Britain and the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964-1970 9780804788588, 0804788588

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B r i ta i n a n d t h e B o m b

Stanford Nuclear Age Series General Editor, Martin Sherwin adv isory board Barton J. Bernstein and David Holloway

B r i ta i n a n d t h e B o m b Nuclear Diplomacy, 1964–1970 David James Gill

Stanford University Press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California ©2014 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gill, David James, author. Britain and the bomb : nuclear diplomacy, 1964–1970 / David James Gill. pages cm. — (Stanford nuclear age series) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-8047-8658-4 1. Nuclear weapons—Government policy—Great Britain—History—20th century. 2. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1964–1979. I. Title. II. Series: Stanford nuclear age series. ua647.g55 2014 2013017258 355.02'170941—dc23 isbn 978-0-8047-8858-8 (electronic) Typeset at Stanford University Press in 10/14 Minion

For Gemma, Michael, Mum and Dad

Contents



Acknowledgments, ix



Abbreviations, xi

Introduction

1

1 A British Bomb

11

2 The Ambiguities of Opposition

51

3 Constructing the Atlantic Nuclear Force

76

4 The Recurring Death of Nuclear Sharing

105

5 Cooperation as Consultation

141

6 Proliferation Politics

171

Conclusion

207

Epilogue

215



Notes, 221   Bibliography, 283   Index, 301

Acknowledgments

Portions of the text have appeared in the following articles: ‘The ambiguities of opposition: Economic decline, international cooperation, and political rivalry in the nuclear policies of the Labour Party, 1963–4’, Contemporary British History 25:2 (2011), 1–24; ‘Strength in numbers: The Labour government and the size of the Polaris force’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33:6 (2010), 819–45; ‘Ministers, markets and missiles: The British government, the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 21:3 (2010), 451–70. I am grateful to Taylor and Francis for allowing me to reproduce my research in this book. Thank you to everyone who helped me to produce Britain and the Bomb. I am especially grateful to Michael S. Goodman, Peter Hennessy, Peter Jackson, Andrew Priest, Thomas Robb, and Len Scott for reading and reviewing earlier drafts. Their advice made the book considerably better. Special thanks to Stanford University Press. John Feneron, Martin Hanft, Emma Harper, Norris Pope, Marty Sherwin, and Stacy Wagner have all been incredibly helpful throughout the publication process. Support from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, the Royal Historical Society, and Aberystwyth University facilitated much of my research in Britain and the United States. This book was only possible because of their generosity. My friends in London, Bristol, and Aberystwyth deserve considerable thanks for their kindness throughout the many years of researching and writing the book. Most important, thank ix

x Acknowledgments

you to my family for their unconditional support and tireless patience. I give my deepest thanks to Gemma, Michael, Mum, and Dad. I dedicate this book to them, with love and gratitude. DJG

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in the main text ABM ACDA ANF BAOR CDS CND CTBT DEA DOPC EEC ENDC Euratom FCO FO FRG IAEA IMF MLF MOD

Anti-Ballistic Missile Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Atlantic Nuclear Force British Army of the Rhine Chief of Defence Staff Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Department of Economic Affairs Defence and Oversea Policy Committee European Economic Community Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament European Atomic Energy Agency Foreign and Commonwealth Office Foreign Office Federal Republic of Germany International Atomic Energy Agency International Monetary Fund Multilateral (Nuclear) Force Ministry of Defence xi

xii Abbreviations

MP NATO NDAC NPG NPT NPWG OPD PAL PLP PRC PTBT PWG SLBM SSBN UK UN USA USSR

Member of Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee Nuclear Planning Group, NATO The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Planning Working Group, NATO Oversea Policy and Defence Committee Permissive Action Links Parliamentary Labour Party People’s Republic of China Partial Test Ban Treaty Paris Working Group Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear United Kingdom United Nations United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

B r i ta i n a n d t h e B o m b

Introduction

P

r ime mini s t er H a r o l d W il s o n suffered many disappointments in his first two terms of office. The devaluation of the pound, the retreat from global defence commitments, and the failure to achieve membership of the European Economic Community overshadowed much of his premiership. Wilson’s occasionally disingenuous explanations of these misfortunes, coupled with a raft of unfulfilled domestic promises, encouraged little sympathy for the plight of his government. Perhaps most damning of all was the scepticism in British politics that his first two terms engendered.1 These ignominies, however, should not obscure a considerable record of achievement in international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons. Indeed, under Wilson, British nuclear diplomacy enjoyed much success. Wilson’s first two governments, beginning in October 1964 and ending in June 1970, represent a critical period in international nuclear history. By the close of 1968, the Labour government had signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. A little over a year later, the treaty came into force, marking an important step towards a world with fewer nuclear weapon states. More than four decades later, the treaty still frames British, European, and American non-proliferation efforts. Preceding this historic feat was another. In 1966, Britain became one of the founding members of the Nuclear Planning Group. The United States, Britain, West Germany, Italy, and three rotating members would share decision-making on nuclear policy in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Despite the end of the Cold War, the group 1

2 Introduction

remains the ultimate authority within NATO concerning nuclear policy issues. British nuclear diplomacy in this period involved more than international agreements. Wilson was the first prime minister to overcome serious pressure to surrender nuclear independence. Beyond calls for disarmament from within the Labour Party, the key challenge to independence came in the form of foreign demands to collectivise British nuclear weapons into a multilateral nuclear force. Under Wilson, the Labour government successfully resisted international pressure to share its nuclear weapons with other NATO members. This diplomatic challenge, unique in British nuclear history, faded away with no diminution to the country’s own nuclear status. The independence of Britain’s nuclear force today, and the enduring absence of a German or European deterrent, owes a debt to Wilson’s handling of nuclear diplomacy more than four decades ago. The importance of this period extends beyond the prime minister’s performance on the international stage. Wilson cemented, and in some cases established, precedents for nuclear policy-making. A commitment to continued investment in times of economic crisis represents his most important legacy. As governments around the world struggle to repair their economies in the wake of the global financial crisis, politicians of all stripes continue to raise serious questions about the cost of nuclear weapons. This study of the Wilson governments reveals that such challenges are not historically unique. Although he was by no means the first prime minister to preside over a troubled economy, the balance of payments deficits and currency crises of his premiership were amongst the worst in the post-war period. In addition, Wilson was the first Labour leader to experience economic difficulties when his own government was aware of the nuclear weapons programme. He therefore had to reconcile a progressive platform with his own nuclear policies and do so publicly. Nevertheless, Wilson defended continued investment. Major economic crises failed to effect change. Spending on the British nuclear weapons programme became, and would remain, sacrosanct. In addition to highlighting the importance of this period in nuclear history, this book examines how and why British nuclear diplomacy changed during Wilson’s leadership. It focuses on three distinct but inter-related strands of British nuclear diplomacy: the sharing of nuclear weapons between states in the form of a multilateral nuclear force; non-physical measures of nuclear weapons cooperation, such as consultative and planning arrangements, be-

Introduction 3

tween alliance members; and a global non-proliferation treaty. British nuclear diplomacy was not one consistent policy. Change reflected competition and cooperation between the pursuit of nuclear sharing proposals, consultative measures, and a non-proliferation treaty, all of which vied against the broader and shifting objectives of the Labour government. To be sure, wider international and domestic considerations encouraged Wilson to exert a degree of flexibility in the pursuit of all of his diplomatic objectives vis-à-vis nuclear weapons. This book is therefore an account of Wilson and the Labour government’s attempts to balance a collection of disparate, and at times competing, influences in the context of British nuclear diplomacy. Introducing a collection of his speeches published in 1964, Wilson describes his task as prime minister as that of conducting a mighty orchestra, attempting to harmonise and integrate domestic and international affairs.2 George Brown, Wilson’s third foreign secretary, reaches a similar conclusion in his own memoirs. ‘The fact of the matter is that Foreign Affairs, whether for Britain or any other nation, are not just a catalogue of unconnected events’, Brown explains. ‘They are a kaleidoscope of inter-related pieces, all of which must somehow be juggled with, virtually at the same time and certainly in relation to each other’.3 British nuclear diplomacy was a series of compromises, an intricate blend of political, economic, and strategic considerations. Cabinet debate, financial crises, and international tensions all influenced nuclear policy-making in the two Labour governments of this period. This book consequently broadens its focus beyond events related to the development and the deployment of nuclear arsenals. Nuclear history is a much more complicated process, influenced by economics and politics, as well as diplomacy and strategy. Although a rising mushroom cloud is a common and evocative image, a more fitting portrayal of British nuclear history would depict accountants shaking their heads and politicians shaking hands.

British Nuclear History Britain became an increasingly marginal economic and military actor on the world stage during Wilson’s premiership. Decline stood in stark contrast to the dominance of the superpowers and the growing influence of the European Economic Community (EEC). Nevertheless, Britain still had an important, albeit lesser, international role.4 Historians have tended to focus on the retreat from East of Suez, relations with the EEC, and wider alliance politics.5 All of these studies touch on the issue of nuclear weapons. There is a substan-

4 Introduction

tial literature on British nuclear history itself. The post-war period in particular has attracted considerable attention.6 Research specifically considering British nuclear diplomacy in the 1960s continues to grow.7 Building on such a broad body of work, this book makes four contributions to the existing literature. First, this book explores nuclear sharing proposals, consultative solutions, and a non-proliferation treaty as interwoven, rather than separate, components of British nuclear diplomacy. Integrating separate bodies of historical research produces a more nuanced account of events. The creation of the Nuclear Planning Group in NATO, for example, helps to explain the timing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the eventual failure of European nuclear sharing proposals. Beyond integrating separate bodies of historical research, such an approach reveals the interconnected nature of events and encourages broader conclusions about nuclear policy-making within the Labour government. Under Wilson, British nuclear diplomacy was simultaneously characterised by success and irrelevance. The failure of nuclear sharing proposals and the realisation of the NPT meant that the Labour government achieved its key objectives. Yet these successes were often more to do with superpower negotiations than the actions of Wilson or his government. An interwoven approach also facilitates a wider analysis of domestic and international influences on the Labour government, many of which had previously appeared unimportant or unrelated. A second contribution comes from this book’s interest in the British economy. Efforts to reduce defence expenditure and anxiety about economic performance certainly influenced the conduct and content of British nuclear diplomacy. In the early months of taking office, for example, the Labour government discussed contributing its own nuclear weapons to a multilateral nuclear force in exchange for concessions from the United States. More broadly, the state of the economy framed political and diplomatic objectives. Growing deficits and currency crises repeatedly threatened the nuclear programme itself, which, in turn, influenced the content and conduct of nuclear diplomacy. By exploring the economic dimensions of events, it is possible to complement and often improve on existing diplomatic and strategic accounts of the period. Consequently, this book pays particular attention to the growing collection of work considering the economy in this period, and integrates it into a study of the Labour government’s handling of nuclear diplomacy.8 This book’s third contribution is a greater consideration of the relationship between the Labour government’s desire to join the EEC and British nuclear diplomacy. The book pays particular attention to the growing collection of

Introduction 5

work considering Britain’s second application for membership.9 Wilson’s interest in joining was limited to the later stages of his time in office. Nevertheless, an interest in the EEC strengthens existing accounts of British nuclear history that have focused on the Cold War or US-UK relations. Wilson often adopted a secondary role in negotiations on the NPT and repeatedly left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the EEC, who were resentful of the treaty’s discriminatory terms, and thus helped to protect Britain’s application for membership. The final contribution comes from a closer examination of Wilson and his own attempts to balance competing interests within the government. Although reaching familiar conclusions about his style of leadership, this book provides a more detailed account of his handling of nuclear policy. He was a skilful, forceful, and often devious politician. Wilson, for example, was instrumental in managing the government to support the continuation of Britain’s nuclear weapons programme. He did so cautiously by gathering support beforehand, directly controlling the flow of information available to the cabinet, and exploiting his small majority to encourage cooperation. Crucially, though, he was also a pragmatist. Wilson often modified the content and conduct of British nuclear diplomacy in response to a wide array of competing domestic and international interests. Although wide in scope, this book has clearly defined parameters. It considers the development of British nuclear diplomacy with respect to the governments of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). This decision reflects the disproportionately high levels of influence that these countries had on the nuclear policies of the Labour government. Interest in US-UK nuclear relations also benefits from the more frequent contact between the Labour Party and US officials, and the wealth of readily available archival documentation on both sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, this book seeks to make its contribution by exploring the political and economic dimensions of British nuclear diplomacy. Relations within NATO, Britain’s global military commitments, and the Cold War context are important elements in the study of British nuclear diplomacy. Nonetheless, this book is not a strategic or military history and does not dwell on the mechanics, planning, or intelligence surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. Many scholars have already made useful contributions to these fields. This book instead contributes to British nuclear history by exploring the fields of politics and economics, utilising a raft of available but often overlooked sources.

6 Introduction

The majority of source materials come from the National Archives in London, including Prime Ministerial, Cabinet, Treasury, Defence and Foreign Office documents released under ‘the thirty-year rule’.10 This book also draws from the Labour Party archive and a selection of private papers, venturing to a number of smaller archives housing these collections.11 As this book is concerned with British perceptions and policy-making, British documents are the principal focus of its research. Nevertheless, additional material from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library and the US National Archives in Maryland is useful in addressing absences in British archives. The collection of US documents found in the Foreign Relations of the United States book series, published by the Office of the Historian in the US Department of State, is similarly helpful.12 In support of a wide array of archival documentation, this book also draws on a wealth of secondary sources, published data and interviews with ministers and officials. Despite focusing on decision-making at the highest level, often in the context of international negotiations, this book recognises the context of decisionmaking within the government. Discord in the Labour Party, cabinet debate, and interdepartmental rivalries all provide an important context to the development of British nuclear diplomacy. There is an abundance of memoirs and diaries from all levels of the Labour government.13 Added to these is a collection of biographies concerned with many of the key participants, particularly Wilson.14 Also useful are the selection of books concerned more broadly with British government, cabinet, and Whitehall in this period.15 International historians should consider influences from within government. Politicians, civil servants, and institutions construct policy as a reaction to domestic and international events.

Overview This book contains six chapters. Taken together, they explore how and why British nuclear diplomacy evolved under Wilson’s leadership. Chapter One, ‘A British Bomb’, offers an overview of nuclear policy between 1945 and 1962. It charts the development of British nuclear diplomacy in the post-war period, focusing on the major themes that Wilson would come to face during his time in office. A desire for strategic independence, US-UK nuclear tensions, and the emergence of a commitment to measures of non-proliferation are perhaps the clearest historical antecedents. The role of the economy in British nuclear

Introduction 7

history also receives attention. Balance of payments deficits, the threat of devaluation, and anxieties about comparative decline influenced successive governments’ handling of the British nuclear weapons programme. Wilson’s rise through government weaves into this historical account. The post-war period represented the future prime minister’s formative years in the British political system and helps to contextualise his later actions in office. Chapter Two, ‘The Ambiguities of Opposition’, explores the twenty-month period between Wilson’s becoming leader of the opposition in February 1963 and the General Election of October 1964. It considers how Wilson balanced his own approach to nuclear diplomacy with the demands of the Labour Party and broader domestic and international constraints. Nuclear weapons had been a tremendously divisive issue within the Labour Party. As leader of the opposition, Wilson sought to satisfy the needs of the party, which often came at the expense of a more conciliatory negotiating position with Washington concerning nuclear sharing proposals. He was, at this time, more concerned with party unity, rather than transatlantic commitments on which he had little influence. Wilson could address international issues when he took office; if he failed to win the next election it would not be his problem. Thus, in discussions with foreign officials, he vigorously contested any future commitments to nuclear sharing, and cast doubt on Britain’s future as a nuclear power. International pressures, specifically the fear of an exclusive nuclear alliance between the FRG and US, and consequently West German access to nuclear weapons, eventually led Wilson to produce some subtle caveats to his negotiating position with Washington. Yet, to his domestic audience, he repeatedly downplayed such diplomatic prudence. In contrast to his private approach to nuclear diplomacy, Wilson’s public position was far more ambivalent and intentionally ambiguous. Claims that he could not make a final decision on the future of the British nuclear weapons programme, and consequently nuclear sharing proposals, until he was in power provided a convenient way to criticise the Conservative government and keep the Labour Party united, without necessarily committing to cancellation. Wilson’s criticisms of the British nuclear weapons programme also complemented the Labour Party’s broader efforts to highlight the Conservative government’s perceived mishandling of the national economy. Chapters Three and Four, ‘Constructing the Atlantic Nuclear Force’ and ‘The Recurring Death of Nuclear Sharing’, consider the development of nuclear sharing proposals between 1964 and 1967. Wilson oversaw the creation of the

8 Introduction

Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) as a more palatable replacement to the widely unpopular Multilateral Force (MLF). Although its principal objective was to address the MLF problem, the ANF became a serious proposal that sought to improve broader international nuclear relations and facilitate measures of non-proliferation. Moreover, much of the government initially perceived the ANF as an effective method with which to secure future military and economic concessions from NATO and the United States. Specifically, in return for a commitment of Polaris submarines or V-bombers, Wilson sought the release of a substantial number of conventional forces presently committed to Western Europe. These potential concessions were especially valuable given the precarious situation of the pound, a significant balance of payments deficit, and a commitment to greater defence rationalisation. Moreover, from a domestic and party perspective, the ANF served as a valuable instrument for Wilson to justify the preservation of the British nuclear weapons programme without harming party unity or undermining his slim parliamentary majority. Nevertheless, the ANF was only ever a more acceptable version of a still widely unpopular idea. Once Wilson had secured approval from the cabinet and US president Lyndon Johnson to pursue this proposal, progress swiftly dissipated. Throughout 1965, the government subtly extricated itself from its commitment to nuclear sharing proposals, and instead pursued consultative solutions and a non-proliferation treaty. Broader international and domestic concerns, however, tempered Wilson’s resistance to nuclear sharing. US support for the pound, growing tensions with the FRG on the costs of military cooperation in Europe, and fears about a revival of the MLF meant that formal support for the ANF remained prudent. The government’s stance on nuclear sharing was thus characterised by public support for the ANF, but procrastination and equivocation in private. Consequently, nuclear sharing proposals, effectively lifeless within the government itself, lingered on the international landscape for several more years. Chapter Five, ‘Cooperation as Consultation’, looks in more detail at the emergence of non-physical measures of cooperation in British nuclear diplomacy between 1965 and 1967. Despite initial reservations, the Labour government ultimately welcomed US proposals for greater consultation between the allies in the form of the Nuclear Planning Working Group (NPWG), later supplanted by the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). The proposal complemented the dual objectives of removing nuclear sharing proposals from the international political landscape and progressing non-proliferation negotiations. Re-

Introduction 9

sponsibility for the success of this approach, though, rested largely with the superpowers. In a series of private negotiations designed to improve the ailing non-proliferation negotiations, a compromise emerged. The Soviet Union tacitly agreed to relinquish its objections to consultative measures of nuclear cooperation, specifically the NPG. In exchange, the United States agreed to forgo any further commitment to nuclear sharing proposals, such as the MLF and ANF. The United States subsequently used the offer of a permanent seat on the NPG to convince the FRG to forgo its increasingly unrealistic ambitions for a multilateral nuclear force. Because of its exclusion from these private negotiations, the British government played a secondary role in overcoming the international difficulties surrounding the possession and control of nuclear weapons. Wilson remained unwilling to denounce the ANF formally. This stance reflected his unease about upsetting his US creditors, and lingering fears about the possibility of a future NATO nuclear force that could exclude British participation. Persistent difficulties over the costs of British forces stationed in West Germany, and a growing interest in membership of the EEC, only strengthened Wilson’s reluctance to press the issue. It was therefore private superpower negotiations and France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command structure that helped to facilitate closer collaboration in matters of nuclear cooperation within the alliance. Thus, between 1965 and 1967, Britain enjoyed significant progress in both nuclear consultation and non-proliferation largely because of the actions of other states. Chapter Six, ‘Proliferation Politics’, explores the later stages of the British government’s pursuit of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. By 1967, a desire for entry into the EEC had become a major influence on the content and conduct of British nuclear non-proliferation policy. Wilson intentionally embraced a secondary role in the negotiation process, leaving the running to the superpowers, in order to avoid conflict with the countries of the EEC and thereby protect Britain’s application for membership. Although membership was not achieved in 1967, a commitment to future entry continued to influence nonproliferation policy. Indeed, a desire for future membership of the EEC, alongside giving renewed impetus to the NPT, helps to explain the British government’s decision to become the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the treaty. This chapter also challenges the pervading assumption that the decision to sign and later ratify the treaty was uncontested within the British government. Some ministers harboured serious reservations about the consequences of the

10 Introduction

treaty on Britain’s nascent relations with the EEC. Tensions between these foreign policy objectives surfaced in sporadic arguments at the highest levels of office. Despite his own increasingly precarious political and economic situation, Wilson successfully managed the passage of the treaty through his own government. The NPT codified the death of nuclear sharing and, more important, Britain’s legal existence as one of only a small number of nuclear weapon states. Taken together, these six chapters reveal how and why British nuclear diplomacy evolved under Wilson’s leadership as he struggled to balance his own objectives against wider domestic and international forces.

1

A British Bomb

N

have become an important feature of British politics. ‘The bomb’ has endured for six decades, despite budget cuts, popular protests, and the end of the Cold War. Britain had only been a nuclear power for twelve years when Harold Wilson formed his first government in 1964. There was a distinct possibility that further investment would end at this time.1 The Labour prime minister’s first six years in office therefore proved to be a critical juncture in British nuclear history. Beyond his decision to sustain and improve the national nuclear weapons programme, Wilson cemented and in some cases established precedents for strategic independence, measures of non-proliferation, and nuclear policy-making in times of economic crisis. His period of office set an important and different course in British nuclear history. Nevertheless, new governments do not exist in isolation from their past. Consideration of Wilson’s approach to nuclear diplomacy as leader of the opposition and as prime minister requires an understanding of the decisions and events that preceded his leadership. The post-war period has attracted considerable attention from nuclear historians.2 Drawing on this expansive body of literature introduces some of the major themes of nuclear diplomacy that would subsequently influence Wilson’s time in office. A commitment to a national nuclear force, tensions with the governments of the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the emergence of a commitment to measures of non-proliferation are the clearest historical antecedents. The role of the economy in Brituc l e a r w e a p o n s

11

12 A British Bomb

ish nuclear history also deserves attention. It is remarkable that contemporary nuclear historians have paid so little attention to the fiscal and monetary decisions of the post-war period. Balance of payments deficits, the threat of devaluation, and anxieties about comparative decline influenced successive governments’ handling of the British nuclear weapons programme. Precedents in each of these areas would exert a powerful influence on the Labour government’s handling of nuclear diplomacy in the 1960s. In addition, Wilson’s own rise through government weaves into this historical account. The post-war period represented the future prime minister’s formative years in the British political system. Although Wilson’s subsequent decisions in office reflect more than his own political beginnings and his predecessors’ legacies, past events certainly influenced his handling of nuclear diplomacy. This chapter divides amongst the governments of Clement Atlee, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold Macmillan. At the core of each section, and every chapter in this book, is an attempt to broaden the study of the bomb in British history. It is tempting to view nuclear policy-making in the context of an apocalyptic confrontation. Studies of British nuclear strategy and Whitehall’s preparations for a third world war abound. Such topics have generated considerable interest despite consuming so little of the government’s time. The reality of nuclear weapons in British history was typically far more mundane. Successive prime ministers spent considerable amounts of time discussing the bomb in the context of their own parties, the state of the economy, and commitments to foreign governments. Politicians, economists, and diplomats worked with strategists to direct policy. British nuclear history thus reflects a wide variety of influences and an evolving mix of objectives beyond merely preparation for war.

Clement Attlee By May 1945, the war in Europe had ended and the future of the British coalition government looked uncertain. Prime Minister Winston Churchill proposed a national referendum to prolong the life of Parliament, thereby extending his premiership until Japan had been defeated.3 Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee stubbornly rejected the proposal. The voting public rewarded his obstinacy. Atlee came to office on 26 July 1945, following a decisive electoral victory for the Labour Party. While widely regarded as an uncharismatic leader, the new prime minister offered an orderly and tidy minded approach

A British Bomb

13

to post-war governance.4 Benefiting from a wave of popular support, a crop of new Labour MPs entered Parliament. Among the swelling numbers of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) was James Harold Wilson. Although securing his seat in the House of Commons at the age of twenty-nine, he was already well equipped for a political career.5 Wilson had the rare qualities of a regional, non–public school background and an Oxford University education. He had been one of the youngest dons of the century, tutoring in economics, later serving in the war as a specialist within the civil service, and eventually working as a statistician and economist for the coal industry.6 Wilson began his political career at the dawn of the nuclear age. Eleven days after the General Election an atomic bomb struck the Japanese city of Hiroshima. There followed an attack on Nagasaki three days later. The bomb proved to be devastatingly effective. More than one hundred thousand people died in a matter of days, and, in conjunction with the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific war, Japan surrendered shortly thereafter.7 The power of these weapons troubled Attlee.8 His immediate response was to support the establishment of international control over atomic energy in the immediate post-war period. Negotiations converged on the ‘Baruch plan’, a United States proposal that sought to place nuclear energy under the control of an international authority.9 Not to be outdone, the British government devised its own, albeit equally ill-fated, plan for control.10 Mistrust and uncertainty proved insurmountable obstacles to cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union.11 Although dragging on until May 1948, negotiations became deadlocked by the end of July 1946. The end of that year marked the failure of the international control of atomic energy.12 With diplomacy blunted, Attlee turned his attention to a more radical proposal. In late October 1946, a small group of ministers in the Labour government struggled to decide whether to sacrifice scarce resources to the creation of atomic power rather than to the post-war economic recovery.13 The changing nature of international politics helped to motivate this discussion. The British and American governments had collaborated closely in the field of atomic energy during the Second World War.14 Cooperation proved to be fleeting. The US government passed the McMahon Act in August 1946, which prohibited the passing of classified atomic energy information to all foreign countries. 15 While US-UK atomic intelligence relations did continue, the British government no longer had access to any nuclear weapons and therefore needed to decide whether to pursue an independent programme.16 Debate was restricted

14 A British Bomb

to a small number of cabinet ministers, many of whom doubted the value of such a project. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was in no doubt as to the decision. ‘We have got to have this thing over here whatever it costs’, he argued, memorably concluding, ‘We’ve got to have the bloody Union Jack on top of it’.17 The gathered ministers ultimately agreed to pursue the project, and work on an atomic bomb was secretly authorised in a subsequent meeting early in January of the following year. This was not a rejection of diplomacy, to which Attlee remained committed, but rather a shrewd fusion of policies. Indeed, the prime minister had delayed this particular decision because he was sensitive to the issue of international control.18 The bomb would allow the government to negotiate any future arms control agreement as a nuclear power and thus from a position of strength.19 The minutes of the cabinet meetings in October and January reveal that strategic, diplomatic, and reputational motivations blended into a convincing argument against economic prudence. The assembled ministers concluded that atomic energy provided an important military supplement and offered a relatively cheap way of retaining global influence; technological superiority could overcome deficiencies in troop numbers.20 Nuclear weapons therefore protected Britain’s status as a global power and ensured an independent voice in international politics. In addition, investing in atomic energy offered insurance if other countries developed similar capabilities. The minutes reveal that the group’s principal motivation, however, was the United States. An independent atomic energy programme offered the hope of re-opening nuclear cooperation, which would reduce the cost of the British programme, and the chance to establish a channel with which to influence US strategy.21 Many ministers also feared a return to American isolationism and the risks it posed to British security, an anxiety Attlee stressed in subsequent interviews.22 These concerns were well founded. Alongside the cancellation of nuclear cooperation and the recent termination of wartime financial assistance, President Harry Truman reduced the number of US troops stationed in Europe. Standing at 3.5 million in June 1945, within two years this number had fallen to 200,000.23 From whom the government required protection is less clear. Britain was in range of Soviet bombers.24 Yet, Attlee was a ‘Cold War sceptic’, more concerned with Germany and Japan at that time.25 The records of these cabinet meetings make little mention of the Soviet threat.26 The decision to develop a British bomb was therefore not the result of any immediate threat but a necessary precaution: a desire for security in preparation for a potential atomic enemy.27

A British Bomb

15

Indeed, and in contrast to his efforts towards international control, Attlee was largely uninterested in the details of strategic planning, leaving the chiefs of staff to grapple with technical questions about the number of warheads and the type of targets. Clashes between the services and a lack of political direction consequently left nuclear strategy uncertain and often incoherent.28 By early 1948, work was finally underway on a British weapon. Despite the significance of this decision, and the tremendous costs involved, there had been no discussion in cabinet or Parliament.29 The practice of secrecy in peacetime nuclear decision-making would become a hallmark of successive Labour governments.30 Observing the letter rather than the spirit of parliamentary process, Attlee allowed the Defence Sub-Committee of the cabinet to release information about the decision to manufacture the bomb but without any publicity.31 The minister of defence admitted the development of atomic weapons during a question period in the commons on 12 May, but refused to give any further information for reasons of ‘public interest’.32 The wider press appears to have cooperated and made no further mention of the announcement.33 Attlee did not need to keep the decision secret to ensure progress. The majority of the government would have approved of the nuclear programme in defence of their leader and country.34 Openness, however, carried other risks. Such sensitive information merited caution, and Attlee admitted he did not trust all of his cabinet.35 Moreover, many in the PLP may not have supported such a programme on moral grounds. Only months after the decision to begin work on the bomb, large numbers of Labour MPs opposed or abstained from the vote to introduce the National Service Act. The revolt highlighted lingering tensions within the Labour Party on issues of national defence.36 Secrecy thus circumvented such parliamentary difficulties and ensured party cohesion. Attlee’s approach also avoided questions about the affordability of the nuclear programme. Between 1946 and 1948, according to estimates at the time, investment totalled £15 million and would double in the following two years.37 By way of contrast, the Olympics held in London later that year cost only £750,000.38 The bomb raised difficult questions for a government committed to greater social welfare in an already war-ravaged economy. Economic issues at the national and international level dominated the postwar government. The Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, of which Britain was a signatory, meant that the dollar functioned as the pivot of the global exchange system, sustained by the promise of conversion into gold at US $35 per ounce. All signatories pegged their currencies to the dollar, with the pound

16 A British Bomb

set at $4.03. The international role of sterling was twofold. It served as a reserve asset for other countries—namely, a secondary medium of foreign exchange after the US dollar, and a currency for international trade and investment.39 Proponents of the Bretton Woods agreement believed that a fixed parity system would stabilise international trade. Each country maintained reserves of gold or dollars to support the value of its own currency. If Britain, for instance, suffered a balance of payments deficit, demand for the pound would fall as foreign governments and private investors lost confidence. The Bank of England would then intervene in the currency markets, using its own reserves to buy pounds, stimulating demand and restoring parity.40 Reality complicated theory. Britain emerged from the Second World War with a sovereign debt of nearly 250 percent of GDP.41 This frightening ratio surpasses even the most indebted economies of the twenty-first century.42 The Labour government inherited limited assets in gold and foreign currency reserves, totalling £610 million, alongside large liabilities in excess of £3,500 million, predominantly debt in the British Empire and Commonwealth following their support in the war.43 Attlee also faced growing deficits in the balance of payments, driven in part by mounting war debts and the decline of ‘invisible’ revenue, principally net shipping earnings and income from foreign investments. The transition to a peacetime economy, investment in welfare reforms, and vast military commitments abroad exacerbated the country’s precarious situation.44 The government’s defence budget, as a proportion of national income, remained higher than that of any European country and even surpassed the United States in 1950.45 Urgent demand for American goods coupled with inconvertible currencies meant that the drain of gold and dollars from British reserves posed an immediate challenge to the Labour government.46 Reserves had already more than halved by 1945.47 Growing balance of payments deficits restricted access to sufficient foreign currency reserves, which, in turn, undermined the Bank of England’s ability to maintain confidence in the pound.48 The typical response to a deficit was to raise interest rates in order to attract short-term funds back into sterling, which harmed economic growth by raising the cost of borrowing but relieved pressure on the reserves.49 The American Loan Agreement of June 1946 provided Britain with $3,750 million, which helped the Labour government to survive its immediate difficulties. An ill-fated attempt at convertibility alongside growing gold and dollar deficits in the following months underlined the fragility of the economy. Further cuts in military spending followed thereafter,

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contributing to the withdrawal of military forces from India, Greece, Turkey, and Palestine.50 It was in such circumstances that, on 29 September 1947, Attlee appointed Wilson as president of the board of trade. At thirty-one he was the youngest member of the cabinet in the twentieth century.51 Wilson temporarily renounced his mild Yorkshire accent, a distinctive feature of his subsequent premierships, perhaps in an effort to conform to his new role as an ‘economically literate technocrat’.52 Benefiting in part from US loans, the economy began to recover.53 Success was short-lived. The reappearance of a deficit in 1949, relaxed domestic controls, and weakened exports to the United States meant that dollars continued to flow out of British coffers. Violent trade swings, a lack of reserves, and heavy short-term indebtedness left sterling vulnerable to speculative pressure. There followed a further drain on the reserves and a new balance of payments crisis.54 Such troubles would become a recurring theme of the Bretton Woods system.55 Attlee favoured devaluation, believing mounting speculative pressure discouraged exports and undermined willingness to hold sterling. Stafford Cripps, chancellor of the exchequer, grudgingly agreed to devalue the pound in order to stem the drain on reserves.56 On 18 September 1949, Cripps cut the value of sterling from $4.03 to $2.80.57 Although the value of sterling fell by 30 percent, the relative figure was closer to 9 percent because other European countries devalued simultaneously.58 Devaluation therefore helped to restore the competitive balance between Europe and the United States whilst slowing the speculative drain of dollars and increasing import prices.59 Perhaps most important, the British government’s loyalty to the Bretton Woods system allowed investors to infer a commitment to sound and stable policies.60 Nevertheless, the political consequences of devaluation were dramatic. Both of Wilson’s major biographers, Ben Pimlott and Philip Ziegler, describe their subject’s reaction to devaluation with reference to ‘humiliation’ and ‘defeat’.61 Alongside damage to the reputation of the Labour Party was the immediate harm to his own career. Wilson’s ambiguous position on devaluation and politicised handling of events, likely motivated by a desire to secure the chancellorship, alienated many of his peers.62 Most upset was Hugh Gaitskell, minister of fuel and power, who felt Wilson to be untrustworthy. Ambiguous is perhaps a fairer characterisation; it would certainly prove to be a motif of his premiership. Wilson’s ambitions suffered in the crisis, whilst Gaitskell subsequently secured the chancellorship.63 Beyond tensions within the party, devaluation disorientated and traumatised the government.64

18 A British Bomb

It forced Attlee to pursue harsh deflationary measures, which threatened to undermine the government’s social spending and thus its core platform. Cripps proposed cuts of around £280 million, most of which passed through cabinet.65 Against this background, it is curious that historians have shied away from considering the relationship between devaluation and the British nuclear programme. By 1950, according to estimates at the time, costs for the British nuclear programme totalled £49.7 million and would go on to double over the following two years.66 This figure is conspicuous given the huge programme of cuts underway. Moreover, there was a significant opportunity cost, as the nuclear programme competed with British industry for skilled labour and scarce materials. Coupled with the weakness of the economy, and a wider trend of fiscal tightening, an open discussion of the nuclear programme would have prompted some calls for cancellation. Attlee’s secrecy in nuclear decision-making allowed him to circumvent opposition from, and maintain unity within, the wider Labour Party.67 International affairs perhaps explain the dearth of attention that nuclear historians have paid to the state of the economy in 1949. Only weeks before devaluation, the Soviet Union achieved its own atomic explosion. Such news, when it eventually reached the British government, was surprising. The intelligence service had expected that such a major scientific feat would be possible only several years later.68 Tensions with the Soviet Union were at an all-time high following the Berlin Blockade between June 1948 and May 1949. British withdrawals from India, Greece, Turkey, and Palestine contrasted with the communist seizure of Czechoslovakia and the Stalinization of Eastern Europe. The balance of power appeared to be shifting. Growing tensions led to the return of US strategic bombers in Britain, which subsequently included atomiccapable aircraft, and the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, America’s first peacetime alliance.69 Shortly after the Soviet explosion, there followed the collapse of negotiations within the United Nations concerning the international control of nuclear energy, a failure attributable to both superpowers.70 Nuclear cooperation remained equally limited amongst allies. Throughout this period, Attlee and the Labour government pursued the resumption of USUK nuclear relations. The subsequent exchange of information would reduce development costs and ultimately provide a channel with which to influence US strategy.71 Despite continued cooperation in military and intelligence fields, Attlee was unable to re-establish the intimacy of the Manhattan Project. Tru-

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man protected the American nuclear monopoly, whilst revelations of Soviet espionage in Britain undermined any hope of nuclear rapprochement.72 Subsequent agreements in 1948 and 1951 only reinforced the US monopoly, although progress occurred in atomic intelligence cooperation.73 Attlee led the Labour Party to a narrow victory in the General Election of February 1950. The government’s majority in the House of Commons fell to seven, preserving but immobilising the administration.74 Junior ministers in more competitive constituencies were especially vulnerable. Wilson won his seat by 834 votes, one of the narrowest victories in the country.75 The Cold War swiftly encroached on Attlee’s second term. Bevin believed that the two ‘danger spots’ for Britain would be Germany and Indochina.76 The first challenge, however, emerged in East Asia. On 25 June 1950, forces from North Korea, supported by the Soviet Union, attacked neighbouring South Korea. In spite of clear differences of opinion in how to handle the conflict, the British and American governments committed themselves to defend the south.77 Attlee and Truman discussed the Korean crisis in early December 1950, and eventually broached the subject of the atomic bomb.78 The president stated that he would not consider the use of nuclear weapons without prior consultation, but bluntly refused a request for written assurance.79 Attlee’s helplessness, and inability to influence US nuclear policy, only encouraged his pursuit of a British bomb. Anxiety about the Soviet threat encouraged increases in defence expenditure, but so too did fear that the Americans might refocus their attentions away from Europe.80 Despite the recent devaluation and accompanying deflationary measures, Cripps proposed an increase from £2,590 million over the three years to £3,400 million, which erroneously presumed a major US subsidy for British defence spending. Attlee accepted the need for an increase and the consequent restrictions on social spending. ‘We can’t afford not to’, he remarked.81 The government’s sacrifices proved inadequate. Over the coming months, US representatives expressed dissatisfaction with the British military contribution. On 18 December, Attlee asked the cabinet for authorisation to increase defence expenditure, stressing the need to support their allies and protect the US-UK partnership.82 The defence budget subsequently increased to £4,700 million in January 1951, marking more than an 81 percent increase on initial expenditure levels. The cabinet had struggled with this decision. Many ministers, including Wilson, expressed concern at the possible economic consequences. These wor-

20 A British Bomb

ries proved to be well founded. Increases in defence spending helped to push a balance of payments surplus of £307 million in 1950 to a deficit of almost £369 million in 1951 and put greater strain on dollar reserves. 83 The national economy was already struggling. Production had slowed for all leading industrial countries, whilst Germany and Japan re-entered the world markets as major competitors to Britain.84 There followed an austerity budget, infamous for Gaitskell’s new charges for ‘teeth and spectacles’, which sought to address the burden of healthcare spending but offset only a fraction of the spending increase.85 Attlee would authorise more than £50 million, double the new healthcare charges, to the nuclear weapons programme over the next two years.86 It is difficult to believe that in such circumstances a government committed to social reform, already facing spending restrictions and a weakened economy, would not have applied tremendous pressure on Attlee to consider cancellation or reduced investment. There followed one of the most dramatic cabinet farewells of the post-war period.87 Wilson resigned his post, following the lead of Minster of Labour Aneurin Bevan, prompting serious divisions within the Labour Party.88 These events surprised Attlee, absent from the meeting because of illness, later remarking that the president of the board of trade ‘ought to have had more understanding of the economic position’.89 Wilson explained his unwillingness to accept collective responsibility as a reaction to the overstretched economy, not health charges, although the cabinet minutes stressed both. Resignation is, at first glance, difficult to reconcile with such a pragmatic politician. Political bravery and antipathy towards Gaitskell were motivating factors. More pressingly, Wilson’s decision to follow Bevan’s populist line generated support from within his own constituency and thus offered a temporary solution to the growing challenges to his seat in the House.90 The decision was therefore a logical mix of personality, politics, and policy.91 It was also well timed. On 25 October 1951, Labour went to the polls hoping to increase its majority but was soundly defeated. Returning to the opposition benches after surviving the election, Wilson’s sacrifice appeared far smaller than it might have been.92 Throughout his period in government, there is no evidence that he knew of the nascent British nuclear weapons programme. Wilson, like most of his colleagues, remained ignorant of the bomb. It would instead fall to a Conservative prime minister to publicise the Labour government’s investment in nuclear weapons.

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Winston Churchill On 26 October 1951, Churchill came to office with a small majority. The old warrior had returned to Downing Street for his final premiership, albeit somewhat diminished in terms of energy and concentration at the age of almost seventy-seven.93 Churchill remains the only prime minister to have authorised the use of nuclear weapons. Under the terms of the 1943 Quebec Agreement the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was a joint decision with the US president, albeit somewhat of a technicality.94 As leader of the opposition, he publicly and repeatedly criticised the Labour government for having fallen behind the Soviet Union’s own nuclear programme.95 During his time in office, Churchill remained deeply committed to the bomb. He sustained investment in the nuclear programme, supported the development of thermonuclear (or hydrogen) weapons, and actively pursued the restoration of the transatlantic nuclear relationship. As the bomb neared completion, one of Churchill’s first tasks was to approve testing.96 He briefly considered possessing ‘the art rather than the article’ to reduce expenditure, before eventually authorising the test on 14 December 1951. After taking power, the prime minister was amazed by how much Attlee had kept quiet about the British nuclear programme, especially the costs involved. Revised estimates for the financial year put the cumulative investment at £104,642,000.97 On 18 February 1952, Churchill revealed to Parliament that Britain would test its own atomic bomb later that year, thereby publicly announcing the existence of the programme. Speaking in the House of Commons, he declared: I was not aware until I took office that not only had the Socialist Government made the atomic bomb as a matter of research, but that they had created at the expense of many scores of millions of pounds the important plant necessary for its regular production . . . . I must, as an old Parliamentarian, express my surprise that a full and clear statement was not made of this policy to Parliament, especially in view of the immense sums of money which were voted by this House without their having any clear appreciation of what was being done.98

Reference to ‘immense sums of money’ highlights the continuing relationship between the bomb and the economy. Both major parties supported the nuclear programme, and there was a broad post-war consensus on many key macroeconomic objectives, notably employment and the welfare state. The

22 A British Bomb

government and the opposition, however, held different economic principles. In office, the Labour government had struggled to persuade voters of the desirability of austerity and eventually retreated from wartime controls. In contrast, the newly elected Conservative government was committed to liberalisation. It rejected quotas and encouraged stability by attracting capital from abroad and reducing pressure on domestic demand. Borrowing helped to address temporary imbalances but functioned only as a short-term device because it tended to make holders of sterling nervous about devaluation.99 The Conservative government oversaw the reopening of the city of London in 1951 as an international market for foreign exchange dealing alongside commodity trading and pursued the relaxation of exchange controls, culminating in full convertibility of the pound in 1958. These changes helped steady growth in invisible exports, without which Britain would have been in continuous balance of payments deficit since the early 1950s. After 1952, the dollar shortage began to ease. The balance of payments improved as terms of trade became more favourable and reserves began to increase, although exchange levels remained low.100 Despite these successes, progress towards convertibility encouraged speculative short-term capital movements that had a deflationary effect on the economy and inhibited economic growth at home by raising the domestic cost of borrowing.101 These problems would intensify and repeatedly influence nuclear policy over the coming decades. Before dealing with these emerging challenges, the new government had to deal with the economy it had inherited. Obscuring the Labour government’s successful completion of post-war economic adjustment, most notably in low unemployment and stable prices, was the re-armament programme that had weakened the balance of payments.102 Under Churchill, nuclear weapons came to play an increasingly important economic role. The West, he believed, possessed the military power to deter the Soviet Union and that the threat of war had lessened since rearmament.103 The Conservative government thus adopted a ‘long haul’ solution, slowing and stretching the rearmament programme over a longer period.104 The prime minister directed the three British chiefs of staff in the spring of 1952 to carry out a fundamental strategic review taking into account the state of the economy, the role of nuclear weapons, and commitments to NATO.105 The chiefs produced a ‘Global Strategy Paper’ that led Britain to become the first nation to base its national security planning on a declared policy of nuclear deterrence. In sum, the threat of immediate reprisal seemed sufficient to halt Soviet aggression.106 The paper was not revolutionary, sharing many similarities with earlier strategy pa-

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pers, and different views among the chiefs of staff undermined any semblance of coherence in strategic planning. Nonetheless, the relationship between the economy and the bomb was now clear. The British government, unlike its wealthier nuclear counterparts, swiftly embraced the atomic bomb as a way to reduce the financial burden of conventional forces.107 Such reasoning was questionable. The US State Department believed the nuclear weapons programme would actually incur greater costs than maintaining British troop numbers in Western Europe.108 Broadly defined, it consumed up to 20 percent of the defence budget in the 1950s.109 Yet there was a wider diplomatic value. An independent nuclear force allowed the British government to develop its own targeting plan, which facilitated some influence over US strategy, thereby tempering superpower escalation and stemming doubts about American commitments to the defence of Britain.110 The bomb therefore appeared to be an expensive but worthwhile investment. After a successful explosion on 3 October 1952, Britain became the world’s third nuclear power.111 Less than one month later, the United States exploded a thermonuclear device one thousand times more powerful than the British bomb. As Peter Hennessy notes, Britain had caught up for a mere twenty-eight days.112 Dwight Eisenhower won the presidency of the United States shortly thereafter, and Churchill immediately pushed for the restoration of the nuclear relationship.113 Eisenhower had sympathy for America’s erstwhile nuclear ally, though timing rather than emotional bonds facilitated progress. The Korean War ended in July 1953, but the Soviet Union performed its first partial thermonuclear test in the following month.114 Cold War tensions mounted. By 1953, 427,000 American troops stood in Europe, alongside several thousand tactical nuclear weapons.115 Beyond his personal opinion of the McMahon Act, which he felt to be ‘one of the most deplorable incidents in American history’, Eisenhower believed that the United States should support its allies and provide them with the technology necessary to counter Soviet military superiority. There followed a series of initiatives that helped to achieve closer nuclear cooperation, culminating in an ‘Agreement for Cooperation regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defence Purposes’ in 1955. Although an important step forward, inter-agency disputes ensured information sharing remained limited.116 Thermonuclear weapons encouraged renewed efforts towards international control. On 8 December 1953, Eisenhower delivered his ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal to the UN General Assembly. In the speech, he stressed the dangers of proliferation and expressed the hope that atomic energy could be adapted for

24 A British Bomb

peaceful purposes. Churchill publicly welcomed the proposal. In private, the cabinet held major reservations about US dominance of atomic energy for industrial purposes. By June 1954, Churchill had overruled his ministers and agreed to British participation in the project, preferring to retain some control over the proposal.117 International negotiations dragged on for years, degenerating into limited schemes of arms control and ultimately focusing on the prohibition of nuclear tests. These diplomatic failures were somewhat of a blessing for the British government. Agreement, senior ministers feared, could have come at the expense of the country’s own nuclear programme.118 Thermonuclear weapons, however, had forced a shift in the aims and objectives of nuclear diplomacy. A small number of concealed hydrogen bombs could devastate an entire nation. Abolition treaties, which would now require infallible inspection and verification procedures, became increasingly unrealistic. In line with the superpowers, British nuclear diplomacy gradually readjusted to focus on schemes to control the arms race and halt nuclear proliferation.119 The destructive effects of the hydrogen bomb astounded Churchill.120 It was an understandable reaction. The chiefs of staff concluded that 12 million people, out of a population of only 46 million, would perish if ten 10-megaton thermonuclear weapons struck the British Isles.121 As soon as he was sure it was feasible and affordable, Churchill made the decision, which soon became something of an obsession, to pursue a British hydrogen bomb.122 The Committee on Defence Policy met to discuss the cost of the project on 19 May. The gathered ministers, including the minister of defence and chancellor of the exchequer, agreed that the government was committed to reducing defence expenditure but supported investment in a hydrogen bomb. Alongside familiar diplomatic and strategic arguments, Churchill stressed the possibility of using nuclear weapons to make substantial reductions to conventional force levels, an idea that would gain considerable momentum over the coming decade.123 Having gathered support in advance, for the first time a prime minister involved the full cabinet in the nuclear decision-making process.124 The cabinet met on 7 July 1954. Churchill delivered a well-crafted argument for the hydrogen bomb, stressing that Britain’s influence as a world power and its ability to prevent war depended on effective nuclear weapons. After telling the gathered ministers that he had taken the decision to make the bomb, the minutes of the meeting reveal only that cabinet ended. Private recollections, however, suggest that Churchill’s cavalier approach to such an important issue had led to a mass walk-out. Open debate on nuclear policy carried such risks.

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Discussion resumed the following morning. The cabinet were informed that net additional cost would not exceed £10 million—a relatively small additional expense to adjust the programme, as nine-tenths of the effort was required for continuing with solely atomic weapons. Hydrogen bombs also had the added attraction of requiring fewer bombers.125 Echoing criticism that would emerge within the Labour Party several years later, the cabinet broached the question of proliferation. The ministers rejected the notion that it might be easier to prevent Germany acquiring a bomb if the British government refrained from producing such weapons. There was no sharp distinction between old and new nuclear weapons. Instead, in a curious twist of logic, the group agreed that such a weapon would probably help progress towards an abolition agreement. Familiar arguments dominated the remainder of proceedings. A hydrogen bomb would help to deter enemies and maintain standing in world affairs, negating the strategic disadvantages of Britain’s small size and dense population by increasing the risks of nuclear war for the superpowers.126 As Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden noted, ‘[If] continents, and not merely small islands, were doomed to destruction, all was equal in the grim reckoning’.127 Moreover, the hydrogen bomb would demonstrate to American onlookers that Britain merited collaboration and consultation, whilst helping to reduce military dependence on the United States.128 After the discussion, there was general support for thermonuclear weapons. On 26 July, the cabinet gave permission to proceed.129 The official verdict came a year later, when the 1955 Defence White Paper officially announced the decision to manufacture a hydrogen bomb.130 The Churchill government had sought to take control of strategic planning, motivated in large part by economic concerns, but differences between the government and the chiefs of staff, alongside the continuation of inter-service rivalries, left policy inconsistent and ambiguous. Important questions about deterrence policy, transatlantic interdependence, and non-proliferation policy remained unanswered. Churchill bequeathed to his successor an expanding development programme but no clear or coherent strategic posture.131 Despite this confusion, the concept of an ‘independent British deterrent’ had taken hold in political debates.132 Churchill’s plans for continued investment in the British nuclear programme met little resistance from his own party or from the opposition. Attlee grudgingly supported the development of the hydrogen bomb, albeit while still seeking international efforts at control.133 Nevertheless, there were growing tensions within the Labour Party.

26 A British Bomb

In March 1955, Bevan led sixty-one backbenchers to abstain from supporting a key party amendment to nuclear policy, demanding a commitment to a policy of no first use; a Labour government, the rebels believed, should use nuclear weapons only to retaliate against a comparable attack. Although this public confrontation achieved little, nuclear tensions simmered. Wilson, who had returned to the front bench following Bevan’s resignation from the Parliamentary Committee a year earlier, was not amongst those arguing against the bomb, despite claims to the contrary.134 While on the backbenches, he had authored a popular pamphlet arguing for economic independence in order to challenge American strategic decisions. His argument, perhaps inadvertently, made British nuclear weapons more important.135 Wilson emerged at this time as spokesperson for the middle ground, having moved back towards the political centre of the party. His return to the shadow cabinet, at the expense of his former mentor, appeared opportunistic to colleagues, but suspicions within the party failed to curb Wilson’s political ascent. He slowly rose up the ranks of the shadow cabinet, gradually becoming a favoured compromise candidate.136 As Wilson’s political career gathered momentum, another was drawing to a graceful conclusion.

Anthony Eden In April 1955 Churchill retired, allowing an increasingly impatient Eden to succeed him.137 The old warrior’s persistence reflected concerns about the consequences of retirement and well-founded doubts about his replacement’s ability. Churchill’s obsessive fear of the bomb had also motivated his perseverance.138 Failing health ultimately forced change. Eden would become one of the most tragic British political figures in the post-war period. Although charming and intelligent, poor health and poorer judgement undermined his premiership.139 Eden’s handling of nuclear affairs, both with the governments of the United States and Europe, did little to recover his tarnished reputation. Upon replacing Churchill, the new prime minister immediately called a General Election. This was the first election in which both parties made explicit reference to nuclear weapons, albeit more as a fact than as an electoral tactic.140 Attlee’s shrewd contradiction persisted; Britain would build bombs but seek peace. Eden notes in his memoirs that the Labour government was ‘certainly right to make the bomb’, commending Attlee’s efforts at ‘ingeniously concealing the large sums expanded’, and stressing that the Soviet leadership would be unwilling to provoke world conflict if it resulted in mutual destruction.141

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The Conservative Party returned to power on 26 May 1955 with an expanded majority. Despite his own party’s loss, Wilson was cheerful. By this time, he had returned to official favour in Labour circles. Following Attlee’s retirement and Gaitskell’s accession to the leadership, Wilson became shadow chancellor. The leader of the opposition believed that Wilson lacked support within the party, and thus the promotion of a rival was not a danger.142 Gaitskell not only underestimated his political opponent but also misjudged the importance of the role itself. Wilson had secured one of the most important positions in the party and at a time when economic issues were increasingly important in determining voting patterns.143 The Labour Party had struggled to deal with the prosperity of Britain in 1955.144 In contrast, the Conservative victory reflected the improving state of the economy and rising living standards.145 An increasingly favourable economic situation no doubt helped to avoid difficult questions about the costs associated with the British nuclear weapons programme. Recovery in 1953 led to an outright boom in 1955. After 1952, the dollar shortage began to ease and the balance of payments improved. Although difficulties persisted, there was a current account surplus in all but three years of the 1950s.146 Nevertheless, the government remained conscious of the fragility of the economy, particularly with respect to defence expenditure. In June 1956, Eden commissioned a major inter-departmental review of British foreign policy. He was keen to lessen overseas obligations in light of anxiety about the balance of payments and limited gold reserves.147 After considering pursuing relief on interest payments from its American creditors, the review focused on reducing international commitments and defence spending. Cuts to such targets were understandable. The British government struggled to maintain its global presence and honour its pledge to maintain substantial forces on the Continent. By 1955, the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) constituted a growing subsidy to the economy and balance of payments of the FRG at the expense of the British economy. Military spending certainly came at the expense of civilian investment.148 In addition, the diversion of resources away from export industries and high levels of overseas military expenditure weakened the balance of payments surplus.149 Senior officials informed the prime minister that defence spending would rise from £1,527 million in 1955 to £1,929 million in 1959. ‘The country’, Eden remarks in his memoirs, ‘could not be expected to stand this mounting strain’.150 Nuclear weapons offered a solution. Not only could such devices provide reliable deterrence, Eden believed that they could also deal with aggression.151 The adoption of a ‘trip-wire strategy’,

28 A British Bomb

whereby NATO would retaliate against any attack with nuclear weapons, would enable the British government to reduce its forces stationed in Europe.152 The Suez debacle, however, would soon expose the shortcomings of such a comforting formula. In October and November 1956, seeking to recover access to the recently nationalised Suez Canal, the British and French governments conspired with the Israeli government to invade Egypt. The American and Soviet governments, with support from the United Nations, condemned military action. Despite repeated warnings, Eden proceeded.153 Although fears about Soviet reprisals proved unfounded, a continued military presence became unsustainable.154 The Suez crisis led to a run on sterling as the markets anticipated devaluation, resulting in a huge drain on reserves. A diplomatic crisis thus became an economic crisis. The US government remained unwilling to aid the British government until it withdrew its forces. Economic difficulties, alongside domestic and international pressures, eventually forced capitulation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the US government subsequently helped to reverse the speculative crisis. Recovery was swift.155 This rescue set the precedent for international support for sterling and highlighted the special assistance that the British government could attract for the pound.156 The Suez crisis exposed many of the limitations of British nuclear diplomacy. The nuclear V-bomber force became operational in October 1956, weeks before events in Suez, but not a penny of investment in the nuclear programme proved useful to the problems posed by Egypt or the US government.157 Ground troops had conducted the necessary military operations, while the ‘national deterrent’ had proven impotent in the face of the superpowers and irrelevant in the shadow of economic disaster. British nuclear strategy more broadly also remained unclear. Eden remained committed to thermonuclear weapons and on shifting the emphasis away from conventional forces in both national and alliance terms. Yet tensions between a desire for strategic independence and an economic need for interdependence remained largely unresolved, as did basic questions about the form deterrence should take and national targeting policy.158 Eden presided over further difficulties in the realm of nuclear diplomacy. The resumption of disarmament negotiations in Geneva was a mixed blessing. Superpower talks facilitated progress but increasingly marginalised smaller powers. The US government ignored the British government’s ambitious proposals, instead pursuing the ‘Open Skies’ initiative whereby major powers

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allowed inspection via aerial photography. British disarmament plans consequently withered away.159 Inadequacies in nuclear diplomacy extended beyond the United States. On 25 March 1957, after years of negotiations during Eden’s premiership, representatives from West Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the Rome treaties. Signature established the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which coordinated member states’ research programmes for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Eden has been criticised for his failure to pursue closer economic integration with the EEC.160 His failure to embrace Euratom, despite strong Continental support, also deserves attention. The French government initially favoured a European nuclear energy organisation over a ‘common market’, believing it to be a more feasible area for cooperation. The possibility of a French nuclear programme and further proliferation, however, strengthened Eden’s reluctance either to participate in European integration or to jeopardize the prospect of Anglo-American nuclear weapons cooperation.161 Eisenhower believed that Euratom was essential for a united Europe that could act as a strong bulwark against the Soviet Union. Unlike its support to Britain, though, the United States would only provide the necessary and substantial investment if Euratom’s nuclear facilities accepted international inspection. Such a demand was anathema to most European governments, who instead demanded a self-inspection regime. These tensions were serious and would later dominate negotiations leading up to the signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1968.162 Euratom grew swiftly regardless of these obstacles. Eden thus lost the battle for the leadership of Europe’s nuclear power industry and squandered his initially strong bargaining position. Moreover, efforts to stem the European nuclear programme helped to encourage an independent French programme, spurred on by the events of the Suez affair. Eden’s mismanagement of nuclear diplomacy alienated France, delayed future European integration, and allowed the United States to remain the dominant force in British nuclear history.163 Eden’s brief premiership had been deeply troubled. The emergence of the EEC and Euratom, the Suez crisis and its negative impact on transatlantic relations, and growing defence expenditures raised serious questions about the future of the British nuclear weapons programme. A new prime minister would have to deal with these problems. By early 1957, it was clear that Eden’s premiership was untenable. The Suez crisis had fatally undermined the government. ‘Eden gambled’, as David Dutton concludes, ‘and he lost’.164 On 10 Janu-

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ary, Eden resigned on the grounds of ill health and Harold Macmillan became prime minister. The bomb passed to its fourth owner.

Harold Macmillan Historians find Macmillan complicated and elusive, seeing a scholar and a warrior, a Whig and a Tory.165 Despite these contradictions, his handling of nuclear policy was relatively consistent. The new prime minister believed that conventional means alone would fail to protect Europe.166 Macmillan was a nuclear moderniser who invested in the weapons programme, and, especially towards the end of his premiership, involved his full cabinet in the management of nuclear policy.167 Benefiting from his predecessors’ efforts, the V-bomber force came on stream in 1957, making Macmillan the first prime minister to be truly nuclear equipped, albeit with rudimentary command and control of a small stockpile of weapons.168 Being so equipped raised serious questions for the government. While sovereignty in theory rests in Parliament, in practice the prime minister, advised by the cabinet, has responsibility for directing the defence of the state. Prior to the late 1950s, command and control issues were almost exclusively post hoc arrangements. Reduced warning times encouraged advanced preparation. Macmillan appointed a deputy with the authority to launch Britain’s nuclear forces. He also introduced a ‘two-person’ rule, whereby the prime minister could not initiate the use of nuclear weapons alone but required the assistance of another individual, widely believed to be the chief of the defence staff. The prime minister could authorise the use of nuclear weapons, but only a figure in the military could give the order. In the event of the destruction of political leadership, the military would assume authority, effectively removing the safety catch of the command structure. Moreover, during Macmillan’s premiership, work was completed on a huge underground capability known as ‘Turnstile’ or ‘Burlington’, deep beneath the limestone of the Cotswolds. In the event of war, the prime minister and a small number of ministerial colleagues would join him or her underground and authorise nuclear retaliation.169 It is tempting to view nuclear weapons in the context of an apocalyptic confrontation. References to launch codes and underground bunkers excite and terrify in equal measure. Excitement perhaps explains why such issues have generated so much academic interest despite consuming so little of the government’s time. The reality of nuclear weapons in British history was far more mundane. Nuclear

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weapons typically existed in an economic and diplomatic context. The governments of Macmillan were no exception. Only weeks before becoming prime minister, Macmillan attended a dinner at the British embassy in Paris in December 1956. He reportedly suggested that ‘the great thing for a country was to be rich’ and posed an intriguing question to his audience: ‘Why should we not give up spending millions on atom bombs . . . and just sit back and be rich?’170 As chancellor of the exchequer, Macmillan had spoken of halving defence expenditures; if only 50 percent of the savings shifted into exports, he argued, it could eliminate the foreign exchange problem and help to reduce taxation. Britain was still spending a tremendous amount of money on defence. Between 1950 and 1957, defence expenditures had almost doubled. More startling, defence spending between 1952 and 1956 had absorbed an average of almost 9 percent of Britain’s gross national product.171 The nuclear weapons programme, broadly defined, consumed up to 20 percent of the defence budget in the 1950s.172 Macmillan nevertheless believed the bomb to be a worthwhile investment. He clung to the belief that nuclear weapons could effect major efficiencies in defence spending. In opposition, Wilson would call this solution an expensive pipe dream that left serious gaps in conventional defence, although he would later adopt a similar stance once in office.173 Amongst its European allies, Britain devoted the largest share of its resources to defence.174 Comparative assessment had become increasingly popular as statistical improvements allowed economists to place British performance in an international context. Such developments coincided with a major shift in national political debate where the desire for rising living standards, and not full employment, now dominated economic policy.175 Britain’s performance contrasted with the faster growth of living standards in European countries, a discrepancy that became the basis for claims of national decline.176 Europe’s post-war recovery and subsequent integration promoted competition and threatened British access to Continental customers. As exports suffered, the government began to run balance-of-payments deficits, which reduced confidence in the national economy and the pound.177 Fearing blame for Britain’s newfound deficiencies, the Conservative government understandably shied away from publicising ‘declinist’ views but recognised the need for reform.178 In April 1957, Secretary of State for Defence Duncan Sandys produced a new defence white paper, stressing the importance of the economy and export trade in supporting Britain’s military power and

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global influence.179 The BAOR reduced from 77,000 to 64,000 in 1957/58 and 55,000 in 1958/59, although international pressure thwarted further reductions.180 In addition, the termination of national service reduced the size of the armed forces from 690,000 to 375,000 by 1962.181 While the state of the economy was important in explaining these decisions, so too were nuclear weapons. The two issues framed British defence policy. In the House of Commons, Macmillan explained that ‘the end of conscription must depend upon the acceptance of nuclear weapons’.182 The state of the economy at once excused and motivated the government’s commitment to a British nuclear force. More than one scholar notes that the defence review appears to have ignored the bomb’s limited utility in Korea and Suez.183 In addition, doubts about limited war left radical proposals about using tactical nuclear weapons in West Germany stillborn.184 After a fall in the period 1957–58, defence spending started to rise again. In the five years following the review, real defence spending rose by 8 percent.185 The seeming efficiencies of the bomb distracted the government from the problems of its burdensome global commitments. The British people had already endured sixteen years of austerity and tight economic controls, and nuclear weapons offered a useful alternative to the fiscal tightening necessary to sustain a global presence.186 Despite these question marks, Macmillan, in the main, faced limited political opposition to his nuclear policies. There were some voices of dissension. Starting the debate on the 1957 Defence White Paper, Labour MP Richard Crossman argued that seeking independence would encourage France and West Germany to do the same. If Britain was unwilling to trust the United States, no one would. A ‘little British deterrent’ therefore weakened NATO and promoted proliferation.187 Repeating these arguments two months later, Crossman stressed the issue of affordability. Nuclear weapons, he reasoned, were more expensive than the alternative, and the pursuit of modernisation would lead to unending cuts to conventional forces.188 Conventional and nuclear forces increasingly became competing, rather than complementary, elements of national security. Nevertheless, the Labour Party leadership grudgingly concluded that such weapons were necessary and supported the government’s nuclear policies, including the production of thermonuclear weapons. On 15 May 1957, Britain tested its first hydrogen bomb prototype. Although producing disappointing yield results it provided proof of principle, and a further test in November proved more effective.189 Alongside their perceived economic value, these weapons reflected the British government’s determination

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to remain a great power and to maintain a privileged position vis-à-vis the United States.190 Gaitskell defended his continued support for thermonuclear weapons by stressing the need for cost savings and openly questioning whether during a Soviet threat the US government would be prepared to ‘risk the wholesale destruction of American cities to save Britain from Soviet domination’.191 Leaders seated on both sides of the parliamentary floor thus defended the bomb with reference to Washington and spiralling defence costs, as well as a weapon with which to deter Moscow. The British bomb was a diplomatic and economic tool as much as a strategic or military weapon.192 Although it is important not to exaggerate Macmillan’s influence on transatlantic relations, the prime minister certainly enjoyed a revival in US-UK cooperation.193 In the spring of 1957, he noted the sympathetic reception his government’s new defence policy received in the United States; privately he rebuffed Eisenhower’s attempt to forestall the reduction of British NATO forces.194 Improvements in the transatlantic relationship coincided with the successful launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957, which provided the Soviet Union with an ICBM capability able to reach mainland America.195 Macmillan ventured to Washington for talks with the president on 24 and 25 October to suggest the further pooling of atomic efforts.196 Discussions led to a ‘Declaration of Common Purpose’, advocating greater interdependence between the two countries.197 Following the agreement, the president promised to ask Congress to amend the Atomic Energy Act and agreed to a new trip-wire strategy in NATO, enabling Britain to seek reductions in forces stationed in West Germany.198 In renewing cooperation, Macmillan had realised the ambition of British nuclear diplomacy since 1946.199 When published on 25 October, the Declaration spoke of the unity and intent of free nations. The arrangement was part of a broader initiative, despite claims of a focus on US-UK cooperation.200 For Eisenhower, nuclear cooperation with Britain was an effort to encourage the Macmillan government not to implement cuts to conventional forces, which could harm cohesion in NATO and weaken the alliance’s presence in the Middle East and Europe. Moreover, Eisenhower believed that nuclear cooperation with Britain and other NATO allies complemented his long-term goal of ensuring European governments took responsibility for their own defence.201 The president’s commitment to sharing nuclear power was clearly evidenced by his financial and material support for Euratom, which he regarded as essential for a strong defence against the Soviet Union.202 Following Sputnik, many alliance members feared a weakening of the US

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nuclear guarantee to Europe and pressed for a greater say in decision-making. Tensions within NATO, and more specifically between the nuclear weapon states and the non–nuclear weapon states, had resulted in a ‘crisis of credibility’ for the alliance. This problem stemmed from Western Europe’s dependence on US nuclear weapons and lingering doubts as to whether Washington would risk its own survival in defence of Bonn, Paris, or London during a nuclear confrontation. As Alex Danchev remarks, Europe demanded ‘no annihilation without representation’.203 Demands for a stronger European voice encouraged support for a NATO or possibly European nuclear force.204 Eisenhower appreciated these anxieties. American arrangements with the British government were an ‘opening wedge’ for a broader sharing of nuclear information within the alliance.205 Furthermore, the need for different targeting policies within the alliance was an increasingly popular idea. In 1957, Henry Kissinger, consultant to several government agencies, publicised a more imaginative approach to coordinating target selection within the alliance.206 Britain offered what has been termed a ‘second centre of strategic decision-making’ within NATO, offering an independent nuclear capability that provided added insurance for the alliance.207 Such arguments encouraged nuclear cooperation, rather than deprivation, within the alliance.208 There was an economic dimension to nuclear relations within the alliance. As the Western European economies became increasingly competitive, they began to produce surpluses, buying large amounts of American gold.209 US deficits subsequently grew in size and the gold supply receded. By the end of the 1950s, a spiral of decline emerged, as chronic deficits made foreign governments and central banks increasingly reluctant to hold dollars.210 Eisenhower eventually addressed the run on the US gold stock by deliberately restraining the domestic economy in order to bring the nation’s international account into equilibrium, thereby reassuring the international monetary system.211 This was a short-term solution, and concern grew about the balance of payments position.212 While devaluation presented a longer-term solution, it threatened international liquidity, potential currency wars and competitive imitations, all the necessary ingredients for a major global depression.213 The US government instead focused on reducing military spending, specifically America’s still large Continental presence. Eisenhower hoped nuclear cooperation would build confidence within the alliance and facilitate the withdrawal of troops stationed in Europe, reducing government expenditure and addressing growing domestic demands for repatriation.214

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Cooperation extended to strategic planning. In late 1957, the British and American governments agreed to co-ordinate nuclear strike plans, focusing on a mix of city and military targets. Over the course of the following two years, a series of detailed reports put growing emphasis on targeting major centres of population in the Soviet Union, focusing on between thirty and forty-four Soviet cities. In the event of a retaliatory strike, estimated deaths reached into the millions. The British government therefore contributed to an alliance strategy based on ‘deterrence through war fighting’, intended to suppress Soviet forces, as well as maintaining a unilateral counter-city strategy.215 Yet, ambiguity persisted in the absence of clear objectives from the British government. Strategy lacked coherence in all areas but one; cost was now the key consideration in nuclear policy.216 In early July 1958, the American and British governments signed the ‘Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defence Purposes’, formalising closer nuclear cooperation.217 The agreement signalled a clear change in the British government’s attitude to a global test ban treaty. By allowing Britain to manufacture nuclear weapons without recourse to testing, Macmillan now wholeheartedly endorsed Eisenhower’s attempts to suspend future tests.218 Additional agreements occurred in the following year, which allowed the British government to buy US component parts of nuclear weapons and any associated systems.219 By mid-1958, privileged information flowed eastward across the Atlantic allowing the British government to continue the development of a sophisticated nuclear force, albeit increasingly entwined with the technological and political preferences of the United States.220 Andrew Pierre suggests that from this point onwards, the British government became at least partially dependent on American satellite intelligence, navigation and radio communications systems, and ‘undoubtedly lost a measure of her strategic independence’.221 Crucially, though, operational independence remained intact. The inability to launch nuclear weapons without permission would be strategically pointless and hugely wasteful.222 Moreover, the British government continued to invest heavily in the nuclear weapons programme and committed itself to a reciprocal nuclear relationship.223

Electing Macmillan In 1959, Macmillan went to the polls. He ran a campaign on the economy, providing the memorable line, ‘[M]ost of our people have never had it so good’.

