 June 1949, referred to in Hayles’ ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’ (TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2613, Appendix X, Radio Activities). 261 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 620, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31 December 1948’. 262 TNA:  FO  953/​554, PE  2613, H.  R. Hayles, information officer, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’, Appendix X, Radio Activities.

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the director of Overseas Services –​and accompanied by E. Tangye Lean –​ head of European services –​and Angeloglou –​organizer of the BBC Greek section. Over the course of his visit, Sir Ian Jacobs met with the Greek Prime Minister Themistoklis Sofoulis, George Papandreou, Ailianos and Svolopoulos. He also inspected one of the EIR studios and transmitters. Moreover, he met with W. G. Tatham, the BC representative and the British military attaché, and with Guy Hadley, the BBC’s Balkan correspondent. At the Embassy, Jacobs discussed matters pertaining to the BBC and the Information Department. However, his first priority was to discuss with Svolopoulos the ‘problems of mutual interest’ and especially Humphreys’ secondment. The ambassador and other members of the Embassy staff were keen that Humphreys should stay to draw up a ‘thorough scheme for the re-​equipment of the Greek Radio’. Svolopoulos was particularly anxious to have the new transmitters for Athens and Thessaloniki installed and operated –​so as to take up EIR frequency allocations under the Copenhagen Plan –​and asked that Humphreys should stay for a further two years to put the scheme into effect. The BBC, however, ‘very much doubted whether the Greeks would make real progress with the scheme’, and Sir Ian Jacobs questioned Svolopoulos as to whether the Greeks had the money to carry it through. Svolopoulos assured him ‘categorically’ that the scheme had been approved, that money was available and that arrangements were even made to tender for more equipment. In view of this, Humphreys’ secondment was extended for a further six months, though the extension of his secondment would depend on the scheme’s progress. If progress was clearly made by the end of the six months, then the BBC would consider expanding Humphreys’ secondment for a further eighteen months; otherwise, the BBC would withdraw him. Jacobs also had a long conversation with Svolopoulos about the American plans in Thessaloniki and the deadlock between the Americans and the EIR. The Americans wanted both to erect their transmitter at Thessaloniki and to run it, giving the Greeks some time on the air. Jacobs estimated that the Americans issued pressure via their political channels and that Svolopoulos ‘may be double crossed by his own masters’. ‘I do not think there is anything that we can do about it at present’, he reported

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back to his deputy, J. B. Clark.263 The intelligence that the British had obtained proved to be accurate. Exchanges of correspondence between the US Embassy and the Greek government expressed the desire of the two governments to co-​operate in establishing ‘a more powerful radio transmitter in Salonica [Thessaloniki]’, development of which had been studied by American technical experts. On 30 March 1949, US Ambassador Henry F. Grady sent Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Konstantinos Tsaldaris a memorandum and terms –​in both English and Greek –​under which the US government was willing to proceed with this project. The two documents were final and binding on both parties and needed only to be confirmed by note of approval from the Greek government, which was duly given on 12 April. The agreement was ratified into legislative decree in October 1949.264 According to this agreement, the new 50 kW medium-​ wave station would be known as Radio Salonica and would replace the existing broadcasting station on 804 kc. The operation of the station was to represent the ‘co-​operative efforts of both Governments’, while the new Radio Salonica should not be confused with Athens Radio or the Tsigiridis station in Thessaloniki. The operation of the new station in Thessaloniki would be ‘completely separate and distinct’ from that of the existing two stations. A joint Greek-​American committee –​composed of three Americans selected by the US ambassador and three Greeks selected by the foreign minister –​would determine the policy for the operation of the station. The director general was to be appointed by the Greek Ministry of Press and Information (previously the Ministry of Press)265 to execute ‘the policies and decisions determined by the Committee’, while a training programme would be set up to instruct Greek technicians on American broadcasting practices and the operation of high-​power broadcasting equipment. A Greek engineer would act as assistant to the American engineer in charge. The American government was responsible for the administration, design, construction and installation of the station and for paying any associated costs, including the salaries of American personnel. These personnel would 2 63 TNA: FO 953/​551, PE 1796, Letter, E. I. C. Jacob to Clark, 5 May 1949. 264 ΦΕΚ: 266, Legislative Decree 1191, 17 October 1949, 1737–​1743. 265 See footnotes 79 and 80, Chapter 3.

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be granted the same privileges and immunities as were provided for members of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Mission by the agreement of 2 July 1948, so long as the ECA agreement with Greece was in force and technical supplies were not obtainable in Greece. The Greek government should lease land selected by the US government and pay all the local costs of operation, including for salaries, supplies and services. Equipment, parts and materials imported or exported to and from Greece for the operation of the station should be ‘completely free from import duties, taxes or any other charges’.266 Apart from the programmes produced by the Greek government, the station would broadcast ‘instantaneous or delayed relays of programmes, in various languages’, on behalf of the US State Department, including programmes initiated by the United States Information Service (USIS) in Greece. The Greek government would reserve the time ‘beginning at 7 p.m. and ending 11 p.m. Greek time’ for the relay of the VOA.267 The agreement was for ten years and the EIR was excluded from the terms. This agreement established the terms for further expansion of the station and provided the foundation for later agreements between the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Embassy in Athens as part of the continuation of American radio diplomacy in the sensitive areas of south-​east Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. In July, Humphreys was sent to Thessaloniki to inspect the new short-​ wave transmitter being erected by the Americans. In a special report to the BBC, Humphreys noted that the transmitter’s route began in Italy, where it had been delivered to the US ambassador in Rome and was originally intended for use throughout the country. However, under one of the several American Aid to Greece schemes, in mid-​August 1948 the transmitter and its associated equipment was shipped to Piraeus and handed over to the Greek government, which in turn handed it over to the EIR. Svolopoulos had intended to install it as the new Athens transmitter; instead, the Greek government shipped it to Thessaloniki and handed it over to the US consul general in Thessaloniki. At about the same time, an 266 ΦΕΚ: 266, Legislative Decree 1191, 17 October 1949, 1737–​1443. 2 67 The VOA had a Greek section, which started broadcasting from Washington in November 1942. It was closed down almost ten years after the closure of the BBC Greek section, in August 2014.

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American engineer named Brady arrived in Thessaloniki and took charge of the project, known to the Americans under the code name DORA. From this point onwards, Svolopoulos was not consulted on any aspect of the scheme.268 The Thessaloniki transmitter would broadcast an evening session, at peak broadcasting hours, directed to the Balkans and a daytime Greek session. The Balkan session would transmit VOA programmes –​relayed from the US –​to a radius that would include the targeted Balkan capitals of Belgrade, Budapest, Tirana and Bucharest. The Greek session would transmit programmes for Greek consumption. The Americans were prepared to accept EIR programme material only if it was up to their required standard; otherwise, they would rely on their original programming or relay US-​based programmes. Humphreys, acting on behalf of the BBC, informally suggested that the BBC be relayed from Thessaloniki during both sessions. The Americans responded that they might consider such a proposal on the basis of a ‘bargaining point’. Humphreys suspected that the ‘bargain’ they had in mind was for the BBC to agree to allow them to operate beyond the internationally restricted wavelength power agreements.269 Humphreys’ enquiries in Thessaloniki pertained not only to technical issues –​including the American intentions for the transmitter’s power and wavelength –​but also to policy matters, including the management of the station and the type of programmes to be broadcast. He was impressed by ‘the force behind this project and the magnitude of the resources and facilities available’, although he noted that even the American engineers doubted the wisdom of certain technical arrangements, which had ‘apparently, been dictated from Washington’. The transmitter and receiving site were located at a well-​situated point ‘particularly for propagation in a north-​westerly direction’. It would operate with an output power of 50 kW, as authorized under the Copenhagen Plan, and would be provided with two or possibly three equipped studios. The Americans planned to put the transmitter into 268 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  2745, H.  F. Humphreys, ‘Special Report on Visit to Thessaloniki’, addressed to BBC Chief Engineer, also copied to Head of East European Department, to Overseas Division and to Athens Information Officer, British Embassy, 23 July 1949. 269 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  2745, Chief Engineer, BBC, ‘Special Report on Visit to Thessaloniki’, 23 July 1949.

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service by the end of September 1949 (it actually began broadcasting in mid-​March 1950); Humphreys estimated that the intended date was overly optimistic due to the size of the venture and the inexperience of the Greek technicians in this type of work. Regarding direction and staffing, he suggested that the overall management of the station, its policy direction and its executive and technical control be carried out by the Americans. Greek participation was limited to the three individuals on the six-​member joint board and to a number of recruited Greek electricians who were being trained as operator-​mechanics to undertake operational work. Humphreys found out from the conversations he had with the Americans that they were ‘resolutely opposed’ to the employment of EIR staff. The remainder of his report on the transmitter’s programme and its political implications was ‘of direct interest to the FO’.270 From the discussions Humphreys had with Brady, it became clear that in order to set up a powerful medium-​wave transmitter for the VOA in Thessaloniki, the US State Department intended to disregard international agreements concerning wavelengths. Any reservations held by the BBC or any other interested party against America ‘riding roughshod over international agreements restricting power and aerial directivity’ should be expressed at higher level. It was also clear to Humphreys that the US State Department had given orders that this scheme should go ahead regardless of Svolopoulos’ intention to challenge it on constitutional grounds. The EIR’s charter gave it a complete mandate for broadcasting in Greece, and no contrary agreement could become effective unless ratified by the Greek Parliament. Discussing the issue with Humphreys, Svolopoulos insisted that he was never consulted by the Americans on the use of the Thessaloniki frequency and that he challenged the validity of the agreement ‘with certain Greek Ministers’. However, any constitutional obstacles were eventually brushed aside with the ratification of the agreement by legislative decree in October 1949. The manner in which the Americans sought to impose their terms in their negotiations with the Greek government –​by circumventing and bypassing the EIR charter –​was ‘to say the least, remarkable’, Humphreys noted.271 2 70 TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 2745, Minutes, Clairy-​Fox, 8 September 1949. 271 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  2745, Chief Engineer, BBC, ‘Special Report on Visit to Thessaloniki’, 23 July 1949.

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Humphreys’ special report on his visit to Thessaloniki was copied to the head of the BBC East European Department, to the Overseas Division and to the information officer at the British Embassy Athens. The latter drew the EEID’s special attention to two points of Humphreys’ report: first, to the political aspects of this American venture; and, second, to Humphreys’ informal suggestion to allow the BBC to be relayed from Thessaloniki. He suggested that in the interest of British propaganda to the satellite countries, the EEID might discuss the matter with the BBC and the competent US authorities.272 Humphreys’ points were also discussed among the Information Policy Department (IPD) and the Information Research Department’s Southern, North American and General departments. Barbara Ruthven-​ Murray thought that ‘these apparently high-​handed ways’ on the part of the Americans were not really a British concern; moreover, Ruthven-​Murray expressed that the British did not need BBC relays from Thessaloniki, unless the BBC relays could cover areas not provided for by Alpensender. A. A. Stark of the IPD commented that, as the BBC advised, the Salonica transmitter might well reach parts of Eastern Europe that Alpensender could not effectively reach. However, he considered that it ‘would not be the moment’ to open negotiations for BBC relays through the transmitter, for three reasons. First, the British did not want to assist the Americans in flouting the Copenhagen Agreement; second, the American operation of the Thessaloniki transmitter encountered a certain amount of opposition in Greece (although it was unlikely that any Greek opposition could influence the issue); and, third, the relays –​which were ‘by no means essential’ –​would involve the British in considerable extra costs at a time when it was not advisable to allocate money on non-​essential issues. John McCormick of the FO’s Southern Department regretted the fact that the Americans ‘should behave on this high-​handed way’, but he also agreed that ‘it is not our job to put them right’.273 In any case, the Americans agreed to discuss the implementation of the Copenhagen Plan in November with the British and the French, and the British would then take up the matter 272 TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 2745, Letter, Confidential, Hayles for information officer, Athens, to EEID, 22 August 1949. 273 TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 2745, Minutes, John McCormick, 4 October 1949.

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with the Americans. Until that happened, the British attitude should be either disapproval or disagreement. Meanwhile opposition expressed by anyone in Greece would be supportive to the British argument.274 New power balances were underway and the British did not wish to come into an open confrontation with the Americans; rather, they wished to co-​ operate with them so that together they might ‘shoot […] the same target from different angles’.275 The Thessaloniki transmitter began transmission on its permanent short-​wave frequencies at 791 kc on 15 March 1950. A few days prior, the USIS Press Office in Athens issued two press releases (one on 1 March and the other on 9 March) introducing the new station and emphasizing the scale of Greek participation in its construction. The releases also pointed out the benefits that would be accrued for Greek engineers from the associated training programme, which would be run during the construction period. They additionally provided information on the station’s schedules, which were to be determined jointly by the Greek and American governments, along with the transmission times and its relays in seven languages (Bulgarian, Serbo-​Croat, Slovene, Turkish, Romanian, Greek and English).276 Humphreys secondment as technical advisor to the EIR attached to the director general was due to expire by the end of March 1950. The issue of the extension of his secondment had always been subject to a considerable amount of discussion between the EIR and the BBC, especially regarding the date from which the EIR should take over from the BBC in paying his salary, as had been agreed between Sir Ian Jacob and Svolopoulos. The BBC was now prepared to extend Humphreys’ secondment beyond 31 March 1950 to allow the EIR to start implementing the ‘Programme of Technical Development’; Humphreys been closely associated with the installation of the new equipment for the programme, for which he drafted the technical 2 74 TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 2745, Minutes, 8, 20, 22 September, 4, 7, 11 October 1949. 275 TNA: FO 1119/​6, PR 229/​1/​G, FO Circular to British Missions, 12 May 1948. 276 TNA:  FO  953/​893, PG  11930/​2, USIS, Press Office, US Information Service, Athens, ECA Annex, Bouboulinas Street, US Embassy, ECA Mission to Greece, American Mission for Aid to Greece, Press Release, ‘New Radio in Thessaloniki Goes On Air’, 1 March; ‘New Thessaloniki Station on Air Six Hours Per Evening’, 9 March 1950.

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specifications. During his eighteen-​month tenure, Humphreys felt he had developed a keen understanding ‘of the many problems, political, technical, staffing and financial’ facing the EIR and that he had gained a clear perception of Greek broadcasting as a whole. However, all this experience could only be of value if the EIR made adequate provisions for its application, which were already long overdue. Humphreys therefore proposed a centralized scheme of technical planning and correlation that would bring about the ‘ultimate and desirable’ result of an integrated Greek Broadcasting Service. Such a scheme would be beneficial in that it would create reserves of human resources, equipment and material, thus eliminating wasteful duplication and unnecessary expenditure while contributing to the overall efficiency of the Greek broadcasting service. In his capacity as the technical advisor on broadcasting to the Greek government, his activities should include the technical administration, planning, development and correlation of broadcasting activities in Greece, which were at present conducted by the EIR and the Greek Armed Forces Radio. The time span of the agreement should be set initially for three years, with a provision for annual renewal of the contract up to a maximum of five years.277 It was hoped that the matter might be settled soon, ‘one way or the other’, once Hugh Carleton Greene, head of the BBC’s Eastern European service, arrived in Athens in April 1950. Carleton Greene was due to arrive in Thessaloniki on 4 April on the way to Athens, and Humphreys hoped that this would provide an opportunity to complete the protracted negotiations concerning his secondment ‘as well as for discussing other matters of interest to the Corporation in Greece’.278 In regard to the political scene, the first Greek general election after the end of the civil war was held on 5 March 1950 in what was a heavily charged climate –​especially for the left. A significant portion of the eligible voting population was in prison for political reasons –​either sentenced to death or under arrest –​and many others were displaced, mainly in Makronissos. A series of short-​lived coalition governments involving the centre parties 277 TNA:  FO  953/​887, PG  1192/​11, Letter, Humphreys to Svolopoulos, Athens, 11 March 1950. 278 TNA: FO 953/​887, PG 1192/​11, Letter, Humphreys, British Embassy, Athens, to H. Bishop, Broadcasting House, 17 March 1950.

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followed (including that of N. Plastiras, S. Venizelos and G. Papandreou), though none commanded a majority. Svolopoulos resigned from his post at the EIR and in March 1950 was replaced by General Christodoulos Tsigantes, a member of the Liberal Party. The British Embassy considered that this change ‘may not be to our disadvantage’.279 The new leadership of the EIR in October 1950 concluded a four-​year co-​operation agreement with Humphreys in his capacity as EIR technical advisor. After this time, Humphreys continued to pursue his career as the director of technical services at the Near East Broadcasting Station280 in Limassol, Cyprus.281 As Angeloglou wrote in his memoirs, Tsigantes ‘recognized the power and influence of the BBC and wanted to model EIR on the Corporation. The BBC gave Tsigantes the fullest-​co-​operation’.282 Tsigantes also cultivated close relations and co-​operation with the Americans and French. Angeloglou recalled that on one occasion, in August 1951, Tsigantes invited Richard Erstein –​his opposite at the VOA –​to meet him in Athens at ‘a big dinner to mark the meeting of the Heads of the Greek Sections’, which was hosted by Tsigantes. Also invited were Lawrence Gilliam, head of features at the BBC’s Domestic Services and in Athens at the time, and Sir Brooks Richard, the information officer of the British Embassy and

279 TNA: FO 953/​887, PG 1192/​11, Letter, information officer, Athens, to IPD, FO, 29 March 1950. 280 The Near East Broadcasting Station (also Sharq al-​Adna, in October 1956 renamed the Voice of Britain) started broadcasting in Arabic in 1941 from Jaffa, Mandate of Palestine. It was fully financed and run by the British government. Just before the British left Palestine in early May 1948, the station was moved to Cyprus. After the Suez Crisis, the station was turned over to the BBC at the end of March 1957. See Douglas A. Boyd, ‘Sharq al-​Adna/​The Voice of Britain: The UK’s “Secret” Arabic Radio Station and Suez War Propaganda Disaster’, Gazette:  The International Journal for Communication Studies 65/​6 (2003), 446–​454; Alban Webb, London Calling: Britain, the BBC World Service and the Cold War (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 178–​179; A. McNicholas, ‘Sharq al-​Adna:  British Covert Radio and the Development of Arab Broadcasting’, Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication 13/​3 (2020) 1–​19. 281 ERT Archives: A11/​K2. 282 Angeloglou, This is London, 216.

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later British ambassador in Athens.283 Tsigantes remained as EIR director-​ general until 1953.

British public diplomacy and the BBC BBC foreign-​language transmissions performed a major role in British public diplomacy and during the war had become woven into the fabric of Allied wartime broadcasting. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the extension of the BBC’s European Service rendered it particularly important to the FO.284 It was evident that the BBC would play a significant role overseas in wartime, as the service was Britain’s main propaganda channel and the most direct means of reaching large audiences.285 By the time war was declared on 3 September 1939, the BBC was broadcasting in five European languages (French, German, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese) in addition to English, and in Arabic.286 Listeners in Europe  –​the first frontline of the war  –​tuned into BBC English and foreign-​language stations for news on the progress of the war; many considered that the stations provided more accurate and reliable programming than the one-​sided fascist German or Italian propaganda.287 The BBC sought to build on that reputation, presenting its news to its home and overseas listeners as a credible and objective source of information and a ‘voice that offered hope and encouraged resistance’.288 As James 283 Angeloglou, This Is London, 216, 217–​218. 284 The BBC’s External Services were funded by government grant-​in-​aid administered by the Treasury and the FO. See Beresford Clark, ‘The B.B.C.’s External Services’, International Affairs 35/​2 (1959), 175–​180; Andrew Boyle, Only the Wind will Listen:  Reith of the BBC (London:  Hutchinson, 1972), 286–​288; Webb, London Calling, 7, 13–​14, 186. 285 Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, 24. 286 Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 208, 210. For a summary of expansion of BBC European Services, see Garnett, The Secret History of PWE,  11–​13. 287 Cf. E. Tangye Lean, Voices in the Darkness: The Story of the European Radio War (London: Secker and Warberg, 1943). 288 Gerald Mansell, Let Truth be Told:  50 Years of BBC External Broadcasting (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1982), 164.

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Curran and Jean Seaton explained, ‘[i]ndeed the BBC’s claim to accuracy and objectivity was, in itself, a propaganda weapon –​a demonstration of the superiority of democracy over totalitarianism’.289 However, this BBC strategy in its foreign-​language broadcasting was not only an attempt to preserve the credibility of democracy as opposed to totalitarianism, but also, as Philp M. Taylor argued, a way to rally ‘foreign sympathy to the British cause’. The BBC was also obliged to become ‘an adjunct to wider government strategies’290 and to play a ‘defensive role’ for a country ‘whose world-​wide interests and commitments exceeded her capacity to defend them’. The war, in many ways, put sympathy to the British cause to the test.291 BBC broadcasts were projected internationally to the nations of occupied and neutral Europe and beyond.292 Perceived as a powerful vehicle of British foreign policy, the performance of the BBC in covering the news was under constant FO supervision. In July 1940, the European-​language services were reorganized on the basis of a different propaganda strategy, one that was long term and psychological in form rather than short term and operational. By the end of 1941, the BBC European broadcasts came under the control of the PWE,293 which was created in August 1941 with Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart as its director general and dealt with reorganization of British propaganda and intelligence.294 At the end of February 1942, the PWE moved into Bush House, which at the time housed the BBC European Service.295 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was 289 James Curran and Jean Seaton, Power Without Responsibility:  The Press and Broadcasting in Britain (London:  Routledge, 1991), 166. Even during and also after the war, voices questioned the ‘overall achievement of the wartime BBC’ and its independence and truthfulness (Siân Nicholas, The Echo of War: Home Front Propaganda and the Wartime BBC, 1939–​45 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 8; Siân Nicholas, ‘Now the War is Over:  Negotiating the BBC’s Wartime Legacy in Post-​War Britain’, in Jamie Medhurst, Siân Nicholas and Tom O’Malley, eds, Broadcasting in the UK and US in the 1950s (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 9–​28, 11). 290 Webb, London Calling, 7. 291 Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 215. 292 Clark, ‘The B.B.C.’s External Services’, 171. 293 Garnett, The Secret History of PWE, 83, 87–​88. 294 Ibid.  124. 295 Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, 36.

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made directly responsible for policy and Minister of Information Brendan Bracken managed its administration. Ivone Kirkpatrick296 –​controller of BBC European Services –​was invited to join the PWE, thus establishing a direct link with the BBC. Among the other officials was Reginald Leeper, who was head of the FO’s Political Intelligence Department (PID) until January 1943, when he became British ambassador in Athens. Policy –​still often a matter of debate –​was laid down at weekly meetings between the PWE and the BBC. The BBC’s foreign-​language services were ‘the most heavily controlled element of the BBC’s entire wartime output’.297 Noel Francis Newsome, the director of broadcasting for the European service, was placed in charge of ensuring that all foreign-​language services followed the official line laid down in the daily PWE directives. However, the BBC European Service maintained ‘a substantial degree of independence both [from the] PWE and […] Broadcasting House itself ’.298 The literature devoted to the importance of the BBC as an arm of British diplomacy in the allied struggle against the Axis powers and afterwards in the Cold War years is substantial.299 In contrast, however, fewer historical studies have attempted to synthesize the history of the individual BBC foreign-​language services,300 which were often very different from one 296 Ibid, 332–​333,  342. 297 Nicholas, ‘Now the War is Over’, 11. 298 Briggs gives five main reasons for this in The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, 419–​422. 299 To mention but a few:  Asa Brigg’s four-​volume The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom; Taylor, The Projection of Britain (1981); Taylor, British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century; Michael Stenton, Radio Propaganda and Resistance in Occupied Europe:  British Political Warfare and Propaganda, 1919–​ 1939 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1981); Mansell, Let Truth Be Told; Gary D. Rawnsley, Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956–​64 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996); Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War (London: Brassey’s 1997); and Webb, London Calling. 300 See, for instance, Stephanie Seul and Nelson Ribeiro, eds, ‘Revisiting Transnational Broadcasting:  The BBC’s Foreign-​Language Services during the Second World War’, Media History 21/​4 (2015), 365–​377, 369. In the last five years, there has been an increasing research interest in the topic, with the latest examples including Vike Martina Plock, The BBC German Service during the Second World War: Broadcasting to the Enemy (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

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another in terms of their respective priorities –​strategic and political –​as set by the FO.301

The creation of the BBC Greek Service302 When Greece became a theatre of war, it became necessary for propaganda to be co-​ordinated with military operations, and as such every broadcast had to strictly follow operational policy. The Greek Service made its first broadcast on 30 September 1939. The establishment of the BBC Greek Service immediately after the outbreak of war demonstrated its importance as a major means of transmitting British propaganda to Greece. Throughout the occupation, all information came from German-​ controlled sources. One such outlet was the Athens Radio Greek programmes. BBC news bulletins on the advancement of the Allied struggle against the Axis powers helped to keep morale high in Greece, and listening to these became synonymous with resistance. Despite the limited number of radio sets, the claim that the BBC enjoyed large audiences in Greece and among Greeks abroad was indisputable, as indicated by the numerous BBC listeners’ surveys, listeners’ letters303 and reports from the Information Department staff ’s tours. The popularity of the service also helped to enhance Britain’s reputation as an ally at a particularly critical time for Greek-​British relations; a shadow had been thrown over Greece’s relations with Britain following the latter’s previously lukewarm support for the Greeks in the war against Italy and Germany. The BBC Greek Service was severely criticized by the Greek government-​in-​exile for anti-​ royal sentiments and liberal views, thereby reflecting the conflicting tendencies and political tensions among Greek political rivalries, which in turn would intensify in the following years. Due to Greece’s complex 301 Mansell, Let Truth Be Told, 165. 302 A monograph on the history of the BBC Greek Service (1939–​2005) is forthcoming from this author (Palgrave Macmillan). 303 The BBC had long conducted a monthly series of European audience surveys in occupied countries, and in January 1942, a separate series was started especially for the Balkan countries (BBC WAC: E2/​190).

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political situation, policy control of the Greek section was strict.304 As it pertained to the war, Britain encouraged the Greek resistance. Regarding future political developments, however, Britain had previously committed its support to the Greek king. The FO, the PWE and the PID were responsible for ensuring that the material put out by the BBC did not conflict with its official policy.305 The BBC exercised control of programme content, but did not do so independently of the policymaking remit of the FO. However, the BBC was not prepared to allow itself to be left unprotected and therefore defended the Greek Service each time its independence or reputation for reliability and objectivity was violated. In general, however, the BBC largely supported –​albeit sometimes critically –​British foreign policy in Greece. The BBC’s influence in Greece in effect remained Britain’s ‘most powerful weapon’, even after the British withdrawal from Greece in March 1947. Many regular listeners also listened to other foreign broadcasts, in particular broadcasts from the Americans and the Greek transmissions from the US. Listeners could also listen to French radio programmes that were already relayed by Athens Radio.306 The EIR relayed a daily fifteen-​minute Greek transmission from Paris, plus a weekly fifteen-​minute programme in French by the French Embassy’s Information Service.307 For the British, however, the main competitor was the Americans, who became more deeply involved in Greek broadcasting. In response, the British sought to retain their influence in this field. Several types of questionnaire were sent by the BBC to its listeners, asking for technical information, opinions and programme suggestions. The BBC also pursued publicity ventures to further promote the News service among Greek listeners. Two major publicity events occurred in 1949: the visit of Sir Ian Jacob –​director of the BBC Overseas Services –​to Greece and Cyprus in May, which coincided with

304 Cf. Briggs, The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom, Volume III, 461–​ 462. See also Mansell, Let Truth be Told, 166, 168–​170. 305 Koutsopanagou, The British Press, 95. 306 TNA: FO 953/​236, PE 0290, Confidential, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st October to 31st December 1947’. 307 BBC WAC: E3/​941/​1 Greece (October–​November  1947).

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a prize-​giving ceremony; and the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the formation of the BBC Greek section in September. The visit of Sir Ian Jacob to Greece in May 1949 coincided with the prize-​giving ceremony for the BBC Listener Research Department’s competition, organized in 1948, which gathered statistical data for the news outlet.308 The prize-​g iving ceremony was held on 5 May at the British Embassy. To prepare for the ceremony, Angeloglou visited Athens nearly a month before the event (from 10 April to 11 May 1949) on a trip that included a visit to Cyprus. The ceremony was attended by Ailianos, Svolopoulos and First Secretary of the American Embassy George Edman. It was also attended by journalists from the main Athenian newspapers as well as the Daily Herald, Kemsley Newspapers and Reuters Athens. The event proved to be ‘an unqualified success’.309 The prize-​winners expressed their ‘deep gratitude’ for the work of the BBC, and the press reported favourably on the event and expressed ‘appreciation’ for the work of the BBC.310 The event was also widely covered by the Greek-​Egyptian press, which included special articles and photographs of the ceremony. Moreover, Angeloglou made efforts while in Athens to enhance local audiences for the BBC Greek section. In order to better understand the needs and trends of public opinion in Greece, the section had previously made use of the regular flow of letters from listeners in Greece. However, this method declined in use due to a loss of interest among listeners and a lack of encouragement from the British. With this in mind, Angeloglou agreed to restart a listener research panel, albeit on more modest lines than in the past.311 Apart from the prize-​giving ceremony in May 1949, which provided good publicity for the BBC, a special publicity effort was made by the Embassy in connection with the tenth anniversary of the Greek Service. An elaborate window display of BBC photographs prepared for the Athens Information Office remained for one month and attracted ‘a great deal of 308 TNA: FO 953/​554, PE 2613, Appendix X, Radio Activities, ‘Six-​Monthly Report for the Period 1st January to 30th June 1949’. 309 TNA: FO 953/​551, Dispatch No. 93, Sir Norton to Ernest Bevin, 16 May 1949. 310 Ibid. 311 TNA: FO 953/​551, PE 1796, Letter, Confidential, information officer, Athens, to EEID, Confidential, 19 May 1949.

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attention and was seen by many people as it occupies a central position’.312 A set of photographs was sent to Thessaloniki, where it was shown by the consul, and further sets of enlarged photographs were sent to consulates in Corfu, Crete, Rhodes and Patras.313 In addition, Eklogi published special illustrated articles on the anniversary. Press releases and photographs were sent to a number of daily newspapers in Greece.314 Angeloglou also arranged publicity for the anniversary in Egypt, where there was a Greek community of approximately 200,000, ‘a considerable percentage of which listens regularly to the BBC Greek Service’.315 The event was also celebrated in a special feature on the BBC Greek Service itself on 28 September 1949, which was relayed by Athens Radio and opened with a message from Ailianos. Then Angeloglou spoke, commenting on Ailianos’ message, stating that it was ‘for us a sort of recognition by official Greece that we have not failed in our duty and our ultimate objective’. All staff took part in presenting the history of the section, documenting its ‘hard times of successive disappointments’, the ‘extraordinary delicate’ mission which it had to perform, but also its contribution to ‘a great cause –​the strengthening of the bonds between the peoples of Britain and Greece’.316 The tenth anniversary of the BBC Greek Service garnered very favourable comment in the Greek and Greek-​Egyptian press alike, both of which featured special articles, photographs and tributes to the event. Typical of the expressions of goodwill was an article in the liberal newspaper To Vima that described the ten years of the service as ‘a milestone in the cordial relations with England and in the strengthening of the long existing bonds between the two countries in the

312 BBC WAC:  E2/​183, Publicity OS, Greek Service, File  1, 1949–​1954:  ‘Tenth Anniversary of Greek Service’. 313 Ibid. 314 BBC WAC:  E2/​ 183, Notes for Monthly Report:  August and September 1949: Tenth Anniversary of Greek Service in E12/​183, Publicity OS, Greek Service, File 1, 1949–​1954: ‘Tenth Anniversary of Greek Service’. 315 E12/​183, Publicity OS, Greek Service, File 1, 1949–​1954, Angeloglou to A.Pub.O, Publicity for Greek Service’s 10th anniversary, 26 August 1949. 316 TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 3679, ‘A Programme to Celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the Greek Service of the BBC’ (broadcast on 28 September 1949 and relayed by Athens Radio).

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political and cultural field’.317 Reports from the British information officer indicated that ‘the BBC does enjoy a very real popularity in the country’.318 The FO was satisfied that the BBC Greek Service had achieved a satisfactory blend of political and cultural talks and features of local interest.319 Britain sought to play an active role in Athens Radio’s post-​war reorganization by establishing the EIR based on the BBC model. Apart from being allocated broadcasting time for BBC programmes over the EIR and to relay its Greek Service programmes –​which had had a special place in the hearts of Greek listeners since the war years –​there was a more pressing reason for this British intention. The issue of Cyprus was expected to bring British policy into conflict with Greek public opinion. The appointment of Humphreys to the key post of EIR technical director gave priority to British technical assistance and equipment for the station, and perhaps more importantly, it could prevent broadcast of news that cast Britain in an unfavourable light –​including news on topics like Cyprus. Based on confidential reports received from 1946 to 1949, the Overseas Listener Research Office circulated the ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’ in October 1949 for internal use in the BBC and the British government. It was considered a digest of information and a convenient reference source about the radio situation in Greece. It served as a useful guide and a framework on which new information could be collected pertaining to the main radio trends in Greece, including updated statistics, new sidelights on the BBC audience and fresh data on the development of radio in Greece. This information, in turn, could feed into future projects. The handbook drew on radio reference books, monitoring service reports, radio magazines, the press, listeners’ letters and statements from visitors to Greece. It concluded that the BBC was regarded not only ‘as an independent organisation which is above party politics’ but also an educational, cultural institution, and the audience’s trust was interpreted 317 TNA:  FO  953/​887, PG  1192/​8, Confidential, BBC Command, BBC Overseas Listener Research Report:  BBC Overseas Listener Research Report, Survey for 1949. 318 TNA: FO 953/​552, PE 2171, Greek programmes –​week ending 25 June; Minutes, Storey, 12 October 1949. 319 TNA: FO 953/​553, PE 3679, Minutes, Storey, 10 October 1949.

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as ‘a reflection of the esteem in which Britain is held’ in Greece. ‘“London said so”’ the report concluded, which was understood to mean that the BBC’s word had a finality that ‘decides all argument and […] does not apply only to news items; high government officials, doctors, lawyers, scientists asked for copies of BBC broadcast talks, housewives, artisans, shop assistants used the phrase “educate us”’.320 The educational character of the BBC broadcasts was not the first priority of the FO. Rather, the continuous and imaginative campaigns to increase its audience in Greece constituted the stable ground on which the BBC should be kept on as the most basic lever of British propaganda in Greece. The BBC remained a major agent for projecting Britain and British interests in Greece throughout the period under examination and beyond, despite the intense competition from the Americans, who made efforts to establish influence in the Greek information field, as seen in the dissemination of the VOA. The 1950 ‘BBC Overseas Listener Research Report’ on Greece concurred, with no deviation from the evidence so far.321 When Thessaloniki’s new 50 kW transmitter –​which was used mainly for VOA relays –​was put into service in March 1950, a new player was added to the radio scene. From mid-​1947 onwards, American hegemony in Greece became increasingly evident, not only in the field of information but also in that of culture. Despite this new geopolitical reality, the British continued to compete for their own share of influence in both fields. In this chapter, I have analysed Britain’s deep engagement with the development of Greek broadcasting. In a similar way (as discussed in the next chapter), the BC –​ the other pillar of British public diplomacy –​was also tasked with the important role of projecting the image of Britain and British power in early post-​war Greece.

320 TNA:  FO  953/​553, PE  3150, BBC Command, ‘Handbook of European Radio Information: Greece’, 11 October 1949. 321 TNA:  FO  953/​887, PG  1192/​8, Confidential, BBC Command, BBC Overseas Listener Research Report for the period 1st January to March 1950.

Chapter 4

Cultural Aspects of British Policy in Post-​War Greece

The object was not culture for culture’s sake, but culture for policy’s sake. –​Reginald Leeper (1943)1

The Athens branch of the British Council (BC) owed the early post-​war resumption2 of its activities to the efforts of Sir Reginald Leeper, British ambassador to Greece (1943–​1946).3 Leeper, as one of the movers in the creation of the BC in London in 1934,4 firmly believed in the importance of cultural work ‘as a very definite political instrument’ that ‘should go hand in hand with our foreign policy’.5 He held a strong conviction that the BC had a major role to play in relation to Britain’s post-​war position as a means of enhancing British influence worldwide, thereby 1 2

3

4 5

In Louise Atherton, ‘Lord Lloyd at the British Council and the Balkan Front, 1937–​1940’, The International History Review 16/​1 (1994), 25–​48, 27. It started in 1937 as an Anglophile society called the Anglo-​Hellenic League; in 1938, it was renamed the Institute of English Studies (IES), headed by H. V. Routh, who was holder of the Byron chair of English at the University of Athens, funded by the BC (Anastasios Sagos, A Chronicle of the British Council Office in Athens, 1938–​1986 (Athens: privately reproduced typescript, 1995), 8). The early days of the BC in Greece were explored in two previous studies of this author based on Greek archival sources and personal testimonies:  ‘Προπαγάνδα και Απελευθέρωση’; and on the archives at the TNA, London: ‘“To Cast Our Net Very Much Wider”:  The Re-​Opening of the British Council in Athens and its Cultural Activities in Greece’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018),  39–​68. Taylor, The Projection of Britain, especially the chapter ‘Cultural Propaganda and the British Council’, 125–​178. Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 255.

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counterbalancing its economic and military weakness. This view was also commonly held in the Foreign Office (FO) in the early post-​war years.6 As soon as the Papandreou government was formed in April 1944, Leeper –​then in Cairo –​urged the FO to reactivate the BC as soon as possible. Leeper felt that the time was ‘ripe’ to do so, while also attaching considerable importance to the expansion of British studies in higher education, subsidized by the British and staffed by ‘carefully chosen British occupants’. A few days after liberation and the establishment of the Greek government in Athens, Leeper had reason to believe that there was ‘a real wave of interest in everything English that extended to various classes of Athenians hitherto unaffected by earlier British Institute activities’. In a feverish flow of dispatches, letters and telegrams for almost a month following late October 1944, Leeper criticized the BC for being ‘too slow’ and for failing to grasp the urgency of getting their work in Greece underway. Agreeing that cultural relations with Greece should be resumed ‘as soon as is practicable’,7 the matter was discussed at a meeting in the FO on 20 November. Those present included Deputy Secretary General of the BC Richard Seymour, W. R. L. Wickham, David Shillan8 from the BC, H. M. Hedley9 of the FO Cultural Relations Department (CRD) and A. R. Dew, who was head of the FO’s Southern Department. Leeper’s criticisms were regarded as vague and unfair. The meeting agreed that the BC should ask Leeper for detailed proposals of what direction their actions should immediately take; once proposed, Shillan could visit Athens to discuss long-​term plans.10 6

D. W. Ellwood, ‘“Showing the World What It Owed to Britain”: Foreign Policy and “Cultural Propaganda”, 1935–​1945’, in N. Pronay and D. W. Spring, eds, Propaganda, Politics and Film (London: The Macmillan Press, 1982), 67. 7 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1343, Telegram No. 197, FO to Leeper, 16 November 1944. 8 He was the first BC representative in Yugoslavia ( January 1940 to April 1941) and at the British Institute in Portugal (1941 to September 1943). He later became assistant director of the BC’s Foreign Division A (Europe). 9 She was in charge of matters of planning, finance and administrative connection with the BC, and co-​ordination between the BC, the COI and information services. 10 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1506, Minutes, Hedley; Outward Telegram No. 1, FO to Athens, 24 November 1944.

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By early 1945, the tensions between the FO and the BC over the latter’s post-​war future reached a crisis point and forced Sir Malcolm Robertson –​ BC chair –​to resign in protest at the end of May. A sure sign of this tension was the FO withholding Leeper’s correspondence from the BC for a critically important period of time, no doubt in part so that the FO could control future actions specific to the BC as well as its broader handling of post-​war developments. The delay led Sir Robertson to protest.11 In reality though, this crisis was much more than the product of a bureaucratic power struggle.12 In general, the lack of planning and any clear conceptualization of British cultural policy produced bitter fruit.13 Pending the arrival of a permanent BC representative –​as the director of the BC in Athens was referred to at the time –​Leeper and Commanding Officer Kenneth Johnstone14 were to look after the BC’s interests. Meanwhile, pre-​war agencies that operated under the BC’s patronage in the promotion of Anglo-​Greek social, cultural and educational relations informed Leeper of their eagerness to begin again ‘with more official backing’.15 Indeed, former local teachers at the IES –​the pre-​war centre of the BC’s work in Greece –​proposed that rather than wait for staff from Britain, English classes should begin. George Georgiades-​Arnakis,16 a former teacher and principal at the IES (along with A. I. Mallides) suggested that if this was not within the scope of the BC’s immediate interests, Greek teachers could start a similar school as a private enterprise; to this end, Georgiades-​Arnakis asked to what extent the legation could support

11

TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  402, Letters of Sir M. Robertson to Sir M. Palairet, 6 December 1944 and 16 January 1945. 12 Ellwood, ‘“Showing the World What it Owed to Britain”’, 65. 13 Frances Donaldson, The British Council: The First Fifty Years (London: Jonathan Cape, 1984), 134–​137. 14 Together with Leeper, he helped establish the BC in London; see Taylor, The Projection of Britain, 152. 1 5 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1488, Telegram No. 234, Leeper to FO, 15 November 1944. 16 See obituaries by Ioannis Chasiotis, ‘Γεώργιος Αλεξ. Γεωργιάδης  –​Αρνάκης (1912-​ 1976)’, Ελληνικά, 30 (1977–​1978), 521–​525, and N. Tomadakis, ‘Γεώργιος Αλέξ. Γεωργιάδης –​Αρνάκης (1912-​1976)’, Επετηρίς Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών, vol. 42 (1975–​1976), 450–​453.

