British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923-1939: Divide, Define and Rule 1315410834, 9781315410838

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British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923–​1939

As Cyprus experienced British imperial rule between 1878 and 1960, Greek and Turkish nationalism on the island developed at different times and at different speeds. Relations between Turkish Cypriots and the British, on the one hand, and Greek Cypriots and the British, on the other, were often asymmetrical, with the Muslim community undergoing an enormous change in terms of national/​ethnic identity and class characteristics. Turkish Cypriot nationalism developed belatedly as a militant nationalist and anti-​Enosis movement. This book explores the relationship between the emergence of Turkish national identity and British colonial rule in the 1920s and 1930s. Ilia Xypolia is Teaching Fellow in Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom.

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Empires in Perspective

Series Editor: Jayeeta Sharma, University of Toronto

This important series examines a diverse range of imperial histories from the early modern period to the twentieth century. Drawing on works of political, social, economic and cultural history, the history of science and political theory, the series encourages methodological pluralism and does not impose any particular conception of historical scholarship. While focused on particular aspects of empire, works published also seek to address wider questions on the study of imperial history. The English Empire in America, 1602–​1658: Beyond Jamestown L H Roper The Theatre of Empire: Frontier Performances in America, 1750–​1860 Douglas S Harvey Transoceanic Radical: William Duane: National Identity and Empire, 1760–​1835 Nigel Little Race and British Colonialism in Southeast Asia, 1770–​1870: John Crawfurd and the Politics of Equality Gareth Knapman A History of Italian Colonialism, 1860–​1907 Giuseppe Finaldi Anglo-​Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–​1887 Stephen A Royle British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923–​1939: Divide, Define and Rule Ilia Xypolia

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British Imperialism and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus, 1923–​1939 Divide, Define and Rule Ilia Xypolia

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First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Ilia Xypolia The right of Ilia Xypolia to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-​1-​138-​22129-​1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-​1-​315-​41085-​2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Out of House Publishing

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To my parents Theodoros and Charalampia

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Contents

List of illustrations Acknowledgements Note on transliteration List of acronyms and abbreviations

ix xi xiii xiv

1 Introduction

1

2 Historical background

4

Turkish nationalism  5 Kemalism  7

3 International context

31

Introduction  31 British Empire and British administration  32 Strategic importance of Cyprus  35 The Italian imperial threat  43 Turkey and Cyprus  48 Conclusion  50

4 Social and economic context

59

Introduction  59 Urbanisation  60 Press and ‘print capitalism’  68 Emigration to Anatolia  72 Conclusion  76

5 Ideological and cultural context Introduction  82 Education as a political tool  83

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viii Contents Cultural transformation  102 The marriage law and polygamy  102 Hat versus fez  106 Mosque prayers for the empire  107 Language reform  109 Conclusion  111

6 Political context

121

Introduction  121 Local councils  122 Relations with Greek Cypriots  128 Internal division  133 Judiciary  139 October Revolt  140 Palmerocracy  143 Turkish consul  144 The communist threat  147 Conclusion  153

7 Discussion

163

British imperialism  163 Divide and rule  164

Appendix Bibliography Index

170 174 188

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Illustrations

Tables 4.1 Nationalities of members of the civil establishment, 1 January 1928 4.2 Muslim Cypriot population, 1881–​1946 4.3 Percentages of Muslims and Christians in six towns, 1921 & 1931 4.4 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1922 4.5 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1924 4.6 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1925 4.7 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1926 4.8 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1930 4.9 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1931 4.10 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1932 4.11 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1934 4.12 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1935 4.13 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1936 4.14 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1937 4.15 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1938 4.16 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1939

62 63 63 64 65 65 65 65 66 66 66 66 67 67 67 67

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x  List of illustrations 4.17 4.18 4.19 5.1 5.2 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5

Principal publications in Turkish, 1919–​1929 Principal publications in Turkish, 1930–​1937 Immigrants and emigrants, 1922–​1938 Muslim Cypriot elementary schools, 1919–​1938 Muslim Cypriot secondary schools, 1919–​1937 Numbers of mosques, tekyes and seminaries, 1919–​1937 Muslim voter turnout, Legislative Council elections Muslim members of the Executive Council Muslim members of the Legislative Council Police casualties and the punishment of insurgents, 1931 Turkish consuls in Cyprus

70 72 72 96 100 108 127 129 129 142 145

Figure 4.1 Share of Cypriot communities in police force personnel, 1922–​1939

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Acknowledgements

I have been the fortunate recipient of much advice and support over the years it has taken to write this book, which begun as a doctoral dissertation in SPIRE at Keele University, United Kingdom. In the entire process of the project I was fortunate to work with Professor Bülent Gökay. I have enjoyed splendid research guidance by Bülent, who wisely and wittily supported me with his intellectual generosity. I  am also indebted to Vassilis Fouskas, who not only introduced Bülent to me but has also helped in innumerable ways. I have to also express my gratitude to Professor Robert Ladrech, who gave useful pointers and references. In addition, my deep appreciation goes to Professor Farzana Shain for her genuine support. I have also benefited from the scholarly support of Panayiotis Ifestos, Marios Evriviades, Andrew Liaropoulos, Petros Liacouras, Dionysis Tsirigotis and Emmanuella Doussis. I would similarly like to thank Professor Ben Fowkes and Dr Helen Parr for their helpful advice and suggestions. I should also thank Robert Langham, Senior Editor at Routledge, who has always been very encouraging and helpful and put up with my delays. The series of ‘Nationalism’ workshops at LSE organised by Professor Breuilly and Dr Hutchinson and the ‘Ottoman/​Turks in Conflict’ workshop at Columbia University organised by Christine Philliou offered me stimulating environments that helped me to add different dimensions and perspectives on the issues that this book considers. I was also fortunate to have, on various occasions, constructive discussions with Robert Holland, Diana Markides, Umut Ozkirimli, Andrekos Varnava, the late Peter Loizos, Altay Nevzat and Ahmet An. This project was possible only with the financial assistance of the generous IKY scholarship. Ms Christodoulou and Mr Karaliotis were always helpful and supportive in difficult and uncertain times. I have to acknowledge the support of various other research grants I was awarded at Keele University. This project has given me the opportunity to visit and study material retrieved from various institutions. I  would like here to thank the friendly and helpful staff at the National Archives in London, the CAARI in Nicosia, the Republican Archives in Ankara, the State Archives in Nicosia, the State

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xii Acknowledgements Archives in Keryneia, the British Library in London, the IHR in London and the National Archives in Washington, DC. My sincere gratitude goes to my colleagues Alkistis Ntai, Recep Dogan, Ercan Aslantas, Daniel K. Fletcher, Kalliopi Stavropoulou and Zehra Aziz Beyli. Thanks to Helen Farrell for providing assistance with administrative tasks. A very special thank you goes to my close ones and my friends for letting me vent my frustration throughout this project. Last, but certainly not least, I am most grateful to my siblings Penelope, Dimitris and Kyriaki for their constant encouragement and love. My deepest gratitude goes to my parents, Theodoros and Charalampia, for their unconditional love and constant support of every kind. This book is dedicated to them with respect and love.

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Note on transliteration

Names and titles in Ottoman Turkish have been rendered in accordance with modern Turkish usage and not by strict transliteration. Arabic names and terms are transliterated according to the system based on that of the International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES). Greek names have been transliterated using the Latin script.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

AKEL Cypriot Progressive People’s Working Party BKP United Cyprus Party BSA Basbakanlik Cumhuriyet Arsivi, Republican Archives of Turkey (Ankara) CHP Republican People’s Party, Turkey CO Colonial Office (of United Kingdom) CPIO Cyprus Press and Information Office (Nicosia) CSA Cyprus State Archives (Nicosia) CTP Republican Turkish Party CUP Committee of Union and Progress (Turkey) EOKA National Organization of Cypriot Freedom Fighters FO Foreign Office (of United Kingdom) KA Archives from the self-​declared TRNC (Keryneia) KKK Communist Party of Cyprus SWOT Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats TNA The National Archives (London) WO War Office (of United Kingdom) YKP New Cyprus Party

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1  Introduction

Hegel, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, claimed that the periods of non-​conflict are the blank pages in history books. This is valid also in the case of Cyprus. One should consider the gallons of ink that have been spilled for the history of Cyprus, while almost nothing has been written about the interwar period. The two decades between the two world wars found the island under the rule of the British Empire and in relative peace. Thus, this period has not attracted the interest of many scholars. This book aims to capture how the ostensibly stagnant landscape of the politics on the island was decisive for the emergence of the national identity for the Muslim Cypriot community. This book offers a critical exploration into the prehistory, in the sense of a background to the struggles generally depicted as beginning in the 1950s, of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. It attempts to highlight that the interwar period was still of paramount importance not only in the history of Cyprus but also in the history of the whole region of the eastern Mediterranean. The reality of the two nationally awakened communities of the island from the 1950s onwards began to take place in the 1920s. The vast majority of the Cypriots were Christian Orthodox and, since the early nineteenth century, have self-​identified as Greeks. However, the Muslim minority of the Cypriot inhabitants had not acquired any national identity until the interwar period. During this period a major transformation took place in the identity of the Muslim community of the island, a shift from a religious to a national identity. This shift had serious repercussions in the later events that followed in the postwar era. In order to examine this shift, I focus on the context wherein this national identity emerged: the social, ideological, cultural, political and international context. This context was set by British rule. Turkish Cypriot politics during the period of British rule in Cyprus has not been the most popular field of research. Even the scholars who are engaged with the Cyprus issue tend to focus on the Greek Cypriot politics of the period, ignoring the interesting dynamics of the politics of the Muslim Cypriot community. This book looks back to the interwar period, to which the causes of conflict in Cyprus can be traced. It explores the extent to which the British policy

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2 Introduction of ‘divide and rule’ in Cyprus contributed to the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism on the island, making the Turkish Cypriot elites embrace the tenets of the Turkish security programme in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Turkish Cypriot people define themselves as ‘patriotic Turks’. Turkish Cypriot nationalism had specific characteristics as a nationalist movement, and its intensification took place in the 1950s. In addressing this question, British, Cypriot, Turkish and Greek sources are all analysed. This study aims to explore the special relationship between imperialism and nationalism in Cyprus. As stated earlier, Turkish Cypriot nationalism was not born in a vacuum, and in that sense it has to be understood within the context that was set by the British. The main research question that this book seeks to address is this: to what extent did British imperial rule affect the emergence and development of a Turkish Cypriot national identity? The question is formulated in this way in order to arrive at a balanced analysis of the whole situation and avoid coming to hasty conclusions and dogmatic statements about the influence of British imperialism on the formation of the Turkish Cypriot national identity.

The structure of the book The main themes of this research  –​nationalism, identity, religion and imperialism  –​run in parallel in the following chapters. The main themes are inextricably linked in the endeavour to investigate and explore in depth the research question. The method of presentation of the argument and the findings of the book, as Marx has suggested, should definitely be different from the method of enquiry.1 Therefore, the plan of the book is as follows. The following chapter provides a historical background, along with some considerations on Turkish nationalism and the ethnic origins of the Muslim Cypriots. The purpose of this chapter is to make clear how certain contested and ambiguous terms and notions, such as nation and identity, are going to be used in the book, and the chapter is therefore essential for us to proceed with our analysis. Paraphrasing what the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates said, we should first define the concepts, and then we can start to communicate. Having clarified the operational definitions of the terms and the notions to be used, we proceed to the third chapter of the book, concerning the international context. In this chapter we discuss the wider context of the period, which had serious repercussions for the turn of events in Cyprus. In particular, it is argued that the changing international context affected events in Cyprus in two ways. The first is that it altered the geostrategic importance of the island for the British Empire. The second, and extremely important, factor was the gradual success of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, which created a successful example that the Muslim community of Cyprus could attune to. In order to illustrate both these factors we focus on the evolving British perceptions of two of the aspiring regional powers, Italy and Turkey.

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Introduction 3 In the fourth chapter, we turn our focus on the island itself. In particular, we examine the events of the period within the Cypriot socio-​economic context, which therefore involves discussing the urbanisation of Cypriot society and the so-​called modernisation that British rule initiated. In the fifth chapter, in addition to the social and economic context, we look at the ideological and cultural context. This is a vital aspect to consider in order to fully understand the transformation in the collective identification of the Muslim community of the island. The focus is upon the educational system, drawing particular attention to changes in the history textbooks. In the sixth chapter, we focus on the political context. In doing so, I analyse the political participation of the Muslim community in the political bodies of the island. I  also examine the relations that the Muslim community had with the British administration and its Greek counterpart. All these interactions will be examined in a political context. The focus is on the representation of the Muslim community in the local administrative bodies of the Legislative Council, the Executive Council and the Advisory Council. In the concluding chapter, a brief summary of the central ideas discussed in the previous chapters is presented. It places the arguments and findings in broader debates, and clarifies the limitations of the argument. Finally, it draws some conclusions for other similar cases and presents an outlook for future research. Furthermore, the conclusion highlights the importance of the study as a whole, its contribution and its relevance today.

Note 1 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I (New York: Vintage Books, 1977). The method of presentation and the method of enquiry for Marx: ‘[T]‌he latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze its different forms of development and to track down their inner connection. Only after this work has been done can the real movement be appropriately presented. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-​ matter is now reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear as if we have before us an a priori construction’ (p. 102).

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2  Historical background

Today, in the twenty-​first century, Cyprus is one of the EU member states and, at the same time one, of the very few divided states worldwide. According to the opinion of the majority of scholars engaged with the study of the Cyprus issue, nationalism is the main source for this extravagant reality. Additionally, a growing number of critical studies tend to emphasise the role that imperialism played in shaping the Cyprus conflict. Nowadays the island is inhabited by two separate communities with distinct national identities, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Although these communities had a harmonic and peaceful relationship for centuries, many scholars, loosely following Samuel Huntington’s argument on the ‘clash of civilizations’,1 support the idea that their coalescence into a unitary state is impossible. Cyprus was confronted by almost persistent intercommunal conflict from the mid-​1950s until 1974. Cyprus, as part of a number of empires throughout the centuries  –​ namely Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Venetian and Ottoman  –​has experienced imperialism since ancient times. British colonial rule succeeded three centuries of rule by the Ottoman Empire, starting in 1878 and officially ending in 1960. Greek and Turkish nationalism developed in different historical periods and at different paces. Greek nationalism commenced at the beginning of the nineteenth century, way before the advent of British colonialism in 1878, while Turkish nationalism started developing in the Ottoman Empire at the end of nineteenth century, and was consolidated only with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Relations between Turkish Cypriots and the British, on the one hand, and Greek Cypriots and the British, on the other, were asymmetrical. During the colonial era in Cyprus the Muslim community underwent an enormous change in terms of national/​ ethnic identity and class characteristics. Turkish Cypriot nationalism developed belatedly, as a militant nationalist and anti-​ Enosis movement. The scale of the scholarly output attendant upon the politics of the small island of Cyprus is immense. Despite the vast literature that accompanies and analyses various aspects of the politics of modern Cyprus, there is little in it that has focused on the development Turkish Cypriot nationalism.

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Historical background 5 Against this background, this book explores the formation of Turkish national identity and its relationship with British colonial rule, which remains a terra incognita in the scholarly literature. Myriad academic papers have been written on the Cyprus issue, with most of them theorising it as an ethnic conflict starting from the 1950s, when the intercommunal fighting began. However, very few have explored the conditions under which the two distinct communities were shaped, especially the Turkish Cypriot identity. Therefore, it is of special academic interest to trace the relationship between the emergence of Turkish national identity and British colonial rule, because, I argue, the latter set the political and ideological context in which the nationalism of the Turkish Cypriot community developed; the rest of the book will analyse this. In particular, the study focuses on the period between the two world wars, 1923 to 1939, when the transformation of the Muslims of Cyprus into Turkish Cypriots occurred. The time frame of this study is delimited by two important events: the signing of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the outbreak of the Second World War. The decision to start the period in question in 1923 was taken on the basis of the undoubted significance of the Lausanne treaty for Cyprus and the Muslim community of the island. As we illustrate in Chapter 4, a clause of 1923 treaty enabled a large number of Muslim Cypriots to emigrate to the newly founded Republic of Turkey. However, the British authorities in Cyprus were alerted to the potential for massive emigration to Anatolia to lead to the fading away of the Muslim community in Cyprus. There are secret documents on the threat that emigration posed to British interests, epitomising British imperial policy in the island. Therefore, this book investigates the period commencing with the signing of the Lausanne treaty in 1923 and ending with the advent of the Second World War in 1939. Both events constitute major turning points for British rule in Cyprus. The First World War constitutes a major turning point for the Middle East as a region. The so-​called ‘sick man of Europe’, the Ottoman Empire, passed away, and long-​declining Ottoman rule in the region came to an end. Both events marked a shift in the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean.

Turkish nationalism Ne mutlu Türküm diyene Mustafa Kemal Ataturk2 It is simply impossible to understand the emergence and the development of Turkish nationalism without looking into the international context from which it arose and the historical trajectory of which it is the product. The turning point in the history of the Ottoman Empire was the military defeat in Vienna in the late seventeenth century. The defeat of the Ottoman Army in 1683 at the siege of Vienna was a major turning point in the history of the empire. Scholars such as Halil Inalcik argue that it marked not only

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6  Historical background the beginning of decline of the Ottoman Empire but also the beginning of the reorientation of the Ottomans towards the West.3 It took more than a century after the 1683 Ottoman defeat at Vienna for the sultan to proceed towards Western-​style military training for the infantry.4 However, it was only at the end of the eighteenth century, after the Ottoman-​Russian War of 1768–​1774, that an Ottoman sultan actively sought to turn the tide towards the West by adopting the perceived Western lifestyle whole-​heartedly and without reservation.5 The reason for this relatively belated turn, according to the prominent British historian Arnold Toynbee, was the tremendous military and political success enjoyed by the ‘world of Islam’ in the ante-​1683 era. It was only when the military decline of the Ottomans seemed irreversible that the elites actively sought to introduce initiatives that would prevent the fall of the empire. Just as the spread of nationalism was based on the political imitation of successful templates, the spread of what were perceived as Western system of values and technology was based upon the same logic. Therefore, the reforms undertaken by Mustafa Kemal Pasha have to be examined as the last link in a chain of Westernisation that had begun in the aftermath of the Ottoman defeat in the 1683 Vienna siege. In order to understand this reorientation of the Ottoman Empire, and consequently the Turkish Republic, it is always necessary to take into account the political context. Fundamentally, there was a decisive shift in power towards the West during this period, and the gradual reorientation of the Ottoman Empire towards the West followed this development. After all, success breeds imitation. From the standpoint of a historical materialist approach, this study holds that initially we witness the shift of material power, and subsequently the shift of ideas. It is vital to put at the centre of the analysis the image and the perception of the West in order to understand the nature and the development of this Turkish nationalism. All the great thinkers and advocates of Turkish nationalism, such as Ziya Gökalp, had a certain perception for the West. We need to see the power and knowledge nexus behind this perception.6 We should always bear in mind the world dominance of the European powers at this time:7 the European empires had expanded considerably and dominated the globe. The ideology of Turkish nationalism gradually developed during this golden age of dominance for the West. The Eurocentric reinvention of history and archaeology had a significant impact on the construction of a superior image for Western civilisation.8 The contributions of the non-​European cultures and the civilisations that had emerged in non-​European lands were systematically erased.9 The Western global dominance was translated into the constructed feeling of European superiority –​a superiority in all the manifestations of the civilisation. The perception of the notions of nation and nationalism is still very Eurocentric. The Kemalist reforms and so-​ called revolution were based upon this assumption of superior Western civilisation. It was widely felt and believed that only by blindly adopting the Western values and system would there be

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Historical background 7 progress. The notion of Western-​type democracy lies at the epicentre of this adoption process. The reforms were top-​down impositions. Secularism was considered to be a key component of the European democratic system. ‘Secularism’ as a term in the scholarly literature has come into being only relatively recently; it was not introduced until the middle of the nineteenth century.10 Although its meaning has evolved significantly, secularism nowadays is largely perceived as the separation of religion and politics in a general sense. However, there is a lively ongoing debate on various conceptual and normative aspects of both secularism and secularisation.11 The distinction between secularism and secularisation as a philosophical and scientific process is significant for Syed Al-​Attas. Al-​Attas argues that the dichotomy between a secular and a theocratic state is false, as an Islamic state is neither wholly theocratic nor wholly secular.12 Sami Zubaida argues that the dichotomy of the religious and the secular has not been very fluid, and it has only recently been established within popularised fundamentalism that encouraging religion to turn into a matter of politics and ‘social engineering’ is also a product of the secularisation process.13 Academic literature looking at the question of the compatibility of Islam and modernity focuses on the notion of secularism. In particular, it emphasises secularism as a sine qua non for the process of modernisation to commence, including in Muslim-​ majority countries. This so-​called ‘secularisation thesis’ claims that modernity undermines the plausibility of religion as a political force.14 The secularisation thesis follows a Weberian premise arguing for the decline of the importance of religion in the modern world, because the power of rationalism supersedes that of religious/​dogmatic belief in modernity.15 The teleological nature of this modernisation theory underpins the work of all the classic Western sociologists, such as Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx and August Comte. It is also evident in the work of the prominent American sociologist C. Wright Mills, who, when writing in the late 1950s, estimated that, “in due course, the sacred shall disappear altogether, except in the private realm”.16

Kemalism Hans Kohn’s classic typology of ‘liberal civic Western’ /​‘illiberal ethnic Eastern’ nationalism symbolises the epitome of Eurocentric biases in the academic field of studies of nationalism.17 This typology is so well established that many scholars still apply these sharp distinctions in studies of empirical cases. The case of Kemalism in Turkey is not an exception to this academic tradition. Only a very few critical scholars, such as the Marxist Perry Anderson, perceive that Kemalism represented a purely ethnic type of nationalism that was intentionally masqueraded as civic.18 Studies are very reluctant to characterise Kemalism as purely ethnic and go as far as to describe two faces of Kemalist Turkish nationalism, one inclusive and one exclusive.19 However, in the vast majority of scholarly works, Kemalist nationalism is widely characterised as a civic nationalism that eventually

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8  Historical background transformed and incorporated some ethnic elements. They usually support their claim of the ‘civic’ character of Kemalism on two grounds. Firstly, they cite article 88 of the 1924 Constitution, which dictated that ‘the inhabitants of Turkey are considered as Turks by virtue of citizenship irrespective of religious and racial differences’, as evidence of the inclusiveness of the Turkish national identity.20 Secondly, scholars illustrate their claim for the civic type of nationalism by quoting the –​as it became –​national slogan of the Turkish Republic, ‘Ne mutlu Türküm diyene’ (‘How happy is the one who says “I am a Turk’ ”), coined by Mustafa Kemal. This phrase encapsulates Ernest Renan’s civic view of the nation as a ‘daily plebiscite’, highlighting the voluntary choice for an association with a nation. Thus, the Kemalist form of Turkish nationalism is widely conceived by the vast majority of scholars as civic in origin, rather than ethnic. In this study we move beyond this distinction, which obscures rather than reveals the nature and the characteristics of a certain form of nationalism. The adherents of Kemalism were French-​educated scholars who professedly pursued a civic conceptualisation of the nation. Two of the most influential ideologues of the early twentieth century were undoubtedly Yusuf Akçura(oglu) and Ziya Gökalp. Yusuf Akçura (1876–​1935), in his 1904 essay ‘Üç Tarz-​ı Siyaset’ (‘Three types of policy’),21 presented the ideological debate that was going on for a while among intellectuals of the declining Ottoman Empire.22 Ottomanism, which originated in the 1860s, was the idea that the mosaic of communities would fuse into one Ottoman citizenry if all the subjects of the empire were equal.23 The second strand of thinking was Islamism, based on the idea that regeneration of the Ottoman state lay in a return to Islamic values and law.24 Finally, the third current was Turkism. Ziya Gökalp (1876–​1924) was probably the most significant ideologue in the shaping of the Turkish nationalist project.25 The work of the prolific Turkish intellectual was highly influenced by the French sociologist Émile Durkheim in his conceptualisation of culture and civilisation and the ideas of progress. As with most eminent Western sociologists, Durkheim’s work is underpinned by the binary distinction of modern and traditional societies.26 This distinction comprised the central basis upon which Gökalp developed his understanding of culture and civilisation. While in the Western world progress is a natural route, in the non-​Western world progress will be achieved only by adopting Western ideas and values. Gökalp urged Turkish nationalism to be compatible with both Islamic culture and Western civilisation. In doing so, he considered Western civilisation to be more broadly based than Christianity. He considered religion to constitute the culture of a society. So Islam is simply the culture of the society, and not the civilisation. The understanding of civilisation and culture as separate entities paved the way to arguing for the compatibility of civilisation and culture, and, in particular, the Western civilisation and the Islamic culture. Gökalp’s ideas have long been perceived as advocating a civic model of cultural nationalism.27 The literature on Gökalp has emphatically rejected any

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Historical background 9 racist connotations that are attributed to his work and theory. His ‘sociological’ definition of the nation held that nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographical, political, or voluntary group or association. Nation is a group composed of men and women who have gone through the same education, who have received the same acquisitions in language, religion, morality, and aesthetics. The Turkish folk express the same idea by simply saying: ‘The one whose language is my language, and whose faith is my faith, is of me.’ Men [sic] want to live together, not with those who carry the same blood in their veins, but with those who share the same language and the same faith. Our human personality is not our physical body but our mind and soul.28 This quote has been cited in order to support the view that Gökalp was anti-​ racist and advocated a voluntary and civic approach to nationalism. Although, on a number of occasions, Gökalp attempted to synthesise the currents of Islam and Turkism in the ideological debates, this position assumed that the existence of the race was only temporarily and instrumentally omitted. Turkism was introduced into the Ottoman Empire by Russian émigrés after the Young Turks Revolution in 1908.29 The Pan-​Turkish programme envisaged a unification of the Turkic people on the basis of the common historical roots. In 1911 the Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) organisation, close to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), was established. However, gradually these Pan-​Turkish aspirations lost momentum, and the Turkish current of ideology started focusing on Anatolia. In particular, in 1917 CUP developed the Halka Dogru (Towards the People) movement, which envisaged the Anatolian peasants as the ‘real’ Turks.30 Kemalism is considered an offshoot from the Young Turks movement. The Young Turks represented a continuation of the pro-​European trends that had been in existence in the Ottoman Empire at least since the middle of the nineteenth century. The mainstream literature in modern Turkey tends to portray Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as the leader who established and marked a new era. The history of modern Turkey is therefore considered as a new and groundbreaking era without any connections to the Ottoman past. However, recently scholars such as Eric Zürcher have pointed out the continuities of the late Ottoman era with the early period of the republic.31 Zürcher, in his prominent textbook Turkey: A Modern History, establishes a different periodisation of the history of the republic, tracing the continuities especially between the Young Turks movement and Mustafa Kemal’s reforms. The heroic portrait of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a deus ex machina who saved Turkey is central in the mainstream historiography of modern Turkey. The vast majority of scholars omit to trace the longer process of reforms that had been taking place in the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century and present the development of the nationalistic movement under the leadership of Kemal Mustafa Pasha as the beginning of new era that was marked

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10  Historical background by a radical and violent break with the past. Bernard Lewis’s work presents Kemal Ataturk in an epic manner, but he neglects to point out the continuities of Kemalist reforms with initiatives that had taken place in the late Ottoman era. Lewis holds a rather primordial view on the Turkish nation.32 He argues that the Turkish nation was made imperceptible by Islam. He writes that ‘the Turks had so completely identified themselves with Islam that the very concept of a Turkish nationality was submerged’.33 Scholars such as Bernard Lewis are very enthusiastic and confident that the Westernisation and modernisation of Turkey has been irreversible. However, one need only look at post-​war developments in the twentieth century, with the numerous military interventions in order to keep the state on the Westernisation track. In the same realm, we find Andrew Mango writing a series of books on Ataturk in which Mustafa Kemal is the sole founder of Turkey.34 Lord Kinross’s book is considered the definite biography of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk;35 Kinross portrays Kemal Ataturk as a war hero and a reformer. The nation and nationalism are not only highly contested notions to define but, most importantly, are fundamentally dynamic. In order to understand Turkish nationalism as it was shaped in the aftermath of the First World War after Mustafa Kemal’s military victory36 and the independence of the Turkish Republic in 1923, we should put it in the spatial and temporal context from which it emerged. As mentioned above, the spread of nationalism is conceived as an act of political imitation. The successful cases and examples beget copies. I now discuss briefly the powerful successful models of nationalism. The power of the West was determinant in Kemal Ataturk’s perceptions. And, of course, we could draw some parallels with today. The relationship between Kemal Ataturk and the Western powers has long been an issue of speculation within Turkish society, and it has even sparked many conspiracy theories. They have somehow been part of folk lore in contemporary Turkey, but remain unspoken as it is an insult to Turkishness to discuss or question the importance of the founder of the republic. The ‘conspiracy theories’ consider Mustafa Kemal Pasha37 as an agent of the Western powers who acted on their behalf in advancing their own interests.38 Accordingly, Ataturk’s reforms are perceived as a tool for Western intervention in the country. It is important to clarify here that this study does not encompass these conspiracy theories that portray Mustafa Kemal as a mandated agent of Western countries. Not one of these theories is supported by any historical evidence. However, this research project holds that the global hegemony of the West made possible the creation of certain perceptions of Western supremacy. The readings and understandings of the West’s ascendancy shaped the Turkish political elites’ decisions to effect social and political transformations. Moreover, it is not a coincidence that recently Turkey has initiated the first serious challenge to the Kemalist dogmatic narrative, precisely while the global debate on the decline of the West is ongoing.39 It is understandable if the appeal of the victorious West for the ‘sick man of Europe’ at the beginning of the twentieth century, and especially in the

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Historical background 11 aftermath of the First World War, was reportedly highly influential. It is interesting to note the evolution of perceptions of the West within Turkish society. Comparing the turn of the twentieth century with the early twenty-​first century, some conclusions can be drawn. Today Turkey’s alleged new reorientation towards the Middle East and the Muslim world arguably signifies and marks the decline of the global image of the West. The relative decline of the West is of course first economic, and then consequently its cultural hegemony deteriorates.40 As the economic power shifts towards the East and the South the ideological and cultural dimensions of power follow. As the power–​ knowledge nexus is very strong, we should not be surprised to see changes in thinking when a change in power occurs. It is what we are witnessing the beginnings of today: a shift in the paradigm. Although this is a very interesting discussion, it is certainly beyond the scope of this book to analyse it any further. What is fundamental here is to understand the meaning and the significance of the West at the time in question. The reason I have included the comparison with today is to show the evolutionary meaning of the perception of Western civilisation. Let us now turn our focus onto Mustafa Kemal’s reforms. According to prominent Marxist scholar Perry Anderson, Kemal’s reforms comprised a sui generis cultural revolution that was never accompanied by a social one. Despite the revolutionary character of the reforms, the structure of society and the pattern of class relations remained the same. Kemal’s revolution acquired only an elitist impetus rather a popular one. Anderson argues that Kemalism has remained a vertical affair:  Kemalism not only inherited an Ottoman tradition, but accentuated it.41 In a speech in 1927, the so-​called Nutuk, Kemal Ataturk elaborated his views on modernisation.42 Based on a dichotomous reasoning, his historical account considered Tanzimat, the Unionists, as forces moving towards modernisation while the conservative forces of reaction obstructed Turkey’s progress ‘on the road to contemporary civilization’.43 Mustapha Kemal in the early 1920s realised a modernisation programme in the newly founded Turkish Republic. Kemal’s reforms were based on the six basic principles (republicanism, populism, nationalism, secularism, statism and reformism) of his ideology, which are reflected in the six arrows of the flag of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi: CHP).44 One of the most central reforms in Ataturk’s modernisation campaign was that of language. In changing the alphabet from Arabic letters to Latin, Ataturk aimed at modernising/​Westernising society; the new letters were an adapted version of the Latin alphabet. However, this reform created a huge gap between the new generation of Turks, who would be educated with the new Latin alphabet, and their ancestors, who had been educated with the Ottoman letters. Hence, even today this historical rupture is apparent, as the vast majority of the population of the Republic of Turkey cannot read documents written in the Ottoman language, and therefore cannot access their ancestors’ historical texts. This is one the major criticisms of Ataturk’s linguistic reform.

12

12  Historical background Ataturk’s attempt to make the Turkish language more accessible to Westerners thus created a rift between the Ottoman historical heritage and the newly founded Republic. His change to the letters of the alphabet was accompanied by a purification of the language with the elimination of Arabic and Persian words. The new orientation of the Ataturk regime towards the West was apparent in every single one of his reforms. The idea behind this linguistic purism was the refinement of Turkishness, cleansed of foreign influences, in particular Arabic and Persian influences. The language reform undoubtedly even constituted a big symbolic rift between the traditional conservative Ottoman elite and the new, emerging Western-​educated Young Turk elite.45 This new generation that was led by Mustafa Kemal believed that the Westernisation and modernisation of society would be the only way to ensure its survival. The most radical reform was the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. Accordingly, the most controversial of all the reforms that Mustapha Kemal Pasha imposed was the establishment of a secular regime –​i.e. the separation of political and religious authority.46 Hakan Yavuz notes that, in contrast to the American version of secularism, the Kemalist model was based on ‘the radical Jacobin laicism that aimed to transform society through the power of the state and eliminate religion from the public sphere’.47 There were pragmatic reasons and incentives behind Ataturk’s decision to abolish the Caliphate. Secularism is actually the principle of the separation of religion and politics. Mustapha Kemal emphasised the need of secularism not only for ideological reasons but for pragmatic ones as well. His opponents came predominantly from the religious camp, and their power and legitimacy was derived directly from Islam. Therefore, it was in his political interests to restrict any power and authority derived from religion. Kemal Ataturk was heavily influenced by Ziya Gökalp. Gökalp’s work48 has been translated into English by Niyazi Berkes, a sociologist with Cypriot origins. Gökalp was following the insights of the French sociologist Émile Durkheim when he advocated making a distinction between civilisation and religion. According to Gökalp, religion can provide only the cultural element of the society. For Gökalp, Islam and his perception of Western civilisation are not incompatible. He often referred to the example of the Greeks and the Armenians. Gökalp argued that, just as the Greeks and Armenians had been able to catch up with Western civilisation easily and quickly after their independence, so the Turks could do the same. The only important thing to note was that, in the case of the Greeks and the Armenians, the Church and politics were separate. According to Gökalp, that was the main reason why the Greeks and the Armenians were easily accepted by the West. He warned that that was something that the Turks should bear in mind if they wished to be included in the Western family. The Turks were in any case part of the only community in the Ottoman Empire that did not have a separate religious authority.49

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Historical background 13 The perception of the relation between civilisation and culture is of paramount importance for the study of the transformation from a religious to a national identity. Ataturk’s perception was that they are one and the same. However, his major influence, Ziya Gökalp, considered civilisation and culture as separate entities. The importance of this question of separation or unity lies in the bigger question of the compatibility of civilisation and culture and, in particular, that of Western civilisation and Islamic culture. The relevant academic literature has attributed the birth of the Turkish nation to statism.50 This means that the state constructed and shaped the character of the nation. It followed the exact opposite direction to the Greek case. In Greece, it was the nation that created the state. It is worth noting the dialectic relation of the nation-​building process across the shores of the Aegean. So, while the Turkish War of Independence that marked the birth of the Turkish Republic and, indeed, the construction and creation of the Turkish national identity was against the Greeks, the Greek War of Independence, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, took place against the Ottoman Empire. Ayse Kadioglu refers to the paradox of Turkish Nationalism. She explains that the Turkish national identity was constructed and manufactured by the state elites.51 The imposition of the Turkish national identity was in the interest of the state elites, especially during the first decades of the existence of the Turkish Republic. To sum up, the main argument in this subsection is that, in order to understand the complex of attributes that determine the character of the Turkish national identity, one should in fact focus on the global context and the dominant paradigm. Moreover, this argument can be strengthened if one sees the transformation of the national or, better, collective identity of Turkey today. Given the apparent material decline of the power of the so-​called West and the sequential gradual decay, the appeal of the Western understanding of the nation is being challenged in Turkey today. The ethnic origins of the Muslim community of Cyprus Antony Smith, one of the most eminent contemporary scholars of nationalism, does not attempt to develop a general theory of nationalism, as he holds that it is rather too complicated a category to make generalisations. However, he does attempt to shift the focus to the ‘ethnic’ origins of nations. According to Smith, an ethnic community has six main attributes: ‘a collective proper name; a myth of common ancestry; shared historical memories; one or more differentiating elements of common culture; an association with a specific ‘homeland’; a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the population’.52 In this section we will briefly examine the ‘ethnic’ origins of the Muslim community of Cyprus. In particular, we investigate whether the Muslim community possessed any of Smith’s attributes that could constitute an ethnie. As with all the national narratives today, Turkish Cypriot official self-​ perception accepts that the nation has ethnic origins.53 Unfortunately, not

14

14  Historical background only is there a lack of conceptualisation of the nation and ethnicity in the relevant literature on Cyprus, but the ahistorical account of that assumption is also obvious. In the post-​1950s period the dominant assumption is that in Cyprus there has been throughout the centuries two distinct ethnic communities, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot. For example, Lawrence Durrell in his famous orientalist travelogue portrays Turkish Cypriots in the 1950s bearing certain ethnic characteristics and cultural traits.54 Historically, Cyprus had always been acquired by all the major powers that had arisen in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1571 it was the turn of the Ottoman Empire to conquer the island, and a significant wave of immigration from Anatolia to Cyprus took place. Large numbers of settlers constituted the Muslim community of the island. Up until then the vast majority of the population had been comprised of Orthodox and Catholic Christians. The Ottoman rulers of Cyprus applied the so-​called millet system, dividing the subjects of the empire along the religious lines of the millets.55 Dhimmis (non-​Muslim) and Muslims enjoyed different rights and were subject to different taxation. Accordingly, the majority of the civilian offices of the state were held by Muslims. In Cyprus, the Muslims were part of the dominant millet, and the Christians were recognised as a separate millet. There are conflicting estimates for the composition of the Cypriot population during the Ottoman era.56 It is interesting that Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus, a historian of Greek Cypriot origin, argued that in the eighteenth century the number of Muslims exceeded that of Christians. The cleavages between the ruling elite (both Muslim and Christian), the peasantry (both Muslim and Christian) and a limited middle sector of local gatherers torn between the two were more fundamental than the institutional and religious differences between Muslims and Christians.57 It was a class-​based society, in which class relations, identities and conflicts superseded all others.58 However, tracing the ethnic origins of Muslim Cypriots only in the immigration of the Muslim populations from Anatolia has been challenged. During the Ottoman epoch in Cyprus numerous Christians converted to Islam for socio-​economic reasons. The act of religious conversion from Christianity to Islam would alter the social status of the individual,59 in turn changing the subject status from being a dhimmi taxpayer into a Muslim taxpayer, which meant paying fewer taxes.60 Being part of the ruling millet, the Muslims of Cyprus had certain privileges, mainly of a socio-​economic nature. These privileges were the real reason why many non-​Muslim subjects of the empire chose to convert to Islam. The difference between being part of the ruling millet and being a member of any other millet was substantial. During the period of Ottoman rule in Cyprus the Muslims, as the ruling class, had no communal organisation of their own. Their religious courts and waqfs formed a part of the general administration. They were not represented in the government through a religious head. However, following the act of religious conversion, the convert immediately became part of the dominant Muslim millet.61 Yet, arguably, there were a large number of these converts who secretly remained

 15

Historical background 15 Christians. The so-​called Linovamvakoi62 passed through a crypto-​Christian stage to Islam during the period of Ottoman rule, and they remained Muslims even after the advent of British rule because the powerful Church of Cyprus did not accept them back.63 There are very conflicting accounts as to their population, not least because there was not even an official census during this period.64 According to Paraskevas Samaras, in 1860 the population of Linovamvakoi amounted to about 10,000 to 15,000 persons, out of a total of 32,000 Muslim Cypriots.65 In 1879 their numbers reached 20,000 out of 45,000 Muslim Cypriots.66 Additionally, the numerous reported instances of intermarriage between Muslims and Christians during Ottoman rule in Cyprus make the picture of ‘ethnic purity’ more complicated.67 According to Kyriakos Hadjioannou, a large portion of today’s Turkish Cypriot population is actually ‘Greek’, and passed through a crypto-​Christian stage to Islam.68 However, it must be noted that many scholars have been sceptical about the so-​called sect of Linovamvakoi,69 and their scepticism extends to the focus on Linovamvakoi having a decisive role in undermining the Muslim stake in the island. The current conflict has received many different readings in line with the official perspectives of the various political parties, and different politicians have encompassed different narratives of the history. For the Greek Cypriot leaders of the left, such as Ezekias Papaioannou and Vassos Lyssaridis, the cause of the conflict and the division between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was the ‘divide and rule’ policy operated by the imperialists and colonialists. On the other hand, Greek Cypriot leaders of the centre-​right of the political spectrum, such as Glafkos Clerides, focus on the responsibility of the Greek Cypriots, arguing that, because of mistakes by the Greek Cypriots and their inability to create friendly relations with the Turkish Cypriots, the conditions were created for intervention by foreign interests.70 What is clear is that the Greek Cypriot leaders agree on the role of the British factor as the catalyst in the creation of the conflict. Where the disagreement lies is in the role of the Greek Cypriots to prevent that divisive policy. For the Turkish Cypriot political leaders, there is also a difference of opinion on the roots of the conflict. The nationalist leaders of right-​wing forces, such as Rauf Denktash, argue that Greek Cypriots have the lion’s share of the responsibility for the conflict. They have demonised their compatriots, holding that it was a Greek Cypriot goal to exterminate all the Turkish Cypriots. They argue that the Greek Cypriots have always had in mind the ultimate goal of an ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the Muslim population on the island. Turkish Cypriot conspiracy theories target the EOKA fighters of the 1950s and the first president of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III. President Makarios is always implicated in the numerous conspiracy theories, and his demonised personality is portrayed in Turkish Cypriot folklore as evil, racist, opportunist and instrumentalist. At the other end of the political spectrum, the left does not have a strong voice in the political affairs of the occupied north Cyprus. The left-​wing parties, such as the Republican Turkish Party

16

16  Historical background (CTP), the New Cyprus Party (YKP) and the United Cyprus Party (BKP), offer more sober readings of the Cypriot conflict. Nevertheless, the voices of the political leaders are important in the formation of the picture of the ‘other’. The Turkish Cypriot leaders of the far right reinforce the division in their attempt to shape and maintain the ‘Cretan syndrome’ and the survival dilemma. They prefer to maintain their power by whipping up fears of survival. Nationalism, especially in the interwar period, has often been considered as the Achilles’ heel of the British Empire. National identities and nations were one thing, but the political movement of nationalism demanding political goals was the beginning of the end for the empire, at least in its traditional form.71 While national identity can be constituted with a wide variety of different elements –​and there are nations that have not been active in the sense of raising demands for political autonomy –​it was of paramount importance for the British to control the higher education of the Middle Eastern countries in order to control and shape an identity that would be compatible with the continuation of their foreign rule and intervention. Interpretations of the rise and development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism It is often said that Cyprus has produced more history than it can afford. The vast majority of the relevant literature on the period of British colonial rule in Cyprus focuses solely on the 1950s. There are very few historians and social scientists who have attempted to trace the roots of the conflict in the interwar period. The generally accepted periodisation of the history of Cyprus takes the period from the advent of British rule until the 1950s as a coherent period. The elusive nature of the relative tranquillity of the interwar period has resulted in only a few significant works focused on this period. Thus, the relevant literature fails to take on board the evolution, shifts and the turning points in the history of the Muslim community of Cyprus before the Second World War, all of which had a significant impact on the social and political history of the island. The lack of a sophisticated debate on identity and nationalism in the scholarly literature concerning Cyprus is a serious shortcoming. The vast majority of scholars appear to be confined by ‘black and white’ contrasts and simplifications, failing to grasp the complexity of the phenomenon. However, any focused historical study has to be located within the existing scholarship on the topic, within the historiography. The original contribution that this study aims to achieve needs to be located in the broad field of study in which the topic sits. Therefore, in this section I will briefly discuss the most significant debates and controversies in the field. The overwhelming bulk of the academic literature on Cyprus politics under British rule focuses solely on the 1950s, failing to draw appropriate attention to the developments and dynamics that took place earlier. This great unevenness is valid also for the depth of research on particular themes. While

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Historical background 17 nationalism tends to be portrayed as the source of the Cyprus issue, its historical development has not received the necessary attention in the literature. Furthermore, there is an astonishing lack of works attempting to draw links between the development of nationalisms and the policies of the imperialists. The current study aspires to fill this gap in the literature. Undoubtedly, there is not one history of Cyprus. There are at least two: one is written from the Greek perspective, the other from the Turkish viewpoint. There are two contrasting claims with regard to the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalism on the island. The scholarly literature has attributed the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism to two chief factors: British imperial policies and Greek Cypriot nationalist agitation. The first, argued by historians such as Robert Holland, William Mallinson and others, is that Turkish Cypriot nationalism in Cyprus was the result of the British ‘divide and rule’ policy of the 1950s.72 The operation of such a policy meant that certain ethnic groups were ‘trusted’ by the British more than others and thus given a preferential status within the colony.73 These accounts take it for granted that in the early 1950s there was already a national identity for the Muslim community of Cyprus. They tend to examine the hostile nationalisms in the 1950s but omit any analysis of the prior shape and emergence of national identity among the Muslim community of Cyprus. Vassilis Fouskas and Alex Tackie offer a fresh non-​partisan concise account of the Cyprus issue, emphasising the lasting impact of imperialism.74 The second, argued by Turkish Cypriot historians such as Şükrü Gürel75 and Fikret Halil Alasya,76 is that Turkish Cypriot nationalism developed as a reaction to Greek Cypriot nationalism that wanted to unite the island with mainland Greece. Gürel’s77 work, which is considered to be the standard history of Cyprus in Turkish, and Vehbi Serter’s78 book, which is the standard Turkish Cypriot school textbook on the history of Cyprus, present the history of Cyprus as nothing but part of Turkish history. Alasya’s history of Cyprus puts emphasis on the significance of the era of the Ottoman rule of the island, with the author using the terms ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turkish’ interchangeably. Alasya makes the case for the common racial ancestry of the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks. Mahmut İslamoğlu in his works aims to highlight the Turkish culture on the island, failing to appreciate the identity rift in the Muslim community of the island, which has had a cultural impact as well.79 These works consider the Turkish national identity to pre-​date the 1950s. The main pitfall and weakness of this interpretation of the rise of Turkish nationalism is that it fails to explain why, during the previous peaks of Greek nationalist agitation, the Muslim community on the island was not totally hostile to the Greek demands then and did not initiate any similar nationalist agitation. In particular, academic scholars following the first approach attribute Turkish nationalism to British imperialism, especially to the nationalism that developed in the 1950s. Michael Attalides argues that there was no Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus during the interwar period,80 saying that it developed only in the 1950s with the contribution of Britain, which involved

18

18  Historical background Turkey and organised the Turkish Cypriots politically. He also highlights the decisive role that the Enosis movement played, as it was perceived as an existential threat for the survival of the Turkish Cypriot community. According to the same author, Turkish Cypriot nationalism was an elite phenomenon. Its belated development was due to the late establishment of the Turkish state and the fact that, during the period of Ottoman rule on Cyprus, the millet system did not allow the Muslims to have autonomous political representation. Certainly, the perceived threat from the Enosis movement played its own decisive role.81 The eminent British historian Robert Holland focuses on the British imperial ‘divide and rule’ policy during the post-​war period.82 In the work of Yiorghos Leventis83 and Anastasia Yangou,84 who attempt to shift the focus to the period of the Second World War, the interwar period remains largely unexamined. In the same realm, Vangelis Coufoudakis argues that Turkish Cypriot political consciousness grew slowly through the first quarter of the twentieth century, and explains its development as a response to the dynamism of the Greek Cypriot Enosis movement and to the manipulative behavior of the British colonial authorities.85 During the interwar period Turkish Cypriots, perceiving Britain as their main protector, remained loyal to the Crown. On the other hand, they reacted against Greek Cypriots’ Enosis movement. In their turn, the British colonial authorities tried to use the Turkish Cypriot support in order to subdue the Enosis movement.86 Furthermore, there are historians who do not investigate the formation of the Turkish Cypriot identity at all, such as George Georghallides in his voluminous works on the interwar period.87 Georghallides’ works on the political and administrative history of the island in the interwar period are considered as the seminal studies on the 1920s and 1930s. However, Georghallides focuses on the British government and the Greek Cypriots, omitting analysis of the interesting developments that were taking place in the Muslim community at the same time. Joseph Joseph’s work on the ethnic conflict adheres to the argument that the British operated a ‘divide and rule’ policy that maintained and reinforced the ethnic, administrative and political separation inherited from the Ottoman period. Nevertheless, he does not examine the emergence of Turkish nationalism on the island and its relationship with British imperial rule. Instead, he focuses on the post-​independence period.88 The several histories of the island written by Greek or Greek Cypriot scholars are preoccupied only with the politics of the Greek Cypriots, neglecting scrutiny of the developments and politics of the largest minority of the island. Constantinos Spyridakis, in his brief historical account for the island, concentrates exclusively on Greek Cypriot affairs and does not even mention the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community during the colonial period.89 Doros Alastos, in his concise survey of the history of the island, pays no attention to the formation of Turkish Cypriot national identity, as he follows the Hellenic theme in the history of the Cypriot people.90

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Historical background 19 Paschales Kitromilides argues that the decisive factor for the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism was the development of Greek Cypriot nationalism. He stresses that how imperialism operated in practice was strongly connected with domestic conditions.91 However, Costas Kyrris points out the belated development of Turkish nationalism. He emphasises that, while many Greek Cypriots participated in the three consecutive Greco-​Turkish wars of 1897, 1912 and 1922, the Muslim Cypriots did not join the Ottoman army, unlike the many Greek Cypriots who participated on the Greek side.92 This to a certain extent could be indicative of the indifference of the Muslim Cypriot community towards the destiny of the Ottoman Empire. Members of the Muslim Cypriot community were portrayed as mostly preoccupied with their own destiny, and this is why they preferred to support the continuation of British rule in Cyprus.93 Many scholars presume that there are such things as apolitical differences, failing to discern the politics that shapes every conflict. For instance, Adamantia Pollis argues that British colonial rule institutionalised the ‘apolitical differences’ between Christians and Muslims as soon as British rule was established on the island.94 Pollis maintains that the British contributed to the emergence of both nationalisms of the island, leaving to one side the reality that Greek nationalism had been present on the island from as far back as the nineteenth century.95 Frank Tachau claims that Muslim Cypriots share an ethnic affinity with the Turkish population of Anatolia.96 Charles Beckingham, for his part, observes that a Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus developed during the 1930s.97 He attributes it to the success of Kemal Ataturk’s revolution in Turkey and the Greek Cypriot revolt of 1931.98 Even though the title of Ioannis Stefanides’ book on nationalism refers almost exclusively to this ideology, the author does not pay enough attention to the construction and development of the two strands of nationalism.99 In particular, he does not pursue the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, taking it as a given, even though he notes that a Turkish Cypriot movement existed only in the post-​war period, and that it manifested itself primarily in reaction to the Enosis movement. During the interwar period Turkish Cypriots had a strong Islamic trait and did not adopt Kemal Ataturk’s secular reforms. The authoritarian colonial administration after 1931 acted as a strict control on the development of Turkish and Greek nationalisms alike.100 Representatives of the second academic approach argue that Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged as a reaction to the Greek Cypriot agitation. However, the overwhelming majority of the works hold the premise that the roots of Turkish nationalism pre-​dated the First World War and had its adherents in Cyprus.101 They identify nationalism amongst the Muslim community of the island during the interwar period as a mass phenomenon. However, there are few academic works that investigate the formation of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Important rightist historians who have written about the history of the island, such as Şükrü Güler102 and Fikret Alasya,103 have no interest in analysing developments of the interwar period as they take it as a

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20  Historical background given that Turkish Cypriot nationalism already existed on the island. On the other side, eminent leftist writers, such as Ahmet An, blame nationalist ideas and British rule for the historical development of Cyprus issue but without paying enough attention to the formation of the Turkish Cypriot national identity.104 Meltem Samani argues that Turkish Cypriot nationalism was a by-​ product of developments in the late Ottoman Empire and the early days of the Republic of Turkey, blaming the British policy only for the separation of the two, already shaped, ethnic communities.105 Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin traces the turning point of the process of the Turkification of the Muslim community of Cyprus in the victory of the Turkish troops in the Greco-​Turkish war of 1922. Ateşin examines the process of transformation –​or, rather, metamorphosis, as he calls it –​in the collective identity of the Muslim community of the island.106 He focuses on the significant role played by education and the press. He highlights the impact of particular newspapers, namely Masum Millet, Ses and Halkin Sesi, on the development of this national identity.107 Although Ateşin’s work sheds some light on certain aspects of the role that education, media and certain individuals played, it completely fails to acknowledge the contribution of British rule throughout the process of transformation. Umut Uzer argues that the Muslim community of the island had always been self-​identified first with the Ottoman Empire and then with the Republic of Turkey. Uzer claims that the adoption of the Kemalist reforms by the Muslim community of the island took place in a purely voluntary manner.108 One of the most relevant works is James McHenry’s study, which investigates the interwar period and the relationship between British imperial rule and the Turkish Cypriot community.109 Nonetheless, the author does not emphasise the shaping of the national identity of Turkish Cypriots.110 The Turkish Cypriot historian Niyazi Kızılyürek examines the Cyprus issue as a problem of clashing nationalisms, critically attributing responsibilities to both nationalist movements of the island.111 But this author, who has written extensively on nationalism in Cyprus, fails to analyse in depth the interwar period and the relationship between British imperialism and the development of Turkish Cypriot nationalist identity. Sotos Ktoris fills an important gap in the Greek Cypriot historiography by analysing the evolution of bicommunal relations on the island.112 Authors whose studies refer to the history of Cyprus do not explore the emergence and the development of the nationalist ideas of Turkish Cypriots. Clement Dodd focuses on the post-​war period and, without providing any analysis of the interwar period, argues that Turkish Cypriot nationalism existed in the 1920s.113 Turhan Feyzioğlu and Necati Ertekun also take as a given the existence of the two distinct national communities for over four centuries, failing to trace the origins of the development of the two communities in their historical overview.114 Pierre Oberling argues that Ataturk’s secular ideas influenced young Muslim Cypriots very early from the 1920s, leading them to identify

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Historical background 21 themselves not just as Muslims but as Turks and spontaneously adopt many of Ataturk’s social reforms. The author claims that the discriminative British administration and the bigotry of the Greek Cypriots reinforced the Turkish ethnocentrism.115 Halil Salih examines the nationalisms on the island after the 1950s and stresses the intercommunal conflict. He makes no reference to the origins of the Turkish nationalist trends, taking them as pre-​existing even during the interwar period.116 H. D. Purcell and Metin Tamkoc view Cyprus as the scene of inevitable outright ethnic conflict where peaceful coexistence is impossible.117 They completely ignore the intercommunal cooperation and partnership between Turkish and Greek Cypriots during the interwar period. It is important to note that, since the emergence and development of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus, the words ‘Ottoman’ and ‘Turkish’ have tended to be used interchangeably, as synonyms, in the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot scholarly literature.118 It is indicative that, in the 1950s, Fazıl Küçük, the prominent Turkish Cypriot leader, referred to the historical period of Ottoman rule in Cyprus as Turkish rule.119 In the same realm we find Ertekun,120 who uses the term ‘Turkish’ for the Muslim community of Cyprus even before the First World War.121 Three unpublished PhD theses that touch upon similar issues that this book examines, from Altay Nevzat,122 Eleni Bouleti123 and Yannis Moutsis,124 are very welcome contributions for this underexplored period. All of them analyse longer periods that eventually lose their focus on a deep analysis. Nevzat argues that Turkish nationalism in Cyprus had its origins in the late nineteenth century. Bouleti’s study explores the process of the ‘nationalisation’ of the Muslim Cypriot community, though it neglects materials and sources in Turkish. Bouleti’s emphasis is on the collaboration of the traditionalist faction of the Muslim community with the British government in Cyprus. Moutsis’ work provides valuable insights into the role of the Turkish Cypriot press in the transformation of the collective identity of the Muslim Cypriot community of the island. Before concluding it is important to mention that leftist scholars from both sides are regularly ill-​served by the nationalist accounts of the ‘other side’. In fact, leftist anti-​nationalist accounts are often misused by nationalist scholars, who take only selectively the critiquing of their work towards the idea of nation and nationalism but not the whole concept, which is basically against the idea of nation and nationalism altogether. The nationalist scholars, in order to support their arguments, pick certain extracts from the work of the leftist non-​partisan accounts. Their work is prone to wild exaggerations and tends to cite only those parts of an author’s work that agree with their argument, while missing out whole realms of scholarship. Without wishing to omit the contribution of the above-​mentioned authors of both approaches, it is necessary to highlight that the majority of their works have as sources either English and Greek literature or English and Turkish. The present study aims to review all the seminal works written in all three languages: English, Turkish and Greek.