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The Conservative Party rallied around this platform.224 Nevertheless, by the late 1950s, invisible earnings were less able to play their balancing role as competition eroded sources of income.225 The successful formation of the EEC and its discrimination against British goods weakened exports that were vital to the balance of payments and the stability of sterling. In addition, the return to full convertibility undermined the sterling markets and increased the vulnerability of the pound to speculative short-term capital movements. Foreign governments or private investors could buy sterling more easily, but they could just as easily sell it. Speculators sold sterling because of the expectation, often selffulfilling, that the currency was overvalued. Consequently, from the late 1950s onwards, there were a series of ‘runs on the pound’ where, in each instance, the Bank of England was obliged to intervene in the currency markets in order to support sterling. Each intervention constituted a drain on Britain’s gold and foreign currency reserves. In addition, raising interest rates to attract investors and thus relieve pressure on the reserves had a deflationary effect on the economy, discouraging investment and inhibiting economic growth by raising the domestic cost of borrowing.226 Moreover, while Britons may have never ‘had it so good’, others seemed to be having it better. Unparalleled absolute improvements in material life had taken place against the background of relative economic decline.227 Although the government continued to stress the positive prospect of a doubling of the standard of living, the opposition made explicit use of the comparative data on Britain’s poor economic performance in relation to European neighbours to increase electoral concern with economic growth.228 As shadow chancellor, Wilson skilfully moved declinist rhetoric into the high ground of Labour politics, where a commitment to affluence had previously been ideologically problematic, helping to focus the party.229 In the House of Commons on 16 April 1958, Wilson first linked the state of the economy to nuclear policy, something that would become a recurring theme of his political career. He noted that Britain was becoming a second-rank industrial power, and that membership of the nuclear club could not disguise the country’s real status.230 By the early 1960s, such arguments had so successfully dominated the political landscape that comparative assessments of economic performance became the ‘common currency’ of British politics.231 Despite growing economic concerns, the Conservative Party won the 1959 election decisively. Macmillan now presided over a 100-seat majority in the House of Commons. Defeat plunged the Labour Party into civil war, a situ-

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ation worsened by union frictions, foreign policy tensions, and Gaitskell’s aggressive leadership. Wilson attracted considerable blame. The Labour Party had attempted to prove a strong commitment to sterling and expunge ideas of economic mismanagement. Yet doubts about taxation and ad hoc fixes, alongside the government’s successful handling of recent economic troubles, undermined the opposition’s campaign.232 As the economy garnered more attention, so too did the bomb and the relationship between the two issues. Nuclear weapons had featured prominently in both manifestos. The Labour manifesto noted the repeated ‘blunders in planning and expenditure committed by no fewer than seven Tory Defence Ministers’, and stressed the party’s vigorous opposition to ‘the Government’s dangerously one-sided reliance on nuclear weapons’.233 The Conservative manifesto simply highlighted the government’s belief in deterrence and a commitment to disarmament, ‘subject to a proper system of international inspection and control’.234 The prime minister, however, was well aware of the growing burden of the bomb. Successive Conservative governments had failed to reduce defence spending sufficiently. Economic constraints vied against strategic utility. Treasury officials conflicted with engineers, technicians, and strategists, who sought to provide the most credible nuclear force.235 There was a growing awareness of the costs of the nuclear programme in Whitehall, with serious questions about the necessary levels of investment.236 The growing vulnerability of V-bombers and a reliance on older missile systems increasingly undermined the credibility of British nuclear weapons.237 The shooting down of a U-2 spy plane in May 1960 fostered uncertainty as to whether the V-bomber force could penetrate Soviet anti-aircraft missile defences.238 Continued relevance required further and greater expenditures on nuclear weapon and delivery systems, which, in turn, undermined wider cutbacks to defence spending.239 Growing dependence on nuclear weapons thus occurred as the British government entered a period when such weapons were increasingly beyond its means.240 Britain was the first country to run into serious difficulties maintaining a credible nuclear force, as technology and cost threatened to overpower political will. Since 1955, the British government had invested heavily in an intermediate-range ballistic missile, ‘Blue Streak’, to serve as a credible replacement to the existing V-bomber force.241 More advanced technology had rendered the missile obsolete, while the costs involved in the project had spiralled upwards from the £65 million already spent to an additional £500–600 million. In March, Macmillan and Eisenhower agreed that the British government could

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acquire the US-designed and comparatively affordable Skybolt missile, pending successful development, in order to extend the life of the V-bomber force.242 American Polaris missiles were also an option at the time.243 Launched from a submarine, these would permit the bomb to move into the sea and thus away from the vulnerable British Isles. Nevertheless, concerns about cost and interdepartmental manoeuvring led to the adoption of an airborne missile on 13 April 1960. Skybolt would cost between £76 million and £115 million.244 The decision to purchase Skybolt represented a watershed in British nuclear history. The government chose complete reliance on a foreign power to sustain its nuclear capability.245 Claims of independence were consequently limited to the control, rather than the manufacture, of nuclear weapons. Tensions emerged in the Conservative government, as some backbenchers began to question the value of nuclear weapons and the doctrine of independence. The cancellation of Blue Streak also signalled a reversal in the opposition’s stance on nuclear weapons.246 For the Labour Party, in government and opposition, the bomb had been a necessary investment; now it was simply a costly burden. The Labour leadership argued that they could no longer support the ‘independent deterrent’ rationale, as reliance on US technology rendered it absurd, and stressed the inordinate costs of the nuclear programme.247 This shift was discernible in parliamentary debate following the Blue Streak cancellation. 248 The major parties had now parted ways after a period of broad consensus.249 Labour’s position requires a degree of clarification. Gaitskell argued that the Vbomber force should not be scrapped but not be replaced either. Furthermore, he opposed an independent deterrent but stressed his support for a nucleararmed NATO for as long as the Soviet Union retained nuclear weapons. Wilson cut his nuclear teeth during the ensuing debates, introducing many of the ideas he would use throughout his time as leader of the opposition. He stressed the financial aspects of the situation, castigating the government’s ‘monstrous waste’ of public money on an ‘empty illusion’ and first introduced the slogan ‘so-called deterrent’.250 Wilson subsequently referred to this event as ‘a moment of truth’ for Britain, later comparing the government to ‘a rather pathetic sort of man who cannot afford a television and who cannot bring himself to admit the fact, so he puts up the aerial instead’.251 The opposition’s nuclear policies were in a period of flux. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) had become a mass movement, and increasingly coloured political attitudes, particularly within the Labour Party. Nuclear tensions also reflected deeper problems. After a third electoral defeat, many within

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the party sought to oust Gaitskell and promote a more socialist platform. This was a period of considerable unrest, which left the party increasingly unmanageable.252 In 1960, the party conference rejected Gaitskell’s stance and voted in favour of a motion that called for the ‘unilateral renunciation of the testing, manufacture, stockpiling, and basing of all nuclear weapons in Great Britain’.253 This clash was as much about nuclear politics as it was a struggle for control of the party.254 Indeed, there followed a direct challenge when Wilson stood against Gaitskell for the party leadership. Both men rejected unilateralism, but Wilson, observing the nuances of the debate, stressed hostility to the ‘independent deterrent’ and generated support from unilateralists. It was not enough. On 3 November, the party returned its result. Wilson lost dramatically, 81 to 166.255 The unilateralist’s victory proved to be short-lived. Gaitskell spent a year recovering the party and educating it on defence, pushing towards multilateralism.256 In 1961, the conference reversed its decision.257 The Labour Party supported an end to British nuclear testing, no first use of nuclear weapons, and the abandonment of the bomb—but would only surrender nuclear weapons following internationally agreed measures and would remain in NATO.258 Gaitskell had reasserted his control. Yet tensions persisted and mistrust lingered. In August, Gaitskell established contact with the security services to help indentify secret communists in the party. Interestingly, Wilson was the most senior Labour Party politician on whom the secret service held a file, under the pseudonym of Norman John Worthington. Although Wilson was never suspected of being a crypto-communist, his close connections with the Soviet Union troubled the security services.259 In September, following his failed attempt on the leadership, Gaitskell moved Wilson sideways to become shadow foreign secretary. The motives behind this shift are debatable. It could have been a routine reshuffle or perhaps a malign manoeuvre to weaken his challenger.260 It is tempting to focus on Wilson’s time as shadow foreign secretary and his own diplomatic experience, a reputation he certainly cultivated, when looking to his foreign policies once in office. Wilson, however, was an economist before a diplomat, an important point for his future handling of nuclear diplomacy. His three official visits to Moscow while in government, for instance, had been for trade negotiations. In a confidential interview, a former colleague joked that Wilson admitted that ‘while he knew nothing about foreign affairs, he supposed there would be economic and financial aspects to international questions, and he would just have to concentrate on those’.261 His economic background served him well.

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In a notable speech in early 1961, Wilson had contrasted the government’s waste of £255 million on the Blue Streak programme with its efforts to collect £65 million for the National Health Service.262 He continued these criticisms as he settled into his new role. The United States, he noted, spent more on research and development than Britain’s total defence budget. Wilson resisted the temptation to equate reduced expenditure on nuclear weapons with improvements to social services or tax reductions. He was instead committed to NATO and improvements in conventional forces.263 This position was understandable given recent events. Following the 1961 Berlin crisis and the erection of the Berlin Wall, there had been a reversal of cutbacks to defence.264 Wilson believed that dependence on nuclear weapons undermined NATO by avoiding commitments to essential conventional forces. Moreover, ‘the vain searching for nuclear prestige’ raised ‘the risk of a false step or an over-adventurous Eastern military move being transformed into nuclear war’.265 Wilson’s repeated criticisms concerning the cost of the bomb were a welltimed challenge to the government. Fears about unemployment and the state of the economy had led to increases in public expenditure and tax concessions. The current account deteriorated from a surplus of £350 million in 1958 to a deficit of £237 million in 1960. Confidence in sterling fell away in 1961, especially after the revaluation of the deutsche mark in March and poor trade figures in June. These events revived currency speculation, and a fresh balance of payments crisis developed in the early summer. Attractive rates of interest and doubts about the dollar had previously encouraged an inflow of shortterm funds. Revaluation reversed this flow, as speculators increasingly favoured the deutsche mark. A raft of deflationary measures, assistance from European central banks, and an IMF credit of $2 billion allowed the government to cover large withdrawals.266 Deficits improved but unemployment rose sharply.267 The government was evidently struggling with the economy. Such troubles fuelled the opposition’s criticisms of Macmillan’s economic policies and the value of the bomb. Wilson’s year as shadow foreign secretary also provided the opportunity to establish a line on Europe, a topic that would increasingly influence his political career and the course of British nuclear diplomacy.268 In July 1961, Macmillan launched Britain’s first application for membership of the EEC. The motivations behind this decision remain contentious but reflect a mix of political, diplomatic, and economic factors, not least the changing pattern of imperial and Commonwealth trade.269 Gaitskell attacked the application and used the

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issue to restore relations with the left wing of the Labour Party.270 Despite initial reservations, Wilson also adopted an increasingly anti-EEC line. Motivated by a concern for party unity and fear of German revanchism, he preferred to focus on the importance of the Commonwealth after 1961.271 Nuclear weapons complicated the issue. Exclusive US-UK cooperation on the Skybolt project fuelled French and West German resentment of Britain’s favoured status and threatened further proliferation.272 For Wilson, nuclear weapons made European political cohesion impossible. Britain could not reconcile its views on proliferation with a European community that sought independent nuclear weapons of its own.273 After Blue Streak, the opposition began to claim that the ‘independent deterrent’ encouraged proliferation.274 The Labour Party had proposed ‘a nonnuclear club’ whereby Britain would renounce nuclear weapons if all others, excluding the superpowers, did likewise. Gaitskell had also proposed disengagement in Europe, unifying Germany and creating a neutral buffer between east and west that excluded nuclear weapons.275 Wilson set out his party’s position on proliferation, referring to ‘the so-called independent deterrent’, which he would surrender gladly for the sake of a comprehensive disarmament agreement.276 As the third nuclear power, and now with the opportunity to leave the nuclear game, the Labour leadership felt Britain should create conditions to stop a fourth nuclear power from emerging. Why foreign leaders would follow Britain’s lead was unclear. Such aspirations faded in the glow of the French bomb in early 1960. The British government’s unique negotiating position had evaporated, weakening the link between national and international disarmament.277 In the House of Commons, Macmillan concluded that while he sought abolition, unilateral disarmament would only weaken his negotiating position.278 International progress towards measures of arms control had faded from the political landscape as mistrust repeatedly stifled negotiations between the White House and the Kremlin. The election of President John Kennedy in 1960 offered a fresh start. Events once again conspired against progress. Following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, where US-backed forces attempted to invade communist Cuba, Khrushchev and Kennedy decided to resume testing. In spite of these tensions, and in part driven by Macmillan’s own efforts, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to participate in the newly formed Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) at Geneva in December 1961.279 Macmillan’s efforts appeased growing domestic-political demand for progress towards a test

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ban treaty, which helped to undercut criticism from CND and unilateralists within the Labour Party. In addition, by stigmatising countries who sought to develop nuclear weapons, such a treaty made an important first step towards stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. Progress towards non-proliferation also helped to protect Britain’s exclusive nuclear status and tactfully prohibited West German access to nuclear weapons, without recourse to open discrimination. British nuclear diplomacy thus pursued an agreement to help non-proliferation rather than an effort to ban nuclear testing.280 Later, tensions in Cuba derailed negotiations. Although the Soviets subsequently refused to discuss international control and concentrated solely on securing a partial treaty, which excluded underground tests, negotiations eventually resumed. By the summer of the following year, following agreement to overlook French and Chinese non-adherence, negotiations advanced. On 5 August 1963, the three nuclear powers signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), prohibiting nuclear tests in outer space, in the atmosphere, and under water.281 Despite enjoying considerable progress in international negotiations, new problems emerged for British nuclear diplomacy. Unlike his predecessor, Kennedy sought to discourage independent nuclear deterrents and centralise nuclear control in Washington. Speaking in Ann Arbor in 1962, US secretary of defense Robert McNamara noted that independent nuclear capabilities were ‘expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility’. He subsequently denied that he was talking about the British force, but his comments caused anxiety in London about the future of nuclear interdependence.282 Kennedy also sent a letter to Macmillan stressing his concern that the British nuclear programme encouraged proliferation in France and Germany. 283 Frictions within the US-UK nuclear relationship were increasingly apparent. Relations across the Atlantic came under further strain during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.284 Private negotiations, culminating in the eventual withdrawal of Soviet and US missiles from neighbouring territories, averted nuclear war.285 These events temporarily derailed negotiations for a test ban treaty in Geneva, although it is debatable whether the episode catalysed or complicated diplomacy.286 The handling of the crisis worried the British government. Kennedy made limited efforts to consult Macmillan when making serious decisions about using nuclear weapons.287 Yet the Soviet Union had earmarked several scores of bombs for Britain, ensuring the country’s total destruction.288 The crisis highlighted the limits, but also the closeness, of

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the nuclear relationship.289 Kennedy and Macmillan held detailed telephone discussions during the crisis.290 This perhaps explains why the prime minister handled the crisis so calmly. He did not retire to Turnstile and asserted firm political control over his nuclear war machinery, despite some independent initiative from the Air Staff. Macmillan also held three long cabinet discussions in this period and prepared the economy for the heavy buying of gold and a fall in the value of stocks and shares.291 Gaitskell and George Brown, deputy leader of the Labour Party, were privy to intelligence briefings on the crisis.292 Though Wilson did not enjoy such privileges, he certainly benefitted from events. During the tensions, he showed his mettle as a potential actor on the world stage, criticising US brinkmanship.293 Following a successful television debate with the foreign secretary in October, he gave a powerful speech in the House of Commons later that month, stressing how close the world came to catastrophe. Britain deserved consultation, Wilson protested, not because it was a member of the nuclear club but because the country’s troops stretched perilously and tenuously across many of the danger areas of the world.294 Enjoying popular and party support, Wilson stood for deputy leadership. It remains debatable as to how seriously Wilson believed he could win and how far he was simply marking his card for a future role.295 On 30 October 1962, Brown won 133 to 103. Twice in two years, the Labour Party had rejected Wilson. Lingering mistrust had frustrated his otherwise impressive political progress.296 Much like Wilson, the British government would soon have its confidence punctured. Speaking to the press in early December, McNamara announced the cancellation of the Skybolt missile because of testing problems and eroding strategic credibility. The British government had underestimated or ignored repeated hints of cancellation, resulting in what Pierre describes as ‘the greatest crisis between the two countries since the Suez affair’.297 It is possible that Skybolt provided a useful excuse for restricting or indeed ending Britain’s independent nuclear force.298 Lingering problems including the Congo crisis, the Yemeni civil war, and the Cuban trade embargo had heightened tensions across the Atlantic.299 It seems more likely, though, that recent events in Cuba may well have dulled Kennedy’s political antenna to the sensitivity of the decision, a conclusion substantiated by his subsequent actions.300 There were stark differences between the British government’s public and private attitudes towards the American announcement.301 The British reaction to cancellation reflected confusion, having misunderstood US warning signals,

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and mischief, simulating shock at the cancellation in an effort to obtain a superior weapon.302 The Skybolt crisis, while international, was also domestic in nature.303 By the end of 1962, the Conservative Party was deeply troubled, with its leader under growing scrutiny. Macmillan already faced increasing pressure from the Labour Party about the realities of nuclear independence.304 As the country’s dependence on the United States was exposed, French president Charles de Gaulle stressed his opposition to British entry into EEC. The looming failure of the membership bid was a crushing defeat and raised serious questions about the future of the British economy.305 In contrast to Britain’s economic difficulties, many of the other economies of Western Europe continued to grow.306 Political and economic integration in Europe threatened to further reduce British access to Continental consumers and strengthen emerging competition.307 Moreover, proposed reductions to Britain’s international military presence and the changing nature of the global economy had begun to erode traditional economic relationships with the Commonwealth, most notably in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Australia.308 As money flowed out of British coffers, the Conservative government began to run a massive balance of payments deficit.309 In a downward spiral, the deficits undermined investor confidence in the British economy, which, in turn, reduced faith in the pound, already suffering in the international monetary system.310 Economic difficulties contributed to the growing unpopularity of the Conservative government. Recent by-elections had shown big swings to the Labour Party. Macmillan flew to Nassau to meet with Kennedy to rescue the British nuclear weapons programme as well as his own government.311 The attention bestowed upon the Nassau Conference, held in the Bahaman capital between 18 and 21 December 1962, reflects the importance of the Nassau agreement, or more accurately The Statement on Nuclear Defense Systems, within British nuclear history.312 The resultant eleven-paragraph agreement between Macmillan and Kennedy cemented US-UK strategic interdependence. More specifically, it provided the British government with US Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).313 The organisers originally intended the meeting to focus on the PTBT negotiations, but the British government’s priorities were clear.314 Swiftly rejecting alternative systems, Macmillan pursued the Polaris missile, recognising the value of a sea-based and effectively indestructible second-strike weapon.315 In his memoirs, Macmillan recalls fierce and sometimes painful arguments with Kennedy, which contrasts with claims of a more choreographed diplomatic crisis.316 Earlier scholarship suggests that

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agreement stemmed from Kennedy’s desire to assuage fears of a growing Atlantic rift. The close personal relationship between the two leaders, the limited direct financial return to the United States, and the fifth paragraph’s explicit reference to ‘political cohesion’ lend this interpretation an air of credibility.317 Recent scholarship, however, convincingly tempers the conclusion that the British government emotionally blackmailed a reluctant American delegation.318 Macmillan’s appeals to Kennedy about the collapse of the Conservative government may have evoked personal sympathy, but anxiety about a Labour government’s impact on European cohesion and alliance defence commitments were more pressing concerns.319 America’s own needs certainly played a key role in the negotiations. Repeated references to the alliance, highlighted in the latter half of the document, reveal a significant strategic concession. Macmillan had agreed to discuss a Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF) within NATO, tying the British Polaris fleet into a wider alliance force. A combination of slack American staff work and skilful British diplomacy left Macmillan’s commitment ambiguous.320 Beyond the suggestion of multinational, rather than multilateral, frameworks in the ninth paragraph, the agreement’s reference to ‘supreme national interests’, a clause whereby Britain could remove itself from any nuclear force in certain circumstances, further clouded the issue of nuclear sharing.321 In addition to Polaris missiles, the United States provided the British government with launching systems, components of communications equipment, and even high-grade steel for the submarines. Despite these changes, the prime minister retained complete control over the use of nuclear weapons. In early 1962, Conservative ministers had agreed to unilateral targeting plans focusing on fifteen major city targets in the Soviet Union. Nassau led to a re-evaluation. By late 1963, the Joint Intelligence Committee recommended targeting only five cities, a decision motivated by the new economic realities before Britain and its ability to produce only four to five Polaris submarines.322 US-UK strategic plans also remained in place, undergoing occasional revision.323 Macmillan, like his successors, would make every effort to maximize British nuclear independence.324 Nevertheless, the future of the Polaris programme was now tied into broader debates about ‘nuclear sharing’ within the alliance.325 The concept of an internationally crewed, or ‘mixed-manned’, surface fleet with access to nuclear weapons had originated in the late 1950s and evolved through the early 1960s.326 The MLF was an American proposal designed to provide other members of the alliance with a say in nuclear policy, which the United States hoped would overcome growing concerns about NATO nuclear

46 A British Bomb

guarantees and dissuade non–nuclear weapon states from acquiring such weapons.327 Non-nuclear weapon states in Western Europe, and the FRG in particular, desired massive nuclear retaliation triggered by a tripwire on their eastern frontier. This was psychologically comforting, but also respected the military superiority of the Soviet Union’s conventional forces. In contrast to Eisenhower, who was prepared to respond to conventional threats with a nuclear strike, Kennedy desired a more graduated approach to deterrence. A ladder of nuclear escalation left full-scale nuclear exchange as a last resort.328 By giving US allies a voice in nuclear strategy, the MLF could therefore help to stem West German ambitions for nuclear weapons and overcome objections from within NATO about what would come to known as ‘flexible response’.329 Curiously overlooked by most nuclear historians were the economic motivations behind the MLF, and the Nassau agreement more broadly, as the US government attempted to balance monetary policy and European defence.330 Indeed, Kennedy admitted that nuclear weapons and the balance of payments deficit were the two issues that most scared him.331 Inheriting Eisenhower’s difficulties, the Kennedy administration suffered from growing deficits as well as a drain of dollars and gold. The president believed he could manage these problems by reducing government expenditures abroad, specifically troops stationed in West Germany, rather than enacting unpalatable trade and capital controls. Furthermore, Kennedy worried that the countries that benefitted most from American military protection—namely, France and West Germany—might use growing payments surpluses to compel changes to US security policies in Europe.332 As Francis Gavin explains, ‘Monetary pressure became a tool for each side to signal their intentions and bring about desired outcomes. The French and the West Germans signalled their unhappiness with Kennedy’s security policies by cashing in dollars for gold or by abrogating arrangements . . . that were meant to ease the U.S. dollar and gold drain’.333 These economic challenges, though troubling, deserve a degree of context. The existence of persistent deficits for a quarter of a century highlights American power. Moreover, dependence on US nuclear protection to counterbalance the Soviet threat framed all tensions within the alliance.334 Dollar diplomacy was understandable. The FRG was heavily reliant on US largesse, having no general staff and being unable to conduct independent national defence planning. The West German government therefore tried to impress its own strategic preferences through recourse to its economic power and, more passively, by stressing its importance as a military buffer between the

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superpowers in Europe.335 American troops therefore remained in Europe to maintain peace between the superpowers but also to avoid tensions within the alliance.336 These alliance tensions form the backdrop to debates about nuclear sharing. The MLF was a tool for the Kennedy administration to facilitate the withdrawal of US troops and stabilise the American economy, without exacerbating military and monetary difficulties in the alliance or encouraging a German bomb that could undermine détente.337 Washington and London subsequently managed to achieve an ‘offset agreement’ with Bonn, whereby the West German government would purchase American or British military equipment to offset the exchange costs of keeping forces stationed in Europe.338 This helped both countries’ balance of payments and strengthened West Germany’s capacity to fight a conventional war.339 The Berlin crisis, and American offers of major deployments to assist the West German government, overcame reservations about reliance on conventional forces and facilitated offset negotiations.340 By early 1962, the Federal Republic of Germany had signed an offset agreement that, alongside a series of sophisticated defences for the US dollar and gold supply, led to improvements in American and British deficits. The United States continued to lose gold at a substantial rate, though, which underlined the importance of eliminating the deficit and pursuing further reductions to defence expenditure.341 Monetary stability still relied on the goodwill of the European surplus countries. Kennedy understood these issues when he met Macmillan in Nassau at the end of the year. The inclusion of the MLF tied Britain’s nuclear force into broader alliance debates about economic and military security. Both sides thus left the Bahamas with a degree of satisfaction. Kennedy had made significant progress towards a NATO multilateral force, whilst Macmillan had secured the future of the British nuclear weapons programme.342 In Nassau, plans for a multilateral force were only half formed; London doubted that Washington took them seriously.343 Nevertheless, the US government was serious, and renewed its efforts in Bonn and Paris immediately afterward.344 Many initial reactions to the MLF were negative. The governments of France, Norway, Canada, Portugal, and Denmark rejected participation.345 The Soviet and British governments, as well as the Labour Party, were similarly opposed to nuclear sharing, fearing it would undermine measures of non-proliferation and place a ‘German finger on the trigger’.346 The Conservative government was particularly uncomfortable with plans for the MLF that had evolved to include a mixed-manned surface fleet of twenty-five ships armed with Polaris

48 A British Bomb

missiles.347 The idea of international crews sharing control over British nuclear weapons was anathema to most British politicians. The FRG welcomed the proposal. Keen to reduce defence expenditures in Europe without risking the danger of a nuclear West Germany, the United States pressed Britain for cooperation on the MLF.348 Macmillan had secured a good deal with inexpensive terms, but many members of his own party believed that acquiescence to a NATO force surrendered nuclear independence.349 The Labour Party’s response to the Nassau Conference was largely hostile. Labour frontbenchers questioned the cost of, and the need for, Polaris missiles and queried the government’s ambiguous commitment to a multilateral force as a condition of the agreement.350 Debates about independence after Nassau were somewhat belated. The abandonment of Blue Streak was when the government first began to favour partial dependency, promoting affordability above independence.351 Despite the difficulties of the negotiations, Macmillan kept his full cabinet informed of his progress in Nassau via telegrams and a special cabinet meeting, although the crisis atmosphere precluded a lengthy debate about the merits of remaining a nuclear power.352 Regardless of estimates that put the cost of a four-boat submarine force at £220 million over seven years, the cabinet supported Macmillan.353 After the Nassau conference, Macmillan was anxious about the durability of the agreement and seriously considered alternatives if the agreement fell apart.354 Nassau better represented a diplomatic agreement rather than a technical contract; very little had been decided in detail.355 Concrete details would only emerge in the Polaris Sales Agreement of the following year. Although a cost review ruled out developing an alternative delivery system, it seems likely that even if Nassau had unravelled, the government would probably have maintained some kind of air-launched missile.356 On 3 January 1963, Macmillan led a discussion with the full cabinet. Hiding his anxieties, he defended the decision to acquire the Polaris missile and the shift from nuclear independence to interdependence. The US monopoly, he argued, was undesirable within NATO, and Britain required its own nuclear force should the US government ever waver. Moreover, without a bomb, the British government would be without influence in future arms limitation talks. The cabinet supported its leader.357 Nevertheless, the future of the British nuclear weapons programme was not yet certain. Because of the lengthy construction process, the decision to sustain the Polaris programme would fall to the victor of the next general election.

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Conclusion Resilience characterises British nuclear history. Successive post-war prime ministers protected the country’s nuclear capability against spiralling costs, mounting technical challenges, and growing public scrutiny. Like his predecessors, Wilson would grapple with nuclear diplomacy in the context of shifting international relations and economic stability. Closer links are discernible. Wilson would adopt Attlee’s preference for secrecy in nuclear policy-making and his commitment to measures of international control. Legacies also transcended party lines. Churchill’s interest in the bomb as an economic tool and Macmillan’s commitment to interdependence clearly framed Wilson’s own approach to nuclear diplomacy. Perhaps the most obvious inheritance was the bomb itself. Wilson ultimately assumed his predecessors’ staunch commitment to the British nuclear weapons programme. Nevertheless, Wilson’s leadership represents a decisive period in British nuclear history. He faced much greater pressure for change from within his party and from without than any of his predecessors. Although Attlee had pursued the bomb in difficult times, Wilson would not have the luxury of public and party ignorance that his predecessor had enjoyed. Nor could he rely on the broad and consistent support for nuclear weapons that typified Conservative government. Many in the Labour Party saw the bomb as a military liability and a financial burden. Wilson, like all of his precursors, would fight to sustain investment in the nuclear weapons programme. The economic difficulties of the 1950s, however, pale in comparison to the balance of payments problems and currency crises of the 1960s. Alongside new economic pressures were unique diplomatic commitments. More so than any of his predecessors, international obligations impinged on Wilson’s approach to nuclear diplomacy. The key challenge came in the form of nuclear sharing within NATO. Macmillan may have brokered the Nassau agreement, but Wilson would have to live with its consequences. He would be the first prime minister to endure sustained pressure from the US government to collectivise the British nuclear force. Beyond US-UK relations, international circumstances were evolving. As a period of superpower detente emerged, many of the lingering obstacles to a non-proliferation treaty faded from the political landscape. This newfound opportunity complemented Wilson’s long-standing commitment to nonproliferation. In contrast, Attlee, Churchill, Eden, and Macmillan had all been frustrated in their efforts to establish international controls over atomic energy.

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Wilson became the first prime minister with the opportunity and inclination to pursue an international non-proliferation treaty. His handling of nuclear diplomacy whilst in office consequently represents an historical watershed. That economic crises, interdependence, and non-proliferation still frame international nuclear politics today underlines his legacy. Wilson would usher British nuclear history into the modern era.

2

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h e G en er a l El ec t i o n o f 19 6 4 was a closely fought race. Despite a wafer thin majority in the House of Commons, Harold Wilson led the Labour Party back to power after more than thirteen years out of office. An important component of Wilson’s success in keeping his party united, and therefore electorally viable, was his handling of nuclear politics on the domestic and international stage. The extant body of literature considering the nuclear policies of the Labour government between 1964 and 1970 continues to grow.1 It is somewhat surprising that historians, with the exception of Wilson’s biographers, have focused so little attention on the Labour Party’s nuclear policies prior to taking power.2 Consideration of the twenty-month period between Wilson becoming leader of the opposition in February 1963 and the General Election of October 1964 sheds light on how Wilson balanced his own approach to nuclear policy with the demands of the party, domestic politics, and broader diplomatic constraints. Wilson sought to satisfy the disparate needs of the party, often at the expense of a more conciliatory position with Washington and Bonn during negotiations concerning nuclear weapons. Diplomacy focused principally on the sharing of nuclear weapons between allied states in the form of a multilateral nuclear force. Publicly and privately, Wilson vigorously argued against any future commitment to nuclear sharing and instead stressed the need for measures of non-proliferation and greater European influence on US nuclear strategy. None of this is to suggest that the future prime minister intended to adopt 51

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such a limited international role or restrictive negotiating stance once in office. Wilson’s rhetoric on nuclear diplomacy enjoyed the luxury of opposition, unencumbered by the responsibilities of government and largely motivated by the need for party unity and electoral success. Nevertheless, international pressures, specifically the fear of an exclusive nuclear alliance between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, and therefore West German access to nuclear weapons, eventually led Wilson to produce several subtle caveats to his negotiating position with Washington. Yet to his domestic audience, the leader of the opposition repeatedly downplayed such diplomatic subtleties. Woven into these broader issues of nuclear diplomacy was the question of whether the Labour Party would sustain the Polaris programme. The Nassau Conference, held in the Bahaman capital between 18 and 21 December 1962, led to an agreement between Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan and President John Kennedy that provided the British government with US Polaris submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).3 This allowed the replacement of the existing V-bomber force with a number of submarines that would provide an effective nuclear capability over the coming decades.4 Because of the lengthy construction process, a Labour government would still have to decide whether it would sustain the Polaris programme. Wilson’s position on this matter was complex and shifted among different audiences. In London, he candidly suggested that the party would defer a decision until after the election and offered only ambiguous criticisms of existing nuclear policy, focused on the issues of independence and cost. This helped to circumvent divisions within the party and strengthen his own electoral position, without necessarily committing to the programme’s cancellation. In private meetings in Washington, however, Wilson repeatedly stated his intention to renounce nuclear weapons. Such claims were most likely attempts to extract concessions from the wider Atlantic alliance, contrasting with public efforts in London to avoid commitment and ensure future room for manoeuvre. This period also highlights Wilson’s recognition of nuclear weapons’ wider economic value. Stressing the costs of the Polaris programme at home and abroad complemented efforts to highlight the Conservative government’s perceived mishandling of the national economy.5 Yet Wilson did not cancel the Polaris programme. The question of when he decided against cancellation has produced a slight but lingering division within the existing historiography. Some authors suggest that the leader of the opposition was unsure and delayed a decision prior to taking office, although the

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veracity of several memoirs supporting this view is questionable.6 Other historians claim that he formed a preference for retaining the Polaris programme prior to taking office.7 Despite largely supporting the latter interpretation, Wilson’s ambiguous rhetoric, and the flexibility that opposition afforded him, should temper confidence in any straightforward assessment of his attitude to nuclear weapons.

The Labour Party and Nuclear Weapons The Labour Party faced an immediate problem in early 1963. On 18 January, Hugh Gaitskell, the party’s leader, died. By this time, Wilson was a considerable force within the party. On news of Gaitskell’s death, he immediately prepared to fight for the leadership.8 It was still not entirely clear how Wilson would handle nuclear policy. In the 1950s, he had revealed his support for an ‘independent deterrent’, an ambiguous term typically referring to a nationally controlled arsenal of nuclear weapons, and his antipathy to the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.9 By the early 1960s, a more nuanced position had emerged. Wilson stressed his doubts as to the notion of an ‘independent deterrent’, recognising US-UK nuclear interdependence, but was also firm in his opposition to unilateral nuclear disarmament and West German access to nuclear arms.10 Such careful positioning provided Wilson with a broader base of support in the party, and subtly allowed him to differentiate himself from his political rivals. Wilson secured the party leadership without great difficulty in February.11 The result was somewhat of a surprise. Weak opposition and Wilson’s transformation into a unity candidate overcame a reputation for divisiveness and opportunism.12 Although somewhat calmed since the Conferences of 1960 and 1961, lingering tensions on matters of defence still threatened to undermine his position. In a private diary entry, Labour MP Michael Stewart noted, ‘Harold became the leader and by universal consent does well . . . . We still have to watch the defence issue—which despite the powerful tide in our favour, could still destroy W[ilson]’.13 Stewart, who would become Wilson’s foreign secretary, clearly recognised the seriousness of the nuclear difficulties that the leader of the opposition had inherited. Wilson, like Gaitskell before him, sought to keep the party united and electorally viable. Unlike his predecessor, however, he studiously avoided confrontation on the matters of disarmament that had so dominated the party conferences of 1960 and 1961.14 Above all else, he sought party unity. Wilson was, as

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Peter Hennessy aptly explains, ‘first and last a party man; everything would be sacrificed to that central requirement’.15 He made numerous efforts to appease competing factions within the party during 1963.16 Although in terms of ideology, policy, and organization, Labour’s long-term political strategy did not change significantly between 1959 and 1964, there was a subtle degree of change in nuclear policy at the highest level.17 Wilson brought nuclear critics into his shadow cabinet, encouraged those within the party who supported CND to downplay unilateralism, and assigned former supporters of Gaitskell to prominent front bench positions.18 Wilson’s leadership therefore displayed a pragmatic commitment to party unity. Although failing to address its lingering and seemingly intractable divisions, paradoxically, under Wilson the Labour Party became more unified.19 His triumph reflected, at least in part, his own skill as a leader. Much of Wilson’s success in reconciling these nuclear divisions, however, was due to events outside of his control. The relative improvement in East-West relations following the Cuban Missile Crisis, the signing of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, and the subsequent decline in support for CND all helped to calm tensions.20 These factors, and various compromises within the party, also had a profound impact on Labour’s approach to nuclear weapons in opposition. The waning of CND and the success of the PTBT meant that the Labour Party could no longer rely on fears of annihilation to garner domestic support for its criticisms of the Conservative government’s nuclear policies.21 Instead, public criticism focused on the two related areas of cost and independence. The first of these, and frequently overlooked by historians, was the cost of the Polaris programme. Shortly after Wilson took leadership of the party, Patrick Gordon Walker, shadow secretary of state for foreign affairs, made the Labour Party’s position very clear in the House of Commons: ‘[We] must at last reach a clear-cut decision to end the hopelessly extravagant and wasteful attempt to maintain a British independent nuclear deterrent’.22 The Polaris programme would prove to be a relatively minor part of the defence budget. Nevertheless, such challenges complemented broader criticisms of the struggling British economy, and subtly tied in to assumptions of relative economic decline that drove the opposition’s modernisation platform.23 Indeed, this period represents the zenith of ‘declinism’, following the publication of a number of books and articles analysing British economic decline and failure.24 Most criticism focused on the difficulties with the country’s balance of payments. The Labour Party characterised the problem as the Conservative gov-

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ernment’s failure to export enough to pay for its imports. The problem was much more complicated. Britain’s long-standing reliance on imports meant that the visible balance was in deficit. Jim Tomlinson notes that there was some room for optimism. Surpluses from the invisible balance, which recognises other goods such as shipping and overseas investment, and the private invisible balance—namely, commercial transactions—meant that Britain was exporting enough to pay for its imports.25 Yet the official balance reflects a considerable deficit. The problem lay with government spending, a major component being international defence commitments. The scale of Britain’s foreign investments, which made the government anxious to defend its financial stakes abroad, and alliance pressure on Britain to retain an international military role inhibited withdrawal.26 Although seemingly counterintuitive, greater expenditure on nuclear weapons could still be rationalised. Putting political and strategic motivations to one side, the Polaris programme was a minor part of the defence budget. Moreover, many senior ministers believed that a nuclear force would actually help to make a number of efficiencies in defence spending. Following electoral victory, the Labour government seriously considered using the proposed Polaris force to extract military and economic concessions from the United States.27 Wilson believed that a commitment of Polaris submarines or V-bombers could facilitate the release of forces presently committed to Western Europe, which he could then redeploy for other defence obligations. Nevertheless, during his time as leader of the opposition, Wilson used the evident costs of the Polaris programme and difficulties with the balance of payments to stress the government’s mismanagement of the economy. The opposition’s second criticism of the government’s nuclear policies focused on the perceived notion of independence. This was, according to Labour frontbenchers, erroneous given that any future nuclear force would be reliant on US missiles. George Brown, deputy leader of the Labour Party, combined both criticisms in early March 1963: ‘Polaris may come off, but it is still an expensive pretence because it can never be independent in any genuine sense of the word and it will cost us an enormous sum of money’.28 This position was somewhat disingenuous. The British government always maintained strategic autonomy, and Wilson would go on to successfully protect the independence of the Polaris force. All the same, such rhetoric was popular within the party, and, significantly, avoided any firm commitment as to what a Labour government would do once in power.

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The Labour Party leadership was open about deferring a decision on Polaris until after the election. Wilson’s private papers, only recently available to scholars, are revealing.29 As early as April 1963, less than two months after securing the leadership of the Labour Party, Wilson admitted in an interview: We certainly wouldn’t dump the warheads into the sea, or the ‘V’ bombers or anything of that kind. Remember, we can’t take a decision until we are the government. If we become the government, we have to see much more about the defence situation than parliament has so far been told, but our present thinking is that we would do nothing to maintain by new action, new order, new weapons, the British deterrent.30

A range of party members, including his future foreign and defence secretaries, writing before and after taking office, agreed that Wilson could only make such a decision after the election.31 Even the American embassy noted that ‘Labor [sic] has never flatly stated it would abandon the Polaris programme, but had adopted a wait and see approach’.32 Denis Healey, shadow secretary of state for defence, candidly remarks in his memoirs that the Labour Party gave the impression that it would actually abandon Polaris if it won power but avoided any formal commitment on the matter.33 During an American television interview in April, the host repeatedly asked Wilson if the renunciation of nuclear weapons would not commit Britain to the status of a second-class military power. Wilson repeatedly denied the claim but eventually conceded, ‘If being a firstrate military power means being a nuclear power, that is right’.34 Throughout this twenty-month period, the opposition’s public stance on nuclear weapons was thus consistently one of criticism over content. Discussions within the Labour Party about the role of nuclear weapons also ventured on to the international stage. Tied into questions about the future of the Polaris programme were broader debates about ‘nuclear sharing’, or a multilateral nuclear force, within NATO. The concept of an internationally crewed surface fleet with access to nuclear weapons had originated in the late 1950s and evolved through the early 1960s.35 The MLF was an American proposal designed to provide other members of the alliance with a say in nuclear policy, which the United States hoped would overcome growing concerns about NATO nuclear guarantees and dissuade non–nuclear weapon states from acquiring such weapons.36 The MLF issue, and consequently relations with the United States, would come to dominate British nuclear diplomacy during Wilson’s time in opposition and his early years in office.37

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Following the Franco-German Treaty of Collaboration, or Élysée Treaty, of January 1963, Washington redoubled its efforts as fears grew of an exclusive Franco-German partnership that would undermine a strong and united Western alliance.38 Nevertheless, the MLF faced a myriad of difficulties, not least translating an ostensibly political idea into a functional strategic reality. There also remained considerable unease in London about West German participation in any such scheme.39 Suspicions of West German revanchism, the dilution of Britain’s exclusive nuclear status, and fears of encouraging nuclear proliferation all played their part. Furthermore, by proposing a major strategic rebalancing throughout Europe, the MLF increasingly strained relations with France and the Soviet Union.40 The Labour Party was acutely aware of these tensions and shared the British government’s distrust of the proposal.41 During talks with Kennedy in 1963, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan cautiously attempted to navigate these difficulties.42 He agreed that the British government would participate in a feasibility study for the MLF, but ‘without prejudice to the question of British participation in the force’.43 Implicit in London’s position was the hope that continued delay would gradually reduce the political momentum behind the MLF.44 The wider Conservative government was also largely resistant to the proposal. Foreign Secretary Lord Home, who would later renounce his peerage in order to become prime minister following Macmillan’s resignation, remained at best ambivalent.45 The Ministry of Defence was opposed to any form of cooperation, and argued that the force was expensive and vulnerable to attack. The Foreign Office was also initially sceptical of the MLF. It felt that the proposal would only harm East-West relations, particularly sensitive in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Senior officials in the Foreign Office, however, would eventually go on to stress the need to participate with the MLF in order to avoid a strictly West German–US nuclear partnership or British exclusion from any future nuclear force.46 To be sure, an exclusive partnership threatened to undermine or dilute the ‘special’ US-UK nuclear relationship, and touched on historical concerns about German military power.47 Exclusion from any future force would also curtail British influence on NATO nuclear policy, which the possession of nuclear weapons had so far secured. Moreover, outright rejection of the MLF could have required revision to the Nassau agreement, threatening its already generous terms.48 In public, the Labour Party was critical of the MLF, but generally avoided firm commitments on the future of the proposal. Healey, for example, argued

58 The Ambiguities of Opposition

in the House of Commons that the MLF was wasteful and ineffective, but that this might not be enough to condemn it.49 In private, most senior members of the Labour Party were vehemently opposed to the proposal.50 Criticism of nuclear sharing played an important role within the party. Gordon Walker would later explain that a Labour government would need to build a close relationship with West Germany: ‘[On] this we may have some trouble with the left wing of the party. This can be offset by strong opposition to the MLF’.51 The interaction between party concerns and foreign policy was therefore important to the course of nuclear diplomacy. In the House of Commons on 4 March 1963, Healey stated that he would abandon Polaris and rejected the need for a multilateral nuclear force. He instead proposed a NATO nuclear deterrent and a more intimate consultation between America and her allies on matters of nuclear cooperation.52 Here, then, were glimmers of the Nuclear Planning Group that the Labour government would subsequently pursue in office.53 Foreshadowing future debates over ‘flexible response’, he also noted that, in return for Britain’s securing a greater share in the control of the US nuclear force, strategic changes were necessary in Western Europe. Healey continued, ‘[We] on our side of the Atlantic must be prepared to reduce America’s liability to use her nuclear forces by raising the threshold at which N.A.T.O. is compelled to use atomic weapons in response to a conventional attack’.54 Even at this high price, nuclear consultation remained favourable to measures of nuclear sharing. These comments also perhaps respect the lingering influence of radical proposals by Gaitskell and Healey for the exclusion of nuclear weapons in Central Europe.55 In March 1963, Gordon Walker met US diplomat Livingston Merchant. Gordon Walker was clear that the Labour government would take Britain out of the nuclear field by allowing the V-bomber force to run down without replacement, putting the savings into conventional forces. He also suggested that there was no need to maintain nuclear weapons, as the United States would provide nuclear support to the alliance. It would therefore be odd for a Labour government to put additional money into a collective deterrent ‘of which it would gravely doubt the value’. Moreover, he considered the MLF inherently unnecessary because international commentators had overstated West German desires for nuclear weapons.56 Evidently, cooperation with the United States on the Polaris programme and nuclear sharing appeared to be much less important to the Labour Party than to the Conservative government. Wilson met Walt Rostow, head of the US Policy Planning Council, in Wash-

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ington on 30 March.57 Rostow reported of Wilson: ‘The maintenance of a world position for Britain on a conventional basis, in his view, is more important than moving expensively or pretentiously forward in the nuclear field’. Wilson had instead focused his attentions on a non-proliferation treaty and greater measures of alliance consultation. Undeterred, Rostow concluded that Wilson ‘would jump with both feet into the MLF’ because it would give the British a say in alliance nuclear control vis-à-vis the West Germans and save money on his defence budget.58 Wilson had exhibited a strong desire for control in any future nuclear alliance, and, given the precarious state of the economy, he was keen to reduce defence expenditure. Yet as his actions over the following months reveal, Wilson was not convinced that the MLF was the best way to achieve these objectives. The leader of the opposition was, at this time, more concerned with party unity, rather than transatlantic commitments on which he had little influence. Wilson could address international issues when he took office; if he failed to win the next election it would not be his problem. As Ben Pimlott summarises eloquently: ‘An Opposition Leader in the British system has many tasks: to keep the faith, inspire the troops, maintain unity; give a policy lead. The most important is to win. Everything depends on that simple, clinical achievement of a House of Commons majority’.59 Wilson needed a united and effective party to realise victory. An uncompromising approach to nuclear diplomacy was, at this time, a largely unproblematic boon to this one objective. Gordon Walker met with senior elements of the US government at the end of May 1963. In an early meeting with Merchant on 29 May, Gordon Walker criticised the MLF on economic grounds, suggesting that it involved a levy paid by allies to the United States for part of the cost of its own nuclear weapons.60 In a subsequent discussion, Rostow informed Gordon Walker that if necessary, the United States would go along with West Germany alone. In response, Gordon Walker threatened to join an exclusively European nuclear programme, and warned that the United States should not underestimate the consequences of cooperating with West Germany alone.61 Gordon Walker later spoke with Kennedy and again suggested that a Labour government would let its weapons run down in exchange for a share in US nuclear policy. In an effort to promote delay, he posed a very simple question. ‘Why not wait until after the election? If we lost we would have no more to say. If we won and we could not win German acceptance of our policy, we would then accept the MLF was the only way to handle Germany and would no longer stand in the way’.62

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Gordon Walker later spoke with US secretary of defense Robert McNamara. He informed McNamara that there could be no equality in NATO until the FRG was on a nuclear par with Britain. Thus Labour intended to leave ‘the deterrent business’, and let the United States have control of nuclear policy in return for ‘an intimate voice’ on nuclear control. Again, then, there are glimmers of the non-physical measures of nuclear weapons cooperation such as consultative arrangements between alliance members that the Labour government would subsequently pursue in office. Gordon Walker asked McNamara to delay a decision while Labour tried to push through this policy. As Andrew Priest explains, in turning conventional wisdom on its head, a lack of nuclear weapons gave the Labour Party bargaining power.63 During his time in Washington, a subtle change in Gordon Walker’s position emerged. In his meeting with Merchant, he admitted that if after renegotiating Nassau it was still not possible to achieve assurances from the West German government that they would not seek nuclear weapons, then the Labour government ‘would throw itself whole heartedly into the MLF’.64 Similarly, he promised Dean Rusk, US secretary of state, he would keep an open mind on the issue.65 Recent events in Bonn help to explain Gordon Walker’s comments. Only one month earlier, the West German cabinet had formally decided to join the MLF, and agreed to meet 30 percent of the overall costs.66 Moreover, on 6 April, Gordon Walker had met with Gerhard Schröder, West German foreign minister, and admitted that if the MLF was the only way of keeping FRG out of nuclear temptation, he would look at it seriously.67 Schröder subsequently told Gordon Walker on 31 May that Bonn was committed to the MLF. He had also stressed that there was growing interest in a nuclear deal with France.68 West German perseverance therefore troubled the Labour leadership. Any lingering hopes of disengagement in Central Europe had been wholly undermined.69 Concerns about West German proliferation had evidently begun to influence Labour’s nuclear diplomacy, albeit subtly and only in private discussion with US officials. The Labour Party may have been critical of the proposal, but Gordon Walker was unwilling to renounce future involvement. Healey would also concede that if other courses remained blocked and the MLF came into existence, Labour would rather join than not.70 Despite these caveats, the remainder of the year passed with Wilson sniping at the MLF concept, and repeating his assertion that it was based on the flawed assumption that the FRG desired nuclear weapons.71 In conversation with the Soviet leadership in June, Wilson and Gordon Walker stressed their opposition to the MLF and emphasised their

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desire to give up nuclear weapons for a share of US decision-making.72 The Labour Party as a whole was, and would remain, deeply critical of the proposal.73 Labour’s criticisms contrasted with the efforts of the Conservative government. Driven by a desire to avoid an exclusive West German–US nuclear alliance, or to ensure British inclusion in any future nuclear force that might follow, it developed a counterproposal to the MLF. Peter Thorneycroft, secretary of state for defence, brought the idea forward during a NATO ministerial meeting in December 1963. Although the ‘Thorneycroft Proposal’ conceded British involvement in the MLF, it utilized land-based missiles and aircraft, removing the submarine element and replacing it with V-bombers. By offering only existing weapons, it reduced costs and kept the Polaris fleet independent. Thorneycroft’s proposal was widely perceived by the United States as a calculated attempt to delay the MLF, and was largely damaging to the British government’s effort to slow negotiations.74 In the following weeks, the US government made it clear that without British participation the United States would go on with West Germany alone.75 There were thus major international constraints operating on British nuclear policy-making. It would be a mistake to transfer all of these concerns onto the opposition. By the close of 1963, such difficulties appear to have had only limited bearing on Wilson’s nascent nuclear policy. None of this is to suggest that the leader of the opposition had not recognised the need to preserve Britain’s favoured status with the United States and, equally important, to maintain strong relations within the broader NATO alliance.76 Accepting some antiAmericanism within the party, much of Labour viewed their ally fondly.77 Nor was the Labour leadership ignorant of the FRG’s nuclear aspirations. Wilson was instead more concerned with party unity, rather than transatlantic commitments over which he had little influence. These concerns were well founded. In October 1963, following Macmillan’s resignation, Douglas-Home, rather reluctantly, became the leader of the Conservative government.78 By December, it was clear that the prime minister sought to expose divisions within the Labour Party over nuclear weapons.79

The Evolution of Policy By 1964, the nuclear debate remained highly polarised. Questions of cost and strategic independence remained the focus of Wilson’s critique of Conservative nuclear policy, while Douglas-Home repeatedly stressed that the future

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of British security and national pride was at stake.80 Beyond accentuating one another’s differences for future electoral benefit, such exaggerated positions served to obscure the tensions within both parties. Just as the Conservatives wished to downplay internal anxieties regarding nuclear dependence on the United States, Labour sought to conceal its lingering divisions over defence, and particularly nuclear, policy.81 Wilson’s continued criticisms of Douglas-Home’s calls for nuclear independence might, upon first glance, appear somewhat counterintuitive. In his memoirs, Healey even suggests that this political stance meant that the Labour government later won the election in spite of their position on the national deterrent.82 The most convincing explanation for this policy is that the leader of the opposition simply made the best of the political situation in which he found himself. Such an interpretation respects Wilson’s pragmatic, or opportunistic, style of leadership.83 Not only did Wilson’s political posture help to keep his party united, but it also encouraged a valuable perception of an alternative to the Conservative’s defence policy. In private conversation with Richard Neustadt, advisor to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Wilson allegedly said that ‘he had little to lose by taking this line as he could not compete with Douglas-Home for the “jingo vote”’.84 Looking beyond the public rhetoric, three events in February 1964 suggest that the New Year had brought a shift in Wilson’s attitude towards nuclear diplomacy: the creation of a strategy team on Labour’s nuclear weapons policy; a private meeting on matters of defence with the government; and a revealing announcement in the House of Commons. Each of these events revealed Wilson’s desire to keep his options open, and they are worth exploring in more detail. Beginning with the first, Pimlott claims that Wilson asked Brown to chair a nuclear working group.85 Brown actually suggested the idea, in reaction to recent criticism from the government about Labour’s nuclear policies.86 Nevertheless, Wilson agreed and stressed ‘the importance of not adding any further opportunity to our opponents to say that our defence policy is in a state of confusion’.87 Wilson’s willingness to reconsider Labour’s nuclear policies was likely motivated by Douglas-Home’s decision to fight the election on the issue of nuclear weapons. Moreover, many in the party, including Wilson, mistakenly believed that an election in May 1964 was probable.88 An expansionary budget in 1963 had triggered a recovery, and the government thus postponed an election to benefit from this prosperity. Improvement came at a cost. The

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balance of payments moved into heavy deficit, which soon became something of a gift for the opposition.89 Equally important, in light of the recent and wellpublicised failure of Thorneycroft’s proposals, Wilson now accepted the need to avert an exclusive West German and US partnership and to ensure British inclusion in any potential nuclear force. The second event to suggest a shift in Wilson’s attitude towards nuclear diplomacy was a confidential meeting between Healey and Thorneycroft on 3 February. After their talk, Thorneycroft informed the prime minister that ‘the Opposition’s main anxiety was to learn more about what, in the way of greater control over other people’s deterrents, they could expect to gain in return for the existing British deterrent which they hope to take over and use as a bargaining counter’.90 Hennessy suggests that Healey had proposed the idea of pooling British Polaris submarines with a similar contribution from the United States inside a NATO nuclear force.91 It is, however, equally possible that Healey discussed the concept of surrendering the Polaris force in return for a greater say in NATO nuclear policy. Indeed, only weeks later Healey would explain that he still thought the MLF ‘a non-starter and nuclear consultation and planning with NATO was a better way forward’.92 It would be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of this particular meeting. A subsequent note from Thorneycroft to Prime Minister Douglas-Home expressed some scepticism about Wilson’s motivations: It is interesting that Mr. Wilson really wants to try to get ammunition for his own policy of claiming that if we drop our deterrent we can get control of other peoples. There are two approaches we might have in mind: (a) One could tell him everything about joint planning and targeting and the M.L.F. and so on in the hope that this will inhibit him from presenting his case to the public in the best possible light; or (b) One could assume that anything he was told he would use and that therefore one should tell him nothing.93

Douglas-Home’s handwritten annotation at the bottom of this note reveals the only information he was willing to share with Wilson: ‘We can tell him that Mr Rusk said that if they thought they could get a say in the use of the US deterrent it was pure bunk’.94 In an interview with Hennessy in the late 1980s, Douglas-Home expresses his confidence that Wilson would not cancel the Polaris programme. He explains, ‘[In] spite of the manifesto, in spite of what he had said during the elec-

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tion campaign, I didn’t think he’d be able to cancel it [Polaris] when he understood the facts’.95 Hennessy suggests that the meeting between Healey and Thorneycroft helps to explain Douglas-Home’s confidence.96 It is possible to infer from approach ‘b’ in the above note, however, that the prime minister initially saw this meeting as a ruse by Wilson to improve his political position. Such suspicions were not unique to the opposition. Gaitskell had previously confided to Alastair Hetherington, editor of the Guardian newspaper: ‘With Wilson, you couldn’t talk about any confidential matter and be sure that he wouldn’t go and talk to the very people concerned immediately’.97 DouglasHome’s own memoirs, written in the mid-1970s, do not appear to share his later confidence. Here he states that, regarding Polaris, Wilson ‘was, to put it bluntly, ignorant or irresponsible . . . . He was either unsure of the potential of “Polaris” as a deterrent, or careless of the first duty of a government which is to provide security for its country’.98 Beside Brown’s nuclear strategy group and Healey’s private meeting, a third event suggests that nuclear policy was evolving in the Labour Party. Only weeks after his meeting with Thorneycroft, Healey made an intriguing announcement in the House of Commons: ‘I cannot say yet whether or not we will cancel the Polaris submarine’, he announced, continuing: ‘Whether it is of any value as part of an alliance effort we cannot make up our minds until we negotiate the question with the United States’.99 Although making familiar criticisms about the sensible use of resources and notions of independence, Healey’s admission that a Labour government would not necessarily cancel Polaris is the most striking element of this speech.100 The timing of this admission, however, is important. Wilson would be venturing to Washington in the near future, so it made little sense to foreclose any negotiating position at this stage. Moreover, Healey was likely correct that it would have been difficult for the Labour Party to decide how or whether to integrate British nuclear weapons into a NATO force without prior discussion, even if Wilson did not pursue the MLF. The wording of the speech was also largely non-committal. Later correspondence within the US government identified Healey’s speech as ambivalent and so probably the best statement of the Labour Party’s intentions with respect to the Polaris programme.101 These comments, placed in their proper context, suggest that the party was keeping its options open. Events across the Atlantic would substantiate this conclusion.

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Nuclear Diplomacy in Washington On 17 February 1964, Gordon Walker returned to Washington. In discussions with Rostow, he repeated the party line that Labour still planned to end ‘the national deterrent’ by converting the proposed Polaris submarines into conventionally armed submarines and remained opposed to the MLF. Crucially, though, he accepted that the Labour Party was still keeping its options open.102 Coupled with Healey’s announcement in the House of Commons, and assuming a degree of coherence in policy-making, this openness appeared to represent something of a new direction for the Labour Party. It is perhaps surprising, then, that Wilson’s own actions in Washington appear to contradict this shift in policy. On 2 March 1964, Wilson held a brief meeting with McNamara. Philip Ziegler suggests that during their discussion, Wilson stated that he actually favoured the integration of the British deterrent within a common European effort and was not a unilateral disarmer.103 Scrutiny of the evidence referenced reveals a somewhat different series of remarks. There is no mention of a common European effort. Moreover, the memorandum of conversation states that Wilson actually reiterated Labour’s intention ‘to do away with the U.K’.s nuclear force’, using the considerable sums saved, around £300 million a year, to improve conventional forces. With the seeming absence of humility, Wilson even said that ‘the intelligent people and responsible press all agree with Labor [sic]’.104 Later that day, Wilson spoke with William R. Tyler, US assistant secretary for European affairs, and re-emphasised his ambition to counter nuclear weapons’ appeal to ‘the man in the pub’ with the expansion of conventional forces. He was also keen to stress the tremendous savings that he could make by renouncing the Polaris programme.105 Still later that evening, President Lyndon Baines Johnson met Wilson at the White House. During their meeting, Wilson made it clear that a British nuclear deterrent ‘made no sense at all for England today’, focusing instead on conventional forces and potential cost savings that could be realised. Furthermore, he stressed his disapproval of nuclear sharing, stating that ‘the only circumstances in which the Labor [sic] government would support the MLF would be if this were the only way to prevent Germany from acquiring a national nuclear force’, which he thought unlikely. He felt that the MLF had ‘the result of putting the German finger on the nuclear trigger’, and so preferred to concentrate on measures of consultation and non-proliferation.106

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Viewed in isolation, it seems strange that such an experienced politician would be so guileless as to suggest the immediate abandonment of Polaris and the MLF without any thought to the state of US-UK relations, particularly given the threat of an exclusive West German–US nuclear alliance or British exclusion from any future nuclear force. Wilson’s comments thus sit rather uncomfortably with his ‘wait and see’ approach, and contradict his own later admission that ‘I have frequently and specifically said that I have never been opposed to Polaris’.107 The Labour Party’s position, however, was not as confused as it may first appear. Wilson’s comments reflected a shrewd appreciation of wider alliance politics. Priest persuasively argues that it is ‘likely he wanted to extract concession on the MLF, his threat on Polaris a move to cajole the president into reducing his support for the NATO force’.108 In the early months of taking office, the Labour government would repeatedly discuss its intention to use the proposed Polaris force to extract military and economic concessions from the United States.109 Specifically, in return for a commitment of Polaris submarines or V-bombers, Wilson sought the release of a substantial number of forces presently committed to Western Europe. The United States was quite aware that, if a Labour government retained its nuclear weapons, Polaris could be a valuable ‘bargaining asset’ for Wilson.110 Suggestions that the Labour government sustained the bomb for diplomatic advantage are common throughout the existing historiography.111 Wilson’s statements in Washington could well have reflected a great deal of political and economic foresight, utilising his time in opposition to enable greater concessions once in office. That his comments were disingenuous is somewhat corroborated by his comments in a press conference in Washington the day after his meeting with Johnson. Initially, the leader of the opposition continued to make the same noises about nuclear weapons being the wrong use of resources and the wrong contribution to the NATO alliance. On the issue of nuclear sharing, however, he stated that ‘if we were convinced that this was the only way to stop Germany from becoming a nuclear power then reluctantly, very, very, reluctantly, we would go along with it’.112 Wilson was evidently unwilling to refuse the possibility of future cooperation, using West Germany as a subtle caveat to his position on nuclear sharing. These subtleties were not wasted on the Americans. In a later visit to Washington, Wayland Young, a future parliamentary secretary, noted that ‘on all sides, I heard it said that Harold Wilson had left the impression during his recent visit that a Labour government probably would in the end join an M.L.F.’.113

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During this press conference, Wilson also stated that if the Polaris submarines ‘got, in a sense, past the point of no return here, we would obviously be prepared to offer them for the Western deterrent within NATO on whatever basis NATO is going to be organised’.114 Wilson had therefore revealed that the Polaris programme could exist under a Labour government, albeit due to events outside of his control. It is also interesting to note his use of economic factors to defend cancellation and, simultaneously, continuation. Past the point of no return was ‘an escape clause’.115 As it turned out, the Polaris programme was far from this critical stage, even after the Labour Party took power. Nevertheless, Wilson later used the ‘past the point of no return’ argument to justify sustaining the Polaris programme to his own cabinet.116 Economic arguments were, as several historians note, a convenient fiction for Wilson whilst in office.117 It seems reasonable to reach the same conclusion regarding his time in opposition. Wilson’s caveats left mixed messages. While allies realised that there was an opportunity for future cooperation, the Labour Party, following reports of the press conference, could seize hold of the familiar rhetoric. Talk of cancellation, a desire to remove the MLF, and the subsequent cost savings would certainly have pleased many within the party. Senior members of the Labour Party subsequently reaffirmed these objectives in two journal articles.118 Such a sop to the party was especially important at this time, as Wilson expected and had planned for an election in May 1964.119 Although expectations of a spring election were to be disappointed, Wilson’s attempt to secure concessions proved to be a well-timed threat; the Conservative government was presently attempting to forestall progress on the MLF, further heightening US anxiety on the matter.120 All of Wilson’s comments in Washington were far from binding. To be sure, during the press conference, he admitted that ‘as an opposition leader I am not here to negotiate with the Government; oppositions can’t negotiate with the Governments’.121 His comments were therefore a useful but ultimately empty concession to those in the party who resented the MLF and the continuation of the Polaris programme. In Washington, Wilson was keeping his options open. Perhaps this reflected his own indecision on the matter, but, more likely, he considered this approach the best balance of future diplomatic concessions and the immediate demands of party politics. Wilson’s reputation as an intelligent and pragmatic leader lends this interpretation an air of credibility.122 It also explains why, irrespective of his own feelings on the matter, he remained largely

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non-committal on nuclear issues in the many months leading up to the General Election. After his journey to Washington, Wilson tiptoed around the issue of nuclear weapons in Britain, which he feared might cause his party electoral embarrassment.123 Conversely, when he visited Moscow in June 1964, he took with him a ‘master plan’ for disarmament that included ‘a halt in the production of nuclear delivery vehicles’, a ‘bonfire of obsolete bombers’, and a non-proliferation treaty. The Soviet government swiftly rejected most of these proposals.124 Similarly, when Gordon Walker visited the Italian prime minister in late April, he said that his opposition to the MLF had not changed.125 Wilson’s forceful assertions on the international stage thus contrasted with his more ambivalent domestic stance. It no doubt helped that, by speaking to foreign officials in a confidential manner, Wilson was able to keep the two political spheres separate. This, of course, was not always achievable. Wilson would fallaciously deny subsequent reports in the British press that he gave Washington officials the impression that in the last resort, Labour would reluctantly accept the MLF.126

Pre-election Politics As the election neared, Wilson and the Labour Party continued to assert to the electorate that only a government could make a decision on the future of Polaris and nuclear sharing. This is borne out in official correspondence between the Labour Party and the public throughout 1964.127 Young, writing on behalf of the Fabian Society, a left-of-centre think tank integrated into the Labour Party, had also conceded this point by May 1964.128 Even after coming to power, Wilson justified his eventual decision to proceed with the Polaris programme only in the light of new information made available to him.129 Different people viewed this policy of indecision in very different ways. The Labour MP Tony Benn notes in his diaries that he expected Wilson was going to give up Polaris.130 Similarly, some among the chiefs of staff had expected changes following a Labour victory.131 Conversely, Hennessy suggests that nobody at the senior levels of Whitehall expected Wilson’s government to turn Britain into a non-nuclear power.132 Wilson’s ambiguities and contradictions would not have escaped the Labour Party’s attention. Perhaps many were weary of further debate, given the party’s troubled history on the matter. Interest in such controversial subjects may have faded as party members prepared for the election and rallied behind

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their leader. Whatever the reason, these ambiguities went unquestioned. It was in this context that the party began to ready itself for the next General Election. Discussion on nuclear issues between April and August was somewhat subdued. Ziegler suggests that as Wilson adjusted to an autumn election, he feared that he might peak too early and attempted to ‘put his efforts in cold storage for summer’.133 Although he was not wholly successful in this endeavour, it helps to explain the dearth of evidence in this period. The Labour Party manifesto, hurriedly produced before the election campaign began, launched on 11 September.134 The Conservative Party manifesto had spoken of the critical need for nuclear weapons. Conversely, the opposition effort focused its criticism on the agreement reached at the Nassau Conference and the ‘independent deterrent’, which, it remarked, ‘will not be independent and it will not be British and it will not deter’.135 This all sits rather uncomfortably with Wilson’s preference to delay a decision until after coming to power. It is true that he had not been privy to all of the government’s defence data. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to conceive of any information that could prompt Wilson to sustain the Polaris programme if it was not independent, British, or effective. The manifesto was also highly critical of nuclear sharing proposals, stressing its opposition to the development of national nuclear deterrents and the MLF. The Labour Party instead sought the integration of NATO’s nuclear weapons, though it is not clear how such a proposal would be realised. Nuclear weapons also played an economic role in the election. Recognition of ‘costly defence expenditure’, tied into the party’s explicit aim of ‘reversing the decline of the thirteen wasted years’, and complemented a broader climate of ‘declinism’.136 The Labour manifesto argued: [S]uccessive Conservative Chancellors have been unable to get the economy moving steadily forward . . . . In 13 years, the Conservatives have spent £20,000 m. and our defences are weaker than at almost any time in our history. Flagrant waste on missile and other projects has diverted funds and resources from urgently needed defence projects . . . . We are not prepared any longer to waste the country’s resources on endless duplication of strategic nuclear weapons.

Wilson had thus subtly woven together the future of Polaris and the Labour Party’s broader economic and foreign policy commitments. This approach was more than clever posturing. Early on, Wilson had realised that economics was his opponent’s major vulnerability.137 Douglas-Home had admitted in an in-

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terview prior to Macmillan’s departure that he could not be prime minister because he did his economics with matchsticks.138 Wilson’s comments would therefore have served as a clear and demanding rejoinder to Douglas-Home’s attacks on Labour’s nuclear policies. Given the manifesto’s raft of criticisms and ambiguities, it would have been reasonable to believe that a Labour government would surrender Polaris and reject the MLF. It is not true, however, that the Labour Party manifesto had unambiguously promised to abolish the Polaris programme.139 Nowhere is there any such commitment. The manifesto instead appeared more a criticism of the Conservative government than a statement of Labour’s own approach. This was not an oversight on Wilson’s part. Although Peter Shore, then head of the Labour Party’s Research Department, hurriedly penned the majority of the manifesto, Wilson personally rewrote the defence sub-section of the document. Aside from a small number of senior officials, no one else saw it, much to the displeasure of several of his colleagues.140 While cautious, comments regarding ‘renegotiating Nassau’ served to avoid exacerbating existing divisions within the party. The manifesto carefully accentuated minor differences between both parties, but, by avoiding any firm or clear commitments, did so without risking any unnecessary criticism. It perhaps also reflected Wilson’s desire to keep his options open.141 Ambiguity, it would appear, was an intentional part of Wilson’s preparation for the election. Anthony Shrimsley suggests that, on the subject of Nassau, Wilson confided to friends, ‘Nobody ever really knew what I meant by renegotiate’, although he fails to mention when or to whom.142 There are no documents to corroborate this particular admission, but many authors claim that this absence of clarification was merely a formula of words and an act of intentional ambiguity.143 Criticism that Wilson’s statements regarding the bomb had been vague actually emerged shortly after he took office.144 Such criticisms are particularly credible given that ambiguity was to become a motif of Wilsonian government. Alongside matters of national defence, it is equally difficult to disentangle the style and substance of Wilson’s subsequent foreign and domestic policies in office.145 Although Wilson likely recognised the merits of pursuing the Polaris programme, tensions within the party and the dynamics of the election encouraged him to stress only his criticisms of existing policy. In turn, senior party members would continue to downplay the significance of important caveats regarding West Germany and the costs of the Polaris programme. As evidenced by his private writings in August, Gordon

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Walker was clear about the tremendous costs of a nuclear programme but remained unsure of Wilson’s own feelings. ‘The basic fact is that we cannot afford a full nuclear armoury. The question’, he wrote, ‘is only whether we buy US weapons after the V-bombers run out’. None of this is to suggest that he had not reached his own opinion on the matter. ‘Our strength and influence in this world depends on conventional forces. A first-class fleet of helicopters would be of more use to us than nuclear weapons’.146

The Nuclear Deterrent Election ‘Nineteen sixty-four’, Hennessy contends, ‘was the nuclear deterrent election’.147 A variety of issues at that time, not least Labour’s own commitments to economic and social reform, concerned politicians and the wider electorate.148 Nevertheless, Hennessy’s assessment rightly captures one of the most readily discernible differences between the competing parties. It was the Conservatives who attempted to make the bomb a central part of the election. This decision can be explained, in large part, as an effort to exacerbate existing divisions within the Labour Party and, perhaps more important, as a topic on which Prime Minister Douglas-Home felt more comfortable building his own election campaign.149 For the Labour Party, as events over the preceding months have shown, the issue of nuclear weapons had less to do with the electorate, and much more to do with international relations and politics within the Labour Party. The lengthy campaign began on 12 September and formally commenced three days later.150 Douglas-Home continued to focus on the issue of nuclear weapons, with mixed results.151 As the General Election neared, Wilson went on to make two speeches on foreign and defence policy. The first was held in Plymouth on 27 September, whilst the second, and major, effort took place in Wandsworth on 5 October 1964.152 Even here, Wilson preferred to focus on matters of modernising Britain, caring for the old, and pushing ahead economically.153 Although matters of foreign policy did affect the 1964 election, Wilson was quite aware that domestic interests were still far more important to the electorate.154 During one speech Wilson stated, ‘We have to re-negotiate the Nassau agreement. The submarines may be wanted for NATO. We certainly do not want them for any nuclear Suez. But if they are not wanted as nuclear missile carrying vessels, they will still be built, with whatever modifications are needed, as

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nuclear powered tracker submarines’.155 Evidently, the leader of the opposition still refused to commit himself on the potential construction of nuclear submarines. Fittingly, a little over a week before the election, Thorneycroft accused Wilson of trying to cover the issue with ‘intellectual sludge’.156 While party politics and domestic considerations tempered Wilson’s position on the future of the Polaris programme and nuclear sharing proposals, international events aroused a very different response. In late September, the US State Department and West German officials began private talks in the hope of making progress on the MLF. This followed a letter that Ludwig Erhard, chancellor of the FRG, had sent to Johnson suggesting an early start in drafting an MLF agreement on a bilateral basis. Despite the delicacy of this suggestion, on 6 October 1964, Erhard announced such a possibility at a press conference in Berlin.157 This fuelled intense suspicion of an exclusive nuclear alliance amongst the FRG’s European allies, and within Bonn itself. Johnson subsequently emphasised the need for broad support for the proposal, and Rusk produced a statement precluding a bilateral MLF agreement between the US and the FRG.158 Senior members of the Labour Party viewed the press release dimly. It appeared to Healey that Bonn sought to establish a pre-eminent position with Washington.159 Gordon Walker agreed, writing in his diary, ‘We must at all costs avoid a US alliance with Germany over our heads’.160 During his time in office, Wilson was extremely anxious to avoid the emergence of a US–West German nuclear alliance excluding British participation, much as the Conservative government had been following such threats from the United States in early 1964.161 Anxiety over US intentions certainly influenced his thinking on nuclear sharing. Wilson later explained that British nuclear weapons were important because he and his colleagues did not ‘want to be in the position of having to subordinate ourselves to the Americans when they, at a certain point, would say, “We’re going to use it”, or something of that kind—though in fact, I doubt anyone expected it ever to be used’.162 It seems likely that Erhard’s announcement, the seeming inevitability of the MLF, and the proximity of the election, finally encouraged Wilson to explore a more nuanced approach to the issue of nuclear sharing and accept British inclusion is some form. It was around this time that the leader of the opposition developed the concept of the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF).163 Although both proposals continued to evolve, there were a number of clear differences between the ANF and the MLF. The ANF would subsume the MLF into a larger

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force containing British V-bombers and Polaris submarines, alongside an additional contribution from the United States and potentially France. Initial proposals excluded British involvement in a mixed-manned element and emphasised British and American vetoes over the use of the force.164 Another key distinction was political. The ANF, Wilson claims in his memoirs, ‘was our answer to the controversial Nassau agreement, which we had said we would ‘renegotiate’.165 More specifically, it would commit British nuclear forces to NATO for as long as the alliance lasted and revoke the ‘supreme national interests’ clause. This clause originated in negotiations between Macmillan and Kennedy during the Nassau Conference, and stipulated that although Polaris missiles were included as part of a NATO multilateral force, in certain circumstances the British government could use them independently. The ANF therefore appeared to grant a major concession to the alliance. Respecting the Labour Party’s manifesto pledges, the proposal would also place British nuclear weapons under international control, a vague concept Wilson termed ‘internationalisation’, and seek to make progress towards measures of alliance consultation and non-proliferation. These plans, however, were still in their formative stages in early October. The electorate would have to make their decision in ignorance of Wilson’s new idea.