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this endeavour financially.17 The FO, however, found it prudent not to make any arrangements with local teachers until Shillan had completed his investigation.18 The Anglo-​Hellenic League in Athens also promptly stated its eagerness to resume activities. In October 1944, the league approached Sir Malcolm Robertson19 and Leeper for support.20 Leeper was receptive to their entreaties and forwarded their requests to British Foreign Secretary Antony Eden.21 Leeper even recommended that in addition to an initial grant-​in-​aid and an annual fund for operating expenses, the BC should make available 300 pounds for the purchase and immediate dispatch by air of books to the league.22 The BC did not endorse Leeper’s view of the Anglo-​Hellenic League’s position ‘as particularly urgent’ and wished first to hear the views of the Athens Embassy and the FO.23 This correspondence provided an occasion to redefine not only the BC’s post-​war relations with the league but also the post-​war planning of British cultural relations with Greece.24 In particular, the subject of the Anglo-​Hellenic League was ‘somewhat complex’ and required careful consideration in the light of British policy in general in Greece. The BC put before the FO their broad policy lines and set out their objectives. Especially in the Balkan countries, the BC was by no means satisfied with the results of their pre-​war policy of relying –​perhaps unduly –​on existing Anglophile societies. This policy produced results in Greece that had weakened the structure of the organization. Such close connections involved them in 17

TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1416, Letter, Michael Cresswell, British Embassy to Greece, to D. F. Howard, Southern Department, FO, 2 November 1944, enclosing a Letter from G. Georgiades-​Arnakis to Leeper, 25 October 1944. 18 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1416, Minutes, 17 November 1944. 19 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1386, Letter, J. Romanos to D. S. Laskey, 3 November 1944 and enclosed Letters of A. A. Pallis, vice president of the Athens branch, to Leeper and to Sir Malcolm Robertson, 26 October 1944. 20 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1486, Letter, Anglo-​Hellenic League (A. Benakis, president, and B. V. Melas, secretary) to Leeper, 28 October 1944. 2 1 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1486, Letter No. 5, Leeper to Antony Eden, 31 October 1944. 22 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1488, Telegram No. 234, Leeper to FO, 15 November 1944. 23 TNA: BW 34/​10, Telegram No. 4 Brico, FO to Athens, 15 January 1945; BW 34/​10, Letter, Seymour to Johnstone, 2 December 1944. 24 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1488, K. T. Gurney, FO, to Wickham, BC, ‘Cancelled’, n.d.

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local rivalries over which they could have little or no control, especially where personalities were concerned. The BC considered this friction to be harmful to the development of its work as a whole, which it preferred to be independent of local factions and under the direct control of its representatives. This was particularly pertinent in view of the British intention to strengthen the teaching of English in secondary schools and universities, especially in the early stages when the exchange of teaching methods was deemed to be more important than ‘pure’ cultural relations. A close connection with a private body –​such as the Anglo-​Hellenic League in its pre-​war form –​rendered it difficult for the BC to direct English-​language teacher training. Many within the BC appreciated the importance of Anglophile societies, however –​especially at that time –​and regarded their function as primarily social rather than cultural or academic in nature. The BC preferred to concentrate its efforts on the Anglo-​Hellenic League in Athens and Thessaloniki and to get both working again. Besides, in the past the BC had not been entirely satisfied with the relations between the league in London and the BC Home Division. They also expressed some dissatisfaction with the league’s rivalry with the British Hellenic Society in Cairo. The BC thus preferred to see the league ‘in more effective hands’.25 The future basis of BC work in Greece would instead be built on establishing independent institutes in Athens and Thessaloniki, controlled by the office of the representative in Athens and with functional officers and at least one travelling officer attached to the Athens office. These institutes –​staffed ‘adequately with Englishmen’ –​controlled all teaching activities and were, especially in the case of Thessaloniki, focal points for the distribution of the BC’s printed, visual and music material and centres from which British cultural ideas were disseminated throughout the country. The representative also co-​ordinated other BC activities, including university appointments. The BC welcomed the FO’s suggestion to appoint a suitable officer to advise the Greek government on the reconstruction of its educational system, with special reference to English. It was deemed to be an opportunity ‘of major importance’, provided it could be used as a part of a coherent plan 25 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 664, GR/​20/​4, Letter, Richard Seymour to Gurney, 14 February 1945.

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under the representative’s control. On the question of books, the BC’s intention was to provide a first-​class library that, with FO agreement, would be housed at the Athens Institute, while a subsidiary library would be based at the Thessaloniki Institute.26 Johnstone agreed with the BC’s policy regarding organizations such as the Anglo-​Hellenic League.27 The FO eventually advised providing grants to the league, while the BC drew up an elaborate scheme for assistance to the league. However, action could not be taken before the BC’s Finance and Agenda Committee met on 13 February 1945.28

The search for a permanent British Council representative for Athens Post-​war cultural activities in Greece, the core of which had been entrusted to the BC, had to be developed under an elaborate and comprehensive operational scheme. The appointment of a permanent representative was a major priority for both the FO and the BC. The BC intended to make Athens a Grade I post, ‘i.e. equivalent in importance to Paris and Rome’.29 However, such a proposal had yet to be approved by the FO, and it was doubtful whether the post merited so high a status within the hierarchy of the BC overseas. Besides, several issues still needed to be clarified, including whether the post was to be filled by an established BC official or someone who was not as established, or alternatively to appoint a more high-​powered man for the critical period of the first two or three years 26 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 664, GR/​20/​4, Letter, Richard Seymour to Gurney, enclosed copy of a Letter from Sir Robertson to Colonel Johnstone, copy for Gurney, 14 February 1945. 27 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Johnstone to Sir Malcom Robertson, 10 March 1945. 28 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 307, Letter by Wickham to Gurney, 23 January 1945; FO to Leeper, for Colonel Johnstone, 22 January 1945. 29 At that time, representatives were established in France, Italy and Yugoslavia; see A. J. S. White, The British Council: The First 25 Years, 1934–​1959 (London: HM Stationary Office, 1965), 52.

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and revisit afterwards whether Athens should remain a Grade I post.30 It was believed at the BC that they needed a person of some academic reputation, preferably not a classical scholar, who is a competent administrator, who knows the Greeks and can speak modern Greek. In temperament he should be the kind of person to whom people like to take their grievances.31

Two names were mentioned initially: Romilly Jenkins,32 who was a lecturer in modern Greek at Cambridge; and Michael Grant, classicist and the BC’s first representative in Turkey.33 Further, Instructor Captain C. D. Howell –​ who knew Greece well –​was regarded in London as a suitable candidate, though Leeper’s preference was for ‘someone of far greater calibre’.34 The candidate preferred by most in London and Athens was J. C. S. Runciman, who was at the time a professor of Byzantine art and history at the University of Istanbul. In his corner were the members of the BC London office, Head of the Ministry of Information (MOI) Balkan section A.  J. Henderson, Leeper, Johnstone and Grant, the latter being a personal friend of Runciman. However, W. H. Montagu-​Pollock, who was head of the CRD at the FO, expressed doubts regarding Runciman’s administrative abilities.35 3 0 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1416, Minutes (handwritten), Hedley, 28 April 1945. 31 TNA: BW 34/​10, GR/​8/​2, Letter, Seymour to Johnstone, 2 December 1944. 32 Romilly James Heald Jenkins (1907–​1969) was a British scholar in Byzantine and modern Greek studies. He was a student of the classics in the British School at Athens (1933–​1936) and, from 1936, the assistant director and a member of the Board of the Managing Committee; in 1948 he was named a trustee, and from 1951 to 1958 he served as chair of the Managing Committee. During the Second World War, he served with the British Foreign Service. Lewis Gibson was a lecturer in modern Greek at the University of Cambridge (1936–​1946), a Koraes professor of modern Greek and Byzantine history at King’s College London (1946–​1960) and a professor of Byzantine history and literature at the Dumbarton Oaks Institute (1960–​1969). 33 TNA: BW 34/​10, GR/​8/​2, Letter, Seymour to Johnstone, 2 December 1944. 34 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 307, Telegram, FO to Leeper, for Johnstone, 22 January 1945; LC 398, Telegram No. 7 Brico, Leeper following from Johnstone to FO, 8 February 1945; Telegram No. 13 Brico, FO to Athens, 26 February 1945. 35 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1416, Letter, Personal and Confidential, Montagu-​Pollock to Gerald Scott, Foreign Division, MOI, 1 May 1945; TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1799, Personal and Confidential Handwritten Note by Scott to Montagu-​Pollock, 5 May

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With the decision on Runciman still not finalized, William Plomer –​ a novelist, poet and literary editor who worked in the information section of the Admiralty during the war36 –​and the Shakespearean scholar M. R. Ridley37 were also mentioned as possibilities. Professor C. M. Attlee was also considered for the post of representative, in addition to his position as chair of history at the University of Athens. This latter proposal was eventually dismissed by the CRD and the British Embassy in Athens for being ‘a measure of false economy’. The Embassy considered the work of the BC in Greece to be of such importance and its representative to be such a significant public figure that the post required a full-​time occupant and so could not be combined with academic duties. Moreover, a forthcoming reorganization of the University of Athens would ensure that holders of academic posts were to remain out of the public limelight.38 The FO attributed the suggestion of appointing Attlee to ‘a misunderstanding’ on the part of the Athens Embassy, but the fact remains that the FO prioritized sending him to Greece. Indeed the Treasury agreed to the financial arrangements of Professor Attlee’s salary on 27 June, and in July the university admitted Attlee as chair of British history and institutions,39 while Runciman40 left for his post in Athens on 2 October.41

1945, and Henderson’s Comment written by hand on Pollock’s Letter to Scott, 1 May; TNA: FO 924/​162; Scott passed the FO inquiry to A. J. Henderson, head of the Balkan section; Letter, Personal and Confidential, [Scott] to Wickham, 16 May; TNA: FO 924/​162, Wickham to Montagu-​Pollock, 22 May 1945. 36 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 2222, Telegram No. 51 Brico, Leeper from Johnstone to FO, 4 June 1945; Minutes, Montagu-​Pollock, 13 June 1945; Hedley, 17 June 1945. 3 7 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3062, Letter, Montagu-​Pollock to Johnstone, 28 July 1945. 38 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2635, Letter, Personal, Harold Caccia, Athens, to Montagu-​ Pollock, FO (referring to FO Telegram No.  55, 15 June), 22 June 1945; Minutes, Hedley, 7 July 1945. 39 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2635, Letter, Montagu-​Pollock to Colonel K. R. Johnstone, 9 July 1945. 40 For Runciman’s preference for the post of the representative, see Koutsopanagou, ‘“To Cast Our Net Very Much Wider”’, 44–​45. 41 For Runciman’s years as BC representative in Athens, see Michael Llewellyn-​Smith, ‘Steven Runciman at the British Council: Letters from Athens, 1945–​1947’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955, 69–​110.

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In addition to selecting a suitable representative, the BC faced serious staffing shortages accentuated by the British government’s decision to deny requests from government departments and bodies to release those still serving in the armed forces. The London office of the BC intended to withdraw Johnstone from Greece to direct the work of the BC’s European Division, but in view of his importance to the British Embassy in Athens, he was allowed to remain in the capital until the autumn. Besides, Leeper himself asked the London office to allow Johnstone to stay on in Athens as head of the BC, since the next few months were to be critical in establishing the BC’s work on a more solid basis.42 A. W. S. Barron was transferred from Cyprus to Athens, arriving at the end of February 1945, and N. S. Whitworth arrived in Athens from Cairo in April of the same year to assume the post of director of the IES and devote himself to teaching, as did P. B. Gotch, his assistant director at the IES, who was in charge of arranging lectures and general liaison work.43 Rex Warner44 was appointed director of the British Institute of Higher Studies (British Institute hereafter), with Major Patrick Leigh Fermor45 –​well known in Greece for his wartime record in Crete –​as deputy director.

British cultural propaganda in Greece Assessments of the crucial year 1945 The BC, which still awaited Sir Findlater Stewart’s report on its future scope and status, was unsure of its destiny and thus was unable to plan effectively for its development. Regarding the organization of the BC 2 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Leeper to White, 21 March 1945. 4 43 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 531, Telegram No. 16 Brico, Telegram No. 24 Brico, FO to Athens, 27 February; Athens to FO, 6 April 1945. 44 For Rex Warner’s years in Athens, cf. E. Stephen Tabachnick, ‘Athens, 1945–​1947’, in Fiercer Than Tigers: The Life & Works of Rex Warner (East Lansing: Michigan University Press, 2002). 45 Donaldson, The British Council, 147. For Fermor’s years at the British Institute, Athens see Artemis Cooper, Patrick Leigh Fermor: An Adventure (London: John Murray, 2012), 199–​213.

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in Greece, which was not held to have been ‘altogether satisfactory’ in the pre-​war period, BC staff were anxious ‘to start well’ after the war.46 Those acquainted with the conditions in Greece confirmed that there was a broad scope for scientific and technical aid. An assessment made by the BC in London found that the education system needs recasting; reforestation and anti-​erosion measures are also of prime importance […]. The country needs re-​seeding […]. There are important prospects in Greece for civil engineering. By building dams and power-​stations, etc. the water supply could be enormously improved.47

However, unsure of whether this was all ‘Council work’, it was felt that defining the scope of the BC’s work should wait until after Johnstone’s report was received.48 After receiving the BC’s Greek estimates for 1945–​1946 and following discussions with Shillan and others during his visit to London in March, Johnstone was ready to give a general picture of the conditions prevailing in Greece and of the work recommended for the BC in the country. Submitting his proposals in a memorandum on 7 March, Johnstone explained to A. J. S. White, the BC’s secretary general, that his object was solely to provide some idea of the general background against which the BC would work, confining himself to the general principles along which –​in view of local conditions –​they could most usefully act; detailed reports on individual topics would be addressed in other correspondence. Johnstone pointed out that Britain had undertaken responsibilities in Greece that they had towards ‘no other country in Europe’, thus giving Greece a special claim to British attention. The result of the British venture in Greece would have an impact on British moral standing in the post-​war world. He stipulated that if the British failed to revive Greece, it would be because ‘we did not possess the moral or mental forces necessary to inspire such a revival’. Therefore, British influence and advice would be required ‘to make 6 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, A. J. S. White to Leeper, 10 March 1945. 4 47 TNA: BW 34/​10, GR/​8/​2, Note, Crowther to Wickman, 1 March 1945; Minutes, Wickham (?), 1 March 1945; Miss Stavridi, 2 March 1945. 48 Ibid.

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themselves felt in every branch of the Greek administration, including particularly education, sociology and the practical application of the sciences’.49 Johnstone saw the main role of the BC as an educational institution to alter the mindsets of the youth in Greece and to turn them away from the ‘extreme political theories and ideals’ exacerbated by the war, rather than simply being an instrument for the teaching of the English language, despite the ever-​increasing demand for such classes. Therefore, the primary need was for the ‘the reconvention and enlightenment of the younger generation which is directly related to education, both secondary and higher’. Through education, it could be possible ‘to explain to young people brought up on extreme doctrines […] the possibility of other and more moderate points of view, particularly in questions of political and social organisation’. On the other hand, he found it ‘astonishing’ how vigorous the country’s literary and artistic resources remained despite the ravages of the war. He considered that a force that might conceivably lead the way to the revival and regeneration of Greece was ‘the one new idealistic national movement, namely EAM [Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo –​National Liberation Front]’, which had gathered in its ranks a very large segment of the younger generation who rejected both the dictatorial Metaxist past and the old-​party political system. The ‘tragedy of Greece’ however, was that the Kommunistiko Komma Ellados (KKE [Communist Party of Greece]) ‘in its ambitious striving for political power’, sought to dominate the EAM from its earliest stages of development. Johnstone observed that the political climate in Greece was so polarized that the forces of renewal in Greece were in danger of being identified with ‘criminals and unscrupulous elements’, thus increasing the risk that political control might pass ‘into the selfish hands of the older political organisations’. Greece was now tasked with rebuilding its entire political, economic, social and educational structure from the ground up. With that said, ‘the unsettlement of men’s minds’ seriously hindered this work of reconstruction and rendered the Greeks unable ‘to undertake any vigorous new effort unaided’. Johnstone was convinced that Britain had a role to play in that renewal process. Yet 49 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, ‘British Council Work in Greece: 1945/​6’, 7 March 1945.

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the success of the British experiment to help found a national government –​one that could ‘gradually attract to itself the more responsible idealistic and progressive elements in the country and set them to work on the task of reconstruction’ –​was ‘very far from certain’.50 Johnstone’s analysis followed the general direction of British policy towards Greece at this period, which was to reinforce the ‘centre’ against the two other poles: the EAM and the old-​party political system. The immediate aim of British policy was to isolate the EAM, to denounce it for having been dominated from its early development by the KKE and to try to win over its moderate elements. From the point of view of BC’s intellectual liaison in Greece, its work –​ according to Johnstone –​was to serve a ‘dual purpose’ by making a full contribution to the improvement of mutual understanding between the two peoples and to teach English to the Greeks. In competing with the socially broad influence –​both artistic and intellectual –​of the French presence in Greece, the British strategy in his view needed to be primarily focused on what he termed the ‘quality and character’ of the BC’s staff. In Greece, where he believed human contact and the human voice had a significantly greater impact than printed or illustrated material, the quality of BC staff and lecturers was overwhelmingly important. Above all, they needed to be individuals who were ‘prepared as much to take an active interest in modern Greek literature, science, agriculture or music, as to inform the Greeks about British achievements in these various fields’.51 In terms of regional expansion, Johnstone suggested that if the BC wished to work in Greece as a whole and not confine itself to Athens and Thessaloniki, ‘static regional officers’ were likely to be far more valuable than the travelling officers attached to the representative’s office. Ideally, there would be at least five such individuals, one each in Patras, Crete, Volos, Corfu and Mytilene; alternatively, the latter could be in Rhodes following the return of the Dodecanese to Greece. He also suggested that the British should, as in the past, encourage the Anglo-​Hellenic League in different places, but in so doing also seek to prevent the Athens Anglo-​Hellenic 50 51

Ibid. Ibid.

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League from ‘any imperialistic designs’ in regard to the provincial leagues. Johnstone’s proposals for the BC’s presence in Greece also addressed the general organizational structure of the BC, in particular the co-​ordinating role of its representative and his relations with the Embassy. He further proposed an enhancement of the representative’s status in his relationship with the Embassy so that he might ‘stand in relation to HM Ambassador at Athens much as the Council itself (stood) in relation to the FO’.52 Although the BC’s London office failed to support every one of the proposals put forward by Johnstone, an agreement was reached in regard to the general direction of future policy. The proposals that were dropped by the BC focused mainly on the relations between the BC representative and the British ambassador and the suggestion regarding the nature of the relationship between the regional BC representatives and the Anglo-​Hellenic League.53 BC matters in Greece in 1945 remained under Leeper’s tight supervision and only after installing ‘a good local head’ would he consider relaxing control and allowing the BC to get on with its work.54 He again pressed the BC to accelerate its work in Greece and to find sources of support. This was especially important after the founding of the Greek-​Soviet League in July 1945, which was interpreted by the British Embassy as bringing a marked increase in Soviet propaganda in Greece. Harold Caccia, minister at the British Embassy, stressed that even the Greek government accepted the Greek-​Soviet League at face value and that it had the blessing of Minister of Information Dionysios Zakythinos. Leeper requested that the supply of books, newspapers and lectures and the acquisition of premises should be sped up and that the BC should quickly appoint its representative in Athens.55 The problem they faced, however, was that the Greek members of the Greek-​Soviet League were mainly leftist and liberal academics, although the open participation of the KKE was ‘carefully avoided’.56 D. S. 52 Ibid. 53 TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  1372, Letter, Wickham to Gurney, 7 April; Minutes, Hedley (addressed to the Southern Department), 14 April 1945. 54 TNA: BW 34/​10, Telegram No. 20 Brico, Leeper to FO, 15 March 1945. 55 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3062, Original Minutes in FO 371/​48238, R 11703/​3/​19, Caccia to FO, 7 July 1945; Minutes, Laskey, 12 July 1945; Miss [H. M.] Hedley, 19 July 1945. 56 Koutsopanagou, ‘Προπαγάνδα και Απελευθέρωση’, 183.

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Laskey of the FO’s Southern Department commented that even though the threat of Soviet propaganda in Greece was not immediately visible, they could not ‘afford to let the Russian challenge go unanswered’.57 He took up the matter with the CRD, who arranged to send propaganda material regularly to Greece. Hedley felt the time was right to reopen the question of the Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention, especially since Britain had started to organize conventions with other Allied countries, thus–​with official blessing –​providing the BC with a visibly important diplomatic status. The next few months were crucial for the BC’s readiness to take over all its duties in autumn 1945, when the British Institute was due to open in Athens and Thessaloniki. Despite facing criticism for being dilatory in this regard, Johnstone defended the BC’s work in Greece. During the summer months, two ‘major achievements’ for the BC’s preparation were made: the successful organization of the summer schools at Poros in August, aiming to train fifty English-​language teachers for January 1946; and the preparation for the BC’s scholarship scheme. In the meantime, a first-​class central library was established at the British Institute in Athens and Thessaloniki, which included musical scores and gramophone records. Arrangements were also made for a lecture programme in the winter of 1945–​1946. The BC had a slot on Athens Radio, with the help of Keith Newlands of the Embassy’s Press Department, and the British Institute eventually acquired new premises.58 What remained was the work of organizing the BC’s activities in a more comprehensive and co-​ordinated manner.

Richard Seymour’s visit to Greece and Italy, 8–​31 October 1945 A number of issues had to be settled in both Greece and Italy. The FO believed that both countries should be given ‘the highest priority’59 as the 5 7 58 59

TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3062, Minutes, D. S. Laskey, 12 July 1945. TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3307, Letter, Johnstone to Montagu-​Pollock, re. Pollock’s Letter of 28 July, 2 August 1945. TNA: BW 34/​10, GR/​8/​2, Letter, Montagu-​Pollock to Johnstone, 28 July 1945.

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‘bastions of democracy’ against Soviet infiltration in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, a key region of British strategic interest.60 BC Secretary General A.  J.  S. White decided that a visit from his deputy, Richard Seymour, to these two ‘important outposts of the BC’ would be more valuable than visits to the new BC posts in north-​western Europe. On 8 October 1945, just a few days after Runciman’s arrival in Athens, Seymour was sent to Greece and Italy on an inspection visit. He regarded his visit to Greece ‘as more important’ than the visit to Italy, and instead of dividing his time equally between the two countries, cut short his visit to Italy to spend more time in Greece, where, he stated, ‘there will be more need for me’.61 His visit was timely. By early November 1945 –​near the beginning of a new academic year –​almost an entire year’s worth of preparatory work had been undertaken to enable the BC to take up its role in Greece. The BC had acquired its first permanent representative, Runciman, who together with Professor Attlee occupied two key posts that would oversee the conduct of British cultural policy in Greece. Runciman reached Athens a few days before Seymour. In Athens, Seymour held discussions with Runciman and Major Cardiff on all aspects of the BC’s work in Greece. He discussed with the director of IES Whitworth the future direction of English teaching in Greece. He also discussed policy with Leeper and Runciman, and with Professor Attlee he discussed the institution of a chair of British life and thought at the University of Athens. In addition to inspecting the BC’s two buildings, sorting out staffing issues and meeting with Anglo-​Hellenic League representatives, he also toured Piraeus and Kokkinia, both working-​class areas. Further, he discussed the Thessaloniki Hospital project and the proposed 60 TNA: BW 40/​9, Minutes of Meeting at the FO, 17 July 1945. Moreover, in these two countries there were powerful communist parties and their first post-​war general elections were imminent. In May 1945, Montagu-​Pollock, in a politically significant text, analysed the role of cultural policy with respect to Britain’s position after the Second World War. For the FO directive regarding the activity of the BC in Greece and Italy, see Ellwood, ‘“Showing the World What It Owed to Britain”’, 72. 61 TNA:  BW  2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Letter, Seymour to Montagu-​Pollock, 18 September 1945; Minutes, Seymour to Dr A. E. Morgan, 20 September 1945.

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school of nursing with Major General Sir Ernest Cowell, the director of the Health Division at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). On a short visit to Thessaloniki, Seymour met with Elliott, the director of the British Institute in Thessaloniki, and representatives of the Anglo-​Hellenic League in Thessaloniki. During this visit he also met with Dr Henry Foy of the Malaria Research Laboratory at Thessaloniki and Major Niblack of the US Army, who was the medical director of UNRRA for northern Greece. He also inspected the municipal and refugee hospitals. There were some ‘overriding factors’ that Seymour felt affected the BC’s work in Greece.62 Firstly, Seymour agreed with Johnstone that the British government’s ‘deep and peculiar’ political commitment to the country attached a significance to the BC’s actions that ‘had no parallel elsewhere’. ‘We are in a position of unusual responsibility and must watch our step with unusual care’, he noted. Secondly, while Seymour encouraged the continued existence of Anglo-​Greek leagues and societies, he considered that they should not be left to ‘their own devices’ given the ‘varying kinds of political bias’ that had operated in the pre-​war period; he thought doing so might actually do ‘great harm’. Thirdly, he found out that while English learning had been taken up during the occupation in somewhat of a national mania, the standard of English –​especially among prospective English teachers in the gymnasia –​was low. Finally, Seymour underscored that policy should be exercised with the understanding that the Greeks could probably ‘be led but not pushed’; as such, the BC should follow the tide rather than fight against it, at least until it was more firmly established. Seymour emphasized that the BC should spread its influence across all age groups in Greek society, especially the youth. The younger generation was a social group of special interest for the BC’s work in Greece, as Johnstone had emphasized in his March 1945 report and which Leeper unwaveringly attached great importance to. Seymour was anxious that the BC should set up some organization to assist young people, especially university students. He envisioned that the organization would take the 62 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’.

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form of a youth league comparable to the Soviet-​Greek and Franco-​Greek youth leagues, but without the same political biases. In such a highly polarized country, however, Seymour predicted some difficulties in keeping any Greek league ‘at once both non-​political and alive’; he suggested that it would be better that all BC centres should organize ‘junior sections of the institutes, hold summer camps and assist Greek organizations like the Scouts where that can be done without descending into the political arena’. He also maintained that the BC should not restrict its appeal to a small circle of affluent Greeks, but extend this to all social classes; moreover, he stressed that any favouring of the former should be restrained. The location of the recently purchased British Institute building in Kolonaki Square was open to some criticism, as Kolonaki was a well-​known conservative stronghold with specific political and social connotations. ‘The Council staff are well aware of this and I have no doubt that the evil results can be avoided by skillful management’, he noted.63 He was also sceptical about the Anglo-​ Hellenic League in Athens, whose members were ‘mostly well-​to-​do, right wing people and no persons of outstanding importance are actively concerned with it’.64 The vast majority of its members came from the Kolonaki area. Seymour believed that the BC should actively discourage the league in Athens from its ambitions to control the provincial leagues. Similarly, the BC should also seek to hinder any effort of the league in Thessaloniki to spread its branches to Macedonia. With that said, as the leagues were Anglophile social centres and often served a useful purpose, Seymour conceded that they should get some assistance from the BC –​though Seymour preferred to see them self-​supported. The BC should ‘use them, watch carefully their policies and their right-​wing tendencies and avoid […] recurrent commitments’.65 Compared to the Anglo-​Hellenic League in Athens, the league in Piraeus –​with its extensive work in English teaching –​was a ‘more interesting affair’. Piraeus was a city distinct from Athens, and both Cardiff and British Consul Warden Baker agreed that it required ‘separate treatment’ as Piraeus was home not only to factories –​‘whose workers we 63 64 65

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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should try to establish relations’ with –​and a few organized worker communities, but also to many commercial and seafaring ventures, for which information on subjects such as marine engineering would be welcome. League members there were drawn from a reasonably wide range of social classes. Seymour fully endorsed Runciman’s recommendation that they should continue to support the Anglo-​Hellenic League in Piraeus, not as an appendage of Athens, but as a distinct provincial post. He added that they should endeavour to develop a similar post in Kokkinia, which was a communist stronghold. Seymour warned that the fact that a number of other British-​Greek leagues and bodies had sprung up –​many of which were ‘mostly bogus’ and intended to further the political fortunes of their promoters –​should warrant a healthy degree of scepticism on the part of British agencies when assessing the worth of Greek-​Anglophile societies in general. Both the BC and the Embassy attached great deal of importance to the BC’s representations in centres outside Athens and Thessaloniki. The Anglo-​Greek Information Service (AGIS) was responsible for information and cultural work, for English classes and for other educational work in most of the provincial centres until the end of 1945. As the transfer of these activities to the MOI was then underway, Cardiff and Osbert Lancaster of the Embassy’s Press Department agreed to ‘a division of labour’ between the BC and the MOI in such centres, and Seymour agreed.66 Relations with the press attaché were also harmonious, and Seymour found no overlap or friction with MOI work. Seymour agreed that the BC and MOI officers should handle each other’s material in centres where only one was represented. If these arrangements were accepted, the BC would be represented in Piraeus, Patras, Kavala, Corfu and Rhodes. He considered that in some ways, the BC’s work in northern Greece would be even more important than its work in Athens and that the developments in this region should be watched with great care. Elliott would also need to act as assistant representative in Macedonia and Thrace. Terence C. Rapp became the consul 66 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Appendix B (BC, Athens) to D. P. Reilly, Athens Embassy, 20 October 1945, enclosed in Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’.

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general in Thessaloniki and was deemed a positive asset for the BC’s work in the city, especially given his prior experience in Yugoslavia as the consul general for the BC in Zagreb. Seymour also dealt in greater detail with the division of functions between the British Institute and the IES in Athens. He estimated that there was an urgent demand for printed material and that the distribution of this material to Greece had been among the main priorities set by Leeper in terms of developing post-​war British cultural work in Greece. The BC set up a central library of books and pamphlets on education as well as educational periodicals,67 which were sent to Athens at Leeper’s request.68 To meet the anticipated demand for English-​language textbooks, feverish efforts were made by Leeper both to accelerate the publication of the Greek versions of these textbooks for the language courses in Greek secondary schools and to equip BC language classes in Athens and Thessaloniki, which were due to start on 1 November 1945.69 Moreover, since the range of requests was broad, London asked for more information on what specialist technical periodicals were required based on the needs of their readers.70 In addition, in an attempt to approach the Greek academic community, the education section of the AGIS –​acting on behalf of Johnstone and in conjunction with the dean of the University of Athens and other ‘authoritative people’ –​built up lists of learned societies and distinguished persons 67 General periodicals included:  Education, Education Handbook, Education Committees Year Book, Journal of Education, Journal of Careers, Overseas Education, Practical Education, Schools & College Management, School Government Chronicle, School Librarian, School Library Review, Times Educational Supplement, Parents Review, Junior Bookshelf and Hobbies. Adult and higher education periodicals included: Adult Education, Higher Education Journal and Highway. Periodicals regarding younger children included: Child Education Quarterly, Pictorial Education Quarterly, Home & School, and New Era in Home & School. 68 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’. 69 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 4475, Leeper to FO, Telegram No. 163 Brico, 19 October 1945, and Telegram No. 165 Brico, 22 October 1945. 70 TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  912, By Bag, ‘Educational Periodicals’, Wickham to Johnstone, referred to Athens, Dispatch No. 25 of 11 November 1944 (LC 1576). Enclosed Letter to Johnstone, 6 March 1945.

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in the academic world for whom the section could act as a distributing agency for educational matter (especially journals and book lists).71 The BC responded affirmatively to specific requests from individual university professors72 and libraries. The BC responded especially positively when these individuals or organizations demonstrated a particular interest, as seen in the Library of the Greek Parliament’s request for English books. A first consignment of books for sale in Greek bookshops through the Book Export Scheme Ltd73 was ready for dispatch, and it was deemed most important that this should arrive prior to the election. In late 1945, a ‘rather select presentation parcel’ was sent to Athens, comprised of G. M. Trevelyan’s English Social History and Arthur Bryant’s English Saga, 1840-​1940.74 The BC Books Department also put together and dispatched a small collection of books, including Winston Churchill’s The Dawn of Liberation, Sir W. Beveridge’s Full Employment in a Free Society and Julian Huxley’s On Living in a Revolution.75 Seymour also urged the BC to expand its cultural activities 71 TNA: BW 34/​10, G. S. Conway, AGIS/​education section, Athens, to Kennedy-​ Cooke, director of the BC’s Production Division, 14 February 1945. 72 Cf. TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 531, Telegram No. 6, Athens to FO, 31 January 1945; Telegram No. 14, FO to Athens, 27 February 1945. 73 The Book Export Scheme Ltd was established during the war and administered by the BC in order to facilitate the sale of British books abroad. After the war, Greece was one of the countries (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Italy) that the Book Export Scheme Ltd retained, until normal channels were re-​established. In 1948, it was taken over by the Central Office of Information with local help from the BC. See White, The British Council, 109–​110; Diana Jane Eastment, ‘The Policies and Position of the British Council from the Outbreak of War to 1950’, DPhil thesis, University of Leeds, 1982, 213, 226. 74 G.  M. Trevelyan, English Social History (London:  Longmans, 1944); Arthur Bryant, English Saga, 1840-​1940 (London: Collins, 1940). 75 Winston Churchill, The Dawn of Liberation (London:  Cassell, 1945); Sir W. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1945); Julian Huxley, On Living in a Revolution (London: Chatto & Windus, 1944). Other titles included: Ernest Barker, Reflections on Government (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Sir W. Beveridge, The Pillars of Security (London: Allen & Unwin, 1943); Sir Cecil Carr, Concerning English Administrative Law (London:  Oxford University Press, 1941); Winston Churchill, Into Battle (London:  Cassel, 1941); Ivor W. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 1933), and by the same author, Parliament (Cambridge:  Cambridge

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by importing into Greece material of the highest quality on lesser-​known aspects of British life, including the ballet and theatre.76 Seymour’s report thus provided a comprehensive overview of the BC’s post-​war activities in Greece and was circulated to the BC Executive Committee, the CRD, Joanna Stavridi (advisor to the FO on Greek matters) and Runciman in Athens.77 With this report, the organization and operation of the BC was set on track, the results of which would soon become evident.

The British Council in Athens reaches its peak Under Runciman’s directorship from October 1945 to May 1947, the BC experienced the most intellectually creative period in its operation, gathering around it a number of British writers and artists who, with their own distinctive personalities, provided a new impulse for a rapprochement in Anglo-​Greek cultural relations. Before his resignation, Runciman gave an account of where he felt the BC had succeeded and where they had failed during the two years of his tenure. The report, which had been requested by Michael Grant, who was at the time in London serving as deputy director of the BC’s European Division, was to be confidential. Runciman wanted it to be ‘not a factual and statistical report such as our ordinary monthly and annual reports are, but rather a commentary’ on the BC’s work during his time at the helm. The report outlined the status of the BC at the time and its relations with other organizations (including the British Embassy, foreign embassies, the Greek government, Greek academic bodies and the Greek public), the BC’s activities in Athens and in other regions, the issue of scholarships and British University Press, 1939); and David Mitrany, Economic Development in S.E. Europe (London: Political and Economic Planning, 1945). See also Koutsopanagou, ‘“To Cast Our Net Very Much Wider”’, 50–​51. 76 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’. 7 7 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, R. Davies to Montagu-​Pollock, 19 November 1945.

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visitors to Greece. Runciman felt that the BC was in search of an identity that could reach the Greek public as a friend ‘who will listen sympathetically to appeals of a cultural sort’.78 As he aptly put it, the vagueness of the BC’s title in both English and Greek made its function something of a mystery to outsiders and complicated rather than helped its general position. The BC was often confused with the consulate, even by British soldiers who asked the BC to help them with personal affairs. The British Embassy was on the side of the BC, but ‘never interfered’ in its activities. The BC’s relations with the Embassy were based on mutual goodwill, wherein the BC provided the Embassy with information it received through its contacts, while the Embassy gave ‘advice or assistance’ when requested. Runciman also noted the ‘especially co-​operative’ Embassy Press Department, which assisted him with publicity for the BC’s activities in the Greek press. Although limited in scope –​given that the newspapers tended to report little besides political news –​BC activities were regularly publicized and press references were typically friendly. At the same time, following the policy proposed by Seymour that the BC should follow the tide rather than fight against it, Runciman sought to develop good relations with the Greek political and academic worlds. Relations with the relevant ministries –​particularly education, health (through the Thessaloniki Hospital scheme) and reconstruction –​were on ‘cordial terms’. However, contact with the left was not yet deemed possible. The BC’s relationships with the universities in Athens and Thessaloniki also ‘remain[ed] excellent’. Byron Professor W. A. Sewell gave regular lectures, which received favourable comment, though the audiences were small and mainly made up of ‘anglophile old ladies’.79 The BC also maintained good relations with other foreign cultural organizations and went to great lengths not to attempt any ‘sort of rivalry’ with them. Despite the existence of a long-​standing Franco-​Greek cultural relationship, Runciman considered that the French –​who before the war dominated Greek cultural life –​had lost considerable ground due to ‘their association with the extreme left’.80 The Americans, on the other hand, did not appear to exercise cultural 78 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947. 79 Ibid. 80 Cf. Lucile Arnoux-​Farnoux, ‘The Institut Français d’Athènes 1945–​1955: Cultural Exchanges and Franco-​Greek Relations’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955, 227–​238.

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propaganda on any significant scale, relying rather on their material assets and their schools. And though the Soviets were active, their cultural work only reached their political sympathizers. A point with which many across the Greek political and social spectrum appeared to agree, and to which they accorded great importance, was the BC’s approach towards diversifying its appeal, particularly across a range of social groups and the young. In this context, a landmark cultural event was held at the British Institute in Athens in early 1947, causing a sensation. Although exhibitions of Greek art were not normally considered to be within the remit of the BC, it was Warner’s policy, which Runciman ‘most firmly’ supported, to introduce them.81 He did so for two reasons: firstly, to show the BC’s interest in Greek art and life; and, secondly, to attract visitors who might not otherwise be drawn to a BC event. This particular event combined a performance of Karaghiozis –​the popular Greek shadow puppet –​by Sotiris Spatharis with an exhibition of artworks by Theophilos,82 an untrained folk painter whose works had initially been neglected but which were now collected by connoisseurs. George Seferis, diplomat and poet, spoke at the opening of the event.83 This was the first exhibition of Spatharis’ work, held some fifteen years after his death, and so it aroused enormous interest. The communist press, which considered him an ‘artist of the people’, deplored the fact that it was the British who held the exhibition. At the same time, the communist press urged its readers to visit the exhibition,84 in what was described wryly by Runciman as ‘the first time that Communists have been told to enter any British building’.85 81 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947. 82 Theophilos Hatzimihail (c. 1870–​1934), known simply as Theophilos, was a major folk painter of modern Greek art. His posthumous broader recognition would come late in June 1961 in a great exhibition of his works at the Louvre Museum, thanks to the art critic and publisher Stratis Eletheriadis (Tériade). 83 The American School of Classical Studies at Athens:  George Seferis Papers  –​ Subseries I. B. 8, File 7. 84 Rizospastis, 8 May 1947, 2. The newspaper dedicated a three-​column article to his life and works:  G. Maroudis, ‘The Folk Painter, Theophilos’, Rizospastis, 15 May 1947, 2. 85 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947.