22

22  Historical background I argue that the emergence of Turkish Cypriot nationalism has to be examined mainly in relation to four factors, namely: the agitation of Greek Cypriot nationalism; the success of Ataturk’s revolution; the modernisation of Cypriot society; and the British ‘divide and rule’ policies. These four elements played an important role in the process of the transformation of the Muslim community of the island into a national one. This project examines all four, focusing especially on the fourth. First of all, as was shown above, the vast majority of the studies hold that Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged and developed mainly as a reaction to Greek Cypriot nationalism. However, as Percy Arnold has observed, Turkish Cypriots tended to see Greek Cypriot nationalism much like the weather:  it was always with them, and they were not challenged by it.125 Even so, many scholars have argued about a fear for survival dominating the members of the Turkish Cypriot community, because of the Greek Cypriot nationalist aspirations. They have even argued about the so-​called ‘Cretan syndrome’. The Cretan Revolt and union with Greece had a serious impact on the Turkish Cypriot community. But it was only in the 1950s that the nationalist discourse of the Turkish Cypriot community referred to the destiny of the Turkish Cretan community as the potential ‘worst-​case scenario’ in the case of union of Cyprus with Greece. However, there is no historical account126 that this syndrome was apparent in the Turkish Cypriot political discourse before the 1950s. It is important here to make it clear that this first element was not enough by itself to create a hostile national community on the island. As Edward Said correctly highlights in discussing the significance of ‘otherness’ in defining the self, it is important to examine the Greek Cypriot national identity. National identity as a chameleon takes the form of the environment that surrounds the self. The importance of the otherness in the shaping of the self is significant. However, one could argue that, although this is an important element, it is not the only crucial ingredient. If it was, then the Armenians, Maronites and Latinos –​the other communities of the island –​should have shaped a national identity at a similar pace. The second element that was crucial in the process of the shaping of the Turkish Cypriot national identity was undoubtedly the success of Ataturk’s reforms in Turkey. The influence of Mustafa Kemal’s secularisation process between the 1920s and the 1940s was the source of inspiration for the internal debate within the Muslim community of Cyprus, which eventually led to the shaping of the Turkish Cypriot nationalist movement in the 1950s. Ataturk’s abolishment of the Ottoman Caliphate in 1924 and the following reforms had a double impact on the Muslim community of Cyprus. To the emerging secular faction, Turkey became a model of modernisation and progress that was, seemingly, acceptable to Muslims. At the same time, concerns about the adoption of such measures fuelled religious propaganda in favour of Islamic tradition. However, the British saw the Kemalist trend in the community as a chance to counter the Greek Cypriot nationalist agitation by allowing

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Historical background 23 and actively encouraging its transformation from a religious to a national community. The third element, which will be examined thoroughly later in the book, was the modernisation of Cypriot society through the advent of Western colonial rule. According to the dominant ‘modernist’ approach in studies of nationalism, urbanisation and modernisation are very important preconditions that provide a fertile ground within which a national identity can be developed. After all, social movements such as nationalism are products of social change. Nonetheless, nationalism may be modern, but modernity is not nationalism.127 Lastly, the fourth element –​and, as illustrated by the emphasis of this book, the most important –​is the impact of British imperial policies. Britain’s imperial rule critically affected the transformation of the Muslim community of Cyprus from a religious community to a national community. If we look carefully at all the elements we can see that it was the British who set and controlled the ideological, social, economic and political context wherein Turkish Cypriot nationalism emerged. Therefore, we should not examine all these factors/​elements independently, but only in the political and social context established by British rule. Of course, in the social sciences there is never one single cause, one solitary factor, that is responsible for the result: there is no such thing as mono-​causality. However, we as historians should shed light on the most crucial factors that had a huge impact and effect on the phenomenon in question. Therefore, it is undoubtedly the case that the various factors to which scholars have attributed the development of a Turkish Cypriot national identity have indeed played an important role in the shaping of this identity among the Cypriot community. However, this study does not examine the development of the Turkish Cypriot national identity simply as a reaction to Greek Cypriot nationalist agitation, but analyses the context wherein this identity emerged. It will focus on the social, ideological and political context that was set by British rule. The existence of British rule on the island put the Muslim community there on a different developmental trajectory from what happened at the same time in Turkey. But, before we look at the ‘Cypriot contexts’, it is important also to review international developments in the eastern Mediterranean. The interwar years were of paramount importance for British hegemony in the area. The Italian threat began to be more apparent from the middle of the 1930s. The struggle for hegemony had serious repercussions for British policies on the island as well as for the British perception of the geostrategic importance of Cyprus.

Notes 1 Samuel P.  Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 1997). 2 It means ‘How happy is the one who says “I am a Turk” ’. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, from his famous speech Nutuk on 29 October 1933:  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk: Söylev (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 2009).

24

24  Historical background 3 The scholarship is vast on this. Halil Inalcik is one of the most prominent historians of the Empire. See Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–​1914 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1994). 4 Arnold J.  Toynbee, The World and the West (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1953), 20. 5 Ibid., 21. 6 For more on the power and knowledge nexus, see Michel Foucault’s work, which is highly influenced by Antonio Gramsci’s insights. 7 Eric Hobsbawm’s work on European history. Eric J.  Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, 1875–​1914 (London: Abacus, 2007). 8 Ilia Xypolia, “Racist Aspects of Modern Turkish Nationalism”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 18, no.  2 (2016):  111–​ 24, doi:  10.1080/​ 19448953.2016.1141580. 9 For more on Eurocentric constructions of history, see the first chapter of Frank’s eminent work: Andre Gunder Frank, Re-​Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley, CA:  University of California Press, 1998). See also Edward W.  Said, Orientalism, anniversary edn. (New York: Vintage Books, 2014); and Ilia Xypolia, “Eurocentrism and Orientalism”, in The Encyclopedia of Postcolonial Studies, eds. Sangeeta Ray and Henry Schwarz (Hoboken, NJ:  Wiley-​Blackwell, 2016), doi: 10.1111/​b.9781444334982.2016.x. 10 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 11 Rajeev Bhargava, Secularism and Its Critics (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999). 12 Syed Al-​Attas, Islam and Secularism (Kuala Lumpur: ISTAC, 1993), xv. 13 Sami Zubaida, “Islam and Secularization”, Asian Journal of Social Science 33, no. 3 (2005): 438–​48. 14 Steve Bruce, Religion and Modernization: Sociologists and Historians Debate the Secularization Thesis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 15 Max Weber, “Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions”, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. Hans H. Gerth and Charles Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946). 16 Charles Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 34. 17 Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism (New York: Macmillan, 1944). 18 Perry Anderson, “Kemalism”, London Review of Books 30, no. 17 (2008): 3–​12. 19 Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order? (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004). 20 For a critical review of these legal arguments, see Derya Bayir, Minorities and Nationalism in Turkish Law (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013). 21 Yusuf Akçura, Üç Tarz-​I Siyaset (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991). 22 François Georgeon, Aux Origins du Nationalisme Turc:  Yusuf Akcura (1876–​ 1935) (Paris: ADPF, 1980). 23 Erik J.  Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building:  From Ottoman Empire to Ataturk’s Turkey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 215. 24 Niyazi Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1959). 25 Ibid.

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Historical background 25 26 Georgeon, Aux Origins du Nationalisme Turc: Yusuf Akcura (1876–​1935). 27 Jacob M.  Landau, Pan-​ Turkism:  From Irredentism to Cooperation (London: Hurst, 1981). 28 Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization. Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp, 136–​37. 29 Landau, Pan-​Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, 28. 30 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From Ottoman Empire to Ataturk’s Turkey, 215. 31 Ibid. 32 For a comprehensive overview of the main theories of nationalism, see Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, 2nd edn. (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 33 Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd edn. (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1968), 2. 34 Bülent Gökay, “Book Review of Andrew Mango’s ‘From the Sultan to Ataturk’ ”, H-​ Net:  Humanities and Social Sciences Online, 2011, www.h-​net.org/​~diplo/​ essays/​PDF/​Haus-​Turkey.pdf. Andrew Mango has a series of books on Turkey and, in particular, on Ataturk. He is considered as a sympathiser to the Kemalist revolution. According to Gökay, Ataturk was the symbol of the reorientation of society towards the West, but in fact this was a very long process that can be dated back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. 35 Lord Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990). 36 Dionysis Tsirigotis, The Greek Strategy in Asia Minor, 1919–​1922 (in Greek) (Athens: Piotita, 2010). 37 It is important to note that there are a wide variety of names used in the academic literature for Mustafa Kemal Pasha. Born in Thessaloniki in the end of the nineteenth century, was named as Mustafa. ‘Pasha’ means ‘general’ in Turkish. By using only ‘pasha’, scholars are seeking to focus solely on his military dimension and not on the political man. After his reforms and the passing of the law for acquiring surnames, Mustafa Kemal took the name ‘Ataturk’, the ‘father of the Turks’. However, scholars who prefer not to call him ‘Ataturk’ are usually opponents of his reforms. This study will use both names interchangeably. 38 Marc David Baer, “An Enemy Old and New:  The Dönme, Anti-​Semitism, and Conspiracy Theories in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic”, Jewish Quarterly Review 103, no. 4 (2013): 523–​55, 528. 39 One can see only the big picture of the international system. We can observe today the shift of power towards the East. The historical materialist approach that this study encompasses allows us to see that first we observe the material change –​i.e. the power shift –​and then we witness the change in the paradigm of ideas. It is interesting to note Turkey’s indicative example. In the 1920s Ataturk chose to look towards the West, where the global power was, while today we can see the Islamic Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi  –​ AKP) reorientating the country’s priorities, reading carefully changes in the international system. The perceived differences between Western and Islamic political thought are illustrated by Ahmet Davutoglu, a former prime minister:  Ahmet Davutoglu, Alternative Paradigms:  Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory (Lanham, MD:  University Press of America, 1993).

26

26  Historical background 40 The literature on the Western decline increases in parallel with the ongoing financial crisis. See the book by Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, The Fall of the US Empire:  Global Fault-​Lines and the Shifting Imperial Order (London:  Pluto Press, 2012). 41 Perry Anderson, “ ‘The Divisions of Cyprus’ ”, London Review of Books 30, no. 8 (2008): 7–​16. 42 Atatürk, Nutuk: Söylev. 43 Zürcher, The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From Ottoman Empire to Ataturk’s Turkey, 5. 44 The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi –​CHP) is the Kemalist party that still exists today. 45 For the language reform, see the 2010 article of Ayşegül Aydingün and Ismail Aydingun, “The Role of Language in the Formation of Turkish National Identity and Turkishness”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 10, no. 3 (2004): 415–​32. The article is based on Geoffrey Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 46 Kinross, Ataturk: The Rebirth of a Nation, 384. 47 M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito, “Islam in Turkey: Retreat from the Secular Path?”, in Turkish Islam and the Secular State, eds. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L.  Esposito (Syracuse, NY:  Syracuse University Press, 2003), xvi. The Jacobin laicism refers to the control of religion and limitations on public expressions of religiosity. 48 Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization:  Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp. 49 What is very interesting in Gökalp’s sociological analysis is the fact that he highlights some sociological factors for the new driving forces of change. Nevertheless, we should remember that the economic elite in the Ottoman Empire always did consist of non-​Muslims millets such as the Greeks and the Armenians. The nature of the religion is a satisfactory explanation, as Islam in a way constrains any profitable activity and certainly does not motivate people for business and innovation. All these points were obvious to Gökalp as a sociologist. The new social forces that would emerge in the Turkish Republic should replace the Greek and Armenian economic elites. The Greek and the Armenian millets constituted the economic elites of society. The reasons why the Christian millets were able to control the economy of the Ottoman society are various. Mainly, it was because their religion permitted these millets to concentrate upon commercial activities and businesses. On the other hand, an equally important reason was their exclusion from politics and from military service. 50 For example, see the work of Spyros Sofos and Umut Ozkirimli, Tormented by History:  Nationalism in Greece and Turkey (London:  Hurst, 2008). On Turkish nationalism and its statist character, also see Gunay Goksu Ozdogan, “Turkish Nationalism Reconsidered:  The ‘Heaviness’ of Statist Patriotism in Nation-​ Building’ ”, in Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, eds. Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyurek and Umut Ozkirimli (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 47–​60. 51 Ayse Kadioglu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity”, Middle Eastern Studies 32, no. 2 (1996): 177–​93. 52 Anthony D.  Smith, National Identity (Reno, NV:  University of Nevada Press, 1993), 21.

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Historical background 27 53 In order to stress my point here I will cite an official publication from 1971 that emphasises the existence of the two distinct ethnic entities. ‘There has never been a “Cypriot Nation”, and the island has never come under the rule of Greece’: Cyprus Turkish Information Centre, The Cyprus Problem: A Brief Review (Nicosia: Cyprus Turkish Information Centre, 1971), 5. 54 Lawrence Durrell, Bitter Lemons of Cyprus (London: Faber & Faber, 1957). 55 In Turkish, millet means ‘religious community’. The Ottoman Empire used the millet system, which granted minority religions the freedom to establish their own sets of laws and system of taxation. Under the millet system, non-​Muslims were granted autonomy to manage their own personal and religious affairs so long as they swore loyalty to the empire. 56 George Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, The Ottoman Province, the British Colony, 1571–​1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952). 57 Adamantia Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus”, Comparative Politics 5, no. 4 (1973): 575–​99. 58 Ibid., 575. 59 Charles F.  Beckingham, “The Turks of Cyprus”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 87, no. 2 (1957): 165–​74. 60 The burden of the taxes for the non-​Muslim millets could be onerous, and therefore the conversion was a very appealing option. Panagıotıs Samaras, The Greek Origins of the Turkish Cypriots: A Historical Study (in Greek) (Athens: Bouloukos & Logothetis, 1987). 61 R. L. N. Michel, “Muslim-​Christian Sect in Cyprus”, Nineteenth Century Journal 63, May (1908): 751–​62. 62 Linovamvakoi comes from the words ‘linen’ and ‘cotton’, meaning that those people were different in appearance (Muslims) from what they really were (Christians). 63 Haşmet M. Gurkan, Bir Zamanlar Kibris’ta (Nicosia: Cyrep Yayinlari, 1986), 39. 64 Emile Y. Kolodny, “Une Communauté Insulaire en Méditerranée Orientale : Les Turcs de Chypre”, Revue de Géographie de Lyon 46, no. 1 (1971): 1–​56. 65 Samaras, The Greek Origins of the Turkish Cypriots: A Historical Study, 58. 66 Ibid. 67 Ilia Xypolia, “Cypriot Muslims among Ottomans, Turks and Two World Wars”, Bogazici Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies 25, no. 2 (2011): 109–​20, 110. 68 Kyriakos Hadjioannou, The Origins of the Turkish Cypriots (in Greek) (Limassol: Hadjioannou, 1976), 36. 69 See Beckingham, “The Turks of Cyprus”, 173; and Costas M.  Constantinou, “Aporias of Identity Bicommunalism, Hybridity and the ‘Cyprus Problem’ ”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 42, no. 3 (2007): 247–​70, doi: 10.1177/​0010836707079931. 70 Glafkos Clerides, No Cyprus: My Deposit (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 1989). 71 It is worth noting here that, after the decline of the traditional Western empires, the advent of the ‘American Century’ marked a new phase of imperialism, the new imperialism; for more details, see Vassilis Fouskas and Bülent Gökay, The New American Imperialism:  Bush’s War on Terror and Blood for Oil (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). Now the colonies, the mandate states and the protectorates take a different form and shape, but again we see similar goals and interests. 72 William Mallinson, Cyprus: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005).

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28  Historical background 73 Nadav Morag, “Cyprus and the Clash of Greek and Turkish Nationalisms”, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 10, no. 4 (2004): 595–​624. 74 Vassilis Fouskas and Alex O.  Tackie, Cyprus:  The Post-​Imperial Constitution (London: Pluto Press, 2009). 75 Şükrü Sina Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878–​ 1960) :  Kolonyalizm, Ulasçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınlar, 1984). 76 Fikret Halil Alasya, Kibris Tarihi ve Kibrista Turk Eserleri (Ankara:  Turk Kulturunu Arastirma Enstitusu, 1964). 77 Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878–​1960) : Kolonyalizm, Ulasçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika. 78 Vehbi Zeki Serter, Kibris Tarihi (Nicosia: Kema Offset, 1999). 79 Mahmut İslamoğlu, Kıbrıs Türk Folkloru (Ankara: Ürün Yayınları, 2004). 80 Michael A Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1979). 81 Ibid. 82 Robert Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954–​1959 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 83 Yiorghos Leventis, Cyprus:  The Struggle for Self-​ Determination in the 1940s (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002). 84 Anastasia Yiangou, Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010). 85 Van Coufoudakis, Cyprus:  A  Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006). 86 Ibid. 87 George S. Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1985). 88 Joseph S.  Joseph, Cyprus:  Ethnic Conflict and International Politics:  From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union, 2nd edn. (London: Macmillan, 1997). 89 Constantinos Spyridakis, A Brief History of Cyprus (Nicosia:  Publication Department of Greek Communal Chamber, 1964). 90 Doros Alastos, Cyprus in History (London: Zeno, 1976). 91 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, “From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus”, in Cyprus Reviewed:  The Result of a Seminar on the Cyprus Problem Held in June 3–​6 1976 by the Jus Cypri Association and the Coordinating Committee of Scientific and Cultural Organisations, ed. M.  A. Attalides (Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, 1977), 35–​70. 92 Costas P. Kyrris, Peaceful Coexistence in Cyprus under British Rule (1878–​1959) and after Independence: An Outline (Nicosia: Public Information Office, 1977). 93 Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus”. 94 Petros Papapolyviou highlights the importance of Cypriots’ support to Greece. He considers it vital for the development of the Enosis movement. Petros Papapolyviou, Cyprus and the Balkan Wars:  Contribution to the History of Cypriot Volunteerism (in Greek) (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1997). 95 Ibid., 575. 96 Frank Tachau, “The Face of Turkish Nationalism as Reflected in the Cyprus Dispute”, Middle East Journal 13, no. 3 (1959): 262–​72. 97 Charles F.  Beckingham, “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus”, Die Welt Des Islam 5, nos. 1/​2 (1957): 65–​83, 65. 98 Ibid.

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Historical background 29 99 Ioannis Stefanides, Isle of Discord: Nationalism, Imperialism and the Making of the Cyprus Problem (London: Hurst, 1999). 100 Ibid. 101 Altay Nevzat, Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave (Oulu, Finland: Oulu University Press, 2005). 102 Gürel, Kıbrıs Tarihi (1878–​ 1960) :  Kolonyalizm, Ulasçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika. 103 Alasya, Kibris Tarihi ve Kibrista Turk Eserleri. 104 Ahmet An, Kibris Turk Liderliginin Olusmasi (1900–​ 1942) (Nicosia:  Galeri Kultur Yayinlari, 1997). 105 Meltem O. Samani, Kibris Turk Milliyetciligi (Istanbul: Baski, 1999). 106 Hüseyin Mehmet Ateşin, Kibrisli “Musluman”larin “Turk”lesme ve “Laik”lesme Seruveni (1925–​1975) (Istanbul: Marifet Yayinlari, 1999). 107 Ibid., 44–​62. 108 Umut Uzer, Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy: The Kemalist Influence in Cyprus and the Caucasus (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011), 110. 109 James A. J. McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919–​1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community (New York: Garland Publishing, 1987). 110 Ibid. 111 Niyazi Kızılyürek, Cyprus:  The Deadlock of Nationalisms (in Greek) (Athens: Mavri Lista, 1999). 112 Sotos Ktoris, Turkish Cypriots: From Marginalisation to Partnership, 1923–​1960 (in Greek) (Athens: Papazisis, 2013). 113 Clement H. Dodd, The Cyprus Imbroglio (Cambridge: Eothen Press, 1998). 114 Turhan Feyzioğlu and Necati M.  Ertenkun, The Crux of the Cyprus Question (Nicosia: Rustem, 1987). 115 His argument is not supported by any primary or secondary source. Pierre Oberling, a professor of history in the City University of New York, has written extensively on Cyprus and has been located in the pro-​Turkish point of view in the relevant literature. Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais:  The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). 116 Halil Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus:  The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1978). 117 H. D. Purcell, Cyprus (London: Ernest Benn, 1969); Metin Tamkoc, The Turkish Cypriot State (London: Rustem, 1988). 118 As we will see below, history is often used as a political and cultural tool. The British policy of allowing the separate boards of education to control and determine the curriculum resulted in a distortion of ‘history’. When the subject of history becomes entwined with politics we often witness an abuse of history. 119 Fazil Kucuk, The Voice of Cyprus: Who Is at Fault? (Nicosia: TRNC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Public Relations Department, 1990). 120 Necati Ertekun’s work has neither bibliography nor references. His work is located within the Turkish Cypriot biased accounts. 121 Necati M. Ertekun, The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Nicosia: Rustem, 1984), chap. 1. 122 Nevzat, Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave.

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30  Historical background 123 Eleni Bouleti, “The British Policy regarding the Turkish Cypriot Community, 1878–​1950” (in Greek) (Panteion University, 2008). 124 Ioannis Moutsis, “The Turkish Cypriots (1918–​ 1931):  From a Religious Community to an Ethnic Minority” (SOAS, University of London, 2014). 125 Percy Arnold, Cyprus Challenge: A Colonial Island and Its Aspirations (London: Hogarth Press, 1956), 153. 126 In the 1950s the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash referred to this syndrome in his attempt to awake the nationalist sentiment of his compatriots. 127 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd edn. (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 1993).

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3  International context

Introduction By examining the international context, I  aim to illustrate the interplay of events in Cyprus with those that were taking place at the same time in the former Ottoman space and the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, by drawing upon the international events that were taking place during the period in question, I  seek to shed light on the gradual change in the geostrategic importance of Cyprus, which had a direct impact on colonial rule and the administration’s policies on the island. The holistic approach that this study encompasses dictates that we cannot focus solely on certain elements while omitting to understand the totality and the whole picture. Today Cyprus is considered as the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean.1 ‘He who controls Cyprus, rules the eastern Mediterranean,’ writes George Hill, highlighting the historical attraction of the island to the regional powers. However, Cyprus’ geostrategic importance has evolved over time in response to developments in the wider geopolitical context of the eastern Mediterranean. The main research question refers to the impact of imperial policies on the development of a militant national identity. Britain, with its empire in decline in the interwar period, found itself in the position of having to reconsider many of its imperial priorities. The reality of the coming of a new world order in the aftermath of the First World War had serious repercussions for the perceived strategic importance of Cyprus in the vital eastern Mediterranean area for the declining British Empire. The eastern Mediterranean had undoubtedly been a vital zone for British imperial interests ever since the country’s emergence as a global power.2 The Mediterranean was not only a route for the British but a region of critical importance for the empire.3 In this chapter I  will examine the following three points. First, the evolution of the strategic importance of the island in the eyes of the British Foreign Office. In order to give an accurate picture we should examine British perceptions of the challenge the threatening Italian ambitions in the eastern Mediterranean region posed to the British Empire. The growing Italian imperial aspirations in the so-​called Mare Nostrum had alerted the British Foreign

32

32  International context Office, which consequently gave additional attention to Italian influence on the island. The Italian Empire, having colonised the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean Sea, was gradually making its presence in Cyprus more vociferous, with the Italian consul seen as persona non grata for the British government in Cyprus. Therefore, it was difficult in view of the actual  –​or, at least, perceived –​threat of Italian influence to allow Cypriots the right to self-​ determine. On the contrary, under these new circumstances Cyprus became a significant geostrategic possession in the region as a whole. The second factor is the special evolving circumstances in Turkey. The events that took place in Turkey at that time and the major transformation in the political and cultural context of the newly founded Republic impinged on events in Cyprus. We shall define the Kemalist revolution as an imposed top-​ down revolution, an enforced ‘Westernising’ process that was not endorsed by the bulk of the population. In particular, by examining Turkey closely we shall highlight two important elements. Firstly, the major transformation in the politics and society of Turkey that was taking place will be revealed. Secondly, we will consider British perceptions of the groundbreaking events that were taking place in Turkey. With the new developments in Turkey, Britain reconsidered its imperial policies in Cyprus. Third, the evolving geostrategic significance of Cyprus for the British Empire had a direct impact on the policies of the British administration. Cyprus was, in relative terms, one of the safer and more stable places among the British-​influenced territories of the Levant. The planning of the project to establish a British university in the eastern Mediterranean reveals the relatively stable political situation in the island, as well as the great significance that Cyprus had gradually acquired after the turmoil in Palestine in the 1930s and the fluidity in the political landscape of Egypt. For the purposes of the cultural propaganda campaign that the British Foreign Office was undertaking in the eastern Mediterranean, the project of setting up a British university was designed by the Foreign Office. Cyprus’ geostrategic significance was highlighted by the developments of instability and conflict in the other British areas of influence in the region.

British Empire and British administration In the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth there was a commonly used expression that ‘the sun never sets on the empire’, stressing Britain’s extensive global imperial possessions. For over three centuries the British had ruled the seas, resulting in an empire that covered two-​fifths of the world’s territory and more than 450 million people. Harford Mackinder lays out the twofold meaning of the empire for Britain at the peak of its power: on the one hand, the federation of British commonwealths; and, on the other, the maintenance of British rule among alien races. Mackinder also underlines how economic benefits were among the imperial attributes. The essential factor was the maintenance of strong naval power.4

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International context 33 One of the key notions in this study is the term ‘imperialism’. But, before proceeding any further, it would be useful to discuss the term itself; it is important to provide some background for how imperialism as a concept has been introduced into academic discourse –​among others –​in the twentieth and twenty-​first centuries. Imperialism has been defined in many ways by different scholars. The word is commonly misapplied. But it was only in 1902, when John Hobson published his magnum opus, that the term first appeared academically. The significance of the work of the English liberal economist lies not only in the fact that he introduced the new term but that his groundbreaking text has been a major source of influence for the theorists of imperialism of the twentieth century. The theories of Nikolai Bukharin, Vladimir Lenin and Hannah Arendt were all shaped by Hobson’s seminal work.5 Lenin perceived imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism. A recently published collection by Richard Day and Daniel Gaido attempts to trace the root of the modern notion of imperialism as it appears in Lenin’s work in the Second International, which took place in the late nineteenth century.6 John Hobson’s, Rosa Luxemburg’s and Vladimir Lenin’s classic works on imperialism highlight the economic factors that led to imperialism being portrayed purely as a product of capitalism.7 They all conceive imperialism in terms of capitalistic development. They consider imperialism as characteristic of a certain aspect and phase of the capitalistic system. Their explanation of imperialism refers only to economic analysis. According to Marxian scholars, imperialism as a political phenomenon should be understood as a direct reflection of economic forces. Within the same realm, liberal scholars such as Hobson adopt an economic explanation of imperialism, though they stress the maladjustments in the capitalist system at a global level. The commercial and financial foundations of imperialism are important to note in order to sketch the motives for building the British Empire. Economic historians Peter Cain and Antony Hopkins suggest that the main drive behind the imperial expansion was not geopolitical but financial.8 Cain and Hopkins, coining the term and the concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, stress the significance of the financial sector of the British economy and conclude that it was the principal motive driving imperialism. Building upon these economic analyses, Joseph Schumpeter’s work aims to offer a historical and sociological analysis. Schumpeter’s social analysis lays emphasis on imperialist agents:  he attempts to connect the ancient empires to the atavism of the imperialism of modern capitalist civilisation.9 Schumpeter defines imperialism as the object-​less disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion.10 Schumpeter disagrees with Lenin’s view because imperialism existed in the pre-​capitalist era. In Schumpeter’s theorisation of imperialism, all political units in history share the aspiration of territorial expansion. However, Schumpeter’s view is problematic, because he attributes imperialism to irrational elites. His argument runs in parallel with optimistic liberal scholars, who view economic interdependence, trade and globalisation as leading to a Kantian perceptual peace. However,

34

34  International context Schumpeter’s view of imperialism focuses only on military expansion, leaving out economic expansion. This omission has provided a point of critique for Marxist and Marxian researchers. Scholars such as Giovanni Arrighi and Immanuel Wallerstein, working on dependency theory and world system theory, stress the significance of economic imperialism.11 Hans Morgenthau, a realist scholar of international relations, considers that the terms ‘imperialism’ and ‘imperialistic’ are indiscriminately applied to any foreign policy, regardless of its actual character, if it concerns anything happening in another country with which it disagrees.12 Basing his conceptualisation on the notion of the balance of power, Morgenthau defines imperialism as a national foreign policy that aims to acquire more power by reversing the status quo. Edward Said defines imperialism as ‘the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory’. However, Said makes a sharp distinction with the term “colonialism”.13 Said understands colonialism as a consequence of imperialism, involving the implanting of settlements on distant territory. Said highlights the fact that, even when colonialism has officially ended, imperialism remains in place through the general cultural sphere and a range of political, ideological, economic and social practices.14 Michael Doyle, a prominent scholar of imperialism, considers empire to be ‘a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society’.15 Doyle argues that an empire can be achieved ‘by force, by political collaboration, by economic, social, or cultural dependence’.16 For Doyle, imperialism is simply the ‘process or policy of establishing or maintaining an empire’.17 Recently a growing amount of scholarly literature has been produced holding a more celebratory view of benevolent empires. These accounts tend to neglect imperialism in their recounting of a moral and liberal British Empire.18 However, the main argument of this study is that the British Empire did indeed apply imperial policies in Cyprus during the period in question. In the following chapters we shall attempt to explore the time-​hallowed and classic divide et impera strategy, which every empire has employed in its specific own way. Niccolò Machiavelli, in his magnum opus The Prince, is essentially spelling out the strategy of dividing and ruling. In particular, Machiavelli argues on the essence of fostering hostility among the population.19 The Machiavellian method to ‘divide and rule’ the population through fostering hostility among the members of the two communities was operated in Cyprus. However, as we shall explore later in this study, the British Empire was not a monolithic entity, and its ‘grand strategy’ always followed the fundamental principle of adaptability. According to the Chinese pioneer strategist Sun Tzu, a vital principle for a successful strategy is its adaptability to the circumstances.20 Sun Tzu considers the art of studying circumstances as the most crucial for the final outcome. The variety of

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International context 35 circumstances is infinite, and the methods always have to be regulated by consideration of these circumstances. As we shall analyse in depth below, the British adjusted their methods in 1930s. It was an intrinsic part of their reading of the new circumstances:  they availed themselves of the opportunity provided by the new circumstances. Sun Tzu argues that the essence is an adjustable, convertible and flexible strategy. The Chinese scholar considers a rigid and stiff strategy as a catastrophe. Planning along strategic lines –​i.e. modifying in the light of new circumstances –​is key to a successful outcome. Accordingly, when the circumstances altered, the British modified their plans. By taking as their long-​awaited pretext the Greek Cypriot awakening in 1931, they imposed a dictatorship. As has been stated above, this study follows a historical materialist approach. Empire was based first and foremost on economic power. The root of imperialism is conquest by the establishment of economic power, and it is sustained through the installation of sympathetic collaborative governments. It is therefore an imperative to convince the subject colonies and people that it is beneficial for them to support the maintenance of imperial rule. After all, the compliance of such subjects is a conditio sine qua non.21 What this book highlights is the fact that the divide and rule policy was implemented in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions simultaneously.22 The British government maintained the communal division of the local population along the religious lines drawn by the previous imperial rulers, the Ottomans. However, the horizontal division refers to class. The local elites, or a part of the local ruling elites, should collaborate with the imperial government. I use the terms ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ here in connection with divisions to refer to the class and religious dimensions, respectively. Horizontal and vertical division is always the case in divide and rule policies. Mere communal division is not enough. The close interconnectedness of British imperial interests with the local elites’ interests illustrates the harmony of their interests. In short, in order to maintain their rule on the island the British needed ‘appropriators of the perpetrators’.23 What I aim to illustrate in the following chapters is that, in the case of Cyprus, religious divisions were not enough. Even in non-​industrial agrarian societies there is always the threat of solidarity across class lines.

Strategic importance of Cyprus The argument presented here is that, after the First World War, Cyprus’ geostrategic significance transformed the British strategy on Cyprus from a colonial to an imperial one. Colonialism refers to settlement on a distant territory, whereas imperialism, in Edward Said’s view, is domination and subordination organised with an imperial centre and a periphery.24 This is why the infamous imperial ‘divide and rule’ policy was implemented. The main argument here is supported by official documents retrieved from the United Kingdom’s National Archives at Kew.

36

36  International context Colonial historians engaged solely with the British Empire tend to focus on India and Africa, putting the Mediterranean in second place. However, the Mediterranean and the so-​called British ‘white colonies’ were much more vital for the British Empire than merely a passage on the way to India.25 Today Britain holds two military bases on the island:  Dekheleia and Akrotiri are places under British sovereignty.26 But it is what these bases mean to Britain today that is the real question. Scholars put forward the analogy of the unsinkable airplane carrier (using the oft-​quoted maxim from US President Eisenhower) in the eastern Mediterranean, while others focus on the intelligence aspect, as Cyprus has for many decades provided the unofficial ‘headquarters of British and French intelligence in the Middle East’.27 Also, British war veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq are offered a one-​week trip to Cyprus for unlimited use of alcohol and tobacco. It is not hard to imagine how military personnel who have been deprived of this material for long periods will perceive Cyprus: as the land for party and intoxication. But Cyprus has vastly more to offer Britain than simply that. Another oft-​quoted maxim, that ‘whoever wants to be the ruler of the eastern Mediterranean has to conquer Cyprus’, has been used widely to illustrate the geopolitical importance of Cyprus over the centuries.28 The significance of the island to the British Empire evolved during the whole period of British rule in Cyprus, but not least throughout the period in question. The geostrategic importance of Cyprus germinated after the First World War. Scholars such as Andrekos Varnava argue that Cyprus was not important at all for the empire until the advent of the Great War.29 According to this argument, the three unsuccessful offers of Cyprus to Greece can be explained.30 There has been internal disagreement within the British government regarding the status of Cyprus and the offers to Greece. One of the most elaborated discussions, in the Cabinet of the then British prime minister, Herbert Asquith, took place in 1915. Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in favour of giving Cyprus to Greece; he clashed with Lord Kitchener, then Secretary of State for War, who emphasised the imperative of retaining control over Cyprus in light of the Allied campaign in Hatay.31 The interwar period is usually considered as a pause in the history between the two periods of bloodshed, or, in Giovanni Arrighi’s words, a 30-​year war for the British succession.32 Many world system theorists, such as Samir Amir, consider the period from the beginning of the First World War to the end of the Second as a distinct phase in the imperialist stage, during which a conflict between the cores took place.33 The dominant position of Britain was past and new emerging competing cores were aiming at a hegemonic position. Taking its inspiration from Immanuel Wallenstein’s world system theory, that ever since the sixteenth century the development of a single capitalist economy has been the driving force of social change, this study holds that the interconnectedness and interdependences of the subsystems compels us always to look for the wider picture, rather than focusing on developments that took place purely in one country.

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International context 37 The future of Cyprus was never going to be determined only by developments in Britain and in Cyprus but by global and regional dynamics. According to a Foreign Office memorandum, at the beginning of the First World War it was understood that the future of Cyprus would have to be reconsidered when peace was made in connection with the whole Eastern settlement.34 While the world slowly passed into the global age of oil, the role of petroleum and its products had sparked a debate within the British government. The recent discoveries of oil fields in the Persian (or Arabian) Gulf had an impact on the geostrategic location of Cyprus and its importance to the British Empire. It is an indicative 1925 FO memorandum.35 It shows that, even miles away from Cypriot territory, the discovery of oil in Iran in 1908 gradually began to shift imperial priorities. It is well known that Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty in the First World War, argued for change in imperial military technology, for the replacement of coal with oil. The inter-​imperial rivalry during the First World War and its aftermath portrays a complex picture, in which access to sources of oil began to acquiring the status of a significant strategic goal. The great powers of the period, Britain, France and Italy, were constantly concerned with the status of Cyprus. It is worth noting that, in the secret Sykes–​Picot Agreement of 1916, Britain inter alia agreed that it would ‘at no time enter into negotiations for the cession of Cyprus to any third power without the previous consent of the French government’.36 This arrangement was the result of France’s interest in Syria and south-​eastern Asia Minor. The French government secured the insertion of the arrangement because Cyprus had a strategic relationship with these areas.37 The end of the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence constituted a major turning point for the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean region. The so-​called ‘sick man of Europe’, the Ottoman Empire, collapsed and was succeeded by the secular Republic of Turkey. From the beginning of the Great War till the signing of the Lausanne treaty, all the great powers in the region altered their policies and alliances. Since the defeat at Vienna in the late seventeenth century the Ottoman Empire had been in a gradual but stable decline. The nineteenth-​century Russian–​Ottoman rivalry opened up again the ‘Eastern question’ for the British Empire.38 The Russo-​ Turkish War of 1878 was like an alarm bell to the British Empire. Russian influence in the Balkans was the most crucial element. Geopolitics dictates that Britain, as a maritime power (and now the United States), should never let a land power to reach warm seas.39 The 1878 acquisition of Cyprus by the British Empire was influenced mainly by two factors. Firstly, there was British policy regarding the declining Ottoman Empire. Secondly, and more importantly, there was the desire to strengthen the naval and military position of the British Empire in the Levant.40 The shift of the balance of power and the consequent change in the foreign policy and goals of the major powers in the region is illustrated in British War Office documents. In the British War Office’s special report from 1923 entitled

38

38  International context ‘A History of the Nationalist Movement, 1918–​1922’ the conclusion was that, during these four years, ‘all the accepted policies of the Great Powers of Europe towards Turkey had been completely reversed’.41 The report goes on to describe how ‘for over 100 years Russia has attempted to obtain control of the [Turkish] Straits by the destruction of Turkey’.42 The report highlights the change in British policy towards Turkey. While, during those 100 years, Britain had supported Turkey in order to keep the Straits closed, in the 1918–​ 1922 period Britain adopted the ‘role of Russia and attempted to destroy Turkey in order to secure control of the Straits; whilst Chicherin [the Soviet foreign secretary] has adopted the role of Disraeli by keeping “the sick man of Europe” alive, and by demanding the closing of the Straits’.43 The Suez Canal –​‘the Indian Highway’44 –​shaped and constantly changed the geostrategic importance of Cyprus. From the beginning of its establishment till the nationalisation of control of the canal, perceptions of geostrategic importance on the part of the British Foreign Office were constantly shaped by events in Egypt. The 1923 confidential memorandum prepared for the Foreign Office revealed this interconnection. Perhaps even more important was the 1882 invasion of Britain in Egypt, resulting in a British occupation and virtual British government of Egypt. By this means the British Empire secured a military and naval base in the Levant and acquired control over the Suez Canal. That ‘necessarily made Cyprus much less important than it otherwise would have been. The military effect and diplomatic complication resulting from the occupation of Egypt absorbed the whole available energy, and inevitably Cyprus and Asia Minor were neglected.’45 Until the official annexation of the island, no steps were taken to develop Cyprus as either a naval or military base. It was found not suitable as a sanatorium for troops. While it seemed possible that the harbour of Famagusta might have been suitable as a naval base, this would certainly have required a very large expenditure of money. It would obviously have been difficult to justify this expenditure on an island that was not under British sovereignty. In fact, therefore, little was done.46 After the end of the First World War, and with the 1922 Anglo-​Egyptian agreement, Britain gradually lost control over Egypt. Under the terms of the Anglo-​Egyptian Treaty of 1936, Britain was required to withdraw all its troops from Egypt, except those necessary to protect the Suez Canal and its surroundings, numbering 10,000 troops plus auxiliary personnel. This made Cyprus even more important for the British Empire. It was impossible then to abandon the last British possession in the region.47 The military expediency of the island contributed also to the rising importance of Cyprus for the British Empire. At the end of the First World War the various diplomatic discussions connected with the general settlement of the eastern Mediterranean resulted in a strengthening of the British position with regard to Cyprus. In a 1919 memorandum, Admiral de Robeck, the commander-​in-​chief of British naval forces in the Mediterranean at that time, argued the importance for Britain of retaining the island. Admiral de

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International context 39 Robeck stressed the naval advantages derived from the possession of Cyprus and its importance as an air base. This evolution in warfare strengthened the consideration that had led to the acquisition of the island at the end of the nineteenth century.48 According to Admiral de Robeck, Cyprus formed an important strategic position on the air route to India and Mesopotamia, and in addition provided a base from which aeroplanes could examine the whole coastline –​territory in which unsettled conditions might be expected to exist for a considerable time.49 At the end of the 1930 the Colonial Office discussed the possibility of permanently stationing a Royal Air Force squadron in Cyprus.50 The secret memorandum’s arguments in support of the proposal are indicative also for the significance that Cyprus had acquired for the British.51 Cyprus, which at that time was the only British possession in the eastern Mediterranean, along with its healthy climate and low cost of living, was ‘the obvious “hill station” for the Middle East command when British had to move to the comparative discomfort of the Canal Zone’.52 In the late 1930s, as the potential for a second world war became greater, Britain’s Foreign Office was planning the establishment of more military bases in key geostrategic areas. There are many reports and plans prepared by the Committee of Imperial Defence to establish Cyprus as a military base in the eastern Mediterranean in the late 1930s.53 Eventually, the further development of the already established military facilities in Egypt was considered as the most preferable choice, rather than building a new military base in Cyprus.54 However, the Colonial Office wanted to take into account the evolving situation in the Mediterranean and the Middle East before making a definite decision regarding British defence policy vis-​à-​vis Italy.55 The project of the British university in the eastern Mediterranean The strategic importance of the island is also indicated in the project for establishing a British university in the eastern Mediterranean.56 This section draws upon primary sources to explore the British strategic planning to set up a British university in Cyprus.57 British possessions in the eastern Mediterranean were at stake in the aftermath of the First World War. Since the early 1930s the British Foreign Office had been eagerly planning the establishment of a university in the Near East region in order to ‘shape the local elites favourably familiar with the culture and values of the West’. The university was considered as the most important and effective channel through which these propagandist ideas could be disseminated in the local intellectual elite. The project was not realised due to the eventual outbreak of the Second World War. However, the significance of this incomplete project lies in its demonstration of British grand strategy in the eastern Mediterranean during the interwar period. While designing the project, the British Foreign Office had to decide upon possible sites for establishing the educational institution. In doing so the Foreign Office took

40

40  International context into consideration the social and political developments that were taking place in every society in the region. They reached the conclusion that, out of Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine and Cyprus, Cyprus was the most suitable option. The project Throughout the 1930s the Foreign Office collaborated closely with the Colonial Office in planning the establishment of a British university in the eastern Mediterranean.58 Although it never came to fruition, it is interesting to explore the strategic design of the university, for two reasons. First, it highlights the importance that this project of cultural propaganda had in the British grand strategy for the area. It is apparent in official documents that the Foreign Office perceived that the development, shape and formation of a national identity take place mainly through education. Thus, by controlling higher education, the British Empire would have been able to control the ideas and values that the new generation of the local intellectual elite would encompass, and then circulate and diffuse these values to the masses. The second reason is the insight it gives into British perceptions of the social and political environment of the region. The Foreign Office, in a series of reports, indicated that British strategy in the eastern Mediterranean had too narrow a focus of the British outlook on politics and commerce, neglecting to stress the importance of cultural power.59 The FO reports disclose the two main aims of the project. The first was to control the spread of nationalist ideas and make the local elites familiar with Western values. The second reason was to combat and counter-​attack Italian propaganda.60 In other words, the imperative was to place British cultural propaganda in this region, in any event, upon a positive rather a negative basis. The basic parameters under consideration were, essentially, three: the site of the proposed university; the scope and the aim of the project; and the expenditure from public funds. Here we focus on the locations that were considered as possible places to host the university. The strategic plan can be paralleled with the economic SWOT analysis: a systemic calculation of the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats was carried out for every single potential site. The final decision for the establishment of the university would have been made on the basis of the most updated information and recommendations by the relevant embassies. Therefore, the Colonial Office would obtain detailed information from Palestine and Cyprus, while the Foreign Office would collect information about the universities at Athens, Beirut, Cairo and Istanbul. Then, based on this information, the British Council would prepare a detailed scheme. Subsequently, the Treasury would be informed at the same time that the proposal was being worked out in conjunction with the Council, and a request for financial assistance would be submitted to the Treasury.