A Decision The 1964 General Election returned the Labour Party to power, albeit with a majority of only four seats.166 Timing had proven instrumental in Wilson’s success. The result may well have been very different had news of Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s dismissal or the first nuclear test by the People’s Republic of China reached Britain prior to the election. Wilson modestly remarked, ‘It was an open question whether, if the news from Moscow had come an hour or two before the polls closed, there would have been an electoral rush to play safe and to vote the existing Government back into power’.167 Douglas-Home regretfully noted that the result may have been quite different ‘if the Chinese had happened to give out the news of the explosion of the bomb a day or two earlier’.168 Events, however, conspired in favour of a new government. Wilson swiftly addressed the ambiguities surrounding the future of the Polaris programme. Solly Zuckerman, chief scientific advisor to the Ministry of Defence, suggests that following a discussion on 18 October 1964, ‘Wilson, almost straight away, decided to carry on’.169 This reminiscence does comple-

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ment documentary evidence from the following weeks. By early November, less than a month after the election, Wilson had decided to sustain the Polaris programme, a decision subsequently ratified by the cabinet.170 The immediacy with which Wilson made this difficult decision would appear to correlate with claims that he had been open to retaining Polaris before coming to office. It remains an intriguing counterfactual as to whether or not Gaitskell or Brown would have approached issues of defence in the same way, had either reached the premiership.171 There is no definitive answer as to why Wilson decided to sustain the Polaris programme. Indeed, many explanations exist. In his memoirs, Wilson explains that the production of the submarines was ‘well past the point of no return; there could be no question of cancelling them, except an inordinate cost’.172 This was simply untrue.173 Yet economics may have played a role in the decision. In a broadcasted conversation with Hennessy many years later, Wilson suggests that he defended the Polaris programme because it helped in ‘general negotiations’ with the United States, and was a lever to prise dollars from the US Treasury to bail out the British economy.174 The serious economic difficulties that Wilson inherited once in office lend this explanation an air of credibility. Curiously, deterring the Soviet Union did not seem to figure in Wilson’s thinking. Healey retrospectively justified the decision to sustain the Polaris programme with reference to strategic rationale. ‘If you are inside an alliance’, he claimed, ‘you increase the deterrent to the other side enormously if there is more than one centre of decision for the first use of nuclear weapons’.175 Diplomacy within the alliance could perhaps have played a role. In later interviews, Wilson and Healey explain that a large reason behind keeping a national nuclear force was the potential need to restrain the United States, although how and from what remains unclear.176 Such arguments are not entirely convincing. Hennessy suggests that such explanations were instead ‘camouflage for the understandable reluctance for any British premier . . . to risk history judging him to be the one who left Britain without its ultimate weapon’ should a nuclear threat ever emerge.177 More immediate political considerations also help to explain the decision to sustain the Polaris programme. In opposition, Wilson’s most important task had been to achieve a House of Commons majority.178 Success in this endeavour did not quell his appetite for power. Given Wilson’s political ambitions, and his small majority, there is no reason to think that he was not already pre-

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paring for the next election. Several days after gaining cabinet approval for the Polaris programme, he met with US undersecretary of state George Ball. During their meeting, Wilson defended his decision. ‘Merely to hand over Polaris’, he explained, ‘would be a vote-loser in this country’.179

Conclusion Wilson was one of the most effective leaders of the opposition of the twentieth century.180 Being in opposition complemented his ambiguous rhetoric on nuclear weapons. International diplomacy played a secondary role to more pressing concerns, not least party unity and electoral viability. Throughout this period, however, Wilson publicly refused to commit to a decision on the Polaris programme or nuclear sharing before taking office. He also increasingly relied on two important caveats to his position—namely, West Germany’s nuclear ambitions and the costs of a nuclear weapons programme. These question marks were innocuous enough not to damage his political ambitions, but sufficient to leave his options open. Wilson’s success was not a political anomaly. Recent survey research suggests that voters embrace ambiguity and that imprecise political positions can provide a winning electoral strategy.181 The Labour Party’s ambiguous challenges to Conservative nuclear policy also complemented wider criticisms of the government’s perceived mishandling of the economy. Economics, though, often had a far greater bearing on the leader of the opposition’s rhetoric than on his actions. Wilson’s decision to pursue the Polaris programme shortly after coming to office surprised some US government officials who had predicted that he would make this decision only after holding defence talks with Johnson. Experts within the US government had mistakenly felt that they were in a position to affect the British government’s ultimate decision on this programme, following the leader of the opposition’s apparent interest in the scale of cancellation costs.182 Few, it seems, were immune to Wilson’s rhetoric. Ambiguity was a powerful tool in the right hands.

3

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p o n ta k i n g o f f i c e , Prime Minister Harold Wilson faced the daunting prospect of developing his own approach to British nuclear diplomacy. The Labour government swiftly rallied behind Wilson’s concept of the Atlantic Nuclear Force. The ANF would comprise British V-bombers and Polaris submarines, matched with an equivalent contribution from the United States, committed to NATO. Initial drafts of the proposal suggested that, unlike the Multilateral Force, there would be vetoes on use, and Britain would retain operational independence by remaining outside of any mixed-manned, or internationally crewed, element.1 The development of the ANF as a replacement to the MLF drove British nuclear diplomacy in the early months of Wilson premiership. The earliest historical accounts of Labour’s involvement with nuclear weapons sharing suggest that the ANF was a British invention principally designed to replace the increasingly unpopular MLF proposal.2 Such arguments have consistently found support in the published recollections of many senior Labour ministers in office at that time.3 All of these accounts claim that the ANF proposal emerged as a consciously cynical attempt to undermine American and West German ambitions for a multilateral European nuclear force. Benefitting from previously withheld archival sources, several more recent studies instead conclude that the ANF proposal was a serious diplomatic initiative by the new Labour government with intentions beyond merely scuppering the MLF.4 It is debatable as to whether or not the British government actually ever 76



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wanted their own proposal to succeed. Although the ANF most likely originated with a serious purpose beyond merely scuppering the MLF, it is fair to suggest that the government did not mourn its eventual demise.5 The sharing of nuclear weapons between states whether in the guise of the MLF or the ANF, remained unpopular within the Wilson government. Nevertheless, a combination of international, domestic, and party pressures made an alternative such as the ANF, rather than outright rejection, the most sensible solution for the new government during its early months in power. In addition, economic considerations exerted a powerful influence over attitudes towards both proposals. Existing accounts downplay or ignore such factors. Debates about the state of the economy and the possibility of potential concessions from the United States, however, are essential to understanding the history of nuclear sharing. From an alliance perspective, the ANF was crucial to forestalling a strictly FRG-US nuclear partnership and consequently West German access to nuclear weapons.6 International pressures, however, also tempered progress on nuclear sharing. French and Soviet distrust of the ANF threatened the stability of NATO and the Labour government’s commitment to East-West detente, respectively. Wilson’s development of the proposal was therefore an attempt to navigate competing international influences on British nuclear diplomacy. Wilson also used the ANF proposal to disguise his decision to pursue the Polaris programme, and thus ease lingering tensions within the party, without sacrificing strategic nuclear independence. He relied, somewhat paradoxically, on his slim parliamentary majority and economic arguments to ensure support for the ANF. Many within the Labour government perceived the ANF as a valuable tool with which to extract valuable military concessions from NATO. Such efficiencies were critical given a commitment to swingeing cuts to the defence budget and wider difficulties in the British economy. Between 1957 and the last year of Conservative government, real defence spending had risen by 8 percent. In addition, military spending overseas accounted for one-third of the payments deficit in 1964.7 By early December 1964, approval from the cabinet and Washington allowed Wilson to pursue the ANF proposal without restraint. It might seem curious, then, that the Labour government subsequently withdrew its support for nuclear sharing, albeit privately. Ironically, the early success of the ANF provided Wilson with the confidence and the opportunity to move away from any commitment to nuclear sharing, and he subtly began to extricate the government from any commitments to the proposal. The ANF was therefore a calculated re-

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action to unwanted pressures from within and without. In the absence of these once great pressures, the proposal became a problem rather than a solution for Wilson and the British government.

The British Economy and the MLF Nuclear weapons presented several immediate challenges to the Labour government. Wilson’s handling of nuclear affairs, however, was a secondary concern. The state of the economy was the major problem. On many indicators, the government performed creditably. Unemployment and inflation were rising but remained relatively stable. Growth, although slower than in much of Western Europe, was reasonable in the main.8 Yet major troubles lingered. Dominating his first months in power, and indeed most of his time in government, was a tremendous balance of payments deficit.9 Wilson subsequently claimed he had underestimated the seriousness of Britain’s economic position prior to taking office, but he likely exaggerated his ignorance of the matter.10 The Labour Party was certainly aware of the broader difficulties facing the economy, and the issue had been a major theme of Wilson’s election platform. Moreover, James Callaghan, chancellor of the exchequer, and Reginald Maudling, former chancellor, had a close relationship. The two spoke to each other during their respective tenures of office and often in a frank manner.11 These inherited troubles had placed immense pressure on the pound and led to an outflow of funds that threatened the value of sterling and, in turn, the wider economy. Almost immediately after coming to power, Wilson gathered Callaghan and George Brown, head of the newly created Department of Economic Affairs, to discuss the crisis. The problem divided economic advisors and members of the government.12 For such market sensitive decisions, perhaps even more than in nuclear weapons policy, prime ministers and chancellors determine the procedures and the outcomes for policy, in what Peter Hennessy terms an ‘institutionalised breach’ of the collective nature of cabinet government.13 Wilson was the only one of this triumvirate with expert knowledge of the issues, having been the only person to hold a major economic post in government or to be involved in the previous devaluation decision of 1949. He led the discussion accordingly.14 The group swiftly agreed not to devalue the pound. In his memoirs, Wilson claims that he based this decision on three factors: the government’s loss of credibility as an economic manager, particularly since the 1949 devaluation; the fear that competitive devaluations might



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follow in other economies; and the fear that devaluation would require sharp deflationary policies and thus a reduction in the standard of living, thereby abandoning the Labour Party’s electoral promises.15 Wilson came down firmly against devaluation without much consideration of the alternative.16 Jim Tomlinson suggests that the decision not to devalue revealed that ‘politics was in command’.17 The stringent domestic measures that would have accompanied devaluation would likely have been electorally damaging. Many historians criticise Wilson’s commitment to parity as misguided and argue that delaying devaluation led to successive speculative crises, which weakened dollar reserves and repeatedly forced emergency constraints on the economy.18 Yet, recent research instead suggests that Wilson’s decision was a reasonable response to this initial sterling crisis. A fresh crisis three weeks later was essentially speculative—the fault of the newly liberalised capital markets rather than the overall trading position.19 Tomlinson also accepts that Wilson’s scepticism about the effectiveness of the price mechanism, the process by which changes in price influence the production of goods and services, as an economic instrument may have influenced the decision.20 Moreover, the Treasury briefing for the incoming government had strongly argued against devaluation, calling it ‘an act of desperation’.21 International factors also had an important role to play. Wilson had obligations to the United States, West Germany, and France to hold the existing rate and wished to avoid disruption to the global financial system.22 More than one account suggests that Wilson and Lyndon Johnson struck a deal before the General Election whereby the United States would support sterling, if a Labour government did not devalue the pound.23 Despite debate as to the form and timing of this ‘deal’, consideration of sterling’s position in the international economy did play a role in Wilson’s decision.24 The question of devaluation, and the precarious state of the national economy, subtly weaves into the broader questions of British nuclear diplomacy. It is an intriguing counterfactual as to whether devaluation, and the deflationary policies that followed, would have led to the cancellation of the Polaris programme. Assuming a significant reduction in government expenditure, the cabinet and Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), empowered by Wilson’s slim majority, would certainly have questioned further investment in nuclear weapons at the expense of other priorities. The Labour Party manifesto had challenged the ‘flagrant waste’ of the Polaris programme and the costs of the MLF, while committing Wilson to ‘reversing the decline of the thirteen wasted

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years’.25 To these concerns can be added Wilson’s own commitment to an expensive programme of modernisation and equality in Britain, which would have further inhibited government spending on defence.26 Public expenditure growth fixed on social services and not defence. Crucially, though, elements within the new government were beginning to suggest that retaining Polaris and pursuing cooperation with the MLF proposal might offer some economic rewards. At the end of Labour’s first week in office, the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) Long Term Study Group concluded that ‘we could try to link a reduction of our forces to our participation in an MLF if it is formed’.27 More specifically, the British government could make a commitment of Polaris submarines and V-bombers to the MLF in exchange for the release of a substantial number of forces presently committed to Western Europe. The US government was already aware that the Labour government might use Polaris as a ‘bargaining asset’ in future negotiations on NATO contributions.28 The MLF therefore touched on broader debates about the economic relationship between nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Western Europe. The pragmatic conclusion of the Long Term Study Group was not representative of the wider government. There is little evidence that the Treasury was particularly concerned with the MLF at this time, beyond considering where such a proposal might fit within a larger programme of cost reductions. The devaluation of the pound had understandably monopolised its attentions. Neither the Foreign Office nor the Ministry of Defence favoured the proposal.29 The latter feared the challenge posed to operational independence and the very essence of a ‘national deterrent’.30 Criticisms also focused on the matter of cost. An expected 10 percent contribution to the overall cost of the MLF, totalling approximately £11 million a year for ten years, forced sacrifices elsewhere. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Defence recognised that opposition to the MLF would fail to prevent its creation and would only cause resentment within the alliance.31 Denis Healey, secretary of state for defence, grudgingly accepted that the best way to prolong discussions was to offer a constructive counterproposal.32 A desire to avoid any US-FRG nuclear alliance that excluded British participation and put a West German ‘finger on the trigger’, explains the Foreign Office’s apprehension. Such an outcome threatened to dilute the ‘special’ US-UK nuclear relationship and touched on historical concerns about German military power for a significant minority of the government.33 Moreover, outright rejection could have required revision to the Nassau agreement, threaten-



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ing its already generous terms and relations between the two countries more broadly.34 Wilson, Healey, and Patrick Gordon Walker repeatedly expressed strong Atlantic sympathies, and all desired the strengthening of US-UK relations.35 As Healey remarks in his memoirs, ‘The Ministry of Defence was totally opposed to the MLF and the Foreign Office was not terribly keen on it, but felt that our relationship with the Americans required that we should put it to sleep quietly, rather than directly oppose it’.36 West Germany was itself an important variable in the development of British nuclear diplomacy. Any form of nuclear sharing would require German approval in order to gain American support.37 It also remained imperative to avoid Gaullist sentiments in Bonn leading West Germany into forming a nuclear coalition with France. The Soviet Union’s persistent criticism of nuclear sharing proposals further complicated matters. Too much cooperation on the MLF threatened the promotion of East-West detente and progress towards a non-proliferation treaty. This complex web of international relations forced Wilson to balance disparate and often competing interests against the government’s own objectives. The architects of British nuclear diplomacy, Wilson, Gordon Walker, and Healey were all opposed to the MLF. Earlier pre-election commitments challenging the concept had cemented this position. The need to expose the pretence of the ‘independent deterrent’, however, presented something of a problem. Without a way to place British nuclear weapons under international control, a concept Wilson termed ‘internationalisation’, the decision to sustain the Polaris programme would be difficult to justify to the Labour Party. Moreover, broader international commitments meant that the new government could not so glibly object to cooperation as it had done in opposition. The solution that emerged was the Atlantic Nuclear Force.

The Architects of British Nuclear Diplomacy Wilson claimed that he thought of the ANF while in the bath, during the election campaign.38 Gordon Walker’s recognition of ‘Wilson’s basic idea’ some months later further supports this claim. On Thursday 22 October 1964, Gordon Walker spent an evening at Wilson’s home, where the prime minister ‘proposed that we might think of committing our Polaris submarines absolutely to the Atlantic Force’.39 The next day the idea appeared in The Times, which, discounting any uncanny coincidence, further substantiates claims that Wilson

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had developed the idea. Gordon Walker, however, was responsible for developing and protecting many of the features of the ANF in subsequent discussions with US officials. This included the idea of an intergovernmental authority and the name ‘Atlantic Nuclear Force’.40 Gordon Walker presented the first outline proposal of the ANF to Dean Rusk, US secretary of state, and George Ball, US undersecretary of state, in Washington over two days towards the end of October.41 He began by explaining the financial and political reasons for not supporting the MLF. Talks turned to the British counterproposal. Gordon Walker presented the V-bomber force and an equal number of British and US Polaris submarines as the backbone of the proposal. Both governments would have a veto on all elements in the force, and all nations participating in the mixed-manned element would have a veto. Britain would remain committed to the force as long as the alliance lasted and promised to revoke the ‘supreme national interests’ clause agreed at Nassau, where in certain circumstances the British government could use its Polaris missiles independently. Gordon Walker stressed that the government did not wish to take part in any mixed-manned force, but the promise to revoke the ‘supreme national interests’ clause appeared to be a major concession. In what would become a motif for British nuclear diplomacy over the coming months, Gordon Walker stressed that the ANF was not a device designed to stall further negotiations, but requested more time to consider how best to proceed. Only later would the foreign secretary admit that he had initiated these talks primarily to ‘gain time’.42 Rusk and Ball were sceptical of the idea, in large part because of its questionable appeal to Bonn.43 Yet the ANF proposal did not engender the negative reaction that Gordon Walker had feared.44 Washington found the new government much more amenable to discussions on nuclear sharing than they had assumed prior to the General Election.45 The United States agreed to give further thought to these ideas but suggested that the next step would be to discuss the proposal with West Germany.46 The ANF proposal was therefore progressing relatively successfully at this early stage. Similar discussions would continue over the following weeks.47 On 14 November, Gordon Walker journeyed to Bonn, where he presented the same idea to West German minister of foreign affairs Gerhard Schröder and West German chancellor Ludwig Erhard. Both proved largely receptive to the ANF proposal, seeing it as evidence of progress towards a much desired hardware solution. The German foreign minister was open to new ideas, Gordon Walker reported to Wilson, but still wanted a mixed-manned surface fleet. Crucially,



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though, he also welcomed some delay on the issue, owing to continuing French pressure and tensions within his own government.48 The first weeks of the Labour government’s handling of nuclear diplomacy are revealing. Wilson had overseen the development of a cautious diplomatic counterproposal to the unpopular MLF. He had thus allowed Gordon Walker and Healey to become more cooperative on the issue of nuclear sharing in negotiations with foreign governments. Political, strategic, and diplomatic considerations had motivated this newfound desire for cooperation. Economic considerations, however, were also important. Among certain elements of the Labour government, there remained strong hopes for concessions if the Nassau agreement’s ‘supreme national interests’ clause was removed.49 In keeping with Gordon Walker and Healey’s discussions, British officials in Whitehall began to develop a provisional draft of the ANF proposal. Following its completion, Wilson assembled his most senior colleagues to advance the proposal. This meeting was to be the continuation, rather than the commencement, of highlevel discussions regarding the ANF.50 Wilson met with Gordon Walker and Healey to discuss the Atlantic Nuclear Force proposal on Armistice Day, 11 November 1964. This diminutive cabinet committee, the smallest in the history of UK nuclear policy-making, was of lasting importance to both the future of the ANF and the demise of the MLF.51 The meeting, referred to as MISC. 16, was prepared hurriedly as a background brief for future defence discussions at Chequers and, more pressingly, ahead of discussions between Gordon Walker and Schröder in Bonn, scheduled for several days later.52 Talks went beyond the earlier proposals presented in Washington. The cabinet committee was prepared to acquiesce to elements of a mixed-manned nuclear force. Flexibility over such a bitter and divisive subject underlined the importance Wilson placed on sustaining US-UK cooperation and avoiding British exclusion from any future nuclear force. It also reflected advice from Burke Trend, the cabinet secretary, recognising that British participation in the mixed-manned element was sine qua non.53 Wilson thus followed the path established by the preceding government following such threats from the United States in early 1964.54 Alongside discussions pertaining to nuclear weapons sharing, Wilson’s committee ultimately agreed that ‘three submarines would represent the minimum force which would be acceptable . . . in the event of the dissolution of the NATO alliance’.55 A sufficient number of boats provided a necessary contribution to this budding nuclear alliance and much needed evi-

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dence of a commitment to cooperation. Moreover, it was felt that such a contribution would ensure that the British government could maintain some level of control over the alliance. Wilson and Healey would both later suggest that a large reason behind keeping a national nuclear force was the potential need to restrain the United States, although how and from what remains unclear.56 While diplomatic considerations encouraged a Polaris fleet tied into a multilateral nuclear force, economic factors also played an important role during the meeting. Echoing the earlier findings of the DOPC, the group believed that the ANF would facilitate ‘substantial concessions’ from the United States. Specifically, in return for a commitment of Polaris submarines and V-bombers, Wilson sought the release of a substantial number of forces presently committed to Western Europe. Such a concession would ease the growing cost of the defence budget without undermining Britain’s broader global military role outside of the NATO area, which Wilson was reluctant to reduce.57 Keeping troops ‘East of Suez’, a broad term encompassing British interests in the Middle and Far East, would ease the military burdens faced by the United States during the Cold War. Maintaining an international presence would in turn help Wilson to secure essential US support for sterling and the wider British economy.58 Economic interdependence would increasingly shape strategic decision-making within the Wilson government. Indeed, when the party was later angrily divided over Britain’s continued support for the war in Vietnam, Wilson succinctly explained to Frank Cousins, then minister of technology, why he could not surrender his commitment to President Johnson: ‘Because we can’t kick our creditors in the balls’.59 The state of the British economy was a hugely important influence on the Labour government at this time. The budget, unveiled on the same day as the MISC. 16 meeting, did little to impress the financial markets and resulted in a ‘speculative fever’ leading to rumours of devaluation.60 Pressure on the pound had been surprisingly moderate until November, but the markets reacted negatively to Callaghan’s first budget and the value of sterling began to suffer once more. The government only managed to overcome this problem after obtaining international financial support from a number of central banks, led by the United States, and the Bank of International Settlements. Although stabilising the pound, the British government acquired new debts of around £1,200 million.61 Correspondence between Wilson and Johnson reveals that the United States was supporting the British in an effort to secure additional funds from the International Monetary Fund in order to maintain the integrity of ster-



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ling.62 Wilson said of the loan that it was ‘without strings and they’re all in it’.63 Kevin Boyle suggests that in exchange for US support, however, the Wilson government agreed, implicitly, to take no action that would reduce Britain’s military presence in the Far East and to support US policy in Vietnam.64 The Johnson administration would also have been quite aware that the stability of the dollar, and the international economic system, were both dependent on the success of sterling.65 A major devaluation could potentially undermine the stability of the international exchange rate system. Wilson certainly recognised that the United States had a ‘vested interest’ in the strength of sterling.66 The ANF provided some flexibility in the midst of, and potentially a counterbalance to, strategic and economic dependence on the United States. In an interview with Peter Hennessy many years later, Wilson suggests that he defended the Polaris programme because it helped in ‘general negotiations’ with the Americans, and was a lever to prise dollars from the US Treasury to bail out the British economy. Hennessy notes that deterring the Soviet Union did not seem to figure in Wilson’s thinking.67 Scrutiny of MISC. 16 substantiates this claim. Indeed, despite Healey’s later justifications, nuclear strategy and perceptions of Britain’s role as a second centre of decision-making appear to have had limited bearing on the decision to continue the Polaris programme or integrate it into a multilateral force.68 In many ways, the Polaris force and the ANF were diplomatic and economic tools, as much as strategic or military instruments, especially valuable in this period of financial woe. Economic considerations also played an important role in limiting the size of any potential Polaris fleet, if not British involvement in a multilateral force. A smaller number of boats underlined the new government’s commitment to reduce levels of defence expenditure. A healthy anxiety regarding the costs of the Polaris programme had already emerged throughout the government in its first weeks of office. Prior to the cabinet committee, senior officials within the Ministry of Defence and the Treasury had considered the cost savings produced from the possibility of outright cancellation.69 Three submarines emerged as the best compromise solution, albeit at the expense of strategic independence. The provision of three submarines could not guarantee one on station at all times, but as the group believed that an equivalent number of United States submarines would be committed to the force, ‘sufficient coverage would be provided’.70 While the committee made their decisions in the context of broader international influences, party considerations also influenced the group’s conclusions.

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The existence of this cabinet committee was an early recognition of the need to keep the new government united behind nuclear weapons policy, particularly given the Labour Party’s divisive history on the subject and its small majority in the Commons. Only the prime minister can create a cabinet committee and appoint its personnel, important decisions that can steer the result of a meeting.71 Gordon Walker would later note that Wilson’s ‘partial cabinets’ only ever consisted of small groups generally in, or near to, agreement on the topic at hand.72 The function of this meeting was therefore to carry over support for the ANF into the wider cabinet. There is also some truth in Wilson’s subsequent admission that he preferred nuclear decision-making in small groups because there was ‘less chance of a leak’.73 The small number of attendees underlined the delicacy of this proposal as well as Wilson’s commitment to its realisation. The prime minister would have been quite aware of the difficultly in securing anything more than a small nuclear force prior to the full cabinet’s broader approval of the nuclear programme. A three-boat force tied into a multilateral programme would better reflect pre-election commitments to the rejection of an ‘independent deterrent’. While the value of the ANF may have seemed obvious to those in attendance, elements of the government remained sceptical. Immediately after the MISC. 16 cabinet committee, Frank Mottershead informed the Cabinet Office that they needed to manage expectations of substantial concessions from the United States and NATO. The deputy undersecretary of state for defence argued that the ANF proposal was not likely to appear to the United States or other allies as giving ground for substantial concessions, particularly in the form of reducing existing defence commitments.74 Such scepticism was common within Whitehall. On 17 November, Denis Laskey, a Cabinet Office official, sent a paper to Trend to ‘counter undue optimism about the concessions we might obtain from our allies in the negotiation for an ANF’.75 Laskey felt that there would be immense difficultly in securing any easement of the defence burden in Western Europe or outside NATO. ‘The conclusion’, he argued, ‘must be that we shall need most if not all of our bargaining power to get agreement on an ANF on terms satisfactory to us, and that there will be little or nothing left for extracting wider concessions’.76 In further correspondence, Philip Rogers, the deputy cabinet secretary, expressed similar concerns to Trend and stressed that they ‘must seek to bring home to ministers’ the lack of concessions that could be achieved.77 On 19 November, Trend sent a lengthy preparatory note to the prime minister for the forthcoming defence talks at Chequers. He outlined Britain’s major



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objectives in the nuclear field, which included fostering the strength and unity of NATO, promoting measures of alliance consultation, and averting proliferation. Most important, Trend emphasised the possibility of using British nuclear weapons to reduce current levels of defence expenditure, which he believed posed a grave threat to the economy. While a sophisticated inquiry into cost effectiveness offered a long-term solution, Trend believed that the ANF offered a short-term solution. In line with Rogers and Laskey, he accepted that the scope for bargaining in either area was limited; NATO commanders considered their forces to be below strength in Western Europe, and the alliance was accustomed to Britain’s carrying its share of the international burden. Nevertheless, Trend was clear that the government needed to find some relief from its global defence burdens. Further concessions might be possible if Wilson was prepared to surrender the ‘independent deterrent’ to a far greater degree.78 Although the complete surrender of nuclear independence was a controversial suggestion, Wilson would have received Trend’s advice with respect.79 He held considerable influence over the Labour government, with Barbara Castle, minister for overseas development, unkindly referring to him as ‘Harold’s personal henchman’.80 In his memoirs, Henry Kissinger notes of Trend: ‘His office is as powerful as it is anonymous. A senior civil servant who remains in place through all changes of administration, he prepares the minutes of cabinet meetings, supervises the permanent civil service machinery . . . . [T]he influence inherent in this position was used with special effectiveness by its incumbent’.81 Historians should also be aware of Trend’s more subtle authority. As Richard Crossman, then minister of housing, remembers of his time in office: ‘Cabinet proceedings are recorded by the Cabinet Secretariat. They do not take down in shorthand what actually was said because they prefer to record what should have been said’.82 Trend’s influence even reaches out of the archives and into Wilson’s memoirs, which he helped to redraft.83

The Defence Debate The Cabinet Committee on Defence Policy convened on 21 November 1964.84 If MISC. 16 had served a preparatory role for the preservation of the Polaris programme and nuclear sharing, this series of larger meetings would help to secure a wider base of support for Wilson’s ambitions.85 Healey’s memoirs suggest that there was not total agreement on continuing the Polaris programme. Brown, George Wigg, paymaster-general, and Alun Chalfont, minister

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for disarmament, had all argued against continuation.86 Nevertheless, the proposal passed without any minuted objections during the defence debate. The attendees instead turned their attention to the formation of the ANF and the nature, rather than the future, of the Polaris force. Gordon Walker outlined the details of the latest proposal. He stressed that further efforts would be made to create a mixed-manned element that was not a surface fleet and would not expand the size of the Western nuclear arsenal. Although the non-nuclear members of the ANF would have a veto over any use of nuclear weapons, in return they would agree not to acquire nuclear weapons. Gordon Walker considered French membership unlikely, but he believed it was vital that the British government make such an offer, if only in an effort to avoid criticism of exclusion.87 The ANF, however, was more than just a new approach to nuclear sharing in NATO. The proposal drew together a raft of seemingly irreconcilable needs from across the wider government. Wilson’s uncanny ability to make such a position credible allowed him to overcome, or perhaps effectively obscure, the nuclear divisions that so threatened the government and its small majority. As Saki Dockrill suggests, the ANF became ‘a magnet to attract all Britain’s negative strategic and economic desiderata and turn them into strengths’.88 At the heart of the discussions at Chequers lay three interrelated issues—namely, politics, strategy, and economics. From a political perspective, the ANF was, at its very core, an attempt to turn the British government’s involvement with an unpopular idea into a uniting force. It did so by removing many of the features of the MLF that were previously so objectionable.89 The ANF’s success was a combination of vague commitments and compromise, but also of Wilson’s skill as prime minister and his domination of debate throughout the weekend.90 Building on the agreements reached during MISC. 16, the proposal became somewhat of a contradiction. In a sop to elements within the government seeking progress towards disarmament, Wilson was able to claim that the ANF encouraged measures of consultation within the alliance, offered the renegotiation of the Nassau agreement, and internationalised British nuclear weapons.91 Conversely, nuclear proponents understood that the Polaris force would remain under national control, thereby allowing the Labour government to withdraw the fleet if necessary. In correspondence with Wilson, Gordon Walker later admitted, ‘In a point of practice there is likely to be little difference between the Nassau reservation about the right to withdraw in the event of supreme national emergency and our own commitment to leave the submarines there



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so long as the alliance lasts’.92 Wilson was reconfirming, not renegotiating, the Nassau agreement.93 Adopting a strategic perspective, scrutiny of the decisions reached at Chequers reveals that, through careful wording and a reliance on national vetoes, senior members of the British government were still trying to avoid surrendering the operational independence of nuclear forces. Operational controls, however, presented a technical rather than political problem. The idea of applying ‘physical vetoes’ to any NATO nuclear force, including electronic locks and Permissive Action Links (PAL), devices included in or attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude arming or launching, meant that the British government could lose control over its nuclear weapons. Prior to the defence debate, the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee had reasoned that if the government was to accept such demands, the ability to use the force independently could disappear.94 Even if such a PAL system did emerge, the group gathered at Chequers was confident that it could be physically circumvented.95 Several weeks earlier, the Chiefs of Staff had decided to retain the firing codes necessary to launch any missiles, thereby ensuring an effective independent deterrent capability in the last resort.96 From an economic perspective, the gathered ministers and officials at Chequers continued to adopt favourable assessments about the value of the ANF in future defence negotiations with the United States. Despite the Cabinet Office’s efforts to manage such expectations, optimism regarding future concessions was clear throughout the third and fourth committee meetings.97 Efforts to reduce defence spending were wholly understandable. The defence meeting at Chequers had commenced shortly after the government’s difficult first budget. Wilson would have been acutely aware of these growing troubles, especially amidst an already enormous balance of payments deficit. To be sure, at the very beginning of the weekend defence briefing, Wilson stressed that Britain’s ‘economic strength was as important to our international influence as our military strength’.98 Appreciating these interrelated issues of politics, strategy, and economics, recent historical accounts rightly consider the ANF to be a complex and carefully conceived proposal, and clearly more than an attempt to scupper the MLF.99 Discussions also touched on questions about the size of the Polaris force. It was during the fourth and final meeting at Chequers that Wilson informed his colleagues ‘of the five submarines which had been planned, two were at an advanced stage of development and short of scrapping it would be impracticable not to complete them’.100 This was a familiar defence. Wilson had

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readied this ‘escape clause’ as early as March 1964 in a Washington press conference.101 Economic excuses protected the future of the Polaris force, but, in turn, made the ANF necessary for the purposes of internationalisation. The conclusion of the defence committee had actually been largely noncommittal, resulting only in an agreement to a force of three boats, which did not preclude the acquisition of more. Two submarines were inadequate, but five were ‘unnecessarily high and would, apart from the serious financial and economic objections, risk stimulating an increase of the contribution which our allies sought’.102 The choice between three or four boats would increasingly come to divide the leading government ministries, while arguments for a fifth boat were resurrected on several occasions over the following weeks. The Treasury felt that the best course of action following the Chequers meeting was a three-boat force and, in the meantime, to go slow on the fourth boat, with the expectation that it would be cancelled.103 Conversely, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence continued to press for at least a four-boat force.104 The chiefs of staff were deeply sceptical of a three-boat force’s ability to satisfy existing strategic needs.105 The chief scientific advisor to the Ministry of Defence, Solly Zuckerman, had also stressed the need for ‘a nuclear lever of sufficient size’, meaning at least four boats were required, and preferably five, in order to pose a meaningful ‘political weapon’.106 Arthur Hockaday, private secretary to the secretary of state for defence, stressed that a decision along the lines of ‘not less than 3’ would be useful in providing greater flexibility during negotiations with Washington.107 These diplomatic anxieties were particularly acute following Johnson’s decision, only the day before, to help Britain secure additional funds from the IMF to combat the sterling crisis.108 The Wilson government’s attitude to the size of the Polaris force was thus not one of consensus, even if there appeared to be agreement regarding the continuation of the Polaris programme itself. By the close of the weekend, the ANF had survived wider scrutiny from a raft of senior government ministers and officials. The majority of attendees at the defence debate shared the belief that the ANF was necessary to extract military concessions.109 This belief, however flawed, helped to drive the decisionmaking process. On 23 November, Wilson spoke eloquently in the House of Commons on the value of the ANF proposal. He readily admitted that he was prepared to contribute British nuclear weapons to NATO for ‘commensurate advantages for our own defences’. This contribution would include a number of Polaris submarines, an interesting admission given that Wilson had yet to



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receive cabinet approval for their construction. He excused this decision by explaining that some submarines were ‘past the point of no return’, noting that the former Conservative government had postponed the last election. Wilson also went on to criticise the opposition for their lack of attention to the economic dimensions of British nuclear diplomacy.110 During his speech, the prime minister publicly criticised the notion of a mixed-manned surface fleet, and thus the MLF proposal. He stressed that it added nothing to Western strength and was likely to cause difficulties within the alliance.111 Wilson explained the dangers of a majority voting system that could potentially allow other countries to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons, thereby placing a West German finger ‘on the nuclear trigger’. Wilson went on to refer to this danger of ‘European Clause’ despite US assurances that no such danger existed.112 It is, at first glance, difficult to understand Wilson’s rationale. His comments appear strangely careless in the tense international climate, where West German and US interests still appeared to favour the MLF and the future of the ANF remained precarious. The context of debate deserves recognition. Wilson would later admit that he had said he had been forced to speak for forty-five minutes without anything to say.113 He would also apologise to both the West German and US governments for his comments. Although it is plausible that Wilson’s comments were accidental, this interpretation does not sit well with Wilson’s impressive gift for oratory or his own skill as a prime minister. Wilson would be venturing to Washington soon. Such aggressive rhetoric revealed the continuation of the diplomatic approach that he had favoured in opposition. By showing himself to be implacably opposed to the MLF, he could extract greater concessions from the United States in future negotiations regarding nuclear sharing. Moreover, accepting the agreement reached at the defence weekend, such rhetoric also likely reflected politics within the Labour Party. Wilson was keen to continue using criticism of the MLF to keep the party united and obscure divisions over the still controversial debates surrounding the ANF and the Polaris programme. The question of West German access to nuclear weapons was a lingering fear, widely shared across the Labour government.114 To be sure, after a dispute about the minutes of a cabinet meeting on this subject, Crossman explained to Trend that ‘satisfying’, rather than ‘dealing with’, the nuclear aspirations of the FRG would have divided the government.115 The sensitivity of this issue was not lost on Wilson. During a trip to Moscow in the previous year, and largely for the benefit of the party, the prime minister

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made noises about the danger of giving nuclear arms to West Germany.116 As he once remarked of the FRG and the MLF, ‘If you have a boy and wish to sublimate his sexual appetite it is unwise to take him to a striptease show’.117 Wilson would quickly learn that he could no longer enjoy the luxuries of opposition; dividing domestic and international audiences was now far more difficult. His speech was something of a shock for international onlookers. Rusk and Schröder received reports of Wilson’s comments as they were discussing the MLF, which caused ‘considerable concern’.118 Ball had optimistically commented to Johnson that, following discussions at Chequers, it was quite likely that the British government would work out an accommodation with the United States and the West Germans on the MLF.119 Wilson’s comments consequently surprised some officials in Washington.120 The surprise did not generate a favourable response. Lord Harlech, British ambassador to the United States, spoke with McGeorge Bundy, national security advisor to the president, shortly after the speech. Bundy, Harlech reported, ‘made extremely light of the possibility that we might use our present position as any kind of bargaining counter: in hard fact we had nothing to bargain with’.121 During a meeting in Washington several days later, and still somewhat bemused, Bundy explained, ‘I did not myself see how there could be any very interesting bargaining processes between Washington and London on the basis of a British position of this sort’.122 In a subsequent meeting, cooler heads prevailed. Bundy admitted that he did not intend to suggest all the dialogue should now be between FRG and Britain.123 Nevertheless, Wilson’s bravado in the House of Commons had done little to help Gordon Walker’s many weeks of subtle negotiations in Washington. Wilson’s comments were also deeply problematic in a wider international context. During this time, General Charles de Gaulle, president of France, had threatened to join with Eastern states in opposing West German unification and announced that France was likely to leave NATO in due course. Additionally, he talked of West German participation with French nuclear forces, thereby offering Bonn an alternative to the US-UK plans.124 Rogers had already stressed the need for the ANF to counteract the dangers of the MLF, and its importance as a lever against de Gaulle’s influence in the European Economic Community.125 Wilson’s remarks served to strengthen the position of de Gaulle and stoked suspicion of the alliance in the West German press.126 The British Ambassador to West Germany, Sir Frank Roberts, described the situation as highly delicate: ‘The particular danger at present, so far as the . . . [West Ger-



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man] Government are concerned, is that misconceptions of British intentions have coincided with a new move, apparently friendly . . . from de Gaulle’.127 Uniting the Labour Party behind opposition to the MLF had come at a high price to Britain’s wider diplomatic relations. The international community did not yet share Wilson’s confidence in the ANF as a solution to the vexing problem of nuclear sharing. Criticism of the MLF thus generated an understandably sour reaction abroad.

Cabinet Approval On 26 November 1964, Wilson gathered the full cabinet. The decision was made to commit ‘such Polaris submarines as we might construct’ to a proposed Atlantic Nuclear Force, leaving the question of its size for later.128 Given that Wilson had portrayed Polaris as part of a multilateral force, rather than an ‘independent deterrent’, the cabinet may have reasonably concluded that this position adequately reflected earlier electoral commitments. Castle, for example, believed that the ANF concept would enable Britain to ‘internationalise’ its nuclear deterrent.129 It is equally plausible, however, that the cabinet was happy to let a divisive topic pass through without further issue or, perhaps in a more cynical vein, were simply reluctant to oppose Wilson.130 It is worth noting that, at this time, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) had united in appreciation of their leader.131 Although perhaps because of Wilson’s own popularity, it could just as easily reflect the government’s small majority and its obvious vulnerability to even the smallest rebellion. Few ministers would have been willing to bring down their own government so soon, particularly as it had taken thirteen years to return to power. Although there were occasional attempts to take advantage of the government’s vulnerability, the prime minister reacted sharply to each instance and refused to submit to any threats of blackmail. Wilson’s memoirs highlight his success in keeping the party united, paying tribute to the general parliamentary gallantry of this period.132 Even Ian Mikardo and Michael Foot, both ardent unilateralists who had failed to secure cabinet positions, managed to restrain themselves on the nuclear issue.133 Each man would go on to create considerable trouble for Wilson and his whips throughout both Labour governments.134 The most notable exception to this period of unity was the successful refusal of two Labour backbenchers, Woodrow Wyatt and Desmond Donnelly, to follow their own party on the issue of renationalising the steel industry.135 An

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unexpected by-election loss in the following year, and its negative effect on the necessary parliamentary arithmetic, ultimately helped to ensure the success of the Wyatt-Donnelly revolt. There was, however, another important distinction between the prime minister’s failure with steel and his success with nuclear weapons. Contrasting with the unambiguous issue of renationalisation, Wilson had made considerable efforts to control and obscure the nature of the nuclear debate. As one minister present in the meeting later explained, the prime minister ‘can exert, when he is successful, a dominating personal control . . . . Usually [the cabinet] is dominated by his personality, and, if not, this is because he prefers to exert his control in less obvious ways’.136 Wilson had cautiously gathered support prior to this meeting and, more important, had directly controlled the flow of information available to the cabinet. In his memoirs, he explains that the production of the submarines was ‘well past the point of no return; there could be no question of cancelling them’.137 This was not the case. According to Healey’s memoirs: The navy told me that, though the hulls of two Polaris submarines were already laid-down and long lead items had been ordered for two more, it would still be possible to convert them into hunter-killer submarines at no additional cost . . . . When I gave Wilson and Gordon Walker this unexpected news they asked me not to let other members of the Cabinet know; Wilson wanted to justify continuing the Polaris programme on the grounds that it was ‘past the point of no return’. I did not demur.138

The existing historiography has rightly seized on Wilson’s ‘past the point of no return’ argument as a convenient fiction.139 Castle alleges that Healey subsequently admitted to this invention, during a cabinet meeting in early January 1968. When asked if it was feasible to cancel the Polaris programme, he explained that it was not possible at this stage, although it would have been possible earlier, when Labour took office.140 The alternatives to this decision had been hidden or obscured. Alongside efforts to control the flow of information, Wilson repeatedly stressed the benefits of continuation. The Polaris submarines offered Britain a strategically and diplomatically valuable tool at a significantly reduced cost. The 1966 White Paper later revealed that the expected operating costs of the Polaris force would be below 2 percent of the total defence budget.141 Broader economic factors were hugely important in generating support for the ANF. The cabinet secretary had advised Wilson to stress the possibility of concessions from NATO if the British



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government made a major contribution towards the Atlantic Nuclear Force. ‘The main recompense which we must seek’, Trend remarked, ‘is some relief from the burdens which we carry in Europe’ in order to continue with ‘the extra-European commitments’.142 The cabinet’s approval allowed Wilson to pursue the objectives of British nuclear diplomacy he had set out upon taking office and provided him with the greatest possible leverage in future discussions with Washington. To be sure, Wilson had only offered an unknown number of submarines, which were to be used in an as-yet nonexistent multilateral nuclear force. The proposal was not, however, an entirely fraudulent offering to Bonn or Washington. Gordon Walker privately considered the ANF to be the government’s ‘major foreign policy initiative’ upon taking office.143 Several authors rightly argue that the ANF was, at this point, a serious proposal.144 Wilson had successfully navigated the Labour Party’s nuclear divisions in fewer than six weeks. It would be a mistake, though, to seize on the cabinet’s approval as evidence of popular support for the Polaris programme or the ANF within the government. The absence of comments from other senior ministers echoing Gordon Walker’s faith in the proposal is striking. One of the few accounts by a minister present at these discussions suggests that the new government had ‘conjured away the idea of an independent nuclear deterrent with the ANF’ and in the process ‘abandoned its opposition to nuclear weapons’.145 Wilson had avoided, rather than resolved, these tensions within the government. By early December, Healey had developed a more detailed outline for the Atlantic Nuclear Force.146 The proposal would consist of British V-bombers, alongside an equal number of British and US Polaris submarines, an unspecified French contribution and a limited mixed-manned component. A Nuclear Control Commission linked to NATO, containing representatives of all contributing countries, would manage the force. The final decision on use would remain with the existing nuclear powers. Healey also was clear that the British government would retain independent national control. In many ways, accepting the inclusion of the British Polaris force, the ANF mirrored the earlier proposals developed by Peter Thorneycroft during the Conservative government under Douglas-Home.147 Wilson, of course, denied any such charge of imitation, claiming that his proposals were ‘less obsessional and more realistic’.148 This distinction was at best rhetorical. Despite its arguably unoriginal character, Healey’s proposal addressed many lingering concerns within the government regarding nuclear sharing. These

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proposals removed the possibility of any expensive new surface fleet, as originally proposed by the United States, and offered only the inclusion of existing British armaments. The defence budget would therefore come under no additional strain. Healey’s proposal also left French participation open for future discussions, thereby pleasing officials in Bonn and Washington. Perhaps most important, these proposals facilitated greater levels of international cooperation by putting the ANF under a separate command structure. This had the dual benefit of guarding against French obstinacy within the NATO Council, whilst simultaneously allowing West Germany to develop some influence within the alliance without acquiring nuclear weapons. For some historians, at its core the ANF was a non-proliferation treaty binding all NATO members.149 Such claims appear reasonable. Following this new proposal, all non-nuclear powers would be obliged to abstain from developing nuclear weapons and would never gain control of nuclear weapons within the alliance. An internal briefing paper for Wilson, penned in late November, clearly stressed the ANF’s value in containing West German nuclear aspirations.150 Wilson and the Foreign Office were strongly committed to a non-proliferation treaty, and certainly did not want West Germany to gain access to nuclear weapons. Yet proliferation was only one strand of the ANF. Trend had produced another briefing paper almost a week earlier. In it, he argued that the ANF touched on the pursuit of measures of nuclear consultation within NATO and the strengthening of the alliance, both of which honoured earlier electoral pledges. Perhaps most significantly, Trend stressed the potential relationship between the ANF and reductions to British defence expenditure.151 The proposal was also important as both a counterproposal to the MLF and a force for unity within the Labour Party, which helped to avoid lingering resentments about nuclear weapons and excused the continuation of the Polaris programme. Rogers offered another, unique, explanation for the ANF. He informed Trend, ‘I have always felt that a major aspect of these negotiations [on nuclear sharing] is not so much the containment of the nuclear aspirations of Germany, as the possibility of obtaining a political position in Europe which has hitherto been denied us by our exclusion from the EEC’.152 Although an interesting explanation, Wilson sought closer links with the Commonwealth at the time.153 Rogers admitted that it would be absurd to put such subconscious influences too high.154 The development of a more detailed proposal does not contradict the conclusion that nuclear sharing remained largely unpopular throughout the gov-



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ernment as a whole. The ANF remained an unwelcome distraction to Wilson’s preferred course of nuclear diplomacy, which sought nuclear independence and measures of consultation and non-proliferation. It would therefore be more accurate to consider Healey’s latest proposals as making the best of a bad situation. The ANF was, above all else, a reflection of the fact that the Wilson government could not, at this time, see an end to the pressure for British participation in measures of nuclear sharing.155 It was thus an attempt to limit the potential damage this commitment posed to British interests. During a conversation with Schröder in December, Gordon Walker admitted that the proposals had presented the British government with considerable internal political difficulty.156 Debate between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence persisted throughout late November and early December. Although both departments had agreed to contribute British submarines to the alliance without political strings attached, there was disagreement regarding the cosmetic nature of this commitment, specifically uniforms and flags on any mixed-manned fleet. As Laskey remarked to Trend, ‘[We] are swallowing a camel and it would be folly to strain at this gnat’.157 Both departments also continued to interpret the Nassau agreement differently with respect to nuclear sharing. British commitments to the United States therefore remained somewhat confused within the government.158 Such difficulties were particularly pressing given the prime minister’s upcoming visit to Washington and the ANF’s direct challenge to many of the objectives of the MLF. The United States had developed the MLF in an effort to quell persisting strategic anxieties within the alliance, address balance of payments deficits, and stem any desire by the FRG for its own nuclear weapons. The ANF and particularly its nondissemination clause, however, reflected the concerns of London and Moscow rather than Bonn. The Labour government was presenting a subtle but important change to the direction of nuclear sharing within the NATO alliance. Despite these modifications, the prime minister was not overly worried about his forthcoming visit to Washington.

Preparations for Washington In his memoirs, Wilson claims that Johnson pressed for the MLF with more fervor than Kennedy.159 That the prime minister considered himself to be under immense pressure from the United States to acquiesce to the MLF proposal remains largely unchallenged throughout the historiography.160 There is much

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to credit previous suggestions of Wilson’s anxiety in his preparations for Washington. On 25 November, Richard Neustadt, an advisor to the Johnson administration, told Wilson that the US-UK relationship would suffer if Britain failed to consider contributing to the American proposal.161 Later that month, Ball met with Wilson and stressed the need to keep the MLF intact.162 Accounts of these two events are accurate, but viewed in isolation they distort the wider political climate. Johnson did not consider the proposal essential to the success of his broader German policy.163 Concern over the MLF was actually symptomatic of anxiety over the perceived strength of his foreign and economic policies. Although it is impossible to support claims that Johnson believed the MLF had died in summer 1964, the president’s support for the proposal had certainly waned.164 The Johnson administration had become increasingly receptive to alternatives, especially those with a strong non-proliferation bent, which helps to explain why the ANF had generated a favourable reaction during Gordon Walker’s earlier trip to Washington. Furthermore, support for the MLF had never been strong or consistent within Washington. In October, Bundy had restrained Ball from proceeding with the MLF too quickly. Bundy, who was concerned by its potential to upset both France and Britain, remained unsure and wished to delay a decision.165 Such debates within the Johnson administration destabilised the base of support for the MLF.166 Chester Cooper, one of Bundy’s senior advisors, later contacted Healey to say that Johnson’s position had become more flexible.167 Even after Wilson’s comments in the House of Commons, the United States remained sympathetic to British ideas.168 By mid-November, senior officials within the British government had begun to appreciate ‘the degree to which the possibilities for negotiation have now been widened’ and that the Washington environment around the MLF had changed.169 Indeed, the United States ‘has made it clear that . . . they are disposed in principle to consider British proposals.’170 These comments help to contextualise Wilson’s discussions with Ball in late November. Although Wilson’s account of his meeting with Ball is somewhat dramatised, it is clear that Ball left an ultimatum.171 Crucially, though, Wilson doubted whether Ball was ever speaking on behalf of the White House.172 Brown, and later Healey, subsequently informed Wilson that conditions for negotiations were better than expected.173 Sir Henry Hardman, permanent undersecretary of state for defence, informed Healey that he had reached a similar conclusion after meeting with



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Neustadt on 30 November. Talks were illuminating. Neustadt claimed that recent US financial assistance to Britain had been entirely altruistic, and so his government did not expect ‘crude bargaining’ in future defence talks. Hardman disagreed. He suggested that the United States had helped Britain because of its own desire to protect the dollar. As discussions continued, Hardman became increasingly confident of the ANF’s chances of success. Neustadt even admitted that Johnson could ‘not afford to be saddled with an apparent “failure” of foreign policy towards Germany’, and consequently Washington’s position had become ‘pragmatic, rather than dogmatic’. Hardman thus believed that ‘it may be possible to extract more than had ever been thought out of the Americans’.174 Wilson was aware of these conflicting messages from Washington. Trend informed him on 2 December: ‘[T]he recent reconnaissance trips of Neustadt and Ball . . . have obscured the wood by highlighting particular trees . . . . [A]dvice on how to handle the President . . . is useful’ but ‘too much of the recent tooing and froing has smacked of lobbying by one interest or another no less insidious for being less fanatical’. ‘It should’, he concluded ‘be strenuously resisted’.175 The British government was evidently far better prepared for their confrontation with Washington than generally assumed. Nevertheless, preparations were painstaking.176 Discussions between Laskey, Rogers, and Trend in early December, for example, reveal the pressures mounting on Britain’s ambiguous commitment to the ANF. Laskey suggested that the government’s tactics should be to ‘play for time’.177 Rogers, however, expressed his growing anxiety regarding the pace of decision-making. He stressed that such delays served only to weaken Britain’s relationship with the United States and the EEC: ‘There is serious danger in allowing the issues to be delayed for too long—and still more in seeking to delay them for too long’. ‘Time’, he declared, ‘is not on our side’.178 Wilson must have recognised these dangers. There was an opportunity to move away from the MLF, but nuclear sharing would have to remain on the negotiating table in one form or another for the sake of wider British interests.

Transatlantic Nuclear Relations The US-UK summit held over 7 and 8 December 1964 was Wilson’s second meeting with Johnson that year, but his first as prime minister.179 Although broaching many topics, the ANF proposal formed the centre of the debate to which all discussion eventually led.180 Alongside the issue of nuclear sharing, discussions also explored measures of non-proliferation and consultative ar-

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rangements.181 At the same time, Healey and Gordon Walker talked with Rusk and US secretary of defense Robert McNamara. Here, discussions focused on national military contributions and the international landscape before eventually reaching British proposals for nuclear sharing.182 The US-UK economic relationship framed this summit. Foreign, and particularly US, support was essential to provide sufficient funds for the British government to avoid speculators forcing the devaluation of the pound. In exchange, American largesse depended on the stability of the pound and on Britain’s ability to serve US foreign policy, particularly East of Suez.183 British nuclear diplomacy subtly tied into these broader debates. The prime minister spoke frankly to the president about the economic troubles of the British government. Perhaps recognising these lingering difficulties, Johnson told Wilson that he believed Britain could join a nuclear alliance at no additional cost. There was, however, no promise of concessions from the United States in return for a British contribution to the ANF. Later that afternoon, the British delegation stressed the serious economic pressure confronting them, and the need to cut back worldwide commitments. It was at this time that they submitted their ANF proposal, the timing perhaps reflecting ambitions to extract future concessions. A private talk on monetary matters did follow in the late afternoon.184 Scrutiny of the ‘talk that never happened’, as Trend referred to it, reveals only that the US government endorsed British economic policy.185 The British delegation patiently waited for their hosts’ reaction to the ANF proposal. On the afternoon of the following day, the president instructed his delegation in NATO to enter into full discussions with Britain.186 Johnson had been cautious throughout the summit and deeply anxious about the proposal’s reception in the FRG. His final decision remained non-committal, leaving the British and West German governments to explore the ANF alongside existing proposals. Claims of the MLF’s death are therefore exaggerated.187 To be sure, shortly after meeting with Johnson, Wilson travelled to Canada and met with Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian prime minister, where he remarked, ‘[A]dmittedly they [the United States] had not abandoned the MLF’.188 Johnson made a formal commitment to a mixed-manned fleet multilateral force in a press conference several weeks later.189 The president later informed Wilson that he was still interested in the issue, and encouraged him to pursue the matter with the West Germans.190 Ball described the acceptance of the ANF as a tactical decision that would help towards the future reorganisation of nuclear power



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in the alliance.191 As Trend informed the cabinet, ‘[T]he MLF was still alive as a project’, but ‘with luck, the timetable has been slowed down; and a decision may be postponed until after the German election’.192 Nevertheless, Wilson would describe this event as a diplomatic victory. In his memoirs, he remarks that ‘clearly we had won the day’.193 The meeting’s outcome ensured that there was to be no US-UK crisis over the rejection of the MLF, and it allowed Wilson to exploit the situation to his own advantage.194 This result was all the more impressive given that earlier in the year Johnson had been vocal in wanting European, and particularly British, cooperation with the MLF and had hoped to have the matter settled by the end of the year.195 Immediately prior to the summit, Johnson had even expressed doubts about the value of Wilson’s visit to Washington.196 According to Bundy, Britain had forced America to rethink.197 This meeting, however, was not a zero sum game of nuclear diplomacy. Wilson and Johnson had both succeeded, in part. The pursuit of national interests had brought the two men together. Johnson wanted a strong British economy and support for US activities in Vietnam and East of Suez, whilst Wilson sought continued financial assistance and the successful continuation of the US-UK relationship. Both leaders therefore made every reasonable effort to cooperate.198 It is also worth noting that in preparatory talks prior to the meeting, the president and his key advisors had debated at length how hard to push their guests.199 Johnson would even admit, over a year later, that he had not wished to ‘foul up’ his relationship with Wilson by being difficult and had recognised the prime minister’s slim majority in the Commons.200 The president made his position very clear several days after their meeting in a memorandum to Lord Harlech: ‘[It] would be unfair to force an immediate decision . . . on a man who has been in power for less than two months, with a four-seat majority and a very grave economic and financial crisis on his hands’.201 Ironically, economic and political weakness helped to explain the success of British nuclear diplomacy. Divisions in Washington over US involvement in nuclear sharing had eased the progress of the British proposal whilst Johnson achieved a graceful exit from what had become an intractable diplomatic tangle.202 Suggestions of the ANF ‘torpedoing’ the MLF are somewhat misleading, as they suggest an immediacy or surprise to the course of proceedings that did not exist.203 The claim that Wilson ‘had been pushing at an open door in Washington’ is also disingenuous, particularly given Johnson’s own doubts on the matter and the continued debate on the MLF long after the summit.204

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The Johnson administration had only surrendered its prominent role in the nuclear sharing debate. Senior US officials, most notably Ball, believed that this was a first step towards Britain’s surrendering its nuclear weapons, and a real commitment to a collective deterrent.205 Washington was also increasingly aware of the controversy surrounding the issue at home and abroad, and was no longer willing to force the issue on Western Europe.206 Curiously, nuclear historians typically overlook the economic backdrop to this decision.207 The MLF had been a tool for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to facilitate the withdrawal of US troops, essential for improving the balance of payments, without exacerbating military and monetary difficulties with Europe.208 By 1964, the US balance-of-payment deficit had fallen from a high of $3.9 billion in 1960 to $2.4 billion, and the pressure on the dollar had eased.209 Although Vietnam would undermine this recovery, returning the deficit back to its 1960 level within three years, Johnson would not escalate the conflict until the following year.210 The financial need to withdraw troops from Europe and the threat of monetary pressure from surplus countries had therefore reduced, consequently tempering the urgency of a nuclear sharing solution. Following the summit in Washington, Wilson was pleased with his performance and believed that the US government was ‘very ready to consider our new proposals’.211 During a cabinet meeting held on 11 December, he emphasised US willingness to discuss the ANF proposal. He did concede, however, that a mixed-manned surface fleet was still open for further discussion. In the House of Commons on 17 December, Wilson successfully fought off criticisms from the opposition regarding the Labour government’s nuclear policies.212 Although the MLF limped on, there was now a viable British alternative with which to lead future nuclear sharing discussions. The real success of the summit, though, was that responsibility to reach a solution rested firmly with London and Bonn. Washington’s newfound apathy was remarkably opportune. In the best of all possible outcomes, the ANF proposal was also on the negotiating table, while support for nuclear sharing continued to fade. As John Young explains, ‘Britain might no longer face joint United States–German pressure to enter the MLF, but neither would Germany face joint Anglo-American pressure to enter the ANF’.213 This situation provided the perfect excuse to slow future nuclear sharing negotiations without risking the essential financial and military support that Britain required and eased the pressure to reach a swift solution. As the year ended, correspondence within the government strengthens charges of dishonesty. In a confidential note, Gordon Walker reveals, ‘Our gen-



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eral position should be that we . . . want an early decision. In fact I think that it would pay us if things drag on a bit, perhaps until the German elections. But it must look as if others, not we, are dragging our feet’.214 This act of duplicity was not an aberration. A subsequent telegram from the Foreign Office to Bonn only re-emphasises this point: ‘We want to be seen to be making progress towards a solution’ but ‘don’t want to be blamed for splitting the alliance or make it look like a British failure if the ANF does not come off ’.215 Young rightly notes that this ‘two-faced policy’ reflected continuing resistance within Whitehall. There is no evidence that the Ministry of Defence had altered its vehement opposition to any notion of a mixed-manned surface fleet. Moreover, the Treasury had already begun to resent the extra costs associated with such proposals and was strongly opposed to the notion of the government financing its own, larger national contribution.216 Delay therefore suited most Whitehall officials, albeit for different reasons. In December, Erhard informed both Healey and Wilson that he still wanted to pursue a nuclear sharing solution.217 Fortunately, the upcoming elections in the FRG meant that he was unwilling to press the emotive and divisive issue at that time. For Erhard, the debate concerning nuclear sharing threatened to exacerbate already fraught tensions between those in his government who sought closer nuclear collaboration with France and those who preferred cooperation with the British and US governments.218 In the absence of West German or American support, Britain stood alone with the ANF. The Labour government’s reaction to these shifting international contexts was to support the creation of nuclear sharing publicly, but privately to seek delay.

Conclusion The ANF evolved through a series of ad hoc meetings and cabinet committees to serve many domestic and international interests within the Labour government. Wilson was keen to use the proposal to his advantage, whether extracting greater concessions from the United States or obscuring lingering nuclear tensions within the party. Crucially, though, these interests were not the motivating forces behind the proposal. The ANF emerged only when Wilson believed that some form of nuclear sharing within NATO was likely and that exclusion would harm British interests. When the pressure for nuclear sharing eased, so too did the momentum behind the proposal. A more serious commitment to the ANF, and its non-proliferation and economic pretensions, would

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surely have resulted in Wilson’s pushing through a proposal already largely acceptable to the West German and US governments. The ANF was only ever a more palatable variation of a still largely unpopular idea. Any improvement it brought to long-standing commitments to nuclear sharing was therefore relative, rather than absolute. Washington’s reluctance to lead the development of future solutions offered the British government a valuable opportunity to begin to extricate itself from existing commitments to nuclear sharing. The Labour government’s reaction to these shifting diplomatic contexts was to support the creation of a nuclear sharing solution publicly, but to ensure delay privately. This conclusion lends credence to the argument that the ANF was merely a tolerable variation of what remained a largely unwelcome intrusion on the preferred course of British nuclear diplomacy.

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that Harold Wilson had generated behind the Atlantic Nuclear Force proposal during his first three months in office rapidly deteriorated thereafter. Inertia was not entirely surprising, least of all to the prime minister. There remained a deep-seated antipathy to the sharing of nuclear weapons between states throughout the British government. Nevertheless, broader diplomatic and economic considerations meant that Wilson was unwilling to surrender the proposal in its entirety. His concern about relations with international creditors and doubts about the emergence of a nuclear alliance excluding Britain encouraged caution. The ANF, understood as a commitment to international nuclear cooperation, also helped to keep the Labour Party united on the historically divisive issue of nuclear weapons and obscured fundamental similarities with Conservative nuclear policy. The attempt to balance political, economic, strategic, and diplomatic objectives manifested itself at the highest levels of government as a commitment to delaying progress on all aspects of nuclear sharing, but stopped short of outright rejection. Wilson wanted the ANF dead, but he could not be seen to kill it. Throughout 1965 and 1966, the British government subtly extricated itself from earlier commitments to nuclear sharing solutions and focused its attention on a non-proliferation agreement and consultative arrangements within NATO. This was a difficult transition. Efforts to exclude commitments to nuclear sharing from a British draft of a non-proliferation treaty soured relations with the FRG and United States. On such issues, the Labour government was he m o men t u m

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much closer to agreement with the Soviet Union than with its own allies in NATO. Despite international and party pressures, however, Wilson successfully delayed progress on the ANF and avoided the resurgence of the MLF. In so doing, British nuclear diplomacy increasingly focused on the realisation of a non-proliferation treaty and the creation of a consultative body within NATO. Although serious proposals in their own right, they were also crucial in obscuring the government’s cautious retreat from nuclear sharing.

Managing the ANF On 1 January 1965, Patrick Gordon Walker concluded that ‘we have had success in getting the “A.N.F.” to take precedence over “M.L.F.”’1 Overcoming the MLF had been a major diplomatic objective for the Labour government during its first months of power. It now faced the question of what to do with the ANF. By the end of 1964, the proposal’s advancement had slowed.2 The government’s aversion to nuclear sharing meant that, in the newfound absence of US and West German pressure, it did little to progress the ANF thereafter.3 Despite the proposal’s unpopularity among much of the government, however, Wilson remained unwilling to surrender his formal commitment to the ANF. This compromise position reflected a raft of diplomatic considerations. The proposal was crucial to forestalling an exclusive nuclear partnership between the US and the FRG, and consequently West German access to nuclear weapons.4 Moreover, US support for the pound, growing tensions with the FRG concerning the costs of military cooperation in Western Europe, and fears of a revival of the MLF meant that formal support for the ANF remained prudent. Wilson’s hesitance also underlined the continued importance of the proposal from a party perspective.5 The ANF helped to excuse the continuation of the Polaris programme, and thus ease lingering tensions within the government, without sacrificing strategic nuclear independence. As an internal Treasury memorandum explained, ‘[If] things went wrong, the British government might have to decide about its independent nuclear deterrent without the advantage of being able to say that it is unreservedly assigning to an international force the Polaris submarine’. The note concluded, ‘It is thus difficult to dispute the need to keep the ANF concept alive long enough to allow HMG to announce a Polaris decision against this background’.6 Although Wilson’s slender parliamentary majority of four seats had encouraged unity, cooperation on nuclear issues was premised on the integration of British nuclear weapons into an international force.

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Changing the parameters of the debate could have prompted a rebellion on this issue, which could have undermined the government. Wilson’s efforts to nurture compromise within the party and slow progress on nuclear sharing had done little to clarify the government’s actual position on the ANF. More than one historian has charged Wilson with accentuating a sense of uncertainty in his party, and this appears to be especially true with respect to nuclear sharing in early 1965.7 Despite accepting the need for delay, Gordon Walker was committed to the idea. ‘It will pay us to have some delay’, he noted. ‘But we must appear throughout as eager for an early solution. On balance, it is good to have time for people here to get used to the idea of A.N.F. and also see that it would much better to have this than nothing . . . . I will press hard, sometime this year, to get the A.N.F. accepted’.8 It was, Gordon Walker believed, the only viable solution to West German demands for nuclear sharing. Such sentiments were not indicative of the wider government’s commitment to the ANF. Gordon Walker and the Foreign Office accepted delay in the hope that the rest of the government might ‘get used to the idea’.9 The Ministry of Defence and the Treasury remained unimpressed. The former was increasingly concerned about the extent to which national prestige was involved in the fate of the project.10 The latter expressed its resentment towards the extra costs associated with the proposal, specifically the notion of Britain financing a larger contribution of the costs.11 By starting international talks on ANF finance prematurely, there would be limited scope for bargaining and any advantage on reimbursement for contributions would be lost.12 Beyond lingering tensions within Whitehall, the New Year had brought a period of flux to the progress of nuclear sharing in the international arena. The Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin, wrote to Wilson on 6 January, stressing that West German involvement in the ANF was akin to proliferation.13 In a subsequent conversation with Wilson, Aleksander Soldatov, Soviet ambassador to London, was strongly opposed to the ANF. He suggested that it would whet nuclear appetites and he was ‘puzzled by UK’s role in negotiations’. Soldatov concluded, somewhat fairly, that ‘the change of the name does not change the substance of the matter’.14 Such a response was expected. Burke Trend had briefed Wilson as early as November stressing that the Soviet government was likely to see the ANF only as a replacement to the MLF.15 Such a position was also characteristic of Soviet foreign policy and its hopes of driving a wedge between the FRG and her allies.16 Opinion among the governments of the EEC differed on the issue. French

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president Charles de Gaulle merely transferred his criticisms of the MLF on to the ANF. It would, he felt, undermine the nascent Franco-West German axis and empower US influence over Western Europe.17 There was, however, some uncertainty as to the position of the FRG. Bonn had made its preference for a mixed-manned nuclear sharing solution clear to London.18 Furthermore, some British internal reports note the emergence of new nuclear tensions in the West German government. Deputy Under-Secretary of State Lord Samuel Hood, for example, had suggested that the mood in West Germany was critical, uncertain, and increasingly suspicious of the British government. Such conclusions should not be overplayed. The Foreign Office noted that it was ‘not inclined to treat this [Hood’s fears of West German suspicions] too seriously, except to consider possible discussion with the Germans prior to [sic] chancellor’s visit to Paris’.19 Indeed, Bonn’s response to the ANF was largely favourable.20 Despite initial confusion, it soon became clear that the West Germans were willing to cooperate with the ANF.21 Following discussions between Gordon-Walker and Gerhard Schröder, federal minister of foreign affairs, on 18 December 1964, the West German reaction to the ANF was reasonably positive.22 Several days after Hood’s communique, Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts informed the Foreign Office that West Germany welcomed the proposal.23 Despite still desiring a mixed-manned fleet, the West Germans were happy to accept the overall aims of the plan, including a reduction in the size of surface fleet and, most important, the need for non-proliferation.24 A willingness to cooperate posed some immediate problems. Correspondence within the Cabinet Office reveals that West German interest in the ANF could, if pursued, pose significant ‘political embarrassments for the Government at the present time’.25 Concerns comprised technical and financial anxieties. Permissive Action Links (PAL), devices included in or attached to a nuclear weapon system to preclude unauthorised arming or launching, became a matter of central importance to both Whitehall and ministers. Both the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence were unwilling to accept ‘lock and key’ systems on Polaris submarines integrated into a multilateral force. Such a concession could prevent the British government from using or, in the event of dissolution, recovering Polaris missiles without consent from her NATO allies.26 The concept inherently challenged long-standing conceptions of operational independence. At the close of 1964, all NATO members had received an outline of the government’s ANF proposal. NATO members collected a revised version early in the New Year following feedback from the United States, Canada,

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and Italy. The British government’s hesitance to progress the proposal, coupled with the unpopularity of the PAL concept, resulted in a perplexing set of revisions. A PAL system could be acceptable to the British government, but this commitment required the return and control of any weapons as needed, citing the example of the dissolution of NATO.27 This caveat effectively emasculated the role of PAL by allowing the British government to decide when such restrictions could apply. New financial anxieties had also emerged regarding the consequences of nuclear sharing. From the end of 1964, the balance of payments improved up until the last quarter of 1967.28 Yet the pressure on sterling continued and the sustained drain on reserves forced further borrowing from abroad. The proposed budgeting of the ANF, and how the government would fund its own contribution, was thus an increasingly thorny issue. The Treasury had decided by early 1965 that a shared budget was preferable to a programme of national financing, as it offered the chance to secure from other participants a net contribution towards the overall operating costs. There remained, however, considerable anxiety within the Treasury regarding the impact such a decision would have on the government’s position on mixed-manning. If costs were shared, it would be possible to challenge the long-standing argument that Britain could not afford to contribute to a mixed-manned fleet, because of its expenditure on Polaris submarines.29 These anxieties were to become particularly acute in early 1965 when, following the feedback from the United States, Canada, and Italy, the DOPC accepted that a mixed-manned fleet should be part of the ANF force.30 Technical and financial concerns evidently encouraged cautious progress for the British government concerning nuclear sharing proposals.