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Certain right-​wing journalists attacked the exhibition for being ‘frivolous’, but the majority of newspapers expressed gratitude to the BC for its interest in Greek art. The exhibition drew crowds representing all classes and especially the young. Another outlet the BC had to reach out to a wider intellectual and artistic audience was its Anglo-​Greek Review. Runciman considered that its use and value were unquestioned, since it was ‘the leading intellectual periodical in Greek and reached left-​wing circles that are otherwise untouched by British propaganda’.86 Although its content was ‘completely non-​political’,87 Runciman noted that the BC was occasionally accused by the extreme right of sponsoring a crypto-​communist publication. English teaching finally came under the auspices of the BC, thus setting aside any such ambitions among other actors, such as the Anglo-​Hellenic League. The BC’s main centre of activity in Athens was the British Institute, which under Warner’s directorship had come to play a noteworthy part in intellectual life. Its work fell under two headings: first, the regular courses for advanced students of English with an examination in view; and, second, public lectures and exhibitions and the provision of a library. The lectures held at the British Institute –​expressed in plain, uncomplicated English –​ were at this point delivered on a regular basis, and in early 1947 Whitworth introduced a separate series of debates in English, which also proved very popular. Similar to these initiatives were the innovative weekly lectures on English music at the British Institute by functional officer and music critic Ronald Crighton, which secured a consistent audience; it was thought important that foreign institutes did not provide a similar service or even ‘anything parallel’. Crichton gave occasional lectures elsewhere and had a weekly programme playing English gramophone records on Athens Radio. Greek lecturers and musicians also participated in the BC’s events through programmes on British themes. Other activities were related to the fine arts, films and visual propaganda. From late 1946 onwards, the BC made ‘practical use of the films sent to them from London’. Their main success 86 Cf. Tziovas, ‘Between Propaganda and Modernism’ in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955, 123–​154. 87 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947.

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was with medical films, the scripts of which were translated into Greek. Shows were given to doctors at the institute, in hospitals and at the university. The scheme proved to be ‘one of the most important and successful of our recent activities’.88 Runciman asked for more technical films with commentaries in Greek, as he considered them to be of great value. The presentation of books to select societies and individuals and the distribution and presentation of periodicals continued, he reported, ‘to be a useful and very much appreciated’ part of BC work in Greece. The Embassy, moreover, had relieved the BC of some of its burdens, for instance by clearing copyrights and providing books to booksellers. Another significant dimension of the consolidation of the BC in Greece, to which both Johnstone and Seymour attached great significance in their reports, was its regional spread. Since the work of the BC was not intended to be limited to Athens, the diffusion of the BC’s work beyond the capital became one of Runciman’s core priorities. ‘Goodwill’ tours by regional representatives took place throughout the country, and in each of the areas visited, activities were tailored to local conditions. In Thessaloniki, for example, the British Institute organized English classes for university teachers. The fact that a large number of university teachers, most of whom spoke French, had by that time acquired ‘some knowledge of English’ meant that the BC was able to establish a strong and lasting relationship with the university. The BC still had not provided a full professor in Thessaloniki, but a lecturer had been found for the next academic year until an appropriate teacher was appointed. Runciman himself gave a farewell party in Thessaloniki on 20 May 1947 to explore the university’s willingness to develop further forms of collaboration. Elliott was also reported to have made several tours ‘of great value’ in Macedonia, where small English schools were opening in many towns. A BC directorate was also established in Piraeus, a region with a ‘professional, business and nautical life’ of its own and where many night schools hosted young workers for study. The BC made contact with each of the town’s English teachers, while they in turn –​along with their students and others –​made increasing use of the Piraeus centre and its small but valuable library, stocked with technical, 88

Ibid.

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commercial and maritime books. In Patras, thanks to the work of the regional representative Arthur Fosse, the BC occupied ‘a very definite and popular place’ in the town’s life. The same was also true of Corfu, where the local secretary, Maria Aspioti,89 performed the work of a BC representative. The BC’s centre in Kavala was described as ‘a feature of local life’, and its representative Sheldon Williams toured Eastern Macedonia and Thrace extensively on behalf of the BC. H. B. Forster, director of the BC’s regional office in Mytilene, held exhibitions and gave lectures in Greek on British history and life. Moreover, with the help of the Press Department, Forster maintained a small centre in Chios. He had also helped to found and supervise several self-​supporting schools of English in towns throughout the Aegean Islands. Runciman supported the view that it was important to maintain an active local centre in that area, as difficulties in communicating with Athens kept these islands isolated. Crete was deemed to be the least successful of the regional directorates, largely because its various cultural activities on the island were reported to be regarded by the local people as little more than British propaganda.90 Making an overall assessment, Runciman considered that the BC had acquired ‘a certain standing and reputation’ since the liberation. However, he noted that the BC’s policy of refraining from political involvement limited its ability to reach the Greek general public, especially such organizations as trade unions or youth leagues. While the report concluded that the extent of the impact of the BC’s work with the Greek population was impossible to measure with any accuracy, he remained convinced that the 89 Maria-​Aspasia (Marie) Aspioti (1909–​2000) was a writer, poet and playwright. She was director of the English Institute (1945–​1955), but resigned in protest against the British policies in Cyprus and returned the MBE [Member of the Order of the British Empire] she had been awarded. She co-​founded, with Michael Desyllas, the magazine Prosperos: Edition of Art and Literature of the British Council (1949–​ 1954), the title of which was inspired by Lawrence Durrell’s work Prospero’s Cell (London: Faber and Faber, 1945). She was a close friend of Durrell, but their relationship cooled due to his stance on the Cyprus issue in his capacity as public information officer in Cyprus since July 1954 (cf. Panos Karagiorgos, ‘An Unpublished Letter of Durrell to Marie Aspioti’, in Anna Lillios, ed., Lawrence Durrell and the Greek World (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2004), 57–​61. 90 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947.

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presence in Greece ‘of a certain number of [...] British men and women with a large scale of friends and known sympathies and interest in Greece does an immense if intangible amount of good’. Furthermore, the BC’s work became widely known through tours undertaken by its regional officers, notably Elliott in northern Greece, O. P. S. Batty in western Greece and the Peloponnese, and Forster on the Aegean Islands. Runciman, however, also expressed concern that the BC’s reputation, which largely rested on personal contacts made by BC officials, was not entirely secure and would falter if good personal contacts were not maintained. Otherwise, he warned, the BC ‘might as well close down in this country’.91 After the American takeover from Britain in March 1947, Runciman felt that there had been a ‘noticeable tendency’ among minor Greek officials to treat the British with ‘less attention’; but so long as Greek senior officials remained ‘our personal friends’, he sensed that this change in power dynamic may not seriously disrupt the work of the BC. However, he expressed the fear that his successor –​not having the time to get acquainted with his new environment –​might face difficulties. For this reason and in order to simplify administrative arrangements, Runciman thought the time had come for an authorized cultural convention with Greece in order to provide the BC with an official status. The British Embassy agreed that this was ‘a suitable moment’, since the Greek authorities were ‘on the whole, well disposed’ towards the British. If the FO and the BC in London concurred, the British Embassy was ready to start negotiations.92 The BC’s regional expansion proved to be complementary to the practical needs of British information networking in the country. After a reduction in the number of information centres under the AGIS regime, their services were covered by the BC, which took over its language classes, while local intelligence was adequately covered in consular reports. After the election in March 1946, the coming to power of the extreme right and the change in the Greek political scene, Britain –​while pursuing its information policy –​also sought to ensure that British cultural influences 91 Ibid. 92 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947.

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were maintained at a steady level. In this respect, the BC, particularly through its language classes, had ‘a more important role to play than the Press [Information] Department’, and it was ‘of the highest importance that the maximum degree of co-​operation should exist between the two bodies’.93 This was Osbert Lancaster’s view in his final report of his tenure at the Embassy’s Information Department, in June 1946. His recommendations regarding the future of the BC’s role can be summarized as follows. Firstly, there should be close co-​operation between the Information Department and the BC, with a much closer integration of their functions, since –​particularly in the matter of libraries –​their activities overlapped. Secondly, he stressed the importance of ensuring a steady flow of British books, articles and films; as with language classes, the BC should play a role ‘of the greatest consequence’ here. Thirdly, the personnel resources of the Information Department and the BC in the provinces should be pooled. Moreover, BC representatives in certain places should assist the Information Department. The necessary degree of co-​operation could only be achieved, however, if it was first perfected in London, before being echoed on the ground in Greece.94 Finally, improvement was needed in the layout and appearance of the Anglo-​Greek Review, which performed ‘a very useful service’. Such an improvement could increase its modest but not altogether unsatisfactory circulation.95 By the end of the summer 1947, a number of acute issues that had been hampering the BC’s work were resolved, notably regarding the translation rights of English books for Greek publishers, the supplies of English textbooks and the delays in appointing BC staff.96 Thus, under Runciman’s directorship, the organization and operation of the BC 93 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 94 TNA: FO 924/​424, LC 3333, Minutes, Hilton Young, Hedley, Dudley, Johnstone, Lowell, Montagu-​Pollock, from 2 to 23 July 1946. 95 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3333, Osbert Lancaster, ‘A Brief Account of British Information Services in Greece, December 1944-​May 1946’, 20 June 1946. 96 TNA:  FO  924/​424, LC  3145, Letter, No.  169, Norton to Bevin, 20 June 1946; Letter, Montagu-​Pollock to Johnstone, 8 July 1946; Letter, Johnstone to Montagu-​ Pollock, 26 August 1946; Montagu-​ Pollock’s Draft Letter to Johnstone, 25 September 1946; Letter, FO to Norton, 30 September 1946.

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regularized somewhat and its results became more evident. Furthermore, the BC had proved itself to be –​alongside British information policy –​ an essential, effective and long-​term instrument in the dissemination of British propaganda in Greece. Warner left the British Institute in May 1947, and Runciman resigned as representative later that same month. This was followed by Cardiff ’s97 departure from Greece. After almost two years at the helm of the BC, one of the most creative periods of its history ended with their departure.98 Throughout their tenure, they managed to surround the BC with talented British writers and artists –​most of them with classical training –​who had travelled the country, had knowledge of the people and, in the post-​ war euphoria, believed in the coming of a new era. Their interaction with a number of gifted Greek intellectuals resulted in a rich literary and artistic collaboration.99 As enthusiasts of mutual cultural exchange, and not just because of their admiration of the ancient Greek past, they sought to reach out to wider social milieux in working-​class areas and in the provinces, and to present to them and the world the cultural achievements of modern Greece. This approach mirrored Kenneth Johnstone’s perceptions of how cultural relations should be developed. He advocated for a British 97 An anthology of Cardiff ’s memories of persons he met during his Athenian period when he worked with the BC, among whom were Lawrence Durrell and Patrick Leigh-​Fermor, is included in his book Friends Abroad:  Memories of Lawrence Durrell, Freya Stark, Patrick Leigh-​ Fermor, Peggy Guggenheim and Others (London: Radcliffe Press, 1997). 98 The long-​lasting impact on intellectual life and culture of the BC during the first years of its post-​war operation was noted by Frances Donaldson in a personal conversation in 1982 with a leading Greek citizen and at one time minister of culture; see Donaldson, The British Council, 147. 99 The theme has been fully explored in:  Edmund Keeley, Inventing Paradise:  The Greek Journey 1937–​47 (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1999); David Roessel, In Byron’s Shadow (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2002); Roderick Beaton, George Seferis: Waiting for the Angel. A Biography (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); David Wills, The Mirror of Antiquity: 20th Century British Travellers in Greece (Newcastle:  Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007). More recent is the collective work: Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018).

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cultural programme in Greece that performed as an intellectual link between the two peoples.100 It is precisely this distinction between ordinary cultural relations and intercultural communication that, in modern terms, defines what is called ‘public diplomacy’.101 As diplomat and academic Michael Llewellyn-​Smith, British ambassador to Greece from 1996 to 1999, argued: ‘if their appointment [at the BC] was not the result of extremely skillful choice by some anonymous genius in the FO, it was certainly an exceedingly lucky chance’. Thus, this fruitful collaboration between the BC and the local intelligentsia ‘was hardly part of a grand plan by the Council’.102 But maintaining these close cultural relations needed time and political will to cultivate, and as Runciman predicted, the next director would face difficulties in securing these conditions. The new setting created by the increased American domination of all aspects of economic and cultural life in Greece did not facilitate these efforts. Wilfrid G. Tatham took over in late September 1947 as the new representative. In trying to solve the BC’s staffing, financial and administrative issues, he faced considerable barriers from ‘the very uncooperative Athens Embassy’, which refused to support further increases in the size of the accounts section in the Athens office.103 As Llewellyn-​Smith mused, ‘perhaps it was all too good to last’.104

A change of scene: enter the Americans At a turning point in Anglo-​Greek relations (and while Runciman was still in office), Sir Ronald F. Adam,105 chair of the BC, and Alethea C. 1 00 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, 7 March 1945. 101 The term ‘public diplomacy’ was coined in 1965; see Nicholas J. Cull, ‘Public Diplomacy before Gullion:  The Evolution of a Phrase’, in Nancy Snow and P. M. Taylor, eds, Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy (London: Routledge, 2009),  19–​23. 102 Llewellyn-​Smith, ‘Steven Runciman’, 82. 103 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Minutes, Alethea Hayter, 25 August 1948. 104 Llewellyn-​Smith, ‘Steve Runciman’, 83. 105 On Sir R. T. Adam’s views on cultural diplomacy and the role of the BC, see Roger Broad, The Radical General:  Sir Ronald Adam and Britain’s New Model Army 1941–​1946 (Stroud, UK: Spellmount, 2013), 184–​192.

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Hayter,106 BC acting director for north/​south Europe, visited Greece in February and March 1947, respectively. They did so at the precise moment the position of Greece in British foreign policy was to undergo a major transformation. Britain, facing acute post-​war financial difficulties, decided at a Cabinet meeting on 30 January 1947 to radically reduce its involvement in Greece and turned to the US to take over its role in supporting the royalist Greek government. On 21 February, in the midst of the Greek Civil War, Britain informed the US State Department that it would suspend economic aid to Greece at the end of March, but emphasized its view that Greece should not be lost from the Western sphere of influence. On 12 March, Truman’s declaration of his Doctrine pledging to contain the communist uprising in Greece implied that American support might also be forthcoming for other nations threatened by Soviet communism. George Marshall’s subsequent offer of aid in June acted as a catalyst, impacting heavily on the economy, society and culture of Greece. The British decision to withdraw aid from Greece inevitably affected the BC’s work in the country, and with the waning of British political dominance in Greece, the resource costs of the BC’s presence required fresh consideration. In light of this looming crisis, the BC’s chair, Sir Ronald Adam, chose Greece as the first port of call on his one-​month tour of the Near and Middle East.107 Arriving in Athens in February 1947, he focused principally on the BC’s work in the teaching of English, its regional priorities, the hospital scheme in Thessaloniki, the need to maintain good relations with the Greek Ministry of Reconstruction and the need to find ‘good 106 Hayter (1911–​2006) spent her early childhood in Cairo, Egypt. She joined the BC in 1945. Her first overseas posting was as assistant representative at the BC Athens branch (1952–​1960), succeeding Lieutenant Colonel Smuts, nephew of Field Marshal Jan Smuts. Other postings she held were as deputy representative and assistant cultural attaché to Paris and representative to Belgium. She was author of notable works: A Sultry Month (London: Faber and Faber, 1968); Opium and the Romantic Imagination (London:  Faber and Faber, 1968); Horatio’s Version (London: Faber and Faber, 1972); and A Voyage in Vain (London: Faber, 1973). Her brother, William Hayter, was British ambassador to the Soviet Union (1953–​ 1957); see Harriet Harvey-​Wood, ‘Obituary’, The Guardian, 13 January 2006. 107 The other countries visited were Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iran and Egypt.

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replacements’ after losing the services of Runciman, Warner and Cardiff in the early summer of 1947. In his view, the main problem in Greece was the teaching of English. The 1945 legislation that had nominally introduced English as a compulsory subject in Greek secondary schools was yet to be implemented, and Runciman and Adam expected little help from the Greek government for its imminent enactment. The passage of legislation necessary for the BC to commence work on the hospital in Thessaloniki had also suffered delays, which Adam blamed on the ‘political bias’ that had ‘reared its ugly head’ in the Greek Parliament. Of all the Greek ministries he visited, Adam found the Ministry of Reconstruction to be ‘the most progressive’, and he was intrigued to discover that three directors of that ministry had been BC scholars. Adam also appreciated the value of the Anglo-​Greek Review, which he found to be ‘penetrating into the furthest villages, because of the authors’.108 Regarding the BC’s regional posts, he regarded Macedonia as the most important part of Greece for the BC to be engaged with, considering Thessaloniki as the centre from which they could cover the region. The one-​man directorate in Patras was also found to be doing ‘great work’, covering a wide field in the Peloponnese. He reported that work was to continue in Mytilene, which was ‘important as a left-​wing field’, and Piraeus, in terms of ‘catering for a particular class’. At the same time, Crete was to be given up temporarily and work in Corfu would not even be attempted, given the circumstances of the time. As a general observation, Adam thought it ‘wonderful’ how little politics had affected the BC’s work, that there was little or no overlap with the Embassy’s Information Department, and that the friendliest relations existed between the two. However, the BC was facing financial difficulties centrally, and he detected a degree of demoralization among sections of the BC’s staff in Greece.109 Cuts were imposed, recruitment became impossible, and discussions with the FO on employment and salaries failed to reach any positive conclusions. The constitution of the BC was also altered, thus introducing significant changes to its internal structures.110 108 TNA: BW 1/​191, GEN/​310/​20B, ‘The British Council Report on the Chairman’s tour of the Near and Middle East, 28th January 1947 –​8th March, 1947’, Strictly Confidential, R. T. Adam to K. R. Johnstone, Overseas Division C, 31 March 1947. 109 Ibid. 110 Donaldson, The British Council, 160–​161.

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Taken together, these multiple pressures –​financial, political and structural –​forced the BC to reconsider its financial base in regard to its operations in Greece. Following the chair’s visit to Greece, on 6 March Runciman, at Adam’s request, sent a plan for regional reorganization in Greece, which he submitted to the BC’s Foreign Division.111 He suggested that the new policy was to evolve the current regional directorate system into an arrangement of self-​supporting schools supervised by visiting BC staff. The main aim of the first phase of the new plan was to establish more effective contact with English schools and Anglophile societies in the Greek provinces. An equally important objective was to rebalance the costs of the enterprise. This included the financing of summer schools with a fund of 1,000 pounds derived from savings accrued from the suspension of the Athens chair of British life and thought. Also the Piraeus Directorate was saved by suspending the Crete Directorate. Savings were also made by downgrading the Thessaloniki chair to a Grade III lectureship and by reinstating the sports officer’s post as an alternative to the more expensive expansion of the Piraeus Directorate.112 The new plan was operative from 1 October 1947. Before Wilfrid G. Tatham, the new representative in Greece, left London for Athens in late September, he was told by Alethea Hayter about the proposed staff changes in the regional reorganization plan, which were eventually approved in mid-​October 1947.113 In November, however, a devasting intervention occurred when the British ambassador in Athens was asked by the FO for his ‘urgent views’ on the BC’s budget estimates. The ambassador replied that he was ‘in honest doubt’ as to whether ‘in these hard times [the BC] is in some ways a bit of a luxury’. The Greek 111 TNA:  BW  34/​11, GR/​8/​2, Ref:  POL/​1/​1, ‘Plan for the Reorganisation of the Regional Offices of the British Council in Greece’, Runciman to the Director of Foreign Division C, 4 March 1947. Hayter was in Athens at that time discussed the plan with Runciman and Cardiff. 112 TNA:  BW  34/​11, GR/​8/​2, Hayter to Johnstone, Establishment, Budget and Control, Greece Reorganisation Plan:  Adjustments to 1947/​48 Allocations, 11 July 1947; Hayter to Tatham, 7 October 1947. 113 TNA:  BW  34/​11, Confidential Report, GR/​8/​2, W.  G. Tatham to Johnstone, 14 October 1947. See also Agenda, Finance Committee, 12th Meeting, 14 October 1947.

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people were in ‘the direst straits and lectures on art and poetry […] simply do not make sense, except to an audience of two or three hundred of the intelligentsia’. The ambassador made two general criticisms: first, there was undue expenditure on administration costs; and, second, under present circumstances, much of the BC’s work in Greece –​including teaching English and promoting British culture –​was an extracurricular activity the Greeks could not afford. Reducing expenditures became the most pressing issue, and the FO gave serious consideration to the ambassador’s recommendation for drastic cuts,114 which appeared to herald a major shift in attitude towards the role and importance of the BC in Greece. The decline in the importance of the BC at this moment should also be understood in relation to the departure of the entire coterie of the most intellectually engaged senior staff of the BC, its reduced finances and the growing predominance of American cultural hegemony in the country. But, in particular, it should be seen in the context of its relevance to FO policy, the financial constraints and the notion of cultural diplomacy as an unnecessary expenditure in a period of retrenchment.115 Besides, it had been felt at the FO from the beginning that the Athens branch was not sustainable as a Grade I post beyond the first two or three years. ‘I could not have arrived at a worse time […] trying to pick up as many threads as possible’, Tatham wrote to Johnstone shortly after the former assumed his duties in Athens; the latter was then Division C (Europe) controller of the BC London office. One of the first difficulties Tatham faced was staff crisis among both the London-​appointed and the Greek staff. This had been long in the making, but erupted openly just as he took up his duties and was exacerbated by the recent loss of such senior staff as Runciman, Warner and Cardiff. Along with their departure, ‘the partial or temporary loss of valuable contacts’ left the BC at a standstill. Another priority was the BC’s work in Thessaloniki, namely the delicate questions of the Thessaloniki professorship, the hospital and the nursing 114 TNA: BW 34/​11, Letter, GR/​8/​2, FO to G. H. Shreeve, BC’s Assistant-​Director-​ General for regional work, 20 December 1947. Relevant paragraphs of the British ambassador’s reply in his conferential letter to the FO on 11 November 1947 were quoted in the FO’s letter to Shreeve. 115 White, The British Council, 72.

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school project. Tatham visited the area on 22–​27 October 1947 as his first act after taking office, as he needed to obtain a more complete picture of all the BC’s activities in Greece. Runciman’s report of 31 May116 provided the basis for Tatham’s understanding of a number of key issues regarding the operation of the BC and enabled him to shape his own opinion of the work that needed to be done.117 In a supportive letter, Johnstone also helped Tatham formulate his plans for the immediate future of BC work in Greece by suggesting some key areas of interest that London regarded as its main strategic aims. Firstly, the teaching of English to teachers in Greek state schools together with the application of ‘gentle and insistent pressure’ on the Greek Ministry of Education ‘to implement their promise to introduce or extend the teaching of English’ were regarded areas of high priority. Secondly, the cultivation of the intelligentsia and the maintenance of high circulation figures for the Anglo-​Greek Review were matters of significance. Finally, the provision of adequate cover for the main provincial centres, including Crete, Rhodes and Epirus, was important; at this point in time, these centres were not receiving due attention from the BC. Those aims were regarded as ‘roughly co-​equal’. To achieve them, two vital posts needed to be filled: director of the British Institute and an Athens-​based regional officer for Piraeus –​the latter was an important post for the BC’s work in the wider Athens area. Johnstone also warned Tatham of the risk of becoming too closely connected to ‘the richer and extreme right elements in Athens’ in their ‘determined attempt […] to annex the Council and all its works’. He advised keeping the embrace ‘at arm’s length’; it would be fatal ‘to yield to it’, he noted with characteristic acerbity.118 Instead, he advised that the BC should continue its attempt to approach other social classes outside the centre of Athens, particularly in areas with a significant working-​class population. 116 This was apparently was based on a detailed report prepared in April 1947 by J. B. Elliott, assistant representative for northern Greece, presumably at the request of Sir Ronald Adams (TNA: BW 34/​11, BC, Salonica). 117 TNA:  BW  34/​ 11, Confidential Report, GR/​ 8/​ 2, Tatham to Johnstone, 14 October 1947. 118 TNA:  BW  34/​ 11, GR/​ 8/​ 2, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Tatham, 13 November 1947.

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The British Council in 1948 and 1949 In January 1948, Tatham held a conference of BC directors and regional directors to discuss the entire organization of the BC in Greece. This meeting was followed up with a corresponding report in late January, covering Tatham’s early months in the post. Knowing relatively little about the country and its recent war history, and having spent only a short period of time there, he admitted that it was hard for him to come to any hard and fast conclusions regarding the position of the BC in Greece. What he discovered, though, was that for the Greek government, far from being a high priority, culture was deemed merely ‘an also-​ran’.119 For the government, the war effort against the rebels, reconstruction and the task of addressing the severe economic conditions were the most urgent considerations. Moreover, American pressure for the government to balance the budget reduced Greek spending on cultural activities even further and left little room for other projects. In his report, Tatham noted that two of BC’s main plans were largely ‘ruined’ due to the failure of the Greek government to implement its promise to introduce English into Greek schools and due to the dysfunction of the scheme to set up English schools across the country. He noted that the latter had resulted from the dangers of travel for regional officers during the ongoing civil war, coupled with the reluctance of local authorities to engage with the projects under such turbulent conditions. Due to the drastic administrative changes at the BC in 1947, the continuity of its policies had been severed. The BC was faced with the task of establishing anew its position and rebuilding its relations with the Greeks. This process was slow, however, owing to the delays in senior staff replacements and the limited time period with which the representative and his assistant had to develop the necessary networks. Three government ministries were of direct interest to the BC: reconstruction, education and health. Good working relationships were maintained with the first, while 119 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, W. G. Tatham, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947 –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948.

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‘cordial’ contacts continued with the second. But any contact with health depended entirely on the Embassy’s decision in regard to the Thessaloniki Hospital scheme. In terms of the academic sector in Athens, Professor Sewell was allocated the task of liaising between the university and the BC; in practice, though, the BC was involved beyond the formal level. In Thessaloniki, it was the British Institute that undertook the task of liaising with the university and with other institutions, including the local authorities and foreign consulates, and individuals. As for the general public, Tatham also found that the BC needed to resist the embrace of the rich right-​wing elements that sought to influence its work. Ultimately, however, Tatham expressed some optimism that ‘a proper balance’ could be struck, as BC staff continued to maintain friendly relations with all social groups. Meanwhile, outside Athens it was easier to reach a wider audience; this was due principally to the work and personal tact of the regional directors and other staff. Tatham also raised a number of long-​term policy questions on which decisions needed to be made in London. He recommended that the BC ought to keep their organization flexible while dealing with the constantly changing political situation in Greece. He suggested, firstly, that they abandon the regional reorganization plan, originally proposed by Runciman in March 1947. Tatham conjectured that the proposed scheme, which involved a considerable amount of travel by regional directors, may have been effective under normal conditions, but not under the circumstances of civil war. Secondly, he proposed the amalgamation of the British Institute and the IES. In 1945, when both the prospect of English becoming a compulsory subject in secondary schools and the establishment of two additional seats at the University of Athens appeared likely, the BC acquired a new, privately owned building in Kolonaki Square. This raised the number of BC-​run centres in Athens to three: the BC office, the British Institute and the IES. In 1948, with prospects uncertain, the BC considered that such an arrangement was a waste of both money and manpower; Tatham agreed that the number of BC buildings should be reduced to two. Whereas the British Institute was ostensibly the BC’s main centre of activity in Athens in 1948, it appeared to Tatham that it did not ‘pull its weight’, being too little used and having failed to establish a notable presence in Athenian

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intellectual life, as Warner had envisaged in 1947. Without an appointed director and with very few students –​since it only catered to diploma candidates at the time –​it was found to be significantly underperforming compared to the IES. With its two thousand or so students, the IES was, as Tatham observed, ‘probably the most vigorous and effective Council agency in Greece’. Its success demonstrated the need for further ‘elementary or near-​elementary teaching’ in Greece, and if London continued to fail to acknowledge that need, the consequences would be ‘disastrous’ for the work of the BC. Thirdly, he strongly advised that resources should be made available to establish a new education officer post. Given the urgent need to develop and co-​ordinate a teaching strategy, the BC required a qualified educational advisor. This person would be based in Athens but would devote up to half of their time travelling and developing provisions in the provinces. The duties of the post were to include inspecting, advising and reporting on regional directorates as well as inspecting schools in the districts. The post would also take responsibility for the Cambridge examinations, all summer schools and the supervision of scholarship candidate selection. Fourthly, while ‘Arts and Letters’ were not be neglected, the BC’s cultural programme should in the first instance focus on issues of relevance to the process of reconstruction, such as medicine, science and engineering. Finally, should a major reorganization of the BC take place, a new Grade II officer post would be necessary to develop the work in northern Greece.120 For the London directors of the BC, the issue of introducing English into Greek state schools was a major concern, and the prospect of postponing its introduction indefinitely was regarded as ‘a serious blow’ to the BC’s long-​ term planning in Greece. It would be ‘a disastrous error’, Johnstone pointed out, to leave the field of foreign language teaching in Greek secondary schools to the French. They did, however, agree to the proposed amalgamation of the Athens institutes, which left only two issues to be resolved: the regional reorganization plan and the creation of an education officer post.121 Replying to 120 Ibid. 121 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Minutes, Alethea Hayter, 17 February 1948; see also BW 34/​23, GR/​8/​2, Johnstone’s Letter of 19 March in Regional Officer to Deputy Controller, Overseas ‘C’, ‘Greece: General Policy’, 28 May 1948; BW 34/​

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Tatham, Johnstone summarized the BC’s views on the main problems raised in his report. While the London office confirmed its strong support for the educational policy Tatham had outlined for Greece, it also took the view that the general approach should be one of sending ‘gentle’ and tactful reminders to the Greek Ministry of Education regarding the BC’s ‘ultimate objective’ in regard to its educational activities in the country. ‘We do not want to irritate them’, Johnstone warned, ‘by repeatedly demanding a reform that under present conditions is quite impossible for them to carry out.’ On the question of the regional reorganization plan, two general points were apparent to the BC’s London directors. Firstly, it was scarcely possible to have a system of travelling regional directors as originally envisaged given that it was so dangerous to travel. Secondly, they could not hope to cover the whole of Greece with the finances at their disposal. It seemed therefore that the best course of action would be to maintain permanent regional officers in as many of the main provincial centres as the BC could afford. In as many of the less strategically important centres as possible, a resident BC officer would be kept to lay the groundwork for the centres to become financially self-​sufficient in around two years. Tatham’s proposal for an educational advisor was to be considered in view of a revised regional plan, which would also include the merger of the two institutes. The argument for establishing a Grade II directorship at Thessaloniki was accepted in principle, but in reality was not affordable at that point in time.122 Tatham admitted that 1948 was a standstill year when significant progress could not be made.123 Changes at the senior staff level in 1947, dictated principally by funding cuts, led to serious reversals for the BC’s work in Greece. Moreover, the steadily deteriorating economic conditions and the continuing civil war also negatively impacted the work of the BC. Its regional network underwent damaging changes, leaving the centres at Thessaloniki, Patras, Corfu and Mytilene as the only areas of operation. Despite the fact that Crete was 23, GR/​8/​2, GR701/​3, Minutes, Alethea Hayter, 17 February 1948; by Johnstone, 19 February 1948. 122 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Tatham, 22 March 1948. 1 23 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division (C.  A.  M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C), ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948.

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considered a more important geographical region than Mytilene, the BC withdrew from the island, as its work there had not proved successful and the prospects were considered ‘unrewarding’. The Kavala Directorate also closed in June 1948. After a tour of Mytilene and Chios in May 1948, Tatham suggested that in 1949–​1950 the BC should close the Mytilene Directorate and open an alternative in Rhodes, Volos or even Crete. Janina was also suggested as a useful centre for a regional directorate, but as in Volos, the continuation of the civil war rendered it virtually inaccessible from Athens. Rhodes, however, was relatively unaffected by the civil war and was therefore deemed a promising centre for BC work. Thus, the recommendation was for a new BC directorate in Rhodes in 1949–​1950 and one in Crete in 1950–​1951, by which time the directorates in Corfu124 or Piraeus were expected to close. In addition, English language schools in Corfu and Piraeus were subsidized in order to secure their transition from regional directorates to self-​supporting institutions.125 An appealing feature of the BC’s work at this time was its lectureship programme. Tatham found that given Greece’s preoccupation with reconstruction, Greeks ‘thirsted for knowledge’ of medicine, engineering, agriculture and the practical sciences. Germany had previously provided teaching material for these subjects, and a vacuum was left that offered ‘a wide field for valuable work’ for the BC. Visiting lecturers played a valuable role in this process. An example was the public talks given by the renowned surgeon Sir Gordon Gordon-​Taylor, who brought the BC in Athens and Thessaloniki into close contact with a number of the most important figures in the field of Greek medicine. With this in mind, Tatham suggested that lecturers, along with future BC representatives or indeed other senior officers, should possess a background in the sciences rather than the humanities, as was the case hitherto. Moreover, Tatham believed that a month-​long visit from a British expert could do a great deal of good in terms of attracting wider interests. Indeed lectures and 124 The Directorate in Corfu, ‘of its small, domestic kind’, run by Maria Aspioti, ‘an exceptionally able and devoted Greek Directress’, was considered a model for the other BC regional directorates. Tatham stated that it was ‘an example to larger institutes in Greece’. 125 Mentioned in: TNA: BW 34/​20, GR/​680/​1, Director, South Europe, to Deputy Controller, Overseas ‘C’, ‘Regional Directorate –​Greece’, 25 June 1948.

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courses were offered at the institute by BC staff on a range of arts subjects –​ including history, literature, music and the plays of Shakespeare –​because they were still believed to attract the ‘best audiences’.126 Weekly public lectures were also delivered by staff members and English residents, including J. M. Cook of the British School of Archaeology and the economist Sir Theodore Gregory, while visiting lecturers included Steven Runciman, former BC representative in Athens, V. H. Mottram, professor of physiology at the University of London,127 the literature scholars Ronald Bottrall128 and Herbert Read, the classical pianist Gerald Moore, and Cecil Horsley, the Bishop of Gibraltar (1947–​1953).129 It is worth noting here that a number of prominent Western clerics visited Greece during the Greek Civil War to deliver lectures, assess attitudes in the circles of the Greek Orthodox Church130 and make contacts with Greek religious organizations.131 The 126 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division [C. A. M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 127 Dictionary of National Biography, 1971-​1980 (Oxford 1986), 604–​605. 128 Bottrall (1906–​1989) was a Faber poet and professor of English literature. He contributed significantly to the reconstruction of Britain’s post-​war cultural relations with Italy in the post of BC representative in Rome (April 1945–​1950), but also before the war as professor of English and assistant director of the British Institute at Florence (December 1937). In 1957–​1959, he served as the BC’s representative in Athens. 129 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division [C. A. M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C.], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 130 One such was Peter Hammond, British writer and priest, who came to Greece in 1948 as part of his two-​year postgraduate study at the University of Thessaloniki and travelled widely around the country. His book The Waters of Marah:  The Present State of the Greek Church (London: Rockliff Press, 1956) studied the Greek Orthodox Church and the nature of eastern Christianity. W. H. Clifford Frend, former wartime intelligence officer, was another prominent theologist whose name was connected to Greece (see footnote 259, Chapter 4). 131 David Balfour (see footnote 37, Chapter 1) of the British Embassy introduced –​ in November 1944  –​Harold Buxton, the Bishop of Gibraltar (1933–​1947), to the Greek Orthodox religious organization ‘Χριστιανικός Κοινωνικός Κύκλος’ [Christian Social Circle]. The organization organized lectures in February 1947 by Reverend Herbert Waddams of the Church of England Council on Foreign Relations, and in February 1948 by Francis F. Lincoln, member of the American

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Greek Church was the only Orthodox Church in Europe to be located in the Western sphere of influence, and by August 1947 –​when President Harry Truman’s correspondence with Pope Pious XII was published132 –​ Christianity had acquired a central role in the Anglo-​American religious anti-​communist campaign, as a Western ideological and spiritual counterproposal to the tenets of Marxism.133 While the Anglo-​American anti-​ communist campaign demonized the atheist Soviet Union, Britain and the US were at the same time concerned that the Russian Orthodox Church might enable the Soviet Union to extend its influence throughout the Orthodox world.134 In an effort to facilitate closer relations between Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Anglican leaders, an Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches was organized in Amsterdam in 1948.135 Additionally, British Institutes in Athens and Thessaloniki held cultural events comprised of discussions, literary groups136 and music clubs. These events were less successful in Athens than in Thessaloniki; in the latter, the

132

133 134 135

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Mission to Greece, Economic Co-​operation Administration, 1947–​1950; see Το Κοινωνικό Πρόβλημα και ο Χριστιανισμός [The Social Problem and Christianity] (Athens: Χριστιανικός Κοινωνικός Κύκλος [Christian Social Circle], 1951), 6–​7. Dianne Kirby, ‘Truman’s Holy Alliance:  The President, the Pope and the Origins of the Cold War’, in Dianne Kirby, ed., Religion and the Cold War (Basingstoke: Palgrave-​Macmillan, 2002), 77–​102. Kirby has written extensively on the religious anti-​communist front. See Dianne Kirby, ‘Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-​American Cold War Alliance and the Defence of Western Civilisation and Christianity, 1945–​1948’, Journal of Contemporary History 35/​3 (2000), 385–​412. Dianne Kirby, ‘The Archbishop of York and Anglo-​American Relations During the Second World War and Early Cold War, 1942-​1955’, The Journal of Religious History 23/​3 (October 1999), 327–​345, 335–​336. Dianne Kirby, ‘Harry S. Truman’s International Religious Anti-​ Communist Front, the Archbishop of Canterbury and the 1948 Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches’, Contemporary British History 15/​4 (Winter 2001), 35–​70. Cf. Darill Hudson, The World Council of Churches in International Affairs (London: Faith Press, 1977). Discussion groups were founded in April 1947 as part of the cultural groups field, with a music club and a literary group, founded in November 1947 (TNA: BW 34/​ 20, GR/​701/​3, J. H. Vinden, Thessaloniki, Acting Director, ‘The British Institute, Thessaloniki. Annual Report for the Period Ending March 31 1948’, 31 March 1948).

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influential collaboration of the Greek governor general, the persistence of the British Institute director and the care with which the events were organized all contributed to their greater vitality. Adding further value to the BC’s cultural work, the Anglo-​Greek Review –​rescued from ‘the axe of economy at the last moment’ –​was considered most valuable and ‘an important side’137 of the BC’s cultural work, maintaining a strong link with the Greek intelligentsia.138 The April 1948 issue, for example, was devoted to a series of critical articles on the Greek national poet Dionysios Solomos on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birth.139 Tatham praised George Katsibalis140 –​its ‘vigorous editor’ –​and noted approvingly that the review’s ‘rigid abstention from politics is in marked contrast to the vast majority of Greek papers and periodicals’.141 It was evident that by this time, the BC was encountering a radically transformed set of circumstances in Greece. And while Tatham sought to introduce major changes to capitalize on these circumstances, he admitted that the prospect of realising these aims in 1949 was ‘not as settled as could be wished’.142 The reasons for this failure included: first, the reduced number 137 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Letter, Personal and Confidential, Tatham to Johnstone, Personal and Confidential, 11 August 1948; ‘The BC. Greece. February 1948-​July 1948. Confidential Report’, 10 August 1948. 138 BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947 –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948. 139 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, P.  B. de Jongh, Functional Officer (Books & Publications), ‘Annual Report. April 1948 –​March 1949. Books & Publications Department’, 20 April 1949, annexed to W. G. Tatham, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949. 140 For Katsibalis’ (1899–​1978) editorship of the Anglo-​Greek Review and as a promoter of closer Anglo-​Greek literary relations, see the chapters in Mackridge and Ricks by D. Tsiovas, ‘Between Propaganda and Modernism’, 123–​154, and Avi Sharon, ‘Making a New Myth of Greece:  G.  K. Katsibalis as Anglo-​Greek Maecenas’, 111–​122. 141 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division [C. A. M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C.], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 142 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Letter, Personal and Confidential, Tatham to Johnstone, 11 August; ‘The BC. Greece. February 1948-​July 1948. Confidential Report’, 10 August 1948.