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International context 41 A 1936 memorandum by Kenneth Johnstone of the Foreign Office on the cultural propaganda campaigns in the Mediterranean came to some interesting conclusions for British political interests in the area.61 In particular, the memorandum reached the conclusion that ‘French, Italian and German cultural propaganda was seriously injuring, or threatening to injure, British political interests in the Mediterranean’. At that time Johnstone held that French propaganda did not constitute a menace whereas Italian and German propaganda definitely did.62 The Foreign Office constantly kept an eye on the activities of the German, Italian and French propaganda campaigns. For 1936–​37 it was estimated that the Italian, French and German governments each granted over £1 million for cultural institutions and propaganda expenditure, while Britain spent only £30,000.63 The Foreign Office, in viewing the foreign propaganda campaigns in the eastern Mediterranean, concluded that ‘propaganda can only be met by propaganda’.64 The purpose would be twofold: firstly, the retention of the loyalty of their ‘own people’; and, secondly, the assurance that their case in foreign countries would not go by default.65 Seen in this light, the establishment of a British university in the region seemed necessary in order to establish an important channel though which a cultural propaganda campaign could take place. The possible locations The possible locations were mainly three –​Egypt, Palestine and Cyprus –​but the prospects of Turkey, Transjordan and Lebanon were also considered. The most likely sites were considered to be Palestine and Cyprus. The establishment of a British university in the area would meet ‘a genuine need in Palestine, Cyprus and Transjordan, both from the point of view of the inhabitants of those countries and also from that of general British interests in this region’.66 At that time the nearest university centres were the American University at Beirut and the three universities at Cairo. The University of Beirut, which at one time –​rightly or wrongly –​enjoyed a fair reputation, then began to appear to be in decline. Moreover, in Cyprus the local reason was the strong attraction of the universities in Athens and Istanbul. In the late 1930s the political future of Palestine was so uncertain that it was simply impossible to make any plans for long-​term work there. It is very interesting that, before the question of the partition of Palestine arose, Arthur Wauchope, the high commissioner for Palestine, was of the opinion that Palestine would be a better centre for a British university than Cyprus because it would be more attractive than Cyprus to students from adjacent Arab territories, with the result that the spread of British culture amongst the Arabs in the Near East would have been very considerable. But, following the publication of the Royal Commission Report and the British statement of policy in favour of a scheme of partition, the whole question started from a new basis.67

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42  International context If the project had materialised in the late 1930s, the location of the university would have been Cyprus. It is indicative that in 1937 Lord De La Warr, parliamentary Under-​Secretary of State for the Colonies, at a meeting with the Advisory Committee in Egypt, revealed that the Colonial Office was ‘seriously thinking of creating a British University at Cyprus’.68 Cyprus was the best option because of its location and the relatively calm situation in the island. For internal reasons, British liberal educational policy in the island came to an end in the 1930s with the imposition of an authoritarian regime. In 1931 the nationalist agitation of the Greek Cypriots led to a shift in imperial educational policies on the island. The British government in Cyprus reported to the Foreign Office that until the early 1930s Greek and Turkish propaganda messages had been allowed to spread their influence without effective restraint, with ‘the former insisting that Cyprus must be united to Greece and the latter drawing away to Turkey the Muslim minority in the island, particularly the younger Turkish Cypriots’.69 Boosting a British identity now was the imperative for the government. For this reason, the British government attempted to end the education of Cypriots in Greek and Turkish universities. The governor of Cyprus, Sir Richmond Palmer, was very supportive of the proposed establishment of a university in Cyprus. Palmer argued that the ‘nationalist’ sentiment should and would gradually diminish in both volume and intensity, in proportion to the degree in which the government promoted educationally  –​and otherwise  –​British national ideals and culture. Palmer believed that these would be very beneficial also for the Cypriots, as the gains of the British connection would appear to them as a material and concrete advantage.70 The concerns and difficulties about choosing Cyprus were mainly of a practical nature. The practicability of establishing the university in Cyprus was questioned. As the aim was to attract students from all over the eastern Mediterranean and not only Cyprus, transportation to and the accessibility of the island were serious issues. The means of communication from Middle Eastern countries with Cyprus would have to be improved. At that time it was very difficult for Middle Easterners to get to the island as the cost was prohibitive. The project was never realised because of the outbreak of the Second World War. However, the last memorandum on the project, based on relevant information collected from Nicosia, Jerusalem, Athens, Cairo, Beirut and Istanbul, elucidated that, in the most fundamental debate over the site of the proposed institution, Cyprus was the appropriate place. Due to the uncertainty in Palestine, the Foreign Office was reluctant to suggest Jerusalem as the site of the proposed university. In 1937 the conclusion was the recommendation of Cyprus as the most appropriate place for the realisation of the project. To sum up, this section has sought to shed light on the strategic importance of Cyprus in the 1930s through this unsuccessful attempt to institutionalise

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International context 43 cultural propaganda. By examining the project for establishing a British university in the eastern Mediterranean in the 1930s it is obvious that Cyprus had a significant place in British geostrategic planning.

The Italian imperial threat One of the most important elements in British strategic considerations in the interwar period for the eastern Mediterranean was the growing ambitions of the Italian Empire. The next subsection briefly explores the way British perceptions of Italian imperial aspirations had an impact on British calculations of the geostrategic importance of Cyprus. In particular, it draws upon the archival material provided by the British National Archives to show that the British were seriously concerned about the Italian Empire’s aspirations for Cyprus. Reports on the Italian consul in Cyprus and official correspondence from the Foreign Office demonstrate the British fears of the Italians.71 The advent of Benito Mussolini’s Fascist regime in Italy soon translated into the development of the revisionist aspirations of the Italian Empire in the eastern Mediterranean.72 The guiding principle of Italian foreign policy in the interwar period was the Mare Nostrum (‘Our Sea’) policy, through which domination over the areas that had been formerly ruled by the Roman Empire was regarded as the principal aim of Fascist Italy, for a national regeneration after the ‘mutilated’ victory in the Great War. By 1937 Mare Nostrum constituted Italy’s official policy.73 Mussolini’s geopolitical vision was clearly articulated in his 1939 remarks to the Grand Council. For Mussolini, Italy was ‘a prisoner of the Mediterranean, and the more populous and prosperous Italy becomes, the more its imprisonment will gall’. For Mussolini, the ‘bars of this prison are Corsica, Tunis, Malta, Cyprus’.74 The first step that Italian policy should follow was to ‘break the bars of the prison’. For Mussolini, the plan to make the Mediterranean a mare italiano was of paramount importance in annihilating the British and French influence in this sea. He considered the presence of Britain and France as parasitical.75 Mussolini believed that Britain was an ‘ “avaricious” and essentially “bourgeois” nation’ that was only pursuing the maintenance of the ‘existing geopolitical status quo, thereby keeping Italy “imprisoned” within its own sea’.76 In the light of this imperial goal, Italy posed a serious threat to the British Empire, as it controlled the eastern Mediterranean space at the time. Even at the start of the First World War Italy’s ambitions for the expansion of her dominions in the Levant menaced the British Empire. In 1914 Italy, just like France, showed that she was not indifferent to Cyprus’ fate. According to a British memorandum, Italy would prefer Cyprus to remain under British sovereignty, as Italy did not want Greece to have it.77 Italy perceived that any cession of Cyprus to Greece would much strengthen the Greek claims to Rhodes.78 In 1919 Italy attempted to set a similar provision for Cyprus to the one in the Sykes–​Picot agreement, whereby, with the inclusion of a special

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44  International context provision on Cyprus, France ensured that Britain would not cede the island to any other power without previously consulting France.79 The British government in Cyprus started to be seriously concerned about the Italian Mediterranean ambitions from the late 1920s.80 Indeed, from the early 1930s, when Italian policy became more assertive, with advances in Africa, the British started closely monitoring on the activities of the Italian consul in Nicosia. Sometimes it seemed that they were more worried about his activities than those of the Greek and Turkish consuls, who were usually at the epicentre of British attention. Even in the late 1920s, when petitions from Greek Cypriots delegates calling for Enosis with Greece were becoming increasingly annoying, the British held that even the Greek Cypriots knew that it was very likely that, if the British were to leave the island, the Italians or Turks would sooner or later incorporate Cyprus into their territory. In particular, Arthur Dawe, an official at the Colonial Office, wrote in 1929 that ‘Greek Cypriots are afraid that if they were handed over without some such arrangement, the Island sooner or later would be snapped up either, by Italy or Turkey’.81 Dawe was confident that ‘Greek Cypriots would far rather be under the British than under the Italians or the Turks’.82 This confidence was based upon the increasingly deteriorating Greek–​Italian relations during this period. Even in the echo of the 1931 October Revolt in Cyprus the British were concerned about the ‘Italian threat’. In private confidential correspondence between two district governors in November 1931 Bayle83 wrote on the potential of union of the island with Greece: ‘Then, of course, there is the other side of the question. If Cyprus were handed over to Greece how long would it remain Greek? Italy, France and Turkey would be fighting, like dogs over a bone, for her; and Rhodes is a good example of what the Italians can do to a Colony. No, when all is considered I think Cyprus is very well off indeed and the people ought to be thankful for what they have got.’84 Italy’s growing aspirations and influence were definitely and directly affecting British policy in Cyprus. The locating of all the consulates in Nicosia alerted the British government, as these could increase their influence in local politics. The Colonial Office was concerned about the transfer of the offices of the consuls of Greece, Turkey and Italy to Nicosia because ‘opportunities for intrigue and the spread of propaganda are far greater than in Larnaca’.85 In 1937 a report on the political situation in Cyprus regarding the first five months of the year stated that ‘the Turkish and Italian Consuls have not openly been active during the period’.86 Giuseppe Brigidi arrived in Cyprus from Canada as the new Italian consul de carrière in 1936.87 British intelligence monitored his activities. A secret report in 1936 strongly warned that his early activities were pointing to the fact that the ‘undercover intentions of his post’ were to ‘spread Italian propaganda in Cyprus’.88 Brigidi kept the office of Italian consul for only one year, as he left Cyprus on 9 November 1937 to transfer to the Italian consulate at

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International context 45 Hankow, China.89 The significance that the Italians were giving to Cyprus was illustrated by the appointment of this important consul. Numerous intelligence reports gave a detailed account of the Italian consul’s activities in Cyprus. In 1936 Governor Palmer sent a secret report on the political situation in Cyprus to William Ormsby-​Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.90 In the report Palmer referred to the ceremony of 4 November 1936 the Italian consulate had held in order to celebrate the birthday of the king of Italy, Vittorio Emanuele III. Palmer described it as a gathering that was exclusively for known Fascists. The Italian consul, wearing his uniform, along with 40 Italian Fascists, attended the ceremony. Palmer’s report gives a detailed account, even describing the badges on the uniforms of the officials. The branch of the Italian Navy League that (in 1936) had just been established in Cyprus was wearing a badge that had the Mare Nostrum (Palmer translated it as ‘the sea belongs to us’) inscription.91 Palmer also reported that five Italian children had been sent from Cyprus during the past summer to attend a Fascist camp in Italy. The tense relations between the British government and the Italian consul were also demonstrated during the government’s celebration for the coronation of King George VI. On 12 May 1937, throughout the British colony of Cyprus, a number of official ceremonies were held in honour of the British king all across the island. However, it was reported that ‘all the Italian Consular authorities in the Island boycotted the Coronation ceremonies’.92 The Italian consulate was also gradually building good relations with the minority Maronite community of the island. In 1936 the specially dedicated thanksgiving service in Larnaca that was held to celebrate Italy’s successful invasion of Abyssinia was also attended by members of the Maronite community.93 The presence of the Maronites, who are affiliated with the Catholic Church, was embraced by the Italian consulate, and after the service they were ‘shown over an Italian merchant vessel which was in harbour’.94 The British government was deeply concerned by this affinity, and ordered an investigation into the motives of their attendance. During the investigation the government discovered that a Cypriot Italian who lived near the Maronite village of Kormakitis was ‘indulging in some Italian propaganda on his own behalf’.95 Yet the intelligence service reported to the British government that ‘he has been severely warned and it is unlikely that he will indulge in propaganda in future’.96 Another important aspect of the Italian activities in Cyprus that had serious repercussion for local affairs was the Fascist propaganda campaign. The assertive efforts of the Italian Empire to challenge the cultural hegemony of the British Empire in the eastern Mediterranean had also arrived in Cyprus by the early 1930s. These activities contributed to the British decision to establish an authoritarian regime in the 1930s. In the aftermath of the October Revolt of 1931, an authoritarian regime was imposed in Cyprus.97 A series of laws passed during the 1930s abolished any notion of the freedom of the press and granted the British colonial

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46  International context government strong control in terms of censorship of the press and films. Despite this extensive control of the information network, the British government remained deeply concerned with the Italian propaganda efforts in Cyprus, and the British government in Cyprus insisted that the Reuters news agency should be the sole information source for the local press in relation to international affairs. The British government was agitated when an intelligence report outlined that the Italian consul had arranged ‘to have transmitted free of charge all world news received by him through Stephani Agency [the official Fascist news agency] provided that newspapers which took this news should cease to publish Reuter’s’.98 The report also revealed that this move from the Italian consul had appealed to at least one local newspaper, whose editor was publishing ‘almost daily articles which have already appeared in the Italian Press’.99 In 1936 it was also reported that the Italian consul himself was, ‘under cover of his post’, actively spreading Fascist propaganda in Cyprus.100 The Fascist radio station Radio Bari, which had been broadcasting since its establishment in 1934, acted as a propaganda medium and was systematically spreading Fascist propaganda throughout the Mediterranean.101 In 1937 the Foreign Office considered establishing a wave transmitter on Cyprus that would be controlled by the Foreign Office in order to effectively combat Italian propaganda throughout the Arab world.102 Radio Bari’s activities and its efforts to spread Italian propaganda and stimulate anti-​British sentiments also included several publications in local languages, especially Arabic, which were distributed in Arab-​speaking countries in the region. In Cyprus it had also published and distributed books in Greek. In 1937 the Italian Broadcasting Company at Bari published a book featuring the history and activities of Radio Bari during the first three years of its existence. The book, which was ‘printed in Greek and Italian’, emphasised ‘the friendly relations between Greece and Italy’.103 The Italian consul himself distributed ‘several copies of this book’ in Cyprus.104 The Italian campaign in Abyssinia marked a turning point for British–​ Italian relations in this period. Italian activities on Cyprus and in the Middle East were also closely followed by all the British consulates and embassies across the region of the eastern Mediterranean. Throughout the 1930s there was voluminous correspondence between the Foreign Office and the British embassy in Ankara regarding the Italian government’s eastern Mediterranean policy.105 After the 1936 Italian conquest of Abyssinia, a change in the Italian policy in the eastern Mediterranean was noticed by British officials in the Foreign Office.106 The Anglo-​Italian rapprochement of the 1930s was perceived with a certain amount of scepticism by the Foreign Office. The British considered that Italy ostensibly desired close and friendly relations with Britain but that the Italian government was deliberately waiting before attempting to fulfil its imperial ambitions. Sir Percy Loraine argued that the 1936 Anglo-​Italian agreement, signed on 16 April, was a product of the Italian volte-​face after

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International context 47 its conquest of Ethiopia. Loraine held that it would be a ‘natural and reasonable calculation that Italy can more easily and more effectively spread her influence and her power in the eastern Mediterranean in the sun of Anglo-​ Italian friendship rather than in the icy shade of Anglo-​Italian tension’.107 The British ambassador continued to argue that Italy was merely attempting to ‘guard and reinforce by diplomatic methods her eastern naval flank’.108 In 1938 Governor Palmer was invited to attend a party as the representative of the government of Cyprus at the Italian consulate in Nicosia for the birthday of the King Vittorio Emanuele III. However, Richmond Palmer, in an interview with the Italian consul, explained that it was an established practice in Cyprus that the government’s representative at consular functions should be the commissioner of the district. The Italian consul used this occasion to speak about the status of consuls in Cyprus.109 The Foreign Office was very upset by the behaviour of the governor. On 9 March 1939 an official from the Foreign Office commented on the occasion and said that he could not understand ‘why the Colonial Secretary should be too grand to go to this party. The Governor might consider it beneath his dignity but is the person of the Colonial Secretary so sacred?’110 The Foreign Office official held that ‘the attitude of the Cyprus authorities towards foreign consuls is stupid and is doing us a certain amount of harm, but it is no use trying to get any sense into the head of Sir Richmond Palmer, who is fortunately leaving Cyprus on the 22nd April. His successor may have more tact.’111 As the Second World War approached, the British Empire was even more alert to Italian advances in the Mediterranean. There was concern that the Italians were using Cyprus in order to supply their army in north Africa.112 For instance, on 14 October 1937 the Criminal Investigation Department in Nicosia sent the colonial secretary a secret intelligence report detailing that the Mantovani shipping agency from Larnaca had been ‘approached by an Italian firm in Port Said and asked to quote prices for a large supply of mules. It is thought that these mules are required for the Italian Army in North Africa.’113 At the same time the British government in Cyprus became agitated about information regarding an alleged plan to establish air facilities for Italy in Cyprus. In particular, it had been reported that the Italian air transport company that operated an air service ‘between Italy–​Greece–​Rhodes and Haifa’ had requested ‘the Socony Vacuum Oil Company in Cyprus to establish a petrol depot at Polis (near Cape Akamas)’.114 As has been illustrated, British–​ Italian relations during the interwar period had serious repercussion for the local affairs of Cyprus. As long as the British Empire perceived the growing Italian imperial aspirations in the eastern Mediterranean as a threat, the geostrategic importance of the island increased for the British. Thus, the evolution of British imperial policy in Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean during the interwar period can only be fully grasped by taking into account the inter-​imperial rivalry. These strategic considerations of the British Empire and the evolution of British policy underlie the continuities and the changes throughout the period in question.

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Turkey and Cyprus This cannot be, By no assay of reason: ’tis a pageant To keep us in false gaze. When we consider The importancy of Cyprus to the Turk;’ Othello115 When the first senator in Shakespeare’s sixteenth-​century masterpiece Othello refers to a potential Ottoman invasion of Cyprus, the strategic importance of the island for the Ottomans was highlighted. In this section, we look into the significance of Cyprus attributed to it by the newly founded Republic of Turkey. Developments in Turkey will be approached from three angles:  the first is the kinds of developments that were taking place in Turkey at that period; the second is how Britain perceived these developments; and the third is whether the developments altered the geostrategic significance of Cyprus. In 1878 the island passed to the administrative authority of the British, under the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultan.116 With the Cyprus Convention, which was annexed to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, ‘England occupied that island in order to be able to assist Turkey now that her Eastern frontier had been weakened by the loss of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum. With Cyprus as a base, England could control the Taurus passes in Cilicia and prevent Russia’s advance into Syria.’117 There was also an obligation to pay the British government a fixed tax per year, known as the ‘tribute’. The British census of 1881 estimated the population at 136,629 Christians, 46,289 Muslims, 691 English and 2,400  ‘others’.118 The change from Ottoman to British rule did not extend to modernisation of the administration, as the British did not radically transform the Ottoman system.119 In 1914, because of the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, Britain officially annexed Cyprus. The Muslims of Cyprus welcomed the annexation, by affirming their loyalty to the British rulers.120 Turkish scholars attributed their stance to the feeling of abandonment by Turkey and the awareness of Turkey’s weakness. However, after the annexation the Muslims lost the special status that they had enjoyed, derived from the sultan’s nominal sovereignty. The First World War was followed by the Greco-​Turkish war of 1919–​1922, from which the modern state of Turkey emerged. In the early twentieth century, therefore, among the Muslims in the Ottoman Empire arose questions of identity:  Turkish, Ottoman or Muslim?121 There was no sign of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus until the early 1920s. When we are examining Turkish Cypriot nationalism, we should always bear in mind the fact that Turkish nationalism was the last to develop in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the Muslim community of the island did not have a mainland nationalist movement to attune to until the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.122 Even when the Young Turk Revolution was broken there was little response from the Muslims of Cyprus. The National Pact (Misaki-​Milli) was contracted in 1920 during the Turkish–​Greek war. The assembly constituted by members of the Ottoman

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International context 49 Chamber of Deputies agreed upon the limits and borders that the new state should have. The National Pact in fact set red lines for the borders of the state that would eventually be formed. In addition, the National Pact ‘recognised and affirmed that the principles set forth herein represent the maximum of sacrifice to which the Ottoman Nation can consent in order that a just and lasting peace may be assured’.123 The criterion was the Turkish populations inhabiting former Ottoman territories. The island of Cyprus was not included in the lands that the National Pact considered vital for the state.124 It is important to note one other significant dimension in the internal politics of the newly founded Republic of Turkey. A Kurdish rebellion in 1925 gave the government the pretext to silence domestic opposition. The government took the Kurdish uprisings as an opportunity to label all the disaffected groups as traitors and assist in the establishment of a one-​party regime and the imposition of the Kemalist reforms.125 Since the early 1920s there had been many reports from the British embassies and consulates in Jerusalem, Cairo, Baghdad and Beirut that attempted to give a detailed account of the so-​called Turkish and Kemalist agents and their activities in the former Ottoman territory.126 British officials followed and recorded all these developments closely. However, there is not a single account of activities of this kind in the 1920s for Cyprus. During the period in question the British were very concerned with the spread of communist ideas, especially in areas under their influence. As in Cyprus, Britain was keeping an eye on the development of a communist movement in Turkey. Regarding communist arrests and movement, James Morgan from the British embassy in Ankara reported on the arrests of communists that had taken place in Samsun, Constantinople, Adrianople and Bursa in the early 1930s. Morgan explained in his report that the movement in Constantinople could probably be attributed to ‘economic crisis and unemployment, which was considerable among tobacco workers owing to [the] cessation of activities of American tobacco firms’.127 The change in the British strategy in Cyprus in the 1930s occurred in the context of many developments. Turkey was constantly complaining to the British government of Cyprus for permitting violations of Turkish social reforms. There were a significant number of Turkish citizens who were against the prohibition of polygamy in the newly founded Turkish Republic. There are many reported cases of Turkish citizens visiting Cyprus in order to get married to a second wife, with a Muslim Cypriot bride as the second wife. Turkey reacted by calling on the British government in Cyprus to take action in order to prevent these marriages. However, the British were reluctant for various reasons to take action, as that could disturb the relations of Cyprus with Egypt and Palestine as well. Muslim men from Egypt and Palestine were also seeking brides from the Muslim Cypriot community. The British government’s evaluation was that commercial relations with Muslim Egypt and Muslim Palestine were much more important for Cyprus than those with Turkey.128

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50  International context From the early 1930s onwards the prospects of a second world war steadily intensified. The British Foreign Office repeatedly enquired as to Turkey’s intentions in any future war. In 1933 the British legation in Athens communicated to the Foreign Office that there was information from a reliable source that the Greek prime minister, Eleftherios Venizelos, had remarked whilst giving an account of his visit to Ismet Inonu to one of his most trusted partisans that Mustapha Kemal had stated that Turkey would do her best not to go to war.129 According to the same source, the leader of the Turkish Republic stated that, in the event that Turkey did have to go to war, it would be ‘on the side which held the command of the sea’.130 In the early 1930s the state of British–​Turkish relations was described by the Foreign Office as friendly.131 In 1932 the British embassy in Ankara reported to the Foreign Office the prevalence of friendly relations between Turkey and Britain.132 It made particular reference to the good impression that had been made on Turks by the British official history of the Dardanelles campaign.133 The heroic presentation of Mustafa Kemal in the official history was gladly accepted by Turkish officials. The October Revolt in 1931 attracted little attention in the Turkish press. The British embassy in Ankara reported that it was a surprising fact that the Turkish press reproduced news items without providing comments. The British embassy was displeased with this ‘inadequate coverage’ of the events because it did not highlight the ‘pro-​British attitude of the Cypriot Turks’.134 However, the interest of the Turkish government might actually have been very high. According to one of the very few available documents from the Republican Archives in Ankara, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs informed his prime minister about the demonstration by several hundred Greek Cypriots in front of the British consulate in Thessaloniki, Greece, on the same day as the big riots in Nicosia.135

Conclusion In conclusion, it can be seen that the international context is of paramount importance in understanding British imperial policy in Cyprus and the eastern Mediterranean. In this chapter, I have highlighted the strategic considerations of the British Empire. We have looked at the evolution of the policy underlying the continuities and the changes in the British stance throughout the period in question. I argue that the process of shaping a national identity in the Muslim community of the island should be examined in the context of the politics and events that were taking place at the same time in the area of the eastern Mediterranean. Although Cyprus is an island, events there are not marginalised or isolated from developments in the eastern Mediterranean as a whole. The insular territory of Cyprus was influenced by the events that were taking place in former Ottoman lands, such as Turkey, Syria, Palestine and Egypt.

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Notes 1 Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy:  America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001). 2 Robert Holland’s latest book on Britain and the Mediterranean attempts to fill the gap in the historiography of the empire. While the historians of the empire tend to focus on the Indian subcontinent, Holland argues for the significant importance of the Mediterranean Sea for the British Empire. Robert Holland, Blue-​Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800 (London: Penguin Books, 2012). 3 Fernand Braudel was the first one who wrote about the Mediterranean as a unique and distinctive world of its own. Fernand Braudel, Memory and the Mediterranean (New York: Vintage Books, 2002). 4 Halford Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas (London: William Heinemann, 1902), 345–​6. 5 The text was published during the Second Boer War, when the debate on imperialism was dominated by the works of John Stuart Mill and John Ruskin. His theory about the accumulation of capital had a major impact on the pioneer economists of the twentieth century, such as John Maynard Keynes and Paul Samuelson. Although his revolutionary theory was in conflict with the Zeitgeist, Hobson subverted the dominant discourse. Hobson’s ideas have exerted influence not only on economics but also on the social sciences. 6 Richard B. Day and Daniel. F Gaido, Discovering Imperialism: Social Democracy to World War I (The Hague: Brill, 2011). 7 John A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005); Peter Hudis and Kevin B. Anderson, The Rosa Luxemburg Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004); V.  I. Lenin, Imperialism:  The Highest Stage of Capitalism (London: Penguin Books, 2010). 8 P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–​2000, 2nd edn. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2002). 9 Joseph A.  Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes:  Two Essays by Joseph Schumpeter, 9th edn. (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1966), vii. 10 Ibid., 6. 11 Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism (New  York:  Schocken, 1978); and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New  York:  Academic Press, 1974). 12 Hans J.  Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New  York:  Alfred A.  Knopf, 1960), 45. 13 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 9. 14 Ibid. 15 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 45. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Look at the work of the prominent British historian Niall Ferguson, who has been accused of writing a nostalgic, romantic and apologetic account of the British Empire. Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2002). 19 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 20 Sun Tzu, The Art of War (London: Penguin Books, 2002).

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52  International context 21 The Latin phrase sine qua non, which literally means ‘without which not’, is used for an absolutely essential condition. 22 For a more detailed account of the horizontal and vertical dimensions of British imperialism, see Ilia Xypolia, “Divide et Impera:  Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of British Imperialism”, Critique:  Journal of Socialist Theory 44, no. 3 (2016): 221–​31, doi: 10.1080/​03017605.2016.1199629. 23 I use the term ‘perpetrators’ to illustrate that British rule carried on despite the contravention of the will of the native population. 24 Edward Said defines imperialism as ‘the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory’. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 9. 25 The recent work of Robert Holland is situated against the tide of scholarly historical accounts of the British Empire, which are mainly focused on East Asia. Holland, Blue-​Water Empire: The British in the Mediterranean since 1800. 26 Yiorghos Leventis, “The British Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus:  The Uniqueness of a Colonial Remnant”, in Crossing over Cyprus: Studies on the Divided Island in the Eastern Mediterranean, eds. Yiorghos Leventis, Nanako Murata Sawayanagi and Yasushi Hazama (Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 2008). 27 Scholars argue that Cyprus’s location offers a unique angle for sending signals to satellites. Of course, the main reason is the relatively peaceful situation on the island compared to the Middle Eastern countries. 28 It was first used in the seminal History of Cyprus textbook by George Hill: A History of Cyprus, vol. IV, The Ottoman Province, The British Colony, 1571–​1948. 29 Andrekos Varnava, British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878–​1915: The Inconsequential Possession (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009). Varnava argues that there was no operation of imperialism in Cyprus before the world war for the simple reason that the British did not care about the island and did not plan to stay there. That is why they were eager to offer Cyprus to Greece in exchange for the latter’s support for Serbia. 30 British offered Cyprus to Greece three times unsuccessfully in order to encourage the latter to join the Great War on the side of the Allied powers. TNA: FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 31 Panagiotis Dimitrakis, Military Intelligence in Cyprus:  From the Great War to Middle East Crises (London: I. B. Tauris, 2010), 16. 32 Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism. 33 Samir Amin, “Crisis, Nationalism, and Socialism”, in Dynamics of Global Crisis, eds. Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), 170. 34 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 35 See appendix for the full text:  TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925.

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International context 53 36 “Sykes–​Picot Agreement: 1916”, http://​avalon.law.yale.edu/​20th_​century/​sykes.asp. 37 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 38 F. R.  Bridge and R.  Bullen, The Great Powers and the European State System, 1815–​1914 (London:  Longman, 1980); Dwight E.  Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878 (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1934); Matthew S.  Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774–​ 1923 (London: Macmillan, 1966). 39 All the masters of geopolitics share this view. The British geographer Halford Mackinder, with his theory on the “heartland” as the “geographical pivot of history”, and the German geographer Karl Haushofer have highlighted this. Karl Haushofer, An English Translation and Analysis of Major General Karl Ernst Haushofer’s “Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean”: Studies on the Relationship between Geography and History (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 2002). 40 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 41 TNA: WO 157/​1310 (1923) “A History of the Nationalist Movement, 1918–​1922; Volume 2”. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Since the nineteenth century India had been considered as the jewel in the British Empire’s crown. 45 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 46 Ibid. 47 As we will see below, the British were planning to establish a university in the Near East, and Cyprus was the best location for it compared to other British possessions. It is interesting, as we will see below, how the British perceived Cyprus in the 1930s. 48 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 49 Ibid. 50 TNA: WO 32/​2405 (1934) “Reorganisation of Local Forces in Cyprus”. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 TNA: CO 67/​278/​7 (1937) “Development of Cyprus”. Secret despatch from R. B. Howard, Office of the Cabinet, to A. J. Dawe, Colonial Office, dated 28 June 1937. 54 Dimitrakis, Military Intelligence in Cyprus: From the Great War to Middle East Crises, 22. 55 TNA: CO 67/​278/​7 (1937) “Development of Cyprus”. A. J. Dawe’s internal CO correspondence, dated 8 July 1937. 56 The project is analysed in depth below in the chapter on education. 57 Ilia Xypolia, “Cultural Propaganda and Plans for a British University in the Near East”, Mediterranean Quarterly 27, no. 3 (September 2016): 88–​104, doi: 10.1215/​ 10474552-​3697854.

54

54  International context 58 It is worth noting here that the project referred interchangeably to ‘Near East’ and ‘eastern Mediterranean’. For a consistent presentation, ‘eastern Mediterranean’ will be used throughout this book. 59 Brian McKercher accurately points out the primacy of the Foreign Office in British foreign policy-​making in the interwar period. In particular, McKercher argues that from 1925 to 1937 the Foreign Office regained its power to influence British foreign policy. Brian J.  C. McKercher, “Old Diplomacy and New:  The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–​1939”, in Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–​1950, eds. M. L. Dockrill and Brian J. C. McKercher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 87. 60 TNA:  CO 67/​ 273/​ 2 (1937) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. K.  R Johnstone, Foreign Office, prepared the Confidential Memorandum: Proposals for Expenditure by the British Council in the Near East during the financial year 1937–​38, dated 11 May 1937. 61 TNA:  FO 141/​675/​8 (1937) “English Education and Culture”. British cultural propaganda in the Mediterranean area. 62 Ibid. 63 TNA: FO 141/​675/​8 (1937) “English Education and Culture”. Minutes from the Cultural Print, Foreign Office, dated 22 February 1937. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 TNA: CO 67/​273/​2 (1937) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Confidential Memorandum: Proposals for Expenditure by the British Council in the Near East during the financial year 1937–​38, dated 11 May 1937. 67 TNA: CO 67/​273/​2 (1937) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Confidential letter from Arthur Wauchope, High Commissioner for Palestine, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby-​Gore, dated 20 July 1937. 68 TNA: FO 141/​675/​8 (1937) “English Education and Culture”. Record of meeting of the Advisory Committee, Lord De La Warr also being present, for a discussion of educational and cultural activities in Egypt, 7 January 1937. 69 TNA: CO 67/​273/​2 (1937) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Confidential Memorandum: Proposals for Expenditure by the British Council in the Near East during the financial year 1937–​38, dated 11 May 1937. 70 TNA:  CO 67/​273/​2 (1937) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Confidential letter from the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Richmond Palmer, to Ormsby-​Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 30 June 1937. 71 Ilia Xypolia, “ ‘From Mare Nostrum to Insula Nostra’: British Colonial Cyprus and the Italian Imperial Threat”, The Round Table 105, no.  3 (2016):  287–​96, doi: 10.1080/​00358533.2016.1180047. 72 Alan Cassels, Italian Foreign Policy, 1918–​1945: A Guide to Research and Research Materials, 2nd edn. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1991). 73 Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–​1940 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 107. 74 MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939–​ 1941:  Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 40. 75 Brendan Simms, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy, 1453 to the Present (London: Penguin Books, 2014), 328.

 55

International context 55 76 Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–​1940, 35. 77 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential Memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 78 Ibid. 79 TNA: C0 67/​217/​5 (1926) “Annexation of Cyprus”. Internal CO correspondence, dated 29 April 1926. 80 For Italian foreign policy in the Mediterranean, see:  Mack Dennis Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire (London: Viking Books, 1976); Bruce G. Strang, On the Fiery March:  Mussolini Prepares for War (Westport, CT:  Praeger, 2003). Strang’s book focuses on Italian foreign policy of the period between June 1936 and September 1939. For British–​ Italian relations, see:  Massimiliano Fiore, Anglo-​Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–​1940 (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013). 81 TNA: CO 67/​228/​1 (1929) “Movement for Union of Cyprus with Greece”. Dawe internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 16 September 1937. 82 Ibid. 83 A British official at the Foreign Office. 84 TNA: CO 67/​241/​4 (1931) “Administration: Individual Criticisms”. Confidential letter from Bayle, at Limassol, to Sir Samuel Wilson, dated 2 November 1931. 85 TNA:  CO 67/​ 265/​ 11 (1936) “Political Situation:  Monthly Police Intelligence Reports”. Governor Richmond Palmer sent the intelligence report to Ormsby-​ Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, on: “Secret Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st July to the 1st October, 1936”. 86 TNA:  FO 141/​643/​6 (1937) “Cyprus:  General Situation; Includes Reports on Political Situation for Periods 1 October 1936 to 31 October 1937”. The report on the situation in Cyprus in respect of the period ended 31 December 1936 points out that ‘all the consuls de Carriere  –​viz:  the Consuls for Greece, Italy and Turkey –​have now settled into their new homes in Nicosia’. The following “Report on Political Situation in Cyprus”, for the period ended 30 April 1937, holds that ‘the Turkish and Italian Consuls have not openly been active during the period’. 87 TNA:  CO 67/​265/​11 (1936) “Political situation:  monthly police intelligence reports”. Palmer sent the Intelligence Report to Ormsby-​Gore on:  “Secret Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st July to the 1st October, 1936”. 88 Ibid. 89 TNA:  CO 67/​274/​5 (1937) “Political Situation:  Quarterly Reports”. Intelligence Reports: “Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st November to the 31st December 1937”. 90 TNA:  CO 67/​ 265/​ 11 (1936) “Political Situation:  Monthly Police Intelligence Reports”. Intelligence Reports: “Secret Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st October to the 31st December, 1936”. 91 Ibid. 92 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1937) Intelligence Report “The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st May to the 30th June, 1937”. 93 TNA: CO 67/​265/​11 (1936) Intelligence Report “The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st April to the 30th June, 1936”. 94 Ibid.

56

56  International context 9 5 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Georghallides, Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis; Alexis Rappas, Cyprus in the 1930s: British Colonial Rule and the Roots of the Cyprus Conflict (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014). 98 TNA:  CO 67/​ 265/​ 11 (1936) Intelligence Report “The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st October to the 31st December, 1936”. 99 Ibid. 100 TNA:  CO 67/​ 265/​ 11 (1936) Intelligence Report “The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st July to the 1st October, 1936. 101 Manuela A.  Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad:  Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935–​1940 (London: Routledge, 2006), 82. 102 Callum A. MacDonald, “Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British Countermeasures 1934–​38”, Middle Eastern Studies 13, no. 2 (1977): 202. 103 TNA:  CO 67/​ 274/​ 5 (1937) “Weekly Police Intelligence Report (summary), 7.10.1937 –​ 13.10.1937”. 104 Ibid. 105 TNA:  FO 141/​ 445/​ 4 (1937) “Italian Government’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy. Includes correspondence relating to a rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia”. 106 James Barros, Greece and the Politics of Sanctions: Ethiopia 1935–​1936 (London: Royal Historical Society, 1982). James Barros’ book gives a detailed account of neglected aspects in the evolution of Greek–​ Italian relations during the Abyssinian crisis. 107 TNA:  FO 141/​ 445/​ 4 (1937) “Italian Government’s Eastern Mediterranean Policy. Includes correspondence relating to a rapprochement between Italy and Yugoslavia”. Sir Percy Loraine, British Embassy Ankara, telegram to Foreign Office, dated 18th February 1937. 108 Ibid. 109 TNA: FO 371/​23824 (1939) “Status of Italian Consul in Cyprus. Code 22 File 1499”. Extract from secret despatch from Governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 13 January 1939. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 TNA: CO 67/​247/​5 (1932) “Amendment of Imperial Orders in Council by Local Legislation”. Intelligence Reports, 1937. 113 Ibid. 114 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) Intelligence Report “The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st November to the 31st December, 1937”. 115 William Shakespeare, Othello (San Diego, CA: Icon Classics, 2006), 25. 116 TNA: WO 157–​1309 (1923) “Turkey: A History of the Nationalistic Movement, 1918–​1922; Volume 1”. The British War Office reports the following: ‘Insurrections in Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria then led to the war between Turkey and Russia of 1877, which culminated in the Treaty of San Stefano of 1878. The most important feature of this Treaty was the creation of a greater Bulgaria by the Russian Tsar (Bulgaria being Slav, the Czar hoped to create a friendly tool to use against Turkey). But the other powers –​particularly England –​objected, and later in the

 57

International context 57 same year at the Treaty of Berlin, considerable territory was restored to Turkey, whose Empire in Europe had been reduced to eastern Thrace by the immediately preceding Treaty (Bulgaria losing two thirds of the territory granted her earlier in the year). The Berlin Treaty, however, gave the Balkan States their separate identities; it laid the foundation stone of German–​Turkish friendship; but it also was the cause of Austria’s enmity with Serbia; for Austria realised that the new Serbia was a definite barrier between her and the Aegean. By the Cyprus Convention, which was annexed to the Treaty, England occupied that island in order to be able to assist Turkey now that her eastern frontier had been weakened by the loss of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum. With Cyprus as a base, England could control the Taurus passes in Cilicia and prevent Russia’s advance into Syria. Within four years, however, Turco-​British friendship was undermined by the British occupation of Egypt and by the return to power of Gladstone, who was renowned for his sympathy with the subject races of Turkey.’ 117 TNA: WO 157–​1309 (1923) “Turkey: A History of the Nationalistic Movement, 1918–​1922; Volume 1”. 118 Pollis, “Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus,” 575. 119 Hill, A History of Cyprus, vol. IV; George S.  Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyrus 1918–​1926 (Nicosia:  Cyprus Research Centre, 1979), 34. 120 Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, 41. 121 Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, 2nd edn. 122 Erik J.  Zürcher, Turkey:  A  Modern History, 3rd edn. (London:  I.  B. Tauris, 2005). 123 TNA: WO 157/​1310 (1923) “Turkey: A History of the Nationalistic Movement, 1918–​1922; Volume 2”. 124 Ibid. 125 Bülent Gökay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–​ 1991:  Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism (London: Routledge, 2006), 41. 126 TNA:  FO 141/​ 505/​ 4 (1926) “Turkish and Kemalist Agents, 1921–​ 1926”. Correspondence of Foreign Office with embassies and consulates. 127 TNA: FO 371/​16093 (1932) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 811 –​2307”. Confidential letter from James Morgan, British embassy in Ankara, to Sir John Simon, Foreign Office, dated 31 March 1932. 128 TNA: CO 67/​268/​4 (1937) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Despatch from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Ormsby-​Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 December 1936. 129 TNA: FO 371/​16987 (1933) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 2596 –​8002”. Confidential letter from Patrick Ramsay, British legation in Athens, to Sir John Simon, Foreign Office, dated 21 October 1933. 130 Ibid. 131 TNA:  FO 371/​16093 (1932) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 811  –​2307”. Confidential letter from Sir George Clerk, British embassy in Ankara, to Sir John Simon, Foreign Office, dated 3 June 1932. 132 TNA:  FO 371/​16093 (1932) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 811  –​2307”. Confidential letter on Anglo-​Turkish relations from Sir George Clerk, British embassy in Ankara, to Sir John Simon, Foreign Office, dated 16 June 1932. 133 Ibid.

58

58  International context 134 TNA: FO 371-​/​16091 (1932) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 188 (Papers 1557 –​End) –​ 318”. “Annual Report on Turkey for 1931” prepared by the British embassy in Constantinople, dated 7 January 1932. 135 BSA: 030-​0-​010-​000-​000-​254-​712-​44. Letter from the minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey to the prime minister of the Republic of Turkey, dated 2 November 1931.

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4  Social and economic context

Introduction The argument is developed here in dialogue with Karl Deutsch’s theory as articulated in his seminal work Nationalism and Social Communication.1 In this realm, national identity is developed upon a system of internal communication. Thus, the alteration of the social structure and the pattern of social relations towards Western-​style modernisation contribute to the development of a sense of common identity. This study adheres to a materialist perspective and considers nation and nationalism as modern phenomena, realised through the modern conceptualisation of time and space.2 Urbanisation is the product of the new social life that brought about the modern era in the first place. David Harvey’s work is a pioneer in highlighting the spatial dimension in modernity while social theorists, such as Max Weber, have tended to focus more on the changing concept of time.3 The main argument that the scholars of the modernist school in the studies of nationalism hold is that urbanisation is sine qua non for the nation-​ building process. More precisely, urbanisation and its product phenomena, such as centralisation of the state and bureaucratisation, gradually lead to the transformation of all the other kinds of collective identities to the national one. This chapter follows the theoretical concepts of the modernist school of nationalism study and makes two main points. First, that the urbanisation of the Muslim community of Cyprus took place as a by-​product of the incentives that the British government imposed. Second, that the modernisation of the Muslim community of Cyprus occurred in the context set up by the British government. The argument, therefore, is that the transformation of the collective identity occurred because of the social and economic changes in the community’s nature. This socio-​economic change that took place and reshaped the reality of the Muslim community of Cyprus was planned by the British Foreign Office. This section focuses on Turkish Cypriot employment in government service.

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60  Social and economic context

Urbanisation The urbanisation of the community is significant in order to transform its collective identity. There is a consensus amongst modernist scholars of nationalism that the most powerful force of modernisation is urbanisation. However, as John Breuilly accurately highlights, nationalism is modern but modernity does not translate automatically into nationalism.4 The research question is addressed through the insights of Karl Deutsch’s theory of communications and nationalism. I argue here that the social patterns and social structure of the Muslim community altered largely because of its employment in the public sector and the government. This was the result of a deliberate strategy of ‘divide and rule’ operated by the British. Although the British government in Cyprus recognised that the members of the Muslim community were often less qualified than their counterparts, they were massively employed in the public sector. This led to the urbanisation of the Muslim community and the subsequent rapid and historic transformation of its social roots. New middle class The most significant result of the British annexation of Cyprus was the emergence of a new social class within the Turkish Cypriot community, which eventually transcended the traditional ones. As elsewhere, in Cyprus the two factors that helped the genesis of the new class were the introduction of a market economy and Western education. The interwar period was a period of transformation for the Turkish Cypriot community, based on the economic and political context of the Cypriot society. The economic changes involved a transition from a predominantly agricultural, rural community with low standards of living to an urban community with rapidly expanding economic activity centred in towns. It was under British rule that Turkish Cypriots began moving away from mixed villages, in which they peacefully coexisted with Greek Cypriots, towards the towns.5 The technical and institutional changes that were initiated by the British administration had far-​reaching consequences in terms of social change in the Turkish Cypriot community. The technical changes included improvements in the communication system, with the building of roads that connected the main towns and villages.6 When the British arrived in Cyprus the road network covered less than 30 miles. By 1938 it extended 856 miles, of which 644 miles were asphalted. It also had 1,716 miles of village roads. By the late 1930s Cyprus was served by ‘an excellent arterial road system providing communication between every important town and may of the more important villages’.7 The construction of new roads reduced journey times between the main towns and the villages immensely. Cypriot society at large was predominantly agricultural during the period in question. The vast majority of the population was occupied with agriculture, either as independent peasant farmers or as labourers on other peasants’

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Social and economic context 61 lands. However, a gradual but steady transformation in labour can be observed with the development of new industries. In 1938 about 8,000 Cypriots were regularly employed in the mines and around 6,000 in various small industries.8 These numbers are impressive given that in 1921 were only 21 miners in regular employment. The slow evolution of the economy from agricultural to a nascent ‘modern’ industrial one accompanied the gradual shift in labour activities. The slow but steady development of a capitalist society shaped the dynamics in the transformation of Muslim community. Still, the urbanisation of the Turkish Cypriot community was greatly facilitated by the massive employment of its members in the colonial administrative apparatus. By employing a large number of members of the Muslim Cypriot community in the various administrative bodies of Cyprus, the British gave the Muslims of Cyprus greater motivation to live in the towns of the island than the rural areas. The initiatives that the British Government took in an effort to improve the dire economic situation in the 1930s were based upon the data and the recommendations put forward by three reports.9 The 1930 Surridge report was fundamental for designing the new policies for both urban and rural areas of the island.10 In his survey, Brewster Joseph Surridge addressed the impoverishment of the rural population of the island.11 In 1935 two more reports were prepared for the Government. Sir John Greaves’ report on economic conditions accounted for the low standard of living on Cyprus,12 while Sir Ralph Oakden’s report focused on the finances and economic resources of the island.13 From Ottoman to British administration Eurocentric literature unanimously considers the Ottoman Empire’s style of administration to have been meagre and underdeveloped in comparison with those of the European empires. Like most empires, Ottoman-​style rule was characterised by several principles employed across its territories. At the heart of the Ottoman ruling principles was the division of the population across religious lines into millets. Ottoman subjects were organised into the millets that encompassed their hierarchies. The religious leaders of each millet were responsible for collecting taxes and arranging legal matters. The members of the Muslim millet were the only ones who could bear arms and enjoy exemption from some taxes. The case of Ottoman Cyprus was no exception for the deployment of the governing principles of the empire. The administration on the island was manned mostly by members of the dominant Muslim community. Members of the other millets were usually under-​represented in numbers or simply employed in the lower ranks. In general, non-​Muslim Cypriots held the professional offices for which Muslim candidates were not available. After the First World War the role of Muslims in the administration became prominent. With the establishment of the British administration, which necessitated putting the machinery of the government on a new

62

62  Social and economic context basis, the recruitment of Muslims began. Muslims were introduced into the administration as a counterweight to the Greek Cypriot nationalistic agitation. The British administration in Cyprus was designed on the model of a Crown colony; accordingly, the senior posts in the Cyprus government were to be occupied mainly by British officials, assisted by local officials. The over-​ representation of the Muslims in the administration had wider social and intercommunal implications. The Christians complained, that, although they constituted the majority of the population, they felt deprived in terms of the government of the country. The members of the Muslim community were over-​represented in the administrative apparatus of Cyprus and in its security bodies –​i.e. the army and police. Nevertheless, urbanisation is a process that involves not only the concentration of the population in towns but also the diffusion of urban values, behaviour and organisation to rural areas. As the Muslim middle class grew in the towns the development of ethnic-​national awareness would be more rapid. Table  4.1 is indicative of the massive employment of the members of the Muslim community of Cyprus during the period in question.14 The number of Muslim civil servants was disproportionate to their population.15 Moreover, the urbanisation also functioned as a physical separation between the two communities, as it eventually strengthened community-​based relations at the expense of class-​based social relations. The censuses of the interwar period (Table 4.2) indicate that the urban population was growing at twice the rate at which that of the rural areas was growing. All these developments resulted in the formation of a new stratification system for the Muslim Cypriot community, with a much higher degree of differentiation, many more gradations and more positions in the higher levels of the occupational structure. Table  4.3 shows the proportion of the Muslim population living in towns during the interwar period. The share of the Muslims in the urban population is quite impressive given that the overall proportion of the Muslims during this period was less than one-​fifth of the total Cypriot population.

Table 4.1 Nationalities of members of the civil establishment, 1 January 1928

English Turks Greeks Roman Catholic and Maronites Armenians Total: 1953 Source: TNA: CO 67/​226/​15 (1928).61

Number

Percentage

76 699 1101 56 21

4 36 56 3 1 100

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Social and economic context 63 Table 4.2 Muslim Cypriot population, 1881–​1946

1881 1901 1911 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1946

Muslim Cypriots

Percentage

Population of Cyprus

45,458 51,309 56,428 61,338 62,225 63,052 63,394 64,746 65,610 66,485 68,271 69,183 64,435 64,725 65,014 65,303 65,592 65,881 66,170 80,548

24.40 21.60 20.58 19.74 19.58 19.58 19.43 19.58 19.58 19.58 19.58 19.59 18.38 18.27 18.16 18.05 17.95 17.84 17.74 17.90

186,173 237,022 274,108 310,715 317,703 321,945 326,245 330,601 335,015 339,488 348,616 353,090 350,486 354,215 357,934 361,653 365,372 369,091 372,810 450,114

Source: Cyprus Blue Books and censuses.