The Size of the Polaris Force The amount of material passing over Wilson’s desk represented a staggering increase over his predecessors.31 Whereas most prime ministers had roughly similar amounts of material on defence and economic matters, the latter absorbed significantly more of Wilson’s attention. A 1959 Gallup opinion poll showed that economic issues came second to issues of foreign policy and defence, but the situation had reversed by 1966.32 The state of the economy certainly exerted considerable influence on nuclear policy within the Labour government. Indeed, the size of the proposed Polaris force was still unclear at this time as anxieties about cost vied against calls for effectiveness.33

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On 12 January 1965, James Callaghan circulated a memorandum detailing the case for a three-boat Polaris force.34 Here, the Treasury’s lingering resentment at anything more than a three-boat force was re-emphasised. Callaghan’s criticism of a four-boat force revolved around the inability of Polaris to help diplomatic ambitions whilst intensifying the financial burden placed upon Britain. In earlier correspondence, the Treasury stressed that its principal interest at that time was ‘to secure a decision in favour of three Polaris submarines, which would be a real and lasting contribution towards the £2,000 million 1969–70 Defence target’.35 This target represented the Labour government’s recent commitment to a 16 percent reduction in military expenditure within five years. The decision reflected the belief that excessive overseas spending had caused the recent currency crises, although an unwillingness to reduce spending on education or welfare priorities left few other alternatives for cuts. 36 In addition, Wilson had repeatedly defended the continuation of the Polaris programme as a way in which to extract military concessions from Britain’s allies.37 A commitment to investment in nuclear weapons therefore not only reduced the available defence budget but also excused further cuts. Wilson did not find Callaghan’s economic arguments convincing. Even by removing the fourth and fifth submarine, savings would only amount to less than 1 percent of total defence spending. More than one author notes the overall success of the Polaris programme, citing its timely completion some 13 percent below the anticipated cost.38 It is, however, important to appreciate that at the time the Treasury were increasingly aware of the many overruns and mistakes occurring at early stages of development.39 The chancellor went on to make an unmistakable appeal to Wilson’s earlier electoral commitments. He stressed that the argument in favour of four boats made sense only if the government was trying to achieve an independent deterrent force. If that was the case, the ANF was merely an ‘an ingenious disguise’.40 Immediately following this memorandum, Denis Healey made his own case for a four-boat force. He stressed the economic utility of such a force, specifically its importance in significantly reducing present defence contributions within NATO, and its value to the strength of the alliance. The secretary of state for defence also stressed that three boats would not provide a consistent and year-round deterrent, and, if NATO withdrew its support, Britain would be left with an ineffective and thereby pointless, deterrent force.41 It is perhaps also worth noting that following these memoranda, the Ministry of Defence made a serious case for a larger Polaris force to protect British interests in India

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and East of Suez. Senior defence officials argued that with anything less than a five-boat force it would not be possible to maintain one boat on patrol at all times in the Indian and Pacific oceans without very expensive and unplanned support facilities and consequently deterrence would suffer.42 Healey and Callaghan eventually agreed to cancel the fifth submarine. This decision remained their only point of agreement. While Callaghan urged the cancellation of the fourth submarine, Healey and Gordon Walker pushed to proceed with four boats immediately. The Treasury argued that ‘the logic of the Secretary of State [for Defence]’s arguments seem open to question’.43 The question, it felt, was not whether three submarines were too few for Britain’s independent strategic needs but whether a joint contribution of three submarines from the United States and an equal number from Britain were sufficient for a NATO force. Differences of opinion evidently reflect the very different criteria deployed in judging the necessary size of the Polaris force. Interestingly, disagreement between Healey and Callaghan was quite abnormal. Healey notes in his memoirs that however much they argued in private about their own programmes, he usually supported the chancellor in cabinet discussions.44 Debate about the size of the Polaris force was therefore not a personal difference but an inherent interdepartmental conflict driven by the Treasury’s continuous efforts to reduce expenditure. On 29 January 1965, the DOPC met to determine the size of the Polaris force. In what was to become a marathon meeting, a raft of senior officials joined Wilson.45 After reiterating the positions presented by Callaghan and Healey earlier in the month, Wilson concluded that the balance of arguments was in favour of a force of four submarines, noting the dangers if one out of a force of three were involved in an accident. The costs would be met within the total defence budget, but it would be necessary to negotiate an amendment of the Polaris Sales Agreement before any public statement was made.46 The Cabinet Committee therefore accepted the strategic need to ensure that one submarine would always be on station, thereby allowing the uninterrupted continuation of ‘the national deterrent’. The committee, however, also appreciated the broader economic considerations and, simultaneously, the need to ensure a favourable response from the United States. If strategic concerns had been the only criterion, it seems likely five boats would have preferable.47 A four boat force allowed at least one submarine to remain on patrol at all times and would anticipate unforeseen gaps in the, at present, theoretical operating cycle.48 The size of the Polaris force therefore reflected a compro-

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mise between strategy and economics. The government, however, downplayed the latter. Subsequent preparations to inform the United States of the decision stressed that there was to be no mention of cost as a contributing factor to this decision, for fear of appearing weak internationally.49 A number of newspaper leaks forced the government to rush forward official details of the decision.50 Healey thus announced the cancellation of the fifth boat in the House of Commons on 15 February, although, somewhat curiously, the opposition raised no criticism of this decision at that time.51

The ANF and the NPT On 30 January 1965, Winston Churchill’s funeral presented Wilson with the opportunity to meet with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard. During their discussion, Erhard confirmed Wilson’s suspicions that no decision to join a collective nuclear force would be made until after the West German election in autumn 1965.52 The chancellor’s willingness to delay a decision provided Wilson with a convenient excuse for delay. Events within the government also helped to slow progress. On 21 January, Gordon Walker lost a by-election in the normally safe Labour seat of Leyton, which forced his exit from the House of Commons. Having failed to secure his own seat in Smethwick in the earlier General Election, following a controversial anti-immigration campaign led by his Conservative opponent Peter Griffiths, Wilson regretfully informed his colleague that it would be impossible for him to carry on in the Foreign Office.53 This unexpected loss reduced Labour’s overall majority in the House of Commons to three, which helped to ensure the success of an internal revolt on the issue of steel renationalisation later that year. These failures were significant. Talk of holding an election in March 1965 swiftly evaporated, and internal tensions grew over the course of the year.54 Michael Stewart replaced Gordon Walker as secretary of state for foreign affairs. Stewart proved to be, Wilson would recall, ‘an outstanding success’.55 Although Stewart remained formally committed to the ANF, it is difficult to discern the same level of personal commitment that Gordon Walker offered to the proposal. To be sure, despite losing his seat, the former foreign secretary later journeyed to Washington arguing that the United States was failing to support the ANF.56 Following the loss of arguably its greatest proponent, support for the ANF continued to falter. Uncertainty even began to divide the Foreign Office, the only consistent base of support for the proposal. By late January, senior

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officials in the Foreign Office decided not to circulate a new draft proposal on the ANF, as originally intended. Evelyn Shuckburgh, permanent representative to North Atlantic Council, made it clear that the circulation of a new version of the British paper would revive interest in the project. This was dangerous, as the absence of any ‘follow-up’ would make many within the alliance sceptical of British motives.57 His colleagues, Roberts and Lord Harlech, the British ambassador to the United States, subsequently supported this position.58 Interdepartmental debate had descended into intradepartmental dispute. Indeed, upon receipt of these letters, internal correspondence within the Foreign Office noted that ‘the troops in Bonn have mutinied’.59 The resistance succeeded, and further discussions, not amended proposals, became the focus of British nuclear diplomacy. The Foreign Office was keen to stress, however, that ‘discussions should continue and we [the British government] should not appear to be delaying or obstructing progress’.60 On 8 and 9 March, Wilson and Erhard met in Bonn. During their talks, Wilson fought to protect references to non-proliferation in the ANF, which had become major plank of British nuclear diplomacy.61 Interest in averting the spread of nuclear weapons gathered momentum after Macmillan had secured the revocation of the McMahon Act and an effective nuclear partnership with the United States.62 Somewhat paradoxically, nuclear stability provided the British government with the confidence to pursue a viable non-proliferation treaty, albeit for other states first.63 Wilson was deeply committed to realising a worldwide non-proliferation agreement.64 Upon taking office in 1964, the prime minister appointed Alun Gwynne-Jones as minister for disarmament, a new position first proposed by Wilson in 1961.65 Gwynne-Jones, ennobled Lord Chalfont, took responsibility for progressing the government’s disarmament objectives. This new position was little different from the minister of state for the Foreign Office, previously responsible for disarmament, a point readily acknowledged by Chalfont.66 Nevertheless, the Queen’s speech, following the opening of Parliament on 3 November, included a firm commitment to restarting negotiations for a treaty.67 The attractions of a non-proliferation treaty were clear. Such an agreement embraced popular sentiment within the Labour Party regarding complete nuclear disarmament and helped to assuage lingering ‘nuclear tensions’.68 A treaty would help to ensure that British nuclear weapons retained their perceived diplomatic and strategic value without fear of dilution from nuclear competitors. Most important, a global agreement would also reduce the global danger of nuclear proliferation.69 The Chinese atomic test and

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fears of Indian nuclear ambitions only heightened Wilson’s commitment to the NPT.70 Non-proliferation consequently remained a major objective, even if tied to an unpopular proposal. Returning to the issue of nuclear sharing, Erhard said that party politics, domestic issues, and relations with France made it difficult to make any firm decisions. Although he did not believe the MLF to be dead, Erhard agreed with Wilson that the MLF was now ‘a sort of Sleeping Beauty’. Respecting the chancellor’s desire not to be seen discussing the topic directly, Wilson and Erhard remitted the nuclear sharing problem to the Paris Working Group (PWG).71 NATO had established the PWG in November 1963, to consider issues of control and legality surrounding the MLF. Shuckburgh, having previously represented the government here, thus reluctantly entered into a second round of nuclear sharing negotiations. The first round, regarding the development of the MLF, had lasted more than two years and was, in his own words, ‘an unsatisfactory experience’. He noted that during the discussions, ‘London was divided not only as the detail but into the basic question whether we wanted the negotiations to succeed or fail’.72 His request for clear instructions at this point is therefore a candid reaction to the pervading air of indecision. Shuckburgh, like the rest of the government hoping for some clarity on the matter, was to remain disappointed over the following months as Wilson pursued his favoured policy of delay. As the Cabinet Defence Committee concluded at the end of March, ‘[O]ur policy is and should remain to be ahead, but only just ahead, of our allies in regard to this proposal’.73 In appreciation of the increasingly divisive nature of nuclear sharing, a cabinet sub-committee was formed in February to deal with the question of the ANF.74 Despite these proactive efforts to manage divisions within the government, efforts to reach an agreement on the details of the ANF proposal remained largely ineffective. In early March, Roberts noted the continued existence of a prevailing political inertia.75 The opposition was seemingly aware of Wilson’s tactics. In the House of Commons on 3 March, Thorneycroft, now shadow defence secretary, attacked Wilson’s commitment to the ANF as insincere, stating that the ‘only engagement which this nuclear force has ever been in was to sink the M.L.F. and that was apparently successful’.76 The British government’s timidity concerning nuclear sharing contrasted with its bolder efforts to realise a non-proliferation treaty. Formal negotiations on non-proliferation date back to 1959, when the major powers of Europe and the United States established the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament to

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establish a dialogue between East and West and to consider the feasibility of an international non-dissemination agreement. By 1962, the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament expanded into the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva. Only seventeen nations attended, following France’s refusal to take a seat in the committee.77 The principal business of the ENDC was negotiation on a treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. France and the People’s Republic of China denounced the idea of such a treaty and abstained from negotiations.78 Britain thus secured its place as the third and final nuclear power at the negotiating table, albeit by default. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, enjoyed permanent leadership of the committee and were able to dictate the timing and substance of all debate.79 ‘Britain’, J. P. G. Freeman convincingly suggests, ‘was quite simply not powerful enough to change the agenda of possibilities’.80 Throughout 1963 and 1964 ‘poor signalling, misperception, and alliance politics’ repeatedly undermined efforts on both sides.81 There were also problems within the alliance. The British and Soviet governments opposed a treaty that allowed nuclear sharing in Europe, while the West German and US governments were committed to creating a multilateral nuclear force.82 The ENDC had fallen silent since its adjournment on 17 September 1964 after Soviet representatives had blamed the Western powers for slowing the progress on nuclear disarmament.83 Before developing any such treaty, the NATO allies would need to find a way to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union. During the early months of 1965, East and West remained deadlocked on matters of non-proliferation, with the Soviet Union refusing to reconvene discussions in the ENDC. This diplomatic impasse had not hindered British optimism. On 8 March, Chalfont ventured to Washington for talks with William Foster, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). Both men had already met in December, coordinating British and US policies on arms control in response to Soviet intransigence concerning the MLF.84 Chalfont recounts that they were in agreement for the need to reopen the ENDC, if only in order to maintain an atmosphere of detente and set about drafting ‘a constructive agenda’. This included a non-proliferation treaty but also a start to talks on chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons on the seabed and in outer space. Chalfont suggests that these smaller steps were essential to creating and maintaining momentum in the negotiation process.85 Discussions pertaining to a draft non-proliferation treaty were nevertheless often difficult.

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Foster was critical of the decision to rule out a future European nuclear force.86 While non-proliferation had assumed immediate importance within the British government, the issue had divided the Johnson administration. The Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, or the Gilpatrick report, had stressed the importance of non-proliferation and suggested that progress in this area should not be dependent on the resolution of any issues relating to nuclear sharing.87 In contrast, Robert McNamara supported intensified efforts to negotiate a non-proliferation agreement but argued that the US government must first seek to retain the veto over MLF forces.88 Throughout late 1964 and early 1965, many in the US government had questioned whether it was appropriate to take up the dialogue on disarmament with the Soviet Union and if the early tabling of such a proposal in future disarmament discussions was desirable.89 Despite US doubts, the British government took every opportunity to pursue the resumption of non-proliferation negotiations. Stewart and Chalfont, and later Wilson, met with Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, during his visit to London in March 1965. Throughout their talks, they pressed him to agree to a resumption of negotiations.90 Events in Vietnam and an unwillingness to return to discussions in Geneva without something to talk about help to explain Soviet intransigence.91 Despite these obstacles, Gromyko agreed in principle to a resumption of discussions. He also took the opportunity to stress the perceived inconsistency in a British position that advocated disarmament and at the same time proposed an Atlantic Nuclear Force that gave the West Germans access to nuclear weapons. Following Gromyko’s return to Moscow, the Soviet government proposed an early return to the Geneva talks.92 What promoted this policy reversal remains unclear. China’s recent nuclear tests and a possible Soviet desire to disrupt nuclear cooperation in NATO likely played a role.93 As the year progressed, Wilson remained content to delay proceedings on the ANF until after the West German elections. The period from April to June 1965 produced renewed debate regarding the financial commitments of the proposed force. Debate in the Treasury focused on the practicalities of ensuring that the FRG achieved a position of nuclear parity within the ANF. The costs of such a proposal for Britain would be around £360 million, accepting variations in the potential size of the mixed-manned fleet and the size of the US contribution. Appreciating the costs of this commitment, there were a number of methods for ensuring West German parity with Britain and the United States, including contributing an equal number of missiles and sharing capital costs.94

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After a series of calculations, the Treasury concluded that, in each case, the FRG could not achieve parity, largely because of their limited military capabilities. An alternative approach was a single common budget for the financing of all elements of the force. This proposal allowed the FRG to attain nuclear parity, thereby strengthening notions of collective ownership by emphasising the international and integrated character of the ANF. The main reason why these proposals were of such interest to the Treasury, however, was their cost saving potential. On a 20 percent basis, the value of Polaris submarines would provide a ‘credit balance’ to use against a share of the larger operating costs of the ANF. A common alliance budget would allow other participating nations to contribute indirectly to the cost of Britain’s Polaris submarines. This solution remained imperfect. The Treasury was understandably anxious about revealing any US-UK financial arrangements to the wider alliance. Moreover, a common financial system would make it difficult to recover British submarines after the breakup of NATO, following the hypothetical dissolution of the force.95 The issue of financing the ANF with West German contributions was especially relevant given the ‘offset problem’ surrounding British forces stationed on the Continent. Although willing to pay for the costs of the resources, the British government resented the associated exchange rate costs. During the Macmillan government, the West German government had agreed to offset these costs by buying military equipment from British and US suppliers.96 These offsets had waned in recent years, and, given his economic woes, Wilson raised the issue with Erhard during a summit in March 1965. A downturn in West German growth and their previous support for sterling in money markets, alongside fears that reductions to British forces would upset NATO, meant that Wilson was unwilling to push the issue. In April 1965, Jack Diamond, the chief secretary to the Treasury, negotiated a compromise. He extended the current agreement to March 1967, with West Germany offsetting approximately 70 percent of foreign exchange costs.97 Hubert Zimmermann stresses the need not to exaggerate these tensions. Compared with the implications for Western financial and security policy in the US-FRG offset agreements, West German–British offset negotiations were ‘a sideshow, albeit a very noisy one’.98 Nevertheless, this was all occurring while the Treasury grappled with the costs of the Polaris programme and the ANF. The possibility of a ‘credit balance’ was therefore an important way to generate much needed revenues from West Germany. Despite these financial opportunities, Wilson was still far from keen to advance nuclear sharing proposals. Interdepartmental debate further slowed pro-

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ceedings. Officials within the Foreign Office contended that a stringent nonproliferation agreement would enhance British security interests. Conversely, many within the Ministry of Defence believed that Britain’s independent contribution to the ‘Western deterrent’ was essential in securing national interests abroad.99 The ANF and a British draft of the NPT thus competed against each other, with the latter repeatedly gaining ground at the expense of the former over the coming months.100 Divisions remained irreconcilable, as evidenced by Laskey’s recommendation that the latest drafts of the ANF proposal should not be given to ministers but remain with the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office.101 In the NATO talks that opened on 5 May, Shuckburgh was required only to defend the existing ANF proposal and explore possibilities without commitment.102 Beyond interdepartmental debates, international affairs also exerted considerable influence over the progress of nuclear sharing. Kosygin’s criticisms of the ANF seemed to undermine any hope for the coexistence of a non-proliferation treaty and a multilateral nuclear force. During one cabinet discussion, Barbara Castle, minister for overseas development, voiced her concern that the Soviet Union’s opposition to ANF was an outright impediment to aspirations of non-proliferation in Europe.103 President Lyndon Johnson’s unwillingness to develop a treaty that excluded nuclear sharing therefore threatened to derail the broader negotiating process. By mid-June, Moscow had agreed to the resumption of the ENDC, later scheduled for 27 July 1965.104 The West German elections would follow on 19 September. Soviet intransigence and German delay could no longer obscure the British government’s unwillingness to advance its own nuclear sharing proposals. A clash between the ANF and a non-proliferation treaty would soon become unavoidable.

Non-proliferation Diplomacy While talks on the ANF slowed, the British government pursued a nonproliferation treaty with vigour. It was not yet clear whether a final US-UK text could be prepared for the resumptions of talks in late July. Stewart had discussed the issue with Dean Rusk on 22 March, but the latter opposed the tabling of the present British draft.105 In an internal memorandum, Foster recalled that even in May, when he had first been given a copy of the British draft, he ‘saw real difficulties with it for the United States, especially Bonn’.106 The British government remained undeterred. By early June 1965, Chalfont and

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the Foreign Office had agreed internally on a legally drawn draft treaty, which they showed to the Americans, Canadians, and Italians.107 This version did little to address the issue of nuclear sharing, and, as Stewart later admitted, it ‘went too far for our allies’.108 As late as 9 July, British officials were still seeking American comments on their draft.109 On 11 July, Rusk informed the president that there were substantial drawbacks in the British draft, whereby the language limited the development of the MLF/ANF proposal by insisting on the maintenance of a veto by one of the existing nuclear powers. The United States feared that this would undermine any hope of a consensus among their European allies.110 On 19 July, Patrick Dean, the British ambassador to the United States, met Foster and deposited an aide-memoire on instruction from London. This was a further defence of the unpopular British draft, stressing its compatibility with the ANF and the European option. To the US government, however, this draft offered only difficulty to the wider alliance and did little to mollify the pro-MLF lobby in the State Department.111 During the meeting, Foster expressed his preference for Britain not to table its draft at the opening ENDC session. The British government subsequently received suggestions for several amendments that would allow the United States to support the draft at the ENDC.112 On 22 July, Rusk learned of the British government’s rejection of his suggested changes to the draft treaty, and, moreover, Britain’s intention to immediately table the draft at the ENDC.113 US exasperation was palpable. Somewhat exaggerating the problem, Rusk, in discussion with McGeorge Bundy, went so far as to suggest that ‘NATO had never before been confronted with a disagreement between the US and the UK such as this’.114 Rusk sent Stewart a telegram later that day, stressing his deep concern about their failure to reach ‘a meeting of the minds’ on a non-proliferation treaty. He also stressed the danger of Western divisions, and suggested that the USSR’s objections were spurious, seeking only to create dissension in NATO ranks.115 In reply, Stewart, although still unhappy about the terms, was unwilling to exacerbate this US-UK schism: I am as anxious as you are not to cause strains in the alliance or to allow the Russians to exploit Western disagreements, although we must recognise that a real difference of view exists between our two Governments on the question of the so-called “European option”. . . . But we shall certainly want to review our position, rather than proceed at once to tabling the draft treaty at Geneva, if unfortunately we cannot get a NATO consensus of view.116

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It is difficult to tell whether the Foreign Office had misjudged the situation or had simply tried its luck. Hal Brands reasonably suggests that the British diplomacy over the proposed draft treaty was simply a more confrontational form of persuasion to coax Washington away from nuclear sharing proposals.117 By the summer of 1965, there was limited commitment to the ANF in the British government. The USSR would not accept a non-proliferation treaty until all signatories abandoned the idea of a ‘European nuclear force’. Surrendering this condition in a treaty would clearly complement Wilson’s desire to improve UK-Soviet relations and encourage detente.118 It would also help to address underlying fears of a German national leader acquiring nuclear weapons.119 Growing economic anxieties further help to explain the British government’s reluctance to commit to nuclear sharing in a non-proliferation treaty. The newfound preference by the United States for the provision of British warheads for the ANF was especially concerning. Such a condition would come at the expense of the UK’s own naval programme, diminish the already limited saving from cancelling the fifth submarine, and introduce further expenses in the form of costly firing tests, updating expenses, and potentially jeopardise the supply of fissile material.120 Beyond such concerns, however, a perceived shift in Washington’s attitude, towards consultative solutions and away from nuclear sharing proposals, may well have steeled Stewart’s nerve. Efforts to produce greater levels of consultation on nuclear matters within the alliance had resurfaced during a meeting of NATO defence ministers held between 31 May and 1 June 1965, following the technical and diplomatic failures of earlier efforts in the decade.121 McNamara proposed that the alliance should form a Defence Ministers Select Committee. The ‘McNamara Committee’ would deal with the problem of extending alliance participation in the decision to use nuclear weapons.122 On 21 July, the North Atlantic Council considered the proposal and agreed to the establishment of the committee consisting of defence ministers from the US, the UK, the FRG, Italy, and Canada. The new committee would report directly to the council and be purely consultative.123 Although there were fears that de Gaulle might quash this new proposal, French officials had no objection to the creation of a select committee of defence ministers.124 The British government’s initial reaction to the ‘McNamara Committee’ was not entirely positive.125 The implications were not yet clear, and it is unlikely that British diplomats immediately saw it as a solution to the debate over nuclear sharing in Western Europe, if only because McNamara himself initially denied any such intention.126 Indeed, despite initial res-

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ervations, Schröder welcomed the proposal as a complement to a multilateral force.127 Moreover, there were concerns that the new NATO committee might undermine Britain’s close nuclear relationship with the United States.128 Nevertheless, many within the British government came to believe that McNamara’s proposal was evidence of Washington reconsidering the value of nuclear sharing.129 These suspicions were well founded. McNamara later admitted that he introduced the proposal when he was sure the concept of nuclear sharing was dead.130 ‘Common Planning and consultation’, he explains in his own account of events, ‘are essential aspects of any sensible substitute to the unworkable and dangerous alternative of independent nuclear forces with the alliance’.131 Existing accounts persuasively suggest that McNamara believed that the committee idea was a viable alternative to the MLF; he suggested consultation only when he did not think Britain and the FRG were likely to find an area of agreement.132 The committee was also possibly a further attempt to isolate the French in order to force them to cooperate with NATO strategy or expose their obstinacy.133 American officials denied such claims. They repeatedly stressed that they intended the proposal to complement rather than undermine MLF-ANF discussions, and had not intended to ‘smoke out’ the French.134 McNamara’s early statements about compatibility, however, likely reflected a desire to defend the proposal from any objections within the alliance or his own government. Despite the myriad of motivations driving the British draft nonproliferation treaty, it was clear that it would go no further. In a subsequent meeting with Foster, Chalfont argued that he would announce, in the forthcoming NATO meeting scheduled for 26 July, his government’s intention not to immediately table a draft treaty at Geneva.135 Britain had capitulated. Thus, when Chalfont eventually met Foster in Paris prior to the opening of the ENDC in Geneva, there remained serious differences over a draft nonproliferation treaty.136 It is reasonable to ask why Stewart did not fight harder to protect his preferred version of the treaty. A mix of international pressure and self-interest largely explains the decision to delay tabling the British draft. The MLF and the ANF remained an instrument with which the US government could improve economic and military relations within the alliance and gain the FRG’s support for the NPT.137 Contrary to the Soviet position, the West German government wanted the nuclear sharing issue resolved before a non-proliferation treaty was negotiated.138 The Americans sympathised with the West Germans, for economic and geostrategic reasons,

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and thus did not want the British government to press its draft.139 The US government also remained suspicious of the USSR’s motivations and felt that they wanted to disrupt progress towards European cooperation.140 These intra-alliance concerns tempered the conduct and content of British nuclear diplomacy. Moreover, Wilson was anxious not to kill the ANF too early, for fear of a revival of support for the MLF.141 In the face of such resistance, a British draft could wait; cooperation with allies on wider strategic and diplomatic interests was too important to risk.142 Britain’s precarious economic state also necessitated continued and close collaboration with its creditors. Indeed, it is difficult to exaggerate US-UK economic interdependence at this time.

Economic Interdependence and Nuclear Weapons In Labour’s second budget, announced on 6 April 1965, Callaghan declared his intention to reduce the net outflow of long-term capital and his commitment to lower public expenditure.143 Although mildly deflationary, the budget failed to rebuild sufficient confidence in sterling. Speculative pressure increased and foreign exchange losses continued to grow.144 It is unsurprising that Wilson subsequently decided against holding an election before 1966.145 By July, a new crisis had emerged, following deterioration in the current account and growing pessimism in financial markets about the government’s ability to avoid devaluation.146 Alec Cairncross, head of the government economic service, suggests that Wilson rejected devaluation ‘unhesitatingly’, despite the advice of several economic advisors.147 With inadequate resources to defend the pound, Wilson and Callaghan sought further US support. At the end of June, Callaghan ventured to Washington to discuss future support for the pound. The United States, the chancellor of the exchequer learnt, would not provide any additional financial support until the British economy was ‘put in order’. This condition meant restraining the high level of demand and reducing the rate of growth.148 There was little option but to accept such demands. On 27 July, Callaghan informed the cabinet of the deflationary package that he, together with Wilson and George Brown, had developed. The measures passed through the cabinet relatively painlessly.149 Nevertheless, the pound still required external support.150 The situation was urgent. As Wilson notes in his memoirs, the governor of the Bank of England ‘felt that the financial end of the world was near’, with the dollar falling soon after the pound.151

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There was debate in Washington as to what concessions they should request from the British government. Some authors suggest that an agreement, secret or otherwise, was made by early summer 1965 whereby the United States would organise a multilateral rescue for the sinking pound, in return for British policies of deflation at home, retention of overseas military commitments, and support for the United States in Vietnam.152 Indeed, events in South East Asia were so troubling that, according to Henry Fowler, treasury secretary in the Johnson administration, McNamara said that he would give the British ‘an extra billion dollars for one brigade’.153 Bundy also suggested that they inform the British government that ‘a brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars’.154 Yet, under advisement from other senior colleagues, notably George Ball and Francis Bator, deputy national security adviser, Johnson decided against making demands for British military support in Vietnam. The president feared that, if presented with this option, Wilson might consider devaluation and withdrawal from the East of Suez as preferable alternatives.155 The former imperilled the American economy and the latter left a dangerous strategic vacuum and undermined operations in Vietnam.156 While most historians accept that there was never a deal on Vietnam, there is disagreement as to what was decided. Clive Ponting suggests that by August, after considerable debate, the United States had decided on its conditions for the support of sterling via a multilateral rescue package. These were to be the maintenance of Britain’s international defence commitments, the parity of the pound, and a series of deflationary policies.157 Jonathan Colman and Thomas Schwartz produce a more nuanced explanation. There was never any explicit agreement. Instead, there was only ever a tacit connection or ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ between US support for sterling and Britain’s posture East of Suez.158 It was the perception of the pound as the first line of defence for the dollar that largely motivated this ‘tacit connection’ between Britain and the United States.159 US policy-makers believed that the collapse of the pound might endanger the US economy and the Bretton Woods system more broadly.160 Fear of ‘a terrifying run on the pound’ and the consequent impact of devaluation on the dollar certainly tempered ambitions for concessions.161 If the stability of the dollar came under threat, the government would need to raise interest rates to relive pressure on the currency. Such measures could deflate the economy, leading to reduced tax revenues, making the war in Vietnam and domestic policies unsustainable or forcing unpopular tax rises, which could themselves result in pressure for military withdrawal.

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Maintaining the value of sterling value was therefore a logical defence of the dollar and the American economy.162 There were, however, several other important considerations. The president desired the continuation of Britain’s international defence commitments in order to share some of the Cold War burden and thus help his own increasingly costly policies in Vietnam.163 There were also hopes that in the next three months the United States could use this rescue package to initiate discussions with Wilson about British ‘attitudes on nuclear weapons’.164 Walt Rostow, head of the US Policy Planning Council, later explained what this meant, in a telephone conversation with Ball. The United States would use ‘the interplay of the British budget, the long-term loan, etc. [to] end up with a transfer of [British] submarines’, in order to ‘collectivize the British system . . . . [T]he main thing is getting the British out [of the nuclear business]’.165 Michael Quinlan, a long serving British civil servant with considerable expertise in defence, suggests that there has never been any American attempt to manipulate or leverage nuclear cooperation to secure Britain’s compliance in unpopular policies.166 The conversation between Rostow and Ball reveals that there were serious talks about using economic support to manipulate British nuclear policy. For the time being, though, nuclear commitments were not on the negotiating table and the United States mobilised their rescue effort. There followed a massive coordinated buying of the pound on foreign exchange markets by central banks in mid-September.167 Over the winter of 1965–66, the foreign exchange situation improved. Reserves increased and the government repaid a small amount of debt while the economy remained buoyant and unemployment fell.168 Although ‘putting the economy in order’ presented a serious political challenge to Wilson, a stable economy was far more important in terms of staying in office. It was no coincidence that during this difficult economic period, between May and September, Labour suffered in the opinion polls, but subsequently regained its dominance in the early autumn.169 Yet Wilson’s refusal to adopt a wage and price freeze shows that the British government was not beholden to its creditors.170 In addition, the deal was not particularly damaging for Wilson’s or Callaghan’s own broader objectives. Wilson did not wish to withdraw from East of Suez, or devalue the pound, and measures of deflation fitted with the chancellor’s view of how to run the economy. Fortunately for the prime minister, the United States had left problematic commitments such as British assistance in Vietnam or the collectivisation

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of the Polaris programme off the negotiating table. Wilson had pulled off something of a diplomatic coup. It was not, however, a one-sided affair. Shared interests and US reliance on Britain’s economic and military position had helped.171 Nevertheless, US financial largesse merely delayed the difficult choices facing British economic and defence policy.172

The ANF in Terminal Decline International discussions on the future of non-proliferation ran alongside US-UK economic negotiations. On 27 July 1965, the ENDC resumed discussions in Geneva, after a recess of more than ten months. Things got off to a tense start when Semyon Tsarapkin, Soviet representative to the ENDC, made some thinly veiled criticisms about the United States, noting imperialist aggression in Vietnam, Congo, and Latin America. Foster was unimpressed, and suggested that Tsarapkin had taken advantage of his privilege as chairperson.173 Despite these tensions, discussions were at last underway. The following meeting, held two days later, was Chalfont’s first speech in the ENDC. Here, he emphasised the importance of concluding a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.174 He also passed on a formal message from Wilson, who, perhaps sensing some hostility, explained that a desire to preserve exclusive nuclear privileges did not drive the British government’s commitment to a nonproliferation treaty.175 As Chalfont notes in his memoirs, the eight non-aligned states in the ENDC saw the treaty as a plan devised by two groups of alcoholics to impose total abstinence on everyone else.176 In August, Washington attempted to tighten up the language of a treaty in an effort to assuage anxieties in Bonn and London.177 The British government, however, remained unwilling to accept the possibility of any future ‘European entity’ with majority decision-making.178 Nonetheless, on 17 August, the United States tabled its first draft treaty in Geneva. Foster explained that this draft was the product of close collaboration amongst the NATO countries in the ENDC, but remained an imperfect instrument designed primarily as a basis for negotiation within the committee.179 In the following meeting, two days later, Chalfont stressed ‘full support’ for the tabling of this treaty as the basis for further negotiation. He was clear to note, however, that the British government did not agree with the present draft in its entirety. As the draft stood, it did not rule out the possibility of an association of states using nuclear weapons by the decision of the majority without a veto by the

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nuclear weapon states. The British government, Chalfont explained, would prefer to see this possibility closed and remained ‘irrevocably opposed’ to any formulation for the Western alliance which made nuclear weapons subject to a majority vote.180 British and American differences could possibly have remained hidden from public gaze in Geneva.181 More likely, though, tensions within NATO had become publicly obvious.182 Many ENDC members, particularly Canada, Britain, and Italy openly commented on the perceived inadequacies in the draft, accepting it only as the basis for further work. It is therefore erroneous to claim that this draft had general acceptance in NATO.183 The Soviet Union objected to any treaty that did not ban direct or indirect access to nuclear weapons through the MLF or ANF or by means of the proposed NATO planning committee. In discussion over the following weeks, Tsarapkin expressed his concern about the creation of the MLF and the possibility of giving non-nuclear members of NATO access to nuclear weapons, whilst Foster questioned the Soviet’s commitment to a non-proliferation treaty. The ENDC again became deadlocked and by mid-September adjourned for the year with no further progress.184 On 24 September, shortly after the ENDC had concluded, the Soviet Union submitted its own draft treaty to the United Nations General Assembly. The superpower took this opportunity to draw attention to its differences with the United States, with its draft prohibiting the control or use of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states or groups of states.185 The US delegation was sceptical of this draft, suspecting its use as a bargaining counter. Indeed, over the preceding months, the Soviet’s unwillingness to accept any nuclear sharing solution had also expanded into an unwillingness to consider potential consultative solutions.186 There was a simple way to overcome these differences. Spurgeon Keeny, serving on the US National Security Council, informed Bundy, “[T]hey [the Soviet Union] might eventually propose to give up the language outlawing our NATO arrangements if we were prepared to give up the MLF’.187 The British government had reached a similar conclusion. According to Wilson’s memoirs, as negotiations stalled, Chalfont tried to inject further momentum into the discussions: The Geneva disarmament conference was deadlocked. The Foreign Office wanted us to support the Americans. Lord Chalfont wanted to take a new initiative. At Michael Stewart’s suggestion we supported him. If we had not done so, I believe the non-proliferation treaty now in force might never have been signed. It was the breakthrough.188

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Wilson’s own recollection is, of course, not the only view. Stewart paints a more cautious picture of events: [A] stage was reached in the discussions about the project non-proliferation treaty in which Lord Chalfont wanted to put a particular proposal forward but the officials at the Foreign Office were more cautious and wanted to wait until it had been fully discussed with the Americans. I supported Chalfont over this . . . . [It] is possible that Harold Wilson slightly overemphasises the importance of this: if I had decided the other way I do not think it would have wrecked all chance of the non-proliferation treaty; but the decision I did make certainly opened a door.189

Although not explicit, it seems reasonable to conclude that the ‘breakthrough’ involved the decision to drop the ANF in favour of the NPT. Some historians have tentatively adopted this explanation.190 In an interview, the author asked Chalfont whether he developed an initiative to surrender the ANF in order to facilitate progress towards a non-proliferation treaty. His remarks are telling: The British government was officially in favour of the ANF. But, that was partly because of the Americans, to keep our relationship good with them and to appear to be supporting them . . . . I personally always thought that the MLF and ANF were absolute nonsense . . . so my own personal view of the negotiations was to find something that would get rid of that concept altogether.191

Wilson would have favoured anything that provided him with an escape from the lingering problem of nuclear sharing. There were also domestic and party reasons for Wilson’s support of Chalfont’s initiative. Chief among these would have been the continuing need for an arms control initiative to excuse the continuation of the Polaris programme without the internationalisation of British nuclear weapons.192 It is misleading, then, to suggest that the British government reluctantly withdrew the ANF, and did so only when it became apparent that a non-proliferation treaty served British objectives more effectively.193 A non-proliferation treaty instead provided a convenient excuse for Wilson to extricate himself from any commitment to the ANF. To be sure, in cabinet in late September, Stewart conceded that the ANF might lead the Soviet government to refuse to participate in a non-proliferation treaty. The West Germans ‘might therefore have to be satisfied with machinery for closer consultation on nuclear matters instead of a collective nuclear force’. In this same meeting, Wilson concluded that the ANF might prove stillborn

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and stressed his desire for East-West detente instead.194 Similar thoughts arose outside of the cabinet. In October, the Foreign Office, then the greatest supporter of nuclear sharing, had seriously begun to consider abandoning the ANF in favour the NPT.195 When speaking with Rusk in mid-October, Stewart noted the way nuclear sharing solutions could prejudice non-proliferation talks, whilst Chalfont stated that a treaty was more important than a NATO nuclear force.196 Speculation within and outside of the government began to mount that Britain was ready to relinquish its commitment to the ANF. Formally, the Foreign Office and the Labour leadership remained keen to deny that they no longer supported the ANF, respecting the delicate matters of economic and strategic interdependence with their West German and American allies.197 At the Labour Party conference in Blackpool, Stewart repeatedly espoused the value of the ANF and using it as the basis for a worldwide treaty on nondissemination.198 Yet, within the British government, support for the ANF was moribund. The American government, however, had not surrendered a commitment to the MLF. Such a decision would only emerge after many more months of negotiation. The actions of the British government, though, had prompted the Americans to reassess their position. In a message to the president, Bundy subsequently encouraged a ‘Johnson break-through’, where an agreement with the West Germans not to acquire a nuclear weapons system would allow a non-proliferation treaty and a new collective arrangement for consultation in NATO. ‘Since in fact no one now wants the MLF’, he said, ‘I think we may well be able to make some money with Moscow if we tell them privately before we sink it publicly’.199 Johnson appears to have ignored this suggestion.

A Retreat from Nuclear Sharing Following his electoral victory in September, Erhard sought to reinvigorate the nuclear sharing debate. Federal Minister of Defence Gerhard Schröder and Stewart resumed discussions in mid-November. Stewart pressed for measures of consultation as a better form of nuclear sharing. He also suggested building up a decision-making body within NATO, leaving open nuclear sharing solutions as ‘possible options for the future’. Schröder, however, expressed a preference for a joint weapons system alongside consultation. He went on to state his desire for a combination of the ANF and MLF based on West Germany’s military, political, and psychological needs. Evidently, a clear gap persisted be-

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tween Bonn and London.200 Anxiety only intensified following West German press reports, which, although favourable in their assessment of the meeting, conveyed the impression of a looming compromise between the MLF and the ANF.201 As a senior Foreign Office official warned, ‘[If] the impression gains ground that the ANF is dead, the Germans, far from being content with consultative arrangements only, may go back to the MLF.202 This meeting therefore presented a most unwelcome challenge to the government’s hopes for the collapse of international negotiations on nuclear sharing solutions. These months represent a dangerous high-wire act for the government. The opportunity had arisen to remove the ANF, which had previously supplanted the MLF. It logically followed that if the Labour government surrendered the ANF there could be a resurgence of support for the MLF.203 Wilson’s remark in his memoirs that there was ‘a last attempt to revive the ghost’ is telling.204 Understandably, Stewart remained publicly non-committal about whether he felt the ANF and MLF should be dropped.205 This curious stance is borne out in correspondence to and from Bonn in the final months of 1965. The ‘proposal for ANF still stood but as [Stewart] had indicated publicly, we are not (repeat not) irrevocably tied to it.206 The foreign secretary avoided any firm indication of his plans in the House of Commons.207 Fear of the resurgence of the MLF, a completely unacceptable alternative, inhibited the pace at which the government extricated itself from the ANF, a more palatable version of a still unpopular idea. The US government provided a glimmer of hope when Dean met with McNamara on 7 October 1965. McNamara stressed that the best way to prevent the West Germans acquiring their own bomb was to bring them in as soon as possible on consultations about nuclear matters within the alliance, referring to what would become the NPG. He also suggested, albeit ‘without exactly saying so’, that plans for an ANF or MLF might not proceed much further. Nevertheless, he accepted that the Johnson administration would write-off the proposal only after careful discussions with the FRG.208 The British government therefore continued to support the ANF in public, whilst hoping for its failure in private. Wilson, speaking to Harlan Cleveland, US ambassador to NATO, on 20 October, reiterated his support for the proposal.209 In a question in the Commons on 4 November, he again declared approval for the ANF.210 Yet the Queen’s speech, which opened Parliament on 9 November, committed the Labour government to the conclusion of a treaty to prevent the further spread of nuclear

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weapons, but made only a cautious pledge to ‘work for a generally satisfactory organization of the nuclear resources of the allies’. According to an internal US briefing document: Whatever the formal Labour government commitment to ANF there is current evidence that the Labour government is becoming progressively more reluctant about ANF, more disposed to keep an independent deterrent, and inclined to place a higher priority on pursuing a non-proliferation agreement with the Russians than a nuclear parity arrangement with the Germans.211

These assumptions were borne out in November when Cleveland met with Wilson and Healey on separate occasions. Both were clear that there was no political pressure to internationalise British nuclear weapons. Wilson remarked that Labour is ‘under no domestic political pressure, even from its own leftwing, about the independent deterrent’.212 Wilson had decided to sustain the ‘independent deterrent’; the question for the United States was whether he might change his mind. On 26 November 1965, Ball and McNamara ventured to 10 Downing Street.213 When asked about the ANF, Wilson avoided any suggestion of surrender and said that it remained as it had been twelve months ago, before the FRG had put it in ‘cold storage’. More bluntly, Healey said he only wished to survive the problem of nuclear sharing, recognising that there was no solution. Both men instead stressed their support for McNamara’s Special Committee, the first session of which would take place the following day.214 McNamara asked about the British position regarding the independent deterrent. Wilson said ‘that it was always as it had been. We wished to internationalise it. But things changed’. Wilson, it appeared, was shying away from his own rhetoric. Healey explained that ‘it was no longer a problem in terms of British politics. It was now a purely practical problem of what to do with the Polaris boats which were now, for all practical purposes, beyond the construction point of no return, for the benefit of the free world as a whole’. The secretary of state for defence had made this position very clear in the House of Commons only two days earlier, stating that he had no intention of relinquishing the Polaris force or selling it to the US government.215 Stewart also added that it was difficult to see many West Germans supporting the demands of their government for nuclear weapons. It is possible that these comments were part of a wider diplomatic tactic, used in order to extract further concessions during Wilson’s next visit to Washington. Yet, it is more likely, particularly given his repeated efforts to slow

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progress on the ANF, that the prime minister desired an independent national nuclear force and was preparing his excuses. Discussion turned to the economics of nuclear sharing. Wilson said that the British government’s physical and financial contribution to the ANF would come in the form of its Polaris force. There was no precise view about any financial contribution West Germany should make, although a solution could exist in the context of the offset agreement. The real issue was to associate the alliance more fully with the ‘Western deterrent’ and the problems of control and crisis management. Wilson, Healey, and Stewart were clearly pushing away from nuclear sharing towards measures of consultation. Their guests were far more ambivalent. Ball was worried that giving up on nuclear sharing could undermine stability in Western Europe and thereby encourage the future development of more independent nuclear forces. The future of an independent nuclear force in Britain also concerned many of his colleagues. Senior elements within the Johnson administration still believed that there was room for negotiation with the British government on nuclear sharing and the future of the Polaris programme. In a telephone conversation one month earlier, Rostow and Ball discussed linking US financial support with a transfer of British submarines to a multilateral force: Rostow said it was discussed that out of the interplay of the British budget, the long-term loan, etc. you might end up with a transfer of their submarines . . . . Ball said it would only end up with the transfer of their subs if that is what is decided that we are going to achieve. The problem is we have always been to [sic] tentative about what we wanted and therefore never got anything . . . . Rostow said this is the part he is working on, and we were going to have [to] put the bite on to get that result.216

These were not idle threats. Bator had overseen detailed research on the British Polaris programme throughout November, in expectation of Wilson’s forthcoming visit to Washington. One briefing paper noted that if the ANF resulted in the purchase of British Polaris submarines, there would be budgetary savings of several hundred million pounds over the next three to four years.217 There were also documents considering the financial consequences of the outright cancellation of the British Polaris programme.218 One estimate suggested savings would reach almost $2.5 billion (£893 million). These remarkable figures underline the cost of Wilson’s nuclear ambitions. Wilson appeared unaware of, or perhaps uninterested in, US proposals for

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the cancellation or collectivisation of the British Polaris programme. On 7 December 1965, there was a lengthy cabinet meeting on non-proliferation and West German participation in nuclear strategy. Castle reports that Wilson was pleased with his efforts. ‘He said we had succeeded in one thing: MLF was dead. Nor was the ANF likely to survive. Even the Germans were beginning to realise that it was better for them to have “more consultation and less hardware”. He implied that we were gradually achieving our aims on non-proliferation and a detente in Europe, but we are waiting a long time with little results so far’.219 This admission to the cabinet is somewhat surprising. Wilson’s apparent confidence in the looming death of nuclear sharing solutions belied continued efforts by senior elements in Bonn to achieve some form of nuclear sharing.220 Similarly, Wilson’s confidence was, at best, an unduly favourable interpretation of US intentions on the matter. It is true that the first session of McNamara’s Special Committee had taken place some ten days earlier. This event was not enough, however, to suggest a major shift in US policy. Bator, Rostow, and Ball still clearly sought the transfer of British submarines into an international force. Nor was there any significant progress in non-proliferation negotiations between East and West. The endurance of nuclear sharing solutions continued to frustrate British efforts towards a treaty. Stewart and Chalfont had met again with Gromyko during a visit to Moscow in November 1965 but made little headway. As Chalfont acknowledged in his memoirs, ‘It was often joked that ‘nyet’ was his favourite word’.221 By the close of 1965, both sharing and consultative solutions appeared unacceptable to the Soviet Union. American inflexibility on the issue of nuclear sharing thus meant that British ambitions for the swift realisation of a non-proliferation agreement remained unfulfilled.222 Wilson’s comments were a display of bravado to his cabinet. This was a curious boast. Wilson had, after all, justified the continuation of the Polaris programme, and underlined his commitment to internationalisation, through the ANF. Several months earlier, Wilson and Douglas-Home, leader of the opposition, had debated nuclear policy in the House of Commons. Douglas-Home continued to press the prime minister. ‘[Is] it not a fact that the nuclear situation with regard to our armaments is exactly the same as it was a year ago, and may I congratulate the Prime Minister on that?’ Wilson, well prepared on the subject, ably retorted, No, Sir. Unlike a year ago, when the whole of our nuclear defence policy was based on an electoral pretence, when everything the right hon. Gentleman said

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on this was systematically misleading the country as to the true facts, the situation today is that we have made proposals for internationalising nuclear weapons on the only basis that makes sense—interdependence.223

The cabinet meeting on 7 December reveals this distinction to be untrue. The reversal of a commitment to ‘internationalisation’ went largely unchallenged. Castle, however, did note her discomfort with this drift away from Labour’s old positions. Wilson, she reports, did what he always did in these matters and simply intervened in her questioning in order to justify the government’s policy.224

Return to Washington Wilson’s celebratory rhetoric was limited to the cabinet. When in Washington between 16 and 18 December 1965, he disingenuously suggested that he was still committed to nuclear sharing.225 Wilson had not forgotten the need to keep his major creditor happy. He even began the meeting by expressing his gratitude for the staunch support of the United States on money matters twice since he became prime minister.226 Nevertheless, on the first day he did suggest that the two countries should concentrate on the ‘McNamara Committee’ and try to get the FRG to settle for measures of consultation.227 The discussions progressed well despite the absence of any progress on the ANF proposal over the last year. Wilson even managed to cast doubt on West Germany’s nuclear ambitions, which he felt to be ‘a bit unreal’, not least because the bomb played such a small part in the recent elections. Ignoring advice from many of his own advisors, Johnson did not pursue the cancellation or collectivisation of the British Polaris force in any of his talks with Wilson. There could perhaps have been a strategic element to this decision. Britain offered what has been termed a ‘second centre of strategic decision-making’ within NATO. As Quinlan explains, ‘The existence of independent nuclear capability in Western Europe . . . was seen as a useful added insurance’ if in some scenario the US armoury became unavailable.228 It is unlikely, however, that this attempt to complicate Soviet decision-making would have impressed many in the Johnson administration. McNamara found independent nuclear forces destabilising, confusing the signals that Washington wished to send Moscow, and would have preferred investment in conventional forces in Western Europe.229 Changes in strategic rationale from an ‘independent deterrent’ to a ‘second centre of decision-making’ were a diplomatic convenience, allowing both loyalty to NATO and the continuation of an inde-

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pendent nuclear force. The concept therefore better served British, rather than alliance, concerns.230 Wider political and economic events instead help to explain Johnson’s reluctance to influence British nuclear policy at this time. The president desired the continuation of Britain’s international defence commitments in order to share some of the Cold War burden and thus help his own increasingly costly policies in Vietnam.231 Moreover, he was keen to ensure the continued stability of the pound as the first line of defence against the dollar. These had formed the key motivations for US support of sterling via a multilateral rescue package only months earlier. The president feared that, if presented with demands for changes to British nuclear policy or involvement in Vietnam, Wilson might find devaluation or withdrawal from the East of Suez preferable.232 The two men also understood the need for cooperation. Johnson was aware of Wilson’s precarious position, given his small parliamentary majority and the persisting troubles of the British economy. The president admitted that he had not wished to ‘foul up’ their relationship by being difficult when they met in late 1964, and the prime minister’s problems had not since disappeared.233 Johnson was himself looking for support. It is true that he had other foreign policy interests, not least managing the Western alliance, handling de Gaulle, and promoting better relations with the Soviet Union.234 Nevertheless, it is difficult to exaggerate the importance that Vietnam played in the Johnson administration and the way in which in framed US-UK discussions during Wilson’s premiership.235 The war was increasingly expensive and unpopular, troubling the American economy and scuppering domestic initiatives.236 Britain’s international presence East of Suez and Wilson’s support for the Johnson administration were therefore essential. The future of British nuclear weapons was simply a secondary concern at this stage. Scrutiny of the discussions in Washington also substantiates the suggestion that Wilson did not intend to ‘internationalise’ British nuclear weapons. On the second day, Ball asked Wilson exactly what he meant by internationalising the Polaris submarines. Wilson evasively suggested that ‘the whole question of Britain’s nuclear independence was of less domestic political interest’, and went on to offer only vague details about using Polaris in the Far East that he admitted he had not yet thought out.237 Although the idea intrigued McNamara, the idea of Commonwealth Nuclear Force never amounted to much.238 Discussions about deploying Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region would persist until 1968, reflecting lingering concerns about China’s nuclear power, commit-

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ments East of Suez, and German pressure for equal treatment within NATO on nuclear matters.239 Crucially, Wilson’s visit to Washington occurred before Erhard met Johnson on 20 December.240 This order of events was fortunate, allowing Wilson to avoid pressure from Johnson to accept West German desires for a hardware solution.241 The details of the later Erhard meeting sit rather uncomfortably with Wilson’s earlier bravado in cabinet regarding the fast approaching death of nuclear sharing. The public statement produced by Erhard and Johnson after their talks in Washington did avoid the issue of nuclear sharing and addressed only measures of consultation.242 Yet, during their meeting, they discussed both proposals.243 Several days later, Johnson sent a letter to Wilson in which he explained that the West German government placed considerable emphasis on some form of collective nuclear defence. In an effort to clarify West German interests, Erhard provided Johnson with a memorandum that he then also forwarded to Wilson.244 The FRG firmly supported a nuclear sharing solution, and Johnson urged Wilson to make a serious effort to respond to West German proposals. The president concluded by stating that ‘I think it is important that we move ahead on this expeditiously since the matter has been so long in limbo’. 245 Wilson replied to both leaders in early January 1966, and agreed that the proposals should receive swift treatment. His response was wholly disingenuous. While promising to study the West German memo he hoped McNamara’s Special Committee would develop apace.246 The prime minister was not to be disappointed. Over the following twelve months, the newly created Nuclear Planning Working Group (NPWG), forerunner to the NPG, successfully met four times, once in Washington, London, Paris, and Rome.247 By early 1966, the Labour government had dug its heels in the ground on the issue of nuclear sharing. ‘[By] now’, John Young argues, ‘Wilson was determined to do nothing’.248 As weeks passed, Wilson studiously avoided any confrontation on the matter. By mid-February, when Erhard suggested talks between foreign ministers on NATO nuclear issues, Wilson delayed a reply.249 The prime minister also advised his staff to postpone all further correspondence on the multilateral force.250 Despite the Foreign Office’s anxieties about dashing West German hopes, British policy had become increasingly supportive of consultative arrangements, which officials hoped would satisfy Bonn.251 Although it would limp on in discussions over the course of the year, and even merited a mention in the 1966 election manifesto, support for the ANF within the British government was exhausted.

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Wilson’s occasional exhumations of the ANF helped to highlight his commitment to alliance solidarity in difficult times. On 22 February 1966, following an interim defence white paper from the previous year, the government published a major reassessment of British defence policy.252 Ministers and officials attributed much of the blame for the currency crises of 1964 to excessive overseas spending, particularly when the current account was healthy on other measures. Concern about the balance of payments thus frames successive defence white papers.253 The cabinet had agreed to limit defence spending to £2,000 million a year by 1969. The defence budget would shrink by £400 million, representing a 16 percent reduction in military expenditure.254 International obligations and opinion within the PLP limited cuts to force levels in Western Europe, which meant that the bulk of the reductions to capabilities, but not obligations, came from East of Suez.255 Defence spending was the most obvious choice for cuts. Education and welfare were priorities for a Labour government, whilst Wilson had pledged additional investment in healthcare and the scientific revolution.256 In addition, the prime minister had repeatedly defended the continuation of the Polaris programme on economic grounds and the possibility of using nuclear weapons to extract military concessions from their allies.257 A commitment to investment in nuclear weapons therefore not only reduced the available defence budget but also encouraged further cuts. Despite some concerns, the Johnson administration welcomed the relatively modest cuts and the balance struck between economic stability and global commitments.258 Although Wilson had managed to reconcile alliance commitments with reduced defence expenditure, he had failed to address the larger question of Britain’s unsustainable global commitments. Perceptions of status perhaps played a role.259 Wilson’s commitments to his allies and creditors, however, more likely encouraged his cautious approach to defence spending and his unwillingness to surrender the ANF. Immediately after the defence debate, parliament adjourned for the next general election.

The Demise of Nuclear Sharing Wilson had decided on a March election after considerable thought on the matter.260 Several weeks before the election, he privately admitted that it was now ‘crystal clear’ to him that he was ‘totally opposed to a solution to the problems of the nuclear alliance that gave Germany any hardware solution’. He continued, ‘[If] it ever became necessary for him to bang the table, in dealing with

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the affairs of the alliance, it would be on this subject that he would bang it’.261 The Labour Party manifesto, ‘Time for Decision’, gave a very different impression of British nuclear diplomacy: Within N.A.T.O. we have given over-riding priority to stopping the further spread of atomic weapons. For this purpose we believe that Labour’s proposal for an Atlantic Nuclear Force remains the best basis for allied discussions, since it allows for legitimate consultation among the members of N.A.T.O. while providing firm guarantees against new fingers on the nuclear trigger. Labour stands by its pledge to internationalise our strategic nuclear forces.262

Evidently, the ANF remained a convenient fiction for Wilson. It allowed him to honour his pledge to internationalise ‘the national deterrent’ and accentuate differences in policy between both major parties. The Labour government was also still keen to appear amenable to the interests of their West German and US allies. In private, however, any such support for nuclear sharing was long since dead. Wilson had no ambition to pursue any form of nuclear sharing and was only interested in achieving consultative solutions and a non-proliferation treaty. The Labour Party achieved a decisive victory, and was re-elected with a ninety-seven-seat majority on 31 March.263 This was not only a vindication of Wilson’s premiership but also a historic achievement. With only one technical exception, short parliaments in the twentieth century had ended with the governing party losing seats.264 Moreover, for the first time in the history of the party, a leader had improved the electoral position of a Labour government.265 This healthy majority in the House of Commons provided Wilson with greater political freedom, and lessened fears of a small, divided government undermining his nuclear policy ambitions.266 This victory, however, did nothing to reduce the government’s pressing economic difficulties, while the scale of success removed the convenient excuse of a small parliamentary majority. Success actually made discipline within the PLP more difficult, as the need for ministerial caution had largely evaporated. The prime minister also began to spend less time with his own backbenchers, many of whom were new and unfamiliar to him, meaning that he lost some of the closeness to junior ministers he had previously enjoyed. For all of these reasons, it would now be much harder to manage the PLP.267 Beyond some minor changes, Wilson did little to alter the structure of his administration, presumably out of respect for its efforts and fear of making

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unnecessary enemies. Consequently, the election had limited impact on the present direction of British nuclear diplomacy. Wilson had already made his decision to wait patiently for the expiration of the ANF on the international stage. There was little the cabinet or the PLP could do to challenge this by now well-established approach. Fortunately for Wilson, the larger and more contentious decisions about sustaining the Polaris programme and the ANF had occurred when party unity was at an all time high. During the time of the election, international negotiations continued on the increasingly interwoven issues of nuclear sharing, non-proliferation, and consultation. Wilson suggests that in early 1966, Chalfont held successful talks with Soviet disarmament ministers that led to more detailed talks in Moscow a month later, and ‘helped to break the deadlock’.268 Documentary evidence suggests that these claims are erroneous. In March, Chalfont actually informed Wilson that the Soviets were broadening objections from technical to political forms of proliferation, including measures of nuclear consultation. He described this new Soviet position as untenable and non-negotiable.269 The Foreign Office encouraged a largely cautious approach. Chalfont represented a countervailing force to this position. In order to achieve agreement with the Soviet Union, which he believed took precedence, it was necessary to abandon all nuclear sharing proposals immediately. In March, Chalfont recommended ‘a concerted action against the hardware solution’ as a first step in securing a non-proliferation treaty with the Soviets. ‘I am more than ever convinced’, he argued, ‘that we can expect no change in the Soviet position until a decision about nuclear sharing arrangements has been taken in NATO’.270 This suggestion did not respect Wilson’s cautious approach, and the government continued to avoid open criticism of nuclear sharing solutions. Following Labour’s electoral victory, excuses for further delay became increasingly hard to find, which aroused suspicions in Bonn and Washington. Rusk urged Johnson on 11 April that tripartite talks with Germany and Britain should commence immediately. He noted, ‘The British have been playing a game. They have been for abandoning their independent nuclear weapon in principle but against it in practice . . . . They have advanced the ANF . . . then backed away from their own proposal’.271 The United States now had every opportunity to question British delay. The appointment of Walt Rostow as special assistant for National Security Affairs, following Bundy’s resignation, meant that a strong proponent of the MLF was also active within the White House. Indeed, this appointment only boosted Rostow’s already considerable influence

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on presidential decision-making and did lead to more pressure for a nuclear deal between Britain and Germany.272 In a note to the prime minister, Thomas Balogh, economic adviser to the cabinet, stressed the unfortunate timing of Rostow’s appointment and feared the revival of the MLF and ANF proposals. Wilson, writing in the margins of the note, replied, ‘I share in your anxieties’ but added, ‘We will play it our way’.273 Wilson’s confidence rested on solid foundations. Only weeks earlier, McNamara had canvassed British support by threatening that the MLF was in danger of resurfacing if a consultative alternative did not establish itself. 274 It had become clear that senior elements in Washington increasingly supported the concept of nuclear consultation. On 22 April, Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum 345, which explicitly required an examination of consultative solutions, albeit alongside other approaches.275 Over the course of the year, nuclear sharing proposals faded from the international political landscape. A series of private negotiations between the superpowers would ultimately ensure the emergence of consultative solutions and a non-proliferation treaty in their place. On 21 February 1967, Rogers wrote to Nicholls regarding the future of the ANF sub-committee within the government. He noted that it had been ‘active in the first half of 1965 . . . but has not met since August of that year’.276 The government was subsequently notified of its dissolution.

Conclusion On the issue of nuclear sharing, British diplomacy was characterised by ambiguity, duplicity, and prevarication. It might be tempting to criticise Wilson for the empty promises he made to the West German and US governments, and the fiction of internationalisation he sold to his own party and to a wider domestic audience. Nevertheless, he had adopted a sensible approach. The alternatives available to the prime minister were far from appealing. He could capitulate and accept British involvement in some form of nuclear sharing. This solution could potentially undermine national nuclear independence and thus all of its associated benefits, as perceived by many within the government. A British nuclear force was, for example, an important counterbalance to dependence on US military and economic strength. Such a concession would also do little to please the wider electorate, providing further of evidence of Britain’s decline on the global stage. Conversely, Wilson could withdraw from a commitment to nuclear sharing, as he had threatened to do in opposition. This solution, however, en-

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dangered cooperation in NATO and Britain’s broader alliance network. It also threatened to facilitate the emergence of a special West German–US nuclear relationship, which would come largely at Britain’s expense. Delaying a decision was therefore preferable to making one. Publicly, Wilson remained committed to the ANF. Yet, much as the preceding year had heralded the death of the MLF within the British government, 1965 represented the private demise of the ANF. It is true that the West German and American governments pursued nuclear sharing solutions, albeit to varying degrees, in the following year. Yet it was in 1965 that the British government moved sharply away from the ANF, focusing its efforts on a non-proliferation treaty and measures of consultation. Soviet intransigence over the nuclear sharing issue thus proved to be tremendously convenient, inadvertency protecting British nuclear interests. Wilson’s willingness to sacrifice the ANF appeared as a gesture of goodwill, rather than a desire to avoid entangling nuclear alliances or challenges to strategic independence. In a curious series of twists and turns, Wilson had used the ANF to replace the much more unpopular MLF, and to defend the continuation of the Polaris programme. He then subtly abandoned the ANF in favour of a nonproliferation treaty and measures of consultation. Delicate policy revisions helped to obscure Wilson’s failure to internationalise the ‘national deterrent’ in any meaningful sense. By late 1965, the ANF had served its central purpose. It had provided evidence of a desire to cooperate with the FRG and the US on the issue of nuclear sharing. Moreover, the ANF had successfully ensured that the Labour Party remained united behind the Polaris programme. It had little more to offer British nuclear diplomacy. The Labour government, under Wilson’s leadership, had adopted a pragmatic, albeit disingenuous, approach to the issue of nuclear weapons sharing in NATO. Efforts to exclude commitments to nuclear sharing from the British draft of a non-proliferation treaty not only divided the Foreign Office but also soured relations with the FRG and US. Nevertheless, the prime minister had managed to secure the independence of British nuclear weapons and helped to facilitate the collapse of the MLF and the ANF.277 That this result was realised through a policy of equivocation and opportunism is informative. Devoid of any discernible commitment to nuclear sharing, he steered his government to success, patiently waiting for the threats to this central objective to subside. The subsequent emergence of the Nuclear Planning Group and the Non-Proliferation Treaty would ultimately reward Wilson’s brave but devious efforts.

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O

Harold Wilson rose to the dispatch box in the House of Commons. Asked for a statement on the Labour government’s progress on nuclear sharing, his answer was succinct. ‘Since the proposals of the McNamara Committee were put forward’, the prime minister responded, ‘we have always expressed very full support for inter-allied consultation and co-operation rather than for any hardware solution’.1 Robert McNamara’s proposal that NATO should form a Defence Ministers Select Committee to deal with the nuclear problems of the alliance had the prime minister’s full support. Success in this venture, Wilson hoped, would provide him with the opportunity to move away from nuclear sharing solutions, such as the Multilateral Force and the Atlantic Nuclear Force, and ultimately break the deadlock in non-proliferation treaty negotiations. He was not to be disappointed. By late 1966, NATO had agreed to the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group to discuss matters of nuclear cooperation within the alliance. The NPG would permanently include Britain, West Germany, Italy, and the United States, alongside three rotating members. Each member would be involved in NATO nuclear weapons policy, albeit with varying degrees of influence. In the following months, reflecting in part the success of the NPG, the negotiations surrounding a non-proliferation treaty gathered apace while support for nuclear sharing faded from the political landscape. The emergence of the NPG is therefore essential to understanding nuclear diplomacy at this time. Oliver Bange suggests that nuclear sharing and nuclear non-proliferation were ‘Sian 2 0 Oc to b er 19 6 6 ,

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mese twins’.2 Respecting the importance of nuclear consultation, a more apt metaphor would be conjoined triplets. Despite a small number of studies, consideration of the British government’s relationship with consultative solutions remains somewhat underdeveloped.3 The emergence and development of measures of nuclear consultation were an important influence on British nuclear diplomacy between 1965 and 1967. Within the government, consultation appeared to provide a palatable alternative to the vexing issue of nuclear sharing and complemented a desire for progress in non-proliferation negotiations. Nevertheless, international, domestic, and party considerations again tempered the Labour government’s approach to nuclear diplomacy. The West German and American governments continued to pursue nuclear sharing proposals in 1965 and 1966. The ANF, therefore, continued to loom large in international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons. Indeed, the Labour government proved unwilling to make West German participation in the NPG conditional on the renunciation of their interest in a nuclear sharing solution. This stance reflected lingering fears about the possibility of a future NATO nuclear force that could exclude British participation, and Wilson’s own unease about upsetting his international creditors. Continued troubles with the pound and the threat of devaluation only strengthened Wilson’s desire for close cooperation with his European and US allies. Persisting difficulties over the costs of British forces stationed in West Germany, and a growing interest in membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), increased Wilson’s reluctance to press the issue. British nuclear diplomacy thus stagnated. The persistence of nuclear sharing proposals meant that the Soviet Union remained unwilling to cooperate with NATO in the fields of consultation and non-proliferation. Superpower interests ultimately converged on a non-proliferation treaty. In the absence of firm US support, the West German government’s desire for a nuclear sharing solution became untenable. A series of private negotiations in 1966 led to the collapse of the MLF and ANF proposals. The US government used the offer of membership of the NPG to overcome any lingering West German resistance, thereby allowing nuclear sharing to fade slowly into the shadow of a consultative solution. This solution facilitated rapid progress in private negotiations on a non-proliferation treaty between the US and Soviet governments. Due to its exclusion from these private negotiations, the British government played a secondary role in overcoming the international difficulties surrounding the possession and control of nuclear weap-



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ons. Indeed, during 1966, Wilson enjoyed significant progress in all his nuclear objectives largely because of the actions of other states. President Charles de Gaulle’s decision to withdraw France from NATO’s integrated command structure inadvertently helped to unite the other members of the alliance in this period and smoothed the way for closer collaboration in matters of nuclear cooperation. Favourable shifts in international politics therefore proved instrumental to the success of British nuclear diplomacy.

The Special Committee In late July 1965, the Ministry of Defence prepared a brief for Denis Healey in preparation for the NATO Select Committee of Defence Ministers on Nuclear Consultation, in which the secretary of state formally represented the British government.4 The details had been subject to revisions from the chief of the defence staff, the Foreign Office, and the UK delegation to NATO.5 The brief noted the dissatisfaction among the non-nuclear members of the alliance regarding their limited voice in nuclear affairs, and went on to suggest that a consultative solution could help to meet West Germany’s nuclear aspirations: This is particularly important at a time when some Americans are alleged to be contemplating the desirability of giving priority to a non-dissemination agreement at the expense of the MLF/ANF. We have already welcomed Mr McNamara’s proposal and should now give what help we can in seeing how it can be worked out in more detail. . . . If we cannot devise a system which gives the non-nuclear members of the alliance some voice in nuclear matters, the inference must be that only by actual ownership of nuclear weapons can countries secure influence.

A desire to remove nuclear sharing solutions from any future negotiations in NATO, and fears of West German ownership of nuclear weapons, evidently motivated British support for McNamara’s proposal. The concept complemented Wilson’s ambitions for British nuclear diplomacy splendidly. While recognising the importance of such a proposal, there were limits on British efforts within the Select Committee: The proposal is an American one and, since they own the major part of the West’s deterrent forces, it must be primarily for them to suggest suitable arrangements for further nuclear consultation in the alliance. Moreover, the UK has recently made its own major initiative in the ANF proposal . . . we must

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be careful that our activities in the Select Committee do not lead to the suspicion that we are trying to distract attention from proposals for a mixed manned fleet.6

Here, then, were two familiar themes in British nuclear diplomacy: a desire to avoid any system of nuclear sharing and a hesitance to exhibit this preference. The solution, the brief argued, was for the Select Committee to proceed slowly in order to prove its worth as a useful forum for the exchange of views on nuclear policy. Success in this field would command widespread support from NATO and, in turn, undermine any potential French opposition. A cautious approach continued to pay dividends. Patrick Dean met with McNamara on 7 October 1965. McNamara stressed that the best way to prevent the West Germans from acquiring their own nuclear weapons was to bring them in as soon as possible on consultations about nuclear matters within the alliance. Nevertheless, McNamara accepted that the Johnson administration would only write off nuclear sharing proposals after careful discussions with the West Germans.7 In a message to the Foreign Office, Frank Roberts, British ambassador to the FRG, was not confident that such a committee was the panacea it appeared. ‘While the Germans are interested in membership of the select committee and should therefore be prepared to cooperate with McNamara in getting it established sooner rather than later, it is, I fear, only wishful thinking to suppose that this alone will satisfy the Germans’.8 Over the coming months, US tenacity proved Roberts wrong. The first session took place on 27 November 1965. It was somewhat different from McNamara’s original proposal. Questions of representation had undermined the idea of a Select Committee, and a Special Committee involving the defence ministers of ten countries emerged in its place. Discussions focused on the US nuclear arsenal, crisis management, and allied participation in nuclear planning. The meeting also approved the decision prepared by the permanent representatives to create three working groups of five members each, looking at communication, data exchange, and nuclear planning. The FRG, Italy, and, chosen by lot, Turkey joined Britain and the United States as members of the third and most important sub-group. The new body would act as an informal ad hoc committee within the NATO framework, reporting to the Council of Ministers.9 In early December, the British government shared its ‘London plan’ with the US government, an effort to deal with the NATO nuclear problem by improving West German confidence. It envisaged a standing committee including Britain, the US, the FRG, and Italy, with a vacant seat for France. As a consul-



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tative forum, the committee would have responsibility for nuclear planning in the alliance, including deployment, target policy, and crisis management. It would also consider future requirements—namely, nuclear sharing. More boldly, the London plan also suggested that Britain should deepen its commitment of existing and planned nuclear forces to NATO. There were two important caveats to this proposition that made it far less generous than it appeared. First, the authors of the London plan observed that if NATO failed to respond to an attack, the alliance would ‘cease to exist’ and thus the British government would resume full control of its forces. Second, any such commitment did not necessarily require the ANF.10 The plan proved to be illustrative of British nuclear diplomacy in the coming months, displaying a readiness to cooperate with the alliance on nuclear issues but an unwillingness to make any major contributions to its success. The London plan had limited impact on proceedings. More important to the progress of negotiations were the actions of another government in the alliance. At the conference of the NATO Council on 14–16 December 1965, French representatives demanded the termination of the Special Committee. The French government claimed that it lacked the consent of all fifteen-member states of the alliance, while the North Atlantic Council could adequately handle all necessary questions. The other ministers within NATO did not receive France’s ultimatum well, and they adhered to the original plans.11 Foreshadowing events in the following year, French intransigence served only to unite the remaining members of NATO. Following visits by Wilson and Ludwig Erhard to Washington in December 1965, measures of consultation had gathered momentum, although the West Germans still sought nuclear sharing solutions.12 The US administration sought to delay a decision and only vaguely stated its support for some form of nuclear sharing.13 Importantly, though, Erhard and Gerhard Schröder subsequently agreed that the FRG would now not develop a new weapon system. Although this idea had never been likely, Thomas Schwartz rightly suggests that such a commitment opened up important opportunities for the United States to move forward in non-proliferation negotiations with the Soviet government.14 Following this meeting, a non-proliferation treaty replaced the MLF and ANF as the key military and security issue in relations between the FRG and US over the next three years.15 In 1966, the Nuclear Planning Working Group (NPWG) became the central focus of the Special Committee’s work. In all but name, this was the Select

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Committee of the alliance. There were four meetings over the following twelve months, in Washington, London, Paris, and Rome. Discussions ranged from strength and operational plans for strategic nuclear forces to the problems of using nuclear weapons in a conventional military conflict in Western Europe.16 Consultative solutions, however, were still a contested issue. Despite being moribund within the British government, it would be quite wrong to think that discussions about nuclear sharing had ceased in Bonn or Washington. Wilson, however, studiously avoided any confrontation on the matter, hoping McNamara’s scheme would develop apace.17 Although anxious about dashing West German hopes, London sought only a consultative solution to satisfy Bonn.18 As consultative solutions competed against nuclear sharing proposals, the British government also continued to focus on realising a non-proliferation treaty. The ENDC resumed on 27 January 1966. The committee now had two draft treaties before it, ably reflecting the East-West divide. There was at this stage little evidence that either superpower was in a conciliatory mood. In this first meeting, William Foster challenged the intentions of Nikolai Roshchin, first leader of the Soviet delegation at Geneva. Foster suggested that without future cooperation he could only conclude that the Soviet Union had no real interest in a treaty and simply wished to use negotiations for their own political ends.19 Discussions behind the scenes paint a different picture. A letter from Chairman Alexei Kosygin to President Lyndon Johnson reveals that several weeks earlier the Americans and Soviets had agreed to initiate their own bilateral negotiations once discussions formally resumed.20 This letter supports the more recent suggestion that while the MLF issue appeared to show Moscow and Washington moving away from each other, in reality the two powers had begun to converge on the underlying logic of a strategic bargain preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.21 A compromise, however, was not immediately forthcoming. The Labour government, seemingly unaware of these subtle developments, remained troubled by potential nuclear sharing solutions. During a meeting of the Western members of the ENDC in Paris in January 1966, Alun Chalfont warned that, until they had resolved the nuclear sharing issue in NATO, the Soviet Union would not be prepared to enter into serious non-proliferation negotiations.22 In response to such claims, Johnson sent a message to Wilson, who would be visiting Moscow for talks with Chairman Alexei N. Kosygin and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev in late February. The president stressed that the NPT and ANF were not mutually exclusive and suggested that the Soviet



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Union was trying to use the FRG to create difficulties in the NATO alliance. 23 Wilson remained unconvinced. As the NPWG gathered apace, the concept of nuclear sharing drifted further away from British interests. Privately, he had told Arthur Goldberg, US ambassador to the United Nations, that he was now totally opposed to a nuclear sharing solution.24 It is unlikely that this particular confession would have been a surprise to any senior members of the Labour government at this time. The first ministerial level meeting of the five-power working group on nuclear weapons was held in Washington on 17–18 February. McNamara produced a detailed briefing of strategic force posture within the alliance, avoiding the issue of nuclear sharing. Nevertheless, press reports suggested that the FRG was not yet convinced that a consultative committee would effectively deter a potential aggressor, unless accompanied by some form of co-ownership. Such reports did not reflect a belated upsurge of West German interest in nuclear sharing solutions but instead simply its continuation. McNamara and Dean Rusk both reiterated that the committee was not a substitute for an allied nuclear force.25 The preferred course of British nuclear diplomacy was evidently still far from assured. It is important to note that the NPG had merit for the British government beyond removing nuclear sharing from the political landscape. Britain, like the FRG, was keen to discuss other pressing strategic issues in NATO, not least the cost of its military contributions and continuing tensions regarding alliance nuclear strategy. The meeting of the working group held in London on 28–29 April, for instance, considered tactical nuclear weapons deployed in the European theatre. These were armaments designed for the battlefield, and thus distinct from strategic nuclear weapons designed for the purposes of deterrence or mass destruction. While agreeing that existing alliance doctrine on the use of tactical nuclear weapons was unsound, the British government remained somewhat uncomfortable with America’s preference for ‘flexible response’. Kennedy and Johnson both sought a more graduated deterrence, which provided a ladder of nuclear escalation and left a full-scale nuclear exchange as a last resort, although it is debatable as to whether this would have resulted in any real operational change to NATO strategy.26 Such a graduated approach would also force investment in conventional forces in Western Europe.27 Many states in NATO, the FRG in particular, desired massive nuclear retaliation triggered by a ‘tripwire’ on Western Europe’s Eastern frontier. This solution was psychologically comforting, but also respected the military superiority of the

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Soviet Union’s neighbouring conventional forces. Furthermore, many countries, including Britain, were unwilling to commit to substantial increases in conventional contributions.28 By late 1967, ‘flexible response’ had replaced the old military strategy of ‘massive retaliation’, albeit with compromises on both sides, making measures of consultation ever more important.29

Superpower Negotiations Wilson’s decisive re-election in March 1966 did not lead to renewed pressure from the United States to cooperate on nuclear sharing. In April 1966, the prime minister instead came under pressure to cooperate with consultative measures in NATO. McNamara was canvassing support from Britain by threatening that the MLF was in danger of resurfacing if a consultative alternative did not establish itself.30 Wilson would have received this news favourably. As the year progressed, it became clear that Washington increasingly supported measures of nuclear consultation over nuclear sharing. The president issued National Security Action Memorandum 345 on 22 April 1966, which explicitly required an examination of both consultative and nuclear sharing approaches.31 Johnson wrote to Wilson the following month and mentioned the ANF but stressed that he was not ‘wedded to any particular solution to this problem . . . . We are doing staff work over a whole range of options. We should not foreclose any of them’.32 Historians often overlook how non-proliferation negotiations influenced this particular change and vice versa. In May 1966, Adrian Fisher, deputy director of the ACDA, sent Johnson a message echoing McGeorge Bundy’s reference almost a year earlier to a ‘Johnson breakthrough’. He informed the president that the deadlock in the ENDC could be broken with a compromise that did not involve a nuclear sharing component.33 Later that month, there also appeared to be a shift in the Soviet position. As Foster confided to Rusk: As you know, both in public and private, the Soviets have previously taken a tough and extreme line against any FRG ‘access’ to nuclear weapons, including ‘political access’, such as the Special Committee. Their public attacks on our non-proliferation treaty have continued to be extreme. However, in private conversations at Geneva, both Soviet and Bloc representatives have now shown awareness of the need to accommodate any non-proliferation treaty to the reality of continued nuclear consultations and, by implication at least, to the reality of present nuclear arrangements in NATO.34



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The superpowers were seemingly groping their way to a solution very similar to Chalfont’s own proposal from the previous year. The major difference being the inclusion of consultative measures. Foster felt he could strike a compromise with the Soviet Union, surrendering nuclear sharing but not nuclear consultation. Moscow’s eventual withdrawal of objections to nuclear consultation vindicated this belief.35 Discussions ultimately led to a tacit understanding. The central element of US-Soviet consensus was ‘an agreement to disagree’ about nuclear sharing arrangements, meaning the proposed treaty would only deal with what was prohibited rather than what was permitted.36 By mid-September, Foster informed Johnson that, following private negotiations, it was possible to achieve a treaty that did not undermine nuclear consultative arrangements.37 Johnson had evidently managed to overcome his unease about surrendering nuclear sharing. The amount of time and energy he had dedicated to the idea, and his desire not to aggravate Bonn, help to explain why this policy change took so long.38 In his memoirs, Johnson elaborates on his decision. ‘Various nations absorbed the meaning of the Cuban Missile Crisis’, he argues, continuing, ‘as anxiety lessened, allied diplomatic and military leaders concluded that a joint nuclear force was not essential to the vitality of NATO . . . and that trying to work out details of such a force might be more divisive that unifying’.39 Concern about an international ‘chain reaction’ of nuclear proliferation led by India also helped to motivate US policy revision.40 As McNamara explained, ‘In the calculus of risk, to proliferate independent nuclear forces is not simply an arithmetical addition of danger. We would not merely be adding up risks; we would be insanely multiplying them’.41 The suggestion that ‘international criticism’ of Johnson’s reluctance to kill the MLF, and anxiety about Britain moving towards an open rift with the United States, encouraged change are less convincing.42 Senior US officials had been worried that Washington might ‘[become] isolated on arms control’, but such concerns were minor.43 Britain had fallen into line with America on all of its previous drafts, despite serious reservations. Progress in negotiations was a two-way process. Cooperation was important to Soviet leaders, as it blocked West German access to nuclear weapons, which outweighed the risk of collusion with the United States during the conflict in Vietnam. Moreover, by forestalling NATO nuclear sharing, the Soviet Union could potentially benefit from the political embarrassment such a treaty might introduce between the NATO allies.44 This complex mesh of influences and motivations was most fortunate for Wilson and the Labour government. Brit-

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ain’s nuclear independence would remain unchallenged. Such a treaty would also enhance the political benefits of owning such weapons whilst removing nuclear sharing proposals from the negotiating table.45 Over the following months, private superpower discussions drove the nonproliferation negotiations. Following disagreements with the British government regarding the scope of a non-proliferation treaty in 1965, Johnson had decided to initiate direct discussions with Moscow, excluding London.46 In June 1966, still apparently unaware of these changing dynamics, the British government continued to resist a version of a treaty that left open the possibility of nuclear sharing, arguing that the Soviet Union would view this idea negatively.47 In mid-July, Washington responded by saying that references to a future nuclear entity did not constitute dissemination and should not upset the Soviet government. Furthermore, the latest draft changes recommended by Britain would not ‘appreciably narrow the differences’ preventing agreement between East and West, while they carried the added problem of being difficult to explain to the FRG. Nevertheless, the US government was now reviewing the possibility of compromise language in the treaty.48 Indeed, in an earlier speech on 5 July, Johnson had stressed his desire to ‘find an acceptable compromise language’ in order to make progress towards an effective non-proliferation treaty.49 Given their own private negotiations, the United States requested that the British government give no hint to the Soviet Union or their NATO allies that they were conducting any such review. The British government swiftly agreed.50 Beyond keeping the British government apprised of the current situation, this warning from across the Atlantic reflected a desire to temper any statements the prime minister might make during his forthcoming trip to Moscow. Prior to leaving, Wilson told Johnson how he expected to handle Kosygin, recognising the strong feeling in the US administration that it would be premature and harmful to discuss non-proliferation. Though he would speak on the subject, he agreed not to enter into negotiation or compromise their existing positions. ‘If they think they can drive a wedge between you and me, they are sadly mistaken’.51 It was Wilson, however, who was mistaken. Private superpower discussions had removed Britain from the centre of the non-proliferation negotiations.