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of centres in Athens and the fact that reorganization proved impossible; second, the time taken up by major administrative and financial problems; and, third, the continuing uncertainty regarding staffing. The prevailing political and economic conditions and the failure to quell the rebels created an atmosphere that did not favour the positive development of new initiatives and condemned a number of projects –​including the Thessaloniki Hospital scheme and the lectureship –​to an impasse. At the British Institute in Athens –​even though the teaching was deemed to be of good quality, lectures were well attended, the library was well stocked, the numbers of readers were increasing and contacts with musicians, painters, actors and doctors were still productive –​Tatham felt there was insufficient ‘community life’. He noted equally that the IES tended to be too much like a school. BC publications, with the exception of the Anglo-​Greek Review, hardly sold at all. Yet some activities proved successful. Unlike in Athens, the British Institute in Thessaloniki enjoyed a high reputation and ‘excellent’ relations with the Greeks, both official and unofficial.143 Furthermore, the lecture tour programme by eminent British scholars continued throughout 1948 and 1949. Tatham also praised the BC’s regional directors, who had established a ‘remarkable’ position for themselves. He mentioned Elliott in Thessaloniki, Sheldon-​Williams in Kavala and Forster in Mytilene, all of whom left a most favourable impression on local society. ‘In the matter of Education’, Tatham noted that these regional directors were ‘looked on as oracles and they are treated with the respect due to a headmaster or inspector and they accept it naturally’. These regional directors –​often acting as ‘one-​man shows’ –​yielded excellent results for little cost to the BC, and Tatham wished the BC could afford more of them. To the positive activities of the BC Tatham added the production of British literary works and a successful summer school held at the Anargyrios kai Korgialenios Sxoli Spetson (AKSS [Anargyrios and Korgiallenios School of Spetses]) in July 1948, with students attending from the universities in Athens and Thessaloniki. The BC was also involved in the appointment of a new English master at the AKSS, whose job description involved high levels of school administration in addition 143

Ibid.

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to teaching duties. This was of some significance since the appointment of candidates who held administrative and classroom responsibilities could clearly exert a greater influence on both the conduct of the school and the projection of British interests as a whole.144 Tatham concluded that in general, when comparing the BC’s cultural efforts to those of other foreign competitors, the British had ‘no reason to be afraid’. The BC retained its appeal –​though in terms of its funding remained ‘hopelessly inferior’ to others, especially the Americans. The abundance of available funds from the US attracted public attention and gratitude –​the indicators of this aid were plainly visible; but their ‘strictly cultural’ work was limited. On the other hand, the French, despite their long-​standing cultural presence in Greece and their net being ‘spread wide and their work successful’, their involvement in groups with left-​wing sympathies caused some resentment in Greek government circles.145 In short, Tatham deplored the fact that matters which could have easily been settled had become far too complicated and that the efforts required in resolving them were time-​consuming and ultimately futile. A major obstacle was the British Embassy’s failure to support the work of the British to the extent that it needed and deserved. On this last point, Tatham enclosed an appendix on relations with the British Embassy. In it he expressed the view that the BC’s work had become unimaginative and restricted in scope. Moreover, he expressed that his staff were not sufficiently ‘spectacular’ to make the BC and its work more widely known and more admired in Athens. He himself, he confessed, was too distracted by staff, administrative and financial problems to be able to concentrate on a 144 Giorgos Stamatiou, Αναργύρειος και Κοργιαλένειος Σχολή Σπετσών. Ένα υποδειγματικό κολλέγιο [Anargyrios and Korgialenios School. An Exemplary College] (Spetses:  Spetses Cultural Association, 2003), 157. However, perception differences existed in the school system, which sometimes resulted in friction, as in 1953 when all English masters –​among them the novelist John Fowles –​were dismissed for trying to institute ‘moral reforms’. James R. Aubrey, John Fowles: A Reference Companion (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 18; Stamatiou, Αναργύρειος και Κοργιαλένειος Σχολή Σπετσών, 168. 145 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Letter, Personal and Confidential, Tatham to Johnstone, 11 August; ‘The BC. Greece. February 1948-​July 1948. Confidential Report’, 10 August 1948.

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representative’s real work, which should include establishing durable relations with ‘men of influence’ in the country. ‘Briefly’, he wrote, ‘we should not be satisfied with the amount we do and with the influence we have in Athens’.146 In response, the BC in London pledged to do their utmost to increase the quality of the staff in Athens and to find ‘a really live man, with some knowledge of Greece’ for the post of education officer. Hayter suggested that approval should be obtained urgently from the Treasury to defray the costs of appropriate rates of pay for local BC staff. But on each of these matters, the BC was obstructed by the ‘very unco-​operative Athens Embassy’, and an approach directly to the FO was considered to convey the view that the BC in Athens required stronger support from the Embassy.147 Thus 1948 was a year of retrenchment for the BC as a whole, one that saw its grant-​in-​aid reduced by 10 per cent, a blow that was followed by a further cut in funding throughout 1949–​1950. This led the BC to restrict its expenditures, resulting in a reduction of activities that was felt most keenly throughout Europe.148 With the reduced funds came an urgent need to reallocate resources and to adapt strategies to achieve the revised priorities. In Greece, the civil war raged unabated throughout 1949, and all efforts to defeat the rebels were met with failure. Such continuing uncertainty undermined the work of the BC on the ground, while the regional reorganization plan remained incomplete, the outstanding staffing issues stayed unresolved and the relations with the British Embassy were in the process of being redefined. In addition to funding cuts, communication difficulties further complicated the administrative management of the scholarship scheme and hampered the unfolding of the BC cultural programme. This was principally due to the fact that many of the areas within the BC’s sphere of operation had become war zones, thereby isolating them from the rest of the country and subjecting them to conscription, which in turn deprived the BC of many its collaborators and much of its target audience. Given this ill-​fated combination, Tatham noted in his 1949 annual report 146 Ibid. 147 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Director, South Europe, to Controller, Overseas ‘C’, 25 August 1948:  Minutes, Alethea Hayter, 25 August 1948; by Johnstone, 27 August 1948. 148 White, The British Council, 72–​73, 87.

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that ‘every new activity had to be financed by sacrificing an old activity and these sacrifices often hurt our prestige’. However, he maintained that the reputation of the BC remained high and that the appointment of new senior staff members began to return some of the lost ground. In his 1949 report, among the issues that Tatham found to be of ‘particular interest’ was the propaganda potential of the printed word. The BC in London had already acknowledged print in all its forms to be ‘one of the main British weapons in Greece’ and was eager to extend the public interest in books and other forms of print.149 The availability of English books via Greek booksellers was improving, thus reducing the need for BC intervention in the print market. As noted by BC Functional Officer P. B. de Jongh, at no time since the war had so many English books been for sale in Athens as in the 1948–​1949 period. During Christmas week in 1948, three booksellers independently reported that sales of English and American books had reached peak levels. As a result of rising interest in print, book exhibitions were launched in major Greek cities. The books covered a variety of subjects, ranging from art, literature and science to education, agriculture and engineering. English books were dispensed to the new English-​language section of the Library of the University of Athens, the library of the Welfare Department of the Greek General Staff, the Hellenic Institute of International and Foreign Law,150 Queen Frederica’s Military Nurses’ Training School, the Anglo-​Hellenic League in Athens, the Greek Red Cross in Corfu, the Technical Chamber of Greece, the editor of the periodical Aktines,151 the official organ of the Christian Union of Scientists, 149 TNA: BW 34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Minutes, Hayter, 19 July 1949. 1 50 The Hellenic Institute of International and Foreign Law (Ελληνικό Ινστιτούτο Διεθνούς και Αλλοδαπού Δικαίου) was established in 1939 by Professor Petros Vallindas, abolished in 1941 (Legislative Decree 116, issue 1, 30 May/​3 June 1941) and resumed its activities in 1946 (Law 188, No. 354, issue 1, 16 December 1946). It exists to this day. 151 This was a monthly scholarly publication intended to theologize science in a Christian conceptual framework and to demonstrate Christianity as a political response for the post-​war world reconstruction. Like the similar magazine Zoë, it resonated with anti-​communist rhetoric. Cf. V. Makrides, ‘Orthodoxy in the Service of Anticommunism: The Religious Organisation Zoë during the Greek Civil War’, in Philip Carabott and Thanasis D. Sfikas, eds, The Greek Civil War: Essays on a Conflict of Exceptionalism and Silence (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate: 2004), 159–​174,

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and individual ministers, artists and journalists. For the first time, reviews of English books became a regular feature in the Anglo-​Greek Review, and they appeared increasingly in the Greek152 press.153 In order to facilitate this area of operation in Greece, the books grant was raised by 100 pounds in 1949–​1950 and the BC in London signalled its intention to raise this by a further 150 pounds in 1950–​1951, while the periodical grant was to go up by 100 pounds in 1950–​1951.154 It was also reported that the BC continued to cultivate ‘cordial’ relations with the appropriate Greek authorities and to expand its circles of friendly contacts, thus increasing the volume of English teaching and consolidating other networks, especially in the medical, theatrical and musical fields.155 In relation to the latter, Tatham identified ‘the most important event’ as being the visit in February 1950 of Sir Malcolm Sargent,156 who twice conducted the State Orchestra, each time ‘before a packed and enthusiastic audience’.157 Interest in modern British art was stimulated by lectures and exhibitions held at the BC. Lady Norton,158 wife of the British ambassador, befriended artists such as John Craxton and Lucien Freud, both of whom she induced to visit Greece; Craxton exhibited his works at

152 153 154 155 1 56 157 158

161; D. Arkadas, ‘Κατασκευάζοντας εθνικόφρονες:  τα εκκλησιαστικά κατηχητικά σχολεία ως πεδίο θρησκευτικού αντικομμουνισμού’ [Constructing Nationalists: The Sunday Schools as a Field of Religious Anticommunism], Θέσεις, 138 ( January/​ March 2017), 69–​91. Such as H Kathimerini, Eleftheria, To Vima, Oi Kairoi, Nea Oikonomia, Archives of Economics and Social Sciences, Iatriki, Agon Epivioseos, Aktines, Aionas and Poitiki Techni. TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, P.  B. de Jongh, Functional Officer (Books & Publications), ‘Annual Report. April 1948 –​March 1949. Books & Publications Department’, 20 April 1949. TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Minutes, Hayter, 19 July 1949. See, White, The British Council, 89. TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949. Eleftheria, 28 February 1950, Mousiki Kinisis, no. 21, 1 March 1950. TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to Overseas  C, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1949/​50’, 27 May 1950. Noel Evelyn (née Hughes) was generally known as Peter. She cofounded the London Gallery (The Papers of Leopold Amery: AMEL 6/​3/​142).

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BC premises on several occasions. Exhibitions of this kind were favoured by the BC as they took up little space, often provided a good background for lectures and were particularly attractive in the provinces. On printed publicity, the Anglo-​Greek Review continued to maintain its high reputation in Greece’s intellectual world.159 Additionally, a new magazine called Prosperos160 was issued in Corfu by the local BC directorate. An important dimension of its work in this regard was the sponsorship of translations and the publication of English classics. The new director of the institute, Louis MacNiece,161 began a series of play readings that proved very popular, while play readings in Thessaloniki and Corfu also drew appreciative audiences. Early in 1950, Professor Sewell produced ‘Doctor Faustus’ at the British Institute, and the actress Vivienne Bennett visited Athens and Thessaloniki to give Shakespearean recitals. However, the cultural offer provided by the BC faced increasing competition in the major urban centres –​particularly in Athens –​from a number of foreign agencies that were broadening the choices for Greek audiences. Additionally, thanks to the gradual rise in living standards, the once literally starving population became far more discerning in regard to the quality of the cultural offer. Outside of Athens, the provincial towns were neglected to a considerable extent and enjoyed far fewer cultural opportunities. And while, hitherto, the BC sought to expand its work in these regions with some success, the imposition of financial constraints on its work increasingly led to the shrinking of those regional networks.162 Beyond 159 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949. 160 Cf. Theodosis Pylarinos, ‘The Magazine Prosperos and the British Council Corfu Branch’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​ Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955, 159–​171. See also Pyrarinos’ entry in Droulia and Koutsopanagou, eds, Εγκυκλοπαίδεια του Ελληνικού Τύπου 1784–​1974, 558–​559. 161 He was seconded from the BBC to direct the British Institute in January 1950 (David Ricks, ‘MacNeice in Greece’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955, 201–​218. Cf. Amanda Wrigley, Louis MacNeice: The Classical Radio Plays (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013). 162 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to Overseas  C, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1949/​50’, 27 May 1950.

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the range of specifically cultural events and facilities, the BC acknowledged that the country’s most pressing needs at a time of post-​war reconstruction were such items as laboratory and medical equipment, hospitals and agricultural machinery. While most were sourced from large American and international organizations, Tatham argued that British firms could contribute to the rebuilding effort too. The BC’s relations with the medical world in particular, he noted, were ‘very wide and intimate’, while contacts were also made with engineers, mathematicians, geologists, botanists and agriculturists who the BC had assisted in the past. However, the BC was handicapped by a paucity of staff members with the scientific backgrounds that could facilitate communication with such professional groups.163 The ending of the civil war with the defeat of the rebels in the summer of 1949 certainly impacted the BC’s work. The opening of the roads re-​ established countrywide communications, and Runciman’s proposed plan of touring regional directors became feasible again. But until May 1950, most of the regional directorates had closed, leaving open only those in Thessaloniki, Patras and Corfu. The Piraeus Directorate reopened in October 1948, then closed again in March 1949 due to poor demand. The Mytilene Directorate closed in June 1950, and Forster took over Patras after the position in Rhodes was cancelled due to financial reasons. The easing of travelling restrictions also permitted the education officer to spend more time touring the country and gathering information on the demands for English teaching in all parts of Greece; in this way, his post began to fulfil its promise. Tatham stressed again the need for an Anglo-​ Greek Cultural Convention that would ratify the ‘anomalous status’ of the BC in Greece and regularize the existing state of affairs.164 It was agreed in London that such a cultural convention should take place, and a draft text was forwarded to Athens.165

163 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949. 164 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to Overseas  C, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1949/​50’, 27 May 1950. 165 TNA: BW 34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Minutes, Hayter, Scott-​Kilvert and others, 19 July 1949, and Hayter, 11 July 1950.

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British Council educational activities in Greece The teaching of the English language, which had always been the BC’s main focus, was linked to the introduction of English language teaching in secondary schools and the reform of the Greek education system at secondary school and university levels. In November 1944, Leeper urged immediate action on these priorities, in case other ‘undesirable bodies’ tried to seize the initiative. This was in reference to the reactivation of the Institut Français and to a ‘disturbing report’ that the EAM was planning to establish a similar institute in which English and Russian would be taught.166 In a stormy correspondence with the CRD in mid-​November 1944, Leeper urged that the BC consider a list of activities, including reopening the English Language Institute, sending a high-​ranking British education officer to Athens to renew contact, and considering what assistance could be given to the contemplated reorganization of Greek universities and schools or to exchange students. In this context, he proposed that an immediate gift of books to the University of Athens would be an effective intervention, while British lecturers should be sent to Athens to teach on topics such as Britain at war, reconstruction and social reform.167 Among Leeper’s recommendations, the BC thought the ‘most important proposal’ was the one concerning the Greek educational system and specifically his suggestion that a competent man be sent to study the future of English teaching, in conjunction with the Greek Ministry of Education. This was linked to a few core issues, namely the renewal of the Byron visiting professorship and the creation of two additional chairs at the University of Athens, as stated in the FO telegram of 2 May 1944. The BC found that establishing a British influence in the Greek state educational system was of very great importance, and they were ‘most anxious to co-​ordinate our activities in this way’ and in pursuit of a wider scheme, 166 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1489, Telegram No. 240, Leeper to FO, 16 November 1944; LC 1506, Telegram No. 263, Leeper to FO, 18 November 1944. There is no evidence of an EAM plan to establish an institute, other than a probable intelligence report regarding the Greek-​Soviet League, founded in July 1945. 167 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 1544, Telegram No. 287, Leeper to FO, 20 November 1944.

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‘which would affect not only the organization but the personnel of the Greek system’.168 By co-​ordinating the actions of the FO with those of the BC, a new plan was set to emerge. This included the compulsory teaching of English in secondary schools, the reconceptualization of the Byron visiting professorship at the University of Athens and the sponsorship of new university chairs in Athens and Thessaloniki, not only in the humanities but also in relation to scientific or technical subjects. Furthermore, the plan foresaw an increase in scholarships for Greek students to study at British universities, a programme of lectures in Greece from select British visitors, the stocking of libraries in Athens and Thessaloniki, the distribution of educational and technical periodicals at Leeper’s discretion and a range of other cultural projects (expanded on below).

Teaching the English language In late January 1945, David Shillan169 was sent on an exploratory visit to Greece to investigate the current position of the BC and to discuss long-​ term plans with Leeper. Shillan was authorized by the FO to remain in Athens so long as the BC required the help of a senior officer to supervise the temporary arrangements.170 With Shillan in Athens and Whitworth, Gotch and Barron about to take charge of the IES in Athens and Thessaloniki, Leeper considered the moment ‘most favourable’ to draw up a new programme for the development of English teaching in Greece 168 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 276, Letter, Wickham to Johnstone, copy of this Letter to Gurney, 18 January 1945. 169 On 14 April 1945, after his visit to Greece, he gave a speech at Chatham House entitled ‘A General Impression of the Situation in Greece’, RIIA/​8/​1105 (Chatham House, London, 10 April 1945). He wrote extensively on linguistic matters and the teaching of English language. Among his works were: Exercises in Criticism (London:  Bell, 1931) and Spoken English:  A Short Guide to English Speech (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1954). 170 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 531, Telegram No. 8, FO to Athens, Leeper, following for Shillan, 8 February 1945.

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and for a renewed liaison with Greek educational authorities.171 In the meantime –​until a plan was drawn up, and since the preparation of higher education programmes would take time  –​Leeper was anxious to ‘start something, however modest, at once’. He proposed to start both elementary and advanced English-​language classes in the three major cities –​ Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras –​and in Corfu, due to its Anglophile cultural load. He estimated that the full cost of a three-​month programme, including the salaries of teachers and junior administrative staff, would be adequately covered by student fees. If absolutely necessary, BC funds for up to 300 pounds could be advanced with the Political Intelligence Department’s agreement from Allied Information Service (AIS) funds, against future repayment by the BC. These classes would be ‘strictly temporary’ and would not be given under the IES’ name, thus avoiding committing the BC until it was able to decide what the long-​term scheme of its Athens activities would be. Before the war, the BC’s work in Greece was principally confined to the teaching of English at the IES in Athens. Leeper intended to obtain the original IES building through military requisition. He also raised the question of a possible English school and underlined the need to send books –​especially textbooks172 –​in order to meet the growing demand for the English language, which was further stimulated by the English lessons broadcasted on Athens Radio and by the forthcoming English language classes at the institute, for which 13,000 pupils were enrolled. As no supplies of books were currently available, Leeper asked the FO to obtain permission to publish English reprints in Greece as AIS productions, instead of through Greek publishers, for

171 TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  397, Telegram No.  1 Brico, Leeper, Athens, to FO, 22 January 1945 (re. FO Telegram No. 2 Brico, of 17 December 1944 and Telegram No. 4 Brico, of 22 December 1944). 172 The most popular were:  C.  K. Ogden, Basic Way to English, Part 1 to Part IV (London:  Evans Bros); L.  W. Lockhart, Everyday Basic (London:  Kegan Paul); C. E. Eckersley, Brighter English (London: Longman); and Walter Ripman, English Book for Boys and Girls Whose Mother Tongue Is Not English (London: J. M. Dent & Sons).

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fear of book piracy.173 However, his suspicion proved to be unfounded.174 Apart from focusing on English language teaching, Leeper’s other main priority was liaising with the Greek educational authorities. This task had to be undertaken by a British educational figure of sufficient seniority, who would be sent to Greece for this purpose. As the Greek authorities might resent direct advice on the reorganization of education, the plan was for this person to give a course of lectures to Greek teachers on British educational methods and the reorganization of British education, which would either be preceded or followed by a tour of Greek schools and universities. Leeper surmised that this ‘would give opportunities for tactful guidance and offers of help’.175 Professor Hamley eventually visited Greece in June, staying for about three months. S. J. Davies, dean of the Faculty of Engineering at the University of London, also visited Greece but limited his visit to three weeks.176 While, in Athens, Leeper, Shillan and Johnstone discussed the future plans for possible British work in Greece, in London, Secretary General Seymour tested the BC’s plans in talks with A. Agnides, the Greek ambassador in London. Agnides warmly welcomed the reopening of the BC’s work in Greece and considered the establishment of British schools in Greece –​including the revival of the AKSS177 –​the first priority. He 173 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 397, Leeper, Athens to FO, Telegrams No. 1 Brico of 22 January 1945, No. 2 Brico of 25 January 1945, No. 3 Brico of 28 January 1945, and No. 17. Brico of 8 March 1945. 174 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 397, Telegram No. 79 Brico, FO to Athens, following for Cardiff, 14 July 1945. 175 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1068, Telegram No. 21 Brico, Athens (Leeper) to FO, 16 March 1945. 176 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 942, Telegram No. 56, Brico, FO to Athens, 15 June 1945. 177 It was modeled on ‘Eton and Harrow Schools’ (Stamatiou, Αναργύρειος και Κοργιαλένειος Σχολή Σπετσών, 12) and was inaugurated in 1927 by the Greek premier, Eleftherios Venizelos. In 1939, the school was placed under the high protection of King George II. Its first principal was Eric Sloman (1927–​1934). Sloman had previously been the first director of the Police Academy in Corfu, established in 1921. He served as chief censor of the Greek broadcasts from Cairo (May 1941–​January 1945) (see Joly, The Dawn of Amateur Radio, 124). From 1945 to his death in 1952, he served as head of the English department of the American College (Phsychiko). By virtue of law (ΦΕΚ 19, Law 3776, 22 January 1929, Article 5, 215) together with

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approved the BC’s decision to concentrate on teacher training institutes as part of the educational reforms. He eventually agreed with Seymour on the importance of reforming the Greek educational system through the introduction of British methods, and he further agreed that the visits of Professor Hamley and Professor Davies were likewise of the highest importance.178 A memorandum jointly prepared in Athens concluded that the spread of the English language throughout Greece was indisputably to the advantage of both Anglo-​Greek relations and British commerce. The principal British foundations in Greece would be the British Institute in Athens and Thessaloniki, which would serve as centres of advanced study and instruction in British life and thought. They would also hold advanced classes in English up to the standard of the Cambridge Diploma in English Studies and serve as centres for higher studies of both the English language and various aspects of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, they would hold special courses of a limited duration and summer schools for future teachers of the English language at secondary school and university levels. They would therefore be freed from the ‘burden of elementary teaching’ and leave this to the ‘schools of English’,179 which should be founded alongside the two the Young Men’s Christian Association School in Thessaloniki, the AKSS was ranked equal to the Hellenic-​American Educational Foundation (Athens College) (est. 1926). English was taught by English-​speaking masters selected by the BC. Until the Second World War, among the English masters were Kenneth Mathews (1931–​1932), later BBC Balkan correspondent, D. E. Noel-​Paton ( January 1938–​ 1941), and since April 1942, editor of the BBC Greek section, N. Whitworth (1940–​1941). The school suspended its operation in January of 1941. It went back into operation in 1946–​1947. The school buildings were granted to the BC to organize summer schools for English teachers (1947–​1949). After the war, among the English masters were Charles Fowler (1947, 1953) and John Fowles (1951–​1953). The school did not manage to reach its pre-​war level; the range of its pupils’ social composition narrowed and was ‘far from the English college models’ that had inspired its founders. It was placed under the protection and influence of the royal family and had an anti-​communist spirit. For more, see Stamatiou, Αναργύρειος και Κοργιαλένειος Σχολή Σπετσών. 178 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 868, GR/​8/​2, Minutes, Seymour to Wickham, 2 March 1945; Wickham to Gurney and a copy to Johnstone, 5 March 1945. 1 79 The BC accepted Whitworth’s recommendation that even though elementary instruction to junior students was planned for these schools, the use of the word

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institutes. These schools would give elementary instruction in English to a certain number of students –​say 2,000 –​selected from a much larger mass of applicants. When instituted, these English classes should be self-​ supporting. The need for elementary English instruction was thus recognized as urgent until such time as the introduction of English into Greek secondary schools could produce a generation of students who had been taught English in their early education. With regard to secondary education, British intervention in the Greek school system was carried out indirectly to avoid any hint of foreign interference, as suggested by Leeper. Johnstone, who signed the memorandum, made special mention of the AKSS. The school, whose building had remained intact during the war, was due to reopen, and a member of its governing body contacted Johnstone in late March 1945. Previous experience had shown that the governing body was a ‘very difficult organisation to help effectively’, but the BC could not refuse all assistance. If the school opened again, Johnstone felt that some ‘very radical reforms’ should be made in its constitution. If its constitution was revised ‘in such a way as to strengthen the authority of the British element in the school without exposing it to Greek intrigues’180 and if the school itself was obliged to draw its pupils from a wider section of Greek society, then it could be an experimental school along British lines. In any case, there should be no question of opening it as a British initiative, ‘since we cannot control it’; rather, its opening should be ‘primarily as a result of Greek effort’. Nonetheless, the foundation of a British school in Greece –​an idea supported by Leeper –​held a strong case, particularly in northern Greece, provided that –​as Johnstone noted –​‘such a school can be largely self-​supporting’.181 In July 1945, Johnstone, now at his new post in the London office, again raised the question of Spetses to the BC.182 By ‘school’ instead of ‘institute’ of English studies, would detract from BC prestige, while the latter did convey something to interested Greeks. These schools were eventually named Institutes of English Studies (TNA:  BW  34/​10, Thompson’s Minutes to Orton, Johnstone, Deputy Secretary General, 25 July 1945). 180 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, ‘British Council Work in Greece: 1945/​6’, 7 March 1945. 1 81 Ibid. 182 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945.

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late August 1945, although no final decision was made about the AKSS,183 the BC chose the English masters who –​under Article 7 of the school’s statute –​would also serve as co-​principals of the school.184 Johnstone admitted that one of the reasons he deliberately delayed making a decision regarding the AKSS (and in general for any British school in Greece) was to avoid his actions being interpreted as an attempt to compete with the three American institutions in Greece: the Athens College, the Athens College for Girls (latterly known as Pierce College) and the Anatolia College of Thessaloniki.185 However, the BC’s recommendations to the Greek government on teaching English and training English teachers ultimately did take the Americans by surprise, and in June 1945, the Americans criticized the BC for initiating negotiations with the Greek government on this matter without their knowledge.186 The rapid activation of British competition to attract possible students irritated the Americans at a time when their own Athens colleges planned to reopen after the Second World War. The three existing American schools were well known in Greece, and as such the British had to take them into consideration. ‘We must, of course, take [the Americans] into our confidence as far as we possibly can’, Johnstone wrote to Cardiff, but ‘we would not be likely to draw away to any institutions of our own possible pupils of either of these institutions’.187 Cardiff ’s handling of the matter met with the FO’s full approval.188 At a meeting on 26 June, in order to ‘pacify’ the heads of the three American colleges, Cardiff made it clear that the BC welcomed American co-​operation in regard to the English teachers and their qualifications. It was agreed on 183 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2627, Telegram No. 102 Brico, BC to HM Ambassador, Athens, following for Cardiff from Johnstone, 13 August 1945. 184 Stamatiou, Αναργύρειος και Κοργιαλένειος Σχολή Σπετσών, 137. 185 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945. 186 For the reaction of the heads of the three American educational establishments in Greece, see Koutsopanagou, ‘“To Cast Our Net Very Much Wider”’, 47–​48. 187 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945. 188 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2994, EDU/​1/​1, letter entitled ‘American Co-​operation in the Teaching of English in Greece’, Cardiff to Thompson, 3 July 1945. Seymour to Montagu-​Pollock, 18 July 1945. H. D. Bryan, FO, to Seymour, 22 August 1945.

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both sides that regarding the training of teachers for secondary schools, all future dealings with the Greek Ministry of Education would henceforth take place following a joint consultation. Regarding examinations, the awarding of diplomas and the teacher training courses, the respective American and British standards would be followed and regarded as equivalent. Cardiff also explained that the BC’s hasty approach to the Greek Ministry of Education was driven by and confined to its attempt to persuade the Greek authorities to complete the training of temporary teachers by January 1946. This would be regarded as a means of supplying staff to the secondary schools following the passage of the legislation that introduced English teaching into the gymnasia. Cardiff therefore urged against alternations by the American educationalists to the draft law at this stage –​the law was sent to them for information –​because any hesitations might place the issue in danger of postponement by the Greek authorities.189 Besides, Cardiff was convinced that excluding the Americans ‘from a share in our plans’, refusing to co-​operate with them or avoiding their support would greatly prejudice the British ‘chances of success’ in their dealings with the Greek Ministry of Education. The BC had every reason to support a training scheme in which the Americans would play a contributing role, as there could certainly be ‘no better method of encouraging a sympathy and understanding not only for the Anglo-​Saxon language but for Anglo-​ Saxon ideas and institutions’.190 The co-​operative spirit was evident from both British and American sides, and included the mutual sharing of their premises for English teaching.191 Further meetings were held with the heads of American schools in Greece, who agreed to most of the British proposals on the matter. ‘It now only remains to persuade the Ministry of Education to accept our advice on the subject’, Cardiff noted. Legislation was finally passed on 21 December 1945.192 189 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2994, EDU/​1/​1, Secret, ‘Impressions of a Meeting with Mr Homer Davies (of Athens College), Professor Riggs (of Anatolia College) and McElroy (of the Athens College for Girls), 26th June, 1945’. 190 TNA: BW 34/​10, Cardiff, ‘Memorandum on British Council Activities in Greece’, n.d. [c. July 1945]. 191 TNA: BW 34/​10, Elliott, Supplement to Report of 4 July, 16 July 1945. 192 ΦΕΚ: 311, Compulsory Law 752, ‘Re. the Introduction of English as a Compulsory Subject in the Secondary Schools’, 21 December 1945, 1565.

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In the autumn of 1945, the BC also had to deal with the major task of taking over English-​language teaching from the AGIS. During his visit in January, Shillan was surprised by the width of the field covered by the AGIS, stating that it was ‘far wider than any ever undertaken by the Council’ and that the BC would therefore face great difficulties in its dealings without adequate staff.193 While the AGIS stopped supervising classes in Athens in the summer of 1945 and passed them over to Whitworth (the IES director), it continued to do so in the provinces. While the BC London office was keen to follow up on all of AGIS’ contacts –​including with the National Schoolmasters Association –​the BC also made it clear that even with this intention, it would be unlikely to acquire enough staff to serve Greece as a whole. Whether such classes could be taken over by the Anglo-​Hellenic League as private undertakings by the Greeks or if –​and to what extent –​the BC could take on their supervision after the AGIS retired became a matter of careful consideration during the summer and autumn of 1945. Therefore, the present teaching arrangements under the AGIS were to be considered a temporary expedient, without prejudice to the BC’s long-​term intentions. The BC was reluctant to get involved in the elementary-​level English teaching commitments of the AGIS, fearing that this very great demand for English instruction might jeopardize the BC’s wider aims. The London office considered that their ‘real work’ lay in the higher studies to be conducted at the British Institute, which would be staffed from London and carry the primary purpose of teaching Greek English teachers. The British Institute could also serve as a venue for public lectures on a variety of cultural topics for those who already spoke fairly sufficient English. In the course of transferring the English-​language classes from the AGIS to the BC, several reports and memoranda considered the state of affairs in both Athens and Thessaloniki. These reports included one by Malan of the Political Warfare Executive on the British Institute in Athens, another by Whitworth on AGIS language classes in Athens and Piraeus and the reopening of the IES in Athens, and another by Elliott and Barron 193 TNA:  BW  34/​10, Extract from the Draft Minutes of the Finance and Agenda Committee of 10 April 1945.

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on the institute in Thessaloniki. According to these reports, 193 English classes were organized by the AGIS up to 30 June 1945, encompassing 5,530 students in Athens and Piraeus.194 Three more classes were arranged for students at the university and Athens Polytechnic. Moreover, the Athens police requested special classes for their officers. Forty-​four teachers were engaged, of which, forty-​two were Greek. Whitworth continued to act as teacher of English at the polytechnic and also requested English classes at the Military Cadet School and at the Air Force Cadet School; his associations with the schools would continue in later years.195 By the end of summer 1945, there were upwards of 3,000 AGIS students. For the term about to commence in October, 3,226 existing students had applied along with a further 4,589 new applicants, totalling 7,815 students altogether.196 However, the low standards of teaching, ‘a most cumbersome’ organization and a growing demand for English elementary instruction prompted the BC to do ‘everything possible’ to dissociate these classes from the IES teaching programme. The running of such an organization in Athens could not easily be handled by Whitworth and Gotch alone; of the two, only Whitworth was a teacher. Because of this, the brunt of the teaching was borne by local staff, who were organized by the former and current IES teachers, Georgiades-​Arnakis and Mallides, respectively. This led in turn to some teachers using their posts to advertise externally for private lessons, while many others took it for granted that they would continue as future BC teachers. On the other hand, Georgiades-​Arnakis regarded himself as a natural candidate for director of a new institute. Under these circumstances, Whitworth’s takeover of the scheme became ‘a delicate and difficult’ task 194 Of 14,000 applications received, 3,000 were under the minimum age of 17. Some 9,000 applicants were invited to attend classes, but almost 50 per cent failed to follow up on their applications (TNA: BW 34/​10, Whitworth, ‘General Report on AGIS Language Classes (Athens & Piraeus) to 30th June 1945’, 2 July 1945). 195 See TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, W. G. Tatham, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947 –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948, and Tatham to European Division [C. A. M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C.], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 196 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council. Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’.

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and took some time to complete.197 The answer from the London office was to speedily appoint a representative whose task it would be ‘to reduce to their proportions the aspirations of Georgiades-​Arnakis and his associates’. Elementary instruction at the IES was a ‘secondary consideration’ that should not interfere with the creation of a British Institute.198 During the time that Whitworth and Gotch were on home leave, Elliott –​who had been in Greece since mid-​June 1945 and had spent time in both Athens and Thessaloniki –​was left in temporary charge of the IES in Athens. In July, he too reported to Johnstone on the current state of affairs and on the future scope of BC’s work in both Athens and Thessaloniki. Northern Greece, with Thessaloniki as its centre, was considered ‘a rather special BC region, enjoying a fair measure of autonomy’, though ultimately subject to the Athens representative. At this time the institute in Thessaloniki had thirty-​seven classes with 1,050 students, a great many of whom were young people still at school (a number that would have been higher had there been space or more qualified staff ). However, the intention for September 1945 registration was to give priority to professionals, doctors, engineers, lawyers, teachers, members of the services and the police. The Greek military commander in Thessaloniki also requested that a class be held for Greek military officers. Elliott stressed the importance of setting up a special BC northern region post in Thessaloniki. Apart from its remoteness from Athens and the extreme difficulty of communication, many of the problems faced by people in northern Greece differed from those in the capital or in the south. Elliott found that ‘everybody’ (namely Dr E. Riggs, who was British consul and principal of Anatolia College, Barron, and Greek and AGIS officials) supported the idea of devoting special attention to Thessaloniki, as well as to other areas of northern Greece.199 An intensive three-​week summer training camp at the Nautical School of Poros was also scheduled; Professor Hamley was expected at the training camp for part of the time. This course was intended to produce 197 TNA:  BW  34/​10, Whitworth, ‘General Report on AGIS Language Classes (Athens & Piraeus) to 30th June 1945’, 2 July 1945. 198 TNA: BW 34/​10, Thompson’s Minutes to Orton, Johnstone, Deputy Secretary General, 25 July 1945. 199 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Elliott to Johnstone, 4 July 1945.

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a core group of qualified teachers for secondary schools, in readiness for the ratification of the new legislation on English teaching. All the teachers who attended the course –​ten out of the fifty were from Thessaloniki –​ had been approved by the Ministry of Education as suitable candidates.200 The summer course was viewed as the beginning of a ‘term’, which would continue at the institutes in Athens and Thessaloniki through October, November and December, until the Cambridge Certificate examination took place in early December 1945. In conclusion, Elliott emphasized that the demand for English courses was enormous and that Greece ‘in every way deserves to be the Council’s favourite child’.201 Elliott’s view that northern Greece stood out for special treatment coincided with that of Barron, who was director of the British Institute in Thessaloniki. The British observed that the policy of the Greek governments was often to make Athens central in all aspects of national life, and Thessaloniki and the north had thus been neglected. The BC would be in a better position to win over the people of the north if it made it plain from the beginning that it would not follow this same policy of focusing solely on the capital. With sufficient energy and working along ‘the right lines’,202 the BC could take the lead in Thessaloniki’s cultural revival and ‘have a profound influence upon it’.203 Besides, Macedonia and Thrace were expected to increasingly share the European spotlight, as would be the case in the following years. Barron suggested that when the AGIS left its small information centres in Macedonia and Thrace, they should be taken over and converted into centres of BC influence. He concurred that elementary English instruction should remain for the present the most important of the BC’s activities in Thessaloniki. ‘There are relatively few people in Thessaloniki at the moment who could hope to pass even the Cambridge Lower Certificate without at least a year’s re-​education’, he asserted.204 Thus, there was virtually no demand for an institute of higher studies at 200 TNA: BW 34/​10, Cardiff, ‘Memorandum on British Council Activities in Greece’, n.d. [c. July 1945]. 201 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Elliott to Johnstone, 4 July 1945. 202 TNA: BW 34/​10, Barron, ‘Proposals for Future Activities for the British Council in Northern Greece’, n.d. [c. July 1945]. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid.

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that point in time in Thessaloniki. Rather, he advised that a higher institute should come into being gradually, as the need arose. Back in Athens, Cardiff approved both reports and suggested that in the autumn Elliott should establish himself in Thessaloniki, where he could prepare the way for the opening of the institute in the spring of 1946 and explore the possibilities of regional activities in Macedonia and Thrace before the AGIS left the area.205 By end of July 1945, many of the outstanding points concerning BC work in Greece were gradually cleared up. Johnstone directed BC policy for all of Greece from London, leaving Cardiff as the acting representative of the BC in Athens.206 It was at this time that the issues of scholarships, English teaching and the appointment of Professor Attlee207 could be pursued safely. To investigate, Seymour visited Greece in October 1945 and found several somewhat ‘inconvenient facts’.208 A degree of incongruity existed as the BC attempted to prescribe policy in London without a sufficient appreciation of the local conditions. The standard of English among those nominated by the Greek Ministry of Education to teach English in gymnasia when English became compulsory was still well below the standard set by the Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency. These eighty-​seven teachers would not be ready for ‘higher studies’ for some considerable time. In addition, ninety-​one university and polytechnic professors and 135 private English teachers were either learning or had applied to learn English at the IES; estimates suggested that these individuals were, at worst, at a very elementary standard and, at best, below the Certificate of Proficiency standard. An additional 976 professional men and women with a university education (including 201 doctors), 77 nurses (a highly important class for the British cultural programme) and 1,587 university students were studying or had applied to study at the IES. Finally, there was no faculty of modern languages at the University of Athens. The standard even of French teaching in secondary schools was deplorably low. ‘The French Institute [is] anxious 205 TNA: BW 34/​10, Cardiff, ‘Memorandum on British Council Activities in Greece’, n.d. [c. July 1945]. 206 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, F. Y. Thompson to Elliott, 22 August 1945. 207 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945. 208 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’.

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for our co-​operation to ensure that all French and English university language instruction should be undertaken by the French Institute or by the Council’, Seymour reported. Clearly the existing conditions needed to be improved. To this end, Seymour recommended that about twelve of eighty-​ seven English teachers should be brought to London as BC visitors in the summer of 1946 in order to improve their English. Seymour therefore found that the ‘theory hitherto adopted by the Council in London that the institute should at once be a centre of higher studies’ was untenable on these grounds. The British Institute could be slowly developed as a centre of regular instruction as soon as there was a satisfactory flow of students at Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency level. Another point broached by Seymour was the level of discrimination exercised in the selection of pupils, both before the war and again when AGIS classes began. In the future, it was clear that students should undergo a more rigorous selection process. As it was, the categories of applicants referred to in the IES Statistics of Registration for the year 1945–​1946209 were satisfactory, and the IES would be fully occupied without teaching English to the general public. As for the delineation of functions between the IES and the new institute in Kolonaki Square, Seymour believed that the former should only teach up to the Certificate of Proficiency standard. His recommendations were: first, that the IES should continue in this way to teach some 3,000 students; second, the IES should confine itself to working up to the Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency; third, it should confine itself as far as possible to especially useful categories of pupils; fourth, it should conduct extramural classes, including at Athens Polytechnic and for the benefit of working-​class pupils and public servants; and, fifth, for financial reasons, a minimum number of British teachers should be employed, who should be appointed as soon as possible. As for Thessaloniki, the BC should continue to teach English. Moreover, classes at this location should be incorporated into the British Institute in the traditional manner. 209 IES, Statistics of Registration, 3–​20 September 1945, from the 3,226 services, registered in numerical order were: bank and private employees, students, government employees, lawyers, doctors, architects, others (Appendix in Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’ (TNA: BW 2/​144 GB/​16/​120/​1)).