Table 4.3 Percentages of Muslims and Christians in six towns, 1921 & 1931 Town

Nicosia Larnaca with Skala Limassol Famagusta with Varosha Paphos with Ktima Kyrenia

1921

1931

Muslim

Christian

Muslim

Christian

36.32 23.32 19.72 23.57 45.89 29.74

63.68 76.68 80.28 76.43 54.11 70.26

32.76 21.67 15.85 19.84 40.64 24.01

67.24 78.33 84.15 80.16 59.36 75.99

Source: Report of the Census of 1931.62

The appointment of Muslim Cypriots to higher posts was a widespread practice for the British administration. H.  R. Cowell, in internal Colonial Office correspondence, outlined the British plan of appointing Cypriots and, in particular, an increasingly large number of Muslim Cypriots. Cowell held that ‘the general policy was well understood’, and there was no need to particularise it. Cowell added that the ‘general trend in recent years by local candidates to an increasing degree, and other things being anything like equal preference has usually been given to the local candidate’.16 Cowell argued that it was well understood that the policy did ‘not necessarily tend to immediate

64

64  Social and economic context efficiency’, but it forestalled ‘one form of political agitation’ and prepared ‘the way for the ultimate extension of self-​government without too violent a break’. Cowell continued that, ‘in fact’, the policy had become ‘so generally accepted that we assume an apologetic attitude towards the maintenance of British officials, readily accept criticism of them, and in fact impair their efficiency by lack of support’. Cowell concluded that, ‘all this being admitted, I think it would be unwise to bind ourselves definitely to appoint Cypriots to all the posts cited in whatever circumstances. Each case must be considered on its merits.’17 The tough economic conditions of the 1930s had a greater impact on rural than urban areas. This was highlighted in February 1933, when the commissioner of Larnaca sent a dispatch to the colonial secretary on rural unemployment. He identified the main causes of rural unemployment as, inter alia, the increase in the rural population and reduction of emigration, and the decrease in remittances from abroad.18 At the same time, many indebted from the heavy taxation of small independent farmers could not cope with the deteriorating economy and had to sell their small pieces of arable land. It is estimated that more than two-​thirds of arable land changed ownership during the interwar period. Many small farmers were then transformed into industrial workers, moving to the towns. By the end of the 1930s the main sources of working class occupation were agriculture, construction, mines and house service. Police Employment in the police force was a very important tool for the implementation of the ‘divide and rule’ strategy. Scholars engaged with the Cyprus issue have highlighted the role of this strategy in the 1950s, when the Greek Cypriot anti-​colonial struggle of EOKA was suppressed by the British government along with the police of force of the island, which was comprised mainly by members of the Turkish Cypriot community. The police force, as one of the most fundamental elements in the state apparatus of oppression, was chosen by the British government to be composed overwhelmingly by the members of the minority community of Cyprus. The local personnel employed in the police force during the period in question is shown in Tables 4.4 to 4.16. Table 4.4 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1922

Officers NCOs: sergeants Corporals Troopers and privates Total

Greeks63

Turks

Catholic

Armenian

British

Total

8 19 24 342 393

9 24 15 476 524

2 1

–​

3 6

3 3

7 –​ –​ –​ 7

26 44 39 824 933

Note: NCO = non-​commissioned officer. Source: TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928).64

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Table 4.5 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1924

Officers NCOs: sergeants Corporals Troopers and privates Total

Christian

Muslim

British

Total

10 15 12 315 352

9 19 21 364 413

4 –​ –​ –​ 4

23 34 33 679 769

Source: TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928).65

Table 4.6 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1925

Officers NCOs: district sergeant majors Sergeants Corporals Troopers and privates Total

Christian

Muslim

British

Total

10 5 11 12 340 378

9 8 10 21 337 385

4 –​ –​ –​ –​ 4

23 13 21 33 677 767

Source: TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928).66

Table 4.7 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1926

Officers NCOs: district sergeant majors Sergeants Corporals Troopers and privates Total

Christian

Muslim

British

Total

10 6 12 13 379 420

9 8 8 20 296 341

4 –​ –​ –​ –​ 4

23 14 20 33 675 765

Source: TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928).67

Table 4.8 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1930

Officers NCOs: district sergeant majors Sergeants Corporals Troopers and privates Total Source: TNA: CO 69/​40 (1930).68

Christian

Muslims

British

Total

9 8 9 21 380 427

9 6 11 12 300 338

4 –​ –​ –​ –​ 4

22 14 20 33 680 769

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Table 4.9 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1931 Christian Officers 10 NCOs: district sergeant majors 6 Sergeants 10 Corporals 23 Troopers and privates 380 Total 429

Muslim

British

Total

8 8 10 10 293 329

4 –​ –​ –​ –​ 4

22 14 20 33 673 762

Source: TNA: CO 69/​42 (1933).69

Table 4.10 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1932 Christian Officers 10 NCOs: district sergeant majors 7 Sergeants 10 Corporals 23 Troopers and privates 367 Total 417

Muslim

British

Total

8 7 10 10 287 322

4 –​ –​ –​ –​ 4

22 14 20 33 654 743

Source: TNA: CO 69/​42 (1933).70

Table 4.11 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1934

Officers NCOs Troopers Privates Total

Christian

Muslim

Other

Total

9 39 131 219 398

8 26 75 182 291

1 1 1 10 13

18 66 207 411 702

Source: TNA: CO 69/​43 (1936).71

Table 4.12 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1935 Christian Officers 7 Sergeant-​majors and sergeants 46 Constables (M) 136 Constables (F) 222 Total 411 Source: TNA: CO 69/​43 (1936).72

Muslim

Other

Total

10 20 72 197 299

1 1 1 17 20

18 67 209 436 730

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Table 4.13 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1936

Officers Sergeant majors and sergeants Constables (M) Constables (F) Total

Christian

Muslim

Other

Total

6 45 142 219 412

8 21 68 186 283

1 1 1 28 31

15 67 211 433 726

Source: TNA: CO 69/​43 (1936).73

Table 4.14 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1937

Officers Sergeant majors and sergeants Constables (M) Constables (F) Totals

Christian Orthodox

Muslim

Other

Total

6 44 121 225 396

8 21 74 182 285

1 1 –​ 27 29

15 66 196 434 710

Source: TNA: CO 69/​45 (1939).74

Table 4.15 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1938

Officers Sergeant majors and sergeants Constables (M) Constables (F) Totals

Christian Orthodox

Muslim

Other

Total

6 47 119 234 406

8 25 61 193 287

1 1 –​ 27 29

15 73 180 454 722

Source: TNA: CO 69/​45 (1939).75

Table 4.16 Religious denominations of Cypriot personnel of the police force, 31 December 1939

Officers Sergeant majors and sergeants Constables (M) Constables (F) Totals Source: TNA: CO 69/​45 (1939).76

Christian Orthodox

Muslim

Other

Total

5 48 125 237 415

9 25 60 205 299

1 1 –​ 26 28

15 74 185 468 742

68

68  Social and economic context 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1922 1924 1925 1926 1930 1931 1932 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 Muslims

Greeks

Figure 4.1 Share of Cypriot communities in police force personnel, 1922–​1939

During the course of 1928 the police force recruited 65 Cypriots. From these 65, 27 were members of the Muslim community and 38 were from the Christian community. Their enlistment brought the total number of ‘other ranks’ up to 746.19 Analysing the data from the tables above, it is worth noting that, until 1922, the official statistics made use of the term ‘Greek’ as a national denomination. From 1923 this adjective completely disappeared, and was replaced by the religious ‘Christian’ or ‘Christian Orthodox’. However, in the case of the Muslim community the same religious denomination was used throughout the period in question. Analysing the share of the Muslim Cypriots in police employment during this period, we find that, though the population of the Muslim community comprised less than one-​fifth of the population of the island, 40 per cent of those employed were Muslims. The decrease in the absolute number of the Muslim Cypriots was mainly due to the pressure of the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council. The Greek Cypriot press has often raised awareness of this issue, highlighting the disproportional representation of the communities in the state apparatus. This issue often appeared in the Greek press as an epitome of the asymmetrical relations between the British government in Cyprus and the two communities on the island.

Press and ‘print capitalism’ Benedict Anderson, in his classic study on nationalism, stresses the role of the press in the formation of an imagined community.20 Anderson coins the term ‘print capitalism’ to highlight the importance of the use of the rapid use of the printing press by capitalist markets. The publication of daily newspapers creates a new public sphere in which the nation can be imagined. As

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Social and economic context 69 literacy levels were quite low, the newspapers addressed only a section of the community. One of the most important functions of the newspapers and the printed press has been the standardisation of the vernacular language. In the case of Cyprus, they played a key role in popularising the new Turkish alphabet. Nationalist papers such as Söz (‘Statement’) immediately adopted the Kemalist reformed language and offered language lessons to their readers in order to smooth the transition. The circulation numbers are only indicative (Tables  4.18 and 4.19) of the principal publications of the period. Yet the readership should have been much higher. As has been observed in later periods, kahvehane (coffee houses in villages) used to have a copy that could be read by various gatherers. Nevertheless, the kahvehane have been one of the most significant public meeting places restricted to men across Cyprus, performing a special role in the socio-​economic organisation of the villages. So the readership should have been much higher per copy. In the late nineteenth century there were few publications in Turkish, such as Saded, Kipris, Zemen, that were circulated not only in Cyprus but also in Turkey and other places such as Egypt, Russia, France, Austria, Britain, Bulgaria and India. However, it was during the interwar period that the Turkish press gradually gained prominence. The nationalist Söz began publication in 1921, with its editor, Remzi Okan, very vociferous in advocating Kemalism on the island. One of the most important newspapers that represented the traditionalist section of the community was Masum Millet (‘Innocent People’). Even in the early 1930s it continued to use the Ottoman alphabet, resisting the adoption of the romanised Turkish alphabet. The internal division of the community can be observed also in the polemic editorials of the Turkish press, which projected the rivalry between the Kemalists and the traditionalists. The British government in Cyprus understood the importance of the newspapers in spreading nationalist ideology. Since the 1930s the government in Cyprus had been planning the introduction of a law in order to amend and consolidate the Law relating to the Printing and Publication of Newspapers and other Publications and to provide for the registration of books and the keeping of printing presses.21 The events of 1931 and the imposed authoritarian regime that followed accelerated the introduction of laws for censoring and suppressing the local press. In May 1930 a new press law was introduced. It established requirements over the ownership of newspapers. It required the editors of newspapers to show that they were ‘of good character’ and to give an incredibly large amount of money, £200, as a guarantee. This had a large impact, especially on smaller publications, which were the ones chiefly affected by this law. For instance, the communist Neos Anthropos paper had to temporarily cease publication in August 1930.22 In 1934 new press laws introduced ever tougher requirements for the publication of newspapers. They empowered the colonial secretary ‘in his

70

newgenrtpdf

Table 4.17 Principal publications in Turkish, 1919–​1929

Doğru Yol Vatan Ershad Ankebut Söz

1919

1920

W 1,200 W 800 M 500

W 1,200 W 800 M 460 300

Daou Hakikat Birlik Notes: W = weekly; M = monthly. Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

1921

1922

1923

1924

1925

W 800 M 400 310 W 1,200

W 800 W 800 M 400 310 W 1,200 W 600

W 800 W 800

W 800 W 800

W 800 W 800

W 1,200 W 1,000 W 600

310 W 1,200 W 600 W 1,000

1926

1927

1929

W 1,200

W 1,200

W 1,000

W 1,000

W 1,000 W 600

W 1,000 W 600

W 1,000 W 700

W 1,000 W 700

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Social and economic context 71 discretion’ to act on behalf of ‘the public interest’ by either suspending newspapers or cancelling their permits. The proprietor of every newspaper had to deliver to the colonial secretary a copy of every newspaper within three days of its publication.23 The colonial secretary could also ask newspaper editors to publish statements or corrections free of charge. However, the strict control and censorship was eased a little with an amendment in May 1936.24 The 1934 press law amendment is very indicative of the activities of the Turkish Cypriot Press.25 In particular, in spite of the censorship that the press laws had increased, editors of certain newspapers continued their critique of the British government. Governor Richmond Palmer, in a letter to Sir Philip Cunliffe-​Lister dated 5 January 1934, expressed his concerns about the constant violation of the existing press laws by the publication of ‘tendentious articles displaying the country as bleeding and oppressed’.26 Palmer requested an amendment to the press law that would give the governor even greater power in censoring publications. In this despatch, Palmer enclosed ten translated extracts from various newspapers’ articles in order to illustrate his concerns over the hostile attitude of the press towards his government. He chose to include only extracts from Greek Cypriot newspapers, namely Chronos, Aletheia, Proini, Neon Ethnos, Protevousa and Phoni tis Kyprou, with not a single one from the Turkish Cypriot press.27 All the extracts were pointed at a veiled hostility towards the government. It is well worth noting here the perceptions of the governor regarding the propaganda power of the press. Palmer considered that the Cypriot population in urban and rural areas, which was ‘largely uneducated’, ‘drink in and believe what they are told by the editors whose views do not in reality represent any definite “public opinion”, but are simply vehicles for disseminating ill-​will and personal spite’.28 In 1937 the British government in Cyprus rejected Mehmet Rifat’s application for permission to republish the Masum Millet newspaper on the grounds that he was against the British government. The interesting thing is that the commissioner’s report stated that Rifat was ‘against religion, in favour of Communism and at the same time a member of the so-​called Turkish National Council’.29 Masum Millet had ceased publication in 1934 (see Tables 4.17 and 4.18 for the principal Turkish-​language publications in this period). Rifat, an advocate, applied for permission to revive the publication, stating in his cover letter to the colonial secretary that ‘the Turkish newspapers’ were ‘monopolized by certain irresponsible and obscure persons to the detriment of the Muslim Community’. He added that he couldn’t tolerate any more the ‘continuation of the poisonous propaganda’. Although Rifat’s application complied with almost all the typical preconditions, the report of the commissioner, R. S. O. Wagner, suggested that he was ‘not a fit and proper person to publish a newspaper’.30 Hitherto his newspaper had not been of public interest. Wagner reported that Rifat was known to be ‘anti-​Government and has been publishing articles against religion and in favour of Communism’. He had also reportedly been a member of the so called Turkish National Council. Wagner characterised Rifat as ‘neurasthenic and irresponsible, hence his mania for

72

72  Social and economic context Table 4.18 Principal publications in Turkish, 1930–​1937

Söz Hakikat Masum Millet

1930

1931

1932

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

W 1,000 W 1,000

W 970 W 420 W 720

W 830 W 330 W 400

D 830

B 1,150

B 1,600

B 1,600

B 1,200

W W 650–​750 1,000

W 1,000

Haber

B 400

Ses

B 500

Notes: W = weekly; M = monthly; B = biweekly; D = daily. Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

Table 4.19 Immigrants and emigrants, 1922–​1938

1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

Immigrants

Emigrants

7,385 4,562 4,733 5,767 6,558 6,044 7,537 7,970 7,715 7,586 8,497 8,995 9,471 10,214 11,787 12,469

4,359 (visas) 5,392 (visas) 7,526 (visas) 7,000 7,175 8,543 7,743 9,210 7,230 6,939 8,678 9,890 9,868 10,800 12,417 13,027

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

attacking the Government and his religion’.31 This instance illustrates the evolution of the relationship between the British government in Cyprus with the traditionalist section of the Muslim Cypriots during the period in question.

Emigration to Anatolia The importance of the acquisition of Turkish citizenship by Muslim Cypriots after the 1923 Lausanne treaty is threefold. Firstly, it depicts the stance of the newly founded Turkish Republic towards the Muslim community of

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Social and economic context 73 the former Ottoman space. Secondly, it illustrates the desire of the Muslim Cypriots to be included in the newly founded Turkish Republic. Thirdly, and most importantly for this book, it demonstrates the British strategy on the island, and in particular the significance of the continuation of the existence of the Muslim minority. The importance of the Lausanne treaty for Cyprus and in particular the relationship between the British rule and the Muslim community of the island was immense. The time frame of this book is demarcated by the turning point of the 1923 treaty. In the aftermath of the First World War the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres was signed between the victorious principal Allied powers (the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan), the principal powers of Armenia, Belgium, Greece, the Hedjaz (a region in the present-​day state of Saudi Arabia), Poland, Portugal, Rumania, the Serb-​Croat-​Slovene state and Czechoslovakia, on the one hand, and, on the other, the defeated Turkey. Three articles concerned Cyprus provided that Turkey recognised the annexation of the island by Britain and renounced all rights and title over or relating to Cyprus, including the right to the ‘tribute’ formerly paid by that island to the sultan. Article 117 held that ‘Turkish nationals born or habitually resident in Cyprus will acquire British nationality and lose their Turkish nationality, subject to the conditions laid down in the local law’.32 There was no provision for Muslim Cypriots to opt for Turkish nationality and emigrate to Turkey. However, following the Turkish victory during the ‘Turkish-​Greek war’ (1919–​1922), the Treaty of Sèvres was replaced by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which included a provision for the right of the Muslim Cypriots to choose their residence and nationality. By the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne and the subsequent nationality legislation in the various mandated states, habitual residents of the territories separated from Ottoman rule who were Ottoman subjects automatically became Cypriots, Palestinians, Syrians, etc. However, they could opt to become Turkish citizens, having two years to exercise the option and being required to take up residence in Turkey if they did so. However, it is questionable if significant numbers of Cypriots exercised this option. Suha Bolukbasi states that over 9,000 Muslim Cypriot left the island for Turkey.33 However, Costas Kyrris claims that the number of Cypriots who opted to leave the island for Anatolia was about 5,000.34 Kyrris argues that, soon after 1928, many of them returned to the island, frustrated by the poor conditions they had encountered in Anatolia. Kyrris points out the clear instructions Turkey had sent to the first Turkish consul, Assaf Bey, appointed to the island. These directions promoted the policy of Turkey in the 1920s, in terms of campaigning for Muslim populations to migrate to the new-​founded republic. This policy of Ataturk’s implemented the principles articulated in the National Pact (Misaki-​Milli). Turkey realised that it was highly unlikely that the British presence on the island would be terminated soon and that, consequently, the union of the island with Greece impossible. So the priority in the 1920s was to bring to Anatolia as many Muslim Cypriots as possible.

74

74  Social and economic context Accordingly, Assaf Bey actively encouraged Muslim Cypriots to emigrate to Anatolia.35 The annual reports that the British government of Cyprus issued are indicative of the numbers emigrating to Anatolia in the 1920s (Table 4.19). However, all the numbers are tentative. There are difficulties in estimating the exact numbers of emigrants from Cyprus to the newly founded Turkish Republic, and also the numbers of those who eventually returned to the island. Up until 1924 the number of emigrants was simply estimated by the visas issued. Article 16 of the Lausanne treaty was not the only one that Britain did not fully respect and subsequently violated its provision.36 There was also article 21, which gave Cypriots the choice to opt for Turkish nationality on some conditions. The article reads as follows: ARTICLE 21. Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the 5th November, 1914, will acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the local law, and will thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. They will, however, have the right to opt for Turkish nationality within two years from the coming into force of the present Treaty, provided that they leave Cyprus within twelve months after having so opted. Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on the coming into force of the present Treaty who, at that date, have acquired or are in process of acquiring British nationality in consequence of a request made in accordance with the local law, will also thereupon lose their Turkish nationality. It is understood that the Government of Cyprus will be entitled to refuse British nationality to inhabitants of the island who, being Turkish nationals, had formerly acquired another nationality without the consent of the Turkish Government.37 In order to understand the significance of article 21 of the Lausanne treaty, we should take into account the demographics of the newly founded Turkish Republic at that time. In 1923 the British War Office issued a special intelligence report asserting that Turkey, after its victory in the Turkish–​Greek war, was obliged to establish peace as it was literally ‘bankrupted in men’.38 The vast decrease in the population of Turkey in the short period of eight years of conflict (1914 to 1922)  had been dismaying. For generations the purely Turkish population had been rapidly decreasing. The eight years of warfare had caused a marked decrease in the number of births, apart from the numbers who had been killed or died on active service.39 On the other hand, the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, which had produced the money for the sinews of war of the Turkish government, ‘had been decimated by massacre, or removed bodily by deportation’.40 It was estimated that in 1923 the population of Anatolia was ‘probably only 30% of what it was in 1914’.41

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Social and economic context 75 Therefore, there was an urgent need for the newly founded Republic of Turkey to boost its population by encouraging the Muslims who remained outside its borders to emigrate there.42 For those Cypriots who had emigrated to Turkey the issue was making the final decision either to opt for Turkish nationality or Cypriot, according to the clauses of article 21 of the Lausanne treaty. The internal correspondence of the Colonial Office illustrates the British concerns about this issue. In 1927 G. Hazlerigg, an official at the Colonial Office, gave a report to J. Risley and Arthur Dawe regarding the general question raised by the Cypriot optants for Turkish nationality who then chose to return to the island.43 Hazlerigg said that at that moment it appeared to be that, out of 9,000 ‘odd persons’ who had opted for Turkish nationality, only 2,500 to 3,000 had actually left Cyprus to go to Turkish territory. There was, therefore, as the Foreign Office had observed, ‘a Turkish Colony of some 5,000 or 6,000 people in the island who, for this and the succeeding generation, may be a source of anxiety to the authorities’.44 The Foreign Office concluded that this was ‘clearly not desirable if it can be avoided’, but wondered: ‘[I]‌t would not be possible for those who opted during the period laid down to cancel their options?’45 The emigration of Muslims to Anatolia continued during 1926, but on a smaller scale than in previous years, the right to opt for Turkish nationality provided by the Treaty of Lausanne having terminated on 6 August that year. The annual report on the colony of Cyprus stated that, by that date, ‘some 3,000 Turks had availed themselves of the right’.46 The pro-​Kemalist Cypriot newspaper Söz was calling for emigration to Anatolia, where ‘employment has increased and labourers are in great demand’.47 Söz encouraged Cypriots not to emigrate to London or Australia but to Turkey, saying that, ‘in Turkey, conditions of living and climate’ were ‘almost the same as in Cyprus. And we wonder whether the labourers in Cyprus cannot establish an Association and seek for employment in Turkey through the medium of the Government of Cyprus.’48 The British government attempted to do whatever it could to retain the Muslim population on the island. Accordingly, in violation of the previous arrangements, it facilitated the passage of Muslim Cypriots who regretted opting for a Turkish nationality. In 1930 a law published in The Cyprus Gazette gave the option even to those Muslim Cypriot who had acquired Turkish nationality under article 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne but had not moved to Turkey to apply for British nationality.49 In the 1930s the deteriorating economic situation made living conditions tough for the vast bulk of the island’s population. Although in 1927 Cyprus was relieved of the ‘tribute’ (debt charge), Cypriots resented the heavy tax burdens. The Muslim community was very affected by the tough economic conditions. In many cases the situation had deteriorated so much that soup kitchens had to be set up for food relief.50 According to Söz, in 1933 a whole village had applied to the republic for permission to emigrate to Turkey. According to the same source, Turkey replied by granting their request and informing them that they would be

76

76  Social and economic context settled at Elaziz and that land would be allotted to them.51 Söz predicted that it was likely more villages would seek similar solutions. However, the British government set great impediments to these emigration flows. As a British subject, each emigrant would be asked to furnish security of £50. This amount of money was extremely high for ordinary people to collect and therefore it was impossible for them to pay it.52 Throughout the 1930s the Turkish government considered persons who opted for Turkish nationality under the Treaty of Lausanne to be Turkish subjects whether they had left within 12 months of their option or not. The attention of the Turkish government was drawn to a publication of a notice in The Cyprus Gazette in 1930.53 Governor Richmond Palmer, in his correspondence with the Colonial Office, constantly repeated his anxiety at the possibility of losing the precious support of the Muslim community deriving from the continuation of British rule. Considering the local implications of and possible reactions to large-​scale emigration to Turkey, Palmer concluded that it was ‘desirable as far as properly may be done, to discourage any considerable proportion of the Muslim element and its racial composition’.54 In addition, Palmer argued that the wider political considerations dictated doing nothing which would ‘weaken the part which the Turk played in the racial composition of the island’.55 Palmer continued by suggesting the he was very anxious that ‘every effort should be made to retain within its shores the whole of the present industrious, loyal and hardworking, albeit poor, Muslim community’.56 In 1935 H. T. Allen, in a letter addressed to the Under-​Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote that it would, for political reasons, be undesirable, in Ramsay MacDonald’s view, to enact legislation of the nature suggested –​i.e. to influence the optants for Turkish nationality within the period prescribed in the treaty.57 The political reasons that Allen was referring to were the continuation of the existence of the Muslim minority on the island. It is worth noting that the British were also concerned with the emigration of Cypriots to Britain.58 Of course, their reasons were very different from those that made them worried about emigration to Turkey. Cypriot immigration into the United Kingdom was highly undesirable because of their poor and humble background. They could create some barriers to this immigration but they could not ban it in any way. Reports from the Metropolitan Police in London regarding the poor and humble life of Cypriots in the capital of the empire, along with the racist English perceptions, were taken into consideration by British officials in Cyprus in order to restrain and discourage the wave of immigration.59 In 1936 the governor of Cyprus requested the British Home Office to give him an account of all Cypriots arriving in the United Kingdom in that year.60

Conclusion In this chapter of the book, I  have analysed the social context wherein the transformation in the collective identity of the Muslim community took place. The advent of British rule gradually altered the Cypriot society and economy.

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Social and economic context 77 Due to British initiatives and policies, the predominantly agricultural nature of the economy began a slow transformation. The development of a system of roads that connected the main towns with most of the villages facilitated communication and urbanisation. The growth of ‘print capitalism’ offered a public space for the Muslim Cypriot community to imagine a nation. Furthermore, the British stance regarding the massive emigration of Muslim Cypriots to Anatolia in the 1920s is very important in demonstrating the significance of the continuing existence of a sizeable Muslim Cypriot community for the perpetuation of British rule over the island. Still, a socio-​economic analysis alone that examines the formation of the national identity simply as a result of this social change is not sufficient to provide a fully comprehensive explanation of the transformation process. The analysis also needs to focus upon the political context within which the nationalism reigns. Therefore, it is imperative to look into the sphere of political action and organisation.

Notes 1 Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication:  An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1953). 2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. edn. (London: Verso, 2006). 3 David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity:  An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 204. 4 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd edn. 5 Rolandos Katsiaounis, “Social and Political Change in Cyprus, 1878–​ 1924”, in Yearbook of the Centre of Scientific Research (Nicosia:  Centre of Scientific Research, 1995). 6 Michael A.  Attalides, Social Change and Urbanization in Cyprus:  A  Study of Nicosia (Nicosia: Publications of Social Research Centre, 1981). 7 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no.  1895:  Cyprus Report for 1938 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1939). 8 Ibid. 9 Alexis Rappas, “The Elusive Polity: Imagining and Contesting Colonial Authority in Cyprus during the 1930s”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 26, no. 2 (2008): 363–​97. 10 Ibid. 11 B. J. Surridge, Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus: Based on Reports of Investigators Who Visited Villages throughout the Colony during 1927 and 1928, and Amplified by Statistical and Other Information from the Records of Government (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1930), 2. 12 J. B. Greaves, Report on Economic Conditions in Cyprus and Malta with a Note on the Trade of Gibraltar (London: HM Stationery Office, 1935), 32. 13 R. Oakden, Report on the Finances and Economic Resources of Cyprus (London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1935). 14 TNA: CO 67/​226/​15 (1928) “Nationalities of Members of the Civil Establishment”. Letter from R.  Nicholson, officer administering the government of Cyprus, to L. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 5 October 1928.

78

78  Social and economic context 15 TNA: CO 67/​223/​17 (1928) “Pan-​Hellenic Propaganda; Foreign Maps in Cyprus”. Enclosure entitled “Summary of Articles ‘Impressions of Cyprus’ by Stephanos Harmidi, in a despatch from Percy Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain, published in Eleftheron Vema”, dated 11 May 1928. 16 TNA: CO 67/​240/​2 (1931) “Appointment of Cypriots to Fill Higher Posts in the Government Service of the Colony”. Cowell internal CO correspondence, dated 6 August 1931. 17 Ibid. 18 Cyprus State Archives [henceforth CSA]:  SA1 486/​ 1931  “Unemployment in Cyprus”. 19 TNA: CO 67/​230/​1 (1929) “Annual Report, 1928”. Annual report on the colony of Cyprus for the year 1928, prepared by the government of Cyprus, sent enclosed with the letter from Sir Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 December 1929. 20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. edn. (London: Verso, 2006). 21 TNA: CO 67/​235/​5 (1930) “Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses Law, 1930”. 22 It was circulated for the second time from January 1930 to August 1930. 23 Cyprus Gazette, no. 2370, 1 June 1934, pp 367–​380. 24 Cyprus Gazette, no. 2515, 22 May 1936, pp 343–​350. 25 TNA: CO 67/​254/​10 (1934) “Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses (Amendment) Law, 1934”. Press law amendment 1934. 26 TNA: CO 67/​254/​10 (1934) “Newspaper, Books and Printing Presses (Amendment) Law, 1934”. Letter from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 5 January 1934. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 CSA: SA1 610-​1931-​1 “Massum Millet –​Innocent Community”. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Murat Metin Hakki, ed., The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878–​2007 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007), 6. 33 Suha Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World:  Turkish–​ American Relations and Cyprus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 22. 34 Costas P. Kyrris, Cyprus, Turkey and Hellenism (in Greek) (Nicosia: Lampousa, 1980), 105. 35 Kızılyürek, Cyprus: The Deadlock of Nationalisms (in Greek). 36 In the 1950s Britain invited Turkey to take part in talks about the future of Cyprus, in a move that was against the Lausanne Treaty. It is still questionable how and why the Greek side accepted this violation of the treaty. It was most probably one of the significant turning point events in the history of the Cyprus issue. Article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty held that ‘Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty, and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned. The provisions of the present Article do not prejudice any special arrangements arising from neighbourly relations which have been or may be concluded between Turkey and any limitrophe countries.’ Hakki, ed., The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878–​2007, 7.

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Social and economic context 79 37 Ibid. 38 TNA: WO 157/​1310 (1923) “Turkey: A History of the Nationalistic Movement, 1918–​1922; Volume 2”. War Office’s intelligence summary on “Turkey: a history of the Nationalistic Movement, 1918–​1922”. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Turkey’s stance on the Cypriot immigrants might have been influenced also by the widely spread rumour that Italy was planning to colonise the region of southern Anatolia with Italian emigrates. E. Kuran, “Turkish–​Greek Relations in Connection with the Cyprus Question, 1923–​1939”, in Cyprus International Symposium on Her Past and Present, ed. Ismail Hakki Mirici (Famagusta:  Yuksekogretim Printing House, 1994). For more on this issue, see: George S. Georghallides, “Turkish and British Reactions to the Emigration of the Cypriot Turks to Anatolia, 1924–​ 1927”, Balkan Studies 18, no. 1 (1977): 43–​52. 43 TNA:  CO 67/​221/​11 (1927) “Return to Turkey of Cypriots Opting for Turkish nationality”. 44 TNA: CO 67/​221/​11 (1927) “Cypriots Opting for Turkish Nationality”. 45 Ibid. 46 TNA: CO 67-​220-​2 (1926) “Annual Report 1926”. 47 CSA: SA1 517/​1926/​2 “Newspapers Articles, Söz”. Söz, no. 974, 28 July 1936. 48 Ibid. 49 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Extract from the Cyprus Gazette of 24 January 1930. ‘No. 94. OPTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE. It is hereby notified for the general information that the Secretary of State for the Colonies has intimated that persons, who opted for Turkish nationality under Article 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne but failed to leave Cyprus within twelve months of having so opted in accordance with the provisions of the same Article, are not considered by His Majesty’s Government to have acquired Turkish nationality. All such persons may therefore, if they so desire and being otherwise eligible, apply for a certificate of British nationality under the Cyprus (Annexation) Amendment Orders in Council, 1914–​1929.’ 50 For instance, for the establishment of a soup kitchen in Limassol, see:  Embros, no. 38, dated 15 February 1937. 51 CSA: SA1 517/​1926/​2 “Newspapers Articles, Söz”. Söz, no. 693, 27 December 1933. 52 Ibid. 53 TNA: CO 67/​265/​14 (1936) “Cypriot Optants for Turkish Nationality”. Internal CO correspondence, dated 9 June 1936. 54 TNA:  CO 67/​ 265/​ 14 (1936) “Cypriot Optants for Turkish Nationality”. Confidential letter from Richmond Palmer to J.  H. Thomas, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 10 January 1936. Palmer wrote: ‘In the interval which has subsequently elapsed whilst the national status of optants for Turkish nationality under the provisions of Article 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne has been under discussion in London, I have been able fully to consider the local implications and possible reactions of a large scale emigration to Turkey; and my conclusion is that it is desirable so far as proportion of the Muslim element in its racial composition.’ 55 Ibid.

80

80  Social and economic context 56 Ibid. Palmer wrote: ‘In addition wider political considerations make it desirable to do nothing which would weaken the part which the Turk plays in the racial composition of the Island and I am anxious that every effort should be made to retain within its shores the whole of the present industrious, loyal and hardworking, albeit poor, Moslem community.’ 57 TNA:  CO 67/​ 260/​ 19 (1935) “Status of Cypriots Who Opted for Turkish Nationality”. Letter from Allen to the Under-​Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 23 October 1935. 58 TNA:  CO 67/​ 260/​ 7 (1935) “Control of Cypriot Immigration to the United Kingdom”. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. G.  B. W.  Alfie, the Under-​Secretary of State, Aliens Department, Home Office, letter to N. L. Mayle, the Under-​Secretary of State, Colonial Office, dated 11 July 1936. 61 It is very interesting to see the use of the term ‘race’. TNA: CO 67/​226/​15 (1928) “Nationalities of Members of the Civil Establishment”. Letter from R. Nicholson, officer administering the government of Cyprus, to L. Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 5 October 1928. 62 C. H.  Hart-​Davis, Report of the Census of 1931 (Nicosia:  Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1932), 2. 63 The last time they use the national adjective rather than religious denomination for police personnel. 64 TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1922, prepared by A. E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1923. 65 TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1924, prepared by A.  E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1925. 66 TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1925, prepared by A.  E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1926. 67 TNA: CO 69/​38 (1928) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1926, prepared by A.  E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1927. 68 TNA: CO 69/​40 (1930) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1930, prepared by A.  E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1931. 69 TNA: CO 69/​42 (1933) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1931, prepared by A.  E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1932. 70 TNA: CO 69/​42 (1933) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1932, prepared by A.  E. Callagher, chief commandant of Cyprus Military Police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1933.

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Social and economic context 81 71 TNA: CO 69/​43 (1936) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1934, prepared by W. C. C. King, chief commandant of police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1935. 72 TNA: CO 69/​43 (1936) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1935, prepared by W. C. C. King, chief commandant of police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1936. 73 TNA: CO 69/​43 (1936) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1936, prepared by W. C. C. King, chief commandant of police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1937. 74 TNA: CO 69/​45 (1939) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1937, prepared by W.  S. Gulloch, commissioner of police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1938. 75 TNA: CO 69/​45 (1939) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1938, prepared by W.  S. Gulloch, commissioner of police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1939. 76 TNA: CO 69/​45 (1939) “Administration Reports”. Report on the Cyprus Police Force for the year 1939, prepared by J.  H. Ashmore, commissioner of police, printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office, 1940.

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5  Ideological and cultural context

Introduction In the historical materialism of Karl Marx, ideology served as the justification of the dominant class and the tranquillisation of the workers to accept their misery and exploitation. Hence ideas, ideology and consciousness are all constructed.1 Consciousness and ideology are products of the material mode of life. This mode of life, and also the being of individuals, are formed from the material conditions of their production. In other words, material life determines consciousness, and not the other way around. Marx held that all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness and ideas arise from the material production of life itself.2 Marx held that the total of the productive forces, capital funds and social forms of intercourse –​i.e. the conditions of life (which different generations find in existence) –​determines the real basis of what philosophers have conceived of as ‘substance’ and the ‘essence of man’.3 The changes and the shifts in history take place only when the material elements alter, while the momentum that ideas gain is only a product of this process. Marx, in expressing criticism of the dominant German ideology and idealism, made it clear that there is no difference between German idealism and the ideology of all the other nations, as it was also perceived by the latter that the world is dominated by ideas that are the determining principles in history. Marx pointed out the flaws of the Hegelian world of ideas, in which ideas determine the material life. However, Louis Althusser in his magnum opus Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses criticises Marx’s approach in the German ideology. For Althusser, ideology has a material existence and always exists in an apparatus and its practice.4 Here, I examine ideology through state apparatuses such as educational institutions. Three main points are put forward in this chapter. First, it is shown that education was considered by the British government as the principal channel through which Greek nationalist ideas were transmitted, and therefore was a major concern. On the island two separate systems of education were running in parallel. In the 1920s the systems were supervised by separate boards of education. In the 1930s, with the imposition of the authoritarian regime, there

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Ideological and cultural context 83 was a fundamental change in the educational policy of the British government in Cyprus. Second, there was no higher education institution in Cyprus during the period in question. The Muslim elite wishing to pursue higher education had to emigrate to Turkey in order to study at university level. The British government in Cyprus preferred the Boğaziçi University /​Robert College in Istanbul instead of either British or Greek institutions for the training of the teachers in Cyprus. The case of the project to establish a British university in Cyprus illustrates the change in the strategy of the British government in the 1930s. Finally, a Turkish curriculum was adopted in the Muslim Cypriot schools of the island. The British educational policy was to the allow the separate boards of education for the two communities of the island to set their own curricula. This provision gave an opportunity to a major channel (along with the Turkish consulate) through which the dissemination of new secular ideas could occur.

Education as a political tool The role of education in the formation of a national identity is central. The Italian Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci, with his work on cultural hegemony, highlights the constructed truths that education and ‘common sense’ are consisted of. The Gramscian approach has been influential for a large amount of literature following a critical approach. Michel Foucault highlights the power–​knowledge nexus and argues that power is behind every relation.5 This anti-​foundational approach to knowledge necessitates investigating the power relations behind any constructed ‘truths’. This approach can be applied to changes in the readings of history, and especially official history. As we will see later in this chapter, the history textbooks in Cyprus during the period in question were changed in accordance with shifts in power. Frantz Fanon and Paolo Freire have highlighted the importance of the educational emancipation of the subordinate in their social struggles for liberation.6 Vladimir Lenin also wrote discourses on the need for the education of the masses. Lenin held that it was advocated by ‘the bourgeois gentry and the social reformists’ and it was actually used as ‘something that demoralizes the masses and imbues them with bourgeois prejudices’.7 Lenin supported that the view that the real education of the masses could never be separated from ‘the independent, the political, and particularly from the revolutionary, struggle of the masses themselves. Only the struggle educates the exploited class.’8 In the 1930s there was a significant shift in British educational policy. As with every successful instance of strategic planning, British rule adapted itself to the new circumstances.9 These new circumstances dictated a shift in policy towards promoting a British identity. This did not mean that the British abandoned the time-​honoured ‘divide and rule’ policy but that their educational policy changed to the promotion of British ideas and values. This change can be paralleled with a cultural propaganda campaign. The prominent scholar on propaganda Philip M. Taylor has written extensively

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84  Ideological and cultural context on British projection in the interwar period.10 Taylor highlights the role of two newly established institutions:  the British Council and the BBC. In the same realm, the prominent British historian of imperialism John MacKenzie, focusing on the imperial propaganda put out to British subjects, does not exclude education –​and, more precisely, school textbooks –​as a crucial area for the transmission of cultural propaganda.11 Both historians stress the threat of Italian propaganda in the eastern Mediterranean as a crucial driving force for the development of an assertive British cultural propaganda campaign in the region. Cultural propaganda campaigns have long been associated with projecting the ‘soft power’ of the state. The division of power into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ is merely analytical.12 The controversial term ‘soft power’, introduced into the field of international relations by Joseph Nye, highlights the importance of cultural and ideological influence in the pursuit of imperial imperatives.13 Nonetheless, the creation and maintenance of empires throughout history was initially based on ‘hard power’  –​i.e. political and economic power. In other words, even in classic imperialism the establishment of political power was sustained through the installation of meekly collaborative governments. It was therefore important to convince the subject colonies and people that the maintenance of imperial rule is beneficial for them.14 The compliance of the subjects has been a conditio sine qua non of imperialism. E. H.  Carr in his magnum opus The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–​1939, draws attention to power over opinion as one of the three interdependent types of power.15 In the same realm, Gramsci has introduced the notion of cultural hegemony. The inspirational philosopher argues that elites become dominant because ‘common sense’ knowledge serves their interests. Gramsci argues that power and domination are established not only through the projection of coercive force but also through the construction of shared values. The dominant does not impose the values but these are constantly negotiated between the dominant and the subordinate. As with hegemony, imperialism emerges from a base of consent. This Gramscian notion complements Marx’s approach on domination, as it elaborates on the diverse processes within the ‘superstructure’.16 Education has always been the channel through which this type of indoctrination is disseminated. The importance of a free and independent education is apparent in the seminal work of the Brazilian Marxist scholar Paolo Freire, The Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Freire attempts to shed light on the significance of the education of the people and subsequently the awareness of their rights.17 However, the point is:  who is going to preset the curriculum, who is going to specify what is wrong and what is right? This issue was at the epicentre of the study by the French philosopher Louis Althusser.18 Althusser argues that official educational institutions serve merely as ideological state apparatuses through which the official state ideology is enforced and maintained. Drawing from Althusser’s conceptualisation, Michel Foucault’s work takes things a little further. Foucault brackets schools along with prisons and hospitals as examples of disciplinary institutions.19

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Ideological and cultural context 85 Foucault advocates for the power–​knowledge nexus. Power, according to the French philosopher, is behind every single relationship.20 Therefore, we should always contextualise the knowledge in time and space. This spatial and temporal dimension should be accompanied by a power politics analysis. The power analysis is fundamental and essential; hence, we should analyse the power and what is at stake. Nevertheless, when someone is planning a strategy, he or she should take into consideration the goals, the means and, most importantly, the enemy, the obstacle, the threat whether potential or actual. Thus, it is of paramount importance for us to draw upon what was at stake for the British Empire at the time in question for this study. The need to control the curriculum and the ideas that the intellectual elites would encompass was apparent in British educational policy in Cyprus from the 1930s and onwards. As we saw in the review above, the relevant literature has highlighted that it is through educational institutions that the state tries to produce the appropriate identity and ideology of its subjects in order to establish the necessary broad base of consent. The educational policy adopted by the British during the period in question needs to be divided in two subperiods. The 1920s and the 1930s should be examined as separate phases. The demarcation line should be drawn on the 1931 riots, when British rule used the pretext of suppressing the Greek Cypriot uprising and established an authoritarian dictatorial regime, the so-​ called ‘Palmerocracy’. There a few studies on the Muslim educational system for this period.21 William Weir’s work on education in Cyprus since the advent of British rule is very enlightening. He argues that the British intentionally did not cut off the education of the Muslim community of Cyprus from Turkish influence.22 However, Weir highlights that, at the end of the nineteenth century, there was little constructive influence available from the Ottoman Empire, and education in Cyprus essentially drifted along.23 In the same vein, Panayiotis Persianis argues that the British colonial educational policy applied in Cyprus was an ‘adapted education’ policy, and was very much dependent on the will of the governed people.24 For Persianis, British rule in Cyprus can be divided into two subperiods regarding educational policies. In the first one, running from 1878 to 1931, the British government in Cyprus applied an explicit ‘adapted education’ policy.25 According to Persianis, the British government was mainly preoccupied with primary education. The British government objected to secondary education not only due to the financial cost but also because of the fear of spreading Greek nationalist propaganda.26 Stylianos Petrou argues that the British government intended to ‘turkify’ the Muslim community through education. Without grounding his claim on primary source research, Petrou argues that British rule in Cyprus gave financial support to the establishment and reorganisation of Muslim primary schools in order to construct a counterweight to contain the Greek national movement.27 Religious education in schools was also in decline as a result of the decreasing funding to the Evkaf since the British arrival in Cyprus.28

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86  Ideological and cultural context Early years of British educational policy Three years after the advent of the British rule on Cyprus two separate boards of education were set up. In the words of Canon F. D. Newham, chief inspector of schools, it was impracticable to join Greeks and Muslims on the same board for educational purposes, as there was a ‘great difference between the system of education, language, and the habits of two races’.29 The first Muslim Board of Education was composed of the chief secretary (a Briton), the Chief Kadi, the Mufti, one person appointed by the delegates of Evkaf, and six Muslims elected by the district committees.30 In 1883 Britain sent Edward Fairfield to Cyprus to produce a report on financial issues concerning the administration. Fairfield highlighted the ‘disproportionate amount spent upon Turkish schools as compared with that devoted to the Christians’.31 Newham in his report illustrated this fact by stating that the Muslim community, which comprised less than one-​fourth of the population of the island, received an annual grant three and a half times bigger than the one granted to the majority population, the Greeks.32 The Ottoman Empire also sent grants for students from the Muslim community of Cyprus. In particular, it was reported in 1904 that 12 Muslim schools for boys and one for girls had received no grant from the government but were ‘maintained by grants of about £250 a year from Constantinople, and from small grants from local mosque funds’.33 Weir notes that the religious influence was still dominant in the curriculum; that Ottoman history and geography were taught; but that there was nothing in the curriculum that directly concerned Cyprus.34 A long centralisation process began with the enforcement of the Education Law of 1905.35 The main reason the British government initiated this centralisation process was as an incentive to fight corruption on the part of the village committees in awarding teachers’ salaries.36 The centralisation of education was only eventually achieved in the 1930s with the imposition of the authoritarian regime, the so-​called ‘Palmerocracy’. Educational policies Like all political movements, nationalism requires an intellectual leadership. The relatively belated development of a national consciousness among the Muslims of Cyprus was due to the fact that they did not have a Turkish nationalist movement to attune themselves to until the Kemalist revolution in Turkey. The Ottoman Empire essentially collapsed after its defeat in the Russian–​Ottoman War in 1774. The ‘sick man of Europe’ was struggling to survive. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the rise of nationalism and revolts from various millets took place, reflecting their resentment. The sultan’s answer was a slew of reforms, granting some rights to the rebels. Tanzimat (Tanzimat-​I Hayriye, the Propitious Regulations) is the name given to the period from 1839 to 1856, in which a series of reforms attempted to give

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Ideological and cultural context 87 autonomy and rights to the millets and decentralise power in the Ottoman Empire in order to prevent its dissolution. Education was the channel through which nationalist ideology spread among the young generation of Muslim Cypriots. The dual education system that was established as part of the self-​styled liberal British policy permitted the educational system of Turkey to be employed in Cyprus. This ensured that Muslim children would be socialised into gradually becoming Turks. They were educated in schools that adopted Turkish curricula in the 1920s. The Turkish Board of Education was dominated by the Mufti. In the Muslim Cypriot schools a lot of hours traditionally were dedicated to religious instruction. However, following Kemal Ataturk’s reforms in Turkey, the curriculum in the Turkish Cypriot schools was directed to nurture the emerging Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. The members of the Muslim community of Cyprus had their national identity shaped through the courses of Turkish history and geography, boosting their awareness of Turkish roots, and they constructed in their imagination their roots with Anatolia. From 1923 onwards the young generation of Turkish Cypriots was consistently taught Kemal Ataturk’s ideas. However, in the 1920s the vast majority of members of the community remained against Ataturk’s reforms, as they were more traditionalists. Only a small minority were in favour of Ataturk’s reforms.37 In Cyprus, throughout the 1920s, Osmanli Turkish, ‘somewhat archaic and free from Persian and Arabic words’, was spoken by the Cypriot Muslims, who as a general rule were also conversant with Greek.38 The Muslim schools adopted the new Latin alphabet in 1928. From 1930 the new Turkish alphabet rapidly came into use, and it became obligatory for all official purposes in 1932.39 It is reported that in 1934 the romanised Turkish alphabet was in general use. In the 1930s evening classes in the new Turkish alphabet were being held at many Muslim secondary schools throughout the island, and, according to official British reports, these classes were very popular and well attended. The classes, delivered on a voluntary basis by the elementary schoolmasters, increased literacy rates among the Muslim community. The Turkish Cypriot educational system remained effectively under British control, unlike the Greek Cypriot one. Moreover, British control of the Evkaf,40 which was instrumental in funding and organising most of the schools, gave the British an important indirect mean of overseeing the educational affairs of the Muslim community. The rise in education and literacy rates accelerated this process of nationalisation among the Muslim Cypriots, for whom religious identity had long been the primary locus of identification. Even after the introduction of educational reforms in the 1930s and the increase in British control over the schools, the content of instruction in the most important areas related to nationalism did not alter. On the contrary, from the 1930s onwards new courses were introduced at the secondary level that facilitated more the formation of a ‘Westernised’ elite. During the period in question Britain allowed Turkey to develop channels of education that added velocity to the diffusion of nationalist

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88  Ideological and cultural context sentiment among the Muslim community of Cyprus. It was in the interests of the British to create a compelling Turkish Cypriot national identity so as to counterbalance the Greek Cypriot one. Nevertheless, education is probably the most significant tool for the modern state to normalise, discipline and control its power over society. It is through institutionalised educational system that in modern times the identity of the individual has been shaped. In the 1920s the British self-​styled their model of education as liberal due to the fact that they let the communities have some control over it. The events of 1931 marked the beginning of a new direction for British policies in the island. A turning point in the modern history of Cyprus was the violent events of October 1931. The Greek Cypriot revolt was succeeded by a period of authoritarian British rule. The British then ruled by decree, abolishing the constitution and centralising control of the educational systems in order to constrain the spread of Greek nationalist ideology. This also meant control of the Muslim educational system and restriction on the spreading of the Kemalist ideology. It is interesting to note that, in 1933, a Turkish Cypriot teacher and an ardent supporter of Kemalist ideology, Tekki Effendi, was dismissed from the post of schoolmaster in the village of Polis on the grounds that he was spreading political propaganda.41 According to the acting governor of Cyprus, Tekki Effendi was one of the leaders of the ‘Turkish National Congress’ movement in Cyprus.42 A 1920 law enabled the governor, on the recommendation of the Muslim Board of Education, to appoint teachers, with their salaries paid from direct taxation earmarked for education. Salaries were placed on a definite scale, and provision was made for retiring gratuities. Yet, with the 1929 law on elementary education, the schoolteachers were brought under the direct control of the British government. The government held the powers of appointment, promotion, dismissal and all disciplinary functions, and salaries were paid direct from revenue.43 By the 1930s the older generation of Turks was gradually disappearing and dwindling, and the younger generation, who were educated with the Turkish curricula, were tending to become more favourable to the Kemalist reforms. Nonetheless, the evident success of Ataturk’s revolution contributed to the steady development of national consciousness among the Muslim Cypriots.44 They began to feel that it was no longer shameful to be called a Turk, as it had been during the First World War. The history books that were taught from in the Muslim Cypriot schools were the same as in the Republic of Turkey. In 1933 Turkey celebrated the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the republic. The official history for the nourishment of Turkish intellects was described in a British report as ‘not only indigestible, but also conceit with which the modern Turk is so richly imbued’.45 A glimpse at the following summary of the main points of the official Turkish history, the use of which is obligatory in all schools, will make these harsh comments clear. The following summary is the work of Dr

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Ideological and cultural context 89 Resit Galip Bey, the former minister of public instruction of the Republic of Turkey. There are ten main points and themes underlying the official history. Firstly, the cradle of mankind is Central Asia. Life first began and evolved there. Secondly, the world’s first civilization was established in Central Asia by the Turkish race, the original people and first inhabitants. Thirdly, anthropologically, the brachycephalic Alpine type was representing the Turkish race. Fourthly, the large-​scale migrations resulting from the contact of Europe and Asia took place from east to west, not from west to east. Fifthly, the Turks spread to different territories in wholesale migrations, the principal causes of which were the droughts which occurred at various epochs in Central Asia with increasing severity; they established ancient civilizations in those places. These civilizations, with a common source and creator, developed according to the particular conditions of the new surroundings. Sixthly, the Turkish language is the mother tongue. The correct solution of philological problems is impossible without taking into consideration the paleontology, archaic structure and formations of the Turkish language. Seventhly, as in the case of ancient civilizations (wrongly referred to as Islamic civilization), the role of foundation and achievement in the civilization of more recent epochs belongs to the Turks. Eighthly, in view of the fact that its climate most nearly approached the climate of Central Asia, and that from the geographical point of view it formed a bridge leading to Syria, Palestine, Egypt, the Aegean and the continent of Europe, the plain of Anatolia became Turkicised towards the end of the Paleolithic age, and this process spread with maximum rapidity in the calcolithic [sic] age; by the end of the Selcuk era the currents of invasion and immigration which had flowed for thousands of years had made Anatolia, from the racial point of view, a stage representing Turkism in its purest and most unalloyed form, to such an extent that the ancient history of Turkism could be traced as much in Anatolia as in Central Asia.46 Galip Bey concludes [T]‌he ninth main theme was the inability of the Turkish nation during the last few centuries to fulfil its duty of historical guide in the progress and development if the world is an obstructive feature connected with obstructive caused and factors, though the racial setting which sets off the valuable and worthy jewels is sound. Once the factors of obstructive decadence were removed by a process of revolution, the Turkish nation will once more resume its definite and essential duty of lighting the path of the undying historical work of civilization and the progress of mankind. This may be expressed in the formula: ‘The Turkish nation has done, can do and will do.’ Finally, the tenth major theme underpinning the new