The EEC and British Nuclear Weapons Following his announcement earlier in the year, de Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military structure on 30 June 1966. Many within Lon-



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don and Washington feared that advocates of the MLF would now resurrect the proposal, in an effort to counter this period of strategic uncertainty.52 The general’s decision, although initially creating a crisis in the alliance, ultimately presented a valuable opportunity for Britain’s own nuclear objectives.53 NATO’s attention focused away from nuclear weapons to the more urgent areas of military cooperation and alliance stability. When Wilson met Erhard a few weeks later in June, their discussions largely ignored nuclear matters. A common approach to the problems in NATO instead took centre stage. A Foreign Office brief for the prime minister noted that West German thinking seemed to be moving in the direction of consultation and that it had already ‘evolved a good deal’.54 Despite this apparent shift, during a conversation in the previous month, Schröder had told Stewart that a nuclear sharing option should remain open for future discussions.55 In July, the US embassy in Bonn reported that although a nuclear sharing solution remained a long-term goal, Schröder and Minister of Defence KaiUwe von Hassel felt that they might be willing to give it up ‘under certain circumstances’. Schröder did not clarify exactly what these circumstances might be, but it seems reasonable to assume that he wanted an acceptable forum for nuclear planning.56 It is debatable as to how far French withdrawal hastened West German cooperation, but it did help to diminish suspicions of British duplicity. Wilson’s statement to the House of Commons in July that the Labour government ‘still intends to achieve early allied agreement on an allied nuclear force but that more urgent matters have come first’ was telling.57 The prime minister continued to wait patiently for his preferred outcome, pushing consultation and non-proliferation at the expense of nuclear sharing proposals. Britain’s relationship with the countries of the EEC, however, increasingly hindered Wilson’s ability to move away from nuclear sharing proposals. Following Labour’s second electoral victory, Wilson seriously began to consider launching a new bid for membership of the EEC. Britain achieved membership only on 1 January 1973, under the Conservative government of Edward Heath. A belated entry should not obscure Wilson’s significant efforts during his time in office. Europe was a sensitive issue; de Gaulle had vetoed Britain’s first application in 1963.58 All three major biographies of Wilson see him becoming favourable to entry by mid-1966 but are vague on the timings and on Wilson’s motivations.59 It is debatable as to whether Wilson had already decided on the principle of an application before the next General Election or instead preferred to keep his options open for several months afterwards.60 Nevertheless,

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Wilson subtly shifted emphasis towards membership of the EEC by early 1966. In a Sunday Times article from late January 1966, Wilson allegedly told George Brown, ‘George, I’ve got news for you. You’ll be startled by what I’m going to say. We’re going in’.61 A myriad of reasons explain such a shift in policy. A desire to improve business confidence and encourage investment in Britain’s economy was an important influence.62 Nevertheless, many ministers viewed the financial implications of EEC membership as unpredictable and, balance of payments aside, the economy remained successful on many indicators.63 Alongside economic motivations existed a broader trend of geo-strategic readjustment, highlighted by shifting relations with the United States and the Commonwealth as well as a broader process of military withdrawal from East of Suez.64 Helen Parr convincingly argues that Wilson felt that the EEC could shore up and reconfigure Britain’s international position.65 Change also reflected the mood in cabinet and a wider shift in favour of the EEC within the government.66 In August, Stewart became head of the Department of Economic Affairs, allowing an ardently pro-European Brown to become foreign secretary. Brown’s arrival signalled a renewed commitment to the EEC.67 Perhaps most important for Wilson, the pursuit of membership also lessened the danger of the opposition under Heath making capital out of this issue. While refusing to take the debate to the cabinet, Wilson agreed with Brown and Stewart that a group of officials should study ‘a move to Europe’.68 Over the coming months, economic crises and the need to reconfigure Britain’s international position would lead Wilson to pursue EEC membership more vigorously.69 Progress on EEC membership remained cautious. Wilson did create an unofficial minister for Europe, George Thomson, and accepted an ardently pro-European Michael Palliser as his new private secretary.70 Yet these actions only paid lip service to the growth of support for European integration. To be sure, he appointed two of the leading critics of integration, Douglas Jay, president of the Board of Trade, and Fred Peart, minister of agriculture, to a new cabinet committee on relations with Europe. Wilson’s position thus remained equivocal, as reflected in a series of speeches several weeks after securing power.71 Nevertheless, his position on future membership, even if not yet wholehearted, required close cooperation with the countries of the EEC. In the House of Commons, Wilson denied that he had ever looked at his approach to nuclear sharing in relation to the EEC, and instead claimed that he saw them as two separate issues.72 Such a conclusion is unconvincing. British



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membership of the EEC was, for many in the Labour government, directly related to the issue of nuclear weapons. Wilson admits in his memoirs that he believed the Nassau agreement, and specifically the commitment to a multilateral force, had been the decisive factor in the failure of the first British application.73 De Gaulle was highly critical of the Nassau agreement and the MLF because he viewed them as evidence of British dependence on the United States. Recent research, however, reveals that this was only a minor factor in his decision to reject Britain’s first application. Similarly, sterling, another popular explanation for de Gaulle’s vetoes, was never the most prominent or intractable subject of negotiation.74 A host of economic and political factors, not least the threat to France’s own position of predominance in the EEC, had motivated the general’s veto in 1963.75 Nevertheless, nuclear weapons appeared to be an important problem for relations between Britain and France. In an effort to redress this balance, Wilson would explore the idea of an entente nucléaire between the two states, although this idea proved unsuccessful.76 De Gaulle’s persistent scepticism towards British membership of the EEC meant the Labour government would instead have to focus its attention towards the FRG. In July 1966, Walter W. Heller, an economic advisor to Johnson, informed the president of his discussions with Wilson and Brown on the subject of Europe. Brown thought that with US support in Bonn they could achieve membership on the initiative of ‘the five’—namely, the other members of the EEC, rather than France. Heller could not see how Brown’s approach could outflank the French and thought it unlikely that Wilson would press this issue in his forthcoming meeting with Johnson.77 Of ‘the five’, only Bonn was potentially strong enough to force change in Paris.78 Thus, despite Heller’s doubts, Wilson believed that there was good reason to keep the ANF on the negotiating table, albeit disingenuously, and to ensure progress on consultative solutions. Both were potentially valuable bargaining chips in future negotiations vis-à-vis West Germany and the EEC. Wilson’s interest in membership grew over the coming months and thus increasingly influenced the content and conduct of British nuclear diplomacy. While serving as more of a backdrop to negotiations on the ANF and NPG, a desire for entry into the EEC would become a major influence the Labour government’s pursuit of a non-proliferation treaty. A growing interest in cooperation with the countries of the EEC certainly helped to undermine any hopes for a Commonwealth Nuclear Force. Wilson had offered vague details about deploying the Polaris force in the Far East during discussions in Washington in December 1965.79 Though the Labour govern-

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ment’s commitment to this proposal was debatable, maintaining a world role and halting nuclear proliferation in South Asia were serious objectives.80 Given Britain’s limited resources, however, any such commitment would have come at the expense of the ANF. A Commonwealth Nuclear Force would therefore have sent out conflicting signals about British commitments to membership of the EEC.81 Interest in the EEC consequently left the proposal moribund, while the eventual decision to hasten the withdrawal of British forces from the East of Suez ultimately sealed its fate.

Nuclear Independence and the July Measures Delayed by the General Election, James Callaghan unveiled his deflationary budget in May 1966.82 Despite these efforts, by June a fresh exchange rate crisis was approaching. The situation was particularly disquieting, as support arrangements for the British economy made in 1965 were due to expire. Although replaced by fresh arrangements on 13 June, totalling £2,000 million in new credit, problems persisted.83 Domestic troubles contributed to these pressing economic difficulties. On 16 May, the National Union of Seamen began industrial action after the government decided to support employers over a pay and hours offer. The ‘seaman strike’ was long and bitter. The cabinet supported Wilson’s stance and the strike ended on 1 July, but it had paralyzed the docks and shaken investor confidence.84 Despite improvements in the balance of payments, investors remained concerned by continuing tightness in the labour market—namely, British employers’ difficulty filling jobs.85 The strike’s effect on exports played on these lingering concerns and support for the pound plummeted. The first two weeks of July brought a further sterling crisis, with a new drain on reserves and renewed attacks on the pound. ‘The nightmare’, Ben Pimlott explains, ‘had returned. Life in No. 10 and No. 11 Downing Street now revolved around the gold figures’.86 One immediate solution available to Wilson was devaluation. He swiftly decided against such action for the same interwoven political, economic, and diplomatic reasons he had done so in 1964 and 1965.87 Opposition consequently developed in the cabinet. Talk of a ‘July plot’ to remove Wilson exaggerates both the strength of any backbench revolt and the likelihood of the prime minister’s willingness to resign. In their memoirs, Wilson and Callaghan both dismiss any notion of a plot at that time.88 Tensions, however, clearly existed. Brown makes no mention of any plot,



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but Richard Crossman, minister for housing, and Tony Benn, minister of technology, both recall that Brown did make noises about the need for a new prime minister in order to float the pound.89 Moreover, although most of the cabinet supported Wilson’s decision, he faced resistance from several senior ministers, including Callaghan and Brown. Only by skilfully dividing these key ministers was he able to restore control and ensure his policy was favoured.90 On the afternoon of 19 July, the cabinet met. After five hours, the final vote was 17 to 6 in favour of not devaluing the pound.91 Short-term considerations had triumphed, largely at the expense of the long-term stability of the economy.92 The decision not to devalue the pound had two important consequences, the first being political. These events represented the end of the Wilson-Callaghan-Brown triumvirate, which had played such a major role in economic decision-making since 1964. It gave way to the rule of the office at No. 10, with decisions taken in consultation with the ‘kitchen cabinet’ of close friends and advisers.93 Only days later, Wilson organised a cabinet reshuffle, the most noteworthy change being the appointment of Brown as foreign secretary. Although there may well have been some malice behind these changes, they more likely represented tactical or ‘self protective’ motivations. Wilson’s changes created ‘a galaxy of jealous rivals’, thereby isolating his enemies.94 The second consequence of the cabinet’s decision was its effect on the British economy. The government produced the ‘July measures’, which amounted to a major fiscal tightening.95 The package had a powerful effect on domestic demand and strengthened the balance of payments, thereby helping to stem the crisis.96 Yet these measures had serious repercussions for the government’s domestic policies and marked the end to many of its socialist ambitions.97 Wilson informed Johnson on 20 July that his plans would mean ‘real suffering’, but that Britain ‘will rise to the challenge’. He admitted that he was willing to give up ten to twelve points of his sixteen-point margin in the public opinion polls to make his programme for deflation and a wage-price freeze stick.98 Hinting at things to come, Wilson continued, ‘We cannot, in imposing these measures at home, avoid also reducing our Government expenditure overseas, civil and military and including defence expenditure in Germany as well as elsewhere’.99 The sterling crises of 1966 certainly added new tensions to the offset issue, a problem still only superficially addressed.100 The government subsequently produced an ad hoc re-evaluation of defence capabilities and commitments. A second major review, only months after the

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first, cut a further £100 million from overseas expenditures. International commitments, a growing interest in EEC membership, and trilateral offset negotiations made withdrawals from Europe illogical. A US-backed coup in Indonesia had relieved pressure on forces in Malaysia and Singapore, but the Johnson administration resisted any British withdrawal from the Far East. The Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean were therefore the only viable targets for reduction. Unlike the first defence review, which had focused on promoting efficiencies and reducing waste, a retreat from the Middle East meant that British and American interests had begun to suffer in the face of economic tumult.101 Significant changes to defence and foreign policy therefore threatened London’s diplomatic and economic relationship with Washington. Serious questions about the Polaris programme followed in the House of Commons. Asked whether the financial crisis necessitated the postponement of the Polaris programme, Healey emphatically disagreed and stressed that delay would produce enormous increases in cost.102 Although the pound was not devalued, the economy required support.103 Wilson would once again turn to the United States for assistance. The British government, however, was in a fortunate position with respect to their leading financial backers. Francis Bator explained why to the president on 14 July. The US government, he noted, wanted British forces to remain on the Rhine and East of Suez, and was not willing support devaluation because of its potentially negative impact on the US economy. While most senior US officials preferred withdrawal to devaluation, neither was particularly attractive.104 Four days later, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Fowler sent a note to the president about the sterling crisis. He was confident that Wilson and Callaghan would pursue a powerful package of demand-compression and wage restraint, but thought it was unlikely that this would provide a permanent cure. Moreover, if these measures failed, sterling would remain ‘teetering on the edge’. For Johnson, the options were stark: put up more ‘bail money’; a large devaluation of sterling; or a controlled small devaluation.105 It was in this context that Wilson prepared for his trip to Washington for a meeting with Johnson and further discussions about nuclear cooperation. Prior to his third journey to Washington as prime minister, the Foreign Office briefed Wilson on the government’s position on nuclear diplomacy vis-àvis the United States: Our objective is to show the urgent need to advance in the related fields of nonproliferation [and] nuclear sharing . . . . In particular, we want to know whether



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the President would support us in an attempt now to persuade the Germans to give up ‘hardware solutions’ . . . . [A NATO body for nuclear consultation] should help to defuse the pressure for unattractive hardware solutions and thus preserve the unity of the main NATO allies . . . . If we reached agreement on these lines, we could agree to forget the A.N.F. proposal in its original form . . . . [A] solution on these lines could remove one of the main obstacles to a nonproliferation treaty.106

The briefing also revealed that the British government had far more ambitious plans for the NPG than their American counterparts. A bolder form of consultation, comprising crisis management, a review of weapons systems, and nuclear planning had a better chance of averting a return to nuclear sharing. This solution would provide ‘a painless way of taking the steam out of German nuclear ambitions and could in time lead them to give up the idea of a separate collective force’.107 While Wilson’s objectives were clear, senior elements within the US government were questioning their ally’s nuclear role in light of the troubles of the British economy. Prior to Wilson’s arrival in Washington, George Ball encouraged Johnson to persuade the prime minister to surrender Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’, as he felt it would ease the problem of nuclear sharing and contribute to global non-proliferation. Britain, he concluded, ‘cannot afford the resources and foreign exchange that go into the construction of the present four nuclear submarines’.108 Rusk suggested to Johnson that he should use this opportunity to reaffirm Wilson’s intent to abandon nuclear weapons, which he believed would have a positive effect in West Germany, India, and Japan regarding the issue of nuclear equality. He also felt that the president should point out that the administration had examined ways to assist the British government with the termination of the Polaris programme, which could result in a net saving of $2 billion over the next twenty years.109 Similarly, Bator and Ball both contemplated the opportunity, however slim, that Britain might be encouraged to leave the ‘strategic nuclear business’ in exchange for US help in striking a deal with the Continental governments on the funding of sterling liabilities.110 On the morning before Wilson arrived, Bator stressed to Johnson that, in return for any concessions, the United States should ensure that the British government supported the McNamara formula. Although no longer expecting Wilson to give up his Polaris force, it might be possible to move him away from an independent nuclear role. This, he believed, would solve the West German nuclear problem and allow the United States to progress measures of non-pro-

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liferation.111 Rusk, Ball, and Bator were all keen to use the economic crisis to force a shift in British nuclear policy. They were all to be disappointed. Wilson arrived in Washington on 28 July 1966. Discussions began the following day. The prime minister worried about possible tensions between the two, not least over Vietnam and the financial crisis.112 Despite some concerns, the talks went well, aided in large part by Wilson’s efforts to stress his allegiance to the United States, his acceptance of future EEC membership, and a commitment to maintaining a global presence.113 As James Ellison suggests, this period marks one of the peaks of the Johnson-Wilson relationship.114 Crucially, the president promised full backing to the pound.115 The ‘Hessian option’, the use of US economic power to force British troops into Vietnam, has generated some speculation among historians, but such pressure was limited.116 In his memoirs, Wilson fairly denies a link between financial help and the policy in Vietnam. Nor did his hosts appear to have applied any pressure on Britain’s nuclear policies. Fortunately for the prime minister, the United States had left problematic commitments off the negotiating table. Despite advice from many of his own advisors, and in keeping with his actions in their 1965 meeting, Johnson did not pursue the cancellation or collectivisation of the Polaris programme during his talks with Wilson. He remained reluctant to push nuclear issues when they threatened to undermine cooperation in more important areas. The president instead desired the continuation of Britain’s international defence commitments, in order to share some of the Cold War burden and thus help his own increasingly costly policies in Vietnam.117 Moreover, he was keen to ensure the continued stability of the pound as the first line of defence against the dollar. If presented with demands for British involvement in Vietnam or the surrender of the Polaris force, Wilson might find devaluation or withdrawal from the East of Suez preferable.118 Although holding a larger majority in the House of Commons than he had in their last meeting, Johnson was quite aware that he could only push Wilson so far. These concerns all proved very helpful for British nuclear diplomacy. In their previous meetings, Johnson had encouraged Wilson to cooperate with the FRG and explore the possibility of a nuclear sharing solution. This is the first meeting between Wilson and Johnson in which there is no mention of nuclear sharing. As private superpower negotiations were by now well underway, Johnson appears to have largely surrendered any interest in the proposals. Upon completion of the US-UK summit, Wilson began to make his way back to Britain to enjoy the final of the World Cup. Briefly stopping at Ottawa on



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the way, Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson bet five dollars that England would lose. As Wilson cheerfully notes, a few days later Britain’s currency reserves ‘gained $5 (Canadian)’.119

British Resistance to Consultation The third session of the NPWG met in Paris in late July 1966, coinciding with a meeting of the full Special Committee. During the meeting, McNamara suggested that the continuation of their work should occur in a more institutionalised form.120 Healey, however, resisted any attempt to formalise the working group. This response ran contra to US thinking that a significant role within a more formalised NPWG would encourage German thinking away from multilateral nuclear sharing proposals.121 McNamara was thus ‘puzzled and rather distressed’ by the attitude taken by the secretary of state for defence. Healey’s resistance to McNamara’s proposal appears peculiar, creating tensions within the alliance and doing little to generate support for British entry into the EEC or calm tensions concerning the offset issue. It also appears to contradict his own suggestions of more intimate consultation between America and her allies on matters of nuclear cooperation, made on both sides of the Atlantic before and after taking office.122 To be sure, the Labour Party was quite familiar with the idea of nuclear consultation, and had proposed consultation as an alternative to the MLF throughout 1963 and 1964.123 Furthermore, measures of consultation had been an important component of the ANF proposal.124 Quite why the Labour government had not pursued these ambitions is unclear, although Wilson may have wanted to discourage the suspicion that he was trying to undermine progress on the ANF.125 Healey’s actions, however, were rational. The defence secretary sought only to ensure that the West Germans would first renounce any collective nuclear sharing solutions before joining this new permanent NATO body. He therefore objected to the final US draft because it included references to the MLF and ANF.126 At this time, there were serious debates between, and within, the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office as to whether West German participation should be conditional on renouncing their interest in nuclear sharing. A draft departmental brief by the Ministry of Defence, penned on 12 September, highlights the internal debate: [There are] strong arguments against seeking to lay down such a condition at the present time: The Germans would almost certainly reject it (at least before

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Chancellor Erhard’s visit to Washington on 27–28th September); and we are dependent on them for a satisfactory outcome to the present offset problem of British Forces in Germany, we do not want to provoke a crisis. On the other hand, the Foreign Secretary and Lord Chalfont feel that some new step must be made to secure progress towards a non-proliferation treaty and that the most constructive step would be to disarm Russian criticism by making it clear that the NATO nuclear-sharing problem is to be resolved by a consultative solution which rules out German access to hardware.127

The interplay of consultative, non-proliferation, and nuclear sharing proposals were thus clearly visible in the government’s thinking. Defence officials, following comments from the Foreign Office, UK delegation to NATO, and the other interested branches of the Ministry of Defence, later redrafted this brief for Healey in advance of his next meeting. The new briefing, which reiterated the importance non-proliferation, now accepted that any such condition excluding nuclear sharing would cause strains in the alliance, already at a delicate stage of negotiations regarding the foreign exchange cost of British forces in West Germany.128 There was a flurry of correspondence between Wilson and Johnson at this time as the United States sought to delay the British government from announcing cuts to its forces stationed in West Germany. Johnson even considered ‘putting a small amount of foreign exchange in the pot’, to lessen pressure from Callaghan and others in the cabinet pressing for a decision on the ‘offset crisis’ by mid-October.129 The updated brief argued that it would be premature to seek agreement on the renunciation of a nuclear sharing solution. ‘Such a form of words if it were to achieve its object vis-à-vis the Russians would have to be categorical, unambiguous and capable of being published’, logically arguing, ‘As such it could hardly be accepted by the Germans at this stage’. The note continued: Although there is little pressure for the establishment of a collective nuclear force at present, this may revive if the special committee appears to be leading nowhere. It is therefore important to get permanent consultative machinery established in NATO soon in order to give the non-nuclear members, and particularly the Germans, an effective voice in nuclear policy and planning, and thereby to defuse German aspirations for participation in a collective nuclear force. This will put us in a better position to pursue agreement with the Russians on non-proliferation. It will also demonstrate that the alliance is not paralysed by French actions.130



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Fears of a revival of support for nuclear sharing proposals therefore continued to motivate British nuclear diplomacy well into 1966. Britain subsequently fell into line behind the United States and agreed to the unconditional establishment of the permanent consultative machinery in NATO. The NPWG meeting in Rome on 23 September principally concerned questions of membership criteria and did not mention the MLF or the ANF.131 Instead, the working group developed a proposal for the future structure of allied nuclear consultation. Analogous to the organisation of the Special Committee within the alliance, it would create a permanent committee for issues of nuclear planning—namely, the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (NDAC), which all member states could join and would report to the NATO council. Succeeding the NPWG and subordinate to the NDAC was the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), which consisted of seven members. The four permanent members were the US, the FRG, Britain, and Italy. The NPG would also have three rotating members from the group of other interested member countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands, and Turkey.132 Further discussion on nuclear sharing would await the formation of these new consultative arrangements.133

Consultation as Compensation As the ENDC went in to recess in August 1966, it had become clear that the Erhard government’s demands for a NATO force involving mixed ownership of nuclear weapons was no longer feasible alongside the Johnson administration’s continued efforts towards a non-proliferation treaty. Despite continued public commitments on the issue, Foster informed Rusk: ‘It [is] no longer advisable to hold open what have become unrealistic options at the expense of a nonproliferation agreement and the consequent lessening of tensions which would follow from such an agreement’.134 Although private superpower negotiations continued in September and October, progress was cautious.135 Johnson’s memoirs suggest that a partial breakthrough came on 22 and 24 September, when Rusk and Gromyko had long, frank talks in New York. It now became possible for a compromise formula to develop. After reading reports of the Rusk-Gromyko talks, Johnson invited his senior advisors to Camp David on 1 October. The group agreed that the Soviet Union was interested in a compromise and felt that an agreement was in reach, but were concerned they would use negotiations to create trouble among the allies.136 For the US

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government, upsetting the West Germans, and alliance cohesion more broadly, was the cost of Soviet agreement to a non-proliferation treaty.137 There were differences of opinion within the Johnson administration about dropping the MLF and the risking of damaging relations with FRG and encouraging proliferation.138 Yet by 1966, a treaty had become the priority. As Beatrice Heuser suggests, the death of hardware solutions occurred ‘through asphyxiation by Britain, France and finally America’.139 American support for a non-proliferation treaty came at a difficult time for relations with the FRG. In September, Erhard met with Johnson in Washington. The chancellor wanted drastic reductions in the current offset agreement. The West German government had been behind in its payments since 1965, reflecting domestic pressures, fears of US withdrawal, and broader nuclear anxieties. Although sensitive to its ally’s interests, West German military purchases were essential to reducing balance of payments deficits, which had ballooned under the weight of Vietnam and social welfare programmes.140 The president therefore reaffirmed the importance of the offset agreement. This was not a simple military decision. Only weeks earlier, the British government had announced that they would make large troops withdrawals from West Germany, owing to late payments.141 Further squabbles threatened a downward spiral of military retrenchment within the alliance that threatened to undermine NATO. The offset agreement and an informal arrangement to hold surplus dollars instead of buying gold were important contributions to the US economy. If either arrangement unravelled, the American payment deficit would expand and gold losses would increase. Such a situation could force the Johnson administration to withdraw troops from Europe, increasing the pressure on the West German government to acquire nuclear weapons. Proliferation would scare the Soviet Union into a more hostile posture, thus shattering relatively stability in Europe. The Johnson administration appreciated that nuclear sharing and offset issues were connected, and that it was a risk to thwart Erhard on both counts. Nevertheless, a non-proliferation treaty and the growing deficit had become more pressing concerns than West German preferences.142 Indeed, the outlook for the following year, even assuming success in offset negotiations, was an even larger and ‘unacceptable’ deficit.143 Echoing Kennedy’s earlier efforts with the MLF, the Johnson administration sought to avoid escalating military and economic tensions by offering access to nuclear weapons. Nuclear sharing, however, had evolved into a consultative solution. US officials sought to compensate Bonn with consultative measures. Al-



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though Erhard and Schröder had initially viewed the NPG as an unacceptable alternative to the MLF, US officials persuaded them that it offered the FRG a meaningful role in alliance strategy.144 During the summit, and perhaps recognising that few alternatives remained, Erhard proposed relinquishing the MLF for a permanent seat in the NPG. The West German people ‘would have to know which voice they would have in nuclear strategy’, he told Johnson, adding, ‘Nobody was expecting a “hardware solution” any longer’.145 West German pressure for a nuclear sharing solution had weakened considerably over the course of the year, reflecting the host of political and economic problems faced by the Erhard government and growing international pressure for change.146 In the absence of firm US support, the West German government’s negotiating position had become untenable. In addition, Erhard would have wanted a minor success with which to return home. Consultative solutions provided a degree of compensation. In return for a private understanding that the MLF was dead, the FRG became a permanent member of the NPG in late 1966.147 The West German government had lowered its ambitions. As Haftendorn explains, ‘The original intention of getting a finger on the nuclear trigger had been replaced by the desire instead to be able to get a hold on the nuclear safety catch’.148 Bonn would still have found this deal attractive because, as there were to be four NATO states as permanent members, it obtained a greater nuclear stature within the alliance. Nevertheless, Erhard left humiliated. By November, his government had collapsed, blamed for the economic slowdown and weakness in dealing with the United States. Trilateral negations subsequently addressed the offset issue, which produced a rather meagre agreement in the following year. The British and West German governments, however, could not reach a complete agreement, and the United States had to part-finance the arrangement. British military withdrawals from Europe proved to be minimal, albeit at further cost to their already overstretched American ally.149 On 10 October, after months of negotiations, the Soviet Union and the United States appeared to have agreed on the ‘gut’ aspect of the non-proliferation problem. It was now felt that Roshchin and Foster could produce acceptable language on a new draft, with conditions acceptable to the Soviet Union.150 Britain’s exclusion from this process is not entirely surprising. The early treaty negotiations were as much to do with finding a formula on the deployment of nuclear weapons inside Europe that was acceptable to the two Cold War superpowers as with a universal non-proliferation regime. Carl Ungerer suggests

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that the nuclear arms control negotiations between the two superpowers were a ‘duopoly’, with a secret and undeclared collusion between the superpowers in an effort to avoid the constraints of effective disarmament measures.151 The common interest that characterized US-Soviet non-proliferation diplomacy after late 1964 did appear to highlight a sort of international collusion and even ‘proto-détente’.152 The consequence of these close relations was necessarily the exclusion of others.

Consultative Supremacy On 14 December 1966, NATO defence ministers received the original report of the Special Group. This contained recommendations for improving procedures for intra-alliance consultation and proposals for institutionalising the nuclear planning process. The North Atlantic Council adopted the NDAC and the NPG as new permanent NATO organs.153 In the House of Commons, Healey commented that the preceding twelve months had provided greater progress on the nuclear question than in the past seventeen years.154 Progress in the related fields of non-proliferation and consultation also benefitted from the collapse of the coalition government in West Germany on 1 December 1966. The Grand Coalition that emerged in its place appointed Kurt Georg Kiesinger as chancellor and Willy Brandt as foreign minister. Although both approved of a non-proliferation treaty and the NPG, they still required approval from their own government. Many in the West German cabinet, clinging to a belief in a future European nuclear force and fearing permanent second-class citizenship, refused to surrender their nuclear ambitions.155 The formation of the NPG contributed to an easing of ‘nuclear tensions’, but it was far from a panacea and unrest lingered within the alliance. Small but persistent difficulties surrounded the formation of the NPG, many of which took several months to overcome. Some West German officials, for instance, privately argued that the FRG should not be a permanent member of the NPG. The Foreign Office suggested that this rejection was merely a ‘technical gambit’, used to imply a certain disinterestedness in the NPG, as it did not meet West Germany’s requirements in the matter of nuclear sharing.156 This conclusion seems reasonable given that these protests appeared to fade away shortly thereafter. Moreover, during November and December, there were tensions about the number of members, with officials from Canada and the Netherlands demanding membership tout court.157 A ‘gentlemen’s agreement’,



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involving rotating memberships for three of the members of the NDAC, overcame these problems early in the New Year.158 The NATO council meeting made no explicit reference to the cancellation of nuclear weapons sharing. Somewhat expectedly, the Soviet press carried a number of reports that criticised the NPG as having brought the FRG one step closer to access to nuclear weapons. Several days after the meeting, Pravda, a leading Soviet newspaper, posed the question: ‘What prevents the United States and Britain from officially declaring their final renunciation of plans for MLF and ANF, although there have been more than enough newspaper hints on this point?’ In correspondence with the Foreign Office, Sir Geoffrey Harrison, British ambassador to Moscow, had underlined this last sentence and, in the margins, posed his own question: ‘What indeed?’159 Official endorsement of the NPG by the NATO nations finally removed the MLF from the political landscape.160 Although the alliance became fully reconciled to this approach only after experience with the NPG, by the close of 1966 supporting the consultative group was tantamount to conceding the collapse of nuclear sharing.161 A superpower desire to progress non-proliferation negotiations, and the later tacit agreement to exclude any mention of nuclear weapons sharing within the draft, meant that the NPG emerged independently of the MLF or ANF. Once underway, the NPG helped to placate strategic anxieties within the alliance, and successfully assuaged much of the demand for nuclear sharing in Bonn. At a press conference prior to the first meeting in April 1967, McNamara stated that the whole purpose of the NPG was ‘to expose the non-nuclear nations more fully and more intimately to the entire spectrum of nuclear activity’.162 Talk consequently shifted away from ownership and towards strategy. The first session of the NPG was held in Washington on 6 and 7 April. The non-nuclear members of the group raised questions of participation, while the United States provided information on strategic systems, assessments of strategic balance, and arms control. Close cooperation played a large role helping discussions on tactical nuclear weapons and operational procedures, all of which aided the development of ‘flexible response’.163 On the issue of tactical weapons deployed in Western Europe, many of the gathered ministers felt that the weapons available were sufficient but the composition of force needed review. Upon the FRG’s suggestion, the group also considered how host countries should participate in nuclear operational planning.164 The FRG, and many of the other member states of NATO, clearly benefitted from the creation of the NPG. This consultative body provided non–nuclear

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weapon states with greater access to nuclear information and some influence on NATO’s arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. The NPG provided the medium and small non-nuclear powers in NATO a role in the alliance, offering them a forum in which to discuss nuclear matters and share their grievances with the United States and others.165 Closer collaboration on nuclear issues also helped to promote alliance cooperation following French withdrawal from NATO.166 These achievements, however, should not be overplayed. The greatest beneficiaries of consultative solutions were Britain and the superpowers. The NPG had removed nuclear sharing from the political landscape in a relatively painless way and paved the way for progress towards a non-proliferation treaty. Most important, both achievements had been realised without undermining British nuclear independence. The NPG was purely a planning, not a decision-making, body. Its work was limited to decision-making before the start of a conflict. Formal guidelines said nothing as to when the allied nations should release tactical nuclear weapons. Under ‘war conditions’ the decision to release nuclear weapons therefore still ultimately rested with the US president and the British prime minister.167

NATO and the Polaris Force Early in 1967, Wilson’s newly formed Committee on Nuclear Policy invited Healey to inform alliance authorities that the British government would assign its Polaris force to NATO when the first submarine became operational in 1968.168 As the prime minister retained orders for firing, John Young and Peter Hennessy rightly argue that this concession to the alliance did not amount to much.169 If Britain chose to deploy its forces independently, it could have done so, and would have likely targeted several major Soviet cities.170 Moreover, there were clear practical distinctions in how the UK and US operated their submarines.171 Wilson failed to mention these caveats when pressed in the House of Commons. On 5 December 1967, the prime minister, questioned about his policy of internationalisation, stated that Britain’s present nuclear forces, which did not yet include Polaris, were committed to NATO. He then suggested, entirely disingenuously, that the future independence of Polaris was still a matter for negotiation in the Nuclear Planning Group.172 The prime minister retained complete control over the nuclear force. Firing orders would eventually extend beyond the grave. Since submarines became



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the chief carrier of the bomb, during Heath’s premiership, the prime minister had to make ready his or her ‘letters of last resort’ within a few days of taking office. These four identically worded hand-written letters, locked away onboard each submarine, contain orders on what action to take in the event that an enemy nuclear strike destroyed the British state. After scanning the airwaves for signs of life, the submarine commander and his executive officer would open the sealed instructions. These letters, and thus the clearest insight into the British approach to nuclear deterrence, remain secret, with none surviving beyond any term of office.173 During Wilson’s premiership, the strategic rationale of the British government had evolved from maintaining an ‘independent deterrent’ to that of being a ‘second centre of decision-making’. By theoretically complicating Soviet decision-making, and thereby enhancing ‘the western deterrent’, this concept allowed loyalty to NATO and the perpetuation of an independent nuclear role.174 Within the Labour Party, such conceptual shifts encouraged criticisms that Wilson had abandoned an electoral commitment to internationalise the Polaris force.175 The NPG thus became a convenient excuse for explaining away earlier electoral promises. As late as 30 January 1969, Wilson claimed that he still intended to renegotiate the Nassau agreement, but needed to see how the NPG ‘works out’ before bilateral negotiations could begin.176 Later that year, the Polaris force replaced the V-bomber force as the ‘national deterrent’, completed on time and 13 percent below the originally anticipated cost.177 Before the Polaris force even became operational, strategists were asking serious questions about its medium-term effectiveness. Deterrence credibility rested on ‘the Moscow criterion’, or the ability of nuclear forces to be able to destroy the Soviet capital.178 As early as 1962, Wilson had questioned whether Soviet anti-missile technology undermined claims of a credible deterrent. 179 Within five years, both superpower governments had announced that they would deploy an anti-ballistic missile system (ABM) around their major cities. The pace and cost of technological change threatened the future of the British nuclear weapons programme. Indeed, in early 1967, Brown informed Wilson that ABM systems might undermine the Moscow criterion, as a small nuclear force would struggle to overcome additional layers of protection. Moreover, a new arms race could destabilise the international strategic environment and undermine existing measures of arms control.180 In sum, ABMs could restrict nuclear war to Europe. McNamara, with support from Healey, persuaded the NPG to oppose ABMs on the grounds it could destabilise the nuclear balance.

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Curiously, McNamara later restated American desires to build an ABM system, presumably under political pressure from within the Johnson administration.181 In response to these challenges, the Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy authorised a series of Polaris improvement studies in early 1967. Following discussions with American experts and officials, the government had three alternatives: abandon Polaris; do nothing; or improve Polaris via ‘hardening’, protecting the warheads from close detonations, and ‘adding decoys’ designed to deceive Soviet radars. Under Healey’s recommendation, and because of the uncertainties surrounding ABMs, the committee postponed a decision in favour of further studies.182 In June 1967, Wilson told Parliament that Britain would not purchase Poseidon, an American missile better equipped to deal with ABMs.183 Two senior ministers, Richard Crossman and Barbara Castle, note that he did not discuss the matter with the cabinet.184 Rejecting Poseidon highlighted British independence from the United States, improving the prime minister’s standing within the party and facilitating British membership of the EEC.185 Indeed, Wilson recalls telling de Gaulle that this decision was ‘Nassau in reverse’.186 The British government instead directed research towards a new Britishbuilt warhead for Polaris that could penetrate Soviet defences.187 By 1970, Wilson had still not reached a decision on the matter, despite improvement studies approaching £4 million per annum. The absence of definitive evidence, persistent uncertainty about foreign military spending, and disagreements within the government sustained doubts about how best to respond to a fully functioning Soviet ABM system.188 In addition, the British government received no privileged information regarding American ABM programmes.189 Wilson procrastinated. It would fall to Edward Heath, his successor, to reach a final decision about the future of Polaris. Nevertheless, Wilson’s support for improvement studies helped successive Labour and Conservative policy-makers to defend the Moscow criterion.190 Despite serious questions about the future relevance of its own strategic capabilities, the Wilson government remained active in nuclear diplomacy within the alliance. Although a detailed assessment is beyond the remit of this chapter, a brief account of the NPG’s role over subsequent years is enlightening. The NPG proved to be a forum in which to bridge, if not resolve, differences between the strategic preferences of Western Europe and the United States. 191 It certainly had a beneficial effect on other areas of alliance relations, espe-



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cially discussion surrounding the Non-Proliferation Treaty.192 The NPG also contributed to finding acceptable comprises on persistent differences regarding the new strategic concept of ‘flexible response’. Shared knowledge of American nuclear capabilities and operational plans certainly lessened doubts about the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee.193

Conclusion The Nuclear Planning Group served two key functions for the British government. The first was as a practicable way to address the concerns of its allies in NATO vis-à-vis the use of nuclear weapons. The second, and perhaps more important, function of the NPG was its role in the collapse of nuclear sharing proposals and the success of early non-proliferation negotiations. Some historians would challenge this conclusion, rejecting the claim that the failure of the MLF directly relates to the United States giving priority to the NPT. Such arguments tend to rest on the belief that the decision to forgo the MLF was made in December 1964, while US non-proliferation policy only materialised in course of 1965.194 Yet neither Wilson nor Johnson decided to forgo the MLF in 1964. Although there was a shift in emphasis towards European leadership on the issue, the ANF proposal ensured that nuclear sharing remained on the political landscape for several more years. The British, West German, and US governments were still discussing the issue during 1966. Moreover, US desires for a non-proliferation treaty did not suddenly materialise in 1965, but gradually took precedence in Washington as superpower interests converged on the issue. Thus nuclear sharing and non-proliferation were relevant to each other for a much longer period than assumed. It was the superpowers’ desire for progress in non-proliferation negotiations that resulted in the United States withdrawing its once firm support for nuclear sharing. In this new international context, membership of the NPG proved a sufficient concession for the FRG to remove demands for a nuclear sharing solution from the negotiating table. It is debatable as to what alternatives were actually available to West Germany, but the NPG nevertheless helped to facilitate agreement. Despite its own interests in the matter, the British government played only a minor role in overcoming the international difficulties surrounding the possession and control of nuclear weapons. The NPG was principally a US idea to which many countries contributed. Moreover, the British government remained unwilling to criticise nuclear sharing publicly, and decided against

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making West German participation in the NPG conditional on the renunciation of nuclear sharing solutions. These decisions reflected Wilson’s well-established preference for caution and prevarication in nuclear diplomacy. Persisting difficulties over the offset agreement, and a growing interest in membership of the EEC, only encouraged his reluctance to press the issue. By 1967, nuclear sharing had almost entirely faded from the political landscape and non-proliferation negotiations were well underway. Wilson had left the difficult choices to the United States. It had served him well.

6

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O

the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons opened for signature. Sixty countries signed immediately, including the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. The negotiations preceding this historic occasion have attracted the attention of many scholars, particularly those interested in US and NATO history.1 Consideration of British involvement, however, remains comparatively limited. Historians have focused even less attention on British non-proliferation policy after signature. Brevity certainly characterises the formal recollections of those senior politicians and officials involved in events.2 More than one author notes that the treaty merited only six pages in Harold Wilson’s memoirs.3 Michael Stewart provides a rather cynical explanation. ‘Foreign Secretaries’, he wryly remarked, ‘should remember the comment of the Spirit Sinister in Hardy’s Dynasts, “War makes rattling good history; but peace is poor reading”’.4 Despite Hardy’s choice words, there do exist a small number of ‘rattling good’ historical accounts of the British government’s involvement with the NPT.5 Although well researched and intelligently developed, existing accounts either suffer from the absence of relevant British archival materials or eschew many of the details of decision-making within the government, particularly during the later stages of the negotiation process. Closer examination of events in this period reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community complicated British nuclear non-proliferation policy.6 Previous studies have overlooked or underplayed this subtle relationship, treating the EEC and n 1 J u ly 19 6 8 ,

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the NPT as largely separate, rather than entwined, foreign policy objectives. In spite of the British government’s deep-seated commitment to a non-proliferation treaty, Wilson sought a secondary role in negotiations and repeatedly left the running to the superpowers. This approach avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the EEC, resentful of discriminatory terms, which, in turn, helped to protect Britain’s membership bid. Regardless of Wilson’s efforts, and careful management of nuclear diplomacy, the application failed. Nevertheless, a commitment to future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, alongside giving renewed impetus to the NPT, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the treaty.7 Difficulties on the domestic stage persisted throughout negotiations. Elements within the Labour government contested the decision to sign and later ratify the treaty. Opposition reflected serious reservations about the consequences for NATO nuclear policy and Britain’s nascent relations with the EEC. Tensions between these foreign policy objectives surfaced in sporadic arguments between ministers at the highest levels of government. The economy proved equally troublesome in this period. On 19 November 1967, Wilson authorised the devaluation of the pound. Essential deflationary measures forced major cuts to defence expenditure and raised serious questions about the future of the British nuclear weapons programme. The Polaris force survived initial demands for cancellation, but the future of improvement programmes appeared uncertain. Economic recovery was slow and punctuated by a series of currency crises. Wilson’s approval rating plummeted. Yet, in contrast to these difficulties, the prime minister’s handling of nuclear diplomacy was largely successful. The realisation of the treaty of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons was an important milestone in international nuclear history. Throughout his time in office, Wilson was a leading advocate for measures of non-proliferation and, despite what some historians claim, never lost interest in the NPT.8

A European Power Over the course of 1966, the superpowers groped their way to a compromise solution in private conversations in Geneva.9 A tacit understanding emerged, with ‘an agreement to disagree’ about nuclear sharing arrangements, leaving a treaty to deal only with what was prohibited rather than what was permitted. Negotiations continued and, by 10 October 1966, Moscow and Washington



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had made major progress towards acceptable language on a new draft, with conditions acceptable to both parties.10 The superpowers had largely excluded Britain from the negotiation process. Correspondence within the Foreign Office highlights this exclusion: ‘[It] looks rather as if something is up and that the Americans do not want to confide in us at this stage’.11 As talks continued, the United States remained keenly aware that it was negotiating on matters that affected its allies without their agreement. As Dean Rusk put it, ‘[T]his whole operation has to be renounceable by us if need be’.12 George Brown’s trip to Moscow in November 1966, which he felt to be a great success, underlines British ignorance.13 Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin suggests that Brown was unaware of recent events, and that Kremlin leaders deliberately avoided the topic.14 George Quester claims that there was some embarrassment in the Labour government because it was consulted no more than anyone else.15 Historians should be careful not to exaggerate the extent of British exclusion. In a recent interview, Alun Chalfont suggested that elements within the Foreign Office were aware of some proceedings, even if they were not present.16 Moreover, there may have been some opening up between Britain and American later in the year. On 7 December, Brown informed the Foreign Office that in discussion with Willy Brandt, West German foreign minister, there was to be no mention of the Americans keeping the British government informed of the details of their bilateral discussions.17 A week later, Rusk informed Brown that he had worked out a new draft of a treaty, and welcomed British comments.18 Analysts within the British government read, and supported, the new draft. The wording did not interfere with the existing organisation of nuclear forces in NATO or arrangements for consultation within the alliance and would ‘tilt the balance in favour of agreement’.19 Washington and Moscow finally reached agreement on a treaty in December 1966.20 Following Brown’s earlier discussion with Rusk, suggestions that Britain received the news at the same time as other Western allies are accurate but somewhat misleading.21 In February 1967, Alexei Kosygin, premier of the Soviet Union, journeyed to London for talks with the prime minister. During a formal dinner at 10 Downing Street, Wilson informed Kosygin that he was glad to see the United States and the Soviet Union at last making progress on a non-proliferation treaty. Speaking on behalf of the British government he also confided, ‘It was rather as if we were on the outside with our noses pressed to the window watching celebrations inside, with the organisation of which we had been very much concerned’.22 Yet, as events over the coming months would reveal, exclusion

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would prove to be advantageous to another of Wilson’s major foreign policy objectives at that time—namely, British membership of the EEC. By the close of 1966, the British government was pursuing the NPT and seriously considering entry into the EEC. Although seemingly detached from each other, these two major foreign policy objectives would soon collide. By early 1967, irrespective of its practical arms control merits, a non-proliferation treaty had come to represent a symbol of detente in an adversarial Cold War relationship.23 The superpowers had formed an agreement on the broad outline of a treaty but, critically, not the issue of safeguards. As tensions over nuclear sharing faded, safeguards, a set of activities designed to verify that a state would not use nuclear programmes for weapons purposes, emerged as the greatest challenge to progress.24 The United States had initially tried to get International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a mandatory condition of the NPT.25 Pressure from the Western allies, preferring verification via the European Atomic Energy Community, led to the scrapping of mandatory safeguards from a draft treaty in August 1965. By the close of 1966, the United States sought only to secure the widest application of IAEA or equivalent international safeguards in connection with peaceful nuclear activities.26 The Soviet Union, however, rejected ‘equivalent international safeguards’, which would have allowed a self-inspection regime in Europe, instead demanding binding IAEA verification measures. During subsequent discussions with the Soviet government, William Foster informed Rusk that a ‘unique chance’ to reach agreement on a safeguards article could emerge if the members of Euratom were willing to accept the application of IAEA safeguards or ‘settle for a treaty lacking any meaningful safeguards provision, thus abandoning one of our major arms control objectives’.27 In subsequent discussions, the members of Euratom remained unwilling to cooperate. Imposition of safeguards by a rival institution appeared as an attack on European integration.28 Fears about superpower conciliation and the lingering threat of US troop withdrawals from the Continent only promoted anxiety. Alongside monetary pressure, provided by current account surpluses in Europe, a treaty was one of few remaining bargaining chips.29 The British government recognised the need for agreement on the safeguards issue in order to produce a credible treaty. Indeed, neither superpower was willing to proceed without full West German involvement, appreciating its geo-strategic significance in a wider Cold War context and the danger of further proliferation in Europe. British non-proliferation diplomacy also fo-



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cused on the FRG. France had refused to support a non-proliferation treaty, regarding it as a superpower attempt to defend the existing nuclear monopoly.30 Wilson’s interest in West Germany also reflected his related desire for membership of the EEC. President Charles de Gaulle looked increasingly likely to veto Britain’s application as the year drew on. Of the remaining five members of the EEC, only the FRG was potentially strong enough to force change in Paris.31 The West German Foreign Ministry had reached a similar conclusion: ‘Huge British interest in joining the EEC gives us the opportunity to demand from the British a more supportive approach to those problems the NPT poses for the EEC and Euratom members’.32 Negotiations were complicated in February when the FRG announced that it was no longer able to finance British forces in West Germany, leading to a breakdown in troop cost negotiations.33 The ‘offset problem’, following French withdrawal from NATO military command structure, did little to restore faith in Western European security. These tensions, resting on top of lingering ‘historic traumas’—namely, West Germany’s desire for international rehabilitation and equality with Britain—set the context for non-proliferation negotiations and over the following year.34 When Wilson and Brown met Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Brandt in Bonn on 16 February, the West Germans’ concerns centred on both the content and manner of treaty negotiations. With some sympathy, Wilson replied, ‘If Germany felt that she was sometimes being pushed around a little, so did Britain’.35 Kiesinger sought ‘psychological support’ from Britain. He desired assurances, repeating concerns raised with the Americans a week earlier, that a treaty would not become an instrument of discrimination against West German peaceful atomic energy.36 In response, Wilson subsequently sent Solly Zuckerman, chief scientific advisor to the government, to Bonn to calm fears about the future of German civil nuclear technology.37 Historians tend to claim that Wilson’s strategy was to dispel objections to international inspection.38 Zuckerman certainly suggests in his memoirs that he sought to allay West German fears that the treaty would permanently deny them certain technological and economic advantages.39 Yet it is possible that the meeting instead reflected the British government’s attempt to cooperate more closely with the FRG, and thereby Euratom, rather than merely encouraging the adoption of IAEA safeguards. In a message to President Lyndon Johnson on 21 February, Wilson stated British motivations clearly. The prime minister said they should try to keep FRG on board in order to keep momentum for So-

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viet signature, and that without their support British entry into the EEC could be complicated.40 Whatever Zuckerman’s motivations, upon completion of the meeting, Zuckerman believed that the safeguards issue was no longer a technical issue; progress was now dependent on the political handling of the West Germans.41 The Americans had reached a similar conclusion.42 Despite some disagreement amongst historians concerning the British government’s commitment to European safeguards, a desire for closer cooperation with the members of the EEC directly influenced the British governments’ non-proliferation policy.43 Such an interpretation is borne out by events on the afternoon of 1 March 1967, when Wilson met with Brown, Chalfont, Zuckerman, and Burke Trend. After debate between Brown and Chalfont, Wilson reached a decision that was to guide the government’s attitude to the non-proliferation treaty over the coming months, concluding, ‘Our approach should be that of a European power discussing the matter with European partners and not seeking to fight American battles’.44 Although cooperating with the FRG, the British government did so cautiously, and with limited change to its existing stance on a treaty. The suggestion that by spring 1967, British coaxing had led to the Americans agreeing to offer the application of IAEA safeguards to their own civil nuclear activities is inaccurate.45 This particular concession had actually first been proposed by the US government in February in an effort to overcome West German fears about industrial espionage and the effect of a treaty on peaceful nuclear programmes.46 The proposal gathered wide support in the United States, widely considered as the key to solving the safeguards problem.47 On 14 April, Chalfont informed the members of the Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee that the US government was willing to place its civil nuclear industry under international safeguards. In such circumstances, the British government had previously agreed to make a similar offer, and the United States expected such a reciprocal move.48 This proposal was a serious and concerted effort to win West German approval on both sides of the Atlantic. Nonetheless, Britain did not instigate the concession, preferring to leave the running to the Americans. A cautionary, not concessionary, approach allowed Wilson to better reconcile two seemingly opposed objectives: a satisfactory non-proliferation treaty and membership of the EEC. Nevertheless, such actions also reflected a government concerned with Bonn’s approval. In keeping with Wilson’s recommendation a month before, Britain was now acting as a European power discussing problems with its European partners.



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Closer cooperation with the countries of the EEC is unsurprising, given the wider context of events. In April, succumbing to longer-term trends, the cabinet agreed to withdraw completely from East of Suez by the mid-1970s.49 Only the EEC now afforded Britain a significant role on the international stage. 50 A series of economic crises, and debatably their mishandling, hastened this decision.51 Throughout 1967, and following the April budget, the government began to relax its deflationary economic policies as conditions improved. In the following months, however, pressure began to mount on the pound.52 In early May, Wilson lodged Britain’s second application for membership of the EEC, thereby abandoning his earlier commitment to satisfying Britain’s strict conditions of entry.53 Amongst other issues, membership, speculators believed, might necessitate devaluation. Inclusion thus offered long-term benefits to the current account but in the short-term contributed to an increasingly problematic drain on reserves.54 A desire for membership encouraged the British government to behave increasingly as a ‘European power’ during non-proliferation treaty negotiations, albeit with some resistance from the PLP.55 It was at this time that Wilson moved Chalfont to Western European affairs to manage negotiations regarding Britain’s entry into the EEC, leaving Fred Mulley to conduct non-proliferation and disarmament talks.56 By the launch of the British application, Whitehall already understood that the FRG was either unwilling to risk its own relationship with France or unable to use their political position to help Wilson.57 This information does not seem to have affected British efforts towards achieving membership, especially in the nuclear realm. By mid-May 1967, the prime minister requested a note from the foreign secretary on the latest position of the draft treaty and, curiously at this stage, whether the British government might be endangering its European posture for the sake of a treaty that would not be acceptable outside of Europe. Referring to Europe and the superpowers, Wilson was concerned ‘not to fall between two stools’, presumably whilst attempting to sit on both.58 Brown accepted that it would be foolish to risk Britain’s European position for a non-proliferation treaty. Yet he suggested that there had never been resistance to the idea of a treaty, just that it respected the interests of the EEC: If the situation should arise in which there is a direct confrontation between the United States and Russians on one side—and the members of EURATOM on the other, on the issue of the acceptability of EURATOM safeguards we should have to consider our position very carefully: the whole success of our European

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policy might depend on the choice we made. For the present it should therefore be a major aim of our policy at Geneva to see that things do not reach such a state.59

The Labour government’s commitment to a non-proliferation treaty thus balanced delicately against its desire for closer relations with the EEC. British nuclear diplomacy appeared to have reached its lowest ebb, unable to influence the superpowers and unwilling to influence the actions of the non–nuclear weapon states. Chalfont noted that the principal difficulty regarding the completion of a treaty was the failure of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree on a draft acceptable to NATO regarding safeguards.60 The rest of the world, including Britain, could only wait for the superpowers try to reach an agreement. British influence on either superpower was limited. Tensions over Vietnam and the precarious state of the pound had tested US-UK relations.61 Only months earlier, Johnson promised considerable financial support to Britain if Wilson sent troops into Vietnam.62 Such a deal might have bolstered a struggling economy but it would have torn the Labour Party apart and likely forced Wilson from office. Overseas military expenditure further strained relations. Following a third defence review in July 1967, the government decided to halve its forces in Singapore and Malaysia by 1970/71, withdrawing completely by the mid-1970s.63 The prime minister had sacrificed a British presence East of Suez to ameliorate balance of payment problems and to appease opinion within the Labour Party. An influx of MPs from the last election supported the acceleration of defence cuts in light of reductions to domestic spending.64 Wilson became increasingly sensitive to tensions within his own party. Indeed, he reshuffled a small number of cabinet posts in August, promoting more competition within the party and diluting threats to his own position.65 Shifting geo-strategic circumstances help to explain the timing and scope of the government’s defence review. British ministers and officials felt that the Americans had become ambivalent about further withdrawals, a reasonable conclusion given growing concerns within the Johnson administration about open-ended support for sterling. In addition, Indonesia’s retreat from confrontation in the summer of 1966 meant that the need for British troops in Malaysia evaporated.66 Wilson also believed retreat from empire would ease Britain’s passage into EEC.67 Nevertheless, the prime minister’s announcement of withdrawal from East of Suez disappointed the Johnson administration.68 Transatlantic relations suffered. Refusal to help in Vietnam and the withdrawal of forces from East of Suez had occurred despite considerable and repeated fi-



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nancial support. Even if Wilson had been willing to step into non-proliferation treaty negotiations, it is unlikely he would have been welcomed.

Safeguarding Participation Throughout the summer of 1967, discussions continued in vain for a satisfactory formula on the safeguards issue. The United States continued to make concerted efforts to ‘win’ Bonn.69 In August, the FRG eventually accepted a proposal whereby the US and USSR would table a draft treaty jointly, albeit leaving details concerning the safeguards issue blank and with several conditions regarding future negotiations.70 Talks moved quickly. On 24 August, representatives from the United States and Soviet Union were able to present identical draft treaties on nuclear non-proliferation to the United Nations.71 Although still partially incomplete, there was hope that this draft would overcome the remaining obstacles to achieving a treaty.72 Despite other challenges, most notably persistent objections from the Indian government regarding security guarantees and progress towards disarmament, the issue of safeguards remained the major priority for the superpowers.73 Both sides made further concessions throughout September and October.74 The Soviets were now willing to permit Europe to negotiate with IAEA through Euratom, albeit tacitly. The countries of the EEC, however, prevaricated, and remained unable to reach agreement. The British government dutifully continued its negotiations on a range of issues with the West German government in London, between 23 and 25 October. Despite some debate about how best to handle their guests, a conciliatory approach prevailed. Threats were ineffective not only because they would be hollow but also because West German support was essential to other foreign policy objectives.75 Talks initially focused on the EEC and the offset problem, before moving on to the current draft of the nonproliferation treaty. Although issues such as nuclear sharing were no longer important, Kiesinger remained anxious about the preservation of Euratom. Mulley stressed the need for swift action and, in response to charges that the current draft was discriminatory, highlighted both British and US willingness to accept the application of agreed safeguards to themselves. West German misgivings may have been somewhat reduced, but, as this meeting revealed, they were far from removed.76 To be sure, by November, following many weeks of discussion, the Euratom countries remained unable to produce their own safeguards article and instead contented themselves with giving the United

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States five ‘principles’ on which to negotiate.77 Despite American and Soviet cooperation, the Euratom countries still had no clear views on the alternative formulations of the safeguard article by early December.78 The present session of the ENDC had been due to recess earlier that month but, in an effort to reach agreement on the safeguards issue, the co-chairmen kept the ENDC open until mid-December. Sensing the opportunity slipping from them, the US government formally announced their intention to put their peaceful nuclear activities under safeguards when the non-nuclear states accepted safeguards under the proposed treaty. Washington did not inform London beforehand. The British government hurriedly rushed to make a similar announcement in the House of Commons two days later, on 4 December.79 Internal correspondence reveals annoyance but also a sense of urgency to produce a similar announcement in an effort to maintain the government’s ‘leading role as a bridge between the super-powers and Euratom/other N.A.T.O. states’.80 This commitment to Europe should not be underestimated, given the complexity of placing all civil operations under international safeguards.81 Curiously, the Treasury had very little to say about this costly concession, despite ‘a massive increase in safeguarding costs’.82 The chancellor simply accepted the proposal, and Treasury officials refused further comment.83 These curiosities aside, these efforts proved significant. Brandt went on to describe the announcements as a ‘significant step’ toward resolving the problem of safeguards.84

Devaluation and Exclusion Soviet-US and FRG-US talks at the end of 1967 finally addressed these issues of safeguards. The Soviet Union accepted a system whereby the IAEA remained as supreme control authority, whilst inspections in Western Europe were to be conducted by Euratom.85 Curiously, a background note produced by the British government later suggested that it had been ‘uniquely qualified to help towards the compromise solution which was adopted’.86 It is difficult to see how the British government was uniquely qualified to help or, indeed, what it had done. Britain was often ill placed to support the progress. It had been unable to influence the superpowers and unwilling to influence the countries of the EEC. The United States acted as global mediator not because the British government did not want to help, but because they would have been unable to do so in any meaningful way.



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Although the treaty appeared to be progressing well, the pound was struggling. Harsh deflationary measures in the previous year had been helpful, but their relaxation in spring placed sterling under renewed pressure. Falling British exports and the panicked response of the government to the oil embargo imposed following the Six-Day War did little to help this downward trend.87 Economic difficulties intensified in September following a dock strike in Liverpool that harmed exports, just as the Seaman’s strike had done in 1966.88 By October, it had become increasingly difficult to defend sterling against the markets as a record deficit emerged.89 Only the United States offered hope of economic salvation. Wilson was keenly aware that Johnson’s primary concern was Vietnam. John Silkin, chief whip, reported that it would be hard to contain a possible revolt by the PLP if military concessions followed.90 The prime minister had thus far successfully balanced the domestic and international pressures on his government; military cooperation with the United States in Vietnam would jeopardise this equilibrium.91 Wilson, however, held other important bargaining counters. Because of the necessary deflationary package that would have to follow any devaluation, the threat of further defence cuts might encourage US support. Moreover, because the dollar was under strain, a British devaluation could potentially damage the US economy. According to Ben Pimlott, Wilson believed economic self-interest and a history of cooperation would prevail.92 The prime minister also had a third card to play. Less than a year earlier, senior elements within the US government had pressed the president to negotiate the surrender of Britain’s ‘independent deterrent’.93 Reconsidering the future of Britain’s nuclear weapons programme, however, does not appear to have featured as a potential bargaining counter. Pimlott suggests that despite Wilson’s best efforts, by 15 November it was evident that no more money would be forthcoming, while suggestions of French support proved erroneous.94 Events appear to be more complicated. The US government was keen to avoid devaluation, but had to work in conjunction with other lenders to address the crisis. Sterling therefore remained an effective source of bargaining power. On 17 November, after weeks of difficult negotiations, an international package led by the European Commission to forestall devaluation seemed assured.95 Yet it was too late. Callaghan recalls that Wilson had decided to accept devaluation on 13 November, and the cabinet reached the same conclusion the following day.96 The decision had been difficult and left bitter memories that would outlast the prime minister himself. Headed to

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Wilson’s funeral almost three decades later, Callaghan and Castle resumed ‘a heated argument about devaluation’.97 The government believed it had little choice but to devalue the pound, as there were no longer sufficient funds to resist the growing speculative forces challenging sterling.98 It remains an intriguing counterfactual as to whether Wilson could have delayed devaluation, or lessened the subsequent deflationary measures, if he had decided to send British troops into Vietnam in exchange for continued financial assistance. This was not beyond the realm of possibility. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy all promised considerable financial support to Britain if Wilson sent troops into Vietnam.99 While military cooperation may have been unrealistic because of pressing political considerations, Wilson might have achieved some concessions had he surrendered the ‘independent deterrent’. Senior members of the Johnson administration certainly desired the cancellation or collectivisation of the British nuclear force.100 Nevertheless, Wilson rejected both options. The announcement of the change of parity from $2.80 to $2.40 was made late on the evening of Saturday, 18 November in order to cheat the typically brutal Sunday papers.101 In contrast to 1949, with the exception of Denmark there were no simultaneous devaluations by other industrial countries.102 In addition, the benefits were limited. Pressure on sterling continued, reflecting global instability and a delay for the effect to reach the balance of payments, resulting in mounting pressure on the US dollar.103 When Wilson first became a Member of Parliament, the pound had stood proudly at $4.03. Twice in his political career, he had been involved in devaluing the pound. Further decline was to come. The Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971, ushering in an ear of generally floating exchange rates. In 1976, Wilson’s last year in office, the pound fell beneath $2 for the first time, and eventually slumped to below $1.70.104 Devaluation was forced in all but a technical sense.105 The decision resulted in Callaghan’s resignation and replacement by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins.106 Callaghan believed that it was the right time to leave, later admitting that his successor spoke with the authority he no longer had.107 In his memoirs, Jenkins suggests that the decision was inevitable and had been desirable eighteen months earlier.108 Devaluation provided the new chancellor with a strong political position from which to pursue reductions in public expenditure.109 Although Jenkins acted swiftly to address the problem, throughout the following two years there were doubts about the government’s ability to hold the new parity.110 Some of the fault rests with the Labour government.