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The BC should also be involved with the many classes held outside Athens and Thessaloniki by the Anglo-​Hellenic League. Seymour considered that neither the leagues in Athens nor Thessaloniki were capable of undertaking language instruction on a larger scale.210 As a consequence, the teaching of English spread throughout Greece during the years that followed, and it operated under many systems: the BC Institute under British supervision (Thessaloniki, Kavala); the BC Institute under Greek supervision (Corfu); schools under a local committee but entirely managed by a BC official (Patras, Mytilene); subsidized schools under a local committee (Crete); assisted schools under a local committee (Serres and elsewhere); and private schools (Tripoli).211 English teaching remained the primary function of the BC’s various centres and usually the only activity of the small independent schools, such as those in Xanthi, Serres, Chios and Tripoli. However, the standard of teaching at such places was considered lamentably low, and any improvements would require ‘considerable cost’. Two summer schools were held for local teachers in July 1947 at Patras and Kavala.212 A survey entitled ‘English as a First Language’ –​conducted by the BC in February and March 1948 –​estimated that 8 per cent of the Greek population knew some English. This figure was considered ‘extraordinary’ given that immediately before the Second World War, only 1 per cent knew some English.213 Despite intense efforts by the British, the law of 1945, which introduced English-​language teaching in secondary schools, remained a dead letter due to lack of funds and teachers. But there was also a general reluctance on the 210 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’. 211 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, W. G. Tatham, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947  –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948, and Tatham to European Division [C.  A.  M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C.], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 212 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division [C.  A.  M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947–​1948’, 4 June 1948. 213 BBC WAC:  E3/​94/​1, OS Audience Research:  Southern Europe:  Greece, Bi-​ monthly Report on Greek Audience, February–​March 1948, 5.

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part of Greek intellectuals, educationalists214 and the general public alike to engage with the process; this reluctance was expressed even before the draft law was passed in December 1945 (a time when all omens pointed to a favourable outcome for the British). The FO was aware of this reluctance by means of the Greek press cuttings sent by the Embassy. Politically opposed newspapers in Greece began to report on the issue of the introduction of the English language as a point of political controversy.215 Reforming the Greek education system by removing its Metaxist legacy became a common goal of all Greek governments until the election of March 1946. The Ministry of Education was staffed by high-​ranking executives who were known to be bearers of reformist ideas and advocates of the introduction of the vernacular (demotiki) at all levels of education. Despite these efforts and the positive decision by the Cabinet in March 1945, the process whereby it was to become law froze.216 Despite the many setbacks faced by the Ministry of Education and its eventual failure217 to promote a reformist programme, it is fairly indicative that E. Papanoutsos –​one of the main figures of the reformist education group –​retained his position as director general of education for all levels of education, from the primary to the higher. The British supported the ministry’s reformist efforts, which would bring pedagogy into Greek schools and would align Greek universities closer to British 214 Cf A. M. Trantafyllidis –​one of the educational reformers and advocate of the use of the vernacular at all levels of education –​two lectures in April 1946 in which he spoke about the dangers of an ‘excessive, untimely and imprudent’ multilingualism for the mental and intellectual cultivation of the child. He expressed scepticism, however, at what age, in what way and to what extent language learning should be pursued with the Greek pupils. He defended the cultural advantages of language learning but with priority to the learning of the mother tongue along with its cultural load. (A. Manolis Triantafyllidis, Οι ξένες γλώσσες και η αγωγή [Foreign Languages and Education] (Athens, 1946), 93.) 215 TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  2944, article in the centrist Greek newspaper Eleftheri Ellada entitled ‘Educational Acrobatics’, 21 June, and the aggressive reply by the right-​wing paper Ellinikon Aima, 22 June 1945. 216 Noutsos, Ο δρόμος της καμήλας και το σχολείο, 79. 217 Noutsos, Ο δρόμος της καμήλας και το σχολείο, 154–​169. See also Alexis Dimaras, ed., Η μεταρρύθμιση που δεν έγινε [Frustrated Reform], 2 vols (Athens: Ermis, 1974; reprint Athens: Estia, 1999), νγ΄-​νδ΄.

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methodologies. With this in mind, Leeper called for the English textbooks that were translated into Greek to be ‘neither purely classic nor demotic Greek, but the everyday language of the people’. He also urged the BC to send teachers –​along with Papanoutsos –​to Britain on BC-​funded scholarships.218 Following his return to Athens, Papanoutsos conveyed his impressions of this experience and his broader judgments on its value in two articles published by the newspaper H Ellas, on 17 and 29 September 1945. In these articles, he argued that the British Education Act of August 1944 should be the model for the reform of Greek education. The full text of the Act had been published a month earlier in the Anglo-​Greek Review.219 Therefore, at a time when modern Greek was yet to be taught in secondary schools and the education system had more urgent needs –​including the lack of school buildings, provision of necessary school equipment and inadequate teacher salaries –​the introduction of a second compulsory language (other than French) appeared to be somewhat of an unaffordable luxury. After all, French –​which had been taught by law as a compulsory subject since the founding of the Greek state –​was the standard language of communication with the outside world, both at official state level and in academia.220 Consequently, the draft law of 1945 may be regarded more as the result of systematic and co-​ordinated pressure from the British. The British discreetly continued to put pressure on the Ministry of Education. Due to Sewell’s personal efforts, beginning in 1946, some important steps were taken at the University of Athens. The first, in early 1947, was the creation of an English diploma –​the first in a foreign language to be set up in the university –​for those students who took the Byron professor’s course as an extracurricular subject.221 Among the more successful steps towards English teacher training at the university level was the successful presentation by the British Institute in Athens of a number of candidates for the first University of Cambridge Diploma examination to be held in 218 Koutsopanagou, ‘“To Cast Our Net Very Much Wider”’, 45–​46. 219 Noutsos, Ο δρόμος της καμήλας και το σχολείο, 94–​95, footnote 110. 220 For the introduction of French in Greek schools, cf. Loukia Efthymiou, La Formation des francisants en Grèce: 1836–​1982 (Paris: Publibook, 2015). 221 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947.

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Greece, a milestone in the history of English teaching in Greece. Offering preparation for this exam and the examinations for Proficiency and Lower certificates were important BC contributions towards creating a cohort of teachers who would be capable of implementing the English-​language secondary school programme. The BC reserved for themselves the legal right to issue diplomas in English, and thus these were the only diplomas the BC recognized. At the same time, the BC formally distanced themselves from ‘locally concocted diplomas’ –​namely certificates issued by the headmasters of independent schools of English, which were usually run by the Anglo-​Hellenic League. It was ‘incomparably the most effective means we possess for attaining the Council’s ends’, Tatham noted.222 ‘This is the moment to strike’, Tatham pointed out. At the University of Thessaloniki, the lector –​whose appointment had been long delayed –​took up his duties ‘at last’. A similar English diploma course was expected to be initiated at the University of Thessaloniki in connection with the British Institute. This ‘extra link in the chain of friendship between the University and the British Institute is most valuable, but too early to report progress’, he noted. In the meantime, regular courses of lectures were still given at the institute in Athens, in Thessaloniki and in the regional directorates, all of which were well attended. Lecturers from Britain under BC auspices –​in addition to the regular visitors sponsored by London –​usually visited only Athens and Thessaloniki; however, lecturers from Athens visited the provinces. Distinguished Greek persons lectured on English topics and the BC hosted lecturers from America, China and France. Lectures in Greek were also carried out under the auspices of the BC Scholars’ Association.223 In April 1950, a three-​day teachers’ conference was held at the British Institute in Athens to discuss the situation concerning English teaching at the elementary and university levels, and the supply and quality of Greek teachers of English. Invitations were sent to Greek, American and British teachers of English in Athens and the provinces, and the conference was attended by approximately seventy-​four teachers out of a total eighty who 222 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Letter, Confidential, Tatham to the BC Education Division, 20 September 1948. 223 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949.

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were invited. Members of the Greek General Staff and the Greek Ministry of Education were also present. Tatham opened the conference and lectures were given by Professor Sewell, lecturers and senior members of the British Institute staff, and W. J. Ball, the education officer. Each session concluded with a discussion of issues raised by a ‘brains trust’, which consisted of representatives from the BC, the British Institute, Pierce College and Athens College. In the first session of the conference, Ball outlined the activities of the BC and gave a general survey of the situation before and after the war. He emphasized Sewell’s efforts to introduce English teaching into the University of Athens as part of the proposed faculty of modern language and explained that the Greek Ministry of Education was attempting to legalize English teaching more generally. He hoped that the Cambridge Proficiency Certificate might shortly become recognized as a qualification for teaching.224 In this context, a plan was drawn up to hold a second conference of a more practical nature, within one year of the first. After laborious and lengthy British efforts, it was now only a matter of time until the English diploma courses instituted by Professor Sewell and Professor Davies at the universities of Athens and Thessaloniki would take effect. In June 1951, the Greek Ministry of Education finally passed the education law, which had been drafted so long prior.225 Following this legislation, the British were able to survey the progress of English teaching in Greece from a different position.226 The teaching of the English language remained the BC’s most important function, since knowledge of English was essential for British cultural ambitions in Greece. ‘No English culture, except music and the plastic arts, can be absorbed without knowledge of the language’, Tatham had emphasized in his annual report for 1948–​1949.

224 TNA: BW 34/​20, GR/​701/​3, P. Drummond Thompson, Director of Studies, the British Institute, ‘Report on a Conference of Teachers on the Teaching of English’, 17–​19 April 1950. 225 ΦΕΚ: 185, Compulsory Law 1858, 23 June 1951. 226 TNA: BW 34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Minutes, Scott-​Kilvert, 10 July 1950; Alethea Hayter, 11 July 1950.

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University chairs It is indicative of the Greek government’s reluctance to appoint any foreign professors that the first university foreign language chair was not appointed until February 1933.227 France established the first readership at the University of Athens for the 1933–​1934 academic year and assumed all key costs. In 1934–​1935, a German chair was created at Athens Polytechnic, and in 1936 another was inaugurated at the University of Athens. However, the status of these posts was unclear  –​that is, until a law in 1938 allowed the creation of foreign chairs at the University of Athens and the appointment of foreign professors.228 The Byron chair for English language teaching at the University of Athens was founded in 1937 to celebrate the university’s centenary229 and was officially recognized in December 1938.230 The chair was funded by the BC, which continued to support the position financially until 1963.231 H. V. Ruth was appointed the first professor and was also director of the IES from the following year. On Leeper’s recommendations,232 the BC offered to provide and subsidize British professors for two further chairs at the University of Athens –​ in addition to the Byron chair –​following liberation.233 The Treasury had 227 Efthymiou, La Formation, 136–​137. 228 Chairs of foreign literature were established at the University of Athens, Faculty of Arts by Decree-​Law 1100, ΦΕΚ: 69, ‘Re. Establishment of Chairs for Foreign Literature at the Philosophical School of the University of Athens’, 23 February 1938, 469–​470. 229 Address by Greek Minister of Education K. Georgakopoulos, Address by Professor Donald Struan Robertson, representatives of the British Universities; Ο Εορτασμός της Εκατονταετηρίδος του Πανεπιστημίου Αθηνών [The 100th Anniversary Celebration of the University of Athens] (Athens: Pyrsos, 1937). 230 ΦΕΚ: 469, Royal Degree, ‘Establishing a Chair of English Philology and Literature at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Athens’, 14 December 1938, 3063. 231 Donaldson, The British Council, 178. 232 TNA: FO 924/​36, LC 16, Leeper to FO, Telegram No. 464, 29 June 1944. Leeper’s telegram referred to FO Telegram No. 197, 2 May 1944. 233 TNA:  FO  924/​36, LC  16, mentioned in Gurney’s letter to C.  H.  M. Wilcox (Treasury), 14 July 1944.

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previously agreed in principle to resume BC activities in Italy, and in July 1945 it agreed to the BC’s proposal.234 Financial approval was formally given at the 110th Meeting of the Finance and Agenda Committee of the BC on 13 February 1945.235 In February 1945, Leeper provided the FO with specific details for developing education in Greece. After consultation with ‘the competent authorities’ and with the British consul general in Thessaloniki, he made the following recommendations. First, the Byron visiting professorship of English Literature in Athens should be re-​established, but in closer co-​ordination with the university syllabus and more focused on the needs of the students, rather than the cultured and leisured classes of Athens. Second, a chair of science or engineering should be established. Third, there should be a chair of British history and institutions in Athens, which would approximate a professorship of education based on British models; though in reality it would be better to avoid referring to the position in that way ‘for fear of wounding Greek susceptibilities’.236 Any suggestion that the professorship was specifically designed to help organize the Greek educational system would cause offence from the start. It was also felt that the right man could probably do much in the way of providing tactful and effective guidance to the Ministry of Education and to the university, especially in regard to introducing English as a compulsory subject at the Greek secondary schools. The field of the professorship should fall into one of the modern greats at Oxford (i.e. history, political science or economics); moreover, the holder of the position should have as wide as possible a knowledge of educational practice. There should be a similar chair in Thessaloniki. Both chairs would be closely aligned to the work of the British Institute in Athens and Thessaloniki, especially in regard to teacher training in English subjects and with particular reference to the development of British social institutions. Leeper also recommended the

234 Mentioned in TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 2287, Letter, H. M. Hedley for Montagu-​ Pollock to A. J. D. Winnifrith, Treasury, 15 June 1945. 235 Mentioned in TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  2287, GR/​5/​16, Letter, Davies, BC, to Montagu-​Pollock, 7 June 1945. 236 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 886, Telegram No. 5 Brico Saving, Leeper to FO (referring to FO of 3 February), 24 February 1945.

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appointment of a marine biology expert to assist the development of a Greek marine research institute.237 Johnstone shared Leeper’s recommendations and considered that the cost of these chairs should be borne by the BC. He agreed on the role of the new professor of British history and institutions, which, in the capacity of an unofficial consultant to the Greek Ministry of Education, would help them ‘move from German to English practice’. He also emphasized a few key points pertaining to the Byron professorship. Primarily, the professor should in the future be a more permanent fixture and less of a visitor than his predecessors, with the chair functioning ‘as an organic part of the University curriculum’.238 Johnstone expected the chair to lecture on literary subjects to a wide audience, since there was –​at any rate –​a very considerable audience in Athens for lectures of this kind, as recent experiments with a ‘Shakespeare Week’239 had shown. He would also lecture on British social institutions, thus taking part in the development of a faculty or sub-​ faculty of English at the University of Athens.240 The FO considered the appointment of the new chair to be of the highest importance for their aim of getting the Greek educational system remodelled along British lines.241 In June 1945, the BC recommended C. M. Attlee,242 professor of education at the University College of Nottingham, as the new chair. Leeper 237 Ibid. 238 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, ‘British Council Work in Greece: 1945/​6’, 7 March 1945. 239 This was a series of seven lectures about Shakespeare in English by British (Kenneth Johnstone, Osbert Lancaster and Derek Patmore) and Greek (C.  A. Trypanis and Tentes Rodokanakis) scholars before the production of Twelfth Night by the Manolidou-​Aroni-​Horn company at the Pantheon Theatre in February 1945, on the initiative of the theatrical agent Theodoros Kritas, in conjunction with the BC. The lectures were introduced by Georgios Melas, deputy minister of the interior; see Koutsopanagou, ‘Προπαγάνδα και Απελευθέρωση’, 177. 240 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, ‘British Council Work in Greece: 1945/​6’, 7 March 1945. 241 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 2287, Letter, H. M. Hedley for W. H. Montagu-​Pollock to Winnifrith, Treasury, 15 June 1945. 242 He was the author of Philosophy in Educational Theory (Birmingham:  Cornish Brothers, Ltd, 1932). The BC supported his candidacy on the grounds that he had previous experience in matters pertaining to Greece; it should be noted though

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approved his appointment. The FO was ‘extremely anxious’ for the appointment to be made soon, and in case it became indefinitely postponed, they felt they should be prepared to pay the whole salary.243 However, even with the Treasury paying Attlee’s entire salary, the BC was not sure that the university would agree to the appointment. As ‘the most important thing is to get Professor Attlee to Greece somehow’, the FO backtracked and asked Athens whether Attlee would be acceptable as a representative. There was a view that ‘Attlee would be more suitable than Runciman’.244 In the meantime, Johnstone, from London, urged Cardiff to approach the Greek authorities for a decision regarding Attlee’s appointment.245 On 23 June, Caccia informed the FO that Ambassador Leeper, Johnstone, the Greek Ministry of Education and the University of Athens had ‘all agreed’ to the proposed chairs.246 On 27 June, the Treasury agreed that the BC should, for the time being, provide the entire salary and its allowances for the new chair of British history and institutions at the University of Athens.247 Regarding the proposed appointment of Professor Attlee, it was ‘felt that Professor Attlee should not combine both posts and the professorship would be more suitable’.248 As both the post and the work itself needed to be created from the ground up, it was decided that Attlee should visit Greece and file a report

243 244 2 45 246 247 248

that no data has been recovered so far on what kind of previous experience Attlee had. There was evidence, however, that he impressed the BC ‘with his keenness and energy’ (TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 2287, R. Davies, BC, London, to Montagu-​ Pollock, ‘Proposed Chair of British History and Institutions, University of Athens’, 7 June 1945). TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 2287, Letter, H. M. Hedley for W. H. Montagu-​Pollock to Winnifrith, Treasury, 15 June 1945. TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2430, Minutes, Hedley, Montagu-​Pollock, 15 June 1945; FO to Athens, Telegram No. 55, following for Johnstone (referring to FO Letter of 30 April and Telegram of 31 May), 15 June 1945. TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 2287, Telegram No. 59 Brico, FO to Athens, 23 June 1945. TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  2430, Telegram No.  60 Brico, Athens (Caccia) to FO, from Cardiff, 23 June 1945. TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  2626, Letter, R.  L.  M. James (Treasury) to Montagu-​ Pollock, referred to Pollock’s Letter of 15 June to Winnifrith, 27 June 1945. TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2755, Athens Telegram No. 63 to FO, 27 June 1945.

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on his return to Britain. The main purpose of his visit was exploratory, both in terms of discovering the essence of the work that should be done and to determine whether the existing conditions would allow him to carry out what he was sent to Greece to do. However, in the eyes of the Greek authorities, it should be seen that his visit had a social character, to get better acquainted with his new professional environment.249 Similarly the BC supported a visit to Greece by Professor S. J. Davies to explore scientific and technical aspects of the proposed reorganization of the University of Athens.250 Professor Davies arrived in Athens in July 1945 and Professor Attlee a month later.251 Attlee was to perform a major task, which would depend largely on his personal tact. The post that he was sent to serve in Greece was not purely academic, but carried significant political weight. He required to act as a kind of British educational advisor to the Greek government, under the guise of an academic teacher. He therefore needed to be accepted by both academia and government education circles, so that the latter would seek his advice on questions related to educational organization and methods. Pending the commencement of Attlee’s appointment, Seymour –​who was in Athens on his nearly month-​long tour of Greece and Italy –​suggested that Attlee should make his presence among the educational circles more visible. Seymour suggested that Attlee give lectures in Athens and Thessaloniki on educational topics and teaching methods, since another aspect of his core duties would include helping to train teachers. He also suggested that Attlee should visit Greek schools to become more familiar with their teaching methods, starting in the working-​class areas of Piraeus.252 Professor Attlee began his classes in November 1945,253 but 2 49 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945. 250 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 276, Wickham’s Letter to Johnstone, 18 January 1945. 251 TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  2928, Telegram No.  1554, Athens (Caccia) to FO, 18 July 1945. 252 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’. 253 Historical Archive of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, School of Philosophy, Minutes of Meetings, 17th Meeting, 5 November 1945, vol.  21, p. 319.

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the official institution of his post as chair of British life and thought took place a month later.254 When a proposal was put forth to revive the Byron chair of English literature at the University of Athens, Seymour questioned the wisdom of converting this post into a full-​time chair. He considered that the proper place for the advanced study of English literature and language was at the British Institute; moreover, if there was to be a professor of English literature at the university, the post should be filled by a member of the institute itself. If this suggestion was unacceptable to the BC, he suggested a return to the old policy of appointing a visiting professor. There were also two short-​lived proposals at the time: one to appoint a professor of an engineering subject to the polytechnic in Athens and another to appoint a ‘professor of technical English’ to Athens Polytechnic. The latter was more an IES extramural activity. In regard to the suggestion made in London by Dr Neville Marriott Goodman, UNRRA director of medical services for Europe, that a professor of physiology or public health and hygiene might be appointed to the School of Medicine in Athens, Seymour –​during his inspection visit to Greece in October –​sought the views of Runciman and General Sir Ernest Cowell, who was UNRRA director of health for the mission to Greece. Seymour’s opinion was that the appointment of, for instance, a tropical disease specialist to a chair in the Faculty of Medicine at Thessaloniki might be more justified than one at the Athens School of Medicine, given that Dr Foy’s Malaria research laboratory operated at the former location. Ultimately, Seymour recommended that a medical professor should not be appointed, as the Faculty of Medicine had only just opened and did not inhabit a proper building and did not possess advanced laboratory facilities; the matter should therefore be reconsidered after the Thessaloniki Hospital project was completed. At the same time, Seymour recommended that an official link should be created between the University of Thessaloniki and the institute via the appointment of a

254 The chair of British life and thought was instituted by Law 745/​1945. Regarding the appointment of professors for the English and American chairs, their qualifications, duties and rights were to be determined by Royal Decree upon a proposal by the Ministry of Education and the University Senate.

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Grade II professor of British life and thought, who would be attached to the institute staff.255 Attlee remained in the post of professor of British life and thought for nearly seven months, and in September 1946, the University of Athens decided to amalgamate the position with the Byron chair. As the 1945 law did not make the same provision for reciprocity as the 1938 law on the founding of the Byron chair, the University of Athens proposed merging the two chairs within the framework set out for the Byron chair so that this reciprocity would remain. The issue of the chair of British life and thought was put off until October 1951, when the Royal Degree under Emergency Law 745/​1945,256 drafted by the School of Philosophy, came up for discussion in the University Senate.257 Attlee’s successor –​W. A. Sewell, former professor of English at Auckland University College, New Zealand –​was appointed in April 1946. His appointment was eventually ratified by the Greek Ministry of Education for a period of up to ten years. Throughout his long service, he intervened to increase the number of English-​language classes (which were not then compulsory) and taught seven to eight classes for the public on the topic of English thought in the seventeenth century and twelve classes on Shakespeare’s tragedies. He complained that his class in English literature was not equivalent to those taught at the university, asked for the certification of English-​language studies and requested that persons attending his classes not be required to pay fees. His tenure as chair ended in June 1951 when a law was passed establishing two university departments of English studies: one in Athens and one in Thessaloniki. His successor as Byron chair –​Bernard Blackstone –​was selected in London from forty-​three candidates. However, while the majority of faculty at the School of Philosophy voted to affirm the selection, all faculty members concurred with the lone dissenter, Professor Spyridon Marinatos, that ‘the election of professors of foreign literature must in future be done by university professors who will also bear the responsibility for their choice’.258 255 TNA: BW 2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Seymour’s ‘The British Council Report on Visit to Greece and Italy by Deputy Secretary-​General, 8th to 31st October 1945’. 256 ΦΕΚ:  309, Emergency Law  745, ‘On the Establishment of New Chairs at the University of Athens’, 19 December 1945, 1560. 257 Koutsopanagou, ‘“To Cast Our Net Very Much Wider”’, 49–​50, 62 (footnotes 90, 95), 63 (footnotes 104, 105). 258 Ibid. 50, 63 (footnotes 108, 110–​113).

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In April 1947 –​a year after Sewell’s appointment –​the BC’s selection committee for university posts overseas recommended Dr W. H. C. Frend259 as the chair of British life and thought at the University of Thessaloniki.260 However, for practical reasons, including the fact that only 10 per cent of the audience understood English, the chair was abolished and converted to a lectureship.261 W. R. Loader’s262 appointment to the lectureship in Thessaloniki depended on the approval of the BC’s selection committee,263 and doubts as to Loader’s suitability were expressed by Professor Sewell and the university rector.264 Until November 1947, however, an agreement had not been made by the university in regard to the appointment; as such, the matter was taken up by Tatham, who would make personal contact with the university.265 Despite the frequent contact between the British Institute and the University of Thessaloniki, as well as Tatham’s good relations with the university professors, the chair remained empty.266 The BC did, however, provide 259 His earlier fields of interest were archaeological and mediaeval, but the war years had turned him to the study of modern history, particularly of Europe and especially its economic and sociological aspects. Frend’s most distinguished academic career, however, was in theology. From 1942 to 1946, he served as intelligence officer in the FO. He was to become one of the leading historians of the early church; see Proceedings of the British Academy, 150 (2007), 37–​54. Eventually, Frend came to Greece in 1956. 260 TNA:  BW  34/​11, J.  B. Elliott, assistant representative for northern Greece, ‘Salonica Report’, April 1947, 7–​8. 261 TNA: BW 34/​11, Minutes, Scott-​Kilvert, 15 April 1947, and Hayter, 19 April 1947. 262 William Reginald Loader (1916–​1973) was an English academic and writer with the literary pseudonym Daniel Nash. Among his works is My Son Is in the Mountains (London: Jonathan Cape, 1955), which dealt with Polk’s murder in Thessaloniki in May 1948. (See T. J. Carty, ed., A Dictionary of Literary Pseudonyms in the English Language, 2nd edn (reprint Abingdon, Routledge, 2015), 149, 578). 263 TNA: BW 34/​11, Cardiff, BC assistant representative, Cable on 9 July (mentioned in Hayter’s Letter to Cardiff, 11 July 1947). 264 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 265 TNA:  BW  34/​11, ‘Salonica Lectorship’ Minutes, Scott-​Kilvert, regional officer, Greece, and Hayter, 11 November 1947. 266 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947  –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948, and Tatham to European Division

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a lector for the academic year 1948–​1949, and he successfully took up his duties.267 In general, relations with the universities in 1949–​1950 remained cordial. Athens Polytechnic and the Panteios School in Athens welcomed lecturers from London on different subjects, and arrangements were in process to revive English teaching at both institutions. Ioannis Georgakis, professor of law at the Panteios School,268 sought ways ‘for closer contact with English culture in general, with the English language and with English thought on political economy and economics’. His keenness was demonstrated again in early 1950 when he declared to the BC the Panteios School’s desire to establish such a connection. On his initiative, a conference to discuss ways of achieving closer contact between English and Greek universities took place in February 1950. Participants at this conference included Sydney Hebblethwaite (the Embassy’s information officer), Professor Sewell, Louis MacNeice (director of the British Institute), Tatham and the school’s professors.269 The Panteios School was considered a significant academic establishment due to its importance for the education of the great majority of Greek civil servants. Georgakis was the prime mover in the scheme to establish an international research institute in Athens, after a project to establish an ‘Athenian Chatham House’ was abandoned. The latter was the idea of Alex Photiades,270 who proposed to the FO the

267 268 269 270

[C. A. M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949. Georgakis was elected in 1941. In 1944, he became Chef de Cabinet of the Regent Damaskinos, the Archbishop of Athens. He took part in the Varkiza Agreement as an observer. In 1945, he was appointed governor general of the Ionian Islands. TNA:  BW  34/​10, Minutes, F.  Y. Thompson, Regional Officer for the Balkans, 4 May; Thompson to Lieutenant Colonel G.  S. Conway, British Embassy, 14 May 1945. Alex Photiades, Greek government representative for educational and cultural matters in London in 1945 (TNA: BW 34/​10, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945) was professor at Athens Polytechnic, founding member of UNESCO and a permanent representative of Greece (1947–​1954). Along with Sir Alfred Zimmern, cofounder of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, he mentioned to F. R. Cowell, FO, ‘the desire of some members of the Greek Government’ to establish

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establishment of ‘some organisations’ in Athens –​along the lines of Chatham House271 –​with the aim of attracting ‘younger Greek intellectuals’ who were at present ‘bewildered in the void created by the disintegration of their old political parties’.272 Philip J. Noel-​Baker, the minister of state –​who was under the impression that the original proposal was from Leeper –​took a ‘personal interest’ in the project and wondered whether it would be feasible for the cost of the project to be borne by the BC.273 Both of the projects were abandoned due to lack of finance.274

Scholarships Since the re-​establishment of the BC branch in Athens, scholarships and bursaries –​for teachers, other professionals and visitors to Britain –​ were one of the most effective aspects of its work.275 The BC’s London

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such a scheme in Athens along the lines of Chatham House or Political and Economic Planning. All three knew each other, as they were country delegates at the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, inaugurated in 1920, is a prestigious think tank for the analysis of international issues aiming to promote debate and policy responses. During wartime, its scientific outlook was liberal internationalism, elitism, religiosity and Anglo-​Saxonism. It played a key role in the creation of a post-​war international order based on Anglo-​American alliance; cf. Andrea Bosco and Cornelia Navari, Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919–​1945: The Royal Institute of International Affairs during the Inter-​War Years (London:  Lothian Foundation Press, 1994) and Inderjeet Parmar, Think Tanks and Power in Foreign Policy: A Comparative Study of the Role and Influence of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1939–​ 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004). TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3909, Minutes, F. R. Cowell, FO (in charge of UNESCO, cultural conventions, USA, basic English, youth movements), 19 June 1945. TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3909, Minutes, Montagu-​Pollock, 6 September 1945, 11 September 1945. TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 5009, Letter, Leeper to Montagu-​Pollock, 22 October 1945. TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 276, Wickham’s Letter to Johnstone, 18 January 1945.

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office emphasized that the scholarship selection board should have strong British representation and that Johnstone, as acting representative of the BC, would be its chair. Greek scholars would be chosen on the grounds that on their return to Greece, ‘[they] would be most useful in propagating British social and economic theory and thus in helping to counter Russian brands’,276 thus giving an ideological dimension to the targeting of these scholarships. The BC was prepared to offer a dozen scholarships for 1945.277 Johnstone considered that these should be made available for Greek students in British universities and to facilitate organized visits or temporary employment in the United Kingdom for Greek workers or technical specialists.278 He also put forth that special scholarships should be given to Greek individuals for their exceptional services to the British cause during the war.279 Leeper urged the FO to raise the number to sixteen scholarships, enabling teachers to take the one-​year course in English, even if only for 1945. His request was made in anticipation of the introduction of English in Greek gymnasia and due to the great shortage of trained English teachers. The FO agreed that six teachers scholarships could be included –​in place of the six postgraduate scholarships –​but that the total number could not be increased.280 The number of applications received by 1 May 1945 for BC scholarships totalled 350.281 The Greek Embassy in London was keen to intervene in the selection process, as it appeared that securing a scholarship had turned into a field of ‘personal and political jealousies’ among Greek candidates.282 Cardiff ’s list of scholarship appointees sent to the London office in July included a number of architects and other ‘suitable visitors’ 276 TNA:  FO  924/​36, LC  1504, Letter, E.  R. Warner, British Embassy to Greece, Cairo, to Gurney, 8 November 1944. 277 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter to Deputy Secretary General, 24 March 1945. 278 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 1372, Johnstone’s Memorandum, ‘British Council Work in Greece: 1945/​6’, 7 March 1945. 279 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter to Deputy Secretary General, 24 March 1945, and extract from the Minutes of the Heads of Divisions meeting on 28 March, 30 March 1945. 280 TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  886, Telegram No.  6 Brico Saving, Athens to FO, 19 March 1945; Telegram No. 27 Brico, FO to Athens, 4 April 1945. 281 TNA: BW 34/​10, Minutes, 28 May 1945. 282 TNA: BW 34/​10, Letter, Confidential, Johnstone to Cardiff, 6 July 1945.

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in the hope that the BC ‘will be able to accept them’.283 Due to Greece’s post-​war reconstruction needs, there was an obvious British interest in urban planning. The BC brought several British architects to Athens to give lectures, including J. M. Richards,284 who stirred great interest. Both the BC and the Embassy prioritized scholarships to Greek architects, many of whom were employed as state officials in major public works.285 The BC had always maintained cordial relations with the Ministry of Reconstruction; this was, to some extent, because many of its high-​ranking executives were BC fellows.286 In working out the BC’s scholarship scheme, Runciman followed a more weighted selection process and carefully avoided invoking resentment 283 TNA:  BW  34/​10, Cardiff, ‘Memorandum on BC Activities in Greece’, n.d. [c. July 1945]. 284 TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  942, Telegram No.  48 Brico, Athens to FO, 27 May 1945. Copies of his An Introduction to Modern Architecture (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1940, revised 1953 and 1963) on modern movement in architecture were sent to Greece as it was connected with his lecture of 6 June 1945. 285 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2627, Telegram No. 92 Brico, Athens (Caccia) to FO, following for Thompson from Cardiff, 28 July 1945; Telegram No. 88 Brico, Athens (Caccia) to FO, 22 July 1945; Telegram No. 90 Brico, FO to Athens, 2 August 1945. 286 Among them was Dimitris Fotiadis, one of the innovators of the urban architectural tradition, who set his seal on the evolution of the Athenian block of flats (polikatoikia). (Cf. Helen Fessas-​Emmanouil and Emmanuel V. Marmaras, Δώδεκα Eλληνες Αρχιτέκτονες του Μεσοπολέμου [Twelve Greek Architects of the Interwar Period] (Heraklion:  Panepistimiakes Ekdoseis Kritis, 2005). Also among them were Rennos Koutsouris  –​a pioneer of the Le Corbusier movement  –​Arthur Scheepers and J. Papaioannou, who were architects in the Undersecretariat for Reconstruction, and Prokopios Vassiliadis, who –​in addition to the Athens Master Plan –​also made a decisive contribution to urban planning works and architecture in the 1950s and 1960s. As director of urban studies at the Housing Service in the Ministry of Public Works in 1952, he promoted a multitude of significant state projects. Paul Mylonas was later professor of architectural style at Athens Polytechnic and Thucydides Valentis was a basic representative of modernism in Greece and professor in the chair of building science at Athens Polytechnic. As a public official, he served as an architect in the School Building Programme of the Ministry of Education (1930–​1932), was head of departments in the Ministry of the Air Force (1935–​1960) and was seconded to the Division of Reconstruction Works at the Ministry of Public Works (1950–​1952).

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from the Greek Ministry of Education, as was the case with the Institut Français due to its ‘high-​handed, tactless and rather political selection of scholarship candidates for France’.287 During his tenure as representative, the selection procedure became systematized. The candidates were required to take English tests, the results of which would be passed on to a committee of mostly university and polytechnic professors, appointed by the ministry. Then, a joint committee of the BC and the ministry would draw up the definitive list, though the latter was prepared to accept the BC’s recommendations. ‘We are thus ensured that every candidate submitted to London has the full support of the Greek government, which is of importance in securing for male students their temporary exemption from the liability of being called up for military service’.288 The BC reserved five places for candidates ‘to whom we considered we already had an obligation’, whose names were not submitted for discussion to the joint committee.289 The BC’s selection system was revised in 1948.290 A new method of selecting candidates was developed in which the participation of the Greek Ministry of Education was instrumental, as their support was required to obtain permits for students to leave the country.291 Yet, the BC found it increasingly difficult to send students, bursars and visitors to Britain,292 owing to either the high cost of living (thus permitting only those ‘who are rich or who have rich relatives in Britain’)293 or the ongoing military service and the ban on foreign travel for all males between the ages of 19 and 39, which 287 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947. 288 Ibid. 289 Ibid. 290 TNA:  BW  34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947 –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948 291 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division [C.  A.  M. White, Assistant Regional Officer for Controller Overseas Division C], ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1947-​1948’, 4 June 1948. 292 For 1949–​1950, the number of BC grantees were only five scholars, three full-​scale visitors, five bursars and a fair number of Greeks who attended short-​term courses (TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to Overseas  C, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1949/​50’, 27 May 1950). 293 TNA:  BW  34/​23, S/​GR/​701/​7, Confidential Report, Steven Runciman, ‘The British Council in Greece, January 1st to May 31st, 1947’, 31 May 1947.

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was enforced in 1948.294 This meant that exemptions and permissions for BC scholarship holders going to Britain could be obtained only after long, time-​consuming negotiations. Despite the rigid regulations regarding leaves of absence from the country and financial matters, the BC’s scholarship programme continued unabated for the next terms, as the benefits gained from it were ‘extraordinarily important’ and multilayered.295

Beyond the normal functions: key proposals for the expansion of British Council activity in Greece The BC’s statutory field of activity in Greece included primarily English teaching and projecting the ‘British way of life’. However, the dissolution of the AGIS and the resulting increase in responsibilities of its successor –​ the Embassy’s Information Department, whose own staff had seen substantial reductions  –​meant that a more collaborative scheme with the BC was needed. That scheme was intended to prevent overlapping of functions between the two agencies while also creating a pool of staff that could be deployed in a more efficient manner. As a consequence, the BC was obliged to undertake activities that were not directly stipulated in its statutory remit, but which did involve considerable opportunities for broader cultural engagement. Several such projects were proposed, some of which were met with modest success and others eventually abandoned. Advisor on marine biology Τhe establishment of a marine biology institute in Greece had been the subject of long-​standing negotiations in the past. Its scientific significance was based on the limited available knowledge of marine fauna and flora in 294 TNA: BW 34/​23, GR/​701/​3, Confidential Report, W. G. Tatham, ‘The British Council in Greece. June 1947 –​January 1948’, 26 January 1948. 295 TNA:  BW  34/​20, GR/​701/​3, Tatham to European Division, ‘Annual Report. British Council in Greece, 1948/​49’, 14 June 1949.

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the eastern Mediterranean and south-​eastern Europe. In the early 1920s, the Greek state apparently failed to recognize the opportunity to boost Greek science via such an institute.296 With that said, the Greek government was fully aware of the significance that a marine biological institute could have for the country’s fishing industry and the economy in general, and a small hydrobiological station was set up just outside of Athens in 1924. Apart from the strategic importance of the eastern Mediterranean in the competition of the major powers during the interwar years, the area presented significant scientific interest, as its marine life had not yet been recorded and classified. In this context, in the mid-​1930s the Germans planned to establish an institute in Greece on ‘biological archaeology’.297 In early 1945, Britain showed an interest in taking up the project. Leeper suggested a marine biology expert might be able to assist development of the planned institute. This person would hold the temporary position of acting director during a visit of three to six months. But, before proceeding further, the FO needed to know whether the Greek government would bear the cost of travel and subsistence for the expert and agriculture experts. Although the answer to this was a negative,298 the BC succeeded in interesting Professor H. Munro Fox (formerly Fuchs), a professor of zoology at Bedford College,299 to the project, beginning in Athens at the end of June 1945.300 Professor Fox had been to Naples in 1912 and had worked on 296 Proposals that were made in 1935 by Georgios Pantazis, professor of zoology and director of the university’s Zoological Museum, that the station should be affiliated to the University of Athens were rejected. See Maria Zarifi, ‘German Science as a Medium of Cultural Policy and Propaganda? The Scientific Relations Between Greece and the Third Reich: A Case Study’, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, 2005, 288. 297 Zarifi, ‘German Science’, 289. 298 TNA: FO 924/​162, LC 886, Telegram No. 5 Brico, Leeper (Athens) to FO, 24 February (referring to FO Telegram No.  6 Brico of 3 February 1945); Telegram No. 19 Brico, FO to Athens, 7 March 1945; Telegram No. 20 Brico, Athens to FO, 16 March 1945. 299 In 1927, Fox was appointed as head of the Department of Zoology and Comparative Anatomy at the University of Birmingham, a post he held until 1941. He was professor of zoology at Bedford College, London, from 1941 to 1954. 300 An application form with the particulars of Fox was dispatched to the FO on 17 July 1945 (TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 2627, Athens (Caccia) to FO).

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fertilization at the zoological station for ten months. He had also learned about the geographical area from various research expeditions and scientific assignments. During the First World War, he served with the City of London Yeomanry in the Balkans, Egypt, Thessaloniki and Palestine. In 1919, he returned to Cairo to join the staff at the Cairo School of Medicine (1919–​1923) and in 1934–​1935 he co-​organized an expedition to study the fauna of the Suez Canal. This was an unusual sort of appointment for the BC to make –​and especially to pay for –​but since ‘there is money available’, the FO felt that this was an ‘opportunity of which we should agree to take advantage’.301 Particulars regarding Professor Fox were dispatched on 29 June.302 Oddly, there is no evidence that Fox actually went on to occupy the Greek post. However, the Hellenic Hydrobiological Institute was created and annexed to the Academy of Athens in July 1945. The institute’s eleven-​member board included two representatives of the Allied states who would ‘contribute to the Institute’s enrichment and operation’.303 Provisions were made for the recruitment of qualified national or foreign technical staff, whose costs –​as well as those of the administrative staff –​ would be borne by the State Treasury and the Ministry of Education, respectively.304 Professor Spiros Dontas became the institute’s new director, but due to lack of funds and personnel, the institute did not open until 1947. In 1946, the only scientists reported to have worked at the institute were Greek Minister of Education N. Louvaris, in an unspecified role, and the French hydrobiologist, Professor G. Belloc.305 With credits from the Marshall Plan, the institute’s home –​the Villa Skouloudi –​was repaired 301 TNA:  FO  924/​162, LC  2282, Letter, GR/​5/​1, Thompson, Regional Officer for the Balkans, to H. M. Hedley, 5 June 1945; Minutes, Hedley, 16 June 1945; Letter, Hedley to Thompson, 25 June 1945. 302 TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  2627, Telegram No.  63 Brico, FO to Athens, 29 June 1945; Telegram No. 85 Brico, Athens (Caccia) to FO, following from Cardiff, 17 July 1945. 303 ΦΕΚ: 183, Compulsory Law 469, ‘Re Founding of the Hellenic Hydrobiological Institute by the Academy of Athens’, 13 July 1945. 304 Ibid. 305 Zarifi, ‘German Science’, 305.