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90  Ideological and cultural context Turkish history was that because the analysis of the foregoing principles showed that, whereas the Ottoman theory of history neglected and denied the nation, the theory of Mustafa Kemal took the nation alone as its one subject, studies it, delves into it, makes it known, and selects formulae relating to its future exclusively from its history and past life. On the basis of this theory, nobody could say: ‘My origin goes back to Noah,’ or ‘I am descended from Ali or Veli,’ and in this way establish an ancestry by arranging his pedigree; nobody can establish false claims to pride of race if he ignores the Turkish nation. The Turkish nation alone is the foundation and origin.47 This lengthy quote indicates the main principles that the Turkish educational system was following in the 1930s. These maximal claims characterised the Turkish curricula that had been taught in Cyprus. Accordingly, the young generation of Cypriots were taught a historical narrative that had very particular racial claims.48 In the 1930s the British policy on education changed. The goal then was to introduce a ‘British atmosphere’,49 by assertively promoting British values and ideas throughout the educational systems. After this fundamental change in British educational policies, the Colonial Office proposed the creation of a history textbook written by a British academic.50 The intention was, again, to produce a British-​friendly version of the history of the island in order to teach it in the local schools. The plan was to establish a narrative of historical events that was favourable to the British imperial government. Eventually, in 1936, a British academic from Cambridge University, George Hill, was selected as the most appropriate to write this book on the history of British Cyprus.51 Hill was considered the most suitable scholar to undertake this task not only because he was a recognised historian but also because he was the last director of the British Museum who knew ‘Cyprus and its antiquities well’.52 This book would be intended to be the official version of the history of the island. The target audience would be not only academics but also the wider public. In 1937 the Foreign Office proposed also the preparation of a very short history of Cyprus for the general public and the tourists.53 George Hill suggested that the Foreign Office consider Sir Harry Luke as a potential author of the book.54 The Colonial Office also considered the British academic A. B. Steel, a history lecturer at Christ’s College in Cambridge University, as a potential author of the textbook. With this publication the Foreign Office aimed to reach an even wider audience. The concise book would not just be included in the reading course for pupils and teachers in the secondary schools; it would also be prescribed for local civil service examinations.55 Internal correspondence in the Colonial Office indicated its main concerns about the project of producing a Cyprus history textbook. Arthur Mayhew noted that the general aim of the book would be to develop an intelligent interest in the history and archaeology of Cyprus and to give such information on ‘the subject as any Cypriot who has undergone a course of secondary

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Ideological and cultural context 91 education ought to possess’.56 Mayhew’s proposal also reveals two important assumptions. On the one hand, the Colonial Office held that teaching of the history and archaeology of Cyprus was both ‘unsatisfactory in itself and biased in a Greek or Turkish sense for want of an objective textbook’. On the other hand, this textbook could be written only by a Briton with ‘some knowledge both of Cyprus and of general history and archaeology but not employed or resident in the island’.57 The fact that the scholar should appear to have no formal association with the British government in Cyprus was crucial, as the book would be promoted as a non-​partisan, unbiased and objective account. In 1936 the governor, Richmond Palmer, stressing the need for an ‘interesting authoritative short history of Cyprus’, pointed out that ‘Turkish history, since the changes in Turkey itself, has made extravagant claims both for the Turks themselves as a race, and for their language’.58 The Foreign Office considered it essential that the book should be written in close consultation with the Cyprus authorities. There were numerous exchanges of despatches in the Foreign Office regarding the author, the copyright and the publisher of the book. The Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies met at the beginning of 1937 in order to further discuss the project of writing a book about the history of Cyprus.59 There was an almost unanimous consensus on the publisher. The FO officials were very considered with the reception of the book by the locals. The main purpose of its existence was to address the Cypriots. The book ought to be published by a British publishing firm.60 A publication by the governor of Cyprus, which seemed to be suggested in the Colonial Office’s memorandum, would be open to objection in so far as it would create a local impression that the main object of the book was political propaganda.61 It was decided that the British government in Cyprus had to give an assurance to the selected publisher regarding the purchase of copies for a period of years, and also it was considered as essential to consult the local communities. Subsequently, the British government in Cyprus held discussions with leaders from both communities, namely Neoptolemos Paschalis, Solicitor-​General, and Mehmet Münir Bey, director of the Evkaf. Muslim Cypriot educational system: primary education Throughout the 1920s British government officials were very proud of the progress in the field of education since their arrival on the island. They never failed to mention the increase in numbers of both schools and scholars. In 1881 there had been only 170 schools, with 6,776 scholars, and total expenditure was £3,672. Four decades later the numbers had multiplied, with the number of schools increased to 762, 43,700 scholars and expenditure reaching £75,800 in 1921. However, during the period in question education remained voluntary. Since the 1920s various petitions by Cypriots had called on the British government to take the necessary steps to provide compulsory elementary education.62 After the 1931 events legislative provisions for the exercise

92

92  Ideological and cultural context of compulsory powers were made.63 The 1931 Compulsory Education Act, passed by the Legislative Council, provided that compulsion would gradually be introduced. However, the law was never enforced, due to the dire ‘financial conditions’.64 Since the advent of British rule in Cyprus control of the schools had been left in the hands of the various religious communities, which had their several governing bodies operating under the supervision of the Education Department.65 However, with the introduction of the 1933 law elementary education was directly controlled by the government in order to infuse a ‘British atmosphere’.66 Each religious community had an entirely separate system of schools. Classes in Christian and Maronite schools were taught in Greek while Muslim schools were taught in Turkish.67 The 1920 Elementary Educational Law for Muslim schools changed the system of raising funds for educational purposes. The method of local assessment was now taken by a ‘Central Education Fund raised by additions to the verghi kimat [land tax] and to the sheep and goat tax’.68 It provided that teachers should be appointed on the recommendation of the high commissioner of the Board of Education, and that their salaries should be fixed by the board. Of the total amount required to meet the expenditure on elementary education, the taxes referred to above were ‘graduated so as to produce approximately one half, the remainder to be found by the Government out of general revenue’.69 The 1920 Elementary Education Law was welcomed by the Muslim members of the Legislative Council as being necessary for the existence of the Muslim educational system.70 In contrast, the Greek members of the council opposed the law, and eventually the law was amended in order to exclude Greek schools. This arguably facilitated the closer cooperation of the Muslim Cypriots with the British government, as they were ‘most receptive to educational change’.71 In the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the 1920 law it was reported that the larger property and flock owners, who had to ‘pay more by way of school fees than under the old system to the relief of the poorer classes of tax payers’, complained to the British government.72 The Muslim community, seemingly well supplied with a large number of schools (Table 5.1), was actively pursuing two goals in order to improve the two areas in which the Muslim educational system needed support, namely school buildings and securing competent teachers. To these ends the Education Department of the British government in Cyprus actively worked both on improving school buildings as far as possible and on strengthening the system’s personnel.73 The 1927 memorandum on compulsory education prepared by Newham, the chief inspector of schools, described pupils’ attendance at school. More than one-​fifth of the Muslim male pupils did not attend school. The attendance for female Muslim pupils was extremely low, as more than four-​fifths of them did not attend school.74 The immensity of these figures can be illustrated by comparing with the figures for the Greek Cypriot community. Only 10 per

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Ideological and cultural context 93 cent of Greek male pupils and 40 per cent of Greek female pupils did not attend school.75 In 1933 section 8 of the Education Law provided for compulsory attendance at schools in areas that were prescribed by the governor. However, throughout the 1930s the law was not applied in any area in the island. The Söz newspaper wrote that the law on compulsory education was actually ‘an “Ideal Law”, which had no practicability’.76 However, Söz stressed that the law for compulsory attendance could not be applied unless the government raised extra expenditure in public estimates. Attendance in the towns was about 80 per cent but in the villages the attendance level was very low, on account of the economic circumstances.77 The Elementary Education Laws introduced between 1933 and 1937 proposed an extension of the powers of taxation for the local educational bodies of elementary schools.78 Since the late 1920s the British had begun to attach ‘considerable importance to the benefits derived from education’,79 and therefore took great interest in the administration of the schools. In 1926 the Annual Report of the British government in Cyprus gave an account of the primary education of the Muslim community.80 The two main problems facing the Muslim educational system were the quality of the school buildings and the supply of schools with adequate teaching staff. While the government was funding small projects in order to improve school buildings in the villages, the main issue was to maintain adequate staffing levels. The wave of emigration of Cypriots to Turkey in accordance with the provisions of article 21 of the 1923 Lausanne treaty also had serious repercussions for the educational system of the Muslim community. The reason was that in 1925 many of the teachers had left Cyprus for Turkey, in search of ‘further education and in the hope of obtaining superior appointments’.81 This caused a serious problem, as the number of qualified teachers in the Muslim community of Cyprus was very small. In order to cover the pressing needs, the British government had to temporarily re-​employ a few retired teachers. The Education Department had also recruited some new teachers, recent graduates from the Muslim Cypriot secondary schools. The erection of new school building and teachers’ residences made these posts more attractive too.82 Despite these efforts, the issues remained, in 1926 Dr Necmeddin Eyüb, as a member of the Board of Education sent a letter to the British governor stressing the need to initiate a programme for the improvement of Muslim elementary education.83 The ‘brain drain’ to Turkey in the 1930s was attributed by the Governing Body for Muslim Secondary Schools to three chief factors: the popular and political misrepresentation of the Muslim Cypriots; unsatisfactory headmasters; and the ‘absorptive capacity of Turkey for promising Muslim Cypriots (who seemed to have compared well with the products of lycées in Turkey)’.84 The governing body wanted to stop this human capital flight by modernising the schools and connecting education with the labour market of Cyprus. Concerned with the issue of the ‘brain drain’ to Turkey, the director of

94

94  Ideological and cultural context education wrote a letter to the colonial secretary stating that the governing body also considered it an imperative to combat the drift of the best Muslim boys to Turkey. He suggested providing them with an education that would fit them better for work in Cyprus. He stated that there had not been any attempt to change the old lycée curriculum, which secured boys’ admission to Turkish universities. However, he suggested that in the senior classes an alternative should be given, namely English, practical science and commercial subjects.85 In 1934 the British government in Cyprus was planning to alter the curriculum in order to allocate more hours for teaching English and less time to the teaching of Greek. Münir Bey was the only member of the Executive Council, along with the British treasurer, who agreed with this proposal of the director of education.86 However, the Colonial Office considered that a new educational policy that would lengthen the hours of English teaching at the expense of the teaching of Greek would arouse considerable wrath among the Greek Cypriot community.87 The Muslim community, and in particular the educational leaders, had realised that a good command of English would be absolutely essential for the existence of the community. We have to take into account that a good knowledge of English was a prerequisite for members of the Muslim community to enter into public service. That was the main reason why the Muslim director of the Shakespeare School in Nicosia, Nejmi Sagib Bodamialisade, a deeply religious person who had translated the Quran, was assertively pushing the British, with various petitions, to introduce English lessons from the first years of elementary education for Muslim pupils. In particular, on 1  November 1934 Bodamialisade88 sent Ramsay MacDonald, the British prime minister, a petition by the Muslim girl students of the Shakespeare School requesting the introduction of English into the lower classes of Muslim elementary schools in Cyprus.89 He held that the good command of the English language that would have been promoted by this educational measure would be ‘the only means to secure the Muslim existence in Cyprus’.90 Nevertheless, Bodamialisade was a great supporter of British rule. He published an article in the English-​ language daily Embros saying that ‘during the last forty years, up to a short time ago, the methods and standard of education in Cyprus were so wonderful that it enabled thousands of Cypriots of different religion, percentage and social status to obtain excellent positions, wealth and reputation in different parts of the world’.91 He addressed the ‘criticisers’ by saying: ‘Education in Cyprus is not so despicable or desponding as they imagine.’92 The Colonial Office was clearly dissatisfied with the history curriculum in Cypriot elementary schools. After the abolition of the constitution and the imposition of the authoritarian regime by Governor Palmer, the British had the opportunity to alter the curriculum. In 1934 the Colonial Office was designing a curriculum whereby the history of Cyprus and the history of Britain would be taught on an equal basis, while the other countries would be grouped as ‘general European history’. The idea came from the British

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Ideological and cultural context 95 experience in Ireland. In particular, while considering this change in the curriculum CO officials reported that, in Ireland, ‘English History has been taught first while Irish history was merely a special subject’.93 This ‘imperialist’ view was justified by the fact that ‘for the past 1000 years Cyprus has really had no history of her own and in this respect resembles Ireland’.94 In 1935 a new syllabus in the subjects of history and geography was experimentally introduced.95 For the classes of history and geography in elementary schools the Colonial Office ordered Longmans Green & Co. to produce the textbooks. The history of Cyprus for classes three and four would be ‘specially written in English and translated locally into Greek and Turkish’. For the classes at fifth and sixth level on the ‘Outlines of world history’, the textbook would be an adaptation of a book already in use in a number of colonies, called Landmarks of World History. Accordingly, the geography books would both be taken from ‘a highly successful series written by a leading English geographer96 and already adapted for use in West Africa, the West Indies and the Far East. Their adaptation here presents no difficulty except in the new sections to be added dealing with neighbouring countries of the Near East.’97 The teachers in the Muslim Cypriot schools were organised by having their own teachers’ association in Cyprus. However, the association did not wish to interfere in politics or the internal struggle for the leadership of the Muslim community of the island. In 1926 the association established certain rules. In particular, there was a provision that clearly stated that the association would not allow any connection with any political person or party, and it would not interfere with any political elections.98 Nevertheless, the aim of the association was ‘to keep away from politics and to stand on the principle of co-​operation and the mutual support of its members’.99 In the late 1920s the Kemalist section of the Muslim community had started articulating a critique on the Turkish inspectors of schools. The Turkish newspaper Masum Millet tried to highlight the inadequacy of the Turkish inspectors of schools.100 In 1929 Masum Millet published an article on the inspectors of schools. It held that the British government, having decided to concentrate on the administration of education, had taken on a very heavy responsibility. Although it was gratifying to see that the estimates of the elementary schools were that they were very rich, it was sad to observe that the qualifications of the Turkish inspectors of schools were very poor. None of them was a graduate from a high school or even from a lycée. The article concluded by stating that educational experts were needed if it was desired to apply the new Education Law with success.101 In 1926 the number of elementary schools for the Muslim community was 262 out of 889 in the whole island. More than a decade later this number was slightly reduced, to 212. However, what is even more interesting is to note that the total number of pupils in elementary schools was steadily increasing in the 1930s. Due to the economic crisis, a number of small schools in villages had had to be merged in the early 1930s. Throughout the period in question the attendance rates were more than 70 per cent.

96

Table 5.1 Muslim Cypriot elementary schools, 1919–​1938 Number of schools –​ aided private

Scholars –​ aided private

Total

1919

214 (village prescribed by government) 15 (town) 6 (other private)

7,479 (73% attendance)

1920

235

1921

241

1922

242

1923

250

1924

252

1925

270

1926

262

1927

268

1928 1929

262 267

B 3,105 G 2,407 (village) B 709 G 802 (town) B 355 G 101 (other) B 4,319 G 3,423 B 4,354 G 3,003 B 4,334 G 3,023 B 4,799 G 3,318 B 5,212 G 3,683 B 5,057 G 3,547 B 5,261 G 3,526 B 5,437 G 3,641

8,951

1930

268

1931

294

1932

296

1933

283

1934

264

1935

259

1936

238

1937

211 16 (other private) 212

B 5,343 G 3,608 B 5,303 G 3,531 B 5,923 G 4,044 B 6,244 G 4,421 B 6,456 G 4,445 B 6,270 G 4,225 B 4,788 G 3,174 B 4,484 G 2,824 B 4,493 G 2,931 B 4,431 G 3,046

1938

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

8,342

7,407 8,117 8,895 8,601 8,787 9,078

8,834 (avg att 6,368) 9,967 (avg att 7,527) 10,665 (avg att 7,789) 10,901 (avg att 8,075) 10,495 (avg att 7,740) 7,962 (avg att 6,218) 7,308 (avg att 5,707) 7,424 (avg att 5,769) 7,477

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Ideological and cultural context 97 Muslim Cypriot educational system: secondary education In the 1920s the programmes in Muslim secondary schools were arranged in order to prepare pupils for higher education in Turkey, mainly in Istanbul.102 The principal Muslim secondary schools were the Boys’ Lycée103 and the Victoria, for girls, in Nicosia, and there were intermediate classes attached to the elementary schools.104 The average attendance at Muslim secondary schools had been relatively high throughout the period in question (Table 5.2). It is important to note that the high school was established at the end of the nineteenth century. It was renamed ‘Sultani’, but only until 1925, when it took the name of ‘Lycée’. Kemalist educational reforms in the newly founded Turkish Republic followed the model of the French educational system, and therefore high schools acquired the French name. What is important to note here that the immediate reaction of the Muslim community of Cyprus to the abolition of the caliphate was to rename the high school as ‘Sultani’ to honour the deposed sultan.105 The Boys’ Lycée was completed in 1929 at a cost of £8,000 with money received from both the Evkaf Office and government sources.106 The Evkaf Department undertook to pay annually for 20 years the sum of £35.15, comprising interest and a sinking fund for the repayment of the third loan of £500 for the completion of the Turkish lycée.107 The buildings of the Victoria Girls’ School were also extended in the late 1920s. In 1940 the British Council decided to give a grant of £1,000 for the expansion of the Muslim lycée after a request by the colonial secretary, Andrew Barkworth Wright, and ‘in view if the importance which the Council attached to the improvement of Muslim educational facilities in Cyprus’.108 The Governing Body for Muslim Secondary Schools had made a statement in 1939 regarding the extension of the lycée. It considered it was ‘imperative to combat the drift of the best Muslim boys to Turkey by giving them an education which will fit them better for in Cyprus’.109 Although there was no attempt to change the old lycée curriculum that had secured boys’ admission to Turkish universities, in the upper classes an alternative modern side was established, in which more attention was given to English, practical science and commercial subjects. The establishment of the authoritarian regime in the 1930s gave the British government the opportunity to control the Greek Cypriot educational system, which was a major concern for the British throughout the 1920s. In 1928 the Colonial Office had been actively ‘engaged upon scrapping the system on the grounds that was intolerable’.110 Note that it was the Greek education system that was characterised as ‘intolerable’ by the Colonial Office. Internal correspondence in the Colonial Office from 1928 highlights the discontent of the British government with the old educational system. In fact, the Colonial Office recommended that the dissatisfaction of the British government with the educational system in Cyprus be stated explicitly. Following the imposition of authoritarian rule in the aftermath of the October revolt the British introduced education laws and took back control

98

98  Ideological and cultural context of the educational systems. Since the late 1920s the British government in Cyprus, in order to counteract the ‘pan-​Hellenic propaganda’, had been advocating the need to make changes in education. In particular, the British had suggested that it was an imperative to gradually introduce policies that promoted ‘teaching more “Cypriot” patriotism and teaching students to realise that the real interest of Cyprus lies in staying within the British Empire’.111 In order to restrain and control the pan-​Hellenic feelings, the British concluded that the remedy was to suppress them and attempt to gradually spread the seed for creating a new Cypriot identity. This new identity would, ideally, promote the development of a conscious feeling throughout the Cypriot population of wanting to remain as subjects of the British Empire. However, a Greek identity was already very strong for the majority of the Cypriot population, and it would definitely be difficult to transform it in this way. The significant role of education in the diffusion of nationalistic ideology was apparent also in the strategy of Ronald Storrs, who had taken over as governor in late 1926. Replying to a secret letter from Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1928, Storrs admitted that he was confident that the main answer to the spreading of nationalist ideas was one of education.112 The establishment of authoritarian rule in the early 1930s came in tandem with the introduction of a number of education laws that gave extra powers to the British government to control education in the island. Accordingly, the Muslim Boys’ Lycée and Victoria Girls’ School, both in Nicosia, passed under the management of a governing body appointed directly by the governor. Despite this, the curriculum of the lycée continued to follow the curricula of lycées in the Republic of Turkey, the only exception being the introduction of some commercial courses in the top classes.113 Similarly, in 1932, the new headmaster and headmistress for the two secondary schools were brought from Turkey while each school employed also an English teacher.114 However, in 1934 the leadership in both schools changed. In the lycée the headmaster and two assistant masters, one of whom was in charge of the boarding house, were English. At the Victoria School the headmistress, an assistant mistress for physical training and part-​time teachers of teaching methods and of arts and crafts were all English. In the late 1930s this female-​only school was reshaping its focus to give special attention to domestic science and physical training. The urgent need to supply qualified teachers to the Muslim elementary schools resulted in the introduction of an extra class in the Victoria Girls’ School in 1937 for the training of elementary schoolmistresses.115 The very extensive Turkish syllabus in the Muslim Boys’ Lycée was reflected in poor results for its graduates in the government examinations in the English language.116 However, in the 1930s the number of hours devoted to English in the lycée was increased considerably. Teaching in English was given in mathematics, history and geography, not with the intention of interfering in any way with the teaching of these subjects in Turkish but ‘simply to increase the vocabulary of the boys, and to provide practical matter for conversation’.117 The primary goal remained the preparation of the pupils for

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Ideological and cultural context 99 continuing further their studies in Turkey. In particular, the lycée’s programme was adjusted in order to meet the requirements of Istanbul University.118 Since the late 1920s the Kemalist section of the community had been calling for the introduction of technical education, as it was realised that this would be a key factor for the progress of the Muslim community. In 1929 the nationalist newspaper Masum Millet published an article regarding technical education in Cyprus. It argued that ‘the present system of education in Cyprus was encouraging urbanism’.119 It claimed that the introduction of technical education was an imperative and that, accordingly, English instructors should be appointed. The 1935 Secondary Education Law, which was brought into force in March 1936, provided for the registration and inspection of all secondary schools and for the licensing of all teachers in such schools, and gave the government the power to refuse or cancel legislation or licences in certain cases.120 The British government also took control of the curriculum. In particular, any secondary school, in order to obtain the much-​ needed grant-​ in-​ aid, would have to conform to the conditions imposed by the regulations made under the 1935 Secondary Education Law. These conditions included government approval of the curriculum.121 Muslim Cypriot educational system: university education There was no university or even university college in Cyprus during the interwar period. In fact, there was not even a public university on the island until recently. Students who wanted to continue in higher education went from the gymnasiums or the Muslim lycée to the universities in Greece or Turkey, especially to study law or medicine. By the late 1930s, following the change in British educational policy in Cyprus and the government’s initiatives, an increasing number of students were going to the Inns of Court and to British universities, polytechnics, engineering colleges, hospitals, etc.122 At the start of 1930 the Colonial Office considered the Robert College in Istanbul as the best alternative solution for the training of the Cypriot teachers if they could not go to Greece. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, who had himself visited Robert College, thought that Cypriot teachers would receive excellent training there.123 Lord Passfield, in an enclosure to a letter to Rieves regarding educational improvements, wrote that there appeared to be no really systematic method of training teachers. The local secondary schools provided the only training ground available. Lord Passfield held that the ‘Turkish secondary school for boys, called the Idadi School, is reputed to be a well-​run institution, and usually has an Englishman on the staff’.124 For Muslim girls there was the Victoria Girls’ School, which had been established in Nicosia by the Muslim community as a memorial to Britain’s Queen Victoria. In the 1930s, in the light of the new circumstances, it was in the British interest to educate the next generation of the elites in Cyprus and in the

100

100  Ideological and cultural context Table 5.2 Muslim Cypriot secondary schools, 1919–​1937 Victoria Girls

Idadi

Nicosia Roashdie

1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1929 1930

95 95 95 100 101 95 86 181 258 295 268

186 153 153 160 158 202 144 215 216 282 287

136

1931 1932

–​ 259

–​ 368

–​

1933

336

188

1934

107

239

50 (Shakespeare Lycée)

1935

252

99

70 (Shakespeare Lycée)

1936

75

253

123 (Shakespeare Lycée) (aided private)

1937

52

234

M 88 F 75 total 163

Total

260 259 297 230 396 474 577 avg att M 263 F 247 –​ avg att M 333 F 248 avg att M 329 F 182 avg att M 224 F 100 mixed 40 avg att M 247 F 99 mixed 61 avg att M 247 F 70 mixed 120 avg att M 220 F 47 mixed 135

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

various Middle Eastern societies according to the British system of values and principles, rather than letting the subjects be educated according to their sets of beliefs and values. For this reason, the Foreign Office from the early 1930s onwards planned to establish a British university in the Near East, though the outbreak of the Second World War meant that the project was never realised. It was at this time that the Colonial Office began its planning for the establishment of a British university in Cyprus, with students from all over the Near East.125 Cyprus was regarded as the best option because of its

 101

Ideological and cultural context 101 location and the relatively calm situation in the island, and for the inculcation of a British identity and to stop the education of Cypriots in Greek and Turkish universities. The first reference to the project for the establishment of a British university in the Near East came in paragraph 32 of Sir Percy Loraine’s classic despatch no. 977 of 9 November 1933. The Near East Committee of the British Council gave some consideration to the matter but its general impression was that, unless the very large sum that would be necessary for the foundation of the university could be found either by private benefactors or from public sources, the proposition was not yet a sufficiently practical one to warrant spending a great deal of time on it. Subsequently, the Secretary of State for the Colonies took a personal interest in the scheme, and, despite the financial impediments, the Colonial Office held informal discussions among different departments with a view to determining what the official attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards the project should be whenever it materialised.126 Before questions of finance and organisation were dealt with, the most important question was the decision on the site of the university. As already stated, the potential locations were Cairo, Cyprus and Palestine. In June 1937 the governor of Cyprus sent a letter to the Foreign Office with detailed information and comments on the potential for establishing a British university in Cyprus.127 In his despatch Sir Richmond Palmer included the recommendation of the director of agriculture in Cyprus, who pointed out that the demand for agricultural teaching was for training of a strictly practical nature to enable agriculturalists to work their holdings on improved lines.128 The British government had closed down the agricultural school in 1934 on the grounds that the training was too advanced to meet local needs and that, practically, the only opening that existed for these studies lay in employment in government service. The agricultural school was replaced by a system of practical training on experimental stations. In 1936 the British passed a law to amend the Elementary Education Laws of 1933 and 1935. Their main concern was the erection of a training college for teachers at Morphou. Despite the huge economic constraints it was an important priority for the British to begin training teachers in Cyprus and not in Greece and Turkey. The acting governor, Sir William Battershill, in a confidential letter to Ormsby-​Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote that the training college was the foundation for all future developments in elementary education and ‘it is essential that its construction should not be delayed’.129 He then continued:  ‘It is of such importance to establish the Training College without delay that it is, in my opinion, desirable to build it, even at the expense of the Education Funds, rather than not to build it at all,’130 In 1937 Governor Palmer wrote that, of the students who went to Athens University, the majority intended to work in Cyprus, whereas of those who studied at Istanbul few, if any, returned to the land of their birth. According to Palmer, Turkey was ‘in the position of a young country advancing in prosperity which offered a much better prospect for ambitious young men

102

102  Ideological and cultural context speaking Turkish than Cyprus’.131 Palmer argued that the best of the Muslim community were still ‘both persona grata to British residents in Cyprus, and at the same time of a sound, loyal and reliable type’.132 According to him, in 1937 the influence of modern Turkey in Cyprus was not great.133 Palmer suggested that, with a reformed Muslim lycée and the English school both open to Turks, it would be possible to ‘absorb the services of the more educated Turks, either in the Government Service or otherwise, in a greater degree than had already obtained’.134 Palmer recommended that the British government in Cyprus should not educate Cypriots to suit the requirements of Athens and Istanbul but should provide a practical alternative to suit its own interests and needs.135 In this way, Palmer believed that the nationalist sentiment should and would gradually diminish in both volume and intensity. In order to achieve this, he highlighted also the importance of educational encouragement and the promotion of British national ideals and culture.136

Cultural transformation This section examines the cultural context wherein the national identity was shaped. It also examines the initiatives and policies of the British government in Cyprus that facilitated the transformation occurring in the Cypriot Muslims reluctantly accepting the Kemalist reforms introduced in the Republic of Turkey. In particular, the reforms of the dressing code, the language reforms and the changes to the civil code and family law will be analysed. A great deal of the literature on the studies of nations and nationalism has emphasised the strong element of culture, along with the politics and the ideology. The so-​called ethno-​symbolist scholars in the study of nationalism, such as Anthony D. Smith, illustrate the significance of symbols. The interesting interplay between religious and national identity has been thoroughly analysed by Smith.137 What took place in Turkey in that period was a cultural revolution, even if many scholars argue that it was a top-​down imposition of a cultural model. The broken ties with the Islamic East are, even today, a controversial issue. Culture here is understood broadly. Scholars perceive culture as a system of beliefs, norms and values that determine the behaviour of its members.138 Here I  will approach it as context. As mentioned earlier in the conceptual framework, nationalism has been examined as consciousness, movement or ideology.139 Depending on this choice, the scholar then has to follow a different approach in the analysis. However, the alteration of certain symbols marked a rupture with the past.

The marriage law and polygamy Polygamy is an institution that we can meet even today in very traditional Islamist societies. Based on a vague interpretation of the Quran, Muslim men are allowed under certain circumstances to have more than one legitimate

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Ideological and cultural context 103 wife. Today it is one of the most controversial issues in the civil code debate that takes place in various Muslim countries. One of the more radical reforms that Mustafa Kemal initiated immediately after taking power was the introduction of a new family law. The new family law was of paramount importance in the modernisation process adopted by Kemalist Turkey. Under the new reforms the traditional polygamous marriage would be illegal in the newly founded republic. At the time, in Cyprus, polygamous marriages remained a popular custom among the members of the Muslim community. However, the emerging secular section of the Muslim Cypriot community was concerned about it, and was advocating the adoption of the new family law in Cyprus as well. Marriages between Muslim Cypriots and Turkish citizens The British government was confronted with the issue of polygamy because of marriages between Muslim Cypriots and Turkish citizens. There were various instances in which citizens of the newly founded Turkish Republic came to Cyprus in order to get married to Cypriots, as polygamy had been forbidden in Turkey with the reforms undertaken by Mustafa Kemal. The government was uneasy with the various interventions by the Turkish consul in the affairs of the Muslim community of Cyprus. The consul was attempting to stipulate that the new Civil Code that Turkey had adopted in 1926 should be valid for the Cypriot Muslims as well. In fact, a case of polygamy in 1935 is indicative of the consul’s role. In 1935 a Turkish citizen who had gone temporarily to Cyprus was about to get married to a Cypriot Muslim while he was already married in Turkey.140 The consul for Turkey, Mehmed Erdogan, sent a letter to the colonial secretary asking him to take the necessary steps to prevent his polygamous marriage in Cyprus. The new Civil Code, applied in Turkey since 1926, enforced monogamy, but a number of cases had arisen of Turkish citizens contracting marriage in Cyprus at the Sheri tribunals of the island even though they were already married in Turkey.141 Mehmet Hakki, the Fetva Emini of Cyprus, replied to the request of the Turkish consul that these marriages are canonically permissible.142 The Fetva Emini stated that, in Cyprus, Sheri law (Muslim canon law) posed no impediment to a marriage between male and female persons of the Muslim religion –​of whatever nationality they may be or in whatever country they may reside; or for a male person to marry, according to the necessity of circumstances, two to four wives, the maximum, and to keep them under his Nikah (bond of marriage contract) at the same time.143 The traditional nature of the Muslim Cypriot community was widely esteemed in the whole eastern Mediterranean region,144 as is indicated by the case of the so-​called ‘Muslim brides’. Many Arab Palestinian men would visit Cyprus in order to choose a Muslim Cypriot to be their bride.145 In 1934 the British Colonial Office reported that it was estimated that an average of 20 visas had been given each month for the past three years to Muslim applicants

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104  Ideological and cultural context who declared that the purpose of their journey to Cyprus was to choose a wife, and the procedure of the Department of Immigration was to require the production by these people of a certificate of good character from the local police.146 The British government of Cyprus was very reluctant to take any measures to prevent these marriages, for two chief reasons. The first was that any intervention in Sacred Law could result in a reduction in the control and authority of the Mufti and the Kadi, who were the best collaborators with the government.147 The second main reason was that the British government in Cyprus did not wish to disturb commercial relations with Muslim Egypt and Muslim Palestine, which were much more important than those with Turkey.148 Turkey, through its consul, communicated to the British government of Cyprus its discontent with the judicial system and the Civil Code in Cyprus. Turkey complained that the problem with the legal system in force in Cyprus, under which all questions of personal status were dealt with by religious tribunals applying religious laws, lay in the fact that these tribunals did not take account of the principles of private international law.149 According to Turkey, local religious tribunals in Cyprus had jurisdiction not merely over Cypriots but also, in effect, over foreigners.150 Bay Fethi Okyar from the Turkish consulate in Larnaca sent a letter directly to the Cypriot courts regarding polygamous marriages. This behaviour was considered by the Foreign Office as ‘an error in the manner of his communication’, which caused some irritation to the local authorities:151 Sir Richmond Palmer was furious with the involvement of someone as senior as Bay Fethi Okyar, from the Turkish consulate, in the government’s affairs.152 Through a letter from its embassy in London, Turkey also asked the Foreign Office to introduce legislative initiatives to prevent polygamous marriages.153 The marriage between Hassan Oglu Salih Zeki of Nicosia, a Turkish subject, and Aliye Zia of the Mahmud Pasha quarter of Nicosia, a British subject, is indicative of the interference of the Turkish consul. Salih Zeki was already married. Erdogan, the Turkish consul in Larnaca, sent a letter directly to the Sheri judge of Nicosia and Kyrenia districts requesting the marriage permit be cancelled.154 This intervention worried the governor, who characterised the Turkish consul’s action as reprehensible.155 Palmer argued that the consul was far too prone to meddle and interfere in matters connected with Muslim Cypriots, who were British subjects. In a series of despatches to the Colonial Office, Palmer attempted to illustrate the ‘political tendencies underlying the activities of the Turkish Consul in the island’.156 The Turkish government, alarmed by the violation of the newly established social reforms, had often requested the British government to take action to prevent the violation. There were many official complaints through Erdogan to the British government in Cyprus asking the latter to stop these marriages being contracted. Because the representations of the Turkish consul had no effect the Turkish embassy in London wrote a letter to the British Foreign Office.157 Sedat Zeki, the counsellor in the embassy, called the Foreign Office to act upon it. Zeki suggested that the most appropriate remedy would be,

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Ideological and cultural context 105 in the event of Turkish citizens applying for marriage to Cyprus courts, to make them submit to the same procedure applied to all citizens of states whose marriage law is also monogamous, with a view to preventing bigamy.158 Consequently, the British Foreign Office submitted a proposal for consideration to the British governor to restrict the jurisdiction of the religious courts in Cyprus, in matters of personal status, to persons domiciled in the island.159 Sir Richmond was very sceptical about the Foreign Office’s proposal.160 There were at that time two ways in which it was possible for a Muslim to get married in Cyprus: either by getting a permit from a religious tribunal or by civil contract under the provisions of the Sacred Law. The essential requirements of that law were a proposal made by or on behalf of one of the parties to the marriage and an acceptance of the proposal by or on behalf of the other, in the presence and hearing of two male or one male and two female witnesses, who must be sane and adult Muslims. The proposal and acceptance had to be expressed at one and the same meeting. Sir Richmond emphatically declared that the majority of Muslim marriages in the colony were still contracted by getting a permit form from a religious tribunal. There were only very few marriages that took place by civil contract under the Sacred Law.161 Palmer strongly disapproved of any legislative action being taken that might interfere with any of the provisions of the Sacred Law. He considered that whatever legislation might be passed on this subject would be ‘liable to be misunderstood by the old school of Muslim thought and deliberately misrepresented by the new school as a vindication of their principles of life and thought’.162 The governor stated that it would almost certainly ‘be hailed among those Muslims who are in touch with modern Turkish ideals and views as a victory for Kemalistic intervention in Cyprus’.163 The British strategy towards Muslim Cypriots in the 1930s can be summarised in the following passage from a despatch from the governor to the Foreign Office. Palmer canvasses the British strategy, writing: ‘As you are aware it is essential in Cyprus, for political reasons, not to encourage Cypriot Muslims to look to Turkey for guidance nor to look upon that country as their spiritual home; but rather to attempt, whilst raising the educational and economic standard of local Muslims, to keep them fully attached to their old customs and religion and to retain them as British subject looking only to Great Britain for help and assistance.’164 This clearly elaborates the change that had taken place in British strategy in the 1930s. In 1936 Palmer emphatically held that the bulk of the Turkish speaking Muslim Cypriots have no real and substantial ties of sentiment with Asia Minor and the Kemalist regime, and it is very obvious from the history of the last decade in Cyprus that their political bias towards Turkey is influenced very largely by the degree of support or lack of support which this Government gives to local Muslim institutions, as also the degree in which Government is mindful of Muslim interests and of the fact that the Muslim represent the former governing classes of the Island.165

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106  Ideological and cultural context The change in British strategy in the 1930s was a result of the intensity of the Greek national agitation. In 1936 Palmer held that the history of the Greek Enosis movement in Cyprus, which, from being a negligible sentiment, had developed as a consequence of toleration into a permanent embarrassment, afforded ample reason for deprecating any similar procedure in the case of Turkish nationalism.166 Furthermore, commercial relations with Muslim Egypt and Muslim Palestine were considerably more important for Cyprus than those with Turkey.167

Hat versus fez One of the most visible social reforms undertaken by Mustafa Kemal’s newly established regime in the 1920s was the ‘hat revolution’. In August 1925 Turkey introduced a hat law, which dictated the replacement of the traditional turban,168 or fez, by a European-​style hat (şapka). In Ottoman society, the turban and the fez were a significant indication of social and official status for Muslim clerics.169 With this law the clerics were forbidden to wear their symbolic mark of authority. Consequently, those whose status was seriously affected reacted against the law.170 It is very interesting that, in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots, the fez was a symbol of Turkishness while, in Kemalist Turkey, it meant exactly the opposite: Ottomanism. Greek Cypriots complained that the British government disparaged Greek national sentiment but Turkish cultural elements were eagerly supported. This discontent was often expressed with letters of complaint to the British governor. A  letter by George S.  Frangoudis, the Cypriot president of the School of Political Sciences in Athens, to Sir Ronald Storrs on 1 November 1931 is very typical of the complaints the governor was receiving.171 Frangoudis expressed his discontent with the British administration in Cyprus because, on the one hand, the British in every way affronted the national feelings of Greek Cypriots but, on the other hand, gave their support to those of the Turkish Cypriots. The Cypriot academic illustrated the British double standards with the example of the fez, writing that ‘though the wearing of the fez has been abolished in Turkey you have preserved it on the heads of your zaptiens in order that Cyprus may present a Turkish appearance’.172 The replacement of fezzes with hats in the school costumes of the Muslim schoolboys was also an issue of a major concern for the Cadi of Cyprus. In 1925 the Chief Cadi of Cyprus sent a letter to the chief inspector of schools requesting that the costumes of the students ‘not be allowed to be changed at all on account of the political and special attitude of Cyprus’ unless a fetva was issued by the Mufti of Cyprus and unless a decision was obtained from the Muslim Board of Education and the Governing Body for Muslim Secondary Schools.173 Maintaining the habit of wearing fezzes instead of hats was an important issue for the divided Muslim community of Cyprus. The traditional elements,

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Ideological and cultural context 107 with the prominent voice of the Cadi, supported the fez while the so-​called pro-​Kemalist groups endorsed its supersession with the hat. The retention of the wearing of fezzes can be illustrated by various cases in the Turkish Cypriot press. In 1933 the nationalist newspaper Söz published photographs in its coverage of a ceremony with the governor, Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs, at Larnaca. In the photographs the representatives of the Turkish community appeared wearing fezzes. However, in a later issue of the paper an anonymous letter to the editor addressed this issue, criticising the fez-​wearing leaders of the Muslim community.174 In particular, the letter referred to the two photographs inserted in the previous issue showing the Muslim Cypriots bidding goodbye to the governor. The reader protested about the caption below each photograph describing the Cypriots seen in them as the representatives of the Turkish Community.175 According to the reader, who signed himself as a Turk from Nicosia, those people wore fezzes or turbans while all the Turkish youth and the majority of the Turkish people in Cyprus wore hats. The letter concluded that, without wishing to criticise those gentlemen for their headdress, as Cyprus is a liberal country, it is important to point out that ‘the headdress of the Turkish Community in Cyprus is hat and it can be represented only by persons who wear hats’.176 Then the editor of the paper commented, at the end of the letter, that he admitted the mistake in publishing the lines referred to, and added that he was very glad to see that the press was being controlled ‘by our youth’.177 One other very important and visible social reform in Ataturk’s regime in Turkey was the groundbreaking permission to consume alcohol. This was undoubtedly an important symbolic milestone. In Cyprus it was adopted reluctantly. It is indicative that, in 1936, the Muslim Cypriot Kardesh Ojaghi Club in Nicosia amended its constitution in order to be able to sell alcoholic beverages.178 Up to 1936 the use of intoxicating drinks in the Kardesh Ojaghi premises had been prohibited. However, in 1936 the rule imposing this prohibition was deleted and a resolution was passed authorising the Club to ‘obtain a licence for the sale of drinks’.179 This repeal of the prohibition served as a visible symbol of the increasing influence of the Kemalist reforms in Cyprus.

Mosque prayers for the empire In Cyprus, prayers in the mosque were used by the traditional section of the Muslim community to advertise their loyalty to the British government of Cyprus. The prayers at the mosques, which had to be recited by the Fetva Emini, always wished the best for the British Empire. Even on the most important religious days of the year, as on 2 June 1936, on the occasion of the Prophet’s birthday, the prayers always emphasised loyalty to the British.180 The prayers entreated victory for and the dominance of the British Empire.181 The  prayers recited at the most central mosque of Cyprus, the St Sophia

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108  Ideological and cultural context Table 5.3 Numbers of mosques, tekyes and seminaries, 1919–​1937

1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937

Mosques

Tekyes

Medreses or seminaries

200 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 202 222 222 222 222 222 222

15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 10 10 11

8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 3 3 3 3 3

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

Mosque Nicosia, by the Fetva Emini on 2 June 1936 included the following: ‘O God, make our rightful Empire and Government victorious and predominant over all…’182 Mosques and the procedure of religious sermons and prayers became one more area of conflict between the two conflicting trends in the community.183 During the period in question there were over 200 religious buildings administered by the Evkaf, such as mosques and tekyes184 (Table 5.3). The reason was the language of the Muslim ceremonies. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had imposed in Turkey the replacement of Arabic with Turkish for prayers and the ezan (the call to prayer).185 It was one of the most controversial reforms initiated by Ataturk’s regime, and it did not last long as it was never widely accepted in Turkey, where, in November 1931, the Directorate of Religious Affairs instructed all the muezzins of mosques to ‘prepare themselves to recite the ezan in Turkish’.186 In Cyprus the most crucial issue was the language that was used for religious services. The confusion and controversy with this issue are revealed in the stance taken by the Evkaf Office, which in April 1938 issued instructions for the procedure of religious sermons and prayers to be followed in all the mosques throughout the colony.187 Of course, in Turkey this shift from Arabic to Turkish took a while, until the muezzins were ready to read the prescribed text. However, whereas in Turkey Mustafa Kemal replaced the

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Ideological and cultural context 109 Arabic with the new Turkish translation of the prayers, in Cyprus the traditionalist Islamists of the Evkaf Office were against this reform. This is why they ordered that all the prayers and sermons in all the mosques, during the performance of religious services, should be performed ‘exclusively in the Arabic language in accordance with ancient custom’.188 Moreover, the Fetva Emini underlined also the goal that in the mosques the preachers should teach the principles of Islam only in the approved religious form and not in a Kemalist interpretation. Furthermore, in order to control the diffusion of Kemalist through the mosques, the Fetva Emini asked to instruct and warn such persons who were authorised to preach in the mosques that their preaching on Fridays, before or after the service as well as on religious festival nights, should be ‘in conformity with the religious requirements and without infringement of the local laws’.189 The Muslim law of inheritance also caused a controversy in Cyprus. The Kemalist section of the Muslim community in Cyprus was advocating modernisation of the law. In 1929 the Kemalist newspaper Masum Millet held that the existing Muslim law of inheritance was ‘as old as the world and was the law of a religious primitive Government’.190 The secularist enthusiasts perceived that the existing law was ‘incomprehensible, ambiguous, full of injustice and dictated by the rigid and avaricious spirit of the male sex’. It was thought that it constituted ‘a second volume to the historic Voconian Law, under which the female sex is aggrieved’. In various instances the Kemalist advocates called for replacing the existing ‘theological crutch’ by enacting a modern law of inheritance, including wills.191 The Kemalist Cypriots were constantly publishing articles in their press urging progress and pushing for change against the nomadic traditions that Islamic religious practices and customs contained.192 In 1929 an article in Masum Millet made harsh criticisms of the Sheri courts. It held that the Sheri courts had no laws to apply and kept away from government control in an ‘extraterritorial condition to the detriment of the Community’.193 This critique found that no useful services could be expected from such courts, which were under the political influence of the Evkaf Office. It was perceived as a disgrace for Muslims to have their family life ‘ruled by the disgustful nomadic customs of early days’.194 The call for abolition of courts of this type was constant. In the same realm, Kemalist journalists were arguing for the introduction of a penal code for the Muslim community. For instance, in an article published in Masum Millet in 1929 there was a call for a modern penal code. The need for such a code was illustrated with examples that ‘punishments should be provided for defloration under promise of marriage and adultery’.195

Language reform One of the most central reforms in Ataturk’s modernisation campaign was language reform. Changing the language alphabet from Arabic letters to

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110  Ideological and cultural context Latin, Ataturk aimed to Westernise society. The new letters were an adapted version of the Latin alphabet. This language reform was undoubtedly, even symbolically, a major rift in the newly founded Republic of Turkey between the traditional conservative Ottoman elite and the new, emerging, Western-​ educated Young Turk elite.196 Ataturk’s adoption of the new Turkish alphabet was intended to downgrade the links with the Arabic and Persian languages and to facilitate communication with the West.197 In Cyprus the success of the language reform was assessed in the Annual Reports issued by the British government. Throughout the 1920s the official reports held that ‘Osmanli Turkish, somewhat archaic and free from Persian and Arabic words, was spoken by the Moslems, who, however, as a general rule were conversant with Greek’.198 However, according to the official reports the change in the alphabet was gradually taking place in 1930. Since 1928 the Muslim schools had adopted the new Turkish alphabet.199 In 1932 it was stated that ‘the new Turkish alphabet had been rapidly coming into use and became obligatory for all official purposes in 1932’.200 The Colonial Report in 1937 held that since 1934 the new Turkish alphabet had been in general use.201 The same publications reported that, in the 1930s, evening classes in the new Turkish alphabet were being held at Muslim schools throughout the island, and, according the official British reports, they were very popular and well attended. The Kemalist reform in the language was welcomed by the British government but not by the Muslim Cypriots. The Government Printing Office in Nicosia printed The New Turkish: An Elementary Grammar, Vocabulary, and Phrase Book of the Turkish Language in the New Latin Characters’, by A. C. Mowle, in order to help British officers to learn Turkish.202 In the introduction to the booklet Mowle wrote that the dramatic reform of the Turkish script by Mustafa Kemal Pasha in 1928 had revolutionised the Turkish language.203 As it was no longer necessary to learn the complex Arabic lettering, the language had become ‘universally accessible’. Mowle called on British officials to learn the language, as its acquisition, especially by British people, should then be ‘a matter of comparative case, for not only is its pronunciation easy to English tongues, but its construction, different though it be from the construction of English, is logical and simple’.204 However, at the same time, as with Turkish citizens, it was difficult for Cypriots to accept the reform. The Turkish papers that made their appearance at the time had more pictures than text while the traditionalist Turkish Cypriot papers maintained the Ottoman alphabet.205 However, nationalist newspapers such as Söz immediately adopted the new romanised alphabet. Similarly, Yeni Koroglu, the Kemalist newspaper from Turkey, was distributed in Cyprus. It had been published in Istanbul in the new Turkish alphabet since 1928, but at first it included more photos and pictures than texts. In every single issue it included photos from Cyprus. Yeni Koroglu, the ultra-​ nationalist newspaper in Turkey, often had photos from Turkish Cypriots in the late 1920s and early 1930s.206

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Ideological and cultural context 111 The language in the courts was also an important issue for the British government. In particular, during the authoritarian regime in the 1930s it was necessary for controlling all the political cases in the courts that the language was comprehensible. Therefore, in 1933 the British government in Cyprus passed a law that also had a provision for the language in the courts: court proceedings should be conducted in the English language. The reason behind the provision was not only to help the containment of Greek Cypriot nationalism but also to enable British lawyers to practise law in Cyprus.207

Conclusion In this chapter I have analysed the cultural and ideological context wherein the transformation in the collective identity of the Muslim community took place. The study of Turkish Cypriot national identity cannot be examined without reference to the historical, political and ideological contexts, all of which have greatly influenced it. The exploration of the formation of Turkish national identity in Cyprus and its relation with British colonial rule seeks to add a new dimension to the voluminous studies on Cyprus and to contribute to our understanding of the trajectory of the tangled politics of Cyprus. This meticulous study of a wide range of primary materials aims to provide a better understanding not only of the events that took place in the period in question but also of their impact on and significance for later events.

Notes 1 Karl Marx in The German Ideology writes: ‘The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men –​the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appears as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of the politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness [das Bewusstsein] can never be anything else than conscious being [das bewusste Sein], and the being of men is their actual life-​process. If in all ideology men and their relations appear upside-​down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-​process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-​process.’ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology, including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), 42. 2 Ibid., 61. 3 Ibid., 62. 4 Luis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: NLB, 1971), 167. 5 Michel Foucault, Power/​Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–​ 1977 (Brighton, UK: Harvest Press, 1980).