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Devaluation demanded further pain. There was resistance to, and ignorance of, the scale of deflation required to make the reduced value of sterling work as a measure to restore the balance of payments.111 The government needed to borrow money to ensure devaluation did not encourage further speculation against the pound. The IMF provided additional credit, but required a commitment to deflation. Continuing the trend established in the July measures, Jenkins pursued a package of tax increases and sharp cuts in public spending. The cabinet eventually agreed to these painful proposals.112 Political compromises clouded over the necessary deflationary package, however, meaning that the government could have exploited this economic opportunity more thoroughly.113 More bad news was to come. Devaluation, and the sterling agreements that followed, altered relations with the sterling area and the Commonwealth, reinforcing the need to integrate with the EEC.114 De Gaulle soon dashed expectations of membership. On 27 November 1967, he rejected Britain’s second application, and the Council of Ministers confirmed his veto in late December.115 Britain now had to tend to its woeful economic situation outside of the EEC. Rejection coincided with growing tensions in US-UK relations. Johnson may well have been expecting devaluation, but the news was ‘still a heavy blow’.116 Alan Dobson notes that while Britain’s economic weakness had previously brought Britain and the United States together, it now had an unravelling effect and irreparably weakened nuclear and economic relations.117 David Reynolds suggests that as Britain’s military and economic power eroded, so too did its special value to the United States.118 Such conclusions are fair, but the two countries continued to work closely together during the devaluation and subsequent crises in order to shore up the international monetary system.119 Johnson recognised it had been a particularly difficult year for the Labour government. Writing to his besieged ally, he encouraged Wilson to take heart in the success of their joint efforts in meeting the critical problems of November and December and in restoring confidence and order to the world’s financial system.120 As the year drew to a close, there was further debate in the British government and, recognising the need for a further round of defence cuts, uncertainty about the future of the Polaris programme. The prime minister remained defiant in the House of Commons, swiftly rejecting the suggestion that he should consider mothballing the Polaris force given the state of the economy.121 Financial tensions had lingered throughout the year. Wilson had noted that he

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was ‘concerned at the apparent failure of the Treasury to keep as close a scrutiny on expenditures, current or projected, in the nuclear weapons field as they did in other fields’ earlier in March.122 Nevertheless, he wished to retain the bomb, and the cabinet later accepted the continuation of the programme as planned.123 Events preceding this decision, however, merit closer attention. Alongside domestic cuts, Jenkins proposed further reductions to overseas expenditure and even suggested abandoning Britain’s nuclear role.124 In the final weeks of 1967, the Treasury and the Department of Economic Affairs sought the cancellation of the Polaris programme and any future improvement programme to aid the penetration of Soviet defences. The Foreign Office, Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, and Ministry of Technology disagreed. These departments argued that the government should retain its nuclear capability and pursue further improvements. A third position also emerged. The president of the Board of Trade and the chief scientific officer to the government suggested retaining but not improving the Polaris force. Nevertheless, as a cabinet paper explained, all were ‘agreed in doubting whether there is adequate advantage, now or in the immediate future, in going for the half-way house of retaining the rest of our nuclear capability while giving up Polaris’.125 Uncertainty therefore lingered over the future of the entire British nuclear weapons programme. Wilson’s nuclear committee gathered to reach a decision. Debate ensued amongst political heavyweights. The nuclear committee comprised Wilson, Brown, Jenkins, Stewart, Denis Healey, Tony Benn, and Privy Councillor George Thompson. Representing the Ministry of Defence, Healey stressed the strategic value of the Polaris force. The Soviet Union, he believed, could conceivably attack the UK and not the US. In addition, abandonment would not avoid the spread of nuclear weapons. Following these familiar strategic justifications, Healey concentrated his defence of the Polaris programme on sunk costs. The government had already spent or committed 90 percent of the capital costs of the system. Expenses would thus decline to £30–£40 million per annum, which was about 2 percent of the defence budget. Polaris therefore presented the most cost effective contribution to NATO. A similar replacement would be more expensive and increase the burden on the balance of payments. Diplomatic arguments also played a key role in Healey’s defence. Scrapping the Polaris force, or selling it to the Americans, was politically unacceptable. Surrendering influence over US nuclear policy and the potential polarisation of nuclear power posed great risks for Europe and Britain.126



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In contrast to Healey’s efforts, the Treasury appealed to include the Polaris force in forthcoming spending reductions. Although the basis of the case against continuation was financial, a pressing concern giving recent traumas, many within the government also held a healthy scepticism that the United Kingdom could or would confront the USSR independently of the USA. The Treasury’s central argument, however, was that the government ‘must rely more, for our influence in the world, on the soundness of our economy and less on the military presence or deterrent threat’.127 Wilson remained unconvinced. The minutes note that the ‘political arguments were so strong as to outweigh completely the economic advantages that we would gain from abandoning Polaris’. The committee offered its ‘strong support’ for the completion of the Polaris programme.128 The immediate battle won, debate moved on to the question of modernisation. Healey stressed that failing to authorise improvement programmes would undermine the credibility of Polaris. It would also ‘forfeit its value as a bargaining counter should the time come when we wished to gain advantage from abandoning or internationalising it’. This was a curious argument. The cabinet had originally approved the construction of the Polaris force on the promise of internationalisation. A political commitment had thus evolved into ‘a bargaining counter’. After further discussion, the committee deferred a decision on upgrading Polaris and committed itself only to further studies to clarify the costs and requirements of any improvements. In the present economic situation, Wilson concluded, no particular element of the defence programme was sacrosanct.129 Later that day, the prime minister faced the House of Commons. He was asked, in view of the state of the economy, how much the government would save if the fleet of Polaris submarines was not commissioned but put into mothballs instead. The savings made by mothballing the Polaris fleet when complete, he replied, would be a great deal less than imagined.130 The first week of December 1967 represents a defining moment in British nuclear history. Wilson could have dominated his nuclear committee, whether by force of personality or more subtle methods, and ensured the cancellation or sale of the Polaris force.131 The chancellor of the exchequer would have supported such a decision, as would the majority of the PLP, thereby removing almost all political obstacles. Wilson would have been aware that cancelling or selling the Polaris force would have generated budgetary savings of ‘several hundred million’ pounds over the next three to four years.132 As an economist, he would have appreciated the urgency of such reductions. Yet Wilson clung to

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the bomb. There is no definitive answer as to why. Many of the reasons he offered in defence of the Polaris force shortly after taking office still applied after devaluation. Strategic factors played only a minor role. Deterring the Soviet Union certainly did not figure highly in Wilson’s thinking during or after the decision.133 The United States appeared to be much more important. In later interviews, Wilson and Healey explain that a large reason behind keeping a national nuclear force was the potential need to restrain the United States, although how and from what remains unclear.134 Counter-intuitively, given the circumstances of the time, economic factors go some way to explaining continuation. In his memoirs, Wilson explains that the production of the submarines was ‘well past the point of no return; there could be no question of cancelling them, except an inordinate cost’.135 While this was not true in 1964, it certainly was the case by 1967.136 Healey made a similar claim about ‘sunk costs’ during the committee meeting, and this may well have swayed opinion. Moreover, Wilson still believed that the Polaris programme could be a lever to prise dollars from the US Treasury to bail out the British economy.137 Now more than ever, Wilson sought economic security. Explanations exist beyond economics and diplomacy. Peter Hennessy notes, ‘[T] he understandable reluctance for any British premier . . . to risk history judging him to be the one who left the United Kingdom without its ultimate weapon’ should a nuclear threat ever emerge.138 Wilson, though, was probably looking to the next election rather than the history books. He had admitted his own position in a private discussion three years earlier. ‘Merely to hand over Polaris’, Wilson explained, ‘would be a vote-loser in this country’.139 The last year had been disastrous for the Labour government. Every vote counted. The Polaris force had survived, but there were serious questions about future investment in research and development. Under Wilson’s instruction, Benn commissioned the Kings Norton Working Party review to consider the upgrade question. The report recommended continuing investment and work continued on options for improvement, motivated in part by unsubstantiated fears about Soviet ABMs.140 By 1970, the government had still not reached a decision on the matter, despite millions of pounds of investment in improvement studies.141 Procrastination left the choice to a new government. Heath reached a decision in 1973, favouring the British ‘super antelope’ upgrade to Polaris, later renamed ‘Chevaline’, in place of US variants.142 Economic and diplomatic factors help to explain the choice of a comparatively less effective but more costly upgrade.143 The return of a Labour government in 1974 prompted further



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debate. Nevertheless, the status quo endured. Wilson defended the completion of the Chevaline programme just as he had supported the Polaris programme ten years earlier.144

Preparation for Signature The early months of 1968 were a difficult time for Wilson. Over the last two years, official membership of the Labour Party had suffered a collapse.145 Devaluation and bad opinion polls did little to improve the situation. The war in Vietnam and arms sales to South Africa had weakened the prime minister in the eyes of many in the Labour Party.146 Between January and March, some felt Jenkins could have toppled Wilson. The state of the economy offered no solace. Following devaluation, further savings were necessary. At the end of 1967, Wilson and Jenkins forced through the cabinet the complete withdrawal from Suez by 1971, significantly speeding up the existing process, and approved the cancellation of the F-111 aircraft. This was not, as some historians claim, a revolution in defence policy but instead the culmination of a longer trend of rationalisation.147 The government reduced defence spending by £100 million, although it still spent a higher proportion of national income on defence than any other Western European country.148 To be sure, most forces transferred to new NATO roles in Europe and the North Atlantic. The alliance strategy of flexible response helped to justify a larger conventional role in Europe for displaced Asian forces.149 News of British plans for total withdrawal from the Far East and the Persian Gulf by 1971 further strained US-UK relations, with the Johnson administration increasingly burdened by the demands of Vietnam.150 The president could not conceal his ‘deep dismay’ about Wilson’s decision, which he felt to be ‘tantamount to British withdrawal from world affairs’.151 These policy changes are noteworthy for nuclear historians. Wilson had originally argued for the Polaris force as a bargaining chip to reduce force levels in Europe and to maintain a presence East of Suez. The government had failed to realise either objective, but investment in the bomb persisted. One of Wilson’s few successes at this time was the progress of a global nonproliferation treaty. The ENDC resumed on 18 January 1968. In the first meeting of the year, the US and Soviet co-chairmen each tabled identical revised draft treaties.152 The proposals now included an international safeguard clause, which allowed the non–nuclear weapon states to conclude necessary agreements with the IAEA ‘either individually or together with other States’. The

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IAEA remained as the supreme control authority, but European inspectors could conduct implementation in Western Europe, thus preserving the status of Euratom.153 The revised treaty now included a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to further disarmament negotiations.154 That these disarmament negotiations only needed to be pursued ‘in good faith’, however, was sufficiently ambiguous to allow minor efforts towards nuclear disarmament to honour the obligations set forth in any treaty.155 There was therefore, at best, an extremely weak commitment to change, and no binding obligations.156 Nevertheless, after many years of painful negotiations, a treaty had emerged. Following submission of the US and Soviet revised treaties, the ENDC examined the drafts and proposed a series of amendments from January until mid-March. Throughout this review period, the British government endured significant debates revolving around the realisation of a non-proliferation treaty. By late January, a treaty was within grasp. Two concerns tempered British optimism. First, some non-aligned countries had indicated that they might be reluctant to sign. In keeping with the British approach of leaving the running to others, Mulley stressed that there was no point using ‘unilateral pressure’ on such states, and instead preferred to wait for the emergence of ‘universal pressure’. Second, the Euratom countries had not yet formally endorsed the revised safeguard article. ‘It would be particularly awkward for us as potential members of Euratom and the EEC’, Mulley noted, ‘if such a confrontation of views arose at Geneva’.157 Despite the failure of Britain’s second application, it appears the Foreign Office were still keen to avoid conflict with the countries of the EEC. The British government was also digesting the issue of security assurances at this time. The idea of providing support to any state renouncing nuclear weapons that subsequently became the victim of an act of aggression involving such devices continued to present difficulties. Both the British and American governments recognised the need to provide security assurances in order to persuade as many non-nuclear countries as possible to commit to signature. Fearing that discussions in this area might move forward quickly, elements within the government believed it would need to take a position on the matter in order to play a role in exchanges with the superpowers. The Foreign Office, if not the government more widely, agreed to commit itself to any agreement reached between the Soviet Union and the United States.158 The government’s solution to any remaining points of contention appeared to be to follow policy drafted in Washington, rather than in London. It is difficult to see Britain’s influence over any aspect of the final stages of the negotiation process.



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Senior ministers nevertheless continued to believe that the British government was playing a leading role in the negotiation process. During the cabinet’s Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on 30 January, Mulley stated that the complete text of the non-proliferation treaty ‘embodied a number of revised provisions on which we had taken the initiative. Owing to our wish not to prejudice our position vis-à-vis the members of the European Atomic Energy Community (represented in the ENDC by Italy) we had not publicised the role that we had played, but in fact we had done much to bridge opposing views’. This statement appears to have gone unchallenged. Although this ‘role’ remains unclear, such comments underline the restraining influence of the EEC on British non-proliferation policy.159 The DOPC meeting moved on to the question of security assurances. Particularly troubling was the US proposal for a ‘non-use’ commitment whereby nuclear weapon states would refrain from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states undertaking non-proliferation obligations. Healey felt that this commitment would weaken British nuclear deterrence by limiting strategic options. It therefore presented ‘a serious division’ between Britain and the superpowers. Nevertheless, the committee accepted that it would be unthinkable not to subscribe to the idea if the two superpowers did reach an agreement.160 Evidently, in this instance at least, progress towards a non-proliferation treaty played a larger role in British nuclear policy than the concept of deterrence. This decision would seem to support suggestions that Wilson, along with many in the cabinet, saw the bomb as a diplomatic tool, designed to improve Britain’s global standing.161 Opinion within the Foreign Office had largely guided the British government’s position on a non-proliferation treaty thus far. As negotiations entered their final stages, however, challenges arose. During the DOPC meeting, Healey expressed doubts about the effectiveness of such a treaty and feared that it was inconsistent with NATO strategy. He also stressed that by appearing to collaborate with the superpowers against the smaller powers, a treaty could seriously prejudice Britain’s standing with the members of the European Economic Community.162 Adding more detail to the official minutes, Benn claims in his diaries that Healey actually launched into a major attack, suggesting that it would invalidate NATO. When Wilson asked him why he had not raised this issue before, he could only answer that he did not think the treaty had been taken seriously.163 In a subsequent letter to Mulley, Healey detailed further objections to the

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present draft of the treaty, specifically its perceived threat to present NATO strategy.164 Benn claims that personal factors motivated Healey’s challenge, chiefly the cancellation of his beloved F-111 project earlier that year.165 In an interview with the author, Chalfont suggests that such opposition actually represented an undercurrent of resistance in the Ministry of Defence to negotiations in Geneva on matters of national security.166 Healey’s comments were controversial, but they were not unique. Similar views had begun to emerge in the Conservative Party.167 Nevertheless, the method in which he questioned the current draft of the treaty—namely, reintroducing a series of difficult and divisive issues—failed to garner much support and ultimately embarrassed Healey.168 Zuckerman, Chalfont, and Sir Elwyn Jones, the attorney general, all subsequently expressed their surprise at Healey’s comments and immediately disregarded them as almost entirely without substance.169 Mulley replied to Healey in a lengthy note defending the existing draft. He was clear that if Healey aired his concerns, the only option left would be to withdraw from negotiations, which was unacceptable in the PLP or in the House of Commons.170 Brown and Wilson fully supported Mulley’s response.171

Signature On 8 and 9 February, Wilson met with Johnson in Washington.172 The president’s preoccupation with the war in Vietnam and broader financial problems meant that he was unwilling to press Wilson on the issue of British military withdrawal, leaving existing plans unaltered.173 Against these more pressing considerations, nuclear weapons did not feature highly. Nonetheless, Rusk informed Wilson that both superpowers were hopeful of swift progress towards realising a non-proliferation treaty.174 West Germany’s position vis-à-vis a treaty was more complicated. The advisor on disarmament to the West German government, Ambassador Swidbert Schnippenkötter, had made the ‘significant remark’ in late January that he thought nothing would stop a non-proliferation treaty now, and he expected the West German government to offer a signature in early summer.175 This remark was unduly optimistic. Several days after the talks in Washington, Brandt informed Wilson that Kiesinger wanted to sign a treaty but was having trouble with his own party on the issue.176 Nevertheless, during a DOPC meeting on 14 February, the foreign and defence secretaries believed that negotiations were progressing well and that the superpowers were



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close to an agreement on this issue. The only outstanding issue was that of security guarantees for non-nuclear powers.177 On 7 March 1968, Foster informed the ENDC that the US, Soviet, and British governments had agreed to sponsor a draft resolution on security assurances for consideration by the United Nations Security Council. Any state committing or threatening aggression with nuclear weapons would be countered by measures taken in accordance with the UN charter.178 It is worth noting that security assurances still did not form part of the current draft, but existed merely as a reaffirmation of the Security Council’s existing position.179 Crucially, for the British government at least, these assurances did not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons on non–nuclear weapon states, which could undermine the present NATO defence posture in Europe. There remained, however, a degree of ambiguity regarding these commitments, specifically over the issue of ‘non-use’ commitment. Accordingly, the British government advised all of its diplomats to avoid ‘being drawn’ on negative security measures and instead focus on ‘positive’ assurances’, in the hope that no such agreement would emerge.180 Later that month, senior representatives from the United States and Soviet Union informed the ENDC that they had submitted a joint draft, revising the version produced on 18 January, to the United Nations General Assembly.181 The British government continued to struggle with the economy as the latest draft of the non-proliferation treaty reached the final stages of negotiation. Before Jenkins unveiled his first budget, pressure continued to mount on the pound. Devaluation and deflation had not ended speculative challenges. There was a lengthy delay for the effects to reach the balance of payments, and uncertainty persisted in the global currency markets.182 On 14 March, the strain on national reserves threatened the goal of stable exchange rates, and pushed Wilson and Jenkins into urgent discussions with the United States and other international creditors in an effort to maintain parity.183 The possibility of a disastrous second devaluation threatened the potential breakdown of the global trading system. It is therefore one of the most underappreciated sterling crises since 1945.184 The chronic weakness of the pound and doubts about the dollar encouraged further movement away from paper money into gold.185 The ‘gold pool’, formed in 1961 by the United States and eight other countries to sell gold when demand was too great, intervened to stabilise the market and keep prices close to the official $35 per ounce. Following continued and heavy losses, the gold pool threatened to disintegrate. As speculators purchased growing quanti-

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fies of gold, expecting a rate change, the future of the Bretton Woods system looked uncertain. Later that day, Wilson met with Jenkins and Callaghan but was unable to find Brown, who may have been intoxicated at the time. Just after 11 p.m., Wilson, Jenkins, and Leslie O’Brien, the governor of the Bank of England, agreed to declare the next day a Bank Holiday in order to shut down the London foreign exchange market following US requests.186 As a necessary precondition for this announcement, Wilson hurriedly convened a meeting of the Privy Council for the early hours of the next day, but informed Brown too late for him to attend. Brown subsequently rallied a group of senior ministers, including Gordon Walker, Benn, and Stewart who felt that Wilson should have informed them of these serious economic events.187 Although their fury was limited to complaint, Brown began a heated exchange with Wilson criticising his exclusion from the decision-making process. The following day, Brown sent what amounted to a letter of resignation. On 16 March, Stewart returned as the secretary of state for foreign affairs, following Wilson’s decision to accept Brown’s latest, but perhaps most acrimonious, offer of resignation.188 He secured the position as foreign secretary because of his previous loyalty, but, crucially, because he had also worried Wilson with his recent support of Brown.189 Stewart, like his predecessor, became an ardent supporter of a non-proliferation agreement. The budget announced on 19 March was the most deflationary since the war, but failed to end pressure on sterling.190 Days later, the US government, in conjunction with existing lines of credit from the IMF and other central banks, agreed to use its resources to support the pound. The group provided $4 billion in short-term credits. Self-interest motivated support. The gold crisis and the weakness of the pound threatened the stability of dollar. The American economy was already struggling with ever-larger balance of payments deficits, exacerbated by Johnson’s commitment to Vietnam and the Great Society initiative.191 Inaction would have placed greater strain on the dollar and, in turn, the American economy. A further credit agreement allowed the British government to avoid a new sterling crisis and successfully stave off a second devaluation.192 Problems persisted throughout the year. The current account balance worsened and trade figures continued to disappoint. In addition, expectations about the devaluation of the franc and the revaluation of the mark led to instability in the exchange markets. Minor crises followed in July and November, resulting in a new deflationary package towards the end of the year.193 For Britain, the absence of international support would have forced severe austerity measures



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that would have wrecked the Wilson administration.194 It is difficult to see how any government would have been able to sustain investment in the nuclear weapons programme under these circumstances. Such an indebted government would likely have sold its Polaris submarines back to the United States.195 Many felt the collapse of the government was imminent.196 Wilson certainly faced an unprecedented degree of hostility from the public and the press, the former from economic troubles and the latter largely after the D-Notice affair.197 Pimlott suggests that although every government suffers a mid-term political recession, none experienced as severe an episode of public rejection as Wilson in 1968–69, including the Conservative governments of the Suez crisis and Profumo affair. The prime minister, however, had some measure of security. An all-party ballot was required to choose a Labour leader, which provided the incumbent with a surer hold on power.198 There was no constitutional method to remove him from power; his replacement would have required overwhelming support from ministers and backbenchers. Callaghan later admitted that he did not think he could unseat the prime minister.199 Wilson had helped his own chances of survival through the arrangement of the cabinet. No senior ministers would cooperate to oust him. Neither Callaghan and Jenkins, nor Healey and Crosland, were willing to work with each other, preferring the status quo to the potential change.200 Nevertheless, plots were underway. Cecil King, controller of the Daily Mirror newspaper, entertained a fantastic plot of overthrowing Wilson. On 10 May 1968, after a further dip in opinion polls and poor local election results, King launched a noteworthy but unsuccessful press campaign to oust Wilson. His efforts ultimately backfired. The incident created support for Wilson within the Labour Party, and, for his meddling, King was later dismissed as chairman of the International Publishing Corporation. Other schemes, however, rumbled on. On 27 May, Gordon Walker informed Jenkins about growing resistance to Wilson in the PLP. Jenkins took this plot, instigated by Christopher Mayhew, former parliamentary undersecretary of state, seriously. In a series of meetings in June and July, the chancellor gave his blessing to the plotters but urged caution and suggested waiting. In a meeting on 19 July, Gordon Walker urged action but unnamed others pushed back plans for a putsch until the autumn, effectively aborting the conspiracy.201 While Wilson survived these challenges, his popularity continued to decline, and would not recover until summer 1969.202 Nuclear diplomacy fared much better at this time, albeit not without some difficulties. By early April, it was evident that support for the current

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treaty draft in the General Assembly was far from overwhelming. Many of the non–nuclear weapon states were critical of the draft, and asked for the inclusion of meaningful obligations on further measures of disarmament for the nuclear weapon states.203 Despite these difficulties, British fears regarding ‘negative’ security assurances were allayed on 23 April. The superpowers had now dropped the inclusion of a ‘non-use’ commitment and reached agreement on positive security assurances, which would be set out in the Security Council resolution. 204 This was another small success for British nuclear policy, albeit realised by the superpowers. On 12 June, after a series of further minor revisions, the General Assembly approved the draft text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United Nations General Assembly endorsed this text in June by an overwhelming majority vote.205 The mood in Whitehall was buoyant. Parliament received the text of the treaty on 27 June 1968.206 Shortly thereafter, the British government agreed with its US and Soviet counterparts that signature should take place in the three capitals on 1 July. Sir Geoffrey Harrison, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, would sign for Britain in Moscow, whilst Sir Patrick Dean, British ambassador to the United States, would do so in Washington. The British ceremony was held in London in Lancaster House Office at 11 a.m., with Stewart signing on behalf of HMG alongside ambassadors from the United States and the Soviet Union.207 In his speech on the day of signature, Wilson announced to the gathered crowd, reporters, and television cameras: If steps had not been taken to prevent nuclear weapons spreading first to one country, then to another, within a few years the whole world would have been darkened by a black cloud of fear. The purpose of this Treaty is to dispel the gathering cloud, and to ensure that the vast forces locked inside the atom are devoted to the welfare of mankind, rather than to its destruction.208

Although West Germany had refused to participate, on the first day of signature sixty states had signed. By the end of July this figure had reached seventy.209 Wilson must have been thankful for this one success in a sea of problems. As his stock continued to fall in opinion polls, elements within the party sought to replace him, and the economy struggled, the NPT offered a rare moment of triumph.210 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that several weeks prior to signature, Wilson was concerned that the passage of the treaty continued to suffer such a lack of publicity.211 In light of his growing unpopularity and the



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D-Notice affair, much of the newspaper press were perhaps unwilling to share in the prime minister’s success. Wilson suggested that his government had played a significant part in helping towards the achievement of the treaty.212 Such a claim is debatable. Indeed, later that month, Zuckerman wrote to Wilson stressing that in the next phase of disarmament negotiations, Britain should play a much more independent role. He continued, ‘[We] are not likely to get far out of line with the Americans, whatever we do. Past experience has shown that we have achieved little by merely following the U.S. line’.213 In the coming months, however, the British government would take a lead and become the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the treaty. Signature was merely an expression of consent to respect the terms of agreement. Ratification was required to bring the treaty into force. The ENDC resumed on 16 July and, following a request from Wilson the day before, Mulley informed those in attendance that after completing the NPT, he hoped that the committee would now be able to turn its attention to other measures of arms control and disarmament. Mulley subsequently advanced proposals on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, arrangements for peaceful nuclear explosions, and limitations on chemical and biological warfare.214

Ratification Curiously, historians have largely ignored Britain’s path to ratification, with most studies focusing only on the signature of the treaty. The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 may explain the dearth of attention that British ratification has thus far received.215 Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the importance of this period for British nuclear diplomacy. Mulley spoke with Foster about the timing of British ratification the day after the treaty opened for signature. He was concerned that if the United States ratified first, Britain would face irresistible pressure from the non-aligned states and the Soviet Union to ratify the treaty. Acquiescence would, in turn, undermine relations with the Euratom countries who might wish to delay ratification until they had a chance to work out the safeguards agreements with the IAEA. Foster welcomed the idea of early British ratification, leaving the treaty’s entry into force dependent on the United States and Soviet Union.216 The British government now appeared quite willing to take a lead on non-proliferation policy. Although a clear shift away from a strategy that left the running to the superpowers, the underlying rationale was consistent. A desire to progress the NPT

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and protect British entry into the EEC motivated these seemingly opposed non-proliferation strategies. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, Wilson and Stewart raced back from their holidays in the Scillies and Swanage, respectively.217 The invasion punctured confidence in East-West detente, which many had believed to be the bedrock for a non-proliferation treaty. Even Anatoly Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, admitted that events in Czechoslovakia had soured the diplomatic atmosphere.218 Economic confidence also suffered. Investors’ money flowed out of Europe and back into the United States. Events in Czechoslovakia, alongside political unrest in France, thus provided the US government with a small balance of payments surplus by the end of the year.219 The British government enjoyed no such improvement. Weakness in the trade account continued and, more than a year after devaluation, pressure on the pound persisted.220 The British government understood that events in Czechoslovakia had led to many countries delaying signature and ratification.221 Expectedly, these concerns were especially pronounced in the FRG. In a private note to the prime minister, Zuckerman suggested that the West German government was on the point of signing when the crisis occurred.222 The invasion of Czechoslovakia had a profoundly negative effect on the FRG’s attitude towards the NPT, hardening opposition and reducing international pressure for signature.223 The reaction was similarly bad in the United States. Many senators were reluctant to approve any agreement with Moscow. Moreover, looming elections meant that the Republican Party sought to delay approval until a potentially new administration could share credit for this historic event.224 Events in Czechoslovakia had a very different effect in London. After expressing outrage, the British government adopted a ‘business as usual’ approach to East-West relations.225 In discussions with Johnson, Stewart was clear that Britain would continue to work with the Soviet Union because this was the best way to make progress in disarmament talks.226 As Stewart remarked to the cabinet, ‘The chief result of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Czechoslovakia had been to make it more difficult for us to encourage a detente between East and West, but this did not affect the urgent need for the NPT’.227 As pressure on Bonn reduced, efforts to stimulate cooperation gained a new importance. There was a clear division within the government regarding the timing of ratification. Zuckerman highlighted resistance to the Foreign Office’s approach on 12 September 1968, when he informed the prime minister of ‘an official level



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campaign’ from the Ministries of Technology and Defence against hurrying ratification, regardless of US actions. Both departments feared that early ratification would force Britain to adopt IAEA safeguards before everyone else, thereby putting Britain at a commercial disadvantage to competitors in the civil nuclear field. The commercial argument was largely unreal, since IAEA safeguards would not apply until the treaty came into force.228 Despite their questionable logic, such arguments frustrated further progress on the matter. Mulley did not take these delays well, allegedly meeting Benn ‘wild with rage’ and threatening to report him to Wilson if the ‘mess’ was not cleared up.229 On 13 September, Wilson, sensing the potential for a protracted series of debates, sent a personal minute to Stewart stating his concerns for the prospects of the treaty. It was clear to the prime minister that events in Czechoslovakia had bolstered opposition to ratification in the United States, whilst other countries’ signature and ratification appeared much less likely, particularly Italy and West Germany. Wilson was nevertheless unambiguous in his position: ‘[It] remains a major objective of our policy to get an effective Non-Proliferation Treaty in operation as quickly as possible. I should like to be reassured that this is the basis on which all interdepartmental discussions are taking place and that we are all working together to this end’.230 Wilson’s frustrations are understandable. Beyond his long-held commitment to a non-proliferation treaty, failure to ensure the success of his favoured policy would do little to strengthen his already damaged reputation within the PLP and among the public.231 In response to Wilson’s concerns regarding the future of the NPT, Stewart repeated his commitment to early ratification. Seizing upon Wilson’s concerns, he suggested that events in Czechoslovakia only heightened the need for early ratification, which was the best way to demonstrate continued faith in the treaty. He did, however, ‘recognise that there is likely to be some damage to our relations with our European friends, if we ratify in the near future’. ‘Ratification’, he continued, ‘before Italy and Germany have signed the treaty may well be criticised . . . and could make it more difficult for us to develop successfully . . . in the European field’.232 Although there could be some damage to Continental relations, Stewart hoped that much could be done to minimise this danger by giving the Euratom countries advanced notice of their intentions. Nevertheless, as the note concluded, the arguments in favour of early ratification were over-riding. It might be tempting to argue that, following the failure of Britain’s second application, relations with the countries of the EEC were now a lesser concern

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for Wilson and the Foreign Office. Such a conclusion is largely unconvincing. Wilson remained a consistent and determined supporter of British accession to the EEC.233 He only began to hedge his bets on Europe at the end of his second government, which, given the polls at the time, was likely in preparation for the opposition benches.234 The myriad of political and economic problems faced by the British government had not disappeared, and no other likely solutions were forthcoming. Jenkins could only describe the economy as existing in a state of fragile calm at that time.235 The Foreign Office’s fears about the consequences of delay, not a disregard for future membership of the EEC, explain the motivations behind early ratification. ‘If the worst happened and both the USSR and USA ratified before us we should then virtually be left to decide when the Treaty came into force’, Stewart informed Wilson, ‘and we should be subjected to pressures from all sides, particularly in the house’.236 Slight injury to present relations with the countries of the EEC was eminently preferable to major diplomatic problems in the future. Stewart’s favoured approach also had the added benefit of giving renewed impetus to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, support for which had suffered following events in Czechoslovakia. Early ratification thus reflected the most sensible way in which to balance these two foreign policy objectives. The Foreign Office suggested the British government push for ratification around the time that Parliament reassembled, as it would be difficult to defend delay in the House or in front of the PLP. While Wilson and the Foreign Office held similar attitudes to ratification, many in the government were far less enthusiastic. Benn informed Stewart that almost all of the ‘near nuclear weapons’ states have avoided signature and that their support remained crucial. A treaty to which many near-nuclear weapon states did not adhere would not only fail in its central objective, but, given its restrictions, could undermine British efforts to sell nuclear technology overseas. Benn stressed that it was in the government’s political and economic interests to ensure Euratom and near-nuclear states signed and ratified the treaty as soon as possible. He continued, ‘Washington has hitherto believed that moves to review IAEA safeguards would “rock the boat”. But the “near nuclears” as matters stand now, are refusing to get into the boat’.237 Benn thus sought delay in order to generate more confidence in the treaty. In an interview with the author, Benn explains that his department’s caution reflected its own ambivalence on the subject, which contrasted with Wilson and the Foreign Office’s strong commitment to the NPT.238 Debate continued in a series of private exchanges in late September and



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October. Healey suggested that it would be best to offer a compromise, and sign the NPT after the FRG and Italy, keeping Britain ‘among the leaders’ whilst at the same time ensuring that they did not get ‘too much at odds with European opinion’.239 Benn remained concerned about the consequences of ratification to peaceful nuclear cooperation in Western Europe. There were, he felt, obvious advantages if ratification could coincide.240 Stewart recognised that ratification after the FRG and Italy was the best of all compromises. He was, however, keen that these dangers were not exaggerated, as no one had yet complained against British ratification. Furthermore, if West Germany realised Britain was waiting for them, Bonn could hold up the treaty indefinitely.241 Stewart’s position appears reasonable. The approach favoured by Healey and Benn not only slowed the progress of the treaty, but, by surrendering control over the timing of ratification, overlooked the likelihood of future diplomatic tensions. By October it had become clear that the US Senate would not consider the treaty in its present session. This realisation should have removed much of the urgency underlying the Foreign Office’s position. Seizing upon this event, however, Mulley instead suggested that it was more important that Britain should take a lead on the issue. Recent discussions, he believed, strengthened the Foreign Office’s position. Neither West German nor Italian representatives had given a very encouraging reply as to when they expected to sign. If Britain postponed ratification in order to coincide with West German and Italian signature, there would be a considerable wait. Furthermore, neither official expressed any hope of British delay and likely expected early ratification.242 In the DOPC meeting of 16 October, interdepartmental differences came to a head.243 Stewart was adamant that the government was still going ahead with the ratification of the NPT. He took the opportunity to mention that in New York he had encountered no opposition to British ratification from the West Germans, Italians, and others, in circumstances that provided every opportunity for them to have raised any objections. As US ratification was unlikely to occur before March, Britain should now take the lead. By ratifying before the superpowers, London avoided any potential future pressure from Bonn, which might not wish the treaty to come into force. While accepting the need to bring the NPT into operation as soon as possible, Healey argued that it would be unwise to ratify before the United States, the Soviet Union, and the FRG. He instead stressed the need for a harmonisation of policy with Europe, the importance of appearing to understand objections to the Soviet Union’s recent actions, and a number of practical problems for British commercial interests.

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Healey’s pro-European arguments are somewhat curious. Stewart’s diary entries repeatedly state Healey’s desire to obstruct cooperation with Europe and his basic dislike for the EEC.244 Perhaps, in this instance, Europe served as a convenient tool with which to challenge elements of non-proliferation policy he found distasteful. Benn agreed with Healey’s concerns regarding the commercial and economic consequences of such a decision, but was less interested in the need for cooperation with Europe. He felt that it was a mistake ‘to appear always to be in the position of suppliants vis-à-vis the EEC’, perhaps harbouring some resentment over the events of the previous year. Wilson did not find the arguments produced by Healey or Benn persuasive. In summing up the discussion, he was clear that although there had been a division of opinion, there was general agreement that they should ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty in November.245 Later that month, at the opening of Parliament on 30 October 1968, the Queen’s speech declared the government’s intention to ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.246 Though some opposition continued into November, Stewart ultimately overcame Benn’s concerns about the commercial consequences of early ratification. In private correspondence, he explained that ratification would add nothing to the obligations assumed by signing and would not alter Britain’s competitive position.247 Similarly, on 20 November, the attorney general, in the Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy, concluded that the treaty was not a bar to collaboration with European countries on new methods of providing fissile material for civil purposes. According to his own diaries, Benn admits that it was at this time that he turned in favour of ratifying, presumably under the weight of these arguments.248 Healey, clutching at straws, argued in a subsequent ministerial committee that the attorney general’s comments had only increased his doubts about early ratification of the treaty. Wilson, pushing Healey’s concerns to one side, concluded that the NPT should be ratified in November, leaving a final decision to be taken in cabinet. He asked Stewart to arrange the circulation of a short memorandum to the cabinet setting out the reasons for ratifying the treaty and the proposed timing.249 The prime minster had evidently thrown his weight behind ratification. On 27 November, Mulley announced in the House of Commons that in order to give renewed impetus to the treaty, the British government would now seek ratification.250 Wilson had honoured his commitment to realising the NPT first cited in the Queen’s speech to Parliament on 3 November 1964.251 It would be a mistake to exaggerate the effect of the treaty. In



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late November, the Foreign Office informed several of its diplomatic missions that, in the interim period before Soviet and US ratification, Britain would not be bound by its terms. Ratification added nothing to the obligations already assumed by signing.252 Moreover, there was still uncertainty as to the future of the treaty. The government was unsure as to whether the superpowers and forty other states would ratify the treaty or how long this might take, although it remained hopeful.253

The Treaty In November 1969, following the formation of a new coalition, the West German government signed the NPT. Bonn had remained opposed to signature because of a threat made by the Soviet government to invoke, in appropriate circumstances, the ‘enemy state’ clauses of the United Nation charter, which could be used to legitimately interfere in West German affairs. In early 1969, the Western allies declared that any future intervention would be an attack against all NATO members.254 Such a commitment helped to reduce fears of US military withdrawal, which made the treaty more palatable.255 Perhaps more important, by mid-1969, the FRG was the only Western European state, other than France, not to have signed. International pressure would therefore have exerted considerable force on Bonn. As the number of signatures continued to grow, keeping momentum behind the ratification of treaty was crucial. Despite Britain’s ratification, the superpowers’ own progress slowed. There were understandable concerns in London about Washington’s intentions. On 11 September 1968, the Foreign Office learnt that presidential candidate Richard Nixon had, following events in Czechoslovakia, stated that ratification should be postponed. The following day, Dean informed the Foreign Office that George Ball, Walt Rostow, and Gene Rostow, undersecretary for political affairs, all doubted the ratification of the NPT in near future.256 In October, Stewart asked whether there would be any change in policy positions in the United States after the election, but the president said he was unable to predict what would happen and expressed his anxieties on the matter.257 During a National Security Council meeting in late November, Johnson was concerned that the ratification of the NPT was in doubt.258 Towards the end of the year, following the election of Richard Nixon, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger informed British officials that the new president was in no hurry to ratify the treaty.259

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Concerns about the future of the NPT proved to be fleeting. Nixon did pursue a more aggressive policy of ‘nuclear sufficiency’, but did so in order to pursue arms control negotiations from a position of strength.260 The new administration’s National Security Council met in late January 1969. Nixon stated that he was in favour of the NPT and only questioned the timing of ratification.261 In further discussions during the following week, the president was clear that he would go forward with ratification of the treaty and suggested that the US government ‘should reflect a tone of optimism that other countries will sign or ratify’.262 This commitment was repeated in a subsequent conversation between Nixon and Anatoli Dobrynin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, on 17 February 1969. Dobrynin held talks with the Soviet leadership—namely, Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Nikolai Podgorny—after which he expressed a desire to work with Nixon to bring about an ‘era of negotiations, not confrontation’ particularly with regard to the NPT.263 Wilson could breathe a sigh of relief about Nixon’s handling of the treaty, if not transatlantic relations more broadly. The two leaders did not have a particularly strong relationship. Only when Wilson returned to office after his successor, did relations improve. As Conrad Black notes, ‘Heath would also achieve what Nixon thought impossible: he made Harold Wilson and Nixon good friends’.264 The Senate gave its consent to the agreement on 13 March 1969, by a vote of 83–15.265 Later that month, Nixon began to explore the feasibility of synchronizing the ratification of the treaty with the Soviet Union.266 Wider symbolic significance, and an attempt to prevent Soviet challenges to the treaty after the United States had ratified, help to explain the motives behind this decision. By the close of the year, the Department of State informed all diplomatic posts to encourage all those countries that had not yet signed or ratified the NPT to do so.267 Progress was swift. On 5 March 1970, the US and USSR ratified the treaty, thereby bringing it into force. A further ceremony in London marked this auspicious occasion.268 There was much to celebrate. By 1970, ninety-six nations had ratified the treaty. The success of British nuclear diplomacy had been a welcome change for the British government. Throughout the last year, Wilson’s approval rating had suffered, reaching a woeful 26 percent in August 1969. Despite concerted efforts to protect the pound, the market was unconvinced and pressure returned in April, May, and August 1969.269 There followed another deflationary budget in April. Within a matter of months, the balance of payments position



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began to improve. Although the devaluation of the franc and revaluation of the deutschemark encouraged further speculation, the situation stabilised and pressure on the pound eased.270 In October, Wilson’s approval rating rose to 43 percent and the threat to his position melted away.271 His successful handling of sectarian rioting in Northern Ireland and glimmers of economic recovery, highlighted by reports of a huge increase in exports from July to August, had helped greatly. Recovery continued as a series of by-elections in October defied expectations and yearly trade figures revealed a comfortable surplus.272 By early 1970, the economy had finally escaped the balance of payments difficulties that had plagued the last decade.273 Although unemployment and inflation were rising, they remained low, while growth had begun to recover.274 A victory now looked plausible. The successful ratification of the NPT followed in March 1970. A month later, on 14 April 1970, Jenkins published his budget. In contrast to successive deflationary efforts, the chancellor set out £200 million of tax cuts, largely in direct taxes.275As Labour took the lead in the subsequent polls, Wilson decided on 18 June as the date for the next General Election. In contrast to the preceding two efforts, the Labour Party’s 1970 manifesto made little reference to nuclear issues. It focused only on the NPT and plans for future arms treaties.276 The notion of ‘internationalising’ the ‘so called independent deterrent’, once a mainstay of Wilson’s electoral platform, was conspicuous by its absence. Almost six years of government appeared to have settled these nuclear issues, both for the majority of the electorate and the Labour Party. The campaign trail went well and enjoyed increasing success, but the recovery proved insufficient.277 The Conservative Party won the election.278 Looking at two key economic indicators, inflation and unemployment, Wilson’s defeat came at a time of relative prosperity. Such electoral results were a surprisingly frequent occurrence in twentieth-century British history.279 The recent past, however, helps to explain voting behaviour. The Labour government may well have left a strong economy, but the electorate remembered what it had taken to reach this point.280 Despite being only fifty-four, Wilson had already served almost as long as Attlee or Macmillan. Shortly before the election, Wilson informed Jenkins that he planned to retire on 14 June 1973, thereby outlasting Liberal prime minister Herbert Asquith.281 Unequivocal and traumatic defeat postponed these plans. As anger and disappointment faded, Wilson became determined to continue his political career.282 He would return to office in less than four years.

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Conclusion Wilson’s second government endured successive crises. Devaluation brought the relationship between the national economy and the nuclear weapons programme into sharp relief. Urgent deflationary measures forced a radical rethink of spending commitments. The nuclear weapons programme came closer to cancellation after devaluation than at any other period in Wilson’s premiership. It is curious that this point in British nuclear history had garnered so little attention. A focus on nuclear strategy rather than political economy perhaps explains why. John Lewis Gaddis’s conclusion that the Soviet Union was a troubled triceratops, appearing sufficiently formidable but struggling against a host of internal problems, serves as a relevant metaphor.283 Economic difficulties were not limited to communist countries. Destabilising crises troubled successive British governments.284 Had the subsequent gold crisis worsened, it is likely Wilson would have conceded cancellation. Although economic indicators informed nuclear policy, however, they did not necessarily lead it. Problems with the balance of payments, devaluation, and the harsh deflationary measures that followed all failed to upset the nuclear status quo. The realisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained a consistent objective throughout Wilson’s premiership, despite claims to the contrary.285 The prime minister’s ability to sustain nuclear independence and realise an effective non-proliferation agreement were related and noteworthy achievements. The NPT laid fears of a nuclear West Germany to rest and codified Britain’s exclusive nuclear status. Nevertheless, in many ways this period highlighted the weakness of British nuclear diplomacy. Influence over other states reached its lowest ebb, unable to sway the superpowers, and unwilling to pressure the non–nuclear weapon states. Wilson tried to secure Britain’s own position by avoiding confrontation with the countries of the EEC and the superpowers. Although avoiding confrontation, he had failed to improve relations with either. Wilson had been unable to secure US support for sterling in time to avoid devaluation and remained excluded from the EEC. To use his own metaphor, Wilson had fallen between two stools.286 The NPT introduced Britain to the harsh reality of its own declining relevance on the international stage. Carl Ungerer suggests that ‘middle powers’, such as Australia and Canada, regardless of their close involvement in the NPT negotiations, were unable to alter the substantive text of the agreement. Despite valuable contributions to the technical and legal aspects of debate, any advan-



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tage that these states may have had in the diplomatic bargaining processes was limited to a supportive or technocratic role.287 These claims appear to be largely applicable to Britain. Ownership of nuclear weapons does not appear to have provided the British government with any special influence over the course of the negotiations. By way of contrast, the West German government, which possessed no nuclear weapons, did exert some influence on the NPT. Foster would later note that during the long negotiations, the FRG ‘had written half of the treaty’.288 While some scholars welcome the spread of nuclear weapons, most find the proliferation of the twentieth century troubling.289 Francis Gavin persuasively suggests that events in the 1960s hold many valuable lessons about proliferation in the early twenty-first century.290 Achieving the Non-Proliferation Treaty required cooperation between ideologically opposed groups and compromises within divided governments. Moreover, as evidenced by West Germany, stopping the spread of nuclear weapons was difficult but ultimately possible. Looking back on the ratification of the treaty in his memoirs, Stewart argues that although it ‘was by no means a perfect instrument . . . its importance should not be under-rated. The immediate and real danger of widespread proliferation was averted, giving the world breathing space’.291 The value of the treaty remains debatable. Those states most likely to proliferate, such as India and Pakistan, ignored the treaty. For Wilson, the treaty, if not the negotiation process, was a major success. Britain had become one of only a small number of legally recognised nuclear weapon states.

Conclusion

H

to dwell on the difficulties faced by Harold Wilson between 1964 and 1970. This focus is understandable. The Labour government suffered the ignominies of devaluation, withdrawal from the East of Suez, and continued exclusion from the European Economic Community. A raft of unfulfilled domestic promises did little to blunt the criticism that the Labour government was a disappointment. Wilson made difficult, unpopular choices. It does not follow, however, that these were necessarily the wrong choices. Criticism of Wilson’s decision to delay devaluation is reasonable, but it is difficult to see how any prime minister could have avoided the same outcome or the harsh deflationary measures that followed. Moreover, problems with sterling and the balance of payments distorted the Labour government’s wider successes in dealing with the economy. There were many triumphs, not least an increase in the standard of living and the modernisation of the economy.1 Upon leaving office, Wilson noted that he had left the incoming prime minister with the strongest economic situation in living memory.2 Wilson’s record is thus mixed and somewhat subjective. As Roger Middleton argues, there can never be a value-free diagnosis of the British economy.3 Although pursued more urgently under Wilson, the withdrawal of forces from East of Suez was part of a much longer trend of defence rationalisation.4 Respecting Britain’s newfound economic and military position in the world, few viable alternatives were ever truly available. Wilson could have grasped the i s to r i a n s h av e t en d ed

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nettle sooner, and more tightly, but he was nevertheless the first post-war leader to take decisive action to curb military spending. Finally, Charles de Gaulle’s veto undermined the Labour government’s application for membership of the EEC. It is difficult to see how any prime minister could have overcome that particular obstacle. Wilson also did much to contribute to the lifting of the French veto, continued to generate trust in British intentions and set the date for the opening of new and ultimately successful negotiations before losing office.5 He endured failures but he also enjoyed successes. As his official biographer notes, ‘[If] he is to be damned for the first is seems only fair he should be praised for the second’.6 The prime minister could certainly have better managed these disappointments. The fairest criticisms of Wilson were that of exaggeration and shorttermism. He promised too much and to delivered too little, often muddling through difficult situations without a clear long-term plan. It is somewhat ironic, then, that Wilson’s inflexibility on the issue of Vietnam undermined his last, best hope to uphold defence commitments and the value of the pound. It remains an intriguing counterfactual as to whether Wilson could have delayed withdrawal or devaluation if he had decided to send British troops into Vietnam in exchange for continued financial assistance. At the very least, such concessions could have soothed the harsh deflationary measures that followed devaluation in 1967. Such an agreement was not beyond the realm of possibility. Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy all promised considerable financial support to Britain if Wilson sent troops into Vietnam.7 While cooperation in Vietnam may have been unrealistic because of pressing political considerations, it is interesting to consider what concessions, if any, Wilson might have achieved if he had surrendered the ‘independent deterrent’. As early as 1964, Burke Trend had suggested that some relief from Britain’s global defence burdens might be possible if Wilson was prepared to surrender a degree of nuclear independence.8 Senior members of the Johnson administration certainly desired the cancellation or collectivisation of the British nuclear force.9 Nevertheless, the president left the Polaris programme off the negotiating table, and interest in changing British nuclear policy faded. Wilson did not pursue the matter, and it is easy to see why. Nuclear weapons held a diplomatic, economic, and strategic value for Wilson. Moreover, as Peter Hennessy explains, there would have been an understandable reluctance ‘to risk history judging him to be the one who left the United Kingdom without its ultimate weapon’ should a nuclear threat ever



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emerge.10 Perhaps the single best reason for Wilson’s reluctance to surrender British nuclear weapons was his own political temperament. Several days after gaining cabinet approval for the Polaris programme, he met with US undersecretary of state George Ball. During their meeting, Wilson defended his decision. ‘Merely to hand over Polaris’, he explained, ‘would be a vote-loser in this country’.11 Few concessions would have been worth electoral defeat.

Wilson and British Nuclear Diplomacy It would be a mistake to see British nuclear diplomacy as the pursuit of one consistent policy objective. Change in part reflected competition and cooperation between the three distinct, but interrelated, strands of British nuclear diplomacy. To recall, these were the physical sharing of nuclear weapons between states; non-physical measures of cooperation, such as consultative and planning arrangements; and a global non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, the policy objectives of the Labour government evolved. While Wilson’s commitment to nuclear independence and non-proliferation were key organising principles, both carried a degree of flexibility. Fear of damage to the US-UK nuclear relationship and anxiety about West German nuclear revanchism initially led to a grudging acceptance of nuclear sharing proposals. Similarly, Wilson’s commitment to non-proliferation stopped short of a treaty with stringent safeguards in order to facilitate future membership of the EEC. Thus, the content and conduct of British nuclear diplomacy unmistakably evolved during Wilson’s leadership. It is therefore difficult, if not simply unwise, to try to generalise accounts of the Labour government’s approach to international nuclear cooperation. Between 1963 and 1964, the Labour Party’s approach to nuclear diplomacy enjoyed the luxuries of opposition. International issues played a secondary role to more pressing domestic concerns and the needs of the party. Throughout this period, Wilson refused to commit publicly to a decision on the future of the Polaris programme or nuclear sharing. He also relied on two important caveats to his position—namely, West Germany’s nuclear ambitions and the cost of a nuclear weapons programme. These question marks were innocuous enough not to damage his political ambitions, but sufficient to keep his nuclear options open once in office. His ambiguous stance complemented wider criticisms of the Conservative government, especially their perceived mishandling of the economy. It is also clear that the hope of economic and diplomatic

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concessions, derived from the integration or abandonment of Britain’s Polaris force, increasingly influenced his attitude to nuclear weapons. Once in power, Wilson pursued a more complex and subtle nuclear diplomacy. Although initially motivated by the unpopularity of the MLF, the development of the ANF evolved to serve many domestic and international interests within the Labour government. This approach was consistent not only with Wilson’s desire to ensure party unity but also with his keen appreciation of broader political and economic constraints on the Labour government. Many ministers perceived the ANF as a valuable tool with which to extract military concessions from NATO, critical given a commitment to swingeing cuts to the defence budget and wider difficulties in the British economy at that time. Wilson ultimately convinced the cabinet to support the continuation of the Polaris programme as part of the ANF. He did so by cautiously gathering support beforehand, directly controlling the flow of information available to the cabinet, and exploiting his small parliamentary majority to encourage cooperation. Washington also accepted the ANF proposal, albeit alongside the MLF, and left the future of nuclear sharing largely in British and West German hands. The Labour government’s reaction to these shifting contexts was to support the creation of a nuclear sharing solution publicly, but privately ensure delay. The ANF had emerged only as a more palatable variation of a still largely unpopular idea. Any improvement it brought to long-standing commitments to nuclear sharing solutions was therefore relative, rather than absolute. Washington’s reluctance to lead the development of future nuclear sharing proposals thus offered the British government a valuable opportunity to begin to extricate itself from existing commitments to nuclear sharing. The FRG and the US continued to pursue nuclear sharing solutions, albeit to varying degrees, over the course of 1965 and 1966. The British government, however, moved cautiously away from the ANF, focusing its efforts on a nonproliferation treaty and measures of consultation. Soviet intransigence over the nuclear sharing issue consequently proved to be tremendously expedient for British interests. Wilson’s willingness to sacrifice the ANF appeared as a gesture of goodwill, rather than a desire to avoid entangling nuclear alliances or challenges to British nuclear independence. The appearance of cooperation was important, as Britain’s precarious economic state necessitated continued and close collaboration with its US and European creditors. Nor was Wilson’s position entirely disingenuous. His refusal to condemn nuclear sharing openly



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reflected his fear of a revival of the MLF or Britain’s potential exclusion from any future nuclear force. Wilson calmly waited for international support for nuclear sharing to subside. Backstairs agreements between the superpowers ultimately removed any such proposals from the international political landscape, and thereby allowed progress in the fields of non-proliferation and nuclear consultation. In an imaginative series of twists and turns, Wilson used the ANF to replace the MLF and defend the continuation of the Polaris programme. Once the Polaris programme was underway, the NPG and the NPT usurped the ANF. In each instance, the British government moved a step further away from surrendering nuclear independence. Subtle policy revisions obscured Wilson’s failure to internationalise British nuclear weapons in any meaningful sense. In contrast to the MLF and ANF, the realisation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was a largely consistent objective throughout Wilson’s time as leader of the opposition and prime minister. The signature and ratification of the treaty was a success in many regards. It addressed fears of a nuclear West Germany and cemented Britain’s exclusive nuclear status. Nevertheless, the NPT negotiations also underline a declining international relevance. British authority had reached its lowest ebb, unable to influence the superpowers, and unwilling to influence the countries of the EEC. Nevertheless, such an approach allowed negotiations to continue in a broadly favourable direction and respected a growing desire for membership of the EEC. Wilson had shifted Britain out of the spotlight, delaying immediate gratification for longer-term benefit.

Economists, Strategists, and Pragmatists When scholars talk of nuclear weapons, they tend to invoke images of apocalyptic war and global disaster. Such terms of reference are at once familiar and awesome. Yet the reality of nuclear weapons in British history is far more mundane. Even if constructed for deterrence, and perhaps effectiveness in conflict, their principal use lies in an economic and diplomatic capacity. Although a rising mushroom cloud is a common and evocative illustration, a more fitting portrayal of British nuclear history would depict accountants shaking their heads, and politicians shaking hands. The first two governments of Harold Wilson are no exception. It is curious that the relationship between the economy and nuclear weapons in British political history has received so little attention. In his memoirs,

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Wilson notes that economic crises dominated almost all of his time in government between 1964 and 1970.12 There is no reason to believe that nuclear weapons were immune from the demands of the Treasury’s coffers. US-UK economic interdependence and a desire for membership of the EEC, to consider only two examples, directly affected the content and conduct of British nuclear diplomacy during Wilson’s first two governments. The prime minister also considered nuclear weapons to hold considerable economic value in their own right. In an interview with Hennessy, Wilson explains that he defended the Polaris programme because it helped in ‘general negotiations’ with the United States, and was a lever to prise dollars from the US Treasury to bail out the British economy.13 By paying greater attention to the economic events of the period, it is possible to build on, and strengthen, diplomatic and strategic accounts of British nuclear diplomacy. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the economy in British nuclear history, but it is not impossible. Economic forces did constrain the government but they did not dictate policy.14 The political economist Robert Gilpin suggests that although economic forces do restrict government policy options, they do not impose a financial straitjacket.15 In a similar vein, the historian David Reynolds suggests that despite often being overruled by foreign powers or the economy, ‘Britain did make choices’.16 Nowhere is this clearer than in Wilson’s handling of the nuclear weapons programme. Problems with the balance of payments, devaluation, and the harsh deflationary measures that followed all failed to upset the nuclear status quo. Nor, despite several opportunities, did the government sell the Polaris force back to the United States. Wilson clung to the bomb. The state of the economy informed, but did not lead, the British nuclear weapons programme. Economic considerations may well have faded in the shadow of war. British prime minister James Callaghan stated that he would have been willing to authorise the use of nuclear weapons in the direst of circumstances.17 Whether Wilson would have arrived at the same conclusion as his successor is unclear. His pragmatism in office and his preference for ambiguity makes it extremely difficult to answer this question. Although these traits may initially frustrate historians, they do help to explain Wilson’s successful handling of British nuclear diplomacy. In many instances, fortunate circumstances favoured the ambitions of the Labour government. The failure of nuclear sharing and the success of the NPT owe more to superpower diplomacy than to the actions of Wilson or his gov-



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ernment. There was an aleatory element in Wilson’s success. It would nevertheless be a mistake to characterise this brief chapter of British nuclear history as entirely reactive in nature. Policy was neither thoughtless nor involuntary. Wilson had the presence of mind to manage his government’s often precarious situation. By obscuring unpopular decisions and capitalising on new opportunities, ambiguity and pragmatism often helped to ensure Britain’s success in international negotiations concerning nuclear weapons. While Wilson often sought to present decisions as a compromise between competing interests, he frequently took decisive and surreptitious steps to achieve his preferred outcomes on both the domestic and international stage. The objectives of British nuclear diplomacy, however, were complex and shifting. Wilson often modified his own ambitions in response to a wide array of competing interests. Decisions were set against a Cold War background of tensions within NATO, attempted membership of the EEC, and a series of overwhelming economic crises. The success of British nuclear diplomacy in the face of these challenges was a remarkable achievement.

Epilogue

L

o r d W il s o n o f R ie va u l x passed away on 24 May 1995. After losing the election of 1970, Wilson returned to office twice more.1 Triumph in four general elections remains an achievement unequalled in post-war British history. Illness forced the prime minister’s early departure from office in 1976. Although Alzheimer’s disease robbed him of a more active role thereafter, Wilson remained in the House of Commons until 1983, eventually accepting a seat in the House of Lords. A controversial political figure, his career in government made an enduring impression on the course of British history. On news of his death, Tony Blair, leader of the Labour Party, provided a moving epitaph:

Harold Wilson, in a sense, was to politics what the Beatles were to popular culture. He simply dominated the nation’s political landscape, and he personified the new era, not stuffy or hidebound but classless, forwardlooking, modern . . . . I believe that in time the perception of Harold Wilson and his years in government will change.2

History is replete with unfulfilled prophecies. It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss Blair’s claims as mere pleasantries. The historical debate surrounding Wilson’s performance has focused heavily on social and economic reforms and, to a lesser extent, foreign policy. Reflection on comparatively marginalised topics therefore adds something important to historical evaluations of the prime minister. Wilson’s period of office set a new, modern course for British nuclear diplomacy. 215

216 Epilogue

Wilson’s first two governments represent a critical period in British nuclear history. The NPT continues to frame British attempts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.3 Indeed, every subsequent prime minister has stressed his or her commitment to the treaty. Similarly, Wilson’s willingness to support consultative measures helped to create the Nuclear Planning Group. The NPG remains the ultimate authority within NATO concerning nuclear policy issues and provides an essential link between the European and North American members of the alliance.4 Neither the treaty nor the group is without fault; there are more nuclear weapon states than ever before, and tensions still rumble on within the alliance. Yet the alternatives are surely worse. The vast majority of governments around the globe respect the treaty, which has helped to stigmatise and thus slow the spread of nuclear weapons, and the NPG has soothed tensions within the alliance for more than four decades. Wilson was by no means the only, or indeed the most important, leader involved in realising either of these historic achievements. His handling of nuclear diplomacy nevertheless deserves credit. Wilson’s enthusiasm helped to sustain international negotiations and ensured British inclusion on favourable terms. The continued independence of Britain’s nuclear force and the enduring absence of a German or European deterrent also owe a debt to Wilson’s handling of nuclear diplomacy. Under his leadership, the Labour government successfully resisted international pressure to share British nuclear weapons with other members of NATO. This diplomatic challenge, unique in British nuclear history, faded away with no diminution to the country’s own nuclear status. The ‘independent deterrent’ survived. Wilson may have inherited the bomb but he cemented its place in British politics. Successive premierships protected the Polaris force and sustained investment in costly modernisation programmes. Although the rhetoric may have changed, the results did not. The Chevaline programme, which updated the Polaris force, became operational in 1982. A full replacement, the US Trident weapons system, entered service in 1994. Prime ministers Edward Heath, James Callaghan, Margret Thatcher, and John Major all defended the status quo.5 The electorate did have a choice. In the 1980s, Michael Foot and Neil Kinnock both led the Labour Party into elections promising unilateral disarmament.6 Their electoral failures meant that the bomb remained untouched, though there is no certainty that either Foot or Kinnock would have honoured their manifestos.7 By 1991, following repeated defeat at the polls, and motivated by developments within the party as well as a rapidly improving international

Epilogue 217

situation, Kinnock conceded defeat. A Labour government would now only abandon Britain’s nuclear weapons when the other nuclear powers abolished their arsenals.8 John Smith replaced Kinnock in 1992, following the Labour Party’s fourth successive electoral defeat. Smith had few qualms about British nuclear weapons, having had no objections to the Polaris force and no connection to CND.9 When Tony Blair became leader of the opposition in 1994, following the premature death of Smith and the caretaker leadership of Margaret Beckett, the party carried no commitment to unilateral disarmament. The Labour Party won a landslide victory in the General Election of 1997. After eighteen years in opposition, Blair chose to defend the nuclear status quo. The manifesto was clear that a Labour government would retain the Trident force, which would become the sole carrier of the British nuclear weapons capability.10 Between 2005 and 2006, Blair led a series of discussions on the future of the British nuclear programme. Debate ended at a full cabinet meeting on 4 December 2006. Without any dissenting voices, the gathered ministers authorised the construction of a new generation of missile carrying submarines to sustain the British nuclear force over the period 2020 to 2050, a decision subsequently endorsed by US president George W. Bush.11 In his memoirs, Blair provides an insight into his decision to support the renewal of ‘the independent nuclear deterrent’: You might think I would have been certain of that decision, but I hesitated over it. I could clearly see the force of common sense and practical argument against Trident, yet in the final analysis I thought giving it up too big a downgrading of our status as a nation, and in an uncertain world, too big a risk for our defence . . . . So, after some genuine consideration and reconsideration, I opted to renew it. But the contrary decision would not have been stupid. I had a perfectly good and sensible discussion about it with Gordon [Brown], who was similarly torn. In the end, we both agreed, as I said to him: imagine standing up in the House of Commons and saying I’ve decided to scrap it. We’re not going to say that, are we? In this instance, caution, costly as it was, won the day.12

Blair’s apparent hesitation, and his respect for the contrary verdict, reflects the enormity of the decision as well as the long and difficult history of the bomb within the Labour Party. The House of Commons voted 409 against 161 to renew the Trident system. A number of Labour MPs dissented, leading Blair to accept that the decision would not be binding for future parliaments.13 Following Blair’s resignation in June 2007, Brown led the Labour government for three more years. His comments to the United Nations about the fu-

218 Epilogue

ture of nuclear policy in September 2009 sparked diplomatic concerns about British disarmament, all of which proved to be erroneous.14 Brown never intended to challenge the nuclear status quo. He had supported renewal when he was chancellor of the exchequer and continued to do so as prime minister. The General Election of 2010 only reinforced his commitment to the bomb. Brown promised to exclude Trident and its replacement from a strategic defence review throughout his election campaign, despite the country’s struggle through the first major recession of the twenty-first century. During the second televised leaders’ debate, both Brown and David Cameron, leader of the opposition, criticised Nick Clegg, leader of the Liberal Democrats, for his proposal to include Trident in a future strategic defence review. Brown was scathing. ‘I have to deal with these issues every day and I say to you, Nick, get real’.15 An inconclusive election result produced a coalition government that comprised the Conservative and the Liberal Democrat parties. As the coalition government struggled to repair the British economy in the wake of the global financial crisis, politicians of all persuasions raised serious questions about future investment in nuclear weapons programmes. Prior to the election, all major parties had committed themselves to an era of austerity in an attempt to reduce the deficit and protect the economy, and promised to conduct major defence reviews.16 Cameron, speaking before he took office, stressed that if he formed a government he would review all major defence projects, including the Trident upgrade, in an effort to bring public finances under control.17 He swiftly clarified his position and, within weeks of taking office, unambiguously committed himself to defending the British nuclear weapons programme. The importance of the nuclear question in the next General Election remains open to debate, but expectations of major policy revisions, from any political party, are likely to be disappointed. Change premised on the cost of the British nuclear weapons programme is certainly not justified by the historical record. The 2006 white paper set the cost of procuring new submarines and associated equipment and infrastructure in the region of £15–20 billion, with costs falling principally in the period between 2012 and 2027.18 These sums are less daunting when put into historical perspective. The British government has already spent many tens of billions of pounds on the nuclear weapons programme since the late 1940s.19 Major economic challenges have clearly influenced policy, but repeatedly failed to remove the bomb from British politics. Wilson ensured continued investment in the nuclear weapons programme despite repeated and severe financial crises. Although by no means the first prime

Epilogue 219

minister to oversee a troubled economy, the balance of payments deficits and currency challenges of his premiership were amongst the worst in the postwar period. Spending on the British nuclear weapons programme became, and remains, sacrosanct. Every subsequent prime minister has adhered to Wilson’s precedent, whether during the IMF crisis in the 1970s or the recent global financial crisis.20 Unveiling a bronze statue of Wilson in September 2006, Blair played tribute to his predecessor’s legacy. ‘He was there at the top of politics for many years and I think of him as the first modern Prime Minister . . . . He also brought in a whole new culture, a whole new country. He made the country very, very different’.21 Blair’s words serve as a useful reminder for nuclear historians. Wilson changed Britain’s relationship with the bomb. Beyond the shift towards American missiles and a submarine force lay important political changes. Investment and independence became immutable commitments despite serious economic pressures. Relations between states also changed. Dedication to consultation and measures of non-proliferation came to characterise British nuclear diplomacy. That investment, interdependence, and non-proliferation continue to frame policy-making underlines his legacy. Wilson ushered British nuclear history into the modern era.

Notes

The following abbreviations are used in the Notes: CAB Cabinet papers CF Country file DEFE Defence papers FMB Francis M. Bator file FO Foreign Office papers FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States GNWR Patrick Gordon Walker papers GRDS General Records of the Department of State HC House of Commons HWP Harold Wilson papers JCP James Callaghan papers LBJL Lyndon Baines Johnson library LHA Labour history archive MFP Michael Foot papers MGB McGeorge Bundy file NSF National Security file PREM Prime Minister’s Office papers PRO Public Records Office RICH Ian Mikardo papers (Jo Richardson Papers) SF Subject file, LBJL SK Spurgeon Keeny file 221

222 Notes

STWT Michael Stewart papers T Treasury papers USNA US national archives Introduction 1. Peter Hennessy, The prime minister: The office and its holders since 1945 (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 2000), 288; Clive Ponting, Breach of promise: Labour in power, 1964–1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1989). 2. Harold Wilson, Purpose in politics: Selected speeches by Rt Hon Harold Wilson (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), viii. 3. George Brown, In my way: The political memoirs of Lord George Brown (Middlesex: Penguin, 1972), 158. 4. J. W. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2: International Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 5. Saki Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from East of Suez: The choice between Europe and the World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002); G. C. Peden, Arms, economics and British strategy: From dreadnoughts to hydrogen bombs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Helen Parr, British policy towards the European Community: Harold Wilson and Britain’s world role, 1964–7 (Oxon: Routledge, 2006); Melissa Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe: Pursuing Britain’s membership of the European Community (London: Tauris, 2007); R. Gerald Hughes, Britain, Germany and the Cold War: The search for a European detente, 1949–1967 (London: Routledge, 2007); Geraint Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War: The Labour government and East-West politics, 1964–1970 (Rochester: A Royal Historical Society Publication, Boydell Press, 2009); Terry Macintyre, Anglo-German relations during the Labour government, 1964–70: NATO strategy, detente and European integration (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007); Andrew Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO: Britain, America and the dynamics of alliance, 1962–68 (London: Routledge 2006). 6. Margaret Gowing, Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy, 1945– 52, Volume 1: Policy making (London: Macmillan, 1974); Gowing, Independence and deterrence, Volume 2: Policy execution (London: Macmillan, 1974); Andrew Pierre, Nuclear politics: The British experience with an independent strategic force, 1939–1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972); Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy, 1945–1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the special relationship: Britain’s deterrent and America, 1957–1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); John Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence: British nuclear strategy, 1945–64 (London: Oxford University Press, 1995). Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the command of Western nuclear forces, 1945–64 (London: Harwood, 2000). 7. Lawrence Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons (London: Macmillan, 1980); J. P. G. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control policy in the context of Anglo-American relations, 1957–68 (London: Macmillan Press, 1986); Christopher Bluth, Britain, Germany

Notes 223

and Western nuclear strategy (London: Oxford University Press, 1995); Jane Stromseth, The origins of flexible response (London: Macmillan, 1998); Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, ‘Trick or truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany, and US Non-proliferation policy’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 11:2 (2000), 161–84; John Young, ‘Killing the MLF? The Wilson government and nuclear sharing in Europe, 1964–66’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 14:2 (2003), 295–324; Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the struggle for nuclear nonproliferation, 1945–1970 (London: Praeger, 2004); Andrew Priest, ‘From hardware to software: The end of the MLF and the rise of the Nuclear Planning Group’, in Andreas Wenger, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher (eds.), Transforming NATO in the Cold Wars: Challenges beyond deterrence in the 1960s (London and New York: Routledge, 2006). 8. See, for instance, Susan Strange, Sterling problem and the six (London: Chatham House, 1967); Susan Strange, Sterling and British policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); Alec Cairncross and Barry Eichengreen, Sterling in decline: The devaluation of 1931, 1949 and 1967 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Alan Dobson, The politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship 1940–1987 (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988). For more recent contributions, see C. R. Schenk, ‘Sterling, international monetary reform and Britain’s applications to join the European Economic Community in the 1960s’, Contemporary European History 11 (2002); Jim Tomlinson, ‘The decline of empire and the economic “decline” of Britain’, Twentieth Century British History 14:3 (2003), 216–17; Jim Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3: Economic policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004); Raj Roy, ‘No secrets between “special friends”: America’s involvement in British economic policy, October 1964–April 1965’, History 89:295 (2004), 399–423; Glen O’Hara, ‘“Dynamic, exciting, thrilling change”: The Wilson government’s economic policy, 1964–1970’, in O’Hara and Helen Parr (eds.), The Wilson governments 1964–1970 reconsidered (London: Routledge, 2006), 79–98. 9. Helen Parr, ‘Gone native: The foreign office and Harold Wilson’s policy towards the EEC, 1964–67’, in Oliver J. Daddow (ed.), Harold Wilson and European integration: Britain’s second application to join the EEC (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 75–94; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 142–65; Helen Parr, ‘A question of leadership: July 1966 and Harold Wilson’s European decision’, Contemporary British History 19:4 (2005); Helen Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a role in British foreign policy, 1964–1967’, in O’Hara and Parr, The Wilson governments 1964–1970 reconsidered, 99–117; Parr, British policy towards the European Community; Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe; Jane Toomey, Harold Wilson’s EEC application: Inside the foreign office (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 2007). 10. In 1968, the Labour government established legislation to reduce the ‘fifty-year rule’ to thirty years. As Wilson explained, ‘[If] criticisms are to be made of me and my conduct of affairs, I would rather be alive to answer them’: Tristram Hunt, ‘Opening up our history’, The Guardian (29 Jan. 2009). For a discussion on this topic, see Peter Hennessy and Chris Westcott, ‘The last right? Open government, freedom of information and the right to know’, Strathclyde Analysis Papers 12 (Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 1992).

224 Notes

11. This book explores the private papers of Harold Wilson, James Callaghan, George Brown, Barbara Castle, Michael Stewart, and Patrick Gordon Walker. 12. The Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) series, however, often provides edited or sanitized versions of documents that can disadvantage the historian: Marc Trachtenberg, The craft of international history: A guide to method (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 160–62. 13. See, for instance, Harold Wilson, The Labour government, 1964–1970: A personal record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971); Denis Healey, The time of my life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989); Tony Benn, Out of the wilderness, Diaries 1963–7 (London: Hutchinson, 1987); Tony Benn, Office without power, Diaries: 1968–72 (London: Hutchinson, 1988); Brown, In my way; James Callaghan, Time & chance (Glasgow: William Collins Sons and Co., 1988); Solly Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles (London: W. W. Norton, 1989); Alun Chalfont, The shadow of my hand: A memoir (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000); Barbara Castle, The Castle diaries, 1964–1970 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984); Roy Jenkins, A life at the centre (London: Macmillan, 1991); Michael Stewart, Life and Labour: An autobiography (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1980); Marcia Williams, Inside Number 10 (New York: Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, 1972). 14. Ben Pimlott, Harold Wilson (London: BCA and Harper Collins, 1992); Austin Morgan, Harold Wilson (London: Pluto Press, 1992); Phillip Ziegler, Wilson: The authorised life (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993). 15. Richard Crossman, The myths of cabinet government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970); Richard Crossman, Inside view: Three lectures on prime ministerial government (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972); Patrick Gordon Walker, The cabinet (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970); Simon James, British cabinet government (London: Routledge, 1999, second edition); Jon Davis, Prime ministers and Whitehall (London: Continuum Press, 2009). The doyen of this particular field is Peter Hennessy: ‘The quality of cabinet government in Britain’, Policy Studies 6:2 (Oct. 1985), 15–45; Cabinet (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Whitehall (London: Fontana Press, 1990); Muddling through: Power, politics and the quality of government in postwar Britain (London: Victor Gollancz, 1996); The secret state: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin Books, 2003, revised edition).

Chapter 1 1. Hennessy, The secret state, 45. 2. See, for instance, Gowing, Independence and deterrence, Volumes 1–2; Pierre, Nuclear politics; G. M. Dillon, Dependence and deterrence: Success and civility in the AngloAmerican special nuclear relationship, 1962–1982 (London: Gower Publishing, 1983); Peter Malone, The British nuclear deterrent (London: Croom Helm, 1984); Clark and Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy; Clark, Nuclear diplomacy; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence; Richard Moore, Nuclear illusion, nuclear reality: Britain, the United States and nuclear weapons, 1958–64 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

Notes 225

3. Vernon Bogdanor, The people and the party system: The referendum and electoral reform in British politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 35. 4. Hennessy, The prime minister, 147–77. For more on Attlee, see Clement Attlee, As it happened (London: Viking Adult, 1954); Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982). 5. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 95; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 106–23. 6. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 3–91; Ziegler, Wilson, 1–46; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 1–105; Harold Wilson, The making of a prime minister, 1916–64 (London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1986), 1–80. More succinct accounts include Paul Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson (Middlesex: Penguin, 1968); and Andrew Roth, Harold Wilson: Yorkshire Walter Mitty (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977); Christopher Hitches, ‘Say what you will about Harold’, London Review of Books 15:23 (1993), 7–9. 7. J. Samuel Walker, Prompt and utter destruction: Truman and the use of atomic bombs against Japan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 77–91. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki should not obscure the importance of the Soviet intervention in the war with Japan. For an account of the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons and the winning of the Pacific war, see Ward Wilson, ‘The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima’, International Security 31:4 (2007), 162–79. 8. Peter Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007), 38: National Archives, London, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), GEN 75/1, memorandum by the prime minister, 28 Aug. 1945. 9. The Baruch plan has received considerable attention. For a good overview of the historiography, see Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008). 10. Susanna Schrafstetter, ‘“Loquacious . . . and pointless as ever”? Britain, the United States and the United Nations negotiations on international control of nuclear energy, 1945–48’, Contemporary British History 16:4 (2002), 87–108; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 17–41. 11. Craig and Radchenko, The atomic bomb, passim. 12. Schrafstetter, ‘Loquacious . . . and pointless as ever’, 91, 99, 104; Gowing, Independence and deterrence, 87–92; Clark and Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy, 57; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 37–45. 13. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 44–48; PRO, CAB, 130/2, minutes, 25 Oct. 1946. For more on the immediate post-war period, see Peter Hennessy, Never again: Britain, 1945–1951 (London: Vintage, 2006). 14. Margret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945 (London, 1964); Pierre, Nuclear politics, 9–63; Sabine Lee, ‘“In no sense vital and actually not even important”? Reality and perception of Britain’s contribution to the development of nuclear weapons’, Contemporary British History 20:2 (2006), 159–85. 15. John Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement: The search for nuclear interdependence’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31:3 (2008), 427. 16. Michael Goodman, ‘With a little help from my friends: The Anglo-American

226 Notes

atomic intelligence partnership, 1945–1958’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 18:1 (2007), 155–83; John Baylis, ‘Exchanging nuclear secrets: Laying the foundations of the Anglo-American nuclear relationship’, Diplomatic History 25:1 (2001), 33–61. 17. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 44–48. 18. Balyis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 55; Clark and Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy, 49–50. 19. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 39; Clark and Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy, 46. Schrafstetter, ‘Negotiations on International Control’, 90, 103. 20. John Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine: The “Moscow Criterion” and the Polaris Improvement Programme’, Contemporary British History 19:1 (2005), 54–55; Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers: Economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), 370. 21. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 428; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 77, 127. 22. Francis Williams, A prime minister remembers: The war and post-war memories of Attlee (London: Heinmen, 1960), 118–19; Harris, Attlee, 288. 23. David Reynolds, Britannia overruled: British policy and word power in the 20th century (London: Longman, 1991), 158–59; Clark and Wheeler, The British origins of nuclear strategy, 4–5, 38–40. 24. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 161–62. 25. Hennessy, The prime minister, 166–67; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 20–21. 26. Hennessy, The secret state, 49. 27. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 54–55. 28. Ibid., 64–65, 95–96, 122–25, 359. 29. Harris, Attlee, 290–91. 30. Len Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, International Affairs 82:4 (2006), 686. 31. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 78. 32. Hansard, House of Commons, Debates (hereafter HC Deb), 12 May 1948, vol. 450 c2117. 33. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 78. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 69. 34. Hennessy, Muddling through, 103–4. 35. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 69. 36. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, passim. 37. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 80. 38. Mike Rowbotham, ‘The 1948 Olympics’, The Independent (7 July 2005). 39. Some historians claim that the British government sought reserve currency status: Strange, Sterling problem and the six; David Sanders, Losing an empire, finding a role: British foreign policy since 1945 (Hampshire: Macmillan, 1990), 201–2. The weakness of the global monetary system actually encouraged international demand for the continuation of the pound as a major reserve currency: Catherine R. Schenk, The decline of sterling: Managing the retreat of an international currency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), esp. 2–6, 414–30.