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and converted into workshops, while technical equipment was also purchased. In addition, free film shows about fishing were held and free night classes were offered to professional fishermen. In 1948, the US –​through UNRRA –​donated a specially equipped 80-​tonne boat to the institute for ichthyological studies, replacing an old wooden boat. It began mapping Mediterranean fish-​farming areas and taking samples from the sea floor.306 After several changes of name and some mergers, it became the Hellenic Centre for Marine Research in 2001. A model hospital and a training centre for nurses in Thessaloniki After the war, Greece was in urgent need of welfare relief. It faced acute food crisis and urgent need to improve the public health of its war-​ravaged population and carry out the reconstruction of its badly damaged public services infrastructure. Almost all of the public service apparatuses had to be rebuilt and reorganized from the ground up, including the public health system. In addition, direct action was needed to improve public health; malaria presented a real danger, as it had reached epidemic proportions. But the anti-​malaria campaign that was launched to control the disease proved to be yet another field of competition between Britain and other countries, especially the US. Ultimately, this rivalry would have significant impacts on the propaganda work of those foreign states in Greece. The Americans began their anti-​malaria field research307 in Greece after the influx of refugees in 1922, when the disease reached dangerous levels 306 Eleftheria, ‘Υδροβιολογικόν Ινστιτούτον εις Πειραιά’ [Hydrological Institute in Piraeus], 17 April 1949, 6. 307 Anti-​malaria research began in the US as early as 1915, when Dr Wickliffe Rose, chair of the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission, initiated malaria programmes, which soon began to cross the US borders in practically every malaria-​endemic region in the world. The Rockefeller International Health Division developed a system of interplay between field and laboratory research and aided in setting up laboratories, establishing and maintaining schools and training stations in malariology at many strategic points, ‘all the way from Leesburg, Georgia, to Athens and Karachi’; see Raymond B. Fosdick, The Story of the Rockefeller Foundation

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for the entire population and was further exacerbated by existing sanitary and health problems in the country. During the interwar period, public health emerged as a priority on the national political agenda and became a focal point of international collaboration. The liberal Greek government of Eleftherios Venizelos –​in power for most of the 1920s –​made the first attempts to reconstruct the public health system. It appealed for foreign assistance to the League of Nations Health Organization in late 1922 and after 1923 to the Rockefeller Foundation (RF). Private American philanthropy in Greece and the Near East in general had a long tradition, dating back to the early nineteenth century. The American missionary expeditions –​particularly their educational and humanitarian work –​helped to create among local people a perception of the US as a benevolent country, in sharp contrast to the diplomatic and economic dominance of the European powers; this perception lasted a long time. The most extensive foreign relief aid in this period came from American philanthropic organizations, such as Near East Relief and the American Red Cross, operating under the auspices of the US government. They introduced American methods in their humanitarian services, thus enhancing American prestige and influence in the region. In the 1920s, the extension of American influence was faster than any other major power.308 After several abortive requests, the Greek state finally ensured the RF’s collaboration through the intervention of the League of Nations, leading in December 1929 to an agreement between the three bodies.309 The most important tasks undertaken by the RF in Greece were: the anti-​malaria campaign; a fellowship programme for field studies in malaria; and the Athens School of Hygiene, which was established in 1929. The RF funded the operation of a malaria laboratory at the Athens School of Hygiene, a field laboratory in Thessaloniki and five field stations, where students of the (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952; reprint New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989) 12, 37, 47–​48. 308 Louis P. Cassimatis, American Influence in Greece 1917–​1929 (Kent, OH:  Kent State University Press, 1988), x. 309 Vassiliki Theodorou and Despina Karakatsani, ‘Health Policy in Interwar Greece: The Intervention by the League of Nations Health Organisation’, Dynamis 28 (2008), 53–​75, 68.

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school and officers of the Ministry of Hygiene –​established in November 1923 –​practised. Despite the high expectations and the co-​operative relationship between the RF and the Greek state, the plan to rebuild a modern and efficient public health system in Greece failed when the advance of the Second World War put an end to any further health reform. Contributing factors to this included the unsettled political condition of Greece that followed Venizelos’ electoral defeat in September 1932, the poor state of the Greek economy, the sluggish bureaucracy and the clash between the RF’s specific set of values and Greek practices.310 By 1932, the RF funds had gradually diminished too.311 After the RF left Greece, the Thessaloniki laboratory passed to the control of the Malaria Research Laboratory, a League of Nations organization. In 1932, Dr Henry Foy –​a British haematologist and nutrition researcher –​became the laboratory’s head. It was supported by funds provided by an American philanthropist –​Mrs David Simmons –​and administered by the league until the end of 1937, when the funds ‘neared exhaustion’.312 Simmons may be related313 to James Stevens Simmons,314 who was a pioneer in preventive medicine with long experience in directing army laboratories both in the US and abroad and whose contribution to the knowledge of dengue fever and malaria was significant. It is not clear from the evidence gathered so far in what capacity Mrs Simmons funded the workshop and what relations she had, if any, with the RF. However, a Wellcome Trust communication with the British ambassador in Athens in 1950 mentioned 310 Dimitra Giannuli, ‘“Repeated Disappointment”: The Rockefeller Foundation and the Reform of the Greek Public Health System, 1929–​1940’, Bulletin of the History of Medicine 72/​1 (1998), 47–​72. 311 Theodorou and Karakatsani, ‘Health Policy in Interwar Greece’, 72. 312 A. Rupert Hall and B. A. Bembridge, Physic and Philanthropy: A History of the Wellcome Trust, 1936–​1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 41. 313 If she was James Stevens Simmons’ daughter, her name was Frances (Mrs David M. McConnell). 314 William S. Powell, ‘Simmons, James Stevens’ (Newton, USA, 1890–​ 1954), physician, army officer and university professor (Dictionary of North Carolina Biography). See also John Farley, To Cast Out Disease. A History of the International Heath Division of the Rockefeller Foundation (1913–​1951) (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2004), 172–​175.

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that Mrs Simmons had funded the Thessaloniki laboratory since its inception in 1924 and that its centre was ‘in rooms in a house in Thessaloniki’. Dr Neil Hamilton Fairley, a world figure in the anti-​malaria campaign, with a distinguished career in clinical tropical medicine,315 collected additional funds that enabled the new research laboratory to be built on the grounds of the Thessaloniki Refugee Hospital. In 1934, Fairley paid several visits to the Thessaloniki laboratory, where he conducted pioneering research into blackwater fever and had access to ample material for his experiments.316 It was on Fairley’s advice that the British Medical Research Council (MRC) began developing plans for malaria research based in Thessaloniki; when his funding ended in 1937, the MRC was still eager to continue. But as part of the British government, the MRC could not itself take responsibility for a laboratory in a foreign country.317 The MRC therefore appealed to the Wellcome Trust,318 which agreed to continue the laboratory as a centre for work on malaria and tropical medicine.319 This enterprise was very much in the spirit of the Wellcome Trust’s own interventions into tropical medicine and paved the way for its support of similar small independent teams around the world with a clearly defined programme of research.320 Thus, from early 1938, with agreement from the Greek government, Foy took charge of the Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory (as it was now John Boyd, ‘Neil Hamilton Fairley, 1891–​1966’, Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 12 (November 1966), 132–​133; Hall and Bembridge, Physic and Philanthropy, 62. 316 Boyd, Biographical Memoirs, 131. It is worth mentioning that as he was well acquainted with the malaria situation in Macedonia, and in early 1941 he was in the position to convince Controller in Chief General Sir Archibald Wavell to alter his campaign plan away from this area to reduce the danger from malaria for the Allied troops (Boyd, Biographical Memoirs, 133). 317 Wellcome Trust, The Wellcome Trust, First Report Covering the Period 1937–​1956 (London: Wellcome Trust, 1957), 34. (The author of the report was most likely Sir Henry Dale, chair of the Wellcome board of trustees.) 318 The Wellcome Trust was created for the advancement of medical science in 1936 in accordance with the will of Sir Henry Wellcome. 319 Wellcome Trust, The Wellcome Trust, First Report, 37. 320 Cf. Wellcome Trust, The Wellcome Trust:  Its Origins and Functions (London: Wellcome Trust, 1963).

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called) in Thessaloniki, and the trustees agreed to meet expenses up to a limit of 2,000 pounds per annum. From 1939, the trustees were guided in their oversight of the Thessaloniki laboratory by a strong advisory committee chaired by Sir Henry M. Dale, who was chair of the BC’s Science Committee and president of the Royal Society. The advisory committee also included Dr Hamilton Fairley, who later became Wellcome professor of tropical medicine at London University, Dr Charles Kellaway, who later became the wartime director of pathology for the Australian Army headquarters, and Brigadier J. S. K. Boyd, who had been director of pathology at the War Office, later became director of research in tropical medicine at the Wellcome Research Institute in London, and was a member of the Colonial Medical Research Committee. Soon after taking on the laboratory, the trustees also approved Foy’s extension plans, providing more working space and accommodation for ten beds, so that clinical studies could be made on patients suffering from malaria. As Foy was not medically qualified, Dr Athena Konti,321 who was already employed at the Thessaloniki Refugee Hospital, was appointed to take charge of the clinic.322 The plans of the Wellcome Trust –​in association with the MRC –​to conduct research on malaria, blackwater fever and nutritional anaemia in Greece, and further afield in Cyprus, progressed well until the German invasion of 1941. At that point, the laboratory was emptied of its equipment, which was placed at the disposal of the General Headquarters Middle East in Cairo. In 1944, Foy and Konti returned to Thessaloniki under the auspices of the UNRRA. The period until 1948 was spent partly in Thessaloniki testing the possibilities of resuming research at the location and partly in Britain developing experience in the most modern research developments.323 321 She gained her Bachelor of Medicine from the University of Athens in 1930 and her Doctor of Medicine in 1933 (Wellcome Library, Archives). 322 Hall and Bembridge, Physic and Philanthropy,  41–​42. 323 The official Wellcome website refers to Henry Foy as ‘the Trust’s first scientific employee, [who] established the Wellcome Trust Malaria Research Laboratory in Thessaloniki, Greece, in 1938. The laboratory transferred to Nairobi, Kenya, in 1949, where it has evolved into one of the Trust’s Major Overseas Programmes’, .

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Since 1939, the BC had shown considerable interest in building a model hospital of 100 beds in Thessaloniki. The aim of such a hospital was ‘to be used as a model to demonstrate to the Greeks of Macedonia and Thrace British standards of hospital organization and administration’.324 The hospital was to be run along the lines of agreements between the Greek government and the RF, the Health Organization of the League of Nations, and the Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory. Although the war prevented this plan from being fully explored, it was put forward again in 1945 in a ‘modified form to meet [the] new conditions’.325 The new plan proposed that the BC would make a sum of approximately 20,000 pounds available for the purpose of reconditioning the Thessaloniki Refugee Hospital and expanding it from 200 to 300 beds, making it a model hospital that could be used both as a centre to train nurses and a supplementary teaching school for final-​year students at the university’s School of Medicine.326 At the end of August 1945, at the request of the BC, Sir Henry Dale intervened in the project. On 14 September 1945, Foy –​who remained director of the Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory in Thessaloniki and who was one of the original proponents of the proposal –​submitted a memorandum on the plan to the BC through Kenneth Johnstone.327 Accordingly, the BC made an approach through Sir John Stavridi328 –​ the Greek consulate general in London –​with the support of Sir Henry Dale, to the Lord Mayor’s Greek Relief Fund, asking for ‘favourable consideration’ of a grant for that purpose.329 As the BC would not provide funds for it, the Lord Mayor’s Greek Relief Fund donated 20,000 pounds for the project.330 The Southern Department raised no objection to the 324 TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  4225, Dr Henry Foy, ‘Memorandum on a Plan for the Establishment of a Modern Hospital and Nurses training Centre in Thessaloniki’, 14 September 1945. 325 Ibid. 326 Ibid. 327 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 4225, Dr Henry Foy, ‘Memorandum on a Plan’. 328 ‘Obituary’, The Times, 27 July 1948. 329 TNA: FO 924/​706, LC 933, Letter, Sir Henry Dale to B. C. MacDermot, FO, 25 February 1948. 330 TNA:  FO  924/​163, LC  4225, Letter, R. Seymour to Montagu-​Pollock, 14 September 1945.

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proposal.331 The Lord Mayor was anxious to make an announcement of ‘this gift’ before the return to Greece of the Greek regent, who was then in London for a crucial meeting with Ernest Bevin on the acute problem of timing of the Greek plebiscite and election. The timing was opportune, as the British government had arranged for maximum publicity to be given to his visit. On the day of his departure from Britain, the FO issued an Allied statement (excluding the Soviets) to the press, postponing the plebiscite. The next day, another statement was issued giving a brief note of subjects discussed in London, such as the material assistance afforded to Greece.332 Yet the announcement of this gift was not followed through. The entire scheme needed careful further consideration, and it was felt that it would be necessary before proceeding to obtain assurances from the Greek government on certain key issues.333 In October, Richard Seymour –​deputy secretary general of the BC –​ who was on an inspection visit to Greece, discovered an alternative plan drawn up by Miss Baggallay –​UNRRA nursing advisor for Greece –​which presented an unexpected complication. On his arrival in Thessaloniki, Seymour inspected the municipal hospital and also accompanied Dr Foy to the Thessaloniki Refugee Hospital, which evidently required far more additional help than the municipal hospital. Rather than argue the relative merits of the plans by Foy and Baggallay, Seymour recommended to Dr Foy and Major Nilbank –​the local UNRRA medical director from the US Army Medical Service –​that those interested in these plans might benefit from presenting a united front to the Lord Mayor’s Fund to secure the 20,000 pounds. Seymour considered that the project had ‘real value’, even more so if the training of nurses could be incorporated into the main project. This would do much, he argued, to raise the standard of nursing in Greece, to bring material benefit to the inhabitants of Macedonia and to facilitate contacts with a British institution and to the medical profession. Seymour recommended that the BC provide a matron and a sister 331

TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 4225, Minutes, Hedley, 18 September 1945; D. S. Laskey, 21 September 1945. 332 TNA: FO 371/​48280, R 16350, Minutes, Laskey, 27 September 1945. 333 TNA:  FO  924/​ 163, LC  4225, Letter, Montagu-​ Pollock to Seymour, 24 September 1945.

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tutor as well as an annual scholarship to Britain for one or two nurses. The Wellcome Trust Laboratory in the Thessaloniki Refugee Hospital was a research centre in which the MRC was interested, and Seymour hoped that some permanent connections between that hospital and a London hospital could be arranged.334 The project was suspended until the necessary Greek legislation was adopted and the Greek government provided its share of funding.335 In September 1947, however, the change of Greek government and, consequently, the new hygiene minister –​Α. Orphanides –​brought a shift in the government’s attitude. A decree passed in October authorized the setting up of the nursing school in Thessaloniki,336 and advisory members of the school’s board of directors included representatives of the BC and the Wellcome Trust. Two British nurses were also appointed as technical consultants for two years, paid for by the BC. Unfortunately, by this time the BC in London had definitively abandoned the idea on both monetary and administrative grounds. Tatham did, however, suggest that the CRD might approach the Lord Mayor’s Fund to persuade its board to allocate half the originally promised money to the Midwifery School in Thessaloniki and half to the original Thessaloniki Hospital scheme, with the Wellcome Trust or, failing them, the World Health Organization administering the latter portion.337 334

TNA:  BW  2/​144, GB/​16/​120/​1, Letter, Seymour to Montagu-​Pollock, 18 September 1945; Minutes, Seymour to Dr A. E. Morgan, 20 September 1945. 335 Seymour, Sir G. Wilkinson of the Lord Mayor’s Fund and Dr Henry Foy agreed that the BC should transfer its responsibility for administering the grant to the Wellcome Trust; see TNA:  FO  924/​706, LC  651, Confidential, British Embassy to CRD, 3 February 1948; Minutes, J. Aitken, 11 February 1948. See also TNA: FO 924/​706, LC 933, Sir Henry Dale to B. C. MacDermot, FO, 25 February 1948. 3 36 ΦΕΚ 241, Legislative Decree 440, ‘Re the establishment of a School of Nursing in Thessaloniki’, 30 October 1947, 1290–​1291. 337 TNA:  FO  924/​706, LC  651, Letter, Confidential, British Embassy to CRD, 3 February 1948; Letter, B.  C. MacDermot, FO, to Sir Henry Dale, Chair of the board of trustees, Wellcome Trust, 23 February 1948; LC 933, Letter, Sir Henry Dale to MacDermot, 25 February 1948; Minutes, 4 March 1948; LC 1114, Letter, Foy, Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory, Royal Society of Tropical Medicine to McDermot, 6 March 1948.

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The British Embassy was thus surprised by an announcement in the United States Information Service Daily News Bulletin on 10 April that an agreement had been signed by Orphanides, Dwight P. Griswold –​chief of the American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) –​and Georgios Hatzivassilliou –​chair of the board and professor at the Thessaloniki School of Medicine –​for the construction of the state School of Nursing at the Thessaloniki Central [Refugee] Hospital. Plans and specifications were prepared by the Greek government’s technical services in collaboration with the AMAG’s Public Health Division. Since the agreed allocation of 20,000 pounds from the Lord Mayor’s Fund was now superfluous, the Embassy asked the CRD to arrange for the money to be allocated instead (in its entirety) to the Thessaloniki Midwifery School and Maternity Home. Both Foy and Sir Henry Dale were ‘a little annoyed about this stealing of our thunder by the Americans’338 when the ‘Wellcome Research Laboratory had fought hard to get the money for this project and had spent considerable time and money on getting out the plans’. They were both of the opinion that ‘this is the only project of its kind in Greece with which they would wish the Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory in Greece to be associated’.339 Having negotiated and produced plans for this project and feeling very strongly the need for a rehabilitated hospital in Thessaloniki, they proposed holding the 20,000 pounds from the Lord Mayor’s Fund until it was quite certain that the Americans would go ahead with their plans. Indeed, by late August, it was ‘quite clear that the Americans are not undertaking the rehabilitation of this Hospital’ due to a severe cut in the AMAG budget, though they were preparing to finish the Nursing School.340

3 38 TNA: FO 924/​706, LC 1613, Minutes, J. N. A [ J. Aitken?] 16 June 1948. 339 TNA: FO 924/​706, LC 1613, Letter, CRD to Chancery, 17 June 1948. 340 TNA: FO 924/​706, LC 1613, Extract, United States Information Service, Daily News Bulletin, ‘Nursing School to Be Built in Thessaloniki’, Athens, 10 April 1948; British Embassy, Athens to CRD, Confidential, 16 April 1948; J. M. Vine (UN, WHO, Greece Mission), Athens to Henry Foy, Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory, Thessaloniki, 30 August 1948; Dr Henry Foy, Wellcome Trust Research Laboratory, Central Refugee Hospital, Thessaloniki, Greece to Aitken, 30 September 1948.

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The issue was not discussed further for more than a year, until a letter dated 16 January 1950 from Dr O. F. Hedley –​medical director of the US Public Health Service and director of the Public Health Division of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Mission to Greece –​arrived at the Wellcome Trust in London. In this correspondence, Dr Hedley asked the trust about their intentions regarding the Thessaloniki laboratory and for information regarding the status of the 20,000 pounds. He subsequently asked the British Embassy if they could interest themselves in this matter. In his letter to the Wellcome Trust, Dr Hedley spoke of ‘an abandoned or at least unused laboratory located on the property of the Central State Hospital in Thessaloniki’, whose retention for research in malaria was unjustifiable with the advent of the chemical compound DDT. He continued that the current incidence of malaria was so low that there were insufficient patients for clinical studies. Dr Foy had since departed for South Africa, leaving the keys with the British consul general; most of the equipment had been removed. The American Mission, however, was interested in this laboratory, in providing funds to build a nursing school and in refurbishing the hospital. He also suggested that the building be donated to the Greek state as a public health laboratory, especially since the land on which the laboratory was erected belonged to the State Hospital. The 20,000 pounds, if still available, would ‘relieve the ECA of some of the financial responsibility for making much needed improvements’. If the trust no longer had an interest in this project, the Americans would know ‘better how to proceed’.341 In late January 1950, Dr Hedley met Lady Norton –​wife of the British ambassador to Greece –​who agreed to mediate to persuade the Wellcome Trust to give its consent to his proposal that the laboratory be donated to the Greek state as a public health laboratory, retaining its name as the Wellcome Research Centre. ‘It would be a grand gesture and of great value to the Greek people as well as giving another proof to the world of the practical reality of Anglo-​American co-​operation’, she wrote to the trustees, while the ambassador also hoped that the FO would ‘see their way to discuss the matter with the Foundation’. The FO found no grounds for intervention in 341 TNA:  FO  924/​825, L  116/​1, Letter, British Embassy to CRD, 27 January 1950; Dr O.  F. Hedley, Medical Director, US Public Health Service, Director, Public Health Division, Economic Co-​operation Administration Mission to Greece, Athens to the Wellcome Foundation, London, 16 January 1950.

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this matter.342 Since full responsibility for the 20,000 pounds lay between the Lord Mayor’s Fund (as owners) and the Wellcome Trust (as trustees), the CRD had no power to intervene as to how or when it should be spent.343 Thus, as far as the FO was concerned, no further action was required on the proposal.344 Exploitation of minerals The establishment of an independent Department of Mining and Metallurgical Engineering at the Athens Polytechnic in 1946345 must be seen in the context of the exploitation of the country’s resources for the needs of reconstruction and the post-​war discussion about the more intense utilization of mineral resources. Before the war, mineralogists represented only 2 per cent of the students registered in the Technical Chamber of Greece (data from 1933–​1934), and all of them studied abroad.346 Britain was often not included among student preferences, since almost the only school of 342 TNA: FO 924/​825, L 116/​2, Letter, Lady Norton to T. R. G. Bennett, chair and managing director, Messrs Burroughs & Wellcome, 31 January 1950; Letter, Athens Embassy to CRD, 8 February 1950; Minutes, 14 and 16 February 1950. 343 TNA:  FO  924/​825, L  116/​1, ‘Brief resume of case’, 14 February 1950; CRD to Chancery, Unclassified, 20 February 1950. 344 TNA: FO 924/​825, L 116/​7, Minutes, 10 May 1950. 345 By-​law 935/​1943, the chairs of Special Mining and Metallurgy of Iron, Special Metallurgy, Stratification and Applied Geology were established, but the substantial operation of the Mining and Metallurgical Engineering Department didn’t begin until the academic year 1945–​1946 with the establishment of the five-​year programme of studies in the Department of Mining and Metallurgical Engineering by virtue of Decree-​Law 1021/​27.2.1946. In 1948, they were merged into a single department; see G. Tsamasfyros and D. Basantis, eds, Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο 1837-​1997, Εκατόν Εξήντα Χρόνια [National Technical University of Athens 1837-​ 1997, One Hundred and Sixty Years] (Athens: National Technical University of Athens, 1997), 115–​116. 346 The first preference was for the Säschische Bergakademie, Freiburg and Université Faculté Technique, École Spéciale des Arts et Manufactures et Mines, followed by the École National Supérieure des Mines, Paris. See Lida Papastefanaki, Η φλέβα της γης. Τα μεταλλεία της Ελλάδας, 19ος-​20ς αιώνας [The Vein of the Earth, the Mines of Greece, 19th–​20th Century] (Athens: Bibliorama, 2017), 126.

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metalliferous mining in the UK347 was the Camborne School of Mines, founded in 1888 and merged in 1909 with all the mining schools in Cornwall, becoming the School of Metalliferous Mining (Cornwall).348 Its diploma –​ the Associateship of the Camborne School of Mines –​was introduced in 1936 but not recognized as a higher-​level professional qualification in Britain until 1949. Further still, it was not recognized at this point by the Greek government.349 The principal of the school had approached the Greek authorities directly after the war and was told to submit his application for recognition to the senate of Athens Polytechnic. The application was submitted early in 1949, but received no reply. The issue was taken up again in December 1949, when G. I. Siotis350 –​‘director of a US firm of mine-​owners’ and a graduate of the School of Metalliferous Mining –​approached the British Embassy with a request to employ mining engineers who had obtained degrees from his own school.351 However, as these persons needed to have graduated from recognized institutions, Camborne graduates were not acceptable. The CRD was aware that the issue of recognition of the school by the Greek government had dragged on since 1947 and wanted to see the matter ‘settled in favour of the school’.352 347 TNA: FO 924/​791, CRL 23/​1, Letter, T. Comfort, British Embassy, Athens, to J. P. G. Finch, CRD, 28 December 1949. 348 His first principal, W. Ficher Wilkinson, was educated at the Freiberg University of Mining and Technology in Germany. 349 TNA: FO 924/​791, L 23/​4, Letter, Gravenall to Dove, 14 March 1950. 350 This was Georgios I. Siotis, a founding member and member of the board of directors of the mines in Parnassos (1933), on Milos (1934) (see Papastefanaki, Η φλέβα της γης, 297–​298). He was also a founding member and member of the board of directors of the mines in Peristeri, Attica. See Nikos Theodosiou, ‘Η εξέγερση του “κάρβουνου”. Το χρονικό του “κάρβουνου” (των Λιγνιτωρυχείων Περιστερίου)’ [The Rise of ‘Coal’. The Chronicle of ‘Coal’ (from the Lignite Mines of Peristeri)], . 351 TNA: FO 924/​791, Letter, T. Comfort, British Embassy, Athens, to J. P. G. Finch, CRD, 28 December 1949. 352 TNA:  FO  924/​791, L  23/​4, Letter, P.  A. Dove, CRD, FO, to R. Morrison, Director, External Relations branch, Ministry of Education, 17 January 1950.

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According to the available evidence, Siotis was at the time general manager of the US mining firm Mediterranean Mines,353 which worked the Kirki mine, once a British enterprise. Britain’s mineralogical interest in Greece dated from 1873, and the proposed formation of a Greek-​British company to smelt iron ores had been postponed during the international financial crisis of 1875–​1893. The French firm Compagnie Française des Mines du Laurium, established in Paris in 1875, was active from 1890 to 1905/​1907 –​the period of flourishing mining activity in Greece –​and played a central role in Greek mining history. It was also at this time that German, Belgian and Dutch companies had interests in the country. The Anglo-​Greek Magnesite Company maintained a firm long-​term presence in Greece from 1902 to 1959 and in 1922, extended its activities to both Euboea and Macedonia.354 The Kirki mines in Thrace were run by a British enterprise from 1926 until the Germans took over during the war. In February 1926, the Greek state granted the exclusive right to exploration to Alfred Jackson of Surrey (UK). In 1927 this concession was ratified and in 1929 it was amended and ratified by Law 4116.355 In 1934, a contract with the British company Thracian Mineral Products Ltd356 –​represented by F. A. Ivanof –​was ratified by Law 6341, leading to the establishment in Lavrio of an ore enrichment industry, which derived material from mines around Greece. Two years later, in 1936, Ivanof –​also representing the Thracian Union Trust357 –​signed a new contract with the Greek state, transferring all contracts previously signed from 1926 to London and to the Kirki Mines 353 As appears from the correspondence with Basil J. Vlavianos, editor of Ethnikos Kiryx, the largest and longest running Greek-​American newspaper in New York (1915 to the present day) and member of the board of directors until 1949. See:  Online Archive of California:  Basil J. Vlavianos papers 1890–​1990, Subseries 6: Mediterranean Mines, 1947–​1955. 354 Papastefanaki, Η φλέβα της γης, 66, 68, 71–​72, 81. 355 ΦΕΚ:  A  85, 8 March 1926; ΦΕΚ:  A  286, 13 November 1927; ΦΕΚ:  A  358, 18 October 1934. 356 TNA: BT 31/​37750/​274045, Company No. 274045; Thracian Mineral Products Limited. Incorporated in 1933. Dissolved in 1959. 357 The company could not ‘by reason of its liabilities continue its business’ and it ‘wound up voluntarily’; The London Gazette, 10 June 1938, 3774. In 1943, it was struck off the register; The London Gazette, 14 May 1943, 2170.

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Company.358 In 1945, Kirki passed into Greek jurisdiction and in 1946, an agreement was reached with the American company Mines Incorporated,359 ratified a year later.360 In December 1949, the British Embassy approached the Greek Ministry of Education and, at their request, the Board of Trade’s Commercial Relations and Exports Department361 then contacted the Camborne School of Mines and the Ministry of Education in the UK. The Embassy also formally approached Athens Polytechnic, asking them to decide on the application already submitted by the school. Its reply, ‘after a considerable amount of prodding’, was that the Camborne School was ruled a ‘middle’ technical institute, not comparable with the highest school of Athens Polytechnic, and that recognition was not granted. T. Comfort of the British Embassy attributed this to ‘a purely technical’ reason pertaining to the absence of a British classification system of higher education that could be paired with foreign institutions. As the Camborne School was not included in a register of institutions of higher education, the polytechnic classified it as a ‘middle’ school, which, in Greece, does not issue degrees. He wondered whether the CRD might develop a technique for sorting out such cases. However, if the cultural convention was signed, a solution could be found through agreed terms of a mutual recognition of degrees. Before replying to the polytechnic, Comfort asked whether the CRD could find out from either the BC’s Education Division or the British Ministry of Education if there was ‘any irrefutable yardstick’ indicating that the Camborne diploma was regarded officially in Britain as being equivalent to university mining degrees, as such evidence was the only 358 ΦΕΚ: A 280, On the ratification of the contract of 16 June 1936 between the Greek state and Mr. F.  A. Ivanof representing the London-​based companies Thracian Union Trust Limited and Thracian Mineral Products Limited, 7 July 1936. 359 The company was represented by W.  C. Schmidt, who was a mining engineer, member of The American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers and attached in 1945 to the Central American Minerals Mission of the Foreign Economic Administration, US Department of State. 360 ΦΕΚ: Α 80, 19 April 1947. 361 It is not specified whether this is the British Board of Trade or some equivalent Greek authority.

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factor that might convince the polytechnic to change its mind. ‘I should enjoy telling the members of the Technical University here that they are a crowd of pompous, hide-​bound old nincompoops, but until we have more ammunition, we must reserve the pleasure’, he noted with indignation.362 This was an unfair comment, though, to one of the most respected university institutions in the country. The BC’s Education Division learned that the diploma issued by the school, although recognized and accepted by the mining industry as being of a high standard, did not have ‘degree status’,363 though the school was willing to raise the status and level of recognition of the qualification. However, Athens Polytechnic refused to budge on its position, granting recognition only to institutions which required five years of university training before obtaining a degree. As a consequence, the BC decided not to pursue the matter further.364 The Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention The practical impasses to Anglo-​Greek cultural relations led to an acceptance of the fact that a fresh understanding should be reached between the two countries. To secure such an agreement and thus resolve the difficulties faced by the BC in carrying out its activities in Greece, it was acknowledged that both countries needed a clear and unambiguous statement of the terms of their collaboration, via an Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention. Cultural relations agreements between Greece and other countries had been more frequent in the 1930s. For instance, 1938 marked 362 TNA: FO 924/​791, CRL 23/​1, Letter, T. Comfort from Athens Embassy to J. P. G. Finch, CRD, 28 December 1949. 363 TNA: FO 924/​791, CRL 23/​1, Letter, P. A. Dove, CRD, to R. Morrison, Ministry of Education, 17 January 1950; Letters, Dr B. Gravenall, Education Division at the BC to Morrison, 30 January and 6 February 1950. 364 TNA:  FO  924/​791, L  23/​4, Letter, The Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, London, to W. R. McAlpine, Combined Sciences Department, BC, London, 24 February 1950; Letter, Granvenall to Dove, 14 March 1950; L 23/​5, Letter, Morrison to Dove, 17 March 1950; L 23/​7, Letter, T. Comfort from Athens Embassy to J. P. G. Finch, CRD, 6 June 1950. In 1993, Camborne became a specialized Engineering Department of the University of Exeter.

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a period of Greek cultural rapprochement with France and Italy. The Greek cultural agreement with France –​signed in December 1938 –​provided an avenue for exchange of prominent professors and scientists who could produce original work. It also recognized the existence of two important French cultural institutions –​the École Française d’Athènes and the Institut Français d’Athènes –​as well the creation of a chair of French literature and history at the University of Athens.365 The Italian government came close to ratifying a cultural contract with Greece in 1937, but negotiations fell through when the Italian authorities in the Dodecanese began prosecuting Greek islanders. Greece was also among the very first countries to ratify a cultural agreement with Germany, though was not bound to Germany by any alliance or pact, as were Germany’s cultural partners (Hungary, Italy, Japan or Spain). Britain had not previously entered into cultural conventions with any country other than Greece.366 In the context of the establishment of the BC in Athens in 1939, to counter Axis propaganda in the Balkans, an Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention was signed on 30 December 1940. However, owing to the outbreak of war in Greece, the convention was never ratified. Immediately following liberation, on 2 December 1944, the BC asked the FO whether they proposed to take any action on the 1940 Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention. It took some time for the FO to reply, and when it did, in mid-​February 1945, it was equivocal: the FO would not raise this question with the Greek government at present, since the convention would certainly need revising in the light of post-​war conditions. However, the issue remained on the FO’s agenda and it would keep the position under review.367 In fact, Leeper was ‘strongly’ in favour of maintaining the BC’s current unofficial status, as it gave it a free hand in expanding its network in the country and its dealings with the Greek authorities. ‘I feel sure that its initiative would be cramped were it to become an entirely official organisation’, Leeper explained.368 365 ΦΕΚ: A 57, Decree-​Law 1608, ‘Re. Greek-​French Agreement on Educational and Cultural Relations, Dated 19 December 1938’, 14 February 1939, 385–​389. 366 White, The British Council, 75. 367 TNA:  BW  34/​10, GR/​8/​2, Letter, Seymour to Johnstone, 2 December 1944; Letter, Gurney to Seymour, 13 February 1945. 368 TNA: BW 34/​10, Telegram No. 20 Brico, Athens (Leeper) to FO, 15 March 1945.

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With the formation of the Greek-​Soviet League in July 1945, Hedley felt that the time was right to reopen the question of the Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention. She believed that there was no need to raise it yet with the BC, ‘as it will need further consideration here before we have any definite proposal to make’.369 The contract drafted in 1940 was considered obsolete and not worth resurrecting, since it dated back to a time when Britain’s ‘fortunes were at a low ebb’. As the convention stood, it would limit ‘the liberties which British organizations concerned with cultural relations already de facto enjoyed’ in 1946, rather than guaranteeing them ‘any definite rights’. As the new post-​war political balances brought to the forefront the need to re-​establish international cultural relations, a number of cultural conventions had been mooted between Britain and other European states. The Anglo-​Belgian Cultural Convention was the first to be signed in April 1946, while Norwegian, Dutch and Czech texts of parallel conventions were still at draft stage. The view was widely shared that any future cultural convention with Greece would benefit from any lessons learned from the formulation of those other agreements. Pending their completion, however, it was deemed premature to predict their practical outcomes and thus the wording of the convention with Greece. The British Embassy in Athens agreed with the logic of that cautious approach.370 The arrival in March 1947 of the US as a major power in Greece, however, led to renewed calls to protect the BC’s work in the country, and thus the issue of a cultural convention was again placed on the agenda. In July 1947, Montagu-​Pollock raised the question of the convention with the BC, noting that he also sought out the views of the Embassy in Athens.371 In December 1947, the Athens Embassy put forward its own proposals to the FO. In February 1948, the FO contacted the BC’s London office, but by July 1948 the Athens Embassy had received no reply.372 The BC asked 3 69 TNA: FO 924/​163, LC 3062, Minutes, Hedley, 19 July 1945. 370 TNA: FO 924/​424, LC 140, Letter, Athens Embassy to CRD (referring to FO Letter of 22 November 1945), 4 January 1946; Minutes, 22 October 1946. 371 TNA: FO 924/​657, LC 1443, in a Letter dated 2 July 1947. This reference is included in Seymour’s letter to Finch of 5 April 1948. 372 TNA: FO 924/​657, LC 1389, Letters, Athens Embassy to CRD, 27 March 1948, 29 April 1948, 13 July 1948.

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the CRD to provide an update of their position and asked to be consulted in the initial stages of any drafts.373 On 23 July 1948, the CRD informed the British Embassy that they were now discussing a draft text with the BC and –​as soon as they had agreed on the general outlines –​would send Athens a draft for their observations. The draft ‘rather slavishly’ followed the Belgian one, aside from the fact that in the Greek version, a few words were added to cover archaeological matters.374 In March 1949, the CRD sent the British Embassy a draft and asked for comments. After discussing it with both the BC’s representative and the director of the British School of Archaeology in Athens, they deemed it satisfactory. As the British school was already quite satisfied with its current agreement with the Greek Ministry of Education, the phrase ‘in accordance with existing arrangements’ was inserted. The BC’s only queries concerned wording that might make the BC institutes in Greece liable to inspection by Greek school inspectors and by Greek taxation authorities, with a view to taxing institute receipts.375 Tatham was anxious to conclude an agreement that would afford the BC a legitimate justification for ensuring its smooth and unhindered operation. The new regularities and political equilibrium in Greece no longer secured the BC its previous status, and the lack of official recognition led to increasing difficulties for its activities. Having a convention agreed and signed as soon as possible presented evident advantages for the BC, especially since Greece was by then settling into a more normal peacetime state after the end of the civil war.376 Until then, there had been a considerable amount of correspondence between the Embassy in Athens and the CRD about the proposed convention. By late 1949, as cultural conventions were now coming up in the context of the Council of Europe, the BC made requests to speed up the 373 TNA: FO 924/​657, LC 1443, Letter, Richard Seymour, BC, London to J. P. G Finch, CRD, FO, 5 April 1948. 374 TNA:  FO  924/​657, LC  1389, Letter, CRD to Athens, 23 July 1948; Letter, Confidential, J. P. G Finch to R. Seymour, BC, 23 July 1948. 375 TNA: FO 924/​758, LC 2806, Letter, British Embassy Athens, to CRD, FO, 15 September 1949 (referred to FO Letter of 24 March 1949). 376 TNA:  FO  924/​758, LC  2860, Letter, British Embassy, Athens, to CRD, 23 September 1949.

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Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Luxembourgian conventions. In January 1950, the CRD informed the London office that they had received the Athens Embassy’s comments on the draft and would soon have a text ready for submission to the Greek government.377 Articles 2, 7 and 18 of the convention needed further clarification with the Greek Ministry of Education, which delayed the process.378 These articles379 were essentially a description of the BC and its activities, reinforcing its role as an educational and cultural organization. However, reciprocity in the implementation of the convention was in name only, as the likelihood of Greece setting up such an exchange programme were minimal, something that the British openly acknowledged.380 By this time, Tatham had become seriously concerned with the BC’s ‘ludicrous’ position, given that its status was so ill-​defined, and he suggested the British Embassy should make a direct approach to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs.381 Ultimately, in September 1950, the Embassy presented the Greek government with a draft convention and held informal discussions with the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs on its wording and objectives.382 The process of negotiations took a further year 377 TNA: FO 924/​758, LC 3054, Letter, Seymour to Finch, CRD, 13 October 1949. TNA: FO 924/​759, LC 3713, Letter, Personal, Seymour to Finch, 14 December 1949; Letter, Finch to Seymour, 10 January 1950. 378 TNA: FO 924/​863, L 235/​4, Letter, Ronald Morrison, Ministry of Education to Finch, 19 July 1950. 379 Article  2 concerned the permission to establish cultural institutes (schools, libraries, film libraries and cultural centres) in the territory of the other, and each contracting government would give every facility for the importation of the necessary equipment, including books, gramophones, gramophone records, radio sets, films, film projectors and picture exhibitions. Article  7 concerned the development of summer courses to be attended by academic personnel, teachers, students and school pupils of either contracting government, and Article 18 concerned the entry, residence and departure of foreigners of either contracting government. 380 TNA: FO 924/​863, L 235/​4, Letter, Ronald Morrison, Ministry of Education, to Finch, 19 July 1950. 381 TNA:  FO  924/​863, L 235/​2, Letter, Confidential, Tatham to Johnstone, 1 April 1950. 382 TNA:  FO  924/​863, L  235/​4, Letter, CRD to British Embassy, 28 July 1950; ‘Anglo-​Greek Convention’, British Embassy to CRD, 26 September 1950; Letter, British Embassy to CRD, 11 January 1951.