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112  Ideological and cultural context 6 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin Books, 1983); Paolo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (London: Penguin Books, 1996). 7 Vladimir I.  Lenin, Selected Works, vol. III (London:  Lawrence & Wishart, 1936), 6. 8 Ibid., 6. 9 The Chinese scholar Sun Tzu was the first to highlight the essence of the principle of the adaptation to the circumstances in his masterpiece: Tzu, The Art of War. 10 Philip M.  Taylor, The Projection of Britain:  British Overseas Publicity and Propaganda, 1919–​1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 11 John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–​1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). 12 Andrew N.  Liaropoulos, “Being Hard on Soft Power”, Research Institute for European and American Studies (2011), www.rieas.gr/​researchareas/​2014-​07-​30-​ 08-​58-​27/​transatlantic-​studies/​1519-​being-​hard-​on-​soft-​power. 13 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). ‘Soft power’ remains a highly contested notion. Nye highlights its significance in the pursuit of American imperial imperatives. 14 It is interesting to see in parallel the mission civilatrice that has its racist roots on the assumption of the superiority of the French civilisation. 15 The other two types of power are the military and the economic. According to Carr, the art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–​1939 (London: Macmillan, 1954). 16 Stuart Hall, “Gramsci and Us”, Marxism Today, 1987: 16–​21. 17 Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 18 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. 19 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (London:  Penguin Books, 1977). These institutions are of paramount importance for the Foucaultian notion of governmentality –​i.e. the art of government. 20 Thus, according to Foucault, the official knowledge that is produced in the educational institutions should be examined through the lens of the power–​knowledge nexus. 21 William Wilbur Weir, Education in Cyprus:  Some Theories and Practices in Education in the Island of Cyprus since 1878 (Nicosia: Cosmos Press, 1952). 22 Ibid., 71. 23 Ibid. 24 Panayiotis Persianis, “The British Colonial Education ‘Lending’ Policy in Cyprus (1878–​1960): An Intriguing Example of an Elusive ‘Adapted Education’ Policy’ ”, Comparative Education 32, no. 1 (1996): 45–​68. 25 Ibid., 52. 26 Ibid. 27 Stylianos Petrou, Cypriot Education as a Process of Conflict-​Regulation of the Cyprus Issue (in Greek) (Athens: Panteion University, 2000), 63. 28 Béatrice Hendrich, “Islamic Religious Education in Cyprus”, Journal of Muslims in Europe 4, no. 1 (2015): 7–​37, 13. 29 Newham, as cited in Weir, Education in Cyprus: Some Theories and Practices in Education in the Island of Cyprus since 1878, 71. 30 Ibid. 31 Cited in ibid.

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Ideological and cultural context 113 32 Newham, as cited in ibid. 33 Joseph Turner Hutchinson and Claude Delaval Cobham, A Handbook of Cyprus (London: Waterlow & Sons, 1904), 29; cited in Weir, Education in Cyprus: Some Theories and Practices in Education in the Island of Cyprus since 1878, 72. 34 Ibid., 71. 35 Ibid., 28. 36 “Report of the Department of Education for the School Year 1934–​5” (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1935), 3, cited in ibid., 28. 37 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, 46. 38 TNA: CO 67/​220/​2 (1927) ‘Annual Report 1926’. 39 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports –​Annual, no. 1618: Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1932 (London:  HM Stationery Office, 1933). 40 ‘Evkaf’, in Turkish, is a pious, religious foundation. 41 TNA:  CO 67/​252/​15 (1934) “Petition from M.  Tekki Effendi against Dismissal as a Schoolmaster”. Despatch by Herbert Henniker-​Heaton, acting governor of Cyprus, to Colonial Office, dated 20 December 1933. 42 Ibid. 43 TNA: CO 69-​42 (1933) “Report of the Department of Education for the School Years 1930–​31 and 1931–​32”. Nicosia: printed at the Cyprus Government Printing Office. 44 Beckingham, “Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus”, 73. 45 TNA:  FO 371–​17959 (1934) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 264 (papers 7708  –​end)  –​ 640”. Annual Report on Turkey, 1933. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Xypolia, “Racist Aspects of Modern Turkish Nationalism”. 49 Antigone Heraclidou, “Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931–​ 1939: A ‘Coup d’État’ on Greek-​Cypriot Elementary Education?”, Cyprus Review 24, no. 2 (2012): 47–​72. 50 TNA: CO 67/​271/​8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. Memorandum on the proposed Cyprus history textbook. 51 TNA: CO 67/​271/​8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. Note from the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies ‘History of Cyprus’ signed by F. J. Pedler, official secretary, Colonial Office, dated 9 December 1936. 52 Ibid. George Hill’s expertise and experience with the antiquities of the British Museum are illustrated also in the bulk of detailed historical account dedicated to the antiquity in his four-​volume A History of Cyprus. 53 TNA:  CO 67/​ 271/​ 8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. 54 TNA: CO 67/​271/​8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. Extract from the minutes of the meeting held on 21 January 1937 at the Colonial Office from the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, Textbook Subcommittee. 55 TNA: CO 67/​271/​8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. A note on the proposed Cyprus history textbook, from a Foreign Office official, dated 30 July 1937. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid.

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114  Ideological and cultural context 58 TNA: CO 67/​271/​8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, confidential letter to W.  G. A.  Ormsby Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 November 1936. 59 TNA: CO 67/​271/​8 (1937) “Production of a History of Cyprus for Use in Schools”. Extract from the minutes of the meeting of the Textbook Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, held on 21 January 1937 at the Colonial Office. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 CSA: SA1 1673/​1926 “Compulsory Education”. The resolution by the Hon. L. Z. Pierides, MLC, concluded that the government could take steps to provide compulsory elementary education. This was one of the first proposals for the adoption in Cyprus of compulsory education. It proved very effective, as it resulted in the Compulsory Education Law 1931. 63 TNA:  CO 1045/​452 (1930–​1960) “Cyprus:  Reports and Miscellaneous Papers”. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1938 (London: HM Stationery, 1939). 64 TNA:  CO 67/​247/​9 (1932) “Survey of Administrative, Economic and General Development of Cyprus 1927–​32”. Survey of the administrative, economic and general development of the colony, 1927–​1932, prepared by Sir Ronald Storrs. 65 TNA:  CO 67/​ 220/​ 2 (1928) “Annual Report, 1926”. Colonial Office, Colonial Reports –​Annual: Cyprus Report for 1926 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1927). 66 Heraclidou, “Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931–​ 1939:  A  ‘Coup d’État’ on Greek-​Cypriot Elementary Education?”, 53. 67 TNA:  CO 1045/​452 (1930–​1960) “Cyprus:  Reports and Miscellaneous Papers”. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1938. 68 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no 1093:  Cyprus Report for 1920 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1921). 69 Ibid. 70 Georghallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyrus 1918–​1926. 71 Heraclidou, “Making a British Atmosphere in Cyprus, 1931–​ 1939:  A  ‘Coup d’État’ on Greek-​Cypriot Elementary Education?”, 50. 72 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no.  1159:  Cyprus Report for 1922 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1923). 73 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no 1253:  Cyprus Report for 1924 (London: HM Stationery Office. 1925). 74 CSA: SA1 1673/​1926 “Compulsory Education”. 1927 memorandum on compulsory education, by Newham, chief inspector of schools to the colonial secretary of Cyprus. Newham states in his memorandum that ‘the deficiency in Muslim children is 1123 boys and 2858 girls. The present numbers enrolled being 5261 boys & 3526 girls. We have now 53 Boys Schools, 51 Girls Schools, 157 Mixed and 2 Infants, i.e. 263 in all.’ 75 CSA: SA1 1673/​1926 “Compulsory Education”. 1927 memorandum on compulsory education, by Newham, chief inspector of schools to the colonial secretary of Cyprus. Newham states in his memorandum that ‘at present in Schools were 23900 boys and 14570 girls. The deficiency to be 3200 boys and 11330 girls. There are now 159 Boys Schools, 161 Girls Schools, 293 Mixed Schools and 13 Infants Schools.’

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Ideological and cultural context 115 6 CSA: SA1 1673/​1926 “Compulsory Education”. Söz, no. 833, dated 15 May 1935. 7 77 Ibid. 78 CSA: SA1/​1468/​1931/​3 “The Elementary Educational Laws, 1933–​1937”. 79 TNA:  CO 67/​220/​2 (1928) “Annual Report, 1926”. Colonial Office, Colonial Reports –​Annual: Cyprus Report for 1926. 80 Ibid. 81 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no.  1313:  Cyprus Report for 1925 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1926). 82 TNA:  CO 67/​220/​2 (1928) “Annual report, 1926”. Colonial Office, Colonial Reports –​Annual: Cyprus Report for 1926. 83 CSA:  SA1 931/​ 1926  “Programme for improvement of Moslem Elementary Education”. ‘Programme:  Moslem Elementary Education’ prepared by Dr Eyoub Ayijddim, Member of the Board of Education (English translation), dated 30 April 1926. 84 CSA: SA1 575/​1928 “Moslem Lycée, Nicosia. Building and Premises”. Letter by the Director of Education of Cyprus to the Colonial Secretary of Cyprus, dated 1 December 1939. 85 Ibid. 86 CSA:  SA1 731/​ 1934/​ 2  “Revision of Curriculum for Elementary Schools”. Internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 5 September 1936. 87 Ibid. 88 Bodamialisade translated the Quran and was the one who wrote the poem on the Cyprus jubilee in 1928! Too religious and too pro-​British. 89 CSA: SA1 731.1934/​1 “Revision of Curriculum for Elementary Schools”. Letter from Nejmi Sagib Bodamialisade, director of the Shakespeare School, to Ramsay MacDonald, prime minister of Great Britain, dated 1 November 1934. 90 Ibid. 91 CPIO: Embros, issue 22, 28 January 1937. 92 Ibid. 93 CSA:  SA1 731/​ 1934/​ 2  “Revision of Curriculum for Elementary Schools”. Internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 27 August 1934. 94 Ibid. 95 CSA: SA1 731/​1934/​2 “Revision of Curriculum for Elementary Schools”. Extract from a memorandum on the production of textbooks for Cyprus elementary schools by the director of education, m.p. 685/​32. 96 It is far beyond the scope of this study, but it is worth noting the Eurocentric approaches to history and geography by the English textbooks. For more, consult the masterpiece: Frank, Re-​Orient: Global Economy in the Asian Age. 97 CSA: SA1 731/​1934/​2 “Revision of Curriculum for Elementary Schools”. Extract from a memorandum on the production of textbooks for Cyprus elementary schools by the director of education, m.p. 685/​32. 98 CSA: SA1 674/​1919 “Cyprus Turkish Teachers Association”. 99 Ibid. 100 CSA: SA1 707/​1931/​2 “Masum Millet Articles”. 101 Ibid. 102 TNA:  CO 67/​220/​2 (1928) “Annual Report, 1926”. Colonial Office, Colonial Reports –​Annual: Cyprus Report for 1926. 103 This Turkish high school was established in 1898. Between 1922 and 1925 it was named ‘Sultani’, before taking the name ‘Lycée’ in 1925. Brief history of the

116

116  Ideological and cultural context Turkish lycée in Nicosia, in the annual journal Kipris Erkek Lisesi Mecmuasi, 1933–​ 1944, from the Mehmet Sahin collection at State Archives Keryneia, Cyprus. 104 TNA:  CO 67/​220/​2 (1928) “Annual Report, 1926”. Colonial Office, Colonial Reports –​Annual: Cyprus Report for 1926. 105 Brief history of the Turkish lycée, in the annual journal Kipris Erkek Lisesi Mecmuasi, 1933–​1944, from the Mehmet Sahin collection at State Archives Keryneia, Cyprus. 106 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no 1513:  Cyprus Report for 1929 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1930). 107 CSA: SA1 494/​1931 “Moslem Secondary Schools”. 108 CSA:  SA1 575/​ 1928  “Moslem Lycée, Nicosia. Building and Premises”. Extracts from the memorandum of the British Council, no. CYP/​6/​1, sent on 31 May 1940. 109 CSA: SA1 575/​1928 “Moslem Lycée, Nicosia. Building and Premises”. Letter by the director of education of Cyprus to the colonial secretary of Cyprus, dated 1 December 1939. 110 TNA:  CO 67/​230/​1 (1928) “Annual Report, 1928”. Internal correspondence in the Colonial Office on the Annual Report of 1928, dated 15 January 1930. 111 TNA:  CO 67/​ 223/​ 17 (1928) “Pan-​ Hellenic Propaganda:  Foreign Maps in Cyprus”. Letter from L. S. Amery to Sir Ronald Storrs, dated 24 April 1928. 112 TNA:  CO 67/​ 223/​ 17 (1928) “Pan-​ Hellenic Propaganda:  Foreign Maps in Cyprus”. Secret letter from Sir Ronald Storrs to L.  S. Amery, dated 10 May 1928. 113 TNA: CO 1045/​452 (1930–​1960) “Cyprus: Reports and Miscellaneous Papers”. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1938. 114 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no.  1618:  Cyprus Report for 1932 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1933). 115 TNA: CO 1045/​452 (1930–​1960) ‘Cyprus: Reports and Miscellaneous Papers”. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1938. 116 Report of the headmaster of the Turkish lycée in the annual journal Kipris Erkek Lisesi Mecmuasi, 1933–​1944, from the Mehmet Sahin collection at State Archives Keryneia, Cyprus. 117 Ibid. 118 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no.  1525:  Cyprus Report for 1930 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1931). 119 CSA: SA1 707-​1931-​2 “Masum Millet Articles”. 120 TNA: CO 1045/​452 (1930–​1960) “Cyprus: Reports and Miscellaneous Papers”. Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1938. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 TNA:  CO 67/​ 233/​ 13 (1930) “Education and Agricultural Co-​ operation”. Private and confidential letter from W.  I. Rieves to Lord Passfield, dated 18 February 1930. 124 TNA:  CO 67/​ 235/​ 10 (1930) “Visit of the Under-​ Secretary of State for the Colonies”. Letter from Passfield to Rieves, dated February 1930.

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Ideological and cultural context 117 125 TNA: CO 67/​273/​4; TNA: CO 67/​273/​3; TNA: CO 67/​259/​16; TNA: CO 67/​264/​ 15; TNA: FO 141/​675. 126 TNA:  FO 141/​ 675  “Projected Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Transmitting a copy of a memorandum by the Colonial Office for observations. 127 TNA: CO 67/​273/​4 1937 “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. 128 Ibid. 129 TNA: CO 67/​264/​13 1936 “Elementary Education”. Confidential letter from acting governor of Cyprus W. D. Battershill to Ormsby-​Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 31 July 1936. 130 Ibid. 131 TNA: CO 67/​273/​2 (1938) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Confidential letter from Richmond Palmer, the governor of Cyprus, to Ormsby-​Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 30 June 1937. 132 Ibid. 133 TNA: CO 67/​273/​4 (1938) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. 134 TNA: CO 67/​273/​2 (1937) “Proposed Establishment of a British University in the Near East”. Confidential letter from Richmond Palmer, the governor of Cyprus, to Ormsby-​Gore, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 30 June 1937. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 138 We will not follow here Ziya Gökalp’s definition of culture –​i.e. the unique and sui generis composition of the ‘mores’ of a particular nation. Berkes, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization: Selected Essays of Ziya Gokalp, 23. 139 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2nd edn. 140 CSA:  SA1 766/​ 1935  “Marriages between Cypriot Moslems and Turkish Citizens”. 141 TNA:  CO 67/​263/​3 (1935) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Letter from Sedat Zeki, counsellor in the Turkish embassy in London, to A. K. Helm, Foreign Office, dated 13 August 1935. 142 CSA:  SA1 766/​ 1935  “Marriages between Cypriot Moslems and Turkish Citizens”. 143 Ibid. 144 The analysis of every issue on Cyprus within the regional context of the eastern Mediterranean is always essential. 145 TNA: CO 67/​269/​5 (1936) “Moslem Brides”. 146 TNA:  CO 67/​269/​5 (1936) “Moslem Brides”. Internal Colonial Office correspondence from Dawe, dated 30 June 1936. 147 TNA: CO 67/​268/​4 (1937) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Despatch from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Ormsby-​Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 December 1936. 148 Ibid. 149 TNA: CO 67/​268/​4 (1937) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Dawe in internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 9 March 1936.

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118  Ideological and cultural context 150 TNA: CO 67/​268/​4 (1937) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Despatch from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Ormsby-​Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 December 1936. 151 TNA: CO 67/​268/​4 (1937) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Dawe in internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 9 March 1936. 152 Ibid. 153 Ibid. 154 TNA:  CO 67/​263/​3 (1935) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Letter from M. Erdogan, counsellor in the Turkish consulate in Larnaca, to the Sheri judge of Nicosia and Kyrenia districts, dated 10 October 1935. 155 TNA:  CO 67/​263/​3 (1935) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Letter from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to J. H. Thomas, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 6 December 1935. 156 TNA: CO 67/​263/​3 (1935) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Letter from H.  T. Allen, Colonial Office, to the Under-​Secretary of State, Foreign Office, dated 20 January 1936. 157 TNA:  CO 67/​263/​3 (1935) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Letter from Sedat Zeki, counsellor in the Turkish embassy in London, to A. K. Helm, Foreign Office, dated 13 August 1935. 158 Ibid. 159 TNA: CO 67/​268/​4 (1937) “Marriage of Turkish Citizens in Cyprus”. Despatch from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Ormsby-​Gore, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 December 1936. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 It is interesting to note that the turban was replaced by the fez by early Ottoman attempts to reach modernity. This Westernisation/​modernisation step was then abolished by Ataturk’s reforms, which forbade both the turban and the fez as symbols of parochialism and backwardness. 169 In Gökay’s words: ‘Without his turban and gown, a Muslim cleric was a nobody’. Gökay, Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–​ 1991:  Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism, 41. 170 As Gökay well puts it: ‘Following the adoption by the assembly of the law mandating the wearing of hats, 25 November 1925, a series of explosions occurred in various places in Anatolia. Between 15 and 20 people eventually lost their heads for wishing to cover them as they saw fit.’ Ibid. 171 TNA:  CO 67/​ 239/​ 14 (1931) “Political Situation”. Letter from George S Frangoudis, president of the School of Political Sciences in Athens, to Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, dated 1 November 1931. 172 Ibid. 173 CSA: SA1 969/​1925 “Wearing of Hats by the Moslem School Boys”. 174 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no. 682, 14 December 1933.

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Ideological and cultural context 119 1 75 Ibid. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid. 178 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no. 919, 14 January 1936. 179 Ibid. 180 CSA: SA1 952/​1936 “Prayers on the Occasion of the Prophet’s Birthday”. Prayers recited at the St Sophia Mosque in Nicosia, by the Fetva Emini, dated 2 June 1936. 181 Ibid. 182 Ibid. 183 CSA:  SA1 1419/​1938  “Moslem Ceremonies. Procedure of Religious Sermons and Prayers”. Confidential letter from the Evkaf Office in Cyprus to Mr Stanley, government of Cyprus, dated 27 April 1938. 184 A dervish or Sufi residence or place of worship. 185 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, 46. 186 Ibid., 46. 187 CSA: SA1 1419/​1938 “Moslem ceremonies. Procedure of Religious Sermons and Prayers”. Confidential letter from the Evkaf Office in Cyprus to Mr Stanley, government of Cyprus, dated 27 April 1938. 188 CSA:  SA1 1419/​1938  “Moslem Ceremonies. Procedure of Religious Sermons and Prayers”. Letter from Munir Bey to all the Evkaf agents and the chief clerk, Evkaf Department, dated 26 April 1938. 189 CSA: SA1 1419/​1938 ‘Moslem Ceremonies. Procedure of Religious Sermons and Prayers”. Letter from M. Hakki, the Fetva Emini, to the delegate of Evkaf of Cyprus, dated 25 April 1938. 190 CSA: SA1 707/​1931/​2 “Masum Millet Articles”. 191 Ibid. 192 Ibid. 193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Ibid. 196 For the language reform, look at the 2010 article Aydingün and Aydingun, “The Role of Language in the Formation of Turkish National Identity and Turkishness”, which is based on Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success. 197 Lewis, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, 27. 198 TNA: CO 67/​220/​2 (1928) “Annual Report, 1926”. Annual Report for Cyprus for the Year 1926. 199 TNA: CO 67/​247/​9 (1932) “Survey of Administrative, Economic and General Development of Cyprus 1927–​32”. Survey of the administrative, economic and general development of the colony, 1927–​1932, prepared by Sir Ronald Storrs. 200 Colonial Office, Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1932. 201 Colonial Office, Colonial Reports  –​Annual, no.  1849:  Cyprus Report for 1937 (London: HM Stationery Office, 1938). 202 A. C. Mowle, The New Turkish: An Elementary Grammar, Vocabulary, and Phrase Book of the Turkish Language in the New Latin Characters (Nicosia: Government Printing Office, 1930). The booklet was retrieved from the State Archives, Keryneia, Cyprus.

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120  Ideological and cultural context 2 03 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 205 Certain Turkish papers started to be circulated in Cyprus. The papers had more pictures and photographs than text. In almost every issue there was a caption from Cyprus. 206 KA: State Archives of Keryneia, newspaper collection. 207 TNA: CO 67/​250/​4 (1933) “Language Used in the Cyprus Courts”.

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6  Political context

Introduction Let us now turn to the political context wherein the shift from a religious to a national identity occurred. In order to address the main research question in this chapter I am turning my focus onto the political context in which Turkish nationalism emerged and developed. The incentives that the British government gave the Muslims of Cyprus allowed them to organise themselves. This chapter puts forward four main points. First, throughout the period in question Muslim Cypriots were used by the British administration in the political representative institutions, such as the Legislative Council and Executive Council, as a counterbalance to the growing Greek Cypriot nationalist agitation. The share of seats the Muslim Cypriot delegates in these political institutions were allocated was not proportionate to the share of the size of the community’s population. With the exception of 1930, Muslim Cypriots always cooperated with the British colonial government against Greek Cypriots in these institutions. Second, the British government in Cyprus not only sharpened the cleavages between the two communities but also strengthened national identification within the Turkish Cypriot community. The politicisation of the Muslim community helped the community to be more organised and modernised. The new political elite emerged through these institutions. Third, the adoption of separate electoral rolls and communal representation, along with the creation of separate administrative and political structures, not only divided the population along religious lines but also created the necessary basis for the political organisation of the Muslim Cypriot community by nurturing the advance of a distinct Turkish Cypriot socio-​political system. This introduction of partially representative politics had far-​reaching consequences for the political organisation of the Muslim community. Fourth, British rule in Cyprus systematically violated clauses in article 21 of the Lausanne treaty regarding the emigration of Muslim Cypriots to Anatolia. It was in the strategic interests of the British to maintain a sufficient number of Muslim Cypriots in the island in order to efficiently operate the ‘divide and rule’ policy among the local communities.

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122  Political context

Local councils Upon their arrival in Cyprus, the British introduced political structures that were designed to pit the two communities against each other. The British policy of explicitly separating the two communities was apparent not only in the setting up of separate educational systems but also in the separate representation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the Legislative Council. Separate representation was secured for the Muslims of Cyprus in all the schemes of the representative and consultative bodies designed by the British. This policy was partly justified as the outcome of the liberal attitude towards minorities, but mainly it was one of political convenience. Soon after their advent on the island the British established a Legislative and an Executive Council with two kinds of members: the officials and the non-​officials. The non-​officials were Cypriots while the officials came from the British administration.1 These bodies were a ‘ritual’ for the administration of all the British Crown colonies. Therefore, it is worth noting that, even though Cyprus did not acquire the status of a Crown colony till 1925, it was treated in this sense as though it had been since the advent of British rule at the end of the nineteenth century. Cyprus saw the establishment of the Legislative Council, composed of members of the Muslim and Christian (or ‘Non-​Muslim’, as they used to be called) communities. In line with their liberal beliefs, the British introduced a constitution as a signal of good intentions for a liberal administration. After a revision of the constitution, in 1882, the Legislative Council was composed of six officials and 12 local inhabitants, the latter being nominated to represent the various sections, communities and districts of the country. Nevertheless, the Legislative Council functioned only as a consultative body, with rather limited powers. For the elections of the non-​official members of the council, Cyprus was subdivided into regions. The elections were conducted by distinct communal division. The 12 members of the council would be divided into three Muslims and nine Christians, more or less in accordance with the percentage of the communities in the population as shown by the census of 1881. The elected members in the Legislative Council were designated as representing religious communities, Muslims and Christians, and thus the scheme endeavoured to blunt the edge of the social and political divisions. Communal representation was an effective method for operating the ‘divide and rule’ strategy. The allocation of six seats to unelected members of the council meant that the three Muslim members had to side with the British if they wanted to counterbalance the majority of the delegates. This allocation ensured that the number of official members (appointed by the government) and elected Muslim members combined was equal to the number of Greek delegates. The former would eventually be superior in voting power by virtue of the casting vote of the high commissioner. Even with an increase in the seats on the council in 1925, when Cyprus became a Crown colony, this balance was maintained in 1925. Moreover, the lack of provision for legislative

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Political context 123 representation for the smaller Cypriot communities of Maronites, Latinos and Armenians facilitated the British government in operating its imperial strategy. The ostensibly liberal policy suited the political game of chess. British rule in Cyprus proudly paraded its self-​styled liberal administration. The official British account of the occupation of the island highlighted the progress in the liberal system of government in comparison with the Ottoman one.2 The establishment in 1882 of a constitution was based on the electoral principle. The British emphasised that Cyprus had been ruled despotically before their advent. Moreover, although the ‘mass of the people were illiterate and there was no tradition of self-​government’, the 1882 constitution created, besides an Executive Council to advise the high commissioner, a Legislative Council under the presidency of the high commissioner with six official non-​elected members and 12 elected members, three of whom were elected by Muslim inhabitants and nine by the ‘non-​Muslims’.3 In 1925, with Cyprus’ elevation to the status of Crown colony, the Legislative Council was enlarged by the addition of three official members and three elected members. Innovations made then were the requirements that all members should be British subjects and should take an oath of allegiance to the Crown.4 The title of high commissioner was abolished. The Legislative Council used to be called a ‘toy parliament’.5 Its powers were extremely limited. In particular, there were main three grievances about the role of the council.6 Firstly, the Legislative Council could not introduce any law for the appropriation of part of the public revenues, or even propose a bill imposing a tax without having previously obtained permission from the British governor. Secondly, it did not have any control over the whole of the sums to be appropriated during the voting of the budget, a great portion of them being beyond its control by virtue of existing imperial Orders in Council and laws. Thirdly, the Legislative Council was essentially absent in the preparation of the budget and did not have any control over the estimates of expenditure.7 Therefore, legislative authority, subject to the power of the British monarch to disallow local legislation or to legislate for the colony by Order in Council, resided with the governor.8 The representation of the communities in the Executive Council was even more unequally non-​proportional to the demographic census. The Executive Council consisted of four official members and two non-​official members, one Muslim and one Christian, appointed by the governor. This equation of the two communities in terms of representation triggered objections by the Greek Cypriot community. Nevertheless, the Executive Council was essentially powerless. In principle, its sole function was to advise the governor on new legislation, and on the exercise of the powers granted to the governor in council under existing laws.9 The proportion of Muslim members in both the Legislative and the Executive Councils was heavily criticised by the Greek Cypriot political elite. It is indicative that in 1929 the Greek members of the Legislative Council sent a memorial to the new British Secretary of State on the occasion of Labour’s

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124  Political context electoral victory in Britain.10 After expressing their aspiration to union with Greece, the Greek political leaders analysed the ‘incompetence and the shabbiness’ of the Legislative Council. Their criticism came from the point of view of the majority of the inhabitants, who were Greek. The composition of the Legislative Council was considered an ‘unconcealed provocation’ for the majority of the population. It was even characterised as a form of tyranny of the minority.11 The British government intended to sharpen the communal cleavages in the representative bodies. In 1927 a confidential letter from the acting governor, Reginald Nicholson, to the Under-​Secretary of State explicitly disclosed the British ‘divide and rule’ policy. Nicholson explained that the three elected Muslim members would almost invariably vote with the British government and not with the 12 elected Greek members. This was significant, because it converting the majority of 15 elected to ten government members into a government majority.12 Nicholson claimed that ‘the effect of this has been twofold’. On the one hand, it had kept ‘alive the mutual antipathy of the Greek and the Turkish sections of the community’, while, on the other hand, it had encouraged ‘the Greek elected members in their attitude of hostility towards the policies of the government’.13 These policies were gradually leading to a strengthening of national identification within the Turkish Cypriot community. The October 1931 revolt gave the best pretext to the British Empire to establish authoritarian rule in Cyprus, abolishing the constitution and the Legislative Council. Letters patent were then issued reconstituting the government without a Legislative Council and entrusting the power of legislation directly to the governor. The Executive Council was retained. The Advisory Council was established on 28 October 1933 as a replacement for the Legislative Council. The announcement in the Extraordinary Gazette stated that its official justification was to provide the governor with a channel through which he could obtain the views of the people on questions of legislation and other matters. However, the actual raison d’être was, in Palmer’s words, ‘the postponement of the constitutional question which they could not touch for some time’.14 The Advisory Council was intended to replace the Legislative Council as a representative institution but, unlike the latter, it had no elected members. It was composed of four official members and ten non-​official members appointed by the governor. The British administration did not assign any legislative power to this council; its role was solely to consult and advise the government on legislative and other measures.15 The annual estimates for Cyprus were only examined and discussed in the Advisory Council, which had absolutely no powers of influence in the policy-​making process. The Kemalist faction of the Muslim community saw this development as a very positive step for the restoration of representative bodies. Hüseyin Djemal Effendi, from the nationalist Söz newspaper, commenting upon the establishment of the Advisory Council, hoped that ‘the punitive treatment

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Political context 125 which was being made to a people which has been the victim of a wrong agitation’ would not be prolonged.16 Djemal Effendi endorsed the establishment of the Advisory Council only as a temporary measure towards a sound and smooth form of government.17 When the governor, Sir Reginald Stubbs, sent to the Colonial Office his proposal for an Advisory Council on which there would be four Greek Cypriots and one Turkish Cypriot, the Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, sent a private letter to Stubbs. He wrote that he was ‘in favour of the Advisory Council because this establishment will help to postpone indefinitely any new constitution’. He also noted: ‘I agree about the numbers; and I see no reason why you should not have two Turks.’18 However, for the governor of Cyprus an increase of the number of the Turkish representatives in the council would mean not only a Greek Cypriot dissident but also difficulty in finding an appropriate and qualified Turkish Cypriot representative. In November 1933 the British government appointed Mehmed Zekia Bey, from Famagusta, as the first Muslim member of the newly established Advisory Council.19 Zekia Bey was from the Kemalist faction of the Muslim community and a member of the Central Committee of the Turkish Congress.20 The Kemalist newspaper Söz endorsed the appointment of Zekia Bey as a member of the Advisory Council.21 During the first year of its existence the Advisory Council met only three times.22 It was not considered successful, as it was hardly used at all. It is telling that only nine laws out of the 49 enacted were ever placed before the council. However, in 1934 Governor Palmer reassured the Colonial Office in London that, even so, the Advisory Council had served its purpose –​i.e. to postpone the constitutional question, which ‘they could not touch for some time’.23 In 1933 a memorandum compiled by Governor Stubbs in 1933 revealed the British perception of the Cypriots. Stubbs wrote that ‘with such a history it is not surprising that the Cypriot has developed and retained a typical slave mentality’. Reginald Stubbs portrayed Cypriots as being full of ‘intrigue, deceit and suspicion[, which] meet one at every turn’. For him, ‘no Cypriot will trust another and is probably very wise not to do so. And public spirit is a thing not only unknown but practically inconceivable to him.’24 This racist portrayal of Cypriots was indicative of the British authoritarian regime throughout the 1930s. The debate on the future Cyprus constitution was rather heated throughout the 1930s.25 The British administration’s intention was the maintenance of rule by decree. The Greek Cypriot political elite sent petitions to the British colonial secretary in London asking for a new constitution. For the Muslim Cypriot elite, the issue of the constitution was more complicated. This wider dimension was revealed in 1937 by the Kemalist newspaper Söz, which published an article highlighting the issue of defence, perceiving the Greek Cypriots as a threat: ‘[T]‌hen comes the question of Defence. To attribute the

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126  Political context present tranquility and security to our own powers would be an absolute fallacy. If it is intended to leave the responsibility of Defence to Great Britain, this will certainly involve submission to her power and authority, in which case we shall have to seek the ways of our local progress and development.’26 In April 1934 Governor Palmer sent a secret letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, describing the political situation and noting: ‘It should be added that as the older generation of Turks is gradually disappearing and dwindling, and as the younger generation tend to become Kemalists, we cannot in any case return to the old method of controlling Cyprus for long.’27 The Conservative politician knew very well that British tactics on the island had to adjust to the newly established circumstances. The adoption of separate electoral rolls and communal representation, along with the creation of separate administrative and political structures, not only separated the two communities but also created the necessary basis for the political organisation of the Muslim Cypriot community, by fostering the development of a distinct Turkish Cypriot socio-​political system. The establishment of partially representative politics was extremely consequential for the political organisation of the Muslim community. On their arrival the British had planned the introduction of elections, as one of the policies they had adopted throughout their empire. The election of representative political institutions was used as a tool for legitimising their government. Yet the electorate was rather limited, to purely male suffrage. Only men over the age of 21 could cast votes, if they met the economic criterion of paying taxes. In 1906 the secret ballot was introduced. However, despite several demands, the vote was not compulsory. In the three elections that took place during the period the increasing levels of voter turnout for the Muslim Cypriots is very indicative of their political participation. As Table 6.1 shows, in the elections for the Legislative Council the voter turnout increased. In the elections of 3 November 1921 the total voter turnout was 65.5 per cent. In the elections of 1 October 1925 the voter turnout remained at the same levels, with 62.8 per cent of registered voters participating. In the consequential elections of 7 October 1930 the level of participation increased, with 74.6 per cent of registered Muslim voters electing their delegates to the Legislative Council, for what proved to be the last time. The increasing electoral turnout could also be explained by the gradual improvement in transport. In particular, the island was divided into three electoral districts with only 22 electoral centres. This meant that voters often had to make a very long and expensive journey in order to cast their votes. Voters from the lower classes were primarily affected. During the interwar years the Muslim community of the island was not cohesive. There was a division between the secularist Muslims and the traditional Muslims. As in Turkish society in the 1920s, the Turkish Cypriot community was dominated by the so-​called traditional Muslims. Only a fraction of the Muslim elite favoured Kemal Ataturk’s secular views. The rift in the Muslim community during the interwar period was a reflection of the conflict between the reformist and traditional trends within the Ottoman Empire.

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Table 6.1 Muslim voter turnout, Legislative Council elections Year

1921 1925 1930

Electoral district of Nicosia and Kyrenia

Electoral district of Famagusta and Larnaca

Electoral district of Limassol and Paphos

Registered voters

Voted

% turnout

Registered voters

Voted

% turnout

Registered voters

Voted

% turnout

4,261 4.096 4.142

1,522 2.384 3.185

35.7 58.2 76.9

5,279 3.940 4.172

3,477 2.691 –​

65.9 68.3 –​

3,623 5,580 3,475

2,460 3,477 2,501

67.9 62.3 71.9

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

Total turnout

65.5 62.8 74.6

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128  Political context British colonial rule cooperated more with traditional elites. Traditionalists were conservatives and were identified with the leaders of the Evkaf. At the same time an emerging faction of secularist Muslims were cooperating with Greek Cypriots on economic issues. The secularists supported and introduced Ataturk’s reforms. The 1930s were the crucial decade in the development of a Turkish Cypriot secular identity. The ‘internal conflict’ of the Muslim community terminated after the Second World War, with the eventual victory of the secularists. However, British policies changed as the politics of the two communities changed. They did not have a simple, unitary and timeless character.

Relations with Greek Cypriots Looking into the social context within which the national identity was shaped, it is important to examine the relations with the other community of the island. This section builds upon the notion of Tönnies’ community and society. The question here is whether these two communities could form one society or whether they were separate communities. The eminent sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies theorised in his magnum opus people as social animals, with only secondary reference to overarching structures of political power.28 Our starting point is to test if this is the case in the relations between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriots form the ‘other’ in the identity formation process for us; as psychology dictates, the ‘otherness’ determines the ‘self’. As we saw above, the British government deliberatively excluded communal representation of the smaller Armenian, Latin and Maronite minorities on the island. Therefore, the institutions promoted the establishment of a bicommunal system. There are various scholarly interpretations debating the nature of the intercommunal relations between Muslim and Christian Cypriots. The relevant literature tends to accept the two extreme cases for these relations, either characterised as convivencia (coexistence) or as conflict. However, very little research has been done on analysing the interaction of the two communities in Cyprus during the interwar period. In 1932 the peaceful relations between the communities, elaborated in an article by Professor Arnold Toynbee for the Annual Survey of the Institute of International Affairs, alerted the Colonial Office,29 in particular Toynbee’s account of Cypriot affairs. Although the British government in Cyprus contacted Toynbee to revise the article, Toynbee insisted on his narrative. Governor Storrs was frustrated and wrote that, despite the request of his government to update the article, the ‘tendentious nature of the article” remained unchanged. The Colonial Office was concerned that Toynbee’s article in the prestigious journal could be ‘utilized locally for propaganda purposes’. While the British government was displeased with the portrayal of the British achievement in Cyprus, what it was really anxious about was Toynbee’s account of Greco-​Turkish relations in Cyprus. Toynbee held that both Greeks and Muslim Cypriots alike expected the British regime to be a transitional

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Political context 129 Table 6.2 Muslim members of the Executive Council Year

Executive Council

Date of appointment

1913 1926

Mussa Irfan Mehmed Munir

8 December 1913 9 June 1926

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

Table 6.3 Muslim members of the Legislative Council Year

Legislative Council

Electoral district

1921

Mussa Irfan Mustapha Hami Dr Eyüb Musa Mehmed Munir Mahmoud Djelaleddin Dr Eyüb Musa Mehmed Necati Mehmed Zekia Dr Eyüb Musa

Nicosia and Kyrenia Famagusta and Larnaca Limassol and Paphos Nicosia and Kyrenia Famagusta and Larnaca Limassol and Paphos Nicosia and Kyrenia Famagusta and Larnaca Limassol and Paphos

1925

1930

Source: Cyprus Blue Books.

stage in the transfer of Cyprus from Turkey to Greece. According to Toynbee, the Muslim Cypriot community of Cyprus was not unanimously opposed to Enosis. Toynbee doubted whether the oft-​cited (by the British) objections of the Muslim Cypriots were indeed very real, and gave ‘instances of Turkish minorities who seemed contented under Greek rule’.30 For Toynbee, local affairs in Cyprus had always been affected by the politics of the region. Therefore, the new phase in Greek–​Turkish relations that had been established with the Venizelos–​Ataturk pact of 1930 also had repercussions for bicommunal relations on the island. Toynbee argued that the ‘Greco-​Turkish national feud had been suddenly and unexpectedly brought to an end’ and was accompanied by a ‘détente in popular feeling between the Greek and Turkish peoples’.31 The peaceful coexistence between the members of the communities of the island could be illustrated in various cases of collaboration. For instance, in 1931 Isaias Dimitriou, Asif Rifat and Loutfik Ekremian from, respectively, the Greek, the Muslim and the Armenian communities applied jointly for a licence to sell alcoholic beverages to the Nicosia administrative council (Medjilis Idare).32 The Greek Cypriot leaders advocating Enosis (union with Greece) called on their Muslim compatriots to support their cause. These calls became more vociferous till the October 1931 revolt. An article by Savvas Loizides

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130  Political context published in the Greek Cypriot newspaper Eleftheria illustrates the calls. Loizides, a prominent lawyer, comparing the cases of the Muslim community in Greece and the Muslim community in Cyprus called on his Muslim compatriots to reconsider their stance towards Enosis. Loizides argued that, because of the common cultural mentality, Greek Cypriots would be better rulers than the British for the Muslim Cypriots. Loizides gave assurances that under Greek rule in Cyprus the Muslim Cypriot community would enjoy more spiritual and economic development than under British rule. Finally, the Greek Cypriot lawyer suggested a Muslim Cypriot delegation should visit the Muslim community of Greece in western Thrace in order to understand their rights and equal status in the Greek state.33 In the 1930s the Kemalist press in Cyprus was increasingly publishing articles about the Greek Cypriot mayors of the main towns of the island. According to the law, the mayor of a municipal area acted as the mayor of all the communities residing in that area. Söz was reporting cases of mayors allegedly not acting within the spirit of the law and serving only the interests of the Greek community. However, the allegations made against the mayors were evident only from the ‘uttering of stinging words’. Söz’s presentation of Greek Cypriot mayors was not supported with strong cases but, nevertheless, it created an image of intercommunal antagonism. Söz’s reports called on the government to ‘find a remedy and to save their rights from being trodden under the feet of the Greek majorities’.34 In the villages of Carpass and Paphos many Muslims spoke Greek. A number of articles appeared in Söz accusing Greek priests in these villages availing themselves of this fact by endeavouring to convert them to Christianity. Söz requested the intervention of the police.35 This case again gave an opportunity for the Kemalist section of the community to raise the issue of the Mufti. As this alleged policy by the Greek Church has not been reported anywhere else, one could claim that Söz’s notes and articles were an attempt to breed intercommunal animosity. In 1933 the Greek Cypriot newspaper Paphos published an article on the subject of Greco-​Turkish cooperation. Söz translated and republished the article. In 1933 the editor of Söz, commenting on the article, considered that any friction between Greeks and Turks had been created ‘by some intellectuals whose aims were to become prominent and occupy positions’.36 He claimed that ‘in the past years these intellectuals exploited the pure sentiments of the people, adopted a negative policy and brought about the present disagreeable circumstances’.37 The traditionalist section of the Muslim community tended to cooperate more with their Greek compatriots. In contrast, the rising Kemalist elite considered the relations of the Muslim community with the Greek one as by definition defective. They viewed with suspicion any attempt at closer cooperation between the communities. For instance, writing on the prospect of establishing a cooperative bank for Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot teachers, the prominent Kemalist newspaper Söz was clearly against it.

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Political context 131 Although it considered the suggestion to attractive, it argued that ‘Municipal Corporations formed a good example to show that wherever Greeks are in majority they do whatever they like, and that what they do for the Turks they think that they do it as an act of grace’.38 The distrust and the hostility of the increasingly prominent Kemalists towards their Greek compatriots was apparent in many cases. For instance, in the summer of 1935 Turkish and Greek Cypriot teachers signed a common petition requesting that their appointment be pensionable, as was the case with other government officials. The Kemalist newspaper Söz, which covered in detail this issue on its front page, failed to mention and highlight the common aims that teachers from both communities shared.39 The British government had always been aware of the two communities’ peaceful cooperation, which could destroy its imperial strategy. There were a few remarkable instances when members of both communities cooperated against the British imposition of harsh economic policies, such as in 1885, 1902 and 1927.40 However, the one case of bicommunal cooperation that was the most consequential came in 1930. In an effort to balance the budget, the British colonial government wanted to impose a law that would increase customs. However, this initiative was obstructed when the Muslim member of the Legislative Council, the so-​called 13th Greek, Necati Özkan, voted on the side of his Greek colleagues and against the British. This was one of the most exemplary cases in the colonial history of Cyprus, as the ‘divide and rule’ policy had failed. In the aftermath of the vote, Ronald Storrs was confronted with riots, which gave him the necessary pretext for abolishing many democratic rights and establishing an actual authoritarian regime, which became known as Palmerocracy. In the Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus in 1937, the British Foreign Office illustrated its unremitting fear of potential cooperation on the part of the two communities against British imperial rule throughout the 1930s. In particular, it talked about ‘Greek-​Orthodox agitators who, working through disaffected elements in the Moslem community, have sought to propagate in the Muslim press the notion that there is no longer any cause for disagreement in Cyprus between Turks and Greeks, and that they should form a common front to oppose Government’.41 The authoritarian measures imposed by Sir Richmond Palmer’s government aimed at terminating any links and cooperation between the two main communities of the island.42 In 1938 Governor Palmer, in his secret letter to the new British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Malcolm MacDonald, on the occasion of the visit by a Turkish naval ship to Famagusta, commented on intercommunal relations in Cyprus.43 According to Palmer, ‘the Turkish Nationalistic movement had supervened in the form of a tendency for “Enosis” and Kemalism to make common cause’.44 Palmer continued by arguing that there was essentially no community of interest or purpose between the ‘Greek and the Turkish speaking elements of Cyprus’. Palmer reminded MacDonald that for many years the support of the Muslim members of the Legislative Council (in the

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132  Political context days when that body existed) had enabled the British government in Cyprus ‘to overcome the continuous and solid resistance of the Orthodox opposition’. Palmer stressed that there was a ‘fundamental difference45 of outlook and temperament which divide[d]‌the Muslim and the Greek Orthodox Communities’. This, according to Palmer, made permanent political partnership unlikely. However, the governor expressed his fear of ‘a marriage of expediency, engineered by those whose antagonism to Government’ was strong enough ‘to overbear any too nice scruples of race and religion’. This, Palmer warned, could ‘constitute a serious embarrassment if it were popularly to be supposed that the stronghold of the Government’s policy could be taken or threatened by combined assault’.46 Therefore, it is revealed in this letter that Governor Palmer assumed that there were apolitical differences between the two communities. This is a very common presumption that can be found in the imperial mentality. This mentality assumes that there are already apolitical divisions among colonised populations, and therefore the imperial presence can in a way be justified. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that it was only when there was an urgent need to recruit Cypriot troops into the British army on the outbreak of the Second World War that these assumptions and mentality were suddenly abandoned. The only occasion when the British considered Cypriots as one unit and let the two communities cooperate as a single entity was the project of establishing a Cypriot unit to serve in the Second World War. In a 1939 report compiled by Colonel Beall, the formation of a Cypriot unit in the regular army was recommended. Colonel Beall reported that ‘there is very little difference, from the Army point of view, between the “Greek” Cypriot and the “Turk” Cypriot. They mix very well, and to advantage.’47 So, not only was there no problem among the members of the two communities but, to the contrary, it was highly recommended that they cooperate and form a single unit. Colonel Beall wrote in his report on the special characteristics of Cypriots: ‘Although they differ in religion and general character there is no difficulty as regards “mixing”.’48 In fact, a mixture would appear to be the best method forming a unit. The report concluded that the police force was already ‘mixed and the result was very satisfactory’.49 The cooperation and collaboration of the two communities against colonial rule was the worst possible situation for the British, as it would jeopardise the status of their government in Cyprus. Even the Greek leader, Eleftherios Venizelos, clearly understood that the key to a solution in the Cyprus issue was the need for the two communities to stand together. Venizelos in a personal note in 1936 wrote that he would suggest that Cypriots should be loyal subjects of the British Empire in order to gradually acquire the status of India –​i.e. home rule and equal membership of the British Commonwealth of nations.50 Venizelos added that, in order to achieve this goal, ‘the relations between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus must become everyday closer and friendlier’.51

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Political context 133

Internal division The religious versus secular struggles that are apparent today in contemporary Turkish politics have their roots in the late nineteenth century. The struggles between religious and secular agents involved different goals and strategies. From the end of the nineteenth century, in the declining Ottoman Empire, Young Turks opposed the monarchy of the sultan and supported the reinstallation of the constitution of 1876. Turkish nationalism initially, at the end of the century, developed largely within language and literature studies, and it was only after 1904 that it took on a more political character and began to be transformed into a political movement.52 The Turkish nationalist project aimed at the homogenisation of the population. Turkish nationalism was constructed by the need for a state. The Muslim community was not homogeneous during the period in question. In Cyprus the traditionalists figured prominently in the religious opposition to Ataturk’s reforms, and they continued to enjoy influence to a large extent even after the Second World War. The British found in the traditional Evkafçılar section of the Muslim community a close collaborator in their efforts to prevent the self-​determination of the Cypriot population. Until the 1930s, on nearly every occasion that the Greek Cypriots submitted a petition or passed a resolution calling for Enosis, the Muslim Cypriots either remained neutral or responded with a demand that there should be no change in the status of the island, demonstrating their loyalty to British rule. The members of the Muslim Cypriot community during the interwar period could be characterised as inbetweeners, for three reasons. The first is that the period in question for this book is the period between the two world wars. The second is the fact that during that period the Cypriot Muslims were in between two identities: a religious one and a national one. Finally, the third reason that we might call the Cypriot Muslims inbetweeners is that during the period in question –​and, in fact, during the whole colonial period –​they were in between the British government, which wanted to maintain its rule over the island, and the growing nationalist agitation of the majority of their counterparts: the Greek Cypriots. From the late 1920s the two leading figures in this rivalry were Mehmet Münir Bey and the Turkish consul, representing, respectively, the traditionalist Evkafçılar and the Kemalists Halkçılar. Münir Bey53 was the leading personality in the political affairs of the community for two decades. He was very pro-​British and, in the eyes of the British government, had ‘the mentality of an old Turkish pasha’.54 He had absorbed into himself every office he could. Nonetheless, British governors saw him as the best collaborator, and appointed him as the delegate of the Evkaf institution and as a member of the Executive Council even though, at the same time, he was an elected Legislative Councillor. The Turkish consulate that had been established in 1925 in Larnaca was considered the main channel for spreading Kemalist ideology among the Muslim Cypriots. The Turkish consul was an inimical

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134  Political context critic of the traditionalists, who were close collaborators with British rule. He was hostile to the administration of the Evkaf.55 In 1924 a memorandum on the future of Cyprus that had been prepared by the Foreign Office reported that ‘the Muslim population, being as they were a minority, regarded British rule as a safeguard and accepted the new situation, showing no tendency to identify themselves to the Turks’.56 That happened only in the 1930s, when the Kemalist tide was growing among the Cypriot Muslims. From the late 1920s Münir Bey began gradually to acquire a certain unpopularity among the Muslim Cypriots. The growing Kemalist section of the Muslim community started to make official accusations against his multiple appointments in the public service. In particular, in 1930 Said Molla, advocate and ex-​member of the Legislative Council, sent a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, to complain about Münir’s multiple appointments. He criticised the fact that one man had been allowed to combine so many functions. Münir Bey was the delegate of Evkaf and at the same time held appointments in the Legislative and Executive Councils, whereas he was officially considered and practically was a public officer. Said Molla perceived this state of affairs as wrong and objectionable, both from a legal and a disciplinary point of view.57 Against Molla’s attack on Münir Bey, Mahmoud Djelaleddin Effendi58 and Doctor Eyüb Musa,59 the other two Muslim members of the Legislative Council, expressed their solidarity to Münir by writing a testimonial. They stated that Said Molla’s memorandum represented only his personal views and not those of the Muslim community.60 The elections of 1930 were a turning point for politics and the political balance in the Muslim Cypriot community. At the elections, held in October, a Kemalist ‘progressive’ ‘moderniser’, Misirilizade Mehmet Necati Özkan Bey,61 was elected to the Legislative Council, taking the place of the ‘traditional’ and ‘pro-​ British’ Münir Bey.62 Sir Ronald Storrs, the governor, explained in a letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that Münir Bey’s defeat in the 1930 elections was because of his unpopularity among Muslim Cypriots. Storrs argued that Necati Özkan ‘secured his election by a very lavish disbursement of money, defeating Münir Bey by 440 votes’ in the Nicosia–​ Kyrenia electoral district.63 Another Kemalist candidate, Mehmet Zekia, was also elected in the Famagusta–​Larnaca district, while the Evkafçılar retained only one seat with the re-​election of the conservative Doctor Necmeddin Eyüb in the Limassol–​Paphos electoral district. Storrs, in his memoirs, highlighted also the role of the Turkish consul, Assaf Bey, in spreading the Kemalist ideology among members of the community.64 Necati Özkan was very vociferous in fighting for the rights and interests of his community. In his electoral campaign he managed to capitalise on the growing frustration with the British over their policies for the lycée, making education the central issue of the elections. He supported the relaxation of British control of the Evkaf and the direct election of the Mufti by his community and