Notes 227

40. This description is taken from Sanders, Losing an empire, 200–201, 205–6. 41. Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, xvii. 42. Robert W. Kolb (ed.), Sovereign debt: From safety to default (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley, 2011), xv. 43. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 37–60; Sanders, Losing an empire, 201. 44. Alec Cairncross, The British economy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, second edition), 46–47. 45. Malcolm Chalmers, Paying for defence: Military spending and British decline (London: Pluto Press, 1985), 46–47. 46. Cairncross, The British economy, 48–50. 47. Steve Marsh and John Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “special relationship”: The Lazarus of international relations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 17:1 (2006), 175–76. 48. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 37–60; Sanders, Losing an empire, 201, 205–6. 49. Sanders, Losing an empire, 205–6. 50. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 60–68; Chalmers, Paying for defence, 41; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 169. 51. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 99; Wilson, Making of a prime minister, 96–97; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 124–53. 52. Hennessy, Never again, 1945–51 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1992), 317, 336. 53. Cairncross, The British economy, 52–55. 54. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 135–37; Cairncross, The British economy, 56–57; Schenk, The decline of sterling, 71–72. 55. Francis J. Gavin, ‘The gold battles within the Cold War: American monetary policy and the defense of Europe, 1960–1963’, Diplomatic history 26:1 (2002), 65–66. 56. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 68–79. 57. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 134–36; Schenk, The decline of sterling, 100–101. 58. Cairncross, The British economy, 55; Schenk, The decline of sterling, 78. 59. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 68–79; Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, 151–55. 60. Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, xvii–xviii. 61. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 134, 146; Ziegler, Wilson, 73. 62. Wilson’s concerns about devaluation were shared by Siegmund Warburg, one of the country’s most prominent bankers: Niall Ferguson, Siegmund Warburg: High financier: The lives and time of Siegmund Warburg (New York: Penguin Press, 2010), 130–31. 63. Ziegler, Wilson, 73–76; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 150–53; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 134, 137–46, 146, 155–59. 64. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 134, 146. 65. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 152; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 146–49. 66. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 80. 67. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 687. 68. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 70, 77; Hennessy, The secret state, 31. 69. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 79; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 169, 175–77. 70. Craig and Radchenko, The atomic bomb, 129–30; Stephen Twigge, ‘Disarmament

228 Notes

and non-proliferation’, in Matthew Grant (ed.), The British way in Cold Warfare: Intelligence, diplomacy and the bomb, 1945–75 (London: Continuum, 2009), 36–37. 71. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 124, 127, 130. 72. Michael Goodman, ‘British intelligence and the Soviet atomic bomb, 1945–1950’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26:2 (June 2003), 120–51; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 132, 134. 73. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 428; Goodman, ‘With a little help from my friends’, 156; Baylis, ‘Exchanging nuclear secrets’, 35–36. 74. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 154. 75. Ibid., 149–50. 76. Geoffrey Warner, ‘Anglo-American relations and the Cold War in 1950’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 22:1 (2011), 46–47. 77. Ibid., 44–60. 78. FRUS, 1950, vol. III, 1706–88. 79. David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 825–26. 80. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 48–49. 81. Warner, ‘Anglo-American relations’, 50. 82. Ibid., 51, 56. 83. Hennessy, Never again, 415. 84. Cairncross, The British economy, 102–4. 85. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 50–53; Cairncross, The British economy, 79–80. 86. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 80. 87. Hennessy, Never again, 416–18. 88. Warner, ‘Anglo-American relations’, 57. 89. Hennessy, The prime minister, 161; Williams, A prime minister remembers, 246– 47. 90. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 158–65; Ziegler, Wilson, 84–88. 91. Hennessy, Never again, 416–18. 92. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 172. 93. Hennessy, The prime minister, 178–206; Roy Jenkins, Churchill: A biography (London: Macmillan, 2001); Sebastian Haffner, Churchill (London: Haus, 2003). 94. Hennessy, The prime minister, 199–200. 95. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 83–84. 96. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 85–86. 97. Ibid., 77–86; PRO, PREM, 11/297, Churchill and Bridges exchanges, 8–21 Dec. 1951. 98. HC Deb, 26 Feb. 1952, vol. 496 cc964–65. 99. Roger Middleton, The British economy since 1945 (Basingstoke and London: Macmillan, 2000), 71–74, 86–87; Jim Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy, managing the people: Britain c. 1931–70’, Economic History Review 58:3 (2005), 562–63; Cairncross, The British economy, 117–18. 100. Cairncross, The British economy, 116, 118. 101. Sanders, Losing an empire, 203–6; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 208–11. 102. Cairncross, The British economy, 85–86, 91–92, 94, 120.

Notes 229

103. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 86–87. 104. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 54–55. 105. Andrew M. Johnston, ‘Mr. Slessor goes to Washington: The influence of the British Global Strategy Paper on the Eisenhower New Look’, Diplomatic History 22:3 (1998), 367–69. 106. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 87–88. Recent research tempers claims that a British precedent contributed to the ‘New Look’ military policies of the Eisenhower administration: Johnston, ‘Mr. Slessor goes to Washington’, 361–98. 107. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 148–51. 108. Johnston, ‘Mr. Slessor goes to Washington’, 372, 379. 109. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 89; Chalmers, Paying for defence, 57. 110. Johnston, ‘Mr. Slessor goes to Washington’, 363, 371. For more on the relationship between British and American power, see Kevin Ruane and James Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and the pursuit of “Power-byProxy” in the 1950s’, Contemporary British History 18:3 (2004), 147–67. 111. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 85–86. 112. Ibid. 113. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 429; HC Deb, 26 Feb. 1952, vol. 496 cc964–65. 114. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 87. 115. John J. Mearsheimer, The tragedy of great power politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 256. 116. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 429–31. 117. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 55–56, 58. 118. Twigge, ‘Disarmament and non-proliferation’, 37–41; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 52–78. 119. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 205–6. 120. HC Deb, 12 July 1954, Col. 34. 121. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 105–12. 122. Ibid., 87, 91, 97, 100, 104–25. 123. Ibid., 100–104; PRO, CAB, 134/808, minutes, 19 May 1954. 124. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 687. 125. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 90. 126. Marsh and Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “special relationship”’, 192–93. 127. Anthony Eden, Full circle (London: Casell, 1960), 368. 128. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 181–82; Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 431. 129. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 100, 112–21; PRO, CAB 128/27, cabinet minutes, 7 July 1954; PRO, CAB 128/27, cabinet minutes, 8 July 1954; Hennessy, The prime minister, 198–99. 130. Statement on defence: 1955, Cmd. 9391, 7, cited in Pierre, Nuclear politics, 92. 131. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 174–77, 203–5. 132. Richard Gott, ‘The evolution of the independent British deterrent’, International Affairs 39:2 (1963), 238–39, 242–43; HC Deb, 2 Mar. 1955, vol. 537 cc2182.

230 Notes

133. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 102; Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 687. 134. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 226–27. 135. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 81: Harold Wilson, In place of dollars (London: Tribune pamphlet, 1952). 136. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 178–90. 137. Cahal Milmo, ‘Churchill and Eden: Their struggle’, The Independent (4 Feb. 2008). 138. Hennessy, The prime minister, 206; Peter Hennessy, Having it so good: Britain in the fifties (London: Allen Lane, Penguin Books, 2006), 134. 139. Hennessy, The prime minister, 207–47. Eden provided a three-volume autobiography, covering his early career to 1938, 1938–45, and his post-war life: Anthony Eden, Facing the dictators (London: Casell, 1962); The reckoning (London: Casell, 1965); Full circle. Biographies include Robert Rhodes James, Anthony Eden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986); David Dutton, Anthony Eden: A life and reputation (London: Arnold, 1997); D. R. Thorpe, Eden: The life and times of Anthony Eden, first Earl of Avon, 1897–1977 (London: Chatto and Windus, 2003). 140. See http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1955/1955-labour-manifesto. shtml; http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1955/1955-conservative-manifesto.shtml. 141. Eden, Full circle, 368–69. 142. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 190, 196; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 200. 143. Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy’, 556, 577. 144. Jim Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”: The falling behind of the British economy in the postwar years’, Economic History Review 49:4 (1996), 749–50. 145. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 190. 146. Cairncross, The British economy, 116, 91. 147. Ruane and Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’, 156–57. 148. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 62–63. 149. Ibid., 114–16. 150. Eden, Full circle, 370. 151. Ibid., 370–73. 152. Ruane and Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’, 157–58. 153. For a detailed, archival account of events, and communications between Eden and Eisenhower, see FRUS, 1955–57. Suez Crisis, July 26–Dec. 31, 1956: vol. XVI, documents 1–671. 154. Hennessy, The prime minister, 136–37. 155. Cairncross, The British economy, 91. 156. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 100–101, 112–14. 157. Hennessy, The prime minister, 136–37; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 97. 158. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 238–40. 159. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 67–71. 160. Hennessy, The prime minister, 211–12. 161. Mervyn O’Driscoll, ‘Missing the nuclear boat? British policy and French military nuclear ambitions during the EURATOM foundation negotiations, 1955–56’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 9:1 (1998), 135–62.

Notes 231

162. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 77–78. 163. O’Driscoll, ‘Missing the nuclear boat?’, 139, 154–56. 164. Dutton, Anthony Eden, 458. 165. Hennessy, The prime minister, 248–71. For Macmillan’s own account since 1945, see Tides of fortune, 1945–55 (London: Macmillan, 1969); Riding the storm: 1956–1959 (London: Macmillan, 1971); Pointing the way, 1959–61 (London: Macmillan, 1972); At the end of the day: 1961–1963 (London: Macmillan, 1973). For biographies, see Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan: A biography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982); Alistair Horne, Macmillan. Volume 1 of the official biography: 1894–1956 (London: Macmillan, 1988); Horne, Macmillan. Volume 2 of the official biography: 1957–1986 (London: Macmillan, 1989). 166. Macmillan, Riding the storm, 292. 167. Hennessy, The prime minister, 262. 168. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 128; Moore, Nuclear illusion, nuclear reality, 3, 78–104; Hennessy, The prime minister, 113–14. Technically, the Royal Air Force was capable of delivering nuclear bombs in 1954: Sanders, Losing an empire, 244. 169. Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, ‘Learning to love the bomb: The command and control of British nuclear forces, 1953–1964’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22:1 (1999), 29–53, esp. 31, 40–42, 49; Hennessy, The prime minister, 90, 114–17, 120–21, 142. 170. Hennessy, The secret state, 44. 171. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 97–98, 343. 172. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 57. 173. HC Deb, 6 Mar. 1962, vol. 655 cc225–26. 174. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 113; see chapter six, table 6.2. 175. Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 733, 736. 176. Ibid., 738, 743–45. For British views of the European post-war economies, see Glen O’Hara, ‘This is what growth does: British views of the European Economies in the prosperous “golden age” of 1951–73’, Journal of Contemporary History 44:4 (2009), 697–718. 177. Kevin Boyle, ‘The price of peace: Vietnam, the pound, and the crisis of American empire’, Diplomatic History 27:1 (2003), 41–42. 178. Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 745. 179. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 427–30; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 98. 180. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 69–70. 181. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 96; Matthew Grant, ‘Home defence and the Sandys Defence White Paper, 1957’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31:6 (2008), 926. 182. HC Deb, 17 Apr. 1957, vol. 568 cc2040. 183. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 100; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 5. 184. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 21–22. 185. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 68, 73, 75; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 196. 186. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 106, 98. 187. HC Deb, 17 Apr. 1957, vol. 568 cc1985–6. 188. Ibid., 31 July 1957, vol. 574 cc1376–79. 189. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 441.

232 Notes

190. Marsh and Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “special relationship”’, 192–93. 191. HC Deb, 1 Apr. 1957, vol. 568 cc63–64, 70–72. 192. Marsh and Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “special relationship”’, 192–93. 193. Nigel J. Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days” of Anglo-American relations revisited, 1957–63’, Diplomatic History 29:4 (2005), 691–723. 194. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 121. 195. Jan Melissen, ‘The restoration of the nuclear alliance: Great Britain and atomic negotiations with the United States, 1957–58’, Contemporary Record 6:1 (1992), 94–95; Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 433, 437. 196. Macmillan, Riding the storm, 321–26; Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 438; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 140. Talks ranged over a variety of subjects: FRUS, 1955–57. Western Europe and Canada: Vol. XXVII UK. Part VI. The Washington talks, Oct. 1957: documents 306–37. 197. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 438; Macmillan, Riding the storm, 324. 198. Ruane and Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’, 160. 199. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 438. 200. Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days”’, 699–700; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 143; Ruane and Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’, 160–61; Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 439–40, 451, 456; G. Ball, The discipline of power (London: Bodley Head, 1968), 93, 102; Jan Melissen, The struggle for nuclear partnership: Britain, the United States and the making of an ambiguous alliance, 1952–59 (Groningen: Styx, 1993), 109–14. 201. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 439–40, 456–58; Marc Trachtenberg, A constructed peace: The making of a European settlement, 1945–1963 (West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1999). For a discussion of Plans for FrancoItalian-German (FIG) nuclear cooperation, see Melissen, Struggle for nuclear partnership, 149–50. 202. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 77. 203. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 163, quoting Alex Danchev, Oliver Franks: Founding father (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 132. 204. Ralph Dietl, ‘In defence of the West: General Lauris Norstad, NATO nuclear forces and transatlantic relations 1956–1963’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 17:2 (2006), 355. 205. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 457. 206. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear weapons and foreign policy (New York: Harper for the Council on Foreign Relations; London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 279. 207. Michael Quinlan, Thinking about nuclear weapons: Principles, problems, prospects (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 121–22. 208. Gott, ‘The evolution of the independent British deterrent’, 243–44. 209. Robert M. Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968 and the waning of the “American century”’, American Historical Review 101:2 (1996), 399, 396–422. 210. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 66–67; Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 399–400. 211. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 42; Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 400.

Notes 233

212. FRUS, 1958–60. Foreign economic policy: Vol. IV, Foreign Economic Policy, document 49, Paper Prepared in the Department of State, 24 July 1959. 213. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 66–67. 214. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 457. 215. Hennessy, The prime minister, 113–14; Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 55–56, 60–61. 216. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 275–77. 217. John Simpson and Jenifer Mackby, ‘The special nuclear relationship’, in Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (eds.), U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation after 50 years (London and Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), 10–14. 218. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 92–93, 96, 102–3. 219. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 141. 220. Melissen, ‘The restoration of the nuclear alliance’, 96; Marsh and Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American “special relationship”’, 192–93. 221. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 456; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 316. 222. Quinlan, Thinking about nuclear weapons, 122 fn 3. 223. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 452–54. 224. Hennessy, The prime minister, 266. 225. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 208–11. 226. Sanders, Losing an empire, 203–6; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 208–11. 227. Middleton, The British economy, 137; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 759. 228. Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 747; Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy’, 580. 229. Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 749–53. 230. HC Deb, 16 Apr. 1958, vol. 586 cc174. 231. Hennessy, Having it so good, 42–43; Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy’, 565. 232. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 218–24. 233. See http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1959/1959-labour-manifesto. shtml. 234. See http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1959/1959-conservative-manifesto. shtml. 235. Moore, Nuclear illusion, nuclear reality, 131–38. 236. Hennessy, Having it so good, 577–86. 237. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 182–86. 238. Kristan Stoddart, ‘The Wilson government and British responses to anti-ballistic missiles, 1964–1970’, Contemporary British History 23:1 (2009), 3. 239. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 186–96. 240. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 6; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 161. 241. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 211, 197; Hennessy, The secret state, 60. 242. FRUS, 1958–60, vol. VII, part II, Western Europe, document 370 (hereafter VII:II:370), memorandum for the files, 29 Mar. 1960; ibid. VII:II:371, memorandum, Eisenhower to Macmillan, 29 Mar. 1960; ibid. VII:II:372, memorandum, Macmillan to Eisenhower, 29 Mar. 1960.

234 Notes

243. Macmillan, Pointing the way, 252. 244. Ken Young, ‘The Royal Navy’s Polaris lobby, 1955–62’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25:3 (2002), 56–86; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 200–201; Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 132–38; PRO, CAB, 128/34, cabinet minutes, 13 Apr. 1960. 245. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 74. 246. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 196–201. 247. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 234. 248. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 201. 249. HC Deb, 27, Apr. 1960, vol. 622 cc228. 250. Ibid., cc321–30. 251. HC Deb, 6 Mar. 1962, vol. 655 cc230. 252. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 687; Benn, Out of the wilderness, 64; Barbara Castle, Fighting all the way (London: Macmillan 1993), 326. 253. Labour History Archive, Manchester (hereafter LHA), Labour Party Annual Report, 1960. 254. Brian Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Richard Cohen Books, 1996), 349–75; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 227, 229; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 203–4. 255. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 235, 241–45. 256. Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell, 376–403. 257. LHA, Labour Party Annual Report, 1961. 258. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 689; Report of Sixth Annual Conference, 1961, 8; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 206. 259. Christopher Andrew, The defence of the realm: The authorised history of MI5 (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 412–19. 260. Ziegler, Wilson, 129. 261. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 247. 262. HC Deb, 7 Feb. 1961, vol. 634 cc304–5. 263. Ibid., 6 Mar. 1962, vol. 655 cc223–30. 264. Toshihi Koaono, ‘“It is not easy for the united states to carry the whole load”: Anglo-American relations during the Berlin crisis, 1961–1962’, Diplomatic History 34:2 (2010), 325–56. 265. HC Deb, 20 Dec. 1961, vol. 651 cc1465, 1477. 266. For more on the adoption and failure of incomes policies, see Glen O’Hara, ‘“Intractable, obscure and baffling”: The incomes policy of the Conservative government, 1957–64’, Contemporary British History 18:1 (2004), 25–53. 267. Cairncross, The British economy, 111–12, 134, 138–41. 268. Ziegler, Wilson, 130–31. 269. Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days”’, 695; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 753–54; Ruane and Ellison, ‘Managing the Americans’, 162–64; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 142; Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe, 8–9; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 192, 297; Schenk, The decline of sterling, 95–100, 121–24. 270. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 142; Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe, 9. 271. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 238, 246, 247; Ziegler, Wilson, 130–31.

Notes 235

272. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 213–14, 218–21. 273. HC Deb, 8 Nov. 1962, vol. 666 cc1215. 274. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 212. 275. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 688–89; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 180–81. 276. HC Deb, 8 Nov. 1962, vol. 666 cc1271. 277. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 211, 218–21. 278. HC Deb, 26 June 1962, vol. 661 cc960. 279. Twigge, ‘Disarmament and non-proliferation’, 42–43. 280. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 102–4, 119–21; Trachtenberg, A constructed peace, 390. 281. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 116, 119–21. 282. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 207–8; Alan Dobson, ‘The years of transition: AngloAmerican relations, 1961–1967’, Review of International Studies 16:3 (1990), 257. 283. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 215, 209. 284. For more insights into the crisis, see Sheldon M. Stern, The Cuban Missile Crisis in American memory: Myths versus reality (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012). 285. Nur Bilge Criss, ‘Strategic nuclear missiles in Turkey: The Jupiter affair, 1959– 1963’, Journal of Strategic Studies 20:3 (1997), 97–122; Twigge, ‘Disarmament and nonproliferation’, 44. 286. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 113–14. 287. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 224–25. 288. Hennessy, The secret state, 145–46. 289. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 317–18. 290. Hennessy, The prime minister, 123; FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XI: Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, documents, 45, 74, 87: records of telephone conversation between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan on 22, 25, 26 Oct. 1962. 291. Hennessy, The prime minister, 122–25, 129–31. 292. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 232. 293. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 249–51. 294. HC Deb, 31 Oct. 1962, vol. 666 cc149–65. 295. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 232; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 249–51. 296. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 249–51; Ziegler, Wilson, 132–33. 297. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 224–25, 228–29; Malone, The British nuclear deterrent, 36. For a comprehensive account, see Richard Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt crisis in perspective (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999). 298. Dobson, ‘The years of transition’, 247. 299. Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days”’, 718, 720; Dobson, ‘The years of transition’, 239–58. 300. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 229–31. 301. Clark, Nuclear diplomacy, 372. 302. Ken Young, ‘The Skybolt crisis of 1962: Muddle or mischief?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 27:4 (2004), 614–35. 303. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 228–30l; Dobson, ‘The years of transition’, 247.

236 Notes

304. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 16. 305. Hennessy, The prime minister, 266–70. 306. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 15, 17–118; Moses Abramovitz, ‘Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind’, Journal of Economic History 46:2 (1986), 388, 385–406. 307. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 41–42. 308. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 121–24. 309. For details of the British balance of payments during the 1960s, see Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 13. 310. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 42; Schenk, ‘Sterling, international monetary reform and Britain’s applications’, 345. 311. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 226. 312. See, for instance, Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 319–58; Clark, Nuclear diplomacy, 374–421; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 231–43. 313. FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, memorandum of conversation: Kennedy and Macmillan, Nassau, 19 Dec. 1962, 1091–96. 314. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 114. 315. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 18. 316. Macmillan, At the end of the day, 356–67; Trachtenberg, A constructed peace, 362. 317. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 231–37, 241, 244; Dillon, Dependence and deterrence, 14, 28–30; Ashton, ‘Harold Macmillan and the “Golden Days”’, 720–21. 318. Clark, Nuclear diplomacy, 409–16; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 322–23; Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The irony of interdependence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 174–85. 319. Dobson, ‘The years of transition’, 248. 320. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 352; Clark, Nuclear diplomacy, 416. 321. Clark, Nuclear diplomacy, 416; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 354–58; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 236, 293. 322. Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 56–57. 323. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 354–58; Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 57. 324. Michael Middeke, ‘Anglo-American nuclear weapons co-operation after the Nassau conference’, Journal of Cold War Studies 2:2 (2000), 69–96. 325. Andrew Priest, ‘In American hands: Britain, the United States and the Polaris Nuclear Project 1962–1968’, Contemporary British History 19:3 (2005), 355; Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the shadow of Vietnam (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003), 39–46; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 133–62; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 294–95, 326–31. For more on nuclear control within NATO, see Twigge and Scott, Planning Armageddon. 326. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 326–27; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–96. 327. Trachtenberg, A constructed peace, 314; Helga Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution: A crisis of credibility, 1966–67 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 111–39. 328. Denis Healey, Wilson’s secretary of state for defence, suggests that he produced the first extended treatment of the doctrine of graduated deterrence in his 1956 Chatham House booklet On limiting atomic war. This, he claims, formed the strategy of Flexible Response later adopted by NATO: Healey, The time of my life, 238.

Notes 237

329. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 27. 330. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 61–94; Francis J. Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power: The politics of international monetary relations, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 59–116. 331. Arthur Schlesinger, A thousand days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), 601; Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 61. 332. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 93, 68, 63–64. 333. Ibid., 93. 334. Susan Strange, ‘The persistent myth of lost hegemony’, International Organisation 41:4 (1987), 551–74. 335. Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 44–45, 124; John Lewis Gaddis, We now know: Rethinking Cold War history (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 113–51. 336. Hubert Zimmermann, ‘The improbable permanence of a commitment: America’s troop presence in Europe during the Cold War’, Journal of Cold War Studies 11:1 (2009), 3–27. 337. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 83–84; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 140–41. 338. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 124. 339. Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 400. 340. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 72–73. 341. FRUS, 1961–63, vol. IX, Foreign Economic Policy, document 17, Report by the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to Kennedy, 27 July 1962; ibid. IX, 18, memorandum from Dillon to Kennedy, 9 Oct. 1962. 342. Clark, Nuclear diplomacy, 522. 343. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 17. 344. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 238–40. 345. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141. 346. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 116. 347. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 326–27; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–96; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 164. 348. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 326–28; Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 83–84. 349. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 242. 350. HC Deb, 31 Jan. 1963, vol. 670 cc1140–47; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 324– 26. 351. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 317–18. 352. Hennessy, The prime minister, 262; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 215. 353. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 142–47; PRO, CAB, 128/36, cabinet minutes, 21 Dec. 1962. 354. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 148–54; PRO, PREM 11/4147, record of meeting on Polaris, 31 Dec. 1962. 355. Dillon, Dependence and deterrence, 30.

238 Notes

356. Hennessy, The secret state, 66–67; Hennessy, Muddling through, 113. 357. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 157–62; PRO, PREM 11/4147, cabinet minutes, Conclusions, 3 Jan. 1963.

Chapter 2 1. See, for instance, Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 31–40; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 163–82; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324; Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 148–61. 2. An exception to this criticism is Pierre, Nuclear politics, 251–72. For Wilson’s major biographies, see Pimlott, Harold Wilson; Morgan, Harold Wilson; Ziegler, Wilson. 3. FRUS, 1961–63, vol. XIII, memorandum of conversation: Kennedy and Macmillan, Nassau, 19 Dec. 1962, 1091–96. 4. For a fuller discussion on the Nassau conference, see Pierre, Nuclear politics, 231– 42; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 319–58. 5. These arguments also appear in David James Gill, ‘The ambiguities of opposition: Economic decline, international cooperation, and political rivalry in the nuclear policies of the Labour Party’, Contemporary British History 25:2 (2011), 1–26. 6. Ponting, Breach of promise, 87; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 31; Rhiannon Vickers, ‘Foreign policy beyond Europe’, in Peter Dorey (ed.), The Labour governments, 1964–1970 (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 139; Memoirs supporting this view can be found in Wilson, The Labour government, 40; Benn, Out of the wilderness, 94–95; Healey, The time of my life, 302. 7. Anthony Shrimsley, The first hundred days of Harold Wilson (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 88–89; Ziegler, Wilson, 208; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 262–67; Hennessy, The secret state, 70–71; John W. Young, ‘International factors and the 1964 election’, Contemporary British History 21:3 (2006), 363. 8. Bizarre claims of a Soviet plot to ensure Wilson’s rise to power are briefly considered in Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell, 433–34. 9. Ziegler, Wilson, 105, 124. 10. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 234–35, 238, 293. 11. Ibid., 252–81; Ziegler, Wilson, 136; Healey, The time of my life, 156. The first ballot was declared on 7 February, with Wilson achieving 115 votes against 88 for Brown and 41 for Callaghan. The second ballot result followed on 14 February, with Wilson securing 144 votes against Brown’s 103. Wilson is alleged to have stated that he ‘hadn’t lost a moment’s sleep in this contest’: Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 259. 12. Timothy Heppell, ‘The Labour Party leadership election of 1963: Explaining the unexpected election of Harold Wilson’, Contemporary British History 24:2 (2010), 151–71. 13. Michael Stewart Papers, Churchill Archive, Cambridge (hereafter STWT) 8/1/4, Diary (1963–June 1964), Feb.–June entry. 14. Mervyn Jones, Michael Foot (London: Victor Gollancz, 1994), 249–50, 291; Castle, Fighting all the way, 336; Healey, The time of my life, 150, 193. 15. Hennessy, Muddling through, 266; Harold Wilson, Governance of Britain (London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1976), 156–57.

Notes 239

16. One should be wary of simplifying the Labour Party as two opposing factions: Ilaria Favretto, ‘“Wilsonism” reconsidered: Labour Party revisionism, 1952–1964’, Journal of Contemporary British History 14:4 (Winter 2000), 54–80. 17. Steven Fielding, ‘Rethinking Labour’s 1964 campaign’, Contemporary British History 21:3 (2006), 71. 18. D. E. Butler and Anthony King, The British general election of 1964 (London: Macmillan, 1965), 72; Kenneth Morgan, Britain since 1945: The people’s peace (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 231; Ponting, Breach of promise, 87. 19. Callaghan, Time & chance, 150; Jones, Michael Foot, 270; Healey, The time of my life, 150; Ponting, Breach of promise, 19. 20. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 31; Mark Phythian, ‘CND’s Cold War’, Contemporary British History 15:3 (2001), 139–41; Richard Taylor, Against the bomb: The British peace movement 1958–1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 275–314, esp. 309. 21. Young, ‘International factors’, 364. 22. HC Deb, 5 Mar. 1963, vol. 673 cc223–24. 23. Tomlinson, ‘Managing the economy’, 565–68; Tomlinson, ‘Inventing “decline”’, 748; David Blaazer, ‘“Devalued and dejected Britons”: The pound in public discourse in the mid-1960s’, History Workshop Journal 47 (1999), 125; Fielding, ‘Rethinking Labour’s 1964 campaign’, 317. 24. Blaazer, ‘Devalued and dejected Britons’, 125. 25. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 13–14. 26. Matthew Jones, ‘A decision delayed: Britain’s withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961–8’, English Historical Review 472 (2002), 569–95. 27. During his first formal meeting on the subject of the bomb after taking office, Wilson was keen to use the bomb to extract ‘substantial concessions’ from the United States; PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC. 16/1: Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 Nov. 1964; ibid., 130/213, MISC. 17/1–4 Meeting(s), Defence Policy, minutes of meetings held at Chequers, 21 Nov. 1964, 22 Nov. 1964, passim. 28. HC Deb, 5 Mar. 1963, vol. 673 cc328–29. 29. Not all of Wilson’s private papers are presently available. According to Helen Langley, curator of the Modern Political Papers at the Bodleian Library, some documents remain with Lady Wilson. 30. Harold Wilson Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford (hereafter HWP), NBC, Meet the press, 7:13, 7 Apr. 1963. 31. HWP, MS. Wilson. C.881, letter from Patrick Gordon Walker, 12 Mar. 1963; Healey, The time of my life, 302; Benn, Out of the wilderness, 94–95. 32. Austin, Texas, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL), National Security File (hereafter NSF), Security file, Box 34, American Embassy, London, to Department of State, 21 Oct. 1964. 33. Healey, The time of my life, 245. 34. Hennessy, The secret state, 70. 35. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 326–27; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–96. 36. Trachtenberg, A constructed peace, 314; Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 111–39.

240 Notes

37. See, for instance, Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324. 38. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141. 39. PRO, DEFE 25/33, note of conversation, 2 Nov. 1964; Ponting, Breach of promise, 91. 40. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 328. 41. Saki Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence: Dealing with three roles and the Wilson government’s defence debate at Chequers in November 1964’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 11:1 (2000), 228; Ponting, Breach of promise, 89–91; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 116; Wilson, The Labour government, 41. Wilson, The Labour government, 49; Healey, The time of my life, 245, 304. 42. For a more detailed account of the Conservative handling of the MLF issue in the early 1960s, see Middeke, ‘Anglo-American nuclear weapons co-operation’, 69–96. 43. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 330. 44. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 165–66. 45. Andrew Holt, ‘Lord Home and Anglo-American relations, 1961–1963’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 16:4 (Dec. 2005), 712–13. 46. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 328–29. 47. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295. 48. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 164. 49. Bruce Reed and Geoffrey Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1971), 158. 50. Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 228. 51. Robert Pearce (ed.), Patrick Gordon Walker, political dairies, 1932–1971 (London: Historian’s Press, 1991), 300. 52. HC Deb, 4 Mar. 1963, vol. 673 cc61. 53. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 148–61. 54. HC Deb, 4 Mar. 1963, vol. 673 cc59. 55. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 688. Healey outlines this proposal in a Fabian Society lecture in 1957: ‘A neutral belt in Europe’, in Denis Healey, When shrimps learn to whistle: Signposts for the nineties (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), 159–75. 56. The Gordon Walker Papers, Churchill Archive, Cambridge (hereafter GNWR), 1/15, note, 12 Mar. 1963; HWP, MS Wilson C. 881, confidential letter from Gordon Walker to Wilson, 12 Mar. 1963. 57. For an insight into Rostow’s influence on presidential decision-making, see David Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008). 58. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 85, quoting JFK, POF, Countries, Box 127A, United Kingdom, Security, 1/63–4/63, Brubeck to Bundy, 30 Mar. 1963: note of meeting between Wilson and Rostow, 30 Mar. 1963. 59. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 310–11. 60. GNWR 1/15, note, 29 May. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid.

Notes 241

63. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86, quoting JFK, NSF, Country Files, Box 170, United Kingdom, 1/2163–12/31/62, memorandum of conversation, 29 May 1963. 64. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86: quoting JFK, NSF, RSF, Box 218, Multilateral Force, General, 5/22/63–5/31/63, memorandum of conversation between Merchant and Gordon Walker, 29 May 1963. 65. GNWR 1/15, note, 31 May. 66. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 141. 67. GNWR 1/15, note, 6 Apr. 1963. 68. Pearce, Patrick Gordon Walker, political dairies, 284–85. 69. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 688. 70. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87, referencing JFK, NSF, RSF, Box 218 A, Multilateral Force, General, 11/1/63–11/14/63, Bruce to Rusk, 14 Nov. 1963. 71. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86–87. 72. GNWR 1/15, summary of discussions between Wilson, Gordon Walker and Khrushchev, Gromyko and Gomulka on separate occasions. June 1963. 73. Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 228; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 86–87; Ponting, Breach of promise, 89–91; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 116; Wilson, The Labour government, 41; David Owen, The politics of defence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1972), 180. 74. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 330; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 166. 75. PRO, DEFE 7/ 2028, Washington to FO, 31 Jan. 1964. 76. Ponting, Breach of promise, 90; James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis: Rising to the Gaullist challenge, 1963–68 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 19. 77. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 20; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 19–20; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 222. 78. Hennessy, The prime minister, 272–85. 79. Young, ‘International factors’, 356. 80. Wilson, The Labour government, 40; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 24, 31; Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1970), 203–4. 81. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 252; Young, ‘International factors’, 356. 82. Healey, The time of my life, 242; Ziegler, Wilson, 208. 83. See, for example, Ziegler, Wilson, 516; Healey, The time of my life, 331; Ponting, Breach of promise, 403; Hennessy, Muddling through, 247–49; Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson, 330; Edward Heath, The course of my life: My autobiography (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), 250; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 211–13; David Owen, Time to declare (London: Michael Joseph, 1999), 47. 84. Hennessy, The secret state, 71. 85. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 308. 86. HWP, MSC. Wilson C.891, Brown to Wilson, 18 Feb. 1964. 87. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 308. 88. Wilson, Making of a prime minister, 201; Ziegler, Wilson, 142, 152.

242 Notes

89. Cairncross, The British economy, 134, 148–50. 90. PRO, PREM 11/4733, Thorneycroft to Douglas Home, 3 Feb. 1964. 91. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 167; Hennessy, The secret state, 71. In both cases, Hennessy refers to PRO, PREM 11/4733, Thorneycroft to Douglas Home, 3 Feb. 1964. 92. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 163–64. 93. PRO, PREM 11/4733, Defence talks with the opposition, 4 Feb. 1964. 94. Ibid. 95. Hennessy, Muddling through, 114. 96. Hennessy, The secret state, 70–71; Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 167. 97. Peter Patterson, Tired and emotional: Life of Lord George Brown (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993), 119; Ziegler, Wilson, 132–33. 98. Douglas Home, The way the wind blows (London: Collins, 1976), 213–14. 99. HC. Debs. col. 480–1, 26 Feb. 1964. 100. Healey, The time of my life, 302. Healey allegedly thought the Polaris programme would continue under a Labour government and made every effort to ensure that Labour was not irrevocably tied into surrendering the deterrent: Pierre, Nuclear politics, 264. 101. LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy, London, to Department of State, 21 Oct. 1964. 102. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87, quoting LBJ, NSF, Country File, United Kingdom, Box 213, Rostow to Tyler, 17 Feb. 1964. 103. Ziegler, Wilson, 208: Ziegler references: LBJL, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, documents 10 (memorandum of conversation between Wilson and McNamara, 2 Mar. 1964) and 17a (memorandum of conversation between Wilson and William R. Tyler, 2 Mar. 1964). 104. LBJL, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, document 10, 5 Mar. 1964 (memorandum of conversation between Wilson and McNamara, 2 Mar. 1964). 105. Ibid., memorandum of conversation between Wilson and William R. Tyler, 2 Mar. 1964. 106. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 227, Tour d’Horizon with Wilson, 2 Mar. 1964. 107. Ziegler, Wilson, 124. 108. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 88; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 266. 109. PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC. 16/1: Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 Nov. 1964; ibid., 130/213, MISC. 17/1–4 Meeting(s), Defence policy, minutes of meetings held at Chequers on Saturday, 21 Nov. 1964 and Sunday, 22 Nov. 1964, passim. 110. LBJL, NSF, Security file, box 34, American Embassy, London, to Department of State, 21 Oct. 1964. 111. Healey, The time of my life, 307; Vickers, ‘Foreign policy beyond Europe’, 139; Hennessy, Muddling through, 116; Owen, Time to declare, 146. 112. LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington by Wilson, 3 Mar. 1964. 113. HWP, MSC. Wilson C.891, letter to Wilson from Wayland Young, 20 May 1964.

Notes 243

114. LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington by Wilson, 3 Mar. 1964. 115. Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87. 116. Healey, The time of my life, 302. This is in contrast to the prime minister’s recollections: Wilson, The Labour government, 40–41. 117. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 284–85; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 32; Hennessy, The secret state, 72. 118. Patrick Gordon Walker, ‘Labour foreign and defence policy’, Foreign Affairs 42:3 (1964), 391–98; Fred Mulley, ‘NATO’s nuclear problems: Control or consultation’, Orbis 8:1 (1964), 21–35. 119. Wilson, Making of a prime minister, 201; Ziegler, Wilson, 142, 152. 120. Young, ‘International factors’, 355. 121. LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington by Wilson, 3 Mar. 1964. 122. Morgan, Pimlott, and Ziegler all make these claims in their lengthy biographies on Wilson. 123. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 308. 124. Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 51. 125. GNWR 1/15, note, 30 Apr. 1964. 126. MSC. Wilson C.891, lobby briefing, 13 May 1964. 127. HWP, MS. Wilson. C.55, letter to G. Banner, 15 Apr. 1964; letter to Mr Boyd, 10 Mar. 1964; Reply to Mr Johnstone, 10 July 1964. 128. HWP, MS. Wilson. C891. Wayland Young, ‘Bombs and votes’, Fabian Tract 354 (May 1964). On page four Young states: ‘The Labour Party has been thirteen years without contact with the official planners in this complicated and largely secret field; it is right that we should refuse to be drawn into detail’. 129. Wilson, The Labour government, 40. 130. Benn, Out of the wilderness, 108. 131. Ibid.; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 373. 132. Hennessy, Whitehall, 188. 133. Ziegler, Wilson, 152–53. 134. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 254; Ziegler, Wilson, 157–58. 135. Ian Dale (ed.), Labour Party general election manifestos, 1900–1997 (London: Routledge, 2000), 123–24; Butler and King, The British general election of 1964, 130. 136. Jim Tomlinson, ‘It’s the economy, stupid! Labour and the economy, circa 1964’, Contemporary British History 21:3 (2006), 338. 137. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 306; Wilson, Making of a prime minister, 200. 138. Hennessy, The prime minister, 276. 139. Several authors erroneously make this claim. See, for instance, Morgan, Britain since 1945, 283; Owen, Time to declare, 146. 140. Wilson, The Labour government, 201; Roth, Harold Wilson, 301; Ziegler, Wilson, 157; Anthony Howard, Crossman: The pursuit of power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1990), 263; Young, ‘International factors’, 355–56. 141. Young, ‘International factors’, 355.

244 Notes

142. Shrimsley, The first hundred days, 73. 143. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 263; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 31; Hennessy, Muddling through, 114; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Ponting, Breach of promise, 87; Hennessy, The secret state, 70; Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 689. 144. Shrimsley, The first hundred days, 73. 145. Respectively, Chris Wrigely, ‘Now you see it now you don’t: Harold Wilson and Labour’s foreign policy’, in R. Coopey, S. Fielding, and N. Tiratsoo (eds.), The Wilson governments, 1964–1970 (London: Cassell, 1995), 123–35; Richard Coopey, ‘Industrial policy in the white heat of the scientific revolution’, in Coopey, Fielding, and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, 102–22. 146. GNWR 3/4, Thoughts on foreign policy, Aug. 1964. 147. Hennessy, Muddling through, 114. 148. See, for instance, Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3; Stephen Fielding, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 1, Labour and cultural change (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Peter Thompson, ‘Labour’s “Gannex conscience”? Politics and popular attitudes in the “permissive society”’, in Coopey, Fielding, and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, 136–50. 149. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 252; Young, Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 203–4; Heath, The course of my life, 266; Young, ‘International factors’, 354, 363. 150. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 311. 151. Young, ‘International factors’, 359–64. 152. Ibid., 369 fn 41. 153. Butler and King, The British general election of 1964, 131. 154. Young, ‘International factors’, 351–71. 155. LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy, London, to Department of State, 21 Oct. 1964. 156. Butler and King, The British general election of 1964, 130. 157. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 131–32. 158. PRO, PREM 13/25, Bonn to Foreign Office, 9 Oct. 1964; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, documents 36–38, correspondence between Erhard and Johnson and memorandum of conversation between West German and US representatives on the MLF, 30 Sept. 1964 to 7 Oct. 1964; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 167. 159. PRO, PREM 13/25, record of meeting, 23 Oct., 26 Oct. 160. Pearce, Patrick Gordon Walker, political dairies, 299–300. 161. PRO, DEFE 7/2028, Washington to FO, 31 Jan. 1964, originally located in Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 331. The Labour government formally acknowledges this threat after coming to power; PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC. 17/3, Defence policy, 21 Nov. 1964. 162. Hennessy, Muddling through, 116. 163. PRO, PREM 13/1273, note, 4 Mar. 1966; PRO, FO 800/951, Gordon Walker diary memorandum, 26 Dec. 1964, record of meeting, 22 Oct. 1964. 164. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 300–301. 165. Wilson, The Labour government, 44.

Notes 245

166. 1964 General Election results: Labour: 317, Conservatives: 304, Liberal: 9. The Labour Party was thus returned to power with a majority of only four seats. 167. Wilson, The Labour government, 2. 168. Home, The way the wind blows, 215. These same quotations also appear in Young, ‘International factors’, 362. 169. Hennessy, Muddling through, 114. 170. PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC. 16/1, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 Nov. 1964; ibid. 128/39, cabinet meeting, 26 Nov. 1964. 171. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 235; Healey, The time of my life, 303–4. 172. Wilson, The Labour government, 40. 173. Healey, The time of my life, 302; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 284–85; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 32; Hennessy, The secret state, 72. 174. Hennessy, Cabinet, 148–50. 175. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 169; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 26. 176. Hennessy, Muddling through, 116. 177. Hennessy, The prime minister, 291. 178. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 310–11. 179. PRO, PREM 13/27, record of conversation, 30 Nov. 1964. 180. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 319; Hennessy, Muddling through, 249. 181. Michael Tomz and Robert P. Van Houweling, ‘The electoral implications of candidate ambiguity’, American Political Science Review 103:1 (2009), 83–98. 182. LBJL, NSF, Security File, Box 34, American Embassy, London, to Department of State, 21 Oct. 1964.

Chapter 3 1. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 300–301. 2. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 283; C. J. Bartlett, The long retreat: A short history of British defence policy (London: Macmillan, 1972), 248; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 23; David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An ocean apart (London: Hodder and Sroughton, 1988), 246; Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western nuclear strategy, 99; Stromseth, The origins of flexible response, 163. 3. See, for instance, Wilson, The Labour government, 49–50; Healey, The time of my life, 304–5; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 374–75; Owen, The politics of defence, 180. 4. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 224–26; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324; Jonathan Colman, A ‘special relationship’?: Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American relations ‘at the Summit’, 1964–8 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 2, 26–40, 43–45; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 93–94; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 17–22. 5. The following two chapters therefore build on the existing nuclear sharing histo-

246 Notes

riography, especially Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295–324; and Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84, and, beyond providing a more detailed account of events, introduce the importance of economic and domestic political considerations. 6. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 328–29; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 164. 7. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 75, 77. 8. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 221–22, 232; O’Hara, ‘Dynamic, exciting, thrilling change’, 383–402. For an analysis of the difficulty in using such indicators in assessing a government’s popularity, see Niall Ferguson, The cash nexus: Money and power in the modern world, 1700–2000 (London: Allen Lane Penguin Press, 2001), 235–38. 9. Wilson, The Labour government, xvii. 10. Ibid.; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 262–63. 11. Callaghan, Time & chance, 153–54. 12. Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, 166; Hennessy, Muddling through, 250–51. 13. Hennessy, The prime minister, 86–87. 14. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 350; Edmund Dell, The chancellors: A history of the chancellors of the exchequer, 1945–90 (London: Harper Collins, 1996), 304. 15. Wilson, The Labour government, 5–7; Callaghan, Time & chance, 159–61; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 351. 16. Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, 166. 17. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 49–50. 18. See, for instance, Ponting, Breach of promise; Strange, Sterling and British policy. For an overview of the debate, see Schenk, The decline of sterling, 155–57. 19. Scott Newton, ‘The two sterling crises of 1964 and the decision not to devalue’, Economic History Review 62:1 (2009), 73–98. 20. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 49. 21. PRO, PREM, T 171/758, note, 15 Oct. 1964. Warburg shared this view, and expressed his opinions to Wilson before and throughout his premiership: Ferguson, Siegmund Warburg, 279. 22. Tim Bale, ‘Dynamics of a non-decision: The “failure” to devalue the pound, 1964–7’, Twentieth Century British History 10:2 (1999), 192–217. 23. Edward Short, Whip to Wilson: The crucial years of the Labour government (London: Macdonald, 1989), 37; Ziegler, Wilson, 191. 24. John Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson administration and the British Labour government: Vietnam, the pound and East of Suez’, Journal of American studies 30:2 (1996), 211–12; Roy, ‘No secrets between “special friends”’, 406–7. 25. Dale, Labour Party general election manifestos, 123–24; Butler and King, The British general election of 1964, 130. 26. N. Woodward, ‘Labour’s economic performance, 1964–1970’, in Coopey, Fielding, and Tiratsoo, The Wilson governments, 72–99. 27. PRO, CAB 148/10, Cabinet DOPC Long Term Study Group, 23 Oct. 1964.

Notes 247

28. LBJL, National Security file (hereafter NSF), Security file, box 34, American Embassy, London, to Department of State, 21 Oct. 1964. 29. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 173. 30. Ponting, Breach of promise, 90. 31. PRO, CAB 148/40, Cabinet DOPC, 23 Oct. 1964. 32. PRO, PREM 13 25, note of a meeting with Shuckburgh, 26 Oct. 1964. 33. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295; Lawrence Black, ‘“The bitterest enemies of Communism”: Labour revisionists, Atlanticism and the Cold War’, Contemporary British History 15:3 (2001), 30. 34. Ponting, Breach of promise, 90; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 164; Hennessy, Muddling through, 115. 35. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 383; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 20; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 19–20; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 222. 36. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 173. 37. PRO, DEFE 25/33, Misc. 17/4, 18 Nov. 1964. 38. PRO, PREM 13/1273, note, 4 Mar. 1966. This interpretation is supported by Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 300; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 230. Others suggest Healey was responsible: Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 168; Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 158. 39. PRO, FO 800/951, Gordon Walker diary memorandum, 26 Dec. 1964, record of meeting, 22 Oct. 1964. 40. Ibid., record of meeting, 19 Nov. 1964; PRO, DEFE 25/33, Brown to Healey, 4 Dec. 1964. 41. PRO, PREM 13/26, record of meeting, 26 Oct. 1964 and 27 Oct. 1964; PRO, FO 800/951, Gordon Walker diary memorandum, 26 Dec. 1964. 42. PRO, FO 800/951, Gordon Walker diary memorandum, 26 Dec. 1964. 43. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 13, document 43, Department of State to the embassy in Germany, 29 Oct. 1964. 44. PRO, PREM 13 25, note of a meeting with Shuckburgh, 26 Oct. 1964. 45. LBJL, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Bundy to Johnson, 26 Oct. 1964. 46. PRO, PREM 13/25, records of meetings, 26–27 Oct. 1964. 47. Ibid., 13/26, note of meeting, 11 Nov. 1964. 48. Ibid., 13/25, Foreign secretary to prime minister, 16 Nov. 1964. 49. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 9 Nov. 1964. 50. Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 229. Dockrill suggests that the strategy to deal with the MLF impasse was developed during MISC. 16. This conclusion ignores Healey’s and Walker’s earlier diplomatic efforts and disregards the possibility of an informal strategy developing between Wilson, Healey, and Gordon Walker in the weeks preceding MISC. 16. 51. PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC. 16/1: Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 Nov. 1964; Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 167. 52. PRO, PREM 13/26, Burke to Wilson, 10 Nov. 1964.

248 Notes

53. Ibid., Trend to PM, 25 Nov. 1964. 54. PRO, DEFE 7/2028, Washington to FO, 31 Jan. 1964, originally located in: Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 331; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 166–67; PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC. 17/3, Defence Policy, 21 Nov. 1964. 55. PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC 16, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 Nov. 1964. 56. Hennessy, Muddling through, 116. 57. PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC 16/1, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 11 Nov. 1964; Wilson, The Labour government, 39; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 278–79. 58. Hennessy, Muddling through, 253; Saki Dockrill, ‘Forging the Anglo-American Global Defence Partnership: Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson, and the Washington Summit’, Journal of Strategic Studies 23:4 (2000), 107. 59. Ziegler, Wilson, 228–29. For more on Anglo-American economic relations in the context of Vietnam, see Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson administration and the British Labour government’, 211–31; Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 37–72. 60. Callaghan, Time & chance, 172–73. 61. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 50–51; Wilson, The Labour government, 34–38; Alec Cairncross, The Wilson years: A treasury diary, 1964–1969 (London: Historian’s Press, 1997), 17. 62. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 233, Wilson to Johnson, 19 Nov. 1964; ibid., document 234, Johnson to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 63. Cairncross, The Wilson years, 18. 64. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 43. For more on Wilson’s pragmatic approach to Vietnam at this time, see John W. Young, ‘Britain and LBJ’s war, 1964–1968’, Cold War History 2:3 (2002), 63–92. 65. Schenk, ‘Sterling, international monetary reform and Britain’s applications’, 368; D. B. Kunz, ‘Somewhat mixed up together: Anglo-American defence and financial policy during the 1960s’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27:2 (1999), 228; Roy, ‘No secrets between “special friends”’, 402–3, 422. 66. Wilson, The Labour government, 38. 67. Hennessy, Cabinet, 148–50. 68. Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 169; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 26. 69. PRO, DEFE 13/350, Modification of the Polaris programme, 19 Oct. 1964; PRO, T 225/2587, Correspondence between Bennett, Nairne, and Pritchard, 8–18 Nov. 1964. 70. PRO, CAB 130/212, MISC 16/1, Atlantic Nuclear Force, Wednesday 11 Nov. 1964. 71. Hennessy, The prime minister, 79. 72. Gordon Walker, The cabinet, 90. This book came under serious pressure for revision from Wilson, particularly on the passages pertaining to cabinet committees: GNWR, 2/3, Wilson to Gordon Walker, 29 July and 8 Aug. 1969. 73. Hennessy, Cabinet, 148–49. 74. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Mottershead to Rogers, 13 Nov. 1964. 75. Ibid., Laskey to Trend, 17 Nov. 1964. 76. Ibid., Laskey to Trend, 17 Nov. 1964.

Notes 249

77. Ibid., Rogers to Trend, 17 Nov. 1964. 78. PRO, PREM 13/18, Trend to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 79. Wilson, The Labour government, 20; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 622–23; Ziegler, Wilson, 184–85; Castle, The Castle diaries, 115; Edward Pearce, Denis Healey: A life in our times (London, Little Brown 2002), 350. 80. Castle, The Castle diaries, 306. 81. Henry Kissinger, The White House years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), 92–93. 82. Crossman, Inside view, 5. 83. For the memoirs in question, see Wilson, The Labour government. Several omissions regarding international relations were made under advisement: HWP, MS Wilson C. 1673. 84. PRO, CAB, 130/213, MISC. 17/1–4 Meeting(s), Defence Policy, minutes of meetings, 21–22 Nov. 1964; Williams, Inside Number 10, 38; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 211–40. 85. Walker, The cabinet, 90. By their nature, such meetings were highly selective. At least one cabinet minister was wholly unaware of this ‘inner cabal’ at the time: Castle, Fighting all the way, 350. 86. Healey, The time of my life, 302–4. 87. PRO, CAB, 130/213, MISC.17/meetings, defence policy, minutes of meetings, 21 and 22 Nov. 1964. See also, Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 302–3. 88. Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 233. 89. Ibid.; Ponting, Breach of promise, 91. 90. Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 374; Dockrill, ‘Britain’s power and influence’, 232. 91. Wilson, The Labour government, 44; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 105; Ponting, Breach of promise, 92; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 374. 92. PRO, FO 800/951, A.N.F. negotiations, 1 Jan. 1965. 93. Ponting, Breach of promise, 92. 94. PRO, DEFE 25/33, OPD meeting minutes, 9 Nov. 1964. 95. PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/4, 22 Nov. 1964. 96. PRO, DEFE 32/9, confidential annex to COS 67th meeting, 10 Nov. 1964; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 278–79. 97. PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/3, 21, Nov. 1964; ibid., MISC 17/4, 22 Nov. 1964. 98. Ibid., MISC. 17/1, Defence policy, 21 Nov. 1964. 99. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295– 324. 100. PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC. 17/4, Defence policy, 22 Nov. 1964. 101. LBJ, NSF, Country File, UK, Box 213, Press conference in Washington, 3 Mar. 1964. 102. PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC. 17/4, Defence policy, 22 Nov. 1964. 103. PRO, T 225/2587, Departmental drafts circa Nov. 1964; ibid., Polaris, 3 Dec. 1964. 104. Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from East of Suez, 80.

250 Notes

105. PRO, DEFE 13/350, 5 Boat Polaris force, 17 Nov. 1964. 106. PRO, CAB, 164/713, Deployment of U.K. Polaris Submarines, Solly Zuckerman to Burke Trend, 20 Nov. 1964 (referencing minute to Healey, 18 Nov. 1964). 107. PRO, DEFE, 13/350, Correspondence between APH and Healey, 20 Nov. 1964. 108. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 233, Wilson to Johnson, 19 Nov. 1964; ibid., document 234, Johnson to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 109. PRO, CAB, 130/213, MISC. 17/1–4 Meeting(s), Defence policy, minutes of meetings, 21 Nov. 1964 and Sunday, 22 Nov. 1964. 110. HC Deb, vol. 702 cc944–45, 23 Nov. 1964. 111. Ibid., 23 Nov. 1964, vol. 702 cc943–44. 112. PRO, PREM 13/27, New York to Foreign Office, 29 Nov. 1964. 113. PRO, DEFE 25/33, record of conversation, 11 Dec. 1964. 114. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 170; Ponting, Breach of promise, 91. 115. Hennessy, Whitehall, 217. 116. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 292–93. 117. New York Times, 19 Oct. 1964. Cited in McGeorge Bundy, Danger and survival: Choices about the bomb in the first fifty years (Random House, 1988), 495, via Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 170. 118. PRO, DEFE 25/33, Bonn to FO, 1 Dec. 1964. 119. LBJL, MGB, Box 18, draft memorandum of conversation, 19 Nov. 1964. 120. PRO, PREM 13/26, Washington to FO, 23 and 25 Nov. 1964. 121. Ibid., 25 Nov. 1964. 122. LBJL, MGB, Box 18, memorandum of conversation, 27 Nov. 1964, document 6b. 123. Ibid., 6a. 124. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 170–71. 125. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Atlantic Nuclear Force, Rogers to Trend, 17 Nov. 1964. 126. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 171. 127. PRO, PREM 13/027, Roberts to FO, 26 Nov. 1964. 128. PRO, CAB 128/39, cabinet meeting, 26 Nov. 1964. 129. Castle, The Castle diaries, xv. 130. James, British cabinet government, 97. For an insight into cabinet government, with comments from Denis Healey and Roy Jenkins, see Peter Hennessy and Caroline Anstey, ‘Diminished responsibility? The essence of cabinet government’, Strathclyde Analysis Papers 2 (Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, 1991). 131. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 356–57; Wilson, The Labour government, 102–3. 132. Wilson, The Labour government, 102–3. 133. Short, Whip to Wilson, 28; Jones, Michael Foot, 292–93; Ian Mikardo, Backbencher (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1988), 174–75. 134. Wilson’s whips had numerous problems with both men: Short, Whip to Wilson, 28, 74, 78, 94, 147–48, 187–88, 195, 199, 219, 258, 266, 269, 274, 277–78; Labour History Archive, Manchester Michael Foot Papers (hereafter MFP) M/2, Personal correspondence folder, 1961–68, passim; Jo Richardson Papers (hereafter RICH), 3/4/7, Silkin to Mikardo, 11 May 1967; RICH, 3/4/7, letter to prime minister, 6 Feb. 1968. 135. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 357–59.

Notes 251

136. Crossman, The myths of cabinet government, 57. 137. Wilson, The Labour government, 40. 138. Healey, The time of my life, 302. Healey’s admission is curious. As Castle explains, Healey’s ‘autobiography is a masterly piece of work and, as I read it, I chuckled over the cunning way he skates over his confessions of past mistakes, leaving the impression that they did not adversely affect events, though of course they did’. Castle, Fighting all the way, 155. 139. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 284–85; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 32; Hennessy, The secret state, 72. 140. Castle, The Castle diaries, 356. 141. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 287: Cmnd 2901, Statement on defence estimates (1966), 9. 142. PREM 13/18, Trend to PM, attached note, 25 Nov. 1964. 143. PRO, FO 800/951, Gordon Walker diary memorandum, 26 Dec. 1964. 144. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 304–5; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 276–83. 145. Richard Crossman, The diaries of a cabinet minister, Volume 1: Minister of housing, 1964–1966 (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1975), 73. 146. PRO, PREM 13/104, Atlantic Nuclear Force, 7 Dec. 1964. 147. Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 49. 148. Wilson, The Labour government, 51. 149. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 169. 150. Ibid. (referencing elements from PRO, PREM 13/26, briefing paper, 25 Nov. 1964). 151. PRO, PREM 13/18 Trend to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 152. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Rogers to Trend, 4 Dec. 1964. 153. Tomlinson, ‘The decline of empire’, 216–17. 154. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Rogers to Trend, 17 Nov. 1964. 155. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 305. 156. PRO, DEFE 25/33, conversation between secretary of state and Schröder, 11 Dec. 1964. 157. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Laskey to Rogers, 2 Dec. 1964. 158. Ibid. 159. Wilson, The Labour government, 43. 160. See, for instance, Dockrill, ‘Global defence partnership’, 118; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 306; Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 27. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 172, instead suggests that Johnson actually ‘ordered the State Department to refrain from pressing the MLF on the Europeans’. 161. PRO, PREM 13/103, record of meeting, 27 Nov. 1964; ibid., 13/27, Draft telegram, 30 Nov. 1964; Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 27; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 51, editorial note. 162. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 54, Ball to State, 2 Dec. 1964. 163. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 170. 164. Ibid., 172; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 43–46.

252 Notes

165. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, memorandum of conversation, 31 Oct. 1964. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 306. 166. Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 20–36; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 106–7. 167. PRO, PREM 13/25, Healey to Gordon Walker, 16 Nov. 1965. 168. PRO, DEFE 25/33, Bonn to Foreign Office, 1 Dec. 1964. 169. Ibid., ‘Washington Talks’, 18 Nov. 1964. 170. Ibid., Misc 17/4 Cabinet Office, 18 Nov. 1964. 171. Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 28. 172. Wilson The Labour government, 46. 173. Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 27–28; PRO, DEFE 25/33, Healey to PM 30 Nov. 1964. 174. PRO, DEFE 25/33, Hardman to secretary of state, Washington talks, 30 Nov. 1964. 175. PRO, PREM 13/105, Prime minister: Strategy for Washington, 2 Dec. 1964. Taken from Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 28. 176. Dockrill, ‘Global defence partnership’, 108. 177. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Laskey to Rogers and Trend, 3 Dec. 1964. 178. Ibid., Rogers to Trend, 4 Dec. 1964. 179. Dockrill, ‘Global defence partnership’, 107–29; Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 21–22; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 87. 180. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 237, Off-the-record meeting, 7 Dec. 1964; Dockrill, ‘Global defence partnership’, 119; PRO, PREM, Trend to Wilson, 11 Dec. 1964. 181. Wilson, The Labour government, 48–49; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 52. 182. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 236: memorandum of conversation, 7 Dec. 1964. 183. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 365, 383. 184. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 237, Off-the-record meeting, 7 Dec. 1964. 185. PRO, PREM 13 104, North American visit, notes for cabinet, 11 Dec. 1964. 186. For a more detailed account of this meeting, see Dockrill, ‘Global defence partnership’, 107–29; Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 37–52. 187. Healey, Time of my life, 305; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 375; Ponting, Breach of promise, 92. 188. PRO, DEFE 25/33 Ottawa talks, 9 Dec. 1964. 189. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 308. 190. PRO, PREM 13/27, Foreign Office to Washington, 15 Dec. 1964. 191. LBJL, George Ball Papers, Box 5, Telecon 1/30/65, Kuchel and Ball, Doc. 4. 192. PRO, PREM 13/104, North American visit, notes for cabinet, 11 Dec. 1964. 193. Wilson, The Labour government, 50. 194. Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 19; Priest, Kennedy, Johnson, NATO, 120. 195. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 16, memorandum of discussion on the MLF, 10 Apr. 1964.

Notes 253

196. Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 20. 197. PRO, PREM 13/104, FO to Washington, 15 Dec. 1964. 198. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 366. 199. LBJL, NSF, Country File, box 214, memorandums of conversation, 5–6 Dec. 1964. 200. PRO, PREM 13/686, record of meeting, 16 Dec. 1965. 201. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 62, Bundy to Bruce, 9 Dec. 1964. 202. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 118. 203. Wilson, The Labour government, 175; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 317–18. 204. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 271; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 307. 205. LBJL, George Ball Papers, Box 1, Telecon 12/9/64, White and Bundy, Doc. 18. 206. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 65, National Security Action Memorandum No. 322, 17 Dec. 1964; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 44–45. 207. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 61–94; Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 59–116. 208. Gavin, ‘The gold battles’, 83–84. 209. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy, document 18, letter from Kaysen to Johnson, 25 Nov. 1964; document 19: briefing paper prepared by the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury, 4 Dec. 1964: document 20: Paper prepared for the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, 9 Dec. 1964. 210. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 42; Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 117, 210; Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 401. 211. Wilson, The Labour government, 50. 212. HC Deb, 17 Dec. 1964, vol. 704 cc691–704. 213. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 308. 214. PRO, DEFE 25/33, note from Gordon Walker, 23 Dec. 1964. Young first cites this quote in ‘Killing the MLF?’, 309. 215. PRO, DEFE 25/34, telegram from FO to Bonn, 30 Dec. 1964. 216. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 309; PRO, T 225/2569, Dodd to Lester, 22 Dec. 1964; ibid., Clarke to Armstrong, 31 Dec. 1964. 217. PRO, PREM 13/27, note of conversation, 15 Dec. 1964; ibid., record of conversation, 11 Dec. 1964. 218. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 151.

Chapter 4 1. PRO, FO 800/951, Present state of A.N.F. negotiations, 1 Jan. 1965. 2. PRO, PREM 13/219, Gordon Walker to Healey, 23 Dec. 1964. 3. Ponting, Breach of promise, 90; Reed and Williams, Denis Healey and the policies of power, 173. 4. Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 328–29; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295; Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 164. 5. Wilson, The Labour government, 44; Ponting, Breach of promise, 90. 6. PRO, T 225/2570, Dodd to Ball, 11 Jan. 1965.

254 Notes

7. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 224; Hennessy, Muddling through, 255. 8. PRO, FO 800/951, Present state of A.N.F. Negotiations, 1 Jan. 1965. 9. PRO, PREM 13/220, British Embassy, Bonn to FO, 9 Mar. 1965; PRO, FO 800/951, Present state of A.N.F. Negotiations, 1 Jan. 1965. 10. PRO, DEFE 25/34, brief for secretary of state for defence, 30 Mar. 1965. 11. PRO, T 225/2569, Dodd to Lester, 22 Dec. 1964; ibid., Clarke to Armstrong, 31 Dec. 1964. 12. Ibid., 225/2570, Dodd to Ball, 11 Jan. 1965. NB. 14 Jan. 1965. 13. PRO, PREM 13/219, Kosygin to Wilson, 6 Jan. 1965. 14. PRO, DEFE 25/34, record of conversation between PM and Soviet ambassador, Annex, 7 Jan. 1965. 15. PRO, PREM 13/18, Trend to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 16. For an overview of Soviet foreign policy, see Robin Edmonds, Soviet foreign policy, 1962–1973: The paradox of super power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975); Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet power and Europe 1945–1870 (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), esp. 111. 17. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 143–45, 151. 18. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 173. 19. PRO, DEFE 25/34, Bonn to Foreign Office, 12 Jan. 1964. 20. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 310. 21. PRO, DEFE 25/34, Le Hardy to COS, 26 Jan. 1965. 22. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Rogers to Laskey, 25 Jan. 1965. 23. PRO, DEFE 25/34, FO telegram, 18 Jan. 1965. 24. PRO, PREM 13/219, Bonn to FO, 18 Jan. 1965; PRO, DEFE 25/34, Le Hardy to PS, 19 Jan. 1965. 25. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Laskey to Rogers and Trend, 22 Jan. 1965; ibid., Rogers to Trend, 29 Jan. 1965. 26. PRO, FO 800/951, Present state of A.N.F. Negotiations, 1 Jan. 1965; PRO, DEFE 25/34, note on PAL, 1 Jan. 1965; PRO, T 225/2571, Rogers to Wright, 21 Apr. 1965. 27. PRO, CAB 148 19 (5) DOPC committee, 12 Jan. 1965. 28. Cairncross, The British economy, 155, suggests a level of improvement greater than recent figures suggest; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 13, 222. 29. PRO, T 225/2570, Dodd to Walker, 11 Jan. 1965. 30. PRO, CAB 148 19 (5) DOPC committee, 12 Jan. 1965. 31. Hennessy, The prime minister, 91–96. 32. Middleton, The British economy, 70. 33. For a more detailed account of the debate, see David James Gill, ‘Strength in numbers: The Labour government and the size of the Polaris force’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33:6 (2010), 1–27. 34. PRO, CAB 148/19, memorandum by the chancellor of the exchequer, 12 Jan. 1965. 35. PRO, T 225/2570, Dodd to Bell, 11 Jan. 1965.

Notes 255

36. Jeremy Fielding, ‘Coping with decline: US Policy toward the British defense reviews of 1966’, Diplomatic History 23:4 (1999), 634–35, 638; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 51. 37. PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/3, 21, Nov. 1964; ibid., MISC 17/4, 22 Nov. 1964. 38. Dillon, Dependence and deterrence, 18–19; Hennessy, Muddling through, 116. 39. PRO, T 225/2670: Correspondence between 4 Oct. and 9 Nov. 1964 ably highlights the Treasury’s growing anxiety. 40. PRO, CAB 148/19, memorandum by the chancellor of the exchequer, 12 Jan. 1965. 41. Ibid., memorandum by the secretary of state for defence, 12 Jan. 1965. 42. Gill, ‘Strength in numbers’, 22–23. For more on British and Indian nuclear relations, see Susanna Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”: British-Indian nuclear relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964–68’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 25:3 (2002), 87–108. 43. PRO, T 225/2586, Construction of Polaris submarines, 13 Jan. 1965. 44. Healey, The time of my life, 327. 45. Pearce, Healey, 350. 46. PRO, CAB 148/18, 29 Jan. 1965. 47. Gill, ‘Strength in numbers’, passim. 48. PRO, DEFE 13/350, Chief of the naval staff to secretary of state, 6 Nov. 1964. 49. Ibid., 69/449, Size of Polaris force, 4 Feb. 1965. 50. See, for instance, PRO, PREM 13/222, ‘Government to cancel fifth Polaris’, The Times, 11 Feb. 1965. 51. HC Deb, 15 Feb. 1965, vol. 706 cc817–8; PRO, DEFE 13/350, Mayhew to Trend, 15 Feb. 1965. 52. PRO, PREM 13/317, record of conversation, 30 Jan. 1965. 53. GNWR 1/16, Wilson to PGW, 22 Jan. 1965. 54. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 357; Short, Whip to Wilson, 37; 131–34, 147–51; MFP, M/2, Personal correspondence folder, 1961–68, Foot to Wilson, 19 Oct. 1965; MFP, M/2, Personal correspondence folder, 1961–68, Wilson to Foot, 21 Oct. 1965. 55. Wilson, Making of a prime minister, 205. 56. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 75, memorandum from Tyler to Rusk, 8 Mar. 1965. See also Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 311. 57. PRO, DEFE 25/34, Foreign Office telegram number 19, 26 Jan. 1965. 58. Ibid., Foreign Office telegram from Lord Harlech, 26 Jan. 1965; ibid., FO telegram from Roberts, 26 Jan. 1965. 59. Ibid., note, circa 26 Jan. 1965. 60. PRO, CAB 148/41 DOPC minutes, Friday 12 Feb. 1965. 61. Wilson, The Labour government, 48–49. 62. Baylis, ‘The 1958 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement’, 425; Macmillan, Riding the storm, 323; Zukerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 332. 63. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 252–53; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 165; Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 195; Young, The Labour governments, 1964-–1970: Volume 2, 132.

256 Notes

64. Wilson, The Labour government, 48–49. 65. Ibid., 11; HC Deb, 20 Dec. 1961, vol. 651 cc1465, 1477. 66. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 88, 114. 67. Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 52. 68. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 196; Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 689. 69. Stewart, Life and Labour, 216–17, 244; Healey, The time of my life, 315. 70. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 118–19. 71. PRO, PREM 13/220, record of conversation, 8 and 9 Mar. 1965. 72. PRO, CAB 148/48, Shuckburgh to secretary of state for foreign affairs, 15 Mar. 1965. 73. PRO, DEFE 25/34, brief for secretary of state for defence Cabinet Committee, 30 Mar. 1965. 74. PRO, CAB 165/209, Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy, Committee Sub-Committee of the Atlantic Nuclear Force, 19 Feb. 1965. 75. PRO, PREM 13/220, British Embassy, Bonn to Foreign Office, 9 Mar. 1965. 76. HC Deb, 3 Mar. 1965, vol. 707 cc1361–66. 77. The ENDC officially contained five NATO nations, five Warsaw pact nations, and eight non-aligned states: the United States, Britain, Canada, France, and Italy; Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania; Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic. 78. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 164; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 130. 79. Carl Ungerer, ‘Influence without power: Middle powers and arms control diplomacy during the Cold War’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 18:2 (2007), 403. 80. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 197. 81. Hal Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War: The superpowers, the MLF, and the NPT’, Cold War History 7:3 (2007), 390–401. 82. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 161–84; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 295– 324. 83. ENDC, 217, 17 Sept. 1964. For verbatim transcripts, see http://quod.lib.umich. edu/e/endc/. 84. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 99, 103, 111. 85. Ibid., 107–8. 86. PRO, FO 371/181387/45, record of meeting, 8 Mar. 1965; ibid., J. E. D. Street to Foreign Office, 17 Mar. 1965. 87. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 64, Report to the President by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 21 Jan. 1965. 88. United States National Archives (hereafter USNA), Record Group (RG) 200, records of Robert S. McNamara, Box 121, McNamara to Foster, 19 Dec. 1964. 89. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 54, memorandum from Thompson to Foster, 10 Dec. 1964; ibid., document 72, memorandum of conversation, 22 Mar. 1965. 90. PRO, PREM 13/603, record of conversations, 16–18 Mar. 1965; Stewart, Life and Labour, 216; Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 112.