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to conclude, but in September 1951 the Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention was finally agreed.383 Though, it was also acknowledged that the mutual nature of the agreement was to be largely rhetorical, since there could never be an equal exchange of students nor any other reciprocal cultural exchanges on the same scale for the Greeks. If one pillar of British propaganda in Greece was the BBC, the other was the BC. Leeper, the main architect of the re-​establishment of its Athens branch, regarded the BC as a vital means of expanding British influence –​ cultural and otherwise –​at a time when Britain entered a period of relative economic and military decline. The period during which this vision remained potent was only brief, however, and made possible by a climate of post-​war euphoria combined with a fluid political situation in Greece. Despite the intention for mutual cultural exchanges between the two peoples, the BC’s efforts to approach broader social groups –​especially the younger generation and the man on the street –​and to expand its activities beyond Athens were met with limited success. The British Institute in Athens had not managed to establish itself as a prominent cultural centre –​ unlike its French competitor, the Institut Français –​and thus prevented the realization of the central vision of the main actors in the first two years since the re-​establishment of the BC. In March 1947, Runciman warned the BC that Britain’s popularity in Greece was ‘waning fast’ and that if the British were not prepared to assist the Athens branch, he would not be surprised if the Greeks ‘turn[ed] to other directions for guidance and sympathy’.384 At this time, reduced support from the British Embassy, staffing reductions and a difficult funding environment deprived the BC of the resources it needed to expand its operations. The BC was also, for financial reasons, obliged to serve the needs of the, which itself faced sharp budget cuts. The BC undertook to support several projects that were outside its remit, in key sectors of Greek science, material resources and public health. All the same, the information programme remained completely distinct from the cultural programme. The BC’s unclear status, until 1951, due to the lack of 383 The convention ratified in September 1953 (ΦΕΚ: A 264 Legislative Decree 2616, 23 July 1953). 384 TNA:  BW  34/​11, Letter, Runciman to Director, FO Division ‘C’, The British Council, 6 March 1947.

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an agreed cultural convention between the UK and Greek governments, further hampered the success of its work. However, one area in which the BC could claim to have succeeded was in the passing of legislation in 1945 regarding the introduction of English teaching in schools, although it would take until 1951 for the Act to become fully effective. A widespread knowledge of English in Greece was essential to achieve British cultural aims in the country, and thus English-​language teaching was the BC’s main area of responsibility. By extending English teaching throughout Greece, the British may have broken the long-​held monopoly of the French language in the Greek educational system, one that had held sway since the founding of the Greek state. At the same time, however, these efforts exposed the impracticability of taking unilateral action in this regard without acknowledging the presence of the US and its own ambitions to extend American influence in the region through the teaching of the same language. Both Britain and the US recognized the value of maintaining their own independent propaganda campaigns and thus sought to ‘shoot at the same target from rather different angles’.385 This was indicative of the new dynamics of post-​war international relations that Britain needed to address.

385 TNA: FO 1119/​6, PR 229/​1/​G, FO Circular to British Missions, 12 May 1948.

Conclusion

Safeguarding British strategic interests and sustaining British influence in south-​eastern Europe were two of the major priorities of British foreign policy before, during and immediately following the Second World War. British strategic objectives in the Mediterranean region upgraded Greece’s military importance, and Greek-​British relations were thereby significantly tightened. The linchpin of British policy towards Greece, all along, was the restoration of the Greek monarchy. The return to the throne of the Anglophile King George II in November 1935 created fertile ground for increasing British influence in Greece. This was marked by the establishment of the Byron Chair of English Language and Literature at the University of Athens in 1937 and by the British government’s efforts to support English language teaching throughout Greece through the formation of the Institute of English Studies in 1938 –​the institute director concurrently held the title of British Council (BC) representative in 1940. During the war, especially from the autumn of 1941 onwards, the question of the Greek monarchy formed the baseline for Foreign Office (FO) handling of the ever-​increasing complexities of Greek affairs. The cancelling of the Allied Balkan offensive in mid-​July 1943, however, gave a new turn to the Greek political situation. From the autumn of 1943, as new configurations shaped the Greek political canvas, two factors determined British policy: tackling the rising power of the Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM [National Liberation Front]) in order to reduce its capacity to seize power after liberation; and ensuring the return to Greece –​with or without a referendum –​of a king to whom wartime British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had given full and unshakeable support. Between these two opposing poles, the FO sought to reinforce the centre, the so-​called moderates. This policy continued after liberation, ultimately without success, as was illustrated by the outcome of the March 1946 election, in which the left abstained. From mid-​1946 onwards, the position previously occupied by Greece in British regional

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strategy decreased in importance, as Greece was relegated in line with the Attlee government’s growing scepticism regarding further Mediterranean and Middle Eastern engagements.1 Besides, continuing austerity measures at home rendered the British government reluctant to contemplate further aid to the country.2 On 21 February 1947, Britain informed the US State Department that it would be suspending economic aid to Greece by the end of March. In response, the Truman administration resolved in June 1947 to provide Greece with large-​scale assistance through Marshall aid. The cooling of British-​Greek relations became more evident in the early 1950s, when the Cyprus issue came to dominate the political agenda. It is against this historical background that British involvement in Greece must be seen and understood. Even before the Second World War had ended, British publicity was primarily focused on how to ‘sell’ the unpopular king to an unwilling Greek people. In order to implement this process, greater co-​ordination needed to be established with the Greek government-​in-​exile, then resident in Cairo. Thus, renewed channels of communication were opened between London and Cairo, through which the exchange of information was facilitated. After liberation, the British military apparatus in Greece continued in the form of organizations such as the British Military Mission, Police and Prisons, and Naval Missions. These missions were tasked with facilitating the return and consolidation of the Greek government; the missions remained active until at least late December 1947, when the military responsibility for Greece was assumed by the United States. British post-​war intervention was also facilitated through another –​more subtle –​avenue, namely that of publicity through all kinds of media, pertaining to both information services and cultural activities. By examining in close detail these British publicity policies in the later years of the war and early post-​war Greece, this study has pointed to a number of conclusions that modify the ways in which the

1 2

Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: Britain and the World Role, 1900–​1970 (London: Fontana Press, 1991), 205. Williams, F., Twilight of Empire: Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee (New York: Barnes, c. 1961; reprint Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 172. See also Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness, 205.

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implementation of British foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean –​ and more generally –​can be framed and interpreted. British publicity policy in Greece was consistent with the overall policy of promoting the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign. The chief conduits for channelling this policy were –​initially –​the existing British military structures that functioned as intelligence services during the war. British wartime structures were kept almost completely intact until the Greek parliamentary election of 31 March 1946. Reginald Leeper, the British ambassador (1943–​March 1946), was reluctant to loosen the military structure of the British Information Service (BIS), given that it had proved so effective in the war years and remained militarized until it was placed in the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information. The bloody events of December 1944 exposed British policy in Greece to criticism from international public opinion and led Leeper and the FO to send Osbert Lancaster to Greece on 13 December 1944 to take over the BIS until the election. The British aim of strengthening the so-​called ‘moderate centre’ proved unfeasible given that the election brought to power an extreme-​right government. The outcome of the parliamentary election and the ensuing September 1946 plebiscite accelerated the outbreak of the Greek Civil War. The British then found themselves in the midst of two even more polarized political camps, facing resentment and hostility from the left (despite the left’s long-​standing ties with the British government) and reservation and growing mistrust from the right. In response, Leeper –​who had anticipated that after the March 1946 election political circumstances might make Britain's position even more difficult –​sought to speed up various cultural agreements with the Greek authorities. He urged the establishment of two chairs of English language and literature in Greece, an idea he had mooted as early as the spring of 1944 when he was still in Cairo. He was a fervent advocate for reopening the BC in Greece and upgrading it to a Grade I post. The selection of a suitable candidates for the chair of British life and thought and the post of BC representative in Athens would, for a long time, occupy the FO, the BC’s head office in London and the British Embassy in Athens. The three individuals appointed as BC representative were Professor C. M. Attlee ( July 1945), J. C. S. Runciman (October 1945) and W. A. Sewell (April 1946). Attlee’s undercover role was to advise the Greek government,

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indirectly, on educational matters and to cultivate and maintain close and friendly relations with the Greek Ministry of Education. His successor, Sewell, promoted many British educational objectives in Greece. However, he was sometimes met with objections from the Greek academic establishment. Runciman held the post of the BC representative until his resignation in May 1947, and the end of his tenure marked the close of the BC’s most intellectually creative period in Greece. In the interim and as long as the British enjoyed full influence in Greece –​during the period up to the March 1946 election –​various cultural projects were proposed, but met with little or no success. Two of them concerned cutting-​edge British cultural investments in Greece, namely the introduction of English as a first foreign language in Greek secondary schools and the foundation of the Greek National Broadcasting Institute (EIR) on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) model. After strenuous negotiations with the Greek authorities, both projects resulted in legislation in 1945; however, the first was delayed until as late as 1951 and the second was abolished after the 1946 election. Promoting the English language teaching lay at the heart of the British cultural programme, as language was not only a cultural issue but also a tool for facilitating all kinds of communication at the local level. The BC was also tasked with extending its radius beyond its location at Kolonaki Square, a place known as a conservative stronghold. It sought to broaden its appeal to a wide audience, not only to the few ‘anglophile old ladies’ who were its most frequent visitors. The BC’s founders, Leeper and Kenneth Johnstone, unwaveringly attached great importance to reaching out to the younger generation, who they believed would play a significant role in the future of the country. In his comprehensive account of the British publicity in Greece (written in his role as press attaché, before his return to London), Lancaster stressed the important role that the BC could play in the future of British-​Greek cultural relations. Already in January 1943 there was growing speculation as to whether, after the war, the BC would continue ‘to interpret its mission as widely as it has done in the past’.3 The FO posited that the BC should constitute a branch of the FO information 3

Donaldson, The British Council, 124 onwards.

Conclusion

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organization, rather than acting as an independent body. The bitter controversy between the FO and the BC over its post-​war development was, in reality, as Donaldson argued, ‘more than a bureaucratic power-​struggle’.4 It showed rather a ‘lack […] of any clear conceptualisation of British post-​war cultural policy in general’.5 As a consequence, the future role of the BC was ‘restricted to educational and cultural work’ and did not overlap with the British government’s information services.6 Henceforth the mission of the BC would be defined by its educational, rather than its publicity, work,7 while the British government directed its information publicity work to the Information Research Department, following its formation in 1948. The main objective of British publicity abroad was ‘to ensure the presentation overseas of a true and adequate picture of British policy, British institutions and the British way of life’.8 More specific tasks included the projection of the advantages of trade with Britain and the achievements of British industry, science and art. The execution of this directive was laid in the remit of the British Embassy’s information officer. The first information officer, A. G. R. Rouse came to Greece on 4 April 1946, as Lancaster’s time in Athens came to an end. The renaming and upgrading of Lancaster’s post of press attaché to that of information officer is indicative of the importance attributed to it as the main promoter of this publicity campaign by the FO. The information officer was entrusted with increased responsibilities and a degree of autonomy, though always operated in accordance with the policies adopted by the head of the British Legation. His duties concerned all matters of publicity, including the distribution of information and any associated cultural issues. Rouse undertook the difficult task of reorganizing the BIS in Greece, adjusting it to peacetime conditions and adapting it to the economic constraints imposed by Britain’s diminished post-​war 4 5 6 7 8

Ellwood, ‘“Showing the World What it Owed to Britain”’, 65. Donaldson, The British Council, 134–​137. TNA: FO 930/​490, P 487, FO Paper, ‘The Aims and Work of the British Council [in Foreign Countries]’, 22 June 1946. TNA: BW 1/​27, P 802/​718/​907, FO Circular 0169, ‘Definition of the Work of the British Council’, 3 December 1946. TNA: FO 930/​490, P 487, FO Paper, ‘The Aims and Work of the British Council [in Foreign Countries]’, 22 June 1946.

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economic capacity. After so many drastic cuts in Britain’s information and cultural apparatus, it is interesting to note Rouse’s concern, in his correspondence with the FO, that Greeks should not be made aware of Britain’s weaknesses and that these reductions in capacity should be compensated, thereby demonstrating at every opportunity Britain’s continued cultural interest in Greece. The other pillar of British publicity in Greece was the BBC. The BBC was the main British propaganda channel and the most direct means of reaching large audiences. The BBC’s popularity was of added value to propaganda work, thus rendering it particularly important for the FO. Listening to the news bulletins of its Greek Service –​which were established immediately after the outbreak of war in 1939 and provided the latest news on the advance of the Allied struggle against the Axis powers –​became synonymous with resistance. The popularity of the BBC Greek Service also helped sustain the good name of Britain at a particularly critical time for Greek-​British relations, when Britain’s lukewarm support for the Greeks in the war against the Italians and the Germans caused discontent among the Greek public and threw a dark shadow over the relations. After 1947, competition on the airwaves with the Americans became inevitable. As Britain found itself in a weaker position due to its inability to match the scale of American spending on Greek technical needs for radio infrastructure, H. F. Humphreys’ secondment in October 1948 as a technical advisor to the EIR was an important success for British interests. Once the EIR committed to all-​British equipment, it would be reliant on spare parts from British manufacturers. But, more importantly, from his key post, Humphreys could exert ‘indirect control over policy’. This was important because, as the British Embassy unambiguously pointed out using a possible crisis over Cyprus as an example, ‘the station [could] at any time adopt a tone out of keeping with British interests’.9 Surprisingly, Britain’s main rival in the field of cultural propaganda in Greece was not the Soviet Union, but the US and France. The Soviet cultural programme in Greece operated in an unfavourable political climate 9

TNA: FO 953/​238, PE 343, Letter, Urgent and Non-​Confidential, J. C. McMinnies for information officer Athens to EEID, 28 January 1948.

Conclusion

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and was kept under tight police surveillance. France, on the other hand, which had long held a prominent position in the cultural life of Greece, maintained its position in the years following the war. The French language continued to be taught in Greek secondary schools as the foremost foreign language. The British, on the other hand, lacked the appeal enjoyed by French culture in Greece, and the impact of the Institut Français in Athens was described with admiration in reports by British Embassy officials. At the same time, the officials also expressed deep reservations regarding the institute’s leftist inclinations, which from time to time led to a chilling of relations with the Greek authorities. However, the main British competitor for cultural influence in Greece was the US. Since the arrival of American financial aid in June 1947, the US set out to directly control virtually all key sectors of the state apparatus. At first, American cultural engagement in Greece was less visible than that of the British; initial American official support for the United States Information Service (USIS) was ‘rather half-​hearted’.10 The Americans sought help in their early information work from the more experienced British, and therefore the two countries collaborated closely in the exchange of periodicals and books. By early 1948, the situation changed, as USIS became more active. From early 1949 onwards, there was ‘a slight increase’ in the competition between the two countries. British films could not compete with Hollywood’s glamour; nor could British photographic prints compete with glossy American ones. Anglo-​American cultural competition also became more evident on the airwaves, a field that was particularly sensitive for the British. In general, the pre-​war formula of the ‘projection of Britain’ campaign remained the main objective of British publicity policy after the war. By the end of 1946, the FO’s decision was to conduct cultural programmes in the service of the state’s official information and propaganda wing. The Greek Civil War –​the first major international crisis of the Cold War –​became a testing ground for the FO’s state-​led publicity policy, in Greece and elsewhere. British publicity in Greece was based mainly on 10 TNA: FO 953/​29, PE 2458, ‘Quarterly Report for the Period 1st January to 31st March 1947’.

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official material sent from London. This was in sharp contrast to its foreign competitors, who preferred to promote their cultural and political outlooks using commercial outlets, relying on local budgets and the utilization of Greek human resources. After the many cultural experiments that were conducted throughout the Greek Civil War –​some hesitant or ambivalent, others more vigorous –​in 1949, Sydney Hebblethwaite, as information officer, reached a sober conclusion. The ultimate aim of the FO, he complained, had not been sufficiently clear; nor was it evident what the FO wished the information officers at their various posts and in particular in Greece to achieve. Furthermore, he considered the policy of ‘Projecting Britain’ to have been ‘inadequate’ to the task. He questioned the very meaning, as well as the nature, of British involvement in Greece. The FO, however, chose to interpret his comments in technical rather than policy terms, which –​as Hebblethwaite observed –​merely fudged the essential point. British foreign policy at this time was in search of a post-​war role. Britain’s foreign policy in Greece provides a major case study regarding Britain’s emerging role on the international stage after the end of the Second World War. It was arguably the first real post-​war test of British global power, one that measured its changing status in the shifting fortunes of international relations during the Cold War period. Post-​war Britain was overstretched and its international reach was tenuous. And while it could be argued that the FO did its best to hold it together, on the ground it was beginning to dawn on frontline workers like Hebblethwaite that the message Britain was seeking to convey to the world was increasingly a myth, a tale told more to reassure politicians and the press in London than to make an impact on the wider world. Britain’s failure to compete with the cultural influences exerted by other powers in post-​war Greece signalled the larger decline of its international prestige. From then on, the time bomb of Britain’s post-​war decolonization had started to tick. Culture, as an engine of political change and a tool of diplomacy, has certain capabilities, but is also subject to certain constraints. Seen in this light, it becomes apparent that it was the relative weakness of Britain’s post-​war economic and political power that led it to compensate for policy failures by harnessing and weaponizing culture and cultural institutions to its

Conclusion

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aims. George Angeloglou, organizer of the BBC Greek section, may have spoken somewhat rhetorically when he observed that while ‘the flame of allegiance to political Britain may burn high or low [...] the faith in social, cultural Britain never wavers’.11 There can be little doubt that this was an earnestly held view, but –​as this book has sought to demonstrate –​such cultural optimism may also have had its limitations.

11

TNA: FO 953/​549, PE 688, BBC Command, ‘Survey of 1948, Greece’.

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Potts, Jim, ‘Truth Will Triumph:  The British Council and Cultural Relations in Greece’, in David Wills, ed., Greece and Britain since 1945 (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 99–​129. Pylarinos, Theodosis, ‘The Magazine Prosperos and the British Council Corfu Branch’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon:  Routledge, 2018), 159–​171. Reynolds, David, ‘Culture, Discourse, and Policy:  Reflections on the New International History’, in From World War to Cold War (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 2006; reprint 2010), 331–​351. Ricks, David, ‘MacNeice in Greece’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​ Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 201–​214. Sharon, Avi, ‘Making a New Myth of Greece:  G.  K. Katsibalis as Anglo-​Greek Maecenas’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon:  Routledge, 2018), 111–​122. Shaw, Tony, ‘British Feature Films and the Early Cold War’, in Gary D. Rawnsley, ed., Cold-​War Propaganda in the 1950s (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 125–​143. Stathakis, G., ‘Η οικονομική πολιτική των ΗΠΑ στην Ελλάδα, 1949–​ 1953. Σταθεροποίηση και νομισματική μεταρρύθμιση’ [US Economic Policy in Greece, 1949–​1953. Stabilization and Monetary Reform], in Η Ελληνική κοινωνία κατά την πρώτη μεταπολεμική περίοδο, 1945–​1967 [Greek Society in the First Post-​War Period, 1945–​1967] (Athens: Sakis Karagiorgas Foundation, 1994), 41–​56. Taylor, Philip M., ‘Power, Propaganda and Public Opinion: The British Information Services and the Cold War, 1945–​57’, in Ennio Di Nolfo, ed., II Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy and the Origins of the EEC, 1952–​1957 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992), 445–​461. Tziovas, D., ‘Between Propaganda and Modernism:  The Anglo-​Greek Review and the Rediscovery of Greece’, in Peter Mackridge and David Ricks, eds, The British Council and Anglo-​Greek Literary Interactions, 1945–​1955 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 123–​154. Voglis, Polimeris and Stratis Bournazos, ‘Στρατόπεδο Μακρονήσου, 1947–​1950. Βία και προπαγάνδα’ [Camp Makronissos 1947–​1950. Violence and Propaganda], in Christos Xatziiosif, ed., Ιστορία της Ελλάδας του 20ού αιώνα [History of 20th-​ Century Greece] (Athens: Bibliorama, 2009), 51–​81. Zarifi, Maria, ‘Das deutsch-​griechische Forschunginstitutfür Biologie in Piräus, 1942–​1944’ [The German-​Greek Research Institute for Biology in Piraeus, 1942 –​1944], in Susanne Heim, ed., Autarkie und Ostexpansion. Pflanzenzucht

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Index

Academy of Athens 373 Acme Photos 140 Actualités 167 Adam, Ronald F. 95 n. 25, 318–​320 advertising see publicity Aeroporike Metaphore Ellados (AME) [Air Transport of Greece] 192 Agean Islands 9, 314, 315 Agence France-​Presse 105, 108 agents 5, 29, 79, 114, 129 n. 151, 198 Agios, Nicholaos 176 Agnides, Athanasios 221–​222, 342 Agrinion 58, 59 Ailianos, Mihail 267 Albania 49, 228, 258 Aldington, J. W. 200 Alexander, Harold 126 Alexandroupolis 197 Alissida Shoe Factory 162 Alliance Française 122 Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) 38, 228 Allied Information Service (AIS) 21, 22, 32, 217–​220, 226, 341 Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections 72 Alpensender 276 ambassadors 16, 40–​41, 55, 125, 163, 175, 184, 241, 271, 273, 280, 301, 321–​ 322, 336, 342, 376–​377 American Collge of Greece 161, 163, 185 American Farm School 162 American Mission for Aid to Greece (AMAG) 111, 119, 163, 166, 170, 185, 186, 262, 264, 382

American School of Archaeology 185 Amery, John 43–​45, 48, 52 Amsterdam 330 Anargyrios kai Korgialenios Sxoli Spetson (AKSS) [Anargyrios and Korgiallenios School of Spetses] 332, 343 n. 117, 344–​345 Anastasiades, Michalis 217, 227, 234, 235’ Anatolia College, Thessaloniki 345, 349 Anderson, Maxwell 163 Angeloglou, George 25, n. 14, 256, 267, 271, 279, 285–​286, 403 Angelopoulos, Alkeos 140 Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention 302, 338–​394 Anglo-​Greek Information Service (AGIS) 21, 22, 29, 32, 34, 35, 37, 47–​53, 54–​55, 57–​62, 64, 66, 67, 71–​75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 151, 156, 173, 224, 306–​307, 315, 347–​352, 371 and role as press attaché 37–​47 Anglo-​Greek Magnesite Company 386 Anglo-​Hellenic Chamber of Commerce 114 Anglo-​Hellenic Information Centre see Athens Information Centre (AIC) Anglo-​Hellenic League 49, 162, 163, 292–​ 294, 300, 301, 303–​306, 312, 335, 347, 353, 356 Anonimi Eteria Radiophonikon Ekpompon (AERE) 69, 214–​215, 223–​229 see also broadcasting

434 Anotato Oikonomiko Symvoulio (AOS) [Supreme Economic Council] 208 anti-​communism activities in Greece 6, 13, 81, 101, 108–​ 111, 239, 247 n. 181, 258 material 5, 104, 108–​110, 132, 200, 202, 263, 335 n. 151 see also propaganda Arapis, Captain 51 architects 18, 368–​369, 393 Argos 161 Aristotle University of Thessaloniki see University of Thessaloniki Arliss, Leslie 155 artists 76, 184, 309, 317, 336 Aspioti, Maria 49, 165, 314, 328 n. 124 Associated Press 105, 108, 135, 140 Astor Cinema 146, 149, 151, 159, 168 Athens Information Centre (AIC) 48, 50–​52, 65, 88, 113, 114, 120, 121, 124, 137, 161, 162, 165, 173, 175–​182,  251 and USIS 183–​190 Athens 14, 22, 33, 36, 43, 48, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59–​60, 61, 80, 105, 109, 113–​ 116, 119–​128, 134, 135, 141–​143, 145–​153, 156, 159–​165, 168, 169, 176, 178, 183, 192–​193, 197, 199, 212–​223, 226–​228, 237, 250–​253, 260–​262, 264, 271, 273, 293, 300, 302, 305–​307, 310, 323, 325, 328, 330, 332, 335, 337, 340, 345, 347–​ 349, 353, 356–​357, 359, 360, 362, 364, 366–​367, 369, 372, 393 Athens College for Girls 345 Athens Information Centre (AIC) 48, 50–​52, 65, 88, 113, 114, 120, 121, 124, 137, 161, 162, 165, 173, 175–​183,  251 and USIS 183–​190

Index Athens News Agency 71, 75, 81, 108 Athens Polytechnic 166, 348, 388 Athens Radio 40, 41, 45, 50, 60, 188, 192, 195, 198, 214–​216, 218, 220–​222, 226, 227, 230–​232, 235, 240–​241, 245–​246, 249, 252, 255, 256, 258, 264, 266, 269, 272, 283–​287, 302, 312, 341 Athens School of Hygiene 375 Atkins, B. J. 200 Attlee, C. M. 139 n. 175, 296, 303, 360, 361–​362, 364, 396, 397 Auckland University College 256, 364 audiences 132, 141, 148, 149, 153–​156, 158–​ 163, 167, 167, 169, 172–​174, 183, 190, 198, 247, 253, 254, 260, 262, 270, 287, 288, 312, 322, 325, 334, 336, 360, 365, 398 Australia 176, 178, 378 Austria 229 authors see writers Autonomous Socialist Macedonia 57 ‘Avez-​Vous lu?’ see Bulletin Bibliographique du Department Étranger Axis powers 21, 42 n. 80, 282, 283, 389, 400 Baggallay, Miss 389 Balfour, David 31–​33, 329 n. 131 Balkan General News Service (BGNS) 140 Balkans 29, 31, 38, 45, 53 n. 117, 57 n. 130, 61, 132, 133, 135 n. 165, 140, 203, 206 n. 3, 244, 271, 274, 283 n. 303, 292, 295, 342 n. 177, 373, 395, 423 Ball, W. J. 357 Bank of Greece 144 Bari 213

Index Barnett, H. C. L. 248–​249 Barron, A. W. S. 297, 340, 347, 349, 350 Bartlett, H. F. 200 Batty, O. P. 315 Bedford College 372 Belgrade 253 Belloc, G. 373 Berlin 212 Bettos, I. 240 Beveridge, W. 308 Full Employment in a Free Society 308 Bevin, Ernest 66, 78, 139 n. 175 Bishop, Harold 265 Board of Trade (UK) 15, 387 n. 361 see also trade Bone Tuberculosis Sanatorium 151 Book Export Scheme Ltd 308 books 16, 46, 50, 72–​73, 77, 89, 91, 103, 111–​122, 125, 128, 129, 132, 155, 176, 183, 184, 246, 287, 292, 294, 301, 307–​308, 313, 316, 331, 335, 336, 339, 341, 401 booksellers 116–​117, 119, 120, 125, 313, 335 Booty, G. H. 219 Bowen, H. C. 265–​266 Boy Scounts 165, 180 Boyd, J. S. K. 378 Bracken, Branden 282 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and British public diplomacy 280–​283 creation of Greek Service 283–​288 Domestic Service 279 English Radio 280 External Department 211 and Greek National Broadcasting Foundation (EIR) 264–​269 Greek Section 17, 205, 221, 256–​258, 271, 284, 285, 403 influence in Greece 9, 205, 284

435 Information Department 16, 87, 89, 195, 250, 252, 289 Listener Research Department 285 Monitoring Services 241 Overseas Service 221, 250, 252 Psychological Warfare Division 221 British Council (BC) 8, 23, 93 395 Books Department 308 Division C 322 education activities 339–​367 Education Division 377–​378 European Division 297, 309 expansion in Greece 371–​374 Home Division 293 Mytilene Directorate 328, 338 peak of 309318 Press Department 314 representatives in Athens 294–​297 British Embassy, Athens 5, 13, 41, 45, 46, 47, 55, 74, 81, 85, 87, 113, 169, 175, 184, 196, 233, 235, 244, 255, 269, 276, 285, 296, 297, 301, 309, 310, 315, 333, 334, 382, 383, 385, 387, 390–​393, 397, 399, 401 Class B releases 62, 64 and end of Greek Civil War 194–​200 Information Department 9, 13, 22–​ 23, 47, 55–​57, 61, 79, 87–​90, 104, 108, 110, 111, 120, 125, 135, 157, 160, 162, 165, 176, 189, 190, 192, 194, 200, 236, 246, 250, 256, 279 intelligence services 77 post-​war reorganization of 80–​85 Press Department 32, 34, 40, 41, 46, 65, 66, 67, 72, 75–​78, 81, 82, 130, 230, 241, 243–​246, 302, 306, 310 staffing of 62–​66 reports from Greece 89–​90 British Hellenic Society 293 British Industries Fair 193

436 British Information Service (BIS) 15, 21, 26, 42, 54, 66–​67, 69–​72, 76–​77, 85, 87, 105, 113, 121, 243, 256, 397, 399 British Institute of Higher Studies 297 British Legation 81, 399 British Medical Research Council (MRC) 377 British Military Mission 89, 396 British School at Athens 18 British School of Archaeology 329, 391 British Travel Association 15 broadcasting ix, 5, 9, 17, 22, 26, 50, 53, 55–​56, 60–​61, 66, 69–​70, 77, 79, 81–​82, 87, 90, 94, 96, 121, 130, 188, 199 American challenges in 255–​263 British broadcasting policy 216–​240, 264–​269 interest in Greece 206–​216 see also Anonimi Eteria Radiophonikon Ekpompon (AERE); British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC); Greek NationalBroadcasting Foundation (EIR); radio see also programming Brooks, Richard 279 Bryant, Arthur 308 English Saga, 1840–​1940 308 Bucharest 194, 260 Bulgaria 48, 57 n. 130, 228, 232, 255, 257, 258 Bulletin Bibliographique du Department Étranger 117 Bureau of Tourism, Greece 114, 130 Bush House 281 Caccia, Harold 301, 361 Cairo 24, 25, 29–​32, 36, 42, 58, 60, 73, 113, 216, 218, 219, 236, 237 n. 143, 241,

Index 245, 253, 290, 293, 297, 373, 378, 396, 397 Cambridge Certificate of Proficiency 350352 Camborne School of Mines 385, 387 Canada 108, 127, 162, 176, 193 Cardiff, Major 48, 303, 305, 306, 317, 320, 322, 345–​346, 351, 361, 368 Carleton Greene, Hugh 278 censorship and film 142–​143 Anglo-​Egyptian  27 censors 219, 259, 342 n. 177 Censorship Stops Committee 28 preventative 130, 236 Resolution C 107 Resolution LA 107 Resolution LB 107 rules 26, 106–​108, 142 n. 188 Central State Hospital, Thessaloniki 383 Chaidari Barracks 176 Chalandritsa 96 Chalkis 58 Chania 58, 59, 165, 199 Chatham House see Royal Institute of International Affairs Chios 49, 59, 82, 314, 328, 353 Christian Union of Scientists 355 Christianiki Adelfotita Neon (XAN) [Young Men’s Christian Brotherhood] 163 Churchill, Winston 35–​36, 98 n. 39, 308, 395 Memoirs 109 The Dawn of Liberation 308 Churchill Street Information Centre see Athens Information Centre (AIC) Cineac Cinema 159 cinemas see films civil service 161, 165, 226, 238, 239, 366

Index Clark, J. B. 221, 272 Clubs 114, 156, 166, 176, 254, 330 Coate, G. R. 49, 65, 83, 118, 176, 245 Cold War 1–​2, 6–​15, 101, 109, 160, 172, 199, 202, 233, 282, 401, 402 Collard, D. R. 196 Colonial Medical Research Committee 378 comedies 153, 155, 251 Comfort. T. 387 Comité Consultatif International pour la Radio [International Radio Consultative Committee] 233 communism 7, 15–​17, 24 n. 9, 57, 70–​71, 74, 76–​77, 87, 100 n. 48, 107 n. 71, 108, 109, 132, 142, 165 n. 277, 182, 203, 235, 258–​259, 269, 299, 303 n. 60, 306, 311–​312, 319 and intelligentsia 76 and propaganda 9, 77, 152 n. 232, 262 Compagnie Française des Mines du Laurium 386 concentration camps 163, 164 n. 271 Concise Oxford Dictionary 117 Co-​operative Aid Remittances to Europe 187 controllers 28, 29, 212, 221, 270, 282, 322 Cook, J. M 329 Cookridge, Edward Henry 104 n. 58 Copenhagen Plan 269, 271, 274, 276 copyright 89, 102, 106, 136 Corfu 44, 49, 58, 59, 83, 91 n. 14, 165–​166, 212, 215, 227, 228, 230 n. 107, 286, 300, 306, 314, 320, 327, 328, 335, 337, 338, 341, 342 n. 177, 353 Corinth 58, 161, 198 n. 392 Council of Europe 391 Cowell, Ernest 304, 363 Crabtree, Arthur 155 Craxton, John 336

437 Crete 44, 47, 58, 59, 78, 82–​84, 94, 165, 176, 196, 199, 286, 297, 300, 314, 320, 321, 323, 327–​328, 353 Crighton, Ronald 312 Curran, James 376 currency 56, 115, 116, 117, 118, 122, 124, 141, 144, 183, 240 Cyclades 47 Cyprus 10, 17, 91 n. 15, 100, 131, 133, 134, 195, 197, 205, 265, 269, 270, 279, 284–​285, 287, 297, 378, 396, 400 Dale, Henry M. 378, 379, 382 Darjeeling 30 Davies, S. J. 342, 343, 357, 362 DDT 383 de Jongh, Piet 199, 335 Dedalus Airlines 182 Desyllas, Theodoros 161 Dickens, Charles 149, 155 Dimaras, Constantine 235 Dimitriadis, Heraklesss 207 Dimokratikos Stratos Elladas (DSE) [Democratic Army of Greece] 194, 259 n. 215, 260 doctors 94, 163, 288, 313, 332, 349, 351 Dodecanese 58, 188, 244, 300, 389 Dodson, Derek 197 Dontas, Spiros 373 Doxiades, C. A. 162 Dracopoulos, Constantinos 210–​212 Drama 197, 217 Durham Company 208 Durrell, Lawrence 42 Eagle Lion Gloria Films 56, 79, 141–​142, 144–​146, 150, 153, 156, 159–​160, 167, 179 East European Information Department (EEID) 64–​65, 79, 80, 82–​83,

438 242–​243, 245–​247, 264, 265, 268, 276 École Française d’Athènes 389 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) 126, 131, 185–​186, 195–​196, 198, 273, 383 Eden, Anthony 282–​282 Eden, Guy 98 editors 55, 61, 77, 91–​93, 97, 100, 102, 107, 109, 123, 127, 129, 137, 138, 196199, 242 Edman, George 108, 110, 285 education 9, 23, 62, 185, 254, 290, 299, 326, 307, 310, 324, 334, 335, 338, 339, 341, 342, 344, 351, 354, 355, 357, 359, 362, 366, 387 Ελεύθερη Ελλάδα 215 [Free Greece Radio] 259 Egypt 24, 27, 29, 100, 145, 256, 262, 286, 373 Eland, R. T. 41–​42, 45, 51–​52, 82–​83, 91, 94, 194, 245 Eleftheriou, Stephanos 208, 209, 222, 249 Eleftheroudakis bookshop 116 Eliascos, E. 81–​82, 91, 236, 244, 250 Elizabeth, Princess of England 179 Ellis, A. G. 64, 181 Encyclopaedia Britannica 117 Enosis Syntakton Hmerision Efimeridon Athinon [ Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers] 134 Epirus 42, 44, 47, 49, 58, 83, 323 Erstein, Richard 279 Ethniki Kai Koinoniki Apeleftherosi 24 Ethniki Organisis Kritis [National Organization of Crete] 176 Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM) [National Liberation Front] 24, 25, 34, 36, 39, 67 n. 163, 68, 70, 71, 98 n. 39, 196, 233 n. 76, 235–​236, 295, 299–​300, 339, 395

Index see also Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (ELAS) Ethniko Idryma Radiofonias (EIR [National Radio Foundation]) 9, 17, 22, 53, 56, 60, 61, 62, 81, 94, 110, 205, 225–​227, 229–​241, 244, 245, 248, 256–​257, 260–​264, 277, 266, 284, 287, 398, 400 and American transmitters 269–​280 and BBC 264–​269 servicing of 249–​225 Ethnikos Dimokratikos Ellinikos Syndesmos (EDES) [National Republican Greek League] 24, 25, 49, 182, 234 n. 124 Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos (ELAS) [National People’s Liberation Army] 25, 36, 218 see also Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM) Euboea 386 Europe 7, 126, 131, 187, 221, 280, 281, 322, 330, 334, 363 Eastern 276 North-​western  303 Northern 319 South-​east 270, 273, 372, 395 Southern 11, 92, 319 Western 203, 260 European Airways 114, 192 European Broadcasting Convention 269 Ewer, William Norman 92 n. 16, 103, 250 exhibitions 172–​175 ‘Britain Can Make It’ 174 ‘Britain Goes Ahead’ 161, 162, 163, 174, 179, 191, 260 ‘British Health Services and Child Welfare’ 180 ‘British Justice’ 180 ‘British Local Government’ 180

Index ‘International Civil Aviation Exhibition’ 162, 175, 192 ‘London’s Underground’ 180 Fairley, Neil Hamilton 377, 378 Falls, Cyril 98 Farran, Captain 103 fashion 16, 77, 100, 104, 132, 136, 138 fevers 376–​378 films 50, 52, 56, 75, 114, 141–​153, 168, 169, 171–​172,  178 audience reactions to 153–​156, 167 distributors 57, 143–​145, 160 mobile film units 160–​164 movies Black Narcissus 172 Blanche Fury 172 Brief Encounter 172 Brothers, The 150 Caravan 155 End of the River, The 150 Esther Waters 153, 155 Fallen Idol, The 172 Great Expectations 148, 149, 150, 151, 179 Hamlet 151, 152 Henry V 146, 148, 152, 169 Jassy 149, 151 La Bataille du Rail 171 Le sience est d’or 171 Les Visiteurs du Soir 171 Lost Weekend 149 Madonna of the Seven Moons 155 Man Within, The 150 Matter of Life and Death, A 150, 151 Miranda 153 Nicholas Nickleby 150 Odd Man Out, The 149, 150, 151, 153 n. 241, 172

439 Οι Γερμανοί Ξανάρχονται [The Nazis Strike Again, Alekos Sakellarios] 154 Oliver Twist 152 Piccadilly Incident 150 Rake’s Progress, The 172 Red Shoes, The 152, 172 Wicked Lady, The 155 World is Rich 163 newsreels 167–​172 non-​theatrical 156–​160, 162, 169, 170, 171, 185, 188, 196 Children on Trial 159 World is Rich, The 162–​163 This Modern Age 157 West Riding 160 screenings of 156, 188, 198 First World War 33, 373 Fleetwood-​May, Cecil 71 Fleming, Alexander 252 Florence, P. A. 266 Florina 57, 59 food crisis 18, 374 Foote, E. J. 202, 203 Forester, H. B. 314, 315, 332 Forster, E. M. 97 Fosse, Arthur 42, 44, 49, 314 Fox (Fuchs), H. Munro 372–​373 Fox Movietone News 167 Foy, Henry 304, 376, 377–​383 France 8, 96, 111, 115, 168, n. 284, 198, 213, n. 36, 262, 294, n. 29, 356, 358, 370, 389, 400, 401 culture in Greece 105, 171, 189, 401 Fraser, Lindley 93 n. 20 Frederica, Queen of Greece 148, 149, 151, 159, 186 French-​Hellenic League 175 Frend, W. H. C. 365 Freud, Lucien 336