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Political context 135 not by appointment by the British governor. He was definitely against Enosis but he voted on the side of the Greek delegates in the Legislative Council only when he thought that it was in the interest of the Muslim community.65 In the aftermath of the 1930 elections the internal correspondence in the Colonial Office was indicative of the growing concern felt by British officials at the victory of Necati Özkan. In June 1931 W.  Shipway wrote that ‘the machinery now threatens to break down completely. This is mainly owing to the fact that Mehmet Münir Bey’s successor has joined the Greek opposition. The somewhat ludicrous result is that the Constitution now centres round the person of the worthless Necati Bey.’66 The Turkish consul, Assaf Bey (see Table 6.5), was in close collaboration with the editor and proprietor of the Kemalist local newspaper Söz, Mehmet Remzi Okan. Assaf Bey was participating in local politics, and was considered a supporter of Necati’s party against the Evkaf. It was rumoured that Assaf Bey had secured a subsidy for the proprietor of Söz, who was also supporter of Necati’s party.67 In 1930 Söz published various reports attacking Münir Bey’s pro-​British stance. The Turkish consul’s interference in local affairs began to cause dissatisfaction on the part of British officials. The political enmity between the Turkish consul and Münir Bey was often reported in the Turkish Cypriot Nationalist press, such as Söz, Hakikat and Vakit, which were the link between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community, affirming the loyalty of the latter to Kemalism.68 On a regular basis Münir Bey reported to the governor that the Turkish consuls in Cyprus considered the Evkaf institution as a stumbling block to their aims to dictate to Muslim Cypriots. Münir Bey held that one who was loyal to the British government was not necessarily anti-​Turkish.69 In 1931 he asked Governor Storrs to make an enquiry about Judge Raif with regard to allegations of his meddling in local politics. Raif Effendi, district judge70 at Nicosia and Kyrenia, was accused that he had been taking part in local politics. He had grievances against Münir Bey and several police officers, considering them as ‘his enemies’ who were persistently trying to injure him.71 However, Storrs decided not to initiate a judicial enquiry, as it would serve no useful purpose. This bitter personal vendetta between two prominent figures in the Muslim Cypriot community was not considered an issue of paramount importance for the British government in Cyprus. In 1933 there was the prospect of a visit by the Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, to Cyprus, and the Kemalist agents within the community prepared themselves to welcome him. Söz seized the opportunity and attempted to highlight that the director of Evkaf was not the representative of the Muslim Cypriots, calling on fellow citizens to ‘abstain from signing any document which may be presented to them by the Evkaf party to the effect that they are satisfied with the present organisation’.72 On the same possible visit by Sir Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, Hüseyin Djemal Effendi, the advocate, wrote an article in Söz. He expressed his hopes that the ‘Turkish Community’ would have an

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136  Political context opportunity to express its wishes. Djemal Effendi stressed that one of the main concerns of the community was to be represented by elected members in a ‘Legislative Council possessing reasonable powers’ and not just the power of effecting economy in the annual estimates. Djemal Effendi presented four claims of his community. Firstly, he argued, there was a deprival of spiritual authority for the Muslim community of Cyprus. Djemal Effendi stressed that his community wished that its religious affairs were conducted in the same manner as such affairs are conducted by other communities in Cyprus. Secondly, there was the issue of the Evkaf properties. The Kemalist section of the community wished the Evkaf properties to be administered by the Muslim community under the British government’s control. Thirdly, there was the issue of the Sheri courts. Djemal Effendi argued for the improvement of the Sheri courts along with the adoption of the new Turkish Family Law. Finally, Djemal Effendi pleaded in favour of the Muslim community gaining power in the administration of its education.73 All these claims had been submitted to the British government by the Central Committee of the Turkish Congress. However, the British government did not initiate any changes to address these concerns. The director of Evkaf and the British government were the best collaborators on the island. The instances of disagreement were very few. One of these few cases was the disagreement by Münir Bey and the British government over the issue of investing the compensation paid to the Evkaf on the abolition of Abdullah Pasha Evkaf tithes. A meeting was held at the Evkaf Office to consider the matter of investing the compensation. The director of Evkaf suggested to the government that the share of the beneficiaries also be retained in Cyprus and invested in an immovable property. However, the British government did not accept the suggestion and ordered that the share of the beneficiaries should be paid to the trustees (mutevelli).74 An interesting case highlighting the internal conflict within the Turkish Cypriot community took place in 1935. Münir Bey took the liberty of communicating directly with the Secretary of State for the Colonies. In his secret letter Münir Bey complained about the interference by the Turkish consul in respect of his nephew, Ertogroul Ishinay. Münir Bey accused the consul of using his political enmity towards Münir Bey’s family in order to put pressure on Münir Bey to fall more into line with the consul’s political views. In particular, Münir Bey accused the consul of requesting from the Turkish government the expulsion of Ertogroul from the Military Veterinary College in Ankara.75 The Turkish consul pressed the British government to accept the Kemalist reforms concerning the Civil Code. As we saw above, on many occasions the consul intervened and called on the British government to change the law on polygamy in order to void marriages of Turkish citizens with Cypriots. Despite the fact that the British were reluctant in the 1930s to accept these reforms, very gradually the Cypriot Muslims embraced them. Regarding the use of the fez in Cyprus, a paradox occurred. As we saw earlier, although in Turkey the

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Political context 137 fez was an Ottoman symbol and was abolished by the Kemalist reforms, in Cyprus the use of the fez was popular throughout the period in question and it was perceived as a Turkish symbol. It is of interest that the Greek Cypriots grasped that the wearing of the fez presented a Turkish appearance.76 After all, the official version of Turkish nationalism in the republic was different from the actual operative ideals and loyalties of the Muslim Cypriots. It was only after the Second World War that Kemalism became apparent in every aspect of life within the Turkish Cypriot community. The fact that the last Ottoman caliph considered Cyprus as the place of his new residence illustrates the dominance of the traditional section of the community. When the former caliph was forced out from his palace in Istanbul he moved to Monaco. However, from the early 1930s the ex-​caliph regarded Cyprus as the best potential location for his next residence.77 The internal conflict of the Muslim Community was underlined in the issue of the muftiship.78 The struggle for leadership in the Muslim Community gained momentum when the issue of the abolition of the post of Mufti arose. The Evkaf Office wanted the abolition in order to be the only leader of the community with the right to reply on religious issues according to its interpretations of the Quran and Sheri law. The office of Mufti was abolished on 1 January 1929.79 The delegates of Evkaf were in favour of abolishing the post of Mufti. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary dated 8 November 1928 they proposed the abolition of the muftiship on four grounds. Firstly, the Mufti had the one duty of issuing fetvas and he could not act as the leader of the community. Secondly, the post had been falsified by Kemalists wishing to turn the Mufti into a ringleader. Thirdly, as the new Evkaf Department was going to be created it would save money if all the Muslim posts were embodied in this Muslim department. Finally, the Evkaf Department should be responsible for replying to religious questions, according to the Quran.80 Münir Bey was in favour of abolishing the post of Mufti. The post was replaced by that of the Fetva Emini, who belonged in the Evkaf Department. In 1937, in a Report on the System Adopted in Cyprus for Dealing with the Administration of Evkaf Estates, Münir Bey analytically wrote his views on the issue.81 He related how the duties of the Mufti were carried out by an official in the Evkaf Department appointed by the delegates. He was styled ‘Fetva Emini’ and was learned in Muslim law and looked upon as a Muslim religious dignitary. The literal translation of the Arabic word ‘mufti’ is the ‘person who issues fetvas’.82 As there is no priesthood in Islam it was the custom for the Sheikh-​ul-​Islam, a Cabinet minister in Turkey, to appoint muftis in various vilayets, districts and nahiehs, from amongst those learned in Muslim law, to issue fetvas. The Fetva Emini was looked upon as the authority in the interpretation of the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet, known as ‘Hadis’, and expressed his opinion when called upon so to do through the medium of the ‘fetva’. Fetvas were based on Quranic and Sheri law. The Fetva Emini was also responsible for the fixing of dates for bairams, Ramazan and other festivals

138

138  Political context that were entirely religious, in accordance with the established Muslim custom after observing the new moon. Muftis never performed any other duties and they were, as a rule, elderly and pious, supposed to devote their time entirely to religious matters, learning and teaching thereof. The Sheikh-​ul-​Islam’s letter of appointment addressed to a mufti ran as follows: ‘You are authorized by me to issue Fetvas in accordance with the correct and true principles of Moslem religion.’ It was short and precise, and quite significant that these venerable gentlemen had no other duties or power except to issue fetvas. Therefore, Münir Bey concluded that the position of the Fetva Emini, Mufti or Fetva Officer was quite clear and they had no authority whatsoever to interfere with the administration of Evkaf funds.83 The Fetva Emini’s salary was also a controversial issue in this internal division. The editor of the Masum Millet accused the Evkaf Office of nepotism,84 the accusation based on the fact that there was no transparency in the process of fixing the salary. In the same issue of the newspaper there was another attack on both the Evkaf delegate and the Fetva Emini. In particular, the editor –​using a false name and fictitious addresses in order to avoid censorship –​ wrote, ironically, ‘[T]‌o His Eminence the Flying Reed. We received your letter. Your complaint against you not having been appointed a Travelling Preacher is quite justifiable. But you must not be disappointed. It will not be difficult for the Evkaf to create a post for you. For instance, it may satisfy you if you are appointed to be the Emini of the pilaph eaters.’85 It is worth noting here that Masum Millet frequently used humour to attack the Evkaf Office and its practices. One other reason behind the use of fictitious stories was the need to avoid governmental censorship. The conflict between the main nationalist newspapers, Söz and Masum Millet, and the Evkaf office was evident in many instances. The occasion of the opening of the training school for imams and hatifs (mosque officials) was one of them. The British government, in cooperation with the Evkaf Office, opened this training school in order to prepare competent persons to fill the vacancies in the said religious posts. This initiative, though gladly welcomed by the Evkaf officials, met with disapproval from their opponents. On 7 December 1932 the Evkaf officials sent a letter to the colonial secretary to express their gratitude for the opening of the training school and took the opportunity to point out the internal conflict with their community by accusing the leading Kemalist newspapers Söz and Masum Millet of being irreligious and anti-​government. In particular, they pointed out that the editors of the papers, published in Nicosia, ‘who are irreligious and against the Government, are usually publishing intolerable articles against the religion, clergy and institutions of Islam, and we pray that the Government may stop them from publishing articles of an anti-​religious nature, contemning the sacred institutions and misleading the public’.86 The letter was signed by the Evkaf officials: Mehmed Hakki, the Fetva Emini; Ahmed Muhiddin, the ex-​ Kadi; Elhaj Münir, the Musevvid el Fetva; Ahmed Hamdi, religious professor; and Mehmed Akif, a sheikh.

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Political context 139 In the summer of 1931 the pro-​Evkaf newspaper Hakikat, in its leading article, attempted to expose the paradoxical claims of the Kemalist elite. It considered the attitude of the Kemalists as changeable and their claims contradictory. In particular, it argued that Kemalists had formerly asked for the abolition of the Sheri courts and of the muftiship, and for the introduction of certain reforms.87 They also declared that they considered it an insult to be called Muslims. However, after a short time they undertook to protect the Muslim religious institutions, and elected a mufti. The article characterised this position as ‘nothing but anarchy’.88 It proceeded to accuse the British government as appearing to be much too tolerant towards them. The article concluded that it was the duty of the government to ‘protect the dignity of individuals and of institutions, and to make them understand that there was a limit to the Liberty of the Press’.89 The Kemalists advocated the need for the restitution of the Mufti post because of the social needs of the Muslim community. The real intention behind the strong advocacy for the muftiship was to make the powers of the Evkaf Office dominant. In 1929 Masum Millet had published an article on the Mufti debate, holding that ‘one of the social needs of the Muslim community is to have an able and independent Religious authority, a “shepherd”, free from any political influence to guard the Muslim Flock in Cyprus’.90 The reference to ‘guarding the flock’ meant that the Kemalists would like to guard and control the power of the Evkaf. What is ostensibly a paradox is that the Kemalist agent in Cyprus was a religious figure, the Mufti.91 The power of the Mufti over the community was enormously influential. In 1933 Masum Millet published a series of articles criticising the Evkaf Office’s powers. The article expressed a wish to control and check the Evkaf’s power and suggested the establishment of an Evkaf Advisory Council, similar to that of the government and consisting of English and Turkish members ‘with a Veto right reserved for the Governor’.92 Masum Millet’s articles consistently, at any opportunity, gave vent to hostility towards the Evkaf, and in particular its director. The Kemalist newspaper constantly and vociferously opposed the various appointments of the director of the Evkaf in posts of the British government. Münir Bey’s appointment as the Muslim member of the Executive Council led to a series of articles in all the Kemalist newspapers of the island complaining about the British government’s decision. It held that this appointment was contrary to the wishes of the community.93 The bitter rivalry of the Turkish press of the period was captured in the cover pages of the leading newspapers. They often employed canny techniques to attract readers’ attention. The Söz editor, M. Remzi, in one editorial on the first page played on words when he wrote that ‘the Hakikat [‘Truth’] newspaper conceals the truth’.94

Judiciary During the Ottoman period Islamic law, which represented part of the religion of the state, became common law in the absence of specific legislation, and

140

140  Political context the Muslim courts possessed a residuary jurisdiction in matters of personal status. Under British rule the Muslims became a separate community and the jurisdiction of the Muslim courts was restricted to Muslims only while the residuary jurisdiction fell to the state civil courts. In 1927 an imperial Order in Council reorganised the judicial system of Cyprus. The supreme court was expanded from consisting of two judges to five, to include a Greek Cypriot and a Muslim Cypriot. Accordingly, the district courts were reduced from six to three. Each district court had two Greek and two Muslim Cypriot judges. However, the law was amended in 1931, vesting the power in the governor to set the number of Cypriot judges as he considered most appropriate. In 1933 the British passed a law that also had a provision for language use in the courts: as mentioned above, court proceedings were to be conducted in English. The reason behind the provision was not only to contain Greek Cypriot nationalism but also to enable British lawyers to practise law in Cyprus.95 The remuneration of the delegates of Evkaf became an issue in the late 1920s. In 1928 the acting governor, Reginald Nicholson, argued in a confidential letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies for equal treatment and policy towards the remuneration both of the Turkish and the British delegate.96 In particular, Nicholson differed in his opinion over the decision that the remuneration of the Turkish delegate be regarded as a salary, and non-​pensionable. Nicholson held that it would be invidious to differentiate between the Turkish and the British delegates in this respect, and, subject to the approval of the Secretary of State, he proposed that the remuneration of the British delegate should be placed on the same footing and treated not as a duty allowance but as a non-​pensionable salary.97 The Kemalist press would publish defamatory articles against Sheri court judges. The Muslim judges occasionally complained to the British authorities about that offence. For instance, in 1933 Mehmet Hakki, the Fetva Emini, wrote a letter to the colonial secretary.98 Hakki attached two copies99 of the Kemalist newspaper Masum Millet in which the principles of the Quran and, more especially, the canon law of inheritance were ‘openly ridiculed and the religious sentiments of the Moslems hurt’. Hakki argued that the Muslim community100 of Cyprus was ‘vehemently denouncing these publications’. The Fetva Emini concluded his letter with a request that the case be referred to the Attorney General for the ‘prosecution of the Editor of this paper under article 14 of the Press Law contained in Destour vo. 2, page 223 and under the relative sections of the Cyprus Penal Code’.101

October Revolt The October Revolt of 1931, also known as Octovriana, is considered to be the major turning point by scholars engaged with the Cyprus issue in the interwar period. The stance of the Turkish Cypriots in the October Revolt

 141

Political context 141 tends to be under-​examined in the myriad accounts of the event. An ‘event’ is, in fact, a very vague concept. Historians and scholars tend to problematise ‘events’ in different ways. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, an event has three basic elements:  it is accidental, it occurs by chance and it has an experimental spirit. Gilles Deleuze, based on Nietzsche’s conceptualisation of events, argued that they change people’s perceptions. He considers an event as a threshold at which the virtual potential becomes actualised. That is exactly the case with the events of October 1931 in Cyprus, which are considered a milestone in Cypriot history. In the light of the October Revolt, the British Empire changed its perception of how it should rule the country. Indeed, one could argue that the events of the October uprising gave the best –​and long-​awaited –​pretext for the British to impose authoritarian rule on the Cypriots. After the Labour Party returned to office in Britain in June 1929,102 Greek Cypriots started getting their hopes up for a solution to their problems and demands. The global economic crisis along with maladministration on the island had put the lower classes into an extremely difficult position. The majority of the peasants of all the communities of the island were in a state of poverty and wretchedness. The National Organization of Cyprus was founded in 1930 by the Church, the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council and other Greek Cypriot representatives. In 1931, on the Greek national day of 25 March, large masses of the population were mobilised and signed a petition for union with Greece, which was sent to Governor Storrs and the British foreign secretary. On 12 September 1931, in a secret meeting in Nicosia, Greek Cypriots of the Legislative Council and other leading figures decided to take more extreme measures in terms of disobeying British rule, including the non-​payment of taxes and boycotting British good.103 In October 1931, in various meetings of the National Organization of Cyprus, Greek Cypriot representatives decided to take radical initiatives. Indeed, the bishop of Kition, Nikodemos Mylonas, with a proclamation declaring union with Greece and calling on Cypriots to disobey, resigned from his ‘parliamentary seat’.104 On 18 October 1931 the National Radical Union of Cyprus (EREK) was founded. On 21 October there was a meeting of all the leading Greek Cypriot figures at the archbishop’s palace. On the same day, later that evening, another meeting took place at the Greek Club, where the Greek members of the Legislative Council delivered speeches. According to British official accounts, a crowd armed with heavy sticks, cudgels and stones of about 4,000 to 5,000 individuals then walked towards the governor’s house. After delivering speeches the crowd stoned the windows of the house while setting the house and four government cars on fire. It was then that the police took the order to start shooting at people. Storrs had 85 armed police at his disposal under a Turkish inspector.105 British government officials criticised Governor Storrs for dithering, as it was only after the burning of the governor’s house on 21 October and the burning of the commissioner’s house in Limassol the next day that

142

142  Political context Storrs issued the proclamation putting into force the Order in Council106 that gave him full powers to act.107 The unrest in Cyprus and the national aspirations of the Greek Cypriots were extremely annoying for the Foreign Office. The measures that followed the unrest were the imposition of an authoritarian regime. However, we should not forget that at the same time in Europe it is very hard to find any liberal or democratic regime. It was a time of emerging authoritarianism. On 11 November 1931 Sir Ronald Storrs send a despatch to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, to inform him of the causalities during the previous month’s riots. In the despatch Storrs included all the names of the 30 people who had been wounded and the six who had been killed. Among them there were no Turkish Cypriot civilians who had been either wounded or killed by the British bullets.108 However, according to the police report on the police causalities during the October riots, the vast majority were Turkish Cypriot.109 Table 6.4 shows an analysis of the police casualties. On 2 November 1931 Bayle wrote a confidential letter addressed to Sir Samuel Wilson, Permanent Under-​Secretary of State for the Colonies, on his personal criticism of the British administration for the October riots, stating that the situation was very serious. Bayle argued: ‘It is a piece of good fortune that the Turks have not joined in although Storrs’ policy has been a most exasperating one for the Turks, they have remained loyal and are satisfied with British rule though he has alienated 90% of their sympathy.’110 Nevertheless, Governor Storrs immediately after the disturbances informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies that this ‘was a purely Greek rebellion’ and the other communities were ‘loyal throughout and openly grateful for Government’s actions’.111 Both sides of the Turkish Cypriot press were unanimous in their stance on the revolt. It is indicative that the leading newspapers, the Kemalist Söz and the conservative Hakikat, called to their readers that Muslim Cypriots should not participate in the riots. Table 6.4 Police casualties and the punishment of insurgents, 1931 District

Wounded

Greek Cypriots

Turkish Cypriots

British

Nicosia Police Department (headquarters) Limassol Famagusta Paphos Larnaca Kyrenia Total

12  9 –​  4 –​ 13 –​ 38

6  4 –​  2 –​  3 –​ 15

6 4 –​ 2 –​ 10 –​ 22

–​ 1 –​ –​ –​ –​ –​ 1

Source: TNA: CO 67/​241/​5 (1931).187

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Political context 143 The press in Turkey did not cover the October Revolt in Cyprus. The British embassy in Ankara reported that it was a surprise that the Turkish press displayed such little interest in the Cyprus insurrection, contenting itself, for the most part, to reproduce news items essentially without comment. When comments did appear, it was mainly detached, though one journalist, of ‘Muslim Cypriot origin though anti-​British bias, indulged in a certain amount of carping criticism of British rule, even insinuating that the Turks of the island had also good reason to complain’.112 However, the British embassy’s report informed the Foreign Office that there was no reference to the ‘well-​known pro-​British attitude of the Cypriot Turks, apart from a single undated and unsigned letter, said to emanate from Cyprus and reproduced in one newspaper without comment, declaring that the Turks of the island protested violently against any proposal to annex it to Greece, and looked to the Turkish press for support. They looked in vain.’113

Palmerocracy The aftermath of the October Revolt found Cyprus in a very difficult situation. The disturbances in the island gave the British the perfect pretext for what they had been trying to do for years: impose martial law. What they did is issue an Order in Council. It came into operation in Cyprus on 22 October 1931, and was published under notification no. 868 in The Cyprus Gazette of 23 October 1931, in exercise of the powers vested in the governor by article II of the Defence (Certain British Possessions) Order in Council, 1928. A kind of martial law was imposed by the issuance of a Defence Order in Council. The Legislative Council was abolished and all its powers were transferred to the governor. In its place, in 1933, an Advisory Council was formed. This autocratic period of British rule in Cyprus is usually referred in the literature as ‘Palmerocracy’, as all power was transferred to the governor, and this post was taken by Sir Richmond Palmer for nearly six years, from 8 November 1933 to 4 July 1939. Social functions continued, and on many occasions Münir Bey visited Government House for luncheon as a guest of Palmer.114 Nonetheless, Palmerocracy was a truly authoritarian regime. It suppressed all political activities and carefully monitored the activities of all leading political figures. It is interesting that, in an article on the cover page of Söz, Necati wrote that he knew that the government had been closely recording all moves.115 Nevertheless, Governor Palmer kept close relations with Münir Bey. The flag is one of the most powerful symbols of nationalism. Immediately after the October Revolt the British government in Cyprus made sure that it prohibited all national flags. The 1931 Flags Prohibition Law was amended in 1932 in order to make clear the exemption of permitting only the British flag to be flown at all times and places.116 In late 1933, when Sir Edward Stubbs accepted the offer of the governorship of Ceylon, the Colonial Office made an offer of the Cyprus governorship to

144

144  Political context Sir Richmond Palmer (governor of The Gambia since 1930).117 Sir Richmond Palmer entered Nigerian service in 1904. He was appointed Resident in 1917 and lieutenant-​governor of the Northern Provinces of Nigeria in 1925. Since 1930 he had held the positions of governor and commander-​in-​chief of The Gambia.118 In the initial appointment, Sir Richmond Palmer’s term of office was decided to be limited to five years, and not the six years that was the usual period for which the governor of Cyprus held office. This decision was made due to Palmer’s age; he was in his 57th year.119 In 1936 Sir Richmond Palmer urged that a definite status be given to a ‘Commissioner within his District’. Palmer wrote on the importance of the precedence of district commissioners in Cyprus. Palmer stated that the ties of local sentiment were very strong in the five or six different districts of the island and were very important factors in minimising such subversive levers as Enosis and Communism. Palmer held that good order and positive public sentiment or opinion tended to hinge largely on the personality and influence of the commissioners. Therefore, Palmer suggested that, for things to continue moving in the right direction, it would be essential to make the position of ‘Commissioner’ as good as possible, and fill it with ‘the best men available’.120 Palmer’s overall performance as governor of Cyprus was not rated highly. The Foreign Office on various occasions saw fit to express its dissatisfaction with his policies and actions. As we saw above (in the section on the Italian threat in Chapter 3), towards the end of his term of office the Foreign Office was very disappointed with his attitude towards the Italian consul. FO officials regarded his attitude as stupid and harmful to British interests.121 In 1935 Palmer held that the Turkish consul was ‘the focus of all that was disloyal amongst the younger Turks’. He pointed out that the Turkish consul was hostile to the administration of the Evkaf. Palmer was concerned at the negative potential of the transfer of the consulate to Nicosia, because the consul would become the ‘storm centre for all disaffection gathered in Nicosia’. The governor also remarked on the activities of the consul in connection with Muslim Cypriot emigration to Turkey. Palmer held that his ‘opportunities for inducing persons to emigrate to Turkey’ would be greater if he were stationed in Nicosia.122

Turkish consul In 1925 the Turkish consulate was established in Larnaca. Ever since the arrival of the first consul in the island, the British authorities kept a close eye on his activities. In 1935 the Turkish consul stated to the British government that he was under orders from the Turkish government to transfer the consulate from Larnaca to Nicosia.123 Governor Palmer argued that this would be in ‘the highest degree undesirable from security and other points of view’, and that no consulate should be stationed in Nicosia.124

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Political context 145 In 1937 Palmer sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby-​Gore, his Secret Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus for the last quarter of 1936, noting that the consul for Turkey, ‘like his predecessor, keeps very quiet on the surface and gives no open cause for complaint’.125 Similarly, a report on the political situation for the first five months of 1937 stated that ‘the Turkish and Italian Consuls have not openly been active during the period’.126 The Foreign Office was disappointed with Governor Palmer’s relations and attitude towards foreign consuls. In particular, in March 1939, internal correspondence in the Foreign Office reveals that the attitude of the Cyprus authorities towards foreign consuls was considered not only ‘stupid’ but also harmful.127 FO officials commented that it was ‘no use trying to get any sense into the head of Sir Richmond Palmer’, who was fortunately leaving Cyprus very soon. Foreign Office reports reveal that Governor Palmer was considered as ‘not having the necessary tact’.128 From the late 1930s the Turkish consul was considered by the British colonial government as the main channel through which nationalist ideology was diffused from Turkey to Cyprus. This was obvious on the occasion of Kemal Ataturk’s funeral. Governor Palmer had forbidden the showing of a film of the funeral of the Turkish leader. The Turkish consul sent a dispatch on 10 December 1938 to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking for permission to make a complaint to the British government of Cyprus. The British authorities declined the claim of the Turkish consul, maintaining that, due to the ‘special circumstances in Cyprus’, the showing of such a film ‘might lead to a political demonstration’.129 The prohibition of the film of Ataturk’s funeral has to be understood in the context of general prohibition. For instance, film of a Greek royal wedding was banned as well.130 The British colonial government exercised detailed control over the censorship of films. As mentioned above in the international context, in the late 1930s, as another world war gradually came to seem inevitable, relations between Britain and Turkey entered a new phase. This could be projected also onto

Table 6.5 Turkish consuls in Cyprus

Ali Assaf Bey (Guvenir) Ali Assaf Bey (Guvenir) Mustafa Djelal Bey Mehmed Muhittin Bey (Erdogan) Ekrem Ismail Arar Kemal Karman Recep Yazgan Source: Cyprus Gazettes.

Location

Date of appointment

Nicosia Larnaca Larnaca Larnaca Nicosia Nicosia Cyprus

26 November 1925 11 February 1929 16 February 1931 22 October 1931 31 December 1936 22 September 1939 17 January 1940

146

146  Political context the views of the British colonial government on the national awakening of Turkish Cypriots. In the late 1930s the British government in Cyprus was concerned about the dynamics of the potential development of a Turkish nationalist movement in Cyprus. The government attempted to trace the sources of funding for the nationalist campaign that was conducted in the 1930s. In 1938 Governor Palmer wrote a secret dispatch to Malcolm MacDonald, newly reappointed as Secretary of State for the Colonies, regarding Turkish nationalistic propaganda in Cyprus.131 Palmer held that it was difficult to trace the funds that aided the propaganda. However, Palmer argued that there was good reason to believe that the Turkish consulate in Cyprus was in possession of funds for the dissemination of Kemalist propaganda and that ‘this Consulate and its entourage were mainly responsible for the encouragement of those elements among the Muslim community who have been engaged in tendentious activities against this Government’.132 Palmer contended that those elements included the local newspaper Söz, which was stated to receive a sum of £18 a month from consular sources, though ‘the statement could not be proved’.133 And this statement still cannot be proved until the Turkish Republic makes its archives accessible to scholars. In 1938 Percy Loraine from the British embassy in Istanbul sent a personal and confidential letter to Governor Palmer on the subject of relations between Turkey and Cyprus.134 He enclosed a copy of the minute in which he had recorded his conversation with the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Doctor Aras. Loraine argued that there could not possibly be any substance in a Turkish nationalistic movement in Cyprus. Loraine believed that the development of a Turkish nationalistic movement in Cyprus that opposed the British government would be impossible. Loraine based his belief on two elements. Firstly, he believed that every Kemalist by definition was a friend of Britain. Secondly, he held that it was the settled policy of the government of the Turkish Republic and the personal wish of Kemal Ataturk not to intervene in the politics of Cyprus. Loraine stated that ‘Kemalists were not Nazis’. He argued that there was ‘no attempt by Kemalists to organize minorities in other people’s territories, as did the Nazis’. Loraine reassured Palmer that the Muslim community of Cyprus had always been a strong element of support for the British government, and the Turkish government wished nothing but that they should so remain. The only concern for the Turkish government, Loraine stated, would be if the government of Cyprus allowed ‘the young generation of Turks to remain under the obscurantist influence of hodjas and such like, and withheld from the possibilities of liberal education and progress on modern lines of thought and science’.135 However, Loraine informed Palmer that, if Muslim Cypriots attempted to create an atmosphere either of suspicion or hostility between the governments of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic, those men would be considered as enemies of Turkey. Loraine was very confident that the Turkish Republic would not

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Political context 147 have any interest in Cyprus. He made the historical reference that, after the break-​up of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey had lost not only large continental areas but also nearly all the islands it had previously possessed. Loraine held that, in the Turkish Republic, ‘most people forgot about the islands’.136 He claimed that the people of the Turkish Republic had no regrets, ‘not only about the detached territories inhabited by non-​Turkish populations but also about the islands’.137 In Loraine’s view, the islands presented many complicated problems for Turkey, and they were perceived by Turkey as ‘points of vulnerability, offering no counter-​advantage whatever’. Loraine could not trace any grain of ambition or aspiration in Turkey to recover any of her former Ottoman island properties. According to him, the only general principle that guided Turkish policy regarding the detached territories of the Ottoman Empire, whether continental or insular, was the granting of autonomy to those populations. Therefore, in the case of Cyprus, the British colonial administration was perceived as liberal, as it supposedly gave a voice to the local people in the conduct of the affairs of the island.138 In 1938 the British government in Cyprus was concerned with various articles that appeared in the Turkish newspaper Cumhuriyet, and was thinking of prohibiting its sale in Cyprus.139 According to various reports, articles in Cumhuriyet were systematically endeavouring to represent the British government of Cyprus as hostile to Kemalist Turkey. There were also reported cases of published articles in this paper encouraging the development of a kind of Turkish nationalistic movement in Cyprus.140 In 1939 the Turkish naval ship Hamidiye visited Cyprus. Governor Palmer, on the occasion of the visit, wrote in a secret despatch to Secretary MacDonald that, ‘with the complete temporary sterilisation of the normal activities of a large part of the whole Moslem population of Cyprus which it occasioned, [the visit] has emphasised the potential dangers of an awakening of a Turkish-​Cypriot national conscience [i.e. consciousness]’.141 Palmer warned MacDonald that, in the future, the Cypriot government should be informed way in advance of any potential succession visit by a Turkish warship. Palmer admitted that ‘at the moment it is of course rather difficult to judge how thick the new sediment of Turkish national sentiment which has been left behind by this visit may be but a succession of visits of Turkish warships would certainly occasion this Government a degree of anxiety’.142 This Hamidiye visit illustrated the shift that had occurred in British policy in Cyprus during the interwar period.

The communist threat Since the end of the Great War there had been two major threats to the British presence on the island:  Greek Cypriot nationalist agitation and the potential development of a communist movement in Cyprus. The latter was more threatening, as it could surpass the communal division and unite people across class lines.

148

148  Political context While some sort of trade union association had begun appearing in Cyprus at the end of the nineteenth century, it was in the immediate aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution that several associations were formed. The epicentre of these associations and activities was the principal seaport of Cyprus, Limassol. In 1926 the Communist Party of Cyprus (the KKK) was established. Arguably, the KKK set out to follow a relatively nationalist policy, appealing to the popular sentiment for Enosis. This policy can be understood only by taking into account two rather special conditions: on the one hand, the predominantly agrarian nature of Cypriot society; and, on the other, the control of the powerful Autocephalous Church of Cyprus over the Greek Cypriot population.143 The founding congress of the KKK took place in mid-​ August 1926. Although there was not a single Muslim Cypriot delegate at the congress, the proceedings clarify that one of its main aims was to include them. Declarations read during the workings of the congress make clear the inclusive character of the party. There was a call to all Cypriots to unite along class lines. For instance, one declaration called for ‘fellow peasants, Turks or Greeks, from any part of the country’ to realise that the time had ‘come to awake’.’144 The manifesto of the KKK elaborated on this principle of the united front of Greeks and Turks of Cyprus.145 The KKK was in favour of independence for Cyprus and called for an anti-​imperial struggle. However, it was very critical of the nationalist Greek Cypriot leaders propagating Enosis. For the KKK, independence from imperial rule would be achieved only through an inclusive united front of the Cypriot population, which Enosis leaders neglected. A series of articles appeared in Neos Anthropos newspaper advocating this principle in the late 1920s. The KKK envisaged an independent Cyprus that eventually would be part of a ‘Balkan Union of Socialist Republics’, to include also the Republic of Turkey. For the KKK, the 1911–​12 Enosis agitation estranged the Muslim Cypriots and forced them to side with the British rulers.146 While its position and relations with the Greek Cypriot struggle had been evolving throughout the period, it is worth mentioning that, from early on, the party managed to realise the danger inherent in endorsing the Enosis movement, which would be its rupture with the Muslim Cypriot masses.147 In 1926 the KKK called for establishing a ‘united anti-​imperial front’ in order to achieve self-​determination.148 To this end, it advocated the implementation of six steps as a matter of urgency: a) the establishment of universal suffrage for both men and women over 18 years old; b) the transformation of the Legislative Council into a real parliament; c) the establishment of a government accountable to parliament; d) the abolition of the Cyprus ‘tribute’ to Turkey; e) the allocation of funding to agriculture and industry; and f) the discharge of British troops and the creation of local forces. The KKK gave emphasis to the second step, for the creation of a new parliament with power emanating from the electorate. For the empowerment of a truly representative institution, the KKK suggested that all the members should be

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Political context 149 elected. It also pressed for proportional representation for all minorities.149 It was rather remarkable that it did not call for representation that moved beyond religious lines. In the 1920s in Limassol the first activities of the communist movement took place. The Pyrsos newspaper was published in Limassol and was replaced in 1925 by the Neos Anthropos (‘New Man’) newspaper. Arguably, Neos Anthropos acted as a forum that actively promoted the cooperation of the working classes of the Cypriot population, moving beyond religious and communal lines.150 In 1924 the Workers’ Centre in Limassol was founded in order to house the various trade unions of the town.151 Since the early 1920s there had been numerous reports on the communists’ activities. The reports were concentrated around certain Greek Cypriots with close connections with communists in Greece. In 1921 the British colonial government passed the so-​ called Aliens Law, which permitted them to deport any person who posed a potential threat to the peace of the country. One of the prominent figures in the nascent communist movement in Cyprus was Nikos Yiavopoulos, a medical doctor recently returned from Greece. His activities had brought him under the close scrutiny of the British government and alerted the British authorities in Cyprus. Doctor Yiavopoulos was an active member of both the KKK and the Workers’ Centre in Limassol. There were a number of reports on Yiavopoulos and his deportation from the island. In 1925 Brewster Joseph Surridge, a British official of the government in Cyprus, in his report on Doctor Yiavopoulos sent to the then governor, Sir Malcolm Stevenson, detailed Yiavopoulos’ activities. According to Surridge, his activities included ‘the publication of a frankly communist newspaper,152 the establishment of the Cypriot Communist Party with its bureau in Limassol, the organization of a pseudo-​Trade Union Council in Limassol, in reality a cloak for Communist propaganda, [and] the formation of rural centres in villages as “nuclei” of peasant Union’.153 Surridge argued that there was ‘no prospect of immediate trouble as the result of these activities’ but he still recommended the deportation of Doctor Yiavopoulos as a preventive measure.154 Subsequently the governor wrote a letter to the colonial secretary, Leo Amery, describing the level of the communist threat posed by the activities of Doctor Yiavopoulos. Although Stevenson held that the communist movement had not yet gained ground among the community, he was convinced that Doctor Yiavopoulos was a ‘source of considerable potential danger to the peace of the country’.155 Therefore, Stevenson, with no hesitation, recommended ‘his deportation under the provisions of section 5 of the Aliens Law, no. 8, of 1921’.156 Yiavopoulos’ deportation was not the only incident of a communist leader who was under governmental scrutiny. The police kept an account of the number of communists in the island, registering all the so-​called communist activity.157 There was concern about the fully fledged development of organised and large-​scale labour agitation throughout the island. For a number of years this potential was considered as the greatest danger.

150

150  Political context The British reported the KKK inaugural congress as a Pancyprian meeting.158 The congress authorised a Central Committee, which issued a protest against the ‘ferocious war’ carried out by the British government against the KKK. The deportation of Doctor Yiavopoulos and the imprisonment of Charalambos Solomides, editor of the communist newspaper Neos Anthropos, was at the epicentre of the meeting.159 On 19 October 1926 Costas Skeleas, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Cyprus, submitted a protest to the governor of Cyprus, against the ‘illiberal measures which are taken by the Government under you, against the Communist Party and its members’.160 The governor forwarded the protest to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Leo Amery, noting that the communist movement in Cyprus had not been successful because of the government’s initiatives. In particular, the governor mentioned that Yiavopoulos and Solomides’ cases had resulted in setbacks for the communist movement, praising the ‘close and continuous watch exercised by the Government over all persons suspected of designs dangerous to peace and good order’.161 The second congress of the KKK took place in November 1928.162 There was reference to the ‘bankruptcy of the Enosis movement’. One of the contributing factors was the reaction of the Turkish population, which ‘preferred the British administration than the Greek occupation’.163 The congress decided to ‘order the new Central Committee to use all the available means for the systematic propaganda among the Turkish masses’.164 The party’s organ, the Neos Anthropos newspaper, had to cease publication several times. It was replaced by the short-​lived Neos Ergatis (‘New Worker’) newspaper. A law in 1932 gave permission for the registration of trade unions. In 1939 there were 46 trade unions registered with 3,389 members.165 It was then that the first  –​unsuccessful  –​attempt to establish a Pan Cyprian Trade Union took place, which eventually, in 1941, succeeded in founding the Pancyprian Federation of Labour (PSE). It is no coincidence that many prominent strikes occurred in the mines. The mining industry had been crucial in shaping class consciousness. The gradual evolution of the importance of the mining industry in the transformation of the working class of Cyprus is indicated in the numbers of miners. While in 1921 there were only 61 Cypriots regularly employed as miners, by 1931 there were more than 3,000, and in 1938 about 8,000. This increase is very telling in terms of the development of miners’ class. In July 1929 a great strike of Amiantos asbestos miners took place; they demanded a reduction in their working hours. Throughout this period the government of Cyprus had to use force against the strikers in order to get them back to work. It even had to arrest some strikers to further intimidate the growing labour movement. In 1936 miners’ strikes in Mavrovouni, the government sent in the army in order to suppress the strikes and force miners to return to their posts. The organising committee of the strike was truly bicommunal, as it consisted of ten Greek Cypriots and five Turkish

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Political context 151 Cypriots.166 Muslim workers regularly participated alongside members of the Greek Cypriot community. Throughout the 1930s many labour strikes took place, organised across a range of industries and occupations. The list is very long and includes strike action that occurred across the island. Builders held consecutive labour strikes in 1933, 1937 and 1938; shoemakers in 1935; Skouriotissa copper miners struck in 1936, with female workers there striking again in 1936; Varosha workers in 1937; Famagusta textile workers in 1938; Larnaca workers in 1938; and the list goes on.167 In 1937 striking coopers at the Keo Company fought for higher wages. They earned on average £3 per day for about nine working hours.168 The strikers’ demands included fighting for higher wages, reducing working hours, providing compensation in the event of a labour accident and the recognition of trade unions by employers. The striking miners fought also for improved working and living conditions. The stance of the KKK on the October Revolt has been rather controversial, especially for the official narrative of AKEL and its leaders. Two leaders of AKEL wrote. Ploutis Servas, the first Secretary General of AKEL, wrote that the KKK did not participate in the revolt. Servas argued that the KKK condemned the riots as pursuing the interests only of the upper classes and the Church.169 In contrast, Neophytos (Fifis) Ioannou, the AKEL’s Secretary General from 1945 to 1949, detailed a different account of the KKK’s position. During the first couple of days the communist leader Haralambos Vatiliotis (Vatis) condemned the riots as ‘nationalistic provocation of the bourgeois classes’. However, Ioannou underlined that, immediately afterwards, Vatis ‘corrected his mistake’ and endorsed the movement as ‘anti-​imperialist’.170 AKEL’s official account of the events fails to mention the ambiguity of the KKK leaders during the first few days of the revolt.171 The difference of these accounts is very telling about the communist movement’s rather confusing reflections on the event. During the authoritarian regime of Palmerocracy the political activities of Cypriot communists were to a great extent suppressed. The KKK was proscribed and its leaders were deported. Due to the state of lawlessness the KKK was largely isolated from the masses in the 1930s.172 Although there was little communist activity, British rule was constantly concerned about the potential development of a communist movement. Throughout the 1930s there was a series of secret reports conducted by the British government in Cyprus regarding the political situation there. Every report had a special section for the communist activities on the island.173 In 1936 the third KKK congress took place. There was a shift in the party’s strategy. While in the founding congress, a decade earlier, the party had held the principle that it was not in favour of the Enosis movement, in 1936 many members of the party advocated change. They claimed that the KKK joining forces with the Enosis movement was a ‘necessary step for achieving the ultimate goals of the party’. However, many have criticised this shift as political opportunism. Ploutis Servas was elected the Secretary General of the party.

152

152  Political context In 1936 it was reported that ‘communist symbols were found in the house of a known communist who keeps a printing press, but there was not sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution’.174 The town of Limassol was the centre of any kind of communist activity during this period. Communists in Limassol concerned with the considerable rise in the price of bread prepared a petition to the commissioner with 900 signatures from members of both communities.175 In 1937 two small strikes in Limassol, which were quickly settled by reference to the commissioner, were reported.176 Yet communist activity in Cyprus was reported as generally little, ‘thanks to the vigilance of the Police’.177 The little activity there was was confined to the ‘individual efforts of about half-​ a-​dozen known agitators which have little or no outward effect’.178 The local communists were ‘occupying themselves by writing comparatively harmless articles to the Press’.179 Nevertheless, this series of reports underlines the fact that there was always ‘the possibility of subversive propaganda finding its way into the papers and a careful watch in this direction is necessary’.180 The police kept a registration list with the total number of communists. At the end of 1937 175 communists were registered with the police, as compared with 185 at the end of June 1937. The report held that there was ‘no need for prosecution against communists in the Colony’.181 The actual number of Muslim Cypriots who joined the Communist Party during the interwar period is unclear. While there are scattered reports of many Muslim Cypriots joining the trade unions of the period and participating in the massive strikes of the 1930s, the number of activists participating in KKK activities is very imprecise.182 Due to the fact that the KKK was operating illegally throughout the 1930s, the party cadres were vigorous in maintaining the anonymity of its members and activists. In 1931 it was reported that three leading Muslim communists of the period –​Aziz Boulli (an auctioneer), Ahmed Houlousi (a grocer) and Moustafa Nairn Hodja (a tailor) –​had been recruited by Vatis.183 A police report stated that only Houlousi had recruited, enlisting 200 Turks as communists.184 It is also worth noting that, in the Turkish Cypriot press, both the nationalist and the conservative papers of the period published anti-​communist articles. The nationalist papers, such as Söz, emphasised the link of communism with the Soviet Union. These articles argued that the Soviet Union was an enemy of the Republic of Turkey, and therefore adopting, or even sympathising with, the ideology of communism would signify a betrayal to the Turkish ‘motherland’. The Kemalist faction of Muslim Cypriots felt threatened by the potential development of a communist movement on the island that encouraged the cooperation of the working classes. Indicatively, when, in 1931, Söz reported on the participation of Muslim Cypriots in the KKK it stated: ‘We regret to learn that some unknown Turks have been enlisted as communists. We blame their action, as they have done something which is contrary to the public opinion of the Turks of Cyprus and may put the community in a difficult position. We have professors and teachers none of whom is a communist, whom they ought to have consulted beforehand. The proverb says: The stray

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Political context 153 lambs are seized by the wolves.’185 On the other hand, conservative newspapers such as Hakikat paid attention to the role of religion in communist ideology. It used to portray communist ideology as a threat to religion. Nevertheless, a similar tactic can be observed being employed by the English-​language dailies of the 1930s in Cyprus:  Embros and Cyprus Mail also systematically published anti-​communist and anti-​Russian pieces.186

Conclusion The British administration’s policies were designed and implemented in line with the time-​honoured imperial strategy of ‘divide and rule’. The main counter-​argument would be that divisive policies serve simply to amplify the population’s divisions; the pre-​existing hostility of the people was the fundamental factor. In other words, imperial rule just exaggerates it, but certainly does not create it. All kinds of identities are politically and socially constituted and are continually negotiated. For the case of national identity, politics often plays a more determined role in its shaping process. As this study has attempted to highlight, this is exactly the pattern in the case of the formation of the Turkish Cypriot national identity. The formation, reinvention and dissolution of identities are historically contingent. Identities are multiple. At certain historical junctures one identity may come to dominate a person’s sense of self vis-​à-​ vis the other. This is the case with the predominance of the nationality over the religious in the identity of the Muslims of Cyprus. I argue here that the essential key in considering these issues is the influence of the articulation of power by different individuals/​groups. The formation of the national identity does not take place in a vacuum but happens as the climax of a relatively long process.

Notes 1 Order in Council, dated 14 September 1878. For the full text, see:  Hakki, The Cyprus Issue: A Documentary History, 1878–​2007. 2 TNA:  CO 69/​45 (1939) “Administration Reports”. Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1939. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 The Greek Cypriot press usually used this term in order to describe the Legislative Council. 6 Memorial. Dealing with the chief grievances of the people of Cyprus addressed to his Lordship the Secretary of the State for the Colonies by the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council. 1929, printed by Printing Office ‘Nicosia’, Chr. Nicolaou-​Nicosia, Cyprus. 7 Ibid. 8 TNA:  CO 69/​45 (1939) “Administration Reports”. Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1939.

154

154  Political context 9 Ibid. 10 Memorial. Dealing with the chief grievances of the people of Cyprus addressed to his Lordship the Secretary of the State for the Colonies by the Greek elected members of the Legislative Council. 1929, printed by Printing Office ‘Nicosia’, Chr. Nicolaou-​Nicosia, Cyprus. 11 Ibid. 12 TNA: CO 67/​220/​12 (1927) “Government: Proposed Constitutional Changes”. 13 Ibid. 14 TNA:  CO 67/​255/​7 (1934) “Working of the Advisory Council”. Personal letter from Palmer to Parkinson, dated 28 November 1934. 15 TNA:  CO 69/​45 (1939) “Administration Reports”. Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of Cyprus, 1939. 16 CSA: SA1 517/​26/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz no. 645, dated 31 October 1933. 17 Ibid. 18 TNA:  CO 67/​251/​7 (1933) “Setting Up of an Advisory Council”. Private letter from Cunliffe-​Lister to Stubbs, dated 24 August 1933. 19 Cyprus Gazette, 7 November 1933. 20 The National Congress elected a committee in 1930. The establishment of the Turkish Congress was considered as a step ‘towards the constitution of a Legislative Council’. Söz considered the Turkish Congress as the ‘political front’ of the Muslim community. Söz often invited Zekia Bey to discuss the difficult matters with the Central Committee of the Turkish Congress, of which he was a member. CSA:  SA1 517/​26/​2  “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz no.  652, dated 9 November 1933. 21 CSA: SA1 517/​26/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz no. 650, dated 7 November 1933. 22 TNA:  CO 67/​255/​7 (1934) “Working of the Advisory Council”. Letter from Pavlides to Palmer, dated 2 November 1934. 23 TNA:  CO 67/​255/​7 (1934) “Working of the Advisory Council”. Personal letter Palmer to Parkinson, dated 28 November 1934. 24 TNA: CO 67/​251/​3 (1933) “Political Situation”. Memorandum on ‘Cyprus’, prepared by Governor Stubbs, dated 16 October 1933. 25 TNA: CO 67/​272/​16 “Political Situation”. 26 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no. 1027, dated 17 March 1937. 27 TNA:  CO 67/​254/​5 (1934) “Political Situation”. Secret letter from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Cunliffe-​Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4 April 1934. 28 Ferdinand Tönnies, Tönnies:  Community and Civil Society, ed. Jose Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ix. 29 TNA: CO 67/​244/​3 (1932) Article on Cyprus by Professor Toynbee for the “Survey of International Affairs”. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 CPIO: Eleftheria, no. 1736, dated 20 June 1931. 33 CPIO: Eleftheria, no. 1629, dated 28 May 1930. 34 CSA: SA1 517/​26/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz no.707, dated 13 January 1934. 35 CSA: SA1 517/​26/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz no. 628, dated 12 October 1933.