Notes 257

91. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 209; Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 107. 92. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 72, memorandum of conversation, 22 Mar. 1965. 93. Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 390; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 312. 94. PRO, T 225/2571, Mumford to MacKintosh, 8 Apr. 1965. 95. Ibid. 96. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 124. 97. Ibid., 124–27. 98. Hubert Zimmermann, Money and security: Troops, monetary policy, and West Germany’s relations with the United States and Britain, 1950–1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 179. 99. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 179. 100. PRO, CAB 21/6047, Laskey to Trend, 29 Apr. 1965. 101. Ibid. 102. PRO, PREM 13/220, UK delegation NATO to Foreign Office, 15 Mar. 1965. 103. Castle, The Castle diaries, 26. 104. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 82, telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, 15 June 1965. 105. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 312; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 72, memorandum of conversation, 22 Mar. 1965. 106. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 212. 107. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 114. 108. Stewart, Life and Labour, 166–67. 109. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 212. 110. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 85, Rusk to the Mission of NATO and ERO, 11 July 1965. 111. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 214–16. 112. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 88, telegram from Department of State, 22 July 1965. 113. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 216; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 88; telegram from Department of State, 22 July 1965. 114. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 87, record of meeting of the Committee of Principals, circa 22 July 1965. 115. Ibid., document 88, telegram from Department of State, 22 July 1965. 116. Ibid., document 89, message from Stewart to Rusk, 23 July 1965. 117. Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 405. 118. Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 429; Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, passim. 119. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 175. 120. PRO, T 225/2572, MOD draft paper for the DOPC subcommittee, 13 July 1965; PRO, T 225/2646, note by Cullum, 30 July 1965.

258 Notes

121. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 163; Paul Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 1965–1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 10. The four nations were Britain, the US, the FRG, and Italy. 122. DEFE 25/59, UK delegation to NATO Paris to FO, 1 June 1965. 123. PRO, DEFE 25/59, brief for secretary of state, circa July 1965. 124. Ibid., UK delegation to NATO Paris to FO, 9 July 1965. 125. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 152. For an opposing view, see Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 163. 126. DEFE 25/59, UK delegation to NATO Paris to FO, 1 June 1965. 127. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 163–64. 128. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 41. 129. PRO, DEFE 25 59, brief for the secretary of state for defence, 28 July 1965. 130. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 51. 131. Robert S. McNamara, The essence of security: Reflections in office (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), 154–55. 132. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 40–44; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 53; Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 151–52. 133. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 43–44. 134. PRO, DEFE 25/92, Shuckburgh to FO, 1 June 1965; Dean to Foreign Office, 4 June 1965; McNaughton to Healey, 14 July 1965; ibid., Washington to FO, 4 June 1965; ibid., McNaughton to Healey, 14 July 1965; Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 43. 135. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 89, Stewart to Rusk, 23 July 1965, fn 3. 136. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 114. 137. Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western nuclear strategy, 97. 138. PRO, FO 371/181388/97, Bonn to FO, 5 July 1965; ibid., note from H. B. Shepard to FO, 9 July 1965; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 119; Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western nuclear strategy, 161–63. 139. PRO, FO 371/181389/120, Washington to FO, 20 July 1965; ibid., Bonn to FO, 20 July 1965. 140. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 312: Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 215. 141. PRO, FO 371/184415/367, Barnes minute, 30 Oct. 1965. 142. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 253. 143. HC Deb, 6 Apr. 1965, Volume 710 c244. 144. Cairncross, The British economy, 156–57. 145. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 395. 146. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 51–52. 147. Cairncross, The Wilson years, 71. 148. Ponting, Breach of promise, 49–50. 149. Bale, ‘Dynamics of a non-decision’, 204. 150. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 52–53; Ponting, Breach of promise, 49–50. 151. Wilson, The Labour government, 128–29. 152. Ponting, Breach of promise, chapters 3, 13; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 386–87.

Notes 259

153. LBJL, George Ball Papers, Box 1, Telecon 7/29/65, Fowler and Ball, document 91. 154. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 643. 155. Ponting, Breach of promise, 51. 156. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 633–56, esp. 643. 157. Ponting, Breach of promise, 51–52. 158. Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 83–84; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 82–83. 159. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 52. A similar argument appears in Dobson, The politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 211. 160. Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson administration and the British Labour government’, 224–25. 161. LBJL, NSF, CF, Box 208, telegram to the Department of State, 26 July 1965, 80a; Kunz, ‘Somewhat mixed up together’, 45–51; Diane B. Kunz, ‘Lyndon Johnson’s dollar diplomacy’, History Today 42:4 (1992), 45–51. 162. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 637–38. 163. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 45. 164. LBJL, GBP, Box 1, Telecon 7/29/65, Fowler and Ball, Doc. 91. 165. Ibid., Telecon 10/22/65, Rostow and Ball, Doc. 126. 166. Author’s interview with Sir Michael Quinlan in Mackby and Cornish (eds.), U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation, 274. 167. Ponting, Breach of promise, 52–54. 168. Cairncross, The British economy, 158–59. 169. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 394–95. 170. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 205. 171. Glen O’Hara, ‘The limits of US power: Transatlantic financial diplomacy under the Johnson and Wilson administrations, Oct. 1964–Nov. 1968’, Contemporary European History 12:3 (Aug. 2003), 257–78; Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 633–34. 172. Ponting, Breach of promise, 53–54. 173. ENDC Meeting 218, 27 July 1965. 174. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 112–13. 175. ENDC Meeting 219, 29 July 1965. 176. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 109. 177. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 217. 178. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 91, memorandum of conversation, Geneva, 1 Aug. 1965; ibid., document 92, editorial note. 179. ENDC Meeting 224, 17 Aug. 1965. 180. ENDC Meeting 225, 19 Aug. 1965. 181. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 220. 182. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 119; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 92, editorial note; FRUS, 1964–68, XI, document 93, minutes of meeting of the Committee of Principals, 25 Aug. 1965. 183. Stewart, Life and Labour, 166–67. 184. ENDC Meeting 228, 31 Aug. 1965; ENDC Meeting 229, 2 Sept. 1965; ENDC

260 Notes

Meeting 230, 7 Sept. 1965; ENDC Meeting 232, 14 Sept. 1965. The final meeting of 1965 was ENDC 234, 16 Sept. 1965; Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 220. 185. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 221; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 98, memorandum from Keeny to Bundy, 4 Oct. 1965. 186. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 88, telegram from Department of State, 22 July 1965. 187. Ibid., document 98, memorandum from Keeny to Bundy, 4 Oct. 1965. 188. Wilson, The Labour government, 130. 189. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 218. 190. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 313–14; Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 218. 191. Author’s interview with Lord Chalfont, Jan. 2010. 192. Macintyre, Anglo-German relations, 158. 193. Schrafstetter and Twigge, ‘Trick or truth?’, 178. 194. PRO, CAB 128/39 CC (65) 49th conclusions, 23 Sept. 1965. 195. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 313, 319. 196. PRO, PREM 13/220, Washington to Foreign Office, 12 Oct. 1965; PRO, FO 371/184415/378, record of discussion, 11 Oct. 1965; USNA 2, Record Group (RG) 59, GRDS, Box 1667, memorandum of conversation, 11 Oct. 1965. 197. PRO, FO 371/184415/364, FO to Bonn, 19 Oct. 1965; ibid., 371/184415/372, FO to Bonn, 20 Oct. 1965; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 314. 198. STWT 9/5/9, speech by Stewart, 29 Sept. 1965. 199. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 102, memorandum from Bundy to Johnson, 25 Nov. 1965. 200. PRO, PREM 13/927, records of meetings, 19 Nov. 1965. 201. Ibid., Foreign Office telegram, 22 Nov. 1965. 202. PRO, FO 371/184415/367, Barnes minute, 30 Oct. 1965. 203. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 314. 204. Wilson, The Labour government, 184; PRO, PREM 13/805, record of meeting, 26 Nov. 1965. 205. PRO, PREM 13/927, Hansard Col. 21, 22 Nov. 1965. 206. PRO, T 225/2646, Bonn telegram, No. 1926, FO to Bonn, 18 Oct. 1965. 207. HC Deb, 22 Nov. 1965, vol. 721 cc21–23. 208. PRO, DEFE 25 59, Dean to FO, 7 Oct. 1965. 209. LBJL, FMB, ‘The British independent nuclear deterrent’, document 32, 10 Nov. 1965. 210. HC Deb, 4 Nov. 1965, Volume 718 cc1227–29. 211. LBJL, FMB, ‘The British independent nuclear deterrent’, document 32, 10 Nov. 1965. 212. Ibid. 213. PRO, PREM 13/805, record of conversation, 26 Nov. 1965. 214. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 44–46; Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 164–65. 215. HC Deb, 24 Nov. 1965, vol. 721 cc497–98. 216. GBP, Box 1, document 126, Telecon 10/22/65, Rostow and Ball.

Notes 261

217. LBJL, FMB, box 24, ‘The British independent nuclear deterrent’, document 32, 10 Nov. 1965. 218. Ibid., documents 34 and 33 A, circa Nov. 1965. 219. Castle, The Castle diaries, 75. 220. USNA, RG 59, GRDS, Box 1667, telegram to the Department of State from the embassy in Bonn, 13 Dec. 1965. 221. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 133. 222. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 106, telegram from the embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, 23 Dec. 1965. 223. HC Deb, 1 June 1965 vol. 713 cc1506–7 1506. 224. Castle, The Castle diaries, 75. 225. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 60–62. 226. LBJL, FMB, memorandum for record, 17 Dec. 1965, president’s account of his meeting with Wilson, 16 Dec. 1965, Doc 29. 227. PRO, PREM 13/686, record of plenary, 16 Dec. 1965; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 19–20. 228. Quinlan, Thinking about nuclear weapons, 121–22. 229. Robert S. McNamara, ‘The military role of nuclear weapons: Perceptions and misperceptions’, Foreign Affairs 62:1 (Fall 1983), 59–80; Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (Macmillan, 1997), 44–45. 230. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 127–34. 231. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 45. 232. Ponting, Breach of promise, 51. 233. PRO, PREM 13/686, record of meeting, 16 Dec. 1965. 234. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, passim. 235. For an overview, see Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, passim; Sylvia E. Ellis, Britain, America and the Vietnam war (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004). 236. Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 398–401. 237. PRO, PREM 13/686, record of meeting, 17 Dec. 1965. 238. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 648–49; Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”’, 103. 239. Matthew Jones and John W. Young, ‘Polaris, East of Suez: British plans for a nuclear force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964–1968’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2010), 847–70. 240. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 119, memorandum of conversation, 20 Dec. 1965; ibid., document 120, memorandum of conversation, 20 Dec. 1965. 241. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 315, fn 103. 242. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 153. 243. PRO, PREM 13/805, UK-Del. NATO to FO, 17 Dec. 1965. 244. Ibid., Erhard to Wilson, 22 Dec. 1965, Johnson to Wilson, 23 Dec. 1965. 245. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 121, Johnson to Wilson, 23 Dec. 1965. 246. PRO, PREM 13/805, Erhard to Wilson, 22 Dec. 1965, Johnson to Wilson, 23 Dec. 1965, and replies, 5 Jan. 1966. 247. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 166.

262 Notes

248. Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 315. 249. PRO, PREM, 13/805, Erhard to Wilson, 5 Feb. 1966 (delivered 16 Feb.); ibid., Wright to MacLehose, 16 Mar. 1966. 250. Ibid., Wright to MacLehouse (FO), 16 Mar. 1966. 251. PRO, FO 371/190664/29, note from Beeley, 11 Feb. 1966. 252. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1965, Cmnd. 2592, Feb. 1965; Statement on the Defence Estimates, Part I, The Defence Review, Cmnd. 2901; Statement on the Defence Estimates, Part II, Defence Estimates, 1966–67, Cmnd. 2902. 253. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 51. 254. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 634–35. 255. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 81–83; Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 651. 256. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 638. 257. PRO, CAB 130/213, MISC 17/3, 21, Nov. 1964; ibid., MISC 17/4, 22 Nov. 1964. 258. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 639, 645, 651. 259. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 229. 260. Wilson, The Labour government, 199–201; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 396–403. 261. PRO, PREM 13/1273, note, 4 Mar. 1966. 262. 1966 Labour Manifesto, Time for decision. Taken from: http://www.labourparty.org.uk/manifestos/1966/1966-labour-manifesto.shtml. 263. Wilson, The Labour government, 199–218; D. E. Butler and Anthony King, The British general election of 1966 (London: Macmillan, 1966). 264. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 400. 265. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 284. 266. Ibid., 291; Macintyre, Anglo-German relations, 160–61. 267. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 400–403. 268. Wilson, The Labour government, 214. 269. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 121, telegram from the Mission to NATO/ ERO to Department of State, 2 Mar. 1966. 270. PRO, PREM 13/1251, Chalfont to FO, 26 Mar. 1966. 271. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 364, Rusk to Johnson, 11 Apr. 1966. 272. Milne, America’s Rasputin, passim. Young ‘Killing the MLF?’, 316–7. 273. PRO, PREM 13/3094, Balogh to Wilson, 25 Apr. 1966. Young instead emphasises the role of the recent NATO crisis to explain Wilson’s confidence: ‘Killing the MLF?’, 316–17. Chapter 5 covers this issue in more detail. 274. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 155, referencing PRO, DEFE 13/673, meeting between Healey and Nitze, 16 May 1966. 275. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 159, NSAM 345, Rostow to Rusk and McNamara, 22 Apr. 1966. 276. PRO, CAB 165/209, Dissolution of the subcommittee on the ANF, Rogers to Nicholls, Hood and Daniel, 21 Feb. 1967. 277. For similarly positive conclusions, see Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 319; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 25.

Notes 263

Chapter 5 1. HC Deb, 20 Oct. 1966, vol. 734 cc395–96. 2. Oliver Bange, ‘NATO and the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Triangulations between Bonn, Washington and Moscow’, in Wenger, Nuenlist, and Locher, Transforming NATO in the Cold Wars, 177. 3. For more information on the development of the NPG, see Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western nuclear strategy, 179–94; Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 148–61; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 110–13. 4. Healey, The time of my life, 306–7. 5. PRO, DEFE 25/59, Submission to the secretary of state for defence, 10 Aug. 1965; ibid., Final Submission to the secretary of state for defence, 16 Aug. 1965. 6. Ibid., brief for secretary of state for defence, 28 July 1965. 7. Ibid., Dean to FO, 7 Oct. 1965. 8. Ibid., Bonn to FO, 8 Oct. 1965. 9. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 44–46; Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 164–65. 10. USNA, RG 59, GRDS, Box 1667, Airgram to the Department of State from Paris/ USRO, 10 Dec. 1965. 11. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 165–66; Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 48. 12. PRO, PREM 13/686, record of plenary, 16 Dec. 1965; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 19–20; Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 153. 13. PRO, PREM 13/805, UK delegation to NATO to FO, 17 Dec. 1965. 14. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 60–62. 15. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 49–50. 16. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 166. 17. PRO, PREM 13/805, Erhard to Wilson, 22 Dec. 1965; ibid., Johnson to Wilson, 23 Dec. 1965; ibid., replies, 5 Jan. 1966; ibid., Erhard to Wilson, 5 Feb. 1966 (delivered on 16 Feb.); ibid., Wright to MacLehose, 16 Mar. 1966; ibid., Wright to MacLehouse (FO), 16 Mar. 1966. 18. PRO, FO 371/190664/29, note from Beeley, 11 Feb. 1966. 19. ENDC Meeting 235, 27 Jan. 1966. 20. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 108, Kosygin to Johnson, 11 Jan. 1966. 21. Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 401–4; Ungerer, ‘Influence without power’, 404. 22. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 115. 23. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 119, telegram from the Department of State to the embassy in the UK, 20 Feb. 1966. 24. PRO, PREM 13/805, MacLehose note, 4 Mar. 1966. 25. For an opposing view, see Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 50–51. 26. Francis J. Gavin, ‘The Myth of flexible response: US strategy in Europe during the 1960s’, International History Review 23:4 (2001), 847–75.

264 Notes

27. McNamara, ‘The military role of nuclear weapons, 59–80. 28. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 51–53. 29. Healey, The time of my life, 310; Stromseth, The origins of flexible response, 243. 30. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 155, referencing PRO, DEFE 13/673, meeting between Healey and Nitze, 16 May 1966. 31. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 159, NSAM 345, Rostow to Rusk and McNamara, 22 Apr. 1966. 32. Ibid., document 168, Johnson to Wilson, 21 May 1966. 33. Ibid., vol. XI, document 129, Fisher to Johnson, 12 May 1966. 34. Ibid., document 131, Foster to Rusk, 25 May 1966. 35. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 233; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 129; Fisher to Johnson, 12 May 1966; ibid., document 131, Foster to Rusk, 25 May 1966. 36. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Mulley to Healey, 6 Feb. 1968. 37. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 148, Foster to Johnson, Sept. 1966. 38. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 54–55. 39. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The vantage point: Perspectives of the presidency: 1963– 1960 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 477. 40. Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 404–6. 41. McNamara, The essence security, 155. 42. Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 404–6. 43. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 131, Foster to Rusk, 25 May 1966. 44. Wolfe, Soviet power and Europe, 268, 209. 45. Bluth, Britain, Germany and Western nuclear strategy, 160. 46. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 165. 47. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 132, aide-memoire from the British Embassy to the Department of State, 1 June 1966. 48. PRO, PREM 13/2440, Dean to Foreign Office, 12 July 1966. 49. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 165. 50. PRO, PREM 13/2440, Dean to Foreign Office, 12 July 1966. 51. Ibid., Prime minister’s personal telegram, Foreign Office to Washington, 15 July 1966. 52. Andreas Wenger, ‘Crisis and opportunity: NATO’s transformation and the multilateralization of detente, 1966–68’, Journal of Cold War Studies 6:1 (Winter 2004), 37–38. 53. Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 34–71, 190–91; Young, ‘Killing the MLF?’, 316–17. 54. PRO, CAB 133/347, Foreign Office brief for the prime minister’s visit to Washington: Disarmament notes, 22 July 1966. 55. PRO, PREM 13/2559, Wilson to Johnson, 27 May 1966. 56. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 183, George C. McGhee to State Department, 2 July 1966. 57. PRO, T 225/2646, Hansard Extract, HC Col. 238, 14 July 1966. 58. Geoffrey Warner, ‘Review article: Why the general said no’, International Affairs 78:4 (Oct. 2002), 869–82.

Notes 265

59. Ziegler, Wilson, 240–42; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 433–35; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 295. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 146. 60. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 146–47; Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson, 228–32. 61. Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson, 228: Sunday Times, 7 May 1967. 62. Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe, 16–18; Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC’, 409. 63. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 151–52; O’Hara, ‘Dynamic, exciting, thrilling change’, 79–98. 64. Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe, 11–14; Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from East of Suez; Peden, Arms, economics and British strategy, 331–43. 65. Parr, ‘A question of leadership’, 437–58. 66. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 146; Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson, 228. 67. Hughes, Britain, Germany and the Cold War, 148. 68. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 146, referencing PRO, PREM 13/904, Brown to Wilson, 18 Jan.; PRO, PREM 13/905 Stewart to Wilson 21 Dec., 26 Jan., 3 Feb. 69. Parr, ‘A question of leadership’, 437–58. 70. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 146–47. 71. Foot, The politics of Harold Wilson, 230. 72. HC Deb, 19 May 1966, vol. 728 cc1547–49. 73. Wilson, The Labour government, 45; Baylis, Ambiguity and deterrence, 324–26. 74. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 119–54. 75. Warner, ‘Why the general said no’, 869–82. 76. Wilson, The Labour government, 407–8; Helen Parr, ‘Transformation and tradition: Anglo-French nuclear cooperation and Britain’s policy towards the European Community, 1960–74’, in Grant, The British way in Cold Warfare; Kristan Stoddart, ‘Nuclear weapons in Britain’s policy towards France, 1960–1974’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 18:4 (2007), 724–30. 77. FMB, Box 24, memorandum from Heller to Johnson, 24 July 1966, document 10d. 78. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 152–53. 79. PRO, PREM 13/686, record of meeting, 17 Dec. 1965. 80. Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”’, 87–108. 81. Ibid., 103. 82. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 53. 83. Cairncross, The Wilson years, 147–48. 84. Wilson, The Labour government, 249–51. 85. Cairncross, The British economy, 158–59. 86. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 405–6. 87. Ibid., 411–14; Bale, ‘Dynamics of a non-decision’, 192–217. 88. Callaghan, Time & chance, 199; Wilson, The Labour government, 256–57.

266 Notes

89. Anthony Howard, Crossman diaries: Condensed version (London: Magnum books, 1979), 225; Benn, Out of the wilderness, 457. 90. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 416–20. 91. Ibid., 419–31. 92. Jenkins, A life at the centre, 213. 93. Howard, Crossman diaries, 232–34. Crossman suggests that this ‘inner group’ comprised Marcia Williams, Gerald Kaufman, and Peter Shore, together with George Wigg, Thomas Balogh, and Burke Trend. 94. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 435–37. 95. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 53–54. 96. Cairncross, The British economy, 160–61; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 54–55. 97. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 310. 98. LBJL, FMB, Box 24, memorandum from Heller to Johnson, 24 July 1966, document 10d. 99. Ibid., Head of State correspondence file, Box 10, prime minister to the president, 20 July 1966, document 12a. 100. Zimmermann, Money and security, 188. 101. Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 635, 651–56; Chalmers, Paying for defence, 85–87. 102. HC Deb, 3 Aug. 1966, vol. 733 cc452–53; ibid., vol. 733 c114W. 103. Kenneth O. Morgan, Callaghan: A life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 241–45, 253; Cairncross, The Wilson years, 147–48. 104. LBJL, FMB, Box 24, memorandum from Bator to Johnson, 14 July 1966. 105. Ibid., document 17a, memorandum from Fowler to Johnson: Sterling crisis and US bargaining position, 18 July 1966. 106. PRO, CAB 133/347, FO brief for the prime minister’s visit, 22 July 1966. 107. Ibid. 108. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 264, Ball to Johnson, 22 July 1966. 109. LBJL, FMB, Box 24, memorandum for the president from Rusk, 24 July 1966, document 23a. 110. Ibid., memorandum for the president from FMB, 26 July 1966, document 18. 111. Ibid., memorandum for the president from FMB, 28 July 1966, document 31a. 112. Wilson, The Labour government, 263. 113. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 266, telegram from Department of State to posts in NATO capitals, 30 July 1966; Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 78–79. 114. Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 81. 115. Wilson, The Labour government, 264–65. 116. Dumbrell, ‘The Johnson administration and the British Labour government’, 211–31, esp. 222. 117. Boyle, ‘The price of peace’, 45. 118. Ponting, Breach of promise, 51. 119. Wilson, The Labour government, 265–66.

Notes 267

120. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 55–56. 121. PRO, DEFE 25/99, note to Nairne, 1 Aug. 1966; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 189, telegram from the Mission to NATO, 26 July 1966. 122. Healey, The time of my life, 305–6; HC Deb, 4 Mar. 1963, vol. 673 cc59–60; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 52. 123. Pierre, Nuclear politics, 250; Haftendorn NATO and the nuclear revolution, 162; Pearce, Patrick Gordon Walker, political dairies, 295. 124. PRO, PREM 13/18, Trend to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 125. PRO, DEFE 25/59, NATO Select Committee of Defence Ministers on Nuclear Consultation, brief for the secretary of state for defence for Sept., 28 July 1965. 126. Ibid., 25/99, note from Sinclair, 4 Aug. 1966. 127. Ibid., brief for defence secretary, 12 Sept. 1966. 128. Ibid., brief for defence secretary, 15 Sept. 1966. 129. LBJL, HOSCF, Box 10, FMB to LBJ, 30 Sept. 1966, 72; message from president to prime minister, 1 Oct. 1966, 70; message from prime minister to president, 7 Oct. Attached telegram to Department of State, 68. 130. PRO, DEFE 25/99, brief for defence secretary, 15 Sept. 1966. 131. Ibid., note, Nuclear PWG, 23 Sept. 1966 (prepared by Andrew); ibid., record of the fourth meeting held, 23 Sept. 1966 (prepared by Andrew). 132. In the 1970s, Norway and Portugal joined, with the total number of members now totalling eight. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 167. 133. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 56. 134. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 230. 135. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 152, memorandum of conversation, 22 Sept. 1966; ibid., document 153, memorandum of conversation, 24 Sept. 1966; ibid., document 157, memorandum of conversation, 10 Oct. 1966. 136. Johnson, The vantage point, 477–79. 137. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 174. 138. Francis J. Gavin, ‘Blasts from the past: Proliferation lessons from the 1960s’, International Security 29:3 (2004/5), 112–14, 129–31, 134–35. 139. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG, 132. 140. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy, document 88, minutes of meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments, 25 Mar. 1966; ibid., document 90, memorandum from Fowler to Johnson, 23 Apr. 1966; ibid., document 104, editorial note. 141. Ibid., document 103, White House to Johnson, 29 Aug. 1966. 142. Gavin, Gold, dollars and power, 135–64. 143. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. VIII, document 105, Fowler to Johnson, 8 Nov. 1966; ibid., document 108, memorandum from the Cabinet Committee on Balance of Payments to Johnson, 6 Dec. 1966. 144. Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 408. 145. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 207, memorandum of conversation, 26 Sept. 1966.

268 Notes

146. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 155. 147. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 207, memorandum of conversation, 26 Sept. 1966; Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 408: Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 169; Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 51–53. 148. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 166. 149. Gavin, Gold, dollars and power, 144–46, 162–64. 150. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 158, memorandum of conversation, Oct. 10, 1966; ibid., document 162, memorandum from McNaughton to McNamara, 15 Oct. 1966. 151. Ungerer, ‘Influence without power’, 407, quoting Alva Myrdal, The game of disarmament: How the United States and Russia run the arms race (New York: Pantheon, 1976), 293. 152. Ungerer, ‘Influence without power’, 407; Brands, ‘Non-Proliferation and the dynamics of the middle Cold War’, 411. 153. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 168; Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 56–57. 154. Stromseth, The origins of flexible response, 183, citing statement on defence estimate, 1967, Cmnd. 3203 (London, HMSO, 1967). 155. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 244; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 175. 156. PRO, DEFE 25/99, Bonn to Foreign Office, 7 Dec. 1966. 157. Ibid., Foreign Office to Washington, 7 Nov. 1966; ibid., UK delegation to NATO to Foreign Office, 12 Dec. 1966. 158. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 58. 159. PRO, DEFE 25/99 (Harrison), Moscow to FO, 19 Dec. 1966. 160. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 156. 161. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 60. 162. Ibid., 69. 163. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution’, passim. 164. For more details of discussions, see ibid., 169–70. For more on the technical aspects and policy-making process of the NPG and NATO, see Quinlan, Thinking about nuclear weapons, 33–40. 165. Priest, ‘From hardware to software’, 158. 166. Ellison, The United States, Britain and the transatlantic crisis, 113. 167. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 172, 175; Quinlan, Thinking about nuclear weapons, 122. 168. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 209–12. 169. PRO, CAB, 164/713, Healey to Wilson, 3 Aug. 1967; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 122; PREM 13/2571, Healey to Wilson, 21 Mar. 1967 and reply, 10 Apr. 1967; Hennessy, The secret state, 72–73. 170. Kristan Stoddart, ‘Maintaining the “Moscow Criterion”: British strategic nuclear targeting, 1974–1979’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31:6 (2008), 898–900; Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 53–65.

Notes 269

171. Author’s interview with Commodore Tim Hare, in Mackby and Cornish, U.S.UK nuclear cooperation, 318. 172. HC Deb, 5 Dec. 1967, vol. 755 cc1133–34. 173. Hennessy, The secret state, 206–10; Hennessy, The prime minister, 90. How and when these letters reach a submarine remain unclear. One prime minister’s strategic decisions may therefore perhaps briefly encroach on his or her successor’s own instructions. 174. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 127–34. 175. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 690–91. 176. HC Deb, 30 Jan. 1969, vol. 776 cc1520–21. 177. Dillon, Dependence and deterrence, 18–19; Hennessy, Muddling through, 116. 178. Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 58. 179. HC Deb, 6 Mar. 1962, vol. 655 cc223–30. 180. PRO, DEFE 68/21, ‘The ABM question’, 30 Jan. 1967. 181. Stoddart, ‘The Wilson government’, 12–13, 20–21; Healey, The time of my life, 312–13. 182. Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 57–59; PRO, DEFE 68/21, Brown to PM, 30 Jan. 1967; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 37–38; Stoddart, ‘The Wilson government’, 12–13, 20–21; Healey, The time of my life, 312–13. 183. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 37–39; HC Deb, 13 June 1967, Volume 748, col. 299. 184. Crossman, Dairies of a cabinet minister, 200, 325; Castle, The Castle diaries, 260. 185. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 39. 186. Wilson, The Labour government, 408. 187. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 39–40. 188. Catherine Haddon, ‘British intelligence, Soviet missile defence and the British nuclear deterrent, 1964–1970’, in Grant, The British way in Cold Warfare, 159–76; Pete Davies, ‘The British way of economic intelligence during the Cold War’, in Grant, The British way in Cold Warfare, 159–76; Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 251–57, referencing PRO, CAB 186/1, JIC assessment of Soviet Bloc War Potential, 1969–73, 7 Jan. 1969. 189. Stoddart, ‘The Wilson government’, 14, 17, 22. 190. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 37–40, 43–68; Baylis, ‘British nuclear doctrine’, 59–60; Thomas Robb, ‘Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid: The upgrading of the British strategic nuclear deterrent, 1970–1974’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2010), 797–817. 191. Buteux, The politics of nuclear consultation in NATO, 69–109. 192. Haftendorn, NATO and the nuclear revolution, 169. 193. Ibid., 175. 194. Ibid., 392.

Chapter 6 1. See, for instance, George Quester, The politics of nuclear proliferation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Glenn Seaborg with Benjamin Loeb, Stemming the tide: Arms control in the Johnson years (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987);

270 Notes

Heuser, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG; Trachtenberg, A constructed peace, 312–15, 363–68, 380–81. 2. Stewart, Life and Labour, 216–17; Healey, The time of my life, 315; Benn, Office without power, 24–25, 35, 100–101, 123–25, 153–54, 175, 269–70; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 332. For a more detailed account of events, see Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 98–118. 3. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 211; Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 171. For the memoirs in question, see Wilson, The Labour government. 4. Stewart, Life and Labour, 178. 5. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 195–250. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 163–82; Macintyre, Anglo-German relations, 154–68. 6. The EEC, or ‘Common Market’, comprised France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. 7. For a more detailed account, see David James Gill, ‘The British government, the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 21:3 (2010), 451–70. 8. Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 171. 9. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 131, Foster to Rusk, 25 May 1966. 10. Ibid., document 158, memorandum of conversation, 10 Oct. 1966; ibid., document 162, McNaughton to McNamara, 15 Oct. 1966. 11. PRO, FO 371/187470, Geneva to FO, 11 Oct. 1966. 12. LBJL, NSC history, NPT, memo from Fisher to Foster, 9 Nov. 1966. 13. PRO, PREM 13/2440, extract from record of meeting, 23 Nov. 1966. 14. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 166. 15. Quester, The politics of nuclear proliferation, 152. 16. Author’s interview with Chalfont, Jan. 2010. 17. George Brown Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS C. 4868, Diary entry, 6 Dec. 1966; PRO, PREM 13/2440, telegram from Foreign Office (SOSFA) to Bonn, 7 Dec. 1966. 18. PRO, PREM 13/2440, extract of talks, 14 Dec. 1966. 19. Ibid., Foreign Office to Rome, 14 Dec. 1966. 20. Johnson, The vantage point, 477–79; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 166. 21. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 166. 22. PRO, PREM 13/2440, extract from record of conversation, 7 Feb. 1967. 23. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 246. 24. For a more detail account of the debate surrounding safeguards, see David Gill, ‘Ministers, markets and missiles: The British government, the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 21:3 (2010), 451–70. 25. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 64, Report by the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 21 Jan. 1965. For more on Euratom, see Mervyn O’Driscoll, ‘The origins and early history of Euratom, 1954–1968’, in Gordon Lake, Juliet Lodge, and Mervyn O’Driscoll (eds.), The European Parliament and the EURATOM Treaty: Past, present and future (European Parliament, Working Paper ENER 114EN, Luxemburg, 2002).

Notes 271

26. ENDC meeting 286, 23, 25 Aug. 1966. 27. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 172, memorandum from Foster to Rusk, 11 Jan. 1967. 28. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 171. 29. Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 176–77. 30. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 166–67. 31. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 152–53. 32. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 177. 33. Parr, British policy towards the European Community, 118. 34. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 175. 35. PRO, PREM 13/2440, record of meeting, 16 Feb. 1967. 36. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 180, memorandum of conversation, 8 Feb. 1967. 37. Wilson, The Labour government, 367; PRO, PREM 13/2440, record of meeting, 16 Feb. 1967; PRO, PREM 13/1888, record of meeting, 3 and 4 Mar. 1967. 38. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 248; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 172. 39. Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 332. 40. PRO, PREM 13/2440, Foreign Office to Washington, 22 Feb. 1967. 41. Ibid., 13/1888, Roberts to Gore-Booth, 8 Mar. 1967. 42. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 190, Department of State to Geneva, 8 Mar. 1967. 43. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 172; Gill, ‘Ministers, markets and missiles’, 456–47. 44. PRO, PREM 13/1888, note for the record, 2 Mar. 1967. 45. Macintyre, Anglo-German relations, 165–66. 46. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 183, Fisher to Rusk, 25 Feb. 1967; ibid., document 194, fn 2. 47. Ibid., document 194, Rostow to Johnson, 8 Apr. 1967; ibid., document 193, Foster to Johnson, 6 Apr. 1967. 48. PRO, CAB 148/30, Cabinet DOPC, 14 Apr. 1967; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 193, Foster to Johnson, 6 Apr. 1967. 49. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 569–95; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 48; Peden, Arms, economics and British strategy, 331–43; Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from East of Suez, passim. 50. Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC’, 403–21; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 152. 51. Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC’, 416: Crossman, Diaries of a cabinet minister, Volume 2, 335, 30 Apr. 1967; Benn, Out of the wilderness, 496. 52. Cairncross, The British economy, 163–64. 53. Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 152; Parr, ‘A question of leadership’, 452. 54. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 55; Cairncross, The British economy, 163–64.

272 Notes

55. Despite a three-line whip, there was considerable backbench resistance. MFP, M/2, Personal correspondence folder, 1961–68, correspondence between Foot and Silkin, throughout May and June 1967; RICH, 3/4/7, Silkin to Micardo, 11 May 1967. For the 1975 referendum on membership of the EEC, Wilson allowed an ‘agreement to differ’ within the Parliamentary Labour Party: Harold Wilson, Final term: The Labour government, 1974–1976 (London: Weidenfeld, Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), 99, 103–4, 105. 56. Stewart, Life and Labour, 206, 147. 57. Katharina Bohmer, ‘We too mean business: Germany and the second British application to the EEC, 1966–67’, in Daddow, Harold Wilson and European integration, 221. 58. PRO, PREM 13/1888, confidential note, 9 May 1967. 59. Ibid., note to the prime minister, 18 May 1967. NB. ‘[T]he whole success of our European policy might depend on the choice we made’ is underlined and ticked by the prime minister. 60. Ibid., note from Chalfont, 9 May 1967. 61. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 465; Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 121–46. 62. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 588; LBJL, GBP, Box 1, Telecon 7/29/65, Fowler and Ball, document 91. 63. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 590; Chalmers, Paying for defence, 85–87. 64. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 173–74; Chalmers, Paying for defence, 85; Ziegler, Wilson, 329–30. 65. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 316. 66. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 587–89, 583–85, 594. 67. Ziegler, Wilson, 331–32. 68. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 173. 69. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 258, telegram from the Mission to NATO/ ERO to the Department of State, 17 June 1967. 70. Ibid., vol. XI, document 196, memorandum from Rusk to Johnson, circa 16 May 1967. 71. Ibid., document 201, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, 10 Aug. 1967; ENDC Meeting 325, 24 Aug. 1967. 72. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 201, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, 10 Aug. 1967. 73. Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 116; Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”’, 95–99; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 332; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, fn 50; PRO, FO, 371/181392, Foreign Office memorandum, UN General Assembly, supplementary brief, Sept. 1965. 74. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 205, telegram from Mission in Geneva to the Department of State, 1 Sept. 1967; ibid., document 208, memorandum from Fisher to Rusk, 5 Sept. 1967; ibid., document 212, memorandum of conversation, Oct. 4, 1967. For more on Indian challenges to the NPT, see Chalfont, The shadow of my hand, 116; Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”’, 95–99; Zuckerman, Monkeys, men and missiles, 332; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, fn 50; PRO, FO, 371/181392, Foreign Office memorandum, UN General Assembly, supplementary brief, Sept. 1965.

Notes 273

75. Parr, British policy towards the European community, 168–69. 76. PRO, PREM 13/1527, visit to London of the chancellor, 23–25 Oct. 1967. 77. See FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 216, telegram from Department of State, 11 Nov. 1967. 78. Ibid., document 214, memorandum of conversation, 2 Nov. 1967; ibid., document 215, memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, 7 Nov. 1967; ibid., document 218, memorandum from Rusk to Johnson, circa 28 Nov. 1967; ibid., document 219, telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to NATO, 5 Dec. 1967; ibid., document 220, letter from Fisher to Johnson, Dec. 5, 1967. 79. PRO, T 225/2921, Foreign Office to Washington, 1 Dec. 1967. 80. Ibid., note from Patterson to Nicholls, Bancroft and Lavelle, 1 Dec. 1967. 81. PRO, AB 57/95, memo, 18 Apr. 1968. 82. PRO, T 225/2921, note from D. M. Day, attached background note, 1 Dec. 1967. 83. Ibid., note from chancellor, 4 Dec. 1967; ibid., note from J. A. Patterson, attached background note, 18 June 1968. 84. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 221, Rostow to Johnson, 5 Dec. 1967. 85. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 249–50; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 173. 86. PRO, CAB 151/138, background notes (BN 27), Non-Proliferation Treaty, 3 Dec. 1968. 87. Keir Thorpe, ‘The forgotten shortage: Britain’s handling of the 1967 oil embargo’, Contemporary British History 21:2 (2007), 201–22. 88. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 469. 89. Cairncross, The British economy, 163–64. 90. For more on his career, see John Silkin, Changing battlefields: Challenge to the Labour Party (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986). 91. John W. Young, ‘Britain and LBJ’s war, 1964–1968’, Cold War History 2:3 (2002), 86, 63–92. 92. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 475–82. 93. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 264, Ball to Johnson, 22 July 1966; LBJL, FMB, Box 24, memorandum for the president, 24 July 1966, Doc 23a (written by Dean Rusk); ibid., memorandum for the president, 26 July 1966, Doc 18 (written by FMB); ibid., memorandum for the president, 28 July 1966, Doc 31a (written by FMB). 94. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 475–82. 95. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 173–81, 204. 96. Morgan, Callaghan, 271–72. 97. Alistair Campbell, The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alistair Campbell dairies (London: Hutchinson, 2007), 63. 98. Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, 156–217; Cairncross, The Wilson years, 229–50. 99. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 588; LBJL, George Ball Papers, Box 1, Telecon 7/29/65, Fowler and Ball, document 91; Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 643. 100. LBJL, GBP, Box 1, Telecon 10/22/65, Rostow and Ball, Doc. 126; FRUS, 1964–68,

274 Notes

vol. XII, document 264, Ball to Johnson, 22 July 1966; LBJL, FMB, Box 24, memorandum for the president, 28 July 1966, Doc 31a. 101. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 482; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 312–15. 102. Cairncross, The British economy, 165. 103. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 183–84. 104. Ibid., 315–56, 370–71. 105. Samuel Brittan, Steering the economy: The role of the treasury (London: Martin Secker and Warburg, 1969), 188. 106. Thorpe, ‘The forgotten shortage’, 202; Callaghan, Time & chance, 213–15; Morgan, Callaghan, 260–87; Jenkins, A life at the centre, 213–16; Cairncross, The Wilson years, 229–50; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 55–56. 107. JCP, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Box 44, letter to secretary of the treasury, US Treasury Department, 3 Apr. 1968; letter to secretary of the treasury, US Treasury Department, 3 Apr. 1968. 108. Jenkins, A life at the centre, 213. 109. O’Hara, ‘Dynamic, exciting, thrilling change’, 394. 110. Cairncross and Eichengreen, Sterling in decline, 193; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 56–63. 111. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 56–57. 112. Ibid., 56–58. 113. Dell, The chancellors, 345. 114. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 313. 115. Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC’, 411. 116. Johnson, The vantage point, 315. 117. Dobson, The politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 211; Dobson, ‘The years of transition’, 239–57. 118. David Reynolds, ‘A “special relationship”? America, Britain and the international order since the Second World War’, International Affairs 62:1 (1985/86), 13–15. 119. Raj Roy, ‘The battle for Bretton Woods: America, Britain and the financial crisis of Oct. 1967–Nov. 1968’, Cold War History 2 (2002), 33–60. 120. LBJL, Special Head of State correspondence, Box 56, telegram, president to prime minister, 31 Dec. 1967, document 47 C. 121. HC Deb, 5 Dec. 1967, vol. 755 cc1133–34. 122. PRO, PREM 13/1888, note for the record, 17 Mar. 1967. 123. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 219–40; Priest, ‘In American hands’, 369–70; Crossman, Diaries of a cabinet minister, volume 2: 1966–1968, 619–22. 124. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 57–58; Benn, Office without power, 5–6. 125. PRO, CAB 134/3120, British nuclear weapons policy, PN (67), 6, 1 Dec. 1967; Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 220–33. 126. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 234–38. 127. PRO, CAB 134/3120, British nuclear weapons policy, PN (67), 6, 1 Dec. 1967. 128. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 234–40, esp. 236. 129. PRO, CAB 134/3120, minutes of meeting, PN committee, 5 Dec. 1967.

Notes 275

130. HC Deb, 5 Dec. 1967 vol. 755 cc1133. 131. Crossman, The myths of cabinet government, 57. 132. LBJL, FMB, box 24, ‘The British independent nuclear deterrent’, document 32, 10 Nov. 1965. 133. Hennessy, Cabinet, 148–50. 134. Hennessy, Muddling through, 116. 135. Wilson, The Labour government, 40. 136. Healey, The time of my life, 302; Pierre, Nuclear politics, 284–85; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 32; Hennessy, The secret state, 72. 137. Hennessy, Cabinet, 148–50. 138. Hennessy, The prime minister, 291. 139. PRO, PREM 13/27, record of conversation, 30 Nov. 1964. 140. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 240–51. 141. Stoddart, ‘The Wilson government’, 14–15. 142. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 278; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 48. 143. Robb, ‘Antelope, Poseidon or a Hybrid’, 797–817; Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 256–81; Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 46–51. 144. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 52–55. 145. Fielding, The Labour governments, 43–44. Party membership had been in decline since 1952. 146. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 490–91. 147. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 231; Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 569–95. 148. Chalmers, Paying for defence, 78, 87–89. 149. Sanders, Losing an empire, 233–34; Chalmers, Paying for defence, 90–91. 150. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 198; Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from East of Suez, passim; Colman, A ‘special relationship’?, 147–66. 151. LBJL, SHSC, Box 56, president to prime minister, 11 Jan. 1968, 54F. 152. ENDC Meeting 357, 18 Jan. 1968. 153. Freeman, Britain’s nuclear arms control, 249–50; Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 173. 154. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Arms Control and disarmament, notes on current developments, No. 3, 1 Mar. 1968: Annex 1: Draft NPT tabled at the ENDC, 18 Jan. 1968. 155. Ungerer, ‘Influence without power’, 405–6. 156. Freedman, Britain and nuclear weapons, 91. 157. PRO, CAB 148/36, Cabinet DOPC, memorandum by the minister of state, 26 Jan. 1968. 158. Ibid., ‘Security Assurances’, memorandum by the minister of state, 26 Jan. 1968. 159. Ibid., 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 30 Jan. 1968; PRO, PREM 13/2442, Mulley to Healey, 6 Feb. 1968. 160. PRO, CAB 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 30 Jan. 1968; PRO, PREM 13/2442, Mulley to Healey, 6 Feb. 1968. 161. Hennessy, Cabinet, 149–50.

276 Notes

162. PRO, CAB 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 30 Jan. 1968. 163. Benn, Office without power, 24–25. 164. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Healey to Mulley, 31 Jan. 1968. 165. Benn, Office without power, 24–25. Healey was evidently upset by this particular decision: Crossman, Diaries of a cabinet minister, volume 2: 1966–1968, 647; Healey suggests he considered resignation: Time of my life, 273. 166. Author’s interview with Lord Chalfont, Jan. 2010. 167. PRO, DEFE 19/169, record of talks, 9 Feb. 1968; ibid., 10 Feb. 1968. 168. Benn, Office without power, 35. 169. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Zuckerman to prime minister, 1 Feb. 1968; ibid., Chalfont to Stewart, 2 Feb. 1968; ibid., note for the record, 2 Feb. 1968. For more on the attorney general, see Elwyn Jones, In my time: An autobiography (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983). 170. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Mulley to Healey, 6 Feb. 1968. 171. Ibid., Wilson to Stewart, 7 Feb. 1968; Stewart to Wilson, 9 Feb. 1968. 172. PRO, PREM 13/2445, record of talks, 8 and 9 Feb. 1968; Wilson, The Labour government, 496–503. 173. Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe, 199. 174. PRO, DEFE 19/169, record of prime minister’s talks with Rusk, 9 Feb. 1968. 175. Ibid., Foreign Office correspondence, 29 Jan. 1968. 176. PRO, PREM 13/3002, extract from record of conversation with Brandt, Bonn, 13 Feb. 1969. 177. PRO, CAB 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 14 Feb. 1968. 178. ENDC meeting 375, 7 Mar. 1968; PRO, PREM 13/2442, telegram from Geneva to Foreign office, 7 Mar. 1968. 179. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 229, memorandum for the record, 27 Mar. 1968. 180. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office to Certain Missions and Dependent Territories, 7 Mar. 1968. For more on the relationship between non-use and nuclear deterrence, see David James Gill, ‘Review Article: Nuclear deterrence and the tradition of non-use’, International Affairs 85:4 (2009), 831–37. 181. ENDC meeting 376, 11 Mar. 1968; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 229, record of the meeting, 27 Mar. 1968, 182. Cairncross, The British economy, 164–68; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 59–60. 183. Michael J. Oliver and Arran Hamilton, ‘Downhill from devaluation: The battle for sterling, 1968–72’, Economic History Review 60:3 (2007), 488–91; Arran Hamilton, ‘Beyond the Sterling Devaluation: The Gold Crisis of March 1968’, Contemporary European History 17:1 (2008), 73–95. 184. Hennessy, The prime minister, 316–19. 185. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 183–84; Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 173. 186. Roy, ‘Battle for Bretton Woods’, 52–53. 187. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 493–503.

Notes 277

188. Stewart, Life and Labour, 206; Ziegler, Wilson, 291–93. 189. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 502. 190. Cairncross, The British economy, 167; Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 61. 191. Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 398, 401, 404–6; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. VIII, International Monetary and Trade Policy, document 154; notes of meeting, 18 Nov. 1967; document 187; memorandum from Rostow to Johnson, 9 Mar. 1968. 192. Schenk, The decline of sterling, 184–85; Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 182–83. 193. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 61–62. 194. Hennessy, The prime minister, 318–19; Roy, ‘Battle for Bretton Woods’, 52–53; Schenk, The decline of sterling, 184–85. 195. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 219–40; PRO, CAB 134/3120, British nuclear weapons policy, PN (67), 6, 1 Dec. 1967; PRO, CAB 134/3120, minutes of meeting, PN committee, 5 Dec. 1967. 196. John Young, ‘The diary of Michael Stewart as British foreign secretary, April– May 1968’, Contemporary British History 19:4 (2005), 482. 197. The affair occurred in 1967, when Wilson criticised the Daily Express newspaper for breaching two D-Notices (official requests to news editors not to publish on specified subjects pertaining to issues of national security). The newspaper argued that it had been advised of no breach. In a subsequent inquiry, a committee of privy counselors found against the government. For more, see Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 443–49, 470, 622; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 317–19; Andrew, The defence of the realm, 531–32. 198. Hennessy, The prime minister, 99. 199. Ziegler, Wilson, 295. 200. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 503–5. 201. Ibid., 505–9; Ziegler, Wilson, 294–95. Despite a professional rivalry, Jenkins and Wilson appear to have forged a lasting friendship. Talking about the final months of Wilson’s battle with Alzheimer’s, Mary Wilson recalls that ‘Roy Jenkins was the only one [of his old cabinet ministers] who came to see him’. See Roy Hattersley, ‘The truth about Harold Wilson’, Daily Mail (24 June 2007). 202. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 547. 203. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 231, memorandum from Bohlen to Rusk, Washington, 5 Apr., 1968. 204. PRO, PREM 13/2442, Stewart to prime minister, 23 Apr. 1968. 205. PRO, CAB 151/138, background notes, 3 Dec. 1968. 206. Command Paper, CMND 3783. 207. PRO, PREM 13/2442, note to Palliser, 18 June 1968; ibid., note to PM, 27 June 1968; Wilson, The Labour government, 542. 208. PRO, PREM 13/2442, text of the speech delivered by the prime minister, 1 July 1968. 209. Regarding the position of the West German and other foreign governments on the treaty, see FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XIII, document 259, memorandum of conversation, 23 July 1968; ibid., document 283: memorandum of conversation, 17 Sept. 1968.

278 Notes

210. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 493–509, 547. 211. PRO, PREM 13/2442, note to Palliser, 18 June 1968. 212. Text of speech, 1 July 1968, ibid. 213. Zuckerman to PM, 11 July 1968, ibid. 214. Ibid., FO telegram number 245, PM to Mulley, 15 July 1968; ENDC meeting 381, 16 July 1968; PRO, PREM 13/3002, Arms control and disarmament, notes on current developments, 6 Aug. 1968: Annex 3. ‘Future disarmament objectives’ by Mulley to ENDC on 16 July. 215. For more on Britain and the invasion of Czechoslovakia, see Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 139–52; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 132–34. 216. PRO, PREM 13/2442, record of conversation, 2 July 1968. 217. Stewart, Life and Labour, 222; Wilson, The Labour government, 551–52. 218. Anatoly Dobrynin, In confidence: Moscow’s ambassador to America’s six Cold War presidents, 1962–1986 (New York: Random House, 1995), 153. 219. Collins, ‘The economic crisis of 1968’, 411–12. 220. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 61–62. 221. PRO, CAB 151/138, background notes (BN 27) The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 3 Dec. 1968. 222. Ibid. 164/632, SZ to PM, 27 Nov. 1968. 223. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 186–87. 224. Johnson, The vantage point, 490. 225. Geraint Hughes, ‘British policy towards Eastern Europe and the impact of the “Prague Spring”, 1964–68’, Cold War History 4:2 (2004), 115–39. For more on the foreign secretary’s attitude to East-West relations, specifically his belief in a ‘common interest’ for dialogue, see Michael Stewart, ‘Britain, Europe and the Alliance’, Foreign Affairs 48:4 (1970), 648–59. 226. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 297, memorandum of conversation, 11 Oct. 1968. 227. PRO, CAB 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 16 Oct. 1968. 228. Ibid. 164/632, Zuckerman to PM, 12 Sept. 1968. 229. Benn, Office without power, 100–101. 230. PRO, CAB 164/632, Personal minute from prime minister to foreign secretary, 13 Sept. 1968. 231. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 493–509, 547. 232. PRO, CAB 148/38, Cabinet DOPC, Non-Proliferation Treaty, note by the minister of state for foreign affairs, 14 Oct. 1968. Attached minute from the foreign secretary to the prime minister, 23 Sept. 1968. 233. Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe, passim. 234. Ziegler, Wilson, 337–38. 235. The Barbara Castle Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. Box 21, MISC meeting diaries entries, 3/12/68. 236. PRO, CAB 148/38, Cabinet DOPC, Non-Proliferation Treaty, note by the minister of state for foreign affairs, 14 Oct. 1968. Attached minute from the foreign secretary to the prime minister, 23 Sept. 1968.

Notes 279

237. PRO, DEFE 19/169, Benn to foreign secretary, 23 Sept. 1968. Enclosed note. 238. Author’s interview with Tony Benn, 5 Aug. 2009. 239. PRO, CAB 148/38, note, Healey to PM, 27 Sept. 1968. 240. Ibid., note, Benn to PM, 7 Oct. 1968. 241. PRO, CAB 164/632, Personal minute, 4 Oct. 1968. 242. Ibid., 148/38, Cabinet DOPC, note, 14 Oct. 1968. 243. Ibid., 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 16 Oct. 1968. 244. Young, ‘The Diary of Michael Stewart’, diary entries for 10 Apr. and 1 May 1968. 245. PRO, CAB 148/35, Cabinet DOPC, 16 Oct. 1968. 246. HC Deb, 30 Oct. 1968, vol. 297 cc1–6. 247. PRO, CAB 164/632, note to FCS, 8 Nov. 1968; ibid., note to minister of technology, 18 Nov. 1968. 248. Benn, Office without power, 125. 249. PRO, DEFE 19/169, Cabinet Ministerial Committee on Nuclear policy, 20 Nov. 1968. 250. HC Deb, 27 Nov. 1968, vol. 774 cc501–5. 251. Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 52. 252. PRO, PREM 13/3002, telegram from Stewart to certain missions, 27 Nov. 1968. 253. PRO, CAB 151/138, background notes (BN 27) The Non-Proliferation Treaty, 3 Dec. 1968. 254. Schrafstetter and Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon, 187–88; Wilson, The Labour government, 612. 255. Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 176–77. 256. PRO, PREM 13/3002, telegram from Dean to the Foreign Office, 12 Sept. 1968. 257. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 297, memorandum of conversation, 11 Oct. 1968. 258. Ibid., vol. XI, document 293, summary notes, 25 Nov. 1968. 259. PRO, PREM 13/3002, Palliser’s note of meeting with Kissinger, 20 Dec. 1968. 260. Conrad Black, A life in full: Richard M. Nixon (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 571–72. 261. FRUS, Nixon-Ford Administrations, 1969–76, vol. E-2, documents on Arms Control, 1969–72, Subsection 1: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Implementation of Safeguard System, document 5, minutes of National Security Council meeting, 29 Jan. 1969. 262. FRUS, 1969–76, vol. E-2:1, document 8, National security decision memorandum 6, 5 Feb. 1969. 263. Ibid., document 10, memorandum of conversation, 17 Feb. 1969. 264. Black, A life in full, 763. 265. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 250, editorial note. 266. Ibid., 1969–76, vol. E-2:1, document 15, memorandum from Kissinger to Rogers, 21 Mar. 1969. 267. Ibid., document 42, telegram from the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, 2 Dec. 1969. 268. Stewart, Life and Labour, 217.

280 Notes

269. Cairncross, The British economy, 168. 270. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 62–63. 271. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 547–51. 272. Ziegler, Wilson, 312–13. 273. Cairncross, The British economy, 182. 274. Tomlinson, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 3, 232. 275. Ibid., 63. 276. For the Labour Party’s 1970 manifesto, ‘Now Britain’s Strong—Lets Make it Great to Live In’, see http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1970/1970-labourmanifesto.shtml. 277. Ziegler, Wilson, 346–54; Morgan, Harold Wilson, 376. 278. Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 553–60; D. E. Butler and Michael Pinto-Duschinsky. The British general election of 1970 (London: Macmillan, 1971). 279. Ferguson, The cash nexus, 235–38, 248. 280. Morgan, Harold Wilson, 376. 281. At that time, Herbert Asquith was the longest continuously serving prime minister in the twentieth century. Margret Thatcher later surpassed his record. 282. Ziegler, Wilson, 317, 355; Pimlott, Harold Wilson, 568–69. 283. Gaddis, We now know, 284. 284. Gavin, Gold, dollars, and power, 197–200. 285. Hughes, Harold Wilson’s Cold War, 171. 286. PREM 13/1888, confidential note, 9 May 1967. 287. Ungerer, ‘Influence without power’, 409–11. 288. FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XI, document 229. memorandum for the record, 27 Mar. 1968. 289. Kenneth N. Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, The spread of nuclear weapons: A debate (London: W. W. Norton, 1995). 290. Gavin, ‘Blasts from the past’, 100–135. 291. Stewart, Life and Labour, 217.

Conclusion 1. Middleton, The British economy, 67–68; O’Hara, ‘Dynamic, exciting, thrilling change’, 383–402. 2. Wilson, The Labour government, 790; Ziegler, Wilson, 316. 3. Roger Middleton, Government versus the market: The growth of the public sector, economic management and British economic performance, c. 1890–1979 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 621. 4. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 569–95; Young, The Labour governments, 1964–1970: Volume 2, 48; Peden, Arms, economics and British strategy, 331–43; Dockrill, Britain’s retreat from East of Suez, passim. 5. Pine, Harold Wilson and Europe, 177–80. 6. Ziegler, Wilson, 317.

Notes 281

7. Jones, ‘A decision delayed’, 588; LBJL, George Ball Papers, Box 1, Telecon 7/29/65, Fowler and Ball, document 91; Fielding, ‘Coping with decline’, 643. 8. PRO, PREM 13/18, Trend to Wilson, 19 Nov. 1964. 9. LBJL, GBP, Box 1, Telecon 10/22/65, Rostow and Ball, Doc. 126; FRUS, 1964–68, vol. XII, document 264, Ball to Johnson, 22 July 1966; LBJL, FMB, Box 24, memorandum for the president, 28 July 1966, Doc 31a. 10. Hennessy, The prime minister, 291. 11. PRO, PREM 13/27, record of conversation, 30 Nov. 1964. 12. Wilson, The Labour government, xvii. 13. Hennessy, Cabinet, 148–50. 14. Robert Gilpin, Global political economy (London: Princeton University Press, 2000), 370; Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 309. 15. Gilpin, Global political economy, 370. 16. Reynolds, Britannia overruled, 309. 17. Hennessy, The prime minister, 143.

Epilogue 1. Wilson, Final term; Joe Haines, Glimmers of twilight: Harold Wilson in decline (London: Politico’s Publishing, 2004); Lord Bernard Donoughue, Downing Street diary: With Harold Wilson in No. 10 (London: Pimlico, 2006). 2. HC Deb, 24 May 1995, vol. 260 cc907–9. 3. Cm 6994, ‘The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent’ (HMSO, 2006), 7–8, 12–14; Cm 7948, ‘Securing Britain in an age of uncertainty: The strategic defence and security review’ (Oct. 2010), passim. 4. NATO press release: Final communique, ministerial meetings of the Defence Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, Brussels, 15 June 2007, paragraph 6. 5. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 256–80, 281–321, 322–28; Heath, The course of my life, 615; Morgan, Callaghan, 619; Callaghan, Time & chance, 553–58; Margret Thatcher, Downing Street years (London: Harper Collins, 1993), 244–48, 265; Hennessy, Muddling through, 117–278. Despite clear examples of John Major’s position in the House of Commons (HC Deb, 13 Jan. 1992, vol. 201 c469W; ibid., 18 June 1992, vol. 209 cc1035; ibid., 16 May 1995, vol. 260 cc147), his autobiography avoids the subject, noting only his early support for the government against anti-nuclear protestors: John Major, Autobiography (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 72. 6. Scott, ‘Labour and the bomb’, 697–99; Martin Westlake (with Ian St John), Kinnock, the biography (London: Little, Brown, 2001), 140, 225, 369, 379–81 386–88. 7. In an interview with the author in 2009, Tony Benn, who served under both leaders, was doubtful. He suggested that ‘if you look onto the later stage when Michael Foot, who was a passionate unilateralist, became leader of the party he never once advocated unilateral nuclear disarmament in the House of Commons from the front bench as the Labour leader. So, you see, I think the Labour Party on this has always been very wobbly’.

282 Notes

8. Westlake, Kinnock, the biography, 438–39, 442–44, 501. 9. Mark Stuart, John Smith: A life (London: Politico’s, 2005), 12. 10. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 328; Hennessy, The prime minister, 498, 501. 11. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 331–37. 12. Tony Blair, A journey (London: Hutchinson, 2010), 635–66. 13. Hennessy, Cabinets and the bomb, 338–42. 14. ‘US embassy cables: French tell US Britain is ready to abandon Trident’, guardian.co.uk, 8 Dec. 2010; David Leigh, ‘WikiLeaks cables: Whitehall told US to ignore Brown’s Trident statement’, guardian.co.uk, 8 Dec. 2010. 15. ‘Election 2010: Gloves off in second leaders’ debate’, BBC News, 23 Apr. 2010. 16. Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘National defence in the age of austerity’, International Affairs 85:4 (2009), 733–53. 17. Patrick Wintour and Nicholas Watt, ‘Tories cast doubt on £21bn Trident nuclear missile upgrade’, The Guardian (1 May 2009). 18. Cm 6994, ‘The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent’, Dec. 2006. This figure excludes exchange rate changes, material costs over the course of the replacement, and wider running costs: Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Revealed: The £130bn cost of Trident replacement’, The Guardian (18 Sept. 2009). All details at 2006/7 prices. 19. Hennessy, Muddling through, 129. 20. Dominic Casciani, ‘Crisis threatened nuclear weapons’, BBC News, 29 Dec. 2006. 21. ‘Blair’s tribute to Harold Wilson’, London Evening Standard (24 Jan. 2006).

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Index

Anti-ballistic missiles, 167– 68, 186 Atlantic Nuclear Force: origins, 8, 72–73, 81–82; British duplicity, 102–4, 106, 132–33, 135–40; demise, 142, 149, 158, 162–65, 211. See also Multilateral Force Attlee, Clement, 12–21, 25–27, 49, 203 Balance of payments: post-war governments, 7, 12, 16–17, 20, 22, 27, 31, 34, 36, 40, 44, 47, 49, 54, 55, 63; Wilson governments, 2, 8, 78, 89, 109, 136, 152, 154–55, 182–84, 191–92, 196, 202–4, 207, 212, 219; US government, 46–47, 97, 102, 162, 196 Ball, George, 75, 82, 92, 98–100, 102, 123– 24, 130–32, 134, 157–58, 201, 209 Bator, Francis, 123, 131–32, 156–58 Benn, Tony, 68, 155, 184, 186, 189–90, 192, 197–200 Berlin, crises, 18, 40, 47 Blair, Tony, 215, 217, 219 Blue Streak, 37–38, 40–41, 48 British Army of the Rhine, 27, 32 Brown, George, 3, 43, 55, 62, 64, 74, 78, 87, 98, 122, 152–55, 167, 173, 175–77, 184, 190, 192

Bundy, McGeorge, 92, 98, 101, 119, 123, 126, 128, 138, 148, 182, 208 Cabinet: post-war nuclear decisionmaking, 15, 18–20, 24–26, 30, 43, 48; Wilson’s first government, 3, 5–6, 8, 67, 74–75, 77–79, 86–87, 91, 93–95, 101–3, 111, 118, 122, 127–28, 132–33, 135–36; Wilson’s second government, 138, 152, 154–55, 160, 168, 177–78, 181, 183–85, 187, 189, 193, 196, 200, 209–10 Callaghan, James, 78, 84, 110–11, 122, 124, 154–56, 160, 181–82, 192–93, 212, 216 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, 38, 42, 53–54, 217 Canada, 47, 100, 108–9, 120, 126, 161, 164, 204 Castle, Barbara, 87, 93–94, 118, 132–33, 168, 182 Chalfont, Lord (Alun Gwynne-Jones), 87, 113, 115–16, 118, 121, 125–28, 132, 138, 146, 149, 160, 173, 176–78, 190 Chevaline, 186–87, 216 China, People’s Republic of, 73, 115–16, 134 Churchill, Winston, 12, 21–26, 49, 112

301

302 Index

Cuban Missile Crisis, 42–43, 54, 57, 149 Czechoslovakia, 18, 195–98, 201 de Gaulle, Charles, 44, 92–93, 108, 120, 134, 143, 150–51, 153, 168, 175, 183, 208 Deterrence, 22, 25, 27–28, 35, 37, 46, 111, 147, 167, 189, 211 Devaluation: 1949, 12, 17–19; Conservative fears of, 22, 28, 34; considered in 1964–67, 78–80, 84–85, 100, 122–23, 134, 142, 154, 156, 158, 177; 1967 and after, 1, 172, 181–83, 186–87, 191–92, 196, 204, 207–8, 212 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 173, 196, 202 Douglas-Home, Alec, 57, 61–64, 69–71, 73, 95, 132 East of Suez, 3, 84, 100–101, 111, 123–24, 134–36, 152, 154, 156, 158, 177–78, 187, 207 Eden, Anthony, 25–30, 49 Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, 41, 115, 118–19, 121, 125–26, 146, 148, 161, 180, 187–89, 191, 195 Eisenhower, Dwight, 23, 29, 33–35, 37, 46 Erhard, Ludwig, 72, 82, 103, 112–14, 117, 128, 135, 145, 151, 160–63 Euratom, 29, 33, 174–75, 177, 179–80, 188, 195, 197–98 European Economic Community, 1, 3–5, 9–10, 29, 36, 40–41, 44, 92, 96, 99, 107, 142, 150–54, 156, 158–59, 168, 170–72, 174–80, 183, 188–89, 196–98, 200, 204, 207–9, 211–13 Federal Republic of Germany: access to nuclear weapons, 7, 42, 47, 52–53, 65, 77, 80, 91, 106, 137, 149, 160, 163; British fears of revanchism, 41, 57, 209; nuclear weapons and economic diplomacy, 46–48, 102, 162–63 Flexible Response, 46, 58, 147–48, 165, 169, 187 Foster, William, 115–16, 118–19, 121, 125–26, 146, 148–49, 161, 163, 174, 191, 195, 205

France, 9, 29, 32, 42, 46–47, 57, 60, 73, 79, 81, 92, 98, 103, 114–15, 143–45, 150, 153, 162, 175, 177, 196, 201 Gaitskell, Hugh, 17, 20, 27, 33, 37–41, 43, 53–54, 58, 64, 74 General Elections: post-war elections, 12–13, 19, 20, 26–27, 35–37; 1964, 7, 51, 71–73; 1966, 112, 122, 135–38, 148; 1970, 186, 203, 215; elections post-1970, 215–18 Gordon Walker, Patrick, 54, 58–60, 65, 68, 72, 81–83, 86, 88, 92, 94–95, 97–98, 100, 102, 106, 107–8, 111–12, 192–93 Harlech, Lord (Ormsby-Gore, David), 92, 101, 113 Healey, Denis: in opposition, 56–58, 60, 62–65, 72, 74; secretary of state for defence, 80–81, 83–85, 87, 94–98, 100, 103, 110–12, 130–31, 143, 156, 159–60, 164, 166–68, 184–86, 189–90, 193, 199–200 Hennessy, Peter, 23, 54, 63–64, 68, 71, 74, 78, 85, 166, 186, 208, 212 India, 17–18, 110–11, 114, 149, 157, 179, 205 International Atomic Energy Agency, 174–76, 179–80, 187–88, 195, 197–98 International Monetary Fund, 28, 40, 84, 90, 183, 192, 219 Jenkins, Roy, 182–84, 187, 191–93, 198, 203 Johnson, Lyndon Baines, 8, 65, 66, 72, 75, 79, 84, 90, 92, 97–102, 118, 123, 128, 133– 35, 138–39, 146–50, 153, 155–58, 160–63, 168–69, 175, 178, 181–83, 187, 190, 192, 196, 201, 208 Kennedy, John F., 41–47, 52, 57, 59, 62, 73, 97, 102, 147, 162 Khrushchev, Nikita, 41, 73 Kissinger, Henry, 34, 87, 201 Kosygin, Alexei, 107, 118, 146, 150, 173, 202

Index 303

Macmillan, Harold, 30–3, 35–37, 40–45, 47–49, 52, 57, 61, 70, 73, 113, 117, 203 McNamara, Robert S., 42–43, 60, 65, 100 116, 120–21, 123, 129–30, 133–34, 139, 141, 143–44, 147–49, 159, 165, 167–68, 182, 208 Multilateral Force: origins, 45–48, 56; demise, 8–9, 142, 149, 158, 162–65, 211. See also Atlantic Nuclear Force Nassau agreement, 44–49, 52, 57, 60, 69, 70–71, 73, 80, 82–83, 88–89, 97, 153, 167–68 Neustadt, Richard E., 62, 98–99 Nixon, Richard M., 201–2 Non-Proliferation Treaty, see Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Nuclear Planning Group, 1, 4, 8–9, 58, 129, 135, 140–70 passim, 211, 216 Nuclear Planning Working Group, 8, 135, 145, 147, 159, 161 Nuclear sharing, see Atlantic Nuclear Force, Multilateral Force Nuclear weapons: collectivisation, 2, 49, 58, 102, 112, 117, 124,127, 132–33, 135, 157–60, 182, 208; interdependence, 25, 28, 33, 42, 44, 48–50, 53, 84, 122, 128, 133, 212, 219; internationalisation, 73, 81, 88, 90, 93, 127, 130, 132–34, 137, 139–40, 166–67, 185, 211; size of Polaris force, 85–86, 89–90, 93, 95, 109–12 Offset arrangement, 47, 117, 131, 155–56, 159–60, 162–63, 170, 175, 179 Pimlott, Ben, 17, 59, 62, 154, 181, 193 Pound, see Sterling Rusk, Dean, 60, 63, 72, 82, 92, 100, 118–19, 128, 138, 147–48, 157–58, 161, 173–74, 190 Schröder, Gerhard, 60, 82–83, 92, 97, 108, 121, 128, 145, 151, 163 Skybolt missile, 38, 41, 43–44

Soviet Union, see Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Sterling, 1, 8, 15–17, 22, 28, 31, 36–37, 40, 44, 78–80, 84–85, 90, 100, 106, 109, 117, 122–24, 134, 142, 153–58, 172, 177–78, 181–83, 191–92, 196, 202–4, 207–8 Stewart, Michael, 53, 112, 116, 118–21, 126– 32, 151–52, 171, 184, 192, 194, 196–201, 205 Suez crisis, 28–29, 32, 43, 71, 193 Thorneycroft, Peter, 61, 63–64, 72, 95, 114 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 200, 204, 209; signature, 193–94, 201; ratification, 195–202 Trend, Burke, 83, 86–87, 91, 95–97, 99–101, 107, 176, 208 Trident, 216–18 Truman, Harry, 14, 19 Unemployment, 21–22, 31, 40, 78, 124, 203 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: superpower cooperation, 4, 9, 49, 139, 142, 146, 148–50, 158, 161–64, 172–75, 179–80, 187, 190–91, 194, 202; threat to the United Kingdom, 14, 18–19, 23, 33, 42, 46, 74, 85, 184–86 United Kingdom: comparative decline, 3, 7, 12, 31, 36, 54, 69, 79, 139; defence commitments, 1, 5, 16, 45, 55, 86–87, 123–24, 134, 158, 208. See also East of Suez United Nations, 18, 28, 126, 147, 179, 191, 194, 201, 217 United States of America: influence of Vietnam on policy, 101–2, 123–24, 134, 158, 162, 178, 182, 187, 190, 192, 208; nuclear weapons and economic diplomacy, 34, 46–47, 102, 124–25, 131– 32, 162–63. See also Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: superpower cooperation

304 Index

V-bomber force, 8, 25, 28, 30, 37–38, 52, 55–56, 58, 61, 66, 68, 71, 73, 76, 80, 82, 84, 95, 167 Vietnam, 84–85, 101–2, 116, 123–25, 134, 149, 158, 162, 178, 181–82, 187, 190, 192, 208 West Germany, see Federal Republic of Germany Wilson, Harold: commitment to Treaty

on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 113–14, 172; historical significance, 49–50, 137, 215–16, 218–19; support for the Polaris programme, 73–75, 185–86, 208–9 Ziegler, Philip, 17, 65, 69 Zuckerman, Solly, 73, 90, 175–76, 190, 195–96

Stanford Nuclear Age Series General Editor, Martin J. Sherwin advisory board Barton J. Bernstein and David Holloway

The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality By Sheldon M. Stern. 2 Science and Conscience: The Life of James Franck By Jost Lemmerich.  Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement By Lawrence S. Wittner.  Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity By Ira Chernus.  Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb By Michael S. Goodman.  The End of the Pacific War: Sixty Years Later Edited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa.  Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, – By Benjamin P. Greene.  The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis By Sheldon M. Stern.  A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and Its Legacies, rd edition By Martin J. Sherwin.  Averting ‘The Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis Meetings By Sheldon M. Stern.  The Struggle Against the Bomb: Volume Three, Toward Nuclear Abolition, A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, –Present By Lawrence S. Wittner.  Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, – By Arnold A. Offner.  Einstein and Soviet Ideology By Alexander Vucinich. 2 Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI, Revised and Expanded Edition By Gregg Herken. 

The Fate of the Earth and The Abolition Jonathan Schell, with a new introduction by the author.  The Struggle Against the Bomb: Volume Two, Resisting the Bomb, A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, – By Lawrence S. Wittner.  James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age By James G. Hershberg.  The Struggle Against the Bomb: Volume One, One World or None, A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through  By Lawrence S. Wittner.  A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War By Melvyn P. Leffler.  The Wizards of Armageddon By Fred Kaplan, with a new foreword by Martin J. Sherwin. , reissued  Robert Oppenheimer: Letters and Recollections Edited by Alice Kimball Smith and Charles Weiner, with a new foreword by Martin J. Sherwin. , reissued  The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb By Herbert F. York, with a new preface and epilogue historical essay by Hans A. Bethe. , reissued  The Voice of the Dolphins and Other Stories By Leo Szilard. , expanded in  with an introduction by Barton J. Bernstein Atomic Energy for Military Purposes By Henry D. Smyth, preface by Philip Morrison. , reissued with new foreword, 