440 Gammans, L. D. 97 Gaumont British Newsreel 167, 168, 169 Gaylard, Major 51 Georgakis, Ioannis 159, 366 George II, King of Greece 395 Georgiades-​Arnakis, George 291, 348, 349 Germany 53, 141, 217, 229, 283, 328, 389 Gilbert, Scott 42 Gilliam, Lawrence 279 Girl Guides 165 Globereuter 59 Gloster Meteor 193 Goodman, Neville Marriott 363 Gordon-​Taylor, Gordon 328 Gotch, P. B. 297, 340, 348, 349 Goudhi 163 Grady, Henry F. 272 gramaphones 181, 234, 302, 312 Grammos 194 Grant, J. J. 161–​162 Grant, Michael 309 gravure 89, 111, 114 Great Britain armed forces 297 army 32, 67, 182, 216, 248, 250 Central Office of Information (COI) 4–​5, 16, 56, 80, 87, 89, 90, 93–​95, 100, 104, 111–​115, 128, 132–​133, 138, 141, 151, 156–​161, 168, 173–​ 174, 178–​179, 182–​183, 190, 200, 203, 242, 250, 252, 261, 308 n. 73 City of London Yeomanry 373 Commonwealth 100, 131, 203 consulates 148, 167, 310 culture in Greece 13, 23, 155, 180, 289–​294 economy 94, 129 Education Act (1944) 355 embaassies 27, 28 see also British Embassy, Athen Empire 100, 137, 176, 256

Index Force 133 27, 28 Foreign Office (FO) 4, 12, 13, 15–​22, 147, 158, 166, 168, 174, 191, 198–​ 204, 231, 233, 243–​245, 264–​265, 267–​296, 301, 302, 309, 315, 318, 320–​322, 334, 339–​346, 354, 359–​361, 366, 368, 372, 373, 380, 383–​384, 389–​390, 395, 397, 398, 399, 401, 402 Balkans Section 115 Circular No. 23 246 Cultural Relations Department (CRD) 12, 15, 290, 295–​296, 302, 309, 339, 381–​388, 391–​392 Information Department 5, 13, 16, 87, 89, 398 News Department 16, 36, 37, 41, 44, 46, 47, 79, 225, 233, 241, 242 Overseas Information Services 115 Southern Department 79, 198, 242, 276, 290 Foreign Service 4, 81, 201 Hansard Papers 126 House of Commons 127, 177 influence in Greece 10, 62, 72, 189, 284, 288, 339, 395, 398 intelligence 26–​28, 67, 78, 89–​90, 104, 137, 214, 215, 234, 258, 272, 281, 315, 397 Inter-​Services Liaison Department 27, 28 MI14 28 Ministry of Education 387 Ministry of Information (MOI) 4–​5, 15, 31, 27, 29, 64, 77, 79–​82, 148 n. 209, 156, 265 n. 241, 295, 306, 397 Political Intelligence Department (PID) 15, 27, 30 n. 29, 282, 341 Balkans Division 29, 43, 48, 52, 295 Establishment Division 43, 45, 48 European Division 29, 48

Index Middle East (MIME) 27, 28, 41, 60 Ministry of Labour 31 parliament 4, 237, 240 ‘Projection of Britain’ campaign 1, 5–​ 7, 16, 34, 35, 72, 104, 167, 175, 176, 189, 200, 203, 397, 401 Royal Air Force 89, 173 Third Force 6, 7, 199 Treasury 39, 43, 46–​47, 55–​55, 57, 67, 280 n. 84, 296, 334, 358–​359, 361 War Office 22, 32, 33, 40, 378 White Papers 126, 145 Greece air force 162 armed forces 24, 129 n. 151, 131, 156, 191, 194, 198, 263 army 160, 162, 164, 187, 254, 263 and British engineers 264–​269 Chamber of Commerce 191 civil war 104, 106, 113, 130, 132, 143, 155, 158, 194–​204 crisis 10, 35, 61 cultural relations 8, 18, 19, 173, 309, 310 see also Anglo-​Greek Cultural Convention economy 11, 39, 43, 55, 76, 115, 207 n. 5, 238, 306, 319, 372, 376, 396 elections 6, 21, 23, 39, 46, 47, 54, 55, 58, 59, 61–​63, 67, 68, 71, 72, 308, 315, 354, 380, 395, 397, 398 government 11, 24, 26, 28, 31, 33, 39, 57, 61, 72, 78, 96, 101, 114–​116, 119, 123, 130, 145, 151, 163, 183, 193, 194, 205–​210, 212, 216–​217, 220–​ 222, 226, 228–​232, 238, 240, 241, 248–​249, 259, 272–​273, 275, 278, 283, 290, 293, 301, 309, 319, 320, 324, 333, 345, 362, 370, 372, 379, 380, 381, 385, 389, 392, 396–​397

441 liberation of 188, 220, 222 n.75, 241, 290, 314, 358, 389, 395–​396, 375, 377 Ministerial Advisory Committee 225 Ministry of Communications 208–​ 210, 222, 229 Ministry of Education 18, 166, 323, 327, 339, 346, 350–​351, 354, 355, 357, 359, 360, 361, 364, 370, 373, 387, 388, 391, 392, 398 Ministry of Finance 182, 226 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 216 n. 56, 224, 273 Ministry of Health and Welfare 161 Ministry of Information 23, 26–​29, 77 Ministry of National Economy 119 Ministry of Press 22, 81, 121, 225, 239, 240, 241, 244, 272 Ministry of Reconstruction 161, 162, 319, 320, 369 monarchy 21, 24, 237, 295 parliament 207, 270, 275, 320 plebiscite 24, 39, 62–​66, 81, 83, 237, 244, 380, 397 post-​war reconstruction of 9, 13, 14, 18, 22, 23, 55, 62, 121, 136, 227, 238, 293, 299, 300, 310, 324, 326, 328, 338, 339, 369, 374, 384 see also Greece: Ministry of Reconstruction Press and Public Relations Office of the Greek General Staff 263 Royal Hellenic Air Force 161 Royal Hellenic Navy 160, 195, 206 n. 3 servicing of 249–​255 ‘Special Report on a visit to Salonica’ 269–​280 Technical Chamber 335, 384 Welfare Department of the Greek General Staff 355

442 Greek Armed Forces Radio 263, 278 Greek Gendarmerie School 163 Greek National Army 106 Greek National Broadcasting Foundation (EIR) 17, 53, 56, 60–​62, 81, 94, 110, 205, 225–​248, 256, 257, 260–​ 263, 270–​280, 284, 287, 398, 400 Greek public 13, 19, 22, 35, 70, 71–​72, 74, 84, 91–​91, 102, 117–​118, 122, 126, 131, 173, 187, 189, 206, 213, 252, 287, 309–​310, 400 Greek Publishing Company 60 Greek Shipowners’ Union 180 Greek-​Soviet League 175, 188, 301, 339, 390 Gregory, Theodore 329 Gretton, John 92 Griffin, R. J. T. 217 Griswold, Dwight P. 382 Grubb, Kenneth G. 29, 42, 46 Hadley, Guy 271 Haley, W. J. 221–​222, 233 Hamley, Professor 342–​342, 349, 350 Harrison, Arnold 244 Harrow School 31 Hatzivassilliou, Georgios 382 Hayter, Althea 318, 321, 334 health 9, 18, 19, 131, 165 n. 277, 310, 324, 325, 363, 375–​376, 383, 393 Hebblethwaite, Sydney 5–​6, 19–​20, 125–​ 134, 138–​139, 152, 157–​160, 168–​ 171, 189, 196–​204, 264, 366, 402 Hedley, H. M. 290, 302 Hedley, O. F. 383 Hellenic Airlines 191, 192 Hellenic Centre for Marine Research 374 Hellenic Hydrobiological Institute 374 Hellenic Information Service 26 Hellenic Institute of International and Foreign Law 335

Index Henderson, A. J. 29, 31, 38, 295–​296 Heraklion 58, 59, 217 Herbert, S. Mervyn 48, 60–​61, 98 Hobson, Oscar 99 Hollywood 153, 172, 189, 401 hospitals 303, 310, 319, 320, 322, 325, 363, 374 Hourmouzios, Emilios 103, 109 Howell, C. D. 295 Humphreys, H. F. 263, 266, 268–​269, 287, 400 Hungary 308 n. 73, 389 Huxley, Julian 308 On Living in a Revolution  308 Inaugural Assembly of the World Council of Churches 330 India 30, 100 industry 17, 56, 100, 131, 152, 171, 192, 203, 250, 372, 386, 388, 399 information centres 16, 43, 48–​52, 56, 58, 82, 88, 89, 93, 96, 135, 137, 170, 175–​176, 189, 251, 253, 254, 315, 350 see also Churchill Street Information Centre Information Control Division,Wuerttemberg-​ Baden 264 information officers 4, 5, 7, 10, 16, 47, 81, 90, 110, 189, 194, 200, 201–​202, 246, 402 Information Policy Department (IPD) 5, 7, 13, 16, 80, 87–​89, 132–​134, 157, 158, 168–​169, 199, 200, 247, 276 Information Research Department (IRD) 6, 8, 10, 12, 15–​17, 81, 87, 109, 110, 132, 201, 399 Institut Français d’Athènes 189, 249, 339, 370, 389, 393, 401

Index Institute of English Studies (IES) 251, 291, 297, 303, 307, 325–​326, 332, 340–​ 341, 347–​352, 358, 363, 395 intellectuals 76, 149, 177, 235, 317, 367 International Books and News Agency 124 International News Photo see United Press International International News Service (INS) 102, 108 interpreters 64, 194 Ioannides, Ioannis 106 Ioannina 47, 49, 58, 59, 63, 78, 83 Irish Republican Army 149 Italy 16, 22, 34, 39, 141, 144, 160, 213, 217, 219, 273, 283, 302–​309, 359, 362, 389 Ivanof, F. A. 386 J. Arthur Rank Organisation 168, 171–​172 Jackson, Alfred 386 Jacobs, Ian 270–​271 Janina 217, 328 Japan 389 Jenkins, Romilly 295 Jerusalem 218 Johnstone, Kenneth 19, 24, 27, 32, 39, 291, 294–​297, 298–​304, 307, 313, 322, 323, 326–​327, 342, 344–​345, 349, 351, 360–​361, 368, 379, 398 journalists and correspondents 34, 35, 36, 41, 44, 46, 56, 67, 76–​78, 91, 95, 97, 108, 110, 120, 130, 138, 177, 237, 241, 271, 285, 312, 336 Kalamata 30 n. 29, 59, 59, 161, 198 n. 392 Kalavrita 196, 198 n. 392 Kanavarioti, Miss 250 Karaghiozis 311 Karditsa 58, 59 Kartalis, George 25–​27, 70

443 Kato Vlassia 196 Katsibalis, George 331 Kaufman bookshop 116, 124 Kavala 59, 167, 306, 353 Kazantzakis, Nikos 235 Kellaway, Charles 378 Kemsley Newspapers 285 Kessler, Arthur 99 Keystone View Company 135 kings 24, 25, 151, 237, 284, 395, 396 Kingsley, John 93 ‘Economists’ Notebook from London’ 93 Kirki Mine 386 Kirkpatrick, Ivone 282 Knossos 199 Kokkinia 49, 303, 306 Kolonaki Square 305, 325, 352, 398 Kommunistiko Komma Ellados (KKE) 57–​58, 72, 76, 259, 299, 300, 301 Komotini 228, 230 n. 107, 197 Konti, Athena 378 Korda 146 Korda Company 142, 146 Korea 134 Kozani 57, 59, 167 laboratories 304, 338, 363, 375–​383 Labour Pary 203 Lambarakis, D. 74 Lamia 58, 59 Lancaster, Osbert 36–​37, 38, 40–​47, 48–​ 49, 57, 61, 65–​80, 103, 231–​232, 234–​235, 240–​243, 251, 306, 360, 397, 398 Classical Landscape with Figures 103 languages 9, 11, 72, 119, 222, 232, 249, 255, 256, 258, 273, 277, 280–​282, 251, 293, 299, 302, 307, 315–​316, 326, 328, 335, 339, 358, 363–​366, 39–​398,  401

444 teaching English 18, 72, 78, 340–​357 Larissa 58, 59, 228, 263 Laskey, D. S. 302–​303 Law 4116 386 Law 4551 207 Law 6341 386 League for Democracy see Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM) [National Liberation Front] League of Nations Health Organization 375, 379 Lean, E. Tangye 271 lectures 97, 162, 165, 177, 180, 182, 185, 188, 297, 301, 310, 312, 314, 322, 328, 329, 332, 336, 337, 340, 342, 347, 354–​357, 360, 362, 369 lectureships 90, 321, 328, 332, 365 Lee, Arthur 79, 144, 146–​147, 150, 157, 167, 169 Lee, Laurie 97–​98 n. 34 Leeper, Reginald 6, 17, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31–​39, 42, 53, 54, 60–​62, 84–​85, 233, 282, 289–​292, 295, 297, 301. 303, 304, 307, 339, 340–​344, 355, 359–​361, 367, 368, 372, 389, 393, 397, 398 left-​wing groups 32, 49, 70, 77, 107, 163, 189, 239, 260, 312, 320, 333 Levadia 58 Liberal Party 236, 279 libraries 16, 89–​90, 121, 122, 125, 129, 137, 157, 170, 176, 184, 189, 190, 246, 294, 302, 307, 308, 312, 313, 316, 332, 335, 340 Limassol 269–​280 Lindsay, Kenneth 133 Linotype machine 106 Liossia 210, 218, 200, 207 Liossia Wireless Telegraphy 210, 218 Llywelyn-​Smith, Michael 318 Lockhart, Robert Bruce 39

Index London 14, 16, 40, 41, 77, 104, 114, 146, 168, 179, 180, 188, 191, 192, 193, 204, 216, 222, 241, 261, 366, 378, 383, 402 City of London Yeomanry 373 Fleet Street 41 Greek Embassy in 342, 368, 379 London Press Service (LPS) 56, 91, 192, 250 London Transcription Service 251, 252 Lord Mayor’s Greek Relief Fund 379–​384 Louvaris, N. 373 Lovell, M. H. 80, 242, 245 Lykavitos Wireless Telegraphy 218 Lysenko controversy 104 Macedonia 57–​58, 194, 196–​197, 230, 305, 306, 313, 314, 320, 350, 351, 377 n. 316, 379–​380, 386 MacFarlane, D. 48, 51 McMinnies, J. C. 83, 90, 94, 245, 247, 249–​250, 252, 264–​268 MacNiece, Louis 337 McVitty, Howard L. 195–​196 Malan 347 Malan, Edward 27, 31, 347 malaria campaigns 19, 165, 180, 251, 376–​378,  383 Malaria Research Laboratory 304, 376 Mallides, A. I. 191, 348 Manessi 196 Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company Ltd 17, 205–​206 Marinatos, Spyridon 364 Markoglou, Emmanuel 207 Marriott, Richard D. A. 211, 265 Marshall Plan 10, 11, 102, 115, 126, 131, 144, 145, 373, 396 Martipress see Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM) [National Liberation Front]

Index Massey, Major 224, 228 Massingham, Hugh 97 Mayes, Captain 84 Mayhew, Christopher 8, 109 Mediterranean 7, 24, 62, 126, 192, 213 n. 36, 217, 270, 273, 303, 372, 374, 386, 395–​397 Mediterranean Mines 386 Melas, Georgios 159 melodramas 149, 150, 153, 155, 171, 188 Metaxas period 68, 299, 354 Metro-​Goldwyn-​Mayer (MGM) 147, 160 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga 119 Michalopoulos, Andreas (André) 2526 Middle East 24, 28 n. 22, 42, 62, 73, 113, 213 n. 36, 303, 319, 378 From Alamein to the Sangro 104 see also Great Britain: Ministry of Information, Middle East (MIME) Miles Aerovans 192 Miller, Clyde R. 181–​182 Milne, A. K 33–​35, 38, 41, 44 mines and mining 384–​388 Modiano, Mario 140 monarchists 237 Montagu-​Pollock, William H. 295, 390 Montgomery, Field Lord Marshal 104 Montzalas, P. 230 Moore, Gerald 329 Moscow 189, 241, 255 Moscow Conference 100 Moscow Radio 188, 255 Mosquito Service 63 Mottram, V. H. 329 Mountbatten, Philip 179 Mulgan, John 103 ‘Report on Experience’ 103 music 138, 188, 250, 251, 254, 256, 257, 261, 262, 293, 300, 312, 329, 330, 357 musicals 155, 156, 219

445 Mytilene 49, 59, 82, 300, 314, 320, 327–​ 328, 332, 353 Naples 372 National and Kapodistrian University of Athens see University of Athens National Greek Airlines-​TAE 192 National People’s Liberation Army see Ethniko Apeleftherotiko Metopo (EAM) National Schoolmasters Association 347 National Techincal University of Athens see Athens Polytechnic NATO 199 Nautical School of Poros 349 Navplion 161, 198 n. 392 Near East 319 Near East Relief 376 New Zealand 103, 256, 364 Newlands, Keith 53–​54, 65–​66, 83, 224–​ 227, 230, 232, 241–​247, 302 news agencies 71, 75, 81, 105–​106 newspapers and magazines American Atlantic Monthly, The 119 Colliers 113, 123 Daily News Bulletin (USIS) 106, 110, 382 Foreign Affairs 119 Life 119, 169 New York Herald Tribune 102, 123 New York Times, The 102, 140 Readers’ Digest 113, 128 Time 169 British AERA 42, 50, 59–​60, 73, 79, 91, 113 Αnglo-​Elliniki Epitheorisi (Anglo-​ Greek Review) 50, 73, 253, 312, 316, 320, 323, 331, 332, 336, 337, 355 Athens Press Summary 92 Books to Come 128

446 British Digest 110, 112 Daily Express 36 Echo 112–​113, 128 Economist, The 116 European Programmes Bulletins 253 Illustrated London News, The 116, 123, 138 International Survey 126 Leader Summary 97, 128, 251 Listener, The 246 New Statesman, The 116 News Chronicle 97 Observer, The 36, 97 Photo Nea 50 Picture Post 73, 138, 250 Provincial Features 127 Regional Bulletin 93, 94, 100 Regional Press Review 92 Regional Weekly Bulletin 127 Reuters News Bulletin  63-​64 Reuters News Summary 92 Spectator, The 36, 116 Summary of Weeklies 97 Survey of Public Opinion 92 To-​Day 112, 128 Union Jack 99 Weekly Commentary 128 World Digest 246 bulletins 59, 94, 91, 107, 129, 175, 188, 198, 250, 253, 257–​258, 263, 283, 400 Canadian Airmail Bulletin 108 Weekly Review 108 dailies 91, 92, 124, 126 n. 142, 127 n. 146, 136 French Atome 118 Figaro 124 La Science et la Vie 118 Numéro Special 118

Index Science et Technique Pour Tous 118 Greek Akropolis 102, 177 Edo Athinai (Athens Calling) 247, 262 Eikonografimena Nea 50 Eklogi 113, 128 Elefthera Grammata 100, 101 Eleftheria 70, 74, 102 Elliniki Kinimatographiki Epitheorisis 149–​150 Ellinikos Vorras 105, 106, 110 Ellinon Aima 98 Embros 104, 127 n. 46 Ethnos 93, 104, 110 H Ellas 355 Hestia 109, 177 H Kathimerini 75, 79, 92, 102–​103, 109, 136, 193 H Vradyni 98, 104, 105, 109, 235 Humour 132 Kinimatoigrafiki Zoi 132 Makedonia 105, 106, 110 Mellon 93 Nea Alithia 106, 110 Nea Hestia 101–​102 O Ilios 104 Oi Kairoi 128 Oikonomologiki 93, 98 Romantzo 132 Ta Nea 74, 98, 103, 104, 177 Thisavros 113, 132 To Phos 105–​106, 110 To Vima 74, 92, 97, 98, 103, 136, 177, 286 Trast 132 Italian Corriere del’ Information 124 Corriere della Sera 124 reviews 45, 74, 100, 101, 127–​128, 132, 136, 138, 336

Index Russian Investia 124 New Times 119, 124 Pravda 119, 124 Soviet Woman 119 Troud 119 weeklies 45, 74, 127 Nicholson, Harold 97, 139 n. 175 Nicolopoulos, C. 212 Nilbank, Major 380 Noel-​Baker, Francis 31, 335 Noel-​Baker, Philip J. 367 North Atlantic Treaty 126 Norton, Clifford J. 63, 65–​66, 78–​79, 82, 125, 149, 151, 195, 242, 243, 336, 383 Norton, Lady 149, 151, 161, 336, 383 nurses 165, 335, 351, 374–​384 nursing 131, 304, 322, 380–​382 OEPEC 43, 54–​61 Olympics 104, 180, 261 Orient Express 12 orphanages 161 Orphanides, A. 382, 382 OTE Advertising Agency 186 Overseas News Agency 108 Palestine 100, 279 n. 280, 373 Pallini 215, 218 Paniguian, Hracia (Hratchia) 39, 40, 48, 71 Panteion University 159 Panteios School 366 Papagos, A. 130, 194 Papandreou, George 25, 39, 219, 222, 271, 279, 290 Papanoutsos, E. 354 Pariente, Sergeant 65 Paris 106, 124, 231, 284, 294, 386 Paris Peace Conference 91 n. 15, 94

447 Patras 44, 47, 49, 58–​59, 63–​64, 78, 88, 93, 121, 159, 161, 165–​167, 196, 217, 286, 300, 306, 313, 320, 327, 338, 341, 353 Peck, Edward 65 Peloponnese 44, 58, 64, 167, 194, 196, 198, 202, 315, 320 Percival Aircraft Ltd 192 Percival Prentice 193 Petimezas, Heracles 51, 70, 74, 224, 227, 234–​236,  239 Philips 209 Photiades, Alex 366 Pierce College see Athens College for Girls piracy 136, 140, 342 Piraeus 30 n. 29, 49, 113, 125, 127 n. 145, 141, 143, 152–​153, 156, 159, 162, 163, 164 n. 273, 167, 176, 273, 303, 305–​306, 313, 320, 321, 320, 328, 338, 347–​348, 362 Planet News Service 135, 140 Plastiras, Nikolaos 39, 237, 279 police 35, 156, 159, 163, 176, 189, 198, 251, 348, 349, 396, 401 Political Warfare Bureau (PWB) 27–​28, 31, 34, 36, 39, 52, 66 see also Political Warfare Executive (PWE) 27–​28, 31, 34, 36, 39, 52, 66 Political Warfare Executive (PWE) 22, 29, 31, 32, 34, 37, 39–​41, 73, 76–​77, 221 n. 69, 245, 208–​282, 284 see also Political Warfare Bureau (PWB) Plomer, William 296 Pope Pious XII 330 Populist Pary 109, 110, 128, 182, 235 Poros 342, 349 Porter, Paul P. 196 Powell, Dilys 30 n. 29, 44, 152, 155

448 Powell and Pressburger 152, 155 Praktoreio Ephimeridon Athinaikou Typou (PEAT) [News Agents of the Athenian Press] 124, 182, 183 press American 45, 72, 77, 102, 184 Athenian 81, 91, 93, 95, 100, 127, 140 British 4, 10 n. 34, 36, 67, 71, 75, 77, 79, 91, 93, 100, 102, 236, 250 Greek 17, 25, 40, 45, 47, 55, 59, 75, 77, 79, 91, 95–​97, 99–​104, 107–​110, 130, 134–​138, 163 n. 270, 172, 305, 178, 185, 191–​197, 193, 252, 262, 310, 354 Greek-​Egyptian 285, 286 Soviet 69 press attachés 5, 21, 48, 53, 58, 63, 66, 76–​ 77, 81–​84, 242, 243, 306, 398, 399 and AGIS 37–​47 and British Embassy 29–​37 press outlets 93, 94, 103, 127, 128, 137, 139, 176, 283, 285, 312 Prestwick 191 printed material 50, 91, 103, 126, 131, 307 prisons 159, 165, 198, 396 professors 159, 351, 364–​366, 370, 389 see also university chairs professorships 332, 339, 340, 359–​361 programming 164–​167, 217, 219, 220, 231, 248, 256, 274, 280 see also broadcasting projectors 135, 160, 165–​167, 170 propaganda Anglo-​American 199–​200 Anti-​communist 1, 6, 81, 110 British 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, 23–​28, 60, 62, 66–​69, 73, 160, 276, 281–​283, 288, 312, 314, 317, 393, 400 Bulgarian 232, 257 Communist 9, 277, 62 cultural 297–​301

Index Greek 26, 27, 231, 232, 241 Italian 213 n. 36 Russian 232, 257 Soviet 254, 255 Yugoslavic 232, 257 Provisional Democratic Government 194 public address systems 50, 181, 188 Public Health Division of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) Mission to Greece publicity 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 14, 15, 225, 251, 253, 256, 265, 286, 337, 338 AIC 51, 175 American 11, 110–​111, 139, 170, 185, 187, 195 anti-​communist  110 BBC 195, 197, 198, 204, 260, 274, 284–​286 BC 12, 310 British 16, 17, 20, 59–​61, 66–​80, 85, 96, 102, 111, 112, 114, 124, 126, 128, 130–​134, 139, 149, 167–​169, 175–​ 176, 182–​184, 188, 198, 200–​204, 231, 242, 251, 260, 380, 396–​401 British Embassy 80–​85, 96, 109, 175, 182, 192, 193. 310 broadcasting 205 COI 95 commercial publicity 16, 87, 89, 96, 190–​194,  246 EIR 227 FO 15–​16, 199, 399, 401 foreign 15, 81 MOI 40, 45, 47–​54 Overseas and Emergency Publicity Expenditure Committee Paper No. 2304 54–​62 PID 45 policies  87–​88 post-​civil war 200–​204 post-​war  21–​86

449

Index printed 90–​134, 337 radio 192, 198 trade and tourist 15 visual 130, 134–​152, 164, 173, 179, 194, 197, 199 wartime 88 publicists 13, 56, 70, 77 publishers 15, 97, 117, 119, 120, 122, 123, 316, 345 Pyrgos Vasilissis 167, 218 Queen Frederica’s Fund 149 queens 151 see also Frederica, Queen of Greece Radcliffe, Cyril 33–​34, 37 radio 192, 197, 198, 203–​235, 241–​245, 246–​249, 252–​263, 266, 269–​280 see also broadcasting programmes Angliko Tetarto 251 Britian Today 252 English by Radio I Simerini Anglia [Britain Today] 251 Radio Broadcasting Company see Anonimi Eteria Radiophonikon Ekpompon (AERE) Radio Corporation of America (RCA) 240 Radio Luxemburg 264 Radio Sofia 255 radio stations 216, 217, 230 n. 107 Radio Stuttgart 264 Rankin, Carl 163 Rapp, Terence C. 306 Read, Herbert 329 rebels 105, 130, 194, 256, 262, 324, 332, 334, 338 receivers 216, 248, 253–​254 Red Cross 151, 165, 335, 375

Reith, John 212 Reserve Officers Club 176 Rethymno 199 Reuters 71, 75, 77, 81, 95, 99, 105, 106, 108, 140, 241, 245, 285 Rex Cinema 151, 159 Rhodes 42, 44, 58, 68, 82, 88, 94, 166, 188, 244, 286, 300, 306, 323, 328, 338 Richard, Brooks 279–​280 Richards, J. M. 369 Ridley, M. R. 296 Ridsdale, William 233 right-​wing groups 68, 72, 237, 239, 258, 305, 312, 325 Ritchie, D. 221 Rockefeller Foundation (RF) 375–​376,  379 Rodianov, Constantin, 211 Rome 220, 273, 294, 329 n. 128 Rounce, Lieutenant Colonel 48 Rouse, A. G. R. 63–​66, 81–​84, 87, 93–​94, 101–​125, 135–​138, 141, 145–​147, 150–​157, 163, 166, 167–​175, 177–​ 189, 193, 243–​244, 247–​248, 254, 257–​260, 264, 399 Rover Scouts of Greece Association 161 Royal Institute of International Affairs 18, 367 n. 271 Rudkin, Karl 163 Runciman, J. C. Steve 10, 48, 295–​296, 303, 309–​322, 325, 329, 361, 363, 369–​370, 393, 397, 398 Russia see Soviet Union Russian Orthodox Church 31 n. 37, 330 Ruthven-​Murray, Barbara 88, 200, 276 Ryan, Curteis N. 27, 28–​29, 30 n. 29, 42 ‘Appointment of Press Attaché to the British Embassy to Greece’ 29 Salonica 106, 257, 269–​280 Salonica Radio 257, 261

450 Samos 49, 59, 82 Sargent, Orme 33, 34, 37, 336 Save the Children Fund 163 Schaffer, Gordon 99 scholarships 18, 229, 309, 340, 351, 355, 367–​371 School of Engineering, Pireaus 162 School of Hygiene, Athens 375 School of Medicine, Athen 363 School of Medicine, Cairo 373 School of Medicine, Thessaloniki 379, 382 School of Metalliferous Mining, Cornwall 385 School of Nursing, Thessaloniki 382, 408 School of Philosophy, Athen 364 schools 18, 156, 159, 161, 166, 167, 198–​199, 283, 291, 302, 304, 307, 311, 313–​ 314, 320, 321, 324–​326, 328, 333, 333, 335, 336, 339–​341, 342–​359, 362, 385, 394, 398, 401 Scobie, Ronald 34, 36, 219 Scott, Oswald A. 29, 31, 38 Scott-​Gilbert, Captain 42 Scott-​Kilvert, Ian S. 47, 61, 243 Scottish Airlines 114 Scottish Aviation Ltd 191 Second World War 12, 17–​19, 23, 32, 101, 141, 155, 156, 196, 205, 280, 345, 353, 376, 395, 396, 402 Seferis (Seferiadis), George 235, 311 Serres 353 Sewell, W. A. 256, 310, 325, 337, 355, 357, 364–​366, 397–​398 Seymour, Richard 290, 302–​310, 313, 342, 343, 351–​352, 362–​363, 380–​381 Shakespeare, William 155, 329, 360 Shillan, David 290, 292, 298, 340, 342, 347 Sideropoulou, Frosso 258 Sifneos, Panayiotis 237, 239, 247 Signal School 176

Index Simmons, James Stevens 376 Simmons, Mrs David 376, 377 Singapore 24 Siotis, G. I. 385, 386 Sitwell, Edith 97 n. 33 Skouras Films Ltd 75–​76, 141, 145–​147, 153, 168 Skouras, Spyros P. 142 social welfare 9, 17, 94, 129 n. 151, 139, 254, 374 Socialist Republics Sofia 241, 253 Sofoulis, Themistocles 67, 70 n. 167, 71, 236, 271 Sofoulis, Varkiza, 97, 263, 298 Solomos, Dionysios, 358 Sorkin, Marvin 185 sources 1, 12, 13, 14, 59, 71, 77, 106, 108, 109, 110, 121, 141, 218 n. 59, 250, 283, 301 South Africa 193, 383 South African Legation 108, 162, 256 Sovfilm 170, 188 Soviet Union 10, 19, 25, 27, 57 n. 130, 70, 78, 81, 87, 91, 92 n. 16, 96, 100, 107, 109, 111, 124, 188, 232, 328, 330, 368, 397, 400 Spain 389 Speaight, Richard 157, 168 Special Operations Executive (SOE) 29, 31 Spilios, A. 182, 260 Spiro, Edward see Cookride, Edward Henry sponsorships 5, 14, 193, 337, 340 Stadiou Street see Churchill Street Information Centre staff training 5, 18, 162, 201, 228, 229, 234, 264, 272, 277, 293, 317, 343, 345, 346, 349, 355, 359, 374, 380, 368 Stalin, Josef 57

Index Standard Telephones & Cables Ltd 210 Stark, A. A. 376 Stavridi, Joanna 30 n. 29, 309 Stavridi, John 379 Steed, Henry Wickham 92 Stewart, Findlater 297 students 122, 159, 163, 166, 229, 304, 312, 313, 326, 332, 339, 340, 344, 345, 348–​353, 355, 359, 368, 370, 375, 379, 384, 393 Suez canal 373 Suez crisis 20, 279 n. 280 Svolopoulos, Dimitris 240, 247, 257, 259, 261, 264–​279, 285 Syntagma Square 36–​36 Syriotis, G. 97 Tachidromeia, Tilegraphoi, Telephoneia (TTT) [Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones] 209 n. 14, 229 Tahourdin, C. 200, 201 Talbot, Godfrey 220 Tallents, Stephen 212 Tatham, Wilfred G. 271, 318, 321–​338, 356–​357, 365, 366, 381, 391, 392 teachers 94, 198, 291–​292, 302, 304, 313, 323, 341–​357, 362, 368, 392 Technike Aeroporike Ekmetaleyseis (TAE [Technical Air Transport Exploitations]) 191, 192 Telefunken 7, 205, 209, 210, 212–​214, 227, 228, 229 Telegrafnoye agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union] 108 telegrams 34, 36, 233, 290, 339 Theofanis Damaskinos–​Victor Michaelides 76, 141, 145–​147, 171 Thessaloniki 10, 18, 48, 57, 59, 64, 78, 94, 105, 106, 109, 110, 116, 117, 118, 119, 123, 125, 141, 143, 147, 148, 150,

451 152, 156, 161, 165, 167, 174, 176, 191, 198, 212, 215–​218, 227, 228, 230, 248–​253, 257, 261, 269–​280, 293, 300, 302, 305, 306, 313, 319–​ 322, 325, 327–​330, 338, 341, 343, 347, 349, 350, 356, 364, 374–​384 Thessaloniki Hospital Scheme 337, 352353, 359, 408 Thessaloniki Midwifery School and Maternity Home 409 Thessaloniki Refugee Hospital 378, 377–​382 Thessaloniki Tubercular Hospital 162 Thessaly 103 Thrace 194, 196, 306, 314, 350–​351, 379, 386 Thracian Mineral Products Ltd 386 Thracian Union Trust 386 Tirana 241, 253, 274 Tito, Josip 57 n. 130 Tourist Association 114 Toynbee, Arnold J. 252 trade 98, 114–​117, 120, 154, 190–​194, 234, 314, 399 Trans World Airlines 191 transmitters 212, 215, 234, 257, 261, 262, 271 travel and tourism 15, 114, 192, 324, 325, 327, 370, 372 Trevelyn, G. M. 308 English Social History 308 Tripoli 58, 59, 353 Tripolis 161 Truman Doctrine 11, 102, 115 n. 102 Truman, Harry S. 396 Tsaldaris, Konstantinos 272 Tsigantes, Christodoulos 279–​280 Tsigirdis Radio 230, 272 Tsouderos, Emanuel 24, 25 Turkey 228, 262 295 Turkish ‘Anatolia’ airlines 108

452 undersecretariats 219, 222–​223, 226, 227, 229 Union Internationale de Radiophonie [International Broadcasting Union] 233 United Nations 8, 32, 100, 260, 304 United Press International 108, 135, 140 United States army 304, 308 Army Medical Service 380 Congress 11 government 137, 144, 272–​273, 375 in Greece 8, 12, 288, 318–​338 influence in Greece 9, 288, 375, 394, 398 Information Department 197 United States Information Service (USIS) 106, 108, 110–​112, 118, 122, 123, 129, 139, 157, 160, 163, 166, 169, 170, 175, 181, 273, 277, 401 and AIC 183–​190, 195–​198 universities 18, 179, 293, 310, 332, 336, 339, 340, 342, 354, 357, 366, 368 university chairs 18, 358–​367 see also professors University College of Nottingham 360 University of Athens 9, 18, 163, 220 n. 66, 229, 256, 296, 303, 307, 325, 335, 339–​340, 351, 355, 357, 358–​362, 389, 395 University of Cambridge xii, 295, 326, 343, 350–​352, 355, 357 University of Istanbul 295 University of London 329, 342, 378 University of Thessaloniki 9, 356, 363, 365 Vamvetzos, A. 182 Vansittart, Lord 97 Varkiza Agreement 67 and n. 163, 169 Varvaressos, Kyriakos 69–​70

Index Vedova, Edgar 197 Vellacott, Paul Cairn 30 n. 29, 31 Venizelos, Eleftherios 206, 207 n. 5–​6, 279, 347 n. 177, 375–​376, 300, 328 Vienna 245 Viking Air 192 Villa Skouloudi 373 Voice of America (VOA) 195, 199, 255, 258, 269, 273–​275, 279, 282, 288 Volos 44, 47, 49, 58–​59, 64, 78, 83, 88, 94, 121, 165, 166, 263 Votanikos Wireless Telegraphy 218 Voulgaris, Petros 39, 67, 69 Voulpiotis, Ioannis 212–​215, 222, 223 Voulpiotis, Nicolpulos 212 Waddell, J. H. 48 Waithman, Robert 97 Waller-​Bridge, Captain 219 War Establishment 55, 59 Warner, C. F. A. 11, 125, 317, 320, 322, 326 Welch, H. G. G. 54 Wellcome Trust 376–​379, 381–​384 Western Union 6, 104, 177 White, A. J. S. 298, 303 Whitworth, N. S. 297, 303, 312, 340, 347–​349 Wickham, W. R. L. 92, 133, 290 Williams, Sheldon 314, 332 wireless communications and services 33, 106, 174, 209 n. 14, 213, 218, 229, 246, 253 Wireless Telegraphy and Telephone Centre, Pyrgos Vasilissis 218 Wireless Telegraphy Service (Ministry of Communications) 208–​209 Woodhouse, C. M 133 World Health Organization 163, 381 writers 56, 97, 98, 101, 105, 128, 133, 203, 309, 317

453

Index Xanthi 197, 353 Xronopoulos, D. 222 Xydis 219 Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) 114, 162, 174 youth leagues 305 Ypiresia Radiofonikon Ekpompon (YRE) [National Broadcasting Service] 209, 210

Yugoslovia 48, 57 n. 130, 228, 232, 257, 258, 294 n. 29, 307 Zagreb 307 Zakythinos, Dionysios 234, 301 Zappion 227 Zervas, Napoleon 182 Zervas, P. 182

Byzantine and Neohellenic Studies Edited by Andrew Louth FBA, Professor Emeritus of Patristic and Byzantine Studies, University of Durham. David Ricks, Professor Emeritus of Modern Greek and Comparative Literature, King’s College London.

This series encompasses the religion, culture, history, and literary production of the Greek-speaking world and its neighbours from the fourth century AD to the present. It aims to provide a forum for original scholarly work in any of these fields, covering cultures as diverse as Late Antiquity, the Byzantine empire, the Venetian empire, the Christian communities under Ottoman rule, and the modern nation states of Greece and Cyprus. Submissions in English are welcomed in the form of monographs, annotated editions, or collections of papers.

Volume 1 Anthony Hirst, God and the Poetic Ego: The Appropriation of Biblical and Liturgical Language in the Poetry of Palamas, Sikelianos and Elytis. 425 pages. 2004. ISBN 3-03910-327-X Volume 2 Hieromonk Patapios and Archbishop Chrysostomos, Manna from Athos: The Issue of Frequent Communion on the Holy Mountain in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries. 187 pages. 2006. ISBN 3-03910-722-4

Volume 3 Liana Giannakopoulou, The Power of Pygmalion: Ancient Greek Sculpture in Modern Greek Poetry, 1860-1960. 340 pages. 2007. ISBN 978-3-03910-752-0 Volume 4 Irene Loulakaki-Moore, Seferis and Elytis as Translators. 392 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-03911-918-9 Volume 5 Maria Mandamadiotou, The Greek Orthodox Community of Mytilene: Between the Ottoman Empire and the Greek State, 1876–1912. 270 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-0910-3 Volume 6 Eugenia Russell, St Demetrius of Thessalonica: Cult and Devotion in the Middle Ages. 213 pages. 2010. ISBN 978-3-0343-0181-7 Volume 7 Ivan Sokolov, The Church of Constantinople in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Historical Research. 1041 pages. 2013. ISBN 978-3-0343-0202-9 Volume 8 Forthcoming Volume 9 Bernard Mulholland, The Early Byzantine Christian Church: An Archaeological Re-assessment of Forty-Seven Early Byzantine Basilical Church Excavations Primarily in Israel and Jordan, and their Historical and Liturgical Context. 245 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1709-2 Volume 10 Maximilian Lau, Caterina Franchi and Morgan Di Rodi (eds), Landscapes of Power: Selected Papers from the XV Oxford University Byzantine Society International Graduate Conference. 323 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1751-1 Volume 11 Dimitrios Konstadakopulos, From Pax Ottomanica to Pax Europaea: The growth and decline of a Greek village’s micro-economy. 375 pages. 2014. ISBN 978-3-0343-1749-8 Volume 12 John Penrose Barron, From Samos to Soho: The Unorthodox Life of Joseph Georgirenes, a Greek Archbishop. 418 pages. 2017. ISBN 978-3-0343-1788-7

Volume 13 Gioula Koutsopanagou, British Information and Cultural Policy in Greece, 1943–1950: Exercising Public Diplomacy in the Formative Early Cold War Years. 476 pages. 2022. ISBN 978-3-0343-1831-0 Volume 14 Kirsty Stewart and James Moreton Wakeley (eds), Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Byzantine World, c.300–1500 AD: Selected Papers from the XVII International Graduate Conference of the Oxford University Byzantine Society. 210 pages. 2016. ISBN 978-3-0343-2258-4