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Political context 155 36 CSA: SA1 517/​26/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz no. 614, dated 26 September 1933. 37 Ibid. 38 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, dated 7 January 1936. 39 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no. 877, dated 20 August 1935. 40 Alexios Alecou, Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945–​1955: Politics and Ideologies under British Rule (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 13. 41 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) “Political Situation: Quarterly Reports”. 42 For an elaboration of this argument, see Rappas, Cyprus in the 1930s:  British Colonial Rule and the Roots of the Cyprus Conflict. 43 TNA: FO 371/​21935 “Visit of Turkish Ship Hamidiye to Cyprus, Nicosia”. Letter from Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 24 June 1938. 44 Ibid. 45 Palmer’s assumptions on the existence of apolitical differences of the two communities. 46 TNA: FO 371/​21935 “Visit of Turkish Ship Hamidiye to Cyprus, Nicosia’. Letter from Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 24 June 1938. 47 TNA: WO 32/​4237 (1945) “OVERSEAS: Cyprus (Code 0(D)): Raising of Military Cypriot Unit”. Colonel Beall’s 1939 report, prepared by Colonel Beall, dated 2 May 1939. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Eleftherios Venizelos, personal note, March 1936. Cited in Giannos Kranidiotis, Two Critical Phases for the Cyprus Issue (in Greek) (Athens: Argyropoulos, 1986), 162. 51 Ibid. 52 Taner Aksam, A Shameful Act:  The Armenian Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility (London: Constable, 2007), 79. 53 TNA: CO 67/​233/​14 (1930) “Question of Revision of the Constitution”. Attached report/​brief description of the elected members of the elected councillors to the letter from Ronald Storrs to Shackurgh, Colonial Office, dated 12 March 1930. In 1930 a British report described Mehmed Munir Bey as follows: ‘He is a barrister at Law, one of the Public Loan Commissioners, member of the Irrigation Board and of the Central Board of Education (Muslim). Nephew and son-​in-​law of the Mufti and a very respectable person. He has a good deal of influence with the Turks and is all pro Government. His advice as an Executive Councillor is generally sound and has good knowledge of local conditions. He is a valuable man to keep on the Executive and Legislative Councils. Expects to be awarded a high decoration for his services to Government in the Executive and Legislative Councils. Prior to his appointment as Director of Evkaf, he served for many years in the Accounting Branch of the Treasury and lately as a judge of the District Court.’ 54 TNA:  CO 67/​247/​13 (1932) “Munir Bey:  Conversations with Colonial Office Officials”. Note on Munir Bey attached to internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 25 August 1932. 55 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Secret letter from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 3 May 1935.

156

156  Political context 56 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925. 57 TNA:  CO 67/​235/​13 (1930) “Appointments Held by Munir Bey”. Letter from Said Molla, advocate of Paphos Bar, to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 21 April 1930. 58 TNA: CO 67/​233/​14 (1930) “Question of Revision of the Constitution”. Attached report/​brief description of the elected members of the elected councillors to the letter from Ronald Storrs to Shackurgh, Colonial Office, dated 12 March 1930. In 1930 a British report gave the following account for Mahmoud Djellalledin Effendi. ‘He is a merchant of Famagusta and member of the Medjiliss Idare of that District. He is coming from a good family but he is almost illiterate and by no means clever. He has some influence with the Turks of Famagusta. Is related to Munir Bey and is entirely led by him in Legislative Council matters. Was formerly assisting the Turkish Consul in connection with the emigration of Moslem Cypriots to Anatolia but since his elections to the Legislative Council he has ceased to do so. He is fond of drink, and the Greek members of the Legislative Council take advantage of this to extract promises of help from him which he forgets when sober.’ 59 TNA: CO 67/​233/​14 (1930) “Question of Revision of the Constitution”. Attached report/​brief description of the elected members of the elected councillors to the letter from Ronald Storrs to Shackurgh, Colonial Office, dated 12 March 1930. British report for Dr Eyüb Musa in 1930:  ‘Medical practitioner at Paphos. An unscrupulous and bombastic rogue and agitator with the following convictions recorded against him: In 1919 assaulting and wounding –​1 month imprisonment; In 1923 organising a procession –​1£ fine; In 1925 pleaded before the Court to a charge of accepting a bribe in his capacity of Member of the Legislative Council in connection with the appointment of Popular Valuers and was fined £5 and ordered to enter into his own cognizance to appear before the Court and receive judgment when called upon. He is entirely guided by his own interests in all matters and is quite unreliable but at present he is in debt to Munir Bey and completely under his influence. He is a sodomite.’ 60 TNA:  CO 67/​235/​13 (1930) “Appointments Held by Munir Bey”. Letter from Mahmoud Djelaleddin Effendi and Dr Eyüb Musa, Muslim members of the Legislative Council, to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 31 May 1930. 61 Ergin M. Birinci, M. Necati Özkan (1899–​1970), vol. I. (Istanbul: Necati Ozkan Vakfi Yayinlari, 2001). 62 Niyazi Kızılyürek, Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and the Cyprus Issue (in Greek) (Athens: Papazisis, 1999), 57. 63 TNA: CO 67/​238/​11 (1931) “Allegations against District Judge M. Raif Effendi”. Letter from Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 March 1931. 64 Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Readers Union, 1939), 588. 65 Nevzat, Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave, 17. 66 TNA:  CO 67/​239/​14 (1931) “Political Situation”. Internal CO correspondence, dated June 1931. 67 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Secret letter from M.  Midhat to the colonial secretary, dated 1 April 1935.

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Political context 157 68 McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919–​ 1939:  The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community, 140. 69 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus’. Secret letter from Mehmet Munir Bey to the colonial Secretary, dated 31 March 1935. 70 ‘Kadhiz’, in Turkish, is the senior religious judge. 71 TNA: CO 67/​238/​11 (1931) “Allegations against District Judge M. Raif Effendi”. Internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 27 April 1931. 72 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no.672, dated 2 December 1933. 73 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no.673, dated 3 December 1933. 74 CSA: SA1 517/​1928/​2 “Newspaper Articles, Söz”. Söz, no.915, dated 31 December 1935. 75 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Secret letter from Mehmet Munir Bey to the colonial secretary, dated 31 March 1935. 76 TNA:  CO 67/​ 239/​ 14 (1931) “Political Situation”. Letter from George S. Frangoudis, president of the School of Political Science in Athens, to Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, dated 1 November 1931. Frangoudis wrote that ‘the administration in Cyprus has in every way affronted the national feelings if the islanders. Though the wearing of the fez has been abolished in Turkey you have preserved it on the heads of your zaptiehs in order that Cyprus may present a Turkish appearance.’ 77 TNA:  CO 67/​271/​5 (1936) “Claims of the Heirs of the Late Sultan Abdul Hamid”. 78 ‘Mufti’, in Turkish, is a religious leader. 79 McHenry, The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus, 1919–​1939:  The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey, and the Turkish Cypriot Community, 127. 80 CSA: SA1 1469/​1926/​2 “Status of the Evkaf Department”. 81 Ibid. 82 ‘Fetva’, in Arabic ‘fatwa’, means a mufti’s opinion on a point of law, with no executive force. 83 CSA: SA1 1469/​1926/​2 “Status of the Evkaf Department”. 84 CSA: SA1 1301/​1932 “Training School for Imams and Hatifs (Mosque Officials)”. A modern Fetva (religious opinion), Masum Millet, no. 53, dated 27 January 1933. 85 Ibid. 86 CSA: SA1 1301/​1932 “Training School for Imams and Hatifs (Mosque Officials)”. 87 CSA: SA1/​950/​1926 “Hakikat”. Hakikat, no. 492, dated 1 August 1931. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 90 CSA: SA1 707/​1931/​2 “Masum Millet Articles”. 91 It is interesting to note that, as recent research shows, this is the case for the Muslim minority of eastern Thrace in Greece. See Kevin Featherstone, Dimitris Papadimitriou, Argyris Mamarelis and Georgios Niarchos, The Last Ottomans: The Muslim Minority of Greece, 1940–​49 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

158

158  Political context 92 CSA: SA1 707/​1931 “Masum Millet Articles”. Masum Millet, no. 126, dated 15 November 1933. 93 Ibid. 94 Söz, no. 568, dated 15 October 1932. 95 TNA: CO 67/​250/​4 (1933) “Language Used in the Cyprus Courts”. Letter from E. B. Boyd to Patrick Duff, dated 3 January 1933. 96 TNA: CO 67/​225/​20 (1928) “Remuneration of the Delegates of Evkaf ”. Letter from R Nicholson to L. Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 7 September 1928. 97 Ibid. 98 CSA: SA1 1265/​1931 “Defamatory Articles Published in the Local Press against Sheri Courts Judges”. Letter by Mehmet Hakki, Fetva Emini, to the colonial secretary, dated 18 September 1933. 99 PIO: Masum Millet, nos. 104 and 108, 1933. 100 It is interesting to note that, in his 1933 letter to the colonial secretary, Mehmet Hakki, the Fetva Emini, referred to the ‘Moslem’ community, not to the Turkish one. 101 CSA: SA1 1265/​1931 “Defamatory Articles Published in the Local Press against Sheri Courts Judges”. Letter by Mehmet Hakki, Fetva Emini, to the colonial secretary, dated 18 September 1933. 102 Ramsay MacDonald formed his second Labour government in June 1929. 103 TNA: CO 67/​241/​4 (1931) “Administration: Individual Criticisms”. Confidential letter from Bayle, at Limassol, to Sir Samuel Wilson, dated October 1931. 104 Kranidiotis, Two Critical Phases for the Cyprus Issue (in Greek), 19. 105 TNA: CO 67/​241/​4 (1931) “Administration: Individual Criticisms”. Confidential letter from Bayle, at Limassol, to Sir Samuel Wilson, dated October 1931. 106 Bayle explains that the Order in Council of 28 May 1931 ‘gave him [Storrs] full power in such an emergency and…had apparently been in his possession since the date of issue although not a soul, not even the Judiciary, knew of its existence. It was criminal of Storrs not to have published the proclamation in the Gazette at the time he received it, as a wholesome warning. Then, had trouble occurred offences could have been dealt with under the Order.’ TNA: CO 67/​241/​ 4 (1931) “Administration: Individual Criticisms”. Confidential letter from Bayle, at Limassol, to Sir Samuel Wilson, dated October 1931. 107 Ibid. 108 TNA:  CO 67/​ 241/​ 5 (1931) “Administration:  Casualties and Punishment of Insurgents”. Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, despatch to Philip Cunliffe-​ Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 13 November 1931. 109 According to the Islamic names appearing in the list of victims. 110 TNA: CO 67/​241/​4 (1931) “Administration: Individual Criticisms”. Confidential letter from Bayle, at Limassol, to Sir Samuel Wilson, dated October 1931. 111 TNA:  CO 67/​ 241/​ 5 (1931) “Administration:  Casualties and Punishment of Insurgents”. Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, despatch to Philip Cunliffe-​ Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 13 November 1931. 112 TNA: FO 371/​16091 (1932) “Turkey. Code 44 Files 188 (Papers 1557 –​End) –​ 318”. ‘Turkey:  Annual Report for 1931’ prepared from the British embassy in Ankara for the Foreign Office and sent from Sir George Clerk to Sir John Simon, dated 14 January 1932. 113 Ibid.

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Political context 159 114 Many such social gatherings were reported in the press. For instance, CPIO: Embros, issue 34, dated 11 February 1937. 115 CPIO: Söz, no. 561, dated 15 October 1932. 116 TNA: CO 67/​246/​10 (1932) “The Flags Prohibition (Amendment) Law”. Letter from Ronald Storrs, governor of Cyprus, to Sir Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 6 Aril 1932. 117 TNA: CO 850/​21/​14 (1933) “Sir H E Palmer, Cyprus”. Secret letter from E. B. Boyd to J. A. M. Barlow, dated 4 October 1933. 118 TNA: CO 850-​21-​14 (1933) “Sir H E Palmer, Cyprus”. Internal Colonial Office correspondence, dated 6 October 1933. 119 TNA: CO 850/​21/​14 (1933) “Sir H E Palmer, Cyprus”. Letter from the Treasury to the Colonial Office, dated 8 November 1933. 120 TNA: CO 850/​86/​9 (1935–​1940) “Cyprus”. Personal letter from Sir Richmond Palmer to Sir George Tomlinson, dated 26 March 1936. 121 TNA:  FO 371/​23824 (1939) “Status of Italian Consul in Cyprus”. Internal Foreign Office correspondence, dated 9 March 1939. 122 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Secret letter from Richmond Palmer, the governor of Cyprus, to Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 3 May 1935. 123 TNA: CO 67/​262/​2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Secret telegram from the governor of Cyprus to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 3 May 1935. 124 TNA:  CO 67/​ 262/​ 2 (1935) “Political Activities of the Greek and Turkish Consuls in Cyprus”. Secret letter from Richmond Palmer, the governor of Cyprus, to Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 3 May 1935. 125 TNA: CO 67/​275/​10 (1937) “Activities of the Greek Consul”. Extract from the Secret Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st October to the 31st December 1936. 126 TNA:  FO 141/​ 643/​ 6 (1937) “Cyprus:  General Situation; Includes Reports on Political Situation for Periods 1 October 1936 to 31 October 1937”. Secret Intelligence Report on the Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st January to the 31st May 1937. 127 TNA:  FO 371/​23824 (1939) “Status of Italian Consul in Cyprus”. Internal Foreign Office correspondence, dated 9 March 1939. 128 TNA: FO 371/​23824 (1939) ‘Status of Italian Consul in Cyprus’. Internal Foreign Office correspondence, dated 9 March 1939. 129 TNA: FO 371/​23296 (1939) “Turkish Propaganda in Cyprus. Code 44, File 181”. Letter from Percy Loraine, British embassy in Ankara, to Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, dated 30 December 1938. Enclosed in the letter was a ‘memorandum’, a record of the conversation between an official from the British embassy in Ankara and M.  Esat Atuner, director general, 3rd Department, Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 130 TNA: FO 371/​23296 (1939) “Turkish Propaganda in Cyprus. Code 44, File 181”. Parliamentary question on Turkish nationalistic propaganda in Cyprus, dated 3 May 1939. Mr Foot asked Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary of State for Colonies, the reasons for banning the film of Kemal Ataturk’s funeral and the Greek royal wedding while Nazi and Fascist activities were shown in Cyprus. MacDonald replied that he did not exercise any detailed control, which was

160

160  Political context carried out by a body of local officials, and stated that enquiries were already being made. 131 TNA: CO 67/​291/​10 (1938) “Visit of the Turkish Naval Training Ship Hamidiye”. Secret despatch from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Malcolm MacDonald, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 1 July 1938. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 TNA: CO 67/​291/​10 (1938) “Visit of the Turkish Naval Training Ship Hamidiye”. Confidential letter from Percy Loraine, British embassy in Istanbul, to Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, dated 1 September 1938. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 TNA: CO 67/​291/​10 (1938) “Visit of the Turkish Naval Training Ship Hamidiye”. 140 Ibid. 141 TNA: FO 371/​21935 (1938) “Visit of Turkish Ship Hamidiye to Cyprus”. Letter from Richmond Palmer, governor of Cyprus, to Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 24 June 1938. 142 Ibid. 143 Stanley Kyriakides, Cyprus:  Constitutionalism and Crisis Government (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), 27. 144 Pavlos Digklis, AKEL:  Speaking Boldly and Frankly (in Greek) (Nicosia: Epifaniou, 2010), 52. 145 AKEL, Political Decisions and Congress Declaration: KKK and AKEL (in Greek) (Nicosia: Promitheas, 2014). 146 Ibid., 30. 147 Stavros Tombazos, “AKEL:  Between Nationalism and ‘Anti-​Imperialism’ ”, in Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle, eds. Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyurek and Umut Ozkirimli (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 219. 148 AKEL, Political Decisions and Congress Declaration:  KKK and AKEL (in Greek), 30. 149 Ibid., 31. 150 Digklis, AKEL: Speaking Boldly and Frankly (in Greek), 47. 151 Alexios Alecou, “Shaping Identities: The Cypriot Left and the Communist Party of Greece in the 1940s”, Journal of Historical Sociology 30, no. 2 (2017): 217–​38, 221, doi: 10.1111/​johs.12102. 152 He means the Νέος Άνθρωπος (Neos Anthropos: ‘New Man’) newspaper. 153 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Deportation from Cyprus of Dr Yavopoulos”. Report on Doctor Yiavopoulos sent from Surridge to Stevenson, dated 13 June 1925. 154 Ibid. 155 TNA: FO 286/​922 (1925) “Deportation from Cyprus of Dr Yiavopoulos”. Letter from Malcolm Stevenson, governor of Cyprus, to Leo Amery, Secretary of State for Colonies, dated 17 June 1925. 156 Ibid. 157 TNA: CO 67/​240/​16 (1931) “Riots in Cyprus: Deportation of Costas Skeleas”. 158 For a comprehensive history of the Communist Party of Cyprus, see:  Thomas W.  Adams, AKEL:  The Communist Party of Cyprus (Stanford, CA:  Hoover

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Political context 161 Institution Press, 1971); and Yiannos Katsourides, History of the Communist Party in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the Cypriot Left (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014). 159 TNA:  CO 537/​ 701 (1926) “Information regarding Communism in Cyprus (H.Cr. 7749)”. Enclosed ‘Protest’ at the letter from K. Skeleas, secretary of the Communist Party of Cyprus, Limassol, to the governor of Cyprus, dated 19 October 1926. The ‘Protest’ was signed by K. Skeleas on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cyprus, dated 19 October 1926. 160 Ibid. 161 TNA: CO 537/​701 (1926) “Information regarding Communism in Cyprus (H.Cr. 7749)”. Secret letter from officer administering the government to Leo Amery, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 3 November 1926. 162 AKEL, Political Decisions and Congress Declaration:  KKK and AKEL (in Greek), 41. 163 Ibid., 44. 164 Ibid., 41. 165 Digklis, AKEL: Speaking Boldly and Frankly (in Greek), 65. 166 Katsourides, The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the Cypriot Left, 182. 167 Digklis, AKEL: Speaking Boldly and Frankly (in Greek). 168 CPIO: Embros, issue 29, dated 5 February 1937. 169 Ploutis Servas, Cyprus Issue: Responsibilities (in Greek) (Athens: Grammi, 1984). 170 Fifis Ioannou, Fifis Ioannou, the Left, and the Cyprus Problem, ed. Nicos Peristianis (in Greek) (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 2004). 171 AKEL, Historical Essay of KKK–​AKEL (Nicosia: AKEL Central Committee, 1968). 172 Alecou, Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945–​1955: Politics and Ideologies under British Rule, 15. 173 TNA:  CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) “Political Situation:  Quarterly Reports”; TNA:  CO 67/​265/​11 (1936) “Political Situation: Monthly Police Intelligence Reports”. 174 TNA:  CO 67/​265/​11 (1936) “Political Situation:  Monthly Police Intelligence Reports”. Intelligence report: Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st October to the 31st December 1936. 175 Ibid. 176 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) “Political Situation: Quarterly Reports”. Secret intelligence report: The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st January to the 30th April 1937. 177 Ibid. 178 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) “Political Situation: Quarterly Reports”. Secret intelligence report: The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st November to the 31st December 1937. 179 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) “Political Situation: Quarterly Reports”. Secret intelligence report: The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st January to the 30th April 1937. 180 Ibid. 181 TNA: CO 67/​274/​5 (1938) “Political Situation: Quarterly Reports”. Secret intelligence report: The Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1st November to the 31st December 1937. 182 Katsourides, The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the Cypriot Left, 119.

162

162  Political context 1 83 Ibid., 120. 184 Ibid. 185 SA 1/​517/​26 Söz, 13 August 1931. As cited in Sotos Ktoris, “AKEL and the Turkish Cypriots, 1941–​1955”, The Cyprus Review 25, no. 2 (2013): 15–​38, 16. 186 See, for example:  “The First Russian Constitution”, Embros, issue 22, dated 28 January 1937. 187 Table compiled by data retrieved in the detailed account of casualties, prepared by the Cyprus government. Letter from Governor Ronald Storrs to Philip Cunliffe-​Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 13 November 1931. TNA: CO 67/​241/​5 (1931) “Administration: Casualties and Punishment of Insurgents”.

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7  Discussion

In the previous chapters, I attempted to explore the impact of British colonial rule on the transformation of the collective identity of the Muslim community of Cyprus. This impact was investigated by focusing on five contexts: the international, the political, the cultural, the social and the ideological. I attempted to present my findings and my line of argument as clearly as possible. In this chapter, the aim is to follow a different approach. I will summarise what the previous chapters have already discussed. I will set out my conclusions, and then focus on the kernel of what we have explored in the previous chapters. I will conclude with the implications of the study and make some suggestions for further research.

British imperialism Ever since the fifteenth century the British Empire had expanded by assembling a vast variety of territories. However, it was relatively recently that historical narratives of the empire attempted to give an account of this imperialism.1 Today the imperial history is illustrated by a variety of works, all trying to shed light onto dark aspects of the empire. To the oft-​quoted maxim used for the British Empire, to the effect that ‘the sun never sets on the empire’, stressing its extensive and global imperial possessions, another one has come to be added and to complement it. It is ‘the blood never dried’,2 a phrase first coined by the labour movement leader Ernest Jones in the nineteenth century, which gives a fairer account of the empire and its practices. The main debates around which contemporary historical accounts of the empire revolve are mainly the demarcation of the periods defining the first and the second British Empire, the extent of the empire and its motivation. The motivation behind the reasons for expansion, or not, for the empire could be insightful also for understanding the policies applied to the formal and informal territories of the empire. The strategic imperatives and competition between the European powers had been identified as the primary motives for the British imperial expansion during the Victorian era.3 Accounts from John Hobson and Vladimir Lenin illustrated the economic factors portraying imperialism as a product

164

164 Discussion of capitalism. The commercial and financial foundations of imperialism are important in order to sketch the motives behind the empire. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins suggest that the main driver underlying the imperial expansion was not geopolitical but financial.4 In coining the term and the concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, Cain and Hopkins stress the significance of the financial sector of the British economy as the principal motive for imperialism. Theorising imperialism and empire has traditionally developed through a Eurocentric understanding of world history. The historian Ronald Robinson was maybe the first to highlight these biases in the historiography of the British Empire. Robinson’s ‘excentric’ or collaborative theory of imperialism challenges Eurocentric theories of imperialism and suggests that the determinant factor of incidence –​the form, the rise and the fall of imperialism –​was indigenous collaboration and resistance.5 For Robinson, the formal acquisition of territories was the result of local factors and the interactions between indigenous elites and European communities. Robinson’s theory of collaboration on the periphery highlights that the peripheral problems were the cause of imperial expansion. For Robinson, it is a sine qua non precondition for the establishment of a formal empire. Therefore, British rule established a colony in India, where there were collaborators, while the British retained an informal empire in China and Japan, where there were no collaborators. Robinson highlights another important dimension, in that, when the collaborating ruling elite choose resistance, then a counter-​elite will opt instead for collaboration.6 The collaboration mechanism has two levels. At the first, there is an arrangement between the agents of industrial society and indigenous elites. At the second level, there is the collaboration of the indigenous elites with the rigidities of local interests and institutions.7 The interplay between resistance and collaboration could be an explanatory dimension for the British strategy in Cyprus. As we have uncovered in the previous chapters of this book, the British Empire was not a monolithic entity, and its rule in Cyprus was adaptive to the local dynamics and developments. The indigenous collaboration and resistance were constantly shaping and reshaping British colonial policies. Just as Lampedusa states in Il Gattopardo ‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’, the British Empire had to evolve and adapt its strategy in accordance with the ever-​changing circumstances.

Divide and rule ‘The great Imperial problem of the future is to what an extent some 350 millions of Britons subjects, who are aliens to us in race, religion, language, manners, and customs, are to govern themselves, or are to be governed by us,’8 wrote the Earl of Cromer in 1910. During the late Victorian period, when there were many imperial scholars, an increasing number of those studying the British Empire had been drawing an analogy between British

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Discussion 165 imperialism and Roman imperialism. For the Earl of Cromer, the driving force that motivated both empires was essentially the same, ‘the imperious and irresistible necessity of acquiring defensible frontiers’.9 The methods of imperialism were very similar for both the ancient and the modern types. Their undaunted audacity was largely aided by auxiliaries drawn from the conquered territories.10 British rule to a large extent was based upon the various divisions of the local populations. The empire de facto benefited from the hostile and rival relations between different communities. The important question here is whether it set up a ‘divisive’ mechanism whereby the intercommunal problems would be exploited or whether the advantage was gained by simply being a tertius gaudens. Tertius gaudens literally means ‘the third who benefits’ from a conflict between two other parties. The ‘divide and rule’ strategy has been described as an essential feature of imperial policies.11 British rulers adopted the ‘divide and rule’ policy, allied to territorial separation through segregation and partition.12 The imperial governments divided populations into distinct groups on the basis of linguistics, religion, ethnicity and race.13 The ‘divide and rule’ axiom has often been applied elusively and incorrectly in various policies and strategies. Nevertheless, the oft-​quoted maxim of divide et impera is a placeholder for a ‘complex of ideas related by a family resemblance, but differing in the details, mechanism and implications’.14 Eric Posner, Kathryn Spier and Adrian Vermeule suggest that the divide et impera mechanism should have two conditions. Firstly, a unitary actor that bargains with or competes against a set of multiple actors. Secondly, the unitary follows an intentional strategy of exploiting problems of coordination or collective action among the multiple actors.15 Therefore, in order to access whether British rule had implemented a divide et impera strategy in Cyprus, we encounter the need to ascertain if these two conditions were applied in the context of Cyprus. I define here ‘divide and rule’ as the mechanism of which the main feature is that a single actor exploits coordination problems among a group by making discriminatory offers or discriminatory threats.16 The three entities in the Cypriot case were the British government, the Greek Cypriot community and the Muslim Cypriot community. Their relations were asymmetric. The eminent German sociologist Georg Simmel, in discussing the diverse forms of social interaction, pioneered the study of triads, a group of three entities.17 In the combination of three elements characterised by an existing or emerging conflict between two, from which the third draws his advantage, the third party would have acted either as tertius gaudens or as an imperialist. Tertius gaudens, the third party, gains from the dispute of the other two parties. In this case, the advantage the third party gains is simply the result of the actions of the two conflicting parties.18 In the ‘divide rule’ combination of Simmel’s triad, ‘the third element intentionally produces the conflict in order to gain a dominating position’.19

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166 Discussion In this formation the two parties initially are united or mutually dependent with regard to a third. The third party also is aware of the way to distract the forces combined against him into action against one another. The outcome of a ‘divide and rule’ stance on the part of the third party is that the ‘two either keep each other balanced so that he, who is not interfered with by either, can pursue his advantages; or that they so weaken one another that neither of them stand up against his superiority’.20 The main argument of this book is that this second type of triadic social formation existed in Cyprus during the period in question. The British government deliberately set up a ‘divide and rule’ structure in order to gain advantage from the existing and emerging hostilities between the two communities of the island. The collaboration of the local native elites gave another dimension to the ‘divide and rule’ policies: a horizontal one. Therefore, while the classic ‘divide and rule’ policy can be drawn in a vertical way, dividing a community into a collaborating ruling elite and a resisting mass, or even dividing the community along class lines, can be considered as a horizontal ‘divide and rule’ policy. This book, being a study of history, is located within the social sciences. Beneath every thought and idea put forward there is an underlying set of presumptions. For the main three debates in the social sciences this study has a clear-​cut stance in relation to all of them. For the first debate, between materialist and idealism, this study explicitly supports a materialist approach, treating ideas and ideologies as products in the superstructure. The second debate is between determinism and free will. The underlying assumption leans towards the deterministic. The third debate is between structure and agency. The structure is the setting up of the limits and the framework in which the actions of the agents take place. One of the main aims of this study is to highlight the bigger picture and the interconnectedness of the developments on the island with those in the eastern Mediterranean. The influence was interactive. The politics of Cyprus during this period were part of a bigger story. One cannot really understand the political and social developments in Cyprus unless one sees them in the context of developments within the region as a whole. This is especially true for the growth of nationalism. This should not be examined in isolation, or in a purely Anglo-​Cypriot context. The social and commercial interchange with the great ports of the eastern Mediterranean was considerable, especially with Egypt. The influence of the Greek community in Egypt21 on the Greek Cypriots, but also that of Anglo/​Ottoman Egypt on the Turkish Cypriots, was important. Two very prominent Turkish Cypriot figures of the early twentieth century, Kiamil Pasha and Belig Pasha, both rose to wealth and fame in Egypt. One of the main goals of this study is to challenge the evolutionary framework that sees a deterministic movement from religion to nationalism, an inevitable transformation from a religious to a national identity. The book has, at least, tried to highlight the catalyst that shaped the special characteristics of

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Discussion 167 the Turkish Cypriot nationalism. British rule not only created the space for the introduction of Turkish Cypriot nationalism, it planted its seeds. The threat that Britain perceived from Greek Cypriot nationalist agitation, especially after the October Revolt of 1931, became so influential for London that the whole interwar British administrative policy, specifically in the 1930s, was formulated vis-​à-​vis Greek Cypriot nationalism to a large extent. In this regard, this study aims to display the determinant role of this threat in most of the decisions, initiatives and the orientations of the interwar British colonial policy in Cyprus. The driving force behind the British strategic choices was imperial interest. In order to get a fair overview of the imperial competitions in the eastern Mediterranean, we have looked at the international context, with a special emphasis on Italy and Turkey, and also on Egypt. What I  have attempted to illustrate is that the strategic importance of Cyprus altered during the period in question. In particular, the perception of the threat from the Italian Empire’s emerging power in the eastern Mediterranean, along with rapid developments in Turkey and Egypt, assigned Cyprus to a higher position in British strategy in the region. The main argument of the book is that British imperial policy in Cyprus had a major impact on the development of a national identity in the Muslim community of the island. British rule provided the political, ideological and socio-​economic framework through which the transformation of this identity took place. But I hold that, even without the imperial policies of ‘divide and rule’ by the British, Turkish Cypriot nationalism would eventually have emerged anyway. Without the British imperial policies, the Muslim community would eventually have been transformed into a national one, but without its specific characteristics. The specific characteristics and its militant partition character, which were acquired in the 1950s, were largely affected by the British imperial policies employed in the interwar period, which we have examined here. The policies of British rule in Cyprus fostered the conditions for the later eruption of the conflict. The Machiavellian method of ‘dividing and ruling’ a population by promoting hostility among the members of the two communities was operated in Cyprus. However, the British Empire was not a monolithic entity, and its grand strategy has always followed the fundamental principle of adaptability. According to the Chinese pioneer strategist Sun Tzu, a vital principle for a successful strategy is its adaptability to the circumstances.22 Sun Tzu considered the art of studying circumstances as the most crucial for the final outcome. The variety of circumstances is infinite, and the methods always have to be regulated by consideration of these circumstances. As the above in-​depth analysis has shown, the British adjusted their methods in 1930s. It was a part of their reading of the new circumstances. They availed themselves of the opportunity provided by the new circumstances. By taking as a long-​awaited pretext the Greek Cypriot awakening in 1931, they imposed an authoritarian regime.

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168 Discussion When the Cyprus problem is examined at the present time, a significant input from the British imperial inheritance should be discerned. The current unresolved deadlock problem derives largely from the British colonial attempt to divide the population into distinct groups. An understanding of the attendant problems may be enhanced if this imperial legacy is recognised.

Notes 1 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1859–​ 2004, 4th edn. (Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2004), ix. 2 John Newsinger, The Blood Never Dried: A People’s History of the British Empire (London: Bookmarks Publications, 2006). 3 A. J.  Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe:  1848–​1918 (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1954); William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–​ 1902 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951). 4 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688–​2000, 2nd edn. 5 Ronald Robinson, “Non-​ European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration”, in Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, eds. E. R. J. Owen and R. B. Sutcliffe (London: Longman, 1972), 229. 6 Ibid., 120. 7 Ibid., 121. 8 Earl of Cromer, Ancient and Modern Imperialism (London:  John Murray, 1910), 18–​19. 9 Ibid., 19–​20. 10 Ibid., 34–​5. 11 R. Morrock, “Heritage of Strife: Effects of Colonialist Divide and Rule Strategy upon Colonized Peoples”, Science and Society 37, no. 2 (1973): 129–​51. 12 A. J. Christopher, “ ‘Divide and Rule’: The Impress of British Separation Policies”, Area 20, no. 3 (1988): 233–​40, 233. 13 Christopher, “ ‘Divide and Rule’: The Impress of British Separation Policies”. 14 Eric A. Posner, Kathryn E. Spier and Adrian Vermeule, “Divide and Conquer”, Journal of Legal Analysis 2, no. 2 (2010): 417–​71. 15 Ibid., 419. 16 Ibid., 418. 17 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, ed. Kurt R.  Wolff (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1950), 163. The advantage occurring to the tertius derived from the fact that he has an equal, equally independent –​and, for this very, reason decisive –​relation to two others. However, the advantage does not exclusively depend on the hostility of the two. A  certain general differentiation, mutual strangeness or qualitative dualism may be sufficient. This, in fact, is the basic formula of the type, and the hostility of the elements is merely a specific case of it, even if it is the most common (p. 159) Simmel gives the example of the Catholic Church, since the Middle Ages among secular powers, as a tertius gaudens. 18 Ibid., 154–​5. 19 Ibid., 163.

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Discussion 169 20 Ibid. 21 For instance, see:  TNA:  FO 141/​ 649 (1937), referring to “Nationality and Naturalisation: Cypriots in Egypt”; and TNA: FO 141/​716/​8 (1935) “Nationality and Naturalisation. Cypriots in Egypt”. 22 Tzu, The Art of War.

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Appendix

Chronology of main events Key dates 1191 Richard I, Coeur de Lion, of England conquers Cyprus 1489 Cyprus under the rule of the Republic of Venice 1571 Cyprus comes under the control of Sultan Selim II of the Ottoman Empire 1878 Cyprus comes under the administration of the British Empire 1914 Britain officially annexes Cyprus by Order in Council, 5 November 1915 Britain offers Cyprus to Greece, on condition of Greece’s entry into the First World War 1923 Turkey renounces all its rights over Cyprus by article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne 1925 Cyprus becomes a Crown colony 1931  Anti-​ colonial riots in Nicosia, also known as October Revolt or Octovriana; the revolt is suppressed and authoritarian rule is imposed 1954 Britain, in defiance of the Treaty of Lausanne, introduces the idea of a tripartite conference (Britain, Greece and Turkey) to discuss the Cyprus issue; EOKA’s anti-​colonial struggle begins 1959 London–​Zurich agreements for the constitution of an independent Cyprus signed

British governors Sir Malcolm Stevenson Sir Malcolm Stevenson Sir Ronald Storrs Sir Reginald Edward Stubbs Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer Sir William Denis Battershill Sir Charles Campbell Woolley

1920–​1925 (high commissioner) 1925–​1926 1926–​1932 1932–​1933 1933–​1939 1939–​1941 1941–​1946

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Appendix 171

Annex to confidential memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus1 While it is not within the purposes of this memorandum to discuss the strategical position of Cyprus, as few observations may be made on a related subject, which the present writer has had special opportunities for studying on the spot and forming an opinion. 2. It is the probability of Cyprus becoming in the future  –​through perhaps not for a century or more –​a position of infinitely greater importance to us than it is at present. Southern Russia, Cis-​Caucasia and Trans-​Caucasia, Asia Minor, Syria, Irak, Persia are at the present time regions almost entirely undeveloped. They carry, too, a comparatively scanty population. Owing to their natural fertility, favourable climate and great mineral resources, it is inevitable that sooner or later these regions will possess populations enormously greater than now and become the seat of great industrial activity. Political frontiers, whether of the present or the future, need not be considered in discussing this prospect. The point is that, in that immense sector of land and water lying east of Cyprus into Persia and north of Cyprus into Southern Russia, we shall some day have populations which, from their numbers, wealth and external interests, will insist upon making their weight felt in the world. 3. For these regions, or for the greater part of these regions, the Gulf of Alexandretta (in the mouth of which Cyprus stands) occupies a position of vantage not altogether obvious from the map. Owing to the configuration of land and water in this part of the world, and to the profoundly important, widespread and conflicting political interests which converge upon Constantinople and the Straits and render exclusive Russian control of the Straits difficult to secure, the Gulf, as providing a possible alternative outlet to the Mediterranean, has long had an interest for Russia and Russian Caucasian provinces. With Constantinople in effect unattainable, the Gulf was regarded in South-​Eastern Russia as a substitute outlet to blue water by no means to be forgotten or underrated. If we accept developments of the indicated in the preceding paragraph as being possible in the future, our continued possession of Cyprus assumes an importance beyond the present. 4. In another and more local aspect Cyprus, in its relationship to the Gulf of Alexandretta, has yet greater and more definite meaning. Again we need not take into consideration those mutable things, political frontiers. This aspect has to do with the geographical fact that on, or near to the Gulf of Alexandretta –​certainly not farther west than Mersina –​lies the inevitable outlet for a great part of Asia Minor, Northern Syria and Northern Irak. The deep re-​entrant angle here formed by Asia Minor and Syria brings a great area of land within comparatively short distances of the Gulf. This by itself is much, but mountain ranges and the routes through them possible for railways conspire to place the position of a great seaport of the future somewhere between Mersina and Alexandretta. Behind Mersina is a gorge through

172

172 Appendix the Taurus –​already used by the railway. No other access to the sea so easy exists east of the Meander Valley which leads to Smyrna. Northward from Mersina is found another direct and comparatively easy natural route leading to Kaisari, Sivas and the heart of Asia 50 miles apart, the northern one of which is now followed by the railway. In the reverse sense all these four natural routes from west, north, east and south-​east –​and they are the only ones –​ converge upon the Gulf of Alexandretta. Owing to this fact, it follows that, given the necessary railway communication and harbour facilities, somewhere in this angle of the Mediterranean will arise a port serving Asia Minor as far west as Konia, north to Yozgat and Sivas, and eastward to the neighbourhood of Lake Yan. And this port will attract alike the trade of Northern Syria and of Northern Irak. 5. These possibilities were understood by the German interests directing the construction of the Constantinople–​Bagdad Railway, and led them to fix upon Alexandretta as the most favourable position for their Mediterranean port and obtain a concession for its construction. 6. In 1913 the present writer spent several days at Baghche, 30 miles north of the Gulf of Alexandretta, in the company of a German official. He was at the time styled ‘Delegate of the German Ambassador at Constantinople’, and his political duty at Baghche was to supply the necessary diplomatic protection and support for the numerous German officials then stationed at Baghche as the working headquarters of the Bagdad Railway Construction Company. The Delegate had been long in Asia Minor and knew the country from Angora to Van and from Alexandretta to Mosul, and was deep in the counsels of those behind the railway company. It was no secret that the construction of a harbour at Alexandretta was part of the Bagdad Railway scheme, and had just been begun. So we discussed the prospects of the port in much detail, the more so that I had just passed over the two converging routes from Konia and Sivas to the seas at the Gulf of Alexandretta, was about to traverse the other two routes coming from the east, and already had no doubt that on the Gulf, or close to it, would be the position of a port for a great portion of Asia Minor. The Delegate was delighted to find me so much in agreement with his own views, and soon became enthusiastic. What his countrymen were doing at Alexandretta was, he said, merely a small beginning that was to grow into great things with the passage of time. He could find scarcely any limits to the future prosperity of the port. It was recognised by the German interests as a development vital to the whole Bagdad Railway scheme. He foresaw trunk railways and feeder railways eventually making Alexandretta the one port for 150,000 square miles of fertile territory; it would in time become, he said, the greatest port in the Mediterranean. 7. Political events have supervened to prevent the realisation by Germany of these expectations, even in their earlier stages, and political frontiers as at present drawn do not favour the future of a port on the Gulf on the great scale once in prospect. But the natural advantages of the position remain unchanged and unchangeable, and sooner or later will assert themselves.

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Appendix 173 8. Even for the Turkish State as it now exists, the coast line between Alexandretta and Mersina must provide the future outlet for a great part of Asia Minor. If the Turkish State flourishes and grows, there, with certainty, will be a rival of Smyrna; if the Turkish State decays, some other more competent Power will take over the Turkish dominions and find near the Gulf a chief outlet for Asia Minor. In either event, Cyprus, as British possession, will be most fortunately placed against possibilities to come. It is likely that Disraeli, in taking Cyprus, saw more clearly and farther than he knew, and that his description of the island as ‘the Key of Western Asia’ was not entirely extravagant hyperbole. November 21, 1924 W. J. Childs

Note 1 TNA:  FO 286/​922 (1925) “Future of Cyprus”. Confidential memorandum by Mr Headlam-​Morey and Mr Childs respecting Cyprus, sent from Mr Austen Chamberlain to Sir Milne Cheetham, dated 30 January 1925.

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Index

Page numbers listed in bold represent information given in tables. Abyssinian crisis 45, 46, 56n106 Advisory Council 3, 124, 125, 139, 143 agriculture 60, 61, 64, 77, 101, 148 AKEL 151 Amery, L. 98, 149, 150 Anglo-​Egyptian agreement (1922) 38 Anglo-​Egyptian Treaty (1936) 38 Anglo-​Italian agreement (1936) 46, 47 army 5, 19, 47, 62, 132, 150 Assaf Bey, A. 73, 74, 134, 135, 145 Ataturk, M. K. 5, 8, 9, 10, 11–​13, 19, 20–​22, 25n34, 25n37, 25n39, 50, 73, 87, 88, 90, 103, 106–​110, 118n168, 126, 128, 129, 133, 145, 146, 159n130 Battershill, W. 101 Board of Education 29n118, 82, 83, 86–​88, 92, 93, 106, 155n53 British army 132 British Empire 1, 2, 16, 31–​34, 36–​38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 51n2, 52n25, 73, 85, 98, 107, 124, 132, 141, 163, 164, 167, 168 Church 12, 15, 45, 130, 141, 148, 151, 168n17; Church of Cyprus 15, 148; Catholic Church 45, 168n17; Greek Church 130 Churchill, Sir Winston 37 communism 49, 69, 71, 144, 147–​153 communist press 152 Compulsory Education Act 91–​93, 114n62 Constantinople 49, 86, 171, 172; Istanbul 40–​42, 83, 97, 99, 101, 102, 110, 137, 146 Crash (1929) 49, 95, 141 Index compiled by Kyriaki Xypolia

Cretan syndrome 16, 22 cultural propaganda 32, 39, 40, 41, 43, 83, 84, 98 Cunliffe-​Lister, P. 71, 125, 135, 142 Cypriot army 62, 132 Djelaleddin, M. 129, 134 Djemal Effendi, H. 124, 125, 135, 136 education 3, 9, 16, 20, 29n118, 39, 40, 42, 60, 82–​88, 90–​95, 97–​99, 101, 102, 105, 106, 112n20, 114n62, 122, 134, 136, 146, 155n53 Education Department 92, 93 Education Fund 92, 101 Education Law 86, 92, 93, 95, 97–​99, 101, 114n62 Egypt 32, 38–​42, 49, 50, 57n116, 69, 89, 104, 106, 166, 167 elementary education 87, 88, 91–​98, 101; elementary schools 87, 93–​95, 96, 97, 98 Elementary Educational Law 92, 93, 101 emigration 5, 64, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79n54, 93, 121, 144, 156n58; emigrants 72, 74, 76; emigration to Anatolia 5, 72, 74–​77; emigration to Turkey 76 Enosis 4, 18, 19, 28n94, 44, 106, 129–​131, 133, 135, 144, 148, 150, 151 EOKA 15, 64 Evkaf 85–​87, 91, 97, 108, 109, 113n40, 128, 133–​140, 144, 155n53 Executive Council 3, 94, 121–​124, 129, 133, 134, 139, 155n53 Eyüb Musa 129, 134, 156n59

 189

Index 189 Fetva 106, 137, 138, 157n82 Fetva Emini 103, 107–​109, 137, 138, 140 fez 106, 107, 118n168, 136, 137, 157n76 First World War 1, 5, 10, 11, 19, 21, 31, 35–​39, 43, 48, 52n29, 61, 73, 88, 133, 148 France 37, 43, 44, 69, 73; French government 37, 41; French propaganda 41 Germany 41; German propaganda 41; German-​Turkish friendship n57; German ideology and idealism 82, 111n1 Greece 13, 17, 22, 36, 42–​44, 46, 47, 50, 52n29, 73, 99, 101, 124, 129, 130, 141, 143, 149, n157 Greek Cypriot press 68 Greek nationalism 4, 17, 19, 82, 85, 88, 106 Greek press 68 Haber 72 Hakikat 70, 72, 135, 139, 142, 153 Halkin Sesi 20 Hamidiye visit 147 higher education 16, 40, 83, 97, 99; university 32, 39–​43, 83, 90,  99–​101 immigration 14, 76, 89; immigrants 72, 79n42; Cypriot immigration 76; Department of Immigration 104 Ismet Inonu 50 Italian army 47 Italian consul 32, 43–​47, 55n86, 144, 145 Italian consulate in Cyprus 44, 45, 47 Italy 2, 23, 31–​32, 37, 39–​41, 40, 43–​47, 55n86, 73, 79n42, 84, 144, 145, 167; Italian imperialism 31, 32, 43–​45, 47, 167; Italian propaganda 40, 41, 44–​46, 84; Italian press 46 Japan 73, 164 Kemalism 7–​9, 11, 12, 22, 69, 88, 95, 103, 105, 106, 126, 131, 133–​135, 137, 139, 146, 147, 152; Kemalist reforms 6, 9–​11, 19, 20, 22, 49, 69, 88, 97, 102, 110, 118n168, 136, 137; Kemalist revolution 2, 11, 19, 32, 86; Kemalist press 130, 131, 135, 138–​140, 142 KKK 148–​152

Labour party (Britain) 123, 141, 158n102 language reform 12, 26n45, 69, 87, 102, 109, 110, 119n196; Latin alphabet 11, 87, 110 Lausanne Treaty (1923) 5, 37, 72–​76, 78n36, 79n49, 79n54, 93, 121 Legislative Council 3, 68, 92, 121–​124, 126, 127, 129, 131, 133, 134–​136, 141, 143, 148, 153n5, 155n53, 156n58 Linomvamvakoi 15, 27n62 Loraine, P. 46, 47, 101, 146, 147 lycée 93–​95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 115n103, 116n105, 134 MacDonald, M. 131, 146, 147, 159n130 MacDonald, R. 76, 94 Maronite 22, 45, 62, 92, 123, 128 Marx, K. 2, 3n1, 7, 82, 84, 111n1 Masum Millet 20, 69, 71, 72, 95, 99, 109, 138, 139, 140 millet 14, 18, 26n49, 27n55, 61, 86, 87, 95 Misaki-​Milli (National Pact) 48, 73 Mosque 86, 107, 108, 109, 138 Münir, M. 91, 94, 119, 129, 133–​139, 143, 155n53, 156n58, 156n59 Mussa Irfan 129 Mussolini, B. 43 Mustapha Hami 129 Necati Özkan, M. 129, 131, 134, 135, 143 Neos Anthropos 69, 148–​150 New Turkish Family Law 103, 136 newspapers 20, 46, 68, 69, 71, 75, 93, 95, 99, 107, 109, 110, 124, 125, 130, 131, 135, 138–​140, 142, 143, 146–​150, 153 Nicosia 42, 44, 47, 50, 63, 94, 97–​100, 104, 107, 108, 110, 127, 129, 134, 135, 138, 141, 142, 144, 145 Ormsby-​Gore, W. 45, 101, 145 Ottoman army 5, 19 Ottoman Empire 4–​6, 8, 9, 12–​14, 19, 20, 26n49, 27n55, 37, 48, 61, 74, 85–​87, 126, 133, 147 Palestine 32, 40–​42, 49, 50, 89, 101, 104, 106; Palestinians 73, 103 Palmer, H. R. 42, 45, 47, 71, 76, 79n54, 80n56, 91, 94, 101, 102, 104–​106, 124–​126, 131, 132, 143–​147 Palmerocracy 85, 86, 131, 143, 151 Passfield, L. 99, 134

190

190 Index police 62, 64, 65–​67, 68, 76, 80n63, 104, 130, 132, 135, 141, 142, 149, 152 polygamy 49, 102, 103, 136 press  20, 21, 45, 46, 50, 68, 69, 71, 107, 109, 131, 135, 139, 140, 142, 143, 152 Press Law 69, 71, 140 primary education 85, 91, 93; primary schools 85 propaganda 71, 84, 85, 88, 91, 146, 148, 150, 152; Greek nationalist propaganda 85, 148; Turkish nationalistic propaganda 146; communist propaganda 149; religious propaganda 22; press propaganda 71, 131, 152; imperial propaganda 84 racism 9, 15, 76, 112n14, 125 Raif Effendi, M. 135 Remzi Okan, M. 69, 135, 139 Russia 37, 38, 48, 56n116, 69; 1768–​1774 Ottoman-​Russian War 6, 86; Russian-​ Ottoman rivalry 37; Russian émigrés 9; Russian revolution 148 Said Molla 134 Second World War 1, 5, 16, 18, 39, 42, 47, 50, 100, 128, 132, 133, 137, 145 secondary education 85, 87, 90, 93, 97–​100, 106; secondary schools 87, 90, 93, 97–​99, 100, 106 Secondary Education Law 99 Ses 20, 72 Söz 69, 70, 72, 75, 93, 107, 110, 124, 125, 130, 131, 135, 138, 142, 143, 146, 152 Stevenson, M. 149 Storrs, R. 98, 106, 128, 131, 134, 135, 141, 142, 158n106 Stubbs, R. E. 107, 125, 143 Syria 37, 48, 50, 57, 89; Syrians 73

Tanzimat 11, 86 Tertius gaudens 165, 168n17 The Cyprus Gazette 75, 76, 124, 143, 158n106 Toynbee, A. J. 6, 128, 129 Treaty of Berlin 48, n57 Treaty of Sèvres (1920) 73 Turkey 2, 4, 5, 7, 8–​11, 13, 18–​20, 22, 23, 25n39, 32, 37, 38, 41, 42, 44, 48, 49, 50, 55n86, 56n116, 69, 73–​76, 78n36, 79n42, 79n54, 83, 86–​89, 91, 93, 94, 97–​99, 101–​108, 110, 129, 135–​137, 143–​148, 152, 157n76, 167 Turkish consul 44, 73, 103, 104, 133–​136, 144, 145, 145, 156n58 Turkish Consulate in Cyprus 83, 104, 133, 144, 146 Turkish Cypriot nationalism 2, 4, 16–​20, 22, 23, 48, 167 Turkish Cypriot Press 71, 107, 131, 135, 142, 152; Kemalist Cypriot press 109, 130, 135, 140, 142; Muslim press 131, 142 Turkish national identity 5, 8, 13, 17, 111 Turkish nationalism 1, 2, 4–​8, 10, 13, 17–​19, 21, 26n50, 48, 87, 106, 121, 133, 137 Turkish press 50, 69, 139, 143, 152 urbanisation 3, 23, 59–​62, 77, 99 Vakit 135 Venizelos, E. 50, 129, 132 Victoria School 97–​100 Yiavopoulos, N. 149, 150 Young Turks 9, 12, 48, 110, 133 Zekia, M. 125, 129, 134, 154n20